TOP SECRET – U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff new Doc about Operations Security

Executive Summary:

Commanders ensure operational security (OPSEC) is practiced during all phases of operations. OPSEC is a capability that identifies and controls critical information, indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities. As adversary analysts apply more information to an analytical model, the likelihood increases that the analytical model will replicate the observed force. Thus, current and future capabilities and courses of action can be revealed and compromised.

2. Operational Context

a. Joint forces often display personnel, organizations, assets, and actions to public view and to a variety of adversary intelligence collection activities, including sensors and systems. Joint forces can be under observation at their peacetime bases and locations, in training or exercises, while moving, or when deployed conducting actual operations. The actions or behavior of military family members and businesses associated with or supporting military operations are also subject to observation by adversaries, which could equally be associated with activities or operations of the joint force. Frequently, when a force performs a particular activity or operation a number of times, it establishes a pattern of behavior. Within this pattern, certain unique, particular, or special types of information might be associated with an activity or operation. Even though this information may be unclassified, it can expose US military operations to observation and/or attack. Commanders ensure OPSEC is practiced during all phases of operations. OPSEC is a capability that identifies and controls critical information, indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities. In addition, the adversary could compile and correlate enough information to predict and counter US operations.

b. Commanders cannot limit their protection efforts to a particular operational area or threat. With continuing rapid advancement and global use of communications systems and information technology, easily obtainable technical collection tools, and the growing use of the Internet and various social and mass media outlets, the ability to collect critical information virtually from anywhere in the world and threaten US military operations continues to expand. To prevent or reduce successful adversary collection and exploitation of US critical information, the commander should formulate a prudent, practical, timely, and effective OPSEC program. Additionally, the commander’s OPSEC program must establish, resource, and maintain formal OPSEC programs. The commander should formulate these OPSEC programs to be prudent, practical, timely, and effective.

c. In OPSEC usage, an indicator is data derived from friendly detectable actions and open-source information that adversaries can interpret and piece together to reach conclusions or estimates of friendly intentions, capabilities, or activities. Selected indicators can be developed into an analytical model or profile of how a force prepares and how it operates. An indication is an observed specific occurrence or instance of an indicator. OPSEC indicators are friendly detectable actions and open-source information that can be interpreted or pieced together by an adversary to derive critical information.

d. Adversary intelligence personnel continuously analyze and interpret collected information to validate and/or refine the model. As adversary analysts apply more information to the analytical model, the likelihood increases that the analytical model will replicate the observed force. Thus, current and future capabilities and courses of action (COAs) can be revealed and compromised. Critical information consists of specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities needed by adversaries to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. Critical information can be either classified or unclassified.

e. OPSEC considerations must also be observed while working with interagency partners.

U.S. Department of Justice Manual on Electronic Surveillance Unveiled

 

Discussed below are the requirements of each of the three documents comprising a Title III application: the Application, the Affidavit, and the Order. These requirements, which are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2518, are applicable to requests to the court for an order authorizing the interception of oral, wire, and/or electronic communications.

[cited in JM 9-7.010]

28. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE—TITLE III APPLICATIONS

The Application should meet the following requirements:

  1. It must be prepared by an applicant identified as a law enforcement or investigative officer. The application must be in writing, signed by the United States Attorney, an Assistant United States Attorney, and made under oath. It must be presented to a Federal district court or court of appeals judge and be accompanied by the Department’s authorization memorandum signed by an appropriate Department official and a copy of the most recent Attorney General’s Order designating that official to authorize Title III applications. The application may not be presented to a magistrate. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(9) and 2516(1); see also In re United States of America, 10 F.3d 931, 935-38 (2d Cir. 1993).
  2. It must identify the type of communications to be intercepted. “Wire communications” include “aural transfers” (involving the human voice) that are transmitted, at least in part by wire, between the point of origin and the point of reception, i.e., telephone calls. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). This includes cellular phones, cordless phones, voice mail, and voice pagers, as well as traditional landline telephones. “Oral communications” are communications between people who are together under circumstances where the parties enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). “Electronic communications” include text messages, email, non-voice computer and Internet transmissions, faxes, communications over digital-display paging devices, and, in some cases, satellite transmissions. Communications over tone-only paging devices, data from tracking devices (as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3117), and electronic funds transfer information are not electronic communications under Title III. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
  3. It must identify the specific Federal offenses for which there is probable cause to believe are being committed. The offenses that may be the predicate for a wire or oral interception order are limited to only those set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). In the case of electronic communications, a request for interception may be based on any Federal felony, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3).
  4. It must provide a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which, or the place where, the interception is to occur. An exception to this is the roving interception provision set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a) and (b). The specific requirements of the roving provision are discussed in JM 9-7.111. Briefly, in the case of a roving oral interception, the application must show, and the court order must indicate, that it is impractical to specify the location(s) where oral communications of a particular named subject are to be intercepted. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a)(ii) and (iii). In the case of a roving wire or electronic interception, the application must state, and the court order must indicate, that a particular named subject’s actions could have the effect of thwarting interception from a specified facility. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(ii) and (iii). The accompanying DOJ document authorizing the roving interception must be signed by an official at the level of an Assistant Attorney General (including Acting AAG) or higher. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a)(i) and (b)(i). Further guidance on roving interceptions may be found on the DOJNet site of the Electronic Surveillance Unit (ESU), Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO).
  5. It must identify, with specificity, those persons known to be committing the offenses and whose communications are to be intercepted. In United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 422-32 (1977), the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) requires the government to name all individuals whom it has probable cause to believe are engaged in the offenses under investigation, and whose conversations it expects to intercept over or from within the targeted facilities. It is the Criminal Division’s policy to name as subjects all persons whose involvement in the alleged offenses is indicated, even if not all those persons are expected to be intercepted over the target facility or at the target location.
  6. It must contain a statement affirming that normal investigative procedures have been tried and failed, are reasonably unlikely to succeed if tried, or are too dangerous to employ. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). The applicant may then state that a complete discussion of attempted alternative investigative techniques is set forth in the accompanying affidavit.
  7. It must contain a statement affirming that the affidavit contains a complete statement of the facts—to the extent known to the applicant and the official approving the application—concerning all previous applications that have been made to intercept the oral, wire, or electronic communications of any of the named subjects or involving the target facility or location. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(e).
  8. In an oral (and occasionally in a wire or electronic) interception, it must contain a request that the court issue an order authorizing investigative agents to make all necessary surreptitious and/or forcible entries to install, maintain, and remove electronic interception devices in or from the targeted premises (or device). When effecting this portion of the order, the applicant should notify the court as soon as practicable after each surreptitious entry.
  9. When requesting the interception of wire communications over a cellular telephone, it should contain a request that the authorization and court order apply not only to the target telephone identified therein, but also to: 1) any change in one of several potential identifying numbers for the phone, including the electronic serial number (ESN), International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile Equipment Identification (IMEI) number, Mobile Equipment Identifier (MEID) number, or Urban Fleet Mobile Identification (UFMI) number; and 2) any changed target telephone number when the other identifying number has remained the same. Model continuity language for each type of identifier may be obtained from ESU. With regard to a landline phone, it should request that the authorization and court order apply not only to the target telephone number identified therein, but also to any changed telephone number subsequently assigned to the same cable, pair, and binding posts used by the target landline telephone. No continuity language should be included when the target telephone is a Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone. The application should also request that the authorization apply to background conversations intercepted in the vicinity of the target phone while the phone is in use. See United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1070-72 (6th Cir. 1990).
  10. It must contain, when concerning the interception of wire communications, a request that the court issue an order directly to the service provider, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15), to furnish the investigative agency with all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to facilitate the ordered interception. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii). The application should also request that the court direct service providers and their agents and employees not to disclose the contents of the court order or the existence of the investigation. Id.
  11. For original and spinoff applications, it should contain a request that the court’s order authorize the requested interception until all relevant communications have been intercepted, not to exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the earlier of the day on which the interception begins or ten (10) days after the order is entered. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). For extensions, it should contain a request that the thirty-day period be measured from the date of the court’s order.
  12. It should contain a statement affirming that all interceptions will be minimized in accordance with Chapter 119 of Title 18, United States Code, as described further in the affidavit. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).

[updated October 2012]

29. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE—TITLE III AFFIDAVITS

The Affidavit must meet the following requirements:

  1. It must be sworn and attested to by an investigative or law enforcement officer as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7). Criminal Division policy requires that the affiant be a member of one of the following agencies: FBI, DEA, ICE/HSI, ATF, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Marshals Service, or U.S. Postal Inspection Service. Criminal Division policy precludes the use of multiple affiants except when it is indicated clearly which affiant swears to which part of the affidavit, or states that each affiant swears to the entire affidavit. If a State or local law enforcement officer is the affiant in a Federal electronic surveillance affidavit, the enforcement officer must be deputized as a Federal officer of the agency responsible for the offenses under investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1).
  2. It must identify the target subjects, describe the facility or location that is the subject of the proposed electronic surveillance, and list the alleged offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1). If any of the alleged offenses are not listed predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1), that fact should be noted.
  3. It must establish probable cause that the named subjects are using the targeted facility or location to commit the stated offenses. Any background information needed to understand fully the instant investigation should be set forth briefly at the beginning of this section. The focus, however, should be on recent and current criminal activity by the subjects, with an emphasis on their use of the target facility or location. This is generally accomplished through information from a confidential informant, cooperating witness, or undercover agent, combined with pen register or telephone toll information for the target phone or physical surveillance of the target premises. Criminal Division policy requires that the affidavit demonstrate criminal use of the target facility or premises within six months from the date of Department approval. For wire communications, where probable cause is demonstrated by consensually recorded calls or calls intercepted over another wiretap, the affidavit should include some direct quotes of the calls, with appropriate characterization. Criminal Division policy dictates that that pen register or telephone toll information for the target telephone, or physical surveillance of the targeted premises, standing alone, is generally insufficient to establish probable cause. Generally, probable cause to establish criminal use of the facilities or premises requires independent evidence of use of the facilities or premises in addition to pen register or surveillance information, often in the form of informant or undercover information. It is preferable that all informants used in the affidavit to establish probable cause be qualified according to the “Aguilar-Spinelli” standards (Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)), rather than those set forth in the Supreme Court decision of Illinois v. Gates, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983). Under some circumstances, criminal use of the target facility within six months of Department approval may be established in the absence of consensually recorded communications or prior interceptions when use of the phone may be tied to a significant event, such as a narcotics transaction or a seizure, through phone records. In addition to criminal use within six months, the affidavit must also show recent use of the facility or premises within 21 days from the date on which the Department authorizes the filing of the application. For wire and electronic communications, the affidavit must contain records showing contact between the facility and at least one other criminally relevant facility that demonstrates necessity for the wiretap within 21 days of Department approval. The affidavit must clearly and specifically demonstrate how the other facility is criminally relevant and state the date range for the contacts and the date of the most recent contact. The date range for all pen register/phone records data must be updated to within 10 days of submission to OEO. For extension requests, the affidavit should include some direct quotes of wire communications (and/or electronic communications, if applicable), with appropriate characterization, including one from within seven days of Department approval, or an explanation of the failure to obtain such results and the continued need to conduct interceptions. (When the application requests authorization to intercept oral communications within a location, it is often helpful to include a diagram of the target location as an attachment to the affidavit.)
  4. It must explain the need for the proposed electronic surveillance and provide a detailed discussion of the other investigative procedures that have been tried and failed, are reasonably unlikely to succeed if tried, or are too dangerous to employ. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(e). This is to ensure that highly intrusive electronic surveillance techniques are not resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974). It need not be shown that no other investigative avenues are available, only that they have been tried and proven inadequate or have been considered and rejected for reasons described. See, e.g.United States v. Foy, 641 F.3d 455, 464 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cartagena, 593 F.3d 104, 109-111 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Concepcion, 579 F.3d 214, 218-220 (2d Cir. 2009). There should also be a discussion as to why electronic surveillance is the technique most likely to succeed. When drafting this section of the affidavit, the discussion of these and other investigative techniques should be augmented with facts particular to the specific investigation and subjects. General declarations and conclusory statements about the exhaustion of alternative techniques will not suffice.

It is most important that this section be tailored to the facts of the specific case and be more than a recitation of “boiler plate.” The affidavit must discuss the particular problems involved in the investigation in order to fulfill the requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). The affidavit should explain specifically why other normally utilized investigative techniques, such as physical surveillance or the use of informants and undercover agents, are inadequate in the particular case. For example, if physical surveillance is impossible or unproductive because the suspects live in remote areas or will likely be alerted to law enforcement presence (by counter-surveillance or other means), the affidavit should set forth those facts clearly. If the informants refuse to testify or cannot penetrate the hierarchy of the criminal organization involved, the affidavit should explain why that is so in this particular investigation. If undercover agents cannot be used because the suspects deal only with trusted associates/family, the affidavit must so state and include the particulars. Conclusory generalizations about the difficulties of using a particular investigative technique will not suffice. It is not enough, for example, to state that the use of undercover agents is always difficult in organized crime cases because crime families, in general, deal only with trusted associates. While the affidavit may contain a general statement regarding the impossibility of using undercover agents in organized crime cases, it must also demonstrate that the particular subject or subjects in the instant case deal only with known associates. The key is to tie the inadequacy of a specific investigative technique to the particular facts underlying the investigation. See, e.g.Foy, 641 F.3d at 464 United States v. Blackmon, 273 F.3d 1204, 1210-1212 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Uribe, 890 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1989).

  1. It must contain a full and complete statement of any known previous applications made to any judge (federal, state, or foreign) for authorization to intercept, or for approval of interceptions of, wire, oral, or electronic communications involving any of the same persons, facilities, or places specified in the application. This statement should include the date, jurisdiction, and disposition of previous applications, as well as their relevance, if any, to the instant investigation. All relevant electronic surveillance (“ELSUR”) databases must be checked, including that of the agency conducting the investigation. In narcotics investigations, Criminal Division policy provides that the DEA, FBI, and ICE databases be searched. In investigations involving firearms offenses, ATF ELSUR databases should be checked. In joint investigations, all participating agencies’ databases should be checked; in all other cases when it is likely that more than one agency may have investigated the subjects, multiple indices checks should likewise be made. It is recommended that all ELSUR searches be updated to within 45 days of submission of an application to OEO. The duty to disclose prior applications under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(e) covers all persons named in the application, and not just those designated as “principal targets.” United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112 (2d Cir. 1993).
  2. It must contain a statement of the period of time for which the interception is to be maintained. The statute provides that an order may be granted for not more than thirty days or until the objectives of the investigation are achieved, whichever occurs first. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). If the violations are continuing, facts sufficient to justify interception for the full thirty-day period must be provided, or the court may order monitoring to cease once initial, criminal conversations are intercepted. This may be accomplished by showing, through informant or undercover investigation, pen register analysis, physical surveillance, or other law enforcement investigation, that a pattern of criminal activity exists and is likely to continue. If it is clear that the interceptions will terminate after a limited number of days, then the time requested should also be so limited in accordance with the facts of the case.

The statute also provides for a ten-day grace period, before the thirty-day period begins to run. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). This statutory grace period allows for delays by the service provider in establishing interception capability. The ten-day grace period applies only to the initial installation of equipment or establishment of interceptions, and may not be used in an extension application, or in an original application when the equipment is already installed.

Some courts have consulted Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for guidance on the method to calculate the thirty-day period under the statute, and have held that the thirty-day period begins to run on the date after the order was signed, even if the interception started on the same day that it was signed. See United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 575 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Villegas, 1993 WL 535013, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1993); United States v. Gerena, 695 F. Supp. 649, 658 (D. Conn. 1988);United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 317 (S.D. Fla. 1971); but see United States v. Gangi, 33 F. Supp. 2d 303, 310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Pichardo, 1999 WL 649020, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1999). In an abundance of caution, however, OEO recommends that the thirty-day period be calculated from the date and time that the order is signed. OEO further suggests that an applicant adhere to established practice regarding the calculation of the thirty-day period in the applicant’s particular district.

  1. It must contain a statement affirming that monitoring agents will minimize all non-pertinent interceptions in accordance with Chapter 119 of Title 18, United States Code, as well as additional standard minimization language and other language addressing any specific minimization problems (e.g., steps to be taken to avoid the interception of privileged communications, such as attorney-client communications) in the instant case. (18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) permits non-officer government personnel or individuals acting under contract with the government to monitor conversations pursuant to the interception order. These individuals must be acting under the supervision of an investigative or law enforcement officer when monitoring communications, and the affidavit should note the fact that these individuals will be used as monitors pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).)

When communications are intercepted that relate to any offense not enumerated in the authorization order, the monitoring agent should report it immediately to the Assistant United States Attorney, who should notify the court at the earliest opportunity. Approval by the issuing judge should be sought for the continued interception of such conversations. While 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1) and (2) permit use or disclosure of this information without first obtaining a court order, 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) requires a disclosure order before the information may be used in any proceeding (e.g., before a grand jury).

All wire and oral communications must be minimized in real time. The statute permits after-the-fact minimization for wire and oral communications only when the intercepted communications are in code, or in a foreign language when a foreign language expert is not reasonably available. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). In either event, the minimization must be accomplished as soon as practicable after the interception. Such after-the-fact minimization can be accomplished by an interpreter who listens to and minimizes the communications after they have been recorded, giving only the pertinent communications to the supervising agent. The process utilized must protect the suspect’s privacy interests to approximately the same extent as would contemporaneous minimization, properly applied. United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1991);United States v. Simels, 2009 WL 1924746, at *6-*9 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 2, 2009). After-the-fact minimization provisions should be applied in light of the “reasonableness” standard established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).

After-the-fact minimization is a necessity for the interception of electronic communications, such as those in the form of text messages, email, or faxes. In such cases, all communications should be recorded and then examined by a monitoring agent to determine their relevance to the investigation. Further dissemination is then limited to those communications by the subjects or their confederates that are criminal in nature. Further guidance regarding the minimization of text messages may be found on ESU’s DOJNet site.

  1. A judge may only enter an order approving interceptions “within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting (and outside that jurisdiction but within the United States in the case of a mobile interception device authorized by a Federal court within such jurisdiction).” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). Interceptions occur at the site of the target facility or location and at the site where the communications are first heard/reviewed and minimized (e.g. the wire room). United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1996).

Department policy requires that a Title III order be obtained in the district where the wireroom is located. This policy change is intended to ensure that all Title III interceptions occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the authorizing court, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). Use of a regional wireroom will only be considered in exceptional circumstances, and must be discussed with the reviewing ESU attorney on a case-by-case basis.

In cases involving interceptions over a stationary facility or at a fixed location, the order may be obtained in the district where the target facility or location is located.

[updated January 2018] [cited in Criminal Resource Manual 90]

30. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE—TITLE III ORDERS

The Order must meet the following requirements:

The authorizing language of the order should mirror the requesting language of the application and affidavit, stating that there is probable cause to believe that the named subjects are committing particular Title III predicate offenses (or, in the case of electronic communications, any Federal felony), that particular communications concerning those offenses will be obtained through interception, and that normal investigative techniques have been tried and have failed, or are reasonably unlikely to succeed if tried, or are too dangerous to employ. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) and (4). The court then orders (again tracking the language of the application and affidavit) that agents of the investigative agency are authorized to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications over the described facility or at the described premises. Id. The order should also contain language specifying the length of time the interception may be conducted, and, if necessary, authorizing surreptitious and/or forcible entry to effectuate the purpose of the order. Id. The order may also contain language mandating the government to make periodic progress reports (pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6)), and ordering the sealing of those as well as the order, application and affidavit. In the case of a roving interception, the court must make a specific finding that the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a) and/or (b) have been demonstrated adequately. Any other special requests, such as enforceability of the order as to changed service providers without further order of the court, should also be authorized specifically in the order.

The court should also issue a technical assistance order to the communications service provider. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4). This is a redacted order that requires the telephone company or other service provider to assist the agents in effecting the electronic surveillance. OEO does not review redacted service provider orders. An order to seal all of the pleadings should also be sought at this time.

The Application, Affidavit, and Order should be sent via email to OEO atESU.Requests@usdoj.gov. Submissions must include a completed Title III cover sheet that includes the signature of a supervising attorney who reviewed and approved the Title III papers. Criminal Division policy requires that all Title III submissions be approved by a supervising attorney other than the attorney submitting the application. That supervisory attorney must sign the Title III cover sheet, demonstrating that he or she has reviewed the affidavit, application, and draft order included in the submission packet, and that, in light of the overall investigative plan for the matter, and taking into account applicable Department policies and procedures, he or she supports the request and approves of it. The Title III cover sheet, with a space for the supervisor’s signature, may be found on ESU’s DOJNet site.

Spinoff requests (e.g., additional applications to conduct electronic surveillance over a new facility or at a new location in the same investigation) and extension requests are reviewed in the same manner as described above. While the exigencies of investigative work occasionally make the normally required lead time impossible, the timeliness with which an application is reviewed and authorized is largely under the control of the Assistant United States Attorney handling the case. When coordinating an investigation or planning extension requests, it is important to allow sufficient time for the Title III application to be reviewed by OEO. OEO strongly recommends that extension requests be submitted up to a week in advance of the date on which the interception period expires.

Questions or requests for assistance may be directed to ESU at (202) 514-6809. Sample Title III forms are available by email from ESU or on ESU’s DOJNet site.

[updated January 2018]

Mexican Drug Cartels & Their U.S. Affiliates Exposed

Cross-border gangs play a unique role in the illicit transfer of people and goods across the southwest border. According to law enforcement reporting. Mexican cartels utilize US gangs to smuggle drugs and illegal aliens northbound. and smuggle cash. stolen automobiles. and weapons southbound. US gangs often freelance their work and seek profit-making opportunities with multiple cartels.

(U) Note: The drug cartel boundaries represent a generalized picture of territories and disputed areas in Mexico. The primary focus of this map is to demonstrate the gangs and their Mexican criminal affiliations, rather than the specific areas of cartel operations.

 

 

 

The Secret Network of Amazon Founder Jeff Bezos Exposed

The Secret Network of Amazon Founder Jeff Bezos Exposed

 

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CONFIDENTIAL: BLOGGER ALLEGES DPM’S WIFE AT MURDER SCENE

VZCZCXRO0823
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHKL #0529/01 1750915
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 230915Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1247
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 0069
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000529 

SIPDIS 

FOR EAP/MTS AND INR 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2028
TAGS: PGOV PINR KJUS KDEM MY
SUBJECT: BLOGGER ALLEGES DPM'S WIFE AT MURDER SCENE 

REF: KUALA LUMPUR 335 - SEDITION CHARGES AGAINST BLOGGER 

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b and
 d). 

Summary
------- 

1.  (C) Controversial internet journalist Raja Petra executed
a sworn statement on June 18 to the effect that Deputy Prime
Minister Najib's wife, Rosmah Mansor, was at the scene of the
murder of Mongolian national Altantuya Shaariibbu in October
2006, and that PM Abdullah and a Royal received information
to that effect.  While the mainstream press has shied away
from printing Rosmah's name, Kuala Lumpur is abuzz with this
latest explosive allegation.  PM Abdullah has thus far
remained silent, while the national police chief and Attorney
General said they would investigate.  Raja Petra, who faces
sedition charges for earlier claims, informed us that the
Attorney General's Office filed a police report on the
matter, and he expected to be called in for questioning soon.
 While the latest allegations of Rosmah's presence at the
murder seem implausible, they nevertheless will have
resonance with a Malaysian public that does not have
confidence in the integrity of the Altantuya murder
investigation.  Continued public attention to such reports
also could damage Najib's front-runner status as PM
Abdullah's successor.  End Summary. 

Rosmah at Murder Scene, PM Has Report
------------------------------------- 

2.  (U) Controversial internet journalist Raja Petra
voluntarily completed a sworn statement ("statutory
declaration") at a Malaysian court on June 18, in which he
affirmed that he was "reliably informed" Deputy Prime
Minister Najib's wife Rosmah Mansor, together with her aide
Norhayati and acting Colonel Aziz Buyong (Norhayati's
husband), were present at the scene of the murder of
Mongolian national Altantuya Shaariibbu in October 2006.
Raja Petra also stated that military intelligence provided a
report with this information to Prime Minister Abdullah,
which was subsequently given to Abdullah's son-in-law Khairy
Jamaluddin "for safe-keeping," and that one of Malaysia's
traditional rulers also was briefed on the matter.  Raja
Petra did not reveal the source of this information.  Raja
Petra remains indicted for sedition for his earlier internet
reports that implied DPM Najib and wife Rosmah were connected
to the on-going Altantuya murder case (ref A). 

3.  (SBU) Internet reports of Raja Petra's declaration
emerged on June 20, and the full text became available on his
Malaysia Today website.  Some of Malaysia's mainstream media
briefly reported Raja Petra's new allegations, but carefully
avoided identifying Rosmah Mansor as the "prominent VIP"
named in his statement.  An aide to Najib reportedly
described the statement as "mind-boggling."  Inspector
General of Police Musa Hassan told reporters the police would
look into the "highly inflammatory" allegations, and could
take action against Raja Petra if they were found to be
untrue, while Attorney General Abdul Gani Patil stated his
office would look "seriously" into the matter. 

Heavy Buzz in Parliament
------------------------ 

4.  (C) As members of Parliament gathered June 23 for the
opening of the second parliamentary session, Raja Petra's
story competed with speculation of a no-confidence vote
against PM Abdullah for the attention of lawmakers.
Opposition MPs, parliamentary watchers, and journalists who
spoke with us at Parliament all remarked that Raja Petra had
put himself at great risk, and therefore they speculated that
he must have some evidence in hand.  If this is a bluff, "it
will cost him and his family," one MP remarked.  Prominent
opposition MP Lim Kit Siang said he was troubled that the PM
had kept quiet about the allegations.  Later on June 23, Kit
Siang introduced an emergency parliamentary motion to discuss
Raja Petra's statement.  The Parliament Speaker is required
to accept or reject on an emergency motion within 24 hours. 

Raja Petra Ready for Police
--------------------------- 

5.  (C) We spoke briefly with Raja Petra and his wife Marina
on June 23.  They related that the AGO had filed a police
report regarding the affidavit.  A seemingly confident Raja
Petra said, "I am ready and eagerly waiting for the police to
question me," and took exception to the threatening tone of
IGP Musa's remarks.  He also implied he had further evidence
to implicate DPM Najib and his wife, and asked rhetorically
what action the police would take "if the allegations are
true." 

Comment
------- 

6.  (C) Putting aside the question of Najib's links to the
case, the allegation that Najib's wife would be present at
the Altantuya murder scene strikes us as very implausible,
though fully in keeping with Raja Petra's sometimes wild and
highly emotional reporting.  The Malaysian public and
political elite, however, have no confidence in the integrity
of the government's investigation into the 2006 murder of
Altantuya.  The government's inept and gruelingly slow
prosecution of the case against DPM Najib's former advisor
Razak Baginda and two soldiers from Najib's security detail,
and the authorities' decision early on to limit the scope of
the investigation to exclude any further links with DPM
Najib, have sent clear signals of political interference.
Against this backdrop, most Malaysians will believe there is
at least some truth in Raja Petra's affidavit.  Amidst the
leadership struggle within the ruling UMNO party, emerging
fractures in the National Front coalition, and maneuvering
for a no-confidence vote against PM Abdullah, the latest
allegations add to the nation's sense of political turmoil.
Continued public focus on such allegations also could harm
Najib's front-runner status as PM Abdullah's successor. 

KEITH