Video Skid – Monty Python – Four Yorkshiremen

The FBI – Lawyer Pleads Guilty to Involvement in Massive No-Fault Automobile Insurance Fraud Scheme

Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that Sol Naimark, an attorney, pled guilty to his role in two separate conspiracies to defraud private insurance companies under New York’s no-fault automobile insurance law, including one charge related to the largest single no-fault automobile insurance fraud scheme ever charged. Naimark pled guilty yesterday before U.S. District Judge J. Paul Oetken. Recently, Alexander Sander, an owner and controller of several fraudulent no-fault clinics; Gregory Mikhalov, an owner and controller of medical clinics; Lynda Tadder, a manager at a no-fault clinic; and Chad Greenshner, a licensed chiropractor, also pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud and health care fraud in connection with the scheme before Judge Oetken. The five defendants were arrested in February 2012, along with 31 others, and charged with conspiracy to commit mail fraud and health care fraud in connection with a systemic scheme to defraud private insurance companies of more than $279 million under New York’s no-fault automobile insurance law. Some of the defendants were also charged with racketeering and money laundering. A total of 10 defendants, including one licensed doctor, have now pled guilty. Naimark also pled guilty to a separate conspiracy to commit health care fraud.

Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said, “Sol Naimark actively solicited clients for whom he could churn out bogus lawsuits as part of a multi-million-dollar insurance fraud scheme. It is particularly egregious when an attorney uses his license to perpetrate a fraud.”

According to the superseding information, other publicly filed information in the case, and the defendants’ statements in open court:

Under New York State Law, every vehicle registered in New York State is required to have no-fault automobile insurance, which enables the driver and passengers of a registered and insured vehicle to obtain benefits of up to $50,000 per person for injuries sustained in an automobile accident, regardless of fault, (the “No-Fault Law”). The No-Fault Law requires prompt payment for medical treatment, thereby obviating the need for claimants to file personal injury lawsuits in order to be reimbursed. Under the No-Fault Law, patients can assign their rights to reimbursement from an insurance company to others, including medical clinics that provide treatment for their injuries. New York State Law also requires that all medical clinics in the state be incorporated, owned, operated, and/or controlled by a licensed medical practitioner in order to be eligible for reimbursement under the No-Fault Law. Insurance companies will not honor claims for medical treatments from a medical clinic that is not actually owned, operated, and controlled by a licensed medical practitioner.

In order to mislead New York authorities and private insurers, some of the defendants in this case who were the true owners of these medical clinics (“No-Fault clinic controllers”) paid licensed medical practitioners, including doctors, to use their licenses to form the professional corporations through which the medical clinics would then bill the private insurers for the bogus medical treatments. Sandler owned, operated, and controlled at least four of these no-fault clinics, and Tadder was a manager at one of the clinics.

The No-Fault clinic controllers also instructed the clinic doctors to prescribe excessive and unwarranted referrals for various “modality treatments” for nearly every patient they saw. The treatments included physical therapy, acupuncture, and chiropractic treatments—as much as five times per week for each—and treatments for psychology, neurology, orthopedics, and range of motion, in addition to functional capacity tests. Clinic doctors also prescribed unnecessary MRI’s, X-rays, orthopedics, and medical supplies. The No-Fault clinic controllers received thousands of dollars in kickbacks for patient referrals from the owners of the modality clinics (“modality controllers”). Mikhalov was a modality controller who admitted to owning modality clinics that purported to be owned by licensed doctors, as required by New York Law. Greenshner was a chiropractor who provided unnecessary medical treatments at one of the modality clinics.

Patients were also referred to personal injury lawyers to file lawsuits against the insurance companies arising out of their exaggerated injuries from automobile accidents. The success of these lawsuits hinged on how many medical treatments the patients received, providing the necessary incentive for the patients to receive multiple treatments at the no-fault and modality clinics. Naimark admitted to paying a No-Fault clinic controller to refer him patients that received unnecessary treatments so that he could file personal injury lawsuits on behalf of the patients. The second charge to which Naimark pled guilty relates to payments he made to a runner to bring him no-fault patients so that he could file personal injury lawsuits on their behalf.

* * *

Naimark, 54, of Flushing, New York, pled guilty to two counts of conspiracy to commit health care fraud. He faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. He is scheduled to be sentenced by Judge Oetken on July 22, 2013. Sandler and Mihalov each pled guilty to conspiracy to commit health care fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud, and each faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison. Tadder pled guilty to conspiracy to commit health care fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and faces a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison. Greenshner pled guilty to conspiracy to commit health care fraud and faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. Greenshner Mikhalov, Sandler, and Tadder are scheduled to be sentenced by Judge Oetken on July 1, July 8, July 9, and September 27, 2013, respectively.

U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara thanked the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the New York City Police Department for their continued outstanding work in this investigation.

The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Organized Crime Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Daniel S. Goldman, Nicholas L. McQuaid, Carolina A. Fornos and Daniel S. Noble are in charge of the prosecution. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jason L. Cowley and Martin Bell of the Office’s Asset Forfeiture Unit are responsible for the forfeiture of assets.

TMZ – Ice-T & Coco Have Beets Scare!

 

 

The TMZ Tour saw Ice-T and Coco out having lunch and Coco admitted to having a beet salad… so now we know what color her pee is today…

Cryptome – Shabak Sites Then and Now

Shabak Sites Then and Now

http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/History/mischan/Pages/default.aspx [Image]

Google Street View

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Video – Skid – The Lonely Trout: Evolution

 

Billy Connolly rehearses for Eric Idle’s What About Dick? A once in a lifetime comedy event from the procreators of Spamalot. Exclusive Download only from http://www.whataboutdick.com on November 13th 2012.

Starring Russell Brand, Billy Connolly, Tim Curry, Eric Idle, Eddie Izzard, Jane Leeves, Jim Piddock, Tracey Ullman and Sophie Winkleman.

TOP-SECRET – FAA Airspace Management Plan for Disasters

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/FAA-DisasterAirspaceManagement.png

 

FAA Airspace Management Plan for Disasters

  • 30 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • July 18, 2012

Download

0.1 The Airspace Management Plan for Disasters provides a nationally consistent framework and suite of supportive tools for the use of the Federal Aviation Administration’s air traffic and airspace management operational expertise and capabilities, as well as statutory authority, to enhance the safety and effectiveness (including unity of effort) of air missions supporting response and recovery efforts such as Search and Recue flights following a disaster. The plan also speaks to the use of these tools to safeguard persons and property on the ground. Additionally, this plan also helps to balance the needs of those response air missions with the agency’s concurrent effort to return the National Airspace System, which is critical to the U.S. economy and American way of life, to normal operations. Note that the Federal Aviation Administration also uses operational contingency plans and other air traffic management procedures, which are separate from this document, that specifically focus on sustaining the operation of the National Airspace System and normal air traffic, especially for situations involving the disruption or degrading of the agency’s Air Navigation Services.

0.2 Federal, State, and local agency, as well as military, partners are the primary intended audience of this document. This plan is also provides a coordination resource for those Federal Aviation Administration operations personnel who regularly cooperate with interagency partners on the use of air traffic and airspace management capabilities to support response and recovery efforts.

0.3 The plan is informed by numerous natural disasters that have struck the country since Hurricane Katrina in 2005, as well as many national and State-level exercises. Reflecting the lessons learned from those events, the plan is designed to be implemented in a scalable and flexible manner that best meets the operational needs shaped by the specific disaster at hand and the requirements of the responding Federal, State, local, tribal / territorial, and private sector stakeholders. Implementation of this plan can be carried out for any disaster provoking the need for response and recover air missions or otherwise involving the National Airspace System, including events to which the Federal Government is responding through the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act and purely State or local crises. In many cases, the Federal Aviation Administration will implement this plan initially in cooperation with State level authorities, including State Emergency Management Agencies and National Guard units, and then, as the disaster unfolds, scale up implementation as Federal assistance, including response aircraft begin to arrive in theater. Elements of this plan may also be used to facilitate air operations regularly flown by the U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and National Park Service to support, for example, wildfire firefighting, law enforcement, and search and resure missions.

0.4 The plan is not intended as a stand alone document. It is intended to be implemented through Federal Aviation Administration Temporary Flight Restrictions and other operational measures. The plan is also designed to provide air traffic and airspace management input to a broad range of other aviation centric disaster response and recovery plans and procedures used by U.S. Northern Command, United States Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, the State Emergency Management Agencies and National Guard elements, and other Federal, State, local, territorial / tribal interagency partners. In addition, it is intended to complement the National Response Framework and other related disaster response and recovery plans.

Video – Monty Python – Dirty Hungarian Phrasebook

 

The Dirty Hungarian Phrasebook sketch and courtroom scene from Monty Python’s Flying Circus

P.S. Yes, we know they’re just speaking gibberish and it’s not really Hungarian. We don’t need any more smartypants commenters telling us that.

TMZ – Reggie Bush’s Baby Mama Looks Like Kim Kardashian

 

Reggie Bush was out exercising in Santa Monica with his baby mama, Lilit Avagyan, who looks EXACTLY like Kim Kardashian. Exercise is known to help induce labor but hopefully it won’t go down while Reggie is in company — he might fumble it.

Cryptome unveils – Deep State: Inside Government Secrecy Industry

Review of Deep State: Inside the Government Secrecy Industry

 


Deep State: Inside the Government Secrecy Industry

Marc Ambinder and D.B. Grady

Read on Kindle; hardcover due April 1, 2013

This comprehensive assessment of the secrecy industry — its origin in 1947 national security legislation, rise through promotion of the Cold War, decline with collapse of the USSR, near death before 9/11 rescue, to steroidal enhancement with Coldwarish cyberwar  — is paralleled with the critical self-advancing role of journalism in managing information flow to the public through quiet mutually beneficial arrangements between officials and the press in deciding what shall be kept secret and what revealed, with “national security” the plutonium-pitting goose.

Until the Internet blasted open the goose-bolthole for bandits like WikiLeaks.

Ambinder and Brown tell an applaudable if sordid story of complicity between government and media to exploit public trust, aptly summarized by the opening authors’ note:

AUTHORS’ NOTEThis is a book about secrets, and the authors feel an obligation to be transparent about a few things. During his time in the military, author D. B. Grady (which is a pseudonym for David Brown) held a security clearance. No sensitive information he came across while serving in Afghanistan or in the United States made it into this book.

In September 2012, author Marc Ambinder began consulting for Palantir Technologies LLC, an analytics company that does work for intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense, among other clients. He was brought in to work on a specific project that did not require access to secrets or to classified information. There was no cross-pollination; the manuscript had already been completed, and nothing in this book comes from any material gathered at Palantir.

Finally, both authors wrote extensively about secrecy while writing this book. We’ve written tens of thousands of words on the subject, and have collectively written more than 20,000 posts to Twitter. If one compares our body of work to this book, it is possible that we have reused phrases or metaphors to describe certain subjects. If that is the case, it is entirely unintentional. Our brains don’t compartmentalize the way that computers can. However, aside from some material about the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command that also appeared in The Command: Deep inside the President’s Secret Army, the book is an original work in its entirety, the reporting is fresh, and the conclusions, we hope, are original.

While researching this book we stumbled across many things that we won’t be able to write about. Though we have no legal obligation to submit our work to the government before publication, we have an ethical obligation as citizens to take extreme care when writing about sensitive subjects. We shared certain chapters with a number of former senior national security and intelligence officials, including several former directors of intelligence agencies. Our purpose was to learn if the publication of this book would truly jeopardize national security. After receiving the feedback, we asked ourselves whether there was a compelling reason to print the secrets in question anyway, and worked from there. We hope we’ve struck the proper balance.

The last paragraph confirms the national security complicity continues unabated, whether chosen by the authors or enforced by publisher’s lawyers and official secrecy agreements. This is the gold standard of national security office-holding and journalism, either join the club or be excluded from rewarding access.

Despite the authors’ admirably researched coverage of the secrecy industry and complicit journalism, they condemn both official secrecy officially-sanctioned journalism to follow the USSR into extinction by uncontrollable openness generated by public distrust of government and journalism seen as global spying machines.

Don’t dream of rejuggling of government and journalism, online or offline, to head off their decline, no national defense will protect against it, no increase in secrecy measures will stop leaks of vital secrets.

Too many secrets, too many secretkeepers, too many inherent faults to breach overloaded containment vessels. Digital information cannot be controlled by physical fortresses. A thumb drive can be a weapon of mass destruction. Leaks spread at the speed of photons, too fast for human response. At this speed leaks are indistinguishable from secrets except to inhuman machines.

Keeping secrets will depend not on HUMINT but on information system processors requiring layers of interpretation for slow-witted human comprehension and action forever too late. Government and journalism are not equipped mentally or physically for this hyperspeed torrent over-flooding their bulwarks.

A spark of hope national security fear-mongering can work: A specialist is quoted as saying quantum research is as crucial as was the invention of the atomic bomb, the “US cannot survive being second in this race.” Photons faster, more unpredictable and more lethal than controlled atomic reactions. The national security threat of Internet swarm is unbeatable except by highly classified technology.

Very fast forward to plot exposure: Bêtes noires of this downfall of authoritative information is WikiLeaks and other outsiders of the authority-by-secrecy industry.

Outsiders win the WarGame:

“A young man finds a back door into a military central computer in which reality is confused with game-playing, possibly starting World War III.”

 



	

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Argument Clinic

PI – DHS Geospatial Concept of Operations (GeoCONOPS) Version 4

 

DHS-GeoCONOPS

 

Homeland Security Geospatial Concept of Operations (GeoCONOPS) Version 4.0

  • Draft
  • 190 pages
  • June 2012
  • 3.64 MB

Download

The Homeland Security Geospatial Concept of Operations (GeoCONOPS) is a multiyear effort focused on the geospatial communities supporting DHS and FEMA activities under the NRF and in coordination with Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) which describes the Nation’s approach to preparing for the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the United States. The GeoCONOPS, in its fourth year, is a multiyear product to document the current geospatial practices supporting the NRF, PPD-8, and Stafford Act activities. The participants and intended audience of the GeoCONOPS include the GIOT Members, 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESF), both primary and support, and other federal mission partners. The GeoCONOPS will be updated on a yearly basis to ensure it meets the needs of all mission partners. The GeoCONOPS is currently under review by FEMA for adoption by NIMS.

DHS is relying more often and more broadly on geospatial information technology to collect and analyze key situational awareness data for its emergency response missions. According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security and DHS’s mission statement: homeland security covers prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Geospatial products and intelligence play a key role in the Department’s preparation for disasters and its response to them; they are used to help assess damage, aid in search and rescue (SAR), remove debris, and support incident management.

The Geospatial Management Office (GMO) serving the DHS Chief Information Office, was established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Title VII, Subtitle B, Section 8201, Homeland Security Geospatial Information). Through its implementation of DHS Management Directive 4030, the GMO exercises executive leadership in establishing DHS geospatial information technology programs, directives, and initiatives and provides oversight for the integration of geospatial data 1 See Annex C for a complete list of federal partners. and technology. It serves as the principal office to facilitate all interagency activities relating to domestic geospatial and remote sensing (RS) data to support the needs of homeland security-related intelligence, law enforcement, environmental, scientific, and emergency response requirements.

The GMO must develop requirements and processes for access to common operating data used by components and provide guidance to other federal departments and agencies that are supporting and executing homeland security and emergency management operations.

Geospatial technology provides a significant role in incident management. Its uses today include disaster early warning and mitigation, border monitoring, criminal investigations, public health protection, and critical infrastructure oversight. In recent years, federal mission partners have been operating with minimal formal guidance or direction on how to conduct geospatial support to the emergency response and homeland security operating regimes, relying instead on ad hoc coordination.

As a result, geospatial efforts in support of incident management have frequently been slow to start or have been completely unavailable immediately following a disaster, leaving the “full power” and benefits of geospatial technology unrealized. The development of the GeoCONOPS for homeland security and emergency management operations ensures that timely and accurate geospatial data is shared across the entire geospatial community, resulting in better informed decision making across all phases of an incident.

GIOT Team Members

Department of Agriculture (USDA)
– Office of the Chief Information Office
– Enterprise Geospatial Management Office
– Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Coordination
– Emergency Operation Center
– Forest Service
– National Interagency Fire center

Department of Commerce (DOC)
– National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
– US Census Bureau

Department of Defense (DoD)
– Office of the Deputy Undersecretary for Defense
– National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
– National Guard Bureau
– NORTHCOM
– US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)

Department of Health & Human Services (HHS)

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
– Office of the Chief Information Officer/Geospatial Management Office (GMO)
– Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)
– Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
– Federal Insurance & Mitigation Administration (FIMA)
– Office of Response & Recovery (ORR)
– National Preparedness Directorate (NPD)
– National Exercise Division (NED)
– National Integration Center (NIC)
– Mission Support Bureau (MSB)
– Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO)/Geospatial Solutions Branch
– Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)
– Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE)

– National Protection & Programs Directorate (NPPD)
– Federal Protective Service (FPS)
– Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP)
– Office of Health Affairs (OHA)
– Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
– Office of Operations Coordination & Planning (OPS)
– Science and Technology (S&T)
– Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
– US Coast Guard (USCG)
– US Secret Service (USSS)

Department of Housing & Urban Development (HUD)

Department of Interior (DOI)
– US Geological Survey (USGS)

Department of State
– USAID

Department of Transportation (DOT)

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
– Program Manager for the Information-Sharing Environment (PM-ISE)

Small Business Administration (SBA)

Veterans Administration (VA)

Collaborating Partners

American Red Cross (ARC)

National Alliance for Public Safety GIS (NAPSG)

National States Geographic Information Council (NSGIC)

Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC)

TMZ – Brandi Glanville Looking HOT — Would You Risk HPV?

 

Brandi Glanville was looking sexy out on the beach the other day but WHO CARES! We’d rather talk about her HPV.

SECRECY NEWS – OPM MULLS CHANGES TO SECURITY CLEARANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

The Office of Personnel Management has invited the public to comment on
proposed changes to Standard Form (SF) 86, the questionnaire that must be
filled out by all persons who are seeking a security clearance for access
to classified information.

Although critics have argued that the SF-86 is hopelessly out of date and
should be abandoned in favor of a more streamlined process, the changes
that OPM is currently considering are mostly technicalities, not a
wholesale revision.  Proposed changes include a recognition of civil unions
as a legal alternative to marriage, a clarification that use of drugs that
are illegal under federal law must be reported even if they are legal under
state law, and changes in wording and instructions for completion of the
Form.

Public comments on the changes were solicited by OPM in a March 12 Federal
Register notice.

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2013/03/fr-sf86.html

SF-86 is notoriously burdensome to fill out, requiring individuals to
supply detailed personal information about all places they have lived for
the past seven years, their employment history and where they went to
school, along with the name and contact information of someone who can
verify each item, as well as any criminal history record, use of illegal
drugs, and so forth.

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/sf86.pdf

"The SF 86 takes approximately 150 minutes to complete," the OPM notice
says.  But for many people, this seems to be an underestimate.

"I spent four hours one Saturday completing [an] SF-86," wrote John Hamre,
who was deputy secretary of defense under President Clinton, in a
Washington Post op-ed recently. ("The wrong way to weed out spies,"
Washington Post, February 20.)  His pointed criticism of the Form and the
clearance process may have inspired some of the proposed changes.

The OPM notice promises that "once entered, a respondent's complete and
certified investigative data remains secured in the e-QIP system until the
next time" the form must be completed (e.g. for clearance renewal).

But in Secretary Hamre's case this didn't happen for some reason -- his
previous Form was not saved. "The OPM apparently had no record of this
document, which was filed with that agency," he wrote, so he had to start
over from scratch.

When the SF-86 asked for a list of "all foreign travel you have undertaken
in the past 7 years," Hamre balked.  He said he had repeatedly traveled on
official business and always reported any contacts with foreign government
officials.  So "I refused to enter the information, rather than give it to
our government a second time."

As if in response to Hamre's objection, the new OPM notice says the Form's
instructions will be "amended so that the respondent need [not] report
contact related to official U.S. Government travel."

Much like the national security classification system that it supports,
the security clearance process is still predicated on cold war-era
presumptions that became obsolete decades ago. This fundamental critique
has yet to be addressed by OPM.

"Why does our government rely on forms designed in the 1950s?" Hamre
complained.  "Our country needs a system built for the 21st century.  The
current system is pathetic."

DETERRING LEAKS THROUGH POLYGRAPH TESTING

Last summer, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper directed
agencies that perform polygraph tests to include a "pre-test dialogue"
about the need to prevent leaks of classified information as part of the
polygraph interview process.

In a July 2012 memorandum to agencies, he said that the CIA's polygraph
program exemplified what he had in mind.

"During the pre-test discussion, CIA specifically asks whether an
individual has provided classified information or facilitated access to
classified information to any unauthorized persons, to include the media,
unauthorized U.S. persons, or foreign nationals.  The polygraph process is
also used to identify deliberate disclosures," DNI Clapper wrote.  Other
agencies that perform polygraph testing should follow procedures similar to
CIA's, he said.

"Aggressive action is required to better equip United States Government
elements to prevent unauthorized disclosures," DNI Clapper wrote.

The new policy was announced last June, but the implementing July 2012
memorandum was only released this week in response to Freedom of
Information Act requests.  See "Deterring and Detecting Unauthorized
Disclosures, Including Leaks to the Media, Through Strengthened Polygraph
Programs," July 13, 2012:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/intel/leak-poly.pdf

A copy of the memorandum was also obtained by Jason Leopold of
Truthout.org, who reported on it yesterday.

    http://truth-out.org/news/

LEAKS: WHY THE GOVERNMENT CONDEMNS AND CONDONES THEM

Leaks of classified information and the government's responses to them are
the subject of a new study by David Pozen of Columbia Law School.

The starting point for his examination is the "dramatic disconnect between
the way our laws and our leaders condemn leaking in the abstract and the
way they condone it in practice."  How can this disconnect be understood?

Leaks benefit the government, the author argues, in many ways. They are a
safety valve, a covert messaging system, a perception management tool, and
more.  Even when a particular disclosure is unwelcome or damaging, it
serves to validate the system as a whole.

This thesis may explain why the number of leak prosecutions is still lower
than might be expected, given the prevalence of leaks, and why new
legislative proposals to combat leaks have met with a lukewarm response
from executive branch officials.

"The leak laws are so rarely enforced not only because it is hard to
punish violators, but also because key institutional actors share
overlapping interests in maintaining a permissive culture of classified
information disclosures."

The article is full of stimulating observations woven into an original and
provocative thesis.  See "The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns
and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information" by David Pozen, to be
published in Harvard Law Review:

    http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2223703

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Video – Monty Python – Self-Defense Against Fruit

 

from Monty Python’s Flying Circus
Season 1 – Episode 04 – Owl Stretching Time
Recorded 21-09-69, Aired 26-10-69

TMZ – Ben Affleck at Oscars After Party — Shaves Beard!

 

 

Ben Affleck trimmed off his lucky beard just hours after winning the Oscar for Best Picture… even though beardless Ben is guilty of creating “Forces of Nature!” He needs to get that beard back..

PI – Tactical Chat: How the U.S. Military Uses IRC to Wage War

 

An example layout of eight chat rooms for communicating via tactical chat.

Public Intelligence

Despite the U.S. military’s massive spending each year on advanced communications technology, the use of simple text chat or tactical chat has outpaced other systems to become one of the most popular paths for communicating practical information on the battlefield.  Though the use of text chat by the U.S. military first began in the early 1990s, in recent years tactical chat has evolved into a “primary ‘comms’ path, having supplanted voice communications as the primary means of common operational picture (COP) updating in support of situational awareness.”  An article from January 2012 in the Air Land Sea Bulletin describes the value of tactical chat as an effective and immediate communications method that is highly effective in distributed, intermittent, low bandwidth environments which is particularly important with “large numbers of distributed warfighters” who must “frequently jump onto and off of a network” and coordinate with other coalition partners.  Text chat also provides “persistency in situational understanding between those leaving and those assuming command watch duties” enabling a persistent record of tactical decision making.

A 2006 thesis from the Naval Postgraduate School states that internet relay chat (IRC) is one of the most widely used chat protocols for military command and control (C2).  Software such as mIRC, a Windows-based chat client, or integrated systems in C2 equipment are used primarily in tactical conditions though efforts are underway to upgrade systems to newer protocols.  “Transition plans (among and between the Services) for migrating thousands of users to modern protocols and cloud-computing integration has been late arriving” according to the Air Land Sea Bulletin.  Both the Navy and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) are working towards utilizing the extensible messaging and presence protocol (XMPP) in future applications.

In 2009, the Air Land Sea Applications Center issued a multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) manual attempting to codify the protocols and standards for the usage of tactical chat throughout the services.  The manual provides a common language for tactical chat, unifying disparate usage standards in different services such as “consistent naming conventions for rooms, people, and battle roles and activities” and “archival agreements among multiple user communities”.  For example, the manual provides naming conventions for chat room users, demonstrating how to construct user names that clearly indicate the user’s role and unit.  A 4th Infantry Division Plans Officer should utilize the call sign 4ID_OPS_PLANS when engaging in tactical chat while a Tactical Action Officer aboard the USS Enterprise should use the name CVN65_ENT_TAO.  The manual also provides standards for naming chat rooms and managing large numbers of rooms simultaneously for coordinating missions and situational awareness.  A helpful glossary also provides translations of tactical chat abbreviations and terms, such as canx meaning cancel and rgr for roger.

The MTTP manual describes how tactical chat can be used for a variety of purposes to support “coordination, integration, and execution of missions” including everything from maneuver and logistics to intelligence, fires and force protection.  One vignette presented in the manual describes how tactical chat or TC might be used in a cordon and search operation:

“During a day mission by ground maneuver units conducting cordon and search operations in a small village known for harboring insurgents, a Predator UAS flying in support of troops on the ground spotted movement on the roof of a previously searched building. The UAS operator, noticing that the forces conducting the cordon and search had already begun moving away from the structure, used TC to immediately notify the ground unit’s [tactical operations center] that an individual was moving on the roof and appeared to be getting into a hide site. After communicating this information to the troops on the ground, the TOC confirmed that the individual seen by the UAS was not in their unit, and with the assistance of the UAS operator using TC, was able to direct his troops to reenter the building and ‘talk’ them to the suspected hide site over voice communications. The individual hiding on the rooftop was then captured. The use of TC in this instance was critical to the capture of an insurgent that would otherwise have escaped.”

Tactical chat can also be used for targeting the enemy and receiving clearance to fire, enhancing “the collective and coordinated use of indirect and joint fires through the targeting process.”  Rather than contacting “several agencies via radio or telephone and taking several minutes to initiate fire missions on a fleeing target or in the middle of a TIC [troops in contact]“, unit fire support elements can use tactical chat to request clearance and deconflict airspace required for the mission in a matter of seconds, which is helpful in locations like Afghanistan where ground units are commonly separated by more than 90 kilometers.  According to the manual, the chat room transaction in such a situation might appear like this:

[03:31:27] <2/1BDE_BAE_FSE> IMMEDIATE Fire Mission, POO, Grid 28M MC 13245 24512, Killbox 32AY1SE, POI GRID 28M MC 14212 26114, Killbox 32AY3NE, MAX ORD 8.5K
[03:31:28] <CRC_Resolute> 2/1BDE_BAE_FSE, stby wkng
[03:31:57] <CRC_Resolute> 2/1BDE_BAE_FSE, Resolute all clear
[03:32:04] <2/1BDE_BAE_FSE> c
[03:41:23] <2/1BDE_BAE_FSE> EOM
[03:41:31] <CRC_Resolute> c

A fire mission request is sent to the control and reporting center (CRC) controller who then works to deconflict the airspace and report back that the space is now clear.  Once the mission is complete, the brigade fire support element notifies users with the statement EOM or end of mission.

In this case, the brevity of tactical chat allows for fast and simple communication, enabling the brigade fire support element to receive a reply in seconds and continue with their mission.  However, it is this very aspect of tactical chat, its speed and brevity, that can sometimes create confusion on the battlefield.  Similar to the public world of social media, tactical chat allows inaccurate or misleading information to be widely disseminated and sent to all users just “as quickly as accurate information.”  According to the MTTP manual, tactical chat’s “short text messages can cause ambiguity and accuracy can be compromised without strict adherence to standard terminology”, allowing users to quickly proliferate inaccurate or misleading information that can affect operations.  A 2003 article from U.S. News and World Report describes some of the problems created by the use of tactical chat in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In one example, a pilot’s widely reported sighting of vehicles moving towards the Kuwaiti border turned out to be a “large band of hungry camels.”  In another example, a radio intercept was disseminated that reportedly discussed Iraqi soldiers using poisonous artillery rounds.  The copy-and-paste nature of tactical chat led to news of the intercept proliferating fast throughout military chat networks with many saying that the Iraqis were “loading chemical rounds”.   The buzz continued until an Arabic linguist clarified that the intercept was mistranslated and that the rounds were not poisonous, they had just gone bad.

Download it here

Tactical Chat: How the U.S. Military Uses IRC to Wage War

Video – Monty Python – How To Do It

 

How to rid the world of all known diseases

TOP-SECRET – U.S. Army Forensics and Warrant-Based Targeting Newsletter

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CALL-Forensics.png

 

 

Center for Army Lessons Learned

  • 162 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • March 2010

Download

In January 2009 the Army’s authority to unilaterally apprehend and detain insurgents in Iraq expired. The Army now operates in Iraq at the invitation of the Government of Iraq (GOI). The change in the Army’s authority heightens the guiding principle of working by, with, and through the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The Army must work within the Iraqi rule of law when dealing with insurgents who threaten U.S. forces.

It requires the Army to work with the ISF and the Iraqi court system to remove insurgents from the street. The Army must learn how the Iraqi system is structured and how its courts operate. The Army must also help educate the Iraqi courts, particularly the judges, on the science of how Americans collect and process evidence (forensics). Educating the judges on forensics is important to the Army having its day in court and its evidence entered into the proceeding against the insurgents.

The intent of this newsletter is to assist Soldiers, leaders, and commanders in understanding the key aspects of the new landscape as follows:

• Iraqi judges are the law within the Iraqi court system. Commanders must build relationships and trust with the Iraqi judges. Commanders must also help educate judges on internationally accepted techniques used in building a case for prosecution, especially with forensic evidence.

• Commanders and staff judge advocates must actively seek the help of Iraqi local officials to learn how local systems operate because every province and district is unique.

• Soldiers and leaders must be trained in the proper collection and processing of evidence, crime scene documentation, and the identification and handling of witness statements.

• Leaders must understand the local warrant system since the first step in the Iraqi court system is to obtain a warrant issued by an Iraqi judge.

• Commanders that task-organize assets for evidence- or warrant-based targeting will be most successful. Prosecution task forces are also an important tool.

• Advice and practical lessons from subject matter experts in the institutional base and from the forces operating in theater are provided in this newsletter.

When U.S. forces first entered into operations in the Iraqi theater, the coalition operated under a sequential series of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) mandates and at the invitation of the Iraqi government. Coalition forces had unilateral authorization to detain any person posing a threat to U.S. forces or to the Iraqi population. The last mandate, UNSCR 1790, expired at the end of December 2008. Prior to the expiration of UNSCR 1790, U.S. forces began a gradual transition to operations by, with, and through the Iraqis and their security forces. On 1 January 2009, a bilateral security agreement between the United States and the Government of the Iraq was implemented.

The coalition currently operates at the invitation of and under the rule of law of the Iraqi government. U.S. forces must adhere to Iraqi laws and the security agreement provisions before arresting or detaining anyone posing a threat in Iraq. The coalition’s responsibility is to follow the rules of the Iraqi criminal courts and judges to detain criminals and insurgents.

A significant change to daily operations is the coalition cannot detain persons based on the perception of a threat. Before the security agreement, the coalition detained suspects based on its intelligence assessment of whether a suspect posed a threat to the coalition.

Now the coalition operates using evidence- or warrant-based targeting. It requires cooperation between U.S. forces, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and Iraqi judges in the arrest and conviction of terrorists and criminals.

U.S. forces must continue to use targeting methodology (find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate or F3EAD) to identify and convict insurgents and criminals. The coalition must learn techniques to translate collected intelligence into evidence that is acceptable to the Iraqi courts. Forensics is the primary method used by the coalition to develop evidence gathered at the crime scene. Using forensics is new to the Iraqi courts, which traditionally rely on eyewitness testimony as a means of conviction. It is the duty of U.S. forces to educate and to inform their Iraqi partners on the forensics process.

In this newsletter, the reader is introduced to the background and use of forensics in the first two sections, Forensics Background and Battlefield Forensics. The articles in section three, Warrant-Based Targeting, provide a brief education on the Iraqi legal process and how coalition forces are adapting to working within the Iraqi system. This section includes discussions on how units and commanders develop solutions to partner with the ISF to obtain warrants to arrest and detain insurgents. Several examples are provided to demonstrate how commanders work with Iraqi judges, a critical factor in building confidence in the capability to work within the courts. The final section, Evidence Collection, highlights the importance of proper evidence collection and processing. This section offers techniques for conducting searches and evidence handling to minimize the risk of contamination. It also compares the difference between physical and testimonial evidence.

TMZ – Joe Flacco — The RICHEST Normal Dude EVER!

 

Joe Flacco is not only the highest paid QB in NFL history… he’s also the most normal friggin’ dude in the world! Who would EVER guess this dude just made $121 MILLION DOLLARS!?

SECRECY NEWS – BRADLEY MANNING TAKES RESPONSIBILITY

At an open hearing on February 28, Pfc. Bradley Manning said that he was
responsible for providing U.S. government documents to the WikiLeaks
website, including a large collection of U.S. State Department cables, a
video of a brutal U.S. Army helicopter attack in Baghdad, and other
records.

"The decisions that I made to send documents and information to the WLO
[WikiLeaks Organization] and website were my own decisions, and I take full
responsibility for my actions," he told the military court.

The Army belatedly released a redacted copy of Pfc. Manning's statement
yesterday. (An unofficial version had been privately transcribed by Alexa
O'Brien soon after the hearing.)

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/022813-statement.pdf

The Freedom of the Press Foundation obtained an audio recording of the
statement, which it released online.

        https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog

Manning eloquently expressed his motivations for the unauthorized
disclosures, including the need to expose corruption and deception in the
conduct of diplomacy and military operations. He described the efforts he
made to weigh the possible damage that might result from disclosure, and
the judgment he made that release of the records was the appropriate step.

But he did not acknowledge that any other individuals had been placed at
risk by his actions, nor did he take responsibility for any consequences
they might suffer. Taliban leaders said in 2010 that they were scrutinizing
the Afghanistan war records published by WikiLeaks and that they would
"punish" persons listed in the records who were found to have cooperated
with the U.S. military.

FOIA IN THE 113TH CONGRESS, AND MORE FROM CRS

The latest products from the Congressional Research Service include these
items.

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): Background and Policy Options for the
113th Congress, March 8, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R41933.pdf

What's the Difference? -- Comparing U.S. and Chinese Trade Data, February
25, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22640.pdf

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, March 8,
2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf

Hugo Chávez's Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations, March
8, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf

"Sense of" Resolutions and Provisions, March 11, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-825.pdf

U.S. Immigration Policy: Chart Book of Key Trends, March 7, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42988.pdf

INTELLIGENCE SHARING IMPROVES WITH ALLIES, LAGS WITH CONGRESS

The Commander of U.S. Central Command said last week that he is
"encouraged" by the willingness of U.S. intelligence agencies to share
information with military allies, which is becoming "a standard practice
rather than the exception."  At the same time, the chair of the Senate
Intelligence Committee complained that her committee has not been receiving
the intelligence information that it requires to perform its oversight
function.

"As I travel throughout the AOR [area of responsibility] and see the
promise of new initiatives and the risk posed by numerous challenges, I
receive requests from military leaders across the region to increase
intelligence sharing between our militaries," said Gen. James N. Mattis,
CENTCOM Commander, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee
on March 5.

"In order to demonstrate our commitment, I requested the Intelligence
Community to begin drafting releasable products for our most trusted
partners in the Levant, on the Arabian Peninsula, in the Central Asian
States, and in South Asia as a standard practice rather than the
exception," Gen. Mattis said.

"I am encouraged by the personal attention the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence is giving these matters. Director Clapper's strong
emphasis and encouragement for the intelligence community to produce
intelligence in a manner that eases our ability to responsibly share
information with our military counterparts creates a stronger, more focused
front against our common enemies and builds our partner nations'
confidence.  We are grateful for the nimble manner in which our
intelligence community has strengthened our efforts to checkmate more of
our enemy's designs," Gen. Mattis testified.

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2013_hr/030513mattis.pdf

But in a notable contrast, congressional leaders say they have not gotten
similar cooperation from the intelligence community, and they have less
reason for encouragement.

"There is a very strong feeling on both sides of the aisle that the
[intelligence] committee is not receiving the information it needs to
conduct all oversight matters in the manner in which we should," said Sen.
Dianne Feinstein, chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, during the
Senate confirmation of John O. Brennan to be CIA Director on March 7

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2013_cr/brennan.html

"There is the matter of Office of Legal Counsel opinions concerning the
targeted killing of Americans.  The committee needs to understand the legal
underpinning of not only this program but of all clandestine programs, of
all covert actions, so we may ensure the actions of the intelligence
community operate according to law," Sen. Feinstein said. "Absent these
opinions, we cannot conduct oversight that is as robust as it needs to be."

With respect to the opinions on targeted killing, at least, the committee
was finally able to reach an accommodation with the Administration while
the confirmation process was pending, which included "staff access and
without restrictions on note taking," she said.

"I want to thank the administration. I think increasingly they understand
this problem of the need for us to access more information. It is not a
diminishing one, it is a growing one, and it is spreading through this
House-- and I suspect the other House as well," Sen. Feinstein said.

Sen. Patrick Leahy, chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said he
"reluctantly opposed" the confirmation of Mr. Brennan because "the
administration has stonewalled me and the Judiciary Committee for too long
on a reasonable request to review the legal justification for the use of
drones in the targeted killing of American citizens."

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Video – Monty Python: Marriage counselor

CRYPTOME – Alleged Parastoo Aid to JFK OP

http://cyberwarzone.com/various-hacking-teams-unite-opisrael-talks-erasing-israel-web-7-april

7 March 2013

Alleged Parastoo Aid to JFK OP

 


A sends:

We have received a tip from a Persian observer and a source that the recent OP at JFK was done by Parastoo based on their last publication and since, based on their expressions on an underground forum, Joe Biden made statements at AIPAC that made them more angry. There is evidence Parastoo is a role player in #OPISRAEL and the upcoming wave. The JFK Lulz was a Joint OP done by people involved with these groups with Parastoo providing the “know-how” and others bringing logistics to the gang.

TMZ – Joe Flacco — I Might Make $121 Million … But I Still Ride the Bus

 

When Joe Flacco touched down at BWI airport in Baltimore this weekend … there was no fancy limo waiting for him … no chauffeur … just a regular bus to the regular person parking lot … and the $121 MILLION quarterback hopped on it like everybody else.

MDR – Ex-Stasi-Leute – Kontakte zur kriminellen Szene – Amträger korrumpiert…

Landtags-Untersuchungsausschuss in SachsenHatten Ex-Stasi-Leute Kontakte zur kriminellen Szene?

Der Landesverfassungsschutz Sachsen hatte offenbar Hinweise auf Verbindungen früherer Mitarbeiter der DDR-Staatssicherheit zur Organisierten Kriminalität. Das erklärte die frühere Referatsleiterin Simone Skroch (früher Henneck) am Freitag im Landtags-Untersuchungsausschuss zu kriminellen und korruptiven Netzwerken in Sachsen. Die Informationen stammten von mehreren und voneinander unabhängigen Quellen.

Halfen Ex-Stasi-Leute bei der “Verführung” von Amtspersonen?

Die einstige Referatsleiterin im Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Simone Henneck, sagt am 09.01.2013 in Dresden (Sachsen) vor dem Untersuchungsausschuss des Sächsischen Landtages aus.

Die frühere Leiterin der Geheimdienstabteilung für Organisierte Kriminalität gab am Freitag neue Details preis.

Wie die Hauptzeugin des Ausschusses erläuterte, gab es diesen Hinweisen zufolge zahlreiche Kontakte zwischen teils hochrangigen Ex-Stasi-Mitarbeitern und Vertretern der regionalen und internationalen Organisierten Kriminalität in den Bereichen Wirtschaft und öffentliche Verwaltung sowie im Rotlichtmilieu. Ihr Ziel: Angestellte, Beamte, Politiker und andere Vertreter des öffentlichen Lebens zielgerichtet in verfängliche Situationen zu bringen, mit denen man sie später hätte erpressen können. Dazu zählten Skroch zufolge auch Bestechung und Korruption. Die Juristin bezog sich dabei auf das Wirken der Organisierten Kriminalität im Raum Chemnitz, Zwickau und Vogtland.

Vom “Sachsensumpf” zur “Aktenaffäre”

Die Hinweise zu möglichen kriminellen Netzwerken in Sachsen waren 2007 erstmals aufgetaucht. Grundlage war eine Datensammlung des sächsischen Geheimdienstes. Die Vorwürfe reichten von Amtsmissbrauch über Kinderprostitution bis zur Bandenkriminalität. Darin sollten auch Juristen und Polizisten verstrickt sein. Ermittlungen externer Prüfer und der Staatsanwaltschaft Dresden entkräfteten jedoch die Vorwürfe, die Ermittlungen gegen die Beschuldigten wurden eingestellt. Stattdessen wurde Skroch vorgeworfen, Akten aufgebauscht zu haben. Sie bestreitet das vehement und erhob bei ihrer Befragung am Freitag erneut schwere Vorwürfe gegen die frühere Chefetage des Verfassungsschutzamts.

Bereits im Januar hatte Skroch vor dem Ausschuss erklärt, dass zahlreiche Dokumente über die Begegnung von Informanten mit Geheimdienstlern verschwunden seien. Jetzt äußerte sie die Vermutung, dass ihr Panzerschrank während einer Urlaubsreise im Juni 2007 geöffnet wurde. Zudem warf sie ihren damaligen Vorgesetzten vor, sie nicht rechtzeitig über ein gegen sie laufendes Disziplinarverfahren informiert zu haben.

Der aktuelle Untersuchungs-Ausschuss wurde 2010 auf Antrag der Opposition eingesetzt, weil nach ihrer Ansicht im Abschlussbericht des vorherigen Gremiums zu viel Fragen offen gebelieben waren.

http://www.mdr.de/sachsen/sachsensumpf116.html

SECRECY NEWS – FEDS ADD NEW ESPIONAGE ACT CHARGE AGAINST LINGUIST

Last fall, Navy contract linguist James Hitselberger was charged under the
Espionage Act with two counts of unlawful retention of national defense
information after several classified documents were allegedly found in his
possession.  (See "Document Collector Charged Under Espionage Statute,"
Secrecy News, November 7, 2012.)

Two weeks ago, in a superseding indictment, prosecutors added a third
charge of unlawful retention under the Espionage Act, along with three
other counts of unauthorized removal of a public record.

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/hitsel/indict-sup.pdf

Mr. Hitselberger's public defenders responded with a battery of pre-trial
motions, including a new challenge to the constitutionality of the
Espionage Act itself.

The defense attorneys said the indictment against Mr. Hitselberger is
"multiplicious," meaning that a single offense has been alleged in
multiple, redundant counts. This is an impermissible practice that is
considered prejudicial to a defendant.  Mulitplicious counts "afford the
government an unfair advantage by increasing the likelihood that the jury
will convict on at least one count, if only as the result of a compromise
verdict."  The defense asked the court to compel prosecutors to choose
between Count One and Count Two, "both of which charge the same offense of
unlawful retention of national defense information." 

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/hitsel/030113-mult.pdf

Defense attorneys also moved for a "bill of particulars" to require the
government to identify exactly which "national defense information" Mr.
Hitselberger is accused of unlawfully retaining in violation of the
Espionage Act.

"Even if the documents at issue here are classified and the government
proves beyond a reasonable doubt the Mr. Hitselberger retained them, the
government must establish that information within these documents
constitutes national defense information.... [Yet] much (if not all) of the
information contained in the documents is publicly available
information.... In order to prepare for trial without needlessly preparing
to respond to irrelevant information or guessing at what the government
deems relevant, defense counsel must be directed to the portions of the
documents that the government claims constitute national defense
information."

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/hitsel/bop.pdf

But perhaps the most interesting motion filed by the defense, and one
which adds a dimension beyond the particular facts of Mr. Hitselberger's
case, asks the court to find the unlawful retention statute of the
Espionage Act unconstitutionally vague.

Every leak prosecution has included a defense challenge to the
constitutionality of the Espionage Act, almost as a matter of course.  The
constitutionality of the Act has consistently been upheld, though sometimes
with limiting factors imposed by the court.  In any event, the Hitselberger
motion, filed by public defenders A.J. Kramer and Mary Manning Petras,
carefully distinguishes the current matter from previous cases.  At several
points the motion included striking insights from Melville Nimmer and other
legal scholars to bolster its argument.  The result is something more than
a pro forma gesture.

The Espionage Act prohibition on unlawful retention of national defense
information (18 USC 793e) "is a statute of alarming breadth and little
definition," the defense attorneys concluded. "Because the statute is
vague, this Court should dismiss Counts One, Two and Three of the
indictment."

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/hitsel/030113-vague.pdf

Other motions filed by the defense and the prosecution are posted here:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/hitsel/index.html

Mr. Hitselberger is not accused of espionage, nor is he suspected of
acting on behalf of a foreign power.

WHEN CAN A COURT REJECT AN AGENCY CLASSIFICATION CLAIM?

Last year, DC District Judge Richard W. Roberts ordered the U.S. Trade
Representative to disclose a classified document to a FOIA requester
because, he said, the classification of the document was not properly
supported.  (See "Court Says Agency Classification Decision Not 'Logical,"
Secrecy News, March 2, 2012.) That ruling in Center for International
Environmental Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative was a
startling judicial rebuff to executive classification authority of a sort
that had not been seen in many years, and the government quickly appealed.

In oral arguments in the DC District Appeals Court last month, government
attorneys all but declared that a court has no power to overrule an
executive branch classification decision. The transcript of that February
21 hearing has just become available.

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/ciel/oralarg.pdf

Judge Roberts' "substitution of [his] judgment about likely harm to
foreign relations [that could ensue from disclosure] fails to give the
deference that's due to the Executive in this sensitive area of foreign
relations and national security, and is entirely inconsistent with this
Court's consistent case law over many decades that emphasizes the need for
such deference," argued H. Thomas Byron, III, on behalf of the U.S. Trade
Representative.

Circuit Court Judge Brett Kavanaugh asked Mr. Byron whether there were any
circumstances in which a court could reject a classification claim.

"When do you think a Court could ever disagree with the Executive's
determination in this kind of case?" Judge Kavanaugh asked.

Mr. Byron that if the agency's declarations in support of classification
are logical and plausible, then the agency is entitled to judicial
deference.

"Isn't that going to cover 100 percent of the cases?" Judge Kavanaugh
asked.

"I certainly think, Judge Kavanaugh, that the Executive would not submit a
declaration that was not logical or plausible," Mr. Byron replied.

Then he went even further and suggested that the executive branch has
exclusive constitutional authority over classification policy.

Judge Kavanaugh was inquiring how the government would respond to an
argument made in an amicus brief filed by media organizations contending
that Congress had mandated judicial review of classification when it
amended the FOIA in 1974 in order to enable Courts to review executive
classification judgments. Not only that, but when President Ford vetoed the
measure, Congress overrode the veto.

Mr. Byron said, "The question is whether those changes [i.e. the 1974
amendments] altered the constitutionally required deference to the
Executive in this area under the Separation of Powers Doctrine," suggesting
that the congressional override of President Ford's veto was meaningless
and without effect.

"That's interesting," said Judge Kavanaugh. "You don't think Congress
could put the courts in the position of second guessing" the executive?

"Well, when it comes to predictive judgments about harm to national
security and foreign relations I think that's a very difficult question,"
Mr. Byron said.

"I agree," Judge Kavanaugh replied.

Cogent arguments to the contrary were made by attorney Martin Wagner on
behalf of the Center for International Environmental Law at the hearing and
can be found in the transcript.

SUNSHINE WEEK EVENTS AIM TO PROMOTE OPEN GOVERNMENT

This week is Sunshine Week, an annual effort sponsored by journalism
advocacy and civil society organizations to promote values of open
government, freedom of information, and public participation. A rich
variety of events are scheduled around the country, most of which are free
and many of which will be webcast.

    http://sunshineweek.rcfp.org/events/

I will be participating in several programs, including these:  "Open
Government in the Second Term," sponsored by the Center for Effective
Government and the Electronic Privacy Information Center on March 12:

    http://epic.org/events/sunshineweek2013.html

The Future of Classification Reform, sponsored by the Brennan Center for
Justice on March 14:

    http://www.brennancenter.org/events

Freedom of Information Day at the Newseum on March 15:

    http://www.freedomforum.org/e-vite/press/foi-2013/body.html

Freedom of Information Day at the Washington College of Law Collaboration
on Government Secrecy on March 18:

    http://www.wcl.american.edu/lawandgov/cgs/

A new report from the Center for Effective Government found reason to
praise the Obama Administration's openness in some areas of government but
not in national security, which it said has been a "glaring exception" to
progress in other domains.  

Among numerous recommendations for future progress, the Center report
urged the Department of Justice to renounce the use of criminal prosecution
for leaks to the media. "Unauthorized disclosures of restricted information
to the media should be handled through administrative channels, not
criminal prosecution."  See "Delivering on Open Government: The Obama
Administration's Unfinished Legacy," March 10:

    http://www.foreffectivegov.org/obama-first-term-transparency-report

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

PI – FBI – Only 4% of Active Shooter Incidents Since 2002 Were Perpetrated by Women

 

A segment from KETV News in Omaha, Nebraska discusses active shooter training exercises held at a local elementary school. Similar training exercises have been held around the country following recent mass shootings.

Public Intelligence

An FBI analysis of active shooter incidents since 2002 found that 96% of the attacks were perpetrated by males, most of which acted alone. The statistic is found in a joint intelligence bulletin released at the end of December by the Department of Homeland Security and FBI titled “Recent Active Shooter Incidents Highlight Need for Continued Vigilance“.  The bulletin provides brief advice on crisis response and long-term protective measures as well as statistics related to past active shooter incidents, which are defined as situations where one or more individuals participates in a “random or systematic killing spree demonstrating their intent to harm others with a firearm.”  Active shooters are distinguished from other “traditional criminal acts, such as robbery or hostage-taking” by their intention to commit “mass murder”. The FBI analyzed 154 active shooter events in the United States between 2002 and 2012 that included three or more individuals being shot.  This analysis found that:

  • 96% of the shooters were males
  • 51% of the shooters were deceased following the attack (43% committed suicide and 8% were shot and killed by responders)
  • 96% of the attacks involved shooters acting alone
  • 37% of the attacks occurred in workplaces and 17% occurred in an academic setting
  • 40% of the attacks were unable to be linked to a clear motivation
  • 21% of the attacks were motivated by workplace retaliation and 14% were motivated by domestic disputes
  • Academic retaliation by a current or former student only accounted for 7% of the attacks

The FBI’s analysis found that active shooters were often described as “social isolates” who “harbored feelings of hate and anger” and had some contact with mental health professionals.  Though mental illness is a common factor among many active shooters, its functional role in causing the massacre is indeterminate according to FBI analysis.  Very few of the shooters in cases analyzed by the FBI had previous arrests for violent crimes, though many had encountered a significant emotional hardship prior to the attack such as “loss of significant relationships, changes in financial status, loss of a job, changes in living arrangements, major adverse changes to life circumstances, and/or feelings of humiliation or rejection on the part of the shooter.”

To help protect against active shooter situations, the DHS-FBI joint bulletin recommends that public facilities update their emergency and crisis management plans and conduct exercises to ensure a rapid response to a large-scale crisis.  Long-term security plans for public facilities should “emphasize physical safeguards, including building enhancements that present a more robust deterrent and provide a more survivable environment.”  Building enhancement can take the form of physical modification, such as the installation of “window and external door protection with quick-release capability”, as well as the establishment of “safe areas within the facility for assembly and refuge during crises.”

Video – Monty Python – “French Subtitled Film” sketch

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus sketch called “French Subtitled Film” from season 2 episode 10.

 

Die Süddeutsche Zeitung über “GoMoPa” und die Zahlungen von S&K

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/geld/mutmassliche-anlagebetrueger-sk-die-akte-midas-1.1620191-4

TMZ – Lisa Vanderpump — Suck It Haters … We Don’t Need New ‘Housewives’

 

“Real Housewives of Beverly Hills” star Lisa Vanderpump is unfazed by any potential “housewives” boycotting the show, telling TMZ … the show’s not looking for any new cast members anyways.

SECRET – U.S. Army Forensics and Warrant-Based Targeting Newsletter

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CALL-Forensics.png

 

Center for Army Lessons Learned

  • 162 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • March 2010

Download

In January 2009 the Army’s authority to unilaterally apprehend and detain insurgents in Iraq expired. The Army now operates in Iraq at the invitation of the Government of Iraq (GOI). The change in the Army’s authority heightens the guiding principle of working by, with, and through the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The Army must work within the Iraqi rule of law when dealing with insurgents who threaten U.S. forces.

It requires the Army to work with the ISF and the Iraqi court system to remove insurgents from the street. The Army must learn how the Iraqi system is structured and how its courts operate. The Army must also help educate the Iraqi courts, particularly the judges, on the science of how Americans collect and process evidence (forensics). Educating the judges on forensics is important to the Army having its day in court and its evidence entered into the proceeding against the insurgents.

The intent of this newsletter is to assist Soldiers, leaders, and commanders in understanding the key aspects of the new landscape as follows:

• Iraqi judges are the law within the Iraqi court system. Commanders must build relationships and trust with the Iraqi judges. Commanders must also help educate judges on internationally accepted techniques used in building a case for prosecution, especially with forensic evidence.

• Commanders and staff judge advocates must actively seek the help of Iraqi local officials to learn how local systems operate because every province and district is unique.

• Soldiers and leaders must be trained in the proper collection and processing of evidence, crime scene documentation, and the identification and handling of witness statements.

• Leaders must understand the local warrant system since the first step in the Iraqi court system is to obtain a warrant issued by an Iraqi judge.

• Commanders that task-organize assets for evidence- or warrant-based targeting will be most successful. Prosecution task forces are also an important tool.

• Advice and practical lessons from subject matter experts in the institutional base and from the forces operating in theater are provided in this newsletter.

When U.S. forces first entered into operations in the Iraqi theater, the coalition operated under a sequential series of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) mandates and at the invitation of the Iraqi government. Coalition forces had unilateral authorization to detain any person posing a threat to U.S. forces or to the Iraqi population. The last mandate, UNSCR 1790, expired at the end of December 2008. Prior to the expiration of UNSCR 1790, U.S. forces began a gradual transition to operations by, with, and through the Iraqis and their security forces. On 1 January 2009, a bilateral security agreement between the United States and the Government of the Iraq was implemented.

The coalition currently operates at the invitation of and under the rule of law of the Iraqi government. U.S. forces must adhere to Iraqi laws and the security agreement provisions before arresting or detaining anyone posing a threat in Iraq. The coalition’s responsibility is to follow the rules of the Iraqi criminal courts and judges to detain criminals and insurgents.

A significant change to daily operations is the coalition cannot detain persons based on the perception of a threat. Before the security agreement, the coalition detained suspects based on its intelligence assessment of whether a suspect posed a threat to the coalition.

Now the coalition operates using evidence- or warrant-based targeting. It requires cooperation between U.S. forces, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and Iraqi judges in the arrest and conviction of terrorists and criminals.

U.S. forces must continue to use targeting methodology (find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate or F3EAD) to identify and convict insurgents and criminals. The coalition must learn techniques to translate collected intelligence into evidence that is acceptable to the Iraqi courts. Forensics is the primary method used by the coalition to develop evidence gathered at the crime scene. Using forensics is new to the Iraqi courts, which traditionally rely on eyewitness testimony as a means of conviction. It is the duty of U.S. forces to educate and to inform their Iraqi partners on the forensics process.

In this newsletter, the reader is introduced to the background and use of forensics in the first two sections, Forensics Background and Battlefield Forensics. The articles in section three, Warrant-Based Targeting, provide a brief education on the Iraqi legal process and how coalition forces are adapting to working within the Iraqi system. This section includes discussions on how units and commanders develop solutions to partner with the ISF to obtain warrants to arrest and detain insurgents. Several examples are provided to demonstrate how commanders work with Iraqi judges, a critical factor in building confidence in the capability to work within the courts. The final section, Evidence Collection, highlights the importance of proper evidence collection and processing. This section offers techniques for conducting searches and evidence handling to minimize the risk of contamination. It also compares the difference between physical and testimonial evidence.

Clip – Monty Python – Certain Substances

his is a sketch from Season1 Episode 5 called “Mans Crisis of Identity in the Latter Half of the 20th Century”

Public Intelligence – Inspire Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Magazine Issue 10, March 2013

The following is the tenth issue of “Inspire” magazine reportedly produced by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s media organization Al-Malahem.  There are nine previous issues of Inspire magazine, all of which have been published by this site, and we have continually expressed our desire for readers to scrutinize the authenticity of the material provided in this publication.  This scrutiny is especially important given that the supposed editor of Inspire magazine was reportedly killed in a drone strike in 2011.  We have removed password protection from the PDF to enable easier analysis, but have left the file’s original metadata intact.  As with all nine previous issues of the magazine we must emphasize that this material is provided, as always, for educational and informational purposes.

Al-Malahem Media Foundation

  • 62 pages
  • Spring 2013
  • 66.4 MB

Download

Monty Python – Travel Agent Sketch – Video

 

TMZ – Lebron James’s Wedding Ruins Jewish Holiday

Lebron James and his wife have set a date for their wedding… problem is, it falls on the Jewish holiday Yom Kippur. Now we gotta wonder if his agent is going to make it!

TOP-SECRET – DHS Intelligence and Analysis Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Topics of Interest Winter 2013

 

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/DHS-Winter2013-SAR.png

 

Winter 2013: DHS/I&A Analyst Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Topics of Interest

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • January 2013

Download

(U//FOUO) DHS/I&A is interested in the following SAR topics, which have been updated based on current issues of national interest. Previous topics remain relevant, and law enforcement, first responders, and other homeland security professionals should continue to submit reports on these issues. Per the SAR Functional Standard, only information validated as reasonably indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism should be reported as a SAR. I&A is reviewing SAR reports on these topics but would welcome any additional context, ideas or local analysis on these topics and opportunities for joint production. We will discuss key findings and assessments during scheduled HS-SLIC Weekly threat briefs.

(U//FOUO) Reports of threats to religious or cultural facilities. Reports of surveillance; verbal or telephonic threats of violence; trespassing; property damage, including vandalism or arson; or tests of security at religious or cultural facilities. [HSEC-8 TERRORIST OPERATIONS: HSEC-8.3.1 General suspicious activities; HSEC-8.4.2.20 Targets of elicitation – Specific sites]

(U//FOUO) Reports of suspicious activities or incidents associated with state, local, tribal, territorial, or private sector computer networks and Web sites. Reports of denial of service (DoS) attacks against Web sites; Web page defacement; physical entry resulting in unauthorized access to computer networks or hardware; suspicious e-mails that install malware on the network; data exfiltration, or other unusual network access or activity, where there are indicators that the cyber incident is reasonably indicative of links to terrorism. [HSEC-1 CYBER ATTACKS AND EXPLOITATION: HSEC-1.3 Suspicious activities and behaviors, HSEC-1.10 Incidents]

(U//FOUO) Reports of suspicious activities or incidents associated with mass gatherings, and special events. Reporting on observed casing activities; breaches or attempted intrusions at event locations or related venues; suspicious inquiries about security protocols for events or VIPs; testing of security; expressed or implied threats to specific events; incidents of suspicious acquisition of explosive precursor materials; or findings of caches or unusual amounts of weapons or explosives. [HSEC-8 TERRORIST OPERATIONS: HSEC-8.3.1 General suspicious activities; HSEC-8.4.2.21 Targets of elicitation – Special events].

(U//FOUO) Reports of suspicious activities, queries, theft, sabotage, tampering, or vandalism within the transportation sector—including mass transit, aviation, maritime, ground and surface, rail, and pipeline systems. Reporting on attempts to elicit information such as unusual questions about routes, capacities, peak travel time, training, and security; suspicious behavior by passengers or employees; testing of security; and expressed or implied threats by individuals or groups towards this sector. Reporting on the theft, loss, or diversion of personnel identification or credentials, uniforms, equipment, or training materials. Reporting on sabotage or loss of knowledge-based materials for maintenance of fleet. [HSEC-8 TERRORIST OPERATIONS: HSEC-8.3.1 General suspicious activities; HSEC-8.4.2.17 Targets of elicitation – Transportation sector]

(U//FOUO) Reports of efforts to artfully conceal improvised explosive devices in innocuous items, such as satchels, backpacks, suitcases, jars, bottles, cans, shoes, clothing, parcels, or toys. Reporting on potential security probes by individuals trying to enter secure areas with devices that resemble explosive devices. Reporting on unsolicited or unusual parcels delivered from unfamiliar overseas addresses, noting the identification of the sender and recipient and whether the recipient has reported multiple suspicious parcels in recent weeks or months. Reporting on the use of special materials, such as lead or other dense metals or liquids, to prevent the discovery of illicit goods by technical detection equipment, such as x-ray radiography equipment or chemical detectors. [HSEC-8 TERRORIST OPERATIONS: HSEC-8.3.1 General suspicious activities; HSEC-8.8 Methods, capabilities, and activities of adversaries]

(U//FOUO) Note: In the course of official activities, and to the extent permitted by law, police, fire, EMS, and security personnel are encouraged to report activities of a suspicious nature; however, this information should not be collected solely on First Amendment protected activities or on the basis of any racial, ethnic, religious, or other profile.

Film – Monty Python! Police Burglary Sketch

 

Justice prevails – Bin Laden son-in-law detained overseas, brought to New York

  • Al-Qaeda spokesman Sulaiman Bu Ghaith speaks in an undated video message carried on Qatar's al-Jazeera television October 9, 2001 saying that the militant group believed in "terrorism against oppressors". [Osama bin Laden's] al-Qaeda group said on Tuesday that hijacked plane attacks on the United States would continue and that the "battle" would not end until America withdraws from Muslim lands. The station did not explain the origin of the statement but it appeared to be a video recording. Sulaiman Bu Ghaith had appeared with [bin Laden] on a recorded statement issued via Jazeera last Sunday. REUTERS


     Al-Qaeda spokesman Sulaiman Bu Ghaith speaks in an undated video message carried on Qatar’s al-Jazeera television October 9, 2001 saying that the militant group believed in “terrorism against oppressors”. …more 

 Prosecutors unsealed an indictment against a son-in-law of Osama bin Laden on Thursday that charged him with conspiracy to kill Americans, after government sources said he was arrested overseas and brought to New York.

Suleiman Abu Ghaith, a militant who appeared in videos representing al Qaeda after the September 11 attacks in 2001, had initially been picked up in Turkey and was brought to the United States in an operation led by Jordanian authorities and the FBI, the sources said.

The Turkish government deported him to Jordan, the sources said, where local authorities and the FBI took custody of him. He was brought to the United States in the last few days, a law enforcement source said.

U.S. officials including Attorney General Eric Holder announced the indictment on Thursday, saying he would be arraigned on Friday at U.S. District Court in lower Manhattan, only blocks from the site of the World Trade Center, which was destroyed in the September 11 attacks.

Abu Ghaith becomes one of the highest-ranking al Qaeda figures to be brought to the United States for civilian trial. When Holder previously announced plans to try defendants in the September 11 attacks in the same courthouse, he was forced to back down by public opposition, and the trials were moved to the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

New York police were less concerned Abu Ghaith’s case would present a security problem than they were about the trials of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four others charged with plotting the attacks, a law enforcement source said.

“It’s not the same. It doesn’t rise to that level,” said the source, who is familiar with the department’s views and spoke on condition of anonymity.

The indictment accused Abu Ghaith of acting in a conspiracy that “would and did murder United States nationals anywhere in the world,” listing actions before and after September 11, 2001.

“Among other things, Abu Ghaith urged others to swear allegiance to bin Laden, spoke on behalf of and in support of al Qaeda’s mission, and warned that attacks similar to those of September 11, 2001 would continue,” the indictment said.

 

 

It cited a May 2001 gathering at a house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, alleging Abu Ghaith urged guests to swear allegiance to bin Laden, and it says bin Laden summoned Abu Ghaith on the evening of September 11, requesting his assistance. 

Bin Laden and Abu Ghaith appeared together the next morning, when the defendant warned the United States and its allies that a “great army is gathering against you” and that “the nation of Islam” would do battle against “the Jews, the Christians and the Americans,” the indictment alleges.

FIRST WORD FROM CONGRESSMAN

Initial public confirmation of Abu Ghaith’s capture came from Representative Peter King, a senior Republican member of the House of Representatives Intelligence Committee and former chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security.

“I commend our CIA and FBI, our allies in Jordan, and President (Barack) Obama for their capture of al-Qaeda spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith. I trust he received a vigorous interrogation, and will face swift and certain justice,” King said in a statement.

U.S. sources indicated that, while a CIA role in the capture of Abu Ghaith could not be ruled out, the FBI took the lead role in the operation under the auspices of an interagency body known as the High-value Detainee Interrogation Group.

The group was created by Obama’s administration after the president ordered the shutdown of a CIA program in which militant suspects were detained and held in a network of secret prisons during the administration of President George W. Bush.

The suspects were sometimes subjected to controversial and physically coercive “enhanced interrogation techniques,” and also were sometimes transferred without trial to third countries under a procedure known as “extraordinary rendition.”

Records compiled by a United Nations sanctions committee show Abu Ghaith was born in Kuwait in 1965.

After the September 11 attacks, Abu Ghaith first surfaced as one of al Qaeda’s main spokesmen. Later, U.S. officials believe he was part of a group of top al Qaeda figures that included one of bin Laden’s sons, Saad, who allegedly traveled to Iran, where the Iranian government said they were being held “in custody.”

The Long War Journal, a counterterrorism blog published by the conservative Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, reported in 2010 that Abu Ghaith had been released by Iranian authorities and supposedly had returned to Afghanistan.

Revealed – Bradley Manning Attorney on Statement Release

Bradley Manning Attorney on Statement Release


Date: 1 Mar 2013 11:57:42 -0700
From: “The Law Office of David E. Coombs” <info[at]armycourtmartialdefense.com>
Subject: [Auto-Reply] Request for Bradley Manning Statement

Thank you for your recent inquiry. A representative from our office will contact you as soon as possible.

**If this is an inquiry regarding United States v. Manning, our office will not be granting interviews or responding to inquires at this time. However, recognizing the public’s interest in this case, we will be issuing regular public releases at www.armycourtmartialdefense.info.

_____

To: info[at]armycourtmartialdefense.com
Subject: Request for Bradley Manning Statement
Dated: March 1, 2013

Dear Mr. Coombs,

We respectfully request for publication a copy of the full statement by PFC Bradley Manning in court yesterday, February 28, 2013.

Publication will be on Cryptome.org, a public education website.

Thanks very much.

TMZ – Terrence Howard Has SEX SCENE with Oprah

 

Terrence Howard didnít hold back when he described his recent sex scene with Oprah in the movie “Dead Man Down.” In fact, he called her breasts “tig ol’ bitties.” O NO, you didn’t!

TOP-SECRET – Report of the Ministry of Defense about Nuclear Weapons and their misconduct through Cyberterrorists

dsbcover

 

TOP-SECRET – Report of the Ministry of Defense about Nuclear Weapons and their misconduct through Cyberterrorists

CTO Vision writes:

Bottom Line Up Front: After reviewing all available evidence and rigorously weighing threat information, a Task Force of the Defense Science Board (DSB) concludes that:

The United States cannot be confident that our critical Information Technology (IT) systems will work under attack from a sophisticated and well-resourced opponent. 

How does that make you feel? You know yourself what adversaries are doing when it comes to intellectual property theft. Now read on for more about what the DSB sees as the threat to military systems.

Here are more details: 

The Defense Science Board (DSB) provides advice, assessments and reports as chartered by DoD leadership. It has studied cyber security and related topics for years and has been instrumental in providing new ideas and perspectives for action by DoD leadership.

The DSB was recently chartered to look at an interesting and somewhat intellectually stimulating topic, that of how US military systems could withstand cyber attack and remain able to execute their mission.  The chartered group, a task force on Resilient Military Systems, produced a report with a set of recommendations designed to improve DoD’s ability to accomplish its missions. The overarching strategy recommended by the DSB is one that enhanced the department’s defenses in the face of attacks, decreases the effectiveness of adversaries, increases the cost to adversaries, and deters the most significant adversaries by ensuring the US maintains the ability to deliver desired mission capabilities in the face of catastrophic cyber attack.

The task force also identified a framework to implement metrics collection systems and then develop appropriate performance metrics that can be used to shape DoD’s investment decisions. The report approved by DSB chairman Paul Kaminsky is at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports2010s.htm. It is also available at: Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat.

Here is more from the forwarding letter to the report:

The final report of the DSB Task Force on Resilient Military Systems is attached. This report is based on the perspective of 24 Task Force members who received more than 50 briefings from practitioners and senior officials throughout the Department of Defense (DoD), Intelligence Community (IC), commercial sector, academia, national laboratories, and policymakers. This Task Force was asked to review and make recommendations to improve the resilience of DoD systems to cyber attacks, and to develop a set of metrics that the Department could use to track progress and shape investment priorities.

After conducting an 18-month study, this Task Force concluded that the cyber threat is serious and that the United States cannot be confident that our critical Information Technology (IT) systems will work under attack from a sophisticated and well-resourced opponent utilizing cyber capabilities in combination with all of their military and intelligence capabilities (a “full spectrum” adversary). While this is also true for others (e.g. Allies, rivals, and public/private networks), this Task Force strongly believes the DoD needs to take the lead and build an effective response to measurably increase confidence in the IT systems we depend on (public and private) and at the same time decrease a would-be attacker’s confidence in the effectiveness of their capabilities to compromise DoD systems. This conclusion was developed upon several factors, including the success adversaries have had penetrating our networks; the relative ease that our Red Teams have in disrupting, or completely beating, our forces in exercises using exploits available on the Internet; and the weak cyber hygiene position of DoD networks and systems. The Task Force believes that the recommendations of this report create the basis for a strategy to address this broad and pervasive threat.

Nearly every conceivable component within DoD is networked. These networked systems and components are inextricably linked to the Department’s ability to project military force and the associated mission assurance. Yet, DoD’s networks are built on inherently insecure architectures that are composed of, and increasingly using, foreign parts. While DoD takes great care to secure the use and operation of the “hardware” of its weapon systems, the same level of resource and attention is not spent on the complex network of information technology (IT) systems that are used to support and operate those weapons or critical IT capabilities embedded within them.

DoD’s dependence on this vulnerable technology is a magnet to U.S. opponents. In fact, DoD and its contractor base have already sustained staggering losses of system design information incorporating decades of combat knowledge and experience that provide adversaries insight to technical designs and system use. Despite numerous DoD actions, efforts are fragmented, and the Department is not currently prepared to mitigate the threat.

That forwarding letter was signed by the task force co-chairs, Mr. Lewis Von Thaer and Mr. James R. Gosler, two of the most professional, well thought out leaders I have ever worked with.

Please dive deep into the full document now. You will find some information you already know, but I promise some surprises as well.

 

 

 

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL REPORT AT THE LINK BELOW

Click to access ResilientMilitarySystems.CyberThreat.pdf

TOP-SECRET – EU Heads of Mission Jerusalem Report 2012 Draft

he following draft version of the EU Heads of Mission Jerusalem Report 2012 was authored in January 2013 and reportedly leaked to a number of major news outlets by the organization Breaking the Silence.  However, almost none of the outlets chose to publish the full report.  This copy was published by the Israeli +972 Magazine.

EU Heads of Mission Jerusalem Report 2012

  • 15 pages
  • Draft
  • January 2013

Download

Video – Monty Python – The Missing Wallet

 

 

Scene from: “Monty – Python And Now For Something Completely Different” where a man asks a police officer for help.

Cryptome – NIST RFI Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

NIST Framework to Improve Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

 


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 38 (Tuesday, February 26, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13024-13028]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-04413]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Institute of Standards and Technology

[Docket Number 130208119-3119-01]

Developing a Framework To Improve Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity

AGENCY: National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department 
of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice; Request for Information (RFI).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is 
conducting a comprehensive review to develop a framework to reduce 
cyber risks to critical infrastructure \1\ (the ``Cybersecurity 
Framework'' or ``Framework''). The Framework will consist of standards, 
methodologies, procedures, and processes that align policy, business, 
and technological approaches to address cyber risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ For the purposes of this RFI the term ``critical 
infrastructure'' has the meaning given the term in 42 U.S.C. 
5195c(e), ``systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so 
vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of 
such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 
security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This RFI requests information to help identify, refine, and guide 
the many interrelated considerations, challenges, and efforts needed to 
develop the Framework. In developing the Cybersecurity Framework, NIST 
will consult with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the National 
Security Agency, Sector-Specific Agencies and other interested agencies 
including the Office of Management and Budget, owners and operators of 
critical infrastructure, and other stakeholders including other 
relevant agencies, independent regulatory agencies, State, local, 
territorial and tribal governments. The Framework will be developed 
through an open public review and comment process that will include 
workshops and other opportunities to provide input.

DATES: Comments must be received by 5:00 p.m. Eastern time on Monday, 
April 8, 2013.

ADDRESSES: Written comments may be submitted by mail to Diane 
Honeycutt, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau 
Drive, Stop 8930, Gaithersburg, MD 20899. Submissions may be in any of 
the following formats: HTML, ASCII, Word, RTF, or PDF. Online 
submissions in electronic form may be sent to cyberframework@nist.gov. 
Please submit comments only and include your name, company name (if 
any), and cite

[[Page 13025]]

``Developing a Framework to Improve Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity'' in all correspondence. All comments received by the 
deadline will be posted at http://csrc.nist.gov without change or 
redaction, so commenters should not include information they do not 
wish to be posted (e.g., personal or confidential business 
information).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions about this RFI contact: 
Adam Sedgewick, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue 
NW., Washington, DC 20230, telephone (202) 482-0788, email 
Adam.Sedgewick@nist.gov. Please direct media inquiries to NIST's Office 
of Public Affairs at (301) 975-NIST.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The national and economic security of the 
United States depends on the reliable functioning of critical 
infrastructure, which has become increasingly dependent on information 
technology. Recent trends demonstrate the need for improved 
capabilities for defending against malicious cyber activity. Such 
activity is increasing and its consequences can range from theft 
through disruption to destruction. Steps must be taken to enhance 
existing efforts to increase the protection and resilience of this 
infrastructure, while maintaining a cyber environment that encourages 
efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity, while protecting 
privacy and civil liberties.
    Under Executive Order 13636 \2\ (``Executive Order''), the 
Secretary of Commerce is tasked to direct the Director of NIST to 
develop a framework for reducing cyber risks to critical infrastructure 
(the ``Cybersecurity Framework'' or ``Framework''). The Framework will 
consist of standards, methodologies, procedures and processes that 
align policy, business, and technological approaches to address cyber 
risks. The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with 
sector-specific agencies, will then establish a voluntary program to 
support the adoption of the Cybersecurity Framework by owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure and any other interested entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ ``Executive Order 13636--Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity'' 78 FR 11739 (February 19, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the diversity of sectors in critical infrastructure, the 
Framework development process is designed to initially identify cross-
sector security standards and guidelines that are immediately 
applicable or likely to be applicable to critical infrastructure, to 
increase visibility and adoption of those standards and guidelines, and 
to find potential gaps (i.e., where standards/guidelines are 
nonexistent or where existing standards/guidelines are inadequate) that 
need to be addressed through collaboration with industry and industry-
led standards bodies. The Framework will incorporate voluntary 
consensus standards and industry best practices to the fullest extent 
possible and will be consistent with voluntary international consensus-
based standards when such international standards will advance the 
objectives of the Executive Order. The Framework would be designed to 
be compatible with existing regulatory authorities and regulations.
    The Cybersecurity Framework will provide a prioritized, flexible, 
repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective approach, including 
information security measures and controls to help owners and operators 
of critical infrastructure and other interested entities to identify, 
assess, and manage cybersecurity-related risk while protecting business 
confidentiality, individual privacy and civil liberties. To enable 
technical innovation and account for organizational differences, the 
Cybersecurity Framework will not prescribe particular technological 
solutions or specifications. It will include guidance for measuring the 
performance of an entity in implementing the Cybersecurity Framework 
and will include methodologies to identify and mitigate impacts of the 
Framework and associated information security measures and controls on 
business confidentiality and to protect individual privacy and civil 
liberties.
    As a non-regulatory Federal agency, NIST will develop the Framework 
in a manner that is consistent with its mission to promote U.S. 
innovation and industrial competitiveness through the development of 
standards and guidelines in consultation with stakeholders in both 
government and industry. While the focus will be on the Nation's 
critical infrastructure, the Framework will be developed in a manner to 
promote wide adoption of practices to increase cybersecurity across all 
sectors and industry types. In its first year, the emphasis will be on 
finding commonality within and across the affected sectors. It will 
seek to provide owners and operators the ability to implement security 
practices in the most effective manner while allowing organizations to 
express requirements to multiple authorities and regulators. Issues 
relating to harmonization of existing relevant standards and 
integration with existing frameworks will also be considered in this 
initial stage.
    In accordance with the Executive Order, the Secretary of Commerce 
has directed the Director of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (the Director) to coordinate the development of a Framework 
to reduce the cyber risks to critical infrastructure. The Cybersecurity 
Framework will incorporate existing consensus-based standards to the 
fullest extent possible, consistent with requirements of the National 
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995,\3\ and guidance 
provided by Office of Management and Budget Circular A-119, ``Federal 
Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus 
Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities.'' \4\ Principles 
articulated in the Executive Office of the President memorandum M-12-08 
``Principles for Federal Engagement in Standards Activities to Address 
National Priorities'' \5\ will be followed. The Framework should also 
be consistent with, and support the broad policy goals of, the 
Administration's 2010 ``National Security Strategy,'' 2011 ``Cyberspace 
Policy Review,'' ``International Strategy for Cyberspace'' of May 2010 
and HSPD-7 ``Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, 
and Protection.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Public Law 104-113 (1996), codified in relevant part at 15 
U.S.C. 272(b).
    \4\ http://standards.gov/a119.cfm.
    \5\ http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2012/m-12-08_1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The goals of the Framework development process will be: (i) To 
identify existing cybersecurity standards, guidelines, frameworks, and 
best practices that are applicable to increase the security of critical 
infrastructure sectors and other interested entities; (ii) to specify 
high-priority gaps for which new or revised standards are needed; and 
(iii) to collaboratively develop action plans by which these gaps can 
be addressed. It is contemplated that the development process will have 
requisite stages to allow for continuing engagement with the owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure, and other industry, academic, and 
government stakeholders.
    In December 2011, the United States Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) issued a report titled ``CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION: Cybersecurity Guidance Is Available, but More Can Be Done 
to Promote Its Use.'' \6\ In its report, GAO found similarities in 
cybersecurity guidance across sectors, and recommended

[[Page 13026]]

promoting existing guidance to assist individual entities within a 
sector in ``identifying the guidance that is most applicable and 
effective in improving their security posture.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587529.pdf.
    \7\ Id., at page 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NIST believes the diversity of business and mission needs 
notwithstanding, there are core cybersecurity practices that can be 
identified and that will be applicable to a diversity of sectors and a 
spectrum of quickly evolving threats. Identifying such core practices 
will be a focus of the Framework development process.
    In order to be effective in protecting the information and 
information systems that are a part of the U.S. critical 
infrastructure, NIST believes the Framework should have a number of 
general properties or characteristics. The Framework should include 
flexible, extensible, scalable, and technology-independent standards, 
guidelines, and best practices, that provide:
     A consultative process to assess the cybersecurity-related 
risks to organizational missions and business functions;
     A menu of management, operational, and technical security 
controls, including policies and processes, available to address a 
range of threats and protect privacy and civil liberties;
     A consultative process to identify the security controls 
that would adequately address risks \8\ that have been assessed and to 
protect data and information being processed, stored, and transmitted 
by organizational information systems;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Organizational risk responses can include, for example, risk 
acceptance, risk rejection, risk mitigation, risk sharing, or risk 
transfer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Metrics, methods, and procedures that can be used to 
assess and monitor, on an ongoing or continuous basis, the 
effectiveness of security controls that are selected and deployed in 
organizational information systems and environments in which those 
systems operate and available processes that can be used to facilitate 
continuous improvement in such controls; \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Assessments determine whether the security controls selected 
by an organization are implemented correctly, operating as intended, 
and producing the desired results in order to enforce organizational 
security policies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     A comprehensive risk management approach that provides the 
ability to assess, respond to, and monitor information security-related 
risks and provide senior leaders/executives with the kinds of necessary 
information sets that help them to make ongoing risk-based decisions;
     A menu of privacy controls necessary to protect privacy 
and civil liberties.
    Within eight months, the Executive Order requires NIST to publish 
for additional comment a draft Framework that clearly outlines areas of 
focus and provides preliminary lists of standards, guidelines and best 
practices that fall within that outline. The draft will also include 
initial conclusions for additional public comment. The draft Framework 
will build on NIST's ongoing work with cybersecurity standards and 
guidelines for the Smart Grid, Identity Management, Federal Information 
Security Management Act (FISMA) implementation, the Electricity 
Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model, and related 
projects.
    NIST intends to engage with critical infrastructure stakeholders, 
through a voluntary consensus-based process, to develop the standards, 
guidelines and best practices that will comprise the Framework. This 
will include interactive workshops with industry and academia, along 
with other forms of outreach. NIST believes that the Framework cannot 
be static, but must be a living document that allows for ongoing 
consultation in order to address constantly evolving risks to critical 
infrastructure cybersecurity. A voluntary consensus standards-based 
approach will facilitate the ability of critical infrastructure owners 
and operators to manage such risks, and to implement alternate 
solutions from the bottom up with interoperability, scalability, and 
reliability as key attributes.
    A standards-based Framework will also help provide some of the 
measures necessary to understand the effectiveness of critical 
infrastructure protection, and track changes over time. DHS and Sector 
Specific Agencies will provide input in this area based on their 
engagement with sector stakeholders. This standards-based approach is 
necessary in order to be able to provide and analyze data from 
different sources that can directly support risk-based decision-making. 
A Framework without sufficient standards and associated conformity 
assessment programs could impede future innovation in security efforts 
for critical infrastructure by potentially creating a false sense of 
security.
    The use of widely-accepted standards is also necessary to enable 
economies of scale and scope to help create competitive markets in 
which competition is driven by market need and products that meet that 
market need through combinations of price, quality, performance, and 
value to consumers. Market competition then promotes faster diffusion 
of these technologies and realization of many benefits throughout these 
sectors.
    It is anticipated that the Framework will: (i) Include 
consideration of sustainable approaches for assessing conformity to 
identified standards and guidelines; (ii) assist in the selection and 
development of an optimal conformity assessment approach; and (iii) 
facilitate the implementation of selected approach(es) that could cover 
technology varying in scope from individual devices or components to 
large-scale organizational operations. The decisions on the type, 
independence and technical rigor of these conformity assessment 
approaches should be risk-based. The need for confidence in conformity 
must be balanced with cost to the public and private sectors, including 
their international operations and legal obligations. Successful 
conformity assessment programs provide the needed level of confidence, 
are efficient and have a sustainable and scalable business case.
    This RFI is looking for current adoption rates and related 
information for particular standards, guidelines, best practices, and 
frameworks to determine applicability throughout the critical 
infrastructure sectors. The RFI asks for stakeholders to submit ideas, 
based on their experience and mission/business needs, to assist in 
prioritizing the work of the Framework, as well as highlighting 
relevant performance needs of their respective sectors.
    For the purposes of this notice and the Framework, the term 
``standards'' and the phrase ``standards setting'' are used in a 
generic manner to include both standards development and conformity 
assessment development. In addition to critical infrastructure owners 
and operators, NIST invites Federal agencies, state, local, territorial 
and tribal governments, standard-setting organizations,\10\ other 
members of industry, consumers, solution providers, and other 
stakeholders to respond.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ As used herein, ``standard-setting organizations'' refers 
to the wide cross section of organizations that are involved in the 
development of standards and specifications, both domestically and 
abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment

    The following questions cover the major areas about which NIST 
seeks comment. The questions are not intended to limit the topics that 
may be addressed. Responses may include any topic believed to have 
implications for the development of the Framework

[[Page 13027]]

regardless of whether the topic is included in this document.
    While the Framework will be focused on critical infrastructure, 
given the broad diversity of sectors that may include parts of critical 
infrastructure, the evolving nature of the classification of critical 
infrastructure based on risk, and the intention to involve a broad set 
of stakeholders in development of the Framework, the RFI will generally 
use the broader term ``organizations'' when seeking information.
    Comments containing references, studies, research, and other 
empirical data that are not widely published should include copies of 
the referenced materials. Do not include in comments or otherwise 
submit proprietary or confidential information, as all comments 
received by the deadline will be made available publically at http://csrc.nist.gov/.

Current Risk Management Practices

    NIST solicits information about how organizations assess risk; how 
cybersecurity factors into that risk assessment; the current usage of 
existing cybersecurity frameworks, standards, and guidelines; and other 
management practices related to cybersecurity. In addition, NIST is 
interested in understanding whether particular frameworks, standards, 
guidelines, and/or best practices are mandated by legal or regulatory 
requirements and the challenges organizations perceive in meeting such 
requirements. This will assist in NIST's goal of developing a Framework 
that includes and identifies common practices across sectors.
    1. What do organizations see as the greatest challenges in 
improving cybersecurity practices across critical infrastructure?
    2. What do organizations see as the greatest challenges in 
developing a cross-sector standards-based Framework for critical 
infrastructure?
    3. Describe your organization's policies and procedures governing 
risk generally and cybersecurity risk specifically. How does senior 
management communicate and oversee these policies and procedures?
    4. Where do organizations locate their cybersecurity risk 
management program/office?
    5. How do organizations define and assess risk generally and 
cybersecurity risk specifically?
    6. To what extent is cybersecurity risk incorporated into 
organizations' overarching enterprise risk management?
    7. What standards, guidelines, best practices, and tools are 
organizations using to understand, measure, and manage risk at the 
management, operational, and technical levels?
    8. What are the current regulatory and regulatory reporting 
requirements in the United States (e.g. local, state, national, and 
other) for organizations relating to cybersecurity?
    9. What organizational critical assets are interdependent upon 
other critical physical and information infrastructures, including 
telecommunications, energy, financial services, water, and 
transportation sectors?
    10. What performance goals do organizations adopt to ensure their 
ability to provide essential services while managing cybersecurity 
risk?
    11. If your organization is required to report to more than one 
regulatory body, what information does your organization report and 
what has been your organization's reporting experience?
    12. What role(s) do or should national/international standards and 
organizations that develop national/international standards play in 
critical infrastructure cybersecurity conformity assessment?

Use of Frameworks, Standards, Guidelines, and Best Practices

    As set forth in the Executive Order, the Framework will consist of 
standards, guidelines, and/or best practices that promote the 
protection of information and information systems supporting 
organizational missions and business functions.
    NIST seeks comments on the applicability of existing publications 
to address cybersecurity needs, including, but not limited to the 
documents developed by: international standards organizations; U.S. 
Government Agencies and organizations; State regulators or Public 
Utility Commissions; Industry and industry associations; other 
Governments, and non-profits and other non-government organizations.
    NIST is seeking information on the current usage of these existing 
approaches throughout industry, the robustness and applicability of 
these frameworks and standards, and what would encourage their 
increased usage. Please provide information related to the following:
    1. What additional approaches already exist?
    2. Which of these approaches apply across sectors?
    3. Which organizations use these approaches?
    4. What, if any, are the limitations of using such approaches?
    5. What, if any, modifications could make these approaches more 
useful?
    6. How do these approaches take into account sector-specific needs?
    7. When using an existing framework, should there be a related 
sector-specific standards development process or voluntary program?
    8. What can the role of sector-specific agencies and related sector 
coordinating councils be in developing and promoting the use of these 
approaches?
    9. What other outreach efforts would be helpful?

Specific Industry Practices

    In addition to the approaches above, NIST is interested in 
identifying core practices that are broadly applicable across sectors 
and throughout industry.
    NIST is interested in information on the adoption of the following 
practices as they pertain to critical infrastructure components:
     Separation of business from operational systems;
     Use of encryption and key management;
     Identification and authorization of users accessing 
systems;
     Asset identification and management;
     Monitoring and incident detection tools and capabilities;
     Incident handling policies and procedures;
     Mission/system resiliency practices;
     Security engineering practices;
     Privacy and civil liberties protection.
    1. Are these practices widely used throughout critical 
infrastructure and industry?
    2. How do these practices relate to existing international 
standards and practices?
    3. Which of these practices do commenters see as being the most 
critical for the secure operation of critical infrastructure?
    4. Are some of these practices not applicable for business or 
mission needs within particular sectors?
    5. Which of these practices pose the most significant 
implementation challenge?
    6. How are standards or guidelines utilized by organizations in the 
implementation of these practices?
    7. Do organizations have a methodology in place for the proper 
allocation of business resources to invest in, create, and maintain IT 
standards?
    8. Do organizations have a formal escalation process to address 
cybersecurity risks that suddenly increase in severity?

[[Page 13028]]

    9. What risks to privacy and civil liberties do commenters perceive 
in the application of these practices?
    10. What are the international implications of this Framework on 
your global business or in policymaking in other countries?
    11. How should any risks to privacy and civil liberties be managed?
    12. In addition to the practices noted above, are there other core 
practices that should be considered for inclusion in the Framework?

    Dated: February 21, 2013.
Patrick Gallagher,
Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology.
[FR Doc. 2013-04413 Filed 2-25-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-13-P

TMZ – Kourtney Kardashian After Baby — HOT Mom on the Beach

 

Kourtney Kardashian was hanging out in Mexico and she looks SO unbelievably hot in her bikini that you might forget how gross those baby-feeding breasts are…

Unveiled by PI – TOP SECRET – White House Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/WH-EconomicEspionage.png

 

ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS

  • 141 pages
  • February 2013
  • 6.62 MB

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The Administration is focused on protecting the innovation that drives the American economy and supports jobs in the United States. As a Nation, we create products and services that improve the world’s ability to communicate, to learn, to understand diverse cultures and beliefs, to be mobile, to live better and longer lives, to produce and consume energy efficiently and to secure food, nourishment and safety. Most of the value of this work is intangible—it lies in America’s entrepreneurial spirit, our creativity, ingenuity and insistence on progress and in creating a better life for our communities and for communities around the world. These intangible assets are often captured as intellectual property—copyrights, patents, trademarks and trade secrets, and reflect America’s advantage in the global economy.

Emerging trends indicate that the pace of economic espionage and trade secret theft against U.S. corporations is accelerating. There appears to be multiple vectors of attack for persons and governments seeking to steal trade secrets. Foreign competitors of U.S. corporations, some with ties to foreign governments, have increased their efforts to steal trade secret information through the recruitment of current or former employees. Additionally, there are indications that U.S. companies, law firms, academia, and financial institutions are experiencing cyber intrusion activity against electronic repositories containing trade secret information. Trade secret theft threatens American businesses, undermines national security, and places the security of the U.S. economy in jeopardy. These acts also diminish U.S. export prospects around the globe and put American jobs at risk.

As an Administration, we are committed to continuing to be vigilant in addressing threats—including corporate and state sponsored trade secret misappropriation—that jeopardize our status as the world’s leader for innovation and creativity. We will continue to act vigorously to combat the theft of U.S. trade secrets that could be used by foreign companies or foreign governments to gain an unfair economic edge. Departments across the U.S. government have roles in protecting trade secrets and preserving our nation’s economic and national security. This strategy recognizes the crucial role of trade secrets in the U.S. economy and sets out a means for improved coordination within the U.S. government to protect them.

Investigations and Prosecutions of Trade Secret Theft

The Department of Justice has made the investigation and prosecution of corporate and state sponsored trade secret theft a top priority. The Department of Justice and the FBI will continue to prioritize these investigations and prosecutions and focus law enforcement efforts on combating trade secret theft. The FBI is also expanding its efforts to fight computer intrusions that involve the theft of trade secrets by individual, corporate, and nation-state cyber hackers. The Department of Homeland Security component law enforcement agencies will continue to work cooperatively with the Department of Justice when its investigations uncover evidence of trade secret theft.

Law Enforcement and Intelligence Information Sharing

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

ODNI will coordinate within the intelligence community to inform the private sector about ways to identify and prevent the theft of trade secrets that benefit a state sponsor or an entity with ties to a foreign government. ODNI will coordinate expanded discussions between the intelligence community and the private sector, focusing on four main aspects of the threat posed by trade secret theft:

•• The number and identity of foreign governments involved in trade secret misappropriation;
•• The industrial sectors and types of information and technology targeted by such espionage;
•• The methods used to conduct such espionage; and
•• The dissemination, use, and associated impact of information lost in trade secret misappropriation.

ODNI, though the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) will also counter the threat of trade secret misappropriation by sharing threat warning and awareness information with the private sector, as well as imparting counterintelligence tradecraft procedures tailored to the private sector. In order to support this strategy, ONCIX will brief trade association groups and conferences on industry specific threats.

The Department of Justice

The Department of Justice and the FBI will continue to report on trade secret investigations and prosecutions. Additionally, the FBI will continue its outreach and education efforts with the private sector through various local, regional and national initiatives. At the local level, each of the FBI’s 56 field offices will continue to work with academic institutions, manufacturers, laboratories and other entities that are located within the field office’s area of responsibility and are perceived as being potentially at risk for trade secret theft. At the regional level, the FBI will continue to meet regularly with other government agencies, industry, and academia to share information about insider threats, economic espionage and trade secret theft.

The FBI’s headquarters will review the effectiveness of its local and regional efforts with a focus on the extent of outreach to companies and entities such as cleared defense contractors, universities, hospitals, high science companies, and emerging technology firms. The FBI will continue to engage with trade secrets owners through several national outreach organizations, including the Domestic Security Alliance Council, the National Security Business Alliance Council, and InfraGard, and will continue to work closely with various Information Sharing and Analysis Centers. These local, regional and national efforts will continue to reach a broad swath of companies in multiple sectors such as information technology, communications, aeronautics, engineering, energy, financial services, and consumer retail. The FBI’s engagement with the private sector promotes reasonable safeguards based on recent intelligence, case studies, and emerging trends.

The Department of Justice and the FBI will continue to train prosecutors and investigators on trade secret theft with the goal of increasing the number of successful investigations and prosecutions for violations of the Economic Espionage Act. These training events will target domestic law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and international partners. These events will include both a trade secret specific curriculum as well as broader intellectual property rights enforcement themes in which trade secret theft is a component.

The National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center

The National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center will obtain leads regarding trade secret misappropriation through its “Report IP Theft” Initiative.

The Department of Defense

The Department of Defense, through the Defense Security Service, will collect, analyze and report on threat information to cleared industries that support Department of Defense programs and the missions of other U.S. government departments and agencies. The Defense Security Service, in coordination with its partner agencies, will continue to provide advice to those cleared industry partners and deliver security training and education on counterintelligence. Through its annual report on trend analysis of threats targeting to U.S. defense technologies, the Defense Security Service will continue to communicate its analysis to industrial partners of the U.S. government.

The Defense Intelligence Agency will co-chair the National Critical Systems and Joint Technology Task Force with the FBI. This effort will continue to provide a collaborative forum to provide input into the counterintelligence efforts to protect critical and emerging technologies by Federal agencies.

Monty Python – How to Irritate People – Skit Video

The FBI -Investment Advisor Pleads Guilty to Defrauding Investors of More Than $3.2 Million

FRESNO, CA—Joseph Randall Medcalf, 56, formerly an investment advisor in Fresno, pleaded guilty yesterday to three counts of mail fraud and one count of bankruptcy fraud in connection with a scheme to defraud investors, United States Attorney Benjamin B. Wagner announced.

In his guilty plea, Medcalf admitted that from at least May 2002 through October 2007, he carried out a scheme to defraud investors by offering investment “opportunities” in entities that he controlled, such as All Valley Holdings LLC, CenCal Value Investments LLC, and other ventures. Medcalf failed to register these investments with the Securities and Exchange Commission or other governmental entities. Medcalf convinced some investors to move their investments from secure IRAs and other legitimate investments to him. In some cases, Medcalf’s investments were nonexistent; in other cases, they were failing and worthless. Medcalf frequently did not even invest the funds, but either paid other investors “returns” on their investments or spent it for his own personal use.

According to court documents, Medcalf marketed the investment opportunities as safe investments for a set time period, and he usually guaranteed and interest rate between 6 and 8 percent. He stated that the principal and interest would be returned at the end of the term. In some cases, Medcalf executed promissory notes and subscription agreements that stated the investment’s time period and guaranteed rate of return. These promissory notes and subscription agreements were not authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission or other governmental entities. In order to lull investors into believing that the investments were secure, Medcalf sent out financial statements showing substantial returns. Medcalf also encouraged his investors to rollover their investment for another term so he could avoid paying out on the investments and to forestall the investors’ discovery that the purported investments were not legitimate.

According to the plea agreement, Medcalf also filed a bankruptcy petition in which he fraudulently failed to disclose his connection with All Valley Holdings and CenCal Value Investments in an effort to avoid disclosure of his scheme to defraud.

As a result of Medcalf’s fraud, investors lost more than $3.2 million. Medcalf has remained in custody since December 2011 when the FBI arrested him at the Atlanta airport as he flew back into the United States from overseas.

This case is the product of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kirk Sherriff and Christopher Baker are prosecuting the case.

Medcalf is scheduled to be sentenced by United States District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on May 13, 2013. The plea agreement provides for a sentence of six-and-a-half years in prison. The actual sentence will be determined by the court at the sentencing hearing.

SECRECY NEWS – THE REAL MINIMUM WAGE, CYBERSECURITY, AND MORE FROM CRS

The hourly minimum wage reached its peak value in 1968, when it was worth
$10.57 in real terms, the Congressional Research Service calculated in a
new report.  But although the nominal value of the minimum wage has
increased over the years, it has not kept pace with the increase in
consumer prices, and so its real value has fallen.  See Inflation and the
Real Minimum Wage: A Fact Sheet, February 26, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42973.pdf

The recent executive order 13636 on cybersecurity was discussed in another
new CRS report, which reviewed the order's provisions, compared it to
pending legislation, and discussed the authority of the President to act
unilaterally in this area.  See "The 2013 Cybersecurity Executive Order:
Overview and Considerations for Congress," March 1, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42984.pdf

A 1999 provision to provide public access to scientific data used in
federally funded research (known as the Shelby Amendment) has rarely been
invoked in Freedom of Information Act requests, and so neither the benefits
promised by its advocates nor the concerns of its critics have been
realized to any significant extent, a CRS study found.  See Public Access
to Data from Federally Funded Research: Provisions in OMB Circular A-110,
March 1, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42983.pdf

The prospects for current negotiations between the government of Colombia
and the insurgent Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were
assessed in a new CRS report, which also provided background on the
conflict in that country.  See Peace Talks in Colombia, March 1, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42982.pdf

The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear challenges to two state laws
that impose restrictions on same-sex marriage. The two pending cases were
discussed by CRS in Same-Sex Marriage and Supreme Court: United States v.
Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry, February 20, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42976.pdf

The Equal Rights Amendment that was proposed in 1972 to prohibit
discrimination "on account of sex" was eventually ratified by 35 states,
three short of the 38 states required for adoption.  Those ratifications
have formally expired, but some supporters contend controversially that it
would possible "to restart the clock on ratification at the current level
of 35 states."  The issues were discussed by CRS in The Proposed Equal
Rights Amendment: Contemporary Ratification Issues, February 28, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42979.pdf

The adequacy of official reporting of government expenditures is a
continuing concern among policy advocates.  "Two agencies -- the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) -- have
never received unqualified audit opinions, which signifies the persistence
of financial problems at these agencies," a new CRS report said.  See
Federal Financial Reporting: An Overview, February 27, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42975.pdf

Other noteworthy new and updated CRS products that Congress has directed
CRS not to release to the public include the following.

Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 113th Congress, February 27,
2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42985.pdf

Comparison of Rights in Military Commission Trials and Trials in Federal
Criminal Court, February 28, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40932.pdf

International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. Law, March 1,
2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf

Cybersecurity: Authoritative Reports and Resources, February 28, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42507.pdf

U.S. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production in Federal and Non-Federal
Areas, February 28, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42432.pdf

Securing America's Borders: The Role of the Military, February 25, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41286.pdf

Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress, March
5, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42493.pdf

U.S. Trade and Investment in the Middle East and North Africa: Overview
and Issues for Congress, February 28, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42153.pdf

Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover
Violence, February 28, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41075.pdf

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC): Transfer and Disposal of Military
Property, February 28, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40476.pdf

Department of Defense Trends in Overseas Contract Obligations, March 1,
2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41820.pdf

Sequestration as a Budget Enforcement Process: Frequently Asked Questions,
February 27, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42972.pdf

Sessions, Adjournments, and Recesses of Congress, February 27, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42977.pdf

Kenya: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, February 26, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42967.pdf

Comparing Medicaid and Exchanges: Benefits and Costs for Individuals and
Families, February 28, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42978.pdf

Brief History of Comprehensive Immigration Reform Efforts in the 109th and
110th Congresses to Inform Policy Discussions in the 113th Congress,
February 27, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42980.pdf

U.S. Trade and Investment in the Middle East and North Africa: Overview
and Issues for Congress, February 28, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42153.pdf

China's Economic Conditions, March 4, 2013:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Cryptome – Whistleblowing on Whistleblowing Oversight

Whistleblowing on Whistleblowing Oversight

 


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 38 (Tuesday, February 26, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13101-13102]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-04467]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD

[Notice-PCLOB-2013-01; Docket No. 2013-0004; Sequence No. 1]

No FEAR Act Notice; Notice of Rights and Protections Available 
Under Federal Antidiscrimination and Whistleblower Protection Laws

AGENCY: Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with the requirements of the Notification and 
Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002, the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is providing notice to its 
employees, former employees, and applicants for Board employment about 
the rights and remedies available to them under the federal anti-
discrimination, whistleblower protection, and retaliation laws.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Claire McKenna, Legal Counsel, at 202-
366-0365 or claire.mckenna.pclob@dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On May 15, 2002, Congress enacted the 
Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation 
Act of 2002, Public Law 107-174, also known as the No FEAR Act. The Act 
requires that federal agencies provide notice to their employees, 
former employees, and applicants for employment to inform them of the 
rights and protections available under federal anti-discrimination, 
whistleblower protection, and retaliation laws.

Anti-Discrimination Laws

    A federal agency cannot discriminate against an employee or 
applicant with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 
age, disability, marital status, or political affiliation. 
Discrimination on these bases is prohibited by one or more of the 
following statutes: 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. 206(d), 29 U.S.C. 
631, 29 U.S.C. 633a, 2 U.S.C. 791, and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16.
    If you believe that you have been the victim of unlawful 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national 
origin, or disability, you must contact an Equal Employment Opportunity 
(EEO) counselor within 45 calendar days of the alleged discriminatory 
action, or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 calendar days of 
the effective date of the action, before you can file a formal 
complaint of discrimination with your agency. This timeline may be 
extended by the Board under the circumstances described in 29 CFR 
1614.105(a)(2). If you believe that you have been the victim of 
unlawful discrimination on the basis of age, you must either contact an 
EEO counselor as noted above or give notice of intent to sue to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 calendar days 
of the alleged discriminatory action. If you are alleging 
discrimination based on marital status or political affiliation, you 
may file a written complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel 
(OSC) (see contact information below). In the alternative (or in some 
cases, in addition), you may pursue a discrimination complaint by 
filing a grievance through the Board's administrative or negotiated 
grievance procedures, if such procedures apply and are available.

Whistleblower Protection Laws

    A federal employee with authority to take, direct others to take, 
recommend, or approve any personnel action must not use that authority 
to take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a 
personnel action against an employee or applicant because of disclosure 
of information by that individual that is reasonably believed to 
evidence violations of law, rule, or regulation; gross mismanagement; 
gross waste of funds; an abuse of authority; or a substantial and 
specific danger to public health or safety, unless disclosures of such 
information is specifically prohibited by law and such information is 
specifically required by executive order to be kept secret in the 
interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.
    Retaliation against an employee or applicant for making a protected 
disclosure is prohibited by 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8). If you believe that 
you have been the victim of whistleblower retaliation, you may file a 
written complaint (Form OSC-11) with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel 
at 1730 M Street NW., Suite 218, Washington, DC 20036-4505 or online 
through the OSC Web site, http://www.osc.gov.

Retaliation for Engaging in Protected Activity

    A federal agency cannot retaliate against an employee or applicant 
because that individual exercises his or her rights under any of the 
federal antidiscrimination or whistleblower protection laws listed 
above. If you believe that you are the victim or retaliation for 
engaging in protected activity, you must follow, as appropriate, the 
procedures described in the Antidiscrimination Laws and Whistleblower 
Protection Laws section or, if applicable, the administrative or 
negotiated grievance procedures in order to pursue any legal remedy.

Disciplinary Actions

    Under existing laws, each agency retains the right, where 
appropriate, to discipline a federal employee for conduct that is 
inconsistent with the Federal Antidiscrimination and Whistleblower 
Protection Laws up to and including removal. If OSC has initiated an 
investigation under 5 U.S.C. 1214, however, agencies must seek approval 
from OSC to discipline employees for, among other activities, engaging 
in prohibited retaliation, 5 U.S.C. 1214(f). Nothing in the No FEAR Act 
alters existing laws or permits an agency to take unfounded 
disciplinary action against a federal employee or to

[[Page 13102]]

violate the procedural rights of a federal employee who has been 
accused of discrimination.

Additional Information

    For further information regarding the No FEAR Act regulations, 
refer to 5 CFR 724, as well as the appropriate Board offices. 
Additional information regarding federal antidiscrimination laws can be 
found at the EEOC Web site, http://www.eeoc.gov, and the OSC Web site, 
http://www.osc.gov.

Existing Rights Unchanged

    Pursuant to section 205 of the No FEAR Act, neither the No FEAR Act 
nor this notice creates, expands, or reduces any rights otherwise 
available to any employee, former employee, or applicant under the laws 
of the United States, including the provisions of law specified in 5 
U.S.C. 2302(d).

    Dated: February 21, 2013.
Claire McKenna,
Legal Counsel, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
[FR Doc. 2013-04467 Filed 2-25-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P

TMZ – Heidi Klum on ‘America’s Got Talent’ — I’m Ready to ‘X’ You

 

Howie Mandel is already BFFs with Heidi Klum — his new fellow judge on “America’s Got Talent” — in fact, the two are on such close terms … Howie has no problem joking about Heidi slapping her estranged husband Seal.

Published by PI – UNODC Bribery and Corruption in Afghanistan Report – Confidential

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/UNODC-AfghanCorruption.png

 

CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN: RECENT PATTERNS AND TRENDS

  • 40 pages
  • December 2012

Download

The large-scale population survey on the extent of bribery and four sector-specific integrity surveys of public officials undertaken by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan in 2011/2012 reveal that the delivery of public services remains severely affected by bribery in Afghanistan and that bribery has a major impact on the country’s economy. In 2012, half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public service and the total cost of bribes paid to public officials amounted to US$ 3.9 billion. This corresponds to an increase of 40 per cent in real terms between 2009 and 2012, while the ratio of bribery cost to GDP remained relatively constant (23 per cent in 2009; 20 per cent in 2012).

While corruption is seen by Afghans as one of the most urgent challenges facing their country, it seems to be increasingly embedded in social practices, with patronage and bribery being an acceptable part of day-to-day life. For example, 68 per cent of citizens interviewed in 2012 considered it acceptable for a civil servant to top up a low salary by accepting small bribes from service users (as opposed to 42 per cent in 2009). Similarly, 67 per cent of citizens considered it sometimes acceptable for a civil servant to be recruited on the basis of family ties and friendship networks (up from 42 per cent in 2009).

Since 2009 Afghanistan has made some tangible progress in reducing the level of corruption in the public sector. While 59 per cent of the adult population had to pay at least one bribe to a public official in 2009, 50 per cent had to do so in 2012, and whereas 52 per cent of the population paid a bribe to a police officer in 2009, 42 per cent did so in 2012.

However, worrying trends have also emerged in the past three years: the frequency of bribery has increased from 4.7 bribes to 5.6 bribes per bribe-payer and the average cost of a bribe has risen from US$ 158 to US$ 214, a 29 per cent increase in real terms. Education has emerged as one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption, with the percentage of those paying a bribe to a teacher jumping from 16 per cent in 2009 to 51 per cent in 2012. In general, there has been no major change in the level of corruption observed in the judiciary, customs service and local authorities, which remained high in 2012, as in 2009.

Although with a different intensity, bribery not only affects the public sector but also nonpublic sector entities in Afghanistan. Nearly 30 per cent of Afghan citizens paid a bribe when requesting a service from individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan in 2012, as opposed to the 50 per cent who paid bribes to public officials. The national economic impact of non-governmental bribery is also lower, with an estimated total cost of US$ 600 million, some 15 per cent of the estimated US$ 3.9 billion paid to the public sector.

Significant variations in the distribution of these two types of bribery also exist across Afghanistan. The public sector is most affected by bribery in the Western (where 71 per cent of the population accessing public services experienced bribery) and North-Eastern Regions (60 per cent), while it is least affected in the Southern (40 per cent) and Central (39 per cent) Regions. On the other hand, local individuals and entities not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan, such as village elders, Mullahs and Taliban groups, are more involved in bribery in the Southern region (nearly 60 per cent of those who had contact with such individuals).

The analysis of specific forms of bribery in four different sectors of the public administration in Afghanistan (police, local government, judiciary and education), by means of the integrity surveys, indicates that bribery takes place for different reasons in different circumstances. In most cases bribes are paid in order to obtain better or faster services, while in others bribes are offered to influence deliberations and actions such as police activities and judicial decisions, thereby eroding the rule of law and trust in institutions. For example, 24 per cent of cases in which bribes were offered to the police were related to the release of imprisoned suspects or to avoid imprisonment.

The data show that for every five Afghan citizens who paid at least one bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey, there was one who refused to do so mainly due to a lack of financial resources. This means that the use of bribery in the public sector affects the capacity of the Afghan population to access necessary services, and that — as they are more likely to accept the payment of bribes — higher income households can ensure better accessibility to, and a higher quality of, public services than households with lower incomes. Conversely, citizens with lower incomes are more likely to turn down requests for bribes, which effectively prices them out of the “market” for public services and makes them less likely to receive fair service delivery.

Recruitment in the public sector has shown itself to be an area of concern in Afghanistan as it is largely based on bribes or patronage. About 80 per cent of citizens with a family member recruited into the civil service in the last three years declared that the family member in question received some form of assistance or paid a bribe to be recruited. Civil servants in the four sectors covered in the integrity surveys also acknowledged that assistance with recruitment is widespread. For example, some 50 per cent of police, local government staff and school teachers indicated that they received assistance during their recruitment.

When it comes to reporting bribery, 22 per cent of those who paid a bribe in 2012 reported the incident to authorities such as the police (one third), the public prosecutor’s office and the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (one fifth each). While the bribery reporting rate in Afghanistan seems to be relatively high by international comparison, it is not clear if the reporting declared in the survey took place in a formal setting since it rarely led to effective results. Indeed, less than a fifth of cases reported to the authorities resulted in a formal procedure and the majority of claims did not lead to any type follow up.

Manager Magazin – “GoMoPa” erhielt € 200.000,- von S&K – deklariert als “Schutzgeldzahlung”

http://www.manager-magazin.de/unternehmen/artikel/0,2828,886846,00.html

obs Maurischat Gericht 6.8.2012 Frankfurt 23

“GoMoPa-Präsident Klaus Maurischat”

obs Maurischat Gericht 6.8.2012 Frankfurt 28

“GoMoPa-Präsident Klaus Maurischat”

Spam Song by Monty Python – Video

 

Spam Song by Monty Python – Video

FBI Director Robert Muller – The Cyber Threat: Planning for the Way Ahead

 

Director Mueller at RSA
 Director Mueller speaks to cyber security professionals in San Francisco. Read text of his remarks.

The Cyber Threat
Planning for the Way Ahead

 

Denial of service attacks, network intrusions, state-sponsored hackers bent on compromising our national security: The cyber threat is growing, and in response, said FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, the Bureau must continue to strengthen its partnerships with other government agencies and private industry—and take the fight to the criminals.

 

“Network intrusions pose urgent threats to our national security and to our economy,” Mueller told a group of cyber security professionals in San Francisco today. “If we are to confront these threats successfully,” he explained, “we must adopt a unified approach” that promotes partnerships and intelligence sharing—in the same way we responded to terrorism after the 9/11 attacks.

 

Padlocks graphic

Focus on Hackers and Intrusions

The FBI over the past year has put in place an initiative to uncover and investigate web-based intrusion attacks and develop a cadre of specially trained computer scientists able to extract hackers’ digital signatures from mountains of malicious code. Learn more

The FBI learned after 9/11 that “our mission was to use our skills and resources to identify terrorist threats and to find ways of disrupting those threats,” Mueller said. “This has been the mindset at the heart of every terrorism investigation since then, and it must be true of every case in the cyber arena as well.”

 

Partnerships that ensure the seamless flow of intelligence are critical in the fight against cyber crime, he explained. Within government, the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, which comprises 19 separate agencies, serves as a focal point for cyber threat information. But private industry—a major victim of cyber intrusions—must also be “an essential partner,” Mueller said, pointing to several successful initiatives.

 

The National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance, for example, is a model for collaboration between private industry and law enforcement. The Pittsburgh-based organization includes more than 80 industry partners—from financial services, telecommunications, retail, and manufacturing, among other fields—who work with federal and international partners to provide real-time threat intelligence.

 

Another example is the Enduring Security Framework, a group that includes leaders from the private sector and the federal government who analyze current—and potential—threats related to denial of service attacks, malware, and emerging software and hardware vulnerabilities.

 

Mueller also noted the Bureau’s cyber outreach efforts to private industry. The Domestic Security Alliance Council, for instance, includes chief security officers from more than 200 companies, representing every critical infrastructure and business sector. InfraGard, an alliance between the FBI and industry, has grown from a single chapter in 1996 to 88 chapters today with nearly 55,000 members nationwide. And just last week, the FBI held the first session of the National Cyber Executive Institute, a three-day seminar to train leading industry executives on cyber threat awareness and information sharing.

 

“As noteworthy as these outreach programs may be, we must do more,” Mueller said. “We must build on these initiatives to expand the channels of information sharing and collaboration.”

 

He added, “For two decades, corporate cyber security has focused principally on reducing vulnerabilities. These are worthwhile efforts, but they cannot fully eliminate our vulnerabilities. We must identify and deter the persons behind those computer keyboards. And once we identify them—be they state actors, organized criminal groups, or 18-year-old hackers—we must devise a response that is effective, not just against that specific attack, but for all similar illegal activity.”

 

“We need to abandon the belief that better defenses alone will be sufficient,” Mueller said. “Instead of just building better defenses, we must build better relationships. If we do these things, and if we bring to these tasks the sense of urgency that this threat demands,” he added, “I am confident that we can and will defeat cyber threats, now and in the years to come.”

Unveiled by Cryptome – Bradley Manning Military Spying Analyzed

Bradley Manning Military Spying Analyzed

 


This comments on Alexa O’Brien’s Narration of Bradley Manning’s court statement, February 28, 2013:

http://www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wikileaks/bradley_manning/pfc_bradley_e_manning_
providence_hearing_statement.html

Manning’s statement provides useful information to understand military spying seldom revealed to the public. His statement was not only advised by his defense attorney but vetted by military intelligence as mandated for court proceedings.

1. Manning cites his advanced training as a military spy at Fort Huachaca, AZ, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 35F; this MOS requires Top Secret/SCI clearance.*

1.1 He does not describe specific skills he obtained and their application during training. Presumably much of this is classified.

2. Manning cites his military spying duty at Fort Drum, NY.

2.1 He does not describe specifics of what this spying involved. Presumably much of this is classified, particular that associated with spying inside the United States or on US persons.

2.2 Nor if this spying inside the United States and against US persons was legal. Military uses, and perhaps personal use, is likely classified.

3. Manning describes surveilling websites, chat rooms, and other fora as part of his military spying duites, including targets located in the United States and against US persons.

3.1. He does not describe if this surveillance was recorded and applied for military spying purposes by him and/or others in addition to his personal use.

3.2 Nor if this spying inside the United States and against US persons was legal. Military uses, and perhaps personal use, is likely classified.

4. Manning describes chats and communications allegedly with representatives of WikiLeaks.

4.1 He does not describe if these were recorded and/or used for military spying purposes. Presumbly military uses are classified.

5. Manning describes his back-ups of data and analysis of military spying.

5.1 He does not describe military systems back-ups which are conventional in most systems and in particular on systems handling classiifed information.

5.2 Presumably these back-ups will contain data about his and all others’ back-ups and downloads.

6. Manning describes archiving and sharing of spying data and analysis for general use.

6.1 He does not describe multi-level security measures customarily applied to archiving and sharing systems.

6.2 Presumbably these security systems recorded all uploads, downloads and accesses to archiving and sharing systems.

7. Manning describes lax monitoring of computer and network usage, outages, work-arounds and contingencies of systems he used in military spying as justification for his personal initiatives.

7.1 He does not describe counter-intelligence measures to track usage, outage, work-arounds and contingencies long associated with computer and networks, especially those handling classified information.

8. Manning admits to disclosing lightly classified information in his statement.

8.1 He does not disclose any lightly or other classified information in his statement. Presumably advised to not do so.

9. Manning does not describe military spy training in deception, undercover, ruse, lying, impersonation, dupery, false innocence, attacks, counter-attacks, guile, sabotage, planting false information, spread of disinformation, ploys and other spy tradecraft, in particular those associated with the cyber-spy curriculum at Fort Huachuca, AZ.

9.1 Presumbably much of this is classified.

10. Manning describes use of Tor for anonymizing.

10.1 He does not describe faults in Tor:

10.2 Its principal funding by the US Government;

10.3 Its tax-exempt status by the US Government;

10.4 Its principal place of operation in the US;

10.5 Its principal staffing by US persons;

10.6 Its principal board members by US persons;

10.7 Its vulnerability of tracking users through sniffing of nodes and instantaneous access to node activity by planted-ware (including the nodes which claim to not log).

_________

Corollaries:

11. The USG will call 140 or more witnesses for the Manning trial.

11.1 Presumably no prosecution classified testimony will be public, as before.

12. Manning defense will call its witnesses.

12.1 Presumably no defense classified testimony will be public, as before.

13. Military court may withhold information from the public more than civilian courts.

13.1 Information, evidence and testimonry can be classified to avoid disclosure by using military courts to cloak illegal operations.

14. MOS 35F has been revised in response to Manning disclosures, imprisonment and prosecution.

14.1 MOS 35F revisions will not be made public, especially spying inside the United States and against US persons, as before.

15. There will no disclosure of using young service members to spy inside and outside the United States, as long practiced and more recently online.

16. There will be no disclosure of manipulating young service members to believe they know more than they do or getting away with more than they are — standard means and methods of spy operations.

17. There will be no disclosure of manipulating the public by encouraging ostensibly opposition media coverage.

18. There will be no disclosure of manipulating friendly and hostile participants to inform on each other.

More later when the official transcript is released — with the likelihood it may be redacted, doctored or revised for security clearance.

 


* Top Secret clearance is for life; even it is withdrawn there is no escape from the obligation to never reveal what was learned under the clearance (Daniel Ellsberg readily admits he never revealed all he knew for that reason; nor has the other famous US disclosers not in jail or buried).

 


 

 

 

 


TMZ – Chris Brown & Rihanna MURDER Plot on ‘Law & Order: SVU’

 

Chris Brown & Rihanna MURDER Plot on ‘Law & Order: SVU’

An episode of ‘Law & Order: SVU’ which aired last night was eerily similar to the epic Rihanna-Chris Brown abuse scandal but they took it to an extreme and KILLED OFF the Rihanna character. It seems like these “ripped from the headlines” story plots are a little too easy… how about they try JWoww’s jacked up boob job next?

The Proof: Cyber Attacks since Years – Der Beweis: Die jahrelangen Cyberattacken gegen unsere Webseiten

The Proof: Cyber Attacks since Years – Der Beweis: Die jahrelangen Cyberattacken gegen unsere Webseiten

Ein kleiner Ausschnitt

A little excerpt:

graph

Bernd-Pulchernst

Dear Readers,

since days our websites berndpulch.org and http://www.investment-on.com

are attacked by vicious criminals which have been identified including their comrades.

All the proof is given to the relevant authorities.

In the meantime every attack gives us more evidence against these criminals.

We released a new website

http://www.bernd-pulch.org

is a clone of http://www.berndpulch.org

and some more will follow.

History shows that all censorship could not stop the truth.

In fact people get even more curious about the truth which the censors want

to hide !

Sincerely yours

Bernd Pulch

Publisher

Das Betrugsurteil gegen Klaus Maurischat/”GoMoPa” wg Betruges am eigenen Anleger

 

obs Maurischat Gericht 6.8.2012 Frankfurt 23

“Klaus Maurischat”; “GoMoPa”,

 

obs Maurischat Gericht 6.8.2012 Frankfurt 28

 

“Klaus Maurischat”, “GoMoPa”,

https://berndpulch.org/das-betrugsurteil-gegen-bennewirtz-und-peter-ehlers-gomopa-partner-maurischat-und-vornkahl-wg-betruges-am-eigen-anleger/

Am 24. April 2006 war die Verhandlung am Amtsgericht Krefeld in der Betrugssache: Mark Vornkahl / Klaus Maurischat ./. Dehnfeld. Aktenzeichen: 28 Ls 85/05 Klaus MaurischatLange Straße 3827313 Dörverden.

Wer soll denn diesen Typen noch irgendwie trauen ?

Und diese Typen berichten über angebliche und tatsächliche Investment Verbrechen ?

Die Strategie ist es, stattdessen ihre Gegner zu kriminalisieren, wie bereits Meridian Capital bewies und wie es die STASI schon immer tat.

The Judgement against “President and CEO” Klaus Maurischat or whatever his name is because he committed fraud AGAINST HIS OWN INVESTORS.

Their strategy is to criminalize their opponents with their network as Meridian Capital showed – a well-known strategy of  East German STASI Agents.

Who can trust these fraudsters ?

These guys report about investment crime ?

What a parody….

Bernd Pulch

Magister Artium

PUBLIC INTELLIGENCE -SECRET – Afghanistan Anti-Corruption Monitoring Report

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/AF-KabulBankInquiry.png

 

INDEPENDENT JOINT ANTI-CORRUPTION MONITORING AND EVALUATION COMMITTEE REPORT OF THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE KABUL BANK CRISIS

  • 87 pages
  • November 15, 2012

Download

Kabul Bank’s controlling shareholders, key supervisors and managers led a sophisticated operation of fraudulent lending and embezzlement predominantly through a loan-book scheme. This resulted in Kabul Bank being deprived of approximately $935 million funded mostly from customer’s deposits. The loan-book scheme provided funds through proxy borrowers without repayment; fabricated company documents and financial statements; and used information technology systems that allowed Kabul Bank to maintain one set of financial records to satisfy regulators, and another to keep track of the real distribution of bank funds. Shareholders, related individuals and companies, and politically exposed people were the ultimate beneficiaries of this arrangement. Over 92 percent of Kabul Bank’s loan-book – or approximately $861 million – was for the benefit of 19 related parties (companies and individuals). Except for the initial investment of $5 million, all shareholder acquisitions and transfers were ultimately funded by money from Kabul Bank.

Kabul Bank’s Credit Department opened loan accounts for proxy borrowers on instruction from senior management, and forged supporting documents including applications, financial statements, and registrations, and employed fake business stamps to lend authenticity to the documents. Many financial statements were forged by Afghan accounting firms, seemingly established for the sole purpose of producing fraudulent documents to support loan files.

Loan funds were transferred shortly after an account was opened (in some cases even before the supporting documents were completed) through fake SWIFT messages and invoices created by Kabul Bank’s Credit Department itself. Actual disbursements were made through electronic payments or cash from the Bank’s vault. The funds eventually made their way to the true beneficiaries, were used to acquire assets for management, or were withdrawn in cash. Electronic transfers had the appearance of being transferred to overseas suppliers, or for other legitimate purposes. Some cash was transferred through the Kabul Airport using Pamir Airways, which was owned by shareholders related to Kabul Bank. Repayment of loans was rare, and most often new loans were created to provide the appearance of repayment.

Other Kabul Bank funds were misappropriated through non-loan disbursements that included excessive expenses, investments in related businesses, fake capital injections, advance payments of rent and salaries, unjustifiable bonuses, salaries paid to non-existent employees, inflated costs for assets, payment for fake assets, and political contributions.

Failure of regulatory and supervisory efforts

There were several opportunities for various national and international bodies to detect and prevent Kabul Bank’s fraudulent activities. The collective failure of banking oversight and enforcement is one of the many contributing factors that allowed hundreds of millions of dollars to be diverted from important Afghan priorities to the personal bank accounts and business enterprises of a few individuals, including the Bank’s shareholders and management.

The earliest opportunity was presented at the licensing stage where it appears that the personal, financial and criminal backgrounds of shareholders, supervisors and managers were not sufficiently reviewed. The Kabul Bank promoters submitted a business plan, articles of association, and some personal and financial disclosures, presenting a picture of competent management with decades of banking experience. However, Da Afghanistan Bank only reviewed the ex-Chairman’s suitability because he was the only shareholder with sufficiently large shareholdings. The suitability of other shareholders was not extensively reviewed. In conducting their background check, Da Afghanistan Bank submitted names to the Ministry of Interior in April 2004, which were cleared in September 2004, several months after Kabul Bank had begun to operate. It is unclear how extensively the Ministry of Interior’s background check was, but it is unlikely that a criminal check at this time would have identified the founder and ex-Chairman as a fugitive from the Russian Federation because this information had not been shared through Interpol until well after the licensing of Kabul Bank.

Kabul Bank’s illicit activities commenced soon after its licensing, but regulatory and law enforcement agencies did not effectively intervene. The capacity of Da Afghanistan Bank to regulate and supervise banks at this time was low. It was not until 2007 – over two-years since Kabul Bank was licensed – that onsite examinations of banks were conducted in Afghanistan. However, throughout the period between 2007 and September 2010, Da Afghanistan Bank carried out four general examinations of Kabul Bank, undertook three special examinations, and took enforcement measures or corrective actions four times.

Supervisory efforts consistently identified regulatory violations related to governance, loan files, and promotional incentives to gain new depositors. None of these efforts identified the extensive fraud occurring at the Bank, partially due to the sophistication of the Bank’s attempts to hide the fraud and partially due to Da Afghanistan Bank’s lack of capacity and failure to use investigative techniques. Additionally, several efforts to take enforcement action against the Bank were met with interference and were not implemented, including an attempt by Da Afghanistan Bank to limit incentive programs to attract depositors and an attempt by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Afghanistan to issue a fine.

International support was required to bridge the gap between Da Afghanistan Bank’s capacity and requisite levels of supervision leading to the design of programs to develop financial regulatory and supervisory capacity. This international assistance predominantly came in the form of the United States Agency for International Development’s Economic Growth and Governance Initiative which ran from 2005-2011. However, the program was not capable of developing sufficient capacity at Da Afghanistan Bank to detect the fraud at Kabul Bank, nor did the program’s implementing partners – Bearing Point and later Deloitte – detect the fraud or act sufficiently upon fraud indicators.

Video – Monty Python’s best sketch ever

Monty Python’s best sketch ever

My favorite sketch from Monty Python’s Flying Circus.

Video – Monty Python – Spanish Inquisition Torture Scene

 

Monty Python – Spanish Inquisition Torture Scene

 

HA! Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition! Capture and ‘torture’ an old woman.

Hackerattacken und Ausweichdomains – Cyberattacks and replacement domains

Bernd-Pulchernst

Dear Sirs,

 

since our websites are under heavy attacks since months we have released 1 more replacement domain

which mirrors the content of other websites:

 

http://www.bernd-pulch.org

 

Best regards

 

Bernd Pulch

Magister Artium

 

Unveiled by PI – U.S. Army Traffic Control Point Operations Smart Card

Center for Army Lessons Learned

  • 2 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • September 2010
  • 2.93 MB

Download

You may engage the following individuals based on their conduct:

• Persons who are committing hostile acts against Coalition forces (CF).
• Persons who are exhibiting hostile intenttowards CF.

These persons may be engaged subject to the following instructions:

Positive identification (PID) is required prior to engagement. PID is a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a legitimate military target. If no PID, contact your next higher commander for decision.

Use graduated measures of force. When time and circumstance permit, use the following degrees of graduated force when responding to hostile act/intent:

1. Shout verbal warnings to halt.
2. Show your weapon and demonstrate intentto use it.
3. Block access or detain.
4. Warning shots may be permitted in your operating environment (OE)/area of responsibility (AOR).
5. Fire proportional lethal force.

Do not target or strike anyone who has surrendered or is out of combat due to sickness or wounds.

Do not target or strike hospitals, mosques, churches, shrines, schools, museums, national monuments, any other historical and cultural sites, or civilian populated areas or buildings UNLESS the enemy is using them for military purposes or if necessary for your self-defense.

Do not target or strike Local infrastructure (public works, commercial communication facilities , dams), lines of communication (roads, highways, tunnels, bridges, railways), or economic objects (commercial storage facilities, pipelines) UNLESS necessary for self-defense or if ordered by your commander. If you must fire on these objects, fire to disable and disrupt rather than destroy.

ALWAYS minimize incidental injury, loss of life, and collateral damage.

The use of force, including deadly force, is authorized to
protect the following:

• Yourself, your unit, and other friendly forces.
• Detainees
• Civilians from crimes that are likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, such as murder or rape.
• Designated personnel or property, when such actions are necessary to restore order and security.

In general, WARNING SHOTS are authorized ONLY when the use of deadly force would be authorized in that particular situation.

Treat all civilians and their property with respect and dignity. Do not seize civilian property, including vehicles, unless the property presents a security threat. When possible, give a receipt to the property’s owner.

You may DETAIN civilians based upon a reasonable belief that the person:

• Must be detained for purposes of self-defense.
• Is interfering with CF mission accomplishment.
• Is on a list of persons wanted for questioning, arrest, or detention.
• Is or was engaged in criminal activity.
• Must be detained for imperative reasons of security.

Anyone you detain MUST be protected. Force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized to protect detainees in your custody. You MUST fill out a detainee apprehension card for EVERY person you detain.

Looting and the taking of war trophies are prohibited.

All personnel MUST report any suspected violations of the Law of War committed by any US, friendly, or enemy force. Notify your chain of command, Judge Advocate, IG, Chaplain, or appropriate service-related investigative branch.

Monty Python – Travel Agent Sketch Film

Monty Python – Travel Agent Sketch Film

From Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Episode 31. Featuring Michael Palin, Eric Idle & Carol Cleveland. Original Broadcast Date: Nov. 16, 1972.

SECRET – Unveiled by Cryptome – US Bureau of Prisons Location Maps

US Bureau of Prisons Location Maps

 


http://www.bop.gov/locations/locationmap.jsp
Maps of Facilities

 

North Eastern Region Mid Atlantic Region South Eastern Region South Central Region North Central Region Western Region Western Region Western Region Central Office

Please select a region of the map to view facilities in that area; you can then access information specific to an institution or office.

If you would like more information on a facility, contact the facility directly.

Western Region Locations

Legend: Institution Correctional Complex Regional Office
CCM Office   Private Facility

Link to CCM Phoenix Page Link to FCI Phoenix Page Link to FCI Phoenix Page Link to CCM Phoenix Page Link to FCC Tuscon Page Link to FCI Safford Page Link to FCC Victorville Page Link to FCC Victorville Page Link to MCC San Diego Page Link to CCM Long Beach Page Link to Terminal Isl Page Link to MDC Los Angeles Page Link to FCC Lompoc Page Link to CI Taft Page Link to CI Taft Page Link to FDC Seatac Page Link to CCM Seattle Page Link to FCI Sheridan Page Link to CCM Salt Lake City Page Link to FCI Herlong Page Link to CCM Sacramento Page Link to USP Atwater Page Link to FCI Dublin Page Link to FCI Mendota Page Link to Western Regional Office Page Link to FDC Honolulu

 

North Central Region Locations

South Central Region Locations

Northeast Region Locations

Mid-Atlantic Region Locations

Southeast Region Locations

Legend: Institution Correctional Complex Regional Office
CCM Office   Private Facility   Training Center

Link to Southeast Regional Office Page Link to FCI Aliceville Page Link to USP Atlanta Page Link to CCM Atlanta Page Link to FCI Marianna Page Link to FPC Pensacola Page Link to FCI Bennettsville Page Link to FCI Williamsburg Page Link to FCI Edgefield Page Link to FCI Miami Page Link to CCM Miami Page Link to FDC Miami Page Link to CCM Orlando Page Link to MDC Guaynabo Page Link to FCC Coleman Page Link to FCI Tallahassee Page Link to STA Glynco Page Link to FCI Jesup Page Link to FCI Estill Page Link to CI McRae Page Link to FCI Talladega Page Link to CCM Montgomery Page Link to FPC Montgomery Page Link to FCC Yazoo City Page Link to CI Adams County Page Link to CI D. Ray James Page

 

 



TMZ – JWoww Side Boob!

 

TMZ – JWoww Side Boob!

Jersey Shore star Jwoww is sporting a SUPER sexy dress and some HOT side boob… until you notice the surgical scar.

PI – IARPA Office of Incisive Analysis Broad Agency Announcement

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/IARPA-IncisiveAnalysis.png

 

Broad Agency Announcement Incisive Analysis

  • IARPA-BAA-13-02
  • 20 pages
  • January 14, 2013

Download

IARPA invests in high-risk, high-payoff research that has the potential to provide our nation with an overwhelming intelligence advantage over future adversaries. This research is parsed among three Offices: Smart Collection, Incisive Analysis, and Safe & Secure Operations. This BAA solicits abstracts/proposals for the Office of Incisive Analysis (IA).

IA focuses on maximizing insights from the massive, disparate, unreliable and dynamic data that are – or could be – available to analysts, in a timely manner. We are pursuing new sources of information from existing and novel data, and developing innovative techniques that can be utilized in the processes of analysis. IA programs are in diverse technical disciplines, but have common features: (a) Create technologies that can earn the trust of the analyst user by providing the reasoning for results; (b) Address data uncertainty and provenance explicitly.

The following topics (in no particular order) are of interest to IA:

  • Methods for developing understanding of how knowledge and ideas are transmitted and change within groups, organizations, and cultures;
  • Methods for analysis of social, cultural, and linguistic data;
  • Multidisciplinary approaches to assessing linguistic data sets;
  • Methods for measuring and improving human judgment and human reasoning;
  • Methods for extraction and representation of the information in the non-textual contents of documents, including figures, diagrams, and tables;
  • Methods for understanding and managing massive, dynamic data;
  • Analysis of massive, unreliable, and diverse data;
  • Methods for assessments of relevancy and reliability of new data;
  • Methods for understanding the process of analysis and potential impacts of technology;
  • Multidisciplinary approaches to processing noisy audio and speech;
  • Development of novel top-down models of visual perception and visual cognition;
  • Methods for analysis of significant societal events;
  • Methods for estimation and communication of uncertainty and risk;
  • Novel approaches for mobile augmented reality applied to analysis and collection;
  • Methods for topological data analysis and inferences of high-dimensional structures from low-dimensional representations;
  • Methods for the study of algorithms stated in terms of geometry (computational geometry);
  • Methods for geolocation of text and social media;
  • Novel approaches to biosurveillance;
  • Methods to make machine learning more useful and automatic;
  • Methods to construct and evaluate speech recognition systems in languages without a formalized orthography; and,
  • Methods and approaches to quantifiable representations of uncertainty simultaneously accounting for multiple types of uncertainty.

This announcement seeks research ideas for topics that are not addressed by emerging or ongoing IARPA programs or other published IARPA solicitations. It is primarily, but not solely, intended for early stage research that may lead to larger, focused programs through a separate BAA in the future, so periods of performance will generally not exceed 12 months.

Offerors should demonstrate that their proposed effort has the potential to make revolutionary, rather than incremental, improvements to intelligence capabilities. Research that primarily results in evolutionary improvement to the existing state of practice is specifically excluded.

Monty Python – Lumberjack Song – Video

 

Monty Python – Lumberjack Song – Video

PI SECRET – U.S. Army Traffic Control Point Operations Smart Card February 13, 2013 in U.S. Army

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/CALL-TrafficControlPoints.png

 

Center for Army Lessons Learned

  • 2 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • September 2010
  • 2.93 MB

Download

You may engage the following individuals based on their conduct:

• Persons who are committing hostile acts against Coalition forces (CF).
• Persons who are exhibiting hostile intenttowards CF.

These persons may be engaged subject to the following instructions:

Positive identification (PID) is required prior to engagement. PID is a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a legitimate military target. If no PID, contact your next higher commander for decision.

Use graduated measures of force. When time and circumstance permit, use the following degrees of graduated force when responding to hostile act/intent:

1. Shout verbal warnings to halt.
2. Show your weapon and demonstrate intentto use it.
3. Block access or detain.
4. Warning shots may be permitted in your operating environment (OE)/area of responsibility (AOR).
5. Fire proportional lethal force.

Do not target or strike anyone who has surrendered or is out of combat due to sickness or wounds.

Do not target or strike hospitals, mosques, churches, shrines, schools, museums, national monuments, any other historical and cultural sites, or civilian populated areas or buildings UNLESS the enemy is using them for military purposes or if necessary for your self-defense.

Do not target or strike Local infrastructure (public works, commercial communication facilities , dams), lines of communication (roads, highways, tunnels, bridges, railways), or economic objects (commercial storage facilities, pipelines) UNLESS necessary for self-defense or if ordered by your commander. If you must fire on these objects, fire to disable and disrupt rather than destroy.

ALWAYS minimize incidental injury, loss of life, and collateral damage.

The use of force, including deadly force, is authorized to
protect the following:

• Yourself, your unit, and other friendly forces.
• Detainees
• Civilians from crimes that are likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, such as murder or rape.
• Designated personnel or property, when such actions are necessary to restore order and security.

In general, WARNING SHOTS are authorized ONLY when the use of deadly force would be authorized in that particular situation.

Treat all civilians and their property with respect and dignity. Do not seize civilian property, including vehicles, unless the property presents a security threat. When possible, give a receipt to the property’s owner.

You may DETAIN civilians based upon a reasonable belief that the person:

• Must be detained for purposes of self-defense.
• Is interfering with CF mission accomplishment.
• Is on a list of persons wanted for questioning, arrest, or detention.
• Is or was engaged in criminal activity.
• Must be detained for imperative reasons of security.

Anyone you detain MUST be protected. Force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized to protect detainees in your custody. You MUST fill out a detainee apprehension card for EVERY person you detain.

Looting and the taking of war trophies are prohibited.

All personnel MUST report any suspected violations of the Law of War committed by any US, friendly, or enemy force. Notify your chain of command, Judge Advocate, IG, Chaplain, or appropriate service-related investigative branch.

TMZ – The Lindsay Lohan Porn Casting Call

 

The Lindsay Lohan Porn Casting Call

 

Vivid Entertainment is the porn company that literally caught FIRE this weekend — but they’re also casting for a parody porn of Lindsay Lohan’s new film because Lohan herself won’t do the gig. Just give her a few weeks.

“Mandiant” – Announcing Mandiant Intelligence Center

Organizations routinely struggle to understand which cyber threats pose the greatest
risk to them. New threats appear in the news daily and create fire drills for
security teams who must quickly determine what they can and should do to protect
themselves. 

Our newest offering, the Mandiant Intelligence Center
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=239&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>,
draws on our own proprietary intelligence to equip security teams like yours with
the context required to effectively respond to and defend against the most advanced
threat actors. 

With the Mandiant Intelligence Center your security teams can:
*Use tools embedded in the Center to query the Mandiant intelligence database and
receive detailed information on which group is using particular malware, IPs and
domains
*Access detailed profiles of advanced threat groups including their latest tactics,
techniques and procedures
*Obtain detailed context on high profile threat events with analysis on the
potential impact to your organization
*Monitor emerging threat trends

Read more
<http://www.mandiant.com/assets/Mandiant_Intelligence_Center.pdf?elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f&elqCampaignId=283>
about Mandiant for Security Operations or request a call
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=235&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>
to receive a demonstration.

""            

Mandiant In The Headlines

January 30, 2013
Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=236&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>
By Nicole Perlroth – The New York Times 
February 7, 2013
Mandiant, the Go- To Security Firm for Cyber-Espionage Attacks
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=238&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>
By Brad Stone & Michael Riley – Bloomberg Businessweek 
February 18, 2013
Chinese Army Unit Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S.
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=237&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>
By David E. Sanger, David Barboza & Nicole Perlroth – The New York Times 

Learn More About Mandiant®

Mandiant Website
<http://www.mandiant.com/?elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f&elqCampaignId=283>
www.mandiant.com
M-Unition™
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=9&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>
Mandiant's official blog
Mandiant on Twitter
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=10&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>
twitter.com/mandiant
Be Part of Something More
<http://www.mandiant.com/company/careers/?elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f&elqCampaignId=283>
Join the Mandiant Team

SECRECY NEWS – SENATORS ASK SURVEILLANCE COURT TO SUMMARIZE OPINIONS

Several members of the Senate Intelligence Committee wrote to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court this month to ask the Court to prepare
summaries of classified opinions that represent significant interpretations
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in order to facilitate their
declassification and public release.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that plaintiffs challenging the
constitutionality of the FISA Amendments Act lacked the requisite legal
standing to pursue their case, effectively foreclosing public oversight of
intelligence surveillance through the courts.

The Senate letter, the text of which was not released, stems from an
amendment to the FISA Amendments Act that was introduced by Sen. Jeff
Merkley in December to promote declassification of significant Surveillance
Court opinons.  The Merkley amendment was not adopted -- none of the
legislative proposals to increase accountability were approved -- but
Senate Intelligence Committee chair Sen. Dianne Feinstein promised to work
with Sen. Merkley to advance the declassification of FISC opinions.

"An open and democratic society such as ours should not be governed by
secret laws, and judicial interpretations are as much a part of the law as
the words that make up our statute," said Sen. Merkley at that time. "The
opinions of the FISA Court are controlling. They do matter. When a law is
kept secret, public debate, legislative intent, and finding the right
balance between security and privacy all suffer."

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/faa-amend.html

"I wish to address, if I could, what Senator Merkley said in his
comments," said Sen. Feinstein during the December 27 floor debate. "I
listened carefully. What he is saying is opinions of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court should, in some way, shape or form, be made
public, just as opinions of the Supreme Court or any court are made
available to the public. To a great extent, I find myself in agreement with
that. They should be."

"I have offered to Senator Merkley to write a letter requesting
declassification of more FISA Court opinions," Sen. Feinstein continued.
"[...] When possible, the opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court should be made available to the public in declassified form. It can
be done, and I think it should be done more often. If the opinion cannot be
made public, hopefully a summary of the opinion can. And I have agreed with
Senator Merkley to work together on this issue."

That letter, signed by Senators Feinstein, Merkley, Ron Wyden and Mark
Udall, has now been sent to the FISA Court, where it awaits an official
response.

Though the letter itself is a modest step, the willingness of
congressional overseers to assert themselves on behalf of public
accountability takes on new importance in light of yesterday's Supreme
Court decision (by a 5-4 vote) to block a constitutional challenge to the
FISA Amendments Act. That decision all but closes the door to public
oversight of the law's implementation through the courts.

    http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-1025_ihdj.pdf

The Court majority insisted that judicial review of government
surveillance activities is alive and well, contrary to the plaintiffs'
assertion.  It is "both legally and factually incorrect" to assert that
surveillance is insulated from judicial review, stated the majority opinion
written by Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., who cited the role of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court in authorizing surveillance activities.

But ACLU attorney Jameel Jaffer said that view "seems to be based on the
theory that the FISA Court may one day, in some as-yet unimagined case,
subject the law to constitutional review, but that day may never come. And
if it does, the proceeding will take place in a court that meets in secret,
doesn't ordinarily publish its decisions, and has limited authority to
consider constitutional arguments. This theory is foreign to the
Constitution and inconsistent with fundamental democratic values," Jaffer
said.

On Monday, Sen. Feinstein paid tribute to L. Christine Healey, a
professional staff member of the Senate Intelligence Committee who is
retiring this week.  For three decades, Ms. Healey has played an
influential role in intelligence oversight as a staffer on the House and
Senate intelligence committees, as well as on the 9/11 Commission.  "She
has been as responsible as anyone for the passage of a string of four
annual intelligence authorization bills, including the fiscal year 2013 act
that was completed in December," said Sen. Feinstein.

Ms. Healey was also credited by Sen. Feinstein as "the principal drafter
of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008."

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2013_cr/healey.html

A PROFILE OF THE 113TH CONGRESS, AND MORE FROM CRS

"The average age of Members of the 113th Congress is among the highest of
any Congress in recent U.S. history," according to a new report from the
Congressional Research Service.  The average age of Members of the House of
Representatives is 57 years, while the average age of Senators is 62 years.

"The overwhelming majority of Members of Congress have a college
education," the CRS found. "The dominant professions of Members are public
service/politics, business, and law. Most Members identify as Christians,
and Protestants collectively constitute the majority religious affiliation.
Roman Catholics account for the largest single religious denomination, and
numerous other affiliations are represented."

One hundred women (a record number) serve in the 113th Congress. There are
43 African American Members, and 38 Hispanic or Latino Members (a record
number) serving. Thirteen Members are Asian American or Pacific Islanders.
There is one Native American serving in the House.

See Membership of the 113th Congress: A Profile, February 20, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42964.pdf

Other noteworthy new and updated products of the Congressional Research
Service that Congress has not made publicly available include the
following.

Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations, February 19, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41989.pdf

Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations, February 22, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40439.pdf

Bond v. United States: Validity and Construction of the Federal Chemical
Weapons Statute, February 21, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R42968.pdf

Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements,
February 20, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33865.pdf

Border Security: Understanding Threats at U.S. Borders, February 21, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42969.pdf

NAFTA at 20: Overview and Trade Effects, February 21, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42965.pdf

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for
Congress, February 22, 2013, with new material on the anticipated impact of
sequestration:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32665.pdf

Azerbaijan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, February 22, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-522.pdf

U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: Significance, Prospects, and Policy
Options, February 20, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32649.pdf

Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, February 26, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Monty Python! Police – Burglary Sketch

Monty Python! Police burglary Sketch

 

Whistleblowing on Whistleblowing Oversight – revealed by Cryptome

Whistleblowing on Whistleblowing Oversight

 


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 38 (Tuesday, February 26, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13101-13102]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-04467]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD

[Notice-PCLOB-2013-01; Docket No. 2013-0004; Sequence No. 1]

No FEAR Act Notice; Notice of Rights and Protections Available 
Under Federal Antidiscrimination and Whistleblower Protection Laws

AGENCY: Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with the requirements of the Notification and 
Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002, the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is providing notice to its 
employees, former employees, and applicants for Board employment about 
the rights and remedies available to them under the federal anti-
discrimination, whistleblower protection, and retaliation laws.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Claire McKenna, Legal Counsel, at 202-
366-0365 or claire.mckenna.pclob@dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On May 15, 2002, Congress enacted the 
Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation 
Act of 2002, Public Law 107-174, also known as the No FEAR Act. The Act 
requires that federal agencies provide notice to their employees, 
former employees, and applicants for employment to inform them of the 
rights and protections available under federal anti-discrimination, 
whistleblower protection, and retaliation laws.

Anti-Discrimination Laws

    A federal agency cannot discriminate against an employee or 
applicant with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 
age, disability, marital status, or political affiliation. 
Discrimination on these bases is prohibited by one or more of the 
following statutes: 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. 206(d), 29 U.S.C. 
631, 29 U.S.C. 633a, 2 U.S.C. 791, and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16.
    If you believe that you have been the victim of unlawful 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national 
origin, or disability, you must contact an Equal Employment Opportunity 
(EEO) counselor within 45 calendar days of the alleged discriminatory 
action, or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 calendar days of 
the effective date of the action, before you can file a formal 
complaint of discrimination with your agency. This timeline may be 
extended by the Board under the circumstances described in 29 CFR 
1614.105(a)(2). If you believe that you have been the victim of 
unlawful discrimination on the basis of age, you must either contact an 
EEO counselor as noted above or give notice of intent to sue to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 calendar days 
of the alleged discriminatory action. If you are alleging 
discrimination based on marital status or political affiliation, you 
may file a written complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel 
(OSC) (see contact information below). In the alternative (or in some 
cases, in addition), you may pursue a discrimination complaint by 
filing a grievance through the Board's administrative or negotiated 
grievance procedures, if such procedures apply and are available.

Whistleblower Protection Laws

    A federal employee with authority to take, direct others to take, 
recommend, or approve any personnel action must not use that authority 
to take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a 
personnel action against an employee or applicant because of disclosure 
of information by that individual that is reasonably believed to 
evidence violations of law, rule, or regulation; gross mismanagement; 
gross waste of funds; an abuse of authority; or a substantial and 
specific danger to public health or safety, unless disclosures of such 
information is specifically prohibited by law and such information is 
specifically required by executive order to be kept secret in the 
interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.
    Retaliation against an employee or applicant for making a protected 
disclosure is prohibited by 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8). If you believe that 
you have been the victim of whistleblower retaliation, you may file a 
written complaint (Form OSC-11) with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel 
at 1730 M Street NW., Suite 218, Washington, DC 20036-4505 or online 
through the OSC Web site, http://www.osc.gov.

Retaliation for Engaging in Protected Activity

    A federal agency cannot retaliate against an employee or applicant 
because that individual exercises his or her rights under any of the 
federal antidiscrimination or whistleblower protection laws listed 
above. If you believe that you are the victim or retaliation for 
engaging in protected activity, you must follow, as appropriate, the 
procedures described in the Antidiscrimination Laws and Whistleblower 
Protection Laws section or, if applicable, the administrative or 
negotiated grievance procedures in order to pursue any legal remedy.

Disciplinary Actions

    Under existing laws, each agency retains the right, where 
appropriate, to discipline a federal employee for conduct that is 
inconsistent with the Federal Antidiscrimination and Whistleblower 
Protection Laws up to and including removal. If OSC has initiated an 
investigation under 5 U.S.C. 1214, however, agencies must seek approval 
from OSC to discipline employees for, among other activities, engaging 
in prohibited retaliation, 5 U.S.C. 1214(f). Nothing in the No FEAR Act 
alters existing laws or permits an agency to take unfounded 
disciplinary action against a federal employee or to

[[Page 13102]]

violate the procedural rights of a federal employee who has been 
accused of discrimination.

Additional Information

    For further information regarding the No FEAR Act regulations, 
refer to 5 CFR 724, as well as the appropriate Board offices. 
Additional information regarding federal antidiscrimination laws can be 
found at the EEOC Web site, http://www.eeoc.gov, and the OSC Web site, 
http://www.osc.gov.

Existing Rights Unchanged

    Pursuant to section 205 of the No FEAR Act, neither the No FEAR Act 
nor this notice creates, expands, or reduces any rights otherwise 
available to any employee, former employee, or applicant under the laws 
of the United States, including the provisions of law specified in 5 
U.S.C. 2302(d).

    Dated: February 21, 2013.
Claire McKenna,
Legal Counsel, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
[FR Doc. 2013-04467 Filed 2-25-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P

TMZ – Elisabetta Canalis — Screw George … I ROOTED For Quentin Tarantino

 

Bitter party of one? Elisabetta Canalis did NOT want her ex-lover George Clooney to take home Oscar gold last night … telling out photog she was rooting for another man … Quentin Tarantino.

“Mandiant” – Announcing Mandiant for Security Operations

Citation: "Organizations spend millions of dollars investing in top-notch security teams and in
building secure networks to keep would-be attackers out of their IT environments.
Despite these investments, determined attackers routinely compromise well-secured
organizations and steal their intellectual property and financial assets.

Our newest product, Mandiant for Security Operations
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=234&elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7>,
equips security teams to confidently detect, analyze and resolve incidents in a
fraction of the time it takes using conventional approaches. This appliance-based
solution connects the dots between what’s happening on their network and what’s
happening on their endpoints. 

With Mandiant for Security Operations security teams can:
*Search for advanced attackers and the APT
*Integrate endpoint security with your network security
*Accelerate triage of suspected incidents
*Find out what happened, without forensics
*Contain endpoints

Read more
<http://www.mandiant.com/assets/Mandiant_for_Security_Operations.pdf?elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7&elqCampaignId=282>
about Mandiant for Security Operations or request a call
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=235&elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7>
to receive a demonstration.

""            

Mandiant In The Headlines

January 30, 2013
Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=236&elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7>
By Nicole Perlroth – The New York Times 
February 7, 2013
Mandiant, the Go- To Security Firm for Cyber-Espionage Attacks
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By Brad Stone & Michael Riley – Bloomberg Businessweek 
February 18, 2013
Chinese Army Unit Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S.
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By David E. Sanger, David Barboza & Nicole Perlroth – The New York Times 

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Unveiled by Public Intelligence – NATO Legal Deskbook

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/NATO-LegalDeskbook.png

 

 

NATO Legal Deskbook Second Edition

  • 348 pages
  • 2010

Download

NATO leads efforts to bring stability in its ongoing missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Legal Advisers serve as key members of a Commander‘s staff in the complex legal and political environment that NATO operates. The challenges NATO Commanders and legal adviser face to fulfil mandates, accomplish missions, and support the rule of law in embryonic and fragile democratic governments requires discussion, understanding and the documentation of practical solutions.

The NATO Legal Deskbook is published by the Office of the Legal Adviser, Allied Command Transformation Staff Element Europe (Mons) with the active support and help of the Office of the Legal Adviser, Headquarters Allied Commander Transformation (HQ SACT, Norfolk, USA) and the Office of the Legal Adviser, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE, Mons, Belgium), as well as many legal advisers in NATO and in the Member States or in other official or academic positions outside NATO.

Why a NATO Legal Deskbook?

Two re-occurring themes surface in after-action reports from exercises and operations. The first is that NATO Commanders and staffs naturally and increasingly turn to the Legal Advisers to help plan, execute, coordinate, evaluate, and support the assigned mission. The second is that no single doctrinal resource exists in NATO to assist legal practitioners in the fulfilling of this task. Although several Alliance members have produced such guides, before the NATO Legal Deskbook none existed for Legal Advisers and legal personnel assigned to NATO commands.

Whether doctrinally ready or not, the Alliance calls upon NATO Legal Advisers and staffs to advise and, often, help direct the execution of the legal component of a mission or mandate. NATO owes these attorneys, paralegals, and legal personnel, who work under often austere and demanding conditions, practical guidance in the form of a comprehensive resource that provides an overview and insight on the legal regime that forms NATO practice. Fulfilling this need is the genesis, purpose and rational for this practitioner‘s guide.

What this Deskbook is not:

This Deskbook is not NATO policy or military doctrine for legal support to operations.

The Deskbook intends to reflect as closely as possible the policies and practice of NATO in legal matters, however, the Deskbook is not a formally approved NATO document and therefore shall not be deemed as reflection of the official opinion or position of NATO.

The practitioner‘s guide is not intended to offer guidance or advice to other military professionals involved in operations. It was written by Legal Advisers for Legal Advisers and legal staff. Its scope and purpose is limited to providing the military legal subject matter experts assistance in the accomplishment of the mission. While others may find the guide helpful, they should understand it is not a tutorial. Fundamental legal principles, standard practices of interpretation, and basic legal practices are assumed as matters already known by its intended audience: the Legal Adviser, legal assistant, or paralegal.

This practitioner‘s guide does not offer an all-inclusive formula on how to advise a NATO commander on any particular aspect of the law, nor is it intended to supplant national guidance. Instead, the guide pre-supposes that Legal Advisers will continue to find themselves providing legal support to operations and missions in a variety of different circumstances, environments, and locations. The guide and its contents must therefore be flexible and geographically universal in application.

Monty Python and the knights of the Holy Grail[1975] – Full MOVIE

 

Monty Python and the knights of the Holy Grail[1975] – Full MOVIE

 

Cryptome – National Security in the Digital Age: Review

National Security in the Digital Age: Review

 


http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/311052-1

Michael Hayden, Ex-CIA and Ex-NSA head, discusses “National Security in the Digital Age” on C-SPAN. Hayden avidly defends use of murderous drones with “we are at war,” and repeats the phrase several times in formulaicly grave tones and glares  — the most beloved mantra of militarists. Then declines to affirm or deny CIA has a drone program, “remember, the CIA has never admitted using drones.”

In one of the few admissions of CIA error, Hayden says the agency has become dominated by OSS-like military operations at the expense of its primary intelligence mission, that the military ops were appropriate to 9/11 but now believes CIA should return to its more important role.

He claims that in a state of war things are done that should not be prolonged, that wartime powers given to the natsec agencies should be balanced with other national requirements. In response to an audience question about why only the US has a drone warfare program, he answers that the American people and US allies seem to not understand the US is currently at war.

Hayden laughs and jokes a lot, a peculiar behavior for an avowedly grave topic. His bizarre twisting, jerking, spastic body language indicates roiling contempt of the naive questions being asked and evaded. Hayden exhibits characteristic, Petraeus-like, attributes of a trypical military careerist kiss-upper, kick-downer, a vain double-speaker masking intellectual incapability, condescending of civilians without access to secrets, a grandstanding surrogate hero relishing being at the top, mingling with and succoring global prominents (who will hire ex-natsecs to advise and promote warfare) — job requirements to military pinnacle.

This behavior may derive from Hayden being among the horde of natsec-exes managed by speaker bureaus and shows the silly mannerisms required to be “appealing” overlaid long-practiced WMD-terrifying. Hayden noted WMD now means Weapons of Mass Disruption to flog and finance terrifying cyberwar threats — both by and against the US. He emphasizes that the US has masterful technology to address cyber threats but is constrained, to his regret, by political and social clamor about using that technology against the homeland and foreign innocents.

Noteably, when Hayden loses a train of thought or fails to dreg a glib answer, he leans toward interlocutor Frank Sesno and blurts as if pre-metronomed by advanced officer school and sales, “we are at war.”

Observe Hayden’s use of three fingers, four fingers, ticking off points as if to a crowd of subordinates, pointed looks at friendlies in the audience, nodding “you know what I mean.” Among us secrets-knowers, he fingers coded signals, “let’s play the game of taunting with tidbits what others cannot be allowed to know we are stealing from them,” as he is quoted in the title of Gibney’s documentary “We Steal Secrets.”

This signature behavior of officials who have been carefully briefed to say little in public while implying much in secret is endemic in the world’s capitals of testimony and public speaking. Banal, numbing, open information to tease about the classified and confidential only to be delivered in “closed sessions” to those willing to keep the secrets. “Closed sessions” refutation of democracy for its seemingly always at risk, at war, top security.

Excessive, vulgar joshing between Hayden and Sesno, alternating with mock gravitas of the drone-slaughter rationale “we are at war” red-phone cliche, exemplifying mutual caressing and pandering of spies and journalists in sessions closed to the public but branded and hyped with “anonymous sources” and “leaks.”

Hayden likes the CIA-propaganda film Zero Dark Thirty, with slight demur about artistic license. Crows “I know the real CIA heroine and bin Laden hunters,” not naming Frances Bikowsky, Stephen Nicgorski and band of assassins. With clips of and comments on Homeland Hayden and Sesno parade consummate failure of public responsibility — inbred NatSec idiocy — of knowing and over-protecting insiders too well, advanced by lurid entertainment and vapid interviews complicity

A word about Hayden’s physical flabbiness, a characteristic of military members of spy agencies — except for Petraeus. Not needing physical prowess for combat, one might wonder if the physical indolence is deliberate, vaunting mind over muscle, as a mark of superiority now newly institutionalized with the Distinguished Warfare Medal for drone pilots and hackers. Certainly that reward for arrogance over drone targets and clueless Internet users vaunts flab as a war winner, sure to flatter fat-headed gastronomes of all ideologies.

The C-SPAN show is a repugnant, vacuous public relations DC faux natsec simpering horror show, watch it, upload to YouTube, crowd source — Hayden touts crowd sourcing for espionage exploitation.

 


 

TMZ – Paulina Gretzky — Knockers, Knockers… Who’s There?

 

Paulina Gretzky — Knockers, Knockers… Who’s There?

Check out this photo of a sexy, hot celeb stepping out of a car so that all you can see is her cleavage. Can you guess who it is? You get one hint: It’s not Bette Midler.

Proven – China ‘aiding hacker attacks on west’

The building in Shanghai that hosts the Chinese military's Unit 61398

The building in Shanghai that hosts the Chinese military’s Unit 61398, which has been accused of involvement in hacking attacks. Photograph: Peter Parks/AFP/Getty Images

The Chinese army has launched hundreds of cyber-attacks against western companies and defence groups from a nondescript office building in Shanghai, according to a report that warns hackers have stolen vast amounts of data from their targets.

Mandiant, a security company that has been investigating attacks against western organisations for over six years, said in a report (PDF)the attacks came from a 12-storey building belonging to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) general staff’s department, also known as Unit 61398.

Mandiant said it believed a hacking network named the Comment Crew or the Shanghai Group was based inside the compound, in a rundown residential neighbourhood. Although the report fails directly to place the hackers inside the building, it argues there is no other logical reason why so many attacks have emanated from such a small area.

“It is time to acknowledge the threat is originating in China, and we wanted to do our part to arm and prepare security professionals to combat that threat effectively,” said the report.

The discovery will further raise the temperature in the intergovernmental cyberwars, which have heated up in recent years as the US, IsraelIran, China and UK have all used computer subterfuge to undermine rival state or terrorist organisations. One security expert warned that companies in high-profile fields should assume they will be targeted and hacked, and build systems that will fence sensitive data off from each other.

Rik Ferguson, global vice-president of security research at the data security company Trend Micro, said: “We need to concentrate less on building castles and assuming they will be impervious, and more on building better dungeons so that when people get in they can’t get anything else.” .

Mandiant says Unit 61398 could house “hundreds or thousands” of people and has military-grade, high-speed fibre-optic connections from China Mobile, the world’s largest telecoms carrier. “The nature of Unit 61398’s work is considered by China to be a state secret; however, we believe it engages in harmful computer network operations,” Mandiant said in the report.

It said Unit 61398 had been operating since 2006, and was one of the most prolific hacking groups “in terms of quantity of information stolen”. This it estimated at hundreds of terabytes, enough for thousands of 3D designs and blueprints.

“APT1”, as Mandiant calls it, is only one of 20 groups Mandiant says has carried out scores of hacking attacks against businesses and organisations in the west, including companies that work in strategic industries such as US power and water infrastructure.

A typical attack would leave software that hid its presence from the user or administrator and silently siphon data to a remote server elsewhere on the internet at the instruction of a separate “command and control” (C&C) computer. By analysing the hidden software, the pattern of connections and links from the C&C server, the team at Mandiant said they were confident of the source of the threat.

A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman denied the government was behind the attacks, saying: “Hacking attacks are transnational and anonymous. Determining their origins is extremely difficult. We don’t know how the evidence in this so-called report can be tenable. Arbitrary criticism based on rudimentary data is irresponsible, unprofessional and not helpful in resolving the issue.”

But Ferguson told the Guardian: “This is a pretty compelling report, with evidence collected over a prolonged period of time. It points very strongly to marked Chinese involvement.”

Mandiant, based in Alexandria, Virginia, in the US, investigated the New York Times break-in, for which it suggested Chinese sources could be to blame.

President Barack Obama is already beefing up US security, introducing an executive order in his State of the Union speech this month that would let the government work with the private sector to fend off hacking. But it will take until February 2014 to have a final version ready for implementation.

The revelation comes days after the New York TimesWall Street Journaland Washington Post, as well as the social networks Facebook and Twitter, said they had been subjected to “highly sophisticated” hacks that in some cases focused on correspondents writing about China and its government.

Separate investigations by the computer company Dell, working with the news company Bloombergtracked down another alleged hacker, Zhang Changhe, who has written a number of papers on PC hacking. Zhang works at the PLA’s “information engineering university” in Zhengzhou, Henan province, north-central China.

The allegations will raise the temperature in the continuing cyberwar between the west and China, which has been steadily rising since the Pentagon and MI6 uncovered Titan Rain, a scheme that tried to siphon data from the Pentagon and the House of Commons in 2006, and which one security expert said at the time dated back at least to 2004.

Ferguson suggested that western governments were also carrying out attacks against Chinese targets – “but that’s not a culture which would open up about being hit. I would be surprised and disappointed if most western nations don’t have a cybersecurity force.”

The Stuxnet virus, which hit Iran’s uranium reprocessing plant in 2010, is believed to have been written jointly by the US and Israel, while Iranian sources are believed to have hacked companies that issue email security certificates so that they can crack secure connections used by Iranian dissidents on Google’s Gmail system. China is also reckoned to have been behind the hacking of Google’s email servers in that country in late 2009, in an operation that files from WikiLeaks suggested was inspired by the Beijing government.

A timeline of government-sponsored hacking attacks

 

2004 suspected: Chinese group in Shanghai begins probing US companies and military targets.

 

2005: Titan Rain” pulls data from the Pentagon’s systems, and a specialist says of a December 2005 attack on the House of Commons computer system that “The degree of sophistication was extremely high. They were very clever programmers.”

 

2007: Estonia’s government and other internet services are knocked offline by a coordinated attack from more than a million computers around the world – reckoned to have been run from a group acting at the urging of the Russian government. Nobody is ever arrested over the attack.

 

2008: Russia’s government is suspected of carrying out a cyberattack to knock out government and other websites inside Georgia, with which it is fighting a border skirmish over the territory of Ossetia.

 

December 2009: Google’s email systems in China are hacked by a group which tries to identify and take over the accounts of Chinese dissidents. Google withdraws its search engine from the Chinese mainland in protest at the actions. Wikileaks cables suggest that the Chinese government was aware of the hacking.

 

2010: The Flame virus begins silently infecting computers in Iran. Itincorporates cutting-edge cryptography breakthroughs which would require world-class experts to write. That is then used to infect Windows PCs via the Windows Update mechanism which normally creates a cryptographically secure link to Microsoft. Instead, Flame puts software that watches every keystroke and frame on the PC. Analysts say that only a “wealthy” nation state could have written the virus, which breaks new ground in encryption.

 

The Stuxnet worm is discovered to have been affecting systems inside Iran’s uranium reprocessing establishment, passing from Windows PCs to the industrial systems which control centrifuges that separate out heavier uranium. The worm makes the centrifuges spin out of control, while suggesting on their control panel that they are operating normally – and so break them. Iran denies that the attack has affected its project. The US and Israel are later fingered as being behind the code.

 

September 2011: a new virus that silently captures data from transactions in Middle Eastern online banking is unleashed. The principal targets use Lebanese banks. It is not identified until August 2012, when Russian security company Kaspersky discovers the name “Gauss” embedded inside it. The company says the malware it is “nation state-sponsored” – probably by a western state seeking to trace transactions by specific targets.

 

2012: About 30,000 Windows PCs at Saudi Aramco, the world’s most valuable company, are rendered unusable after a virus called “Shamoon” wipes and corrupts data and the part of the hard drive needed to “bootstrap” the machine when it is turned on. In the US, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta described Shamoon as “one of the most destructive viruses ever” and suggested it could be used to launch an attack as destructive as the 9/11 attacks of 2001.

SECRECY NEWS – SEQUESTER MAY SLOW PENTAGON RESPONSE TO WIKILEAKS

The across-the-board budget cuts known as sequestration that are expected
to take effect on March 1 could impede the government's ability to respond
to WikiLeaks and to rectify the flaws in information security that it
exposed, a Pentagon official told Congress recently.

Zachary J. Lemnios, the assistant secretary of defense for research and
engineering, was asked by Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio) to describe the "most
significant" impacts on cybersecurity that could follow from the
anticipated cuts to the Pentagon's budget.

Mr. Lemnios replied that "cuts under sequestration could hurt efforts to
fight cyber threats, including [...] improving the security of our
classified Federal networks and addressing WikiLeaks."

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/fydp-42.pdf

The sequester could also interfere with the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative that began under President Bush, he said, and
could hold up plans to "initiat[e] continuous monitoring of unclassified
networks at all Federal agencies."

Mr. Lemnios' response to Sen. Portman's question for the record (which had
not specifically mentioned WikiLeaks) followed a March 2012 Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing on Emerging Threats and Capabilities that was
published in December 2012 (at page 42).

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/fydp.pdf

Generally speaking, computer security within the military is a daunting
problem, Mr. Lemnios told the Committee, particularly since "The Department
operates over 15,000 networks and 7 million computing devices across
hundreds of installations in dozens of countries around the globe."

The challenge of cybersecurity cannot be fully described in public, said
Dr. Kaigham J. Gabriel of DARPA. "The complete picture requires a
discussion at the special access level."  But he told the Committee last
year that several basic points can be openly acknowledged:

"Attackers can penetrate our networks:  In just 3 days and at a cost of
only $18,000, the Host-Based Security System" -- the Pentagon's baseline
computer security system -- "was penetrated."

"User authentication is a weak link: 53,000 passwords were provided to
teams at Defcon; within 48 hours, 38,000 were cracked."

"The Defense supply chain is at risk: More than two-thirds of electronics
in U.S. advanced fighter aircraft are fabricated in off-shore foundries."

"Physical systems are at risk: A smartphone hundreds of miles away took
control of a car's drive system through an exploit in a wireless
interface."

"The United States continues to spend on cybersecurity with limited
increase in security: The Federal Government expended billions of dollars
in 2010, but the number of malicious cyber intrusions has increased."

Though it was presumably not intentional, the WikiLeaks project galvanized
government information security programs and accelerated efforts to devise
"insider threat" detection mechanisms, along with intensified surveillance
of classified and unclassified government computer networks.

"New classes of anomaly detection methods have been developed and are
based on aggregating events across time and multiple sources to identify
network and host-based behavior that might be malicious," James S. Peery of
Sandia National Laboratories told the Senate Armed Services Committee at
last year's hearing.  "These approaches and behavioral-based methods have
been successful in finding previously undiscovered malware."

"One drawback of this technology, though, is that it has a very high false
positive rate," he said.

OPEN ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ADVANCES

Government-sponsored scientific research published in expensive journals
should become more readily accessible to the public under an initiative
announced by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy on
Friday.

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/obama/sciaccess.pdf

Federal agencies that fund at least $100 million per year in scientific
research were directed by White House science advisor John Holdren to
develop plans to make the results of such research publicly available free
of charge within a year of original publication.

"The logic behind enhanced public access is plain," Dr. Holdren wrote in
response to a public petition on the White House web site. "We know that
scientific research supported by the Federal Government spurs scientific
breakthroughs and economic advances when research results are made
available to innovators. Policies that mobilize these intellectual assets
for re-use through broader access can accelerate scientific breakthroughs,
increase innovation, and promote economic growth."

But the benefits of open access are not the sole consideration in the new
policy.  "The Administration also recognizes that publishers provide
valuable services, including the coordination of peer review, that are
essential for ensuring the high quality and integrity of many scholarly
publications. It is critical that these services continue to be made
available."

"We wanted to strike the balance between the extraordinary public benefit
of increasing public access to the results of federally-funded scientific
research and the need to ensure that the valuable contributions that the
scientific publishing industry provides are not lost," Dr. Holdren wrote.

The resulting policy mandating free public access within 12 months of
publication is the result of an attempt to balance those competing
interests, and it too is subject to future modification "based on
experience and evidence."

COMMENTS SOUGHT ON OVERSIGHT OF "DUAL USE" BIO RESEARCH

Members of the public are invited to comment on the feasibility and
desirability of various forms of institutional oversight at
federally-funded institutions that perform research involving certain
pathogens or toxins.

"Certain types of research that are conducted for legitimate purposes may
also be utilized for harmful purposes. Such research is called 'dual use
research'," said a Notice filed in the Federal Register Friday by the
Office of Science and Technology Policy.

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2013/02/ostp-dual.html

"Dual use research of concern (DURC) is a smaller subset of dual use
research defined as life sciences research that, based on current
understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge,
information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to
pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public
health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the
environment, materiel, or national security," the OSTP Notice explained.

The term "dual use research of concern" should not be taken in a
pejorative sense, OSTP said.

"Research that meets the definition of DURC often increases our
understanding of the biology of pathogens and makes critical contributions
to the development of new treatments and diagnostics, improvements in
public health surveillance, and the enhancement of emergency preparedness
and response efforts. Thus, designating research as DURC should not be seen
as a negative categorization, but simply an indication that the research
may warrant additional oversight in order to reduce the risks that the
knowledge, information, products, or technologies generated could be used
in a manner that results in harm. As a general matter, designation of
research as DURC does not mean that the research should not be conducted or
communicated."

In the February 22 Federal Register Notice, OSTP posed a series of
questions concerning potential oversight arrangements for dual use research
of concern and solicited feedback from interested members of the public.

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
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Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Monty Python’s Flying Circus! – The Full Monty Python !

 

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus!

 

Unveiled by Cryptome – USA v Twitter, Appelbaum et al Effective Today

 

 

Unveiled by Cryptome – USA v Twitter, Appelbaum et al Effective Today

Download the original document below:

appelbaum-104

TMZ – Chick Has Orgasm on LIVE TV with Joy Behar

 

Joy Behar interviewed a sex expert on her Current TV show and the chick busted out an orgasm right there on TV — just by THINKING about it.

TOP-SECRET – New Jersey Fusion Center Phone Kidnapping Scams Report

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/NJROIC-PhoneScam.png

 

New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center Situational Awareness Report

  • 2 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • February 8, 2013

Download

(U//FOUO) During recent weeks, various sources in law enforcement and media outlets have been reporting phone kidnapping scams occurring in Central and Northern New Jersey and New York. In most incidents, scammers have alleged that a member of the phone scam victim’s family had been involved in a car accident and claimed to have taken the victim’s family member hostage. The scammers then claim they will drop their hostage at a hospital after a certain amount of money (usually $1500‐2000) is wired via Western Union to the scammers, as restitution for damage to the scammer’s vehicle. In addition, the scammers state that they have the hostage’s cell phone and any attempts to call the cell phone or disengage from the conversation will result in the murder or beating of the hostage. The scammers try to hold the victim on the phone as long as possible while attempting to persuade them to wire the money; however, reports from some victims indicate the scammers will hang up and not call back under certain circumstances. For instance, when the victim questions the scammers about the hostage’s name, the scammers end the call when they are unable to provide the hostage’s name. According to Officer Kelly Denham, Coral Gables Police Department (Florida), this scam has been tracked back to 1998, when it started in Puerto Rico. She adds that this scam resurfaces every few years. Over the past few months, the NJ ROIC has seen increased reporting of this scam along the east coast.

Comparisons with Similar Scam Incidents

(U//FOUO) In January 2013, reports indicated a similar scam targeting the elderly. In this scam, elderly grandparents were informed their grandchildren were in prison and that the grandparents needed to wire money immediately to ensure their relative’s release. Reports indicate that the scammers may be garnishing information about their victims from Facebook and other social media websites. Several instances of this scam have been reported to local authorities and an alert has been issued throughout the tri‐state area. Although there are commonalities among these incidents, the NJ ROIC has received no information indicating that the incidents are connected.

Common Trends

(U//FOUO) Since 2008, the Federal Bureau of Investigations Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) has received similar complaints which focus on some common trends for these types of scams throughout the United States.

These include:

• (U//FOUO) The caller/suspect claims to be a relative (usually a young person) who is out of the country and in trouble with the police or a criminal element and needs money wired to him/her to get out of trouble.
• (U//FOUO) The caller/suspect calls back several times demanding additional money be sent in increments of $3000‐$4000.
• (U//FOUO) The caller/suspect instructs the victim to go to a Walmart or Money Gram location and wire the money to a person whose name is not the so‐called relative.
• (U//FOUO) Sometimes, the caller/suspect will instruct the person to stay on the phone throughout the entire wire transaction Other times the caller/suspect will instruct the victim not to call the relative’s parents because they will worry or be angry.
• (U//FOUO) In another instance, the caller/suspect calls the grandparent/parent and asks for them by name, claiming to be a police officer in another country and instructs the parent on how to get a debit card (amounts are usually under $2000.00) and where to send it for the bail.

How to Prevent the Scam

• (U//FOUO) When family members are going to work, school, and/or out for the day, know their itinerary, who they will be with, where they are traveling to, and what their final destination will be.
• (U//FOUO) Know the cellular telephone numbers of your family members and the subscriber to the respective cellular telephone numbers.
• (U//FOUO) Know the service provider and how to contact the service provider for the respective family members cellular telephone number. This will aid the police with the investigation and further assist with locating the cellular telephone of the family member by “pinging” the respective cellular telephone off various cell sites to determine where the cellular telephone is located.
• (U//FOUO) Constantly update and query your privacy settings on social media profile sites.
• (U//FOUO) Do not provide unknown individuals with your personal information via social media sites and only provide your private information to those you know and/or wish to have that information.
• (U//FOUO) Check to see what privacy information is readily available to the public via the respective social media sites that you and your family are linked to.

What To Do If You Receive Such a Call

• (U//FOUO) Attempt to verify the validity of the number the scammer is calling from.
• (U//FOUO) Attempt to verify the authenticity of the caller of the scam.
• (U//FOUO) Attempt to identify the location of the person and/or family member potentially being kidnapped.
• (U//FOUO) Notify your local police immediately.
• (U//FOUO) Refrain from accepting any subsequent calls from the number associated with the scam.
• (U//FOUO) Ensure you ask specific questions if you are contacted by the party in association with the scam about the suspected “hostage.” If there is a lack of specific information furnished by the scammer, this may prompt the scammer to end the conversation.
• (U//FOUO) If you cannot speak with the person and/or family member suspected of being kidnapped and you are unable to locate the person and/or family member suspected of being kidnapped, then call the service provider of the cellular telephone associated with the person and/or family member suspected of being kidnapped. In these emergency situations, the service provided could “ping” the respective cellular telephone in an attempt to locate the person’s and/or family member’s cellular telephone.
• (U//FOUO) Record the telephone number the suspected kidnapper and/or suspected scammer is calling from.
• (U//FOUO) Save any text messages and/or photographs the suspected kidnapper and/or scammer sends to you.
• (U//FOUO) Lastly, do not panic, think with a clear head, and provide the proper information to your local police assist with the investigation of the incident and/or scam.

Note: (U//FOUO) Be aware of phone “Spoofing,” in which a suspected scammer calls from his/her telephone, however has spoofed and/or has masked his/her real telephone number with another telephone number that appears as such on the other party’s (victim’s) telephone.

Film – Monty Python – Dead Parrot

 

Monty Python – Dead Parrot

 

from Monty Python’s Flying Circus
Season 1 – Episode 08
Full Frontal Nudity
Recorded 25-11-69, Aired 07-12-69

The world famous Dead Parrot sketch, here, in it’s entirety!

TMZ – Colin Kaepernick — BODY SHOTS Before Super Bowl !

 

TMZ – Colin Kaepernick — BODY SHOTS Before Super Bowl !

Photos have surfaced of San Francisco 49ers quarterback Colin Kaepernick in Mexico getting BODY SHOTS from hot chicks in bikinis. That’s one less teammate for Chris Culliver to worry about…

SECRET from PI – DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Recruiting

DHS-FBI-Recruiting

 

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorists are attempting to recruit new members in the United States and overseas to support their operations, obtain funding, and conduct terrorist attacks.  For example, in May 2012, Maryland-based Mohammad Hassan Khalid pled guilty to attempting to use the Internet to recruit individuals who had the ability to travel to and around Europe to conduct terrorist acts, in addition to providing logistical and financial support to terrorists.  In prior cases of recruitment, individuals who were willing to participate in terrorist acts became involved with known and suspected terrorists, participated in paramilitary training abroad, or tried to acquire small arms and build explosives.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incident from the NSI shared space is an example of an individual being recruited to commit violence.  The example is provided for situational awareness and training:

— (U//FOUO) An individual contacted the police to report being approached by two subjects about supplying firearms and participating in an attack on a military installation.  The subjects were arrested and charged with conspiracy to murder officers and employees of the US Government after being observed conducting surveillance of targets, testing security, and acquiring weapons for the attack.  One of the subjects pled guilty to the charges and is awaiting sentencing.

(U) Past Activities Observed in Individuals Recruited to Participate in Terrorism

(U//FOUO) Studies of terrorist actors have identified particular behaviors that have been observed in individuals vulnerable to recruitment or who have been recruited, and were ready to commit acts of violence.  Any one of these activities may be insignificant on its own, but when observed in combination with other prior observed behaviors—particularly advocacy of violence—may constitute a basis for reporting.

— (U//FOUO) Acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of political activity, expressed willingness to commit acts of violence, or close association with individuals or groups suspected of violent extremism.

— (U//FOUO) Communication with violent extremists, either through direct contact or virtually, or active participation in violent extremist blogs, chat rooms, and password-protected websites.

— (U//FOUO) Interest in paramilitary and explosives training or reconnaissance and surveillance activities in a manner reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning.

— (U//FOUO) Possession of literature written by and for violent extremist groups on terrorist techniques, including use of explosives, poisons, firearms and heavy weapons (when combined with other prior observed behaviors).

— (U//FOUO) Involvement by individuals—who otherwise never committed a crime—in theft, fraud, and illegal activities to fund terrorist causes.

(U//FOUO) In addition, individuals or groups attempting to enlist others to participate in acts of violence or terrorism should be reported to authorities.

(U//FOUO) These identified activities have been observed in cases of mobilization to violence, but are not a concrete formula for predicting illegal activity.  First Ammendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).  DHS and FBI are not advocating interference with the rights of law-abiding individuals.  There may be a legitimate reason why some of the observed behaviors are present; it is up to you to determine when that is not the case.

Monty Python – Holy Grail – Killer Bunny – Film

 

Monty Python – Holy Grail – Killer Bunny – Film

 

A clip from Monty Python’s ‘The Holy Grail’
Also: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DUV7k…

S & K – angeblicher Finanzskandal Teil 2 – Wer zieht die Fäden und wer profitiert ?

Honi soit qui mal y pense
ZITAT AUS DEN MEDIEN-

Es geht um einen Schaden in dreistelliger Millionenhöhe. Die Wirtschaftswoche hatte Ende Januar vor den Aktivitäten gewarnt.

Die Staatsanwaltschaft geht von der Annahme aus, dass Schöneich ihre Zeitschrift zum Zwecke der persönlichen Bereicherung als Werbebroschüre von der S&K-Gruppe missbrauchen ließ. So habe sie sie für die Unterstützung der Hauptbeschuldigten Schäfer und Köller allein 6000 Euro monatlich als „Beraterhonorar“ erhalten.

Wenn der S&K durch ihre Tätigkeit Anlegergelder zuflossen, habe sie zudem ein Prozent der Umsätze vereinnahmt. Darüber hinaus habe Schöneich von Schäfer und Köller teure Geschenke wie Handtaschen und Schmuck angenommen. Schöneich reagierte bis zum Redaktionsschluss gestern nicht auf Anfragen des Handelsblatts.

Anlagetipps: Finger weg von Finanzprodukten, wenn…

  • Tipp 1

    … Renditen von über acht Prozent pro Jahr versprochen werden, gleichzeitig aber ein Drittel der eingeworbenen Summe für Kosten wie Werbung oder Vertrieb draufgeht

  • Tipp 2
  • Tipp 3
  • Tipp 4
  • Tipp 5

Die Finanzwelt ist nach eigenen Angaben mit 100 000 Lesern eine der führenden Publikationen für den erfolgsorientierten, qualifizierten Finanzberater im deutschsprachigen Raum. In der Selbstdarstellung heißt es: „Finanzwelt greift wichtige Themen der Finanzbranche auf, setzt Impulse und berichtet hierüber zum Wohle der Branche.“

Nach der bundesweiten Großrazzia gegen mutmaßliche Anlagebetrüger vom Dienstag waren eine Reihe von Hauptverdächtigen in Untersuchungshaft genommen worden. Die Personen stehen im Verdacht, ein betrügerisches Schneeballsystem aufgebaut und Anleger um mehr als 100 Millionen Euro geprellt zu haben. Die Wirtschaftswoche hatte Ende Januar vor den Aktivitäten gewarnt.

TOP-SECRET – DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Recruiting

 

sara-eisen

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorists are attempting to recruit new members in the United States and overseas to support their operations, obtain funding, and conduct terrorist attacks.  For example, in May 2012, Maryland-based Mohammad Hassan Khalid pled guilty to attempting to use the Internet to recruit individuals who had the ability to travel to and around Europe to conduct terrorist acts, in addition to providing logistical and financial support to terrorists.  In prior cases of recruitment, individuals who were willing to participate in terrorist acts became involved with known and suspected terrorists, participated in paramilitary training abroad, or tried to acquire small arms and build explosives.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incident from the NSI shared space is an example of an individual being recruited to commit violence.  The example is provided for situational awareness and training:

— (U//FOUO) An individual contacted the police to report being approached by two subjects about supplying firearms and participating in an attack on a military installation.  The subjects were arrested and charged with conspiracy to murder officers and employees of the US Government after being observed conducting surveillance of targets, testing security, and acquiring weapons for the attack.  One of the subjects pled guilty to the charges and is awaiting sentencing.

(U) Past Activities Observed in Individuals Recruited to Participate in Terrorism

(U//FOUO) Studies of terrorist actors have identified particular behaviors that have been observed in individuals vulnerable to recruitment or who have been recruited, and were ready to commit acts of violence.  Any one of these activities may be insignificant on its own, but when observed in combination with other prior observed behaviors—particularly advocacy of violence—may constitute a basis for reporting.

— (U//FOUO) Acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of political activity, expressed willingness to commit acts of violence, or close association with individuals or groups suspected of violent extremism.

— (U//FOUO) Communication with violent extremists, either through direct contact or virtually, or active participation in violent extremist blogs, chat rooms, and password-protected websites.

— (U//FOUO) Interest in paramilitary and explosives training or reconnaissance and surveillance activities in a manner reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning.

— (U//FOUO) Possession of literature written by and for violent extremist groups on terrorist techniques, including use of explosives, poisons, firearms and heavy weapons (when combined with other prior observed behaviors).

— (U//FOUO) Involvement by individuals—who otherwise never committed a crime—in theft, fraud, and illegal activities to fund terrorist causes.

(U//FOUO) In addition, individuals or groups attempting to enlist others to participate in acts of violence or terrorism should be reported to authorities.

(U//FOUO) These identified activities have been observed in cases of mobilization to violence, but are not a concrete formula for predicting illegal activity.  First Ammendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).  DHS and FBI are not advocating interference with the rights of law-abiding individuals.  There may be a legitimate reason why some of the observed behaviors are present; it is up to you to determine when that is not the case.

TMZ – ‘Real Housewives of Miami’ — Time to Play with Boobs !

 

TMZ – ‘Real Housewives of Miami’ — Time to Play with Boobs!

We gotta give “The Real Housewives of Miami” credit… they know how to turn a boring video into a friggin AWESOME one… just start playing with each other’s boobs!

SECRET from Public Intelligence – Restricted U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations Manual

 

USArmy-AirMissileDefense

 

FM 3-01 U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations

  • 146 pages
  • Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information for official use.
  • November 25, 2009
  • 8.08 MB

Download

FM 3-01 is the Army Air Defense Artillery’s (ADA) capstone doctrinal publication. The seven chapters that make up this edition of Air and Missile Defense Operations constitute the Army ADA’s view of how it conducts prompt and sustained operations and sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. FM 3-01 also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons.

• Chapter 1 provides a general overview of Army Air and Missile Defense (AMD) operations and the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) mission. The strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war are discussed and AMD operations are defined in terms of their contribution to the Army Operational Concept of Full Spectrum Operations and the Joint Counterair mission.
• Chapter 2 describes the basic concepts inherent in air and missile defense operations which have been developed and improved through many years of operations, both combat and real world deployments. This includes employment principles and guidelines, and engagement operations principles.
• Chapter 3 addresses Command and Control in AMD operations and conforms to Joint Air and Missile Defense doctrine as updated with the lessons learned in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
• Chapter 4 describes Army Air Defense participation in offensive and defensive operations. Offensive operations aim is to defeat the enemy decisively by using overwhelming, aggressive force. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy back time, economize forces, and/or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Air defense elements protect friendly forces and geopolitical assets and accomplish other missions assigned by the JFC. At the Strategic level of war ADA forces protect high visibility JIIM and national assets, as a layer within the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) and supports homeland defense operations. At the Operational level of war, ADA forces protect the theater assets based on the JFCs critical asset list (CAL) like, seaports of embarkation, air ports of embarkation, cities, logistic centers, religious centers, and lines of communications (LOC). At the tactical level of war, Army ADA forces support the Land Component Commanders (LCC)/ARFOR scheme of maneuver while protecting Theater, Corps, Division, and Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) forces according to the JFC’s defended asset list (DAL) priorities.
• Chapter 5 describes the participation of ADA forces in stability operations and civil support operations. Stability operations are conducted outside the U.S. and its territories to promote and protect U.S. national interests. Civil support operations are conducted to address the consequences of natural or manmade disasters, accidents, and incidents within the U.S. and its territories. This chapter describes ADA participation in support of Homeland Security, Homeland Air Security, and counter-drug operations. ADA units may be tasked to provide soldiers and ADA equipment for civil support operations.
• Chapter 6 describes the Army ADA contribution to and benefit from achieving information superiority. Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. Information superiority is the product of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), information management (IM), and information operations (IO). Information superiority enables ADA forces to see first, understand the situation more quickly and accurately, and act faster than their adversaries.
• Chapter 7 discusses the sustainment of Air Defense Artillery (ADA) organizations and the unique challenges to the commanders and staffs of these organizations.

Four appendixes complement the body of the manual. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield is in Appendix A. Air and missile threats facing Army ADA forces and systems are in Appendix B. Air and missile defense planning is in Appendix C. A discussion of the impact of technology on ADA forces is in Appendix D.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

5-25. Civil support is Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities (JP 1-02). Civil support includes operations that address the consequences of natural or man-made disasters, accidents, terrorist attacks, and incidents in the United States and its territories. Army forces conduct civil support operations when the size and scope of events exceed the capabilities or capacities of domestic civilian agencies. Civil support operations are usually noncontiguous. Leaders tailor the application of the operational framework, elements of operational design, and METT-TC to fit each situation. Commanders designate the decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations necessary for mission success. However, identifying centers of gravity, decisive points and even the desired end state can be more complex and unorthodox than in offensive and defensive operations. When visualizing a support operation, commanders recognize that they may have to define the enemy differently. In support operations, the adversary is often disease, hunger, or the consequences of disaster.

5-26. The homeland defense mission for ADA is to prevent, deter, or interdict foreign and domestic aerial threats that are directed towards the United States and its citizens or specified area of operations (AO), such as the National Capitol Region. Nations, terrorist groups, or criminal organizations are increasingly likely to attack the U.S. and its territories using missiles and aircraft.

5-27. The homeland air security (HAS) air and missile threat spectrum Figure 5-1 ranges from traditional military threats to terrorist threats, from medium and long range ballistic missiles, bombers to land attack cruise missiles, terrorist-controlled aircraft, and radio-controlled sub-scale aircraft. The use of an air vehicle as a terrorist weapon is the most stressing HAS threat. State-sponsored military threats are addressed by war plans, operational concepts, and our military’s capabilities. The HAS threat spectrum is depicted
below.

5-28. Government agencies other than the Army will often have the lead in civil support operations. ADA commanders may answer to a civilian chief or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian agency. Command arrangements may often be only loosely defined, causing commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation. ADA commanders consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also political, economic, and psychological in nature.

5-29. The U.S. Constitution allows the use of Army forces to protect the states against invasion and, upon request of a state, to protect it against domestic violence. Army forces, under joint command, provide the nation with critical capabilities, such as missile defense, necessary to secure and defend the homeland.

5-30. The amended Posse Comitatus Act significantly restricts using federal military forces in law enforcement. The Stafford Act defines and clarifies the role of U.S. military forces in support of domestic civil authorities. Since the law may prohibit certain types of activities, commanders need a detailed analysis of their legal authorities for each mission. Generally, ADA troops and systems performing civil support operations, by the nature of their missions, are in compliance with the law and need only be aware of the limitations of their authority.

 

Film – Monty Python – Self-Defense Against Fruit

 

from Monty Python’s Flying Circus
Season 1 – Episode 04 – Owl Stretching Time
Recorded 21-09-69, Aired 26-10-69

Resignation of Pope Benedict XVI – Gay “Network” in the Vatican – Blackmail – Plot to kill Benedict

Papst2-DW-Kultur-vatican-city-state

The resignation of Pope Benedict XVI has been linked to the discovery of a gay “network” in the Vatican that led to some prelates being blackmailed by outsiders.

The potentially explosive claim was made Thursday by the Rome daily La Repubblica. The newspaper said the network was described in a 300-page report presented to the Pope by three cardinals assigned to investigate a series of embarrassing internal leaks that rocked the Vatican last year.

The cardinals interviewed dozens of prelates and lay people in Italy and abroad. Their report describes a Roman Catholic church divided by factions, including a “cross-party network united by sexual orientation,” La Repubblica said.

“For the first time, the word homosexual was pronounced,” the newspaper said, referring to a meeting when the cardinals reported their findings to Pope Benedict.

The Pope was handed the report Dec. 17. He shocked the Catholic world by resigning less than two months later — the first Pope to abdicate in more than 600 years.

Apparently using words found in the report, the newspaper said it contained evidence of “external influence” on Vatican officials from laymen with whom they had links of a “worldly nature.”

“We would call it blackmail,” La Repubblica added.

The Vatican’s spokesperson, Rev. Federico Lombardi, said reporters should not expect anyone from the Vatican to confirm or deny the allegations.

“We’re not going to run after all the speculation, the fantasies or the opinions that will be expressed on this issue,” he added. “And don’t expect the three cardinals to give you interviews, either, because they have agreed not to answer (questions) or give information on this issue.”

The three cardinals who investigated are Spanish cardinal Julian Herranz, Italian cardinal Salvatore De Giorgi, and the Slovak cardinal, Jozef Tomko.

The Pope asked them to investigate after his papacy was undermined in early 2012 by the leaking of a series of Vatican documents. They included private letters to the Pope complaining of corruption and cronyism in the awarding of Vatican contracts. Allegations of money-laundering at the Vatican’s bank were reignited.

A confidential letter from a Vatican official described a presumed plot to kill Benedict and discussed his potential successor. Other leaks linked the murder-suicide of two Vatican Swiss guards in the 1980s to the kidnapping of a 15-year-old Vatican resident, the attempted murder of Pope John Paul II and the controversial burial in a Roman Catholic basilica of Enrico De Pedis, one of Italy’s most notorious gangsters.

The Pope’s butler was eventually convicted of stealing the documents.

Video – Mandiant standing by hacking accusations

 

Mandiant standing by hacking accusations
Rod Beckstrom, a cyber security analyst, talks about the allegations against the Chinese hackers.

The FBI – Crooked CEO Gets 50 Years for Stealing $215 Million

Peregrine headquarters building
The $20 million headquarters of the now-bankrupt Peregrine Financial Group in Cedar Falls, Iowa.

 

 

He was a successful CEO of his own futures brokerage firm and a respected member of his community, creating jobs and supporting local charities.

 

Or so it seemed. For years, Russell Wasendorf, Sr.—as Acting U.S. Attorney Sean R. Berry of the Northern District of Iowa recently put it—was really a “con man who built a business on smoke and mirrors.”

 

It all fell apart in July 2012 when Wasendorf—after an unsuccessful suicide attempt—admitted stealing millions from more than 13,000 investors who had entrusted their hard-earned money to him and his company, the now bankrupt Peregrine Financial Group (PFG), based in Cedar Falls, Iowa. Last month, Wasendorf was sentenced by a federal judge to 50 years in prison—the maximum sentence allowed by law—and ordered to pay restitution to his victims.

 

Hefty Federal Sentences
for Financial Fraudsters

Russell Wasendorf, Sr.’s 50-year sentence was based on a variety of factors, including the amount of financial loss, the sophisticated means used to execute the fraud, and the large number of victims. But he’s not the only subject of an FBI financial fraud case to end up with an extraordinarily lengthy prison sentence. Here are a few more examples:

– Bernard Madoff—150 Years: Founder of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC, he engineered a Ponzi scheme that resulted in billions of dollars of losses to thousands of investors. The federal judge who sentenced him said that Madoff’s “fraud was staggering.” New York press release

– Allen Stanford—110 Years: Chairman of the board of Stanford International Bank, he orchestrated a 20-year investment fraud scheme that helped him steal $7 billion to finance his personal businesses. Speaking at his sentencing on behalf of those he defrauded, a woman told Stanford that “many of the victims had lived the proverbial American dream, only to have it snatched away from them in the name of greed.” Houston press release

– Thomas Petters—50 Years: Petters stole billions of dollars in money and property by inducing investors to provide his company with funds to purchase merchandise that was to be resold to retailers at a profit. Of course, no such purchases were made. Then-Minneapolis Special Agent in Charge Ralph Boelter said he hoped that Petters’ “appropriate” 50-year sentence “will serve as an effective deterrent to those similarly inclined.” Minneapolis press release

How it started. In the early 1990s, Wasendorf’s Peregrine partner pulled his money out of the operation, and Wasendorf didn’t have the funds to keep the company going. So he helped himself to at least $250,000 of Peregrine’s customer funds in accounts at an outside bank. To conceal the theft, he used a copy machine to fabricate a phony bank statement.

 

For the next 20 or so years, Wasendorf continued to steal from customer funds while his company incurred tens of millions of dollars in losses. He carried out this scheme through a series of complex actions designed to conceal his activities and the deteriorating state of the company. For instance:

 

  • He maintained exclusive control of monthly bank statements by instructing PFG personnel to make sure they were delivered to him unopened. He then used a copy machine—and later, computer software—to create phony monthly statements in place of the real statements.
  • He sent the phony statements to PFG’s accounting department, knowing they’d be used in various reports required by oversight bodies—the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the National Futures Association (NFA).
  • He intercepted account verification forms from NFA and CFTC auditors mailed to the bank used by PFG. Wasendorf changed the address of the bank to a post office box that only he had access to; once the forms came into that post office box, he would mail back to the auditors a forged form—supposedly from the bank—that contained an inflated dollar amount of what was in the corresponding bank account.

 

What did Wasendorf do with the misappropriated funds? He created the appearance that PFG was legitimate and successful in order to ward off the suspicions of regulators and auditors. He also funded his own outside business interests—for example, he opened two restaurants in Cedar Falls. And finally, he lived quite luxuriously—he owned a private jet and a huge estate that included a million dollar indoor swimming pool and a 1,000-bottle wine cellar.

 

The case began when the Blackhawk County Sheriff’s Office, first on the scene of Wasendorf’s attempted suicide, contacted the FBI after discovering notes left by the executive admitting his illegal deeds. The ensuing federal investigation—which involved multiple searches, reviews of thousands of electronic and paper documents, and numerous interviews—culminated in September 2012 with Wasendorf’s guilty plea.

 

Special thanks as well to our partners at the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Iowa for their assistance in this case.

MYSTERIÖSE PROBLEME – Hacker-Angriff auf Vettel ? !

http://www.bild.de/sport/motorsport/sebastian-vettel/verdacht-auf-hacker-angriff-bei-den-testfahrten-29205702.bild.html

Unveiled by Cryptome – Iran Zelzaal Rocket Probable 1-Day Attack on US

 

 

Iran Zelzaal Rocket Probable 1-Day Attack on US

Ahmadinejad_iran_uran20100209123504


A sends:

Our Persian observer reports that Iran has made its southern missile and rocket launchers and silos ready for a probable 1-day attack. Based on what we hear, there is high chance of a very small scale fire exchange between the two sides and then call it a mistake. It is a common practice in such situations and we think such test must happen before the upcoming Iranian presidential election, to have a added-value score for Americans. It is a military text book fact that such event is going to happen and this article tips off Iranians are concentrating on the south. It also offer thorough details of Zelzaal, a solid fuel rocket that is set to destroy American airplanes before they get the chance to fly off the band [ground].

http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/195032/%D8%AF%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%82%E2%80%8E%
D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%
B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%
D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%87%D8%
A7-%D9%88-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%
DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3

TMZ – Prince Vs. Weird Al — The ONLY Anti-Parody Artist!

 

TMZ – Prince Vs. Weird Al — The ONLY Anti-Parody Artist!

There’s only ONE artist who consistently turns down Weird Al’s requests to spoof his songs and it’s none other than Prince. THIS MEANS MUSIC WAR!

TOP-SECRET from PI – U.S. Northern Command CONPLAN 3501-08 Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/USNORTHCOM-DSCA.png

CDRUSNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08 DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)

  • 570 pages
  • May 16, 2008
  • 40.9 MB

Download

1. Purpose. Natural or man-made disasters and special events can be so demanding that local, tribal) state and non-military federal responders are temporarily overwhelmed by the situation. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a long history of supporting civil authorities in the wake of catastrophic events. When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) will respond quickly and effectively to the requests of civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 2008 (JSCP) directs CDRUSNORTHCOM to prepare a plan to support the employment of Title 10 DOD forces providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in accordance with (IAW) the National Response Framework (NRF), applicable federal law, DOD Directives (DODD), and other policy guidance including those hazards defined by the National Planning Scenarios that are not addressed by other JSCP tasked plans. DSCA is a subset of DOD civil support that is performed within the parameters of the NRF.

2. Conditions for Implementation

a. Politico-Military Situation

(1) USNORTHCOM was established in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. USNORTHCOM’s dual mission is to conduct Homeland Defense (HD) and civil support operations. When directed by the President or the SecDef, USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations IAW the NRF by responding to Requests for Assistance (RFA) from civil authorities.

(2) The NRF is a guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards response. This plan aligns with the NRF coordinating framework and applies to all forms of support that DOD could provide to civil authorities under the NRF. In addition to Large-scale disaster responses) DOD has long provided smaller scale support for wildland firefighting, National Special Security Events (NSSE)t such as political conventions, and special events (SE) such as major sporting events.

b. Statement. This summary provides military decision makers with a brief recapitulation of the major aspects of this plan. It is based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and is subject to modification in the context of a specific contingency.

c. Legal Considerations. The NRF provides the coordinating framework for support provided under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288) (Title 42 United States Code Section 5121, et. seq.). The Stafford Act and the Economy Act (Title 31 United States Code Section 1535) are the primary sources of statutory authority which govern the federal response. Support under these acts range from small-scale efforts to large-scale operations involving thousands of DOD personnel. DODD 3025.dd) Defense Support of Civil Authorities, is currently in draft, but when finalized, will supersede the current DODDs describing DOD support of civil authorities. Civil support under this plan does not include direct support to law enforcement. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) (Title 18 United States Code Section 1385) and DOD policy place limitations on direct involvement in law enforcement activities by Title 10 military personnel. Direct support to civilian law enforcement authorities requires specific statutory or Constitutional authority to not violate the PCA. While providing DSCA, DOD forces will conform to the CJCS Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) and any supplemental guidance provided by USNORTHCOM.

APPENDIX 22 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

1. Situation

a. State, local, tribal, private-sector, and specific Federal authorities have primary responsibility for public safety and security, and typically are the first line of response and support. Local jurisdictions have primary authority and responsibility for law enforcement activities. As local incidents or events escalate, additional resources will first be obtained through the activation of mutual aid agreements with neighboring localities and/ or State authorities. In the context of State’s resources, the National Guard (NG), while serving under state control for state purposes, is not considered to be part of the Department of Defense (DOD) and executes missions under the command and control (C2) of the Governor in accordance with (IAW) the State’s constitution and statutes.

b. It is DOD policy to cooperate with civilian law enforcement officials to the maximum extent practicable. The implementation of DOD policy shall be consistent with the needs of national security and military preparedness, the historic tradition of limiting direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities, and the requirements of applicable law.

c. It is the intent of this appendix to provide an overview of defense support of law enforcement as it cannot cover all potential requests for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) that relate to civilian law enforcement. Defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies covers a broad spectrum of potential activities from very small support activities such as training civilian law enforcement, loaning a piece of equipment, or an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) or dog team to large-scale incidents or events such as a riot. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) addresses civil disturbance operations as part of public safety. This appendix will not address civil disturbance operations. See USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3502, Civil Disturbance Operations, for more information.

d. State level emergency response operations for natural disasters have evolved concerning the use of the NG in a law enforcement role from state to state. Govemor1s use of their powers has set a precedence for the future. Governors may, by use of their state powers and via a state to state memorandum of agreement, authorize the NG of one state to perform law enforcement and security duties within the another state.

e. In accordance with (IAW) reference g. which is still in DRAFT form, DSCA does not apply to the following programs that are related to support to law enforcement agencies:

(1) Sensitive support provided IAW DOD Directive (DODD) S-5210.36.

(2) Inspector General of the DOD, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service:? or the military criminal investigative organizations when they are conducting joint investigations with civilian law enforcement agencies of matters within their respective jurisdictions, using their own forces and equipment.

(3) The non-Federalized National Guard and their activities under the C2 of the Governor.

(4) Counter-narcotic operations conducted under section 124) Title 10, U.S. Code.

(5) Defense Intelligence Components providing intelligence support IAW Executive Orders (EO) 12333 and 13356, the DODD on Intelligence activities (DODD 5240.1) and DODD Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Person (DODD 5240.1-R). Defense Intelligence  components are defined in DOD Directive 5240.1

f. Enemy Forces. See Base plan

g. Friendly Forces. See Base plan

h. Assumptions

(1) DOD law enforcement and security missions/tasks will be in support of a Primary Agency under the NRF or a designated agency for other approved law enforcement activities.

(2) The Posse Comitatus Act will not be modified.

(3) DOD policy and guidance will not change after the formal release of references g and i.

(4) Civilian law enforcement agencies will continue to request training support for Jaw enforcement activities, loan/lease of DOD equipment) support for National Special Security Events (NSSEs), and other law enforcement activities.

2. Mission. See Base plan

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations

(1) Defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies in response to a natural or man-made disaster, emergency, incident, or event will be processed IAW reference i above and executed at the direction of the President or approval of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) IAW the Base plan.

(2) Release of information to the public concerning law enforcement operations is the primary responsibility of the civilian agency that is performing the law enforcement function. When defense support is provided under reference j above, assistance provided and information released by DOD PAO agencies to the public shall be approved by the Secretaries of the Military Departments or the Directors of the Defense Agencies and such assistance may be conditioned upon control by the Secretaries of  the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies before information is released to the public.

(3) Use of Information Collected During DSCA Operations. Military Departments and Defense Agencies are encouraged to provide to federal, state, or local civilian law enforcement officials any information collected during the normal course of DSCA operations that may be relevant to a violation of any federal or state law within the jurisdiction of such officials.

(4) USNORTHCOM will initiate coordination for defense support with the designated law enforcement agency upon SecDef approval of a RFA.

(5) Training Civilian Law Enforcement. Military Departments and Defense Agencies may provide training to federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement officials. Such assistance may include training in the operations and maintenance of equipment made available under the military equipment loan/lease program. This does not permit large scale or elaborate training, and does not permit regular or direct involvement of military personnel in activities that are fundamentally civilian law enforcement operations, except as otherwise approved and authorized.

b. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Coordination regarding legality of support will be staffed through the chain of command and USNORTHCOM Judge Advocate (JA) to the SecDef.

(2) The SecDef is the approval authority for all RFAs made by law enforcement agencies. This includes:

(a) Requests for potentially lethal support (i.e.) lethal to the public, a member of law enforcement, a military member or DOD employee).

(b) Loans of equipment, facilities, or personnel to law enforcement.

(c) Lethal support includes: loans of arms; combat and tactical vehicles, vessels or aircraft, or ammunition.

(d) All requests for support under 10 USC 382 and 18 USC 831; all support to counterterrorism operations; and all support to law enforcement when there is a potential for confrontation between law enforcement and specifically identified civilian individuals or groups.

(3) Immediate response authority. When requested, local military commanders and DOD officials may provide defense support to civil law enforcement agencies under this authority in order to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. This authority does not authorize DOD forces to perform law enforcement functions in support of civil law enforcement agencies unless consistent with an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC) Section 1385) and IAW the guidance provided in the Basic plan.

(4) Restrictions on direct assistance to civilian law enforcement. Except as otherwise provided, the prohibition on the use of military personnel “as a Posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws” prohibits the following forms of direct assistance:

(a) Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity.

(b) A search or seizure.

(c) An arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity.

(d) Use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.

(5) The SecDef is the approval authority for all assistance with the potential for confrontation between DOD personnel and civilian individuals or groups.

(6) If a DOD Component has a question on the appropriateness or legality of providing requested support, such request shall be forwarded through the military chain of corrunand to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD(HD/ ASA)).

4. Administration and Logistics. See Base plan

5. Command and Control. See Base plan

 

Monty Python – Life of Brian – Always Look On The Bright Side of Life

 

Monty Python – Life of Brian – Always Look On The Bright Side of Life

Die wahren Hintergründe zu S & K – Teil 1

Bernd Pulch lachend

Liebe Leser,

umfangreiche Ermittlungen der Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main – Schwerpunktstaatsanwaltschaft für Wirtschaftsstrafsachen – und dem Fachkommissariat für Wirtschaftskriminalität beim Polizeipräsidium Frankfurt am Main seit dem Jahre 2012 haben zu einer groß angelegten Razzia in sieben Bundesländern unter Einbeziehung von 1.200 Ermittlungsbeamten und 15 Staatsanwälten geführt. Es wurden sechs Personen festgenommen, weitere Beschuldigte sind vorläufig festgenommen wurden. Gegen ca. 50 weitere Personen wird darüber hinaus ermittelt, so heisst es.

Die Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main wirft den Verantwortlichen banden- und gewerbsmäßigen Betrug mit Kapitalanlagen, Untreue und weitere Straftaten vor. Die Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main spricht in ihrer Pressemitteilung von einem Schneeballsystem und einem sich abzeichnenden Schaden im dreistelligen Millionen-Euro-Bereich. Gegenstand der Ermittlungen sind nach Mitteilung der Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main mehrere Anlagefonds im neunstelligen Euro-Bereich.

Es wurden Vermögenswerte im Gesamtvolumen von über 100 Millionen EUR gesichert.

Stellungnahme der Kanzlei Göddecke

Es war nur eine Frage der Zeit, dass sich staatliche Behörden mit den Geschäften der S&K-Unternehmensgruppe beschäftigen. Bereits seit November letzten Jahres standen die Geschäfte der S&K-Unternehmen unter kritischer Beobachtung durch die Medien.

Dass staatliche Ermittlungsbehörden in diesem massivem Umfang tätig werden, zeigt, dass die gegen die S&K-Unternehmensgruppe und deren Verantwortlichen erhobenen Vorwürfe zumindest den dringenden Tatverdacht strafbarer Handlungen rechtfertigen.

Verhaftet wurden Jonas Köller, Stefan Schäfer, die Spitzen der S&K-Unternehmensgruppe sowie Haucke Bruhn und Thomas Gloy von United Investors, dem Vertrieb in Hamburg sowie zwei weitere angebliche Mittäter.

Allerdings sind unter Umständen nicht nur Anleger der S&K-Unternehmensgruppe von den Festnahmen betroffen. So hatte die S&K-Unternehmensgruppe auf verschiedenen Wegen umfangreiche geschäftliche Beziehungen zu anderen Fonds namhafter Anbieter aufgenommen, so zu den MIDAS-Fonds (Private-Equity Fonds) und einigen Immobilienfonds der DCM-Gruppe. Auch bei den Fonds der SHB-Gruppe sollten wichtige Posten mit Personen besetzt werden, die dem Umfeld der S&K-Unternehmensgruppe zuzuordnen waren. In Anbetracht des Umstandes, dass nach vorliegenden Informationen und Unterlagen Zweifel an der Werthaltigkeit einiger Immobilien der S&K-Unternehmensgruppe bestanden haben, haben wir diese Entwicklung stets kritisch beobachtet.

Erfreulich ist, dass die Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main nach eigenen Angaben umfangreiche Vermögenssicherungen vorgenommen hat. Hierdurch erhöhen sich die Chancen für Anleger, wenigstens einen Teil ihres Geldes zurückzuerhalten, jedenfalls wenn sie rechtzeitig aktiv werden.

Die Ermittlungsergebnisse der Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main und anderer Staatsanwaltschaften könnten die Durchsetzung von Ansprüchen gegen die S&K-Unternehmensgruppe erheblich erhöhen. Dies betrifft Anleger der Fonds S&K Real Estate Value Added Fondsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, Deutsche S&K Sachwerte GmbH & Co. KG, Deutsche S&K Sachwerte Nr. 2 GmbH & Co. KG und S&K Investment Plan GmbH & Co. KG. Aber auch Anleger, die in den Jahren 2010 bzw. zuvor Lebensversicherungen und/oder Bausparverträge an Unternehmen der S&K-Gruppe verkauft haben und deren Forderungen gestundet oder bisher regelmäßig ausgezahlt wurden, können betroffen sein. Auch aktuell hat die S&K-Unternehmensgruppe über die Asset Trust AG Lebensversicherungen und ähnliches aufgekauft. Hier drohen den Anlegern erhebliche finanzielle Verluste.

Wie es mit den Fonds der MIDAS-Gruppe und verschiedenen Fonds der DCM weitergeht, wird sich zeigen, wenn feststeht, ob diese Fonds überhaupt noch handlungsfähig sind. Für Anleger der SHB-Fonds könnte die aktuelle Entwicklung die Frage der Abstimmung bei den laufenden Gesellschafterabstimmungen erheblichen Einfluss haben.

Experten kommen zu der Auffassung, dass die Aktion – unabhängig von ihrer Berechtigung – die vorhandenen Fonds schwer beschädigen wird sowie das Vertrauen in die gesamte Immobilienbranche für Jahre untergraben wird. Eine ganz spezielle Rolle spielte hierbei auch der selbsternannte „Nachrichtendienst“ „GoMoPa“ und deren Zuträger und V-Leute in der Branche, den Medien und in den Behörden. Erfahrene Experten verweisen auf den Zusammenhang zwischen den mutmasslichen STASI Täter: „GoMoPa“, „Anlegeranwalt Resch, Beate P****n, Staatsanwältin, Wiesbaden/Rhein Main, ihren Gatten, den Gesellschafter der Immobilienzeitung GmbH, Thomas P*****n sowie den Druck auf die Frankfurter Staatsanwaltschaft in der Finanzkrise „abzuliefern.“

Natürlich haben die Beschuldigten – es gilt die Unschuldsvermutung – und auch die Branche nach dem medialen Donnergewitter keine Chance mehr, meinen wohl Rechtsexperten…

Warum Banken, die Milliarden zerstört haben und mit Milliarden Steuergeldern willfähriger Politiker subventiniert werden , gänzlich ungeschoren davonkommen, und deren Manager Millionengehälter kassieren, erschliesst sich unserer Redaktion nicht.

BANKEN MÄSSIGES – EH PARDON BANDENMÄSSIGES VERBRECHEN ? !

Durch die Aktion wird das Vertrauen in die deutsche Immobilienbranche auf Jahre zerstört.  Die Fonds werden mutmasslich insolvent. Die Gewinner sind dubiose Aktienhaie, “Anlegeranwälte” und damit verbandelte “Juristen” und   “Journalisten”  in den Behörden.”

Die Verlierer sind die Immobilienbranche und deren Angehörige.

Und wer immer noch nicht kapiert hat, mit wem er oder sie es bei bei “GoMoPa” und deren V-Leuten in der Justiz und in der in Rhein/ Main ansässigen V-Leuten/Medien  zu tun hat.

Und warum ehemalige STASI-Leute, die eine Kampagne mit ihren V-Leuten in der Justiz und sogenannten “Fachzeitungen” aus dem Rhein-Main-Gebiet (Wiesbaden ! sic !) unter der Ägide bestimmter “Familienangehöriger” anzetteln können, mutmasslich im Auftrag von Immobilien-Wettbewerbern , damit immer diese weiter erfolgreich sind, erschliesst sich auch nicht – auf den ersten Moment.

Jahrzehntelange Intrigen ! Oder was P*****n ? Oder was M***a ?

Und: Warum gilt in Deutschland – gerade nach den NAZIs und nach der STASI – Terrorr-Willkür keine Unschuldsvermutung wie im Rest der Welt ?

Wie verkommen ist diese deutsche Gesellschaft und deren “Organe” – instrumentalisiert durch durchschaubare Interessen seit dem Fall der Mauer 1989 ?

Nie wude ein TOP-STASI-Mann oder TOP – Gestapo- Mann verurteilt !

Trotz aller Massenverbrechen !

Berichten hierüber die gleichgeschalteteten deutschen Main-Stream-Medien ? Nein !

Und bei den Milliarden – Verlusten – kein einziger Banker wurde verurteilt  !

Gab es Berichte in den gleichgeschalteten, anzeigenabhängigen Medien oder in der “Immobilienzeitung” oder in “GoMoPa” oder in “Das Investment” etc pp ?

WAS GIBT ES NUR FUER ZUFAELLE  ?!

Zum Thema: Es wurde kein Banken-Opfer gefunden ( Gab es den keine ????)….

Stattdessen wurde ein dankbares Justiz- und Medien-Opfer gefunden – und am ersten Tag gleich richtig fertiggemacht.  Woher  haben die Medien all  die schönen Photos und Infos von der Razzia ?

Die Anleger interessieren eh keinen und bei den Immobilien verstehen die Bürokraten eh nix !

Damit ist der Immobilien-Miliarden-Schaden JETZT vorprogrammiert.

ZUDEM – Welche globalen Investoren sollen JETZT investieren nach diesem  §JUSTIT§- KO ?

Wer PROFITIERT denn davon ?

Bei weiterem Nachdenken, denke ich werden Sie alles verstehen !

Herzlichst

Bernd Pulch

(Magister Artium)

HACKER-ANGRIFFE a la “GoMoPa” – USA drohen China mit Handelskrieg

http://www.bild.de/geld/wirtschaft/cyberwar/hacker-angriffe-usa-drohen-china-mit-handelskrieg-29196880.bild.html

Unveiled – Mandiant Report on Chinese Hackers

Chinese Hackers Screen-Shot-2013-02-19-at-2.17.49-AM

When Mandiant, the company that investigated the recent cyber attacks on the New York Times, released its report yesterday, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, the media grabbed it. They zinged off one news story after another about how this company had exposed the cybercriminals that the Chinese government claimed to know nothing about.

News? No. It was simply another layer of evidence that cyber activists/hackers/criminals/agents/whatever have been stealthily conducting cyber reconnaissance missions, infecting computers with malware, exfiltrating data, and in general, being bad guys. In 2011, Dmitri Alperovitch, then vice president of Threat Research for McAfee, authored a report about Shady RAT (Remote Access Tool), the malware that had been used by Chinese cybercriminals to exfiltrate data from a broad cross-section of organizations over a 2-5 year period — undetected. Alperovitch broke new ground when he included a table of more than 70 companies, organizations, and government agencies from around the globe that had been compromised. It included the U.N., the International Olympic Committee, and numerous U.S. entities. Now, that was news.

Mandiant’s report gave the world more of the same about Chinese cyber bad guys. In fact, it was the same Chinese bad guys. Mandiant acknowledges that the group behind the attacks in their investigation is the same group that Alperovitch identified in Shady RAT.

What is news in the Mandiant report is how they conducted their forensic investigation. Mandiant actually tracked the attackers’ communications back to a compromised “hop point” (middle man computer), obtained the cooperation of the compromised middle organization, and captured the keystrokes of the criminals as they were conducting their “work.”

Mandiant and its client companies turned the tactics of the criminals against them and carefully compiled evidence over several years. They observed this particular group of cyber hackers attack more than 141 companies in 20 industries since 2006. Mandiant courageously published its findings, including a video of screenshots captured as the criminals engaged in their acts, and acknowledged that they “expect reprisals from China.”

A lot of credit goes to the unsung heroes: the companies that made Mandiant’s work possible:
the victim organizations that were determined to track the criminals and funded substantial forensic investigations, and
the “middle-man” organizations that accepted Mandiant’s help when notified of their role and cooperated to advance the investigations.

This does not happen because forensic and computer geeks decide to chase cybercriminals. It happens because senior management understands both the importance of what is happening and their fiduciary duty to protect the assets of the organization.

Alperovitch, who is now co-founder and CTO of forensic firm CrowdStrike, notes that “Mandiant’s report is important and makes it starkly clear that it is becoming harder and harder for the Chinese government to deny that they know nothing about this.” Nevertheless, according to Alperovitch, “the identified group is just one of two dozen in China that are engaged in similar activities, many of them linked to units in the People’s Liberation Army.”

So, here is the bottom line for corporate America: unlike traditional crimes, companies cannot just call the cops and let them chase the cyber criminals. Affected organizations play a leading role in every investigation because it is their systems and data that are being stolen or leveraged. The lesson from Mandiant is that we must all come together and collectively fight cybercrime, irrespective of whether the criminal is a rogue hacker or a nation state.

A few tips to get started: Be on the alert for malicious code on your system and, when detected, don’t shirk from funding a proper forensic investigation. If your company is approached by a reputable firm or law enforcement agency with evidence that your corporate systems are being used as a hop point, cooperate as fully as possible. Stay engaged and ensure the investigation stays within the rule of law. Understand these are hard problems and take time.

 

Download the original document here:

PDF_MTrends_2012

TMZ – Kim Kardashian – Khloe Was NOT Fired from ‘X Factor’

 

TMZ – Kim Kardashian – Khloe Was NOT Fired from ‘X Factor’

 

Khloe Kardashian did not go the way of Paula Abdul … and Nicole Scherzinger … and Cheryl Cole … and Steve Jones … and NOT been 86’d from “X Factor” … this according to Kim Kardashian.

SECRECY NEWS – A NEW JUDGE FOR THE FISA COURT

Judge Claire V. Eagan of the Northern District of Oklahoma was appointed
this month to the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court by the Chief
Justice of the United States.

Her term on the FIS Court began on February 13, 2013 and will extend until
May 18, 2019.  She replaces Judge Jennifer B. Coffman, who retired on
January 8 before the end of her term.  Another appointment, to replace
outgoing Judge John D. Bates, whose term ends tomorrow, is imminent, said
Sheldon Snook, spokesman for the Court.

The FIS Court authorizes electronic surveillance and physical searches for
intelligence and counterterrorism purposes. The current membership of the
Court is listed here:

        http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/court2013.html

Judge Eagan was appointed to the federal bench by President George W. Bush
in 2001.

The FIS Court has been discussed lately as a potential model for some form
of judicial review of the use of drones in lethal strikes against suspected
terrorists. Speaking at the February 7 confirmation hearing of John Brennan
to be CIA Director, Senate Intelligence Committee chair Sen. Dianne
Feinstein said her Committee would examine "the proposal to create an
analogue of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review the
conduct of such strikes."

But the application of the FISA model for authorizing intelligence
surveillance to the substantially different issue of lethal targeting would
not be straightforward, and may not be appropriate at all.

The notion "that federal judges ought to be assigned the task of
monitoring, mediating and approving the killer instincts of our government
[...] is a very bad idea," wrote Judge James Robertson, a former FIS Court
member, in the Washington Post ("Judges shouldn't decide about drone
strikes," February 15).

UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY, AND MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that
Congress has chosen not to make available to the public include the
following.

Federal Reserve: Unconventional Monetary Policy Options, February 19,
2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42962.pdf

Federal Assault Weapons Ban: Legal Issues, February 14, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42957.pdf

Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: Issues in Innovation and
Competitiveness, February 15, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42960.pdf

Unauthorized Aliens: Policy Options for Providing Targeted Immigration
Relief, February 13, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42958.pdf

Cars, Trucks, and Climate: EPA Regulation of Greenhouse Gases from Mobile
Sources, February 14, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40506.pdf

Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, February 15, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf

Exemptions for Firearms in Bankruptcy, February 15, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41799.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Cyberattacke – Hacker spionieren jetzt auch Apple aus

http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article113765478/Hacker-spionieren-jetzt-auch-Apple-aus.html

Monty Python – Football – Film

 

Monty Python – Football – Film

monty python guyswith their crazy ideas

Revealed – Iran Zelzaal Rocket Probable 1-Day Attack on US

Iran Zelzaal Rocket Probable 1-Day Attack on US

 


A sends:

Our Persian observer reports that Iran has made its southern missile and rocket launchers and silos ready for a probable 1-day attack. Based on what we hear, there is high chance of a very small scale fire exchange between the two sides and then call it a mistake. It is a common practice in such situations and we think such test must happen before the upcoming Iranian presidential election, to have a added-value score for Americans. It is a military text book fact that such event is going to happen and this article tips off Iranians are concentrating on the south. It also offer thorough details of Zelzaal, a solid fuel rocket that is set to destroy American airplanes before they get the chance to fly off the band [ground].

http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/195032/%D8%AF%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%82%E2%80%8E%
D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%
B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%
D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%87%D8%
A7-%D9%88-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%
DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3

China-Hacker – Europäische Sicherheitsexperten sagen wachsende Gefahr aus dem Internet voraus

http://www.bild.de/geld/wirtschaft/cyberwar/hacker-zentrale-china-28587324.bild.html

Der Beweis: Hackerangriff auf sparkasse.de

hacker

THE INVESTMENT MAGAZINE – THE ORIGINAL – DAS INVESTMENT MAGAZIN – DAS ORIGINAL – Hackeralarm bei den Sparkassen: Unbekannte haben am Montag eine Schadsoftware auf einzelnen Internet-Seiten von sparkasse.de platziert, wie der Deutsche Sparkassen- und Giroverband (DSGV) mitteilte.

“Kunden, die ohne aktuellen und aktiven Virenscanner auf sparkasse.de waren, könnten sich diese Schadsoftware auf den eigenen Rechner geladen haben.” Betroffene Kunden sollten ihren Rechner mit einem gängigen Virenschutzprogramm durchsuchen und die Schadsoftware beseitigen, empfahl der DSGV am Dienstag.

Am Montag sei zwischen 12.45 Uhr und 17.05 ein seit Anfang des Jahres im Internet kursierender Trojaner auf der Sparkassen-Seite aktiv gewesen, erklärte ein DSGV-Sprecher. In dieser Zeit hätten rund 30.000 Besucher die Homepage besucht, auf der diverse Angebote der Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe beworben werden. Einzelne Sparkassen-Filialen oder Online-Banking-Angebote seien nicht betroffen gewesen. “Auch Angriffe auf Homebanking-Programme von Kunden wurden nicht beobachtet.”

Die IT-Experten der Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe nahmen die Seiten am Montag umgehend vom Netz, als sie den Trojaner entdeckten. Die Angebote seien erst nach eingehender Prüfung wieder online gestellt worden, erklärte der DSGV. “Dadurch konnte der Angriffsversuch schnell unterbunden werden.”

TMZ – Porn Star Alexis Texas: No Black Guys for Me, Please!

 

TMZ – Porn Star Alexis Texas: No Black Guys for Me, Please!

Alexis Texas, one of the most famous porn stars in the world, takes issue against bangin’ black dudes! Is this horribly racist — or just part of her BRILLIANT master plan?

Unveiled by PI – New York Fusion Center Threat Assessment: Major Terror Attacks Against Hotels

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NYSIC-HotelAttacks.png

New York State Intelligence Center Threat Assessment: Major Terror Attacks against Hotels, 2002-2011

  • 12 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • March 29, 2012

Download

This product analyzes major terror attacks on hotels and provides a strategic-level assessment of the groups, tactics, and frequency of global terror attacks against hotels from 2002 – 2011. Additionally, the product identifies the deadliest types of attacks, comparing casualty counts and attack methods. The product was derived from media reporting and unclassified, for official use only sources.

Key Assumptions

Radical Islamic groups, including al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda linked groups continue to plan attacks against the West, including the United States (US). These groups view civilians as potential targets and will continue to use a variety of attack methods. Lack of information pertaining to a certain category in this report does not necessarily represent the absence of a threat. However, the frequency and tactic of attack analyzed in this report may indicate the most common vulnerabilities to an attack on the hotel sector.

Executive Summary

Since 2002 there have been 18 major terrorist attacks against hotels worldwide; a major attack is defined as an attack resulting in at least 10 casualties. During this time period there were no attacks against US homeland-based hotels. Groups with a connection to al-Qaeda carried out all but one of these major attacks.

  • An attack on a hotel within New York State or the US would most likely follow the current predominant worldwide trend and utilize explosives or small arms.
    • Major attacks against hotels were primarily carried out using a military grade explosive; however, an explosive device constructed within the US would most likely use homemade explosives, such as triacetone triperoxide (TATP).
    • The use of small arms to attack a US-based hotel may be seen as a more viable option than trying to assemble a homemade explosive. Al Qaeda and their affiliates have encouraged Western-based radicals to use small arms to carry out attacks because of their ease of use and availability in comparison to building an explosive device.
  • The likelihood of an al-Qaeda-inspired lone actor successfully attacking a hotel is low. However, lone actors in the US have shown an interest in targeting hotels previously. For example, Farooque Ahmed, arrested in April 2010, conducted pre-operational surveillance at a Washington, D.C. area hotel.
  • A key leader or high-profile event/mass casualty opportunity was targeted in nearly 50% of the attacks, and represents a possible motivating factor for targeting.
  • The most common tactic used against hotels is a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), accounting for 43% of the attacks analyzed in this report.

Film – Monty Python – Dirty Hungarian Phrasebook

 

Monty Python – Dirty Hungarian Phrasebook

 

The Dirty Hungarian Phrasebook sketch and courtroom scene from Monty Python’s Flying Circus

TMZ – Did Miss America Wear FAKE Abs?

 

Miss America Mallory Hagan had rock hard abs during the competition… but recent bikini photos tell quite the different story. So one’s gotta ask — did Miss America FAKE her awesome abs!?

Unveiled – TEPCO Handouts on Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Handouts at Press Conferences

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/index-e.html

Samples:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130204_01-e.pdf

[Image]

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130206_01-e.pdf

[Image]

 


TOP-SECRET – Moynihan Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy Report

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/MoynihanReportGovernmentSecrecy.png

 

 

 

Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy

  • Senate Document 105-2
  • 275 pages
  • December 31, 1997

Download

It is time for a new way of thinking about secrecy.

Secrecy is a form of government regulation. Americans are familiar with the tendency to overregulate in other areas. What is different with secrecy is that the public cannot know the extent or the content of the regulation.

Excessive secrecy has significant consequences for the national interest when, as a result, policymakers are not fully informed, government is not held accountable for its actions, and the public cannot engage in informed debate. This remains a dangerous world; some secrecy is vital to save lives, bring miscreants to justice, protect national security, and engage in effective diplomacy. Yet as Justice Potter Stewart noted in his opinion in the Pentagon Papers case, when everything is secret, nothing is secret. Even as billions of dollars are spent each year on government secrecy, the classification and personnel security systems have not always succeeded at their core task of protecting those secrets most critical to the national security. The classification system, for example, is used too often to deny the public an understanding of the policymaking process, rather than for the necessary protection of intelligence activities and other highly sensitive matters.

The classification and personnel security systems are no longer trusted by many inside and outside the Government. It is now almost routine for American officials of unquestioned loyalty to reveal classified information as part of ongoing policy disputes—with one camp “leaking” information in support of a particular view, or to the detriment of another—or in support of settled administration policy. In the process, this degrades public service by giving a huge advantage to the least scrupulous players.

The best way to ensure that secrecy is respected, and that the most important secrets remain secret, is for secrecy to be returned to its limited but necessary role. Secrets can be protected more effectively if secrecy is reduced overall.

Benefits can flow from moving information that no longer needs protection out of the classification system and, in appropriate cases, from not classifying at all. We live in an information-rich society, one in which more than ever before open sources—rather than covert means of collection—can provide the information necessary to permit well-informed decisions. Too often, our secrecy system proceeds as if this information revolution has not happened, imposing costs by compartmentalizing information and limiting access.

Greater openness permits more public understanding of the Government’s actions and also makes it more possible for the Government to respond to criticism and justify those actions. It makes free exchange of scientific information possible and encourages discoveries that foster economic growth. In addition, by allowing for a fuller understanding of the past, it provides opportunities to learn lessons from what has gone before—making it easier to resolve issues concerning the Government’s past actions and helping prepare for the future.

This does not mean that we believe the public should be privy to all government information. Certain types of information—for example, the identity of sources whose exposure would jeopardize human life, signals or imagery intelligence the loss of which would profoundly hinder the capability to collect critical data, or information that could aid terrorists—must be assiduously protected. There must be zero tolerance for permitting such information to be released through unauthorized means, including through deliberate or inadvertent leaks. But when the business of government requires secrecy, it should be employed in a manner that takes risks into account and attempts to control costs.

It is time to reexamine the long-standing tension between secrecy and openness, and develop a new way of thinking about government secrecy as we move into the next century. It is to that end that we direct our recommendations.

Ours is the first analysis authorized by statute of the workings of secrecy in the United States Government in 40 years, and only the second ever. We started our work with the knowledge that many commissions and reports on government secrecy have preceded us, with little impact on the problems we still see and on the new ones we have found.

In undertaking our mission to look at government secrecy, we have observed when the secrecy system works well, and when it does not. We have looked at the consequences of the lack of adequate protection. We have sought to diagnose the current system, and to identify what works and ways the system can work better. Above all, we have sought to understand how best to achieve both better protection and greater openness.

That the secrecy system that evolved and grew over the course of the 20th century would remain essentially unchanged and unexamined by the public was predictable. It is to be expected of a regulatory system essentially hidden from view. Some two million Federal officials, civil and military, and another one million persons in industry, have the ability to classify information. Categories of administrative markings also have proliferated over time, and the secrecy system has become ever more complex. The system will perpetuate itself absent outside intervention, and in doing so maintain not only its many positive features, but also those elements that are detrimental to both our democracy and our security.

It is time for legislation. There needs to be some check on the unrestrained discretion to create secrets. There needs to be an effective mode of declassification.

To improve the functioning of the secrecy system and the implementation of established rules, we recommend a statute that sets forth the principles for what may be
declared secret.

Apart from aspects of nuclear energy subject to the Atomic Energy Act, secrets in the Federal Government are whatever anyone with a stamp decides to stamp secret. There is no statutory base and never has been; classification and declassification have been governed for nearly five decades by a series of executive orders, but none has created a stable and reliable system that ensures we protect well what needs protecting but nothing more. What has been consistently lacking is the discipline of a legal framework to clearly define and enforce the proper uses of secrecy. Such a system inevitably degrades.

We therefore propose the following as the framework for a statute that establishes the principles on which classification and declassification should be based:

Sec. 1 Information shall be classified only if there is a demonstrable need to protect the information in the interests of national security, with the goal of ensuring that classification is kept to an absolute minimum consistent with these interests.

Sec. 2 The President shall, as needed, establish procedures and structures for classification of information. Procedures and structures shall be established and resources allocated for declassification as a parallel program to classification. Details of these programs and any revisions to them shall be published in the Federal Register and subject to notice and comment procedures.

Sec. 3 In establishing the standards and categories to apply in determining whether information should be or remain classified, such standards and categories shall include consideration of the benefit from public disclosure of the information and weigh it against the need for initial or continued protection under the classification system. If there is significant doubt whether information requires protection, it shall not be classified.

Sec. 4 Information shall remain classified for no longer than ten years, unless the agency specifically recertifies that the particular information requires continued protection based on current risk assessments. All information shall be declassified after 30 years, unless it is shown that demonstrable harm to an individual or to ongoing government activities will result from release. Systematic declassification schedules shall be established. Agencies shall submit annual reports on their classification and declassification programs to the Congress.

Sec. 5 This statute shall not be construed as authority to withhold information from the Congress.

Sec. 6 There shall be established a National Declassification Center to coordinate, implement, and oversee the declassification policies and practices of the Federal Government. The Center shall report annually to the Congress and the President on its activities and on the status of declassification practices by all Federal agencies that use, hold, or create classified information.

STASI-Agent enttarnt – Deckname IM “Jochen”

http://www.bild.de/unterhaltung/leute/stasi/stasi-beichte-in-bild-28565858.bild.html

Monty Python and the Holy Grail – She’s a witch!

 

Monty Python and the Holy Grail… 😀

Unveiled by Cryptome – Saudi Arabian Drone Base Under Construction

UM ALMALH AIRPORT

Cost of more than 86 million ..

To approve the creation of airport or salt to guard the southern border of the Empty Quarter

[Image]

Design proposal for the airport or salt to guard the southern border of the Empty Quarter.

Issued approval of the High Commissioner on an airport or salt to guard the southern border of the Empty Quarter near from [Asha] province at a total cost estimated at 86.318.104 million riyals and this covers airports, border guards full limits of the Empty Quarter to serve the citizens living in those remote areas.

This was stated by Director General of Border Guard, Maj. Gen. / Zmim bin Joiber whipper noting that it comes within the framework of the keenness and rulers may Allah to provide all that would serve the people of the nation and overcome difficulties and said that the issuance of this approval Commissioner to an airport or salt in the south of the Empty Quarter near from [Asha] province aims to provide support and transport, surveillance and medical evacuation in addition to the service of the citizens living in those remote areas.

And between General Zmim whipper that because of the difficulty of terrain Empty Quarter desert and what it represents challenges to the work of border guards, the State has guard God in an earlier period represented by the Ministry of Interior established a number four airports to border guards in the Empty Quarter, namely, (Batha – Shebeita – Ardh – Zabhloten) [see bases] so as to facilitate work transport and logistical support and evacuation centers for border guards.

Major General Sawat: airport offers support and medical evacuation of citizens living in remote areas

Whipper stressed that this project is one of the main pillars in the development of system and border guards supported by the Second Deputy Prime Minister and the Deputy Minister of the Interior and the direct supervision by HRH assistant interior minister for security affairs God keeps them all.

On the other hand, Director of Border Guard Aviation Affairs Brigadier Pilot / Khalid bin Abdullah Alersahan that the Department of Border Guard Aviation has prepared specifications required the assistance of local specialized consultancy offices and external to ensure matching international standards and safety requirements used in the establishment of international airports.

[Image]

Aerial photography of the airport. [The complex shown without the fabric hangars which would be at top center.]

The Brigadier Alersahan that the airport, which was awarded the total amount of (86.318.104) million includes a runway length of 3 km and a width of 60 meters capable of accommodating various types of civilian and military aircraft of different sizes including the aircraft Boeing 747 in addition to the parking planes were designed to accommodate up to four planes of the same size, the project also includes support services and communications system and advanced navigational devices and approved by international aviation authorities to ensure aviation safety and to the highest international standards and that would qualify the airport for use in various weather conditions.

It is worth mentioning that the border guards occurred several months before the contract with the CEO of Flight School at the University of North Dakota, United States of America to train 30 pilots of the employees of border guards within the strategy of the Ministry of Interior to develop security capabilities and strengthen the infrastructure of the security services.

[Owen Boswarva notes that the University of North Dakota has a drone pilot training program.]

_____

9 February 2013. This base appears to be a Saudi Arabian border guard facility located at Umm Al Melh. It may also serve as a CIA drone base but no evidence has been found for that use. Owen Boswarva discovered the metadata of the Wired Bing image of the site, below, giving the date of February 17, 2012, several months after the drone killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011.

Entering the coordinates of the Bing image discovered by Wire, 19.102438,50.120902, in Google Maps produces:

[Image]

A Google search on Umm Al Melh produces several items about the facility contractor and staff (not excluding the possibility the work was contracted through Blackwater/Xe/Academia — the initial date of the contract is close to the reports of when Blackwater was engaged to build a drone base):

http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c0/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A-ewIE8TIwN_
D38LA09vV7NQP8cQQ_dgE_3g1Dz9gmxHRQDvjvPB/?x=1&ANNOUNCEMENT_NO=22694

Abdullah A. M. Al-Khodari Sons Company announces the signing of a contract with the Ministry of Interior (Border Guard)

2011-09-20 (1432-10-22 ) 08:26:54

With reference to the earlier announcement of 06/09/1432H corresponding to 06/08/2011G, Abdullah A. M. Al-Khodari Sons Company announces the completion of the signing of a contract with the Ministry of Interior (Border Guard) for the construction of the second phase of Border Guard Airport in Umm Almelh (South of the Kingdom Empty Quarter) within a period of 720 days from the date of contract signing on 23/08/2011. The contract is valued at SAR 120,665,267 as per the contract copy which was received by the company on 19/09/2011. The financial impact of this project is expected to be in the fourth quarter of the current financial year. [This suggests the airport is to be completed by August 2013.]

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[Image]

 


8 February 2013

 


Wired’s discovery of a drone base in Saudi Arabia is exemplary spotting.

No date for the facility has been provided, although there are reports construction was authorized in 2010 and the construction contract given to Blackwater/Xe/Academia.

Add 9 February 2013:

Owen Boswarva discovered the metadata of the Wired Bing image of the site, below, giving the date of February 17, 2012, several months after the drone killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011.

Close examination of the base shows that it is under construction and far from ready for drone flights.

If it was used to launch the drone that killed Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011 that means the photos show it well before that time.

It might be estimated that the stage of construction shown could be about 6-8 months after start, and about that amount of time to completion.

[Image]

The main runway is being cast in concrete flags, square in shape, probably atop compacted gravel, and is far from complete. Checkboard casting patterns are conventional: Cast the first flag in steel formwork, after the concrete sets remove the formwork, then cast concrete flags in the the voids created. Leave gaps for expansion joint segments.

[Image]

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A concrete mixing plant is some distance away.

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A secondary dirt runway has piles of material on it, thus not usable.

[Image]

In front of the clamshell structures which will house the drones there is amply packed construction trailers, sheds and materials where drones will be readied for flight. There appears to be security fencing and/or bollards around this area (the only on the whole site) which may indicate need for protection of sensitive apparatus and personnel. Close-by construction trailers here are separated from those for the rest of the facility, some located within the security fencing, others not.

[Image]

[Image]

Ribs of a fabric structure lie flat before erection.

[Image]

Foundation excavated for a future structure adjoining the apron.

[Image]

The construction workers camp, with little or no security surrounding it. Two sewage pits. Circular driving track is peculiar, perhaps to train truck drivers for the many open-top tractor-trailers shown. Many trucks were needed to haul in materials over 240 miles from the nearest main Saudi town.

[Image]

Foundation excavations for flight lines or support structures.

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TMZ – Beyonce’s ‘Life Is But a Dream’ — Is She WORSE than Gwyneth Paltrow?

 

TMZ – Beyonce’s ‘Life Is But a Dream’ — Is She WORSE than Gwyneth Paltrow?

Beyonce has been leading a rather highfalutin lifestyle as of late… but has she become more hoighty-toighty than Gwyneth Paltrow? One man dared to ask the question…

PI – New Jersey Fusion Center School Shootings Commonalities Analysis

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NJROIC-SchoolShootings.png

 

New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center School Shootings Commonalities

  • 5 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • November 15, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) This report attempts to analyze the indicators and commonalities of recent school shootings in an effort to inform public safety officials and assist in the detection and prevention of potential school shooter plots or attacks. All incidents included in this assessment occurred in the United States while classes were in session. Domestic violence shootings and gang violence were not included in an effort to differentiate between “active shooter” incidents and other acts of violence. DHS defines an “active shooter” as an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.

(U//FOUO) Recently several school shooting plots and attacks have occurred throughout the United States, which has resulted in the deaths and injuries of their victims. These incidents included:

  • January 2011 (Utah) – Law enforcement officers arrested two teenagers after discovering that they planned to bomb their high school. The two suspects had blueprints of the school and planned to escape after their attack by stealing a plane at a nearby airport.
  • February 2011 (Ohio) – A student killed three classmates and injured two others at a high school when he opened fire in the cafeteria.
  • April 2012 (California) – A school shooting left seven people dead and three others wounded when a nursing student opened fire at a small Christian college.
  • October 2012 (Maryland) – A 15-year old high school student shot and critically injured a classmate on the first day of school.

(U//FOUO) One or more plots or shootings have occurred in each of the last 10 years in the United States, resulting in the deaths of students and school administrators. These attacks have occurred at all types of schools, including elementary, high school, college, and other educational institutions. In every instance of a school shooting attack in the United States during this period, the attacker has used small arms or homemade explosives.

Use of Social Media

(U//FOUO) In the past several years, the majority of students who have conducted plots or attacks against their schools have publicized their anger or intentions through the use of social media. Not every instance of expression of anger will necessarily result in violence, but when school shootings have occurred, the perpetrators have often previously expressed a fixation with death or inflicting pain on others.

(U//FOUO) While students have used social media to express their anger and intentions to attack their schools, this type of action is neither new nor limited to online activity. Even without the use of online media, students have expressed their frustration and intentions through other outlets by using handwritten journals, notes, and drawings. These documents can indicate pre-operational planning, as illustrated in the 1999 Columbine shooting. Diary entries of the Columbine shooters, released in 2006, not only contained their anger but also reminders to fill ammunition clips and acquire bomb-making materials, including nails, propane, and fuses.

(U//FOUO) Recent examples of students publicizing their intentions to plot or attack their schools include the following:

January 2011 (Nebraska) – A high school student who shot one administrator and killed another posted ominous messages on his Facebook page that read., “You’re gonna hear about the evil [expletive] I did but that [expletive] school drove me to this. I want you guys to remember me for who I was before this. I greatly affected the lives of the families ruined but I’m sorry. Goodbye.”  These attacks occurred despite the existence of these postings because friends or family were unaware of these writings until law enforcement investigated the shootings and searched the students’ computers.

February 2012 (Ohio) – Authorities discovered several Facebook postings by a high school student attending Chardon High School after he killed three classmates. One of his Facebook postings read, “He longed for only one thing, the world to bow at his feet,” and ended ominously, “Die, all of you.”

In 2012 law enforcement officers arrested several students after they posted threatening language online. In one instance, in January 2012, two students were arrested for planning to bomb their school after one of them shared their plans with another student, who then informed school officials. When questioned by law enforcement, one of the students stated that not only was the 1999 Columbine High School shooting their inspiration, but also that they hoped to surpass its death toll. This instance and several others in which a concerned student or parent informed the local police department, preventing the attack, demonstrate the importance of reporting suspicious activities.

(U//FOUO) While social media has provided students with a venue to post their anger and intent, the Internet can also provide them with access to violent web sites. Violent online material has the potential to influence an already emotionally troubled student producing sometimes negative and deadly consequences. In 2005 a 16-year old, who posed messages on a neo-Nazi website calling himself the Angel of Death, killed nine people and wounded seven before committing suicide. Some online material can also provide instructions on weapons use and bomb construction.

Who are the shooters?

(U//FOUO) In the last 10 years, male students have been responsible for the majority of school shootings nationwide. Students who perpetrated attacks were also more likely to know their intended targets rather than to attack their victims randomly. When students targeted an administrator, they believed that either the school failed to protect them from bullies, or the student felt school officials unfairly reprimanded them.

(U//FOUO) The remaining attackers were outsiders with no relationship to the school or school employees who attacked their supervisors because of employment disputes. One instance of a school employee attacking a school occurred in March 2012, when hours after a teacher was fired, he returned to school and shot dead a school administrator prior to committing suicide. Outsider shooters with no relation to the school, on the other hand, are more likely to attack their victims randomly because these attackers had no discernible association with the school and had no grievances with any potential victims.

(U//FOUO) In 2006, two separate outsider attackers shared similar tactics, one at Platte Canyon High School in Colorado in September, and another at an Amish school at Nickel Mines, PA, in October. In both incidents, the gunmen attacked the schools, took several female students hostage, and killed one or more students, before taking their own lives moments before law enforcement officers broke into the classrooms. The threat from outside attackers is not, however, limited to a gunman entering a school. Shooters have also targeted students by waiting outside the school or near the perimeter during recess or at dismissal.

BLOOMBERG TV – At Cyber War: How Chinese Hackers Spy on You

 

Megan Hughes reports on Chinese hackers and efforts to prevent the security breaches. (Source: Bloomberg)

Monty Python – The Cheese Shop sketch

 

Monty Python – The Cheese Shop sketch

Cryptome unveils Homeland Security TSWG Controlled Items

Homeland Security TSWG Controlled Items

Links go to the GPO bookstore.

 


http://newbookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/homeland-security-
tswg-controlled-items?sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC&items_per_page=60

Homeland Security TSWG Controlled Items

Combined CBTool/PCW Building Protection Design Tool (TSWG Controlled Item) (CD-ROM)

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Workinfg Group and United Technologies Research CenterGPO Stock # 008-001-00213-1 ISBN: 9780160888649

This is a controlled item. To order, please send an e-mail request to the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) at PUBS@TSWG.GOV and provide the publication title, quantity, contact and organization name, mailing address and phone number. Security contractors must provide the name of the sponsoring Government agency and its contact information. TSWG will approve your order via e-mail and furnish an approval number. You may then place your order, accompanied by a copy of the confirmation e-mail and approval number, to GPO via fax. Our fax number is 202-512-2104. Thank you.

Price: $32.00

By: Defense Dept.GPO Stock # 008-001-00203-3 ISBN: 9780160856655

Book says “Dari” on the back cover. This document is not for public use, but for military, Federal, State, and local agencies as a reference for training and operations in preparing for and responding to a terrorist threat. Publication is general and may not reflect the most recent threats. Issued with spiral binding. sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $75.00

By: Defense Dept.GPO Stock # 008-001-00205-0 ISBN: 9780160856679

Contains images and Urdu-language text describing the indicators and warnings pertaining to homemade explosives. This booklet provides a quick reference to establish an awareness level so that responders can visually recognize the materials, chemicals, and equipment associated with the manufacture of homemade explosives. The Guide will help all on-scene personnel visually assess the possibility that a situation involves the manufacture of homemade explosives. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $75.00

By: Defense Dept.GPO Stock # 008-001-00201-7 ISBN: 9780160854330

This document is not for public use, but for military, Federal, State, and local agencies as a reference for training and operations by emergency personnel in preparing for and responding to a terrorist incident. Information in this publication is general and may not reflect the most recent threats.

Price: $75.00

By: Defense Dept.GPO Stock # 008-001-00202-5 ISBN: 9780160856648

Contains images and Farsi-language text describing the indicators and warnings pertaining to homemade explosives. This booklet provides a quick reference to establish an awareness level so that responders can visually recognize the materials, chemicals, and equipment associated with the manufacture of homemade explosives. The guide will help all on-scene personnel visually assess the possibility that a situation involves the manufacture of homemade explosives. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $75.00

By: Defense Dept.GPO Stock # 008-001-00204-1 ISBN: 9780160856662

Contains images and Pashto-language text describing the indicators and warnings pertaining to homemade explosives. This booklet provides a quick reference to establish an awareness level so that responders can visually recognize the materials, chemicals, and equipment associated with the manufacture of homemade explosives. The Guide will help all on-scene personnel visually assess the possibility that a situation involves the manufacture of homemade explosives. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $75.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00187-8 ISBN: 9780160799297

The Explosive Breaching Characterization Handbook is a technical reference guide for use during explosive breaching training and operations. The Handbook includes information on Target Intelligence, Explosive Breaching Safety, Breaching Charge construction, and other technical data. The guide is for use by civilian law enforcement operators who have been professionally trained in explosive breaching. It is printed on waterproof paper, spiral bound, and suitable for operational use in the field.

Price: $57.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working Group, National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00186-0 ISBN: 9780160796821

Prepared in cooperation with St. Petersburg College, National Terrorism Preparedness Institute. Helps train personnel who may be involved with the inspection of merchant vessels to determine various indicators of suspect hidden Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on a range of vessel types. The MVIG Training Support Package binder contains the 520-page instructor manual, a CD-ROM containing all course materials, and a DVD containing the classroom support materials. On cover: “Security Warning: For Official Use Only. Law Enforcement Sensitive.”

Price: $242.00

By: Defense Dept., Technial Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00176-2 ISBN: 0-16-075921-8

The MVIG is a 188-page guide for determining various indicators of suspect hidden Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on a range of vessel types, recognition of typical representative IED types, and has a training section for recognition of explosives and IED types, HAZMAT markings and WMD devices. It is printed on waterproof paper, spiral-bound, and suitable for operational use in the maritime environment. Prepared especially for police and fire departments. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $76.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00175-4 ISBN:

The SSEG provides professionals across the Department of Defense conducting SSE missions with a ready reference and operational guideline for SSE operations in the presence of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) materials. This guidebook serves as a job aid in the pre-incident, incident, and post-incident management of SSE reconnaissance and mitigation. The 94-page SSEG contains elements related to force protection, SSE planning, execution and operations, as well as decontamination procedures, U.S., International, and United Nations (UN) Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) labels, service component information, reference list, and website links. Sold in packages of 10 copies only.

Price: $97.50

By: Defense Dept., TSWGGPO Stock # 008-001-00157-6 ISBN:

This is a controlled item. To order, please send an e-mail request to the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) at PUBS@TSWG.GOV and provide the publication title, quantity, contact and organization name, mailing address and phone number. Security contractors must provide the name of the sponsoring Government agency and its contact information. TSWG will approve your order via e-mail and furnish an approval number. You may then place your order, accompanied by a copy of the confirmation e-mail and approval number, to GPO via fax. Our fax number is 202-512-2104. Thank you.

Price: $145.00

By: Defense Dept., Army, Corps of Engineers and Interagency Technical Support Working CroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00158-4 ISBN: 0-16-051074-0

WINDAS is a database query program for the existing data on glass response to blast loads. In addition, WINDAS contains a graphical British Hazard Guide calculator for predicting window debris hazard levels to personnel from blast events. HAZL is a robust model for calculating window response and personnel hazard. It uses a Single Degree of Freedom model for window response up to failure and a debris transport model for predicting fragment trajectory. WINDAS and HAZL are available on one CD-ROM.

Price: $21.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working Group, Combating Terrorism Technology Support OfficeGPO Stock # 008-001-00159-2 ISBN: 0-16-051073-2

The SWIG is a guide for determining various indicators of suspect hidden Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on a range of vessel types, recognition of typical representative IED types, and has a training section for recognition of explosives and IED types. It is printed on waterproof paper, spiral-bound, and suitable for field use.

Price: $9.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00161-4 ISBN:

CMUDS was developed for use by civil engineers and architects in the design of buildings and structures to better withstand terrorist bomb blasts. CMUDS is provided on a CD-ROM and supports the rapid search and retrieval of charge, applied load, damage level, and deflection data applicable to CMU structures. The user specifies the search conditions used to obtain the database records. Retrieved records may contain drawings, photographs, plots, as well as tabulated text and numeric information, all of which can be displayed in the various windows of the CMUDS graphical user interface (GUI).

Price: $21.00

By: Defense Dept., TSWGGPO Stock # 008-001-00162-2 ISBN:

This is a controlled item. To order, please send an e-mail request to the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) at PUBS@TSWG.GOV and provide the publication title, quantity, contact and organization name, mailing address and phone number. Security contractors must provide the name of the sponsoring Government agency and its contact information. TSWG will approve your order via e-mail and furnish an approval number. You may then place your order, accompanied by a copy of the confirmation e-mail and approval number, to GPO via fax. Our fax number is 202-512-2104. Thank you.

Price: $123.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)GPO Stock # 008-001-00164-9 ISBN: 0-16-068073-5

This guide presents ready reference material associated with planning and executing programs and operations for protecting personnel and assets against the threat of vehicle bombs. The 143-page guide is available in a waterproof flip chart format, and contains information on the threat, trends and forecast, explosives detection methods, blast and fragment mitigation methods and key points for incident commanders. The approach is to provide best practices for conducting vehicle searches and using blast and fragment mitigation devices. Was sold in packages of 10 copies only.

Price: $178.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working Group, Combating Terrorism Technology Support OfficeGPO Stock # 008-001-00165-7 ISBN: 0-16-073076-7

The SWIG TSP consists of a three-ring binder containing printed instructor guidance, a student manual, and PowerPoint slides for instructional use.. Included with the shrink- wrapped binder are two VHS Video Tapes, one containing Train the Trainer Video, and the other containing classroom support video clips and the final exam. Also included in the package is a CD-ROM with Train the Trainer Video clips and the printable documentation, PowerPoint presentations, and Classroom Video Clips.

Price: $105.00

 

By: Defense Dept. and the National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00167-3 ISBN: 0-16-072457-0

A CD-ROM version of the printed Railcar Inspection Guide (RIG) available for Windows-based computers. Provides guidelines to assess and screen railcars for improvised explosive devices, weapons of mass destruction, and other contraband. Provides a standardized railcar inspection process with an illustrated walk-through. Highlights important design features that affect the car’s use as a large bomb, provides indications of the typical uses, and states conditions that may indicate an enhanced threat.

Price: $23.00

By: Defense Dept. and the National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00169-0 ISBN: 0-16-073200-X

Provides guidelines to assess and screen railcars for improvised explosive devices, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and other contraband. The RIG provides a standardized railcar inspection process with an illustrated walk-through. This field guide highlights important design features that affect the car’s use as a large bomb, provides indications of the typical uses, and states conditions that may indicate an enhanced threat. Sold in packages of 10 copies only.

Price: $181.50

By: Defense Dept. and the National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00170-3 ISBN: 0-16-073201-8

Spiral bound. provides guidelines to security personnel assigned the responsibility of assessing and screening personnel for concealed/improvised weapons, explosive devices, and other contraband. The information is meant to be applied in conjunction with previous training, experience, and standard procedures and policies. The guide has a training section for recognition of improvised and commercial weapon types; specialty firearms and handguns; explosive materials and devices; and WMD materials and devices. It is printed on waterproof paper, spiral-bound, and suitable for field use. Sold in packages of 10 copies only.

Price: $268.00

By: Defense Dept. and the National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00171-1 ISBN: 0-16-073225-5

Consists of a three-ring binder containing printed instructor guidance, a student manual, and PowerPoint slides for instructional use. Included with the shrink-wrapped binder are two VHS video tapes; one containing a Train-the-Trainer video, and the other containing classroom support video clip scenarios. Also included in the package are three CD-ROMs and one DVD containing, in a digitized format, all information in the manuals, PowerPoint slides, and video clips.

Price: $128.00

By: Defense Dept. and the National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00172-0 ISBN: 0-16-073237-9

Looseleaf. The RIG TSP consists of a three-ring binder containing printed instructor guidance, a student manual, and PowerPoint slides for instructional use. Included with the shrink-wrapped binder are two VHS video tapes; one containing a Train-the-Trainer video, and the other containing classroom support video clip scenarios. Also included in the package is a CD-ROM containing, in a digitized format, all information in the manuals, PowerPoint slides, and videoclips.

Price: $93.50

By: Defense Dept. and the National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00173-8 ISBN: 0-16-073238-7

Looseleaf. The PSG TSP consists of a three-ring binder containing printed instructor guidance, a student manual, and PowerPoint slides for instructional use. Included with the shrink-wrapped binder are two VHS video tapes; one containing a Train-the-Trainer video, and the other containing classroom support video clip scenarios. Also included in the package is a CD-ROM containing, in a digitized format, all information in the manuals, PowerPoint slides, and video clips.

Price: $81.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00174-6 ISBN: 0-16-075653-7

The RFWG, also known as the Security Procedures and Protocols for Mitigating Radio Frequency Threats, is for use by Government agencies and Industry dealing with protection of infrastructure facilities against RFW threats. This includes government facilities, electric power generation facilities, petroleum industry, communication networks, transportation industry, and banking systems. The RFWG is a 128-page field guide that includes guidelines, definitions of the RFW threat; identification of threat devices and how they are employed; defensive tactics, techniques, and procedures; establishing controlled areas, and how to respond to an RFW attack.

Price: $55.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00178-9 ISBN:

The BPG Bridges is a 74-page guide that focuses on identifying vulnerabilities of different bridge types. The BPG Bridges is printed on waterproof paper, spiral-bound, and suitable for operational use in the maritime environment.

Price: $39.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working Group, Investigative Support and Forensics SubgroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00179-7 ISBN: 9780160778728

The DCCTV Guide includes best practices, guidelines, and recommendations intended to provide personnel responsible for the collection of DCCTV evidence guidance in securing and collecting video data to maintain its integrity. Topics include native/proprietary file format, retrieval methods, media, legal concerns, and more. The 80-page DCCTV guide is printed on waterproof paper sized (4.5×6″) to fit into a pocket for field use.

Price: $34.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00180-1 ISBN:

A spiral-bound, pocket-sized (4.5″ x 7″), booklet printed on waterproof paper. Its purpose is to provide quick reference information about general indicators and warnings, production setups, and end products that are representative of plausible improvised chemical and biological agent production methods found in openly available literature. The handbook contains mock-up photographs and diagrams to assist security and response personnel in recognizing the telltale signs of improvised chemical or biological agent production, including the crude reagents and equipment used. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $13.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00181-9 ISBN:

The ISCS TSP is an eight hour course that combines WMD threat identification and current policies and regulations regarding inter-modal containers and security. This TSP is for training law enforcement and security personnel to an awareness level on the subject of Intermodal Supply Chain Security by utilizing an instructor and student manual, as well as PowerPoint presentations and video. The ISCS TSP is contained in a three-inch, three-ring binder, and includes 300 pages of Instructor Manual and Student Manuals and two CD-ROMs containing a Train-the-Trainer Video, PowerPoint Presentations and Classroom Videos.

Price: $215.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00182-7 ISBN:

Three-inch, three-ring binder, consisting of an instructor and student manuals, CD-ROM (s) with PowerPoint presentations and manuals, and classroom videos (DVD and VHS). The IED Awareness for First Responders TSP is a complete training package to train state and local Law Enforcement and Security Personnel to an awareness level on the subject of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The TSP focuses on information pertaining to current IED threats and countermeasures to train emergency responders to recognize IEDs, IED components, potential targets, and methods employed by terrorists using IEDs.

Price: $151.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00183-5 ISBN:

The SHBG is a 5″ X 7″ pocket guide providing performance and best practices focused on operational lessons learned and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for Law Enforcement and Security Personnel on the subject of Preparation for the Suicide/Homicide Bomber. The guide book, based on the content of the related Preparation for the Suicide/Homicide Bomber Training Support Package (TSP) is a reference for reviewing the training provided in the TSP. The guide is a succinct, compact, handy reference guide produced in an accessible and durable form. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $131.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00184-3 ISBN:

The VIG is a 5X7″ spiral bound 184 page booklet printed on waterproof paper. It is intended for determining various indicators of suspect hidden Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on a range of vehicle types, recognition of typical representative IED types, and has a training section for recognition of explosives and IED types. It is printed on waterproof paper, spiral bound, and suitable for field use. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $117.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00185-1 ISBN: 9780160795329

Designed as a quick reference guide for military, first responders, Federal, State, and local government personnel. The goal of this guidebook is to provide awareness level information that will allow on-scene personnel to rapidly assess that a situation involves the presence of homemade explosives. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $85.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00188-6 ISBN: 9780160800849

The SEEC Guide is a field guide for use by military and other Federal agencies for overseas evidence collection purposes. This guide provides best practices for conducting a systematic search of a secure location to enable the collection of evidence and information that can be used in the prosecution and conviction of detainees, as well as the development of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence information.

Price: $38.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00190-8 ISBN: 9780160800863

The SEEC TSP is a is a three-ring binder that contains a 392-page instructor manual, a CSI-style introduction to Evidence Collection DVD, and a CD-ROM containing all course materials and printable student materials to be used in classroom instruction principally for military personnel on evidence collection procedures and methodology during site exploitation (SE) operations.

Price: $210.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00191-6 ISBN: 9780160802713

For use by all emergency responders and military personnel confronting the need to decontaminate large groups of people affected by chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) events. Includes pre-incident response procedures for CBR Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incidents. The MPDTSP is a 288 page publication within a 3 ring binder containing an Instructor Guide, Instructor CD containing PowerPoint instructional slides, video files, and Student Guide. Also included are a Train-the-Trainer video and Classroom Support DVDs.

Price: $185.00

By: Defense Dept., Technial Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00192-4 ISBN: 9780160806421

Instructor manual for use in training Federal, State and local responders and law enforcement personnel, who are be involved with inspection of vehicles that may pose a terrorist threat. Covers topics such as Inspection Fundamentals, Interviewing, Passenger Vehicle Inspections, Commercial Vehicle Inspections, and also contains a glossary and student assessment. A COPY OF THE CONFIRMATION E-MAIL AND APPROVAL NUMBER. Issued in spiral binding. Prepared especially for police and fire departments. For Official Use Only. Law Enforcement Sensistive.

Price: $150.00

 

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00193-2 ISBN: 9780160806735

Guide for tunnel owners and operators, which identifies potential threats to tunnels. The best practices guide includes information on: tunnel configurations, tunnel threats and vulnerabilities, and how to assess the need for security upgrades via a risk assessment, and techniques for mitigating potential threats. Prepared in cooperation with St. Petersburg College, National Terrorism Preparedness Institute.

Price: $36.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00194-1 ISBN:

A complete package of training course materials designed for use in promoting understanding and positive interactions between Americans and Indonesians during in-country military operations. Covers definition and comparison of culture, government, economy, major and minor religions, people, social constructs, and language.

Price: $234.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00198-3 ISBN:

Intended to provide first responders from Federal, State and Local government services’ organizations with guidelines for evacuating civilian personnel from potential bomb threats. The booklet can also be used by emergency planners to develop personnel evacuation plans from specific buildings, sites, or facilities based on various bomb threat levels.

Price: $8.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working Group, Combating Terrorism Technology Support OfficeGPO Stock # 008-001-00199-1 ISBN: 9780160841903

Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) databases that catalogue critical infrastructures have been developed over the years by public utility/safety commissions, private corporations, and others. These COTS databases were identified and assessed for potential use with a Geographical Information System. Results of these assessments, including public safety assets, such as fire and police departments; public and private water systems; transportation systems; oil and gas distribution; electrical power grid; telecommunications facilities; and others, have been compiled into a Critical Infrastructure Database (CIDB). The database facilitates Internet access to ensure that databases are the most current.

Price: $9.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00200-9 ISBN: 9780160846090

Contains guidance on Armored Passenger Vehicle (APV) budget and procurement requirements, quality assurance/quality control procedures, vehicle classification specifications, general threat information, inventory control methods, driver training, vehicle maintenance, vehicle replacement, life cycle issues, ballistic and blast protection guidelines and testing protocols, and automotive performance guidelines and testing protocols.

Price: $21.00

By: Defense Dept., Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office; and Office of the Secretary of Defense Human Social Culture Behavior Modeling ProgramGPO Stock # 008-001-00206-8 ISBN: 9780160858710

A training guide that facilitates the development of cultural sensemaking and other critical thinking skills. The guide is organized around seven vignettes describing actual intercultural interactions that have taken place within operational contexts in Afghanistan and provides a typical American as well as a typical Afghan perspective on the situation (i.e., it describes the concerns and motivations driving thinking and decision making within the situation for both sides). Prepared in cooperation with Applied Research Associates. Issued with spiral binding. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $89.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00207-6 ISBN: 9780160864476

This guide provides the team leader with the items required for a comprehensive post-blast assessment report. It should be used when taking notes on-scene to ensure all appropriate data is recorded.

Price: $3.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00208-4 ISBN: 9780160864483

This instruction provides the knowledge necessary for EOD personnel to complete accurate and detailed exploitation and reporting of tactical post-blast incidents in accordance with the weapons intelligence lexicon. It presents tne general post-blast assessment processes and procedures required from on-scene arrival to succinct and timely reporting to higher echelons in an effort to prevent and deter future incidents. The goal is to enhance current EOD post-blast assessment classroom training within a highly accessible learning environment. For official use only.

Price: $25.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00209-2 ISBN: 9780160873751

A clear, concise, and easy-to-use Radiological Dispersion Device Recognition Guide for training and operational use by hazardous materials, explosive ordnance disposal/bomb squad, and other public safety personnel. The guidebook is focused on two high-priority sources: Cesium-137 and Iridium-192. copy of the confirmation e-mail and approval number, to GPO via fax. Our fax number is 202-512-2104. Thank you.

Price: $52.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00210-6 ISBN:

Intended for in the field use by personnel engaged in the collection of forensic evidence from an improvised explosive device. The card is meant to provide the user with summarized instructions for the collection, packaging and prioritization of forensic evidence.our order, accompanied by a copy of the confirmation e-mail and approval number, to GPO via fax. Our fax number is 202-512-2104. Thank you.

Price: $61.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00211-4 ISBN:

Intended to describe the use of the IDD Evidence Collection Card (GPO Stock Number 008-001-00210-6) to assist in the collection of forensic evidence after an IDD is rendered safe. The guide is meant to provide the user with detailed instructions as to the background, intention, use, and terminology used in the card.

Price: $7.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00212-2 ISBN: 9780160887345

Includes a survey and evaluation of existing blast mitigation technology, identification and assessment of the vulnerability of the US pipeline system, and the results of a test program to verify the performance of pipeline blast mitigation technologies. “Restricted for interagency use.”

Price: $33.00

By:GPO Stock # 008-001-00215-7 ISBN:

Price: $25.00

By: Defense Dept., Technial Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00214-9 ISBN:

This is a controlled item. To order, please send an e-mail request to the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) at PUBS@TSWG.GOV and provide the publication title, quantity, contact and organization name, mailing address and phone number. Security contractors must provide the name of the sponsoring Government agency and its contact information. TSWG will approve your order via e-mail and furnish an approval number. You may then place your order, accompanied by a copy of the confirmation e-mail and approval number, to GPO via fax. Our fax number is 202-512-2104. Thank you.

Price: $19.00


 


 

TMZ – Gisele Bundchen’s RIDICULOUS Post-Baby Bikini Bod

 

Gisele LITERALLY had a baby living inside of her two months ago… and now she looks SMOKING HOT in a bikini! How is that even possible!?

Confidential – New Jersey Fusion Center Mass Shootings Analysis

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New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center Mass Shootings Analysis

  • 9 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • November 28, 2012

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(U//FOUO) The mass killing incidents this year at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin and a movie theater in Colorado garnered international attention and focused the efforts of public and private sector security officials on the prevention of and response to mass shootings in the United States. This report examines the 29 deadliest mass shootings in the past 13 years, starting with the shootings at Columbine High School in Colorado in 1999, to identify commonalities and trends. These 29 incidents include shooting incidents in which at least five people were killed.

(U//FOUO) DHS defines an “active shooter” as an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area. In most cases, active shooters use firearms, and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims. Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Typically, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the shooting and mitigate further harm to victims. Typically, active shooter situations are over within 10 to 15 minutes.

Key Findings

  • (U//FOUO) An analysis of 29 mass shooting incidents in the United States since 1999 indicates that nearly half were workplace shootings.
  • (U//FOUO) All of the shooters but one were males between the ages of 17 and 48. All but one of the 29 incidents were conducted by single shooters.
  • (U//FOUO) Most of the active shooters took their own lives or were shot by responding police officers.
  • (U//FOUO) Only four of the shooters were current or former members of the military.
  • (U//FOUO) Semiautomatic handguns were the most commonly used type of weapon in the mass shootings.

Analysis of Mass Shootings Since 1999

(U//FOUO) The 29 mass shootings incidents since 1999 – listed in Appendix 1 – were analyzed to identify commonalities and trends. These include the following:

  • Males between the ages of 17 and 48 conducted all of the attacks but one.
  • The largest number of mass shootings – 13 of the 29 – occurred at the workplace and were conducted by either a former employee or relative of an employee.
  • All of the active shooters were single attackers, with the exception of two students who conducted the shootings at Columbine High School.
  • In most of the incidents – 20 of the 29 – the active shooters took their own lives or law enforcement was forced to shoot and kill them, thus leaving their true motives uncertain.
  • In only four of the 29 incidents were the shooters active or former members of the U.S. military.
  • Semiautomatic handguns are the weapon of choice for mass shootings.

Active Shooters: How to Respond

(U//FOUO) Following the tragedy that occurred at Virginia Tech in 2007, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security released a document with recommendations on what to do in the event of an active shooter situation. The most critical recommendation is for both law enforcement and the private sector to have training and conduct drills in order to be prepared for an active shooter incident.

(U//FOUO) In many of the case studies discussed, there were indicators of potential violence. The following is a list of warning signs that an employee may exhibit in the workplace:

  • Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs.
  • Unexplained increase in absenteeism; vague physical complaints.
  • Noticeable decrease in attention to appearance and hygiene.
  • Depression/withdrawal.
  • Resistance and overreaction to changes in policy and procedures.
  • Repeated violations of company policies.
  • Increased severe mood swings.
  • Noticeably unstable, emotional responses.
  • Explosive outbursts of anger or rage without provocation.
  • Suicidal; comments about “putting things in order.”
  • Paranoid behavior or utterances (“Everybody is against me”).
  • Increasingly talks of problems at home.
  • Escalation of domestic problems into the workplace; talk of severe financial problems.
  • Talk of previous incidents of violence.
  • Empathy with individuals committing violence.
  • Increase in unsolicited comments about firearms, other dangerous weapons and violent crime.

Monty Python Upperclass Twit of the Year – Film

 

 

The Upperclass Twit of the Year race (full version with all events) from Monty Python’s Flying Circus

Monty Python – Blackmail – Film

 

Monty Python – Blackmail

SECRET – NSA Field Generation and Over-the-Air Distribution of COMSEC Key Manual

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NAG-16F FIELD GENERATION AND OVER-THE-AIR DISTRIBUTION OF COMSEC KEY IN SUPPORT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES

  •  99 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • May 2001

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1. (U//FOUO) Where Are We Heading? – A major evolution in communications security (COMSEC) keying technology has begun. Under the Electronic Key Management System (EKMS) program, standards, hardware, and applications are being developed to apply state of the art automation to generate, distribute, load, control, and account for COMSEC key. The program incorporates sufficient backward compatibility to assure that both future, automated key and existing, common electronic key can be handled. EKMS hardware is being fielded, but full development of tailored tactical key generation and distribution programs may take several more years.

2. (U//FOUO) Where Are We Now? – Until EKMS Key Processors (KPs) and local management devices (LMDs) are fully implemented throughout the tactical forces, military commanders must be able to establish secure communications, without needless and/or redundant prepositioning of key or last minute key tape distribution. This document prescribes pre-EKMS techniques to satisfy that requirement, but emphasizes use of available EKMS terminals and other key variable generators (KVGs) to generate tactical key.

3. (U//FOUO) Interoperability – Effective and timely creation of secure tactical nets and circuits requires that communications planners and operators have a common base of understanding regarding applicable COMSEC procedures and equipment operating instructions. This document fulfills that requirement for Joint commands and their Service components. It also has limited applicability in multi-national operations and exercises, when the Allied participants use COMSEC equipment that is capable of over-the-air key distribution (OTAD).

NOTE: (U//FOUO) ACP-132A, Field Generation and Over-the-Air Distribution of Key in Support of Tactical Operations and Exercises, is the equivalent of NAG-16F for use by the military forces of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. U.S. tactical forces do not hold ACP-132A, because its provisions are similar to those of NAG-16F.

NOTE: (U//FOUO) NAG-22A, Over-the-Air Rekeying of Combined Tactical Nets and Circuits, is a partial equivalent of NAG-16F intended to explain over-the-air rekeying (OTAR) to Allied users of “S” nomenclatured (special purpose) COMSEC equipment. When Combined nets/circuits include terminals equipped with “S” equipment, a U.S. station equipped with “K” nomenclatured equipment must serve as the net control station (NCS). U.S. tactical forces do not hold nor need NAG-22A.

NOTE: (U//FOUO) SDIP-14, Operational Doctrine for TSEC/KW-46 Fleet Broadcast, includes doctrine for Over-The-Air Transfer (OTAT) of tactical key via the single-channel North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) fleet broadcasts. U.S. Navy (USN) tactical forces having NATO missions should hold SDIP-14.

4. (U//FOUO) Implementation – The principal advantage of the key management procedures presented here is flexibility to create a continuing supply of tactical key for a variety of commonly held COMSEC equipment and to distribute it electronically to potential users. The key generation and distribution routines given are particularly suitable for support of Joint operations and exercises involving forces that do not routinely train together. However, they cannot be relied upon to contribute to joint mission accomplishment, unless required levels of user competency are maintained through incorporation into intra-Service operations and exercises.

b. (U) Purpose – This document is intended as the standard U.S. user’s manual for planning and conducting field key generation and OTAD in support of tactical activities. It is targeted primarily at Joint and Intra-Service Operations and Exercises, particularly those involving forces that do not routinely train or operate together. It also has limited application to Combined operations and exercises involving Allied forces that hold OTAR- and OTAT-capable COMSEC equipment.

1. (U) INTRODUCTION

a. (U//FOUO) Perspective – Field generation and Over-The-Air-Distribution (OTAD) of the COMSEC key needed to support tactical communications offers distinct operational advantages over dependence on centrally produced, physically distributed tape key. Communications efficiency and flexibility can be materially enhanced, if secure tactical nets and circuits are established and rekeyed with field-generated TEK that is distributed via Over-The-Air Rekeying (OTAR). Pending full implementation of the Electronic Key Management System (EKMS), operational flexibility can also be enhanced if TEK for other tactical applications is distributed via Over-the-Air Transfer (OTAT), between Data Transfer Device (DTDs), using STU-III, STU-IIIA, STU-IIB, STE, or KY-68 secured telephone circuits, KW-46 secured broadcasts, or nets/circuits secured by KG-84A/C and KIV-7/7HS equipment. Commanders who generate and electronically distribute needed key have maximum latitude to structure their communications to support mission requirements and to react quickly to fluid tactical situations and potentially serious key compromises.

b. (U) Purpose – This document is intended as the standard U.S. user’s manual for planning and conducting field key generation and OTAD in support of tactical activities. It is targeted primarily at Joint and Intra-Service Operations and Exercises, particularly those involving forces that do not routinely train or operate together. It also has limited application to Combined operations and exercises involving Allied forces that hold OTAR- and OTAT-capable COMSEC equipment.

c. (U) Definitions & Acronyms – Many of the specialized terms used in this document are defined in Annex A. Acronyms that appear in the document are also expanded in Annex A.

d. (U//FOUO) Activation – U.S. commanders at all echelons are authorized and encouraged to direct field generation and OTAD of keys needed to support tactical operations and exercises for which they are responsible.

NOTE: (U//FOUO) The procedures addressed herein are presented as routine communications practices for tactical forces, but exceptions to certain specified COMSEC procedural constraints are authorized during COMSEC emergencies, in which the only viable alternative available to the responsible commander is plain text communications. The distinction between routine communications and COMSEC emergencies must be recognized, so that the emergency easements do not become standard operating practices, when the risks they entail should not be accepted. It is also important to note that the security easements permitted by this manual apply only in tactical applications and may not be extended to fixed-facility or strategic communications.

e. (U//FOUO) Application to TRI-TAC & MSE – The TRI-TAC and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) tactical communications systems have internal procedures for generating and distributing the keys they use; the provisions of this manual do not apply to those keys. However, due to the vital function they can perform in the production of keys intended for other applications, TRI-TAC/MSE KG-83 and KGX-93/93A KVGs and the KT-83 test equipment used to certify them require special safeguards that do not apply to the other TRI-TAC/MSE COMSEC equipment. These are stated in the following subparagraphs.

(1) (U//FOUO) Using KVGs & Fill Devices – Any certified KVG having all of its tamper detection labels intact may generate 128-bit key at any classification level for any purpose, but fill devices into which KVGs load key must be safeguarded at the level of the most highly classified key they contain.

(2) (U//FOUO) Certifying KT-83s & KVGs – All KT-83s, KG-83s, and KGX-93/93As must be certified to the SECRET level at least every 24 months; none of these equipment need be certified to the TOP SECRET level. Each certification must be accomplished with a certified KT-83 and NSA-approved procedures and may be done by one qualified person who must be cleared at least SECRET. Any certified KT-83 with its tamper detection labels intact may be used to certify any other KT-83 or any KG-83 or KGX-93/93A. One result of this authorization is that any command that holds two or more KT-83s may stagger their certification dates and use one to certify the other, indefinitely. In COMSEC emergencies, responsible commanders are authorized to use KVGs with expired certifications, provided field certification is not feasible and certified replacements have been requisitioned.

(3) (U//FOUO) Storing KT-83s & KVGs – Tamper detection labels are required on all operational KVGs and KT-83s. After tamper detection labels have been applied to them, certified but uninstalled KG-83s, KGX-93/93As, and KT-83s may be stored and handled without Two-Person Integrity (TPI) controls. Installed KVGs may be stored in unmanned TRI-TAC and MSE shelters, if the following conditions are met:

(a) (U//FOUO) Physical Safeguards – Responsible commanders must ensure that adequate physical safeguards are provided for non-operational TRI-TAC/MSE shelters to minimize the risk of theft, tampering, or sabotage to all of the COMSEC equipment stored therein.

(b) (U//FOUO) Tamper Detection Labels – At the time of its last certification, NSA-furnished, coyote logo tamper detection labels must have been applied to each KT-83, KG-83, and KGX-93/93A, in accordance with NSA instructions. Certifying activities must record the serial numbers of the labels they apply to each KT-83 or KVG, so that this information may be made available to investigating elements, if tampering with a certified KVG is suspected. Recorded label serial numbers must also be compared with those removed from each KVG that is recertified at the same facility two or more consecutive times. Any unexplained serial number anomalies must be reported as COMSEC incidents.

NOTE: (U//FOUO) To increase the security of the coyote logo tamper detection labels, NSA has classified them SECRET prior to application; upon application, they are declassified. Any UNCLASSIFIED coyote logo labels on hand at using locations must be brought under SECRET protection. Pertinent questions may be referred to the NSA Protective Technologies Division at (301) 688-6816 of DSN 644-6816.

Monty Python – Arthur ‘Two Sheds’ Jackson – Video

 

Monty Python – Arthur ‘Two Sheds’ Jackson

A short skit from “Monty Python’s Flying Circus” about where Arthur ‘Two Sheds’ screen name is from.

Unveiled by Cryptome – Saudi Arabia Airports and Air Bases

Wired spots a drone base:

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/02/secret-drone-base-2/

Bing Maps http://binged.it/YYSsPW

Obscured on Google (2007) http://goo.gl/maps/w9RwJ

[Image]

Add Ghafah Airport.

6 February 2013

Saudi Arabia Airports and Air Bases

News reports today claim the US has established a CIA drone base in Saudi Arabia for attacks within Yemen. Previously, there have been reports of drone bases in Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Oman and Yemen operating in the US Central Command area of operations.

Some reports may be accurate but more likely these reports are based on disinformation to conceal where the bases are located.

This shows Google Maps airports and air bases in Saudi Arabia. A CIA air base is not likely to be shown by Google which has a history of concealing informaton requested by governments. These locations may be useful to show where the base is not located.

Bing.com/maps, with images by Nokia, often shows sensitive sites censored by Google. However, Google often sites that are out of date or obscured by Bing. A Saudi base search on Bing is underway.

One airport below, at Alkwifriah on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia, is not designated on Google maps.

The photos are geographically arranged approximately from north to south, with those in the south closest to Yemen.

 


 

Saudi Arabia Airports and Air Bases

Ghafah AirportBing http://binged.it/YH3mWD

Google (obscured) http://goo.gl/maps/FDNGa

[Image]

Guriat AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/Zj1h8

[Image]

Turaif AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/Qt9UQ

[Image]

Arar AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/4LA9V

[Image]

Al Jouf (Al-Jawf) AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/HBpy7

[Image]

Tabouk (Tabuk) AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/2EEIu

[Image]

Hail AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/dZll2

[Image]

Hafar Al-Batin Airport (King Khalid Military City)Google http://goo.gl/maps/EJg6B

[Image]

Qaisumah AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/sIDzC

[Image]

Prince Nayef Bin Abdulaziz Airport QassimGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/Wva67

[Image]

King Fahd International AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/uYUni

[Image]

Ras Khafji AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/NFNNO

[Image]

Ras A Mishab AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/sY3jN

[Image]

Tanajib AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/KecfI

[Image]

Abu Ali AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/OvgXR

[Image]

Jubail AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/Kqi50

[Image]

King Abdul Aziz Naval BaseGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/cPT1u

[Image]

Ras Tanura AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/FW9kw

[Image]

King Abdulaziz Air Base (Dahran International Airport)Google http://goo.gl/maps/la99G

[Image]

Abqaiq AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/5VSSG

[Image]

Al Hasa AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/0tGQp

[Image]

Al Hasa Air StripGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/bkFbE

[Image]

Al Udayliyah Air StripGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/UQfRi

[Image]

Mohammad Bin Adbulaziz International AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/aPlVn

[Image]

Yanbu AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/5gk80

[Image]

Prince Salman Bin Abdulaziz (Dawadmi) AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/YHdum

[Image]

King Khalid (Khaled) International AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/ZTf2A

[Image]

Air Field Near AlkwifriahGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/qpNEh

[Image]

Ugtah Highway StripGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/d0QEN

[Image]

Riyadh Air BaseGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/wgQ9B

[Image]

KP 718 (Otherwise Unidentified)Google http://goo.gl/maps/zR6FO

[Image]

Saudi Aramco Pump Station 6 Air StripGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/c1rCm

[Image]

Al Lidem AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/k2egz

[Image]

King Abdullah Airport Gizan (Jazan)Google http://goo.gl/maps/nrywZ

[Image]

Abha International AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/zTPWt

[Image]

Wadi al Dawasir (Kumdah) AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/QS7Ub

[Image]

Albaha (Al-Aqiq) AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/oUEIy

[Image]

Bisha AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/W4o8B

[Image]

Nejran (Najran) Air BaseGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/wDWsl

[Image]

Sharurah Air BaseGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/7qeUo

[Image]

TMZ – Kim Kardashian Imitates Jesus Christ?

 

We all knew Kim Kardashian is one of the biggest celebrities in the world… but now she’s imitating Jesus Chris while on vacation in Brazil. Nice one, Kim…

 

 

SECRECY NEWS – ARMY USE OF DRONES IN U.S. IS CONSTRAINED, NOT PROHIBITED

There are significant barriers to the Army's use of unmanned aerial
systems within the United States, according to a new Army manual, but they
are not prohibitive or categorical.

"Legal restrictions on the use of unmanned aircraft systems in domestic
operations are numerous," the manual states.  The question arises
particularly in the context of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),
refering to military assistance to government agencies in disaster response
and other domestic emergencies.

"Use of DOD intelligence capabilities for DSCA missions--such as incident
awareness and assessment, damage assessment, and search and
rescue--requires prior Secretary of Defense approval, together with
approval of both the mission and use of the exact DOD intelligence
community capabilities. Certain missions require not only approval of the
Secretary of Defense, but also coordination, certification, and possibly,
prior approval by the Attorney General of the United States."

As a general rule, "military forces cannot use military systems for
surveillance and pursuit of individuals."  This is precluded by the Posse
Comitatus Act, as reflected in DoD Directive 5525.5.

But there is a possibility that exceptions may arise, the manual
indicates.  "[Unmanned aircraft] operators cannot conduct surveillance on
specifically identified U.S. persons, unless expressly approved by the
Secretary of Defense, consistent with U.S. laws and regulations."

See U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-52, Airspace Control, February 2013
(especially Appendix G):

        http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-52.pdf

"Commanders decide to employ unmanned aircraft systems judiciously. Use of
unmanned aircraft systems requires approval at high levels within the DOD
and the FAA prior to employment in DSCA," the manual states.

"Certain unmanned aircraft systems such as Global Hawk can operate far
above normal commercial traffic while providing situation assessment to
ground commanders. Intermediate systems such as the Predator have supported
recent disaster operations, dramatically increasing situational awareness
at the joint field office level. If available and authorized, these systems
can provide near-real-time surveillance to command posts for extended
periods. The approval process is not automatic."

The Army manual asserts that the perceived risks of drone failure or
accident are out of proportion to the actual documented risks.

"For example, from 2003 to 2010, small, unmanned aircraft systems flew
approximately 250,000 hours with only one incident of a collision with
another airspace user. However, the perception of the risk posed by small,
unmanned aircraft systems was much greater." (page A-1).

WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN EXECUTIVE ORDER AND A DIRECTIVE?

The Obama Administration issued policy statements this week on critical
infrastructure protection and cyber security, including measures to
encourage information sharing with the private sector and other steps to
improve policy coordination.  Curiously, the Administration issued both an
Executive order and a Presidential directive devoted to these topics.

Executive Order 13636 focuses on "Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity" while Presidential Policy Directive 21 deals more broadly
with "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience."

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13636.htm

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-21.pdf

But the simultaneous release of the two types of Presidential instruction
on overlapping themes raises the question:  What is the difference between
an Executive Order and a Presidential Directive?

"There are probably two significant differences between an EO and a PD, at
least to my understanding," said Harold Relyea, who served for decades as a
Specialist in American National Government at the Congressional Research
Service.

"First, in almost all cases, for an EO to have legal effect, it must be
published in the Federal Register.  This is a statutory requirement.  A PD
does not have to meet this publication requirement, which means it can more
readily be 'born classified'."

"Second," he added, "is the matter of circulation and accountability.  EOs
are circulated to general counsels or similar agency attorneys, which can
be readily accomplished by FR publication.  Again, a PD may be more
selectively circulated, and this is done through developed routing
procedures.  Ultimately, EOs are captured not only in the FR, but also in
annual volumes (Title 3) of the CFR [Code of Federal Regulations].  PDs are
maintained in the files of the NSC staff and, God knows, if anywhere else! 
I might also add that a form for EOs has been prescribed (in an EO); no
form has been prescribed (as far as I know) for PDs."

A CRS overview of the various types of "Presidential Directives" authored
by Dr. Relyea in 2008 is available here:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-611.pdf

The Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel wrote in a 2000 opinion
that executive orders and directives are equivalent in their force and
impact. "As this Office has consistently advised, it is our opinion that
there is no substantive difference in the legal effectiveness of an
executive order and a presidential directive that is not styled as an
executive order."

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/predirective.html

For reasons that are not immediately clear, President Obama has issued
presidential directives much less frequently than his predecessors.  The
latest directive, PDD-21, is only the 21st such Obama directive.  By
comparison, President George W. Bush had issued 42 directives by the first
January of his second term.  President Clinton had issued 53 directives by
the beginning of his second term.

NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service obtained
by Secrecy News that have not been made readily available to the public
include the following.

North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, February 12, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34256.pdf

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, February
13, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current
Developments, February 12, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33548.pdf

Filling U.S. Senate Vacancies: Perspectives and Contemporary Developments,
February 13, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40421.pdf

Child Well-Being and Noncustodial Fathers, February 12, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41431.pdf

Abortion and Family Planning-Related Provisions in U.S. Foreign Assistance
Law and Policy, February 12, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41360.pdf

Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress,
February 8, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42956.pdf

U.S. Manufacturing in International Perspective, February 11, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42135.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
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     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

101 East : China’s cyber warriors – rising tide of cyber warfare with the West

 

Google, the world’s largest internet company, closed down its search engine facility in China after issues with censorship and hacking. The case has highlighted a growing cyber warfare between the West and China. 101 East looks at the role of the internet in China and the rising tide of cyber warfare with the West.

SECRET – U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Patrolling Handbook

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CALL-COIN-Patrolling.png

 

COUNTERINSURGENCY PATROLLING HANDBOOK

  • 132 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • April 2008

Download

Patrols are one of the most common operations a unit will perform in the counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. A patrol is the basis for many other types of operations. Cordon and search, reconnaissance, demonstration of force, security, and traffic control checkpoints are all activities a unit may perform while on patrol. Patrols are invaluable in the COIN environment because they enable units to interface with the indigenous population and gain human intelligence.

This handbook will assist junior leaders in planning and preparing for, executing, and recovering from patrols. It is not intended to be a single-source document. Rather, it is intended to provide techniques used by others to enhance the unit’s standing operating procedures and orders.

The key lessons for patrol leaders in the COIN environment are:

• Patrol planning: Upon receiving the order, leaders must quickly develop an appropriate, detailed plan.
• Patrol preparation: Leaders must ensure that all patrol members know their individual tasks and provide them the necessary resources to succeed.
• Patrol execution: Leaders will accomplish all patrol tasks to standard and guide the patrol to a successful outcome.
• Recovery: Leaders perform multiple tasks during recovery:
• Assemble the intelligence and other data collected during the patrol and pass it to the appropriate staff sections.
• Conduct a thorough after-action review to gain observations, insights, and lessons.
• Supervise equipment and personnel reset to ensure the unit is ready for subsequent operations.

Because every unit conducts some kind of patrol, this handbook should be distributed to all units.

This chapter provides the patrol leader with an outline of what he needs to accomplish to have a successful patrol in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Because of the uniqueness of the COIN operating environment, patrol leaders must consider many aspects of an operation that they would not consider in a conventional environment.

The patrol leader should learn about the people, topography, economy, history, religion, and culture of the patrol area. He must know the location of villages, roads, fields, and population groups that are in and around the area of his patrol. The patrol leader needs to make sure his map is up to date. He should study the map thoroughly and develop a mental model of the area. This mental model becomes a framework upon which every new piece of information is incorporated into the common operating picture.

Understanding the operational area provides a foundation for analyzing the insurgency:

• Who are the insurgents?
• What drives them?
• What are the agendas of local leaders or power brokers?

An insurgency is a competition among many groups, each seeking to mobilize the local populace in support of its agenda; therefore, COIN operations always have more than two sides.

A COIN patrol leader must understand what motivates the people in his area of operations and use those motivations to support the patrol’s mission. Understanding why and how the insurgents are attracting followers is essential. This understanding requires knowing the primary enemy (insurgents, criminal element, local militia, al-Qaeda). Insurgents are adaptive, resourceful, and probably from the local area. The local populace has known these insurgents since they were young. U.S. forces are the outsiders. Insurgents are not necessarily misled or naive. Much of the insurgency’s success may stem from unpopular central government policies or actions by security forces that alienate the local populace.

The genesis of a patrol is a mission from higher headquarters. Following unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and using normal troop-leading procedures (TLP), the patrol leader may coordinate with the company commander or battalion staff. This coordination should include many of the following items:

• Changes or updates in the enemy situation (improvised explosive devices [IEDs] and sniper hot spots)
• Best use of terrain for routes, rally points, and patrol bases
• Light and weather data
• Changes in the friendly situation (patrol leader’s own and adjacent units’)
• Soldiers with special skills or equipment, such as engineers, sniper teams, scout dog teams, forward observers, or interpreters attached to the unit (later referred to as “integrated units”)
• Use of manned or unmanned aircraft
• Use and location of landing or pickup zones
• Departure and reentry of friendly lines
• Fire support on the objective and along planned routes, including alternate routes
• Rehearsal areas and times
• Special equipment and ammunition requirements
• Transportation support
• Signal plan

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – The Parrot Sketch

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – The Parrot Sketch

TMZ – Kate Upton on Sports Illustrated Swimsuit Cover — AGAIN!

 

Sexy model Kate Upton made the cover of yet ANOTHER issue of Sports Illustrated’s Swimsuit Edition. That’s one for each boob!

 

PUBLIC INTELLIGENCE – DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Testing of Cybersecurity

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/DHS-FBI-Cybersecurity.png

 

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • November 20, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorists or cyber criminals might try to discover vulnerabilities in computer systems by engaging in unauthorized testing of cybersecurity in order to exploit those vulnerabilities during an attack.  These attempts might include port scanning, phishing, and password cracking.  “Social engineering,” another technique, leverages unwitting insider access by eliciting information about operational and security procedures from employees, personnel, and their associates.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incidents from the NSI shared space demonstrate types of behavior terrorists or cyber criminals might exhibit during the preoperational stage of attacks. Although none were linked to terrorist or other criminal activity, they are cited as relevant examples for awareness and training purposes.

— (U) An individual sent an e-mail to a state government office requesting information on public access to a local reservoir. The e-mail included a link to a Web site that contained malicious software (malware).

— (U) A review of a first responder’s computer system revealed an attempted hacking incident; several Internet Protocol (IP) addresses associated with the probes originated from out-of-state and foreign locations, suggesting that the actual IP addresses were being masked and that the probes were malicious.

— (U) In a likely social engineering attempt, a private business received unsolicited telephone calls from a caller attempting to obtain or confirm information regarding names, titles, e-mail addresses, and access badge numbers for its employees.  When asked, the caller provided no contact information and only gave her first name.

(U) Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) Definition of Testing of Security

(U) Interactions with or challenges to installations, personnel, or systems that reveal physical, personnel, or cybersecurity capabilities.
(U) Port Scanning – a process of scanning for open computer port(s), enabling attackers to identify potential targets.
(U) Phishing – type of social engineering; fraudulent e-mail or other electronic communications to deceive computer users into disclosing private information or downloading malware.
(U) Password Cracking – attempting to guess passwords, possibly by synchronizing multi-computer attempts using automated utilities that try every possible password.
(U) Note: The Functional Standard v 1.5 defines SAR as “official documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.”

(U) Possible Indicators of Cybersecurity Testing

(U//FOUO) The following activities may indicate efforts to test cybersecurity for potentially malicious purposes.  Depending upon the context—time, location and other indicators—suspicious cyber activity should be reported to the appropriate authorities, particularly if a terrorism or criminal link is suspected.

— (U//FOUO) Unsolicited phone, e-mail, or in-person inquiries asking for employee or organizational information, including official or proprietary information such as organizational structure and networks.

— (U//FOUO) Requests for access to cyber infrastructure physical areas, electronic files, or escalated computer access privileges not required to complete the requestor’s job or task.

— (U//FOUO) Increase in network reconnaissance activity—such as pinging (verification that an IP address exists and accepts requests), port scanning, and intrusion detection system alerts—observed and recognized by IT personnel.

— (U//FOUO) Missing or added computer equipment in the work area, such as laptops, CDs, external hard drives, or thumb drives.

(U) For additional information on cybersecurity best practices, please refer to US-CERT Web page http://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications.

(U//FOUO) First Ammendment activities should not be reported in a SAR or Information Sharing Environment SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).

Monty Python’s Meaning of Life – Organ Donor

 

Monty Python’s Meaning of Life – Organ Donor

Full Speech Of President Obama – Statement On Fiscal Cliff Negotiations

 

Full Speech Of President Obama – Statement On Fiscal Cliff Negotiations

Unveiled – Chinese Hacker Movie

Unveiled – Chinese Hacker Movie

 

The threat of becoming a victim of Distributed Denial of Service attacks is gaining alarming momentum as of late. With assaults constantly getting cheaper and easier to orchestrate, the focus of the ill-doers is shifting from highly prominent and affluent public and large private sector entities to smaller targets. Today, a criminal can bring your site to a standstill for as little as $5-8 per hour, whereas the financial implications of being forced offline can cost the victim immeasurably more in revenue loss and reputation damage.

Life of Brian – He’s Not The Messiah

 

Life of Brian – He’s Not The Messiah

 

Life of Brian

http://www.amazon.com/Monty-Python-Tr…

SECRET – San Francisco Public Utilities Commission Surveillance

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/SFPUC-SurveillanceStreetlights.png

 

Pilot No. CS-264 To Pilot Wireless Control and Communications System for LED Street Lights and Other Devices

  • 18 pages
  • June 8, 2012

Download

The SFPUC owns and maintains approximately 18,500 cobra-head type high pressure sodium (HPS) luminaires, located throughout the City of San Francisco’s forty-nine square miles. The SFPUC anticipates replacing the existing HPS street light luminaires with dimmable LED luminaires in the next two years. The SFPUC also plans to install an integrated wireless communication monitoring and control system (wireless system) to remotely manage the LED street lights. The SFPUC would prefer to install the wireless system as part of the SFPUC LED Streetlight Conversion Project, but will consider purchasing luminaires and installing the wireless system at a later date. Ideally, the wireless system will accommodate other wireless devices, unrelated to street lighting, in a common wireless system mesh network.

The City has multiple needs for the secure wireless transmission of data throughout its various neighborhoods and districts. Future needs for the secure wireless transmission of data throughout the City may include:

• Electric vehicle charging stations data transmission
• Electric meter reading
• Gunshot monitoring
• Street surveillance
• Public information broadcasts
• Street parking monitoring devices
• Traffic monitoring
• Traffic signal control
• Pollution monitoring
• Others

A. General

The purpose of the RFP and subsequent Pilot Project is to identify innovative possibilities unknown to the SFPUC that may be relevant to City agencies in the future. Respondents are invited to define the characteristics and features of an innovative solution for LED street light control, and include this description in their submittal. The information below is provided to help Respondents identify products that meet the SFPUC’s desired performance criteria for LED street light controls, and to guide the submittal as is relates to wireless control of LED luminaires. It is not intended to limit the scope of the SFPUC’s interest in multifunctional wireless systems.

B. Desirable Wireless System Features

1. Endpoint and Gateway Features:

a. UL listing;
b. NEMA and IP rated;
c. ANSI C136.10-2006 compliance;
d. NTCIP 1213 compliance;
e. Solid state and HID lighting compatibility;
f. 120V/240V compatibility;
g. Back-up astronomical clock;
h. Antenna that is less than 4” long;
i. 0-10V dimming capability;
j. Components that can be mounted on or within the luminaire, arm or streetlight pole; and
k. Self-commissioning capability.

2. Network Features:

a. Data encryption per AES 128 or 256; and
b. SFPUC hosting of wireless network and data.
3. Controls and Software Functions:
a. Web portal customization per SFPUC requirements;
b. On/off scheduling;
c. Failure detection;
d. Ability to record events and report historical data;
e. Remote, secure web-based access of monitoring and control functions;
f. Luminaire grouping;
g. Automated detection and reporting of cycling lamps, fault conditions, or malfunctioning equipment and hourly reporting of voltage, current, power factor, and energy consumption data at interval of at least 1 transmission per hour;
h. Lumen depreciation adjustment, defined here as gradually increasing LED drive current over time to compensate for light source depreciation. Adaptive lighting capability, defined here as dimming LED streetlight with wireless controls, based upon scheduled dimming events [AND/OR] pedestrian and traffic motion sensor feedback]; and
i. GPS mapping function that provides a geographical representation of streetlights’ locations and operational status.

C. The following types of systems and/or solutions will not be considered:

1. Systems that do not default lighting controls to “on” in the event of a failure in controls hardware or network communication;
2. Power line carrier communication systems;
3. Systems that are not compatible with solid state lighting;
4. Systems that do not integrate pedestrian and traffic sensors; and
5. Non-dimmable LED street light control systems.

TMZ – Jewel’s Advice for Homeless People

 

Singer Jewel was homeless at one point… and she gives a crash course on how to make the MOST out of living on the street!

SECRECY NEWS – LEAK OF WHITE PAPER BOOSTS INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

The unauthorized disclosure last week of a Justice Department White Paper
on the legality of targeted killing of senior al Qaida operatives who are
Americans had the collateral effect of strengthening congressional
oversight of intelligence.

The leak not only fulfilled a stalemated congressional effort to provide
information to the public, but it also catalyzed the long-sought disclosure
of classified documents to the intelligence committees themselves.

Although the intelligence committees received the White Paper in June
2012, they proved powerless on their own to gain its broader public
release, or to acquire their own copies of the underlying legal memoranda.

“I have been calling for the public release of the administration’s
legal analysis on the use of lethal force--particularly against U.S.
citizens--for more than a year," said Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the chair of
the Senate Intelligence Committee in a February 5 statement. "That analysis
is now public...."

In other words, what the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee was
unable to accomplish for over a year was achieved by a resourceful reporter
(Michael Isikoff of NBC) along with a cooperative source.  That is a
peculiar fact that ought to prompt some soul-searching on the part of the
Committee, which has been relentlessly critical of intelligence-related
leaks.

But the disclosure did more than just make the White Paper available to
the public and launch a substantial public debate on its contents.  It also
enhanced the ability of the intelligence committees themselves to gain
access to additional classified records on which oversight depends.

Specifically, it was the leak of the White Paper that enabled the belated
disclosure of two classified Office of Legal Counsel memoranda to the
intelligence committees last week.

The causal relationship between the leak and the release of the OLC memos
was made explicit by White House press secretary Jay Carney at a February 7
press gaggle.

"I mean, there has always been some interest, obviously, but there has
been heightened interest.  I think that what you've seen in the -- because
of the public disclosure of the white paper, is that that interest reached
higher levels than in the past, and therefore this decision was made to
make this extraordinary accommodation to provide classified Office of Legal
Counsel advice," Mr. Carney said.

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2013/02/wh020713.html

This statement neatly illustrates the synergy that can exist among robust
national security reporting, public awareness and effective intelligence
oversight.

Yet the Senate Intelligence Committee in particular seems to have lost
sight of the benefits for its own work of press attention and public
engagement. The February 7 hearing on the nomination of John Brennan to be
Director of CIA marked the end of a period of more than one year -- dating
from January 31, 2012 -- without a public hearing.  This may be an
unprecedented hiatus in the history of the Senate Committee.  (The House
Intelligence Committee has held public hearings more frequently.)  In light
of last week's events, the nearly exclusive emphasis on closed hearings
should perhaps be reconsidered.

DOJ WHITE PAPER RELEASED AS A MATTER OF "DISCRETION"

Late Friday afternoon, the Department of Justice released an official copy
of its White Paper on lethal targeting of Americans to Freedom of
Information Act requesters, including FAS and Truthout.org, several days
after it had been leaked to the press.

    http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/doj-lethal.pdf

The official version appears to be identical to the document posted by NBC
News, except that it contains a notation on the first page stating "Draft
November 8, 2011." (It also lacks the heavy-handed NBC watermark.)

"The Department has determined that the document responsive to your
request is appropriate for release as a matter of agency discretion," wrote
Melanie Ann Pustay, director of the Office of Information Policy at the
Department of Justice.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2013/02/oip-020813.pdf

This is a surprising statement, because as recently as two or three weeks
earlier, the Department had said exactly the opposite.

"The document is protected by the deliberative process privilege, and is
not appropriate for discretionary release at this time," wrote Paul Colborn
of the DoJ Office of Legal Counsel in a January 23, 2013 denial letter to
the New York Times.

   http://documentcloud.org/documents/566817-white-paper-foia-denial.html

What changed in the interim?  Obviously, the fact that the document leaked
-- and had already been read by most people who cared to do so -- altered
DoJ's calculation.  The decision to cease withholding the document in light
of its public availability displays some minimal capacity for
reality-testing.  To continue to insist that the document was protected and
exempt from release would have been too absurd.

But the Freedom of Information Act process is supposed to meet a higher
standard than "not absurd," and in this case it failed to do so.

According to a FOIA policy statement issued by Attorney General Eric
Holder in 2009, "an agency should not withhold information simply because
it may do so legally.  I strongly encourage agencies to make discretionary
disclosures of information. An agency should not withhold records merely
because it can demonstrate, as a technical matter, that the records fall
within the scope of a FOIA exemption."

The Attorney General's policy cited President Obama's own statement on
FOIA which declared that "The Government should not keep information
confidential merely because public officials might be embarrassed by
disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of
speculative or abstract fears."

The pre-leak withholding of the White Paper on targeted killing appears to
have been inconsistent with both policy statements.  It is now clear that
only "speculative or abstract fears" were at issue, not actual hazards.

Was the release of the memo "a threat to national security"?  A reporter
asked that question at the White House press briefing on February 5. "No.
No," said Press Secretary Jay Carney.  "It wasn't designed for public
release, but it's an unclassified document."

"And since it is out there," he added, "you should read it."

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2013/02/wh020513.html

Last week, Reps. Darrell Issa and Elijah Cummings of the House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform asked the Department of Justice to
explain several apparent inconsistencies between FOIA policy and actual
practice.

"The Committee seeks information about a number of issues including what
many term as outdated FOIA regulations, exorbitant and possibly illegal fee
assessments, FOIA backlogs, the excessive use and abuse of exemptions, and
dispute resolution services," they wrote in a February 4 letter.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2013/ogr-oip.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Cops & Robber

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Cops & Robber

Confirmed – German Left party’s Gysi scrutinised for alleged Stasi ties

 

gysi_HA_Bayern_Berl_132990b

German prosecutors have opened preliminary proceedings against Gregor Gysi, one of the Left party’s key election campaign figures, over allegations he lied about links with the former East German secret police, the politician said on Sunday.

Gysi, who leads the Left party’s parliamentary group, has repeatedly faced allegations in the past two decades that as a lawyer in former East Germany he passed information on clients – some of them known dissidents – to the Stasi secret police.

He said on Sunday he was confident the case would be dropped and saw no reason to reconsider his position in a team of eight that is leading the Left party’s campaign for federal elections in September.

“Of course the suit will be discontinued just like previously because I never gave a false affidavit,” he said in a post on social media site facebook. “That’s why there’s not the least reason to reconsider my candidacy.”

According to Welt am Sonntag newspaper, the case brought by a former judge concerns an affidavit Gysi gave in 2011 to block the airing of a TV documentary. In the statement he said he had never knowingly or intentionally reported to the Stasi on his clients or anyone else.

Gysi, whose parliamentary immunity was lifted for the proceedings to be opened, has always said he did not cooperate with the Stasi.

Left co-party leader Bernd Riexinger said the claims lacked substance and dismissed them as electioneering.

“Gregor Gysi is our best man. It doesn’t surprise us that the others attack him. That’s dirty election campaigning,” Riexinger told the Berliner Zeitung daily to be published on Monday.

TMZ – Lindsay Lohan’s Doing Penthouse!

Lindsay Lohan is doing Penthouse, folks! [Disclaimer: Don’t get your hopes up, it’s NOT as cool as it sounds]

SECRET – U.S. Marine Corps Human Intelligence Exploitation Team (HET)

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/MCCLL-IraqHET.png

 

Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Exploitation Team (HET) Operations in Iraq Quick Look Report

  • 8 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • August 6, 2008

Download

HET is viewed as a highly valuable and effective intelligence generating asset which, in conjunction with other intelligence sources, provides a significant amount of actionable intelligence during operations in Iraq. “The HET teams produced more reporting … than any other intel asset we have out there.” “HETs have been the pointy tip of the spear in this counterinsurgency fight. Two-thirds of MNF-W operations are directly driven by HET operations.” Key observations from this collection include the following.

• Short dwell times in CONUS between HET personnel deployments required a prioritization of mission oriented training over annual training requirements and professional military education (PME).
• Interviewees stated that the addition of the counterintelligence (CI)/HUMINT SNCO to the TTECG staff has resulted in the insertion of more realistic HUMINT scenarios during Mojave Viper (MV). HETs typically link up with their supported battalions for the first time at MV.
• 1st Intelligence Battalion and CI/HET Company leaders stated that they were manned at 70% of their linguist requirements, and that time for language training was insufficient: “There’s just not enough time for the language piece.”
• Interviewees stated that very little HUMINT is being gathered by Marines from the female portion of the Iraqi population. Without female CI/HUMINT Marines, it is difficult to gain access to Iraqi females in view of cultural norms relating to females being alone with males not related to them. The majority of those interviewed favored allowing women into the CI/HUMINT field.

The remainder of this report contains more detail and recommendations on the above and other topics.

Background

This in-theater collection was conducted in Iraq over a 60 day period from April to June 2008, and was a continuation of the focused collection effort on units participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF), as directed by the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and endorsed by the Commanding Generals, I and II Marine Expeditionary Force. The collection sought to examine the mission, scope, successes, shortfalls, equipment, manning and emerging issues associated with human intelligence exploitation teams that deployed to Iraq during OIF 08.1.

The CI mission is to conduct counterintelligence activities to identify and counteract the threat posed by foreign intelligence capabilities and by organizations or individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. The HET mission is to collect and report timely, accurate and mission focused information from human sources in order to fulfill tactical, MEF, theater and national level intelligence requirements.

Key Points:

With a dwell time in CONUS of five months between seven month deployments, completion of pre-deployment training was challenging for the members of CI/HUMINT Company, 1st Intelligence Battalion from which the HETs were sourced. Post-deployment leave and multiple holidays further reduced available training time. To successfully complete mission specific training, annual training and professional military education (PME) were sacrificed. Time available for language and cultural training was viewed as insufficient. The cumulative effect of multiple deployments added to the impact of a short PTP period for CI/HUMINT Marines.

MCCLL note: Commenting on a draft of this report, the lead CI/HUMINT officer at Intelligence Department (IOC), HQMC noted that, “The high operational tempo affects not just CI/HUMINT Marines, but the entire intelligence community. Our SIGINT Marines are currently in a 1:0.9 dwell right now as opposed to a 1:1 for CI/HUMINT.”

Pre-deployment training was viewed as effective in achieving mission specific training goals. Mojave Viper served as a cohesion building experience for HETs and their supported battalions, and provided an opportunity to educate the battalions on HET capabilities. The addition of the CI/HUMINT SNCO to the TTECG staff resulted in the insertion of more realistic HUMINT scenarios during MV. Some HET Marines expressed the opinion that they did not need MV military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and tactical training but rather just the FINEX. Specialized courses provided by private contractors received positive reviews. These courses included the interrogation and source operations course provided by C-HET Solutions; the Reid Associates Detainee Operations Course and the Harris Radio Course.

Interviewees stated that training for Mine Resistant Armor Protected (MRAP) vehicles, crew-served weapons, language and cultural knowledge was insufficient. Limited training time was most often cited as the problem. The extended length of time needed to develop an effective language capability was a strong concern since this is considered a critical HET skill.

MCCLL note: The Tactical Iraqi Language and Culture Training System (TILTS) is a personal computer based, scenario-oriented software program that can be used for pre-deployment or in-country training to give Marines a usable grasp of Iraqi culture, gestures, and situational language. The goal of TILTS is to shrink language and cultural training time from several months of traditional classroom learning to 80 hours or less of hands on computer based interactive training. This training can be taken in increments, integrated with existing pre-deployment training. Other languages available are Pashtu, Dari and French. Commenting on a draft of this report, the Operations Officer, Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL) notes that “CAOCL has developed a multitude of other classroom and distributed learning (DL) training products. TLTS is a DL product designed for use as a tool in-conjunction with other CAOCL sponsored training modules in an overall blended learning environment with respect to the PTP Continuum,” that CAOCL can provide units targeted training, and that language and regional expertise requirements must be identified far enough in advance so that required training and funds can be projected.

HETs in direct support of infantry battalions are dependent on their supported battalion for mobility and security. With Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) assuming increasing responsibility for security, and as USMC infantry units begin to go into an overwatch posture, HETs are faced with the challenge of how to continue to operate in their AO. There is a strong feeling that HETs should be provided with their own organic mobility and security in the future. At the start of the OIF 08.1 deployment, 1st Intelligence Battalion recruited a convoy security element from infantry and reservists who volunteered to deploy for this purpose. This test concept proved effective but is probably not the long term solution needed. Those planning to deploy HETs in upcoming deployments must consider their mobility and security needs in a changing operational environment.

Monty Python Holy Grail – Constitutional Peasants

 

Monty Python Holy Grail – Constitutional Peasants

 

TOP-SECRET – West Point Combating Terrorism Center Report

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CTC-ViolentFarRight.png

 

Challengers from the Sidelines: Understanding America’s Violent Far-Right

  • 148 pages
  • November 2012

Download

In the last few years, and especially since 2007, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of attacks and violent plots originating from individuals and groups who self-identify with the far-right of American politics. These incidents cause many to wonder whether these are isolated attacks, an increasing trend, part of increasing societal violence, or attributable to some other condition. To date, however, there has been limited systematic documentation and analysis of incidents of American domestic violence.

This study provides a conceptual foundation for understanding different far-right groups and then presents the empirical analysis of violent incidents to identify those perpetrating attacks and their associated trends. Through a comprehensive look at the data, this study addresses three core questions:

(1) What are the main current characteristics of the violence produced by the far right?

(2) What type of far-right groups are more prone than others to engage in violence? How are characteristics of particular far-right groups correlated with their tendency to engage in violence?

(3) What are the social and political factors associated with the level of far-right violence? Are there political or social conditions that foster or discourage violence?
It is important to note that this study concentrates on those individuals and groups who have actually perpetuated violence and is not a comprehensive analysis of the political causes with which some far-right extremists identify. While the ability to hold and appropriately articulate diverse political views is an American strength, extremists committing acts of violence in the name of those causes undermine the freedoms that they purport to espouse.

3.1.2 – Anti-Federalist Movement: Ideological Foundations

In contrast to the relatively long tradition of the white supremacy racist movement, the anti-federalist movement appeared in full force only in the early to mid-1990s, with the emergence of groups such as the Militia of Montana and the Michigan Militia. Anti-federalism is normally identified in the literature as the “Militia” or “Patriot” movement. Anti-federalist and anti-government sentiments were present in American society before the 1990s in diverse movements and ideological associations promoting anti-taxation, gun rights, survivalist practices, and libertarian ideas. However, most scholars concur that the 1980s “farm crises,” combined with the implications of rapid economic, cultural and technological changes in American society, growing political influences of minority groups, and attempts to revise gun control and environmental legislation, facilitated the rapid emergence of a cohesive movement in the mid to late 1990s. In other words, the militia movement was a reactive social movement which mobilized in response to specific perceived threats.

The anti-federalist movement’s ideology is based on the idea that there is an urgent need to undermine the influence, legitimacy and practical sovereignty of the federal government and its proxy organizations. The groups comprising the movement suggest several rationales that seek to legitimize anti-federal sentiments. Some groups are driven by a strong conviction that the American political system and its proxies were hijacked by external forces interested in promoting a “New World Order,” (NWO) in which the United States will be embedded in the UN or another version of global government. The NWO will be advanced, they believe, via steady transition of powers from local to federal law-enforcement agencies, i.e., the transformation of local police and law-enforcement agencies into a federally controlled “National Police” agency that will in turn merge with a “Multi-National Peace Keeping Force.” The latter deployment on US soil will be justified via a domestic campaign implemented by interested parties that will emphasize American society’s deficiencies and US government incompetency. This will convince the American people that restoring stability and order inevitably demands the use of international forces. The last stage, according to most NWO narratives, involves the transformation of the United States government into an international/world government and the execution and oppression of those opposing this process. Linda Thompson, the head of the Unorganized Militia of the United States details the consequence of this global coup: ”This is the coming of the New World Order. A one-world government, where, in order to put the new government in place, we must all be disarmed first. To do that, the government is deliberately creating schisms in our society, funding both the anti-abortion/pro-choice sides, the antigun/pro-gun issues…trying to provoke a riot that will allow martial law to be implemented and all weapons seized, while ‘dissidents’ are put safely away”. The fear of the materialization of the NWO makes most militias not merely hostile towards the federal government but also hostile towards international organizations, whether non-profitable NGOs, international corporations, or political institutions of the international community, such as the UN.

The militias’ anti-federalist sentiments are also rationalized by their perception of the corrupted and tyrannical nature of the federal government and its apparent tendency to violate individuals’ civilian liberties and constitutional rights. That is why they are concerned about the transformation of the United States into a police state in which power is used arbitrarily and without accountability. In the words of a Missouri Militia member, “One of the things that people really fear from the government is the idea that the government can ruin your life; totally destroy your life….split your family up, do the whole thing and walk off like you’re a discarded banana peel, and with a ho-hum attitude.”

In the context of violation of constitutional rights, militia members in particular tend to point out the steady increase in gun control and environmental legislation and the overregulation of the economic and social realms, especially in regard to immigration and education issues. The opposition to gun control legislation has been driven mainly by the perception of many that this represents a breach of the Second Amendment and a direct violation of a constitutional right, having direct impact on the ability of many to preserve their common practices and way of life. In contrast, the opposition to environmental legislation has been driven by the economic consequences of this legislation, as perceived by the militia members, in particular the decline of industries which are not environmentally friendly but crucial for the economy in rural areas. The Testimony of Susan Schock reveals the resulting frustration, clearly expressed in the words of Charles Shumway, Arizona Militia member: “Unless the ‘curse’ of the Endangered Species Act was repealed, there would be ‘rioting, bloodshed, rebellion and conflict that will make the Serbian-Bosnia affair look like a Sunday picnic.’”

Finally, many of the militias also legitimize their ideological tendencies by referring to the strong role of civilian activism, civilian paramilitary groups, individual freedoms, and self-governing and frontier culture in America’s history and ethos, especially during the Revolutionary War and the expansion to the West. Hence, members of these groups see themselves as the successors of the nation’s founding fathers, and as part of a struggle to restore or preserve what they regard as America’s true identity, values and way of life.

To conclude, it should be noted that historically some of the anti-federalist groups have absorbed racist and Christian Identity sentiments; nonetheless, the glue binding their membership and driving their activism has been and remains hostility, fear and the need to challenge or restrict the sovereignty of the federal government.

Exclusive Content from the Monty Python Vault – From The Vault #1

 

Monty Python Holy Grail – Black Knight

Monty Python Holy Grail


TMZ – What Happened to Lindsay Lohan’s Lips!?

 

What Happened to Lindsay Lohan’s Lips!?

 

Take a look at this recent photo of Lindsay Lohan. If you can shed some light as to WHAT THE HELL HAPPENED TO HER LIPS, well then, we’re all ears.

SECRECY NEWS – US MILITARY CASUALTY STATISTICS, AND MORE FROM CRS

A sobering compilation of statistics on injuries sustained by U.S.
military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan was updated this week by the
Congressional Research Service based in part on data that CRS gathered from
the Pentagon.

"This report includes statistics on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
traumatic brain injury (TBI), amputations, evacuations, and the
demographics of casualties," the CRS report said. "Some of these statistics
are publicly available at the Department of Defense's (DOD's) website,
whereas others have been obtained through contact with experts at DOD."

See "U.S. Military Casualty Statistics: Operation New Dawn, Operation
Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom," February 5, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22452.pdf

Another newly updated CRS report presents an informative and diverting
account of politics in China.

"China's Communist Party dominates state and society in China, is
committed to maintaining a permanent monopoly on power, and is intolerant
of those who question its right to rule. Nonetheless, analysts consider
China's political system to be neither monolithic nor rigidly hierarchical.
Jockeying among leaders and institutions representing different sets of
interests is common at every level of the system."

See "Understanding China's Political System," January 31, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41007.pdf

And for good measure there is a CRS report on the legal foundation for
public access to government records.  See "Access to Government Information
In the United States: A Primer," January 16, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/97-71.pdf

There is no legal foundation that would guarantee public access to CRS
reports.  So they have to be obtained through alternate channels.

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Falling from Building

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Falling from Building

Unveiled – Cryptome Triple Cross

Cryptome Triple Cross

16 March 2012. Set up to publish documents on the use of conventional XX duplicity to deceive and circumvent more deviously. To examine and expose XX as camouflage for XXX and beyond. Submissions welcomed: cryptomexxx[at]earthlink.net


00033.htm   Assange-WikiLeaks Crypto Arms Call Triple Cross          December 5, 2012
00032.htm   Informancy Industry                                      May 8, 2012
00031.htm   Government and Commerce Dupe About Privacy               April 20, 2012
00030.pdf   Who Watches the Watchmen: Denial and Deception           April 19, 2012 (7.0MB)
00029.htm   Secret Service DoD Sexual Entrapment by CU/VZ            April 18, 2012

00028.pdf   US Evaluation Board Secret Deception Operation           April 18, 2012
00027.htm   OSS Sources and Methods 1940-1947 Entry 220              April 6, 2012
00026.htm   OSS Sources and Methods 1940-1947 Entry 219              April 6, 2012
00025.htm   OSS Sources and Methods 1940-1947 Entry 218              April 6, 2012
00024.htm   OSS Sources and Methods 1940-1947 Entry 217              April 6, 2012

00023.htm   OSS Sources and Methods 1940-1947 Entry 216              April 6, 2012
00022.htm   OSS Sources and Methods 1940-1947 Entry 215              April 6, 2012
00021.htm   OSS Sources and Methods 1940-1947 Entry 214              April 6, 2012
00020.htm   OSS Sources and Methods 1940-1947 Entry 213              April 6, 2012
00019.htm   OSS Sources and Methods 1940-1947 Entry 212              April 6, 2012

00018.htm   OSS Sources and Methods 1940-1947 Entry 211              April 6, 2012
00017.htm   OSS Thousands of Sources and Methods Files (see above)   April 5, 2012 (offsite)
00016.htm   DoD Releases Psyop-Media-SM Deception Docs               April 5, 2012 (offsite)
00015.pdf   IWG Report on Withheld Records of War Criminals          April 5, 2012 (7.4MB)
00014.pdf   OSS Personnel                                            April 5, 2012

00013.pdf   OSS Terms, Names, Abbreviations, and Code Words          April 5, 2012
00012.pdf   OSS Covert Operations 1940-1947                          April 4, 2012
00011.htm   CIA Covert Operations in Europe                          April 4, 2012
00010.htm   Analysis of the Name File of Heinrich Mueller            April 4, 2012 (offsite)
00009.htm   An American Spy by Olen Steinhauer                       April 1, 2012

The following eight triple-crossing files are from the CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room. These exemplify triple-crossing by spy services through FOIA releases, favoritism to cooperative media, deliberate leaks, official publications and agency-approved publications by members and former members to use the appearance of openness as disinformation, information management and propaganda. Their purpose is to distort through devious disclosure of files describing such techniques and at a deeper level to demonstrate triple-cross tertiarily.

00008.pdf   CIA Deception Research No. 9 1980                        24 March 2012 (5.7MB)
00007.pdf   Central American Psychological Operations 1953           19 March 2012 (3.0MB)
00006.pdf   UK Spy School 1944                                       19 March 2012 (1.3MB)

00005.pdf   Rizzo Triple Agent 1944                                  19 March 2012 (98KB)
00004.pdf   Soviet Triples 1957                                      19 March 2012 (1.2MB)
00003.pdf   Neble Double Agent                                       19 March 2012 (69KB)
00002.pdf   Counterspy 1963                                          19 March 2012 (1.5MB)
00001.pdf   Dogwood 1944                                             19 March 2012 (2.9MB)

 


An American Spy by Olen Steinhauer

Everyone lies, for different reasons. The picture is always opaque.

Real espionage is actually like this. Winston Churchill, a keen aficionado of wartime deception, described the spying game as “tangle within tangle, plot and counterplot, ruse and treachery, cross and double-cross, true agent, false agent, double agent, gold and steel, the bomb, the dagger and the firing party . . . interwoven in many a texture so intricate as to be incredible and yet true.” Spying is itself a form of fiction, the creating of invented worlds, which perhaps explains why so many of the best spy novelists were once in the intelligence business: W. Somerset Maugham, Ian Fleming, Graham Greene and le Carré himself.

Ben Macintyre’s latest book, “Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies,” will be published in July.

 


[Image]

A NATO Ministers of Defense meeting begins at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium on Friday, Feb. 3, 2012. Defense Ministers from across Europe as well as U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta are attending the meeting. (Jacquelyn Martin, Pool)

 


Conventional XX duplicity

http://definitions.dictionary.net/deceive

Thesaurus words for “deceive”: abuse, bamboozle, be untruthful, befool, beguile, betray, bitch, bluff, bunk, cajole, cheat, cheat on, circumvent, con, conjure, cozen, debauch, defile, deflower, defraud, delude, despoil, diddle, do, dodge, double-cross, draw the longbow, dupe, elude, equivocate, evade, exaggerate, falsify, fib, finesse, foil, fool, force, forestall, four-flush, frustrate, gammon, get around, get round, give the runaround, give the slip, go one better, gull, hoax, hocus-pocus, hoodwink, hornswaggle, humbug, impose on, impose upon, inveigle, juggle, lead astray, lead on, let down, lie, lie flatly, mislead, mock, outfigure, outflank, outgeneral, outguess, outmaneuver, outplay, outreach, outsmart, outwit, overreach, pass the buck, pigeon, play one false, prevaricate, put, put something over, rape, ravage, ravish, ruin, seduce, sell out, shift, shift about, snow, soil, speak falsely, spoof, stonewall, story, stretch the truth, string along, suck in, sully, swindle, take, take in, tell a lie, throw off, trick, twist and turn, two-time, victimize, violate

 


http://definitions.dictionary.net/circumvent

Thesaurus words for “circumvent”: avoid, baffle, balk, bamboozle, beat, befool, beg, beguile, betray, bilk, blast, bluff, brave, burke, bypass, cajole, challenge, cheat on, checkmate, circle, circuit, circuiteer, circulate, circumambulate, circummigrate, circumnavigate, close the circle, come full circle, compass, confound, confront, conjure, contravene, counter, counteract, countermand, counterwork, cross, cycle, dash, deceive, defeat, defy, delude, describe a circle, destroy, detour, diddle, disappoint, discomfit, disconcert, discountenance, dish, disrupt, ditch, double, double-cross, dupe, elude, encircle, encompass, escape, evade, flank, flummox, foil, forestall, frustrate, gammon, get around, get away from, get out of, get round, girdle, girdle the globe, give the runaround, give the slip, go about, go around, go one better, go round, go the round, gull, gyre, hoax, hocus-pocus, hoodwink, hornswaggle, humbug, juggle, knock the chocks, lap, let down, make a circuit, mock, nonplus, orbit, outfigure, outflank, outgeneral, outguess, outmaneuver, outplay, outreach, outsmart, outwit, overreach, pass the buck, perplex, pigeon, play one false, put something over, revolve, round, ruin, sabotage, scotch, shake, shake off, shuffle out of, sidestep, skirt, snow, spike, spiral, spoil, stonewall, string along, stump, surround, take in, thwart, trick, two-time, upset, victimize, wheel.

 


http://definitions.dictionary.net/devious

Thesaurus words for “devious”: Byzantine, O-shaped, aberrant, aberrative, ambagious, amoral, anfractuous, artful, backhand, backhanded, balled up, bending, calculating, canny, circuitous, circular, complex, complicated, confounded, confused, conscienceless, convoluted, corrupt, corrupted, crabbed, crafty, criminal, crooked, cunning, curving, daedal, dark, deceitful, deceptive, deflectional, departing, designing, desultory, deviant, deviating, deviative, deviatory, digressive, discursive, dishonest, dishonorable, divagational, divergent, diverting, double-dealing, doubtful, dubious, duplicitous, elaborate, embrangled, entangled, errant, erratic, erring, evasive, excursive, felonious, fishy, fouled up, foxy, fraudulent, furtive, guileful, helical, ill-got, ill-gotten, immoral, implicated, indirect, insidious, insincere, intricate, involuted, involved, knotted, knowing, labyrinthian, labyrinthine, left-handed, lonesome, loused up, many-faceted, matted, mazy, meandering, messed up, misleading, mixed up, mucked up, multifarious, not kosher, oblique, orbital, out-of-the-way, pawky, perplexed, planetary, plotting, questionable, rambling, ramified, remote, removed, retired, rotary, rotten, round, roundabout, roving, scheming, screwed up, secret, secretive, serpentine, shady, shameless, shifting, shifty, shrewd, side, sidelong, sinister, sinistral, sinuous, slick, slippery, sly, smooth, snaky, snarled, sneaking, sneaky, spiral, stray, subtile, subtle, surreptitious, suspicious, swerving, tangled, tangly, tortuous, treacherous, tricky, turning, twisted, twisting, unconscienced, unconscientious, unconscionable, underhand, underhanded, undirected, unethical, unprincipled, unsavory, unscrupulous, unstraightforward, vagrant, veering, vulpine, wandering, wily, winding, without remorse, without shame, zigzag

 


XXX Triplicity

A simple case of XXX is to deploy a comparatively easy to discover duplicity to conceal one more deeply protected. Multi-layered security may serve as a multi-layered decoy to lead away from a deep-bunkered treasure. Identifiably weak comsec may divert from more valuable comms. A small error to indicate a larger mistake which hides a great delusion

TMZ – Kim Kardashian’s Divorce Gets Even NASTIER!

 

Kris Humphries just made things REALLY UGLY in his divorce from Kim Kardashian… but at least he’s got a sweet sponsorship deal Harvey completely made up to fall back on!

SECRECY NEWS – SPOTLIGHT ON DOD SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS

The procedures for establishing, managing and overseeing special access
programs (SAPs) in the Department of Defense are spelled out in an updated
DoD Instruction that was issued yesterday.  See "Management,
Administration, and Oversight of DoD Special Access Programs," DoD
Instruction 5205.11, February 6, 2013.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/i5205_11.pdf

A special access program is a classified program that employs security
measures above and beyond those that would normally be used to protect
ordinary (or "collateral") classified information. Such measures may
include special eligibility reviews, polygraph testing, cover, and other
controls on information.  Within DoD, SAPs fall into three broad topical
categories: intelligence, acquisition, and operations and support.

DoD SAPs have been a focus of controversy in the past, because their
intensive secrecy seemed to foster mismanagement.  There were massive,
multi-billion dollar failures (e.g., the aborted A-12 naval aircraft
program) as well as the occasional eccentricity (e.g., the Timber Wind
nuclear powered rocket for anti-ballistic missile missions), both of which
triggered Inspector General audits.

        http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/Audit2/91-059.pdf

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/tw.pdf

Because of those kinds of missteps, "The special access classification
system... is now adversely affecting the national security it is intended
to support," the House Armed Services Committee concluded in 1991 (H.Rept.
102-60, p. 101).

But such concerns are expressed less frequently today. This is partly
because of changes in Congress, but also because the administration of
special access programs at the Pentagon has become less improvisational and
freewheeling, and more standardized. (Whether they are also more successful
is impossible to say.)

The newly updated DoD Instruction defines the SAP "governance structure,"
which consists of a multi-level SAP Oversight Committee (SAPOC), the Senior
Review Group (SRG), and the SAP Senior Working Group (SSWG).

The Instruction also sheds light on the hierarchical structure of some
SAPs, which are in effect SAPs within SAPs: "DoD SAPs may include
subordinate activities identified as, in descending order, compartments,
sub-compartments, and projects."

There is also another SAP hierarchy along an axis of sensitivity.
"Acknowledged SAPs," whose existence may be admitted and made known to
others, are the least sensitive.  "Unacknowledged SAPs" (such as Timber
Wind once was) are more sensitive and cannot be referenced. Their very
existence is a classified fact.  But both of those categories must be
reported to Congress.  "Waived SAPs" are the most sensitive of special
access programs, and they are exempted by statute (10 USC 119e) from normal
congressional notification requirements.  In such cases, only eight senior
members of the congressional defense committees may be advised of the
program.

DoD's SAPs are not to be confused with the intelligence community's
Controlled Access Programs (CAPs), which serve a similar function.  An
official within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
is responsible for "deconflict[ing] the names and abbreviations for DoD's
SAPs and DNI's CAPs."

It is noteworthy that the new DoD Instruction on SAP management is a
public document.  It rescinds and replaces a 1997 Instruction that was
considered too sensitive for public release.

BRENNAN: "PERHAPS" CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IS OUTDATED

Among the questions submitted to DCIA-nominee John Brennan by the Senate
Intelligence Committee in advance of his much-anticipated confirmation
hearing this afternoon was one about classification policy.

        http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/

A recent report to the President from the Public Interest Declassification
Board termed the national security classification system "outdated," the
Committee noted.  Does Mr. Brennan agree?

"I would say that the classification system is perhaps outdated in some
respects and the recommendations from the PIDB report warrant further
consideration," he replied (Question 30). "If confirmed as Director, I
would review the PIDB's conclusions and would be glad to get back to the
Committee with my views."

        http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2013_hr/brennan-preh.pdf

In other words, he seemed to say, one of the cornerstones of intelligence
as practiced today may be obsolete, at least "in some respects." But I have
nothing to say about that right now. Let's talk about it after I am
confirmed.

VETERANS AND HOMELESSNESS, AND MORE FROM CRS

Newly updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that have
not been made readily available to the public include the following.

Argentina's Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the "Holdouts",
February 6, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41029.pdf

Honduras-U.S. Relations, February 5, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf

Veterans and Homelessness, February 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34024.pdf

VA Housing: Guaranteed Loans, Direct Loans, and Specially Adapted Housing
Grants, February 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42504.pdf

Agricultural Conservation: A Guide to Programs, February 5, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40763.pdf

The National Flood Insurance Program: Status and Remaining Issues for
Congress, February 6, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42850.pdf

Appropriations Subcommittee Structure: History of Changes from 1920 to
2013, February 5, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31572.pdf

U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress,
February 6, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
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Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

PI – NATO Guidance for Developing Maritime Unmanned Systems (MUS) Capability

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CJOSCE-MUS.png

 

Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence

  • 98 pages
  • July 9, 2012

Download

In 2008, recognizing a nascent requirement in the maritime security domain, CJOS COE was requested by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) to provide an overall picture of Maritime Unmanned Systems (MUS) as a potential new capability, with a view to create an increased awareness and trigger further developments within the Alliance. The resulting MUS Study, published in November 2009, was then forwarded for endorsement by ACT, to the International Military Staff (IMS). Following this first document, CJOS COE has produced the attached Guidance document building on the initial study and aiming at supporting NATO MUS capability development.

This guidance aims to inform the capability development of Maritime Unmanned Systems (MUS), broadening beyond that currently being exploited by UAV into Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) and Underwater Surface Vehicles (USV). It covers likely attributes and tasks for MUS, and discusses some of the challenges in developing this capability.

Definition

An MUS is defined as an Unmanned System operating in the maritime environment (subsurface, surface, air) whose primary component is at least one unmanned vehicle. A UUV is defined as a self-propelled submersible whose operation is either fully autonomous (pre-programmed or real-time adaptive mission control) or under minimal supervisory control. They are further sub-divided in 4 vehicles classes (man-portable, Light Weight Vehicle (LWV) Heavy Weight Vehicle (HWV), Large Vehicle Class (LVC).

An USV is defined as a self-propelled surface vehicle whose operation is either fully autonomous (pre-programmed or real-time adaptive mission control) or under minimal supervisory control. They are further sub-divided in 4 vehicles classes (X-Class, Harbour Class, Snorkeler Class, Fleet Class).

Future Capability Requirements The foreseen future Maritime Capability Requirements for MUS are:

a. Persistent ISR, above and below the surface;
b. Capability beyond the high water mark;
c. Cheaper systems;
d. Lower risk to personnel;
e. Less vulnerable to cyber attacks;
f. Stealth;
g. Less collateral damage;
h. Netcentric.

MUS Attributes

The areas for MUS to contribute to naval needs derive from their operational advantages, which include: autonomy, risk reduction, deployability, environmental adaptability and persistence.

UUV Missions/Tasks

Nine areas are identified where UUVs can support or conduct a mission:

(1) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR);
(2) Mine Countermeasures (MCM);
(3) Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW);
(4) Inspection/Identification (ID);
(5) Oceanography/Hydrography;
(6) Communication/Navigation Network Nodes (CN3);
(7) Payload Delivery;
(8) Influence Activities (IA);
(9) Time Critical Strike (TCS).

USV Missions/Tasks

The missions that could be executed by a USV are:

(1) Mine Countermeasures (MCM);
(2) Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW);
(3) Maritime Security (MS);
(4) Surface Warfare (SUW);
(5) Special Operations Forces (SOF) Support;
(6) Electronic Warfare (EW);
(7) Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) Support.

Key Challenges

Based on today‘s capability, future advances in technology will enhance endurance, processing, autonomy, and interoperability. Many of the missions are demanding in terms of autonomy and propulsion. Achieving the level of autonomous intelligence collection required for persistent capabilities will be challenging. Autonomous modes of operation and the technology required to shift from one level of autonomous operation to another are still under development, many shortfalls have been pointed out in the area of engagement/intervention.

UUVs have a limited ability to communicate with the outside world and the use of UUVs, in particular for CN3, requires considerable electrical power for transmissions.

Cyber defense challenges include threats to the MUS vehicle itself, and its feeds and products. A careful balance between the level of autonomy achieved and the vulnerability to cyber attack will need to be developed.

General

It is considered that the realm of MUS has a lot to offer, increasing operational effectiveness, reducing risk to human life and moreover represents a potential to reduce operational costs.While the greatest cost-effectiveness could be achieved by agreeing to a set of common platforms and command and control systems for such vehicles, ongoing Research and Development (R&D) will still drive future trends in MUS technology. Each nation will need to procure onboard sensors and other payloads according to their own requirements. To date, surface and subsurface MUS capabilities have received much less R&D attention and funding than Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and require capital investment to catch up. There is also less data available from which to conduct comparisons of operational effectiveness between manned and unmanned platforms. However, such surface and subsurface capabilities should compliment existing and emerging UAVs to ensure that NATO can effectively counter the wide range of emerging threats in the maritime environment.

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Conquistador Coffee Campaign

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Conquistador Coffee Campaign

Unveiled – North Korea’s naval bases – TOP – SECRET-Photos

DPRK Submarine Bases

Submarine Base Near Sinpo, Mayang-do Island, North KoreaGoogle Earth and Maps http://goo.gl/maps/4PXio
November 26, 2012[Image]
[Image][Image]
August 14, 2009[Image][Image]
Adjoining Submarine Basehttp://goo.gl/maps/A9F3A
November 26, 2012[Image][Image]

[Image]

[Image]

Four submarines in drydock

[Image]

August 14, 2009[Image][Image]

[Image]

[Image]

August 5, 2004[Image][Image]

[Image]

[Image]

September 15, 2002[Image]Sub docked at right

[Image]

Two subs in drydock

[Image]


What might be a grounded submarine nearby undergoing salvageGoogle Earth and Maps http://goo.gl/maps/D9VuPNovember 26, 2012

[Image]

August 14, 2009

[Image]

August 5, 2004[Image][Image]
September 5, 2002[Image][Image]

 

Submarine Base Near Chaho, North KoreaGoogle Earth and Maps http://goo.gl/maps/r11dw
October 5, 2010[Image]October 24, 2004

[Image]

October 5, 2010[Image][Image]

[Image]

October 29, 2004[Image][Image]

[Image]

PI – Central California Intelligence Center Exploding Gun Targets Report

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CCIC-ExplodingTargets.png

 

Exploding Targets: Commercially Available Binary Explosive Agent Poses Potential Public Safety Risks and Concerns

  • 5 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • October 18, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) The Central California Intelligence Center (CCIC)/Sacramento Regional Threat Assessment Center (RTAC) has prepared the following Situational Information Report on exploding targets, a commercially available binary explosive agent, to provide law enforcement and public safety officials with a better understanding of the potential public safety risks involving its use. While exploding targets are legally permissible depending on state and local regulations, the CCIC is concerned that the mixture may be more dangerous than what is stated on the manufacturer’s website especially if mishandled by individuals with novice experience in handling explosive components or when used in large quantities to detonate bigger targets and, in essence, creating an explosives or incendiary device. The CCIC is currently unaware of any reporting or incidents within the Sacramento RTAC area of responsibility which indicate exploding targets are being used for nefarious purposes; however, the recent conviction of Fairbanks militia members in Anchorage, Alaska, for conspiring to kill federal officials and illegally stockpiling weapons and 19 jars of Tannerite exploding targets highlight the potential dangers of this binary explosive when exploited by domestic violent extremist groups.

(U) Background: Exploding Target Proliferation

(U) Tannerite: First Manufacturer of Exploding Targets

(U) The production and distribution of exploding targets have occurred since at least 2002 when the manufacturer of the Tannerite brand began to market and sell them as a “binary explosive” supplied as two powders in two separate containers. Since Tannerite, other companies that manufacture exploding targets have surfaced that produce similar binary explosive mixtures (See Figure 1). As a result, this binary explosive agent has become more accessible to the public through large stockpiles available at local gun shops, and outdoor sport stores as well as online purchase via the Internet.

  • (U) Exploding targets consists of two powder components that, when combined, produce the explosive agent that the Tannerite website advises is primarily used “as a target for firearms practice.”
  • (U) Since the components are not categorized as an explosive agent until mixed, the binary exploding target package can be purchased and shipped in the United States without an explosives manufacturing license.

(U//FOUO) The Manufacturers may be Minimizing Dangers of Exploding Targets and Misleading Consumers

(U//FOUO) The manufacturers provide both guidance and knowledge to consumers through their website regarding the components of exploding targets and the ability to purchase this product in the United States without an explosives manufacturing license which suggests a familiarity with federal laws that govern the manufacturing and shipment of binary explosives but are likely unfamiliar with state and local ordinances that regulate its use. The CCIC is concerned the manufacturer may be exploiting certain loop holes in how federal laws regulate binary explosives and using this knowledge for commercial gain, but minimizing the dangers of exploding targets and misleading its consumers with its “designed to be safe” pronouncement.

 

Revealed – Inside China’s Hacker World – Movie

 

CNN reports – Chinese Hackers are becoming stronger.

TV unveals – FBI Confidential — China’s Cyber Terrorism

 

 

According to a leaked secret FBI document, Chinese counterfeiters have sold close to 75 million dollars of fake Cisco Systems routers to the U.S. military. This revelation raises troubling questions about both the integrity of U.S. defenses in cyberspace and the possible motives of a foreign government with a long rap sheet for military espionage and cyber hacking. At least some of China’s fake routers may be specially designed to provide Chinese hackers with undetectable “back doors” into the highest echelons of classified information throughout the defense department bureaucracy.

SECRECY NEWS – JUDGE WALTON NAMED PRESIDING JUDGE OF FISA COURT

Chief Justice of the United States John Roberts has appointed D.C.
District Judge Reggie B. Walton to serve as Presiding Judge of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, effective February 22, 2013.

        http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/walton

Judge Walton, who has been a member of the FIS Court since May 2007, will
replace Presiding Judge John D. Bates, whose term expires on February 21. 
Judge Walton's own term on the Court extends through May 18, 2014.  His
appointment as Presiding Judge was confirmed by Sheldon Snook, spokesman
for the Court.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court reviews and authorizes
applications for electronic surveillance and physical search under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  A roster of the current court
membership is here:

        http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/court2013.html

The Court's operation under the recently renewed FISA Amendments Act was
discussed in "Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act," Congressional
Research Service, January 2, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R42725.pdf

In his regular capacity as district court judge, Judge Walton has presided
over a number of celebrated cases including U.S. v. Libby, U.S. v. Roger
Clemens, and Hatfill v. John Ashcroft.  Less famously, he also heard
Aftergood v. National Reconnaissance Office, a 2005 Freedom of Information
Act case in which he ruled in favor of the plaintiff, myself.  That case
inaugurated the now-routine public release of unclassified intelligence
agency budget justification records.

http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2006/07/fas_wins_foia_lawsuit_over_nro.html

MENTAL DISORDERS AMONG IRAQ VETERANS, AND MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that have
not been made readily available to the public include the following.

Mental Disorders Among OEF/OIF Veterans Using VA Health Care: Facts and
Figures, February 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41921.pdf

Evaluating the "Past Performance" of Federal Contractors: Legal
Requirements and Issues, February 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41562.pdf

Increasing the Social Security Payroll Tax Base: Options and Effects on
Tax Burdens, February 5, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33943.pdf

Water Resource Issues in the 113th Congress, January 31, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42947.pdf

Upcoming Rules Pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act:
The 2012 Unified Agenda, February 1, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42946.pdf

The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012: Modifications to the Budget
Enforcement Procedures in the Budget Control Act, February 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42949.pdf

United Nations System Funding: Congressional Issues, January 15, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33611.pdf

U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, January 18, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22967.pdf

European Union Enlargement, February 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21344.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
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OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Handelsblatt: Auch “Washington Post” vermutet Hacker-Angriff aus China

http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/it-medien/cyber-attacken-auch-washington-post-vermutet-hacker-angriff-aus-china/7725248.html

Die kommunistischen Hacker aus Peking im Sold alter STASI-Seilschaften

Unter Beschuss: Logo von Twitter.

Unter Beschuss: Logo von Twitter.

Hacker-Attacken auf Medienhäuser und Technologie-Firmen schüren Angst vor der Cybermacht China. Jüngstes Opfer ist der Mikroblogging-Dienst Twitter.

Ungewöhnliche Muster von Zugriffen, damit fing alles an. Es klingt geheimnisvoll, was Bob Lord, Sicherheitschef von Twitter, in einem Blog-Beitrag beschreibt. Aber diese überraschenden „Muster“ waren es, die Lord und seine Leute misstrauisch werden ließen – und sie auf einen laufenden Angriff aufmerksam machten, der den Nutzern des Kurzmitteilungsdienstes galt.

Das Twitter-Team hat diesen Angriff abwehren können, schreibt Lord, aber wie sich bald herausstellte, waren zuvor bereits rund 250.000 Konten geknackt worden. Betroffen sind offenbar vor allem Nutzer, die schon lange bei Twitter angemeldet sind. Ihre Konten wurden sicherheitshalber gesperrt und die Opfer per E-Mail aufgefordert, ihre Passwörter zu ändern.

Über die Identität des Angreifers konnte Lord nichts Genaues sagen – allerdings sei das „nicht das Werk von Amateuren“, erklärte er und stellte die Aktion in einen größeren Zusammenhang: „Es gab in jüngster Zeit eine Zunahme von groß angelegten Sicherheits-Attacken auf US-amerikanische Technologie- und Medien-Unternehmen.“

New York Times und Wall Street Journal betroffen

Damit liefert Lord vielleicht doch einen Hinweis darauf, wo er die Herkunft der Angreifer vermutet. Denn die Medien-Unternehmen, die Lord erwähnt, sind sicherlich die New York Times und das Wall Street Journal. Beide haben in der vergangenen Woche über Hackerangriffe auf ihre Internetseiten und Computersysteme berichtet. Und beide vermuteten Hacker aus China hinter den Angriffen, die es darauf angelegt hatten, die jeweilige China-Berichterstattung zu überwachen. Am Wochenende machte auch die Zeitung Washington Post publik, dass sie schon 2008 Ziel von Hacker-Angriffen gewesen sei. Unter Verdacht auch hier: China.

Klare Beweise sind bei Angriffen dieser Art aber schwer beizubringen, und China weist ein ums andere Mal alle Vorwürfe zurück. Doch die Cyber-Einbrüche häufen sich, und sie belasten zunehmend die internationale Politik. Die am Freitag aus dem Amt geschiedene US-Außenministerin Hillary Clinton hat kurz vor ihrem Abschied erklärt, die US-Regierung beobachte eine Zunahme von Hackerangriffen sowohl auf staatliche Einrichtungen als auch auf Privatunternehmen. Sie wünsche sich ein internationales Forum, das Antworten auf „diese Art illegalen Eindringens“ suche. Die jüngsten Enthüllungen fachen die seit Jahren schwelende Angst der Amerikaner an vor der Cyber-Armee aus Zehntausenden „Roten Hackern“.

(Berliner Zeitung mit AFP, dpa)

 

http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/medien/hacker-angriff-auf-twitter-peking-unter-hacker-verdacht,10809188,21627722.html

In den Fängen der Online – Mafia – Der große Datenklau über unsere Computer

 

Report München – Der große Datenklau über unsere Computer

In den Fängen der online-Mafia: Der große Datenklau über unsere ComputerSie klauen Daten, spähen Passwörter aus, legen Web-Seiten lahm oder verschicken Spam. Dass man ihnen auf die Schliche kommt, fürchten die Kriminellen nicht: Nicht ihre Computer, sondern die PCs unbescholtener Bürger verüben die Straftaten – sie gehorchen den Kommandos Unbekannter.

Die EU gegen die kriminellen Hacker

Unternehmen sollen melden, wenn Hacker-Angriffe auf ihre IT-Infrastruktur stattfinden. Das zumindest plant EU-Kommissarin Neelie Kroes. Das Vertrauen in die IT soll wachsen, so könnte sich beispielsweise Cloud-Computing durchsetzen und langfristig neue Jobs schaffen.

Die EU-Kommissarin Neelie Kroes denkt Informationen der Süddeutschen Zeitung zufolge über eine Meldepflicht bei Hacker-Angriffen für Unternehmen nach. Laut der für „Digitale Agenda“ zuständigen Niederländerin würden Cyber-Attacken auf Unternehmen nicht nur sie selbst, sondern auch die allgemeine IT-Sicherheit in der EU bedrohen. Gemeinsam mit ihren Kolleginnen Cecilia Malmström (Innenkommissarin) und Catherine Ashton (EU-Außenbeauftragte) will Kroes noch 2013 eine entsprechende Strategie für europäische Cyber-Sicherheit präsentieren. In der Folge soll die EU einen neuen Gesetzesentwurfverabschieden, der entsprechende Statuten für Internetprovider und Betreiber von Rechenzentren regeln soll.

Kroes sagte gegenüber der Süddeutschen Zeitung: „Ich bin ein großer Befürworter von Selbstregulierung, aber in diesem Fall fürchte ich, dass wir damit nicht weiterkommen. Es geht nicht darum, sich gegenseitig die Schuld in die Schuhe zu schieben, sondern darum, voneinander zu lernen.“ Die EU-Kommissarin sieht ihren Vorstoß als notwendig an, da dasVertrauen in die IT wachsen müsse. Technologien wie beispielsweise das Cloud-Computing könnten sich sonst nicht auf Dauer durchsetzen. Das servergestützte Berechnen von Daten soll laut Kroes die lahmende EU-Wirtschaft wieder in Schwung bringen. Kroes verspricht sich außerdem eine Entlastung für die öffentliche Verwaltung, die kontinuierlich zu erhöhten Sparmaßnahmen gezwungen sei.

Wie “Otmar Knoll”, “Fairvesta” zusammnen mit “GoMoPa” kritische Webseiten illegal ausschaltet

 

Zitat OtmarKnoll/Fairvesta:

Subject:   AW: AW: AW: AW: [Fwd: Your enquiry]
From:   “Knoll, Otmar”
Date:   Tue, February 5, 2013 8:14 pm
To:   “‘office@ebizz.tv'”
Priority:   Normal
Options:   View Full Header | View Printable Version  | Download this as a file
Schade dass Sie nicht hören wollen, nun ist es zu spät, vielleicht überlegen Sie
sich das noch mal.
Den wenn die Domains offline gehen, dann haben Sie kein Medium mehr.
Wer nicht hören will muss fühlen sagt ein Sprichwort.

http://i-nvestment.com/category/leserbrief/

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Otmar Knoll
Handlungsbevollmächtigter

fairvesta Group AG
Konrad-Adenauer-Str. 15
D - 72072 Tübingen
Tel:  +49 (0)7071 3665-0
Fax: +49 (0)7071 3665-77
o.knoll@fairvesta.de 
www.fairvesta.de

Amtsgericht Stuttgart HRB 382675
Vorstand: Hermann Geiger
Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrates: Alfred Renner
Sitz: Tübingen
USt.-IdNr.: DE814337296

D

SECRECY NEWS – KEEPING SECRETS FROM CONGRESS

When government information is classified or otherwise withheld from
release, the possibility of government accountability to the public is
undermined.  But when the executive branch withholds crucial information
from Congress, that may pose an even more fundamental challenge to
democratic governance.

"The administration has refused to share Presidential Policy Directive 11
(PPD 11) with the Congress," said Sen. Richard Lugar last year at a hearing
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which has just been published. 
PPD 11 is the Obama Administration document that set the terms of reference
for the Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study, which will dictate the
future size and configuration of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Sen. Lugar voiced a polite objection to this unilateral act of Obama
Administration secrecy:  "I simply would say that our country is strongest
and our diplomacy is most effective when nuclear policy is made by
deliberate decisions in which both the legislative and executive branches
fully participate."

        http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/implement.html

The withholding of presidential directives from Congress is not a new
practice.  A 1992 investigation by the General Accounting Office found that
Congress had not been routinely notified of the preparation or issuance of
national security directives and that none of the relevant congressional
committees "are regularly receiving copies" of such directives.

It is known that presidential directives can be used to establish national
policy, to direct the implementation of policy, and to authorize the
commitment of government resources. But without access to detailed
information about the directives, GAO reported in 1992, "it is impossible
to satisfactorily determine how many NSDs [national security directives]
issued make and implement U.S. policy and what those policies are."

On the other hand, unlike many executive orders, presidential directives
"do not appear to be issued under statutory authority conferred by Congress
and thus do not have the force and effect of law," GAO said. Certainly such
directives cannot limit congressional authority or power to legislate.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/gao-nsiad-92-72.pdf

Yesterday eleven Senators wrote to President Obama to ask him to direct
the release to Congress "the secret legal opinions outlining your authority
to authorize the killing of Americans in the course of counterterrorism
operations."

"It is vitally important... for Congress and the American public to have a
full understanding of how the executive branch interprets the limits and
boundaries of this authority, so that Congress and the public can decide
whether this authority has been properly defined, and whether the
President's power to deliberately kill American citizens is subject to
appropriate limitations and safeguards," the Senators wrote.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2013_cr/olc-lethal.pdf

Later in the day, Mike Isikoff of NBC News obtained a confidential
Department of Justice White Paper entitled "Lawfulness of a Lethal
Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational
Leader of Al-Qa'ida or An Associated Force."

        http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/doj-lethal.pdf

NBC said the document had been "provided to members of the Senate
Intelligence and Judiciary committees in June by administration officials
on the condition that it be kept confidential and not discussed publicly." 
This non-disclosure condition, now abrogated, is difficult to understand on
national security grounds, but easier to comprehend as an attempt to manage
or evade public controversy.

At any rate, the government's legal argument, such as it is, is now on the
public record.  The most important task before Congress is not to plead for
release of additional, underlying source documents, but to respond as a
legislative body to the Administration's now-public assertion of its
position.  To do nothing is to endorse it.

AN INTELLIGENCE HISTORY OF THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

The Central Intelligence Agency has published a series of essays on
intelligence and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, to coincide with a symposium on
the subject held last week at the Nixon Presidential Library.

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/

The publication itself ("President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War") is a welcome addition to the literature.  But
it also "includes some embarrassing errors," wrote Amir Oren in the Israeli
paper Ha'aretz on February 3 ("CIA report on Yom Kippur War: Israel had
nuclear arsenal"). 

"For example," Oren wrote, "in the photograph labeled 'An Egyptian soldier
holding up a portrait of President Sadat,' the soldier in question and the
two soldiers flanking him are clearly Israelis, as evidenced by the 'IDF'
stamped visibly on their shirts."

"The editors of the new study also err in attributing two things to
lessons from the Six-Day War: the faulty prevailing conception among
Israeli Military Intelligence 'that Israel would have at least 48 hours'
warning before an invasion' and that Sadat wouldn't start a war before
acquiring fighter planes. Furthermore, it seems they also confused war
analyst Maj. Gen. (ret.) Chaim Herzog with one of his sons, Brig. Gen.
(ret.) Mike Herzog," he added.

If these discrepancies are cause for embarrassment, then it is the kind of
embarrassment that should be willingly endured. To put it another way,
exposing such work to external review and criticism is an unsurpassed way
of identifying and correcting errors.

A REPORT ON CIA DETENTION AND RENDITION PROGRAMS

In the absence of an official public account of post-9/11 U.S.
counterterrorism programs, Americans (and others) must rely on unofficial
accounts.

"Globalizing Torture" is a new report from the Open Society Justice
Initiative, authored by Amrit Singh.  It is said to provide "the most
comprehensive account yet assembled of the human rights abuses associated
with CIA secret detention and extraordinary rendition operations. It
details for the first time what was done to the 136 known victims, and
lists the 54 foreign governments that participated in these operations. It
shows that responsibility for the abuses lies not only with the United
States but with dozens of foreign governments that were complicit."

        http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/

It was reported in "Report Says 54 Countries Helped CIA After 9/11" by
Scott Shane, New York Times, February 4.

THE JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE, AND MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that have
not been made readily available to the public include the following.

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress,
February 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22942.pdf

U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues, January 24, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42948.pdf

Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2013, February
1, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20792.pdf

IMF Reforms: Issues for Congress, February 1, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42844.pdf

Medicare, Medicaid, and Other Health Provisions in the American Taxpayer
Relief Act of 2012, January 31, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42944.pdf

Hemp as an Agricultural Commodity, December 18, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32725.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

TOP-SECRET – Federal Reserve Discussion Paper on Foreign Banks in U.S.

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/FR-ForeignBanksPrimer.png

oreign Banks in the U.S.: A primer

  • William Goulding and Daniel E. Nolle
  • 77 pages
  • November 2012

Download

This paper describes the foreign banking landscape in the United States. It begins by establishing a vocabulary for discussion of the subject, and then identifies a number of important data-related issues. With that information in hand, the remainder of the paper focuses on identifying the most important underlying trends on both sides of the balance sheets of foreign-owned banks’ U.S. operations. At each step, the investigation considers how foreign-owned banks compare to U.S.-owned domestic banks, and how two types of foreign banks operations in the U.S. — branches and agencies of foreign banks (FBAs), and foreign-owned subsidiary banks (FSUBs) — compare to each other. The banking sector in the U.S. experienced substantial swings in performance and stability over the decade surrounding the 2008-2009 financial crisis and changes in every major dimension of foreign-owned banks’ assets and liabilities were even larger than for domestic banks. Changes were especially large at FBAs. For example, cash balances came to dominate the assets side of FBAs’ aggregate balance sheet, with the absolute level of cash balances larger than those of domestic U.S. banks beginning in 2011, despite the fact that total assets of domestic U.S. banks are five times the assets of FBAs. Further, the recent unprecedented build-up of cash balances by FBAs was almost entirely composed of excess reserves. Changes in FBAs’ liabilities-side activities have also been large, with much funding coming from large wholesale deposits and net borrowing from their foreign parents and related offices abroad.

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Conquistador Coffee Campaign

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Conquistador Coffee Campaign

Monty Python’s Flying Circus

http://www.amazon.com/Complete-Monty-Pythons-Flying-Circus/dp/B001E77XNA/ref=…

Cryptome – Germans Exploited Codes of Special Ops Executive

 SOE codes and Referat Vauck

In the 1930’s the British SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) collected information from European targets through two parallel systems. On the one hand regular SIS officers operated as passport control officers in the British consulates. This system gave them diplomatic protection but on the other hand foreign governments could easily identify them and keep them under observation.

As the diplomatic situation deteriorated a parallel system was created that would afford better security. This was the Z organization, created in 1936 and headed by Claude Dansey. The Z organization was supposed to operate independently of British embassies and thus avoid the attention of foreign internal security agencies.
At the start of WWII both networks were unable to perform as intended. As British embassies closed down, the PCO’s lost their networks. The undercover Z organization on the other hand had been compromised from double agents and British intelligence suffered a grievous defeat in the Venlo incident.
Since both groups had neglected to build up ‘stay behind’ networks and supply them with the necessary radio equipment this meant that Britain had practically no reliable intelligence networks available after the fall of France. In this void the need for extreme measures led to the creation of the SOE (Special Operations Executive) organization in 1940. SOE was responsible for intelligence and sabotage operations against the Axis powers but since it had the same mission as SIS countless power struggles ensued between these two agencies.
The wartime performance of SOE was mixed at best. Although they certainly had their successes, countless SOE networks were compromised and their members arrested and executed. In Holland their entire network fell under German control in the famous Englandspiel operation.  In France they lost countless agents and networks. Just the fall of their Prosper network in 1943 led to the arrest of hundreds of resistance members.
SOE was disbanded in 1946 and most of its archives were destroyed postwar with some lost in a fire. Unfortunately the loss of the archives means that many questions about SOE wartime operations can never be answered.
Were some of the failures of SOE in Western Europe connected with their insecure cryptosystems? Leo Marks, head of the SOE cipher section, was constantly worried about the insecurity of their poem code but it took him till late 1943 to introduce the unbreakable letter one time pad. The change was gradual and even in 1944 many insecure systems continued to be used.
Let’s have a look at this whole affair.
SOE cryptosystems
WWII intelligence services had two conflicting requirements when it came to cryptologic systems for their agents.
On the one hand they needed systems that would be easy to use in the field (so that ruled out like complicated/bulky systems like cipher machines).
On the other hand these messages had to be kept secure from enemy codebreakers, since each one contained information that could compromise their entire networks.
Unlike military messages that are usually unimportant on their own the traffic of a spy group contains names, addresses and other sensitive information that can be used by the enemy to untangle the entire group.
The only system that satisfied both requirements was the one time pad system and it was introduced gradually in late 1943. However for most of the war SOE used systems that were both insecure and prone to errors by the user.
Let’s take a look at them:
1). Playfair square
The first crypto system used by SOE was the well known Playfair cipher.
The security afforded by this system was very low and from 1942 it was restricted to internal network communications and its use prohibited for messages sent by radio.
2). Columnar transposition
The main system used by SOE for most of the war was the transposition of the text based on a numerical key.
Simple transposition
First the text is written underneath the key. Then each column is written vertically in the order specified by the key. This results in a ‘scrambled’ text.
For example let’s say our message is the following ‘Gestapo has arrested our radio operator cipher material compromised’ and the ‘key’ is ‘automobile’:
First we write the key and number each letter according to their position in the alphabet. If the same letter is present more than once we number them starting from the one to the left.
1
10
9
7
6
8
2
4
5
3
a
u
t
o
m
o
b
i
l
e
Then we write the plain text below the key:
1
10
9
7
6
8
2
4
5
3
g
e
s
t
a
p
o
h
a
s
a
r
r
e
s
t
e
d
o
u
r
r
a
d
i
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
o
r
c
i
p
h
e
r
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
c
o
m
p
r
o
m
i
s
e
d

Now we use the numerical key to rearrange the columns and copy the output:

garammoeopassurrohdphleaoeecdasicrmtedreoptoiiisraotrerrtap
Double transposition
The same procedure is then repeated one more time but with a different key of a different length. For example let’s assume the second ‘key’ is ‘elephant’:
2
5
3
7
4
1
6
8
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
2
5
3
7
4
1
6
8
g
a
r
a
m
m
o
e
o
p
a
s
s
u
r
r
o
h
d
p
h
l
e
a
o
e
e
c
d
a
s
i
c
r
m
t
e
d
r
e
o
p
t
o
i
i
i
s
r
a
o
t
r
e
r
r
t
a
p
The scrambled text becomes
muladiegooocortrademtopmshdeirapherpaaoresriraspctoteraiesr. Then the text is broken up in 5-letter groups and null letters are inserted to make the total divisible by 5.
Each message had to contain at least 100 letters and no more than 400-500.
The security of the transposition system depended on the use of different keys for each message. How were these keys selected?
Key taken from a book
In the early years the transposition keys were taken from a book. Both the agent and the receiving station had the same edition of a specific book and the indicator at the start of the message specified the page number, the line and the number of letters to be used for the two tables. Since the indicator had to be sent in letter groups a number to letter conversion table was used to turn the page numbers etc into letters. Before converting the numbers however the agent had to encipher this group by adding (without carrying) his own secret identification number.
This whole operation was time consuming and prone to errors. Moreover the use of a book as a key generator was found to be impractical in the field. Instead a poem or verse was used to create transposition keys.
Key taken from a poem
Each agent had to memorize a specific poem and could then use it to create different transposition keys for each message. After writing down the poem each word was assigned a letter of the alphabet. Then the user had to choose at random 6 consecutive letters.
Let’s say our poem is ‘Mary Had a Little Lamb’:
MARY
HAD
 A LITTLE
LAMB
WHOSE
FLEECE
WAS
A
B
 C
D
E
F
G
H
WHITE
AS
SNOW
AND
EVERYWHERE
THAT
MARY
WENT
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
THE
LAMB
WAS
SURE
TO
GO
IT
FOLLOWED
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
HER
TO
Y
Z

Let’s assume that the letters chosen are PQRSTU, the odd letters furnish the first ‘key’ and the even letters the second. In our example PRT points to ‘WENT LAMB SURE’ as the first ‘key’. For the second we use QSU so it’s ‘THE WAS TO’. The indicator showing which words were used as ‘keys’ will be PRT filled with two nulls so as to form a 5-letter group (all messages were sent in 5-letter groups), so let’s say PARNT and the final step is to move all the letters forward by using the agents’ secret number. For instance if the number was 45711 then in our example PARNT will change into TFYOU, as each letter moves forward as many positions as indicated by the secret number P+4=T, A+5=F, R+7=Y, N+1=O, T+1=U.

This system was preferred by agents because they did not have to carry a book around. However if the agent was captured and tortured he might reveal his poem to the Germans with the result that they would be able to decode all his messages.
The problem of indecipherables
As can be seen in the aforementioned examples the slightest mistake in numbering the key or enciphering the plaintext will result in an indecipherable message. This was the biggest problem with the double transposition system and as a result a large percentage of the messages received at SOE HQ were unreadable. This forced HQ to request another transmission of the same message, with the following problems for the agents:
1). Forcing an agent to resend the message led to loss of time. If the information was time sensitive then obviously there was danger of it becoming useless.
2). The Germans monitored radio traffic in the occupied areas  and used direction finding equipment in order to locate the sites of illegal transmissions. The longer an agent stayed ‘on the air’ the easier it was for the Germans to triangulate his position.
3). Sending the same message enciphered with different keys was dangerous from a security point because it could provide enemy cryptanalysts with a way to solve it.
4). SOE agents were taught a series of secret signs that could be inserted in their messages in order to warn HQ that they had been captured and were under German control. Usually these were spelling mistakes at a prearranged point. However the huge number of indecipherables completely negated the value of this security system since messages had so many mistakes that it was not possible to know If they were a result of operator error or a deliberate attempt to warn HQ!
In order to deal with indecipherables a codebreaking department was created in the SOE cipher section and was tasked with solving the incoming messages.
WOK’s (Worked-Out Keys)
The use of a poem as a source of keys was found to be cumbersome and prone to errors and was replaced with a new system called the ‘A-Z system’ by Lorain and ‘WOK’ by Leo Marks.
Instead of choosing the transposition keys from a poem the agent was given a silk handkerchief with prepared keys. Each key had its own discriminant. Once the key was used then it was cut off and destroyed.
This system guaranteed that even if the agent was captured he would not be able to reveal the key to his captors since he did not have to memorize it. It also minimized operator errors.
3). Delastelle system
The cipher of Felix Marie Delastelle (1840–1902) is mentioned by Pierre Lorain but not by Leo Marks. According to Lorain it was a transitional system used in 1942-43.
4). LOP’s – (Letter One time Pads)
The epitome of the spy field cipher was the letter one time pad. This was adopted thanks to the efforts of Leo Marks and was gradually introduced in late 1943. The system used a substitution table together with a set of prepared ‘keys’. Each letter of the ‘key’ was ‘coupled’ with the opposite letter of the plaintext and they were substituted using the conversion table.
‘Between Silk and Cyanide: The Story of SOE’s Code War’, p248 has an example of a conversion table:
For example if we want to encode the message ‘Jacques has arrived safely’ using the ‘key’  aqgtfdpxwmvxtdndixvhydk then the cipher text will be ooleifdvmqwckwxfuewygtb as aj=o, qa=o, gc=l etc
The OTP system is mathematically unbreakable provided the key is as long as the message and each key is only used once. The security of the system was such that messages could be as small as 10 letters.
However the OTP has the problem of distribution of keys, as both the sending and the receiving party need to have the same keys.
German exploitation of SOE codes
The German agencies responsible for monitoring illicit radio transmissions were the Radio Defence Corps of the Armed Forces High Command – OKW Funkabwehr and the similar department of the regular police – Ordnungspolizei. Both agencies operated in Western Europe but they were assigned different areas.
These agencies not only monitored the agents’ traffic but in many cases they were able to locate the site of transmissions through D/F (direction finding). In such cases the radio center was raided and often the operator and his cipher material were captured.
This cipher material was then used by Dr Vaucks agents section to identify the crypto-systems, solve them and decode the traffic. This section, headed by Dr Wilhelm Vauck, was originally part of the Army’s signal intelligence agency OKH/In 7/VI but worked closely with the Radio Defense Corps. It was established in 1942 and by the end of the year two-man teams were detached to regional Aussenstellen in Paris, Marseilles, Lyons, Prague, Oslo, Vienna, Brussels. In late 1943 the entire department was moved to the OKW Funkabwehr.
According to postwar reports they usually had success with a system if it had been physically compromised. However in some cases it was possible to solve enemy systems cryptanalytically. Mettig, head of the Army’s signal intelligence agency in 1941-43 says in TICOM I-115 that
a special weakness of Allied agents’ ciphers was the use of books for enciphering. Usually only a minor inroad or other clue was required to reproduce a piece of the cipher text and conclusions could thence be drawn as to which book was used. In the case of one Allied transmission in the summer of ’42, five or six French words of a text were ascertained, leading to the conclusion that the cipher book dealt with the Spanish civil war. In view of this assumption, all French books about the Spanish civil war in the State libraries of Paris, Madrid and Lisbon were read with the object of trying in these 5-6 words. The book was found. PW always looked on a great research effort as worthwhile. The greatest weakness in using books for enciphering lay in the fact that, once a book had been compromised, an entire transmission could be broken automatically. The weakness existed even if the book in question could not be secured in the same edition or impression. It was still possible for Referat Vauck (though again only after considerable research) to find the right place in the book and to secure a fluent deciphering system by means of conversion tables.
Another weakness of Allied agent ciphers was the use of poetry. Here the verse metre was an additional help in solving the cipher text, as was done in the case of a Czech transmission in the autumn of 42/43.’
Notice that Mettig mentions in his report the use of poems and books as key generators. As we have seen these were indeed the main SOE systems (and probably SIS too).
How successful was the German effort vs SOE codes?
Unfortunately it is impossible to answer this question conclusively since I have not seen any TICOM reports giving details on the work of the Vauck section. Nor does it seem that Dr Vauck was interrogated by TICOM authorities after the war.
The Germans certainly decoded some messages as can be seen in file HW 40/76 ‘Enemy exploitation of SIS and SOE codes and cyphers: miscellaneous reports and correspondence’:

Fenner, head of the cryptanalysis department of OKW/Chi, said in DF-187F, p20 about the Vauck section that ‘there may have been some 50 messages decrypted weekly, among them some to be sure which were almost a year old and hence had only historical significance’. Fenner however was not the best source since he makes many ‘mistakes’ in his reports. TICOM report DF-9 ‘Captured Wehrmacht Sigint Document: Translation of Activity Report of OKW/Chi for the Period 1st January, 1944 to 25th June, 1944’, p4 gives the messages decoded by month and says in the end ‘The 6.000 agents messages handed to Fu III are not included in these figures.’

Hans Kurfess, a member of the Agents section detailed to the Paris Aussenstelle says in report CSDIC/CMF/SD 80, p24 ‘KURFESS, whose attachment was more “normal” than that of LENTZ and who consequently has a clearer idea of the sort of traffic that came through the Aussenstelle, states that most of the deciphered messages were short (40-50 groups) and used a double transposition cipher with a key phrase consisting of a line of poetry. They nearly all concerned the resistance movement in FRANCE, giving times of rendezvous, parachute dropping of supplies and WT sets. He remembers the code names “LYSANDER” and “EIFFEL” but cannot state in exactly what connection, and also one message of about 250 groups giving military information. He has forgotten for whom it was intended.’
There is also this information from ‘The German Penetration of SOE: France, 1941-44’ by Jean Overton Fuller:
One day `Archambaud’ was all on edge, and to my question, ‘What is the matter?’ he replied. “Mr Goetz has given me, in clear, the text of a radiophonic message I received from London several weeks before my arrest. He had received the deciphered text of the message from Berlin. Now that was a message I had never been able to decipher myself, as London had committed a fault in the ciphering. Well, in Berlin they had deciphered it, and so it is from the Germans that I learn what it contained.”I know that the central department in Berlin recorded almost all the enemy radiophonic messages from France and elsewhere, and that every time we arrested a radio operator Kieffer immediately asked Berlin to send, still ciphered or deciphered, the texts of the messages which he had sent to and received from London. For a long time after that `Archambaud’ racked his brains as to how Berlin had been able to decipher his messages.
This passage seems to support the Abbe Guillaume’s belief that the arrival of the two Canadians by parachute in the Sologne was known to the Germans through their having broken Archambaud’s code, while he was still at liberty. Germaine Tambour, two days before her arrest, had told Laure Lebras the Germans seemed to know of parachutings at the same time as the Resistance and she believed they had the code. Professor Foot wrote that he had seen no evidence causing him to believe the Germans ever broke the code of an operator still at liberty, but Professor Foot had not the benefit of having seen Vogt’s letter to me about this. That they asked the agents to give their codes may seem evidence against their ability to break them, but I suspect it may have been a question of time. From Vogt’s letter, it appears to me that sometimes they could and sometimes they could not break the code.

Perhaps the British know more about what really happened since the first page in HW 40/76 says:

So I guess we’ll have to wait…

Sources: ‘Secret Warfare: The Arms and Techniques of the Resistance’ by Pierre Lorain, ‘Between Silk and Cyanide: The Story of SOE’s Code War’ by Leo Marks, ‘Secret War: The Story of SOE, Britain’s Wartime Sabotage Organization’, ‘MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949’, ‘European Axis Signals Intelligence’ vol3 and 4, TICOM reports I-115, I-200, DF-187B, DF-187F, DF-9 , HW 40/76 ‘Enemy exploitation of SIS and SOE codes and cyphers’, ‘The German Penetration of SOE: France, 1941-44’, CSDIC/CMF/SD 80 – ‘First Detailed Interrogation Report on LENTZ, Waldemar, and KURFESS, Hans’, CSDIC (UK) SIR 1106 ‘Report on information obtained from PW CS/495 Uffz MIERSEMANN’
Acknowledgements: Once again I have to thank Ralph Erskine for helping me identify the SOE cryptosystems.
Source:

TMZ – Charlize Theron is Justin Bieber?

 

Charlize Theron showed off her new haircut — which happens to be the EXACT same style as Justin Bieber’s! In fact, that style is so popular, it’s even infiltrated the TMZ newsroom.

PI – Assessment of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban and Gun Violence

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NIJ-AssaultWeaponsBan.png

 

An Updated Assessment of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban: Impacts on Gun Markets and Gun Violence, 1994-2003

  • Christopher S. Koper, Daniel J. Woods and Jeffrey A. Roth
  • 114 pages
  • June 2004

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This overview presents key findings and conclusions from a study sponsored by the National Institute of Justice to investigate the effects of the federal assault weapons ban. This study updates prior reports to the National Institute of Justice and the U.S. Congress on the assault weapons legislation.

The Ban Attempts to Limit the Use of Guns with Military Style Features and Large Ammunition Capacities

• Title XI, Subtitle A of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 imposed a 10-year ban on the “manufacture, transfer, and possession” of certain semiautomatic firearms designated as assault weapons (AWs). The ban is directed at semiautomatic firearms having features that appear useful in military and criminal applications but unnecessary in shooting sports or self-defense (examples include flash hiders, folding rifle stocks, and threaded barrels for attaching silencers). The law bans 18 models and variations by name, as well as revolving cylinder shotguns. It also has a “features test” provision banning other semiautomatics having two or more military-style features. In sum, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has identified 118 models and variations that are prohibited by the law. A number of the banned guns are foreign semiautomatic rifles that have been banned from importation into the U.S. since 1989.
• The ban also prohibits most ammunition feeding devices holding more than 10 rounds of ammunition (referred to as large capacity magazines, or LCMs). An LCM is arguably the most functionally important feature of most AWs, many of which have magazines holding 30 or more rounds. The LCM ban’s reach is broader than that of the AW ban because many non-banned semiautomatics accept LCMs. Approximately 18% of civilian-owned firearms and 21% of civilian-owned handguns were equipped with LCMs as of 1994.
• The ban exempts AWs and LCMs manufactured before September 13, 1994. At that time, there were upwards of 1.5 million privately owned AWs in the U.S. and nearly 25 million guns equipped with LCMs. Gun industry sources estimated that there were 25 million pre-ban LCMs available in the U.S. as of 1995. An additional 4.7 million pre-ban LCMs were imported into the country from 1995 through 2000, with the largest number in 1999.
• Arguably, the AW-LCM ban is intended to reduce gunshot victimizations by limiting the national stock of semiautomatic firearms with large ammunition capacities – which enable shooters to discharge many shots rapidly – and other features conducive to criminal uses. The AW provision targets a relatively small number of weapons based on features that have little to do with the weapons’ operation, and removing those features is sufficient to make the weapons legal. The LCM provision limits the ammunition capacity of non-banned firearms.

The Banned Guns and Magazines Were Used in Up to A Quarter of Gun Crimes Prior to the Ban

• AWs were used in only a small fraction of gun crimes prior to the ban: about 2% according to most studies and no more than 8%. Most of the AWs used in crime are assault pistols rather than assault rifles.
• LCMs are used in crime much more often than AWs and accounted for 14% to 26% of guns used in crime prior to the ban.
• AWs and other guns equipped with LCMs tend to account for a higher share of guns used in murders of police and mass public shootings, though such incidents are very rare.

The Ban’s Success in Reducing Criminal Use of the Banned Guns and Magazines Has Been Mixed

• Following implementation of the ban, the share of gun crimes involving AWs declined by 17% to 72% across the localities examined for this study (Baltimore, Miami, Milwaukee, Boston, St. Louis, and Anchorage), based on data covering all or portions of the 1995-2003 post-ban period. This is consistent with patterns found in national data on guns recovered by police and reported to ATF.
• The decline in the use of AWs has been due primarily to a reduction in the use of assault pistols (APs), which are used in crime more commonly than assault rifles (ARs). There has not been a clear decline in the use of ARs, though assessments are complicated by the rarity of crimes with these weapons and by substitution of post-ban rifles that are very similar to the banned AR models.
• However, the decline in AW use was offset throughout at least the late 1990s by steady or rising use of other guns equipped with LCMs in jurisdictions studied (Baltimore, Milwaukee, Louisville, and Anchorage). The failure to reduce LCM use has likely been due to the immense stock of exempted pre-ban magazines, which has been enhanced by recent imports.

It is Premature to Make Definitive Assessments of the Ban’s Impact on Gun Crime

• Because the ban has not yet reduced the use of LCMs in crime, we cannot clearly credit the ban with any of the nation’s recent drop in gun violence. However, the ban’s exemption of millions of pre-ban AWs and LCMs ensured that the effects of the law would occur only gradually. Those effects are still unfolding and may not be fully felt for several years into the future, particularly if foreign, pre-ban LCMs continue to be imported into the U.S. in large numbers.

The Ban’s Reauthorization or Expiration Could Affect Gunshot Victimizations, But Predictions are Tenuous

Should it be renewed, the ban’s effects on gun violence are likely to be small at best and perhaps too small for reliable measurement. AWs were rarely used in gun crimes even before the ban. LCMs are involved in a more substantial share of gun crimes, but it is not clear how often the outcomes of gun attacks depend on the ability of offenders to fire more than ten shots (the current magazine capacity limit) without reloading.
• Nonetheless, reducing criminal use of AWs and especially LCMs could have nontrivial effects on gunshot victimizations. The few available studies suggest that attacks with semiautomatics – including AWs and other semiautomatics equipped with LCMs – result in more shots fired, more persons hit, and more wounds inflicted per victim than do attacks with other firearms. Further, a study of handgun attacks in one city found that 3% of the gunfire incidents resulted in more than 10 shots fired, and those attacks produced almost 5% of the gunshot victims.
• Restricting the flow of LCMs into the country from abroad may be necessary to achieve desired effects from the ban, particularly in the near future. Whether mandating further design changes in the outward features of semiautomatic weapons (such as removing all military-style features) will produce measurable benefits beyond those of restricting ammunition capacity is unknown. Past experience also suggests that Congressional discussion of broadening the AW ban to new models or features would raise prices and production of the weapons under discussion.
• If the ban is lifted, gun and magazine manufacturers may reintroduce AW models and LCMs, perhaps in substantial numbers. In addition, pre-ban AWs may lose value and novelty, prompting some of their owners to sell them in undocumented secondhand markets where they can more easily reach high-risk users, such as criminals, terrorists, and other potential mass murderers. Any resulting increase in crimes with AWs and LCMs might increase gunshot victimizations for the reasons noted above, though this effect could be difficult to measure.

3.1. Criminal Use of Assault Weapons

Numerous studies have examined the use of AWs in crime prior to the federal ban. The definition of AWs varied across the studies and did not always correspond exactly to that of the 1994 law (in part because a number of the studies were done prior to 1994). In general, however, the studies appeared to focus on various semiautomatics with detachable magazines and military-style features. According to these accounts, AWs typically accounted for up to 8% of guns used in crime, depending on the specific AW definition and data source used (e.g., see Beck et al., 1993; Hargarten et al., 1996; Hutson et al., 1994; 1995; McGonigal et al., 1993; New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, 1994; Roth and Koper, 1997, Chapters 2, 5, 6; Zawitz, 1995). A compilation of 38 sources indicated that AWs accounted for 2% of crime guns on average (Kleck, 1997, pp.112, 141-143).

Similarly, the most common AWs prohibited by the 1994 federal ban accounted for between 1% and 6% of guns used in crime according to most of several national and local data sources examined for this and our prior study (see Chapter 6 and Roth and Koper, 1997, Chapters 5, 6):

• Baltimore (all guns recovered by police, 1992-1993): 2%
• Miami (all guns recovered by police, 1990-1993): 3%
• Milwaukee (guns recovered in murder investigations, 1991-1993): 6%
• Boston (all guns recovered by police, 1991-1993): 2%
• St. Louis (all guns recovered by police, 1991-1993): 1%
• Anchorage, Alaska (guns used in serious crimes, 1987-1993): 4%
• National (guns recovered by police and reported to ATF, 1992-1993): 5%
• National (gun thefts reported to police, 1992-Aug. 1994): 2%
• National (guns used in murders of police, 1992-1994): 7-9%
• National (guns used in mass murders of 4 or more persons, 1992-1994): 4-13%

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – The Audit

Monty Python’s Flying Circus

http://www.amazon.com/Complete-Monty-Pythons-Flying-Circus/dp/B001E77XNA/ref=…

TMZ – Jennifer Lawrence: My Boobs Aren’t Right! — Jimmy Kimmel Interview

 

If you think Jennifer Lawrence is absolutely perfect, then you are DEAD WRONG… because according to JLaw, she’s got a MAJOR ISSUE in the boob department!

Revealed-DHS-FBI Bulletin: Recent Active Shooter Incidents

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(U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to provide information on the recent active shooter incidents that have taken place in the Homeland. This information is provided to support the activities of DHS and FBI and to assist private sector security officials and federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement in identifying protective and support measures relating to active shooters.

(U//FOUO) For the purpose of this report, an “active shooter” is defined as one or more individuals participating in a random or systematic killing spree demonstrating their intent to harm others with a firearm. An active shooter’s objective is that of mass murder, rather than committing traditional criminal acts, such as robbery or hostage-taking. Active shooter attacks are dynamic incidents that vary greatly from one to another.

(U) Key Findings

(U//FOUO) Recent shootings underscore the need for private sector security officials and law enforcement to ensure that protective and crisis response measures are in place and up-to-date.

(U//FOUO) The FBI analyzed 154 active shooter events in the United States between 2002 and 2012 (to date) that included three or more individuals being shot.*

(U//FOUO) Motivations for active shooting incidents are difficult to fully determine. The shooter was deceased after 51 percent of these events (43 percent committed suicide and 8 percent were shot and killed by responders). Forty-five percent of active shooters were arrested and 4 percent remain unidentified. A clear motivation was never determined in 40 percent of cases analyzed; however, the most common identified motivations were found to be workplace retaliation (21 percent), domestic disputes (14 percent), and academic retaliation by a current or former student (7 percent).

(U//FOUO) The shooter was male in 96 percent of cases analyzed. The shooter acted alone 96 percent of the time. Active shooter events most commonly occurred in a workplace environment (37 percent) or academic setting (17 percent).

(U//FOUO) From investigations and analysis, many active shooters were described as social isolates, harbored feelings of hate and anger, and/or had some reported contact with mental health professionals. Mental illness is commonly referenced as a potential contributing factor, but its causal impact on the attack can only be speculated. Very few active shooters had previous arrests for violent crimes. Common catalysts or triggers observed include: loss of significant relationships, changes in financial status, loss of a job, changes in living arrangements, major adverse changes to life circumstances, and/or feelings of humiliation or rejection on the part of the shooter.

(U) Suggested Protective and Crisis Response Measures

(U//FOUO) The following protective and crisis response measures may assist or augment existing safety, security, and counterterrorism efforts at commercial and public facilities. Facilities should review and update existing emergency and crisis management procedures using these measures. Officials should consider the following measures for everyday security:

— (U//FOUO) Review, update, and validate all emergency and crisis management plans.
— (U//FOUO) Coordinate response plans across functional disciplines (e.g. police, fire, EMS, hospitals, school districts, and private sector) and regions to maximize response in a large incident.
— (U//FOUO) Conduct exercises of emergency and crisis management plans.
— (U//FOUO) Raise awareness among employees by conducting “all hazards” awareness training.
— (U//FOUO) Raise community awareness of potential threats and vulnerabilities.
— (U//FOUO) Ensure the staff are aware of their roles and responsibilities during a crisis and exercise these responsibilities.
— (U//FOUO) Ensure that emergency communications equipment is present and operable. Practice emergency communications plans and systems.
— (U//FOUO) Report suspicious activity to proper authorities, to include missing or stolen weapons.

(U) Long-Term Protective Measures

(U//FOUO) Protective measures in the long term should emphasize physical safeguards, including building enhancements that present a more robust deterrent and provide a more survivable environment. Officials should consider the following measures:

— (U//FOUO) Install secure locks on all external and internal doors and windows with quick-release capability from within for emergency escape.
— (U//FOUO) Install window and external door protection with quick-release capability from within for fire escape.
— (U//FOUO) Consider establishing safe areas within the facility for assembly and refuge during crises.
— (U//FOUO) Consider establishing/implementing an emergency communications system such as phone trees or text messages for personnel.

(U) Indicators of Surveillance

(U//FOUO) The following activities may suggest surveillance of facilities. Independently, each indicator may represent legitimate recreational or commercial activities; however, multiple indicators could suggest a heightened threat:

— (U//FOUO) Overly interested in entry points, peak days and hours of operation, security personnel, surveillance assets (including cameras), and access controls such as alarms, barriers, doors, gates, or locks.
— (U//FOUO) Loitering, parking, or standing in the same area over multiple days with no reasonable explanation.
— (U//FOUO) Observing security reaction drills or procedures (may cause an incident to observe response).
— (U//FOUO) Having an unusual interest in speaking with building maintenance personnel or security guards.
— (U//FOUO) Attention to or avoidance of surveillance cameras.
— (U//FOUO) Attempts to disguise appearance from visit to visit (change in hair color, style of dress).
— (U//FOUO) Interest without justification in obtaining site plans, ingress and egress routes, and information on employees or the public.
— (U//FOUO) Garments not appropriate for weather/seasons.
— (U//FOUO) Unusual behavior, such as staring at or quickly looking away from personnel or vehicles entering or leaving facilities or parking areas.
— (U//FOUO) An increase in anonymous telephone or e-mail threats in conjunction with suspected surveillance incidents, indicating possible surveillance of threat reaction procedures.
— (U//FOUO) Discreet use of still cameras and video recorders or note taking or use of sketching materials that would raise suspicion in a reasonable person.

(U//FOUO) Law enforcement agencies, security personnel, and administrators should be aware of and remain alert to indicators of surveillance activities. Officials are encouraged to review and update their evacuation plans and security and emergency policies.

Monty Python’s Meaning of Life – Every Sperm is Sacred

 

Monty Python’s Meaning of Life

http://www.amazon.com/Monty-Python-Trinity-Pythons-Meaning/dp/B001E12ZAM/ref=…

Cyberattacks against us – Same procedure – Wall Street Journal Announces That It, Too, Was Hacked by the Chinese

hacker.gifchinese

One day after The New York Times reported that Chinese hackers had infiltrated its computers and stolen passwords for its employees, The Wall Street Journal announced that it too had been hacked.

On Thursday, The Journal reported that it had been attacked by Chinese hackers who were trying to monitor the company’s coverage of China. It said hackers had broken into its network through computers in its Beijing bureau.

In a written statement, the business newspaper owned by News Corporation described the attack as an “ongoing issue” and said it was working closely with authorities and security specialists to clean up its systems. It said that it completed a “network overhaul” on Thursday in an effort to rid its systems of hackers.

China’s Ministry of National Defense has denied any involvement in the cyberattack at The Times or any other American corporations.

But security experts said that in 2008, Chinese hackers began targeting American news organizations as part of an effort to monitor coverage of Chinese issues.

In a report for clients in December, Mandiant, a computer security company, said that over the course of several investigations it found evidence that Chinese hackers had stolen e-mails, contacts and files from more than 30 journalists and executives at Western news organizations, and had maintained a “short list” of journalists for repeated attacks. Among those targeted were journalists who had written about Chinese leaders, political and legal issues in China and the telecom giant Huawei.

Bloomberg News, another American news organization, was targeted by Chinese hackers last year, and some computers were infected, according to a person with knowledge of the company’s internal investigation. The attack occurred after Bloomberg published an article on June 29 about the wealth accumulated by relatives of Xi Jinping, a Chinese official who is expected to become president in March.

Bloomberg has confirmed that hackers had made attempts but said that “no computer systems or computers were compromised.”

The timing of the attacks on The New York Times coincided with the reporting for an investigation, published online on Oct. 25, that found that the relatives of Wen Jiabao,China’s prime minister, had accumulated a fortune worth several billion dollars through business dealings.

Security experts hired by The Times to detect and block the computer attacks found digital evidence that Chinese hackers, using methods that some consultants have associated with the Chinese military in the past, breached The Times’s network.

The Associated Press reported Thursday that officials in the Obama administration were considering more assertive action against Beijing to stop Chinese computer espionage campaigns.

The Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, said Thursday a global effort was needed o establish “rules of the road” for cyber activity.  In her final meeting with reporters at the State Department, Mrs. Clinton addressed a question about China’s efforts to infiltrate computer systems at The New York Times.

 “We have seen over the last years an increase in not only the hacking attempts on government institutions but also non-governmental ones,” Mrs. Clinton said.

The Chinese, she said, “are not the only people who are hacking us.”

 “There is a lot that we are working on that will be deployed in the event that we don’t get some kind of international effort under way,” Mrs. Clinton added without elaborating.

The United States has been increasingly vocal about such efforts against government and private industry. In a November 2011 intelligence report, government officials specifically accused China and Russia of stealing intellectual property for economic gain.

<nyt_author_id>

Cyberattacken wie bei uns – Hacker spähen Nutzerkonten von Twitter aus

An illustration picture shows the logo of the Website Twitter on an Ipad, in Bordeaux

THE INVESTMENT MAGAZINE – THE ORIGINAL – DAS INVESTMENT MAGAZIN – DAS ORIGINAL – Der Online-Kurznachrichtendienst Twitter ist Opfer eines Hackerangriffs geworden.

Dabei seien möglicherweise Passwörter und andere Informationen von rund 250.000 Nutzern gestohlen worden, teilte das US-Unternehmen am Freitagabend mit. Es vermutete Profis hinter der Tat. “Der Angriff war nicht das Werk von Amateuren”, schrieb Twitter in einem Blog. Er sei vielmehr sehr ausgefeilt gewesen. Zugleich versicherte der Dienst, der für seine maximal aus 140 Zeichen bestehenden Nachrichten bekannt ist, dass die Passwörter aus Sicherheitsgründen zurückgesetzt worden seien. Die Betroffenen würden informiert.

Twitter äußerte sich nicht zur Vorgehensweise der Hacker und zu deren Herkunft. Der Angriff soll in dieser Woche erfolgt sein. Es sei kein isolierter Vorfall, sondern vermutlich seien andere Unternehmen und Organisationen zuletzt ähnlich angegriffen worden. Erst kürzlich waren die Internetseiten der “New York Times” und des “Wall Street Journal” von Hackern heimgesucht worden. Beide Zeitungen teilten mit, die Hacker hätten von China aus agiert. Der 2006 auf den Markt gekommene Kurznachrichtendienst betonte, eng mit den Behörden und der Regierung zusammenzuarbeiten.

Es ist nicht das erste Mal, dass Hacker ins Twitter-System eingedrungen sind und Zugriff auf Nutzerinformationen erhielten. 2010 einigte sich das Unternehmen mit der Kartellbehörde FTC auf unabhängige Überprüfungen der Datensicherheit über zehn Jahre hinweg.

Twitter befindet sich in privaten Händen und hat weltweit rund 200 Millionen Nutzer. Der Wert des Unternehmens wird auf mehr als acht Milliarden Dollar geschätzt. In der Wahlnacht des 6. November in den USA liefen weltweit mehr als 327.000 Tweets in der Minute über den Dienst.

 

OUR WEBSITES ARE UNDER ATTACK AFTER PUBLISHING THE STASI NAMES BY CHINESE HACKERS WHICH ARE ACTING ON BEHALF OF SOME GERMAN THUGS. THE SUSPECTS ARE “GoMoPa”, “KLAUS MAURISCHAT”, “MARK VORNKAHL”, “PETER EHLERS” AMD “GERD “WILHELM” BENNEWIRTZ OR WHATEVER THEIR REAL NAMES MIGHT BE…

IMMER WIEDER WERDEN WEBSITES MUTMASSLICH DURCH “GOMoPa” UND DEREN MUTMASSLICHE AUFTRAGGEBER ATTACKIERT WIE MUTMASSLICH “GERD BENNEWIRTZ” UND “PETER EHLERS”
Die FÄLLE SIND BEI DEN ZUSTÄNDIGEN BEHÖRDEN

SIEHE AUCH HIER:

https://berndpulch.org/2013/02/02/cyberattacks-hackers-in-china-attacked-the-times-for-last-4-months/
DER BEWEIS AUS DEM JAHR 2000: SO REGTE GRUNER und JAHR-TOCHTER, IPV, MICH AN, DEN TITEL “INVESTMENT” ZU LANCIEREN

https://berndpulch.org/2011/05/23/der-beweis-aus-dem-jahr-2000-so-regte-gruner-jahr-tochter-ipv-mich-an-den-titel-investment-zu-lancieren/

DIE BESTEN DAS INVESTMENT- DAS ORIGINAL Cover seit dem Jahre 2000

http://investmentmagazin.com/?page_id=257

DER BEWEIS “DAS INVESTMENT MAGAZIN” DAS ORIGINAL IST ECHT
https://berndpulch.org/2011/04/17/der-beweis-das-investment-magazin-das-original/
DER MAGISTER-TITEL VON BERND PULCH IST ECHT
https://berndpulch.org/der-beweis-magisterarbeit-bernd-pulch/

 

 
Reporting by Bernd Pulch, Lionel Goodwin, Sarah Goodsmith, Bridget Gallagher and Tim Wilkinson

 

 
http://wwww.investment-on.com

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http://www.pulch.me, http://www.i-nvestment.com, http://www.bernd-pulch.me, http://www.worldwideblog.net,

 
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The INVESTMENT – MAGAZINE – THE ORIGINAL- was founded in 1995. We publish three editions, one global, one for Asia and one germany, Austria and Szwiterland.

We are independent from financial companies.

We focus on HNWI.

A high net worth individual (HNWI) is a person with a high net worth. In the private banking business, these individuals typically are defined as having investable assets (financial assets not including primary residence) in excess of US$1 million.[1][2] As explained below, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated a different definition of “high net worth individual” for regulatory purposes.

The Merrill Lynch – Capgemini World’s Wealth Report 2009 defines HNWIs as those who hold at least US$1 million in financial assets and Ultra-HNWIs as those who hold at least US$30 million in financial assets, with both excluding collectibles, consumables, consumer durables and primary residences. The report states that in 2008 there were 8.6 million HNWIs worldwide, a decline of 14.9% from 2007. The total HNWI wealth worldwide totaled US$32.8 trillion, a 19.5% decrease from 2007. The Ultra-HNWIs experienced the greater loss, losing 24.6% in population size and 23.9% in accumulated wealth. The report revised its 2007 projections that HNWI financial wealth would reach US$59.1 trillion by 2012 and revised this downward to a 2013 HNWI wealth valued at $48.5 trillion advancing at an annual rate of 8.1%.

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See more at See more at http://www.berndpulch.co, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.berndmpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.org, http://www.bernd-pulch.org, http://www.berndpulch.de, http://www.berndpulch.info and http://www.berndpulch.at and http://www.berndpulch.net, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.investment-on.com, http://www.investmentmagazin.com, http://www.investment-magazin.tv, as well as at http://www.ebizz.tv and http://www.star-fashion.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://wwww.maberndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulchorg.com, http://www.magisterberndpulch.org, http://www.berndpulchcom.com,http://www.berndpulch.me,http://www.berndpulchme.com,
http://www.pulch.me, http://www.i-nvestment.com, http://www.bernd-pulch.me, http://www.worldwideblog.net,

We broadcast and produce
IPTV channels all around the globe.

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Copyright General Global Media

*Magister Bernd M. Pulch (MA – Magister Artium)

Magister Bernd M. Pulch studied Publizistik (2), Komparatistik (1) and Germanistik (1-2) until 1988

University Mainz

Published his Magister-Thesis for Professor Hans-Mathias Kepplinger

about Dolf Zillmans “Emotional Arousal Theory” January 1987

You can order the book of Bernd Pulch for only € 125,- It can be delivered in 7 days.

Payment must be made in advance.

See more at http://www.berndpulch.co, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.berndmpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.org, http://www.bernd-pulch.org, http://www.berndpulch.de, http://www.berndpulch.info and http://www.berndpulch.at and http://www.berndpulch.net, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.investment-on.com, http://www.investmentmagazin.com, http://www.investment-magazin.tv, as well as at http://www.ebizz.tv and http://www.star-fashion.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://wwww.maberndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulchorg.com, http://www.magisterberndpulch.org, http://www.berndpulchcom.com,http://www.berndpulch.me,http://www.berndpulchme.com,
http://www.pulch.me, http://www.i-nvestment.com, http://www.bernd-pulch.me,

Investment Magazin, Investment, Das Investment, Investment Magazine

 

OUR WEBSITES ARE UNDER ATTACK AFTER PUBLISHING THE STASI NAMES BY CHINESE HACKERS WHICH ARE ACTING ON BEHALF OF SOME GERMAN THUGS. THE SUSPECTS ARE “GoMoPa”, “KLAUS MAURISCHAT”, “MARK VORNKAHL”, “PETER EHLERS” AMD “GERD “WILHELM” BENNEWIRTZ OR WHATEVER THEIR REAL NAMES MIGHT BE…

IMMER WIEDER WERDEN WEBSITES MUTMASSLICH DURCH “GOMoPa” UND DEREN MUTMASSLICHE AUFTRAGGEBER ATTACKIERT WIE MUTMASSLICH “GERD BENNEWIRTZ” UND “PETER EHLERS”

Die FÄLLE SIND BEI DEN ZUSTÄNDIGEN BEHÖRDEN

SIEHE AUCH HIER:

https://berndpulch.org/2013/02/02/cyberattacks-hackers-in-china-attacked-the-times-for-last-4-months/

DER BEWEIS AUS DEM JAHR 2000: SO REGTE GRUNER und JAHR-TOCHTER, IPV, MICH AN, DEN TITEL “INVESTMENT” ZU LANCIEREN

https://berndpulch.org/2011/05/23/der-beweis-aus-dem-jahr-2000-so-regte-gruner-jahr-tochter-ipv-mich-an-den-titel-investment-zu-lancieren/

DIE BESTEN DAS INVESTMENT- DAS ORIGINAL Cover seit dem Jahre 2000

http://investmentmagazin.com/?page_id=257

DER BEWEIS “DAS INVESTMENT MAGAZIN” DAS ORIGINAL IST ECHT

https://berndpulch.org/2011/04/17/der-beweis-das-investment-magazin-das-original/

DER MAGISTER-TITEL VON BERND PULCH IST ECHT

https://berndpulch.org/der-beweis-magisterarbeit-bernd-pulch/

Reporting by Bernd Pulch, Lionel Goodwin, Sarah Goodsmith, Bridget Gallagher and Tim Wilkinson

http://wwww.investment-on.com

See more at See more at http://www.berndpulch.co, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.berndmpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.org, http://www.bernd-pulch.org, http://www.berndpulch.de, http://www.berndpulch.info and http://www.berndpulch.at and http://www.berndpulch.net,  http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.investment-on.com, http://www.investmentmagazin.com, http://www.investment-magazin.tv, as well as at http://www.ebizz.tv and http://www.star-fashion.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://wwww.maberndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulchorg.com, http://www.magisterberndpulch.org, http://www.berndpulchcom.com,http://www.berndpulch.me,http://www.berndpulchme.com,
http://www.pulch.me, http://www.i-nvestment.com, http://www.bernd-pulch.me, http://www.worldwideblog.net,

For security reasons we do not provide any more information to protect us against cyber criminals – join our Crusade against Cyber Criminals

The INVESTMENT – MAGAZINE – THE ORIGINAL- was founded in 1995. We publish three editions, one global, one for Asia and one germany, Austria and Szwiterland.

We are independent from financial companies.

We focus on HNWI.

A high net worth individual (HNWI) is a person with a high net worth. In the private banking business, these individuals typically are defined as having investable assets (financial assets not including primary residence) in excess of US$1 million.[1][2] As explained below, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated a different definition of “high net worth individual” for regulatory purposes.

The Merrill Lynch – Capgemini World’s Wealth Report 2009 defines HNWIs as those who hold at least US$1 million in financial assets and Ultra-HNWIs as those who hold at least US$30 million in financial assets, with both excluding collectibles, consumables, consumer durables and primary residences. The report states that in 2008 there were 8.6 million HNWIs worldwide, a decline of 14.9% from 2007. The total HNWI wealth worldwide totaled US$32.8 trillion, a 19.5% decrease from 2007. The Ultra-HNWIs experienced the greater loss, losing 24.6% in population size and 23.9% in accumulated wealth. The report revised its 2007 projections that HNWI financial wealth would reach US$59.1 trillion by 2012 and revised this downward to a 2013 HNWI wealth valued at $48.5 trillion advancing at an annual rate of 8.1%.

WATCH OUR OWN 560 CHANNELS and 5.000 ASSOCIATED CHANNELS TOTALLY FREE

ebizz.tv is a new, free and open-source platform for internet television and video with more as 5 million videos in the library and 900.000 video channels.

See more at See more at http://www.berndpulch.co, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.berndmpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.org, http://www.bernd-pulch.org, http://www.berndpulch.de, http://www.berndpulch.info and http://www.berndpulch.at and http://www.berndpulch.net,  http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.investment-on.com, http://www.investmentmagazin.com, http://www.investment-magazin.tv, as well as at http://www.ebizz.tv and http://www.star-fashion.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://wwww.maberndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulchorg.com, http://www.magisterberndpulch.org, http://www.berndpulchcom.com,http://www.berndpulch.me,http://www.berndpulchme.com,
http://www.pulch.me, http://www.i-nvestment.com, http://www.bernd-pulch.me, http://www.worldwideblog.net,

We broadcast and produce
IPTV channels all around the globe.

WE BUILD YOUR PERSONAL WEB TV CHANNEL

Copyright General Global Media

*Magister Bernd M. Pulch (MA – Magister Artium)

Magister Bernd M. Pulch studied Publizistik (2), Komparatistik (1) and Germanistik (1-2) until 1988

University Mainz

Published his Magister-Thesis for Professor Hans-Mathias  Kepplinger

about Dolf Zillmans “Emotional Arousal Theory”  January 1987

You can order the book of Bernd Pulch for only € 125,- It can be delivered in 7 days.

Payment must be made in advance.

See more at http://www.berndpulch.co, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.berndmpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.org, http://www.bernd-pulch.org, http://www.berndpulch.de, http://www.berndpulch.info and http://www.berndpulch.at and http://www.berndpulch.net,  http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.investment-on.com, http://www.investmentmagazin.com, http://www.investment-magazin.tv, as well as at http://www.ebizz.tv and http://www.star-fashion.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://wwww.maberndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulchorg.com, http://www.magisterberndpulch.org, http://www.berndpulchcom.com,http://www.berndpulch.me,http://www.berndpulchme.com,
http://www.pulch.me, http://www.i-nvestment.com, http://www.bernd-pulch.me,

Investment Magazin, Investment, Das Investment, Investment Magazine

Cyberattacken wie bei uns – Chinesische Hacker spionieren New York Times aus

NEW YORK TIMES – Chinesische Hacker spionieren US-Tageszeitung aus

Hacker sind in Computer der New York Times eingedrungen. Sie stahlen Passwörter und spionierten E-Mail-Konten aus. Sicherheitsexperten verfolgten die Angriffe nach China zurück.

Unbekannte haben sich über Monate Zugang zu den Computersystemen der Tageszeitung New York Times (NYT) verschafft. Die Sicherheitsexperten konnten die Angriffe nach China zurückverfolgen. Anlass war mutmaßlich ein Bericht über die Familie des scheidenden Premierministers Wen Jiabao – die Angriffe begannen kurz danach.

Die Angreifer drangen in die Systeme der New York Times ein. Dort installierten sie Schadsoftware und verschafften sich Zugang zu den Arbeitsplatzrechnern von 53 Mitarbeitern, von denen die meisten nicht im Newsroom arbeiten. Zudem kopierten die Angreifer die Passwörter aller NYT-Mitarbeiter. Es sollen keine Kundendaten entwendet worden sein.

Warnung vor Erscheinen

Die Angriffe schienen in direktem Zusammenhang mit dem Bericht über den chinesischen Politiker zu stehen: Sie hätten unmittelbar nach der Veröffentlichung am 25. Oktober 2012 begonnen, berichtet die Tageszeitung. Kurz zuvor sei die Zeitung von chinesischen Behörden vor Angriffen gewarnt worden. Die Tageszeitung habe sich an den Netzbetreiber AT&T gewandt, und der habe direkt, nachdem der Artikel online erschienen war, Aktivitäten festgestellt, die auf einen Computerangriff hinwiesen. Das NYT engagierte daraufhin das Sicherheitsunternehmen Mandiant und informierte das FBI.

Die Analyse der Mandiant-Experten ergab, dass der Angriff schon früher begonnen hatte: Im September, kurz vor dem Ende der Recherchen zu dem Artikel, waren die Hacker erstmals in die NYT-Computer eingedrungen und hatten das Passwortsystem gehackt. So konnten sie sich Zugriff auf die E-Mail-Konten von David Barboza, Leiter des NYT-Büros in Schanghai und Autor des Berichts, und Jim Yardley, Leiter des Südostasienbüros in Indien und davor Chef des Pekinger Büros, verschaffen.

Wie es scheint, kopierten die Angreifer jedoch keine Dokumente, sondern suchten nach den Namen von Informanten. Auch hatten sie kein Interesse daran, die Computersysteme der Zeitung komplett lahmzulegen – obwohl sie, wie die Zeitung zugibt, die Möglichkeit dazu gehabt hätten.

Phishing-Mails

Wie die Angreifer den Zugang zu den NYT-Computern erlangten, ist noch nicht geklärt. Die Experten vermuten, dass sie E-Mails mit verseuchten Anhängen oder Links verschickt haben, über die Schadsoftware auf die Computer geschleust wurde. Inzwischen seien alle Zugänge, die die Hacker nutzten, geschlossen.

Um ihre Spuren zu verwischen, waren die Angreifer zuerst in Computersysteme von US-Universitäten eingedrungen, so dass es auf den ersten Blick so aussah, als kämen die Angriffe von dort. Chinesische Hacker gehen nach Angaben der von der NYT beauftragten Sicherheitsexperten häufig so vor. Auch die verwendete Schadsoftware wies Merkmale auf, die auf Akteure aus China schließen lassen. Schließlich gelang es den Sicherheitsexperten, die Angriffe zu den Universitätscomputern zurückzuverfolgen, die als Ausgangspunkt von Angriffen des chinesischen Militärs auf Lieferanten des US-Militärs gelten.

Hacker bei Bloomberg

Die NYT scheint indes nicht das einzige Medienunternehmen zu sein, das chinesische Hacker ins Visier genommen haben: 2012 wurden bei Bloomberg News Computer mit Schadsoftware infiziert. Anlass war mutmaßlich ein vergleichbarer Bericht der Nachrichtenagentur über Xi Jinping, seinerzeit noch Vizepräsident und inzwischen Chef der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas und designierter Staatschef.

Wen ist seit 2003 Premierminister der Volksrepublik China. Zuvor war er fünf Jahre lang Vizepremier. Im Oktober 2012 deckte die NYT auf, dass Wens Familie während seiner Amtszeit ein immenses Vermögen angehäuft habe – umgerechnet rund über 2 Milliarden Euro sollen Wens Angehörige, vor allem seine Frau Zhang Peili, zusammengetragen haben. Die Behörden reagierten umgehend auf den Bericht: Sie sperrten den Zugang zur Website der Zeitung.

Was wusste Wen?

Unklar ist Wens Rolle: Zwar ist seine Familie während seiner Amtszeit reich geworden – unter anderem aufgrund wirtschaftlicher Entscheidungen, die Wen mitverantwortet hat. Er selbst soll aber von den Aktivitäten seiner Frau wenig angetan gewesen sein. Laut einer der von Wikileaks veröffentlichten Botschaftsdepeschen soll er sogar deswegen eine Scheidung erwogen haben. Nach dem NYT-Bericht forderte er eine Untersuchung und bot an, dafür die Vermögensverhältnisse der Familie offenzulegen.

Wen wird turnusmäßig nach zwei Amtszeiten von je fünf Jahren sein Amt in diesem Frühjahr aufgeben. Auf dem 18. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei wurde im Herbst 2012 die neue Führungsriege vorgestellt. Wens Nachfolger wird voraussichtlich Li Keqiang, der das Amt im März übernehmen soll. Im Vorfeld des Führungswechsels gab es einen Machtkampf zwischen zwei Parteiflügeln.
OUR WEBSITES ARE UNDER ATTACK BY CHINESE HACKERS WHICH ARE ACTING ON BEHALF OF SOME GERMAN THUGS.

Video – Sexy ‘Reporter’ with Prime Minister Ivica Dacic

THIS sexy lass says pants to diplomacy – as she flashes her naked undercarriage to the Serbian Prime Minister. Politician Ivica Dacic was caught unawares by the cheeky prank during an interview for Croatian television. He thought he was in the studio to answer questions on Balkan politics – but instead was treated to a full-frontal from the show’s sexy presenter.

The clip begins with the stunning but improbably dressed host – a model acting as a journalist – welcoming Dacic to the studio.

Wearing a tiny, low-cut dress and heavy make-up, she kisses him on both cheeks and settles him in his chair as he is miked up.

With her legs crossed, she proceeds to ask hapless Dacic a series of political questions.

But as he gives a sombre reply to one of her comments, the shapely brunette slowly re-crosses her legs – and reveals her own controversial policy.

The move is clearly stolen from the racy flick Basic Instinct – although this lass is no Sharon Stone.

As the word “Censored” covers her modesty – just about – a nervous cameraman pans to Dacic for his reaction.

But the Serb shows he’s in the Premier league when it comes to taking a joke – he is shown going goggle-eyed with shock before smirking and enjoying a chuckle at the prank.

The scene – part of a candid camera show called Nemoguca Misija (meaning “Mission Impossible”) – has now had nearly 1million views on YouTube.
In der serbischen Version von “Verstehen Sie Spaß” geht es zur Sache: Das Opfer der Sendung — Serbiens Premier Ivica Dacic — bekommt es mit einer äußert leichtbekleideten Journalistin zu tun.

OUR WEBSITES ARE ATTACKED CONSTANTLY BY CHINESE HACKERS WHICH ARE ACTING ON BEHALF OF SOME GERMAN THUGS.

IMMER WIEDER WERDEN WEBSITES MUTMASSLICH DURCH “GOMoPa” UND DEREN MUTMASSLICHE AUFTRAGGEBER ATTACKIERT WIE MUTMASSLICH “GERD BENNEWIRTZ” UND “PETER EHLERS”
Die FÄLLE SIND BEI DEN ZUSTÄNDIGEN BEHÖRDEN

SIEHE AUCH HIER:

https://berndpulch.org/2013/02/02/cyberattacks-hackers-in-china-attacked-the-times-for-last-4-months/
DER BEWEIS AUS DEM JAHR 2000: SO REGTE GRUNER und JAHR-TOCHTER, IPV, MICH AN, DEN TITEL “INVESTMENT” ZU LANCIEREN

https://berndpulch.org/2011/05/23/der-beweis-aus-dem-jahr-2000-so-regte-gruner-jahr-tochter-ipv-mich-an-den-titel-investment-zu-lancieren/

DIE BESTEN DAS INVESTMENT- DAS ORIGINAL Cover seit dem Jahre 2000

http://investmentmagazin.com/?page_id=257

DER BEWEIS “DAS INVESTMENT MAGAZIN” DAS ORIGINAL IST ECHT
https://berndpulch.org/2011/04/17/der-beweis-das-investment-magazin-das-original/
DER MAGISTER-TITEL VON BERND PULCH IST ECHT
https://berndpulch.org/der-beweis-magisterarbeit-bernd-pulch/
Reporting by Bernd Pulch, Lionel Goodwin, Sarah Goodsmith, Bridget Gallagher and Tim Wilkinson
http://wwww.investment-on.com

See more at See more at http://www.berndpulch.co, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.berndmpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.org, http://www.bernd-pulch.org, http://www.berndpulch.de, http://www.berndpulch.info and http://www.berndpulch.at and http://www.berndpulch.net, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.investment-on.com, http://www.investmentmagazin.com, http://www.investment-magazin.tv, as well as at http://www.ebizz.tv and http://www.star-fashion.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://wwww.maberndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulchorg.com, http://www.magisterberndpulch.org, http://www.berndpulchcom.com,http://www.berndpulch.me,http://www.berndpulchme.com,
http://www.pulch.me, http://www.i-nvestment.com, http://www.bernd-pulch.me, http://www.worldwideblog.net,
For security reasons we do not provide any more information to protect us against cyber criminals – join our Crusade against Cyber Criminals

The INVESTMENT – MAGAZINE – THE ORIGINAL- was founded in 1995. We publish three editions, one global, one for Asia and one germany, Austria and Szwiterland.

We are independent from financial companies.

We focus on HNWI.

A high net worth individual (HNWI) is a person with a high net worth. In the private banking business, these individuals typically are defined as having investable assets (financial assets not including primary residence) in excess of US$1 million.[1][2] As explained below, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated a different definition of “high net worth individual” for regulatory purposes.

The Merrill Lynch – Capgemini World’s Wealth Report 2009 defines HNWIs as those who hold at least US$1 million in financial assets and Ultra-HNWIs as those who hold at least US$30 million in financial assets, with both excluding collectibles, consumables, consumer durables and primary residences. The report states that in 2008 there were 8.6 million HNWIs worldwide, a decline of 14.9% from 2007. The total HNWI wealth worldwide totaled US$32.8 trillion, a 19.5% decrease from 2007. The Ultra-HNWIs experienced the greater loss, losing 24.6% in population size and 23.9% in accumulated wealth. The report revised its 2007 projections that HNWI financial wealth would reach US$59.1 trillion by 2012 and revised this downward to a 2013 HNWI wealth valued at $48.5 trillion advancing at an annual rate of 8.1%.

WATCH OUR OWN 560 CHANNELS and 5.000 ASSOCIATED CHANNELS TOTALLY FREE

ebizz.tv is a new, free and open-source platform for internet television and video with more as 5 million videos in the library and 900.000 video channels.

See more at See more at http://www.berndpulch.co, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.berndmpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.org, http://www.bernd-pulch.org, http://www.berndpulch.de, http://www.berndpulch.info and http://www.berndpulch.at and http://www.berndpulch.net, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.investment-on.com, http://www.investmentmagazin.com, http://www.investment-magazin.tv, as well as at http://www.ebizz.tv and http://www.star-fashion.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://wwww.maberndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulchorg.com, http://www.magisterberndpulch.org, http://www.berndpulchcom.com,http://www.berndpulch.me,http://www.berndpulchme.com,
http://www.pulch.me, http://www.i-nvestment.com, http://www.bernd-pulch.me, http://www.worldwideblog.net,

We broadcast and produce
IPTV channels all around the globe.

WE BUILD YOUR PERSONAL WEB TV CHANNEL

Copyright General Global Media

*Magister Bernd M. Pulch (MA – Magister Artium)

Magister Bernd M. Pulch studied Publizistik (2), Komparatistik (1) and Germanistik (1-2) until 1988

University Mainz

Published his Magister-Thesis for Professor Hans-Mathias Kepplinger

about Dolf Zillmans “Emotional Arousal Theory” January 1987

You can order the book of Bernd Pulch for only € 125,- It can be delivered in 7 days.

Payment must be made in advance.

See more at http://www.berndpulch.co, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.berndmpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.org, http://www.bernd-pulch.org, http://www.berndpulch.de, http://www.berndpulch.info and http://www.berndpulch.at and http://www.berndpulch.net, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.investment-on.com, http://www.investmentmagazin.com, http://www.investment-magazin.tv, as well as at http://www.ebizz.tv and http://www.star-fashion.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://wwww.maberndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulchorg.com, http://www.magisterberndpulch.org, http://www.berndpulchcom.com,http://www.berndpulch.me,http://www.berndpulchme.com,
http://www.pulch.me, http://www.i-nvestment.com, http://www.bernd-pulch.me,

Investment Magazin, Investment, Das Investment, Investment Magazine

Cyberattacks – Hackers in China Attacked The New York Times for Last 4 Months

A Cyberattack From China: TimesCast: Chinese hackers infiltrated The New York Times’s computer systems, getting passwords for its reporters and others.

SAN FRANCISCO — For the last four months, Chinese hackers have persistently attacked The New York Times, infiltrating its computer systems and getting passwords for its reporters and other employees.

Readers’ Comments

Readers shared their thoughts on this article.

After surreptitiously tracking the intruders to study their movements and help erect better defenses to block them, The Times and computer security experts have expelled the attackers and kept them from breaking back in.

The timing of the attacks coincided with the reporting for a Times investigation, published online on Oct. 25, that found that the relatives of Wen Jiabao, China’s prime minister, had accumulated a fortune worth several billion dollars through business dealings.

Security experts hired by The Times to detect and block the computer attacks gathered digital evidence that Chinese hackers, using methods that some consultants have associated with the Chinese military in the past, breached The Times’s network. They broke into the e-mail accounts of its Shanghai bureau chief, David Barboza, who wrote the reports on Mr. Wen’s relatives, and Jim Yardley, The Times’s South Asia bureau chief in India, who previously worked as bureau chief in Beijing.

“Computer security experts found no evidence that sensitive e-mails or files from the reporting of our articles about the Wen family were accessed, downloaded or copied,” said Jill Abramson, executive editor of The Times.

The hackers tried to cloak the source of the attacks on The Times by first penetrating computers at United States universities and routing the attacks through them, said computer security experts at Mandiant, the company hired by The Times. This matches the subterfuge used in many other attacks that Mandiant has tracked to China.

The attackers first installed malware — malicious software — that enabled them to gain entry to any computer on The Times’s network. The malware was identified by computer security experts as a specific strain associated with computer attacks originating in China. More evidence of the source, experts said, is that the attacks started from the same university computers used by the Chinese military to attack United States military contractors in the past.

Security experts found evidence that the hackers stole the corporate passwords for every Times employee and used those to gain access to the personal computers of 53 employees, most of them outside The Times’s newsroom. Experts found no evidence that the intruders used the passwords to seek information that was not related to the reporting on the Wen family.

No customer data was stolen from The Times, security experts said.

Asked about evidence that indicated the hacking originated in China, and possibly with the military, China’s Ministry of National Defense said, “Chinese laws prohibit any action including hacking that damages Internet security.” It added that “to accuse the Chinese military of launching cyberattacks without solid proof is unprofessional and baseless.”

The attacks appear to be part of a broader computer espionage campaign against American news media companies that have reported on Chinese leaders and corporations.

Last year, Bloomberg News was targeted by Chinese hackers, and some employees’ computers were infected, according to a person with knowledge of the company’s internal investigation, after Bloomberg published an article on June 29 about the wealth accumulated by relatives of Xi Jinping, China’s vice president at the time. Mr. Xi became general secretary of the Communist Party in November and is expected to become president in March. Ty Trippet, a spokesman for Bloomberg, confirmed that hackers had made attempts but said that “no computer systems or computers were compromised.”

Signs of a Campaign

The mounting number of attacks that have been traced back to China suggest that hackers there are behind a far-reaching spying campaign aimed at an expanding set of targets including corporations, government agencies, activist groups and media organizations inside the United States. The intelligence-gathering campaign, foreign policy experts and computer security researchers say, is as much about trying to control China’s public image, domestically and abroad, as it is about stealing trade secrets.

Security experts said that beginning in 2008, Chinese hackers began targeting Western journalists as part of an effort to identify and intimidate their sources and contacts, and to anticipate stories that might damage the reputations of Chinese leaders.

In a December intelligence report for clients, Mandiant said that over the course of several investigations it found evidence that Chinese hackers had stolen e-mails, contacts and files from more than 30 journalists and executives at Western news organizations, and had maintained a “short list” of journalists whose accounts they repeatedly attack.

While computer security experts say China is most active and persistent, it is not alone in using computer attacks for a variety of national purposes, including corporate espionage. The United States, Israel, Russia and Iran, among others, are suspected of developing and deploying cyberweapons.

The United States and Israel have never publicly acknowledged it, but evidence indicates they released a sophisticated computer worm starting around 2008 that attacked and later caused damage at Iran’s main nuclear enrichment plant. Iran is believed to have responded with computer attacks on targets in the United States, including American banks and foreign oil companies.

Russia is suspected of having used computer attacks during its war with Georgia in 2008.

The following account of the attack on The Times — which is based on interviews with Times executives, reporters and security experts — provides a glimpse into one such spy campaign.

After The Times learned of warnings from Chinese government officials that its investigation of the wealth of Mr. Wen’s relatives would “have consequences,” executives on Oct. 24 asked AT&T, which monitors The Times’s computer network, to watch for unusual activity.

On Oct. 25, the day the article was published online, AT&T informed The Times that it had noticed behavior that was consistent with other attacks believed to have been perpetrated by the Chinese military.

The Times notified and voluntarily briefed the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the attacks and then — not initially recognizing the extent of the infiltration of its computers — worked with AT&T to track the attackers even as it tried to eliminate them from its systems.

But on Nov. 7, when it became clear that attackers were still inside its systems despite efforts to expel them, The Times hired Mandiant, which specializes in responding to security breaches. Since learning of the attacks, The Times — first with AT&T and then with Mandiant — has monitored attackers as they have moved around its systems.

Hacker teams regularly began work, for the most part, at 8 a.m. Beijing time. Usually they continued for a standard work day, but sometimes the hacking persisted until midnight. Occasionally, the attacks stopped for two-week periods, Mandiant said, though the reason was not clear.

Investigators still do not know how hackers initially broke into The Times’s systems. They suspect the hackers used a so-called spear-phishing attack, in which they send e-mails to employees that contain malicious links or attachments. All it takes is one click on the e-mail by an employee for hackers to install “remote access tools” — or RATs. Those tools can siphon off oceans of data — passwords, keystrokes, screen images, documents and, in some cases, recordings from computers’ microphones and Web cameras — and send the information back to the attackers’ Web servers.

Michael Higgins, chief security officer at The Times, said: “Attackers no longer go after our firewall. They go after individuals. They send a malicious piece of code to your e-mail account and you’re opening it and letting them in.”

Lying in Wait

Once hackers get in, it can be hard to get them out. In the case of a 2011 breach at the United States Chamber of Commerce, for instance, the trade group worked closely with the F.B.I. to seal its systems, according to chamber employees. But months later, the chamber discovered that Internet-connected devices — a thermostat in one of its corporate apartments and a printer in its offices — were still communicating with computers in China.

In part to prevent that from happening, The Times allowed hackers to spin a digital web for four months to identify every digital back door the hackers used. It then replaced every compromised computer and set up new defenses in hopes of keeping hackers out.

“Attackers target companies for a reason — even if you kick them out, they will try to get back in,” said Nick Bennett, the security consultant who has managed Mandiant’s investigation. “We wanted to make sure we had full grasp of the extent of their access so that the next time they try to come in, we can respond quickly.”

Based on a forensic analysis going back months, it appears the hackers broke into The Times computers on Sept. 13, when the reporting for the Wen articles was nearing completion. They set up at least three back doors into users’ machines that they used as a digital base camp. From there they snooped around The Times’s systems for at least two weeks before they identified the domain controller that contains user names and hashed, or scrambled, passwords for every Times employee.

While hashes make hackers’ break-ins more difficult, hashed passwords can easily be cracked using so-called rainbow tables — readily available databases of hash values for nearly every alphanumeric character combination, up to a certain length. Some hacker Web sites publish as many as 50 billion hash values.

Investigators found evidence that the attackers cracked the passwords and used them to gain access to a number of computers. They created custom software that allowed them to search for and grab Mr. Barboza’s and Mr. Yardley’s e-mails and documents from a Times e-mail server.

Over the course of three months, attackers installed 45 pieces of custom malware. The Times — which uses antivirus products made by Symantec — found only one instance in which Symantec identified an attacker’s software as malicious and quarantined it, according to Mandiant.

A Symantec spokesman said that, as a matter of policy, the company does not comment on its customers.

The attackers were particularly active in the period after the Oct. 25 publication of The Times article about Mr. Wen’s relatives, especially on the evening of the Nov. 6 presidential election. That raised concerns among Times senior editors who had been informed of the attacks that the hackers might try to shut down the newspaper’s electronic or print publishing system. But the attackers’ movements suggested that the primary target remained Mr. Barboza’s e-mail correspondence.

“They could have wreaked havoc on our systems,” said Marc Frons, the Times’s chief information officer. “But that was not what they were after.”

What they appeared to be looking for were the names of people who might have provided information to Mr. Barboza.

Mr. Barboza’s research on the stories, as reported previously in The Times, was based on public records, including thousands of corporate documents through China’s State Administration for Industry and Commerce. Those documents — which are available to lawyers and consulting firms for a nominal fee — were used to trace the business interests of relatives of Mr. Wen.

A Tricky Search

Tracking the source of an attack to one group or country can be difficult because hackers usually try to cloak their identities and whereabouts.

To run their Times spying campaign, the attackers used a number of compromised computer systems registered to universities in North Carolina, Arizona, Wisconsin and New Mexico, as well as smaller companies and Internet service providers across the United States, according to Mandiant’s investigators.

The hackers also continually switched from one I.P. address to another; an I.P. address, for Internet protocol, is a unique number identifying each Internet-connected device from the billions around the globe, so that messages and other information sent by one device are correctly routed to the ones meant to get them.

Using university computers as proxies and switching I.P. addresses were simply efforts to hide the source of the attacks, which investigators say is China. The pattern that Mandiant’s experts detected closely matched the pattern of earlier attacks traced to China. After Google was attacked in 2010 and the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists were opened, for example, investigators were able to trace the source to two educational institutions in China, including one with ties to the Chinese military.

Security experts say that by routing attacks through servers in other countries and outsourcing attacks to skilled hackers, the Chinese military maintains plausible deniability.

“If you look at each attack in isolation, you can’t say, ‘This is the Chinese military,’ ” said Richard Bejtlich, Mandiant’s chief security officer.

But when the techniques and patterns of the hackers are similar, it is a sign that the hackers are the same or affiliated.

“When you see the same group steal data on Chinese dissidents and Tibetan activists, then attack an aerospace company, it starts to push you in the right direction,” he said.

Mandiant has been tracking about 20 groups that are spying on organizations inside the United States and around the globe. Its investigators said that based on the evidence — the malware used, the command and control centers compromised and the hackers’ techniques — The Times was attacked by a group of Chinese hackers that Mandiant refers to internally as “A.P.T. Number 12.”

A.P.T. stands for Advanced Persistent Threat, a term that computer security experts and government officials use to describe a targeted attack and that many say has become synonymous with attacks done by China. AT&T and the F.B.I. have been tracking the same group, which they have also traced to China, but they use their own internal designations.

Mandiant said the group had been “very active” and had broken into hundreds of other Western organizations, including several American military contractors.

To get rid of the hackers, The Times blocked the compromised outside computers, removed every back door into its network, changed every employee password and wrapped additional security around its systems.

For now, that appears to have worked, but investigators and Times executives say they anticipate more efforts by hackers.

“This is not the end of the story,” said Mr. Bejtlich of Mandiant. “Once they take a liking to a victim, they tend to come back. It’s not like a digital crime case where the intruders steal stuff and then they’re gone. This requires an internal vigilance model.”

<nyt_correction_bottom>

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: January 31, 2013

An earlier version of this article misstated the timing of a cyberattack that caused damage at Iran’s main nuclear enrichment plant. Evidence suggests that the United States and Israel released a computer worm around 2008, not 2012.

A version of this article appeared in print on January 31, 2013, on page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/technology/chinese-hackers-infiltrate-new-york-times-computers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

The same happens to us since years – the attackers are known and we have informed the authorities about it.

OUR WEBSITES ARE ATTACKED CONSTANTLY BY CHINESE HACKERS WHICH ARE ACTING ON BEHALF OF SOME GERMAN THUGS.

IMMER WIEDER WERDEN WEBSITES MUTMASSLICH DURCH “GOMoPa” UND DEREN MUTMASSLICHE AUFTRAGGEBER ATTACKIERT WIE MUTMASSLICH “GERD BENNEWIRTZ” UND “PETER EHLERS”

Die FÄLLE SIND BEI DEN ZUSTÄNDIGEN BEHÖRDEN

SIEHE AUCH HIER:

https://berndpulch.org/2013/02/02/cyberattacks-hackers-in-china-attacked-the-times-for-last-4-months/

DER BEWEIS AUS DEM JAHR 2000: SO REGTE GRUNER und JAHR-TOCHTER, IPV, MICH AN, DEN TITEL “INVESTMENT” ZU LANCIEREN

https://berndpulch.org/2011/05/23/der-beweis-aus-dem-jahr-2000-so-regte-gruner-jahr-tochter-ipv-mich-an-den-titel-investment-zu-lancieren/

DIE BESTEN DAS INVESTMENT- DAS ORIGINAL Cover seit dem Jahre 2000

http://investmentmagazin.com/?page_id=257

DER BEWEIS “DAS INVESTMENT MAGAZIN” DAS ORIGINAL IST ECHT

https://berndpulch.org/2011/04/17/der-beweis-das-investment-magazin-das-original/

DER MAGISTER-TITEL VON BERND PULCH IST ECHT

https://berndpulch.org/der-beweis-magisterarbeit-bernd-pulch/

Reporting by Bernd Pulch, Lionel Goodwin, Sarah Goodsmith, Bridget Gallagher and Tim Wilkinson

http://wwww.investment-on.com

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http://www.pulch.me, http://www.i-nvestment.com, http://www.bernd-pulch.me, http://www.worldwideblog.net,

For security reasons we do not provide any more information to protect us against cyber criminals – join our Crusade against Cyber Criminals

The INVESTMENT – MAGAZINE – THE ORIGINAL- was founded in 1995. We publish three editions, one global, one for Asia and one germany, Austria and Szwiterland.

We are independent from financial companies.

We focus on HNWI.

A high net worth individual (HNWI) is a person with a high net worth. In the private banking business, these individuals typically are defined as having investable assets (financial assets not including primary residence) in excess of US$1 million.[1][2] As explained below, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated a different definition of “high net worth individual” for regulatory purposes.

The Merrill Lynch – Capgemini World’s Wealth Report 2009 defines HNWIs as those who hold at least US$1 million in financial assets and Ultra-HNWIs as those who hold at least US$30 million in financial assets, with both excluding collectibles, consumables, consumer durables and primary residences. The report states that in 2008 there were 8.6 million HNWIs worldwide, a decline of 14.9% from 2007. The total HNWI wealth worldwide totaled US$32.8 trillion, a 19.5% decrease from 2007. The Ultra-HNWIs experienced the greater loss, losing 24.6% in population size and 23.9% in accumulated wealth. The report revised its 2007 projections that HNWI financial wealth would reach US$59.1 trillion by 2012 and revised this downward to a 2013 HNWI wealth valued at $48.5 trillion advancing at an annual rate of 8.1%.

WATCH OUR OWN 560 CHANNELS and 5.000 ASSOCIATED CHANNELS TOTALLY FREE

ebizz.tv is a new, free and open-source platform for internet television and video with more as 5 million videos in the library and 900.000 video channels.

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http://www.pulch.me, http://www.i-nvestment.com, http://www.bernd-pulch.me, http://www.worldwideblog.net,

We broadcast and produce
IPTV channels all around the globe.

WE BUILD YOUR PERSONAL WEB TV CHANNEL

Copyright General Global Media

*Magister Bernd M. Pulch (MA – Magister Artium)

Magister Bernd M. Pulch studied Publizistik (2), Komparatistik (1) and Germanistik (1-2) until 1988

University Mainz

Published his Magister-Thesis for Professor Hans-Mathias Kepplinger

about Dolf Zillmans “Emotional Arousal Theory” January 1987

You can order the book of Bernd Pulch for only € 125,- It can be delivered in 7 days.

Payment must be made in advance.

See more at http://www.berndpulch.co, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.berndmpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulch.org, http://www.bernd-pulch.org, http://www.berndpulch.de, http://www.berndpulch.info and http://www.berndpulch.at and http://www.berndpulch.net, http://www.berndpulch.co.uk, http://www.investment-on.com, http://www.investmentmagazin.com, http://www.investment-magazin.tv, as well as at http://www.ebizz.tv and http://www.star-fashion.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://www.magister-berndpulch.com, http://wwww.maberndpulch.com, http://www.berndpulchorg.com, http://www.magisterberndpulch.org, http://www.berndpulchcom.com,http://www.berndpulch.me,http://www.berndpulchme.com,
http://www.pulch.me, http://www.i-nvestment.com, http://www.bernd-pulch.me,

Investment Magazin, Investment, Das Investment, Investment Magazine

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Merchant Banker

Monty Python’s Flying Circus

http://www.amazon.com/Complete-Monty-Pythons-Flying-Circus/dp/B001E77XNA/ref=…

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Merchant Banker

Sports Illustrated Swimsuit: Athletes Wives Video

 

Watch this exclusive video with Jeff Garcia’s, Carmelo Anthony’s and Johnny Damon’s wives, posing for the SI Swimsuit 2008 photo shoot.
For more photos and videos visit http://www.si.com/swimsuit

The New York Times – German Media Ridiculous

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/arts/television/stupid-german-tricks-wearing-thin-on-tv.html?_r=0

 

Really ? No surprise for me !!!

It is even worse !!!

Manfred Mann – Ha Ha Said The Clown

TMZ – 49ers Superstars Frank Gore & Michael Crabtree — STRIP CLUBBIN’ Before the Superbowl

 

 

How do SF 49ers superstars Frank Gore, Michael Crabtree and Patrick Willis stay relaxed before the Super Bowl? They hit up one of the BEST STRIP CLUBS on Bourbon Street!!!

SECRECY NEWS – ARMY MANUAL HIGHLIGHTS ROLE OF “INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES”

The use of information-related tools to support military operations and to
help shape their outcome is discussed in a newly updated Army manual on
what are now called "Inform and Influence Activities."

Inform and influence activities (or IIA) refers to "the integration of
designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes,
messages, and actions with operations to inform United States and global
audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy
decisionmaking."

In some circumstances, the manual says, information operations can play a
decisive role.

"Activities occurring in, through, or by means of the information
environment have a consequential effect on an operational environment and
can impact military operations and outcomes. Therefore, commanders and
their staffs must understand their operational environments completely.
This understanding includes the information environment and the potential
impacts it can have on current and planned military operations."

But the effectiveness of such activities is naturally limited by the
realities of the military engagement.

"Soldiers' actions powerfully influence the credibility of IIA. Visible
actions coordinated with carefully chosen, credible words influence
audiences more than uncoordinated or contradictory actions and words. All
audiences--local and regional as well as adversary and enemy--compare the
friendly force's message with its actions. Consistency contributes to the
success of friendly operations by building trust and credibility.
Conversely, if actions and messages are inconsistent, friendly forces lose
credibility. Loss of credibility makes land forces vulnerable to enemy and
adversary information or countermessaging and places Army forces at a
disadvantage."

"Aligning information-related capabilities with the overall operation
ensures that messages are consistent with the forces' actions to amplify
the credibility of those messages. It is paramount that inform and
influence efforts complement not contradict. Failing to do so jeopardizes
credibility."

The updated Army manual replaces a 2003 document titled "Information
Operations."

"The publication does not address every information-related capability
commanders can use to help shape their complex operational environments. It
should, however, generate introspection and provide just enough guidance to
facilitate flexibility and innovative approaches for commanders to execute
the art of command to inform and influence."

See "Inform and Influence Activities," U.S. Army Field Manual 3-13,
January 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-13.pdf

AFTERMATH OF DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL, AND MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service which
Congress has not made publicly available include the following.

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Recent Activities and Ongoing Developments,
January 31, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42942.pdf

The Unemployed and Job Openings: A Data Primer, January 31, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42943.pdf

Congressional Redistricting and the Voting Rights Act: A Legal Overview,
January 31, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42482.pdf

Health Insurance Exchanges Under the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA), January 31, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42663.pdf

Medicare Primer, January 31, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40425.pdf

U.S. Government Agencies Involved in Export Promotion: Overview and Issues
for Congress, January 31, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41495.pdf

Sovereign Debt in Advanced Economies: Overview and Issues for Congress,
January 31, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41838.pdf

Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, January 31, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33460.pdf

United Nations Regular Budget Contributions: Members Compared, 1990-2010,
January 15, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30605.pdf

U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market:
Major Policy Considerations, January 28, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41032.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

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     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – The Money Song

 

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus

http://www.amazon.com/Complete-Monty-Pythons-Flying-Circus/dp/B001E77XNA/ref=…

SI Swimsuit – Body Painting Video

 

See the most beautiful girls during their body painting SI Swimsuit shoot.
For more SI Swimsuit photos and videos visit http://www.si.com/swimsuit.

Revealed – Cryptome – Stealing Secrets Series

Stealing Secrets Series

Sensitive Information Security Sources and Breaches: http://cryptome.org/0002/siss.htm
Voksanaev OSINT (RU): http://viktorvoksanaev.narod.ru/voksanaev.html
UK Secret Bases: http://www.secret-bases.co.uk/

 


2013-0111.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Whistleblower Org              January 31, 2013
2013-0110.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Bradley Manning                January 31, 2013
2013-0109.pdf         Stealing Secrets: World Newspapers and Magazines January 31, 2013
2013-0108.pdf         Stealing Secrets: National Archives              January 31, 2013
2013-0107.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Library of Congress            January 31, 2013

2013-0106.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Par:AnoIA                      January 31, 2013
2013-0105.pdf         Stealing Secrets: The Vatican                    January 31, 2013
2013-0104.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Worldwide Spy Agencies         January 31, 2013
2013-0103.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Acxiom                         January 31, 2013
2013-0102.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Lexis Nexis                    January 31, 2013

2013-0101.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Intelius                       January 31, 2013
2013-0100.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Cloud Computing                January 31, 2013
2013-0099.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Google                         January 31, 2013
2013-0098.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Wikipedia                      January 31, 2013
2013-0097.pdf         Stealing Secrets: WikiLeaks                      January 31, 2013

2013-0096.pdf         Stealing Secrets: The Tor Project                Janaury 31, 2013
2013-0095.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Internet Archive               January 31, 2013
2013-0094.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Semantic Web                   January 31, 2013
2013-0093.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Press Freedom Foundation       January 31, 2013
2013-0092.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Muckrock                       January 31, 2013

2013-0091.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Cryptocomb                     January 31, 2013
2013-0090.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Public Intelligence            January 31, 2013
2013-0089.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Secrecy News                   January 31, 2013
2013-0088.pdf         Stealing Secrets: US Intelligence Community      January 31, 2013
2013-0087.pdf         Stealing Secrets: Data.gov                       January 31, 2013

2013-0086.pdf         Stealing Secrets: DoJ Digtial Strategy           January 31, 2013
2013-0085.pdf         Stealing Secrets: IRS Tax Data Safeguards        January 31, 2013
2013-0084.htm         Stealing Secrets: Patient Safety Data Security   January 31, 2013
2013-0083.htm         Stealing Secrets                                 January 30, 2013

 

TMZ – Kim Kardashian’s SUPER BOWL Pick

Gambling addicts may want to take note of who Kim Kardashian picked to win the Super Bowl… because Lord knows this chick knows how to make a buck!

TOP-SECRET – FBI Bomb Data Center Bulletin: The Bomb Threat Challenge

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/FBI-BombThreatChallenge.png

 

FBI Bomb Data Center General Information Bulletin 2012-1

  • 13 pages
  • September 2012

Download

As we enter an era in which the administration of law enforcement becomes more complicated, greater challenges are thrust not only upon police officials, but also upon the community at large. The bomb threat is one such challenge. The bomber has a distinct advantage over other criminals because he can pick his time and place from afar, and use the bomb threat as a weapon to achieve his criminal objectives. This bulletin has been prepared in order to provide law enforcement and public safety agencies with a working base from which to establish their own bomb threat response capability; and to enable these same agencies, when called upon by potential bomb or bomb threat targets in the business community, to offer assistance in developing guidelines for a bomb threat response plan.

In developing a bomb threat response plan, there are four general areas of consideration: (1) Planning and Preparation, (2) Receiving a Threat, (3) Evacuation, and (4) Search. Information presented under each of these four topics will assist in the preparation of an effective bomb threat plan. Suggested methods described in this bulletin will apply in most cases; however, specific requirements will be unique for each facility and will need to be worked out on an individual basis. Once the function of the organization, size of the facility, number of personnel, location and relation to other establishments, and available resources are evaluated; a comprehensive bomb threat plan can be formulated.

Words used in conjunction with this phase include organization, liaison, coordination, and control. Only with a properly organized plan will those affected by a bomb threat know how, when, and in what order to proceed.
Liaison should be maintained between appropriate public safety agencies and facilities likely to be subject to bomb threats or bombings; and also between public safety agencies and military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams charged with responding to bombing incidents.

Through such contact, it will be possible to determine what technical and training services might be needed by potential bomb threat targets. Note that while some public safety agencies may provide considerable aid in bomb threat situations, most public and private facilities must plan and carryout the major portion of the plan, including internal control and decision making. Both liaison and coordination are factors which a bomb threat plan must take into consideration, especially when neighboring establishments or businesses may share the same building. Proper coordination will assure smooth handling of the bomb threat with the least amount of inconvenience to all concerned. Control is especially important during evacuation and search efforts, and effective security will lessen the risk of an actual explosive device ever being planted.

RECEIVING A THREAT

In preparation for the eventuality of a telephone bomb threat, all personnel who handle incoming calls to a potential target facility should be supplied with a bomb threat checklist as shown in Figure 1. When a bomb threat is received, it may be advisable for the person receiving the call to give a prearranged signal. For instance, the signal can be as simple as holding up a red card. This would allow monitoring of the call by more than one person, and it would enable someone else to attempt to record and/or trace the telephone call.

Tape recording the call can reduce the chance or error in recording information provided in the bomb threat. It may serve as evidence valuable to the investigation and assist in evaluating the authenticity of the bomb threat.
Since local jurisdictions may have statutes restricting this sort of recording, the proper officials should be contacted prior to installation and use of such equipment. If a continuous recording setup is not deemed economically practical, a system which could be activated upon receipt of a threat call might be considered feasible. A local telephone company representative can provide information regarding specific services available. Regardless of whether the bomb threat call is to be recorded and/or monitored, the person handling it should remain calm and concentrate on the exact wording of the message, and any other details which could prove valuable in evaluating the threat.

In those instances when a bomb threat has been electronically recorded, voice identification techniques may be employed. While the courts and the scientific community are divided over the reliability of “voice printing” as evidence, it can serve as an investigative tool. Upon request, the FBI will perform audio examinations, for the purpose of investigative leads only, for any law enforcement agency. Departments interested in this service may contact their local FBI Field Office for further assistance.

Although comprising a smaller percentage of bomb threats, the written threat must be evaluated as carefully as one received over the telephone or the Internet. Written bomb threats often provide excellent document-type evidence. Once a written threat is recognized, further handling should be avoided in order to preserve fingerprints, handwriting, typewriting, postmarks, and other markings for appropriate forensic examination. This may be accomplished by immediately placing each item (i.e., threat documents, mail envelope, etc.) in separate protective see through covers, allowing further review of the pertinent information without needless handling. In order to effectively trace such a bomb threat and identify its writer, it is imperative to save all evidentiary items connected with the threat.

Regardless of how the bomb threat is received (e.g., e-mail, telephone, written), the subsequent investigation is potentially an involved and complex one requiring a substantial degree of investigative competency in order to bring the case to a successful conclusion. Cognizant of this, and of the fact that useful evidence regarding the threat seldom proceeds past the bomb threat stage, the efficient accumulation and preservation of evidence cannot be over stressed.

After a bomb threat has been received, the next step is to immediately notify the people responsible for carrying out the bomb threat response plan. During the planning phase, it is important to prepare a list setting forth those individuals and agencies to be notified in the event of a bomb threat. In addition to those people mentioned previously, the police department, fire department, FBI and other Federal public assistance agencies, medical facilities, neighboring businesses, employee union representatives, and local utility companies are among those whose emergency contact information should be included on such a list.

The bomb threat must now be evaluated for its potential authenticity. Factors involved in such an evaluation are formidable, and any subsequent decision is often based on little reliable information. During this decision making process, until proven otherwise, each threat should be treated as though it involved an actual explosive device; even though bomb threats in which an IED is present comprise a small percentage.

Monty Python Live Hollywood Bowl – Pope and Michaelangelo

Monty Python Live Hollywood Bowl

http://www.amazon.com/Complete-Monty-Pythons-Flying-Circus/dp/B001E77XNA/ref=…

Video – Confirmed – Ukraine ex-policeman jailed for murder of journalist Gongadze

 


http://www.euronews.com/
 A former Ukrainian police officer has been jailed for life for the murder of a campaigning journalist Georgiy Gongadze in 2000.

General Oleksiy Pukach implied in court that others, including ex-President Leonid Kuchma, were equally guilty.

A case against the former leader was dismissed two years ago.

Gongadze wrote about political corruption and crime.

The discovery of the 31-year-old’s headless body sparked a wave of public anger which eventually led to the “Orange Revolution”.

His widow’s lawyer said she intended to appeal, arguing that the court has failed to determine the motives for the killing.

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SECRET – Iranian Hackers Target US-UK Joint Operations

Iranian Hackers Target US-UK Joint Operations

 


A sends:

Source : http://www.rce.ir/viewtopic.php?f=8&t=245#p860

An observer we trust has let us know that in an underground Iranian hacker and reverse engineering forum, one article shows some guys have been up to no good against US-UK Joint Operations and hacked into the Waves as well as the C4I system.

Ironically, there is a link and quote from cryptome.us [link added by Cryptome] regarding IRGC’s drones flying over US carriers and put both conclusions together in a way that reader, indirectly, understands that military SATCOMS and JTRS terrestrial (say military VHF) are not safe for US-UK and to our understanding they could easily use these capabilities to grab scores from catastrophic events. The fact Iran is still talking to 5+1 in addition to these efforts, to the best of our analysis, are Iranian Deterrence.

TMZ – Hulk Hogan: Brooke Hogan’s SEXY Legs!

 

Hulk Hogan is catching some heat for tweeting a picture of his daughter’s sexy legs in a short skirt. Is Hulk just being a proud parent or just REALLY, SUPER CREEPY?

PI-Restricted U.S. Army Training for Reconnaissance Troop and Below in Urban Operations

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TC 90-5 Training for Reconnaissance Troop and Below in Urban Operations

  • 116 pages
  • Distribution authorized to U.S. government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information that is for official government use.
  • February 2010
  • 5.09 MB

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Because the operational environment (OE) requires Army forces to operate in urban areas, commanders must have accurate information on the complex human elements, infrastructure, and physical terrain that make up the urban environment. The limits on imagery and electronic reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) capabilities place a premium on human-based visual reconnaissance. Reconnaissance troops and platoons must be trained to gather and analyze the necessary information and provide it to their commanders and higher headquarters. This chapter discusses definitions, training strategy, prerequisite training, individual task training, and collective task training designed to prepare reconnaissance units at troop level and below for operations in urban terrain.

URBAN-SPECIFIC TASKS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS AND CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1-25. The following sample tasks are listed in TC 7-98-1:

  • Conduct cordon and search operations, including site exploitation (SE).
  • Conduct roadblock/checkpoint operations.
  • Conduct civil disturbance operations.
  • Secure civilians during operations.
  • Process detainees and enemy prisoners of war (EPW).

1-26. See FM 3-06.11 for a review of additional tasks related to stability operations and civil support operations. These include, but are not limited to, the following:

  • Conduct area security, including presence patrols.
  • Conduct convoy escort.
  • Conduct route clearance operations.

SECTION IX – CONTROL CIVILIAN MOVEMENT/DISTURBANCE

3-60. The likelihood of civil disturbances during urban operations is high. Handled poorly, the reaction to a civil disturbance can quickly escalate out of control, with potential long-term negative effects for mission accomplishment. Conversely, a well-handled situation will lead to an enhanced view of the reconnaissance platoon’s discipline and professionalism and potentially could result in fewer such incidents in the future.

SUPPORTING TASKS

3-61. Table 3-9 lists the supporting tasks that must be accomplished as part of controlling civilian movement and disturbances.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-62. A possible TTP description for this task is covered by procedures known by the acronym of IDAM:

  • Isolate.
  • Dominate.
  • Maintain common situational awareness (SA).
  • Employ multidimensional/multiecheloned actions.

3-63. The first step entails isolating, in time and space, the trouble spot from outside influence or interaction. Unit tactical operation centers in the theater must develop TTP that “isolate” riots or demonstrations to keep them from becoming larger and potentially more violent. The idea is to close access into and out of the demonstration location (Figure 3-13). Once access is closed, rioters tend to tire within hours, and the demonstration dies down, eventually resulting in a peaceful conclusion. Figure 3-14 provides a technique for positioning several tiers of checkpoints and tactical control points, given the mission to isolate a riot. Controlling major road networks into and out of the demonstration area also serves to enhance trafficability if the riot escalates.

3-64. Units dominate the situation through force presence and control of information resources. They can demonstrate an overwhelming show of force at command posts (CP) and dispatch helicopters to conduct overflights above demonstrations and massing civilian mobs. In addition, use of appropriate air assets can give commanders a bird’s-eye view of events, providing real-time updates on the situation and ensuring that units know the “ground truth” at all times. This knowledge gives commanders a decisive advantage both in negotiations with potentially hostile elements and in tactical maneuvers.

3-65. The following factors apply for the platoon in attempting to dominate the situation:

  • Although units can dominate a civil disturbance using nonlethal munitions, it is important to consider force protection issues. In addition, if aviation assets are available, reconnaissance or utility helicopters can provide a show of force. Attack helicopters should be used in anoverwatch or reserve position.
  • Forces may need to detain group leaders or instigators to dominate a civil disturbance. An instigator is identified as a person who is “prodding” others to commit disruptive acts or who is orchestrating the group. Often, an instigator carries a bullhorn or hand-held radio.
  • The smallest unit that can employ the “snatch-and-grab” technique is a platoon. Before a platoon deploys to quell a riot, identify a four-person snatch-and-grab team, two to secure the individual and two to provide security. It is imperative that each member of the snatch-and-grab team wears the Kevlar helmet with face shield and flak vest, but the team should not bring weapons or load-bearing equipment with them into the crowd. See Figure 3-15 for an illustration of the snatch-and-grab team.
  • In accordance with Executive Order 11850, the President of the United States must approve the use of the riot control agency (RCA). The U.S. policy is to employ RCAs in limited circumstances, though never as a method of warfare. Commanders should be conscious that use of RCAs might pose a risk of escalation or public panic if it creates the erroneous perception that a chemical weapon is being used.
  • Another element that is crucial for successful civil disturbance operations is the use of combat camera personnel. Document events to hold personnel, factions, and gangs or groups accountable. To ensure that the right message is being presented, control the information environment through the synchronized efforts of information engagement assets, with support from the staff judge advocate (SJA) and civil affairs (CA) offices.

3-66. Commanders and leaders maintain SA through timely, accurate, and complete multisource reporting. They can receive reports from a broad spectrum of sources. Unit CPs, air assets, and close liaison with HN police, NGOs, PVOs, and other civilian agencies all contribute to an accurate assessment of any situation. In addition, UAS, such as the Predator and Pioneer, are effective in observing large sectors of an AO. Analyze the reports produced and relay them to each unit involved in the operation.

3-67. As part of the IDAM procedures, multidimensional/multiechelon actions may entail the following considerations:

  • Policy and legal considerations.
  • ROE.
  • Standards of conduct.
  • High visibility of civil disturbance operations with the media, including leaders who must interact with the media.
  • Crowd dynamics.
  • Communication skills for leaders who must manage aggressive and violent behavior of individuals and crowds.
  • Use of electronic warfare to monitor and control belligerent communications.
  • Tactics.
  • Lethal overwatch.
  • Search and seizure techniques.
  • Apprehension and detention.
  • Neutralization of special threats.
  • Recovery team tactics.
  • Cordon operations to isolate potential areas of disturbance.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

5-33. The smallest organizational PSYOP element is the tactical PSYOP team (TPT), consisting of three Soldiers. In high-intensity conflict, the TPT normally provides PSYOP support to a squadron. During counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, planning and execution are primarily conducted at the troop level because the troop is the element that most often directly engages the local government, populace, and adversary groups. Operating in the troop AO allows TPTs to develop rapport with the target audience. This rapport is critical to the accomplishment of the troop’s mission. The TPT chief, usually a SSG or SGT, is the PSYOP planner for the troop commander. He also coordinates with the tactical PSYOP detachment (TPD) at the squadron level for additional support to meet the troop commander’s requirements. PSYOP planning considerations include the following:

  • The most effective methods for increasing acceptance of friendly forces in occupied territory.
  • The most effective methods of undermining the will of the threat to resist.
  • The impact of PSYOP on the civilian population, friendly government, and law enforcement agencies in the area.
  • Clearly identified, specific PSYOP target group(s).
  • Undermining the credibility of threat leadership and whether or not it will bring about the desired behavioral change.

Monty Python – Holy Grail – Black Knight

 

Monty Python – Holy Grail – Black Knight

Monty Python Holy Grail

http://www.amazon.com/Monty-Python-Trinity-Pythons-Meaning/dp/B001E12ZAM/ref=…

TMZ – Hilary Duff — Rich Girl Hair

 

 

Hilary Duff is definitely stinkin’ rich and has very nice hair… and one (male) member of the TMZ newsroom just so happens to be her exact hair doppelganger!

TOP-SECRET-U.S. Northern Command Title 10 Dual Status Commander Standard Operating Procedures

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USNORTHCOM PUBLICATION 3-20 TITLE 10 SUPPORT TO DUAL STATUS COMMANDER LED JOINT TASK FORCE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

  • 194 pages
  • January 31, 2012

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The Council of Governors and the President of the United States have identified the need for Dual Status Commanders (DSC) to unify the response efforts within the 54 Territories and States of the United States of America. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) has identified Title 10 Deputy Commanders (O-6 in grade) to lead a Joint Support Force Staff Element (JSF-SE) that will integrate with the State-Level DSC staff in order to provide unity of effort to the response of both Title 32/State Active Duty (SAD) and Title 10 forces. This Standard Operating Procedures document outlines the USNORTHCOM Staff support to the DSC Program, a template for a T10 Deputy Commander Handbook and the methods, procedures and best practices for the JSF-SE.

This chapter provides an overview and background of the Dual Status Commander (DSC) program, and it provides an introduction to the Title 10 Support to Dual-Status Commander Led Joint Task Force Standard Operating Procedures which details the roles, responsibilities and processes/procedures for USNORTHCOM Staff, components, subordinates, and assigned/attached forces in supporting the DSC program.

1.1 Purpose

1.1.1. This standard operating procedure (SOP) outlines the Title 10 (T10) staff roles, responsibilities, and processes/procedures for support to a DSC during Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations (events/incidents requiring a Federal response).

1.1.2. This SOP consists of five chapters which provide: an overview of the DSC program (Chapter One); an outline of the roles, responsibilities, and processes/procedures for United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Staff Support to DSC led Joint Task Forces (JTFs) (Chapter Two); T10 Deputy Commander (Chapter Three); the Joint Support Force Staff Element (JSF-SE) SOP (Chapter Four); and a recommended JSF-SE training curriculum (Chapter Five).

1.1.3. This SOP assumes that USNORTHCOM will provide a baseline JSF-SE that will integrate with the State JTF staff to support the T10 requirements. The JSF-SE will leverage support from the State JTF staff to meet the T10 requirements (e.g., reporting of JTF Situation Report (SITREP)/Storyboard, joint personnel status reports (JPERSTATs), logistical status reports (LOGSTATs), etc). While DSC led JTFs can organize with parallel and separate staff structures under a DSC, the best practice referenced within this SOP is the integrated staff model, where T10 staff are fully integrated with the State Active Duty/Title 32 (SAD/T32) staff.

1.1.4. All references to State within this SOP are used to refer to States, Territories, Commonwealths and the District of Columbia.

1.2 Background

1.2.1. In January 2009, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directed the development of options and protocols that allow Federal military forces supporting the Primary Agency to assist State emergency response personnel in a coordinated response to domestic disasters and emergency operations, while preserving the President’s authority as Commander in Chief.

1.2.2. In February 2010, during the first Council of Governors meeting, the SecDef acknowledged mutually exclusive sovereign responsibilities of Governors and the President, and urged all participants to focus on common ground and build a consensus approach to coordinate disaster response.

1.2.3. In August 2010, the Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) hosted an orientation visit for the initial State DSC candidates (i.e., Florida, California, and Texas).

1.2.4. In December 2010, a Joint Action Plan for DSC was approved by the Council of Governors, Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), stating that the appointment of a DSC is the “usual and customary command and control arrangement” when State and Federal military forces are employed simultaneously
in support of civil authorities in the United States.

1.2.5. In May 2011, CDRUSNORTHCOM assigned USNORTHCOM/J36 Domestic Operations (NC/J36) as office of primary responsibility (OPR) for DSC. NC/J36 will coordinate with NORADUSNORTHCOM (N-NC) J5 and N-NC/J7 on doctrine and training, respectively.

1.2.6. This SOP is one of many documents which address the DSC integrated response to a DSCA event.

1.2.7. Figure 1-2 provides a hierarchy of DOD’s DSCA-related documents. Links to these references can be found in Annex A.

1.2.7.1. DOD Directive 3025.18 outlines the DOD roles in providing DSCA.

1.2.7.2. DOD Directive 5105.83 National Guard Joint Force Headquarters – State (NG JFHQs-State) establishes policy for and defines the organization and management, responsibilities and functions, relationships, and authorities of the NG JFHQs-State.

1.2.7.3. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) DSCA Standing Execution Order (EXORD) directs DSCA operations in support of the National Response Framework (NRF) and identified primary agencies in the USNORTHCOM and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) domestic geographic areas of responsibility (AOR).

1.2.7.4. The CDRUSNORTHCOM Standing EXORD for DSCA operations outlines how USNORTHCOM will employ DOD forces in support of other federal agencies in the USNORTHCOM Operational Area (OA).

1.2.7.5. USNORTHCOM concept plan (CONPLAN) for DSCA is the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) plan to support the employment of T10 forces providing DSCA in accordance with (IAW) the NRF, applicable federal laws, DOD Directives, and other policy guidance including those hazards defined by the National Planning Scenarios that are not addressed by other Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan tasked plans.

1.2.7.6. USNORTHCOM operations order (OPORD) 01-11/01-12 provides direction on the conduct of military operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR. USNORTHCOM produces an OPORD annually to address planned/forecasted military operations in support of the USNORTHCOM Theater Campaign Plan.

1.2.7.6.1. Subsequent Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) provide specific guidance (or changes to previous guidance) on unique events to address unforecasted military support operations.

1.2.7.7. The DSC Concept of Operations (CONOPS) describes the terms, responsibilities, and procedures governing the qualification, certification, appointment, and employment of a DSC for designated planned events, or in response to an emergency or major disaster within the United States, or its territories, possessions, and protectorates.

1.2.7.8. The USNORTHCOM Initial Entry Concept of Execution (CONEX) provides USNORTHCOM doctrine and procedures for establishing Joint initial command and control (C2) and support capability for its Civil Support (CS), Homeland Defense (HD) and Department of State (DOS) support operations.

1.2.7.9. The JTF Commander Training Course (JCTC) Handbook serves as a working reference and training tool for individuals who will command and employ JTFs for HD and CS at the federal and/or state level.

Monty Python – Holy Grail – Witch Village

Monty Python – Holy Grail – Witch Village

Monty Python Holy Grail

http://www.amazon.com/Monty-Python-Trinity-Pythons-Meaning/dp/B001E12ZAM/ref=…

Cryptome unveils – ATT Greenstar Secretly Spied Millions of Calls

ATT Project Greenstar Secretly Spied Millions of Calls

Greenstar prefigures current ATT’s once-secret participation in intercepting vast telecommunications data for the National Security Agency. More: https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/faq

 


EXPLODING THE PHONE

The Untold Story of the Teenagers and Outlaws Who Hacked Ma Bell

PHIL LAPSLEY

Grove Press New York

 


[pp. 92-97]

If there were no billing records for fraudulent calls, there was no way to know how many fraudulent calls there were or how long they lasted. And that meant AT&T was gazing into the abyss. Say the phone company catches some college students with electronic boxes. Fantastic! But elation is soon replaced by worry. Is that all of them? Or is that just the tip of the iceberg? Are there another ten college students doing it? A hundred? Are there a thousand fraudulent calls a year or are there a million?

Engineers hate stuff like this.

Bell Labs, filled to the brim with engineers, proposed a crash program to build an electronic toll fraud surveillance system and deploy it throughout the network. It would keep a watchful eye over the traffic flowing from coast to coast, ever vigilant for suspicious calls — not every call, mind you, but a random sampling of a subset of them, enough to gather statistics. For the first time Bell Labs — and AT&T’s senior management — would have useful data about the extent of the electronic toll fraud problem. Then they’d be in a position to make billion-dollar decisions.

The project was approved; indeed, AT&T gave Bell Labs a blank check and told them to get right to work. Tippy-top secret, the program had the coolest of code names: Project Greenstar. Within Bell Labs Greenstar documents were stamped with a star outlined in green ink to highlight their importance and sensitivity. Perhaps as a joke, the project lead was given a military dress uniform hat with a green general’s star on it, an artifact that was passed on from one team lead to the next over the years.

Greenstar development began in 1962 and the first operational unit was installed at the end of 1964. Bill Caming, AT&T’s corporate attorney for privacy and fraud matters, became intimately familiar with the program. “We devised six experimental units which we placed at representative cities,” Caming said. “Two were placed in Los Angeles because of not only activity in that area, but also different signaling arrangements, and one was placed in Miami, two were originally placed in New York, one shortly thereafter moving to Newark, NJ, and one was placed in Detroit, and then about January 1967 moved to St. Louis.”

Ken Hopper, a longtime Bell Labs engineer involved in network security and fraud detection, recalls that the Greenstar units were big, bulky machines. “I heard the name ‘yellow submarine’ applied to one of them,” he says. They lived in locked rooms or behind fenced-in enclosures in telephone company switching buildings. A single Greenstar unit would be connected to a hundred outgoing long-distance trunk lines and could simultaneously monitor five of them for fraud. The particular long-distance trunk lines being monitored were selected at random as calls went out over them. At its core, Greenstar looked for the presence of 2,600 Hz on a trunk line when it shouldn’t be there. It could detect both black box and blue box fraud, since both cases were flagged by unusual 2,600 Hz signaling.

As Caming described it, “there were in each of these locations a hundred trunks selected out of a large number, and the [ … ] logic equipment would select a call. There were five temporary scanners which would pick up a call and look at it with this logic equipment and determine whether or not it had the proper [ … ] supervisory signals, whether, for example, there was return answer supervision. When we have a call, we have a supervisory signal that goes to and activates the billing equipment which usually we call return answer supervision. That starts the billing process and legitimizes the call, and if you find voice conversation without any return answer signal, and that is what it was looking for, it is an indication, a strong indication, of a possible black box that the caller called in; and if, for example, you heard the tell-tale blue box tone [ … ] this was a very strong indication of illegality because that tone has no normal presence upon our network at that point.”

When Greenstar detected something unusual, it took an audacious next step: it recorded the telephone call. With no warrant and with no warning to the people on the line, suspicious calls were silently preserved on spinning multitrack reel-to-reel magnetic tapes. If Greenstar judged it had found a black box call it recorded for sixty to ninety seconds; if it stumbled upon a blue box it recorded the entire telephone call. Separate tracks recorded the voice, supervisory signals, and time stamps.

When the tapes filled up they were removed by two plant supervisors. “They were the only two who had access from the local [telephone] company,” Caming says. Then they were sent via registered mail to New York City. There, at the Greenstar analysis bureau, specially trained operators — “long-term chief operators who had great loyalty to the system [who] were screened for being people of great trust,” Ken Hopper says — would listen to the tapes, their ears alert for indications of fraud. The operators would determine whether a particular call was illegal or was merely the result of an equipment malfunction or “talk off” — somebody whose voice just happened to hit 2,600 Hz and had caused a false alarm. When these operators were finished listening, the tapes would be bulk erased and sent back for reuse.

“The greatest caution was exercised,” Bill Caming recalls. “I was very concerned about it. The equipment itself was fenced in within the central office so that no one could get to it surreptitiously and extract anything of what we were doing. We took every pain to preserve the sanctity of the recordings.”

Project Greenstar went on for more than five and a half years. Between the end of 1964 and May 1970, Greenstar randomly monitored some 33 million U.S. long-distance phone calls, a number that was at once staggeringly large and yet still an infinitesimally tiny fraction of the total number of long-distance calls placed during those years. Of these 33 million calls, between 1.5 and 1.8 million were recorded and shipped to New York to be listened to by human ears. “We had to have statistics,” said Caming. Statistics they got: they found “at least 25,000 cases of known illegality” and projected that in 1966 they had “on the order of 350,000 [fraudulent] calls nationwide.”

“Boy, did it perk up some ears at 195 Broadway,” says Hopper. It wasn’t even that 350,000 fraudulent calls was that big a number. Rather, it was the fact that there was really nothing that could be . done about it, at least not at once. “It was immediately recognized that if such fraud could be committed with impunity, losses of staggering proportions would ensue,” Caming said. ”At that time we recognized — and we can say this more confidently in public in retrospect — that we had no immediate defense. This was a breakthrough almost equivalent to the advent of gunpowder, where the hordes of Genghis Khan faced problems of a new sort, or the advent of the cannon.”

The initial plan with Greenstar was simple: Wait. Watch. Listen. Gather statistics. Tell no one. Most important, don’t do anything that would give it away. “There was no prosecution during those first couple of years,” Hopper says. “It was so the bad guys would not be aware of the fact that they’re being measured.” It was only later, Hopper says. that AT&T decided to switch from measurement to prosecution. Even then! Hopper said, “The presence of Greenstar would not be divulged and that evidence gathered to support toll fraud prosecutions would be gathered by other means.” Instead, Hopper relates, Greenstar would be used to alert Bell security agents to possible fraud. The security agents would then use other means, such as taps and recordings, to get the evidence needed to convict. “Greenstar bird-dogging it would not be brought out,” says Hopper. “It was just simply a toll fraud investigation brought about by unusual signaling and you would not talk about the fact that there was a Greenstar device. That was the ground rule as I understood it. Any court testimony that I ever gave, I never talked about any of that.” As another telephone company official put it, “If it ever were necessary to reveal the existence of this equipment in order to prosecute a toll fraud case, [AT&T] would simply decline to prosecute.”

Bill Caming became AT&T’s attorney for privacy and fraud matters in September 1965. Greenstar had been in operation for about a year when he was briefed on it. His reaction was immediate: “Change the name. I don’t even know what it is, but it just sounds illegal. Change the name.” More innocent-sounding code names like “Dewdrop” and “Ducky” were apparently unavailable, so AT&T and Bell Labs opted for something utilitarian and unlikely to attract attention: Greenstar was rechristened “Toll Test Unit.”

As the new legal guy at AT&T headquarters, Caming faced questions that were both important and sensitive. Forget how it sounded, was Greenstar actually illegal? And if it was, what should be done about it? Before joining AT&T Caming had been a prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials after World War II. He was highly regarded, considered by many to be a model of legal rectitude. Was there any way he could see that the AT&T program was legit?

There was. He later stated under oath that there was “no question” Greenstar was in fact legal under laws of the day — a surprising conclusion for what at first blush appears to be an astonishing overreach on the part of the telephone company. There were two parts to Caming’s reasoning. The first had to do with the odd wording of the wiretap laws of the early 1960s; using this wording Caming was able to thread a line of legal logic through the eye of a very specific needle to conclude that the program was legal under the law prior to 1968. The second part had to do with his position at American Telephone and Telegraph. In 1968, when Congress was considering new wiretapping legislation, Caming was in a position to help lawmakers draft the new law. He made very sure that the new wiretap act didn’t conflict with AT&T’s surveillance program.

Caming even informed the attorneys at the Justice Department’s Criminal Division about Greenstar in 1966 and 1967, in connection with some prosecutions. “Now, that does not say that they cleared it or gave me their imprimatur,” he allowed. But then, he added, “we did not feel we needed it.”

Years later, the Congressional Research Service agreed with Caming regarding the legality of the program — to a degree. While not going so far as to say there was “no question” that Greenstar was legal, it was concluded that “It is not certain that the telephone company violated any federal laws by the random monitoring of telephone conversations during the period from 1964 to 1970. This uncertainty exists because the Congressional intent [in the law] is not clear, and case law has not clearly explained the permissible scope of monitoring by the company.”

This whole mess formed a challenging business conundrum for AT&T executives, the sort of thing that would make for a good business school case study. Put yourself in their shoes. You have made an incredibly expensive investment in a product — the telephone network — that turns out to have some gaping security holes in it. You have, as Bill Caming said, no immediate defense against the problem. You finally have some statistics about how bad the problem is. It’s bad, but it’s not terrible, unless it spreads, in which case it’s catastrophic. Replacing the network will take years and cost a billion dollars or so. The Justice Department isn’t sure there are any federal laws on the books that actually apply. And every time you prosecute the fraudsters under state laws, not only do you look bad in the newspapers — witness the Milwaukee Journal’s 1963 front-page headline “Lonely Boy Devises Way of Placing Free Long Distance Calls” — but the resulting publicity makes the problem worse.

AT&T played the best game it could with a bad hand. For now it would quietly monitor the network, keeping a weather eye on the problem. When the company found college kids playing with the network, investigators would give them a stern talking — to and confiscate their colored boxes. Execs would start thinking about a slow, long-term upgrade to the network to eliminate the underlying problem. And if opportunity knocked and they could help out the feds with an organized crime prosecution — and in the process set a clear precedent for the applicability of the federal Fraud by Wire law — well, that would be lovely.

That opportunity came knocking in 1965. As it turned out used a sledgehammer.

[pp. 115-16]

On May 5, 1969, the Supreme Court declined to hear their case. More than three years after the FBI took a sledgehammer to Ken Hanna’s door, the issue was finally settled. If you were making illegal calls you had no right to privacy. The phone company could tap your line and turn the recordings over to law enforcement.

For the phone company, the victory was about much more than convicting Hanna or Dubis. AT&T now had a case that had gone all the way to the Supreme Court, one that proved, definitively, that 18 USC 1343 — the Fraud by Wire law that the Justice Department had believed wasn’t relevant — did apply to blue boxes. Thanks to Hanna’s failed appeal, the matter was now settled. AT&T finally had an arrow in its quiver to use against the fraudsters.

Throughout all of this legal drama one mystery remains: how had the telephone company found out about Hanna’s or Dubis’s blue box calls in the first place?

In the Hanna case, Miami telephone company security agent Jerry Doyle received a telephone call from the Internal Audit and Security Group at AT&T headquarters in New York asking him to investigate Hanna’s telephone line for a possible blue box. How did investigators in New York know that somebody in Miami was making illegal calls? Hanna’s attorneys asked Doyle this very question but Doyle said he didn’t know.

There was a one-word answer that nobody was giving: Greenstar. Hanna had been caught up in AT&T’s toll fraud surveillance network. Imagine what would have happened if this had come out during Hanna’s trial. After all, the Hanna case took almost four years to resolve and went to the Supreme Court based on tape recordings of each of his illegal calls. Think of the legal circus that would have ensued if Hanna’s defense attorneys had learned that the telephone company had been randomly monitoring millions of telephone calls nationwide and recording hundreds of thousands of them.

This added considerably to the stress of prosecuting Greenstar cases. AT&T attorney Caming recalls, “That was the problem in the Hanna case! Fortunately, defense counsel never probed too far as to what our original sources of information were.” With blue box prosecutions, he adds, “We were always on pins and needles as to what might spill over into the public press.”

Fortunately for AT&T in the Hanna and Bubis cases their luck held. And although Caming wasn’t a gambler or a bookmaker, he knew a thing or two about luck. In particular, he knew it didn’t last forever.

[p. 144]

At that point, the phone company billing records show something anomalous: here’s a call to a number, 555-1212, that should never look like it answered and yet it does. The phone company doesn’t like anomalies in its network, not so much because they think somebody might be messing with them, but just because anomalies probably mean that something is broken somewhere and needs repair.

“I knew that was an irregularity,” Acker says. “My fear was, you know, if this registers on your tape” — Acker knew the phone company in those days used paper tape for billing records — “they’ll be able to tell that [the call] answered, and they know it’s not supposed to.” Acker’s fears were right on the money. The phone company was indeed using computer-generated reports of supervision irregularities to spot blue boxes. Along with Greenstar, these reports were a primary tool the Bell System used to detect such fraud and, due to Greenstar’s secrecy, were among the most effective for prosecution.

Acker’s surprise caller was a security agent from his telephone company, New York Telephone. The agent had already talked to Acker’s friend John, likely because of 555-1212 supervision anomalies. But the reason the agent wanted to talk to Acker was more concrete. John had ratted out Acker to the security agent.

“He spilled his guts,” Acker says. “That was just an inconceivable no-no to me. That pretty much trashed our friendship. Forever and ever.” Forty years later you can still hear the intensity in Acker’s voice. “When you get in trouble, you don’t squeal on anybody.”

[p. 182]

Charlie Schulz and Ken Hopper, members of the technical staff of the Telephone Crime Lab at Bell Laboratories.

Hopper’s path to the Telephone Crime Lab was a circuitous one. In 1971 he was a distinguished-looking forty-five-year-old electrical engineer, a bit on the heavy side, with blue eyes, short brown hair, and glasses. Hopper had joined the Bell System some twenty-five years earlier, shortly after the end of World War II. Within a few years he had found himself at Bell Laboratories’ Special Systems Group working on government electronics projects. The stereotype of government work is that it’s boring, but Hopper was a lightning rod for geek adventure: wherever he went to do technical things physical danger never seemed far behind. There was the time he had to shoot a polar bear that had broken into his cabin while he was stationed up in the Arctic working on the then secret Distant Early Warning Line, the 1950s-era radar system that would provide advance warning of a Soviet bomber attack. Or the time he almost died in a cornfield in Iowa while building a giant radio antenna for a 55-kilowatt transmitter to “heat up the ionosphere” for another secret project. Then there’s the stuff he still can’t really talk about in detail, involving submarines and special tape recorders and undersea wiretaps of Soviet communications cables.

The Special Systems Group was a natural to help AT&T with the Greenstar toll-fraud surveillance network in the 1960s, Hopper says, and that work led to involvement with other telephone security matters. But the Telephone Crime Lab also owes its existence to the FBI. Hopper recalls, “In the mid-1960s the FBI laboratory came to our upper management and said they were getting electronic-involved crimes. They had no people in their laboratory that could examine evidence in these cases, especially related to communication systems, and they asked for Bell Labs’ assistance. Upper management of Bell Labs agreed that this was in the public interest and that we would do that. The work was assigned to my organization, Charlie Schulz being the supervisor. We had just a few people, never more than two or three, working on this stuff.

[pp. 304-05]

The Ashley-Gravitt affair was much in the newspapers that fall and attracted the attention of Louis Rose, an investigative reporter at the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Missouri’s preeminent newspaper. Rose had written a series of articles examining the apparently cozy relationship between Southwestern Bell and the Missouri Public Service Commission, its regulator in that state. “I had been looking at all the expenditures and all of the salaries and donations by Southwestern Bell,” Rose recalls. James Ashley, he says, “found a convenient thing in me, because I was already looking up these ties.”

In January 1975 the Texas scandal spread to North Carolina when a former Southern Bell vice president — another who had been forced out of the telephone company, as it happened — admitted during an interview that he had run a $12,000-a-year political kickback fund for the Bell System. The telephone company soon found itself being investigated by an assortment of agencies: the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Department of Justice, the Federal Wiretap Commission, the FCC, and the Texas attorney general.

The next shoe to drop in the scandal was, in a way, predictable, so predictable, in fact, that Bill Caming, AT&T’s patrician attorney for privacy and fraud matters, had predicted it ten years earlier. Caming couldn’t say exactly when it would happen, or exactly how it would happen, but he was sure it would happen. Ever since I965, when he had first learned about AT&T’s Greenstar toll-fraud surveillance system, with its tape recordings of millions of long-distance calls and its racks of monitoring equipment kept behind locked cages in telephone company central offices, Caming had maintained it was a matter of when — and not if — the news of Greenstar would eventually leak.

The “when” turned out to be February 2, 1975. The “how” was a front-page headline in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch: “Bell Secretly Monitored Millions of Toll Calls.” The article, by Louis Rose, quoted an anonymous source within the phone company and was chock-full of details: a list of the cities where Greenstar had been installed, the specifics of its operation, the stunning news that the phone company had monitored 30 million calls and tape-recorded some 1.5 million of them. Someone — someone high up, it seemed — had spilled the beans. By the next day the story had been picked up by the newswires and the New York Times.

Caming didn’t need a crystal ball to predict what happened next: a phone call from the chair of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice. “He said. ‘I think we’re going to have to have one of your guys come down and explain all this to us,” Caming knew, as he had known for ten years now, that he would be the guy.

Less than three weeks later Caming found himself before the U.S. Congress. swearing to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Seated with Caming were Earl Conners, chief of security for Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, and John Mack, a Bell Labs engineer who was intimately familiar with the technical details of Greenstar. True to his reputation for loquaciousness (or maybe it was his legal training) Caming made sure his colleagues never got to speak more than two dozen words over the course of the three-hour hearing. Caming explained AT&T’s motivations for launching the surveillance system, how it operated, and, most important, why it was legal — indeed, not just legal, but in fact the only option AT&T had to combat blue box and black box fraud at the time. Never once did he refer to it as “Greenstar,” the name that ten years earlier he said “just sounds illegal.” Perhaps it was Caming’s legal reasoning, perhaps it was his appearance — competent, prepared, confident, yet self-effacing — or perhaps it was 195 Broadway’s deft handling of the press on the matter, but AT&T managed to weather the Greenstar storm without much damage. Despite some alarming headlines there was little fallout and no criminal investigation. The Greenstar matter quickly faded away.

[pp. 358-59]

Notes

95 “decline to prosecute”: Rose, “Bell Secretly Monitored Millions of Toll Calls.”

96 “Change the name”: During my interviews with Bill Caming I often used the term Greenstar in our discussions. Ever the AT&T attorney, he would periodically correct me: “No, that’s not its name. That was an internal code name that we stopped using.” Sometime later I visited the AT&T Archives in Warren, New Jersey, which maintains a computerized index of old Bell System files. I typed in “Greenstar” and watched the display light up like a Christmas tree as it found relevant documents. When I mentioned this to Caming a few days later, he gave a rueful laugh and responded, “Well, I guess you can’t keep a good name down.”

96 two parts to Caming’s reasoning: Before 1968, the federal wiretapping law was Section 605 of Title 18 of the United States Code. It was a strangely written law. As discussed in the next chapter, section 605 did not make wiretapping (“interception”) itself illegal. Rather, to commit a crime under 605 you had to both intercept a communication and then disclose the contents of the communication to someone else. Clearly when Greenstar recorded a call and a human listened to it, there was an interception, but because the trained operator listening to the tapes never discussed the contents of the communication (just the signaling of the call itself), there was no disclosure, and thus, AT&T asserted, no crime. In 1968 the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act became the new law that governed wiretapping — but that law had specific carve outs for random monitoring and interception of communications by telephone company personnel attempting to protect the assets of the telephone company.

96 “imprimatur”: Caming, “Surveillance,” pp. 243-44.

96 Congressional Research Service: Ibid., p. 234.

97 “Lonely Boy”: “Lonely Boy Devises Way of Placing Free Long Distance Calls.”

 



	

TMZ – Is ‘American Idol’ Racist!?

 

Nine black former contestants on “American Idol” are threatening to sue the show for being racist… and it led Harvey to go on one of his all-time CLASSIC rants about who he would fire in the TMZ newsroom!

SECRET – U.S. Northern Command-NORAD Battle Staff Standard Operating Procedures

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/USNORTHCOM-BattleStaffSOP.png

NORAD AND USNORTHCOM PUBLICATION 1-01 BATTLE STAFF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

  • 171 pages
  • March 11, 2011

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1.1.1 NORAD and USNORTHCOM Publication Series

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Publication Series is the authoritative reference defining the Commands’ missions and structure, force employment objectives, mission area planning considerations and operational processes from the strategic to the tactical level. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Publication Series also defines the Commands’ doctrine, as well as their operational tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Publication Series is authoritative because it defines the actions and methods implementing joint doctrine and describes how assigned and attached military forces will be employed in the Commands’ joint and combined operations. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Publication Series consists of:

• Capstone publication: USNORTHCOM Publication (NCP) 1, Capstone Guidance
• Keystone publications:
− NCP 0-1, Homeland Defense Concept of Employment (HD CONEMP)
− NCP 0-2, Civil Support Concept of Employment (CS CONEMP)
− NORAD and USNORTHCOM Publication (N-NCP) 1-01, Battle Staff Standard Operating Procedures (BSOP)
• Supporting publications: Supporting publications provide execution-level operational and tactical guidance, force employment direction and TTP. Supporting publications are called concepts of Execution (CONEX). These supporting publications can be functionally aligned (e.g., NCP 3-05 Joint Task Force Concept of Execution) or created by a subordinate unit (e.g., NCP 10-01, Joint Task Force North Concept of Execution), assigned component command headquarters (e.g., NCP 10-05, Army Forces North Concept of Execution) or supporting commander (e.g., NCP 10-08, United States Fleet Forces Command Concept of Execution in Support of USNORTHCOM)

NORAD and USNORTHCOM Instruction (N-NCI) 10-154, NORAD and USNORTHCOM Publication Series provides further background on the Publication series policy and purpose.

1.1.2 NORAD and USNORTHCOM Battle Staff

The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Battle Staff is activated during contingencies and crises to facilitate the Commander’s timely strategy and operational decision making. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Battle Staff task organizes using an adaptive joint headquarters construct, integrating J-code staff, special staff and agency liaisons into various Battle Staff nodes. This cross-functional Battle Staff organization ensures processes critical to the NORAD and USNORTHCOM missions are reliable, repeatable and efficient, and minimizes functional stove piping. The adaptive joint headquarters construct evolves beyond the traditional J-code staff organization thereby creating a Battle Staff organization optimized to execute cross-functional, joint war fighting processes to improve collaboration and increase understanding of the operational environment.

Though NORAD and USNORTHCOM are separate commands with different establishing authorities, they have complimentary missions. The two Commands share common values, understanding the urgency and significance of their duties in light of very real and present dangers. Operations and incidents could occur within the NORAD area of operations (AO) and USNORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR) that would involve responses by both Commands. Canada and the United States also share a common border and have mutual defense and civil support and civil assistance interests. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Battle Staff organization and processes defined in this BSOP are intended to ensure the two Commands’ missions are accomplished effectively, efficiently and in close cooperation.

1.3 NORAD and USNORTHCOM Battle Staff Organization

Headquarters NORAD and Headquarters USNORTHCOM accomplishes its routine operations within the traditional J-code staff organizational structure and transitions to the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Battle Staff construct in response to preplanned events or contingencies as directed by the Commander. For preplanned events (contingency planning), the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Chief of Staff (N-NC/CS) will designate an OPR to stand up a joint planning team (JPT) or operations planning team (OPT). These teams can be led by any directorate, but are typically led by the Directorate of Strategy, Policy and Plans (N-NC/J5), NORAD Directorate of Operations (N/J3) or USNORTHCOM Directorate of Operations (NC/J3). The work of the JPT or OPT is conducted outside of the Battle Staff organization and processes, but may be transitioned to the Battle Staff’s crisis action planning (CAP) responsibility as the preplanned event approaches. The Battle Staff is designed to provide cross-functional expertise and leverage information technology to improve collaboration and decision superiority in CAP. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Battle Staff’s primary role is to support the Commander’s operational decision-making process during CAP and execution. The Battle Staff coordinates and collaborates with higher, adjacent, supporting, supported commands and agencies internal and external to the Department of Defense (DOD). This BSOP generally assumes Battle Staff activation will be required for a period between 12 hours and 30 days. However, such activation (Chapter 2) is scalable based on the nature and magnitude of the crisis or contingency.

The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Battle Staff is a three-tiered organization:
• The Command Executive Group (CEG), led by the Battle Staff Executive Director (N-NC/CS)
• Battle Staff Core Centers
− NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center (N2C2)
− NORAD Future Operations Center (N/FOC)
− USNORTHCOM Future Operations Center (NC/FOC)
− NORAD and USNORTHCOM Future Plans Center (FPC)
• Battle Staff supporting nodes (i.e., Centers, Cells, Boards and working groups [WG], as required)

Monty Python – Holy Grail – Killer Rabbit

 

Monty Python – Holy Grail – Killer Rabbit

TMZ – Meet the ‘Plastic Wives!’

 

Hollywood’s so-called “Plastic Wives” aren’t just married to plastic surgeons… they’re also very proud (and VERY OBVIOUS) clients as well!

SECRET – NSA Technology Directorate Manual: Cable Installation at NSA Facilities

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NSA-CableInstallation.png

 

Cable Installation at NSAW Facilities

  • Document Number: X312-061-1006
  • Version 1.4
  • 25 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • September 25, 2008

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(U//FOUO) This document provides detailed instructions for the implementation and installation of premise wire infrastructure in support of unclassified and classified networks within NSAW, Build-out Facilities, domestic facilities where NSA controls the plenum, domestic facilities where NSA does not control the plenum and all OCONUS field sites. This document provides instructions for implementations and installations of premise wiring in communications facilities, office spaces and machine rooms by ITD Internal Service Providers (ISP), External Service providers (ESP), field personnel stationed at the respective facilities or authorized NSA agents.

(U//FOUO) This document applies to all new voice, video, and data cabling including TS/SCI, Secret and Unclassified networks for all NSA facilities identified in the previous paragraph. This includes any construction, restoration, and modernization projects. This document is not intended to justify wholesale replacement and upgrade of existing premise wiring or cable infrastructure unless security violations are found.

(U//FOUO) It is presumed that any facility in which these instructions pertain is protected by approved means of anti-terrorist force protection (ATFP), owned or leased by the NSA/CSS and perimeters monitored by security cameras, intrusion alarms or other means approved and implemented by the Office of Physical Security, Countermeasures/Headquarters Security and Program Protection or Field Security. Where these do not apply, additional Security and TEMPEST counter measures are required. Details are provided in the respective sections of this document.

(U//FOUO) Prior to the installation of any Red communications or network infrastructure, all facilities will have Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) accreditation in accordance with NSA/CSS Manual 130-1, Annex P and NSA/CSS Policy 6-3, Operational Information Systems Security Policy. All installation personnel must be legal U.S. citizens in accordance with NSA/CSS Policy 5-23, Physical Security Requirements for Controlled Areas.

(U//FOUO) Failure to adhere to the Standards outlined in this document will result in delays in activation and possibly denial of services until the facility is certified to be in compliance. Additional site surveys will be conducted by the Office of Technical Security Countermeasures as part of the automated Annex P process detailing appropriate Countermeasures for the respective facility.

Monty Python Holy Grail – French Taunter

Monty Python Holy Grail – French Taunter

Monty Python Holy Grail

http://www.amazon.com/Monty-Python-Trinity-Pythons-Meaning/dp/B001E12ZAM/ref=…

TMZ – Steven Tyler’s Speedo-Clad Bongo Bash!

 

Steven Tyler didn’t just rage his face off at a wild bongo bash on the beach in Hawaii… he did it while wearing a tiny mankini!

PI – National Counterintelligence Executive Specifications for Constructing Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/NCIX-SCIF-Specs-1.2.png

 

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES

  • IC Tech Spec‐for ICD/ICS 705
  • 166 pages
  • April 23, 2012

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This Intelligence Community (IC) Technical Specification sets forth the physical and technical security specifications and best practices for meeting standards of Intelligence Community Standard (ICS) 705-1 (Physical and Technical Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities). When the technical specifications herein are applied to new construction and renovations of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs), they shall satisfy the standards outlined in ICS 705-1 to enable uniform and reciprocal use across all IC elements and to assure information sharing to the greatest extent possible. This document is the implementing specification for Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 705, Physical and Technical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (ICS-705-1) and Standards for Accreditation and Reciprocal Use of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (ICS-705-2) and supersedes Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/9.

The specifications contained herein will facilitate the protection of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) against compromising emanations, inadvertent observation and disclosure by unauthorized persons, and the detection of unauthorized entry.

A. Analytical Risk Management Process

1. The Accrediting Official (AO) and the Site Security Manager (SSM) should evaluate each proposed SCIF for threats, vulnerabilities, and assets to determine the most efficient countermeasures required for physical and technical security. In some cases, based upon that risk assessment, it may be determined that it is more practical or efficient to mitigate a standard. In other cases, it may be determined that additional security measures should be employed due to a significant risk factor.

2. Security begins when the initial requirement for a SCIF is known. To ensure the integrity of the construction and final accreditation, security plans should be coordinated with the AO before construction plans are designed, materials ordered, or contracts let.

a) Security standards shall apply to all proposed SCI facilities and shall be coordinated with the AO for guidance and approval. Location of facility construction and or fabrication does not exclude a facility from security standards and or review and approval by the AO. SCI facilities include but are not limited to fixed facilities, mobile platforms, prefabricated structures, containers, modular applications or other new or emerging applications and technologies that may meet performance standards for use in SCI facility construction.

b) Mitigations are verifiable, non-standard methods that shall be approved by the AO to effectively meet the physical/technical security protection level(s) of the standard. While most standards may be effectively mitigated via non-standard construction, additional security countermeasures and/or procedures, some standards are based upon tested and verified equipment (e.g., a combination lock meeting Federal Specification FF-L 2740A) chosen because of special attributes and could not be mitigated with non-tested equipment. The AO’s approval is documented to confirm that the mitigation is at least equal to the physical/technical security level of the standard.

c) Exceeding a standard, even when based upon risk, requires that a waiver be processed and approved in accordance with ICD 705.

3. The risk management process includes a critical evaluation of threats, vulnerability, and assets to determine the need and value of countermeasures. The process may include the following:

a) Threat Analysis. Assess the capabilities, intentions, and opportunity of an adversary to exploit or damage assets or information. Reference the threat information provided in the National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment (NTIPA) produced by the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) for inside the U.S. and/or the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB), Security Environment Threat List (SETL) for outside the U.S. to determine technical threat to a location. When evaluating for TEMPEST, the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authorities (CTTA) shall use the National Security Agency Information Assurance (NSA IA) list as an additional resource for specific technical threat information. It is critical to identify other occupants of common and adjacent buildings. (However, do not attempt to collect information against U.S. persons in violation of Executive Order (EO) 12333.) In areas where there is a diplomatic presence of high and critical threat countries, additional countermeasures may be necessary.

b) Vulnerability Analysis. Assess the inherent susceptibility to attack of a procedure, facility, information system, equipment, or policy.

c) Probability Analysis. Assess the probability of an adverse action, incident, or attack occurring.

d) Consequence Analysis. Assess the consequences of such an action (expressed as a measure of loss, such as cost in dollars, resources, programmatic effect/mission impact, etc.).

Monty Python – Always Look On The Bright Side of Life – Filmclip

 

Life of Brian

http://www.amazon.com/Monty-Python-Trinity-Pythons-Meaning/dp/B001E12ZAM/ref=…

SECRECY NEWS – FORMER CIA OFFICER KIRIAKOU SENTENCED FOR LEAK

Former CIA officer John Kiriakou was sentenced today to 30 months in
prison for a violation of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act after
he pleaded guilty to one count of identifying a covert agent.

Although the sentence is less than that prescribed by federal sentencing
guidelines, the government said that it considers the reduced penalty
"reasonable."

In a presentencing memorandum for the defense, Mr. Kiriakou's attorneys
said that his offense should be seen in the context of his lifelong
commitment "to public service and the defense of America's national
security."

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/kiriakou/012413-defmem.pdf

"In the course of his service to the United States and the Central
Intelligence Agency, Mr. Kiriakou placed himself in harm's way on countless
occasions, earning the CIA's Exceptional Service Award no fewer than ten
times," the defense memorandum said.

Although Mr. Kiriakou accepted full responsibility for his actions, the
defense said that he had been duped into making the unauthorized disclosure
that led to his prosecution.

"In 2006, Journalist A told Mr. Kiriakou that he was working on a book
about the Abu Omar rendition in Milan. That was false. Journalist A has
never published a book on that subject and the defense is aware of no
evidence that he was ever working on one."

"In reality, unknown to Mr. Kiriakou, Journalist A was acting as a private
investigator on behalf of lawyers representing terrorist detainees in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and was forwarding the information he received from
Mr. Kiriakou, as well as information he received from many other
individuals, to another private investigator working with the detainees'
lawyers. Mr. Kiriakou now realizes that he made a very serious mistake in
passing any information to Journalist A, but he would not have done so had
he known how Journalist A would make use of that information," the defense
memorandum said.

The defense noted that "Mr. Kiriakou has fully and forthrightly accepted
responsibility for his actions and recognizes the seriousness of the crime
to which he has pled guilty.  Yet while many will never know Mr. Kiriakou
apart from this prosecution, the incident that led to this moment cannot
undo the reality of Mr. Kiriakou's life in full-- a life dedicated to the
values of freedom, decency, public service, and love of country.  As the
government concedes, although Mr. Kiriakou's crime was unquestionably
serious, he was never motivated by any desire to harm the United States,
national security, the CIA's critical mission abroad, or any individual
person."

A petition asking President Obama to pardon Mr. Kiriakou or commute his
sentence has already been signed by thousands of supporters.

After Vice Presidential aide Scooter Libby was convicted of perjury in
connection with the unauthorized disclosure of the identity of CIA officer
Valerie Plame in 2007 and sentenced to 30 months in jail, his sentence was
promptly commuted by President George W. Bush.

INTERNATIONAL TAX HAVENS, AND MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that
Congress has not made available to the public include the following.

Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, January 23, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf

An Overview of the Tax Provisions in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of
2012, January 20, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42894.pdf

Receipt of Unemployment Insurance by Higher-Income Unemployed Workers
("Millionaires"), January 23, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42643.pdf

Summary Report: Congressional Action on the FY2013 Disaster Supplemental,
January 22, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42892.pdf

FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief: Summary and
Considerations for Congress, January 23, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42869.pdf

Congressional Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Legislative
Considerations, January 22, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40076.pdf

Congressional Careers: Service Tenure and Patterns of Member Service,
1789-2013, January 3, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41545.pdf

Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF): Summary and Issue Overview,
January 22, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42641.pdf

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, January 24, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40479.pdf

Mexico's New Administration: Priorities and Key Issues in U.S.-Mexican
Relations, January 16, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42917.pdf

Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act, January 2, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R42725.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
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_______________________
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Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
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Monty Python – Hermit – Life of Brian

 

Life of Brian

http://www.amazon.com/Monty-Python-Trinity-Pythons-Meaning/dp/B001E12ZAM/ref=…

SI Swimsuit: Jessica Gomes – Body Painting Video

Jessica Gomes tells you about experience being a human canvas for the SI Swimsuit 2008 body painting shoot.
For more photos and videos visit http://www.si.com/swimsuit

SI Swimsuit: Jessica Gomes – Body Painting Video

NSA – ALAN GROSS CASE SPOTLIGHTS U.S. DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS IN CUBA

Alan Gross (left) and Peter Kornbluh at the Havana military prison where Gross is being held. November 28, 2012.

ALAN GROSS CASE SPOTLIGHTS U.S. DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS IN CUBA

LAWSUIT FILED BY FAMILY YIELDS DOCUMENTATION ON “OPERATIONAL” NATURE OF USAID EFFORT

CONTRACTOR INTRODUCES CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS IN COURT ARGUMENTS

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 411

Posted – January 24, 2013

Edited by Peter Kornbluh

For more information contact:
Peter Kornbluh 202/994-7116 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Related Postings

American jailed in Cuba wants US to sign ‘non-belligerency pact’ to speed release
Michael Isikoff, NBC News, December 2, 2012

Secrecy, politics at heart of Cuba project
Tracey Eaton, Along the Malecón, January 17, 2013

Cuba Proposes Exchange Deal for Imprisoned American, Alan Gross
Chris Woolf, PRI’s The World, December 3, 2012


Bookmark and Share

Washington, D.C., January 18, 2013 – The U.S. government has “between five to seven different transition plans” for Cuba, and the USAID-sponsored “Democracy” program aimed at the Castro government is “an operational activity” that demands “continuous discretion,” according to documents filed in court this week, and posted today by the National Security Archive. The records were filed by Development Alternatives Inc (DAI), one of USAID’s largest contractors, in response to a lawsuit filed by the family of Alan Gross, who was arrested in Cuba in December 2009 for attempting to set up satellite communications networks on the island, as part of the USAID program.

In an August 2008 meeting toward the end of the George W. Bush administration, according to a confidential memorandum of conversation attached to DAI’s filing, officials from the “Cuba Democracy and Contingency Planning Program,” as the Democracy effort is officially known, told DAI representatives that “USAID is not telling Cubans how or why they need a democratic transition, but rather, the Agency wants to provide the technology and means for communicating the spark which could benefit the population.” The program, the officials stated, intended to “provide a base from which Cubans can ‘develop alternative visions of the future.'”

Gross has spent three years of a 15-year sentence in prison in Cuba, charged and convicted of “acts against the integrity of the state” for attempting to supply members of Cuba’s Jewish community with Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN) satellite communications consoles and establish independent internet networks on the island. Last year, he and his wife, Judy, sued both DAI and USAID for failing to adequately prepare, train and supervise him given the dangerous nature of the democracy program activities.

During a four-hour meeting last November 28, 2012, with Archive analyst Peter Kornbluh at the military hospital where he is incarcerated, Gross insisted that “my goals were not the same as the program that sent me.” He called on the Obama administration to meet Cuba at the negotiating table and resolve his case, among other bilateral issues between the two nations.

The exhibits attached to DAI’s court filing included USAID’s original “Request for Proposals” for stepped up efforts to bring about political transition to Cuba, USAID communications with DAI, and Gross’s own proposals for bringing computers, cell phones, routers and BGAN systems-“Telco in a Bag,” as he called it-into Cuba.

According to Kornbluh, DAI’s filing is “a form of ‘graymail'”–an alert to the U.S. government that unless the Obama administration steps up its efforts to get Gross released, the suit would yield unwelcome details of ongoing U.S. intervention in Cuba.

In its effort to dismiss the suit, DAI’s filing stated that it was “deeply concerned that the development of the record in this case over the course of litigation [through discovery] could create significant risks to the U.S. government’s national security, foreign policy, and human rights interests.”

 


READ THE DOCUMENTS

Document l: USAID “Competitive Task Order Solicitation in Support of Cuba Democracy and Contingency Planning Program (CDCPP), May 8, 2008.

Document 2: Memoranda of Conversation between USAID AND DAI officials, “Meeting Notes from USAID CDCPP Meeting, August 26, 2008.

Document 3: Alan Gross, “Para La Isla,” Proposed Expansion of Scope of Work in Cuba Proposal, September 2009.

Document 4: Declaration of John Henry McCarthy, DAI Global Practice Leader

Document 5: Defendant Development Alternatives, Inc.’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim, January 15, 2013.

Document 6: Cuban Court Ruling Against Alan Gross, March 11, 2011, certified English translation. 

TMZ – Steven Tyler — I’ll Play the Bongo … You Watch My Dongo

 

See if you can watch this video of a mankini-sportin’ Steven Tyler bangin’ away in a drum circle in Maui … and NOT stare at his drumstick.

SECRET – National Counterintelligence Executive Specifications

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/NCIX-SCIF-Specs-1.2.png

 

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES

  • IC Tech Spec‐for ICD/ICS 705
  • 166 pages
  • April 23, 2012

Download

This Intelligence Community (IC) Technical Specification sets forth the physical and technical security specifications and best practices for meeting standards of Intelligence Community Standard (ICS) 705-1 (Physical and Technical Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities). When the technical specifications herein are applied to new construction and renovations of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs), they shall satisfy the standards outlined in ICS 705-1 to enable uniform and reciprocal use across all IC elements and to assure information sharing to the greatest extent possible. This document is the implementing specification for Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 705, Physical and Technical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (ICS-705-1) and Standards for Accreditation and Reciprocal Use of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (ICS-705-2) and supersedes Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/9.

The specifications contained herein will facilitate the protection of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) against compromising emanations, inadvertent observation and disclosure by unauthorized persons, and the detection of unauthorized entry.

A. Analytical Risk Management Process

1. The Accrediting Official (AO) and the Site Security Manager (SSM) should evaluate each proposed SCIF for threats, vulnerabilities, and assets to determine the most efficient countermeasures required for physical and technical security. In some cases, based upon that risk assessment, it may be determined that it is more practical or efficient to mitigate a standard. In other cases, it may be determined that additional security measures should be employed due to a significant risk factor.

2. Security begins when the initial requirement for a SCIF is known. To ensure the integrity of the construction and final accreditation, security plans should be coordinated with the AO before construction plans are designed, materials ordered, or contracts let.

a) Security standards shall apply to all proposed SCI facilities and shall be coordinated with the AO for guidance and approval. Location of facility construction and or fabrication does not exclude a facility from security standards and or review and approval by the AO. SCI facilities include but are not limited to fixed facilities, mobile platforms, prefabricated structures, containers, modular applications or other new or emerging applications and technologies that may meet performance standards for use in SCI facility construction.

b) Mitigations are verifiable, non-standard methods that shall be approved by the AO to effectively meet the physical/technical security protection level(s) of the standard. While most standards may be effectively mitigated via non-standard construction, additional security countermeasures and/or procedures, some standards are based upon tested and verified equipment (e.g., a combination lock meeting Federal Specification FF-L 2740A) chosen because of special attributes and could not be mitigated with non-tested equipment. The AO’s approval is documented to confirm that the mitigation is at least equal to the physical/technical security level of the standard.

c) Exceeding a standard, even when based upon risk, requires that a waiver be processed and approved in accordance with ICD 705.

3. The risk management process includes a critical evaluation of threats, vulnerability, and assets to determine the need and value of countermeasures. The process may include the following:

a) Threat Analysis. Assess the capabilities, intentions, and opportunity of an adversary to exploit or damage assets or information. Reference the threat information provided in the National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment (NTIPA) produced by the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) for inside the U.S. and/or the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB), Security Environment Threat List (SETL) for outside the U.S. to determine technical threat to a location. When evaluating for TEMPEST, the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authorities (CTTA) shall use the National Security Agency Information Assurance (NSA IA) list as an additional resource for specific technical threat information. It is critical to identify other occupants of common and adjacent buildings. (However, do not attempt to collect information against U.S. persons in violation of Executive Order (EO) 12333.) In areas where there is a diplomatic presence of high and critical threat countries, additional countermeasures may be necessary.

b) Vulnerability Analysis. Assess the inherent susceptibility to attack of a procedure, facility, information system, equipment, or policy.

c) Probability Analysis. Assess the probability of an adverse action, incident, or attack occurring.

d) Consequence Analysis. Assess the consequences of such an action (expressed as a measure of loss, such as cost in dollars, resources, programmatic effect/mission impact, etc.).

Monty Python – Biggus Dickus – Film – Life of Brian

 

Monty Python – Biggus Dickus – Film – Life of Brian

SI Swimsuit Video: Tori Praver Body Painting

 

Tori Praver tells you all about what it feels to become a human canvas in this SI Swimsuit 2008 bodypainting video.
For more SI Swimsuit photos and videos visit http://www.si.com/swimsuit.

The FBI – Former Chief Financial Officer of Stanford Group Entities Sentenced to Federal Prison

HOUSTON—James M. Davis, 64, formerly of Baldwyn, Mississippi, the former chief financial officer of Stanford International Bank (SIB) and Houston-based Stanford Financial Group, was sentenced today to five years in prison for his role in helping Robert Allen Stanford perpetrate a fraud scheme involving SIB and for conspiring to obstruct a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation into SIB.

Today’s sentence was announced by U.S. Attorney Kenneth Magidson of the Southern District of Texas; Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; FBI Assistant Director Ronald T. Hosko of the Criminal Investigative Division; Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Employee Benefits Security Administration (DOL EBSA) Phyllis C. Borzi; Chief Postal Inspector Guy J. Cottrell of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS); and Chief Richard Weber, of Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI).

The prison sentence was imposed by U.S. District Judge David Hittner of the Southern District of Texas, who also sentenced Davis to serve three years of supervised release. As part of Davis’ sentence, the court also imposed a personal money judgment of $1 billion, which is an ongoing obligation for Davis to pay back criminal proceeds.

During the sentencing proceeding, Judge Hittner noted that Davis began cooperating with the government in early 2009, shortly after SIB’s collapse. Judge Hittner also noted that over the following three years, Davis provided substantial assistance to the authorities in the investigation and prosecution of others, including testifying at Stanford’s trial; testifying during the trial of Gilbert T. Lopez, Jr. and Mark J. Kuhrt, Stanford’s former chief accounting officer and global controller, respectively; and preparing to testify against Laura Pendergest-Holt, Stanford’s chief investment officer. Holt eventually pleaded guilty; Stanford, Lopez, and Kuhrt were convicted at trial. Stanford and Holt are currently serving 110 years and three years in prison, respectively. Lopez and Kuhrt are in federal custody and await sentencing, scheduled for February 14, 2013.

As part of his 2009 guilty plea, Davis admitted that he was aware of Stanford’s misuse of SIB’s assets, kept the misuse hidden from the public and from almost all of Stanford’s other employees, and worked to prevent the misuse from being discovered. In addition, Davis acknowledged that in January 2009, when the SEC sought testimony and documents related to SIB’s entire investment portfolio, he conspired with others in an effort to impede the SEC’s investigation and help SIB continue operating.

The investigation was conducted by the FBI, USPIS, IRS-CI, and DOL EBSA. The case against Davis is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Jason Varnado of the Southern District of Texas, Deputy Chief Jeffrey Goldberg, Deputy Chief William Stellmach, and Trial Attorney Andrew Warren of the Justice Department Criminal Division’s Fraud Section. The Justice Department also thanks the SEC for their assistance and cooperation in this matter.

Cryptome unveils – New York City Pistol Permit Holders

New York City Pistol Permit Holders:

http://gawker.com/5974190/here-is-a-list-of-all-the-assholes-who-own-guns-in-new-york-city

312,462 New York State Pistol Permit Holders in April 2010:

http://cryptome.org/ny-packing-master.zip (7.8MB) (This has been on Cryptome since June 2010)Below, a link to a work-in-progress wooly Google fusion map of selected NY State holders. Note lack of NYC holders in the NY State list — one dot for each of the five boroughs! — apparently due to NYC.gov omitting addresses in data sent to the state as redacted from the Gawker list. Addresses are also omitted for most officials.

Geocoding the New York city/state data the Google program produced dots all over the world, perhaps erroneously using names of permit holders as location — a fix badly needed for the bloke pegged to be in Antartica. It also failed to plot two addresses in the CSV data for Robert DeNiro in NYC, and based on the scarcity of dots inside the state, what appears to be the bulk of the CSV data:

https://www.google.com/fusiontables/embedviz?viz=MAP&q=select+col4+from+14ZUks_
vShPj1sfpeP4sK8kfzBeFMyqJ2mKk3Q6E&h=false&lat=42.30124822202767&lng=
-74.62118965937498&z=8&t=1&l=col4

Trivia: Cryptome owns a couple of NYC-registered legacy long-guns, never-used, unloaded, locked and stashed under Grant’s Tomb, or was it the east abutment of GW Bridge.

 


http://pastebin.com/DjU5Km6q

NY Pistol Permit Owners

By: a guest on Jan 19th, 2013  |  syntax: None  |  size: 0.49 KB  |  hits: 1,377  |  expires: Never
Copied
  1. This goes out to the New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, the National Rifle Association, Christopher Fountain (you shameless scumbag), and everyone else who has threatened the Journal News and Gawker reporters and employees.
  2. The internet doesn’t forget.
  3. Free information. Ban ammunition.

TMZ – Katherine Webb Goes Hollywood… in a Bikini!

 

Alabama QB AJ McCarron’s girlfriend, Katherine Webb, has totally gone Hollywood… but good news folks — she’s doing so while wearing a skimpy bathing suit! ROLL TIDE!!!

SECRET – U.S. Army Doctrine Publication: Defense Support of Civil Authorities

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/USArmy-DSCA.png

 

ADP 3-28 Defense Support of Civil Authorities

  • 26 pages
  • July 26, 2012
  • 7.09 MB

Download

ARMY SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

6. Army forces support civil authorities by performing defense support of civil authorities tasks. Defense support of civil authorities is defined as support provided by United States Federal military forces, DoD [Department of Defense] civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the States, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support (DODD 3025.18).

7. Military forces provide civil support at federal and state levels. Federal military forces are active Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force; mobilized Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force Reserve; and National Guard mobilized for federal service under title 10, United States Code (USC). State National Guard forces under state control perform DSCA tasks when serving under title 32, USC.

READINESS

8. Numerous features of DSCA are distinct from the other tasks of decisive action—offense, defense, and stability. DSCA tasks stress the employment of nondestructive means to save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property. Domestic operations are operations in the homeland: The physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, United States possessions and territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace (JP 3-28). Domestic operations are constrained by various laws to a greater degree, in comparison to the Law of Land Warfare and The Hague and Geneva Conventions. It is accurate to say that most tasks performed in domestic support are common to overseas operations; however, Soldiers conduct them under very different conditions.

9. Commanders gauge unit readiness for DSCA missions by assessing proficiency in three warfighting functions: mission command, sustainment, and protection. The requirement to deploy into a domestic operational environment—often with little warning—and to operate with joint and interagency partners requires mission command that can adapt systems and procedures for a noncombat, civilian-led structure.

10. The majority of DSCA missions will stress the sustainment warfighting function. Mission success depends on units’ ability to deliver personnel, medical support, supplies, and equipment, while maintaining their equipment and Soldiers. This is challenging because forces often provide support in areas devastated by a disaster and lacking potable water, electrical power, and sanitation. When needed, a federal installation identified as a base support installation will serve as a base for federal military forces throughout the mission.

11. The protection warfighting function is the third area for readiness assessment. It is imperative that commanders understand their protection capabilities. They must understand which of those capabilities may be exercised legally in domestic environments so they can be properly integrated into the overall scheme of protection.

MILITARY CAPABILITY

12. Soldiers are trained to exercise initiative in combat and training. They must understand which military capabilities may be exercised during domestic operations, including consideration for duty status (title 10, title 32, or state active duty). With this understanding, they will be able to maximize their initiative and efforts. Commanders maintain a balance between the willingness of their subordinates to engage any mission against the capability to accomplish it. Military capability comprises—

  • The ability to perform a task effectively and efficiently.
  • The ability to perform a task safely.
  • The legal authority to perform a task.

PRIMARY PURPOSES FOR ARMY SUPPORT

13. While there are many potential missions for Soldiers as part of DSCA, the overarching purposes of all DSCA missions are, in the following order, to—

  • Save lives.
  • Alleviate suffering.
  • Protect property.

Some DSCA missions may accomplish these purposes directly. An aircraft crew participating in a search and rescue operation is there to save lives. Soldiers fighting fires in a national forest are guarding public property, as are the National Guard Soldiers patrolling streets in the aftermath of a tornado. Some DSCA missions accomplish these purposes indirectly. Soldiers and civilians helping load medical supplies for shipment from an installation to a municipal shelter will not meet the people housed there, but their actions will help reduce the distress of their fellow citizens. In the absence of orders, or in uncertain and chaotic situations, each Soldier governs his or her actions based on these three purposes.

PRIMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF ARMY SUPPORT

14. Army forces operating within the United States encounter very different operational environments than they face outside the Nation’s boundaries. Although many of the small-unit tasks remain the same, there are important differences in the conditions associated with them. Principally, the roles of civilian organizations and the relationship of military forces to federal, state, tribal, and local agencies are different. The differences are pronounced enough to define a different task set than offense, defense, or stability. The support provided by Army forces depends on specific circumstances dictated by law. Soldiers and Army civilians need to understand domestic environments so they can employ the Army’s capabilities efficiently, effectively, and legally.

15. While every domestic support mission is unique, four defining characteristics shape the actions of commanders and leaders in any mission. These characteristics are that—

  • State and federal laws define how military forces support civil authorities.
  • Civil authorities are in charge, and military forces support them.
  • Military forces depart when civil authorities are able continue without military support.
  • Military forces must document costs of all direct and indirect support provided.

PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DOMESTIC CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

43. Providing support for domestic civilian law enforcement applies to the restricted use of military assets to support civilian law enforcement personnel within the United States and its territories. These operations are significantly different from operations outside the United States. Army forces support domestic civilian law enforcement agencies under constitutional and statutory restrictions, as prescribed by corresponding directives and regulations.

44. Except as expressly authorized by the Constitution of the United States or by another act of Congress, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of the Active Army, Air Force, and—through DODD 5525.5—the Marine Corps and Navy as enforcement officials to execute state or federal law and perform direct law enforcement functions. However, the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to state National Guard forces in state active duty status and title 32 status. Nor does the Posse Comitatus Act restrict the Coast Guard, even when under the operational control of the Navy, since the Coast Guard has inherent law enforcement powers under title 14, USC. Intelligence activities during DSCA should be coordinated through higher headquarters for approval, in addition to consultation from a staff judge advocate. Additionally, Executive Order 12333 provides guidelines for the use of military intelligence, including permitted and prohibited activities during DSCA operations.

45. Law enforcement support falls into two broad categories: direct and indirect support. Direct support involves enforcing the law and engaging in physical contact with offenders. Indirect support consists of aid to law enforcement agencies but not enforcement of the law or direct contact with offenders. Federal laws, presidential directives, and Department of Defense policy restrict the use of federal military forces from enforcing laws and providing security except on military installations. These laws, policies, and directives carefully specify exceptions to the restrictions. When authorized by the Secretary of Defense, federal military forces may provide indirect support to law enforcement agencies, but support is limited to logistical, transportation, and training assistance except when emergency authority applies. State and territorial governors can use state National Guard forces for direct support of civilian law enforcement; however, such use is a temporary expedient and must be in accordance with state laws.

Monty Python – Stoning – Life of Brian Movie

 

“Warning

Don’t say Jehovah, Or This Will Happen To You..”

Life of Brian

http://www.amazon.com/Monty-Python-Trinity-Pythons-Meaning/dp/B001E12ZAM/ref=…

SI Swimsuit: Marisa Miller Body Painting Video

Marisa Miller’s body become a canvas in this SI Swimsuit 2008 Body Painting video.
For more SI Swimsuit photos and videos go to http://www.si.com/swimsuit

SECRET -White House National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/WH-InfoSharingStrategy.png

 

National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding

  • 24 pages
  • December 2012

Download

Our national security depends on our ability to share the right information, with the right people, at the right time. This information sharing mandate requires sustained and responsible collaboration between Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and foreign partners. Over the last few years, we have successfully streamlined policies and processes, overcome cultural barriers, and better integrated information systems to enable information sharing. Today’s dynamic operating environment, however, challenges us to continue improving information sharing and safeguarding processes and capabilities. While innovation has enhanced our ability to share, increased sharing has created the potential for vulnerabilities requiring strengthened safeguarding practices. The 2012 National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding provides guidance for effective development, integration, and implementation of policies, processes, standards, and technologies to promote secure and responsible information sharing.

Our responses to these challenges must be strategic and grounded in three core principles. First, in treating Information as a National Asset, we recognize departments and agencies have achieved an unprecedented ability to gather, store, and use information consistent with their missions and applicable legal authorities; correspondingly they have an obligation to make that information available to support national security missions. Second, our approach recognizes Information Sharing and Safeguarding Requires Shared Risk Management. In order to build and sustain the trust required to share with one another, we must work together to identify and collectively reduce risk, rather than avoiding information loss by not sharing at all. Third, the core premise Information Informs Decisionmaking underlies all our actions and reminds us better decisionmaking is the purpose of sharing information in the first place. The Strategy focuses on achieving five goals:

1. Drive Collective Action through Collaboration and Accountability. We can best reach our shared vision when working together, using governance models that enable mission achievement, adopting common processes where possible to build trust, simplifying the information sharing agreement development process, and supporting efforts through performance management, training, and incentives.

2. Improve Information Discovery and Access through Common Standards. Improving discovery and access involves developing clear policies for making information available to approved individuals. Secure discovery and access relies on identity, authentication, and authorization controls, data tagging, enterprise-wide data correlation, common information sharing standards, and a rigorous process to certify and validate their use.

3. Optimize Mission Effectiveness through Shared Services and Interoperability. Efforts to optimize mission effectiveness include shared services, data and network interoperability, and increased efficiency in acquisition.

4. Strengthen Information Safeguarding through Structural Reform, Policy, and Technical Solutions. To foster trust and safeguard our information, policies and coordinating bodies must focus on identifying, preventing, and mitigating insider threats and external intrusions, while departments and agencies work to enhance capabilities for data-level controls, automated monitoring, and cross-classification solutions.

5. Protect Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties through Consistency and Compliance. Integral to maintaining the public trust is increasing the consistency by which we apply privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections across the government, building corresponding safeguards into the development of information sharing operations, and promoting accountability and compliance mechanisms.

As we execute the Strategy together, we will harness our collective resolve to treat information as a national asset, make it discoverable and retrievable by all authorized users, and arm those charged with preserving the security of our Nation. Only as we work together, hold ourselves accountable, and take concerted ownership of advancing our goals, will we achieve the safety and success our country rightfully demands and fully deserves.

Priority Objectives
Top Five

The following objectives capture the highest five priorities of the Administration in achieving the information sharing and safeguarding goals of this Strategy.

1. Align information sharing and safeguarding governance to foster better decisionmaking, performance, accountability, and implementation of the Strategy’s goals.

2. Develop guidelines for information sharing and safeguarding agreements to address common requirements, including privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, while still allowing flexibility to meet mission needs.

3. Adopt metadata standards to facilitate federated discovery, access, correlation, and monitoring across Federal networks and security domains.

4. Extend and implement the FICAM Roadmap across all security domains.

5. Implement removable media policies, processes and controls; provide timely audit capabilities of assets, vulnerabilities, and threats; establish programs, processes and techniques to deter, detect and disrupt insider threats; and share the management of risks, to enhance unclassified and classified information safeguarding efforts.

Additional Priority Objectives

The remaining objectives represent additional priority activities for departments, agencies, and other stakeholders to advance the goals of this Strategy.

6. Define and adopt baseline capabilities and common requirements to enable data, service, and network interoperability.

7. Provide information sharing, safeguarding, and handling training to appropriate stakeholders using a common curriculum tailored to promote consistent, yet flexible, and trusted processes.

8. Define and implement common processes and standards to support automated policy-based discovery and access decisions.

9. Establish information sharing processes and sector specific protocols, with private sector partners, to improve information quality and timeliness and secure the nation’s infrastructure.

10. Develop a reference architecture to support a consistent approach to data discovery and correlation across disparate datasets.

11. Implement the recommendations and activities of the Federal IT Shared Services Strategy among appropriate stakeholders to facilitate adoption of shared services.

12. Refine standards certification and conformance processes enabling standards-based acquisition among departments and agencies, standards bodies, and vendors to promote interoperable products and services.

13. Promote adherence to existing interagency processes to coordinate information sharing initiatives with foreign partners, as well as adopt and apply necessary guidelines, consistent with statutory authorities and Presidential policy to ensure consistency when sharing and safeguarding information.

14. Create a common process across all levels of government for Requests for Information, Alerts, Warnings, and Notifications to enable timely receipt and dissemination of information and appropriate response.

15. Complete the implementation of the NSI programs in the National Network of Fusion Centers and Federal entities while expanding training and outreach beyond law enforcement to the rest of the public safety community.

16. Achieve the four Critical Operational Capabilities, four Enabling Capabilities, and other prioritized objectives, across the National Network of Fusion Centers to enable effective and lawful execution of their role as a focal point within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information.

National security stakeholders across the government, guided by our shared Principles, can now act in concert to accomplish these priority objectives and build implementation plans to realize the goals of this Strategy. As we execute the Strategy together, we will harness our collective resolve to treat information as a national asset, make it discoverable and retrievable by all authorized users, and arm those charged with preserving the security of our nation with all information available to drive decisions that protect our country and its people. Only as we work together, hold ourselves accountable, and take concerted ownership of advancing our goals, will we achieve the success our country rightfully demands and fully deserves.

Kim Kardashian’s Airport Escort! – TMZ

 

Kim Kardashian is accustomed to being the center of attention at the airport… but a ridiculous Segue-riding cop escorting her while blasting his siren DEFINITELY wasn’t helping matters.

Bild unveils – Dirty STASI-Money, the media and Eurojust after 1989

http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/ddr/skandal-um-illegale-sed-millionen-weitet-sich-aus-28207952.bild.html

SECRECY NEWS – PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES

"Under the Federal criminal justice system, the prosecutor has wide
latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even whether to prosecute for
apparent violations of Federal criminal law," says the U.S. Attorneys'
Manual. "The prosecutor's broad discretion in such areas as initiating or
foregoing prosecutions, selecting or recommending specific charges, and
terminating prosecutions by accepting guilty pleas has been recognized on
numerous occasions by the courts." (Chapter 9-27).

Although prosecutors enjoy broad discretion concerning whether and whom to
prosecute, there are limits, the Manual says, and consequences for
prosecutorial overreaching:  "Serious, unjustified departures from the
principles set forth herein are [to be] followed by such remedial action,
including the imposition of disciplinary sanctions, when warranted, as are
deemed appropriate."

(After the execution of Socrates, remorseful Athenians rose up against his
three prosecutors, according to the uncorroborated account of Diogenes
Laertius.  Meletus was stoned to death, while Anytus and Lycon were
banished.)

The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is discussed in a new report from
the Congressional Research Service, which focuses particularly on
immigration cases.

The report "addresses the constitutional and other foundations for the
doctrine of prosecutorial discretion, as well as the potential ways in
which prosecutorial discretion may be exercised in the immigration
context." It also considers "potential constitutional, statutory, and
administrative constraints upon the exercise of prosecutorial discretion."

See "Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Enforcement: Legal Issues,"
January 17, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42924.pdf

Some other new and updated CRS products that Congress has not authorized
CRS to release to the public include these:

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress,
January 14, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42918.pdf

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, December 19, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf

The Protection of Classified Information: The Legal Framework, January 10,
2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RS21900.pdf

Crisis in Mali, January 14, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42664.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Monty Python Live Hollywood Bowl – Pope and Michaelangelo

 

Monty Python Live Hollywood Bowl – Pope and Michaelangelo

Monty Python Live Hollywood Bowl

http://www.amazon.com/Complete-Monty-Pythons-Flying-Circus/dp/B001E77XNA/ref=…

TOP-SECRET by Cryptome – Thales e-Security Supports Bank Security Critique

Thales e-Security Supports Bank Security Critique

DMCA notice: http://cryptome.org/2013/01/thales-dmca.htm

 


From: Dave Harrop <Dave.Harrop[at]thales-esecurity.com>
To: “cryptome[at]earthlink.net” <cryptome[at]earthlink.net>
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2013 12:59:03 +0000
Subject: Re: Cryptome Copyright Infringement – DMCA Takedown Notice

Dear Mr Young

Further to my letter to you dated 11 January 2013 in connection with (a) the Zaxus Host Security Module RG7000, Operations and Installations Manual, 1270A513 Issue 3; and (b) the Zaxus Host Security Module RG7000, Programmer’s Manual, 1270A514 Issue 3 both of which are published on the cryptome.org website.

Thales is in no way trying to censor information that would benefit banking security research.

The information concerned, as has been noted, has been available since 2003 and is in fact obsolete.  It also does not reflect the current Thales payment hardware security module.

It is not unusual for Thales to suggest that out-of-date information is removed from web sites so that it doesn’t cause confusion or mislead our customers.  This would normally be handled with a polite request to the web site owner; on this occasion, unfortunately, we were over-zealous in initiating a takedown notice.

Thales fully appreciates the benefits of openly sharing information relating to our security products and fully supports legitimate academic research in this area.  The most up-to-date and accurate information can be obtained directly from Thales.

Thales e-Security actively participates in key technical forums such as ASC X9, Global Platform, NACHA, PCI SSC, Smart Card Alliance and OASIS, which contribute heavily to banking security research and future requirements around security for the payment industry. Thales has always respected and continues to support external forums to further security within the banking industry.

I therefore wish to withdraw my earlier request for you to remove or disable access to the material in question and apologise for any distress it may have caused.

Yours faithfully,

Dave Harrop
Head of Contracts (EMEA & APAC)
Thales E-Security
Jupiter House, Station Road, Cambridge, CB1 2JD
t: +44 7802 555148
e: dave.harrop[at]thales-esecurity.com

[Attached letter]

http://cryptome.org/2013/01/thales-dmca-letter-02.pdf

 



	

TMZ – French Reality Star: Check Out My Beach Thong! — Nabilla Benattia

 

Want to see a hot French reality show star hit the beach in a thong bikini? Of course you do!

TOP-SECRET – U.K. Crown Prosecution Service Guidelines for Prosecuting Social Media Communications

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/UK-SocialMediaProsecution.png

 

Interim guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social media

  • 25 pages
  • December 19, 2012

Download

These guidelines set out the approach that prosecutors should take when making decisions in relation to cases where it is alleged that criminal offences have been committed by the sending of a communication via social media. The guidelines are designed to give clear advice to prosecutors who have been asked either for a charging decision or for early advice to the police, as well as in reviewing those cases which have been charged by the police. Adherence to these guidelines will ensure that there is a consistency of approach across the CPS.

The guidelines cover the offences that are likely to be most commonly committed by the sending of communications via social media. These guidelines equally apply to the resending (or retweeting) of communications and whenever they refer to the sending of a communication, the guidelines should also be read as applying to the resending of a communication. However, for the reasons set out below, the context in which any communication is sent will be highly material.

These guidelines are primarily concerned with offences that may be committed by reason of the nature or content of a communication sent via social media. Where social media is simply used to facilitate some other substantive offence, prosecutors should proceed under the substantive offence in question.

These guidelines are interim guidelines and they have immediate effect. At the end of the public consultation period, they will be reviewed in light of the responses received. Thereafter final guidelines will be published.

Initial assessment

12. Communications sent via social media are capable of amounting to criminal offences and prosecutors should make an initial assessment of the content of the communication and the course of conduct in question so as to distinguish between:

(1) Communications which may constitute credible threats of violence to the person or damage to property.

(2) Communications which specifically target an individual or individuals and which may constitute harassment or stalking within the meaning of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 or which may constitute other offences, such as blackmail.

(3) Communications which may amount to a breach of a court order. This can include offences under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 or section 5 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. All such cases should be referred to the Attorney General, and via the Principal Legal Advisor’s team where necessary.

(4) Communications which do not fall into any of the categories above and fall to be considered separately (see below): i.e. those which may be considered grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false.

13. As a general approach, cases falling within paragraphs 12 (1), (2) or (3) should be prosecuted robustly where they satisfy the test set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. Whereas cases which fall within paragraph 12(4) will be subject to a high threshold and in many cases a prosecution is unlikely to be in the public interest.

Monty Python – Four Yorkshiremen – Film Clip

Monty Python Live Hollywood Bowl

http://www.amazon.com/Complete-Monty-Pythons-Flying-Circus/dp/B001E77XNA/ref=…

 

TMZ – Adam Levine & Behati Prinsloo — He’s a Supermodel Connoisseur

 

Maroon 5 front man Adam Levine is dating yet ANOTHER Victoria’s Secret supermodel, Behati Prinsloo. Seriously, does this dude just flip through the catalog to find his girlfriends?

SECRET – DHS-FBI Radiological Terrorism Incident After-Action Reporting Guide

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/DHS-FBI-RadiologicalReporting.png

 

 

Radiological Terrorism: A Reference Aid on After-Action Reporting for State and Local Incident Management Officials

  • 10 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • April 12, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) This Reference Aid was jointly produced by DHS and the FBI to assist in the acquisition of detailed information in the aftermath of a successful or attempted radiological terrorism incident that would be of interest to the national law enforcement and emergency response communities. It is intended to help state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies and private sector entities deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks against the United States.

(U//FOUO) Incident response to a radiological terrorist attack would involve, but not necessarily be limited to, police, fire, hazardous materials, public health, and radiological and nuclear detection emergency management teams and offices. Incident response also would require establishing an incident command system, such as a unified command structure based on the National Incident Management System.

(U//FOUO) This Reference Aid focuses narrowly on those responders who complete after-action reports following incidents described in this Reference Aid. The information collected may provide broader situational awareness after an incident has occurred, support threat analysis of potential follow-on incidents, assist in identifying perpetrators, and facilitate the allocation of consequence-management resources.

(U//FOUO) Warning: Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or radiological exposure devices (REDs) may be hazardous, even at a distance. Individuals should not endanger themselves by approaching a dangerously radioactive source or device in an attempt to collect this information. State, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector medical officials will normally be involved in safety evaluations following such incidents.

(U) Incident Description and Details

(U//FOUO) For any incident suspected or confirmed of being a malicious attempt to expose or contaminate persons, property, infrastructure, or natural resources with radioactive materials, information of interest includes:

— (U//FOUO) Time and place of the incident—include street address and geographic coordinates, such as latitude and longitude or military grid reference system, if available.

— (U//FOUO) Types of buildings, activities, and infrastructure at the site. Describe what was occurring at the incident site immediately prior to the incident, including any special events taking place. Estimate how many people were present at the start of the incident.

— (U//FOUO) Information about persons fleeing the scene immediately prior to the incident.

— (U//FOUO) Details regarding how radioactive materials were dispersed or intended to be dispersed, to include explosive, manual, or other means of dispersal.

— (U//FOUO) Indications or evidence that other or secondary devices exist.

— (U//FOUO) Evidence of coordination or pre-planning between multiple persons.

— (U//FOUO) Indications or evidence that perpetrators were aware of or tried to circumvent security measures.

— (U//FOUO) Indications or evidence that the perpetrators took measures to confine people in proximity to the radiological device.

— (U//FOUO) Distractions, diversions, or other tactics used to transport or place a device at the incident scene.

— (U//FOUO) Unusual odors, airborne particles, smoke, powders, liquids, or vapors.

— (U//FOUO) Proximity, if known, of the incident site to intense radiation sources, such as those that might be found at hospitals, universities, or industrial sites using radiation devices.

— (U//FOUO) Status of the climate control system, windows, and doors—for incidents that occurred inside a building or vehicle—before and during the incident, to include any evidence of tampering or sabotage.

— (U//FOUO) Proximity of the incident site to critical infrastructure, including potentially symbolic targets or high-population areas.

— (U//FOUO) If the incident involved an attempt to create an RDD or RED by damaging a piece of equipment containing radiological material at its place of installation:

– (U//FOUO) Name, location, and function of the host facility.
– (U//FOUO) Type, purpose, and location of the equipment housing the radiological source within the facility.
– (U//FOUO) Type, quantity, and activity level of the radiological source used in the equipment.
– (U//FOUO) Any information about how the perpetrators might have gained access to the equipment.

— (U//FOUO) If the incident involved an attempt to create an RDD or RED by breaching the packaging and containment measures of radiological material being transported in a vehicle:

– (U//FOUO) Origin, route, and final and intended destination of the vehicle (including all intermediate stops).
– (U//FOUO) Type, quantity, and activity level of the radiological source or sources being transported.
– (U//FOUO) Tactics and tools used by the perpetrators in both the attempt to interdict the shipment or release the radioactive material.
– (U//FOUO) Timeline of events that notes where on the vehicle’s route the radioactive release occurred.

— (U//FOUO) Photos or video of the incident site before, during, and after the incident.

— (U//FOUO) For incidents occurring outdoors, weather conditions leading up to and during the incident—to include any micro-weather conditions peculiar to the incident site, such as unusual wind conditions (or lack thereof) caused by urban canyons, humidity, or whether the incident site was in full sunlight or shade.

— (U//FOUO) Aircraft, model aircraft, or balloons overflying the scene before, during, or after the incident, particularly if the activity was unusual or could be linked to reconnaissance of the incident site or dispersal of radiological materials. Describe the overflight activity and any suspicions it may have raised.

— (U//FOUO) Prior suspicious incidents at the same location, particularly descriptions of possible preoperational activity such as reconnaissance, surveillance, recent theft of radiological materials, or unusual photographing of infrastructure, facilities, or personnel.

Monty Python – Live Hollywood Bowl – Lumberjack Song

 

 

Monty Python – Live Hollywood Bowl – Lumberjack Song

Monty Python Live Hollywood Bowl

http://www.amazon.com/Complete-Monty-Pythons-Flying-Circus/dp/B001E77XNA/ref=…

TMZ – Miss Universe’s Underage BOOZE Party!

 

Despite not even being 21 yet, Miss Universe Olivia Culpo knows how to booze like a champ!

SECRET DHS-FBI Bulletin: Indicators of Suspicious Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Activity

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/DHS-FBI-ChemBio.png

 

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • December 27, 2010

Download

(U//FOUO) Law enforcement and first responders may encounter chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) related material or equipment at private residences, businesses, or other sites not normally associated with such activities. There are legitimate reasons for possessing such material or equipment, but in some cases their presence can indicate intent or capability to build CBR weapons, particularly when other suspicious circumstances exist.

(U//FOUO) Potential Indicators of Suspicious Activity: A single indicator of CBR activity may not be conclusive, but combinations of indicators, including those associated with other suspicious activity, warrant thorough and careful investigation. Law enforcement and first responders should be vigilant for suspicious activities and report them to a Joint Terrorism Task Force via a Suspicious Activity Report, or contact the nearest state and major urban area fusion center.

— (U//FOUO) Unusual or unpleasant odors, chemical fires, brightly colored stains, or corroded or rusted metal fixtures in apartments, hotel or motel rooms, self-storage units, or garages.
— (U//FOUO) Unexplained presence of equipment, containers, or material that could be used for radiation shielding or protection, such as lead, concrete, or steel.
— (U//FOUO) Unexplained presence of radiation detection or identification equipment.
— (U//FOUO) Damage to clothing, evidence of serious illness, or injuries such as burns, skin lesions, infections, or missing hands or fingers.
— (U//FOUO) Presence of potential precursors for biological agent production, such as castor beans or bacterial growth materials.
— (U//FOUO) Laboratory equipment such as Bunsen burners, microscopes, and scientific glassware; personal protective equipment such as masks, goggles, and gloves; household items such as plant seeds, strainers, coffee grinders, and filters; and common household chemicals such as acetone located together in places that are unusual, hidden, or disguised.
— (U//FOUO) An individual’s reluctance or inability to explain the presence of toxic chemicals, radioactive materials, biological organisms, or related equipment.
— (U//FOUO) Presence of CBR training manuals, such as The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook or The Anarchist Cookbook.
— (U//FOUO) Chemical containers discarded in dumpsters.
— (U//FOUO) Evidence of unexplained animal deaths.
— (U//FOUO) Security measures that appear inappropriate for the location they protect.

Monty Python – Silly Olympics

 

 

 

Silly Olympics

 

SECRET – U.S. Army Operation Enduring Freedom Battle Command in Counterinsurgency

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/CALL-OEF-BattleCommand.png

 

OEF ROAD TO WAR: BATTLE COMMAND IN COIN

  • 90 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • June 2010
  • 13.5 MB

Download

This newsletter was produced in conjunction with the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Center–Afghanistan (CTC–A) to provide current and relevant information for brigade combat team (BCT), battalion, and company commanders and staffs concerning current U.S. and coalition best practices in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. As a “living document,” it will be updated continuously in order to capture, analyze, and disseminate critical information in support of operations across all lines of effort. It will disseminate key observations, insights, and lessons (OIL) from theater to give commanders a better understanding of the operational environment into which they are preparing to deploy. The information is from your peers—commanders, staff officers, and small unit leaders —who served or who are currently serving in Afghanistan.

This newsletter provides “a way” to better understand and apply counterinsurgency and stability operation fundamentals in preparation for deployment. Key concepts include:

• Synchronizing the combined efforts of the Afghan government, Afghan Security Forces, combat advisors, BCTs, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), agricultural development teams, other governmental agencies, and enablers to achieve the commander’s goals. • Assisting commanders in the development of predeployment training plans, focusing both on combat skills and nonlethal aspects of operations.
• Enhancing the development of host nation security forces through best practices and OIL.
• Developing a long-term plan that integrates operations against all lines of effort.
• Integrating information operations into all plans and orders.
• Achieving better cultural understanding in the operational environment.
• Integrating PRTs with unit plans and operations to attain heightened situational understanding and unity of effort.

Engaging Key Leaders

The ability to target key tribal, village, and district leaders is essential to building a bond between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), ANA, Afghan National Police (ANP), and the ISAF. Engaging leaders over security alone will not separate the insurgents from the population or gain support for the GIROA. True concern for the needs of a tribe, village, and district with honest commitments is just as important. One needs to support the population, which is gained by applying the appropriate influence. If you can shape the operational environment by nonlethal means, the population becomes more flexible in its support of the lethal targeting of insurgents. However, without the ability to provide security, no amount of improvements in the standard of living will convince local leaders and their tribes to support the GIROA. Once the GIROA has established security in the isolated villages so insurgents cannot mass against them, then conditions can be set for effective reconstruction.

The use of the ANA or ANP, human terrain teams, provincial reconstruction teams, embedded training teams, and civil affairs using ASCOPE (area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events) or PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information) to assess villages and districts and their leaders leads to more focused key leader engagements (KLEs). Using ANA, ANP, or IROA representatives provides access to those who can influence the reduction of insurgent activities, reduce village support to insurgents, and boost support to the GIROA.

The KLE is about the individual, his cultural norms, his tribe, and his need to maintain control of his environment. Depending on the area, a key leader’s ethical decisions are not necessarily based upon a rigid moral compass but upon moral imperatives. Ethics are based on self-interest and self-preservation. Using one’s family, clan, village, or tribe is expected. Why else would a public official hold office?

Tribal Engagement

Tribal engagement is an important aspect of the COIN effort in Afghanistan. The tribal system in Afghanistan is a strong facet of day-to-day life. The system of government establishing itself in Afghanistan has sub-governors in each district, a governor for the province, and a parliament and president for the country. The elders represent their villages and tribes; the government must have the support of the elders if it is to survive. The majority of the population still views the elders as the decision-makers as opposed to the government representatives. This is evidenced when the elders ask for a prisoner release after a person is arrested by either the ANA or coalition forces. The elders will ask for release because they collectively “vouch” for the prisoner’s innocence and still believe the tribal system is a much more appropriate method for dealing with criminals. Efforts are constantly made to convince the elders that the person was arrested based on evidence collected according to the new Afghan law system outlined in the new Afghan constitution.

Tribal elders are reluctant to submit to the proposed system of government for a number of reasons. According to the proposed system of law, power is taken away from the tribal elder and given to an elected official. The tribal elder has been the cornerstone of Afghan governance for thousands of years, and elders are not willing to relinquish this power to someone who may be from a different tribe. Elders assume that their tribe or sub-tribe will not be represented appropriately, and they often are correct in this assumption. Tribal loyalty, in many cases, is more important than loyalty to the country of Afghanistan. Elders are not willing to place a united Afghanistan over advancement of their particular tribe.

ANA operations and tribal engagements are the keys to convincing the population and elders of Afghan government efforts and the importance of a united Afghanistan.

ANA is tasked with securing the country. Progress in governance can be made only when security is established. Only after security is established will the elders and the general population see the GIROA as a legitimate force for stabilizing the country. Integral to the stabilization of Afghanistan is allowing the tribes to retain their individual identities while conceding some power to the new system of governance. This can be accomplished only through the engagement of tribal elders by Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) and GIROA representatives.

Tribal elders in close vicinity to ANA or coalition firebases and outposts are much more likely to support the GIROA government. Enemy groups and facilitators constantly engage local villagers, but most of the time they get little or no support because of constant ANA and coalition presence. The Afghan people understand power, and they will support the element that, in their eyes, has the power—either the ANSF or the enemy. The elders know the enemy can affect them more in remote areas, so they will harbor enemy facilitators more readily than elders who are near coalition firebases. The elders near a coalition or ANA presence understand the power of the ANA to arrest any facilitators that harbor enemy elements.

Monty Python – Ministry of Silly Walks – Film

 

Monty Python – Ministry of Silly Walks – Film

Full Movie – The Last Of The Mohicans – Daniel Day-Lewis & Madeleine Stow

SECRECY NEWS – SANDIA SCIENTISTS MODEL DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL PROTEST

Researchers at Sandia National Laboratories have been studying the ways
that information, ideas and behaviors propagate through social networks in
order to gain advance warning of cyber attacks or other threatening
behavior.

The initial problem is how to explain the disparate consequences of
seemingly similar triggering events.  Thus, in 2005, the Danish newspaper
Jyllands-Posten published cartoons featuring the Muslim Prophet Muhammad,
prompting widespread protests.  In 2006, by contrast, the Pope gave a
lecture in which he made comments about Islam that were considered
derogatory by some, but the ensuing controversy quickly faded away.

"While each event appeared at the outset to have the potential to trigger
significant protests, the 'Danish cartoons' incident ultimately led to
substantial Muslim mobilization, including massive protests and
considerable violence, while outrage triggered by the pope lecture quickly
subsided with essentially no violence," wrote Sandia authors Richard
Colbaugh and Kristin Glass.  "It would obviously be very useful to have the
capability to distinguish these two types of reaction as early in the event
lifecycle as possible."

What accounts for the difference in these outcomes? The intrinsic
qualities of the events are not sufficient to explain why one had
disruptive consequences and the other did not. Rather, the authors say, one
must factor in the mechanisms of influence by which individual responses
are shaped and spread.

By way of analogy, it has been shown that "it is likely to be impossible
to predict movie revenues, even very roughly, based on the intrinsic
information available concerning the movie" such as cast or genre, but that
"it *is* possible to identify early indicators of movie success, such as
temporal patterns in pre-release 'buzz', and to use these indicators to
accurately predict ultimate box office revenues."

The Sandia authors developed a methodology that reflects the "topological
properties" of social and information networks -- including the density and
hierarchy of connections among network members -- and modeled the dynamics
of "social diffusion events" in which individuals exercise influence on one
another.

They report that their model lends itself, among other things, to
"distinguishing successful mobilization and protest events, that is,
mobilizations that become large and self-sustaining, from unsuccessful ones
early in their lifecycle."

They tested the model to predict the spread of textual memes, to
distinguish between events that generated significant protest (a May 2005
Quran desecration) and those that did not (the knighting of Salman Rushdie
in 2007), and to provide early warning of cyber attacks.

The authors' research was sponsored by the Department of Defense and the
Department of Homeland Security, among others.  See "Early warning analysis
for social diffusion events" by Richard Colbaugh and Kristin Glass,
originally published in Security Informatics, Vol. 1, 2012, SAND
2010-5334C.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/diffusion.pdf

STRATEGY LACKING FOR DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPONENTS

There is a "large inventory" of classified nuclear weapons components
"scattered across" the nation's nuclear weapons complex and awaiting
disposal, according to an internal Department of Energy contractor report
last year.

But "there is no complex-wide cost-effective classified weapon disposition
strategy." And as a result, "Only a small portion of the inventory has been
dispositioned and it has not always been in a cost-effective manner."

See "Acceptance of Classified Excess Components for Disposal at Area 5,"
presented at the Spring 2012 Waste Generator Workshop, April 24, 2012.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/excess.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Videoclip – SI Swimsuit: Marisa Miller Body Painting

 

Marisa Miller’s body become a canvas in this SI Swimsuit 2008 Body Painting video.
For more SI Swimsuit photos and videos go to http://www.si.com/swimsuit

Cryptome – Assange’s International Subversive Vol 1

Assange International Subversive

 


A sends:

Here is “International Subversive” Vol#1, the Hacking E-zine produced / edited by the Australian ‘hacker’ Mendax in 1991 (reference: Dreyfus, “Underground: Tales of hacking, madness and obsession on the electronic frontier” Ch.8

http://suelette.home.xs4all.nl/underground/justin/chapter_8.html ) aka Assange

The document came to me in several pieces – I’ve made no changes to the content other than to stick them together in order and add in some formatting (spaces) that tidy up some of the headings, so all spelling mistakes etc are originals (there are two section “2.4” & two section “2.7”, the later of each should be sections “2.5” & “2.8” respectively I guess according to the contents section). Best viewed with a fixed-width font.

The E-zine lists its editor as ‘The Chthonic Hvee’, presumably Mendax wielded his electronic editorial pen to publish under a different alias (in the same way he was able to change is alias from ‘proff’ to ‘Mendax’ being a research contributor to the Dreyfus book. Interesting.).

I can’t confirm the original source of the document or the accuracy of its content so it comes to you with all appropriate disclaimers – perhaps some of Cryptomes readers will be familiar with the incidents , etc., discussed within and can comment further, if you decide to publish this.

http://cryptome.org/2013/01/International_Subversive__Volume1.txt.gz

TMZ – Britney Spears’s $100 MILLION Vegas Deal

 

Britney Spears is definitely not hurting for cash… but Brit may be on the brink of signing a deal that could make her an additional $100 million dollars… A YEAR!

TOP-SECRET – Restricted U.S. Army Access Control Handbook

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/USArmy-AccessControl.png

 

TC 19-210 Access Control Handbook

  • 137 pages
  • Distribution is authorized to US Government agencies only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means.
  • October 2004

Download

This handbook provides installation commanders with the basic information necessary for effective access control to their installations. It does not discuss the technical issues involved with standards and designs. Information regarding standards and designs is evolving and will be resolved by the Headquarters (HQ) Department of the Army (DA) PS Review Board (DAPSRB) and the PS integrated concept teams. This handbook provides commanders with the legal and jurisdictional issues associated with the inspection procedures at an ACP. Additionally, this handbook equips operators (which includes military police [MP], DA police, and sentinels of augmenting units) of an ACP with the various vehicle inspection criteria and measures necessary to conduct an effective ACP.

The openness of the United States (US) society provides an opportunity for our enemies to operate with more freedom than they would have in more restrictive venues. Also exacerbating the threats is the global proliferation of cheap weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to disseminate knowledge about such weapons. Few US cities are fully prepared to deal with incidents involving WMD. Critical infrastructure and the US economy are becoming increasingly more reliant on information and computer-based technologies that are vulnerable to covert attacks. Many military installations and facilities are key force projection platforms and are susceptible to attacks from terrorists using WMD, from unconventional special forces formed from elements infiltrated into the United States, or from indigenous hostile elements.

As a result of recent events, Army installations have increased their force protection (FP) readiness through increased access control operations. Access control is a major implied security mission that supports the installation FP program. The FPCON determines the level of operation at an ACP, and thus, the ACP must be able to quickly and easily enhance security under an increased FPCON. ACPs serve as the access point for all personnel, vehicles, and deliveries to an installation. The ACP becomes the first chance for forces to inspect incoming personnel, vehicles, and cargo in order to detect, assess, and deter an incident.

Installation commanders must establish installation access control procedures that comply with Department of Defense (DOD) and DA policies. In addition to these policies, installation commanders must consider—

  • Manpower availability.
  • FPCON.
  • ACP layout.
  • Other factors, all of which will influence a commander’s manning level for an access control operation.

When considering installation access control, commanders must reflect on its purpose, the impact on the surrounding community, and the end state. The purpose of access control is to identify, reduce, or eliminate installation and in-transit vulnerabilities to threats and to enhance the overall FP posture while minimizing the impact on normal operations. The end state is to protect the forces through a myriad of measures that are addressed in the installation access control plan. FPCON levels and access control measures are established in a graduated scale based on the intelligence provided by a threat fusion cell.

Monty Python – Job Interview

 

CEO – Defrauding Gold Coin Investors of More Than $2.4 Million

DENVER—James P. Burg, age 61, formerly of Fairplay, Colorado, faces fraud charges related to a scheme to defraud gold coin investors, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the FBI, the IRS-CI, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service announced. Burg was indicted by a federal grand jury in Denver on November 6, 2012, for charges of wire fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, and failure to file tax returns. The indictment remained sealed until his arrest in California on November 29, 2012. Burg then appeared in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. In court there, Burg was ordered to be detained and transferred by U.S. Marshals from California to Colorado. Burg’s first Colorado court appearance occurred on January 2, 2013, where he was advised of his rights and the charges pending against him. He appeared in court on January 7, 2013, and again on January 14, 2013, for the purpose of a detention hearing. On January 14, 2013, U.S. Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty ordered that Burg could be released prior to trial on a $50,000 secured property or cash bond. Once released on that pre-trial bond, Magistrate Judge Hegarty ordered Burg to a halfway house (once bed space is available), pending the resolution of the criminal case.

According to the indictment, beginning on or about October 1, 2007, and continuing through and including on or about January 12, 2012, in Colorado and elsewhere, James P. Burg devised and intended to devise a scheme to defraud customers that ordered coins from a business known as Superior Discount Coins and Gold Run Investments and for obtaining money from those customers by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises. Burg took and received $2,464,099 from customers that ordered coins, and he failed to deliver the coins as promised.

As part of the scheme, Burg represented that he was the chief executive officer of a company known as Superior Discount Coins (SDC) and that SDC was in the business of selling coins. Burg also conducted business using a company known as Gold Run Investments (GRI) and represented that GRI was in the business of selling coins. At times, Burg operated GRI using the alias “Tim Burke.” Burg advertised and solicited customers through radio advertisements and over the Internet using websites he controlled, including; http://www.superiordiscountcoins.com, http://www.yourcoinbroker.com, and http://www.goldruninvestments.net.

Burg misrepresented and promised customers that if they ordered coins from SDC or GRI and paid him for those coins, he would deliver the coins to them or to accounts designated by them. He sent and caused to be sent to customers that ordered coins from SDC or GRI invoices stating amounts of money owed for the coins and, in some cases, providing information about a bank account to which the customers should transfer their money to purchase the coins.

The money Burg received from customers was not used to purchase coins for such customers, but instead he converted the money to his own use and benefit. Burg refused to refund money to customers in several instances where the customers requested a return of their money after he failed to deliver coins as originally promised. To prevent the scheme’s detection, Burg sometimes filled customers’ orders for coins only after such customers threatened to take legal action or report him to law enforcement authorities. Burg used one customer’s payment for coins to refund funds to another customer.

For calendar years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, Burg failed to file income tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service as required by law. These returns were required to be filed with the IRS on April 15 following the subsequent above mentioned years.

“A core mission of the U.S. Attorney’s Office is to protect victims from scam artists who try to trick them out of their hard earned money,” said U.S. Attorney John Walsh.

“The FBI has made protecting innocent investors a priority,” said FBI Special Agent in Charge James Yacone. “As such, we will vigorously investigate those who engage in schemes to swindle and defraud.”

“The U.S. Postal Inspection Service has no shortage of investment investigations and this is another example of greed overcoming honest business practices,” said Adam Behnen, Inspector in Charge, with the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. “These criminal charges illustrate the commitment of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service to protect the American public by investigating individuals who use the U.S. mail to further their schemes.”

“Fraud schemes are often described as a house of cards and will eventually fall apart exposing the individuals responsible,” said Stephen Boyd, Special Agent in Charge, IRS-Criminal Investigation, Denver Field Office. “This is a great example of federal agencies working together.”

Burg was charged with six counts of wire fraud, nine counts of mail fraud, four counts of money laundering, and four counts of willful failure to file tax returns. If convicted of the wire fraud and mail fraud counts, he faces not more than 20 years in federal prison, and a fine of up to $250,000 per count. If convicted of the money laundering counts, he faces not more than 10 years in federal prison and a fine of up to $250,000 per count. If convicted of failing to file tax returns, he faces not more than one year in federal prison and a fine of up to $25,000 per count.

This case was investigated by special agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the IRS-Criminal Investigation, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

Burg is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Timothy Neff.

The charges contained in the indictment are allegations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

Apocalypo – Full Movie by Mel Gibson

Cryptome unveils MIT Closet Allegedly Used by Aaron Swartz

MIT Closet Allegedly Used by Aaron Swartz

 


Closet in MIT Building 16 from Which Aaron Swartz Allegedly Downloaded JSTOR Docs (USG photos from court filing)

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Box Allegedly Used by Aaron Swartz to Hide Downloading Laptop

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Alleged Download Equipment of Aaron Swartz

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Download Equipment Allegedly Stored in Separate Building W20

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SI Swimsuit: Quiana Bodypainting – Video

 

Quiana Grant’s Swimsuit 2008 bodypainting video

TMZ – Kobe Bryant vs. Bill Clinton — Who BANGED More Chicks?

 

It’s arguably the greatest question posed in the last century or so… who has taken down more chicks: Kobe Bryant or former President Bill Clinton?

TOP-SECRET – DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Theft/Loss/Diversion

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/DHS-FBI-TheftLoss.png

 

 

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • November 15, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorists may attempt to steal or divert precursor materials, uniforms, identification, blueprints, documents, access cards, facility vehicles, or other items–possibly with the help of knowledgeable insiders–for use in pre-operational planning or attacks. Emilio Suarez Trashorras, a Spanish national convicted for his role in the 2004 Madrid train bombings, stole the explosives used in the attack and the vehicles used to transport the explosives from a mining company where he worked.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incidents from the NSI shared space demonstrate types of behavior terrorists might exhibit during pre-operational stages for attacks. While none were ultimately linked to terrorist activity, they are cited as relevant examples for awareness and training purposes:

– (U) An individual approached a transit authority security officer on a rail platform to report a fight in progress. No fight was found, but the individual continued to engage the security officer with questions, then seized a set of transit keys from the officer’s pocket and fled. Efforts to apprehend the suspect were unsuccessful.

– (U) A powder company that supplies explosives to the mining and construction industries reported in 2011 that the locks to an explosives magazine were cut overnight, and numerous items were stolen, including three 50-lb bags of ammonium nitrate fuel oil, one case of emulsion explosive, two cases of cast boosters, and three 1,000-foot rolls of detonation cord.

(U) Possible Indicators of Pre-Operational Theft/Loss/Diversion

(U//FOUO) The following activities can indicate efforts to illegally obtain materials for use in terrorist pre-operational planning or attacks. Theft is a common criminal occurrence that is not necessarily associated with terrorism. Care should be taken to distinguish crimes of opportunity from those that may indicate a terrorist motive. Depending upon the context, theft, loss, or diversion incidents should be reported to the appropriate authorities, particularly if a terrorism link is suspected.

– (U//FOUO) Theft of chemicals, hazardous substances, weapons, pre-cursor materials, or items that could compromise facility security, such as uniforms, identification, blueprints, vehicles (or components), technology, or access keys or cards.

– (U//FOUO) Receipt, transfer, or delivery of any of the above without legitimate reason, necessary identification, or authorization.

– (U//FOUO) A pattern of losses or irregularities in facility inventory indicating sensitive materials may have been misdirected or are missing.

– (U//FOUO) Employees who frequently requisition extra uniforms, equipment, or other proprietary or sensitive materials, and/or who remove them from the facility without authorization.

(U//FOUO) First Ammendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).

Monty Phyton – Bicycle Repairman

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus

http://www.amazon.com/Complete-Monty-Pythons-Flying-Circus/dp/B001E77XNA/ref=…

TMZ – Jodie Foster’s CRAZY Golden Globes Speech!

 

There were a lot of highlights from this year’s Golden Globe Awards… but none more shocking than Jodie Foster’s crazy, all over-the-place acceptance speech!

TOP-SECRET – Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations HSBC Money Laundering Case History

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/HSGAC-HSBC.png

 

U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History

  • 340 pages
  • July 17, 2012

Download

HSBC Case Study. To examine the current money laundering and terrorist financing threats associated with correspondent banking, the Subcommittee selected HSBC as a case study. HSBC is one of the largest financial institutions in the world, with over $2.5 trillion in assets, 89 million customers, 300,000 employees, and 2011 profits of nearly $22 billion. HSBC, whose initials originally stood for Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, now has operations in over 80 countries, with hundreds of affiliates spanning the globe. Its parent corporation, HSBC Holdings plc, called “HSBC Group,” is headquartered in London, and its Chief Executive Officer is located in Hong Kong.

Its key U.S. affiliate is HSBC Bank USA N.A. (HBUS). HBUS operates more than 470 bank branches throughout the United States, manages assets totaling about $200 billion, and serves around 3.8 million customers. It holds a national bank charter, and its primary regulator is the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which is part of the U.S. Treasury Department. HBUS is headquartered in McLean, Virginia, but has its principal office in New York City. HSBC acquired its U.S. presence by purchasing several U.S. financial institutions, including Marine Midland Bank and Republic National Bank of New York. A senior HSBC executive told the Subcommittee that HSBC acquired its U.S. affiliate, not just to compete with other U.S. banks for U.S. clients, but primarily to provide a U.S. platform to its non-U.S. clients and to use its U.S. platform as a selling point to attract still more non-U.S. clients. HSBC operates in many jurisdictions with weak AML controls, high risk clients, and high risk financial activities including Asia, Middle East, and Africa. Over the past ten years, HSBC has also acquired affiliates throughout Latin America. In many of these countries, the HSBC affiliate provides correspondent accounts to foreign financial institutions that, among other services, are interested in acquiring access to U.S. dollar wire transfers, foreign exchange, and other services. As a consequence, HSBC’s U.S. affiliate, HBUS, is required to interact with other HSBC affiliates and foreign financial institutions that face substantial AML challenges, often operate under weaker AML requirements, and may not be as familiar with, or respectful of, the tighter AML controls in the United States. HBUS’ correspondent services, thus, provide policymakers with a window into the vast array of money laundering and terrorist financing risks confronting the U.S. affiliates of global banks.

Disregarding Links to Terrorism. For decades, HSBC has been one of the most active global banks in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, despite being aware of the terrorist financing risks in those regions. In particular, HSBC has been active in Saudi Arabia, conducting substantial banking activities through affiliates as well as doing business with Saudi Arabia’s largest private financial institution, Al Rajhi Bank. After the 9-11 terrorist attack in 2001, evidence began to emerge that Al Rajhi Bank and some of its owners had links to financing organizations associated with terrorism, including evidence that the bank’s key founder was an early financial benefactor of al Qaeda. In 2005, HSBC announced internally that its affiliates should sever ties with Al Rajhi Bank, but then reversed itself four months later, leaving the decision up to each affiliate. HSBC Middle East, among other HSBC affiliates, continued to do business with the bank.

Due to terrorist financing concerns, HBUS closed the correspondent banking and banknotes accounts it had provided to Al Rajhi Bank. For nearly two years, HBUS Compliance personnel resisted pressure from HSBC personnel in the Middle East and United States to resume business ties with Al Rajhi Bank. In December 2006, however, after Al Rajhi Bank threatened to pull all of its business from HSBC unless it regained access to HBUS’ U.S. banknotes program, HBUS agreed to resume supplying Al Rajhi Bank with shipments of U.S. dollars. Despite ongoing troubling information, HBUS provided nearly $1 billion in U.S. dollars to Al Rajhi Bank until 2010, when HSBC decided, on a global basis, to exit the U.S. banknotes business. HBUS also supplied U.S. dollars to two other banks, Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd. and Social Islami Bank, despite evidence of links to terrorist financing. Each of these specific cases shows how a global bank can pressure its U.S. affiliate to provide banks in countries at high risk of terrorist financing with access to U.S. dollars and the U.S. financial system.

A. Findings

This Report makes the following findings of fact.

(1) Longstanding Severe AML Deficiencies. HBUS operated its correspondent accounts for foreign financial institutions with longstanding, severe AML deficiencies, including a dysfunctional AML monitoring system for account and wire transfer activity, an unacceptable backlog of 17,000 unreviewed alerts, insufficient staffing, inappropriate country and client risk assessments, and late or missing Suspicious Activity Reports, exposing the United States. to money laundering, drug trafficking, and terrorist financing risks.

(2) Taking on High Risk Affiliates. HBUS failed to assess the AML risks associated with HSBC affiliates before opening correspondent accounts for them, failed to identify high risk affiliates, and failed for years to treat HBMX as a high risk accountholder.

(3) Circumventing OFAC Prohibitions. For years in connection with Iranian U-turn transactions, HSBC allowed two non-U.S. affiliates to engage in conduct to avoid triggering the OFAC filter and individualized transaction reviews. While HBUS insisted, when asked, that HSBC affiliates provide fully transparent transaction information, when it obtained evidence that some affiliates were acting to circumvent the OFAC filter, HBUS failed to take decisive action to confront those affiliates and put an end to conduct which even some within the bank viewed as deceptive.

(4) Disregarding Terrorist Links. HBUS provided U.S. correspondent accounts to some foreign banks despite evidence of links to terrorist financing.

(5) Clearing Suspicious Bulk Travelers Cheques. In less than four years, HBUS cleared over $290 million in sequentially numbered, illegibly signed, bulk U.S. dollar travelers cheques for Hokuriku Bank, which could not explain why its clients were regularly depositing up to $500,000 or more per day in U.S. dollar travelers cheques obtained in Russia into Japanese accounts, supposedly for selling used cars; even after learning of Hokuriku’s poor AML controls, HBUS continued to do business with the bank.

(6) Offering Bearer Share Accounts. Over the course of a decade, HBUS opened over 2,000 high risk bearer share corporate accounts with inadequate AML controls.

(7) Allowing AML Problems to Fester. The OCC allowed HBUS’ AML deficiencies to fester for years, in part due to treating HBUS’ AML problems as consumer compliance matters rather than safety and soundness problems, failing to make timely use of formal and informal enforcement actions to compel AML reforms at the bank, and focusing on AML issues in specific HBUS banking units without also viewing them on an institution-wide basis.

Monty Phyton – Argument Clinic – Video

Monty Python’s Flying Circus


Sports Illustrated Swimsuit: Jarah Model Diary – Video

The Cia – CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Forces

 

 


CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Forces: The Importance Of Clandestine Reporting [PDF 17.2 MB*]

warsawpact.jpg

This study examines the role of clandestine reporting in CIA’s analysis of the Warsaw Pact from 1955 to 1985. The Soviet Union established itself as a threat to the West at the end of World War II by its military occupation of eastern European countries and the attempts of its armed proxies to capture Greece and South Korea. The West countered with the formation of NATO. While the West welcomed West Germany into NATO, the Soviets established a military bloc of Communist nations with the Warsaw Treaty of May 1955. This study continues CIA’s efforts to provide a detailed record of the intelligence derived from clandestine human and technical sources from that period. This intelligence was provided to US policymakers and used to assess the political and military balances and confrontations in Central Europe between the Warsaw Pact and NATO during the Cold War.

View this study’s photos and maps on the CIA Flickr stream [external link disclaimer]

View the videos from this publication on the CIA’sYouTube Channel.**

Download Catalogue of Documents and Summaries: Finished Intelligence, Clandestine Reporting, and Other Sources [PDF 1.1MB*]

 

 

Cryptome – Stephen John Nicgorski, CIA OBL Spy, Drone Tout

Thanks to diligent research and publication by Cryptocomb last evening it was possible to locate information about “CIA John,” a previously unnamed CIA officer who tracked Osama bin Laden and reportedly is also the principal advocate of CIA drone killing.

Name: Stephen John Nicgorskihttp://www.manta.com/c/mr4mmxm/stephen-j-nicgorski-mr-mrs

Possible address: 1685 Winterwood Court, Herndon VA
Possible phone: (703) 467-9597

After Cryptome published unidentified photos in 2011 of Nicgorski at the White House, he was identified but not named by the New York Observer which published photos of Nicgorski as a basketball player along with details about his father:

http://cryptome.org/0004/cia-john/cia-john.htm

From Google Books:

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An Observer URL with the name of Nicgorski is still online but produces an empty page:

http://observer.com/term/stephen-john-nicgorski/

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From 123people.com

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Steve Nicgorski, with signature, front row at right playing for Notre Dame from Ebay:

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[Note the unusually tall man at rear with tie pattern which matches the photo above. This photo is taken in the large conference room of the Situation Room complex.] President Barack Obama talks with members of the national security team at the conclusion of one in a series of meetings discussing the mission against Osama bin Laden, in the Situation Room of the White House, May 1, 2011. Gen. James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is seen on the screen. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

 


http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/tcpalm/obituary.aspx?n=franklin-a-schuloff
&pid=128611260#fbLoggedOut

Stephanie Nicgorski is the the wife of Stephen Nicgorski.

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TMZ – What Happened to Kate Middleton’s Face!?

 

 

The Royal Family just released Kate Middleton’s official portrait… and let’s just say it’s ABSOLUTELY FRIGGIN’ HORRENDOUS!

PI – U.S. Army Tactical Questioning Pocket Reference Card

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/USArmy-TacticalQuestioningReference.png

 

Asymmetric Warfare Group

  • 2 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • December 2010

Download

Tactical Questioning (TQ)

TQ is
■Gathering information from people.
■An expedited interview in the field.
■Used to gain and exploit time-sensitive information for follow-on missions.
■Always an interview, NOT an interrogation.

Conduct TQ when
■Target is secure.
■People of interest are on the objective.
■Talking to a local national.

Prepare for success
■Prepare a TQ annex in the unit OPORD.
■Rehearse TQ (use interpreters).
■Develop standard basic questions.
■Develop a TQ plan.
■Have needed equipment accessible.
■Use site that is out of earshot of segregation area and is undisturbed.

Leads are statements or answers that indicate the detainee may have information on another significant subject or additional information on the question being asked.

■Hot lead: Time-sensitive information of immediate value or information that answers PIR.
■Cold lead: Information that does not meet criteria of hot lead and does not warrant a change in the current interview or current operations.
■Source lead: Information that identifies a source that has the knowledge you seek.

Initial Screening (JUMPS)

JUMPS is an acronym to guide any Soldier on the types of questions to ask in any interview. First question always is: “Is there any immediate danger to my patrol?”

■J – Job: What is your job/profession/rank/tribe (clan)/father’s name/place of birth/age?
■U – Unit: What is your unit/the name of your company? Who is your boss/supervisor?
■M – Mission: What is the mission of the unit/company you work for? Mission of next higher unit/company, current mission, anticipated future missions?
■P – Priority information requirement (PIR): Ask questions pertinent to your commander’s PIR.
■S – Stuff: Ask questions about anything that does not fit in the categories above: This is a catch-all category and a good place to tie questions to items that were found on the individual (e.g., “explain this map and these circled spots”).

Types of Questions

Direct: (Only authorized technique)

■An efficient method of asking precise questions toward a specific objective. Normally, who, what, when, where, why, and how begin the question.
■DON’T FORGET “ELSE”! (Who else, why else, where else, etc.)

Tips

■ “War game” your techniques in rehearsals.
■ Do not depend on lists or cheat sheets (you may lose eye contact and miss an indicator of deception).
■ Have a focused approach (erratic questions all over the map will confuse both you and the detainee).
■ Be specific and focused with questions (if you want to know what the person’s profession is, ask “What is your profession?” not “What do you do?”).
■ Ask questions that cannot be answered with yes or no.
■ If you are doing most of the talking, he is winning!

Do Not Use:

Vague:

■Questions that are not specific. These may lead to answers that are misinterpreted by the interviewer or elicit broad answers that are of no use.

Compound:

■Multiple questions contained within a single question: “When did you stage and conduct the attack?”

Negative:

■Phrasing that prompts the interviewee to make a negative response, whether true or not: “You didn’t see any CF while on your recon, did you?”

Leading:

■Questions that prompt the interviewee to give the answer he believes you want.

Monty Phyton – Galaxy Song

 

Galaxy Song

TMZ – Is Paris Hilton STILL Richer than Kim Kardashian?

Kim Kardashian is arguably one of the biggest celebrities in Hollywood… but it turns out Paris Hilton is getting the last laugh in the end!

PI – FBI Analysis Finds That Only 4% of Active Shooter Incidents Since 2002 Were Perpetrated by Women

A training exercise for police academy recruits involves active shooter scenarios at an area elementary school.

 

A segment from KETV News in Omaha, Nebraska discusses active shooter training exercises held at a local elementary school. Similar training exercises have been held around the country following recent mass shootings.

 

Public Intelligence

An FBI analysis of active shooter incidents since 2002 found that 96% of the attacks were perpetrated by males, most of which acted alone. The statistic is found in a joint intelligence bulletin released at the end of December by the Department of Homeland Security and FBI titled “Recent Active Shooter Incidents Highlight Need for Continued Vigilance“.  The bulletin provides brief advice on crisis response and long-term protective measures as well as statistics related to past active shooter incidents, which are defined as situations where one or more individuals participates in a “random or systematic killing spree demonstrating their intent to harm others with a firearm.”  Active shooters are distinguished from other “traditional criminal acts, such as robbery or hostage-taking” by their intention to commit “mass murder”. The FBI analyzed 154 active shooter events in the United States between 2002 and 2012 that included three or more individuals being shot.  This analysis found that:

  • 96% of the shooters were males
  • 51% of the shooters were deceased following the attack (43% committed suicide and 8% were shot and killed by responders)
  • 96% of the attacks involved shooters acting alone
  • 37% of the attacks occurred in workplaces and 17% occurred in an academic setting
  • 40% of the attacks were unable to be linked to a clear motivation
  • 21% of the attacks were motivated by workplace retaliation and 14% were motivated by domestic disputes
  • Academic retaliation by a current or former student only accounted for 7% of the attacks

The FBI’s analysis found that active shooters were often described as “social isolates” who “harbored feelings of hate and anger” and had some contact with mental health professionals.  Though mental illness is a common factor among many active shooters, its functional role in causing the massacre is indeterminate according to FBI analysis.  Very few of the shooters in cases analyzed by the FBI had previous arrests for violent crimes, though many had encountered a significant emotional hardship prior to the attack such as “loss of significant relationships, changes in financial status, loss of a job, changes in living arrangements, major adverse changes to life circumstances, and/or feelings of humiliation or rejection on the part of the shooter.”

To help protect against active shooter situations, the DHS-FBI joint bulletin recommends that public facilities update their emergency and crisis management plans and conduct exercises to ensure a rapid response to a large-scale crisis.  Long-term security plans for public facilities should “emphasize physical safeguards, including building enhancements that present a more robust deterrent and provide a more survivable environment.”  Building enhancement can take the form of physical modification, such as the installation of “window and external door protection with quick-release capability”, as well as the establishment of “safe areas within the facility for assembly and refuge during crises.”

Monty Phyton Film – Every Sperm is Sacred

 

Every Sperm is Sacred

TMZ – Beyonce’s GQ Cover — HOLY CRAP SHE’S HOT!

 

Beyonce is on the cover of GQ… and HOLY MOTHER OF GOD SHE LOOKS SO HOT! This woman seriously just had a baby!?

SECRET – DHS, Fusion Centers Struggle to Respond to Mass Shootings

Public Intelligence

Four days after the mass shooting last July in Aurora, Colorado, a project of the Houston Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security called Ready Houston released a training video to help educate members the public about how to survive a mass shooting.  The six-minute video, which was produced with $200,000 from the Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Area Security Initiative, includes a dramatic recreation of a man dressed entirely in black walking into an office building and beginning to shoot people at random with a shotgun that he pulls from a small satchel.  Variously described as “outlandish“, “surreal” and “over-the-top“, the video has met with mixed responses since it was re-released by several fusion centers and local agencies, including most recently the Alabama Department of Homeland Security.

The response to the video and other instructional items produced by DHS, fusion centers and law enforcement agencies in response to recent mass shootings demonstrates the difficulty in responding to tragedies where often little can be done to save innocent lives.  After the mass shooting last December at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, fusion centers around the country rushed to issue bulletins discussing everything from tactics for countering mass shooters to suggestions for dealing with children in response to the shooting.  Some of the bulletins present useful facts regarding procedures for dealing with active shooter situations, the law enforcement term for incidents where an individual is attempting to kill people in a confined area, and links to resources for emergency planners and school officials.  The Delaware Valley Intelligence Center issued a bulletin the day of the shooting to “provide some basic information on active shooter situations and immediate actions that should be taken in the event an active shooter incident were to occur.”  The bulletin contains a three-point plan for reacting to an active shooter:

1. EVACUATE (if possible)
• Have an escape route and plan in mind.
• Leave your belongings behind.
• Keep your hands visible and open palms facing forward.
• Follow instructions of police officers.
• Have a designated meeting point and knowledge of everyone who is present. 

2. HIDE OUT
• If you are in an office, stay there.
• If you are in a hallway, lobby etc. get into a room.
• Lock and barricade the door with large items (i.e., desks, file cabinets). If the door can not be locked or barricaded, lay on your back with your feet up against the door to use your body weight as a barricade.
• Get as low as possible, lay on the floor.
• Silence all electronic devices.
• Remain quiet. Remain calm.
• Dial 911, if possible, to alert police of location, physical description, and type weapon(s) used by the shooter(s).
• If you cannot speak, leave the line open and allow the dispatcher to listen.

3. TAKE ACTION
• As a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger, attempt to take the active shooter down. When the shooter is at close range and you cannot flee, your chance of survival is much greater if you try to incapacitate him/her. Act with physical aggression, and throw items at the active shooter.

Another bulletin from the Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) called “Helping Your Community Feel Safe” describes techniques for helping children cope with the most recent mass shooting.  Given that the “magnitude of death and destruction in traumatic events require special attention and communication with children”, the bulletin recommends providing “structured time to discuss the event” and limiting “exposure to television and other sources of information about the disaster and its victims, especially for children.”  The bulletin also recommends that parents and teachers be “alert to changes in a child’s usual behavior — drop in grades, loss of interest, not doing homework, increased sleepiness or distraction, isolating themselves and weight changes.”  Teachers are particularly encouraged to increase their “students’ sense of control and mastery at school” by letting them plan a “special activity”.

Issues with providing practical responses to school attacks and mass shootings have also affected other agencies.  Past bulletins from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime have stated that “school shooters” often “engaged in repetitive viewing of violent media and were often fascinated with previous school shootings.”  The bulletin warns of “repeated viewing of movies depicting school shootings, such as ‘Zero Day’ and ‘Elephant’,” which “may indicate a fascination with campus attacks.”  A 2006 guide from the Regional Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC), one of six Regional Information Sharing Systems funded by the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance, recommends identifying school shooters before they strike by their interests and school work.  The guide lists interest in “Satanist cults, Nazism” and “violent media” as potential indicators of a school shooter, recommending that teachers look out for “dark themes present in school work, personal writing, humor, drawings, or doodles” that may indicate a predisposition towards violent behavior.

Film – Penis Song by Monty Phyton

 

Film – Penis Song by Monty Phyton

 

from

 

Monty Python’s Meaning of Life

Sports Illustrated Swimsuit: Melissa Haro Model Diary – Video

Melissa Haro gets personal during her SI Swimsuit 2008 shoot.
For more photos and videos go to http://www.si com/swimsuit.

TMZ – Paris Hilton on Kim Kardashian Pregnancy — ‘I’m Really Happy For Her’

 

They ain’t exactly friends anymore … in fact, they’re more like fierce rivals … but Paris Hilton tells TMZ she’s actually happy that her ex-BFF Kim Kardashian is knocked up with Kanye’s baby.

CONFIDENTIAL – Scottsdale Inventions Electric Shock Handcuffs for Detainees Patent

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ScottsdaleShockHandcuffs.png

 

APPARATUS AND SYSTEM FOR AUGMENTED DETAINEE RESTRAINT

  • 43 pages
  • November 29, 2012

Download

There is provided a device and system for restraining detainees through devices attached to the detainees and configured to administer electrical shocks when certain predetermined conditions occur. Restraining devices may be activated by internal control systems or by external controllers that transmit activation signals to the restraining device. External controllers may be actuated by an external controlling entity such as a detention guard or other person or system, or may be controlled by an enabling signal sent by wired or wireless connections to the controller. There is also provided a system for detainee restraint where multiple detainees may be restrained collectively or individually in a controlled environment such as a detention facility, a jail, or a detainee transport vehicle.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

[0016] There is provided a device and system for restraining detainees through devices attached to the detainees and configured to administer electrical shocks when certain predetermined conditions occur. Restraining devices may be activated by internal control systems or by external controllers that transmit activation signals to the restraining device. External controllers may be actuated by an external controlling entity such as a detention guard or other person or system, or may be controlled by an enabling signal sent by wired or wireless connections to the controller. There is also provided a system for detainee restraint where multiple detainees may be restrained collectively or individually in a controlled environment such as a detention facility, a jail, or a detainee transport vehicle.

[0017] Embodiments of the restraining device of the present invention includes a restraint for physically constraining movement of at least a portion of a detainee’s body; an electric shock component coupled to the restraint; and a control system coupled to the electric shock component, the control system configured to cause the electric shock component to deliver a shock to the detainee when a predetermined condition occurs. The restraining device may be any device capable ofbeing attached to a detainee and restraining at least a portion of the detainee’s body, and in various implementations may include at least one of: a handcuff; an ankle cuff; a restraining belt; a straightjacket; a harness; a facial restraint; a helmet; and a neck collar; and combinations thereof. The restraint further includes one or more electrodes coupled to the electric shock component, and one of the one or more electrodes are configured to contact the skin of the detainee to deliver a shock when a predetermined condition occurs. Warnings in various forms may be provided to the detainee by the restraining device prior to administration of shock, and may be managed selectively by the control system coupled to the restraining device. Examples of warnings may include one or more of: an audio warning; a tactile warning such as a vibration or low-intensity shock; a visual warning such as a flashing light or text indicating a shock may be administered; and combinations thereof. The warnings may be varied in intensity to attempt to modify behavior of the detainee prior to administration of a shock, and the output of the administered shock may be tailored to a predetermined or variable amount based upon conditions perceived by an external controlling entity.

[0018] In various embodiments, the shock output of the restraining device may be varied to achieve any desired result. For example, the control system may be configured to cause the electric shock component to vary at least one of: a magnitude of the electric shock; a frequency of a signal generating the electric shock; and duration of the electric shock.

[0019] Embodiments of the restraining device may further include one or more sensors in communication with the control system. A sensor may be configured to detect whether the detainee engages in an unauthorized activity, and when such condition occurs the control system may be configured to deliver a shock to the detainee. The unauthorized activity may be defined to include any condition such as the detainee entering an unauthorized location; the detainee approaching a restricted area within a predetermined distance; the detainee approaching a keep-out zone broadcasting a keep-out signal, wherein a signal power level of the keep-out signal received by the device exceeds a predetermined threshold; the detainee attempting to tamper with the restraining device; or the detainee exiting an authorized location. Additionally, unauthorized activities may include the detainee making a threatening movement, where the restraining device measures through its sensors that the detainee is making movements of an aggressive nature or is modifying posture to a posture of potential aggression, such as drawing back a fist to swing, raising an arm suddenly, yanking against the restraining device, or rising suddenly from a prone or seated posture. Also, sensors on the restraining device may determine an unauthorized activity has occurred when the detainee makes an utterance that exceeds a predetermined volume measured by sensors coupled to the restraining device (such as a microphone); such a situation may be desirable to prevent the detainee from interfering in court proceedings, for example. In another embodiment, an unauthorized activity may include use of an unauthorized system such as any structure, device, or system to which use or access by the detainee can be controlled, including: a door to a building, ignition to a police car, computer system, or a weapon. In one embodiment, if a weapon is equipped with an RFID or other identification device, sensors in the restraining device may transmit a signal and receive a response signal indicating that a weapon is in a predetermined the proximity, and if the detainee does not move away from the weapon to cause the response signal to fall below a predetermined threshold, a shock will be administered. In yet another embodiment, an unauthorized activity occurs when the detainee fails to provide a predetermined verbal acknowledgement. Various combinations of these states may lead to additional unauthorized activities being detected.

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Party Political Broadcast

Monty Python’s Flying Circus S4E06: Party Political Broadcast

Video – Sports Illustrated Swimsuit: Tori Praver Model Diary

TMZ – Does Brent Musburger Want to BANG AJ McCarron’s Girlfriend Katherin

 

ESPN announcer Brent Musburger noticed Alabama QB AJ McCarron’s beauty queen girlfriend in the crowd during the National Championship… and let’s just say the old dude didn’t hold back his feelings towards the striking brunette!

TOP-SECRET – National Counterterrorism Center Special Report

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/NCTC-FirstResponderIEDs.png

 

Worldwide: IED Targeting of First Response Personnel—Tactics and Indicators

  • 8 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • August 7, 2012

Download

(U) Key Findings

(U//FOUO) Although most terrorist IED attacks outside war zones target civilians or symbols of authority and usually involve a single device, some are designed specifically to target emergency response personnel. The most common tactics involve using secondary or tertiary devices in tiered or sequential attacks intended to kill or maim response personnel after they arrive on the scene of an initial IED incident.

• The extent of government control in the intended target zone is a critical variable in operational planning for attacks against first responders. Whether attackers have sufficient access to the target area to gain familiarity with the landscape, the presence of police or other security forces, and even possibly their emergency response procedures are significant factors in attack preparation.

• Terrorists who are well-versed in the render-safe procedures used by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams are the most likely to construct secondary devices capable of defeating techniques to defuse or destroy them.

(U//FOUO) There is widespread concern about the availability of information in online manuals, videos, and extremist discussion forums on IED design and tactics that can be used by plotters in Western countries—including the US.

• Only one Homeland attack plot by homegrown violent extremists (HVEs)a in recent years was intended to specifically target first responders, but a successful Homeland attack may be imitated once it is publicized in the media. • Growing awareness of the tactics and techniques used by terrorists elsewhere in the world— particularly in East Africa, South Asia, and Yemen —could motivate HVEs and other Homeland adversaries to deliberately plot attacks that target first responders.

• The targeting of EOD personnel during execution of render-safe and exploitation procedures represents a higher level of adversary tactical sophistication that could provide an early indication of the need to reassess the Homeland IED threat environment.

(U//FOUO) Targeting Responders Depends on Context

(U//FOUO) All incidents involving IEDs, including those that fail or are a hoax, draw emergency responders to handle any casualties, secure the area, deactivate or dispose of other potential explosive devices, and begin the process of investigative forensics. Although most terrorist IED attacks target civilians or symbols of authority and usually involve a single device, some devices encountered outside war zones are designed specifically to target emergency response personnel. Motivations for targeting first responders are highly dependent on context.

• In countries coping with insurgencies or political unrest that result in a sustained level of violence, responders may be deliberately targeted to counter their capabilities to deal with attacks by the armed opposition. Insurgents in the Iraq and Afghanistan war zones primarily target first responders—military police and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel—to degrade their ability to counter the insurgent’s primary weapon of choice, the IED. Insurgents in countries like Thailand—where the primary focus is to counter government rule or occupation—most likely attack first responders because they represent the ruling government.

• Criminal organizations under law enforcement or military pressure—such as drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) in countries like Mexico and Colombia—may attack first responders to deter or inhibit disruption operations against them.

• Terrorist groups or individual extremists with ideological agendas may target responders deliberately to enhance the magnitude of their terror attack, creating increased fear and media attention by demonstrating that even would-be rescuers are vulnerable to attack.

(U//FOUO) The extent of government control in the intended target zone is a critical variable in operational planning for attacks against first responders. Whether attackers have sufficient access to the target area to gain familiarity with the landscape, the presence of police or other security forces, and even possibly their emergency response procedures are significant factors in attack preparation. Freedom of access also allows time to set up the attack, which is particularly important if multiple devices are to be employed. Attacks against responders have been particularly successful where an adaptive adversary is able to control the response environment and rely on support from local populations, either through cooperation or coercion. A pervasive security presence or particular vigilance by local citizens or police forces may not prevent conducting a single attack targeting civilians but could make it much more difficult to specifically target response personnel.

(U//FOUO) Unconstrained Diffusion of Tactics and Techniques Proliferates Knowledge

(U//FOUO) Information on IED design and tactics has become available to plotters in Western countries—including the US—who might then employ options, such as tiered attacks targeting emergency responders, they otherwise might not have considered. Explosives training manuals, extremist literature such as Inspire magazine, and Internet videos and chat rooms are widely disseminated. Violent extremists making available knowledge of EOD procedures and countermeasures could facilitate and significantly enhance the capability of terrorists to lure responders into IED ambushes and construct devices that would detonate as authorities tried to contain or deactivate them. A successful attack against responders may be imitated once publicized in the media.

• The diffusion of IED design information and tactics is not bound by geographic or motivational constraints. A review of bombmaking publications available on the Internet or in printed form dating back to the 1960s illustrates that an extremist can readily access a wide variety of manuals detailing EOD procedures and information on how to build victim-operated IEDs.

• Manuals, videos, and forum discussions are not complete substitutes for practical experience in IED emplacement, however; evidence of handson training and IED testing by terrorists in Western countries could give security services and law enforcement indicators of possible attack plotting.

(U//FOUO) Terrorists interested in conducting complex IED attacks, including deliberately targeting emergency personnel responding to an initial IED attack, can also learn from the examples of groups that have such experience in high-threat Western environments, some of whom are willing to provide expert training or instruction. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) bombmakers in the UK in the early 1990s created and employed a wide array of IED switches intended to reduce the effectiveness of security forces by targeting British and Irish EOD and response personnel, according to military reporting.

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – A Book at Bedtime – Full Movie

 

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus S3E12: A Book at Bedtime

SECRECY NEWS – HOMELAND SECURITY HAS TOO MANY DEFINITIONS, SAYS CRS

The existence of multiple, overlapping and inconsistent definitions of the
term "homeland security" reflects and reinforces confusion in the homeland
security mission, according to a newly updated report from the
Congressional Research Service.

"Ten years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S.
government does not have a single definition for 'homeland security.'
[Instead,] different strategic documents and mission statements offer
varying missions that are derived from different homeland security
definitions."

Most official definitions of homeland security include terrorism
prevention.  Many but not all encompass disaster response. Most do not
include border security, or maritime security, or immigration matters, or
general resilience, though some do.

"An absence of consensus about the inclusion of these policy areas may
result in unintended consequences for national homeland security
operations," the CRS report said. "For example, not including maritime
security in the homeland security definition may result in policymakers,
Congress, and stakeholders not adequately addressing maritime homeland
security threats, or more specifically being able to prioritize federal
investments in border versus intelligence activities."

"The competing and varied definitions in these documents may indicate that
there is no succinct homeland security concept. Without a succinct homeland
security concept, policymakers and entities with homeland security
responsibilities may not successfully coordinate or focus on the highest
prioritized or most necessary activities."

"At the national level, there does not appear to be an attempt to align
definitions and missions among disparate federal entities," CRS said.

Without a uniform definition, a coherent strategy cannot be formulated and
homeland security policy is rudderless.  "Potentially, funding is driving
priorities rather than priorities driving the funding."

Speaking of funding, there are thirty federal departments, agencies, and
entities receiving annual homeland security funding excluding the
Department of Homeland Security, the CRS report said.  In fact,
approximately 50% of homeland security funding is appropriated for agencies
other than the Department of Homeland Security.

See "Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional
Considerations," January 8, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42462.pdf

DESALINATION, DNA TESTING, AND MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that have
not been made available to the public include the following.

Desalination and Membrane Technologies: Federal Research and Adoption
Issues, January 8, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40477.pdf

The Corporation for Public Broadcasting: Federal Funding and Issues,
January 8, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22168.pdf

DNA Testing in Criminal Justice: Background, Current Law, Grants, and
Issues, December 6, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41800.pdf

Environmental Considerations in Federal Procurement: An Overview of the
Legal Authorities and Their Implementation, January 7, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41297.pdf

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation:
Legal Standards and Procedures, January 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40633.pdf

Social Security: The Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP), January 8,
2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-35.pdf

Social Security: The Government Pension Offset (GPO), January 8, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32453.pdf

Economic Growth and the Unemployment Rate, January 7, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42063.pdf

Overview and Issues for Implementation of the Federal Cloud Computing
Initiative: Implications for Federal Information Technology Reform
Management, January 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42887.pdf

The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA):
Issues for the 113th Congress, January 3, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42886.pdf

Military Medical Care: Questions and Answers, January 7, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33537.pdf

Israel: 2013 Elections Preview, January 8, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42888.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

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Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

TMZ – Kim Kardashian — She’s Showing a Baby Bump!

 

Kim Kardashian is finally showing signs of a baby bump! Brace yourself folks, we have a long road of Kim Kardashian pregnancy updates in the coming months. So prepare accordingly.

TOP-SECRET – National Intelligence Council Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds

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Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds

  • 160 pages
  • December 2012
  • 20.5 MB

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This report is intended to stimulate thinking about the rapid and vast geopolitical changes characterizing the world today and possible global trajectories during the next 15-20 years. As with the NIC’s previous Global Trends reports, we do not seek to predict the future—which would be an impossible feat—but instead provide a framework for thinking about possible futures and their implications.

The world of 2030 will be radically transformed from our world today. By 2030, no country—whether the US, China, or any other large country—will be a hegemonic power. The empowerment of individuals and diffusion of power among states and from states to informal networks will have a dramatic impact, largely reversing the historic rise of the West since 1750, restoring Asia’s weight in the global economy, and ushering in a new era of “democratization” at the international and domestic level. In addition to individual empowerment and the diffusion of state power, we believe that two other megatrends will shape our world out to 2030: demographic patterns, especially rapid aging; and growing resource demands which, in the cases of food and water, might lead to scarcities. These trends, which are virtually certain, exist today, but during the next 15-20 years they will gain much greater momentum. Underpinning the megatrends are tectonic shifts—critical changes to key features of our global environment that will affect how the world “works” (see table on page v).

Extrapolations of the megatrends would alone point to a changed world by 2030—but the world could be transformed in radically different ways. We believe that six key game-changers—questions regarding the global economy, governance, conflict, regional instability, technology, and the role of the United States—will largely determine what kind of transformed world we will inhabit in 2030. Several potential Black Swans—discrete events—would cause large-scale disruption (see page xi). All but two of these—the possibility of a democratic China or a reformed Iran—would have negative repercussions. Based upon what we know about the megatrends and the possible interactions between the megatrends and the game-changers, we have delineated four archetypal futures that represent distinct pathways for the world out to 2030. None of these alternative worlds is inevitable. In reality, the future probably will consist of elements from all the scenarios.

Megatrends and Related Tectonic Shifts

Megatrend 1: Individual Empowerment

Individual empowerment will accelerate substantially during the next 15-20 years owing to poverty reduction and a huge growth of the global middle class, greater educational attainment, and better health care. The growth of the global middle class constitutes a tectonic shift: for the first time, a majority of the world’s population will not be impoverished, and the middle classes will be the most important social and economic sector in the vast majority of countries around the world. Individual empowerment is the most important megatrend because it is both a cause and effect of most other trends—including the expanding global economy, rapid growth of the developing countries, and widespread exploitation of new communications and manufacturing technologies. On the one hand, we see the potential for greater individual initiative as key to solving the mounting global challenges over the next 15-20 years. On the other hand, in a tectonic shift, individuals and small groups will have greater access to lethal and disruptive technologies (particularly precision-strike capabilities, cyber instruments, and bioterror weaponry), enabling them to perpetrate large-scale violence—a capability formerly the monopoly of states.

Megatrend 2: Diffusion of Power

The diffusion of power among countries will have a dramatic impact by 2030. Asia will have surpassed North America and Europe combined in terms of global power, based upon GDP, population size, military spending, and technological investment. China alone will probably have the largest economy, surpassing that of the United States a few years before 2030. In a tectonic shift, the health of the global economy increasingly will be linked to how well the developing world does—more so than the traditional West. In addition to China, India, and Brazil, regional players such as Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Turkey will become especially important to the global economy. Meanwhile, the economies of Europe, Japan, and Russia are likely to continue their slow relative declines.

The shift in national power may be overshadowed by an even more fundamental shift in the nature of power. Enabled by communications technologies, power will shift toward multifaceted and amorphous networks that will form to influence state and global actions. Those countries with some of the strongest fundamentals—GDP, population size, etc.—will not be able to punch their weight unless they also learn to operate in networks and coalitions in a multipolar world.

Megatrend 3: Demographic Patterns

We believe that in the world of 2030—a world in which a growing global population will have reached somewhere close to 8.3 billion people (up from 7.1 billion in 2012)—four demographic trends will fundamentally shape, although not necessarily determine, most countries’ economic and political conditions and relations among countries. These trends are: aging—a tectonic shift for both for the West and increasingly most developing countries; a still-significant but shrinking number of youthful societies and states; migration, which will increasingly be a cross-border issue; and growing urbanization—another tectonic shift, which will spur economic growth but could put new strains on food and water resources. Aging countries will face an uphill battle in maintaining their living standards. Demand for both skilled and unskilled labor will spur global migration. Owing to rapid urbanization in the developing world, the volume of urban construction for housing, office space, and transport services over the next 40 years could roughly equal the entire volume of such construction to date in world history.

Megatrend 4: Growing Food, Water, and Energy Nexus

Demand for food, water, and energy will grow by approximately 35, 40, and 50 percent respectively owing to an increase in the global population and the consumption patterns of an expanding middle class. Climate change will worsen the outlook for the availability of these critical resources. Climate change analysis suggests that the severity of existing weather patterns will intensify, with wet areas getting wetter and dry and arid areas becoming more so. Much of the decline in precipitation will occur in the Middle East and northern Africa as well as western Central Asia, southern Europe, southern Africa, and the US Southwest.

We are not necessarily headed into a world of scarcities, but policymakers and their private sector partners will need to be proactive to avoid such a future. Many countries probably won’t have the wherewithal to avoid food and water shortages without massive help from outside. Tackling problems pertaining to one commodity won’t be possible without affecting supply and demand for the others. Agriculture is highly dependent on accessibility to adequate sources of water as well as on energy-rich fertilizers. Hydropower is a significant source of energy for some regions while new sources of energy—such as biofuels—threaten to exacerbate the potential for food shortages. There is as much scope for negative tradeoffs as there is the potential for positive synergies. Agricultural productivity in Africa, particularly, will require a sea change to avoid shortages. Unlike Asia and South America, which have achieved significant improvements in agricultural production per capita, Africa has only recently returned to 1970s’ levels.

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Dennis Moore – Full Film

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus S3E11: Dennis Moore

SI Swimsuit Video – Jessica

Travel to Israel with Jessica for her SI Swimsuit 2008 shoot. For more SI Swimsuit photos and videos visit http://www.si.com/swimsuit

SECRECY NEWS –

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which authorizes
intelligence surveillance activities, acknowledged in 2007 that it has
issued "legally significant decisions that remain classified and have not
been released to the public."

In 2010, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the
Department of Justice undertook to declassify those Court rulings, but
since then none has been released. Why not?

"We tried," a senior intelligence agency official said, but the rulings
were hard to declassify. After redacting classified operational information
and other sensitive details, no intelligible text of any consequence
remained, according to this official.

The Department of Justice made a similar assertion years ago in response
to a lawsuit brought by the ACLU, stating that "Any legal discussion that
may be contained in these materials would be inextricably intertwined with
the operational details of the authorized surveillance."

Although the 2010 declassification initiative has not been formally
cancelled, it is unclear how or why the failure to date to declassify the
FISC orders would change.

In the debate over reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act, Sen. Jeff
Merkley offered an amendment that was intended to break the current
impasse.  If a surveillance court order could not be declassified, the
amendment proposed, then an unclassified summary of the order should be
prepared.  (If even that were not possible, the amendment would have
required a report on the status of the declassification process.)

        http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/faa-amend.html#fisc

The Merkley amendment, like others, was rejected by the full Senate.  But
Senator Dianne Feinstein, the Intelligence Committee chair, offered her
assistance to Sen. Merkley in advancing public access to FIS Court
opinions.

"If the opinion cannot be made public, hopefully a summary of the opinion
can," Sen. Feinstein said on December 27. "And I have agreed with Senator
Merkley to work together on this issue."

But the intelligence agency official said that unclassified summaries of
surveillance court decisions were probably not a satisfactory alternative. 
A summary written by the Department of Justice would not be a statement of
the court's opinion at all, the official said.  At best, it would represent
the Administration's own understanding of what the court had ruled,
paraphrased for public release.

What if the Court itself were to prepare its opinions in a "tearline"
format, with a general statement of its findings presented separately from
the more highly classified specifics of the case under discussion?  Would
that not facilitate declassification and release of the court rulings?

"That might work," the official said.  However, he said, it would be
"awkward" for agencies to presume to tell the court how to format its
opinions.

But it would not be awkward for members of Congress to make such a
request, perhaps in a forthcoming letter referenced by Sen. Feinstein.

"I have offered to Senator Merkley to write a letter requesting
declassification of more FISA Court opinions," she said. "If the letter
does not work, we will do another intelligence authorization bill next
year, and we can discuss what can be added to that bill on this issue."

In the past, a handful of FISA Court opinions have been declassified and
made public, including a FISC opinion dated May 17, 2002, a FIS Court of
Review (FISCR) opinion dated November 18, 2002, and a FISCR opinion dated
August 22, 2008.

NEW PROCEDURES FOR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM ACQUISITION

The Director of National Intelligence issued a directive last month
prescribing procedures for major system acquisitions by elements of the
intelligence community.

The directive defines a multi-phase process for identifying critical
needs, evaluating alternative paths to meet those needs, and so forth.

See Intelligence Community Directive 115, "Intelligence Community
Capability Requirements Process," December 21, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-115.pdf

REACHING THE DEBT LIMIT, AND MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service which
Congress has directed CRS not to release to the public include the
following.

Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government
Operations, January 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41633.pdf

The "Fiscal Cliff" and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, January
4, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42884.pdf

Proposals to Change the Operation of Cloture in the Senate, January 3,
2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41342.pdf

International Trade and Finance: Key Policy Issues for the 113th Congress,
January 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42882.pdf

Speakers of the House: Elections, 1913-2013, January 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30857.pdf

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) and Claims of Property Rights "Takings",
January 7, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31796.pdf

The Role of TARP Assistance in the Restructuring of General Motors,
January 3, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41978.pdf

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, January
4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf

U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues, January 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41952.pdf

North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation,
January 4, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
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     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

TMZ – Jessica Alba — Back on All Fours!

 

Jessica Alba hit the beach in Mexico and assumed the position that she made famous almost 8 years ago… and it’s STILL just as hot as it was then!

TOP-SECRET – Senator Coburn DHS Urban Areas Security Initiative Waste Report

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/SenatorCoburn-UASI.png

 

Safety at Any Price: Assessing the Impact of Department of Homeland Security Spending in U.S. Cities

  • 55 pages
  • December 2012
  • 4.46 MB

Download

This report examines the UASI grant program, including a detailed review of 15 cities that have received funding through the program. It is intended to assess whether spending on DHS antiterrorism grants like UASI have made us safer, and whether the taxpayer dollars that have been spent on these programs have yielded an adequate return on investment in terms of improved security.

The results of the investigation find that taxpayer money spent on homeland security grant programs has not always been spent in ways obviously linked to terrorism or preparedness. Importantly, this does not mean money was spent outside the bounds of what was allowed. The decision by officials in Michigan to purchase 13 sno-cone machines and the $45 million that was spent by officials in Cook County, Illinois on a failed video surveillance network have already garnered national attention as examples of dubious spending. Both were defended or promoted by DHS.

Other examples have not received as much attention. Columbus, Ohio recently used a $98,000 UASI grant to purchase an “underwater robot.” Local officials explained that it would be used to assist in underwater rescues.

Keene, New Hampshire, with a population just over 23,000 and a police force of 40, set aside UASI funds to buy a BearCat armored vehicle. Despite reporting only a single homicide in the prior two years, the City of Keene told DHS the vehicle was needed to patrol events like its annual pumpkin festival. Tulsa, Oklahoma used UASI funding to harden a county jail and purchase a color printer.

In 2009, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania purchased for $88,000 several “long-range acoustic device,” or LRAD, which is mounted on a truck and emits an ear-splitting sound. Local officials used it to disperse G-20 protestors, giving one bystander permanent hearing loss, but which they called “a kinder and gentler way to get people to leave.”

Peoria, Arizona spent $90,000 to install bollards and surveillance cameras at the Peoria Sports Complex, which is used for spring training by the San Diego Padres and Seattle Mariners. The Oxnard-Thousand Oaks UASI used $75,000 to also purchase surveillance equipment, alarms and closed-circuit television, which it installed in its Civic Arts Plaza, a local theater and cultural center.

UASI funds were also used for mundane expenses, such as paying the overtime costs of police and firefighters or purchasing new computers for the local emergency planning office. Some urban areas used their awards for local outreach, holding conferences, creating websites and posting videos on how citizens can spot signs of terror in their own neighborhoods. A video sponsored by the Jacksonville UASI alerted its residents to red flags such as people with “average or above average intelligence” or who displayed “increased frequency of prayer or religious behavior.”

When asked, FEMA could not explain precisely how the UASI program has closed security gaps or prepared the nation in the event of another attack. In part, FEMA has done very little oversight of the program, allowing cities to spend the money on almost anything they want, as long as it has broad ties to terror prevention. In fact, according to a June 2012 report by the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General, “FEMA did not have a system in place to determine the extent that Homeland Security Grant Program funds enhanced the states’ capabilities to prevent, deter, response to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies before awarding more funds to the states.” Moreover, the agency failed to issue preparedness goals, intended to shape the use of UASI funds, until last year—nine years after the program was created. Because of this, it is difficult to measure the gains with any specificity.

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Mr. Neutron – Full Movie

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus S4E05: Mr. Neutron

SI Swimsuit Video: Julie in Israel

TOP SECRET – Thomas Donahue Fletcher

Thomas Donahue Fletcher

Thomas Donahue Fletcher is an undercover CIA officer identified to journalist Matthew Cole by former CIA officer John Kiriakou which has led to Kiriakou’s prosecution and guilty plea — to be sentenced to prison shortly. Fletcher is reported to be the officer heading the CIA’s waterboarding enhanced interrogation program.

NY Times front page story on Kiriakou, 6 January 2012:

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/us/former-cia-officer-is-the-first-to-face-prison-for-a-
classified-leak.html

NY Times does not print Fletcher’s name but he was identified on several web sites in October 2012. Cryptocomb reported then Fletcher was based at CIA headquarters and lived in Vienna, VA.

Joining infamously with Fletcher, but not yet publicly named, “CIA John” is reported to be the prinicipal proponent of the CIA drone assassination program.

http://cryptome.org/2012/12/cia-john-drone.htm

Photographs of CIA John:

http://cryptome.org/0004/cia-john/cia-john.htm

Photos of Fletcher and identity of CIA John invited: cryptome[at]earthlink.net

 


 

Thomas Donahue Fletcher

http://www.city-data.com/fairfax-county/H/Huntrace-Way-2.html10413 Huntrace Way
Vienna, VA

Owner: THOMAS D FLETCHER

Land value: $257,000
Building value: $284,400
Total value for property: $541,400

Land area: 21,534 square feet
Living area: 2,560 square feet
Utilities: Water connected, Sewer connected, Gas connected
Number of stories: 2
Building use: Single Dwelling or Patio House
Style: 2 Story

Exterior wall: Half Aluminum/Half Brick
Floor type: Hardwood
Roof type: Wood Shingle
Basement: Full
Basement type: Daylight
Number of bedrooms: 5
Number of full bathrooms: 3
Number of half bathrooms: 1
Heating: Yes
Number of fireplaces: 1
Year property was built: 1968

Additions:

Addition type: Lower: Frame/brick
Addition area: 264 square feet
Addition type: Lower: Open porch or portico
Addition area: 48 square feet
Addition type: Lower: Wood deck
Addition area: 566 square feet
Addition type: Lower: Attached garage
Addition area: 484 square feet
Sale date for most recent sale: 10/26/1998
Sale price for most recent sale: $282,000
Sale date for second most recent sale: 10/17/1990

Read more: http://www.city-data.com/fairfax-county/H/Huntrace-Way-2.html#ixzz2HClu2kh9

Google Maps[Image]
Google Street View[Image]
Bing Maps Birdseye[Image]
[Image]
[Image]
[Image]
Intellius report on Fletcher — addresses, relatives, neighbors:http://cryptome.org/2013-info/01/fletcher-intellius.pdf

TMZ – From the Vault: Paris Hilton Goes Postal — Caught on Tape

 

In 2008, a skeleton-hoodied Paris Hilton walked into this Toronto porn shop after spying a cardboard cutout of herself — hawking her sex tape!

Confidential – FBI Cyber Alert

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/FBI-AntisecICS.png

 

Vulnerabilities in Tridium Niagara Framework Result in Unauthorized Access to a New Jersey Company’s Industrial Control System

  • 5 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • July 23, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) In February and March 2012, unauthorized IP addresses accessed the Industrial Control System (ICS) network of a New Jersey air conditioning company, US Business 1. The intruders were able to access a backdoor into the ICS system that allowed access to the main control mechanism for the company’s internal heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) units. US Business 1 was using the Tridium Niagara ICS system, which has been widely reported in the media to contain multiple vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker to remotely control the system.

(U//FOUO) On 21 and 23 January 2012, an unknown subject posted comments on a known US website, titled “#US #SCADA #IDIOTS” and “#US #SCADA #IDIOTS part-II”. The postings were linked to the moniker “@ntisec”, and indicated that hackers were targeting SCADA systems this year, and something had to be done to address SCADA vulnerabilities.

(U) The user of the “@ntisec” moniker searched Google, and the website http://www.shodanhq.com, for the term “:(unknown character) slot:/” and “#TRIDIUM / #NIAGARA vector”. The posting by “@ntisec” included a list of URLs, one of which was an IP address that resolved to US Business 1, and was assigned to its office building’s HVAC control system.

(U//FOUO) The main control box for the HVAC system of US Business 1 was a Tridium brand, Niagara model controller. US Business 1 actively used this system in-house, but also installed the control system for customers, which included banking institutions and other commercial entities. An IT contractor of US Business 1 confirmed the Niagara control box was directly connected to the Internet with no interposing firewall.

(U//FOUO) US Business 1 had a controller for the system that was password protected, but was set up for remote/Internet access. By using the link posted by the hacktivist, the published backdoor URL provided the same level of access to the company’s control system as the password-protected administrator login. The backdoor required no password and allowed direct access to the control system.

(U//FOUO) Logs from the controller at US Business 1 dated back to 3 February 2012, and access to the controller was found from multiple unauthorized international and US-based IP addresses.

(U//FOUO) The URL that linked to the control system of US Business 1 provided access to a Graphical User Interface (GUI), which provided a floor plan layout of the office, with control fields and feedback for each office and shop area. All areas of the office were clearly labeled with employee names or area names.

(U) On 13 July 2012, the Department of Homeland Security released ICS-CERT ALERT entitled, “Tridium Niagara Directory Traversal and Weak Credential Storage Vulnerability”, which detailed vulnerabilities within the Niagara AX ICS that are exploitable by downloading and decrypting the file containing the user credential from the server.

(U) According to the Tridium website, over 300,000 instances of Niagara AX Framework are installed worldwide in applications that include energy management, building automation, telecommunications, security automation and lighting control.

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Michael Ellis – Full Film

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus S4E02: Michael Ellis

TMZ – Chris Brown — Rihanna Returns to the Scene of the Crime

 

Rihanna was photographed in the passenger seat of Chris Brown’s car… the same place where she was viciously beaten by Brown almost four years ago!

TOP-SECRET – DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Observation/Surveillance

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/DHS-FBI-Observation.png

 

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • October 15, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorists often conduct physical surveillance to identify suitable targets, determine vulnerabilities, plan attack methods, or assess the target’s security posture.  In March 2010, David Coleman Headley pled guilty for his role in the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India by conducting video and photographic surveillance of potential targets, as well as later surveilling Danish newspaper offices–the target of another attack plot.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incidents from the NSI shared space demonstrate types of behavior terrorists might exhibit during planning or actual attacks. Although none were linked to terrorist activity, we consider the examples relevant for situational awareness and training:

– (U//FOUO) A city utility company reported suspicious surveillance activity at a hydroelectric plant.  On six occasions within a three-day period, two vehicles of the same color, make, and model (but with different license plate numbers) were observed traveling slowly on the road adjacent to the plant, stopping at specific posts on the property, turning around, and slowly returning in the other direction.
– (U//FOUO) A prominent hotel in a major metropolitan area reported a male and a female photographing the hotel entrances from a vehicle with Canadian license plates.  Security camera footage showed the vehicle moved at lease twice to different locations around the hotel while the passenger took photos of the hotel and surrounding restaurants and the driver on a clipboard.  No additional information regarding this incident is available.

(U) Possible Indicators of Observation/Surveillance

(U//FOUO) The following may indicate suspicious observation/surveillance activity and should be reported to appropriate authorities, but context (time, location, personal behaviors, and other indicators) should be carefully considered to rule out legitimate, non-suspicious activities:

– (U//FOUO) Unusual, repeated, or prolonged observation of infrastructure (for example, with binoculars or video cameras);
– (U//FOUO) Taking notes or measurements, counting places, sketching floor plans, maps, or diagrams;
– (U//FOUO) Scrutinizing security personnel, shift changes, or facility activities; or
– (U//FOUO) Extended loitering without explanation, particularly in concealed locations with optimal visibility or potential targets.

(U//FOUO) First Ammendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).

Monty Python’s Flying Circus: The Nude Organist – Full Movie

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus S3E09: The Nude Organist

Revealed – Former C.I.A. Officer Is the First to Face Prison for a Classified Leak

The first C.I.A. officer to be
convicted of disclosing classified
information to a reporter in more
than six decades is scheduled to be
sentenced to 30 months in prison on
Jan. 25. John Kiriakou is to be
sentenced as part of a plea deal in
which he admitted e-mailing the name
of a covert officer to a
reporter.His prosecution, as well as
five others, has been lauded on
Capitol Hill as a long-overdue
response to a rash of dangerous
disclosures and defended by both
President Obama and Attorney General
Eric H. Holder Jr.Mr. Kiriakou is
remorseful, up to a point. “I
should never have provided the
name,” he said.Supporters say
Mr. Kiriakou neither intended to
damage national security nor did so.
Some see a dark paradox in the
impending imprisonment of Mr.
Kiriakou, who in a 2007 appearance
on ABC News defended the
C.I.A.’s use of desperate
measures to get information but also
said that he had come to believe
that waterboarding was torture and
should no longer be used.

TMZ – Tamala Jones: Here’s What Kim Kardashian Should Name Her Baby…

 

“Castle” star Tamala Jones offered some free advice as to what Kim Kardashian should name her baby… and her suggestions are ABSOLUTELY FANTASTIC!

SECRET – Verizon Patent: DVR That Watches Users to Target Advertising

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Verizon-DVR-Patent.png

 

METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR PRESENTING AN ADVERTISEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH AN AMBIENT ACTION OF A USER

  • 14 pages
  • November 29, 2012

Download

Exemplary targeted advertising systems and methods are disclosed herein. An exemplary method includes a media content presentation system presenting a media content program comprising an advertisement break, detecting an ambient action performed by a user during the presentation of the media content program, selecting an advertisement associated with the detected ambient action, and presenting the selected advertisement during the advertisement break. Corresponding methods and systems are also disclosed.

[0001] The advent of set-top box devices and other media content access devices (“access devices”) has provided users with access to a large number and variety of media content choices. For example, a user may choose to experience a variety of broadcast television programs, pay-per-view services, video-on-demand programming, Internet services, and audio programming via a set-top box device. Such access devices have also provided service providers (e.g., television service providers) with an ability to present advertising to users. For example, designated advertisement channels may be used to deliver various advertisements to an access device for presentation to one or more users. In some examples, advertising may be targeted to a specific user or group of users of an access device.

[0002] However, traditional targeted advertising systems and methods may base targeted advertising solely on user profile information associated with a media content access device and/or user interactions directly with the media content access device. Accordingly, traditional targeted advertising systems and methods fail to account for one or more ambient actions of a user while the user is experiencing media content using a media content access device. For example, if a user is watching a television program, a traditional targeted advertising system fails to account for what the user is doing (e.g., eating, interacting with another user, sleeping, etc.) while the user is watching the television program. This limits the effectiveness, personalization, and/or adaptability of the targeted advertising.

[0015] Detection facility 104 may be configured to detect an ambient action performed by a user during the presentation of a media content program (e.g., by presentation facility 102). As used herein, the term “ambient action” may refer to any action performed by a user that is independent of and/or not directed at a media content access device presenting media content. For example, an ambient action may include any suitable action of a user during a presentation of a media content program by a media content access device, whether the user is actively experiencing (e.g., actively viewing) or passively experiencing (e.g., passively viewing and/or listening while the user is doing something else) the media content being presented.

[0016] To illustrate, an exemplary ambient action may include the user eating, exercising, laughing, reading, sleeping, talking, singing, humming, cleaning, playing a musical instrument, performing any other suitable action, and/or engaging in any other physical activity during the presentation of the media content. In certain examples, the ambient action may include an interaction by the user with another user (e.g., another user physically located in the same room as the user). To illustrate, the ambient action may include the user talking to, cuddling with, fighting with, wrestling with, playing a game with, competing with, and/or otherwise interacting with the other user. In further examples, the ambient action may include the user interacting with a separate media content access device (e.g., a media content access device separate from the media content access device presenting the media content). For example, the ambient action may include the user interacting with a mobile device (e.g., a mobile phone device, a tablet computer, a laptop computer, etc.) during the presentation of a media content program by a set-top box (“STB”) device.

Monty Python and the Holy Grail (1975) HD – Full Movie

Sports Illustrated Swimsuit Video : Daniella

 

Watch Brazilian super-model Daniella Sarahyba in Cayman Islands for her SI Swimsuit 2008 shoot. For more SI Swimsuit photos and videos visit http://www.si.com/swimsuit

SECRECY NEWS – AN OPEN SOURCE LOOK AT IRAN’S INTELLIGENCE MINISTRY

Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security is believed to employ more
than 30,000 intelligence officers and support personnel, making it "one of
the largest and most active intelligence agencies in the Middle East,"
according to a new report from the Federal Research Division of the Library
of Congress.

"The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) uses all means at its
disposal to protect the Islamic Revolution of Iran, utilizing such methods
as infiltrating internal opposition groups, monitoring domestic threats and
expatriate dissent, arresting alleged spies and dissidents, exposing
conspiracies deemed threatening, and maintaining liaison with other foreign
intelligence agencies as well as with organizations that protect the
Islamic Republic's interests around the world," the report states.

See "Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile," December
2012.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/world/iran/mois-loc.pdf

The report was first obtained and reported by Bill Gertz in "Iran Spy
Network 30,000 Strong," Washington Free Beacon, January 3, 2013.

        http://freebeacon.com/iran-spy-network-30000-strong/

The new report provides an informative account of the Ministry's history,
organizational structure, and recruitment practices, as far as these can be
discerned from published sources.

"The information in this report was collected mainly from Farsi and
English journals, online news Web sites, and Iranian blogs," the Preface
states.  (Some older information from the FAS web site is cited at a couple
of points.)

"Needless to say, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security does not
publish information about its activities on Iranian Web sites.
Consequently, in the absence of official government information, this
report occasionally relies on social media, in particular blogs, as a
source of information more than might ordinarily be warranted. The
reliability of blog-based information may be questionable at times, but it
seems prudent to evaluate and present it in the absence of alternatives."

"Every minister of intelligence must hold a degree in ijtihad (the ability
to interpret Islamic sources such as the Quran and the words of the Prophet
and imams) from a religious school, abstain from membership in any
political party or group, have a reputation for personal integrity, and
possess a strong political and management background," the report says.

A newly disclosed U.S. Army intelligence document explains how to
determine whether weapons that were captured in Iraq were manufactured in
Iran.

Iranian weapons systems "have several distinctive visual identification
markings that identify their source" which are described in the Army
publication.  The document was partially declassified last month and was
obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Matthew Schroeder of the
FAS Arms Sales Monitoring Project.

See "Identifying Small Arms and RPGs Produced in Iran," U.S. Army National
Ground Intelligence Center, 2004.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/world/iran/smallarms.pdf

ARMY DRAWDOWN, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that
Congress has not made available to the public include the following.

Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress,
January 3, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42493.pdf

U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress,
January 3, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf

The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for
Congress, January 3, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf

Internet Domain Names: Background and Policy Issues, January 3, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-868.pdf

Internet Governance and the Domain Name System: Issues for Congress,
January 2, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42351.pdf

Federal Regulation of Chemicals in Commerce: An Overview of Issues for the
113th Congress, January 3, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42879.pdf

Physician Practices: Background, Organization, and Market Consolidation,
January 2, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42880.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
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Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

TMZ – Kim Kardashian Getting Pregnant Sparks SEX TAPE Boom!

 

So how is everyone celebrating the wonderful news that Kim Kardashian is pregnant? By watching her sex tape!!! Yeah, there are A LOT of weirdos out there, folks…

TOP-SECRET – DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Photography

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/DHS-FBI-Photography.png

 

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • November 13, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorists and criminals may use photos or videos of potential targets to gain insight into security operations and details of facility operations, including traffic flow through and around facilities, opening times, and access requirements. In late 2000 and early 2001, convicted al-Oa’ida operative Dhiren Barot took extensive video footage and numerous photographs of sites in downtown New York City and Washington, DC in preparation for planned attacks. Photographs and video useful in planning an attack may include facility security devices (surveillance cameras, security locks, metal detectors, jersey walls and planters); security personnel; facility entrances and exits; and other features such as lighting, access routes, gates, roads, walkways, and bridges.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incidents reported to the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) shared space demonstrate types of suspicious photography and videography consistent with pre-operational activity and attack planning. Although none were ultimately linked to terrorist activity, they are cited as examples for awareness and training purposes:

(U//FOUO) An individual took photographs of several buildings, a control tower, and lighting system poles associated with an elevated runway approach at an aviation facility.

(U//FOUO) An individual was encountered videotaping in a well-known retail complex while in the garage. The individual had video of the building’s ventilating system. The individual was
arrested when he returned to the area after; having been directed to leave.

(U//FOUO) An individual took photos and video in a mall while holding the phone close to his body at waist level. The photographs and video footage included the mall storefronts, upper mall structures, bridges, exit doors, and closed-circuit television cameras.

(U//FOUO) Indicators of Potentially Suspicious Photography

(U//FOUO) The following activities are consistent with suspicious photography. Although a single indicator may not be suspicious, one or more in combination may signify suspicious activity:

– (U//FOUO) Photography or videography focused on security features, including cameras, security personnel, gates, and barriers.
– (U//FOUO) Repeated visits by the same individual(s) taking photographs or video of vulnerable features, or security features of critical infrastructure.
– (U//FOUO) Individuals encountered with photographs of critical infrastructure, iconic buildings, or other sites not of tourist interest.

(U//FOUO) First Ammendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Mr. and Mrs. Norris’ Ford Popular

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus S3E02: Mr. and Mrs. Norris’ Ford Popular

The Chambers Brothers – Time Has Come Today (long version) – Video

 

 (Rare live, extended version)

The FBI – Former Bank Employees Admit Embezzlement

Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, and George L. Piro, Acting Special Agent in Charge, Albany Division-Federal Bureau of Investigation, make the following announcement:

Megan Horton, 54, of Owego, Tioga County, New York; and Gwenn Gooding, 43, also of Owego, Tioga County, New York, pled guilty today in United States District Court to the felony crime of bank embezzlement. Shannon Moore, 38, of Athens, Bradford County, Pennsylvania, previously pled guilty on December 21, 2012, in United States District Court to a similar felony crime of bank embezzlement. Horton, Gooding, and Moore were former employees of Chemung Canal Trust Company Bank (CCTC), located at 203 Main Street, Owego, New York.

In their pleas before Senior United States District Court Judge Thomas J. McAvoy, Horton, former branch manager; Gooding, former head teller; and Moore, a former teller, admitted that, between December 2004, and September 2011, they embezzled large sums of money from CCTC. Horton admitted stealing more than $200,000; Gooding admitted stealing more than $100,000; and Moore admitted stealing more than $25,000. The embezzlement was uncovered as a result of an audit of the CCTC bank branch following the Southern Tier flooding in September 2011.

Horton, Gooding, and Moore each face a maximum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of $1 million. Moore is scheduled to be sentenced on April 23, 2013; Gooding is scheduled to be sentenced on May 4, 2013; and Horton is scheduled to be sentenced on May 7, 2013.

The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Albany Field Division, and is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Thomas P. Walsh. Further inquiries may be directed to the United States Attorney’s Office, Binghamton branch office, at (607) 773-2887.

SI Swimsuit Video: Irina

 

Watch super model Irina in Russia for her SI Swimsuit 2008 shoot. For more photos and videos visit http://www.si.com/swimsuit.

Transocean to Pay Record $1 Billion in Civil Penalties and $400 Million in Criminal Fines

WASHINGTON—Transocean Deepwater Inc. has agreed to plead guilty to violating the Clean Water Act (CWA) and to pay a total of $1.4 billion in civil and criminal fines and penalties for its conduct in relation to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the Department of Justice announced today. The criminal information and a proposed partial civil consent decree to resolve the U.S. government’s civil penalty claims against Transocean Deepwater Inc. and related entities were filed today in U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Transocean Deepwater Inc. has signed a cooperation and guilty plea agreement with the government, also filed today, admitting its criminal conduct. As part of the plea agreement, Transocean Deepwater Inc. has agreed, subject to the court’s approval, to pay $400 million in criminal fines and penalties and to continue its ongoing cooperation in the government’s criminal investigation. In addition, pursuant to the terms of a proposed partial civil consent decree also lodged with the court today, Transocean Ocean Holdings LLC, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling Inc., Transocean Deepwater Inc., and Triton Asset Leasing GMBH have agreed to pay an additional $1 billion to resolve federal Clean Water Act civil penalty claims for the massive, three-month-long oil spill at the Macondo Well and the Transocean drilling rig Deepwater Horizon. Under the civil settlement, the Transocean defendants also must implement court-enforceable measures to improve the operational safety and emergency response capabilities at all their drilling rigs working in waters of the United States.

“This resolution of criminal allegations and civil claims against Transocean brings us one significant step closer to justice for the human, environmental, and economic devastation wrought by the Deepwater Horizon disaster,” said Attorney General Eric Holder. “This agreement holds Transocean criminally accountable for its conduct and provides nearly a billion dollars in criminal and civil penalties for the benefit of the Gulf states. I am particularly grateful today to the many Justice Department personnel and federal investigative agency partners for the hard work that led to today’s resolution and their continuing pursuit of justice for the people of the Gulf.”

“Today’s announced settlement will aid the Gulf region’s recovery from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and require Transocean to take important steps that will help guard against such incidents happening in the future,” said Acting Associate Attorney General Tony West. “This resolution is the culmination of the tremendous efforts of many attorneys and staff in the Justice Department’s Criminal, Civil, and Environment and Natural Resources Divisions—dedicated public servants whose hard work continues on behalf of the American people.”

“Transocean’s rig crew accepted the direction of BP well site leaders to proceed in the face of clear danger signs—at a tragic cost to many of them,” said Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “Transocean’s agreement to plead guilty to a federal crime and to pay a total of $1.4 billion in criminal and civil penalties, appropriately reflects its role in the Deepwater Horizon disaster.”

“The development and exploration of a domestic source of energy is vitally important, and it can and must be done in a responsible and sound manner. This unprecedented settlement under the Clean Water Act demonstrates that companies will be held fully accountable for their conduct and share responsibility for compliance with the laws that protect the public and the environment from harm,” said Ignacia S. Moreno, Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Environment and Natural Resources Division. “This settlement will provide immediate relief and benefits to the people of the five Gulf states and requires Transocean to implement significant safety measures, as well as stringent auditing and monitoring to reduce the risk of any future disasters.”

“Today’s settlement and plea agreement is an important step toward holding Transocean and those responsible for the Deepwater Horizon disaster accountable,” said Cynthia Giles, Assistant Administrator for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. “EPA will continue to work with DOJ and its federal partners to vigorously pursue the government’s claims against all responsible parties and ensure that we are taking every possible step to restore and protect the Gulf Coast ecosystem.”

According to court documents, on April 20, 2010, while stationed at the Macondo well site in the Gulf of Mexico, the Deepwater Horizon rig experienced an uncontrolled blowout and related explosions and fire, which resulted in the deaths of 11 rig workers and the largest oil spill in U.S. history. In agreeing to plead guilty, Transocean Deepwater Inc. has admitted that members of its crew onboard the Deepwater Horizon, acting at the direction of BP’s “Well Site Leaders” or “company men,” were negligent in failing fully to investigate clear indications that the Macondo well was not secure and that oil and gas were flowing into the well.

The criminal resolution is structured to directly benefit the Gulf region. Under the order presented to the court, $150 million of the $400 million criminal recovery is dedicated to acquiring, restoring, preserving, and conserving—in consultation with appropriate state and other resource managers—the marine and coastal environments, ecosystems, and bird and wildlife habitat in the Gulf of Mexico and bordering states harmed by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. This portion of the criminal recovery will also be directed to significant barrier island restoration and/or river diversion off the coast of Louisiana to further benefit and improve coastal wetlands affected by the oil spill. An additional $150 million will be used to fund improved oil spill prevention and response efforts in the Gulf through research, development, education, and training.

The civil settlement secures $1 billion in civil penalties for violations of the CWA, a record amount that significantly exceeds last year’s $70 million civil penalty paid by MOEX Offshore 2007 LLC, a 10 percent partner with BP in the Macondo well venture. The unprecedented $1 billion civil penalty is subject to the Resources and Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist Opportunities, and Revived Economies of the Gulf Coast States Act of 2012 (Restore Act), which provides that 80 percent of the penalty will be to be used to fund projects in and for the Gulf states for the environmental and economic benefit of the region. This civil resolution reserves claims for natural resource damages and clean-up costs.

Under the civil settlement, the Transocean defendants must also observe various court-enforceable strictures in its drilling operations, aimed at reducing the chances of another blowout and discharge of oil and at improving emergency response capabilities. Examples of these requirements include certifications of maintenance and repair of blowout preventers before each new drilling job, consideration of process safety risks, and personnel training related to oil spills and responses to other emergencies. These measures apply to all rigs operated or owned by the Transocean defendants in all U.S. waters and will be in place for at least five years.

The guilty plea agreement and criminal charge announced today are part of the ongoing criminal investigation by the Deepwater Horizon Task Force into matters related to the April 2010 Gulf oil spill. The Deepwater Horizon Task Force, based in New Orleans, is supervised by Assistant Attorney General Breuer and led by Deputy Assistant Attorney General John D. Buretta, who serves as the director of the task force. The task force includes prosecutors from the Criminal Division and the Environment and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice; the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Louisiana, as well as other U.S. Attorneys’ Offices; and investigating agents from the FBI, EPA, Department of the Interior, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of Law Enforcement, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality.

The civil resolution announced today is part of the ongoing litigation against defendants BP Exploration and Production Inc., the Transocean defendants, and Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (among others) for civil penalties, injunctive relief, and a declaration of unlimited liability for removal costs and damages under the Oil Pollution Act. The civil enforcement effort is supervised by Assistant Attorney General Moreno for the Environment and Natural Resources Division and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian Hauck of the Civil Division. Numerous federal agencies have contributed immeasurably to these enforcement and settlement efforts, including the EPA, the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture.

The criminal case against Transocean is being prosecuted by Deepwater Horizon Task Force Deputy Directors Derek A. Cohen and Avi Gesser and task force prosecutors Richard R. Pickens, II, Scott M. Cullen, Colin Black, and Rohan Virginkar. Numerous Environment Division and Civil Division lawyers are pursuing the civil enforcement action, led by Steve O’Rourke and R. Michael Underhill.

An information is merely a charge, and a defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The proposed civil settlement is subject to a public comment period and final court approval. Information on submitting comment will be available at http://www.justice.gov/enrd/Consent_Decrees.html.

TMZ – Why Jessica Simpson Should HATE Kim Kardashian’s Baby!

 

Kanye West is beyond excited that Kim Kardashian is having his baby… but you know who shouldn’t be happy in the slightest? Jessica friggin’ Simpson — that’s who!

SECRET-DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Materials Acquisition/Storage

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/DHS-FBI-MaterialsAcquisition.png

 

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • August 7, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorists overseas and in domestic attack plots have used various methods to acquire and store materials necessary to construct explosives. Najibullah Zazi, who pled guilty in 2010 to plotting to attack the New York subway system, made multiple, large-quantity purchases of chemical components needed to assemble the homemade explosive Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP)—6 bottles on one day and 12 bottles on a separate day—at beauty supply stores throughout the summer of 2009. Law enforcement and first responders should be aware that the possession, storage, or attempt to acquire unusual quantities of laboratory equipment, personal protective equipment, chemicals, and flammable accelerants—although legal to purchase and own—could provide indicators of preoperational attack planning.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incidents reported to the NSI shared space demonstrate types of suspicious material acquisition and storage that could be indicative of preoperational activity and attack planning. While none were ultimately linked to terrorist activity, they are cited as examples for awareness and training purposes:

— (U//FOUO) A tip prompted police to search a residential property where they discovered TATP; bomb components such as fuses and pipes; laboratory equipment such as coolers and beakers; and precursor chemicals including hydrogen peroxide, acetone, hydrochloric acid, black/smokeless powder, glycerin, and aluminum powders.
— (U//FOUO) An individual contacted a home improvement store requesting to purchase 15 gallons of 35 percent food-grade hydrogen peroxide, a substance that can be used in making homemade explosives such as TATP and Hexamethylene Triperoxide Diamine.

(U) Possible Indicators of Suspicious Materials Acquisition and Storage

(U//FOUO) The following activities can indicate storage or efforts to acquire materials for potentially illicit purposes. Depending on the context—type and quantity of materials, reason for possession, personal behaviors, and other indicators— suspicious activities associated with acquisition or storage of materials should be reported to appropriate authorities.

— (U//FOUO) Individuals with signs of chemical exposure, including inhalation and skin burns.
— (U//FOUO) Non-agricultural chemical impact on foliage in close proximity of a residence or a business.
— (U//FOUO) Possession or attempts by individuals to acquire unusual quantities of materials used to produce explosives inconsistent with their stated purpose, business, or purchase history.
— (U//FOUO) Presence of precursor materials and protective/specialized handling equipment in residential dwellings or chemical containers and laboratory equipment discarded in residential neighborhoods.
— (U//FOUO) Presence of metal or plastic drums for storing chemicals, foul odors or caustic fumes coming from room or building, large industrial fans in windows at odd times of year.

(U//FOUO) Additionally, attempts to acquire official or fabricated uniforms, badges, access cards, or identification credentials or officially marked vehicles should be reported.

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Spam – Full Show Movie

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus S2E12 Spam

SECRERCY NEWS – INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT STEPS BACK FROM PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

The move by Congress to renew the FISA Amendments Act for five more years
without amendments came as a bitter disappointment to civil libertarians
who believe that the Act emphasizes government surveillance authority at
the expense of constitutional protections.  Amendments that were offered to
provide more public information about the impacts of government
surveillance on the privacy of American communications were rejected by the
Senate on December 27 and 28.

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/faa-amend.html

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/faa-reauth.html

Beyond the specifics of the surveillance law, the congressional action
appears to reflect a reorientation of intelligence oversight away from
public accountability.  The congressional intelligence committees once
presented themselves as champions of disclosure. They no longer do so.

The first annual report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
chaired by the late Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, stated in 1977 that "While most
of the work of the Committee is, of necessity, conducted in secrecy, we
believe that even secret activities must be as accountable to the public as
possible."

    http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pubactivities.html

Of course, the question of how much accountability is "possible" has
always been debatable.  But the basic principle of maximum possible
disclosure was endorsed by subsequent Committee leaders including Sen.
Barry Goldwater and Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan, who also wrote in 1981 that
"intelligence activities should be as accountable as possible to the
public."

In 1999, Senators Richard Shelby and Bob Kerrey affirmed on behalf of the
Intelligence Committee that "as much information as possible about
intelligence activities should be made available to the public."

But in recent years the Committee's periodic statement of principles has
changed in a subtle but significant way.  In its most recent report in
2011, the Committee said it seeks "to provide as much information as
possible about its intelligence oversight activities to the American public
consistent with national security concerns." Instead of disclosure and
public accountability for intelligence activities, the Committee would
promise only to reveal as much as possible about its oversight activities.

What makes this rhetorical shift noteworthy is that it seems to correspond
in broad strokes to a shift in the character and activity of the Committee
away from public accountability for intelligence.  Past Committees did not
always press for public accountability (and were not often successful when
they did), and the current Committee has not been completely indifferent to
it, but there does seem to be a perceptible trend.

The Senate Intelligence Committee used to be at the forefront of debates
over public disclosure of intelligence.  Demands for declassification --
often for intelligence budget information -- were a normal feature of
annual intelligence legislation in the 1990s. Public hearings, including
hearings with non-governmental witnesses, were commonplace.  To varying
degrees, Senators like Daniel Moynihan, Howard Metzenbaum, Arlen Specter,
Bob Kerrey, and others were thorns in the side of U.S. intelligence
agencies in support of public disclosure.

Over the past decade, however, the Committee's priorities appear to have
changed, to the detriment of public accountability.  In fact, despite the
Committee's assurance in its annual reports, public disclosure even of the
Committee's own oversight activities has decreased.

In 2012, the Committee held only one public hearing, despite the
prevalence of intelligence-related public controversies.  That is the
smallest number of public hearings the Committee has held in at least 25
years and possibly ever.  A non-governmental witness has not been invited
to testify at an open Committee hearing since 2007.

(A congressional official countered that in recent years confirmation
hearings had provided the occasion for most public hearings by the
Intelligence Committee, and that in 2012 there were simply no nominees
requiring hearings.  Meanwhile, the official noted, the Committee did
include a provision to reauthorize the Public Interest Declassification
Board in its markup of the 2013 intelligence bill.  And the Committee is
engaged with agency Inspectors General that are reviewing classification
practices in the intelligence community and elsewhere.  The Committee's own
web site has also been usefully supplemented with hearing records and
reports dating back to the 1970s.)

When annual disclosure of the intelligence budget total did finally become
a routine occurrence in 2007, it was principally through the legislative
efforts of Senators Joe Lieberman and Susan Collins of the Senate Homeland
Security Committee, not the Intelligence Committee.  Similarly, efforts to
strengthen oversight of intelligence by the Government Accountability
Office were led by Senator Daniel Akaka, again from outside the
Intelligence Committee.

(The Intelligence Committee did, however, legislate a requirement in 2010
for disclosure of the budget request for the National Intelligence Program.
 And it was cautiously supportive of an expanded role for GAO in
intelligence oversight.)

Most recently, the Intelligence Committee conducted a multi-year
investigation of the CIA's post-9/11 detention and interrogation program. 
It is, said Senator Dianne Feinstein, the Intelligence Committee chair, "by
far the most important oversight activity ever conducted by this
committee."  But the resulting report "will remain classified and is not
being released in whole or in part at this time," she said December 13. 
Its importance is evidently independent of any public impact it might have.

    http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2012/12/df121312.html

(A congressional official said there is an intent to make portions of the
report public over the coming months.)

Even in view of the contrary indications (noted above), and some others,
the dominant trend as we perceive it is that public accountability in
intelligence has been deemphasized.

Senator Feinstein made the point another way, when she said of the
Committee that "We are the public." 

"I mean, we are the public check on the Executive Branch," Sen. Feinstein
said during the FISA reauthorization debate on December 27, explaining why
she believed greater disclosure of information concerning government
surveillance activities was unnecessary. "We are not of the intelligence
community. We are the public, and it is our oversight, it is our due
diligence to go in and read the classified material."

Intelligence Committee Vice Chair Sen. Saxby Chambliss also said that the
Committees themselves provided public oversight by serving as proxies for
the public:  "In matters concerning the FISA Court, the congressional
Intelligence and Judiciary Committees serve as the eyes and ears of the
American people. Through this oversight, which includes being given all
significant decisions, orders, and opinions of the court, we can ensure
that the laws are being applied and implemented as Congress intended."

By these lights, public accountability is more or less superfluous. 
Senator Chambliss said that a report on the privacy impact of government
surveillance advocated by Sen. Ron Wyden was unnecessary, because "If we do
our job, there is absolutely no reason for this amendment--and we do our
job."

Members of the House Judiciary Committee last month expressed their own
confidence in non-public intelligence oversight.  They rejected a
resolution introduced by Rep. Dennis Kucinich to require the Attorney
General to produce legal justifications for the use of drones "relating to
the practice of targeted killing of United States citizens and targets
abroad," a subject of recurring public controversy.

In a December 18 report, the Committee said the Kucinich resolution was
unwarranted because "the House and Senate Intelligence Committees continue
to conduct robust oversight into the drone program that targets terrorists
and their associates."  Public controversy is beside the point.

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_rpt/adverse.html

How should one understand the apparent diminished interest in public
accountability?  It is hard to say.  There is a strain of political
commentary that characteristically invokes official bad faith as the
sovereign explanation for all disfavored policy outcomes:  Officials act
the way they do -- instead of the way I wanted them to -- because they are
power-hungry or compromised by financial interest, social affiliation, or
personal ambition.  This is usually a lazy and self-serving explanation (if
my opponents are scoundrels, I must be okay) even if it is not always and
altogether wrong.

Another possibility is that intelligence collection is much more fragile
than is generally recognized.  A senior intelligence agency official said
recently that if the specific surveillance methods authorized by the FISA
Amendments Act were to become public knowledge, those methods could be
circumvented or defeated "without much difficulty."  The official did not
elaborate.

Even if that were true, however, it would not explain the broader trends
-- the declining number of public hearings on intelligence, the diminished
focus on declassification, the abandoned (or muted) commitment to
disclosure of "as much information as possible about intelligence
activities."

Nor does it fully explain the Senate's categorical rejection last month of
all of the proposed amendments to the FISA Amendments Act, which were about
as undemanding as they could be. (The intelligence community said that one
amendment to require preparation of an estimate of the number of American
communications collected was not feasible or would entail privacy
violations of its own). Most of the amendments would not have imposed any
change in policy or any compulsory disclosure, but only certain reporting
obligations, and even those had waivers for national security concerns.  As
far as oversight and accountability are concerned, these proposals were
practically de minimis, of homeopathic proportions, and yet they were
rejected by the Senate.

(Although Sen. Jeff Merkley's amendment to promote declassification of
opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court was among the
rejected proposals, Sen. Feinstein said that she would work together with
Sen. Merkley to help achieve that end.)

"What it comes down to is what we define robust congressional oversight in
a program such as this to be," said Sen. Ron Wyden of his amendment to the
FISA Amendments Act, which was voted down on December 28.

"Plain and simple--we need more information," said Sen. Mark Udall. "How
else can we evaluate this policy? The American public has a right to know.
And needs to know. How many Americans are affected by FISA? Are existing
privacy protections working? Are they too weak? Do they need to be
strengthened? These are vital questions. They need to be answered. And so
far they have not been."

Now, for the foreseeable future, they will not be answered, at least not
to anyone outside of the intelligence committees.

NEW CRS REPORTS ON TAX POLICY

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that
Congress has not made available to the public include the following items
on tax policy.

International Corporate Tax Rate Comparisons and Policy Implications,
December 28, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41743.pdf

Reform of U.S. International Taxation: Alternatives, December 27, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34115.pdf

Distributional Effects of Taxes on Corporate Profits, Investment Income,
and Estates, December 27, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32517.pdf

Tax Deductions for Individuals: A Summary, December 20, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42872.pdf

Funding and Financing Highways and Public Transportation, December 26,
2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42877.pdf

The Debt Limit: History and Recent Increases, December 27, 2012:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31967.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Video – Sports Illustrated Swimsuit : Brooklyn Decker

 

Travel to Israel with super model Brooklyn Decker for her SI Swimsuit 2008 shoot

The FBI – Sovereign Citizen Extremists Targeting Law Enforcement

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/FBI-SovereignCitizensTargetingLEOs.png

 

Recent Sovereign Citizen Extremist Targeting of Law Enforcement Highlights Potential for Violence during Traffic Stops

  • 5 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • June 1, 2012

Download

(U//LES) The FBI assesses with medium confidence, based on reliable source reporting and reports from other law enforcement agencies, some sovereign citizen extremistsb are making more specific plans to interfere with state and local law enforcement officers during traffic stops and, in some cases, intentionally initiating contact with law enforcement. The FBI assesses with medium confidence that a shift from reacting to law enforcement scrutiny1,2 to targeting police officers indicates an increased interest in harassing and intimidating police and may lead to potentially hostile confrontations.

(U) Targeting Law Enforcement

(U//LES) Some sovereign citizen extremists have recently initiated contact with police officers, which the FBI assesses are attempts to harass officers. This assessment is based on sovereign citizen extremists’ past attempts to intimidate law enforcement and ideologically based distrust of government officials. If correct, this suggests a heightened interest among extremists in attempting to harass and intimidate law enforcement.

• (U) In April 2012, Arkansas law enforcement officers pulled over a self-proclaimed sovereign citizen. According to a news report, the man’s wife drove to the scene, told officers they had no right to arrest her husband, and said officers were committing “treason.” A struggle began and an officer used a Taser to subdue the man.

• (U//LES) In March 2012, self-described sovereign citizens in California demanded that law enforcement officers fill out a “Public Servant’s Questionnaire” during a traffic stop, with space for officers’ personal information. According to an officer of another law enforcement agency, sovereign citizens used the questionnaire to buy time and call others to the scene, who recorded the incident and made unreasonable demands.

• (U//LES) During a February 2012 traffic stop in Oregon involving a Republic for the united States of America (RuSA) [sic] member, the driver of a second vehicle traveled backward on a highway, parked, and became confrontational with the officers conducting the traffic stop, according to an officer of another law enforcement agency. The man, also a RuSA member, continued to approach even after officers ordered him to stop, but the incident ended peacefully.

• (U//LES) In December 2011, a self-described sovereign citizen followed an Arkansas state trooper and made a series of violations to deliberately initiate a traffic stop. The individual was hostile, and used a Bluetooth headset to speak to an unknown person during the stop. An unidentified driver of a second vehicle arrived at the scene, but the driver did not interact with the officer conducting the traffic stop.

(U) Plans to Target Law Enforcement Officers or Provide Armed Response to “Emergencies”

(U//LES) Some sovereign citizen extremist groups aspire to implement Ranger programs and other plans to respond to perceived law enforcement abuses. Given limited assets, the FBI assesses with high confidence complete implementation is unlikely. But the nature of these plans and beliefs that sovereign citizen extremists are legitimate law enforcement officers suggests even small or poorly funded versions of these plans have the potential for violence.

• (U) In March and April 2012, the RuSA released an American Ranger Plan to stand up full-time, armed Rangers authorized to use deadly force during official duty. Part of the plan details scenarios in which Rangers are authorized to act. Scenarios included negotiating with law enforcement for release of incarcerated RuSA members and using “all force necessary” to extract members from jail if negotiations fail, and responding to traffic stops, evictions, and “roadside piracy.” RuSA members determined these “scenarios” would not be released to the public, according to a source who has reported reliably in the past.

• (U//LES) As of late 2011, sovereign citizen extremists bought out-of-service police vehicles and trained to target police, according to officers of another law enforcement agency.

• (U//FOUO) Over the past several years, sovereign citizen extremist groups in Montana and Alaska sought to establish the Liberty Bell Network, a communications system designed to summon numerous armed group members to “emergencies,” according to reliable sources. In February 2012, a RuSA member in Arizona recommended the group implement a similar system because it worked well in Alaska.

TOP-SECRET- U.S. Army Responsible Drawdown and Reset Special Study

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/CALL-ResponsibleDrawdown.png

 

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

  • 162 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • September 2011

Download

In 2008, in preparation for the eventual drawdown of United States military forces from Iraq, Army Materiel Command (AMC) began the search for lessons learned concerning the drawdown of forces that occurred after Operation Desert Storm. This search produced over ten thousand pages of documents that were fragmented in nature and contained no clear path to the end-state objectives of the current operational force. Thus, as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) transitioned to Operation New Dawn (OND), the plan for the responsible drawdown of forces from Iraq had to be built from a new foundation, with no historical lessons learned to create an architecture in which planners could operate.

The purpose of this special study is to provide commanders, leaders, and planners at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels a guide that synchronizes strategic-level requirements and outcomes with operational- and tactical-level objectives, therefore providing synergy of effort that will support the Army Force Generation cycle and reset planning timelines. It is our hope that this information will be useful to both sustainment and maneuver commanders, that it will constitute a historical survey of recent drawdown operations, and that it will offer tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be used today and in the future to assist cornmanders at all levels with the planning and execution of the responsible drawdown of forces.

The responsible drawdown of forces (RDOF) process in Iraq remains one of the most complex undertakings by the U.S. Army in history. After nearly a decade in Iraq, the strategic relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (DOS) requires all of the following events to occur within a seamless transition period: reduce U.S. and coalition forces, transition responsibility for security, assign key locations, and allocate necessary equipment to the DOS and/or the host nation. The RDOF process presents challenges at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels that are complex and multifaceted.

This special study has been written for the operational planner to discuss a wide range of strategic planning considerations during the RDOF process. The lessons captured in this document are largely derived from the Iraq perspective. These considerations will equally apply to a successful redeployment in Afghanistan or any other theater where a deliberate RDOF process will be undertaken with transition to another authority, whether it is government, host nation, or a coalition partner.

Consequently, this special study will describe a number of lessons learned along with considerations for RDOF at the strategic level. The chapters will describe important time frames and key strategic considerations, discuss transition to another authority, and explore contracting challenges and equipment disposition considerations.

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Whicker’s World – Full Film

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus S3E01: Whicker’s World

SI Swimsuit Video: Ana Beatriz

 

 

Watch super model Ana Beatriz in Nicaragua for her SI Swimsuit 2008 shoot.

Cryptome – Military Cyber Influence Operations Theory

Military Cyber Influence Operations Theory

Related:

1019.pdf    Military Information Operations Primer           December 29, 2012 (3.1MB)
1018.pdf    Military Information Influence Operations        December 29, 2012 (1.3MB)
1017.pdf    Military Influence Operations and the Internet   December 29, 2012

 


http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/theory.htm

theory and research

information operations theory, theories, communications theory


Basics and OverviewsBack to Top


Relating to Doctrine and StrategyBack to Top


Who’s Doing ResearchBack to Top


U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social SciencesBack to Top


Symbols & SymbologyBack to Top


Media TheoryBack to Top


Surveys, Polling, & Statistical AnalysisBack to Top


Focus GroupsBack to Top

  • Community Tool Box, National Park Service – includes tools such as
    • Consensus building
    • Networking
    • spiffy Focus groups
    • Press conferences
    • Group mapping
    • and many more – with sections for each tool on “use it if …” and “forget it if …”

     

  • Frequently asked questions (FAQs) about focus groups – Dept of Education – selecting the participants, writing up and presenting the results 
  • Qualitative Research: Introducing focus groups, by Kitzinger, University of Glasgow, BMJ, July 1995 
  • When to Use Focus Group Interviews, Minnesota Dept of Health – adapted from Krueger and Casey (see below)
    • [ed.] consider using when (see link for expanded text)
      • Insights are needed in exploratory or preliminary studies.
      • There is a communication or understanding gap between groups or categories of people.
      • The purpose is to uncover factors relating to complex behavior or motivation. Focus groups can provide insight into complicated topics where opinions or attitudes are conditional or where the area of concern relates to multifaceted behavior or motivation.
      • You desire ideas to emerge from the group. Groups possess the capacity to become more than the sum of their parts, to exhibit a synergy that individuals alone cannot possess.
      • The researcher needs additional information to prepare for a large-scale study. Focus groups have provided researchers with valuable insights into conducting complicated and often quantifiable investigations.
    • [ed.] you may not want to use when (see link for expanded text)
      • The environment is emotionally charged and more information of any type is likely to intensify the conflict. This is likely to occur in situations where the issues are polarized, trust has deteriorated and the participants are in a confrontational attitude.
      • The researcher has lost control over critical aspects of the study. When control is relinquished to other individuals or groups, the study is prone to manipulation and bias.
      • Statistical projections are needed. Focus groups do not involve sufficient numbers of participants nor does the sampling strategy lend itself to statistical projections.
      • You cannot ensure the confidentiality of sensitive information.

     

  • Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research (3rd Ed.), by Richard A. Krueger and Mary Anne Casey 

Game TheoryBack to Top


Behavior Modeling & AnalysisBack to Top


Insider Threat ModelsBack to Top

  • Understanding the Insider Threat, RAND Proceedings of a March 2004 Workshop
    • Plenary and breakout sessions discussed various aspects of the problem, including intelligence community system models, vulnerabilities and exploits, attacker models, and event characterization.

     

  • Research on Mitigating the Insider Threat to Information Systems – #2, RAND Proceedings of a Workshop Held August, 2000 – including
    • Chapter 3 -Insider Threat Models
    • Appendix A: An Insider Threat Model for Model Adversaries
    • Appendix B: An Insider Threat Model for Adversary Simulation
    • Appendix C: Modeling Behavior of the Cyber-Terrorist
    • Appendix D: Can Technology Reduce the Insider Threat?
    • Appendix E: The Insider Threat to Information Systems
    • Appendix F: The Insider Espionage Threat
    • Appendix G: Insider Threat – A Theoretical Model
    • Appendix H: Information Assurance Cyberecology

     

  • The Insider Threat to Information Systems, by Shaw, Ruby, and Post – posted by the Defense Security Service (DSS)
    • In summary, the research literature which we have surveyed identifies a coherent cluster of risk factors characteristic of a vulnerable subgroup of Critical Information Technology Insiders (CITIs).
      • Introversion
      • Social and Personal Frustrations
      • Computer Dependency
      • Ethical “Flexibility”
      • Reduced Loyalty
      • Entitlement
      • Lack of Empathy

     


Social Network Analysis (SNA)Back to Top


Bayesian Inference and Decision TheoryBack to Top


Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience (ECN)Back to Top


Chaos TheoryBack to Top


Rumor PropagationBack to Top

  • Rumor and Gossip Research, by Rosnow and Foster, in Psychological Science Agenda, April 2005 – American Psychological Association – excerpts below
    • We should distinguish between rumor and gossip, as each appears to function differently in its pure state. Rumors have been described as public communications that are infused with private hypotheses about how the world works (Rosnow, 1991), or more specifically, ways of making sense to help us cope with our anxieties and uncertainties (Rosnow, 1988, 2001). On the other hand, as Wert and Salovey (2004b) noted, “almost as many functions of gossip have been argued as writers to write about gossip” (p. 77). More than rumor, gossip tends to have an “inner-circleness” about it, in that it is customarily passed between people who have a common history or shared interests.
    • Allport and Postman called their most far-reaching assertion “the basic law of rumor.” It declared that rumor strength (R) will vary with the importance of the subject to the individual concerned (i) times the ambiguity of the evidence pertaining to the topic at hand (a), or R ? i × a. The basic law of rumor was not empirically grounded in any rumor research, but was adapted from the earlier work of Douglas McGregor (1938) on factors influencing predictive judgments (Rosnow, 1980). 
    • As another recent illustration, Air Force Captain Stephanie R. Kelley (2004), for her Master’s thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School, did a content analysis of 966 rumors collected in Iraq from a weekly feature in the Baghdad Mosquito. Proceeding from the idea that rumors serve as a window into people’s uncertainties and anxieties, she identified fears inhibiting cooperation with U.S. counterinsurgency efforts and formulated ideas for improving Coalition information campaigns. [ed. – see that thesis below]

     

  • spiffy Rumors in Iraq: a Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds (local copy), by Kelley, Sep 2004, Naval Postgraduate School 

     

  • spiffy A Theory of Rumor Transmission, by Buckner, in The Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1965 
  • Problem Solving in Social Interactions on the Internet: Rumor As Social Cognition, by Bordia and Difonzo, Social Psychology Quarterly, March 2004 – abstract below
    • Rumor discourse has been conceptualized as an attempt to reduce anxiety and uncertainty via a process of social sensemaking. Fourteen rumors transmitted on various Internet discussion groups were observed and content analyzed over the life of each rumor. With this (previously unavailable) more ecologically robust methodology, the intertwined threads of sensemaking and the gaining of interpretive control are clearly evident in the tapestry of rumor discourse. We propose a categorization of statements (the Rumor Interaction Analysis System) and find differences between dread rumors and wish rumors in anxiety-related content categories. Cluster analysis of these statements reveals a typology of voices (“communicative postures”) exhibiting sensemaking activities of the rumor discussion group, such as hypothesizing, skeptical critique, directing of activities to gain information, and presentation of evidence. These findings enrich our understanding of the long-implicated sensemaking function of rumor by clarifying the elements of communication that operate in rumor’s social context.

     

  • Dynamics of rumor propagation on small-world networks, by Zenette, in Physical Review, Mar 2002 

Lattice Theory & Formal Concept Analysis (FCA)Back to Top


Collective IntelligenceBack to Top

  • NASA ‘Collective Intelligence’ Can Send Space Messages Faster (local copy), NASA news, 21 Oct 2004
    • “The Internet is a huge network of computers relaying messages to one another,” Wolpert explained. “We figured out how to change the goals of those computers so messages arrived at their ultimate destinations faster, with improvements of up to five times in certain Internet-based experiments,” Wolpert said. The same type of collective intelligence will enable spacecraft to send messages faster to Earth and return more data.
    • These procedures also can help carry out other tasks such as programming nano-computers, controlling unpiloted aerial vehicles (UAVs) and running the national airspace where airliners fly, Wolpert ventured.

     

  • An Introduction to Collective Intelligence (local copy), by Wolpert and Tumer, NASA, Feb 2000 
  • Collective Intelligence (local copy), by Wolpert, NASA, Jan 2003 

Schmitt AnalysisBack to Top

  • An Introduction to Legal Aspects of Operations in Cyberspace (local copy), by Wingfield and Michael, Naval Postgraduate School, Apr 2004
    • There is, unfortunately, a catch—the UN Charter, the paradigmatic document of international law, takes a qualitative approach, not a quantitative one. The framers, writing at the end of WWII, wanted to discourage military coercion, even at the cost of increasing diplomatic and economic coercion. Deciding that even the most stiffly worded diplomatic note—or restrictive economic boycott—would be preferable to an armored division crashing across an international border, the framers incorporated a very low threshold for impermissible military activity and a very high threshold for nonmilitary activity. The problem with this approach, as the subsequent decades have shown, is that many forms of “nonmilitary” coercion—such as terrorism and so called “low intensity conflicts”—result in more death and destruction than many traditional military activities, and many of today’s information weapons look nothing like military weapons and technology of the past. Sixty years ago, a telegraph message was simply a means of communication, benign and unassuming. Perhaps today—and certainly in the future—its e-mail equivalent could carry a virus capable of wreaking just the sort of havoc described above.
    • Policy makers can overcome this intellectual and legal quandary by adhering to a forward-looking doctrine known as the “Schmitt Analysis.” By demonstrating how military coercion differs from diplomatic and economic coercion, Michael Schmitt, late of Yale, the Naval War College, and now at the Marshall Center in Europe, identified seven areas—severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, presumptive legitimacy, and responsibility—in which military operations differ qualitatively from nonmilitary ones. If any given operation were quantitatively “graded” in each of these seven areas, the results could be used to give a principled qualitative description of the operation, accurately classifying it as a use of force or not.
      • Severity: If people are killed or there is extensive property damage, the action is probably military; the less damage, the less likely the action is a “use of force.”
      • Immediacy: When the effects are seen within seconds to minutes—such as when a bomb explodes—the operation is probably military; if the effects take weeks or months to appear, it is more likely diplomatic or economic.
      • Directness: If the action taken is the sole cause of the result, it is more likely to be viewed as a use of force; as the link between cause and effect attenuates, so does the military nature of the act.
      • Invasiveness: A violated border is still an indicator of military operations; actions that are mounted from outside a target nation’s borders are probably more diplomatic or economic.
      • Measurability: If the effect can be quantified immediately—such as photographing a “smoking hole” where the target used to be—the operation has a strong military characteristic; the more subjective the process of evaluating the damage, the more diplomatic or economic.
      • Presumptive Legitimacy: State actors have a monopoly on the legitimate use of kinetic force, while other non-kinetic actions—attacks through or in cyberspace— often are permissible in a wider set of circumstances; actions that have not been the sole province of nation-states are less likely to be viewed as military.
      • Responsibility: If a state takes visible responsibility for any destructive act, it is more likely to be categorized as a traditional military operation; ambiguous responsibility militates for a non-military label.

     

  • Measured Responses to Cyber Attacks Using Schmitt Analysis (local copy), presentation by Michael and Wingfield, Nov 2003, at IEEE COMPSAC Web & Security Informatics Workshop 
  • Measured Responses to Cyber Attacks Using Schmitt Analysis: A Case Study of Attack Scenarios for a Software-Intensive System (local copy), paper by Michael et al, Nov 2003, as posted by Naval Postgraduate School
    • In this paper we address the development of measured responses to coercive actions. We demonstrate, via a case study of kinetic and cyber attacks on a safety-critical software-intensive system, the application of the Schmitt Analysis to the question of whether the attacks have risen to the level of a “use of force” under international law, taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the attacks.

     


Uncertainty Reduction TheoryBack to Top

  • A Comparative Study of Uncertainty Reduction Theory in High- and Low-Context Cultures, 1987 paper by Kim and Yoon – abstract (below) in ERIC
    • To test the cross-cultural validity of uncertainty reduction theory, a study was conducted using students from South Korea and the United States who were chosen to represent high- and low-context cultures respectively. Uncertainty reduction theory is based upon the assumption that the primary concern of strangers upon meeting is one of uncertainty reduction, or of increasing predictability of the behavior of both themselves and others in the interaction. The high-context/low-context culture distinction depends on the amount of contextual information left unstated in typical communication settings–Korean leaves much unstated, while American English spells out much information explicitly. Subjects, 88 Korean students at Yonsei university and 62 native American English speakers at the University of Massachusetts, responded to a questionnaire in their own language designed to determine the kind of information they would exchange upon first meeting someone. Results indicated little difference between the two types of culture with regard to interpersonal patterns in initial interactions. In both cultures, people exchanged background information more than sociability or personal interests and attitude and had a higher degree of certainty in their prediction of sociability than in their prediction of personal interests and attitude. (Seven tables of results and 10 references are appended.) (SKC)

     

  • Uncertainty Reduction Theory, interpersonal communication lesson from University of Twente, NL
    • Uncertainty reduction theory (URT) was initially presented as a series of axioms (universal truths which do not require proof) and theorems (propositions assumed to be true) which describe the relationships between uncertainty and several communication factors. URT was developed to describe the interrelationships between seven important factors in any dyadic exchange:
      • verbal communication,
        nonverbal expressiveness,
        information-seeking behavior,
        intimacy,
        reciprocity,
        similarity, and
        liking.

      This theoretical perspective was originated by C.R. Berger and Calabrese in 1975; they drew on the work of Heider (1952).

     

  • Unertainty Reduction Theory of Charles Berger – summary posted at Ohio University
    • “Berger uses seven axioms in order to reinforce his theory.
      • Axiom 1- As verbal communication increases, the level of uncertainty decreases.
        Axiom 2- As nonverbal expressiveness increases, the level of uncertainty decreases.
        Axiom 3- Uncertainty causes increased levels of information seeking.
        Axiom 4- High levels of uncertainty result in low levels of self disclosure.
        Axiom 5- Uncertainty causes increased levels of reciprocity.
        Axiom 6- Similarities decrease uncertainty whereas dissimilarities increase uncertainty.
        Axiom 7- High levels of uncertainty cause a decrease in liking whereas low levels of uncertainty increase liking.

     


Social Penetration TheoryBack to Top

  • Social Penetration: A Description, Research, and Evaluation, 1993 paper by Allensworth – abstract (below) in ERIC
    • Social penetration has been described by S.W. Littlejohn (1992) as “the process of increasing disclosure and intimacy in a relationship.” The phrase “social penetration” originated with I. Altman and D. Taylor, the foremost researchers in this area. From other theories, Altman and Taylor developed a unified theory which provided a stable base from which researchers could study. Before an understanding of the theory can be obtained, there must be knowledge of the philosophical perspective behind the orientation. Using the systems perspective, the definition of communication that supports social penetration theory is, as follows: communication is the process of exchanging symbols and gaining understanding and sharing from the exchange. Social penetration is consistently viewed as having 4 stages of penetration, summarized by Michael Roloff (1981):
      • (1) orientation, with a ritualized conversation and disclosure of superficial information;
        (2) exploratory affective exchange–communication about superficial topics is expanded and there is movement toward inner layers;
        (3) affective exchange–movement to the central layers of personality; and
        (4) stable exchange, achieved in a few relationships.

      In research studies that use social penetration theory in their framework, its relation to individuals on a daily basis can be seen. For example, a longitudinal study of college roommates investigated developmental changes in social penetration processes. Another study investigated Japanese students at American universities and paired them with American student friends, examining their cross-cultural relationships. Exploring social penetration theory is of great importance to the study of communication. (Contains 2 figures and 17 references.) (NKA)

     


Information Manipulation TheoryBack to Top

  • Information Manipulation Theory, U. of Ky, part of the Persuasion theories page
    • A speaker purposefully and covertly violates one of the conversational maxims of quantity, quality, relation and manner with the intention of deceiving his/her listener.

     

  • Information Manipulation Theory, by McCornack, in Communication Monographs, Mar 1992 – abstract (below) in ERIC
    • Presents Information Manipulation Theory to describe the different ways that information can be manipulated in the production of deceptive messages. Suggests that deceptive messages covertly violate principles governing conversational exchanges regarding quantity, quality, manner, and relevance of information that should be presented. (SR)

     


Inoculation TheoryBack to Top

  • McGuire, W. “Resistance to persuasion conferred by active and passive prior refutation of the same and alternative counterarguments.” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961 
  • Inoculation Theory, U. of Ky, part of the Persuasion theories page
    • Inoculation theory states that inoculation is used to describe the attribution of greater resistance to individuals. Or, the process of supplying information to receivers before the communication process takes place in hopes that the information would make the receiver more resistant.

     

  • Review of the Literature Regarding McGuire’s Inoculation Theory: Early Formulations and Recent Applications, dissertation by Braley, 2001 – abstract (portion below) at ERIC
    • As originally formulated by William J. McGuire, Inoculation Theory provided a means of immunizing cultural truisms against the effects of persuasive attacks. Subsequent studies have demonstrated its efficacy in conferring resistance to issues of considerable complexity and controversy. The efficacy of the Inoculation Theory process has been widely attributed to its double-defense action: threat to beliefs motivates subjects to bolster those beliefs, while refutational preemption provides persons with a model for defending the same against attack. Although no research has been conducted to evaluate the utility of Inoculation Theory principles and procedures in considering immunity to matters of religious faith, its success with highly controversial, complex, and personal issues strongly suggests its potential.

     

  • Furthering Adjustment: An Application of Inoculation Theory in an Intercultural Context, paper by Briggs and Harwood, 1983 – abstract (below) in ERIC
    • A significant need exists for new and expanded training programs for people who must interact with different cultures. When people experience a new cultural environment, they are likely to experience conflict between their own cultural predispositions and the values, beliefs, and opinions of the host culture. A training program, the Cultural Communication Capsule, can aid in cross-cultural adaptation by improving interpersonal and social communication skills. Employing the metaphor of inoculation, the capsule is intended to immunize and inoculate against the erosion of self-image and self-confidence that results when people who do not understand a host culture’s norms feel that their own cultural norms under attack. The program consists of discussion questions to stimulate new value orientation and uses exercises and simulation games organized around 10 elements:
      • (1) linguistic variables,
        (2) identity and status,
        (3) historical and political climates,
        (4) social values and structures,
        (5) economic trends,
        (6) technological language vocabularies,
        (7) nonverbal communication,
        (8) family/friends,
        (9) employment skills, and
        (10) company policy.

      The questions relate to cultural norms that underlie communication on-the-job specifically and the new cultural environment in general. (Sample questions for each of the 10 elements are provided.) (HOD)


Borden-Kopp ModelBack to Top

  • With formulas relating the canonical strategies of information warfare to Shannon’s information theory 
  • What is Information Warfare?, by Borden, Air & Space Power Chronicles, 1999
    • On the IW battlefield, there are only four tasks to be performed:
      • Data is:
        • Collected
        • Moved
        • Stored, and
        • Used to reduce uncertainty (perform Situation Assessment (SA))
    • There are only four types of Attack Measures possible against the four IW tasks. These are:
      • Degrade
      • Corrupt
      • Deny
      • Exploit

     

  • A Fundamental Paradigm of Infowar, by Kopp, 2000
    • If we are to apply a classification scheme to the most basic strategies in IW/IO, they can be divided into four simple categories:
      • A) denial of information (DoI), ie concealment and camouflage, or stealth.
      • B) deception and mimicry (D&M), ie the insertion of intentionally misleading information.
      • C) disruption & destruction (D&D), ie the insertion of information which produces a dysfunction inside the opponent’s system; alternately the outright destruction of the system.
      • D) subversion (SUB), ie insertion of information which triggers a self destructive process in the opponent’s target system.
      • [ed. author gives examples of each of the above for electronic combat in air warfare and for cyberwar]
    • Gibsonian cyberwar may have indeed captured the public imagination as the most critical aspect of the IW/IO paradigm, but if history teaches us anything, the use of new information distribution media to wage propaganda wars may be the area in which the greatest political and military impact is seen.

     

  • Shannon, Hypergames and Information Warfare, slides for lecture by Kopp, 2002
    • The Shannon model provides a powerful tool for capturing the interactions between adversaries and the information carrying channel.
    • The Shannon model cannot capture how the manipulation of the channel might be reflected in the behaviour of the adversaries.
    • Hypergames are games in which the respective adversaries may not be fully aware of the nature of the engagement they are participating in, or indeed that they are actually participating in an engagement.

     


Shannon’s Information Theory(s)Back to Top

  • Information is that which reduces uncertainty (Shannon–Weaver definition) 
  • search on internet 
  • A Mathematical Theory of Communication by Claude E. Shannon – 1948 paper for Bell Labs 
  • Shannon’s theory(s) and theorems touched many aspects of information/communications – below is one application 
  • Appendix 1. Notes on the Theil Index, to Manufacturing Wage Inequality in the Appalachian Region, report by Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), 2001
    • … [Claude] Shannon’s [information] theory [1948] was motivated by the need to measure the value of information. Shannon argued that the more unexpected an event is, the higher the yield of information it would produce. To formalize this idea, Shannon proposed to measure the information content of an event as a decreasing function of the probability of its occurrence. Adding some axiomatic principles, most importantly that independent events should yield information corresponding to the sum of the individual events’ information, Shannon chose the logarithm of the inverse of the probability as the way to translate probabilities into information. The logarithm allows the decomposition of the multiplicative probabilities into additive information content.If we have a set of n events, one of which we are certain is going to occur, and each with a probability xi of occurring, then  and the expected information content is given by Shannon’s measure:

      [1]                   

      The information content is zero when one of the events has probability 1; we draw no information from the occurrence of an event we are sure is going to happen. The information content is maximum when ; in this case H = log n . In other words, maximum information is derived from the occurrence of one event in a context of maximum uncertainty. To borrow from thermodynamics, maximum information is derived from a state of maximum disorder, or maximum entropy. This is the reason why entropy is used as a synonym of expected information. ….

     


Innovation Diffusion TheoryBack to Top

  • See also Innovation Adoption-Diffusion on Future Studies page 
  • A Primer in Diffusion of Innovations Theory, by Clarke — short and to the point, with the stages of innovation, characteristics of innovation, adopter categories, and roles in the innovation process
    • the stages through which a technological innovation passes
      • knowledge (exposure to its existence, and understanding of its functions);
      • persuasion (the forming of a favourable attitude to it);
      • decision (commitment to its adoption);
      • implementation (putting it to use); and
      • confirmation (reinforcement based on positive outcomes from it)

     


Metcalfe’s Law, Amdahl’s Law, and Moore’s LawBack to Top

  • Metcalfe’s Law
    • Metcalfe’s Law – Wikipedia entry 
    • “The power of a networked system grows exponentially with the number of devices in the network.”
      — from Evolution or Revolution: Tracing Outsourcing’s Controversial Path, by Hamblen, in Chips, Jan 1998 
    • Hudson Trend Analysis – Final Report to NOAA (local copy), 2002 – includes extensive section on information technologies, advances, and potential impacts
      • The Internet harnesses the power of Metcalf’s Law which generates huge increases in the value of the network as the number of participants rises.
      • “Metcalf’s Law” defines the potential for huge benefits of any type of network as more people participate — whether through telephone, automobile or Internet. It states that the value of the network increased with the square of the number of participants. For example, if a network has 10 participants its value is 10 x 10 or 100 units. If the network instead has 1000 participants its value is 1000 x 1000 or 1 million units — not 100 times the original 10 but 10,000 times as much.

       

     

  • Amdahl’s Law
    • Amdahl’s Law – Wikipedia entry
      • “… is used to find the maximum expected improvement to an overall system when only part of the system is improved. It is often used in parallel computing to predict the theoretical maximum speedup using multiple processors.”
      • “Amdahl’s law can be interpreted more technically, but in simplest terms it means that it is the algorithm that decides the speedup not the number of processors. You eventually reach a place where you can not parallelise the algorithm any more.”
      • “Amdahl’s law is a demonstration of the law of diminishing returns….”

       

     

  • Moore’s Law

     


Clausewitz and Info OpsBack to Top

  • Clausewitz’s Theory of War and Information Operations (local copy), by Darley, in Joint Force Quarterly, Jan 2006
    • It further suggests that IO and kinetic operations are inseparably linked, like strands of a DNA molecule in a gene, and in the same way have a dominant/recessive relationship (for example, one exercising dominance over the other depending on where the conflict falls on the continuum relative to the polar extremes). Thus, among the important issues it highlights, the theory shows the absolute need to refine both the specific political objectives of a campaign as well as their nature in order to determine whether the campaign is predominantly kinetic or informational. This suggests that neglecting consideration of the role of IO and its integration with kinetic operations imperils the entire campaign plan.

     

  • See also other Clausewitz references on the Military Theorists page of the Air War College Gateway to the Internet 

Sun Tzu and Info OpsBack to Top


SensemakingBack to Top

  • see also knowledge management below 
  • Sensemaking Symposium, Final Report (local copy), DODCCRP, 2001
    • A knowledge management workshop sponsored on 6-8 March 2001 by the Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) identified sensemaking as an essential cognitive element of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). As shown in Figure 1, participants of this earlier workshop viewed sensemaking as occurring within the cognitive domain while linking other critical MDMP elements across the information and physical domains of command and control. 
    • Figure 5. Sensemaking Strategies Employed by Military Commanders
      • Situation Management
      • Recognition Primed
      • Deliberate
    • Figure 1. Sensemaking Conceptual Framework (click on image to enlarge)
      sensemaking diagram, click to enlarge

     


Persistent SurveillanceBack to Top

Knowledge ManagementBack to Top


Media Richness TheoryBack to Top


Steganography – hiding in plain sightBack to Top


Other Info Ops and Knowledge TheoryBack to Top


Other Theories – which have or might have application in info-opsBack to Top

  • see also ye olde brain, and its workings at Air War College Gateway to the Internet 
  • Military Theory page at Air War College Gateway to the Internet

     

  • Social Balance Theory: Revisiting Heider’s Balance Theory for many agents (local copy), by Khanafiah and Situngkir, as posted by Los Alamos National Labs 
  • Category Error
    • Category Error or Category Mistake, Wikipedia entry
      • A category mistake, or category error is a semantic or ontological error by which a property is ascribed to a thing that could not possibly have that property.
      • Another frequently occurring category mistake was revealed by John Searle in his “Chinese Room” argument. With the creation of the “chessmaster” computer, many were discussing whether a computer could actually understand language even if it could play chess and carry on a casual conversation. Searle argues that understanding language is not a capacity that a computer could possibly have. He compares it to a person in a room of Chinese boxes with Chinese symbols on them. He is given a manual on how to manipulate the symbols to send them out of the room (output). All the while new symbols are being sent in for him to manipulate (input). It is argued that in the same way that computer does not understand as it cannot understand.

     

  • Ashby’s “Law of Requisite Variety”
    • The larger the variety of actions available to a control system, the larger the variety of perturbations it is able to compensate. [ed. – how might this apply to strategic communication or other info-ops elements?]

     

  • General Robert E. Lee and Modern Decision Theory, by Gilster, in AU Review, Mar-Apr 1972, including discussion of battle of Chancellorsville, and brief discussion of
    • Lanchester Equations
    • Bayes’ Theorem
    • Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theorem

     

  • Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle
    • Every time a major power, even for the noblest of reasons, considers intervention, that power must confront the politico-military equivalent of Werner K. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle: to inject yourself into the situation is to change the situation and, at least temporarily, will probably mean some liberal idealistic principles taking the proverbial back seat to realpolitik.
      — from Lost in the Snow: the US Intervention in Siberia during the Russian Civil War, by Stamp, CSI, Leavenworth 
    • No matter how well designed and statistically reliable our study may be, the fact that we are doing a study influences the data we collect. … Heisenberg, an atomic physicist, posited we cannot measure anything without altering it or its environment and we cannot know the extent of our disruptions with certainty. Whenever we measure, we must consider the effect that the act of collecting data has on the data itself.
      — from Chapter 9 of Executive Decision Making, from the Naval War College

     

  • The Basis Problem in Many-Worlds Theories (local copy), by Stapp, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 27 Feb 2002
  • additional work by Stapp 
  • spiffy Explorations in Learning & Instruction: The Theory Into Practice (TIP) Database – a wealth of interlinked information on theories about learning, thinking, and communicating 
  • spiffy Psychological theories/effects, summarized at Wikipedia – how might they apply in IO?

     

  • Psychological experiments/syndromes – are there IO analogies?
    • Milgram Obedience Experiment, aka Milgram Experiment, examined how far even well educated folks will go in obeying orders that may conflict with their consciences, with more than 60 percent willing to administer potentially fatal electrical shocks to “subjects” – just because they were told to by the professor running the “experiment” 
    • Stanford Prison Experiment, classic examination of the psychology of imprisonment – changing behaviors of students cast in the roles of both prisoners and guards 
    • Stockholm Syndrome, where hostages sometimes begin to identify with their captors 
    • Learned Helplessness, when individuals come to believe their personal actions do not affect the outcome, so why try
      • an example of application is Chapter 8 Domestic Violence, 1999 National Victim Assistance Academy, Dept of Justice
        • …People suffering from learned helplessness are more likely to choose behavioral responses that will have the highest predictability of an effect within the known, or familiar, situation; they avoid responses–like escape, for instance–that launch them into the unknown…. (Walker 1979).

       

     

  • Forensic principles/laws/theories – are there IO analogies?
    • Locard’s Exchange Principle states that whenever two objects come into contact, a transfer of material will occur. – quote from “Trace Evidence Recovery Guidelines,” in Forensic Science Communications, Oct 1999
      • [ed. – We’ve all seen this on CSI and other popular forensic TV shows. Might there be a similar principle regarding the exchange of information or influence when two communications efforts come into contact — be it in the press, in cyberspace, or in the minds of individuals/groups?]

     

  • Management principles/laws/theories – are there IO analogies?
    • Parkinson’s Law – after Cyril Northcote Parkinson (1909-1993), British historian
      • Any of several satirical observations propounded as economic laws, especially “Work expands to fill the time available for its completion.” [from The American Heritage® Dictionary]

       

    • Peter Principle – after Laurence Johnston Peter (1919-1990)
      • The theory that employees within an organization will advance to their highest level of competence and then be promoted to and remain at a level at which they are incompetent. [from The American Heritage® Dictionary]

     

  • Epistemology and Rosen’s Modeling Relation (local copy), by Dress, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Nov 1999
    • Rosen’s modeling relation is embedded in Popper’s three worlds to provide an heuristic tool for model building and a guide for thinking about complex systems.

     


ReadingsBack to Top

TMZ – Kim Kardashian Pregnant with Kanye West’s Baby

We just got the full version of Kanye’s baby announcement… and it’s awesome. Check it out — when was the last time you saw Kanye look so happy? The answer is never.

SECRET-U.S. Army – Marine Corps Unmanned Ground Systems Presentation

 

Army-Marine Corps Board (AMCB) Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)

  • 34 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • September 12, 2011

Download

Unmanned Ground Systems consist of a powered physical system with no human operator on aboard the principal platform, which can act, either operated remotely or with some degree of autonomy, to accomplish assigned tasks. Unmanned Ground Systems may be mobile or stationary, can be smart learning, self-adaptive, and includes all associated supporting components such as Operator Control Units (OCU).

Subcategories of Unmanned Ground Systems include unmanned ground vehicles (UGV), and unattended munitions and sensors.

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – The Golden Age of Ballooning – Full Movie

 

Monty Python’s Flying Circus S4E01: The Golden Age of Ballooning

Happy New Year 2013 ! Fireworks COUNTDOWN

 

New Year’s Eve 2013 Fireworks Live Stream : Watch Sydney, Melbourne NYE Fireworks 2013 Live Streaming Free HD : Sydney Harbour forms …

Monty Python – Scott of the Antarctic – Full Movie

 

Monty Python S2E10: Scott of the Antarctic

Sydney New Years Fireworks Nine O’Clock 2013

SECRECY NEWS – SENATE PASSES INTELLIGENCE BILL WITHOUT ANTI-LEAK MEASURES

congress night1
The Senate passed the FY2013 intelligence authorization act on December 28
after most of the controversial provisions intended to combat leaks had
been removed.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee,
said the bill was revised in order to expedite its passage.

"Since the bill was reported out," she said, "the Committee has received
thoughtful comments from our colleagues, media organizations, and from
organizations that advocate for greater governmental transparency. As a
result of these comments, and technical suggestions received from the
Executive Branch, we have decided to remove ten of the twelve sections in
the title of the original bill that addressed unauthorized disclosures of
classified information so that we might ensure enactment this year of the
important other provisions of the bill."

        http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/intelauth.html

More precisely, the revision of the bill could be attributed to the
intervention of Sen. Ron Wyden, who all but single-handedly blocked its
enactment after it was approved in Committee last July by a vote of 14-1,
with only Wyden dissenting.  Its passage by the full Congress seemed to be
assured, but in November, Sen. Wyden placed a hold on the bill to prevent
its adoption by unanimous consent.

The provisions that were removed from the final bill included restrictions
on background briefings for the press, limits on media commentary by former
government officials, and authority for the DNI to unilaterally revoke the
pension of a suspected leaker. ("Anti-Leak Measures in Senate Bill Target
Press, Public," Secrecy News, July 31, 2012).

Sen. Wyden opposed most of the anti-leak measures, he explained on
December 21, "because, in my view, they would have harmed first amendment
rights, led to less informed public debate about national security issues,
and undermined the due process rights of intelligence agency employees,
without actually enhancing national security."

He supported the revised intelligence bill, which passed the Senate Friday
on a voice vote.

One of the anti-leak provisions that did remain in the bill (sect. 504)
will require government officials to notify Congress whenever classified
intelligence is disclosed to the press in an authorized manner, other than
through FOIA or other routine processes.  Thus, Congress must be advised
whenever classified intelligence is declassified specifically for the
purpose of disclosure to the media or -- more remarkably -- if it is
disclosed to the press on an authorized basis while still classified.

This is an unprecedented legislative definition (or recognition) of a
category of information that has no explicit basis in executive branch
policy-- namely, authorized disclosures of classified information to an
uncleared member of the press or the public.  ("Can Disclosures of
Classified Information Be Authorized?", Secrecy News, December 19, 2012). 
While disclosures of classified information to the press obviously occur,
the official authorization for such disclosures, if it exists at all, has
always remained tacit.  (There is an exception for life-threatening
emergencies, in which classified information may be disclosed to
first-responders and the like.)

The new provision notably applies to all "government officials," including
White House officials.  It may oblige the Administration either to abstain
from authorized disclosures of classified intelligence to the press, or to
revise its policies to more clearly permit such disclosures, or to somehow
evade the new reporting requirement, perhaps by defining it away.  Thus,
for example, Vice President Dick Cheney stated in 2004 that classified
information could be used "to shape and inform what one says publicly"
without violating prohibitions on disclosure of classified information.

In any case, it will be interesting to see whether the executive branch
notifies Congress of even a single such authorized disclosure to the media
of classified intelligence over the coming year, after which the provision
will sunset (or expire).

"Unfortunately," said Sen. Feinstein, "I am certain that damaging leaks of
classified information will continue, and so the Committee will need to
continue to look for acceptable ways to address this problem."

The revised intelligence bill also backs off from a move to repeal the
requirement for an annual report on security clearances.  The most recent
such annual report provided significant new transparency and insight into
the security clearance system, including the unexpectedly large number of
cleared persons.  ("Security-Cleared Population Tops 4.8 Million," Secrecy
News, July 23, 2012).

The Director of National Intelligence had asked Congress to eliminate this
reporting requirement, and the Committee markup of the bill initially
complied in July.  But in response to concerns expressed by public interest
groups, the final legislation did not include the repeal of the security
clearance reporting requirement.

"I believe we have addressed all of the concerns that have been brought to
our attention by our colleagues and the public," said Sen. Feinstein.

A NEW RULE TO PROTECT RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (CRS)

A forthcoming Nuclear Regulatory Commission rule on the physical
protection of radioactive "byproduct materials" -- not including uranium or
plutonium -- is discussed in a new report from the Congressional Research
Service.

"The rule will have broad impacts across the country and across most if
not all aspects of industries that use radioactive material, including
hospital and blood bank irradiators, industrial radiography equipment,
massive facilities for irradiating certain foods and medical supplies,
laboratory equipment for research into radiation and its effects, state
regulators, and manufacturers, distributors, and transporters of
radioactive sources. NRC anticipates that the rule will be published in the
Federal Register in early 2013."

See "Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 C.F.R. 37, A New Rule to Protect
Radioactive Material: Background, Summary, Views from the Field," December
14, 2012:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R42868.pdf

Congress has directed CRS not to make its reports directly available to
the public.

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Auckland Welcomes 2013 – Video

 

Auckland New Zealand welcomed 2013 with a spectacular fireworks display. Auckland is close to the International Dateline and the first major city to welcome the new year. (Dec. 31)

TMZ – Kim Kardashian to Instagram — I’ll Take My Big Ass Somewhere Else!

 

Kim Kardashian doesn’t want Instagram — or anyone else — controlling her images without permission. So … let’s fight about it!!!

SECRET-U.S. Army Operation Enduring Freedom Embedded Training Team Handbook

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/CALL-OEF-Training.png

 

FIRST 100 DAYS OEF ETT HANDBOOK

  • 84 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • August 2008

Download

This handbook is written for you, the embedded training team (ETT) member. Traditionally, this mission was reserved for Special Forces’ units or teams. With the revision of Army Field Manual 3.0, Operations, this is now a mission for general purpose forces. The Army has not yet officially designated one organization or agency as the ETT proponent; therefore, information concerning TTs circulates at all levels. This handbook has been vetted by the Joint Center for International Security Forces Assistance, 1st Infantry Division, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned Integration Network.

There are two key facts ETT members must consider:

• Your first 100 days in theater will set the tone for the rest of your tour.
• You will not have much time for professional reading while at the predeployment site. So, if you only read one handbook, we think it should be this one.

The subjects in this handbook are a compilation of the most important topics raised by your predecessors during in theater interviews and redeployment surveys.

Advising and Mentoring

As an embedded training team (ETT) member, you can count on playing the roles of advisor and mentor. Some of you may also be trainers.

Definitions:

• Military advisor: Soldier sent to foreign nations to aid that nation with its military training, organization, and other military tasks.
• Mentor: A trusted friend, counselor, or teacher; usually a more experienced person.

Doctrinally, ETT members conduct an advisory mission; however, within Afghanistan, the use of the term mentor is more readily used by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (e.g., Afghan National Army [ANA], Afghan National Police [ANP], etc.). An effective advisor performs not only the advisory role, but will be a mentor to his counterpart.

Mentor basics

The ANSF unit has much to gain from coalition advisors:

• Coalition funding and equipment (lethal and nonlethal)
• Coalition intelligence
• Coalition effects (lethal and nonlethal)
• Coalition training
• Operational and tactical advice

A great advisor can:

• See solutions to seemingly unsolvable problems.
• Work from the commander’s intent and guidance.
• Orchestrate events to ensure success from behind the scenes (focus on the mission versus seeking personal credit).

A great advisor must:

• Be part diplomat and part warrior.
• Stay aware of local power struggles and how they will affect his organization.
• Attempt to influence ANSF according to long-term interests rather than short-term gains.

A mediocre advisor:

• Does not understand the dynamics of rapport, credibility, and value.
• Is often reduced to liaison roles with counterparts, while liaison officers who understand these dynamics often achieve status similar to advisors or confidantes with counterparts.

Key Skill Areas for Mentoring

The ANA are skillful in:

• Dismounted patrolling
• Combined arms
• Branch-specific skills

The ANP are skillful in:

• Community-oriented policing
• Problem-oriented policing
• Evidence procedures
• Arrests

The Afghan Border Police (ABP) are skillful in:

• Search
• Border rules
• Border checkpoints

Everyone should be skillful in:

• Ethical training
• Combat lifesaver
• Targeting
• Communications
• Intelligence preparation of the battlefield
• Human intelligence
• Planning
• Orders
• Leadership
• De-escalation of force
• Systems
• Civil-military operations

Missions of an ANA Advisor/PMT

Primary missions

Mentor ANA in:

• Leadership, staff, and support functions.
• Planning, assessing, supporting, and executing operations and training.
• Doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Provide ANA access to combat enablers such as:

• Close air support/fires.
• Medical evacuation.
• Quick reaction force (QRF).
• Redundant command and control capability.

Sustain ANA units:

• Monitor ANA pay operations and personnel
• Contract or cash purchase ANA support/sustainment
• Assist ANA forces in forecasting requirements
• Assist ANA forces in planning, developing, and executing sustainment

Other ANA support missions

School house and doctrine (Training and Doctrine Command):

• Develop and execute institutional training programs.
• Synchronize Soldier, noncommissioned officer (NCO), and officer course programs of instruction.
• Update and translate doctrinal and training publications.

Logistical support (logistics task force): Maintain and sustain ANA forces (ANA depot-level support).

Partnership program: Participants with Combined Joint Task Force-101, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, and International Security Assistance Force.

Police mentor team missions

Afghan Uniformed Police PMT:

• Assist and mentor the provincial Community of Police (CoP) in operating, manning, and equipping the Joint Police Command Center.
• Mentor, coordinate, monitor, and support the assigned provincial CoP efforts to conduct authorized Afghan National Auxiliary Police training, sustainment training, and opportunity training.
• Establish close coordination with the provincial reconstruction team/police technical assistance team within your area of responsibility.

Afghan Border Police PMT missions:

• Mentor ABP element in participating in the Joint Regional Command Center (JRCC) process for that headquarters (HQ).
• Mentor, coordinate, monitor, and support the assigned battalion or brigade commander efforts to conduct sustainment training and opportunity training.

Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) PMT missions:

• Mentor ANCOP element in participating in the JRCC process for that HQ.
• Provide coordination support to the ANCOP element during cross-boundary/QRF operations.

Other missions for advisor/mentors:

• Presence patrol (day and night)
• Village assessment
• Humanitarian aid
• Traffic checkpoint
• Eradication of suspected or known enemy positions
• Drug eradication
• Cordon and search for weapon cache
• High value target force protection and security escort
• Route/area security
• Joint operation
• Route/area reconnaissance
• Threat investigation

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – How to Recognize Different Parts of the Body – Full Movie

Monty Python’s Flying Circus S2E09 How to Recognize Different Parts of the Body

Merry Christmas Everyone

TMZ – Lindsay Lohan — Hell No! I Won’t Kiss Charlie Sheen!

CONFIDENTIAL-NATO Technical Report: Measuring the Effectiveness of Activities

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/NATO-MeasuringInfluence.png

 

How to Improve your Aim: Measuring the Effectiveness of Activities that Influence Attitudes and Behaviors

  • 100 pages
  • This document should be announced and supplied only to NATO, Government Agencies of NATO nations and their bona fide contractors, and to other recipients approved by the RTO National Coordinators.
  • August 2011

Download

The emphasis of military operations is shifting more and more towards non-kinetic activities, such as Psychological Operations and Information Operations, which are geared towards influencing attitudes and behaviors of specific target audiences. Though many such activities are undertaken, there is little systematic evaluation of the effects they bring about and their effectiveness. As a result, it is not well known what these operations contribute to the overall operation and to what degree they are achieving their goals. The purpose of the Task Group HFM-160 was to develop a systematic approach to the Measurement Of Effectiveness (MOE) of influence operations.

In our approach, we consider MOE to be a process rather than a “thing”; there is no definitive list of MOE or even an overview of best practices. All MOE are custom made for a specific situation. Our approach is a way of thinking about how to assess the effects of what you have done and how effective you have been. MOE is most intuitively suited to influence operations, such as PSYOPS. However, any operation will affect attitudes and behaviors – especially kinetic operations. For this reason, our approach generalizes across the whole operations spectrum: from PSYOPS and CIMIC to the most assertive kinetic activity. Our work takes NATO PSYOPS doctrine (AJP 3.10.1) as a starting point and augments it specifically for MOE. There where we feel existing definitions and procedures are insufficient, we take the liberty to develop our own. Our approach should be seen as a starting point. It is not possible to become an MOE expert in a couple of days after reading about our approach. Furthermore, some activities in the approach, such as statistical analysis, should be supported by knowledgeable individuals; just knowing that something should be done is not the same as being able to do it. The approach was designed for operational and tactical levels working with, commissioning, developing or interpreting MOE for any type of influence activity. They should gain an understanding of the complexity of attitudinal and behavioral MOE, the basics of how to embed MOE in operations and the basics of how to develop MOE such that it yields the desired – or at least useful – information.

The most important key concepts in the HFM-160 approach to MOE are: effects and effectiveness. Effects refer to changes in the environment, potentially brought about by your actions, though other forces may lead to the observed effects. Effectiveness refers to the degree to which your actions are responsible for bringing about the desired effects. Effects can be seen as a goal in and of themselves; what causes the effects is relatively unimportant as long as the effects are manifested. In terms of effectiveness, how the change comes about is key. It is not enough that change has occurred; you must gain insight into the cause of this change: either your actions or something else.

2.2.1 Effects

Every operation conducted is geared towards realizing a particular effect. In terms of kinetic activities, this may be to diminish the adversary’s fire power or limit their mobility. In operations geared towards attitudinal and behavioral change, it may be to create support within the local population or something more tangible such as collecting firearms in civilians’ possession. In all cases, the goal is to change something through your actions. Any change resulting from any operation may be identified as an effect. Though hopefully the effect you want is what changes, an effect may also be unwanted or unintended. Effects may be positive or negative. They may also be material, attitudinal or behavioral.

Monty Python’s Flying Circus Whicker’s World – S3E01 – Full Show Movie

 

 

Whicker’s World

CONFIDENTIAL-NATO Technical Report: Measuring the Effectiveness of Activities that Influence Attitudes and Behaviors

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/NATO-MeasuringInfluence.png

 

How to Improve your Aim: Measuring the Effectiveness of Activities that Influence Attitudes and Behaviors

  • 100 pages
  • This document should be announced and supplied only to NATO, Government Agencies of NATO nations and their bona fide contractors, and to other recipients approved by the RTO National Coordinators.
  • August 2011

Download

The emphasis of military operations is shifting more and more towards non-kinetic activities, such as Psychological Operations and Information Operations, which are geared towards influencing attitudes and behaviors of specific target audiences. Though many such activities are undertaken, there is little systematic evaluation of the effects they bring about and their effectiveness. As a result, it is not well known what these operations contribute to the overall operation and to what degree they are achieving their goals. The purpose of the Task Group HFM-160 was to develop a systematic approach to the Measurement Of Effectiveness (MOE) of influence operations.

In our approach, we consider MOE to be a process rather than a “thing”; there is no definitive list of MOE or even an overview of best practices. All MOE are custom made for a specific situation. Our approach is a way of thinking about how to assess the effects of what you have done and how effective you have been. MOE is most intuitively suited to influence operations, such as PSYOPS. However, any operation will affect attitudes and behaviors – especially kinetic operations. For this reason, our approach generalizes across the whole operations spectrum: from PSYOPS and CIMIC to the most assertive kinetic activity. Our work takes NATO PSYOPS doctrine (AJP 3.10.1) as a starting point and augments it specifically for MOE. There where we feel existing definitions and procedures are insufficient, we take the liberty to develop our own. Our approach should be seen as a starting point. It is not possible to become an MOE expert in a couple of days after reading about our approach. Furthermore, some activities in the approach, such as statistical analysis, should be supported by knowledgeable individuals; just knowing that something should be done is not the same as being able to do it. The approach was designed for operational and tactical levels working with, commissioning, developing or interpreting MOE for any type of influence activity. They should gain an understanding of the complexity of attitudinal and behavioral MOE, the basics of how to embed MOE in operations and the basics of how to develop MOE such that it yields the desired – or at least useful – information.

The most important key concepts in the HFM-160 approach to MOE are: effects and effectiveness. Effects refer to changes in the environment, potentially brought about by your actions, though other forces may lead to the observed effects. Effectiveness refers to the degree to which your actions are responsible for bringing about the desired effects. Effects can be seen as a goal in and of themselves; what causes the effects is relatively unimportant as long as the effects are manifested. In terms of effectiveness, how the change comes about is key. It is not enough that change has occurred; you must gain insight into the cause of this change: either your actions or something else.

2.2.1 Effects

Every operation conducted is geared towards realizing a particular effect. In terms of kinetic activities, this may be to diminish the adversary’s fire power or limit their mobility. In operations geared towards attitudinal and behavioral change, it may be to create support within the local population or something more tangible such as collecting firearms in civilians’ possession. In all cases, the goal is to change something through your actions. Any change resulting from any operation may be identified as an effect. Though hopefully the effect you want is what changes, an effect may also be unwanted or unintended. Effects may be positive or negative. They may also be material, attitudinal or behavioral.

TOP-SECRET-U.S. Army Soldier’s Primer to Terrorism Tactics

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/USArmy-TerrorismTTPs.png

 

TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.07 C3

  • 104 pages
  • August 2012
  • 8.9 MB

Download

This Soldier’s primer describes terrorism TIP threats in an operational environment (OE) and the likely impacts on military operations in a U.S. combatant command area of responsibility (AOR). The intent is to improve situational awareness and operational understanding of current terrorism capabilities-limitations, and complement the deliberate and intuitive processes of-

– Military Risk Management
– Protection of Friendly Forces
– Mission Orders Conduct, and
– Adaptive Leader Decisionmaking.

TMZ – Alex Morgan — The Great Butt Controversy!

 

Team USA soccer star Alex Morgan proves that guys love a chick with some junk in the trunk … but can a dude with a giant dumper get the same kind of attention from chicks?

SECRET-National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Student Guide

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/NGIA-HumanGeography.png

 

The following document on the incorporation of human terrain into geographic intelligence analysis was posted earlier this month to the document sharing website Scribd.

 

National Geospatial-Intelligence College

  • Version 1.6
  • 157 pages
  • September 12, 2011
  • 5 MB

Download

This course provides an overview of incorporating Human Geography into GEOINT at NGA, with the intention of providing a foundation of the knowledge, skills, and application capabilities for the NGA GEOINT analyst. By the end of the course, you will:

• Understand the relevance and need to incorporate Human Geography into GEOINT
• Be familiar with Human Geography concepts and data
• Be able to apply the NGA workflow process, including Human Geography data needs, acquisition, and challenges

Human Terrain Defined

Incorporating Human Geography into GEOINT can be used to support efforts to understand the human terrain. But what is ‘human terrain’?

One definition describes human terrain as “the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of the people among whom a force is operating.”

Human terrain is not a new concept; the need for understanding the behavior of adversaries and their culture, as well as that of the local populations with whom our military forces, diplomats, and aid organizations work, has been identified before: General Petraeus noted that “You have to understand not just what we call the military terrain… the high ground and low ground. It’s about understanding the human terrain, really understanding it.”

• World War II / Korea
• JANIS: Joint Army Navy Intelligence Studies
• Vietnam
• Hamlet Evaluation System
• Attempt to measure the socio-economic, political, security conditions in a COIN environment

HT Analysis (HTA) is an evolving concept, and is often modified to meet specific organizational needs, requirements, and missions.

(U) Current efforts and challenges include creating a:

• Standardized doctrine
• Centralized database
• Shared lexicon
• Single HTA qualification course
• Product standardization
• Workflow methodology

Efforts to develop and implement greater understanding of the ‘human terrain’ across the IC include:

• Defense Intelligence Agency
• DISCCC: Defense Intelligence Socio-Cultural Capabilities Council
• Human Factors Analysis Division
• US Combatant Commands
• Human Terrain Analysis Team
• Cultural and Human Environment Team
• US Special Operations Command
• National Air and Space Intelligence Center
• Service Intelligence Centers

Goal for NGA

“Create new value by broadening and deepening our analytic expertise. By providing deeper, contextual analysis of places informed not only by the earth’s physical features and imagery intelligence, but also by ‘human geography’.”

GEOINT is synonymous with a deep contextual understanding of places…of locations on the Earth. This understanding is informed by:

• what we know about the Earth’s physical features
• what structures people build
• how people use those structures – their activities
• human geography – data and information that can be understood spatially and depicted visually that further deepens and enriches our understanding of a “place.”

Monty Python’s Flying Circus S2E06 – Full Movie

Cryptome – Alaska National Guard Illegal Activities ?

A sends:

Illegal Activities within the Alaska National Guard

December 24, 2012

Please read through all the links.  This post is being sent out to numerous media sources to gain national attention, and multiple forensic toxicology / autonomic / clinical pathologists in order to bring together interested parties who can help to achieve in the following:

(1) bring justice to numerous US military families, especially to the men and women stationed in Alaska who have died and continue to die of “unknown” causes without investigations even though reports stated foul play, drug cartel, and weapons trafficking; 2) syndicate a national and global awareness of rogue militants allowed to join the United States Armed Forces today to operate against itself appointed at the highest levels; and, 3) bring justice to 45+ stationed Alaska military rape victims who after reporting through the proper channels up the chain of command were left without investigations into their cases and rather actually ignored.

It is said to be a cover up that goes deep.  A connection much bigger than humanly imaginable.  The drug cartel, guns trafficking, operating out of mainly Fort Greely, Alaska.  FBI agent Karl Hansen flew to Alaska with a second agent from Washington DC with orders from his superiors to
investigate the unknown deaths and claims of drug cartel operating out of Alaska, as well the 45+ reported rape victims that were left un-investigated.  Star generals are reported involved at the highest levels, and at one point, it was remarked how “this is movie stuff” shaking his head.  Colonel Blaylock when questioned said it is the residual effects of Eric Holder’s Operation Fast and Furious that is being injected into our military.

Colonel Blaylock has gone to 11 sources to get help, and then in the middle of investigations, April 2012, he was terminated from the US Armed Forces after 29.5 years serving.

Sources Made Aware

1       FBI
2       Alaska StateTrooper
3       Anchorage Police Department (APD)
4       US Marshals
5       Senator Begich
6       Senator Murkowski
7       Governor Parnell
8       US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) Fort Rich
9       Department of Army
10      Department of Defense (DoD)
11      Anchorage Daily News three (3) times

No one agency or department listed has started a thorough investigation that will begin to punish these crimes stated by family, in reports made by military and other officials, and now in a newer report in 2012 made by the FBI.  To date, the wrong doers continue without punishment, meanwhile
justice gets delayed for the 45+ raped victims, and numerous military families who want answers as to why their loved ones died.

Colonel Blaylock did however do something about this himself.  Staff Sergeant Michelle M. Clark, age 31, seven (7) months pregnant, came to him on Friday January 13, 2011 to say “they are going to kill me.”  Two days later, Monday January 16, 2011, Michelle was found dead in her home, as
was the 7-month old unborn little girl upon hospital arrival.

Blaylock did work closely with FBI agent Karl Hansen as Karl put together a report for his superiors back in Washington DC.  Colonel Blaylock has given the following 11-page print (see attachment) to issue to the press naming individuals and what he knows is currently transpiring in the
Alaska military, especially Fort Greely, Alaska.

Asked how this could have happened, Colonel Blaylock states numerous men and women are released from prison, their past criminal records wiped clean, and in return they work for upper superiors in a state like Alaska while they are stationed in the military.  The US military is also
accepting non-US citizens into the United States Armed Forces Blaylock states.  Meanwhile, numerous military young and old, men women, daughters sons, fathers mothers, and even families will continue to die off due to unknown causes on US military bases, in their own homes, while deployed, or in various off character places across the globe because they refused to cooperate with the greater agenda.

In researching I found the below list of published linked articles to the numerous Alaskan military ‘deaths due to unknown causes’.  Take note, some deaths occur more often in one company, infantry, battalion, brigade etc; not all remain in one location due to deployment and or relocation, but this begets a connection to the working military factions within.

Blaylock believes there is a connection to the two Kodiak US Coast Guardsmen shot in April 2012 (see link below) while on guard at a remote communications station on the island of Kodiak.  Is it possible?  FBI agent Karl Hansen reported that one of the weapons used in a Fairbanks plot to kill (see links below) was found on a mobile device owned by deceased Staff Sergeant Michelle Clark, in charge of Supply Support.  As far as the family is concerned, this is why she was killed.  She got close and didn’t cooperate.

Karl said each step of the way got botched in Michelle’s case including but not limited to the fact 1) Michelle was raped and filed a report; 2) she made a three-week earlier 911 call because she felt threatened in her own home; 3)  Michelle was found at home and someone unknown made the
actual 911 call; 4) Michelle was transported to the hospital but emergency crew conflict and with hold answers; 5) Michelle’s autopsy, body specimens, and medical records were misplaced, lost, and done incorrectly; 6) the medical examiner and coroner reports were questionable; and 7) the funeral home  that prepared her for burial knows more than they are saying they’ve admitted.  There remains still strong evidence, however, that in the right hands will together initiate the justice process for all.

In conclusion, here are a few thoughts to ponder.

Staff Sergeant Michelle M Clark was stationed in Kosovo 2010 where she witnessed a lack of accountability in prescription medication handouts arriving into Kosovo according to her father who she visited often and confided in.  Was it this sensitive information that ultimately followed
her back to Alaska and lead to her death?  She wanting no part of it ultimately was raped and she reported this rape.  Staff Sergeant Michelle M Clark, head of supply support then, noticed her supply room keys stolen one day but it mysteriously is placed back on her desk after one month. She began documenting supplies missing and being shipped out according to family members.  She felt she was a target kill unable to trust anyone and she disclosed this fear to Colonel Blaylock.  Michelle’s death remains suspicious and the family wants to exhume the body.

We know at the time of investigation April 2012 from Karl Hansen that an image taken by Michelle was found to be one of the weapons used in a retaliatory plot in Fairbanks by militia staff to kill a judge, trooper, and IRS agent.  Moreover, the Kodiak station remains un-staffed after two Coast Guardsmen were shot April 2012 and no longer acts as an operating Port of Entry for entries of merchandise into the state of Alaska to collect duties, and to enforce the various provisions of the customs and navigation laws (19 CFR 101.1).  Anchorage is the new Port Service Provider and is located near a major city.

Is this a problem?  If the drug cartel begins shooting people at the Port of Anchorage for non-compliance while trafficking like talk is what they did in Kodiak, then we will have a big problem all over America.  Kodiak is a perfect entry point for protecting Alaska.  Presently without congress approval, future construction and expansion plans for the Port of Anchorage are cut from 1 billion to 322 million making it unsuitable and unstable for a safe delivery platform, and it puts Anchorage in danger especially now in light of the drug cartel operating out of Fort Greely, Alaska in apparent consent by government in control of  military.

Alaska cannot secure it’s borders or ports to protect it’s land if there is no funding; and if this is happening widespread at ports across America, there will be an increase in violence due to the overlooking of these rogue military, police, state, and other judicial systems that have allowed these drug cartel factions to criminally organize within our government and homeland security.

Colonel Blaylock can be reached at the phone number he provided in the Attachment.  Email a request if you have not received this attachment.

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LINKS
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Military Deaths Stationed-Living in Alaska

1)      http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/07/25/wilmington_soldiers_
death_in_alaska_under_investigation/

2)      http://www.jber.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123255768

3)      http://www.ktva.com/home/outbound-xml-feeds/Fairbanks-Stationed-Soldier-Death-Under-
Investigation–131154793.html?m=y

4)      http://www.ktva.com/home/outbound-xml-feeds/Fairbanks-Stationed-Soldier-Death-Under-
Investigation–131154793.html?video=pop&t=a

5)      http://classic.alaskastar.com/stories/051111/Bri_dosrw.shtml

6)      http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2009809518_apaksoldiersdeath.html

7)      http://www.alaskapublic.org/2011/11/09/army-still-investigating-alaska-soldier’s-
suspicious-death/

8)      http://article.wn.com/view/2012/08/22/Death_of_JBLM_infantry_solider_is_under_investigation/

9)      http://www.adn.com/2010/03/16/1186459/soldiers-death-under-investigation.html

10)     http://www.adn.com/2012/12/18/2728079/last-of-accused-in-soldiers-suicide.html#storylink=
botnext

11)     http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/us/8-charged-in-death-of-fellow-soldier-us-army-says.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0a

12)     http://militarytimes.com/valor/solider/1768377/

13)     http://www.adn.com/2012/08/13/2587244/details-lacking-on-airmans-death.html

14)     http://www.usarak.army.mil/alaskapost/archives2008/081205/dec05story1.asp

15)     http://woundedtimes.blogspot.com/2009/07/fort-richardson-staff-sgt-found-dead-in.html?m=1

16)     http://newsminer.com/view/full_story/9396244/article-Death-of-Fort-Richardson-soldier-under-
investigation?instance=home_news_window_left_bullets

17)     http://www.adn.com/2010/03/16/1186459_soldiers-death-under-investigation.html

18)     http://articles.ktuu.com/keyword/fort-richardson/recent/4

Other Source Links

Fox News

Coast Guard Members Killed After shooting at Alaska Station

1)      http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/04/12/2-coast-guard-members-killed-after-shooting-at-
alaska-station/

2)      Port of Entry Kodiak

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/contacts/ports/ak/3127.xml

3)      Port Expansion Price Tag Billions to Millions

http://www.ktva.com/home/top-stories/Port-Expansion-Price-Tag-Scaled-Back-from-Billions-to-
Millions—-124238094.html

4)      Alaska Militia Plot

http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2011/03/20/20110320alaska-
militiaplots0320.html

 

SECRET-UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey November 2012

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Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012

  • 28 pages
  • November 2012

Download

Despite the eradication of opium poppy by Governor-led Eradication (GLE) having increased by 154% in comparison to its 2011 level (9,672 hectares eradicated in 2012), the total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 154,000 hectares (125,000 – 189,000) in 2012.

While that represents a 18% increase in cultivation, potential opium production was estimated at 3,700 tons (2,800 – 4,200 tons) in 2012, a 36% decrease from the previous year. This was due to a decrease in opium yield caused by a combination of a disease of the opium poppy and adverse weather conditions, particularly in the Eastern, Western and Southern regions of the country.

The high level of opium prices reported in 2011 was one of the principal factors that led to the increase in opium poppy cultivation in 2012. However, while opium prices remained high during 2012 there was some decline in all regions of the country, though differences between regions became more and more pronounced.

The vast majority (95%) of total cultivation took place in nine provinces in Afghanistan’s Southern and Western regions,6 which include the most insecure provinces in the country. Opium cultivation increased in most of the main opium poppy-growing provinces, including Farah, Nangarhar, Badghis and Nimroz, whereas cultivation remained stable in Uruzgan and decreased by 11% in Kandahar, the second most important poppycultivating province between 2009 and 2011.

Opium cultivation rose by 19% in Hilmand which, with 75,176 hectares or 49% of total opium cultivation in 2012, remained the largest opium-cultivating province in Afghanistan. However, a separate estimate was also available for the Hilmand “Food Zone” alternative livelihood project 8 , which showed that relatively less poppy is cultivated within the food zone than outside it.

Opium cultivation also increased in the Eastern region where it rose significantly in Kunar (121%), Kapisa (60%) and Laghman (41%) provinces. However, the Eastern region contributed only 4% to the national total of opium production in 2012. In the Northern region, opium cultivation increased by 10% in Baghlan province despite the eradication of 252 hectares in 2012.

Monty Python’s Flying Circus – How To Recognise Different Types of Trees – Full Show Movie

TOP-SECRET – DHS-FBI Bulletin: No Specific Threats to American Jewish Community

 

 

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/DHS-FBI-JewishCommunityThreats.png

No Specific Threat to American Jewish Community, Despite Recent World Events

  • 5 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • February 8, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) provides law enforcement and private sector safety officials with an evaluation of potential terrorist threats to Jewish organizations, facilities, and personnel in the United states. The information is provided to support the activities of DHS and FBI and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and first responder officials to deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks in the United States.

(U) Threat overview

(U//FOUO) Heightened tensions between Israel, Iran, and the United States-stemming from threats against Israeli or Jewish targets in Asia and Europe attacks on Iranian nuclear scientists; global economic sanctions against Iran; and press reporting of Israel’s possible intent to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities-have contributed to the perception of an increased threat to the Jewish community worldwide from Iran or its surrogates. Hizballah’s longstanding interest in exacting retribution for the February 2008 death of Imad Mughniyah–a senior founding member of Hizballah who was killed in Syria–may also be fueling these concerns. We have no information, however, to indicate that these recent events have significantly increased the threat to Jewish organizations, facilities, and personnel in the United States.

– (U) On 3 February 2012, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei publicly threatened to retaliate against economic sanctions levied on his country and to support militant groups who oppose Israel.

– (U) On 24 January 2012, the Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff publicly remarked that terrorist groups are trying to conduct attacks against Israeli targets abroad, according to a respected Israeli newspaper, and some Israeli consulates in the United States have reportedly circulated letters warning of escalating threats to Israeli and Jewish facilities. Additionally, letters containing an unidentified, non-toxic white powder were recently mailed to various Israeli consulates in the United States, Europe, and Canada, according to open source reporting.

– (U) Three Azerbaijanis allegedly linked to Iranian intelligence were arrested for plotting to attack the Israeli Ambassador to Azerbaijan and the leader of a local Jewish school, according to late January international media reporting.

– (U//FOUO) An alleged Hizballah plot to attack Israeli or Jewish targets in Asia was reportedly disrupted in Thailand last month, although the targets and timing of the operation are unclear; press reporting suggested a similar threat existed in Europe, but we have no information to indicate that similar plots were directed at the Homeland.

(U//FOUO) Jewish organizations, facilities, and personnel in the United States have been a focus of violent extremists in the past and we assess that they will likely remain a target of violent groups and individuals in the future.

Mary, Queen of Scots – Full Movie

A Biographical film about Mary Queen of Scotland and her perpetual rival Elizabeth I of England. This Film features the fictional meeting of the two queens. Starring Vanessa Redgrave as Mary Stuart and Glenda Jackson as Elizabeth I of England.