TOP-SECRET – Former Jersey City Construction Project Superintendent Sentenced to Prison for Social Security Disability Scam

NEWARK—The former project superintendent on a Jersey City, New Jersey high-rise construction project was sentenced today to six months in prison and six months of home confinement for a scheme in which he hid his employment so he could continue to receive Social Security disability payments, U.S. Attorney Paul J. Fishman announced.

Pasquale Zinna, 44, of Hackettstown, New Jersey, previously pleaded guilty to two counts of the indictment against him: Social Security disability fraud and structuring financial transactions. His wife, Janeen Zinna, 43, was also sentenced today—to two years’ probation with the special condition of 100 hours of community service. She previously pleaded guilty to a superseding information charging her with misprision of her husband’s Social Security fraud. U.S. District Court Judge Katharine S. Hayden imposed the sentences today in Newark federal court.

According to documents filed in this case and statements made in court:

In 1999, Pasquale Zinna filed an application for disability insurance benefits with the Social Security Administration (SSA), claiming that, as of March 15, 1996, he was disabled and unable to work due to a back injury. By filing the application, Pasquale Zinna agreed to notify the SSA if there was any improvement in his medical condition or if he regained the ability to work.

Beginning in September 2005, Pasquale Zinna was the project superintendent for 160 Broadway Concrete, a sub-contractor at the high-rise construction project at 77 Hudson Street in Jersey City. He failed to report his return to work to Social Security and concealed his employment at Broadway Concrete by having his paychecks issued to him in the names of other individuals, including his wife. Janeen Zinna admitted during her guilty plea that she filed a joint federal income tax return with her husband for 2007 which claimed income received from Broadway Concrete was for work she performed.

Pasquale Zinna also admitted to making a series of cash withdrawals from his joint checking account with his wife at Commerce Bank, now TD Bank, in order to avoid the bank’s reporting requirement for financial transactions in excess of $10,000.

In addition to the prison term, Judge Hayden sentenced Pasquale Zinna to three years of supervised release. He was also ordered to pay $101,753 in restitution to the Social Security Administration and to forfeit $98,000 involved in the illegal financial transactions. Janeen Zinna was also held responsible for the restitution. The defendants paid these obligations in full at today’s proceeding.

Four New York men have also pleaded guilty to a wide range of fraud and other offenses stemming from their involvement in the Jersey City construction project between 2007 and 2008.

Rocco Mazzaferro, 64, of Brooklyn, New York, and Vincenzo Genovese, 75, of Staten Island, New York, pleaded guilty November 22, 2011 to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Vincenzo Genovese also pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to embezzle pension benefits.

Anselmo Genovese, 44, of Staten Island, New York, pleaded guilty December 16, 2011 to two counts of making unlawful labor payments.

Eric Haynberg, 46, of New York, pleaded guilty December 16, 2011, to a superseding information charging him with misprision of the wire fraud committed by Mazzaferro and Vincenzo Genovese.

The sentencings of Mazzaferro and Vincenzo Genovese are currently scheduled for July 10, and July 12, 2012, respectively. Sentencing for Eric Haynberg is currently scheduled for June 7, 2012, and for Anselmo Genovese on July 11, 2012.

U.S. Attorney Fishman credited special agents of the FBI, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge Michael B. Ward in Newark; and Department of Labor’s Office of Inspector General, Office of Labor Racketeering and Fraud Investigations, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge Robert L. Panella for the New York Region, for the investigation leading to the arrests and charges. He also thanked the IRS, under the direction of Acting Special Agent in Charge JoAnn S. Zuniga; and the SSA Office of the Inspector General, under the direction of Edward J. Ryan, New York Field Division, for their work on this case, and the U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration, for its assistance.

The government is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorney Leslie F. Schwartz of the U.S. Attorney’s Office Economic Crimes Unit in Newark.

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TOP-SECRET – Open Source Center North Korea Unusual Threats Signal Possible Action Against South Korea

North Korea’s recent threat to carry out “special actions” against the South is rare and seems intended to signal the regime’s resolve to move forward with some form of provocation. The threat, however, is unlike past warnings the regime has typically issued prior to military provocations, suggesting that the North might follow through with a move other than a conventional military attack. Significantly, some aspects of the warning appear to signal Pyongyang’s commitment to follow up on the “actions” in the near future.

North Korea on 23 April issued an unprecedented “notice” in the name of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Supreme Command Special Operations Action Team. The toughly worded message — a response to what Pyongyang apparently viewed as provocative remarks recently made by ROK President Lee Myung-bak — contained an unusually vague warning against Seoul.

The “notice” particularly took issue with President Lee’s recent comments on “strengthening” South Korea’s national “self-defense capabilities” (Yonhap, 19 April), which it characterized as an “extremely grave frenzy of provocation” and a “theory of striking” the North’s “supreme headquarters” (Pyongyang radio, 23 April). The message stated that the North’s “revolutionary armed forces” will take “special actions” against the “gang of traitors’ reckless” move, and emphasized that the “actions…will start soon” (Pyongyang radio, 23 April).

This is only the second time the North has used the “special actions” formulation to threaten President Lee in an authoritative military pronouncement. Pyongyang just five days earlier used the same threat — albeit in a passive voice — in an authoritative KPA Supreme Command spokesman’s “statement,” which said that “special action measures will be taken” (Pyongyang radio, 18 April).

The “notice” also contained a figurative reference to turning the “group of rats” — referring to the ROK leadership — into “ashes” within “three to four minutes” (Pyongyang radio, 23 April). The “ashes” formulation is on the low end of the rhetorical threat spectrum. Pyongyang in recent years has issued more direct and literal formulations to threaten Seoul, particiuarly following the Ch’o’nan sinking.

The threat to carry out “special actions” is ambiguous and not as definitive as warnings Pyongyang has issued in the lead-up to past military provocations, suggesting that the regime might be contemplating some form of action other than an actual military attack. The North’s typical rhetorical pattern prior to provocations is to signal in authoritative media that it has decided to act without divulging how, when, or where it will move.

Prior to the sinking of Ch’o’nan, Pyongyang issued a more direct threat in the name of an authoritative KPA General Staff spokesman stating that it “will” respond to US ROK military drills with a “powerful military counteraction” (Pyongyang radio, 25 February 2010). Similarly, leading up to the Yo’np’yo’ng Island shelling, a statement by the spokesman for the North side’s delegation to North-South military talks warned that its Army “will counter” the South’s provocations with a “merciless physical retaliation” (KCNA, 29 October 2010).

Committing to Prompt Action

Although the recent threat was not as definitive as warnings the North issued in advance of past military provocations, the unusual use of the phrase “will start soon” in combination with the unique “special actions” formulation appears designed to signal that the regime is committed to following through with its warning.

Pyongyang’s use of the term “soon” is unusually specific and categorical. The last time the North modified its threat with this term was in a less authoritative North-South Military Talks General-Level Representative “notice,” which warned that its “army will soon” take “corresponding decisive measures” in response to South Korea distributing leaflets to the North (Pyongyang radio, 10 April 2010). Unlike the most recent threat, however, this warning was preceded by a conditional phrase, which afforded the regime the flexibility to refrain from taking immediate action.

Further underscoring its commitment to carry out its threat, the North broadcast the KPA “notice” to both domestic and external audiences. In addition, the North Korean radio and television carried the message at least two times a day for three days following the initial announcement.

DOWNOAD THE ORIGINAL FILE HERE

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Mighty Derringer – TOP SECRET – U.S. Nuclear Terrorism Exercise Leaves Indianapolis in “Ruins”

Washington, D.C., May 29, 2012 – A secret exercise in 1986 by a U.S. government counter-terrorist unit uncovered a host of potential problems associated with disrupting a nuclear terrorist plot in the United States. Declassified documents released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and posted today by the National Security Archive offer the first detailed public look at the inner workings of the agencies, military units and other U.S. entities responsible for protecting the country from a terrorist nuclear attack.

Today’s posting consists of over 60 documents related to MIGHTY DERRINGER, an exercise that focused on Indianapolis in December 1986. The materials provide background on the creation, in 1974-1975, of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), a group assigned to respond to plausible threats of nuclear terrorism or extortion. Today, NEST (now the Nuclear Emergency Support Team) conducts exercises to assess its capability to respond to the possible presence of a terrorist device and test the ability of NEST and critical cooperating organizations (including military units)to work together.

While the MIGHTY DERRINGER exercise and resulting documents are over two decades old, the institutions participating in the exercise retain their roles today, and the issues confronting them in 1986 are similar to the ones that they would face in responding to a nuclear threat in 2012 (and beyond).

This posting is notable for being the first publication of documents that provide in-depth exposure into all aspects of such an exercise – including the state-of-play at key points and the array of issues involved in disabling terrorist devices. Of particular interest are references to the participation of the Joint Special Operations Command and Delta Force – mirroring the role they would have in a real-world incident. In addition, after-action reports reveal the assorted problems that can arise in coordinating the response to a nuclear terrorist threat among a large number of organizations.

* * * *

THE MIGHTY DERRINGER EXERCISE

In late January and early February 2012, members of the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) patrolled Lucas Oil Stadium as well as surrounding areas of Indianapolis as a precautionary measure in advance of Super Bowl XLVI. An initial survey to gather information on background levels of radiation was followed by an actual search for signatures associated with either a nuclear explosive device or a radiation dispersal device (a ‘dirty bomb’).¹ Fortunately, none was found.

Over twenty-five years earlier, for a few days in early December 1986, NEST personnel also patrolled Indianapolis, also in search of a nuclear device. That search was triggered by an intelligence report that suggested that an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) might have been smuggled into the city by terrorists. With the assistance of the Delta Force, U.S. personnel were able to recover and disable the device in a fictitious neighboring country; unfortunately the Indianapolis device exploded and 20 square blocks in downtown Indianapolis were completely destroyed.

As it happens, the terrorist group, the intelligence report, and the detonation were fictional – elements of a NEST exercise designated MIGHTY DERRINGER, one of a number of tests designed to anticipate and prevent the potential real-world catastrophe of a terrorist nuclear strike in a major American city. Documents published today by the National Security Archive provide newly declassified details on how the MIGHTY DERRINGER exercise unfolded and how the participants later evaluated it.

This is the most extensive set of declassified documents on any nuclear counterterrorism exercise, covering every phase of the response, from concept to critiques, and it offers valuable insights into a world that is usually hidden from public scrutiny. Among the disclosures:

§ The role of the top secret Joint Special Operations Command’s Delta Force in carrying out the assault on the terrorist cell in the fictional country of Montrev.

§ Descriptions of the different types of disablement techniques U.S. forces utilize – emergency destruct, standard destruction, and hard entry.

§ Assessments of the coordination problems and different perspectives of agencies that would be involved in a real-world response.

The instruction to establish NEST, known until 2002 as the Nuclear Emergency Search Team, took the form of a November 18, 1974 memo from Maj. Gen. Ernest Graves, the Atomic Energy Commission’s assistant general manager for military application, to Mahlon Gates, the manager of the commission’s Nevada Operations Office. (Document 1). Gates was “directed and authorized” to assume responsibility for the planning and execution of field operations employing AEC radiation detection systems for the “search and identification of lost or stolen nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials, bomb threats, and radiation dispersal threats.”

Personnel for NEST would come from AEC’s nuclear weapons laboratories – Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and Los Alamos – as well as key AEC contractors. Almost all those individuals would continue in their regular positions full-time and become part of a NEST effort when required.

What inspired Graves’ memo was an incident that had taken place in May of that year. The Federal Bureau of Investigation received a letter demanding $200,000. Failure to comply would result in the detonation of a nuclear bomb somewhere in Boston. Personnel and equipment were quickly assembled and transported to Griffiss Air Force Base in Rome, New York. But before the team could make it to the threatened city, the crisis receded when no-one came to pick up the $200,000 in phony bills left at the designated site. ²

But the incident and the difficulties involved in responding to the threat convinced senior leaders that there was a need for a dedicated capability to deal with any attempt at nuclear extortion or nuclear terrorism. From its inception, NEST devoted considerable time and effort to conducting exercises designed to allow the team to test its readiness, procedures, and equipment in a variety of scenarios. In addition, since confronting a nuclear threat would involve not only NEST but a multitude of organizations, exercises provided an opportunity to identify potential problems in interagency cooperation.

MIGHTY DERRINGER was a particularly notable exercise in exploring the organizational, governmental, and technical problems that might arise in responding to a nuclear terrorist threat. While the existence of MIGHTY DERRINGER has been reported previously, the documents obtained by the National Security Archive and posted in this briefing book provide far more detail than previously available on the scenario, results, and after-action assessments of the assorted organizations involved. Since NEST and these other government entities are still critical components of America’s counter-terrorist capability, these records are valuable for the insight they offer into how a current-day nuclear detection operation would unfold and particularly what kinds of problems might be encountered.³

The exercise took place in two locations – Camp Atterbury, Indiana, near Indianapolis, and Area A-25 of the Energy Department’s Nevada Test Site – which corresponded to the two locations involved in the exercise scenario. One of the those locations was Indianapolis while the other was the country of ‘Montrev’ – a rather transparent fictional version of Mexico (since Montrev shared a border with the United States, its capital city was ‘Montrev City’, and its primary security agency was the Directorate for Federal Security – the same as Mexico’s).

Montrev was the initial focus of the exercise, with a terrorist group commanded by “Gooch” threatening to detonate an improvised nuclear device (IND) near the country’s Bullatcha oil field. According to the scenario, terrorists had stolen the devices from a new nuclear weapons state. Eventually, the participants discovered that that there was a second nuclear device and it appeared that it was being infiltrated into the United States, possibly with Pittsburgh as a target – although it was subsequently determined that the target was Indianapolis. While U.S. forces (with Delta Force assistance) were able to recover and disable the device in Montrev, Indianapolis experienced a 1 kiloton nuclear detonation that resulted in “total devastation over a 20 square block area.” (Document 38) The scenario had originally posited a successful disarming, but the exercise controllers decided to introduce a new element.

The scenario allowed for all aspects of a possible response to a nuclear terrorist/extortionist threat to be practiced – from initial assessment of the threat to the management of the “consequences” of a detonation. The documents posted cover, with varying detail, the core aspects of a response – intelligence collection, technical and behavioral assessments, search, access/defeat of terrorist forces, recovery of a device, diagnostics, hazards and effects estimation, disablement and damage limitation, safe transportation of the device, and consequence management of a detonation. In addition, they also concern a variety of important aspects of a response – including security, command and control, communications, logistics, radiological measurement and containment, weather forecasting, public information, and interaction with local officials.

The documents also identify the large number of organizations involved in the exercise. There is NEST and the organizations that contributed members or capabilities – including Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and contractor EG&G. Additional organizations whose participation is evident include the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Joint Special Operations Command, Special Forces Operation Detachment – Delta (Delta Force), several military explosive ordnance disposal units (from the Army and Navy), the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Beyond detailing participants and describing different aspects of the exercise and static plans, some of the documents (the ‘Sitreps’- Document 19, Document 23, Document 32) provide a more dynamic view of the state of play at various points in the exercise. In addition, the post-exercise critiques provide different individual and institutional perspectives as to either the realism of the exercise or what the exercise revealed about strengths and weaknesses of the then current U.S. ability to respond to a nuclear terrorist threat.

Thus, Vic Berkinklau, an engineer with the Atomic Energy Commission, in addition to describing MIGHTY DERRINGER as an “Excellent, well managed exercise,” had an additional eight observations which concerned subjects such as uncertainty as to the number of NEST personnel needed in Montrev, the relationship between NEST and the Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team, and the need for more detailed analysis of the consequences of a nuclear detonation in a populated area (Document 43). L.J. Wolfson of the Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center contributed an eight-page single-spaced analysis concerning a variety of topics, including the nuclear device, assessment and intelligence, command and control and disablement. He observed (Document 47) that “there is too great a prevalence to believe what might, and probably is, very inconclusive intelligence information” and that “the entire operation was slowed and overburdened by the number of personnel involved.”

Commenting on the terrorism phase of the exercise (Document 50), William Chambers, NEST member and site controller for the Indianapolis component of the exercise, wrote that liaison between the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team, NEST, and EOD personnel was “excellent” but that “the joint procedures for withdrawing the HRT and survivors, securing the perimeter, and clearing access to the device need clarification.” An unattributed comment (Document 66) suggested that the Delta Force players did not appreciate the “gravity of dealing with a nuclear device.”

In the subsequent twenty-five years, NEST and other organizations concerned with nuclear terrorism have conducted a significant number of exercises – particularly following the attacks of September 11, 2001.⁴ However, because of its scale and scope MIGHTY DERRINGER remains one of the more notable nuclear counterterrorism exercises.

The Energy Department is keeping secret significant aspects of MIGHTY DERRINGER, but more may be learned about the exercise and the State Department’s role in it from the response to a pending request. Moreover, files on MIGHTY DERRINGER at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library will eventually be declassified and shed light on the National Security Council’s role.

(Note: A list of abbreviations used in the documents appears below.)

READ THE DOCUMENTS

Background

Document 1: Ernest Graves, Assistant General Manager for Military Application, Atomic Energy Commission, to M.E. Gates, Nevada Operations, “Responsibility for Search and Detection Operations,” November 18, 1974. Secret.

Source: Department of Energy FOIA Release

With this memo General Graves assigned Gates and the AEC’s Nevada Operations Office responsibility for search and detection operations with respect to lost and stolen nuclear weapons and special nuclear material as well as responding to nuclear bomb and radiation dispersal threats. The memo became the basis for the creation of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).
Document 2: Director of Central Intelligence, IIM 76-002, The Likelihood of the Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons by Terrorist Groups for Use Against the United States, January 8, 1976. Secret.

Source: CIA FOIA Release.

An interagency group of intelligence analysts explored the constraints on the exploitation of nuclear explosives, attitudes and behavior toward the United States, means of acquiring nuclear explosives, the ways in which nuclear devices might be used against the United States, and the capabilities of existing terrorist groups. While the authors considered it unlikely that the U.S. would be the target of a nuclear terrorist attack “in the next year or two,” they also noted that, in the longer term, “we would expect a corresponding erosion of the constraints against terrorist use of nuclear explosives.”
Document 3: Energy Research and Development Administration, “Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST),” n.d. (but 1977). Unclassified.

Source: Energy Research and Development Administration

NEST began its existence as an unacknowledged government organization, but in 1977 it was concluded that NEST would have to interact with local law enforcement and political authorities in dealing with nuclear threats, and thus its existence would need to be acknowledged. This fact sheet, distributed to the press by ERDA, was the means by which NEST’s existence was quietly announced.
Document 4: E.J. Dowdy, C.N. Henry, R.D. Hastings, S.W. France, LA-7108, Nuclear Detector Suitcase for the Nuclear Emergency Search Team, February 1978. Unclassified.

Source: Los Alamos National Laboratory

This technical paper describes one piece of equipment designed specifically for NEST personnel – a portable Neutron Detection system that could be carried in any vehicle. The paper describes the detectors, the electronics, and the operations.
Document 5: Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 6-86, The Likelihood of Nuclear Acts by Terrorist Groups, April 1986, Secret, excised copy

Source: Mandatory Review Request; release by Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.

This estimate examined several incentives and constraints with regard to nuclear terrorism – including the availability of nuclear information, material, and trained personnel; changing levels of protection for nuclear weapons and other sources of nuclear/radioactive material; and terrorist capabilities and motivations (including possible state support to nuclear terrorism). The authors concluded that there was only a “low to very low” probability of nuclear terrorism that involved detonation of an improvised nuclear device or nuclear weapon – or the dispersal of radioactive material in a way that would threaten mass casualties or produce widespread contamination.

Preparations

Document 6: William Hoover, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs, to DCI William Casey, 23 September 1985, with CIA routing memos, Confidential

Source: CREST, National Archives II

A senior Energy Department official informed Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey of the Department’s conclusion on the need for a large-scale nuclear exercise in the early 1987 fiscal year and requested the CIA’s participation.
Document 7: Robert B. Oakley, State Department Counter-Terrrorism Center, to Executive Secretary Nicholas Platt, MIGHTY DERRINGER Exercise Planning,” 4 April 1986, with memorandum to Vice Admiral John Poindexter attached, Confidential

Source: State Department FOIA release

This memorandum, from the head of the State Department’s Counter-Terrorism Center, along with that attached memo to the president’s national security adviser, described the level of State Department participation in MIGHTY DERRINGER.
Document 8: Peter Borg, State Department Counter-Terrorism Center, to Richard Kennedy et al., “Exercise MIGHTY DERRINGER,” 6 October 1986, Secret

Source: State Department FOIA release

A number of State Department officials were recipients of this secret memo, which informed them of the nature of MIGHTY DERRINGER, when it would take place, some requirements for the exercise to be realistic, and the State Department’s participation.

The Exercise

Document 9: Don McMaster, Behavioral Assessment Report/PLC, n.d. [circa 2 December 1986], Incomplete copy, Secret