



AUDIENCE SEGMENT REPORT:
**Muslim Communities
of France**

May 2012





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Executive Summary



OVERVIEW

Understanding master narratives can be the difference between analytic anticipation and unwanted surprise, as well as the difference between communications successes and messaging gaffes. Master narratives are the historically grounded stories that reflect a community's identity and experiences, or explain its hopes, aspirations, and concerns. These narratives help groups understand who they are and where they come from, and how to make sense of unfolding developments around them. As they do in all countries, effective communicators in France speaking to Muslim communities invoke master narratives in order to move audiences in a preferred direction. French influencers rely on their native familiarity with these master narratives to use them effectively. This task is considerably more challenging for US communicators and analysts because they must place themselves in the mindset of foreign audiences who believe stories that—from an American vantage point—may appear surprising, conspiratorial, or even outlandish.

This report serves as a resource for addressing this challenge in two ways. First, it surfaces a set of nine master narratives carefully selected based on their potency in the context of France's Muslim communities, and their relevance to US strategic interests. Second, this report follows a consistent structure for articulating these narratives and explicitly identifies initial implications for US communicators and analysts. The set outlined here is not exhaustive: these nine master narratives represent a first step that communicators and analysts can efficiently apply to the specific messaging need or analytic question at hand. For seasoned experts on French Muslim communities, these narratives will already be familiar—the content contained in this report can be used to help check assumptions, surface tacit knowledge, and aid customer communications. For newcomers to European Islam accounts, these narratives offer deep insights into the stories and perceptions that shape French Muslim identity and worldviews that may otherwise take years to accumulate.

Some master narratives cut across broad stretches of the French Muslim populace, while others are held only by particular audience sub-segments. This study divides France's Muslim communities into eight audience sub-segments that demonstrate how different master narratives resonate with different sections of the populace. Each of the nine master narratives aligns with one or more of the following segments: Cultural Muslims, Personal Practitioners, Civic Islamists, Wealthy Secularists, Old Guard, Strict Practitioners, Young *Banlieuesards*, and *Indigènes* (see the Appendix for a detailed description of these audience segments).

THE MASTER NARRATIVES

The table on the following page summarizes the nine master narratives highlighted in this report. For each narrative, it specifies the relevant audience segments as well as the narrative's core themes. The condensed narrative description simulates the voice of someone who believes in the narrative itself, helping communicators and analysts immerse themselves in the mindset of the foreign audience.

About the Master Narratives Platform

This report is part of the Master Narratives platform, a collaboration between Open Source Center, Monitor 360, and other partners across the US Government. The Master Narratives platform is focused on surfacing and articulating Master Narratives across a range of important geographies. These insights can be used to better understand critical audience segments and key influencers, build analytic capabilities, and develop actionable messaging and counter-messaging strategies. To learn more about the master narratives platform and how it can be applied to your mission, contact Open Source Center at MasterNarratives@rccb.osis.gov.

Narrative Title & Audience Segments	Condensed Master Narrative A description of the master narrative as it might be articulated by one who subscribes to it	Core Narrative Themes
<i>La République Laïque</i> (Secular Republic) <i>Cultural Muslims,</i> <i>Personal Practitioners</i>	France was founded on <i>laïcité</i> (“secularism”), guaranteeing freedom for Muslims to practice their faith while celebrating French values. Now, Islamists, radicals, and fundamentalists have fed an image that Muslims are a threat, causing the government to stigmatize all Muslims. To ensure their freedom of conscience and leave accusations of being un-French behind, Muslims must remind their government that Republican principles call for separating church and state, not for outlawing Islam.	Injustice, Pride, Privacy, Stigmatization
Islamophobic France <i>Civic Islamists</i>	Ever since colonizing the Maghreb, France has made hollow promises of religious tolerance. Then World War II came, causing the decimated French nation to beg for guest workers. Immigrants believed French promises of rights in exchange for honest work. They should have known France was and is a hypocritical Islamophobic nation. To hold onto their full identities in a nation that denies it, Muslims need to make a place for civic Islam, elect real leaders, and condemn French hypocrisy.	Discrimination, Hypocrisy, Identity, Representation
<i>La France Juste</i> <i>Wealthy Secularists</i>	Muslims’ grandparents came to France in search of wealth and a better life. Those who worked hard and made an effort to become French found their dreams well within reach. Now, a disturbing number of Muslims have turned backwards, oppressing women under the veil and complaining of double standards. These malcontents must stop their futile <i>communautarisme</i> (“self-segregation”). By leaving behind their backward ways Muslims will prosper, and can shape one of the world’s greatest nations.	Aspiration, Greatness, Industriousness, Leadership, Prosperity
Hell in the <i>Banlieues</i> <i>Young Banlieuesards</i>	Ever since Muslims have been in France they have battled poverty in the grim housing estates on the outskirts of big cities. Locked in a closed cycle of poverty, crime, and lack of opportunities, banlieue youth rose up to make their grievances known in the mid-2000s. All the residents of the banlieues want is a fair chance at graduating from school, a good job, and peaceful communities. Until that becomes a reality, the cycle of poverty and rioting will surely continue.	Abuse, Discrimination, Isolation, Poverty, Unrest
Turning to God <i>Strict Practitioners</i>	In the 1950s and 1960s Muslims came to France and, out of fear of being branded unpatriotic, pretended to adopt godless French values. Now Muslims have lost track of their roots and values, enduring isolation and discrimination all too often without the guidance of their holy text. Muslims must find themselves by studying the Qu’ran, rejecting the West’s corruption, and seeking to improve fellow Muslims’ lives. In this way Muslims can live proudly and purify their souls.	Faith, God, Identity, Proselytization
American Exemplars <i>Broadly held across segments except Indigènes</i>	America has developed into a place where ethnicity is no longer a barrier to success. One need only look at the 2008 election of Barack Hussein Obama as proof of what minorities can achieve in America. Compared with this example, the French state is failing miserably in its efforts to empower Muslims. The French must learn from America, and end their discrimination. This will make good on French ideals, and empower Muslims to fulfill their vast potential.	Aspiration, Comparison, Discrimination, Empowerment, Minority Rights
American Imperialists <i>Broadly held across segments except Wealthy Secularists</i>	The United States and its partner Israel have long been the enemies of Muslims around the world. Today, the Palestinian people fight valiantly to survive and preserve their territory in the face of relentless American-supported Israeli aggression. All people who love the oppressed must protest American-Zionist terrorism at home and abroad, and demand Israeli forces to withdraw from Palestine. In doing so, Muslims can show solidarity with Palestine, and help end the occupation.	Injustice, Oppression, Resistance, Threat
The Forgotten <i>Old Guard</i>	As long as the French Republic has known North Africans, it has abused and exploited them to serve its own ends, abandoning the Harkis and drowning Algerian protestors in the Seine. The government must take full responsibility for its past actions by apologizing publicly and acknowledging Maghrebis’ trauma. Until this happens, Muslims will never be able to move on from this injustice.	Colonialism, Displacement, Injustice, Victimization
Stand Up, <i>Indigènes</i> <i>Indigènes</i>	For generations, the <i>République coloniale</i> has treated <i>les indigènes</i> (“natives”) as second-class citizens, from the colonization of Algeria to the 2005 <i>banlieue</i> riots. In the face of this colonial oppression, <i>Indigènes</i> will never deny the fundamentals of their culture for Western indulgences. To stop being victimized by France, <i>indigènes</i> must build organizations that stand up to their neocolonial oppressors, and reject compromise.	Colonialism, Defiance, Pride, Racism, Righteous Cause

These master narratives were developed and validated through extensive open source research and subject matter expert outreach, and were further vetted by USG analysts.

KEY FINDINGS

The master narrative landscape of the Muslim Communities of France can shed light on critical questions about Muslims' religious and cultural integration, in particular, how Muslims view Western values, engage with the French state, and interact with their countries of origin. Muslims in France are grappling with simultaneous desires to preserve their identity in a nation that is—by law—strictly secular, and to achieve the set of full rights, protections, and economic opportunities they assert are due to them as French citizens. This creates tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims, and also between Muslim audience segments who articulate differing visions for how Muslims can live a prosperous life in France while remaining true to their heritage.

The figure below illustrates how the nine master narratives highlighted in this report shed light on these tensions, mapping these narratives to critical questions that shape French Muslims' relationships with French society, the French state, transnational Islamic groups, and Muslims' countries of origin.

What role do French Muslims want Islam to play in France?	How do French Muslims view their social and economic opportunities?	What are French Muslims' predominant perspectives on other countries?
<i>La Republique Laïque</i> Islamophobic France Stand Up, <i>Indigènes</i>	Hell in the <i>Banlieues</i> <i>La France Juste</i> The Forgotten Turning to God	American Exemplars American Imperialists



What role do French Muslims want Islam to play in France?

Two broadly held master narratives and one narrowly held narrative reflect debates on whether Islam should be expressed in public, and whether Islam is compatible with French sociocultural values and the French political model. For communicators, these narratives illuminate the tension inherent in discussing religious identity in a nation committed to the indivisibility of the nation along religious or ethnic lines, and principles of *laïcité* (“secularism”). These narratives also demonstrate the potential pitfalls associated with publicly advocating “integration” or “multiculturalism” to a population that has mostly identified as “French” for decades. For analysts, tracking the competition between these narratives can provide insight into where tensions are likely to arise within Muslim communities, and how Muslim communities might respond to perceived provocations from non-Muslim French.



How do French Muslims view their social and economic opportunities?

These master narratives represent competing French Muslim viewpoints on how to seek prosperity and social harmony: by engaging with French institutions, or by resisting integration and rejecting state involvement in their lives. For communicators, these narratives offer a mix of opportunities and pitfalls. On the one hand, communicators can win allies by emphasizing the importance of economic advancement and social acceptance for French Muslim communities. On the other hand, these narratives highlight pitfalls related to France's colonial legacy; even inadvertent references to this era risks alienating both Muslims and non-Muslims. For analysts, these narratives provide insight into how perceptions of disenfranchisement influence political struggles, give rise to social unrest, and fuel increased religiosity. Additionally, one of these narratives ("The Forgotten") interacts with narratives in North Africa; this narrative creates a conduit by which events in France shape opinions in the Maghreb, and vice-versa.



What are French Muslims' predominant perspectives on other countries?

These widely held master narratives reflect French Muslims' views on the alleged persecution of Muslims in the Middle East by Western powers, and celebration of US domestic policy toward minorities. These narratives present opportunities for communicators to find common ground with French Muslims by highlighting the struggles and successes of American minorities. They also underscore that US messaging to French Muslims is likely to be received with a mix of enthusiasm and skepticism in equal measure. For analysts, tracking the competition between these master narratives can help to better anticipate shifts in French Muslim opinion toward the United States.

This master narrative landscape reflects that a majority of Western Europe's largest Muslim population perceives themselves to be treated with suspicion by their government and the non-Muslim population. These master narratives reveal a vibrant and ongoing discourse among French Muslims, replete with grievances, on how to navigate cultural and political differences with France while advocating for empowerment. What has made this dialogue sensitive and, at times, rancorous, is that the conversation on how to resolve these tensions is also happening outside of French Muslim communities. This often obscures access to French Muslims' true beliefs. National debate has intensified in the wake of events such as the 2004 headscarf controversy, the 2005 *banlieues* riots, and the 2012 Mohamed Merah shootings, thrusting this master narrative landscape to the center of public discourse. In this discourse some key influencers assert these events are the inescapable consequences of sheltering Muslim communities unwilling to assimilate, whose culture and beliefs are viewed as incompatible with Western institutions. Others assert that these are actions borne of people who are disenfranchised and struggling in a society that is allegedly biased against them. The master narratives in this report offer the reader a way to penetrate the haze of these heated public debates. By providing an introduction to the complex layers of discourse French Muslims navigate on a daily basis, these master narratives can help readers understand how French Muslims are likely to perceive and respond to French and US policies, actions, and messages.

REPORT STRUCTURE & PAYOFFS

The remainder of this document provides greater analytic detail for the nine master narratives outlined above. Each master narrative is articulated and analyzed in five pieces:

1. **Audience Segment:** With which audience segments does this master narrative reside?
2. **Master Narrative:** How might a subscriber to this master narrative describe it, what evidence reinforces these beliefs, and how do influencers leverage this narrative for their own political aims?
3. **Significance for Strategic Communicators:** How does this master narrative shed light on messaging opportunities and pitfalls?
4. **Significance for Analysts:** How can tracking this master narrative help analysts improve situational awareness, anticipate critical shifts in public debates, and better understand key influencers?
5. **Appendices:** The appendices for each master narrative highlight key phrases, symbols, or themes associated with the master narrative as well as relevant sourcing and validation. These appendices also provide detailed descriptions of each audience segment.

As with all master narrative reports, caution should be exercised to avoid over-generalizing the mindsets, beliefs, grievances, and ambitions of any single audience segment. No individual is solely a “French Muslim”; they hold multiple other identities, including their country of origin, the area in which they reside, their political affiliations, their religious practices, and their socioeconomic profile. Taking these other sides to French Muslims’ identities into account is likely to enhance the precision of analytic judgments and improve the success of communications strategies.

Research for this analysis included primary sources and open source research across a variety of fields, from historical and anthropological texts to news articles, speeches, and statements by key influencers in French Muslim communities. In addition to this research, interviews with twenty three subject matter experts were used to surface master narratives, test hypotheses, and validate assertions. These experts were asked a combination of expansive, open-ended questions designed to surface new hypotheses as well as targeted questions designed to verify assertions. Combining these interviews with open source research, this report highlights how each master narrative reflects perceived history, themes, and objectives that are central to French Muslim identity.

This report is not a silver bullet: improving US messaging and analysis will continue to rely on the creativity and expertise of communicators and analysts confronted with complex mission goals, changing local conditions, and bureaucratic constraints. What this report can do is help communicators and analysts more effectively place themselves in the shoes of foreign audiences. For communicators, this means avoiding costly pitfalls while more easily crafting effective messaging that taps into themes that resonate with foreign audiences. For analysts, this means better understanding key influencers and their messages, as well as shifting internal and external political dynamics. Finally, this report is an analytic exercise to support decision makers, who can use master narratives to better anticipate how foreign actors and audiences will interpret USG policies and actions. The insights and analysis provided in this report serve as a first step in providing communicators and analysts with the resources they need to seize upon those opportunities and, in doing so, strengthen US understanding of foreign audiences.

Master Narratives



“La République Laïque”

AUDIENCE SEGMENTS

Established Majority	Influential Minorities	Wildcards
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Cultural Muslims ➤ Personal Practitioners <p>Civic Islamists</p>	<p>Wealthy Secularists</p> <p>Old Guard</p>	<p>Strict Practitioners</p> <p>Young <i>Banlieuesards</i></p> <p><i>Indigènes</i></p>

This master narrative is held by Personal Practitioners and Cultural Muslims. These subscribers tend to be working and middle-class, politically moderate, and live in urban areas and mid-sized towns throughout France. Cultural Muslims tend not to attend local mosques or adhere to daily religious practice. Personal Practitioners practice Islam as a religion and a private choice, and do not extend their faith to politics or the public sphere. Personal Practitioners and Cultural Muslims both assert that France’s Republican social bargain is intrinsically fair and protects freedom of religious practice.¹ As such, these segments support the dominant Republican discourse that *laïcité* requires all “differences”—particularly religious ones—to remain in the private sphere.^{2,3}

MASTER NARRATIVE: “LA RÉPUBLIQUE LAÏQUE” (SECULAR REPUBLIC)

NARRATIVE: “*La République*” was founded on the bedrock of *laïcité* (secularism), codified in 1905, guaranteeing freedom for people of all backgrounds to lead their lives as they will while celebrating French values. No matter their beliefs or origin, newcomers to the glorious French nation could cultivate a French identity in state schools and civic institutions. Muslims used to enthusiastically embrace this system, but the noisy Islamists of the 1980s and 1990s made Islam a political issue. First there was the *Marche des Beurs*, then calls for Muslim schools and Muslim political organizations. Today, radical activists and fundamentalists feed an image that being Muslim means being a violent threat to the state, causing the government to unjustly stigmatize all Muslims. Now the state tries to control Muslims’ most private decisions, such as how to dress, what to eat, and where and when to worship. Muslims must remind their government of its own book of rules: *laïcité* and Republican principles call for a separation of church and state, not for outlawing Muslims. Through living by the principle of *laïcité*, while fighting attempts to control how Muslims live their lives, Muslims can ensure their personal freedom and leave accusations of being un-French behind them.

ANALYSIS: This broadly held master narrative reflects the primary conflict of the French Muslim narrative landscape: the extent to which French citizens of Muslim descent should publicly assert their Muslim identity. This conflict creates two tensions: first, between subscribers and Civic Islamists, and second, between subscribers and the French government. Subscribers assert that political activism in other French Muslim communities since the 1980s—namely by Civic Islamists—overstepped the bounds of *laïcité*.⁴ Subscribers claim these Muslims forced discussions of religion into the public domain, and as such, are responsible for government's allegedly unjust reactions toward all Muslims. Subscribers cite prayer in the streets, efforts to create Muslim schools, and efforts to influence the law through Islamic teachings as undesirable examples of publicly expressed Islam.^{5,6} Subscribers frequently express anger that Civic Islamist key influencers have not done enough to rid French Muslim communities of religious extremists, who subscribers claim reinforce public perceptions that all Muslims are violent radicals. The tension between Personal Practitioners and Civic Islamists leads to frequent rhetorical conflict across a variety of media. The second place this narrative creates tensions is between subscribers and the French government, which subscribers allege restricts their private religious decisions. One focal point of these tensions was the 2004 ban of the *burqa* ("body covering") and *niqab* ("veil") in public places, and the proposed extension of this ban to the *hijab* ("headscarf"). Subscribers vary in support for these bans, depending on whether they interpret wearing the headscarf as a public or private demonstration of faith.^{7,8,9} Some view wearing a headscarf as a private decision, similar to fasting during Ramadan or praying; others view it as a public expression of Islam. Subscribers also point to other examples of state encroachment, including a proposal to ban Arabic and the *hijab* during at-home childcare, an alleged shortage of prison certified imams, and prisons' alleged lack of respect for Muslim inmates' prayer carpets and other religious objects.^{10,11,12,13,14,15} These issues represent, to subscribers, state violation of its own principles of *laïcité*. These competing tensions fuel continuing debate on whether Muslims or the French government are at fault for Muslims' struggles to integrate in France.

Key influencers invoke this master narrative to express their simultaneous support for French Republican values and protection of the private practice of Islam. Some of these influencers, such as Imam Hassen Chalghoumi of the Drancy Mosque, invoke this narrative while criticizing Civic Islamists. In 2010, Imam Chalghoumi linked his faith to Republican values in an interview cited by weekly news magazine *Marianne*: "The Muslim environment has been taken hostage by Islamism and by nihilism. One must be capable of repairing it and structuring it with humanistic Islam. ... I am battling against ideological fossilization and dogmatic ponderousness. ... [I am] an imam of the Republic..."¹⁶ Although many subscribers observe Islamic practices and have connections to religious institutions, they often express views that their faith is separate from their public persona and participation in French civic life.¹⁷ Key influencers also highlight that this master narrative is held by a large "silent majority" of French Muslims. In the same article, former mufti of Marseille, reputed author, and *laïcité* advocate Soheib Bencheikh, stated his testimony to "the invisibility of the Muslim silent majority decreed by the media and politicians."¹⁸

SIGNIFICANCE FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATORS

Messages that express shared US support for a separation of church and state could resonate strongly with subscribers to this narrative. These messages are most likely to be well-received if they highlight points of consensus between US and French beliefs in the freedom to privately practice one's religion. Depicting these shared beliefs as necessary to prevent discrimination

and exclusion is highly likely to fall on receptive ears. This messaging strategy may help to win allies among politically moderate French Muslims, and isolate more vocal French Muslim audiences advocating for fundamental political reform. When deploying this messaging strategy, communicators should be careful not to appear to be conflating US democratic and French republican constitutional principles. Subscribers hold France's Republican integrationist model—which bars religious conduct in public places—in high regard, and do not strive to mimic the US multicultural democratic model, which is often more tolerant of public displays of religiosity.^{19,20}

While many subscribers to this master narrative are practicing Muslims, they view their faith as a private affair that should not be discussed in the public domain. As a result, communicators might alienate subscribers to this master narrative if they address them as "Muslims" in public forums. Similarly, communicators are likely to find resistance to messaging that highlights the role of Muslim values or practices in the public sphere. As a caveat, this resistance does not mean subscribers do not identify with Islam. On the contrary, most Personal Practitioner subscribers are deeply attached to Islamic beliefs.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ANALYSTS

Subscribers to this master narrative direct frustrations in two directions: toward other Muslims and toward the state. In this respect, analysts can track this master narrative to anticipate tensions between these groups. These tensions could flow: toward the state and away from other Muslims; toward other Muslims and away the state; or maintain a status quo in which both groups receive blame. By tracking indicators of which direction these frustrations trend, analysts could better anticipate evolving political alliances and rifts. For example, analysts could monitor whether subscribers highlight specific Muslim political organizations or figures as performing inappropriate public demonstrations of faith, such as prayer in the street or advocating for Muslim schools. These symbols have the potential to evolve into divisive fault lines between Muslim communities, and have in the past become focal points of civic unrest. If key influencers invoking this narrative focus their ire on Muslims it could signal expanding areas of common ground on which subscribers could connect and ally with mainstream French politicians. Conversely, analysts could monitor how frequently subscribers to this narrative and Civic Islamists express shared grievances toward the French state, for example, in protests at proposed restrictions on the *hijab*. These shared grievances could indicate the potential for broad, issue-based alliances to develop among Muslim communities in France.

"Islamophobic France"

AUDIENCE SEGMENTS

Established Majority

Cultural Muslims
Personal Practitioners

Influential Minorities

Wealthy Secularists
Old Guard

Wildcards

Strict Practitioners
Young *Banlieuesards*
Indigènes

➤ Civic Islamists

Subscribers to "Islamophobic France" assert that they are equally French and Muslim, and that their faith plays a primary role in their life as French citizens.^{1,2} Members of this audience segment are generally educated urbanites, including an array of left-leaning political activists and organizations. These organizations include, but are not limited to, groups alleged to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), such the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), the Collective of Muslims in France (CMF), and the Union of Muslim Organizations of Seine-Saint-Denis (UAM-93).^{3,4,5}

MASTER NARRATIVE: "ISLAMOPHOBIC FRANCE"

NARRATIVE: Ever since they colonized the Maghreb, the French preached religious tolerance and separation of church and state. These were hollow promises that only applied to Christians; laws like the *décret Crémieux* made it clear Muslims could become citizens only by rejecting Islam. Then after World War II and the independence wars came, France begged its former colonies for guest workers. Immigrants believed French promises of genuine rights in exchange for honest work. Muslims should have known better; France was and is a hypocritical Islamophobic nation. Although charlatan politicians pander for votes by paying lip service to "diversity" and supporting the laughable French Council on the Muslim Faith (CFCM), they still block Muslims from real power. They also discriminate against harmless expressions of faith like headscarves and demonize Muslims simply trying to worship outside of overcrowded mosques. The French have no real problem with religion in public—just look at the rights afforded the Jews. Muslims need to band together, elect real leaders, create legal protections for Islam, and condemn French hypocrisy in proclaiming religious tolerance while robbing Muslims of basic freedoms. By creating a space for civic Islam, Muslims can hold onto their full identities in a country that denies Islam's compatibility with French citizenship.

ANALYSIS: In contrast to the “*La République Laïque*” master narrative, subscribers to “Islamophobic France” argue the French state must allow Muslims to express their faith in public and create Islamic civic institutions.^{6,7} The MB-affiliated International Institute of Islamic Thought introduced the term “Islamophobia” in the early 1990s, using the term to decry perceived discrimination against Islam, its values, and its practitioners. The MB cultivated this master narrative in their messaging throughout the 1990s and 2000s and continues to today, using it to motivate and attract followers.⁸ Beyond the MB, some French audience segments draw direct connections between alleged anti-Muslim prejudice and the perceived injustices of France’s colonial legacy. This viewpoint is particularly pronounced among subscribers of Algerian descent. Subscribers to “Islamophobic France” and “*La République Laïque*” interpret the Republican principle of *laïcité* in two different ways, leading to two different aspirations for how the French state should interact with its Muslim population.^{9,10} While subscribers to “*La République Laïque*” focus exclusively on reforms to correct perceived transgressions on French secularist principles, subscribers to “Islamophobic France” advocate for the integration of Islam into France’s legal and political institutions.^{11,12} Subscribers call for include protections for Muslims to worship publicly, for French courts to uphold legal decisions in support of Islamic principles, and for Muslims who publicly proclaim their faith to acquire political office and party leadership.¹³ Many of these aspirations are encapsulated by demands for the state to accommodate Muslims’ ability worship and to demonstrate their faith—for example, by seeking to overturn the ban on face coverings in public, protesting an alleged shortage of places of worship, advocating for gender separated swimming pools, and wide availability of halal foods.¹⁴ Subscribers believe that by mobilizing voters, they can elect Muslim politicians who will advocate for these issues.

Key influencers use themes from this master narrative to depict leading French politicians as prejudiced against French Muslims, and to rally support in response to perceived discrimination. For example, CMF head Nabil Ennasri wrote in 2011: “Islamophobic posturing veiled under *laïcité* is the new horizon for those who, with the failure of social projects, have found their solution for existence: the stigmatization of the Muslim, of Islam, and of the foreigner.”¹⁵ Key influencers also invoke this narrative to criticize the alleged double standard between how the government treats Muslims and other minorities, highlighting French Jews in particular.¹⁶ Abderrahmane Dahmane, Nicolas Sarkozy’s former Integration Advisor, expressed anger at perceived French double standards in a 2011 interview with *Rue89.com*: “Since 2007 [former President Sarkozy] has been invited to numerous dinner debates in the Muslim community. He has never come ... everyone responded to me: ‘But he finds the time to have dinner at the CRIF [Council of French Jewish Institutions]. Sarkozy gives the impression he establishes a hierarchy among the communities. ... [H]e has cut himself off from the Muslim community once and for all.”¹⁷ Mr. Dahmane’s critique of the French state’s alleged double standards is widely-expressed among subscribers, who direct this complaint at politicians on the left and right alike.¹⁸

SIGNIFICANCE FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATORS

Subscribers to this master narrative are highly attuned to terminology that might appear to be benign to an outsider. Subscribers view terms like “diversity” and “multiculturalism” in official messaging as buzzwords, symbolic of the French government’s allegedly “charlatan” efforts to promote integration.¹⁹ Key influencers such as Tariq Ramadan explicitly denounce “mul-

“culturalism” as a failed model of integration.²⁰ Messaging that invokes these words specifically could damage trust and hinder communicators’ attempts to find common ground with subscribers. Instead of invoking these terms explicitly in dialogues with subscribers, communicators could appeal to the themes that underlie these terms, focusing on Americans’ respect for the public practice of diverse religions. This messaging strategy is likely to bolster French Muslim communities’ appreciation of US domestic policies on race and religion [see: “American Exemplars”].

Avoiding engagement with community leaders viewed as inauthentic could help communicators avoid accusations of hypocrisy from subscribers to this narrative. Subscribers are deeply skeptical of claims by government-sponsored organizations, such as the CFCM, to represent French Muslims.²¹ Building rapport with alternative organizations would provide US communicators with more opportunities to engage with subscribers to this master narrative. Organizations that are viewed as more representative by subscribers include the UAM-93 or the CME, although it should be noted that both of these organizations are alleged to be tied to the MB.^{22,23,24} Communicators might want to pursue rapport-building efforts with these organizations in private forums, to avoid alienating French government officials who back the government-sponsored organizations from which communicators would be distancing themselves.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ANALYSTS

The competitive dynamics between the “*La République Laïque*” and “Islamophobic France” master narratives can help analysts track how different camps of French Muslims are gaining or losing momentum in the debate to shape their communities’ future. Analysts may want to pay particular attention to wildcard events—such as the March 2012 Mohamed Merah shootings—which Civic Islamists, Personal Practitioners, and Cultural Muslims will often compete to tie into a narrative. For example, after the Merah shooting subscribers to “Islamophobic France” were quick to disassociate Muslim communities and Islam from the attacks, and warned politicians not to “fan Islamophobia” for “electoral purposes.”²⁵ Subscribers to “*La République Laïque*” were somewhat quieter, with the exception of Drancy Mosque Imam Hassen Chalghoumi, known for his liberal views, who said that France’s Muslims have been “too silent since 9/11” and that “the authorities, too, need to act against radical Islam.”²⁶ The competition between these two narratives, particularly in the wake of wildcard events, could serve as a barometer for public views toward integrating public expressions of Islam into mainstream French society.

The extent to which subscribers to “*La République Laïque*” and “Islamophobic France” simultaneously critique the French government could be an indicator of potential cooperation between French Muslim community leaders. While Cultural Muslims and Personal Practitioners generally frown upon making Islam a political issue, the rightward turn in French politics since 2011 has forced Islam into the center of mainstream French political debate. In response, French Muslims from all audiences have censured perceived government interference in their religion. As influencers in each of these audience segments seek to galvanize public support, they may highlight commonalities between these narratives in an effort to build alliances between Muslim community organizations, and attract supporters from outside their traditional base.

"La France Juste"

AUDIENCE SEGMENTS

Established Majority	Influential Minorities	Wildcards
Cultural Muslims	➤ Wealthy Secularists	Strict Practitioners
Personal Practitioners	Old Guard	Young <i>Banlieuesards</i>
Civic Islamists		<i>Indigènes</i>

Subscribers to this master narrative often came from humble economic backgrounds in their countries of origin and have prospered since arriving in France. Members of this small but influential audience segment tend to mix freely with non-Muslims and are well-represented in educated professions such as medicine and law. Some hold national political office, and a minority of non-office holders express political aspirations.^{1,2,3,4} While members of this segment vary in their levels of piety, from privately practicing Islam to rejecting their religious heritage altogether, all Wealthy Secularists support Republican principles such as "*laïcité*" (separation of church and state) and equality under the law.⁵

MASTER NARRATIVE: "LA FRANCE JUSTE"

NARRATIVE: The grandparents of today's Muslims came to France in search not just of economic opportunity, but also of *Égalité, Liberté, and Fraternité*. Those who worked hard at their jobs and made an effort to become French found their dreams to be well within reach. Now, a disturbing number of Muslims have turned backwards, oppressing women under the veil and endlessly complaining of double standards. They ignore the fact that France is a meritocracy: just look at the success of Tawfik Mathlouthi, or Lofti Belhassine. Moreover, France is a free and democratic nation, not a repressive and hopeless place like the countries Muslim immigrants left behind. These confused and misguided malcontents must stop their futile *communautarisme* ("self-segregation") and try to make something of themselves. The most successful of France's Muslims can provide a shining example by continuing to prosper, pushing themselves to make the most of their personal merit. By leaving behind the backward ways of their home countries, Muslims will be free and prosperous, and can shape one of the world's greatest nations.

ANALYSIS: This master narrative represents a generally optimistic and meritocratic outlook on Muslims' potential to integrate in France. This narrative creates tensions between subscribers and the majority of French Muslims. These tensions are intensified by non-Muslims elites' uses of this master narrative.⁶ First, subscribers frequently criticize other French Muslims for an alleged unwillingness to work hard and integrate, creating tension with younger and less affluent Muslims who comprise the majority of the French Muslim population. Subscribers often draw clear lines between themselves and other Muslims, claiming that their success is due to not having been "ghettoized"—i.e., adopting the cultural values of poor and working class Muslims of shared national descent.⁷ Second, this narrative exacerbates tensions within French Muslim communities. Non-Muslim key influencers eagerly echoed and reinforced this narrative in the mid-2000s as guidance for French Muslims seeking to integrate.⁸ For example, former President Nicolas Sarkozy consistently advocated for the rise of successful Muslim role models, nominating individuals such as Fadela Amara, Rachida Dati, and Rama Yade to his cabinet while celebrating their rise from humble backgrounds.^{9,10,11} By attaching this narrative to these individuals, the French government created further rifts between subscribers and French Muslim communities. For example, Muslim communities widely criticized former Secretary of State for Urban Policies Fadela Amara for having distanced herself from Muslim communities, and allegedly doing little to create lasting Muslim political gains.¹² Non-Muslim elites' usage of this narrative has declined since the start of the 2012 Presidential elections, however, as most seek to broaden their electoral bases among non-Muslims.^{13,14,15} This has eroded support for this master narrative within the Wealthy Secularists audience segment.^{16,17}

Key influencers invoke this master narrative to express that opportunities exist for Muslims to prosper in France.¹⁸ The back cover of the 2008 autobiography of millionaire Lofti Belhassine states: "Having arrived in France from Tunis at age nineteen, Lofti Belhassine immediately wanted to 'conquer France,' put his history behind him and become a Frenchman who makes a good living. Thanks to Republican schooling, he succeeded in overcoming the mostly traditional upbringings of his ancestors. In 35 years, he has climbed to the highest echelons..."¹⁹ Non-Muslim key influencers also frequently invoke this master narrative, seeking to highlight the successes of the Wealthy Secularists to divert criticism of institutional discrimination against Muslims.²⁰ For example, after Sarkozy appointed Rachida Dati—a Moroccan bricklayer's daughter—as justice minister in 2007, he said that appointing her meant "to all the children of France that with merit and effort everything becomes possible," and that she was evidence that all Muslims could integrate and achieve success in France.²¹ These messaging strategies have not generated resonance and have failed to motivate audiences, because this master narrative lacks authenticity among the majority of French Muslims.^{22,23} For example, after Dati's appointment, participants on the French Islamic forum, *Mejliss* wrote comments such as: "The only positive aspect of nominating people of immigrant background into the government is that people get used to this [*sic*] kind of names. But, these three women have something in common, they all denied their identity. They denied their religion, their culture, and their origin. Their only North African and Muslim attribute is their name. So we cannot speak of integration."²⁴ Non-Muslims drawing upon this master narrative to celebrate the success of a select few creates rifts with the majority of French Muslims.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATORS

US messaging that invokes this master narrative in public forums is likely fall on deaf ears with poor and working class French Muslim key influencers. French Muslim communities often

see Wealthy Secularist audiences to be unrepresentative of their communities, un-Islamic, and "tokens" of the establishment.²⁵ Most French Muslims do not celebrate the life stories of these individuals, and draw few parallels between the successes of this audience segment and their own daily travails. By highlighting this narrative's themes of aspirational self-empowerment, US communicators may cast themselves as out of touch with the realities of most French Muslim communities.

However, US communicators may be able to deploy this master narrative in private forums in order to strengthen relationships with rising Wealthy Secularist key influencers, particularly those who are members of the political elite or have aspirations to join. One way to tap into the aspirations of subscribers is to draw parallels with the "American Dream," and deeply-held American beliefs on the potential for immigrants' social and economic advancement. A second way communicators could tap into the aspirations of subscribers is by celebrating the successes of specific French Muslims, such as businessman Tawfik Mathlouthi, directors Jamel Debbouze, Rachid Bouchareb, Raouf Dafri, or Malik Chibane, and Rock and *Rai* (Maghrebi folk music) artist Karim (R'Mic). Subscribers often point to the successes of these individuals as examples of the success Muslims can achieve in France, despite the fact that not all of these individuals are themselves subscribers to "*La France Juste*."

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ANALYSTS

Analysts could also monitor the competition between the "*La France Juste*" and "Islamophobic France" master narratives—widely-held among left-leaning middle-class Muslims—to better anticipate emerging political alliances within French Muslim communities. The "*La France Juste*" master narrative shows signs of being displaced by the "Islamophobic France" narrative, which criticizes the French government for its alleged double standards in treatment of religious minorities. Since 2011, members of the Wealthy Secularists segment have increasingly highlighted persecution of Muslims in their messaging to the public. For example, Rachida Dati, former French Minister of Justice, wrote a widely-read open letter to *Le Monde* in December 2011 accusing Prime Minister François Fillon of preventing the advancement of French Muslims.²⁶ If Wealthy Secularist audiences cease articulating "*La France Juste*" and instead endorse "Islamophobic France" alongside leftist Muslim audiences, it could be an indicator that the French Muslim political spectrum has reshaped itself, with the potential to spawn coalitions encompassing wealthy and middle class Muslim key influencers. By tracking this competition, analysts could gain insight into the potential for emerging broad-based alliances of French Muslims. These coalitions would have the potential to combine Wealthy Secularists' economic clout and governmental connections with Civic Islamists' numbers and political organization.

When non-Muslim key influencers draw upon this master narrative, they frequently cite specific Muslim individuals as embodying the virtues of hard work and integration. By tracking which individuals these key influencers cite, analysts could better anticipate which Muslims are likely to be drawn into the circles of France's political elite. These initiatives were common in the mid-2000s; as one example, in 2005 then-President Jacques Chirac visited the offices of successful French Muslim entrepreneur Aziz Senni, highlighting Mr. Senni as an aspirational symbol for other French Muslims.²⁷ However, a rightward turn in French politics since 2011 has dampened non-Muslim key influencers' celebration of Wealthy Secularists; instead many have turned their messaging to criticize Muslim communities for their failures to integrate.²⁸ If this trend were to reverse it would be notable, and may help analysts to anticipate Muslim key influencers ascending into the French elite.

"Hell in the *Banlieues*"

AUDIENCE SEGMENTS

Established Majority

Cultural Muslims
Personal Practitioners
Civic Islamists

Influential Minorities

Wealthy Secularists
Old Guard

Wildcards

Strict Practitioners
➔ **Young *Banlieuesards***
Indigènes

This master narrative expresses the outrage felt by poor and working-class Muslim communities toward the French government. Subscribers argue that the state ignores young Muslims living in the French suburbs, and that young Muslims have no path out of the economic disenfranchisement and geographic isolation of the *banlieues* ("suburban slums").¹ The themes of dislocation in this narrative resonate widely with poor, working-class, and liberal audiences (e.g., those who support the *Parti Socialiste* or smaller parties further left on the political spectrum), including non-Muslims.

MASTER NARRATIVE: "HELL IN THE *BANLIEUES*"

NARRATIVE: Ever since there have been Muslims in France, they have been forced into the dilapidated *cités* ("housing projects") in the *banlieues*, cut off from jobs and opportunities. For years, the residents of these *bidonvilles* ("shanty-towns") hoped these conditions were temporary, and tried to press on with dignity. But help never came, and the Muslims of the *banlieues* never left. Their silent suffering hit a breaking point in the mid-2000s, when the youth of the *banlieues* rose up to make their grievances known. In spite of their desperate cries for help, they received nothing from the state except heavy doses of tear gas and prison sentences. Nicolas Sarkozy himself even referred to these French citizens as "scum." Worst of all, the media dishonestly painted these riots as "Muslim," depicting honest youth as violent thugs. Muslims never asked for *discrimination positive* ("affirmative action") from the government; all they want is what the state promises all French citizens: a fair chance at graduating from school, a good job, and opportunity to advance, while avoiding the batons of *les flics* ("the police"). Until everyone has a chance to work and live in peace, the cycle of *banlieue* poverty and rioting will surely continue.

ANALYSIS: This master narrative reflects themes of discrimination and second-class citizenship that are reinforced by the “Islamophobic France,” “The Forgotten,” and “Stand Up, *Indigènes*” master narratives. Subscribers to “Hell in the *Banlieues*” resent the state’s alleged decades-long neglect of their neighborhoods. As evidence, they point to high unemployment and poverty rates (with almost half of *banlieue* youth living below the poverty line), high crime rates, and approximately 30 percent dropout rates in public schools.^{2,3,4,5,6} Subscribers believe these conditions reflect the French government’s intentional neglect of the *banlieues*, reinforced by stigmatization of young Muslim youth in the media.^{7,8} A majority of subscribers cite this master narrative as a reason to avoid engaging with police, as an explanation for why many young Muslims do poorly in school, and as a reason for difficulties in job hunting. This isolates many subscribers from the French mainstream, and contributes to a self-perpetuating cycle in which lowered expectations reinforce diminished educational and professional aspirations. Events that tap into this master narrative’s grievances can galvanize subscribers to violent and unpredictable actions. For example, in 2005 riots began after two *banlieue* youth—Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré—died while fleeing police officers, tapping into Young *Banlieuesards*’ anger at perceived police brutality.^{9,10} A minority of subscribers channel their frustration into political mobilization, forming groups such as *Banlieues Respect*, which advocates for an end to “discrimination” against *banlieues* residents and improved job opportunities.^{11,12} These organizations also receive support from Civic Islamists [see: “Islamophobic France”].¹³ These divergent responses to the frustration of the *banlieues* highlight subscribers’ diversity in worldviews and aspirations, creating tensions with French government officials who often view the *banlieues* as monolithic blocs. Although subscribers respond to *banlieue* poverty in diverse ways, they are united by this master narrative, with all subscribers asserting the state has failed to provide them with the jobs and education they need.

Key influencers use this master narrative to encourage reform as well as anti-government action across racial and religious lines in *banlieue* communities. For example, networks of key influencers such as hip-hop, rap, and *raï* (Maghrebi folk music) artists often invoke this master narrative to lament what they allege to be broken promises by the French state to *banlieue* youth.^{14,15} Some of these influencers express their views in debates on prominent news shows—such as “*Vous aurez le dernier mot!*” (“You Will Have the Last Word”) on France 2—in addition to through their music and art.^{16,17} In a 2011 debate during the Chêne Noir Sufism conference in Avignon, rapper and author Abd Al Malik highlighted the potential for instability in the *banlieues*: “It’s as if France had first and second class citizens.... [The *banlieues*] have never been considered a priority. And some point, inevitably, things are bound to explode.... We have the means to change our social landscape...[so] the war of the *banlieues* will not take place. But if nothing is done, it will take place.”¹⁸ Al Malik connected this potential for instability to a lack of government involvement with *banlieue* youth: “There needs to be more moderates, but above all there need to be other methods. So before voting laws into place, politicians should leave their ivory towers and talk to the [Muslim] grassroots, the citizens, the associations.”¹⁹ This narrative is not solely invoked in youth culture and arts; key influencers from a diversity of backgrounds draw upon this narrative, including politicians, community organizers, and religious leaders. These key influencers often invoke this master narrative to mobilize local constituencies to vote or participate in community initiatives in their *cité*.²⁰

SIGNIFICANCE FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATORS

Subscribers to this narrative are likely to be receptive to messaging that emphasizes the importance of improved economic and educational opportunities in the *banlieues*.²¹ Rather

than highlight the need for the special treatment of Muslims, communicators may find wider receptivity to messaging that states that all citizens deserve fair and equal economic opportunities. Many Muslim youth in the *banlieues* are skeptical of *discrimination positive* ("affirmative action") and believe that the French state should be held accountable to its Republican ideals and rhetoric, rather than treat young *Banlieuesards* as an exceptional group.²² Communicators may also want to downplay any connections with the center-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), as this party is frequently criticized for not doing more to provide education and job opportunities for Young *Banlieuesards*. Communicators could also coach local community leaders, advocacy groups, and *banlieue* entrepreneurs on ways they could seek and create economic opportunity in their communities. These efforts could help to move Young *Banlieueards* from being cultural outsiders to active participants in national mainstream political discourse.

Communicators who link Muslims to the *banlieues*—for example, by referring to "Muslim *banlieues*"—risk alienating subscribers and being perceived as out-of-touch from both Muslim and *banlieue* communities. Subscribers to this narrative believe the French media unfairly casts the *banlieues* as overwhelmingly Muslim. Subscribers protest this alleged media bias, although statistics for the most well-known *banlieues* support this characterization.^{23,24} Many subscribers believe that popular associations between Muslims and France's most widely-reviled neighborhoods gives rise to false stereotypes of Muslims as poor criminals.^{25,26,27,28}

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ANALYSTS

By tracking whether the anger expressed in this master narrative is directed to any specific political party, analysts could better anticipate changes in electoral support for the UMP and *Parti Socialiste* among the residents of the *banlieues*. French Muslims have traditionally demonstrated greater political support for candidates on the left (e.g. the *Parti Socialiste*) than on the right (e.g., the UMP), although some polls suggest that over thirty percent of *banlieues* residents support the UMP.²⁹ Due to most Muslim communities' widespread anger at the state ignoring the needs of the *banlieues* and avoiding engagement with young Muslims, many subscribers have become skeptical of both ends of the political spectrum. *Banlieues* voter abstention rates can be as high as seventy percent in some areas.³⁰ However, activists, artists, and performers have in the past targeted the *banlieues* to mobilize voters in opposition to the ruling party, frequently deploying themes from this narrative to undermine support for the UMP and encourage support for the *Parti Socialiste*.^{31,32} By monitoring how key influencers use the master narrative in voter mobilization efforts, and the political parties they emphasize as enemies of the *banlieues*, analysts might better anticipate French politicians' electoral momentum.

This master narrative can inspire subscribers to take part in violent civil unrest, depending on the context in which it is invoked and how key influencers direct subscribers to channel their grievances. Analysts could better anticipate subscribers' actions by tracking whether usages of this master narrative articulate that there is a solution for *banlieue* poverty, and if so, what that solution might be. Occasions when large numbers of subscribers consistently articulate that the government has not provided the required solutions to *banlieue* poverty have demonstrated the potential to lead to rioting. Adversary key influencers have also attempted to tie their messaging to this master narrative, presenting poverty and suffering in the *banlieues* to be linked to a global campaign of persecution against Muslims. These adversary key influencers place subscribers' suffering into a global context, and in doing so, attempt to stir support for violent extremist organizations.

"Turning to God"

AUDIENCE SEGMENTS

Established Majority	Influential Minorities	Wildcards
Cultural Muslims	Wealthy Secularists	➤ Strict Practitioners
Personal Practitioners	Old Guard	Young <i>Banlieuesards</i>
Civic Islamists		<i>Indigènes</i>

Subscribers to this master narrative frequently express their piety and share a common dedication to learning the written word of the Qur'an.^{1,2} Subscribers fall into three categories: first, most Strict Practitioners grew up as Cultural Muslims and have "re-converted" to a strict Islamic practice; second, some subscribers were not born Muslim, but converted to a strict practice of Islam; finally, a small minority of subscribers have followed this type of Islamic practice for their entire lives.^{3,4} The Strict Practitioners audience segment has grown steadily in size since the late 1980s, in part due to the growing identity crisis among many French Muslims—particularly youth—who assert they neither belong fully in France nor in their country of origin.^{5,6,7}

MASTER NARRATIVE: "TURNING TO GOD"

NARRATIVE: In the 1950s and 1960s Muslim immigrants came to France and, out of fear of being branded unpatriotic, pretended to adopt the godless French values pushed on them. A few generations have passed and Muslims in France have lost track of their roots and values, enduring isolation and discrimination all too often without the guidance of their holy text. Muslims in France have easy access to the temptations of drugs and crime, and the *haram* ("forbidden") slowly seeps into their lives. To make matters worse, most Muslims in France practice a folk Islam—polluted by the traditions of the *bled* ("homeland")—or the cultural influences of the West. To find themselves, French Muslims—particularly youth—must reclaim their faith by studying the Qur'an and faithfully practicing the five pillars of Islam while rejecting the corruption of the West. They also must live their faith everyday by improving the lives of their fellow Muslims—whether by petitioning the government, serving their communities, or simply lending an ear to a lost soul. Embracing Islamic truth is the way for Muslims to live proudly and purify their souls.

ANALYSIS: This master narrative motivates subscribers to take political action, to engage in social and community services, and—in a minority of cases—to fully reject French norms and values. This narrative reinforces the themes of the “Islamophobic France” master narrative and provides an outlet for the grievances of subscribers to the “Hell in the *Banlieues*” master narrative. Subscribers’ embrace of a strict Islamic lifestyle usually results from a personal or identity-related crisis—as opposed to rebellion against older generations or the French state—and contributes to three types of activities. First, this narrative encourages a minority of subscribers to reject their French identities, turn fully to Islam, and seek identities that transcend national boundaries to become members of the global *ummah* (“community of believers”).^{8,9} In a handful of instances, this rejection of French identity can form the ideological basis for radicalization. Studies demonstrate linkages between societal isolation and violent activity, and key influencers draw upon this narrative to direct that violent activity against the French state.¹⁰ A group that embodies this is the radical *Forsane Alizza* (Cavaliers of Pride), who often publicly expresses its views through inflammatory methods. For example, in 2011 members of the group burned the French penal code, asserting that the only law that is valid is the law of Allah.¹¹ Second, “Turning to God” often gives rise to political action and dialogue when used in conjunction with the “Islamophobic France” narrative. Subscribers typically invoke themes from these two master narratives in combination to demand freedom to practice Islam openly, the creation of Muslim community youth organizations, increased availability of halal foods, and rights to wear the *burqa* and *niqab* in public spaces, among other causes.^{12,13} Notably, Salafist subscribers do not engage in these activities, as they reject the legitimacy of democracy and do not seek accommodation from a state they view as ungodly. Finally, this master narrative inspires subscribers, particularly those in the *banlieues*, to participate in social service organizations or local charities. Many subscribers’ intensified identification with Islam stems largely from their religion’s ability to provide them with relief from daily feelings of social, political, and economic humiliation and rejection.¹⁴ Some Muslim organizations perform extensive outreach in the *banlieues*, seeking to proselytize to youth frustrated with their daily life, suggesting that the solution to drug addiction, depression, or criminal involvement can be sought through reconnection with Islam [see: “Hell in the *Banlieues*”].

The key influencers likely to invoke this master narrative hail from poor-to-working class backgrounds and work in diverse fields, including imams, proselytizers, and musicians.^{15,16} When they invoke this master narrative, they often focus their critique on allegedly impure, secular, Western activities, and call for youth to reclaim their faith. Imam Hassan Iquioussen, founder of the *Jeunes Musulmans de France* (Young Muslims of France), a satellite organization of the *Union des Organizations Islamiques de France* (UOIF) that focuses on proselytizing to young Muslims, articulated this narrative in a January 2011 Friday sermon. He stated that Muslims in France were living in “opulence, decay, and division,” similar to Muslims in Spain prior to Christian Reconquista (710–1492), and “drank alcohol and enjoyed music and fashion.” He noted that “the Haram [the forbidden] is penetrating your house through the Internet, television, mobile phones” only “to take your soul, yet you are not aware of it.” He lamented that “today, history is repeating itself” in France and called for young Muslims to congregate in mosques “to find people able to wake you up.” He also called on the audience to “be proud of being Muslim” and “to express it” and to stop “being colonized in your head.”^{17,18} This usage of the narrative is one example of how many influencers combine the religious themes of this master narrative with the themes of political action in “Islamophobic France,” and economic disenfranchisement in “Hell in the *Banlieues*” to tap into a volatile mix of emotions in subscribers.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATORS

This master narrative creates opportunities for hardline Salafist groups—such as Forsane Alizza—to shape the debate on Islam by asserting that the only interpretation of Islam is one that rejects Western laws, customs, and norms. To help to undermine this notion, US communicators could work with friendly key influencers who have credibility with the target audience, such as religious leaders, leaders of youth organizations, or social workers, to highlight variations in the practice of Islam around the world. To bring this message even closer to home, US communicators could work with their messaging partners to highlight the variations in the practice of Islam among Muslims in different French cities. Subscribers' assertion that they must "reject of the corruption of the West" can create resistance to US outreach. Working with proxies is likely to improve the success of US messaging.

More generally, messaging expressing respect for Muslim values and traditions is likely to resonate with subscribers to this master narrative. Communicators could build trust with subscribers living in *banlieues* in particular by highlighting the potential of Islam to act as a grounding influence and moral guide for young people suffering from ills such as crime, poverty, and drug addiction.¹⁹ Communicators also may find that messaging connecting Qur'anic teachings with social justice and civic engagement meets with widespread receptivity. When expressing respect for Muslim values and traditions, communicators should be aware that most subscribers to this master narrative do not identify with any particular school of belief within Sunni Islam, but rather to an individual interpretation of the word of the Qur'an. When expressing respect for Muslim values and traditions, communicators are likely to find broad receptivity to messages that highlight the personal connection young believers have with Islam, and subscribers' belief that the Qur'an is the unmediated word of God, equally accessible to all who practice the Islamic faith.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ANALYSTS

Analysts could track how religious leaders use this master narrative to steer young French Muslims' interpretations of the Qur'an, in order to better anticipate the actions of these groups of young French Muslims. First, analysts could monitor the attendance imams receive at their sermons, and the rough age level of the attendees, in order to gauge whether these imams are seen as credible by young people. Imams engaged with youth in settings such as prisons may be worthwhile to monitor regardless of their observable numbers of followers, as incarcerated young Muslims may be more vulnerable to radicalization than other French Muslims.²⁰ In this setting, analysts should look to monitor inmates filling the role of imam/religious teacher, rather than state imam chaplains (*aumôniers*), which are carefully selected by the French Ministry of Justice.²¹ Second, analysts could track which imams emphasize the themes of this narrative focused on the "godless French" and "avoiding the *haram*," messages which steer subscribers to isolate themselves from mainstream French society. By assessing the level of credibility imams have with young people, and the way they employ this narrative when speaking with French Muslim youth, analysts may be able to better anticipate potential anti-French or anti-Western activities in which young French Muslims are likely to engage.

Analysts might assess potential links between this master narrative and violent activity by monitoring instances in which it is invoked in tandem with the "Hell in the *Banlieues*" and "Islamophobic France" master narratives. To better anticipate instances of potentially violent unrest, analysts could monitor key influencer speeches and media for a combination of three

themes in these distinct master narratives. These themes include: the perception of political impotence and resentment articulated by Young *Banlieuesards* in "Hell in the *Banlieues*," the sense of religiously based persecution that Civic Islamists claim in "Islamophobic France," and rejection of a French identity in favor of a transnational one expressed by Strict Practitioners in "Turning to God." Key influencers expressing all three of these themes in combination tap into a volatile and unpredictable mix of emotions in young French Muslims. When emotions of anger, frustration, and impotence are combined with a rejection of French identity, subscribers may be more likely to focus their hostility on the French state. Consistent exposure to messaging strategies that combine these themes could serve as a foundation for a range of unpredictable and potentially destructive actions among young French Muslim communities—from civil unrest, to criminal acts such as the Mohamed Merah shootings, to organized violent extremist activity.

“American Exemplars”

AUDIENCE SEGMENTS

Established Majority	Influential Minorities	Wildcards
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Cultural Muslims ➤ Personal Practitioners ➤ Civic Islamists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Wealthy Secularists ➤ Old Guard 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Strict Practitioners ➤ Young <i>Banlieuesards</i> <i>Indigènes</i>

This master narrative is held by diverse French Muslim audiences. Young *Banlieuesards* hold this narrative most deeply; many young and disenfranchised Muslims in the *banlieues* are highly attuned to US popular culture, and express appreciation for US outreach efforts in their communities. Other subscribers—particularly members of the upper economic strata—have ties to US business and political communities.¹

MASTER NARRATIVE: “AMERICAN EXEMPLARS”

NARRATIVE: Blacks were oppressed by the US Government for centuries, but now America has developed into a place where race and ethnicity are no longer barriers to success. One need only look at the stardom of Josephine Baker or the 2008 election of Barack Hussein Obama—a black man with Muslim roots—as proof of what minorities can achieve in America. Americans are proud of their nation’s diversity, treat blacks with respect and dignity, and celebrate the inspiring and dynamic talent that comes from black communities. Compared with this example, the French state is failing miserably in its efforts to empower minorities. Muslims in the *banlieues* see more of American diplomats than they do their own elected officials; French ministers only visit Muslims during election time, surrounded by heavy security. French government, businesses, schools, and media must learn from America, and end discrimination against French citizens of Muslim heritage. This will make good on French ideals of tolerance and democracy, and empower Muslims to fulfill their vast potential.

ANALYSIS: This master narrative is one of two narratives in which the United States plays a central role. This narrative celebrates US domestic policy toward minorities and generates tensions between both French Muslim communities and their government, and the US and French governments. Many subscribers to this master narrative celebrate the attention that the US Embassy in Paris has paid to the *banlieues*, expressing appreciation that "A foreign country identifies us as potential leaders."² Informally, US "hip hop culture" has influenced young French Muslim culture, with young French Muslims adopting American-originated forms of artistic expression as diverse as graffiti, breakdancing, and rap music.³ This master narrative gives rise to tension between French Muslims and the French government, with subscribers asserting that the French government neglects them in comparison to the United States' historical treatment of African-Americans.⁴ Consequently, this master narrative is a potential source of friction between the French and US communicators. For example, French media roundly condemned unflattering comparisons American actor Samuel L. Jackson made between his childhood memories of racially divided Tennessee and conditions in a *banlieue* he visited in Bondy, France on a visit sponsored by the US Embassy.⁵ French journalists sporadically claim that the widespread resonance of this master narrative indicates US efforts to influence French Muslim communities. These outreach efforts sometimes are disparaged as "direct interference" infringing on French sovereignty and are depicted as threats to the principle of *laïcité* for engaging with French Muslim communities based on their religious identity.^{6,7}

By celebrating US engagement with French Muslim populations, Muslim key influencers seek to shame French officials for their alleged neglect. In August 2010, Nabil Ennasri, leader of the Collective of Muslims of France (CMF) wrote on *Oumma.com*: "On one side, Barack Obama, with a serene air, wishes American Muslims a happy month of Ramadan. The President of the nation that endured the 9/11 trauma finds the right words to express his consideration for the month of fast that several millions of his fellow citizens are about to observe. ... [O]n the other side stands the President of France, which is home to one of the most important Muslim communities in the West. And there, not a single word or statement, but the fuelling of an unhealthy climate, which targets foreigners, immigrants, and of course Muslims, more and more roughly. No statement, no video on the Internet, no sign of consideration for these millions of French who are about to experience an important period of their spirituality. ... Many in France should learn from the relationship toward Islam displayed by many American elected politicians and the media. Obsessed with chasing the far-right votes and being a prisoner of militant secularism, the French political class (and especially the political right, that has been in power for nearly a decade) still cannot reconcile itself with the new face of French society. However, their position needs to change. The United States is here to show them the way."⁸ In a 2008 interview, Ali Zahi, then-cabinet director for the mayor of the Parisian *banlieue* Clichy-sous Bois stated: "Many young people think that America is waging a war on Muslims[,] ... I tell them: America is many things. It is a country that has a black presidential candidate and a self-confident Muslim community."⁹ Key influencers use this master narrative to unfavorably contrast the French government's alleged dismissal of Muslims with attempts by US communicators to build bridges with French Muslim communities.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATORS

This master narrative presents a variety of opportunities for US communicators to engage with and win allies in French Muslim communities. For example, by pointing to successful African American individuals and prospering US minority communities, communicators can cast

the United States as a place of relative opportunity for minorities. Additionally, by maintaining a visible presence in Muslim-majority *banlieues*, communicators build their legitimacy as knowledgeable and respectful friends of French Muslim communities. Expressing support for the role local Muslim organizations play in the community during a consulate-hosted event, such as an *Iftar* (breaking of the fast during Ramadan) dinner, is one example of the many strategies that can help US communicators to reinforce the themes of this master narrative.¹⁰ Winning allies in these communities could help open messaging channels across sociocultural and ethnic lines, providing US communicators with the opportunity to connect with individuals of Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan descent. Opinions transmit between diaspora populations and communities in their nations of origin; these opinions are transmitted by combination of transnational family ties, searches for marriage partners, economic interactions, and cultural exchanges via media and pop culture.¹¹ This master narrative could provide US communicators with a conduit via which to steer opinions in French Muslims' countries of origin.

These messaging strategies also have the potential to create tensions between US communicators and the French government. The French media has criticized US engagement in the *banlieues*. In the mid-2000s, the French media went so far as to warn of the "CIA infiltrating the *banlieues*"; although these accusations have subsided, the French press remains suspicious of US motives in reaching out to the population of the *banlieues*.^{12,13} To help to mitigate the risk of inflaming tensions with the French government, US communicators could ensure they do not cast aspersions or doubt on French integration policies. Additionally, maintaining transparent and consistent messaging on the rationale for engaging with French Muslim populations will help to deflect accusations of secrecy or hidden motives. By focusing on celebrating US ideals of opportunity and equality, while remaining transparent in US motivations to establish friendly relations with citizens from all backgrounds and ethnic heritages, US communicators can deflect potential criticism that they are undermining French domestic policies.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ANALYSTS

By tracking which elements of this master narrative key influencers emphasize, analysts can shed light on their influence strategies and objectives. Key influencers can use this master narrative for multiple purposes: to celebrate the United States, to criticize the French government, and to do both simultaneously. To achieve these objectives, key influencers must choose which elements of this master narrative to emphasize most heavily, e.g., the relative success of minorities in America, or the perceived failures of the French government. These messaging choices could provide insight into key influencers' agendas. For example, uses of this narrative that only laud the United States in the context of juxtaposing it against the French state may indicate the key influencer is working toward strategic ends that do not involve the United States. Additionally, the elements of this master narrative that key influencers choose to emphasize could shed light on prevailing political climate among French Muslim communities (e.g., whether pro- or anti-US sentiments, and pro- or anti-French sentiments predominate), as well as indicate the French Muslim audiences from which these key influencers are seeking support. Messages that focus on celebration of the United States are more likely to resonate with some Wealthy Secularists and Young *Banlieuesards*, while those casting aspersions on France may resonate more with Civic Islamists.

“American Imperialists”

AUDIENCE SEGMENTS

Established Majority

- Cultural Muslims
- Personal Practitioners
- Civic Islamists

Influential Minorities

- Wealthy Secularists
- Old Guard

Wildcards

- Strict Practitioners
- Young *Banlieuesards*
- *Indigènes*

This master narrative resonates with the majority of French Muslim audiences, albeit for diverse reasons.¹ For example, Civic Islamists tend to be members of the French political left and view aggression against Palestinians to be emblematic of persecution of Muslims in France and worldwide. *Indigènes* express that Israeli and US policies in the Middle East are an extension of historical imperialist aims.² Strict Practitioners are opposed to perceived aggression against the global *ummah*.

MASTER NARRATIVE: “AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS”

NARRATIVE: The United States and its partner Israel have long been the enemies of Muslims around the world. Without regard for the views of its citizens, the US Government invades Muslim countries, helps illegitimate Arab dictatorships steal the wealth of the people, and undermines legitimate Islamic regimes. Every day the US-Zionist axis—with the support of France—conspires against the Muslims of the Middle East, building military bases to permit the expansion of the criminal state of Israel while keeping a foot on the throat of the Palestinian people. This imperialism must not stand. Today, the Palestinian people fight valiantly to survive and preserve their territory in the face of relentless American-supported Israeli aggression. Muslims and non-Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs are all Palestinians in their hearts and should be proud to fight for Palestine. All people who love the oppressed must protest American-Zionist terrorism at home and abroad, and demand Israeli forces to withdraw from Palestine. In doing so, Muslims can show solidarity with their brothers and sisters in Palestine, and do their part to end the illegal occupation.

ANALYSIS: This master narrative is in conflict with the “American Exemplars” narrative. Although these narratives appear inconsistent—one celebrates US policies towards minorities whereas the other protests US treatment of Muslims worldwide—they are held concurrently by many French Muslims. These contradictions highlight many French Muslim audiences’ conflicted views on the United States. The “American Imperialists” narrative underscores two beliefs widely held by Muslim audiences in France: first, that the US Government and Israel are close allies with identical policy agendas, and second, that the United States is complicit in illegal attacks on Muslim-majority nations across the world (e.g., US combat in Afghanistan and Iraq). As a result, subscribers see the United States to be complicit in the “occupation” of Palestine, motivating protests, linking Muslim communities to leftist ideologies, and driving calls for violent extremist activity.^{3,4,5} Key influencers that deploy the “American Imperialists” master narrative as the basis for radical action do not widely resonate with French Muslim communities; this usage often reinforces radical influencers’ outsider status.⁶ As the “American Imperialists” and “American Exemplars” narratives are simultaneously and widely-held, key influencers frequently invoke both in their messaging strategies in attempts to resonate with diverse French Muslim audiences.

Key influencers use this master narrative to stir opposition against US foreign policy and generate support for pro-Palestinian policies in France and abroad. For example, in a 2011 demonstration in front of the Algeria-backed Grand Mosque of Paris to celebrate International *al-Quds* [Jerusalem] Day, an unidentified demonstration leader pronounced, “Today, we, Muslims of France, Muslims of Paris, are here to celebrate International *al-Quds* day[,] ... we are here, Arabs and non-Arabs, from all origins, Muslims and also non-Muslims, to tell Palestine that is watching us that we support Palestine in our hearts and in our blood ... and most of all to say death to Israel, death to America, but [*sic*] death to the imperialist America, because the American people is [*sic*] going to wake up, so we ask all peoples who support the oppressed to come out and support Palestine.”⁷ This narrative is also used in less overtly radical messaging strategies to cast doubt on US outreach to French Muslims while not explicitly calling for violence. In October 2011 Yahia Gousami, leader of the Anti-Zionist Party (PAS) and the Shiite Zahra Center, posted a message on the PAS website stating: “The United States has been involved in a policy of approach and capture in the Arab Muslim world. Everything is done to improve the image of the United States in the eyes of a generally hostile population, considering the unconditional support of successive American administrations for the Zionist entity, and the acts of aggression against Iraq, Afghanistan, and today, Pakistan.”⁸ Key influencers use this narrative to link the United States to support for Israel and conflicts in the Arab world, sometimes seeking to undermine attempts at US engagement with French Muslim communities.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATORS

The “American Imperialists” and “American Exemplars” master narratives are both broadly held. Although “American Exemplars” presents a variety of opportunities for US communicators to connect with French Muslim audiences, “American Imperialists” presents few. All US communications about Israel and Palestine are likely to be scrutinized by French Muslim audiences seeking evidence that the United States is an enemy of Palestine and unquestioningly backs Israeli foreign policy. Subscribers also assert that France is a supporter of the “US-Zionist” axis, meaning dialogues with the French government about the Israeli-Palestine conflict are also likely to be subject to criticism from subscribers. Subscribers are likely to be

well-informed on these communications; themes from this narrative also resonate with non-Muslim French subscribers, and US-French interactions on Israel and Palestine receive wide coverage in the French media.

Communicators discussing collaborative actions with France in the Middle East may seek to coordinate their messaging with US communicators interacting with French Muslim communities. Key influencers are likely to deploy this narrative to stir unrest in response to US communicators discussing the need for coordinated action in the Middle East. For example, US discussions with France on interventions in Syria and Iran may be subjected to heated criticism. This unrest has the potential to be directed at US communicators working in French Muslim communities, interfering with messaging strategies and relationship-building efforts.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ANALYSTS

Analysts could monitor whether key influencers discussing the United States alter the balance of the “American Exemplars” and “American Imperialists” master narratives in their messaging strategies in order to anticipate shifts in French Muslim communities’ opinions on the United States. As both of these master narratives are widely subscribed-to, key influencers seeking broad appeal among French Muslim communities combine both into their messaging. For example, in August 2010 Islamic news website *SaphirNews.com* stated, “Obama does not abandon his fair play role with Muslims[,] ... [his] friendship is shared in different ways by Americans and Muslims worldwide. Although it is generally welcomed, some Muslims see in this gesture a trick aimed at diverting attention from the troops implanted in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are Muslim countries.”⁹ If widely-followed key influencers are able to motivate French Muslims by using just one of these narratives, it could indicate a shift in worldviews towards the United States among French Muslims—for better or worse. In order to monitor this, analysts could track key influencers that incorporate the United States into their messaging, monitor whether these key influencers emphasize both of these narratives or just one, and assess the response their messages receives from French Muslim communities (e.g., the crowds they draw, comments they receive in online forums, the tone of follow-on dialogue in social media).

Analysts could monitor this master narrative for whether key influencers link it to the French occupation of Algeria in order to better anticipate the potential for grievances associated with colonial occupation to transmit to younger audiences. Key influencers draw connections between Palestine and colonial Algeria; for example, in 2011 activist Daniel Cohn-Bendit stated, “You’re right that Israel is a democracy, but up to the wall, only up to the wall. Beyond the wall the occupation is like the French occupation in Algeria.”¹⁰ By linking these grievances with the “American Imperialists” master narrative, key influencers create the potential for France’s colonial legacy to resonate with younger French Muslims subscribers. This transmission could indicate that France’s colonial legacy will remain a widely-held grievance and rallying cry for young French Muslims.

"The Forgotten"

AUDIENCE SEGMENTS

Established Majority	Influential Minorities	Wildcards
Cultural Muslims	Wealthy Secularists	Strict Practitioners
Personal Practitioners	➔ Old Guard	Young <i>Banlieuesards</i>
Civic Islamists		<i>Indigènes</i>

This master narrative is most prevalent among Algerian members of the Old Guard, first generation Maghrebi immigrants who came to France during the period from the 1950s to the early 1970s. Many Algerian members of this audience segment were either directly involved or had family members involved in the Franco-Algerian War, either as combatants for Algeria, *harkis* (Algerians who fought in the French Army during the Franco-Algerian War) or protesters in Metropolitan France. Many Tunisian and Moroccan members of the Old Guard also subscribe to this master narrative, citing it as a key example of French transgressions against Maghrebis.¹ This group is shrinking with age; most subscribers who came of age during the 1954–62 Franco-Algerian War are now senior citizens.

MASTER NARRATIVE: "THE FORGOTTEN"

NARRATIVE: Maghrebis left their homes and families in North Africa in search of a better life in France. Yet as long as the French Republic has known North Africans, it has abused and exploited them to serve its own ends, abandoning the *harkis* and drowning their Algerian brothers in the Seine. To make up for these atrocities the French government threw pittances at Maghrebis living in France—a plaque, a few francs, and a half-hearted apology—all while barely concealing their disdain. Worse, attempts to protest these injustices have been dismissed as *communautarisme* ("self-segregation"), robbing them of the right to publicly proclaim their trauma and unearth the atrocities of France's history in Algeria. Maghrebis deserve more than the scraps of recognition they have received. They must demand recognition from the French government that colonialism was unjust to its very core. The government must take full responsibility for its past actions by apologizing publicly and acknowledging the trauma Maghrebis endured. Until this false amnesia ends, Muslims will never be able to move on from this injustice and forgive the French for the abuses they inflicted.

ANALYSIS: This master narrative reflects two deeply-held grievances against the French government: resentment of historical state-backed violence against Algerians, and a perception that the French government has not satisfactorily recognized the wartime trauma it inflicted on Algerian diaspora communities. In addition, this master narrative connects members of the Algerian diaspora to their country of origin, and could represent a conduit for grievances and narratives from Algeria to be adopted by the diaspora. The first of subscribers' two grievances is the French state's historical violence against Algerian communities. Subscribers point to two incidents in particular as examples: when the French government left numerous *harkis* in Algeria, who were then killed by the Algerian government for having fought on the side of the French; and the Paris Massacre of 1961, when the French police attacked a demonstration of some 30,000 Algerians, killing anywhere from forty to over two hundred. These grievances perpetuate beliefs that the French government continues to plot violence against both Algerian immigrants living in France and residents of Algeria.² Second, subscribers assert that the French government has not satisfactorily recognized the trauma it inflicted on Algerians. During the fiftieth anniversary of the 1962 Paris Charonne metro station killings of nine French Algerians by French police, members of the Old Guard protested the French government for not taking responsibility for violence against Algerians, and for having "fostered a culture of forgetting."³ As further evidence, subscribers point to legislation proposed in February 2005 that mandated that French school curricula teach students that colonization benefited Algeria. Many themes in this narrative echo anti-Western Algerian narratives such as "A Hard-Earned Sovereignty" [see: "A Hard-Earned Sovereignty" in the Master Narratives Country Report: Algeria].⁴ The similarities between these two master narratives create an opportunity for key influencers in both countries to access both French Muslim and Algerian audiences, hardening Muslims' attitudes toward the French state by criticizing France's colonial legacy. This messaging opportunity may, however, have a limited time window; this master narrative is on the decline as the Old Guard audience segment shrinks due to its age.

Key influencers use this master narrative to draw linkages between the violence committed by the French state against Algerians during the 1960s and continued alleged persecution of Muslims in France. In an October 2011 op-ed in *The Guardian*, French Algerian journalist, activist, and media personality Nabila Ramdani wrote, "Republican values of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* will be all but forgotten when thousands of Parisians recall the most murderous episode in the French capital's postwar history tomorrow. Commemorations are planned for the fiftieth anniversary of the Franco-Algerian massacre, when up to 200 peaceful protesters were slaughtered in cold blood around iconic national monuments. ... Few would argue that the tribal murders committed by Paris police half a century ago are likely to be repeated today. But nor would anyone pretend that the discriminatory policies which gave rise to such horrors have disappeared from modern France."⁵ By linking the events of 1962 with modern day policies, key influencers cast the French state as unreformed and unrepentant colonialists who continue to disenfranchise members of the North African diaspora in France.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATORS

This master narrative presents US communicators with limited messaging opportunities, due to continuing tensions between the French state and subscribers to this narrative. US communicators that even obliquely reference symbols from this narrative to members of the Old Guard—for example, by referring to a mass migration of Algerians to France in the 1960s—may put themselves at risk of inflaming tensions between subscribers and the French govern-

ment. Additionally, for many conservative French policymakers, discussions on the struggles of Algerians during the French-Algerian war is a redline. Communicators that attempt to address themes from this narrative in their messaging risk a range of unpredictable responses from subscribers and non-subscribers alike.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ANALYSTS

Analysts can monitor how “The Forgotten” master narrative interacts with Algerian narratives such as “A Hard-Earned Sovereignty” to anticipate unrest in French Muslim communities and the rise of transnational key influencers [see: “A Hard-Earned Sovereignty” in the Master Narratives Country Report: Algeria]. There is evidence that these narrative interact; a majority of Algerians echo French Muslims’ condemnations of France’s colonial legacy. For example, in January 2011 Mousa Abdi, a member of the Algerian parliament, proposed a bill to “criminalise colonialism,” aiming to bring French citizens who committed crimes during the colonial period before Algerian courts.⁶ Interaction between these two narratives could lead to a variety of results; in this case, by criminalizing French citizens, the interaction could result in French Muslims seeing justification in taking punitive action against non-Muslim French.⁷ There are a variety of other potential outcomes to the interaction between French and Algerian narratives expressing shared grievances on France’s colonial history. For example, key influencers using both of these narratives in their messaging can motivate audiences in both France and Algeria, opening the possibility for these key influencers to coordinate subscribers’ actions transnationally. Additionally, evolution in Algerian narratives has the potential to impact the “The Forgotten” master narrative. Should Algerian narratives expressing anger at France’s colonial history be displaced by narratives focusing on other topics—e.g., Islamism, economic empowerment, political reform—this may be an indicator that Algerian communities are focusing on other grievances, suggesting the grievances and aspirations in “The Forgotten” are also likely to evolve.

Analysts could track uses of this narrative by the Young *Banlieuesards* segment to gain insight into whether this narrative might be transmitted between generations. This master narrative could reinforce many of young Muslims’ other grievances with the French state, further exacerbating tensions and becoming an impediment to improved relations. To examine the potential for this narrative to be adopted by younger French Muslims, analysts could monitor how frequently this master narrative’s themes are articulated during demonstrations, commemorations of the French-Algerian War, and in informal media sources such as music and film where Young *Banlieuesards* are more likely to express their views.⁸ By tracking this narrative’s transmission between generations, analysts will be able to assess whether France’s colonial legacy will continue to stir unrest and resentment in French Muslim communities.

“Stand Up, Indigènes”

AUDIENCE SEGMENTS

Established Majority

Cultural Muslims
Personal Practitioners
Civic Islamists

Influential Minorities

Wealthy Secularists
Old Guard

Wildcards

Strict Practitioners
Young *Banlieuesards*

➤ Indigènes

A small, vocal minority of leftist French Muslims affiliated with the *Parti des Indigènes de la République (PIR)* (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic)—some of whom are referred to as “Islamist-leftists” and “Islamist-feminists”—subscribe to this master narrative.^{1,2} These are a small group of highly vocal, university-educated, later generation Muslims who connect contemporary discrimination against Muslims to France’s history of colonialism. This master narrative receives significant attention in mainstream televised French media, despite being held only by a tiny contingent of young French Muslim political activists.³

MASTER NARRATIVE: “STAND UP, INDIGÈNES”

NARRATIVE: For generations, the *République coloniale* (“colonial Republic”) has treated *les indigènes* (“natives”) as second-class citizens. *Indigènes* have withstood the bigotry and abuses of the imperialist French for decades—from the brutal days of colonialism, to the 1961 Paris massacre, to the vile rancor of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the right’s puppet, Nicholas Sarkozy. Then during the 2005 riots, France showed she had never lost her neocolonial colors, pummeling Muslims with rubber bullets and reinstating curfew laws from the *Guerre d’Algérie* (“French-Algerian War”). *Indigènes* will never deign to become *intégrationnistes cochonistes* (“integrators via ham”), denying the fundamentals of their culture and adopting a Westernized Islam to mimic whites’ consumerist and racist ideals. Instead, *indigènes* must stick closely to their principles, build organizations that stand up to their neocolonial oppressors, decry racism at home and abroad, and avoid any compromise with Islamophobes and imperialists. Never compromising the *indigènes’* core principles of ethnic and religious equality may mean that reform is slow, but doing so is the only way for Muslims to stop being victimized by France.

ANALYSIS: The "Stand Up *Indigènes*" narrative contributes to widespread tension between subscribers and non-Muslim audiences, receiving more media attention than its small subscriber base would suggest. This narrative also contributes to tension between subscribers and other Muslims by harshly criticizing Muslims who seek to integrate into French society.^{4,5,6} Non-Muslim audiences are alienated by the emphasis this master narrative places on subscribers' racial, ethnic, and post-colonial grievances.^{7,8} For example, the term *indigènes*—used by subscribers to refer to Muslim communities—repels many non-Muslim audiences. This term was used by French colonialists in the early twentieth century to refer to Algerians; by using this name for Muslims living in France subscribers imply the continued existence of a French colonialist mindset.⁹ Non-Muslims on the left and right sides of the French political spectrum view this master narrative's demands as "un-French," and accuse subscribers of being *communautaristes* ("self-segregators"). This master narrative also contributes to friction within Muslim communities, both for the media attention it receives and because of subscribers' divisive criticism of integrationist French Muslims. Many French Muslims express anger that this master narrative receives more media attention than other, more widely held narratives such as "*La République Laïque*."¹⁰ Subscribers' unwillingness to respect French values, or to compromise with them, makes this master narrative unpopular among mainstream Muslim audiences who seek more pragmatic, results-oriented routes to political reform.^{11,12,13,14} Subscribers to this narrative accuse many of these Muslims to be forsaking their Islamic and ethnic heritage in favor of Western indulgences, using the phrase "Westernized Islam" as short-hand to accuse them of compromising to Western cultural influences. For example, they criticize French Islamic religious institutions of promoting "McDonald's-style Islam," accuse other Muslims of being *intégrationnistes cochonistes* (inferring they eat foods forbidden under Islam), and point to consumer goods such as halal champagne as evidence that Muslims in France have inappropriately turned away from their Islamic identities.¹⁵ These accusations create publicity, while sowing tension among French Muslims.

Key influencers invoke this master narrative in two primary ways: to bring France's colonial history to the center of contemporary dialogue about French Muslim communities, and to criticize Personal Practitioners and Cultural Muslims. In a 2011 interview, PRI leader Houria Bouteldja said: "France has a neo-colonial relationship with the [immigrant] population descending from the colonial histories. And since we are still partially discriminated against in France, well, we believe that we are still considered indigenous people in the political sense of the term ... still as sub-citizens."¹⁶ In a 2008 interview with an Algerian news agency, Ms. Bouteldja also expressed her anger at integrationist efforts, blaming both French Muslims and the government: "The ruling elites can no longer say openly that we are inferior, so instead they ... showcase 'diverse' people that represent for them successful integration. The major sign[s] of this success ... are people, above all women, that manifest publicly the abandonment of all reference to their origins (it is what we call 'integration via ham'), or better yet, that adopt a very offensive posture against their community of origin."¹⁷ Statements such as Ms. Bouteldja's are viewed as inflammatory in mainstream French political discourse, and receive a significant amount of media attention. Uses of this narrative tend to resonate more widely with leftist intellectual audiences abroad than in France, and as such, are also frequently broadcast internationally.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATORS

Mainstream French Muslim audiences are likely to criticize communicators that give publicity to subscribers' views by interacting with them. By avoiding public interaction with organizations and key influencers that invoke this narrative, US communicators can dodge accusations of legitimizing fringe French Muslim influencers. Additionally, US communicators are unlikely to see payoffs by engaging with subscribers.^{18,19,20} Despite frequent exposition by the French media on subscribers to this master narrative, these subscribers have little sway beyond a small circle of Islamo-leftists. Most do not have strong ties to the broader French Muslim community, nor do they have significant influence in their countries of heritage. It may be best to limit interaction with subscribers altogether, and focus messaging instead on French Muslim communities where messaging gains are likely to pay greater dividends.

US communicators may have greater success with the majority of French Muslim audiences by disputing the anti-integrationist themes of this master narrative to cultivate ties with mainstream French Muslim key influencers. Most French Muslims find messages in this master narrative to be repugnant, although a few members of the Old Guard also subscribe to the narrative's anti-colonialist themes [see: "The Forgotten"]. In a 2008 survey featured in a reputable French weekly magazine, sixty percent of French Muslim respondents said they considered themselves "as much French as Muslim," suggesting that the divisive rhetoric of this master narrative does not resonate with the majority of French Muslims.²¹ Members of the Personal Practitioners, Cultural Muslims, and Civic Islamist audience segments are likely to be appreciative of messaging that counters *Indigènes'* rhetoric.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ANALYSTS

This master narrative shares themes of colonialism with "The Forgotten" master narrative, and melds colonial-era grievances with assertions that Islam is being co-opted by the French state. By monitoring for instances when key influencers invoke "The Forgotten" master narrative in combination with "Stand Up, *Indigènes*," analysts could better anticipate whether France's colonial legacy will remain a point of tension for young French Muslim communities. Additionally, this narrative's links with "The Forgotten" also indirectly link this narrative with Algerian national master narratives [see: Master Narratives Country Report: Algeria]. Many key influencers that frequently invoke "Stand Up, *Indigènes*" travel to Algeria with some regularity. This linkage represents the potential for key influencers in Algeria to access young French Muslims, and the potential for French Muslim key influencers to draw upon Algerian narratives to motivate French audiences. By monitoring key influencers' usage of this narrative, analysts could identify conduits by which transnational influence campaigns might take place.

By monitoring alternative channels such as *Beur FM*, informal and cultural media such as stand-up comedy, comic books, *rai* (Maghrebi folk music) and rap music, analysts could more accurately gauge how widely young subscribers subscribe to this master narrative.²² Mainstream French media often gives this master narrative a significant amount of attention, belying the narrative's limited appeal among young Muslims. If this narrative were to take hold among broader young French Muslim audiences, however, it could be a leading indicator that many are choosing to reject French integrationist ideals in favor of political conflict. Monitoring alternative media sources could help analysts to more accurately anticipate hardening of popular attitudes toward engagement with the French state.



Appendix & Sourcing



Muslim Communities of France Audience Segmentation

The audience segmentation below is optimized for surfacing the most potent master narratives of the Muslim Communities in France, and for delineating the boundaries between these narratives.

ESTABLISHED MAJORITY

Cultural Muslims

The majority of French Muslims subscribe to an idea of Islam as a source of moral guidance and a strong part of their cultural heritage, but seldom engage in religious practice. Cultural Muslims—sometimes referred to as “secular Muslims”—may abide by some traditional religious traditions such as fasting during Ramadan, but they tend not to adhere to daily religious practice, attend local mosques, or study the Qur’an. Members of this audience segment may view some Islamic principles, such as the prohibition of alcohol, as irrelevant in modern life, but still view Islam as an essential part of their identity and worldview. First generation immigrant Cultural Muslims often tend to integrate their Muslim faith with customs and traditions from their homeland. This audience segment is more critical of political Islam than of the government. These individuals span socioeconomic classes and geographic regions, although they tend to be of middle-to upper-middle class origins and live in urban areas.

Personal Practitioners

The second-largest audience segment within France’s Muslim population, Personal Practitioners practice Islam as a religion and a private choice, and assert that religious beliefs should be kept out of the public eye. They assert a belief in the value of France’s Republican principles and interpret *laïcité* as the protection to practice one’s religion freely in private. Personal Practitioners’ political views tend to be focused on economic or educational matters, rather than issues branded as specifically “Muslim.” One exception to this is that many Personal Practitioners are strongly opposed to the headscarf ban, as many view choosing to wear Islamic garb as a private decision, and therefore an issue closely tied to private religious freedom. This audience segment is mostly of working-to-middle class origin, and most live in suburban areas.

Civic Islamists

A slightly smaller group than the Personal Practitioners, France’s Civic Islamists understand Islam not only as a religion and a private choice, but as a way of life that should be publicly recognized. This group nominally accepts *laïcité*, but at the same time pushes for solutions that contravene it. Many in this group strive to gain political affirmation of Islam and actively engage in dialogue with French institutions to this end. While they uphold France’s Republican principles, they believe there is a wide gap between the nation’s ideals and the way they are interpreted and exercised. Civic Islamists allege deeply entrenched French prejudice against Muslims, racism, and economic dislocation as the basis for this gap and thus believe that ethnicity, religion, citizenship, and social class all should play a role in their public identities.

Most view French and Muslim identities as compatible, and desire to be able to express both simultaneously in public spaces. They are mostly middle class, educated Muslims living in urban areas, but also have some poor and working-class members.

INFLUENTIAL MINORITIES

Wealthy Secularists

France's Wealthy Secularists are a small but influential group of mostly men employed in white-collar jobs, many of whom are affiliated with prestigious schools such as Sciences-Po or Hautes Études Commerciales (HEC). Also referred to as the *grimpeurs* ("climbers"), this group supports France's official efforts to promote diversity in the political and economic elite. This audience segment generally supports mainstream political parties, and many aspire to become professional politicians. Many avoid any mention or discussion of Islam for fear of being perceived as religious by non-Muslim French.

Old Guard

Members of the Old Guard are a shrinking group of first generation Maghrebi immigrants who came to France in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s. Most members of the Old Guard moved to France to escape economic hardships, usually due to warfare, in their countries of origin. Algerians comprise the largest portion of this audience segment, as they migrated in droves to escape the violence and economic devastation of the Algerian War (1954–62). One exception to these trends is the *harkis*, who left Algeria to escape punishment for having fought on the side of the French. Non-*harki* members of the Old Guard usually came to France through the nation's guest worker program—discontinued during the French recession of 1973–74—with the intention of eventually returning to their respective home countries. However, most of these first generation immigrants have remained in France for its economic opportunities and social safety net, which many perceived to be preferable to life in the Maghreb even during the worst years of the French recession in the 1970s. Nonetheless, members of the Old Guard tend neither to identify strongly as French nor as part of broader French Muslim communities, but rather as members of their respective country's diaspora.

WILDCARDS

Strict Practitioners

Members of this audience segment share a common dedication to learning the written word of the Qur'an and identify primarily as active Muslims. Members of this audience segment fall into three main categories. First, most Strict Practitioners grew up as Cultural Muslims and have "re-converted" to a strict religious practice. These mostly young "reverts" believe their Islamic practice to be more "authentic" than that typically practiced by their parents or grandparents. As a result, some experience frequent conflicts with their older family members. Second, some subscribers—typically referred to as "converts"—were not born Muslim and adopted a strict practice of Islam. Third, a minority of subscribers has followed strict Islamic practice for their entire lives. The Strict Practitioners audience segment has grown steadily in size since the late 1980s, in part due to the growing identity crisis among many French Muslim youth, who believe they neither belong in France nor in their country of origin. This rising turn to Islam is also rooted in response to personal crises among many Muslims—particularly youth in the banlieues—including drug addiction, criminal backgrounds, or personal isolation. Subscribers' turn to a strict interpretation of Islam is a marked shift from the religious

practice of previous generations of French Muslims, who mostly adhere to more traditional Islamic practices from their countries of origin. Theological interpretations and institutional affiliations among Strict Practitioners vary widely. This segment therefore includes Sufis, Salafists, Shi'ias, and other smaller sects, and does not have a single central organization claiming to speak on its behalf. In their quest to reclaim Islam in a form unmediated by institutions or religious leaders, many Strict Practitioners look to sources on the Internet and television such as *Iqra TV*, rather than to local mosques or religious leaders.

Young *Banlieuesards*

The poor and working class youth of France's *banlieues* ("suburban slums") consider themselves unrecognized, stigmatized, and rejected from French society. Most live in *cités* ("housing projects"), isolated from the economic and cultural activities of urban centers. Young *Banlieuesards*—particularly males—complain of blatant discrimination and abuse by the police, and allege they are stereotyped as criminals. Many Young *Banlieuesards* assert that this discrimination is linked to their ethnic and religious backgrounds, citing the fact that an estimated seventy percent of France's prison population is of Muslim descent. While this audience segment's anger toward the French government is widely-held and deeply-rooted, Young *Banlieuesards* lack a coherent political identity. As a result, their forms of political expression tend to be emotionally charged and come in bursts, the prime example of which is the 2005 riots.

Indigènes

A small group of intellectuals and activists, the *Indigènes* are best known for their participation in the Party of the Indigenous of the Republic (PIR) political party. Similar to Civic Islamists, *Indigènes* assert that the French Republican system is inherently flawed. However, the *Indigènes* connect contemporary discrimination against France's Muslims to the legacy of colonialism, and express contempt for other Muslims who seek to integrate. This connection to colonial history is symbolized by their name: "*indigènes*" is a term non-Muslim French historically used to refer to native populations of North Africa during the colonial era. While the *Indigènes*' political views generally land between left and far left of center, this audience segment's sole focus on ethnic and racial issues inhibits its ability to form alliances with non-Muslim members of France's political left such as the official Socialist, Communist, and Trotskyist parties.

Sources

MUSLIM COMMUNITIES OF FRANCE AUDIENCE SEGMENTATION

Cultural Muslims

- In an interview with Monitor 360, Leyla Arslan argued that most Muslims in France were “secular Muslims,” rather than religiously orthodox or actively practicing. Dr. Arslan explained that individuals who subscribed to this “secular” or “cultural” Islam viewed their faith as a moral guide, and as the root of many of their traditions—but that they do not abide rigidly by Islamic rules. For example, Dr. Arslan said that a cultural Muslim might practice Ramadan and avoid pork—but may indulge in an occasional glass of wine. Monitor 360 interviews with David Prochaska (University of Illinois), 3 February 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhli (EHESS), 14 February 2012; Sara Wildman (*The Guardian*), 15 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Salim Lamrani (Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University), 20 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012.
- According to a 2006 Pew Research survey on European Muslims, “Muslims living in France are indeed absorbing the secular ways of their countrymen, among whom fully 83% self-identify with their nationality, rather than their religion.” “The French-Muslim Connection: Is France Doing a Better Job of Integration Than Its Critics?” Pew Research Center. 17 August 2006: <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/50/the-french-muslim-connection>.
- According to French weekly CSA, “60% of French Muslim respondents said they considered themselves ‘as much French as Muslim,’ with 22% saying they felt ‘Muslim first,’ and 14% ‘French first.’” “Poor Integration, Cultural Gap Keep Muslims Out of Mainstream,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 14 March 2012: EUP20120314237002001.
- Alec Hargreaves describes the lack of religiosity among many French Muslims, stating: “In numerous surveys, between a fifth and a third of young people from Muslim backgrounds regularly say they are not Islamic believers, and many of the others profess only a weak allegiance to the religion of their parents.” Alec G. Hargreaves, *Multicultural France: Immigration, Politics, Culture and Society*. Routledge. 2007. Print. Pp. 104-105.
- Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse describe the variety of religious observance among Muslims of different national origins in their book *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. They cite statistics that suggest that Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa constitute the “most observant subgroup” of Muslims in France, while the subgroup of Algerian descent is “the least observant.” In fact, they point out that half of all Algerians and Algerian Berbers said either that they had “no religion” or that they “did not practice their religion.” Although Algerians form the majority of Maghrebis, who form the majority of French Muslims, there is some diversity among Maghrebis in terms of religiosity: Moroccans are more likely to be religiously observant than their Algerian counterparts. In Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse, *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. Brookings Institution Press. 2006. Print. Pp. 87-88.
- Farid Boudjellal, *Les folles années de l'intégration*. Lisez-Moi. 2004. Graphic Print.

Personal Practitioners

- In interviews with Monitor 360, subject matter experts Sharif Gemie, Leyla Arslan, Nabila Ramdani, and Houria Bouteldja asserted that the majority of the French Muslim community subscribes to an integrationist world view. They described these integrationists as Muslims who uphold the principles of *laïcité* and view themselves as entirely French. Interviewees added that the difference between integrationists and more critical activists is that the former believes that religion ought to be a private affair. They underscored that this is an integrationist view across levels of religious piety or orthodoxy. Monitor 360 interviews with David Prochaska (University of Illinois), 3 February 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhli (EHESS), 14 February 2012; Sara Wildman (*The Guardian*), 15 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Salim Lamrani (Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University), 20 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012.
- Sharif Gemie begins his chapter on Fadela Amara in *French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France*, with the following quote: “My France ... is the France of the Enlightenment, the France of the Republic, the France of Marianne, the Dreyfusards, the Communards, the Resistance. In brief, the France of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.” Dr. Gemie then describes Ms. Amara’s background at length in his book, underscoring her upbringing in the *banlieues* and her continued Islamic practice. Dr. Gemie explains that while Ms. Amara considers herself both Muslim and French, she believes there is a “binary division” between the “friends of liberty” and “the enemies, described as Islamist.” Sharif Gemie, *French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France*. University of Wales Press. 2010. Print. Pp. 66-85.

- Fadela Amara, Secretary of State for Urban Policies under French Prime Minister François Fillon's UMP government, embodies this audience segment. In a 3 April 2008 interview with Algerian daily *Al-Akhba*, she asserted that she was simultaneously Muslim and *laïque*: "Yes, I am Muslim, I observe Islamic practices, I have prayed five times a day every day since my childhood—despite the difficulty I face to complete them at the traditional times—and I fast during Ramadan, which is a very important month for me. Since I entered community life, I never hid the fact that I am a practicing Muslim. It's a private affair that does not prevent me from being *laïque* in politics." "*Fadela Amara, musulmane et laïque*," *LeFigaro.fr*. Translated from French. 3 April 2008: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2008/04/03/01011-20080403FILWWW00531-fadela-amara-musulmane-et-laique.php>.
- A 2011 *Time* story on political activist Dounia Bouzar explains that despite the fact that Ms. Bouzar is "an outspoken foe of the burqa as a male-imposed means of dehumanizing and enslaving women," she just as ardently opposed the law France passed last year banning the garment. She argued individual rights—including what one decides to wear or not—outweighs the law's stated goal of seeking to protect the honor of women why [sic] might wear the burqa it weren't banned." "France's Iconic 'Moderate Muslim' Becomes Target of Islamophobe Aggression," *Time: Global Spin*. 24 February 2011: <http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/02/24/frances-iconic-moderate-muslim-becomes-target-of-islamophobe-aggression/>.

Civic Islamists

- In an interview with Monitor 360, head of the Collective of Muslims in France (CMF) Nabil Ennasri articulated the voice of the Civic Islamists. He discussed the fact that his Muslim faith was not in conflict with his French nationality. On the contrary, Mr. Ennasri argued that his Muslim values contributed to this ability to be a productive French citizen. He expressed his anger at the French state for its allegedly anti-Muslim and racist policies, but believed that the Muslim community had an obligation to work within the confines of Republicanism to reform French society. Monitor 360 interviews with David Prochaska (University of Illinois), 3 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhli (EHESP), 14 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- Sharif Gemie begins his chapter on Swiss Scholar Tariq Ramadan in his book *French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France* with the following quote: "My aim is to affirm the absolute legitimacy of the statement 'I am French and Muslim.'" Dr. Gemie explains that Tariq Ramadan ought to be featured in work about French Muslims despite the fact that he is Swiss because "to date, his most extensive audience has been in France and, in turn, French political cultures have had a decisive influence on his thinking." Sharif Gemie, *French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France*. University of Wales Press. 2010. Print. Pp. 112-132.
- John Bowen, in his book *Can Islam be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State*, cites one of the founders of the Young Muslims' Union (UJM), who said that in the *beur* activism of the 1980s and 1990s, "We were the radicals; we did not fear crying out 'Allahu Akhbar' at our demonstrations." Dr. Bowen explains that this student movement went on to start its own bookstore, Tawhid, which began publishing the writings and lectures of the Swiss scholar Tariq Ramadan. John Bowen, *Can Islam be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State*. Princeton University Press. 2010. Print. Pp. 22-24.
- Several OSC Summary reports highlight examples of Civic Islamism in France, including: the opening of Salafist bookstores; pro-Palestinian political activism; affiliations with the Muslim Brotherhood; and the opening of Muslim schools. "French-language Islamic Bulletin for 10-16 Nov 11," OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 16 November 2011: EUP20111116101001; "French-language Islamic Bulletin for 1-7 December 11," OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 7 December 2011: EUP20111209091001; "French-language Islamic Bulletin for 6-12 October 11," OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 12 October 2011: EUP20111013091001.

Wealthy Secularists

- In interviews with Monitor 360, John Bowen, Sharif Gemie, and Leyla Arslan asserted that the CFCM only benefited a small elite of French Muslims. Leyla Arslan described this group as one that is predominantly male, and that avoids the mention of Islam in the public sphere. Dr. Arslan also used the phrase "riding the wave of diversity," to describe the way in which these Aspiring Climbers—or *grimpeurs*—have reacted to the French government's efforts to incorporate multiculturalism into the public sphere. Monitor 360 interviews with John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012.
- In an interview with Monitor 360, founder of the *Al-Kanz* halal blog Fateh Kimouche used the term "*bourgeois*" (bourgeois *beurs*, French slang for Arabs) to describe Wealthy Secularists. Mr. Kimouche said that this term described someone who seeks to detach themselves from their Muslim, Arab roots in order to appear "whiter" or more bourgeois. Furthermore, Mr. Kimouche said that the term did not directly imply wealth, as he believed it did not include wealthy Muslims like himself, who are profoundly and publicly religious. Similarly, Mr. Kimouche argued that not all Wealthy Secularists were necessarily wealthy—some merely aspired to be, so economic status becomes a part of their identity nonetheless. Monitor 360 interview with Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- In their book *Displacement, diaspora, and geographies of identity*, Smadar Lavie and Ted Swedenborg refer to Wealthy Secularists as being in direct contrast to France's array of "community-based political and cultural groups." Smadar Lavie and Ted Swedenborg, *Displacement, diaspora, and geographies of identity*. Duke University Press. 1996. Print. Pp. 129-134.

- In his book *French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France*, Sharif Gemie explains that individuals like Chahdortt Djavann make a distinct choice to adopt French culture over one rooted in Islam or their nations of origin. Dr. Gemie says Ms. Djavann “presents a clear contrast between Iran,” her nation of origin, “and France, and suggests that France is, in every sense, a better society.” Sharif Gemie, *French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France*. University of Wales Press. 2010. Print. Pp. 48-65.
- Farid Boudjellal’s comic book *Le Beurgeois* depicts a fictional Wealthy Secularist named Mouloud Benbelek, a Maghrebi immigrant in France who became extremely wealthy and mocks and resents Muslims who complain about discrimination or lack of opportunity. Farid Boudjellal, *Le Beurgeois*. Album Soleil Productions. 1997. Graphic Print.

Old Guard

- In interviews with Monitor 360, various subject matter experts explained that first generation Muslim immigrants—particularly those from the Maghreb—tend to have a stronger sense of attachment to their country of origin than the generations that follow. These experts also mentioned the so-called “myth of return,” that many of these first generation immigrants believed for many years, but have since abandoned. Monitor 360 interviews with Arun Kapil (Paris Center for Critical Studies), 31 January 2012; David Prochaska (University of Illinois), 3 February 2012; Justin Vaïsse (Brookings Institute), 3 February 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in St. Louis), 6 February 2012; Maruta Herding (Cambridge University), 8 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (Algerian-French Writer), 28 February 2012; Mohammed Henniche (UAM-93), 28 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhli (EHESS), 29 February 2012.
- Rachid Bouchareb’s 2006 film *Indigènes* tells the story of four North African men enlisted in the French army during World War Two. As they fight to liberate France from Nazi oppression, they also have to fight against French discrimination. Rachid Bouchareb, *Indigènes*. Tessalit Productions. 2006. Film.
- According to Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse in their book *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*, the age distribution of France’s Muslim population is “skewed toward youth.” They explain that the older, first generation that arrived to France in the 1960s and 1970s, “was born of the workers’ movement and trade unionism of the 1970s.” This group was “largely secular and concerned with legal rights, and it can be described as marking the progression from immigration to citizenship.” Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse, *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. Brookings Institution Press. 2006. Print. Pp. 22-23, 89.
- The Old Guard includes surviving *harkis*, the nearly one hundred eighty thousand Algerians who fought for the French during the Franco-Algerian War. They fought in a combination of all-Algerian units commanded by the French officers, mixed Franco-Algerian units, and all-Algerian platoons attached to French units. They were frequently used by the French military as intelligence gatherers for their local language skills. “The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962: Blueprint for U.S. Operations in Iraq,” School of Advanced Military Studies. 26 May 2003: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA429272>.

Strict Practitioners

- Numerous subject matter experts discussed this audience segment in interviews with Monitor 360. In an interview with Monitor 360, Leyla Arslan argued that youth comprised the majority of Strict Practitioner Muslims, but that this segment did not represent the majority of young Muslims. Dr. Arslan explained that the orthodox interpretations of Islam among this audience led to generational conflicts between youth and their parents. Monitor 360 interviews with John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012.
- In an interview with Monitor 360, Leyla Arslan used the English-language term “Born Agains” to describe French Muslim youth who have “re-converted” to Islam. She noted the distinction between the beliefs and practices of these “reverts” and those of their parents and grandparents’ culturally-influenced Islam. Monitor 360 interview with Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012.
- A March 2012 OSC Summary states, “Religiosity appears to be growing among French Muslims, especially the youth.” The report cites “respected demographer” Michele Tribalat, whose research shows that “the proportion of people [in France] of Algerian descent aged 20-29 who said they had no religion dropped from 30% in 1992 to 14% in 2008.” the summary also cites figures from “the reputable IFOP polling institute,” regarding participation in Friday prayers among French Muslims under 25: these numbers grew from 7% in 1989 to 23% in 2011. “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 8-14 March 12,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 14 March 2012: EUP20120316091001.
- According to researchers Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse, “One of the main reasons for re-Islamization has been immigrants’ disaffection and disenchantment with the promises of integration.” Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse, *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. Brookings Institution Press. 2006. Print. Pp. 90-97.

Young Banlieuesards

- Monitor 360 validated that this master narrative appeals to young poor and working-class Muslims living in the *banlieues* in interviews with subject matter experts. Monitor 360 interviews with Jonathan Paris (International

Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence), 2 February 2012; David Prochaska (University of Illinois), 3 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Omar Saghi (Sciences-Po), 14 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (Algerian-French writer), 28 February 2012; Mohammed Henniche (UAM-93), 28 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.

- Sociologist Laurent Mucchielli, cited in Robert Leiken's *Europe's Angry Muslims*, says “*banlieuesards*’ consider themselves globally unrecognized, stigmatized, and really rejected by French society. They are not represented by traditional political forces, and find themselves, consequently, powerless to construct autonomous collective action that is durable and non-violent, as opposed to the emotional outbursts that were the riots.” Robert Leiken, *Europe's Angry Muslims*. Oxford University Press. 2012. Print. Pp. 45-47.
- According to journalist François Reynart, cited in Alain-Philippe Durand's book *Black, Blanc, Beur: Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in the Francophone World*, the French housing projects in the *banlieues* reproduce the same “multiethnic unification” through hip-hop culture: “There is indeed a banlieue culture, rap, and verlan (slang), but it belongs to all the inhabitants of the housing estate populated by as many whites as blacks and Beurs.” Alain-Philippe Durand, *Black, Blanc, Beur: Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in the Francophone World*. Scarecrow Press. 2002. Print. P. XV.
- The popular rap song “**** the Police” by NTM invokes the themes of police brutality experienced by Young *Banlieuesards*. “NTM—**** the Police,” Youtube. 28 April 2009: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DHNP_VQPF8Q.
- Alec Hargreaves explains the disaffection of *banlieue* youth, even as *discrimination positive* (“affirmative action”) has taken root: “Yet even while changing their discourse in ways which previously seemed inconceivable, policy-makers have often appeared half-hearted in their initiatives, leaving minority ethnic youths deeply skeptical as to the seriousness of their intent. The growing frustration and disaffection of those youths erupted in the riots of November 2005, the scale and duration of which far exceeded those of earlier disturbances in the *banlieues*. The replacement of denial by schizophrenia was a classic case of too little, too late.” Alec G. Hargreaves, *Multi-Ethnic France: Immigration, Politics, Culture and Society*. Routledge. 2007. Print. Pp. 10, 109-111.
- Matthew Kassovitz's 1995 film *La Haine* shows the bleak economic and social reality of the French *banlieues*, through the story of three characters—one Arab, one Jew, and one black—and this has come to become central to international understandings of this audience segment. Matthew Kassovitz, *La Haine*. Les Productions Lazennec. 1995. Film.
- For more on this audience segment, see also “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 6-12 October 11,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 12 October 2011: EUP20111013091001; “EU Fundamental Rights Agency Issues Study on ‘Marginalisation’ of Young Muslims,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 27 October 2010: EUP20101028101005; “Youth Gangs and ‘Trouble in the (Housing) Projects,’” CESDIP. January 2008: <http://www.cesdip.fr/spip.php?article332>; “French Police Abuse Power with Black and Arab Men, says report,” *Bikya Masr*. 27 January 2012: <http://bikyamasr.com/55166/french-policeabuse-power-with-black-and-arab-men-says-report/>.

Indigènes

- In interviews with Monitor 360, diverse subject matter experts concurred that this audience segment is a minority in comparison to the mainstream of French Muslims. These experts also explained that the *Indigènes* were unique for their particularly polarizing rhetoric regarding the legacy of colonialism and contemporary racial and ethnic issues. Most of these subject matter experts, including Professors Leyla Arslan and Jocelyne Cesari, were skeptical about the ability of this audience segment to generate political gains for French Muslims in general. Leader of the Party of the Indigenous of the Republic Houria Bouteldja reinforced these views when she explained in an interview that the PIR would refuse to compromise with any nation or organization they perceive to be imperialist, neocolonial, or capitalist. She cited the United States, France, and most French political parties as examples of such entities. Monitor 360 interviews with Arun Kapil (American Graduate School), 31 January 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (Algerian-French writer), 28 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- In interviews with Monitor 360, subject matter experts explained that the term “*indigène*” was the word used to describe “natives” in French colonies. While subject matter experts who do not subscribe to this master narrative used the term only in reference to individuals affiliated with Islamo-leftist or Islamo-feminist movements, subscribers like Houria Bouteldja used the term in lieu of the word “Muslim.” Monitor 360 interviews with Arun Kapil (American Graduate School), 31 January 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences Po), 13 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (Algerian-French writer), 28 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- Dr. Gemie describes a 2005 *appel* (“petition”) signed by several Islamo-leftist groups such as the PIR. Toward the end of the *appel*, Dr. Gemie points out the signers’ “self-definition”: “We, the descendants of African slaves and deportees, the sons and daughters of the colonized and the immigrants, we, French and non-French people living

in France, male and female militants fighting against the oppression and the discriminations produced by the post-colonial Republic.” Sharif Gemie, *French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France*. University of Wales Press. 2010. Print. Pp. 137-158.

- In a 2009 interview with *Algerie News*, Houria Bouteldja expresses the *Indigènes'* anti-integrationist and anti-colonial views: “To integrate yourself, you have to deny the fundamentals of your culture and adopt what is the common representation of the ideal citizen according to the television. ... But even then, it is not enough. Look at the history of the Harki and the discrimination they have faced in France since the end of the War of Algeria. It demonstrates the absurdity of this negation of one's self, which, nonetheless, is proposed as the ideal option. At minimum, it seems we would have to resort to cosmetic surgery to try and get rid of our indelible differences.” “The Decolonizing Struggle in France: An Interview with Houria Bouteldja,” *Algerie News* via *Monthly Review*. 8 June 2008: <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2009/bouteldja281009.html>.

“LA RÉPUBLIQUE LAÏQUE” (THE SECULAR REPUBLIC)

Key Phrases, Symbols, or Images

- **1905 French law on the Separation of Church and State:** This law, often referred to as the “*laïcité* law,” barred the French state from officially recognizing, funding or endorsing religious groups. Secularism is directly mentioned in the French constitution, but this law represented a major shift in church-state relations in France. It has recently come under increased scrutiny and debate in connection with the integration of Muslims in French society.
- **Mme. M:** In 2008, France denied citizenship to a *burqa*-wearing Moroccan woman—publicly known as “Mme. M”—married to a Frenchman on the grounds of her religious practice. This marked the first time the French state took into account a person's religious practice to judge their ability to assimilate into French society.
- ***Liberté, Égalité, et Fraternité:*** “Liberty, equality, and fraternity” are the three foundational values of the French Republic, and are often invoked in contemporary discussions about *laïcité* and integration. This phrasing, originated in the French Revolution (1787-99), became institutionalized in the Third Republic (1870-1914). Many key influencers suggest that “*Laïcité*” is the fourth term in the phrase. (Image via <http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~chazelle/politics/france.html>)



Liberté • Égalité • Fraternité
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

Quotations & Citations

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 19. Monitor 360 interviews with John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhli (EHES), 14 February 2012; Sara Wildman (*The Guardian*), 15 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Salim Lamrani (Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University), 20 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012.
 20. Sharif Gemie, *French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France*. University of Wales Press. 2010. Print. Pp. 1-16

Sourcing

Audience Segment

- Monitor 360 validated that this master narrative appeals to the Cultural Muslim and Personal Practitioner segments in interviews with subject matter experts. Monitor 360 interviews with Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhli (EHES), 14 February 2012; Sara Wildman (*The Guardian*), 15 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Salim Lamrani (Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University), 20 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012.
- In her thesis and in an interview with Monitor 360, Leyla Arslan referred to Cultural Muslims as "secular practitioners" and to Personal Practitioners as "integrationists," and explained that these groups comprised the majority of French Muslims. Dr. Arslan argued that "secular practitioners" tended to engage in a cultural practice of Islam, rooted in the traditions and values of their nations of origin. She also argued that "integrationists" supported the dominant Republican discourse in their belief in maintaining their "differences" to the private sphere—among family and friends, at home. Monitor 360 interview with Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Leyla Arslan, "Enfants d'Islam et de Marianne: une classe moyenne en devenir." Thesis. Print. Translated from French. 2011.
- A December 2010 article in *Liberation.fr* included statistical figures that underscored the fact that Cultural Muslims and Personal Practitioners form the majority of French Muslims: "Out of the 6 million Muslims in France, only 17% of those who pray attend mosques on Friday. And among them the great majority of Muslims pray and then go watch TV with their children." "French Sociologist Notes Obstacles to Building Mosques in France," *Liberation.fr* via www.opensource.gov. 22 December 2010: EUP20101222029005.

Master Narrative

- This narrative was validated and described by multiple experts on France's Muslim communities in conversations with Monitor 360. Monitor 360 interviews with David Prochaska (University of Illinois), 3 February 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhli (EHESS), 14 February 2012; Sara Wildman (*The Guardian*), 15 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Salim Lamrani (Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University), 20 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012.
- According to a March 2011 article on the website of the left-of-center weekly magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur*, several Muslims formerly involved in the conservative Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party reacted negatively to party chairman Jean-François Copé's proposed legislative debate on *laïcité*. Mr. Copé's proposed debate would determine the degree to which the practice of Islam in France ought to be regulated, including whether all Mosque sermons should be conducted in French rather than Arabic, the language traditionally used among even native French-speaking Muslims. Head of the Paris Grand Mosque and official representative to the state-sponsored CFCM (French Council of the Muslim Faith) Abdallah Zekri, publicly tore up his UMP membership card and called on "all Muslims in the UMP" to do the same. Abderahmane Dahmane, technical adviser for diversity at the Elysée (President's office) and former national secretary for immigration at the UMP, expressed his support for Muslims cancelling their membership to the UMP until it had cancelled the debate envisaged by Mr. Copé, claiming that "The UMP of (Jean-François) Copé is a scourge for Muslims." CFCM President Mohammed Moussaoui expressed his "surprise at seeing emerge ... proposals on the exercising of the Muslim faith, in particular the banning of the use of Arabic during prayers and preaching, in clear violation of the two fundamental principles of secularism that are separatism and neutrality." Finally, the rector of the Grand Mosque, Dalil Boubakeur, called on the French president to cancel this debate, asking that the state "not meddle with the sacredness" of Islam. "French Muslims Urged to Leave UMP," *Nouvelobs.com* via www.opensource.gov. 11 March 2011: EUP20110311029003.
- According to a 13 April 2011 report in center-left *L'Express* magazine, Muslims' perceived inability to practice Islam in prison has fueled Personal Practitioners' resentment of the French state. The article cites three primary examples of alleged barriers to free, private religious practice: "a blatant shortage" of prison-certified imams, the "absence of halal food," and a "lack of respect for prayer carpets and other religious objects." Muslims' sense that they are unable to freely practice their faith in prison is further underscored by the fact that the proportion of Christian chaplains to Muslim imams does not align with prison demographics. Muslims represent approximately 30 to 50 percent of France's overall inmate population (and 70 percent in Île-de-France, Lyon, Marseille, and the North), yet there are only 150 prison-certified imams, compared to more than 900 Christian chaplains. "Top Civil Servant Highlights Problems Experienced by Muslims [sic] in French Prisons," *L'Express* via www.opensource.gov: 13 April 2011: EUP20110418029004.
- *Samiha et les fantômes* ("Samiha and the ghosts") is a children's book intended to teach young girls about sexism, specifically the sexism of the Muslim veil. A description of the book by its publisher reads: "When she grows up, Samiha will become a ghost. In her family, as a girl one is a ghost of their mother. It's Uncle who wants female ghosts all around him: 'to be a ghost is to respect your father, your brother, your husband.' One day, Uncle dies and becomes a ghost — a real ghost. 'So, what does it mean to be a ghost?' Samiha asks him. 'What is it like to be by yourself all the time, shut away, far from anyone's glances, far from the sun, what's it like to see the world in black and white from the moment you wake up? I will never be a ghost.'" "*Un livre pour enfant sur le voile intégral*," www.egale.eu. Translated from French. 23 April 2010: <http://www.egale.eu/news/27/109/Un-livre-pour-enfant-sur-le-voile-integral.html>.
- A 2008 program on educational TV channel CapCanal deals with the issue of how to teach children about *laïcité*, specifically in schools. The video description presents that it seeks to answer some of the following questions: "How can children be formed from elementary school onward, to the ideal of *laïcité*? What is the genuine issue in connecting students' understanding of *laïcité*?" The short film features interviews and conversations with children in different schools about questions of religion, acceptance, and *laïcité*. "Apprendre la *laïcité* à l'école," *CapCanal*. 2008: <http://capcanal.com/video.php?rubrique=1&emission=1&key=Z8Nw8jvsDv>.
- Fadela Amara, Secretary of State for Urban Policies under French Prime Minister François Fillon's UMP government, embodied this master narrative in a 3 April 2008 interview with Algerian daily *Al-Akhba*: "Yes, I am Muslim, I observe Islamic practices, I have prayed five times a day every day since my childhood—despite the difficulty I face to complete them at the traditional times—and I fast during Ramadan, which is a very important month for me. Since I entered community life, I never hid the fact that I am a practicing Muslim. It's a private affair that does not prevent me from being *laïque* in politics." "*Fadela Amara, musulmane et laïque*," *LeFigaro.fr*. Translated from French. 3 April 2008: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2008/04/03/010111-20080403FILWWW00531-fadela-amara-musulmane-et-laique.php>.

Significance for Strategic Communicators

- In interviews with Monitor 360, several subject matter experts underscored the difference between the French Republican model of integration, and the Anglo-Saxon multiculturalist model in the US and the UK. They highlighted that in France, one cannot hyphenate one's identity—figuratively and literally—as immigrants are expected to integrate by fully adopting French culture, language, and norms. Subject matter experts explained that in spite of this rhetoric, most immigrants and members of diaspora communities—particularly those in France's Muslim communities—believe despite their best efforts to fully integrate, French society continues to reject them. As

such, according to Sharif Gemie in his book *French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France*, the Republican integrationist model has come under scrutiny in recent years. Monitor 360 interviews with John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhli (EHESS), 14 February 2012; Sara Wildman (*The Guardian*), 15 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Salim Lamrani (Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University), 20 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012. Sharif Gemie, *French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France*. University of Wales Press. 2010. Print. Pp. 1-16.

- Washington University in St. Louis professor John Bowen explains the Republican integrationist model and provides its historical context in his 2010 book *Can Islam be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State*: “French Republicanism promotes the idea that all citizens ought to participate together in public life without being divided by intermediary groups, and toward that end the revolution abolished guilds and corporations, and made it difficult for citizens to form legally recognized associations. In his writings on the new society of the United States, Tocqueville contrasted American reliance on free association with the French reliance on the state.” Dr. Bowen explains that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, “a set of contrary ideas created a running counterpoint to the centralizing logic of Republicanism.” In 1901, citizens were given the right to register associations, and the 1905 law on religion was intended to turn churches over to their control. Dr. Bowen argues that the state “saw the advantage of extending this corporatist logic to immigrants as well, who in 1981 were given the same right to form associations” which then could receive state funds. Finally, Dr. Bowen explains that associative life thrives in France today—but that while “association” is a “positive term in public discourse,” “community” is not. John Bowen, *Can Islam be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State*. Princeton University Press. 2010. Print. Pp. 179-182.

Significance for Analysts

- On 10 February 2011 former President Nicolas Sarkozy stated in an interview with popular French television station *TF1*, in which he rejects the multiculturalist model in favor of an integrationist one: “If you come to France, you accept to melt into a single community, which is the national community. And if you don’t want to accept that, you cannot be welcome in France.” Former President Sarkozy demonstrated support for the private practice of Islam in the same interview, stating: “our Muslim compatriots must be able to practice their religion, as any citizen can,” but noted that “we in France do not want people to pray in an ostentatious way in the street.” “Multiculturalism has failed, says French president,” *AFP* 10 February 2011: <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jR1m5BpMrDES3u4Cso1v3FwQRUG?docId=CNG.6b096ac0cdfcfe7a0f599fbb1c85c27.911>.
- An 11 February 2010 entry on the popular French media blog *LeMedia.fr* cites Fadela Amara’s critique of chart-topping female rapper Diam’s, who the previous October converted to Islam and began wearing a headscarf: “I hope that tomorrow, Diam’s will take off her headscarf. ... She’s become a real danger for young girls in low-income neighborhoods because she’s giving them what I view to be a very negative image of what it is to be a woman.” “Diam’s: violente critique de Fadela Amara,” *Le-Media.fr*. 11 February 2010: <http://www.le-media.fr/diam%E2%80%99s-violente-critique-de-fadela-amara.html>.
- During the debate over *halal* foods in March 2012, CFCM President M. Moussaoui explained that *laïcité* should only intervene in religious practice insofar as those traditions interfere with public order: “At the root, it’s evident that in a secular state, neither the state nor science defines any faith’s religious practices. The only limit that could be imposed ought to be in relation to the necessities of public order.” “*Halal: le CFCM ne veut pas que les musulmans ‘servent de boucs émissaires’*,” *LeFigaro.fr*. Translated from French. 6 March 2012: http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2012/03/06/halal-le-cfcm-ne-veut-pas-que-les-musulmans-servent-de-boucs-emissaires_1652385_1471069.html.

“ISLAMOPHOBIC FRANCE”

Key Phrases, Symbols, or Images

- “**Islamophobia**”: A hallmark term for subscribers to this master narrative, “Islamophobia” refers to prejudice against, fear of, and hatred toward Muslims. This term is frequently used by subscribers as an accusation that non-Muslim French are irrationally discriminating against all Muslims. Use of this term creates tension with non-Muslims, who assert it shuts down debate on otherwise valid questions of integration and identity.
- “**Français de Souche**”: This term, translated literally to “of French stock,” is used to describe French citizens who are ethnically French and religiously Catholic or secular. Both individuals who describe themselves as “*français de souche*” and Muslims—many of whom who find the phrase to be racist and xenophobic—invoke this appellation in political discourse.
- **Tariq Ramadan**: Geneva-based scholar Tariq Ramadan plays an influential role in French Muslim communities, is viewed as a spokesperson for organizations such as the CME, and embodies Civic Islamists’ ideology. Ramadan promotes a “third way” for European Muslims – distinct both from the isolationism preached by Salafists, and the rejection of Islam or its public practice promoted by Cultural Muslims and Personal Practitioners – that encourages French Muslims to act as citizens that abide by both Muslim and Republican principles.
- **Headscarf bans**: Subscribers point to several laws regarding the female headscarf as examples of the French state’s infringement on their free religious practice. Specifically, they point to the 2004 law that forbade the use of the

headscarf in colleges and high schools; the 2010 law that forbade the use of the *burqa* in public; the 2011 law that forbade a mother wearing a headscarf to accompany children on school fieldtrips; the 2011 legalization of private sector employment discrimination against women who wear headscarves; and the 2012 law that forbade use of the headscarf among daycare workers, both while in public daycare centers and during at-home care during work hours.

- **Public Swimming Pool Debate:** Public swimming pools symbolize Civic Islamists' grievance regarding France's alleged double standards toward Muslims and Jews. Both Orthodox Judaism and Islam call for members of different genders to swim in separate bodies of water. In response to the religiously-based demands of some French Jewish communities, some public swimming facilities have allowed a designated swim time for Jewish schools and families, during which individuals can swim in gender-separated pools. However, subscribers allege that the same state-run facilities refuse to make similar allowances to Muslims who seek both seek the same gender-separated swimming arrangement as these Jewish groups, and also seek to wear full-body coverings in the pool.
- **Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen:** 2002 and 2007 Presidential candidate for the far-right Front National (FN) party Jean-Marie Le Pen, and his daughter, 2012 FN Presidential candidate and FN President Marine Le Pen are symbolic, for many Muslims, of allegedly growing anti-Muslim sentiments. Many Muslim and non-Muslim audiences alike point to Jean-Marie Le Pen's unexpectedly high polling numbers in the 2002 election against former President Jacques Chirac (Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)) as the moment when anti-Muslim discourse entered mainstream French politics. Marine Le Pen is also outspoken regarding Muslim immigration, and received significant media attention in December 2010 for her adamant position against Muslim prayer in the street.
- **Claude Guéant:** Subscribers and leftist non-Muslims view UMP member Claude Guéant as a symbol of French anti-Muslim sentiments. Mr. Guéant became infamous among Muslim communities for his controversial statement in February 2012 that "not all civilizations are equal." Although Mr. Guéant claimed that he did not intend to direct this point specifically at Muslims, the statement has been interpreted among Muslim communities and left-leaning non-Muslim audiences as evidence of the UMP's increasing use of allegedly anti-Muslim rhetoric.
- **The "Myth" of French Republicanism:** Popular media and blogs often feature images and videos such as the comic below – featured on a 28 January 2012 blog entry on *CFCM.TV* (which has no association with the French Muslim umbrella organization CFCM)—to express the perceived contrast between France's Republican ideals and the reality of their implementation. (Image via <http://www.cfcmtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/islamophobie1.jpg>)



Quotations & Citations

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2. "Study Finds Islam Has Replaced Republican Values in France's Problem Suburbs," *LeMonde.fr* via www.opensource.gov. 5 October 2011: EUP20111005029001.
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8. "Poor Integration, Cultural Gap Keep Muslims Out of Mainstream," OSC Analysis via www.opensource.gov. 14 March 2012: EUP20120314237002.

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12. Monitor 360 interviews with John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Maruta Herding (University of Cambridge), 8 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012.
13. "What are European Muslims' Concerns and Aspirations?" *TariqRamadan.com*. 24 April 2001: <http://www.tariqramadan.com/What-are-European-Muslims-Concerns,042.html?lang=fr>.
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15. "Charlie Hebdo: la faute à qui?" par Nabil Ennasri," *Oumma.com*. Translated from French. 3 November 2011: <http://oumma.com/Charlie-Hebdo-la-faute-a-qui>.
16. Monitor 360 interviews with Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Mohammed Henniche (UAM-93), 28 February 2012.
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19. Monitor 360 interviews with Jonathan Paris (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence), 2 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhli (EHESS), 14 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Mohammed Henniche (UAM-93), 28 February 2012.
20. "Tariq Ramadan: 'le multiculturalisme à l'anglaise ne peut survivre tel quel,'" *LaLibre.be*. Translated from French. 8 September 2005: <http://www.lalibre.be/actu/international/article/238426/tariq-ramadan-le-multiculturalisme-a-l-anglaise-ne-peut-survivre-tel-quel.html>.
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Sourcing

Audience Segment

- Monitor 360 validated that this master narrative resonates with Civic Islamists in interviews with subject matter experts. Monitor 360 interviews with David Prochaska (University of Illinois), 3 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhli (EHESS), 14 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.

- In an interview with Monitor 360, Leyla Arslan talked about how Civic Islamists—whom she calls the “Critics”—represent a shift from their political activist counterparts a generation ago. Whereas the former focuses their reform efforts on allowing public demonstrations of faith through halal foods or gender separated swimming hours at public pools, the latter focused more on specifically racial and ethnic demands in efforts like the *Marche des Beurs* (“March of the Arabs”). Monitor 360 interview with Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012.
- In an interview with Monitor 360, businessman and founder of the *Al-Kanz halal* blog Fateh Kimouche argued that neoconservative members of the French political system and media falsely draw a connection between use of the term “Islamophobia” and radical Islamists, particularly those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Mr. Kimouche asserted that this linkage is factually inaccurate and further demonstrates French prejudice toward Muslims. In addition, Mr. Kimouche argued that the fact that there is no stigma surrounding the term “anti-Semitic” is yet another sign of French double standards toward Muslims and Jews. Monitor 360 interview with Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.

Master Narrative

- This narrative was validated and described by multiple experts on France’s Muslim communities in conversations with Monitor 360. Monitor 360 interviews with John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Maruta Herding (University of Cambridge), 8 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Salim Lamrani (Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University), 20 February 2012; Mohammed Henniche (UAM-93), 28 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- In an interview with Monitor 360, CMF leader Nabil Ennasri explained that he does not believe there is any conflict between Islam and politics. On the contrary, he said that both his Islamic and his Republican values inspired his own political engagement: Islam encourages Muslims to contribute to society and to social transformation, and Republicanism supports the principles of equality, liberty, and fraternity. He compared Muslim teachings on citizenship to Christian teachings on social justice. Monitor 360 interview with Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012.
- In a January 2012 article in center-left newspaper *Le Monde*, Sciences-Po professor Mohammed Adraoui explained why Muslim youth consider France a “hypocritical country”: “Once many educated youths reach 28-30 years of age, they realize that the cards have been misdealt and that the social contract has not been complied with.” These youth cite “the difficulties they face finding work in spite of their diplomas” as evidence of this break. Dr. Adraoui argues that these youth see this reality as a direct contrast to the opportunities provided them by countries like Qatar, which in 2012 began an effort to invest 50 million Euros in France’s *banlieue* (“suburban slum”) communities. Qatar has stated that they seek to provide French Muslim youth with professional opportunities that judge them “solely on their skills,” implying a distinction from an allegedly biased French system. Dr. Adraoui cites this rhetoric and investment as the primary reason why Qatar’s initiatives in France are “a success.” “Mixed Reactions Greet Qatari Initiative to Invest in France’s Poor Neighborhoods,” *LeMonde.fr* via www.opensource.gov. 6 January 2012: EUP20120106029009.
- Muslim influencers invoked themes from this master narrative in reaction to Franco-Algerian Mohamed Merah’s Toulouse shooting of three Jewish children and a teacher on 19 March 2012. According to a 21 March 2012 OSC Summary, “*Muslim forums questioned the official version of events and even expressed suspicion that a large-scale government conspiracy was at work.*” Other influencers drew on themes from this narrative to encourage the French public not to “succumb to panic and the stigmatization of Muslims.” Other Muslim key influencers expressed offense that the suspect was associated with Islam, and highlighted the “99 percent” of “peaceful, non-violent” Muslims. By invoking this narrative, Muslim key influencers claim they are seeking to prevent a surge in “Islamophobia” toward French Muslim communities. “France: Muslim Officials Urge Public To Disassociate Toulouse Shooter From Rest of Community,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 21 March 2012: EUP20120321091001.
- Popular stand-up comic Samia Oriental uses humor to invoke this master narrative’s themes of French hypocrisy and discomfort with Muslims. In a March 2009 sketch, she focused her jokes on the Islamic headscarf, telling a story about uncomfortable reactions among her colleagues at a daycare center, when they realized her headscarf was not a fashion statement but rather a permanent, religious article of clothing. Ms. Oriental poked fun at how her colleagues would tell her they were very “open-minded,” yet concerned that her wearing the headscarf might encourage the daycare children to turn into terrorists. She also mocked her coworkers’ questions about whether she had been forced to wear the headscarf by men in her family, and joked that the “liberation” of these self-righteous non-Muslim women was only in the space “between the kitchen and the bathroom.” “Youtube: *Le voile par Samia Oriental Comic*,” Youtube. Translated from French. 15 March 2009: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OnErFuHbwA>.
- The 2010 internet short film “*Le Corbeau*” – a slang term for “an anonymous letter writer” – is a political comedy that taps into this master narrative’s theme of perceived anti-Muslim prejudice, specifically in French public schools. The film begins with a young, non-Muslim female teacher receiving an anonymous, threatening letter from one of her students. The letter demands that the teacher cease to wear short skirts and begin to wear a hijab, or suffer violent consequences. The visibly traumatized teacher complains to the principal, who in turn asks her to take a few weeks off from school to recover while the incident blows over. The principal then informs the class, comprised of Muslim and non-Muslim students, that they all will be punished unless the perpetrator takes responsibility for his or her actions. When she leaves the classroom, tension builds between the students, as the

non-Muslim majority determines that the perpetrator must be Muslim. The students form alliances and divisions based on their respective religious and ethnic backgrounds, and are increasingly frustrated at their inability to find the culprit. The final scene of the film shows the young teacher's boyfriend – who has a Muslim name and appears to be North African—picking her up from school on his motorcycle. He asks her if the plan “worked” and she says it did. Smiling, she informs him that due to the principal's over-sensitivity, they have two weeks of paid vacation. The film has a viewership of approximately 1.5 million, and has been shared on Facebook more than 2,800 times. “*Le Corbeau*,” A Part Ça Tout Va Bien. Translated from French. December 2010: <http://www.apartcatoutvabien.com/video-le-corbeau-20.html>.

- Chart-topping female rapper Diam's, who has sold over one million albums and grew up in the *banlieues* of Paris, uses her music as a forum in which to express her sense of stigmatization for having converted to Islam and decided to wear the hijab: “I don't deserve to be deprived of studies or education / This nation is not *laïque*, it's just afraid of contagion. ... The only argument they tell you for why I bother them is that I'm the enemy because I'm a female convert and I wear a headscarf.” “*Diam's: Dans le plus grand secret, elle orchestre son retour*,” UAM93.com. Translated from French. 4 March 2012: <http://www.uam93.com/news/diams-dans-le-plus-grand-secret-elle-orchestre-son-retour.html?643dd299ab0d63a14113ad040155a4a7=4cc536af0064cb91487021e2d5ae78b4>; “Diam's lance son SOS,” *L'Express*. Translated from French. January 2012: http://www.lexpress.fr/culture/musique/hip-hop/diam-s-lance-son-sos_828209.html.
- At a March 2012 “Spring in the Suburbs 2012” meeting in the Paris suburb of Bagnolet, Tariq Ramadan “addressed the issue of how Muslims should participate in the national political discourse. He told his audience that Muslims themselves had to set the agenda.... Muslims became a danger to the authorities, he said, once they began to think ‘democratically and critically.’ They had to enter the political debate ‘not through invisibility but through critical visibility.’ They were seen as ‘traitors’ to the republic because they exposed the fact that those who had been oppressed or colonized did not have access to power.” “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 12-18 April 12,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 18 April 2012: EUP20120419091002.
- In March 2011, Islamic forum readers criticized a statement by the UMP as “post-colonialism”: “On 18 March, the ruling Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) posted on its website a statement titled ‘The Muslims of France Supporting the UMP and the Presidential Majority Have Decided To Create ‘The Union of French Muslims [l’Union des Français musulmans, UFM].’ The statement was, however, soon removed from the UMP website, with a statement saying the page was ‘temporarily unavailable.’ ... On the Salafi-leaning No-Mejliss forum, members made comments [in response to this statement] such as ‘Once again a whiff of post-colonialism, nostalgic in a way!’ and ‘Memories! Muslims during French colonization. French Jews differentiated from ‘real’ French with a star. Will there soon be a yellow crescent on our hijab or kamis [North African robe]?’” “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 17-23 Mar 11,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 23 March 2011: EUP20110324101001.
- In an October 2011 article in *The Guardian*, French-Algerian journalist Nabila Ramdani linked late colonial-era actions of the French police to modern-day discrimination against French Muslims: “Republican values of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* will be all but forgotten when thousands of Parisians recall the most murderous episode in the French capital's postwar history tomorrow. Commemorations are planned for the 50th anniversary of the French-Algerian massacre, when up to 200 peaceful protesters were slaughtered in cold blood around iconic national monuments, including the Eiffel Tower and Notre Dame Cathedral” She concludes her article by stating that “Few would argue that the tribal murders committed by Paris police half a century ago are likely to be repeated today. But nor would anyone pretend that the discriminatory policies which gave rise to such horrors have disappeared from modern France.” “The massacre that Paris denied,” *The Guardian*. 16 October 2011: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/16/massacre-paris-denied>.
- In a March 2011 statement, two French Muslim key influencers asserted the creation of the CFCM was an attempt to “control” Muslims, and linked this with France's colonial history: “[Kamel] Chibout [president of the Greater East Regional Federation of the Grand Mosque of Paris] and [Benabdellah] Soufari [former president of the Regional Council of the Muslim Faith of the Alsace Region] described the French Council of the Muslim Faith [CFCM] as ‘a colonial structure, especially created to keep a grip on the Muslim populations in France.’ They added that the CFCM was ‘never an organization wished for by Muslims in France, but was an initiative of the UMP [Sarkozy's Union for a Popular Movement] to control Islam in France.” “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 25 Feb-3 Mar 10,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 3 March 2010: EUP20100309101001.

Significance for Strategic Communicators

- A March 2012 *Le Monde* blog entry described UOIF-affiliated Muslim communities' critical reactions to the CFCM's decision to remain uninvolved with the 2012 presidential election to avoid “exploiting Islam.” In an effort to place themselves clearly in France's political terrain, five Muslim organizations, mostly affiliated with the UOIF, launched a “call for a citizens' initiative,” which they named “The future will henceforth be constructed with me.” A month after its launch date, this initiative had more than 3,500 signatures, demonstrating some support for political engagement and critique of the apolitical nature of the CFCM. “*Appel citoyen' musulman et cahier de doléances aux candidats à la présidentielle*,” *LeMonde.fr*. Translated from French. 13 March 2012: <http://religion.blog.lemonde.fr/2012/03/13/appe-citoyen-musulman-et-cahier-de-doleances-aux-candidats-a-la-presidentielle/>. Multiple subject matter experts also discussed that the majority of French Muslims criticized the CFCM as unrepresentative. Monitor 360 interviews with Salim Lamrani (Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University), 20 February 2012; Nacira Guénif-Souilamas (l'Université Paris-XIII), 27 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- The UAM-93 is a Muslim organization affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood based in the Seine-Saint-Denis suburb northeast of Paris. A March 2012 OSC Summary defined the organization as “an influential local associa-

tion formed by former members of the French Muslim Brotherhood-linked UOIF, with close links to the Democratic Independent Alliance, a splinter group from Tunisian Muslim Brotherhood party Ennahda.” Since the Arab spring and regime change in Tunisia, it has become increasingly openly tied to the Tunisian Muslim Brotherhood. “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 15-21 March 12,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 21 March 2012: EUP20120322091001; “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 8-14 March 12,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 14 March 2012: EUP20120316091001.

Significance for Analysts

- A January 2012 editorial piece on the French Muslim website *Bakchich.info* describes the weight subscribers place on the term “Islamophobia,” as well as their resentment at the allegedly limited media attention or recognition “Islamophobia” receives in France. The editorial asserts that “Islamophobia is not just a matter of words,” and it is not just “the generally blanket stigmatism of Muslims” hidden “behind the broad screen of free speech,” it also “involves deeds.” The author asserts these anti-Muslim acts are on the rise, yet still ignored by the French state. The article points to Abdallah Zekri, chair of the National Islamophobia Observatory at the CFCM, who considers that many people believe that “if they get caught” for anti-Muslim acts, “the courts will in any case take a lenient line with them, given the current climate.” “French Website Deplores Lack of Media, Political Attention Paid to Islamophobia,” *Bakchich.info* via www.opensource.gov. 30 January 2012: EUP20120206029004.
- Many Muslim and left-wing non-Muslim audiences alike have critiqued the UMP for its shift to the right. In particular, Muslims and left-wing politicians accuse former President Nicolas Sarkozy, former Minister of the Interior Claude Guéant, and UMP President Jean-François Copé – among others – of allegedly pandering to the FN’s more conservative stance on immigration in order to increase their electoral popularity among “swing” voters. In March 2012, former New Anticapitalist Party (NPA) candidate Olivier Besancenot denounced Claude Guéant, arguing that the former Interior Minister “is reading a from a script written by Marine Le Pen. ... Marine Le Pen wants to have a place in the UMP. The UMP wants to have a place in the FN. So one day or another, they’ll eventually meet in the middle.” “*Halal à la cantine: ‘Claude Guéant dépasse les bornes,’*” *LeFigaro.fr*. Translated from French. 3 March 2012: <http://elections.lefigaro.fr/presidentielle-2012/2012/03/03/01039-20120303ARTFIG00271-halal-a-la-cantine-claude-gueant-depasse-les-bornes.php>.

“LA FRANCE JUSTE”

Key Phrases, Symbols, or Images

- **Beur:** “Beur” is the *penvers* (French slang whereby words are said backward by syllable) word for “Arab” in French. The term has infiltrated popular culture and media, and as a result many variations on the word—such as *bourgeois*—have entered French slang vocabulary as well. “Rebeu” has also come into common usage as an alternative to “beur.” Some non-Muslims and Muslims, including subscribers to this narrative, find the term *beur* offensive, and assert that it has negative connotations.
- **Discrimination Positive:** Loosely translates to “affirmative action” in France. The first steps to create these intentional pathways to minorities’ success in France began in the early 2000s, and have been controversial among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The first and most well-known case of *discrimination positive* is at the Parisian Sciences-Po university, which in 2001 initiated a program to favor the admittance of students from low-income neighborhoods in France.

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2. “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 23-29 February 12,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 29 March 2012: EUP20120301091001.
3. “Rachida Dati accuses French PM of sexism and elitism,” *The Guardian*. 14 December 2011: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/14/rachida-dati-french-sexism-elitism>.
4. “*Législatives: Nora Berra se dit victime de discrimination,*” *Le Figaro*. Translated from French. 23 February 2012: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2012/02/23/01002-20120223ARTFIG00585-legislatives-nora-berra-se-dit-vic-time-de-discrimination.php>.
5. A minority of Cultural Muslims and Private Practitioners also subscribe to this master narrative, and share Wealthy Secularists’ support for *laïcité*.
6. Monitor 360 interviews with John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012.
7. “French Muslims Struggle to Achieve Success,” *PBS*. 30 April 2007. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-june07/france_04-30.html.
8. “*Le ‘carré sémiotique’ des discours politiques,*” *SciencesHumaines.org*. Translated from French. November 2009: http://www.scienceshumaines.com/le-carre-semiotique-des-discours-politiques_fr_24339.html.

9. Monitor 360 interviews with John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012.
10. "Rachida Dati, l'ordre juste de Sarkozy," *Liberation.fr*. 1 June 2007: <http://www.liberation.fr/evenement/0101103814-rachida-dati-l-ordre-juste-de-sarkozy>.
11. "The rise and fall of Rachida Dati," *The Guardian*. 19 November 2008: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/20/rachida-dati-france-sarkozy-pregnant>.
12. "French Minorities Have Doubts on Political Success," *New York Times*. 12 April 2009: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/13/world/europe/13iht-france.html?pagewanted=all>.
13. Monitor 360 interviews with John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012.
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15. Farid Boudjellal, *Le Bourgeois*. Album Soleil Productions. 1997. Graphic Print.
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17. "Législatives: Nora Berra se dit victime de discrimination," *Le Figaro*. Translated from French. 23 February 2012: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2012/02/23/01002-20120223ARTFIG00585-legislatives-nora-berra-se-dit-vic-time-de-discrimination.php>.
18. Monitor 360 interviews with John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012.
19. Lofti Belhassine, *Chère Liberté: Tunis, Paris, Bruxelles*. Hugo & Compagnie. Translated from French. 2008. Print. Back Cover.
20. Monitor 360 interviews with John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012.
21. "The rise and fall of Rachida Dati," *The Guardian*. 19 November 2008: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/20/rachida-dati-france-sarkozy-pregnant>.
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27. "French Muslim businessman bucks the trend," *MSNBC*. 5 June 2005: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12802435/ns/world_news-islam_in_europe/t/french-muslim-businessman-bucks-trend/#.T2zXRDFQ550.
28. "Nicolas Sarkozy will find it hard to tempt the French again," *The Guardian*. 14 February 2012: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/feb/14/nicolas-sarkozy-hard-to-tempt-french>.
29. "Le Golfe, nouvelle terre d'asile des Beurs de banlieue," *Le Figaro*. Translated from French. 18 February 2009.
30. Monitor 360 interview with Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
31. Farid Boudjellal, *Le Bourgeois*. Album Soleil Productions. 1997. Graphic Print.

Sourcing

Audience Segment

- Monitor 360 validated that this master narrative resonates with members of the Wealthy Secularists in interviews with subject matter experts. Monitor 360 interviews with Steven Croucher (Marist College), 2 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- In an interview with Monitor 360, founder of the *Al-Kanz* halal blog Fateh Kimouche asserted that the term "bourgeois" (bourgeois "beurs," French slang for Arabs) is a commonly used term used to describe members of the Wealthy Secularists segment. Mr. Kimouche said that the term *bourgeois* described someone who seeks to detach

themselves from their Muslim, Arab roots in order to appear “whiter” or more bourgeois. Furthermore, Mr. Kimouche said that the term did not directly imply wealth, as well-to-do, deeply and publicly religious Muslims like himself are not included in this segment. Similarly, Mr. Kimouche argued that not all *bourgeois* were necessarily wealthy – some merely aspired to be. Monitor 360 interview with Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.

- Renowned graphic novelist Farid Boudjellal’s 1997 canonical comic book *Le Bourgeois* features a wealthy Arab immigrant in France named Mouloud Benbelek, who becomes one of the nation’s wealthiest men. The character is selfish and greedy, and has no regard for any Muslims political initiatives such as the March of the *Beurs*. On the contrary, Benbelek resents Muslims who complain about their economic or social situation, and even opens a “Poverty Museum” as a tongue-in-cheek response to poor immigrants’ economic woes. Farid Boudjellal, *Le Bourgeois*. Album Soleil Productions. 1997. Graphic Print.

Master Narrative

- This narrative was validated and described by multiple experts on France’s Muslim communities in conversations with Monitor 360. Monitor 360 interviews with Steven Croucher (Marist College), 2 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- Sharif Gemie, in his book *French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France*, includes a chapter on Iranian immigrant Chahdortt Djavann, who invokes the themes of this master narrative directly in the following quote: “I learnt my first words of French at the age of 25. ... Today I’m a writer: it’s possible in France to pull yourself up, even if you haven’t got a penny, even if you can’t speak a word. So, I reject this sob-story language, and let’s stop saying ‘we live in difficult areas, we’re poor. ... Here in France, I have not known racism.” Sharif Gemie, *French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France*. University of Wales Press. 2010. Print. P. 48.
- A July 2009 Middle East Media Research Institute report highlights Ms. Djavann’s explicitly anti-Islamic sentiments, in spite of her own Muslim heritage. For example, Ms. Djavann writes: “The French intellectuals who oppose the banning of the veil in secular schools must understand that they are supporting Islamic dictatorships.” Similarly anti-Islamic views are not widely-held among the Wealthy Secularists but form a key part of the worldviews for some key audience members. “Reformist Iranian-French Writer Chahdortt Djavann: The Hijab, a Political Weapon and Form of Sexual Abuse, Should Be Outlawed,” The Middle East Media Research Institute. 7 July 2009: <http://www2.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=reform&ID=IA53309>.
- In a 26 February 2012 forum on the French-language Moroccan *Yabiladi* blog, one forum member questioned the religious heritage of members of the Wealthy Secularists stating it would be “wrong” to say that politicians like Rachida Dati and Najat Belkacem had “sold out” their religion as they had not been religious in the first place, adding that “a strict Muslim would never get a chance to be elected in France, the most atheist country in the world” “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 23-29 February 12,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 29 March 2012: EUP20120301091001.
- According to a 12 April 2009 *New York Times* article on minority representation in the French government, data revealed the French governing class to be “whiter than its electorate.” In fact, “Of the 555 deputies elected to the National Assembly from metropolitan France, just three are from minority backgrounds. There are four out of 310 senators.” A PBS report from the same year and several Monitor 360 interviews with subject matter experts confirmed these disproportionate political representation figures. “French Minorities Have Doubts on Political Success,” *New York Times*. 12 April 2009: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/13/world/europe/13iht-france.html?pagewanted=all>; “French Muslims Struggle to Achieve Success,” PBS. 30 April 2007. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-june07/france_04-30.html; Monitor 360 interviews with Steven Croucher (Marist College), 2 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhli (EHESS), 14 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.

Significance for Strategic Communicators

- Karima Delli is a young female politician who was born in relative poverty to French-Algerian parents. She obtained a masters degree in political science, joined the Green Party, and has been a representative of Paris’s Île-de-France region in the European Parliament since 2009. “Biographies des 72 élus français au Parlement européen,” Euractiv.fr. Translated from French. 20 May 2009: <http://www.euractiv.fr/priorites-de-lue-elections/article/biographies-parlement-europeen-deputes-francais-2009-2014-001702>; “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 3-9 November 11,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 11 November 2009: EUP20111110091001.
- Tawfik Mathlouthi is a French Muslim businessman of Tunisian origin, known for having founded Mecca Cola, a soda targeting Muslim consumers. Mr. Mathlouthi’s political activism has been primarily known for its focus on supporting Palestine and for public opposition to Tunisian leader Ben-Ali during the 2011 Arab Spring. Mr. Mathlouthi is also outspoken in his support for French democratic values. “Tawfik Mathlouthi: ‘Je suis animé par des valeurs universelles,’” *Oumma.tv*. Translated from French. Date unknown: <http://oumatv.tv/Tawfik-Mathlouthi-Je-suis-anime>.
- As stated in a June 2011 OSC Summary, celebrity Muslim French comic Jamel Debbouze was the target of criticism on Islamic websites between 20 and 28 May, highlighting the gap in religiosity between members of the Wealthy Secularists segment and more publicly practicing Muslims. For example, the French-language jihadist forum *Ansar Al-Haqq*, “HamzaElAssad” posted a link to a *YouTube* audio in which “Debbouze spoke of his wedding

to a Catholic wife, regretted ‘religion is becoming more and more present,’ and said he drank wine. The message prompted 23 comments harshly criticizing Debouze; ‘HamzaElAssad’ said Debouze was ‘an enemy of Allah, may Allah guide him or break his back.’ These comments had already made Debouze the target of criticism from Islamic websites earlier this year.” “France: French-language Islamic bulletin for 26 May-1 June 11,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 1 June 2011: EUP20110602243001.

- According to a 19 November 2008 report in *The Guardian*, “Mainland France currently has only one non-white MP and, in a recent poll, 80% of French people said they might vote for a black person at president, but only 58% could bring themselves to vote for one of millions of the French citizens of Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian descent.” “The rise and fall of Rachida Dati,” *The Guardian*. 19 November 2008: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/20/rachida-dati-france-sarkozy-pregnant>.

Significance for Analysts

- Young French Muslim business executive Aziz Senni’s 2005 book *The Social Elevator Is Out of Order... I Took the Stairs* tells the story of his allegedly having lifted himself up from poverty in the *quartier*, to great economic success. A review of the book on Amazon.com states: “Aziz Senni belongs to this generation ‘of the hood’ which has not benefited from the social elevator reserved for the privileged ones with ‘equality of chance.’ Taking ‘the stairs,’ he at a young age proved his character and lucidity,” *Aujourd’hui en France* via www.opensource.gov. 12 January 2009: EUP20090112029003; “*Lascenseur social est en panne...: J’ai pris l’escalier!*” Amazon.com. Translated from French. 2007: <http://www.amazon.fr/Lascenseur-social-est-panne-lescalier/dp/2841877442>.
- A 20 February 2012 tweet from former President Nicolas Sarkozy featured a short Sarkozy campaign video highlighting several youths of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds expressing their support for the President’s reelection. The commentary on the widely-read *Rue-89.com* argues that the intention of this video is to demonstrate the racial diversity – among “*blacks-blancs-beurs*” (blacks, whites, and Arabs) of support for former President Sarkozy. “*Blacks-Blancs-Beurs: la version Sarko 2012*,” *Rue89.com*. Translated from French. 20 February 2012: <http://www.rue89.com/2012/02/20/black-blancs-beurs-la-version-sarko-2012-229546>.
- A page from Farid Boudjellal’s comic *Le Beurgeois* illustrates the interaction between the “*France Juste*” master narrative and the “Islamophobic France” narrative. The comic’s main character, Mouloud Benbelek, says firmly throughout the book that the French are not prejudiced about anything but money. However, Benbelek still highlights the “special treatment” he receives due to his Arab background. In the scene depicted in the below comic, Benbelek arrives to a party where he is expected to attend. When his name is not on the list, he asks them to check for his other name: “the Arab.” Farid Boudjellal, *Le Beurgeois*. Album Soleil Productions. 1997. Graphic Print.



“HELL IN THE BANLIEUES”

Key Phrases, Symbols, or Images

- HLMs: To accommodate the large growth of working-class immigration in the 1950s through the 1970s, the French state invested in large-scale public housing projects, called HLMs (“*habitation à loyer modéré*”—or low-income housing). In the 1970s and 1980s, the physical conditions in these estates deteriorated, due in large part to municipal budget cuts. These housing projects have come, for many, to symbolize the neglect of France’s working-class suburban neighborhoods. (Image via <http://www.lefigaro.fr/medias/2009/08/14/633a770a-88fa-11de-8279-4fbefe7fc2c8.jpg>)



- **2005 Riots:** On 27 October 2005, two French youths of Malian and Tunisian descent—Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré—were electrocuted as they fled the police in the Parisian *banlieue* of Clichy-sous-Bois. Their deaths sparked nearly three weeks of rioting in 274 towns throughout the Paris region, France, and beyond. The rioters, mostly unemployed teenagers from destitute HLMs, caused over €200 million in damage as they torched nearly 9000 cars and dozens of buildings, daycare centers, and schools. The French police arrested close to 2900 rioters; 126 police and firefighters were injured, and there was one fatality—a bystander who died after being struck by a hooded youth. Much of the mainstream media—both in France and abroad—called these “Muslim riots,” although there has been no evidence that these riots were religious in nature. On the contrary, most subject matter experts and residents of the *banlieues* alike explain these riots as a reaction to years of economic and social marginalization. (Image via http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_rFGGrmuM1S8/R1BeOdEZQ3I/AAAAAAAAAFQ/5V_4TgLI4ImY/s1600-R/paris%2Briots2.jpg)



- **Seine-Saint-Denis / “93”:** Located to the northeast of Paris, Seine-Saint-Denis is Paris’s ninety-third department, and is often referred to as “the 93.” The most well-known communes in this department are L’Île-Saint-Denis, Clichy-sous-bois—which was the epicenter of the 2005 riots—and Montfermeil. The ratio of ethnic minorities in these neighborhoods is difficult to estimate accurately as French law prohibits the collection of ethnic data for census taking purposes. However estimates suggest there are 500,000 Muslims out of a total population of 1.4 million. In addition, many Muslim organizations such as the Union of French Islamic Organizations and the UAM-93 call this area home.
- **Hip Hop / Rap Music:** Hip Hop and Rap artists play a crucial role in communicating the themes of police brutality and neglect on the part of the state in the *banlieues*. Outside of the United States, France has the greatest number of rap and hip hop artists. Two rap groups, Suprême NTM and Cortex, are particularly well-known. One representative lyric in a Suprême NTM song is as follows: “You’ve burned the wings of a whole generation / Shattered dreams, soiled the seed of hope / Oh! When I think about it / It’s time to think; it’s time that France/ Deigns to take account of its crimes.”
- **La Haine:** Mathieu Kassovitz’s 1995 film, shot in black-and-white has become an iconic portrayal of the racial and cultural volatility of Paris’s low-income *banlieues*. The film feature three main characters, Vinz, Hubert, and Saïd—a Jew, an African, and an Arab—who aimlessly pass their days in the bleak concrete environs of the HLMs. Their resentment at their marginalization slowly simmers until it reaches a climactic boiling point. The film continues to be referred to by subject matter experts and in contemporary documentaries and articles. (Image via <http://watch-undergroundcinema.blogspot.com/2010/03/watch-la-haine.html>)



Quotations & Citations

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Sourcing

Audience Segment

- Monitor 360 validated that this master narrative resonates with young poor and working-class Muslims living in the *banlieues* in interviews with subject matter experts. Monitor 360 interviews with Jonathan Paris (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence), 2 February 2012; David Prochaska (University of Illinois), 3 February 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Omar Saghi (Sciences-Po), 14 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (Algerian-French writer), 28 February 2012; Mohammed Henniche (UAM-93), 28 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- In an interview with Monitor 360, Sciences-Po professor Leyla Arslan referred to members of this audience segment as “*galériens*,” or “losers.” She described *galériens* as having largely failed or done poorly in school, being oriented toward vocational careers, and often continuing their studies until their late twenties and early thirties. In Dr. Arslan’s focus group conversations, members of this audience segment explained their academic and economic difficulties as the result of the racism of French institutions such as schools and the police force. Dr. Arslan explained further that *galériens* tended to have a lot of anger about what did not function in their neighborhoods and lives, but had difficulty expressing how they sought to change those conditions—or what specifically they would seek to change if they were able. Monitor 360 interview with Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012.
- In an interview with Monitor 360, founder of the *Al-Kanz* halal blog Fateh Kimouche critiqued the mainstream point of view that residents of the *banlieues* were increasingly turning to Islamism in response to their economic and geographic conditions [see also: “Turning to Allah”]. He said that most residents of the *banlieues* prioritized material concerns, such as attaining steady and well-paid employment, a pleasant place to live, marriage and a small family, and perhaps extra time for hobbies such as watching soccer. Mr. Kepel argued that Muslims deserved a “right to banality”—to be able to attain the same “normal” material and social desires as any other French person. Monitor 360 interview with Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.

Master Narrative

- This narrative was validated and described by multiple experts on France’s Muslim communities in conversations with Monitor 360. Monitor 360 interviews with Jonathan Paris (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence), 2 February 2012; David Prochaska (University of Illinois), 3 February 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012;

Omar Saghi (Sciences-Po), 14 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (Algerian-French writer), 28 February 2012; Mohammed Henniche (UAM-93), 28 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.

- A March OSC Summary states, “French media generally refer to largely immigrant-populated areas surrounding French cities, both large and small as ‘banlieues’ (suburbs). A 1996 law created the ‘zones urbaines sensibles’ (*sensitive urban areas*), known as ZUS, to help governments identify high-priority areas for urban renewal. There are 751 ZUS across France with approximately 4.5 million residents, perhaps accounting for about half of French Muslims. “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 8-14 March 12,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 14 March 2012: EUP20120316091001.
- The Qatari government plans to invest heavily in France’s low-income *banlieue* neighborhoods. According to a January 2012 article in *Le Monde*, on 9 December 2011, Qatar announced the creation of a 50-million Euro investment fund destined for “troubled French neighborhoods in 2012.” The *Le Monde* article claims this will comprise almost 10 percent of the 548-million Euro Urban Affairs Ministry budget for that year. Qatar’s initiatives have been met with mixed reactions, ranging from widespread Muslim support for any such investments, to outcries of foreign intervention by the non-Muslim right. Many Muslims and non-Muslims alike also believe these initiatives demonstrate the need for the French state to provide support to French Muslim communities, and compare Qatar’s initiatives to similar ones taken by the US Embassy [see: “American Exemplars”]. “Mixed Reactions Greet Qatari Initiative to Invest in France’s Poor Neighborhoods,” *LeMonde.fr* via www.opensource.gov. 6 January 2012: EUP20120106029009.
- In an October 2011 article in *Le Monde*, journalist Luc Bronner described the “long-term sidelining” that France’s *banlieues* continue to experience. He argued that this neglect is illustrated by a 2011 tuberculosis epidemic—which he calls “a disease from another century”—in Clichy’s Chene-Pointu neighborhood. Mr. Bronner describes this neighborhood as “a ghetto of poor people and immigrants, against which government officials remain helpless,” and points to the area’s “very high unemployment rate, an unequalled poverty level in Île-de-France, and massive academic failure” as evidence. “Study Finds Islam Has Replaced Republican Values in France’s Problem Suburbs,” *LeMonde.fr* via www.opensource.gov. 5 October 2011: EUP20111005029001.
- According to a 2006 Humanity in Action report, unique language and fashion are distinguishing factors between residents of the *banlieues* and those in central Paris—and as such, are used to discriminate against *banlieue* dwellers. The report describes these differences in greater detail: “The rhetorical manipulation of syllables in words like ‘les femmes’ (women), ‘bonjour’ (hello), and ‘je suis énervé’ (I am irritated) creates words with suburban flavor: ‘les meufs,’ ‘journon,’ and ‘sui venère,’ a clear indication that the French dialect in the suburbs is distinct from that of metropolitan France. Likewise, suburban fashion is distinct from that of central Paris based both on ethnic dress and economic hardships.” “A Grey Hope: Thin Territorial Identity among French Suburban Youth in Garges and Sarcelles,” Humanity in Action. 2006: <http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/202-a-grey-hope-thin-territorial-identity-among-french-suburban-youth-in-garges-and-sarcelles>.

Significance for Strategic Communicators

- In an interview with Monitor 360, Leyla Arslan mentioned that even though *discrimination positive* (“affirmative action”) receives a great deal of political and media attention, the members of this audience segment whom she interviewed had never heard of the concept. She said that after she explained it to them, they were generally suspicious of the concept and said they would only be supportive of it in special circumstances, if it was based exclusively on class background, not race or ethnicity. Furthermore, she said some respondents said they felt the concept of quotas made it seem like Muslims were “animals,” and were wary of using any sort of racial quota system given the alleged similarities between Muslims in Europe today and Jews in Europe in the inter-war era. Monitor 360 interview with Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012.
- In a 13 March 2012 television debate between former President Nicolas Sarkozy and Thibault Balka, a writer and activist based in the Val-d’Oise *banlieue*, Mr. Balka underscored the anger many residents of the *banlieues* feel toward the state generally, and the UMP specifically: “You can’t just put a few layers of paint on buildings to say that you care about the *banlieues*. Today, the issue for the *banlieue* is employment. ... As you’ve tried to combat issues like drugs, you’ve created a bad reputation. The image of the *banlieue* is negative, and we are viewed as people who live on the backs of the French.” “Youtube: *Vifs échanges entre Sarkozy et un habitant de la banlieue*,” Youtube. Translated from French. 13 March 2012: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uwt-sjvR_BM.

Significance for Analysts

- In interviews with Monitor 360, several subject matter experts underscored the fact that subscribing audiences were increasingly skeptical of politicians on the left and the right of the political spectrum. Founder of the *halal* blog *Al-Kanz* Fateh Kimouche expressed that parties on the left and the right were equally racist toward residents in the *banlieues*, but differed in how directly they expressed these viewpoints. Whereas politicians affiliated with the FN or UMP were direct and perhaps more grating in their prejudice, those affiliated with the PS are more “paternalistic” in their prejudice—discriminating against residents of the *banlieues* through allegedly condescending social welfare initiatives and more private prejudices. Monitor 360 interviews with Stephen Croucher (Marist College), 2 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (*Parti des Indigènes de la République*), 16 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.

- A 14 March 2012 OSC Summary described the dire economic situation in France's *banlieue* communities, and in Muslim communities on the whole: "Despite 'substantial' state spending on the suburbs, statistics from French agencies and international organizations show that Muslims are less likely to be employed and tend to perform more poorly in school than French residents as a whole. They also tend to be highly concentrated in suburban districts." The report highlighted a 25 October 2010 article in center-left newspaper *Le Monde*, which estimated that "18.6% of ZUS (sensitive urban areas) residents were jobless against 9.8% in other urban areas, according to a 2010 survey by the Sensitive Urban Areas National Observatory (ONZUS), an independent government agency." The report cited further that youth unemployment "is particularly high in ZUS, with 43% of young men and 37% of young women unemployed," which is "twice the national average." The report cites that unemployment "is particularly high among immigrants of North African descent. A 2011 survey by the National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) found that the unemployment rate of immigrants of Algerian and Moroccan descent aged 15-24 reached 45.8% and 40.7%, respectively, against 19% for native-born French. This result corroborated the findings of two 2010 reports by the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies and the OECD. Both emphasized that North Africans were facing the "most trouble to find work," with an unemployment rate 20% higher than the national average and against 6% for Eastern European immigrants." "French-language Islamic Bulletin for 8-14 March 12," OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 14 March 2012: EUP20120316091001.
- According to a 14 March 2012 OSC Summary, while "only large riots" make national or international news headlines, "clashes between youth and the police occur on a regular basis in smaller towns." "French-language Islamic Bulletin for 8-14 March 12," OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 14 March 2012: EUP20120316091001

"TURNING TO GOD"

Key Phrases, Symbols, or Images

- **Halal/haram:** Strict Practitioners' turn to Islam often has to do with a longing for clear moral guidance. As such, subscribers find the boundaries between what is *halal* ("lawful") and *haram* ("forbidden") to be essential to this master narrative. This is most clearly evident through the development of halal cuisine in France over the past twenty-five years. Halal foods have become a marker of identity for many Muslims, reflecting the primacy of many Muslims' religious ethics in their everyday behavior. These ethical and moral boundaries apply to more than just food however, as they are invoked regarding sexuality, alcohol consumption, music, and more.
- **Roqya:** *Roqya*—also spelled *roqia* or *ruqya*—is an Islamic practice loosely translated as "incantations." Decried by the *Sunna*, *ruqya* calls for the words of the Qur'an to be used for healing purposes. Despite *roqya's* Qur'anic roots and evidence that the Prophet Muhammad engaged in *roqya* himself, many Strict Practitioners reject this as an "un-orthodox" practice based in a belief in "magic" rather than in the teachings of pure Islam. As such, these Strict Practitioners view *roqya* as a remnant of the culturally-influenced Islamic practices of their—particularly female—Maghrebi parents or grandparents.
- **Ummah:** The Arabic word "*Ummah*," defined literally as "community" or "nation" refers to a community of Believers or Muslims across the globe who are "brothers and sisters in Islam." This term is frequently used by Strict Practitioners who express a grater degree of connection with their fellow Muslims outside of France than with non-Muslim nationals, breeding frequent transnational ties.

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21. In some French prisons, inmates fill the role of imam/religious teacher as the French penitentiary system lacks adequate numbers of approved imams
22. "Ummah," Islamic-Dictionary.com. 2012: <http://islamic-dictionary.com/index.php?word=ummah>.

Sourcing

Audience Segment

- Monitor 360 validated that this master narrative appeals to Strict Practitioners in interviews with subject matter experts. Monitor 360 interviews with Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhli (EHESS), 14 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (Algerian-French author), 28 February 2012.
- In an interview with Monitor 360, Leyla Arslan used the English-language term "Born Agains" to describe young Strict Practitioners who have "re-converted" to Islam. She explained that this term implied subscribers' return to their roots, and noted the distinction between the beliefs and practices of "Born Again" Strict Practitioners and those of their parents and grandparents' culturally-influenced faith. Monitor 360 interview with Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012.
- According to a 14 March 2012 OSC Summary, "Religiosity appears to be growing among French Muslims, especially the youth." The report cites "respected demographer" Michele Tribalat, whose research shows that "the proportion of people [in France] of Algerian descent aged 20-29 who said they had no religion dropped from 30% in 1992 to 14% in 2008." OSC also cites figures from IFOP regarding participation in Friday prayers among French Muslims under 25: these numbers grew from 7% in 1989 to 23% in 2011. "French-language Islamic Bulletin for 8-14 March 12," OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 14 March 2012: EUP20120316091001.

Master Narrative

- This narrative was validated and described by multiple experts on France's Muslim communities in conversations with Monitor 360. Monitor 360 interviews with Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhli (EHESS), 14 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (Franco-Algerian author), 28 February 2012.

- In an October 2011 interview by *Le Monde* journalist Luc Bronner with political scientist Gilles Kepel, Dr. Kepel argues that French Muslims' feeling of having been sidelined has encouraged an "intensification" of religious practices. Dr. Kepel cited four ways in which this "stronger Muslim identity" can be seen. First, through the rise over the past 25 years in halal, which is applied not solely to eating habits but more broadly to the creation of a moral border between what is banned and what is authorized among Muslims. Second, through the predominance of endogamous marriage, which is "now virtually the norm" among practicing Muslims. Third, through Muslims' political involvement since the 2005 riots, which led among Muslim political elites to large-scale voter registration and a desire "to influence political debates." Fourth, through increased mosque attendance in the two *banlieues* at the center of the 2005 riots and of his study—Clichy-sous-Bois and Montfermeil (Seine-Saint-Denis)—where, out of a total of 60,000 inhabitants, there are at least 10 mosques that can take in up to 12,000 followers. "French Survey Shows Islamic Identity Has Grown Stronger in Urban Neighborhoods," *Le Monde* via www.opensource.gov. 5 October 2011: EUP20111005029007; "Study Finds Islam Has Replaced Republican Values in France's Problem Suburbs," *LeMonde.fr* via www.opensource.gov. 5 October 2011: EUP20111005029001.
- An October 2011 *Le Monde* article supports this master narrative's claim that French Muslim youth are increasingly turning to Islam. The article presents support for the argument that new forms of associative and/or religious support, including imams, are increasingly replacing popular *banlieue* organizations. "Sociologist Analyzes Replacement of France's Working Classes Through Immigration," *LeMonde.fr* via www.opensource.gov. 14 October 2011: EUP20111014029008.
- In an interview with Monitor 360, businessman and founder of the *Al-Kanz* halal blog Fateh Kimouche argued that political scientist Gilles Kepel's thesis—that people turn to Islam in reaction to the conditions in the *banlieues*—is both inaccurate and limited. He asserted that individuals like Dr. Kepel seek to explain Muslims' personal religious and spiritual decisions through social or political frameworks or as a reaction to a condition. Mr. Kimouche said further that such an explanation tended to be rooted in prejudice and lack of understanding. In addition, Mr. Kimouche argued that second and third generation Muslims were no more religious than first generation immigrants. Instead, he claimed they expressed their religious views more publicly and openly than did their parents or grandparents. Mr. Kimouche explained that his parents, who came to France from Algeria, considered themselves to be guests in France. He argued that in the same way that anyone would act differently as a guest than when they were in their own home, his parents acted more cautiously in France than he does. Monitor 360 interview with Fateh Kimouche (*Al Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- In an interview with a Parisian newspaper, Bordeaux Imam Tarek Oubrou reacted to Gilles Keppel's findings, both by mentioning the rising allegiance to orthodox Islamic practices and critiquing the absence of Muslims in political office: "...[W]e don't need a specialist to tell us [about the rise of Salafism]...[or] rise in *halal* foods. It's simply because the number of Muslims is growing. ... I think that it's not normal that the integrationist lever of the Republic does not allow the second or third generation to reach political office." Imam Oubrou also underscored that the growing affiliation among youth to a *banlieue* identity has a "small religious aspect." He also argued that this identity "touches a population that feels threatened. It's the expression of a frustration. Muslims are not a separate species." "*Un imam juge le politologue*," *Le Parisien*. 2 February 2012: <http://www.leparisien.fr/espace-premium/air-du-temps/un-imam-juge-le-politologue-02-02-2012-1841306.php>.

Significance for Strategic Communicators

- According to an April 2006 OSC Feature, Islamic extremists play an influential role in proselytization: "While Islamic extremists make up a statistically insignificant portion of the French prison population, they are regarded by French authorities as a dangerous minority that has helped bring about a 'revival of Islam in prisons.'... A 2005 RG study notes that proselytizing in prison leads not only to conversion but also to radicalization and potential terrorism, a situation exacerbated by the dearth of Muslim chaplains. Recognized authority Farhad Khosrokhavar's interviews with French prison inmates accused of association with terrorists reveal certain shared attitudes and experiences that lead to a rejection of Western values and make the subjects receptive to extremist messages." "Analysis: Radical Islam in French Prisons," OSC Feature via www.opensource.gov. 4 April 2006: FEA20060404021728.
- Tariq Ramadan explained the diversity of Muslims in Europe in an article he wrote and posted on his own website on 24 April 2001: "Many [European Muslims] are trying to find a way to be good citizens in Europe. But there are others who don't want to be part of Europe. Therefore, one must speak of the Tablighis, the Salafis and about the Hizb-ul-Tahrir, and the significant role they play should not be underestimated. They are, and they will be important because there are problems within the Muslim communities in Europe.... Moreover, these divisions could be manipulated in order to advance certain political goals. Some groups might be more susceptible to subtle manipulation, while others are overtly supported by some states. These divisions are not just inward, rather there is more to these differences. The realization of this fact must be part of our understanding of the Muslim future." Ramadan notes the applicability of these examples to French Muslim communities. "What are European Muslims' Concerns and Aspirations?" TariqRamadan.com. 24 April 2001: <http://www.tariqramadan.com/What-are-European-Muslims-Concerns,042.html?lang=fr>.
- In a 31 March 2012 interview with center-right newspaper *Le Figaro*, expert on radical Islam and research fellow at the Advanced School of Social Science Studies Dominique Thomas stated, "Salafism, as practiced in France, is not a danger to society." Dr. Thomas stated further that "of the Muslims who have radicalized to the extent of violence, only a very few have passed through the circles headed by Salafist preachers," and that "Salafism as such rejects political violence." "French Expert Plays Down Salafist Threat," *Le Figaro* via www.opensource.gov. 31 March 2012: EUP20120402029014.

Significance for Analysts

- In an interview with Monitor 360, Sciences-Po professor Omar Saghi expressed that local imams and ethnic media bear little influence on most Muslim audiences' worldviews, as most Muslims are not actively religious. One exception he cites are those who have re-adopted Islam. As such, Dr. Saghi underscored the importance of transnational ties—young Muslims who feel distant from French culture often turn to their country of origin, which has sparked a growing *mouvement de retour* ("return movement") among second and third generation Maghrebis. Université Paris XIII professor Nacira Guénif-Souilamas also supported this viewpoint regarding growing ties to Muslims' nations of origin. Monitor 360 interviews with Omar Saghi (Sciences-Po), 3 February 2012; Nacira Guénif-Souilamas (Université Paris XIII), 13 March 2012.
- The UOIF website describes its own mission as rooted in collective action in line with both Muslim and Republican beliefs: "In 1983, experiencing the need to come together and coordinate their efforts, about fifteen associations from the largest cities in France came together to form the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF). Today, the UOIF includes numerous associations spread all over the French territory. Since its creation, the UOIF has stayed on a track to forge an identity based on a reading, a practice, and a discourse, and has taken positions that both conform to Islam and to the laws of the Republic." *L'institution*, UOIF. Translated from French. 2012: <http://www.uoif-online.com/v3/spip.php?article21>.
- A March 2012 article in center-right *Le Figaro* highlighted the UOIF's multifaceted identity. The article cites Samir Amghar, a specialist in Salafism, saying that "the UOIF finds itself torn between its absolutely law-abiding, indeed, loyalist vision setting out to remain within the republican framework at all times and other, more radical tendencies in its midst. ... How can one be an orthodox Muslim and, at the same time, a good citizen in France? The question is of great complexity for the organization itself." "France: Muslim Organization Upset by Government Ban on Radical Preachers' Entry," *Le Figaro* via www.opensource.gov. 31 March 2012: EUP20120402029007.

"AMERICAN EXEMPLARS"

Key Phrases, Symbols, or Images

- **"American Dream"**: French Muslims are generally highly receptive to the American narrative that success is based not on one's skin color or ethnic heritage, but instead on one's intelligence, confidence, and work ethic. Many French Muslims assert that this is a more inclusive, pragmatic, and realistic approach to integrating minority populations than France's policies.
- **President Barack Obama**: President Obama's 2008 election was widely celebrated by French Muslims as a triumph for ethnic minorities the world over. He is still depicted in a positive light by many subscribers to this narrative, although headline subscribers to "American Imperialists" tend to instead associate him with US foreign policy in the Middle East, which subscribers to that narrative roundly criticize.
- **Martin Luther King Jr.**: Martin Luther King Jr.'s legacy resonates with subscribers to this master narrative as a symbol of diversity and US minority rights. Older generations cite Martin Luther King Jr. as an inspiration for the October 1983 *Marche des Beurs* ("March of the Arabs"), a turning point in French Muslim civil activism.
- **Samuel L. Jackson**: This American actor is popular among French Muslim audiences, and is viewed as a modern-day symbol of the success minorities can achieve in America. His 2010 visit to Parisian *banlieues* was well-received by French Muslim communities, but was criticized by French media for stoking ethnic tensions. Many young French Muslims assert that the French film industry has ignored and misrepresented the *banlieues*.
- **Josephine Baker**: An African-American who emigrated to France in the 1930s, Josephine Baker was a jazz singer and the first African-American woman to star in a major motion picture. She assisted in the French Resistance, and received the Croix De Guerre. French Muslim and non-Muslim audiences alike point to Ms. Baker as a national hero, and older generations of French Muslims in particular point to Ms. Baker as symbolic of the opportunities possible for American-born minorities.

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6. "The Grand (Hip-Hop) Chessboard: Race, Rap, and *Raison d'Etat*," Middle East Report. Fall 2011: http://columbia.academia.edu/HishaamAidi/Papers/908662/_Race_Rap_and_Raison_dEtat_MERIP_Fall_2011.
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9. "U.S. courts the support of French Muslims," *New York Times*. 26 May 2008: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/26/world/americas/26iht-paris.4.13227713.html?_r=1.
10. "CG Marseille Strengthens Ties With Marseille Muslim Community," Consulate General of the United States, Marseille, France. 25 August 2011: <http://marseille.usconsulate.gov/event20110825.html>.
11. Monitor 360 interviews with Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Omar Saghi (Sciences-Po), 14 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Nacira Guénif-Souilamas (l'Université Paris-XIII), 27 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (Algerian-French author), 28 February 2012.
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13. "La diversité en marche," Canal+. Translated From French. February 2012: <http://www.canalplus.fr/c-infos-documentaires/pid4226-c-la-diversite-en-marche.html?vid=584957>.

Sourcing

Audience Segment

- Monitor 360 validated that this master narrative resonates with diverse French Muslim audiences in interviews with subject matter experts. Monitor 360 interviews with Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhliya (EHESS), 14 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012.
- A July 2010 article in *Press & Cite* highlighted the resonance of this master narrative with young French Muslims, particularly those living in *banlieues*: "This use of American soft power meets an expectation of many young people who feel the urge to lunge at the French institutions they deem responsible for their situation (in part due), and are ready to pounce in the open arms of Uncle Sam..." "Etats-Unis: à quand le retour du (vrai) plan Marshall pour les banlieues?" *Presse & Cite*. Translated from French. 8 July 2010: <http://www.presseetcite.info/journal-officiel-des-banlieues/etats-unis-quand-le-retour-du-vrai-plan-marshall-pour-les-banlieues-r>.

Master Narrative

- This narrative was articulated and validated in a series of interviews with experts on French Muslim communities. Monitor 360 interviews with Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhliya (EHESS), 14 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University) 16 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- In a Monitor 360 interview, journalist Nabila Ramdani asserted that the American embassy has been much more active and consistent in their outreach to French Muslims than the French Government. She highlighted that many French Muslims view the United States as the home of the American dream, and celebrate the opportunities minorities have in the United States. CMF leader Nabil Ennasri reinforced this point of view, noting that the US Embassy's efforts to discuss diversity were welcome and helpful. Sharif Gemie underscored that Josephine Baker was an enduring symbol for French Muslims of the opportunities minorities could find in the United States. Monitor 360 interviews with Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University) 16 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012.
- The widely-watched 2012 Canal+ documentary "Washington-Paris, La Diplomatie des Banlieues" investigates the French-American Foundation and the US embassy's involvement in France's banlieues, through social programming, the training of rising politicians, and the invitation of Hollywood celebrities alike. The film discusses the underlying reasons the US is likely to be so concerned with these neighborhoods as rooted in an alleged fear of terrorism and national security threats rising out of these marginalized neighborhoods. "La diversité en marche," Canal+. February 2012: <http://www.canalplus.fr/c-infos-documentaires/pid4226-c-la-diversite-en-marche.html?vid=584957>.
- In May 2008, the *New York Times* reported on French media reactions to US outreach to French Muslim communities: "After a Paris newspaper ran a front-page story last month listing a few cultural projects financed by the U.S. Embassy, indignation erupted. 'The CIA in the suburbs' read the banner during a documentary by the public broadcaster France 2. The left-leaning magazine *Marianne* warned of an 'American takeover of Arabs and blacks.'" "U.S. courts the support of French Muslims," *New York Times*. 26 May 2008: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/26/world/americas/26iht-paris.4.13227713.html?_r=2.
- In July 2011, Members of the National Association of Elected Politicians from the Diversity (ANELD), a cross-party association of politicians from French ethnic minorities, returned from a trip to the US arguing that France should allow the collection of statistics based on ethnic origin. Based on recent visits to the United States sponsored by the US embassy, they stated such a move would help to combat discrimination and promote

diversity. Their views were expressed in Respect Mag, an online magazine specializing in reporting on social and ethnic diversity and urban living, and targeting young people, on Islamic news website *SaphirNews.com*, and in the mainstream media, including TV channels *France 24* and *France 2*, and dailies *Le Figaro* and *Libération*. “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 21-27 Jul 11,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 21 July 2011: EUP20110727104001.

- A January 2012 *Al-Jazeera* article notes a few examples of the French government's to US outreach in French Muslim communities: “Speaking on a television show, former Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin scoffed, ‘This shows the limits of American diplomacy,’ adding that US diplomats were wrongly reading the banlieues crisis through their own history, and viewing France's urban crisis through a religious prism,” “Are Europe's Muslims America's problem?” *Al-Jazeera*. 26 January 2012: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/01/201212110539569620.html>.

Significance for Communicators

- In interviews with Monitor 360, subject matter experts Jocelyne Cesari, Nabil Ennasri, and Mohammed Henniche underscored that French Muslims do not see a conflict between the “American Exemplars” and “American Imperialists” master narratives—many French Muslims describe the difference as “American people” versus “American foreign policy.” Monitor 360 interview with Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University) 16 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Mohammed Henniche (UAM-93), 28 February 2012.
- In 2009, the US Embassy provided a painted mural for the civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. at the Collège Martin Luther King in Villiers-le-Bel, after which a group of African and Arab children sang “We Shall Overcome” around US Ambassador to France Charles Rivkin. “Reportage à Villiers le Bel,” *Rue89*. Translated from French. 20 September 2009: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xajnar_reportage-a-villiers-le-bel_news.
- The vision and ideals of Martin Luther King Jr. have been a contributing factor to activism in French Muslim communities since the 1980s. On its website Civic Dilemmas, the NGO Facing History and Ourselves writes, “When fifteen teenagers set out on foot from the southern city of Marseille in October 1983, they hoped their march might draw attention to anti-Arab violence and intolerance. They invented a new name for themselves—*Beurs*, which was a play on the term *Arabes* (Arabs)—in an attempt to escape the negative connotation associated with being Arab. The “March of the *Beurs*” climaxed in Paris two months later, as a crowd estimated at 100,000 welcomed this new generation of civil rights activists inspired by the likes of Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.” “The Beur Generation,” Facing History and Ourselves. Date not provided, accessed 26 March 2012: <http://civildilemmas.facinghistory.org/content/keur-generation>.

Significance for Analysts

- Leading Muslim influencers frequently depict President Obama in a positive light. For example, on 28 May, leading Islamic news website *SaphirNews.com* translated into French an article by Dalia Mogahed, member of the Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships and director of the Abu Dhabi Gallup Center, in which she underlined the positive aspects a speech from President Obama. “French-language Islamic bulletin for 26 May-1 June 11,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 1 June 2011: EUP20110602243001.
- American film stars and rap artists are well-known and celebrated by young French Muslim audiences. French hip-hop is heavily influenced by American rap; one of the genre's founding fathers, Daniel Bigeault, was heavily influenced by the hip-hop music scene in the 1970s. France is the world's second-largest market for hip-hop music after the United States. “In Paris, Hip-Hop Takes Center Stage,” *New York Times*. 17 June 2010: <http://intransit.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/in-paris-hip-hop-takes-center-stage/>.
- Young French Muslim audiences have long articulated their grievances through American-influenced art forms and symbolism. For example, in the mid-1990s French hip-hop group Suprême NTM sampled well-known American rap act “Public Enemy” for a widely-distributed and celebrated song that expressed hatred of the police in French Muslim communities. “A Guide to French Hip Hop,” *Liverpool Daily Post*. 5 April 2009: <http://www.peterguy.merseyblogs.co.uk/2009/04/french-hip-hop.html>.

“AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS”

Key Phrases, Symbols, or Images

- **Jerusalem/Al-Quds:** Subscribers to this master narrative claim Jerusalem is unjustly occupied, and symbolic of US-Israeli aggression in the Middle East. The French media frequently transmits Jewish-Muslim tensions to French audiences; for example, in November 2011 French media sources widely reported on the desecration of graves in an old Muslim cemetery in Jerusalem.
- **Salah Hamouri:** Salah Hamouri is a French citizen who was indicted in Israel in 2005 for plotting to assassinate Israeli Rabbi Ovida Yosef, and for being a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. He pleaded guilty to the second of these counts, and was sentenced to seven years in jail, a decision widely protested in France. Hamouri was released as part of the prisoner exchange for captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in December 2011.
- **Mohammed Merah:** Mohammed Merah, a 23-year old French Muslim who grew up in the *banlieues* outside of Toulouse, was killed by French police after shooting and killing seven people. Mohammed's victims included

three soldiers who had recently returned from Afghanistan, a rabbi and three children at a Jewish day school. As rationale for his attacks, Merah asserted he did it to “avenge Palestinian children” as well as “strike against the French military due to their foreign military operations.” (Image via <http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/4210549/Toulouse-killer-is-dead-as-32-hour-siege-ends.html>)



- **September 11th Attacks:** Some subscribers to this master narrative view the attacks as a warranted act of resistance by the Arab world. These subscribers often discuss these attacks in terms of restoring the “honor” of Muslim countries, and as incurred by Israeli aggression.

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4. “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 27 October-2 November 11,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 2 November 2011: EUP20111103091001.
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Sourcing

Audience Segment

- Monitor 360 validated that this master narrative resonates with diverse French Muslim audiences in interviews with subject matter experts. Monitor 360 interviews with Jonathan Paris (International Center for the Study of Radicalization), 2 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (Journalist), 13 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Khusheed Wadia (Warwick University), 16 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 February 2012.
- Journalist Nabila Ramdani highlighted that the majority of French Muslims feel passionately about the Israel-Palestine conflict, and believe the US and French governments unjustly side with Israel. She highlighted that this belief shapes how subscribers perceive conflicts in their own communities; many young Muslims called the 2005 riots the “*intifada* of the *banlieues*.” Monitor 360 interview with Nabila Ramdani (*The Guardian*), 13 February 2012.
- This master narrative is a major topic of discussion among individuals associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic leftists, and transmits across national borders. *Ansar Al-Haqq* is the main French-language jihadist

online discussion forum, and frequently features discussion of this master narrative's themes. For example, on 29 June 2011, forum participant "*Le Jardin des Croyantes*" ("The Garden of Believers") posted a translation of a text by Shaykh Abu Bashir al-Tartusi, a prominent pro-jihad Salafist cleric based in London, urging Muslims to "free prisoners." Al-Tartusi said: "One thing about which the community should wake up and worry is the fate of Muslim prisoners worldwide, and particularly that of scholars and preachers. Those who have taken it upon themselves to talk openly and truly and to confront lies. This concerns those imprisoned by traitor regimes submitted [to westerners] and apostates in Muslim countries—and there are many subjected to the torture and humiliation of these obscure and oppressing prisons—as well as those detained in the prisons of the Romans in America or Western countries." "French-language Islamic Bulletin for 30 June-6 July 11," OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 6 July 2011: EUP20110707091001.

Master Narrative

- This master narrative was articulated and validated in Monitor 360 interviews with a range of French Muslim subject matter experts. Monitor 360 interviews with Jonathan Paris (International Center for the Study of Radicalization), 2 February 2012; Nabila Ramdani (Journalist), 13 February 2012; Houria Bouteldjia (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Khusheed Wadia (Warwick University), 16 February 2012; Nabil Ennassri (Collective of Muslims in France), 17 February 2012; Mohammed Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (Activist), 28 February 2012.
- In a Monitor 360 interview, Professor Khursheed Wadia noted that there is a widespread perception among French Muslims that the United States is an imperial power. This belief, Dr. Wadia asserts, is connected by most to the belief that the United States desires to extract resources from Muslim-majority nations worldwide. She also highlighted the Palestinian conflict as a key symbol of alleged US intervention in the Middle East. Monitor 360 interview with Khusheed Wadia (Warwick University), 16 February 2012.
- On 19 December 2011, Islamic websites and forums extensively reported on the release of Salah Hamouri, a 26-year-old French-Palestinian who has been detained in Israel for six years, adding that "his release should not obscure the fate of other 4,000 Palestinian prisoners [sic]." Arrested in 2005, Hamouri was suspected of planning to kill Yossef Ovadia, a member of the religious Israeli Shass party, and of being a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Pro-Palestinian groups and local elected representatives in France, mainly from the Communist Party (PC), have engaged in a constant mobilization for Hamouri's release since 2006. "French-language Islamic Bulletin for 15-21 December 11," OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 21 December 2011: EUP20111222091001.
- Themes from this narrative resonate with both French Muslims and non-Muslims. In a 2011 YouGov poll, sixty-nine percent of French citizens answered "yes" in response to "Do you think that the Palestinians have a right to their own state?" "Why America and France clash on Palestine," *Globalpost*. 22 September 2011: http://www.salon.com/2011/09/22/france_america_palestine/singleton/.
- In a 2011 Pew Survey, approximately sixty two percent of French Muslims expressed that relations between Muslims and people in Western nations were "bad." This is, however, a decline from sixty six percent in a 2006 survey. "Muslim-Western Tensions Persist," Pew Research Center. 21 July 2011: <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2011/07/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Muslim-Western-Relations-FINAL-FOR-PRINT-July-21-2011.pdf>.
- Extremist actions based on this narrative have been widely condemned in the wake of the March 2012 Mohamed Merah shootings. In an interview on 21 March 2012, Abdelhak Eddouk, a Muslim leader in the Paris suburb of Essonne asserted that "Killing young Jews to avenge young Palestinians causes nothing but revulsion." "French Muslims fear backlash after shootings," *Agence France Presse*. 21 March 2012: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/353066/french-muslims-fear-backlash-after-shootings/>.

Significance for Communicators

- While support for Palestine and Hamas may be widespread among French Muslims, it is not universal or unconditional. In September 2011, prominent French Muslim leaders met with Noam Shalit to support the call on Hamas to release Noam's son Gilad Shalit, an Israeli Defense Forces soldier captured by Hamas militants during a cross-border raid. "French Muslim leaders call on Hamas to release Gilad Shalit," *Haaretz.com*, 14 September 2012: <http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/french-protest-leader-tells-israeli-activist-don-t-separate-social-issues-from-politics-1.386137>.
- The United States has provided aid to Palestinian communities, aid to which Palestinian leaders have demonstrated receptivity and expressed gratitude. In a March 2012 article, *Reuters* reported that "Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad said on Saturday the release of \$88.6 million in development funds by U.S. lawmakers would help ease a fiscal crisis in the aid-dependent Palestinian economy. 'This is very important in order to help us deal with the economic crisis,' Fayyad told reporters in Ramallah," "Palestinian PM says freed U.S. aid to help ease crisis," *Reuters*. 24 March 2012: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/24/us-palestinians-usa-aid-idUSBRE82M1CI20120324>.

Significance for Analysts

- Some sources suggest that this narrative could drive subscribers to radicalism. On 21 November, private TV channel M6 aired a video report entitled “From Paris to Yemen, the French People Who Choose Radical Islam,” which documented the reportedly growing influence of small Salafi groups in France and Europe, and claimed new interest among French Salafis in emigrating to Yemen. The video report was based on a succession of short portraits of Salafi individuals and groups, starting with Mohamed Achamlane, aka “Cortex,” or “Abou Hamza,” leader of the hardline Salafi group Forsane Alizza (Riders of Pride). The video closed with an interview with Ali Kurdi during which he claimed that the recruitment of new Al-Qaida members had “never been easier,” and said: “I just have to show them videos, or some pictures of Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine. It is really easy to recruit like this.” Kurdi told the journalist that the “easiest prey” were the converts, and said: “The one who has chosen to convert is easier to manipulate. A non-Muslim is ready to make more efforts, to invest all his money, time, and soul in Islam.” “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 24-30 November 11,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 1 December 2011: EUP20111201091001.
- Mohammed Merah, responsible for the March 2012 shootings of three French soldiers, a professor, and three Jewish students, proclaimed himself to be a *Mujahideen* who belonged to al-Qaeda, and cited wanting to “avenge Palestinian children” as rationale for his attacks. “Toulouse: un djihadiste décrit comme «calme et gentil,»” *Le Figaro*. Translated from French. March 21 2012: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2012/03/21/01016-20120321ART-FIG00355-toulouse-le-suspect-est-un-djihadiste-francais-de-24-ans.php>.
- Influencers across the world on both sides of the political spectrum note the similarities between France’s occupation of Algeria and the Israel-Palestine conflict. A September 2010 opinion article in the *Jewish Daily Forward* states “A right-wing government that settlers believed would look after their interests instead enters into negotiations with an organization that established its position through terrorism. Outraged by the prospect of concessions, the angry settlers openly defy their government’s authority. Despite the onset of peace talks, bloodshed continues—and it is unclear how an agreement can actually be reached. A synopsis of recent events in the Israeli-Palestinian arena? Perhaps. But it could also be a description of France’s efforts to bring to an end to its war in Algeria in the early 1960s. And just as the fate of the *pieds noirs*, French Algeria’s European population, was a key barrier to achieving a negotiated agreement in Algeria, skeptics today argue that the rapid growth of Israel’s West Bank settlements has rendered a two-state solution impossible. Is any Israeli government really prepared to evacuate (or perhaps leave behind under Palestinian rule) tens of thousands of Israeli settlers, as would be required under any foreseeable peace accord?” “Shades of Algeria on the West Bank,” *Jewish Daily Forward*. 15 September 2010: <http://www.forward.com/articles/131316/shades-of-algeria-on-the-west-bank/#ixzz1qFJuZVFR>.

“THE FORGOTTEN”

Key Phrases, Symbols, or Images

- **Pieds-noirs:** Literally “black feet,” this was the name taken by French colonists who lived in Algeria before the Franco-Algerian War. In 1962, the vast majority of *pieds-noirs* relocated to Metropolitan France.
- **Harkis:** Muslim Algerians who served as auxiliaries in the French army during the Franco-Algerian war. Charles De Gaulle ordered army officers to prevent the return of *harkis* to Metropolitan France after the war, although many managed to escape with the aid of non-Muslim army officers. Thousands were killed by Algerians after France withdrew from Algeria; other *harkis* who escaped to Metropolitan France argue they have never been fairly compensated or recognized for their service. Some French Muslims still use the term “*harki*” to denounce other Muslims for collaborating with French government policies.
- **Franco-Algerian War:** The Franco-Algerian War lasted from 1954–1962. It was characterized by guerrilla warfare, and pitted the French Army and loyalist Algerians against insurgent Algerian Muslims. The war ended when France signed the Évian Accords in 1962. The war still divides audiences, with non-Muslim French and Algerians (including members of the diaspora) accusing one another of terrorism, torture, and assaults on civilians.
- **Front de Libération Nationale (FLN):** This Algerian nationalist organization fought the French government in the Franco-Algerian war, and took control of Algeria after the 1962 Évian Accords. Many members of the Old Guard audience segment have personal or familial connections to this group. Tensions persist between non-Muslim French and the FLN; during the October anniversary of the Paris Massacre of 1961, the head of the FLN urged France to present an apology to Algeria for crimes committed during the colonial years.
- **Paris Massacre of 1961:** In Paris on 17 October 1961, the French police attacked a demonstration of approximately thirty thousand Algerian protestors. Sources estimate deaths from the attacks number in the hundreds, although the death toll has never been made public and may never be known as some bodies were deposited in the Seine. Subscribers to this narrative point to this event as a prominent example of the French state’s alleged unwillingness to come to terms with its historical treatment of Algerians.
- **Metro Charonne:** On 8 February 1962, the French police charged a crowd of demonstrators denouncing the Franco-Algerian war at the Paris Charonne Metro station. Nine people died as a result of the charge. The fiftieth anniversary of this event was commemorated in February 2012, during which some key influencers drew parallels between the status of Muslims in modern-day France and the repressive tactics deployed by the police at Charonne.

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4. Master Narratives Country Report: Algeria," Monitor 360 via www.opensource.gov. 29 November 2011: FBS20111129745133.
5. "The massacre that Paris denied," *The Guardian*. 16 October 2011: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentis-free/2011/oct/16/massacre-paris-denied>.
6. "Algerian Min. calls for law criminalizing French colonialism," *Kuwait News Agency*. 7 May 2011: <http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2165008&language=en>.
7. Transmission of this narrative could occur through Algerian-born individuals. For example, an Algerian-born former Guantanamo detainee was rumored in January 2012 to be leading Friday prayers in an illegal prayer circle near Bordeaux. "French Language Islamic Bulletin for 2-8 February 12," OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 8 February 2012: EUP20120209091001
8. "Algerian Revolution Echoes in French Violence," *NPR*. 4 December 2005: <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5038459>.

Sourcing

Audience Segment

- Monitor 360 validated that this master narrative resonates with the Old Guard audience segment in interviews with subject matter experts. Monitor 360 interviews with Arun Kapil (Paris Center for Critical Studies), 31 January 2012; David Prochaska (University of Illinois), 3 February 2012; Justin Vaïsse (Brookings Institute), 3 February 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in St. Louis), 6 February 2012; Maruta Herding (University of Cambridge), 8 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (Algerian-French Writer), 28 February 2012; Mohammed Héniche (UAM-93), 28 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhlia (EHESS), 29 February 2012.
- In interviews with Monitor 360, Justin Vaïsse confirmed that this narrative resonated with non-Algerian Maghrebis, noting that the French colonial legacy is frequently connected by these subscribers to a broader narrative on how the West is opposed to Islam. John Bowen confirmed this perspective. Monitor 360 interviews with Justin Vaïsse (Brookings Institute), 3 February 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in St. Louis), 6 February 2012.
- Approximately one hundred eighty thousand *harkis* fought for the French during the Franco-Algerian War. They fought in a combination of all-Algerian units commanded by the French officers, mixed Franco-Algerian units, and all-Algerian platoons attached to French units. They were frequently used by the French military as intelligence gatherers for their local language skills. "The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962: Blueprint for U.S. Operations in Iraq," School of Advanced Military Studies. 26 May 2003: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA429272>.

Master Narrative

- This master narrative was articulated and validated in Monitor 360 interviews with a range of French Muslim subject matter experts. Monitor 360 interviews with Arun Kapil (Paris Center for Critical Studies), 31 January 2012; Justin Vaïsse (Brookings Institute), 3 February 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in St. Louis), 6 February 2012; Maruta Herding (University of Cambridge), 8 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (Algerian-French Writer), 28 February 2012; Mohammed Héniche (UAM-93), 28 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhlia (EHESS), 29 February 2012.
- In interviews with Monitor 360, John Bowen highlighted that French Muslim communities still view the events of October 1961 as "flashpoints," and that older communities of French Algerians ardently advocate for the French government to admit culpability for widespread violence against Algerians and "abandonment" of the *harkis*. Jocelyne Dakhlia noted that the construction of the *Mosquée de Paris* was meant as a payment of debts, but was viewed to be "far too late" by many French Muslims. David Prochaska highlighted that many French Muslims believe the state owes them financial compensation for services rendered in the Franco-Algerian War. Monitor 360 interviews with David Prochaska (University of Illinois), 3 February 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in St. Louis), 6 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012.
- The term "*harki*" is still used by Muslims to disparage Muslims viewed to be supporting right wing non-Muslim policies. For example, in December 2010 Jeannette Bougrab, state secretary for youth from the ruling Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) of Algerian origin said there was "no such thing as moderate Islam." In response,

Oumma.com, a portal associated with the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), wrote: “[Bougrab] is the new manipulated spokesperson of the government. Without nuances, this daughter of a *harki* comes with her big clogs in order to stir up the darkest prejudices against the Muslims, while asserting her Arab origins in order to give legitimacy to her virulent criticism,” “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 1-7 December 11,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 7 December 2011: EUP20111209091001.

- The 2006 film *Indigènes* (release title “Days of Glory” in the United States) tells the story of four North African men enlisted in the French army during World War II. As they seek to liberate France from Nazi oppression, they also fight French discrimination in the military. The film won numerous awards, including the 2006 Best Actor at the Cannes Film Festival and the 2006 Best Original Screenplay at the César Awards. *Indigènes* also received an Academy Award nomination in 2007 for best foreign-language film. Rachid Bouchareb, *Indigènes*. Tessalit Productions. 2006. Film.
- A short video on the *harki* website harki.net features an interview with Emmanuel Sabatié, author of “*Je ne vous oublie pas*”, a historical fiction book about the bleak experience of three *harkis* in Algeria in the early 1960s, and their journey to France. The book’s editor includes a brief description of the plot: “When Algeria became a purgatory for *harkis* and night brought fear[,] ... [y]ou would have done just as Abdelkader, Benyoucef, Hamed, and all the others. You would have fled to your demise.” The short film also includes clips of historical documents and films, demonstrated in homage to the violence and humiliation experienced by the *harkis*. “*Oujda*” et “*je ne vous oublie pas*” : 2 nouveaux romans qui abordent le sujet des *harkis*,” *Harki.net*. Translated from French 2010: <http://www.harki.net/article.php?id=512>.
- *France24* describes the lack of official governmental discussion of the French-Algerian War in a March 2012 article: “The official site of the Archives of France features a surprisingly brief four paragraphs on ‘the end of the Algerian War.’ Concluding with the July 3, 1962 Algerian Independence Day the website explanation in French ends with an abrupt, ‘During this period, the bloodshed continued and affected all communities: Europeans and Muslims, civilians and military.’ In one concise line, the trauma of a generation and the birth pains of a new nation have been summarised. Absent is any mention of the *harkis*, the Algerians who served in the French security forces, thousands of whom were massacred when French forces withdrew from Algeria. There’s no specific reference to the *pieds-noirs*—the European immigrants in Algeria who fled the North African colony en masse to return to a mother country they never really knew and where they weren’t really welcome. And there’s not a single mention of the OAS (*Organisation Armée Secrete*)—a terrorist group formed by French Army members who refused to accept an independent Algeria and unleashed a bloodbath of terror attacks, including several attempts to assassinate then President Charles de Gaulle,” “France remembers the Algerian War, 50 years on,” *France24*. 19 March 2012: <http://www.france24.com/en/20120316-commemorations-mark-end-algerian-war-independence-france-évian-accords>.
- French news outlet *RFI* notes that former President Nicolas Sarkozy has made efforts to draw upon themes from this master narrative to consolidate his electoral base. *RFI* writes: “Keen to reach out to this group ahead of the presidential election in April, Nicolas Sarkozy recently denounced what he said was the ‘abandonment’ of this group by the French authorities of the time, calling it an injustice, though he stopped short of making a formal apology.” The National Front party has also made overtures to the *harkis*, praising their collaboration with non-Muslim French. “As presidential election looms, no commemoration in Paris of Algeria’s war of independence from France,” *RFI*. 19 March 2012: <http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20120319-presidential-election-looms-no-commemoration-paris-algerias-war-independence-france>; “France-Algeria: 50 Years After Independence, What Happened To The *Harkis*?” *International Business Times*. 2 April 2012: <http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/322773/20120402/france-algeria-war-independence-harkis-le-pen.htm>.

Significance for Communicators

- Tensions generated by the French Algerian war influence how non-Muslim French view specific neighborhoods and industries. In December 2009, *Riposte Laïque* reported that a member of the rightwing party “Republic, Stand Up” was “attacked by the Islamic militia of Barbes” while filming Muslims praying in the streets in the 18th district of Paris. The district in which the cameraman was filming was described as a “North African enclave,” where “the first North Africans came in the early years of the twentieth century, but the big wave of immigrants arrived in the 1950s, often to work in the automobile industry. By the end of the decade the Goutte-d’Or was so heavily populated with Algerians that it became the headquarters of the FLN [National Liberation Front] during the Algerian war.” “French-language Islamic Bulletin for 17-23 Dec 09,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 23 December 2009: EUP20091224101001.
- Historical monuments and museums can become focal points of controversy for subscribers to this master narrative. For example, in March 2009 the *New York Times* writes, “From Marseille to Montpellier, museums about colonialism and the *pieds-noirs*, encouraged by nostalgic and militant *pieds-noirs* like Mr. Scotto, have been proposed or are soon to open, to the consternation of many French who feel that the pied noir story, told by some of its more right-wing partisans, is incendiary and not one anyone needs to hear now. The museum in Marseille not long ago prompted some Algerians to make noises about curtailing economic relations with France should it proceed as planned.” “In France, a War of Memories Over Memories of War,” *New York Times*. 4 March 2009: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/arts/design/05abroad.html?pagewanted=all>.

Significance for Analysts

- Although subscribers criticize *pieds-noirs* for their alleged colonial nostalgia, this mindset does not necessarily transmit between generations. For example, in September 2010 French-language jihadist forum *Nida At-Tawhid*

held a poll asking what forum participants “origins” were. “Abou Malik al Muhajir” wrote: “My father is a *pied noir*, his mother was Italian and his father French. My mother is from Congo-Brazzaville, her grandmother was Chad-ian and her father a pure Congolese. I was born in the Basque country [southwest of France], and as Brother ‘Abou Houdaifa’ said about the Bretons, the Basques also do not feel French. I think that you all know ETA [Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, an armed Basque Separatist Group].” “French Language Islamic Bulletin for 30 Sept-6 Oct 10,” OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 6 October 2010: EUP20101007091001.

- In a 2007 paper for ACME Journal, researcher Amy Siciliano describes the connection between France’s colonial legacy and contemporary filmmaking on the youth of the *banlieues*. “The youth have become ‘symptoms’ of a nation in crisis, not only out of the forces of racialization, but also because of their ‘cultural otherness’: marginalized as residents of a Parisian *banlieue*. Past exclusions rooted in a colonial mentality have been reconfigured into the present, fashioned in such a way that—migration, and ‘the immigrant’ in general, are transformed into both a ‘cause and effect’ of an insecurity, which finds its ‘natural’ spatial fix in France’s multi-ethnic *banlieues*,” *La Haine: Framing the ‘Urban Outcasts’*,” *ACME Journal*. 2007: <http://www.acme-journal.org/vol6/ASI.pdf>.
- In *Integrating Islam*, authors Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse argue that this master narrative experienced a re-surgence in the mid-2000s, and highlight the potential for colonial-era grievances to transmit to a younger generation. “Beginning in 2004 and 2005, a fierce debate about the French colonial legacy emerged in close connection with integration issues, for several reasons. [One] reason was the recent rise in activism on the part of children and grandchildren of immigrants, many of whom trace their origin to former French colonies, bear the burden of discrimination, and resent their current social situation.” Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse, *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. Brookings Institution Press. Print. Pp. 52-53.

“STAND UP, INDIGÈNES”

Key Phrases, Symbols, or Images

- **Houria Bouteldja:** The spokeswoman for the PIR, Houria Bouteldja is considered to be an “Islamofeminist” and an “Islamofeminist.” Her views embody the *Indigènes*’ prioritization of racial, ethnic, and colonial issues over religious ones, although Ms. Bouteldja is a practicing Muslim. Often the target of far-right critiques due to her allegedly “anti-white” and racist beliefs, in 2007 Ms. Bouteldja was arraigned following a complaint filed by the General Alliance Against Racism and for the Respect of the French and Christian Identity (AGRIF), a traditionalist Catholic association reportedly close to far-right circles.
- **France’s colonial legacy:** France’s colonial legacy is the primary symbol in this master narrative, as subscribers believe contemporary prejudice against Muslims in France is rooted in neocolonialism. As such, inflammatory images that invoke colonialism’s oppression of *Indigènes*—such as the below image from the widely-read comic book series *Tin Tin*—are used in popular online forums. (Image via <http://www.indigenes-republique.fr/IMG/cache-288x300/arton1154-288x300.jpg>)



- **May 8:** For France, May 8 is a day of celebration, marking the end of the Nazi occupation in France. However, this date also marks a day of mourning for Algerians: on 8 May 1945, French army soldiers killed 45,000 Algerian civilians. For subscribers, this date symbolizes the contradictions between French-Algerian and non-Algerian French experiences of history. The PIR organizes an annual memorial march for this day.
- **Malcolm X:** Malcolm X and the US Black Power movement of the 1960s are symbols of central importance to *Indigènes*, due to the perceived parallels in their efforts for racial equality in the United States. The PIR has named their annual conference after Malcolm X, and uses his book and speeches in public assemblies, online media communications, and publications. Subscribers view Malcolm X as a symbol not solely of minority rights, but of the no-compromise tactics for which the *Indigènes* should strive.

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Audience Segment

- Monitor 360 validated that this master narrative appeals to *Indigènes* in interviews with subject matter experts. Monitor 360 interviews with Arun Kapil (American Graduate School), 31 January 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012; Mohamad Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (French-Algerian writer), 28 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- In interviews with Monitor 360, subject matter experts explained that the term "*indigène*" was the word used to describe "natives" in French colonies. While subject matter experts who do not subscribe to this master narrative used the term only in reference to individuals affiliated with Islamo-leftist or Islamo-feminist movements, subscribers like Houria Bouteldja used the term in lieu of the word "Muslim." Monitor 360 interviews with Arun Kapil (American Graduate School), 31 January 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February

2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012; Mohamad Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (French-Algerian writer), 28 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.

- In an interview with Monitor 360, founder of the *Al-Kanz* halal blog Fateh Kimouche confirmed that the *Indigènes'* anti-colonialist themes resonate widely among Muslim audiences, and that this segment's grievances regarding France's colonial legacy were harsher than those supported by the majority of Muslims. He also remarked that the fact that the *Indigènes* are mostly young plays a role in the resonance of these themes, as most Muslims in France are also young. Monitor 360 interview with Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.

Master Narrative

- This narrative was validated and described by multiple experts on France's Muslim communities in conversations with Monitor 360. Monitor 360 interviews with Arun Kapil (American Graduate School), 31 January 2012; John Bowen (Washington University in Saint Louis), 6 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Leyla Arslan (Sciences-Po), 13 February 2012; Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012; Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University), 16 February 2012; Mohamad Adraoui (Sciences-Po), 24 February 2012; Slimane Benaïssa (French-Algerian writer, 28 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- In an interview with Monitor 360, PIR leader Houria Bouteldja critiqued France's "integrationist majority," who she defined as those who believe that the French Republic is intrinsically equal. She said her issue with "Islamic integrationism" is that it is a sort of "McDonalds-style Islam," which she defined as a religion that physically resembles Islam, but at the core is merely a mimicry of occidental practices and ideals. She cited examples of this allegedly impure religion as halal whiskey or halal champagne, or Muslim swimming suits. Ms. Bouteldja said that she could not accept that these integrationist Muslims view their religion as a moral guide, if they continue to live in what she described as an imperialist society that allegedly continues to subjugate Muslims daily. Monitor 360 interview with Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012
- In an interview with Monitor 360, Fateh Kimouche argued that the reason groups like the PIR receive disproportionate media attention is because if someone is featured on a prominent television or radio program once, they become labeled an expert and are asked to come back often, regardless of their credibility in their own communities. Mr. Kimouche asserted that the PIR has a compelling and original discourse, which is interesting even to those who do not agree with them. Similarly, media debates require several viewpoints, and seek Houria Bouteldja to represent an Islamo-leftist perspective. Monitor 360 interview with Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- A March 2010 OSC Summary describes the PIR as an "Islamo-leftist and self-described 'anti-colonial'" party connected to the Movement of the Indigenous of the Republic (MIR). It held its first constituent congress in Saint-Denis, a *banlieue* Northeast of Paris. The summary quotes an official PIR statement announcing the official creation of the party, in which it calls on "those who want to mobilize against the contemporary forms of colonialism and racism and against the oppression suffered by the working-class neighborhood to join" them. The summary also points out that on 7 March 2010 Interior Minister Brice Hortefeux declared that he "does not rule out demanding the dissolution of this new party." "France: French-language Islamic Bulletin for 4–10 March 10," OSC Summary via www.opensource.gov. 10 March 2010: EUP20100311101001.
- Night Orient, the first brand of non-alcoholic, halal champagne marketed in the French banlieues was trumpeted by its manufacturer as "one more way that Muslims can integrate into European society, especially during the holiday season." According to French Muslim news site Saphirenews, a competitor brand, Cham'Alal, started to be sold in France at the beginning of Ramadan 2008. "Halal champagne' falls a little flat," *The National*.ae. Date not specified: <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/europe/halal-champagne-falls-a-little-flat>; "Champagne Halal: 'la marque islam se vend bien,'" SaphirNews.net. Translated from French. 19 June 2008: http://www.saphirnews.com/Champagne-Halal-la-marque-islam-se-vend-bien_a9168.html; "Non-alcoholic! Only 25 calories per serving!" Night Orient. No date specified: http://www.nightorient.fr/index_fr.htm.
- The term "integration via ham" is a metaphor used by Houria Bouteldja in a June 2008 interview with Saïd Mekki for *Algerie News*. A footnote in the translated version of this article states that the metaphor "makes reference to the assimilation of Muslims to a French identity by means of leaving their own culture, identity and epistemology. The metaphor comes from the fact that Muslim religious practice entails not eating pig meat. For many Arab-Muslims who try to assimilate to a French identity, to be able to demonstrate their high degree of assimilation, resort to eating ham in public space. This is a reminiscent of the 'celebration of the pig' in the 16th century Imperial Spain following the conquest of Al-Andalus and the Americas, where many Jews and Muslims held the celebration of the pig as a public act in their municipalities to hide their origins or their religious identity, with the purpose of eliminating any suspicion on the part of the ecclesiastical/statist authorities of the Catholic Spanish monarchy." "The Decolonizing Struggle in France: An Interview with Houria Bouteldja," *Algerie News* via Monthly Review. 8 June 2008: <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2009/bouteldja281009.html>.

Significance for Strategic Communicators

- In an interview with Monitor 360, professor Arun Kapil confirmed the marginality of this master narrative. He explained that French Muslims and non-Muslims alike accept radically leftist perspectives in their political discourse, but reject the *Indigènes'* racially radical politics as a break with republican values. Dr. Kapil argued that

Muslims in particular viewed the militancy of this master narrative as counterproductive, as it immediately shuts off political discourse. Monitor 360 interview with Arun Kapil (American Graduate School), 31 January 2012.

- In an interview with Monitor 360, Houria Bouteldja explained that she and the PIR rejected all the efforts of the US Embassy in the French *banlieues* and critiqued those Muslims who had welcomed these US-led initiatives. Ms. Bouteldja said that she refused to work with any group she considered to be imperialist in nature, regardless of whether that assistance helped residents of the *banlieues*. Monitor 360 interview with Houria Bouteldja (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic), 16 February 2012.

Significance for Analysts

- In interviews with Monitor 360, several subject matter experts described “*communautarisme*” as a uniquely French phenomenon defined loosely as self-segregation or tribalism. Subject matter experts explained that this term had an extremely negative connotation in the French political context, and that the term is undoubtedly used to describe political engagement centered on racial or ethnic issues. Monitor 360 interviews with Arun Kapil (American Graduate School), 31 January 2012; Omar Saghi (Sciences-Po), 3 February 2012; Maruta Herding (University of Cambridge), 8 February 2012; Sharif Gemie (University of Glamorgan), 10 February 2012; Jocelyne Dakhlia (EHESS), 14 February 2012; Nabil Ennasri (Collectif des Musulmans de France), 17 February 2012; Fateh Kimouche (*Al-Kanz*), 28 March 2012.
- *Beur FM* is a popular private, free French radio station that caters to France’s Muslim communities, particularly those from the Maghreb. Established in 1992 by Nacer Kettane, *Beur FM* broadcasts for 23 hours a day on more than 15 frequencies. The station primarily broadcasts in French, but also includes some Arabic and Berber language broadcasts. “*La fréquence de BEUR FM*,” *Fréquence-Radio.com*. Translated from French. Date unknown: <http://www.fréquence-radio.com/fréquence-BEUR%20FM.html>; “*Nacer Kettane, PDG de Beur FM*,” *Journalisme.com*. Translated from French. 2011: <http://www.journalisme.com/content/view/383/131/>; “*Youtube: Edition Spéciale de Canal+ Nacer Kettane BEUR FM.m4v*,” *Youtube*. Translated from French. 23 February 2011: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y0J2wC16acU>.
- *Raï* music is Maghrebi folk music, which gained prominence in Algeria in the 1960s and remains popular in North Africa and France. It is sometimes compared to American “blues” due to its focus on alienation, poverty, drug and alcohol abuse, and forbidden sexual desires. Modern *raï* singers often blend traditional *raï* with rock—called “*rock n’ raï*”—or rap music. Cheb Khaled is the most well-known contemporary *raï* singer in France today, whose chart-topping song “*Aïcha*” has over 8 million views on *Youtube*. “*Raï: Barbès en hausse*,” *L’Express*. Translated from French. 27 May 1999: http://www.lexpress.fr/informations/barbes-en-hausse_633815.html; “*Youtube: aïcha cheb khaled*,” *Youtube*. Translated from French. 19 June 2007: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iIyyPsqRweE>; “*Accueil*,” *MusiqueRay.org*. Translated from French. 2011: <http://www.musiqueray.org/>.







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