Tag: Syrian Refugees

Syria Sentences Bashar al-Assad to Death in Absentia – As Former Al-Qaeda Commander Leads Country

Syria Sentences Bashar al‑Assad to Death in Absentia – As Former Al‑Qaeda Commander Now Leads the Country

A Damascus criminal court has sentenced former Syrian president Bashar al‑Assad to death in absentia, convicting him of crimes against humanity, war crimes, premeditated murder, torture and arbitrary arrest committed during the country’s nearly 14‑year civil war. The landmark ruling also condemned his brother Maher al‑Assad and five other former military and security officials to death.

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The Verdict

On August 11, 2026, Judge Fakhr al‑Din al‑Aryan of the Fourth Criminal Court in Damascus delivered the historic judgment. The court found Assad guilty of “premeditated and intentional murder of more than one person and of children, torture, arbitrary arrest and crimes against humanity”.

The trial lasted nearly four months. Assad, who fled to Russia after his regime was overthrown in December 2024, was tried in absentia along with most other defendants. The only accused to appear in person was Atef Najib, Assad’s cousin and former security chief in Daraa province, who was arrested in early 2025 and stood trial in a cage wearing a prison uniform.

In addition to Assad and Najib, the court sentenced:

· Maher al‑Assad – Bashar’s younger brother and commander of the feared Fourth Armoured Division – to death in absentia
· Fahd al‑Freij – former defence minister – to death in absentia
· Four other unnamed former military and security officials

—

The Crimes

The charges stem from Assad’s brutal crackdown on the 2011 pro‑democracy protests, which spiralled into a civil war that killed hundreds of thousands of Syrians.

The court established that Assad, as “the highest decision‑maker”, bore direct responsibility for directing state institutions to commit systematic violations. His brother Maher led the Fourth Division, which spearheaded the crackdown on protests, recaptured territory and was accused of running a drug trafficking network to enrich the regime.

Atef Najib, the former head of political security in Daraa, was convicted for his role in the 2011 torture of 15 teenage boys who had graffitied anti‑Assad slogans – an event widely seen as the spark that ignited the nationwide uprising.

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Reaction in Syria: “The Joy Is Indescribable”

As news of the verdict spread, crowds gathered outside the courthouse in Damascus, chanting, applauding and waving Syrian flags. Celebrations also erupted in Daraa, the birthplace of the revolution.

“The joy is indescribable. God willing we will see Bashar al‑Assad and all his aides hanging on the gallows.” – A man in Damascus, holding a photo of his late father.

Nouha al‑Masri, a prosecutor in the case who lost her brother in the 2011 Daraa massacre, told the BBC:

“We have been waiting for 15 years to reclaim even a small part of our rights… In the new Syria, there will be no impunity from this day forward.”

—

The New Government: From Terrorist to President

The court that convicted Assad sits in a Syria that has undergone a radical transformation. The regime that fell in December 2024 was overthrown by a coalition of rebel forces led by Hay’at Tahrir al‑Sham (HTS) – a group with deep roots in Al‑Qaeda and still designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union.

The man who now leads Syria is Ahmed al‑Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al‑Jolani. Just a few years ago, he was one of the most wanted terrorists in the world, with a **$10 million U.S. bounty** on his head. The U.S. designated him a “specially designated global terrorist” in 2013, and the FBI maintained a Rewards for Justice programme offering the $10 million reward for information leading to his capture as recently as 2017.

In January 2025, al‑Sharaa was declared Syria’s transitional president. An interim constitutional declaration came into effect in March, and a new government was established under HTS leadership. Al‑Sharaa has since appointed a 210‑member parliament, with 70 lawmakers directly appointed by him, and has consolidated executive authority while operating an extensive patronage network.

The irony is stark: a man once hunted by the U.S. as a terrorist now meets with American officials. In November 2025, al‑Sharaa visited the White House, where President Trump received him. U.S. officials have acknowledged direct contacts with HTS, and while they have noted al‑Sharaa’s welcome comments about protecting minority and women’s rights, they remain sceptical about his long‑term intentions. The U.S. embassy in Syria, meanwhile, has not removed its “WANTED” notice for the man it once offered $10 million to capture.

Britain, too, continues to outlaw HTS, while the EU maintains financial sanctions against al‑Jolani. The new Syrian leadership thus exists in a state of diplomatic limbo: internationally recognised as the de facto government, yet led by individuals still designated as terrorists by the very powers now negotiating with them.

—

Symbolic Justice or Practical Dead End?

While the verdict is a powerful symbol of transitional justice, its practical impact is limited. Assad and his brother remain in Moscow, where they were granted asylum on humanitarian grounds. Russia has previously declined extradition requests.

Human rights activists warn that the death sentence could complicate any future extradition, as countries generally refuse to surrender suspects to nations where they face execution. Syria’s new authorities have said they will pursue “international legal avenues” to try to prosecute the two men.

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A New Chapter for Syria

The trial is part of a broader effort by Syria’s interim government to break with the Assad dynasty’s five‑decade legacy of repression. Since the regime fell in December 2024, authorities have detained numerous former officials and launched investigations into atrocities.

The verdict was described by prosecutors as “as big as the sacrifices that Syrians gave for 15 years”. For many, it is a first step toward accountability – even if the former dictator himself remains beyond reach.

Yet the question of who now holds power in Syria remains deeply uncomfortable for the international community. The man who signed the order to try Assad is himself a former Al‑Qaeda commander, still wanted by many of the same nations that applaud the verdict. In Syria, justice for Assad’s victims is being delivered by a government that, until recently, was itself considered a terrorist organisation. The paradox could not be more acute.

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Syrien verurteilt Assad zum Tode – während Ex-Terrorist das Land regiert

Ein Strafgericht in Damaskus hat den früheren syrischen Präsidenten Baschar al-Assad in Abwesenheit zum Tode verurteilt. Der Schuldspruch umfasst Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit, Kriegsverbrechen, Mord, Folter und willkürliche Verhaftungen während des fast 14-jährigen Bürgerkriegs. Das historische Urteil verurteilt auch seinen Bruder Maher al-Assad und fünf weitere ehemalige Militär- und Sicherheitsbeamte zum Tode.

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Das Urteil

Am 11. August 2026 verkündete Richter Fakhr al-Din al-Aryan des Vierten Strafgerichts in Damaskus das historische Urteil. Das Gericht befand Assad für schuldig der “vorsätzlichen und absichtlichen Tötung mehrerer Personen und von Kindern, Folter, willkürlicher Verhaftung und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit”.

Der Prozess dauerte fast vier Monate. Assad, der nach dem Sturz seines Regimes im Dezember 2024 nach Russland geflohen war, wurde zusammen mit den meisten anderen Angeklagten in Abwesenheit verhandelt. Der einzige Angeklagte, der persönlich vor Gericht erschien, war Atef Nadschib, Assads Cousin und ehemaliger Sicherheitschef in der Provinz Daraa, der Anfang 2025 verhaftet wurde und in einem Käfig in einer Gefängnisuniform vor Gericht stand.

Zusätzlich zu Assad und Nadschib verurteilte das Gericht:

· Maher al-Assad – Baschars jüngerer Bruder und Kommandeur der gefürchteten Vierten Panzerdivision – in Abwesenheit zum Tode
· Fahd al-Freij – ehemaliger Verteidigungsminister – in Abwesenheit zum Tode
· Vier weitere namentlich nicht genannte ehemalige Militär- und Sicherheitsbeamte

—

Die Verbrechen

Die Anklage geht auf Assads brutale Niederschlagung der prodemokratischen Proteste von 2011 zurück, die sich zu einem Bürgerkrieg ausweitete, der Hunderttausende Syrer das Leben kostete.

Das Gericht stellte fest, dass Assad als “höchster Entscheidungsträger” die direkte Verantwortung dafür trug, dass staatliche Institutionen systematische Menschenrechtsverletzungen begingen. Sein Bruder Maher führte die Vierte Division an, die die Niederschlagung der Proteste anführte, Territorium zurückeroberte und beschuldigt wurde, ein Drogenhandelsnetzwerk zur Bereicherung des Regimes betrieben zu haben.

Atef Nadschib, der ehemalige Chef der politischen Sicherheit in Daraa, wurde wegen seiner Rolle bei der Folter von 15 Jugendlichen im Jahr 2011 verurteilt, die anti-Assad-Parolen gesprüht hatten – ein Ereignis, das weithin als der Funke gilt, der den landesweiten Aufstand entzündete.

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Reaktionen in Syrien: “Die Freude ist unbeschreiblich”

Als die Nachricht vom Urteil bekannt wurde, versammelten sich Menschenmengen vor dem Gerichtsgebäude in Damaskus, skandierten, applaudierten und schwenkten syrische Flaggen. Auch in Daraa, dem Geburtsort der Revolution, brachen Feierlichkeiten aus.

“Die Freude ist unbeschreiblich. So Gott will, werden wir Baschar al-Assad und alle seine Helfer am Galgen hängen sehen.” – Ein Mann in Damaskus, der ein Foto seines verstorbenen Vaters hielt.

Nouha al-Masri, eine Staatsanwältin in dem Fall, die ihren Bruder bei dem Massaker von Daraa 2011 verlor, sagte der BBC:

“Wir haben 15 Jahre darauf gewartet, auch nur einen kleinen Teil unserer Rechte zurückzuerlangen… Im neuen Syrien wird es von diesem Tag an keine Straflosigkeit mehr geben.”

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Die neue Regierung: Vom Terroristen zum Präsidenten

Das Gericht, das Assad verurteilte, tagt in einem Syrien, das einen radikalen Wandel durchgemacht hat. Das Regime, das im Dezember 2024 fiel, wurde von einer Koalition von Rebellenkräften unter Führung der Hay’at Tahrir al-Scham (HTS) gestürzt – einer Gruppe mit tiefen Wurzeln in Al-Qaida, die von den USA, Großbritannien und der EU immer noch als terroristische Organisation eingestuft wird.

Der Mann, der heute Syrien regiert, ist Ahmed al-Scharaa, früher bekannt als Abu Mohammad al-Dscholani. Vor wenigen Jahren war er einer der meistgesuchten Terroristen der Welt mit einer US-Kopfgeld von 10 Millionen Dollar. Die USA hatten ihn 2013 als “speziell ausgewiesenen globalen Terroristen” eingestuft, und das FBI unterhielt noch bis 2017 ein Programm, das 10 Millionen Dollar für Informationen zu seiner Ergreifung aussetzte.

Im Januar 2025 wurde al-Scharaa zum syrischen Übergangspräsidenten ernannt. Im März trat eine vorläufige Verfassungserklärung in Kraft, und unter der Führung der HTS wurde eine neue Regierung gebildet. Al-Scharaa hat seitdem ein 210-köpfiges Parlament ernannt, wobei 70 Abgeordnete direkt von ihm bestimmt wurden, und hat die Exekutivgewalt konsolidiert, während er ein ausgedehntes Patronagenetzwerk betreibt.

Die Ironie ist frappierend: Ein Mann, der einst von den USA als Terrorist gejagt wurde, trifft sich heute mit amerikanischen Beamten. Im November 2025 besuchte al-Scharaa das Weiße Haus, wo Präsident Trump ihn empfing. US-Beamte haben direkte Kontakte mit der HTS eingeräumt und zwar al-Scharaas willkommene Äußerungen zum Schutz von Minderheiten- und Frauenrechten zur Kenntnis genommen, bleiben jedoch skeptisch, was seine langfristigen Absichten betrifft. Die US-Botschaft in Syrien hat unterdessen die “WANTED”-Mitteilung für den Mann, für dessen Ergreifung sie einst 10 Millionen Dollar ausgesetzt hatte, nicht entfernt.

Auch Großbritannien ächtet die HTS weiterhin, während die EU Finanzsanktionen gegen al-Dscholani aufrechterhält. Die neue syrische Führung existiert somit in einem diplomatischen Schwebezustand: international als De-facto-Regierung anerkannt, jedoch von Personen geführt, die von denselben Mächten, die nun mit ihnen verhandeln, immer noch als Terroristen eingestuft werden.

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Symbolische Gerechtigkeit oder praktische Sackgasse?

Das Urteil ist zwar ein mächtiges Symbol für die Übergangsjustiz, seine praktische Wirkung ist jedoch begrenzt. Assad und sein Bruder bleiben in Moskau, wo ihnen aus humanitären Gründen Asyl gewährt wurde. Russland hat bisher Auslieferungsersuchen abgelehnt.

Menschenrechtsaktivisten warnen, dass das Todesurteil jede künftige Auslieferung erschweren könnte, da Länder in der Regel keine Verdächtigen an Staaten ausliefern, in denen ihnen die Hinrichtung droht. Die neuen syrischen Behörden haben angekündigt, “internationale Rechtswege” zu verfolgen, um die beiden Männer zu verfolgen.

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Ein neues Kapitel für Syrien

Der Prozess ist Teil der umfassenderen Bemühungen der syrischen Übergangsregierung, mit dem jahrzehntelangen Erbe der Unterdrückung durch die Assad-Dynastie zu brechen. Seit dem Sturz des Regimes im Dezember 2024 haben die Behörden zahlreiche ehemalige Beamte inhaftiert und Ermittlungen zu Gräueltaten eingeleitet.

Das Urteil wurde von den Staatsanwälten als “so groß wie die Opfer, die die Syrer 15 Jahre lang gebracht haben” bezeichnet. Für viele ist es ein erster Schritt zur Rechenschaft – selbst wenn der frühere Diktator selbst unerreichbar bleibt.

Die Frage, wer nun in Syrien die Macht innehat, bleibt für die internationale Gemeinschaft zutiefst unbequem. Der Mann, der den Befehl zur Verurteilung Assads unterzeichnete, ist selbst ein ehemaliger Al-Qaida-Kommandeur, der von vielen der gleichen Nationen, die das Urteil bejubeln, immer noch gesucht wird. In Syrien wird Gerechtigkeit für Assads Opfer von einer Regierung verlangt, die bis vor kurzem selbst als terroristische Organisation galt. Der Widerspruch könnte nicht größer sein.

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Syria Air Raid on Film

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Revealed by Cryptome – Cyber Warriors in the Middle East: Syrian E-Army

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Exposed by Cryptome – Syria Devastation Photos

 

Syria Devastation Photos
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March 2, 2012. New satellite imagery and eyewitness accounts reveal that the bombardment of the Baba Amr neighborhood in Homs has inflicted widespread destruction and a large number of deaths and severe injuries of civilians, Human Rights Watch said today.[Image]

Exposed by Cryptome – Syria Devastation Photos 2

 

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The Files TV – IED bombs new Syrian rebel strategy

SECRET//NOFORN: DAMASCUS384, RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6431
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000384 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018
TAGS: PREL SY
SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA:  DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY 

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 

1.  (S/NF) Summary:  As the U.S. continues its re-engagement
with Syria, it may help us achieve our goals if we understand
how SARG officials pursue diplomatic goals. Syrian President
Bashar al-Asad is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his
father but he, too, prefers to engage diplomatically on a
level of abstraction that seems designed to frustrate any
direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by extension, his
judgment.  Bashar's vanity represents another Achilles heel:
the degree to which USG visitors add to his consequence to
some degree affects the prospects for a successful meeting.
The SARG foreign policy apparatus suffers from apparent
dysfunctionality and weaknesses in terms of depth and
resources but the SARG punches above its weight because of
the talents of key individuals.  SARG officials generally
have clear, if tactical, guidance from Bashar and they are
sufficiently professional to translate those instructions
into recognizable diplomatic practice.  But in a diplomatic
world that is generally oiled by courtesy and euphemism, the
Syrians don't hesitate to be nasty in order to achieve their
objectives.  The behaviors they employ as diplomatic
"force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic
style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal.
End Summary. 

-------------------
Gaming Out the SARG
------------------- 

2.  (S/NF) As the U.S. moves forward to re-engage Syria, we
are well aware that Syrian officials have long been famous
for their abilities as tough negotiators.  The late President
Hafiz al-Asad could wear down his interlocutors through sheer
staying power in 10-hour meetings without breaks; the wealth
of detail and historical perspective he brought to those
discussions also tested the mettle of those who were
attempting to persuade him to a course of action he
questioned.  His son Bashar is neither as shrewd nor as
long-winded as his father but he, too, prefers to engage
diplomatically on a level of abstraction that seems designed
to frustrate any direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by
extension, his judgment.  Bashar's presentations on world
affairs suggest that he would prefer to see himself as a sort
of philosopher-king, the Pericles of Damascus.  Playing to
Bashar's intellectual pretentions is one stratagem for
gaining his confidence and acquiescence; it may be
time-consuming but could well produce results.  Bashar's
vanity represents another Achilles heel:  the degree to which
USG visitors add to his consequence to some degree affects
the prospects for achieving our goals.  Every interaction we
have with the SARG is, in fact, a transaction and the better
equipped we are to understand the dynamics of our
negotiations the better able we will be to achieve our
objectives.  Post has assembled the compendium below in an
attempt to reflect our experience in dealing with the SARG in
the hope that Washington-based interlocutors will find it
useful. 

------------------------------------
A Compendium of Diplomatic Behaviors
------------------------------------ 

3. (S/NF) Capacity:  SARG scope of action is limited the
President's span of control.  He is generally able to monitor
 the activities of his foreign minister, political/media
advisor, intelligence chiefs, and brother Maher.  At various
times, his vice president and national security advisor are
also active and therefore under his direct supervision.
While communication flows between him and his subordinates,
it appears not to be formalized and information is highly
compartmented.  Subordinates' portfolios are not clearly
delineated; overlapping areas create tension and competition.
 There is no "interagency" policy development process that
lays out advantages and disadvantages of policy choices.
There are, as far as we know, no briefing or decision memos.
The bench is not deep; beyond the principals lie only a few
trusted staffers.  Bashar and his team also find it difficult
to juggle more than one major foreign policy issue at a time. 

4. (S/NF) Protocol:  SARG officials are sticklers for
diplomatic protocol, although they are not experts on the
international conventions from which it is derived.   The
SARG places a high value on protocolary forms that ensure
respectful treatment of state officials (despite bilateral
differences) because such forms guarantee that the President
and his representatives are shown proper courtesies by a
world that is often at odds with Syria.  (This focus on
protocol underlies the continuing Syrian unhappiness over the
absence of a U.S. ambassador.)  Protocol conventions also
reinforce the notion of equal relations between sovereign
states and the SARG insists that communications between it
and foreign embassies comply with traditional diplomatic
practice.  The MFA receives a flood of diplomatic notes from
Damascus-based foreign missions daily which are apportioned
out to various offices for action.  The diplomatic notes,
translated into Arabic by the senders, become the paper trail
for SARG decisions.  The MFA bureaucracy does not appear to
generate cover memoranda that provide background to requests
or recommendations for decisions.  Many such notes, possibly
all notes from the U.S. Embassy, are sent to the Minister
himself for review.  The MFA does not have internal email,
only fax and phone.  Instructions to Syrian missions abroad
are often sent by fax; sometimes the MFA fails to provide
instructions at all. 

5. (S/NF) The Suq:  In dealing with the U.S., the Syrians see
every encounter as a transaction.  The level and composition
of the Syrian side of any meeting is carefully calculated in
terms of protocol and the political message being sent; a
lunch invitation must be interpreted as more than just the
Arab compulsion to hospitality ) who hosts the lunch is as
important as who attends the meetings.  When it comes to
content, the Syrians seek to gain the highest value
deliverable for the lowest price or no price at all.  During
the re-engagement process, the SARG has attempted to extract
high profile USG gestures in exchange for relief of
operational constraints on the Embassy.  The SARG has been
uncharacteristically forward-leaning in allowing discussions
on a New Embassy Compound site to develop as far as they
have; actual closure on a land deal, however, is probably
contingent on U.S. delivery of a SARG desirable, e.g., the
announcement that a U.S. ambassador will be sent to Damascus.
 The SARG's focus on embassy operations is in part rooted in
their paranoia over USG intelligence collection and
penetration of Syrian society but the imposition of
constraints on mission activities has also conveniently
created an embassy list of desiderata that the SARG seeks to
use as cost-free concessions.  FM Muallim candidly
acknowledged this approach when he commented in February to
Charge that he had not yet decided what he needed in exchange
for permission to reopen the American School in Damascus. 

6.  (S/NF) Vanity and Self-preservation:  The President's
self-image plays a disproportionate role in policy
formulation and diplomatic activity.   Meetings, visits,
trips abroad that enhance his respectability and prestige are
pursued; encounters that may involve negotiations or
difficult debate are declined or delegated to subordinates.
The President responds with anger if he finds himself
challenged by visitors, but not until after the meeting.  He
seems to avoid direct confrontation.  When engaged in summit
diplomacy, he often seeks to include allies to bolster his
confidence (e.g., Quadripartite Summit in September 2008,
Riyadh Summit in April 2009).   His foreign policy
subordinates are all "employees" without constituencies or
influence independent of the President's favor.  Their
overriding concern when engaging foreigners is to avoid the
appearance of overstepping or violating their instructions.
They are particularly cautious in the presence of other
Syrians; requests to meet one-on-one often yield more
expansive and candid responses. 

7. (S/NF) Deceit:  SARG officials at every level lie.  They
persist in a lie even in the face of evidence to the
contrary.  They are not embarrassed to be caught in a lie.
While lower level officials often lie to avoid potential
punitive action from their own government, senior level
officials generally lie when they deem a topic too
"dangerous" to discuss (e.g., Al-Kibar, IAEA) or when they
have not yet determined whether or how to respond (FFN,
Hezbollah arms supplies, etc).  When a senior SARG official
is lying, the key challenge is not demonstrating  the lack of
veracity but discovering the true reasons for it. 

8. (S/NF) Passivity:  SARG foreign policy is formulated in
response to external developments (changes in regional
leadership, initiatives from the West, etc).  The SARG does
not launch initiatives and generally seeks cover from allies
when exploring new courses of action.  The SARG is much more
confident on the Arab level than on the international level.
SARG policy responses are generally tactical and operational,
exploratory rather than decisive, oblique instead of direct.
Strategy, to the extent it exists, emerges from a series of
tactical choices.  The lack of initiative appears rooted in
an underlying sense of diplomatic powerlessness.  Every
foreign policy embarrassment in Syria's history lies under
the surface of a generally false projection of assertiveness.
 That assertiveness is sometimes read as arrogance. 

9.  (S/NF) Antagonism:  Every Syrian diplomatic relationship
contains an element of friction.  There is some current
friction, for example, in the Syrians' relations with the
Turks and the French.  The Syrians are not troubled by
discord; they seek an upper hand in any relationship by
relying on foreign diplomats' instinctive desire to resolve
problems. By withholding a solution, the SARG seeks to
control the pace and temperature of the relationship.  SARG
officials artificially restrict their availability  and can
engage in harsh verbal attacks to intimidate and rattle
foreign diplomats.  SARG officials delight in disparaging
their interlocutors behind their backs for allowing
themselves to be cowed.  On the international level, the
President has indulged in personal criticisms of foreign
leaders; unlike his father, he deliberately makes enemies
when he doesn't necessarily have to.  FM Muallim can behave
similarly but he probably does so on the President's
instructions. 

10. (S/NF) Complacency:  SARG leadership genuinely believes
that SARG foreign policy has been, is being, and will be
vindicated by events.  They also genuinely believe their
foreign policy is based on morally defensible and
intellectually solid principles, although it is usually
reactive and opportunistic.  Existing policy choices are
immutable unless the President decides to change them, in
which case, his new policies, despite any appearances to the
contrary, are consistent with "traditional" principles.
Baathism infuses foreign policy principles (Pan-Arabism) but
pragmatism is more important.  More recently, Bashar's like
or dislike of other leaders plays a role in policy
formulation. 

11. (S/NF) The Non Sequitur:  When Syrian officials don't
like a point that has been made to them, they frequently
resort to an awkward changes in subject to deflect perceived
criticism.  Syrian officials seem to think they've scored a
verbal hit by employing a facile non sequitur, usually in the
form of a counter-accusation.  When the SARG's human rights
record is raised with Muallim, for example, he often raises
Israel's December-January Gaza operation or, more recently,
asks if the U.S. will accept the 1300 Al Qaeda sympathizers
in Syrian jails.   The non sequitur is intended to stop
discussion of the unwelcome topic while subtly intimidating
the interlocutor with the threat of raising a subject that is
putatively embarrassing to him or her.  When the non sequitur
is deployed, it is clear that the SARG official is on the
defensive. 

12.  (S/NF) Comment:  Given the apparent dysfunctionality of
the SARG foreign policy apparatus and its weaknesses in terms
of depth and resources, the SARG's ability to punch above its
weight internationally is noteworthy.  Much of its strength
appears to lie in the talents of key individuals and their
ability to collaborate with each other, despite tensions and
rivalries.  SARG officials generally have clear, if tactical,
guidance from Bashar and they are sufficiently professional
to translate those instructions into recognizable diplomatic
practice.  But the behaviors they employ as diplomatic
"force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic
style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal.  At
the end of the day, there are few who really like to deal
with the Syrians.  The SARG, well aware of its reputation,
however,  spends much of its energy ensuring that we have to. 

CONNELLY