How Dark Forces plan a $ 500 Million Dirt Campaign Against Hillary Clinton ‘s White House Run

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Hillary Clinton did not yet announce her run for White House, but her super-wealthy political foes are hatching a massive $500 million plot to start an attack: The “dirty tricks” campaign is aimed at wrecking the 2016 presidential campaign of the 66-year-old former first lady.

Sources say operatives are digging up details on at least eight Hillary “secrets!”

They will also try to use a variety of evidence to rip the covers off Hillary’s torrid love affairs with both men and women, according to insiders

“Super-wealthy Anti-Clinton Factions are willing to spend half a billion dollars between them to find out what Hillary has been hiding,” revealed a top political source.

“With that huge bankroll, conservative groups with underground operatives believe they can amass evidence that will ruin Hillary’s chances of becoming our first female president.”

Another insider added: “The word is out to ‘gut’ Hillary at any and all costs!”

On-the-record attacks have already begun.

Republican Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky, a possible 2016 contender, publicly cited Bill Clinton’s affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky as fair game in relation to Hillary’s run.

Paul’s remarks prompted GOP chairman Reince Priebus to tweet: “Remember all the #Clinton scandals…That’s not what America needs again.”

And in a national interview on the FOX News Channel, former Democratic volunteer Kathleen Willey – who has insinuated the Clintons were involved in the mysterious deaths of her husband, Ed, and deputy White House counsel Vince Foster – accused Hillary of “ruining” and “terrorizing” people.

Foster and Willey, a Richmond, Va., lawyer, were both found dead of apparent self-inflicted gunshot wounds in 1993, the first year of Clinton’s presidency.

SECRET #1Foster was also the Clintons’ personal attorney, and the “dirty tricks” team is looking for two letters in sealed manila envelopes that disappeared from Foster’s White House office safe after his death on July 20. One envelope was addressed to then-Attorney General Janet Reno.

That “smoking gun” letter is believed to implicate Hillary in ordering the government’s attack on religious zealot David Koresh’s compound in Waco, Texas, in April 1993. The raid sparked a massive inferno that killed 74 men, women and children, including 12 kids under the age of 5 and two pregnant women.

“Investigators are out to show that during Bill’s first year in the White House, Hillary was abusing her power and actually making executive decisions, one of which was allegedly the raid on Waco.”

Marinka Peschmann – author of the 2012 book, “Following Orders: The Death of Vince Foster, Clinton White House Lawyer” – told The ENQUIRER that “the orders to raid Waco were from Hillary, but Janet Reno took the fall, and Vince Foster was devastated by what happened. I’m sure those documents were destroyed. (But) if copies were to emerge today, they could destroy Hillary.”

SECRET #2 Peschmann also believes that Foster’s death triggered a massive cover-up by the Clinton administration and declared: “Hillary should not be in the White House. She should be in jail.”

Researchers point out several suspicious details about Foster’s “suicide,” most notably that his fingerprints weren’t on the gun and the bullet that killed him was never found.

“For two decades, investigators, authors and media figures have declared that Vince Foster was murdered – and that he was Hillary’s longtime lover,” said a close source. “If Hillary is incriminated in missing evidence in his death, it will stop her from becoming president.”

SECRET #3 Sources say material linking Hillary and Foster is being sought, and investigators also hope to prove the outrageous claim that Hillary had an affair with Webb Hubbell, a top Justice Department official. Hubbell was the youngest mayor in Little Rock, Ark., history and Hillary’s former partner at the Rose Law Firm. He eventually served 18 months in prison for embezzlement.

SECRET #4 Foes are targeting Hillary’s rumored lesbian affairs, including a White House dalliance, sources say.

“That affair came to light when a veterinarian who treated the Clinton family cat, Socks, at the White House claimed that he stumbled onto Hillary locked in a steamy embrace with a woman,” said the source. “It’s believed the woman is ready to ‘out’ Hillary and reveal details of their sex romps.

“Investigators are also running down other explosive rumors, including one that Hillary had a ‘hook-up’ with a handsome young male White House intern as retribution after the Lewinsky scandal came to light.”

SECRET #5 Plotters are also seeking definitive proof that, during the so-called “Zippergate” scandal, Hillary ordered secret investigators to dig up dirt on Lewinsky and her family, said the source.

Diaries written by Hillary’s late best friend and confidante, Diane Blair, were recently unearthed by the Washington Free Beacon website and contain comments Hillary never thought would come to light.

“In one of the diary entries, Blair, who died in 2000, quotes Hillary calling Monica a “narcissistic loony toon,” said the insider. “That vicious dig could bring Monica out of the woodwork to attack Hillary – and confirm a hushed up secret probe that Hillary ordered against her and her family. This is a genuine fear of Hillary’s.”

Investigators also hope to expose a “secret breakdown” Hillary allegedly suffered after the scandal that nearly cost her husband the presidency, insiders say.

“Hillary went ballistic during a vicious fight with Bill and had to be medicated afterward,” said the source.

“The main interest is to determine what medications Hillary may have been prescribed, and to prove that she’s unstable.”

SECRET #6 Conservative groups may also be looking into explosive allegations from Hillary’s days as Arkansas’ first lady.

Although it’s never been proven, rumors have swirled that “Hillary and Bill were connected to a major drug-running operation that was based in Arkansas and tied to a series of murders,” said the source. “There were allegations that an airport in Mena (Ark.) was used to smuggle in millions of dollars worth of cocaine and other drugs.

“The operation was tied to several murders, including a well-known drug-smuggler named Barry Seal.”

If it’s firmly established by the conservative group’s probe that Bill and Hillary were directly tied to these claims, the source says she’d face an intense media grilling that would explode her campaign.

SECRET #7

Investigators also plan to resurrect the story that New Age psychic Jean Houston prompted then-first lady Hillary to have an imaginary chat with Eleanor Roosevelt.

“Washington Post” Watergate reporter Bob Woodward reported the incident in his 1996 book, “The Choice,” and once revived, “the revelation will make Hillary look like a fool,” said the source.

SECRET #8

Perhaps the most devastating element of the plot to destroy Hillary is to expose a shocking “medical secret,” sources say. As The ENQUIRER has reported, a brain cancer scare came to light after Hillary suffered a concussion due to a fainting spell in December 2012.

After extensive testing, doctors discovered a blood clot in a vein between her brain and skull, and dissolved it with blood thinners.

But according to the source: “Plotters are determined to show that Hillary isn’t healthy enough to serve a four-year term as president that would take her into her 70s.”

Cryptome – 9/11 Secrecy Prolongs Warmaking and NSA Excess

9/11 Secrecy Prolongs Warmaking and NSA Excess

At 09:08 PM 2/20/2014, A wrote:

Mr. Young,

I’m curious about your opinion about what really happened on 9/11. I was reading one of your FOIA posts and was curious about your opinion. Please don’t waste too much time on this. I’m working an 80-hour per week job and am married. So, I don’t have as much time as I would like to research. A simple copy-and-paste job will do with a few different links.

Thank you for your time and for all the documents you post,

_____

21 February 2014

These are some of my comments on WTC.

http://cryptome.org/wtc-collapse.htm

9/11 is a much larger issue than WTC which I am still brooding about. There is still a lot of information which the USG has not released, and until that is done it will be difficult to do more than speculate.

It is a great shame, likely criminal, that the USG refuses to release all material it has, for that perpetuates suspicion of a cover-up of those at fault and sets yet another precedent for using official secrecy to avoid accountability.

A somewhat lesser but related shame is that there has been no person or persons in the USG held accountable or punished for 9/11, leaving the false impression nothing could have been done to prevent it.

Our view is that public pressure should be continued, and increased, for full release of the USG material, both classified and unclassified. Withholding this material will undermine trust in government, and worse, leave government free to avoid responsibility to the public for war and peace. So long as that fundamental responsibility to the public is avoided we think continuous war is inevitable for unnecessary loss of life and limb and unforgiveable waste of national resources.

Behind the avoidance of public responsibility is the ever increasing use of unjustified secretkeeping, prolongation of exaggerated threats to national security, and as Ike warned the perpetuation of the lucrative military-industry-media complex hidden by official secrecy. It is this secrecy which breeds suspicion of the USA at home and overseas and will almost surely lead to more 9/11s.

NSA excess is directly attributable to 9/11 secrecy about lack of government accountability.

Regards,

John

TOP-SECRET – Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board NSA Bulk Telephone Records Collection Report

The following report was released January 23, 2014 by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Statements from board members Elisebeth Collins Cook and Rachel Brand were released along with the report.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

238 pages
January 23, 2014

The PCLOB is an independent bipartisan agency within the executive branch established by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.6 The Board is comprised of four part-time members and a full-time chairman, all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Board’s authorizing statute gives it two primary responsibilities:

1) To analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties; and

2) To ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism.

This Report arises out of the Board’s responsibility to provide oversight by analyzing and reviewing executive branch actions, in this case the operation of the Section 215 telephone records program.

…

B. Legal Analysis: Statutory and Constitutional Issues

Section 215 is designed to enable the FBI to acquire records that a business has in its possession, as part of an FBI investigation, when those records are relevant to the investigation. Yet the operation of the NSA’s bulk telephone records program bears almost no resemblance to that description. While the Board believes that this program has been conducted in good faith to vigorously pursue the government’s counterterrorism mission and appreciates the government’s efforts to bring the program under the oversight of the FISA court, the Board concludes that Section 215 does not provide an adequate legal basis to support the program.

There are four grounds upon which we find that the telephone records program fails to comply with Section 215. First, the telephone records acquired under the program have no connection to any specific FBI investigation at the time of their collection. Second, because the records are collected in bulk — potentially encompassing all telephone calling records across the nation — they cannot be regarded as “relevant” to any FBI investigation as required by the statute without redefining the word relevant in a manner that is circular, unlimited in scope, and out of step with the case law from analogous legal contexts involving the production of records. Third, the program operates by putting telephone companies under an obligation to furnish new calling records on a daily basis as they are generated (instead of turning over records already in their possession) — an approach lacking foundation in the statute and one that is inconsistent with FISA as a whole. Fourth, the statute permits only the FBI to obtain items for use in its investigations; it does not authorize the NSA to collect anything.

In addition, we conclude that the program violates the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. That statute prohibits telephone companies from sharing customer records with the government except in response to specific enumerated circumstances, which do not include Section 215 orders.

Finally, we do not agree that the program can be considered statutorily authorized because Congress twice delayed the expiration of Section 215 during the operation of the program without amending the statute. The “reenactment doctrine,” under which Congress is presumed to have adopted settled administrative or judicial interpretations of a statute, does not trump the plain meaning of a law, and cannot save an administrative or judicial interpretation that contradicts the statute itself. Moreover, the circumstances presented here differ in pivotal ways from any in which the reenactment doctrine has ever been applied, and applying the doctrine would undermine the public’s ability to know what the law is and hold their elected representatives accountable for their legislative choices.

The NSA’s telephone records program also raises concerns under both the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We explore these concerns and explain that while government officials are entitled to rely on existing Supreme Court doctrine in formulating policy, the existing doctrine does not fully answer whether the Section 215 telephone records program is constitutionally sound. In particular, the scope and duration of the program are beyond anything ever before confronted by the courts, and as a result of technological developments, the government possesses capabilities to collect, store, and analyze data not available when existing Supreme Court doctrine was developed. Without seeking to predict the direction of changes in Supreme Court doctrine, the Board urges as a policy matter that the government consider how to preserve underlying constitutional guarantees in the face of modern communications technology and surveillance capabilities.

…

E. Transparency Issues

In a representative democracy, the tension between openness and secrecy is inevitable and complex. The challenges are especially acute in the area of intelligence collection, where the powers exercised by the government implicate fundamental rights and our enemies are constantly trying to understand our capabilities in order to avoid detection. In this context, both openness and secrecy are vital to our survival, and we must strive to develop and implement intelligence programs in ways that serve both values.

Transparency is one of the foundations of democratic governance. Our constitutional system of government relies upon the participation of an informed electorate. This in turn requires public access to information about the activities of the government. Transparency supports accountability. It is especially important with regard to activities of the government that affect the rights of individuals, where it is closely interlinked with redress for violations of rights. In the intelligence context, although a certain amount of secrecy is necessary, transparency regarding collection authorities and their exercise can increase public confidence in the intelligence process and in the monumental decisions that our leaders make based on intelligence products.

In the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures, the government has released a substantial amount of information on the leaked government surveillance programs. Although there remains a deep well of distrust, these official disclosures have helped foster greater public understanding of government surveillance programs. However, to date the official disclosures relate almost exclusively to specific programs that had already been the subject of leaks, and we must be careful in citing these disclosures as object lessons for what additional transparency might be appropriate in the future.

The Board believes that the government must take the initiative and formulate long-term solutions that promote greater transparency for government surveillance policies more generally, in order to inform public debate on technology, national security, and civil liberties going beyond the current controversy. In this effort, all three branches have a role. For the executive branch, disclosures about key national security programs that involve the collection, storage and dissemination of personal information — such as the operation of the National Counterterrorism Center — show that it is possible to describe practices and policies publicly, even those that have not been otherwise leaked, without damage to national security or operational effectiveness.

With regard to the legislative process, even where classified intelligence operations are involved, the purposes and framework of a program for domestic intelligence collection should be debated in public. During the process of developing legislation, some hearings and briefings may need to be conducted in secret to ensure that policymakers fully understand the intended use of a particular authority. But the government should not base an ongoing program affecting the rights of Americans on an interpretation of a statute that is not apparent from a natural reading of the text. In the case of Section 215, the government should have made it publicly clear in the reauthorization process that it intended for Section 215 to serve as legal authority to collect data in bulk on an ongoing basis.

There is also a need for greater transparency regarding operation of the FISA court. Prospectively, we encourage the FISC judges to continue the recent practice of writing opinions with an eye to declassification, separating specific sensitive facts peculiar to the case at hand from broader legal analyses. We also believe that there is significant value in producing declassified versions of earlier opinions, and recommend that the government undertake a classification review of all significant FISC opinions and orders involving novel interpretations of law. We realize that the process of redacting opinions not drafted for public disclosure will be more difficult and will burden individuals with other pressing duties, but we believe that it is appropriate to make the effort where those opinions and orders complete the historical picture of the development of legal doctrine regarding matters within the jurisdiction of the FISA court. In addition, should the government adopt our recommendation for a Special Advocate in the FISC, the nature and extent of that advocate’s role must be transparent to be effective.

It is also important to promote transparency through increased reporting to the public on the scope of surveillance programs. We urge the government to work with Internet service providers and other companies to reach agreement on standards allowing reasonable disclosures of aggregate statistics that would be meaningful without revealing sensitive government capabilities or tactics. We recommend that the government should also increase the level of detail in its unclassified reporting to Congress and the public regarding surveillance programs.

…

II. Overview of the PCLOB’s Recommendations

A. Section 215 Program

Recommendation 1: The government should end its Section 215 bulk telephone records program.

The Section 215 bulk telephone records program lacks a viable legal foundation under Section 215, implicates constitutional concerns under the First and Fourth Amendments, raises serious threats to privacy and civil liberties as a policy matter, and has shown only limited value. As a result, the Board recommends that the government end the program.

Without the current Section 215 program, the government would still be able to seek telephone calling records directly from communications providers through other existing legal authorities. The Board does not recommend that the government impose data retention requirements on providers in order to facilitate any system of seeking records directly from private databases.

Once the Section 215 bulk collection program has ended, the government should purge the database of telephone records that have been collected and stored during the program’s operation, subject to limits on purging data that may arise under federal law or as a result of any pending litigation.

The Board also recommends against the enactment of legislation that would merely codify the existing program or any other program that collects bulk data on such a massive scale regarding individuals with no suspected ties to terrorism or criminal activity. Moreover, the Board’s constitutional analysis should provide a message of caution, and as a policy matter, given the significant privacy and civil liberties interests at stake, if Congress seeks to provide legal authority for any new program, it should seek the least intrusive alternative and should not legislate to the outer bounds of its authority.

The Board recognizes that the government may need a short period of time to explore and institutionalize alternative approaches, and believes it would be appropriate for the government to wind down the 215 program over a brief interim period. If the government does find the need for a short wind-down period, the Board urges that it should follow the procedures under Recommendation 2 below.

Recommendation 2: The government should immediately implement additional privacy safeguards in operating the Section 215 bulk collection program.

The Board recommends that the government immediately implement several additional privacy safeguards to mitigate the privacy impact of the present Section 215 program. The recommended changes can be implemented without any need for congressional or FISC authorization. Specifically, the government should:

(a) reduce the retention period for the bulk telephone records program from five years to three years;

(b) reduce the number of “hops” used in contact chaining from three to two;

(c) submit the NSA’s “reasonable articulable suspicion” determinations to the FISC for review after they have been approved by NSA and used to query the database; and

(d) require a “reasonable articulable suspicion” determination before analysts may submit queries to, or otherwise analyze, the “corporate store,” which contains the results of contact chaining queries to the full “collection store.”

…

Recommendation 12: The scope of surveillance authorities affecting Americans should be public.

In particular, the Administration should develop principles and criteria for the public articulation of the legal authorities under which it conducts surveillance affecting Americans. If the text of the statute itself is not sufficient to inform the public of the scope of asserted government authority, then the key elements of the legal opinion or other documents describing the government’s legal analysis should be made public so there can be a free and open debate regarding the law’s scope. This includes both original enactments such as 215’s revisions and subsequent reauthorizations. While sensitive operational details regarding the conduct of government surveillance programs should remain classified, and while legal interpretations of the application of a statute in a particular case may also be secret so long as the use of that technique in a particular case is secret, the government’s interpretations of statutes that provide the basis for ongoing surveillance programs affecting Americans can and should be made public.

…

4. Expanding Relevance Beyond its Normal Legal Meaning

As illustrated above, precedent from other legal contexts involving the production of records does not support a concept of relevance like the one proffered by the government in support of the NSA’s bulk calling records program. To be sure, the case law regarding civil discovery, grand jury subpoenas, and administrative subpoenas shows that relevance is interpreted broadly, and that incidental production of unrelated materials is accepted as essential to enable fulsome investigative efforts. Standards of relevance thus permit parties and the government to engage in a degree of fishing, so long as it is not arbitrary or in bad faith. But the case law makes equally clear that the definition of relevance is not boundless. And no case that we have found supports the interpretation of relevance embodied in the NSA’s program.

Tacitly acknowledging that case law from analogous contexts is not adequate to support its position, the government suggests that Section 215 calls for “an even more flexible standard” of relevance. But none of the government’s arguments, in our view, supports a definition of “relevant” as broad as the one the government proffers.

First, had Congress wished to inscribe a standard of relevance in Section 215 even less exacting than those developed in analogous legal contexts, it could have done so. But contemporary statements from legislators, highlighted by the government itself, evince an intent to match Section 215 to the standards used in those contexts. The reference to grand jury subpoenas added to the statute in 2006 was meant to reassure those with concerns about the scope of Section 215 that the statute was consistent with practice in other fields.

Second, the fact that Section 215 requires only “reasonable grounds to believe” that records sought are relevant to an “investigation,” as the government emphasizes, does not call for a different standard of relevance than the one used in all other contexts. By demanding only “reasonable grounds to believe,” rather than certainty, that items sought are relevant to an investigation, the statute ensures that Section 215 is consistent with the analogous civil and criminal contexts — where the requester need not show that every item sought actually is relevant in an evidentiary sense, but merely that the items reasonably may be. The statute’s reference to a reasonable belief about the items requested shows that it contemplates the same scenario faced in the subpoena and discovery arenas: the government seeks a category of items that it reasonably suspects, but cannot be sure, includes material pertinent to its investigation. That scenario, and the legal standards that govern it, still require some factual correlation between the category of documents defined by the government and the circumstances of the investigation for which they are sought. Indeed, Section 215’s requirement of a “statement of facts” supporting the government’s belief underscores the importance of that context-specific inquiry.

Thus, even if the qualifier “reasonable grounds to believe” imposes a lower burden of proof on the government than if the statute simply authorized production of “relevant” documents, Section 215 still embodies the assumption that specific facts will link the government’s investigation to the particular group of records it seeks. That assumption is incompatible with a continuously renewed request for the daily acquisition of all records of a particular type.

Third, the unique characteristics of national security investigations do not warrant interpreting “relevance” expansively enough to support the NSA’s program. The government argues, and we agree, that the scope of relevance varies based on the nature of the investigation to which it is applied. Accordingly, the government cites the “remarkable breadth” of the national security investigations with which Section 215 is concerned, as contrasted with ordinary criminal matters, and emphasizes that these investigations “often focus on preventing threats to national security from causing harm, not on the retrospective determination of liability or guilt for prior activities.”

These valid distinctions, in our view, simply mean that the government will be able to make qualitative showings of relevance more often in national security investigations than in others. Because the government is investigating a broader scope of actors, over a longer period of time, across a wider geographic range, and before any specific offense has been committed, more information can be expected to be legitimately relevant to its efforts. Such considerations do not call for the wholesale elimination of relevance as a meaningful check on the government’s acquisition of items.

Finally, the heightened importance of counterterrorism investigations, as compared with typical law enforcement matters, does not alter the equation. Items either are relevant to an investigation or they are not — the significance of that investigation is a separate matter. No matter how critical national security investigations are, therefore, some articulable principle must connect the items sought to those investigations, or else the word “relevant” is robbed of meaning. Congress added a relevance requirement to Section 215 in 2006 knowing full well that the statute governs national security investigations. It cannot, therefore, have meant for the importance of such investigations to efface that requirement entirely.

In sum, we find the government’s interpretation of the word “relevant” in Section 215 to be unsupported by legal precedent and a subversion of the statute’s manifest intent to place some restriction, albeit a generous and flexible one, on the scope of the items that can be acquired under its auspices.

Plan for the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding

The following plan was released by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) in December 2013 and is available on GitHub.

Strategic Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding

32 pages
December 2013

Today’s dynamic operating environment challenges Federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector partners to continue improving information sharing and safeguarding processes and capabilities. While innovation has enhanced the ability to share and we have overcome many cultural barriers, increased sharing has created the potential for vulnerabilities requiring strengthened safeguarding practices.

In December 2012 the President signed the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (Strategy) which is anchored on the 2010 National Security Strategy and builds upon the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing. The Strategy provides guidance for more effective integration and implementation of policies, processes, standards, and technologies to promote secure and responsible national security information sharing. This document provides a higher-level overview of a longer, more detailed implementation plan for the Strategy, and is intended to assist in briefing senior policy makers on plans, progress, and performance related to achieving the vision of the NSISS.

Under the collaborative leadership of the National Security Staff (NSS) and the Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), with departments and agencies participating through the Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee (ISA IPC), a government-wide effort is underway to plan and coordinate continued, agency-based implementation of the Strategy’s 16 Priority Objectives. The ISA IPC, in coordination with the Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee, Federal CIO Council, and other interagency oversight and governance bodies, will transparently monitor progress against milestones and achievement of outcomes described in this Strategic Implementation Plan.

…

The Assassination of JFK Jr – Full Version Movie

https://youtu.be/wqBo7C7kAGs

TOP-SECRET – Operation Northwood

Proposed Top Secret plan from 1962 stating intent among the Joint Chiefs of Staff to stage terrorist attacks, including killing innocent civilians, to provoke war with Cuba
Proposals include use of drone aircraft to stage foreign attacks, staging hijackings, staging attacks on U.S. vessels and facilities, staging riots, as well as the creation of “terror campaigns” on U.S. soil

Operation Northwoods was a plan circulated in the U.S. government in 1962 to stage false flag terrorist attacks inside the U.S. and abroad to provoke “military intervention in Cuba”. The plan called for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or other operatives to commit genuine acts of terrorism in U.S. cities and elsewhere. These acts of terrorism were to be blamed on Cuba in order to create public support for a war against that nation, which had recently become communist under Fidel Castro. One part of the Operation Northwoods plan was to “develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.” The document was signed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer and reportedly presented to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on March 13, 1962. ¹ ²

The previously Top Secret document was originally made public on November 18, 1997, by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board, a U.S. federal agency overseeing the release of government records related to John F. Kennedy’s assassination.³

“Appendix to Enclosure A” and “Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A” of the Northwoods document were first published online by the National Security Archive on November 6, 1998 in a joint venture with CNN as part of CNN’s 1998 Cold War television documentary series—specifically, as a documentation supplement to “Episode 10: Cuba,” which aired on November 29, 1998. “Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A” is the section of the document which contains the proposals to stage terrorist attacks.⁴

U.S. Government’s Willingness to Stage Terrorist Attacks

In the recommendations section of the “Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)” memo, the Joint Chiefs of Staff make clear their willingness to stage actual terrorist events with legitimate casualties to sustain their intentions to “intervene” militarily in Cuba’s affairs. The cumulative effect of many of the recommendations is stated as being to provoke reactions from the Cuban government which would justify “military intervention”. Many of the suggested actions have a strong component of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) designed to simultaneously engender domestic U.S. support for “military intervention” while portraying the Cuban government as a rogue, dangerous entity which will internationally serve to justify the U.S. military intervention. The suggested actions include:

Use of drone (unmanned) aircraft to simulate air-related catastrophes

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner en route from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will begin transmitting on the international distress frequency a “MAY DAY” message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to “sell” the incident.⁵

Staging “hijacking attempts” of civilian vessels

7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba.⁶

Creation of “terror campaigns” inside the U.S. with legitimate victims

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

The terror campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.⁷

Destruction of U.S. military vessels

A “Remember the Maine” incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to “evacuate” remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.⁸

Staging fires and mortar attacks on U.S. military bases to cause actual damage to installations and potentially personnel

5. Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
6. Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
7. Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.⁹

Using friendly provocateurs to stage riots

4. Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans)¹⁰

Source notes:

Pentagon Proposed Pretexts for Cuban Invasion in 1962. National Security Archive. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/index.html [↩]
Lyman Lemnitzer. Wikipedia.org. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyman_Lemnitzer [↩]
Operation Northwoods. Wikipedia.org. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Northwoods [↩]
Ibid. [↩]
Operation Northwoods Documents. Public Intelligence. http://publicintelligence.net/operation-northwoods-documents/ [↩]
Ibid. [↩]
Ibid. [↩]
Ibid. [↩]
Ibid. [↩]

Video-Anthology – J.EDGAR HOOVER.BLACKMAILING,LURID CROSS-DRESSING QUEEN!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3N3Vg5l-ITU&feature=share&list=PLD90A4ED0655815E9&index=1

Clip concerning Hoover seeking a psychiatrist regarding his sexuality. Anthony Summers comments. Later comments on several people who had seen the Hoover photograph,

Joseph Shimon of the Washington Police comments on ‘sexparties with no girls’.

Lansky had obtained photographs of Hoover in a ‘compromising’ position.

Gordon Novel claims to have seen the photograph, and also claims Carlos Marcello had seen it, and in fact used it to control Hoover.

Peter Pitchess,former FBI agent comments on the non existant mafia. Also does former FBI agent Neil Welch and William Turner.

Clip with Robert Kennedy and a statement regarding the mafia. More on his take at the mafia in a clip with their take on Hoffa. Comments by Robert Blakey.

Clip from questioning of mob-informant Joe Valacci. Robert Kennedy took upon the mafia when Hoover had refused to even acknowledge its existence.

From ‘Evidence of Revision’ – Conspiratus Ubiquitus

TOP-SECRET-Masterspy Worldwide Threat Assessment Tweaked – House Commitee on Intelligence

Unveiled – The Secret Connection which killed the Kennedys – The Movie

https://youtu.be/8xVcfTzuJrM

This is the mindblowing 6-part,10 hour, video documentary series Evidence of Revision whose purpose is to present the publicly unavailable and even suppressed historical audio, video and film recordings largely unseen by the American and world public relating to the assassination of the Kennedy brothers, the little known classified “Black Ops” actually used to intentionally create the massive war in Viet Nam, the CIA “mind control” programs and their involvement in the RFK assassination and the Jonestown massacre and other important truths of our post-modern time.

Playlist:
http://www.youtube.com/playlist?p=PL6…

http://conspiracyscope.blogspot.com/

TOP-SECRET-Committee on National Security Systems Recommendations on U.S. Secret Networks

Threats to Federal information systems are rising as demands for sharing of information and intelligence between Federal Departments and Agencies increase. It is essential that the Federal Government devise an approach that addresses both challenges without compromising the ability to achieve either objective. Developing a common governance framework and set of Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) capabilities that enhance the security of our systems by ensuring that only authorized persons and systems from different Federal components have access to necessary information is a high priority. The Federal Identity, Credential and Access Management (FICAM) Roadmap and Implementation Guidance was developed to address the need for secure information sharing capabilities across the breadth of the Federal Government.

A recent gap analysis conducted to determine gaps between the current state of the Secret Fabric and FICAM revealed substantive differences between levels of adoption of this framework and served as the catalyst for this document. In addition to varying levels of FICAM maturity, the gap analysis also showed significant variations in levels of sharable information, connectivity, and governance structures which further complicate the aim of a common FICAM framework across the Secret Fabric.

Using the gap analysis as a starting point, this document provides four major recommendations:

Establish and Empower a Governance Structure for ICAM on All Networks
 Develop a Common Interoperable ICAM Architecture for the Secret Fabric
 Transition to a Common Interoperable ICAM Architecture
 Prepare for the Evolution of ICAM on the Secret Fabric as New Technology Emerges and New Mission and Business Needs Arise

The following progress chart summarizes the recommendations with objective end states and suggested activities required to accomplish the objectives along a snapshot of status of ICAM on the Secret Fabric as of the publication date of this document. These recommendations, objectives and activities will be included in the FICAM Implementation Plan for the Secret Fabric currently under development by the National Security Systems (NSS) Identity and Access Management (IdAM) Working Group under the guidance of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE).

Download the original document here:
CNSS-ImplementingFICAM

Obama & the Blonde Danish President’s Wife at Mandela’s Funeral doing the “Clinton”

Shocking ! Obama Snaps ‘Selfie’ During Mandela Memorial Service — And Michelle is Not Pleased

Obama Snaps ‘Selfie’ During Mandela Memorial Service — And Michelle is Not Pleased

Obama snaps selfie…See More

TOP-SECRET: Obama Administration White Paper on NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata

ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT

23 pages
August 9, 2013

This white paper explains the Government’s legal basis for an intelligence collection program under which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtains court orders directing certain telecommunications service providers to produce telephony metadata in bulk. The bulk metadata is stored, queried and analyzed by the National Security Agency (NSA) for counterterrorism purposes. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“the FISC” or “the Court”) authorizes this program under the “business records” provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1861, enacted as section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 215). The Court first authorized the program in 2006, and it has since been renewed thirty-four times under orders issued by fourteen different FISC judges. This paper explains why the telephony metadata collection program, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Court, is consistent with the Constitution and the standards set forth by Congress in Section 215. Because aspects of this program remain classified, there are limits to what can be said publicly about the facts underlying its legal authorization. This paper is an effort to provide as much information as possible to the public concerning the legal authority for this program, consistent with the need to protect national security, including intelligence sources and methods. While this paper summarizes the legal basis for the program, it is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the program or the legal arguments or authorities in support of it.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Under the telephony metadata collection program, telecommunications service providers, as required by court orders issued by the FISC, produce to the Government certain information about telephone calls, principally those made within the United States and between the United States and foreign countries. This information is limited to telephony metadata, which includes information about what telephone numbers were used to make and receive the calls, when the calls took place, and how long the calls lasted. Importantly, this information does not include any information about the content of those calls—the Government cannot, through this program, listen to or record any telephone conversations.

This telephony metadata is important to the Government because, by analyzing it, the Government can determine whether known or suspected terrorist operatives have been in contact with other persons who may be engaged in terrorist activities, including persons and activities within the United States. The program is carefully limited to this purpose: it is not lawful for anyone to query the bulk telephony metadata for any purpose other than counterterrorism, and Court-imposed rules strictly limit all such queries. The program includes internal oversight mechanisms to prevent misuse, as well as external reporting requirements to the FISC and Congress.

Multiple FISC judges have found that Section 215 authorizes the collection of telephony metadata in bulk. Section 215 permits the FBI to seek a court order directing a business or other entity to produce records or documents when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation of international terrorism. Courts have held in the analogous contexts of civil discovery and criminal and administrative investigations that “relevance” is a broad standard that permits discovery of large volumes of data in circumstances where doing so is necessary to identify much smaller amounts of information within that data that directly bears on the matter being investigated. Although broad in scope, the telephony metadata collection program meets the “relevance” standard of Section 215 because there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that this category of data, when queried and analyzed consistent with the Court-approved standards, will produce information pertinent to FBI investigations of international terrorism, and because certain analytic tools used to accomplish this objective require the collection and storage of a large volume of telephony metadata. This does not mean that Section 215 authorizes the collection and storage of all types of information in bulk: the relevance of any particular data to investigations of international terrorism depends on all the facts and circumstances. For example, communications metadata is different from many other kinds of records because it is inter-connected and the connections between individual data points, which can be reliably identified only through analysis of a large volume of data, are particularly important to a broad range of investigations of international terrorism.

Moreover, information concerning the use of Section 215 to collect telephony metadata in bulk was made available to all Members of Congress, and Congress reauthorized Section 215 without change after this information was provided. It is significant to the legal analysis of the statute that Congress was on notice of this activity and of the source of its legal authority when the statute was reauthorized.

The telephony metadata collection program also complies with the Constitution. Supreme Court precedent makes clear that participants in telephone calls lack a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of the Fourth Amendment in the telephone numbers used to make and receive their calls. Moreover, particularly given the Court-imposed restrictions on accessing and disseminating the data, any arguable privacy intrusion arising from the collection of telephony metadata would be outweighed by the public interest in identifying suspected terrorist operatives and thwarting terrorist plots, rendering the program reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Likewise, the program does not violate the First Amendment, particularly given that the telephony metadata is collected to serve as an investigative tool in authorized investigations of international terrorism.

The Proof – German Spy: Without US Help “We’d Be Fucked”

http://translate.google.com/translate?sl=de&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.welt.de%2Fpolitik%2Fdeutschland%2Farticle117789219%2FWas-die-Deutschen-ueber-die-Spionage-der-USA-wussten.html

TOP-SECRET – Congressional Budget Office Report: Distribution of Expenditures in Individual Income Tax System

CBO-TaxExpenditures

A number of exclusions, deductions, preferential rates, and credits in the federal tax system cause revenues to be much lower than they would be otherwise for any given structure of tax rates. Some of those provisions—in both the individual and corporate income tax systems—are termed “tax expenditures” because they resemble federal spending by providing financial assistance to specific activities, entities, or groups of people. Tax expenditures, like traditional forms of federal spending, contribute to the federal budget deficit; influence how people work, save, and invest; and affect the distribution of income. This report examines how 10 of the largest tax expenditures in the individual income tax system in 2013 are distributed among households with different amounts of income. Those expenditures are grouped into four categories:

Exclusions from taxable income—
• Employer-sponsored health insurance,
• Net pension contributions and earnings,
• Capital gains on assets transferred at death, and
• A portion of Social Security and Railroad Retirement benefits;

Itemized deductions—
• Certain taxes paid to state and local governments,
• Mortgage interest payments, and
• Charitable contributions;

Preferential tax rates on capital gains and dividends;
and

Tax credits—
• The earned income tax credit, and
• The child tax credit.

Some of the provisions of law that reduce the amount of taxable income under the individual income tax also decrease the amount of earnings subject to payroll taxes. The figures presented in this report are generally based on the reduction in payroll taxes as well as the reduction in income taxes, but some figures separate those two effects. (Provisions that reduce payroll tax receipts generally reduce future Social Security benefits as well; that effect is not analyzed in this report.)

How Do Tax Expenditures Affect the Federal Budget?

Although the 10 major tax expenditures listed here represent a small fraction of the more than 200 tax expenditures in the individual and corporate income tax systems, they will account for roughly two-thirds of the total budgetary effects of all tax expenditures in fiscal year 2013, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates. Together, those 10 tax expenditures are estimated to total more than $900 billion, or 5.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), in fiscal year 2013 and are projected to amount to nearly $12 trillion, or 5.4 percent of GDP, over the 2014–2023 period. In addition, tax credits to subsidize premiums for health insurance provided through new exchanges to be established under the Affordable Care Act will represent a new tax expenditure beginning in 2014, estimated to equal 0.4 percent of GDP over the 2014–2023 period.

…

Revealed – DHS and FBI Bulletins on OpUSA Tools and Tactics

The following bulletins were released May 6, 2013 by the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center and FBI in anticipation of the OpUSA campaign. A DHS bulletin on the campaign was released May 2, 2013 by computer security journalist Brian Krebs.

National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center OpUSA: Potential Tools	May 6, 2013	4 pages	Download
FBI Liaison Alert System #C-000007-DD	May 6, 2013	1 page	Download

Multiple groups, and individual hacker handles have claimed their intent to attack U.S. websites as part of OpUSA. As seen in many hacktivist operations (Ops), willing participants have posted free tools to assist other like minded individuals in their attack efforts. Often, more coordinated attacks will name a specific tool, target, day and time for the attack. That has not been the case for OpUSA thus far. Individual hacker groups seem to be conducting attacks independently, each claiming responsibility for individual defacements and data breaches that have supposedly recently taken place. Below you will find some of the tools being posted in conversations about OpUSA and links to US-CERT sites which provide background on the vulnerabilities exploited by these tools as well as mitigation advice for computer network defense actions.

Structured Query Language (SQL) injection

The following is a sampling of tools being offered to willing members interested in using SQL attacks during OpUSA.

Havij: Automates SQL Injection attacks. It allows the attacker to ‘fingerprint’ the database, retrieve Database Management System users and password hashes, dump tables and columns, retrieve specific data from the database, run SQL statements, and access the underlying file system and execute commands on the operating system.

SQL Poison: This exploit scanner tool incorporates automated Google Dorking methods to look for SQL vulnerabilities. Once the vulnerability is discovered, it performs an SQL injection attack.

The following US-CERT advisories offer further information:

US-CERT SQL Injection: http://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications/sql-injection

US-CERT Securing Your Web Browser: http://www.us-cert.gov/publications/securing-your-web-browser

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

DDoS tools are often used by hacktivist so users may voluntary botnets. These are a list of the available DDoS tools via Open Source:

Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC): Floods servers with TCP or UDP packets with the intention of disrupting service.

High Orbit Ion Cannon (HOIC): Can attack as many as 256 sites simultaneously and can target subdirectories of the main page using “booster packs” that enable traffic with multiple user-agent strings, referrers, and headers.

HTTP Unbearable Load King (HULK): Also referred to as HULK DDoSser. Generates unique requests for each and every request generated, which bypasses caching engines and impacting the server’s load directly.

Slowloris: Attempts to keep multiple open connections to the target web server and keep them open as long as possible.

DDos Notepad: Attackers can create a simple Batchfile DDoS echo script using Notepad.

ByteDOS: Windows desktop DOS application that is a standalone executable file and doesn’t require any special installation on the attacking machine. It is equipped with embedded IP resolver capabilities that allow the tool to resolve IPs from domain names. It also supports SYN Flood and ICMP flood.

Turbinas: Also referred to as VOLKS TURBINAS.EXE, which are associated with Cloaked Malware group designed to evade security detection systems.

Syn Flood DOS: Attack in which the actor sends a number of consecutive SYN requests to a target attempting to consume server resources.

Jays Booter: A customized shell booter, which can be instructed to attack a specific IP for a period of time in an attempt to boot the target off of the internet. There are three types of shells: POST, GET, and SLOWORIS.

HTTPFlooder: Program that attempts to flood the HTTP layer through GET and POST requests.

TORSHAMMER: A Slow POST DOS tool written in Python. It can be run through the TOR network, which will anonymize the attacker. It can impact unprotected web-servers running Apache and IIS.

R.U.D.Y: Also known as R-U-Dead-Yet. This is an HTTP POST DOS attack that allows the attacker to choose the forms and form fields that they want to use for the POST attack.

OWASP HTTP Tool: A Slow POST DOS tool that allows the attacker to generate a customized number of connections, connection rate, timeouts, and even the content length.

Anonymous DOSer: A customized DOS tool put together in visual basic. It is very simple to use and can be used for HTTP floods or UDP floods.

Windows_DNS_Attack_Tool: DNS Amplification tool. It uses open DNS resolvers and source address spoofing to create large denial of service attacks.

Goodbye: Similar to HTTPFlooder and R-U-Dead-Yet DDoS tools.

The following US-CERT advisories offer further information:

US-CERT Anonymous DDoS Activity: http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA12-024A

US-CERT Understanding Denial-of-Service-Attacks: http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015

US-CERT DNS Amplification Attacks: http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A

Password Crackers/Stealers

Several password crackers and stealers were spotted on related forums. Some of which are found below:

Backtrack 5: A Linux based penetration testing tool. The most recent edition was synced up with the new release of KaliLinux. This toolkit provides easy-to-use tools such as port scanners, metasploit, Nmap, Browser Exploitation Framework, Hydra, Aircrack-ng, and Ophcrack. Aircrack and Ophcrack are password crackers.

Hash Cracker: Refers to multiple free applications designed to crack MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA384, and SHA-512 using bruteforce techniques or using a rainbow table/dictionary attacks.

CpanelBruteReiluke: Bruteforce password cracking tool designed by a developer known as Reiluke. Reiluke also has made his blind SQL, email brute force, and exploit scanner tools available via open source.

Gmail_Hacker: Labeled as a free Gmail-specific password cracking tool which is advertised as taking less than 2 minutes to retrieve passwords.

Firefox Password Stealer: Provides details on how an attacker can turn their Firefox browser into a password stealer. This is not a tool, but rather direction for end users.

ICQ Steal0r: Program seems to be dedicated to stealing passwords of ICQ users. ICQ is an instant messaging application popularized by Mirabilis.

The following US-CERT advisories offer further information:

US-CERT Password Management: https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/PasswordMgmt2012.pdf

Proxy Servers/Anonymizers

In additional to options like the onion router (TOR), OpUSA members have advertised the following to assist actors in obfuscating their activity.

CYBERGHOST: A Virtual Private Network (VPN) simulator which sets up a proxy server allowing anonymous activity with 128-bit AES encryption. It also has the most server locations available in the US and a number of countries in Europe.

TunnelBear: This VPN simulator also circumvents Geoblocking, which is geographically blocking internet users from certain web services.

SumRando: This VPN simulator allows users to generate random IP addresses, which can obfuscate attribution.

Real Hide IP: Hides the IP address of anyone employing the application.

Hotspot Shield: Hides the IP address of anyone employing the application.

Other Tools Mentioned

Hacker groups have mentioned the following tools among several others that don’t fit the above categories.

Net Tools: This could refer to any number of items, but c|net offers a network toolbox that has network sniffing and scanning tools.

Pack Del Hacker: This is a simplified, online-based file-sharing service.

EmailScraperWizardv06b: This is noted as one of the more successful email scrapers on the internet. It can extract email addresses from websites.

IP Port Scanner: This could refer to multiple tools dedicated to scanning, mapping and discovering open ports.

IP Scanner: These types of tools can scan networks, detect devices, wireless devices, routers, and can find HTTP, HTTPS, and FTP folders.

DHCP_IP_Forcer: This allows an attacker to essentially scan a network and detect IP addresses and MAC addresses on a network. Some DHCP Force components allow the attacker to reconfigure modems.

Summary

While it is difficult to assess the specific tools that may be used against targeted organizations, this product is intended to provide organizations with an idea of the type of free tools that may be employed against them, so they may better prepare mitigation strategies during OpUSA or similar hacktivist operations. As always, NCCIC reminds users and administrators of the importance of best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Critical Infrastructure Key Resource (CIKR) owners and operators should work toward a resilient network model that assumes such an attack will occur against their enterprise. The goal is to minimize damage, and provide pathways for restoration of critical business functions in the shortest amount of time possible.

Revealed – Prez Sets Commission on Election Administration

Executive Order 13639
Establishment of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration

Click to access 2013-07837_PI.pdf

[FR Doc. 2013-07837 Filed 04/02/2013 at 8:45 am; Publication Date: 04/03/2013]

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13639

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to promote the efficient administration of Federal elections and to improve the experience of all voters, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment. There is established the Presidential Commission on Election Administration (Commission).

Sec. 2. Membership.

(a) The Commission shall be composed of not more than nine members appointed by the President. The members shall be drawn from among distinguished individuals with knowledge about or experience in the administration of State or local elections, as well as representatives of successful customer service-oriented businesses, and any other individuals with knowledge or experience determined by the President to be of value to the Commission.

(b) The President shall designate two members of the Commission to serve as Co-Chairs.

Sec. 3. Mission.

(a) The Commission shall identify best practices and otherwise make recommendations to promote the efficient administration of elections in order to ensure that all eligible voters have the opportunity to cast their ballots without undue delay, and to improve the experience of voters facing other obstacles in casting their ballots, such as members of the military, overseas voters, voters with disabilities, and voters with limited English proficiency. In doing so, the Commission shall consider as appropriate:

(i) the number, location, management, operation, and design of polling places;

(ii) the training, recruitment, and number of poll workers;

(iii) voting accessibility for uniformed and overseas voters;

(iv) the efficient management of voter rolls and poll books;

(v) voting machine capacity and technology;

(vi) ballot simplicity and voter education;

(vii) voting accessibility for individuals with disabilities, limited English proficiency, and other special needs;

(viii) management of issuing and processing provisional ballots in the polling place on Election Day;

(ix) the issues presented by the administration of absentee ballot programs;

(x) the adequacy of contingency plans for natural disasters and other emergencies that may disrupt elections; and

(xi) other issues related to the efficient administration of elections that the Co-Chairs agree are necessary and appropriate to the Commission’s work.

(b) The Commission shall be advisory in nature and shall submit a final report to the President within 6 months of the date of the Commission’s first public meeting.

Sec. 4. Administration.

(a) The Commission shall hold public meetings and engage with Federal, State, and local officials, technical advisors, and nongovernmental organizations, as necessary to carry out its mission.

(b) In carrying out its mission, the Commission shall be informed by, and shall strive to avoid duplicating, the efforts of other governmental entities.

Sec. 5. Termination. The Commission shall terminate 30 days after it presents its final report to the President.

Sec. 6. General Provisions.

(a) To the extent permitted by law, and subject to the availability of appropriations, the General Services Administration shall provide the Commission with such administrative services, funds, facilities, staff, equipment, and other support services as may be necessary to carry out its mission on a reimbursable basis.

(b) Insofar as the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App.) (the “Act”), may apply to the Commission, any functions of the President under that Act, except for those in section 6 of the Act, shall be performed by the Administrator of General Services.

(c) Members of the Commission shall serve without any additional compensation for their work on the Commission, but shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, to the extent permitted by law for persons serving intermittently in the Government service (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707).

(d) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to a department, agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(e) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 28, 2013.

Full Speech Of President Obama – Statement On Fiscal Cliff Negotiations

http://youtu.be/fop2irJWtcQ

Full Speech Of President Obama – Statement On Fiscal Cliff Negotiations

Secrecy News – WHITE HOUSE ADVANCES INSIDER THREAT POLICY

In a memorandum to agency heads last week, President Obama transmitted
formal requirements that agencies must meet in order "to deter, detect, and
mitigate actions by employees who may represent a threat to national
security."

Along with espionage and acts of violence, the National Insider Threat
Policy notably extends to the "unauthorized disclosure of classified
information, including the vast amounts of classified data available on
interconnected United States Government computer networks." To combat such
unauthorized disclosures, agencies are required to "monitor employee use of
classified networks."

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/obama/nitp.pdf

The new standards, which have not been made publicly available, were
developed by an interagency Insider Threat Task Force that was established
by President Obama in the October 2011 executive order 13587, and they
reflect the ongoing tightening of safeguards on classified information in
response to the voluminous leaks of the last few years.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13587.htm

But the latest issuance also illustrates the superfluousness (or worse) of
current congressional action concerning leaks.  Executive branch agencies
do not need Congress to tell them to develop "a comprehensive insider
threat program management plan," as would be required by the Senate version
of the pending FY2013 Intelligence Authorization Act (section 509).  Such
plans will go forward in any case.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/ssci-leaks.pdf

Sen. Ron Wyden has placed a hold on the pending intelligence bill, citing
objections to several of the proposed anti-leak provisions contained in
Title V of the bill. He said the proposed steps were misguided or
counterproductive.

"I am concerned that they will lead to less-informed public debate about
national security issues, and also undermine the due process rights of
intelligence agency employees, without actually enhancing national
security," he said on November 14.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/wyden-hold.html

The most problematic measures in the Senate bill are those intended to
restrict contacts between reporters and government officials.

Senator Wyden said that legislative actions to limit the ability of the
press to report on classified matters could undermine or cripple the
intelligence oversight process.

"I have been on the Senate Intelligence Committee for 12 years now, and I
can recall numerous specific instances where I found out about serious
government wrongdoing--such as the NSA's warrantless wiretapping program,
or the CIA's coercive interrogation program--only as a result of
disclosures by the press," he said.

        *        *        *

The record of a July 2012 House Judiciary Committee hearing on National
Security Leaks and the Law has recently been published.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/leaks-hjc.pdf

IG REVIEW OF FISA COMPLIANCE COMPLETED BUT NOT RELEASED

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice
said it had recently completed a review of the Department's use of Section
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act
(FAA), but the report is classified and its findings have not been
released.

"The OIG examined the number of disseminated FBI intelligence reports
containing a reference to a U.S. person identity, the number of U.S. person
identities subsequently disseminated in response to requests for identities
not referred to by name or title in the original reporting, the number of
targets later determined to be located in the United States, and whether
communications of such targets were reviewed.  The OIG also reviewed the
FBI's compliance with the required targeting and minimization procedures,"
according to a November 7 OIG memorandum on Top Management and Performance
Challenges in the Department of Justice.

        http://www.justice.gov/oig/challenges/2012.htm

A copy of the classified report has been requested under the Freedom of
Information Act.

Earlier this year, Sen. Ron Wyden placed a hold on reauthorization of the
FISA Amendments Act "because I believe that Congress does not have enough
information about this law's impact on the privacy of law-abiding American
citizens, and because I am concerned about a loophole in the law that could
allow the government to effectively conduct warrantless searches for
Americans' communications."

        http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/wyden-fisa.html

AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS

The Department of Defense issued a new Directive last week establishing
DoD policy for the development and use of autonomous weapons systems.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_09.pdf

An autonomous weapon system is defined as "a weapon system that, once
activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a
human operator."

The new DoD Directive Number 3000.09, dated November 21, establishes
guidelines that are intended "to minimize the probability and consequences
of failures in autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that could
lead to unintended engagements."

"Failures can result from a number of causes, including, but not limited
to, human error, human-machine interaction failures, malfunctions,
communications degradation, software coding errors, enemy cyber attacks or
infiltration into the industrial supply chain, jamming, spoofing, decoys,
other enemy countermeasures or actions, or unanticipated situations on the
battlefield," the Directive explains.

An "unintended engagement" resulting from such a failure means "the use of
force resulting in damage to persons or objects that human operators did
not intend to be the targets of U.S. military operations, including
unacceptable levels of collateral damage beyond those consistent with the
law of war, ROE [rules of engagement], and commander's intent."

The Department of Defense should "more aggressively use autonomy in
military missions," urged the Defense Science Board last summer in a report
on "The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems."

        http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/09/dsb_autonomy.html

The U.S. Army issued an updated Army Field Manual 3-36 on Electronic
Warfare earlier this month.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-36.pdf

INDIA-US SECURITY RELATIONS, AND MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that have
not been made readily available to the public include the following.

India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement, November 13, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42823.pdf

A Guide to China's Upcoming Leadership Transitions, October 16, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42786.pdf

U.S. Trade and Investment Relations with sub-Saharan Africa and the
African Growth and Opportunity Act, November 14, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31772.pdf

Roles and Duties of a Member of Congress, November 9, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33686.pdf

The Congressional Research Service made a humorous appearance in the
Doonesbury comic strip on November 24, in connection with the report on tax
cuts that was withdrawn in response to criticism from some Republican
Senators.

        http://doonesbury.slate.com/strip/archive/2012/11/24

In fact, as often noted, members of Congress of both parties consistently
withhold public access to most CRS reports.

        http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/11/crs_withdrawal.html

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
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_______________________
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Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
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Unveiled – Paula (Dean) Kranz (Broadwell)

Paula Kranz

kranzp@95mp.21tsc.army.mil

http://www.west-point.org/users/usma1995/52324/95news_1999.htm

18 May 1999. Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Today I bumped into Matt Passante, D4, who happened to be an escort officer for a VIP attending a briefing I gave on the Hunter UAV. He’s been at Fort Huachuca for 3 weeks and is working in the Directorate of Combat Development. I just spoke with him in passing, but he’s doing well. I also received an e-mail from Paula Kranz, A2. Paula and I were platoon leaders together in B/102d MI Bn in Korea, where she, being a natural leader, did a fantastic job and represented ’95 well. She sent me her new e-mail address (you can click on her name to write her) and her phone numbers, which I’d be happy to share on request.

5 October 1999. Savannah, Georgia. Devon Blake (Morris), G2 sends news from her home station at Hunter Army Airfield in Savannah. On December 5, 1998 Devon married Tim Blake, a real civilian, no less! In attendance as bridesmaids was Paula Kranz, A2, Sarah Ross, D3 and Abi Thompson, F4, who you should be able to pick out in the wedding photo below. Devon’s currently on deployment to Bosnia as an augmentee to 10th Mountain Division, Task Force 2-15 Field Artillery Regiment. Devon also sends other great photos–one from her promotion to Captain on July 1 and another of her surrounded by children in Bosnia.

http://www.west-point.org/users/usma1995/52324/images/photogallery/
devon_morris_wedding_%28Dec%201998%29.jpg

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http://www.west-point.org/users/usma1995/52324/images/photogallery/
devon_morris_promotion_%28Jul%201999%29.jpg

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http://www.west-point.org/users/usma1995/52324/images/photogallery/
devon_morris_in_bosnia_1999.jpg

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VIDEO-Election Results 2012: Nate Silver on How He Got It Right

NYT-Obama Wins the 2012 Election: Obama’s Complete Presidential Victory Speech

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nv9NwKAjmt0

Unveiled – Michelle Obama Protection

Michelle Obama Protection

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Lots of supporters take photographs of First lady Michelle Obama, bottom center during a campaign stop at Hampton University, Virginia, November 2, 2012. AP

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U.S. First Lady Obama meets with supporters during a get-out-the-vote tour, November 1, 2012. Reuters.

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First Lady Michelle Obama addressed a crowd of several hundred supporters in Sioux City, Iowa, Monday, Oct. 29, 2012,at the Sioux City COnvention Center in the downtown area. Jerry Mennenga

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First Lady Michelle Obama greets a child while talking with supporters after speaking at a campaign rally, Friday, Oct. 26, 2012, in Las Vegas. AP

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First lady Michelle Obama returns to the White House after watching her daughter Sasha’s basketball game in Washington, Sunday, March 11, 2012. AP

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In this undated image released by Nickelodeon, first lady Michelle Obama. seated second left, interacts with Jerry Trainor, left, as Miranda Cosgrove, center, Nathan Kress and Jennette McCurdy, right, look on during Obama’s guest appearance on the popular children’s show, “iCarly,” premiering Monday, Jan. 16, 2012 at 8 p.m EST on Nickelodeon. AP

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First lady Michelle Obama, wearing a hat and sunglasses, stands in line at a Target department store in Alexandria, Va., Thursday, Sept. 29, 2011, after doing some shopping. AP [Secret Service at right.]

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First lady Michelle Obama works the crowd while participating during the taping of Extreme Makeover Home Edition in Fayetteville, N.C., Thursday, July 21, 2011. AP

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US first lady Michelle Obama steps out of a vehicle, prior to boarding her plane, in Gaborone, Botswana, at the end of her week long trip to Africa, Sunday, June 26, 2011.

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U.S. first lady Michelle Obama and daughters Sasha and Malia depart Cape Town, South Africa, as they travel to Gaborone, Botswana, Friday, June 24, 2011. AP

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U.S. first lady Michelle Obama embraces an audience member after she speaks at Regina Mundi Church and addresses the Young African Women Leaders Forum, in a Soweto township, Johannesburg, South Africa, Wednesday, June 22, 2011. AP

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First lady Michelle Obama greets people after speaking at a ceremony to dedicate the first of three new Fisher houses,Thursday, Dec. 2, 2010, at the Bethesda Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Md. AP

[Image] U.S. first lady Michelle Obama, center left, walks with friends and security during a visit to Ronda in southern Spain, Saturday, Aug. 7, 2010. AP

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Security officers escort a convoy of cars, one believed to be transporting U.S. First Lady Michelle Obama, on arrival at the Villa Padierna Hotel in Marbella, southern Spain, Wednesday, Aug. 4, 2010. AP

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First lady Michelle Obama, center, greets Marines after a speech at Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base in San Diego, Sunday, June 13, 2010. AP

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First Lady Michelle Obama, center, examines vegetables grown by Somali immgrant Khadija Musame, second from right, as interpreter Bilal Muya, right, farm coordinator Amy Lint, second from left, and Dr. Robert Ross, President and CEO of The California Endowment, look on Thursday April 15, 2010 in San Diego. AP

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U.S. first lady Michelle Obama, second left, shakes hands with UN and NGO workers during a visit to the United Nations base in Port-au-Prince, Tuesday, April 13, 2010. Obama is on a one-day visit to Haiti. AP

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Florida, January 2010.

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Michelle Obama at Latin American Montessori Bilingual Public Charter School, May 4, 2009. Wikipedia

Katy Perry Performs At A Milwaukee Rally For President Barack Obama

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FAS – 2010 Military Intelligence Budget Request Declassified

The Department of Defense this week released a redacted version of the budget justification for the FY 2010 Military Intelligence Program (MIP).

“The MIP sustains all programs, projects or activities that support the Secretary of Defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and related intelligence responsibilities and provides capabilities to meet the warfighters’ operational and tactical requirements whenever and wherever needed,” the document states.

The MIP budget justification for FY 2010, which was submitted to Congress in 2009, presents dozens of individual military intelligence programs. While budget figures have been censored, along with various other classified matters, the summary descriptions of most of the individual MIP programs were released more or less intact.

The document (large pdf) was provided to the Federation of American Scientists in response to a Freedom of Information Act request.

“In the last several years, we have embarked on a fundamental change to the concept of defense intelligence – one that balances the unique role of support to the warfighter with the recognition that today’s security environment crosses traditional organizational domains,” the budget document says.

“The deep integration of defense intelligence into the larger Intelligence Community, the evolution of our collaboration with homeland defense counterparts, and the fostering of committed international partnerships are all outcomes of this fundamental change,” wrote James R. Clapper, then-Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) in his introduction to the budget justification.

In FY 2010, Congress appropriated $27 billion for the Military Intelligence Program. The FY 2013 request for the MIP was $19.2 billion. The budget appropriation for FY 2012 is to be disclosed by the end of this month.

WIKILEAKS intervenes in the U.S. federal election

Dear WikiLeaks Friend,

From today WikiLeaks has decided to intervene in the U.S. federal election. It is clear that whether Republicans or Democrats are in power, without the sort of pressure we can exert when we are at our strongest, the U.S. government will continue to declare the whole world a battleground. Last Friday, the Pentagon publicly reissued its threats against WikiLeaks, demanding that we destroy our previous publications and cease “soliciting” U.S. military whistleblowers — and that our failure to do so was an ongoing “crime” and “law enforcement matter”. The FBI file for the pending prosecution of WikiLeaks, according to court records from earlier this year, has reached 42,135 pages. WikiLeaks is determined to stop these and other moves towards what appears to be ?€? let’s be honest ?€? a transnational security state dystopia. We believe knowledge is power and that knowledge should be in the hands of the people. By placing huge quantities of secret knowledge into your hands we can stop the concentration of power that is driving these trends. We ask that you cast the only vote that matters, and vote with your wallet. It is possible for you to make donations with your credit card, despite the attempted blockade. To do so, visit http://wikileaks.org/donate Also, please consider visiting our campaign website, at http://wikileaks.org/donate2012 and passing it on to your friends and family. Below are some suggestions Friends of WikiLeaks might want to consider to support WikiLeaks in this campaign: -Show your support to the world AND financially assist WikiLeaks: Buy a Tshirt at the official WikiLeaks store: http://www.wikileaks.spreadshirt.com – Download a poster to print and display from: http://www.somersetbean.blogspot.com – write to your national papers to correct libels against Assange and WikiLeaks: eg Julian Assange has not been charged with any crime anywhere, yet publications state the contrary. – write articles, facebook posts, tweets emails etc titled ‘Why I will not be voting for Obama’ or ‘Why I will not be voting from Romney – Contact your friends, family, colleagues and classmates organise a WikiLeaks campaign event – Create a WikiLeaks Campaign/Defence Group at your school, college, University or work place Solidarity, Julian Assange and Team

TOP-SECRET – Restricted U.S. Army Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon Manual

FM 3-20.98 provides basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the tactical employment of the reconnaissance and scout platoons of the reconnaissance squadrons in the heavy, infantry, and Stryker brigade combat teams (HBCT, IBCT, and SBCT) as well as the battlefield surveillance brigade’s (BFSB) reconnaissance and surveillance squadron and the cavalry squadron of the armored cavalry regiment (ACR).

This publication—

• Provides doctrinal guidance for commanders and leaders of the currently transitioning organizations who are responsible for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations in the reconnaissance and scout platoons.
• Serves as an authoritative reference for personnel developing doctrine (fundamental principles and TTP), materiel and force structure, institutional and unit training, and standing operating procedures (SOP) for reconnaissance and scout platoon operations. It does not, however, cover deployment; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; or redeployment operations.
• Describes doctrine that is based on suggestions, insights, and observations from previously developed doctrine and from units and leaders taking part both in operational situations, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and in training at the Army’s combat training centers. These doctrinal principles and procedures are intended to be used as a guide and are not to be considered inflexible. Each situation in combat must be resolved by an intelligent interpretation and application of the doctrine outlined in this manual.
• Is directed toward the reconnaissance and scout platoon leader and platoon sergeant (PSG). The manual reflects and supports Army operations doctrine as covered in FM 3-0, Operations; FM 3-90, Tactics; FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team; and FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron. It is not a stand-alone reference for reconnaissance and scout platoon operations; rather, it is intended to be used in conjunction with those and other existing doctrinal resources.
• Outlines the framework in which the five types of reconnaissance and scout platoons (HBCT, IBCT, SBCT, BFSB, and ACR) will operate, either by themselves or together as part of the troop or larger organization. The manual also includes discussions of doctrine that is applicable to each specific type of platoon.

…

THE OE IN RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

3-33. Reconnaissance and scout platoons must be prepared to operate beyond the traditional roles of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition of enemy forces. Today, scouts must adjust their traditional roles to fulfill the broader mission of providing SU in its fullest sense. This involves an understanding of the OE in all its aspects, covering political, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time variables in addition to the military aspects of the OE. This multidimensional requirement means that the platoon must develop an understanding of what is happening and why. In the asymmetric environment, identifying enemy centers of gravity, decisive points, and the means to influence the enemy’s will and behavior—while observing proper ROE—is one of the most important contributions that the platoon can make to ensure successful mission accomplishment. For more information on the OE, refer to FM 3-0.

NONTRADITIONAL ASPECTS OF THE OE

3-34. The Army has traditionally focused its efforts on traditional combat operations, based on open terrain, force-on-force battles, and symmetrical enemy formations, focusing on gaining information on the enemy and terrain. Platoon planning, however, must expand to include nontraditional aspects of OE variables that could influence its operations.

Asymmetric Warfare

3-35. Conditions in the new millennium, coupled with the technological developments of the information age, raise the specter of asymmetric warfare, a concept in which a weak opponent successfully engages a stronger opponent using a variety of non-conventional TTPs. The goal is to gain an advantage in hopes of achieving the weaker force’s objectives and goals. Asymmetric threats include—

Regional military forces.

Paramilitary forces.

Guerrillas and insurgents.

Terrorists.

Criminal groups.

Certain civilian groups and individuals.

Political parties.

Religious groups.

3-36. Threat elements will use a number of nontraditional approaches in conducting asymmetric warfare, including the following:

Information operations (IO).

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Operations in complex terrain.

Civilian involvement (include hiding within the population and staging evasive attacks).

Urban Considerations

3-37. The urban environment confronts commanders with a combination of difficulties rarely found in other settings in which the Army conducts operations. The distinct characteristics of the urban environment are primarily a function of the following factors:

The increasing size and global prevalence of urban areas.

The combinations of man-made features and supporting infrastructure superimposed on the existing natural terrain.

The density of civilians in close proximity to combat forces.

3-38. The human dimension represents potentially the most important and the most perplexing factor for commanders to understand and evaluate. Although urban terrain is complex, understanding it is a relatively straightforward process in comparison to comprehending the multifaceted nature of urban society. The urban environment is, first, a human environment. That makes it different from all other types. An urban environment is not solely defined by its structures or systems but by the people who compose it. It reacts and interacts with an army in ways that no natural environment can.

3-39. Military operations often require Army forces to operate in close proximity to a high density of civilians, whose presence, attitudes, actions, and needs in turn affect the conduct of operations. Civilian populations continually influence, to varying degrees, military operations within an AO. As urban areas increase in size, they become less and less homogenous; therefore, commanders must understand and account for the characteristics of a diverse population whose beliefs and actions may vary based on many factors. Improving communications with the local population (especially using interpreters) can improve intelligence gathering and win acceptance of the platoon within that AO. Security requirements might change when these personnel are on vehicles and around digital communication systems.

3-40. The decisive terrain during a military operation, particularly in stability operations, may be the civilian inhabitants themselves. To gain and/or retain the support of the civilian population, commanders must first understand (through reconnaissance) the complex nature and character of the urban society and its infrastructure. Scouts must then understand and accept that every military action (or inaction) may influence, positively or negatively, the relationship between the urban population and Army forces and, by extension, have a significant impact on mission success. With this awareness, commanders visualize decisions they must make, plan operations, and implement programs. They can take immediate action to maintain support of a friendly populace, gain the support of neutral factions, or neutralize hostile elements. Unit continuity books maintaining feedback on past operations within the area will provide insight on past successful and unsuccessful missions and their results.

…

HUMINT OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-152. HUMINT is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both passive and active, to gather information to satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements and cue other intelligence disciplines. HUMINT tasks include, but are not limited to, the following:

Source operations using tactical and other developed sources.

Liaison with HN officials and allied counterparts.

Elicitation of information from the civilian populace, including transients.

Identification of individuals as potential force protection sources.

Debriefing of U.S. and allied forces and civilian personnel.

Interrogation of EPWs and detainees.

Information operations.

Translation and exploitation of threat documents, media, and other materials.

3-153. All reconnaissance and scout platoon leaders can expect to conduct some form of HCT collection activities to gather the information needed to make decisions in support of the overall mission. HUMINT activities help the platoon leader shape the AO by providing information that enables him to respond to previously unforeseen threats. He focuses the HUMINT effort by carefully assigning missions and clearly defining the desired results. In orienting the unit’s HUMINT efforts and capabilities, the platoon leader must decide who or what will be advantageous targets for collection activities. As noted, only the SBCT reconnaissance platoon has organic HUMINT personnel.

Role of HUMINT Collectors

3-154. The SBCT platoon’s HUMINT Soldiers, who can be augmented by interrogators (from the MICO) when available, conduct collection operations in support of the overall mission. These operations rely on the use of both casual and recruited sources of information. The collection effort includes liaison activities; the debriefing of refugees, detainees, and EPWs; review of open source literature; and DOMEX. HUMINT collectors directly support SE and subsequent intelligence gathering operations against the enemy. These operations use the techniques identified in FM 34-5 and FM 2-22.3. Other resources include AR 381-172, which covers policy concerning counterintelligence force protection source operations (CFSO), and AR 381-10, which outlines policies and procedures governing the conduct of intelligence activities by the Army.

…

HUMINT Sources

3-156. Platoon leaders should be familiar with the types of sources HUMINT personnel will use to satisfy command PIR:

Casual source. A casual source is one who, by social or professional position, has access to information of CI interest, usually on a continuing basis. Casual sources usually can be relied on to provide information that is routinely available to them. Casual sources include private citizens, such as retired officials or other prominent residents of an area.

Official sources. These are liaison contacts. CI personnel conduct liaison with foreign and domestic CI, intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies to exchange information and obtain assistance. CI personnel focus on investigative, operational, and threat information.

Recruited sources. These include sources who support CFSO, as identified in FM 34-5. By design, CFSOs entail the use of human source networks, dispersed throughout the area that can provide timely and pertinent force protection information.

Refugees, detainees, and EPWs. Interrogators normally conduct collection operations with these sources, often with technical assistance from a CI agent.

Open source publications. These printed materials, as well as radio and television broadcasts, are valuable sources of information of CI interest and operational information. Depending on the resources, this support can be provided by interrogation personnel, allied personnel, indigenous employees, or reserve component translators.

Documents not openly available. Such sources as adversary plans and reports are exploited in much the same way as open source publications.

Reconnaissance Support Activities

3-157. In military urban operations, people (EPWs and civilians) are the preeminent source of information. HUMINT collection provides information otherwise not available through SIGINT and image intelligence (IMINT). As an example, when a lodgment is made in a building, the HUMINT collectors:

Move in and interrogate EPWs.

Persuade holdouts to surrender.

Help with the questioning and evacuation of noncombatants.

Collect information on floor plans and defensive plans.

Determine locations of combatants and noncombatants in the area.

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

USArmy-ReconScoutPlatoon-2

SECRET – Democratic National Convention 2012 Security

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

dnc-sec-2012

TOP-SECRET – Obama Protection 48

U.S. President Barack Obama (3rd L) greets an Air Force officer before boarding Marine One helicopter on August 4, 2012 at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland. Obama is spending the weekend at Camp David.

President Barack Obama shakes hands with supporters at the end of a campaign rally at Loudoun County High School on August 2, 2012 in Leesburg, Virginia. The president campaigned earlier in the day in Florida.

President Barack Obama, center, greets supporters after speaking at a campaign event at Loudoun County High School, Thursday, Aug. 2, 2012 in Leesburg, Va. Obama was campaigning in Florida and Northern Virginia today.

President Barack Obama greets supporters after speaking at a campaign event at Loudoun County High School, Thursday, Aug. 2, 2012 in Leesburg, Va. Obama spent the day campaigning in Florida and Northern Virginia.

A Secret Service Counter Sniper Team prepares to climb down a ladder from on top of a people mover after President Barack Obama aboard Air Force One landed at Dulles International Airport in Sterling, Va.. , Thursday, Aug. 2, 2012.

President Barack Obama greets supporters after a campaign event at Rollins College, Thursday, Aug. 2, 2012, in Winter Park, Fla.

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Secret Service grabs a forearm stroking Obama.

President Barack Obama greets guests on the tarmac upon his arrival at Orlando International Airport, Thursday, Aug. 2, 2012, in Orlando, Fla. Obama is campaigning in Florida and Northern Virginia today.

President Barack Obama stops to greet patrons at Lechonera El Barrio, a local restaurant in Orlando, Fla. , Thursday, Aug. 2, 2012. Obama is campaigning in Florida and Northern Virginia today.

President Barack Obama greets eight-year old Olivia Short after he departed from Air Force One upon his arrival in Orlando, Fla. , Thursday, Aug. 2, 2012.

President Barack Obama is hugged by a supporter after speaking at a campaign event at Mansfield Central Park, Wednesday, Aug. 1, 2012, in Mansfield, Ohio. Obama is campaign in Ohio with stops in Mansfield and Akron today. [Secret Service ready to remove an arm from Obama’s back. Note three agents in the crowd.]

Marine One helicopter, with President Barack Obama aboard, takes off from Wall Street heliport in New York, Monday, July, 30, 2012. Obama traveled to New York for a private fundraiser. [Decoy helo at rear, fire truck at right, Coast Guard ship in the river.]

US President Barack Obama prepares to land at the Wall Street Helipad in New York on July 30, 2012. Obama is in New York to attend campaign events ahead of the November presidential election. [Two Marine transport at left, Secret Service agent on dock.]

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A Secret Service vehicle, left, and Air Force Security Forces vehicle follow Air Force One on the tarmac as it prepares to take-off with President Barack Obama aboard, at Andrews Air Force Base, Md. , Monday, July 30, 2012.

U.S. First Lady Michelle Obama sits separated from the public during the basketball match between the U.S. and France for the London 2012 Olympic Games at the Basketball Arena in the Olympic Park at Stratford in east London July 29, 2012. [Michelle’s customary Secret Service at her right, and below.]

US First Lady Michelle Obama (R) speaks with tennis player Venus Williams (top L) as they attend the women’s singles tennis match between Serbia’s Jelena Jankovic and Serena Williams of the US during the London 2012 Olympic Games at the All England Tennis Club in Wimbledon, southwest London, on July 28, 2012.

U.S First Lady Michelle Obama, left, waves an American flag as she cheers on the U.S. swim team during the first day of finals at the 2012 Summer Olympics, Saturday, July 28, 2012, in London. At right is Summer Schlopy, host of Yahoo! Sports’ web series Elite Athlete Workout. [Two Secret Service at left.]

Agents keep watch as U.S. President Barack Obama (C) walks to the Marine One helicopter before departing from a soccer field at the Madeira School after attending a campaign event at a nearby private residence in McLean, Virginia, July 27, 2012.

US President Barack Obama walk across a field after stepping off Marine One upon arrival at the Madeira School landing zone July 27, 2012 in McLean, Virginia. Obama is in McLean to attend campaign fundraisers.

President Barack Obama waves as he walks across the football field at Madeira school in McLean, Va. , Friday, July, 27, 2012. Obama Traveled to Northern Virginia for a private fundraiser.

US First Lady Michelle Obama plays with children as part of her ‘Let’s Move-London’ event at the Winfield House in London on July 27, 2012, hours before the official start of the London 2012 Olympic Games. [SS at right.

U.S. first lady Michelle Obama plays with schoolchildren during a ‘Let’s Move!’ event for about 1,000 American military children and American and British students at the U.S. ambassador’s residence in London, ahead of the 2012 Summer Olympics, Friday, July 27, 2012. [Two Secret Service in suits to hide weapons; at center, female.]

U.S. Secret Service keeps watch as President Barack Obama departs the New Orleans area in Air Force One at Louis Armstrong International Airport in Kenner, La. , Wednesday, July 25, 2012. Obama delivered remarks at the National Urban League 2012 Annual Conference and attended campaign events in New Orleans.

President Barack Obama walks over to greet people after arriving at Boeing Field in Seattle, Tuesday, July 24, 2012.

US President Barack Obama greets wellwishers upon arrival on Air Force One at Portland International Airport in Portland, Oregon, July 24, 2012. Obama is traveling to attend campaign events and fundraisers.

Supporters walk in a line across the tarmac to greet President Barack Obama on his arrival at Boeing Field Tuesday, July 24, 2012, in Seattle. Obama is scheduled to attend a pair of campaign fund-raisers in the area.

President Barack Obama heads to his limousine after stopping at the Gateway Breakfast House in Portland, Ore. , Tuesday, July 24, 2012.

CONFIDENTIAL – Department of Home Security – Innfrastructure Protection Note

Performance venues include theaters, concert halls, auditoriums, and amphitheaters, ranging in size and function from small neighborhood movie theaters or community playhouses to high-capacity venues in major metropolitan areas. Performance venues are relatively open-access, limited egress facilities and have been successfully targeted in the past.

Potential Indicators of Violence

Potential attackers have a wide variety of weapons and tactics available to achieve their objectives. Specific threats of most concern to performance venues include:
• Active Shooter / Small arms attack
• Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
• Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)
• Arson/incendiary attack

Indicators are observable anomalies or incidents that may precede an attack. Indicators of an imminent attack requiring immediate action may include the following:
• Persons in crowded areas (e.g., theater or auditorium lobby) wearing unusually bulky clothing that might conceal suicide explosives or weapons
• Suspicious or illegally parked vehicles near a performance venue or where crowds gather prior to or following performances and events
• unauthorized entry to the performance venue or restricted areas of the facility
• Persons or teams of people attempting to
• Unattended packages (e.g., backpacks, briefcases, boxes) that might contain explosives. Packages may be left in open areas or hidden in trash receptacles, lockers, or similar containers
• Evidence of exit doors being in propped open or ajar thus allowing access from the exterior

Indicators of surveillance by potential attackers include:
• Persons using or carrying video/camera/observation equipment in or near the facility over an extended period
• Persons discovered with facility maps, photos, or diagrams with critical assets highlighted or notes regarding infrastructure or listing of personnel
• Persons parking, standing, or loitering in the same area over a multiple-day period with no reasonable explanation
• An increase in threats from unidentified sources by telephone, postal mail, or e-mail and/or an increase in reports of threats from outside known, reliable sources
• Evidence of unauthorized access to the HVAC system or suspicious substances near HVAC intakes

Protective Measures

Protective measures include equipment, personnel, and procedures designed to protect a facility against threats and to mitigate the effects of an attack. Protective measures for performance venues and theatres include:

Communication and Notification
• Develop a communication and notification plan that covers voice, data, and video transfer of information related to security
• Provide the ability to record incoming communications (e.g., telephone calls) to identify potential threats
• Develop a notification protocol that outlines who should be contacted in emergencies
• Conduct outreach to neighboring properties to confirm and discuss emergency procedures

Suspicious Activity Reporting and Emergency Notifications
• Be aware of your surroundings; make sure you are in the safest possible location prior to calling (out of harm’s way)
• Be calm and articulate; talk slowly
• State your name, location, and the nature of the emergency
• Provide high level details of your situation
• Advise if you are injured; provide details
− Suspicious Activity Awareness Video: What’s in Store: Ordinary People | Extraordinary Events available at http://www.dhs.gov/cfsector
• Ensure staff is aware of how to report suspicious activity
• The “If You See Something, Say Something™” campaign and the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative encourage citizens to report suspicious activity to law enforcement
− More information can be found at https://www.dhs.gov/files/reportincidents/see-something-say-something.shtm

Planning and Preparedness
• Conduct regular evacuation drills with facility employees, clearly outlining the evacuation routes and outdoor assembly points
• Designate an employee as security director to develop, implement, and coordinate all security-related activities
• Conduct threat analyses, vulnerability assessments, consequence analyses, risk assessments, and security audits on a regular and continuing basis
• Establish liaison and regular communications with local law enforcement and emergency responders, state and federal law enforcement, public health organizations, and industry organizations to enhance information exchange, clarify emergency responses, track threat conditions, and support investigations
• Institute layers of security measures on the basis of the expected crowd level or performance type

Personnel
• Maintain up-to-date security training with regular refresher courses
− Active Shooter – How to Respond training available at https://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is907.asp
− Active Shooter Situation: Options for Consideration (Video) has been posted to the HSIN-Critical Sector (CS) portal at https://cs.hsin.gov/
• Provide security information and evacuation procedures to patrons before each performance. Advise patrons and staff to be alert to suspicious activity or items and on how to report such incidents

Monitoring, Surveillance, Inspection
• If warranted, evaluate the need to develop a monitoring, surveillance, and inspection program that is consistent with facility operations and security requirements
• Perform security sweeps of the entire facility before each show or performance
− Training Webinar: IED Threat Awareness and Detection available at http://www.dhs.gov/cfsector
• Consider limitations to patrons carrying bags/backpacks/gym bags, etc into the venue
• Consider screening of bags and persons wearing bulky clothing prior to venue entrance
− Training Video: Check It – What’s in the Bag available at http://www.dhs.gov/cfsector
• Confirm that all exit doors leading from venue to the exterior of the facility have operational locks and that they are locked
• Ensure the doors have not been propped open; consider active patrols around the exteriors and emergency exits just prior to the beginning of each show

Infrastructure Interdependencies
• Ensure that the facility has adequate utility service capacity to meet normal and emergency needs

Incident Response
• Review unified incident command procedures for responding to an event with local law enforcement, emergency responders, and government agencies
− Establish evacuation procedures and ensure the evacuation routes are clear of obstruction

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

DHS-PerformanceVenues

TOP-SECRET – U.S. State Department Map – Data of Syrian People Fleeing Internal Violence

Unveiled – TOP-SECRET – Obama Protection 47

Obama Protection 47

U.S. President Barack Obama greets people gathered on the sidewalk after stopping for food at Skyline Chili in Cincinnati, July 16, 2012. Obama flew on Monday to Cincinnati for election campaign events. Reuters

US President Barack Obama greets wellwishers upon arrival on Air Force One at Cincinnati Northern Kentucky International Airport in Boone, Kentucky, July 16, 2012, enroute to attend campaign events in Cincinnati, Ohio. Getty

President Barack Obama passes his jacket to White House Trip Director Marvin Nicholson before heading over to greet people after arriving at Northern Kentucky International Airport in Boone, Ky. , Monday, July 16, 2012. Obama is spending the day campaigning in Cincinnati. AP

U.S. Secret Service members use a golf cart while providing protection for President Barack Obama while he golfs at the Army installation’s course July 15, 2012 in Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. Obama also campaigned in Virginia, a state he won in 2008, on Saturday, holding events in Fairfax and Glen Allen. Getty

US President Barack Obama greets supporters are he arrives at a campaign event on July 14, 2012 at Centreville High School in Clifton, Virginia. Getty

U.S. President Barack Obama arrives at a campaign rally at Centreville High School in Clifton, Virginia, July 14, 2012. Obama travelled to Virginia on Saturday for campaign events. Reuters

President Barack Obama walks up a set of stairs during a campaign rally at Centreville High School in Clifton, Va. , a Washington suburb, on Saturday, July 14, 2012. AP

People hold signs protesting against U.S. President Barack Obama along Obama’s motorcade route on his way to a campaign rally at Centreville High School in Clifton, Virginia, July 14, 2012. Obama travelled to Virginia on Saturday for campaign events. Reuters

President Barack Obama laughs while campaigning under the pouring rain at the historic Walkerton Tavern & Gardens in Glen Allen, Va. , near Richmond Saturday, July 14, 2012. It is in the Congressional district represented by House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, R-Va. , a key county in a crucial swing state of the presidential election. AP

U.S. President Barack Obama greets supporters at the end of his ”A Vision for Virginia’s Middle Class” campaign event July 14, 2012 at Walkerton Tavern in Glen Allen, Virginia. On the last day of his two-day campaign across Virginia, Obama continue to discuss his plan to restore middle class security and urged Congress to act on extending tax cuts to middle class families. Getty

President Barack Obama campaigns during the pouring rain at the historic Walkerton Tavern & Gardens in Glen Allen, Va. , near Richmond, Saturday, July 14, 2012. AP

Protesters line an entrance route to a campaign event where President Barack Obama is scheduled to speak at the historic Walkerton Tavern & Gardens in Glen Allen, Va. , near Richmond Saturday, July 14, 2012. AP

Conservative local residents protest prior to U.S. President Barack Obama’s ”A Vision for Virginia’s Middle Class” campaign event July 14, 2012 at Walkerton Tavern in Glen Allen, Virginia. On the last day of his two-day campaign across Virginia, Obama continue to discuss his plan to restore middle class security and urged the Congress to act on extending tax cuts to middle class families. Getty

President Barack Obama removes his jacket upon his arrival at Washington Dulles International Airport in Chantilly, Va. , Saturday, July 14, 2012, for a campaign event in the vicinity. AP

US President Barack Obama boards his limousine after greeting well-wishers upon arrival July 14, 2012 at Richmond International Airport in Richmond, Virginia. Obama is in Virginia to attend campaign events. Getty

Secret Service members keep watch in front of Air Force One shortly before US President Barack Obama’s departure on July 14, 2012 at Richmond International Airport in Richmond, Virginia. Obama is in Virginia to attend campaign events. Getty

US President Barack Obama hold up a tomato during a stop at Berry’s Produce on July 14, 2012 in Mechanicsville, Virginia. Obama is campaigning in Virginia ahead of the November presidential election. Getty

President Barack Obama shakes hands as he arrives at the Richmond International Airport in Richmond, Va. , Saturday, July 14, 2012. AP

President Barack Obama greets the crowd after a campaign stop at the historic Fire Station No.1, in downtown Roanoke, Virginia, Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama traveled to southwest Virginia to discuss choice in this election between two fundamentally different visions on how to grow the economy, create middle-class jobs and pay down the debt. AP

President Barack Obama greets the crowd during a campaign stop at the historic Fire Station No.1, in downtown Roanoke, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama traveled to southwest Virginia to discuss choice in this election between two fundamentally different visions on how to grow the economy, create middle-class jobs and pay down the debt. AP

President Barack Obama greets people after arriving at Roanoke Regional Airport in Roanoke, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day campaigning in Virginia. AP

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President Barack Obama greets people after arriving at Roanoke Regional Airport in Roanoke, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day campaigning in Virginia. AP

President Barack Obama arrives at the Roanoke Airport on Air Force One on the campaign trail, Friday, July 13, 2012 in Roanoke, Va. AP

President Barack Obama greets people after arriving at Roanoke Regional Airport in Roanoke, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day campaigning in Virginia. AP

President Barack Obama greets the crowd after speaking at a campaign event at Phoebus High School in Hampton, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day in Virginia campaigning. AP

President Barack Obama arrives to speak at a campaign event at Phoebus High School in Hampton, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day in Virginia campaigning. AP

U.S. President Barack Obama (C) greets supporters at the end of his ‘A Vision for Virginia’s Middle Class’ campaign event July 13, 2012 at Green Run High School in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Obama discussed his plan to restore middle class security and urged the Congress to act on extending tax cuts to middle class families. Getty

U.S. President Barack Obama (R) greets supporters at the end of his ‘A Vision for Virginia’s Middle Class’ campaign event July 13, 2012 at Green Run High School in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Obama discussed his plan to restore middle class security and urged the Congress to act on extending tax cuts to middle class families. Getty [Two Secret Service in “hands ready” position.

President Barack Obama reaches out to shake hands at a campaign event at Green Run High School in Virginia Beach, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day in Virginia campaigning. AP

President Barack Obama heads to his car after greeting people after arriving at Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP

President Barack Obama is surrounded by secret service as he greets people after arriving at Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP

President Barack Obama heads to his car after greeting people after arriving at Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP

President Barack Obama meets with supporters after arriving aboard Air Force One at the Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP

President Barack Obama walks to Air Force One at Andrews Air Force Base in Md. , Friday, July 13, 2012, enroute to Virginia for a series of campaign events. AP

Members of the media exit a house alongside US President Barack Obama’s SUV holding in the driveway as Obama meets with Jason McLaughlin, principal of Center Point-Urbana High School, his wife, Ali, an account manager for a document scanning company, and their 4-year-old son Cooper, on middle class tax cuts at their home in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, July 10, 2012. Getty

Secret Service agents guard the door of the home of Jason and Ali McLaughlin while President Barack Obama visits with them in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Tuesday, July 10, 2012. AP

U.S. President Barack Obama arrives in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, July 10, 2012. Obama flew to Iowa for an event pushing for the extension of Bush-era tax cuts due to expire at the end of 2012. Reuters

President Barack Obama heads to his car after getting ice cream at Deb’s Ice Cream & Deli in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Tuesday, July 10, 2012. AP

Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response – by Jeremy Sharp

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Unveiled – Obama Protection 47