The Most Influential People of All Time – The Secret List

Rank – Name – Year of Birth – Score
  1. 1
    1207
    396
    4
  2. 2
    698
    257
    1642
  3. 3
    1541
    801
    570
  4. 4
    702
    285
    1879
  5. 5
    455
    182
    384
  6. 6
    524
    179
    1564
  7. 7
    646
    219
    1452
  8. 8
    391
    182
    427
  9. 9
    436
    235
    1809
  10. 10
    354
    161
    469
  11. 11
    280
    158
    356
  12. 12
    461
    243
    1869
  13. 13
    316
    168
    1564
  14. 14
    256
    147
    551
  15. 15
    260
    163
    100
  16. 16
    284
    137
    1809
  17. 17
    294
    178
    563
  18. 18
    236
    123
    1473
  19. 19
    145
    58
    1398
  20. 20
    272
    151
    1732
    21
  21. 227
    165
    1818
  22. 22
    281
    156
    1847
  23. 23
    370
    221
    1929
  24. 24
    415
    206
    1856
  25. 25
    243
    128
    1743
  26. 26
    193
    78
  27. 27
    232
    151
    1769
  28. 28
    289
    142
    1706
  29. 29
    209
    154
    1451
  30. 30
    249
    122
    1847
  31. 31
    327
    258
    1889
  32. 32
    171
    135
    1162
  33. 33
    74
    27
    1483
  34. 34
    204
    118
    1863
  35. 35
    221
    130

    The Wright Brothers

  36. 36
    178
    118
  37. 37
    166
    139
    1856
  38. 38
    115
    42
    570
  39. 39
    145
    118
    1596
  40. 40
    233
    147
    1918
  41. 41
    118
    60
    1475
  42. 42
    235
    158
    1874
  43. 43
    122
    88
    742
  44. 44
    128
    113
    272
  45. 45
    137
    125
    1870
  46. 46
    203
    153
    1955
  47. 47
    60
    12
    1756
  48. 48
    28
    8
    1712

    added by: Polar Bear

  49. 49
    91
    74
    5
  50. 50
    99
    81
    18784

 

 

SECRET – U.S. Army Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) Manual

The following manual was released by the U.S. Army on February 12, 2014.  The manual was first reported by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists.

FM 3-38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities

  • 96 pages
  • February 12, 2014

Download

FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, provides overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA). This manual describes the importance of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to Army forces and provides the tactics and procedures commanders and staffs use in planning, integrating, and synchronizing CEMA.

This manual provides the information necessary for Army forces to conduct CEMA that enable them to shape their operational environment and conduct unified land operations. It provides enough guidance for commanders and their staffs to develop innovative approaches to seize, retain, and exploit advantages throughout an operational environment. CEMA enable the Army to achieve desired effects in support of the commander’s objectives and intent.

The principal audience for FM 3-38 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should see applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning cyberspace operations, electronic warfare (EW), and spectrum management operations (SMO). Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual.

CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES DEFINED
1-1. Cyber electromagnetic activities are activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system (ADRP 3-0). CEMA consist of cyberspace operations (CO), electronic warfare (EW), and spectrum management operations (SMO) (see figure 1-1 on page 1-2).

1-2. Army forces conduct CEMA as a unified effort. Integration is the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole (JP 1-02). Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 1-02). CEMA integrates and synchronizes the functions and capabilities of CO, EW, and SMO to produce complementary and reinforcing effects. Conducting these activities independently may detract from their efficient employment. If uncoordinated, these activities may result in conflicts and mutual interference between them and with other entities that use the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). CO, EW, and SMO are synchronized to cause specific effects at decisive points to support the overall operation.

1-3. The CEMA element is responsible for planning, integrating, and synchronizing CO, EW, and SMO to support the commander’s mission and desired end state within cyberspace and the EMS. During execution the CEMA element is responsible for synchronizing CEMA to best facilitate mission accomplishment. (See chapter 2 for more information on the CEMA element.)

1-4. Cyberspace operations, EW, and SMO are essential to the conduct of unified land operations. While these activities differ in their employment and tactics, their functions and capabilities must be integrated and synchronized to maximize their support to unified land operations. The integration of these activities requires an understanding of the functions and capabilities being employed.

CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS

1-5. Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). Cyberspace operations consist of three functions: offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and Department of Defense information network operations (see chapter 3).

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1-6. Electronic warfare is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-13.1). EW consists of three functions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. These functions are referred to as divisions in joint doctrine (see chapter 4).

SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

1-7. SMO are the interrelated functions of spectrum management, frequency assignment, host-nation coordination, and policy that enable the planning, management, and execution of operations within the electromagnetic operational environment during all phases of military operations. SMO are the management portions of electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO). EMSO also include electronic warfare (see chapter 5)

FUNCTIONS OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS

3-1. Army forces coordinate and integrate CO through CEMA. They do this to gain and maintain freedom of action in cyberspace and as required to achieve periods of cyberspace superiority.

3-2. Cyberspace superiority is the degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary (JP 1-02). Such interference is possible because large portions of cyberspace are not under the control of friendly forces. Cyberspace superiority establishes conditions describing friendly force freedom of action while denying this same freedom of action to enemy and adversary actors. Ultimately, Army forces conduct CO to create and achieve effects in support of the commander’s objectives and desired end state.

3-3. CO are categorized into three functions including offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and Department of Defense information network operations. These functions are described in joint doctrine as missions in cyberspace that require specific actions in cyberspace (see joint doctrine for CO). Figure 3-1 on page 3-2 depicts the three interdependent functions of CO.

OFFENSIVE CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS

3-4. Offensive cyberspace operations are cyberspace operations intended to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace (JP 1-02). Army forces conduct OCO across the range of military operations by targeting enemy and hostile adversary activity and related capabilities in and through cyberspace. OCO are designed to support the commander’s objectives and intent consistent with applicable authorities and legal frameworks. (See paragraph 3-38 for additional information on authorities and other legal considerations.)

3-5. OCO are conducted in and through cyberspace where information technology infrastructures, along with the people and systems that use them, exist in an area of operations and pervade an operational environment. To varying degrees, host-nation populations, governments, security forces, businesses and other actors rely upon these infrastructures and supporting networks or systems. Given these conditions, OCO require deliberate coordination and integration to ensure desired effects (changes in behavior which do not suggest the ways or means those changes were created) are created and focused at the right place and time in support of the commander’s objectives.

3-6. Using OCO, commanders can mass effects through the employment of lethal and nonlethal actions leveraging all capabilities available to gain advantages in cyberspace that support objectives on land. For example, cyberspace capabilities and other information-related capabilities may be directed at an enemy weapons system consisting of the targeted platform and its operators. The cyberspace capability could create degrading effects on the platform while an information-related capability influences, disrupts, corrupts, or usurps the decisionmaking of the operator. (See FM 3-13 for additional information on inform and influence activities (IIA) and information-related capabilities.)

CYBERSPACE ATTACK

3-7. A cyberspace attack consists of actions that create various direct denial effects in cyberspace (for example, degradation, disruption, or destruction) and manipulation that leads to denial that is hidden or that manifests in the physical domains. For the Army, cyberspace attacks are a type of cyberspace operation employed primarily in support of OCO. Cyberspace attacks are primarily employed outside of LandWarNet, but they are coordinated and deconflicted inside of the Department of Defense information networks (DODIN). (See paragraph 3-24 for additional information on the DODIN.)

3-8. Army forces conduct or facilitate cyberspace attacks in support of OCO within designated areas of operation. For example, when employed as part of an offensive cyberspace operation, a cyberspace attack may be directed at information resident in, or in transit between, computers (including mobile phones and personal digital assistants) and computer networks used by an enemy or adversary. Enemy or adversary actors may be denied the ability to use resources or have their information resources used for friendly proposes as a result of a cyberspace attack. In every instance, commanders and staffs follow appropriate authorities and legal guidance. (See paragraph 3-38 for additional information on authorities and other legal considerations.)

3-9. Using specific portions of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) as primary pathways or avenues of approach, cyberspace attacks may employ capabilities such as tailored computer code in and through various network nodes such as servers, bridges, firewalls, sensors, protocols, operating systems, and hardware associated with computers or processors. Tailored computer code is only one example of a cyberspace capability (a device, computer program, or technique, including any combination of software, firmware, or hardware) designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace. The development and employment of tailored computer code represents the core and unique technical nature of CO capabilities. Computer code is designed to create specific effects, and when employed this code moves in the form of data packets in and through cyberspace across wired and wireless driven communication technology and systems. Cyberspace attacks must therefore be coordinated and integrated in support of the commander’s objectives and consistent with applicable assessment measures and indicators.

3-10. Cyberspace attack capabilities are employed to support maneuver operations by creating simultaneous and complementary effects. For example, a cyberspace attack capability may be employed in conjunction with electronic attack, offensive space control, fires, and information related capabilities to deceive, degrade, destroy, and disrupt a specific enemy integrated air defense system or enemy safe haven (see table 3-1 on page 3-4).

 

Top Pentagon Official Ordered Destruction of bin Laden Death Photos, NSA Employee Gave Snowden Password to Classified Info Network, US Falls in Press Freedom Rankings to #46

McRaven's order to destroy the photos was first mentioned in a 2011 draft Pentagon IG report examining whether the Obama administration gave special access to Hollywood executives planning the film “Zero Dark Thirty.”

McRaven’s order to destroy the photos was first mentioned in a 2011 draft Pentagon IG report examining whether the Obama administration gave special access to Hollywood executives planning the film “Zero Dark Thirty.”

A FOIA lawsuit brought against the Department of Defense by Judicial Watch has spurred the declassification of documents revealing U.S. Special Operations Commander, Admiral William McRaven, ordered the immediate destruction of any photos of the death of Osama bin Laden. On May 13, 2011, McRaven told subordinates that any photos should have already been turned over to the CIA –presumably so they could be placed in operational files out of reach of the FOIA– and if anyone still had access to photos, to “destroy them immediately or get them to the [redacted].” McRaven issued the directive only hours after Judicial Watch issued a press release stating they would be filing suit for the records.

The National Security Agency (NSA) currently collects data on less than a third of domestic calls, according to anonymous officials, raising questions about the efficacy of the bulk surveillance tool. Officials reported that the agency collects information from most landlines, but that it is incapable of collecting information from cell phones or internet calls. However, the NSA is in the process of building “the technical capacity over the next few years to collect toll records from every domestic land line and cellphone call, assuming Congress extends authority for Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act after it expires in June 2015.”

A new audit from the Government Accountability Office reports that spy agencies, including the FBI, CIA, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and components of the Departments of Justice, Energy, Treasury, Homeland Security, and State, “have provided unreliable and incomplete reports to Congress since 2011 on the use of private contractors.” The unclassified report does not disclose the number of core contractors –like Edward Snowden- these agencies employ, or how much money is spent on them.

A document posted to cryptome.org reveals Snowden was given access to NSAnet to scrape 1.7 million classified files he would not otherwise have had access to by a civilian employee Photo: EPA

A document posted to Cryptome.org reveals Snowden was given access to NSAnet to scrape 1.7 million classified files by a civilian NSA employee. Photo: EPA

A declassified document recently posted on Cryptome.org reveals that a civilian NSA employee gave Snowden their Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificate, allowing Snowden access to classified information on NSAnet that would otherwise have been unavailable to the contractor. Then, without the civilian employee’s knowledge, Snowden used a commonly available web crawler to “scrape”  1.7 million files.

The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, said during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing Tuesday that nearly a year after Edward Snowden accessed the classified files, the agency still does not have the technology fully in place to prevent a similar unauthorized disclosure. Under questioning, Clapper said that Snowden would have been caught had he tried to scrape material from NSA headquarters in Ft. Meade, MD, rather than an agency outpost in Hawaii, further commenting that “[o]ur whole system is based on personal trust.”

February 4 report from Republicans on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee reported that more than 15 federal agencies were hacked last year, and either lost control of their networks or had them stolen as a result. The report further notes the occurrence of 48,000 other cyber ‘incidents’ involving government systems, and that “civilian agencies don’t detect roughly four in 10 intrusions.”

The debate over targeting an American terror suspect in Pakistan in a lethal drone attack continued this week. This is the first time officials have discussed killing an American citizen in such an attack, and comes in the middle of another debate about whether the lethal drone program should be transferred from the CIA to the Pentagon. DNI Clapper publicly acknowledged the existence of the covert CIA drone program for the first time this Tuesday during the aforementioned Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. Sen. Bill Nelson (D-FL) asked Clapper to confirm if the White House was considering “shifting the use of drones, unmanned aerial vehicle strikes, from the CIA to the DOD,” to which Clapper responded, “Yes, sir, it is. And again, that would also be best left to a closed session.”

Former State Department analyst Stephen Kim pled guilty to leaking a Top Secret intelligence report on North Korea to a Fox News reporter and is expected to serve 13 months in prison. The report led to a June 11, 2009, Fox News story that stated “Pyongyang’s next nuclear detonation is but one of four planned actions the Central Intelligence Agency has learned, through sources inside North Korea…” implying the source inside North Korea was CIA human intelligence that was placed at risk due to the story’s publication.

USA, #46.

USA, #46.

The US fell 13 places to #46 in Reporters Without Borders’ latest ranking of press freedom around the world, and is now sandwiched between Romania and Haiti. The report cites national security measures as the reason for the rankings plummet, including Chelsea Manning’s conviction, the DOJ’s seizure of AP phone records as part of a leak investigation, and the government’s attempts to have Edward Snowden returned for prosecution.

The NSA refuses to acknowledge the existence or non-existence of documents on a Top Secret U.S. intelligence facility in Mexico City, a communications hub that barred Mexican personnel and focused on “high value targeting,”despite previously declassified information describing its role. The NSA issued a “Glomar” denial in response to a FOIA request filed by the National Security Archive last year, even after the Archive published a declassified Pentagon memo confirming the NSA’s involvement in the operations of the “Mexico Fusion Center.”

Finally this week, Polish prosecutors may try to question Guantanamo detainees as part of an investigation into whether or not the CIA maintained a secret “black” prison in the Eastern European nation between 2002 and 2003. The Polish investigation began in 2008 after CIA officials told the AP that a prison in operated in Poland “from December 2002 until the fall of 2003.” Human rights groups believe more than a handful of terror suspects were held there, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Happy FOIA-ing!

DHS-FBI-NCTC: Building Security Measures May Hinder Emergency Response Efforts

Building Security Measures May Impact Emergency Response to Attacks by Violent Extremists

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • December 6, 2013

Download

(U//FOUO) Facility security measures, such as interior control points or exterior barriers, may require first responders to adjust normal protocols and procedures to operate rapidly during emergencies. The timeline below is an overview of attacks and plots against US-based facilities with varying levels of security. The diversity of tactics and targets used underscores the need for interagency exercises and training that incorporates multiple scenarios to account for building security measures likely to be encountered.

(U) First Responder Response Considerations:

(U//FOUO) Conducting periodic exercises with building authorities and interagency partners will help responders tailor a coordinated response to the unique security characteristics of the site
and increase efficiency during an emergency. Engagement with partners may address a number of issues including:

»» (U//FOUO) Building emergency response plans that identify the key staff members to assist and advise first responders as well as their roles and responsibilities during crisis;
»» (U//FOUO) Interior building control points which may limit responder access to areas and affect the rapid deployment of tools and equipment;
»» (U//FOUO) Building access control systems: the availability of master keys or swipe cards to provide full access and/or entry into restricted areas;
»» (U//FOUO) The existence of exterior building security measures which may affect the placement of response vehicles or the ability to ventilate building and rescue victims;
»» (U//FOUO) Closed circuit television (CCTV) monitors to maintain situational awareness and to assist with accountability and evacuation of building occupants; and
»» (U//FOUO) Suspicious activity reporting training to building staff and tenants to help identify and disrupt potential preoperational activity or actual attacks.

Cryptome – Federal Reserve Probes Watergate-Iraq Corruption

Click to access frs-12-0330.pdf

Cryptome – 9/11 Secrecy Prolongs Warmaking and NSA Excess

9/11 Secrecy Prolongs Warmaking and NSA Excess

 


At 09:08 PM 2/20/2014, A wrote:

Mr. Young,

I’m curious about your opinion about what really happened on 9/11. I was reading one of your FOIA posts and was curious about your opinion. Please don’t waste too much time on this. I’m working an 80-hour per week job and am married. So, I don’t have as much time as I would like to research. A simple copy-and-paste job will do with a few different links.

Thank you for your time and for all the documents you post,

A

_____

21 February 2014

A,

These are some of my comments on WTC.

http://cryptome.org/wtc-collapse.htm

9/11 is a much larger issue than WTC which I am still brooding about. There is still a lot of information which the USG has not released, and until that is done it will be difficult to do more than speculate.

It is a great shame, likely criminal, that the USG refuses to release all material it has, for that perpetuates suspicion of a cover-up of those at fault and sets yet another precedent for using official secrecy to avoid accountability.

A somewhat lesser but related shame is that there has been no person or persons in the USG held accountable or punished for 9/11, leaving the false impression nothing could have been done to prevent it.

Our view is that public pressure should be continued, and increased, for full release of the USG material, both classified and unclassified. Withholding this material will undermine trust in government, and worse, leave government free to avoid responsibility to the public for war and peace. So long as that fundamental responsibility to the public is avoided we think continuous war is inevitable for unnecessary loss of life and limb and unforgiveable waste of national resources.

Behind the avoidance of public responsibility is the ever increasing use of unjustified secretkeeping, prolongation of exaggerated threats to national security, and as Ike warned the perpetuation of the lucrative military-industry-media complex hidden by official secrecy. It is this secrecy which breeds suspicion of the USA at home and overseas and will almost surely lead to more 9/11s.

NSA excess is directly attributable to 9/11 secrecy about lack of government accountability.

Regards,

John

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 87, LAOS,

Click on the entries to get more infos.

Officers & Master Clients (3)

Listed Addresses (3)

The Nieman Foundation for Journalism about the State of Journalism in China

Click to access journalism-in-china.pdf

 

Exposed by Cryptome – Syria Devastation Photos

 

Syria Devastation Photos

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March 2, 2012. New satellite imagery and eyewitness accounts reveal that the bombardment of the Baba Amr neighborhood in Homs has inflicted widespread destruction and a large number of deaths and severe injuries of civilians, Human Rights Watch said today.[Image]

Exposed by Cryptome – Syria Devastation Photos 2

 

Syria Devastation Photos 2

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Unveiled – Edward Lucas DMCA Notice for Snowden Plot

Edward Lucas DMCA Notice for Snowden Plot

 


Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2014 13:56:57 +0000
From: “Edward Lucas” <edwardlucas[at]economist.com>
To: <cryptome[at]earthlink.net>
Cc: <Andrew Rosenheim <androsen[at]amazon.co.uk>
Subject: DCMA notice

Mr John Young
Cryptome, 251 West 89th Street, New York, NY 10024

Dear Mr Young

I am the copyright owner of the article being infringed at:

http://cryptome.org/2014/02/lucas-snowden.htm

It is a Kindle Single available for sale on the Amazon website

This letter is official notification under the provisions of Section 512* of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (*DMCA*) to effect removal of the above-reported infringements. I request that you immediately issue a cancellation message as specified in RFC 1036 for the specified postings and prevent the infringer, who is identified by its web address, from posting the infringing content to your servers in future. Please be advised that the law requires you, as a service provider, to *expeditiously remove or disable access to* the infringing content upon receipt of this notice. Non-compliance may result in a loss of immunity for liability under the DMCA.

Use of the material in the manner complained of here is not authorized by me, the copyright holder, or the law. The information provided here is accurate to the best of my knowledge. I swear under penalty of perjury that I am the copyright holder.

Please send me, at the address noted below, a prompt response indicating the actions you have taken to resolve this matter.

Yours faithfully

Edward Lucas

+44 207 576 xxxx (direct)
+44 7770 380 xxx (mobile)

edwardlucas[at]economist.com
The Economist
25 St James St
London SW1A 1HG
www.edwardlucas.com

This e-mail may contain confidential material. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete all copies. It may also contain personal views which are not the views of The Economist Group. We may monitor e-mail to and from our network.

Sent by a member of The Economist Group. The Group’s parent company is The Economist Newspaper Limited, registered in England with company number 236383 and registered office at 25 St James’s Street, London, SW1A 1HG. For Group company registration details go to http://legal.economistgroup.com


	

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 86, KYRGYZSTAN,

Click on the entries to get more infos.

Officers & Master Clients (4)

Listed Addresses (4)

Cryptome – NSA Snowden Releases Tally Update – *1,159 Pages

18 February 2014. Add *45 pages to The Intercept (37 pages are duplicates of release by NBC News). Tally now *1,159 pages of The Guardian first reported 58,000 files; caveat: Janine Gibson, The Guardian NY, said on 30 January 2014 “much more than 58,000 files in first part, two more parts” (no numbers) (tally now less than ~1.8%). DoD claims 1,700,000 files (~.0062% of that released).

Note: Between 10-17 February 2014, The Intercept disclosed fragments of Snowden pages and the New York Times referenced some but as far as known did not release them in full. If available please send link.

10 February 2014. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad (via Electrospaces.blogspot.com).

7 February 2014. Add 15 pages NBC News.

5 February 2014. Add 14 pages NBC News.

31 January 2014. Add 27 pages to CBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 47 pages to NBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 18 pages to Anonymous via New York Times.

16 January 2014. Add 8 pages to The Guardian.

* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

Related Snowden Document and Page Count Assessment:

http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-count.htm

* 5 January 2014. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel (30 December 2013. No source given for NSA docs). Tally now *962 pages (~1.7%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.50% of that released).

4 January 2014. The source was not identified for *133  pages published by Der Spiegel and Jacob Appelbaum in late December 2013. They are included here but have not been confirmed as provided by Edward Snowden. Thanks to post by Techdirt.

Glenn Greenwald tweeted:

Glenn Greenwald @ggreenwald, 8:05 AM – 29 Dec 13@Cryptomeorg @ioerror I had no involvement in that Spiegel article, ask them – and they don’t say those are Snowden docs.

Matt Blaze tweeted, 11:24 AM – 2 Jan 14

matt blaze @mattblazeIf there are other sources besides Snowden, I hope journalists getting docs are careful to authenticate them (& disclose uncertainty).

3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.

3 January 2014. See also EFF, ACLU and LeakSource accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.

* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 December 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages (8 duplicates) to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.

23 December 2013

http://www.adn.com/2013/12/22/3243451/pincus-snowden-still-has-a-road.html

We’ve yet to see the full impact of former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s unauthorized downloading of highly classified intelligence documents.

Among the roughly 1.7 million documents he walked away with — the vast majority of which have not been made public — are highly sensitive, specific intelligence reports, as well as current and historic requirements the White House has given the agency to guide its collection activities, according to a senior government official with knowledge of the situation.

The latter category involves about 2,000 unique taskings that can run to 20 pages each and give reasons for selective targeting to NSA collectors and analysts. These orders alone may run 31,500 pages.

13 December 2013. Add 26 pages to Trojkan (SVT). Tally now 797 pages (~1.4%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.40% of that released). Australia press reports “up to 20,000 Aussie files.”

Rate of release over 6 months, 132.8 pages per month, equals 436 months to release 58,000, or 36.3 years. Thus the period of release has decreased in the past month from 42 years.

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

 


21 November 2013. See also EFF and ACLU accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

 


3 November 2013

47 42 Years to Release Snowden Documents

Out of reported 50,000 pages (or files, not clear which), about 446 514 pages (>1% 1%) have been released over 5 months beginning June 5, 2012. At this rate, 89 100 pages per month, it will take 47 42 years for full release. Snowden will be 77 72 years old, his reporters hoarding secrets all dead.

NY Times, 3 November 2013:

Whatever reforms may come, Bobby R. Inman, who weathered his own turbulent period as N.S.A. director from 1977 to 1981, offers his hyper-secret former agency a radical suggestion for right now. “My advice would be to take everything you think Snowden has and get it out yourself,” he said. “It would certainly be a shock to the agency. But bad news doesn’t get better with age. The sooner they get it out and put it behind them, the faster they can begin to rebuild.”

 


 

Outlet Pages
The Guardian 273
Washington Post 216
Der Spiegel * 97
O Globo Fantastico ~87
New York Times
Anonymous
118 (82 joint)
18
ProPublica 89 (82 joint)
Le Monde 20
Dagbladet 13
NRC Handelsblad 5
Huffington Post 3
CBC 36
The Globe and Mail 18
SVT 2
L’Espresso 3
Trojkan (SVT) 29
Jacob Appelbaum * 71
Information.dk 22*
Anonymous/New York Times 18
NBC News 76
The Intercept *45

 


Timeline of releases:

18 February 2014. Add 45 pages to The Intercept.

10 February 2014. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad (via Electrospaces.blogspot.com).

7 February 2014. Add 15 pages NBC News.

5 February 2014. Add 14 pages NBC News.

31 January 2014. Add 27 pages CBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 47 pages to NBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 18 pages to Anonymous.

16 January 2014. Add 8 pages to The Guardian.

* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.

2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.

* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 Decebmer 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum.

* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum.

* 30 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel.

24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.

13 December 2013. Add 26 pages to Trojkan (SVT).

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

11 December 2013. Belatedly add 25 pages to Guardian.

11 December 2013. Belatedly add 74 pages to Washington Post.

10 December 2013. Add 2 pages to CBC.

10 December 2013. Add 4 pages to CBC (duplicate of previous source).

9 December 2013. Add 3 pages to Trojkan. Add 2 pages to Guardian. Add 82 pages to New York Times and ProPublica (joint).

6 December 2013. Add 3 pages to L’Espresso.

5 December 2013. Add 2 pages to SVT (Swedish TV).

5 December 2013. Add 1 page to Washington Post.

4 December 2013. Add 3 pages to Washington Post.

2 December 2013. Add 3 pages to CBC.

30 November 2013. Add 18 pages to The Globe and Mail.

30 November 2013. Add 3 pages to NRC Handelsblad.

29 November 2013. Add 1 page to CBC.

27 November 2013. Add 3 pages to Huffington Post.

26 November 2013. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

23 November 2013. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad.

23 November 2013. Add 5 pages to New York Times.

22 November 2013. Add 10 pages to Dagbladet.

18 November 2013. Add 6 pages to The Guardian.

17 November 2013. Add two images to Der Spiegel.

4 November 2013. Add 14 pages to Washington Post.

3 November 2013. A reports an additional 54 slides for O Globo Petrobas.

3 November 2013. Add 22 pages to New York Times.

2 November 2013. Add 13 pages to Guardian, 11 are duplicates.

31 October 2013. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

29 October 2013. Add 3 pages to Der Spiegel

27 October 2013. Add 2 pages to Der Spiegel.

25 October 2013. Add 4 pages to Le Monde.

22 October 2013. Add 5 pages to Le Monde.

21 October 2013. Add 11 pages to Le Monde, 8 are duplicates.

20 October 2013. Add 1 page to Der Spiegel.

13 October 2013. Add 4, 7 and 9 pages to Washington Post.

8 October 2013. Add 7 pages to O Globo: CSE spying on Brazilian ministry, reported 7 October 2013.

6 October 2013. Add Snowden pages published by Washington Post, Der Spiegel, O Globo Fantastico, New York Times, ProPublica. Some are duplicates(*).

 


5 October 2013

26 Years to Release Snowden Docs by The Guardian

Out of reported 15,000 pages, The Guardian has published 192 pages in fourteen releases over four months, an average of 48 pages per month, or 1.28% of the total. At this rate it will take 26 years for full release.

Edward Snowden will be 56 years old.
Glenn Greenwald will be 72.
Laura Poitras will be 75.
Alan Rusbridger will be 86.
Barton Gellman will be 78.
Julian Assange will be 68.
Chelsea Manning will be 52.
Keith Alexander will be 88.
Barack Obama will be 78.
Daniel Ellsberg will be 108.
This author will be 103.

 


 

Number Date Title Pages

The Guardian 273
21 16 January 2014 SMS Text Messages Exploit 8
20 9 December 2013 Spying on Games 2
18 18 November 2013 DSD-3G 6
19 1 November 2013 PRISM, SSO
SSO1 Slide
SSO2 Slide
13*
18 4 October 2013 Types of IAT Tor 9
17 4 October 2013 Egotistical Giraffe 20*
16 4 October 2013 Tor Stinks 23
15 11 September 2013 NSA-Israel Spy 5
14 5 September 2013 BULLRUN 6*
13 5 September 2013 SIGINT Enabling 3*
12 5 September 2013 NSA classification guide 3
11 31 July 2013 XKeyscore 32
10 27 June 2013 DoJ Memo on NSA 16
9 27 June 2013 Stellar Wind 51
8 21 June 2013 FISA Certification 25
7 20 June 2013 Minimization Exhibit A 9
6 20 June 2013 Minimization Exhibit B 9
5 16 June 2013 GCHQ G-20 Spying 4
4 8 June 2013 Boundless Informant FAQ 3
3 8 June 2013 Boundless Informant Slides 4
2 7 June 2013 PPD-20 18
1 5 June 2013 Verizon 4

Washington Post 216
2 January 2014 Quantum Computer 2 10
2 January 2014 Quantum Computer 3
23 December 2013 NSA/CSS Mission 2
11 December 2013 Excessive Collection 9
11 December 2013 SCISSORS 2 7
11 December 2013 SCISSORS 1 4
11 December 2013 Yahoo-Google Exploit 6
11 December 2013 Cable Spying Types 7
11 December 2013 WINDSTOP 1
11 December 2013 Co-Traveler 24
11 December 2013 GSM Tracking 2
11 December 2013 SIGINT Successes 4
11 December 2013 GHOSTMACHINE 4
5 December 2013 Target Location 1
4 December 2013 FASCIA 2
4 December 2013 CHALKFUN 1
26 November 2013 Microsoft a Target? 4
4 November 2013 WINDSTOP, SSO, Yahoo-Google 14
30 October 2013 MUSCULAR-INCENSOR Google and Yahoo 4
14 October 2013 SSO Overview 4
14 October 2013 SSO Slides 7
14 October 2013 SSO Content Slides 9
4 October 2013 Tor 49
4 October 2013 EgotisticalGiraffe 20*
4 October 2013 GCHQ MULLENIZE 2
4 October 2013 Roger Dingledine 2
30 August 2013 Budget 17
10 July 2013 PRISM Slide 1
29 June 2013 PRISM 8
20 June 2013 Warrantless Surveillance 25*
7 June 2013 PPD-20 18*
6 June 2013 PRISM 1

Der Spiegel * 97
31 December 2013 QFIRE * 16
30 December 2013 TAO Introduction * 16
30 Deceber 2013 QUANTUM Tasking (8 duplicates of QUANTUMTHEORY) 28*
30 December 2013 QUANTUMTHEORY 14
29 December 2013 TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (images)
TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH
(DE article)
4
17 November 2013 ROYAL CONCIERGE (DE)ROYAL CONCIERGE (EN) 2
29 October 2013 NSA-CIA SCS 3
27 October 2013 NSA-CIA SCS 2
20 October 2013 Mexico President 1
20 September 2013 Belgacom 3
16 September 2013 SWIFT 3
9 September 2013 Smartphones 5
1 September 2013 French Foreign Ministry 0
31 August 2013 Al Jazeera 0

O Globo Fantastico ~87
7 October 2013 CSE Brazil Ministry 7
8 September 2013 Petrobas ~60
3 September 2013 Brazil and Mexico 20

New York Times 118
9 December 2013 Spying on Games 82*
23 November 2013 SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 5
3 November 2013 SIGINT Mission 2013SIGINT Mission 2017 22
28 September 2013 Contact Chaining Social Networks 1
28 September 2013 SYANPSE 1
5 September 2013 BULLRUN 4*
5 September 2013 SIGINT Enabling 3*

ProPublica 89
9 December 2013 Spying on Games 82*
5 September 2013 BULLRUN 4*
5 September 2103 SIGINT Enabling 3*

Le Monde 20
25 October 2013 NSA Hosts FR Spies 4
22 October 2013 Wanadoo-Alcatel 1
22 October 2013 Close Access Sigads 2
22 October 2013 Boundless Informant 2
22 October 2013 PRISM 11

Dagbladet 13
19 November 2013 BOUNDLESSINFORMANT 13

NRC Handelsblad 5
8 February 2014 MIVD BoundlessInformant
Cryptome mirror
1
30 November 2013 Dutch SIGINT 3
23 November 2013 SIGINT Cryptologic Platform 1

Huffington Post 3
27 November 2013 Muslim Porn Viewing 3

CBC 36
30 January 2014 CESC IP Profiling 27
10 December 2013 NSA-CSEC Partnership 1
10 December 2013 G8-G20 Spying 4*
2 December 2013 G8-G20 Spying 3
29 November 2013 G8-G20 Spying 1

The Globe and Mail 18
30 November 2013 CSEC Brazil Spying 18*

SVT (Swedsh TV) 2
5 December 2013 Sweden Spied Russia for NSA 2

L’Espresso 3
6 December 2013 NSA Spies Italy 3

Trojkan (SVT) 29
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Relationship 1*
11 December 2013 NSA 5 Eyes Partners 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Agenda 8
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA RU Baltic 1
11 December 2013 NSA GCHQ Sweden FRA COMINT 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA  XKeyscore Plan 5
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Sources 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Tor et al 3
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Slide 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Quantum 1 1
11 December 2013 GCHQ Sweden FRA Quantum 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Quantum Accomplishments 2
9 December 2013 NSA and Sweden Pact 3*

Jacob Appelbaum * 71
30 December 2013 NSA Catalog * 50
30 December 2013 NSA Catalog Video Clips * 21

Information.dk 22*
14 January 2014 SSO (duplicate) 7*
14 January 2014 PRISM (duplicate) 11*
13 January 2014 5-Eyes Spy G8-G20 (duplicate) 4*

Anonymous/
New York Times
18
27 January 2014 NSA Smartphones Analysis 14
27 January 2014 GCHQ Mobile Theme 4

NBC News 76
7 February 2014 GCHQ Cyber Attack 15
5 February 2014 GCHQ Anonymous 14
27 January 2014 GCHQ Squeaky Dolphin 47

The Intercept *45
18 February 2014 GCHQ Psychology37 Duplicates of NBC News *44
18 February 2014 NSA-GCHQ Discovery 1

 

 


 

 

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 85, KUWAIT,

Click on the entries to get more infos.

Officers & Master Clients (26)

Offshore Entities (3)

Listed Addresses (23)

Plan for the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding

The following plan was released by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) in December 2013 and is available on GitHub.

Strategic Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding

  • 32 pages
  • December 2013

Download

Today’s dynamic operating environment challenges Federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector partners to continue improving information sharing and safeguarding processes and capabilities. While innovation has enhanced the ability to share and we have overcome many cultural barriers, increased sharing has created the potential for vulnerabilities requiring strengthened safeguarding practices.

In December 2012 the President signed the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (Strategy) which is anchored on the 2010 National Security Strategy and builds upon the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing. The Strategy provides guidance for more effective integration and implementation of policies, processes, standards, and technologies to promote secure and responsible national security information sharing. This document provides a higher-level overview of a longer, more detailed implementation plan for the Strategy, and is intended to assist in briefing senior policy makers on plans, progress, and performance related to achieving the vision of the NSISS.

Under the collaborative leadership of the National Security Staff (NSS) and the Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), with departments and agencies participating through the Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee (ISA IPC), a government-wide effort is underway to plan and coordinate continued, agency-based implementation of the Strategy’s 16 Priority Objectives. The ISA IPC, in coordination with the Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee, Federal CIO Council, and other interagency oversight and governance bodies, will transparently monitor progress against milestones and achievement of outcomes described in this Strategic Implementation Plan.

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 84, KENYA,

Click on the entries to get more infos.

Officers & Master Clients (11)

Listed Addresses (9)

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 83, KAZAKHSTAN,

Click on the entries to get more infos.

Officers & Master Clients (88)

Offshore Entities (4)

Listed Addresses (85)

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 81, Jersey,

Click on the entries to get more infos.

Officers & Master Clients (232)

Offshore Entities (231)

Listed Addresses (161)

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 80, Japan,

Click on the entries and get additional infos.

Officers & Master Clients (533)

Offshore Entities (4)

Listed Addresses (467)

Eichmann – The Movie – Portrait of a German State Terrorist

https://youtu.be/Lp6iZ6–3gM

 

Eichmann is a biographical film detailing the interrogation of Adolf Eichmann. Directed by Robert Young, the film stars Thomas Kretschmann as Eichmann and Troy Garity as Eichmann’s Israeli interrogator, Avner Less.

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 79, Jamaica,

Click on the entries to get more info.

Officers & Master Clients (5)

Listed Addresses (4)

Cryptome – Sliming Snowden

Sliming Snowden

 


http://www.amazon.com/gp/cdp/member-reviews/A3J1JL75Q0E4VD/ref=pdp_new_
read_full_review_link?ie=UTF8&page=1&sort_by=MostRecentReview#RSR0O1O4HLAZ3

5.0 out of 5 stars Sliming Snowden, February 9, 2014

By

John Young “Cryptome” (New York, NY)

This review is from: The Snowden Files: The Inside Story of the World’s Most Wanted Man (Vintage) (Kindle Edition)

Luke Harding wraps the Snowden story in shades of patriotism, conveying compromised journalism pretending opposition to government while seeking its approval for titillating stories of national security expose, editors redacting as commanded, airbrushing embarassments, withholding details needed to combat the global spying disease while helping spread it by self-serving like spies.

Harding self-serves his mendacious industry: valorous, vainglorious Guardian, New York Times, Washington Post, varieties of global media, headlining gravest news of NSA violations of public trust only after careful consultation with national authorities, thereby doubling public trust infidelities.

Harding embellishes protestations of resistance to government control, but does not reveal the extent of self-censorship the news outlets have engaged in: only a tiny number of Snowden documents — between .0062% (of 1.7 million by USG), and 1.7% (of 58,000 by the Guardian) — have been released, with thousands of melodramatic stories written about the near total censorship of what Snowden called his gift to the public.

Worst fault: there are no Snowden documents in the book, total censorship of credible evidence, instead only rhetorical blather composed of rewrites of news accounts and a bit of inside-the-Guardian gossip and much self-congratulation.

This is a sales brochure for the Guardian, characteristically bloviated by editor Alan Rusbridger, puffed-up with profiles of daring journalists — Ewan MacAskill, Laura Poitras, Glenn Greenwald — hyper-aroused at the unexpected Snowden windfall, dancing and laughing at their good fortune, of journalism’s, rescue for a declining industry beaten by truly courageous unjournalistic initiatives.

(Harding smears Julian Assange for his arch-enemies Guardian and New York Times, only glancingly mentions Baron Gellman’s seasoned, superior and less flamboyant reports on Snowden.)

Editors of the Guardian and the New York Times are portrayed without blemishes, valiant, brave, stalwart, while cultivating governments to participate in a mutually beneficial campaign of the illusion of risk and assurance long practiced by the press and officials at lunches and private conferences here amply admitted as if just wonderful buddies giving a hand to bollix the public.

Snowden is praised for speaking exactly like a perfect hybrid of Guardian-NY Times-lawyerly journalism and official press officers oozing concern for the public interest while relishing controversy and public attention by explaining (with ample redactions and omissions) what spies do to save nations. Pacts are set among all parties for roles to play, words to say, actions to take, increased profits and budgets to be enjoyed. Harding crows it will takes years, even decades, for the story to run, run and run some more. In synchronicity, Jill Abramson, NYTimes editor, said recently at a public gathering titled “Journalism After Snowden,” “thank god for Snowden, we want more stories, we need more stories.”

Harding has provided a tawdry romance of illusory national security journalism, sweaty and heavy breathing of adrenaline rush on airliners, breast and chest baring videoed in Hong Kong hotels for later private showings, bountiful informaton copulation in the rathole salons of London, New York, Washington, DC, and Rio de Janeiro.

With books, videos, films, TV, news cascading endless Snowden gush, no wonder billionaire Omidyar leaped to fund a $250 million bordello to service this natsec investment adventure with exciting jaunts to Rio to sit at the feet of Marquis de Greenwald (amidst leg-humping dogs) for instructions in the sexiest of journalism following the slimy Internet pornography industry.

Maryland Lawmakers Push to Cut Water, Electricity to NSA Spy Agency Headquarters

NSA nerve center in Fort Meade targeted by bill.

This undated photo provided by the National Security Agency (NSA) shows its headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland. The NSA has been secretly collecting the phone call records of millions of Americans, using data provided by telecom firms AT&T, Verizon and BellSouth, the newspaper USA Today reported on May 11, 2006. The National Security Agency is based in Fort Meade, Md., and is currently building a new computer center there that will be cooled with recycled wastewater from Howard County, Md.

By פבר. 10, 2014 86 Comments SHARE

The National Security Agency’s headquarters in Ft. Meade, Md., will go dark if a cohort of Maryland lawmakers has its way.

Eight Republicans in the 141-member Maryland House of Delegates introduced legislation Thursday that would deny the electronic spy agency “material support, participation or assistance in any form” from the state, its political subdivisions or companies with state contracts.

The bill would deprive NSA facilities water and electricity carried over public utilities, ban the use of NSA-derived evidence in state courts and prevent state universities from partnering with the NSA on research.

[BROWSE: Editorial Cartoons About NSA Surveillance]

State or local officials ignoring the NSA sanctions would be fired, local governments refusing to comply would lose state grant funds and companies would be forever barred from state contracts.

The bill was filed as emergency legislation and requires support of three-fifths of delegates to pass. It was referred to the chamber’s judiciary committee.

NSA facilities in Maryland use a massive amount of water and electricity, the supply of which might be jeopardized by the legislation.

[RELATED: California Legislators Propose Bill to Banish NSA]

The agency signed a contract with Howard County, Md., for water to cool a computer center under construction at Fort Meade, The Washington Post reported Jan. 2. The deal reportedly involves up to 5 million gallons of water a day for nearly $2 million a year. As of 2006 the agency headquarters purchased as much electricity from Baltimore Gas & Electric as the city of Annapolis, The Baltimore Sun reported.

The proposal is the latest in a series of state bills aiming to cut off the NSA one jurisdiction at a time for allegedly ignoring the Fourth Amendment with its dragnet collection of phone and Internet records.

The legislative wave is spearheaded by the Tenth Amendment Center, which along with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee launched the OffNow coalition last year seeking to cut off water to the NSA’s just-built Utah Data Center.

[READ: Rand Paul’s NSA Lawsuit May Be Heard Alongside Klayman’s]

Legislation hasn’t yet been introduced in Utah, but lawmakers in Arizona, California, Tennessee, Washington and other states have filed bills based on model legislation from the Tenth Amendment Center.

Several of those bills were introduced with bipartisan sponsorship. The Arizona bill has been the most successful to date, winning 4-2 approval by the state Senate Government and Environment Committee on Feb. 3.

 

TOP-SECRET – U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2013 Annual Report

The following report was released by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan on February 8, 2014.

AFGHANISTAN ANNUAL REPORT 2013 PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT

  • 93 pages
  • February 2014

Download

Armed conflict in Afghanistan took an unrelenting toll on Afghan civilians in 2013. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 8,615 civilian casualties (2,959 civilian deaths and 5,656 injured) in 2013, marking a seven percent increase in deaths, 17 percent increase in injured, and a 14 percent increase in total civilian casualties compared to 2012.

Escalating deaths and injuries to civilians in 2013 reverses the decline recorded in 2012 and is consistent with record high numbers of civilian casualties documented in 2011. Since 2009, the armed conflict in Afghanistan has claimed the lives of 14,064 Afghan civilians.

UNAMA attributed 74 percent of civilian deaths and injuries to Anti-Government Elements, 11 percent to Pro-Government Forces (eight percent to Afghan national security forces and three percent to international forces) and ten percent to ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Pro-Government Forces. The remaining five percent of civilian casualties were unattributed, resulting mainly from explosive remnants of war.

Mirroring the trends reported in UNAMA’s 2013 Mid-year Report on Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by Anti-Government Elements particularly in areas populated or frequented by civilians was the main factor that drove the escalation in civilian casualties across Afghanistan in 2013.

Increased ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Pro-Government Forces with civilians caught in the crossfire was a new trend with ground engagements causing 27 percent of all civilian deaths and injuries in 2013.

UNAMA observed that 2013 was the worst year for Afghan women, girls and boys since 2009 with the highest recorded number of women and children’s deaths and injuries. Conflict-related violence caused 746 women casualties (235 women killed and 511 injured), up 36 percent from 2012. Child casualties increased by 34 percent compared to 2013 to 1,756 with 561 children killed and 1,195 injured.

In line with the new trend of increased civilian casualties from ground engagements, 39 percent of all women and children casualties were from ground engagements which caused the most women and child casualties in 2013. While ground engagements injured the most women and children in 2013, IEDs remained the biggest killer of women and children.

At the start of 2014, UNAMA reiterates the imperative for parties to the armed conflict, in particular Anti-Government Elements, to halt the worsening impact of conflict on Afghan civilians. Increased indiscriminate and unlawful use of IEDs by Anti-Government Elements killed and injured thousands of Afghan civilians as they went about their daily lives. Targeted killings of civilians by Anti-Government Elements and increased ground engagements between insurgents and Afghan national security forces put more and more civilians at risk of death and injury in their homes and communities.

UNAMA again calls on all parties to the conflict to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law to take all necessary measures to protect civilians from the harms of conflict.

Anti-Government Elements and the Protection of Civilians

In 2013, Anti-Government Elements caused 74 percent of all civilian casualties, deliberately targeting civilians across the country and carrying out attacks without regard for civilian life. UNAMA attributed 6,374 civilian casualties (2,311 civilian deaths and 4,063 injured) to Anti-Government Elements, an increase of four percent compared to 2012.

Indiscriminate and unlawful use of IEDs by Anti-Government Elements, the only party to the conflict that uses IED, increased and was the leading cause of civilian deaths and injuries in 2013, accounting for 34 percent of all civilian casualties. UNAMA documented 2,890 civilian casualties (962 civilian deaths and 1,928 injured) from IEDs, a 14 percent increase from 2012. Since 2009, IEDs in Afghanistan have killed or injured 12,504 civilians (4,515 civilian deaths and 7,989 civilians injured) in 3,716 separate IED attacks.

UNAMA notes with concern the dramatic rise in civilian casualties caused by radio-controlled IEDs (RC-IEDs), documenting 356 separate RC-IED attacks. These devices caused 1,149 civilian casualties (257 civilians killed and 892 injured), an 84 percent increase from 2012.

Civilian casualties from pressure-plate or victim-activated IEDs (PP-IEDs) declined by 39 percent from 2012 causing 557 civilian casualties (245 civilian deaths and 312 injured). While the decrease is noted, the human cost of PP-IED attacks in 2013 remained high. PP-IEDs were detonated in public areas used by civilians such as roads, markets, Government offices, bazaars, in and around schools, and bus stations. UNAMA reiterates that PP-IEDs as victim-activated devices – which are triggered by any person including children stepping on them or any vehicle driving over them such as civilian minibuses – are indiscriminate reinforcing its call on Anti-Government Elements to stop using them.

Suicide and complex attacks resulted in 1,236 civilian casualties (255 killed and 981 injured) from 73 incidents in 2013. While the number of attacks remained similar to 2012, an 18 percent decrease in civilian casualties from these attacks was noted. Suicide and complex attacks accounted for 15 percent of all civilian casualties in 2013.

UNAMA documented 1,076 civilian casualties (743 civilians’ killed and 333 injured) from 605 incidents of targeted killings. Anti-Government Elements increasingly targeted and killed civilian Government officials and civilians they perceived to support the Government including community and religious leaders, judicial authorities, tribal elders, election workers, off-duty police officers, and persons supporting the peace process.

Threats and targeted attacks by Anti-Government Elements against mullahs (religious leaders) they accused of supporting the Government rose as attacks against mullahs and mosques tripled in 2013.
UNAMA documented 25 incidents of attacks against election workers and election facilities by Anti-Government Elements during 2013, resulting in 16 civilian casualties (four civilian deaths and 12 injured).

Throughout 2013, UNAMA noted increased public messaging by the Taliban on civilian casualties. However, the situation on the ground for Afghan civilians did not improve. The Taliban increased their indiscriminate use of IEDs and continued to attack civilians.

In 2013, the Taliban claimed responsibility for 153 attacks affecting civilians, an increase of 292 percent in such claims by the Taliban compared to 2012. UNAMA’s verification found these 153 attacks resulted in 944 civilian casualties (302 civilians killed and 642 injured), reflecting a 136 percent increase in civilian casualties for which the Taliban claimed responsibility compared with 2012. Most of these attacks in 2013 used indiscriminate tactics such as IED detonations in public areas or directly targeted civilians or civilian objects, particularly civilian administration personnel and buildings.

UNAMA highlights that indiscriminate attacks and deliberate targeted attacks against civilians are strictly prohibited under international humanitarian law which binds all parties to the conflict in Afghanistan including the Taliban. Attacks on civilians and killings of mullahs, elections workers, tribal elders and other civilians not directly participating in hostilities may amount to war crimes.

The Taliban began publishing monthly statements detailing incidents of civilian casualties they alleged were caused by Pro-Government Forces. Of the 277 incidents listed by the Taliban, 91 had been documented by UNAMA, 83 were followed up by UNAMA and 103 could not be verified as involving civilian casualties from conflict-related violence.

On 17 June, the Taliban announced the establishment of a “special committee under the supervision of the military commission for the avoidance of civilian losses.” The statement noted the committee was tasked with collecting information, investigating and referring incidents of ‘negligence’ by Taliban members to a sharia court. No public information has been provided to date on any action taken by this committee.

UNAMA highlights that for such a mechanism to be credible, it must use the definition of “civilian” under international humanitarian law and promote compliance with principles and norms of international and national law.

Civilian Casualties from Ground Engagements between Parties to the Conflict

UNAMA documented 2,327 civilian casualties (534 civilian deaths and 1,793 injured) from 962 incidents of ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Pro-Government Forces particularly Afghan national security forces, a 43 percent increase from 2012.

Ground engagements were the second leading cause of civilian casualties countrywide producing 27 percent of all civilian deaths and injuries, and accounted for the majority – 39 percent – of all women and children casualties in 2013.

Of all incidents of ground engagements resulting in civilian casualties, 1,030 civilian casualties (266 civilian deaths and 764 injured) – 44 percent of civilian casualties from ground engagements – were attributed to Anti-Government Elements.

UNAMA recorded 375 civilian casualties (99 civilian deaths and 276 injured) from ground operations of Afghan national security forces accounting for 16 percent of civilian casualties from ground engagement.

Thirty-eight (38) percent of civilian casualties from ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Pro-Government Forces – 877 civilian casualties (159 civilian deaths and 718 injured) – could not be directly attributed to either party, an increase of 76 percent compared to 2012. This ‘fog of war’ dynamic reflects the changed nature of the conflict in Afghanistan in 2013 which was increasingly being waged in civilian communities and populated areas with civilians caught in the cross fire.

The remaining two percent of civilian casualties from ground engagements were attributed to cross-border shelling into Kunar and Nangarhar provinces which resulted in 37 civilian casualties (nine civilian deaths and 28 injured). Three incidents of ground engagement which killed one civilian and injured seven (eight civilian casualties) were from an unknown source.

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 77, Italy,

Click on the entries to obtain more infos:

Officers & Master Clients (104)

Offshore Entities (1)

Listed Addresses (87)

KGB Death List revealed

 

A KGB hit list of doomed Muslims has been distributed in Dagestan. A photo of the hit list for the Salafi Muslim village of Khadzhalmakhi has been posted on the Internet.

 

3 Muslims from this list have been murdered, and a forth one is in intensive care unit of a hospital. Muslims begin to leave the village for fear for their lives.

Abdulmazhid Abdulmazhidov, as well as father and son Akhmedovs were in the list under numbers 28, 29, 30, and now they martyred, shot dead.

 

Names from the list are deleted only under condition, if Muslims deliver themselves to infidels “with repentance”.

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 76, Israel,

Click on the entries and get additional infos.

Officers & Master Clients (152)

Offshore Entities (21)

Listed Addresses (143)

Exposed – Jean-Jacques Quisquater on Alleged NSA-GCHQ Hack

Jean-Jacques Quisquater on Alleged NSA-GCHQ Hack

Thanks to Jean-Jacques Quisquater.

 


Comments about “NSA-GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer Quisquater”

More info written by Jean-Jacques Quisquater.

This text was updated on February 6, 2014 in the afternoon (Belgian time).

Since February 1st 2014 many papers appeared in the newspapers and on internet concerning  the hack of the personal portable computer of Jean-Jacques Quisquater (JJQ). See

http://www.pcworld.com/article/2093700/prominent-cryptographer-victim-of-malware-attack-related-to-belgacom-breach.html
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/02/03/nsa_gchq_accused_of_hacking_belgian_smartcard_crypto_guru/
http://yro.slashdot.org/story/14/02/03/1239223/crypto-legend-quisquater-targeted—but-nsa-may-not-be-to-blame

Unfortunately many of these papers suffer from approximations and extrapolations and some of them are wrong.

The following text is intended to clarify the context of the attack as much as possible as the investigations are not complete at this stage.

In short:

-Facts: Yes, this portable computer was attacked. We don’t know for sure the vector of the attack in use. According to the Belgian Federal Police the attack of this computer is strongly related to the attack of Belgacom in Belgium allegedly hacked by NSA-GCHQ.

The only found vector of attack is related to an email spoofing a linkedin email mentioning a name close to a name known by JJQ. From this email, JJQ opened a link  to a profile of the mentioned person and JJQ immediately understood it was a spoof and closed his computer in one second. The computer was later extensively scanned by several malware detectors without result. Possibly another vector of attack was used but there is no trace of it.

-Data available on the computer: There was no sensible data on the computer. The main part of  the JJQ’s work is the design of (formal) methods related to cryptography and computer security and this activity is twofold:

   – Methods related to the academic world finally anyway published in conferences, journals, patents and standards. Privacy concerning reviews of scientific papers is important to write these reviews without external pressure, the content is nevertheless not critical.   – Activities related to sensible data of companies always follow a very strict procedure which lead to a very strong level of security
(the use of safes, only in company rooms, dedicated computers without connection, destruction of all the data at the end of the study). Therefore no sensible information related to companies is available on this personal computer.

Companies are only using the practical ideas of JJQ in the spirit of the main principle of Kerckhoffs (« only the key is secret ») and
of Shannon (« The enemy knows the system »).

-The purpose of the attack:  we don’t know. Maybe the cryptography research is under surveillance, maybe some people hope to find some interesting information or contact, maybe there is another goal we will never know.

More precisely:

– September 16, 2013: the Belgian newspaper De Standard announced an attack of Belgacom (main communication operator in Belgium) by the NSA (links in Dutch):

http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20130915_00743233
http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20130916_00743534

– September 16, 2013 (same day in the afternoon): Jean-Jacques Quisquater received an email spoofing a linkedin email,
opened a link to a profile of somebody he was thinking he knows, saw immediately it was a spoof and closed in one second
his computer. The computer was strongly scanned by several malware detectors without result.

JJQ comments: It is not sure that this attack was working and is related to the main attack against the computer but the dates are matching. Other people were also attacked in Belgium. We don’t know the vector of the “winning” attack (phishing, injection packet
through Quantum Insert, … ?).

– September 20, 2013: Der Spiegel announced an attack of Belgacom by GCHQ using tools from NSA, from the files of Snowden: see

http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html

– November 8, 2013: the Federal Police contacted JJQ to discuss with him.

– November 12, 2013: meeting with people from the Federal Police. They announced that the computer was strongly attacked by a targeted attack (it means an attack where there is only one target: it is nearly impossible to detect it). The attack was directly related to the Belgacom attack. The used malware is very clever, very difficult to detect, impossible to remove using currently available antivirus. In fact the malware was only active when outside the personal home. The communications between the malware in the computer and the servers at Belgacom are encrypted: so only metadata are possibly usable for the investigations. It is thus also impossible that any large content from the computer was communicated. No confidential information (commercial or not) was on this computer.

– December 2, 2013: The attack was confirmed and is still under investigation. Later it was learnt that the malware is likely a variant of the malware miniduke:

https://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208194129The_MiniDuke_Mystery_PDF_0_day_Government_Spy_Assembler_Micro_Backdoor

This version of the malware is not detected by any currently available antivirus.

– January 28, 2014: A journalist from De Standaard (Belgian newspapers) contacted JJQ in order to have a meeting because somebody spoke to the journalist about an hacked well-known Belgian cryptographer speaking French (clearly JJQ). This hacking was presented as directly related to the hacking of Belgacom.

– January 30, 2014: During the meeting the journalists announced that De Standaard will publish a paper about this story on next Saturday.

– Saturday February 1st, 2014: Publication of their story by De Standaard: http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20140201_011 (translation in English) and the buzz began. JJQ then answered questions from the Belgian TVs RTBF and RTL.

There are also a lot of information about targeted attacks in:

http://www.symantec.com/security_response/publications/threatreport.jsp

Also read this paper from RAID 2012 (the research conference about intrusions):

http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-33338-5_4

 


 


 

The Assassination of JFK Jr – Full Version Movie

 

https://youtu.be/wqBo7C7kAGs

 

 

Revealed by Cryptome – GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations

Download the Document below:

gchq-cyber-attack

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 75, Isle of Man,

Officers & Master Clients (32)

Click on the entries and get additional infos.

Offshore Entities (1)

Listed Addresses (27)

The National Security Archive – U.S. Satellite Imagery

The use of overhead platforms to observe events on the earth can be traced to the French Revolution, when France organized a company of aerostiers, or balloonists, in April 1794. The United States employed balloons during the Civil War, although little intelligence of value was obtained. In January 1911, the San Diego waterfront became the first target of cameras carried aboard an airplane. Later that year the U.S. Army Signal Corps put aerial photography into the curriculum at its flight training school. Between 1913 and 1915 visual and photographic reconnaissance missions were flown by the U.S. Army in the Philippines and along the Mexican border.1

During World War II the United States made extensive use of airplane photography using remodeled bombers. After the war, with the emergence of a hostile relationship with the Soviet Union, the United States began conducting photographic missions along the Soviet periphery. The aircraft cameras, however, could only capture images of territory within a few miles of the flight path.

On some missions aircraft actually flew into Soviet airspace, but even those missions did not provide the necessary coverage of the vast Soviet interior. As a result, beginning in the early 1950s the United States began seriously exploring more advanced methods for obtaining images of targets throughout the Soviet Union. The result was the development, production, and employment of a variety of spacecraft and aircraft (particularly the U-2 and A-12/SR-71) that permitted the U.S. intelligence community to closely monitor developments in the Soviet Union and other nations through overhead imagery.

The capabilities of spacecraft and aircraft have evolved from being limited to black-and-white visible-light photography to being able to produce images using different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. As a result, imagery can often be obtained under circumstances (darkness, cloud cover) where standard visible-light photography is not feasible. In addition, employment of different portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, individually or simultaneously, expands the information that can be produced concerning a target.

Photographic equipment can be film-based or electro-optical. A conventional camera captures a scene on film by recording the varying light levels reflected from all of the separate objects in the scene. In contrast, an electro-optical camera converts the varying light levels into electrical signals. A numerical value is assigned to each of the signals, which are called picture elements, or pixels. At a ground receiving station, a picture can then be constructed from the digital signal transmitted from the spacecraft (often via a relay satellite).2

In addition to the visible-light portion of the electro-magnetic spectrum, the near-infrared portion of the spectrum, which is invisible to the human eye, can be employed to produce images. At the same time, near-infrared, like, visible-light imagery, depends on objects reflecting solar radiation rather than on their emission of radiation. As a result, such imagery can only be produced in daylight and in the absence of substantial cloud cover.3

Thermal infrared imagery, obtained from the mid- and far-infrared portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, provides imagery purely by detecting the heat emitted by objects. Thus, a thermal infrared system can detect buried structures, such as missile silos or underground construction, as a result of the heat they generate. Since thermal infrared imagery does not require visible light, it can be obtained under conditions of darkness–if the sky is free of cloud cover.4

Imagery can be obtained during day or night in the presence of cloud cover by employing an imaging radar (an acronym for radio detection and ranging). Radar imagery is produced by bouncing radio waves off an area or an object and using the reflected returns to produce an image of the target. Since radio waves are not attenuated by the water vapor in the atmosphere, they are able to penetrate cloud cover.5

However imagery is obtained, it requires processing and interpretation to convert it into intelligence data. Computers can be employed to improve the quantity and quality of the information extracted. Obviously, digital electro-optical imagery arrives in a form that facilitates such operations. But even analog imagery obtained by a conventional camera can be converted into digital signals. In any case, a computer disassembles a picture into millions of electronic Morse code pulses and then uses mathematical formulas to manipulate the color contrast and intensity of each spot. Each image can be reassembled in various ways to highlight special features and objects that were hidden in the original image.6

Such processing allows:

  • building multicolored single images out of several pictures taken in different bands of the spectrum;
  • making the patterns more obvious;
  • restoring the shapes of objects by adjusting for the angle of view and lens distortion;
  • changing the amount of contrast between objects and backgrounds;
  • sharpening out-of-focus images;
  • restoring ground details largely obscured by clouds;
  • conducting electronic optical subtraction, in which earlier pictures are subtracted from later ones, making unchanged buildings in a scene disappear while new objects, such as missile silos under construction, remain;
  • enhancing shadows; and
  • suppressing glint.7

Such processing plays a crucial role in easing the burden on photogrammetrists and imagery interpreters. Photogrammetrists are responsible for determining the size and dimensions of objects from overhead photographs, using, along with other data, the shadows cast by the objects. Photo interpreters are trained to provide information about the nature of the objects in the photographs–based on information as to what type of crates carry MiG-29s, for instance, or what an IRBM site or fiber optics factory looks like from 150 miles in space.


Click on any of the following images to view a larger version of the photo.

CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD

In its May 2, 1946 report, Preliminary Design for an Experimental World Circling Spaceship, the Douglas Aircraft Corporation examined the potential value of satellites for scientific and military purposes. Possible military uses included missile guidance, weapons delivery, weather reconnaissance, communications, attack assessment, and “observation.”8

A little less than nine years later, on March 16, 1955, the Air Force issued General Operational Requirement No. 80, officially establishing a high-level requirement for an advanced reconnaissance satellite. The document defined the Air Force objective to be the provision of continuous surveillance of “preselected areas of the earth” in order “to determine the status of a potential enemy’s warmaking capability.”9

Over the next five years the U.S. reconnaissance satellite program evolved in a variety of ways. The success of the Soviet Union’s Sputnik I and II satellites in the fall of 1957 provided a spur to all U.S. space programs – as any success could be used in the propaganda war with the Soviet Union. In the case of U.S. reconnaissance programs, Sputnik provided a second incentive. The clear implications of the Sputnik launches for Soviet ICBM development increased the pressure on discovering the extent of Soviet capabilities – something that the sporadic U-2 flights could only do in a limited fashion.10

The Air Force program was first designated the Advanced Reconnaissance System (ARS), then SENTRY, and finally SAMOS. Management responsibility for SAMOS was transferred from the Air Force to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), established on February 7, 1958, and then back to the Air Force in late 1959.11

Concern about the the length of time it would take to achieve the primary objective of the SAMOS program – a satellite that could scan its exposed film and return the imagery electronically – led to President Dwight Eisenhower’s approval, also on February 7, 1958, of a CIA program to develop a reconnaissance satellite. The CIA program, designated CORONA, focused on development of a satellite that would physically return its images in a canister – an objective which had been a subsidiary portion of the SAMOS program.12

While all the various versions of the SAMOS program would be canceled in the early 1960s, CORONA would become a mainstay of the U.S. space reconnaissance program for over a decade. It would take over a year, starting in 1959, and 14 launches before an operational CORONA spacecraft was placed in orbit. Nine of the first twelve launches carried a camera that was intended to photograph areas of the Soviet Union and other nations. All the flights ended in failure for one reason or another. The thirteenth mission, a diagnostic flight without camera equipment, was the first success – in that a canister was returned from space and recovered at sea.13

Then on August 18, a CORONA was placed into orbit, orbited  the Earth for a day, and returned its canister to earth, where it was snatched out the air by a specially equipped aircraft on August 19. The camera carried on that flight would be retroactively designated the KH-1 (KH for KEYHOLE) and was cable of producing images with resolution in the area of 25-40 feet – a far cry from what would be standard in only a few years. It did yield, however, more images of the Soviet Union in its single day of operation than did the entire U-2 program.14

The next successful CORONA mission would be conducted on December 7, 1960. This time a more advanced camera system, the KH-2, would be on board. From that time, through the end of the CORONA program in 1972, there would be a succession of new camera systems – the KH-3, KH-4, KH-4A, and KH-4B – which produced higher-resolution images than their predecessors, ultimately resulting in a system that could yield images with approximately 5-6′ resolution. In addition, two smaller programs – ARGON (for mapping) and LANYARD (motivated by a specific target in the Soviet Union) – operated during the years 1962-1964 and 1963 respectively. All together there were 145 missions, which yielded over 800,000 images of the Soviet Union and other areas of the world.15

Those images dramatically improved U.S. knowledge of Soviet and other nations capabilities and activities. Perhaps its major accomplishment occurred within 18 months of the first successful CORONA mission. Accumulated photography allowed the U.S. intelligence community to dispel the fear of missile gap, with earlier estimates of a Soviet ICBM force numbering in the hundreds by mid-1962 becoming, in September 1961, an estimate of between 25 and 50. By June 1964 CORONA satellites had photographed all 25 Soviet ICBM complexes. CORONA imagery also allowed the U.S. to catalog Soviet air defense and anti-ballistic missile sites, nuclear weapons related facilities, submarine bases, IRBM sites, airbases – as well as Chinese, East European, and other nations military facilities. It also allowed assessment of military conflicts – such as the 1967 Six-Day War – and monitoring of Soviet arms control compliance.16

In February 1995, President Clinton signed an executive order that declassified those images. 17


[Source: CIA/National Reconnaissance Office]

A KH-4A image of Dolon airfield, which was a major Soviet  long-range aviation facility located in what is now the  Republic of Kazakhstan. The image shows two regiments of  Tupolev (Tu-16) Bear bombers. The main runway is 13,200 feet  long.

The KH-4A camera system was first introduced in August 1963. Resolution ranged from 9 to 25 feet.

[Source: CIA/National Reconnaissance Office]

A KH-4B image of the Moscow, with an insert of the Kremlin. In the enlargement of the Kremlin, individual vehicles can be identified as trucks or cars, and the line of people waiting to enter Lenin’s Tomb in Red Square can be seen. According to the CIA, the photograph “illustrates some of the best resolution imagery acquired by the KH-4B  camera system.”

The KH-4B was first introduced in September 1967 and generally produced images with 6 foot resolution.

[Source: CIA/National Reconnaissance Office via Federation of American Scientists]

A KH-4B of image, taken on February 11, 1969 of a Taiwanese nuclear facility. The United States intelligence community, relying on CORONA and other forms of intelligence, has closely monitored the nuclear facilities of both adversaries such as the Soviet Union and the PRC and those of friendly nations such as Taiwan and Israel.

The Next Generations

The primary objective of the CORONA program was to provide “area surveillance” coverage of the Soviet Union, China and other parts of the world. Thus, CORONA yielded single photographs which  covered thousands of square miles of territory – allowing analysts to both examine images of known targets and to search for previously undetected installations or activities that would be of interest to the U.S. intelligence community.

The GAMBIT program provided an important complement to CORONA. Initiated in 1960, it yielded the first “close-look” or “spotting” satellite. The emphasis of GAMBIT operations, which commenced in 1963 and continued through part of 1984, was to produce high-resolution imagery on specific targets (rather than general areas). Such resolution would allow the production of more detailed intelligence, particularly technical intelligence on foreign weapons systems. The first GAMBIT camera, the KH-7, could produce photos with about 18 inch resolution, while the second and last model, the KH-8 was capable of producing photographs with under 6 inch resolution.18

While the Air Force concentrated on the high-resolution systems, the CIA (after numerous bureaucratic battles) was assigned responsibility for the next generation area surveillance program. That program, which came to be designated HEXAGON, resulted in satellites carrying the KH-9 camera system – capable of producing images covering even more territory than the CORONA satellites, with a resolution of 1-2 feet. Eighteen HEXAGON satellites would be launched into orbit between 1971 and 1984, when the program terminated.19

In late 1976, a new capability was added when the satellite carrying the KH-11 optical system was placed into orbit. Unlike its predecessors, the KH-11, also known by the program code names KENNAN and CRYSTAL, did not return film canisters to be recovered and interpreted. Rather, the light captured by its optical system was transformed into electronic signals and relayed (through a relay satellite in a higher orbit) back to a ground station, where the signals were recorded on tape and converted into an image. As a result, the U.S. could obtain satellite images of a site or activity virtually simultaneously with a satellite passing overhead.20

The 1980s saw a number of inadvertent or unauthorized disclosures of U.S. satellite imagery. In 1980, as a result of the fiasco at Desert One, where U.S. forces landed in preparation for an attempt to rescue U.S. hostages held in Iran, KH-11 imagery of possible evacuation sites in Tehran was left behind. In 1981, Aviation Week & Space Technology published a leaked (and degraded) KH-11 photo of a Soviet bomber at Ramenskoye Airfield.

In 1984, two images of Soviet aircraft, taken by a KH-8 or KH-9 satellite, were inadvertently published in Congressional hearings. That same year, an employee of the Naval Intelligence Support Center provided Jane’s Defence Weekly with several images taken by a KH-11 satellite of a Soviet naval shipbuilding facility.21


[KH-11 Photograph]

This 1984 computer enhanced KH-11 photo, taken at an  oblique angle was leaked, along with two others, to Jane’s  Defence Weekly by naval intelligence analyst, Samuel Loring  Morison. The image shows the general layout of the Nikolaiev  444 shipyard in the Black Sea. Under construction is a Kiev- class aircraft carrier (shown in the left side of the photo),  then known as the Kharkov, along with an amphibious landing  ship.
Morison was brought to trial, convicted, and sent to prison in a controversial case.

[MiG-29] [SU-27]

These satellite photographs, showing a MiG-29 FULCRUM and SU- 27 FLANKER, were shown to the House Appropriations Committee during 1984 budget hearings. They were then published,  apparently by mistake, in the sanitized version of the  hearings released to the public. During the 1985 trial of  Samuel Loring Morison, government prosecutors would  acknowledge the photographs were satellite images, produced by  a system other than the KH-11.

Current Systems

The United States is presently operating at least two satellite imaging systems. One is an advanced version of the KH-11, three of which have been launched, the first in 1992.

The advanced KH-11 satellites have a higher orbit than that exhibited by their predecessors–operating with perigees of about 150 miles and apogees of about 600 miles. In addition, they also have some additional capabilities. They contain an infrared imagery capability, including a thermal infrared imagery capability, thus permitting imagery during darkness. In addition, the satellites carry the Improved CRYSTAL Metric System (ICMS), which places the necessary markings on returned imagery to permit its full exploitation for mapping purposes. Additionally, the Advanced KH-11 can carry more fuel than the original model, perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 pounds. This permits a longer lifetime for the new model–possibly up to eight years.22

A second component of the U.S. space imaging fleet, are satellites developed and deployed under a program first known as INDIGO, then as LACROSSE, and most recently as VEGA. Rather than employing an electro-optical system they carry an imaging radar.  The satellites closed a major gap in U.S. capabilities by allowing the U.S. intelligence community to obtain imagery even when targets are covered by clouds.23

The first VEGA was launched on December 2, 1988 from the space shuttle orbiter Atlantis (and deorbited in July 1997). A second was orbited in March 1991, from Vandenberg AFB on a Titan IV, and a third in October 1997. The satellites have operated in orbits of approximately 400 miles and at inclinations of 57 and 68 degrees respectively.24

When conceived, the primary purpose envisioned for the satellite was monitoring Soviet and Warsaw Pact armor. Recent VEGA missions included providing imagery for bomb damage assessments of the consequences of Navy Tomahawk missile attacks on Iraqi air defense installations in September 1996, monitoring Iraqi weapons storage sites, and tracking Iraqi troop movements such as the dispersal of the Republican Guard when the Guard was threatened with U.S. attack in early 1998. VEGA has a resolution of 3-5 feet, with its resolution reportedly being sufficient to allow discrimination between tanks and armored personnel carriers and identification of bomb craters of 6-10 feet in diameter.25

The LACROSSE/VEGA satellite that was launched in October 1997 may be the first of a new generation of radar imagery satellites. The new generation will apparently have greater resolution, and constellation size may be increased from 2 to 3.26

[Source: Dept. of Defense]

An advanced KH-11 photograph of the Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant, Sudan. This degraded photo, of approximately 1-meter resolution, was officially released after the U.S. attack on the plant in August 1998 in retaliation for attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa. The U.S. alleged, at least partially on the basis of soil samples, that the plant was involved in the production of chemical weapons.


[Source: Dept. of Defense]

A degraded advanced KH-11 photograph of the Zhawar Kili Base Camp (West), Afghanistan, which housed training facilities for Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist organization.

The photograph was used by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and General Henry H. Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to brief reporters on the U.S. cruise missile attack on the facility.


[Source: Dept. of Defense]

One of over twenty degraded advanced KH-11 photos,  released by the Department of Defense in December 1998 during Operation Desert Fox. The higher resolution, and classified, version of the image was used by imagery interpreters at the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to assess the damage caused by U.S. airstrikes.


[Source: Dept. of Defense]

A degraded advanced KH-11 photo of Al Sahra Airfield, Iraq, used by Vice Adm. Scott A. Fry, USN, Director, J-3 and Rear Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, USN, Joint Staff intelligence director in a Pentagon press briefing on December 18, 1998.


[Source: Dept. of Defense]

The arrows in this degraded advanced KH-11 image, used in a Pentagon press briefing on December 19, 1998, show two areas where the Secretariat Presidential was damaged due to Operation Desert Fox airstrikes.


[Source: Dept. of Defense]

Pre-strike assessment photograph of the Belgrade Army Garrison and headquarters, Serbia.


[Source: Dept. of Defense]

Post-strike damage assessment photograph of the Belgrade Army Garrison and Headquarters, Serbia, attacked during Operation Allied Force.

Commercial Imagery

The U.S. intelligence community has also used imagery, including multispectral imagery, produced by two commercial systems –LANDSAT and SPOT. The LANDSAT program began in 1969 as an experimental National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) program, the Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS).  Currently there are two operating LANDSAT satellites–LANDSAT 4 and LANDSAT 5–launched in 1982 and 1984.27

LANDSATs 4 and 5 operate in 420 mile sun-synchronous orbits and each carries a Thematic Mapper (TM), an upgraded version of the Multispectral Scanner (MSS) on earlier LANDSATs. A typical LANDSAT images is 111 by 102 miles, providing significant broad area coverage. However, the resolution of the images is approximately 98 feet–making them useful for only the coarsest intelligence tasks.

SPOT, an acronym for Le Systeme Pour l’Observation de la Terre, is operated by the French national space agency. SPOT 1 was launched in 1986, followed by three additional satellites at approximately four year intervals. SPOT satellites operate in about 500-mile orbits, and carry two sensor systems. The satellites can return black and white (panchromatic) images with 33 foot resolution and multispectral images with 67 foot resolution. The images are of higher-resolution than LANDSAT’s but cover less territory– approximately 36 miles by 36 miles.28

U.S. intelligence community use of commercial imagery will expand dramatically in the coming years if the new generation of commercial imaging satellites lives up to expectations–which include images with 1-meter resolution. Such imagery and the reduced cost of attaining it when purchased commercially will permit the U.S. intelligence community to fill part of its needs via such commercial systems.

Among the commercial satellites that are expected to produce high resolution imagery are the Ikonos satellites to be launched by Space Imaging Eosat (which also operates the LANDSAT satellites). The first of the satellites, scheduled to be launched in the summer of 1999 from Vandenberg AFB, is designed to generate 1-meter panchromatic and 4-meter multispectral images. A similar satellite is scheduled for launch in September 1998.29

Also promising to provide 1-meter panchromatic imagery and 4-meter multispectral imagery are the satellites to be developed by EarthWatch and Orbital Sciences. EarthWatch’s 1-meter resolution Quickbird satellite is scheduled for launch in late 1998 or 1999. Orbital Science’s OrbView-3 satellite is to be launched in 1999. It is expected to have a 3-5 year lifetime and produce images covering 5×5 mile segments with 1-meter resolution.30


[Source: Space Imaging]

An overhead photograph of Mountain View, California that that has been digitally scanned to represent the one-meter  imagery that the Ikonos satellites are expected to provide.


Notes

1. William Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1986), pp. 28, 32.
2. Farouk el-Baz, “EO Imaging Will Replace Film in Reconnaissance,” Defense Systems Review (October 1983): 48-52.
3. Richard D. Hudson Jr. and Jacqueline W. Hudson, “The Military Applications of Remote Sensing by Infrared,” Proceedings of the IEEE 63, 1 (1975): 104-28.
4. Ibid.; Bruce G. Blair and Garry D. Brewer, “Verifying SALT,” in William Potter (ed.), Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1980), pp. 7-48.
5. Homer Jensen, L.C. Graham, Leonard J. Porcello, and Emmet N. Leith, “Side-looking Airborne Radar,” Scientific American, October 1977, pp. 84-95.
6. Paul Bennett, Strategic Surveillance (Cambridge, Ma.: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1979), p. 5.
7. Richard A. Scribner, Theodore J. Ralston, and William D. Mertz, The Verification Challenge: Problems and Promise of Strategic Nuclear Arms Verification (Boston: Birkhauser, 1985), p. 70; John F. Ebersole and James C. Wyant, “Real-Time Optical Subtraction of Photographic Imagery for Difference Detection,” Applied Optics, 15, 4 (1976): 871-76.
8. Robert L. Perry, Origins of the USAF Space Program, 1945-1956 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force Systems Command, June 1962), p. 30.
9. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
10. On the impact of Sputnik, see Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower’s Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York: Oxford, 1993).
11. Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. KEYHOLE Spy Satellite Program (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), pp. 26-30.
12. Kenneth E. Greer, “Corona,” Studies in Intelligence, Supplement, 17 (Spring 1973): 1-37, reprinted in Kevin C. Ruffner (ed.), CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1995).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.; Robert A. McDonald, “CORONA: Success for Space Reconnaissance, A Look into the Cold War, and a Revolution in Intelligence,” Photogrammetric Engineering & Remote Sensing 61,6
(June 1995): 689-720.
15. McDonald, “CORONA: Success for Space Reconnaissance …”.
16. Robert A. McDonald, “Corona’s Imagery: A Revolution in Intelligence and Buckets of Gold for National Security,” in Robert A. McDonald (ed)., CORONA: Between the Sun and the Earth – The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space (Baltimore: American Society of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 1997), pp. 211-220; Greer, “CORONA”; Frank J. Madden, The CORONA Camera System, Itek’s Contribution to World Stability (Lexington, Mass.: Itek, May 1997), p. 6.
17. Executive Order 12951, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-Based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, February 24, 1995.
18. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space, pp. 77-78, 359-60.
19. Ibid., pp. 105-21, 361-62.
20. Ibid., pp. 123-143, 362.
21. Burrows, Deep Black, photo section.
22. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space, p. 231; Craig Covault, “Advanced KH-11 Broadens U.S. Recon Capability,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 6, 1997, pp. 24-25.
23. Bob Woodward, VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 221.
24. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community 4th ed. (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1999), p. 155.
25. Ibid.
26. David Fulghum and Craig Covault, “U.S. Set to Launch Upgraded Lacrosse,” Aviation Week & Space Technology September 20, 1996, p.34;
27. Bob Preston, Plowshares and Power: The Military Use of Civil Space (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1994), pp. 55-56; Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, p. 159.
28. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, p. 159.
29. Joseph C. Anselmo, “Space Imaging Readies 1-Meter Satellite,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology,  May 19, 1997, p. 26; “Ikonos 1 Undergoes Tests as Launch Nears,” Space News, May 11-17, 1998, p. 19; “Commercial Developments,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 29, 1998, p. 17.
30. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, pp. 160-61.

Unveiled – Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage

 

Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage

  • 137 pages
  • March 7, 2012

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The PLA’s sustained modernization effort over the past two decades has driven remarkable transformation within the force and put the creation of modern command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure at the heart of the PLA’s strategic guidelines for long term development. This priority on C4ISR systems modernization, has in turn been a catalyst for the development of an integrated information warfare (IW) capability capable of defending military and civilian networks while seizing control of an adversary’s information systems during a conflict.

Information Warfare Strategy

PLA leaders have embraced the idea that successful warfighting is predicated on the ability to exert control over an adversary’s information and information systems, often preemptively. This goal has effectively created a new strategic and tactical high ground, occupying which has become just as important for controlling the battlespace as its geographic equivalent in the physical domain.

The PLA has not publicly disclosed the existence of a computer network operations strategy distinct from other components of IW, such as electronic warfare, psychological operations, kinetic strike, and deception, but rather appears to be working toward the integration of CNO with these components in a unified framework broadly known as “information confrontation.” This concept, as discussed by the PLA, seeks to integrate all elements of information warfare—electronic and non-electronic—offensive and defensive under a single command authority.

Earlier in the past decade, the PLA adopted a multi-layered approach to offensive information warfare that it calls Integrated Network Electronic Warfare or INEW strategy. Now, the PLA is moving toward information confrontation as a broader conceptualization that seeks to unite the various components of IW under a single warfare commander. The need to coordinate offensive and defensive missions more closely and ensure these missions are mutually supporting is driven by the recognition that IW must be closely integrated with PLA campaign objectives. The creation of what a probable information assurance command in the General Staff Department bureaucracy suggests that the PLA is possibly creating a more centralized command authority for IW that will possibly be responsible for coordinating at least network defense throughout the PLA.

As Chinese capabilities in joint operations and IW strengthen, the ability to employ them effectively as either deterrence tools or true offensive weapons capable of degrading the military capabilities of technologically advanced nations or hold these nations’ critical infrastructure at risk in ways heretofore not possible for China will present U.S. leaders and the leaders of allied nations with a more complex risk calculus when evaluating decisions to intervene in Chinese initiated conflicts such as aggression against Taiwan or other nations in the Western Pacific region.

Chinese Use of Network Warfare Against the United States

Chinese capabilities in computer network operations have advanced sufficiently to pose genuine risk to U.S. military operations in the event of a conflict. A defense of Taiwan against mainland aggression is the one contingency in the western Pacific Ocean in which success for the United States hinges upon the speed of its response and the ability of the military to arrive on station with sufficient force to defend Taiwan adequately. PLA analysts consistently identify logistics and C4ISR infrastructure as U.S. strategic centers of gravity suggesting that PLA commanders will almost certainly attempt to target these system with both electronic countermeasures weapons and network attack and exploitation tools, likely in advance of actual combat to delay U.S. entry or degrade capabilities in a conflict.

The effects of preemptive penetrations may not be readily observable or detected until after combat has begun or after Chinese computer network attack (CNA) teams have executed their tools against targeted networks. Even if circumstantial evidence points to China as the culprit, no policy currently exists to easily determine appropriate response options to a large scale attack on U.S. military or civilian networks in which definitive attribution is lacking. Beijing, understanding this, may seek to exploit this gray area in U.S. policymaking and legal frameworks to create delays in U.S. command decision making.

Key Entities and Institutions Supporting Chinese Computer Network Operations

The decision to employ computer network operations and INEW capabilities rests with the senior political and military leadership and would be part of a larger issue of employing force during a crisis. Once that decision was made, however, the operational control for the military use of CNO rests with the PLA’s Third and Fourth Departments of the General Staff Department (GSD). The Third Department (3PLA), China’s primary signals intelligence collector is likely tasked with the network defense and possibly exploitation missions. The Fourth Department (4PLA), the traditional electronic warfare arm of the PLA, likely has the responsibility for conducting network attack missions.

The PRC government actively funds grant programs to support CNO related research in both offensive and defensive in orientation at commercial IT companies and civilian and military universities. A review of PRC university technical programs, curricula, research foci, and funding for research and development in areas contributing to information warfare capabilities illustrates the breadth and complexity of the relationships between the universities, government and military organizations, and commercial high-tech industries countrywide.

TOP-SECRET – National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics Talking Map

he following is a “talking map” created by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGIA) in preparation for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia.  Once the PDF is downloaded, you can click on the names of locations on the map and a sound file will play with the proper pronunciation.

Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics Talking Map

  • 1 page
  • Limited Distribution
  • February 26, 2013
  • 43 MB

Download

TOP-SECRET – National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics Maps

The following are a dozen maps created by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGIA) in preparation for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia.

Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics Reference Graphic January 10, 2014 38MB Download
“RusSki Gorki” Jumping Center (SJV) January 14, 2014 5MB Download
Sliding Center “Sanki” (SLV) January 14, 2014 5.4MB Download
“Rosa Khutor” Extreme Park (SFV) January 14, 2014 6.4MB Download
Media Village and Gorki Media Center (MSC) January 14, 2014 6.2MB Download
Sochi Olympic Park Venue Cluster January 14, 2014 12.4MB Download
“Rosa Khutor” Alpine Center (ACV) January 14, 2014 8.2MB Download
Mountain Village (MVL) January 14, 2014 11.2MB Download
“Laura” Cross-country Ski and Biathlon Center (CBV)
and Endurance Village (EVL)
January 14, 2014 15.9MB Download
Sochi Olympic Park (OLP) January 14, 2014 30MB Download
Mountain Venue Area October 21, 2013 11.8MB Download
Adler June 27, 2012 32.1MB Download
ZIP Archive Containing All 12 Files 181MB Download

Cryptome – DDOS Attack and Defense Review of Techniques

Download the Document below

ddos-defense

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 74, Ireland,

Officers & Master Clients (54)
Binchys, Solicitors
Brendan McGrath
Brophy Gillespie
Bul Tara Devi
Cathal O’Sullivan
Ciaran O’Keeffe
Dan Murphy
Danial Higgins
Darren Farrell
DOHERTY David Michael
Eanna Proinsias Timoney
Grace Tan Soo Ching
Graham Thomas BELL
Graham Thomas BELL
Henry Bailey
Homeric Limited
International Offshore Services Group
Ivor Fitzpatrick & Co.
James Murrin
JASON GREER BAIRD
John Ailbe 0’Meara
John Dara O’Reilly
John G. Wallace
John Ignatius Quinn
John Wallace
Keith Hazley
Kevin Joseph Lunney
Leonard Ney
Liam Gerard Mc Caffrey
Longwell Investments Limited
Mac Kenzie Wallace & Co Limited
Mark Doyle
Mary Murrin
Nadeshda Ney
Naser Taher
Nexgen Financial Holdings Limited
Padraig O’Sullivan
Paul Phelan
PHILIP O’DONOGHUE
Philip Burwell
PRIAM HOLDINGS LIMITED
Randal Doherty
Robert James BELL
Ron Hollebrandse
Shamil Salm Daoud
Shane Thomas O’Neill
Shaun Ivor Fitzpatrick
Swiss Capital Invest Holding (Dublin) Limited
Taye Cindy Khamkeo Sivilay
Terence Martin Cross
THE MILL
Whelan Solicitors
WILLIAM CURRAN
Xiao Jun Wang

Offshore Entities (1614)
Accept Ventures Ltd.
ACEITUNAS GUADALQUIVIR S.A.
Action Commerce S.A.
ADI ELECTRONIC LTD.
AeroMax Networks S.A.
AeroWay Business Inc.
AET Commerce Ltd.
Agentus Investments Inc.
AgroChem Inc.
AgroField Investments Ltd.
AgroFinanciers Inc.
AgroImpex Inc.
AgroInter Inc.
AgroMark Express Corp.
AgroPort Ltd.
AirCom Ventures Ltd.
AirGold Company Inc.
AKM EUROLOGISTIK LTD
Alan Projects Corp.
ALEXO GLOBAL CORPORATION
Alfa Energy System Corporation
AlfaCom Merchants Ltd.
AlfaInvest Ltd.
AlfaTex Universal Inc.
AlfaTrade Projects S.A.
ALFREDSON INC.
AllBrook Resources Corp.
ALMEX IMPORTS INC.
AltBridge Projects Ltd.
ALTER FINANCIERS INC.
ALTERBERG UNION GROUP CORP.
AlterFord Limited
Alto Management Ltd.
Altrex Ltd.
Alutek Holding Limited
AmberGroup Invest Corp.
AmerExport Ltd.
AmerGroup Inc.
Ametist Cargo Ltd.
AmTech Worldwide Ltd.
ANCORA EXPORTS INC.
ANDEX LTD.
ANEXO ALLIANCE INC.
ANEXUM TECHNOLOGIES INC.
AngloBrit Trading Corp.
AngloStar Benefits Ltd.
AngloTron Inc.
Anglowest Resources Ltd.
ARBATONT MEMBERS CORP.
ARCONA DIVISION LTD.
Arena Industries S.A.
Argentum Global Holdings Corp.
Argentus Universal Inc.
Aristocratus United Corp.
ArmStone Company S.A.
ARNEX INDUSTRIAL INC.
ARSENAL EUROPE DIVISION INC.
ArtEco Express Inc.
Artivision Corp.
ARTOGON Corp.
ASPECTO SYSTEMS CORP.
Assetline Corp.
AssetMark Corp.
ASTOREX CAPITAL CORP.
ASTORIUS CAPITAL CORP.
AstroGold Corp.
AstroNet Commercial S.A.
AstroTex Universal Limited
AT International Group Ltd.
Atlantex Union Group Inc.
Atlantic Fishery Resources Ltd.
Atritec Company Inc.
Atta Group Ltd
ATWOOD HOLDING INVEST CORP.
AURORA UNIVERSAL GROUP LTD.
Austin Universal Inc.
AUTOMATICA SYSTEMS INC.
AutoMax Express Corp.
AutoNet Commerce S.A.
Avant Piter Corporation
AVIACONSULTING INC.
Aviamax Mercantile Ltd.
Avonhill Ventures Ltd.
AXELSON DIVISION INC.
AXELTOWN INVESTORS LTD.
AXONEX INC.
AXTONE UNIVERSAL INC.
BAKERSON BUSINESS INC.
Bakerwood Business Corp.
BallMet Saolutions Inc.
BALT COTTON GROUP LTD.
BaltExpert Inc.
BaltFox Capital S.A.
BaltHorn S.A.
Baltic Energy Developments Ltd.
Baltic Startrade Ltd.
BALTICUS LIMITED
BaltInform Corp.
BaltMark Express Corp.
BALTO INVEST GROUP INC.
BaltRoad Universal Corp.
BaltStorm Import Ltd.
BaltWood Universal Inc.
BARKER DEVELOPMENTS LTD.
BayCliff Trading Inc.
BELFORD IMPEX Ltd.
BELGIUM EXPORTS LTD.
Belinda Laboratories Ltd
BellCom Import Ltd.
BellCross Holdings Ltd.
BellTech Industries S.A.
Belvedere Commerce S.A.
Belwood Business Corp.
BenHold Express Inc.
BenSoft Management Corp.
BenSon Prospects Ltd.
BentCam Universal Inc.
BERGFORD S.A.
BERGLAND INVEST S.A.
BergLat Associates Inc.
BERGMARK Corp.
BERGMAX Corp.
BergMond Federation Corp.
BergMond Sales Inc.
BERGPORT S.A.
BERGSON S.A.
BergTrans Contracts Corp.
BERWOOD BENEFITS LTD.
BestEx Management Corp.
BETA UNION TRADING INC.
BetaCom Systems Inc.
BetaMark Worldwide Inc.
BIRMINGHAM EUROPE CORP.
BLACKBURY EXPORTERS INC.
BLACKFIELD UNITED CORP.
BlackFore Corporation
BlackSide Universal Inc.
BlackSteel Experts Corp.
BlackStyle Management Inc.
BLANCO DIVISION INC.
BLUEBERG UNITED CORP.
BOLTON UNION CORP.
BonDale Projects S.A.
BondWay Merchants Ltd.
BonInvest Business Inc.
BONMAX S.A
BonWell Import Inc.
Borderlink Transit Corp.
BorgMax Products Inc.
Bradberg Business Group Inc.
BRADFIELD EUROPE CORP.
BradFold Projects Ltd.
BradFront S.A.
BradHorn Company Ltd.
BradStone Capital Corp.
BrandBerg Energy Ltd.
BrandField Inc.
BrandHill Corp.
BrandLex Systems Inc.
BrandMan Trade Ltd.
BrandOn Express Inc.
BrandStorm Impex Corp.
BrantForm Express Corp.
BrantLey Commercial Inc.
Bravel Group Ltd.
Breakwater Trading Ltd.
Brendorf Marketing Ltd.
BridgeFront Limited
BridgeLane Express Corp.
BridgeTown Business Ltd.
BRIDGEWOOD BUSINESS CORP.
BrightHall Corporation
BrightMax Contracts Inc.
BrightMond Worldwide Inc.
BrightMore Management S.A.
BrightPool Federation Ltd.
BrightVale Networks Corp.
Brilliant Diamond Holdings Limited
Brinkford International Inc.
Brinkford Union Ltd.
Bristol Establishment Corp.
BritFold Business Corp.
BritMark Merchants Ltd.
BroadHill Commerce Inc.
BroadLine Import Inc.
BroadMax Capital Inc.
BroadStile Corporation
Broadway Commerce Inc.
BroadWide Contracts Corp.
BROKMAN CAPITAL CORP.
BROKSON CAPITAL CORP.
Brookbury Investors Corp.
BrookLand InterCapital Ltd.
BrookMan Universal Corp.
BrookMond Experts Ltd.
BrookTrade Express Ltd.
BrookWay Export Corp.
BrownField Projects Ltd.
BrownLex Systems Inc.
BROWSON CONCEPTS INC.
BROXON UNITED INC.
BTA International Limited
BTE Global Business Inc.
BuildEx Universal Corp.
BuildMan Projects Inc.
BuildMax Industries S.A.
Burnley Express Inc.
Buxton Contracts Corp.
BYRNE CAPITAL CORP.
CALDWELL ASSOCIATES INVEST INC.
CALINGTON DEALINGS INC.
CALTEX GROUP HOLDINGS CORP.
Cameron Prospects Corp.
CamFord Impex Corp.
Canyon Capital Inc.
CapeMax Capital Inc.
CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES LTD.
CardBond Projects Corp.
CardFox Merchants Ltd.
CardHill Export Ltd.
CardMan ImpEx Corp.
CarEx Universal Inc.
CarFold Systems Ltd.
Cargo Express East Ltd.
CargoMax Merchants Ltd.
CARGONEX COMMERCIAL S.A.
CargoRoad Inc.
CARGOSTAR IMPORTS INC.
CarlBond S.A.
CarlBorg Universal Ltd.
CarlField Ltd.
CarlForce Inc.
CARLFORD ASSETS INC.
CARLINGTON INVEST CORP.
CarlStone Trade Inc.
CarStone Management S.A.
Carten Project Group Ltd.
CartFord Capital Limited
CartInvest Corp.
CartLand Projects S.A.
CartLong Ltd.
CartMond Ventures S.A.
CARTO COMMERCIAL CORP.
CartPool Inc.
CASPIAN INVEST LTD.
CastEx Business Corp.
CastEx Capital Holdings Corp.
CastleBrook Inc.
CastleMond Corp.
CastLux Impex Inc.
CastMond Universal Corp.
CastVille Organization Ltd.
CastWay Management Ltd.
Catena Cosmetics Limited
Causheone Ltd.
CELEBRITY CAPITAL GROUP LTD.
CELTA INDUSTRIAL INC.
Central Production International Group Inc.
Centramax Systems Inc.
CentroGroup Universal Inc.
CentroTransit Incorporated
Century Maxtrade Ltd.
Centurystar Capital Inc.
Cesna Inter Corporation
ChadBerg Trading Corp.
ChartLux Resources Inc.
ChartWood Federation Inc.
CHELSEA INDUSTRIAL GROUP INC.
ChesterBerg S.A.
ChesterBridge Inc.
CHESTERGATE EUROPE CORP.
CHESTERMAN CAPITAL CORP.
ChesterMond Corp.
CHESTERWELL UNITED CORP.
Chrysler East European Logistics Limited
CityBridge Commercial Inc.
CityComplex Inc.
CITYFORD MARKETING LTD.
CITYHILL BENEFITS LTD.
CityMond Projects Inc.
CITYROAD LOGISTICS INC.
CityWest Industries Corp.
CityYork Universal Inc.
Claymore Networks Ltd.
CliffBrook Contracts Ltd.
CliffBury Organization Inc.
CLIFFORD EUROPE LTD.
CliffPark ImpEx Corp.
CliffSon Company S.A.
CLS GROUP LTD.
CoastLine Worldwide Inc.
CODEXO GROUP INC.
COLDWELL BUSINESS INC.
Comel Limited
ComExa Sales Ltd.
Complexus Products Ltd.
Conceptum Resources Ltd.
CONDOR TELECOM LTD.
CONOST LTD.
Constant ImpEx Corp.
CONSTRUCTA INDUSTRIAL INC.
ContraLux Inc.
ContraPort Inc.
ContraTex Sales Ltd.
ContWest Inc.
CONWAY TRANSITS INC.
CopperBerg Ltd.
CopperFord Inc.
CordImex Universal S.A.
CordLex Commercial S.A.
CordMan Worldwide Inc.
CordMile Express Inc.
CORNELSON UNITED CORP.
CorpCom Worldwide Corp.
CorpEx Ventures Ltd.
CORPOREXA UNITED INC.
COSWAY LOGISTICS INC.
COTTON TRANS SERVICES GROUP LTD
CountLex Resources S.A.
COUNTLINE COMPANY INC.
CountPort Impex Inc.
CoverMax Limited
Craftmoore Holdings Ltd.
CraftWood Ltd.
CredoTron Networks Ltd.
CredoVision Ltd.
Creggan Company Limited
Cresta Sales Ltd.
CrestBrand Universal Ltd.
CrestFold Projects S.A.
CroftInvest Ltd.
Crofton Projects Inc.
CRONSON CORP.
CrossFold Capital Ltd.
Crosstech Invest S.A.
Crowley Industries S.A.
CROWNFORD LOGISTICS CORP.
Crownport Union Inc.
CRYSTALEX GROUP HOLDINGS INC.
CVI INVESTMENTS INC.
DALSHIPSNAB CO., LTD.
Danberg Ventures Ltd.
Danboro Division Ltd.
DANBURG EUROPE CORP.
DANLEY CONSORTIUM CORP.
DanLux Organization Inc.
DANPORT SHIPPING INC.
DANSBERG ASSOCIATES INC.
DANSON GENERAL CORP.
DartStone Express S.A.
DartWill Systems Corp.
DARWYN INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS CORP.
Datacomm Solutions Inc.
DataCord Ltd.
DataStone Group Ltd.
DatImex Incorporated
DATUS SYSTEMS INC.
DAVOS INVESTORS INC.
DayStar Capital Group Ltd.
DayTown Commerce Ltd.
DAYWAY TRANSIT INC.
DEKOR LTD.
DELBERG PROJEKT LLC, KG LTD
DelBrand Systems Inc.
DelCo Networks S.A.
DellBorg Import Corp.
DellCroft Organization S.A.
Deltalink Systems Ltd.
DeltaMark Enterprises Corporation
Deltamax Intertrade Ltd.
DeltaPark Express Inc.
DeltaPark Worldwide Corp.
Deltastar Developments GMBH Ltd.
DelTown Worldwide Corporation
DEMYD LTD.
DentEx Capital Inc.
DentLex Projects Inc.
DentWood Projects Inc.
Deporto Consortium Inc.
Desmond Systems Inc.
Detroit Capital Group Inc.
DexBerg Projects Inc.
DEXON GLOBAL CORP.
DEXUM PROJECTS INC.
DEXUS BUSINESS CORP.
Diebold Incorporated
DigiCom Express Corp.
DigiNet Commerce S.A.
DigiSoft Systems Ltd.
DinaForm Sales Inc.
DINBURY INDUSTRIAL INC.
DinExpo Express Inc.
DixForm Universal Corp.
DixLey Corp.
DixMond Experts S.A.
DockBurg Limited
DockMark Ventures Corp.
DomEx Merchants Inc.
DomSon Impex Corp.
Dorchester Sales Ltd.
DorfBurg Industries Corp.
DorfMill Technologies Corp.
Dortmund Union Corp.
DOSTYK TRANS LTD.
DotBurg Organization S.A.
DOVSON DEVELOPMENTS INC.
DowCont Express Inc.
Dower Express Ltd.
DowLex Ltd.
Dowson Europe Ltd.
DRASBERG INC.
DrawNex Universal S.A.
DreamGold Worldwide Ltd.
DreamLine Projects Ltd.
DreamLux Organization S.A.
DreamStar Technology Corp.
DreamVox Sales Ltd.
Drilling Enterprises Corp.
DriveBurg Systems Inc.
DRYFIELD INC.
DUBAI GLOBAL INVESTORS INC.
Duet Alliance Corp.
Dunmore Ventures Incorporated
Dynamica Investments Inc.
DYWOOD UNITED INC.
EarlCross Worldwide Ltd.
EastBrook Worldwide Inc.
EastCrown Import Corp.
Eastern Expotrade Group Ltd.
Eastern Millenium Ltd.
EASTERN TERMINALS INC.
EastFond Ltd.
EASTFORD ALLIANCE INC.
EastLand Networks Inc.
EastLand Universal Inc.
EastRox Trading Inc.
EASTSIDE EXPORT CORP.
EASTWELL COMMERCE INC.
EcoBalt Sales Inc.
EcoExpert S.A.
EcoImport Ltd.
EcoLat Trading Inc.
eCommerce Automotive Limited
EconImpex Ltd.
EconLux Commercial Corp.
EcoPort Commercial Inc.
Ecora Trade Ltd.
EcoStar Holdings Ltd
EcoTerm Universal Corp.
Ecoton Corp.
EcoTon Universal Corp.
Edmontone Developments Inc.
Edmontone Exports Inc.
EffectWest Ltd.
EKMARINE CONSULTING AND SERVICES LTD
ElBerg Resources S.A.
Eleanor Business Ltd.
ELEMENT COMMERCIAL INC.
ELENBERG INVESTORS INC.
ELENBERG UNION LTD.
ELENBURG COMMERCIAL CORP.
ELENSON UNITED CORP.
Elizabeth Trading S.A.
EMERSEN DIVISION INC.
ENERGIUM SYSTEMS CORP.
EnergoCom S.A.
Energostar Resources Ltd.
EnterGroup Corp.
ENTERMAX Corp.
EnterMax Projects Inc.
EnterMond Corporation
EnterVox Merchants Ltd.
EntroMax Systems Inc.
ErgoInter Ltd.
ErgoMark Inc.
ErgoMax Sales Inc.
ErgoTransit Corp.
Esquire International Holdings Corp.
Etegro Systems Ltd.
Eurasia Trading Invest Ltd.
EURIMAX S.A.
Eurimport Inc.
EURIMPORT WORLDWIDE Corp.
EURO-CENTRO S.A.
EUROCONTO S.A.
EUROEXPORT GROUP HOLDINGS INC.
EuroExport Group S.A.
EuroFlex Networks Corp.
Eurogate International Ltd.
EUROGLOBEX Corp.
Euroimpex Invest Corp.
EUROLEGION GROUP INC.
EUROMARK CAPITAL Corp.
EUROMAX INTERTRADE GROUP Inc.
Euromax Intertrade Ltd.
EUROMAX INVEST CORP.
Europack S.A.R.L. Ltd.
EuropeMark Inc.
EuropeMax Limited
EuropeNet Company Ltd.
EuropeTown Inc.
EuropeWay Corporation
EuroStar Systems Inc.
EUROTEX COMMERCIAL LTD.
EuroTrack Impex Ltd.
EUROTRANS BUSINESS Corp.
EUROZONE CAPITAL S.A.
EUROZONE INVEST CORP.
Eurozonex Inc.
EverBrook Corporation
Evergate Export Ltd.
EverMax Experts Inc.
EVERSTONE GROUP HOLDINGS CORP.
EVERTONE GLOBAL INVEST INC.
EVERTRANS UNITED CORP.
EVERWOOD EXPORTS LTD.
ExBurg ImpEx Corp.
ExCord Contracts Inc.
EXFIELD ALLIANCE LTD.
Exforce Trading Ltd.
ExLogo S.A.
Exmill Associates Ltd.
Exo Investments Ltd.
ExpertLine Ltd.
EXPERTO INTERMANAGEMENT INC.
EXPERTUM SERVICES LTD.
ExpoBrand Incorporated
ExpoCredit Holdings Ltd.
Expomax Resources Inc.
Exporta International Corp.
EXPORTMAX S.A.
ExpoSoft Universal Inc.
ExpoTrans Projects Ltd.
ExpoVision Ltd.
EXTERSON INC.
ExtraBerg Ltd.
ExtraCord Company Ltd.
ExtraFold Systems S.A.
ExtraGrade Merchants Ltd.
ExtraLux Universal Inc.
Extramax Industrial Corp.
Extramax Partners Ltd.
ExtraMile Import Ltd.
ExtraMond Management Corp.
EXTRANS Corp.
ExtraWood Resources Corporation
EXTRON DEVELOPMENT Ltd.
Fairborn Import Inc.
FairCord Impex Ltd.
Fairholding Business Corporation
FairHolding Corporation
FairWalk Resources Ltd.
FAIRWELL TRADERS LTD.
FalconBerg Ltd.
FALCONEX INDUSTRIAL INC.
Farmington Universal Ltd.
Farmtrade Ltd.
FCTB TOBACCO LTD.
FEDBERG S.A.
FEDMARK S.A.
FedMax S.A.
FELDMARK INDUSTRIAL INC.
FELWAY PRODUCTS INC.
FESTEX HOLDING CORP.
FESTONE COMMERCIAL INC.
FieldBerg Company Inc.
FieldCrest Organization S.A.
FieldRex Contracts S.A.
FieldStone Commercial Ltd.
Financial Project & Consulting Company Inc.
FinBrand Trade Ltd.
FinBrook Projects Inc.
FinCross Ltd.
FineForm Industries Corp.
FineLux Universal Corp.
Finemark Finance Ltd.
FINEPORT SHIPPINGS LTD.
FINEWAY TRANSITS LTD.
FINEXON AGENCIES INC.
FINEYORK INVESTORS INC.
FinGroup Industries Corp.
FinLex Universal Ltd.
FINLEY INDUSTRIAL S.A.
FinLine Export S.A.
FinLord Company Inc.
FinRoss Contracts Inc.
Finstar Projects Corp.
FinWall Export S.A.
FireBrook Express S.A.
FireCroft Projects Inc.
FireLex Company S.A.
Firetone Logistics Corp.
FirstMax Capital S.A.
FLAMAR SHIPPING LTD.
Fletcher ImpEx Ltd.
FOLDEX COMMERCIAL LTD.
Fordholm Enterprises Inc.
FORDUS UNION LTD.
ForeWay Projects Inc.
Forexa Commerce Inc.
FOREXA MARKETS INC.
Forexlink Ltd.
Forexstar Ltd.
FOREXUM CAPITAL INC.
Formcrest Corp.
FORMWAY PROJECT CORP.
ForstBrand Express Inc.
FortDale Express Ltd.
FortLane Commercial Corporation
FortVille Experts S.A.
FoxGroup Projects Ltd.
FOXMAN UNITED INC.
FrancoSwiss ImpEx Inc.
FrancoTransit Corp.
Frankfurt Gruppe AG Ltd.
FRANRUS AROMAT LTD.
Freedomcorp. Ltd.
FreeMark Express Inc.
FREXON UNIVERSAL INC.
Frontline Commerce Ltd.
FrontLux Universal S.A.
FZK Development Ltd.
GABEX Industrieprodukte-Handels Corp.
GateHolm Ltd.
Gately European Group Ltd.
Gatwick Universal Inc.
GENBULK INVESTMENT LTD.
GENERAL DYNAMICS GROUP INC.
General Maxtrade Ltd.
GenEx Impex Ltd.
GENOVA UNIVERSAL LTD.
GenPort S.A.
GeoForm Company Inc.
GeoGlobe Ltd.
Geolink Merchants Ltd.
GEOMARK S.A.
GEOMAX CAPITAL Corp.
Geoport Corp.
Geoport Systems Inc.
Geostar Holdings Ltd.
Geostar Investments Ltd.
Gerard Projects Ltd.
GERMANET GRUPPE AG INC.
Germanex Continental Corp.
GILKES HOLDING GROUP LTD.
Gillnets Trading Ltd.
GILMAN INTERDEVELOPMENTS INC.
GILMORE TRADERS INC.
GlenBrook Networks Corp.
GLENMARK S.A.
GLENPORT Capital Inc.
GLENREX Corp.
GLENSON INTERHOLD CORP.
Glenwood Projects Inc.
Global Trans & Logistics Ltd.
GlobalCo Financiers Ltd.
GlobalCom Impex Limited
Globe Tours Corporation
Globelink Networks Inc.
Globestream Systems Corp.
Globex Tradeline Ltd.
GNL CORPORATION LTD.
Godwyn, Morgan & Co Ltd.
GOLDCASTLE EXPERTS CORP.
GoldCrown Commercial Ltd.
GOLDENSON IMPORTS INC.
GoldExpo Ltd.
GoldFine Import Ltd.
GOLDING MANAGEMENT INC.
GoldMoor Sales Inc.
GOLDRIDGE BUSINESS CORP.
GOLDSWORD ALLAINCE INC.
GoldVox Merchants Ltd.
Golfship Ltd
GOTLAND INDUSTRIAL INC.
GRAFGATE INVESTORS LTD.
GrandCom Projects S.A.
GrandForm Experts Ltd.
GRAYFIELD UNION INC.
GRAYHOUND EUROPE CORP.
Grayhouse United Corp.
Graylord Commercial Corp.
GreatField Business Inc.
GreatPort Trade S.A.
GreenBridge Trading Ltd.
GreenTrade Import Inc.
GREYBURY SALES CORP.
GreyDell Sales Ltd.
GREYFIELD EUROPEAN CORP.
GREYHILL TRADERS INC.
GREYSTONE INVEST CORP.
GROSMAN TRADING GROUP CORP.
GROUP EXPERT LTD.
Gulfport Shippings Inc.
GUTBERG ESTATES INC.
GUTENBERG EUROPEAN CORP.
HAGERTY UNION CORP.
HallStar Trade Ltd.
HALMAN INDUSTRIAL CORP.
HansaGold Inc.
HansaNord Ltd.
HansaTech Inc.
HansaTown Inc.
HANSTONE CORP.
HANTON INTERMANAGEMENT CORP.
HARISSON UNITED CORP.
Harley Benefits Inc.
Harrington Universal Worldwide Ltd.
HartBrook Merchants Inc.
HartCom ImpEx Ltd.
HARTLEY CONSORTIUM LTD.
HARTMAN MARKETS CORP.
HartMond Corp.
HartMoor Universal Ltd.
HartRow Impex Ltd.
Hawk United Transits Corp.
HAWKINS FINANCIAL GROUP CORP.
HAWKINSON CAPITAL INC.
HEATHROW SYSTEMS LTD.
HEIDELBERG UNITED CORP.
HENDELSON EUROPE CORP.
HENDERMAN ASSOCIATES INC.
HENDERSON DEALINGS INC.
HexaCom Export Ltd.
HexaMark Projects Ltd.
HexaTron Import Inc.
Hi-Mark Capital Corp.
HighLight Organization Corp.
Highline Enterprises Inc.
HILLBORO SYSTEMS LTD.
HillCrest Import Inc.
HILLDORF CONSORTIUM CORP.
HILLFORD SYSTEMS LTD.
HillMont Business Ltd.
HillPrime Management Inc.
Hillsboro European Corporation
HillStar Industries Ltd.
Hillward Intergroup Ltd.
HILLWAY TRANSITS LTD.
HOLANDEX TRADING CORP.
HOLBURG ENTERPRISES GROUP INC.
HoldCrest Worldwide Ltd.
HoldNet Organization S.A.
HoldPark Trade Ltd.
HoldTown Industries Inc.
Holland Industrial Inc.
HOLTAR TRADING Corp.
Holton Systems Ltd.
HOPKINSON FINANCE INC.
Hotline Communications Corp.
Huntington InterCapital Ltd.
HYBROOK FINANCIAL CORP.
HYCROFT EUROPEAN CORP.
HyLond Contracts Inc.
HyTech Express Inc.
IARA Group Ltd.
IBS Capital Inc.
Icefield Industries Inc.
IceHill Ventures AG Ltd.
ICEWELL COMMERCE INC.
ILBERG HOLDINGS INC.
IMPERILINE TRANSIT INC.
ImpEx Logistics Ltd
ImpexBrand Ltd.
ImpexCom Trading Limited
ImpexLine Corp.
ImportCenter Ltd.
ImportCross Inc.
ImportEx Invest Corp.
Importholding Ltd.
IMPORTO S.A.
INBERG CORP.
IncoTex Commercial Inc.
IncoTrans Federation Ltd.
IndexTrend Corp.
IndoCrest Merchants Corp.
Indotech Consultants Ltd.
Industrial Product Resources, Inc.
Industrial Technology Group (ITG) Ltd.
Industrial Technotrade Ltd.
INFINITY BUSINESS GROUP Inc.
Infinity ImpEx S.A.
INFINITY IMPEX TRADING Corp.
INFINITY IMPORT Inc.
INFINITY INDUSTRIES CAPITAL INC.
InfoCord Incorporated
Inglesprone Limited
INLEX S.A.
InLine Capital S.A.
InLogo S.A.
Inmanagement Inc.
INMAXO CAPITAL CORP.
Integra Commercial Ltd.
Integral Worldwide Impex Ltd.
InterAmex Ltd.
InterCord Ltd.
InterCorp Commercial S.A.
Intereuropa Systems Ltd.
InterForm Business Inc.
InterForm Capital Corp.
InterHouse Projects Corp.
INTERLEX EXPORT CORP.
Interlink Networks Ltd.
Intermax Network Inc.
InterMondo Corporation
International Law Services Corporation
International Offshore Services Group
International Offshore Services Group
International Trademark Regulation Company Ltd.
INTERNEX CAPITAL GROUP INC.
Interntional Business Company Global Inc.
InterPark Ltd.
INTERSIDE LOGISTICS AG LTD.
INTERSON TRANSITS LTD.
Intertech Solutions Ltd.
Interum Standarts Ltd.
InTrade Contracts S.A.
IntraHolm Business Inc.
IntWell Universal Corp.
INVENTEX INC.
InvestEx Worldwide Corporation
InvestGold Experts Ltd.
InvestLine Group S.A.
INWESTO CAPITAL S.A.
INWESTO S.A.
InwestWay Star Ltd.
Inwood Investments Capital Ltd.
IOS Group Ltd.
Ireland & Overseas Acquisitions Ltd.
IVEX INC.
IVORY UNITED GROUP LTD.
JackFront Trading Ltd.
JackLond Management S.A.
JACKSON BENEFITS INC.
JACOB FINANCIAL INC.
JACOBSON MARKETING LTD.
JAMES & HILTON CORP.
JANSON INDUSTRIAL INC.
JENSON DIVISION LTD.
Jeta Worldwide Inc.
JetFord International Inc.
JetGroup Universal Inc.
JetHolm Universal S.A.
Jetstar Transport Corp.
JOHANSON FINANCE CORP.
Johnson Intertrans Inc.
Joint Commerce Corp.
JORDEX COMMERCIAL INC.
Jur-Tash Investment Group Inc.
JURGENSEN COMMERCIAL CORP.
JUVENTUS CONSORTIUM LTD.
Kaalbye Agency Services Limited
KAALBYE LOGISTICS INTERNATIONAL LTD.
Kaalbye Yacht Management Inc.
KAMERTON DEVELOPMENTS INC.
Kanon Technologies Corp.
KAUFMAN RESOURCES LTD.
KENBERG S.A.
KENFORD MANAGERS LTD.
KenLord Company S.A.
Kennett Universal Ltd.
KENSON LOGISTICS INC.
KENSON TECHNOLOGIES CORP.
KentBridge Capital Ltd.
KentLine Networks Corp.
KentMax Federation Corp.
KenTown ImpEx S.A.
KentWay S.A.
Kenwell Markets Corp.
Key Energy Ltd.
Key Intertrade Ltd.
KEYSON BENEFITS INC.
KIKO COMMERCIAL INC.
KINGSON HOLDING INVEST CORP.
KingStar Commercial Limited
KLARBERG INC.
KLARUS INDUSTRIAL INC.
KLAYMARK LTD.
KLAYSON DIVISION LTD.
KLEINBERG AGENCIES INC.
KLEINMAN FINANCE INC.
Knightmax Corp.
KOLBERG VENTURES INC.
KOLMAN EUROPEAN GROUP INC.
KONKURENT Inc.
KRAMBERG BENEFITS INC.
KREMOST PARTNERS INC.
KRESTONE TRADING LTD.
KRONBERG ESTATES LTD.
LakeWalk Organization Inc.
Lambert Commerce Inc.
Lanceford Commercial Inc.
Lancroft Estates Inc.
LandGold Networks Ltd.
LandPark Resources Corp.
LandPort ImpEx Inc.
LandTown Inc.
LandWell Trading S.A.
LaneLord Systems Inc.
LaneMond Commercial S.A.
Lanfield Commercial Ltd.
LANSON EUROPEAN CORP.
LARGOWAY TRANSITS CORP.
LarkPool Commercial Inc.
LatBerg Trading Inc.
LATUS TRANSIT CORP.
LawPort Networks Corp.
LAWTONE CAPITAL CORP.
LAYBERG EUROPEAN CORP.
LeadStar Universal Corp.
LENFORD ASSOCIATES LTD.
LeoPort Federation Ltd.
Lexbrow Concepts Ltd.
LexField Projects Ltd.
LexForm Systems Inc.
LEXICO TELECOM LTD.
Lexter Marketing Ltd.
LEYMAN LOGISTICS INC.
LeyMont Universal Inc.
LIBERMAN UNITED CORP.
LIBERTO MANAGEMENT INC.
LightField Sales Inc.
LightFold Impex Inc.
Limburg Alliance, Ltd.
LinDay Trading Group Ltd.
LINDERSEN UNION INC.
LindStar Projects Ltd.
LINFIELD EXPERTS INC.
LINFORD SHIPPINGS LTD.
LinkFord Federation Ltd.
LinMax Organization Ltd.
LinoCard Express Ltd.
LinoMax Sales Corp.
Lipstorne Ltd.
LOGEX LTD.
LOGISTICUS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS INC.
LogoMax ImpEx Corp.
LogoTronic Incorporated
LOKI Group Ltd.
LOKI-R LTD.
LondEx Corporation
LONDMAX S.A.
LONDONA S.A.
LONDONEX UNIVERSAL Corp.
Longford Universal Inc.
LONGMAN SHIPPING CORP.
Longroad Transports Inc.
LORBERG TRANSITS INC.
LORDBURY ESTATES INC.
LORDUS INC.
LordWill Import Ltd.
LORSEN HOLDING CORP.
Loto Commercial Invest Ltd.
LowBrook Transit Corp.
LOYDS INDUSTRIAL CORP.
Luqa Shipping Corp.
LuxCont Organization S.A.
LuxCont Resources Inc.
LUXING CORP.
LUXING TRADING LTD.
LuxInvest Transit S.A.
LuxMark S.A.
Luxor Specialists Inc.
LuxPort Inc.
LuxPort Resources Ltd.
LuxTrans Capital Inc.
Luxury Group Incorporated
Lynchmore Investment Inc.
MacKenzie Universal Inc.
MacroTex Experts Ltd.
Madison Projects Corp.
MAGISTRAL INDUSTRIES INC.
Magnata Consortium Ltd.
MAGNATUM FINANCE INC.
MAGNETA INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL INC.
MAGNO EUROPE CORP.
MAGNUS MONS CORP.
MainLux Financiers Corp.
MainLux S.A.
MajorEx Systems Corp.
Malcolm Express S.A.
MANAGEMENT. PRO NETWORK INC.
Manchester ImpEx Inc.
MANHEIMER INVESTORS INC.
ManLey Export S.A.
MANSON MARKETING LTD.
MAPITEX LTD.
MAREX SHIPPING CORP.
MarkFold AG Ltd.
MASTEREX Capital Corp.
MASTERMAN MARKETING GROUP CORP.
MASTERSON MARKETING LTD.
MAXBERG FINANCIERS S.A.
MAXBERG S.A.
MaxBrand Systems Ltd.
MaxCom ImpEx Inc.
MAXFIELD ESTATES CORP.
MaxiJet Projects Inc.
MaxiTrade Corp.
Maxmedia Advertising Ltd.
Maxus Capital Ltd.
Mayco Finance Holdings Ltd.
Mayco Investments Capital Ltd.
MAYERSON ADVISORS LTD.
MAYFAIR CONSORTIUM LTD.
MAYHILL MANAGERS CORP.
MayPort Commerce Ltd.
MayRock Trading Corp.
MAYWOOD PROJECTS INC.
MCAC Group Inc.
MegaPort Contracts Ltd.
MEGATRON GROUP LTD.
MELBORO TRADERS LTD.
MELBOURNE UNION LTD.
Merchanta Universal Inc.
MERCURIUS EUROPE CORP.
Mercury Export Ltd.
MERIDIANEX S.A.
MetalImpex Limited
MetalSon Incorporated
MetRon Company Impex Inc.
METROPOLITAN MANAGERS CORP.
MEYCO BUSINESS CORP.
MEYCROFT ENTERPRISES INC.
MEYSON RESOURCES LTD.
MicroLine Incorporated
MidWest Systems Ltd.
MILBERG ESTATES INC.
MILDEX TRADING CORP.
MILGATE FINANCIAL CORP.
MillBerg Sales Corp.
Millbrook Transit Ltd.
Milltown Corporate Services Ltd.
MILMAN LOGISTICS INC.
Milord Innovators Inc.
MILSON CAPITAL CORP.
Moderno Company Inc.
Modesto Impex S.A.
Monitor Merchants Ltd.
MonoPort ImpEx S.A.
MonoTec Commerce S.A.
Monsbornes Limited
Monta Inc.
MontEco Universal S.A.
MontHill Networks Inc.
MontLine Import Corp.
MontVille Projects Inc.
MoreBrook Ltd.
MotoLux Inc.
MountLine Export S.A.
MT Global Logistics LTD.
MULLER MARINE LTD
MultiCrest Worldwide S.A.
MULTIWAYS INTERTRANS INC.
MuTec Alliance Inc.
NatExpo Capital S.A.
NatRex Resources Corp.
NELBERG DIVISION INC.
NELDEX INC.
NELFORD UNITED CORP.
NeoBrand Merchants Ltd.
NeoFin Express Ltd.
NeoGroup Commerce Ltd.
NeoLux Universal Inc.
NeoMart Impex Inc.
NeoTransit Corp.
NeoVision Corp.
Nerdborge Ltd.
NetBorg Capital Ltd.
NetMax Company Inc.
NetPromoter Ltd.
Netson Capital Group Inc.
Netwick Venures Inc.
NEUMA UNION LTD.
New Project Invest Limited
Newborg Investhouse Inc.
NEWBURG UNIVERSAL INC.
NewChart Universal Ltd.
NewCourt Projects Corp.
NewCrest Networks Ltd.
NEWFIELD INVESTORS INC.
NewFord Universal Ltd.
NewGrand Projects Inc.
NewLand Commercial S.A.
NEWSTAR CONSOLIDATED INC.
NEXBERG ATLANTIC DIVISION INC.
NexBerg Business S.A.
NEXOR BUSINESS INC.
NEXUM DIVISION INC.
NICON ESTATES LTD.
NIXBERG VENTURES LTD.
NIXFIELD INC.
NIXFORD CAPITAL CORP.
NOIRA UNION Ltd.
NOLFORD CAPITAL CORP.
NordEast ImpEx S.A.
NordField Impex Corp.
NordGroup Ventures Ltd.
NordLight Commerce Inc.
NORDMARK S.A.
Nordmax Corp.
NordPark ImpEx S.A.
NordSide Commercial Ltd.
NORDWAY Inc.
NORSON BENEFITS INC.
Northfield Resources Ltd.
NorthMax Corp.
Northway Forwarding Inc.
Northway General Holding Ltd.
Nottingham Investhouse Ltd.
Novalink Capital Ltd.
NoviLex Company Inc.
NovoCorp Import Ltd.
NowLine Management Corp.
NRG Express Holdings Inc.
NYLAND UNION LTD.
NYLANDER HOLDING CORP.
NYLSON VENTURES INC.
OAKDALE INDUSTRIES LTD
OAKLAND ESTATES HOLDINGS LTD.
Oilfield Supplies and Services Ltd.
OLAFSON EXPORTS INC.
OLBURG ENTERPRISES INC.
OldBerg Systems Ltd.
OldBridge Export Corp.
Oldenburg Union Ltd.
OldInvest Ltd.
OldSon Commerce S.A.
OldTown Sales Ltd.
OLEXON CORP.
Olympex Europe Ltd.
OmniLogic Corp.
OmniRex Projects Corp.
OmniRex Trade Corp.
OPTIMEX SYSTEMS INC.
OPTIMEX TECHNOLOGY CORP.
OPTIMUM SERVICES GROUP CORP.
OREX FINANCIAL CORP.
Orto Medical Corporation
ORWELL BENEFITS INC.
Ostersen Europe Corp.
OstForm Capital Ltd.
OSTWAY SHIPPING CORP.
OTTAWA CONCEPTS CORP.
OVERBRIDGE ALLIANCE INC.
OverCraft Incorporated
OVERLEX INC.
OVERLUX SYSTEMS INC.
Overman Consolidated Corp.
Overstone Markets Inc.
OVERTRANS EUROPE LTD.
OVERWAY SHIPPING CORP.
OXBORO CONSORTIUM LTD.
OxBrand Universal Inc.
OXBURG UNIVERSAL INC.
OxRoad Merchants Ltd.
OXWELL CONSOLIDATED CORP.
P.B.F.I. Ltd.
Palmera Commerce Ltd.
Palmert Members Ltd.
PALSON MARKETING CORP.
PARADO DIVISION INC.
PARAGON INVESTORS GROUP INC.
Paritex Ltd.
PARITUS DIVISION LTD.
PARITUS UNION LTD.
Parkfield Innovations Ltd.
Parkland Specialists Ltd.
ParkLine Commerce Inc.
Parkstone Consortium Corp.
ParkTrade Commerce S.A.
ParkVille Business S.A.
PARKWAY TRANSITS INC.
Parson Resources Ltd.
PatrolMax Ltd.
PAYTONE INSTRUMENTS LTD.
PERLEX CONSULTING CORP.
PETERSEN DIVISION LTD.
PetroAmex S.A.
PetrolStar Corporation
PetroNet Commerce Ltd.
PETROTOTAL TRADE LTD.
Philadelphia Experts Inc.
Planeta Contracts S.A.
PLANEX MARKETING CORP.
PlantBerg Express Corp.
PlantEx Ventures Inc.
PlexCom Ltd.
PNS GROUP INC.
POLAREX TRANSIT CORP.
PolMax Systems Corp.
PolyField Commerce Ltd.
POLYMER TRADING GROUP LTD.
PORT2. RU LTD.
PortBridge Transit Ltd.
PORTICO EUROPE CORP.
PortLux S.A.
Portman Consortium Ltd.
PortMill Capital Inc.
PortoLand Corp.
PORTUS TRANSIT CORP.
PREMIO INVESTMENTS LTD.
PREMIUM PACIFIC INVEST LIMITED
PRESTONE EXPORTS INC.
PrimeLex Management Ltd.
PrimeLink Export Ltd.
PrimeTrans Universal Inc.
PRINCEBERG ADVISORS LTD.
Prisma Express Corp.
Profita Management Inc.
ProfitStar Resources Inc.
ProfLine Universal Ltd.
Projectus Financial Corp.
ProtoTrade Management S.A.
ProWest Corporation
ProWest Impex Corp.
PROXUM MARKETING CORP.
Pur Pur Securities Ltd
QUALITY TECHNOLOGIES INVEST INC.
QUANTUS DIVISION LTD.
Quarto Contracts Inc.
Quatro Engineering Ltd.
QuatroMark Ltd.
QueenPark Development Inc.
QuestBrook Merchants Ltd.
QuestMark Ltd.
QuestRock Transit Ltd.
RadLey Universal Ltd.
RadLine S.A.
RadLux Networks Inc.
RADSON ESTATES INC.
RailMark Contracts Ltd.
RainBerg Organization Corp.
RainBerg Transit Ltd.
RainLand Impex Ltd.
RainLux Federation Corp.
RainMark Networks Corp.
Randolph Express Inc.
RandWalk Corp.
Raptor Investment Holdings Limited
RayBurg Experts Limited
RayMan Intermanagement Inc.
RealCroft Ventures Inc.
REALITE INTERTRADE Corp.
Reality Caspian Ltd.
Realmax Invest Corp.
Realmax S.A.
REALTY ACADEMY ASSOCIATION INC.
RECORDA UNITED CORP.
Redbrick Ventures Ltd.
REDCOAST IMPORTERS LTD.
Redfold Special Inc.
REDHOUSE BENEFITS CORP.
RedLey Corp.
REDNEX CAPITAL CORP.
RedPark Federation Ltd.
REDSEN LTD.
RedSoft Capital Ltd.
REDSON UNIVERSAL CORP.
RedStone Universal Impex S.A.
Redway Exporters Ltd.
RedWick Industries S.A.
ReForm Capital Inc.
Reling Ltd.
ReMex Invest Ltd.
REMUS DIVISION INC.
RenPort Express Inc.
RENPORT TRADE & MEDIA INC.
RENWAY LOGISTICS INC.
Rescare Canterbury Limited
Resulta Experts Ltd.
Retailtrade Limited
RexMan Sales Corp.
REXWAY FORWARDING CORP.
RICHARDSON ESTATES INC.
RichCom Universal Inc.
RichLand Business Ltd.
RichMount Contracts S.A.
RichTown Business Inc.
RightWay Properties Corporation
Ringwold Universal Inc.
RINGWOOD GROUP INC.
RIVERTRADE GROUP LTD.
RiverWay Commercial Corporation
RoadHolm Trade Ltd.
RoadTown Projects Ltd.
Robinson Dealings Ltd.
Rochester Universal Projects Inc.
RODMAN SERVICES INVEST INC.
ROGERSON DIVISION INC.
Rokson Resources Inc.
Rolide Trading Limited
ROLSEN COMMERCE LTD.
Rondo Travel Ltd.
RONDOTEX S.A.
ROSENFIELD ASSOCIATES LTD.
ROVERFIELD EUROPE CORP.
ROVERHOLM EUROPEAN CORP.
ROVERLANE INC.
ROVERMARK INVESTORS INC.
ROVERTOWN CONSORTIUM INC.
RoxBerg Commercial Inc.
Roxboro Capital Inc.
RoxLine Company Ltd.
ROXON MANAGEMENT TRADING INC.
Roxum Pacific Transit Inc.
Royal Garden Publishing Limited
ROYALTON ASSOCIATES CORP.
Royalty Universal Inc.
ROYCE CONSORTIUM INC.
ROYER TECHNOLOGIES INC.
ROYFIELD EUROPE CORP.
Roywood Pacific Division Ltd.
RReal Inc.
S.G.I. Logistic Ltd.
SALVO MANAGEMENT GROUP INC.
SandLake Ventures Ltd.
SandLux Business Ltd.
SandMax Corporation
Sando Industries S.A.
SandWell Industries Corp.
SAS Sorem Ltd.
SAVA INDUSTRIAL CORP.
SCL Limited
Scorex Projects Inc.
ScotBoard Management Ltd.
ScotBridge Merchants Ltd.
ScotBurg Commercial Ltd.
ScotLine Universal Corp.
ScotPort Sales Ltd.
Seaberg Transit Corp.
SeaBurg Capital S.A.
SeaLand Transit Corp.
SeaMark Capital Ltd.
SECTORA UNITED INC.
SELECTUM SYSTEMS GROUP INC.
SELECTUS SYSTEMS INC.
SellPort Transit Corp.
SENATUS INC.
SendMark Inc.
SENTUM SYSTEMS INC.
Seven Sundays Ltd.
SHARP & SONBERG LTD.
ShieldForm Corporation
SIDEBAY GLOBAL CORP.
SideFord Sales Corporation
SIGNUM DIVISION INC.
Silverberg Invest Co. Ltd.
SILVERBERG INVESTORS INC.
SILVERLUX DIVISION LTD.
SIRIUM SYSTEMS INC.
SKYLUX SYSTEMS INC.
SKYMAN SYSTEMS CORP.
SkyTrack Capital Ltd.
SoftLine Resources Inc.
SOGERD LIMITED
Solaris Partners S.A.
SOLEXO SERVICES INC.
SOLEXUS COMMERCIAL INC.
SOLIDEX SERVICES INC.
SolMan Export Ltd.
Solo United Group Inc.
Sonara Projects Ltd.
SONAX LTD.
SouthCrest Contracts Ltd.
SPARTON CONSULTING CORP.
SPRINGWAY LOGISTICS INC.
Stamford Transit Ltd.
STANMARK LTD
STANTON INVESTHOUSE INC.
StarBond Associates Ltd.
STARCRAFT FINANCE INC.
STEINMAN SHIPPINGS LTD.
SteinPort Commerce Ltd.
STEVENS UNITED CORP.
Stockman Interhold S.A.
StockWill Industries Corp.
Straight Transit Inc.
Strategy Coastal Corp.
StreamLex Sales Corp.
Stutgart Gruppe Ag Ltd.
Sundberg Associates Ltd.
SWANBERG ALLIANCE INC.
SWANBERG INDUSTRIAL INC.
SWEDEN SYSTEMS INC.
SwedLine Networks Inc.
SwedPoint Trade S.A.
SWISSBERG TRADERS INC.
SWORDMAN GROUP INC.
SystemFlex Ltd.
T Capital Limited
T Capital Management Limited
Tactica Enterprises Ltd.
TALKO INVEST, LTD.
TALSON CORP.
TaxBoard Contracts Ltd.
TeamFord Inc.
TeamStone Corp.
TECH IMPEX S.A.
TechWood Organization Ltd.
TeleBrand Universal Inc.
TELECOMMUNICATION INVEST CORP.
Telford Financiers Corp.
TelSoft Universal Ltd.
Tengam Limited
TenHolm Commerce Inc.
Tetbury Investments International Limited
Texas Systems Ltd.
TEXBERG HOLDING GROUP CORP.
TEXOR IMPORTS CORP.
TexWay Group Ltd.
TIC Chemical Inc.
TIGERBERG INC.
TIGERSON DEVELOPMENTS INC.
Tigrostone Benefits Inc.
TIMBERSON TRADING LTD.
TIMMERMAN SOLUTIONS LTD.
TITANUM DIVISION CORP.
TLW ImpEx Ltd.
TOKYO TECHNOLOGIES INC.
TOMEX Team Inc.
TonMark Export Ltd.
TONSON INTERHOLD INC.
TONWAY TRANSIT CORP.
TORBERG LOGISTICS INC.
Toronto Capital Corp.
TownPort Trading Inc.
TradeCroft Sales Ltd.
Transcaucas Oil Trading Ltd
TRANSEXPORT GROUP LTD.
Transferex Global Corp.
TRANSFLOT LTD.
TRANSITUS SYSTEMS INC.
TRANSLOGIK AT LTD.
TransMax Finance Corp.
TRANSPOLUX EUROPE INC.
TRANSPORTO S.A.
TRANSPORTUM UNITED CORP.
TRANSTONE INC.
TransWell Contracts Ltd.
TravelCom Trading S.A.
TreeStar Business Ltd.
TrendLex Industries Ltd.
TriaPort Company Inc.
TRIMARK RESOURCES TRADING Corp.
TrioWay Universal Inc.
TTA Finance Ltd.
TurboMilk Ltd.
Tuxford Investors Ltd.
TUXON DEVELOPMENTS INC.
TwinField Management Corp.
Tyler Sales Corp.
TYLEX LIMITED
ULTREX CONCEPTS INC.
UNDERBERG MANAGERS CORP.
UNDERBUSH LTD.
UNDERCODE LIMITED
UNDERCORD UNION CORP.
UNDERCORP MANAGERS LTD.
UNDERFERN COMMERCIAL INC.
Underfield Systems Inc.
UNDERFORD LOGISTICS INC.
UNDERFORT LTD.
UNDERGOLD SALES CORPORATION
UNDERGRAY BENEFITS INC.
UNDERPARK INVESTORS LTD.
UNDERPORT TRANSITS INC.
UNDERVALE HOLDINGS LTD.
UNDERWIND MARKETS LTD.
UnEx Print Ltd.
UniConsult Inc.
UniCroft Projects S.A.
UniFord Commercial Inc.
UNILUX INDUSTRIES INC.
UNIMONT S.A.
UnionExpert Ltd.
UniPort Ventures S.A.
UNIPROJECT Limited
UniStream Holdings Limited
United Steel Trading Corporation
UniTrack Capital Inc.
UniTransit Ltd.
UniWay Contracts Inc.
UpField Express Inc.
Valdex Limited
VALDO PROJECTS INC.
VALECRAFT TRADING INC.
VALECROFT DEALINGS INC.
Valeford Consortium Corp.
Valencia Logistics S.A.
VALENTEX DIVISION LTD.
Valentio Division Ltd.
VALENTO AGENCIES INC.
VALENTUS COMMERCE LTD.
Valington Finance Corp.
VAXON HOLDINGS INC.
Vectora Impex Corp.
Vectus Investment Group Ltd.
VELDEX LTD.
VeloJet Universal Ltd.
VeloMax Export Ltd.
VentHill Trading Ltd.
VERSO BENEFITS INC.
VexLey Organization S.A.
VIEWSIDE MARKETS INC.
ViewStone Universal Ltd.
VIGO GENERAL GROUP LTD.
Volpe Volante P&P Ltd.
VOLTON GLOBAL CORP.
Voyage Contracts Inc.
WAGNERSON CORP.
WAKEFIELD FINANCE GROUP CORP.
WallPoint Systems Inc.
WallTrade Resources Inc.
WardHill Export Corp.
WARRINGTON BENEFITS INC.
WASSERMAN CORP.
WATERHOLM TRADERS INC.
WaterNet Commercial S.A.
WAYMAR UNIVERSAL INC.
WAYMARK BENEFITS LTD.
WayPort Universal Corp.
Wayson Exports Corp.
WELDEX TRADING CORP.
Welfare Merchants S.A.
Well Drilling Company Ltd.
WellCroft ImpEX S.A.
WELLPORT SYSTEMS CORP.
WELTONE PACIFIC CORP.
WENDO LTD.
WENTBERG LTD.
WENTON EUROPE CORP.
WENTUM UNION CORP.
WEST TRANSIT Inc.
WESTENFORD INC.
WestExa Contracts Ltd.
WestHill Import Ltd.
WESTIMPEX TRADING GROUP Inc.
WESTIMPORT S.A.
WESTINGFIELD LTD.
WestLink Capital Inc.
WestMax Corp.
Westmax Invest S.A.
WestMile Express Corp.
WESTRANS IMPEX Corp.
WestTrade Export Inc.
WestTrade ImpEx Corp.
Westwhite United Inc.
WhiteBridge Commercial Corp.
WhiteCord Transit S.A.
WhiteCrest Commercial Inc.
WhiteHolm Ventures Inc.
WhiteMond Commercial Ltd.
WicLand Projects Corp.
WideBoard Ltd.
WilBrook ImpEx Inc.
WilCourt Contracts Inc.
WILDMAN CAPITAL GROUP INC.
WildNet Merchants S.A.
Wilkinson Systems Inc.
WillCourt Inc.
WILLIAMSEN TRANSIT CORP.
WilMark Company Ltd.
Wiltone Global Corporation
WIMBLEDON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS LIMITED
WINDMILL EUROPE GROUP INC.
Windom contracts Inc.
Wing Express Ltd.
WINLORD FINANCE INC.
Winsted Industries Corp.
WINSTONE FINANCE GROUP INC.
WonderLord Trading Corp.
WOODBRIDGE EXPERTS INC.
WOODFIELD ALLIANCE CORP.
Woodgate Resources Corp.
WoodMark Capital Inc.
WoodMark Capital Inc.
Woodstar Systems Corp.
WOODSTONE AGENCIES INC.
WorkPort Projects Inc.
WorldTrade Express Corp.
Worldwide Toner Inc.
WorthBerg Industries Ltd.
Wushan House Limited
XENON ASSETS HOLDINGS INC.
YANG TECHNOLOGIES INC.
YARDBERG Inc.
Yardberg Sales Ltd.
YardCrest Universal Inc.
YARDEX LTD.
YardLand Federation Ltd.
YARDLEY CONSORTIUM INC.
YardStone Commercial Ltd.
YNS Management Ltd.
York Resources Capital Corp.
YORKER IMPORTS CORP.
YORKERSON LIMITED
YORKFIELD MANAGERS INC.
YORKLANE EUROPE DIVISION LTD.
Yorkshire Division Ltd.
Yorkside Investors Inc.
YORKSTAR INDUSTRY CORP.
Yorkway Global Corp.
YORKWELL BUSINESS CORP.
Yorkwood Resources Ltd.
Yposnah S.A.
YVERSON CORP.
ZALBERG SHIPPINGS INC.
ZALMAN DEVELOPMENTS INC.
ZAMELSON INC.
ZELDEX CAPITAL INC.
ZeroStar Systems Ltd.
ZIGELMAN INC.
ZVA Shipping Corp.

Listed Addresses (51)
1 Pinewood, Ballybrack, Co. Dublin, Ireland
10 Doon Heights, Ballyconnell, Co Cavan, Ireland
10 Grand Priory, Headford Road, Kells County, Meath, Ireland
11 Ardoon Salthill Galway, IRELAND
115 Donnybrook Manor Dublin 4.
15 ST. Nicholas Place, Christchurch, Dublin 08 – Ireland
16 Cherrymount, Keadue, Cavan, Co Cavan, Ireland
18 Ballymaconaghy Road Newtownbreda, Belfast, BT8 4SB Northern Ireland
25/28 North Wall Quay International Financial Services Centre Dublin 1 Ireland
26 Herbert Place Dublin 2 Republic of Ireland
31 Porta Carron, Ballymoneen Road Knocknacarra, Galway, Ireland
31 PortaCarron Ballymoneen Road Knocknacarra Galway, Ireland
37 The Beeches Manor Stoneyford, Lisburn BT 28 3PL Northern Ireland
3A Kincora Road Ccontare Dublin 3 Ireland
4 Crosthwaite Park East Dun Laoghaire County Dublin
40 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2 Ireland
42 Chelmsford Road Dublin 6 Ireland
44-45 St. Stephen’s Green Dublin 2 Ireland
4th Floor Dollar House Wellington Quay Dublin 2
50 Summerville Clontarf Dublin 3 Ireland
51 Sandymount Road Dublin 4, Ireland
6 Castle Park Road Dalkey County Dublin Ireland
66 Willow Lodge Ballinderry Upper Lisburn County Antrim, BT28 2WL Northern Ireland
7 Barnhill, Tempo Road, Enniskillen Co Fermanagh, Ireland
7 Grouedale House Ballycorus Road Kilternan Dublin 18, Ireland
79 Castlebrook, Dundrum Dublin 14 Republic of Ireland
95 Beachlawn Dundrum Dublin 16 Ireland
c/o International Offshore Services Group 42 Chelmsford Road Dublin 6 Ireland
c/o Interntaional Fund Services (Ireland) Limited, 3rd Floor, Bishop’s square, Redmond’s Hill, Dublin 2, Ireland.
Chelsea Lodge Duncannon Co. Wexford Republic of Ireland
Coolagarranroe Clogheen County Tipperary Eire
Crosses Green Cork IRISH REPUBLIC
Cuilleann Cottage, Derreennatra, Schull Co. Cork Ireland
Dublin City University Dublin 9 Ireland
Dublin Exchange Facility International Financial Services, Centre Dublin, 1 IRELAND
Easton Lower, Branch Road Tramore Co. Waterford, Ireland
Fintra Road Killybegs, Co. Donegal Republic of Ireland
George’s Quay House 43 Townsend Street Dublin 2 Ireland
Grattan Court Washington Street West Cork Republic of Ireland
Gratton Court Washington Street Cork IRELAND
Greaghrahan, Ballyconnell, Co Cavan, Ireland
Holfeld House, 2-4 Merville Road Stillorgan Co Dublin, Ireland
Lispenny Lodge The Rock Castleconnell County Limerick Republic of Ireland
Natixis Corporate Solutions Ormonde House 12 Lower Leeson Street Dublin 2
Newmount House 22/24 Lower Mount Street Dublin 2 Republic of Ireland
North Main St Bandon, Co. Cork Ireland
Philip Burwell c/o International Offshore Services Group 42 Chelmsford Road Dublin 6 Ireland
Ron Hollebrandse Lispenny Lodge The Rock Castleconnell County Limerick Republic of Ireland
Roseville House, Bridgetown,Castletownroche, Ireland
Sovereign Company Services 109 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2 Ireland
St. Gall’s House St. Gall Garden South Milltown, Dublin 14 Ireland

Sirhan Sirhan Hypno-Programmed Assassin Innocence Plea Documents – RFKennedy Murder Case

The following court documents were filed on November 20, 2011 by the attorney of Sirhan Sirhan, the alleged assassin of Robert F. Kennedy. The documents claim that Sirhan was a hypno-programmed assassin and that another person fired the gun that killed Kennedy. For more information on the documents, see CNN’s article on the case.

SirhanSirhanPlea_Page_001-765x1024

SirhanSirhanPlea_Page_002-765x1024

SirhanSirhanPlea_Page_023-765x1024

SirhanSirhanPlea_Page_030-765x1024

SirhanSirhanPlea_Page_031-765x1024

Video-Anthology – J.EDGAR HOOVER.BLACKMAILING,LURID CROSS-DRESSING QUEEN!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3N3Vg5l-ITU&feature=share&list=PLD90A4ED0655815E9&index=1

Clip concerning Hoover seeking a psychiatrist regarding his sexuality. Anthony Summers comments. Later comments on several people who had seen the Hoover photograph,

Joseph Shimon of the Washington Police comments on ‘sexparties with no girls’.

Lansky had obtained photographs of Hoover in a ‘compromising’ position.

Gordon Novel claims to have seen the photograph, and also claims Carlos Marcello had seen it, and in fact used it to control Hoover.

Peter Pitchess,former FBI agent comments on the non existant mafia. Also does former FBI agent Neil Welch and William Turner.

Clip with Robert Kennedy and a statement regarding the mafia. More on his take at the mafia in a clip with their take on Hoffa. Comments by Robert Blakey.

Clip from questioning of mob-informant Joe Valacci. Robert Kennedy took upon the mafia when Hoover had refused to even acknowledge its existence.

From ‘Evidence of Revision’ – Conspiratus Ubiquitus

Ex-STASI-Spitzel stellt sich ihrer Vergangenheit – Video

http://youtu.be/buGIcPDkw4Y

Sie bekommt ihren Traumjob, als sie in den 80er Jahren Kellnerin in einem Devisenhotel in Ostberlin wird. Der Staat möchte allerdings eine Gegenleistung: sie soll Gäste und Kollegen für die Staatssicherheit bespitzeln. 15 Jahre später meldet sich ein damaliger Freund, der inzwischen seine Akte gelesen hat bei seiner “Stasi-Ratte”. Kanal abonnieren unter:
http://bit.ly/ySWR

Fan werden bei Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/SWR1BW

Offizielle Homepage:
http://www.swr.de/swr1/

Unveiled – NSA Snowden Releases Tally Update – *1,098 Pages

5 February 2014. Add 14 pages NBC News. Tally now *1,098 pages of The Guardian first reported 58,000 files; caveat: Janine Gibson, The Guardian NY, said on 30 January 2014 “much more than 58,000 files in first part, two more parts” (no numbers) (tally now less than ~1.8%). DoD claims 1,700,000 files (~.0062% of that released).

31 January 2014. Add 27 pages to CBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 47 pages to NBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 18 pages to Anonymous via New York Times.

16 January 2014. Add 8 pages to The Guardian.

* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

Related Snowden Document and Page Count Assessment:

http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-count.htm

* 5 January 2014. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel (30 December 2013. No source given for NSA docs). Tally now *962 pages (~1.7%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.50% of that released).

4 January 2014. The source was not identified for *133 pages published by Der Spiegel and Jacob Appelbaum in late December 2013. They are included here but have not been confirmed as provided by Edward Snowden. Thanks to post by Techdirt.

Glenn Greenwald tweeted:

Glenn Greenwald @ggreenwald, 8:05 AM – 29 Dec 13

@Cryptomeorg @ioerror I had no involvement in that Spiegel article, ask them – and they don’t say those are Snowden docs.

Matt Blaze tweeted, 11:24 AM – 2 Jan 14

matt blaze @mattblaze

If there are other sources besides Snowden, I hope journalists getting docs are careful to authenticate them (& disclose uncertainty).

3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.

3 January 2014. See also EFF, ACLU and LeakSource accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.

* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 December 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages (8 duplicates) to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.

23 December 2013

http://www.adn.com/2013/12/22/3243451/pincus-snowden-still-has-a-road.html

We’ve yet to see the full impact of former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s unauthorized downloading of highly classified intelligence documents.

Among the roughly 1.7 million documents he walked away with — the vast majority of which have not been made public — are highly sensitive, specific intelligence reports, as well as current and historic requirements the White House has given the agency to guide its collection activities, according to a senior government official with knowledge of the situation.

The latter category involves about 2,000 unique taskings that can run to 20 pages each and give reasons for selective targeting to NSA collectors and analysts. These orders alone may run 31,500 pages.

13 December 2013. Add 26 pages to Trojkan (SVT). Tally now 797 pages (~1.4%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.40% of that released). Australia press reports “up to 20,000 Aussie files.”

Rate of release over 6 months, 132.8 pages per month, equals 436 months to release 58,000, or 36.3 years. Thus the period of release has decreased in the past month from 42 years.

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

21 November 2013. See also EFF and ACLU accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

3 November 2013

47 42 Years to Release Snowden Documents

Out of reported 50,000 pages (or files, not clear which), about 446 514 pages (>1% 1%) have been released over 5 months beginning June 5, 2012. At this rate, 89 100 pages per month, it will take 47 42 years for full release. Snowden will be 77 72 years old, his reporters hoarding secrets all dead.

NY Times, 3 November 2013:

Whatever reforms may come, Bobby R. Inman, who weathered his own turbulent period as N.S.A. director from 1977 to 1981, offers his hyper-secret former agency a radical suggestion for right now. “My advice would be to take everything you think Snowden has and get it out yourself,” he said. “It would certainly be a shock to the agency. But bad news doesn’t get better with age. The sooner they get it out and put it behind them, the faster they can begin to rebuild.”

Outlet Pages
The Guardian 273
Washington Post 216
Der Spiegel * 97
O Globo Fantastico ~87
New York Times
Anonymous 118 (82 joint)
18
ProPublica 89 (82 joint)
Le Monde 20
Dagbladet 13
NRC Handelsblad 4
Huffington Post 3
CBC 36
The Globe and Mail 18
SVT 2
L’Espresso 3
Trojkan (SVT) 29
Jacob Appelbaum * 71
Information.dk 22*
Anonymous/New York Times 18
NBC News 61

Timeline of releases:

5 February 2014. Add 14 pages NBC News.

31 January 2014. Add 27 pages CBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 47 pages to NBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 18 pages to Anonymous.

16 January 2014. Add 8 pages to The Guardian.

* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.

2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.

* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 Decebmer 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum.

* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum.

* 30 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel.

24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.

13 December 2013. Add 26 pages to Trojkan (SVT).

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

11 December 2013. Belatedly add 25 pages to Guardian.

11 December 2013. Belatedly add 74 pages to Washington Post.

10 December 2013. Add 2 pages to CBC.

10 December 2013. Add 4 pages to CBC (duplicate of previous source).

9 December 2013. Add 3 pages to Trojkan. Add 2 pages to Guardian. Add 82 pages to New York Times and ProPublica (joint).

6 December 2013. Add 3 pages to L’Espresso.

5 December 2013. Add 2 pages to SVT (Swedish TV).

5 December 2013. Add 1 page to Washington Post.

4 December 2013. Add 3 pages to Washington Post.

2 December 2013. Add 3 pages to CBC.

30 November 2013. Add 18 pages to The Globe and Mail.

30 November 2013. Add 3 pages to NRC Handelsblad.

29 November 2013. Add 1 page to CBC.

27 November 2013. Add 3 pages to Huffington Post.

26 November 2013. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

23 November 2013. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad.

23 November 2013. Add 5 pages to New York Times.

22 November 2013. Add 10 pages to Dagbladet.

18 November 2013. Add 6 pages to The Guardian.

17 November 2013. Add two images to Der Spiegel.

4 November 2013. Add 14 pages to Washington Post.

3 November 2013. A reports an additional 54 slides for O Globo Petrobas.

3 November 2013. Add 22 pages to New York Times.

2 November 2013. Add 13 pages to Guardian, 11 are duplicates.

31 October 2013. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

29 October 2013. Add 3 pages to Der Spiegel

27 October 2013. Add 2 pages to Der Spiegel.

25 October 2013. Add 4 pages to Le Monde.

22 October 2013. Add 5 pages to Le Monde.

21 October 2013. Add 11 pages to Le Monde, 8 are duplicates.

20 October 2013. Add 1 page to Der Spiegel.

13 October 2013. Add 4, 7 and 9 pages to Washington Post.

8 October 2013. Add 7 pages to O Globo: CSE spying on Brazilian ministry, reported 7 October 2013.

6 October 2013. Add Snowden pages published by Washington Post, Der Spiegel, O Globo Fantastico, New York Times, ProPublica. Some are duplicates(*).

5 October 2013

26 Years to Release Snowden Docs by The Guardian

Out of reported 15,000 pages, The Guardian has published 192 pages in fourteen releases over four months, an average of 48 pages per month, or 1.28% of the total. At this rate it will take 26 years for full release.

Edward Snowden will be 56 years old.
Glenn Greenwald will be 72.
Laura Poitras will be 75.
Alan Rusbridger will be 86.
Barton Gellman will be 78.
Julian Assange will be 68.
Chelsea Manning will be 52.
Keith Alexander will be 88.
Barack Obama will be 78.
Daniel Ellsberg will be 108.
This author will be 103.

Number Date Title Pages
The Guardian 273
21 16 January 2014 SMS Text Messages Exploit 8
20 9 December 2013 Spying on Games 2
18 18 November 2013 DSD-3G 6
19 1 November 2013 PRISM, SSO
SSO1 Slide
SSO2 Slide 13*
18 4 October 2013 Types of IAT Tor 9
17 4 October 2013 Egotistical Giraffe 20*
16 4 October 2013 Tor Stinks 23
15 11 September 2013 NSA-Israel Spy 5
14 5 September 2013 BULLRUN 6*
13 5 September 2013 SIGINT Enabling 3*
12 5 September 2013 NSA classification guide 3
11 31 July 2013 XKeyscore 32
10 27 June 2013 DoJ Memo on NSA 16
9 27 June 2013 Stellar Wind 51
8 21 June 2013 FISA Certification 25
7 20 June 2013 Minimization Exhibit A 9
6 20 June 2013 Minimization Exhibit B 9
5 16 June 2013 GCHQ G-20 Spying 4
4 8 June 2013 Boundless Informant FAQ 3
3 8 June 2013 Boundless Informant Slides 4
2 7 June 2013 PPD-20 18
1 5 June 2013 Verizon 4
Washington Post 216
2 January 2014 Quantum Computer 2 10
2 January 2014 Quantum Computer 3
23 December 2013 NSA/CSS Mission 2
11 December 2013 Excessive Collection 9
11 December 2013 SCISSORS 2 7
11 December 2013 SCISSORS 1 4
11 December 2013 Yahoo-Google Exploit 6
11 December 2013 Cable Spying Types 7
11 December 2013 WINDSTOP 1
11 December 2013 Co-Traveler 24
11 December 2013 GSM Tracking 2
11 December 2013 SIGINT Successes 4
11 December 2013 GHOSTMACHINE 4
5 December 2013 Target Location 1
4 December 2013 FASCIA 2
4 December 2013 CHALKFUN 1
26 November 2013 Microsoft a Target? 4
4 November 2013 WINDSTOP, SSO, Yahoo-Google 14
30 October 2013 MUSCULAR-INCENSOR Google and Yahoo 4
14 October 2013 SSO Overview 4
14 October 2013 SSO Slides 7
14 October 2013 SSO Content Slides 9
4 October 2013 Tor 49
4 October 2013 EgotisticalGiraffe 20*
4 October 2013 GCHQ MULLENIZE 2
4 October 2013 Roger Dingledine 2
30 August 2013 Budget 17
10 July 2013 PRISM Slide 1
29 June 2013 PRISM 8
20 June 2013 Warrantless Surveillance 25*
7 June 2013 PPD-20 18*
6 June 2013 PRISM 1
Der Spiegel * 97
31 December 2013 QFIRE * 16
30 December 2013 TAO Introduction * 16
30 Deceber 2013 QUANTUM Tasking (8 duplicates of QUANTUMTHEORY) 28*
30 December 2013 QUANTUMTHEORY 14
29 December 2013 TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (images)
TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (DE article) 4
17 November 2013 ROYAL CONCIERGE (DE)

ROYAL CONCIERGE (EN)
2
29 October 2013 NSA-CIA SCS 3
27 October 2013 NSA-CIA SCS 2
20 October 2013 Mexico President 1
20 September 2013 Belgacom 3
16 September 2013 SWIFT 3
9 September 2013 Smartphones 5
1 September 2013 French Foreign Ministry 0
31 August 2013 Al Jazeera 0
O Globo Fantastico ~87
7 October 2013 CSE Brazil Ministry 7
8 September 2013 Petrobas ~60
3 September 2013 Brazil and Mexico 20
New York Times 118
9 December 2013 Spying on Games 82*
23 November 2013 SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 5
3 November 2013 SIGINT Mission 2013

SIGINT Mission 2017
22
28 September 2013 Contact Chaining Social Networks 1
28 September 2013 SYANPSE 1
5 September 2013 BULLRUN 4*
5 September 2013 SIGINT Enabling 3*
ProPublica 89
9 December 2013 Spying on Games 82*
5 September 2013 BULLRUN 4*
5 September 2103 SIGINT Enabling 3*
Le Monde 20
25 October 2013 NSA Hosts FR Spies 4
22 October 2013 Wanadoo-Alcatel 1
22 October 2013 Close Access Sigads 2
22 October 2013 Boundless Informant 2
22 October 2013 PRISM 11
Dagbladet 13
19 November 2013 BOUNDLESSINFORMANT 13
NRC Handelsblad 4
30 November 2013 Dutch SIGINT 3
23 November 2013 SIGINT Cryptologic Platform 1
Huffington Post 3
27 November 2013 Muslim Porn Viewing 3
CBC 36
30 January 2014 CESC IP Profiling 27
10 December 2013 NSA-CSEC Partnership 1
10 December 2013 G8-G20 Spying 4*
2 December 2013 G8-G20 Spying 3
29 November 2013 G8-G20 Spying 1
The Globe and Mail 18
30 November 2013 CSEC Brazil Spying 18*
SVT (Swedsh TV) 2
5 December 2013 Sweden Spied Russia for NSA 2
L’Espresso 3
6 December 2013 NSA Spies Italy 3
Trojkan (SVT) 29
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Relationship 1*
11 December 2013 NSA 5 Eyes Partners 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Agenda 8
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA RU Baltic 1
11 December 2013 NSA GCHQ Sweden FRA COMINT 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Plan 5
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Sources 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Tor et al 3
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Slide 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Quantum 1 1
11 December 2013 GCHQ Sweden FRA Quantum 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Quantum Accomplishments 2
9 December 2013 NSA and Sweden Pact 3*
Jacob Appelbaum * 71
30 December 2013 NSA Catalog * 50
30 December 2013 NSA Catalog Video Clips * 21
Information.dk 22*
14 January 2014 SSO (duplicate) 7*
14 January 2014 PRISM (duplicate) 11*
13 January 2014 5-Eyes Spy G8-G20 (duplicate) 4*
Anonymous/
New York Times 18
27 January 2014 NSA Smartphones Analysis 14
27 January 2014 GCHQ Mobile Theme 4
NBC News 61
5 February 2014 GCHQ Anonymous 14
27 January 2014 GCHQ Squeaky Dolphin 47

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 73, Iran,

Officers & Master Clients (5)
Ebrahim Kahrobai
HOSSEIN MOVAHEDI ZADEH
Houshang PISHVA AZAD
Mehdi Dadpey Reza
Yaseen Gokal

Listed Addresses (5)
55 Mirzaye Shirazi P.O. Box 15955/443 Tehran – Iran
No 36 Main Street, Ekbatan, Tehran Iran
No. 128 Molasadra Street, Tehran, Iran
No. 142, Merdamad Blvard, Tehran, Iran P.O. Box 16315-571
No. 5 Omar Khayam Street Tehran IRAN

Insider enthüllt: Chinas korrupter Ex-STASI-Chef Zhou Yongkang räumte hunderte Milliarden ab

Ein anonymer Insider enthüllte, wie dick Chinas Ex-Stasi-Chef wirklich abräumte: „Das ist der größte Korruptionsfall mit der höchsten Summe in der Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei.“ Seit der Gründung der Volksrepublik habe es nichts Vergleichbares gegeben, so der Insider.

Zhou Yongkang (72) war lange Jahre Chinas Stasi-Chef – davor hatte er sich bereits einen Ruf als „Öl-Pate“ erarbeitet: Während der 80er Jahre war Zhou Parteisekretär des Shengli-Ölfelds in der Provinz Shandong, danach „Vize-Ölminister“ und schließlich Chef von Chinas Erdöl-Monopolisten China National Petroleum (CNPC).

Auf krummen Wegen sammelte Zhou gigantische Geldsummen und Sachwerte: Mehrere 100 Milliarden Yuan (mehrere Zigmilliarden Euro) an Geld, Immobilien und Wertgegenständen sollen es laut dem anonymen Insider gewesen sein. Und auch der langjährige CNPC-Vorstand Jiang Jiemin, Zhous „rechte Hand“, habe sich davon mehrere 10 Milliarden Yuan (mehrere Milliarden Euro) abgezweigt.

Besonders pikant: Auch Chinas Ex-Diktator Jiang Zemin und Ex-Vize-Präsident Zeng Qinghong sollen in den Fall verwickelt sein. Dass hinter den Kulissen bereits Ermittlungen gegen Zeng im Gange sind, sickerte vor wenigen Tagen durch.

Auch über Zhous derzeitigen – streng geheimen – Aufenthaltsort wusste der Informant bescheid: Er sagte, Zhou befände sich momentan in der Inneren Mongolei und werde mehr als 600 Kilometer von Peking entfernt in einer Militäranlage festgehalten. (Bisherige Gerüchte vermuteten einen Ort nahe Peking).

Zwei verschiedene Truppen seien mit Zhous Bewachung beauftragt: Angehörige des Pekinger Sicherheitsstabs der KP-Zentrale, welche direkt Präsident Xi Jinping unterstellt sind, sowie Soldaten des Pekinger Militärs. Zhou befände sich unter strengster Kontrolle. Auch seine Familie dürfe ihn nicht besuchen.

Die Info zu Zhous Aufenthaltsort erklärt, warum Xi Jinping kurz vor dem chinesischen Neujahr eine Rundreise in die Innere Mongolei unternahm und seinen Neujahrsgruß an die Nation von dort sendete.

Ebenfalls am chinesischen „Silvesterabend“ erschien auf der Website des Wirtschaftsmagazins Caixin ein 10-minütiges Video zu Zhou Yongkangs Machenschaften: Das Video wurde als erster Teil einer ganzen Serie mit dem Titel „Zhous Weg“ angekündigt und handelte von Zhous 42-jährigem Sohn Zhou Bin und drei seiner Handlanger.

Als „weiße Handschuhe“, mit denen sich der Öl-Pate beim Umgang mit Schwarzgeld bekleidete, wurden vorgestellt: Familie Huang (Zhou Bins Schwiegereltern aus den USA); Wu Bing, der bereits im August festgenommene Haushälter Zhous, der gleichzeitig CEO einer „Firma“ war, welche Geschäfte zu seinen Gunsten abwickelte; und Mi Xiaodong, hochrangiger Manager des Offshore-Ölförderers CNOOC und Zimmerkollege Zhou Bins aus Studenten-Zeiten.

Der Bericht rollte auf, wie Familie Huang einmal vom Ministerium für Staatsressourcen einen Auftrag für ein Ölförderungs-Projekt in Russland bekam und am Weiterverkauf dieses Auftrags 800 Millionen US-Dollar verdiente. Ein anderes Mal kassierten sie für einen Lizenzverkauf 500 Millionen Yuan mit nur einer Unterschrift.

Schon am 22. November hatte das Magazin „Caixin“ mit zwei Exklusiv-Berichten über Korruption im Öl-Geschäft die Chinesen auf Schritte gegen Zhou Yongkang vorbereitet. Das Magazin gilt derzeit als inoffizielles Sprachrohr von Xi Jinpings Anti-Korruptions-Kampagne.

Unveiled – The Secret Connection which killed the Kennedys – The Movie

 

 

https://youtu.be/8xVcfTzuJrM

 

This is the mindblowing 6-part,10 hour, video documentary series Evidence of Revision whose purpose is to present the publicly unavailable and even suppressed historical audio, video and film recordings largely unseen by the American and world public relating to the assassination of the Kennedy brothers, the little known classified “Black Ops” actually used to intentionally create the massive war in Viet Nam, the CIA “mind control” programs and their involvement in the RFK assassination and the Jonestown massacre and other important truths of our post-modern time.

Playlist:
http://www.youtube.com/playlist?p=PL6&#8230;

http://conspiracyscope.blogspot.com/

Top Secret – Unveiled – Nelson Mandela Last Will and Testament Memo

Download the document below:

mandela-will-memo

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 72, Indonesia

Officers & Master Clients (2961)

Budiono
A Prabhu
A. Budi Pranoto
AAJ BATAVIA
Aam Dewi Hamidah
Aarti Lohia
Abdul Hadi Ismail
Abdul Rachman
Abdul Rahman
Abdul Rifai Natanegara
Abdul Slam TAHIR
Abdul Slam Tahir
Abdullah Alatas
Abu Djaja Bunjamin
Abu Hermanto Budiono
Achirsyah Moeis
Achmad Fadjar
Achmad faried Joesoef
Achmad Faried Joesoef
Achmad Kalla
Achmad Latief Alwy
Achmad Nugraha Djuanda
Achmad Sandi
Achmad, Sally, Erma and Cindy as joint tenants
ADAM SAUTIN
ADAM SAUTIN
Ade R. Syarief
ADE TJAKRALAKSANA
Ade Tjakralaksana
Ade Tjakralaksana
ADELINA PRASETIO
Adhi Utomo
ADHI UTOMO JUSMAN
ADI BISONO
ADI BISONO
Adi Sasono
Adi Sumito
Adimitra Baratama Nusantara
Aditya Koeswojo
Adji Muljo Teguh
Adnan Kelana Haryanto & Hermanto
ADRI ACHMAD DRAJAT
Adriana Maya Politon
Adryansyah
Afandi Hermawan Oey
Afandi Hermawan Oey and Tjoeng Anna Chrisnadi

Continue reading “The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 72, Indonesia”