Category: CRYPTOME

CONFIDENTIAL – The Real Sabu from We Are Anonymous

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the-real-sabu

Unveiled – 142 WikiLeaks Cables Citing SIMO Code for CIA

142 WikiLeaks Cables Citing SIMO Code for CIA

SIMO-CIA.zip 142 WikiLeaks Cables Citing SIMO Code for CIA May 31, 2012

Examples of WikiLeaks Cables Showing Use of Code Word SIMO for CIA or C/SIMO for Chief of Station (Thanks to @Nin_99 and @Wikileaks for link to Taz.de)

http://cablesearch.org/cable/view.php?id=05LJUBLJANA808&hl=C%2FSIMO

1. (S) On November 23, DCM, C/SIMO, and PolMiloff delivered reftel demarche and presentation to MFA Director for Policy Planning and Multilateral Policy (A/S equivalent) Stanislav Rascan, Security Department Head Stanislav Vidovic, and Security Department staffer Rina Pavlin Gnidovec. During the course of C/SIMO’s presentation, Vidovic asked whether the documents shown in the PowerPoint were from Iran, whether the test facility pictured in the diagram was a detonation site or a monitoring facility, and whether IC projections included a timeline for completion of a usable nuclear weapon. C/SIMO responded by noting the documents were from Iran, the diagram featured in the presentation depicted a monitoring facility 10 km removed from the detonation site, and that no known concrete timeline for weaponization existed. Vidovic also asked whether it is the U.S. assessment that Iran is building a nuclear weapon for defensive purposes or whether it has aggressive intentions. C/SIMO underscored the possibility that Iran could use a nuclear weapon preemptively, though it might choose to do so through another state or non-state organization.

http://cablesearch.org/cable/view.php?id=06TOKYO5624&hl=SIMO

8. (S) U.S. participants:

– Assistant Secretary Randall Fort
– INR/NEA Chief John Merrill
– Embassy SIMO Representative Constance Taube
– Political Officer Keith Jordan (control officer)
– Political Officer Evan Reade (notetaker)

http://cablesearch.org/cable/view.php?id=08BELGRADE1108&hl=SIMO

1. (S/NF) The GOT on January 12 passed to SIMO the names of US Embassy officers found on a piece of paper at one of the sites used by “Salafist” terror suspects (reftels). SIMO is reporting this information through other channels.

http://cablesearch.org/cable/view.php?id=06KUWAIT4653&hl=SIMO

2. (S/NF) SIMO noted continuing robust information exchange with Kuwait State Security (KSS) and Kuwait Military Intelligence (KMI) on a range of issues including Iraq, Iran and Hezbollah. KSS and KMI continue to expend substantial resources on force protection efforts for U.S. personnel and convoys. SIMO Chief said U.S.-provided training had increased this year through his organization. He cited the GOK need to improve capabilities across the board, particularly tradecraft and technical capabilities. DATT noted that following the initial phase of DIA-funded human intelligence training, Kuwait will likely pursue further training through private contractors.

For many more instances search for “SIMO” at Cablesearch.org (SIMO will be highlighted in yellow. Ignore its use as a proper name.)

Cryptome – Anonymous Battles Media Gorgons

Anonymous Battles Media Gorgons, May 26, 2012

By John Young “Cryptome” (New York, NY)

This review is from: We Are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World of LulzSec, Anonymous, and the Global Cyber Insurgency (Hardcover)

We Are Anonymous portrays the battle unfolding for control of the Internet era as insurgent skills and techniques for cyber and real world challenges are invented, shared and applied in a struggle with armies of governments, commerce and institutions accustomed to collusive domination.

Parmy Olson’s highly informative account based on extensive interviews, IRC chats, emails of celebrated nics of Anonymous, LulzSec and other subversive inititatives demonstrates that these well-publicized skirmishes are only a small part of a much greater conflict underway between agile, swarming, anarchic, proficient dissidents and heirarchical, sclerotic, bloated and inept authorities worldwide.

This is a amply resourced book to learn about a rapidly spreading under-culture undermining the over-culture, to enjoy its Encyclopedia Dramatica humor, to be infected by its gutsy courage, for appreciating its generous, bountiful, defiant lulz.

Above all, though, this rollicking narrative of misbehavior and disobedience can inspire opposition to the pretentious, ponderous, manipulative ideology of using the Internet to enforce knowledge consumption manufactured by gov, com, edu and org.

This volume shows that the prime force working both sides of the contest is opportunistic multi-headed media gorgon of journalism, film, documentaries, scholarship and personal data aggregating — social engineering, egging on, flattering, seducing, lying, betraying, cheating, double-crossing, promising fame, notoriety and gratification — deploying the traditional means and methods of uniquely privileged spies operating outside the rules of engagement, claiming the high ground above the battleground from their own protected overlook to broadcast beguiling events as they fabricate and churn opinion, news and knowledge.

Succumb to the allure of publicity gorgons and be packaged for sale to your enemies.

The gorgons are legion. Expect them to promote suspicion. This should make U mad.

__________

Apropos:

From a New York Times review of Buzz Bissinger’s latest book:

In a line that’s as slashing as anything in Janet Malcolm’s book “The Journalist and the Murderer,” he says: “All writers silently soak up despair for our own advantage; like dogs rolling in the guts of dead animals, the stink of others makes us giddy. We deny it but we lie in denying it.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Journalist_and_the_Murderer

The Journalist and the Murderer is an examination of the professional choices that shape a work of non-fiction, as well as a rumination on the morality that underpins the journalistic enterprise. The journalist in question is the author Joe McGinniss; the murderer is the former Special Forces Captain Jeffery MacDonald, who became the subject of McGinniss’ 1983 book Fatal Vision.

When Malcolm’s work first appeared in March 1989, as a two-part serialization in The New Yorker magazine, it caused a sensation, becoming the occasion for wide-ranging debate within the news industry.

Malcolm’s thesis, and the most widely quoted passage from The Journalist and the Murderer, is presented in the book’s opening paragraph: “Every journalist who is not too stupid or too full of himself to notice what is going on knows that what he does is morally indefensible.” She continues:

He is a kind of confidence man, preying on people’s vanity, ignorance or loneliness, gaining their trust and betraying them without remorse. Like the credulous widow who wakes up one day to find the charming young man and all her savings gone, so the consenting subject of a piece of nonfiction learns—when the article or book appears—his hard lesson. Journalists justify their treachery in various ways according to their temperaments. The more pompous talk about freedom of speech and “the public’s right to know”; the least talented talk about Art; the seemliest murmur about earning a living.”Anonymous Battles Media Gorgons, May 26, 2012

By John Young “Cryptome” (New York, NY)

This review is from: We Are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World of LulzSec, Anonymous, and the Global Cyber Insurgency (Hardcover)

We Are Anonymous portrays the battle unfolding for control of the Internet era as insurgent skills and techniques for cyber and real world challenges are invented, shared and applied in a struggle with armies of governments, commerce and institutions accustomed to collusive domination.

Parmy Olson’s highly informative account based on extensive interviews, IRC chats, emails of celebrated nics of Anonymous, LulzSec and other subversive inititatives demonstrates that these well-publicized skirmishes are only a small part of a much greater conflict underway between agile, swarming, anarchic, proficient dissidents and heirarchical, sclerotic, bloated and inept authorities worldwide.

This is a amply resourced book to learn about a rapidly spreading under-culture undermining the over-culture, to enjoy its Encyclopedia Dramatica humor, to be infected by its gutsy courage, for appreciating its generous, bountiful, defiant lulz.

Above all, though, this rollicking narrative of misbehavior and disobedience can inspire opposition to the pretentious, ponderous, manipulative ideology of using the Internet to enforce knowledge consumption manufactured by gov, com, edu and org.

This volume shows that the prime force working both sides of the contest is opportunistic multi-headed media gorgon of journalism, film, documentaries, scholarship and personal data aggregating — social engineering, egging on, flattering, seducing, lying, betraying, cheating, double-crossing, promising fame, notoriety and gratification — deploying the traditional means and methods of uniquely privileged spies operating outside the rules of engagement, claiming the high ground above the battleground from their own protected overlook to broadcast beguiling events as they fabricate and churn opinion, news and knowledge.

Succumb to the allure of publicity gorgons and be packaged for sale to your enemies.

The gorgons are legion. Expect them to promote suspicion. This should make U mad.

__________

Apropos:

From a New York Times review of Buzz Bissinger’s latest book:

In a line that’s as slashing as anything in Janet Malcolm’s book “The Journalist and the Murderer,” he says: “All writers silently soak up despair for our own advantage; like dogs rolling in the guts of dead animals, the stink of others makes us giddy. We deny it but we lie in denying it.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Journalist_and_the_Murderer

The Journalist and the Murderer is an examination of the professional choices that shape a work of non-fiction, as well as a rumination on the morality that underpins the journalistic enterprise. The journalist in question is the author Joe McGinniss; the murderer is the former Special Forces Captain Jeffery MacDonald, who became the subject of McGinniss’ 1983 book Fatal Vision.

When Malcolm’s work first appeared in March 1989, as a two-part serialization in The New Yorker magazine, it caused a sensation, becoming the occasion for wide-ranging debate within the news industry.

Malcolm’s thesis, and the most widely quoted passage from The Journalist and the Murderer, is presented in the book’s opening paragraph: “Every journalist who is not too stupid or too full of himself to notice what is going on knows that what he does is morally indefensible.” She continues:

He is a kind of confidence man, preying on people’s vanity, ignorance or loneliness, gaining their trust and betraying them without remorse. Like the credulous widow who wakes up one day to find the charming young man and all her savings gone, so the consenting subject of a piece of nonfiction learns—when the article or book appears—his hard lesson. Journalists justify their treachery in various ways according to their temperaments. The more pompous talk about freedom of speech and “the public’s right to know”; the least talented talk about Art; the seemliest murmur about earning a living.”

 

TOP-SECRET – Assange Extradition Appeal Judgement

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assange-judgement

TOP-SECRET – NSA Crypto Shaping of Computer Industry

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nsa-crypto-computers

CONFIDENTIAL – Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 12-0528

https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/daiichi-12-0528-01-hr.jpg

TOP-SECRET – Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 12-0526

28 May 2012

TEPCO video of the 26 May 2012 tour shown below:http://photo.tepco.co.jp/en/date/2012/201205-e/120526-01e.html

TEPCO high-resolution photos of the tour:

http://photo.tepco.co.jp/en/date/2012/201205-e/120528_01e.html
http://photo.tepco.co.jp/en/date/2012/201205-e/120528-02e.html

27 May 2012

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 26 May 2012

These photos are reduced to half-size of the originals. The 16 full-size originals:

http://cryptome.org/2012-info/daiichi-12-0526/daiichi-12-0526.zip (18.4MB)

TEPCO report on structural stability of Unit 4, 25 May 2012:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120525_05-e.pdf

[Image]

Cryptome Nuclear Power Plant and WMD series: http://cryptome.org/nppw-series.htm

 

 

 

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 26 May 2012
[Image]Media persons and Tokyo Electric Power Co. employees look at the company’s tsunami-crippled Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant during a press tour in Okuma town, Fukushima prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012. (Tomohiro Ohsumi, Pool)
[Image]Reactor buildings from left to right, the No. 1, the No. 2, the No. 3 and the No. 4, are seen during a press tour at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s (TEPCO) Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012. (Tomohiro Ohsumi, Pool)
[Image]Members of the media and Tokyo Electric Power Co. employees walk in front of the No. 4 reactor building, rear, crippled by the March 11 earthquake and tsunami, at the utility company’s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012. (Tomohiro Ohsumi, Pool)
[Image]The damaged No. 4 reactor building stands at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012. Japanese Environment and Nuclear Minister Goshi Hosono, accompanied by the media, has visited the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant to inspect a reactor building and its spent fuel pool at the center of safety concerns. (Tomohiro Ohsumi, Pool)
[Image]Goshi Hosono, Japan’s environment and nuclear minister, third from left, wearing a red helmet, along with members of the media, walks on the No. 4 reactor building at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s (TEPCO) Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012. Japan’s environment and nuclear minister Hosono visited the tsunami-crippled nuclear power plant Saturday to inspect a spent fuel pool at the center of safety concerns. (Tomohiro Ohsumi, Pool)
[Image]Goshi Hosono, Japan’s environment and nuclear minister, inspects the No. 4 reactor building at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012. The visit by Hosono, apparently aimed at demonstrating the safety of the facility, came amid renewed concerns about conditions at the plant’s No. 4 reactor after its operator reported a bulging of the building’s wall. (Toshiaki Shimizu, Japan Pool) [Yellow reactor containment dome at center background.]
[Image]Workers walk in front of the No. 4 reactor building at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s tsunami-crippled Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma town, Fukushima prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012. (Tomohiro Ohsumi, Pool)
[Image]An inside view of the damaged No. 4 reactor building is seen at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s tsunami-crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012. (Toshiaki Shimizu, Japan Pool)
[Image]The inside of the tsunami-crippled No. 4 reactor building is seen during a press tour at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s (TEPCO) Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012.(Toshiaki Shimizu, Japan Pool)
[Image]Japan’s Environment and Nuclear Minister Goshi Hosono, second from left, inspects a pool containing spent fuel rods inside the No. 4 reactor building at Tokyo Electric Power Co. ‘s tsunami-crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012. The pool, located at the top of the building above the reactor, remains one of the plant’s biggest risks due to its vulnerability to earthquakes. (Toshiaki Shimizu, Japan Pool)
[Image]A pool for spent fuel rods is seen inside the No. 4 reactor building of Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s tsunami-crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012. The pool, located at the top of the building above the reactor, remains one of the plant’s biggest risks due to its vulnerability to earthquakes. (Toshiaki Shimizu, Japan Pool)
[Image]The No. 3 reactor building is seen at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s (TEPCO) Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012. Japan’s environment and nuclear minister, accompanied by the media, visited the tsunami-crippled nuclear power plant Saturday to inspect a spent fuel pool at the center of safety concerns. (Tomohiro Ohsumi, Pool)
[Image]The No. 1, left, and the No. 2, reactor buildings are seen during a press tour at the tsunami-crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant of Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012. (Tomohiro Ohsumi, Pool)
[Image]Workers carry out radiation screening on a bus for a media tour at Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) ‘s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima prefecture, Japan, on Saturday, May 26, 2012. Japan’s environment and nuclear minister, accompanied by the media, visited the tsunami-crippled nuclear power plant Saturday to inspect a spent fuel pool at the center of safety concerns. (Tomohiro Ohsumi, Pool)
[Image]A worker carries out radiation screening on a bus for a media tour at Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) ‘s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima prefecture, Japan, on Saturday, May 26, 2012. (Tomohiro Ohsumi, Pool)
[Image]A worker walks through the building used as crisis management headquarters at the tsunami-crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant of Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s (TEPCO) in Okuma, Fukushima prefecture, Japan, Saturday, May 26, 2012. (Tomohiro Ohsumi, Pool)

TOP-SECRET – We Are Anonymous Index of Informants

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we-are-anon-index

SECRET – CIA: Guerilla Warfare Psychological Operations

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cia-guerilla-psyops

UNVEILED – Hillary Clinton Addresses Special Forces Gala

Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
Tampa, Florida
May 23, 2012

ADM MCRAVEN: Thank you, Steve. Well, good evening, everyone, and welcome to tonight’s gala dinner. Before I begin, please join me in a round of applause for the staff of the Tampa Convention Center and the action officers from USSOCOM who worked so very hard to make this event a great success. (Applause.)

To our international guests, our local, state, and national leaders, our guests from industry, and the National Defense Industrial Association, thank you for making this event a priority in your busy schedule, and for your continued support to Special Operations.

Now I have the great privilege of introducing our guest speaker, a woman who has spent virtually her entire life in the service of our country and in the service of the greater international community. She was the first lady of the state of Arkansas, the first lady of the United States, a U.S. senator from the great state of New York, and since 2009, she has held the position as the U.S. Secretary of State.

In a Time Magazine article last month, she was named one of the top 100 most influential people in the world. In that Time article, the former Secretary of Defense, Bob Gates, said of her, and I quote, “In a world that is ever more complex, turbulent, and dangerous, Secretary Clinton has made a singular contribution to strengthening this country’s relationships with allies, partners, and friends, rallying other countries to join us in dealing with challenges to the global order from Libya to Iran to the South China Sea, and reaching out to the people in scores continue – in scores of countries to demonstrate that America cares about them.”

No Secretary in recent memory has had to deal with more international challenges than the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Arab Spring, to the always difficult and challenging North Korea and Iran. In spite of these challenges, she has made incredible strides in safeguarding democratic reforms in Burma, advancing women’s rights around the globe, and reshaping the State Department to align the incredible power of our diplomats, the civilian power, with our already strong military power.

Secretary Clinton is beloved by the men and women in the U.S. military. She is our type of lady – a woman of uncompromising integrity who won’t back down from a good fight, particularly when it comes to matters of principle, a leader who is passionate about the welfare of the world’s less privileged, the disenfranchised, and the downtrodden, and a Secretary who deeply cares for her people and who is an incredibly strong supporter of our men and women in uniform.

Over the last few years, I have had several opportunities to work with Secretary Clinton on some of the United States’s most sensitive military missions. In each case, she listened intently to my advice. In each case, she was instrumental in the final decisions. And in each and every case, she never, ever wavered from her commitment to the American people. She is, without a doubt, one of the finest public servants ever to serve this great nation.

Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming the United States Secretary of State, The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton. (Applause.)

SECRETARY CLINTON: Good evening. Good evening. It is a great honor for me to be here with you this evening. I want to thank Admiral McRaven for that introduction, but far more than that, for his remarkable service to our country, from leading an underwater demolition SEAL platoon to heading the Joint Special Operations Command. He’s doing a terrific job as the ninth commander of the United States Special Operations Command. (Applause.) Many of you know, as Admiral McRaven knows, that it takes real guts to run a mission deep into hostile territory, full of potential dangers. And of course, I’m talking about the White House Correspondents’ Dinner. (Laughter.)

I am pleased to be here with so many representatives to this conference from 90 countries around the world. Your participation is a testament to the important partnerships, and I am grateful that you are here. Because we face common challenges, we face common threats, and they cannot be contained by borders and boundaries.

You know that extremist networks squeezed in one country migrate to others. Terrorist propaganda from a cell in Yemen can incite attacks as far away as Detroit or Delhi. A flu in Macao can become an epidemic in Miami. Technology and globalization have made our countries and our communities interdependent and interconnected. And today’s threats have become so complex, fast-moving, and cross-cutting that no one nation could ever hope to solve them alone.

From the first days of this Administration, we have worked to craft a new approach to our national security that reflects this changing landscape, starting with better integrating the three Ds of our foreign policy and national security: diplomacy, development, and defense. And we call it smart power.

And I have been privileged to work with two secretaries of Defense, Bob Gates and Leon Panetta, and two chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen and Marty Dempsey, who understood and valued the role of diplomacy and development, who saw that we need to work to try to prevent conflict, help rebuild shattered societies, and lighten the load on our military.

For my part, first as a senator serving on the Armed Services Committee and now as Secretary of State, I have seen and admired the extraordinary service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform. So we have made it a priority to have our soldiers, diplomats, and development experts work hand-in-hand across the globe. And we are getting better at coordinating budgets and bureaucracies in Washington as well.

To my mind, Special Operations Forces exemplify the ethic of smart power – fast and flexible, constantly adapting, learning new languages and cultures, dedicated to forming partnerships where we can work together. And we believe that we should work together wherever we can, and go it alone when we must. This model is delivering results.

Admiral McRaven talks about two mutually reinforcing strategies for Special Operations: the direct and the indirect. Well, we all know about the direct approach. Just ask the al-Qaida leaders who have been removed from the battlefield.

But not enough attention is paid to the quiet, persistent work Special Operations Forces are doing every single day along with many of you to build our joint capacity. You are forging relationships in key communities, and not just with other militaries, but also with civil society. You are responding to natural disasters and alleviating humanitarian suffering.

Now, some might ask what does all this have to do with your core mission of war fighting? Well, we’ve learned – and it’s been a hard lesson in the last decade – we’ve learned that to defeat a terror network, we need to attack its finances, recruitment, and safe havens. We also need to take on its ideology and diminish its appeal, particularly to young people. And we need effective international partners in both government and civil society who can extend this effort to all the places where terrorists hide and plot their attacks.

This is part of the smart power approach to our long fight against terrorism. And so we need Special Operations Forces who are as comfortable drinking tea with tribal leaders as raiding a terrorist compound. We also need diplomats and development experts who understand modern warfare and are up to the job of being your partners.

One of our senior Foreign Service officers, Karen Williams, is serving here in Tampa on Admiral McRaven’s staff. And under an agreement finalized this year, we are nearly doubling the number of military and Foreign Service officers who will be exchanged between the Departments of State and Defense. (Applause.) We know we need to better understand each other, and we know that through that better understanding there is even more we can do together.

When I served on the Senate Armed Services Committee, I was impressed by the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Reviews, called the QDR, which guided plans and priorities every four years. So when I became Secretary of State, I launched the first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, and we call it the QDDR. Through it, we are overhauling the State Department and USAID to become more operational, more strategic in our use of resources and personnel, more expeditionary, and more focused on transnational threats.

Let me highlight a few examples. As part of the QDDR, we created a new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations that is working to put into practice lessons learned over the past decade and institutionalize a civilian surge capacity to deal with crises and hotspots.

Experts from this new bureau are working closely with Special Operations Forces around the world. I’ll give you, though, just this one example from Central Africa, where we are working together to help our African partners pursue Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army. In fact, they were on the ground a few months before our troops arrived, building relationships in local communities. And because of their work, village chiefs and other leaders are actively encouraging defections from the Lord’s Resistance Army. Just a few weeks ago, our civilians and troops together helped one community set up its own radio station that is now broadcasting “come home” messages to the fighters. Our diplomats also saw that the UN staff in the region could be useful partners. So they worked through our team in Washington and New York to obtain new authorities for the UN officials on the ground and then link them up directly with our Special Operations Forces to share expertise and improve coordination. Now, this mission isn’t finished yet, but you can begin to see the potential when soldiers and diplomats live in the same camps and eat the same MREs. That is smart power in action.

Here’s another example. We know we need to do a better job contesting the online space, media websites and forums where al-Qaida and its affiliates spread their propaganda and recruit followers. So at the State Department, we’ve launched a new interagency Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. It’s housed at the State Department, but it draws on experts from the intelligence community and the Defense Department, including Special Operations Forces.

The nerve center in Washington is linking up to military and civilian teams around the world and serving as a force multiplier for our embassies’ communications efforts. Together, we are working to pre-empt, discredit, and outmaneuver extremist propagandists. A digital outreach team of tech savvy specialists – fluent in Urdu, Arabic, Somali – is already patrolling the web and using social media and other tools to expose the inherent contradictions in al-Qaida’s propaganda and also bring to light the abuses committed by al-Qaida, particularly the continuing brutal attacks on Muslim civilians.

For example, a couple of weeks ago, al-Qaida’s affiliate in Yemen began an advertising campaign on key tribal web sites bragging about killing Americans and trying to recruit new supporters. Within 48 hours, our team plastered the same sites with altered versions of the ads that showed the toll al-Qaida attacks have taken on the Yemeni people. And we can tell that our efforts are starting to have an impact, because we monitor the extremists venting their frustration and asking their supporters not to believe everything they read on the Internet. (Applause.)

Now, this kind of ideological battle is slow and incremental, but I think it’s critical to our efforts, because what sustains al-Qaida and its terrorist affiliates is the steady flow of new recruits. They replace the terrorists you kill or capture so that they can plan new attacks. This is not about winning a popularity contest, but it is a simple fact that achieving our objectives is easier with more friends and fewer enemies. And I believe passionately that the truth is our friend. Exposing the lies and evil that rests at the heart of the terrorist narrative is absolutely to our advantage.

Now, we’ve also changed the way we do business on the civilian side to be better partners to you in the military. As part of our reorganization, we’ve created a full Counterterrorism Bureau at the State Department that is spearheading a diplomatic campaign around the world to increase local capacity of governments and to deny terrorists the space and financing they need to plan and carry out attacks.

This fits right in with the purpose of this conference: deepening international cooperation against terrorism and other shared challenges. As the threat from al-Qaida becomes more diffuse and distributed, shifting from the core to the affiliates, it is even more important to forge close ties with the governments and communities on the front lines and to help build up their counterterrorism capacity. After all, they often are better positioned than we are to provide services to their people, disrupt plots, and prosecute extremists, and they certainly often bear the brunt of terrorist attacks. So we need to build an international counterterrorism network that is as nimble and adaptive as our adversaries’. Admiral McRaven helped establish the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Centre, so I know he understands how important this is.

Each year, the State Department trains nearly 7,000 police, prosecutors, and counterterrorism officials from more than 60 countries, including frontline states like Yemen and Pakistan. We’re expanding our work with civil society organizations in specific terrorist hotspots – particular villages, prisons, and schools – to try to disrupt the process of radicalization by creating jobs, promoting religious tolerance, amplifying the voices of the victims of terrorism.

This whole effort goes hand-in-glove with the work of Special Operations Forces to train elite troops in places like the Philippines, Colombia, and Afghanistan under the Army Special Forces motto: By, with, and through. You’re doing this in one form or another in more than 100 countries around the world. And this work gives you a chance to develop a deeper understanding of local culture and customs, to learn the human domain as well as the physical terrain.

I’m impressed by the work of your Cultural Support Teams, highly-trained female Special Operations Forces who engage with local populations in sensitive areas like Afghanistan. This is part of our National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security that was developed jointly by the Departments of State, Defense, and others to capitalize on the contributions women everywhere can make to resolving conflicts and improving security. Around the world today, women are refusing to sit on the sidelines while extremism undermines their communities, steals their sons, kills their husbands, and destroys family after family. (Applause.) They’re joining police forces in Afghanistan. They’re writing newspaper articles in Yemen. They’re forming organizations such as Sisters Against Violent Extremism that has now spread to 17 countries. And we are committed to working with these women and doing everything we can to support their efforts as well.

We have to keep our international cooperation going and growing at every level. Next week I’ll be heading to Europe, and I’ll end up in Istanbul for the second meeting of the new Global Counterterrorism Forum, which we helped launch last year. Turkey and the United States serve as the founding co-chairs, and we’ve been joined by nearly 30 other nations. Together, we’re working to identify threats and weaknesses like porous borders, unchecked propaganda, and then devise solutions and mobilize resources. For example, the UAE has agreed to host a new center to develop best practices for countering extremism and radicalization.

Now, some of you in this room have come great distances to be here because you understand that we need a global effort to defeat a global terrorist network. And I thank you for that recognition and for your commitment.

I want to say just a final word about American Special Forces and to thank the admiral and every member of the United States Special Operations Forces who are here today – Army Rangers and Special Forces soldiers, Navy SEALs and Marine special operators, Air Force commandos, every one of you. So much of what you do, both the tremendous successes and the terrible sacrifices, will never be known by the citizens we serve. But I know what you do, and so do others who marvel and appreciate what it means for you to serve.

We’ve just passed the one-year anniversary of the raid that killed Usama bin Ladin. (Applause.) And I well remember those many hours in the Situation Room, the small group that was part of the planning and decision-making process with Admiral McRaven sitting there at the table with us. And I certainly remember that day. We were following every twist and turn of that mission. It was a day of stress and emotion, concern and commitment. I couldn’t help but think of all the people that I represented as a senator from New York serving on 9/11 and how much they and all of us deserved justice for our friends and our loved ones. I was thinking about America and how important it was to protect our country from another attack. But mostly, I was thinking of the men in the helicopters, praying for their safety as they risked their lives on that moonless Pakistani night.

And one thing that I am always proud of and that I hope is conveyed to our visitors and partners around the world: When you meet our special operators or when you meet members of our military or our diplomats and development experts, you will see every shade of skin color, every texture of hair, every color of eye. And if you spend a little time talking and getting to know that man or woman, you will find different parentage, different ethnicity, different religions, because we are Americans. And as Americans, we have a special opportunity and obligation in this interdependent, interconnected world to stand up for the universal rights and dignity of every person; to protect every man, woman, and child from the kind of senseless violence that terrorism inflicts; and also, frankly, to model.

In many places where we go, I as a Secretary of State or our special forces as members of our military, we see ancient disputes between tribes, ethnicities, religions, sex of the same religion, men and women. Just about every possible category is used all too often to separate people instead of finding common ground. If we have learned nothing in the last decade, we should certainly have learned that the terrorists are equal opportunity killers. They want to inflict terror on everyone who does not see the world from their particular narrow, outdated, dead-end worldview.

When you are pursuing a mission in partnership or on behalf of your own country, let us remember that we are on the right side of history. We are on the side of right. Your service is making the world safer for people to be who they are, to live their lives in peace and harmony. That is going to be the challenge of the 21st century. Will we once and for all recognize our common humanity and stand together against the forces of darkness or not? I’m betting we will. And I think it’s a pretty good bet, knowing that our Special Operations Forces and their partners are at the point of that spear.

Thank you for all that you do, not only to keep us safe and protect our ways of life but to demonstrate unequivocally that the world will not tolerate being undermined by those who refuse to recognize that we are truly one world of humanity that deserves the opportunity to pursue our rights and opportunities for a better life. I am very proud to be here to thank you. Thank you for keeping our nation safe and strong. Thank you for working to keep other nations safe and strong. Thank you for helping us build the world that our children deserve.

Thank you all very much. (Applause.)

MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, the commander will now present our guest of honor with a token of our appreciation.

ADM MCRAVEN: Madam Secretary, a small token of our appreciation for joining us here tonight. This is, as you quickly noted, our version of Excalibur, the sword and the stone. And of course, as legend has it, only the wisest and the bravest can pull the sword from the stone. My guess is it will come out easily in your hand. So thank you very much, ma’am, for joining us here tonight. Thank you very much.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you so much, Admiral. (Applause.)


	


	



			
				


			

			
SECRET – UBL Abbottabad Docs: Security, Yemen, Gadahn
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


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CONFIDENTIAL – Measuring the Human Factor of Cyber Security
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


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Cryptome –  Person Search in Large-Area Video Spying
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


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Cryptome unveils Drone Crew Photos
		
	
	

		














Drone Crew Photos








CIA Drone Control Facilities, Langley, VA (No interior photos have been published of the “temporary quonset huts” set up to assassinate targets. Senior CIA officials can observe attacks in real time on the 7th Floor suite, at times inviting special guests.)

http://cryptome.org/eyeball/cia-quonset/cia-quonset.htm[Image]		




Creech Air Force Base, NV, Drone Control Training[Image][Image]




Beale Air Force Base, CA, Drone and U2 Training[Image]




[Image]Israeli soldiers control the Skylark drone during a drill on January 16, 2012 near Bat Shlomo, Israel. The Skylark can carry a camera payload of up to 1kg, has an operational ceiling of 15,000ft and allows users to monitor any designated point within a 15km radius. The Skylark unit consists of a ground control element and three drones, which provide battalion-level commanders with real-time information. Getty




[Image]A technician supporting U.S. Navy SEAL Team 18 works on a UAV, an unmanned aerial vehicle, before a demonstration of combat skills at the National Navy UDT-SEAL Museum in Fort Pierce, Florida November 11, 2011. The demonstration for the public is part of a Veteran’s Day celebration and the annual reunion at the Museum. The drone is equipped with cameras for surveillance. Reuters


























[Image][Image]Adam Stock, the lead pilot for 29 Palms Unmanned Aerial Systems, out of Twentynine Palms, California, pilots a ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicle at Fort Hunter Liggett, Calif., May 19, 2011, in support of Global Medic 2011 and Warrior 91 11-01. Global Medic is a joint field training exercise for theater aeromedical evacuation system and ground medical components designed to replicate all aspects of combat medical service support. Warrior 91 11-01 was a tactical exercise in which U.S. Service members responded to simulated enemy attacks as part of Global Medic 2011 . (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Donald R. Allen/Released). Date Shot: 5/19/2011




[Image]U.S. Soldiers with the 10th Special Forces Group fly an RQ-7B Shadow unmanned aerial vehicle at Hurlburt Field, Fla., from inside their ground control station March 7, 2011, during Emerald Warrior 2011. Emerald Warrior is an annual two-week joint/combined tactical exercise sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command designed to leverage lessons learned from operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom to provide trained and ready forces to combatant commanders. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Andy M. Kin/Released). Date Shot: 3/7/2011




[Image]U.S. Airmen with the 380th Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Squadron prepare an RQ-4A Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle aircraft for takeoff at an undisclosed location in Southwest Asia Dec. 2, 2010. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Eric Harris/Released). Date Shot: 12/2/2010




[Image]U.S. Airmen with the 380th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron prepare an RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle for its first launch from an undisclosed base in Southwest Asia Nov. 27, 2010. The RQ-4 was designed for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Eric Harris/Released). Date Shot: 11/27/2010




[Image]U.S. Marine Corps unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) mechanics assigned to Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU) 3 work on an RQ-7B Shadow UAV during Enhanced Mojave Viper at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif., Aug. 3, 2010. Enhanced Mojave Viper is a combined exercise that prepares Marines for deployments. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Michael C. Nerl/Released). Date Shot: 8/3/2010




[Image]Civilian employees with Fleet Readiness Center East perform maintenance and corrosion assessments on two MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned aerial vehicles at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, N.C., May 14, 2010. (U.S. Navy photo by David R. Hooks/Released). Date Shot: 5/14/2010




[Image]U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jennifer Oberg, background, a communications maintenance instructor, and Senior Airman Raquel Martinez, foreground, check a ground control station during training at March Air Reserve Base, Calif., April 19, 2010. Both are assigned to the 163rd Maintenance Group at March. The California Air National Guard unit is primarily involved in Predator unmanned aerial vehicle missions. (U.S. Air Force photo by Val Gempis/Released). Date Shot: 4/19/2010




[Image]U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Ron Zechman, a predator sensor operator, and Maj. Jeff Bright, a predator pilot and detachment commander of the 432nd Wing out of Creech Air Force Base, Nev., go over pre-flight check lists for an RQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicle at Aeropuerto Rafael Hernandez outside Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, Jan. 28, 2010. Airmen from Creech AFB are providing 24-hour-a-day full-motion video in real time to international relief workers on the ground in order to speed humanitarian aid to remote and cut-off areas of the Haiti following the earthquake Jan. 12, 2010. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. James Harper/Released). Date Shot: 1/21/2010







































[Image]U.S. Air Force Maj. Jeff Bright, a predator pilot from the 432nd Wing out of Creech Air Force Base, Nev., goes over a pre-flight check list for an RQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicle at Aeropuerto Rafael Hernandez outside Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, Jan. 28, 2010. Airmen from Creech AFB are providing 24-hour-a-day full-motion video in real time to international relief workers on the ground in order to speed humanitarian aid to remote and cut-off areas of the Haiti following the earthquake Jan. 12, 2010. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. James Harper/Released). Date Shot: 1/21/2010




[Image]Predator pilot Jonathon Johnson, an air interdiction agent for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, enters the ground control station for the Predator B unmanned aerial systems (UAS) April 3, 2009, at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection UAS operations center at Grand Forks Air Force Base, N.D. The Predator is a new high-tech tool being used to help in flood fight planning for the first time in North Dakota. It has been recording flood imagery, which is being used for positioning of National Guard flood fighting personnel and resources. (DoD photo by Senior Master Sgt. David H. Lipp, U.S. Air Force/Released). Date Shot: 4/3/2009




[Image]Predator pilot Jonathon Johnson, left, an air interdiction agent for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, pilots a Predator aircraft in the ground control station for the Predator B unmanned aerial systems (UAS) April 3, 2009, at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection UAS operations center at Grand Forks Air Force Base, N.D., as UAS instructor pilot Bob Concannon operates the sensor controls. The Predator is a new high-tech tool being used to help in flood fight planning for the first time in North Dakota. It has been recording flood imagery, which is being used for positioning of National Guard flood fighting personnel and resources. (DoD photo by Senior Master Sgt. David H. Lipp, U.S. Air Force/Released). Date Shot: 4/3/2009




[Image]Predator pilot and instructor Michael Nelson, of the University of North Dakota, pilots a Predator in the ground control station for the Predator B unmanned aerial systems (UAS) April 3, 2009, at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection UAS operations center at Grand Forks Air Force Base, N.D. The Predator is a new high-tech tool being used to help in flood fight planning for the first time in North Dakota. It has been recording flood imagery, which is being used for positioning of National Guard flood fighting personnel and resources. (DoD photo by Senior Master Sgt. David H. Lipp, U.S. Air Force/Released). Date Shot: 4/3/2009




[Image]U.S. Army Pfc. Shawn Miller, left, and Sgt. 1st Class Wayne Davidson, both with Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, prepare equipment needed to operate a Raven unmanned aerial vehicle system at Joint Security Station Loyalty in eastern Baghdad, Iraq, March 25, 2009. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. James Selesnick/Released). Date Shot: 3/25/2009




[Image]U.S. Army Pfc. Shawn Miller, from Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, processes information gathered from a Raven unmanned aerial vehicle system, at Joint Security Station Loyalty, in eastern Baghdad, Iraq, March 25, 2009. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. James Selesnick/Released). Date Shot: 3/25/2009




[Image]U.S. Air Force Maj. John Chesser operates the controls of an MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle cockpit during a demonstration at Joint Base Balad, Iraq, on Aug. 1, 2008. The Reaper is designed as a hunter-killer, capable of loitering over targets for long periods of time and delivering laser-guided ordnance. Chesser is a Reaper pilot with the 46th Expeditionary Reconnaissance and Attack Squadron. DoD photo by Staff Sgt. Don Branum, U.S. Air Force. (Released). Date Shot: 8/1/2008




[Image]U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Justin Michaels, of 3rd Special Operations Command, Cannon Air Force Base, N.M., guides a ground control station (GCS) as other Airmen from his unit lower the station into place July 21, 2008. The GCS will serve as a cockpit for Predator/Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class James R. Bell/Released). Date Shot: 7/21/2008




[Image]U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Robert Moore, right, describes his every action to Airman 1st Class Carrie Smith during the setup of a Vehicle Test Controller for a RQ-1 Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle June 16, 2008, at Beale Air Force Base, Calif. They are with the 9th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron. (U.S. Air Force photo by Lance Cheung/Released). Date Shot: 6/16/2008




[Image]U.S. Air Force Airman 1st Class Evan Barnhart assists Senior Airman Stephen Simeone as she controls an unmanned aerial vehicle at Patrol Base Meade, Iraq, Jan. 21, 2008, while providing armed reconnaissance over watch in Southern Arab Jabour, Iraq. Simeone and Barnhart are both joint terminal attack controllers from Fort Stewart, Ga., and are deployed with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Andy Dunaway) (Released). Date Shot: 1/21/2008




[Image]Royal Air Force Maj. Kevin Gambold monitors and pilots an MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicle at Ali Air Base, Iraq, Jan. 10, 2008. Gambold is the commander the 361st Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron and deployed from the 15th Reconnaissance Squadron, Creech Air Force Base, Nev., through a military personnel exchange program. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Jonathan Snyder) (Released). Date Shot: 1/10/2008
































[Image]U.S. Air Force Senior Airman Logan Abrams, right, a Joint Tactical Air Control Party journeyman (JTAC in training), talks with his Army counterparts who are operating a Shadow unmanned aerial vehicle from Forward Operating Base Kalsu, Iraq, June 25, 2007. The Army Shadow is being used to provide real time video surveillance of a suspected explosives laden roadway south of Baghdad. Abrams takes information from the shadow back to his JTAC, Tech. Sgt. Mike Cmelik, who is controlling a B-1 Lancer aircraft to drop 13,500 pounds of ordinance on the roadway. This bombing mission severed a suspected main supply route used by Iraqi insurgents to bring accelerants from the south into the Baghdad area. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Jim Varhegyi/Released). Date Shot: 6/25/2007




[Image]FORWARD OPERATING BASE KALSU, Iraq — U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Andrea Patterson, one of three battlefield weatherman assigned to forward operating base (FOB) Kalsu south of Baghdad, Iraq, provides a weather brief to U.S. Army soldiers controlling Shadow Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for the U.S. Army’s 2nd Battalion, 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Monday, June 25, 2007. Sergeant Patterson, and her fellow Air Force weather forecasters, provide 24 hour a day weather updates to the various U. S. Army 3rd Infantry Division’s operations occurring in the Triangle of Death area. The instantaneous weather information the battlefield weathermen are able to provide are critical to the success, and to the safety of the 3rd ID’s ground and aviation operations. Though Sergeant Patterson is attached to the 3rd ID she officially falls under the recently formed 3rd Expeditionary Weather Squadron headquartered on Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq. She is deployed from Detachment 6, 7th Weather Squadron, Wiesbaden, Germany. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Jim Varhegyi)(released). Date Shot: 6/25/2007




[Image]A representative with the Insitu, Inc., on board the Military Sealift Command afloat prepositioning ship USNS Stockham (T-AK 3017), operates a Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicle over the Solomon Islands April 17, 2007. The scan eagle is assessing earthquake and tsunami damage that struck the island. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Second Class Andrew Meyers/Released). Date Shot: 4/17/2007




[Image]U.S. Air Force Capt. Michael Edmonston, left, and Airman 1st Class Stephen Sadler, both of the 46th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron, work together to remotely operate a Predator MQ-1 unmanned aerial vehicle at Balad Air Base, Iraq, Nov. 5, 2006. The Predators are used to provide surveillance and are equipped with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Chad Kellum) (Released). Date Shot: 11/5/2006




[Image]Peter Bale, Director of Business Development, readies an Aerosonde Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) for a test flight at Naval Air Station Key West, Fla., on Sept. 7, 2006. The remote-piloted UAV is designed to gather critical, near surface data on active hurricanes. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Timothy Cox) (Released). Date Shot: 9/7/2006




[Image]Kris Kokkely, an advanced tactical systems engineer for Boeing, watches his computer screen as data and video streams back from a ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) as it flies over Yodaville training range on Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz., June 19, 2006, for Desert Talon. ScanEagle is a UAV system that is designed to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data, battle damage assessment and communications relay. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Michael P. Snody) (Released). Date Shot: 7/19/2006




[Image]U.S. Air Force Capt. Michael J. Conte, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) pilot assigned to the 46th Expeditionary Strike and Reconnaissance Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., prepares for the nights UAV mission from Balad Air Base, Iraq, July 8, 2006. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Jonathan F. Doti/Released). Date Shot: 7/8/2006




[Image]On 21 June 2006, Maj Toby Buchan, from Spencertown, NY, of Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 (VMU-2) gives the clearance to fly to a Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)before it departs on a mission in Al Taqaddum, Iraq. VMU-2 is deployed with IMEF (FWD) in support of in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Al Anbar Province of Iraq (MNF-W) to develop the Iraqi security force, facilitate the development of official rule of law through democratic government, and continue the development of a market based economy centered on Iraqi reconstruction. .Official USMC Photo by Sergeant Jennifer L. Jones.060621-M-AK780-023.(RELEASED). Date Shot: 6/21/2006




[Image]Pfc. Jonathan Machado, from HHB 3rd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, operates a remote control for the Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) from a safe location. The Raven is used to support land warfare operations and surveillance of the area. The 101st Airborne Division is currently deployed in the Tikrit area in support of the operation. FOB REMAGEN (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Teddy Wade) (Released). Date Shot: 4/21/2006




[Image]John T. Nicholson, Boeing Phantom Works Field Service Representative and Stewart Errico the Boeing ScanEagle, an unmanned aerial vehicle, secures the aircraft so it can be stored for the evening at Asad, Iraq, July 13, 2005. These men are civilian contractors that work with the U.S. Marines Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron Two. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dustin S. Schaefer/Released). Date Shot: 7/12/2005




[Image]Todd Alexander, a support engineer from the Insitu Group, Boeing Corporation, maneuvers a Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle from a remote location during an urban warfare exercise at Indian Springs Auxiliary Air Field, Nev., on May 4, 2005. Scan Eagle flies at low altitudes while taking video surveillance and it feeds images directly to security forces personnel in the field. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Robert W. Valenca) (Released). Date Shot: 5/4/2005




[Image]U.S. Air Force Capt. Andy Beitz (left), a student pilot, and Airman 1st Class Stephanie Barroso, a student sensor operator, practice operating an MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) during training inside the Ground Control Station Cell at Indian Springs Auxiliary Field, Nev., on April 26, 2005. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Kevin J. Gruenwald) (Released). Date Shot: 4/26/2005




[Image]U.S. Air Force 1st Lt. Adam Twitchell, an Intelligence Officer and Operations Cell Mission Coordinator from the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, Indian Springs Auxiliary Field, Nev., reviews local training plans during a MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) mission over Nevada on April 2, 2005. (U.S. Air Force Photo by Tech. Sgt. Kevin J. Gruenwald) (Released). Date Shot: 4/2/2005




[Image]A U.S. Contractor (left), a U.S. Marine Corps 1st Lt. (second from left), a U.S. Marine Corps 1st Sgt. (second from right), and an U.S. Air Force Col. (right) stand around a Unmanned Aerial Vehicle that is on display at Camp Fallujah, Al Anbar Province, Iraq, on Dec. 4, 2004, that will be shown to U.S. Marine Corps Gen. James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Maj. Alford L. McMichael, Senior Non-Commissioned Officer, Allied Command Operations, who are visiting with U.S. military service members who all participated in Operation Al Fajr, which was conducted during Operation Iraqi Freedom. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Gunnery Sgt. Robert Blankenship) (Released). Date Shot: 12/4/2004




[Image]US Air Force (USAF) 46th Expeditionary Aerial Reconnaissance Squadron (EARS) Predator pilots, Captain (CPT) John “Disco” Songer and Airman 1st Class (A1C) Stephanie L. “Princess” Schulte operate individual Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) using remote controls at Balad Air Base (AB), Iraq (IRQ), in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Photographer’s Name: SSGT COHEN A. YOUNG, USAF. Date Shot: 7/2/2004[Image]


US Air Force (USAF) 46th Expeditionary Aerial Reconnaissance Squadron (EARS) Predator pilot, Captain (CPT) John “Disco” Songer operates an individual Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) using a remote control system at Balad Air Base (AB), Iraq (IRQ), in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Photographer’s Name: SSGT COHEN A. YOUNG, USAF. Date Shot: 7/2/2004






































[Image]US Air Force (USAF) maintenance personnel assigned to the 12th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron (ERS), check the maintenance log for a RQ-4A Global Hawk high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial reconnaissance system while preparing for a mission at a forward location, while deployed in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Pictured left-to-right, USAF (Major) Greg Hataway, Staff Sergeant (SSGT) Kelvin Rasor, and MAJ John D’ortona. Photographer’s Name: SSGT Reynaldo Ramon, USAF. Date Shot: 6/30/2002




[Image]Chuck Gardner, systems engineer(front), and Patrick Didier, senior crew technician, both from Northrop Grumman Ryan Aeronautical Center, check the systems on a Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle after its arrival at Langley Air Force Base, Va., June 21, 2001. The aircraft flew non-stop from Edwards Air Force, California in support of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) Seminar taking place at Langley. (Photo by TSgt Jack Braden) (Released). Date Shot: 6/21/2001




[Image]Sitting at the controls, Maj. George Barth, a pilot from the 31st Test and Evaluation Squadron, Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., flies the Global Hawk May 14, 2001, from inside the Mission Control Element, at Edinburgh Air Force Base, Australia, in support of Exercise Tandem Thrust. The Global Hawk is a jet powered Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) designed as a Reconnaissance and Surveillance vehicle with a wing span equal to a Boeing 737, flying at altitudes of up to 65,000 feet for more than 24 hours and capable of searching an area of more than 40,000 square miles. The Global Hawk is deployed to Australia from April to June 2001, flying more than a dozen missions. These missions will include sorties in support of Tandem Thrust as well as maritime, littoral, land surveillance and stand off reconnaissance capabilities. The Global Hawk completed its first successful maiden flight in February 1998. Currently there are five U.S. Air Force Global Hawks which have logged over 60 flights and have clocked more than 600 hours, with it’s biggest challenge to date the non-stop Trans-Pacific flight from Edwards to Edinburgh. Tandem Thrust 2001 is a combined U.S., Australian and Canadian military training exercise. This biannual exercise is being held in the vicinity of Shoalwater Bay training area, Queensland, More than 27,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines are participating, with Canadian units taking part as opposing forces. The purpose of Exercise Tandem Thrust is to train for crisis action planningand execution of contingency response operations. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Jeremy T. Lock) (Released). Date Shot: 5/14/2001




[Image]Portrait of Systems Test Engineer Chuck Gardner, (left), and Avionics Technician Brent Bremer, from Northrop Grumman Edwards Air Force Base, California, as they pre-flight the RQ-4A Global Hawk at RAAF Base Edinburgh, Adelaide, Australia, in support of Exercise TANDEM THRUST 01. Able to cover more than 40,000 square miles, the jet powered Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) RQ-4A Global Hawk has a wing span of 116 feet, equal to a Boeing 737, able to fly up to 65,000 feet and loiter for more than 24 hours. The Global Hawk deployed to Australia from April to June 2001, flying more than a dozen missions. This Global Hawk completed its biggest challenge to date the non-stop Trans-Pacific flight from Edwards to Edinburgh to support TANDEM THRUST 01. TANDEM THRUST 2001 a combined US, Australian, and Canadian military exercise for crisis action planning and execution of contingency response operations. The biannual exercise is held in the vicinity of Shoalwater Bay training area in Queensland, Australia. Photographer’s Name: SSGT JEREMY LOCK, USAF. Date Shot: 5/13/2001

































[Image]US Air Force (USAF) 46th Expeditionary Aerial Reconnaissance Squadron (EARS) Crew Chief, Staff Sergeant (SSGT) Sean Pietre and Senior Airman (SRA) Rothschild Pierre-Louis III unload a rocket from a Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) at Balad Air Base (AB), Iraq (IRQ), in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Photographer’s Name: SSGT COHEN A. YOUNG, USAF. Date Shot: 7/2/2004




[Image]US Air Force (USAF) Staff Sergeant (SSGT) David Miranda, a Dedicated Crew Chief on the MQ-1L Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), inspects an engine during a Preventative Maintenance Inspection (PMI). Miranda is assigned to the 46th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron (ERS) at Balad Air Base (AB), Iraq (IRQ). Photographer’s Name: TSGT SCOTT REED, USAF. Date Shot: 6/10/2004




[Image]US Air Force (USAF) Crew Chief with the 46th Reconnaissance Squadron (RS), Staff Sergeant (SGT) James Barr (right), starts up the engine of a Predator MQ-1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) during a functional check while Senior Airman (SRA) Christipher Dewey observes the engine performance. Photographer’s Name: SSGT PRENTICE COLTER, USAF. Date Shot: 5/26/2004




[Image]US Air Force (USAF) Staff Sergeant (SSGT) Michael Gonzales, a Crew Chief for the 46th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron (ERS), unscrews the engine of a Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) for repairs at Balad Air Base (AB), Iraq (IRQ), in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Photographer’s Name: SSGT CHYRECE E. LEWIS, USAF. Date Shot: 2/10/2004




[Image]US Air Force (USAF) Staff Sergeant (SSGT) Tracy Jones, left and SSGT Jeffery Hicks, Crew Chiefs for the 46th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron (ERS), sign-off preflight documents for the RQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), before its mission from Balad Air Base (AB), Iraq, in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Photographer’s Name: SSGT CHYRECE LEWIS, USAF. Date Shot: 1/31/2004




[Image]US Air Force (USAF) Staff Sergeant (SSGT) Jeffrey Hicks, left and Senior Airman (SRA) John Fanning, with the 46th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron (ERS), perform a post flight check on their RQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) at Tallil Air Base (AB), Iraq, in support of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Photographer’s Name: SSGT SUZANNE M. JENKINS, USAF. Date Shot: 1/19/2004

































[Image]The Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Experiment Program consists of British and Israeli contractors working together controlling the UAV for experimental purposes during a Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) training exercise at Fallon Naval Air Station (NAS), Nevada (NV), during exercise DESERT RESCUE XI. Here two British contractors view a low-resolution strip map, which covers a large area provided by the electrical optical and infrared camera, installed in the UAV during a surveillance and reconnaissance mission. The exercise is a joint service Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) training exercise hosted by the Naval Strike and Warfare Center, designed to simulate downed aircrews, enabling CSAR related missions to experiment with new techniques in realistic scenarios. Photographer’s Name: SSGT REYNALDO RAMON, USAF. Date Shot: 8/13/2003




[Image]A contracted worker operates to controls of a Hunter Joint Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), as it prepares for a experimental flight during a Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) training exercise at Fallon Naval Air Station (NAS), Nevada (NV), during exercise DESERT RESCUE XI. The Hunter is an Israeli multi-role short-range UAV system in service with the US Army (USA). The exercise is a joint service Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) training exercise hosted by the Naval Strike and Warfare Center, designed to simulate downed aircrews, enabling CSAR related missions to experiment with new techniques in realistic scenarios. Photographer’s Name: SSGT REYNALDO RAMON, USAF. Date Shot: 8/13/2003




[Image]Sergeant (SGT) Carlos Carrasco (left) and USMC of Reading PA and Sgt Carlos Carrasco, both from 3rd Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalion, operate the wearable ground control station for the “Dragon Eye” Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) at Camp Ripper, Kuwait during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Photographer’s Name: LCPL Kenneth E. Madden, USMC. Date Shot: 3/7/2003




[Image]US Marine Corps (USMC) Corporal (CPL) John Rocha, Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron-1 (VMU-1), Twentynine Palms, California (CA), at the controls of the GCS-2000 Ground Control Station (GCS) that operates an unmanned air vehicle (UAV) from the flightline near Camp Workhorse during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Photographer’s Name: LCPL ALICIA M. ANDERSON, USMC. Date Shot: 2/25/2003




[Image]US Marine Corps (USMC) Marines from Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron-1 (VMU-1), Twentynine Palms, California (CA), and VMU-2, Cherry Point, North Carolina (NC), lunch together during a construction break of a runway near Camp Workhorse during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Photographer’s Name: LCPL ALICIA M. ANDERSON, USMC. Date Shot: 2/25/2003




[Image]US Air Force (USAF) Senior Airman (SRA) Amy Hodges, Airborne Surveillance Radar System Technician assigned to the 438th Expeditionary Force Protection Squadron (EFPS) waits for final Global Positioning Systems (GPS) data before launching a US Air Force (USAF) “Desert Hawk” Force Protection Airborne Surveillance (FPAS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), while deployed at forward location during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Photographer’s Name: SSGT William Greer, USAF. Date Shot: 10/4/2002




[Image]US Army (USA) Specialist (SPC) Dan Sawicki, 972nd Military Police (MP) Company, operates the controls of a US Air Force (USAF) “Desert Hawk” Force Protection Airborne Surveillance (FPAS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), while deployed at forward location during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Photographer’s Name: SSGT William Greer, USAF. Date Shot: 10/4/2002




[Image]Staff Sgt. Brian Fox, VTC operator (Vehicle Test Controller) of the 12th ERS (Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron), uses a computer interface to provide flight instructions to the Global Hawk on June 30, 2002. The RQ-4A Global Hawk is a high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial reconnaissance system designed to provide military field commanders with high resolution, near-real-time imagery of large geographic areas. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Reynaldo Ramon) (Released). Date Shot: 6/30/2002




[Image]Terry Collins, an L3 employee out of Edwards Air Force Base, checks the uplinks and downlinks for satellite communication with the Global Hawk on June 30, 2002. The RQ-4A Global Hawk is a high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial reconnaissance system designed to provide military field commanders with high resolution, near-real-time imagery of large geographic areas. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Reynaldo Ramon) (Released). Date Shot: 6/30/2002




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Cryptome unveils Drone Photos
		
	
	

		














Drone Photos








[Image]In this March, 28, 2012, photo, an Arcti Copter 5 drone flies over a waterfront park in Berkeley, Calif. Interest in the domestic use of drones is surging among public agencies and private citizens alike, including a thriving subculture of amateur hobbyists, even as the prospect of countless tiny but powerful eyes circling in the skies raises serious privacy concerns. (Eric Risberg)




[Image]In this March, 28, 2012, photo, Mark Harrison, left, and Andreas Oesterer, right, watch as a Ritewing Zephyr II drone lifts off at a waterfront park in Berkeley, Calif. Interest in the domestic use of drones is surging among public agencies and private citizens alike, including a thriving subculture of amateur hobbyists, even as the prospect of countless tiny but powerful eyes circling in the skies raises serious privacy concerns. (Eric Risberg)




[Image]A quadrocopter drone equipped with a camera stands on display at the Zeiss stand on the first day of the CeBIT 2012 technology trade fair on March 6, 2012 in Hanover, Germany. CeBIT 2012, the world’s largest information technology trade fair, will run from March 6-10, and advances in cloud computing and security are major features this year. Getty




[Image]A drone equipped with cameras and sensors flies over a simulation of a contaminated area during a training exercise of a nuclear accident following an earthquake in the region of the nuclear site of Cadarache, January 17, 2012. Reuters




[Image]Israeli soldiers dismantle the Skylark drone during a drill on January 16, 2012 near Bat Shlomo, Israel. The Skylark can carry a camera payload of up to 1kg, has an operational calking of 15,000ft and allows users to monitor any designated point within a 15km radius. The Skylark unit consists of a ground control element and three drones, which provide battalion-level commanders with real-time information. Getty




[Image]A TV drone flies beside Canada’s Erick Guay during the second practice of the men’s Alpine skiing World Cup downhill race at the Lauberhorn in Wengen, January 12, 2012. Reuters




[Image]Advanced Defense Technology Centre engineer Fumiyuki Sato demonstrates his spherical observation drone at the opening of the annual Digital Contents Expo in Tokyo on October 20, 2011. The Japanese defence researcher has invented a spherical observation drone that can fly down narrow alleys, hover on the spot, take off vertically and bounce along the ground. Getty




[Image]President of French far-right party Front national (FN) and candidate for the 2012 French presidential election Marine Le Pen looks at a drone helicopter at the stand of French company Eden as she visits on October 19, 2011 in Paris, at the the France’s Milipol global security trade fair on October 18, 2011 in Paris. Milipol Paris 2011, welcoming more than 1,000 exhibiting companies from 43 countries, runs until October 21. Getty




[Image]This Sept. 2011 photo provided by Vanguard Defense Industries, shows a ShadowHawk drone with Montgomery County, Texas, SWAT team members. Civilian cousins of the unmanned military aircraft that have been tracking and killing terrorists in the Middle East and Asia are being sought by police departments, border patrols, power companies, news organizations and others who want a bird?s-eye view. AP




[Image]A Pakistani villager holds a wreckage of a suspected surveillance drone which is crashed in Pakistani border town of Chaman along the Afghanistan border in Pakistan on Thursday, Aug 25, 2011. Suspected US surveillance drone crashes in Pakistan military area near border with Afghanistan. (Shah Khalid)




[Image]A maple seed is seen on the hand of Craig Stoneking, bottom, project manager at Lockheed Martin Advance Technology Laboratories, as engineer David Sharp holds the company’s new drone, Wednesday, Aug. 10, 2011, in Southampton, N.J. The unmanned, one-winged flight machine is based on the flight of maple seeds that twirl down from trees during the spring. AP




[Image]Pakistani officials collect remains of a Pakistan Navy unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) which crashed outside an oil refinery in Karachi, Pakistan on Tuesday, July 19, 2011. According to a Pakistan Navy official, the accident was caused by a bird hit. No casualties were reported. (Shakil Adil)




[Image]Dr. Gregory Parker, Micro Air Vehicle team leader, holds a small winged drone that resembles an insect, in the U.S. Air Force Micro Air Vehicles lab at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, July 11, 2011. The Micro Air Vehicles unit of the Air Force Research Laboratory at Wright Patterson AFB is developing small military drones, with the goal of making them so small that they resemble small birds and insects, including some that will have moving wings. The mission is to develop MAVs that can find, track and target adversaries while operating in complex urban environments. The engineers are using a variety of small helicopters and drones in the lab to develop the programs and software. Testing takes place in a controlled indoor lab where the team flies the MAVs and then gathers data to analyze for further development. Reuters




[Image]A model of an insect size U.S. Air Force drone is held by a member of the Micro Air Vehicles team of the Air Force Research Laboratory, which is developing small drones at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, July 11, 2011. Reuters




[Image]A computer controlled U.S. Air Force drone prepares to lift off for a test flight of in the Micro Air Vehicles lab at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, July 11, 2011. Reuters




[Image]This product image provided by Parrot, shows the AR.Drone. Parrot, a company known more for its Bluetooth hands-free car speakerphones, has launched a small, unmanned aircraft that can be controlled using an iPhone or another of Apple Inc.’s Wi-Fi-enabled gadgets, including the iPod Touch and the iPad.(Parrot)




[Image]This undated handout photo provided by the U.S. Air Force shows a MQ-9 Reaper, armed with GBU-12 Paveway II laser guided munitions and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, piloted by Col. Lex Turner during a combat mission over southern Afghanistan. (Lt. Col.. Leslie Pratt, US Air Force)




[Image]This undated photo provided by U.S. Customs and Border Protection shows an unmanned drone used to patrol the U.S.-Canadian border. The planes, which are based out of North Dakota, are now venturing as far as Eastern Washington on their patrols. (U.S. Customs and Border Protection)



























[Image]U.S. Navy Boatswain’s Mate 3rd Class Christian Riddle, left, and Boatswain’s Mate 2nd Class Dante Galati secure a recovered Air Force BQM-74C Chukar III aerial target drone to a crane aboard USS Tortuga (LSD 46) after an at-sea exercise for Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) 2011 in the South China Sea June 11, 2011. CARAT is a series of bilateral exercises held annually in Southeast Asia to strengthen relationships and enhance force readiness. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Katerine Noll/Released)




[Image]An X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstrator (UCAS-D) completes its first flight at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., Feb. 4, 2011. The UCAS-D program will demonstrate the capability of an autonomous, low-observable unmanned aircraft to perform carrier launches and recoveries. (DoD photo courtesy of Northrop Grumman/Released). Date Shot: 2/4/2011


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[Image]Air Photo Service Co. Inc, Japan, January 2011




[Image]U.S. Army Sgt. Brian Curd, and Spc. Nicholas Boxley, both combat engineers, from Echo Company, 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, 3rd Advise and Assist Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, prepare the RQ-16A Tarantula Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle, for operation, at Basra province, Iraq, Dec. 1, 2010. Although, T-Hawk requires a great deal of maintenance, the capabilities it provides are well worth the time spent. (U.S. Army photo by 2nd Lt. Matthew Fumagalli/Released). Date Shot: 12/1/2010




[Image]Engineers, from left, Daniel Braun, Eric Sanchez and David Barney, with Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Systems Center Pacific, perform pre-deployment inspections on Littoral Battlespace Sensing Unmanned Undersea Vehicles aboard the oceanographic survey ship USNS Pathfinder (T-AGS 60) while portside in San Diego, Calif., Oct. 21, 2010. Each vehicle hosts a payload suite of sensors that will measure the physical characteristics of the water column as it routinely descends and ascends in the ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Rick Naystatt/Released). Date Shot: 10/21/2010




[Image]U.S. Navy Aerographer’s Mate Airman Alex Boston, left, and Aerographer’s Mate 3rd Class Ryan Thuecks, right, both assigned to the Naval Oceanography Mine Warfare Center, and Ana Ziegler, with the Office of Naval Research, deploy an unmanned underwater vehicle during exercise Frontier Sentinel in the northern Atlantic Ocean June 9, 2010. The annual joint maritime homeland security exercise involved the Canadian navy, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, and federal, state, and local agencies in the detection, assessment and response to maritime security threats. (U.S. Navy photo by Wayne Stigstedt/Released). Date Shot: 6/9/2010




[Image]U.S. Navy Sonar Technician Surface 1st Class Bryson Menke and Mineman 3rd Class Michael Darcy, both stationed with Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit (EODMU) 1, prepare to deploy an unmanned underwater vehicle April 22, 2010, in the Persian Gulf. EODMU-1 and USS Dextrous (MCM 13) are conducting drills. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Ja’lon A. Rhinehart/Released). Date Shot: 4/22/2010




[Image]Danielle Bryant, right, an oceanographer from the Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO), establishes a satellite connection to the Glider Operations Center at NAVOCEANO before launching the seaglider unmanned underwater vessel from the Military Sealift Command oceanographic survey ship USNS Henson (T-AGS 63) March 24, 2010, in the Atlantic Ocean. The vessel is designed to collect physical oceanography data in deep water. Henson is under way off the coast of Fortaleza, Brazil, for Oceanographic-Southern Partnership Station 2010 conducting survey demonstrations with the Brazilian Directorate of Hydrograph and Navigation. Oceanographic-Southern Partnership Station is an oceanographic surveying and information exchange program between subject matter experts with partner nations in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Lily Daniels/Released). Date Shot: 3/24/2010




[Image]U.S. Navy Sonar Technician (Surface) 2nd Class Brad Goss, right, and Sonar Technician (Surface) 1st Class Anthony Craig, left, from the Littoral Combat Ship Anti-Submarine Warfare (LCS ASW) Mission Package detachment, operate an unmanned surface vehicle (USV) in the waters of the Narragansett Bay, R.I., Feb. 16, 2010. The Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division Newport is developing the USV for future LCS ASW operations. (U.S. Navy photo/Released). Date Shot: 2/16/2010




[Image]U.S. Navy Mineman Seaman James Raper pushes the mine neutralization vehicle (MNV) of the mine countermeasures ship USS Defender (MCM 2) into its cradle Nov. 24, 2009, in the Yellow Sea. An MNV is a remote-controlled, unmanned submarine that uses a video camera to confirm the presence of underwater mines. Defender is participating in exercise Clear Horizon, an annual exercise conducted with the Republic of Korea Navy, that is one of the largest international mine counter-measures exercises in the world. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Richard Doolin/Released). Date Shot: 11/24/2009




[Image]The U.S Air Force Academy’s Viking 300 aircraft, an unmanned aerial system, flies over Camp Red Devil at Fort Carson, Colo., July 22, 2009. The Air Force Academy is the first military service academy to begin integrating unmanned aerial systems into its curriculum. (U.S. Air Force photo by Mike Kaplan/Released). Date Shot: 7/23/2009




[Image]An Unmanned Little Bird helicopter, a smaller version of the manned A/MH-6M Little Bird helicopter, is tested and evaluated by personnel from the U.S. Marine Corps’ Warfighting Laboratory at Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va., June 16, 2009, in Bridgeport, Calif., during Javelin Thrust-09. Marine Forces Reserve, headquartered in New Orleans, is conducting Javelin Thrust-09 at six locations throughout the Western United States. The combined arms exercise showcases a range of combat and logistics capabilities and allows leaders to assess the operational readiness of participating units. More than 2,000 reserve- and active-component Marines, Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen are training simultaneously in support of the exercise. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Chief Warrant Officer Keith A. Stevenson/Released). Date Shot: 6/16/2009




[Image]Dirk D. Reum, a robotic systems engineer, conducts a systems check of a robotic unmanned ground vehicle (RUGV) June 13, 2009, in Hawthorne, Nev., before making it available for test training with U.S. Marine Corps infantrymen of India Company, 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment, 4th Marine Division, during exercise Javelin Thrust 2009. The RUGV has a payload capacity of 1,400 pounds. Javelin Thrust showcases a wide range of combat and logistics capabilities, and allows leaders to assess the operational readiness of participating units. More than 3,000 reserve and active component Marines and members of the Navy, Army and Air National Guard will train during the combined arms exercise at six locations throughout the Western United States. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Keith A. Stevenson/Released). Date Shot: 6/13/2009




[Image]The Heron TP medium altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle takes off from Comalapa International Airport in San Salvador, El Salvador, May 21, 2009, during a counter drug operations support mission. The Heron is part of an unmanned aircraft system deployed to El Salvador to support Project Monitoreo, a month-long evaluation initiative to assess the suitability of using unmanned aircraft for counterdrug missions in the United States Southern Command area. (U.S. Army photo by Jose Ruiz/Released). Date Shot: 5/21/2009




[Image]The U.S. Navy and Spatial Integrated Systems Inc. demonstrate a fully autonomous Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) near Fort Monroe, Va., Jan. 14, 2009. The USV uses its autonomous maritime navigation systems to patrol and detect intruders. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Joshua Adam Nuzzo/Released). Date Shot: 1/14/2009




[Image]U.S. Navy Lt. Timothy Stanford, a graduate student at University of Wisconsin, tests his Autonomous Unmanned Vehicle (AUV) prior to competing in the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Society International’s (AUVSI) 11th annual competition in San Diego, Calif., Aug. 1, 2008. AUVSI, in cooperation with the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, hosts the event to encourage young engineers and scientists to consider careers developing AUV technologies for the U.S. Navy. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Brian Gaines/Released). Date Shot: 8/1/2008




[Image]Fox News reporter Phil Keating interviews U.S. Navy Capt. Robert Dishman, the Persistent Maritime Unmanned Aircraft Systems Program Office 262 Program Manager, in front of the Skyship 600 blimp at Naval Air Station Key West, Fla., July 10, 2008. The lighter-than-air vehicle is in Key West for six weeks to conduct a series of maritime surveillance evaluations. The joint airship experiment between the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard emphasizes the cooperative strategy for 21st century seapower among the sea services. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Rachel McMarr/Released). Date Shot: 7/10/2008




[Image]An unmanned aerial vehicle’s Predator Hellfire missile is shown on a simulator’s virtual camera at the March Air Reserve Base in Riverside County, Calif., June 25, 2008. As the U.S. military scrambles to get more robotic warplanes like the Predator drone aloft, it is confronting an unexpected adversary: human error. (Damian Dovarganes)




[Image]Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates learns how to operate an unmanned ground vehicle during a tour of the future combat systems facility at Fort Bliss, Texas, May 1, 2008. (Department of Defense photo by Cherie Cullen/Released). Date Shot: 5/1/2008




[Image]A Condor unmanned aerial vehicle sits on top of its carrying case before flying during Atlantic Strike V at the air-ground training complex in Avon Park, Fla., April 17, 2007. Atlantic Strike is a U.S. Central Command Air Forces initiative and the only joint, tactical-level, urban, close air support training event dedicated to supporting the war on terror. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Stephen Otero) (Released). Date Shot: 4/17/2007




[Image]US Marine Corps (USMC) Marines, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) show the US Navy (USN) Sailors aboard the USN Wasp Class Amphibious Assault Ship USS BOXER (LHD 4) the “Silver Fox” Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). The 15th MEU and the BOXER are part of Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 5 which is currently participating in their Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX) off the coast of Southern California. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Third Class Noel Danseco (RELEASED). Date Shot: 7/16/2006




[Image]Engineers check the structure after the test flights of the Navy-built Guardian Griffin unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The flights demonstrated its capability to support U.S. joint forces with missions ranging from convoy escort and port security to combat patrol. U.S. Navy photo by Mr. John Joyce (RELEASED). Date Shot: 5/18/2006




[Image]The Proteus aircraft takes off from Mojave Airfield near Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., on May 9, 2006. It carries the pod that eventually will contain the radar that will be used on the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle. A year of testing, that will be conducted by the 851st Electronic Testing Group, will begin in September once the radar is installed on Proteus. (U.S. Air Force photo) (Released). Date Shot: 5/9/2006




[Image]Northrop Grumman’s RQ-8A Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) test fires the second of two Mark (MK) 66 2.75-inch unguided rockets during weapons testing at Arizona’s Yuma Proving Grounds. The Fire Scout has the ability to autonomously take off and land from any aviation-capable warship and at unprepared landing zones, with an on-station endurance of over four hours. The Fire Scout system is capable of continuous operations, providing coverage at 110 nautical miles from the launch site. Utilizing a baseline payload that includes electro-optical/infrared sensors and a laser rangefinder/designator the Fire Scout can find and identify tactical targets, track and designate targets, accurately provide targeting data to strike platforms, employ precision weapons, and perform battle damage assessment. Photographer’s Name: TIM PAYNTER, CIV. Date Shot: 7/25/2005




[Image]U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Patrick Vasquez, a Force Protection Airborne Surveillance System (FPASS) operator from the 99th Security Forces Group, prepares to release a Desert Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle during an urban warfare training at Indian Springs Auxiliary Air Field, Nev., on May 4, 2005. The Desert Hawk gives real-time video surveillance to FPASS operators who in turn are able to instantly relay enemy force locations to the troops in the field. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Robert W. Valenca) (Released). Date Shot: 5/4/2005




[Image]A U.S. Air Force BQM-167A Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is launched from Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., on Dec. 22, 2004. The BQM-167A is powered by a ventrally mounted turbojet engine. It can be air or ground launched, and can carry the full range of current target payloads, including radar enhancers, countermeasures, scoring devices, and towed targets. (USAF Photo by Bruce Hoffman, CIV) (Released). Date Shot: 12/22/2004



























[Image]A Boeing ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) sits on top of a table during a demonstration at Indian Springs Auxiliary Field, N.V., on Dec. 18, 2004. The U.S. military uses the four-foot-long UAV as a forward observer to monitor enemy concentrations, vehicle and personnel movement, buildings and terrain in Iraq. (USAF Photo by Tech. Sgt. Kevin J.Gruenwald) (Released). Date Shot: 12/18/2004 [Engine and propeller unit is rotated 90-degrees for service.]


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Mark LaVille, the Scan Eagle Project manager from Boeing Corporation, and Brett Kelley, a support engineer with the Insitu Group also from Boeing, uses an electronic blower to cool the engine of a Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle during an urban warfare exercise at Indian Springs Auxiliary Air Field, Nev., on May 4, 2005. Scan Eagle flies at low altitudes while taking video surveillance and it feeds images directly to security forces personnel in the field. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Robert W. Valenca) (Released). Date Shot: 5/4/2005





[Image]U.S. Air Force maintenance personnel prepare to push Global Hawk Air Vehicle Number 3 (AV-3) into its hanger after its 400th mission at an undisclosed location in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom on Nov. 8, 2004. The Global Hawk is an unmanned aerial vehicle designed for surveillance and reconnaissance. (USAF Photo by Tech. Sgt. Erik Gudmundson) (Released). Date Shot: 11/8/2004




[Image]An AGM-114 Hellfire missile hung on the rail of an US Air Force (USAF) MQ-1L Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is inscribed with, “IN MEMORY OF HONORABLE RONALD REAGAN.” Photographer’s Name: TSGT SCOTT REED, USAF. Date Shot: 6/10/2004




[Image]Tracked and wheeled versions of the Gladiator Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicles (TUGV) take a forward position to determine security of the area. The Gladiators are taking part in a live fire exercise with 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (1/2), Bravo Company (B CO), Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (NC), at Range 400 aboard Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command (MAGTF-TC), Twentynine Palms, California (CA). Photographer’s Name: LCPL PATRICK GREEN, USMC. Date Shot: 1/14/2004




[Image]Lt. Col. George Biondi, Director of Operations for the 82nd Aerial Targets Squadron, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, flies this QF-4 “Rhino” as a safety chase on the wing of a remote-controlled unmanned QF-4 “Rhino” full-scale aerial target drone after a Combat Archer Air-to-Air Weapons System Evaluation Program mission over the Gulf of Mexico. The QF-4 Phantom II, affectionately known as the “Rhino”, is used as a threat-representative unmanned target for live-fire test and evaluation missions. It maintains the basic flight envelope capabilities of the original F-4, and can also be flown manned for workup and remote controller training missions. United States Air Force QF-4’s are flown by the 82nd Aerial Targets Squadron from Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida and Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico. (U.S. Air Force photo Tech. Sgt. Michael Ammons) (Released). Date Shot: 9/16/2003




[Image]A VMU-2’s Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) is ready for launch off a Pneumatic Launcher on the desert floor. Photographer’s Name: LCPL RICHARD W. COURT, USAF. Date Shot: 3/9/2003




[Image]Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vern Clark listens to Steve Castelin of NAVSEA Coastal Systems Station, as he talks about the future of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) such as the Blue Fin currently displayed on Nov. 26, 2002. The CNO is in Panama City, Fla., to see new technology hardware and to visit with local area community leaders. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Photographer’s Mate Johnny Bivera) (RELEASED). Date Shot: 11/26/2002




[Image]A RQ-1L Predator UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) from the 57th Wing Operations Group, Nellis AFB, NV sits in a maintenance bunker at a forward operating airbase in the ENDURING FREEDOM area. The Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned aerial vehicle system used for reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition and is in Afghanistan in direct support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Photographer’s Name: CWO2 William D. Crow, USMC. Date Shot: 2/14/2002




[Image]Operations Specialist 1st Class Guy Hurkmans of Escanaba, Mich., assigned to Destroyer Squadron 50 (DESRON50), Naval Support Activity, Bahrain manually launches an Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) during a flight test that is being conducted in support of Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) on Jan. 6, 2002. (U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 1st Class Ted Banks) (Released). Date Shot: 1/6/2002




[Image]Army personnel walkout and position the Hunter UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) for takeoff at Petrovec Airfield, Skopje, Macedonia, in support of TASK FORCE HARVEST. The role of TASK FORCE HARVEST is to collect arms and ammunition voluntarily turned over by ethnic Albanian insurgents, and thereby helps to build confidence in the broader peace process suggested by the President of former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Hunter UAV plays a key role in helping NATO troops by surveying and looking for any changes in the local area that might hinder the peacekeeping mission. Photographer’s Name: SSGT JOCELYN M. BROUSSARD, USAF. Date Shot: 9/13/2001




[Image]The new Dragon Eye Unmanned Arial Reconnaissance Vehicle sits partially disassembled prior to a demonstration given to commanders during Kernal Blitz Experimental aboard Camp Pendleton, Calif., on June 23, 2001. The Dragon Eye is controlled line of site via computer and can transmit real time video imagery back to the operator. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. John Vannucci) (Released) Date Shot: 6/23/2001




[Image]The Global Hawk heads back towards its hanger after doing preflight checks before going on a twenty four hour mission out of Edinburgh Air Force Base in Adelaide, South Australia, in support of Exercise Tandem Thrust. The Global Hawk is a jet powered Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) designed as a Reconnaissance and Surveillance vehicle with a wing span equal to a Boeing 737, flying at altitudes of up to 65,000 feet for more than 24 hours and capable of searching an area of more than 40,000 square miles. The Global Hawk is deployed to Australia from April to June 2001, flying more than a dozen missions. These missions will include sorties in support of Tandem Thrust as well as maritime, littoral, land surveillance and stand off reconnaissance capabilities. The Global Hawk completed its first successful maiden flight in February 1998. Currently there are five U.S. Air Force Global Hawks which have logged over 60 flights and have clocked more than 600 hours, with it’s biggest challenge to date the non-stop Trans-Pacific flight from Edwards AFB CA to Edinburgh AFB South Australia. Exercise Tandem Thrust 2001 is a combined United States and Australian military training exercise. This biennial exercise is being held in the vicinity of Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Queensland, Australia. More than 27,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines are participating, with Canadian units taking part as opposing forces. The purpose of Exercise Tandem Thrust is to train for crisis action planning and execution of contingency response operations. Photograph CLEARED FOR RELEASE by Lt. Col .Pat Bolibrzuch, Australian Deployment Commander, Global Hawk Program Office and Wing Commander Brett Newell, Deputy Director Emerging Systems, Aerospace Development Branch. U.S. Navy Photo by PH3 J. Smith (Released). Photographer’s Name: PH3 JENNIFER A. SMITH. Date Shot: 5/13/2001




[Image]The Broad-area Unmanned Responsive Resupply Operations (BURRO) is used in conjunction with the Slice Multi-Task Boat (only flight deck is seen) for providing over the horizon sea-based logistics. The BURRO (also known as the KAMAN K-1200 K-MAX Helicopter) is also used for resupplying ships at sea. It is currently on the flightdeck of the Slice Boat (Prototype) at Coast Guard Island in Oakland, California, due to its participation in Fleet Battle Experiment Echo. Also seen in the frame is a right side front view of the U.S. Coast Guard High Endurance Cutter, USCGC SHERMAN, (WHEC-720). This mission is in direct support of Urban Warrior ’99. Photographer’s Name: LCPL Christopher L. Vallee. Date Shot: 3/19/1999




[Image]The Navtec, Incorporated Owl MKII Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) glides stealthly through the waters of Mile Hammock Bay, New River during a demonstration to highlight it’s marine reconnaissance capabilities to the Riverine Insertion Operation Exercise (RIOEX) ’98 participants. The Owl MKII is funded by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and is remote-controlled from a small shoreline control station by Brad Dowling, a Navtec, Inc. electronics engineer, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, during the Riverine Insertion Operation Exercise (RIOEX) ’98. Photographer’s Name: LCPL T.A. Pope, USMC. Date Shot: 5/14/1998




[Image]The Dragon Drone Unmanned Aerial Vehicle was on display at the MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain) facility during LOE 1 (Limited Objective Experiment 1). Urban Warrior is the U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s series of limited objective experiments examining new urban tactics and experimental technologies. Photographer’s Name: Sgt. Jason J. Bortz. Date Shot: 1/23/1998




[Image]US Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC). A “Night Owl”, or RQ-2A Pioneer, surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is launched from its twin rail catapult mounted on a 5-ton truck. This launch is conducted by the Cherry Point Marine Base, Squadron-2, part of Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) 5-97 at Airfield Seagle. Photographer’s Name: LCPL E. J. Young. Date Shot: 4/14/1997




[Image]A close up front view of the fuselage section from the wreckage of a Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) laying on a hillside in the Russian sector of the Multinational Division North (MDN) area of operations. Photographer’s Name: SSG Edward W. Nino. Date Shot: 10/1/1996




[Image]A civilian contractor tests the unmanned submersible Deep Drone aboard a US Navy ship. The sonar device is being used during salvage operations for downed Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (KAL 007). The commercial jet was shot down by Soviet aircraft over Sakhalin Island in the Sea of Japan on August 30, 1983. All 269 passengers and crewmen were killed. PH1 Fel Barbante, USN
















	


	



			
				


			

			
SECRET – Chicago NATO Links by Cryptome
		
	
	

		
A sends:


Chicago NATO links


Thursday, May 17, 2012


Chicago NATO Command and Communications Operations Update – with Photos


[N139HS ModeS:A09D60 , N242A ModeS:A2376D , N3935A ModeS:A490F6]


http://shortwaveamerica.blogspot.com/2012/05/chicago-nato-command-and-communications.html


 


Thursday, May 17, 2012


NATO Communications Monitoring Guide and LIVE COVERAGE


http://shortwaveamerica.blogspot.com/2012/05/nato-communications-monitoring-guide.html


 


Sunday, May 13, 2012


Chicago NATO Summit


http://mt-fedfiles.blogspot.com/2012/05/chicago-nato-summit.html


 


RadioReference Thread: Up-Coming NATO Communications


http://forums.radioreference.com/chicago-metro-area-discussion/239345-up-coming-nato-

communications-where-listen.html>


 


Local Chicago Scanner YahooGroup. (Many posts on NATO stuff & Links)


http://groups.yahoo.com/group/carmachicago/


http://groups.yahoo.com/group/carmachicago/messages


 


State of Illinois Radio Reference – Live Audio


http://www.radioreference.com/apps/audio/?stid=17


 


Radioman911.com now in NATO mode (Scanner Radio Feed)


http://www.justin.tv/radioman911


 


Ship/Boat with AIS transponders for Chicago water area.


http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/


 


NATO Communications Center A Suburban Secret


http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/05/17/nato-communications-center-is-a-suburban-secret/

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – NSA GUNMAN: Learning Enemy Electronic Spying
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


nsa-gunman

	


	



			
				


			

			
Revealed – DoD $155 M for Multi-University War Make Research
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


2012MURI

	


	



			
				


			

			
Unveiled – CIA Communications Intelligence Indoctrination
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


cia-comint-indoctrination

	


	



			
				


			

			
SECRET – Proving that John Dean was Deep Throat’s Source by Philip T. Mellinger
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


dean-deep-throat


 

	


	



			
				


			

			
CRYPTOME – US Nabs 2 for 20,987 Stolen Credit Card Accounts – Indictment vs Borgia and Perez
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


borgia-perez-01

	


	



			
				


			

			
CONFIDENTIAL by Cryptome – DoD Review Guidelines for Guantanamo Detention
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


DTM-12-005

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from Cryptome – NSA TEMPEST Documents Repost
		
	
	

		
       NSA TEMPEST History: http://cryptome.org/2012/05/nsa-tempest-history.pdf


22 June 2011:


Joel McNamara’s comprehensive Complete, Unofficial TEMPEST Information Page has closed. A mirror: http://www.kubieziel.de/blog/uploads/complete_unofficial_tempest_page.pdf


6 April 2003: Add




NCSC 3 – TEMPEST Glossary, 30 March 1981




5 March 2002: Two security papers announced today on optical Tempest risks:




Information Leakage from Optical Emanations, J. Loughry and D.A. Umphress


Optical Time-Domain Eavesdropping Risks of CRT Displays, Markus Kuhn




For emissions security, HIJACK, NONSTOP and TEAPOT, see also Ross Anderson’s Security Engineering, Chapter 15.


HIJACK, NONSTOP, and TEAPOT Vulnerabilities


A STU-III is a highly sophisticated digital device; however, they suffer from a particular nasty vulnerability to strong RF signals that if not properly addressed can cause the accidental disclosure of classified information, and recovery of the keys by an eavesdropper. While the unit itself is well shielded, the power line feeding the unit may not have a clean ground (thus negating the shielding).


If the encryption equipment is located within six to ten wavelengths of a radio transmitter (such as a cellular telephone, beeper, or two way radio) the RF signal can mix with the signals inside the STU and carry information to an eavesdropper. This six to ten wavelengths is referred to as the “near field” or the wave front where the magnetic field of the signal is stronger then the electrical field.


The best way to deal with this is to never have a cellular telephone or pager on your person when using a STU, or within a radius of at least thirty feet (in any direction) from an operational STU (even with a good ground). If the STU is being used in a SCIF or secure facility a cell phone is supposed to be an excluded item, but it is simply amazing how many government people (who know better) forget to turn off their phone before entering controlled areas and thus cause classified materials to be compromised.


Spook Hint: If you have a powered up NEXTEL on your belt and you walk within 12 feet of a STU-III in secure mode you have just compromised the classified key.


— Secure Telephone Units, Crypto Key Generators, Encryption Equipment, and Scramblers (offsite)


Files at Cryptome.org:

tempest-time.htm TEMPEST Timeline
tempest-old.htm TEMPEST History

NSA Documents Obtained by FOIA

nacsem-5112.htm NACSEM 5112 NONSTOP Evaluation Techniques
nstissi-7000.htm NSTISSI No. 7000 TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities           

nacsim-5000.htm NACSIM 5000 Tempest Fundamentals
nacsim-5000.zip NACSIM 5000 Tempest Fundamentals (Zipped 570K)
nsa-94-106.htm NSA No. 94-106 Specification for Shielded Enclosures
tempest-2-95.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95 Red/Black Installation Guidance

nt1-92-1-5.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - TOC and Sections 1-5
nt1-92-6-12.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - Sections 6-12
nstissam1-92a.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - Appendix A (TEMPEST Overview)
nt1-92-B-M.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - Appendixes B-M
nt1-92-dist.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - Distribution List

nsa-reg90-6.htm NSA/CSS Reg. 90-6, Technical Security Program
nsa-foia-app2.htm NSA Letter Releasing TEMPEST Documents
nsa-foia-app.htm NSA FOIA Appeal for TEMPEST Information
nsa-foia-req.htm NSA FOIA Request for TEMPEST Documents

Other TEMPEST Documents

nsa-etpp.htm NSA Endorsed TEMPEST Products Program
nsa-ettsp.htm NSA Endorsed TEMPEST Test Services Procedures
nsa-zep.htm NSA Zoned Equipment Program
nstissam1-00.htm Maintenance and Disposition of TEMPEST Equipment (2000)
nstissi-7000.htm TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities (1993)

tempest-fr.htm French TEMPEST Documentation (2000)
af-hb202d.htm US Air Force EI Tempest Installation Handbook (1999)
afssi-7010.htm US Air Force Emission Security Assessments (1998)
afssm-7011.htm US Air Force Emission Security Countermeasure Reviews (1998)
qd-tempest.htm Quick and Dirty TEMPEST Experiment (1998)

mil-hdbk-1195.htm Radio Frequency Shielded Enclsoures (1988)
emp.htm US Army Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and TEMPEST
 Protection for Facilities (1990)
zzz1002.htm National TEMPEST School Courses (1998)
navch16.htm Chapter 16 of US Navy's Automated Information Systems
 Security Guidelines

tempest-cpu.htm Controlled CPU TEMPEST emanations (1999)
tempest-door.htm TEMPEST Door (1998)
bema-se.htm Portable Radio Frequency Shielded Enclosures (1998)
datasec.htm Data Security by Architectural Design, George R. Wilson (1995)
rs232.pdf The Threat of Information Theft by Reception
 of Electromagnetic Radiation from RS-232 Cables,
 Peter Smulders (1990)

tempest-law.htm Laws On TEMPEST, Christopher Seline (1989)
tempest-leak.htm The Tempest Over Leaking Computers, Harold Highland (1988)
bits.pdf Electromagnetic Eavesdropping Machines for 
bits.htm Christmas?, Wim Van Eck (1988)
nsa-vaneck.htm NSA, Van Eck, Banks TEMPEST (1985)
emr.pdf Electromagnetic Radiation from Video Display Units: An Eavesdropping Risk?, Wim Van Eck (1985)





	


	



			
				


			

			
CRYPTOME unveils GAO: Actions Needed for Security Force Asistance
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


gao-12-556

	


	



			
				


			

			
CONFIDENTIAL – Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives
		
	
	

		
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION

Opportunities and Challenges of Oil Shale Development

Statement of Anu K. Mittal, Director Natural Resources and Environment


Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives


 


DOWNLOD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


gao-12-740t

	


	



			
				


			

			
Unveiled by Cryptome – GAO: Oil Shale Opportunities and Challenges
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL FILE HERE


insa-spies


 

	


	



			
				


			

			
Unveiled – Internet Feds Lulzsec Antisec Indictment
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


net-feds-lulzsec-antisec

	


	



			
				


			

			
CRPYTOME unveils Informancy Industry
		
	
	

		
An informancy industry provides undercover informant services to governments and corporations by use of multiple identities and nyms on the Internet. They recruit, entrap, sting, and gather evidence for indictment and prosecution. They brag about doing this to invite attack for the purpose of tracing attackers.


The exchanges below are allegedly between a US Special Agent Daniel Porsek, possibly FBI, <2023459771@unknown.email>, and an informant, possibly Jennifer Emick, Backtrace Security <infinitysnake@gmail.com>. These exchanges may be legitimate or leaked as bait.


They exemplify use of informants on the Internet, especially for social media, texting, IRC and open and closed bulletin boards. Several names and nyms mentioned are familiar: Hector “Sabu” Monsegur, Corey “Xyrix” Barnhill aka “Kayla,” (“Kayla” also attributed to Ryan Ackroyd), Justin “Null” Perras, Michael “Virus” Nieves, Sam Bowne, “jester,” “lugg.” Hundreds if not thousands more are active on the Net.


Informants are notoriously unreliable and likely to exaggerate, lie, accuse without substantiation, and claim to be more knowledgable than they are. Some claim to be informants for entertainment, for humor and for invitation to become an actual informant. Some see the role as an easy way for monetary reward, to revenge against an enemy, to escape prosecution, or get a job with the agency running them. Some establish firms to provide services of experts in the trade, assuming variously white, gray and black hatted roles. Annual security conferences are marketing and recruiting frenzies for informants. More insidious are the forums where threats and counterthreats are eloquently hawked by rising stars of duplicitous informancy operating under banner of freedom of information.


 




http://pastebin.com/qmZc6NC2


Subject: SMS with Special Agent Daniel Porsek
------------------------

From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Fri, Apr 22, 2011 at 3:09 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Email dsmithers13@yahoo.com
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, May 17, 2011 at 8:36 AM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Looks
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, May 17, 2011 at 8:37 AM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Sorry wrong person
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 10:58 AM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

See email..developments
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 11:43 AM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <12023459771@unknown.email>

Sent email

----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 11:45 AM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Got it. Thanks.
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 11:49 AM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Expecting call. Thanks!
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 10:25 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Keep your ears open for any new intel. Talk tomorrow.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 12:31 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Emailed.
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 12:34 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Read it. Thanks. Will call in a minute
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 8:22 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

The brzilian twitter followers appear to be compromised computers-kaylas bots
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 8:24 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Thx for the info.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 9:53 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Someone posted document from nhs..dated today on pastebin

----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 10:05 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

also evidence of possible carding via bitcoin

----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 13, 2011 at 11:13 AM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Sent email
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Mon, Jun 13, 2011 at 11:13 AM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Thx.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 13, 2011 at 4:06 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Theyre in the senate.gov site
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 13, 2011 at 4:12 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Nut their pron.com hack was manufactured, I think

----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 14, 2011 at 4:15 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Appears they just lifted half a million from bitcoin?!?
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Tue, Jun 14, 2011 at 5:38 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Wow!
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 14, 2011 at 5:42 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Yeah...apparently this is the second theft...looks like the 'lulz' are cover?
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Tue, Jun 14, 2011 at 5:45 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

So not lulz/anon?
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 14, 2011 at 5:46 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Its them.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 14, 2011 at 5:47 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Almost a million dollars in two days
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 14, 2011 at 6:01 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Also one of the former members of MoD tells me solar is also involved, found 
some relation to wildcardsecurity irc
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 14, 2011 at 6:15 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Might be mining bc via botnet
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 2:51 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

There are tons more thefts...ia anyone looking into this?
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 2:54 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Passed it on. I'm traveling today will call u later tonight.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 3:21 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

K, thanks
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Jun 17, 2011 at 10:01 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Caseys freaking out hard
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Fri, Jun 17, 2011 at 10:22 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Why.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Jun 17, 2011 at 10:24 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Everyone is awre of his identity
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Fri, Jun 17, 2011 at 10:24 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

What I figured. Thx
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Jun 17, 2011 at 10:41 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Some wag called his school...eesh
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, Jun 19, 2011 at 10:40 AM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Been a weird morning..kayla says headed for spain. 
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Sun, Jun 19, 2011 at 12:32 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Thanks
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 20, 2011 at 1:00 AM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Found a david lugg in canada who knows a lot about hbgary and claims to 
know kayla in person.  Worse, he works for NCR (cash machine co) in security
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 20, 2011 at 1:14 AM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

And they just posted another manifesto on banks/antisec
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Mon, Jun 20, 2011 at 12:49 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Got it. Thanks.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 12:40 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Haha, nice!
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 5:31 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Sabu making hostage jokes
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 3:22 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Azazel has phone and plans to call
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: 2011/6/22
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Aka sanguine et al
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 6:05 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Ok. Thanks. Will call u tomorrow.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 6:06 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Thanks, have fun

----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 4:55 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Developments..got a scared one
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 5:52 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Will call later tonight to get details.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 7:36 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Williams number is 860 801 0728
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 7:50 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Thx.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 9:20 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Sam bowne looking for emergency lapd infosec contact, any ideas?
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 9:24 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Who is sam bowne?
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 9:25 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Netsec guy at ucsf..app he heard/saw something
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 9:36 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

I just got an overseas call:/
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 9:43 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

K's friend?
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 9:44 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Sam? No sam's legit, white hat
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 9:44 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

What did bowne see?  Tell him to call fbi los angeles. They will put info 
to joint terr task force or appropriate people.
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 9:45 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

K's friend, was that the overseas call?
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 9:54 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Oh...no idea.  They called from guatemala
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 9:58 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

10-4. Going to bed. Chat with u tomorrow.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 9:59 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Kk
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 3:16 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Email again....also got told a nuts storu about brazil
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 3:57 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Ok. Was called by will. Suppose to be sending me logs to yahoo acct. 
Not there yet.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 3:58 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Theres a lot
Hes going through...said gigs of stuff
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 4:01 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Ok. How is he going to send it? Multiple zipped emails?
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 4:17 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

I think so, but hes afk

----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 6:58 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

No call yet from lugg.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 6:59 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

? I doubt lugg will call, I just worry hell try to leave the country
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 7:00 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Ill try and see
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 7:06 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Ok. I will prob pass him to another agent on my squad who can work with 
him. May want to let him know I will talk with him briefly first.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 8:31 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Sure...thing hes asleep, he was up late.
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 9:50 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Going to sleep soon as well. Will catch up tomorrow. Thx for all your help.
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Sat, Jun 25, 2011 at 9:16 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Got your message re sabu. Will have peeps look into. Thx.
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, Jun 25, 2011 at 9:33 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Dave says his father will "fix" evrrything.  They quit today, publicly.  
Ryan bell also mafe his facebook acct publiv
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, Jun 25, 2011 at 11:33 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

http://pastebin.com/raw.php?i=iVujX4TR
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 1:07 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

I got jesters folks to take down sabus address, but one of thrm would 
like to talk to you?  Some skeptiscim there
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 1:46 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Any additional info on brazilian gov stuff?  Your chat was forwarded to 
them.  Very helpful. 
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 1:49 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Just that so fat.  Also heard from sergio fava same t ok me, you must 
be chatting?  Lol
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 2:27 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Is sergio the guy that u chatted with, who wanted u to pass the vuls to sabu?
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 2:28 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

No, brazilian fed police guy
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 2:28 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Guy with the vulns is bruno something
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 2:56 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Tflows ip and email in their own leak, btw
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 4:48 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Kayla tells me he pulled the plug on lulz over strong objectins from sabu
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 5:17 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Ok. Thx
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 5:18 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Him and topiary both chatty
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 8:01 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Had a real intersting convo with a friend of sabu Apparently he and mike 
and justin all went tobedstuy together
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 9:00 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

High school, that is
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 11:44 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Just been told mtgox released one of the thieves accts, and its tflow
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 11:45 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Trying to confirm
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 28, 2011 at 6:58 AM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Oh, someone hates tflow.  That hackforums dump has a real ip
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 28, 2011 at 7:39 AM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

86.178.50.126
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Tue, Jun 28, 2011 at 8:27 AM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Got it. Thx
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Tue, Jun 28, 2011 at 8:28 AM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Mike who and justin who? Nicks?
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Tue, Jun 28, 2011 at 9:37 AM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Nevr mind. Reading email. Thx
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 28, 2011 at 8:34 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Laurelai went to gawker >.<
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Jun 29, 2011 at 2:10 AM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Hector appears to be answering justin perras phone, incriminated himself
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 3:28 AM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Believe laurelai is letting kayla use her skype acct, is connected from 
a kitchener, ontario ip
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 7:04 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Also kayla dumb enough to throw hints about my vpn...Have to laugh, 
because I confirmed her ip, but means I cant do much with laurelai now
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 5:17 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Because they know your vpn?
----------
From: <infinitysnake@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 5:18 PM
To: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>

Yeah, the vpn is open to view on irc, and laurelai dropped in, made a 
private chat, checked and left, wjich is what clued me to check the skype connections
----------
From: Special Agent Daniel Porsek <2023459771@unknown.email>
Date: Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 5:19 PM
To: infinitysnake@gmail.com

Ok.

 Found on 04/27/12 using keyword search antisec and a threshold of 1.

	


	



			
				


			

			
Cryptome unveils CENTCOM Command Control Knowledge Management
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL FILE HERE


centcom-c2km

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Army Assessment of Afghanistan Corruption
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


af-corruption


 

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – NRC on Threat of Nuclear Plant Insider Radiological Sabotage
		
	
	

		
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 84 (Tuesday, May 1, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25762-25767]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-10472]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 72-1039; NRC-2012-0099; EA-12-047]

In the Matter of Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Vogtle 
Electric Generating Plant, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation; 
Order Modifying License (Effective Immediately)

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Issuance of order for implementation of additional security 
measures and fingerprinting for unescorted access to Southern Nuclear 
Operating Company, Inc.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
    L. Raynard Wharton, Senior Project Manager, Licensing and 
Inspection Directorate, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and 
Transportation, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rockville, Maryland 20852; telephone: 
(301) 492-3316; fax number: (301) 492-3348; email: 
Raynard.Wharton@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

    Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 
2.106, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) 
is providing notice, in the matter of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Order Modifying 
License (Effective Immediately).

II. Further Information

I

    The NRC has issued a general license to Southern Nuclear Operating 
Company, Inc. (SNC), authorizing the operation of an ISFSI, in 
accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 
part 72. This Order is being issued to SNC because it has identified 
near-term plans to store spent fuel in an ISFSI under the general 
license provisions of 10 CFR part 72. The Commission's regulations at 
10 CFR 72.212(b)(5), 10 CFR 50.54(p)(1), and 10 CFR 73.55(c)(5) require 
licensees to maintain safeguards contingency plan procedures to respond 
to threats of radiological sabotage and to protect the spent fuel 
against the threat of radiological sabotage, in accordance with 10 CFR 
part 73, appendix C. Specific physical security requirements are 
contained in 10 CFR 73.51 or 73.55, as applicable.
    Inasmuch as an insider has an opportunity equal to, or greater 
than, any other person, to commit radiological sabotage, the Commission 
has determined these measures to be prudent. Comparable Orders have 
been issued to all licensees that currently store spent fuel or have 
identified near-term plans to store spent fuel in an ISFSI.

II

    On September 11, 2001, terrorists simultaneously attacked targets 
in New York, NY, and Washington, DC, using large commercial aircraft as 
weapons. In response to the attacks and intelligence information 
subsequently obtained, the Commission issued a number of Safeguards and 
Threat Advisories to its licensees to strengthen licensees' 
capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack on a 
nuclear facility. On October 16, 2002, the Commission issued Orders to 
the licensees of operating ISFSIs, to place the actions taken in 
response to the Advisories into the established regulatory framework 
and to implement additional security enhancements that emerged from 
NRC's ongoing comprehensive review. The Commission has also 
communicated with other Federal, State, and local government agencies 
and industry representatives to discuss and evaluate the current threat 
environment in order to assess the adequacy of security measures at 
licensed facilities. In addition, the Commission has conducted a 
comprehensive review of its safeguards and security programs and 
requirements.
    As a result of its consideration of current safeguards and security

[[Page 25763]]

requirements, as well as a review of information provided by the 
intelligence community, the Commission has determined that certain 
additional security measures (ASMs) are required to address the current 
threat environment, in a consistent manner throughout the nuclear ISFSI 
community. Therefore, the Commission is imposing requirements, as set 
forth in Attachments 1 and 2 of this Order, on all licensees of these 
facilities. These requirements, which supplement existing regulatory 
requirements, will provide the Commission with reasonable assurance 
that the public health and safety, the environment, and common defense 
and security continue to be adequately protected in the current threat 
environment. These requirements will remain in effect until the 
Commission determines otherwise.
    The Commission recognizes that licensees may have already initiated 
many of the measures set forth in Attachments 1 and 2 to this Order, in 
response to previously issued Advisories, or on their own. It also 
recognizes that some measures may not be possible or necessary at some 
sites, or may need to be tailored to accommodate the specific 
circumstances existing at SNC's facility, to achieve the intended 
objectives and avoid any unforeseen effect on the safe storage of spent 
fuel.
    Although the ASMs implemented by licensees in response to the 
Safeguards and Threat Advisories have been sufficient to provide 
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and 
safety, in light of the continuing threat environment, the Commission 
concludes that these actions must be embodied in an Order, consistent 
with the established regulatory framework.
    To provide assurance that licensees are implementing prudent 
measures to achieve a consistent level of protection to address the 
current threat environment, licenses issued pursuant to 10 CFR 72.210 
shall be modified to include the requirements identified in Attachments 
1 and 2 to this Order. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, I find 
that, in light of the common defense and security circumstances 
described above, the public health, safety, and interest require that 
this Order be effective immediately.

III

    Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 53, 103, 104, 147, 149, 161b, 
161i, 161o, 182, and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 
and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR parts 50, 
72, and 73, it is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that your 
general license is modified as follows:
    A. SNC shall comply with the requirements described in Attachments 
1 and 2 to this Order, except to the extent that a more stringent 
requirement is set forth in the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant's 
physical security plan. SNC shall demonstrate its ability to comply 
with the requirements in Attachments 1 and 2 to the Order no later than 
365 days from the date of this Order or 90 days before the first day 
that spent fuel is initially placed in the ISFSI, whichever is earlier. 
SNC must implement these requirements before initially placing spent 
fuel in the ISFSI. Additionally, SNC must receive written verification 
from the NRC that it has adequately demonstrated compliance with these 
requirements before initially placing spent fuel in the ISFSI.
    B. 1. SNC shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order, 
notify the Commission: (1) If it is unable to comply with any of the 
requirements described in Attachments 1 and 2; (2) if compliance with 
any of the requirements is unnecessary, in its specific circumstances; 
or (3) if implementation of any of the requirements would cause SNC to 
be in violation of the provisions of any Commission regulation or the 
facility license. The notification shall provide
    SNC's justification for seeking relief from, or variation of, any 
specific requirement.
    2. If SNC considers that implementation of any of the requirements 
described in Attachments 1 and 2 to this Order would adversely impact 
the safe storage of spent fuel, SNC must notify the Commission, within 
twenty (20) days of this Order, of the adverse safety impact, the basis 
for its determination that the requirement has an adverse safety 
impact, and either a proposal for achieving the same objectives 
specified in Attachments 1 and 2 requirements in question, or a 
schedule for modifying the facility, to address the adverse safety 
condition.
    If neither approach is appropriate, SNC must supplement its 
response, to Condition B.1 of this Order, to identify the condition as 
a requirement with which it cannot comply, with attendant 
justifications, as required under Condition B.1.
    C. 1. SNC shall, within twenty (20) days of this Order, submit to 
the Commission, a schedule for achieving compliance with each 
requirement described in Attachments 1 and 2.
    2. SNC shall report to the Commission when it has achieved full 
compliance with the requirements described in Attachments 1 and 2.
    D. All measures implemented or actions taken in response to this 
Order shall be maintained until the Commission determines otherwise.
    SNC's response to Conditions B.1, B.2, C.1, and C.2, above, shall 
be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 72.4. In addition, submittals 
and documents produced by SNC as a result of this Order, that contain 
Safeguards Information as defined by 10 CFR 73.22, shall be properly 
marked and handled, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and 73.22.
    The Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, 
may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above conditions, for good 
cause.

IV

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, SNC must, and any other person 
adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this Order 
within 20 days of its publication in the Federal Register. In addition, 
SNC and any other person adversely affected by this Order may request a 
hearing on this Order within 20 days of its publication in the Federal 
Register. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to 
extending the time to answer or request a hearing. A request for 
extension of time must be made, in writing, to the Director, Office of 
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and include a statement of good 
cause for the extension.
    The answer may consent to this Order. If the answer includes a 
request for a hearing, it shall, under oath or affirmation, 
specifically set forth the matters of fact and law on which SNC relies 
and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued. If a 
person other than SNC requests a hearing, that person shall set forth 
with particularity the manner in which his/her interest is adversely 
affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 
CFR 2.309(d).
    All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a 
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or 
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by 
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), 
must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139, 
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit 
and serve all adjudicatory

[[Page 25764]]

documents over the internet, or in some cases to mail copies on 
electronic storage media. Participants may not submit paper copies of 
their filings unless they seek an exemption in accordance with the 
procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the 
Office of the Secretary by email at hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by 
telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) a digital identification (ID) 
certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or 
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal 
server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise 
the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request or 
petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or 
its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID 
certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish 
an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the 
Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.
    Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing 
the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's ``Guidance for 
Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the NRC's public Web 
site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants 
may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but 
should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted 
software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer 
assistance in using unlisted software.
    If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC 
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the 
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to 
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System, 
users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's 
Web site. Further information on the Web-based submission form, 
including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on 
the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
    Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a 
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in 
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with the NRC guidance 
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the 
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be 
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system 
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of 
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends 
the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The 
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access 
to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any 
others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to 
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the 
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and 
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for 
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition 
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document 
via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically using the NRC's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System 
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's Web site 
at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email to 
MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call to 1-866-672-7640. The 
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., 
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
    Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing 
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper 
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: 
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or 
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth 
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. 
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for 
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered 
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or 
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing 
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, 
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a 
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer 
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from 
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the 
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at 
http://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the 
Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to 
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, 
home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC 
regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With 
respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve 
the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use 
application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted 
materials in their submission.
    If a hearing is requested by SNC or a person whose interest is 
adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the 
time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be 
considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be 
sustained.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), SNC may, in addition to 
requesting a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move 
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the 
Order on the grounds that the Order, including the need for immediate 
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence, but on mere 
suspicion, unfounded allegations, or error.
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions as 
specified in Section III shall be final twenty (20) days from the date 
this Order is published in the Federal Register, without further Order 
or proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has 
been approved, the provisions as specified in Section III, shall be 
final when the extension expires, if a hearing request has not been 
received. An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the 
immediate effectiveness of this order.

[[Page 25765]]

     Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23rd day of April, 2012.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Catherine Haney,
Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

Attachment 1--Additional Security Measures (ASMs) for Physical 
Protection of Dry Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) 
contains Safeguards Information and is not included in the Federal 
Register notice

Attachment 2--Additional Security Measures for Access Authorization and 
Fingerprinting at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations, Dated 
June 3, 2010

A. General Basis Criteria

    1. These additional security measures (ASMs) are established to 
delineate an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) 
licensee's responsibility to enhance security measures related to 
authorization for unescorted access to the protected area of an ISFSI 
in response to the current threat environment.
    2. Licensees whose ISFSI is collocated with a power reactor may 
choose to comply with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-
approved reactor access authorization program for the associated 
reactor as an alternative means to satisfy the provisions of sections B 
through G below. Otherwise, licensees shall comply with the access 
authorization and fingerprinting requirements of sections B through G 
of these ASMs.
    3. Licensees shall clearly distinguish in their 20-day response 
which method they intend to use in order to comply with these ASMs.

B. Additional Security Measures for Access Authorization Program

    1. The licensee shall develop, implement and maintain a program, or 
enhance its existing program, designed to ensure that persons granted 
unescorted access to the protected area of an ISFSI are trustworthy and 
reliable and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public 
health and safety or the common defense and security, including a 
potential to commit radiological sabotage.
    a. To establish trustworthiness and reliability, the licensee shall 
develop, implement, and maintain procedures for conducting and 
completing background investigations, prior to granting access. The 
scope of background investigations must address at least the past three 
years and, as a minimum, must include:
    i. Fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
identification and criminal history records check (CHRC). Where an 
applicant for unescorted access has been previously fingerprinted with 
a favorably completed CHRC (such as a CHRC pursuant to compliance with 
orders for access to safeguards information), the licensee may accept 
the results of that CHRC, and need not submit another set of 
fingerprints, provided the CHRC was completed not more than three years 
from the date of the application for unescorted access.
    ii. Verification of employment with each previous employer for the 
most recent year from the date of application.
    iii. Verification of employment with an employer of the longest 
duration during any calendar month for the remaining next most recent 2 
years.
    iv. A full credit history review.
    v. An interview with not less than two character references, 
developed by the investigator.
    vi. A review of official identification (e.g., driver's license; 
passport; government identification; state-, province-, or country-of-
birth issued certificate of birth) to allow comparison of personal 
information data provided by the applicant. The licensee shall maintain 
a photocopy of the identifying document(s) on file, in accordance with 
``Protection of Information,'' in section G of these ASMs.
    vii. Licensees shall confirm eligibility for employment through the 
regulations of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, and shall verify and ensure, to 
the extent possible, the accuracy of the provided social security 
number and alien registration number, as applicable.
    b. The procedures developed or enhanced shall include measures for 
confirming the term, duration, and character of military service for 
the past 3 years, and/or academic enrollment and attendance in lieu of 
employment, for the past 5 years.
    c. Licensees need not conduct an independent investigation for 
individuals employed at a facility who possess active ``Q'' or ``L'' 
clearances or possess another active U.S. Government-granted security 
clearance (i.e., Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential).
    d. A review of the applicant's criminal history, obtained from 
local criminal justice resources, may be included in addition to the 
FBI CHRC, and is encouraged if the results of the FBI CHRC, employment 
check, or credit check disclose derogatory information. The scope of 
the applicant's local criminal history check shall cover all residences 
of record for the past three years from the date of the application for 
unescorted access.
    2. The licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a 
CHRC solely for the purpose of determining an individual's suitability 
for unescorted access to the protected area of an ISFSI.
    3. The licensee shall document the basis for its determination for 
granting or denying access to the protected area of an ISFSI.
    4. The licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain procedures 
for updating background investigations for persons who are applying for 
reinstatement of unescorted access. Licensees need not conduct an 
independent reinvestigation for individuals who possess active ``Q'' or 
``L'' clearances or possess another active U.S. Government-granted 
security clearance, i.e., Top Secret, Secret or Confidential.
    5. The licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain procedures 
for reinvestigations of persons granted unescorted access, at intervals 
not to exceed five years. Licensees need not conduct an independent 
reinvestigation for individuals employed at a facility who possess 
active ``Q'' or ``L'' clearances or possess another active U.S. 
Government-granted security clearance, i.e., Top Secret, Secret or 
Confidential.
    6. The licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain procedures 
designed to ensure that persons who have been denied unescorted access 
authorization to the facility are not allowed access to the facility, 
even under escort.
    7. The licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain an audit 
program for licensee and contractor/vendor access authorization 
programs that evaluate all program elements and include a person 
knowledgeable and practiced in access authorization program performance 
objectives to assist in the overall assessment of the site's program 
effectiveness.

C. Fingerprinting Program Requirements

    1. In a letter to the NRC, the licensee must nominate an individual 
who will review the results of the FBI CHRCs to make trustworthiness 
and reliability determinations for unescorted access to an ISFSI. This 
individual, referred to as the ``reviewing official,'' must be someone 
who requires unescorted access to the ISFSI. The NRC will review the 
CHRC of any individual nominated to perform the reviewing official 
function. Based on the results of the CHRC, the NRC staff will 
determine whether this individual may have

[[Page 25766]]

access. If the NRC determines that the nominee may not be granted such 
access, that individual will be prohibited from obtaining access.\1\ 
Once the NRC approves a reviewing official, the reviewing official is 
the only individual permitted to make access determinations for other 
individuals who have been identified by the licensee as having the need 
for unescorted access to the ISFSI, and have been fingerprinted and 
have had a CHRC in accordance with these ASMs. The reviewing official 
can only make access determinations for other individuals, and 
therefore cannot approve other individuals to act as reviewing 
officials. Only the NRC can approve a reviewing official. Therefore, if 
the licensee wishes to have a new or additional reviewing official, the 
NRC must approve that individual before he or she can act in the 
capacity of a reviewing official.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The NRC's determination of this individual's unescorted 
access to the ISFSI, in accordance with the process, is an 
administrative determination that is outside the scope of the Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. No person may have access to Safeguards Information (SGI) or 
unescorted access to any facility subject to NRC regulation, if the NRC 
has determined, in accordance with its administrative review process 
based on fingerprinting and an FBI identification and CHRC, that the 
person may not have access to SGI or unescorted access to any facility 
subject to NRC regulation.
    3. All fingerprints obtained by the licensee under this Order must 
be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the FBI.
    4. The licensee shall notify each affected individual that the 
fingerprints will be used to conduct a review of his/her criminal 
history record and inform the individual of the procedures for revising 
the record or including an explanation in the record, as specified in 
the ``Right to Correct and Complete Information,'' in section F of 
these ASMs.
    5. Fingerprints need not be taken if the employed individual (e.g., 
a licensee employee, contractor, manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved 
from the fingerprinting requirement by 10 CFR 73.61, has a favorably 
adjudicated U.S. Government CHRC within the last 5 years, or has an 
active Federal security clearance. Written confirmation from the 
Agency/employer who granted the Federal security clearance or reviewed 
the CHRC must be provided to the licensee. The licensee must retain 
this documentation for a period of 3 years from the date the individual 
no longer requires access to the facility.

D. Prohibitions

    1. A licensee shall not base a final determination to deny an 
individual unescorted access to the protected area of an ISFSI solely 
on the basis of information received from the FBI involving: An arrest 
more than 1 year old for which there is no information of the 
disposition of the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the 
charge, or an acquittal.
    2. A licensee shall not use information received from a CHRC 
obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that would infringe upon 
the rights of any individual under the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, nor shall the licensee use the 
information in any way that would discriminate among individuals on the 
basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or age.

E. Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks

    1. For the purpose of complying with this Order, licensees shall, 
using an appropriate method listed in 10 CFR 73.4, submit to the NRC's 
Division of Facilities and Security, Mail Stop TWB-05B32M, one 
completed, legible standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, 
ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where practicable, other fingerprint records for each 
individual seeking unescorted access to an ISFSI, to the Director of 
the Division of Facilities and Security, marked for the attention of 
the Division's Criminal History Check Section. Copies of these forms 
may be obtained by writing the Office of Information Services, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, by calling 
(301) 415-5877, or by email to Forms.Resource@nrc.gov. Practicable 
alternative formats are set forth in 10 CFR 73.4. The licensee shall 
establish procedures to ensure that the quality of the fingerprints 
taken results in minimizing the rejection rate of fingerprint cards 
because of illegible or incomplete cards.
    2. The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for 
completeness. Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing omissions 
or evident errors will be returned to the licensee for corrections. The 
fee for processing fingerprint checks includes one re-submission if the 
initial submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint 
impressions cannot be classified. The one free re-submission must have 
the FBI Transaction Control Number reflected on the re-submission. If 
additional submissions are necessary, they will be treated as initial 
submittals and will require a second payment of the processing fee.
    3. Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application. 
The licensee shall submit payment of the processing fees 
electronically. To be able to submit secure electronic payments, 
licensees will need to establish an account with Pay.Gov (https://www.pay.gov). To request an account, the licensee shall send an email 
to det@nrc.gov. The email must include the licensee's company name, 
address, point of contact (POC), POC email address, and phone number. 
The NRC will forward the request to Pay.Gov, who will contact the 
licensee with a password and user ID. Once the licensee has established 
an account and submitted payment to Pay.Gov, they shall obtain a 
receipt. The licensee shall submit the receipt from Pay.Gov to the NRC 
along with fingerprint cards. For additional guidance on making 
electronic payments, contact the Facilities Security Branch, Division 
of Facilities and Security, at (301) 492-3531. Combined payment for 
multiple applications is acceptable. The application fee (currently 
$26) is the sum of the user fee charged by the FBI for each fingerprint 
card or other fingerprint record submitted by the NRC on behalf of a 
licensee, and an NRC processing fee, which covers administrative costs 
associated with NRC handling of licensee fingerprint submissions. The 
Commission will directly notify licensees who are subject to this 
regulation of any fee changes.
    4. The Commission will forward to the submitting licensee all data 
received from the FBI as a result of the licensee's application(s) for 
CHRCs, including the FBI fingerprint record.

F. Right To Correct and Complete Information

    1. Prior to any final adverse determination, the licensee shall 
make available to the individual the contents of any criminal history 
records obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and 
complete information. Written confirmation by the individual of receipt 
of this notification must be maintained by the licensee for a period of 
one (1) year from the date of notification.
    2. If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it 
is incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, 
correct, or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter in 
the record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These 
procedures include either direct application by the individual 
challenging the record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency)

[[Page 25767]]

that contributed the questioned information, or direct challenge as to 
the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the criminal history 
record to the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Identification Division, Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 
CFR 16.30 through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the 
challenge to the agency that submitted the data and requests that 
agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an 
official communication directly from the agency that contributed the 
original information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes 
necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that agency. 
The licensee must provide at least 10 days for an individual to 
initiate an action challenging the results of a FBI CHRC after the 
record is made available for his/her review. The licensee may make a 
final access determination based on the criminal history record only 
upon receipt of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or correction of the 
record. Upon a final adverse determination on access to an ISFSI, the 
licensee shall provide the individual its documented basis for denial. 
Access to an ISFSI shall not be granted to an individual during the 
review process.

G. Protection of Information

    1. The licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain a system for 
personnel information management with appropriate procedures for the 
protection of personal, confidential information. This system shall be 
designed to prohibit unauthorized access to sensitive information and 
to prohibit modification of the information without authorization.
    2. Each licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an 
individual pursuant to this Order shall establish and maintain a system 
of files and procedures, for protecting the record and the personal 
information from unauthorized disclosure.
    3. The licensee may not disclose the record or personal information 
collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual, 
his/her representative, or to those who have a need to access the 
information in performing assigned duties in the process of determining 
suitability for unescorted access to the protected area of an ISFSI. No 
individual authorized to have access to the information may re-
disseminate the information to any other individual who does not have 
the appropriate need to know.
    4. The personal information obtained on an individual from a CHRC 
may be transferred to another licensee if the gaining licensee receives 
the individual's written request to re-disseminate the information 
contained in his/her file, and the gaining licensee verifies 
information such as the individual's name, date of birth, social 
security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics for 
identification purposes.
    5. The licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained under 
this section, available for examination by an authorized representative 
of the NRC to determine compliance with the regulations and laws.

[FR Doc. 2012-10472 Filed 4-30-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
Revealed – NIST Hosts Cybersecurity Excellence Workshop
		
	
	

		
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 87 (Friday, May 4, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26511-26512]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-10810]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Announcing a National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) 
Workshop

AGENCY: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of initial public workshop.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: NIST announces a National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence 
(NCCoE) Workshop to be held on Tuesday, June 26, 2012. This is an 
initial informational NCCoE workshop. The goals of this workshop are to 
provide a venue for discussion of the NCCoE public-private partnership 
structure, and to describe and gather input from individual 
participants on possible case studies that are expected to form a 
central focus of collaborative efforts. The workshop will also describe 
and explore opportunities for industry, academia, and Federal, state 
and local government agencies to participate in the NCCoE.

DATES: The NCCoE Workshop will be held on Tuesday, June 26, 2012 from 8 
a.m. Eastern Time to 5 p.m. Eastern Time. Attendees must register by 5 
p.m. Eastern Time on Tuesday, June 19, 2012.

ADDRESSES: The event will be held at the Universities at Shady Grove, 
9630 Gudelsky Drive, Rockville, MD 20850.

[[Page 26512]]

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information contact N. 
Lucy Salah by email at nccoe@nist.gov or by phone at (301) 975-4500. To 
register, go to: https://www.fbcinc.com/NIST/nccoe/atreg1.aspx. 
Additional workshop details will be available at http://csrc.nist.gov/nccoe.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The NCCoE is a public-private collaboration 
for accelerating the widespread adoption of integrated cybersecurity 
tools and technologies. The NCCoE will bring together experts from 
industry, government and academia under one roof to develop practical, 
interoperable cybersecurity approaches that address the real world 
needs of complex Information Technology (IT) systems. By accelerating 
dissemination and use of these integrated tools and technologies for 
protecting IT assets, the NCCoE will enhance trust in U.S. IT 
communications, data, and storage systems; lower risk for companies and 
individuals in the use of IT systems; and encourage development of 
innovative, job-creating cybersecurity products and services.
    This initial workshop will provide a venue for discussion of the 
NCCoE public-private partnership structure, and describe and gather 
input from individual participants on possible case studies that are 
expected to form a central focus of collaborative efforts. The workshop 
will also describe and explore opportunities for industry, academia, 
and Federal, state and local government agencies to participate in the 
NCCoE.
    The workshop is open to the general public; however, those wishing 
to attend must register at https://www.fbcinc.com/NIST/nccoe/atreg1.aspx 
by 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Tuesday, June 19, 2012, in order 
to attend.
    For additional information on the NCCoE governance and NCCoE 
operational structure, visit the NCCoE Web site http://csrc.nist.gov/nccoe.

    Dated: April 27, 2012.
Willie E. May,
Associate Director for Laboratory Programs.
[FR Doc. 2012-10810 Filed 5-3-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-13-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – NSA: Risks of New Smartphones
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


nsa-mobile-risks

	


	



			
				


			

			
Unveiled by Cryptome – Apple Legacy Filevault Hole
		
	
	

		
Date: Fri, 4 May 2012 20:40:07 -0400

From: “David I. Emery” <die[at]dieconsulting.com>

To: cryptography[at]randombit.net

Subject: [cryptography] Apple Legacy filevault barn door…


As someone said here recently, carefully built crypto has a unfortunate tendency to consist of three thick impregnable walls and a picket fence in the back with the gate left open.


That seems to have happened to Apple’s older (“legacy”) Filevault in the current release of MacOX Lion (10.7.3)…. something intended to protect sensitive information stored on laptops by providing for encrypted user home directories contained in an encrypted file system mounted on top of the user’s home directory.


Someone, for some unknown reason, turned on a debug switch (DEBUGLOG) in the current released version of MacOS Lion 10.7.3 that causes the authorizationhost process’s HomeDirMounter DIHLFVMount to log in *PLAIN TEXT* in a system wide logfile readible by anyone with root or admin access the login password of the user of an encrypted home directory tree (“legacy Filevault”).


The log in question is kept by default for several weeks…


Thus anyone who can read files accessible to group admin can discover the login passwords of any users of legacy (pre LION) Filevault home directories who have logged in since the upgrade to 10.7.3 in early February 2012.


This is worse than it seems, since the log in question can also be read by booting the machine into firewire disk mode and reading it by opening the drive as a disk or by booting the new-with-LION recovery partition and using the available superuser shell to mount the main file system partition and read the file. This would allow someone to break into encrypted partitions on machines they did not have any idea of any login passwords for.


One can partially protect oneself against the firewire disk and recovery partition attacks by using Filevault 2 (whole disk encryption) which then requires one know at least one user login password before one can access files on the main partition of the disk.


And one can provide further weaker protection by setting a firmware password which must be supplied before one can boot the recovery partition, external media, or enter firewire disk mode –  though there is a standard technique for turning that off known to Apple field support (“genius bar”) persons.


But having the password logged in the clear in an admin readible file *COMPLETELY* breaks a security model – not uncommon in families – where different users of a particular machine are isolated from each other and cannot access each others files or login as each other with some degree of assurance of security. Granted, of course that someone able to alter executable code could plant keyloggers and the like… and break this … but actually shipping product that does so without notice is disturbing.


And for those who use Apple’s easy backup tools (“Time Capsule”), it was possible to assume that those tools only wrote copies of the sparsebundle encrypted container for a Filevault legacy home directory to the backup media meaning that an unencrypted backup would still provide protection for the contained encrypted home directories… but with the password required to decrypt the sparebundles stored in the clear on the (unencrypted) backup that assumption is no longer true.


One wonders why such a debug switch exists in shipped production code… clearly it could be invoked covertly in specific situations, this seems to be an example of someone turning it on for the entire release by accident.


Nobody breaks encryption by climbing the high walls in front … when the garden gate is open for millions of machines.


This bug (LEA feature?) seems to have been introduced into MacOS Lion 10.7.3 early February 2012 and so far has not been corrected by any updates.


—


Dave Emery N1PRE/AE, die[at]dieconsulting.com DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass 02493

“An empty zombie mind with a forlorn barely readable weatherbeaten

‘For Rent’ sign still vainly flapping outside on the weed encrusted pole – in

celebration of what could have been, but wasn’t and is not to be now either.”


Date: Fri, 4 May 2012 20:40:07 -0400

From: “David I. Emery” <die[at]dieconsulting.com>

To: cryptography[at]randombit.net

Subject: [cryptography] Apple Legacy filevault barn door…


As someone said here recently, carefully built crypto has a unfortunate tendency to consist of three thick impregnable walls and a picket fence in the back with the gate left open.


That seems to have happened to Apple’s older (“legacy”) Filevault in the current release of MacOX Lion (10.7.3)…. something intended to protect sensitive information stored on laptops by providing for encrypted user home directories contained in an encrypted file system mounted on top of the user’s home directory.


Someone, for some unknown reason, turned on a debug switch (DEBUGLOG) in the current released version of MacOS Lion 10.7.3 that causes the authorizationhost process’s HomeDirMounter DIHLFVMount to log in *PLAIN TEXT* in a system wide logfile readible by anyone with root or admin access the login password of the user of an encrypted home directory tree (“legacy Filevault”).


The log in question is kept by default for several weeks…


Thus anyone who can read files accessible to group admin can discover the login passwords of any users of legacy (pre LION) Filevault home directories who have logged in since the upgrade to 10.7.3 in early February 2012.


This is worse than it seems, since the log in question can also be read by booting the machine into firewire disk mode and reading it by opening the drive as a disk or by booting the new-with-LION recovery partition and using the available superuser shell to mount the main file system partition and read the file. This would allow someone to break into encrypted partitions on machines they did not have any idea of any login passwords for.


One can partially protect oneself against the firewire disk and recovery partition attacks by using Filevault 2 (whole disk encryption) which then requires one know at least one user login password before one can access files on the main partition of the disk.


And one can provide further weaker protection by setting a firmware password which must be supplied before one can boot the recovery partition, external media, or enter firewire disk mode –  though there is a standard technique for turning that off known to Apple field support (“genius bar”) persons.


But having the password logged in the clear in an admin readible file *COMPLETELY* breaks a security model – not uncommon in families – where different users of a particular machine are isolated from each other and cannot access each others files or login as each other with some degree of assurance of security. Granted, of course that someone able to alter executable code could plant keyloggers and the like… and break this … but actually shipping product that does so without notice is disturbing.


And for those who use Apple’s easy backup tools (“Time Capsule”), it was possible to assume that those tools only wrote copies of the sparsebundle encrypted container for a Filevault legacy home directory to the backup media meaning that an unencrypted backup would still provide protection for the contained encrypted home directories… but with the password required to decrypt the sparebundles stored in the clear on the (unencrypted) backup that assumption is no longer true.


One wonders why such a debug switch exists in shipped production code… clearly it could be invoked covertly in specific situations, this seems to be an example of someone turning it on for the entire release by accident.


Nobody breaks encryption by climbing the high walls in front … when the garden gate is open for millions of machines.


This bug (LEA feature?) seems to have been introduced into MacOS Lion 10.7.3 early February 2012 and so far has not been corrected by any updates.


—


Dave Emery N1PRE/AE, die[at]dieconsulting.com DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass 02493

“An empty zombie mind with a forlorn barely readable weatherbeaten

‘For Rent’ sign still vainly flapping outside on the weed encrusted pole – in

celebration of what could have been, but wasn’t and is not to be now either.”

	


	



			
				


			

			
Unveiled – Osama bin Laden Letters from Abbottabad EN – E-BOOK
		
	
	

		


This report is a study of 17 de-classified documents captured during the Abbottabad raid and released to the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). They consist of electronic letters or draft letters, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation. The earliest is dated September 2006 and the latest April 2011.  These internal al-Qa`ida communications were authored by several  leaders, most prominently Usama bin Ladin.  In contrast to his public statements that focused on the injustice of those he believed to be the “enemies” of Muslims, namely corrupt “apostate” Muslim rulers and their Western “overseers,” the focus of Bin Ladin’s private letters is Muslims’ suffering at the hands of his jihadi “brothers”. He is at pain advising them to abort domestic attacks that cause Muslim civilian casualties and focus on the United States, “our desired goal.” Bin Ladin’s frustration with regional jihadi groups and his seeming inability to exercise control over their actions and public statements is the most compelling story to be told on the basis of the 17 de-classified documents. “Letters from Abbottabad” is an initial exploration and contextualization of 17 documents that will be the grist for future academic debate and discussion.


A note on translation:


The quality of the English translation provided to the CTC is not adequate throughout. When the translation was deemed inadequate, quotations cited in this report have either been amended or translated anew by Nelly Lahoud. Furthermore, the conversion of the dating of the letters from the Hijri to the Gregorian calendar is inaccurate in some places. The Appendix provides corrected dates to some of the letters, along with some pointers on how some letters relate to others.  For those wishing to conduct their own analysis of the documents, it is highly recommended to refer to the original Arabic documents, not the translations.


DOWNLOAD THE E-BOOK HERE


obl-letters-en

	


	



			
				


			

			
Unveiled – Osama bin Laden Abbottabad Documents in English
		
	
	

		
The al Qaeda documents were found in Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011.


Scores of pages of al Qaeda documents seized in last year’s U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden released.




Description of the Abbottabad Documents Provided to the CTC 


This document provides a general description of the 17 declassified documents captured in the Abbottabad raid and released to the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC).  For additional context please see the documents themselves and/or the CTC’s report “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?” released in conjunction with this summary.


The 17 documents consist of electronic letters or draft letters, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation. The earliest letter is dated September 2006 and the latest April 2011. These internal al-Qa`ida communications were authored by several  leaders, including Usama bin Ladin, `Atiyya `Abd al-Rahman, Abu Yahya al-Libi and the American Adam Gadahn, as well as several unknown individuals who were either affiliated with the group or wrote to offer it advice. Other recognizable personalities who feature in the letters either as authors, recipients or points of conversation include Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, leader of the Somali militant group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin; Nasir al-Wuhayshi (Abu Basir), leader of the Yemen-based al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Anwar al-`Awlaqi; and Hakimullah Mahsud, leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Some of the letters are incomplete and/or are missing their dates, and not all of the letters explicitly attribute their author(s) and/or indicate to whom they are addressed. Given that they are all electronic documents either saved on thumb drives, memory cards or the hard drive of Bin Ladin’s computer, except for the letters addressed to Bin Ladin, it cannot be ascertained whether any of these letters actually reached their intended destinations.


 


SOCOM-2012-0000003


This letter was authored by Usama bin Ladin and addressed to Shaykh Mahmud (`Atiyya Abdul Rahman) on 27 August 2010. Mahmud is specifically directed to tell “Basir,” who is Nasir al-Wuhayshi (Abu Basir), the leader of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, to remain in his role (presumably in response to a request from Abu Basir that Anwar al-`Awlaqi take his position), and for him to send “us a detailed and lengthy” version of al-`Awlaqi’s resume. `Atiyya is also told to ask Basir and Anwar al-`Awlaqi for their “vision in detail about the situation” in Yemen. References are also made in the letter to the 2010 floods in Pakistan, a letter from Bin Ladin’s son Khalid to `Abd al-Latif, al-Qa`ida’s media plan for the 9/11 anniversary, and the need for the “brothers coming from Iran” to be placed in safe locations.


SOCOM-2012-0000004  


This document is a letter authored by the American al-Qa`ida spokesman Adam Gadahn to an unknown recipient and was written in late January 2011. In the first part of the document Gadahn provides strategic advice regarding al-Qa`ida’s media plans for the tenth anniversary of 9/11. The letter is in essence a response to many of the requests/queries that Bin Ladin makes in his letter to `Atiyya dated October 2010 (SOCOM-2012-0000015), particularly those concerning a media strategy for the ten-year anniversary of 9/11. In other parts of the document Gadahn incisively criticizes the tactics and targeting calculus of the Islamic State of Iraq (AQI/ISI) and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP); he strongly advocates for  al-Qa`ida to publicly dissociate itself from both groups. The document concludes with a draft statement, which provides a candid assessment of these issues.


SOCOM-2012-0000005


This document is a letter dated 7 August 2010 from “Zamarai” (Usama bin Ladin) to Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, the leader of the Somali militant group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin, which merged with al-Qa`ida after Bin Ladin’s death. The document is a response to a letter Bin Ladin received from al-Zubayr in which he requested formal unity with al-Qa`ida and either consulted Bin Ladin on the question of declaring an Islamic state in Somalia or informed him that he was about to declare one. In Bin Ladin’s response, he politely declines al-Shabab’s request for formal unity with al-Qa`ida.


SOCOM-2012-0000006


This document is a letter believed to have been composed in December 2010 and its content relates to SOCOM-2012-0000005.  The letter is addressed to Azmarai, perhaps a typo or misspelling of the nickname Zamarai (a nickname or kunya for Bin Ladin).   While the identity of the author is unclear, the familiar tone and implicit critique of Bin Ladin’s policy vis-a-vis al-Shabab suggest that this is from a high ranking personality, possibly Ayman al-Zawahiri. Referring to “our friend’s letter” and the perspective of the “brothers…[who might have been] too concerned about inflating the size and growth of al-Qa`ida,” the author of the document urges the receiver to “reconsider your opinion not to declare the accession [i.e. formal merger] of the brothers of Somalia…” This is clearly a reference to al-Qa`ida’s potential merger with al-Shabab and suggests that al-Qa`ida’s relationship with the “affiliates” is a subject of internal debate. If indeed the author of the letter is Ayman al-Zawahiri this could be an indication of a major fissure over a key strategic question at the pinnacle of the organization (for different interpretations of this letter, see Appendix of “Letters from Abbottabad”).


SOCOM-2012-0000007


This letter is authored by Mahmud al-Hasan (`Atiyya) and Abu Yahya al-Libi and addressed to the amir of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Hakimullah Mahsud. It is dated 3 December 2010 and is sharply critical of the ideology and tactics of the TTP.  The letter makes it clear that al-Qa`ida’s senior leaders had serious concerns about the TTP’s trajectory inside Pakistan, and the impact the group’s misguided operations might have on al-Qa`ida and other militant groups in the region. The authors identify several errors committed by the group, specifically Hakimullah Mahsud’s arrogation of privileges and positions beyond what was appropriate as the TTP’s amir; the TTP’s use of indiscriminate violence and killing of Muslim civilians; and the group’s use of kidnapping. `Atiyya and al-Libi also take issue with Mahsud labeling al-Qa`ida members as “guests” and the attempts made by other groups (presumably the TTP) to siphon off al-Qa`ida members. The authors threaten that if actions are not taken to correct these mistakes, “we shall be forced to take public and firm legal steps from our side.”


SOCOM-2012-0000008


This letter was originally an exchange between Jaysh al-Islam and `Atiyya that was forwarded first to a certain `Abd al-Hamid (and presumably to Bin Ladin later). The gist of Jaysh al-Islam’s letter makes it known that the group is in need of financial assistance “to support jihad,” and that the group is seeking `Atiyya’s legal advice on three matters: 1) the permissibility of accepting financial assistance from other militant Palestinian groups (e.g., Fatah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad); 2)  the permissibility of  investing funds in the stock market in support of jihad;  and 3)  the permissibility of striking or killing drug traffickers in order to use their money, and even drugs, to lure their enemies who could in turn be used by Jaysh al-Islam as double-agents. `Atiyya’s response, written sometime between 24 October 2006 and 22 November 2006, is cordial but distant, responding to the questions but refraining from giving any strategic advice.


SOCOM-2012-0000009


This document is part of a longer letter which was not released to the CTC. It is not clear who authored the letter or to whom it was addressed. It discusses the potential need to change the name of “Qa`idat al-Jihad.” The author is of the view that the abridging of the name “al-Qa`ida” has “lessened Muslims’ feelings that we belong to them.” The author is further concerned that since the name “al-Qa`ida” lacks religious connotations, it has allowed the United States to launch a war on “al-Qa`ida” without offending Muslims. The author proposed a list of new names that capture Islamic theological themes: Ta’ifat al-tawhid wa-al-jihad (Monotheism and Jihad Group), Jama`at wahdat al-Muslimin (Muslim Unity Group), Hizb tawhid al-Umma al-Islamiyya (Islamic Nation Unification Party) and Jama`at tahrir al-aqsa (Al-Aqsa Liberation Group).


SOCOM-2012-0000010


This letter is authored by “Abu `Abdallah” (Usama bin Ladin), addressed to “Shaykh Mahmud” (`Atiyya) and dated 26 April 2011 – a week before bin Ladin’s death. In it, Bin Ladin outlines his response to the “Arab Spring,” proposing two different strategies. The first strategy pertains to the Arab World and entails “inciting people who have not yet revolted and exhort[ing] them to rebel against the rulers (khuruj ‘ala al-hukkam)”; the second strategy concerns Afghanistan and it entails continuing to evoke the obligation of jihad there. The letter also makes reference to a wide variety of topics including: the scarcity of communications from Iraq, “the brothers coming from Iran,” and hostages held by “our brothers in the Islamic Maghreb” and in Somalia. The document also briefly discusses Bin Ladin’s sons, his courier, Shaykh Abu Muhammad (Ayman al-Zawahiri), and other individuals of interest.


SOCOM-2012-0000011


This letter, dated 28 March 2007, is addressed to a legal scholar by the name of Hafiz Sultan, and it is authored by someone who is of Egyptian origin. The author makes it explicit that he was alarmed by al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s conduct and he urges Sultan to write to that group’s leaders to correct their ways. The author also asks for legal guidance on the use of chlorine gas, which he appears not to support. A reference is also made to “the brothers in Lebanon” and the need to arrange “to have one of their representatives visit us in the near future.” A message from the “brothers in Algeria” is also included.


SOCOM-2012-0000012


This letter dated 11 June 2009 was written by `Atiyya to the “honorable shaykh.” It is possible that it was addressed to Usama bin Ladin, but it may have been addressed to another senior leader. The majority of the letter provides details on the release of detained jihadi “brothers” and their families from Iran and an indication that more are expected to be released, including Bin Ladin’s family. It seems that their release was partially in response to covert operations by al-Qa`ida against Iran and its interests.


SOCOM-2012-0000013


This is a draft that formed the basis of a publicly available document, part four in a series of statements that Ayman al-Zawahiri released in response to the “Arab Spring.” Through the document one can observe al-Qa`ida’s editing process (reflected in the editor’s comments highlighted in green and in a bold font). While it is not clear if Bin Ladin himself did the editing, whoever did so has solid grammatical foundations and prefers a more self-effacing writing style than al-Zawahiri. The edits were not included in al-Zawahiri’s final speech which was released in a video on 4 March 2011 on jihadi forums. Of the 12 proposed corrections only one appears in al-Zawahiri’s speech.


SOCOM-2012-0000014


This document consists of two letters addressed to “Abu `Abd-al-Rahman,” almost certainly `Atiyya `Abd al-Rahman. It was sent by an operative who knows `Atiyya and is a religious student with ties to the senior shaykhs and clerics in Saudi Arabia. While the letters are not dated, their contents suggest they were composed soon after January 2007; they read very much like an intelligence assessment, designed to provide `Atiyya with some perspective on how al-Qa`ida generally, and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) more specifically, are perceived amongst Saudi scholars of varying degrees of prominence. The author provides `Atiyya with brief summaries of private meetings the author had with certain scholars, with the clear intent of evaluating the level of support that al-Qa`ida enjoys from some relatively prominent members of the Saudi religious establishment.


SOCOM-2012-0000015


This document is a letter dated 21 October 2010 from Bin Ladin to “Shaykh Mahmud” (`Atiyya). The letter is primarily focused on issues in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. In the letter Bin Ladin specifically comments on: the security situation in Waziristan and the need to relocate al-Qa`ida members from the region; counter surveillance issues associated with the movement of his son Hamza within Pakistan; the appointment of `Atiyya’s three deputies; various al-Sahab videos and the media plan for the tenth anniversary of 9/11; the release of an Afghan prisoner held by al-Qa`ida; and the trial of Faisal Shahzad. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Yahya al-Libi, Saif al-`Adl, and Adam Gadahn are also mentioned in the document.


SOCOM-2012-0000016


This document is a letter addressed to “Abu Basir” (Nasir al-Wuhayshi, leader of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula – AQAP) from an unidentified author, most likely Usama bin Ladin and/or `Atiyya. The letter is in part a response to specific requests for guidance from AQAP’s leadership. The author specifically advises AQAP to focus on targeting the United States, not the Yemeni government or security forces. The author also discusses media strategy and the importance of AQAP’s relations with Yemen’s tribes.


SOCOM-2012-0000017


This document is a series of paragraphs, some of which match the content found in SOCOM-2012-0000016. This document was likely written by the author of that document. This letter discusses strategy, the need for al-Qa`ida to remain focused on targeting the United States (or even against U.S. targets in South Africa where other “brothers” are not active), the importance of tribal relations in a variety of different countries, and media activity.


SOCOM-2012-0000018


This document is a letter addressed to Usama bin Ladin from “a loving brother whom you know and who knows you” and dated 14 September 2006. The author is critical of Bin Ladin for focusing al- Qa`ida’s operations on “Islamic countries in general and the Arabian Peninsula in particular.” He enumerates the numerous negative consequences of engaging in jihad inside Saudi Arabia, and informs Bin Ladin that people are now repulsed by the technical term “jihad” and even forbidden to use it in lectures. The author strongly advised Bin Ladin to change his policies.


SOCOM-2012-0000019


This document is a long letter authored by Usama bin Ladin after the death of Sheikh Sa‘id (Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid) in late May 2010 and it is addressed to “Shaykh Mahmud” (`Atiyya) who he designates as Sa‘id’s successor.  Bin Ladin’s letter is concerned with the mistakes committed by regional jihadi groups, which have resulted in the unnecessary deaths of thousands of Muslim civilians. Bin Ladin indicates that he would like to start a “new phase” so that the jihadis could regain the trust of Muslims. He directs `Atiyya to prepare a memorandum to centralize, in the hands of AQC, the media campaign and operations of regional jihadi groups. Considerable space is devoted to a discussion about Yemen, external operations and Bin Ladin’s plans for his son Hamza. This document includes an additional letter that Bin Ladin forwards to `Atiyya authored by Shaykh Yunis, presumably Yunis al-Mauritani, consisting of a new operational plan that al- Qa`ida should consider adopting.






They comprise 175 pages in the original Arabic of letters and drafts from bin Laden and other key al Qaeda figures, including the American Adam Gadahn and Abu Yahya al-Libi.




Scores of pages of al Qaeda documents seized in last year’s U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden were released Thursday.


They comprise 175 pages in the original Arabic of letters and drafts from bin Laden and other key al Qaeda figures, including the American Adam Gadahn and Abu Yahya al-Libi.


Here are the center’s brief description of the documents.


nks for the English translations.

Bergen: OBL docs could damage Al Qaeda

Bin Laden documents revealed

Is al Qaeda weaker today?


Description of the Abbottabad documents (PDF)

The center says the letters were written between September 2006 and April 2011 by many well-known figures.


Letter from bin Laden in August 2010 seeking information about Anwar al-Awlaki and Yemen (PDF)

References are also made to floods in Pakistan and the media plan for the 9/11 anniversary.


Letter from Gadahn in January 2011 giving media advice for 9/11 anniversary (PDF)

The center says the letter appears to be a response to earlier questions from bin Laden.


Letter from bin Laden, using the pseudonym “Zamaria” to the head of a Somali militant group (PDF)

Bin Laden politely declines a request for formal unity with al Qaeda.


Letter composed in December 2010 from a high-ranking personality, possibly Ayman al-Zawahiri (PDF)

The letter refers to the request from the al-Shabab group in Somali to unite with al Qaeda.


Letter dated December 3, 2010, about indiscriminate violence of a group in Pakistan (PDF)

The authors indicate that al Qaeda’s top leaders had serious concerns about the actions of the TTP, a Pakistani Taliban group, including the killing of Muslims.


Letter saying that a militant group needed financial assistance “to support jihad” (PDF)

The center believes the letter was forwarded to bin Laden.


Part of a letter discussing the re-branding of al Qaeda (PDF)

It’s not clear who wrote the letter, but it talks of a need to change the name of the terror organization to “Qaidat al-Jihad.”


Letter from bin Laden dated April 26, 2011 (PDF)

Bin Laden outlines his response to the Arab Spring, a week before his death.


Letter dated March 28, 2007, showing the author’s alarm at al Qaeda in Iraq’s conduct (PDF)

The author, who appears to be of Egyptian origin, asks a legal scholar about the use of chlorine gas.


Letter dated June 11, 2009, about the release of detainees from Iran (PDF)

There is an indication that more people may be released, including some bin Laden relatives.


Draft of a document on the Arab Spring (PDF)

This formed the basis of statements released by al-Zawahiri and reveal the al Qaeda editing process.


Two letters apparently on how al Qaeda is perceived among Saudi scholars (PDF)

The author provides summaries of meetings with scholars, apparently with the intent of evaluating support.


Letter dated October 21, 2010, from bin Laden on the Afghanistan/Pakistan region (PDF)

Bin Laden comments on the security situation in Pakistan’s Waziristan and the need to move al Qaeda members out.


Letter, possibly from bin Laden, to the head of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (PDF)

The author tells group to focus on the United States, not the Yemeni government .


Series of paragraphs, some of which match letter in previous entry to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (PDF)

The letter discusses strategy, the need to target the United States including possible U.S. targets in South Africa.


Letter to bin Laden dated September 14, 2006, from “a loving brother” (PDF)

The author criticizes bin Laden for the attacks in “Islamic countries in general and the Arabian Peninsula in particular.”


Letter from bin Laden in late May 2010 indicating support for a “new phase” (PDF)

Bin Laden says he is concerned with the killings of innocent Muslims in attacks by regional terror groups.


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS IN ENGLISH HERE


SOCOM-2012-0000003 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000004 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000005 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000006 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000007 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000008 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000009 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000010 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000011 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000012 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000013 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000014 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000015 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000016 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000017 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000018 Orig


SOCOM-2012-0000019 Orig

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Unveiled – France-Lybia Nuclear Cooperation Memo (FR-LY)
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


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Revealed – House of Commons Report: News Corp Phone Hacking
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


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Revealed – Osama bin Laden Shrine
		
	
	

		








Osama bin Laden Shrine 2








[Image]Children play on the demolished site of a compound of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad May 1, 2012. Al Qaeda leader bin Laden was killed almost a year ago, on May 2, 2011, by a United States special operations military unit in a raid on his compound in Abbottabad. Reuters




[Image]This two-picture combo shows from top to bottom: Pakistani men walk through a path in a field next to the house where al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden was caught and killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, May 5, 2011; A Pakistani woman and a girl walk through a path in a field next to the demolished house where al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden was caught and killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, Sunday, April 29, 2012.




[Image]A Pakistani woman and a girl walk through a path in a field next to the demolished house where al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden was caught and killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, Sunday, April 29, 2012. A year after the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden, al-Qaida is hobbled and hunted, too busy surviving for the moment to carry out another Sept. 11-style attack on U.S. soil. (Muhammed Muheisen)




[Image]In this Sunday, April 29, 2012 photo, a Pakistani boy tries to break a concrete block as he and other children look for iron from the demolished compound of Osama bin Laden, in Abbottabad, Pakistan. One year since U.S. commandos flew into this army town and killed Osama bin Laden, Pakistan has tried to close one of the most notorious chapters in its history. The compound that housed him for six years was razed to the ground, and the wives and children who shared the hideaway were flown to Saudi Arabia just last week. (Muhammed Muheisen)




[Image]In a Sunday, April 29, 2012 photo, Pakistani girls, center, walk at the demolished compound of Osama bin Laden, in Abbottabad, Pakistan. One year since U.S. commandos flew into this army town and killed Osama bin Laden, Pakistan has tried to close one of the most notorious chapters in its history. The compound that housed him for six years was razed to the ground, and the wives and children who shared the hideaway were flown to Saudi Arabia just last week. (Muhammed Muheisen)




[Image]This photograph taken on April 25, 2012, shows a Pakistani labourer working at a house in front the site of the demolished compound of slain Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in northern Abbottabad, ahead of bin Laden’s first death anniversary. The Pakistani intelligence services provided the United States with information that was helpful in learning more about the compound where Osama bin Laden was killed, a US official said on April 28. Getty




[Image]This photograph taken on April 25, 2012, shows a Pakistani boy swinging a cricket bat at the site of the demolished compound of slain Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, in northern Abbottabad ahead of bin Laden’s first death anniversary. The Pakistani intelligence services provided the United States with information that was helpful in learning more about the compound where Osama bin Laden was killed, a US official said on April 28. Getty




[Image]This photograph taken on April 25, 2012, shows local Pakistani residents walking past the site of the demolished compound of slain Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, in northern Abbottabad ahead of bin Laden’s first death anniversary. The Pakistani intelligence services provided the United States with information that was helpful in learning more about the compound where Osama bin Laden was killed, a US official said on April 28. Getty




Shrine site on May 11, 2011.[Image]




Shrine site on May 1, 2011. Downed chopper in courtyard.[Image]




Shrine site on May 8, 2010.[Image]




Shrine site on June 14, 2005.[Image]




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Confidential – Caderock Missile Battery Eyeball
		
	
	

		








Caderock Missile Battery


Eyeball










The site is the Navy’s David Taylor Model Basin of the Naval Surface Warfare Carderock Division.




http://maps.live.com/default.aspx?v=2&FORM=LMLTCP&cp=38.972693~-77.18664

&style=h&lvl=18&tilt=-90&dir=0&alt=-1000&scene=31360260&phx=0&phy=0&phscl=1&encType=1[Image]		




http://maps.live.com/default.aspx?v=2&FORM=LMLTCP&cp=qgvwwh8k0z6w&style=b&lvl=2&tilt=-90&dir=0&alt=-1000&scene=31360260&phx=0&phy=0&phscl=1&encType=1Looking North


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Looking East[Image]




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SECRET – Unveild by Cryptome – Washington Naval Yard Missile Battery Eyeball
		
	
	

		









Washington Naval Yard Missile Battery


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[Image]Modified Humvee vehicles from the 1st Battalion 200th Air Defense Artillery of the New Mexico National Guard are shown Friday, July 30, 2004, at the unit’s headquarters in Roswell, N.M. About 200 Guard members soon will bolster air defenses near Washington, D.C., in these modified vehicles, carrying up to 288 Stinger missiles. Each Humvee has a turret with 8 missile launchers on top, and there are 36 of the vehicles to be used under the Avenger weapons system, Air Defense Artillery, Maj. Ken Nava said Friday. (AP Photo/Roswell Daily Record, Andrew Poertner)
[Image]Modified Humvee vehicles from the 1st Battalion 200th Air Defense Artillery of the New Mexico National Guard are shown Friday, July 30, 2004, at the unit’s headquarters in Roswell, N.M. About 200 Guard members soon will bolster air defenses near Washington, D.C., in these modified vehicles, carrying up to 288 Stinger missiles. Each Humvee has a turret with 8 missile launchers on top, and there are 36 of the vehicles to be used under the Avenger weapons system, Air Defense Artillery, Maj. Ken Nava said Friday. (AP Photo/Roswell Daily Record, Andrew Poertner)




[Image]A military Humvee with an Avenger anti-aircraft missile launcher on top sits parked near the Pentagon Wednesday, Sept. 11, 2002. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld ordered the launchers placed around Washignton as a “prudent precaution” on the first anniversary of the terrorist attack on the Pentagon. (AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite)
[Image]Security and construction underway to enhance security is seen on Capitol Hill Wednesday, Feb. 12, 2003. Avenger anti-aircraft missiles have been stationed around Washington, along with extra radars, and the Air Force has stepped up its combat air patrols over the capital. (AP Photo/Terry Ashe)










http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&source=s_q&hl=en&geocode=&q=washington,dc&sll=38.873927,-76.99204

&sspn=0.00043,0.002013&ie=UTF8&ll=38.874087,-76.991919&spn=0.001721,0.004026&t=h&z=19&iwloc=addr		




http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&source=s_q&hl=en&geocode=&q=washington,dc&sll=37.0625,-95.677068

&sspn=58.555544,90.175781&ie=UTF8&ll=38.873927,-76.99204&spn=0.00043,0.002013&t=h&z=20&layer=

c&cbll=38.87321,-76.991253&panoid=RiwZ5AN_ySCudUUM4skfYA&cbp=11,318.0434195361363,,2,-7.6240737092004585[Image]


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Looking Northhttp://maps.live.com/default.aspx?v=2&FORM=LMLTCP&cp=qgc3yb8khks1&style=o&lvl=2&tilt=-90&dir=0&alt=-1000&scene=31267496&phx=0&phy=0&phscl=1&encType=1


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Looking East[Image]




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SECRET – Surface to Air Missiles for 2012 Olympics Site
		
	
	

		
The former Bryant and May match factory in Fairfield Road, Bow, East London – now a private gated community of exclusive apartments known as Bow Quarter.


The roofs of two towers (converted for lift shafts for the apartments) have been chosen by the Ministry of Defence to site surface-to-air high-velocity missile systems.










Surface to Air Missiles for 2012 Olympics Site








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SECRET – Space Station Expedition 30 Soyuz Capsule Landing
		
	
	

		








Space Station Expedition 30 Soyuz Capsule Landing








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Dust plumes are caused by retro-rockets fired just before landing.[Image]




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Dan Burbank Extracted[Image]


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Anatoly Ivanishin Extracted[Image]


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Anton Shkaplero[Image]




Left to right, Burbank, Shkaplero and Ivanishin[Image]




Medical Examination Station[Image]




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Unveiled – Nuclear WMD Accident Training
		
	
	

		






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Following: Overhead photos from Google Earth, dated 4 February 2011. Oblique photos from Bing Maps, unknown date.




http://maps.google.com/?t=h&ie=UTF8&ll=35.019664,-106.531205&spn=0.032861,0.068665&z=15&vpsrc=6[Image]






TS-1 (Active)


These appear to be wrecks of motor vehicles


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TS-2 (Active)


These appear to be fragments of a B-52 bomber


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TS-3 (Active)


These appear to be fragments of a B-52 bomber


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TS-4 (Active)


This appears to be an earth penetration of an object, perhaps simulation of unexploded nuclear weapon


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TS-5 (Inactive)  (TR-5 to TR-8 comprise Installation Restoration Plan OT-10)


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TS-8 (Appears Converted to Other Use, But May Be Active)


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Unveiled – Chinese Wiretap Like World Leaders and Crooks
		
	
	

		
When Hu Jintao, China’s top leader, picked up the telephone last August to talk to a senior anticorruption official visiting Chongqing, special devices detected that he was being wiretapped — by local officials in that southwestern metropolis.


The discovery of that and other wiretapping led to an official investigation that helped topple Chongqing’s charismatic leader, Bo Xilai, in a political cataclysm that has yet to reach a conclusion.


Until now, the downfall of Mr. Bo has been cast largely as a tale of a populist who pursued his own agenda too aggressively for some top leaders in Beijing and was brought down by accusations that his wife had arranged the murder of Neil Heywood, a British consultant, after a business dispute. But the hidden wiretapping, previously alluded to only in internal Communist Party accounts of the scandal, appears to have provided another compelling reason for party leaders to turn on Mr. Bo.


The story of how China’s president was monitored also shows the level of mistrust among leaders in the one-party state. To maintain control over society, leaders have embraced enhanced surveillance technology. But some have turned it on one another — repeating patterns of intrigue that go back to the beginnings of Communist rule.


“This society has bred mistrust and violence,” said Roderick MacFarquhar, a historian of Communist China’s elite-level machinations over the past half century. “Leaders know you have to watch your back because you never know who will put a knife in it.”


Nearly a dozen people with party ties, speaking anonymously for fear of retribution, confirmed the wiretapping, as well as a widespread program of bugging across Chongqing. But the party’s public version of Mr. Bo’s fall omits it.


The official narrative and much foreign attention has focused on the more easily grasped death of Mr. Heywood in November. When Mr. Bo’s police chief, Wang Lijun, was stripped of his job and feared being implicated in Bo family affairs, he fled to the United States Consulate in Chengdu, where he spoke mostly about Mr. Heywood’s death.


The murder account is pivotal to the scandal, providing Mr. Bo’s opponents with an unassailable reason to have him removed. But party insiders say the wiretapping was seen as a direct challenge to central authorities. It revealed to them just how far Mr. Bo, who is now being investigated for serious disciplinary violations, was prepared to go in his efforts to grasp greater power in China. That compounded suspicions that Mr. Bo could not be trusted with a top slot in the party, which is due to reshuffle its senior leadership positions this fall.


“Everyone across China is improving their systems for the purposes of maintaining stability,” said one official with a central government media outlet, referring to surveillance tactics. “But not everyone dares to monitor party central leaders.”


According to senior party members, including editors, academics and people with ties to the military, Mr. Bo’s eavesdropping operations began several years ago as part of a state-financed surveillance buildup, ostensibly for the purposes of fighting crime and maintaining local political stability.


The architect was Mr. Wang, a nationally decorated crime fighter who had worked under Mr. Bo in the northeast province of Liaoning. Together they installed “a comprehensive package bugging system covering telecommunications to the Internet,” according to the government media official.


One of several noted cybersecurity experts they enlisted was Fang Binxing, president of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, who is often called the father of China’s “Great Firewall,” the nation’s vast Internet censorship system. Most recently, Mr. Fang advised the city on a new police information center using cloud-based computing, according to state news media reports. Late last year, Mr. Wang was named a visiting professor at Mr. Fang’s university.


Together, Mr. Bo and Mr. Wang unleashed a drive to smash what they said were crime rings that controlled large portions of Chongqing’s economic life. In interviews, targets of the crackdown marveled at the scale and determination with which local police intercepted their communications.


“On the phone, we dared not mention Bo Xilai or Wang Lijun,” said Li Jun, a fugitive property developer who now lives in hiding abroad. Instead, he and fellow businessmen took to scribbling notes, removing their cellphone batteries and stocking up on unregistered SIM cards to thwart surveillance as the crackdown mounted, he said.


Li Zhuang, a lawyer from a powerfully connected Beijing law firm, recalled how some cousins of one client had presented him with a full stack of unregistered mobile phone SIM cards, warning him of local wiretapping. Despite these precautions, the Chongqing police ended up arresting Mr. Li on the outskirts of Beijing, about 900 miles away, after he called his client’s wife and arranged to visit her later that day at a hospital.


“They already were there lying in ambush,” Mr. Li said. He added that Wang Lijun, by reputation, was a “tapping freak.”


Political figures were targeted in addition to those suspected of being mobsters.


One political analyst with senior-level ties, citing information obtained from a colonel he recently dined with, said Mr. Bo had tried to tap the phones of virtually all high-ranking leaders who visited Chongqing in recent years, including Zhou Yongkang, the law-and-order czar who was said to have backed Mr. Bo as his potential successor.


“Bo wanted to be extremely clear about what leaders’ attitudes toward him were,” the analyst said.


In one other instance last year, two journalists said, operatives were caught intercepting a conversation between the office of Mr. Hu and Liu Guanglei, a top party law-and-order official whom Mr. Wang had replaced as police chief. Mr. Liu once served under Mr. Hu in the 1980s in Guizhou Province.


Perhaps more worrisome to Mr. Bo and Mr. Wang, however, was the increased scrutiny from the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which by the beginning of 2012 had stationed up to four separate teams in Chongqing, two undercover, according to the political analyst, who cited Discipline Inspection sources. One line of inquiry, according to several party academics, involved Mr. Wang’s possible role in a police bribery case that unfolded last year in a Liaoning city where he once was police chief.


Beyond making a routine inspection, it is not clear why the disciplinary official who telephoned Mr. Hu — Ma Wen, the minister of supervision — was in Chongqing. Her high-security land link to Mr. Hu from the state guesthouse in Chongqing was monitored on Mr. Bo’s orders. The topic of the call is unknown but was probably not vital. Most phones are so unsafe that important information is often conveyed only in person or in writing.


But Beijing was galled that Mr. Bo would wiretap Mr. Hu, whether intentionally or not, and turned central security and disciplinary investigators loose on his police chief, who bore the brunt of the scrutiny over the next couple of months.


“Bo wanted to push the responsibility onto Wang,” one senior party editor said. “Wang couldn’t dare say it was Bo’s doing.”


Yet at some point well before fleeing Chongqing, Mr. Wang filed a pair of complaints to the inspection commission, the first anonymously and the second under his own name, according to a party academic with ties to Mr. Bo.


Both complaints said Mr. Bo had “opposed party central” authorities, including ordering the wiretapping of central leaders. The requests to investigate Mr. Bo were turned down at the time. Mr. Bo, who learned of the charges at a later point, told the academic shortly before his dismissal that he thought he could withstand Mr. Wang’s charges.


Mr. Wang is not believed to have discussed wiretapping at the United States Consulate. Instead, he focused on the less self-incriminating allegations of Mr. Bo’s wife’s arranging the killing of Mr. Heywood.


But tensions between the two men crested, sources said, when Mr. Bo found that Mr. Wang had also wiretapped him and his wife. After Mr. Wang was arrested in February, Mr. Bo detained Mr. Wang’s wiretapping specialist from Liaoning, a district police chief named Wang Pengfei.


Internal party accounts suggest that the party views the wiretapping as one of Mr. Bo’s most serious crimes. One preliminary indictment in mid-March accused Bo of damaging party unity by collecting evidence on other leaders.


Party officials, however, say it would be far too damaging to make the wiretapping public. When Mr. Bo is finally charged, wiretapping is not expected to be mentioned. “The things that can be publicized are the economic problems and the killing,” according to the senior official at the government media outlet. “That’s enough to decide the matter in public.”

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Fordow Nuclear Plant, Near Qom, Iran
		
	
	

		
https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/2012-info/pantex-birdseye-2.jpg

	


	



			
				


			

			
Crpytome unveils – OWS Protestors Get 1A Camp at National Memorial
		
	
	

		
Notice of Temporary Change


Federal Hall National Memorial is announcing a temporary change to how the public will access the building. Taking this action affords visitors safe access to the site without interfering with those participating in 1st amendment activities at the site.


[Image]


17 April 2012


Occupy Wall Street 17 April 2012


The steps of Federal Hall National Memorial have replaced the sidewalks for the Occupy Wall Street

encampment. Located across Wall Street from the New York Stock Exchange, it is one of the most

popular tourist stops in NYC.


The protest is described by OWS as training for a worldwide General Strike on 1 May 2012. More:


Tidalhttp://occupytheory.org


http://occupiedmedia.us


Cryptome Protest Series: http://cryptome.org/protest-series.htm


 




 










Occupy Wall Street 17 April 2012








[Image]Members of Occupy Wall Street gather on the steps of Federal Hall after being evicted from the sidewalk early yesterday morning where they had been sleeping on April 17, 2012 in New York City. April 17, 2012. Cryptome


[Image]





[Image][Image]


US National Park Service (USNPS) police, which guard national Memorials such as the Statue of Liberty,

are monitoring the protest along with NYPD. An attempt by USNPS police to move the protestors to one

side of the steps was resisted by the protestor above while Cryptome photos and a video were made.

In answer to an inquiry about the resistance, the USNPS officer answered every question with

“they are exercising free speech.”





[Image]Members of Occupy Wall Street gather on the steps of Federal Hall after being evicted from the sidewalk early yesterday morning where they had been sleeping on April 17, 2012 in New York City. As temperatures warm, members of the global protest movement have reasserted their commitment to finding a permanent presence in the financial district following their eviction from Zucotti Park last November in a dramatic police raid. Getty




[Image]Members of Occupy Wall Street gather on the steps of Federal Hall after being evicted from the sidewalk early yesterday morning where they had been sleeping on April 17, 2012 in New York City. As temperatures warm, members of the global protest movement have reasserted their commitment to finding a permanent presence in the financial district following their eviction from Zucotti Park last November in a dramatic police raid. Getty




[Image]Members of Occupy Wall Street gather on the steps of Federal Hall after being evicted from the sidewalk early yesterday morning where they had been sleeping on April 17, 2012 in New York City. As temperatures warm, members of the global protest movement have reasserted their commitment to finding a permanent presence in the financial district following their eviction from Zucotti Park last November in a dramatic police raid. Getty




Following photos taken by Cryptome between 11:30 and 13:30, 17 April 2012.




[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]US National Park Service police SWAT members. Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome


[Image]


[Image]


Senior Park Service police overheard discussing how to corral the protestors without provoking resistance. 17 April 2012. Cryptome





[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




 


Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome





[Image]Side wall of Federal Hall National Memorial where OWS protestors slept overnight until evicted by NYPD. 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]Sidewalk across from Federal Hall National Memorial where OWS protestors slept overnight until evicted by NYPD. 17 April 2012. Cryptome









[Image]Occupy Wall Street, Federal Hall National Memorial, 17 April 2012. Cryptome




[Image]School children were led in a protest chant by their teacher.





















 

























	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from Crpytome – Nuclear Power Plant Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities
		
	
	

		
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 75 (Wednesday, April 18, 2012)] [Proposed Rules] [Pages 23161-23166] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2012-9336] ======================================================================== Proposed Rules Federal Register ________________________________________________________________________ This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules. ======================================================================== Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 75 / Wednesday, April 18, 2012 / Proposed Rules [[Page 23161]] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 [NRC-2012-0031] RIN 3150-AJ11 Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking. ———————————————————————– SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) is issuing this Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) to begin the process of potentially amending its regulations to strengthen and integrate onsite emergency response capabilities. The NRC seeks public comment on specific questions and issues with respect to possible revision to the NRC’s requirements for onsite emergency response capabilities, and development of both new requirements and the supporting regulatory basis. This regulatory action is one of the actions stemming from the NRC’s lessons-learned efforts associated with the March 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant accident in Japan. DATES: Submit comments by June 18, 2012. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the NRC is only able to ensure consideration of comments received on or before this date. ADDRESSES: You may access information and comment submissions related to this document, which the NRC possesses and is publicly available, by searching on http://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2012-0031. You may submit comments by any of the following methods: Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0031. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-492- 3668; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. Email comments to: Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you do not receive an automatic email reply confirming receipt, contact us directly at 301-415-1677. Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 301-415-1101. Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. (Eastern time) Federal workdays; telephone: 301-415-1677. For additional direction on accessing information and submitting comments, see “Accessing Information and Submitting Comments” in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert H. Beall, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3874; email: Robert.Beall@nrc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments II. Background: Fukushima Dai-ichi and the NRC Regulatory Response III. Background: Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities A. Emergency Operating Procedures B. Severe Accident Management Guidelines C. Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines D. Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities Versus Emergency Preparedness IV. Discussion and Request for Public Comment A. ANPR Purpose B. Rulemaking Objectives/Success Criteria C. Applicability to NRC Licenses and Approvals D. Relationship Between Recommendation 8 and Other Near-Term Task Force Recommendations E. Interim Regulatory Actions V. Public Meeting VI. Rulemaking Process and Schedule VII. Related Petition for Rulemaking Actions VIII. Available Supporting Documents I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments A. Accessing Information Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2012-0031 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information for this notice. You may access information related to this ANPR, which the NRC possesses and is publicly available, by the following methods: Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0031. NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select “ADAMS Public Documents” and then select “Begin Web- based ADAMS Search.” For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415- 4737, or by email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced in this notice (if that document is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is referenced. A table listing documents that provide additional background and supporting information is in Section VIII of this document. NRC’s PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. B. Submitting Comments Please include Docket ID NRC-2012-0031 in the subject line of your comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make your comment submission available to the public in this docket. The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact information in comment submissions that you do not want to be publicly disclosed. The NRC posts all comment submissions at http://www. regulations.gov as well as enters the comment submissions into ADAMS. The NRC does not edit comment submissions to remove identifying or contact information. If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to include identifying or contact information in their comment submissions that they do not want to be publicly disclosed. Your request should state that the NRC will not edit comment submissions to remove such information before making the comment submissions available to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS. [[Page 23162]] II. Background: Fukushima Dai-ichi and the NRC Regulatory Response On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the coast of the Japanese island of Honshu. The earthquake precipitated a large tsunami that is estimated to have exceeded 14 meters (45 feet) in height at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant site (hereinafter referred to as the site or the facility). The earthquake and tsunami produced widespread devastation across northeastern Japan, resulting in approximately 25,000 people dead or missing, displacing tens of thousands of people, and significantly impacting the infrastructure and industry in the northeastern coastal areas of Japan. At the time of the earthquake, Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3 were in operation. Units 4, 5, and 6 had been shut down for routine refueling and maintenance activities, and the Unit 4 reactor fuel had been offloaded to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool. As a result of the earthquake, the three operating units at the site automatically shut down, and offsite power was lost to the entire facility. The emergency diesel generators started at all six units, providing alternating current (AC) electrical power to critical systems; overall, the facility response to the seismic event appears to have been normal. Approximately 40 minutes after shutdown of the operating units, the first large tsunami wave inundated the site, followed by multiple additional waves. The tsunami resulted in extensive damage to site facilities and a complete loss of AC electrical power at Units 1 through 5, a condition known as station blackout (SBO). One diesel generator remained functional on Unit 6. Despite the actions of the operators following the earthquake and tsunami, cooling was lost to the fuel in the Unit 1 reactor after several hours, in the Unit 2 reactor after about 70 hours, and in the Unit 3 reactor after about 36 hours, resulting in damage to the nuclear fuel shortly after the loss of cooling. In the days following the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident, the NRC Chairman directed the NRC staff to establish a senior-level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of the NRC’s processes and regulations to determine whether, in light of the events in Japan, the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system, and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction. This direction was provided in a tasking memorandum dated March 23, 2011, from the NRC Chairman to the NRC Executive Director for Operations (COMGBJ-11-0002) (ADAMS Accession No. ML110950110). In SECY-11-0093, “Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan” (ADAMS Accession No. ML11186A959), dated July 12, 2011, the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) provided its recommendations to the Commission. The staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-11-0093 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112310021), dated August 19, 2011, directed the NRC staff to identify and make “recommendations regarding any Task Force recommendations that can, and in the staff’s judgment, should be implemented, in part or in whole, without unnecessary delay.” In SECY-11-0124, “Recommended Actions To Be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report” (ADAMS Accession No. ML11245A127), the NRC staff provided recommendations to the Commission on actions that, in the staff’s judgment, should be initiated without unnecessary delay, and requested that the Commission provide direction for moving forward on these recommendation (subsequently referred to as “Tier 1” recommendations). The Commission approved the staff’s proposed actions in the SRM for SECY-11-0124 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112911571), dated October 18, 2011. In SECY-11-0137, “Prioritization of Recommended Actions to Be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned” (ADAMS Accession No. ML11269A204), the NRC staff requested that the Commission approve the staff’s prioritization of the NTTF recommendations. In the SRM for SECY-11-0137 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113490055), dated December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations and supported action on the Tier 1 recommendations, subject to the direction in the SRM. With respect to regulatory action regarding onsite emergency response capabilities, the Commission directed the NRC staff to initiate a rulemaking on NTTF Recommendation 8, in the form of an ANPR. This document responds to that Commission direction. In November 2011, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) issued INPO-11-005, “Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station” (ADAMS Accession No. ML11347A454). In the SRM for SECY-11-0137, the Commission directed NRC staff to consider INPO-11-005 in its development of the technical bases for any proposed regulatory changes. III. Background: Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities A. Emergency Operating Procedures Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) are required procedures designed to mitigate the effects of a design basis accident and place the plant in a safe shutdown condition. The EOPs are required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” and are included in the administrative control sections of licensee’s technical specifications. Licensed operators are trained and evaluated in the implementation of EOPs through initial license training. The NRC evaluates licensed operator candidates’ knowledge of EOPs during an initial written examination, as required by 10 CFR 55.41 and 55.43, and an initial operating test, as required by 10 CFR 55.45. For proficiency, licensed operator requalification training programs, required by 10 CFR 55.59, routinely train and evaluate licensed operators on their knowledge and ability to implement the EOPs. B. Severe Accident Management Guidelines During the 1990s, the nuclear industry developed Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) as a voluntary industry initiative in response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 2, “Accident Management Strategies for Consideration in the Individual Plant Examination Process,” dated April 4, 1990 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031200551). SAMGs provide guidance to operators and Technical Support Center (TSC) staff in the event of an accident that progresses beyond a plant’s design basis (and therefore beyond the scope of the EOPs). The nuclear power industry owners’ groups (i.e., industry organizations with representatives from the various nuclear plant owners that provide industry oversight for various plant designs) developed generic guidelines specific to the individual plant designs. Given the voluntary nature of the initiative for SAMGs, their implementation throughout the industry has been varied, as noted by NRC inspection results for Temporary Instruction 2515/184, “Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs)” (ADAMS Accession No. ML11115A053). The guidelines themselves were implemented by individual licensees, [[Page 23163]] but because the NRC has not developed a regulatory requirement for SAMGs, the training, evaluation, and procedure control requirements for SAMGs vary from plant to plant. C. Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines Following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC ordered licensees to develop and implement specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or readily available resources that can be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire. These requirements were subsequently imposed as license conditions for individual licensees and formalized in the Power Reactor Security Requirements final rule (74 FR 13926; March 27, 2009) in 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2). As a result, Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) were developed in order to provide guidance to operating crews and TSC personnel on the implementation of the strategies developed to address these large area events. The events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station following the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami highlighted the continued potential benefits of these strategies in mitigating the effects of prolonged SBOs and other events that challenge key safety functions. The NRC has not developed a specific regulatory requirement for training on EDMGs. D. Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities Versus Emergency Preparedness This ANPR focuses on the effectiveness of accident mitigating procedures and the training and exercises associated with these procedures. When using the term “accident mitigating procedures” in this document, the NRC is referring to EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs. The licensee’s emergency preparedness plan and implementing procedures, which are required by 10 CFR 50.47 and 50.54(q) and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, are being evaluated through other NTTF recommendations, and the associated efforts are referred to in the questions in Section IV.D. However, the licensee’s emergency preparedness plan and implementing procedures are not the subject of this ANPR. IV. Discussion and Request for Public Comment A. ANPR Purpose In SECY-11-0124, the NRC staff recommended that the agency engage stakeholders during rulemaking activities “so that the regulatory action and licensee actions taken effectively resolve the identified issues and implementation challenges are identified in advance.” The NRC staff proposed interaction with stakeholders to support development of the regulatory basis, a proposed rule, and implementing guidance for strengthening and integrating the onsite emergency response capabilities. In the SRM for SECY-11-0124, the Commission directed the NRC staff to issue an ANPR prior to developing the regulatory basis for a proposed rule. Accordingly, the NRC’s objective in this ANPR is to solicit external stakeholder feedback to inform the NRC staff’s efforts to evaluate regulatory approaches for strengthening the current onsite emergency response capability requirements. In the SRM for SECY-11-0124, the Commission also encouraged NRC staff to develop recommendations that continue to realize the strengths of a performance-based system as a guiding principle. The Commission indicated that, to be effective, approaches should be flexible and able to accommodate a diverse range of circumstances and conditions. The Commission stated that for “consideration of events beyond the design basis, a regulatory approach founded on performance-based requirements will foster development of the most effective and efficient, site- specific mitigation strategies, similar to how the agency approached the approval of licensee response strategies for the `loss of large area’ event” addressed in 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2). Consistent with the Commission’s direction in the SRM for SECY-11- 0124, the NRC is open to flexible, performance-based strategies to address onsite emergency response capability requirements. This ANPR is structured around questions intended to solicit information that (1) supports development of such a framework and (2) supports assembling a complete and adequate regulatory basis that enables rulemaking to be successful. In this context, commenters should feel free to provide feedback on any aspects of onsite emergency response capability that would support this ANPR’s regulatory objective, whether or not in response to a stated ANPR question. B. Rulemaking Objectives/Success Criteria The NRC is considering development of a proposed rule that would amend the current onsite emergency response capability requirements. Currently, the regulatory and industry approaches to onsite emergency response capability are fragmented into the separate strategies that were discussed in Section III of this document. By promulgation of an onsite emergency response capability rule, the NRC would be able to establish regulations that, when implemented by licensees, would strengthen and integrate the various onsite emergency response strategies. Specifically, the proposed requirements for onsite emergency response capability would strive to accomplish the following goals: 1. Ensure that effective transitions are developed between the various accident mitigating procedures (EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs) so that overall strategies are coherent and comprehensive. 2. Ensure that command and control strategies for large scale events are based on the best understanding of severe accident progression and effective mitigation strategies, and well defined in order to promote effective decision-making at all levels and develop organizational flexibility to respond to unforeseen events. 3. Ensure that the key personnel relied upon to implement these procedures and strategies are trained, qualified, and evaluated in their accident mitigation roles. 4. Ensure that accident mitigating procedures, training, and exercises are appropriately standardized throughout the industry and are adequately documented and maintained. The NRC is seeking stakeholders’ views on the following specific regulatory objectives: 1. What is the preferred regulatory approach to addressing NTTF Recommendation 8? For example: a. Should the NRC develop a new rule, or could the requirements that would provide for a more strengthened and integrated response capability be accomplished by a method other than a rulemaking? Provide a discussion that supports your position. b. If a new rule is developed, what type of supporting document would be most effective for providing guidance on the new requirements? Provide a discussion that supports your position. 2. The NTTF recommendation for emergency response procedures stressed that the EOP guidelines should be revised to establish effective transitions between EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs in [[Page 23164]] an effort to promote a more integrated approach to onsite emergency response. The NRC is interested in stakeholder opinions on the best course of action for revising and maintaining these procedures to accomplish this objective. For example: a. Should the SAMGs be standardized throughout the industry? If so, describe how the procedures should be developed, and discuss what level of regulatory review would be appropriate. Should there be two sets of standard SAMGs, one applicable to pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and one applicable to boiling water reactors (BWRs), or should SAMGs be developed for the various plant designs in a manner similar to EOPs? Provide a discussion that supports your position. b. What is the best approach to ensure that procedural guidance for beyond design basis events is based on sound science, coherent, and integrated? What is the most effective strategy for linking the EOPs with the SAMGs and EDMGs? Should the transition from EOPs to SAMGs be based on key safety functions, or should the SAMGs be developed in a manner that addresses a series of events that are beyond a plant’s design basis? Provide a discussion that supports your position. c. The NTTF Recommendation 8 strongly advised that the plant owners’ groups should undertake revision of the accident mitigating procedures to avoid having each licensee develop its own approach. Is this the best course of action? What additional scenarios or accident plans should be considered for addition to SAMG technical guidelines as a result of the lessons learned in Japan? Provide a discussion that supports your position. d. In the SRM for SECY-11-0137, the Commission directed the NRC staff to consider the November 2011 INPO report, INPO-11-005, in the development of the technical bases for Recommendation 8. How should this document be used by industry in developing SAMGs and the NRC in developing any proposed regulatory changes? Provide a discussion that supports your position. e. Should there be a requirement for the SAMGs and EDMGs to be maintained as controlled procedures in accordance with licensee quality assurance programs? Provide a discussion that supports your position. f. Should the SAMGs and EDMGs be added to the “Administrative Controls” section of licensee technical specifications? Provide a discussion that supports your position. g. In a letter dated October 13, 2011 (ML11284A136), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) recommended that Recommendation 8 be expanded to include fire response procedures. In their letter, ACRS stated that some plant-specific fire response procedures can direct operators to perform actions that may be inconsistent with the EOPs, and that experience has shown that parallel execution of fire response procedures, abnormal operating procedures, and EOPs can be difficult and complex. Should efforts to integrate the EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs include fire response procedures? Are there other procedures that should be included in the scope of this work? Provide a discussion that supports your position. h. What level of effort, in terms of time and financial commitment, will be required by the industry to upgrade the accident mitigating procedures? If possible, please include estimated milestones and PWR/ BWR cost estimates. 3. The NTTF established the identification of clear command and control strategies as an essential aspect of Recommendation 8. What methodology would be best for ensuring that command and control for beyond design basis events is well defined? For example: a. Should separate procedures be developed that clearly establish the command and control structures for large-scale events? Should defined roles and responsibilities be included in technical specifications along with associated training and qualification requirements? Provide a discussion that supports your position. b. Should the command and control approach be standardized throughout the industry or left for individual licensees to define? Provide a discussion that supports your position. c. What level of effort, in terms of time and financial commitment, will be required by the industry to develop these command and control strategies? If possible, please include estimated milestones and PWR/ BWR cost estimates. 4. As the guidelines for accident mitigating procedures are revised and the command and control strategies are developed, personnel who will be implementing these procedures must be adequately trained, qualified, and evaluated. What would be the best approach for ensuring that the personnel relied upon to implement the revised procedures are proficient in the use of the procedures, maintain adequate knowledge of the systems referenced in these procedures, and can effectively make decisions, establish priorities, and direct actions in an emergency situation? For example: a. Should a systems approach to training be developed to identify key tasks that would be performed by the various roles identified in the new strategies? Provide a discussion that supports your position. b. Should the current emergency drill and exercise requirements be revised to ensure that the strategies developed as a result of this ANPR will be evaluated in greater depth? Provide a discussion that supports your position. c. Should the revised accident mitigating procedures, specifically SAMGs and EDMGs, be added to the knowledge and abilities catalogs for initial reactor operator licenses? Provide a discussion that supports your position. d. What level of plant expertise should be demonstrated by the personnel assigned to key positions outlined by the accident mitigation guidelines and command and control strategy? Should these personnel be required to be licensed or certified on the plant design? Provide a discussion that supports your position. e. What training requirements should be developed to ensure emergency directors and other key decision-makers have the command and control skills needed to effectively implement an accident mitigation strategy? Provide a discussion that supports your position. f. What should the qualification process entail for key personnel identified in the new strategies? How would this qualification process ensure proficiency? Provide a discussion that supports your position. g. What level of effort, in terms of time and financial commitment, will be required by the industry to develop and implement these training, qualification, and evaluation requirements? If possible, please include estimated milestones and PWR/BWR cost estimates. C. Applicability to NRC Licenses and Approvals The NRC would apply the new onsite emergency response capability requirements to power reactors, both currently operating and new reactors, and would like stakeholder feedback. Accordingly, the NRC envisions that the requirements would apply to the following: Nuclear power plants currently licensed under 10 CFR part 50; Nuclear power plants currently being constructed under construction permits issued under 10 CFR part 50, or whose construction permits may be reinstated; [[Page 23165]] Future nuclear power plants whose construction permits and operating licenses are issued under 10 CFR part 50; and Current and future nuclear power plants licensed under 10 CFR part 52. D. Relationship Between Recommendation 8 and Other Near-Term Task Force Recommendations The NRC notes that there is a close relationship between the onsite emergency response capability requirements under consideration in this ANPR effort and several other near-term actions stemming from the NTTF report (and identified in SECY-11-0124 and SECY-11-0137). Regulatory actions taken in response to these other activities might impact efforts to amend onsite accident mitigating procedures and training. In this regard: 1. What is the best regulatory structure for integrating the onsite emergency response capability requirements with other post-Fukushima regulatory actions, such that there is a full, coherent integration of the requirements? 2. Recommendations 4.1 and 4.2 address SBO regulatory actions and mitigation strategies for beyond design basis external events, respectively. The implementation strategies developed in response to Recommendations 4.1 and 4.2 will require corresponding procedures. The NRC recognizes the need for coordinating efforts under Recommendations 4.1, 4.2, and 8. What is the best way to integrate these three regulatory efforts to ensure that they account for the others’ requirements, yet do not unduly overlap or inadvertently introduce redundancy, inconsistency, or incoherency? 3. Recommendation 9.3 addresses staffing during a multiunit event with an SBO. Should staffing levels change as a result of a revised onsite emergency response capability or should these duties be assigned to existing staff? 4. Recommendation 10.2 addresses command and control structure and qualifications for the licensee’s decision-makers for beyond design basis events. Should this recommendation be addressed concurrently with Recommendation 8? E. Interim Regulatory Actions The NRC recognizes that implementation of multiple post-Fukushima requirements could be a challenge for licensees and requests feedback on how best to implement multiple requirements, specifically onsite emergency response capability requirements, without adversely impacting licensees’ effectiveness and efficiency. It will take several years to issue a final rule. Should the NRC use other regulatory vehicles (such as commitment letters or confirmatory action letters) to put in place interim coping strategies for onsite emergency response capabilities while rulemaking proceeds? V. Public Meeting The NRC plans to hold a category 3 public meeting with stakeholders during the ANPR public comment period. The public meeting is intended as a forum to discuss the ANPR with external stakeholders and provide information on the feedback requested in the ANPR to support development of onsite emergency response capability requirements. The meeting is not intended to solicit comment. Instead, the NRC will encourage stakeholders at the meeting to provide feedback in written form during the ANPR comment period. To support full participation of stakeholders, the NRC staff plans to provide teleconferencing and Webinar access for the public meeting. Since the intent of the meeting is not to solicit or accept comments, the meeting will not be transcribed. The NRC will issue the public meeting notice 10 calendar days before the public meeting. Stakeholders should monitor the NRC’s public meeting Web site for information about the public meeting: http://www.nrc.gov/public involve/public-meetings/index.cfm. VI. Rulemaking Process and Schedule Stakeholders should recognize that the NRC is not obligated to provide detailed comment responses to feedback provided in response to this ANPR. If the NRC develops a regulatory basis sufficient to support a proposed rule, there will be an opportunity for additional public comment when the regulatory basis and the proposed rule are published. If supporting guidance is developed for the proposed rule, stakeholders will have an opportunity to provide feedback on the implementing guidance. VII. Related Petition for Rulemaking Action The NTTF report provided a specific proposal for onsite emergency actions that was subsequently endorsed by the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in a petition for rulemaking (PRM), PRM-50-102 (76 FR 58165; September 20, 2011), as a way to address licensee training and exercises. In connection with NTTF Recommendation 8.4, “Onsite emergency actions,” the NRDC requested in its petition that the NRC “institute a rulemaking proceeding applicable to nuclear facilities licensed under 10 CFR 50, 52, and other applicable regulations to require more realistic, hands-on training and exercises on Severe Accident Mitigation [sic] Guidelines (SAMGs) and Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) for licensee staff expected to implement the strategies and those licensee staff expected to make decisions during emergencies, including emergency coordinators and emergency directors.” The Commission has established a process for addressing a number of the recommendations in the NTTF Report, and the NRC determined that the issues raised in PRM-50-102 are appropriate for consideration and will be considered in this Recommendation 8 rulemaking. Persons interested in the NRC’s actions on PRM-50-102 may follow the NRC’s activities at www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2012-0031. VIII. Available Supporting Documents The following documents provide additional background and supporting information regarding this activity and corresponding technical basis. The documents can be found in ADAMS. Instructions for accessing ADAMS are in the ADDRESSES section of this document. ———————————————————————— ADAMS Accession Number/Federal Date Document Register Citation ———————————————————————— April 4, 1990…………….. Generic Letter 88-20, ML031200551 Supplement 2, “Accident Management Strategies for Consideration in the Individual Plant Examination Process”. August 28, 2007…………… Appendix A to 10 CFR 72 FR 49505 part 50–General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants. August 28, 2007…………… Final Rule: Licenses, 72 FR 49352 Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants. March 27, 2009……………. Final Rule: Power 74 FR 13926 Reactor Security Requirements. [[Page 23166]] March 23, 2011……………. Memorandum from ML110950110 Chairman Jaczko on Tasking Memorandum- COMGBJ-11-0002–NRC Actions Following the Events in Japan. April 29, 2011……………. Temporary Instruction ML11115A053 2515/184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). May 26, 2011……………… Completion of ML111470264 Temporary Instruction 2515/184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines (SAMGs), at Region IV Reactor Facilities. May 27, 2011……………… Region I Completion of ML111470361 Temporary Instruction (TI)-184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines (SAMGs). June 1, 2011……………… Completion of ML111520396 Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) at Region III Sites–Revision. June 2, 2011……………… Completion of ML111530328 Temporary Instruction (TI) 184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines (SAMGS) at Region II Facilities–Revision. July 12, 2011…………….. SECY-11-0093–“The ML11186A959 Near-Term Task Force ML111861807 Review of Insights (Enclosure) from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident”. August 19, 2011…………… SRM-SECY-11-0093–Near- ML112310021 Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan. September 9, 2011…………. SECY-11-0124, ML11245A127 “Recommended Actions ML11245A144 to be Taken Without (Enclosure) Delay from the Near- Term Task Force Report.”. October 3, 2011…………… SECY-11-0137, ML11269A204 “Prioritization of ML11272A203 Recommended Actions (Enclosure) to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned.”. October 18, 2011………….. Staff Requirements ML112911571 Memorandum–SECY-11-0 124–Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay From The Near-Term Task Force Report. July 26, 2011…………….. NRDC’s Petition for ML11216A242 Rulemaking to Require More Realistic Training on Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines (PRM 50- 102). September 14, 2011………… Letter to Geoffrey H. ML112700269 Fettus, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. from Annette Vietti-Cook, In Regards to the NRC Will Not Be Instituting a Public Comment Period for PRM-50-97, PRM-50-98, PRM-50-99, PRM-50- 100, PRM-50-101, and PRM-50-102. October 13, 2011………….. Initial ACRS Review ML11284A136 of: (1) The NRC Near- Term Task Force Report on Fukushima and (2) Staff’s Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay. November 30, 2011…………. INPO-11-005, Special ML11347A454 Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station. December 15, 2011…………. Staff Requirements ML113490055 Memorandum–SECY-11-0 137–Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to the Fukushima Lessons- Learned. March 14, 2012……………. Summary of the Public ML12073A283 Meeting to Discuss Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 8, Strengthening and Integration of Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities Such As EOPS, SAMGS, and EDMGS, Related to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Power Plant Accident. ———————————————————————— Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of April 2012. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Michael F. Weber, Acting Executive Director for Operations. [FR Doc. 2012-9336 Filed 4-17-12; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
Cryptome unveils – Secret Service DoD Sexual Entrapment by CU/VZ
		
	
	

		
Odd that Cuba and/or Venezuela have not openly been accused of orchestrating the Secret Service/DOD Cartagena sexual honey pot — an entrapment long employed by spy services against the US and its allies, as well as by the US and its allies. Neither CU nor VZ took part in the Cartagena conference where the US failed to get approval for continued Cuba sanctions considered by Latin Americans to be US-Monroe Doctrine abusive.


Senator Collins has raised the possibility of a trap but will likely be briefed into silence. Neither Democrats or Republicans want to open this top secret Pandora’s Box (excuse the pun).


The Open Government Partnership conference in Brasilia which followed Cartagena also camouflaged with triple-crossing “openness” the legacy of Monroe Doctrine covert operations in Latin America to enforce hemispheric hegemony with stealth and bribery.


The chances are high that the sexual entrapment was a CU/VZ counterspy operation against the nest of spies operating in Cartagena, and that White House and Congressional investigations will perfectly cloak the dust-up as it has since President Monroe ordered the standard deception in 1823.

	


	



			
				


			

			
Cryptome unveils – Defense Support to Special Events like Cartagena
		
	
	

		
Defense Support to Special Events


 




[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 74 (Tuesday, April 17, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 22671-22676]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-9148]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

32 CFR Part 183

[DOD-2009-OS-0039; RIN 0790-AI55]


Defense Support to Special Events

AGENCY: Department of Defense.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This rule establishes procedures and assigns responsibilities 
for Special Events, sets forth procedural guidance for the execution of 
Special Events support when requested by civil authorities or 
qualifying entities and approved by the appropriate DoD authority, or 
as directed by the President, within the United States, including the 
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United States or 
any political subdivision thereof and elsewhere if properly approved.

DATES: This rule is effective May 17, 2012.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Carol Corbin, 571-256-8319.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Department of Defense published a 
proposed rule on November 26, 2010 (75 FR 72767-72771). One comment was 
received and addressed below:
    Comment: ``This comment pertains to Page 72770, Section A(iiii)G 
reference to DOD support to the ``National Boy Scout Jamboree''. 
Recommend that DOD not support this event. The Boy Scouts of America 
are an organization that discriminates based on sex, sexual 
orientation, and religion. DOD support is contrary to policies of state 
governments and the federal government. Material support is against the 
general principle of separation of church and state and the important 
elements of the constitution of the United States. DOD support 
essentially demonstrates an ``establishment of religion'' and is 
contrary to anti-discrimination policys [sic].''
    Response: The Department of Defense has valid statutory authority, 
10 U.S.C. 2554, for providing support to the Boy Scout jamboree.

Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' and Executive 
Order 13563, ``Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review''

    It has been certified that 32 CFR Part 183 does not:
    (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or 
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a section of the 
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public 
health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or 
communities;
    (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an 
action taken or planned by another agency;
    (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, 
user fees, or loan programs, or the rights and obligations of 
recipients thereof; or
    (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal 
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in 
these Executive Orders.

Sec. 202, Pub. L. 104-4, ``Unfunded Mandates Reform Act''

    It has been certified that 32 CFR part 183 does not contain a 
Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and 
tribal governments, in aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year.

Public Law 96-354, ``Regulatory Flexibility Act'' (5 U.S.C. 601 et 
seq.)

    It has been certified that 32 CFR part 183 is not subject to the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) because it would not, 
if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. This rule establishes procedures and assigns 
responsibilities within DoD for Special Events in support of civil and 
non-governmental entities; therefore, it is not expected that small 
entities will be affected because there will be no economically 
significant regulatory requirements placed upon them.

Public Law 96-511, ``Paperwork Reduction Act'' (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35)

    It has been certified that 32 CFR part 183 does not impose 
reporting or recordkeeping requirements under the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995.

Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism''

    It has been certified that 32 CFR part 183 does not have federalism 
implications, as set forth in Executive Order 13132. This rule does not 
have substantial direct effects on:
    (1) The States;
    (2) The relationship between the national government and the 
States; or
    (3) The distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government.

List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 183

    Armed forces, Special events.

    Accordingly, 32 CFR part 183 is added to subchapter I to read as 
follows:

PART 183--DEFENSE SUPPORT OF SPECIAL EVENTS

Sec.
183.1 Purpose.
183.2 Applicability and scope.
183.3 Definitions.
183.4 Policy.
183.5 Responsibilities.
183.6 Procedures.

     Authority: 2 U.S.C. 1966, 2 U.S.C. 1970, 10 U.S.C. 372-374, 10 
U.S.C. 377, 10 U.S.C. 2012, 10 U.S.C. 2553-2555, 10 U.S.C. 2564, 18 
U.S.C. 1385, 18 U.S.C. 3056, 31 U.S.C. 1535-1536, 32 U.S.C. 502, 32 
U.S.C. 508, Pub. L. 94-524, and Section 5802 of Pub. L. 104-208, as 
amended.


Sec.  183.1.  Purpose.

    This part:

[[Page 22672]]

    (a) Establishes DoD policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides 
procedures for support of civil authorities and qualifying entities 
during the conduct of special events in accordance with the authority 
in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5111.1 (see http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/511101p.pdf) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 
``Delegations of Authority,'' November 30, 2006 (available by written 
request to Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1010 Defense Pentagon, 
Washington, DC 20301-1010). This support will be referred to as 
``support of special events.''
    (b) Implements provisions of DoDD 5111.1; the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Memorandum, ``Delegations of Authority,'' November 30, 2006; 
title 2, United States Code (U.S.C.), sections 1966 and 1970; title 10, 
U.S.C., sections 372-374, 377, 2012, 2553-2555, and 2564; title 18, 
U.S.C. sections 1385 and 3056; title 31, U.S.C., sections 1535-1536; 
title 32, U.S.C., sections 502 and 508; Public Law 94-524; Section 5802 
of Public Law 104-208, as amended; and title 32, Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) part 185, addressing matters pertaining to Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for special events, including 
support for qualifying entities.


Sec.  183.2.  Applicability and scope.

    (a) Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the 
Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of 
the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense 
Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, National Guard personnel providing 
support of special events in title 32, U.S.C., status, and all other 
organizational entities in DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as 
the ``DoD Components'').
    (b) Does not apply to installation commanders or Heads of DoD 
Components providing localized support to a special event solely under 
the auspices of community relations, public outreach, or recruitment 
efforts pursuant to DoDD 5410.18 (see http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/541018p.pdf) and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5410.19 
(see http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/541019p.pdf) or 
other similar authority.


Sec.  183.3.  Definitions.

    Unless otherwise noted, these terms and definitions are for the 
purpose of this part only.
    Civil Authorities. Defined in Joint Publication 1-02 (see http://www.
dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.)
    Integrated Federal Support Overview (IFSO). A collaborative effort 
of the Special Events Working Group. The purpose of the IFSO is to 
inform the Secretary of Homeland Security and other appropriate senior 
Federal officials, including the Federal coordinator for the special 
event, of all the Federal activities and support in preparation for and 
execution of a special event. The IFSO facilitates the Federal 
coordinator's ability to lead a unified coordination group initially in 
case of an incident to support the Secretary of Homeland Security's 
incident management responsibilities. It also educates Federal 
interagency partners on Federal resources committed to the special 
event.
    National Special Security Event (NSSE). An event of national 
significance as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security. These 
national or international events, occurrences, contests, activities, or 
meetings, which, by virtue of their profile or status, represent a 
significant target, and therefore warrant additional preparation, 
planning, and mitigation efforts. The USSS, FBI, and FEMA are the 
Federal agencies with lead responsibilities for NSSEs; other Federal 
agencies, including DoD, may provide support to the NSSE if authorized 
by law.
    NSSE Executive Steering Committee. Established when the Secretary 
of Homeland Security designates a specific event to be an NSSE. The 
group, led by the USSS, comprises Federal, State, and local public 
safety and security officials whose primary responsibility is to 
coordinate and develop a specific security plan for the designated 
NSSE.
    Qualifying entity. A non-governmental organization to which the 
Department of Defense may provide assistance by virtue of statute, 
regulation, policy, or other approval by the Secretary of Defense or 
his or her authorized designee.
    Special event. An international or domestic event, contest, 
activity, or meeting, which by its very nature, or by specific 
statutory or regulatory authority, may warrant security, safety, and 
other logistical support or assistance from the Department of Defense. 
Event status is not determined by the Department of Defense, and 
support may be requested by either civil authorities or non-
governmental entities. Support provided may be reimbursable.
    Special Event Working Group. A single forum designed to ensure 
comprehensive and coordinated Federal interagency awareness of, and 
appropriate support to, special events. The Special Event Working Group 
is co-chaired by representatives from DHS (including the USSS and FEMA) 
and the FBI, and comprises representatives from more than 40 Federal 
departments and agencies, including the Department of Defense, the 
Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, Energy, Labor, Health 
and Human Services, and Commerce, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The 
Department of Defense representative on the Special Event Working Group 
is designated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)).


Sec.  183.4.  Policy.

    It is DoD policy that:
    (a) DoD capabilities may be used to provide support for 
international and domestic special events as authorized by law and DoD 
policy. DoD resources in support of special events may be provided only 
after the resources of all other relevant governmental and non-
governmental entities are determined not to be available, unless there 
is a statutory exception or the Department of Defense is the only 
source of specialized capabilities. DoD support should not be provided 
if use of commercial enterprises would be more appropriate.
    (b) DoD Components shall provide support to civil authorities or 
qualifying entities for special events only as authorized in this part.
    (c) The Department of Defense may support such events with 
personnel, equipment, and services in accordance with applicable laws, 
regulations, and interagency agreements. Most support shall be provided 
on a non-interference basis, with careful consideration given to 
effects on readiness and current operations. Support for National 
Special Security Events (NSSEs) shall be in accordance with National 
Security Presidential Directive-46/Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-15, Annex II.
    (d) DoD security and safety-related support for an event shall have 
priority over logistics assistance. However, logistics assistance may 
be provided if deemed appropriate and necessary, consistent with 
applicable statutes and policy guidance.
    (e) Funding for special events is subject to the following:
    (1) The Department of Defense may receive separate funding or 
authority to provide support to specific special events.

[[Page 22673]]

    (2) Support of special events for which the Department of Defense 
does not receive appropriations or for which DoD funds are not 
available for such support must be approved by the Secretary of Defense 
and must be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with title 
10, U.S.C., sections 377, 2553-2555, and 2564; title 31, U.S.C., 
sections 1535-1536; or other applicable statutes.
    (3) Reimbursement for DoD support provided to civilian law 
enforcement agencies during special events is required, in accordance 
with title 10 U.S.C. 377, unless the Secretary of Defense elects to 
waive reimbursement after determining that the support:
    (i) Is provided in the normal course of military training or 
operations; or
    (ii) Results in a benefit to the personnel providing the support 
that is substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be 
obtained from military operations or training.
    (4) The DoD will provide support to NSSEs in accordance with HSPD 
15/NSPD 46, as authorized by law and policy.
    (5) Security and safety of special events are responsibilities 
shared by Federal, State, and local authorities. If Federal funds will 
be provided to State or local authorities to offset the costs of 
enhanced security and public safety for special events and if State or 
local officials request the employment of National Guard personnel in a 
Federal pay status, States shall be encouraged to use those funds to 
employ those National Guard personnel in a State pay status or to 
reimburse the Department of Defense for costs related to the employment 
of the National Guard personnel in a Federal pay status.
    (f) DoD support of special events that includes support to civilian 
law enforcement officials must comply with DoDD 5525.5 (see 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/552505p.pdf).
    (g) DoD support of special events that includes support to civilian 
intelligence officials must comply with DoD 5240.1-R (see 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/524001r.pdf).


Sec.  183.5.  Responsibilities.

    (a) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) shall 
establish policy for and facilitate the interagency coordination of 
special events with Federal, State, and local agencies, and qualifying 
entities and the DoD Components, as required.
    (b) The ASD(HD&ASA), under the authority, direction, and control of 
the USD(P), shall:
    (1) In coordination with the CJCS, oversee the management and 
coordination of DoD support of special events including events covered 
under title 10, U.S.C., section 2564.
    (2) Serve as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of 
Defense and the USD(P) on DoD support of special events.
    (3) In accordance with DoDD 5111.13 (see 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/511113p.pdf), 
approve requests for assistance 
from civil authorities and qualifying entities for DoD support of 
special events. Such requests shall be coordinated with appropriate 
offices within OSD, with the CJCS, and with the heads of appropriate 
DoD Components. The ASD(HD&ASA) will immediately notify the Secretary 
of Defense and the USD(P) when this authority is exercised.
    (4) Coordinate, or consult on, special event support policy with 
other Federal departments and agencies (which may include the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)) and with other qualifying entities 
as appropriate.
    (5) Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of DoD 
support of special events.
    (6) Through the CJCS, monitor the activation, deployment, and 
employment of DoD personnel, facilities, and other resources involved 
in DoD support of special events.
    (7) Coordinate DoD support of special events with the General 
Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC, DoD) and the Under Secretary 
of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense 
(USD(C)/CFO).
    (8) Coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public 
Affairs (ASD(PA)) to ensure that information relating to DoD support of 
special events receives appropriate dissemination using all approved 
media.
    (9) Represent the Department of Defense regarding special events to 
other Federal departments and agencies, State and local authorities, 
and qualifying entities, including designating the Department of 
Defense representatives for the working groups identified in Sec.  
183.6(b) of this part.
    (10) Manage, in conjunction with the USD(C)/CFO, the Support for 
International Sporting Competitions (SISC) Defense Account.
    (11) In accordance with section 5802 of Public Law 104-208, as 
amended, notify the congressional defense committees of DoD plans to 
obligate funds in the SISC Defense Account.
    (12) In accordance with title 10 U.S.C. 2564, submit an annual 
report to Congress, no later than January 30 of each year following a 
year in which the Department of Defense provides assistance under title 
10 U.S.C. 2564, detailing DoD support to certain sporting competitions.
    (c) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
(USD(P&R)) shall coordinate on DoD support of special events and, in 
coordination with the CJCS, provide advice regarding the effect the 
requested support will have on readiness and military operations.
    (d) The USD(C)/CFO shall:
    (1) Coordinate on DoD support of special events, and provide advice 
regarding the effect on the DoD budget and on DoD financial resources.
    (2) Maintain the SISC Defense Account in conjunction with the 
ASD(HD&ASA).
    (e) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD(AT&L)) shall coordinate on DoD logistical support of 
special events.
    (f) The GC, DoD shall coordinate and provide legal counsel on DoD 
support of special events.
    (g) The ASD(PA) shall provide policy guidance and review, 
coordinate, and approve requests for ceremonial and entertainment 
support for special events covered by this part, in accordance with 
DoDD 5410.18 (see 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/541018p.pdf), DoDI 5410.19 
(see http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/541019p.pdf) and DoDD 
5122.05 (see http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/512205p.pdf).
    (h) The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
    (1) Designate and maintain an office of primary responsibility 
(OPR) for special events or a special events coordinator, and provide 
that OPR designation and contact information to the CJCS within 60 days 
of the publication of this part. Changes to OPR designation and contact 
information shall be provided to the CJCS within 30 days of the change.
    (2) Provide personnel, equipment, and support of special events as 
directed.
    (3) Ensure that personnel supporting special events comply with 
applicable antiterrorism and force protection training and standards.
    (4) Provide other support of special events as directed.
    (i) The CJCS shall:
    (1) Provide planning guidance to DoD Components for all special 
events for which DoD support may require the employment of military 
forces or centralized command and control.
    (2) Review all requests for DoD support of special events and, in 
coordination with the USD(P&R),

[[Page 22674]]

provide advice on the effect that the requested support will have on 
readiness and military operations.
    (3) Prepare, staff, and issue orders and messages on DoD support of 
special events that has been approved by authorized DoD officials.
    (4) Issue guidance to the Combatant Commanders on the 
implementation of this part.
    (5) Process requests for DoD support of special events.
    (6) Maintain sufficient staff to manage the day-to-day operational 
aspects of DoD support of special events.
    (7) Manage and maintain equipment that is procured to support DoD 
special events.
    (i) Establish and operate a system for delivering DoD assets to 
authorized recipients and for recovering loaned assets at the 
conclusion of the event.
    (ii) Ensure the civil authorities and qualifying entities 
authorized to accept DoD assets provide a surety bond or other suitable 
insurance protection to cover the cost of lost, stolen, or damaged DoD 
property.
    (iii) Plan and program for the life-cycle replacement of special 
events equipment procured under title 10 U.S.C. 2553, 2554, and 2564.
    (iv) Procure goods and services through contracting, when necessary 
and authorized by law.
    (8) Administer the expenditure of appropriated funds, and ensure 
that the Department of Defense is reimbursed for its support of special 
events when required by law or DoD policy.
    (i) With the assistance of the DoD Components, provide cost 
estimates of DoD support to a special event that is under consideration 
for approval.
    (ii) Upon approval, administer the execution of funding for DoD 
support of special events.
    (iii) At the conclusion of DoD support to a special event, collect 
and provide a financial accounting for all DoD funds expended in 
support of that special event.
    (9) Establish and maintain effective liaison with DoD Components 
for the timely exchange of information about special event projects.
    (10) Provide other support of special events as directed.
    (j) The Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB), under the authority, 
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense through the 
Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force, shall:
    (1) Serve as the channel of communications for all matters 
pertaining to the National Guard between DoD Components and the States 
in accordance with DoDD 5105.77 (see 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510577p.pdf).
    (2) Report National Guard special event support of civil 
authorities or qualifying entities when using Federal resources, 
equipment, or funding to the National Joint Operations and Intelligence 
Center.
    (3) Serve as an advisor to the Combatant Commanders on National 
Guard matters pertaining to the combatant command missions, and support 
planning and coordination for DoD support of special events as 
requested by the CJCS or the Combatant Commanders.
    (4) Ensure that National Guard appropriations are appropriately 
reimbursed for special event activities.
    (5) Advocate for needed special event capabilities.
    (6) Develop, in accordance with DoDD 5105.77 and in coordination 
with the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and the ASD(HD&ASA), 
guidance regarding this part as it relates to National Guard matters.


Sec.  183.6.  Procedures.

    (a) General Provisions. (1) This section provides the basic 
procedures for DoD support to special events.
    (2) As appropriate, amplifying procedures regarding DoD support to 
special events shall be published separately and maintained by the 
Office of the ASD(HD&ASA) and released as needed in the most effective 
medium consistent with DoD Directive 8320.02 (see 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/832002p.pdf).
    (b) Special Event Process. (1) Engagement. (i) Engagement may be 
initiated by the Department of Defense, civil authorities, or 
qualifying entities. If the initial engagement is not a written request 
for assistance (RFA), representatives of the ASD(HD&ASA) and the Joint 
Staff will confer to determine actual requirements.
    (ii) Engagement may involve informational briefings and meetings 
between DoD representatives and special event organizers, civil 
authorities, or qualifying entities. These informal engagements may 
result in non-DoD entities submitting an RFA to the DoD Executive 
Secretary, requesting DoD support for a special event.
    (iii) Once an RFA is received, it will be sent to the ASD(HD&ASA) 
and the CJCS simultaneously for staffing and recommendation. Additional 
engagement with the requestor may be required to quantify the scope and 
magnitude of the support requested.
    (2) Planning. (i) The direction and focus of DoD special-event 
planning will depend on the nature of the event and scope and magnitude 
of the support requested or anticipated. International events may 
require additional planning, procedures, and coordination with the 
government of the host country.
    (ii) For National Special Security Events (NSSEs) and events that 
may require the employment of military forces and centralized command 
and control, the CJCS will issue a planning order requesting a 
Combatant Commander to initiate planning and notify potential 
supporting commands or organizations and the Chief, NGB, as 
appropriate. When possible, established CJCS-directed planning 
procedures will be used for the Combatant Commander to provide an 
assessment and request for forces.
    (A) The NSSE designation process generally is initiated by a formal 
written request to the Secretary of Homeland Security by the State or 
local government hosting the event. In other situations where the event 
is federally sponsored, an appropriate Federal official will make the 
request.
    (B) Once the request is received by DHS, the USSS and the FBI will 
send an NSSE questionnaire to the responsible host official for 
completion. The request, completed questionnaires, and other supporting 
information are reviewed by the NSSE Working Group (which includes a 
non-voting DoD member), which provides a recommendation to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security regarding NSSE designation.
    (C) The Secretary of Homeland Security makes the final 
determination to designate an event as an NSSE pursuant to Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 7 (see 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book2/pdf/PPP-2003-book2-doc-pg1739.pdf).
    (iii) There are numerous events where DoD support should be 
anticipated and a planning order issued to the appropriate Combatant 
Commander. These include, but are not limited to:
    (A) The President's State of the Union Address or other addresses 
to a Joint Session of Congress.
    (B) Annual meetings of the United Nations General Assembly.
    (C) National Presidential nominating conventions.
    (D) Presidential inaugural activities.
    (E) International summits or meetings.
    (F) State funerals.
    (G) The National Boy Scout Jamboree.
    (H) Certain international or domestic sporting competitions.
    (iv) There are other events that the Department of Defense supports 
that do not involve the assignment of military forces or centralized 
command and control by Combatant Commanders, which include planning 
requirements

[[Page 22675]]

by the host organizations. These include, but are not limited to:
    (A) Military Department or Service-sponsored events, such as:
    (1) The Marine Corps Marathon.
    (2) The Army 10-Miler.
    (3) Navy Fleet Weeks.
    (4) Installation or Joint Service Open Houses.
    (5) Service or Joint Air Shows.
    (B) Community relations activities authorized in accordance with 
DoDI 5410.19.
    (v) The Department of Defense may provide support to certain 
sporting events that are included under subsection (c) of section 2564 
of title 10, U.S.C., by providing technical, contracting, and 
specialized equipment support. These events may be funded by the SISC 
Defense Account pursuant to title 10 U.S.C. 2564 and include:
    (A) The Special Olympics.
    (B) The Paralympics.
    (C) Sporting events sanctioned by the United States Olympic 
Committee (USOC) through the Paralympic Military Program.
    (D) Other international or domestic Paralympic sporting events that 
are held in the United States or its territories, governed by the 
International Paralympic Committee, and sanctioned by the USOC:
    (1) For which participation exceeds 100 amateur athletes.
    (2) In which at least 10 percent of the athletes participating in 
the sporting event are either members or former members of U.S. 
Military Services who are participating in the sporting event based 
upon an injury or wound incurred in the line of duty or veterans who 
are participating in the sporting event based upon a service-connected 
disability.
    (vi) Planning for DoD support to the Olympics and certain other 
sporting events requires additional considerations.
    (A) Subsections (a) and (b) of section 2564 of title 10, U.S.C., 
authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide assistance for the 
Olympics and certain other sporting events. Unless the event meets the 
specific requirements stated in paragraph (b)(2)(v) of this section, 
the Attorney General must certify that DoD security and safety 
assistance is necessary to meet essential security and safety needs of 
the event.
    (B) The Department of Defense, led by the ASD(HD&ASA), will 
collaborate with the CJCS, the Department of Justice, including the 
FBI, and other appropriate DoD Components and Federal departments or 
agencies, usually as part of a Joint Advisory Committee (JAC), to 
provide a recommendation to the Attorney General on what categories of 
support the Department of Defense may be able to provide to meet 
essential security and safety needs of the event.
    (C) Support other than safety and security may be authorized for 
sporting events, but only to the extent that:
    (1) Such needs cannot reasonably be met by a source other than the 
Department of Defense.
    (2) Such assistance does not adversely affect military 
preparedness.
    (3) The requestor of such assistance agrees to reimburse the 
Department of Defense, in accordance with the provisions of title 10 
U.S.C. 377, 2553-2555, and 2564; title 31 U.S.C. 1535-1536; and other 
applicable provisions of law.
    (vii) Types of support that the Department of Defense can provide 
include, but are not limited to:
    (A) Aviation.
    (B) Communications (e.g., radios, mobile telephones, signal 
integrators).
    (C) Security (e.g., magnetometers, closed-circuit televisions, 
perimeter alarm systems, undercarriage inspection devices).
    (D) Operations and Command Centers (e.g., design and configuration, 
video walls).
    (E) Explosive ordnance detection and disposal (technical advice, 
explosive ordnance disposal teams, explosive detector dog, dog teams).
    (F) Logistics (transportation, temporary facilities, food, 
lodging).
    (G) Ceremonial support (in coordination with the ASD(PA)).
    (H) Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat 
identification, reduction, and response capabilities.
    (I) Incident response capabilities (in coordination with the 
Department of Justice, DHS, the Department of Health and Human 
Services, and in consultation with appropriate State and local 
authorities).
    (viii) DoD personnel support of special events is provided using a 
total force sourcing solution that may include Active Duty and Reserve 
Component military personnel, DoD civilian personnel, and DoD 
contractor personnel. The Department of Defense also may decide to 
respond to requests for assistance by approving, with the consent of 
the Governor(s) concerned, National Guard forces performing duty 
pursuant to title 32 U.S.C. 502.
    (A) National Guard personnel conducting support of special events 
while on State active duty, at the direction of their Governor or 
Adjutant General, are not considered to be providing DoD support of 
special events.
    (B) This part does not limit or affect Department of Defense and 
National Guard personnel volunteering to support special events during 
their non-duty time. This volunteer support is not considered as part 
of DoD support of special events. Volunteers are prohibited from 
obligating or using DoD resources to support a special event while in a 
volunteer status except as authorized by separate statute or authority.
    (3) Coordination. (i) Coordination of DoD support of special events 
will likely take place simultaneously with engagement and planning; 
operate across the full spectrum of strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels; and occur internally among DoD Components and 
externally with supported civil authorities and qualifying entities.
    (A) Policy coordination at the departmental level between the 
Department of Defense and other Federal departments or agencies is the 
responsibility of the ASD(HD&ASA). Other DoD Components may send 
representatives to these meetings with the prior concurrence of the 
ASD(HD&ASA). Standing departmental-level special events coordination 
meetings include:
    (1) USSS-led NSSE Working Group.
    (2) DHS-led Special Events Working Group.
    (3) Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security-led 
International Sporting Event Group.
    (B) Coordination within the Department of Defense is led by the 
ASD(HD&ASA) and is facilitated by the CJCS for the Combatant Commands 
and other joint commands and by other DoD Component Heads for their 
constituent elements.
    (C) The CJCS will work with the Military Service Chiefs, the Chief 
of the National Guard Bureau, and the Heads of DoD Components when 
subject matter expertise is needed for the event organizers. This will 
be based upon location and other criteria, as needed.
    (ii) Inputs to the DHS-produced Integrated Federal Support Overview 
(IFSO) will be solicited by the CJCS and sent to the ASD(HD&ASA) for 
consolidation and deconfliction prior to final submission to DHS. DoD 
Component Heads not tasked by the Joint Staff will submit their input 
directly to the ASD(HD&ASA).
    (iii) RFAs for DoD support will adhere to the following:
    (A) An RFA for DoD support to a special event may be made by 
Federal, State, or local civil authorities, or by qualifying entities.
    (B) RFAs will be in writing and addressed to the Secretary of 
Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, or the

[[Page 22676]]

DoD Executive Secretary, 1000 Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-
1000. DoD Components who receive RFAs directly from the requestor will 
immediately forward them to the DoD Executive Secretary for 
disposition, distribution, and tracking.
    (C) At a minimum, the RFA will be distributed to the ASD(HD&ASA) 
and the CJCS for staffing and recommendation. If the RFA is for a 
single capability for which a DoD Component is the OPR or serves as a 
DoD Executive Agent, the RFA is sent to that Component for action with 
an information copy provided to the ASD(HD&ASA) and the CJCS.
    (D) Vetting of RFAs will be in accordance with the DoD Global Force 
Management process and consistent with criteria published in DoD 
8260.03-M, Volume 2 (see 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/826003m_vol2.pdf).
    (E) Heads of DoD Components will consult with the DoD Executive 
Secretary on which DoD official will communicate DoD special event 
support decisions to the requesting authorities.
    (4) Execution. Execution of DoD support of special events is a 
shared responsibility. The scope and magnitude of the support being 
provided will determine the OPR and level of execution.
    (i) When joint military forces or centralized command and control 
of DoD support to a special event are anticipated or required, a 
Combatant Commander may be identified as the supported commander in a 
properly approved order issued by the CJCS. The designated Combatant 
Command shall be the focal point for execution of DoD support to that 
special event with other DoD Components in support. Reporting 
requirements shall be in accordance with the properly approved order 
issued by the CJCS and standing business practices.
    (ii) When there are no joint military forces required and there is 
no need for centralized command and control, DoD support of special 
events shall be executed by the CJCS or the Head of a DoD Component, as 
designated in a properly approved order or message issued by the CJCS. 
Oversight of DoD support will be provided by the ASD(HD&ASA).
    (iii) As described in the Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of 
Effort, when Federal military forces and State military forces are 
employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities in the United 
States, appointment of a dual-status commander is the usual and 
customary command and control arrangement. Appointment of a dual-status 
commander requires action by the President and the appropriate Governor 
(or their designees).
    (5) Recovery. (i) Durable, non-unit equipment procured by the 
Department of Defense to support a special event shall be retained by 
the CJCS for use during future events in accordance with Sec.  
183.5(i)(7) of this part.
    (ii) An after-action report shall be produced by the Combatant 
Command or OPR and sent to the ASD(HD&ASA) and the CJCS within 60 days 
of completion of the event.

    Dated: April 6, 2012.
Patricia L. Toppings,
OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 2012-9148 Filed 4-16-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P




















	


	



			
				


			

			
Cryptome unveils – Cartegena Sex Culture
		
	
	

		








Cartegena Sex Culture


 






[Image]Prostitutes walk a street of the old city, as heads of state met for the Americas Summit in Cartagena April 14, 2012. Headlines from this weekend’s gathering of more than 30 heads of state have focused on an embarrassing scandal after members of U.S. President Barack Obama’s security detail were caught with prostitutes in historic Cartagena. Picture taken April 14. Reuters




[Image]Prostitutes walk a street of the old city, as heads of state met for the Americas Summit in Cartagena April 14, 2012. Headlines from this weekend’s gathering of more than 30 heads of state have focused on an embarrassing scandal after members of U.S. President Barack Obama’s security detail were caught with prostitutes in historic Cartagena. Picture taken April 14. Reuters




[Image]Prostitutes walk a street of the old city, as heads of state met for the Americas Summit in Cartagena, April 14, 2012. Headlines from this weekend’s gathering of more than 30 heads of state have focused on an embarrassing scandal after members of U.S. President Barack Obama’s security detail were caught with prostitutes in historic Cartagena. Picture taken April 14. Reuters




[Image]Sex in the city of Cartagena, December 9, 2010  http://southamtour.blogspot.com/2010/12/sex-in-city-of-cartagena.html











 

























	


	



			
				


			

			
Secret – Sex Culture
		
	
	

		
















[Image]In this Wednesday, Dec. 28, 2011 file photo, 15-year-old Sahar Gul, is carried into hospital in Baghlan north of Kabul, Afghanistan. According to officials in northeastern Baghlan province, Gul’s in-laws kept her in a basement for six months, ripped her fingernails out, tortured her with hot irons and broke her fingers _ all in an attempt to force her into prostitution. Police freed her last week after her uncle called authorities.




[Image]In this photo taken Saturday, June 19, 2010, a prostitute peers out from her makeshift shack as she waits for clients in downtown Port-au-Prince. Many prostitutes have begun setting up makeshift brothels in the rubble of the buildings that were destroyed during the Jan. 12 earthquake. (Alexandre Meneghini)




[Image]In this photo taken May 5, 2011, a sex worker dances with a customer at the Vila Mimosa prostitution zone in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Spelling the possible end of Vila Mimosa is a high-speed train the government wants to build to link Rio to Sao Paulo, as part of Brazil’s Olympic proposal. The government is expected to open bidding to prospective builders July 29. (Felipe Dana)




[Image]In this photo taken Thursday March 1, 2012 , an exotic dancer performs during the 2012 Sex and Entertainment Expo in Mexico City. The Sex and Entertainment Expo is an annual event where vendors in the sex industry promote their goods and local strip clubs offer a glimpse of their establishments. This year is the event’s ninth consecutive year. AP




[Image]In this photo taken May 8, 2011, a sex worker poses for a photo in her cubicle at the Vila Mimosa prostitution zone in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Spelling the possible end of Vila Mimosa is a high-speed train the government wants to build to link Rio to Sao Paulo, as part of Brazil’s Olympic proposal. The government is expected to open bidding to prospective builders July 29. (Felipe Dana)




[Image]EDS NOTE NUDITY – In this photo taken May 5, 2011, a sex worker finishes her makeup as a coworker dries her hair as they get ready to work at the Vila Mimosa prostitution zone in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Spelling the possible demise of Vila Mimosa is a high-speed train the government wants to build to link Rio to Sao Paulo, a $22 billion project that was promised in Brazil’s Olympic proposal. The government is expected to open bidding to prospective builders July 29. (Felipe Dana)




[Image]In this photo taken May 25, 2011, Dara, second right, drinks with a customer as other sex workers get ready at the Vila Mimosa prostitution zone in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Spelling the possible end of Vila Mimosa is a high-speed train the government wants to build to link Rio to Sao Paulo, as part of Brazil’s Olympic proposal. The government is expected to open bidding to prospective builders July 29. (Felipe Dana)




[Image]A prostitute waits for clients in the Bois de Boulogne, on March 2, 2012 in Paris. Twenty-five suspected prostitutes were arrested during an overnight anti-prostitution operation. Getty [Image below obscured by source.]


[Image]





[Image]In this photo taken May 25, 2011, A sex worker waits for customers at the Vila Mimosa prostitution zone in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Spelling the possible end of Vila Mimosa is a high-speed train the government wants to build to link Rio to Sao Paulo, as part of Brazil’s Olympic proposal. The government is expected to open bidding to prospective builders July 29. (Felipe Dana)




[Image]In this photo taken May 5, 2011, men sit at a bar as sex workers wait for customers at the Vila Mimosa prostitution zone in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Spelling the possible end of Vila Mimosa is a high-speed train the government wants to build to link Rio to Sao Paulo, as part of Brazil’s Olympic proposal. The government is expected to open bidding to prospective builders July 29. (Felipe Dana)




[Image]In this photo taken May 5, 2011, a sex worker enters a cubicle where she sees her clients at Vila Mimosa prostitution zone in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Spelling the possible end of Vila Mimosa is a high-speed train the government wants to build to link Rio to Sao Paulo, as part of Brazil’s Olympic proposal. The government is expected to open bidding to prospective builders July 29.(Felipe Dana)




[Image]In this photo taken May 25, 2011, A sex worker, right, dances with a customer at the Vila Mimosa prostitution zone in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Spelling the possible end of Vila Mimosa is a high-speed train the government wants to build to link Rio to Sao Paulo, as part of Brazil’s Olympic proposal. The government is expected to open bidding to prospective builders July 29. (Felipe Dana)




[Image]A security guard attempts to control an half naked activist and protestor from the Ukrainian women’s right movement FEMEN, after she whistled and waved a file with a sign reading ‘EURO-2012 without prostitution’ painted on her body, in Kiev, on June 8, 2011, during the countdown event dedicated to the beginning of the official start of the UEFA EURO 2012 European Football Championship which will be hosted in Ukraine and Poland and is planned to kick-off on June 8, 2012. Getty




[Image]In this photo taken Friday June 11, 2010, Majouli Feriz, 20, who works as a prostitute, laughs as she talks to other prostitutes, unseen, in the rubble of a damaged building in downtown Port-au-Prince. Many prostitutes have begun setting up makeshift brothels in the rubble of the buildings that were destroyed during the Jan. 12 earthquake. (Alexandre Meneghini)




[Image]In this photo taken Friday June 25, 2010, men watch a prostitute with a customer at her improvised shelter in downtown Port-au-Prince. Many prostitutes have begun setting up makeshift brothels in the rubble of the buildings that were destroyed during the Jan. 12 earthquake. (Alexandre Meneghini)




[Image]In this photo taken Saturday June 19, 2010, prostitutes relax as they wait for customers in downtown Port-au-Prince. Many prostitutes have begun setting up makeshift brothels in the rubble of the buildings that were destroyed during the Jan. 12 earthquake. (Alexandre Meneghini)




[Image]In this photo taken June 5, 2010, Stephen Clancy Hill, 34, a porn actor suspected of fatally stabbing a former co-worker and wounding two others during a violent rampage threatens to kill himself with a samurai sword as Los Angeles Police Department SWAT team members and crisis counselors attempt to keep him from jumping off a cliff during a dramatic, daylong standoff in Chatsworth, Calif. Saturday afternoon. Clancy later fell to his death when officers moved in. (Axel Koester)




[Image]EDS: NOTE NUDITY — Performers from the Beija Flor samba school parade during carnival celebrations at the Sambadrome in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Monday, Feb. 20, 2012. Millions watched the sequin-clad samba dancers at Rio de Janeiro’s iconic Carnival parade. (Victor R. Caivano)




[Image]Prostitutes wear masks as they attend a demonstration ahead of vote on a symbolic resolution to abolish prostitution at the National Assembly in Paris December 6, 2011. French Parliament is to debate abolishing prostitution through a crackdown which would criminalise payment for sex. Reuters




[Image]Romanian students dressed as caged brides attend an event to raise awareness to the risks of human trafficking and sexual exploitation faced by young girls lured by the prospect of a better paying job abroad, in Bucharest, Romania, Saturday, Nov. 19, 2011. The event promoted the Romanian premiere of the movie “If the Seed doesn’t die” by Serb-born director Sinisa Dragin which tells the story of Romanian searching for his daughter, forced into prostitution in Kosovo, and a Serbian seeking the body of his son killed in a car accident in Romania. AP




[Image]In this Saturday, Oct. 19, 2002 file photo, Zakiya, 30, who is accused of adultery, sews while she holds her daughter Zohra, 1, on her lap at the women’s prison in Kabul, Afghanistan. Women interviewed by Human Rights Watch often said they were trying to escape abusive husbands or forced marriages. In some cases, those who had left were assumed to have cheated on their husbands, and therefore were jailed for adultery, which is a criminal offense in Afghanistan. (Lynne Sladky)




[Image]An unidentified Afghan prostitute holds her phones after talking with her friends in her Madame’s house in Kabul, Afghanistan, on Monday, May 26, 2008. Afghanistan is one of the world’s most conservative countries, yet its sex trade appears to be thriving. (Farzana Wahidy)




[Image]In this picture made Friday, May 8, 2009, Eva, left, and Dana, right (full names not given) pose inside the Artemis brothel in Berlin. Like so many other businesses, Europe’s largest legalized prostitution industry is having to adapt to the economic downturn. In response, clubs and brothels are increasingly marketing themselves either as high-class, exclusive spas, or as bargain basements of delight. (Franka Bruns)




[Image]Children in costumes display their placards during an anti-child pornography rally in front of the House of Representatives Wednesday, May 27, 2009 in suburban Quezon City north of Manila, Philippines. The rally conveys a theme as a religious procession called “Flores de Mayo” to claim the legislators to prioritize the passage of the anti-child pornography bill. (Pat Roque)




[Image]Indonesian protesters march against an anti-pornography bill in Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, Saturday, Oct. 11, 2008. About thousand of people attended a rally opposing the endorsement of the anti- pornography bill by the Indonesian parliament. (Firdia Lisnawati)




[Image]** EDS NOTE: NUDITY ** A visitor poses for a friend’s camera in front of a poster at Lisbon’s International Erotic Exhibition Saturday night, Oct. 31, 2009, in Portugal. (Armando Franca)











 


































	


	



			
				


			

			
CRPTOME – Lynnae Williams v. CIA Court Documents
		
	
	

		
Lynnae Williams on Twitter: https://twitter.com/#!/wlynnae


 




Lynnae Williams sends:


Here are the documents I filed in US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and responses from the U.S. Attorney’s Office to my complaint against the CIA. I still need to breakdown the Government’s response into smaller files so I can email them. Thank you for publishing my information on Cryptome and don’t hesitate to contact me if there is further information I can provide.


Best regards,


Lynnae


Williams-Redacted-Amended-Complaint-1.pdf (521KB)


USDisCtFilingFeeReceipt.pdf (159KB)


USDistrictCourtFilingWaiverDenial.pdf (1.3MB)


US-District-Court-Order.pdf (552KB)


SummonsForms.pdf (696KB)


DoJ-Notice-Of-Appearance.pdf (506KB)


USDistCourtEmergencyMotionSeal.pdf (4.2MB)

	


	



			
				


			

			
Top-Secret – Ronaldo Cardonetti life in danger in Brazil
		
	
	

		
Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2012 06:44:40 -0400

From: brasil[at]wikileaks.com.br

To:

Subject: Fwd: Re: Ronaldo Cardonetti life in danger in Brazil


Caro Sr. Joao Carlos Saad:


Bom dia!


Nos encontramos no voo para SP da American Airlines aonde tive o prazer de servi-lo assim como sua esposa na classe executiva e deve se recordar que mencionei a voce que sou conhecido do Boris Casoy e vendi equipamento para tratamento de coluna para ele que me visitou na casa de minha Maezinha na Rua Sao Joao Batista n. 119, Cambuci _SP 01527-010.


Sou ativista digital nas horas de folga e ajudo ativistas do Brasil e dos Estados Unidos dando-lhes hospedagem de sites gratuitamente. A ABUSANDO (Associação Brasileira de Usuários de Numeração IP & Assinantes de Domínios) presidida por mim investiga ha anos as acoes do CGI (Comite Gestor da Internet) que nao tem personalidade juridica e nem representa o governo legalmente mesmo assim, atua coordenando a Internet no Brasil cobrando taxas de dominios que nao receberam a apreciacao do congresoo nacional.


Favor informar Boris Casoy e equipe de jornalismo da Band para acompanhar este caso pois estou sendo perseguido pelo Dirceu, Getschko e Getschko por denunciar falcatruas do PT usando a maquina do registro de dominios e alocacoes de IP’s no Brasil.


Voce pode acompanhar tudo no like ABUSANDO no meu site


http://www.wikileaks.com.br


ou diretamente pelo link:


http://www.abusando.org/nada/inicio.html


Um de meus amigos foi preso pela Policia Federal a mando do Ze Dirceu e PT (sob acusacao de crime contra a seguranca nacional) e foi interrogado pela PF quando os delegados tentaram incrimina-lo usando de metodos ilegais.


O nome dele e’ Nuno Moreira Pereira de Souza e o mesmo tambem e’ ativista digital que denunciou as falcatruas de Demi Getschko e Joze Dirceu dentro do registro.br que e’ comandado pela ONG particular presidida por Demi Getschko, laranja do PT denominada NIC.br e toda a receita dos milhoes de dominios estao sendo controlada pelo Demi Getschko que presta contas aos homens da linha de frente do PT em SP.


Poderei ser preso a qualquer momento tambem sob acusacao de crime contra a seguranca nacional e poderei ter o mesmo fim de Celso Daniel portanto favor investigar esse caso, pois apos minha prisao pela PF podera ser tarde demais.


Telefone para contato no Brasil e exterior:


Ronaldo Cardonetti


011 8706-0201

EUA +1 305 781-3331

+1 305 762-2105


Jorge Modesto (secretario da ABUSANDO)


041 3209-9099 / 041 8843-5117 (claro)


ou Laura TIM 041 9922-3058


Jan Struiving (vice-presidente da ABUSANDO)


Claro    041    8850-9600

OI       041    8435-0420

TIM      041    9937-2250

TIM      041    9903-1089

TIM      041    9705-9626

Vivo     041    9136-1424


Rogerio Gonçalves (ativista digital)


Skype = tele171 .tel.


(21) 2576-3511.


Delegado Castilho (PF Parana)


041 9615-3000


No mais, caso nao venha a acontecer minha prisao, vale a pena investigar apenas para garantir e salvaguardar o direito de liberdade de expressao e jornalismo no nosso querido Brasil com S.


Cordialmente.


Ronaldo Cardonetti


http://wikileaks.com.br

	


	



			
				


			

			
Unveiled – Nuclear Spent Fuel Storage Installation Error
		
	
	

		
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 65 (Wednesday, April 4, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20438-20440]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-8114]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 72-1030, 72-56; 50-338 and 50-339: NRC-2012-0084]


Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Virginia Electric 
and Power Company: North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Issuance of an environmental assessment and finding of no 
significant impact.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jennie Rankin, Project Manager, 
Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555. Telephone: (301) 492-3268; Fax number: (301) 492-
3342; email: jennivine.rankin@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) is 
considering issuance of a one-time exemption to Virginia Electric and 
Power Company (Dominion or licensee) pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7 from the 
requirements of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3) and the portion of 72.212(b)(11) 
which requires compliance with the terms, conditions, and 
specifications of the CoC. Dominion submitted its exemption request by 
letter dated July 21, 2011, as supplemented September 28, 2011. 
Dominion has loaded spent nuclear fuel into Transnuclear, Inc. (TN) 
NUHOMS[supreg] HD Storage System (HD-32PTH) dry storage casks, under 
the Certificate of Compliance (CoC or Certificate) No. 1030, Amendment 
No. 0. The licensee inadvertently reversed the upper and lower zones 
while preparing the dry shielded canister (DSC) loading maps. This 
resulted in twelve fuel assemblies being loaded into seven DSCs with 
decay heat greater than the levels specified in the CoC. Dominion 
requests a one-time exemption to the 10 CFR part 72 requirements to 
continue storage of the affected DSCs with serial numbers DOM-32PTH-
004-C, -005-C, -007-C, -010-C, -013-C, -019-C and GBC-32PTH-011-C in 
their current condition at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage 
Installation (ISFSI) associated with the operation of Dominion's 
nuclear power reactors, North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, located 
in Louisa County, Virginia.

II. Environmental Assessment (EA)

    Identification of Proposed Action: The CoC is the NRC approved 
design for each dry storage cask system. The proposed action would 
grant Dominion a one-time exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 
72.212(b)(3) and from the portion of 72.212(b)(11) that states the 
licensee shall comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications of 
the CoC, to the extent necessary to enable Dominion to continue storage 
of the seven DSCs in their current condition at the ISFSI associated 
with North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2. These regulations 
specifically require storage of spent nuclear fuel under a general 
license in dry storage casks approved under the provisions of 10 CFR 
part 72, and compliance with the terms and conditions set forth in the 
CoC for each dry spent fuel storage cask used by an ISFSI general 
licensee.
    The TN NUHOMS[supreg] HD dry cask storage system CoC provides 
requirements, conditions and operating limits in Attachment A, 
Technical Specifications (TS). The TS restrict the decay heat in lower 
Zone ``1a'' locations to <= 1.05 kW and the upper Zone ``1b'' locations to <= 0.8 kW. The applicant inadvertently reversed the upper and lower zones while preparing the DSC loading maps. This resulted in twelve fuel assemblies being loaded into seven DSCs (serial numbers DOM-32PTH- 004-C, -005-C, -007-C, -010-C, -013-C, -019-C and GBC-32PTH-011-C) with decay heat greater than specified in the CoC. The maximum decay heat of the misloaded fuel assemblies at the time of loading was 0.859 kW, which exceeded the Zone ``1b'' limit mentioned above by 59 watts. Currently, the twelve affected fuel assemblies have been in storage for a minimum of 1.3 years and have decayed to meet the required decay heat limits of the CoC. The proposed action would grant Dominion a one-time exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3) and the portion of 72.212(b)(11) which requires compliance with the terms, conditions, and specifications of a CoC, in order to allow continued storage of the seven affected DSCs in their current condition. This exemption approval is only valid for DSCs with serial numbers DOM-32PTH-004-C, -005-C, - 007-C, -010-C, -013-C, -019-C and GBC-32PTH-011-C, at the North Anna Power Station ISFSI. [[Page 20439]] Need for the Proposed Action: Dominion requested this exemption in order to continue storage of seven as-loaded DSCs containing twelve fuel assemblies which exceeded the CoC decay heat limits at the time of loading. Dominion, with the assistance of TN, has provided an evaluation and thermal analysis which shows that the affected DSCs remain bounded by the system's design basis limits and that the 
continued storage of the fuel in the as-loaded configuration is safe.
    Dominion has considered an alternative to the proposed action, 
which would correct the condition by reloading the affected DSCs to be 
in compliance with CoC No. 1030. This would involve retrieving each of 
the DSCs from their Horizontal Storage Modules (HSM), unloading the 
spent fuel assemblies from the DSC, performing inspections of various 
DSC components, reloading the spent fuel assemblies into the used DSC 
or a new DSC (if there was damage noted on the used DSC) in accordance 
with CoC No. 1030, performing the DSC closing procedures, and 
transferring the DSC back to the ISFSI for re-insertion into the HSM.
    Dominion estimates this alternative action of loading and unloading 
operations would increase personnel exposures by 250 mRem per affected 
DSC. In addition, Dominion states the alternative to the proposed 
action would generate radioactive contaminated material and waste 
during loading and unloading operations and disposal of the used DSCs 
if the DSCs were damaged during the unloading process. The licensee 
estimates the alternative to the proposed action would cost an 
estimated $300,000 for unloading and reloading operations of each 
affected DSC and also necessitate additional fuel handling operations. 
If the DSC was damaged during unloading, the licensee estimates an 
additional $1,000,000 for purchase of a new DSC and $200,000 for 
disposal of the used DSC.
    The proposed action is necessary to document the acceptability and 
safety basis for storage of the DSCs in the as-loaded configuration, 
thus precluding the need to unload the seven DSCs.
    Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action: The NRC staff has 
determined that the proposed action would not endanger life or 
property. The potential impact of using the NUHOMS[supreg] HD dry cask 
storage system was initially presented in the Environmental Assessment 
(EA) for the rulemaking to add the TN NUHOMS[supreg] HD Horizontal 
Modular Storage System for Irradiated Nuclear Fuel to the list of 
approved spent fuel storage casks in 10 CFR 72.214 (71 FR 25740, dated 
May 2, 2006 (Direct Final Rule), and 71 FR 71463, dated December 11, 
2006 (Final Rule)).
    The licensee submitted TN Calculation No. 10494-174, which 
performed bounding thermal analysis using ANSYS finite element software 
to evaluate the misloading events. The licensee concluded the maximum 
fuel cladding temperature for the as loaded DSCs remained below the 
fuel cladding temperature limit used in the Updated Safety Analysis 
Report dated October 2, 2009. The NRC staff performed an independent 
safety evaluation of the proposed exemption and determined that loading 
of the spent nuclear fuel with higher than allowable decay heat loads 
did not exceed the structural and shielding design basis and that the 
fuel cladding temperatures are below the temperature limit at the time 
of loading. The fuel assemblies have since decayed to meet the CoC 
limits. There are no changes being made in the types or amounts of any 
radiological effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no 
significant increase in occupational or public radiation exposure as a 
result of the proposed activities. Therefore, there are no significant 
radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action. 
The proposed action only affects the requirements associated with the 
fuel assemblies already loaded into the casks and does not affect non-
radiological plant effluents, or any other aspects of the environment. 
Therefore, there are no significant non-radiological impacts associated 
with the proposed action.
    Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
    Alternative to the Proposed Action: Because there is no significant 
environmental impact associated with the proposed action, alternatives 
with equal or greater environmental impact were not evaluated. As an 
alternative to the proposed action, the NRC staff considered denial of 
the proposed action which would involve reloading the affected DSCs as 
described previously. Denial of the exemption would result in an 
increase in radiological exposure to workers, a small potential for 
radioactive releases to the environment due to radioactive material 
handling, additional opportunities for accidents, and increased cost to 
the licensee. Therefore, the NRC staff has determined that approving 
the proposed action has a lesser environmental impact than denying the 
proposed action.
    Agencies and Persons Consulted: The environmental assessment 
associated with this exemption request was sent to Ms. Ellie Irons of 
the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality in the Office of 
Environmental Impact Review, by letter dated November 14, 2011 
(ML113180477). The state response was received by a letter dated 
December 14, 2011 (ML120030312). The letter states that the proposed 
action is unlikely to have significant effects on ambient air quality, 
historic resources, surface waters, and wetlands. The letter also 
states that it is unlikely to adversely affect species of plants or 
insects listed by state agencies as rare, threatened, or endangered. 
Furthermore, the Virginia Department of Health considered the 
alternative to the proposed action of reloading the casks presents 
several risks, namely additional radiation exposure to workers and 
potential accidents that may lead to dispersal of radiation to the 
environment. Thus, the Virginia Department of Health states that it 
supports the exemption without reservation. The NRC staff has 
determined that a consultation under Section 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act is not required because the proposed action will not affect 
listed species or a critical habitat. The NRC staff has also determined 
that the proposed action is not a type of activity having the potential 
to cause effects on historic properties. Therefore, no consultation is 
required under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act.

III. Finding of No Significant Impact

    The environmental impacts of the proposed action have been reviewed 
in accordance with the requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 51. Based 
upon the foregoing Environmental Assessment, the Commission finds that 
the proposed action of granting the one-time exemption from the 
requirements of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3) and the portion of 72.212(b)(11) 
which requires compliance with the terms, conditions, and 
specifications of the CoC in order to allow Dominion to store spent 
fuel assemblies in DSCs with serial numbers DOM-32PTH-004-C, -005-C, -
007-C, -010-C, -013-C, -019-C and GBC-32PTH-011-C in the as-loaded 
configuration at the ISFSI associated with North Anna Power Station 
Units 1 and 2, will not significantly impact the quality of the human 
environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined that an 
environmental impact statement for the proposed exemption is not 
warranted and that a finding of no significant impact is appropriate.

[[Page 20440]]

IV. Further Information

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of NRC's ``Rules of Practice,'' final NRC records and documents regarding this proposed action are publicly available in the records component of NRC's Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). The request for 
exemption dated July 21, 2011 (ML11208C453), as supplemented September 
28, 2011 (ML11286A143), was docketed under 10 CFR 50, Docket Nos. 50-
338 and 50-339, and under 10 CFR 72, Docket No. 72-56. These documents 
may be inspected at NRC's Public Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. 
These documents may also be viewed electronically on the public computers 
located at the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR), O1F21, One White Flint 
North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. The PDR reproduction 
contractor will copy documents for a fee. Persons who do not have access 
to ADAMS, or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located 
in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 
1-800-397-4209, or (301) 415-4737, or by email to pdr@nrc.gov.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of March, 2012.
Jennie Rankin,
Project Manager, Licensing Branch, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and 
Transportation, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2012-8114 Filed 4-3-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P






 
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 65 (Wednesday, April 4, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20440-20442]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-8111]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 72-1030, 72-55, 50-280 and 50-281; NRC-2012-0085]


Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Virginia Electric 
and Power Company, Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Issuance of an environmental assessment and finding of no 
significant impact.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jennie Rankin, Project Manager, 
Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555. Telephone: (301) 492-3268; Fax number: (301) 492-
3342; email: jennivine.rankin@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) is 
considering issuance of a one-time exemption to Virginia Electric and 
Power Company (Dominion or licensee) pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7 from the 
requirements of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3) and the portion of 72.212(b)(11) 
which requires compliance with the terms, conditions, and 
specifications of the CoC. Dominion submitted its exemption request by 
letter dated July 21, 2011, as supplemented September 28, 2011. 
Dominion has loaded spent nuclear fuel into Transnuclear, Inc. (TN) 
NUHOMS[supreg] HD Storage System (HD-32PTH) dry storage casks, under 
the Certificate of Compliance (CoC or Certificate) No. 1030, Amendment 
No. 0. The licensee inadvertently reversed the upper and lower zones 
while preparing the dry shielded canister (DSC) loading maps. This 
resulted in five fuel assemblies being loaded into four DSCs with decay 
heat greater than the levels specified in the CoC. Dominion requests a 
one-time exemption to the 10 CFR Part 72 requirements to continue 
storage of the affected DSCs with serial numbers DOM-32PTH-001-C, -002-
C, -003-C, and -009-C in their current condition at the Independent 
Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) associated with the operation 
of Dominion's nuclear power reactors, Surry Power Station Units 1 and 
2, located in Surry County, Virginia.

II. Environmental Assessment (EA)

    Identification of Proposed Action: The CoC is the NRC approved 
design for each dry storage cask system. The proposed action would 
grant Dominion a one-time exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 
72.212(b)(3) and from the portion of 72.212(b)(11) that states the 
licensee shall comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications of 
the CoC, to the extent necessary to enable Dominion to continue storage 
of the four DSCs in their current condition at the ISFSI associated 
with Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2. These regulations specifically 
require storage of spent nuclear fuel under a general license in dry 
storage casks approved under the provisions of 10 CFR part 72, and 
compliance with the terms and conditions set forth in the CoC for each 
dry spent fuel storage cask used by an ISFSI general licensee.
    The TN NUHOMS[supreg] HD dry cask storage system CoC provides 
requirements, conditions and operating limits in Attachment A, 
Technical Specifications (TS). The TS restrict the decay heat in lower 
Zone ``1a'' locations to <= 1.05 kW and the upper Zone ``1b'' locations to <= 0.8 kW. The applicant inadvertently reversed the upper and lower zones while preparing the DSC loading maps. This resulted in five fuel assemblies being loaded into four DSCs (serial numbers DOM-32PTH-001-C, -002-C, -003-C, and -009-C) with decay heat greater than specified in the CoC. The maximum decay heat of the misloaded fuel assemblies at the time of loading was 0.806 kW, which exceeded the Zone ``1b'' limit mentioned above by six watts. Currently, the five affected fuel assemblies have been in storage for a minimum of 2.5 years and have decayed to meet the required decay heat limits of the CoC. The proposed action would grant Dominion a one-time exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3) and the portion of 72.212(b)(11) which requires compliance with the terms, conditions, and specifications of a CoC, in order to allow continued storage of the four affected DSCs in their current condition. This exemption approval is only valid for DSCs with serial numbers DOM-32PTH-001-C, -002-C, - 003-C, and -009-C, at the Surry Power Station ISFSI. Need for the Proposed Action: Dominion requested this exemption in order to continue storage of four as-loaded DSCs containing five fuel assemblies which exceeded the CoC decay heat limits at the time of loading. Dominion, with the assistance of TN, has provided an evaluation and thermal analysis which shows that the affected DSCs remain bounded by the system's design basis limits and that the 
continued storage of the fuel in the as-loaded configuration is safe.
    Dominion has considered an alternative to the proposed action, 
which would correct the condition by reloading the affected DSCs to be 
in compliance with CoC No. 1030. This would involve retrieving each of 
the DSCs from their Horizontal Storage Modules (HSM), unloading the 
spent fuel assemblies from the DSC, performing inspections of various 
DSC components, reloading the spent fuel assemblies into the used DSC 
or a new DSC (if there was damage noted on the used DSC) in accordance 
with CoC No. 1030, performing the DSC closing procedures, and 
transferring the DSC back to the ISFSI for re-insertion into the HSM.
    Dominion estimates this alternative action of loading and unloading 
operations would increase personnel exposures by 250 mRem per affected 
DSC. In addition, Dominion states the alternative to the proposed 
action would generate radioactive contaminated

[[Page 20441]]

material and waste during loading and unloading operations and disposal 
of the used DSCs if the DSCs were damaged during the unloading process. 
The licensee estimates the alternative to the proposed action would 
cost an estimated $300,000 for unloading and reloading operations of 
each affected DSC and also necessitate additional fuel handling 
operations. If the DSC was damaged during unloading, the licensee 
estimates an additional $1,000,000 for purchase of a new DSC and 
$200,000 for disposal of the used DSC.
    The proposed action is necessary to document the acceptability and 
safety basis for storage of the DSCs in the as-loaded configuration, 
thus precluding the need to unload the four DSCs.
    Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action: The NRC staff has 
determined that the proposed action would not endanger life or 
property. The potential impact of using the NUHOMS[supreg] HD dry cask 
storage system was initially presented in the Environmental Assessment 
(EA) for the rulemaking to add the TN NUHOMS[supreg] HD Horizontal 
Modular Storage System for Irradiated Nuclear Fuel to the list of 
approved spent fuel storage casks in 10 CFR 72.214 (71 FR 25740, dated 
May 2, 2006 (Direct Final Rule), and 71 FR 71463, dated December 11, 
2006 (Final Rule)).
    The licensee submitted TN Calculation No. 10494-174, which 
performed bounding thermal analysis using ANSYS finite element software 
to evaluate the misloading events. The licensee concluded the maximum 
fuel cladding temperature for the as loaded DSCs remained below the 
fuel cladding temperature limit used in the Updated Safety Analysis 
Report dated October 2, 2009. The NRC staff performed an independent 
safety evaluation of the proposed exemption and determined that loading 
of the spent nuclear fuel with higher than allowable decay heat loads 
did not exceed the structural and shielding design basis and that the 
fuel cladding temperatures are below the temperature limit at the time 
of loading. The fuel assemblies have since decayed to meet the CoC 
limits. There are no changes being made in the types or amounts of any 
radiological effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no 
significant increase in occupational or public radiation exposure as a 
result of the proposed activities. Therefore, there are no significant 
radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action. 
The proposed action only affects the requirements associated with the 
fuel assemblies already loaded into the casks and does not affect non-
radiological plant effluents, or any other aspects of the environment. 
Therefore, there are no significant non-radiological impacts associated 
with the proposed action.
    Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
    Alternative to the Proposed Action: Because there is no significant 
environmental impact associated with the proposed action, alternatives 
with equal or greater environmental impact were not evaluated. As an 
alternative to the proposed action, the NRC staff considered denial of 
the proposed action which would involve reloading the affected DSCs as 
described previously. Denial of the exemption would result in an 
increase in radiological exposure to workers, a small potential for 
radioactive releases to the environment due to radioactive material 
handling, additional opportunities for accidents, and increased cost to 
the licensee. Therefore, the NRC staff has determined that approving 
the proposed action has a lesser environmental impact than denying the 
proposed action.
    Agencies and Persons Consulted: The environmental assessment 
associated with this exemption request was sent to Ms. Ellie Irons of 
the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality in the Office of 
Environmental Impact Review, by letter dated November 14, 2011 
(ML113180499). The state response was received by letter dated December 
14, 2011 (ML120030312). The letter states that the proposed action is 
unlikely to have significant effects on ambient air quality, historic 
resources, surface waters, and wetlands. The letter also states that it 
is unlikely to adversely affect species of plants or insects listed by 
state agencies as rare, threatened, or endangered. Furthermore, the 
Virginia Department of Health considered the alternative to the 
proposed action of reloading the casks presents several risks, namely 
additional radiation exposure to workers and potential accidents that 
may lead to dispersal of radiation to the environment. Thus, the 
Virginia Department of Health states that it supports the exemption 
without reservation. The NRC staff has determined that a consultation 
under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act is not required because 
the proposed action will not affect listed species or a critical 
habitat. The NRC staff has also determined that the proposed action is 
not a type of activity having the potential to cause effects on 
historic properties. Therefore, no consultation is required under 
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act.

III. Finding of No Significant Impact

    The environmental impacts of the proposed action have been reviewed 
in accordance with the requirements set forth in 10 CFR part 51. Based 
upon the foregoing Environmental Assessment, the Commission finds that 
the proposed action of granting the one-time exemption from the 
requirements of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3) and the portion of 72.212(b)(11) 
which requires compliance with the terms, conditions, and 
specifications of the CoC in order to allow Dominion to store spent 
fuel assemblies in DSCs with serial numbers DOM-32PTH-001-C, -002-C, -
003-C, and -009-C in the as-loaded configuration at the ISFSI 
associated with Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, will not 
significantly impact the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, 
the Commission has determined that an environmental impact statement 
for the proposed exemption is not warranted and that a finding of no 
significant impact is appropriate.

IV. Further Information

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of NRC's ``Rules of Practice,'' final NRC records and documents regarding this proposed action are publicly available in the records component of NRC's Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). The request for 
exemption dated July 21, 2011 (ML11208B629), as supplemented September 
28, 2011 (ML11286A115), was docketed under 10 CFR part 50, Docket Nos. 
50-280 and 50-281, and under 10 CFR 72, Docket No. 72-55. These 
documents may be inspected at NRC's Public Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. 
These documents may also be viewed electronically on the public computers 
located at the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR), O1F21, One White Flint 
North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. The PDR reproduction 
contractor will copy documents for a fee. Persons who do not have access 
to ADAMS, or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located 
in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 
1-800-397-4209, or (301) 415-4737, or by email to pdr@nrc.gov.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of March, 2012.


[[Page 20442]]


    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jennie Rankin,
Project Manager, Licensing Branch, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and 
Transportation, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2012-8111 Filed 4-3-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P




	


	



			
				


			

			
Cryptome unveils – Coast Guard Security for Republican Convention
		
	
	

		
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 64 (Tuesday, April 3, 2012)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 19970-19975]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-7921]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 165

[Docket No. USCG-2011-0922]
RIN 1625-AA87


Security Zones; 2012 Republican National Convention, Captain of 
the Port St. Petersburg Zone, Tampa, FL

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard proposes to establish seven temporary security 
zones on the waters and adjacent land 20 feet shoreward of the mean 
high water marks of Garrison Channel, Hillsborough River, Seddon 
Channel, Sparkman Channel, the unnamed channel north of Davis Islands, 
Ybor Channel, and Ybor Turning Basin in the vicinity of Tampa, Florida 
during the 2012 Republican National Convention. The 2012 Republican 
National Convention will be held at the Tampa Bay Times Forum building 
and other venues from August 27, 2012 through August 31, 2012. The 
Department of Homeland Security has designated the 2012 Republican 
National Convention as a National Special Security Event. The security 
zones are necessary to protect convention delegates, official parties, 
dignitaries, the public, and surrounding waterways from terrorist acts, 
sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or other causes of a 
similar nature.

DATES: Comments and related material must be received by the Coast 
Guard on or before June 4, 2012. Requests for public meetings must be 
received by the Coast Guard on or before May 3, 2012.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by docket number USCG-
2011-0922 using any of the following methods:
    (1) Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
    (2) Fax: (202) 493-2251.
    (3) Mail: Docket Management Facility (M-30), U.S. Department of 
Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001.
    (4) Hand delivery: Same as mail address above, between 9 a.m. and 5 
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The telephone 
number is (202) 366-9329.
    To avoid duplication, please use only one of these four methods. 
See the ``Public Participation and Request for

[[Page 19971]]

Comments'' portion of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section below for 
instructions on submitting comments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this proposed 
rule, call or email Marine Science Technician First Class Nolan L. 
Ammons, Sector St. Petersburg Prevention Department, Coast Guard; 
telephone (813) 228-2191, email D07-SMB-Tampa-WWM@uscg.mil. If you have 
questions on viewing or submitting material to the docket, call Renee 
V. Wright, Program Manager, Docket Operations, telephone (202) 366-
9826.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Public Participation and Request for Comments

    We encourage members of the public and others who are interested in 
or affected by this proposal to participate in this rulemaking by 
submitting comments and related materials. All comments received will 
be posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov and will include 
any personal information you have provided.

Submitting Comments

    If you submit a comment, please include the docket number for this 
rulemaking (USCG-2011-0922), indicate the specific section of this 
document to which each comment applies, and provide a reason for each 
suggestion or recommendation. You may submit your comments and material 
online (via http://www.regulations.gov) or by fax, mail, or hand 
delivery, but please use only one of these means. If you submit a 
comment online via www.regulations.gov, it will be considered received 
by the Coast Guard when you successfully transmit the comment. If you 
fax, hand deliver, or mail your comment, it will be considered as 
having been received by the Coast Guard when it is received at the 
Docket Management Facility. We recommend that you include your name and 
a mailing address, an email address, or a telephone number in the body 
of your document so that we can contact you if we have questions 
regarding your submission.
    To submit comments online, go to http://www.regulations.gov, click 
on the ``submit a comment'' box, which will then become highlighted in 
blue. In the ``Document Type'' drop down menu select ``Proposed Rule'' 
and insert ``USCG-2011-0922'' in the ``Keyword'' box. Click ``Search'' 
then click on the balloon shape in the ``Actions'' column. Comments 
submitted by mail or hand delivery must be in an unbound format, no 
larger than 8\1/2\ by 11 inches, suitable for copying and electronic 
filing. If you submit comments by mail and would like to know that they 
reached the Facility, please enclose a stamped, self-addressed postcard 
or envelope. We will consider all comments and material received during 
the comment period and may change the rule based on your comments.

Viewing Comments and Documents

    To view comments, as well as documents mentioned in this preamble 
as being available in the docket, go to http://www.regulations.gov, 
click on the ``read comments'' box, which will then become highlighted 
in blue. In the ``Keyword'' box insert ``USCG-2011-0922'' and click 
``Search.'' Click the ``Open Docket Folder'' in the ``Actions'' column. 
You may also visit the Docket Management Facility in Room W12-140 on 
the ground floor of the Department of Transportation West Building, 
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Coast Guard 
has an agreement with the Department of Transportation to use the 
Docket Management Facility.

Privacy Act

    Anyone can search the electronic form of comments received into any 
of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or 
signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, 
business, labor union, etc.). You may review a Privacy Act notice 
regarding our public dockets in the January 17, 2008, issue of the 
Federal Register (73 FR 3316).

Public Meeting

    We do not anticipate convening public meetings regarding this 
proposal. You may, however, submit a request for a public meeting on or 
before May 3, 2012 using one of the four methods specified under 
ADDRESSES. Please explain why you believe a public meeting would be 
beneficial. If we determine that a public meeting would aid this 
rulemaking, a meeting will be convened at a time and place announced in 
a subsequent notice in the Federal Register.

Basis and Purpose

    The legal basis for the proposed rule is the Coast Guard's 
authority to establish regulated navigation areas and other limited 
access areas: 33 U.S.C. 1226, 1231; 46 U.S.C. Chapter 701, 3306, 3703; 
50 U.S.C. 191, 195; 33 CFR 1.05-1, 6.04-1, 6.04-6, 160.5; Pub. L. 107-
295, 116 Stat. 2064; Department of Homeland Security Delegation No. 
0170.1.
    The purpose of this proposed rule is to provide for the safety and 
security of convention delegates official parties, dignitaries, and the 
public during the 2012 Republican National Convention.

Discussion of Proposed Rule

    From August 27, 2012 through August 30, 2012, the 2012 Republican 
National Convention will be held in Tampa, Florida. Primary venues for 
the 2012 Republican National Convention are the Tampa Bay Times Forum 
building and the Tampa Convention Center, both of which are located 
adjacent or proximate to Garrison Channel, Hillsborough River, Seddon 
Channel, Sparkman Channel, the unnamed channel north of Davis Islands, 
Ybor Channel, and Ybor Turning Basin in Tampa, Florida. Secondary 
venues and venues hosting convention-related activities will take place 
in other locations throughout Tampa, Florida on or in close proximity 
to navigable waters.
    The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has designated 
the 2012 Republican National Convention as a National Special Security 
Event. National Special Security Events are significant events, which, 
due to their political, economic, social, or religious significance, 
may render them particularly attractive targets of terrorism or other 
criminal activity. The Federal government provides support, assistance, 
and resources to state and local governments to ensure public safety 
and security during National Special Security Events.
    The Coast Guard has conducted threat, vulnerability, and risk 
analyses relating to the maritime transportation system and 2012 
Republican National Convention activities. Threats confronting the 2012 
Republican National Convention assume two primary forms: homeland 
security threats and violent or disruptive public disorder. The 2012 
Republican National Convention is expected to draw widespread protests 
by persons dissatisfied with national and foreign policy and the 
Republican Party agenda. This politically-oriented event has the 
potential to attract anarchists and others intent on expressing their 
opposition through violence and criminal activity. The 2012 Republican 
National Convention also presents an attractive target for terrorist 
and extremist organizations.
    Considerable law enforcement on land may render maritime approaches 
an attractive alternative. Tampa has

[[Page 19972]]

significant critical infrastructure in its port area, which is 
proximate to the downtown area and the Convention's main venues. The 
Port of Tampa is an industrial-based port, with significant storage and 
shipment of hazardous materials.
    The Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel Security Strategy 
sets forth several threat scenarios that must be mitigated in the 
maritime security planning for the 2012 Republican Convention. These 
threats include the potential use of a small vessel to: (1) Deliver a 
weapon of mass destruction; (2) launch a stand-off attack weapon; or 
(3) deliver an armed assault force. 2012 Republican National Convention 
maritime security planning anticipates these threats, while minimizing 
the public impact of security operations.
    The proposed security zones and accompanying security measures have 
been specifically developed to mitigate the threats and vulnerabilities 
identified in the analysis set forth above. Security measures have been 
limited to the minimum necessary to mitigate risks associated with the 
identified threats. The Coast Guard considered establishing a waterside 
demonstration area. However, due to the proximity of the main venue 
area, the geography of the area in question, the associated threats to 
the convention, and the potential to interfere with law enforcement and 
security operations, the Coast Guard determined that establishing such 
an area would not be feasible. The Coast Guard expects ample landside 
demonstration areas to be available.
    The Coast Guard, on behalf of the 2012 Republican National 
Convention Public Safety Committee, has initiated an outreach program 
to inform maritime stakeholders within Tampa of potential disruptions 
to normal maritime activities during the convention. On January 27, 
2012, outreach efforts to the local community began with a presentation 
to the Tampa Bay Harbor Safety and Security Committee. Additional 
meetings were held with businesses that operate in the vicinity of the 
main venue. On February 1, 2012 and February 29, 2012, public meetings 
were held. At each of these meetings, the Coast Guard presented: (1) 
General information on National Special Security Events; (2) an 
overview of the 2012 Republican National Convention; (3) a description 
of the organization of the public safety committee and subcommittees 
established for the convention; (4) a brief discussion of the proposed 
security zones, along with likely limitations on vessel movements and 
enhanced security measures; and (5) the threat, vulnerability and risk 
analysis of the convention from a maritime perspective.
    Responses to information presented by the Coast Guard were 
generally positive and supportive. The majority of questions were 
requests for additional details, such as exactly when the security zone 
would be in effect and what size vessels will be allowed to transit the 
zone or use the docks in the primary venue area. Several people asked 
questions seeking to clarify the restrictions, such as whether boat 
owners would be able to access their vessels, or whether commercial 
traffic would be allowed to operate in Sparkman Channel. There were two 
questions concerning the sufficiency of planned security measures on 
the south and east sides of Harbour Island.
    The Coast Guard responded to all inquiries by stating that the 
details of the security zones were still under development and were 
subject to change. At each meeting, the Coast Guard reminded attendees 
to review the notice of proposed rulemaking when it is published in the 
Federal Register, and encouraged attendees to submit comments to the 
docket if they had concerns or questions.
    The proposed rule would establish seven temporary security zones in 
the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg Zone during the 2012 Republican 
National Convention in Tampa, Florida. The security zones would be 
enforced from 12:01 p.m. on August 25, 2012 through 11:59 a.m. on 
August 31, 2012. The security zones are listed below. All coordinates 
are North American Datum 1983.
    (1) Garrison Channel. All waters of Garrison Channel, including 
adjacent land 20 feet shoreward of the mean high water mark of Garrison 
Channel. All persons and vessels would be prohibited from entering or 
transiting the security zone unless authorized by the Captain of the 
Port St. Petersburg or a designated representative. Vessels with 
permanent moorings in the security zone would not be permitted to move 
during the enforcement period. Vessels remaining in the security zone 
during the enforcement period would be subject to inspection and 
examination by Coast Guard and other law enforcement officials. Persons 
desiring to access their vessels within the security zone would be 
subject to security screenings.
    (2) Hillsborough River. All waters of Hillsborough River, including 
adjacent land 20 feet shoreward of the mean high water mark of 
Hillsborough River, south of an imaginary line between the following 
points: Point 1 in position 27[deg]56'44'' N, 82[deg]27'37'' W; and 
Point 2 in position 27[deg]56'44'' N, 82[deg]27'33'' W. All persons and 
vessels would be prohibited from entering or remaining within the 
security zone unless authorized by the Captain of the Port St. 
Petersburg or a designated representative.
    (3) Seddon Channel. All waters of Seddon Channel, including 
adjacent land 20 feet shoreward of the mean high water mark of Seddon 
Channel, north of an imaginary line between the following points: Point 
1 in position 27[deg]55'52'' N, 82[deg]27'13'' W; and Point 2 in 
position 27[deg]55'54'' N, 82[deg]27'08'' W. All persons and vessels 
would be prohibited from entering or remaining within the security zone 
unless authorized by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg or a 
designated representative.
    (4) Sparkman Channel. All waters of Sparkman Channel, including 
adjacent land 20 feet shoreward of the mean high water mark of Sparkman 
Channel, north of an imaginary line between the following points: Point 
1 in position 27[deg]55'51'' N, 82[deg]26'54'' W; and Point 2 in 
position 27[deg]55'50'' N, 82[deg]26'45'' W. Recreational vessels would 
be prohibited from entering or remaining in Sparkman Channel unless 
authorized by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg or a designated 
representative. Commercial vessels would be authorized to enter or 
transit Sparkman Channel, subject to compliance with security protocols 
established by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg, including: (a) 
Advance notice of intent to transit; (b) inspection and examination of 
all commercial vessels and persons requesting authorization to transit 
the security zone (including positive identification checks); and (c) 
embarkation of law enforcement personnel during authorized security 
zone transits.
    (5) Unnamed Channel North of Davis Islands. All waters of the 
unnamed channel north of Davis Islands, including adjacent land 20 feet 
shoreward of the mean high water mark of the unnamed channel north of 
Davis Islands, east of an imaginary line between the following points: 
Point 1 in position 27[deg]56'16'' N, 82[deg]27'40'' W; and Point 2 in 
position 27[deg]56'18'' N, 82[deg]27'43'' W. All persons and vessels 
would be prohibited from entering or remaining within the security zone 
unless authorized by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg or a 
designated representative.
    (6) Ybor Channel. All waters of Ybor Channel, including adjacent 
land 20 feet shoreward of the mean high water mark of Ybor Channel. 
Recreational vessels

[[Page 19973]]

would be prohibited from entering or remaining in Ybor Channel unless 
authorized by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg or a designated 
representative. Commercial vessels would be authorized to enter or 
transit Ybor Channel, subject to compliance with security protocols 
established by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg, including: (a) 
Advance notice of intent to transit; (b) inspection and examination of 
all commercial vessels and persons requesting authorization to transit 
the security zone (including positive identification checks); and (c) 
embarkation of law enforcement personnel during authorized security 
zone transits.
    (7) Ybor Turning Basin. All waters of Ybor Turning Basin, including 
adjacent land 20 feet shoreward of the mean high water mark of Ybor 
Turning Basin. Recreational vessels would be prohibited from entering 
or remaining in Ybor Turning Basin unless authorized by the Captain of 
the Port St. Petersburg or a designated representative. Commercial 
vessels would be authorized to enter or transit Ybor Turning Basin, 
subject to compliance with security protocols established by the 
Captain of the Port St. Petersburg, including: (a) Advance notice of 
intent to transit; (b) inspection and examination of all commercial 
vessels and persons requesting authorization to transit the security 
zone (including positive identification checks); and (c) embarkation of 
law enforcement personnel during authorized security zone transits.
    All persons and vessels desiring to enter or remain within the 
regulated areas may contact the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg by 
telephone at (727) 824-7524, or a designated representative via VHF 
radio on channel 16, to request authorization. If authorization to 
enter or remain within the regulated areas is granted by the Captain of 
the Port St. Petersburg or a designated representative, all persons and 
vessels receiving such authorization must comply with the instructions 
of the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg or a designated 
representative. Recreational vessels authorized to enter or remain 
within the regulated areas may be subject to boarding and inspection of 
the vessel and persons onboard.
    A Port Community Information Bulletin (PCIB) will be distributed by 
Coast Guard Sector St. Petersburg. The PCIB will be available on the 
Coast Guard internet web portal at http://homeport.uscg.mil. PCIBs are 
located under the Port Directory tab in the Safety and Security Alert 
links. The Coast Guard would provide notice of the security zones by 
Local Notice to Mariners, Broadcast Notice to Mariners, public 
outreach, and on-scene designated representatives.

Regulatory Analyses

    We developed this proposed rule after considering numerous statutes 
and executive orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our 
analyses based on 13 of these statutes or executive orders.

Regulatory Planning and Review

    Executive Orders 13563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 
and 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, direct agencies to assess 
the costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if 
regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize 
net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public 
health and safety effects, distributive impacts, and equity). Executive 
Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and 
benefits, of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting 
flexibility. This proposed rule has not been designated a significant 
regulatory action under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866. 
Accordingly, the Office of Management and Budget has not reviewed this 
proposed rule under Executive Order 12866.
    The economic impact of this proposed rule is not significant for 
the following reasons: (1) The security zones would be enforced for a 
total of 144 hours; (2) the security zones would be in a location where 
commercial vessel traffic is expected to be minimal; (3) commercial 
vessel traffic would be authorized to transit the security zones to the 
extent compatible with public safety and security; (4) persons and 
vessels would be able to operate in the surrounding area adjacent to 
the security zones during the enforcement period; (5) persons and 
vessels would be able to enter or remain within the security zones if 
authorized by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg or a designated 
representative; and (6) the Coast Guard would provide advance 
notification of the security zones to the local community by Local 
Notice to Mariners, Broadcast Notice to Mariners, and public outreach.

Small Entities

    Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612), we have 
considered whether this proposed rule would have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities. The term ``small 
entities'' comprises small businesses, not-for-profit organizations 
that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their 
fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 
50,000.
    The Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this proposed 
rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. This proposed rule may affect the following 
entities, some of which may be small entities: the owners or operators 
of vessels intending to enter or remain within those portions of 
Garrison Channel, Hillsborough River, Seddon Channel, Sparkman Channel, 
unnamed channel north of Davis Islands, Ybor Channel, and Ybor Turning 
Basin encompassed within the proposed security zones from 12:01 p.m. on 
August 25, 2012 through 11:59 a.m. on August 31, 2012. For the reasons 
discussed in the Regulatory Planning and Review section above, this 
proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
    If you think that your business, organization, or governmental 
jurisdiction qualifies as a small entity and that this proposed rule 
would have a significant economic impact on it, please submit a comment 
(see ADDRESSES) explaining why you think it qualifies and how and to 
what degree this proposed rule would economically affect it.

Assistance for Small Entities

    Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), we want to assist small 
entities in understanding this proposed rule so that they can better 
evaluate its effects on them and participate in the rulemaking. If the 
proposed rule would affect your small business, organization, or 
governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its 
provisions or options for compliance, please contact Marine Science 
Technician First Class Nolan L. Ammons, Sector St. Petersburg 
Prevention Department, Coast Guard; telephone (813) 228-2191, email 
D07-SMB-Tampa-WWM@uscg.mil. The Coast Guard will not retaliate against 
small entities that question or complain about this proposed rule or 
any policy or action of the Coast Guard.

Collection of Information

    This proposed rule would call for no new collection of information 
under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

[[Page 19974]]

Federalism

    A rule has implications for federalism under Executive Order 13132, 
Federalism, if it has a substantial direct effect on State or local 
governments and would either preempt State law or impose a substantial 
direct cost of compliance on them. We have analyzed this proposed rule 
under that Order and have determined that it does not have implications 
for federalism.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) 
requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary 
regulatory actions. In particular, the Act addresses actions that may 
result in the expenditure by a State, local, or Tribal government, in 
the aggregate, or by the private sector of $100,000,000 or more in any 
one year. Though this proposed rule would not result in such an 
expenditure, we do discuss the effects of this proposed rule elsewhere 
in this preamble.

Taking of Private Property

    This proposed rule would not cause a taking of private property or 
otherwise have taking implications under Executive Order 12630, 
Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected 
Property Rights.

Civil Justice Reform

    This proposed rule meets applicable standards in sections 3(a) and 
3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform, to minimize 
litigation, eliminate ambiguity, and reduce burden.

Protection of Children

    We have analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13045, 
Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety 
Risks. This proposed rule is not an economically significant rule and 
would not create an environmental risk to health or risk to safety that 
might disproportionately affect children.

Indian Tribal Governments

    This proposed rule does not have Tribal implications under 
Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal 
Governments, because it would not have a substantial direct effect on 
one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal 
Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.

Energy Effects

    We have analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13211, 
Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use. We have determined that it is not a ``significant 
energy action'' under that order because it is not a ``significant 
regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866 and is not likely to 
have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use 
of energy. The Administrator of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs has not designated it as a significant energy 
action. Therefore, it does not require a Statement of Energy Effects 
under Executive Order 13211.

Technical Standards

    The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA) (15 
U.S.C. 272 note) directs agencies to use voluntary consensus standards 
in their regulatory activities unless the agency provides Congress, 
through the Office of Management and Budget, with an explanation of why 
using these standards would be inconsistent with applicable law or 
otherwise impractical. Voluntary consensus standards are technical 
standards (e.g., specifications of materials, performance, design, or 
operation; test methods; sampling procedures; and related management 
systems practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus 
standards bodies.
    This proposed rule does not use technical standards. Therefore, we 
did not consider the use of voluntary consensus standards.

Environment

    We have analyzed this proposed rule under Department of Homeland 
Security Management Directive 023-01 and Commandant Instruction 
M16475.lD, which guide the Coast Guard in complying with the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f), and 
have made a preliminary determination that this action is one of a 
category of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a 
significant effect on the human environment. A preliminary 
environmental analysis checklist supporting this determination is 
available in the docket where indicated under ADDRESSES. This proposed 
rule involves establishing seven temporary security zones, as described 
in paragraph 34(g) of the Instruction that will be enforced for a total 
of 144 hours. We invite any comments or information that may lead to 
the discovery of a significant environmental impact from this proposed 
rule.

List of Subjects in 33 CFR Part 165

    Harbors, Marine safety, Navigation (water), Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Waterways.

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard proposes 
to amend 33 CFR part 165 as follows:

PART 165--REGULATED NAVIGATION AREAS AND LIMITED ACCESS AREAS

    1. The authority citation for part 165 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority:  33 U.S.C. 1231; 46 U.S.C. Chapter 701, 3306, 3703; 
50 U.S.C. 191, 195; 33 CFR 1.05-1, 6.04-1, 6.04-6, 160.5; Pub. L. 
107-295, 116 Stat. 2064; Department of Homeland Security Delegation 
No. 0170.1.

    2. Add a temporary Sec.  165.T07-0922 to read as follows:


Sec.  165.T07-0922  Security Zones; 2012 Republican National 
Convention, Captain of the Port St. Petersburg Zone, Tampa, FL.

    (a) Regulated Areas. The following regulated areas are security 
zones. All coordinates are North American Datum 1983.
    (1) Garrison Channel. All waters of Garrison Channel, including 
adjacent land 20 feet shoreward of the mean high water mark of Garrison 
Channel. All persons and vessels are prohibited from entering or 
transiting the regulated area unless authorized by the Captain of the 
Port St. Petersburg or a designated representative. Vessels with 
permanent moorings in the regulated area are not permitted to move 
during the enforcement period. Vessels remaining in the regulated area 
during the enforcement period are subject to inspection and examination 
by Coast Guard and other law enforcement officials. Persons desiring to 
access their vessels within the regulated area are subject to security 
screenings.
    (2) Hillsborough River. All waters of Hillsborough River, including 
adjacent land 20 feet shoreward of the mean high water mark of 
Hillsborough River, south of an imaginary line between the following 
points: Point 1 in position 27[deg]56'44'' N, 82[deg]27'37'' W; and 
Point 2 in position 27[deg]56'44'' N, 82[deg]27'33'' W. All persons and 
vessels are prohibited from entering or remaining within the regulated 
area unless authorized by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg or a 
designated representative.
    (3) Seddon Channel. All waters of Seddon Channel, including 
adjacent land 20 feet shoreward of the mean high water mark of Seddon 
Channel, north of an imaginary line between the following

[[Page 19975]]

points: Point 1 in position 27[deg]55'52'' N, 82[deg]27'13'' W; and 
Point 2 in position 27[deg]55'54'' N, 82[deg]27'08'' W. All persons and 
vessels are prohibited from entering or remaining within the regulated 
area unless authorized by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg or a 
designated representative.
    (4) Sparkman Channel. All waters of Sparkman Channel, including 
adjacent land 20 feet shoreward of the mean high water mark of Sparkman 
Channel, north of an imaginary line between the following points: Point 
1 in position 27[deg]55'51'' N, 82[deg]26'54'' W; and Point 2 in 
position 27[deg]55'50'' N, 82[deg]26'45'' W. Recreational vessels are 
prohibited from entering or remaining in the regulated area unless 
authorized by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg or a designated 
representative. Commercial vessels are authorized to enter or transit 
the regulated area, subject to compliance with security protocols 
established by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg, including: (a) 
Advance notice of intent to transit; (b) inspection and examination of 
all commercial vessels and persons requesting authorization to transit 
the regulated area (including positive identification checks); and (c) 
embarkation of law enforcement personnel during authorized regulated 
area transits.
    (5) Unnamed Channel North of Davis Islands. All waters of the 
unnamed channel north of Davis Islands, including adjacent land 20 feet 
shoreward of the mean high water mark of the unnamed channel north of 
Davis Islands, east of an imaginary line between the following points: 
Point 1 in position 27[deg]56'16'' N, 82[deg]27'40'' W; and Point 2 in 
position 27[deg]56'18'' N, 82[deg]27'43'' W. All persons and vessels 
are prohibited from entering or remaining within the regulated area 
unless authorized by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg or a 
designated representative.
    (6) Ybor Channel. All waters of Ybor Channel, including adjacent 
land 20 feet shoreward of the mean high water mark of Ybor Channel. 
Recreational vessels are prohibited from entering or remaining in Ybor 
Channel unless authorized by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg or 
a designated representative. Commercial vessels are authorized to enter 
or transit Ybor Channel, subject to compliance with security protocols 
established by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg, including: (a) 
Advance notice of intent to transit; (b) inspection and examination of 
all commercial vessels and persons requesting authorization to transit 
the regulated area (including positive identification checks); and (c) 
embarkation of law enforcement personnel during authorized regulated 
area transits.
    (7) Ybor Turning Basin. All waters of Ybor Turning Basin, including 
adjacent land 20 feet shoreward of the mean high water mark of Ybor 
Turning Basin. Recreational vessels are prohibited from entering or 
remaining in Ybor Turning Basin unless authorized by the Captain of the 
Port St. Petersburg or a designated representative. Commercial vessels 
are authorized to enter or transit Ybor Turning Basin, subject to 
compliance with security protocols established by the Captain of the 
Port St. Petersburg, including: (a) Advance notice of intent to 
transit; (b) inspection and examination of all commercial vessels and 
persons requesting authorization to transit the security zone 
(including positive identification checks); and (c) embarkation of law 
enforcement personnel during authorized regulated area transits.
    (b) Definition. The term ``designated representative'' means Coast 
Guard Patrol Commanders, including Coast Guard boat coxswains, petty 
officers, and other officers operating Coast Guard vessels, and 
Federal, state, and local officials designated by or assisting the 
Captain of the Port St. Petersburg in the enforcement of the regulated 
areas.
    (c) Regulations. (1) All persons and vessels desiring to enter or 
remain within the regulated areas may contact the Captain of the Port 
St. Petersburg by telephone at (727) 824-7524, or a designated 
representative via VHF radio on channel 16, to request authorization.
    A Port Community Information Bulletin is available on the Coast 
Guard internet web portal at http://homeport.uscg.mil. Port Community 
Information Bulletins are located under the Port Directory tab in the 
Safety and Security Alert links.
    (2) If authorization to enter or remain within the regulated areas 
is granted by the Captain of the Port St. Petersburg or a designated 
representative, all persons and vessels receiving such authorization 
must comply with the instructions of the Captain of the Port St. 
Petersburg or a designated representative. Recreational vessels 
authorized to enter the regulated areas may be subject to boarding and 
inspection of the vessel and persons onboard.
    (3) The Coast Guard will provide notice of the regulated areas by 
Local Notice to Mariners, Broadcast Notice to Mariners, public 
outreach, and on-scene designated representatives.
    (d) Effective Date. This rule is effective from 12:01 p.m. on 
August 25, 2012 through 11:59 a.m. on August 31, 2012.

    Dated: March 13, 2012.
S.L. Dickinson,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port St. Petersburg.
[FR Doc. 2012-7921 Filed 4-2-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P



	


	



			
				


			

			
Cryptome – Postal Digital Spying
		
	
	

		
Cryptome welcomes information on, examples of, postal digital spying: cryptome[at]earthlink.net


Before email, social media, hacking, anonymizers and back-doored encryption took their place, postal services (most of them also ran telecommunications) were the prime means of official and commercial spying. The freedom-promising Internet’s ease and ubiquity of digital spying worldwide for a while made paper mail more secure, used even by officials and the military who knew digital communications favored its operators over users. That short-lived, somewhat safe postal means of comms — along with courier and delivery services — now looks to be again doing do-gooders’ triple-crossing evil.


In our NYC 72-unit condo, an in-house digital tracking, security video and notification system records the last-few-feet spying node supplementing an all-building cable-tv-phone-internet rig with handy tap-panel in the basement and a perp-IDing in-home converter box surveilling and archiving futile surfing for escape.


 




Date: Sun, 01 Apr 2012 20:07:10 +0200

From: “Erich M.” <me[at]quintessenz.org>

To: nettime-l[at]kein.org

Subject: Re: <nettime> The (Letter-) Post Office’s last stand … in Florida(WSJ)


On 03/30/2012 01:57 PM, John Young wrote:


> The postal system remains the most secure public communication

> system for all its faults and invasive letter opening and craven

> cooperation with official spies and their corporate cohorts.


Servus John et al,


Ack to all you wrote with a single exception, squire John. The first paragraph ought to be in past tense. I just started digging into that topic, what I already know is: Address scanning/reading in, applying 2-D Codes and timestamps at every stage of transportation. When post office cars or private delivery services stop in front of my house here in .AT my signature is performed on an electronic pad.


At first sight I’d say massive datasets generated by snail mail and packet sorting and processing systems are generously inviting companies to spy on each other and combat competitors abroad. Analysis of delivery cycles, timely detection of hostile marketing campaigns, tracking and blocking delivery of goods under patent/copyright claims or whatever the clone offsprings of ancient DMCA ACTA/TPP/SOPA/PIPA require.


What a nice topic to dig – ahem – to dive into, methinks. Not forgetting my nose clamp I remain


humbly yours


Erich M.


> All digital comsec is faulty — by design so its designers say to

> aid sysadministration and security/privacy updates. No official

> agency has ever had such intimate sustained access to those

> willing to barter digital hawking-gawking for instant full-body

> cat-scan diagnosis.


http://fm4.ORF.at/erichmoechel


http://moechel.com/kontakt.html        PGP KEY 0xEA7DC174

fingerprint 02AA B2E7 C609 307D 34FE 4B5C ACC6 A796 EA7D C174


–… …–   -.. .   . .-. .. -.-. ….   — . …– . — -…


#  distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission

#  <nettime>  is a moderated mailing list for net criticism,

#  collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets

#  more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l

#  archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime[at]kein.org

	


	



			
				


			

			
Crpytome – Chopper Hell Fire Attack on Afghan Civilians
		
	
	

		
DOWNLAOD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT WITH PHOTOS HERE


creech-savagery4


 

	


	



			
				


			

			
Cryptome – General Strike in Central Park New York City
		
	
	

		
Tuesday — 03.27.12 ­ General Strike in Central Park


CONTENTS:


1. Invitation / Introduction

2. Some Background

3. Online Resources

4. Readings

5. Local Links

6. Precarious & Service Worker Assembly


___________________________________________________

1. Invitation / Introduction


What: Drifting Assembly on General Strike

When: Tuesday — 03.27.12

Where: Central Park, meet up at the steps of Metropolitan Museum

When: 6:00 pm

Who: Everyone (dress warm)


During the winter, we participated in a molecular seminar entitled

‘Welcome to the New Paradigm; The Crisis of Everything Everywhere.’ A few

hundred people attended over the course of 9 days, some staying for a

session, others for a day, and yet others for the entire duration.

Together we organized, disorganized, ate, spoke, disagreed, speculated,

walked, mapped, manifested, felt, listened, played, and even mic checked

Diego Rivera.

’Welcome to the New Paradigm’ was an allusion

to a banner we had seen in Washington Square Park at the conclusion of a

day of actions globally on October 15. That same night, after Gayatri

Spivak addressed everyone, we discovered that along with a lot of friends,

she had been thinking about the potentials for a General Strike.


At the time, the occupations at Liberty and across the globe were so

powerful; it was still unclear whether the idea of a General Strike was a

nostalgic regression or potential mode of amplification and generalization

of refusal. After all, the occupations were themselves a new paradigm of a

strike, not just striking against a work place or work but taking

everything, everywhere. As the coordinated and violent attacks by police started in late Fall on

the encampments, there was an even greater urgency placed upon everyone to

consider how this refusal of austerity, of faux solutions, of legalized

robbery, of new forms of enclosure, of an increasing surveillance /

security state, of ever greater ecological ruin, of continued structural

racism, could be expressed, embodied, uttered, collectively; and how could

this be done in a forceful manner, without further empowering or placing

all of our collective attention into a reactionary game with and on the

police force.


In January, we returned to the question of the General Strike and

we asked one another:


What it could mean a General Strike today given the global dimension of

financial capital, given the shifting qualities of the workplace and

work-time (namely its increased itinerancy, placelessness, instability,

meaninglessness), given the ever more invasive forms of extracting

productivity and value from the basic reproduction of our life and social

relations?


The winter provided to hundreds of people a season to formally and

informally meet, consider, propose plans and create possibilities for the

General Strike that has been called on May 1st.

In examining the shifted terrain of work, productivity, and thus strike,

the critical questions which emerge are:


How can this complex arrangement …


– of placed and non-placed labor (i.e., labor that occurs in a

recognizable workplace as well as Starbucks or the neighborhood boutique

cafe or the street or in the home)


– of recognized and unrecognized productivity (i.e., a waged job, albeit

badly paid, contracted labor or just using Google, Facebook, YouTube,

indirectly producing immense data, content, value, profits)
- of

remunerated and unremunerated life (i.e., the time which is paid for a

specific work and the time spent between any specific work just making

oneself available, preparing, learning new skills which could be reapplied

back into work)


– of visible and invisible, of legal and not legalized, of union and

non-unionized workers


… redefine the strategies for a General Strike?


Where could be the sites of blockage? Where could be the site of flow

stoppage? Where could be the sites of non-cooperation? How to activate

other fields of non-cooperation such a debt strike under the heading

general strike? And where could be the sites of cooperation, of

communization, of convergence?


Seen in the light of occupation, how might the general strike also

question the ideals sovereignty, autonomy, or freedom that presume an

individual political subject? How has occupation allowed us to reconceive

the strike not just as total refusal, blockage, or stoppage, but as a

public gathering that demonstrates the practices and principles of

socialization, communization, and mutual aid and care? What would it mean

to rethink the social intransitivity of the strike—its lack of

instrumentality, of work, of means-ends relations—as neither undoing or

negativity nor direct action, but as opening onto the potentiality of

being-in-common?


What does it mean to strike if you are unemployed? Or “your own boss”? Or

a freelance worker? How to also take account of those whose time is not so

flexible, and who face greater threats and risks in walking off the job or

joining a public demonstration?


What qualities could a strike take to address the multiplicity of sites of

and modes of production? And if our consumption, obedience, and everyday

participation is part of our productivity, if our everyday social

reproduction is the lubricant of the economic machinery that increasingly

surveys and oppresses the multitudes and our shared habitats, how could

May 1st become the turning point to intensify a process not only of

withdrawal or a symbolic act but a call for the infinite strike, the

closest we can get of doing nothing, how actively we envision and realize

our lives without capitalism.


We are interested in continuing this discussion not only on theoretical

grounds but through proposals for specific actions online and in the city.

We would like to propose meeting at Central Park on Tuesday early evening

for a walk and informal assembly.


The walking assembly will be unfacilitated by the Central Park Exploratory

Committee, an ungroup attempting to reassert the park as a commons, and as

potential site of convergence on the day of the General Strike, resulting

in a meshwork of refusal, food, music, pleasure, sensuality, resistance,

communization. The group is interested in weaving together with others

great fictions and believes strongly that such visions or horizons will

resonate with multitudes not only on May Day but also for the days

after.


Come join us and bring things to share: proposals,

food, drink.


___________________________________________________

2. Background


A general strike has been called for May Day, first by Occupy Los Angeles

on November 15th, and locally by Occupy Wall Street on February 14th. In

the time between and since many other city and neighborhood assemblies

have taken up the call, and a number of other coalitions, collectives, and

committees have started to agitate and organize for a general strike in

2012.


These recent calls for a May Day general strike have taken inspiration

from Occupy Oakland’s wildcat general strike of November 2nd, 2011, and

the struggles in Wisconsin last Spring which first reignited interest in

the concept. In the months since the Occupy movement began we have seen

general strikes called in Belgium, Egypt, Greece, India, Israel, Italy,

Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, and the United

Kingdom.


The general assembly of Occupy Los Angeles committed to the general strike

on December 19th; Occupy Boston on January 7th; Occupy Tampa on January

7th; Occupy Pasadena on January 8th; Occupy Phoenix on January 10th;

Occupy Williamsburg and Occupy Long Beach on January 17th; Occupy Brooklyn

on January 19th; Occupy Oakland on January 29th; Occupy Ventura on

February 7th; New York City on February 14th; Occupy Sydney on February

18th; Occupy Detroit on February 21st; Occupy Seattle on February 26th;

and Occupy Bushwick on March 1st. In the weeks between and since many

other cities, assemblies, and organizations have also called for the May

Day General Strike, and we expect more to follow suit in the next five

weeks.


___________________________________________________

3. Some Online Resources


NEW YORK CITY LINKS

http://da.nycga.net/mayday/

http://da.nycga.net/category/subgroups/may-day/

https://lists.riseup.net/www/subscribe/strikeeverywhere

http://maydaynyc.org/

http://www.nycga.net/

http://occuprint.org/Category/MayDay

http://occupybk.org/

http://occupybk.org/groups/organize-bushwick-1128840377/

http://occupywilliamsburg.org/

http://strikeeverywhere.net/

http://university.nycga.net/our-courses/studying-may-day/

http://university.nycga.net/our-courses/studying-may-day/recommended-readings/

http://wiki.occupy.net/wiki/May_Day


ONLINE RESOURCES

http://www.gstrike.org/

http://insurrectiondays.noblogs.org/

http://interoccupy.org/may1call/

http://libcom.org/gallery/may-1st-2012-posters-graphics

http://www.occupymay1st.org/

http://www.occupymay1st.org/groups/occupation-coordination/

http://www.occupymay1st.org/resources/imagery/

https://www.facebook.com/events/337068492974144/

https://www.facebook.com/events/307864259256522/

https://www.facebook.com/events/119235331529404/

https://www.facebook.com/events/367411923279181/

https://www.facebook.com/events/185740101536525/

https://www.facebook.com/OccupyGeneralStrike

https://www.facebook.com/occupym1

https://www.facebook.com/occupymayfirst

https://www.facebook.com/strikeeverywhere

https://www.facebook.com/pages/Occupy-May-1st-General-Strike/160023040772206

https://www.facebook.com/pages/Resources-for-the-worldwide-general-strike-May-1st/354855194534813

https://twitter.com/global_strike

https://twitter.com/May1StreetTeam

https://twitter.com/Maydaystrike

https://twitter.com/nycgenstrike

https://twitter.com/OccupyGenStrike

https://twitter.com/OccupyGenStrk

https://twitter.com/occupym1

https://twitter.com/OWSGenStrike

https://twitter.com/OWSMayDay

https://twitter.com/StrikeEverywher

https://twitter.com/USGeneralStrike

https://twitter.com/WorldStrikeMay1


___________________________________________________

4. Readings


[unsorted]

–The Social General Strike – Stephen Naft, 1905:

http://www.mediafire.com/?t37d5nxsvshzdcr


–The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions – Rosa

Luxemburg, 1906:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1906/mass-strike/index.htm


–Reflections on Violence – George Sorel, 1908:

http://ifile.it/wpclbh/__Sorel__Reflections_on_Violence__Cambridge_Texts_in_the_

History_of_Political_Thought_.l_ntx2j6721x3xo9.pdf


–“The General Strike” – Bill Haywood, 1911:

http://www.iww.org/en/history/library/Haywood/GeneralStrike


–“Critique of Violence” – Walter Benjamin, 1921:

http://www.mediafire.com/?ew0x25f2guv


–The General Strike – Ralph Chaplin, 1933:

http://libcom.org/library/general-strike-ralph-chaplin


–“The General Strike” – W.E.B. Du Bois, 1935:

http://townsendlab.berkeley.edu/sites/all/files/The%20General%20Strike.pdf


–Kill the Bill: The Power of a General Strike – Madison IWW, 2011:

http://libcom.org/library/iww-general-strike-pamphlet


–“To All the Working People: Call for De-Nuke General Strike” – Committee

for De-nuke General Strike, 2011:

http://jfissures.wordpress.com/2011/03/26/to-all-the-working-people-%E2%80%93-call-

for-de-nuke-general-strike/


–“Wisconsin’s Lost Strike Moment” – Nicolas Lampert & Dan S. Wang, 2011:

http://www.justseeds.org/blog/2011/04/wisconsins_lost_strike_moment_1.html


–“What Chance a General Strike in Manhattan?” – Nikolas Kozloff, 2011:

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/10/2011107135115719238.html


–“A Message to the Partisans, in Advance of the General Strike” – Society

of Enemies, 2011: http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2011/11/01/18696540.php


–“Blockading the Port is Only the First of Many Last Resorts” – Society

of Enemies, 2011:

http://www.bayofrage.com/from-the-bay/blockading-the-port-is-only-the-first-of-many-last-resorts/


–“General Strike” – Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 2011:

http://occupytheory.org/Tidal_5.html


–“What are the Origins of May Day?” – Rosa Luxemburg, 1894:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1894/02/may-day.htm


–“The Idea of May Day on the March” – Rosa Luxemburg, 1913:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1913/04/30.htm


–“May Day in the West and the East” – Leon Trotsky, 1923:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1924/04/mayday.htm


–“The First of May: Symbol of a New Era in the Life and Struggle of the

Toilers” – Nestor Makhno, 1928:

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/makhno-nestor/works/1928/05_01.htm


–The History of Mayday – Alexander Trachtenberg, 1932:

http://www.marxists.org/subject/mayday/articles/tracht.html


–“A General Strike” – Mariarosa Dall Costa, 1974:

http://caringlabor.wordpress.com/2010/10/20/mariarosa-dalla-costa-a-general-strike/


–“What do we mean by… The General Strike?” – Chris Harman, 1985:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/harman/1985/01/genstrike.htm


–The Incomplete, True, Authentic and Wonderful History of May Day – Peter

Linebaugh, 1986


–“Birth of a Holiday: The First of May” – Eric Hobsbawm, 1994:

http://libcom.org/history/birth-holiday-first-may


–“Infinite Strike” – Anonymous, 2010:

http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/Anonymous__Infinite_Strike.html


–“Which Way Forward for the 99%?” – Occupy May 1st, 2012:

http://libcom.org/library/which-way-forward-99-build-power-show-power-through-

mass-participatory-bold-action


___________________________________________________

5. NYC Links


Brooklyn General Assembly: http://occupybk.org/

Bushwick General Assembly: https://www.facebook.com/groups/Bushwick.GA/

New York City General Assembly: http://www.nycga.net/

Strike Everywhere: http://strikeeverywhere.net/

Williamsburg General Assembly: http://occupywilliamsburg.org/


___________________________________________________

6. Precarious & Service Worker Assembly


Start:

03/28/2012 19:30


Category:

Precarious/Service Worker Assembly


Address:

360 Court Street, Brooklyn, NY, 11231, United States


Tired of being treated like a servant by your customers? Tired of

management demanding more and more for less and less? Feeling alone or

frustrated? Come to the first Precarious and Service Worker Assembly to

network with others who share your interests!


As service workers, we are often both overworked and underpaid; with

Management forcing workers to work ever faster in an ever shorter amount

of time. Productivity and speed-of-service requirements increase while

hours per week are slashed. It’s clear: The harder we work, the less we

get paid, and the richer they get!


Many of us are already in tough situations as parents, immigrants, young

people, and students. Racism is blatantly apparent at many of our

workplaces, with Latino and immigrant workers confined to back-of-house

positions, maintaining a racial hierarchy to keep us separated. For some,

a job at a restaurant or a cafe is a 2nd or even 3rd job, a result of the

declining wages for other careers. Even worse, we often find ourselves

forced into student loan and credit card debt because of low pay. All the

while, rent, food, and transportation costs climb through the roof.


Solidarity and support among local service workers can be empowering for

all of us. Remember, they can’t run these places without us. Bosses thrive

by pitting us against one another, but if not for us, Management wouldn’t

make a dime. So let’s take what’s ours!


Bring some goods to share from your place of employment if you’d like, and

feel free to bring a friend or two ­as long as they’re not the boss! We’ll

be discussing how we can make our collective situation much more

interesting and how we can engage together in upcoming actions like the

May Day General Strike.


__________________________________________________

16 Beaver Group

16 Beaver Street, 4th fl.

New York, NY 10004


for directions/subscriptions/info visit:

http://www.16beavergroup.org


TRAINS:

4,5 — Bowling Green

2,3 — Wall Street

J,Z —  Broad Street

R — Whitehall

1 — South Ferry

	


	



			
				


			

			
Cryptome – Quantum Computation Cognitive Footprint
		
	
	

		
A sends a comment from Schneier on Security:


http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/01/authentication_1.html


Slightly Weird claim: Cognitive Footprint Biometric Application has been around for years


A ‘cognitive footprint’ biometric analysis system based on keyboard and mouse movements, combined with software-use behavior, has been in production for years. I’ve known of it since 2004 with a high degree of confidence, but I’m generally wise enough not to discuss it. I tinker with AI and neural networks (NN) myself, and am an expert software engineer, so I can reliably tell you that it’s not particularly hard to build such a system at the toy/theoretical level. It’s probably quite hard to implement it well in the real world.


My browser-centric toy model of a cognitive footprint biometric application used JavaScript to track keyboard and mouse interaction, which then passed time-parsed data to a neural network for classification. With an ordinary (non-recurrent) neural network the above comments about error rates and edge cases are very accurate. However, with access to an advanced recurrent neural network I’m pretty sure that the error rate could be reduced to a level low enough for effective use in combination with other authentication methods.


___________


Thoroughly Outlandish Claim: Five Eyes got production QC power in 1995


A real-world functional cognitive footprint biometric application requires an advanced recurrent neural network. The recurrent neural network that now powers this app is (literally) related to or descended from a classified system built to crack public-private key cryptography in the 90s.


The Five Eyes (AUS CAN NZ UK US) have had access to practical, production quantum computer power since about 1995. Other groups may have had access since that era, but that’s a moot point. I strongly suspect that both China and Russia later developed operational QCs along similar principles.


The QC approach that actually works, in a production-ready scale-able way, is to run a virtual Turing machine atop a winner-take-all-style teleportation/entanglement-based recurrent topological quantum neural network (QNN). Even a basic neural network is Turing Complete, because a NN can perfectly emulate an XOR gate, and multiple XOR gates can be used to construct a Turing machine. A quantum neural network can emulate a quantum Turing machine.


The underlying physical system for this type of QNN is interactions between non-abelian anyons in a two dimensional electron gas (2DEG). The primary math required is a branch of Knot Theory called Braid Theory. Obviously, the primary purpose of this system, from the Five Eyes/Echelon perspective, is to run Shor’s algorithm to crack public/private key cryptography. A perusal of current known quantum algorithms, combined with a survey of current advanced AI applications, may suggest other uses.


___________


Not especially Weird Claim: There’s a really nifty back story about how this new general technology was developed, and why it matters. It is worthy of a book by Neal Stephenson.


The subject of the 1985 Nobel Prize in Physics was the “quantum Hall effect”, which opened up new avenues of research into quantum effects, esp. in two dimensional electron gases. The process of creating a working quantum neural network involved generating lots of anyons (soliton-type standing waves treated as particles) in a two dimensional electron gas and then exploring and measuring the results.


The cleverest aspect of inventing this new technology was to take this ‘Anyon Soup’ system to the edge of chaos, per the life work of Stuart Kauffman, and then exploit the emergent neural network to bootstrap itself into a more stable and usable system via evolutionary programming techniques. See Kauffman’s publications for details on how and why this emergent neural network exists, and then consider it’s environment to see why it is a quantum neural network. This author believes Stuart Kauffman is overdue for a Nobel Prize.


The original work inventing this new technology was done between 1990 and 1995. It would be hard to do this work methodically without stumbling on the previously unknown fractional quantum Hall effect. The discoverers of this effect were awarded the 1998 Nobel Prize in Physics, and now lead various Quantum Computing research institutes.


Someone, somewhere, is due to be awarded the Grand Prize Turing Award, for solving Turing’s unfinished Morphogenesis problem, and then implementing Turing’s original machine on the resulting artificially intelligent ‘organism’. I’m inclined towards neither spiritualism nor whimsy, but were I so, then I might suspect that, after he died in 1954, Alan Turing reincarnated quickly, in 1965, in order to finish his incomplete life work. The classified nature of the work probably precludes any awards.


I’d really like it if this whole thing was declassified, but fear we’ll have to wait many additional decades for that. This QNN is an excellent candidate to pursue adiabatic (reversible) computing, might be helpful for certain approaches to advanced nanotechnology, and, were it declassified, might also be helpful to many other scientific ventures. Per the Ultra Secret, it’s undoubtedly still considered ‘national security’, even if it’s becoming an open secret within the Intelligence Community.


— Energyscholar

	


	



			
				


			

			
Cryptome – Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Department of Justice Joint Statement
		
	
	

		
REVISED GUIDELINES ISSUED TO ALLOW THE NCTC TO ACCESS AND ANALYZE CERTAIN FEDERAL DATA MORE EFFECTIVELY TO COMBAT TERRORIST THREATS


Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, Attorney General Eric Holder, and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director Matthew G. Olsen have signed updated guidelines designed to allow NCTC to obtain and more effectively analyze certain data in the government s possession to better address terrorism-related threats, while at the same time protecting privacy and civil liberties.


The Guidelines for Access, Retention, Use, and Dissemination by the National Counterrorism Center (NCTC) of Information in Datasets Containing Non-Terrorism Information effective Mar. 22, 2012, update November 2008 guidelines that governed NCTC s access, retention, use, and dissemination of terrorism information contained within federal datasets that are identified as also including non-terrorism information and information pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism.


The updated Guidelines provide a framework that allows NCTC to obtain certain data held by other U.S. Government agencies to better protect the nation and its allies from terrorist attacks.  In coordination with other federal agencies providing data to the NCTC, NCTC will establish the timeline for the retention of individual datasets based upon the type of data, the sensitivity of the data, any legal requirements that apply to the particular data, and other relevant considerations.


Among other modifications, the revised Guidelines:


    

  • Permit NCTC to retain certain datasets that are likely to contain significant terrorism information and are already in the lawful custody and control of other federal agencies for up to five years, unless a shorter period is required by law.
    • 



    

  • Permit NCTC to query this data only to identify information that is reasonably believed to constitute terrorism information.
    • 



    

  • Provide that all data obtained by NCTC from another federal agency pursuant to the Guidelines, will be subject to appropriate safeguards and oversight mechanisms, including monitoring, recording, and auditing of access to and queries of the data, to protect privacy and civil liberties.
    • 



    

  • Require NCTC to undertake a number of additional compliance and reporting obligations to ensure robust oversight.
    • 



The updated Guidelines do not provide any new authorities for the U.S. Government to collect information, nor do they authorize acquisition of data from entities outside the federal government.  All information that would be accessed by NCTC under the Guidelines is already in the lawful custody and control of other federal agencies.  The Guidelines merely provide the NCTC with a more effective means of accessing and analyzing datasets in the government s possession that are likely to contain significant terrorism information.  They permit NCTC to consolidate disparate federal datasets that contain information of value to NCTC s critical counterterrorism mission.  Furthermore, the updated Guidelines do not supersede or replace any legal restrictions on information sharing (existing by statute, Executive Order, regulation, or international agreement).  Thus, the updated Guidelines do not give NCTC authority to require another agency to share any dataset where such sharing would contravene U.S. law or an international agreement.


One of the issues identified by Congress and the Intelligence Community after the 2009 Fort Hood shootings and the Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt was the government s limited ability to query multiple federal datasets and to correlate information from many sources that might relate to a potential attack.  A review of government actions taken before these attacks recommended that the Intelligence Community push for the completion of state-of-the-art search and correlation capabilities, including techniques that would provide a single point of entry to various government databases.


Following the failed terrorist attack in December 2009, representatives of the counterterrorism community concluded it is vital for NCTC to be provided with a variety of datasets from various agencies that contain terrorism information, said Clapper, The ability to search against these datasets for up to five years on a continuing basis as these updated Guidelines permit will enable NCTC to accomplish its mission more practically and effectively than the 2008 Guidelines allowed.


The updated Guidelines have undergone extensive review within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice and have been coordinated throughout the Intelligence Community.  Under the National Security Act of 1947, NCTC is charged with serving as the primary organization in the U.S. Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the U.S. Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism.  Consistent with this statutory mission, Executive Order 12333 provides that Intelligence Community elements may collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning United States Persons (USPs) only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the Intelligence Community element and approved by the Attorney General in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.


The 2008 Guidelines required NCTC to promptly review USP information and then promptly remove it if it is not reasonably believed to constitute terrorism information.  This approach was a reasonable first step in 2008, but based on subsequent experience and lessons learned, the requirement to promptly remove USP information hampers NCTC s ability to identify terrorism information by connecting the dots across multiple datasets.


There are a number of protections built into the 2012 revised Guidelines, said Alexander Joel, ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer. Before obtaining a dataset, the Director of NCTC, in coordination with the data provider, is required to make a finding that the dataset is likely to contain significant terrorism information.


Once ingested, data is subject to a number of baseline safeguards carried over from the 2008 Guidelines, including restrictions that limit access to only those individuals with a mission need and who have received training on the Guidelines.


The approval of these Guidelines will significantly improve NCTC s ability to carry out its statutory mission said Clapper, Our citizens expect that we do everything in our power to keep them safe, while protecting privacy and other civil liberties. These Guidelines provide our counterterrorism analysts with the means to accomplish that task more effectively.


###


NCTC Guidelines: http://cryptome.org/2012/03/nctc-data-spy.pdf (2.2MB)

	


	



			
				


			

			
Cryptome  – NSA Decryption Multipurpose Research Facility
		
	
	

		




The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You Say)


By James Bamford


March 15, 2012


[Excerpts of excellent NSA overview to focus on the MRF decryption facility.]


When Barack Obama took office, Binney hoped the new administration might be open to reforming the program to address his constitutional concerns. He and another former senior NSA analyst, J. Kirk Wiebe, tried to bring the idea of an automated warrant-approval system to the attention of the Department of Justice’s inspector general. They were given the brush-off. “They said, oh, OK, we can’t comment,” Binney says.


Sitting in a restaurant not far from NSA headquarters, the place where he spent nearly 40 years of his life, Binney held his thumb and forefinger close together. “We are, like, that far from a turnkey totalitarian state,” he says.


There is still one technology preventing untrammeled government access to private digital data: strong encryption. Anyone—from terrorists and weapons dealers to corporations, financial institutions, and ordinary email senders—can use it to seal their messages, plans, photos, and documents in hardened data shells. For years, one of the hardest shells has been the Advanced Encryption Standard, one of several algorithms used by much of the world to encrypt data. Available in three different strengths—128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits—it’s incorporated in most commercial email programs and web browsers and is considered so strong that the NSA has even approved its use for top-secret US government communications. Most experts say that a so-called brute-force computer attack on the algorithm—trying one combination after another to unlock the encryption—would likely take longer than the age of the universe. For a 128-bit cipher, the number of trial-and-error attempts would be 340 undecillion (1036).


Breaking into those complex mathematical shells like the AES is one of the key reasons for the construction going on in Bluffdale. That kind of cryptanalysis requires two major ingredients: super-fast computers to conduct brute-force attacks on encrypted messages and a massive number of those messages for the computers to analyze. The more messages from a given target, the more likely it is for the computers to detect telltale patterns, and Bluffdale will be able to hold a great many messages. “We questioned it one time,” says another source, a senior intelligence manager who was also involved with the planning. “Why were we building this NSA facility? And, boy, they rolled out all the old guys—the crypto guys.” According to the official, these experts told then-director of national intelligence Dennis Blair, “You’ve got to build this thing because we just don’t have the capability of doing the code-breaking.” It was a candid admission. In the long war between the code breakers and the code makers—the tens of thousands of cryptographers in the worldwide computer security industry—the code breakers were admitting defeat.


So the agency had one major ingredient—a massive data storage facility—under way. Meanwhile, across the country in Tennessee, the government was working in utmost secrecy on the other vital element: the most powerful computer the world has ever known.


The plan was launched in 2004 as a modern-day Manhattan Project. Dubbed the High Productivity Computing Systems program, its goal was to advance computer speed a thousandfold, creating a machine that could execute a quadrillion (1015) operations a second, known as a petaflop—the computer equivalent of breaking the land speed record. And as with the Manhattan Project, the venue chosen for the supercomputing program was the town of Oak Ridge in eastern Tennessee, a rural area where sharp ridges give way to low, scattered hills, and the southwestward-flowing Clinch River bends sharply to the southeast. About 25 miles from Knoxville, it is the “secret city” where uranium- 235 was extracted for the first atomic bomb. A sign near the exit read: what you see here, what you do here, what you hear here, when you leave here, let it stay here. Today, not far from where that sign stood, Oak Ridge is home to the Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and it’s engaged in a new secret war. But this time, instead of a bomb of almost unimaginable power, the weapon is a computer of almost unimaginable speed.


In 2004, as part of the supercomputing program, the Department of Energy established its Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility for multiple agencies to join forces on the project. But in reality there would be two tracks, one unclassified, in which all of the scientific work would be public, and another top-secret, in which the NSA could pursue its own computer covertly. “For our purposes, they had to create a separate facility,” says a former senior NSA computer expert who worked on the project and is still associated with the agency. (He is one of three sources who described the program.) It was an expensive undertaking, but one the NSA was desperate to launch.


Known as the Multiprogram Research Facility, or Building 5300, the $41 million, five-story, 214,000-square-foot structure was built on a plot of land on the lab’s East Campus and completed in 2006. Behind the brick walls and green-tinted windows, 318 scientists, computer engineers, and other staff work in secret on the cryptanalytic applications of high-speed computing and other classified projects. The supercomputer center was named in honor of George R. Cotter, the NSA’s now-retired chief scientist and head of its information technology program. Not that you’d know it. “There’s no sign on the door,” says the ex-NSA computer expert.


At the DOE’s unclassified center at Oak Ridge, work progressed at a furious pace, although it was a one-way street when it came to cooperation with the closemouthed people in Building 5300. Nevertheless, the unclassified team had its Cray XT4 supercomputer upgraded to a warehouse-sized XT5. Named Jaguar for its speed, it clocked in at 1.75 petaflops, officially becoming the world’s fastest computer in 2009.


[Image]


1 Geostationary satellites


Four satellites positioned around the globe monitor frequencies carrying everything from walkie-talkies and cell phones in Libya to radar systems in North Korea. Onboard software acts as the first filter in the collection process, targeting only key regions, countries, cities, and phone numbers or email.


2 Aerospace Data Facility, Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado


Intelligence collected from the geostationary satellites, as well as signals from other spacecraft and overseas listening posts, is relayed to this facility outside Denver. About 850 NSA employees track the satellites, transmit target information, and download the intelligence haul.


3 NSA Georgia, Fort Gordon, Augusta, Georgia


Focuses on intercepts from Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. Codenamed Sweet Tea, the facility has been massively expanded and now consists of a 604,000-square-foot operations building for up to 4,000 intercept operators, analysts, and other specialists.


4 NSA Texas, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio


Focuses on intercepts from Latin America and, since 9/11, the Middle East and Europe. Some 2,000 workers staff the operation. The NSA recently completed a $100 million renovation on a mega-data center here—a backup storage facility for the Utah Data Center.


5 NSA Hawaii, Oahu


Focuses on intercepts from Asia. Built to house an aircraft assembly plant during World War II, the 250,000-square-foot bunker is nicknamed the Hole. Like the other NSA operations centers, it has since been expanded: Its 2,700 employees now do their work aboveground from a new 234,000-square-foot facility.


6 Domestic listening posts


The NSA has long been free to eavesdrop on international satellite communications. But after 9/11, it installed taps in US telecom “switches,” gaining access to domestic traffic. An ex-NSA official says there are 10 to 20 such installations.


7 Overseas listening posts


According to a knowledgeable intelligence source, the NSA has installed taps on at least a dozen of the major overseas communications links, each capable of eavesdropping on information passing by at a high data rate.


8 Utah Data Center, Bluffdale, Utah


At a million square feet, this $2 billion digital storage facility outside Salt Lake City will be the centerpiece of the NSA’s cloud-based data strategy and essential in its plans for decrypting previously uncrackable documents.


9 Multiprogram Research Facility, Oak Ridge, Tennessee


Some 300 scientists and computer engineers with top security clearance toil away here, building the world’s fastest supercomputers and working on cryptanalytic applications and other secret projects.


10 NSA headquarters, Fort Meade, Maryland


Analysts here will access material stored at Bluffdale to prepare reports and recommendations that are sent to policymakers. To handle the increased data load, the NSA is also building an $896 million supercomputer here.





Oak Ridge National Laboratory – Multi-Program Research Facilityhttp://www.heery.com/Repository/Images/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratories.jpg


[Image]


http://www.heery.com/portfolio/oak-ridge-national-laboratory.aspx?service=5


Oak Ridge National Laboratory – Multi-Program Research Facility


Oak Ridge, Tennessee


The Department of Energy (DOE) complex at Oak Ridge required the creation of a state of the art, large-scale, secure science and technology facility that would provide the appropriate infrastructure and environment to both integrate and consolidate multidisciplinary scientific capabilities for defense and homeland security activities. The Heery-designed and constructed Multi-Program Research Facility (MPRF) provides facilities for research and development activities in non-proliferation research, training and operations; cyber security research and development; geospatial analysis; inorganic membrane research and prototyping; and myriad other activities.


Based on Heery’s previous successful work with ORNL as part of a third-party development team, ORNL tapped the Keenan team to serve as its developer for the MPRF, with Heery in the role of design-builder.


The MPRF contains 218,000 SF of office and laboratory space. This highly secure building plays a key role in delivering the science and technology needed to protect homeland and national security. In addition, Heery International continues to work on various new assignments on the ORNL campus.


The goal was to develop cutting-edge facilities designed for sustainability and energy efficiency. Heery guided ORNL and the development team in delivering facilities to showcase energy and water efficiency and renewable energy improvements. With Heery’s assistance, ORNL now has the most LEED-certified space in the entire DOE system, having attained LEED certification for the firm’s earlier project, the East Campus Complex, and LEED Gold certification for the MPRF, which is the first LEED Gold facility on the ORNL campus.





Following images from bing.com/mapsThe MRF is at upper left.


[Image]





[Image]




[Image]




[Image]




[Image]




[Image]




http://femp.buildinggreen.com/overview.cfm?ProjectID=1125Oak Ridge National Laboratory Multiprogram Research Facility (MRF)


(ORNL Multiprogram Research Facility)


[Image]


Overview


Location: Oak Ridge, TN


Building type(s): Other, Laboratory, Commercial office


New construction


195,000 ft2 (18,100 m2)


Project scope: 5-story building


Rural setting


Completed October 2006


Rating: U.S. Green Building Council LEED-NC, v.2/v.2.1–Level: Gold (39 points)


The Multiprogram Research Facility (MRF) was implemented through a design-build contract, but is a complex mixture of labs and offices that have stringent operational, security, and environmental and energy requirements. The program was highly developed and has detailed technical parameters that could not be compromised.


Environmental Aspects


The building’s vertical orientation minimized its footprint on the landscape. Using native, drought-resistant plants in the landscape obviated the need for irrigation. This, along with the use of low-flow plumbing fixtures, reduced potable water usage by approximately 34%.


The building was projected to use 25% less energy than that of a comparable facility built in minimal compliance with code. A hybrid solar lighting system with rooftop solar collectors was installed to test the feasibility of using fiber optics for natural lighting.


The project team preferred materials with recycled content and those that were manufactured regionally. The team also recycled construction waste wherever possible.


Owner & Occupancy


Owned by Keenan Development Associates, LLC, Corporation, for-profit


Occupants: Federal government


Typically occupied by 318 people, 40 hours per person per week


Expected Building Service Life: 35 years


 


Building Programs


 


Indoor Spaces:


 


 


Other (43%), Office (18%), Laboratory (14%), Conference (6%), Data processing (6%), Mechanical systems (3%), Retail general (3%), Public assembly (2%), Restrooms (2%), Lobby/reception (2%), Cafeteria, Circulation, Gymnasium, Electrical systems






	


	



			
				


			

			
Uncensored – Bradley Manning Hearing March 15, 2012 Photos
		
	
	

		




[Image]


Army Pfc. Bradley Manning (L) leaves the courthouse after his motion hearing at Fort Meade, Maryland March 15, 2012. Manning, a U.S. Army intelligence analyst accused of the largest leak of classified documents in U.S. history, deferred pleading guilty or not guilty in a military court arraignment on Thursday, marking the first step in a court martial that could land him imprisonment for life. Reuters





[Image]US Army Pfc. Bradley Manning is seen arriving for a motion hearing in the case Unted States vs. Manning at Fort Meade March 15, 2012 in Maryland. US Army Pfc. Bradley Manning was charged in February for leaking hundreds of thousands of secret US military and government documents to WikiLeaks. Getty




[Image]US Army Pfc. Bradley Manning(C) is seen arriving for a motion hearing in the case Unted States vs. Manning at Fort Meade March 15, 2012 in Maryland. US Army Pfc. Bradley Manning was charged in February for leaking hundreds of thousands of secret US military and government documents to WikiLeaks. Getty




[Image]Army Pfc. Bradley Manning, center, is escorted by a security detail into a courthouse in Fort Meade, Md. , Thursday, March 15, 2012. Manning, a US Army private accused of leaking classified material to the anti-secrecy website Wikileaks could soon learn when his trial will start. AP




[Image]Army Pfc. Bradley Manning’s civilian attorney David Coombs and Tanya Monestier arrive at a courthouse in Fort Meade, Md. , Thursday, Mar. 15, 2012, for a motion hearing in Manning’s upcoming court-martial trial. Manning, a US Army private accused of leaking classified material to the anti-secrecy website Wikileaks could soon learn when his trial will start. AP




[Image]Army Capt. Paul Bouchard, military defense attorney for Army Pfc. Bradley Manning, arrives at a courthouse in Fort Meade, Md. , Thursday, March 15, 2012, for a motion hearing in Manning’s upcoming court-martial trial. AP




[Image]Army Capt. Joe Morrow, a member of the Army’s prosecution team, arrives at a courthouse in Fort Meade, Md. , Thursday, Mar. 15, 2012, for a motion hearing in the court-martial of Army Pfc. Bradley Manning. Manning, a US Army private accused of leaking classified material to the anti-secrecy website Wikileaks could soon learn when his trial will start. AP




[Image]Army Capt. Angel Overgaard, a member of the Army’s prosecution team, arrives at a courthouse in Fort Meade, Md. , Thursday, March 15, 2012, for a motion hearing in the upcoming court-martial trial of Army Pfc. Bradley Manning. AP




Manning has a single 3-years-of-service hash on his sleeve compared to two on March 15, 2012.[Image]


Army Pfc. Bradley Manning, in handcuffs, is escorted out of a courthouse in Fort Meade in Maryland February 23, 2012. Manning, a U.S. Army intelligence analyst accused of the largest leak of classified documents in U.S. history, deferred pleading guilty or not guilty in a military court arraignment on Thursday, marking the first step in a court martial that could land him imprisonment for life.





































 

























	


	



			
				


			

			
CRYPTOME unveils New Canadian Prison Construction Documents
		
	
	

		
A sends:


Construction drawings and specifications for new prison buildings at four Canadian prisons:


Bath Institution, Bath, Ontario, Drawings and Specifications


http://cryptome.org/2012/03/csc/bath-csc.zip (105MB)


bath_drawings.pdf

bath_specs.pdf


Collins Bay Institution, Kingston, Ontario, Drawings and Specifications


http://cryptome.org/2012/03/csc/collins-bay-csc.zip (136MB)


cb_drawings_arch.pdf

cb_drawings_civil.pdf

cb_drawings_elec.pdf

cb_drawings_mech.pdf

cb_drawings_struc.pdf

cb_specs.pdf


Millhaven Institution, Bath, Ontario, Drawings and Specifications


http://cryptome.org/2012/03/csc/millhaven-csc.zip (170MB)


mh_drawings_arch.pdf

mh_drawings_civil.pdf

mh_drawings_elec.pdf

mh_drawings_elec.pdf

mh_drawings_struc.pdf

mh_drawings_secsys.pdf

mh_specs.pdf


Stony Mountain Institution, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Drawings


http://cryptome.org/2012/03/csc/stony-mountain-csc.zip (73MB)


stony_drawings.pdf


 




Prison Websites (Correctional Service of Canada)


Bath Institution, Bath, Ontario


http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/facilit/institutprofiles/bath-eng.shtml


Collins Bay Institution, Kingston, Ontario


http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/facilit/institutprofiles/collinsbay-eng.shtml


Millhaven Institution, Bath, Ontario


http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/facilit/institutprofiles/millhaven-eng.shtml


Stony Mountain Institution, Winnipeg, Manitoba


http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/facilit/institutprofiles/stonymountain-eng.shtml

	


	



			
				


			

			
Confidential Cryptome – USA v. The Monsegur Five
		
	
	

		
USA v. The Monsegur Five


The various USA charges against Hector “Sabu” Xavier Monsgur (1-SDNY) (2-SDNY) (3-EDCA) (4-CDCA) (5-NDGA) (6-EDVA) and the four persons he informed on, Ryan “Kayla” Ackroyd, Jake “Topiary” Davis, Darren Martyn and Donncha O’Cearrbhail, were assigned to the Southern District of New York court. These are the court dockets and filings in the five cases.


 




Hector Xavier Monsegur 1 – Southern District of New York


None of the docket filings in this case were released. See following docket and docketfrom Eastern District of Virginia.






CLOSED, MERGED






U.S. District Court

Southern District of New York (Foley Square)

CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:11-mj-01509-UA-1







Case title: USA v. Monsegur

Date Filed: 06/08/2011

Date Terminated: 08/15/2011		






 








Assigned to: Judge Unassigned





Defendant (1)




Hector Xavier Monsegur

TERMINATED: 08/15/2011		
represented by
Peggy M. Cross-Goldenberg 

Federal Defenders of New York Inc. (NYC)

52 Duane Street

10th Floor

New York, NY 10007

(212) 417-8732

Fax: (212) 571-0392

Email: Peggy_Cross@fd.org

Designation: Public Defender or Community Defender Appointment		





Pending Counts


Disposition




None





Highest Offense Level (Opening)




None





Terminated Counts


Disposition




None





Highest Offense Level (Terminated)




None





Complaints


Disposition




18:1028A.FRAUD WITH IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS;, 18:1029:PRODUCES/TRAFFICS IN COUNTERFEIT DEVICE.








 









Plaintiff




USA
represented by
James J. Pastore , Jr 

U.S. Attorney’s Office, SDNY (St Andw’s)

One St. Andrew’s Plaza

New York, NY 10007

(212) 637-2418

Fax: (212) 637-2937

Email: James.Pastore@usdoj.gov


Thomas G. A. Brown 

U.S. Attorney’s Office, SDNY (St Andw’s)

One St. Andrew’s Plaza

New York, NY 10007

2126372200

Fax: 718-4221718

Email: thomas.ga.brown@usdoj.gov







 






Date Filed
#
Docket Text




06/07/2011

Arrest of Hector Xavier Monsegur. (gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
1
COMPLAINT as to Hector Xavier Monsegur (1) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028 and 1029. (Signed by Magistrate Judge James L. Cott) (gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
2
CJA 23 Financial Affidavit by Hector Xavier Monsegur. Approved. (Signed by Judge Magistrate Judge James L. Cott) (gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
3
ORDER APPOINTING FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. Peggy M. Cross-Goldenberg for Hector Xavier Monsegur appointed. (Signed by Magistrate Judge James L. Cott on 6/8/2011)(gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge James L. Cott:Initial Appearance as to Hector Xavier Monsegur held on 6/8/2011. Deft appears with Assistant Federal Defender atty Peggy Cross. AUSA James Pastore present for the gov’t. Agreed conditions of release: $50,000 PRB. Other conditions: Deft to be supervised by the FBI with respect to travel and reporting and all other issues. Deft to be released on own signature. See Sealing Order dated 6/8/11. ( Preliminary Hearing set for 7/8/2011 at 10:00 AM before Judge Unassigned.) (gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
4
PRB APPEARANCE Bond Entered as to Hector Xavier Monsegur in amount of $50,000. Deft to be supervised by the FBI with respect to travel and reporting and all other issues. Deft to be released on own signature. (gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
5
ADVICE OF PENALTIES AND SANCTIONS as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. (gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
6
EX PARTE AND SEALED APPLICATION AND AFFIRMATION of AUSA James J. Pastore, Jr. in Support by USA for an order sealing this case, as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. (gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
7
SEALED ORDER as to Hector Xavier Monsegur…that filings in the above-captioned case be filed under seal and the case shall be captioned as United States v. John Doe, in the public docket, until further order by this Court. (Signed by Magistrate Judge James L. Cott on 6/8/2011)(gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




07/08/2011
8
SEALED AFFIRMATION of AUSA Joseph P. Facciponti in Support by USA of a request for a 30-day continuance until 8/8/11, as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. (gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




07/08/2011
9
SEALED ORDER TO CONTINUE IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. Time excluded from 7/8/2011 until 8/8/2011. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Frank Maas on 7/8/2011)(gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/05/2012

TRUE COPY OF UNSEALING ORDER as to Hector Xavier Monsegur…that all records and proceedings, including copies of pleadings and transcripts, associated with the cases with docket numbers S1 11 Cr. 666(LAP), 11 Cr. 693(LAP), 11 Cr. 694(LAP), 11 Cr. 695(LAP), 11 Cr. 696(LAP) and 11 Mag. 1509, which had by previous order of this Court been sealed and captioned as United States v. John Doe, be unsealed and captioned under their true names…that this unsealing order shall be effective 9:00 a.m. on March 6, 2012. (Signed by Judge Loretta A. Preska on 3/5/2012)(gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)






 




Hector Xavier Monsegur 2 – Southern District of New York






ECF






U.S. District Court

Southern District of New York (Foley Square)

CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:11-cr-00666-LAP-1







Case title: USA v. Monsegur






Magistrate judge case number:
1:11-mj-01509-UA







Date Filed: 08/05/2011






 








Assigned to: Judge Loretta A. Preska





Defendant (1)




Hector Xavier Monsegur

also known as

Sealed Defendant 1

also known as

Sabu

also known as

Xavier DeLeon

also known as

Leon		
represented by
Peggy M. Cross-Goldenberg 

Federal Defenders of New York Inc. (NYC)

52 Duane Street

10th Floor

New York, NY 10007

(212) 417-8732

Fax: (212) 571-0392

Email: Peggy_Cross@fd.org

Designation: Public Defender or Community Defender Appointment		





Pending Counts


Disposition




18:1030A.F FRAUD ACTIVITY CONNECTED WITH COMPUTERS (CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT COMPUTER INTRUSION)

(1-3)		






18:1030A.F FRAUD ACTIVITY CONNECTED WITH COMPUTERS (COMPUTER INTRUSION INTENTIONALLY CAUSING DAMAGE))

(4-8)		






18:1030A.F FRAUD ACTIVITY CONNECTED WITH COMPUTERS (COMPUTER INTRUSION FURTHERING FRAUD)

(9)		






18:1029B.F ATTEMPTS TO COMMIT AN OFFENSE (CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ACCESS DEVICE FRAUD)

(10)		






18:1349.F ATTEMPT AND CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT BANK FRAUD

(11)		






18:1028A.F FRAUD WITH IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS (AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT)

(12)		







Highest Offense Level (Opening)




Felony





Terminated Counts


Disposition




None





Highest Offense Level (Terminated)




None





Complaints


Disposition




18:1028A.FRAUD WITH IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS;, 18:1029:PRODUCES/TRAFFICS IN COUNTERFEIT DEVICE.








 









Plaintiff




USA






 






Date Filed
#
Docket Text




06/07/2011

Arrest of Hector Xavier Monsegur. (gq) [1:11-mj-01509-UA] (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
1
COMPLAINT as to Hector Xavier Monsegur (1) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028 and 1029. (Signed by Magistrate Judge James L. Cott) (gq) [1:11-mj-01509-UA] (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
2
CJA 23 Financial Affidavit by Hector Xavier Monsegur. Approved. (Signed by Judge Magistrate Judge James L. Cott) (gq) [1:11-mj-01509-UA] (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
3
ORDER APPOINTING FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. Peggy M. Cross-Goldenberg for Hector Xavier Monsegur appointed. (Signed by Magistrate Judge James L. Cott on 6/8/2011)(gq) [1:11-mj-01509-UA] (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge James L. Cott:Initial Appearance as to Hector Xavier Monsegur held on 6/8/2011. Deft appears with Assistant Federal Defender atty Peggy Cross. AUSA James Pastore present for the gov’t. Agreed conditions of release: $50,000 PRB. Other conditions: Deft to be supervised by the FBI with respect to travel and reporting and all other issues. Deft to be released on own signature. See Sealing Order dated 6/8/11. ( Preliminary Hearing set for 7/8/2011 at 10:00 AM before Judge Unassigned.) (gq) [1:11-mj-01509-UA] (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
4
PRB APPEARANCE Bond Entered as to Hector Xavier Monsegur in amount of $50,000. Deft to be supervised by the FBI with respect to travel and reporting and all other issues. Deft to be released on own signature. (gq) [1:11-mj-01509-UA] (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
5
ADVICE OF PENALTIES AND SANCTIONS as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. (gq) [1:11-mj-01509-UA] (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
6
EX PARTE AND SEALED APPLICATION AND AFFIRMATION of AUSA James J. Pastore, Jr. in Support by USA for an order sealing this case, as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. (gq) [1:11-mj-01509-UA] (Entered: 03/06/2012)




06/08/2011
7
SEALED ORDER as to Hector Xavier Monsegur…that filings in the above-captioned case be filed under seal and the case shall be captioned as United States v. John Doe, in the public docket, until further order by this Court. (Signed by Magistrate Judge James L. Cott on 6/8/2011)(gq) [1:11-mj-01509-UA] (Entered: 03/06/2012)




07/08/2011
8
SEALED AFFIRMATION of AUSA Joseph P. Facciponti in Support by USA of a request for a 30-day continuance until 8/8/11, as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. (gq) [1:11-mj-01509-UA] (Entered: 03/06/2012)




07/08/2011
9
SEALED ORDER TO CONTINUE IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. Time excluded from 7/8/2011 until 8/8/2011. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Frank Maas on 7/8/2011)(gq) [1:11-mj-01509-UA] (Entered: 03/06/2012)




08/09/2011
1
SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault. (nm) (Entered: 08/09/2011)




08/09/2011
2
SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault. (nm) (Entered: 08/09/2011)




08/15/2011
10
SEALED S(1)INFORMATION (Felony) as to Hector Xavier Monsegur (1) count(s) 1-3, 4-8, 9, 10, 11, 12. (jm) Modified on 3/6/2012 (jm). (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/05/2012

TRUE COPY OF UNSEALING ORDER as to Hector Xavier Monsegur…that all records and proceedings, including copies of pleadings and transcripts, associated with the cases with docket numbers S1 11 Cr. 666(LAP), 11 Cr. 693(LAP), 11 Cr. 694(LAP), 11 Cr. 695(LAP), 11 Cr. 696(LAP) and 11 Mag. 1509, which had by previous order of this Court been sealed and captioned as United States v. John Doe, be unsealed and captioned under their true names…that this unsealing order shall be effective 9:00 a.m. on March 6, 2012. (Signed by Judge Loretta A. Preska on 3/5/2012)(gq) [1:11-mj-01509-UA] (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
11
Order to Unseal S(1)Information as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. (Signed by Judge Loretta A. Preska on 3/5/12)(jm) Modified on 3/6/2012 (jm). (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012

S(1) INFORMATION UNSEALED as to Hector Xavier Monsegur (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012

Case Designated ECF as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Loretta A. Preska:Initial Appearance as to Hector Xavier Monsegur held on 3/6/2012. (Please reference arraignment) (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
12
WAIVER OF INDICTMENT by Hector Xavier Monsegur. (Document originally filed under seal on 8/15/11) (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Loretta A. Preska: Defendant present with attorney Peggy Cross and Philip Weinstein; AUSA James Pastore and Thomas Brown also present. Defendant waives indictment and proceeds by information. The agreement is acceptable to the Court. Arraignment as to Hector Xavier Monsegur (1) Count 1-3,4-8,9,10,11,12 held on 3/6/2012. Plea entered by Hector Xavier Monsegur (1) Guilty as to Count 1-3,4-8,9,10,11,12., as to Hector Xavier Monsegur( Sentencing set for 2/15/2012 at 10:30 AM before Judge Loretta A. Preska.) )Hearing originally held 8/15/11) (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
13
RULE 20 DOCUMENTS RECEIVED as to Hector Xavier Monsegur transferred from the United States District Court – District of CD California, Case Number: 11cr766. The following documents were received: Certified copy of the indictment/information, certified copy of the docket sheet, and letter of acknowledgment. (Document originally filed under seal on 8/30/11) (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)






 


 




Hector Xavier Monsegur 3 – Eastern District of California






ECF






U.S. District Court

Southern District of New York (Foley Square)

CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:11-cr-00693-LAP-1







Case title: USA v. Monsegur

Date Filed: 08/12/2011






 








Assigned to: Judge Loretta A. Preska





Defendant (1)




Hector Xavier Monsegur

also known as

Sealed Defendant 1		





Pending Counts


Disposition




18:1030A.F FRAUD ACTIVITY CONNECTED WITH COMPUTERS (COMPUTER INTRUSION FURTHERING FRAUD)

(1)		







Highest Offense Level (Opening)




Felony





Terminated Counts


Disposition




None





Highest Offense Level (Terminated)




None





Complaints


Disposition




None






 









Plaintiff




USA
represented by
James J. Pastore , Jr 

U.S. Attorney’s Office, SDNY (St Andw’s)

One St. Andrew’s Plaza

New York, NY 10007

(212) 637-2418

Fax: (212) 637-2937

Email: James.Pastore@usdoj.gov

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED		






 






Date Filed
#
Docket Text




08/12/2011
1
CONSENT TO TRANSFER JURISDICTION (Rule 20) from the United States District Court – District of ED California; by Sealed Defendant 1 (1) count(s) 1. (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
2
Order to Unseal Case as to Sealed Defendant 1. (Signed by Judge Loretta A. Preska on 3/5/12)(jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012

Case Designated ECF as to Sealed Defendant 1 (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
3
RULE 20 DOCUMENTS RECEIVED as to Hector Xavier Monsegur transferred from the United States District Court – District of ED California, Case Number: 2:11cr332 MCE. The following documents were received: Certified copy of the indictment/information, certified copy of the docket sheet, and letter of acknowledgment. (jm) Modified on 3/6/2012 (jm). (Document originally filed under seal on 8/12/11) (Entered: 03/06/2012)






 


 




Hector Xavier Monsegur 4 – Central District of California






ECF






U.S. District Court

Southern District of New York (Foley Square)

CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:11-cr-00694-LAP-1







Case title: USA v. Monsegur

Date Filed: 08/12/2011






 








Assigned to: Judge Loretta A. Preska





Defendant (1)




Hector Xavier Monsegur

also known as

Sealed Defendant 1

also known as

Sabu

also known as

Xavier DeLeon

also known as

Leon		





Pending Counts


Disposition




18:1030A.F FRAUD ACTIVITY CONNECTED WITH COMPUTERS (COMPUTER INTRUSION FURTHERING FRAUD)

(1-2)		







Highest Offense Level (Opening)




Felony





Terminated Counts


Disposition




None





Highest Offense Level (Terminated)




None





Complaints


Disposition




None






 









Plaintiff




USA
represented by
James J. Pastore , Jr 

U.S. Attorney’s Office, SDNY (St Andw’s)

One St. Andrew’s Plaza

New York, NY 10007

(212) 637-2418

Fax: (212) 637-2937

Email: James.Pastore@usdoj.gov

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED		






 






Date Filed
#
Docket Text




08/12/2011
1
CONSENT TO TRANSFER JURISDICTION (Rule 20) from the United States District Court – District of CD California; by Sealed Defendant 1 (1) count(s) 1-2. (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
2
Order to Unseal Case as to Sealed Defendant 1. (Signed by Judge Loretta A. Preska on 3/5/12)(jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012

Case Designated ECF as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
3
RULE 20 DOCUMENTS RECEIVED as to Hector Xavier Monsegur transferred from the United States District Court – District of CD California, Case Number: CR 11 0766. The following documents were received: Certified copy of the indictment/information. (Document originally filed under seal on 8/12/11) (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)






 




Hector Xavier Monsegur 5 – Northern District of Georgia






ECF






U.S. District Court

Southern District of New York (Foley Square)

CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:11-cr-00695-LAP-1







Case title: USA v. Monsegur

Date Filed: 08/12/2011






 








Assigned to: Judge Loretta A. Preska





Defendant (1)




Hector Xavier Monsegur

also known as

Sealed Defendant 1		





Pending Counts


Disposition




18:1030A.F FRAUD ACTIVITY CONNECTED WITH COMPUTERS (COMPUTER INTRUSION FURTHERING FRAUD)

(1)		







Highest Offense Level (Opening)




Felony





Terminated Counts


Disposition




None





Highest Offense Level (Terminated)




None





Complaints


Disposition




None






 









Plaintiff




USA
represented by
James J. Pastore , Jr 

U.S. Attorney’s Office, SDNY (St Andw’s)

One St. Andrew’s Plaza

New York, NY 10007

(212) 637-2418

Fax: (212) 637-2937

Email: James.Pastore@usdoj.gov

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED		






 






Date Filed
#
Docket Text




08/12/2011
1
CONSENT TO TRANSFER JURISDICTION (Rule 20) from the United States District Court – District of ND GEORGIA; by Sealed Defendant 1 (1) count(s) 1. (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
2
Order to Unseal Case as to Sealed Defendant 1. (Signed by Judge Loretta A. Preska on 3/5/12)(jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012

Case Designated ECF as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
3
RULE 20 DOCUMENTS RECEIVED as to Hector Xavier Monsegur transferred from the United States District Court – District of ND Georgia, Case Number: 11cr379. The following documents were received: Certified copy of the indictment/information. (jm) Modified on 3/6/2012 (jm). (Documents originally received 8/12/11) (Entered: 03/06/2012)






 




Hector Xavier Monsegur 6 – Eastern District of Virginia






ECF






U.S. District Court

Southern District of New York (Foley Square)

CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:11-cr-00696-LAP-1







Case title: USA v. Monsegur

Date Filed: 08/12/2011






 








Assigned to: Judge Loretta A. Preska





Defendant (1)




Hector Xavier Monsegur

also known as

Sealed Defendant 1		





Pending Counts


Disposition




18:1030A.F FRAUD ACTIVITY CONNECTED WITH COMPUTERS (COMPUTER INTRUSION FURTHERING FRAUD)

(1)		







Highest Offense Level (Opening)




Felony





Terminated Counts


Disposition




None





Highest Offense Level (Terminated)




None





Complaints


Disposition




None






 









Plaintiff




USA
represented by
James J. Pastore , Jr 

U.S. Attorney’s Office, SDNY (St Andw’s)

One St. Andrew’s Plaza

New York, NY 10007

(212) 637-2418

Fax: (212) 637-2937

Email: James.Pastore@usdoj.gov

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED		






 






Date Filed
#
Docket Text




03/06/2012
1
CONSENT TO TRANSFER JURISDICTION (Rule 20) from the United States District Court – District of ED Virginia; by Sealed Defendant 1 (1) count(s) 1. (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
2
Order to Unseal Case as to Sealed Defendant 1. (Signed by Judge Loretta A. Preska on 3/5/12)(jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012

Case Designated ECF as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
3
RULE 20 DOCUMENTS RECEIVED as to Hector Xavier Monsegur transferred from the United States District Court – District of ED Virginia, Case Number: 11CR381. The following documents were received: Certified copy of the indictment/information, certified copy of the docket sheet, and letter of acknowledgment. (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
4
Order to Unseal Document as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. ORDERED that all records and proceedings, including copies of pleadings and transcripts, associated with the cases with docket numbers S1 11 Cr. 666 (LAP), 11 Cr. 693 (LAP) 1 11 Cr. 694 (LAP) 1 11 Cr. 695 (LAP), 11 Cr. 696 (LAP) 1 and 11 Mag. 1509, which had by previous order of this Court been sealed and captioned as United States v. John Doe, be unsealed and captioned under their true names. It is further ORDERED that this unsealing order shall be effective 9:00a.m. on March 6, 2012. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Loretta A. Preska on 3/5/12)(jw) (Entered: 03/06/2012)






 




Ryan Ackroyd




U.S. District Court

Southern District of New York (Foley Square)

CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:12-cr-00185-UA-1







Case title: USA v. Ackroyd et al

Date Filed: 02/27/2012






 








Assigned to: Judge Unassigned





Defendant (1)




Ryan Ackroyd

also known as

Sealed Defendant 1

also known as

Kayla

also known as

lol

also known as

lolspoon		





Pending Counts


Disposition




18:1030A.F FRAUD ACTIVITY CONNECTED WITH COMPUTERS (CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT COMPUTER INTRUSION CAUSING DAMAGE)

(1-2)		







Highest Offense Level (Opening)




Felony





Terminated Counts


Disposition




None





Highest Offense Level (Terminated)




None





Complaints


Disposition




None






 









Plaintiff




USA
represented by
Thomas G. A. Brown 

U.S. Attorney’s Office, SDNY (St Andw’s)

One St. Andrew’s Plaza

New York, NY 10007

2126372200

Fax: 718-4221718

Email: thomas.ga.brown@usdoj.gov

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED		






 






Date Filed
#
Docket Text




02/27/2012
2
SEALED INDICTMENT as to Sealed Defendant 1 (1) count(s) 1-2, Sealed Defendant 2 (2) count(s) 1-2, Sealed Defendant 3 (3) count(s) 1-2, Sealed Defendant 4 (4) count(s) 1. (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




02/28/2012
1
SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault. (mps) (Entered: 02/28/2012)




03/05/2012
3
Order to Unseal Indictment as to Sealed Defendant 1, Sealed Defendant 2, Sealed Defendant 3, Sealed Defendant 4. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis on 3/5/12)(jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)






 


 




Jake Davis


 




U.S. District Court

Southern District of New York (Foley Square)

CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:12-cr-00185-UA-2







Case title: USA v. Ackroyd et al

Date Filed: 02/27/2012






 








Assigned to: Judge Unassigned





Defendant (2)




Jake Davis 

also known as

Sealed Defendant 2

also known as

topiary

also known as

atopiary		





Pending Counts


Disposition




18:1030A.F FRAUD ACTIVITY CONNECTED WITH COMPUTERS (CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT COMPUTER INTRUSION CAUSING DAMAGE)

(1-2)		







Highest Offense Level (Opening)




Felony





Terminated Counts


Disposition




None





Highest Offense Level (Terminated)




None





Complaints


Disposition




None






 









Plaintiff




USA
represented by
Thomas G. A. Brown 

U.S. Attorney’s Office, SDNY (St Andw’s)

One St. Andrew’s Plaza

New York, NY 10007

2126372200

Fax: 718-4221718

Email: thomas.ga.brown@usdoj.gov

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED		






 






Date Filed
#
Docket Text




02/27/2012
2
SEALED INDICTMENT as to Sealed Defendant 1 (1) count(s) 1-2, Sealed Defendant 2 (2) count(s) 1-2, Sealed Defendant 3 (3) count(s) 1-2, Sealed Defendant 4 (4) count(s) 1. (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/05/2012
3
Order to Unseal Indictment as to Sealed Defendant 1, Sealed Defendant 2, Sealed Defendant 3, Sealed Defendant 4. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis on 3/5/12)(jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)






 




Darren Martyn


 




U.S. District Court

Southern District of New York (Foley Square)

CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:12-cr-00185-UA-3







Case title: USA v. Ackroyd et al

Date Filed: 02/27/2012






 








Assigned to: Judge Unassigned





Defendant (3)




Darren Martyn

also known as

Sealed Defendant 3

also known as

pwnsauce

also known as

reapsauce

also known as

networkkitten		





Pending Counts


Disposition




18:1030A.F FRAUD ACTIVITY CONNECTED WITH COMPUTERS (CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT COMPUTER INTRUSION CAUSING DAMAGE)

(1-2)		







Highest Offense Level (Opening)




Felony





Terminated Counts


Disposition




None





Highest Offense Level (Terminated)




None





Complaints


Disposition




None






 









Plaintiff




USA
represented by
Thomas G. A. Brown 

U.S. Attorney’s Office, SDNY (St Andw’s)

One St. Andrew’s Plaza

New York, NY 10007

2126372200

Fax: 718-4221718

Email: thomas.ga.brown@usdoj.gov

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED		






 






Date Filed
#
Docket Text




02/27/2012
2
SEALED INDICTMENT as to Sealed Defendant 1 (1) count(s) 1-2, Sealed Defendant 2 (2) count(s) 1-2, Sealed Defendant 3 (3) count(s) 1-2, Sealed Defendant 4 (4) count(s) 1. (jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/05/2012
3
Order to Unseal Indictment as to Sealed Defendant 1, Sealed Defendant 2, Sealed Defendant 3, Sealed Defendant 4. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis on 3/5/12)(jm) (Entered: 03/06/2012)






 




Donncha O’Cearrbhail


Filings in this case were not released.


 




U.S. District Court

Southern District of New York (Foley Square)

CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:12-mj-00609-UA-1







Case title: USA v. O’Cearrbhail

Date Filed: 03/05/2012






 








Assigned to: Judge Unassigned





Defendant (1)




Donncha O’Cearrbhail

also known as

palladium

also known as

polonium

also known as

anonsacco		





Pending Counts


Disposition




None





Highest Offense Level (Opening)




None





Terminated Counts


Disposition




None





Highest Offense Level (Terminated)




None





Complaints


Disposition




18:2511:INTERCEPTION AND DISCLOSURE OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS.








 









Plaintiff




USA
represented by
Thomas G. A. Brown 

U.S. Attorney’s Office, SDNY (St Andw’s)

One St. Andrew’s Plaza

New York, NY 10007

2126372200

Fax: 718-4221718

Email: thomas.ga.brown@usdoj.gov		






 






Date Filed
#
Docket Text




03/05/2012
1
COMPLAINT as to Donncha O’Cearrbhail (1) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2511 & 2. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis) (gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
3
AMENDED COMPLAINT as to Donncha O’Cearrbhail in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2511 & 2. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis) (gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
4
UNSEALING ORDER as to Donncha O’Cearrbhail…that the Complaint and Arrest Warrant in this matter be unsealed effective 9:00 a.m. on March 6, 2012. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis on 3/6/2012)(gq) (Entered: 03/06/2012)






 



























	


	



			
				


			

			
Confidential – Cryptome – USA v. Hector Xavier Monsegur EDVA
		
	
	

		
SA v. Hector Xavier Monsegur EDVA


 








CLOSED






U.S. District Court

Eastern District of Virginia – (Alexandria)

CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:11-cr-00381-TSE-1







Case title: USA v. Monsegur

Date Filed: 08/04/2011

Date Terminated: 08/08/2011		






 








Assigned to: District Judge T. S. Ellis, III





Defendant (1)




Hector Xavier Monsegur

TERMINATED: 08/08/2011		





Pending Counts


Disposition




None





Highest Offense Level (Opening)




None





Terminated Counts


Disposition




18:1030(a)(5)(A), 1030(c)(4)(B)(i)&2 Computer Fraud

(1)		

Rule 20





Highest Offense Level (Terminated)




Felony





Complaints


Disposition




None






 









Plaintiff




USA
represented by
John Frank Eisinger 

US Attorney’s Office (Alexandria)

2100 Jamieson Avenue

Alexandria, VA 22314

(703) 299-3906

Fax: (703) 299-3981

Email: ausa@eisinger.net

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED		






 






Date Filed
#
Docket Text




08/04/2011
1
INFORMATION as to Hector Xavier Monsegur (1) count(s) 1. (krob, ) (Entered: 08/05/2011)




08/04/2011
2
Redacted Criminal Case Cover Sheet (krob, ) (Entered: 08/05/2011)




08/04/2011
4
NOTICE by USA as to Hector Xavier Monsegur (krob, ) (Entered: 08/05/2011)




08/04/2011
5
NON-CONFIDENTIAL Memorandum by USA as to Hector Xavier Monsegur (krob, ) (Entered: 08/05/2011)




08/04/2011
6
MOTION to Seal Case by USA as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. (krob, ) (Entered: 08/05/2011)




08/04/2011
7
ORDER granting 6 Motion to Seal Case as to Hector Xavier Monsegur (1). Signed by District Judge T. S. Ellis, III on 8/4/11. (krob, ) (Entered: 08/05/2011)




08/08/2011
8
CONSENT TO TRANSFER JURISDICTION (Rule 20) to Southern District of New York Counts closed as to Hector Xavier Monsegur (1) Count 1. (krob, ) (Entered: 08/09/2011)




03/06/2012
9
Motion by USA as to Hector Xavier Monsegur. (jcor) (Entered: 03/06/2012)




03/06/2012
10
UNSEALING ORDER that this case will be unsealed as to Hector Xavier Monsegur.

Signed by District Judge T. S. Ellis, III on 3/6/2012. (jcor) (Entered: 03/06/2012)		






 


 



















	


	



			
				


			

			
Confidential from Cryptome – UK Parliament Reveals Mark Burby Super-Injunction 2
		
	
	

		
A sends:


Re: http://cryptome.org/2012/01/mark-burby.htm


There has been one further development in the matter of the Mark Burby super-injunction. Yesterday the High Court published online its judgment in the privacy case at the heart of Burby’s evidence to Parliament:


WXY -v- Henry Gewanter, Positive Profile Ltd & Mark Burbyhttp://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/judgments/2012/wxy-judgment-06032012


The judgment follows from a hearing in July 2011 and finds against Burby in that it prevents him from publicising the allegations covered in his evidence to Parliament.


The other defendants are Henry Gewanter, a PR consultant, and his agency Positive Profile. Gewanter and his agency were engaged by Burby in 2009.


(Gewanter was also the middleman who passed on details of MPs’ expenses to the Daily Telegraph in 2009. The expenses story was a big scandal in the UK, and a journalistic coup for the Telegraph. The Gewanter connection may explain the Telegraph’s particular interest in this case.)


The principals are anonymised in the High Court judgment, but for reference:


— ‘WXY’ / ‘Claimant’ is Mariam Abdul Aziz and the ‘Head of State’ is the Sultan of Brunei.– ‘X’ is Michael McGurk. McGurk apparently made tape recordings of conversations in which some of the allegations were made and passed them to Burby. These are referred to in the judgment as the ‘Jersey Tapes’.


— ‘M’ is a man named Amr Hendawy, apparently an Egyptian national. (Usenet postings from January 2008, linking Mariam Aziz and Amr Hendawy, have been removed by Google following a legal complaint.)


The High Court judgment covers the same ground as Burby’s evidence but does provide a few additional threads to pull.


Central to the case against Burby is that during 2009 he set up a website to publicise some of the allegations. That website is referred to in the judgment only as ‘A’.


By the time of the hearings in 2011 website ‘A’ had been taken down. Ironically, that seems to have counted against Burby. The injunction has been upheld in part because: “the information has not entered the public domain so as to render it is no longer private and confidential. It still retains ‘the basic attribute of inaccessibility’. It is not public property or public knowledge.”


Website ‘A’ was previously at the domain royallyshafted.co.uk. (According to the Nominet whois record, this domain remains registered to sixbynine, a Jersey-based media company controlled by the Burbys.)


From May through July 2009 the website was also linked to a Twitter account [at]royallyshafted. Tweets to that Twitter account (from May to July 2009) are still online; several mention the Sultan of Brunei.


Although the royallyshafted.co.uk website itself is no longer active, ‘snapshots’ of the homepage remain in the Wayback Machine archive at:


http://wayback.archive.org/web/*/http://royallyshafted.co.uk/*


Although some of Burby’s posts have been lost, the Wayback Machine snapshots enable retrieval of ten posts from May and June 2009 as well as the headers of other posts from April 2009. I have attached a verbatim copy of those posts and headers.


http://cryptome.org/2012/03/burby-Royally_Shafted_1.pdf 

http://cryptome.org/2012/03/burby-Royally_Shafted_2.pdf


Most of the posts concern Burby’s attempts to collect on an earlier civil judgment against a member of the Sultan’s family. However there is one post provocatively titled ‘Brunei Royals agent supports 911 attack’.


 



















	


	



			
				


			

			
Cryptome – STRATFOR Hacked Update 7
		
	
	

		
Anonymous allegedly releases “5 million” (not substantiated) Stratfor emails through WikiLeaks:


http://wikileaks.org/the-gifiles.html


John Young @Cryptomeorg


@AnonymousIRC @wikileaks Great show! Will the full raw emails be released as promised by Anonymous to legitimate media-ized spoon-feeding?


 




Summary of releases of STRATFOR documents, subscribers’ firm names and personal information (including addresses, telephone numbers, credit card numbers and passwords), latest release at top:


STRATFOR Hacked Update 6


30 December 2011. A writes that five Pastebin posts of recovered STRATFOR passwords have been removed as indicated below. In addition, four files from sources have been removed from Rapid Share (1) and Wikisend (3).


29 December 2011.


Lulzxmas Dumps 860,000 STRATFOR Accounts: 


http://pastebin.com/f7jYf5Wdhttp://www.megaupload.com/?d=O5P03RXK


28 December 2011.


Prepping for the Stratfor 5M Email Release


http://pastebin.com/Qsqpsr6thttp://piratenpad.de/Stratfor


27 December 2011.


http://pastebin.com/78MUAaeZ [Now removed]


These are 28517 of 53281 (54%) passwords from the list of STRATFOR customer accounts cracked.Part 1/3: http://pastebin.com/CdD92fJG [Now removed]


Part 2/3: http://pastebin.com/AcwQgHmF [Now removed]


Part 3/3: http://pastebin.com/78MUAaeZ [Now removed]


26 December 2011. Firms and personal first names beginning with “D” through “My” (~ 30,000).


http://pastebin.com/q5kXd7Fdhttps://rapidshare.com/#!download|44tl6|2444489251|STRATFOR_full_d_m.txt.gz|3255|

R~7B8842ED6343CEAE67A23C094E131679|0|0 [Now removed]


And 25,000 IT work tickets:


http://www.verzend.be/s8v8ccig12hp/it.tar.gz.html


26 December 2011. Sample Stratfor.com email:


http://pastebin.com/HmDs0EM4“just a small preview of the mayhem to come. 1 out of 2.7 million”


26 December 2011. STRATFOR leaked accounts (10257 passwords recovered)


http://pastebin.com/CdD92fJG [Now removed]


25 December 2011. Firms and personal miscellaneous names not in alphabetical order (~13,000):


http://pastebin.com/8v3768Bw[Now removed]http://wikisend.com/download/132838/stratfor_full_misc.txt.gz [Now removed]


25 December 2011. Firms and personal first names beginning with “B-By” through “C-Cz” (~4,000) :


http://pastebin.com/bUqkb9mqhttp://wikisend.com/download/597646/stratfor_full_b.txt.gz [Now removed]


25 December 2011. Firms and personal first names beginning with “A” through “Az” (~ 4,000).


http://pastebin.com/bQ2YHDdwhttp://wikisend.com/download/601776/stratfor_full_a.txt.gz [Now removed]


 




25 December 2011. A message allegedly to subscribers from George Friedman, Stratfor, was posted to Facebook and Pastebin (below).


25 December 2011. A paste today denying Anonymous role:


http://pastebin.com/8yrwyNkt


And, Stratfor’s A client list of passwords:


http://pastebin.com/5H33nPEK


 




24 December 2011


STRATFOR Hacked


Related:


http://pastebin.com/8MtFze0shttp://pastebin.com/CAWDEW8G


 




A sends:


Subject: Important Announcement from STRATFOR

Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2011 19:49:58 -0500

From: STRATFOR <mail[at]response.stratfor.com>


Dear Stratfor Member,


We have learned that Stratfor’s web site was hacked by an unauthorized party. As a result of this incident the operation of Stratfor’s servers and email have been suspended.


We have reason to believe that the names of our corporate subscribers have been posed [sic] on other web sites. We are diligently investigating the extent to which subscriber information may have been obtained.


Stratfor and I take this incident very seriously. Stratfor’s relationship with its members and, in particular, the confidentiality of their subscriber information, are very important to Stratfor and me. We are working closely with law enforcement in their investigation and will assist them with the identification of the individual(s) who are responsible.


Although we are still learning more and the law enforcement investigation is active and ongoing, we wanted to provide you with notice of this incident as quickly as possible. We will keep you updated regarding these matters.


Sincerely,


George Friedman


STRATFOR

221 W. 6th Street, Suite 400

Austin, TX 78701 US

www.stratfor.com


 




http://www.facebook.com/stratfor


http://pastebin.com/6a86QSMM


Dec 25th, 2011


On December 24th an unauthorized party disclosed personally identifiable information and related credit card data of some of our members. We have reason to believe that your personal and credit card data could have been included in the information that was illegally obtained and disclosed.


Also publicly released was a list of our members which the unauthorized party claimed to be Stratfor’s “private clients.” Contrary to this assertion the disclosure was merely a list of some of the members that have purchased our publications and does not comprise a list of individuals or entities that have a relationship with Stratfor beyond their purchase of our subscription-based publications.


We have also retained the services of a leading identity theft protection and monitoring service on behalf of the Stratfor members that have been impacted by these events. Details regarding the services to be provided will be forwarded in a subsequent email that is to be delivered to the impacted members no later than Wednesday, December 28th.


In the interim, precautions that can be taken by you to minimize and prevent the misuse of information which may have been disclosed include the following:


– contact your financial institution and inform them of this incident;


– if you see any unauthorized activity on your accounts promptly notify your financial institution;


– submit a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) by calling 1-877-ID-THEFT (1-877- 438-4338) or online at https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/; and


– contact the three U.S. credit reporting agencies: Equifax (http://www.equifax.com/ or (800) 685-1111), Experian (http://www.experian.com/ or (888) 397-3742), and TransUnion (http://www.transunion.com/ or (800) 888-4213), to obtain a free credit report from each.


Even if you do not find any suspicious activity on your initial credit reports, the FTC recommends that you check your credit reports periodically. Checking your credit reports can help you spot problems and address them quickly.


To ease any concerns you may have about your personal information going forward, we have also retained an experienced outside consultant that specializes in such security matters to bolster our existing efforts on these issues as we work to better serve you. We are on top of the situation and will continue to be vigilant in our implementation of the latest, and most comprehensive, data security measures.


We are also working to restore access to our website and continuing to work closely with law enforcement regarding these matters. We will continue to update you regarding the status of these matters.


Again, my sincerest apologies for this unfortunate incident.


Sincerely,


George Friedman

	


	



			
				


			

			
Unveiled – Asian Head of State knew of 9/11 and funded al-Qaeda
		
	
	

		
A sends:


You may find this of interest, and if so consider publishing a copy of the Burby submission below. It is currently still up on the UK

Parliament website, but lawyers are reportedly threatening diplomatic repercussions.


In brief:


The unnamed ex-wife of an unnamed Asian head of state has a “super-injunction” in effect in the UK, against a businessman named

Mark Burby. Normally that would prevent any mention in the UK media. However Burby recently provided a written submission to a committee in

the UK Parliament, and it has been published under “parliamentary privilege”.


A few days ago the Telegraph newspaper reported the contents of Burby’s submission under the headline “Head of state ‘funded al-Qaeda

and knew of 7/7 terror attacks'”.


It was reported this afternoon that lawyers for the claimant (ex-wife) are now actually trying to persuade Parliament to take down Burby’s

submission “as a matter of extreme urgency” and warning that it will have diplomatic repercussions.


Burby’s submission is quite extraordinary and includes allegations that the unnamed head of state is a “substantial” backer of AQ and had

advance warning of the suicide bombings in London in July 2005. Additionally it covers personal matters likely to embarrass the

principals involved.


The submission itself is not proof of anything of course. However Burby is clearly not a fantasist. In 2005 he was awarded damages of

£50m over a disputed business deal with the family of the head of state. A second businessman under a similar injunction from the same

source was murdered in Australia in 2009.


I’ve included links to Burby’s submission, the Telegraph articles, and supporting older news articles below.


Naming the names:


The “Asian head of state” is Hassanal Bolkiah, the Sultan of Brunei (ostensibly a close ally of the UK).


The claimant is the Sultan’s first ex-wife Mariam Aziz (recipient of the “world’s largest divorce settlement” in 2003).


The murdered businessman is Michael McGurk (shot to death in Sydney in 2009).


Main links:


Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions – Oral and written evidence (see Burby pages 50-79)


http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/Privacy_and_Injunctions/JCPIWrittenEvWeb.pdf


[Cryptome mirror: http://cryptome.org/2012/01/mark-burby-doc.pdf (2.9MB)]


“Head of state ‘funded al-Qaeda and knew of 7/7 terror attacks'” (Telegraph, 25/02/2012)


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/9104424/Head-of-state-funded-al-

Qaeda-and-knew-of-77-terror-attacks.html


“Exclusive: Lawyers order Parliament to stop publishing super-injunction document” (Telegraph, 28/02/2012)


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/9111931/Exclusive-Lawyers-order-

Parliament-to-stop-publishing-super-injunction-document.html


2003 Divorce:


“The world’s largest divorce settlement” (Scotsman, 04/02/2003)


http://www.scotsman.com/news/international/the_world_s_largest_divorce_settlement_1_544213


“Sultan of Brunei to divorce his second wife” (Hello, 06/02/2003)


http://www.hellomagazine.com/royalty/2003/02/06/sultanofbrunei/


2007 Mariam Aziz and the fortune teller (previous injunction attempt):


“Sultan of Brunei’s bid to ‘protect dignity’ fails” (Telegraph, 11/07/2007)


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1557122/Sultan-of-Bruneis-bid-to-protect-dignity-fails.html


“Sultan of Brunei’s ex-wife and the £2m con” (Telegraph, 12/07/2007)


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1557227/Sultan-of-Bruneis-ex-wife-and-the-2m-con.html


2009 Michael McGurk murder and link to Burby:


“Claims that slain businessman wanted to blackmail Sultan” (ABC, 10/09/2009)


http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2009/s2682461.htm


“McGurk ‘planned to blackmail’ Sultan of Brunei” (ABC, 11/09/2009)


http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-09-10/mcgurk-planned-to-blackmail-sultan-of-brunei/1425082


“British property developer claims police protection after Sydney murder” (Guardian, 09/09/2009)


http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/09/mark-burby-police-protection-australia


Hassanal Bolkiah, Sultan of Brunei (Wikipedia entry)


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassanal_Bolkiah

	


	



			
				


			

			
CONFIDENTIAL –  NSA Overview of Cloud Computing
		
	
	

		


 


DOWNLOAD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


nsa-cloud

	


	



			
				


			

			
CRYPTOME – CIA Kabul Chief of Station Named
		
	
	

		
13 February 2012


CIA Kabul Chief of Station Named 


 




A sends:


I recently sorted out the identity of the CIA Kabul chief of station (all through open sources, of course). Apparently no one has reported it on the web yet.


The triggering information was a WSJ article :


http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704741904575409874267832044.html#


which gave a significant bit of information:


“In the chaos of battle in December 2001, a U.S. military officer accidentally ordered a bomb drop on a meeting between Mr. Karzai and other tribal leaders. The chief leapt on Mr. Karzai to shield him”. It also says that “In 2004 he began his first stint as station chief in Kabul”.


A second source to make the link, DCI George Tenet’s memoirs At the Center of the Storm. Tenet call that guy “Greg V.”


I came across this DOS document :


http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/128838.pdf


On p. 71 you find a list of Kabul embassy officials, including an officer for Regional Affairs named Gregory Vogel who arrived there in September 2004.


What are the chances to have two “Greg V.”s arriving at an upper post in this embassy in 2004?  Especially when you know until June 2004 the CIA chief of station was first-named Peter:


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52673-2004Oct21.html


By the way, that guy has been given a lot of surnames:


– in Gary Berntsen Jawbreaker (2005), he is called “Craig.”


– in Sean Naylor Not a Good Day to Die (2004), it is said that he used the noms de guerre “Spider” and “the Wolf”, and was the senior CIA officer in Gardez during operation Anaconda.


– in Eric Blehm, The Only Thing Worth Dying For (2011), he is called “Casper.”


and as said above, George Tenet said almost all when he called him “Greg V.” (as with “Rich B.”)




 











 


http://cryptome.org/2012/01/cia-kabul-cos.htm






	


	



			
				


			

			
CONFIDENTIAL from CRYPTOME – SEAL 10 Statements on McCabe Detainee Assault
		
	
	

		
US Navy SEAL Matthew McCabe (and two others tried separately) was tried and found not guilty in a military court in May 2010 for assaulting a detainee in Iraq.


May 6, 2010″A military jury in Virginia has found a Navy SEAL not guilty on charges of punching a suspected Iraqi terrorist. Jurors deliberated about an hour and 40 minutes before returning their verdict Thursday in the court-martial of Petty Officer 2nd Class Matthew McCabe. The 24-year-old Perrysburg, Ohio, man was tried at Naval Station Norfolk on accusations of assaulting Ahmed Hashim Abed, who is suspected of plotting the 2004 slayings of four U.S. contractors in Fallujah. The defense suggested throughout the trial that Abed employed a standard terrorist tactic of feigning injury, perhaps even biting his own lip to spill blood onto his clothing.”


The US Navy Criminal Investigative Service took sworn statements about the alleged assault from unit SEAL 10 members serving with McCabe. These were introduced at the trial. The statements:


http://cryptome.org/2012/01/mccabe/mccabe-seal-10.pdf (3.5MB)






Matthew McCabe in Iraq[Image]




SEAL Team[Image]




Matthew McCabe after trial[Image]











 

















	


	



			
				


			

			
UNVEILED – Putin Protest Portraits
		
	
	

		
















[Image]In this Saturday, Feb. 4, 2012 photo, Dmitry Polosov, 25, a scientist, holds a poster reading “for the honor society, for responsible for every act, for freedom of knowledge, for good in the hearts, for love in the minds” as he poses in front of a white canvas placed in the middle of the crowd at a massive protest against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s rule in Bolotnaya square in Moscow. Despite temperatures plunging to minus 20 C (minus 4 F), thousands of Russians took to the streets of Moscow to challenge Putin’s bid.




[Image]In this Saturday, Feb. 4, 2012 photo, Tatyana Lazareva, 46, a television presenter, holds a poster reading “move on to the next level” as she poses in front of a white canvas placed in the middle of the crowd at a massive protest against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s rule in Bolotnaya square in Moscow.




[Image]In this Saturday, Feb. 4, 2012 photo, Vyacheslav Barannikov, 38, an engineer, wears a white ribbon reading “For Russia without Putin” as he poses in front of a white canvas placed in the middle of the crowd at a massive protest against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s rule in Bolotnaya square in Moscow.




[Image]In this Saturday, Feb. 4, 2012 photo, Yekaterina, 26, a translator, wears a scarf with the name of presidential contender Mikhail Prokhorov as she poses in front of a white canvas placed in the middle of the crowd at a massive protest against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s rule in Bolotnaya square in Moscow.




[Image]In this Saturday, Feb. 4, 2012 photo, Kirill, 26, a scientist, wears a scarf with the name of presidential contender Mikhail Prokhorov as he poses in front of a white canvas placed in the middle of the crowd at a massive protest against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s rule in Bolotnaya square in Moscow.




[Image]In this Saturday, Feb. 4, 2012 photo, Nina Lipkina, 53, unemployed, poses in front of a white canvas placed in the middle of the crowd at a massive protest against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s rule in Bolotnaya square in Moscow.




[Image]In this Saturday, Feb. 4, 2012 photo, Gennady, 73, a pensioner, poses in front of a white canvas placed in the middle of the crowd at a massive protest against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s rule in Bolotnaya square in Moscow.




[Image]In this Saturday, Feb. 4, 2012 photo, Yana Romanova, 35, a designer, wears a white ribbon reading “For Russia without Putin” as she poses in front of a white canvas placed in the middle of the crowd at a massive protest against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s rule in Bolotnaya square in Moscow.




[Image]In this Saturday, Feb. 4, 2012 photo, Artur Gazarov, 43, wears a white ribbon reading “For Russia without Putin” as he poses in front of a white canvas placed in the middle of the crowd at a massive protest against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s rule in Bolotnaya square in Moscow.




[Image]In this Saturday, Feb. 4, 2012 photo, Liliya Pevter, 62, a pensioner, poses in front of a white canvas placed in the middle of the crowd at a massive protest against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s rule in Bolotnaya square in Moscow.




[Image]In this Saturday, Feb. 4, 2012 photo, Igor German, 23, an engineer, poses in front of a white canvas placed in the middle of the crowd at a massive protest against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s rule in Bolotnaya square in Moscow.




[Image]In this Saturday, Feb. 4, 2012 photo, Mikhail Shats, 46, an actor, poses in front of a white canvas placed in the middle of the crowd at a massive protest against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s rule in Bolotnaya square in Moscow.




[Image]In this Saturday, Feb. 4, 2012 photo, Dima Kuzmich, 29, a bank employee, poses in front of a white canvas placed in the middle of the crowd at a massive protest against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s rule in Bolotnaya square in Moscow.











 


































	


	



			
				


			

			
DIE HANDELSBLATT-GRUPPE ÜBER DIE NEO-STASI STALKER UND SERIEN-RUFMÖRDER DER “GoMoPa”
		
	
	

		
http://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/boerse-maerkte/boerse-inside/marktgeruechte-finanzaufsicht-untersucht-kursachterbahn-bei-wirecard/3406252.html


 

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET –  National Cyber Security Division Joint Cybersecurity Services Pilot (JCSP)
		
	
	

		
DOWNLOAD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


0080


 

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Slovak Spying Agency Document
		
	
	

		
A sends:


This leaked document codenamed Gorilla [1, 2] was allegedly prepared by the Slovak intelligence agency (SIS). SIS found significant influence by the Penta Financial Group on senior Slovak politicians between 2005 and 2006 (Dzurinda gov’t). Penta claims that the online publication of classified document by the webmasters and other news media violates criminal law and threatens to take legal action against them [3].


Links:


[1] http://dl.dropbox.com/u/51238188/gorila.txt [SK] Cryptome mirror: http://cryptome.org/2012/01/0045.txt


[2] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1giBimg_c1JOngOMKiSCmmtr656PG22q3ZDe63MQtKz4/edit?pli=1 [SK]

Cryptome mirror: http://cryptome.org/2012/01/0046.zip


[3] http://web.volny.cz/noviny/pel-mel/clanek/~volny/IDC/195631/penta-hrozi-zalobami-kvuli-gorile-tlaci-na-

weby-aby-udajny-korupcni-spis-nezverejnovaly.html [CZ]


[4] http://www.praguepost.cz/news/11701-region-gorilla-case-grips-slovakia.html [EN] 


[5] http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/44951/10/former_police_officer_confirms_information_contained_in_gorilla_document.html [EN]

	


	



			
				


			

			
UNCENSORED – Anti-SOPA PIPA Protest NYC Photos
		
	
	

		
















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CRYPTOME – FBI OpenBSD Backdoors and RSA Cipher Vulnerability
		
	
	

		
From: Gregory Perry <Gregory.Perry[at]govirtual.tv>

Subject: Follow up to OpenBSD Crypto Framework Backdoors Thread

Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2012 01:57:39 +0000


Here is a follow up to the FBI / OpenBSD / OCF encryption backdoors thread as promised.  We had a three alarm fire at our house over the Christmas holidays and I am just now getting plugged back in.


1) At ~1997 or thereabouts, the FBI approached a fellow by the name of Lew Jenkins, the Chairman and CEO of Premenos Technology Corp., about their development of an Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) software suite used for corp-to-corp EDI transactions called “Templar”.


2) At that point in time encryption technology (especially public key encryption algorithms) were still considered munitions by the United States government, and presumably the FBI was interested in Premenos research related to key escrow and session recovery of RSA-encrypted communication sessions.


3) A portion of Mr. Jenkins’ research was conducted with a Ecuadorian national that provided Premenos with at least one mathematical vulnerability in the RSA encryption algorithm related to changing the base numbering system of the resulting RSA modulus after a block of plaintext had been encrypted.  Mr. Jenkins and Premenos also maintained extensive contacts with the Crown of England, including prominent English Lords involved with Internet communications technology.


4) One of the investors in Premenos was a fellow by the name of Ross Pirasteh, who was either the Prime Minister of Finance for the Shah of Iran or actually the Shah of Iran himself.  As the story goes, Ross and his family were snuck out of Iran rolled up in Persian rugs just prior to or during the 1979 revolution headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini; once Ross and his family emigrated to the United States, the FBI gave him and his family new identities for obvious reasons.  I initially met Ross in the early 90s from a GPS-based automobile tracking project (nonmilitary-grade GPS), and in 1995 I gave him some information about Templar and he became an investor in Premenos shortly thereafter.


5) In 1999 I co-founded a computer security engineering firm with Ken Ammon and Jerry Harold, Network Security Technologies Inc. (NETSEC).  Ken was the CEO, Jerry was the COO, I was the CTO.  Ken and Jerry were high rank and file ex-NSA InfoSec employees and had extensive contacts in the DoD and federal government; we offered managed network security, penetration testing, vulnerability analysis, and reverse engineering services to the federal government and private sector.


6) NETSEC’s first investor was Ross Pirasteh, he provided a bridge loan to get the company started.  The first friends family fools round of Preferred A investment was via a Boca Raton angel syndicate that I believe Ross had introduced to Ken and his wife, but I was not privy to those details.


7) Our first intended product was an ATM-based high speed embedded network security appliance that was to be placed on customer networks for remote network protocol analysis, surveillance, and intrusion detection and prevention.  Each hardware appliance would be monitored from a cryptographically accelerated encrypted VPN tunnel from the NETSEC NOC, and I designed the initial NOC prototype and network management system.  For the embedded hardware appliance development and contract manufacturing process, I hired Doug Bostrom and Wayne Mitzen, two very talented EE-types that had worked for Ross at a previous venture in Boston related to wireless telemetry (for example, U.S. Patent 6,208,266).


8) During that development effort I approached Theo de Raadt of the OpenBSD project about funding and implementing real-time preemptive POSIX-complaint threads capability to the OpenBSD operating system, instead of using a VxWorks RTOS due to Wind River’s exorbitant licensing costs (OpenBSD and the BSD license were free and unencumbered of patents).  NETSEC provided the OpenBSD Project with hardware and funding to implement the beginning stages of the OpenBSD Cryptographic Framework, based on a HiFN line of cryptographic accelerators that were eventually worked into the OpenBSD kernel and OCF (our first choice was BroadCom, but Ken had connections at HiFN so that was the initial chipset used with the OCF).  x86-based hardware in the late 90s simply could not handle the computational effort required for high speed FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 compliant DES and 3DES encryption, so a dedicated crypto processor was needed to support ATM+ wire speeds.


9) Shortly thereafter, NETSEC started a project with the GSA called the GSA Technical Support Center .  The GSA Technical Support Center was a joint FBI and DoD collaboration to provide reverse engineering and cryptanalytic services to federal government and military components.  The project lead was FBI executive Ron Bitner (or at least that’s the name he gave me), and the GSA representative tasked with funding the project was Dave Jarrell.  When I started working on the project I voiced concerns to Ken about the demarcation point between the FBI and DoD (or lack thereof), which at the time was a fairly egregious violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.  Ken’s answer was that Multi Level Security (MLS) systems such as Trusted Solaris would be used to share information of varying classification levels between the FBI and DoD to preserve the age old separation between the military and civil government, but I saw the proverbial writing on the wall and didn’t want to participate in the project any longer.


10) Later in the year I resigned my position at NETSEC during a company-wide meeting, and went on to start an embedded wireless bandwidth management company.  I had a two year non-compete with NETSEC so I couldn’t work in security any longer at that time.


Obviously there is a lot more to this story than a one page synopsis, but I think what is important to make mention of is the close nexus between supposedly unfriendly governments such as Iran and the US.  In 1995 the FBI was adamantly against any relaxation of encryption export regulations, yet they did an abrupt about-face on the issue in 1999 (for example,


http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/11/business/technology-easing-on-software-exports-has-limits.html

?scp=1&sq=Gregory%20Perry%20encryption&st=cse).


I personally believe that the FBI, or at least certain officials within the administration at that time, willingly advocated the relaxation of encryption export regulations only due to their discovery of critical vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the RSA encryption algorithm not exhibited by the predominant public key encryption method used at the time which was Diffie-Hellman.  Of equal interest was RSA Security’s decision to not pursue an extension of the RSA patent after its 20-year expiration, which they could have easily obtained on national security grounds.  They simply waived their rights and let RSA become an open and public domain standard despite their significant revenues in licensing of the RSA encryption algorithm in the USA based on U.S. Patent 4,405,829.


If any of this conjecture is the case, then it could reasonably be said that the FBI intentionally – and very seriously – weakened the United States critical infrastructure and our military capabilities by advocating the use of a fundamentally weak encryption algorithm as a tradeoff between US National Security and their need to observe domestic communications in the United States.  This of course has serious implications for any technology predicated upon the RSA encryption algorithm and its progeny, such as military grade GPS which uses RSA for weapons targeting, military smart card technology such as the Common Access Card, commercial smart card technologies used in RFID and contactless payment solutions, etc.  Most of these standards are now literally set in stone insofar as embedded systems are concerned, and the vast majority of OpenBSD / OCF installations are embedded-based without an upgrade path due to the small footprint of OpenBSD and the BSD licensing scheme used by the OpenBSD project.  Literally millions (and potentially hundreds of millions) of OpenBSD installations are out there in the embedded space such as routers, firewalls, VPN devices etc, and this goes without mentioning the many other operating systems that have incorporated the OpenBSD OCF and PF firewalling stack without any audit of the source code based on the security and reputation inherent to the OpenBSD Project.


Let me know if you have any other questions, and Happy 2012 to you and Cryptome.


Gregory Perry


 


 

	


	



			
				


			

			
Post-Hacking – Stratfor Back Online
		
	
	

		
Stratfor.com 2012-Jan-11-12:08:


[Image]


Several of the Stratfor.com links below do not work, perhaps because of the sneaky subscriber-tracking code contained.




A sends:


Hello, looks like stratfor is back.


———- Forwarded message ———-

From: Stratfor <mail@response.stratfor.com>

Date: 2012/1/11

Subject: Stratfor: Back online + new Geopolitical Weekly



Watch this video of George Friedman on the hacking incident


More info on the attack

Dear Stratfor Member,


We are happy to announce that our website is back online. Visit Stratfor.com to view our 2012 Annual Forecast, as well as fresh analyses on Syria, Iraq and Lithuania and our Geopolitical Diary.


Below you will find a special edition of the Geopolitical Weekly by George Friedman on Stratfor’s security breach.


We may experience brief service interruptions as we work to handle the high level of interest in the new website. If you have trouble connecting to the new site, please check back again soon.


While we continue to rebuild our infrastructure and website capabilities, you will be able to access our content online without having to log in. We are aggressively implementing our plan to reintegrate customers securely, as this is our top priority. In the next several days, we will be informing you about how to establish a new password and update your billing information. In the meantime, visit our website to read fresh content every day.


We deeply regret that an unauthorized party illegally obtained and disclosed the credit card data of some of you. We are making certain that this will never happen again by having a third party with appropriate security safeguards handle all credit card transactions in the future. We hope that you have taken advantage of the CSID identity protection service we have provided.


We understand that you have many questions. Check out www.stratfor.com/hacking-news, a website we’ve created to give you a full rundown of the incident and our plan to address your concerns.


Please contact us at feedback@stratfor.com with any questions, as well as any comments you may have on the Geopolitical Weekly below.


Thank you again for your patience as we work to secure our website and resume normal operations.

– The Stratfor Team


Geopolitical Weekly: The Hack on Stratfor

By George Friedman | January 11, 2012


In early December I received a call from Fred Burton, Stratfor’s Vice President of Intelligence. He told me he had received information indicating our website had been hacked and our customer credit card and other information had been stolen. The following morning I met with an FBI special agent, who made clear that there was an ongoing investigation and asked for our cooperation. We, of course, agreed to cooperate. The matter remains under active investigation.


From the beginning I faced a dilemma. I felt bound to protect our customers, who quickly had to be informed about the compromise of their privacy. I also felt bound to protect the investigation. That immediate problem was solved when the FBI told us it had informed the various credit card companies and had provided those companies with a list of compromised cards while omitting that it had come from us. Our customers were therefore protected, as the credit card companies knew the credit cards and other information had been stolen and could act to protect the customers. We were not compelled to undermine the investigation.


The FBI made it clear that it expected the theft to be exposed by the hackers. We were under no illusion that this was going to be kept secret. We knew our reputation would be damaged by the revelation, all the more so because we had not encrypted the credit card files. This was a failure on our part. As the founder and CEO of Stratfor, I take responsibility for this failure, which has created hardship for customers and friends, and I deeply regret that it took place. The failure originated in the rapid growth of the company. As it grew, the management team and administrative processes didn’t grow with it. Again, I regret that this occurred and want to assure everyone that Stratfor is taking aggressive steps to deal with the problem and ensure that it doesn’t happen again.


From the beginning, it was not clear who the attackers were. The term “Anonymous” is the same as the term “unknown.” The popular vision of Anonymous is that its members are young and committed to an ideology. I have no idea if this is true. As in most affairs like this, those who know don’t talk; those who talk don’t know. I have my theories, which are just that and aren’t worth sharing.


I was prepared for the revelation of the theft and the inevitable criticism and negative publicity. We worked to improve our security infrastructure within the confines of time and the desire to protect the investigation by not letting the attackers know that we knew of their intrusion. With the credit card information stolen, I assumed that the worst was done. I was wrong.


Early in the afternoon of Dec. 24, I was informed that our website had been hacked again. The hackers published a triumphant note on our homepage saying that credit card information had been stolen, that a large amount of email had been taken, and that four of our servers had been effectively destroyed along with data and backups. We had expected they would announce the credit card theft. We were dismayed that emails had been taken. But our shock was at the destruction of our servers. This attack was clearly designed to silence us by destroying our records and the website, unlike most attacks by such groups.


Attacks against credit cards are common, our own failures notwithstanding. So are the thefts of emails. But the deliberate attack on our digital existence was a different order of magnitude. As the global media marveled at our failure to encrypt credit card information, my attention was focused on trying to understand why anyone would want to try to silence us.


In the days that followed, a narrative evolved among people claiming to speak for Anonymous and related groups. It started with looking at our subscriber list and extracting corporate subscribers who were now designated as clients. The difference between clients and subscribers is important here. A client is someone you do customized work for. A subscriber is simply someone who purchases a publication, unchanged from what others read. A subscriber of The New York Times is not its client. Nevertheless, some of the media started referring to these subscribers as clients, reflecting the narrative of those claiming to speak with knowledge of our business.


From there, the storyline grew to argue that these “clients,” corporate and government, provided Stratfor with classified intelligence that we reviewed. We were no longer an organization that analyzed the world for the interested public, but rather a group of incompetents and, conversely, the hub of a global conspiracy. The media focused on the first while the hacking community focused on the second.


This was why they stole our email, according to some of them. As one person said, the credit cards were extra, something they took when they realized they could. It was our email they were after. Obviously, we were not happy to see our emails taken. God knows what a hundred employees writing endless emails might say that is embarrassing, stupid or subject to misinterpretation. What will not appear is classified intelligence from corporations or governments. They may find, depending on what they took, that we have sources around the world, as you might expect. It is interesting that the hacker community is split, with someone claiming to speak for the official Anonymous condemning the hack as an attack on the media, which they don’t sanction, and another faction defending it as an attack on the rich and powerful.


The interpretation of the hackers as to who we are — if indeed that was their interpretation — was so wildly off base as to stretch credulity. Of course, we know who we are. As they search our emails for signs of a vast conspiracy, they will be disappointed. Of course we have relationships with people in the U.S. and other governments and obviously we know people in corporations, and that will be discovered in the emails. But that’s our job. We are what we said we were: an organization that generates its revenues through geopolitical analysis. At the core of our business, we objectively acquire, organize, analyze and distribute information.


I don’t know if the hackers who did this feel remorse as they discover that we aren’t who they said we were. First, I don’t know who they actually are, and second, I don’t know what their motives were. I know only what people claiming to be them say. So I don’t know if there is remorse or if their real purpose was to humiliate and silence us, in which case I don’t know why they wanted that.


And this points to the real problem, the one that goes beyond Stratfor’s own problem. The Internet has become an indispensible part of our lives. We shop, communicate, publish and read on it. It has become the village commons of the planet. But in the village commons of old, neighbors who knew and recognized each other met and lived together. Others knew what they did in the commons, and they were accountable.


In the global commons, anonymity is an option. This is one of the great virtues of the Internet. It is also a terrible weakness. It is possible to commit crimes on the Internet anonymously. The technology that enables the Internet also undermines accountability. Given the profusion of technical knowledge, the integrity of the commons is in the hands of people whose identities we don’t know, whose motives we don’t understand, and whose ability to cause harm is substantial. The consequence of this will not be a glorious anarchy in the spirit of Guy Fawkes, but rather a massive repression. I think this is a pity. That’s why I wonder who the hackers actually are and what cause they serve. I am curious as to whether they realize the whirlwind they are sowing, and whether they, in fact, are trying to generate the repression they say they oppose.


The attempt to silence us failed. Our website is back, though we are waiting for all archives to be restored, and our email is working again. Our failures have been reviewed and are being rectified. We deliberately shut down while we brought in outside consultants to rebuild our system from the ground up. The work isn’t finished yet, but we can start delivering our analyses. The handling of credit cards is being handed off to a third party with appropriate capability to protect privacy. We have acted to help our customers by providing an identity theft prevention service. As always, we welcome feedback from our supporters as well as our critics.


We are fortunate that we have the financial resources and staff commitment to survive the attack. Others might not. We are now in a world in which anonymous judges, jurors and executioners can silence whom they want. Take a look at the list of organizations attacked. If the crushing attack on Stratfor is the new model, we will not be the last. No security system is without flaws even if it is much better than Stratfor’s was.


We certainly expect to be attacked again, as we were last week when emails were sent out to members from a fake Stratfor address including absurd messages and videos. Our attackers seem peculiarly intent on doing us harm beyond what they have already done. This is a new censorship that doesn’t come openly from governments but from people hiding behind masks. Do not think we will be the last or that we have been the first.


We will continue to publish analysis and sell it to those who believe it has value. To our subscribers who have expressed such strong support, we express our deepest gratitude. To our critics, we assure you that nothing you have said about us represents a fraction of what we have said about ourselves. While there is much not to be proud of in this affair, I am proud beyond words of all my dedicated colleagues at Stratfor and am delighted to return our focus to analyzing critical international affairs.


To all, I dedicate myself to denying our attackers the prize they wanted. We are returning to the work we love, dedicated to correcting our mistakes and becoming better than ever in analyzing and forecasting how the world works.


Comments? Send them to feedback@stratfor.com.


Click hereto unsubscribe from future emails.STRATFOR

221 W. 6th Street, Suite 400

Austin, TX 78701 US





	


	



			
				


			

			
Uncensored – Occupy Wall Street Photos 10 January 2012 – Courtesy of Cryptome
		
	
	

		
















[Image]Occupy Wall Street protesters read books in Zuccotti Park, Tuesday, Jan.10, 2012, in New York. Barricades were removed by Brookfield Properties, the owners of the park, allowing access once again into the park by the protesters. (Louis Lanzano)




[Image]Occupy Wall Street protesters gather in Zuccotti Park as security guards stand next to stacks of barricades,Tuesday, Jan. 10, 2012, in New York. The barricades were removed by Brookfield Properties, the owners of the park, allowing access once again into the park by the protesters. (Louis Lanzano)




[Image]Occupy Wall Street protesters make signs in Zuccotti Park, Tuesday, Jan.10, 2012, in New York. Barricades were removed by Brookfield Properties, the owners of the park Tuesday, allowing access once again into the park by the protesters. (Louis Lanzano)




[Image]Police officers guard the perimeter of Zuccotti Park As Occupy Wall Street protesters gather in the park, Tuesday, Jan.10, 2012, in New York. Barricades were removed by Brookfield Properties, the owners of the park, Tuesday, allowing access once again into the park by the protesters. (Louis Lanzano)




[Image]Occupy Wall Street protesters gather in Zuccotti Park, Tuesday, Jan.10, 2012, in New York. Barricades were removed by Brookfield Properties, the owners of the park, allowing access once again into the park by the protesters. (Louis Lanzano)




[Image]Security from Brookfield Properties, the owners of Zuccotti Park, watch as Occupy Wall Street protesters gather in the park, Tuesday, Jan.10, 2012, in New York. Barricades were removed by the owners allowing access into the park by the protesters on Tuesday. (Louis Lanzano)





	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Obama Called a Moron at Phone Security
		
	
	

		
From TSCM-220 mail list: http://groups.google.com/group/tscm-l2006?hl=en_US


 




Date: Fri, 06 Jan 2012 15:40:24 -0500

To: tscm-l2006[at]googlegroups.com

From:

Subject: [TSCM-L] {5984} POTUS telephones


There’s a very nice collection of dozens of photos of current POTUS telephones in use on John Young’s Cryptome site.  The trained eye will notice some interesting TSCM-related items.


http://cryptome.org/2012-info/obama-phones/0015.htm


 




Date: Fri, 06 Jan 2012 17:00:07 -0500

From: “James M. Atkinson” <jmatk[at]tscm.com>

To: tscm-l2006[at]googlegroups.com

Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] {5986} POTUS telephones


Most of these are CISCO IP phones, or Avaya telephone sets.


Amazing complex instrument with some simply lovely security holes that an eavesdropper can exploit.


http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps9748/index.html

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps8538/index.html

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/phones/ps379/ps5440/index.html

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/phones/ps379/index.html


A lot of these phones are also Lucent MLS of Definite phones (all an eavesdroppers paradise).


I really hate to have to mention this, but in the following image. You will notice the moron who is using a cell phone right next to a STE.


http://cryptome.org/2012-info/obama-phones/pict52.jpg


[Image]


Same here. Moron using cell phone in close proximity to a secure telephone:


http://cryptome.org/2012-info/obama-phones/pict30.jpg


[Image]


When you place a concentrated RF signal transmitter in close proximity to a piece of cryptographic gear (like a STU or STE) the RF signals and strong enough to intermix with the RF or magnetic signals and create a third signal.  This is most valuable with cryptographic equipment that used cables that was not in conduit as the cable (seem in these pictures) provides a high threat access point where all kinds of havoc can be caused if a cell phone is brought within 8-12 feet of a STU, or 16+ feet of a STE. You will notice that the moron holding the phone is well within those distances.


The following image just proved what a utter moron this guy is, and remember who is is:


http://cryptome.org/2012-info/obama-phones/pict29.jpg


[Image]


Notice that he is in a STE, in secure mode, and the STE (unencrypted voice path) is draped over a live RF transmitter.


I apologize Mr. President, but you sir are a fscking moron, just an utter moron.


Observers with sharp eyes will also notice the profoundly sloppy jobs of TSCM that is being done on these phones as well, and how the routing requirements for cables are not beign observered, but then that is the least of their probelms… their boss obviously does not care, so why shoudl they.


Dude, WTF… no seriously, WTF?


-jma


James M. Atkinson

President and Sr. Engineer

“Leonardo da Vinci of Bug Sweeps and Spy Hunting”

http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=15178662

Granite Island Group

jmatk[at]tscm.com

http://www.tscm.com/

(978) 546-3803


 




Date: Fri, 06 Jan 2012 17:53:00 -0500

To: tscm-l2006[at]googlegroups.com

From:

Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] {5987} POTUS telephones


Are executives at the highest levels expected to be TSCM, COMSEC, and TEMPEST experts who possess detailed technical knowledge and extensive related experience?


If yes, then why would any top executive have any need to hire experts in those fields?  Does JMA call his executive clients (who aren’t as well-versed in those fields as he obviously is) “fucking morons?”  That doesn’t seem like an effective business practice to me.


Perhaps the executive in the photo wasn’t briefed by his experts on the finer points of proper COMSEC–such as not to use a cell phone near a STE.  If he wasn’t, then perhaps those experts are to blame, not the executive.  Or maybe there’s other protections in place which prevent that from being a COMSEC problem.  There is equipment in those photos that probably none of us know the workings of…


 




Date: Fri, 06 Jan 2012 18:19:17 -0500

From: “James M. Atkinson” <jmatk[at]tscm.com>

To: tscm-l2006[at]googlegroups.com

Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] {5989} POTUS telephones


Actually yes.


He knows that he can not use a cellphone within X feet of a STU, STE, or security communications media because he can read the white papers on the matter, and has been briefed by the technical advisors until they were blue in the face, but he does not care, he likes his cell phones (because it makes him a more effective leader)


If a customer hires me to tell them about the problem, and I tell them about it, write numerous white papers on the subject for them, demonstrate the risk for them by recovering classified information, and even the CIK form a STU using only a nearby cell phone, and they still refuse to use proper communications security, and abide by stand-off distances (the space between the secure phone and the cell phone), then I will have no problems explain that they are a moron to their face (usually in private, but still).


You need only to watch the video of my testimony before Congress on related matters to see that I tend not to couch my words when it comes to national security matters like this.


The President of the United States is a fucking moron, but given the last pool of candidates he is less of a moron, then the other morons we had running at the time. But still, he is a moron, and an arrogant one at that.


-jma


 




Date: Fri, 06 Jan 2012 18:42:24 -0500

To: tscm-l2006[at]googlegroups.com

From:

Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] {5990} POTUS telephones


So you know this for a fact?  I would think POTUS has more important things to do than “read the white papers” about TSCM.  Arrogant?  Relative to whom?


 




Date: Fri, 06 Jan 2012 19:17:28 -0500

From: “James M. Atkinson” <jmatk[at]tscm.com>

To: tscm-l2006[at]googlegroups.com

Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] {5992} POTUS telephones


I wrote the white paper, and the paper has been repeatedly briefed to him by the DCI in his Daily Presidential Briefing. He has also read the white paper, but it has not dissuaded his cell phone mis-use. Several DCI staffers who prepare the PDB have assured me that the DCI has repeatedly included issue several times in the PDB, and POTUS just does not care.


The threat is known, the threat has been demonstrated, the threat has been replicated by others, it is a known and confirmed weakness, but he does not care, not even slightly.


Some Presidents like to ride around Dallas in open top limos, other are addicted to their cell phones… neither tend to remain in office too long.


He needs to smarten up, as he is risking national security and sabotaging international diplomacy (easily screwed up when secure communications are intercepted).


-jma


 




Date: Sat, 07 Jan 2012 11:44:11 -0500

From: “James M. Atkinson” <jmatk[at]tscm.com>

Subject: Re: Your Comments on Prez Phones

To: Cryptome


You have my permission to publish anything that you see on the TSCM-L list so long as I am the originator of the post.


You have my permission to publish the information that I published about the Presidents phone, and the comments I made in regards to his being warned not to do it.


Here is something about STU/STE and cell phones


http://www.tscm.com/stu.html


TEMPEST, HIJACK, NONSTOP, and TEAPOT Vulnerabilities A STU-III is a highly sophisticated digital device; however, they suffer from a particular nasty vulnerability to strong RF signals that if not properly addressed can cause the accidental disclosure of classified information, and recovery of the keys by an eavesdropper. While the unit itself is well shielded, the power line feeding the unit may not have a clean ground (thus negating the shielding).


If the encryption equipment is located within six to ten wavelengths of a radio transmitter (such as a cellular telephone, beeper, or two way radio) the RF signal can mix with the signals inside the STU and carry information to an eavesdropper. This six to ten wavelengths is referred to as the “near field” or the wave front where the magnetic field of the signal is stronger then the electrical field.


As a rule all COMSEC equipment should be kept out the “near field” by a factor of at least 2.5 to 3 times to get it outside of the field transition point. Simply put, there needs to be a “danger zone” or exclusion zone around any and all COMSEC gear 2.5 to 3 times the near field distance, or 16 to 30 times the longest signal wavelength (the lower the frequency the longer the wavelength).


A “wavelength” is inversely proportional to frequency being used which means that an 800 MHz cellular phone (near a STU) presents a greater direct threat that a higher frequency PCS phone operating in the 1.7 GHz region. On the other hand a PCS or CDMA telephone creates a greater spectral density and far more transitions which allows an eavesdropper to corelate on the signal with more precision.


We also have to consider the amplitude of the signals as well as the “danger zone” created by the transition point or radius of the near field (times 2.5 to 3). When any RF signals inside the “danger zone” exceed -50 dBm (or -77 dBm in some cases) there is still a problem even though the cryptographic equipment is some distance from the actual transmitter, cellular phone, pager, etc. These relatively high signal levels (above -50 dBm or -77 dBm) are actually strong enough that they create secondary fields or signals when they encounter the outside of the equipment case or any other conductive or non-linear element. This is called the “saturation effect”, and if it is not properly addressed can result in the cryptographic equipment put at risk of disclosing secrets. Typically the ambient RF environment near any cryptographic equipment should be well below -80 dBm and in some cases well below -110 dBm. Fields of this strength are common near broadcast facilities such as FM or television transmission towers or cellular/PCS towers. If you have a concern of this nature then you should contact a TSCM professional and schedule an evaluation of the RF in the vicinity of where you will be using your encryption equipment.


The critical thing to remember in all of this is that the ciphering key is where all the magic is at, and that the eavesdropper will typically target the ciphering circuit (or “Scrambler”) to obtain the secret key. Sure they are interested in the material being scrambled by the cryptographic system, and they will also be interested in the inner workings of the phone, but it is obtaining the secret ciphering key that is most important to the spy. An encryption box or cryptographic device may only be classified secret, and yet the keying material is top secret, and the keying material is far more sensitive then the box itself, and must be protected with much greater care.


On a related note, it should be mentioned that the ciphering key is actually of a fairly small length, and that is even if a very small segment of it is compromised the eavesdropper’s may be able to reconstruct it in whole (depending on what segment they get). In some cases even a 200 bit ciphering key can be broken by obtaining a small fragment the cipher which can be “snatched from the airwaves in less a ten millionth of a second” (if the cryptographic ignition key is loaded when in the presence of a cellular phone or strong RF field). Once the key is loaded into the cryptographic device the amount of time required to reconstruct the key is significantly larger, but not at all prohibitive. Remember, the eavesdropper is only looking for a few bits of data (the payload of the key), and that this small number of bits can be “hijacked” by an external RF source like a cellular phone as a highjack requires an absolute minimum of bandwidth.


Since the signal of interest is of extremely narrow bandwidth, and the “illuminating” signal can be easily correlated to the “signal of interest” the eavesdropper can be a considerable distance away from the encryption device and still perform the highjack (called “correlation gain”, which can be well over 40 dB). This assumes that someone using the encryption device has a cell phone or other RF device on their person, that while not on an active call is still checking in with the base station for status updates on a regular basis. Without this “correlation gain” the intercept may only be feasible within a few feet, but with it; the eavesdropper can be 500 and even 1500 feet away.


Remember that the most valuable “item of interest” is not directly the clear text communication itself, but the key used to protect the communication. Once the eavesdropper has the key, then the communication itself would be targeted and exploited. You must protect the key at all times.


NEXTEL or Motorola iDen phones based on a TDMA or “Time Domain” signal presents a really nasty threat as the cell phone is constantly strobing a specific predictable time slice, and basically illuminates the STU and turns it into a strobing lighthouse that will seriously compromise classified information. If a NEXTEL is present within 12-15 feet of a STU-III (when it goes secure or a CIK is loaded) the phone and information passed though it should be considered compromised. The STU should always be located in an area called an exclusion zone, and cellular phones, pagers, beepers, and other RF devices should be kept outside of a stand-off zone of at least 15-20 feet (30 foot is good practice).


Now if this wasn’t confusing enough; portable Inmarsat stations also present a similar problem, but only if the STU is located in front of the transmitter antenna or within the side lobes of the signal (about 45 degrees off the center axis of the antenna).


The best way to deal with this is to never have a cellular telephone or pager on your person when using a STU, or within a radius of at least thirty feet (in any direction) from an operational STU (even with a good ground). If the STU is being used in a SCIF or secure facility a cell phone is supposed to be an excluded item, but it is simply amazing how many government people (who know better) forget to turn off their phone before entering controlled areas and thus cause classified materials to be compromised.


Spook Hint: If you have a powered up NEXTEL on your belt and you walk within 12 feet of a STU-III in secure mode you have just compromised the classified key.


In the case where the STU is being used on a cell phone or satellite phone your best option is to keep the phone in analog mode (a STU, not a STE) and locate the STU a good 6-12 feet away from the antenna. In the case of an Inmarsat terminal simply keep the STU BEHIND the antenna by at least 10-15 feet (this is why Inmarsat terminals have long cables for the antenna). If you can obtain a digital Inmarsat connection you can get a very high quality connection, but the equipment is fairly costly, the terminal is quite large, and the digital service quite expensive.


At no time should a STU-III be operated in the presence of an RF field that exceeds -105 dBm for any signal with less then 30 kHz of occupied bandwidth. In the case of a signal which the occupied bandwidth exceeds 30 kHz the RF levels should not exceed -138 dBm.


Convenience and Security are Always Inversely Proportional.


– James M. Atkinson, 1982


Here is some further unclassified background on the matter (the data on the matter was in my written testimony).


http://www.tscm.com/DeepWaterDooDoo/


http://www.tscm.com/DeepWaterDooDoo/JamesAtkinsonwrittenTestimony.pdf


TEMPEST in a TEAPOT and HIJACK Exploits


Between the TEMPEST and TSCM fields of study there is also an area of our field that deals with unmodified or quasi-modified equipment and signals, which interact with each other. This is the case where in effect a classified signal or classified information is accidentally impressed onto an unclassified signal. Thus, the unclassified signal carrying the classified data with it is accidentally transmitted a considerable distance allowing for eavesdropping by those who should not possess the information. This is usually the result of TEMPEST standards not being rigorously followed during equipment design, installation, and maintenance.


The investigation, study, and control of intentional compromising emanations from telecommunications and automated information systems equipment that was created, provoked, or induced by a spy is known by the code name of “TEAPOT”. An example of this would be the positioning of a rack of two way radios need a secure telephone, or by installing RED cable near to a BLACK cable. This can also involve modifications to software, to slight breaches to the configuration of equipment.


An example of this would be a case where a cable, which contains only unclassified radar, navigation, or communications signals, is placed near a cable, which carries highly classified information. On a maritime vessel an example of an unclassified signal would be the VHF marine radios, the unencrypted HF (shortwave) radio communication systems, and sections of the radar and IFF systems. Should any of these cables or equipment be placed near the classified systems an eavesdropper could intercept the classified information that was riding-on-the-back-of the unclassified signals.


Another example of this would be a warship that downloads classified spy satellite imagery through the onboard satellite communication system.


The problem is that the installer of the classified system has not properly installed the system that creates considerable TEMPEST problems causing these signals to leak off the ship a short distance. This is further complicated by several cables which do not carry classified information but which pass in close proximity to the classified cables.


Due to the unclassified cable, perhaps being a high power antenna link the classified information can now leak out of the ship and be monitored by spies from dozens, if not hundreds of miles distant.


Testimony of James M. Atkinson, President and Sr. Engineer, Granite Island Group 9 of 168

Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

U.S. Coast Guard Budget and Oversight Hearing, April 18, 2007


There is other related information in the above PDF file, all of which you have permission to publish on Cryptome as you see fit.


Warmest Regards,


-jma

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Obama Phones
		
	
	

		
















[Image]On his first day in office, President Barack Obama speaks with a foreign leader in the Oval Office, Jan. 21, 2009. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)




[Image]President Barack Obama places a phone call at his desk in the Oval Office, Jan. 23, 2009. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza) [This is a Raytheon IST secure phone. http://www.telecore.com/products/ist2.html ]




[Image]President Barack Obama meets with Interior Secretary Ken Salazar aboard Air Force One during a flight to Denver, Col., Feb. 17, 2009. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza) [Desk phone is a Cisco secure phone.]


[Image]





[Image][Phone at Oval Office seating area] President Obama has a briefing with a staff member prior to a phone call in the Oval Office, March 13, 2009. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)




[Image]President Barack Obama is seen at a meeting with his staff April 5, 2009, aboard Air Force One on a flight from Prague, Czech Republic en route to Ankara, Turkey. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)


[Image]





[Image]President Barack Obama works with Jon Favreau, director of speechwriting, on the President’s Normandy speech aboard Air Force One enroute to Paris on June 5, 2009. (Official White House photo by Pete Souza)


[Image]





[Image]President Barack Obama confers with Senior Advisor David Axelrod and Press Secretary Robert Gibbs at their hotel in Moscow, Russia, July 6, 2009. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza) [Enlarged from small image.]




[Image]President Barack Obama meets with John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security, in the Oval Office, Jan. 4, 2010. (Official White House photo by Pete Souza) [Two phones, top for secure, bottom White House phone system.]


[Image]





[Image]“This is a rare look inside the President’s Treaty Room office in the private residence of the White House. He was making a call to Poland Prime Minister Donald Tusk.” (Official White House photo by Pete Souza)




[Image]March 29, 2009. “It was a Sunday night in the Oval Office. The auto task force listened to the President before he made phone calls to alert key people about his plan to set deadlines for General Motors and Chrysler overhauls that was to be announced the next morning.” (Official White House photo by Pete Souza)


[Image]





[Image]President Barack Obama meets with Rep. Dennis Kucinich, D-Ohio, aboard Air Force One en route to Cleveland, Ohio, March 15, 2010. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza) [The desk phone is a Cisco secure phone.]


[Image]





[Image]President Barack Obama checks his BlackBerry as he walks along the Colonnade to the Oval Office, March 18, 2010. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)


[Image]





[Image]President Barack Obama talks on the phone with a Member of Congress while en route to a health care event at George Mason University in Fairfax, Va., March 19, 2010. Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs Phil Schiliro rides with the President. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza) [A sends ” [The device between the seats under the seal is unknown. Not all presidential vehicles have it. There is a phone in the console.]


A sends: “With a little enhancement, it’s easy to see that device in the center is a Motorola speakerphone cradle for the handheld, wireless unit the President has.”


[Image]





[Image]President Barack Obama talks on the phone in a holding room at Oakley Lindsay Center in Quincy, Ill., April 28, 2010. Mona Sutphen, deputy chief of staff for policy, sits at right. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza) [Phones are L-3 STE model: http://www2.l-3com.com/cs-east/ia/ste/ie_ia_ste.shtml ]. See enlarged.]


[Image]





[Image]President Barack Obama talks on the phone with German Chancellor Angela Merkel to discuss the economic situation in Europe, prior to the Hampton University commencement in Hampton, Va., Sunday, May 9, 2010. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)


[Image]





[Image]President Barack Obama talks with Alyssa Mastromonaco, director of scheduling and advance, in the Outer Oval Office, May 24, 2010. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza) [Three types of phones sets, perhaps for three different systems.]




[Image]President Barack Obama prepares for foreign leader phone calls with Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and Japanese Prime Minister designate Naoto Kan, in the Oval Office, Saturday, June 5, 2010. Pictured, from left, are Michelle Gavin, senior director for African Affairs, Puneet Talwar, senior director for Iraq, Iran and the Gulf States, John Buchanan (on phone), director of operations and deputy director of the White House Situation Room, and National Security Advisor Gen. James Jones. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza) [A phone technician apparently arranging a secure hook-up.]


 


Obama Phones


The telephone is likely Obama’s primary means of personal, direct government. More private, intimate and persuasive than meetings, classified briefings, legislation and regulation signings, appointments, White House invites, travel, campaign tours, press releases, executive orders, mail, email, fax, TV, radio, photographs, Internet blogs, dining, applause, dance, sports, hugs, back pats, arm grabs, handshakes, baby holds, fist bumps, shout-outs, waves, finger points, grins, guffaws, chin tickles, jokes, punks, pardons, secret orders, medal awards, hospital-casket transfers-cemetary visits.


Presumably all calls are recorded but not likely to be made public any time soon, thus may be the most secret of his service in office. These photos hide far more than they reveal — as intended in defiance of democracy and open government.






	


	



			
				


			

			
CONFIDENTIAL -STRATFOR Hacked Update
		
	

	

		


30 December 2011. A writes that five Pastebin posts of recovered STRATFOR passwords have been removed as indicated below. In addition, four files from sources have been removed from Rapid Share (1) and Wikisend (3).


29 December 2011.


Lulzxmas Dumps 860,000 STRATFOR Accounts:


http://pastebin.com/f7jYf5Wd


http://www.megaupload.com/?d=O5P03RXK


28 December 2011.


Prepping for the Stratfor 5M Email Release


http://pastebin.com/Qsqpsr6t


http://piratenpad.de/Stratfor


27 December 2011.


http://pastebin.com/78MUAaeZ [Now removed]


These are 28517 of 53281 (54%) passwords from the list of STRATFOR customer accounts cracked.


Part 1/3: http://pastebin.com/CdD92fJG [Now removed]


Part 2/3: http://pastebin.com/AcwQgHmF [Now removed]


Part 3/3: http://pastebin.com/78MUAaeZ [Now removed]


26 December 2011. Firms and personal first names beginning with “D” through “My” (~ 30,000).


http://pastebin.com/q5kXd7Fd


https://rapidshare.com/#!download|44tl6|2444489251|STRATFOR_full_d_m.txt.gz|3255|

R~7B8842ED6343CEAE67A23C094E131679|0|0 [Now removed]


And 25,000 IT work tickets:


http://www.verzend.be/s8v8ccig12hp/it.tar.gz.html


26 December 2011. Sample Stratfor.com email:


http://pastebin.com/HmDs0EM4


“just a small preview of the mayhem to come. 1 out of 2.7 million”


26 December 2011. STRATFOR leaked accounts (10257 passwords recovered)


http://pastebin.com/CdD92fJG [Now removed]


25 December 2011. Firms and personal miscellaneous names not in alphabetical order (~13,000):


http://pastebin.com/8v3768Bw [Now removed]


http://wikisend.com/download/132838/stratfor_full_misc.txt.gz [Now removed]


25 December 2011. Firms and personal first names beginning with “B-By” through “C-Cz” (~4,000) :


http://pastebin.com/bUqkb9mq


http://wikisend.com/download/597646/stratfor_full_b.txt.gz [Now removed]


25 December 2011. Firms and personal first names beginning with “A” through “Az” (~ 4,000).


http://pastebin.com/bQ2YHDdw


http://wikisend.com/download/601776/stratfor_full_a.txt.gz [Now removed]


25 December 2011. A message allegedly to subscribers from George Friedman, Stratfor, was posted to Facebook and Pastebin (below).


25 December 2011. A paste today denying Anonymous role:


http://pastebin.com/8yrwyNkt


And, Stratfor’s A client list of passwords:


http://pastebin.com/5H33nPEK


24 December 2011


STRATFOR Hacked


Related:


http://pastebin.com/8MtFze0s


http://pastebin.com/CAWDEW8G


A sends:


Subject: Important Announcement from STRATFOR

Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2011 19:49:58 -0500

From: STRATFOR <mail[at]response.stratfor.com>


Dear Stratfor Member,


We have learned that Stratfor’s web site was hacked by an unauthorized party. As a result of this incident the operation of Stratfor’s servers and email have been suspended.


We have reason to believe that the names of our corporate subscribers have been posed [sic] on other web sites. We are diligently investigating the extent to which subscriber information may have been obtained.


Stratfor and I take this incident very seriously. Stratfor’s relationship with its members and, in particular, the confidentiality of their subscriber information, are very important to Stratfor and me. We are working closely with law enforcement in their investigation and will assist them with the identification of the individual(s) who are responsible.


Although we are still learning more and the law enforcement investigation is active and ongoing, we wanted to provide you with notice of this incident as quickly as possible. We will keep you updated regarding these matters.


Sincerely,


George Friedman


STRATFOR

221 W. 6th Street, Suite 400

Austin, TX 78701 US

http://www.stratfor.com


http://www.facebook.com/stratfor


http://pastebin.com/6a86QSMM


Dec 25th, 2011


On December 24th an unauthorized party disclosed personally identifiable information and related credit card data of some of our members. We have reason to believe that your personal and credit card data could have been included in the information that was illegally obtained and disclosed.


Also publicly released was a list of our members which the unauthorized party claimed to be Stratfor’s “private clients.” Contrary to this assertion the disclosure was merely a list of some of the members that have purchased our publications and does not comprise a list of individuals or entities that have a relationship with Stratfor beyond their purchase of our subscription-based publications.


We have also retained the services of a leading identity theft protection and monitoring service on behalf of the Stratfor members that have been impacted by these events. Details regarding the services to be provided will be forwarded in a subsequent email that is to be delivered to the impacted members no later than Wednesday, December 28th.


In the interim, precautions that can be taken by you to minimize and prevent the misuse of information which may have been disclosed include the following:


– contact your financial institution and inform them of this incident;


– if you see any unauthorized activity on your accounts promptly notify your financial institution;


– submit a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) by calling 1-877-ID-THEFT (1-877- 438-4338) or online at https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/; and


– contact the three U.S. credit reporting agencies: Equifax (http://www.equifax.com/ or (800) 685-1111), Experian (http://www.experian.com/ or (888) 397-3742), and TransUnion (http://www.transunion.com/ or (800) 888-4213), to obtain a free credit report from each.


Even if you do not find any suspicious activity on your initial credit reports, the FTC recommends that you check your credit reports periodically. Checking your credit reports can help you spot problems and address them quickly.


To ease any concerns you may have about your personal information going forward, we have also retained an experienced outside consultant that specializes in such security matters to bolster our existing efforts on these issues as we work to better serve you. We are on top of the situation and will continue to be vigilant in our implementation of the latest, and most comprehensive, data security measures.


We are also working to restore access to our website and continuing to work closely with law enforcement regarding these matters. We will continue to update you regarding the status of these matters.


Again, my sincerest apologies for this unfortunate incident.


Sincerely,


George Friedman

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET-CIA Bucharest Prison Eyeball
		
	
	

		




In northern Bucharest, in a busy residential neighborhood minutes from the center of Romania’s capital city, is a secret that the Romanian government has tried for years to protect.


For years, the CIA used a government building — codenamed Bright Light — as a makeshift prison for its most valuable detainees. There, it held al-Qaida operatives Khalid Sheik Mohammad, the mastermind of 9/11, and others in a basement prison before they were ultimately transferred to Guantanamo Bay in 2006, according to former U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the location and inner workings of the prison.


The existence of a CIA prison in Romania has been widely reported but its location has never been made public until a joint investigation by The Associated Press and German public television, ARD Panorama. The news organizations located the former prison and learned details of the facility where harsh interrogation tactics were used. ARD’s program on the CIA prison will air Dec 8.


The Romanian prison was part of a network of so-called black sites that the CIA operated and controlled overseas in Thailand, Lithuania and Poland. All the prisons were closed by May 2006, and the CIA’s detention and interrogation program ended in 2009.


Unlike the CIA’s facility in Lithuania’s countryside or the one hidden in a Polish military installation, the CIA’s prison in Romania was not in a remote location. It was hidden in plain sight, a couple blocks off a major boulevard on a street lined with trees and homes, along busy train tracks.


The building is used as the National Registry Office for Classified Information, which is also known as ORNISS. Classified information from NATO and the European Union is stored there. Former intelligence officials both described the location of the prison and identified pictures of the building.







[Image]		






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Google Mapshttp://bit.ly/vDKcPW


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CIA Prisoner Unloading Route via Side Street According to AP. 2005 Aerial Photo (Google Earth).[Image]




Following oblique views by Bing.com/maps: http://binged.it/vAOoi0




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CONFIDENTIAL – Georgia Tech Helps to Develop System That Will Detect Insider Threats from Massive Data Sets
		
	
	

		
 


[Image]


Georgia Tech DARPA ADAMS leaders


[Image]


Georgia Tech DARPA ADAMS team


[Image]


Data collection environment


When a soldier in good mental health becomes homicidal or a government employee abuses access privileges to share classified information, we often wonder why no one saw it coming. When looking through the evidence after the fact, a trail often exists that, had it been noticed, could have possibly provided enough time to intervene and prevent an incident.


With support from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Army Research Office, researchers at the Georgia Institute of Technology are collaborating with scientists from four other organizations to develop new approaches for identifying these “insider threats” before an incident occurs. The two-year, $9 million project will create a suite of algorithms that can detect multiple types of insider threats by analyzing massive amounts of data — including email, text messages and file transfers — for unusual activity.


The project is being led by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and also includes researchers from Oregon State University, the University of Massachusetts and Carnegie Mellon University.


“Analysts looking at the electronically recorded activities of employees within government or defense contracting organizations for anomalous behaviors may now have the bandwidth to investigate five anomalies per day out of thousands of possibilities. Our goal is to develop a system that will provide analysts for the first time a very short, ranked list of unexplained events that should be further investigated,” said project co-principal investigator David A. Bader, a professor with a joint appointment in the Georgia Tech School of Computational Science and Engineering and the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI).


Under the contract, the researchers will leverage a combination of massively scalable graph-processing algorithms, advanced statistical anomaly detection methods and knowledge-based relational machine learning algorithms to create a prototype Anomaly Detection at Multiple Scales (ADAMS) system. The system could revolutionize the capabilities of counter-intelligence community operators to identify and prioritize potential malicious insider threats against a background of everyday cyber network activity.


The research team will have access to massive data sets collected from operational environments where individuals have explicitly agreed to be monitored. The information will include electronically recorded activities, such as computer logins, emails, instant messages and file transfers. The ADAMS system will be capable of pulling these terabytes of data together and using novel algorithms to quickly analyze the information to discover anomalies.


“We need to bring together high-performance computing, algorithms and systems on an unprecedented scale because we’re collecting a massive amount of information in real time for a long period of time,” explained Bader. “We are further challenged because we are capturing the information at different rates — keystroke information is collected at very rapid rates and other information, such as file transfers, is collected at slower rates.”


In addition to Bader, other Georgia Tech researchers supporting key components of this program include School of Interactive Computing professor Irfan Essa, School of Computational Science and Engineering associate professor Edmond Chow, GTRI principal research engineers Lora Weiss and Fred Wright, GTRI senior research scientist Richard Boyd, and GTRI research scientists Joshua L. Davis and Erica Briscoe.


“We look forward to working with DARPA and our academic partners to develop a prototype ADAMS system that can detect anomalies in massive data sets that can translate to significant, often critical, actionable insider threat information across a wide variety of application domains,” said John Fratamico, SAIC senior vice president and business unit general manager.


Research News & Publications Office

Georgia Institute of Technology

75 Fifth Street, N.W., Suite 314

Atlanta, Georgia 30308 USA


Media Relations Contacts: Abby Robinson (abby[at]innovate.gatech.edu; 404-385-3364) or John Toon (jtoon[at]gatech.edu; 404-894-6986)


Writer: Abby Robinson

	


	



			
				


			

			
LIVE AND UNCENSORED – Egypt Protest Photos 4
		
	
	

		



















[Image]Thousands of Egyptians perform Friday prayers during a rally in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011. Tens of thousands of protesters chanting, “Leave, leave!” are rapidly filling up Cairo’s Tahrir Square in what promises to be a massive demonstration to force Egypt’s ruling military council to yield power. The Friday rally is dubbed by organizers as “The Last Chance Million-Man Protest,” and comes one day after the military offered an apology for the killing of nearly 40 protesters.




[Image]Egyptian protesters carry a giant Egyptian flag with Arabic writing that reads, in part, “Egypt is greater than you,” in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.




[Image]Protesters, including a wounded man, chant slogans and wave Egyptian national flags during a rally in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.




[Image]Egyptians, including a man perched on a lamp post, perform Friday prayers during a rally in Cairo’s Tahrir square, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.




[Image]Pro-reform leader and Nobel peace laureate Mohamed El-Baradei, center, is surrounded by protesters during his arrival for Friday prayers in Cairo’s Tahrir square, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.




[Image]Egyptian women pray during Friday prayers in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.




[Image]Protesters, including a man holding tear gas cannisters, chant slogans and wave national flags during a rally in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.




[Image]Egyptian men pray next to a t-shirt vendor during Friday prayers in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.




[Image]An Egyptian woman stands next to a cotton candy vendor before Friday prayers in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.




[Image]A man holds up a shoe, which is seen as a sign of disrespect, with pictures of Egyptians including Gamal Mubarak, center, during Friday prayers in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.




[Image]A veiled Egyptian woman waits for Friday prayers in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.




[Image]An Egyptian protester wears a safety mask around his neck as he performs Friday prayers in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.




[Image]An Egyptian girl stands as protesters perform Friday prayers in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.[Image]




[Image]A protester displays an Egyptian flag in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.




[Image]A protester reads a newspaper in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday, Nov. 25, 2011.




[Image]Demonstrators chant slogans as thousands spend the night in Tahrir Square, Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011.











































	


	



			
				


			

			
Uncensored – FEMEN Protest Photos
		
	
	

		









[Image]Activists from Ukraine’s scandalous FEMEN group holds a banner reading ‘woman is not a commodity’ as they stage a topless protest on November 10, 2011 against prostitution and woman as a commodity in an official prostitution’s street in Zurich. Getty[Image]




[Image]An activist of the Ukrainian women movement Femen is being arrested by policemen in front of St Peter’s basilica after holding a placard asking for ‘Freedom for women’ following Pope Benedict XVI’s Angelus prayer on November 6, 2011 at St Peter’s square at The Vatican. Getty




[Image]An activist of the Ukrainian women movement Femen is taken away by Italian policemen in front of St Peter’s basilica after holding a placard asking for ‘Freedom for women’ following Pope Benedict XVI’s Angelus prayer on November 6, 2011 at St Peter’s square at The Vatican. Getty




[Image]An activist of the Ukrainian female rights organization “Femen” shows a placard demanding freedom for women, during a protest at the end of Pope Benedict XVI’s Angelus prayer in St. Peter’s Square at the Vatican, Sunday, Nov. 6, 2011. (Pier Paolo Cito)




[Image]Ukrainian women’s rights group Femen, painted in colors of the Italian flag, take part in a demonstration staged by the Italian Democratic party to protest against Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi in Rome, Saturday, Nov. 5, 2011. The International Monetary Fund will monitor Italy’s financial reform efforts, Premier Silvio Berlusconi said Friday, a humbling step for one of the world’s biggest _ but also most indebted _ economies as market confidence in its future wanes.




[Image]Activists from Ukraine’s scandalous FEMEN group dressed as housemaids stage a topless protest in a show of anger against French former IMF chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s attitude towards women in front of his residence in Paris on October 31, 2011. FEMEN has gained worldwide fame by staging a string of topless protests in Ukraine and now in Europe, in recent years to draw attention to issues from the exploitation of women to corruption. The placard read at L ‘ecstasy of power’, at R ‘your shame can’t be clean up’. Getty




[Image]People walk in front of Kiev Zoo, as activists of the Ukrainian female rights organization “Femen”, take part in a topless protest in Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, Oct. 27, 2011. Kiev zoo is a place that Femen’s activists compared to a concentration camp for those with fur and feathers. Hundreds of animals died at the zoo in recent years due to malnutrition, lack of medical care and abuse, and some suspect that corruption is at the heart of the problem.




[Image]Securty guards detain an activist of the Ukrainian female rights organization “Femen”, during an action of protest in front of Kiev Zoo, Ukraine, Thursday, Oct. 27, 2011. Kiev zoo is a place that Femen’s activists compared to a concentration camp for those with fur and feathers. Hundreds of animals died at the zoo in recent years due to malnutrition, lack of medical care and abuse, and some suspect that corruption is at the heart of the problem. Femen calls for the 100-year-old zoo to be closed.




[Image]Secury guards detain an activist of the Ukrainian female rights organization “Femen”, during an action of nude protest in front of Kiev Zoo, Ukraine, Thursday, Oct. 27, 2011. Kiev zoo is a place that Femen’s activists compared to a concentration camp for those with fur and feathers. Hundreds of animals died at the zoo in recent years due to malnutrition, lack of medical care and abuse, and some suspect that corruption is at the heart of the problem.




[Image]Police detain a member of women’s activist group FEMEN after their protest against government policy in front front of the Cabinet building in Kiev, Ukraine, Wednesday, Aug.24, 2011. The former Soviet republic marks the 20th anniversary of its independence. (Efrem Lukatsky)




[Image]Police detain a member of the women’s activist group FEMEN, after their protest against government policy in front of the Cabinet building in Kiev, Ukraine, Wednesday, Aug. 24, 2011. The former Soviet republic is marking the 20th anniversary of its independence. (Efrem Lukatsky)




[Image]Ukrainian women’s rights group Femen, painted in colors of the European Union countries, protest against the regular summer switch off of public utility supply of hot water in central Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, July 14, 2011. Women symbolically wash themselves in the city fountain to protest the need for hot water all year round, and to highlight the need for the hot water utility during the upcoming EURO 2012 soccer competition.(Efrem Lukatsky)[Image]




[Image]Ukrainian women’s rights group Femen holding a picket in front of a court building, against the detention of a fellow activist in Kiev, Ukraine, Monday, Jan. 17, 2011. The poster reads, “Hands off, Femen”. Opposition politicians and democrats insist that President Viktor Yanukovych trampled Ukraine’s constitution in a bit to monopolize political power.(Efrem Lukatsky)




[Image]Ukrainian women’s rights group Femen, painted in colors of the European Union countries, protest against the regular summer switch off of public utility supply of hot water in central Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, July 14, 2011. Women symbolically wash themselves in the city fountain to protest the need for hot water all year round, and to highlight the need for the hot water utility during the upcoming EURO 2012 soccer competition. (Efrem Lukatsky)




[Image]Police detain Alexandra Shevchenko a member of women’s activist group FEMEN, in front of parliament in Kiev, Ukraine, Tuesday, July 5, 2011. Ukrainians are fiercely opposed to the pension fund reform, which parliament is set to consider this week, that is meant to raise the retirement age for women. (Efrem Lukatsky)




[Image]Semi naked activists from the Ukrainian female rights group Femen protest in front of the Saudi Arabian embassy against a ban on driving cars for women in Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, June 16, 2011. (Sergei Chuzavkov)




[Image]An secury guard detains an activist of the Ukrainian female rights organization ‘Femen’ during an action of protest in front of the city’s State Administration at a opening ceremony of clocks counting down time that remains before the EURO 2012 soccer tournament starts, in Kiev, Ukraine, Wednesday, June 8, 2011. Writing on her back reads ‘Euro 2012 without Prostitution’. (Efrem Lukatsky)




[Image]Activists of the Women’s Movement ‘FEMEN’ perform during a protest against the politics of Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, during a rally to protest against what they claim is the sex-tourism and trafficking of women from Ukraine, at Independence square in Kiev, Ukraine, Wednesday, May 11, 2011. The Women’s Movement ‘FEMEN’ is an organization of the young women of the city of Kiev orientated to represent and defend the rights of women-students of the capital. (Efrem Lukatsky)




[Image]Activists of the Women’s Movement ‘FEMEN’ performs and shout anti-Lukashenko slogans protesting against his politics in Belarus during a rally at Independence square in Kiev, Ukraine, Wednesday, May. 11, 2011. The poster reads ‘Put Lukashenko on the Rack!’. The Women’s Movement ‘FEMEN’ is an organization of the young women of the city of Kiev oriented on the women-students of the capital. The main program of the movement is the national campaign against the sex tourism and women trafficking. (Efrem Lukatsky)




[Image]Activists of the Women’s Movement ‘FEMEN’ performs and shout anti-Lukashenko slogans protesting against his politics in Belarus during a rally at Independence square in Kiev, Ukraine, Wednesday, May. 11, 2011. The poster reading ‘Crush a cockroach’. The Women’s Movement ‘FEMEN’ is an organization of the young women of the city of Kiev oriented on the women-students A depiction of Lukashenko is seen in the background. (Efrem Lukatsky)




[Image]Ukrainian police hold back activists from the women’s rights organization “Femen” during a protest close to the site of the international donors conference to clean up the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site in Kiev, Ukraine, Tuesday, April 19, 2011. Poster reads “Yanukovych is worse than radiation”. On April 26, Ukraine marks the 25th anniversary of the fatal explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. (Ukrafoto)















[Image]Ukrainian activists from the group Femen protest Iran’s treatment of women during the opening of Iranian Culture Days in Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, Nov. 11, 2010. (Sergei Chuzavkov)




[Image]Activists of the Ukrainian Women’s Movement “FEMEN” shout protests in front of the Iranian Embassy in Kiev, Ukraine, Wednesday, Nov. 3, 2010, against the death penalty given to Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, a mother of two children, who was sentenced to death by stoning in Iran on charges of adultery. (Sergei Chuzavkov)




[Image]In this photo taken on Thursday, July 15, 2010, police detain activists of the local FEMEN women’s rights watchdog as they protest against the regular summer switch off of hot water in the city in downtown Kiev, Ukraine. A group of young activists is gaining popularity here for staging topless protests that involve sexually charged gestures, obscene slogans and scuffles with security guards and police. Often, the point seems to be just getting naked.




[Image]Members of the activist group Femen protest at what they see as the manipulation of the democratic system at a polling station in Kiev, Ukraine, Sunday, Feb. 7, 2010. The signs read “The War Begins Here” and “Stop Raping the Country.” (Mikhail Metzel)




[Image]Members of the activist group Femen protest at what they see as the manipulation of the democratic system at a polling station in Kiev, Ukraine, Sunday, Feb. 7, 2010. (Mikhail Metzel)




[Image]Activists of the Women’s Movement “FEMEN”, dressed as prostitutes, take part in a rally outside the Central Election Commission office in Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, Jan. 14, 2010. The event was meant to highlight what the group called political prostitution and crude populism in the election campaign. The posters with the logos of the leading candidates and signature “Choose me” in Ukraine’s presidential race are seen at top.




[Image]An activist of the Women’s Movement “FEMEN”, dressed as a prostitute, holds a poster with the logo of one of the leading candidates and signature “Choose me” in Ukraine’s presidential race, during a rally outside the Central Election Commission office in Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, Jan. 14, 2010. The event was meant to highlight what the group called political prostitution and crude populism, in the election campaign.




[Image]A security officer stops an activist of the Women’s Movement ‘FEMEN’ from climbing a barrier at Mykhailivska Square in Kiev, Ukraine, Monday, Dec. 14, 2009, prior the opening of the meeting for UEFA EURO 2012. The ‘FEMEN’ movement is campaigning against sex tourism and the trafficking of women in Ukraine. (Efrem Lukatsky)





	


	



			
				


			

			
Live and Uncensored – Egypt Protest Photos 3
		
	
	

		



















[Image]Demonstrators are lit by a laser lights as thousands spend the night in Tahrir Square, Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. Police and the protesters, who are demanding that Egypt’s ruling military council step down, are observing a truce after five days of deadly street battles in which dozens have died. (Bela Szandelszky)




[Image]A wounded protester is treated at a field hospital near Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. Police and protesters demanding that Egypt’s ruling military council step down are observing a truce after five days of deadly street battles in which dozens have died. (Manu Brabo)




[Image]Demonstrators chant slogans as thousands spend the night in Tahrir Square, Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. Police and the protesters, who are demanding that Egypt’s ruling military council step down, are observing a truce after five days of deadly street battles in which dozens have died. (Bela Szandelszky)




[Image]Protesters try to climb a concrete barricade erected by Egyptian Army soldiers in the street leading to the interior ministry from Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. Police and protesters demanding that Egypt’s ruling military council step down are observing a truce after five days of deadly street battles in which dozens have died. (Manu Brabo)




[Image]Egyptian Army soldiers stand guard atop a concrete block barricade while protesters chant slogans, near Tahrir Square, in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. Police and protesters demanding that Egypt’s ruling military council step down are observing a truce after five days of deadly street battles in which dozens have died. (Bernat Armangue)




[Image]A protester waves an Egyptian national flag as they gather in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. Police and protesters demanding that Egypt’s ruling military council step down are observing a truce after five days of deadly street battles in which dozens have died. (Bernat Armangue)[Image]




[Image]Protesters gather as Egyptian Army soldiers build a concrete block barricade on the street between Tahrir Square and the interior ministry in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. Police and protesters demanding that Egypt’s ruling military council step down are observing a truce after five days of deadly street battles in which dozens have died. (Khalil Hamra)




[Image]Egyptian protesters stand behind a barbed wire barricade in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. Police and protesters demanding that Egypt’s ruling military council step down are observing a truce after five days of deadly street battles in which dozens have died. (Mohammed Abu Zaid)




[Image]An Egyptian officer, left, attempts to talk to protesters behind a newly erected barbed wire barricade by the Egyptian army near Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. International criticism of Egypt’s military rulers is mounting after five days of clashes between police and protesters demanding the generals relinquish power immediately. (Tara Todras-Whitehill)




[Image]A woman protester attempts to dismantle a barbed wire barricade, newly erected by the Egyptian army, near Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. International criticism of Egypt’s military rulers is mounting after five days of clashes between police and protesters demanding the generals relinquish power immediately. (Tara Todras-Whitehill)




[Image]Protesters gather behind a barbed wire barricade, newly erected by the Egyptian army, near Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. International criticism of Egypt’s military rulers is mounting after five days of clashes between police and protesters demanding the generals relinquish power immediately. (Tara Todras-Whitehill)




[Image]Protesters gather behind a barbed wire barricade, newly erected by the Egyptian army, near Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. International criticism of Egypt’s military rulers is mounting after five days of clashes between police and protesters demanding the generals relinquish power immediately. (Tara Todras-Whitehill)




[Image]Protesters shout through a barbed wire barricade, newly erected by the Egyptian army, near Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. International criticism of Egypt’s military rulers is mounting after five days of clashes between police and protesters demanding the generals relinquish power immediately. (Tara Todras-Whitehill)




[Image]A protester watches Egyptian Army soldiers build a concrete block barricade on the street between Tahrir Square and the interior ministry in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. Police and protesters demanding that Egypt’s ruling military council step down are observing a truce after five days of deadly street battles in which dozens have died. (Khalil Hamra)




[Image]Egyptian Army officers ask protesters to leave the top of a concrete block barricade on the street between Tahrir Square and the interior ministry in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. Police and protesters demanding that Egypt’s ruling military council step down are observing a truce after five days of deadly street battles in which dozens have died. (Khalil Hamra)




[Image]A protester looks through a concrete block barricade erected by the Egyptian Army on the street between Tahrir Square and the interior ministry in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. Police and protesters demanding that Egypt’s ruling military council step down are observing a truce after five days of deadly street battles in which dozens have died. (Khalil Hamra)




[Image]Protesters gather around Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. Police and protesters demanding that Egypt’s ruling military council step down are observing a truce after five days of deadly street battles in which dozens have died. (Mohammed Abu Zaid)




[Image]A protester prays moments after waking up in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday, Nov. 24, 2011. Police and protesters demanding that Egypt’s ruling military council step down are observing a truce after five days of deadly street battles in which dozens have died. (Bernat Armangue)




[Image]Egyptian protesters set a fire during clashes with security forces near Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, late Wednesday, Nov. 23, 2011. Egyptian police are clashing with anti-government protesters for a fifth day in Cairo.











































	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET-Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 19 November 2011
		
	
	

		









[Image]




TEPCO note: Other photos are published on the report “Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (November 17, 2011)” [http://cryptome.org/0005/daiichi-111711.zip (9.1MB)]




The road between unit 2 & unit 3Before, May 3, 2011[Image]


After, May 14, 2011


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Former main building entranceBefore, May 27, 2011[Image]


After, June 7, 2011


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TOP-SECRET-FAA Comunications Security 1991
		
	
	

		
https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/0005/faa-comsec.jpg


                                    ORDER
         Date:  3/5/91                                                         

      Initiated
           by:  ACO-300                                                        

      Subject: COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC) 
 
 FOREWORD                                     

      This order establishes policies and procedures and assigns
      responsibilities for ensuring agency compliance with requirements
      of the national communications security (COMSEC) policy.                 

      The guidance in this order is based upon COMSEC policy directives
      promulgated by the National Security Agency and implementing
      regulations and directives issued by the United States Air Force.
      Should a conflict exist between the requirements of this order
      and the appropriate national COMSEC policy or implementing
      directive, the national policy or directive will in all cases
      apply.  Instances of this type will be reported expeditiously to
      this headquarters.                                                       

      This order is marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.  It is to be
      safeguarded, handled and processed in accordance with
      requirements of Order 1600.15D.  This order is not releasable to
      contractors or to foreign nationals without the specific approval
      of the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security,
      Washington, D.C.  However, dissemination of pertinent information
      extracted from this order to contractors having a need-to-know is
      permissible when such release is authorized by applicable
      National COMSEC Instructions (NACI).                                     

      Changes in national COMSEC policy reflected in this order such as
      the institution of the Formal Cryptographic Access Program have
      been coordinated with and accurately state the position of the
      Office of the Secretary of Transportation.                               

      All FAA personnel whose duties require them to handle, process,
      store, safeguard, or otherwise have access to classified
      cryptographic material are required to become familiar with and
      conform to the requirements of this order.                               

      /s/ James B. Busey
          Administrator                                                        

                            FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                     NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
         NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS WITHOUT ORIGINATOR'S APPROVAL




                              TABLE OF CONTENTS                                

                                                                  Page         

      CHAPTER 1. GENERAL                                       1           

           1.  Purpose                                             1
           2.  Distribution                                        1
           3.  Cancellation                                        1
           4.  Explanation of Changes                              1
           5.  Definitions                                         2
           6.  Forms and Reports                                   2
           7.  Requests for Information                            2
           8.  Statement of Intent                                 2
           9.  Scope                                               2
          10.  Responsibilities                                    2
          11.  Interpretation                                      2
          12.  Authority to change this Order                      7
          13.-19.  Reserved                                        7           

      CHAPTER 2. POLICY FOR GRANTING ACCESS TO U.S.
 CLASSIFIED CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION            13           

          SECTION 1.  POLICY                                      13           

          20.  General                                            13
          21.  Policy                                             13           

          SECTION 2.  DEFINITION                                  13           

          22.  Cryptographic Information                          13           

          SECTION 3.  CRITERIA                                    14           

          23.  Access Requirements                                14
          24.  Polygraph                                          14
          25.  Contacts with Foreign Nationals and Unofficial
               Foreign Travel to Communist or other Designated
               Countries                                          15           

          SECTION 4.  GRANTING FORMAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS        15           

          26.  Scope                                              15
          27.  Preparing AFCOMSEC Form 9                          17
          28.  Withdrawing FCA                                    18
          29.  Certificates of Personnel Declining Cryptographic
               Access                                             19
          30.-34.  Reserved                                       19           

      CHAPTER 3. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC) DUTIES AND
		       RESPONSIBILITIES                                27           

          35.  General                                            27
          36.  COMSEC Custodians and Alternates                   27
          37.  Training                                           28
          38.  Waivers                                            30
          39.  Duties of the COMSEC Custodian                     30
          40.  Performance Standards                              31
          41.  Appointment of Custodians and Alternates           32
          42.  Monitoring Responsibilities                        32
          43.-49.  Reserved.                                      33           

      CHAPTER 4. SAFEGUARDING COMSEC FACILITIES                  39           

          SECTION 1.  GENERAL                                     39           

          50.  Purpose                                            39
          51.  Referenced Publications                            39
          52.  Background                                         39           

          SECTION 2.  PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS                 40           

          53.  Physical Security Standards for Fixed COMSEC
               Facilities                                         40
          54.  Installation Criteria                              40
          55.  Facility Approvals, Inspection, and Tests          41
          56.  Intrusion Detecting Systems                        43
          57.-60.  Reserved                                       43           

          SECTION 3.  ACCESS RESTRICTIONS AND CONTROLS            43           

          61.  Unescorted Access                                  43
          62.  Escorted Access                                    45
          63.  Visitor Register                                   45
          64.  No-Lone Zones                                      46
          65.  Guard Services                                     46
          66.-70.  Reserved                                       47           

          SECTION 4.  PROTECTION OF UNATTENDED COMSEC EQUIPMENT   47           

          71.  General                                            47
          72.  Protection Requirements                            47
          73.-77.  Reserved                                       48           

          SECTION 5.  PROTECTION OF LOCK COMBINATIONS             48           

          78.  Purpose                                            48
          79.  Protection Requirements                            48
          80.  Access to Combinations                             49
          81.  Record of Combinations                             49
          82.-86.  Reserved.                                      50           

          SECTION 6.  NONESSENTIAL AUDIO/VISUAL EQUIPMENT         51           

          87.  Personally Owned Equipment                         51
          88.  Government Owned Equipment                         51
          89.-94.  Reserved                                       51           

          SECTION 7.  STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)         51           

          95.  Requirement                                        51
          96.  Emergency Plan                                     52
          97.-101.  Reserved                                      53           

      CHAPTER 5. SAFEGUARDING AND CONTROL OF COMMUNICATIONS
                  SECURITY MATERIALS                              65           

         102.  General                                            65
         103.  Definitions                                        66
         104.  Handling Keying Material                           66
         105.109.  Reserved                                       66           

          SECTION 1.  GENERAL INFORMATION APPLICABLE TO ALL
                      COMSEC MATERIAL                             66           

         110.  Responsibilities for Safeguarding COMSEC Material  66
         111.  Transport of COMSEC Material                       67
         112.  Courier Responsibilities                           68
         113.  Open Display of COMSEC Material and Information    68
         114.  Destruction                                        68
         115.  Reporting Insecurities                             68
         116.  Evidence of Tampering                              69
         117.  Alteration of COMSEC Material                      69
         118.  Clearance Requirements for Guards                  69
         119.  Storage Requirements                               69
         120.  Other COMSEC Information                           70
         121.  Disposition of COMSEC Materials                    71
         122.  Page Checks of COMSEC Publications                 72
         123.  Daily or Shift Inventory Requirements              73
         124.  COMSEC Account Record File                         73
         125.-129.  Reserved                                      74           

      CHAPTER 6. CONTROLLED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ITEMS (CCI)            79           

         130.  Purpose and Background                             79
         131.  Definitions                                        79
         132.  Control Requirements                               80
         133.  Inventories                                        84
         134.  Reporting Insecurities                             84
         135.  Routine and Emergency Destruction                  84
         136.-144.  Reserved                                      84           

      CHAPTER 7. SECURE VOICE                                    89           

          SECTION 1.  GENERAL                                     89           

         145.  Purpose                                            89
         146.  Types and Models of STU-III                        89
         147.  Definitions                                        89
         148.-150.  Reserved                                      91           

          SECTION 2.  EXCEPTIONS                                  91           

         151.  Requests for Exception                             91
         152.-153.  Reserved                                      91           

          SECTION 3.  COMSEC CUSTODIAN DUTIES AND
                      RESPONSIBILITIES                            91           

         154.  General                                            91
         155.  Receipt of Key                                     91
         156.  Accounting for Key                                 92
         157.  Notices from the KMS/CAO                           93
         158.-160.  Reserved                                      94           

          SECTION 4.  KEYING OF TERMINALS                         94           

         161.  Initial Keying of Terminals                        94
         162.-163.  Reserved                                      94           

          SECTION 5.  ACCOUNTABILITY                              94           

         164.  Cryto-Ignition Key Handling and Local Accounting   94
         165.-166.  Reserved                                      95           

          SECTION 6.  REKEYING                                    96           

         167.  Electronic Rekeying                                96
         168.-170.  Reserved                                      96           

          SECTION 7.  PHYSICAL SECURITY                           96           

         171.  Unkeyed Terminal Type 1                            96
         172.  Keyed Terminal                                     96
         173.  Terminal Display                                   97
         174.  Use by Other U.S. Personnel                        97
         175.  Use by Foreign Nationals                           98
         176.  Storage                                            98
         177.  Use of the Secure Data Mode                        98
         178.  After Hours Protection                             98           

          SECTION 8.  TRANSPORTATION                              98           

         179.  Type 1 Terminals                                   98
         180.-182.  Reserved                                      99           

          SECTION 9.  INSTALLATION                                99           

         183.  General                                            99
         184.  Residences                                         100
         185.-186.  Reserved                                      100          

          SECTION 10.  MAINTENANCE                                100          

         187.  General                                            100
         188.  Access                                             100
         189.-190.  Reserved                                      100          

         SECTION 11.  PROTECTION OF KEY STORAGE DEVICES           101          

         191.  General                                            101
         192.  Fill Devices                                       101
         193.  Crypto-Ignition Keys (CIKs)                        102
         194.  Protection and Use of the Micro-KMODC              104
         195.-198.  Reserved                                      104          

          SECTION 12.  DESTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION      104          

         199.  General Requirement                                104
         200.  Reserved                                           104          

          SECTION 13.  REPORTABLE INSECURITIES                    105          

         201.  Insecure Practice/COMSEC Incident Handling         105
         202.-204.  Reserved                                      106          

          SECTION 14.  RECORDS RETENTION                          106          

         205.  General                                            106
         206.-208.  Reserved                                      106          

      APPENDIX 1. REQUIRED FORMS AND REPORTS (2 pages)           1          

      APPENDIX 2. SAMPLE CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS BRIEFING (9 pages) 1          

      APPENDIX 3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS CERTIFICATE (1 page)      1          

      APPENDIX 4. SECURE TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITY 1 
 AND COMSEC ACCOUNT CHECKLIST (6 pages)                    

      APPENDIX 5. PUBLICATIONS TO BE MAINTAINED BY ALL 1 
 FAA COMSEC ACCOUNTS (2 pages)                             

      APPENDIX 6. PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR FIXED 1 
 COMSEC FACILITIES (3 pages)                               

      APPENDIX 7. STANDARDS FOR SAFEGUARDING KEYING MATERIAL     1
                     (4 pages)          

      APPENDIX 8. ROUTINE DESTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY PROTECTION 1 
 OF COMSEC MATERIAL (7 pages)                              

                           FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                         PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
                        DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552




                             CHAPTER 1. GENERAL                               

      1.  PURPOSE.  This order prescribes FAA standards and procedures
      for communications security (COMSEC) and implements changes in
      national COMSEC policy for FAA COMSEC operations.                        

      2.  DISTRIBUTION.  This order is distributed to Regional
      Administrators and Center Directors:  to the director level in
      the Office of System Engineering and Program Management, Office
      of Air Traffic System Management, Air Traffic Plans and
      Requirements Service, Advanced System Design Service, Office of
      Human Resource Development, Office of Training and Higher
      Education, and Logistics Service; to the division level in the
      Systems Maintenance Service, and Office of Civil Aviation
      Security, Operations to Emergency Operations Staff (ADA-20),
      Regional and Aeronautical Center Civil Aviation Security
      Divisions, Technical Center Civil Aviation Security Staff,
      Europe, Africa and Middle East Civil Aviation Security Staff; to
      COMSEC custodians including Air Route Traffic Control
      Centers; to the FAA manager/supervisor at each Joint Use System
      Long Range Radar Site; to Associate Program Managers for
      Engineering, Communications and Aircraft Acquisition Program.            

      3.  CANCELLATION.  Order 1600.8B, Communications Security
      (COMSEC), dated November 14, 1975, is canceled                           

      4.  EXPLANATION OF CHANGES.  This order updates FAA COMSEC
      policies and procedures to reflect national COMSEC policy
      guidance from the National Security Agency (NSA), and the U.S.
      Air Force (USAF).  It also establishes new training standards for
      individuals assigned as COMSEC custodians.  This revision:
           a.  Promulgates changes in national policy contained in NSA
      National COMSEC Instructions (NACSI) and National
      Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Instructions
      (NTISSI).                                                                

           b.  Establishes a Formal Cryptographic Access (FCA) Program
      in FAA to include mandatory requirements for cryptographic access
      briefings and Cryptographic Access Certificates.                         

           c.  Disseminates USAF guidance for implementing national
      COMSEC policy as set forth in USAF Regulations (AFR), USAF
      Special Purpose/Operational Miscellaneous (AFSAL) publications
      and related documents.                                                   

           d.  Prescribes policies and procedures governing the
      utilization and safeguarding of Controlled Cryptographic Items
      (CCI).                                                                   

           e.  Prescribes mandatory formal training requirements for
      COMSEC custodians.                                                       

           f.  Prescribes guidance concerning the Secure Terminal Unit
      (STU) III secure voice system.                                           

           g.  Establishes requirements for the inclusion of COMSEC
      duties and responsibilities as a Critical Job Element (CJE) in
      the individual performance standards for the COMSEC custodian and
      alternate(s).                                                            

      5.  DEFINITIONS.  The definitions contained in National
      Communications Security Committee (NCSC) 9 and Air Force
      Regulation (AFR) 56-2 apply to this order.  Definitions not
      contained in these references will be provided in the body of the
      order.                                                                   

      6.  FORMS AND REPORTS.  Appendix 1, Required Forms and Reports,
      contains a listing of the forms and reports required by this
      order.  Additional reporting requirements will be addressed in
      the portion of the order to which they pertain.                          

      7.  REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION.  Questions on the interpretation of
      the provisions of this order or their application shall be
      referred to the servicing security element in regions and centers
      or to the Director, Office of Civil Aviation Security,
      Operations, ACO-1, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington,
      D.C. 20591.                                                              

      8.  STATEMENT OF INTENT.  It is the intention of the FAA to
      ensure that requirements of the national COMSEC policy are fully
      understood and implemented by all having responsibilities for
      COMSEC operations and support within the agency.                         

      9.  SCOPE.                                                               

           a.  The provisions of this order apply to all FAA employees,
      military, civilian, and contractor, who are holders or users of
      NSA produced or authorized cryptographic information or who
      otherwise have access to such information, regardless of duty
      station, location, or position.                                          

           b.  FAA procurement actions which result in requirements for
      contractors to generate or utilize NSA approved or authorized/
      cryptographic information in the performance of the contract will
      be accomplished in accordance with Order 1600.56, Guidelines for
      FAA Participation in the Department of Defense (DOD) Industrial
      Security Program (ISP).  Access requirements shall be specified
      in accordance with National Telecommunications and Information
      Systems Security Policy (NTISSP) Number 3.                               

      10.  RESPONSIBILITIES.                                                   

           a.  Director, Office of Civil Aviation Security, ACO-1 is
      responsible for:                                                         

                (1)  Implementing the national COMSEC policy and the
      provisions of this order within the FAA.                                 

                (2)  Recommending policies for safeguarding of FAA
      information and data using COMSEC techniques to provide the
      required degree of protection.                                           

                (3)  Ensuring that cryptologic access briefings and
      debriefings are conducted and that cryptographic access
      certificates are signed in accordance with provisions of this
      order.                                                                   

                (4)  Establishing and ensuring the implementation of
      standards and procedures for handling, safeguarding, accounting,
      destruction, storage, access and control of classified and
      unclassified COMSEC and other NSA approved and authorized
      cryptographic materials in accordance with national COMSEC policy
      and this order.                                                          

                (5)  Developing standards and procedures for physical
      and environmental security of FAA cryptographic communications
      installations.                                                           

                (6)  Ensuring in coordination with the Program Director
      for Communications, FAA COMSEC equipment installations are
      designed in accordance with applicable national COMSEC policies
      pertaining to on-line and TEMPEST engineering standards.                 

                (7)  Monitoring headquarters, region, and center COMSEC
      accounts and appointment of COMSEC custodians.                           

                (8)  Ensuring that countermeasures and specialized
      communications security inspections are conducted of COMSEC
      secure communications areas in accordance with NSA and USAF
      directives, and this order.                                              

           b.  National Airspace System Engineering Service, ASE, is
      responsible for:                                                         

                (1)  Development of National Airspace System (NAS)
      plan/and baseline system requirements for COMSEC systems.                

                (2)  Ensuring the baselined COMSEC system requirements
      and interface requirements are consistent with national COMSEC
      engineering and security standards established by the NSA.               

                (3)  Formulating guidance and standards applicable to
      acquisition of facilities and equipment including COMSEC systems.        

                (4)  Coordination with the Office of Civil Aviation
      Security, on NAS plans and NAS system specifications involving
      COMSEC security requirements and resources.                              

           c.  Office of Air Traffic Systems Management, ATM, is
      responsible for:                                                         

                (1)  Establishing COMSEC requirements for support of
      air traffic control operational telecommunications.                      

                (2)  Developing and recommending national guidance,
      standards, and procedures for implementation of COMSEC in the
      security control of military and other air traffic pursuant to
      the FAA's support of the national defense.                               

                (3)  Coordination with the Office of Civil Aviation
      Security in establishing procedures and standards for the
      identification of sensitive and classified information and data
      in the air traffic control system requiring COMSEC protection.           

                (4)  Ensuring that sensitive and classified
      telecommunications in the air traffic control system are
      safeguarded in accordance with national COMSEC policy.                   

           d.  Air Traffic Plans and Requirements Service, ATR, is
      responsible for:                                                         

                (1)  Coordination with the Office of Civil Aviation
      Security in developing and implementing procedures and standards
      for the identification of COMSEC support required to ensure a
      secure and effective air traffic system telecommunications
      capability.                                                              

                (2)  Serving as the air traffic system focal point for
      coordination of COMSEC programs and requirements in support of
      the NAS.
           e.  Systems Maintenance Service, ASM, is responsible for:           

                (1)  Coordination with the Office of Civil Aviation
      Security to:                                                             

                     (a)  Identify requirements for communications
      security during network planning and engineering of future
      telecommunications networks or expansions or modifications to
      present networks.                                                        

                     (b)  Ensure operational compliance with
      communications security requirements in telecommunications
      maintenance support.                                                     

                (2)  Participate in the development of maintenance
      planning for COMSEC equipment and systems in the FAA, including
      identification of required COMSEC maintenance training for FAA
      personnel.                                                               

           f.  Office of Human Resource Development, AHD, is
      responsible for:                                                         

                (1)  Providing administrative and technical guidance
      and support for inclusion of the COMSEC custodian position in the
      Performance Evaluation Rating (PER) system.                              

                (2)  Establishing standards and criteria for
      designating the responsibilities of the custodian and alternate
      as CJE'S.                                                                

           g.  Office of Training and Higher Education, AHT, is
      responsible for:                                                         

                (1)  Providing administrative and technical guidance
      and support for mandatory training for custodians at the USAF
      COMSEC Account Management course.                                        

                (2)  Establishing and incorporating in appropriate
      directives criteria for evaluation of COMSEC responsibilities and
      training in career development programs for selected employees.          

           h.  Office of Labor and Employee Relations, ALR, is
      responsible for facilitating the implementation of the
      requirements of this order as required.                                  

           i.  Regions and Centers are responsible for implementation
      of this order within their areas of jurisdiction.                        

           j.  Office of Air Traffic System Management, Air Traffic
      Plans and Requirements Service, Systems Maintenance Service,
      National Airspace System Engineering Service are responsible for:        

                (1)  Implementing this order in those organizations
      that report to them who have a requirement for access to COMSEC
      information.                                                             

                (2)  Ensuring that COMSEC custodians receive formal
      COMSEC account management training and that operators and
      maintenance personnel are properly trained in procedures for
      safeguarding and handling of COMSEC material required in the
      performance of their duties.                                             

                (3)  Ensuring that all authorized COMSEC materials are
      properly obtained, procured, installed, operated, safeguarded,
      destroyed, or transferred when no longer required.                       

                (4)  Ensuring that viable emergency plans exist to
      minimize the risk of compromise of COMSEC materials during crisis
      situations.                                                              

           k.  Region and Center Civil Aviation Security Divisions and
      Staffs are responsible for:                                              

                (1)  Ensuring that COMSEC information and material in
      offices and activities under their control or jurisdiction are
      safeguarded and controlled in accordance with this order.                

                (2)  Providing staff guidance, assistance, and
      interpretation with regard to this order.                                

                (3)  Conducting COMSEC account inspections.                    

                (4)  Ensuring that insecurities involving COMSEC
      materials are reported to cognizant authorities in a timely and
      comprehensive manner as required by U.S. Air Force General
      Publication (AFKAG) 2 and NTISSI-4003.                                   

                (5)  Developing and administering a Cryptologic Access
      Program in accordance with provisions of chapter 2, of this
      directive, to include the following:                                     

                     (a)  Ensuring that all personnel within their
      jurisdiction requiring access to U.S. classified cryptographic
      information sign a Cryptologic Access Certificate (AFCOMSEC Form
      9) prior to being granted access in accordance with provisions of
      Chapter 2 of this order and                                              

                     (b)  Ensuring that the signed cryptographic access
      certificate is made a permanent part of the individual employee's
      official security records and is accounted for in accordance with
      provisions of Order 1600.1C concerning retention of security
      clearance/access certificates.                                           

           l.  COMSEC Custodian is the properly appointed individual
      who manages and controls the accountable COMSEC material in the
      COMSEC Material Control System charged to his/her activity with
      responsibilities which include:                                          

                (1)  The receipt, storage, amendment, accountability,
      inventory, and issuance of COMSEC material charged to his/her
      account and destruction or transfer of material when it is no
      longer required.                                                         

                (2)  Ensuring that appropriate COMSEC material is
      readily available to properly authorized individuals whose duties
      require its use.                                                         

                (3)  Ensuring that all persons requiring access to U.S.
      classified cryptographic information receive a cryptographic
      access briefing in accordance with this directive and sign a
      cryptographic access certificate before they are permitted
      access.                                                                  

                (4)  Advising users and supervisors, as appropriate, of
      the required protection and procedures which must be provided
      COMSEC material issued to them for use, including the authorized
      procedures for destruction or disposition of such material when
      it is no longer required.                                                

                (5)  Reporting COMSEC insecurities in accordance with
      instructions in AFKAG-2 and NTISSI-4003.  COMSEC insecurities
      fall into three categories, cryptographic, personnel and
      physical.  Specific examples of each type are given in NTISSI
      4003.                                                                    

           m.  Individual users are responsible for:                           

                (1)  Knowledge of the requirements of this order.              

                (2)  Safeguarding and proper employment of all COMSEC
      material he or she uses or for which he or she is responsible in
      accordance with the provisions of this order.                            

                (3)  Promptly reporting to the custodian any
      occurrences, circumstances, or acts which could jeopardize the
      security of COMSEC material.  Should the custodian be unavailable
      the report is submitted to the servicing security element or
      ACO-300.                                                                 

           p.  Program Manager, Communications and Aircraft
      Acquisition, ANC-1, is responsible for:                                  

                (1)  Management of engineering planning, development,
      acquisition, and implementation of COMSEC equipments and systems
      in support of FAA requirements and the national COMSEC policy.           

                (2)  Recommending, through coordination with the Office
      of Air Traffic System Management and the Office of Civil Aviation
      Security, and other Federal Agencies, appropriate COMSEC
      equipments and systems to meet identified needs.                         

                (3)  Identification of required maintenance training
      for FAA personnel in coordination with the Systems Maintenance
      Service and the Office of Training and Higher Education.                 

                (4)  Coordination with the Office of Civil Aviation
      Security, Operations, to ensure that plans and specifications for
      COMSEC installations are reviewed and meet all FAA NSA security
      requirements prior to installation.                                      

                (5)  Developing and recommending engineering standards
      and procedures to implement national TEMPEST and COMSEC
      engineering criteria for the secure installation and operation of
      COMSEC equipment in the FAA in concert with ACS.                         

      11.  INTERPRETATION.  Questions regarding the interpretation of
      the provisions of this order or their application shall be
      referred to the Regional or Center Civil Aviation Security
      Division or Staff, or to the Manager, Investigations and Security
      Division, ACO-300, Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations,
      800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C., 20591.                  

      12.  AUTHORITY TO CHANGE THIS ORDER.  The Assistant Administrator
      for Civil Aviation Security is authorized to issue changes to
      this order which do not contain policy, assign responsibilities,
      or delegate authority.                                                   

      13.-19.  RESERVED.                                                       

                            FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                          PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
                        DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552




               CHAPTER 2. POLICY FOR GRANTING ACCESS TO U.S. 
 CLASSIFIED CRYTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION                       

                             SECTION 1.  POLICY                                

      20.  GENERAL.  In accordance with policies established by the
      National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security
      Committee (NTISSC) in National Telecommunications and Information
      Systems Security Policy (NTISSP) Number 3, issued in December
      1988, and implemented by the Air Force Systems Security
      Instruction (AFSSI) 4000 of October 1, 1989, the FAA requires
      special access controls for certain U.S. classified cryptographic
      information, the loss of which would cause serious or
      exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security.  This order
      provides policy, guidelines, and procedures as applicable to the
      Formal Cryptographic Access (FCA) Program.  It provides for an
      individual's eligibility, unofficial foreign-travel requirements,
      contacts with foreign nationals, procedures for granting and
      withdrawing FCA, and actions to take when personnel decline FCA.         

      21.  POLICY.  A formal Cryptographic Access Program is
      established in the FAA whereby access to certain U.S. classified
      cryptographic information shall only be granted to individuals
      who satisfy the criteria set forth herein.  All FAA employees and
      FAA contractor employees assigned duties as communications
      security (COMSEC) custodians; alternate COMSEC custodians; COMSEC
      accountants; COMSEC inspectors; cryptoequipment maintenance and
      installation personnel; key distribution center (KDC) personnel;
      telecommunications center personnel; any personnel identified by
      ACO-300; and any other persons who work full time in the above
      areas who have access to the cryptomaterial must have the FCA to
      meet the requirements of this order as well as the requirements
      established for two-person integrity.                                    

                           SECTION 2.  DEFINITION                              

      22.  CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.  The terms used in this order are
      defined in AFR 56-2.  For the purposes of this directive U.S.
      classified cryptographic information is defined as:                      

           a.  TOP SECRET and SECRET, CRYPTO designated, key and
      authenticators.                                                          

           b.  All cryptographic media which embody, describe, or
      implement classified cryptographic logic; this includes full
      maintenance manuals, cryptographic descriptions, drawings of
      cryptographic logics, specifications describing a cryptographic
      logic, cryptographic computer software, or any other media which
      may be specifically identified by the NTISSC.                            

                            SECTION 3.  CRITERIA                               

      23.  ACCESS REQUIREMENTS.  An individual may be granted access to
      U.S. classified cryptographic information, only if that
      individual:                                                              

           a.  Is a U.S. citizen.                                              

           b.  Is an FAA employee or is a U.S. Government-cleared
      contractor approved by ACO-300.                                          

           c.  Possesses a security clearance appropriate to the
      classification of the U.S. cryptographic information to be
      accessed.                                                                

           d.  Possesses a valid need-to-know that has been determined
      to be necessary to perform duties for, or on behalf, of FAA.             

           e.  Receives a security briefing from the servicing security
      element in regions and centers, or from ACO-300 in headquarters,
      detailing the sensitive nature of cryptomaterial and the
      individual's responsibility for protecting cryptomaterial.
      Appendix 2 contains the text of the briefing.                            

           f.  Acknowledges the granting of such access by signing the
      Cryptographic Access Certificate AFCOMSEC Form 9 an example of
      which is contained in Appendix 3 of this order.                          

      24.  POLYGRAPH.  The NTISSP Number 3 provides for utilization of
      non lifestyle counterintelligence polygraph examinations under
      certain conditions.  FAA has determined however that the use of
      the polygraph will not be a requirement in the FAA COMSEC
      Program.                                                                 

      25.  CONTACTS WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS AND UNOFFICIAL FOREIGN
      TRAVEL TO COMMUNIST OR OTHER DESIGNATED COUNTRIES.                       

           a.  All FAA employees possessing an FCA must advise their
      servicing security element of all contacts with nationals of the
      listed governments and receive written permission from their
      facility or office manager with an information copy to the
      servicing security element and to ACO-300 for unofficial travel
      to these countries.                                                      

           Afghanistan                   Latvia
           Albania                       Libyan Arab Republic
           Angola                        Lithuania
           Berlin (Soviet Sector)        Mongolian Peoples
           Bulgaria                       Republic (Outer
           Cambodia (Kampuchia)           Mongolia)
           Peoples Republic of           Nicaragua
            China (Including Tibet)      Poland
           Cuba                          Rumania
           Czechoslovakia                South Yemen
           Estonia                       Syria
           Ethiopia                      Union of Soviet
           Hungarian Peoples             Socialist Republics
            Republic (Hungary)            (Russia)
           Iran                          Democratic Republic of
           Iraq                           Vietnam (North
           Democratic Peoples             Vietnam)
            Republic of Korea            South Vietnam
            (North Korea)                Yugoslavia
           Laos                                                                

           b.  The above restrictions are in addition to those
      requirements of Order 1600.61, Defensive Security Briefing
      Requirements for FAA Employees Traveling to Communist-Controlled
      Countries.                                                               

              SECTION 4.  GRANTING FORMAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS                 

      26.  SCOPE.  This policy shall apply to all FAA employees
      civilian and military who satisfy the requirements of Section 3,
      above, and whose official duties require continuing access to
      U.S. classified cryptographic information.  Procedures to be
      followed in the granting of a Cryptographic Access Certificate
      are as follows:                                                          

           a.  COMSEC Manager and Custodian.  The COMSEC custodian or
      the manager responsible for COMSEC operations in a facility or
      office shall:                                                            

                (1)   Upon receipt of this order take appropriate
      action to coordinate with the supporting personnel office and the
      servicing security element to provide them with the names and
      positions of all personnel requiring FCA.                                

                (2)  Immediately notify the servicing security element
      of any change in status or need-to-know of individuals having
      FCA.                                                                     

            b.  Personnel Offices.  The personnel office will
      coordinate with the supporting security element to accomplish the
      following:                                                               

                (1)  To ensure that the master record reflects the
      requirement for FCA, and to arrange for the procedures to be
      followed to provide the required briefing, as well as
      need-to-know and clearance verification for each individual.             

                (2)  The personnel office will be responsible for
      entering into the Consolidated Management Information System
      (CPMIS) the correct information pertaining to FCA requirements
      for designated positions.                                                

                (3)  To develop procedures that will ensure that the
      servicing security element is informed whenever individuals with
      FCA change positions, terminate or otherwise no longer have need
      for the FCA in accordance with this directive.                           

                (4)  To coordinate with the servicing security element
      and to take such additional actions as may be required to ensure
      that the national security objectives of the FCA are supported
      and implemented.                                                         

           c.  Servicing Security Element.  The servicing security
      element will designate in writing an individual to serve as the
      FCA point-of-contact for implementation and coordination of the
      FCA Program.  This individual may be the personnel security
      officer and will be responsible for implementing the FCA Program
      within his/her area of responsibility.  To include the following
      actions:                                                                 

                (1)  Ensure that the requirements of this order are
      met.                                                                     

                (2)  Provide guidance to operating offices and
      personnel offices on the FCA Program.                                    

                (3)  Ensure that clearance data and other relevant
      information pertinent to individuals seeking FCA is correct and
      is entered into the CPMIS and Civil Aviation Security Information
      System (CASIS) to the extent that is necessary to permit accurate
      tracking of individuals in the FCA Program.                              

                (4)  Coordinate with Personnel and the operating
      facility or office to schedule briefing indoctrinations required
      for FCA and to obtain required signatures on Cryptographic Access
      Certificates (AFCOMSEC Form 9).                                          

                (5)  Ensure that the properly filled out AFCOMSEC Form
      9 (Cryptographic Access Certificate) is handled, documented, and
      retained as required by Order 1600.1C for clearance
      certifications.                                                          

           d.  Cryptographic Access Certificate.                               

                (1)  The facility or office manager having
      responsibility for the COMSEC operation or his or her designated
      representative in coordination with the supporting personnel
      office and the servicing security element will establish
      procedures for briefing personnel requiring FCA.                         

                (2)  Upon completion of the required briefing each
      individual requiring FCA will be asked to sign the Cryptographic
      Access Certificate.  The manager will normally sign as witness to
      the signature of the persons being granted access.                       

                (3)  The original copy of the signed certificate will
      be forwarded to the servicing security element in regions and
      centers, and to ACO-300 in the Washington Headquarters, where it
      will be permanently retained.                                            

           e.  Local Tracking Procedures for FCA.  Each facility or
      office having personnel assigned duties in paragraph 21 will, in
      coordination with the supporting Personnel Office and the
      servicing security element, develop written procedures, to
      include out-processing, for reporting the granting and
      termination of FCA.                                                      

           f.  FAA employees requiring an FCA at TDY locations and who
      meet all requirements of the FCA Program will be briefed prior to
      their departure and asked to sign the Cryptographic Access
      Certificate.  When all requirements have been met, clearance
      status notifications will include the fact that the individual
      has FCA.                                                                 

      27.  PREPARING AFCOMSEC FORM 9.                                          

           a.  AFCOMSEC Form 9.  (Appendix 3)  Include the following
      information on the AFCOMSEC Form 9:                                      

                (1)  Installation.  Facility or office where the
      individual is permanently assigned.                                      

                (2)  Unit or Office Symbol.  Individual's office and
      office symbol.                                                           

                (3)  Supporting COMSEC Account.  Self-explanatory.             

                (4)  Signature.  Payroll signature.                            

                (5)  Name.  Full name, last name, first name, middle
      initial.                                                                 

                (6)  SSN:  Will contain dashes (that is 001-01-0001)           

                (7)  Grade and Date of Birth.  Self-explanatory.               

                (8)  In Section 2, paragraph B, a line will be drawn
      through the last sentence in this paragraph which reads:  "I
      understand that I am subject to and consent to a periodic,
      counterintelligence polygraph examination."  This modification
      will be initialed both by the person signing the form and by the
      witness.                                                                 

      NOTE:  Type AFCOMSEC Forms 9 to ensure legibility and accuracy of
      the information.  The servicing security element and ACS-300 will
      return AFCOMSEC Forms 9 not properly and completely filled in.           

           b.  FAA Cryptographic Access Program.  Prepare three copies
      of AFCOMSEC Form 9.  Forward the original signed certificate to
      the servicing security element in regions and centers and to
      ACS-300 in the Washington Headquarters; one copy to the
      individual; and one copy for retention by the local COMSEC
      account (Folder 2).  Maintain locally retained certificates as
      long as individuals require cryptographic access.  Termination
      statements shall be copies of the locally retained certificate
      with the properly filled in bottom portion.                              

           c.  Supply of AFCOMSEC Forms 9.  Initial distribution of
      AFCOMSEC Forms 9 will be made by ACO-300 to servicing security
      elements in regions and centers who in turn will distribute the
      forms to the accounts for which they have monitor responsibility.
      After initial distribution, forms should be requisitioned as
      needed in accordance with guidance provided in AFKAG-2.                  

      28.  WITHDRAWING FCA.                                                    

           a.  Once granted the FCA may be withdrawn for only three
      reasons:                                                                 

                (1)  Administrative.  An individual is being reassigned
      by the facility or office manager to a position not requiring
      FCA, or a person is being reassigned to another FAA facility or
      region or is terminating employment.
                (2)  Suspension.  If a person's security clearance or
      any special access is suspended as outlined in Order 1600.1C,
      that person's FCA must be suspended until the matter is
      adjudicated favorably.  Suspension of the FCA requires that the
      individual be removed from COMSEC custodian and accounting duties
      that require access to cryptographic material until a final
      determination of reinstatement or revocation can be made.                

                (3)  Revocation.  Any person who has a security
      clearance withdrawn or special access denied will also have the
      FCA revoked.  This revocation of FCA is permanent and cannot be
      reinstated and permanently bars the individual from ever being
      assigned to duties within the areas in paragraph 21.                     

           b.  Facility and office managers will advise the servicing
      security element by message of any change in a person's FCA
      status resulting from suspension or revocation including reason
      for suspension or revocation.  The servicing security element
      will advise ACO-300 by message of all such actions.  In addition
      the facility and office manager will send an original copy of the
      Cryptographic Access Certificate to the servicing security
      element.  Keep a copy of the Cryptographic Access Certificate for
      90 days after signature for local records.                               

      29.  CERTIFICATES OF PERSONNEL DECLINING CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS.
      Send the original copy of certificates of any personnel who
      decline to sign the Cryptographic Access Certificates through the
      servicing security element to ACO-300 for permanent retention.
      Certificates should contain all the information on the individual
      less the signature.  State that the individual has refused FCA on
      the face of the form and on the administering official's
      signature and signature block.                                           

      30.-34.  RESERVED.                                                       

                             FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                           PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
                         DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552




           CHAPTER 3. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC) DUTIES AND 
 RESPONSIBILITIES                                        

      35.  GENERAL.  All COMSEC material shall be entered into and
      retained in the COMSEC accounting system from the time of its
      origin until its ultimate destruction.  COMSEC accounts are
      established when a facility or activity manager has a need for
      secure information processing, and application is made through
      the servicing security element and ACO-300 to the USAF
      Cryptologic Support Center (AFCSC).  Upon approval by AFCSC the
      type of COMSEC account established will vary according to the
      mission it supports.  Within the FAA the two most common types of
      accounts are operational and administrative or monitor accounts.         

      36.  COMSEC CUSTODIANS AND ALTERNATES.                                   

           a.  Designation.  When a COMSEC account has been authorized
      the cognizant facility or office manager will appoint a qualified
      COMSEC custodian and at least one alternate custodian.  The
      appointment will be made in writing by properly completing an Air
      Force COMSEC (AFCOMSEC) Form 3, Appointment of COMSEC Custodians,
      for each COMSEC account.                                                 

                (1)  Managers of Civil Aviation Security Divisions
      shall be the appointing officials for COMSEC monitor accounts
      under their security cognizance.                                         

                (2)  The Manager, Investigations and Security Division,
      Operations, ACO-300, will be the appointing official for the
      headquarters COMSEC monitor account custodian and alternate.             

           b.  Grade Requirements.                                             

                (1)  FAA COMSEC custodians must be grade GS-9 or above.        

                (2)  FAA alternate custodians must be grade GS-7 or
      higher.                                                                  

           c.  Clearance Requirements.  Custodians and alternate
      custodian(s) positions are designated as non-critical sensitive
      for COMSEC accounts handling material at the Secret level or
      lower classification; for accounts handling Top Secret material
      the custodian and alternate custodian(s) positions are designated
      as critical sensitive.  Persons designated to fill these
      positions must be cleared for the highest classification of
      COMSEC material they will be required to handle or have access
      to.  Requirements are as follows:                                        

                (1)  For Top Secret COMSEC accounts, the designating
      official must ensure that persons designated as custodians and
      alternate custodians have a final Top Secret clearance based on a
      favorably adjudicated background investigation completed within
      the past 5 years.  Periodic reinvestigations (PRI) will be
      conducted within 5 years from the date of the last Sensitive
      Background Information, Background Information, or PRI in
      accordance with Order 1600.1C.                                           

                (2)  For COMSEC accounts handling classified material
      up to and including Secret, the designating official must ensure
      that the individuals designated as custodian and alternate
      custodian(s) as a minimum, have a final Secret clearance based on
      a favorably adjudicated Minimum Background Investigation (MBI).
      A PRI is recommended 5 years after placement and every 5 years
      thereafter.                                                              

                (3)  In making selections for custodian and alternate
      custodian the designating official shall give preference to
      qualified candidates who have maximum retainability in their
      current assignment.  Other considerations include the following:         

                     (a)  The individual must never have been relieved
      from COMSEC custodian duties for cause.                                  

                     (b)  If practical, custodians and alternate
      custodians should be selected on the basis of best qualified
      rather than seniority.  In this regard, consideration should be
      given to the following:                                                  

                          1  Persons with a background in COMSEC.              

                          2  Persons having a minimum total of three
      years previous COMSEC experience.                                        

      37.  TRAINING.                                                           

           a.  COMSEC Custodian.  For the purposes of this order the
      following shall apply:                                                   

                (1)  For individuals who have had no prior COMSEC
      experience and for individuals who have not been actively engaged
      in COMSEC activities during the 3 years prior to the date of
      their designation, attendance at the three week COMSEC Account
      Management Course conducted by the USAF is mandatory.                    

                     (a)  It is the responsibility of the FAA manager
      or other official designating the custodian to ensure that the
      designee is scheduled for attendance at this course within 60
      days of the date of appointment.                                         

                     (b)  Because the waiting period for this
      particular course is often several months, it is important that
      requests for allocations be submitted through appropriate
      region/center channels as soon as possible.                              

                     (c)  Additional information concerning this course
      may be obtained from the servicing security element, or from
      ACO-300, Washington, D.C.                                                

                (2)  For employees who have attended the U.S. Air Force
      COMSEC Account Management Course or other formal COMSEC training
      provided by the government within the past 3 years prior to their
      designation as custodian, attendance at the USAF COMSEC Account
      Management Training Course will normally not be required.
      Similarly, employees who have been actively engaged in COMSEC
      operations during the 3 years prior to their designation, will
      not be required to attend formal COMSEC training provided the
      nature of their duties has enabled them to develop the skills and
      proficiency required to perform the duties of custodian.                 

           b.  Alternate COMSEC Custodian(s).  Training for the
      employee(s) designated as alternate COMSEC custodian(s) is
      important, since the alternate performs the duties of the
      custodian in the custodian's absence.                                    

                (1)  Normally if the individual(s) designated as
      alternate custodian(s) have been engaged in COMSEC activities
      during the 3 years prior to their designation additional formal
      training will not be required.  It is highly desirable that at
      least one alternate custodian attend the 3 week USAF COMSEC
      Account Management Course.                                               

                (2)  As a minimum, however, it is mandatory that
      alternate custodians who have not been actively engaged in COMSEC
      activities during the 3 years prior to their designation be
      scheduled to attend approved COMSEC training of shorter duration
      than the USAF course within 60 days of their appointment.                

                     (a)  Courses approved for alternate custodian
      training include COMSEC account management training courses
      offered by the General Services Administration (GSA).  These are
      1 week training courses in COMSEC accounting offered at various
      times during the year in different geographic locations.                 

                     (b)  Allocations for GSA courses are obtained
      through appropriate region/center personnel training channels.
      Information concerning these courses is available from the
      General Services Administration, Communications Security Training
      Center, ATTN:  Registrar 7 KET-6, 1500 East Bannister Road,
      Kansas City, MO 64131-3087.                                              

           c.  Qualification Training Package.  As an interim training
      measure while an individual is awaiting a class date for the
      COMSEC Account Management Course in the case of custodians, or
      the GSA course for alternate custodians, the Qualification
      Training Package (QTP) should be used.  This is an Air Force
      produced COMSEC Account Management training package designed for
      self-study.  Requests for this package should be addressed to
      ACO-300 through the servicing security element.                          

           d.   Recurrent Training.  Recurrent training for COMSEC
      custodians and alternates shall be scheduled as necessary to
      ensure that individuals maintain a high level of proficiency in
      COMSEC account management procedures and practices.  Recurrent or
      proficiency training should be scheduled when the custodian
      determines that such training is required to achieve the required
      level of proficiency.                                                    

           e.  Coordination.  The servicing security element COMSEC
      monitor account will be provided an information copy of all
      requests for COMSEC training for custodians and alternate
      custodians.                                                              

      38.  WAIVERS.                                                            

           a.  Problems encountered in meeting minimum grade or
      training requirements for custodians or alternate custodians will
      be referred to ACO-300, through the appropriate servicing
      security element.                                                        

           b.  Where operational necessity is a consideration a request
      for waiver of minimum requirements may be submitted.                     

           c.  ACO-300 will be the approving authority for all waiver
      requests.  If a waiver is granted, it applies only to the
      designated individual and must not be transferred; it applies to
      the designated individual only while currently assigned; and it
      must be terminated if a qualified person meeting minimum grade
      requirements becomes available.  In addition, the waiver must be
      renewed annually.  Include the following information in all
      requests:                                                                

                (1)  COMSEC account number.                                    

                (2)  Name, grade, and clearance of the individuals
      desired for appointment.                                                 

                (3)  Present duty assignment.                                  

                (4)  Type custodian (primary or alternate).                    

                (5)  Complete justification.                                   

                (6)  Reason for nonselection, if applicable, of
      assigned individuals who are senior in grade and meet all other
      selection criterions.                                                    

                (7)  Date of any known projected personnel gains who
      would meet the minimum grade and/or training requirements.               

                (8)  Date the appointment is planned.                          

      39.  DUTIES OF THE COMSEC CUSTODIAN.  Specific duties for which
      the COMSEC custodian is responsible include the following:               

           a.  The development and implementation of a comprehensive
      user-training program for all persons who, in performing official
      duties, deal with COMSEC material.  An example would be the
      employees responsible for operation of COMSEC equipment at Joint
      Use Sites.  The training will include programs for user personnel
      that ensure these individuals are completely familiar with their
      duties and responsibilities in areas of control, physical
      protection, inventory and destruction of COMSEC material, and
      reporting of security hazards, violations, and possible
      compromises.  Refresher training is required as needed.                  

           b.  Ensure that requirements established in FAA's Formal
      Cryptographic Access (FCA) Program are understood and
      implemented.  This includes ensuring that personnel having an
      operational need for access have received a cryptographic access
      briefing, and have signed a Cryptographic Access Certificate,
      AFCOMSEC Form 9, as required by this order.                              

           c.  Be thoroughly familiar with directives concerning
      classified material such as Order 1600.2C, National Security
      Information.                                                             

           d.  Issue on hand receipt, all COMSEC material to users who
      need it for their job and ensure that all responsible users of
      this material know the procedures for protecting, accounting,
      destroying, and reporting possible compromise of such material.          

           e.  In coordination with the facility emergency planning
      staff, develop written plans to protect COMSEC materials in an
      emergency, and ensure that the plans are integrated with the
      facility contingency plan.  Train COMSEC personnel in their
      duties under the plan and ensure that adequate and appropriate
      destruction equipment and materials are readily available.               

           f.  Ensure that all necessary and appropriate COMSEC
      material is maintained by the account and that disposition
      instructions have been requested from the Central Office of
      Record (COR) for surplus or unneeded material.  Prepare and
      submit accounting reports promptly and accurately.                       

           g.  Ensure that standard operating procedures (SOP) are
      prepared as required, for secure and efficient conduct of
      COMSEC/operations within the cryptofacility.                             

      40.  PERFORMANCE STANDARDS.                                              

           a.  General.  The position of COMSEC custodian and that of
      alternate COMSEC custodian require persons of unquestioned
      integrity and loyalty.  The quality of the work performance of
      individuals in these positions has a direct reflection on the
      national security of the United States and is a vital factor in
      the support provided by the FAA COMSEC effort to the National
      Airspace System.  It is appropriate therefore that the position
      descriptions (PD) for individuals designated as COMSEC custodian
      or alternate COMSEC custodian include the COMSEC responsibilities
      assigned to that individual.                                             

           b.  Requirement.  Managers responsible for performance
      evaluation rating of individuals designated as COMSEC custodians
      or alternate COMSEC custodians will:                                     

                (1)  Ensure that the PD's include the COMSEC
      responsibilities of the individual(s).                                   

                (2)  Identify the COMSEC responsibility as a critical
      job element (CJE) in the performance standards for the
      individual(s).                                                           

      41.  APPOINTMENT OF CUSTODIANS AND ALTERNATES.                           

           a.  Each COMSEC account must have a COMSEC custodian and at
      least one alternate COMSEC custodian.  From a practical
      viewpoint, the COMSEC custodian should be thoroughly familiar
      with the day-to-day transactions of the COMSEC account.                  

           b.  As part of their monitor responsibilities, servicing
      security elements will:                                                  

                (1)  Ensure that proposed custodians and alternates
      meet the clearance requirements and qualifications for
      appointment as described in paragraph 21.                                

                (2)  Obtain original signatures of the designated
      custodian and alternate(s) in the proper blocks on each of four
      copies (three copies when action concerns a monitoring account)
      of AFCOMSEC Form 3.                                                      

                (3)  Ensure that all applicable blocks of all copies of
      the AFCOMSEC Form 3 are completed, including the "Effective Date"
      and "From" block.                                                        

                (4)  Forward the original copy of AFCOMSEC Form 3 under
      a covering letter to the Air Force Cryptologic Support Center
      (AFCSC), Attention:  MMIC, San Antonio, Texas 78243.  Refer to
      Situation F-2, AFKAG-2.  The letter should designate appointment
      or rescission of a custodian or alternate(s), as appropriate.
      One copy of AFCOMSEC Form 3 will be forwarded to FAA
      Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 20591, Attention:  ACO-300.  One
      copy shall be retained by the servicing security element
      monitoring account, and one copy shall be retained in the
      operational account.                                                     

      42.  MONITORING RESPONSIBILITIES.                                        

           a.  FAA/USAF Agreement.  By agreement with the U.S. Air
      Force (USAF), FAA will provide for the monitoring of all FAA
      COMSEC accounts.  The Manager, Investigations and Security
      Division, Operations, ACO-300, is responsible for the agencywide
      COMSEC monitoring effort at the headquarters level.  ACO-300 is
      also responsible for monitoring the administrative/monitor
      accounts of the regions, Aeronautical Center and Technical
      Center, and the operational and user accounts at the Washington
      Telecommunications Center.  The regional and center servicing
      security elements have been established as administrative
      accounts with the responsibility for the monitoring of
      operational and secure telecommunications facilities within their
      respective jurisdictions.                                                

           b.  Monitor/Inspection Requirements.  Monitor and inspection
      activities shall be conducted in accordance with the following
      requirements:                                                            

                (1)  Regional and center monitor accounts shall conduct
      a general inspection of each operational COMSEC account and
      secure telecommunication facility in their jurisdiction at least
      once each year.  Additional inspections will be conducted as
      required by Order 1650.7B.                                               

                (2)  Appendix 4, Secure Telecommunications Facility and
      COMSEC Account Checklist, shall be used as a guide in the conduct
      of the inspection.  The completion of the checklist does not in
      itself constitute a COMSEC inspection.  The inspector must be
      competent and knowledgeable in all phases of COMSEC.  A formal
      written report containing the results of the inspection and
      recommended corrective actions shall be provided to the facility
      or office manager having responsibility for the COMSEC operation,
      and to the custodian of the inspected account.  An information
      copy of COMSEC inspection reports shall be provided to ACO-300,
      ATTN:  ACO-320.                                                          

                (3)  Technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM)
      inspections of secure telecommunications facilities shall be
      conducted in accordance with provisions of this order and Order
      1600.12C, Technical Security Countermeasures Program.                    

                (4)  ACO-300 will inspect regional and center monitor
      accounts at least once every two years.  In addition, ACO-300
      will schedule COMSEC inspections and surveys as required
      agencywide to ensure effective monitoring of regional and center
      COMSEC programs.                                                         

           c.  Administrative Requirements.                                    

                (1)  The custodian of each FAA COMSEC account shall
      forward a copy of all reports, correspondence, etc., pertaining
      to COMSEC accounting to his/her servicing security element
      monitoring account.  Regional and center monitor accounts shall
      provide copies of the documents pertaining to their account
      operations to ACO-300, ATTN:  ACO-320.  Conversely, AFCSC sends a
      copy of all reports, correspondence, etc., it originates to the
      appropriate monitoring account.                                          

                (2)  The monitoring account shall review these
      documents and ensure the completeness, accuracy, and timeliness
      of the accounting actions.  In the event that a monitor account
      receives a copy of a discrepancy report from AFCSC, the monitor
      account custodian shall ensure that the required corrective
      action is accomplished expeditiously.                                    

      43.-49.  RESERVED.                                                       

                      FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                       PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
                     DETERMINED UNDER U.S.C. 552










                 CHAPTER 4. SAFEGUARDING COMSEC FACILITIES                    

                             SECTION 1.  GENERAL                               

      50.  PURPOSE.  National Communications Security Instruction
      (NACSI) 4008, Safeguarding COMSEC Facilities, dated March 4,
      1983, prescribes standards for safeguarding COMSEC Facilities.
      NACSI 4008 is implemented for all USAF supported COMSEC accounts
      by Air Force Regulation AFR 56-6, same subject, dated November 3,
      1986, all FAA COMSEC accounts are required to comply with the
      policies and procedures established in these directives.  This
      chapter identifies specific requirements for which compliance is
      mandatory.                                                               

      51.  REFERENCED PUBLICATIONS.  Appendix 5, to this order contains
      a reference listing of NACSI'S, NTISSI'S, and AFR's that are to
      be maintained by all FAA COMSEC accounts.  The publications
      listed below pertain specifically to areas covered in this
      chapter.                                                                 

           a.  NACSI No. 4005, Safeguarding and Control of
      Communications Security Material, dated October 12, 1979.  This
      NACSI is implemented in USAF publication AFR 56-13, same subject,
      dated July 28, 1987.                                                     

           b.  NACSI No. 4009, Protected Distribution Systems, dated
      December 30, 1981.  Implemented by USAF publication AFR 56-19,
      same subject, dated November 3, 1986.                                    

           c.  NTISSI No. 4004, Routine Destruction and Emergency
      Destruction of COMSEC Material, dated March 11, 1987.
      Implemented by USAF publication AFR 56-5, same subject, dated
      August 28, 1987.                                                         

           d.  NCSC-9, National COMSEC Glossary, dated September 1,
      1982.                                                                    

      52.  BACKGROUND.                                                         

           a.  National standards for safeguarding COMSEC facilities
      are necessary to ensure the integrity of the classified COMSEC
      material contained therein.                                              

           b.  The principal threats which such safeguards must defend
      against are:                                                             

               (1)  Unauthorized access to or observation of classified
      COMSEC material.                                                         

               (2)  Tampering with or TEMPST exploitation of, COMSEC
      and associated telecommunications equipment.                             

               (3)  Clandestine exploitation of sensitive
      communications within a secure telecommunications
      facility (e.g. "bugging").                                               

                   SECTION 2.  PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS                     

      53.  PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR FIXED COMSEC FACILITIES.            

           a.  Application.  For the purposes of this order, unless
      specifically stated otherwise, all FAA COMSEC facilities are
      considered as "fixed."  Should questions arise concerning the
      application of the physical security standards prescribed by this
      order to a specific facility they shall be addressed through the
      servicing security element to Manager, Investigations and
      Security Division, ACO-300, Washington, D.C., for resolution.            

           b.  Standards.  All FAA COMSEC secure telecommunications
      facilities will be designated as CLOSED Areas in accordance with
      Order 1600.2C and will comply with the physical security
      standards specified in this section and Appendix 3.                      

           c.  Special Security Requirements.  Users of COMSEC
      equipment should be aware of special security requirements that
      may apply to the system they are using.  NSA publishes these
      special doctrinal guidance documents as NACSI's in the 8000
      series.  The USAF implements the 8000 series NACSI's as AFSAL's
      and publishes and distributes them as specialized COMSEC
      publications in the COMSEC Material Control System (CMCS).  These
      documents are indexed in AFKAG-13 and are available on request to
      all COMSEC custodians.                                                   

           d.  Security/Engineering Approval.                                  

               (1)  The manager of the office or activity in which a
      secure telecommunications facility is located is responsible for
      ensuring that design and construction plans are coordinated
      through the servicing security element with ANC-120 and ACO-300
      prior to implementation.  This includes engineering and
      construction plans and specifications for proposed secure
      telecommunications facilities and ancillary terminal equipments,
      as well as plans for the reengineering or modification of
      existing facilities.  Failure to do this will result in automatic
      loss of certification for the secure telecommunications facility.
               (2)  Specifications and associated drawings must be
      submitted through the servicing security element to ACO-300 and
      to ANC-120.  Subsequent to a review of the plans and
      specifications, a joint determination will be made by ANC-120 and
      ACO-300 either approving the plans or identifying corrective
      actions that must be taken.                                              

      54.  INSTALLATION CRITERIA.  FAA facilities which generate,
      process, or transfer unencrypted classified information by
      electrical, electronic, electromechanical, or optical means shall
      conform to the guidance and standards in NACSI 4009, NACSIM
      5100A, and NACSIM 5203 with regard to protected wireline
      distribution systems.  Questions concerning security requirements
      shall be addressed through the servicing security element to
      ACO-300 for resolution.  Questions relevant to engineering and
      construction standards should be coordinated through the
      appropriate regional/center Airway Facilities channel and
      forwarded in writing to ANC-120, with an information copy to
      ACO-300 and the servicing security element.                              

      55.  FACILITY APPROVALS, INSPECTION, AND TESTS.                          

           a.  Approval to Hold Classified COMSEC Material.  Each FAA
      facility must be approved by the servicing security element
      before the facility may hold classified COMSEC material.  Such
      approval shall be based on an inspection by the servicing
      security element which determines that the facility meets the
      physical safeguarding and other requirements of this order.              

                (1)  The servicing security element will advise the
      facility manager by letter of the approval or disapproval of the
      facility with an information copy to ACO-300.  The facility will
      retain a copy of the approval letter in its COMSEC file.                 

                (2)  After initial approval, each FAA facility holding
      classified COMSEC material shall be reinspected in accordance
      with provisions of FAA Order 1650.7B as they pertain to Category
      1 facilities.  The facility shall also be reinspected and the
      approval reviewed, when:                                                 

                (a)  There is evidence of penetration or tampering,            

                (b)  Alterations are made which significantly change
      the physical characteristics of the facility,                            

                (c)  The facility is relocated or the facility is
      reoccupied after being temporarily abandoned.                            

           b.  Approval to Operate Secure Telecommunication Facilities.
      In addition to the requirement for physical security approval to
      hold classified COMSEC material, FAA secure telecommunications
      facilities require the following inspections and tests:                  

                (1)  General COMSEC Inspection.  ACO-300 is responsible
      for conducting a general COMSEC inspection of secure
      telecommunications facilities prior to initial activation where
      practicable, but in any case within 90 days after activation.
      Thereafter reinspection is required at intervals of no greater
      than 18 months.  At a minimum, the inspection shall assess secure
      operating procedures and practices, handling and storage of
      COMSEC material, routine and emergency destruction capabilities,
      compliance with installation (Red/Black) criteria, and obvious
      technical security hazards.
                (2)  Technical Surveillance Countermeasures
      Inspections.  TSCM inspections are conducted by ACO-300 in
      accordance with provisions of Order 1600.12C.                            

                     (a)  COMSEC custodians shall send requests for
      TSCM inspections of new secure telecommunications facilities
      through the appropriate servicing security element to ACO-300 in
      accordance with procedures required by Order 1600.12C.  Requests
      will be appropriately classified and should be submitted at least
      90 days before the projected activation date for the facility.           

                     (b)  After the initial TSCM survey ACO-300 will
      schedule subsequent surveys.                                             

                     (c)  Requests for TSCM support shall be submitted
      when any of the conditions exist that are described in
      subparagraphs 5b(2)(a), (b), and (c), Annex A to NACSI 4008/AFR
      56-6.                                                                    

                (3)  TEMPEST Inspections and Tests.  Visual TEMPEST
      inspections and, where determined to be necessary by ANC-120,
      instrumented TEMPEST tests shall be conducted at secure
      telecommunications facilities in accordance with requirements
      specified in subparagraphs 4b(3)(a) and (b), Annex A to NACSI
      4008/AFR 56-6.                                                           

      Written requests for instrumented TEMPEST test support should be
      submitted by the office or activity manager or COMSEC custodian
      through appropriate region/center channels to ANC-120 with an
      information copy to ACO-300.                                             

           c.  Daily Security Check.                                           

               (1)  Continuously Manned Facility.  In a continuously
      manned facility, a security check shall be made at least once
      every 24-hours.  This shall be a visual check to ensure that all
      classified COMSEC information is properly safeguarded, and that
      physical security protection system/devices (e.g., door locks and
      vent covers) are functioning properly.                                   

                (2)  Facilities that are Not Continuously Manned.  In a
      facility which is not continuously manned, the security check
      shall be conducted at least every 24 hours if the facility is in
      operation for 24 hours or more and prior to departure of the last
      person and shall include additional checks to ensure that the
      facility entrance door is locked and that, where installed,
      intrusion detection systems are activated.  Where a facility is
      unmanned for periods greater than 24 hours (e.g., during weekends
      and holidays) and the facility is not protected by an intrusion
      detection system that has been approved by ACO-300, a check shall
      be made at least once every 24 hours to ensure that all doors to
      the facility are locked and that there have been no attempts at
      forceful entry.                                                          

           d.  Activity Security Checklist.  FAA secure
      telecommunications facilities will use Standard Form (SF) 701,
      Activity Security Checklist, to record the daily security check.
      The national stock number for the SF 701 is 7540-01-213-7899.
      The form is available from the GSA.  In facilities which operate
      continuously, at the end of each shift, the person responsible
      (shift supervisor, for example) makes the security check.  The
      daily security check may be a part of, but not a substitute for,
      the daily (or shift) inventory of COMSEC material.
      NOTE:  If in a continuously operating facility the security
      container is not unlocked it will not be opened solely to
      inventory the contents.  An inventory will be conducted when the
      container is opened.                                                     

      56.  INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS.  Intrusion detection systems
      used to protect COMSEC information must be specifically approved
      for that purpose by ACO-300 prior to installation.  When approved
      alarm systems replace permanent guards, they must be used with an
      immediate guard response which will not exceed 5 minutes under
      any condition.                                                           

      57.-60.  RESERVED.                                                       

                SECTION 3.  ACCESS RESTRICTIONS AND CONTROLS                   

      61.  UNESCORTED ACCESS.                                                  

           a.  General.  Unescorted access to FAA offices/activities
      handling, storing, or processing classified COMSEC material will
      be limited to:                                                           

                (1)  FAA government civilian or military personnel who
      are U.S. citizens and whose duties require such access and, if
      the material is classified, who have been granted a security
      clearance equal to or higher than the classification of the
      COMSEC material involved.                                                

                (2)  Normally, these individuals will have regular duty
      assignments in the facility.  The individuals must meet all
      requirements of the FAA Formal Cryptographic Access (FCA) Program
      as specified on Chapter 2 of this order.                                 

                (3)  The names of all such individuals shall appear on
      a posted formal access list.                                             

                (4)  Official visitors whose names do not appear on the
      access list may also be granted unescorted access by the COMSEC
      custodian or the facility manager having responsibility and
      authority for the COMSEC operations, provided the visitors
      require such access and meet the access requirements of NACSI
      4005 and this order to include verification of the fact that the
      individuals have received a cryptographic access briefing and
      have a current signed cryptographic access authorization.  All
      such visits shall be recorded on the visitor register (FAA Form
      1600.8 or equivalent).                                                   

                (5)  No individual will be allowed unescorted access to
      an FAA COMSEC facility who has not received a cryptographic
      access briefing and signed a cryptographic access authorization.         

           b.  Access Controls and Procedures for Secure
      Telecommunications Facilities.  The following controls and
      procedures will be used to control access to secure
      telecommunications facilities:                                           

                (1)  Entrance controls will be established to prevent
      entry by persons not listed on the authorized entrance list.
      Facilities using the locked-door system must have a buzzer system
      and a way to challenge and identify persons before they enter.           

                (2)  Entrance doors to FAA facilities shall be equipped
      with a fish-eye viewing device to permit identification of
      persons seeking admittance.                                              

                (3)  If guards are assigned, station them immediately
      outside the entrance.  Regardless of the control system used,
      entry procedures must ensure identification of persons seeking
      entry so as to prevent viewing of activities within the facility
      before entry is permitted.                                               

                (4)  Unrestricted entry to the secure
      telecommunications center will be limited to persons whose names
      appear on an official posted entrance list.  The authorized
      entrance list must contain the names of all persons regularly
      assigned duties within the secure telecommunications facility and
      those others whose duties require them to have frequent access.
      All personnel on the authorized entrance list must have received
      a cryptographic access briefing and must have a current signed
      Cryptographic Access Certificate on file which is verified by the
      custodian or the manager having responsibility for the COMSEC
      operation.  In addition, each individual on the list must have a
      valid clearance equal to or higher than the COMSEC information
      being given access to.  It is the COMSEC custodian's
      responsibility to verify the clearance for each individual on the
      authorized entrance list.  Custodians should consult with the
      servicing security element to determine the most effective method
      to verify clearance information and cryptographic access
      authorization data for each facility.                                    

                (5)  The following statement will be placed on the
      authorized entrance list, certifying that all persons listed
      thereon have been granted access to classified COMSEC information
      and that a security clearance is on file for each person:  "ALL
      PERSONNEL LISTED HEREON HAVE BEEN GRANTED ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED
      COMSEC INFORMATION AND APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTATION IS ON FILE."  By
      affixing his or her signature to this statement the custodian
      affirms that he or she has personally verified with the facility
      or activity personnel officer, or the servicing element, that
      each individual on the authorized access list has:                       

                     (a)  A current Form 1600.54, Notification of
      Personnel Security Action, on file;                                      

                     (b)  A clearance equal to the highest
      classification level of COMSEC material to which he/she will have
      access.                                                                  

                     (c)  Received a cryptographic access briefing and
      has signed a current Cryptographic Access Certification as
      required by this order.                                                  

                (6)  On the authorized entrance list, the COMSEC
      custodian will specifically designate those persons, by name, who
      may authorize admittance to others not on the list.  The number
      of persons authorized to admit others in this manner shall be
      kept to a minimum.  Usually, the facility manager having
      responsibility and authority over the COMSEC operation, and the
      custodian may authorize admittance.                                      

                (7)  The authorized entrance list will be signed and
      dated by the COMSEC custodian.  It is the custodian's
      responsibility to ensure that the list is current at all times.          

                (8)  An FAA Form 1600-8, Visitor Register, will be
      maintained to record the arrival and departure of all persons
      whose names do not appear on the authorized entrance and access
      list.  Completed FAA Form 1600-8, shall be maintained on file by
      the custodian for a period of two calendar years, after which
      they may be destroyed.                                                   

           c.  Access Control for Administrative/Monitor Accounts.  FAA
      administrative and monitor accounts do not require the stringent
      security measures required for secure telecommunications
      facilities.                                                              

                (1)  Administrative/monitor accounts are those which
      hold only general COMSEC publications or serve as issue points
      for codes and authentication systems.  This type of account
      requires adequate storage facilities and inventory controls.
      However, they may be located within general office space if
      measures are taken to exclude unauthorized and uncleared
      personnel and prevent viewing of COMSEC material when in use.            

                (2)  The custodian must closely control access to an
      administrative account's holdings; access must be limited to
      persons within the immediate working area who have a need-to-know
      and others whose duties require frequent access.  The
      requirements for granting access and certification or
      verification thereof are the same as for secure
      telecommunications facilities.                                           

      62.  ESCORTED ACCESS.
           a.  Uncleared visitors.  Uncleared visitors may be
      authorized admittance by the custodian, or the manager having
      operational responsibility for the COMSEC facility, provided
      effective security precautions are taken to preclude unauthorized
      access to classified information.  These visitors shall be under
      continuous escort by an individual whose name appears on the
      access list.  All such visits shall be recorded in the visitor
      register.                                                                

           b.  Repairmen.  When uncleared repairmen are admitted to
      perform maintenance on commercially contracted information-
      processing equipment which is connected to circuits protected by
      cryptographic equipment, the escort shall be a cryptorepair
      person or other technically qualified individual who is capable
      of recognizing acceptable and proper repair procedures for that
      type of equipment.  This is a means to control attempts at
      malicious action against the involved COMSEC equipment or
      installation.                                                            

      63.  VISITOR REGISTER.                                                   

           a.  Requirement.  A visitor register, FAA Form 1600.8, will
      be maintained at the COMSEC facility entrance area to record the
      arrival and departure of authorized visitors.                            

           b.  Procedure.  The visitor register shall contain the
      following information for each individual.                               

                (a)  Date and time of arrival and departure.                   

                (b)  Printed name and signature of visitor.                    

                (c)  Purpose of visit.                                         

                (d)  Signature of individual admitting visitor.                

           c.  Disposition.  Records of authorized visitors shall be
      retained in the custodian's files for a period of two calendar
      years, after which they may be destroyed.                                

      64.  NO-LONE ZONES.                                                      

           a.  Facilities which produce or generate key (in any form)
      distribution centers, and depots and other logistic activities
      which store or distribute large quantities of keying material
      shall employ no-lone-zone restrictions within all areas in which
      these activities take place.                                             

           b.  Refer to AFR 56-1, paragraph 3-5, for restrictions on
      single person access.                                                    

           c.  The majority of FAA COMSEC facilities handling or
      processing COMSEC material at the SECRET level or below will not
      have a need for institution of no-lone-zone measures.  Custodians
      having questions concerning no-lone-zone applications should
      direct them to ACO-300 through their servicing security element.         

      65.  GUARD SERVICES.                                                     

           a.  Purpose.  FAA facilities requiring the services of a
      secure telecommunications facility may for various reasons not be
      able to have a COMSEC resource in-house.  This would be the case
      for example, if a secure telecommunications facility were being
      reengineered and it was necessary to take the facility off-line
      for a period of time.  When this situation occurs, the FAA
      facility may enter into an agreement with another U.S. Government
      or military secure telecommunications facility to receive and
      transmit their classified and operational messages until the
      facility circuits are operational.  This is referred to as
      "guarding."                                                              

           b.  Requirement.  The FAA manager having operational
      authority and responsibility for a secure telecommunications
      facility will inform ANC-120 and ACO-300, through appropriate
      regional channels to include the servicing security element, of a
      requirement for "guard" service prior to making arrangements for
      such support.  Only secure telecommunications facilities operated
      by U.S. Government or military personnel will be used for
      guarding for classified FAA telecommunications.  Contractor
      operated secure telecommunications facilities will not be used.          

      66.-70.  RESERVED.                                                       

            SECTION 4.  PROTECTION OF UNATTENDED COMSEC EQUIPMENT              

      71.  GENERAL.                                                            

           a.  Noncontinuously Manned Facility.  In a noncontinuously
      manned facility, unattended COMSEC equipment shall be protected
      as prescribed in this section during periods when the facility is
      not manned.                                                              

           b.  Construction.  A facility which meets the construction
      requirements of Appendix 6 provides sufficient protection, under
      normal circumstances, for unattended, unkeyed COMSEC equipment
      installed in an operational configuration.  The requirements for
      the protection of COMSEC equipment in secure telecommunications
      facilities which normally operate unmanned for extended periods
      of time are covered in Annex C, NACSI 4008/AFR 56-6, under
      "Unattended, Fixed Secure Telecommunications Facilities."                

      72.  PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS.                                            

           a.  General.  In some situations there may be significant
      technical or operational reasons to locate communications and
      associated COMSEC equipments in unattended sites.  Any
      requirement for FAA activities to locate COMSEC equipment at
      unattended sites must be submitted through the servicing security
      element to ACO-300 for approval prior to implementation.  The
      request for approval will be submitted in writing, by the
      custodian or facility manager having authority over the COMSEC
      assets and will include the measures to be taken to satisfy the
      safeguarding requirements listed in subparagraph b, below.               

           b.  Safeguards.  Paragraph IID, Annex C to NACSI 4005/AFR
      56-13 establishes the following safeguard requirements:                  

                (1)  The site must be located in an area firmly under
      U.S. control.                                                            

                (2)  Cryptonets whose keying variables are held in
      COMSEC equipments located at unattended sites must be kept as
      small as possible, with unique keying material used on each link
      terminated at an unattended site where feasible.                         

                (3)  COMSEC equipment not in use may not be stored at
      an unattended site.  All COMSEC equipments located at unattended
      sites must be operationally required as on-line, standby or
      back-up items to terminate an active circuit.                            

                (4)  Keying material other than that which is
      electrically or physically held in the COMSEC equipments may not
      be stored at unattended sites.
                (5)  The FAA manager responsible for operation of the
      unattended site must arrange for timely guard force response to
      investigate incidents involving threats to the COMSEC equipment
      at the site.  Response planning should be conducted in
      coordination with the servicing security element.  The servicing
      security element will advise the manager on effective security
      planning and will provide investigative support when necessary.
      The FAA custodian responsible for the COMSEC material must be
      knowledgeable of these arrangements.                                     

                (6)  The FAA manager responsible for operation of the
      unattended site must ensure that inspections of the sites are
      conducted to verify that the COMSEC equipments have not been
      tampered with.  The inspections should be at random and at
      irregular intervals without excessive delay between the
      intervals.                                                               

      73.-77.   RESERVED.                                                      

                 SECTION 5.  PROTECTION OF LOCK COMBINATIONS                   

      78.  PURPOSE.                                                            

           a.  General.  The requirements of this section apply to
      combination locking devices for FAA COMSEC facility doors and
      security containers which hold classified, telecommunications
      security (TSEC) nomenclatured material.                                  

           b.  Collateral Classified Materials.  Combinations to FAA
      security containers which are used to store only collateral
      classified material that is not accountable under the COMSEC
      Material Accounting System (CMCS), may be controlled in
      accordance with this section or the requirements of Order
      1600.2C.  If a container is used to store both collateral and
      TSEC nomenclatured material the protection requirements of this
      section will apply.                                                      

      79.  PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS.                                            

           a.  Selection of Combinations.  Each lock must have a
      combination composed of randomly selected numbers.  This
      combination shall not deliberately or accidentally duplicate a
      combination selected for another lock within the facility and
      shall not be composed of successive numbers, numbers in a
      systematic sequence, nor predictable sequences (e.g., birthdates,
      social security numbers, and phone numbers).                             

           b.  Changing Combinations.  A lock combination shall only be
      changed by a cleared individual having a need-to-know for the
      information safeguarded by the lock.  Combinations must be
      changed:                                                                 

                (1)  When the lock is initially placed in use.  (The
      manufacturer's preset combination shall not be used.)                    

                (2)  When any person having authorized knowledge of the
      combination no longer requires such knowledge (e.g., through
      transfer or loss of clearance).                                          

                (3)  When the possibility exists that the combination
      has been subjected to compromise.                                        

                (4)  At least annually.
           c.  Classification of Combinations.  Lock combinations shall
      be classified the same as the highest classification of the
      information protected by the locks.  For a security container,
      this is the highest classification of the information held in the
      container; for a facility door, it is the highest classification
      of the information held in the facility to which the door
      controls access including that information stored in containers.         

      80.  ACCESS TO COMBINATIONS.                                             

           a.  Access to the combination of a lock used to protect
      COMSEC material shall be limited to individuals who are
      authorized access to the material in accordance with NACSI
      4005/AFR 56-13, and Chapter 2 of this order.                             

           b.  Where a container is used to store future editions of
      keying material, access to the combination shall be further
      restricted to the COMSEC Custodian and the Alternate
      Custodian(s).  Where this restriction cannot be applied because
      others must have access to the container for current editions of
      keying material or other material, future editions of keying
      material shall be stored separately in a locked strongbox which
      can be opened only by the Custodian and the Alternate
      Custodian(s).  The strongbox shall be kept in the security
      container.  Exceptions may be made in operational areas to allow
      shift supervisors access to the next future edition of keying
      material, but not to later future editions.                              

           c.  Access to combinations for security containers used to
      store Top Secret keying material will be controlled in accordance
      with requirements of NTISSI 4005, and Appendix 7.
      81.  RECORD OF COMBINATIONS.                                             

           a.  Standard Form 700.  The Standard Form (SF) 700, Security
      Container Information, NSN:  7540-01-214-5372, will be used to
      record the current combination to COMSEC containers.  Parts 2 and
      2A of each completed copy of SF 700 shall be classified at the
      highest level of classification of the information authorized for
      storage in the security container.  A new SF 700 must be
      completed each time the combination to the security container is
      changed.                                                                 

           b.  Emergency Access.  To provide for ready access to
      secured material in emergencies, a central record of lock
      combinations shall be maintained in a security container approved
      for storage of the highest classified combination.  The
      combination to this container shall be restricted to persons with
      proper clearance and need-to-know.  Provision must be made for
      access to the record of combinations in case of an emergency.            

           c.  Packaging Requirements.  Combinations to FAA COMSEC
      containers will be packaged and handled as follows:                      

                (1)  The SF 700 Part 2 and 2A containing the
      combination will be assigned a classification equal to the
      highest category of classified material stored within the
      container.  In addition to the classification, the SF 700 will be
      annotated to reflect the following:                                      

                     (a)  The identity of the container (reference
      paragraph 191, chapter 8, Order 1600.2C).  This will include the
      container, room, and building number.
                     (b)  The date the combination was changed.                

                     (c)  The responsible persons authorized access to
      the combination.                                                         

                (2)  Safe combination will be maintained within COMSEC
      channels.  This will not prevent storing combinations in FAA
      areas outside the secure communications facility or vault.  For
      combinations up to and including Secret a properly filled out SF
      700 should be forwarded to the servicing security element monitor
      account through COMSEC channels.  Proper packaging is required
      and delivery should be accomplished by courier.  Persons who have
      access to the security containers which house COMSEC combinations
      must have a clearance level equal to or above that required for
      access to security containers or vaults for which the
      combinations have been recorded, and must meet FAA FCA Program
      requirements specified in Chapter 2 of this order.  For storage
      outside the secure communications facility or vault the COMSEC
      custodian will require an SF 154 hand receipt for the combination
      and will maintain the current SF 154 receipt(s) in the COMSEC
      file.                                                                    

                (3)  For storage outside the secure telecommunications
      facility or vault, a combination storage location shall be chosen
      which allows ready access in an emergency but which is restricted
      to persons with proper clearance and need-to-know.  Top Secret
      combinations do not have to be recorded with the Top Secret
      Control Office (TSCO) since they are controlled within COMSEC
      channels.  Top Secret combination must be controlled however in
      accordance with NTISSI 4005, and Appendix 7.                             

           d.  Prohibition.  It is specifically prohibited for
      individuals to record and carry, or store insecurely for personal
      convenience, the combinations to facilities or containers in
      which COMSEC material is stored.  Also, records of such
      combinations may not be stored in electronic form in a computer.         

      82.-86.  RESERVED.                                                       

               SECTION 6.  NONESSENTIAL AUDIO/VISUAL EQUIPMENT                 

      87.  PERSONALLY OWNED EQUIPMENT.  Personally owned receiving,
      transmitting, recording, amplification, information-processing,
      and photographic equipment (e.g., radios, tape recorders,
      stereos, televisions, cameras, magnetic tape and film) shall not
      be permitted in FAA secure telecommunications facilities.                

      88.  GOVERNMENT OWNED EQUIPMENT.  Government-owned or leased (or
      company owned-or leased in the case of contractor-operated
      facilities) receiving, transmitting, recording, amplification,
      video, and photographic equipment (e.g., radios, music systems,
      TV monitors/cameras, and amplifiers) which are not directly
      associated with secure telecommunications operations or
      information processing activities may be used in secure
      telecommunications facilities provided approval for their use is
      granted by the FAA facility chief or manager having
      responsibility for and authority over COMSEC operations on a
      case-by-case basis, subject to the following:                            

           a.  The Government-owned equipment in FAA telecommunications
      facilities must be subjected to and pass all the same technical
      and TEMPEST security requirements that mission-essential
      equipment must pass.                                                     

           b.  Equipment must be reinspected or tested each time it is
      removed and then returned to the facility.                               

           c.  The manager responsible for approving the location of
      the equipment in the secure telecommunications facility will also
      be responsible for ensuring that a record of the latest approval
      and inspection/test is maintained in the secure
      telecommunications facility, and a copy provided to ACO-300
      through the servicing security element.                                  

           d.  The reinspection/test and record requirements do not
      apply to approved portable telephone "beepers" and two-way radios
      carried by visiting key personnel on official duty, if approved
      by the COMSEC custodian.                                                 

      89.-94.  RESERVED.                                                       

               SECTION 7.  STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)                 

      95.  REQUIREMENT.                                                        

           a.  Requirement. Each FAA COMSEC secure telecommunications
      facility shall have a written COMSEC SOP.                                

           b.  Procedure.  The COMSEC custodian will prepare and
      maintain in a current status a written SOP which shall contain
      provisions for the secure conduct of facility operations and for
      the safeguarding of COMSEC material, for example the SOP should
      include procedures for:
                (1)  Cryptographic operations.                                 

                (2)  Local accountability of COMSEC material.                  

                (3)  Obtaining COMSEC maintenance support.                     

                (4)  Controlling access to the COMSEC area.                    

                (5)  Storage.                                                  

                (6)  Routine and emergency destruction.                        

                (7)  Reporting of insecurities.                                

           c.  Coordination.  The custodian will require all persons
      associated with the day-to-day operations of the secure
      telecommunications facility to familiarize themselves with the
      SOP initially and signify by their initials that they have reread
      the SOP at least once every 3 months thereafter.                         

      96.  EMERGENCY PLAN.  As an adjunct to its SOP each FAA Plan
      COMSEC facility shall have a current emergency plan prepared in
      accordance with guidance contained in NTISSI 4004/AFR 56-5.              

      The plan shall be written, and, as a minimum shall be structured
      to address the following concerns:                                       

           a.  Coordination with the overall facility/activity
      emergency contingency planning staff.  COMSEC
      emergency/contingency and destruction planning should be an
      integral part of the overall facility plan.
           b.  Fire reporting and initial fire fighting by assigned
      personnel.                                                               

           c.  Assignment of on-the-scene responsibility for ensuring
      protection of the COMSEC material held.                                  

           d.  Procedures for securing or removing classified COMSEC
      material and evacuation of the area(s).                                  

           e.  Protection of material when admission of outside
      firefighters into the secure area(s) is necessary.                       

           f.  Assessment and reporting of probable exposure of
      classified COMSEC material to unauthorized persons during the
      emergency.                                                               

           g.  Post-emergency inventory of classified COMSEC material
      and reporting of any losses or unauthorized exposure to the
      servicing security element.                                              

      97.-101.  RESERVED.





















           CHAPTER 5. SAFEGUARDING AND CONTROL OF COMMUNICATIONS 
 SECURITY MATERIAL                                       

      102.  GENERAL                                                            

           a.  Purpose.  This chapter specifies minimum safeguards and
      establishes standard criteria for the protection and control of
      Communications Security (COMSEC) material in accordance with
      guidelines set forth in National Communications Security
      Committee document NCSC-1, Safeguarding COMSEC Material.  The
      NCSC has been replaced by the National Telecommunications and
      Information Systems Security Committee (NTISSC).  The U.S. Air
      Force implementing directive is AFR 56-13, Safeguarding and
      Control of Communications Security Material, dated July 28, 1986.        

           b.  Scope.  Controls for safeguarding COMSEC material apply
      to access, use, production, development, transportation, storage,
      accounting, and disposition.  Safeguards and control criteria for
      COMSEC material are specified herein in the following categories:        

                (1)  Keying material marked "CRYPTO" (e.g., key lists,
      key cards, codes, authenticators, one-time pads, CRIBS, rotors,
      keying plugs, tapes, keyed microcircuits, etc.).                         

                (2)  Crypto-equipment (including communications and
      information processing equipment with integral cryptography) and
      components thereof which embody the principles or logic of a
      cryptosystem, including COMSEC computer software and firmware.           

      NOTE:  "Firmware" refers to software that is permanently stored
      in a hardware device which allows reading and executing the
      software but not writing or modifying it.                                

                (3)  Other COMSEC material of the following types:             

                     (a)  General COMSEC instructional documents,
      TEMPEST information, COMSEC equipment operating maintenance
      manuals, changing call signs and frequency systems, brevity
      lists, and keying material not marked "CRYPTO."                          

                     (b)  Crypto-ancillary material (including
      equipment or software designed specifically to facilitate
      efficient or reliable operation of crypto-equipment, or designed
      specifically to convert information to a form suitable for
      processing by crypto-equipment).                                         

      103.  DEFINITIONS.  For the purposes of this order the following
      terms shall have the meanings set forth below:                           

           a.  Communications Security (COMSEC).  Communications
      security (COMSEC) means protective measures taken to deny
      unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications
      of the United States Government related to national security and
      to ensure the authenticity of such communications.  Such
      protection results from the application of security measures
      (including cryptosecurity, transmission security, emissions
      security) to electrical systems generating, handling, processing,
      or using national security or national security related
      information.  It also includes the application of physical
      security measures to communications security information or
      materials.                                                               

           b.  Telecommunications.  Telecommunications means the
      transmission, communication, or processing of information,
      including the preparation of information, by electrical,
      electromagnetic, electromechanical, or electro-optical means.            

           c.  National security.  National security means the national
      defense and foreign relations of the United States.                      

      104.  HANDLING KEYING MATERIAL.  Keying material marked "CRYPTO"
      must be handled within the COMSEC Material Control System (CMCS).
      This is a unique system set up for producing, transmitting,
      storing, accounting for, and destroying COMSEC material including
      International Pact Organization (IPO) material.  All
      nomenclatured COMSEC material (except material handled through
      publication distribution channels; such as National COMSEC
      Instructions (NACSI), National COMSEC/EMSEC Information Memoranda
      (NACSEM) and National COMSEC Information Memoranda (NACSIM)), is
      controlled within the CMCS throughout its life.  The system
      requires that all COMSEC material be handled only between COMSEC
      custodians through established channels.  Classified COMSEC
      material never enters the regular document distribution and
      control system.                                                          

      105.-109  RESERVED.                                                      

                SECTION 1.  GENERAL INFORMATION APPLICABLE TO ALL
                            COMSEC MATERIAL                                    

      110.  RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFEGUARDING COMSEC MATERIAL.                   

           a.  Managers of FAA facilities and offices which use or
      handle COMSEC material are responsible for safeguarding and
      controlling all COMSEC material provided to or produced by their
      facility or office, and for establishing procedures which include
      the following:                                                           

                (1)  A Central Office of Record (COR).  For the FAA the
      U.S. Air Force Cryptologic Support Center, AFCSC/MMIC, San
      Antonio, Texas 78243-5000, is the Central Office of Record.              

                (2)  Establishment and Disestablishment of COMSEC
      Accounts.  Directive guidance for the establishment and
      disestablishment of FAA COMSEC accounts is contained in AFKAG-2
      and this order.                                                          

           b.  COMSEC Custodian.  The COMSEC Custodian is the properly
      appointed individual who manages and controls the accountable
      COMSEC material in the CMCS charged to his/her activity.  The
      custodian's responsibilities include:                                    

                (1)  Receiving, storing, amending, accounting for
      inventorying, and issuing COMSEC material charged to his/her
      account and destroying or transferring of material when it is no
      longer required.                                                         

                (2)  Ensuring that appropriate COMSEC material is
      readily available to properly authorized individuals whose duties
      require its use.                                                         

                (3)  Advising user and supervisors, as appropriate, of
      the required protection and procedures which must be provided
      COMSEC material issued to them for use, including the authorized
      procedures for destruction or disposition of such material when
      it is no longer required.
                (4)  Reporting insecurities in accordance with AFKAG-2
      and NTISSI 4003, COMSEC insecurities fall into three categories,
      cryptographic, personnel and physical.  Specific examples of each
      type are provided in NTISSI 4003, Reporting COMSEC Insecurities.         

           c.  Individual Users.  Individuals involved in the use of
      COMSEC material are personally responsible for:                          

                (1)  Safeguarding and proper employment of all material
      he or she uses or for which he or she is responsible.                    

                (2)  Reporting to proper authorities any occurrences,
      circumstances, or acts which could jeopardize the security of
      COMSEC material.                                                         

      111.  TRANSPORT OF COMSEC MATERIAL.                                      

           a.  Department of Defense Courier Service, State Department
      Diplomatic Courier Service, or departmental couriers are the
      preferred means of transporting COMSEC material.                         

           b.  Use of commercial passenger aircraft for the
      transportation of current or superseded keying material is
      normally prohibited.                                                     

           c.  FAA employees are not authorized to transport current or
      superseded key material for any reason without specific prior
      approval of the servicing security element in regions and
      centers, and ACO-300 in Washington Headquarters.  In addition,
      the employee must have a valid courier letter in accordance with
      the provisions of Order 1600.2C.  The courier letter must be
      signed by the employee's facility or office manager.  Before
      signing the letter it is the manager's responsibility to ensure
      that the employee has received a briefing on his or her
      responsibilities as a courier as required by Order 1600.2C.              

      112.  COURIER RESPONSIBILITIES.                                          

           a.  Couriers are responsible for ensuring the integrity of
      COMSEC material in their custody at all times.  Couriers will
      retain their letter of authorization in their possession at all
      times while actually transporting key materials.                         

           b.  Couriers transporting material into foreign countries
      must ensure that material is not subject to inspection by
      unauthorized personnel.  In no case will U.S. COMSEC material be
      permitted to enter foreign distribution channels unless it has
      been authorized for release by the proper U.S. authorities.              

           c.  In cases where the bulk of the material to be
      transported, or the physical configuration of the conveyance will
      not allow for the courier to keep the material on his person or
      in view at all times, arrangements should be made with the
      carrier to effect a "last-in-first-out" procedure that will
      ensure the material is given the most protection possible, and
      not left unattended at loading docks, cargo storage areas,
      baggage areas, railways platforms, etc.                                  

      113.  OPEN DISPLAY OF COMSEC MATERIAL AND INFORMATION.  The open
      or public display of U.S. Government or foreign COMSEC material
      and information at nongovernmental symposia, meetings, open
      houses, or for other nonofficial purposes is forbidden.  This
      prohibition includes discussion, publications, or presentation of
      COMSEC information for other than official purposes.  Any
      requests for the public or nonofficial display or publications of
      COMSEC information, including Freedom of Information Act
      requests, will be referred through ACS-300 to the Director,
      National Security Agency.                                                

      114.  DESTRUCTION.  Appendix 8 Routine Distribution and Emergency
      Protection of COMSEC Material, contains criteria and procedures
      for secure destruction of COMSEC material.  FAA COMSEC custodians
      will ensure that destruction requirements set forth in this order
      and AFKAG-2 are followed.                                                

      115.  REPORTING INSECURITIES.                                            

           a.  General.  Requirements for reporting COMSEC insecurities
      are specified in NTISSI 4003.  The USAF implementing regulation
      for NTISSI 4003 is AFR 56-12.                                            

           b.  Requirements.                                                   

                (1)  Insecurities associated with FAA COMSEC activities
      will be reported in accordance with NTISSI 4003 or AFR 56-12.
      Information copies of reports of COMSEC insecurities will be
      provided through COMSEC channels to the servicing security
      element and to ACS-300.                                                  

                (2)  The servicing security element will conduct an
      investigation of reported insecurities and submit four copies of
      FAA Form 1600-32 (Report of Investigation) to the Manager,
      Investigations and Security Division, ATTN:  ACO-300.                    

           c.  Classification of Insecurity Reports.  Reports of COMSEC
      insecurities and associated investigative reports shall be
      classified according to content in accordance with provisions of
      NTISSI 4002 and NTISSI 4003.  If there is doubt about the correct
      classification assistance should be requested from the servicing
      security element or ACO-300.  If there is doubt as to whether a
      report should be classified or unclassified, handle and safeguard
      it as classified until a final determination is made in
      accordance with provisions of chapter 4 in Order 1600.2C.                

      116.  EVIDENCE OF TAMPERING.  All instances where COMSEC material
      displays evidence of tampering shall be promptly reported to
      Director, National Security Agency, ATTN:  S-213, in accordance
      with provisions of NTISSI 4003 and AFR 56-12.  Information copies
      of the report shall be provided to the servicing security element
      and ACO-300.                                                             

      117.  ALTERATION OF COMSEC MATERIAL.  No modifications or changes
      in classification or markings or alterations of any kind shall be
      made to COMSEC material without prior approval of the NSA.
      Requests of this nature from FAA COMSEC activities will be
      submitted through COMSEC channels to AFCSC, ATTN:  AFCSC/MMI,
      with information copies to the servicing security element and
      ACS-300.  AFCSC will coordinate with the NSA as required.                

      118.  CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR GUARDS.  Those guards whose
      duties include responsibility for access and protection of
      classified COMSEC material will be appropriately cleared.  Those
      guards whose duties are primarily area control (gate guards,
      building security) need not be cleared when they are used to
      supplement other security measures and will not normally have
      access to classified information.  All guards must be responsible
      and trustworthy personnel and instructed concerning their
      responsibilities.  Foreign guards may be used for control only.
      Questions concerning clearance requirements for FAA guard
      personnel should be coordinated with the appropriate servicing
      security element.                                                        

      119.  STORAGE REQUIREMENTS.                                              

           a.  General.  Storage means the use of security containers,
      vaults, alarms, guards, etc., to protect COMSEC information
      during nonworking hours or when it is not under the direct and
      continuous control of properly cleared and authorized personnel.
      FAA managers and custodians responsible for COMSEC operations
      will ensure that the requirements of this paragraph as well as
      the more detailed standards and criteria in appendix 11 of this
      order are complied with.  Servicing security elements will assist
      COMSEC custodians in implementing these requirements.                    

           b.  Storage Requirements.  For each vault or container used
      to store classified COMSEC material:                                     

                (1)  Designate the level of classified material
      authorized for storage therein but do not show this designation
      externally.                                                              

                (2)  Assign a number or symbol for identification
      purposes.  Place the number or symbol in a conspicuous location
      on the outside of the vault or container.                                

                (3)  Prepare a General Services Administration/
      Information Security Oversight Office (GSA/ISOO) Form SF-700
      (Security Container Information Form) for each security container
      and vault door.  On this form identify the names, addresses and
      home telephone numbers of persons to be notified if the container
      is found insecure.  Post part 1 of the SF-700 conspicuously on
      the inside of the locking drawer of each security container, and
      on the inside of each vault door.  Refer to chapter 8 in Order
      1600.2C.  Even though more than four persons may know the
      combination, only those persons to be notified need be listed on
      part 1.  For ordering purposes the NSN for the GSA/ISOO SF-700
      form is 7540-01-214-5372.                                                

                (4)  Security containers or vaults used to store COMSEC
      information shall be located in areas not accessible to general
      traffic, which are locked or otherwise protected during
      nonworking hours.                                                        

                (5)  Security containers or vaults used to store keying
      material of any classification must never have been drilled to
      gain access unless the drilled parts are replaced with new or
      repaired combination locks or drawer heads.  This also applies to
      SECRET and TOP SECRET COMSEC material other than keying material.
      When containers have been drilled to gain access and have been
      repaired and inspected to ensure acceptable safeguarding
      capabilities/(reference chapter 8 in Order 1600.2C), they may be
      used to store COMSEC material including International Pact
      Organization (IPO) other than keying material, classified no
      higher than CONFIDENTIAL.                                                

      120.  OTHER COMSEC INFORMATION.                                          

           a.  General.  Classified COMSEC information not specifically
      covered by this order shall be safeguarded in accordance with
      requirements of Order 1600.2C, National Security Information.            

           b.  Requirement.  FAA COMSEC accounts will receive
      classified documents such as NACSIS, NTISSIs, AFRs, etc., that
      are not controlled within the CMCS.  Documents of this type are
      referred to as "collateral classified" and will not have a
      register number and will not be listed on inventories provided by
      AFCSC.  Because these documents are distributed through COMSEC
      channels they will normally be delivered directly to the
      custodian and will not be placed under control at the facility
      security control point (SCP).  It is the custodian's
      responsibility to ensure that documents of this type are placed
      under control in accordance with provisions of Order 1600.2C.
      Normally, this means returning documents classified SECRET or
      higher, to the facility/activity SCP, having them logged in, and
      then signed back to the COMSEC custodian.  Reference chapter 7,
      in Order 1600.2C.                                                        

           c.  Location of SCP.  The security control point (SCP)
      function for a facility/activity should not be collocated with
      the COMSEC secure telecommunications facility, in order to ensure
      separation between the document control functions of the SCP and
      the CMCS responsibilities of the custodian and alternate.                

      121.  DISPOSITION OF COMSEC MATERIAL.                                    

           a.  General.  After COMSEC material has been issued to an
      account or user it cannot be transferred or destroyed without
      specific prior approval.  The term "disposition" as used in this
      paragraph means the transfer (return to AFCSC or transfer to
      another FAA account or to an account of another department or
      agency) or destruction of COMSEC material.  Refer to AFKAG-2,
      chapters 5 and 6.                                                        

           b.  Requirements.  When material on hand excess to
      requirements is to be returned to AFCSC or is to be shipped to
      another account to meet operational requirements, specific
      disposition instructions must be furnished as follows:                   

                (1)  ACO-300 is the approval authority to transfer to
      another FAA account.                                                     

                (2)  AFCSC gives authority:                                    

                     (a)  To transfer to an account of another
      department or agency or return to account 616600.                        

                     (b)  For destruction.                                     

           c.  Request.  Requests for disposition instructions will be
      routed through the servicing security element with an information
      copy to ACS-300.                                                         

           d.  Exception.  The above rules do not apply to
      crypto-equipment.  AFCSC gives advance approval for all movement
      of crypto-equipment (AFKAG-2).  To meet contingencies and
      emergencies, ACO-300 in coordination with ANC-120 may approve the
      relocation of FAA assets and then notify AFCSC.                          

      122.  PAGE CHECKS OF COMSEC PUBLICATIONS.                                

           a.  General.  The integrity of COMSEC material must be
      ensured so that all material produced must be accounted for and
      maintained at the lowest possible exposure rate.  Although in
      most cases FAA COMSEC custodians have free access to the secure
      telecommunications facility (TCF) they support, keying material
      issued to the secure TCF is considered to be outside the COMSEC
      material control environment because of the exposure factor.
      When material is issued by the custodian, the receiver, whether
      the actual user or an intermediary, is considered to be a user.
      A local courier is not considered to be a user because, until
      material is sighted for by line item, the material is still
      accountable within the CMCS.                                             

           b.  Requirements.  A page check of all classified COMSEC
      publications is mandatory on certain occasions, both to satisfy
      security requirements and to ensure usability.  Page checks are
      to be made by first consulting the list of effective pages on the
      cover of the document and ensuring that each page is exactly as
      described.  The page check is recorded on the record of page
      checks page; or, if the publication has no record of page checks
      page, record the page check on the record of amendments page or
      on the front cover.  The date checked, signature, and
      organizational identification of the person making the check are
      required.  Page checks will be made:                                     

                (1)  On receipt of classified COMSEC material from any
      source.                                                                  

                (2)  During change of custodian.                               

                (3)  When entering an amendment or changes which adds,
      deletes, or replaces pages or affects page numbers (COMSEC Users
      Guide - AFR 56-10).                                                      

                (4)  At least annually.                                        

                (5)  Before destruction.  The page check conducted
      before a document is destroyed does not have to be recorded.
      Sealed keying material, whether sealed with the original
      production wrapping or sealed by the custodian according to Annex
      B, paragraph IIE3b, NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13, does not require page
      check before destruction.                                                

           c.  Exceptions to Page Check Requirements.  The following
      are exceptions to page check requirements listed in paragraph
      122b:                                                                    

                (1)  Check one-time pads that are sealed on the edges
      as individual pages are used.  No separate record of page check
      is required.  A page check of one-time pads that are not sealed
      on the edges is required only on issue to a user.                        

                (2)  Keycards and keylists enclosed in protective or
      restrictive wrappers should be retained within these wrappers for
      as long as possible.                                                     

                (3)  One-time tape does not require a segment check.           

           d.  Additional page checks.  FAA custodians are authorized
      to conduct additional page checks as needed.                             

      123.  DAILY OR SHIFT INVENTORY REQUIREMENTS.  A daily or shift
      inventory is required for:                                               

           a.  Legend 1 COMSEC material.  Equipments are identified by
      the suffix CA to the national stock number (NSN).                        

           b.  Legend 1 International Pact Organization COMSEC
      material; that is North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
           c.  Legend 2 COMSEC material.  Equipments are identified by
      the suffix CS to the NSN.                                                

           d.  Legend 3 COMSEC material.  Material whose accountability
      has been dropped between AFCSC and the FAA COMSEC account.               

           e.  Legend 5 COMSEC material.  Material which has not been
      placed into effect (reserve or contingency material).                    

      124.  COMSEC ACCOUNT RECORD FILE.  Each FAA COMSEC account shall
      maintain an account record file consisting of six folders as
      required by AFKAG-2.  A description of these files follows:              

           a.  Folder 1.  Accounting reports and an AFCOMSEC Form 14:          

                (1)  File authenticated copies of all accounting
      reports in numerical sequence by the account's voucher number.           

                (2)  Maintain an AFCOMSEC Form 14 in the front of the
      folder.                                                                  

                (3)  Classify this folder a minimum of CONFIDENTIAL.           

           b.  Folder 2.  AFCOMSEC Form 3.  This folder contains the
      current records appointing and rescinding the COMSEC custodian
      and alternate custodians for the COMSEC account.  AFCOMSEC form 9
      also shall be retained in this folder.                                   

           c.  Folder 3.  General accounting correspondence.  File
      copies of correspondence about COMSEC distribution and accounting
      (such as disposition instructions, procedure changes, and tracer
      actions).  Classify this folder equal to the highest
      classification of the correspondence therein.                            

           d.  Folder 4.  Mail and courier package receipts.  File
      package receipts for classified COMSEC material transmitted or
      received through Armed Forces Courier Service, other officially
      designated couriers, or the U.S. Postal Service.                         

           e.  Folder 5.  Hand receipts.  File signed copies of hand
      receipts for COMSEC material issued to users.  Destroy the
      receipt according to the instructions in AFKAG-2.                        

           f.  Folder 6.  Local destruction reports.  Keep reports as
      instructed in Situation E4, AFKAG-2.                                     

      125.-129.  RESERVED.                                                     

                        FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                      PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
                    DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552























              CHAPTER 6. CONTROLLED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ITEMS (CCI)                 

      130.  PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND.                                            

           a.  The Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI) category applies
      to specified, unclassified, secure telecommunications and
      information handling equipments and associated cryptographic
      components.  The intent is to promote the broad use of secure
      telecommunications and information handling equipments for the
      protection of national security (classified), and other sensitive
      information which should be protected in the national interest.          

           b.  Secure telecommunications and information and handling
      equipments and associated cryptographic components which are
      designated "Controlled Cryptographic Item" or "CCI" use a
      classified cryptographic logic; it is only the hardware or
      firmware embodiment of that logic which is unclassified.  The
      associated cryptographic drawings, logic descriptions, theory of
      operation, computer programs, and related cryptographic
      information remains classified.                                          

           c.  Procedures for controlling CCI secure telecommunications
      and information handling equipments and associated cryptographic
      components are required to guard against preventable losses to an
      actual or potential enemy.                                               

                (1)  In keeping with the spirit of expanded use of
      these equipments, minor lapses in carrying out control procedures
      shall be referred to the responsible manager as a matter of
      administrative discretion.  FAA employees can be held liable for
      the loss, damage, or destruction of Government property caused by
      their negligence, willful misconduct, or deliberate unauthorized
      use.                                                                     

                (2)  More serious infractions of CCI control procedures
      may constitute sabotage, loss through gross negligence, theft, or
      espionage that would be punishable under various sections of the
      United States Code or the Uniform Code of Military Justice.              

      131.  DEFINITIONS.                                                       

           a.  Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI).  A secure
      telecommunications or information handling equipment, or
      associated cryptographic components, which is unclassified but
      controlled.  Equipments and components so designated shall bear
      the designator "Controlled Cryptographic Item" or "CCI".                 

           b.  Secure Telecommunications and Information Handling
      Equipment.  Equipment designed to secure telecommunications and
      information handling media converting information to a form
      unintelligible to an unauthorized intercepter and by reconverting
      the information to its original form for authorized recipients.
      Such equipment, employing a classified cryptographic logic, may
      be stand-alone-crypto-equipment, as well as telecommunications
      and information handling equipment with integrated or embedded
      cryptography.                                                            

           c.  Crytopgraphic Component.  The hardware or firmware
      embodiment of the cryptographic logic in a secure
      telecommunications or information handling equipment.  A
      cryptographic component may be a modular assembly, a printed
      circuit board, a microcircuit, or a combination of these items.
           d.  Access.  The ability or opportunity to obtain, modify,
      or use.  External viewing of a CCI does not constitute access.           

      132.  CONTROL REQUIREMENTS.  The following subparagraphs set
      forth the minimum requirements for controlling unkeyed CCI
      equipments and components utilized by the FAA.  Where such
      equipments and components contain classified key they shall be
      protected in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 5 of
      this Order.  Also, depending upon the application, other more
      stringent requirements may be prescribed.                                

           a.  Access.  A security clearance is not required for access
      to unkeyed CCI equipments and components.  However, access shall
      normally be restricted to U.S. citizens whose duties require such
      access.  Access may be granted to permanently admitted resident
      aliens who are U.S. Government civilian employees or active duty
      or reserve members of the U.S. Armed Forces whose duties require
      such access.  ACO-300 may grant waivers to permit non-U.S.
      citizens unescorted access to installed CCIs, regardless of the
      release status of the CCI, under conditions listed below:                

      NOTE:  The approval of the National Managers must be obtained by
      ACO-300 through AFCSC/SRMP before allowing such access by non-
      U.S. citizens in Communist block or other countries listed in the
      Attorney General Criteria Country List.  Such requests shall be
      routed through the servicing security element to ACO-300 together
      with complete justification and explanation of operational need.         

                (1)  Unkeyed CCI's:                                            

                     (a)  Such access is in conjunction with building
      maintenance, custodial duties, or other operational
      responsibilities normally performed by such personnel unescorted
      in the area now containing the CCIs before their installation;
      and                                                                      

                     (b)  The CCI is installed within a facility which
      is a U.S.-controlled facility or a combined facility with a
      permanent U.S. presence, as opposed to a host nation facility,
      even through the primary staffing is by host nation personnel;
      and                                                                      

                     (c)  The servicing security element has determined
      that the risk of tampering with the CCI which could result in
      compromise of U.S. information, classified or unclassified but
      sensitive, is acceptable in light of the local threat and
      vulnerability and the sensitivity of the information being
      protected and indicated by its classification, special security
      controls, and intelligence life; and                                     

                     (d)  Such access is not prohibited by Department
      of State policies and procedures applicable to FAA operation in a
      given geographic area.                                                   

                     (e)  The system doctrine for the CCI does not
      specifically prohibit such access.                                       

                (2)  Keyed CCI's.  In addition to all of the
      requirements for unkeyed CCIs, the following apply for unescorted
      access or use by foreign personnel:                                      

                     (a)  The foreign personnel are civilian employees
      of the U.S. Government or assigned to a combined facility; and
                     (b)  The CCI remains U.S. property, a U.S. citizen
      is responsible for it, and the presence of such installed CCIs is
      verified at least monthly; and                                           

                     (c)  The communications to be protected are
      determined to be essential to the support of FAA or combined
      operations; and                                                          

                     (d)  FAA and other U.S. users communicating with
      such terminals are made aware of the non-U.S. citizen status of
      the CCI user; and                                                        

                     (e)  Only U.S. personnel with classified U.S. keys
      may key CCI's.  Authorized foreign personnel may key CCIs with
      allied keys or unclassified keys.                                        

                (3)  Special Security Requirements.  If a CCI is to be
      installed and operated in a foreign country at a facility which
      is either unmanned or manned entirely by non-U.S. citizens,
      additional special security measures, such as vault areas,
      locking bars, safes, alarms, etc., are required.  Should an
      installation of this nature be required to support FAA operations
      it must be approved in advance by ACO-300 after coordination with
      AFCSC/SRM on a case-by-case basis.                                       

                (4)  Moving CCI's.  CCI's will not normally be moved
      from an environment where the tampering risk presented by non-
      U.S. citizen access is acceptable to a more sensitive environment
      where the risk is not acceptable.  If such action is an
      operational necessity, it must receive the prior approval of the
      FAA servicing security element and in overseas areas the
      cognizant representative of the Department of State for the
      particular geographic area.  All such CCI's must be examined for
      signs of tampering by qualified COMSEC maintenance personnel.
      Any evidence of tampering shall be reported as a COMSEC incident
      and immediate action will be taken to remove the CCI from
      operational use pending notification from the Director, National
      Security Agency.                                                         

           b.  Courier.  Authorized FAA employees and contractor
      employees (U.S. citizens) may courier CCI equipment and
      components.  Requirements for courier authorization are specified
      in FAA Order 1600.2C, National Security Information.                     

                (1)  Authorized persons may transport CCI aboard both
      Government and commercial aircraft, either handcarried or as
      checked baggage.  If it is checked as hold baggage on commercial
      airliners, it must be packaged in a container which is sealed in
      a manner that will detect unauthorized access to the enclosed
      material, such as tamper-detections tape, wire seals, etc.               

                (2)  CCI can be subjected to X-ray inspections;
      however, if airport security personnel require physical
      inspection, the inspection must be limited to external viewing
      only.  To avoid unnecessary delays and searches by airport
      personnel, prior coordination with the servicing security element
      shall be accomplished to ensure that airport personnel are
      informed in a timely manner of the transfer of CCI material.             

           c.  Storage and Transportation.                                     

                (1)  General.  Store and transfer CCI equipment and
      components in a manner that affords protection at least equal to
      that which is normally provided to weapons, computers,
      electronics equipment, etc., and ensures that access and
      accounting integrity is maintained.                                      

                (2)  Storage.  Handle CCI's in connection with
      warehouse functions provided they are under direct supervision of
      an individual who meets the access requirements of this chapter.         

                (3)   Transportation.                                          

                     (a)  General.  Ship CCI equipments and components
      by a traceable means in accordance with the following:                   

                          1  Within CONUS:                                     

                             a  Commercial carrier providing DOD
      Constant Surveillance Service (CSS)  (NOTE:  Contact the
      Transportation Officer of the nearest Defense Contract
      Administration Service Management Area (DCASMA) office for
      information concerning the carriers servicing the specific
      geographic area.  CSS is not available overseas.                         

                             b  U.S. registered mail provided the mail
      does not at any time pass out of U.S. control.                           

                             c  Authorized FAA or contractor courier.
      For contractor couriers, the authorization to act as a courier or
      escort for CCI equipment and components may be granted by the
      servicing FAA security element in accordance with FAA Order
      1600.2C.                                                                 

                             d  Diplomatic courier service.
                          2   Outside CONUS:  In foreign countries
      where there are two or more FAA facilities where FAA personnel
      are stationed, foreign nationals who are employed by the FAA may
      transport CCI's provided:                                                

                             a  There is a signature record that
      provides continuous accountability for custody of the shipment
      from pickup to ultimate destination, and                                 

                             b  There is a constant U.S. presence (for
      example, a U.S. person accompanies a foreign driver in couriering
      the material), or                                                        

                             c  The material is contained in a closed
      vehicle or shipping container which is locked and has a shipping
      seal that will prevent undetected access to the enclosed
      material.                                                                

           d.  Accounting.                                                     

                (1)  Within the FAA, CCI equipments shall be delivered
      to a primary FAA COMSEC account.                                         

                (2)  The COMSEC Custodian shall initially receipt for
      the CCI equipment, and will be responsible for ensuring that
      before further distribution is made the individual CCI items are
      entered into the Property Management System for the using
      facility, Region, or Center as appropriate.                              

      NOTE:  The custodian should coordinate with the responsible
      property management officer to ensure that the requirements of
      this order are met.                                                      

                (3)  CCI equipments shall be accounted for by serial
      number.  CCI components, installed in this equipment, do not
      require separate accountability.  Spares or other uninstalled CCI
      components shall be accounted for by quantity.                           

                (4)  The accounting system must provide the following:         

                     (a)  Establish a central point designated by the
      Property Management Officer for the using facility, region or
      center for control of CCI equipments.                                    

                     (b)  The identification of CCI equipment and
      components which are lost.                                               

                     (c)  Individual accountability in order to support
      prosecution in cases which involve infractions that would be
      punishable under the United States Code or the Uniform Code of
      Military Justice.                                                        

                (5)  The manager having property management
      responsibility for the using facility region or center shall
      ensure that procedures are followed to permit entering CCI
      equipment into the Property Management System data base in such a
      way that equipments can be accurately inventoried when necessary.        

      133.  INVENTORIES.                                                       

           a.  CCI equipments shall be inventoried at least annually.
      This includes uninstalled CCI equipments.  An inventory should
      also be accomplished whenever there is a change of personnel
      responsible for the safekeeping or accounting of an
      organization's holdings of CCI equipments and components.
      Reports of inventory shall be submitted to the central control
      point established for control of CCI equipments.  Inventory
      records shall be maintained current for as long as the using
      facility, region or center maintains CCI assets.                         

           b.  Inability to reconcile an organization's holdings of CCI
      equipments and components with the record of accountability at
      the established central control point shall be reported as an
      insecurity in accordance with this order and AFR 56-12.                  

      134.  REPORTING INSECURITIES.                                            

           a.  Users of CCI must be familiar with the criteria that
      constitutes an insecurity as specified in AFR 56-12.                     

           b.  All insecurities involving CCI equipments or components
      shall be reported through COMSEC channels in accordance with the
      following:                                                               

                (1)  Keyed equipment.  Report insecurities involving
      keying material according to AFR 56-12.                                  

                (2)  Unkeyed equipment.  Insecurities involving unkeyed
      CCI equipments shall be reported in accordance with AFR 56-12 and
      applicable FAA property management directives concerning the
      responsibilities for safeguarding and protection of high value
      U.S. Government property.                                                

      135.  ROUTINE AND EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION.                                 

           a.  The routine and emergency destruction procedures of AFR
      56-5 apply to CCI equipments and components.                             

           b.  Routine destruction of CCI equipment and components by
      FAA users is not authorized.  Equipment that is inoperative or no
      longer required shall be reported to the FAA servicing security
      element with a request for disposition instructions.  The
      servicing security element will be responsible for coordinating
      all such requests with ACO-300 prior to any disposition of the
      equipment.                                                               

      136-144.  RESERVED.                                                      

                          FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                        PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
                      DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552





















                          CHAPTER 7. SECURE VOICE                             

                             SECTION 1.  GENERAL                               

      145.  PURPOSE.  This chapter provides guidelines for use by the
      COMSEC custodian when dealing with the third generation or "user
      friendly" Secure Telephone Units; i.e., STU-III's, that are used
      to transmit classified information.                                      

      146.  TYPES AND MODELS OF STU-III.                                       

           a.  Type I.  These terminals are Controlled Cryptographic
      Items (CCI).  Type I STU-III terminals may be used to secure
      classified information, or unclassified but sensitive, voice or
      data communications when keyed with an appropriate level of
      keying material.  STU-III terminals are considered keyed when
      keying material has been loaded and an authorized Crypto Ignition
      Key (CIK) is inserted.  When keyed, Type I STU-III terminals must
      be safeguarded to the same classification level that the keying
      material being used is authorized to protect.  When the terminals
      are unkeyed, they are considered as high value property and are
      to be protected as CCI in accordance with provisions of NTISSI
      4001, Controlled Cryptographic Items, NTISSI 3013, Operational
      Security Doctrine for the secure Telephone Unit III (STU-III)
      Type 1 Terminal, AFSAL 4001A, Air Force COMSEC Publication
      Controlled Cryptographic Items and this order.                           

           b.  Type II.  Type II terminals may only be used with
      unclassified keying material.  Use of these terminals is not
      addressed in this chapter.                                               

      147.  DEFINITIONS.                                                       

           a.  Authentication Information.  Information which
      identifies a STU-III terminal.  Authentication information is
      specified for each STU-III key ordered and is included as a part
      of the key.  Each terminal's authentication information is
      displayed on the distant terminal during a secure call.
      Authentication information includes:                                     

                (1)  Classification level - the highest classification
      level authorized for an individual STU-III terminal.  During a
      secure call, the clearance level displayed on each terminal is
      the highest level common to both terminals, and is the authorized
      level for the call.                                                      

                (2)  Identification of the using organization (e.g.,
      FAA HQ, Wash. DC).                                                       

                (3)  Expiration date of the terminal's key.                    

                (4)  Foreign access to the terminal, where appropriate
      (e.g. CAN, US/KOR, US/NATO).                                             

           b.  Authorized Person.  A person who meets the access
      requirements of NTISSI/AFSAL No. 4001, Controlled Cryptographic
      Items, (AFR 56-20 when published), and this directive, and who
      has adequate clearance if classified material is involved.               

           c.  Crypto-Ignition Key (CIK).  A key storage device (KSD)
      which contains a portion of STU-III key(s) in encrypted form.
      Insertion of the CIK into the terminal(s) for which it was
      created allows the terminal(s) to be used in the secure mode;
      withdrawal disables the secure mode.                                     

           d.  CIK Information.  Split portions of an encrypted STU-III
      key, a part of which resides in the CIK, the other in the
      terminal.                                                                

           e.  Interoperable CIK.  A single CIK which may be programmed
      to work in more than one terminal.                                       

           f.  Key.  Information (usually a sequence of random binary
      digits) used to initially set up and to periodically change the
      operations performed in a crypto-equipment for purposes of
      encrypting or decrypting electronic signals; for determining
      electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM) patterns (e.g., for
      frequency hopping or spread spectrum); or for producing other
      keys.                                                                    

      NOTE:  Key replaces the terms "variable," "key(ing) variable,"
      and "cryptovariable".                                                    

           g.  Keyed Terminal.  A terminal which has been keyed, in
      which the CIK is inserted.                                               

           h.  Key Encryption Key (KEK).  A key that is used in the
      encryption and/or decryption of other keys for transmission
      (rekeying) or storage.                                                   

           i.  Key Storage Device (KSO).  The name given to the
      physical device that can be used as a fill device and also as a
      CIK for all Type 1 terminals.  It is a small device shaped like a
      physical key and contains passive memory.  When it is used to
      carry key to Type 1 terminals it is termed a fill device; when it
      is used to protect key that has been loaded into Type 1
      terminals, it is termed a CIK.                                           

           j.  Master CIK.  A CIK which may be used to create
      additional CIKs for a terminal as they are required, up to the
      terminal's maximum.                                                      

           k.  Micro-KMODC.  An MS-DOS compatible personal computer
      with a custom hardware/software configuration which, when
      connected to a Type 1 terminal, may be used to electronically
      order and receive STU-III keys.                                          

           1.  Unkeyed Terminal.  A terminal which contains no keys or
      one which has been keyed but from which the CIK has been removed
      and properly secured.                                                    

           m.  User Representative.  A person formally designated to
      order keys for STU-III terminals.                                        

           n.  U.S. Controlled Space.  An area, access to which is
      physically controlled by authorized U.S. Government personnel.           

      148.-150.  RESERVED.                                                     

                           SECTION 2.  EXCEPTIONS                              

      151.  REQUESTS FOR EXCEPTION.  Requests for exception to any of
      the provisions of this chapter must be submitted prior to
      implementation to the Emergency Operations Staff, ADA-20, who is
      Controlling Authority for the FAA STU-III Program.                       

      152.-153.  RESERVED.                                                     

          SECTION 3.  COMSEC CUSTODIAN DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES             

      154.  GENERAL.  The COMSEC Custodian handling STU-III key
      performs those responsibilities normally associated with handling
      and controlling other COMSEC material as specified in this order.
      The COMSEC Custodian is responsible for initial receipt of key,
      for storage until issued to a user, and for all accounting until
      the key is "destroyed."  Although the COMSEC Custodian may be
      the person who actually keys terminals and creates the associated
      CIK's, he or she may instead issue the key to authorized users,
      who load the key and create CIK's.  COMSEC Custodians are also
      responsible for the preparation of a number of control and
      accountability reports.                                                  

      155.  RECEIPT OF KEY.  The COMSEC Custodian will receive the key
      from the Key Management System (KMS) in the form of a key storage
      device, KSD-64A, used as a fill device.  The following applies:          

           a.  Fill Device Labels.  Each fill device will have an
      attached card label.  The card label will be removed by the
      COMSEC Custodian when the key in the fill device is loaded into a
      terminal.  The fill device card label contains space for the
      COMSEC Custodian to write the serial number of the terminal, the
      name of the each user, and the serial number of each KSD-64A that
      is used as a CIK for the terminal.  It is important that a local
      record be maintained of the terminal serial number as it relates
      to the key material identification (KMID) number (or Registration
      Number) binding.                                                         

            b.  Fill Device Packaging.  Fill devices will be shipped
      from the KMS packaged in heat sealed plastic bags.  Packaged fill
      devices will be placed in boxes with shipping papers (SF-153
      COMSEC Material Report).  The boxes will be double wrapped in
      accordance with appropriate COMSEC standards.  A copy of the
      SF-153 COMSEC Material Report must be signed by the COMSEC
      Custodian and returned as the receipt for the key.                       

           c.  Incoming Inspection.  The procedures for incoming
      inspection are as follows:                                               

                (1)  Inspect the package.  If any tampering is evident,
      submit a COMSEC incident report.                                         

                (2)  Take inventory of the package contents against the
      shipping papers.                                                         

                (3)  If all is in order, fill in the appropriate
      blocks, sign the enclosed receipt and return it to the
      KMS/Central Accounting Office (CAO).                                     

                (4)  If all is not in order, call the KMS immediately,
      note the discrepancy on the SF-153, and send it to the KMS/CAO.          

           d.  Storage and Protection of Key.  Fill devices stored by a
      COMSEC Custodian prior to loading into a terminal should remain
      sealed in the plastic bag.  The storage of the fill devices must
      be in accordance with procedures prescribed by this order for the
      storage of classified COMSEC keying material.                            

      156.  ACCOUNTING FOR KEY.  The COMSEC Custodian plays a critical
      role in accounting for STU-III key.  The Custodian is supported
      by the STU-III CAO and the cognizant Central Office of Record
      (COR).                                                                   

           a.  STU-III Type I Key.  The STU-III Type I operational and
      Type I seed key is accounted for by registration number
      Accounting Legend Code 1 (ALC-1).  All test key is unclassified
      and assigned ALC-4 (i.e. after receipt at the user COMSEC
      account, they are locally accountable).                                  

      NOTE:  TOP SECRET Type I operational key requires two person
      integrity handling in accordance with National doctrine, unless a
      specific exemption has been granted by the controlling authority
      (ADA-20) with approval of the National Manager (NSA).                    

           b.  Reports.  In addition to complying with all cognizant
      COR rules and requirements, the COMSEC Custodian is responsible
      for submitting the following reports directly to the KMS/CAO:            

                (1)  Key Receipts.  An SF-153 COMSEC Material Report
      will be included in each key order shipped from the KMS.  The
      Custodian must verify that all listed devices were received and
      then fill in the appropriate blocks, sign the SF-153, and return
      the original to the KMS/CAO.                                             

                (2)  Transfer Reports.  The sending COMSEC Custodian
      must generate an SF-153 Transfer Report whenever STU-III key is
      shipped between COMSEC accounts.  A copy of the report must be
      sent to the KMS/CAO.  The receiving Custodian must receipt for
      the keys and send a copy of the receipt to the KMS/CAO.                  

      Only STU-III key should be listed on Transfer Reports sent to the
      KMS/CAO.  Transfer reports for other types of key and for COMSEC
      equipment should be sent to the appropriate COR (for FAA accounts
      the COR for COMSEC materials other than STU-III is normally the
      US Air Force Cryptologic Support Center (USAFCSC), Kelly Air
      Force Base, TX).                                                         

                (3)  Destruction Reports.  The COMSEC Custodian must
      generate and submit an SF-153 Destruction Report to the KMS/CAO
      when Type I operational key is loaded into a terminal or
      zeroized.  Destruction Reports generated for key loaded in a
      terminal will contain the signature of the Custodian or alternate
      and the serial number of the STU-III terminal in the Remarks
      Column (Block 13).  Destruction Reports for TOP SECRET Type I
      operational key require two signatures, that of the Custodian or
      alternate and a witness.  Destruction Reports for zeroized key
      require two signatures.  Do not mix STU-III key destruction
      reports with other key transactions.  Destruction Reports are not
      required for Type I seed key successfully loaded into a STU-III
      terminal since the electronic conversion call to the KMS results
      in the automatic generation of a Key Conversion Notice (KCN)
      which serves as the Destruction Report.  The KSD-64A should not
      be physically destroyed by breaking or smashing the device as
      this does not guarantee destruction of the key material in the
      device.  For approved destruction procedures refer to the current
      STU-III Key Management Plan and the servicing security element.          

                (4)  Possession Reports.  Possession Reports are used
      when a shipment of key material is received without any
      accompanying paperwork.  The receiving Custodian should generate
      an SF-153 Possession Report and submit it to the KMS/CAO and
      other locations as directed by his COR.  Do not mix STU-III key
      Possession Reports with other key Possession Reports.                    

      157.  NOTICES FROM THE KMS/CAO.                                          

           a.  Key Conversion Notices.  When Type 1 seed key is loaded
      into a terminal, the user must call the KMS to obtain (convert it
      to) the Type I operational key.  The KMS/CAO generates a Key
      Conversion Notice which is sent to the accountable COMSEC
      Custodian informing him or her of the KMID numbers of seed key
      converted to operational key.  This notice indicates the serial
      number of the terminal into which the seed was loaded, the KMID,
      and the date of conversion.  The Custodian should verify that
      this is the terminal in which the key was loaded in order to
      maintain accurate records.  Additionally, this notice must be
      used by the COMSEC Custodian to ensure that all seed keys listed
      have, in fact, been converted.  Any discrepancies must be
      immediately reported as a COMSEC incident.  Delay in reporting
      constitutes a reportable COMSEC incident.  The KCN also documents
      any Type 1 operational key that has been rekeyed before
      notification of a destruction is received at the KMS/CAO.                

           b.  Tracers.  When a key shipment has been sent via
      registered mail to a COMSEC account and the SF-153 key receipt is
      not returned to the KMS/CAO within 30 days, or when key is sent
      by DCS to a COMSEC account and the SF-153-30 key receipt is not
      returned within 45 days, the KMS/CAO will send a Tracer Report to
      the Custodian to determine if the key has been received.  If the
      Custodian has received the key, the key receipt should have the
      applicable blocks filled in and should be submitted to the
      KMS/CAO.  If the key has not been received, the Custodian should
      immediately contact the KMS/CAO for instructions.                        

      158.-160.  RESERVED.
                       SECTION 4.  KEYING OF TERMINALS                         

      161.  INITIAL KEYING OF TERMINALS.                                       

           a.  Procedures for the initial keying of terminals differ
      slightly depending on the type of key.  A separate procedure for
      each type of key (seed and operational) is described below.
      These procedures may vary if a master CIK is desired and may vary
      among terminal vendors.  For detailed information on the specific
      key loading procedures for terminals, see the vendor's key
      loading instructions.                                                    

           b.  CIK's are created for a terminal during the key loading
      procedure.  Therefore, the user organization must decide if a
      master CIK should be created to allow CIK's to be programmed at a
      later time, or decide the number of regular CIKs needed for each
      terminal prior to loading the key.  The STU-III permits creation
      of a master CIK, which allows additional CIKs to be created at a
      later time.                                                              

      162.-163.  RESERVED.                                                     

                         SECTION 5.  ACCOUNTABILITY                            

      164.  CRYPTO IGNITION KEY HANDLING AND LOCAL ACCOUNTING.  To
      operate in the secure mode, a CIK must be inserted into a
      terminal and turned.  This paragraph discusses the accountability
      requirements prescribed for CIK's in terms of guidance in the
      STU-III doctrine and factors that affect both the accounting
      procedures and the number of CIK's required for an organization.
      It is understood that each user organization will disseminate any
      detailed or clarifying doctrinal guidance.                               

           a.  Local Accountability Requirements.                              

                (1)  CIK's are locally accountable.  This means that a
      local record of the CIK's and the persons to whom CIK's for each
      terminal are issued should be maintained.  The COMSEC Custodian
      or an authorized user should record the serial number of the
      STU-III terminal, the KSD-64A serial numbers, and the name of
      each terminal user in the appropriate spaces on the back of the
      fill device card.  Each card is perforated so that it can be
      detached and retained by the Custodian or an authorized user in a
      3x5 card file.                                                           

                (2)  Taking a periodic inventory of the CIK's for each
      terminal is encouraged.                                                  

                (3)  When loss of a CIK is locally reported, the
      Custodian or the authorized user can disable use of that CIK on
      the appropriate terminal.                                                

                (4)  Local guidance to terminal users concerning CIK
      accountability should be formulated and distributed
      appropriately.                                                           

           b.  Crypto Ignition Key Management.  There are a number of
      factors that affect the management and control of CIK's to
      include those listed below.                                              

                (1)  Multiple Terminal Users.  Each user activity or
      office must determine how many people will be allowed to use a
      terminal, which method(s) of multiple use will be allowed, and
      how many CIK's are required.  The methods for supporting multiple
      users of a terminal are as follows:                                      

                     (a)  Shared CIK'S.  A single CIK can be shared
      among a number of users.  During normal duty hours, this CIK can
      be left in the terminal if the terminal is located in a secure
      area where no unauthorized person could gain access to the
      terminal.                                                                

                     (b)  Multiple CIK'S.  STU-III terminals will
      support up to eight CIK's for each key.  The identification
      information displayed during a secure call will be the same for
      each of the eight CIK'S, and any of the eight CIK's can be used
      to operate the terminal.  These CIK's can be issued to several
      users.                                                                   

                     (c)  Multiple Key Sets per Terminal.  STU-III
      vendors offer terminals which can be filled with more than one
      key at a time.                                                           

                (2)  Multiple Terminals per Crypto Ignition Key.
      STU-III vendors offer a feature which will allow a single CIK to
      be associated with more than one terminal (an "interoperable"
      CIK).  This feature requires a single CIK to be programmed by
      each terminal with which it is to be used.  The use of multiple
      terminals per CIK complicates local accountability and security
      procedures, but permits greater flexibility for the user.                

                (3)  Master Crypto Ignition Keys.  STU-III's contain a
      master CIK feature which allows additional CIK's to be created at
      a later date.  However, the total number of CIK's per key stored
      in a terminal may never exceed eight.                                    

      165.-166.  RESERVED.                                                     

                            SECTION 6.  REKEYING                               

      167.  ELECTRONIC REKEYING.  The STU-III KMS provides for
      electronic rekeying of Type I terminals through a rekey call to
      the KMS.  (The Type 2 terminals cannot be electronically
      rekeyed.)  During this process, the terminals identification
      information is not changed.  Only the terminal's cryptographic
      information is changed.  The KMS supports electronic rekey over
      the public telephone networks (1-800 service and regular
      commercial networks) and the DOD AUTOVON network.  The situations
      in which electronic rekeying is performed are:                           

           a.  Initial Keying.  When a terminal is physically keyed
      with Type 1 seed key, a call to obtain Type I operational key is
      necessary.  When a terminal is physically keyed with Type I
      operational key, a call to the KMS rekey number is strongly
      recommended to obtain a current copy of the Compromised Key List
      (CKL) and the Compromise Information Message (CIM).                      

           b.  Scheduled Rekeying.  The terminal user is required to
      call the KMS for an electronic rekey at least once each year.
      Some terminals display the key expiration date automatically each
      time the CIK is inserted.                                                

           c.  When Rekey Notification is Received from the KMS.  A
      universal rekey notification to call for a rekey will be
      promulgated by mail or AUTODIN to all COMSEC Custodians.  The
      COMSEC Custodians will be responsible for directing each of their
      terminal users to call for a rekey.  In addition, the STU-III KMS
      has the capability to use the CIM message to notify STU-III
      terminals via the terminal display to call for a rekey.  (In
      those circumstances where a terminal user cannot call for an
      electronic rekey when such a notice is received, the terminal
      will have to be physically rekeyed.)                                     

      NOTE:  Electronic rekeying is performed by placing a secure call
      to the KMS through toll-free 800 service, AUTOVON, or direct dial
      lines.  The rekey telephone numbers are listed in the STU-III
      User's Manual.                                                           

      168.-170.  RESERVED.                                                     

                        SECTION 7.  PHYSICAL SECURITY                          

      171.  UNKEYED TERMINAL - TYPE 1.  In the unkeyed mode, the
      terminal can be used to place only unsecured, unclassified calls
      which are not sensitive.  An unkeyed terminal must be protected
      in accordance with the requirements of NTISSI/AFSAL 4001, and
      chapter 6 of this order.                                                 

      172.  KEYED TERMINAL.  When the terminal is keyed, it may be used
      in the secure mode by authorized persons only.  The terminal must
      be afforded protection commensurate with the classification of
      the key it contains as required by NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13, and
      Chapter 5, of this order.  When persons in an area are not
      cleared to the level of the keyed terminal, it must be under the
      operational control and within view of at least one appropriately
      cleared, authorized person.
      173.  TERMINAL DISPLAY.  Proper use requires strict attention to
      the authentication information displayed on the terminal during
      each secure call.  When two terminals communicate in the secure
      mode, each terminal automatically displays authentication
      information of the distant terminal.  The information displayed
      indicates the system capacity, and does not authenticate the
      person using the terminal.  Therefore, users must use judgement
      in determining need-to-know when communicating sensitive but
      unclassified or classified information.  If the display fails the
      terminal must not be used in the secure mode.                            

           a.  Authentication.  Authentication information is
      representative of the distant terminal and should match the
      distant user.  If there is question as to the validity of this
      information, sensitive but unclassified and classified
      information should not be communicated, even though voice
      recognition may be possible.                                             

           b.  Display.  When the display indicates that the distant
      terminal's key has expired, this could be an indication of
      unauthorized system access.  If the period is excessive (e.g.
      more than two months), users should not exchange sensitive
      unclassified or classified information.                                  

           c.  Classification Level.  Users must adhere to the
      classification level indicated on the terminal display.  Because
      of the interoperability among terminals of different
      classification levels, the display may indicate a level less than
      the actual classification of either terminal's own key(s) (e.g.,
      when a SECRET terminal calls a CONFIDENTIAL terminal,
      "CONFIDENTIAL" is displayed on both terminals as the approved
      level for the call).  Therefore users must observe the display
      with each call and limit the level of information accordingly.           

           d.  System Testing.  During system testing, authentication
      information on the display may vary, as required for the test;
      however, the display will always indicate that the call is for
      TEST purposes only.  Classified information may not be
      transmitted during system tests.                                         

      174.  USE BY OTHER U.S. PERSONNEL.                                       

           a.  Keyed Type 1 terminals may be used by or under the
      direct supervision of authorized persons only.  When
      operationally required, authorized persons may permit others not
      normally authorized to use the keyed terminal (e.g., persons not
      assigned to the FAA office, service or facility identified in the
      display and persons whose clearance does not meet the level
      indicated on the display) under the following conditions:                

                (1)  The call must be placed by an authorized person.          

                (2)  After reaching the called party, the caller must
      identify the party on whose behalf the call is being made,
      indicating their level of clearance.  Again, the maximum
      classification level may not exceed that level which appears on
      the terminal display.                                                    

           b.  Uncleared or otherwise unauthorized persons must not be
      permitted to overhear classified conversations or to have access
      to classified or sensitive information transmitted over the
      terminal.                                                                

      175.  USE BY FOREIGN NATIONALS.  NTISSI 4001/AFR 56-20 and
      Chapter 6 of this order, limit access to CCI equipments to U.S.
      citizens and permanently admitted resident aliens who are
      employees of the U.S. Government.  For the FAA prior approval of
      the Manager, Emergency Operations Staff, ADA-20, is required for
      any exception to this policy.                                            

      176.  STORAGE.  Type 1 terminals must be stored as specified in
      NTISSI/AFSAL 4001, and Chapter 6, of this order.  Foreign
      nationals who are employed by the U.S. Government at locations
      described in paragraph 179 below, may handle Type 1 terminals in
      connection with warehouse functions, provided they are under the
      direct supervision of an individual who meets the access
      requirements of NTISSI/AFSAL 4001, and Chapter 6.                        

      177.  USE OF THE SECURE DATA MODE.  During data transmissions,
      each Type I terminal must be manned by authorized persons.  The
      data must be sent only after the sending and receiving parties
      have observed the terminal display and have assured themselves of
      the appropriateness of the information transfer (i.e., is the
      sending/receiving party's organization level in the terminal
      display?).  If the terminal is attached to a computer, computer
      security and system issues should be addressed separately with
      the servicing security element prior to start of operations.
      Additional assistance in the area of computer security is
      available if needed from ACO-340, Washington, D.C.  It is
      important that these issues be addressed because of the inherent
      interoperability of all STU-III terminals.                               

      178.  AFTER HOURS PROTECTION.  When authorized persons are not
      present, the CIK must be removed from the terminal and properly
      protected as specified in this chapter.  Area controls must be
      sufficient to ensure access and accounting integrity of the
      terminal.                                                                

                         SECTION 8.  TRANSPORTATION                            

      179.  TYPE I TERMINALS.                                                  

           a.  Type 1 terminals must be unkeyed during shipment.  In no
      instance may KSDs containing seed or operational KEK's or CIK's
      be included in the same container or shipment as Type 1
      terminals.                                                               

           b.  Type I terminals may be transported by any means that
      provides continuous accountability and protection against losses
      and unauthorized access while in transit.  These criteria are
      satisfied by any of the following:                                       

                (1)  FAA courier authorized in accordance with
      provisions of Order 1600.2C.                                             

                (2)  FAA authorized contractor/company, U.S. citizen
      courier.                                                                 

                (3)  U.S. Registered Mail provided it does not at any
      time pass out of U.S. control and does not pass through a foreign
      postal system or any foreign inspection.                                 

                (4)  Commercial carriers under constant surveillance
      service (CSS) in CONUS only.  FAA elements may obtain information
      concerning these services from the General Services
      Administration (GSA), ATTN:  Traffic and Travel Services.
                (5)  U.S. military or military-contractor air service
      (e.g., Military Airlift Command, LOGAIR, QUICKTRANS) provided the
      requirements for CSS are observed.                                       

                (6)  U.S. Diplomatic Courier Service (overseas service
      only).  FAA STU-III units intended for overseas installation in
      FAA facilities or office spaces will be transferred to the
      Department of State for transportation to the overseas location.
      All movements of this type will be coordinated through the
      Manager, Emergency Operations Staff, ADA-20, Washington, D.C.            

                (7)  Armed Forces/Defense Courier Service (ARFCOS)
      outside the 48 contiguous states when no other means of secure
      transportation is available.                                             

      180.-182.  RESERVED.                                                     

                          SECTION 9.  INSTALLATION                             

      183.  GENERAL.  Type 1 terminals may be installed in U.S.
      controlled spaces (including vehicles) and in residences of U.S.
      Government officials.  The fundamental purpose of the Type 1
      terminal is to provide a readily available, easy to use secure
      telephone capability for all personnel who have a need to discuss
      classified or sensitive information.                                     

           a.  Acoustic Security.  Local acoustic security is an
      important consideration.  The greatest security threat to
      telephone conversations is where they are most vulnerable to
      hostile intercept and exploitation -- during transmission over
      the telephone network.  Therefore, a common-sense approach should
      be followed on acoustic security for the Type 1 installation.            

           b.  Servicing Security Element.  Specific provisions for
      achieving acoustical security should be determined in
      coordination with the servicing security element for each FAA
      using organization prior to STU-III installation.  The manager or
      supervisor having responsibility for the STU-III terminal is
      responsible for ensuring that acoustical security measures are
      enforced to preclude unauthorized overhearing of classified or
      sensitive but unclassified telephonic discussions.                       

      184.  RESIDENCES.  Type 1 terminals installed in residences may
      be used only by the persons for whom they are installed.  All of
      the security requirements for preventing unauthorized access to
      classified and sensitive information, and to the keyed terminal
      must be observed.                                                        

           a.  The terminal must be located in an area of the home
      where family members or other unauthorized persons will not
      overhear or view classified or sensitive information.                    

           b.  The CIK must be removed from the terminal following each
      use and kept in the personal possession of the user, or properly
      stored.                                                                  

           c.  If the CIK is stored in the residence and the associated
      terminal is used to protect classified information, the CIK must
      be protected in a GSA-approved security container.                       

           d.  When the terminal is used in the data mode, classified
      information that is viewed on the screen should be removed as
      soon as possible, and should not be printed out unless there is
      appropriate classified storage.                                          

           e.  Installation of STU-III equipments in residences will
      require the prior approval of the servicing security element and
      the responsible COMSEC custodian.                                        

      185.-186.  RESERVED.                                                     

                          SECTION 10.  MAINTENANCE                             

      187.  GENERAL.  NTISSI/AFSAL 4001 contains the training
      requirements which apply to all persons who maintain COMSEC
      equipment, to include the Type 1 terminal.  Authorized
      maintenance personnel need not be cleared unless they require
      access to classified COMSEC information to perform terminal
      maintenance.                                                             

      188.  ACCESS.  Maintenance personnel may not have access to a
      terminal which has been keyed for normal operations.  Therefore,
      any terminal which will be removed or disassembled for repair
      should first be zeroized.  However, if terminal malfunction
      prevents zeroization, the terminal may be returned, minus the
      CIK, which must be retained in appropriate storage by authorized
      persons.  When an FAA terminal is removed from an operational
      area by maintenance personnel the associated KEK's will be
      zeroized.                                                                

      189.-190.  RESERVED.                                                     

               SECTION 11.  PROTECTION OF KEY STORAGE DEVICES                  

      191.  GENERAL.  When they contain KEK's or CIK information, KSD's
      must be protected against unauthorized access.  When they contain
      none of the above information, KSDs require no special handling
      or protection, and their loss is not a reportable insecurity.            

      192.  FILL DEVICES.  Fill devices containing KEK's must be
      safeguarded in accordance with Annex B of NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13,
      and Chapter 5 of this order.                                             

           a.  Access.  An appropriate clearance is required for access
      to a fill device when it contains a classified operational KEK.
      Although seed KEK's are handled as UNCLASSIFIED CRYPTO, COMSEC
      Custodians and users must also be appropriately cleared to
      receive seed KEK's with classified data.                                 

           b.  Classification and Accountability.  See Section 3, of
      this Chapter.                                                            

           c.  Transportation.                                                 

                (1)  Within the U.S.  Fill devices containing
      classified operational KEK's should routinely be transported by
      cleared designated courier or ARFCOS.  However, if distribution
      is to a location which cannot reasonably be served by the above
      means, or the urgency for delivery precludes their use,
      operational KEK's classified up through SECRET may be transported
      by U.S. Registered Mail.  Seed KEK's and unclassified operational
      KEK's may be transported by any means prescribed for transporting
      classified COMSEC material or by U.S. Registered Mail.                   

                (2)  Outside of the U.S.  Fill devices containing
      operational KEK's, regardless of classification, must be
      transported in accordance with arrangements made with the U.S.
      Department of State Office of Communications Security.  Seed
      KEK's, regardless of clearance data may be transported by any
      means prescribed for operational KEK'S.                                  

                (3)  Quantity.  Normally, up to 50 operational and/or
      seed KEK's may be shipped in a single package.  However, when for
      emergency reasons classified operational KEK's must be
      transported by U.S. Registered Mail within the U.S., no more than
      25 may be included in a single package.                                  

           d.  Reserve Key.  Although there is no prohibition against a
      COMSEC Custodian holding some level of seed or operational key in
      reserve for emergency use (e.g., if a terminal fails), that level
      should be kept to a minimum consistent with operational
      requirements, in order to limit the exposure of keys in long-term
      storage.                                                                 

                (1)  COMSEC Custodians must notify the KMS of damaged,
      broken, or otherwise unusable fill devices and return them to the
      KMS for disposition.  The devices must be returned at their
      original classification.                                                 

                (2)  A seed or operational key is considered destroyed
      after it has been loaded in a terminal.  Seed KEK's are
      automatically dropped from central accountability once the
      terminal has been rekeyed through a call to the KMS.  A formal
      destruction report is not required.                                      

                     (a)  COMSEC Custodians must submit a formal
      destruction report for operational KEKs which have been manually
      loaded into the terminal, where a call is not made to the KMS for
      rekeying (a witness to the destruction is not required since the
      terminal records the identification of the key loaded).                  

                     (b)  Manually loaded operational KEK's not
      replaced through a call to the KMS or reported destroyed by a
      destruction report will appear on the COMSEC Custodian's next
      scheduled inventory.                                                     

           f.  Unused KEK(s).  An unused KEK which has passed its
      expiration date should be zeroized (in a Type I terminal) by the
      COMSEC Custodian.  Zeroization must be witnessed by another
      authorized person (e.g., the alternate custodian) who must also
      sign the destruction report submitted to the KMS by the COMSEC
      custodian.  Once zeroized, the KSD may then be used as a CIK.            

      193.  CRYPTO-IGNITION KEYS (CIKS).                                       

           a.  General.  At least one CIK must be created immediately
      following the manual loading of a KEK into a terminal.
      Additional CIK'S, up to the terminal's maximum, may be created at
      this time; or, if the terminal design supports it, the first CIK
      may be designated as a master CIK, allowing subsequent creation
      of additional CIK's as they are required.  Since CIK's permit the
      terminal to be used in the secure mode, they must be protected
      against unauthorized access and use.  The number of CIK's created
      should be kept to the minimum required for operational necessity.        

           b.  Access.  CIK's may normally be retained in the personal
      custody of authorized persons, who must protect them as valuable
      personal property.  Any person who may have unrestricted access
      to the keyed terminal may retain the CIK.                                

           c.  Accountability.  CIK's should be accounted for locally
      to minimize insecurities associated with their use.  Local
      accounting includes maintaining a record of all CIK's created
      along with the names, organizations/locations of the persons to
      whom they are issued.  In addition, the user should verify at
      least once a year to the COMSEC Custodian that he or she still
      holds the CIK.  Verification of CIK holdings should be in writing
      from user to COMSEC account in accordance with procedural
      instruction published by the respective user organizations or the
      Controlling Authority.                                                   

           d.  Transportation.  CIK's may be transported by any means
      prescribed for seed KEKs, or on the person of an authorized user.
      CIKs must always be shipped separately from terminals.                   

           e.  Protection in Use.  During operational hours the CIK may
      be left in the terminal so long as authorized persons are present
      and the terminal is under the continuous visual supervision and
      physical control of an authorized user.  If the area is left
      unattended, authorized persons are not present, or if for any
      reason it is not possible for an authorized user to maintain
      constant visual surveillance and physical control over the
      terminal, the CIK will be removed from the terminal and
      maintained in the personal possession of an authorized user.  In
      the event that the CIK is to be kept in the same room as the
      terminal, the CIK must be afforded protection commensurate with
      the classification of the keyed terminal (e.g., in a GSA-approved
      security container for CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET).             

           f.  Losses.
                (1)  Loss of a CIK must be promptly reported to the
      responsible COMSEC Custodian, who must initiate immediate action
      to delete that CIK from all terminals with which it was
      associated.  All losses shall be reported within 72 hours of the
      loss to the responsible FAA COMSEC Custodian.                            

                (2)  In the event of the loss of an unkeyed terminal,
      the associated CIK(s) must be protected at the classification
      level of the key.  Absence of the terminal prevents the erasure
      of the CIK information in the terminal; therefore, the CIK must
      be zeroized, or protected at the level of the terminal when
      keyed.                                                                   

           g.  Disposition.  Once a CIK has been disassociated from a
      terminal (either through deletion of the CIK from the terminal,
      or zeroization of the associated seed or operational KEK in the
      terminal), the CIK requires no special controls and may be
      retained for further use in the same or other terminals.                 

           h.  Master CIK.  The master CIK should be subject to
      additional controls to prevent its loss or use to make
      unauthorized CIK's or unauthorized secure calls.  Master CIK's
      should be kept under the personal control of an authorized person
      who has been briefed on its sensitivity and the requirements for
      its control.                                                             

                (1)  The master CIK should be maintained in a GSA
      approved security container except when it is required to create
      other CIK's or to place secure calls.                                    

                (2)  Storage of the master CIK must be commensurate
      with the classification of the associated KEK.                           

           i.  Interoperable CIK.  An interoperable CIK may be created
      for concurrent use with one of the keys in up to four Type 1
      terminals.  Authentication information associated with the
      interoperable CIK (i.e., organization and clearance level) must
      be representative of every person with access to this CIK.  If
      the clearance level varies between terminals, any person with
      access to the interoperable CIK must be cleared to the highest
      level of the associated key.  While use of an interoperable CIK
      provides users operational flexibility, COMSEC Custodians should
      assure that the appropriate accounting is maintained and that
      losses are acted upon promptly.  It is important that the
      custodian be aware of the status of an interoperable CIK since
      the terminals in which it is used will probably not be colocated
      and each terminal may also have other CIK's associated with it.
      For these reasons, it is recommended that an interoperable CIK
      remain at all times in the personal possession of a single
      individual assigned responsibility for its use.                          

      194.  PROTECTION AND USE OF THE MICRO-KMODC.  The micro-KMODC may
      be used to electronically order and receive keys.  User
      representatives may order keys, but only appropriately cleared
      COMSEC Custodians may receive keys.  The following guidelines
      apply:                                                                   

           a.  Location.  There are no restrictions on where the
      micro-KMODC may be installed.  However, during use, controls must
      be instituted to prevent unauthorized access to the system and
      its keys.                                                                

           b.  Classifications.  All classifications of key may be
      ordered through a micro-KMODC.  However, only unclassified
      operational KEKs, and all seed KEKs regardless of their clearance
      data, may be received at the micro-KMODC.                                

           c.  Disks.  Floppy disks containing seed and operational
      KEK's received at the micro-KMODC must be labelled and handled as
      UNCLASSIFIED CRYPTO material, and must remain under the local
      control of the COMSEC Custodian.  Each KEK on the disk is
      centrally accountable to the KMS.  A receipt is automatically
      generated for these keys between the micro-KMODC and the KMODC,
      and the appropriate COR notified.  Therefore, a separate
      possession report is not required.  KEK's which remain in the
      COMSEC Custodian's account, whether on the disk or in a fill
      device, will be subject to continuous central accounting until
      converted (seed KEK's) or reported destroyed (operational KEK's).        

           d.  Destruction.  When the floppy disks will no longer be
      used for storage of keys, they must be destroyed in accordance
      with NTISSI 4004/AFR 56-5.                                               

      195.-198.  RESERVED.                                                     

              SECTION 12.  DESTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY PROTECTION                

      199.  GENERAL REQUIREMENT.  The provisions of NTISSI 4004/AFR
      56-5, must be followed in the disposal and emergency protection
      of Type 1 terminals and KSD's used as fill devices and CIK'S.            

      200.  RESERVED.                                                          

                    SECTION 13.  REPORTABLE INSECURITIES                       

      201.  INSECURE PRACTICE/COMSEC INCIDENT HANDLING.                        

           a.  General.  With any secure communications system,
      incidents and compromises of terminals and key are possible.  The
      design of the STU-III terminals and keying concept minimizes the
      threat of compromised traffic; therefore, compromise recovery is
      focused on preventing an adversary from posing as a valid user
      (e.g. a keyed terminal is lost and someone is pretending to be
      the individual identified by the terminal's key).  This paragraph
      provides an introduction into the compromise recovery feature for
      Type I terminals.  For Type 2 terminals, there is no compromise
      recovery capability available.                                           

           b.  Compromise Types.  The terminal users and COMSEC
      Custodians are primarily responsible for detecting potential
      compromises and following through with necessary reporting
      procedures.  These potential compromises are broken into two
      classes:  insecure practices/locally reportable events; and,
      COMSEC incidents/centrally reportable events.                            

                (1)  Insecure Practices/Locally Reportable Events.
      Insecure practices are not in and of themselves COMSEC incidents,
      but could lead to loss of integrity of the user's information as
      well as information of other system users.  For this reason,
      insecure practices should be managed locally.  Examples of
      locally reportable events are the loss of a CIK, and failure to
      rekey a terminal within two months of the end of the
      cryptoperiod.  STU-III doctrine contains a complete listing of
      insecure practices.  Incidents of this type shall be reported to
      the servicing security element for the region or center
      concerned.                                                               

                (2)  COMSEC Incidents/Centrally Reportable.  Centrally
      reportable events are reported to the NSA by secure phone,
      AUTODIN, or registered mail.  The AUTODIN reports should be sent
      to:  DIRNSA FT GEO G MEADE MD//S2// (Reports of insecurities
      involving KEK's must include the assigned KEK identification
      number, whether or not there were any CIK's involved, and whether
      they were under protection when the insecurity occurred.)  The
      following are examples of centrally reportable incidents:                

                     (a)  Loss of a master CIK.                                

                     (b)  Failure to zeroize CIK information from a
      Type I terminal within 72 hours of the loss of a CIK.                    

                     (c)  Failure of the COMSEC Custodian to notify the
      KMS that a seed KEK listed on the conversion notice still exists
      in his or her COMSEC account.                                            

                     (d)  Use in the secure mode of a terminal whose
      display is inoperable.                                                   

                     (e)  Failure to adequately protect or zeroize a
      CIK that is associated with an unkeyed terminal which is lost.           

                     (f)  Indication in the terminals display that the
      distant terminal contains compromised key.                               

      202.-204.  RESERVED.                                                     

                       SECTION 14.  RECORDS RETENTION                          

      205.  General.  In addition to the normal records which are
      retained for accounting purposes, certain information must be
      kept to facilitate the automated Federal Secure Voice System
      compromise recovery mechanism.  The following information must be
      maintained for each KEK until it is truly destroyed (i.e.,
      finally zeroized from the terminal or overwritten by a new KEK):         

           a.  The identification of the terminal into which each KEK
      was loaded.                                                              

           b.  The identification of all CIK's associated with each KEK
      by terminal.                                                             

           c.  The identification of all terminals associated with each
      CIK, by CIK.                                                             

      NOTE:  This information may be recorded on the card which
      accompanies each fill device or it may be computerized.                  

      206.-208.  RESERVED.                                                     

                       FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                     PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
                   DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552





















                   APPENDIX 1. REQUIRED FORMS AND REPORTS                     

          Form Number          Unit of             Title
                               Issue                                           

      1.  AFCOMSEC Form 3      Sheet          Record of Custodian              

      2.  AFCOMSEC Form 9      Sheet          Cryptographic Access
                                              Certificate                      

      3.  AFCOMSEC Form 14     Sheet          COMSEC Material Voucher
                                              and Package Register             

      4.  AFCOMSEC Form 16     Sheet          COMSEC Account Daily-
                                              Shift Inventory                  

      5.  FAA Form 1600.8      Sheet          Visitor Register
                                              (Stock No. 0052-00-91
                                              -2000)                           

      6.  FAA Form 1600.54     Sheet          Notification of Personnel
                                              Security Action
                                              (Stock No. 0052-00-869
                                              -4000)                           

      7.  SF-153               Sheet          COMSEC Material Report           

      8.  SF-700               Sheet          Security Container
                                              Information
                                              (NSN:  7540-01-214-5372)         

      9.  SF-701               Sheet          Activity Security Check
                                              - list.
                                              (NSN:  7540-01-213-7899)         

      10.  SF-702              Sheet          Security Container Check
                                              Sheet NSN 7540-01-213
                                              -7900                            

                                              (NSN:  7540-01-213-7900)
      11.  SF-703              Sheet          TOP SECRET Cover Sheet
                                              (NSN:  7540-01-213-7901)         

      12.  SF-704              Sheet          SECRET Cover Sheet
                                              (NSN:  7540-01-213-7902)         

      13.  SF-705              Sheet          CONFIDENTIAL Cover Sheet
                                              (NSN:  7540-01-213-7903)         

      14.  SF-706              Pack           TOP SECRET Label
                                              (NSN:  7540-01-207-5536)         

      15.  SF-707              Pack           SECRET Label
                                              (NSN:  7540-01-207-5537)         

      16.  SF-708              Pack           CONFIDENTIAL Label
                                              (NSN:  7540-01-207-5538)         

      17.  SF-709              Pack           CLASSIFIED Label
                                              (NSN:  7540-01-207-5540)         

      NOTE:  Ordering information for the above forms is as follows:           

                a.  FAA Forms:  Orders for additional copies of FAA
      forms should be submitted to the FAA Depot, Mike Monroney
      Aeronautical Center, ATTN:  AAC-434, P.O. Box 25082, Oklahoma
      City, Oklahoma 73125.                                                    

                b.  AFCOMSEC forms should be ordered by letter request
      60 days before current supply is depleted.  Letter request should
      be sent to HQ ESC/DAPD, San Antonio, TX 78243-5000.  Request an
      estimated 6 month supply.                                                

                c.  Standard forms (SF) should be ordered through
      normal document acquisition channels from the GSA.  If any
      difficulty is encountered obtaining specific SFs contact the
      servicing security element for assistance.                               

                         FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                   Public Availability to be Determined
                           Under 5 U.S.C. 552





















              APPENDIX 2. SAMPLE CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS BRIEFING                

      1.  You have been selected to perform duties that will require
      access to U.S. classified cryptographic information.  It is
      essential that you be made aware of certain facts relevant to the
      protection of this information before access is granted.  You
      must know the reason why special safeguards are required to
      protect U.S. classified cryptographic information.  You must
      understand the directives which require these safeguards and the
      penalties you will incur for the unauthorized disclosure,
      unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of U.S. classified
      cryptographic information.  Failure to properly safeguard this
      information could cause serious to exceptionally grave damage, or
      irreparable injury, to the national security of the United States
      or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation.                       

      2.  U.S. classified cryptographic information is especially
      sensitive because it is used to protect classified information.
      Any particular piece of cryptographic keying material and any
      specific cryptographic technique may be used to protect a large
      quantity of classified information during transmission.  If the
      integrity of a cryptographic system is breached at any point, all
      information protected by the system may be compromised.  The
      safeguards placed on U.S. classified cryptographic information
      are a necessary component of government programs to ensure that
      our Nation's vital secrets are not compromised.                          

      3.  Because access to U.S. classified cryptographic information
      is granted on a strict need-to-know basis, you will be given
      access to only that cryptographic information necessary to
      perform your duties.  You are required to become familiar with
      Order 1600.8C, as well as AFRs 56-10 and 56-13.  Sections 641,
      793, 794, 798, and 952, Title 18, U.S. Code are contained in
      attachments 1 through 6 of this appendix.  Cited directives and
      Executive Order 12356 are attached in a briefing book for your
      review at this time.                                                     

      4.  Especially important to the protection of U.S. classified
      cryptographic information is the timely reporting of any known or
      suspected compromise of this information.  If a cryptographic
      system is compromised, but the compromise is not reported, the
      continued use of the system can result in the loss of all
      information protected by it.  If the compromise is reported,
      steps can be taken to lessen an adversary's advantage gained
      through the compromise of the information.                               

      5.  You should know that intelligence services of some foreign
      governments prize the acquisition of U.S. classified
      cryptographic information.  They will go to extreme lengths to
      compromise U.S. citizens and force them to divulge cryptographic
      techniques and materials that protect the nation's secrets around
      the world.  You must understand that any personal or financial
      relationship with a foreign government's representative could
      make you vulnerable to attempts at coercion to divulge U.S.
      classified cryptographic information.  You should be alert to
      recognize those attempts so that you may successfully counter
      them.  The best personal policy is to avoid discussions that
      reveal your knowledge of, or access to, U.S. classified
      cryptographic information and thus avoid highlighting yourself to
      those who would seek the information you possess.  Any attempt,
      either through friendship or coercion, to solicit your knowledge
      regarding U.S. classified cryptographic information must be
      reported immediately to your servicing security element, or to
      ACO-300, ATTN:  ACO-320, Headquarters, Federal Aviation
      Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C.,
      telephone 202-267-3961.                                                  

      6.  In view of the risks noted above, unofficial travel to
      certain communist or other designated countries will require the
      prior approval of your manager and the servicing security
      element, or ACO-300.  It is essential that you contact your
      manager and the region/center security office, or ACO-300, if
      such unofficial travel becomes necessary.                                

      7.  Finally, you must know that, should you willfully or
      negligently disclose to any unauthorized persons any of the U.S.
      classified cryptographic information to which you will have
      access, you will be subject to administrative and civil
      sanctions, sanctions, including adverse personnel actions, as
      well as criminal sanctions under the Uniform Code of Military
      Justice or the criminal laws of the United States, as
      appropriate.                                                             

                                 APPENDIX 2
                                Attachment 1                                   

                  Title 18, United States Code Section 641.
                     Public Money, Property or Records.                        

      "Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins or knowingly converts to his
      use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys
      or disposes of any records, voucher, money, or thing of value of
      the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any
      property made or being made under contract for the United States
      or any department or agency therefor;                                    

      "Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to
      convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled,
      stolen, purloined or converted - shall be fined not more than
      $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years or both; but if the
      value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100, he shall
      be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one
      year or both.                                                            

      "The word 'value' means face, par, or market value, or cost
      price, either wholesale or retail, whichever is greater."                

                                 APPENDIX 2
                                Attachment 2                                   

                  Title 18, United States Code Section 793.
           Gathering, Transmitting or Losing Defense Information.              

      "(a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting
      the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the
      information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or
      to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies
      over, or otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel,
      aircraft, work of defense, navy yard, naval station, submarine
      base, fueling station, fort, battery, torpedo station, dockyard,
      canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph,
      telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office,
      research laboratory or station or other place connected with the
      national defense owned or constructed, or in progress of
      construction by the United States or under the control of the
      United States, or of any of its officers, departments, or
      agencies, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
      States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms,
      munitions, or any other materials or instruments for use in time
      of war are being made, prepared, repaired, stored, or are the
      subject of research or development, under any contract or
      agreement with the United States, or any department or agency
      thereof, or with any person on behalf of the United States, or
      otherwise on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place
      so designated by the President by proclamation in time of war or
      in case national emergency in which anything for the use of the
      Army, Navy, or Air Force is being prepared or constructed or
      stored, information as to which prohibited place the President
      has determined would be prejudicial to the national defense; or          

      (b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like or reason
      to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts to
      copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic
      negative, blueprint, plant map, model, instrument, appliance,
      document, writing, or note of anything connected with the
      national defense; or                                                     

      (c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or
      agrees or attempts to receive or obtain from any person, or from
      any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal
      book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan,
      map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected
      with the national defense, knowing or having reason to believe,
      at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts to
      receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken
      made or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of
      this chapter; or                                                         

      (d) Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control
      over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, code book,
      signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative,
      blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note
      relating to the national defense, or information relating to the
      nation defense which information the possessor has reason to
      believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to
      the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates,
      delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered or
      transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver transmit or cause
      to be communicated, delivered or transmitted to receive it, or
      willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to
      the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive
      it; or                                                                   

      (e) Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or
      control over any documents, writing, code book, signal book,
      sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map,
      model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national
      defense, or information relating to the national defense which
      information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to
      the injury of the United States or the advantage of any foreign
      nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to
      be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to
      communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated,
      delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to
      receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it
      to the officer of employee of the United States entitled to
      receive it; or                                                           

      (f) Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession of
      control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch,
      photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model,
      instrument, appliance, note, or information relating to the
      national defense, (1) through gross negligence permits the same
      to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to
      anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen,
      abstracted, or destroyed, or (2) having knowledge that the same
      has been illegally removed from its proper place of custody or
      delivered to anyone in violation of its trust, or lost, or
      stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, and fails to make prompt report
      of such loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction to his superior
      officer -- shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
      more than ten years, or both, or                                         

      (g) If two or more persons conspire to violate any of the
      foregoing provisions of this section, and one or more of such
      persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
      of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the
      punishments provided for the offense which is the object of such
      conspiracy."                                                             

                                 APPENDIX 2
                                Attachment 3                                   

                  Title 18, United States Code Section 794.                    

                       Gathering or delivering defense
                   information to aid foreign government.                      

      "(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be
      used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a
      foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts
      to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government,
      or to any fraction or party or military or naval force within a
      foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United
      States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee,
      subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly any
      document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph,
      photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note,
      instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national
      defense, shall be punished by death or imprisonment for any term
      of years or for life.                                                    

      (b) Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be
      communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or
      communicates or attempts to elicit any information with respect
      to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition
      of any of the Armed Forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of
      the United States or with respect to the plans or conduct, or
      supposed plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or
      with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected
      with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place,
      or any other information relating to the public defense, which
      might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by
      imprisonment for any term of years or for life.                          

      (c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and
      one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of
      the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be
      subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the
      object of such conspiracy."                                              

                                 APPENDIX 2
                                Attachment 4                                   

                  Title 18, United States Code Section 798.
                    Disclosure of classified information.                      

      "(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes,
      transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized
      person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the
      safety of interest of the United States or for benefit of any
      foreign government to the detriment of the United States and
      classified information -                                                 

           (1)  concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code,
      cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any
      foreign government; or                                                   

           (2)  concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance,
      or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared
      or planned for use by the United States or any foreign government
      for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or             

           (3)  concerning the communication intelligence activities of
      the United States or any foreign government; or                          

           (4)  obtained by the process of communications intelligence
      from the communications of any foreign government, knowing the
      same to have been obtained by such processes - shall be fined not
      more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.        

      (b) As used in subsection (a) of this section -- The term
      'classified information' means information which, at the time of
      a violation of this section, is for reasons of national security,
      specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for
      limited or restricted dissemination or distribution; the terms
      'code,' 'cipher,' and 'cryptographic system' include in their
      meanings, in addition to their usual meanings, any method of
      secret writing and any mechanical or electrical device or method
      used for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents,
      significance, or meanings of communications; the term 'foreign
      government' includes in its meaning any person or persons acting
      or purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction, party,
      department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a
      foreign government, or for or on behalf of any government or any
      person or persons purporting to act as a government within a
      foreign country, whether or not such a government is recognized
      by the United States.  The term 'communications intelligence'
      means all procedures and methods used in the interception of
      communications and the obtaining of information from such
      communications by other than intended recipients; The term
      'unauthorized person' means any person who, or agency which, is
      not authorized to receive information of the categories set forth
      in subsection (a) of this section, by the President, or by the
      head of a department or agency of the United States Government
      which is expressly designated by the President to engage in
      communication intelligence activities for the United States.             

      (c) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the furnishing, upon
      lawful demand, of information to any regularly constituted
      committee of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United
      States of America, or joint committee thereof."                          

                                  APPENDIX 2
                                 Attachment 5                                  

                  Title 18, United States Code Section 952.
                    Diplomatic codes and correspondence.                       

      "Whoever, by virtue of this employment by the United States,
      obtains from another or has or has had custody of or access to,
      any official diplomatic code, and without authorization or
      competent authority, willfully publishes or furnishes to another
      any such code or matter, or any matter which was obtained while
      in the process of transmission between any foreign government and
      its diplomatic mission in the United States, shall be fined not
      more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
      both."                                                                   

                                 APPENDIX 2
                                Attachment 6                                   

                  Title 50, United States Code Section 783
                                  Offenses.                                    

      "Communications of classified information by Government officer
      or employee.  It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of
      the United States or any department or agency thereof, or of any
      corporation the stock of which is owned in whole or in major part
      by the United States or any department or agency thereof, to
      communicate in any manner or by any means, to any person whom
      such officer or employee knows or has reason to believe to be an
      agent or representative of any foreign government or member of
      any Communist organization as defined in paragraph (5) of section
      782 of this title, any information of a kind which shall have
      been classified by the President (or by the head of any such
      department, agency, or corporation with approval of the
      President) as affecting the security of the United States,
      knowing or having reason to know that such information has been
      so classified, unless such officer or employee shall have been
      specifically authorized by the President, or by the head of the
      department, agency, or corporation by which this officer or
      employee is employed, to make such disclosure of such
      information."                                                            

                       FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                        PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
                      DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552





















                APPENDIX 3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS CERTIFICATE                  

                      CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS CERTIFICATE
              (This form is covered by the Privacy Act of 1974)                

      Privacy Act Statement:  Authority.  Executive Order 9397.
      Routine and sole use of the SSN is to identify the individual
      precisely when necessary to certify access to US cryptographic
      information.  While disclosure of your SSN is voluntary, your
      failure to do may delay certification, and in some cases, prevent
      original access to US cryptographic information.                         

                            Section 1 (Type Only)
      _________________________________________________________________
      | Installation    | Unit/Office Symbol    | Supporting COMSEC   |
      |                 |                       | Account Number      |
      |                 |                       |                     |
      |_________________|_______________________|_____________________|        

      Instructions:  Section 2 of this certificate must be accomplished
      before an individual may be granted access to US cryptographic
      information.  Section 3 will be accomplished when the individual
      no longer requires such access.  This certificate (original) will
      be made a permanent part of the official records of the person
      concerned.                                                               

                     Section 2.  Authorization for Access to US
                                 Cryptographic information                     

        A.  I understand that I am being granted access to US
      cryptographic information.  I understand that my being granted
      access to cryptographic information involves me in a position of
      special trust and confidence concerning matters of national
      security.  I hereby acknowledge that I have been briefed
      concerning my obligation with respect to such access.                    

        B.  I understand that safeguarding US cryptographic information
      is of the utmost importance and that the loss or compromise of
      such information could lead to irreparable damage to the US and
      its allies.  I understand that I am obligated to protect US
      cryptographic information and I have been instructed in the
      special nature of this information and the principle for the
      protection of such information.  I acknowledge that I have also
      been instructed in the rules requiring that I report any
      unofficial foreign contacts and travel to my appropriate security
      officer and that, before this briefing, I reported any
      unauthorized foreign travel or foreign contacts I may have had in
      the past.  I understand that I am subject to and consent to an
      aperiodic, counterintelligence security polygraph examination.           

        C.  I understand fully the information presented at the
      briefing I have received and am aware that any disclosure of US
      cryptographic information to unauthorized persons may make me
      subject to prosecution under the criminal law of the US.  I have
      read this certificate and my questions, if any, have been
      answered.  I acknowledge that the briefing officer has made
      available to me the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798,
      and 952, Title 18, US Code and Executive Order 12356.  I
      understand that, if I disclose to any unauthorized person any of
      the cryptographic information to which I have access, I may be
      subject to prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
      and/or the criminal laws of the US.  I understand and accept that
      unless I am released in writing by an authorized representative
      of my appropriate security office, the terms of this certificate
      and my obligation to protect all cryptographic information to
      which I may have access apply during the time of my access and at
      all times thereafter.                                                    

      ACCESS GRANTED THIS ____________ DAY OF _________________ 19 ____        

      SIGNATURE ______________________ NAME, GRADE, SSN, DOB __________
                                                            (Type Only)        

      ________________________________ ________________________________
      SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTERING       NAME, GRADE,         (Type Only)
      OFFICIAL                         OFFICIAL POSITION                       

                     SECTION 3.  TERMINATION OF ACCESS TO US
                                 CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION                     

      I am aware that my authorization for access to cryptographic
      information is being withdrawn.  I fully appreciate and
      understand that the preservation of the security of US
      cryptographic information is of vital importance to the welfare
      and defense of the US.  I certify that I will never divulge any
      US cryptographic information I acquired, nor discuss with any
      person any of the US cryptographic information to which I have
      had access, unless and until freed from this obligation by
      unmistakable or categorical official notice from competent
      authority.  I have read this agreement carefully and my
      questions, if any, have been answered to my satisfaction.  I
      acknowledge that the briefing officer has made available to me
      Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of Title 18, US Code,
      Section 783(b) of Title 50, US Code; and Executive Order 12356.          

                                       () Administrative
      REASONS FOR WITHDRAWAL           () Suspension
      (Check One:)                     () Revocation
      ACCESS WITHDRAWN THIS __________ DAY OF _________________ 19 ____        

      SIGNATURE ______________________ NAME, GRADE, SSN, DOB __________
                                                            (Type Only)        

      ________________________________ ________________________________
      SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTERING       NAME, GRADE,     (Type or Stamp)
      OFFICIAL                         OFFICIAL POSITION                       

                     FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                  Public Availability to be Determined
                        Under 5 U.S.C. 552





















             APPENDIX 4. SECURE TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITY AND 
 COMSEC ACCOUNT CHECKLIST                             

      1.  All items in the checklist apply to COMSEC accounts and
      COMSEC user facilities unless considered not applicable by the
      servicing security element or ACS-300 due to specific
      circumstances.  Only those items preceded with an asterisk in
      parentheses (*) apply to administrative accounts.                        

      (*)  2.  (Some questions are self contained that is, good
      management practice dictates an affirmative response to the
      question, but the question itself is the only authority.                 

                                   General                                     

      (*)  1.  Is a semiannual (or upon change of custodian) inventory
      of the COMSEC account being performed as required?
      (AFR 56-10)                                                              

      (*)  2.  Have all discrepancies indicated on previous inspection
      reports (regional/center servicing security element inspections
      and Headquarters ACS-300 inspections) been corrected?
      (AFKAG-1)                                                                

      (*)  3.  If the answer to (2) is "no" what discrepancies still
      exist and what action has been taken to correct them?  Have
      timely follow-up actions been taken? (AFKAG-1)                           

      (*)  4.  Has the COMSEC custodian verified the final clearance of
      all personnel listed on the COMSEC accounts authorized
      entrance/access list each month?  (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008)
      (*)  5.  Has the custodian verified that each person on the
      authorized entrance/access list has complied with all
      requirements of FAA's Formal Cryptographic Access (FCA) Program
      to include having received a briefing and having a signed,
      current Cryptographic Access Certificate on file?  (AFSSI 4000,
      Order 1600.8C)                                                           

      (*)  6.  Has the facility manager having responsibility for
      COMSEC or the COMSEC custodian validated the authorized
      entrance/access list on a monthly basis?  (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008)          

      (*)  7.  Do the COMSEC storage areas of the COMSEC account meet
      minimum physical security requirements established by National
      COMSEC Instruction (NACSI) 4008 and Order 1600.8C?                       

      (*)  8.  Is there documented approval on file certifying that the
      COMSEC account has been inspected and approved for the storage of
      classified COMSEC information by the servicing security element
      for regions/center and by ACS-300 for Washington Headquarters?
      (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008, AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005)                              

      (*)  9.  Are SF 700, Security Container Information, prepared and
      affixed to the inside of vault doors and the locking drawer of
      GSA approved safes and containers? (AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005)                

      (*)  10.  Are safe/vault combinations changed in accordance with
      Order 1600.2C to include at least every 12 months or when a
      person knowing the combination is relieved, transferred, or
      terminated? (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008)
      (*)  11.  Does the COMSEC facility have an emergency plan which
      provides adequate instructions for implementing
      safeguarding/destruction procedures in the event of an emergency?
      (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004)                    

      (*)  12.  Have all assigned personnel including COMSEC custodian
      and alternates, reviewed and participated in quarterly tests (dry
      runs) of the emergency plans?  (AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004)                    

      (*)  13.  Have the COMSEC emergency plans been coordinated with
      the contingency plans or the facility both initially and whenever
      significant changes are made?  (AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004, AFR
      56-10/COMSEC User's Guide)                                               

      (*)  14.  Have adequate destruction equipment and materials been
      provided or suitable arrangements made for emergency destruction?
      (AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004)                                                   

      (*)  15.  Does the account report file contain transfer,
      destruction, and inventory reports?  Are they filed in numerical
      order by voucher Number? (AFKAG-2)                                       

      (*)  16.  Is the account report file properly classified, with a
      minimum of CONFIDENTIAL? (AFKAG-2)                                       

      (*)  17.  Does the account properly maintain the AFCOMSEC Form
      14, COMSEC Material-Voucher and Package Register?  (AFKAG-2)             

      (*)  18.  Is the AFCOMSEC Form 3 current and maintained in the
      account report file?  (AFKAG-2)                                          

      (*)  19.  Is the proper disposition made of all COMSEC files and
      records?  (AFKAG-1, AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide)                       

                              Physical Security                                

      (*)  20.  Were correct procedures used to identify and admit
      inspection personnel?  Was each person in the inspection party
      required to sign the FAA Form 1600.8, Visitor Register, upon
      admittance?  (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008)                                       

      NOTE:  All personnel not listed on the access list must be signed
      in on FAA Form 1600.8 prior to being granted access to the COMSEC
      area.                                                                    

           21.  Has a way been provided so that persons seeking entry
      may be identified prior to admission or viewing of COMSEC
      operations?  (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008, AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005)                 

           22.  Are all secure telecommunications facility doors
      solidly constructed and fitted with approved secure locks?
      (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008, AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005)                              

           23.  Is the secure telecommunications facility sound proofed
      and have measures been taken to prevent acoustic interception?
      (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008)                                                    

           24.  Is an authorized entrance list posted inside the
      facility or inside the COMSEC security container (for an
      administrative facility)?  (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008)                         

           25.  Is the authorized entrance list limited to persons
      assigned and others whose duties may require frequent admittance?
      (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008)                                                    

           26.  Are specific persons designated by name to authorize
      admittance to those persons not on the authorized entrance and
      access list?  (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008)                                      

           27.  Are visitors being processed in and escorted within the
      facility?  (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008)                                         

           28.  Is a copy of the most current TSCM survey on file?
      (AFKAG-1, Order 1600.12C)                                                

      (*)  29.  Have the operational STU-III terminals located in
      offices and residences been inspected within the previous 6
      months by technically competent personnel?                               

      (*)  30.  Is strict accountability maintained for all accountable
      COMSEC material held?  (AFKAG-2, AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide,
      and AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005)                                                

      (*)  31.  During the periodic inventories prescribed in AFKAG-2,
      is the material physically sighted, including material on hand
      receipts to users?  (AFKAG-2)                                            

      (*)  32.  Are written directives in effect that ensure all
      persons who have classified COMSEC material on hand receipt are
      relieved from accountability before permanent departure?
      (AFKAG-2)                                                                

      (*)  33.  Is a daily or shift inventory made for all COMSEC
      materials and equipments where applicable?  (AFR 56-10/COMSEC
      User's Guide, AFR 56-13/ NACSI 4005)                                     

      (*)  34.  Is an inventory performed of COMSEC materials stored in
      a locked safe or other container before closure or locking of the
      container?  (AFR 56-13/NACS1 4005)                                       

           35.  (U)  Is COMSEC and keying material at user activities
      being destroyed immediately, but no later than 12 hours after
      supersession?  (AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004)                                    

           36.  (U)  Are COMSEC materials at the COMSEC account being
      destroyed as soon as possible after supersession, but within the
      time requirements of AFR 56-5?  (AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004)                   

      (*)  37.  (U)  Is proper documentation being maintained locally
      for accountable COMSEC materials destroyed before normal
      reporting to the central office of record (COR)?  (AFR
      56-5/NTISSI 4004, AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide)                         

      (*)  38.  (U)  Are all assigned personnel familiar with the
      procedures for reporting possible physical compromises?  (AFR
      56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-12/NTISSI 4003)                        

      (*)  39.  (U)  Have page checks been made and properly recorded
      in COMSEC documents as required?  (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide,
      AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005)                                                    

      (*)  40.  (U)  Are security checks being performed at the end of
      each shift or on a daily basis as required?  (AFR 56-10/COMSEC
      User's Guide)                                                            

      (*)  41.  (U)  Are adequate authorized facilities available to
      destroy classified waste and are they convenient to each facility
      or account?  (AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004)                                      

      (*)  42.  (U)  Are there appropriate signs displayed to designate
      the secure telecommunications facility as a CLOSED Area?  (Order
      1600.8C, Order 1600.2C)                                                  

      NOTE:  This item applies to administrative accounts only if
      operations codes or authentication systems are held for issue to
      users.                                                                   

      (*)  43.  (U)  Are users given adequate guidance on effective
      dates, accounting, supersession, destruction, physical security,
      and reporting of COMSEC insecurities?  (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's
      Guide, AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities)                     

           44.  (U)  Has the account developed written standard
      operating procedures (SOP), on handling, controlling and
      protecting COMSEC assets including inventory and destruction?
      (AFKAG-1, AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008)                                           

           45.  (U)  Have user accounts developed in coordination with
      the COMSEC custodian their own written SOPs on the handling,
      controlling and safeguarding of COMSEC assets to include
      inventory and destruction?  (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR
      56-6/NACSI 4008)                                                         

           46.  Are all applicable TOP SECRET keying material being
      handled and protected under Two Person Integrity or is an AFCSC
      approved waiver on file?                                                 

                           Cryptographic Security                              

           47.  Are the referenced directives used with appropriate
      SOPs to report insecurities?  (AFR 56-12/NTISSI 4003)                    

           48.  Has a training program been initiated to ensure
      proficiency in all phases of COMSEC operation.  Is this training
      documented?  (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-11/COMSEC
      Duties and Responsibilities)                                             

           49.  Has a specified time been established for circuit
      changes and is a record kept of the time of last change to ensure
      the cryptoperiod is not exceeded?  (AFKAG-1.  AFR 56-5/NTISSI
      4004, AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005)               

           50.  Does the operations section maintain SOPs which list
      current SPECAT codewords and outline specific procedures for
      processing and safeguarding these types of messages?  (AFKAG-1)          

           51.  If appropriate, have persons been briefed on any
      special handling procedures required by the originator or
      recipient of SPECAT messages?  (AFKAG-1)                                 

                              COMSEC Management                                

      (*)  52.  Are all COMSEC materials (initial and resupply) and
      amendments thereto being received and posted on a timely basis?
      (AFKAG-2 and AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities)               

      (*)  53.  When permissible, are extracts made from COMSEC
      publications rather than requesting increased allowance?  (AFR
      56-9/NACSI 4004)                                                         

      (*)  54.  With reference to 54, above - was controlling authority
      approval obtained to make extracts?  (AFR 56-9/NACSI 4004)               

      (*)  55.  Are all items and amounts of COMSEC materials limited
      to those which are absolutely essential to the efficient
      operation and mission of the FAA facility being supported?
      (AFKAG-1, AFKAG-2, AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR
      56-11/COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities, AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005)          

      (*)  56.  Are COMSEC holdings surveyed on a continuing basis to
      determine if items are no longer required or are being received
      in quantities in excess of requirements?  (AFKAG-1, AFKAG-2, AFR
      56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and
      Responsibilities, AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005)                                  

      (*)  57.  Has required annual COMSEC indoctrination or training
      been administered to FAA contractors having access to COMSEC
      materials or information (training identical to that provided for
      FAA personnel)?  (AFKAG-1, AFR 56-12/NTISSI 4003)                        

      (*)  58.  Are both the custodian and the alternates familiar with
      and actively performing their assigned duties and
      responsibilities?  (AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities)        

      (*)  59.  Are all insecurity reports thoroughly reviewed for
      accuracy by the COMSEC custodian and the facility or office
      manager having responsibility for COMSEC before being forwarded
      through official channels?  (AFR 56-12/NTISSI 4003)                      

      (*)  60.  Has corrective action been taken to prevent the
      recurrence of COMSEC insecurities?  (AFR 56-12/NTISSI 4003)              

      (*)  61.  Are insecurity reports being processed in a timely
      manner? (AFR 56-12/NTISSI 4003)                                          

      (*)  62.  Is the COMSEC custodian conducting user training prior
      to issue of COMSEC materials and at least annually?  (AFR
      56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and
      Responsibilities)                                                        

      (*)  63.  Is there training documentation available at the
      account?  (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties
      and Responsibilities)                                                    

      (*)  64.  Has the COMSEC custodian made maximum use of the
      Qualification Training Package (QTP) 491X1-30E, COMSEC Account
      Management, for training of all assigned personnel not attending
      the formal COMSEC training course.  Is documentation of training
      on hand in the COMSEC account?  (AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and
      Responsibilities)                                                        

           65.  Have all applicable personnel been granted Formal
      Cryptographic Access (FCA)?  Have procedures been established to
      debrief personnel upon departure (PCS, termination or
      retirement), and for suspension or revocation of access.  (Order
      1600.8C)                                                                 

           66.  Are all waivers granted to COMSEC accounts or COMSEC
      responsible personnel current?                                           

                               FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                             PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
                           DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552





















           APPENDIX 5. PUBLICATIONS TO BE MAINTAINED BY ALL FAA COMSEC 
 ACCOUNTS                                               

      1.  General.  The publications listed in paragraph 3, below, are
      to be maintained in each FAA COMSEC operational and monitor
      account.                                                                 

      2.  Abbreviations.  The following abbreviations are used in this
      Appendix with the associated meanings as shown below.                    

           a.  AFR - Air Force Regulation.  This is an Air Force policy
      document.  The 56-series of AFRs are directives implementing the
      national COMSEC policy as established by the National Security
      Agency (NSA).                                                            

           b.  NACSI - National Communications Security Instruction.
      The NACSI is an NSA publication that establishes national COMSEC
      policies and procedures.                                                 

           c.  NTISSI - National Telecommunications And Information
      Systems Security Instruction.  The NTISSI is also an NSA
      document.  NTISSIs are used to promulgate current COMSEC doctrine
      and frequently will supersede an older NACSI.                            

           d.  NACSI/AFR or NTISSI/AFR.  When the AFR number is also
      provided on a NACSI or NTISSI it indicates that the Air Force has
      added its own guidance and interpretation to the basic NSA
      document.                                                                

      3.  Publication Listing.                                                 

      _________________________________________________________________
      Item          AFR NO.     NSA Reference          Subject
      _________________________________________________________________
      01             56-1                          Signal Security             

      02             56-2        NCSC-9         Communications Security
                                                  Glossary                     

      03             56-3        NTISSI 4002    Classification Guide
                                                  for COMSEC                   

      04             56-4        NACSI 6002     Security of Defense
                                                  Contractor
                                                    Telecommunications         

      05             56-5        NTISSI 4004    Routine Destruction and
                                                  Emergency Protection
                                                    of COMSEC Material         

      06             56-6        NACSI 4008     Safeguarding COMSEC
                                                  Facilities                   

      07             56-7        NACSI 4007     Management of Manual
                                                  Cryptosystems                

      08             56-9        NACSI 4004     Controlling Authorities
                                                  for COMSEC Material          

      09             56-10       .....          COMSEC User's Guide            

      10             56-11       .....          COMSEC Duties and
                                                  Responsibilities
      11             56-12       NTISSI 4003    Reporting COMSEC
                                                  Insecurities                 

      12             56-13       NACSI 4005     Safeguarding and
                                                  Control of COMSEC
                                                    Material                   

      13             56-19       NACSI 4009     Protected Distribution
                                                  Systems                      

      14             56-20       NACSI 4001     Controlled
                                                  Cryptographic Items          

      15             .....       NTISSI 4005    Control of TOP SECRET
                                                  Keying Material              

      16             AFSAL 4001  NTISSI 4001    Controlled
                                                  Cryptographic Items          

      17             .....       NTISSI 3013    Operational Security
                                                  Doctrine for the
                                                    Secure Telephone
                                                    Unit III (STU-III)
                                                    Type 1 Terminal            

                       FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                       PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
                      DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552





















             APPENDIX 6. PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR FIXED 
 COMSEC FACILITIES                                

      1.  INTRODUCTION.  This appendix sets forth the standards for the
      physical security safeguarding of fixed FAA COMSEC facilities.
      It implements the provisions of Annex A, NACSI No. 4008/AFR 56-6.
      These standards apply to fixed FAA facilities which contain
      classified COMSEC material and which are devoted principally to
      normal activities involving these materials (e.g., secure
      telecommunications, manufacturing, training, maintenance, and
      storage).  Unless reference is made to a specific facility type,
      these standards apply equally to all FAA fixed COMSEC facilities.        

      2.  LOCATION.  FAA fixed COMSEC facilities will be located in an
      area which provides positive control over access, and is as far
      as possible from areas which are difficult or impossible to
      control (e.g., parking lots, ground floor exterior walls,
      multiple corridors or driveways, or surrounded by other
      uncontrolled buildings or offices).                                      

      3.  CONSTRUCTION.  A fixed COMSEC facility must be constructed of
      solid, strong materials to prevent unauthorized penetration and
      to show evidence of attempts at unauthorized penetration.  It
      must provide adequate attenuation of internal sounds which could
      divulge classified information through walls, doors, windows,
      ceilings, air vents and ducts.  Maximum physical security is
      achieved when these facilities are of vault-type construction as
      specified in Annex E to NACSI No. 4005/AFR 56-13.  As a minimum,
      construction or modification of an area containing a FAA fixed
      COMSEC facility shall conform to the following requirements.             

           a.  Walls, Floor, and Ceilings.  Walls, floors, and ceilings
      shall be of sufficient structural strength to prevent, or show
      evidence of attempts at, unauthorized penetration.  Walls shall
      be constructed from true floor to true ceiling.  Where false
      ceilings are used, additional safeguards are required to resist
      unauthorized entry (e.g., installation of an approved intrusion
      detection system in the area above the false ceiling).                   

           b.  Doors and Entrance Areas.  Only one door shall be used
      for regular entrance to the facility.  Other doors may exist for
      emergency exit and for entry or removal of bulky items.  All
      doors shall remain closed during facility operations and will
      only be opened to admit authorized personnel or material.  The
      following standards apply to FAA COMSEC facility doors and
      entrance areas.                                                          

                (1)  Main Entrance Door.                                       

                     (a)  Design and Installation.  The door must have
      sufficient strength to resist forceful entry.  In order of
      preference, examples of acceptable doors are:                            

                          1  GSA-approved vault doors.                         

                          2  Standard 1-3/4-inch, internally
      reinforced, hollow metal industrial doors.                               

                          3  Metal-clad or solid hardwood doors with a
      minimum thickness of 1-3/4-inches.                                       

      The door frame must be securely attached to the facility and must
      be fitted with a heavy-duty/high-security strike plate and hinges
      installed with screws long enough to resist removal by prying.
      The door shall be hung so that the hinge pins cannot be removed
      from the exterior side of the door.                                      

                     (b)  Door Lock.  The main entrance door to FAA
      fixed C0MSEC facilities must be equipped with a GSA-approved,
      built-in, Group 1-R lock. (Note:  A GSA-approved Group 1-R lock
      is a three-position combination lock with a changeable
      combination, is manipulation proof, and is radiation resistant.)
      When FAA COMSEC facilities are continuously manned, an
      electronically actuated lock (e.g., cipher lock or keyless
      pushbutton lock) may be used on the entrance door to facilitate
      the admittance of authorized personnel when the facility is
      operationally manned.  Electronic locks do not afford the
      required physical security protection and may not be used as a
      substitute for the Group 1-R lock required to secure the facility
      when it is not manned.                                                   

                          1  If a cipher lock is used, it must be one
      of the following:                                                        

                             a  Federal Stock Number (FSN) 6350-957-
      4190.  This lock is being produced by several manufacturers.  FSN
      5340-757-0691, manufacturers' part number 152, electric latch
      release, is also needed.                                                 

                             b  Simplex Pushbutton Combination Lock,
      Model NL-A-200-S.  This lock is manufactured by Simplex Security
      Systems, Inc., Collinsville, CT.                                         

      Note:  The knowledge of the combination must be strictly
      controlled and released only to persons assigned regular duties
      within the secure telecommunications facility.  It is emphasized
      that this type of lock is used only as a convenience feature and
      affords no protection from forced or surreptitious manipulation.
      Pushbuttons must be cleaned at least weekly.                             

                          2  A key-operated, pin-and-tumbler,
      night-latch-type lock may be used for personnel access control
      during periods when the facility is operationally manned if the
      following conditions are met:
                             a  The lock must be mounted so that it
      cannot be removed from the outside.                                      

                             b  The lock must have a spring-load
      locking feature.                                                         

                             c  All keys must be numbered and issued
      only on hand receipts to provide a written record of all keys.
      Extra keys will be maintained within the FAA COMSEC facility and
      will be accounted for on the daily inventory.                            

                (2)  Other Doors.  Other doors (e.g., emergency exit
      doors and doors to loading docks) must meet the same installation
      requirements as facility entrance doors but must be designed so
      that they can only be opened from inside the facility.  Approved
      panic hardware and locking devices (lock bars, dead bolts, knobs,
      or handles) may be placed only on the interior surfaces of other
      doors to the facility.                                                   

                (3)  Entrance Areas.  Entrances to FAA COMSEC
      facilities shall be equipped with a device which affords
      personnel desiring admittance the ability to notify personnel
      within the facility of their presence.  A method shall be
      employed to establish positive visual identification of a visitor
      before entrance is granted.  Additionally, the entrance area
      shall be designed in such a manner that an individual cannot
      observe classified activities until access requirements are
      completed.                                                               

           c.  Windows.  COMSEC facilities should not contain windows.
      Where windows exist they will be secured in a permanent manner to
      prevent them from being opened.  Windows will be alarmed and/or
      barred to prevent their use as an access point.                          

      Observation of internal operations of the facility shall be
      denied to outside viewing by covering the windows from the inside
      or otherwise screening the secure area from external viewing.            

                (5)  Other Openings.  Air vents, ducts, or any similar
      openings which breach the walls, floor or ceiling of the facility
      shall be appropriately secured to prevent penetration.  Openings
      which are less than 90 square inches shall have approved baffles
      installed to prevent an audio or acoustical hazard.  If the
      opening exceeds 90 square inches, acoustical baffles shall be
      supplemented by either hardened steel bars or an approved
      intrusion detection system.  All holes, cracks, and other
      openings in walls, floors, and ceilings will be permanently
      filled in or sealed to prevent insertion of surveillance devices.        

                               FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                                PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
                              DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552





















           APPENDIX 7. STANDARDS FOR SAFEGUARDING KEYING MATERIAL             

              SECTION 1.  PHYSICAL ACCESS, STORAGE AND CONTROLS                

      1.  Basis for Protection.  The cryptographic security of
      transmitted information is based primarily on the proper use of
      uncompromised keying material.  The safeguarding and control of
      keying materials used to protect national security information
      are of paramount importance.  To ensure that these keying
      materials are provided the most rigorous and comprehensive
      handling and protection, they must be distributed through the
      COMSEC Material Control System.  Safeguarding of keying material
      is achieved procedurally through restrictions and controls
      governing access, distribution, storage, accounting, use, and
      disposition.                                                             

      2.  Controls.                                                            

           a.  Application.                                                    

                (1)  The requirements of this Appendix apply to all
      hard-copy keying material intended for use to protect
      telecommunications carrying national security information, or to
      ensure their authenticity.  Such keying material, both classified
      and unclassified, will be marked "CRYPTO."                               

                (2)  Additional or differing guidance for certain types
      of keying material may appear in the handling or operating
      instructions of affected systems, and will take precedence over
      the provisions of this appendix and the basic order.                     

                (3)  Specific guidance concerning controls for keying
      variables in electronic form will appear in NSA-published system
      NACSIs and USAF AFSALS.                                                  

                (4)  Guidance on handling of maintenance and test key
      is contained in Annex D, NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13, and in specific
      handling instructions for the material.  In cases of conflict,
      specific handling instructions for the material will take
      precedence.                                                              

           b.  Access.                                                         

                (1)  Government Civilian or Military Personnel Who Are
      U.S. Citizens.  Access to COMSEC keying material other than TOP
      SECRET may be granted to U.S. citizens whose duties require such
      access and, if the material is classified, who have been granted
      a security clearance equal to or higher than the classification
      of the keying material involved.  Access to TOP SECRET COMSEC
      keying material will be governed by requirements of NTISSI 4005.         

                (2)  Contractors and Foreign Nationals.  Access by U.S.
      contractor personnel and by noncitizens is governed by national
      COMSEC policy directives.  Questions concerning such access
      should be directed to ACS-300 through the servicing security
      element.                                                                 

                (3)  Immigrant Aliens.  Refer to Annex B, NACSI
      4005/AFR 56-13.                                                          

                (4)  Need-to-Know.  Clearance or rank does not, in
      itself, entitle any individual to have access to keying material.
      Each person having access to keying materials must need the
      material in the performance of his or her duties or
      responsibilities and be familiar with his or her responsibilities
      for its protection, use and disposition.                                 

           c.   Storage.  Unless appropriately cleared persons are
      using or otherwise safeguarding keying material, it will be
      stored in the most secure facilities available.  As a minimum,
      the following storage requirements apply:                                

                (1)  TOP SECRET.  (Refer to NTISSI 4005)                       

                     (a)  TOP SECRET material will be stored in an
      approved steel security container meeting requirements for
      two-person integrity controls as specified in NTISSI 4005.  The
      container will be physically located in a room or vault that has
      an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) installed, and which has been
      inspected and approved by the servicing security element for TOP
      SECRET storage.                                                          

                     (b)  As an alternative to (a) above, TOP SECRET
      material may be stored in an area that has been approved by the
      servicing security element as a secure area, and is manned
      continuously 24-hours a day by personnel holding final clearances
      authorizing them access to the highest classification of material
      stored.  Two-person integrity controls apply.                            

                     (c)  A Class "A" vault constructed in accordance
      with the specifications outlined in Annex E, NACSI 4005/AFR
      56-13.                                                                   

                     (d)  At user locations, TOP SECRET keying material
      shall be stored under two-person integrity controls employing two
      different GSA approved Group 1R combination locks, with no one
      person authorized access to both combinations.  Storage can be in
      a strongbox within a security container, in a security container
      within a vault, or in a security container with two combination
      locks.  At least one of the combination locks must be built-in,
      as in a vault door or in a security container drawer.  If a
      requirement exists for an approved combination padlock the lock
      selected must be a changeable, three position combination padlock
      meeting Federal Specification FF-P-110.                                  

                (2)  SECRET.  SECRET keying material shall be stored
      in:                                                                      

                     (a)  Any manner approved for TOP SECRET.                  

                     (b)  An approved steel security safe procured from
      the General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Supply
      Schedule.                                                                

                     (c)  A Class "B" vault constructed in accordance
      with the specifications outlined in Annex E, NACSI 4005/AFR
      56-13.                                                                   

                (3)  CONFIDENTIAL.  CONFIDENTIAL keying material shall
      be stored in:                                                            

                     (a)  Any manner approved for TOP SECRET or SECRET.        

                     (b)  An approved steel security container having a
      built-in Group 1R, three position, changeable combination lock.          

                (4)  UNCLASSIFIED.  Unclassified keying material shall
      be stored in:                                                            

                     (a)  The same manner as required for TOP SECRET,
      SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL.                                                 

                     (b)  In the most secure manner available to the
      user.                                                                    

      3.  Supplementary Controls and Older Containers.  Supplementary
      controls such as guard forces, alarms, etc., shall be used as
      determined necessary by the servicing security element to protect
      security containers and areas against unauthorized access.
      Security containers which do not meet the prescribed standards
      may continue to be used until approved containers can be
      procured, in accordance with provisions of chapter 8, Order
      1600.2C.  If a nonapproved container is used or open area storage
      is unavoidable, the classified keying material must be under
      protection of a guard force, or protected by an alarm system
      approved by ACO-300, with immediate guard response capability.
      Frequent and irregular checks should be made of the area.                

      4.  Keyed Equipments.  Equipments which must be stored in a keyed
      condition must be protected in a manner consistent with the
      classification of the keying variable they contain.  Protection
      provided may never be less than for the classification of the
      unkeyed condition of the equipment.                                      

      5.  Split Variables.  Security procedures for equipments
      utilizing split variables will normally be addressed in the
      handling and security doctrine for the specific system.  In most
      cases, removal of part of a split variable permits the equipment
      to be handled as if it were unkeyed.
                          SECTION 2.  DISTRIBUTION                             

      1.  General.  COMSEC custodians are responsible for ensuring that
      keying materials are properly prepared for shipment, that only
      authorized means of shipment are used, that accounting and
      transfer reports are submitted on a timely basis, and that
      packages are examined upon receipt for signs of tampering and
      possible tampering reported.                                             

           a.  Preparation for Shipment.                                       

                (1)  Wrapping:  Keying material will be double-wrapped
      and securely sealed prior to shipment.                                   

                (2)  Markings:                                                 

                     (a)  Inner wrapping will be marked with the
      security classification of the material, "TO" and "FROM"
      addressees, the COMSEC account number, and the instruction "ATTN:
      COMSEC Custodian", or "To Be Opened Only By COMSEC Custodian" or
      equivalent, and the "CRYPTO" marking.                                    

                     (b)  Outer wrappings will contain the "TO" and
      "FROM" addressees and any other notations to facilitate delivery.
      The outer wrapping of the package shall not reveal whether the
      package contains classified information or keying material.
      Material transmitted by State Department diplomatic pouch must
      indicate that "Courier Accompaniment is Required."                       

           b.  Methods of Transmittal.                                         

                (1)  Keying materials must be moved in the custody of
      authorized, and, if classified material is involved, cleared
      department, service, agency, or contractor couriers, U.S.
      Diplomatic Courier Service, or Department of Defense Courier
      Service.  Refer to Annex B, NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13.                        

                (2)  For TOP SECRET keying material, two-person
      integrity controls shall apply whenever local couriers are used
      to transport TOP SECRET key material from a user COMSEC account
      to another user account or location.  Refer to NTISSI 4005.
      Controls shall apply whenever local couriers are used to
      transport TOP SECRET key material from a user COMSEC account to
      another user account or location.  Refer to NTISSI 4005.                 

                        FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                      PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
                    DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552





















               APPENDIX 8. ROUTINE DESTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY 
 PROTECTION OF COMSEC MATERIAL                      

      1.  INTRODUCTION.  This appendix implements the provisions of
      NTISSI Number 4004/AFR 56-5, and establishes standards and
      procedures for the routine and emergency destruction of COMSEC
      materials within the FAA.  The security that is achieved through
      the proper use of contemporary U.S. cryptosystems is heavily
      dependent upon the physical protection which is afforded the
      associated keying material.  Current and superseded keying
      material is extremely sensitive, since its compromise potentially
      exposes to compromise all traffic encrypted with it.                     

      2.  POLICY.                                                              

           a.  Keying Material.  Keying material must be destroyed as
      soon as possible after it has been superseded or has otherwise
      served its intended purpose.  Destruction reports are submitted
      in accordance with AFKAG-2.                                              

           b.  Defective or Faulty Key Material.  As an exception to
      the stated policy defective or faulty key will not be destroyed.
      Instead material in these categories will be reported to
      AFCSC/MMIA, through COMSEC channels, with information copies to
      DIRNSA/S042, and ACS-300.  The material will be held for
      disposition instructions.                                                

           c.  Superseded or Obsolete Cryptoequipment.  Destruction of
      superseded or obsolete cryptoequipment and its supporting
      documentation is also required.  FAA COMSEC accounts will request
      disposition instructions from AFCSC/MMIA.
           d.  Waste Paper Material.  All waste paper material, whether
      containing classified information or not, which is removed from
      the secure telecommunications facility or from the associated
      teletypewriter equipment area, shall be safeguarded and destroyed
      as classified waste.  Teletypewriter, printer, and typewriter
      ribbons used to process classified information will also be
      safeguarded and destroyed as classified material.                        

               SECTION 1.  PROCEDURES FOR ROUTINE DESTRUCTION
                             OF COMSEC MATERIAL                                

      3.  GENERAL.                                                             

           a.  Routine Destruction.  Routine destruction will normally
      be accomplished by the COMSEC custodian and the alternate COMSEC
      custodian(s).  However, this restriction should not preclude
      granting the authority to perform destruction of superseded
      material to additional appropriately cleared persons, who then
      certify the destruction to the COMSEC custodian, if such action
      is required to avoid delay in accomplishing the destruction.  The
      terms "appropriately cleared" and "cleared" mean possession of a
      security clearance for the highest classification of material to
      be destroyed.                                                            

           b.  FAA COMSEC Activities.  In FAA facilities the COMSEC
      custodian, alternate custodian, or appropriately cleared person
      designated by the custodian, will accomplish actual destruction
      in the presence of a cleared witness.                                    

           c.  Requirements.
                (1)  Routine destruction may be accomplished at the
      using facility by a cleared individual and witness.  The issuing
      COMSEC custodian must be advised by the user, either verbally or
      in writing, that the user has destroyed the material.  Verbal
      confirmation must be followed up with written confirmation of
      destruction as soon as possible.  For accounting purposes the
      COMSEC custodian will then consider the material destroyed.  In
      such cases, the COMSEC custodian must brief the user on the
      necessity for prompt and complete destruction of superseded
      keying material, and for prompt reporting of any loss of control
      of material before destruction could be accomplished.                    

                (2)  Extreme care must be taken not to accidentally
      destroy COMSEC material.  Do not destroy COMSEC material unless
      one or more of the following conditions exists:                          

                     (a)  The COMSEC custodian has issued instructions
      to the user.  For example, the material is listed on the COMSEC
      custodian's formal monthly destruction report or in a status
      document, such as AFKAG-14, as being authorized for destruction.         

                     (b)  A superseding document authorizes, in its
      handling instructions, the superseded document to be destroyed.          

                     (c)  The controlling authority supersedes the
      document and authorizes its destruction.                                 

                     (d)  Emergency destruction plans are in effect.           

                (3)  Destruction and witnessing officials for user
      accounts must be appointed in writing and a copy provided to the
      COMSEC custodian.                                                        

                (4)  The user records destruction of legend 1 and 2
      material by preparing two copies of each destruction report (SF
      153).  Users will send one copy to the COMSEC custodian and
      retain the other in the user COMSEC account files.                       

      4.  SCHEDULING ROUTINE DESTRUCTIONS.                                     

           a.  Keying Material.  Keying material designated CRYPTO
      which has been issued for use should be destroyed as soon as
      possible after supersession.  In any event, the destruction
      should be accomplished within not more than 12 hours after
      supersession.  Where special circumstances prevent compliance
      with the 12-hour standard the FAA facility manager having
      responsibility for COMSEC operations may grant an extension of up
      to 24 hours.                                                             

           b.  Complete Editions of Key Material.  Complete editions of
      superseded keying material designated CRYPTO which are held by a
      user account shall be destroyed within 5 days after supersession.
      Every effort must be made by COMSEC personnel however, to destroy
      the superseded material within the 12 hour period established as
      the standard.                                                            

           c.  Maintenance and Sample Key Material.  Maintenance and
      sample keying material not designated CRYPTO is not regularly
      superseded and need only be destroyed when physically
      unserviceable.                                                           

           d.  Classified COMSEC Publications.  Superseded classified
      COMSEC publications which are held by a user COMSEC account shall
      be destroyed within 15 days after supersession.  Every effort
      must be made by COMSEC account personnel to destroy superseded
      material within the 12 hour standard period.                             

           e.  Amendment Residue.  The residue of entered amendments to
      classified COMSEC publications shall be destroyed within 5 days
      after entry of the amendment.                                            

           f.  Compromised Material.  Compromised material will be
      destroyed no later than 12 hours after receipt of disposition
      instructions.  DO NOT destroy the COMSEC material involved in an
      investigation unless directed by NSA or AFCSC.                           

           g.  Correspondence.  When it has no further value destroy
      correspondence concerning superseded documents and material.             

      5.  ROUTINE DESTRUCTION METHODS.                                         

           a.  General.  The authorized methods for routinely
      destroying paper COMSEC material are burning, pulverizing or
      chopping, crosscut shredding, and pulping.  Nonpaper COMSEC
      material authorized for routine destruction must be destroyed by
      burning, chopping or pulverizing, or chemical alteration.  FAA
      COMSEC custodians are responsible for ensuring that destruction
      of paper COMSEC material is accomplished using an NSA-approved
      paper destruction device (some of which are also approved for
      destruction of printed circuit boards), and employing
      NSA-approved destruction methods.  In addition to the guidance
      provided in this order, all FAA COMSEC custodians must also be
      familiar with, and abide by, the requirements for destruction
      reflected in the following references:                                   

                (1)  NSA-approved paper destruction devices are listed
      in Annex B, NTISSI 4004/AFR 56-5.                                        

                (2)  NSA-approved destruction methods are explained in
      Annex C, NTISSI 4004/AFR5 6-5.
           b.  Paper COMSEC Material.  The criteria given below apply
      to classified COMSEC keying material and media which embody,
      describe, or implement a classified cryptographic logic.  Such
      media include full maintenance manuals, cryptographic
      descriptions, drawings of cryptographic logics, specifications
      describing a cryptographic logic, and cryptographic software.
      Other paper COMSEC material may be destroyed by any means that
      are listed in Chapter 9, FAA Order 1600.2C that are approved for
      other paper material of equal classification or sensitivity.             

                (1)  When destroying paper COMSEC material by burning,
      the combustion must be complete so that all material is reduced
      to white ash, and contained so that no burned pieces escape.
      Ashes must be inspected and, if necessary, broken up or reduced
      to sludge.                                                               

                (2)  When pulping, pulverizing, or chopping devices are
      used to destroy paper COMSEC material, they must reduce the
      material to bits no larger than 5 millimeters (0.197 inches) in
      any dimension.                                                           

                (3)  DO NOT PULP paper-mylar-paper key tape or high wet
      strength paper (map stock) and durable-medium paper substitute
      (e.g., TYVEC olefin, polyethylene fiber).  These materials will
      not reduce to pulp, and must be destroyed by burning,
      pulverizing, chopping or crosscut shredding.                             

                (4)  When crosscut (double cut) shredders are used to
      destroy COMSEC material, they must reduce the material to shreds
      not more than 3/64-inch (1.2 mm) in width and not more than
      1/2-inch (13 mm) in length, or not more than 1/35-inch (0.73 mm)
      in width and not more than 7/8-inch (22.2 mm) in length.                 

           c.  Nonpaper COMSEC Material.  The authorized methods of
      routinely destroying nonpaper COMSEC material are burning,
      melting, chopping, pulverizing, and chemical alteration.  The
      material must be destroyed to the extent that there is no
      possibility of reconstructing classified information by physical,
      chemical, electrical, optical, or other means.                           

                (1)  Microforms.  Microforms (microfilm, microfiche, or
      other reduced-image photo negatives), may be destroyed by burning
      or by chemical means, such as immersion in household bleach (for
      silver film masters), or acetone or methelyne chloride (for diazo
      reproductions) for approximately 5 minutes.  When destroying by
      chemical means, film sheets must be separated and roll film must
      be unrolled.  Refer to Annex C, NTISSI 4004/AFR 56-5, for
      additional methods and guidance.  Use caution when destroying by
      chemical means to avoid potential hazards.  Protective clothing
      and goggles should be worn.                                              

                (2)  Magnetic Media.  Magnetic or electronic storage or
      recording media are handled on an individual basis.  Refer to
      Annex C, NTISSI 4004/AFR 56-5.                                           

                (3)  Plastic Canisters.  The objective in destroying
      plastic canisters used to hold keying material is to disfigure
      the two large flat surfaces (sides) of the canister.  This can be
      accomplished by inserting the canister inside a zip-lock bag and
      either puncture or smash the empty canister.  An empty canister
      will shatter.  Do not attempt to destroy an empty canister
      without the noted safety precautions included in the handling
      instructions.  Zip-lock bags are not furnished with the
      canisters.  Adequate safety precautions must be taken to prevent
      injuries that could. be caused by flying pieces of plastic when
      the canister shatters.                                                   

           d.  COMSEC Equipment and Components.  Routine destruction of
      COMSEC equipment and components is NOT AUTHORIZED.  Equipment
      which is unserviceable and cannot be repaired, or which is no
      longer required shall be reported to ANC-120, and to ACO-300
      through the appropriate region/center servicing security element.
      Custodians should review and be familiar with the procedures
      contained in AFKAG-2, USAF COMSEC Accounting Procedures, for
      returning COMSEC equipment and components.  Equipment which is
      unserviceable or no longer required will be retained until
      disposition instructions are provided.                                   

      6.  REPORTING ROUTINE DESTRUCTION.                                       

           a.  General.  FAA COMSEC accounts will report routine
      destruction in accordance with guidance in chapter 6, AFKAG-2.
      FAA accounts and users must destroy and witness all classified
      COMSEC material and record the destruction on an SF 153.                 

           b.  Legend 1 and 2 Material.  Users of keycards, keytapes,
      and keylists will:                                                       

                (1)  Use the destruction record provided with the
      material to record destruction of each day's key settings as soon
      as possible after supersession but no later than 72 hours.  FAA
      facilities which have a normal Monday through Friday operation
      are authorized superseded weekend key settings on the Monday
      following that particular weekend.  If the supersession date
      falls on a non-duty day, return the material on the first duty
      day thereafter.                                                          

                (2)  Return keycard booklet covers or keylist booklets
      or keytape canisters and records of destruction as well as unused
      emergency key settings to the issuing FAA custodian or destroy as
      directed by the custodian no later than 24 hours after monthly
      supersession.                                                            

           c.  Legend 3 or 5 Material.                                         

                (1)  Superseded legend 3 or 5 material must be
      destroyed as soon as possible after use, but no later than 12
      hours after supersession.  The 12-hour time limit is authorized
      for use only when mission requirements preclude immediate
      destruction.                                                             

                (2)  Destroy Secret and Confidential COMSEC material
      (by appropriately cleared destruction and witnessing officials)
      and certify destruction on an SF-153.                                    

                (3)  FAA users will retain certificates of destruction
      (SF 153, COMSEC Material Report, or AFCOMSEC Form 1) for all
      classified legends 3 and 5 material for a period of 2 calendar
      years.                                                                   

           d.  Disposing of Legend 4 Material.  Classified or
      unclassified material is accountable to AFCSC by the accounting
      number or by the quantity on initial receipt and must be reported
      to AFCSC when it is transferred or becomes excess.                       

                (1)  When accounting legend 4 material is no longer
      needed or superseded, users must return the material, except
      amendment residue, to the issuing COMSEC account.                        

                (2)  FAA COMSEC accounts will forward a decrease
      request for the legend 4 material according to AFKAG-2.                  

                (3)  The issuing COMSEC account must destroy and
      witness classified legend 4 COMSEC material.  Destruction is
      recorded on an SF-153.                                                   

           e.  Destruction and Witnessing Official.  Both the
      destruction and the witnessing officials must sign all
      destruction reports subject to the following rules:                      

                (1)  The FAA COMSEC custodian, or alternate COMSEC
      custodian in the absence of the custodian, must sign the
      AFCSC-prepared monthly destruction report.                               

                (2)  Within FAA COMSEC accounts grade requirements are
      as specified in chapter 2, of this directive.                            

                (3)  For FAA COMSEC users, the destruction official
      will be an appropriately cleared responsible individual.  There
      is no grade requirement specified formally for users, therefore,
      facility and activity managers having responsibility for COMSEC
      must use their discretion when appointing responsible
      individuals, and must ensure that these individuals are
      trustworthy and knowledgeable.                                           

                (4)  Clearance requirements are:                               

                     (a)  Within FAA COMSEC-accounts, the witnessing
      official must meet the clearance requirements of the COMSEC
      material being destroyed.  If, for any reason, no one is
      available who meets this requirement, the COMSEC custodian may
      waive the clearance requirement for the witnessing official, in
      which case the witnessing official's examination of the material
      to be destroyed must be confined to the front cover of the
      material.                                                                

                     (b)  For FAA users, the witnessing official must
      meet the clearance requirements of the material being destroyed.
      In an emergency, the destruction official may waive the clearance
      requirement of the witnessing official, subject to the same
      precautions noted in (a), above.                                         

                           FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
                         PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
                        DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552
















	


	



			
				


			

			
CONFIDENTIAL-Egypt Protest Photos
		
	
	

		



















[Image]Protesters keep a pathway clear to move injured people during nearby clashes with Egyptian riot police in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Tuesday, Nov. 22, 2011. Egypt’s ruling military moved up the date for transferring power to a civilian government to July next year and consulted Tuesday with political parties on forming a new Cabinet. But the major concessions were immediately rejected by tens of thousands of protesters in Cairo’s iconic Tahrir Square threatening a “second revolution.” (Tara Todras-Whitehill)




[Image]Women protesters stand in a group during nearby clashes with Egyptian riot police in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Tuesday, Nov. 22, 2011. Egypt’s ruling military moved up the date for transferring power to a civilian government to July next year and consulted Tuesday with political parties on forming a new Cabinet. But the major concessions were immediately rejected by tens of thousands of protesters in Cairo’s iconic Tahrir Square threatening a “second revolution.” (AP Photo/Tara Todras-Whitehill)




[Image]Egyptian protesters perform prayers as they are guarded by other protesters who hold the national flag at Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Tuesday, Nov. 22, 2011. Egyptian politicians say the ruling military has moved up the date for transferring power to a civilian government to July 1, 2012. (Ahmed Ali)




[Image]Protesters demonstrate during clashes with Egyptian riot police, not pictured, near Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Tuesday, Nov. 22, 2011. Egypt’s ruling military moved up the date for transferring power to a civilian government to July next year and consulted Tuesday with political parties on forming a new Cabinet. But the major concessions were immediately rejected by tens of thousands of protesters in Cairo’s iconic Tahrir Square threatening a “second revolution.” (Tara Todras-Whitehill)




[Image]Protesters chant slogans during clashes with the Egyptian riot police near Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt, Tuesday, Nov. 22, 2011.Egypt’s civilian Cabinet has offered to resign after three days of violent clashes in many cities between demonstrators and security forces, but the action failed to satisfy protesters deeply frustrated with the new military rulers. (Khalil Hamra)




[Image]A protester runs to throw a tear gas canister away during clashes with the Egyptian riot police near Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt, Tuesday, Nov. 22, 2011.Egypt’s civilian Cabinet has offered to resign after three days of violent clashes in many cities between demonstrators and security forces, but the action failed to satisfy protesters deeply frustrated with the new military rulers. (Khalil Hamra)




[Image]Protesters run for cover during clashes with the Egyptian riot police near Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt, Tuesday, Nov. 22, 2011. Egypt’s civilian Cabinet has offered to resign after three days of violent clashes in many cities between demonstrators and security forces, but the action failed to satisfy protesters deeply frustrated with the new military rulers. (Khalil Hamra)




[Image]Protesters carry a wounded man during clashes with the Egyptian riot police near Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt, Tuesday, Nov. 22, 2011.Egypt’s civilian Cabinet has offered to resign after three days of violent clashes in many cities between demonstrators and security forces, but the action failed to satisfy protesters deeply frustrated with the new military rulers. (Khalil Hamra)




[Image]A protester on a motorcycle chants slogans during clashes with the Egyptian riot police near Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt, Tuesday, Nov. 22, 2011. Egypt’s civilian Cabinet has offered to resign after three days of violent clashes in many cities between demonstrators and security forces, but the action failed to satisfy protesters deeply frustrated with the new military rulers. (Khalil Hamra)




[Image]An Egyptian riot police officer fires tear gas during clashes with protesters near Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt, Tuesday, Nov. 22, 2011. Egypt’s civilian Cabinet has offered to resign after three days of violent clashes in many cities between demonstrators and security forces, but the action failed to satisfy protesters deeply frustrated with the new military rulers. (Khalil Hamra)




[Image]Egyptian protesters and riot police face off in Alexandria, Egypt, Monday, Nov. 21, 2011. Security forces fired tear gas and clashed Monday with several thousand protesters in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in the third straight day of violence that has killed dozens of people and has turned into the most sustained challenge yet to the rule of Egypt’s military.




[Image]Protesters gather in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Monday, Nov. 21, 2011. Security forces fired tear gas and clashed Monday with several thousand protesters in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in the third straight day of violence that has killed dozens of people and has turned into the most sustained challenge yet to the rule of Egypt’s military.(Khalil Hamra)




[Image]Protesters evacuate a wounded man during clashes with Egyptian riot police to a field hospital near Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Monday, Nov. 21, 2011. Security forces fired tear gas and clashed Monday with several thousand protesters in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in the third straight day of violence that has killed at least two dozen people and has turned into the most sustained challenge yet to the rule of Egypt’s military. (Tara Todras-Whitehill)




[Image]Canadian volunteer nurse, Merikel, below right, helps an Egyptian medical team to treat an injured protester at a field hospital at Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Monday, Nov. 21, 2011. Egyptian riot police clashed Monday with thousands of protesters demanding that the ruling military quickly announce a date to hand over power to an elected government. (Amr Nabil)




[Image]Egyptian protesters throw stones at Egyptian riot police, unseen, in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Monday, Nov. 21, 2011. Police are clashing for a third day in Cairo’s central Tahrir Square with stone-throwing protesters demanding the country’s military rulers quickly transfer power to a civilian government. (Ahmed Ali)




[Image]Protesters throw stones as they take cover during clashes with Egyptian riot police near the interior ministry in downtown Cairo, Egypt, Sunday, Nov. 20, 2011. Firing tear gas and rubber bullets, Egyptian riot police on Sunday clashed for a second day with thousands of rock-throwing protesters demanding that the ruling military quickly announce a date to hand over power to an elected government. The police battled an estimated 5,000 protesters in and around central Cairo’s Tahrir Square.




[Image]Tear gas surrounds Egyptian riot police as they stand guard during clashes in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Saturday, Nov. 19, 2011. Thousands of police clashed with protesters for control of downtown Cairo’s Tahrir Square on Saturday after security forces tried to stop activists from staging a long-term sit-in there. The violence took place just nine days before Egypt’s first elections since the ouster of longtime President Hosni Mubarak in February. (Khalil Hamra)




[Image]Egyptian riot police clash with protesters in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Saturday, Nov. 19, 2011. Egyptian riot police beat protesters and dismantled a small tent city set up to commemorate revolutionary martyrs in Cairo’s Tahrir Square on Saturday. The clashes occurred after activists camped in the central square overnight following a massive Friday rally. The military tolerates daytime demonstrations in the central square, a symbol of the country’s Jan. 25-Feb. 11 uprising.











































	


	



			
				


			

			
OCCUPY-Movement – Pepper Sprayed-Maced Protests Photos
		
	
	

		
















[Image]In this Friday, Nov. 18, 2011, photo University of California, Davis Police Lt. John Pike uses pepper spray to move Occupy UC Davis protesters while blocking their exit from the school’s quad Friday in Davis, Calif. Two University of California, Davis police officers involved in pepper spraying seated protesters were placed on administrative leave Sunday, Nov. 20, 2011, as the chancellor of the school accelerates the investigation into the incident. (Wayne Tilcock)




[Image]In this Friday, Nov. 18, 2011, photo Occupy University of California, Davis, protesters including David Buscho, far left, react after being pepper sprayed by police who came to remove tents set up on the school’s quad Friday in Davis, Calif. Two University of California, Davis police officers involved in pepper spraying seated protesters were placed on administrative leave Sunday, Nov. 20, 2011, as the chancellor of the school accelerates the investigation into the incident. (Wayne Tilcock)




[Image]In this Friday, Nov. 18, 2011, photo occupy protester David Buscho is helped after being pepper sprayed by campus police while blocking their exit from the school’s Quad Friday in Davis, Calif. Two University of California, Davis police officers involved in pepper spraying seated protesters were placed on administrative leave Sunday, Nov. 20, 2011, as the chancellor of the school accelerates the investigation into the incident. (Wayne Tilcock)




[Image]In this image made from video, a police officer uses pepper spray as he walks down a line of Occupy demonstrators sitting on the ground at the University of California, Davis on Friday, Nov. 18, 2011. The video – posted on YouTube – was shot Friday as police moved in on more than a dozen tents erected on campus and arrested 10 people, nine of them students. AP


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[Image]University of California, Davis, student Mike Fetterman, receives a treatment for pepper spray by UC Davis firefighter Nate Potter, after campus police dismantled an Occupy Wall Street encampment on the campus quad in Davis, Calif. , Friday, Nov. 18, 2011. UC Davis officials say eight men and two women were taken into custody. AP




[Image]A police officer uses pepper spray on an Occupy Portland protestor at Pioneer Courthouse Square in Portland Ore. , Thursday, Nov. 17, 2011. AP




[Image]A protester affiliated with the Occupy Wall Street movement pours liquid over the eyes of another fellow protester to ease the pain from pepper spray during an unannounced raid by the New York City Police Department outside Zuccotti Park in New York, in the early hours of November 15, 2011. Police wearing helmets and carrying shields evicted protesters with the Occupy Wall Street movement early on Tuesday from the park in New York City’s financial district where they have camped since September. Reuters




[Image]Seattle Police officers deploy pepper spray into a crowd during an Occupy Seattle protest on Tuesday, Nov. 15, 2011 at Westlake Park in Seattle. Protesters gathered in the intersection of 5th Avenue and Pine Street after marching from their camp at Seattle Central Community College in support of Occupy Wall Street. Many refused to move from the intersection after being ordered by police. Police then began spraying pepper spray into the gathered crowd hitting dozens of people. AP




[Image]Seattle activist Dorli Rainey, 84, reacts after being hit with pepper spray during an Occupy Seattle protest on Tuesday, Nov. 15, 2011 at Westlake Park in Seattle. Protesters gathered in the intersection of 5th Avenue and Pine Street after marching from their camp at Seattle Central Community College in support of Occupy Wall Street. Many refused to move from the intersection after being ordered by police. Police then began spraying pepper spray into the gathered crowd hitting dozens of people. AP




[Image]A woman who gave her name as Jennifer and said she was two months pregnant is rushed to an ambulance after being hit with pepper spray at an Occupy Seattle protest on Tuesday, Nov. 15, 2011 at Westlake Park in Seattle. Protesters gathered in the intersection of 5th Avenue and Pine Street after marching from their camp at Seattle Central Community College in support of Occupy Wall Street. Many refused to move from the intersection after being ordered by police. Police then began spraying pepper spray into the gathered crowd hitting dozens of people. AP




[Image]A man is treated by fellow protesters after he was sprayed in the face with pepper spray by police during the Occupy Seattle’s protest against JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon in Seattle November 2, 2011. About 300 rain-soaked protesters blocked the street outside the Sheraton hotel where Dimon was scheduled to speak at an event organized by the University of Washington’s school of business. Reuters




[Image]A police officer escorts an Occupy Tulsa protestor who was pepper sprayed in the face while being arresting for an alleged curfew violation for inhabiting a city park at night at Centennial Green in downtown Tulsa, Okla. , early Wednesday morning Nov. 2, 2011. Police warned demonstrators that they were in violation of a city curfew and gave them the choice of leaving before applying pepper spray and forcibly removing demonstrators sitting in a circle at the park shortly before 2 a.m. AP




[Image]Protesters use a metal structure against riot police as the police use pepper spray against them during clashes outside the Greek parliament in Athens, Wednesday, Oct. 19, 2011. Greek anger over new austerity measures and layoffs erupted into violence outside parliament on Wednesday, as demonstrators hurled chunks of marble and gasoline bombs and riot police responded with tear gas and stun grenades that echoed across Athens’ main square. Wednesday was the first day of a two-day general strike that unions described as the largest protests in years, with at least 100,000 people marching through central Athens. AP




[Image]A San Diego Police officer maces a demonstrator at the Civic Center Plaza Friday, Oct. 14, 2011 in San Diego. Police on Friday began removing about a half-dozen tents after warning demonstrators that their personal belongings couldn’t stay in the Occupy San Diego camp. (Lenny Ignelzi)




[Image]A demonstrator receives help after San Diego Police used pepper spray during a demonstration at the Civic Center Plaza Friday, Oct. 14, 2011 in San Diego. Police on Friday began removing about a half-dozen tents after warning demonstrators that their personal belongings couldn’t stay in the Occupy San Diego camp. AP




[Image]A demomstrator tries to wash pepper spray from his eyes after a clash with the San Diego Police at the Civic Center Plaza Friday, Oct. 14, 2011 in San Diego. Police on Friday began removing about a half-dozen tents after warning demonstrators that their personal belongings couldn’t stay in the Occupy San Diego camp. AP




[Image]Two demonstrators cover themselves after San Diego Police used pepper spray during a protest at the Civic Center Plaza Friday, Oct. 14, 2011 in San Diego. Police on Friday began removing about a half-dozen tents after warning demonstrators that their personal belongings couldn’t stay in the Occupy San Diego camp. AP




[Image]One demonstrator helps another flush her eyes with water after after police pepper-sprayed a group of protestors, who were trying to get into the National Air and Space Museum in Washington Saturday, Oct. 8, 2011, as part of Occupy DC activities in Washington. (Jose Luis Magana)


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[Image]NYPD Deputy Inspector Anthony Bologna sprays protestors, 26 September 2011. Charlie Grapski via Daily Kos


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[Image]A protester is hit by pepper spray when police used them against protesters as they broke through a police cordon to carry out a sit-in protest in the Hong Kong’s central business district Friday, July 1, 2011, Tens of thousands people march to vent their anger over skyrocketing property prices and government policies, the 14th anniversary of the former British colony’s return to Chinese rule. AP




[Image]A riot police reacts, after his colleagues used pepper spray, against protesters outside the Health Ministry in Athens, Thursday, May 26, 2011. Police have used pepper spray to disperse protesting doctors and state hospital staff, in the latest protest against public spending cuts.




[Image]Israeli riot police detain a man whose face was sprayed with pepper spray during riots in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Issawiya on May 13, 2011 as Israeli police flooded the streets of Jerusalem, fearing violence as Palestinians began marking the ‘Nakba’ or ‘catastrophe’ which befell them following Israel’s establishment in 1948.




[Image]Police spray pepper gas and water canons at protesters in Ankara, Turkey, Thursday, Feb. 3, 2011, trying to stop a march on Parliament by workers protesting government-proposed legislation that they say will strip them of their rights. About ten thousands of workers, many of whom had traveled from across Turkey, had gathered in the capital Ankara and vowed to reach Parliament in defiance of laws that bar demonstrations near the assembly building. AP











 


































	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET FROM THE WHITE HOUSE –  Implementation of Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties
		
	
	

		
Vol. 76 Tuesday, No. 225 November 22, 2011 Part II Department of State ———————————————————————– 22 CFR Parts 120, 123, 124, et al. Implementation of Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties; Proposed Rule Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 225 / Tuesday, November 22, 2011 / Proposed Rules [[Page 72246]] ———————————————————————– DEPARTMENT OF STATE 22 CFR Parts 120, 123, 124, 126, 127, and 129 [Public Notice 7683] RIN 1400-AC95 Implementation of Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties AGENCY: Department of State. ACTION: Proposed rule. ———————————————————————– SUMMARY: The Department of State is proposing to amend the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to implement the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia and the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, and identify via a supplement the defense articles and defense services that may not be exported pursuant to the Treaties. Additionally, the Department of State proposes to amend the section pertaining to the Canadian exemption to reference the new supplement, and, with regard to Congressional certification, the Department of State proposes to add Israel to the list of countries and entities that have a shorter certification time period and a higher dollar value reporting threshold. DATES: The Department of State will accept comments on this proposed rule until December 22, 2011. ADDRESSES: Interested parties may submit comments within 30 days of the date of the publication by any of the following methods: Email: DDTCResponseTeam@state.gov with the subject line, Regulatory Change–Treaties. Persons with access to the Internet may also view and comment on this notice by searching for its RIN on the U.S. Government regulations Web site at http://www.regulations.gov. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sarah Heidema, Office of Defense Trade Controls Policy, Department of State, Telephone (202) 663-2809; Fax (202) 261-8199; or Email DDTCResponseTeam@state.gov. ATTN: Regulatory Change–Treaties. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: ———————————————————————— ITAR Part Proposed change ———————————————————————— Part 120…………………….. Section 120.19 revised to clarify meaning of reexport or retransfer; new Sec. Sec. 120.33 and 120.34 added to provide definitions of the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties between the United States and Australia and the U.K., respectively; new Sec. Sec. 120.35 and 120.36 added to define the implementing arrangements pursuant to the Treaties between the United States and Australia and the United States and the U.K., respectively. Part 123…………………….. Clarifying edits made throughout section and references to new proposed Sec. Sec. 126.16 and 126.17 added; Israel added to Sec. 123.9(e). Part 124…………………….. Sec. 124.11 revised to add Israel to the list of countries and entities subject to the 15-day time period regarding Congressional certification. Part 126…………………….. Clarifying edits made throughout section; Sec. 126.5(b) revised to reference the new supplement to part 126, consequently, Sec. Sec. 126.5(b)(1)-(21) are removed; Sec. 126.16 added to describe the exemption pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia; Sec. 126.17 added to describe the exemption pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom; Supplement No. 1 to part 126 added. Part 127…………………….. Clarifying edits made throughout section; revised to make reference to new proposed Sec. Sec. 126.16 and 126.17. Part 129…………………….. Sections 129.6(b)(2), 129.7(a)(1)(vii), and 129.7(a)(2) revised to include Israel in the listing of countries and entities. ———————————————————————— These proposed amendments are pursuant to the Security Cooperation Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-266), with the inclusion of other proposed changes. Title I of the Security Cooperation Act, the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties Implementation Act of 2010, implements the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia, done at Sydney, Australia, on September 5, 2007; and the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, done at Washington, DC and London on June 21 and 26, 2007, respectively (collectively referred to herein as the “Treaties”). We propose a supplement to part 126 that will identify those defense articles and defense services exempt from the scope of the Treaties. These proposed amendments would affect parts 120, 123, 126, and 127, with new sections in part 126 describing the licensing exemptions pursuant to the Treaties. Title III of the Security Cooperation Act creates for Israel a status in law similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the member countries of NATO, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea concerning certification to the Congress. Pursuant to the proposed change, we would require certification for transfers to Israel prior to granting any license or other approval for transactions of major defense equipment sold under a contract in the amount of $25,000,000 or more (currently required for amounts of $14,000,000 or more), or for defense articles and defense services sold under a contract in the amount of $100,000,000 or more (currently required for amounts of $50,000,000 or more), and provided the transfer does not include any other countries. The change would also shorten from thirty (30) to fifteen (15) calendar days the certification time period during which approval may not be granted. This proposed amendment would affect parts 123, 124, and 129. Additionally, we are revising Sec. 126.5, describing the Canadian exemption, to reference the proposed supplement to part 126. This proposed amendment would affect part 126. Section by section identification of the proposed changes follows. We are revising the authority citation for part 120 to include Public Law 111-266; section 120.1 to reference the Treaties as authorities; and section 120.19 to clarify the meaning of reexport or retransfer. In Sec. 120.28, we are correcting an outdated reference (Shipper’s Export Declaration) to refer to the Electronic Export Information. We are proposing new Sec. Sec. 120.33 and 120.34 to provide definitions of the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties between the United States and Australia and the U.K., respectively. Also, we are proposing new Sec. Sec. 120.35 and 120.36 to define the implementing arrangements pursuant to the Treaties between the United States and Australia and the United States and the U.K., respectively. The proposed change in Sec. 123.4 replaces the word “export” with the word “exporter.” In the last sentence in [[Page 72247]] Sec. 123.9(a), “a person” will replace “exporters,” and we are adding “destination” as an item that must be determined prior to the submission of an application or the claiming of an exemption. We are adding a note following this section. We are revising section 123.9(b) to expand the reference to documents, and to reference the new proposed Sec. Sec. 126.16 and 126.17. We are adding clarifying language to Sec. Sec. 123.9(c), (c)(1), and (c)(2); and adding the language of the current (c)(4) to (c)(3). New language pertaining to new Sec. Sec. 126.16 and 126.17 will comprise a new (c)(4). We are removing and reserving section 123.9(d). We are adding Israel to the list of countries and entities in Sec. 123.9(e); citing the new Sec. Sec. 126.16 and 126.17 in Sec. 123.9(e)(1); and adding clarifying language to Sec. Sec. 123.9(e)(3) and (e)(4). We are adding Israel to the list of countries and entities in Sec. Sec. 123.15(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b). We are adding Australia and the United Kingdom to Sec. 123.16(a), and reference to the Electronic Export Information replaces reference to the Shipper’s Export Declaration in this section and in Sec. 123.16(b)(1)(iii). We are clarifying documents in Sec. 123.16(b)(2)(vi), and adding new Sec. Sec. 123.16(c) and (d) referencing the new Sec. Sec. 126.16 and 126.17. Section 123.22(b)(2) replaces references to the Shipper’s Export Declaration with the Electronic Export Information. We are revising the title and text for Sec. 123.26. We are revising the authority citation for part 124 to include Public Law 111-266. We are revising section 124.11 to add Israel to the list of countries and entities subject to the 15-day time period regarding Congressional certification. We are revising the authority citation for part 126 to include Public Law 111-266, and revising section 126.1(e) for clarification. We are adding a section (e)(1), to contain the current requirement found in (e) to notify the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls of any transactions that contravene the prohibitions of Sec. 126.1(a). We are reserving section (e)(2). We are revising section 126.3 to change “Director” to “Managing Director” and “Office” to “Directorate.” We are replacing references to Shipper’s Export Declaration with Electronic Export Information in Sec. 126.4(d). We are revising section 126.5(a) to change “Port Director” to “Port Directors.” We are revising section 126.5(b) to reference the new supplement to part 126; consequently, we are removing Sec. Sec. 126.5(b)(1)-(21). We are removing and reserving section 126.5(c) (defense services not subject to exemption will be covered by the new supplement to part 126). We are revising Section 126.5(d) to change “re-transfer” to “retransfer,” and revising Sec. 126.5(d)(2) Note 2 to reference the proposed new supplement to part 126. We are adding the terms “criminal complaint” and “other criminal charge” to Sec. 126.7(a)(3), and adding clarifying language to Sec. 126.7(a)(7). We are revising section 126.13(a) to include reference to Sec. 123.9; revising Sec. 126.13(a)(1) to add the terms “criminal complaint” and “other criminal charge”; and revising Sec. 126.13(a)(4) to include reference to Sec. 123.9. We are proposing section 126.16 to describe the exemption pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia, and proposing Sec. 126.17 to describe the exemption pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. We are proposing the addition of Supplement No. 1 to part 126, and this provision will delineate those items of the U.S. Munitions List that are outside the scope of the exemptions established by the Treaties and the Canadian exemptions at Sec. 126.5. We are revising the authority citation for part 127 to include Public Law 111-266. We are revising section 127.1 to make reference, where appropriate, to new proposed Sec. Sec. 126.16 and 126.17, and we are providing clarifying language, leading to the inclusion of a new proposed Sec. 127.1(e). We are adding the words “or attempt to use” in Sec. 127.2(a); “subchapter” will replace “section” in Sec. 127.2(b); we are adding “reexport” and “retransfer to Sec. 127.2(b)(1); adding “Electronic Export Information filing” to Sec. 127.2(b)(2); and proposing a new Sec. 127.2(b)(14). We are adding clarifying language to Sec. 127.3(a); adding the words “or by exemption” to Sec. 127.4(a); adding the words “or claim of an exemption” to Sec. 127.4(c); and proposing new Sec. 127.4(d). We are revising section 127.7(a) to remove the words “for which a license or approval is required by this subchapter.” In Sec. 127.10(a), we are modifying the word “approval” with addition of the word “written.” We are proposing new Sec. 127.12(b)(5). We are revising the structure of Sec. 127.12(d), removing an unnecessary level, and expanding the example list for “shipping documents”. We are revising sections 129.6(b)(2), 129.7(a)(1)(vii), and 129.7(a)(2) to include Israel in the listing of countries and entities. Regulatory Analysis and Notices Administrative Procedure Act The Department of State is of the opinion that controlling the import and export of defense services is a foreign affairs function of the United States Government and that rules implementing this function are exempt from Sec. 553 (Rulemaking) and Sec. 554 (Adjudications) of the Administrative Procedure Act. Although the Department is of the opinion that this proposed rule is exempt from the rulemaking provisions of the APA, the Department is publishing this proposed rule with a 30-day provision for public comment and without prejudice to its determination that controlling the import and export of defense services is a foreign affairs function. Regulatory Flexibility Act Since this proposed amendment is not subject to the notice-and- comment procedures of 5 U.S.C. 553, it does not require analysis under the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 This proposed amendment does not involve a mandate that will result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more in any year and it will not significantly or uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, no actions were deemed necessary under the provisions of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. Executive Order 13175 The Department of State has determined that this proposed amendment will not have tribal implications, will not impose substantial direct compliance costs on Indian tribal governments, and will not pre-empt tribal law. Accordingly, the requirement of Executive Order 13175 does not apply to this proposed amendment. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 This proposed amendment has been found not to be a major rule within the meaning of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. Executive Orders 12372 and 13132 This proposed amendment will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various [[Page 72248]] levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 13132, it is determined that this proposed amendment does not have sufficient federalism implications to require consultations or warrant the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. The regulations implementing Executive Order 12372 regarding intergovernmental consultation on Federal programs and activities do not apply to this proposed amendment. Executive Order 12866 The Department is of the opinion that restricting defense articles exports is a foreign affairs function of the United States Government and that rules governing the conduct of this function are exempt from the requirements of Executive order 12866. However, the Department has nevertheless reviewed this regulation to ensure its consistency with the regulatory philosophy and principles set forth in that Executive Order. Executive Order 12988 The Department of State has reviewed this proposed amendment in light of sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988 to eliminate ambiguity, minimize litigation, establish clear legal standards, and reduce burden. Executive Order 13563 The Department of State has considered this rule in light of Executive Order 13563, dated January 18, 2011, and affirms that this regulation is consistent with the guidance therein. Paperwork Reduction Act This proposed amendment does not impose any new reporting or recordkeeping requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35. List of Subjects 22 CFR Parts 120, 123, 124, and 126 Arms and Munitions, Exports. 22 CFR Part 127 Arms and Munitions, Crime, Exports, Penalties, Seizures and Forfeitures. 22 CFR Part 129 Arms and Munitions, Exports, Brokering. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Title 22, Chapter I, Subchapter M, parts 120, 123, 124, 126, 127, and 129 are proposed to be amended as follows: PART 120–PURPOSE AND DEFINITIONS 1. The authority citation for Part 120 is revised to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 2, 38, and 71, Pub. L. 90-629, 90 Stat. 744 (22 U.S.C. 2752, 2778, 2797); 22 U.S.C. 2794; E.O. 11958, 42 FR 4311; E.O. 13284, 68 FR 4075; 3 CFR, 1977 Comp. p. 79; 22 U.S.C. 2651a; Pub. L. 105-261, 112 Stat. 1920; Pub. L. 111-266. 2. Section 120.1 is amended by revising paragraphs (a), (c), and (d) to read as follows: Sec. 120.1 General authorities and eligibility. (a) Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778), as amended, authorizes the President to control the export and import of defense articles and defense services. The statutory authority of the President to promulgate regulations with respect to exports of defense articles and defense services was delegated to the Secretary of State by Executive Order 11958, as amended. This subchapter implements that authority. Portions of this subchapter also implement the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia and the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. (Note, however, that the Treaties are not the source of authority for the prohibitions in part 127, but instead are the source of one limitation on the scope of such prohibitions.) By virtue of delegations of authority by the Secretary of State, these regulations are primarily administered by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Defense Trade and Regional Security and the Managing Director of Defense Trade Controls, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. * * * * * (c) Receipt of Licenses and Eligibility. (1) A U.S. person may receive a license or other approval pursuant to this subchapter. A foreign person may not receive such a license or other approval, except as follows: (i) A foreign governmental entity in the United States may receive an export license or other export approval; (ii) A foreign person may receive a reexport or retransfer approval; and (iii) A foreign person may receive a prior approval for brokering activities. Requests for a license or other approval other than by a person referred to in paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and (c)(1)(ii) will be considered only if the applicant has registered with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls pursuant to part 122 or 129 of this subchapter, as appropriate. (2) Persons who have been convicted of violating the criminal statutes enumerated in Sec. 120.27 of this subchapter, who have been debarred pursuant to part 127 or 128 of this subchapter, who are subject to indictment or are otherwise charged (e.g., by information) for violating the criminal statutes enumerated in Sec. 120.27 of this subchapter, who are ineligible to contract with, or to receive a license or other form of authorization to import defense articles or defense services from any agency of the U.S. Government, who are ineligible to receive an export license or other approval from any other agency of the U.S. Government, or who are subject to a Department of State policy of denial, suspension or revocation under Sec. 126.7(a) of this subchapter, or to interim suspension under Sec. 127.8 of this subchapter, are generally ineligible to be involved in activities regulated under this subchapter. (d) The exemptions provided in this subchapter do not apply to transactions in which the exporter, any party to the export (as defined in Sec. 126.7(e) of this subchapter), any source or manufacturer, broker or other participant in the brokering activities, is generally ineligible as set forth above in paragraph (c) of this section, unless prior written authorization has been granted by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. 3. Section 120.19 is revised to read as follows: Sec. 120.19 Reexport or retransfer. Reexport or retransfer means the transfer of defense articles or defense services to an end-use, end-user, or destination not previously authorized by license, written approval, or exemption pursuant to this subchapter. 4. Section 120.28 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2) to read as follows: Sec. 120.28 Listing of forms referred to in this subchapter. * * * * * (b) * * * (2) Electronic Export Information filed via the Automated Export System. * * * * * 5. Section 120.33 is added to read as follows: Sec. 120.33 Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia. Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia means the Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [[Page 72249]] Australia Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, done at Sydney, September 5, 2007. For additional information on making exports pursuant to this treaty, see Sec. 126.16 of this subchapter. 6. Section 120.34 is added to read as follows: Sec. 120.34 Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom means the Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, done at Washington DC and London, June 21 and 26, 2007. For additional information on making exports pursuant to this treaty, see Sec. 126.17 of this subchapter. 7. Section 120.35 is added to read as follows: Sec. 120.35 Australia Implementing Arrangement. Australia Implementing Arrangement means the Implementing Arrangement Pursuant to the Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, done at Washington, March 14, 2008, as it may be amended. 8. Section 120.36 is added to read as follows: Sec. 120.36 United Kingdom Implementing Arrangement. United Kingdom Implementing Arrangement means the Implementing Arrangement Pursuant to the Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, done at Washington DC, February 14, 2008, as it may be amended. PART 123–LICENSES FOR THE EXPORT OF DEFENSE ARTICLES 9. The authority citation for part 123 continues to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 2, 38, and 71, Pub. L. 90-629, 90 Stat. 744 (22 U.S.C. 2752, 2778, 2797); 22 U.S.C. 2753; E.O. 11958, 42 FR 4311; 3 CFR, 1977 Comp. p. 79; 22 U.S.C. 2651a; 22 U.S.C. 2776; Pub. L. 105- 261, 112 Stat. 1920; Sec 1205(a), Pub. L. 107-228. 10. Section 123.4 is amended by revising paragraph (d) introductory text to read as follows: Sec. 123.4 Temporary import license exemptions. * * * * * (d) Procedures. To the satisfaction of the Port Directors of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the importer and exporter must comply with the following procedures: * * * * * 11. Section 123.9 is amended by revising paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (e), (e)(1), (e)(3), (e)(4), and removing and reserving paragraph (d), to read as follows: Sec. 123.9 Country of ultimate destination and approval of reexports or retransfers. (a) The country designated as the country of ultimate destination on an application for an export license, or in an Electronic Export Information filing where an exemption is claimed under this subchapter, must be the country of ultimate end use. The written approval of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls must be obtained before reselling, transferring, reexporting, retransferring, transshipping, or disposing of a defense article to any end-user, end-use, or destination other than as stated on the export license, or in the Electronic Export Information filing in cases where an exemption is claimed under this subchapter, except in accordance with the provisions of an exemption under this subchapter that explicitly authorizes the resell, transfer, reexport, retransfer, transshipment, or disposition of a defense article without such approval. A person must determine the specific end-user, end-use, and destination prior to submitting an application to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls or claiming an exemption under this subchapter. Note to paragraph (a): In making the aforementioned determination, a person is expected to review all readily available information, including information available to the public generally as well as information available from other parties to the transaction. (b) The exporter shall incorporate the following statement as an integral part of the bill of lading, airway bill, or other shipping documents and the invoice whenever defense articles or defense services are to be exported or transferred pursuant to a license, other written approval, or an exemption under this subchapter, other than the exemptions contained in Sec. 126.16 and Sec. 126.17 of this subchapter (Note: for exports made pursuant to Sec. 126.16 or Sec. 126.17 of this subchapter, see Sec. 126.16(j)(5) or Sec. 126.17(j)(5)): “These commodities are authorized by the U.S. Government for export only to [country of ultimate destination] for use by [end-user]. They may not be transferred, transshipped on a non- continuous voyage, or otherwise be disposed of, to any other country or end-user, either in their original form or after being incorporated into other end-items, without the prior written approval of the U.S. Department of State.” (c) Any person requesting written approval from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls for the reexport, retransfer, other disposition, or change in end use, end user, or destination of a defense article or defense service initially exported or transferred pursuant to a license or other written approval, or an exemption under this subchapter, must submit all the documentation required for a permanent export license (see Sec. 123.1 of this subchapter) and shall also submit the following: (1) The license number, written authorization, or exemption under which the defense article or defense service was previously authorized for export from the United States (Note: For exports under exemptions at Sec. 126.16 or Sec. 126.17 of this subchapter, the original end- use, program, project, or operation under which the item was exported must be identified.); (2) A precise description, quantity, and value of the defense article or defense service; (3) A description and identification of the new end-user, end-use, and destination; and (4) With regard to any request for such approval relating to a defense article or defense service initially exported pursuant to an exemption contained in Sec. 126.16 or Sec. 126.17 of this subchapter, written request for the prior approval of the transaction from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls must be submitted: (i) By the original U.S. exporter, provided a written request is received from a member of the Australian Community, as identified in Sec. 126.16 of this subchapter, or the United Kingdom Community, as identified in Sec. 126.17 of this subchapter (where such a written request includes a written certification from the member of the Australian Community or the United Kingdom Community providing the information set forth in this subsection); or (ii) By a member of the Australian Community or the United Kingdom Community, where such request provides the information set forth in this section. (d) [Reserved] (e) Reexports or retransfers of U.S.-origin components incorporated into a foreign defense article to NATO, NATO agencies, a government of a NATO [[Page 72250]] country, or the governments of Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, or the Republic of Korea are authorized without the prior written approval of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, provided: (1) The U.S.-origin components were previously authorized for export from the United States, either by a license, written authorization, or an exemption other than those described in either Sec. 126.16 or Sec. 126.17 of this subchapter; * * * * * (3) The person reexporting the defense article provides written notification to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls of the retransfer not later than 30 days following the reexport. The notification must state the articles being reexported and the recipient government. (4) The original license or other approval of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls did not include retransfer or reexport restrictions prohibiting use of this exemption. 12. Section 123.15 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2), and (b) to read as follows: Sec. 123.15 Congressional certification pursuant to Section 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act. (a) * * * (1) A license for the export of major defense equipment sold under a contract in the amount of $14,000,000 or more, or for defense articles and defense services sold under a contract in the amount of $50,000,000 or more, to any country that is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, or the Republic of Korea that does not authorize a new sales territory; or (2) A license for export to a country that is a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, or the Republic of Korea, of major defense equipment sold under a contract in the amount in the amount of $25,000,000 or more, or for defense articles and defense services sold under a contract in the amount of $100,000,000 or more, and provided the transfer does not include any other countries; or * * * * * (b) Unless an emergency exists which requires the proposed export in the national security interests of the United States, approval may not be granted for any transaction until at least 15 calendar days have elapsed after receipt by the Congress of the certification required by 22 U.S.C. 2776(c)(1) involving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, or the Republic of Korea or at least 30 calendar days have elapsed for any other country; in the case of a license for an export of a commercial communications satellite for launch from, and by nationals of, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, or Kazakhstan, until at least 15 calendar days after the Congress receives such certification. * * * * * 13. Section 123.16 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) introductory text, (b)(1)(iii), (b)(2)(vi), and adding paragraphs (c) and (d), to read as follows: Sec. 123.16 Exemptions of general applicability. (a) The following exemptions apply to exports of unclassified defense articles for which no approval is needed from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. These exemptions do not apply to: Proscribed destinations under Sec. 126.1 of this subchapter; exports for which Congressional notification is required (see Sec. 123.15 of this subchapter); MTCR articles; Significant Military Equipment (SME); and may not be used by persons who are generally ineligible as described in Sec. 120.1(c) of this subchapter. All shipments of defense articles, including but not limited to those to and from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, require an Electronic Export Information (EEI) filing or notification letter. If the export of a defense article is exempt from licensing, the EEI filing must cite the exemption. Refer to Sec. 123.22 of this subchapter for EEI filing and letter notification requirements. (b) * * * (1) * * * (iii) The exporter certifies in the EEI filing that the export is exempt from the licensing requirements of this subchapter. This is done by writing, “22 CFR 123.16(b)(1) and the agreement or arrangement (identify/state number) applicable”; and * * * * * (2) * * * (vi) The exporter must certify on the invoice, the bill of lading, air waybill, or shipping documents and in the EEI filing that the export is exempt from the licensing requirements of this subchapter. This is done by writing “22 CFR 123.16(b)(2) applicable”. * * * * * (c) For exports to Australia pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia refer to Sec. 126.16 of this subchapter. (d) For exports to the United Kingdom pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom refer to Sec. 126.17 of this subchapter. 14. Section 123.22 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2) to read as follows: Sec. 123.22 Filing, retention, and return of export licenses and filing of export information. * * * * * (b) * * * (2) Emergency shipments of hardware that cannot meet the pre- departure filing requirements. U.S. Customs and Border Protection may permit an emergency export of hardware by truck (e.g., departures to Mexico or Canada) or air, by a U.S. registered person, when the exporter is unable to comply with the Electronic Export Information (EEI) filing timeline in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section. The applicant, or an agent acting on the applicant’s behalf, in addition to providing the EEI using the AES, must provide documentation required by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and this subchapter. The documentation provided to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection at the port of exit must include the External Transaction Number (XTN) or Internal Transaction Number (ITN) for the shipment and a copy of a notification to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls stating that the shipment is urgent accompanied by an explanation for the urgency. The original of the notification must be immediately provided to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. The AES filing of the export information when the export is by air must be at least two hours prior to any departure from the United States; and, when a truck shipment, at the time when the exporter provides the articles to the carrier or at least one hour prior to departure from the United States, when the permanent export of the hardware has been authorized for export: * * * * * 15. Section 123.26 is revised to read as follows: Sec. 123.26 Recordkeeping for exemptions. Any person engaging in any export, reexport, transfer, or retransfer of a defense article or defense service pursuant to an exemption must maintain records of each such export, reexport, transfer, or retransfer. The records shall include the following information: A description of the defense article, including technical data, or defense service; the name and address of the end-user and other available contact information (e.g., telephone number and electronic mail address); the name of the natural person [[Page 72251]] responsible for the transaction; the stated end-use of the defense article or defense service; the date and time of the transaction; the Electronic Export Information (EEI) Internal Transaction Number (ITN); and the method of transmission. The person using or acting in reliance upon the exemption shall also comply with any additional recordkeeping requirements enumerated in the text of the regulations concerning such exemption. * * * * * PART 124–AGREEMENTS, OFF-SHORE PROCUREMENT AND OTHER DEFENSE SERVICES 16. The authority citation for part 124 continues to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 2, 38, and 71, Pub. L. 90-629, 90 Stat. 744 (22 U.S.C. 2752, 2778, 2797); E.O. 11958, 42 FR 4311; 3 CFR 1977 Comp. p. 79; 22 U.S.C. 2651a; 22 U.S.C. 2776; Pub. L. 105-261. 17. Section 124.11 is amended by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows: Sec. 124.11 Congressional certification pursuant to Section 36(d) of the Arms Export Control Act. * * * * * (b) Unless an emergency exists which requires the immediate approval of the agreement in the national security interests of the United States, approval may not be granted until at least 15 calendar days have elapsed after receipt by the Congress of the certification required by 22 U.S.C. 2776(d)(1) involving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, any member country of that Organization, or Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, or the Republic of Korea or at least 30 calendar days have elapsed for any other country. Approvals may not be granted when the Congress has enacted a joint resolution prohibiting the export. * * * * * PART 126–GENERAL POLICIES AND PROVISIONS 18. The authority citation for part 126 is revised to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 2, 38, 40, 42, and 71, Pub. L. 90-629, 90 Stat. 744 (22 U.S.C. 2752, 2778, 2780, 2791, and 2797); E.O. 11958, 42 FR 4311; 3 CFR, 1977 Comp. p. 79; 22 U.S.C. 2651a; 22 U.S.C. 287c; E.O. 12918, 59 FR 28205; 3 CFR, 1994 Comp. p. 899; Sec. 1225, Pub. L. 108-375; Sec. 7089, Pub. L. 111-117; Pub. L. 111-266. 19. Section 126.1 is amended by revising paragraph (e) to read as follows: Sec. 126.1 Prohibited exports, imports, and sales to or from certain countries. * * * * * (e) Proposed sales. No sale, export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer and no proposal to sell, export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer any defense articles or defense services subject to this subchapter may be made to any country referred to in this section (including the embassies or consulates of such a country), or to any person acting on its behalf, whether in the United States or abroad, without first obtaining a license or written approval of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. However, in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section, it is the policy of the Department of State to deny licenses and approvals in such cases. (1) Duty to Notify: Any person who knows or has reason to know of such a proposed or actual sale, export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer of such articles, services, or data must immediately inform the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. Such notifications should be submitted to the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. (2) [Reserved] * * * * * 20. Section 126.3 is revised to read as follows: Sec. 126.3 Exceptions. In a case of exceptional or undue hardship, or when it is otherwise in the interest of the United States Government, the Managing Director, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, may make an exception to the provisions of this subchapter. 21. Section 126.4 is amended by revising paragraph (d) to read as follows: Sec. 126.4 Shipments by or for United States Government agencies. * * * * * (d) An Electronic Export Information (EEI) filing, required under Sec. 123.22 of this subchapter, and a written statement by the exporter certifying that these requirements have been met must be presented at the time of export to the appropriate Port Directors of U.S. Customs and Border Protection or Department of Defense transmittal authority. A copy of the EEI filing and the written certification statement shall be provided to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls immediately following the export. 22. Section 126.5 is amended by removing and reserving paragraph (c) and revising paragraphs (a), (b), (d) introductory text, and Notes 1 and 2, to read as follows: Sec. 126.5 Canadian exemptions. (a) Temporary import of defense articles. Port Directors of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and postmasters shall permit the temporary import and return to Canada without a license of any unclassified defense articles (see Sec. 120.6 of this subchapter) that originate in Canada for temporary use in the United States and return to Canada. All other temporary imports shall be in accordance with Sec. Sec. 123.3 and 123.4 of this subchapter. (b) Permanent and temporary export of defense articles. Except as provided in Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter and for exports that transit third countries, Port Directors of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and postmasters shall permit, when for end-use in Canada by Canadian Federal or Provincial governmental authorities acting in an official capacity or by a Canadian-registered person for return to the United States, the permanent and temporary export to Canada without a license of unclassified defense articles and defense services identified on the U.S. Munitions List (22 CFR 121.1). The exceptions noted above are subject to meeting the requirements of this subchapter, to include 22 CFR 120.1(c) and (d), parts 122 and 123 (except insofar as exemption from licensing requirements is herein authorized) and Sec. 126.1, and the requirement to obtain non-transfer and use assurances for all significant military equipment. For purposes of this section, “Canadian-registered person” is any Canadian national (including Canadian business entities organized under the laws of Canada), dual citizen of Canada and a third country other than a country listed in Sec. 126.1, and permanent resident registered in Canada in accordance with the Canadian Defense Production Act, and such other Canadian Crown Corporations identified by the Department of State in a list of such persons publicly available through the Internet Web site of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and by other means. (c) [Reserved] (d) Reexports/retransfer. Reexport/retransfer in Canada to another end user or end use or from Canada to another destination, except the United States, must in all instances have the prior approval of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. Unless otherwise exempt in this subchapter, the original exporter is responsible, upon request from a Canadian-registered person, for obtaining or providing reexport/ retransfer approval. In any instance when the U.S. exporter is no longer available to the Canadian end user the [[Page 72252]] request for reexport/retransfer may be made directly to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. All requests must include the information in Sec. 123.9(c) of this subchapter. Reexport/retransfer approval is acquired by: * * * * * Notes to Sec. 126.5: 1. In any instance when the exporter has knowledge that the defense article exempt from licensing is being exported for use other than by a qualified Canadian-registered person or for export to another foreign destination, other than the United States, in its original form or incorporated into another item, an export license must be obtained prior to the transfer to Canada. 2. Additional exemptions exist in other sections of this subchapter that are applicable to Canada, for example Sec. Sec. 123.9, 125.4, and 124.2, that allow for the performance of defense services related to training in basic operations and maintenance, without a license, for certain defense articles lawfully exported, including those identified in Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter. 23. Section 126.7 is amended by revising the section heading and paragraphs (a)(3), (a)(7) and (e) introductory text to read as follows: Sec. 126.7 Denial, revocation, suspension, or amendment of licenses and other approvals. (a) * * * (3) An applicant is the subject of a criminal complaint, other criminal charge (e.g., an information), or indictment for a violation of any of the U.S. criminal statutes enumerated in Sec. 120.27 of this subchapter; or * * * * * (7) An applicant has failed to include any of the information or documentation expressly required to support a license application, exemption, or other request for approval under this subchapter, or as required in the instructions in the applicable Department of State form or has failed to provide notice or information as required under this subchapter; or * * * * * (e) Special definition. For purposes of this subchapter, the term “Party to the Export” means: * * * * * 24. Section 126.13 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) introductory text, (a)(1), and (a)(4) to read as follows: Sec. 126.13 Required information. (a) All applications for licenses (DSP-5, DSP-61, DSP-73, and DSP- 85), all requests for approval of agreements and amendments thereto under part 124 of this subchapter, and all requests for other written authorizations (including requests for retransfer or reexport pursuant to Sec. 123.9 of this subchapter) must include a letter signed by a responsible official empowered by the applicant and addressed to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, stating whether: (1) The applicant or the chief executive officer, president, vice- presidents, other senior officers or officials (e.g., comptroller, treasurer, general counsel) or any member of the board of directors is the subject of a criminal complaint, other criminal charge (e.g., an information), or indictment for or has been convicted of violating any of the U.S. criminal statutes enumerated in Sec. 120.27 of this subchapter since the effective date of the Arms Export Control Act, Public Law 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (June 30, 1976); * * * * * (4) The natural person signing the application, notification or other request for approval (including the statement required by this subsection) is a citizen or national of the United States, has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence (and maintains such lawful permanent residence status under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1101(a), section 101(a)20, 60 Stat. 163), or is an official of a foreign government entity in the United States, or is a foreign person making a request pursuant to Sec. 123.9 of this subchapter. * * * * * 25. Section 126.16 is added to read as follows: Sec. 126.16 Exemption pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia. (a) Scope of exemption and required conditions. (1) Definitions. (i) An export means, for purposes of this section only, the initial movement of defense articles or defense services from the United States Community to the Australian Community. (ii) A transfer means, for purposes of this section only, the movement of a defense article or defense service, previously exported, by a member of the Australian Community within the Australian Community, or between a member of the United States Community and a member of the Australian Community. (iii) Retransfer and reexport have the meaning provided in Sec. 120.19 of this subchapter. (iv) Intermediate consignee means, for purposes of this section, an entity or person who receives defense articles, including technical data, but who does not have access to such defense articles, for the sole purpose of effecting onward movement to members of the Approved Community. (2) Persons or entities exporting or transferring defense articles or defense services are exempt from the otherwise applicable licensing requirements if such persons or entities comply with the regulations set forth in this section. Except as provided in Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter, Port Directors of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and postmasters shall permit the permanent and temporary export without a license to members of the Australian Community (see paragraph (d) of this section regarding the identification of members of the Australian Community) of defense articles and defense services not listed in Supplement No. 1 to part 126, for the end-uses specifically identified pursuant to paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section. The purpose of this section is to specify the requirements to export, transfer, reexport, retransfer, or otherwise dispose of a defense article or defense service pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia. (3) Export. In order for an exporter to export a defense article or defense service pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia, all of the following conditions must be met: (i) The exporter must be registered with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and must be eligible, according to the requirements and prohibitions of the Arms Export Control Act, this subchapter, and other provisions of United States law, to obtain an export license (or other forms of authorization to export) from any agency of the U.S. Government without restriction (see paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section for specific requirements); (ii) The recipient of the export must be a member of the Australian Community (see paragraph (d) of this section regarding the identification of members of the Australian Community). Australian entities and facilities that become ineligible for such membership will be removed from the Australian Community; (iii) Intermediate consignees involved in the export must be eligible, according to the requirements and prohibitions of the Arms Export Control Act, this subchapter, and other provisions of United States law, to handle or receive a defense article or defense service without restriction (see paragraph (k) of this section for specific requirements); (iv) The export must be for an end-use specified in the Defense Trade [[Page 72253]] Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia and mutually agreed to by the U.S. Government and the Government of Australia pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia and the Implementing Arrangement thereto (the Australia Implementing Arrangement) (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses); (v) The defense article or defense service is not excluded from the scope of the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia (see paragraph (g) of this section and Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter for specific information on the scope of items excluded from export under this exemption) and is marked or identified, at a minimum, as “Restricted USML” (see paragraph (j) of this section for specific requirements on marking exports); (vi) All required documentation of such export is maintained by the exporter and recipient and is available upon the request of the U.S. Government (see paragraph (l) of this section for specific requirements); and (vii) The Department of State has provided advance notification to the Congress, as required, in accordance with this section (see paragraph (o) of this section for specific requirements). (4) Transfers. In order for a member of the Australian Community to transfer a defense article or defense service under the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia, all of the following conditions must be met: (i) The defense article or defense service must have been previously exported in accordance with paragraph (a)(3) of this section or transitioned from a license or other approval in accordance with paragraph (i) Transitions of this section; (ii) The transferor and transferee of the defense article or defense service are members of the Australian Community (see paragraph (d) of this section regarding the identification of members of the Australian Community) or the United States Community (see paragraph (b) for information on the United States Community/approved exporters); (iii) The transfer is required for an end-use specified in the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia and mutually agreed to by the United States and the Government of Australia pursuant to the terms of the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia and the Australia Implementing Arrangement (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses); (iv) The defense article or defense service is not identified in paragraph (g) of this section and Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter as ineligible for export under this exemption, and is marked or otherwise identified, at a minimum, as “Restricted USML” (see paragraph (j) of this section for specific requirements on marking exports); (v) All required documentation of such transfer is maintained by the transferor and transferee and is available upon the request of the U.S. Government (see paragraph (l) of this section for specific requirements); and (vi) The Department of State has provided advance notification to the Congress in accordance with this section (see paragraph (o) of this section for specific requirements). (5) This section does not apply to the export of defense articles or defense services from the United States pursuant to the Foreign Military Sales program. (b) Authorized exporters. The following persons compose the United States Community and may export defense articles and defense services pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia: (1) Departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, including their personnel, with, as appropriate, a security clearance and a need- to-know; and (2) Nongovernmental U.S. persons registered with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and eligible, according to the requirements and prohibitions of the Arms Export Control Act, this subchapter, and other provisions of United States law, to obtain an export license (or other forms of authorization to export) from any agency of the U.S. Government without restriction, including their employees acting in their official capacity with, as appropriate, a security clearance and a need-to-know. (c) An exporter that is otherwise an authorized exporter pursuant to subsection (b) above may not export pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia if the exporter’s president, chief executive officer, any vice-president, any other senior officer or official (e.g., comptroller, treasurer, general counsel); any member of the board of directors of the exporter; any party to the export; or any source or manufacturer is ineligible to receive export licenses (or other forms of authorization to export) from any agency of the U.S. Government. (d) Australian Community. For purposes of the exemption provided by this section, the Australian Community consists of the Australian entities and facilities identified as members of the Approved Community through the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls Web site at the time of a transaction under this section; Australian entities and facilities that become ineligible for such membership will be removed from the Australian Community. (e) Authorized End-uses. The following end-uses, subject to subsection (f), are specified in the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia: (1) United States and Australian combined military or counter- terrorism operations; (2) United States and Australian cooperative security and defense research, development, production, and support programs; (3) Mutually determined specific security and defense projects where the Government of Australia is the end-user; or (4) U.S. Government end-use. (f) Procedures for identifying authorized end-uses pursuant to paragraph (e) of this section: (1) Operations, programs, and projects that can be publicly identified will be posted on the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls’ Web site; (2) Operations, programs, and projects that cannot be publicly identified will be confirmed in written correspondence from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls; or (3) U.S. Government end-use will be identified specifically in a U.S. Government contract or solicitation as being eligible under the Treaty. (4) No other operations, programs, projects, or end-uses qualify for this exemption. (g) Items eligible under this section. With the exception of items listed in Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter, defense articles and defense services may be exported under this section subject to the following: (1) An exporter authorized pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section may market a defense article to the Government of Australia if that exporter has been licensed by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls to export (as defined by Sec. 120.17 of this subchapter) the identical type of defense article to any foreign person. (2) The export of any defense article specific to the existence of (e.g., reveals the existence of or details of) anti-tamper measures made at U.S. Government direction always requires [[Page 72254]] prior written approval from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. (3) U.S.-origin classified defense articles or defense services may be exported only pursuant to a written request, directive, or contract from the U.S. Department of Defense that provides for the export of the classified defense article(s) or defense service(s). (4) Defense articles specific to developmental systems that have not obtained written Milestone B approval from the Department of Defense milestone approval authority are not eligible for export unless such export is pursuant to a written solicitation or contract issued or awarded by the Department of Defense for an end-use identified pursuant to paragraphs (e)(1), (2), or (4) of this section. (5) Defense articles excluded by paragraph (g) of this section or Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter (e.g., USML Category XI(a)(3) electronically scanned array radar) that are embedded in a larger system that is eligible to ship under this section (e.g., a ship or aircraft) must separately comply with any restrictions placed on that embedded defense article under this subsection. The exporter must obtain a license or other authorization from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls for the export of such embedded defense articles (for example, USML Category XI(a)(3) electronically scanned array radar systems that are exempt from this section that are incorporated in an aircraft that is eligible to ship under the this section continue to require separate authorization from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls for their export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer). (6) No liability shall be incurred by or attributed to the U.S. Government in connection with any possible infringement of privately owned patent or proprietary rights, either domestic or foreign, by reason of an export conducted pursuant to this section. (7) Sales by exporters made through the U.S. Government shall not include either charges for patent rights in which the U.S. Government holds a royalty-free license, or charges for information which the U.S. Government has a right to use and disclose to others, which is in the public domain, or which the U.S. Government has acquired or is entitled to acquire without restrictions upon its use and disclosure to others. (h) Transfers, Retransfers, and Reexports. (1) Any transfer of a defense article or defense service not exempted in Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter by a member of the Australian Community (see paragraph (d) of this section for specific information on the identification of the Community) to another member of the Australian Community or the United States Community for an end-use that is authorized by this exemption (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses) is authorized under this exemption. (2) Any transfer or other provision of a defense article or defense service for an end-use that is not authorized by the exemption provided by this section is prohibited without a license or the prior written approval of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses). (3) Any retransfer or reexport, or other provision of a defense article or defense service by a member of the Australian Community to a foreign person that is not a member of the Australian Community, or to a U.S. person that is not a member of the United States Community, is prohibited without a license or the prior written approval of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (see paragraph (d) of this section for specific information on the identification of the Australian Community). (4) Any change in the use of a defense article or defense service previously exported, transferred, or obtained under this exemption by any foreign person, including a member of the Australian Community, to an end-use that is not authorized by this exemption is prohibited without a license or other written approval of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses). (5) Any retransfer, reexport, or change in end-use requiring such approval of the U.S. Government shall be made in accordance with Sec. 123.9 of this subchapter. (6) Defense articles excluded by paragraph (g) of this section or Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter (e.g., USML Category XI(a)(3) electronically scanned array radar) that are embedded in a larger system that is eligible to ship under this section (e.g., a ship or aircraft) must separately comply with any restrictions placed on that embedded defense article unless otherwise specified. A license or other authorization must be obtained from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls for the retransfer, reexport or change in end-use of any such embedded defense article (for example, USML Category XI(a)(3) electronically scanned radar systems that are exempt from this section that are incorporated in an aircraft that is eligible to ship under the this section continue to require separate authorization from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls for their export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer). (7) A license or prior approval from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls is not required for a transfer, retransfer, or reexport of an exported defense article or defense service under this section, if: (i) The transfer of defense articles or defense services is made by a member of the United States Community to Australian Department of Defense (ADOD) elements deployed outside the Territory of Australia and engaged in an authorized end-use (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses) using ADOD transmission channels or the provisions of this section (Note: For purposes of paragraph (h)(7)(i)-(iv), per Section 9(9) of the Australia Implementing Arrangement, “ADOD Transmission channels” includes electronic transmission of a defense article and transmission of a defense article by an ADOD contracted carrier or freight forwarder that merely transports or arranges transport for the defense article in this instance.); (ii) The transfer of defense articles or defense services is made by a member of the United States Community to an Approved Community member (either U.S. or Australian) that is operating in direct support of Australian Department of Defense elements deployed outside the Territory of Australia and engaged in an authorized end-use (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses) using ADOD transmission channels or the provisions of this section; (iii) The reexport is made by a member of the Australian Community to Australian Department of Defense elements deployed outside the Territory of Australia engaged in an authorized end-use (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses) using ADOD transmission channels or the provisions of this section; (iv) The retransfer or reexport is made by a member of the Australian Community to an Approved Community member (either United States or Australian) that is operating in direct support of Australian Department of Defense elements deployed outside the Territory of Australia engaged in an authorized end-use (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses) using ADOD transmission channels or the provisions of this section; or [[Page 72255]] (v) The defense article or defense service will be delivered to the Australian Department of Defense for an authorized end-use (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses); the Australian Department of Defense may deploy the item as necessary when conducting official business within or outside the Territory of Australia. The item must remain under the effective control of the Australian Department of Defense while deployed and access may not be provided to unauthorized third parties. (8) U.S. persons registered, or required to be registered, pursuant to part 122 of this subchapter and Members of the Australian Community must immediately notify the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls of any actual or proposed sale, retransfer, or reexport of a defense article or defense service on the U.S. Munitions List originally exported under this exemption to any of the countries listed in Sec. 126.1 of this subchapter, any citizen of such countries, or any person acting on behalf of such countries, whether within or outside the United States. Any person knowing or having reason to know of such a proposed or actual sale, reexport, or retransfer shall submit such information in writing to the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. (i) Transitions. (1) Any previous export of a defense article under a license or other approval of the U.S. Department of State remains subject to the conditions and limitations of the original license or authorization unless the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has approved in writing a transition to this section. (2) If a U.S. exporter desires to transition from an existing license or other approval to the use of the provisions of this section, the following is required: (i) The U.S. exporter must submit a written request to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, which identifies the defense articles or defense services to be transitioned, the existing license(s) or other authorizations under which the defense articles or defense services were originally exported; and the Treaty-eligible end- use for which the defense articles or defense services will be used. Any license(s) filed with U.S. Customs and Border Protection should remain on file until the exporter has received approval from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls to retire the license(s) and transition to this section. When this approval is conveyed to U.S. Customs and Border Protection by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, the license(s) will be returned to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls by U.S. Customs and Border Protection in accordance with existing procedures for the return of expired licenses in Sec. 123.22(c) of this subchapter. (ii) Any license(s) not filed with U.S. Customs and Border Protection must be returned to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls with a letter citing the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls’ approval to transition to this section as the reason for returning the license(s). (3) If a member of the Australian Community desires to transition defense articles received under an existing license or other approval to the processes established under the Treaty, the Australian Community member must submit a written request to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, either directly or through the original U.S. exporter, which identifies the defense articles or defense services to be transitioned, the existing license(s) or other authorizations under which the defense articles or defense services were received, and the Treaty-eligible end-use (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses) for which the defense articles or defense services will be used. The defense article or defense service shall remain subject to the conditions and limitations of the existing license or other approval until the Australian Community member has received approval from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls to transition to this section. (4) Authorized exporters identified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section who have exported a defense article or defense service that has subsequently been placed on the list of exempted items in Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter must review and adhere to the requirements in the relevant Federal Register notice announcing such removal. Once removed, the defense article or defense service will no longer be subject to this section, such defense article or defense service previously exported shall remain on the U.S. Munitions List and be subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations unless the applicable Federal Register notice states otherwise. Subsequent reexport or retransfer must be made pursuant to Sec. 123.9 of this subchapter. (5) Any defense article or defense service transitioned from a license or other approval to treatment under this section must be marked in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (j) of this section. (j) Marking of Exports. (1) All defense articles and defense services exported or transitioned pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia and this section shall be marked or identified as follows: (i) For classified defense articles and defense services the standard marking or identification shall read: “//CLASSIFICATION LEVEL USML//REL AUS and USA Treaty Community//.” For example, for defense articles classified SECRET, the marking or identification shall be “// SECRET USML//REL AUS and USA Treaty Community//.” (ii) Unclassified defense articles and defense services exported under or transitioned pursuant to this section shall be AUS classified as “Restricted USML” and, the standard marking or identification shall read “//RESTRICTED USML//REL AUS and USA Treaty Community//.” (2) Where defense articles are returned to a member of the United States Community identified in paragraph (b) of this section, any defense articles AUS classified and marked or identified pursuant to paragraph j(1)(ii) of this section as “//RESTRICTED USML//REL AUS and USA Treaty Community//” shall no longer be AUS classified and such marking or identification shall be removed; and (3) The standard marking and identification requirements are as follows: (i) Defense articles (other than technical data) shall be individually labeled with the appropriate identification detailed in paragraphs (j)(1) and (j)(2) of this section; or, where such labeling is impracticable (e.g., propellants, chemicals), shall be accompanied by documentation (such as contracts or invoices) clearly associating the defense articles with the appropriate markings as detailed above; (ii) Technical data (including data packages, technical papers, manuals, presentations, specifications, guides and reports), regardless of media or means of transmission (physical or electronic), shall be individually labeled with the appropriate identification detailed in paragraphs (j)(1) and (j)(2) of this section; or, where such labeling is impracticable (oral presentations), shall have a verbal notification clearly associating the technical data with the appropriate markings as detailed above; and (4) Contracts and agreements for the provision of defense services shall be identified with the appropriate identification detailed in paragraphs (j)(1) and (j)(2) of this section. (5) The exporter shall incorporate the following statement as an integral part [[Page 72256]] of all shipping documentation (airway bill, bill of lading, manifest, packing documents, delivery verification, invoice, etc.) whenever defense articles are to be exported: “These commodities are authorized by the U.S. Government for export only to Australia for use in approved projects, programs or operations by members of the Australian Community. They may not be retransferred or reexported or used outside of an approved project, program or operation, either in their original form or after being incorporated into other end-items, without the prior written approval of the U.S. Department of State.” (k) Intermediate Consignees. (1) Unclassified exports under this section may only be handled by: (i) U.S. intermediate consignees who are: (A) Exporters registered with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and eligible; (B) Licensed customs brokers who are subject to background investigation and have passed a comprehensive examination administered by U.S. Customs and Border Protection; or (C) Commercial air freight and surface shipment carriers, freight forwarders, or other parties not exempt from registration under Sec. 129.3(b)(3) of this subchapter that are identified at the time of export as being on the list of Authorized U.S. Intermediate Consignees, which is available on the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls’ Web site. (ii) Australian intermediate consignees who are: (A) Members of the Australian Community; or (B) Freight forwarders, customs brokers, commercial air freight and surface shipment carriers, or other Australian parties that are identified at the time of export as being on the list of Authorized Australian Intermediate Consignees, which is available on the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls’ Web site. (2) Classified exports must comply with the security requirements of the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DoD 5220.22-M and supplements or successors). (l) Records. (1) All exporters authorized pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section who export pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia and this section shall maintain detailed records of all exports, imports, and transfers made by that exporter of defense articles or defense services subject to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia and the requirements of this section. Exporters shall also maintain detailed records of any reexports and retransfers approved or otherwise authorized by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls of defense articles or defense services subject to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia and the requirements of this section. These records shall be maintained for a minimum of five years from the date of export, import, transfer, reexport, or retransfer and shall be made available upon request to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or any other authorized U.S. law enforcement officer. Records in an electronic format must be maintained using a process or system capable of reproducing all records on paper. Such records when displayed on a viewer, monitor, or reproduced on paper, must exhibit a high degree of legibility and readability. (For the purpose of this section, “legible” and “legibility” mean the quality of a letter or numeral that enables the observer to identify it positively and quickly to the exclusion of all other letters or numerals. “Readable” and “readability” means the quality of a group of letters or numerals being recognized as complete words or numbers.) These records shall consist of the following: (i) Port of entry/exit; (ii) Date/time of export/import; (iii) Method of export/import; (iv) Commodity code and description of the commodity, including technical data; (v) Value of export; (vi) Reference to this section and justification for export under the Treaty; (vii) End-user/end-use; (viii) Identification of all U.S. and foreign parties to the transaction; (ix) How the export was marked; (x) Classification of the export; (xi) All written correspondence with the U.S. Government on the export; (xii) All information relating to political contributions, fees, or commissions furnished or obtained, offered, solicited, or agreed upon as outlined in paragraph (m) of this section; (xiii) Purchase order or contract; (xiv) Technical data actually exported; (xv) The Internal Transaction Number for the Electronic Export Information filing in the Automated Export System; (xvi) All shipping documentation (airway bill, bill of lading, manifest, packing documents, delivery verification, invoice, etc.); and (xvii) Statement of Registration (Form DS-2032). (2) Filing of export information. All exporters of defense articles and defense services under the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia and the requirements of this section must electronically file Electronic Export Information (EEI) using the Automated Export System citing one of the four below referenced codes in the appropriate field in the EEI for each shipment: (i) 126.16(e)(1): used for exports in support of United States and Australian combined military or counter-terrorism operations (the name or an appropriate description of the operation shall be placed in the appropriate field in the EEI, as well); (ii) 126.16(e)(2): used for exports in support of United States and Australian cooperative security and defense research, development, production, and support programs (the name or an appropriate description of the program shall be placed in the appropriate field in the EEI, as well); (iii) 126.16(e)(3): used for exports in support of mutually determined specific security and defense projects where the Government of Australia is the end-user (the name or an appropriate description of the project shall be placed in the appropriate field in the EEI, as well); or (iv) 126.16(e)(4): used for exports that will have a U.S. Government end-use (the U.S. Government contract number or solicitation number (e.g., “U.S. Government contract number XXXXX”) shall be placed in the appropriate field in the EEI, as well). Such exports must meet the required export documentation and filing guidelines, including for defense services, of Sec. 123.22(a), (b)(1), and (b)(2) of this subchapter. (m) Fees and Commissions. All exporters authorized pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section shall, with respect to each export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer, pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia and this section, submit a statement to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls containing the information identified in Sec. 130.10 of this subchapter relating to fees, commissions, and political contributions on contracts or other instruments valued in an amount of $500,000 or more. (n) Violations and Enforcement. (1) Exports, transfers, reexports, and retransfers that do not comply with the conditions prescribed in this section will constitute violations of the Arms Export Control Act and this subchapter, [[Page 72257]] and are subject to all relevant criminal, civil, and administrative penalties (see Sec. 127.1 of this subchapter), and may also be subject to other statutes or regulations. (2) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers have the authority to investigate, detain, or seize any export or attempted export of defense articles that does not comply with this section or that is otherwise unlawful. (3) The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and other authorized U.S. law enforcement officers may require the production of documents and information relating to any actual or attempted export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer pursuant to this section. Any foreign person refusing to provide such records within a reasonable period of time shall be suspended from the Australian Community and ineligible to receive defense articles or defense services pursuant to the exemption under this section or otherwise. (o) Procedures for Legislative Notification. (1) Exports pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia and this section by any person identified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section shall not take place until 30 days after the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has acknowledged receipt of a Form DS-4048 (entitled, “Projected Sales of Major Weapons in Support of Section 25(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act”) from the exporter notifying the Department of State if the export involves one or more of the following: (i) A contract or other instrument for the export of major defense equipment in the amount of $25,000,000 or more, or for defense articles and defense services in the amount of $100,000,000 or more; (ii) A contract or other instrument for the export of firearms controlled under Category I of the U.S. Munitions List of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations in an amount of $1,000,000 or more; (iii) A contract or other instrument, regardless of value, for the manufacturing abroad of any item of significant military equipment; or (iv) An amended contract or other instrument that meets the requirements of paragraphs (o)(1)(i)-(o)(1)(iii) of this section. (2) The Form DS-4048 required in paragraph (o)(1) of this section shall be accompanied by the following additional information: (i) The information identified in Sec. 130.10 and Sec. 130.11 of this subchapter; (ii) A statement regarding whether any offset agreement is proposed to be entered into in connection with the export and a description of any such offset agreement; (iii) A copy of the signed contract or other instrument; and (iv) If the notification is for paragraph (o)(1)(ii) of this section, a statement of what will happen to the weapons in their inventory (for example, whether the current inventory will be sold, reassigned to another service branch, destroyed, etc.). (3) The Department of State will notify the Congress of exports that meet the requirements of paragraph (o)(1) of this section. 26. Section 126.17 is added to read as follows: Sec. 126.17 Exemption pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. (a) Scope of exemption and required conditions. (1) Definitions. (i) An export means, for purposes of this section only, the initial movement of defense articles or defense services from the United States to the United Kingdom Community. (ii) A transfer means, for purposes of this section only, the movement of a defense article or defense service, previously exported, by a member of the United Kingdom Community within the United Kingdom Community, or between a member of the United States Community and a member of the United Kingdom Community. (iii) Retransfer and reexport have the meaning provided in Sec. 120.19 of this subchapter. (iv) Intermediate consignee means, for purposes of this section, an entity or person who receives defense articles, including technical data, but who does not have access to such defense articles, for the sole purpose of effecting onward movement to members of the Approved Community. (2) Persons or entities exporting or transferring defense articles or defense services are exempt from the otherwise applicable licensing requirements if such persons or entities comply with the regulations set forth in this section. Except as provided in Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter, Port Directors of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and postmasters shall permit the permanent and temporary export without a license to members of the United Kingdom Community (see paragraph (d) of this section regarding the identification of members of the United Kingdom Community) of defense articles and defense services not listed in Supplement No. 1 to part 126, for the end-uses specifically identified pursuant to paragraphs (e) and (f) below. The purpose of this section is to specify the requirements to export, transfer, reexport, retransfer, or otherwise dispose of a defense article or defense service pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. (3) Export. In order for an exporter to export a defense article or defense service pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, all of the following conditions must be met: (i) The exporter must be registered with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and must be eligible, according to the requirements and prohibitions of the Arms Export Control Act, this subchapter, and other provisions of United States law, to obtain an export license (or other forms of authorization to export) from any agency of the U.S. Government without restriction (see paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section for specific requirements); (ii) The recipient of the export must be a member of the United Kingdom Community (see paragraph (d) of this section regarding the identification of members of the United Kingdom Community). United Kingdom entities and facilities that become ineligible for such membership will be removed from the United Kingdom Community; (iii) Intermediate consignees involved in the export must be eligible, according to the requirements and prohibitions of the Arms Export Control Act, this subchapter, and other provisions of United States law, to handle or receive a defense article or defense service without restriction (see paragraph (k) of this section for specific requirements); (iv) The export must be for an end-use specified in the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom and mutually agreed to by the U.S. Government and the Government of the United Kingdom pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom and the Implementing Arrangement thereto (United Kingdom Implementing Arrangement) (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses); (v) The defense article or defense service is not excluded from the scope of the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom (see paragraph (g) of this section and Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter for specific [[Page 72258]] information on the scope of items excluded from export under this exemption) and is marked or identified, at a minimum, as “Restricted USML” (see paragraph (j) of this section for specific requirements on marking exports); (vi) All required documentation of such export is maintained by the exporter and recipient and is available upon the request of the U.S. Government (see paragraph (l) of this section for specific requirements); and (vii) The Department of State has provided advance notification to the Congress, as required, in accordance with this section (see paragraph (o) of this section for specific requirements). (4) Transfers. In order for a member of the United Kingdom Community to transfer a defense article or defense service under the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, all of the following conditions must be met: (i) The defense article or defense service must have been previously exported in accordance with paragraph (a)(3) of this section or transitioned from a license or other approval in accordance with paragraph (i) Transfers of this section; (ii) The transferor and transferee of the defense article or defense service are members of the United Kingdom Community (see paragraph (d) of this section regarding the identification of members of the United Kingdom Community) or the United States Community (see paragraph (b) of this section for information on the United States Community/approved exporters); (iii) The transfer is required for an end-use specified in the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom and mutually agreed to by the United States and the Government of United Kingdom pursuant to the terms of the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom and the United Kingdom Implementing Arrangement (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses); (iv) The defense article or defense service is not identified in paragraph (g) of this section and Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter as ineligible for export under this exemption, and is marked or otherwise identified, at a minimum, as “Restricted USML” (see paragraph (j) of this section for specific requirements on marking exports); (v) All required documentation of such transfer is maintained by the transferor and transferee and is available upon the request of the U.S. Government (see paragraph (l) of this section for specific requirements); and (vi) The Department of State has provided advance notification to the Congress in accordance with this section (see paragraph (o) of this section for specific requirements). (5) This section does not apply to the export of defense articles or defense services from the United States pursuant to the Foreign Military Sales program. (b) Authorized exporters. The following persons compose the United States Community and may export defense articles and defense services pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom: (1) Departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, including their personnel, with, as appropriate, a security clearance and a need- to-know; and (2) Nongovernmental U.S. persons registered with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and eligible, according to the requirements and prohibitions of the Arms Export Control Act, this subchapter, and other provisions of United States law, to obtain an export license (or other forms of authorization to export) from any agency of the U.S. Government without restriction, including their employees acting in their official capacity with, as appropriate, a security clearance and a need-to-know. (c) An exporter that is otherwise an authorized exporter pursuant to subsection (b) above may not export pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom if the exporter’s president, chief executive officer, any vice-president, any other senior officer or official (e.g., comptroller, treasurer, general counsel); any member of the board of directors of the exporter; any party to the export; or any source or manufacturer is ineligible to receive export licenses (or other forms of authorization to export) from any agency of the U.S. Government. (d) United Kingdom Community. For purposes of the exemption provided by this section, the United Kingdom Community consists of the United Kingdom entities and facilities identified as members of the Approved Community through the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls’ Web site at the time of a transaction under this section; non- governmental United Kingdom entities and facilities that become ineligible for such membership will be removed from the United Kingdom Community. (e) Authorized End-uses. The following end-uses, subject to subsection (f), are specified in the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom: (1) United States and United Kingdom combined military or counter- terrorism operations; (2) United States and United Kingdom cooperative security and defense research, development, production, and support programs; (3) Mutually determined specific security and defense projects where the Government of the United Kingdom is the end-user; or (4) U.S. Government end-use. (f) Procedures for identifying authorized end-uses pursuant to paragraph (e) of this section: (1) Operations, programs, and projects that can be publicly identified will be posted on the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls’ Web site; (2) Operations, programs, and projects that cannot be publicly identified will be confirmed in written correspondence from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls; or (3) U.S. Government end-use will be identified specifically in a U.S. Government contract or solicitation as being eligible under the Treaty. (4) No other operations, programs, projects, or end-uses qualify for this exemption. (g) Items eligible under this section. With the exception of items listed in Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter, defense articles and defense services may be exported under this section subject to the following: (1) An exporter authorized pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section may market a defense article to the Government of the United Kingdom if that exporter has been licensed by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls to export (as defined by Sec. 120.17 of this subchapter) the identical type of defense article to any foreign person. (2) The export of any defense article specific to the existence of (e.g., reveals the existence of or details of) anti-tamper measures made at U.S. Government direction always requires prior written approval from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. (3) U.S.-origin classified defense articles or defense services may be exported only pursuant to a written request, directive, or contract from the U.S. Department of Defense that provides for the export of the classified defense article(s) or defense service(s). (4) Defense articles specific to developmental systems that have not obtained written Milestone B approval from the Department of Defense milestone approval authority are not [[Page 72259]] eligible for export unless such export is pursuant to a written solicitation or contract issued or awarded by the Department of Defense for an end-use identified pursuant to paragraphs (e)(1), (2), or (4) of this section. (5) Defense articles excluded by paragraph (g) of this section or Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter (e.g., USML Category XI (a)(3) electronically scanned array radar) that are embedded in a larger system that is eligible to ship under this section (e.g., a ship or aircraft) must separately comply with any restrictions placed on that embedded defense article under this subsection. The exporter must obtain a license or other authorization from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls for the export of such embedded defense articles (for example, USML Category XI (a)(3) electronically scanned array radar systems that are exempt from this section that are incorporated in an aircraft that is eligible to ship under the this section continue to require separate authorization from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls for their export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer). (6) No liability shall be incurred by or attributed to the U.S. Government in connection with any possible infringement of privately owned patent or proprietary rights, either domestic or foreign, by reason of an export conducted pursuant to this section. (7) Sales by exporters made through the U.S. Government shall not include either charges for patent rights in which the U.S. Government holds a royalty-free license, or charges for information which the U.S. Government has a right to use and disclose to others, which is in the public domain, or which the U.S. Government has acquired or is entitled to acquire without restrictions upon its use and disclosure to others. (8) Defense articles and services specific to items that appear on the European Union Dual Use List (as described in Annex 1 to EC Council Regulation No. 428/2009) are not eligible for export under the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. (h) Transfers, Retransfers, and Reexports. (1) Any transfer of a defense article or defense service not exempted in Supplement No.1 to part 126 of this subchapter by a member of the United Kingdom Community (see paragraph (d) of this section for specific information on the identification of the Community) to another member of the United Kingdom Community or the United States Community for an end-use that is authorized by this exemption (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses) is authorized under this exemption. (2) Any transfer or other provision of a defense article or defense service for an end-use that is not authorized by the exemption provided by this section is prohibited without a license or the prior written approval of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses). (3) Any retransfer or reexport, or other provision of a defense article or defense service by a member of the United Kingdom Community to a foreign person that is not a member of the United Kingdom Community, or to a U.S. person that is not a member of the United States Community, is prohibited without a license or the prior written approval of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (see paragraph (d) of this section for specific information on the identification of the United Kingdom Community). (4) Any change in the use of a defense article or defense service previously exported, transferred, or obtained under this exemption by any foreign person, including a member of the United Kingdom Community, to an end-use that is not authorized by this exemption is prohibited without a license or other written approval of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses). (5) Any retransfer, reexport, or change in end-use requiring such approval of the U.S. Government shall be made in accordance with Sec. 123.9 of this subchapter. (6) Defense articles excluded by paragraph (g) of this section or Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter (e.g., USML Category XI (a)(3) electronically scanned array radar systems) that are embedded in a larger system that is eligible to ship under this section (e.g., a ship or aircraft) must separately comply with any restrictions placed on that embedded defense article unless otherwise specified. A license or other authorization must be obtained from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls for the retransfer, reexport or change in end-use of any such embedded defense article (for example, USML Category XI(a)(3) electronically scanned array radar systems that are exempt from this section that are incorporated in an aircraft that is eligible to ship under the this section continue to require separate authorization from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls for their export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer). (7) A license or prior approval from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls is not required for a transfer, retransfer, or reexport of an exported defense article or defense service under this section, if: (i) The transfer of defense articles or defense services is made by a member of the United States Community to United Kingdom Ministry of Defense elements deployed outside the Territory of the United Kingdom and engaged in an authorized end-use (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses) using United Kingdom Armed Forces transmission channels or the provisions of this section; (ii) The transfer of defense articles or defense services is made by a member of the United States Community to an Approved Community member (either U.S. or U.K.) that is operating in direct support of United Kingdom Ministry of Defense elements deployed outside the Territory of the United Kingdom and engaged in an authorized end-use (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end- uses) using United Kingdom Armed Forces transmission channels or the provisions of this section; (iii) The reexport is made by a member of the United Kingdom Community to United Kingdom Ministry of Defense elements deployed outside the Territory of the United Kingdom engaged in an authorized end-use (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses) using United Kingdom Armed Forces transmission channels or the provisions of this section; (iv) The retransfer or reexport is made by a member of the United Kingdom Community to an Approved Community member (either U.S. or U.K.) that is operating indirect support of United Kingdom Ministry of Defense elements deployed outside the Territory of the United Kingdom engaged in an authorized end-use (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses) using United Kingdom Armed Forces transmission channels or the provisions of this section; or (v) The defense article or defense service will be delivered to the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense for an authorized end-use (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses); the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense may deploy the item as necessary when conducting official business within or outside the Territory of the United Kingdom. The item must remain under the effective control of the United [[Page 72260]] Kingdom Ministry of Defense while deployed and access may not be provided to unauthorized third parties. (8) U.S. persons registered, or required to be registered, pursuant to part 122 of this subchapter and Members of the United Kingdom Community must immediately notify the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls of any actual or proposed sale, retransfer, or reexport of a defense article or defense service on the U.S. Munitions List originally exported under this exemption to any of the countries listed in Sec. 126.1 of this subchapter, any citizen of such countries, or any person acting on behalf of such countries, whether within or outside the United States. Any person knowing or having reason to know of such a proposed or actual sale, reexport, or retransfer shall submit such information in writing to the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. (i) Transitions. (1) Any previous export of a defense article under a license or other approval of the U.S. Department of State remains subject to the conditions and limitations of the original license or authorization unless the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has approved in writing a transition to this section. (2) If a U.S. exporter desires to transition from an existing license or other approval to the use of the provisions of this section, the following is required: (i) The U.S. exporter must submit a written request to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, which identifies the defense articles or defense services to be transitioned, the existing license(s) or other authorizations under which the defense articles or defense services were originally exported; and the Treaty-eligible end- use for which the defense articles or defense services will be used. Any license(s) filed with U.S. Customs and Border Protection should remain on file until the exporter has received approval from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls to retire the license(s) and transition to this section. When this approval is conveyed to U.S. Customs and Border Protection by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, the license(s) will be returned to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls by U.S. Customs and Border Protection in accord with existing procedures for the return of expired licenses in Sec. 123.22(c) of this subchapter. (ii) Any license(s) not filed with U.S. Customs and Border Protection must be returned to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls with a letter citing the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls’ approval to transition to this section as the reason for returning the license(s). (3) If a member of the United Kingdom Community desires to transition defense articles received under an existing license or other approval to the processes established under the Treaty, the United Kingdom Community member must submit a written request to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, either directly or through the original U.S. exporter, which identifies the defense articles or defense services to be transitioned, the existing license(s) or other authorizations under which the defense articles or defense services were received, and the Treaty-eligible end-use (see paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section regarding authorized end-uses) for which the defense articles or defense services will be used. The defense article or defense service shall remain subject to the conditions and limitations of the existing license or other approval until the United Kingdom Community member has received approval from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls to transition to this section. (4) Authorized exporters identified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section who have exported a defense article or defense service that has subsequently been placed on the list of exempted items in Supplement No. 1 to part 126 of this subchapter must review and adhere to the requirements in the relevant Federal Register notice announcing such removal. Once removed, the defense article or defense service will no longer be subject to this section, such defense article or defense service previously exported shall remain on the U.S. Munitions List and be subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations unless the applicable Federal Register notice states otherwise. Subsequent reexport or retransfer must be made pursuant to Sec. 123.9 of this subchapter. (5) Any defense article or defense service transitioned from a license or other approval to treatment under this section must be marked in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (j) of this section. (j) Marking of Exports. (1) All defense articles and defense services exported or transitioned pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom and this section shall be marked or identified as follows: (i) For classified defense articles and defense services the standard marking or identification shall read: “//CLASSIFICATION LEVEL USML//REL UK and USA Treaty Community//.” For example, for defense articles classified SECRET, the marking or identification shall be “// SECRET USML//REL UK and USA Treaty Community//.” (ii) Unclassified defense articles and defense services exported under or transitioned pursuant to this section shall be UK classified as “Restricted USML” and, the standard marking or identification shall read “//RESTRICTED USML//REL UK and USA Treaty Community//.” (2) Where defense articles are returned to a member of the United States Community identified in paragraph (b) of this section, any defense articles UK classified and marked or identified pursuant to paragraph j(1)(ii) as “//RESTRICTED USML//REL UK and USA Treaty Community//” no longer be UK classified and such marking or identification shall be removed; and (3) The standard marking and identification requirements are as follows: (i) Defense articles (other than technical data) shall be individually labeled with the appropriate identification detailed in paragraphs (j)(1) and (j)(2) of this section; or, where such labeling is impracticable (e.g., propellants, chemicals), shall be accompanied by documentation (such as contracts or invoices) clearly associating the defense articles with the appropriate markings as detailed above; (ii) Technical data (including data packages, technical papers, manuals, presentations, specifications, guides and reports), regardless of media or means of transmission (physical or electronic), shall be individually labeled with the appropriate identification detailed in paragraphs (j)(1) and (j)(2) of this section; or, where such labeling is impracticable (oral presentations), shall have a verbal notification clearly associating the technical data with the appropriate markings as detailed above; and (4) Contracts and agreements for the provision of defense services shall be identified with the appropriate identification detailed in paragraphs (j)(1) and (j)(2) of this section. (5) The exporter shall incorporate the following statement as an integral part of all shipping documentation (airway bill, bill of lading, manifest, packing documents, delivery verification, invoice, etc.) whenever defense articles are to be exported: “These commodities are authorized by the U.S. Government for export only to United Kingdom for use in approved projects, programs or operations by members of the United Kingdom [[Page 72261]] Community. They may not be retransferred or reexported or used outside of an approved project, program, or operation, either in their original form or after being incorporated into other end-items, without the prior written approval of the U.S. Department of State.” (k) Intermediate Consignees. (1) Unclassified exports under this section may only be handled by: (i) U.S. intermediate consignees who are: (A) Exporters registered with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and eligible; (B) Licensed customs brokers who are subject to background investigation and have passed a comprehensive examination administered by U.S. Customs and Border Protection; or (C) Commercial air freight and surface shipment carriers, freight forwarders, or other parties not exempt from registration under Sec. 129.3(b)(3) of this subchapter that are identified at the time of export as being on the list of Authorized U.S. Intermediate Consignees, which is available on the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls’ Web site. (ii) United Kingdom intermediate consignees who are: (A) Members of the United Kingdom Community; or (B) Freight forwarders, customs brokers, commercial air freight and surface shipment carriers, or other United Kingdom parties that are identified at the time of export as being on the list of Authorized United Kingdom Intermediate Consignees, which is available on the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls’ Web site. (2) Classified exports must comply with the security requirements of the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DoD 5220.22-M and supplements or successors). (l) Records. (1) All exporters authorized pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section who export pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom and this section shall maintain detailed records of all exports, imports, and transfers made by that exporter of defense articles or defense services subject to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom and this section. Exporters shall also maintain detailed records of any reexports and retransfers approved or otherwise authorized by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls of defense articles or defense services subject to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom and this section. These records shall be maintained for a minimum of five years from the date of export, import, transfer, reexport, or retransfer and shall be made available upon request to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or any other authorized U.S. law enforcement officer. Records in an electronic format must be maintained using a process or system capable of reproducing all records on paper. Such records when displayed on a viewer, monitor, or reproduced on paper, must exhibit a high degree of legibility and readability. (For the purpose of this section, “legible” and “legibility” mean the quality of a letter or numeral that enables the observer to identify it positively and quickly to the exclusion of all other letters or numerals. “Readable” and “readability” means the quality of a group of letters or numerals being recognized as complete words or numbers.) These records shall consist of the following: (i) Port of entry/exit; (ii) Date/time of export/import; (iii) Method of export/import; (iv) Commodity code and description of the commodity, including technical data; (v) Value of export; (vi) Reference to this section and justification for export under the Treaty; (vii) End-user/end-use; (viii) Identification of all U.S. and foreign parties to the transaction; (ix) How the export was marked; (x) Classification of the export; (xi) All written correspondence with the U.S. Government on the export; (xii) All information relating to political contributions, fees, or commissions furnished or obtained, offered, solicited, or agreed upon as outlined in subsection (m) below; (xiii) Purchase order or contract; (xiv) Technical data actually exported; (xv) The Internal Transaction Number for the Electronic Export Information filing in the Automated Export System; (xvi) All shipping documentation (airway bill, bill of lading, manifest, packing documents, delivery verification, invoice, etc.); and (xvii) Statement of Registration (Form DS-2032). (2) Filing of export information. All exporters of defense articles and defense services under the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom and this section must electronically file Electronic Export Information (EEI) using the Automated Export System citing one of the four below referenced codes in the appropriate field in the EEI for each shipment: (i) 126.16(e)(1): Used for exports in support of United States and United Kingdom combined military or counter-terrorism operations (the name or an appropriate description of the operation shall be placed in the appropriate field in the EEI, as well); (ii) 126.16(e)(2): Used for exports in support of United States and United Kingdom cooperative security and defense research, development, production, and support programs (the name or an appropriate description of the program shall be placed in the appropriate field in the EEI, as well); (iii) 126.16(e)(3): Used for exports in support of mutually determined specific security and defense projects where the Government of the United Kingdom is the end-user (the name or an appropriate description of the project shall be placed in the appropriate field in the EEI, as well); or (iv) 126.16(e)(4): Used for exports that will have a U.S. Government end-use (the U.S. Government contract number or solicitation number (e.g., “U.S. Government contract number XXXXX”) shall be placed in the appropriate field in the EEI, as well). Such exports must meet the required export documentation and filing guidelines, including for defense services, of Sec. 123.22(a), (b)(1), and (b)(2) of this subchapter. (m) Fees and Commissions. All exporters authorized pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section shall, with respect to each export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer, pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom and this section, submit a statement to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls containing the information identified in Sec. 130.10 of this subchapter relating to fees, commissions, and political contributions on contracts or other instruments valued in an amount of $500,000 or more. (n) Violations and Enforcement. (1) Exports, transfers, reexports, and retransfers that do not comply with the conditions prescribed in this section will constitute violations of the Arms Export Control Act and this subchapter, and are subject to all relevant criminal, civil, and administrative penalties (see Sec. 127.1 of this subchapter), and may also be subject to other statutes or regulations. (2) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers have the authority to investigate, detain, or seize [[Page 72262]] any export or attempted export of defense articles that does not comply with this section or that is otherwise unlawful. (3) The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and other authorized U.S. law enforcement officers may require the production of documents and information relating to any actual or attempted export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer pursuant to this section. Any foreign person refusing to provide such records within a reasonable period of time shall be suspended from the United Kingdom Community and ineligible to receive defense articles or defense services pursuant to the exemption under this section or otherwise. (o) Procedures for Legislative Notification. (1) Exports pursuant to the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom and this section by any person identified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section shall not take place until 30 days after the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has acknowledged receipt of a Form DS-4048 (entitled, “Projected Sales of Major Weapons in Support of Section 25(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act”) from the exporter notifying the Department of State if the export involves one or more of the following: (i) A contract or other instrument for the export of major defense equipment in the amount of $25,000,000 or more, or for defense articles and defense services in the amount of $100,000,000 or more; (ii) A contract or other instrument for the export of firearms controlled under Category I of the U.S. Munitions List of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations in an amount of $1,000,000 or more; (iii) A contract or other instrument, regardless of value, for the manufacturing abroad of any item of significant military equipment; or (iv) An amended contract or other instrument that meets the requirements of paragraphs (o)(1)(i)-(o)(1)(iii) of this section. (2) The Form DS-4048 required in paragraph (o)(1) of this section shall be accompanied by the following additional information: (i) The information identified in Sec. 130.10 and Sec. 130.11 of this subchapter; (ii) A statement regarding whether any offset agreement is proposed to be entered into in connection with the export and a description of any such offset agreement; (iii) A copy of the signed contract or other instrument; and (iv) If the notification is for paragraph (o)(1)(ii) of this section, a statement of what will happen to the weapons in their inventory (for example, whether the current inventory will be sold, reassigned to another service branch, destroyed, etc.). (3) The Department of State will notify the Congress of exports that meet the requirements of paragraph (o)(1) of this section. 27. Supplement No. 1 is added to Part 126 read as follows: Supplement No. 1 * —————————————————————————————————————- (CA) Sec. (AS) Sec. (UK) Sec. USML category Exclusion 126.5 126.16 126.17 —————————————————————————————————————- I-XXI……………………………….. Classified defense articles and X X X services. See Note 1. I-XXI……………………………….. Defense articles listed in the X X X Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex. I-XXI……………………………….. U.S. origin defense articles ………. X X and services used for marketing purposes and not previously licensed for export in accordance with this subchapter. I-XXI……………………………….. Defense services for or X ………. ………. technical data related to defense articles identified in this supplement as excluded from the Canadian exemption. I-XXI……………………………….. Any transaction involving the X ………. ………. export of defense articles and services for which congressional notification is required in accordance with Sec. 123.15 and Sec. 124.11 of this subchapter. I-XXI……………………………….. U.S. origin defense articles ………. X X and services specific to developmental systems that have not obtained written Milestone B approval from the U.S. Department of Defense milestone approval authority, unless such export is pursuant to a written solicitation or contract issued or awarded by the U.S. Department of Defense for an end use identified in subsections (e)(1), (2), or (4) of Sec. 126.16 or Sec. 126.17 of this subchapter and is consistent with other exclusions of this supplement. I-XXI……………………………….. Nuclear weapons strategic X ………. ………. delivery systems and all components, parts, accessories, and attachments specifically designed for such systems and associated equipment. I-XXI……………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to the existence or method of compliance with anti- tamper measures made at U.S. Government direction. I-XXI……………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to reduced observables or counter low observables in any part of the spectrum. See Note 2. I-XXI……………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to sensor fusion beyond that required for display or identification correlation. See Note 3. I-XXI……………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to the automatic target acquisition or recognition and cueing of multiple autonomous unmanned systems. I-XXI……………………………….. Nuclear power generating ………. ………. X equipment or propulsion equipment (e.g. nuclear reactors), specifically designed for military use and components therefore, specifically designed for military use. See also Sec. 123.20 of this subchapter. I-XXI……………………………….. Libraries (parametric technical ………. ………. X databases) specially designed for military use with equipment controlled on the USML. I-XXI……………………………….. Defense services or technical X ………. ………. data specific to applied research as defined in Sec. 125.4(c)(3) of this subchapter, design methodology as defined in Sec. 125.4(c)(4) of this subchapter, engineering analysis as defined in Sec. 125.4(c)(5) of this subchapter, or manufacturing know-how as defined in Sec. 125.4(c)(6) of this subchapter. [[Page 72263]] I-XXI……………………………….. Defense services that are not X ………. ………. based on a written arrangement (between the U.S. exporter and the Canadian recipient) that includes a clause requiring that all documentation created from U.S. origin technical data contain the statement that “This document contains technical data, the use of which is restricted by the U.S. Arms Export Control Act. This data has been provided in accordance with, and is subject to, the limitations specified in Sec. 126.5 of the International Traffic In Arms Regulations (ITAR). By accepting this data, the consignee agrees to honor the requirements of the ITAR”. I…………………………………… Defense articles and services X ………. ………. related to firearms, close assault weapons, and combat shotguns. II(k)……………………………….. Software source code related to ………. X X Categories II(c), II(d), or II(i). See Note 4. II(k)……………………………….. Manufacturing know-how related X X X to Category II(d). See Note 5. III…………………………………. Defense articles and services X ………. ………. related to ammunition for firearms, close assault weapons, and combat shotguns listed in Category I. III…………………………………. Defense articles and services ………. ………. X specific to ammunition and fuse setting devices for guns and armament controlled in Category II. III(e)………………………………. Manufacturing know-how related X X X to Categories III(d)(1) or III(d)(2) and their specially designed components. See Note 5. III(e)………………………………. Software source code related to ………. X X Categories III(d)(1) or III(d)(2). See Note 4. IV………………………………….. Defense articles and services X X X specific to man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). See Note 6. IV………………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. ………. X specific to rockets, designed or modified for non-military applications that do not have a range of 300 km (i.e., not controlled on the MTCR Annex). IV………………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to torpedoes. IV………………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. ………. X specific to anti-personnel landmines. IV(i)……………………………….. Software source code related to ………. X X Categories IV(a), IV(b), IV(c), or IV(g). See Note 4. IV(i)……………………………….. Manufacturing know-how related X X X to Categories IV(a), IV(b), IV(d), or IV(g) and their specially designed components. See Note 5. V…………………………………… The following energetic ………. ………. X materials and related substances:. a. TATB (triaminotrinitrobenzene) (CAS 3058-38-6) b. Explosives controlled in USML Category V(a)(32) or V(a)(33) c. Iron powder (CAS 7439-89-6) with particle size of 3 micrometers or less produced by reduction of iron oxide with hydrogen d. BOBBA-8 (bis(2- methylaziridinyl)2-(2- hydroxypropanoxy) propylamino phosphine oxide), and other MAPO derivatives e. N-methyl-p-nitroaniline (CAS 100-15-2) f. Trinitrophenylmethyl- ………. ………. ………. nitramine (tetryl) (CAS 479-45- 8) V(c)(7)……………………………… Pyrotechnics and pyrophorics ………. ………. X specifically formulated for military purposes to enhance or control radiated energy in any part of the IR spectrum. V(d)(3)……………………………… Bis-2, 2-dinitropropylnitrate ………. ………. X (BDNPN). VI………………………………….. Defense Articles specific to ………. ………. X equipment specially designed or configured to be installed in a vehicle for military ground, marine, airborne or space applications, capable of operating while in motion and of producing or maintaining temperatures below 103 K (-170 [deg]C). VI………………………………….. Defense Articles specific to ………. ………. X superconductive electrical equipment (rotating machinery and transformers) specially designed or configured to be installed in a vehicle for military ground, marine, airborne, or space applications and capable of operating while in motion. This, however, does not include direct current hybrid homopolar generators that have single-pole normal metal armatures which rotate in a magnetic field produced by superconducting windings, provided those windings are the only superconducting component in the generator. VI………………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to naval technology and systems relating to acoustic spectrum control and awareness. See Note 10. VI(a)……………………………….. Nuclear powered vessels…….. X X X VI(c)……………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to submarine combat control systems. VI(d)……………………………….. Harbor entrance detection ………. ………. X devices. VI(e)……………………………….. Defense articles and services X X X specific to naval nuclear propulsion equipment. See Note 7. VI(g)……………………………….. Technical data and defense X X X services for gas turbine engine hot sections related to Category VI(f). See Note 8. VI(g)……………………………….. Software source code related to ………. X X Categories VI(a) or VI(c). See Note 4. VII…………………………………. Defense articles specific to ………. ………. X equipment specially designed or configured to be installed in a vehicle for military ground, marine, airborne, or space applications, capable of operating while in motion and of producing or maintaining temperatures below 103 K (-170 [deg]C). [[Page 72264]] VII…………………………………. Defense articles specific to ………. ………. X superconductive electrical equipment (rotating machinery and transformers) specially designed or configured to be installed in a vehicle for military ground, marine, airborne, or space applications and capable of operating while in motion. This, however, does not include direct current hybrid homopolar generators that have single-pole normal metal armatures which rotate in a magnetic field produced by superconducting windings, provided those windings are the only superconducting component in the generator. VII…………………………………. Armored all wheel drive ………. ………. X vehicles, other than vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use, fitted with, or designed or modified to be fitted with, a plough or flail for the purpose of land mine clearance. VII(e)………………………………. Amphibious vehicles………… ………. ………. X VII(f)………………………………. Technical data and defense X X X services for gas turbine engine hot sections. See Note 8. VIII………………………………… Defense articles specific to ………. ………. X equipment specially designed or configured to be installed in a vehicle for military ground, marine, airborne, or space applications, capable of operating while in motion and of producing or maintaining temperatures below 103 K (-170 [deg]C). VIII………………………………… Defense articles specific to ………. ………. X superconductive electrical equipment (rotating machinery and transformers) specially designed or configured to be installed in a vehicle for military ground, marine, airborne, or space applications and capable of operating while in motion. This, however, does not include direct current hybrid homopolar generators that have single-pole normal metal armatures which rotate in a magnetic field produced by superconducting windings, provided those windings are the only superconducting component in the generator. VIII(a)……………………………… All Category VIII(a) items….. X ………. ………. VIII(b)……………………………… Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to gas turbine engine hot section components and digital engine controls. See Note 8. VIII(f)……………………………… Developmental aircraft, engines X ………. ………. and components identified in Category VIII(f). VIII(g)……………………………… Ground Effect Machines (GEMS).. ………. ………. X VIII(i)……………………………… Technical data and defense X X X services for gas turbine engine hot sections related to Category VIII(b). See Note 8. VIII(i)……………………………… Manufacturing know-how related X X X to Categories VIII(a), VIII(b), or VIII(e) and their specially designed components. See Note 5. VIII(i)……………………………… Software source code related to ………. X X Categories VIII(a) or VIII(e). See Note 4. IX………………………………….. Training or simulation ………. ………. X equipment for MANPADS. See Note 6. IX(e)……………………………….. Software source code related to ………. X X Categories IX(a) or IX(b). See Note 4. IX(e)……………………………….. Software that is both ………. ………. X specifically designed or modified for military use and specifically designed or modified for modeling or simulating military operational scenarios. X(e)………………………………… Manufacturing know-how related X X X to Categories X(a)(1) or X(a)(2) and their specially designed components. See Note 5. XI(a)……………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to countermeasures and counter-countermeasures See Note 9. XI………………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to naval technology and systems relating to acoustic spectrum control and awareness. See Note 10. XI(b) XI(c) XI(d)…………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to communications security (e.g., COMSEC and TEMPEST). XI(d)……………………………….. Software source code related to ………. X X Category XI(a). See Note 4. XI(d)……………………………….. Manufacturing know-how related X X X to Categories XI(a)(3) or XI(a)(4) and their specially designed components. See Note 5. XII…………………………………. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to countermeasures and counter-countermeasures. See Note 9. XII(c)………………………………. Defense articles and services X ………. ………. specific to XII(c) articles, except any 1st- and 2nd- generation image intensification tubes and 1st- and 2nd-generation image intensification night sighting equipment. End items in XII(c) and related technical data limited to basic operations, maintenance, and training information as authorized under the exemption in Sec. 125.4(b)(5) of this subchapter may be exported directly to a Canadian Government entity. XII(c)………………………………. Technical data or defense X X X services for night vision equipment beyond basic operations, maintenance, and training data. However, the AS and UK Treaty exemptions apply when such export is pursuant to a written solicitation or contract issued or awarded by the U.S. Department of Defense for an end use identified in subsections (e)(1), (2), or (4) of Sec. 126.16 or Sec. 126.17 of this subchapter and is consistent with other exclusions of this supplement. XII(f)………………………………. Manufacturing know-how related X X X to Category XII(d) and their specially designed components. See Note 5. XII(f)………………………………. Software source code related to ………. X X Categories XII(a), XII(b), XII(c), or XII(d). See Note 4. XIII(b)……………………………… Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to Military Information Security Assurance Systems. [[Page 72265]] XIII(c)……………………………… Defense articles and services ………. ………. X specific to armored plate manufactured to comply with a military standard or specification or suitable for military use. See Note 11. XIII(d)……………………………… Carbon/carbon billets and ………. ………. X performs which are reinforced in three or more dimensional planes, specifically designed, developed, modified, configured or adapted for defense articles. XIII(f)……………………………… Structural materials……….. ………. ………. X XIII(g)……………………………… Defense articles and services ………. ………. X related to concealment and deception equipment and materials. XIII(h)……………………………… Energy conversion devices other ………. ………. X than fuel cells. XIII(i)……………………………… Metal embrittling agents……. ………. ………. X XIII(j)……………………………… Defense articles and services ………. X X related to hardware associated with the measurement or modification of system signatures for detection of defense articles as described in Note 2. XIII(k)……………………………… Defense articles and services ………. X X related to tooling and equipment specifically designed or modified for the production of defense articles identified in Category XIII(b). XIII(l)……………………………… Software source code related to ………. X X Category XIII(a). See Note 4. XIV…………………………………. Defense articles and services ………. X X related to toxicological agents, including chemical agents, biological agents, and associated equipment. XIV(a) XIV(b) XIV(d) XIV(e) XIV(f)……… Chemical agents listed in X ………. ………. Category XIV(a), (d) and (e), biological agents and biologically derived substances in Category XIV(b), and equipment listed in Category XIV(f) for dissemination of the chemical agents and biological agents listed in Category XIV(a), (b), (d), and (e). XV(a)……………………………….. Defense articles and services X X X specific to spacecraft/ satellites. However, the Canadian exemption may be used for commercial communications satellites that have no other type of payload. XV(b)……………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to ground control stations for spacecraft telemetry, tracking, and control. XV(c)……………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to GPS/PPS security modules. XV(c)……………………………….. Defense articles controlled in X ………. ………. XV(c) except end items for end use by the Federal Government of Canada exported directly or indirectly through a Canadian- registered person. XV(d)……………………………….. Defense articles and services X X X specific to radiation-hardened microelectronic circuits. XV(e)……………………………….. Anti-jam systems with the X ………. ………. ability to respond to incoming interference by adaptively reducing antenna gain (nulling) in the direction of the interference. XV(e)……………………………….. Antennas having any of the following: (a) Aperture (overall dimension of the radiating portions of the antenna) greater than 30 feet; (b) All sidelobes less than or equal to -35 dB relative to the peak of the main beam; or (c) Designed, modified, or X ………. ………. configured to provide coverage area on the surface of the earth less than 200 nautical miles in diameter, where “coverage area” is defined as that area on the surface of the earth that is illuminated by the main beam width of the antenna (which is the angular distance between half power points of the beam). XV(e)……………………………….. Optical intersatellite data X ………. ………. links (cross links) and optical ground satellite terminals. XV(e)……………………………….. Spaceborne regenerative X ………. ………. baseband processing (direct up and down conversion to and from baseband) equipment. XV(e)……………………………….. Propulsion systems which permit X ………. ………. acceleration of the satellite on-orbit (i.e., after mission orbit injection) at rates greater than 0.1 g. XV(e)……………………………….. Attitude control and X ………. ………. determination systems designed to provide spacecraft pointing determination and control or payload pointing system control better than 0.02 degrees per axis. XV(e)……………………………….. All specifically designed or X ………. ………. modified systems, components, parts, accessories, attachments, and associated equipment for all Category XV(a) items, except when specifically designed or modified for use in commercial communications satellites. XV(e)……………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to spacecraft and ground control station systems (only for telemetry, tracking and control as controlled in XV(b)), subsystems, components, parts, accessories, attachments, and associated equipment. XV(f)……………………………….. Technical data and defense X X X services directly related to the other defense articles excluded from the exemptions for Category XV. XVI…………………………………. Defense articles and services X X X specific to design and testing of nuclear weapons. XVI(c)………………………………. Nuclear radiation measuring X ………. ………. devices manufactured to military specifications. XVI(e)………………………………. Software source code related to ………. X X Category XVI(c). See Note 4. XVII………………………………… Classified articles and defense X X X services not elsewhere enumerated. See Note 1. XVIII……………………………….. Defense articles and services ………. X X specific to directed energy weapon systems. XX………………………………….. Defense articles and services X X X related to submersible vessels, oceanographic, and associated equipment. XXI…………………………………. Miscellaneous defense articles X X X and services. —————————————————————————————————————- [[Page 72266]] Note 1: Classified defense articles and services are not eligible for export under the Canadian exemptions. U.S. origin defense articles and services controlled in Category XVII are not eligible for export under the UK Treaty exemption. U.S. origin classified defense articles and services are not eligible for export under either the UK or AS Treaty exemptions except when being released pursuant to a U.S. Department of Defense written request, directive or contract that provides for the export of the defense article or service. Note 2: The phrase “any part of the spectrum” includes radio frequency (RF), infrared (IR), electro-optical, visual, ultraviolet (UV), acoustic, and magnetic. Defense articles related to reduced observables or counter reduced observables are defined as: a. Signature reduction (radio frequency (RF), infrared (IR), Electro-Optical, visual, ultraviolet (UV), acoustic, magnetic, RF emissions) of defense platforms, including systems, subsystems, components, materials, (including dual-purpose materials used for Electromagnetic Interference (EM) reduction) technologies, and signature prediction, test and measurement equipment and software and material transmissivity/reflectivity prediction codes and optimization software. b. Electronically scanned array radar, high power radars, radar processing algorithms, periscope-mounted radar systems (PATRIOT), LADAR, multistatic and IR focal plane array-based sensors, to include systems, subsystems, components, materials, and technologies. Note 3: Defense Articles related to sensor fusion beyond that required for display or identification correlation is defined as techniques designed to automatically combine information from two or more sensors/sources for the purpose of target identification, tracking, designation, or passing of data in support of surveillance or weapons engagement. Sensor fusion involves sensors such as acoustic, infrared, electro optical, frequency, etc. Display or identification correlation refers to the combination of target detections from multiple sources for assignment of common target track designation. Note 4: Software source code beyond that source code required for basic operation, maintenance, and training for programs, systems, and/or subsystems is not eligible for use of the UK or AS Treaty Exemptions, unless such export is pursuant to a written solicitation or contract issued or awarded by the U.S. Department of Defense for an end use identified in subsections (e)(1), (2), or (4) of Sec. 126.16 or Sec. 126.17 of this subchapter and is consistent with other exclusions of this supplement. Note 5: Manufacturing know-how, as defined in Sec. 125.4(c)(6) of this subchapter, is not eligible for use of the UK or AS Treaty Exemptions, unless such export is pursuant to a written solicitation or contract issued or awarded by the U.S. Department of Defense for an end use identified in subsections (e)(1), (2), or (4) of Sec. 126.16 or Sec. 126.17 of this subchapter and is consistent with other exclusions of this supplement. Note 6: Defense Articles specific to Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) includes missiles which can be used without modification in other applications. It also includes production equipment specifically designed or modified for MANPAD systems, as well as training equipment specifically designed or modified for MANPAD systems. Note 7: Naval nuclear propulsion plants includes all of USML Category VI(e). Naval nuclear propulsion information is technical data that concerns the design, arrangement, development, manufacture, testing, operation, administration, training, maintenance, and repair of the propulsion plants of naval nuclear-powered ships and prototypes, including the associated shipboard and shore-based nuclear support facilities. Examples of defense articles covered by this exclusion include nuclear propulsion plants and nuclear submarine technologies or systems; nuclear powered vessels (see USML Categories VI and XX). Note 8: Examples of gas turbine engine hot section exempted defense article components and technology are combustion chambers/liners; high pressure turbine blades, vanes, disks and related cooled structure; cooled low pressure turbine blades, vanes, disks and related cooled structure; advanced cooled augmenters; and advanced cooled nozzles. Examples of gas turbine engine hot section developmental technologies are Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine Technology (IHPTET), Versatile, Affordable Advanced Turbine Engine (VAATE), Ultra- Efficient Engine Technology (UEET). Note 9: Examples of countermeasures and counter-countermeasures related to defense articles not exportable under the AS or UK Treaty exemptions are: a. IR countermeasures; b. Classified techniques and capabilities; c. Exports for precision radio frequency location that directly or indirectly supports fire control and is used for situation awareness, target identification, target acquisition, and weapons targeting and Radio Direction Finding (RDF) capabilities. Precision RF location is defined as angle of arrival accuracy of less than five degrees (RMS) and RF emitter location of less than ten percent range error; d. Providing the capability to reprogram; and e. Acoustics (including underwater), active and passive countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures Note 10: Examples of defense articles covered by this exclusion include underwater acoustic vector sensors; acoustic reduction; off-board, underwater, active and passive sensing, propeller/propulsor technologies; fixed mobile/floating/powered detection systems which include in-buoy signal processing for target detection and classification; autonomous underwater vehicles capable of long endurance in ocean environments (manned submarines excluded); automated control algorithms embedded in on-board autonomous platforms which enable (a) group behaviors for target detection and classification, (b) adaptation to the environment or tactical situation for enhancing target detection and classification; “intelligent autonomy” algorithms which define the status, group (greater than 2) behaviors, and responses to detection stimuli by autonomous, underwater vehicles; and low frequency, broad-band “acoustic color,” active acoustic “fingerprint” sensing for the purpose of long range, single pass identification of ocean bottom objects, buried or otherwise. (Controlled under Category XI(a), (1) and (2) and in (b), (c), and (d)). Note 11: The defense articles include constructions of metallic or non-metallic materials or combinations thereof specially designed to provide protection for military systems. The phrase “suitable for military use” applies to any articles or materials which have been tested to level IIIA or above IAW NIJ standard 0108.01 or comparable national standard. This exclusion does not include military helmets, body armor, or other protective garments which may be exported IAW the terms of the AS or UK Treaties. —————————————————————————————————————- * An “X” in the chart indicates that the item is excluded from use under the exemption referenced in the top of the column. An item excluded in any one row is excluded regardless of whether other rows may contain a description that would include the item. PART 127–VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES 28. The authority citation for part 127 is revised to read to as follows: Authority: Secs. 2, 38, and 42, Public Law 90-629, 90 Stat. 744 (22 U.S.C. 2752, 2778, 2791); E.O. 11958, 42 FR 4311; 3 CFR, 1977 Comp., p. 79; 22 U.S.C. 401; 22 U.S.C. 2651a; 22 U.S.C. 2779a; 22 U.S.C. 2780; Pub. L. 111-266. 29. Section 127.1 is revised to read as follows: Sec. 127.1 Violations. (a) Without first obtaining the required license or other written [[Page 72267]] approval from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, it is unlawful: (1) To export or attempt to export from the United States any defense article or technical data or to furnish or attempt to furnish any defense service for which a license or written approval is required by this subchapter; (2) To reexport or retransfer or attempt to reexport or retransfer any defense article, technical data, or defense service from one foreign end-user, end-use, or destination to another foreign end-user, end-use, or destination for which a license or written approval is required by this subchapter, including, as specified in Sec. 126.16(h) and Sec. 126.17(h) of this subchapter, any defense article, technical data, or defense service that was exported from the United States without a license pursuant to any exemption under this subchapter; (3) To import or attempt to import any defense article whenever a license is required by this subchapter; (4) To conspire to export, import, reexport, retransfer, furnish or cause to be exported, imported, reexported, retransferred or furnished, any defense article, technical data, or defense service for which a license or written approval is required by this subchapter. (b) It is unlawful: (1) To violate any of the terms or conditions of a license or approval granted pursuant to this subchapter, any exemption contained in this subchapter, or any rule or regulation contained in this subchapter. (2) To engage in the business of brokering activities for which registration and a license or written approval is required by this subchapter without first registering or obtaining the required license or written approval from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. For the purposes of this subchapter, engaging in the business of brokering activities requires only one occasion of engaging in an activity as reflected in Sec. 129.2(b) of this subchapter. (3) To engage in the United States in the business of either manufacturing or exporting defense articles or furnishing defense services without complying with the registration requirements. For the purposes of this subchapter, engaging in the business of manufacturing or exporting defense articles or furnishing defense services requires only one occasion of manufacturing or exporting a defense article or furnishing a defense service. (c) Any person who is granted a license or other approval or who acts pursuant to an exemption under this subchapter is responsible for the acts of employees, agents, and all authorized persons to whom possession of the defense article or technical data has been entrusted regarding the operation, use, possession, transportation, and handling of such defense article or technical data abroad. All persons abroad subject to U.S. jurisdiction who obtain temporary or permanent custody of a defense article exported from the United States or produced under an agreement described in part 124 of this subchapter, and irrespective of the number of intermediate transfers, are bound by the regulations of this subchapter in the same manner and to the same extent as the original owner or transferor. (d) A person with knowledge that another person is then ineligible pursuant to Sec. Sec. 120.1(c) or 126.7 of this subchapter may not, directly or indirectly, in any manner or capacity, without prior disclosure of the facts to, and written authorization from, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls: (1) Apply for, obtain, or use any export control document as defined in Sec. 127.2(b) of this subchapter for such ineligible person; or (2) Order, buy, receive, use, sell, deliver, store, dispose of, forward, transport, finance, or otherwise service or participate in any transaction which may involve any defense article or the furnishing of any defense service for which a license or approval is required by this subchapter or an exemption is available under this subchapter for export, where such ineligible person may obtain any benefit therefrom or have any direct or indirect interest therein. (e) No person may knowingly or willfully cause, or aid, abet, counsel, demand, induce, procure, or permit the commission of, any act prohibited by, or the omission of any act required by, 22 U.S.C. 2778 and 2779, or any regulation, license, approval, or order issued thereunder. 30. Section 127.2 is amended by revising paragraphs (a), (b) introductory text, (b)(1), (b)(2), and adding (b)(14), to read as follows: Sec. 127.2 Misrepresentation and omission of facts. (a) It is unlawful to use or attempt to use any export or temporary import control document containing a false statement or misrepresenting or omitting a material fact for the purpose of exporting, transferring, reexporting, retransferring, obtaining, or furnishing any defense article, technical data, or defense service. Any false statement, misrepresentation, or omission of material fact in an export or temporary import control document will be considered as made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1001, 22 U.S.C. 2778, and 22 U.S.C. 2779. (b) For the purpose of this subchapter, export or temporary import control documents include the following: (1) An application for a permanent export, reexport, retransfer, or a temporary import license and supporting documents. (2) Shipper’s Export Declaration or an Electronic Export Information filing. * * * * * (14) Any other shipping document that has information related to the export of the defense article or defense service. 31. Section 127.3 is revised to read as follows: Sec. 127.3 Penalties for violations. Any person who willfully: (a) Violates any provision of Sec. 38 or Sec. 39 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 and 2779) or any rule or regulation issued under either Sec. 38 or Sec. 39 of the Act, or any undertaking specifically required by part 124 of this subchapter; or (b) In a registration, license application, or report required by Sec. 38 or Sec. 39 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 and 2779) or by any rule or regulation issued under either section, makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, shall upon conviction be subject to a fine or imprisonment, or both, as prescribed by 22 U.S.C. 2778(c). 32. Section 127.4 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) and (c), and adding paragraph (d), to read as follows: Sec. 127.4 Authority of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers. (a) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers may take appropriate action to ensure observance of this subchapter as to the export or the attempted export of any defense article or technical data, including the inspection of loading or unloading of any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft. This applies whether the export is authorized by license or by written approval issued under this subchapter or by exemption. * * * * * (c) Upon the presentation to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer of a license or written approval, or claim of an exemption, authorizing the export [[Page 72268]] of any defense article, the customs officer may require the production of other relevant documents and information relating to the proposed export. This includes an invoice, order, packing list, shipping document, correspondence, instructions, and the documents otherwise required by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection or U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (d) If an exemption under this subchapter is used or claimed to export, transfer, reexport or retransfer, furnish, or obtain a defense article, technical data, or defense service, law enforcement officers may rely upon the authorities noted above, additional authority identified in the language of the exemption, and any other lawful means to investigate such a matter. 33. Section 127.7 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows: Sec. 127.7 Debarment. (a) Debarment. In implementing Sec. 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs may prohibit any person from participating directly or indirectly in the export, reexport and retransfer of defense articles, including technical data, or in the furnishing of defense services for any of the reasons listed below and publish notice of such action in the Federal Register. Any such prohibition is referred to as a debarment for purposes of this subchapter. The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs shall determine the appropriate period of time for debarment, which shall generally be for a period of three years. However, reinstatement is not automatic and in all cases the debarred person must submit a request for reinstatement and be approved for reinstatement before engaging in any export or brokering activities subject to the Arms Export Control Act or this subchapter. * * * * * 34. Section 127.10 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows: Sec. 127.10 Civil penalty. (a) The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs is authorized to impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed that authorized by 22 U.S.C. 2778, 2779a, and 2780 for each violation of 22 U.S.C. 2778, 2779a, and 2780, or any regulation, order, license, or written approval issued thereunder. This civil penalty may be either in addition to, or in lieu of, any other liability or penalty which may be imposed. * * * * * 35. Section 127.12 is amended by adding paragraph (b)(5), and revising paragraph (d), to read as follows: Sec. 127.12 Voluntary disclosures. * * * * * (b) * * * (5) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to negate or lessen the affirmative duty pursuant to Sec. Sec. 126.1(e), 126.16(h)(5), and 126.17(h)(5) of this subchapter upon persons to inform the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls of the actual or proposed sale, export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer of a defense article, technical data, or defense service to any country referred to in Sec. 126.1 of this subchapter, any citizen of such country, or any person acting on its behalf. * * * * * (d) Documentation. The written disclosure should be accompanied by copies of substantiating documents. Where appropriate, the documentation should include, but not be limited to: (1) Licensing documents (e.g., license applications, export licenses, and end-user statements), exemption citation, or other authorization description, if any; (2) Shipping documents (e.g., Shipper’s Export Declarations; Electronic Export Information filing, including the Internal Transaction Number), air waybills, and bills of laden, invoices, and any other associated documents); (3) Any other relevant documents must be retained by the person making the disclosure until the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls requests them or until a final decision on the disclosed information has been made. * * * * * PART 129–REGISTRATION AND LICENSING OF BROKERS 36. The authority citation for part 129 continues to read as follows: Authority: Sec. 38, Pub. L. 104-164, 110 Stat. 1437, (22 U.S.C. 2778). 37. Section 129.6 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2) to read as follows: Sec. 129.6 Requirements for License/Approval. * * * * * (b) * * * (2) Brokering activities that are arranged wholly within and destined exclusively for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, any member country of that Organization, Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, or the Republic of Korea, except in the case of the defense articles or defense services specified in Sec. 129.7(a) of this subchapter, for which prior approval is always required. 38. Section 129.7 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(1)(vii) and (a)(2) to read as follows: Sec. 129.7 Prior Approval (License). (a) * * * (1) * * * (vii) Foreign defense articles or defense services (other than those that are arranged wholly within and destined exclusively for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, any member country of that Organization, Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, or the Republic of Korea (see Sec. Sec. 129.6(b)(2) and 129.7(a)). (2) Brokering activities involving defense articles or defense services covered by, or of a nature described by part 121, of this subchapter, in addition to those specified in Sec. 129.7(a), that are designated as significant military equipment under this subchapter, for or from any country not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, or the Republic of Korea whenever any of the following factors are present: * * * * * Dated: November 7, 2011. Ellen O. Tauscher, Under Secretary, Arms Control and International Security, Department of State. [FR Doc. 2011-29328 Filed 11-21-11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4710-25-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
Live at the Locations – Women Protest Worldwide Photos 7
		
	
	

		









[Image]Members of the Galician pro-indepence group Ceive stage a protest in favor of the transfert of jailed Galician independentist to Galician jails, next to a polling station in the village of Escravitude, some 20 kms from Santiago de Compostela, northwestern Spain, on November 20, 2011. Spaniards voted in rain-swept elections Sunday that were all but certain to hand a thundering victory to the right and topple yet another debt-laden eurozone government. Bowed by a 21,5 percent jobless rate, economic stagnation and deep spending cuts, the first voters of the 36 million-strong Spanish electorate headed to polls ready to punish the ruling Socialists. Getty




[Image]A protester gestures during clashes with Egyptian riot police, not seen, near the interior ministry in downtown Cairo, Egypt, Sunday, Nov. 20, 2011. Firing tear gas and rubber bullets, Egyptian riot police on Sunday clashed for a second day with thousands of rock-throwing protesters demanding that the ruling military quickly announce a date to hand over power to an elected government. (Tara Todras-Whitehill)




[Image]A protester overcome with tear gas inhalation is helped inside a cafe during clashes with the Egyptian riot police, not seen, near the interior ministry in downtown Cairo, Egypt, Sunday, Nov. 20, 2011. Firing tear gas and rubber bullets, Egyptian riot police on Sunday clashed for a second day with thousands of rock-throwing protesters demanding that the ruling military quickly announce a date to hand over power to an elected government. (Tara Todras-Whitehill)




[Image]Wounded protesters are seen in a field hospital during clashes with Egyptian riot police in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Sunday, Nov. 20, 2011. Firing tear gas and rubber bullets, Egyptian riot police on Sunday clashed for a second day with thousands of rock-throwing protesters demanding that the ruling military quickly announce a date to hand over power to an elected government. (Khalil Hamra)




[Image]Occupy Oakland protester Abby Balanda demonstrates during a march through Oakland, Calif., on Saturday, Nov. 19, 2011. Anti-Wall Street protesters in Oakland pushed down a chain-link fence surrounding a city-owned vacant lot where they planned a new encampment on Saturday. (Noah Berger)




[Image]An Occupy Oakland protester, who declined to give her name, pitches a tent to establish a new encampment in Oakland, Calif., on Saturday, Nov. 19, 2011. Police raided the group’s previous camp on Monday. Anti-Wall Street protesters in Oakland pushed down a chain-link fence surrounding a city-owned vacant lot where they planned a new encampment on Saturday. (Noah Berger)




[Image]A police officer arrests a demonstrator affiliated with the Occupy Wall Street movement as they block the entrance to the New York Stock Exchange on Broad Street, Thursday, Nov. 17, 2011 in New York. Two days after the encampment that sparked the global Occupy protest movement was cleared by authorities, demonstrators marched through New York’s financial district and promised a national day of action with mass gatherings in other cities. (Mary Altaffer)




[Image]Police officers arrest a demonstrator affiliated with the Occupy Wall Street movement, Thursday, Nov. 17, 2011 in New York. Two days after the encampment that sparked the global Occupy protest movement was cleared by authorities, demonstrators marched through New York’s financial district and promised a national day of action with mass gatherings in other cities. (Mary Altaffer)[Image]




[Image]Naked Israeli women pose for a photograph in Tel Aviv, November 19, 2011, to show solidarity with Egyptian blogger Aliaa Magda Elmahdy, who put naked pictures of herself on the Internet, support free expression and protest against Islamic extremism. The banner reads: “Love With No Boundaries”. Picture taken November 19, 2011. Reuters




[Image]Tibetan Buddhist nun Palden Choetso sits in a house, in this handout picture taken in 1998 and recently released by the http://www.freetibet. org organisation. The 35-year-old Tibetan Buddhist nun burned herself to death on a public street an hour’s drive away on November 3, 2011, the latest in a string of self-immolations to protest against Chinese religious controls over Tibet. In China, eleven Tibetan monks and nuns — some former clergy — have resorted to the extreme protest since March this year. At least six have been fatal. Reuters




[Image]Activists are blocked by the police during a march against the use of fur on November 19, 2011 in Paris, France. The march, in its third year, is held to protest the use of animal fur in fashion and animal cruelty. Getty




[Image]Pro-Syrian regime protesters shout pro-Syrian President Bashar Assad slogans during a demonstration to show their soldarity with their president, in Damascus, Syria, on Sunday Nov. 20, 2011. Residents in the Syrian capital awoke to two loud explosions Sunday amid reports from activists that the Damascus headquarters of the ruling Baath party had been hit by several rocket-propelled grenades. But eyewitnesses said the party headquarters appeared intact and reported no significant security deployments.




[Image]Women supporters hold placards during a protest organised by Awami National Conference in Srinagar on November 19, 2011. The protesters demanded revocation of Armed Forces Special Powers Act in restive Kashmir. The draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) was introduced in 1990 to give the army and paramilitary forces sweeping powers to detain people, use deadly force and destroy property. Violence is at its lowest in Indian Kashmir since the start of the insurgency that has so far left more than 47,000 people dead by official count but separatists putting the toll twice as high. Getty




[Image]Spain’s ‘indignant’ protesters demostrate in the Puerta del Sol square in Madrid on November 19, 2011 against spending cuts, high unemployment and political corruption, a week before a general election. Spain’s so-called ‘indignant’ protest movement was born when thousands of people set up camp in Madrid’s Puerta del Sol square ahead of May 22 municipal elections. Getty









[Image]A female protester gestures as she argues with Egyptian riot police officers in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Saturday, Nov. 19, 2011. Egyptian riot police beat protesters and dismantled a small tent city set up to commemorate revolutionary martyrs in Cairo’s Tahrir Square on Saturday. (Khalil Hamra)




[Image]Egyptian women wave flags during a rally in Cairo’s Tahrir square, Egypt, Friday, Nov.18, 2011, in a protest against what they say are attempts by the country’s military rulers to reinforce their powers. The rally Friday was dominated by the country’s most organized political group, the Muslim Brotherhood.




[Image]Egyptian Laila Soueif, at left, the mother of prominent blogger Alaa Abdel-Fattah who was jailed by Egypt’s ruling generals, who is on hunger strike to protest her son’s detention, as they celebrate Alaa’s 30th birthday in Cairo’s Tahrir square, Friday, Nov. 18, 2011. At Friday’s rally in Tahrir square, protesters gathered to celebrate the birthday of one of the most prominent revolutionary bloggers to be jailed by the military prosecutor. (Amr Nabil)




[Image]Bahraini demonstrators gesture Friday, Nov. 18, 2011, in A’ali, Bahrain, in front of a replica of the massive protest encampment that was demolished by government forces last spring in the crackdown on a pro-democracy uprising, complete with tents and a model of the landmark pearl monument (unseen). Thousands of Shiite-led protesters calling for greater rights streamed into the area outside the capital of Manama in one of the largest demonstrations in weeks against the Gulf kingdom’s rulers.




[Image]Muslims rally in Foley Square during a protest of ethnic profiling by law enforcement on November 18, 2011 in New York City. Muslims held a rally and Friday prayers and were joined by protesters affiliated with Occupy Wall Street. Getty




[Image]Animal activists, painted in “blood”, lie on a pile of fur during a protest in Belgrade November 18, 2011. The protest was held in conjunction with the “anti-fur” campaign in Europe. Reuters




[Image]Syrians living in Turkey write ‘Freedom’ with their blood during a protest against the government of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad in front of the Syrian consulate in Istanbul, on November 18, 2011. Turkey added its voice Friday to warnings that civil war threatens Syria, while France’s top diplomat called for stepped up sanctions against Damascus, which he said had left it too late to reform. Getty















[Image]Opponents of ousted Thai premier Thaksin Shinawatra hold banners as they shout during a protest in central Bangkok November 18, 2011. Opponents of Thaksin Shinawatra said on Thursday they could take to the streets if the government led by his sister tried to push through an amnesty that would let him return from exile a free man. Reuters




[Image]Muslims listen during a rally in Foley Square to protest against the NYPD surveillance operations of Muslim communities, Friday, Nov. 18, 2011, in New York. Hundreds of Muslims gathered in prayer Friday to oppose a decade of police spying on Muslim communities. The crowd filled about three-fourths of Foley Square in lower Manhattan, not far from City Hall. Demonstrators were scheduled to march on police headquarters (Bebeto Matthews)




[Image]Dorli Rainey, 84, left, who was pepper-sprayed by police last Tuesday while taking part in an “Occupy Seattle” protest, speaks Friday, Nov. 18, 2011, in front of police headquarters in downtown Seattle. Rainey and several dozen others marched to the station Friday and held the rally to call attention to how protesters have been treated. (Ted S. Warren)




[Image]Virila Perez, left, and Francisco Gonzalez, who work as municipal trash collectors, demonstrate against proposed lay-offs by lying on broken glass in Asuncion, Paraguay, Friday Nov. 18, 2011. Asuncion’s municipal government is proposing cuts in employment to reduce the cost of municipal workers to 60% of the city budget. The sign covering them reads in Spanish “Until the final fight, overcome or die.” (Jorge Saenz)




[Image]Annette Jones waits with other demonstrators to be arrested during a protest organized by Occupy Chicago and Stand Up Chicago November 17, 2011 in Chicago, Illinois. The demonstration was one of many protests held nationwide to mark the second month of the Occupy Wall Street protests. Getty




[Image]Occupy Seattle protestors demonstrate at the University Bridge, temporarily shutting it down, after meeting others from Seattle Central Community College during a national day of action, Thursday, Nov. 17, 2011, in Seattle. Traffic was snarled around Seattle’s University District as two rallies marched toward the bridge. (Kevin P. Casey)




[Image]Eugene Police officers carry an Occupy Eugene protester away after arresting her for blocking the entrance to a Chase Bank in Eugene, Ore. Nov. 17, 2011. Occupy Eugene protesters spent an afternoon demonstrating at bank offices, and 17 were arrested. (Chris Pietsch)




[Image]A Occupy Portland protester is arrested by Portland Police officers after protesters take over a Wells Fargo bank Thursday, Nov. 17, 2011, in Portland, Ore. Occupy Wall Street demonstrators held modestly sized, but energetic rallies around the country Thursday to celebrate two months since the movement’s birth and signal that they aren’t ready to quit yet, despite police raids that have destroyed some of their encampments. (Rick Bowmer)




[Image]Occupy Wall Street protesters walk across the Brooklyn Bridge after a rally in Foley Square, Thursday, Nov. 17, 2011 in New York. Organizers with the Service Employees International Union and progressive groups staged similar bridge marches in several cities in an event that was planned weeks ago, but happened to coincide with rallies marking two months since the start of the Occupy movement (Henny Ray Abrams)




[Image]Protesters willing to be arrested, including Donna Cassult, left, of Minneapolis, linked arms and sat on the roadway of the 10th Ave. Bridge in Minneapolis and waited for police to place them in custody Thursday, Nov. 17, 2011. Demonstrators peacefully shut down the 10th Ave. Bridge during rush hour to call attention to the need for more jobs and racial equality in employment.




[Image]Police officers arrest a demonstrators affiliated with the Occupy Wall Street movement, Thursday, Nov. 17, 2011 in New York. Two days after the encampment that sparked the global Occupy protest movement was cleared by authorities, demonstrators marched through New York’s financial district and promised a national day of action with mass gatherings in other cities. (Mary Altaffer)




[Image]20-year-old Egyptian blogger Aliaa Mahdy. Photograph: Aliaa Mahdy

































































































	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET-Fukushima Daiichi NPS Restoration Status
		
	

	

		


DOWNLOAD THE ORGINAL DOCUMENTS HERE


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Original Document: New York Supreme Court Decision to Evict Occupy Wall Street
		
	
	

		
https://i0.wp.com/publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/OWS-TRO_Page_1-798x1024.jpg


This judgment to deny continuance of a temporary restraining order issued earlier in the day maintains that previous eviction orders presented to the Occupy Wall Street protesters in Zuccotti Park are lawful and should be upheld.


NOTE: The New York Supreme Court is the trial-level court of the State of New York and is separate from the New York Court of Appeals, which is the highest appellate court similar in function to other states’ “Supreme Court”.


Downlaod the original document here:


OWS-Eviction

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET-DoJ Hand-Held Aerosol Tear Gas Weapons Assessment
		
	
	

		
This document, NIJ Standard-01 10.00, Hand-Held Aerosol Tear Gas Weapons, is an equipment standard developed by the Law Enforcement Standards Laboratory of the National Bureau of Standards. It is produced as part of the Technology Assessment Program of the National Institute of Justice. A brief description of the program appears on the inside front cover.


This standard is a technical document that specifies performance and other requirements equipment should qeet to satisfy the needs of criminal justice agencies for high quality service. Purchasers can use the test methods described in this standard themselves to determine whether i particular piece ofequipment meets the essential requirements, or they may have the tests conducted on their behalf by a qualified testing laboratory. Procurement officials may also refer to this standard in their purchasing documents and require that equipment offered for purchase meet the requirements. Compliance with the requirements of the standard may be attested to by an independent laboratory or guaranteed by the vendor.


…


This standard establishes minimum performance requirements and methods of test, including safety and handling aspects, for hand -held aerosol tear gas (less -than -lethal) weapons used by law enforcement agencies. These devices are used by law enforcement officers to incapacitate or distract one person or several whose behavior must be modified when the situation is not sufficiently dangerous to require the use of a firearm. The scope of this standard is limited to hand-held tear gas weapons that incorporate ortho-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS) or alpha-chloroacetophenone (CN) as the active agent (lacrimator), sprayed from an aerosol dispenser.


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Women Protest Worldwide Photos 5
		
	
	

		
























[Image]Spanish ‘indignant’ protesters hold a placard reading ‘We do not want fascists’ during a protest in front of a campaign meeting of the far-right party ‘Plataforma per Catalunya’ on November 13, 2011 in Barcelona. Hundreds of Spain’s ‘indignant’ protesters marched through the streets of Madrid Sunday to protest spending cuts, high unemployment and political corruption, a week before a general election. In Barcelona about 30 members of the movement decided at an assembly Saturday to camp out in the Plaza de Catalunya until the general election on November 20. Getty




[Image]Two girls holds a coffin with a doll inside that wearing a mask with the faces of presidential candidates of Popular Party Mariano Rajoy and Socialist Party Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba during a demonstration against the government and banks in Madrid on Sunday, Nov. 13, 2011. Spain goes to the polls for presidential elections on November 20. (Arturo Rodriguez)




[Image]Public workers march during a protest in Lisbon’s main avenue of Liberdade November 12, 2011. Public workers, policemen and military personnel are holding several protests in Lisbon against the job and 2012 state budget cuts. Reuters




[Image]A woman holds up a sign that reads “No is No” as she takes part in the “Marcha de las Putas” (SlutWalk), held to protest against discrimination and violence against women in Lima, November 12, 2011. The march is part of the SlutWalk protest movement which started after a policeman advised women students in Canada to “avoid dressing like sluts”. Reuters




[Image]Pro-Syrian regime protesters, hold up portraits of Syrian President Bashar Assad with Arabic words: ” The lion (Assad) of resistance and the rejectionism” during a demonstration against the Arab League decision to suspend Syria in front the Syrian embassy, in Beirut, Lebanon, on Sunday Nov. 13, 2011. Tens of thousands of pro-regime demonstrators gathered in a Damascus square Sunday to protest the Arab League’s vote to suspend Syria over its bloody crackdown on the country’s eight-month-old uprising.




[Image]Syrian protesters shout anti-Syrian Preident Bashar Assad slogans during a protest in front of the Arab League headquarters in Cairo, Egypt, Saturday, Nov.12, 2011 where the League emergency session on Syria is to discuss the country’s failure to end bloodshed caused by government crackdowns on civil protests. Protesters called the Arab League to suspend the country’s membership. Arabic read ” step out, we need to build civilian modern country” (Amr Nabil)




[Image]Demonstrators with cooking pots and colanders on their heads stand in front of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, Germany, Saturday, Nov.12, 2011. Thousands of people formed a human chain around the Frankfurt bank towers protesting against the power of banks. German police say more than ten thousand people are protesting against the banks’ dominance in two of the country’s major cities.




[Image]A group of protesters prepare their signs before heading out into the ocean to hold an anti-APEC protest at Waikiki Beach in Honolulu on Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011 as the summit is held in Oahu over the weekend. (Marco Garcia)




[Image]Demonstrators hold a ribbon reading “smash banks, redistribute wealth” in front of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, Germany, Saturday, Nov.12, 2011. Thousands of people formed a human chain with the ribbon around the Frankfurt bank towers to protest against the power of banks.Thousands of people formed a human chain around the Frankfurt bank towers protesting against the worldwide power of banks. German police say more than ten thousand people are protesting against the banks’ dominance in two of the country’s major cities.




[Image]Protestors march through downtown Lisbon during a demonstration by military personnel associations against austerity measures Saturday, Nov. 12 2011. The Portuguese government plans to introduce more pay cuts and steep tax hikes next year while the country is struggling to restore its fiscal health despite a euro78 billion ($106 billion) bailout earlier this year. Banner reads ” Amnesty for the military punished for offenses of opinion” refering to military who have been punished for taking part in protests.




[Image]Students march against government plans to reform higher education in Medellin, Colombia, Thursday, Nov. 10, 2011. Thousands of students march in the country’s main cities despite President Juan Manuel Santos’ proposal to withdraw a reform bill on higher education. (Luis Benavides)




[Image]A UCLA student arrested by Los Angeles Police Department officers after she attempted to escape after eleven student protesters sat in circle in middle of the Westwood and Wilshire boulevard intersection as part of a protest of bank practices and rising fees at public universities on November 9, 2011 in Los Angeles, California. The protest organized by ReFund California was one of several planned at universities around the state. Getty




[Image]Students demonstrate against an education reform bill in Bogota, on November 10, 2011. Thousands of students from more than 30 public universities took to the streets in Colombia to protest against proposed education reforms they fear will partially privatize higher education. The students have been on strike over the past month to protest a bill put forward by President Juan Manuel Santos that would require public universities to generate some of their own revenues. On Wednesday Santos offered to withdraw the draft and open a dialogue if the more than half a million students on strike lift their form of pressure. Getty




[Image]A demonstrator holds a banner against the ECB in Naples on November 11, 2011 during a rally called ‘Occupy Napoli’ (Occupy Naples), refering to the Occupy Wall Street movement in New York, to protest against banks and international financial power. Getty




[Image]Hungarian and foreign activists and sympathizers of the ‘True Democracy Now’ group hold banners reading ‘Direct Democracy’ (R) and ‘Be part’, (L) as an elderly woman mouth’s is covered by a fake 1000 euro bill in front the central bank of Budapest on November 11, 2011 during a demonstration for a better and livable world and to protest against the political and economical system. Getty




[Image]A protester holds a sign reading “Neither Tremonti nor Monti” during a protest in front of the Ministry of Finance in Rome November 11, 2011. The package of austerity measures that were demanded by the European Union will now go to the Italian lower house, which is expected to approve it on Saturday. That vote will trigger the resignation of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. The signs refer to Italian Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti and former European Commissioner Mario Monti, who is tipped as the favourite to replace Berlusconi. Reuters




[Image]A Yemeni woman covers her mouth with her hand painted in the colours of the national flag during to a protest against the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh in the capital Sanaa, on November11, 2011. Forces loyal to Yemeni President Abdullah Saleh shelled the country’s second largest city Taez, killing nine people, among them two women and a child, a medic and witnesses said. Getty




[Image]A protester holding a banner camps outside the Banca d’Italia on November 11, 2011 in Venice, Italy. Protest in several Italian cities have been called by the Indignados, students, social centres and other organizations for today 11.11.11 to protest against financial insitutions and cuts proposed by the Government. Getty




[Image]Dalbir Kaur, sister of Indian national Sarabjit Singh on death row in Pakistan, second right, along with supporters of All India Youth Foundation takes an oath for securing his release in front of the India Gate war memorial at 11:11 am, in New Delhi, India, Friday, Nov. 11, 2011. A placard on left reads, “People’s Voice, Sarabjit.” (Gurinder Osan)















[Image]An Indonesian Muslim woman wears a Palestinian flag face mask during a solidarity protest for the Palestinian people in Jakarta, Indonesia, Thursday, Nov. 10, 2011. (Irwin Fedriansyah)




[Image]Demonstrators of a group “Occupy Rio” protest against Rio de Janeiro’s governor Sergio Cabral in downtown Rio de Janeiro November 10, 2011. The demonstration, inspired by the Occupy Wall Street movement, seeks to address the corruption in the police and the problems with the health care system under the governance of Cabral. Cabral had originally organized a demonstration to rally against an oil reform amendment approved by the lower house of Congress. Reuters




[Image]Protesters from the communist-affiliated trade union PAME shout slogans during an anti-government protest in Athens November 10, 2011. Greece named former European Central Bank vice-president Lucas Papademos on Thursday to head a crisis government, ending a chaotic search for a leader to save the country from default, bankruptcy and an exit from the euro zone. Reuters




[Image]A demonstrator marches during a student protest against government plans to reform higher education at the main square in Bogota, Colombia, Thursday, Nov. 10, 2011. Thousands of students marched in the country’s main cities despite a government proposal to withdraw a reform bill on higher education. (William Fernando Martinez)




[Image]People wave flags of Rio de Janeiro state during a protest against an oil reform amendment in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Thursday, Nov. 10, 2011. Thousands of Brazilians are demonstrating against a plan that reduces revenue for oil-producing states and the federal government while increasing oil royalties for non-producing states. (Felipe Dana)




[Image]Christian fundamentalist holds a candle during a demonstration against Italian director Romeo Castellucci’s play “On the Concept of the Face, Regarding the Son of God” in Rennes, western France, Thursday Nov. 10, 2011. Christian fundamentalists gathered outside the cultural palace the Theatre National de Bretagne, (National Theatre of Brittany), to protest against the play which they claim is blasphemous. (David Vincent)




[Image]One of the students with peaceful attitude cleans the shield of a riot policemen that was stained with paint by more violent protesters, during a demonstration against an education reform bill at Bogota’s main square Plaza de Bolivar, on November 10, 2011. Thousands of students from more than 30 public universities took to the streets in Colombia to protest against proposed education reforms they fear will partially privatize higher education. The students have been on strike over the past month to protest a bill put forward by President Juan Manuel Santos that would require public universities to generate some of their own revenues. On Wednesday Santos offered to withdraw the draft and open a dialogue if the more than half a million students on strike lift their form of pressure. Getty




[Image]NOVEMBER 09: UCLA graduate student Cheryl Deutsch is arrested by Los Angeles Police Department officers after she and 10 other student protesters sat in circle in middle of the Westwood and Wilshire boulevard intersection as part of a protest of bank practices and rising fees at public universities on November 9, 2011 in Los Angeles, California. The protest organized by ReFund California was one of several planned at universities around the state. Getty




[Image]A woman shouts out as police officers move into the crowd of demonstrators and push people back during a student anti-cuts protest in London, Wednesday, Nov. 9, 2011. Thousands of students marched through central London on Wednesday to protest cuts to public spending and a big increase in university tuition fees. Police said there were “a number of arrests for public order offenses” Wednesday, but the march was largely peaceful as demonstrators made their way through the city center.




[Image]A protester cries out as students and campaigners march through the streets of London in a protest against higher tuition fees and government cuts, Wednesday, Nov. 9, 2011. (Sang Tan)




[Image]A lone protester stands outside the Scottsdale Plaza Resort to protest Republican Presidential candidate Herman Cain who was addressing the media Tuesday, Nov. 8, 2011, in Scottsdale, Ariz. Cain said Tuesday that he would not drop his bid for the Republicans’ presidential nomination in the face of decade-old allegations of inappropriate sexual behavior. (Charlie Leight)




[Image]Two members of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) who are covered from head to toe in green and blue bodypaint, as they hold a banner reading, “Save the Planet, Go Vegan,” at the Nanjing pedestrian street in Shanghai, China Wednesday, Nov. 9, 2011. (Eugene Hoshiko)




[Image]Protestors from Occupy Philly participate in a ‘die in’ demonstration outside a PNC Bank branch in Philadelphia on Monday Nov. 7, 2011. The demonstration was conducted to draw attention to PNC Bank’s business practices. (Joseph Kaczmarek)




[Image]A Syrian woman, who lives in Cairo, reacts as others wave a giant Syrian revolution flag during an anti-Syrian President Bashar Assad demonstration at Tahrir Square, the focal point of Egyptian uprisings, in Cairo, Egypt, Sunday, Nov. 6, 2011 to support protesters in Syria during the first day of Islamic Eid al-Adha, or Feast of the Sacrifice. (Amr Nabil)




[Image]An activist of the Ukrainian female rights organization “Femen” shows a placard demanding freedom for women, during a protest at the end of Pope Benedict XVI’s Angelus prayer in St. Peter’s Square at the Vatican, Sunday, Nov. 6, 2011. (Pier Paolo Cito)




[Image]Yemeni girls hold a giant Yemeni flag, left, as Syrians hold their revolution flag, right, during a protest against Yemeni and Syrian regimes at Tahrir Square, the focal point of Egyptian uprising, in Cairo, Egypt, Sunday, Nov. 6, 2011 to support protesters in Yemen and Syria during the first day of Islamic Eid al-Adha, or Feast of the Sacrifice. (Amr Nabil)




[Image]Amy Barnes protests as police move in to clear a downtown street during an Occupy Atlanta demonstration late Saturday, Nov. 5, 2011 in Atlanta. (David Goldman)




[Image]In this Nov. 27, 2010 file photo, Susanna Camusso, leader of Italy’s largest labor confederation CGIL, arrives to deliver her speech during a demonstration to protest government policies regarding the economical crisis, in Rome. In an interview with The Associated Press Monday Nov. 7, 2011, Camusso is predicting 2012 will be a “terrifying” year for the economy even if beleaguered Premier Silvio Berlusconi leaves power soon.

































































































	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 12 November 2011
		
	
	

		
















[Image]An official from the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), wearing a protective suit and mask, uses a plastic covered megaphone to speak to fellow TEPCO workers and journalists as they drive towards the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station in Okuma, Japan, Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011. Conditions at Japan’s wrecked Fukushima nuclear power plant, devastated by a tsunami in March, were slowly improving to the point where a “cold shutdown” would be possible as planned, officials said on Saturday during a tour of the facility. The nuclear reactor buildings were still surrounded by crumpled trucks, twisted metal fences, and large, dented water tanks. Smaller office buildings around the reactors were left as they were abandoned on March 11, when the tsunami hit.




[Image]Japanese police man a checkpoint near the edge of the contaminated exclusion zone around the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station near Okuma, Fukushima prefecture, Japan Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011. (David Guttenfelder, Pool)




[Image]A deserted street inside the contaminated exclusion zone around the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant is seen from bus windows in Fukushima prefecture, November 12, 2011.




[Image]A deserted field and buildings inside the contaminated exclusion zone around the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station are seen through a bus window near Okuma, Japan Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011. (David Guttenfelder, Pool)




[Image]An official from the Tokyo Electric Power Co., right, and an unidentified man, both wearing protective suits and masks ride on a bus as they pass by the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station, seen through the window, in Okuma, Japan, Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011. (David Guttenfelder, Pool)




[Image]Officials from the Tokyo Electric Power Co. and Japanese journalists look at the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station from bus windows in Okuma, Japan Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011. Media allowed into Japan’s tsunami-damaged nuclear power plant for the first time Saturday saw a striking scene of devastation: twisted and overturned vehicles, crumbling reactor buildings and piles of rubble virtually untouched since the wave struck more than eight months ago. (David Guttenfelder, Pool)




[Image]A view of Tokyo Electric Power Co’s tsunami-crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Fukushima prefecture November 12, 2011. (David Guttenfelder, Pool)




[Image]The crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant’s No.4, No.3, No.2 and No.1 (R-L) reactor buildings are seen from bus windows in Fukushima prefecture November 12, 2011. Reuters




[Image]The crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant is seen from bus windows in Fukushima prefecture, November 12, 2011. Reuters




[Image]The Unit 4 reactor building of the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station is seen through a bus window in Okuma, Japan Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011. Media allowed into Japan’s tsunami-damaged nuclear power plant for the first time Saturday saw a striking scene of devastation: twisted and overturned vehicles, crumbling reactor buildings and piles of rubble virtually untouched since the wave struck more than eight months ago. (David Guttenfelder, Pool)




[Image]The Unit 4 reactor building of the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station is seen through a bus window in Okuma, Japan Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011. (David Guttenfelder, Pool)




[Image]Broken vehicles are abandoned outside Unit 4 turbine building at the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station as they are observed from inside a bus in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011.




[Image]The crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant’s upper part of the No.3 reactor building is seen from a bus window in Fukushima prefecture, November 12, 2011. Reuters




[Image]The crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station is seen through a bus window in Okuma, Japan Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011. Media allowed into Japan’s tsunami-damaged nuclear power plant for the first time Saturday saw a striking scene of devastation: twisted and overturned vehicles, crumbling reactor buildings and piles of rubble virtually untouched since the wave struck more than eight months ago. (David Guttenfelder, Pool)




[Image]The crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant is seen from bus windows in Fukushima prefecture, November 12, 2011. Reuters




[Image]The crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant is seen from bus windows in Fukushima prefecture, November 12, 2011.  Reuters




[Image]Crushed piping is observed from inside a bus at the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011. Media allowed into Japan’s tsunami-damaged nuclear power plant for the first time Saturday saw a striking scene of devastation: twisted and overturned trucks, crumbling reactor buildings and piles of rubble virtually untouched since the wave struck more than eight months ago. (Ikuro Aiba, Pool)




[Image]Units five and six of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station are seen through a bus window in Futaba, Japan Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011. (David Guttenfelder, Pool)




[Image]Members of the media, wearing protective suits, interview Japan’s Minister of the Environment, Goshi Hosono, and Chief of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, Masao Yoshida, inside the emergency operation center at the crippled nuclear power station in Okuma, Japan Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011. (David Guttenfelder, Pool)




[Image]Tokyo Electric Power Co. employees work inside the emergency operation center at the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station in Okuma, Japan Saturday, Nov. 12, 2011. (David Guttenfelder, Pool)











 


































	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET-Fukushima Daiichi NPS Unit 4 Damage Photos
		
	
	

		




































[Image]






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1 – Rebar deformed upward[Image]




2 – Floor curled up[Image]




3 – Floor pushed up[Image]




4- Wire mesh, inlet of the air-conditioning at Reactor Well was bent to the reverse direction[Image]




5 – Wire mesh, inlet of the air-conditioning at Spent Fuel Pool was bent to the reverse direction[Image]






[Image]






6 – Rubbles from air-conditioning ducts[Image]




7- Rubbles from air-conditioning ducts[Image]




8 – [Photo shown in diagram not provided, instead No. 9 was duplicated.]




9 – Rubbles from air-conditioning ducts[Image]




10 – Rubbles from air-conditioning ducts[Image]




11 – Rubbles from air-conditioning ducts (no air-conditioning ducts above)[Image]




12 – The original place of installation of air-conditioning ducts[Image]






[Image]






13 – Damages to the floor[Image]




14 – Floor pushed down (in front is rubbles from air-conditioning ducts)[Image]




15 – Rubbles from air-conditioning ducts[Image]




16 – Rubbles from air-conditioning ducts[Image]




17 – Rubbles from air-conditioning ducts[Image]











 







































	


	



			
				


			

			
Women Protest Worldwide Photos
		
	
	

		









[Image]In this Saturday, June 25, 2011 file photo, Yemeni women, wearing headbands that read in Arabic, “housewives”, attend a demonstration demanding the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, in Sanaa, Yemen. As demonstrations first swelled in Yemen, the regime distributed a photo of female activist Tawakkul Kamran in a protest test with a male colleague _ cutting out others around them _ to taint her for sinfully sitting alone with a man. Kamran’s Nobel peace prize win win draws attention to the role of women in the Arab Spring uprisings.




[Image]On October 5, 2011, a jury in State Supreme Court in Queens foundthe woman, Barbara Sheehan, not guilty of second-degree murder charges in a case that had been viewed as a strenuous test of a battered-woman defense. Her son and daughter, the children of her slain husband, wept with joy. During the trial, the jury heard how Ms. Sheehan had been relentlessly abused by her husband, Raymond Sheehan, a former police sergeant, during their 24 years of marriage. (Uli Seit)




[Image]Africa’s first democratically elected female president, a Liberian peace activist and a woman who stood up to Yemen’s authoritarian regime won the Nobel Peace Prize on Friday Oct. 7, 2011 for their work to secure women’s rights, which the prize committee described as fundamental to advancing world peace. Seen in this combo from left: Tawakkul Karman of Yemen, Liberian peace activist Leymah Gbowee and Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. (AP Photo)




[Image]In this Tuesday, March 8, 2011 file photo, an Egyptian female protester, second right, argues with a man as hundreds of women marched to Cairo’s central Tahrir Square to celebrate International Women’s Day, Egypt. As demonstrations first swelled in Yemen, the regime distributed a photo of female activist Tawakkul Kamran in a protest test with a male colleague _ cutting out others around them _ to taint her for sinfully sitting alone with a man. Kamran’s Nobel peace win draws attention to the role of women in the Arab Spring uprisings.




[Image]In this Friday, April 1, 2011 file photo, Egyptian women chant slogans as they attend a demonstration in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt. As demonstrations first swelled in Yemen, the regime distributed a photo of female activist Tawakkul Kamran in a protest test with a male colleague _ cutting out others around them _ to taint her for sinfully sitting alone with a man. Kamran’s Nobel peace win draws attention to the role of women in the Arab Spring uprisings.




[Image]Ellen Rios, right, donates a vegan lasagna she made to a protestor at the “Occupy Wall Street” protests in Zuccotti Park, Friday, October 7, 2011, in New York. The three-week-old campout in a lower Manhattan plaza looks like a jumble of tattered sleeping bags, but teams of volunteers working on food, sanitation, health care and other needs keep the shifting population of protesters functioning like an impromptu city within the city. (Andrew Burton)




[Image]A woman helps unpack boxes of donations in the “Shipping and Receiving” section of Zuccotti Park, where “Occupy Wall Street” protests are taking place, in New York, Friday, October 7, 2011. The three-week-old campout in a lower Manhattan plaza looks like a jumble of tattered sleeping bags, but teams of volunteers working on food, sanitation, health care and other needs keep the shifting population of protesters functioning like an impromptu city within the city. (Andrew Burton)




[Image]In this Thursday, Feb. 10, 2011 file photo, Yemeni activist Tawakkul Karman, left, chants slogans along with other demonstrators holding banners during an anti-government protest in Sanaa, Yemen. Banner on right reads in Arabic, “33 years of authoritarian rule.” The 2011 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded Friday, Oct. 7, 2011 to Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Liberian peace activist Leymah Gbowee and Tawakkul Karman of Yemen for their work on women’s rights. (Hani Mohammed)




[Image]Protesters hold carnations in their mouths in Bucharest, Romania, Thursday, Oct. 6, 2011, during the Romanian version of the Slut Walk march. The Slut Walk, a protest against harassment of women initiated by the outfits they wear or their behavior in public, was the first of it’s kind in Romania, a country where it is still quite widely believed that sexual aggression victims bear at least some responsibility for being targeted.(Vadim Ghirda)




[Image]Protesters including Jean Blackwood, left, of Columbia, Mo, and Crystal Elinski, center, of Portland, Ore., hold bundles representing killed children next to a “corporate America” flag, during a march past the White House in Washington, Friday, Oct. 7, 2011, part of Occupy DC activities in Washington. (Jacquelyn Martin)




[Image]Occupy Boston protesters march through the Financial district in Boston, Wednesday, Oct. 5, 2011. The group is part of a nationwide grassroots movement in support of the ongoing Wall Street protests in New York. (Elise Amendola)




[Image]One of several demonstrators is taken into custody by police after refusing to leave a Bank of America branch in downtown Los Angeles, Thursday, Oct. 6, 2011. The arrests Thursday afternoon came at the end of a demonstration that moved among high-rises housing the offices of banks and other financial institutions. (Chris Carlson)




[Image]Theresa Shoatz protests in a cross walk near City Hall Thursday, Oct. 6, 2011, in Philadelphia. Organizers of the Occupy Philadelphia demonstration say Thursday’s protest is a stand against corporate greed. (Matt Rourke)




[Image]A woman holds up a placard with the image of German Chancellor Angela Merkel during a protest outside the German embassy in the Greek capital Athens, on Thursday Oct. 6, 2011. The placard reads, “Europe will become German.” The small group of protesters said Germany must pay Greece reparations for its occupation of the country during WWII before Greece pays off its debts. (Kostas Tsironis)




[Image]Occupy Wall Street protesters march towards Zuccotti Park in New York’s Financial District, Wednesday, Oct. 5, 2011. Protests against Wall Street entered their 18th day Tuesday as demonstrators across the country show their anger over the wobbly economy and what they see as corporate greed by marching on Federal Reserve banks and camping out in parks from Los Angeles to Portland, Maine. (Jason DeCrow)




[Image]Pakistani opposition lawmakers rally outside the parliament to condemn severe power shortages, corruption and lawlessness, Islamabad, Pakistan, Thursday, Oct, 6. 2011. Dozens of opposition parliamentarians boycotted a session of parliament and held a sit-in protest at the gate of Presidential palace condemning severe power shortages, corruption and lawlessness in Pakistan. Placard on left reads “corrupt government, let poor live.”(B.K. Bangash)




[Image]An Occupy Wall Street protester is penned in by barricades and police after trying to march to Wall Street in New York, Wednesday, Oct. 5, 2011. Protesters in suits and T-shirts with union slogans left work early to march with activists who have been camped out in Zuccotti Park for days. Some marchers brought along their children, hoisting them onto their shoulders as they walked down Broadway. (Seth Wenig)




[Image]Riot police detain a protester during minor clashes in Athens, Wednesday, Oct. 5, 2011. Greek civil servants walked off the job on a 24-hour strike Wednesday, paralyzing the public sector in a protest over ever-deeper austerity measures applied as the government struggles to avoid a catastrophic default. At least 16,000 protesters converged in the Greek capital, and a crowd of about 10,000 gathered in the northern city of Thessaloniki. (Thanassis Stavrakis)




[Image]Occupy Wall Street protesters march to join a union rally at Foley Square in New York, Wednesday, Oct. 5, 2011. The protests have gathered momentum and gained participants in recent days as news of mass arrests and a coordinated media campaign by the protestors have given rise to similar demonstrations around the country. (Seth Wenig)




[Image]Jordan McCarthy, 22, from Sandwich, N.H., awakes from under a makeshift shelter where she is camped out among participants in the Occupy Wall Street Protest at Zuccotti Park in lower Manhattan on Wednesday, Oct. 5, 2011 in New York. “We have allowed greed to be more important than humans,” said McCarthy who joined the camp a week ago.




[Image]Foley Square, New York, NY, October 5, 2011. (Cryptome)




[Image]Demonstrator Andrea Vitale cries during a protest to stop the eviction of Matias Gonzalez, a 52-year-old Spanish citizen who can’t pay his mortage, Barcelona Spain, Monday, Oct. 3, 2011. As in many European countries, Spanish mortgages are not like US-style ones in which defaulters can return the keys to the bank and walk away from their debt, albeit with their credit rating in ruins. Here, mortgage holders not only have to give the house back, but also pay off bank debt.




[Image]Occupy Wall Street protestor Alexi Morris is arrested along with at several others in the financial district’s Zucotti park, Monday, Oct. 3, 2011, in New York. The arrests of 700 people on Brooklyn Bridge over the weekend fueled the anger of the protesters camping in a Manhattan park and sparked support elsewhere in the country as the campaign entered its third week. (John Minchillo)




[Image]Occupy Wall Street protestors play drums and sing songs in the financial district’s Zuccotti park Sunday, Oct. 2, 2011, in New York. The protests have gathered momentum and gained participants in recent days as news of mass arrests and a coordinated media campaign by the protestors have given rise to similar demonstrations around the country. (John Minchillo)




[Image]In this citizen journalism image made on a mobile phone and provided by Shaam News Network, anti-Syrian President Bashar Assad protesters flash V-victory signs as a woman in the foreground displays her hands with the Arabic word reading: “leave”, during a demonstration against the Syrian regime, in Edlib province, Syria, on Friday, Sept. 30, 2011. Syrian security forces opened fire on protesters Friday as thousands rallied across the country to call for the downfall of President Bashar Assad.




[Image]Tibetan exiles hold placards at a protest in New Delhi, India, Friday, Sept. 30, 2011. The protest was to express solidarity with two monks who self-immolated on Sept. 26 in Eastern Tibet and against alleged Chinese oppression. (Tsering Topgyal)















[Image]High school students chant slogans during a protest in front of the Greek Parliament in Athens, Thursday, Sept 29 2011. Weeks-long education protests have recently spread to state schools,with a growing number of building occupations around the country. Greece’s troubled Socialist government is facing a growing number of protests against austerity measures, aimed at securing continued bailout loan payment from eurozone countries and the IMF. (Kostas Tsironis)




[Image]Members of French aid group Medecins du Monde carrying a giant cotton bud and placards reading ” Free consultations”, demonstrate for an Universal Health Coverage, outside a meeting of the G20 Labour and Employment Ministers in Paris, Monday, Sept. 26, 2011. (Thibault Camus)




[Image]Activists hold a prayer vigil at Sule pagoda in Yangon, Myanmar, Monday, Sept. 26, 2011. The protesters said they demonstrated to honor persons killed and jailed during pro-democracy protests for years ago led by Buddhist monks. (Khin Maung Win)




[Image]Demonstrators march near the headquarters of Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) during their anti-nuclear power protest, in Tokyo, Saturday, Aug. 6, 2011. TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant was crippled by an earthquake and tsunami March 11, which caused the worst nuclear crisis since Chernobyl. (Shizuo Kambayashi)




[Image]In this June 24, 2011 photo, Pakistani students rally against right-wing student union Jamiat at the Punjab University in Lahore, Pakistan. Two months after the covert U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden, posters emblazoned with images of the burning World Trade Center towers appeared at the prestigious university advertising a literary contest to glorify the slain al-Qaida chief. (K.M. Chaudary)




[Image]Women protest during a rally denouncing corruption, demanding better civil rights and demanding a new constitution, in Casablanca Sunday, April 24, 2011. Banners read, at left, “Freedom, equality and civil rights” and at right “Clause 19 of Constitution must go!” revering to King Mohammed VI’s power. (Abdeljalil Bounhar)




[Image]Women protest holding banners reading “the True Libya” and “Freedom for Libya” during a demonstration against Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi in the centre of Madrid, Spain, Sunday, Feb. 27, 2011. (Andres Kudacki)
































	


	



			
				


			

			
Women Protest Worldwide Photos 2
		
	
	

		



















[Image]Supporters of the Occupy London Stock Exchange protest take part in a mass meditation on the steps of St Paul’s Cathedral in London, Thursday, Oct. 27, 2011. The senior St. Paul’s Cathedral priest who welcomed anti-capitalist demonstrators to camp outside the London landmark resigned Thursday, saying he feared moves to evict the protesters could end in violence.




[Image]Young South Africans who brought their frustration over poverty and joblessness to the streets Thursday, responding to a call by Julius Malema, the tough-talking youth leader of the governing African National Congress, reach the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Thursday Oct. 27, 2011. Malema took the lead in the “economic freedom march” that left downtown Johannesburg by foot to the Stock Exchange, then on foot and by bus about 40 miles (60 kilometers) north to Pretoria, the seat of government.




[Image]Jackie Hayes of Binghamton, N.Y., speaks supporting the Occupy Wall Street movement rally at the state Capitol in Albany, N.Y., Thursday, Oct. 27, 2011. Several speakers criticized Gov. Andrew Cuomo for blocking a bill that would tax New Yorkers making over $1 million a year at a higher rate while cutting aid to schools, colleges and the poor. Cuomo, who was in New York City, had no immediate comment Thursday. (Hans Pennink)




[Image]Security guards detain an activist of the Ukrainian female rights organization “Femen”, during an action of nude protest in front of Kiev Zoo, Ukraine, Thursday, Oct. 27, 2011. Kiev zoo is a place that Femen’s activists compared to a concentration camp for those with fur and feathers. Hundreds of animals died at the zoo in recent years due to malnutrition, lack of medical care and abuse, and some suspect that corruption is at the heart of the problem. Femen calls for the 100-year-old zoo to be closed.




[Image]South Korea protesters stage a rally to protest against a free trade agreement (FTA) between South Korea and the United States near the National Assembly in Seoul, South Korea, Thursday, Oct. 27, 2011. The ruling Grand National Party and the government have set Friday, Oct. 28, as the deadline for ratifying the FTA bill. The letters read: ” Block the FTA between South Korea and the United States.” (Ahn Young-joon)




[Image]Supporters of the Occupy London Stock Exchange movement hold protest placards against bankers betting on food prices in financial markets outside a branch of the Goldman Sachs banking firm on Fleet Street in London, Thursday, Oct. 27, 2011. A police officer, second left, stands guarding the front door and one of the demonstrators, second right, is wearing a mask representing Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne. (Matt Dunham)




[Image]A female Yemeni protestor burns veils during a demonstration demanding the resignation of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Sanaa, Yemen, Wednesday, Oct. 26, 2011. The burning of the veil was not related to women’s rights or issues surrounding the Islamic veils – rather, the act of women burning their clothing is a symbolic Bedouin tribal gesture signifying an appeal for help to tribesmen, in this case to stop the attacks on women protesters. (Hani Mohammed)




[Image]Occupy Wall Street protesters continue to increase their makeshift shelter at Zuccotti Park, Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011 in New York. While some businesses and residents are losing patience with the protesters in Zuccotti Park, organizers say they are receiving and storing heavy duty winter supplies to protest throughout the winter. (Bebeto Matthews)




[Image]Anti-corporate protesters pose for pictures as they stand next to tents of their protest camp outside St Paul’s Cathedral, in central London, Wednesday, Oct. 26, 2011. As authorities around the world swoop in to evict anti-corporate protesters, London’s protest camp has become a tourist attraction _ one that has shut down the landmark St. Paul’s Cathedral.




[Image]University students carry mock coffins that read in Spanish “Here rests a fundamental right,” left, and “Colombian education, 1867-2012,” right, during a protest in Bogota, Colombia, Wednesday Oct. 26, 2011. Students are protesting education reforms planned by the government that propose private funding for public institutions. (Fernando Vergara)




[Image]Occupy Wall Street protesters huddle together after police use tear gas to disperse a large crowd that gathered at 14th Street and Broadway in Oakland, Calif., Tuesday, October 25, 2011. Many demonstrators were arrested. (Darryl Bush)




[Image]A protestor yells as police seal off Woodruff Park to arrest those refusing to leave after Mayor Kasim Reed revoked his executive order allowing the Occupy Atlanta protestors to camp out in Woodruff Park Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011 in Atlanta. (David Goldman)




[Image]North Korean defectors and South Korean civic members hold banners during a rally for North Korean refugees who were repatriated by the Chinese government, in front of the Chinese Embassy in Seoul, South Korea, Wednesday, Oct. 26, 2011. The protesters called for China not to send North Korean refugees back to their country, saying those refugees might get executed. About 30 protesters participated at a rally. (Lee Jin-man)




[Image]Police officers detain an opposition demonstrator during an unsanctioned rally on Triumfalnaya Square in downtown Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011. Several dozens people have been detained at an opposition rally in central Moscow where they were protesting against the lack of alternatives in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. The posters, placed on a fence around a construction site, campaigns against violence to children by the national foundation to support children.




[Image]Swedish protester Rebecka Kullberg applies make-up beside a second protest campsite formed on Saturday by supporters of the Occupy London Stock Exchange group in Finsbury Square, London, Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011. The Occupy protests over economic inequality have spread from a single camp in New York City to cities across the United States, Europe and Asia since mid-September. (Matt Dunham)




[Image]Atlanta Mayor Kasim Reed, far left, faced off with Occupy Atlanta protesters during the mayor’s news conference at City Hall in Atlanta on Monday, Oct. 24, 2011. A protester holds a paper that reads Occupy Wall St. goes global as the mayor leaves. (Curtis Compton)




[Image]An exile Tibetan woman cries out as she scuffles with Indian police outside the United Nations Information Center at a protest seeking U.N. intervention in the Tibet issue in New Delhi, India, Monday, Oct. 24, 2011. The protest was held to express solidarity with the plight of people in Tibet who set themselves on fire in protest against Chinese rule. (Mustafa Quraishi)




[Image]Russian police officers detain a protester as she shouts anti-government slogans during an unsanctioned pro-democracy rally in front of Central Election commission office in downtown Moscow, Russia, Monday, Oct. 24, 2011. (Ivan Sekretarev)




[Image]President of Kashmir’s main opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP) Mehbooba Mufti, center, addresses supporters during a protest in Srinagar, India, Monday, Oct. 24, 2011. Indian police in Srinagar on Monday stopped a protest march led by Mufti against the Jammu Kashmir state government’s alleged mass corruption. (Mukhtar Khan)




[Image]Supporters of Sri Lanka’s Marxist Party, known as Peoples Liberation Front, shout slogans during a protest against the rising cost of living in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Monday, Oct. 24, 2011. (Eranga Jayawardena)




[Image]Paramedics carry a wounded woman to an ambulance at Athens’ main Syntagma Square, during violent demonstrations, Thursday, Oct. 20, 2011. A protester died during an anti-austerity demonstration that turned violent in the Greek capital Thursday, authorities said, hours before lawmakers were to vote on deeply unpopular new cutbacks demanded by creditors to keep Greece afloat. (Lefteris Pitarakis)




[Image]Two police officers hold a woman during clashes in Rome, Saturday, Oct. 15, 2011. Italian police fired tear gas and water cannons as protesters in Rome turned a demonstration against corporate greed into a riot Saturday, smashing shop and bank windows, torching cars and hurling bottles. The protest in the Italian capital was part of Occupy Wall Street demonstrations against capitalism and austerity measures that went global Saturday, leading to dozens of marches and protests worldwide.




[Image]Dr. Angelina Shigeura, 31, left, and Dr. Amit Patel, 29, right, chant during a demonstration by doctors and medical professionals at the Occupy Wall Street protests in Zuccotti Park, Sunday, Oct. 23, 2011, in New York. Doctors from the National Health Program and National Physicians Alliance have merged with the health care demonstrators within the Occupy Wall Street protests to form a group under the banner of “Healthcare for the 99%” and speak out against corporate greed in the medical industry. (John Minchillo)




[Image]Protesters march for a healthier and pollutant free environment during a demonstration called by the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance (SDCEA), a Non-Government Organisation (NGO), in Durban on October 22, 2011. The protest initiated by the SDCEA comes after a fire broke out at the Engen Oil Refinery on October 11 and around one hundred school children have been hospitalised for smoke and toxic fume inhalation. Durban will host the 17 th Conference of Parties (COP) International Climate Change Conference in Durban in December 2011. Getty




[Image]Demonstrators cut a barbed wire fence as they march during a protest against the construction of a high-speed train line, known as TAV, which will link Turin in northern Italy to Lyon in France, near Chiomonte, north of Turin October 23, 2011. Reuters




[Image]Protesters shout as they take part in the ProAlt demonstration at the Old Town Square in Prague on October 22, 2011, to protest against the government planned budget cuts and social reforms. Over one thousand protesters, including Communist Union of Youth, trade unionists, members of organisations for people with disabilities and Czech Roma organisations, demonstrated in Prague. Getty















[Image]‘Occupy Melbourne’ demonstrators protest on October 22, 2011 in Melbourne, Australia. Protesters and riot police clashed in Melbourne again today after police, acting on a Melbourne City Council eviction order, attempted to break up the crowd of hundreds that had been positioned in City Square for a week. Getty




[Image]Demonstrators chant slogans against Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban during an anti-government demonstration in Budapest, Hungary, Sunday, Oct. 23, 2011. Tens of thousands of Hungarians gathered to protest against Orban’s government at the 55th anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. (Bela Szandelszky)




[Image]Hungarian women listen to a speech during a demonstration attended by tens of thousands of people in Budapest on October 23, 2011 to protest against what they call the anti-democratic regime of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, on the anniversary of the 1956 revolution. Hungary’s uprising erupted on October 23, 1956 and was crushed by Soviet tanks on November 4, sealing the country’s fate as a satellite state of Moscow until the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. Getty




[Image]Kurdish protesters opposed to President Bashar Assad, shout slogans as they demonstrate against the Syrian regime, during a sit-in in front of the Syrian embassy, in Beirut, Lebanon, Sunday, Oct. 23, 2011. The banner at left in Arabic reads: “down with the present gang. We want a civil state.” (Bilal Hussein)




[Image]A protester gets arrested during an Occupy Chicago march and protest in Grant Park in Chicago, Sunday, Oct. 23, 2011. Demonstrators of the anti-Wall Street group Occupy Chicago stood their ground in the park and defied police orders to clear the area, prompting police to make more than a dozen arrests early Sunday. (Paul Beaty)




[Image]Protesters are arrested during an Occupy Chicago march and protest at Grant Park in Chicago Sunday, Oct. 23, 2011. Demonstrators of the anti-Wall Street group Occupy Chicago stood their ground in the park and defied police orders to clear the area, prompting police to make more than a dozen arrests early Sunday. (Paul Beaty)




[Image]Occupy Wall Street protestors hold a meeting to discuss the use of funds for cleaning supplies proceeding a proposed cleanup of their camp in Zuccotti Park, Saturday, Oct. 22, 2011, in New York. The protests continue to draw large crowds and fresh participants as similar demonstrations are occuring around the world. (John Minchillo)




[Image]Demonstrators associated with the Occupy Wall Street march past New York City police officers towards a rally against police brutality at Union Square, Saturday, Oct. 22, 2011 in New York. (Mary Altaffer)




[Image]Activists vote during a meeting held amid tents in front of St Paul’s Cathedral in London October 22, 2011. London’s landmark St Paul’s Cathedral closed its doors on Friday because of hazards posed by hundreds of protesters encamped in front of it in a demonstration inspired by the Occupy Wall Street movement. Reuters




[Image]Iranian women gather for a protest in support of the Occupy Wall Street movement outside the Swiss embassy which handles US interests in Tehran on October 22, 2011. Getty




[Image]A protestor looks from her tent during an occupation protest in Finsbury Square in the city of London on October 22, 2011. Saint Paul’s Cathedral remains closed for the first time in modern history because of anti-capitalist demonstrators camping outside the London landmark. More than 200 activists inspired by the Occupy Wall Street movement have taken over the churchyard in front of the cathedral in the city’s financial district since last October 15 to protest against corporate greed and state cutbacks. Getty




[Image]Demonstrators associated with the Occupy Wall Street march through the streets of the East Village neighborhood of Manhattan during a rally against police brutality on Saturday, Oct. 22, 2011. The demonstration marked Saturday’s observance of the “National Day of Protest to Stop Police Brutality, Repression and the Criminalization of a Generation.” AP




[Image]People take a picture of themselves as a souvenir at the location where Occupy Wall Street members are resting at Zuccotti park in New York October 22, 2011. Reuters




[Image]Protestors and members of Occupy Wall Street shout slogans next to NYPD officers, during an annual demonstration calling for a stop to police brutality in New York October 22, 2011. Reuters




[Image]The Council on American Islamic Relations New York Chapter (CAIR-NY) holds Friday prayers with Demonstrators with ‘Occupy Wall Street’ continue their protest at Zuccotti Park in New York on October 21, 2011. The encampment in the financial district of New York City is now in its second month. The demonstrators are protesting bank bailouts, foreclosures and high unemployment. Getty




[Image]A lady meditates on the outer wall of Zuccotti Park at the Occupy Wall Street Encampment in New York October 21, 2011. Reuters




[Image]Demonstrators with ‘Occupy Wall Street’ continue their protest at Zuccotti Park in New York on October 21, 2011. The encampment in the financial district of New York City is now in its second month. The demonstrators are protesting bank bailouts, foreclosures and high unemployment. Getty




[Image]Swiss Copts demonstrate against violence and injustice directed against their community in Egypt at the Place des Nations in front of the European headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, Friday, Oct. 21, 2011. (Martial Trezzini)




[Image]Demonstrators with ‘Occupy Wall Street’ continue their protest at Zuccotti Park in New York on October 21, 2011. The encampment in the financial district of New York City is now in its second month. The demonstrators are protesting bank bailouts, foreclosures and high unemployment. Getty




[Image]A woman sits outside the closed doors of St Paul’s Cathedral in the city of London on October 21, 2011. St Paul’s Cathedral said Friday it was closing its doors to the public for the first time in modern history because of anti-capitalist demonstrators camping outside the London landmark. More than 200 activists inspired by the Occupy Wall Street movement have taken over the churchyard in front of the cathedral in the city’s financial district since last Saturday to protest against corporate greed and state cutbacks. Getty




[Image]Margie Levinthal holds a sign during a march from City Hall to the Wharton School of Business at Pennsylvania University Friday, Oct. 21, 2011 in Philadelphia. The demonstration at City Hall is one of many being held across the country in conjunction with the Occupy Wall Street demonstration in New York. AP




[Image]Protesters display placards during a rally at the financial district of Makati city, east of Manila, Philippines Friday Oct. 21, 2011 in support of the new wave of protests around the globe known as “Occupy Wall Street.” The protesters singled out the country’s three big oil companies as “greedy for profit” as they raised anew this week the pump prices of gasoline and other oil products. (Bullit Marquez)




[Image]Marylou Wagner, left, and her grandchildren, Anthony Evenson, second from left, Phoebe Wagner, and Caitlin Wiesenborn, right, all from Fort Plain, N.Y. , demonstrate while supporting the Occupy Wall Street movement as protesters set up an encampment in Albany, N.Y. , Friday, Oct. 21, 2011. AP















[Image]Demonstrators with ‘Occupy Wall Street’ continue their protest at Zuccotti Park in New York on October 20, 2011. The encampment in the financial district of New York City is now in its second month. The demonstrators are protesting bank bailouts, foreclosures and high unemployment. Getty




[Image]Authorities, from left, front, Chile’s Education Minister Felipe Bulnes, Santiago University Rector Juan Manuel Zolezzi, and Chile’s Senator Ena Anglein von Baer, fourth from left, looks on as protesters carrying a banner that reads in Spanish “Plebiscite now,” stand on a table during a protest at the Chilean Senator headquarters in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Oct. 20, 2011. Students and other protesters interrupted a Senate committee meeting to demand a popular referendum on how to resolve Chile’s social problems, especially education. They left the building after receiving a promise from opposition lawmakers to present a proposal to hold a plebiscite.(Luis Hidalgo)




[Image]A student voluntarily leaves the Senate headquarters seized earlier by dozens of students in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Oct. 20, 2011. Students and other protesters interrupted a Senate committee meeting to demand a popular referendum on how to resolve Chile’s social problems, especially education. They left the building after receiving a promise from opposition lawmakers to present a proposal to hold a plebiscite.(Luis Hidalgo)




[Image]A Tibetan exile has her face covered with a Tibetan flag as she sits after a march to express solidarity with the plight of the people in Tibet, in New Delhi, India, Wednesday, Oct. 19, 2011. Tibetan spiritual leader The Dalai Lama on Wednesday fasted and led prayers in honor of nine Tibetans who set themselves on fire in apparent protest against China’s tight grip over Buddhist practices in Tibet. (Tsering Topgyal)




[Image]Occupy Wall Street participants carry on their occupation of Zuccotti Park near Wall Street in New York, October 18, 2011. Getty




[Image]A woman holds a sign outside of the Occupy Boston encampment as protester walks by with a box on his head in Boston, Massachusetts October 18, 2011. Occupy Boston is an extension of the Occupy Wall Street movement in New York City. Reuters




[Image]A protester takes part in an Occupy Phoenix demonstration in Phoenix, Arizona October 17, 2011. Occupy Phoenix is part of the Occupy Wall Street movement that began in New York last month with a few people and expanded to protest marches and camps across the US and abroad. Reuters




[Image]In an Oct. 9, 2011 photo, Diane McEachern sits with her dogs Mr. Snickers, left, Seabiscuit, and Ruffian, right, on the tundra near Bethel, Alaska. McEachern wanted to participate in the Occupy Wall Street protests so she gathered her dogs, bundled up and went out to the tundra with a homemade sign that read “Occupy the Tundra.” The photo was posted on the Occupy Wall Street Facebook page and has since been shared thousands of times. AP




[Image]Protesting farmers and their supporters raise their clenched fists as they shout slogans during a rally in front of the Supreme Court Tuesday Oct. 18, 2011 in Manila, Philippines. The farmers called on to occupy the Supreme Court similar to the protest dubbed “Occupy Wall Street” to force them to act on their cases on the distribution of lands including Hacienda Luisita which is owned by the family of President Benigno Aquino III. AP




[Image]Students from the United Community daycare center of Brooklyn color in Zuccotti Park where Occupy Wall Street campaign demonstrators have been stationed near Wall Street in New York October 17, 2011. Reuters




[Image]A protestor hops in her sleeping bag as she camps outside St Paul’s Cathedral on October 17, 2011, in London’s financial district, during a third day of demonstrations against corporate greed and state spending cutbacks. The London encampment began on Saturday following a demonstration by about 2,000-3,000 people, as part of Europe-wide anti-capitalist protests inspired by the Occupy Wall Street movement born in New York in September. Getty




[Image]Protesters shout slogans during a demonstration against the government and banks in Puerta del Sol square in solidarity action for the worldwide protest dubbed “Occupy the City” in Madrid on Saturday, Oct. 15, 2011. The organizers of the Occupy Wall Street announced on their website that protesters will demonstrate in concert over 951 cities in 82 countries. (Arturo Rodriguez)




[Image]Protestors march near Toronto’s financial district on Saturday Oct. 15, 2011. The demonstration is one of many being held across the country recently in support of the ongoing Occupy Wall Street demonstration in New York. (Chris Young)




[Image]A protestor blows her whistle during a demonstration in Barcelona Saturday Oct. 15, 2011. Demonstrators in cities all over the world are protesting against corporate power and the banking system. (Emilio Morenatti)




[Image]Occupy Wall Street protestors prepare for a day of demonstrations throughout Manhattan by having their hair cut in Zuccotti Park, Saturday, Oct. 15, 2011, in New York. As many as 1,000 protesters were marching Saturday morning to a Chase bank branch in the financial district, banging drums, blowing horns and carrying signs decrying corporate greed. Other demonstrations are planned around the city all day Saturday. (John Minchillo)










	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET-South Korea Conglomerate ‘SK’ Slush Fund 500m USD
		
	
	

		
This is background of ‘South Korea conglomerate ‘SK’ slush fund 500m USD’ .


Around 2 weeks ago, a blogger exposed ‘South Korea Conglomerate ‘SK’ slush fund 500m USD’ ‘s exhibits to the public in Korea. The blogger opened all the files also.


But this case is against US law also, that’s why I send the exhibits to you.


SK [http://www.sk.com/] is 4th largest conglomerate in Korea and no.1 mobile company also.


The owner of SK is ‘Chey, Tae-Won’, who is son-in-law of Korea’s ex-president ‘Roh, Tae-Woo’.


SK had 500m USD secret money in a tax haven via paper company [BVI, Cayman Island, Hong Kong, etc], and transferred money to the US, and managed the fund using US financial institutions [ING Baring, Bear Stearns, etc].


This is illegal, against US law and against Korea law also.


SK hired a Wall Street financial firm in NY and now that firm is very active also, even though it just changed its name.


This case was revealed via lawsuit under US federal court, SDNY federal court. The case number is 1:05-CV-01142-RJS, which was filed 02/02/2005, and settled 12/08/2009.


All exhibits were acquired from SDNY federal court. [Closed Case record room #370 at SDNY]


The exhibits show everything about ‘SK slush fund’.


__________


SK Slush Fund Exhibits:

	


	



			
				


			

			
Women Protest Worldwide Photos 4
		
	
	

		









[Image]A demonstrator sits holding a sign during a protest against bullfighting in Lima, Peru, Saturday, Nov. 5, 2011. Peru hosts the oldest bullring in the Americas, the Plaza de Acho, inaugurated in 1766 under the ruling of Viceroy Manuel de Amat y Juniet, where every year bullfighters compete for the renown ‘Escapulario de Oro’ or ‘Golden Scapular’, one of the most important bullfighting trophies worldwide. (Karel Navarro)[Image]




[Image]Iranian opposition members hold an old Iranian flag as they protest against the regime in their country, asking the release of jailed dissidents and union members, in Ankara, Turkey, Saturday, Nov. 5, 2011.(Burhan Ozbilici)




[Image]An activist supporting the repeal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) stands in front of banners in support of rights activist Irom Chanu Sharmila during a protest in New Delhi on November 5, 2011. Sharmila has been on a 10-year hunger strike demanding the Indian government to repeal the AFSPA. Getty




[Image]More than 100 police moved on Occupy Sydney protesters at Martin Place October 23, 2011, resulting in the arrest of 40 people. Damian Baker[Image]




[Image]Occupy Wall Street demonstrator Mimi Ho, right, gestures as she carries her daughter Juniper, 1, after she withdrew her savings from a Wells Fargo Bank as part of the protest in downtown Oakland, Calif. , Friday, Nov. 4, 2011. At left is Kimi Lee, who also withdrew her savings. Saturday is Bank Transfer Day for supporters to take their money out of major banks and put their money into smaller banks. AP




[Image]Students stage a protest in front of the government house in Riga November 4, 2011. Thousands of students staged the protest against education budget cuts the Latvian government is planning for 2012, local media reported. Reuters




[Image]Albanian citizens protest in front of the parliament building to stop the passing of a law that will allow the import of waste into the country, in Tirana November 3, 2011. The Albanian government insists that the controversial bill will only allow the import of a limited list of non-toxic waste for recycling purposes, but environmental activists insist that bill would turn Albania into a backyard recycling bin of Europe?s richer countries. A similar attempt to pass a law that would allow import of waste was thwarted in 2004 due to strong public opposition. Reuters




[Image]University students with their necks painted protest at Bolivar square in Bogota, Colombia, Thursday Nov. 3, 2011. Their signs read in Spanish “We have the right to be outraged,” left, and “Excellent education and for all!!” Students are protesting education reforms planned by the government that propose private funding for public institutions. (Fernando Vergara)




[Image]Protesters chant slogans in front of the Greek Parliament during an anti-austerity protest in Athens, Thursday, Nov. 3 2011. Greece’s prime minister abandoned his explosive plan to put a European rescue deal to popular vote and opened emergency talks Thursday with his opponents, demanding their support in parliament to pass the hard-fought agreement into law. (Kostas Tsironis)




[Image]Anti-government protesters pass through their makeshift barricades Thursday, Nov. 3, 2011, during a demonstration in the western village of Malkiya, Bahrain. Men, women and children waved national flags, chanted against the regime and called for prisoners to be freed. Such barricades are used in restive Shiite areas nationwide to slow riot police jeeps who often arrive to disperse the daily demonstrations. (Hasan Jamali)




[Image]Aileen Mioko Smith, center, executive director of pro-sustainable energy NGO group Green Action, and supporters shout anti-nuclear slogans by a yarn ball made by women in Fukushima as they stage a sit-in demonstration, opposing the government’s nuclear energy policy in front of the Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry in Tokyo Thursday, Nov. 3, 2011. (Shuji Kajiyama)




[Image]An exile Tibetan woman tries to immolate herself as others from the community try to stop her, during a protest against China and to honor Tibetans who have immolated themselves since March in a restive Tibetan area of western China, in Katmandu, Nepal, Wednesday, Nov. 2, 2011. Protesters urged G20 leaders to raise the issue of rights violation and crackdown on monasteries in Tibet. (Niranjan Shrestha)




[Image]Occupy Chicago protesters march in downtown Chicago, Wednesday, Nov. 2, 2011. Protesters are gathering in Chicago’s financial district to march in solidarity with other anti-Wall Street protesters nationwide for an Iraq War veteran who was injured in clashes between protesters and police in California. (Nam Y. Huh)




[Image]An Occupy Oakland protester wears makeup in observance of the traditional Mexican holiday “Day of the Dead,” Wednesday, Nov. 2, 2011, in Oakland, Calif. Oakland’s citywide general strike, a hastily planned and ambitious action called by Occupy protesters a day after police forcibly removed their City Hall encampment last week, seeks to shut down the Port of Oakland. (Ben Margot)




[Image]A woman holds her child during a protest in Ciudad Juarez November 1, 2011. Police arrested around 25 protesters as they were trying to put up crosses in a public area in representation of the thousands of victims of the drug war. Reuters




[Image]In this photograph taken by AP Images for AIDS Healthcare Foundation, Protestors from the AIDS Healthcare Foundation deliver a bag full of petitions requesting lower AIDS drug pricing to Johnson &amp; Johnson headquarters in New Brunswick, NJ on Wednesday, Nov. 2, 2011. (Charles Sykes)















[Image]An anti-G20 demonstrator poses on a fake beach during a photobooth session as she takes part in a protest against globalisation in Nice, southeastern France, November 2, 2011. G20 leaders will gather in Cannes for the final summit of France’s presidency on November 3 and 4. Reuters




[Image]A woman involved in the clean-up operation after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster shouts slogans during a protest in front of riot police at Cabinet in Kiev, Ukraine, Wednesday, Nov. 2, 2011. The veterans were demanding the right to keep the social benefits given to them after the clean-up. (Efrem Lukatsky)




[Image]Indian police officers detain Members of the Tibetan Youth Congress during a protest, on the eve of G20 summit in France , outside the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi on November 2, 2011. The protesters flew Tibetan flags,and burned Chinese flags to express their opposition to China’s policies in Tibet, and to call for support for their movement from leaders of the G20. Getty




[Image]Protester Alexis Marvel, of Boston, front, holds an American flag and shouts slogans while joining with members of the Occupy Boston movement, students from area colleges, and union workers as they march through downtown Boston, Wednesday, Nov. 2, 2011. The march was held to protest the nations growing student debt burden. AP




[Image]Demonstrators shout slogans in front of riot police on November 2, 2011 during a protest as the Ukrainian cabinet was meeting in Kiev. Ukrainian veterans of the clean-up from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster are demonstrating against planned benefit cuts. In September, lawmakers gave initial approval to a bill cutting back benefits paid to those who helped clean up the April 1986 nuclear disaster and those who still live on the affected lands. Getty




[Image]Tibetan nationals demonstrate to protest against China’s President Hu Jintao visit to France for Cannes’ G20 meeting, on November 2, 2011 in Paris. Getty




[Image]Young unemployed graduates protest against unemployment and the cost of living, in front of the Moroccan Parliament in Rabat November 2, 2011. Reuters




[Image]Anti-Wall Street protesters demonstrate in front of a closed bank in Oakland, California, November 2, 2011. Hundreds of protesters took to the streets of downtown Oakland at the start of what they called a general strike to protest economic conditions and police brutality in the city. Reuters




[Image]Members of the New York City chapter of Iraq Veterans Against the War and dozens of other uniformed veterans known as ‘Veterans of the 99%’ march from Vietnam Veterans Plaza to Zucotti Park where the Occupy Wall Street movement is centered on November 2, 2011 in New York City. The veterans groups, which feature current and former members of the United States military, marched in support of Occupy Wall Street and to pay homage to Scott Olsen, a former Marine and Iraq War vet who sustained a skull fracture after he was injured by police at an Occupy Oakland protest. Getty




[Image]A demonstrator tries to cross a police line during a protest against the Islamist Ennahda movement in Tunis November 2, 2011. The moderate Islamist party Ennahda, which advocates democracy and pledges not to impose religious bans on the secularist minority here, won 40 percent of the vote in the October 23 election for a constituent assembly. Reuters




[Image]A woman holds a placard on November 1, 2011 during a demonstration in the French city of Nice, two days ahead of the G20 summit to be held in Cannes on November 3 and 4. Thousands of anti-capitalists are to march through the streets of Nice today to protest corporate greed ahead of the G20 summit, echoing protests worldwide. The placard reads : ‘Life not money’. Getty




[Image]In this Thursday, Sept. 8, 2011 file photo, a female protestor, center, flashes the victory sign during a demonstration in Sanaa, Yemen demanding the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Women are fighting to keep a voice for their rights sounding out amid the tumult of Yemen’s landmark revolt. The main goal of the protests by millions around the country, day in and day out since February, is the ouster of President Saleh.










	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET-Taxing Income of Foreign Govs-International Orgs
		
	
	

		
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 213 (Thursday, November 3, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 68119-68124]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-28531]

========================================================================
Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

========================================================================

Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 213 / Thursday, November 3, 2011 /
Proposed Rules

[[Page 68119]]

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service

26 CFR Parts 1 and 602

[REG-146537-06]
RIN 1545-BG08

Income of Foreign Governments and International Organizations

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This document contains proposed Income Tax Regulations that
provide guidance relating to the taxation of the income of foreign
governments from investments in the United States under section 892 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Code). The regulations will affect
foreign governments that derive income from sources within the United
States.

DATES: Written or electronic comments and requests for a public hearing
must be received by February 1, 2012.

ADDRESSES: Send submissions to: CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-146537-06), Room
5205, Internal Revenue Service, PO Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station,
Washington, DC 20044. Submissions may be hand-delivered Monday through
Friday between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-
146537-06), Courier's Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution
Avenue NW., Washington, DC, or sent electronically, via the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov (IRS REG-146537-06).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Concerning the proposed regulations,
David A. Juster, (202) 622-3850 (not a toll-free number); concerning
submission of comments, contact Richard A. Hurst at
Richard.A.Hurst@irscounsel.treas.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Paperwork Reduction Act

    The collections of information contained in this notice of proposed
rulemaking have been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for review and approval under OMB approval number 1545-1053 in
accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)). Comments on the collections of information should be sent to
the Office of Management and Budget, Attn: Desk Officer for the
Department of the Treasury, Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, with copies to the Internal Revenue
Service, Attn: IRS Reports Clearance Officer, SE:CAR:MP:T:T:SP,
Washington, DC 20224. Comments on the collection of information should
be received by January 3, 2012. Comments are specifically requested
concerning:
    Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the
proper performance of the functions of the Internal Revenue Service,
including whether the information will have practical utility;
    The accuracy of the estimated burden associated with the proposed
collection of information;
    How the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be
collected may be enhanced;
    How the burden of complying with the proposed collections of
information may be minimized, including through the application of
automated collection techniques or other forms of information
technology; and
    Estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation,
maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.
    The collection of information in this proposed regulation is in
Sec. Sec.  1.892-5(a)(2)(ii)(B) and 1.892-5(a)(2)(iv). This information
is required to determine if taxpayers qualify for exemption from tax
under section 892. The collection of information is voluntary to obtain
a benefit. The likely respondents are foreign governments.
    Estimated total annual reporting burden: 975 hours.
    Estimated average annual burden hours per respondent: 5 hours.
    Estimated number of respondents: 195.
    Estimated annual frequency of responses: 1.
    An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required
to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a valid
control number assigned by the Office of Management and Budget.
    Books or records relating to a collection of information must be
retained as long as their contents may become material in the
administration of any internal revenue law. Generally, tax returns and
tax return information are confidential, as required by 26 U.S.C. 6103.

Background

    This document contains proposed amendments to 26 CFR part 1 and to
26 CFR part 602. On June 27, 1988, temporary regulations under section
892 (TD 8211, 53 FR 24060) (1988 temporary regulations) with a cross-
reference notice of proposed rulemaking (53 FR 24100) were published in
the Federal Register to provide guidance concerning the taxation of
income of foreign governments and international organizations from
investments in the United States. The proposed regulations contained
herein supplement the cross-referenced notice of proposed rulemaking to
provide additional guidance for determining when a foreign government's
investment income is exempt from U.S. taxation.

Explanation of Provisions

    The Treasury Department and the IRS have recently received numerous
written comments on the 1988 temporary regulations. The proposed
regulations are issued in response to those comments.

Treatment of Controlled Entities

    Section 892 exempts from U.S. income taxation certain qualified
investment income derived by a foreign government. Section 1.892-2T
defines the term foreign government to mean only the integral parts or
controlled entities of a foreign sovereign. The exemption from U.S.
income tax under section 892 does not apply to income (1) Derived from
the conduct of any commercial activity, (2) received by a controlled
commercial entity or received (directly or indirectly) from a
controlled commercial entity, or (3) derived from the disposition of
any interest in a controlled commercial entity. Section 892(a)(2)(B)
defines a controlled commercial entity as an entity owned by the
foreign government that meets certain ownership or control thresholds
and that is engaged in commercial activities anywhere in the

[[Page 68120]]

world. Accordingly, an integral part of a foreign sovereign that
derives income from both qualified investments and from the conduct of
commercial activity is eligible to claim the section 892 exemption with
respect to the income from qualified investments, but not with respect
to the income derived from the conduct of commercial activity. In
contrast, if a controlled entity (as defined in Sec.  1.892-2T(a)(3))
engages in commercial activities anywhere in the world, it is treated
as a controlled commercial entity, and none of its income (including
income from otherwise qualified investments) qualifies for exemption
from tax under section 892. In addition, none of the income derived
from the controlled entity (e.g., dividends), including the portion
attributable to qualified investments of the controlled entity, will be
eligible for the section 892 exemption. Several comments raised
concerns that this so-called ``all or nothing'' rule represents an
unnecessary administrative and operational burden for foreign
governments and a trap for unwary foreign governments that
inadvertently conduct a small level of commercial activity. These
comments have requested that the Treasury Department and the IRS revise
Sec.  1.892-5T(a) to provide for a de minimis exception under which an
entity would not be treated as a controlled commercial entity as a
result of certain inadvertent commercial activity.
    In response to these comments, the proposed regulations at Sec.
1.892-5(a)(2) provide that an entity will not be considered to engage
in commercial activities if it conducts only inadvertent commercial
activity. Commercial activity will be treated as inadvertent commercial
activity only if: (1) The failure to avoid conducting the commercial
activity is reasonable; (2) the commercial activity is promptly cured;
and (3) certain record maintenance requirements are met. However, none
of the income derived from such inadvertent commercial activity will
qualify for exemption from tax under section 892.
    In determining whether an entity's failure to avoid conducting a
particular commercial activity is reasonable, due regard will be given
to the number of commercial activities conducted during the taxable
year, as well as the amount of income earned from, and assets used in,
the conduct of the commercial activity in relationship to the entity's
total income and assets. However, a failure to avoid conducting
commercial activity will not be considered reasonable unless adequate
written policies and operational procedures are in place to monitor the
entity's worldwide activities. The proposed regulations include a safe
harbor at Sec.  1.892-5(a)(2)(ii)(C) under which, provided that there
are adequate written policies and operational procedures in place to
monitor the entity's worldwide activities, the controlled entity's
failure to avoid the conduct of commercial activity during a taxable
year will be considered reasonable if: (1) The value of the assets used
in, or held for use in, the activity does not exceed five percent of
the total value of the assets reflected on the entity's balance sheet
for the taxable year as prepared for financial accounting purposes; and
(2) the income earned by the entity from the commercial activity does
not exceed five percent of the entity's gross income as reflected on
its income statement for the taxable year as prepared for financial
accounting purposes.
    Comments also requested further guidance on the duration of a
determination that an entity is a controlled commercial entity. In
response to these comments, the proposed regulations at Sec.  1.892-
5(a)(3) provide that the determination of whether an entity is a
controlled commercial entity within the meaning of section 892(a)(2)(B)
will be made on an annual basis. Accordingly, an entity will not be
considered a controlled commercial entity for a taxable year solely
because the entity engaged in commercial activities in a prior taxable
year.

Definition of Commercial Activity

    Section 1.892-4T of the 1988 temporary regulations provides rules
for determining whether income is derived from the conduct of a
commercial activity, and specifically identifies certain activities
that are not commercial, including certain investments, trading
activities, cultural events, non-profit activities, and governmental
functions. Several comments have expressed uncertainty about the
applicable U.S. standard for determining when an activity will be
considered a commercial activity, a non-profit activity, or
governmental function for purposes of section 892 and Sec.  1.892-4T.
    Section 1.892-4(d) of the proposed regulations restates the general
rule adopted in the 1988 temporary regulations that, subject to certain
enumerated exceptions, all activities ordinarily conducted for the
current or future production of income or gain are commercial
activities. Section 1.892-4(d) of the proposed regulations further
provides that only the nature of an activity, not the purpose or
motivation for conducting the activity, is determinative of whether the
activity is a commercial activity. This standard also applies for
purposes of determining whether an activity is characterized as a non-
profit activity or governmental function under Sec.  1.892-4T(c)(3) and
(c)(4). In addition, Sec.  1.892-4(d) of the proposed regulations
clarifies the rule in the 1988 temporary regulations by providing that
an activity may be considered a commercial activity even if the
activity does not constitute a trade or business for purposes of
section 162 or does not constitute (or would not constitute if
undertaken in the United States) the conduct of a trade or business in
the United States for purposes of section 864(b).
    Section 1.892-4T(c) lists certain activities that will not be
considered commercial activities. One such activity is investments in
financial instruments, as defined in Sec.  1.892-3T(a)(4), which, if
held in the execution of governmental financial or monetary policy, are
not commercial activities for purposes of section 892. Several comments
have requested that the condition that financial instruments be ``held
in the execution of governmental financial or monetary policy'' be
eliminated to more closely conform the treatment of investments in
financial instruments, including derivatives, with investments in
physical stocks and securities, which under the 1988 temporary
regulations generally are not commercial activities regardless of
whether they are held in the execution of governmental financial or
monetary policy. Section 1.892-4(e)(1)(i) of the proposed regulations
modifies the rules in Sec.  1.892-4T(c)(1)(i) by providing that
investments in financial instruments will not be treated as commercial
activities for purposes of section 892, irrespective of whether such
financial instruments are held in the execution of governmental
financial or monetary policy. In addition, Sec.  1.892-4(e)(1)(ii) of
the proposed regulations expands the existing exception in Sec.  1.892-
4T(c)(1)(ii) from commercial activity for trading of stocks,
securities, and commodities to include financial instruments, without
regard to whether such financial instruments are held in the execution
of governmental financial or monetary policy. These revisions address
only the definition of commercial activity for purposes of determining
whether a government will be considered to derive income from the
conduct of a commercial activity, or whether an entity will be
considered to be engaged in commercial activities. They do not address
whether income from activities

[[Page 68121]]

that are not commercial activities will be exempt from tax under
section 892. Pursuant to Sec.  1.892-3T(a), only income derived from
investments in financial instruments held in the execution of
governmental financial or monetary policy will qualify for exemption
from tax under section 892.
    Comments have requested clarification as to whether an entity that
disposes of a United States real property interest (USRPI) as defined
in section 897(c) will be deemed to be engaged in commercial activities
solely by reason of this disposition. Section 897(a)(1) requires that a
nonresident alien or foreign corporation take into account gain or loss
from the disposition of a USRPI as if the taxpayer were engaged in a
trade or business within the United States during the taxable year and
as if such gain or loss were effectively connected with that trade or
business. The Treasury Department and the IRS believe that an entity
that only holds passive investments and is not otherwise engaged in
commercial activities should not be deemed to be engaged in commercial
activities solely by reason of the operation of section 897(a)(1).
Accordingly, Sec.  1.892-4(e)(1)(iv) of the proposed regulations
provides that a disposition, including a deemed disposition under
section 897(h)(1), of a USRPI, by itself, does not constitute the
conduct of a commercial activity. However, as provided in Sec.  1.892-
3T(a), the income derived from the disposition of the USRPI described
in section 897(c)(1)(A)(i) shall in no event qualify for the exemption
from tax under section 892.
    After the 1988 temporary regulations were published, section
892(a)(2)(A) was amended by the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act
of 1988 (TAMRA), Public Law No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 to provide that
income derived from the disposition of any interest in a controlled
commercial entity does not qualify for the exemption under section 892.
The proposed regulations revised Sec.  1.892-5(a) to reflect the
amendment of section 892 by TAMRA.

Treatment of Partnerships

    Section 1.892-5T(d)(3) provides a general rule that commercial
activities of a partnership are attributable to its general and limited
partners (``partnership attribution rule'') and provides a limited
exception to this rule for partners of publicly traded partnerships
(PTPs). Several comments have requested that the Treasury Department
and the IRS modify the partnership attribution rule to provide that the
activities of a partnership will not be attributed to a foreign
government partner if that government: (i) Holds a minority interest,
as a limited partner, in the partnership; and (ii) has no greater
rights to participate in the management and conduct of the
partnership's business than would a minority shareholder in a
corporation conducting the same activities as the partnership. The
comments assert that the partnership attribution rule causes many
controlled entities of foreign sovereigns to forego making investments
in foreign partnerships or other foreign entities that do not invest in
the United States out of concern that such investments might cause
those controlled entities to be treated as controlled commercial
entities.
    In response to these comments, Sec.  1.892-5(d)(5)(iii) of the
proposed regulations modifies the existing exception to the partnership
attribution rule for PTP interests by providing a more general
exception for limited partnership interests. Under this revised
exception, an entity that is not otherwise engaged in commercial
activities will not be treated as engaged in commercial activities
solely because it holds an interest as a limited partner in a limited
partnership, including a publicly traded partnership that qualifies as
a limited partnership.
    For this purpose, an interest as a limited partner in a limited
partnership is defined as an interest in an entity classified as a
partnership for federal tax purposes if the holder of the interest does
not have rights to participate in the management and conduct of the
partnership's business at any time during the partnership's taxable
year under the law of the jurisdiction in which the partnership is
organized or under the governing agreement. This definition of an
interest as a limited partner in a limited partnership applies solely
for purposes of this exception, and no inference is intended that the
same definition would apply for any other provision of the Code making
or requiring a distinction between a general partner and a limited
partner.
    Although the commercial activity of a limited partnership will not
cause a controlled entity of a foreign sovereign limited partner
meeting the requirements of the exception for limited partnerships to
be engaged in commercial activities, the controlled entity partner's
distributive share of partnership income attributable to such
commercial activity will be considered to be derived from the conduct
of commercial activity, and therefore will not be exempt from taxation
under section 892. Additionally, in the case of a partnership that is a
controlled commercial entity, no part of the foreign government
partner's distributive share of partnership income will qualify for
exemption from tax under section 892.
    Comments also assert that disparity in tax treatment exists under
the temporary regulations regarding foreign government trading activity
described in Sec.  1.892-4T(c)(1)(ii) because trading for a foreign
government's own account does not constitute a commercial activity but
no similar rule applies in the case of trading done by a partnership of
which a foreign government is a partner. The comments note that this
disparity is not generally present in determining whether an activity
is a trade or business within the United States under section 864(b).
See Sec.  1.864-2(c)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(i). In response to these
comments, Sec.  1.892-5(d)(5)(ii) of the proposed regulations provides
that an entity that is not otherwise engaged in commercial activities
will not be considered to be engaged in commercial activities solely
because it is a member of a partnership that effects transactions in
stocks, bonds, other securities, commodities, or financial instruments
for the partnership's own account. However, this exception does not
apply in the case of a partnership that is a dealer in stocks, bonds,
other securities, commodities, or financial instruments. For this
purpose, whether a partnership is a dealer is determined under the
principles of Sec.  1.864-2(c)(2)(iv)(a).

Proposed Effective/Applicability Date

    These regulations are proposed to apply on the date of publication
of the Treasury decision adopting these rules as final regulations in
the Federal Register. For rules applicable to periods prior to the
publication date, see the corresponding provisions in Sec. Sec.  1.892-
4T and 1.892-5T in the 1988 temporary regulations and in Sec.  1.892-
5(a) as issued under TD 9012 (August 1, 2002).

Reliance on Proposed Regulations

    Taxpayers may rely on the proposed regulations until final
regulations are issued.

Special Analyses

    It has been determined that this notice of proposed rulemaking is
not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order
12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It has also
been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act
(5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations and because
the proposed regulations do not impose a collection of information on
small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6)
does not apply.

[[Page 68122]]

Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Code, this notice of proposed
rulemaking has been submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small
business.

Comments and Requests for Public Hearing

    Before the proposed regulations are adopted as final regulations,
consideration will be given to any written (a signed original and eight
(8) copies) or electronic comments, that are submitted timely to the
IRS. The Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on the
clarity of the proposed regulations and how they can be made easier to
understand. All comments will be available for public inspection and
copying. A public hearing will be scheduled if requested in writing by
any person that timely submits written comments. If a public hearing is
scheduled, notice of the date, time, and place for the public hearing
will be published in the Federal Register.

Drafting Information

    The principal author of these regulations is David A. Juster of the
Office of Associate Chief Counsel (International), within the Office of
Chief Counsel, IRS. Other personnel from the Treasury Department and
the IRS participated in developing the regulations.

List of Subjects

26 CFR Part 1

    Income taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

26 CFR Part 602

    Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Proposed Amendments to the Regulations

    Accordingly, 26 CFR parts 1 and 602 are proposed to be amended as
follows:

PART 1--INCOME TAX REGULATIONS

    Paragraph 1. The authority citation for parts 1 and 601 continues
to read in part as follows:

    Authority:  26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *
    Section 1.892-4 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 892(c). * * *

    Par. 2. Section 1.892-4 is added to read as follows:

Sec.  1.892-4  Commercial activities.

    (a) through (c) [Reserved]. For further guidance, see Sec.  1.892-
4T(a) through (c).
    (d) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this
section, all activities (whether conducted within or outside the United
States) which are ordinarily conducted for the current or future
production of income or gain are commercial activities. Only the nature
of the activity, not the purpose or motivation for conducting the
activity, is determinative of whether the activity is commercial in
character. An activity may be considered a commercial activity even if
such activity does not constitute a trade or business for purposes of
section 162 or does not constitute (or would not constitute if
undertaken in the United States) the conduct of a trade or business in
the United States for purposes of section 864(b).
    (e) Activities that are not commercial--(1) Investments--(i) In
general. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (e)(1)(ii) and (iii)
of this section, the following are not commercial activities:
investments in stocks, bonds, and other securities (as defined in Sec.
1.892-3T(a)(3)); loans; investments in financial instruments (as
defined in Sec.  1.892-3T(a)(4)); the holding of net leases on real
property; the holding of real property which is not producing income
(other than on its sale or from an investment in net leases on real
property); and the holding of bank deposits in banks. Transferring
securities under a loan agreement which meets the requirements of
section 1058 is an investment for purposes of this paragraph (e)(1)(i).
An activity will not cease to be an investment solely because of the
volume of transactions of that activity or because of other unrelated
activities.
    (ii) Trading. Effecting transactions in stocks, bonds, other
securities (as defined in Sec.  1.892-3T(a)(3)), commodities, or
financial instruments (as defined in Sec.  1.892-3T(a)(4)) for a
foreign government's own account does not constitute a commercial
activity regardless of whether such activity constitutes a trade or
business for purposes of section 162 or constitutes (or would
constitute if undertaken within the United States) the conduct of a
trade or business in the United States for purposes of section 864(b).
Such transactions are not commercial activities regardless of whether
they are effected by the foreign government through its employees or
through a broker, commission agent, custodian, or other independent
agent and regardless of whether or not any such employee or agent has
discretionary authority to make decisions in effecting the
transactions. Such transactions undertaken as a dealer (as determined
under the principles of Sec.  1.864-2(c)(2)(iv)(a)), however,
constitute commercial activity. For purposes of this paragraph
(e)(1)(ii), the term commodities means commodities of a kind
customarily dealt in on an organized commodity exchange but only if the
transaction is of a kind customarily consummated at such place.
    (iii) Banking, financing, etc. Investments (including loans) made
by a banking, financing, or similar business constitute commercial
activities, even if the income derived from such investments is not
considered to be income effectively connected with the active conduct
of a banking, financing, or similar business in the U.S. by reason of
the application of Sec.  1.864-4(c)(5).
    (iv) Disposition of a U.S. real property interest. A disposition
(including a deemed disposition under section 897(h)(1)) of a U.S. real
property interest (as defined in section 897(c)), by itself, does not
constitute the conduct of a commercial activity. As described in Sec.
1.892-3T(a), however, gain derived from a disposition of a U.S. real
property interest defined in section 897(c)(1)(A)(i) will not qualify
for exemption from tax under section 892.
    (2) through (5) [Reserved]. For further guidance, see Sec.  1.892-
4T(c)(2) through (c)(5).
    (f) Effective/applicability date. This section applies on the date
the regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal
Register. See Sec.  1.892-4T for the rules that apply before the date
the regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal
Register.
    Par. 3. Section 1.892-5 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  1.892-5  Controlled commercial entity.

    (a) In general--(1) General rule and definition of term
``controlled commercial entity''. Under section 892(a)(2)(A)(ii) and
(a)(2)(A)(iii), the exemption generally applicable to a foreign
government (as defined in Sec.  1.892-2T) for income described in Sec.
1.892-3T does not apply to income received by a controlled commercial
entity or received (directly or indirectly) from a controlled
commercial entity, or to income derived from the disposition of any
interest in a controlled commercial entity. For purposes of section 892
and the regulations thereunder, the term entity means and includes a
corporation, a partnership, a trust (including a pension trust
described in Sec.  1.892-2T(c)), and an estate, and the term controlled
commercial entity means any entity (including a controlled entity as
defined in Sec.  1.892-2T(a)(3)) engaged in commercial activities (as
defined in

[[Page 68123]]

Sec. Sec.  1.892-4 and 1.892-4T) (whether conducted within or outside
the United States) if the government--
    (i) Holds (directly or indirectly) any interest in such entity
which (by value or voting power) is 50 percent or more of the total of
such interests in such entity, or
    (ii) Holds (directly or indirectly) any other interest in such
entity which provides the foreign government with effective practical
control of such entity.
    (2) Inadvertent commercial activity--(i) General rule. For purposes
of determining whether an entity is a controlled commercial entity for
purposes of section 892(a)(2)(B) and paragraph (a)(1) of this section,
an entity that conducts only inadvertent commercial activity will not
be considered to be engaged in commercial activities. However, any
income derived from such inadvertent commercial activity will not
qualify for exemption from tax under section 892. Commercial activity
of an entity will be treated as inadvertent commercial activity only
if:
    (A) Failure to avoid conducting the commercial activity is
reasonable as described in paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section;
    (B) The commercial activity is promptly cured as described in
paragraph (a)(2)(iii) of this section; and
    (C) The record maintenance requirements described in paragraph
(a)(2)(iv) of this section are met.
    (ii) Reasonable failure to avoid commercial activity--(A) In
general. Subject to paragraphs (a)(2)(ii)(B) and (C) of this section,
whether an entity's failure to prevent its worldwide activities from
resulting in commercial activity is reasonable will be determined in
light of all the facts and circumstances. Due regard will be given to
the number of commercial activities conducted during the taxable year
and in prior taxable years, as well as the amount of income earned
from, and assets used in, the conduct of the commercial activities in
relationship to the entity's total income and assets, respectively. For
purposes of this paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A) and paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(C) of
this section, where a commercial activity conducted by a partnership is
attributed under paragraph (d)(5)(i) of this section to an entity
owning an interest in the partnership--
    (1) Assets used in the conduct of the commercial activity by the
partnership are treated as assets used in the conduct of commercial
activity by the entity in proportion to the entity's interest in the
partnership; and
    (2) The entity's distributive share of the partnership's income
from the conduct of the commercial activity shall be treated as income
earned by the entity from the conduct of commercial activities.
    (B) Continuing due diligence requirement. A failure to avoid
commercial activity will not be considered reasonable unless there is
continuing due diligence to prevent the entity from engaging in
commercial activities within or outside the United States as evidenced
by having adequate written policies and operational procedures in place
to monitor the entity's worldwide activities. A failure to avoid
commercial activity will not be considered reasonable if the
management-level employees of the entity have not undertaken reasonable
efforts to establish, follow, and enforce such written policies and
operational procedures.
    (C) Safe Harbor. Provided that adequate written policies and
operational procedures are in place to monitor the entity's worldwide
activities as required in paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) of this section, the
entity's failure to avoid commercial activity during the taxable year
will be considered reasonable if:
    (1) The value of the assets used in, or held for use in, all
commercial activity does not exceed five percent of the total value of
the assets reflected on the entity's balance sheet for the taxable year
as prepared for financial accounting purposes, and
    (2) The income earned by the entity from commercial activity does
not exceed five percent of the entity's gross income as reflected on
its income statement for the taxable year as prepared for financial
accounting purposes.
    (iii) Cure requirement. A timely cure shall be considered to have
been made if the entity discontinues the conduct of the commercial
activity within 120 days of discovering the commercial activity. For
example, if an entity that holds an interest as a general partner in a
partnership discovers that the partnership is conducting commercial
activity, the entity will satisfy the cure requirement if, within 120
days of discovering the commercial activity, the entity discontinues
the conduct of the activity by divesting itself of its interest in the
partnership (including by transferring its interest in the partnership
to a related entity), or the partnership discontinues its conduct of
commercial activity.
    (iv) Record maintenance. Adequate records of each discovered
commercial activity and the remedial action taken to cure that activity
must be maintained. The records shall be retained so long as the
contents thereof may become material in the administration of section
892.
    (3) Annual determination of controlled commercial entity status. If
an entity described in paragraph (a)(1)(i) or (ii) of this section
engages in commercial activities at any time during a taxable year, the
entity will be considered a controlled commercial entity for the entire
taxable year. An entity not otherwise engaged in commercial activities
during a taxable year will not be considered a controlled commercial
entity for a taxable year even if the entity engaged in commercial
activities in a prior taxable year.
    (b) through (d)(4) [Reserved]. For further guidance, see Sec.
1.892-5T(b) through (d)(4).
    (5) Partnerships--(i) General rule. Except as provided in paragraph
(d)(5)(ii) or (d)(5)(iii) of this section, the commercial activities of
an entity classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes will be
attributable to its partners for purposes of section 892. For example,
if an entity described in paragraph (a)(1)(i) or (ii) of this section
holds an interest as a general partner in a partnership that is engaged
in commercial activities, the partnership's commercial activities will
be attributed to that entity for purposes of determining if the entity
is a controlled commercial entity within the meaning of section
892(a)(2)(B) and paragraph (a) of this section.
    (ii) Trading activity exception. An entity not otherwise engaged in
commercial activities will not be considered to be engaged in
commercial activities solely because the entity is a member of a
partnership (whether domestic or foreign) that effects transactions in
stocks, bonds, other securities (as defined in Sec.  1.892-3T(a)(3)),
commodities (as defined in Sec.  1.892-4(e)(1)(ii)), or financial
instruments (as defined in Sec.  1.892-3T(a)(4)) for the partnership's
own account or solely because an employee of such partnership, or a
broker, commission agent, custodian, or other agent, pursuant to
discretionary authority granted by such partnership, effects such
transactions for the account of the partnership. This exception shall
not apply to any member in the case of a partnership that is a dealer
in stocks, bonds, other securities, commodities, or financial
instruments, as determined under the principles of Sec.  1.864-
2(c)(2)(iv)(a).
    (iii) Limited partner exception--(A) General rule. An entity that
is not otherwise engaged in commercial activities (including, for
example, performing services for a partnership as

[[Page 68124]]

described in section 707(a) or section 707(c)) will not be deemed to be
engaged in commercial activities solely because it holds an interest as
a limited partner in a limited partnership. Nevertheless, pursuant to
sections 875, 882, and 892(a)(2)(A)(i), a foreign government member's
distributive share of partnership income will not be exempt from
taxation under section 892 to the extent that the partnership derived
such income from the conduct of a commercial activity. For example,
where a controlled entity described in Sec.  1.892-2T(a)(3) that is not
otherwise engaged in commercial activities holds an interest as a
limited partner in a limited partnership that is a dealer in stocks,
bonds, other securities, commodities, or financial instruments in the
United States, although the controlled entity partner will not be
deemed to be engaged in commercial activities solely because of its
interest in the limited partnership, its distributive share of
partnership income derived from the partnership's activity as a dealer
will not be exempt from tax under section 892 because it was derived
from the conduct of a commercial activity.
    (B) Interest as a limited partner in a limited partnership. Solely
for purposes of paragraph (d)(5)(iii) of this section, an interest in
an entity classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes shall be
treated as an interest as a limited partner in a limited partnership if
the holder of such interest does not have rights to participate in the
management and conduct of the partnership's business at any time during
the partnership's taxable year under the law of the jurisdiction in
which the partnership is organized or under the governing agreement.
Rights to participate in the management and conduct of a partnership's
business do not include consent rights in the case of extraordinary
events such as admission or expulsion of a general or limited partner,
amendment of the partnership agreement, dissolution of the partnership,
disposition of all or substantially all of the partnership's property
outside of the ordinary course of the partnership's activities, merger,
or conversion.
    (iv) Illustration. The following example illustrates the
application of this paragraph (d)(5):

    Example 1. K, a controlled entity of a foreign sovereign, has
investments in various stocks and bonds of United States
corporations and in a 20% interest in Opco, a limited liability
company that is classified as a partnership for federal tax
purposes. Under the governing agreement of Opco, K has the authority
to participate in the management and conduct of Opco's business.
Opco has investments in various stocks and bonds of United States
corporations and also owns and manages an office building in New
York. Because K has authority to participate in the management and
conduct of Opco's business, its interest in Opco is not a limited
partner interest. Therefore, K will be deemed to be engaged in
commercial activities because of attribution of Opco's commercial
activity, even if K does not actually make management decisions with
regard to Opco's commercial activity, the operation of the office
building. Accordingly, K is a controlled commercial entity, and all
of its income, including its distributive share of partnership
income from its interest in Opco and its income from the stocks and
bonds it owns directly, will not be exempt from tax under section
892.
    Example 2. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that
Opco has hired a real estate management firm to lease offices and
manage the office building. Notwithstanding the fact that an
independent contractor is performing the activities, Opco will still
be deemed to be engaged in commercial activities. Accordingly, K is
a controlled commercial entity, and all of its income, including its
distributive share of partnership income from its interest in Opco
and its income from the stocks and bonds it owns directly, will not
be exempt from tax under section 892.
    Example 3. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that K
is a member that has no right to participate in the management and
conduct of Opco's business. Assume further that K is not otherwise
engaged in commercial activities. Under paragraph (d)(5)(iii) of
this section, Opco's commercial activities will not be attributed to
K. Accordingly, K will not be a controlled commercial entity, and
its income derived from the stocks and bonds it owns directly and
the portion of its distributive share of partnership income from its
interest in Opco that is derived from stocks and bonds will be
exempt from tax under section 892. The portion of K's distributive
share of partnership income from its interest in Opco that is
derived from the operation of the office building will not be exempt
from tax under section 892 and Sec.  1.892-3T(a)(1).

    (e) Effective/applicability date. This section applies on the date
these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal
Register. See Sec.  1.892-5(a) as issued under TD 9012 (August 1, 2002)
for rules that apply on or after January 14, 2002, and before the date
these regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal
Register. See Sec.  1.892-5T(a) for rules that apply before January 14,
2002, and Sec.  1.892-5T(b) through (d) for rules that apply before the
date these regulations are published as final regulations in the
Federal Register.

PART 602--OMB CONTROL NUMBERS UNDER THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT

    Par. 4. The authority for part 602 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  26 U.S.C. 7805.

    Par. 5. In Sec.  602.101, paragraph (b) is amended by adding an
entry to the table in numerical order to read as follows:

Sec.  602.101  OMB Control numbers.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Current OMB
   CFR part or section where identified and described       Control No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                * * * * *
1.892-5.................................................       1545-1053

                                * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Steven T. Miller,
Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2011-28531 Filed 11-2-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4830-01-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants
		
	
	

		











[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 205 (Monday, October 24, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 65784-65884]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-26889]

[[Page 65783]]

Vol. 76

Monday,

No. 205

October 24, 2011

Part II

Securities and Exchange Commission

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17 CFR Parts 240 and 249

Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based
Swap Participants; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 205 / Monday, October 24, 2011 /
Proposed Rules

[[Page 65784]]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 240 and 249

[Release No. 34-65543; File No. S7-40-11]
RIN 3235-AL05

Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-
Based Swap Participants

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: Section 764(a) of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (``Dodd-Frank Act'') requires the
Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') to issue rules to
provide for the registration of security-based swap dealers (``SBS
Dealers'') and major security-based swap participants (collectively,
``SBS Entities''). Pursuant to this requirement, the Commission is
proposing new Rules 15Fb1-1 through 15Fb6-1 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the ``Exchange Act''), to provide for
the registration of SBS Entities. The Commission is also proposing
forms to facilitate registration (and withdrawal from registration) of
these entities.

DATES: Comments should be received on or before December 19, 2011.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml); or
     Send an e-mail to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include
File Number S7-40-11 on the subject line; or
     Use the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov). Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number S7-40-11. This file number
should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used. To help the
Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please
use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the
Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml). Comments will also be available for Web site viewing
and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street,
NE., Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours
of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. All comments received will be posted without
change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying information
from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to
make available publicly.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David W. Blass, Chief Counsel; Joseph
Furey, Assistant Chief Counsel; or Bonnie Gauch, Special Counsel,
Division of Trading and Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission,
100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549-7010.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents:

I. Introduction
    A. Background
    B. General Approach to the SBS Entity Registration Process
    1. Conditional Registration
    i. Implementation Plan and the Last Compliance Date
    ii. Major Security-Based Swap Participant Applicants Registering
After the Last Compliance Date
    2. Ongoing Registration
    3. Solicitation of Comments on the General Approach to the SBS
Entity Registration Process
II. Proposed Exchange Act Rules and Forms
    A. Registration Application and Amendment
1. Proposed Rule 15Fb2-1
    i. Form of Application
    ii. Senior Officer Certification
    iii. Electronic Filing
    iv. Standards for Granting or Denying Applications
    v. Request for Comment on Additional Registration Considerations
    2. Amendments to Application Forms: Proposed Rule 15Fb2-3
    B. Associated Persons
    1. Certification
    2. Alternative Process
    C. Termination of Registration
    1. Expiration: Proposed Rule 15Fb3-1
    2. Withdrawal: Proposed Rule 15Fb3-2
    3. Cancellation and Revocation: Proposed Rule 15Fb3-3
    D. Special Requirements for Nonresident SBS Entities
    1. United States Agent for Service of Process
    2. Access to Books and Records of Nonresident SBS Entity
    E. Special Situations
    1. Succession: Proposed Rule 15Fb2-5
    2. Insolvency: Proposed Rule 15Fb2-6
    F. Technical Rules
    1. Electronic Signatures
    2. Temporary Rule To Facilitate Paper Filing of Forms
    G. Forms
    1. Form SBSE
    2. Form SBSE-A
    3. Form SBSE-BD
    4. Form SBSE-C
    5. Form SBSE-W
    6. Tagged Data Formats
    H. Alternative Approaches Considered
III. Request for Comment
IV. Paperwork Reduction Act
    A. Summary of Collection of Information
    B. Proposed Use of Information
    C. Respondents
    D. Total Initial and Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burdens
    1. Burden Associated With Filing Application Forms
    2. Burden Associated With Amending Application Forms
    3. Burden Associated With Certification
    4. Burdens Relating to Associated Persons
    5. Burdens on Nonresident SBS Entities
    6. Burden Related to Retention of Manually Signed Signature
Pages
    7. Burden Associated With Filing Withdrawal Form
    8. Burden Associated With Proposed Temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T
    9. Request for Comment on Burden Estimates
    E. Retention Period of Recordkeeping Requirements
    F. Collection of Information Is Mandatory
    G. Confidentiality
    H. Request for Comment
V. Economic Analysis
    A. Benefits
    B. Costs
    1. Costs Attributable to Filing the Forms
    2. Costs of Certification
    3. Costs Relating to Associated Persons
    4. Costs to Nonresident SBS Entities
    5. Cost of Retaining Manually Signed Signature Pages
    6. Costs Associated With Proposed Temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T
    C. Request for Comment
VI. Consideration of Impact on the Economy
VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
VIII. Statutory Basis and Text of Proposed Rules

I. Introduction

A. Background

    On July 21, 2010, the President signed the Dodd-Frank Act into
law.\1\ The Dodd-Frank Act was designed to promote, among other things,
the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system.\2\ Among other
measures, the Dodd-Frank Act provides the Commission and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (``CFTC'') with authority to regulate
certain aspects of the over-the-counter (``OTC'') derivatives market,
where the recent financial crisis demonstrated a need for enhanced
regulation. The Dodd-Frank Act is intended to provide the Commission

[[Page 65785]]

and the CFTC with effective new regulatory tools to oversee that
market, which has grown exponentially in recent years and is capable of
affecting significant sectors of the U.S. economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
    \2\ See id., at Preamble.
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    Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act broadly categorizes covered
products as ``swaps,'' \3\ regulated primarily by the CFTC, ``security-
based swaps,'' \4\ regulated primarily by the Commission, or ``mixed
swaps,'' jointly regulated by the Commission and the CFTC.\5\ Among
other things, the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits any person from acting as a
``security-based swap dealer'' \6\ or ``major security-based swap
participant'' \7\ without being registered with the Commission, and
requires that the Commission issue rules to provide for registration of
these SBS Entities.\8\
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    \3\ Defined in Section 1a of the Commodity Exchange Act
(``CEA'').
    \4\ Defined in Section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act. All
references to the Exchange Act contained in this release refer to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as modified by the Dodd-Frank
Act.
    \5\ In addition, Section 712(d)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act directs
the Commission and the CFTC, in consultation with the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to propose rules and
interpretative guidance to further define, among other things, the
terms ``security-based swap,'' ``swap dealer,'' ``security-based
swap dealer,'' ``major swap participant,'' and ``major security-
based swap participant.'' The Commission and CFTC jointly proposed
further rules and guidance with respect to the dealer and
participant definitions on December 7, 2010. Further Definition of
``Swap Dealer,'' ``Security-Based Swap Dealer,'' ``Major Swap
Participant,'' ``Major Security-Based Swap Participant'' and
``Eligible Contract Participant,'' Exchange Act Release No. 63452
(Dec. 7, 2010), 75 FR 80174 (Dec. 10, 2010) (the ``Intermediary
Definitions Release''). The Commission and CFTC jointly proposed
further rules and guidance with respect to the definitions of
``swap'', ``security-based swap'', and other terms on April 29,
2011. Further Definition of ``Swap, '' ``Security-Based Swap, '' and
``Security-Based Swap Agreement''; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap
Agreement Recordkeeping, Exchange Act Release No. 64372 (Apr. 29,
2011), 76 FR 29818 (May 23, 2011)).
    \6\ Subject to certain exceptions, Exchange Act Section
3(a)(71)(A) defines ``security-based swap dealer'' to mean any
person who: (i) Holds themself out as a dealer in security-based
swaps; (ii) makes a market in security-based swaps; (iii) regularly
enters into security-based swaps with counterparties as an ordinary
course of business for its own account; or (iv) engages in any
activity causing it to be commonly known in the trade as a dealer or
market maker in security-based swaps. See also supra note 5.
    \7\ Exchange Act Section 3(a)(67)(A) defines ``major security-
based swap participant'' to mean ``any person: (i) who is not a
security-based swap dealer; and (ii)(I) who maintains a substantial
position in security-based swaps for any of the major security-based
swap categories, as such categories are determined by the
Commission, excluding both positions held for hedging or mitigating
commercial risk and positions maintained by any employee benefit
plan (or any contract held by such a plan) as defined in paragraphs
(3) and (32) of Section 3 of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002) for the primary purpose of hedging or
mitigating any risk directly associated with the operation of the
plan; (II) whose outstanding security-based swaps create substantial
counterparty exposure that could have serious adverse effects on the
financial stability of the United States banking system or financial
markets; or (III) that is a financial entity that (aa) is highly
leveraged relative to the amount of capital such entity holds and
that is not subject to capital requirements established by an
appropriate Federal banking regulator; and (bb) maintains a
substantial position in outstanding security-based swaps in any
major security-based swap category, as such categories are
determined by the Commission.'' See also supra note 5.
    \8\ The Commission has concluded that SBS Entities that were not
registered with the Commission as of the July 16, 2011, effective
date of Section 15F of the Exchange Act are permitted to lawfully
continue their business absent Commission action with respect to the
SBS Entity registration regime. See Temporary Exemptions and Other
Temporary Relief, Together With Information on Compliance Dates for
New Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Applicable to
Security-Based Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 64678 (Jun. 15,
2011), 76 FR 36287, 36299-300 (Jun. 22, 2011) (the ``Effective Date
Release'').
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    The Commission is proposing Rules 15Fb1-1 to 15Fb6-1 under the
Exchange Act to establish procedures for an SBS Entity to register with
the Commission and additional provisions related to such registration,
including: (1) A requirement to amend an inaccurate application for
registration; (2) procedures for succession to, or withdrawal from,
registration; and (3) procedures for the Commission to cancel or revoke
registration.\9\ The proposed rules would also establish a requirement
for an SBS Entity to certify that none of its associated persons that
effect, or are involved in effecting, security-based swaps on the SBS
Entity's behalf is subject to statutory disqualification. The
Commission is proposing forms to facilitate SBS Entities' registration
and withdrawal from registration.
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    \9\ The Exchange Act gives the Commission broad authority to
craft a registration regime for SBS Entities that helps the
Commission accomplish its missions of protecting investors,
maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitating
capital formation. For example, Section 15F(b)(2) of the Exchange
Act states that an application for registration ``shall be made in
such form and manner as prescribed by the Commission, and shall
contain such information as the Commission considers necessary
concerning the business in which the applicant is or will be
engaged.'' In addition, Section 15F(d)(1) of the Exchange Act
directs the Commission to ``adopt rules for persons that are
registered as [SBS Entities] under [Section 15F].''
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    The proposed rules and forms would address additional registration
requirements applicable to nonresident SBS Entities, including
requirements to appoint a U.S. agent for service of process, and to
provide an opinion of counsel regarding the entity's ability to (1)
Provide the Commission with prompt access to books and records, and (2)
be subject to onsite examinations and inspections by the Commission.
    In proposing these rules and forms, the Commission is mindful that
there are similarities and differences among SBS Entities that hold
substantial positions in security-based swaps and dealers and
participants that hold substantial positions in other financial
products. The Commission also understands that there are similarities
and differences between the security-based swap market and the markets
for other financial products. The Commission believes that, both over
time and as a result of Commission proposals to implement the Dodd-
Frank Act, further information concerning the application of existing
registration and regulatory regimes to SBS Entities and the development
of the security-based swap market may alter certain considerations
relating to the registration of SBS Entities. During the process of
implementing the Dodd-Frank Act and beyond, the Commission intends to
closely monitor developments relating to SBS Entities and the security-
based swap markets. In particular, the Commission intends to evaluate
further information concerning the range of market participants that
may register as SBS Entities, the activities of and services provided
by such market participants, whether these activities and services are
identical or similar to activities and services already regulated by
the federal securities laws or other laws, and how applicable existing
registration and regulatory regimes interact with one another and apply
to SBS Entities.

B. General Approach to the SBS Entity Registration Process

    The Commission's proposed registration requirements for SBS
Entities largely are modeled after the registration regime applicable
to broker-dealers,\10\ while also taking into account the CFTC's
registration requirements for intermediaries.\11\ We preliminarily
believe that because the proposed requirements would closely align with
current requirements for our other registrants, and would be similar to
the registration regime for CFTC registrants, this approach would
provide the Commission and the staff with key information about
registrants while leveraging Commission staff experience and standing
procedures to facilitate a

[[Page 65786]]

substantive review of applications for registration and inspections of
registrants. In addition, the broker-dealer registration regime should
be familiar to, and understood by, many SBS Entities. In particular,
SBS Dealers may already be registered and regulated as broker-dealers
or may be affiliated with a broker-dealer. Moreover, if an SBS Dealer
enters into security-based swap transactions with persons that are not
eligible contract participants, it must register as a broker-dealer
unless an exemption or exception applies.\12\ The proposed approach
would seek to ensure that a market participant registered as both an
SBS Entity and a broker-dealer is subject to a similar and
complementary registration regime. It could therefore both ease the
regulatory burden on such entities and help to establish a consistent
regime for regulating SBS Dealers and dealers of other securities.
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    \10\ This includes rules promulgated under Sections 15(b) and
17(a) of the Exchange Act.
    \11\ 17 CFR 3.1 et seq. Futures commission merchants (``FCMs'')
and introducing brokers presently register with the CFTC by filing
Form 7-R with the National Futures Association. The CFTC has
proposed to register swap dealers and major swap participants
through this same process. See 75 FR 71379, at 71382 (Nov. 23,
2010).
    \12\ See 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(5) and 78o(a).
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    As explained below, our proposed approach to the application
process would build on our existing broker-dealer registration forms--
most notably, Form BD--but also is designed to avoid unnecessary
duplication by permitting SBS Entities that are otherwise registered or
registering as intermediaries with either the Commission or the CFTC to
complete simplified application forms. Under this process, SBS Entities
registered or registering with the Commission as broker-dealers or with
the CFTC as swap dealers or major swap participants would submit a
shorter SBS Entity registration form along with a copy of their
existing registration form.
    An SBS Entity would be permitted to file an application for
registration as soon as final registration rules and forms are adopted.
Further, each SBS Entity would need to be registered (at least
conditionally) by the compliance date set forth in the final
registration rules. In certain circumstances, SBS Entities would be
required to apply for conditional registration, which they could
convert to ongoing registration by fulfilling the applicable
requirements set forth in the proposed rules. As discussed in more
detail below, those requirements would differ depending on whether: (1)
The application was filed with the Commission before or after the
compliance dates for certain new rules to be adopted pursuant to
Section 15F of the Exchange Act; and (2) the applicant is an SBS Dealer
or instead is a major security-based swap participant. Conditional
registration would expire after a specified time, and a conditionally
registered SBS Entity would be required to cease its security-based
swap business if it had not satisfied the applicable conditions to
convert its registration to an ongoing registration. The Commission
could, however, extend any conditional registration for good cause.
    Although the Commission may be familiar with SBS Entities that are
already registered with the Commission (e.g., broker-dealers or
investment advisers), the Commission is mindful that SBS Entities will
nonetheless constitute a new class of registrants that may present
business models and practices with which the Commission will need to
gain experience. Accordingly, the Commission expects that its careful
review of each application for registration and each certification on
Form SBSE-C (the ``Senior Officer Certification'' described further
below) will not only facilitate the Commission's decision to grant or
deny registration to an SBS Entity, but also help to develop this
experience and aid in the identification of areas for further inquiry,
including, as may be appropriate, examinations of particular firms or
business units by the Commission's Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations (``OCIE''), in order to establish an effective ongoing
examination program for such entities.\13\
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    \13\ In addition to SBS Entities, the Dodd-Frank Act requires
the Commission to register for the first time security-based swap
execution facilities, security-based swap data repositories,
municipal advisors, and certain private fund advisers. In light of
these new categories of registrants, the Commission is presently
reviewing the various standards and processes it uses to facilitate
registration of the many types of entities required to register with
it--including broker-dealers, investment advisers, nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations, transfer agents,
clearing agencies, exchanges, national securities associations, and
others. In this regard, the Commission plans to issue a concept
release designed to collect information and evaluate different
aspects of these registration standards and processes. In
particular, the Commission intends to consider the policy objectives
of registration, how best to achieve those policy objectives through
registration and other means, and the relative benefits and costs of
the various means available. Through such a concept release, the
Commission would hope to gain insight into how evolving market
practices, technology, and other considerations could affect or be
affected by the Commission's approach to the registration processes
for various types of entities. Recognizing that the Commission has
finite resources to allocate to registration, examination, and
enforcement functions, the Commission intends to use the concept
release to seek comment as to how it can most effectively and
efficiently utilize these registration and other functions to help
ensure that entities registered by the Commission to perform
important financial intermediary and other functions in the
securities markets have the capability to carry out those functions
and to fully comply with all applicable regulatory requirements.
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    OCIE currently uses risk-based methodologies to focus Commission
examination resources on firms and activities that could pose the
greatest risk to investors and the integrity of the markets. Consistent
with that general approach, OCIE and the Division of Trading and
Markets intend jointly to perform a substantive review of applications
and Senior Officer Certifications received for registration of SBS
Entities to determine whether additional Commission action is
appropriate and to evaluate potential registrants' risk for purposes of
prioritizing examinations.
1. Conditional Registration
    Under the proposed rules, an SBS Entity seeking Commission
registration generally would be required to apply for conditional
registration by submitting a complete application to the Commission.
The Commission would then grant conditional registration if it finds
that the SBS Entity's application is complete, except that the
Commission may institute proceedings to determine whether the
Commission should deny conditional registration if the applicant is
subject to a statutory disqualification or the Commission is aware of
inaccurate statements in the application.\14\ The Commission would
notify the entity electronically when conditional registration is
granted, and would make information regarding registration status
publicly available.
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    \14\ Such proceedings would include notice of the grounds for
denial under consideration and opportunity for hearing, and that at
the conclusion of such proceedings, the Commission would grant or
deny such registration. See proposed Rule 15Fb2-1(d)(1).
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    For an SBS Entity to convert its conditional registration to
ongoing registration, it would be required to submit a Senior Officer
Certification signed by one of its knowledgeable senior officers. The
contents of the Senior Officer Certification and the time frame within
which it must be submitted to the Commission are described more fully
below and specified in the rule. Generally, however, the Senior Officer
Certification would state that, after due inquiry, the senior officer
has reasonably determined that the SBS Entity has the operational,
financial, and compliance capabilities to act as an SBS Dealer or a
major security-based swap participant, as applicable, and has
documented the process by which he or she reached such determination.
We preliminarily believe that this certification requirement would help
to protect both investors and markets from potential problems arising
from SBS Entities that may lack the capabilities necessary to operate
their businesses in compliance with their regulatory obligations.

[[Page 65787]]

i. Implementation Plan and the Last Compliance Date
    After proposing all of the key rules under Title VII, the
Commission intends to seek public comment on a detailed implementation
plan that will permit a roll-out of the new securities-based swap
requirements in a logical, progressive, and efficient manner, while
minimizing unnecessary disruption and costs to the markets. Among other
things, the implementation plan would inform the timing of the
requirement for SBS Entities to register with the Commission, including
whether such registration requirement would exist prior to the latest
date, designated by the Commission, by which SBS Dealers and major
security-based swap participants must begin complying with all of the
initial rules promulgated under Section 15F of the Exchange Act (``Last
Compliance Date'').\15\
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    \15\ The term ``Last Compliance Date'' is defined in proposed
Rule 15Fb2-1(e). The Commission anticipates that the Last Compliance
Date would be clearly stated in the relevant adopting release and
prominently announced on the Commission's Web site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes it is possible that SBS Entities may be
required to register before the Last Compliance Date.\16\ For these
``transitional'' applicants, whether SBS Dealer or major security-based
swap participant, there would be a period of time before the Last
Compliance Date when the Senior Officer Certification would be either
unduly burdensome for registrants (e.g., a rule has been promulgated by
the Commission under Section 15F of the Exchange Act, but compliance
with that rule is not yet required) or inappropriate for meeting the
goals of the certification (e.g., the Commission has not yet adopted a
significant rule under Section 15F of the Exchange Act, so the
certification would not cover compliance in an important regulatory
area).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ The Commission notes that, regardless of the timing of the
Last Compliance Date, a registered SBS Entity would be required to
comply with certain self-operative provisions in Exchange Act
Section 15F upon registration (conditional or otherwise), absent
further Commission action. See Effective Date Release, supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To address this potential transition issue, we preliminarily
believe it is appropriate to propose a conditional registration process
that would permit registration without a Senior Officer Certification
prior to the Last Compliance Date. This process would be available to
all applicants (whether SBS Dealer or major security-based swap
participant) and would, among other things, facilitate the
identification of existing SBS Entities in advance of the compliance
date of certain substantive requirements. Conditional registration
would be effective once the Commission grants such conditional
registration and would expire on the Last Compliance Date (unless
conditional registration was extended pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c)
of proposed Rule 15Fb3-1). Ongoing registration of these conditionally
registered SBS Entities would be conditioned on, among other things,
the registrant providing the Senior Officer Certification to the
Commission on or before the Last Compliance Date. As described above,
fulfillment of this requirement by an SBS Entity would provide the
Commission with some assurance that the SBS Entity understands and has
the ability to undertake its business in compliance with the applicable
requirements. Once a registrant submits its Senior Officer
Certification, the Commission would consider converting its conditional
registration to an ongoing registration.\17\ However, whether or not a
conditional registrant provides the Senior Officer Certification on or
before the Last Compliance Date, the Commission would retain the
flexibility to extend conditional registration for good cause.
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    \17\ Submission of a Senior Officer Certification also would
toll expiration of the SBS Entity's conditional registration for
thirty days, if necessary to facilitate the Commission's review, or
such longer period as the Commission finds for good cause (see
proposed Rule 15Fb3-1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Once the Last Compliance Date has occurred, the conditional
registration process for SBS Dealers would effectively collapse into
the ongoing registration process and any SBS Dealer would need to
submit its Senior Officer Certification with its application (i.e.,
after the Last Compliance Date, SBS Dealers could only apply for
ongoing registration). Major securities-based swap participants could
still conditionally register (as described below) because of challenges
separate and apart from implementation of Section 15F of the Exchange
Act.
ii. Major Security-Based Swap Participant Applicants Registering After
the Last Compliance Date
    As noted in the proposed definition of major security-based swap
participant,\18\ an entity whose security-based swap portfolio crosses
established thresholds in a fiscal quarter would have a two-month grace
period following the end of that quarter to submit a complete
application for registration as a major security-based swap
participant. The Commission preliminarily believes that, while there is
likely to be some advance notice of an impending status change due to
ongoing monitoring of portfolios in the ordinary course of business, an
entity that would likely fall within the definition of a ``major
security-based swap participant'' because of activities in a given
fiscal quarter may not have adequate compliance systems in place within
two months after the end of the triggering quarter to allow the entity
to provide the Commission with a Senior Officer Certification.
Therefore, the Commission proposes to conditionally register such new
participants based on their filing of a complete application before the
expiration of the two-month grace period, subject to a requirement that
they provide a Senior Officer Certification to the Commission within
four months of the submission of their complete application (i.e.,
within six months after the end of the triggering quarter). This
proposal is intended to balance the additional time a new major
security-based swap participant may require to build out its compliance
structure with the Commission's strong interest in having new
registrants promptly comply with applicable federal securities laws.
Such conditional registration would be effective once the Commission
grants conditional registration and would expire four months after
receipt of that application unless the firm files a Senior Officer
Certification with the Commission within that time frame.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ See Intermediary Definitions Release, supra note 5, at 103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As with conditional registrations granted prior to the Last
Compliance Date, once a major security-based swap participant that
applies for registration after the Last Compliance Date submits its
Senior Officer Certification, the Commission could consider converting
its conditional registration to an ongoing registration, as described
below. In addition, whether or not a conditionally registered major
security-based swap participant provides the Senior Officer
Certification within four months after submitting its application, the
Commission retains the flexibility to extend the conditional
registration for good cause.
    The Commission notes that the conditional registration mechanism
for major security-based swap participants would remain in place even
after the Last Compliance Date (i.e., major security-based swap
participants could always avail themselves of a conditional
registration period).
2. Ongoing Registration
    The proposed rules would provide for the ongoing registration of
all conditionally registered SBS Entities following their fulfillment
of the applicable requirements, as well as SBS

[[Page 65788]]

Dealers registering with the Commission after the Last Compliance Date
(and, therefore would not be required to conditionally register). As
described above, an SBS Entity would need to submit both a completed
application and a Senior Officer Certification to obtain ongoing
registration. An SBS Entity that was conditionally registered would not
be required to submit a new application. At the time it applies for
ongoing registration, however, the SBS Entity would be required to
amend its application to correct any information that has become
inaccurate for any reason.
    The Commission would grant ongoing registration if it finds that
the requirements of Section 15F(b) of the Exchange Act are satisfied,
but the Commission would institute proceedings to determine whether the
Commission should deny ongoing registration if the Commission does not
make such a finding, if it finds that the applicant is subject to a
statutory disqualification, or if it is aware of inaccurate statements
in the application or certification.\19\ The Commission would notify
the entity electronically when ongoing registration is granted, and
would make information regarding registration status publicly
available. Pursuant to proposed Rule 15Fb3-1(a), ongoing registration
would be effective until any cancellation, revocation or withdrawal of
the registration or on any other event the Commission determines should
trigger expiration.
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    \19\ Such proceedings would include notice of the grounds for
denial under consideration and opportunity for hearing, and that at
the conclusion of such proceedings, the Commission would grant or
deny such registration. See proposed Rule 15Fb2-1(d)(2).
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3. Solicitation of Comments on the General Approach to the SBS Entity
Registration Process
    We request comment on this approach to the SBS Entity registration
process.
    Q-1. Should the Commission model the registration regime applicable
to SBS Entities more closely after one or more other registration
regimes regulated by the Commission (e.g., securities exchanges or
associations,\20\ clearing agencies,\21\ or investment advisers \22\),
self regulatory organizations (``SROs''),\23\ or other regulators? \24\
If so, please describe which model should be followed and why.
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    \20\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(1) and 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(b)(1)-(2).
    \21\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(A).
    \22\ 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(c).
    \23\ See, e.g., National Association of Securities Dealers Rules
1013 and 1014; Chicago Board Options Exchange Rules 3.5(c)(ii),
8.83(b), and 44.12(b); and NYSE Arca Rule 7.22(a).
    \24\ See, e.g., National Futures Association Registration Rules
(which can be found at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/NFAManualTOC.aspx?Section=8).
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    Q-2. Does the conditional process for SBS Entity registration
outlined above provide a practicable solution to the potential timing
issues raised by the implementation of Section 15F of the Exchange Act?
Are there additional or alternative conditions or mechanisms that would
be appropriate for addressing those issues?
    Q-3. Does the conditional process for major security-based swap
participant registration outlined above provide a practicable solution
to the potential timing issues raised by the look-back features in the
proposed definition of ``major security-based swap participant''
definition? Are there additional or alternative conditions or
mechanisms that would be appropriate for addressing those issues?
    Q-4. Should the Commission delay all registrations until the Last
Compliance Date instead of adopting a conditional registration process?
Why or why not?
    Q-5. Should the Commission consider granting conditional
registration automatically based on the receipt of a completed
application or some other or additional documents? If so, why?
    Q-6. Should the Commission notify the SBS Entity that it has
granted conditional or ongoing registration prior to making the SBS
Entity's registration status publicly available? If so, why and what
should be the timing difference?
    Q-7. Should the Commission provide additional guidance regarding
the process for institution of proceedings? For instance, should the
Commission include timeframes within which proceedings would be
instituted and/or a decision to grant or deny registration based on
those proceedings should be provided (e.g., Exchange Act Section
15(b)(1))? If so, what timeframes or other guidance would be
appropriate and why?
    Q-8. Is it appropriate to seek to minimize duplication by
permitting registered intermediaries to follow a registration process
that uses simplified forms? Why or why not?
    Q-9. Should these intermediaries be required to file their existing
registration forms with the Commission as part of this process, or
should they be required to authorize the Commission to obtain access to
those forms at the relevant repository (e.g., the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (``FINRA'') or the National Futures Association
(``NFA''))?
    Q-10. Should SBS Entities be afforded more time (beyond the Last
Compliance Date) to prepare and provide their Senior Officer
Certification? Why or why not? If so, how much additional time would be
appropriate?
    Q-11. Should major security-based swap participants that file
applications after the Last Compliance Date be afforded more or less
than four months to prepare and provide their Senior Officer
Certification? Why or why not?
    Q-12. What would be the advantages and disadvantages and costs and
benefits of the Commission adopting an approach to SBS Entity
registration that encompasses a more substantive inquiry concerning the
business of an applicant? What would be the impact on market
participants, including investors?
    Q-13. Are there additional or alternative mechanisms that the
Commission could employ to better protect markets and market
participants and minimize the burden on registrants while meeting the
regulatory objectives of a registration scheme for SBS Entities?

Commenters are encouraged to identify other possible solutions that
would allow the Commission to promptly review and consider SBS Entity
registration applications so they would not experience undue
interruptions in business while also providing the Commission
reasonable assurance that they have the ability to carry out their
business and are able to comply with applicable federal securities
laws.

II. Proposed Exchange Act Rules and Forms

A. Registration Application and Amendment

1. Proposed Rule 15Fb2-1
    Proposed Rule 15Fb2-1 would set forth the method through which SBS
Entities could apply for registration with the Commission. Essentially,
the forms and process for filing applications and other documents
electronically with the Commission would be identical for SBS Dealers
and major security-based swap participants. This proposed rule also
would describe the timing of such filings and the standard of review
applied by the Commission in determining whether to grant or deny
registration, which may differ slightly for SBS Dealers and major
security-based swap participants, depending on the type of registration
the firm is seeking. While it may be appropriate for certain rules
applicable to SBS Dealers to differ from those applicable to major
security-based swap participants, the Commission preliminarily believes
that

[[Page 65789]]

the registration rules and forms need not differ significantly because
the information the Commission would need to determine whether
registration is appropriate is similar for both types of entities.
i. Form of Application
    Paragraph (a) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-1 would provide that an SBS
Entity would apply for registration electronically on Form SBSE, Form
SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as appropriate, in accordance with the
instructions to the form. In general:
     SBS Entities registered or registering with the Commission
as broker-dealers would apply for registration using Form SBSE-BD;
     SBS Entities registered or registering with the CFTC as
swap dealers or major swap participants (and not also registered or
registering with the Commission as broker-dealers) would apply for
registration using Form SBSE-A; and
     SBS Entities that do not fit either of the above
categories would apply for registration using Form SBSE.

Specifics regarding each of these forms and their differences and uses
are discussed in more detail below. These forms would be used to
register with the Commission regardless of whether an SBS Entity was
applying for conditional or ongoing registration.
    The Commission solicits comment on the use of forms to register
with the Commission.
    Q-14. Would an alternative mechanism be more appropriate for
registering SBS Entities? If so, which one and why?
    Q-15. Should the registration forms differ based on whether the
entity is registering as an SBS Dealer or major security-based swap
participant? If so, how?
ii. Senior Officer Certification
    Paragraph (b) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-1 would require that each SBS
Entity provide the Commission with a certification on Form SBSE-C to
facilitate the Commission's review of each firm's application for
ongoing registration. A knowledgeable senior officer of the SBS Entity
would be required to sign the certification,\25\ which is designed to
provide the Commission with the applicant's assurance that the
applicant has the capabilities necessary to operate as an SBS Entity
and, therefore, that the applicant should qualify for registration
under Exchange Act Section 15F(b). Accordingly, the certification would
assist the Commission in determining whether to grant the SBS Entity
ongoing registration. Such an informed determination, based in part on
the certification, will help the Commission maintain orderly and
efficient markets and protect investors by helping to ensure that the
Commission only grants registration to SBS Entities that can attest
that they possess the operational, financial, and compliance
capabilities to conduct business as an SBS Entity. Specifically, under
the proposal, each SBS Entity must have a senior officer certify that,
after due inquiry, he or she has reasonably determined that the SBS
Entity has the operational,\26\ financial,\27\ and compliance \28\
capabilities to act as an SBS Entity. In addition, the proposal would
require that the senior officer certify that he or she has documented
the process by which he or she reached that determination. While the
Commission has required regulated entities to provide a certification
in other contexts,\29\ a requirement that an applicant or regulated
entity certify as to its ability to engage in the business it would be
registered to do is relatively new.\30\
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    \25\ In accordance with Proposed Rule 15Fb1-1(b), the SBS Entity
will need to maintain a manually signed copy of this certification
as part of its books and records until at least three years after
the certification was filed with the Commission.
    \26\ The concept of ``operational capability'' can be an
important regulatory consideration because an SBS Entity with
insufficient infrastructure, technology, and human resources
presents operational risks that may adversely impact its
counterparties and the broader market--e.g., if transactions are
inaccurately documented, not documented at all, or if insufficient
margin is collected. See Trade Acknowledgment and Verification of
Security-Based Swap Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 63727
(Jan. 14, 2011), 76 FR 3859, at 3860 (Jan. 21, 2011) (proposing
release) (discussing the recognition by various parties of the
importance of operational infrastructure in the over-the-counter
derivatives market) (the ``Trade Acknowledgement Proposing
Release''). The Commission expects that a key foundation for the
Senior Officer Certification would be the capability of an SBS
Entity to comply with the obligations that would be imposed by the
Trade Acknowledgment Proposing Release, if adopted, other legal
obligations applicable to the operations of an SBS Entity, and the
capability of the SBS Entity to conduct its business as represented
in the SBS Entity's application for ongoing registration.
    \27\ The concept of ``financial capability'' can be an important
regulatory consideration because of, among other things, the role
adequate financing plays in protecting an SBS Entity's
counterparties and the broader market by ensuring that the SBS
Entity has sufficient working capital and liquidity for its
security-based swap business consistent with regulatory requirements
and as needed to respond to market conditions. The Commission will
separately propose capital rules for SBS Entities, as required by
the Dodd Frank Act. 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(e). The Commission expects that
the capability of an SBS Entity to comply with these obligations, if
adopted, would form a key foundation for the Senior Officer
Certification.
    \28\ The concept of ``compliance capability'' can be an
important regulatory consideration because of, among other things,
the wholesale creation of a new regulatory regime for security-based
swaps under the Dodd-Frank Act. For example, in proposing business
conduct rules for SBS Entities, the Commission proposed to require
that each SBS Entity ``[establish, maintain, and enforce] written
policies and procedures addressing the supervision of the types of
security-based swap business in which the [SBS Entity] is engaged
that are reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable
securities laws and the rules and regulations thereunder.'' Business
Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major
Security-Based Swap Participants, Exchange Act Release No. 64766
(Jun. 29, 2011), 76 FR 42396, (Jul. 18, 2011), as corrected by
Exchange Act Release No. 64766, 76 FR 46668 (Aug. 3, 2011)
(proposing release). The Commission expects that development and
implementation of such a compliance regime, if adopted, would serve
as a key foundation for the Senior Officer Certification.
    \29\ See, e.g., 17 CFR 240.15c3-5, 17 CFR 240.13a-14, and 17 CFR
270.30a-2.
    \30\ See, e.g., Registration of Municipal Advisors, Exchange Act
Release No. 63576 (Dec. 20, 2010), 76 FR 824, (Jan. 6, 2011)
(proposing release) (the ``Registration of Municipal Advisors
Proposing Release'').
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    The Commission preliminarily believes that receipt of a Senior
Officer Certification would provide assurances to the Commission that
each SBS Entity has the requisite capabilities to operate in the
capacity for which it seeks registration. The Senior Officer
Certification is designed to require a deliberate and thoughtful self-
assessment by each SBS Entity of its capabilities and thus should
provide assurances to potential investors, customers of, and
counterparties to an SBS Entity that the SBS Entity has the requisite
capabilities to act in that capacity. Further, this Senior Officer
Certification requirement could help prevent disorderly and unstable
markets that could result from the failure of a registered SBS Entity
that lacks the requisite capabilities to operate its business in a
registered capacity. The Senior Officer Certification also may enhance
market participants' ability to assess the counterparty credit risk
associated with a particular SBS Entity counterparty. In this way, the
Senior Officer Certification should help to protect investors and other
market participants from SBS Entities that are not competent to engage
in that business, lack the financial resources to do so, or are unable
or unwilling to comply with applicable law. The Commission thus
preliminarily believes that the Senior Officer Certification could help
the efficient functioning of the market and enhance the confidence of
investors and other market participants.
    The Senior Officer Certification requirement, in other words, is
meant to address many of the same considerations that arise during the
in-depth review by the Commission and its staff, or, in some cases,
SROs, prior to

[[Page 65790]]

granting registration to certain applicants.\31\ For example, under
Sections 6(b) and 19(a) of the Exchange Act, an exchange may not be
registered unless the Commission finds that the exchange ``is so
organized and has the capacity to be able to carry out the purposes of
the Exchange Act and to comply, and [* * *] to enforce compliance by
its members and persons associated with its members, with the
provisions of [the Exchange Act], the rules and regulations thereunder,
and the rules of the exchange.'' \32\ Similarly, under Section 17A of
the Exchange Act, a clearing agency may not be registered unless the
Commission finds that the agency ``has the capacity to be able to
facilitate the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of
securities transactions and derivative agreements, contracts and
transactions for which it is responsible, to safeguard securities and
funds in its custody or control or for which it is responsible, to
comply with the provisions of [the Exchange Act] and the rules and
regulations thereunder, [and] to enforce [* * *] compliance by its
participants with the rules of the clearing agency, and to carry out
the purposes of this section.'' \33\ To this end, the Commission has
published a series of standards ``that the [staff] will use in
reviewing the organizations, capacities and rules of clearing agencies
that currently are registered temporarily with the Commission and of
clearing agencies that may apply for registration * * *.'' \34\ Broker-
dealers that register with the Commission under Section 15(b) also must
become a member of an SRO, and SRO rules generally incorporate
membership application procedures that include, among other things,
assessments by the SRO of the broker-dealer's operational, financial,
and compliance capabilities.\35\
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    \31\ See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(1) (regarding registration of
national securities exchanges), and 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(A)
(regarding registration of clearing agencies). See also 15 U.S.C.
78o-3(b)(1) and (2) (regarding registration of national securities
associations). In addition, the Commission recently proposed rules
governing the registration of security-based swap data repositories
(``SDRs''), security-based swap execution facilities (``SB SEFs''),
security-based swap clearing agencies (``SBS CAs''), and municipal
advisors that relate to potential registrants' operational,
financial, and compliance capabilities. For example, the proposed
registration rules for security-based swap data repositories are
intended to, among other things, assure the Commission that ``an SDR
is so organized, and has the capacity, to be able to assure the
prompt, accurate, and reliable performance of its functions as an
SDR, comply with any applicable provision of the Federal securities
laws and the rules and regulations thereunder, and carry out its
functions in a manner consistent with the purposes of Exchange
Act.'' These proposed rules may also require an SDR to file with the
Commission, as a condition of registration or continued
registration, a review relating to the SDR's operational capacity
and ability to meet its regulatory obligations. Such review could be
in the form of a report conducted by the SDR, an independent third
party, or both. Security-Based Swap Data Repository Registration,
Duties, and Core Principles, Exchange Act Release No. 63347 (Nov.
19, 2010), 75 FR 77306 (Dec. 10, 2010) (proposing release).
Similarly, the proposed registration rules for security-based swap
execution facilities are designed to assure the Commission that a
registrant ``has adequate financial, operational, and managerial
resources to discharge each responsibility of the SB SEF, as
determined by the Commission.'' Registration and Regulation of
Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, Exchange Act Release No.
63825 (Feb. 2, 2011), 76 FR 10948 (Feb. 28, 2011) (proposing
release). Among other things, these rules state in part that ``the
financial resources of a SB SEF shall be considered to be adequate
if the value of the financial resources exceeds the total amount
that would enable the SB SEF to cover its operating costs for a one
year period.'' The Commission also proposed registration rules for
security-based swap clearing agencies that require, among other
things, registrants to establish, maintain, and enforce written
policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that their
systems provide adequate levels of capacity, resiliency, and
security. Such policies and procedures shall, at a minimum: (i)
Establish reasonable current and future capacity estimates; (ii)
conduct periodic capacity stress tests of critical systems to
determine such systems' ability to process transactions in an
accurate, timely, and efficient manner; (iii) develop and implement
reasonable procedures to review and keep current its system
development and testing methodology; (iv) review the vulnerability
of its systems and data center computer operations to internal and
external threats, physical hazards, and natural disasters; and (v)
establish adequate contingency and disaster recovery plans. These
rules further require that clearing agencies that provide central
counterparty (``CCP'') services need to have a qualified person
conduct a review of models that are used to set margin levels, along
with related parameters and assumptions, in order to assure that the
models perform in a manner that facilitates prompt and accurate
clearance and settlement of transactions. In determining whether a
person is qualified to conduct the model validation, clearing
agencies providing CCP services could consider several factors,
including the person's experience in validating margin models,
expertise in risk management generally, and understanding of the
clearing agency's operations and procedures. Clearing Agency
Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act Release No.
64017 (Mar. 3, 2011), 76 FR 14472 (Mar. 16, 2011) (proposing
release) (the ``Clearing Agency Standards Proposing Release'').
Finally, the proposed registration rules for municipal advisors
would require municipal advisors to certify that they have: ``1)
sufficient qualifications, training, experience, and competence to
effectively carry out their designated functions; 2) met, or within
any applicable timeframe will meet, such standards of training
experience, and competence, and such other qualifications, including
testing, for a municipal advisor, required by the Commission, the
MSRB or any other relevant self-regulatory organization; and 3) the
necessary understanding of, and ability to comply with, all
applicable regulatory obligations.'' Registration of Municipal
Advisors Proposing Release, supra note 30.
    \32\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(1).
    \33\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(A).
    \34\ The Commission has established a series of standards ``that
the [staff] will use in reviewing the organizations, capacities and
rules of clearing agencies that currently are registered temporarily
with the Commission and of clearing agencies that may apply for
registration * * *.'' Regulation of Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act
Release No. 16900 (Jun. 17. 1980), 45 FR 41920 (June 23, 1980)
(emphasis added). See also the Clearing Agency Standards Proposing
Release, supra note 30.
    \35\ See, e.g., NASD Rules 1013 and 1014 (membership application
review requires a new broker-dealer to, among other things, file a
detailed business plan, explain its sources of funding, describe the
educational background and experience of its personnel, and undergo
a membership interview). Existing FINRA members that wish to enter
into a materially new business, such as dealing in security-based
swaps, must also file an application to do so, and those
applications are similarly reviewed to determine whether the broker-
dealer has the requisite capabilities to conduct the new business.
NASD Rule 1017. Exchange Act Rule 15b2-2 requires that a new broker-
dealer be examined within six months to evaluate whether the broker-
dealer is operating in conformity with applicable financial
responsibility rules and again within twelve months to evaluate
whether it is also operating in conformity with all other applicable
provisions of the Exchange Act and rules thereunder. 17 CFR
240.15b2-2(b) & (c).
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    At this time, although we provide guidance above regarding the
factors a senior officer would use to serve as a foundation for the
Senior Officer Certification,\36\ we are not proposing a specific
definition of the term ``operational, financial and compliance
capabilities.'' Instead, we request comment regarding whether and how
that phrase should be further defined or interpreted. The Commission
recognizes that whether an SBS Entity has the operational, financial
and compliance capabilities to act as an SBS Entity likely will depend
on its particular facts and circumstances, including, among other
things: the scope and nature of its security-based swap business; its
other related financial and business activities; the extent to which it
is subject to other registration and regulatory requirements or other
supervisory oversight with respect to its activities; its relationships
with, and reliance on, affiliates, service providers, and other
parties; and the extent and nature of its historical involvement in
security-based swap transactions. Moreover, it may be appropriate to
consider the capabilities required for this certification by reference
to regulatory standards. For example, attesting to capabilities might
include a self-assessment of whether the SBS Entity is capable of
communicating in a manner that is based on principles of fair dealing
and good faith; \37\ whether the SBS Entity has established all
contractual or other arrangements and business relationships necessary
to conduct its security-based swap business; \38\ whether the SBS
Entity has or has adequate plans to obtain facilities

[[Page 65791]]

that are sufficient for its operations; \39\ and whether the SBS Entity
is capable of maintaining a level of capital that is adequate to
support the SBS Entity's intended business operations on a continuing
basis.\40\
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    \36\ See supra notes 26-28.
    \37\ See Section 15F(h)(3)(C) (providing that business conduct
requirements adopted by the Commission shall establish a duty to
communicate in a manner ``based on principles of fair dealing and
good faith'').
    \38\ See NASD Rule 1014(a)(4).
    \39\ See NASD Rule 1014(a)(5).
    \40\ See NASD Rule 1014(a)(7).
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    The proposed rules would require that a senior officer of an SBS
Entity certify that he or she has reasonably determined that, after
``due inquiry,'' the security-based swap dealer or major security-based
swap participant has the operational, financial, and compliance
capabilities to act as an SBS Entity.\41\ We believe it is important to
make explicit that the senior officer is obligated under the rule to
conduct some inquiry to form his or her reasonable determination.
However, the Commission does not propose to prescribe any single method
a senior officer must use to gain an appropriate level of comfort and
information before signing the Senior Officer Certification. In other
words, different SBS Entities may utilize different processes to
provide a basis for a senior officer's reasonable determination that
the SBS Entity has the requisite capabilities.\42\
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    \41\ This certification must be accurate as of the date the
certification is filed with the Commission. An SBS Entity would not
be required to have a senior officer update the certification after
the SBS Entity has been approved for ongoing registration.
    \42\ For example, in satisfying other certification requirements
some SBS Entities may use a sub-certification process whereby the
senior officer will not certify a firm-wide statement unless and
until other persons responsible for certain activities in turn
certify to the senior officer that the standard has been met, while
other SBS Entities may use an internal or external audit-type
process whereby a senior officer may choose to employ a third party
to review an area subject to a firm-wide certification before
submitting the certification.
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    As described in Part I above, the proposed registration process
would include conditional and ongoing registration. Pursuant to
subparagraph (b)(1)(i) and (ii), respectively, of proposed Rule 15Fb2-
1, SBS Entities that register conditionally during the transitional
period would need to submit the Senior Officer Certification on or
before the Last Compliance Date and major security-based swap
participants that file an application after the Last Compliance Date
would need to submit the certification within four months after filing
an application. The Commission preliminarily believes that these
timeframes would provide senior officers of conditionally registered
SBS Entities sufficient time to determine that they are able to provide
the relevant certification. Pursuant to subparagraph (b)(2), an SBS
Dealer that files an application after the Last Compliance Date would
need to submit the Senior Officer Certification with its application.
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed
requirement for SBS Entities to provide the Commission with a Senior
Officer Certification on Form SBSE-C as specified in proposed Rule
15Fb2-1(b), and on the registration process generally. With respect to
this certification, the Commission is interested in commenters
responses to the following questions, and also to questions Q-54.
through Q-61. relating to Additional Registration Considerations.
    Q-16. Would the Senior Officer Certification requirement provide
sufficient assurance that each SBS Entity has the necessary
capabilities to act as a registered SBS Entity? Why or why not? Would
it provide sufficient assurance that SBS Entities have established
controls to ensure compliance with all applicable securities law
requirements? Why or why not?
    Q-17. Would the Senior Officer Certification provide sufficient
assurance to customers of and counterparties to SBS Entities,
investors, eligible contract participants and other market participants
that new SBS Entities have the requisite capabilities to act as SBS
Entities? Why or why not?
    Q-18. Should the Commission only require SBS Dealers, and not major
security-based swap participants, to provide a Senior Officer
Certification? Why or why not? What would be the comparative
advantages, disadvantages, costs and/or benefits of such an approach?
    Q-19. Alternatively, should the form of Senior Officer
Certification an SBS Entity must file be driven by whether the entity
is an SBS Dealer or major security-based swap participant? For
instance, should an SBS Dealer be required to certify to its
capabilities and a major security-based swap participant be required to
certify to its policies and procedures? If so, what form of Senior
Officer Certification should SBS Dealers be required to file and which
form of Senior Officer Certification should major security-based swap
participants be required to file? What would be the comparative
advantages, disadvantages, costs and/or benefits of requiring dealers
and participants to certify using different certification language?
    Q-20. What alternative forms of Senior Officer Certification should
be considered, if any? For example, should the proposed Senior Officer
Certification use the language that the Commission proposed with
respect to the certification to be made by municipal advisors? \43\ Why
or why not? What would be the comparative advantages, disadvantages,
costs and/or benefits of using the same certification language the
Commission has proposed for use by municipal advisors as opposed to the
language proposed?
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    \43\ See supra note 31, regarding the certification the
Commission proposed for use by municipal advisors in the
Registration of Municipal Advisors Proposing Release.
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    Q-21. The concept of developing and implementing written policies
and procedures has often been used by the Commission to further its
regulatory objectives. Should the Senior Officer Certification instead
require that a senior officer certify that ``to the best of his or her
knowledge, after due inquiry, the security-based swap dealer or major
security-based swap participant has developed and implemented written
policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violation of
federal securities laws, the rules thereunder, and applicable self-
regulatory organization rules?'' \44\ Why or why not? What would be the
impact of the Senior Officer Certification if it did not specifically
address operational capability? What would be the comparative
advantages, disadvantages, costs and/or benefits of using this language
as opposed to the language proposed?
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    \44\ See, e.g., Section 15(g) of the Exchange Act (requiring
that broker-dealers establish, maintain and enforce written policies
and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the misuse of
material, non-public information). 15 U.S.C. 78o(g). See also Rule
206(4)-7 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the ``Advisers
Act'') (requiring that investment advisers must adopt and implement
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent
violations of the Advisers Act and the rules thereunder). 17 CFR
275.206(4)-7.
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    Q-22. Should the Commission more specifically define the term
``operational, financial, and compliance capabilities''? If so, how
should this term be defined to, among other things, provide greater
certainty to market participants about the basis for providing the
Senior Officer Certification?
    Q-23. Should the Commission specifically define the term
``capability?'' Should the Commission, for example, define the term
``capability,'' as it relates to the financial, operational, and
compliance functions of an SBS Entity, as ``having the necessary
ability or qualities''? Why or why not? Should the Commission define
the term capability in some other way? If so, how and why?
    Q-24. Alternatively, should the Commission simply adopt the
Webster's New World Dictionary definition which

[[Page 65792]]

defines the term ``capability'' to mean ``the quality of being capable;
practical ability,'' and defines the term ``capable'' to mean, among
other things, ``having ability; able; skilled; competent --capable of;
having the ability or qualities necessary for; able or ready to?'' \45\
Why or why not? Should the Commission instead adopt some other
dictionary definition? If so, what other dictionary definition should
be used and why? Alternatively, should the Commission define the term
capability in some other way? If so, how and why?
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    \45\ Websters New World Dictionary 110 (2nd concise ed. 1975).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Q-25. Should the Commission determine that a firm may rely on the
establishment, maintenance and enforcement of written policies and
procedures by an SBS Entity that are reasonably designed to prevent
violation of federal securities laws, the rules thereunder, and
applicable self-regulatory organization rules as a basis for a senior
officer to certify that an SBS Entity has the appropriate ``compliance
capability?'' Why or why not?
    Q-26. Should the Commission determine that a firm may rely on the
establishment, maintenance and enforcement of written policies and
procedures by an SBS Entity that are reasonably designed to assure that
the SBS Entity complies with applicable capital and margin requirements
as a basis for a senior officer to certify that an SBS Entity has the
appropriate ``financial capability?'' Why or why not?
    Q-27. If the Commission does not specifically define what would
constitute operational, financial, and compliance capabilities, will
there still be a sufficient basis for SBS Entities and/or their senior
officers to provide the Commission with a Senior Officer Certification?
Why or why not? Would any potential uncertainty arising from the
decision not to define at this time the terms ``operational, financial,
and compliance capabilities'' and ``capabilities'' cause difficulties
for SBS Entities seeking to register on an ongoing basis? If so, please
describe.
    Q-28. Should SBS Entities be required to provide a Senior Officer
Certification as to any capabilities in addition to the three
specified? If so, what other capabilities and why? Alternatively,
should any of the capabilities be eliminated from the Senior Officer
Certification? If so, which one(s) and why? For example, should the
certification relating to an SBS Entity's capabilities be confined to
operational capability given the regulatory imperative to comply with
applicable regulations (including capital rules)? What would be the
comparative advantages, disadvantages, costs and/or benefits of adding
or eliminating such capabilities?
    Q-29. In addition to, or in lieu of the Senior Officer
Certification requirement, should the Commission utilize an approach to
demonstration of capabilities similar to the one we use to register
national securities exchanges under Exchange Act Section 6(b)(1) \46\
(which requires that an exchange have the ``capacity to be able to
carry out the purposes of [the Exchange Act * * *], the rules and
regulations thereunder'')? Would such a standard provide additional
clarity as to the capabilities to be required of registrants? What
would be the advantages and disadvantages and the costs and benefits of
such an alternative process?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ See supra note 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Q-30. Should the Commission instead utilize an approach to
demonstration of capabilities similar to the one we use to register
clearing agencies under Exchange Act Section 17A(b)(3)(A) \47\ (which
requires that an exchange have the ``capacity to be able to facilitate
the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities
transactions and derivative agreements, contracts and transactions for
which it is responsible, to safeguard securities and funds in its
custody or control or for which it is responsible, to comply with the
provisions of [the Exchange Act] and the rules and regulations
thereunder, [and] to enforce [* * *] compliance by its participants
with the rules of the clearing agency, and to carry out the purposes of
this section'')? Would such a standard provide additional clarity as to
the capabilities to be required of registrants? What would be the
advantages and disadvantages and the costs and benefits of such an
alternative process?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ See supra note 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Q-31. Should the form of Senior Officer Certification an SBS Entity
must file be driven by whether the entity is, or is not, already
registered with the Commission as a broker-dealer or with the CFTC as a
swap dealer or major swap participant? Why or why not? If so, what
forms of certification would be appropriate for use by SBS Entities
that are already registered with one of the Commission or the CFTC?
What would be the comparative advantages, disadvantages, costs and/or
benefits of this approach?
    Q-32. Should SBS Entities already registered with the Commission as
a broker-dealer or with the CFTC as a swap dealer or major swap
participant be excepted from the requirement to file a Senior Officer
Certification? Why or why not? What would be the comparative
advantages, disadvantages, costs and/or benefits of this approach?
    Q-33. If an SBS Entity were also registered with the Commission as
a broker-dealer and an SRO were to conduct a ``material change in
business review'' of the SBS Entity's security-based swap business,
should the SBS Entity be permitted to rely on the SRO's review and
approval of that new business as a basis for its Senior Officer
Certification? Would the form of Senior Officer Certification affect
the SBS Entity's ability to rely on such a review and approval? If so,
how and why? Given that SBS Entities that are also registered as
broker-dealers would be required by existing SRO rules to undergo a
material change in business review, are there any advantages and
disadvantages or costs and benefits associated with reliance on an SRO
``material change in business review'' and approval as a basis for its
Senior Officer Certification?
    Q-34. Similarly, if an SBS Entity were also involved in swap
activity, could that entity use any CFTC, NFA or prudential regulatory
agency's review of its swap business to inform its Senior Officer
Certification to the Commission? Would the form of Senior Officer
Certification affect the SBS Entity's ability to rely on such a review
and approval? If so, how and why? Are there any advantages and
disadvantages or costs and benefits associated with reliance on a CFTC,
NFA or prudential regulatory agency's review of its swap business as a
basis for its Senior Officer Certification?
    Q-35. Would the Senior Officer Certification requirement
effectively require an SBS Entity to employ a third party's services to
examine or confirm conclusions required for the certification? Why or
why not? If third party services were effectively required, what would
be the advantages and disadvantages and costs and benefits of such
third party services?
    Q-36. Should we include the due inquiry requirement in the rule?
Should we instead specify particular steps a senior officer must take
to determine whether the SBS Entity has the requisite capabilities?
    Q-37. Should the senior officer of an SBS Entity be required to
disclose on Form SBSE-C or elsewhere, the nature of the ``due inquiry''
he or she performed before signing Form SBSE-C and his or her resulting
findings and conclusions? Why or why not?
    Q-38. Should the Commission define its expectations with respect to
the ``due inquiry'' a senior officer should perform

[[Page 65793]]

before signing Form SBSE-C? If so, what should be included as part of a
senior officer's ``due inquiry?'' Should ``due inquiry'' differ
depending on whether the SBS Entity is an SBS Dealer or a major
security-based swap participant? Please explain.
    Q-39. Is the timeframe within which the proposed Senior Officer
Certification would need to be filed appropriate? If not, should the
timeframe be shorter or longer and why?
    Q-40. Should the Commission eliminate the requirement that a senior
officer certify that he or she has documented the process by which he
or she reached his or her determination regarding the SBS Entity's
capacity? Why or why not? Should the Commission instead simply require
that a senior officer document this process and require that the SBS
Entity maintain those documents as part of its books and records? Would
a senior officer believe that he or she may be second-guessed if, among
other circumstances, the senior officer certifies as to an SBS Entity's
capabilities but does not retain documentation demonstrating how he or
she reached this determination?
iii. Electronic Filing
    Paragraph (c) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-1 would address the manner in
which the application, certification, and any additional registration
documents would be filed with the Commission. Proposed paragraph (c)(1)
would require applications, certifications, and any additional
documents to be filed electronically. The Commission anticipates that
the EDGAR system will be expanded to facilitate registration of SBS
Entities because it likely would provide the most cost-effective
solution.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ To the extent the Commission utilizes the EDGAR system to
facilitate registration of SBS Entities, applicants would need to
utilize the EDGAR Filer Manual (as defined in 17 CFR 232.11) to
facilitate their filing of applications electronically. The EDGAR
Filer Manual contains all the technical specifications for filers to
submit filings using the EDGAR system. Generally, entities filing
documents in electronic format through the EDGAR system must comply
with the applicable provisions of the EDGAR Filer Manual in order to
assure the timely acceptance and processing of those filings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed paragraph (c)(2) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-1 would specify
the effective date of filing of applications and certifications
submitted pursuant to the paragraphs (a) and (b). Subparagraph
(c)(2)(i) would provide that an SBS Entity's application submitted
pursuant to paragraph (a) would be considered filed only when a
complete Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as appropriate, and
all required additional documents are filed with the Commission or its
designee. Subparagraph (c)(2)(ii) would provide that an SBS Entity's
certification submitted pursuant to paragraph (b) would be considered
filed when a complete Form SBSE-C is filed electronically with the
Commission or its designee.
    If a technological means to facilitate receipt and retention of
applications is not functional by the time final rules are adopted,
proposed temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T, described more fully below, would
require SBS Entities to file applications and additional documents in
paper form.
    The Commission requests comment on the proposed method for
receiving applications.
    Q-41. Should the Commission not require electronic submission of
applications? If not, why?
    Q-41. Instead of expanding the EDGAR system to receive SBS Entity
applications for registration, should the Commission utilize some other
system? Please explain. What would be the comparative advantages and
disadvantages and costs and benefits of utilizing a system other than
EDGAR?
    Q-43. What would be the advantages and disadvantages and costs and
benefits to prospective applicants of expansion of the EDGAR system to
receive SBS Entity applications for registration, especially with
respect to the varying levels of familiarity that they may have with
this system?
    Q-44. Should the Commission designate another entity to facilitate
the electronic receipt of applications? Why or why not? If so, what
types of entities should we consider?
    Q-45. What other issues, if any, should the Commission consider in
connection with electronic filing?
iv. Standards for Granting or Denying Applications
    Paragraph (d) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-1 would provide that the
Commission may grant or deny an application for registration, and would
set forth the standards the Commission would use to make that
determination. The grant or denial of a conditional registration would
depend principally on the completeness of an application, whether the
applicant is subject to a statutory disqualification, and whether the
Commission is aware of inaccurate statements in the application. The
grant or denial of an ongoing registration would also require that the
Commission find that the requirements of Exchange Act Section 15F(b)
are satisfied. As noted in Part I above, conditionally registered SBS
Entities would need to obtain ongoing registration to continue doing a
security-based swap business once their conditional registration
expires.\49\
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    \49\ Proposed Rule 15Fb3-1(b)(1) would provide that conditional
registrations granted pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of Proposed Rule
15Fb2-1 would expire on the Last Compliance Date for SBS Entities
that filed a complete application before the Last Compliance Date,
unless the SBS Entity files with the Commission a certification on
Form SBSE-C or the Commission extends conditional registration for
good cause. Proposed Rule 15Fb3-1(b)(2) would provide that
conditional registrations granted pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of
Proposed Rule 15Fb2-1 would expire four months after a major
security-based swap participant files a complete application, if it
filed such application after the Last Compliance Date, unless the
major security-based swap participant files with the Commission a
certification on Form SBSE-C. In both cases, if the Senior Officer
Certification is filed within the given timeframe, conditional
registration is extended by 30 days to allow the Commission time to
determine whether to grant or deny ongoing registration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When considering an application for conditional registration,
proposed paragraph 15Fb2-1(d)(1) provides that the Commission would
grant such registration if it finds that the firm's application is
complete, except that the Commission may institute proceedings to
determine whether to deny conditional registration if it finds that the
applicant is subject to a statutory disqualification or the Commission
is aware of inaccurate statements in the application. Such proceedings
would include notice of the grounds for denial under consideration and
opportunity for hearing. At the conclusion of such proceedings, the
Commission would grant or deny such registration.
    Paragraph (d)(2) would allow the Commission to grant ongoing
registration to an SBS Entity. It is contemplated that ongoing
registration would be sought by firms that have been conditionally
registered with the Commission, as well as by new firms entering the
marketplace that have not been conditionally registered (e.g., an SBS
Dealer seeking registration after the Last Compliance Date). Paragraph
(d)(2) would specify that the Commission would grant ongoing
registration based on a firm's application and certification. Proposed
paragraph (d)(2) would provide that if the Commission granted
conditional registration to an SBS Entity, the Commission could grant
or deny ongoing registration based on the original application
submitted by the SBS Entity, as amended,\50\ and the certification
submitted to the Commission by the SBS Entity pursuant to paragraph
(b). When considering any

[[Page 65794]]

application for ongoing registration, Rule 15Fb2-1(d)(2) would provide
that the Commission would grant registration if it finds that the
requirements of Exchange Act Section 15F(b) are satisfied, except that
the Commission may institute proceedings to determine whether ongoing
registration should be denied if it does not make such finding or if it
finds that the applicant is subject to a statutory disqualification or
the Commission is aware of inaccurate statements in the application or
certification. Such proceedings would include notice of the grounds for
denial under consideration and opportunity for hearing, and that at the
conclusion of such proceedings, the Commission would grant or deny such
registration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ The SBS Entity may have amended its application to address
changes that may have occurred in the intervening period between the
date the application was originally filed and the date the
Commission evaluates whether ongoing registration should be granted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, the Commission would notify the entity
electronically when conditional or ongoing registration is granted, and
would make information regarding registration status publicly
available.
    The Commission requests comment on these proposed standards of
review for granting or denying registration in proposed Rule 15Fb2-
1(d).
    Q-46. Should the Commission consider using different standards of
review to grant conditional registration to SBS Entities who apply
before the Last Compliance Date than it uses for major security-based
swap participants that apply for conditional registration after the
Last Compliance Date?
    Q-47. Would the standard requiring denial of an application if the
applicant is subject to statutory disqualification cause undue hardship
for any possible applicants? If so, how many applicants are likely to
be affected? Should this standard be refined or eliminated? If
applicants subject to statutory disqualification should be allowed to
register, should they be subject to any additional requirements? Please
explain.
    Q-48. Should the Commission consider broader or more limited
standards for granting or denying conditional registration? If so,
please describe the standard that should be used and the reasons why it
would be more appropriate than the standard proposed.
    Q-49. Should the Commission consider using a different standard of
review to grant ongoing registration?
    Q-50. Should the Commission consider broader or more limited
standards for granting or denying ongoing registration? If so, please
describe the standard that should be used for granting or denying
ongoing registration and the reasons why it would be more appropriate
than the standard proposed.
    Q-51. Should the Commission staff base its decision only on a
review of a firm's application (including any additional documents) and
certification or should an on-site examination or some other type of
review be considered? If so, what would be the appropriate scope and
timing of such a review?
    Q-52. Is there a need to lengthen or shorten the proposed
timeframes provided for the effectiveness of conditional registration
in paragraph (d)(1)? If so, how long should they be?
    Q-53. Should the Commission provide additional guidance regarding
the process for institution of proceedings? For instance, should the
Commission include timeframes within which proceedings would be
instituted and/or a decision to grant or deny registration based on
those proceedings should be provided (e.g., Exchange Act Section
15(b)(1))? If so, what timeframes or other guidance and why?
v. Request for Comment on Additional Registration Considerations
    The Commission requests comment on what, if any, alternative
approaches should be considered to meet the Commission's regulatory
objectives in the registration process for SBS Entities and how any
such alternative approaches would compare to the current proposal.\51\
Any such comparison should describe the relative advantages and
disadvantages of each alternative, as well as their relative costs and
benefits.
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    \51\ As described in footnote 12 above, the Commission is
presently reviewing the various standards and processes it uses to
facilitate registration, and we would expect that any alternative
processes suggested by commenters here would inform that review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Q-54. Should the Commission not adopt a Senior Officer
Certification requirement, and instead seek to satisfy itself during
the registration process, based on documents the SBS Entity may be able
to provide to the Commission, that the SBS Entity has the operational,
financial, and/or compliance capabilities to act as an SBS Dealer or
major security-based swap participant, as applicable? What would be the
advantages and disadvantages and the costs and benefits of such an
alternative process?
    Q-55. If the Commission determines to satisfy itself during the
registration process, based on documents the SBS Entity may be able to
provide to the Commission, that the SBS Entity has the operational,
financial, and/or compliance capabilities to act as an SBS Dealer or
major security-based swap participant, as applicable, should the
Commission identify which documents or categories of documents should
be submitted in order to facilitate its review and/or decision? If so,
what types of documents (e.g., business plan, written procedures, or
annual audit statements) should the Commission identify to facilitate
this review and what would be the costs of obtaining or providing such
documents?
    Q-56. Should the Commission not adopt a Senior Officer
Certification requirement, and instead require that an SBS Entity
obtain and submit to the Commission an independent third-party review
of its operational, financial, and compliance capabilities or its
written policies and procedures before granting ongoing registration?
What practical considerations--e.g., identifying an appropriate
independent third party, measuring the time, cost, and reliability of
any such review, addressing the types of information to be shared with
a third party and the factors to be considered in its review--would
inform whether such a review would be appropriate? What would be the
advantages and disadvantages and costs and benefits of requiring a
third-party review instead of the Senior Officer Certification?
    Q-57. Should the Commission adopt a Senior Officer Certification
requirement, and also require that an SBS Entity employ a third party
to independently review its capabilities to provide a basis for that
Senior Officer Certification? What would be the advantages and
disadvantages and costs and benefits of having an SBS Entity's
capabilities independently reviewed? If such a review were required,
who could perform such a review, what would such review entail, and
should the review be submitted to the Commission along with the
certification? What would be the comparative advantages, disadvantages,
costs and/or benefits of requiring dealers and participants to have
their capabilities independently reviewed?
    Q-58. If the Commission required that SBS Entities obtain and
submit an independent third-party review, what types of entities could
perform such a review (e.g., accountants, law firms, consulting firms)
and what independence standards should apply for purposes of conducting
the review? Could a review or examination by another governmental
agency (e.g., the Federal Reserve Board, the CFTC, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency) or an SRO constitute an independent third
party review for these purposes? If not, why? Are there any practical
or legal impediments to obtaining or providing to the Commission a
review from a third party

[[Page 65795]]

or a governmental agency or an SRO? If so, could these be addressed by
contract or otherwise?
    Q-59. Are there any other forms of oversight that could or should
reinforce or replace the proposed Senior Officer Certification? What
would be the comparative advantages, disadvantages, costs and/or
benefits of such an approach?
    Q-60. Are there other approaches to registration the Commission
should consider that, in a cost-effective manner, would both fulfill
the statutory mandate to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, facilitate capital formation, and ensure that the
security-based swap market smoothly transitions from a generally
unregulated marketplace to one that is regulated and subject to
appropriate oversight? If so, please explain which ones and why.
    Q-61. If the Commission were to consider an approach to
registration that required something other than a Senior Officer
Certification, would SBS Entities need more time to gather, obtain, or
submit any documents, third party review, or other items than we have
proposed for submission of the Senior Officer Certification (i.e., on
or before the Last Compliance Date or, for participants that apply
after the Last Compliance Date, within four months after it files its
completed application)? If so why or why not?
    In the Intermediary Definitions Release,\52\ the Commission
acknowledged that the statutory definitions include a provision stating
that a person may be designated as a dealer for one or more types,
classes or categories of security-based swaps, or activities. Further,
that release indicated that one commenter stated that the Commissions
should allow a person to register as a swap dealer or SBS Dealer for
only a limited set of types, classes or categories of swaps or
security-based swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ Intermediary Definitions Release, supra note 5, at 80182.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Q-62. Should the registration process be expanded in any way to
allow firms to choose whether they register in a ``full'' or
``limited'' capacity? If so, how?
    Q-63. What additional information should be elicited by the
proposed forms to provide the Commission with sufficient information to
determine whether limited (as opposed to full) registration is
appropriate? Should there be separate forms for firms to apply for
limited, as opposed to full, registration? Should there instead be a
separate schedule to the forms as proposed? Should the timing differ
and, if so, how and why?
    Q-64. Should an applicant for limited registration be required to
provide the Commission with a different senior officer or other
certification? If so, how should the certification differ?
    Q-65. Should the Commission apply a different standard of review
when considering whether to grant or deny limited registration to an
applicant? If so, which one and why?
    Q-66. If the Commission were to grant an SBS Entity's application
for limited registration and the SBS Entity later determined that it
would prefer to be fully registered, how should this transition be
effected?

Please provide as much detail as possible in commenting on which of the
above referenced courses of action should be pursued. Please also
provide information regarding possible costs or benefits of each of
these alternatives.

2. Amendments to Application Forms: Proposed Rule 15Fb2-3
    Proposed Rule 15Fb2-3 would require an SBS Entity to promptly \53\
amend its Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, Form SBSE-BD, as applicable, to
correct any information it determines is, or has become, inaccurate for
any reason.\54\ The Commission preliminarily believes this proposed
Rule is necessary in order for it to have access to accurate
information as part of its ongoing oversight of SBS Entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ For purposes of Rule 15b3-1, the Commission has interpreted
the term ``promptly'' to mean within 30 days. (In the Matter of
First Guarantor Securities, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 32725, 51
S.E.C. 612 (Aug. 6, 1993), which states, ``Absent extraordinary
circumstances, an amendment to Form BD filed beyond thirty days from
the change in information cannot be considered `promptly' filed in
accordance with Rule 15b3-1.'') We preliminarily believe this
standard is also appropriate with respect to the use of this term in
proposed Rule 15Fb2-3.
    \54\ This proposed rule is based on Exchange Act Rule 15b3-1,
which is applicable to registered brokers and dealers and has worked
well to assure that broker-dealers promptly amend their
applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of proposed Rule
15Fb2-3.
    Q-67. Should the Commission only require SBS Entities to promptly
update their Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, and SBSE-BD when they become
``materially'' inaccurate?
    Q-68. Should SBS Entities instead be required to periodically
update these forms and, if so, what would be an appropriate timeframe
for updating (e.g., monthly, quarterly, annually)? What may be the
comparative costs and benefits of periodic updating vs. ``prompt''
updating?
    Q-69. If the Commission requires SBS Entities to promptly update
their Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, and SBSE-BD when they become materially
inaccurate, should it also require that all information on the forms be
updated periodically?
    Q-70. Would it be appropriate for the Commission to require that
certain information be updated more frequently than other information?
If so, please describe what information should be subject to more
frequent updates and why, and the frequency with which each such item
should be updated.

B. Associated Persons

1. Certification
    Paragraph (b)(6) of Exchange Act Section 15F generally prohibits
SBS Entities from permitting any of their associated persons \55\ who
are subject to a ``statutory disqualification'' (as defined in Exchange
Act Section 3(a)(39)) to effect or be involved in effecting \56\
security-based swaps on behalf of the SBS Entity if the SBS Entity
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the
statutory disqualification. To provide SBS Entities with a mechanism to
assess their compliance with this provision, paragraph (a) of proposed
Rule 15Fb6-1 would require that an SBS Entity certify, on Schedule G of
Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as appropriate, that no person
associated with it who effects or is involved in effecting security-
based swaps on its behalf is subject to statutory disqualification, as
defined in Section 3(a)(39) of the Exchange Act.\57\ If an associated
person later becomes

[[Page 65796]]

statutorily disqualified, the SBS Entity would need to ensure that the
associated person does not continue to effect or be involved in
effecting security-based swaps on the SBS Entity's behalf and/or
promptly amend its Schedule G in accordance with proposed Rule 15Fb2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(70) generally defines the term ``person
associated with'' an SBS Entity to include: (i) Any partner,
officer, director, or branch manager of an SBS Entity (or any person
occupying a similar status or performing similar functions); (ii)
any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or
under common control with an SBS Entity; or (iii) any employee of an
SBS Entity. However, it generally excludes persons whose functions
are solely clerical or ministerial.
    \56\ The Commission believes that associated persons ``involved
in effecting'' security-based swaps would include, but not be
limited to, persons involved in drafting and negotiating master
agreements and confirmations, persons recommending security-based
swap transactions to counterparties, persons on a trading desk
actively involved in effecting security-based swap transactions,
persons pricing security-based swap positions and managing
collateral for the SBS Entity, and persons assuring that the SBS
Entity's security-based swap business operates in compliance with
applicable regulations. In short, the term would encompass persons
engaged in functions necessary to facilitate the SBS Entity's
security-based swap business.
    \57\ Proposed Rule 15Fb1-1(b), described below, would require
each SBS Entity to maintain a manually signed copy of this
certification as part of its books and records until at least three
years after the certification has been replaced or is no longer
effective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To support this certification requirement, paragraph (b) of
proposed Rule 15Fb6-1 would require SBS Entities to obtain a
questionnaire or application for employment executed by each of its
associated persons that effect or are involved in effecting security-
based swaps on its behalf; such questionnaire or application would
serve as a basis for a background check of the associated person to
determine whether the associated person is statutorily disqualified.
The questionnaires or applications would be required to contain, at a
minimum, the following information: (1) The associated person's name,
address, social security number, Central Registration Depository
(``CRD'') number (if any), Investment Adviser Registration Depository
(``IARD'') number (if any), and the starting date of the associated
person's employment or other association with the SBS Entity; (2) the
associated person's date of birth; (3) a complete, consecutive
statement of all the associated person's business connections for at
least the preceding ten years, including whether the employment was
part-time or full-time; (4) a record of any denial of membership or
registration, and of any disciplinary action taken, or sanction
imposed, upon the associated person by any federal or state agency, by
any national securities exchange or national securities association, or
by a foreign financial regulatory authority including any finding that
the associated person was a cause of any disciplinary action or had
violated any law; (5) a record of any denial, suspension, expulsion or
revocation of membership or registration of any broker, dealer, SBS
Dealer, or major security-based swap participant with which the
associated person was associated in any capacity when such action was
taken; (6) a record of any permanent or temporary injunction entered
against the associated person or any broker, dealer, SBS Dealer, or
major security-based swap participant with which the associated person
was associated in any capacity at the time such injunction was entered;
(7) a record of any arrest or indictment for any felony, or any
misdemeanor pertaining to securities (including security-based swaps),
futures or commodities (including swaps), banking, insurance or real
estate (including, but not limited to, acting or being associated with
a broker-dealer, investment company, investment adviser, futures
sponsor, bank, or savings and loan association), fraud, false
statements or omissions, wrongful taking of property or bribery,
forgery, counterfeiting or extortion, and the disposition of the
foregoing; and (8) a record of any other name or names by which the
associated person has been known or which the associated person has
used.
    The Commission believes that it is standard in the financial
services industry for firms to request this information on employment
questionnaires. This information is similar to the information
identified in Exchange Act Rule 17a-3(a)(12)(i) and required to be
collected by broker-dealers with respect to their associated persons.
Additionally, Form U-4 contains all the information needed pursuant to
Exchange Act Rule 17a-3(a)(12)(i) and would fulfill the requirement to
obtain a questionnaire or application specified in Rule 15Fb6-1(b).
Rule 17a-3(a)(12)(i) and Form U-4 provide broker-dealers with
information through which they can perform background checks on
associated persons necessary to assure that those associated persons
are not subject to statutory disqualification. Moreover, the NFA
collects similar data on associated persons of its members through the
Form 8-R. Consequently, we preliminarily believe it would be
appropriate for SBS Entities to collect this information on associated
persons to allow them to conduct background checks so that they can
comply with the prohibition in Section 15F(b)(6) of the Exchange Act
from allowing statutorily disqualified individuals to effect or be
involved in effecting SBS transactions on their behalf.
    In addition, paragraph (b) of proposed Rule 15Fb6-1 would require
that the SBS Entity's chief compliance officer (``CCO'') (appointed in
accordance with Exchange Act Section 15F(k)), or his or her designee,
review and sign each questionnaire or application.\58\ This provision
is designed to help ensure that due regard is being paid to this
requirement to collect information on employees and to help ensure that
none of the SBS Entity's employees who effect or are involved in
effecting security-based swaps on the SBS Entity's behalf is subject to
statutory disqualification. Moreover, to the extent the SBS Entity's
CCO, or his or her designee, must sign the certification, this
requirement helps ensure that the CCO is aware of this statutory
prohibition and is familiar with the SBS Entity's procedures to comply
with it.
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    \58\ Applicants may already have this information on their
employees, but may not have a CCO, as required pursuant to new
Section 15F(k) of the Act, until the effective date of rules the
Commission may promulgate under Section 15F(k). Security-based swap
dealers and major security-based swap participants could be
conditionally registered even if a CCO has not signed each
associated person's questionnaire or application.
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    Finally, paragraph (c) of proposed paragraph 15Fb6-1 would require
that each SBS Entity maintain the questionnaires and applications for
employment obtained pursuant to paragraph (b) as part of its books and
records for at least three years after the associated person has
terminated his or her association with the SBS Entity. It is likely
that SBS Entities would retain these records for business purposes;
however, this requirement will assure that the questionnaires and
applications are available to the Commission during inspections and
examinations.
    The Commission requests comment on proposed Rule 15Fb6-1.
    Q-71. Would the information regarding associated persons in
paragraph (b) of the proposed rule be sufficient for a CCO to make the
required certification? Why or why not?
    Q-72. Should the information requirements in paragraph (b) be
modified in any way?
    Q-73. Should applicants be required to obtain any additional
information not specified in proposed paragraph (b)?
    Q-74. Should the Commission require that SBS Entities perform
background checks on their employees (e.g., to confirm that their
associated persons do not have a criminal history) in addition to
obtaining questionnaires or applications? Why or why not?
    Q-75. If not, what other process could the Commission use to help
ensure that an applicant is not violating Exchange Act Section
15F(b)(6)?
    Q-76. Should the Commission require applicants to require credit
checks on associated persons? Why or why not?
    Q-77. What, if any, practical or legal limitations or barriers
exist that would hinder an applicant from obtaining background or
credit checks?
    Q-78. Should the Commission require applicants to obtain and
process fingerprints of their associated persons that will be effecting
or involved in effecting security-based swaps on the applicant's
behalf? Why or why not?
    Q-79. What, if any, practical or legal limitations or barriers
exist that would hinder an applicant from obtaining or running
fingerprints of associated persons?

[[Page 65797]]

    Q-80. Should the Commission instead treat the provisions of Section
15F(b)(6) as essentially self-executing and permit SBS Entities to
determine how best to screen associated persons to ensure they are not
subject to a statutory disqualification (provided that they exercise
reasonable care in so doing) and require that an SBS Entity create and
maintain reasonable policies and procedures for determining whether an
associated person is subject to a statutory disqualification? Why or
why not?
    Q-81. What would be the benefits and risks of this approach?
    Q-82. Would this approach be more or less burdensome for SBS
Entities to administer?
    Q-83. Would SBS Entities nevertheless implement an approach similar
to that required under the proposed rule?
    Q-84. How might an SBS Entity comply with Section 15F(b)(6) in ways
that differ from what is set forth in the proposed rule?
    Q-85. Would this alternative policies and procedures approach
provide SBS Entities sufficient legal certainty about whether they have
properly complied with Section 15F(b)(6)?
    Q-86. Should the Commission require that associated persons of SBS
Entities that effect or are involved in effecting security-based swaps
on behalf of the SBS Entity register directly with it? What would be
the costs or benefits involved with registration of such SBS Entity
associated persons? What, if any, practical or legal limitations or
barriers exist to this approach?
    Q-87. Are there other approaches to implementing Section 15F(b)(6)
that the Commission should consider? Please explain.
    Q-88. Should the Commission take a different view regarding which
associated persons should be considered to be ``involved in effecting''
security-based swaps on behalf of the SBS Entity (see footnote 34)? If
so, should additional categories of associated persons be included or
should certain identified categories of associated persons be excluded?
For what reason(s)?
2. Alternative Process
    Section 15F(b)(6) expressly authorizes the Commission to establish
exceptions to this prohibition by rule, regulation, or order.\59\ This
authority is similar to authority provided to the Commission with
respect to the ``traditional'' securities industry, i.e., the industry
regulated under the Exchange Act prior to the Dodd-Frank Act
amendments. This existing Exchange Act authority permits SROs, subject
to Commission review, to allow, among other things, a person subject to
a statutory disqualification to associate with a broker-dealer.\60\
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    \59\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b)(6).
    \60\ When such a person seeks admission to or continuance in
membership or association, the Commission and the SRO have the
opportunity to give special review to such person and to restrict or
prevent entry into, or continuance in, the business where
appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of
investors. See Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
The Securities Act Amendments of 1989, S. Rep. No. 101-105, at 39
(1989); Provision for Notices by Self-Regulatory Organizations of
Stays of Such Actions; Appeals; and Admissions to Membership or
Association of Disqualified Persons, 42 FR 36409 (Jul. 14, 1977)
(adopting rule 19h-1 under the Exchange Act, 17 CFR 240.19h-1, and
providing rules for process of filing notices, content of notices,
and Commission determination).
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    Similarly, Commission Rule 193 (Applications by Barred Individuals
for Consent to Associate) provides a process by which persons that are
not regulated by a SRO (e.g., employees of an investment adviser, an
investment company, or a transfer agent) can seek to reenter the
traditional securities industry despite previously being barred by the
Commission.\61\
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    \61\ 17 CFR 201.193.
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    The Commission requests comment on whether it should develop an
alternative process to allow associated persons of SBS Entities who are
subject to a statutory disqualification to effect or be involved in
effecting security-based swaps on their behalf.
    Q-89. How many SBS Entities and associated persons thereof are
likely to be affected if the Commission does not provide an exemptive
process?
    Q-90. Is it possible that an associated person that is an entity
(i.e., not a natural person) that effects or is involved in effecting
security-based swaps on behalf of an SBS Entity would be subject to a
statutory disqualification? If so, should the Commission consider
excepting any such persons from the prohibition in Section 15F(b)(6)?
Under what circumstances and why?
    Q-91. Should the Commission except such persons globally (e.g., by
a blanket rule) or on an individual basis (e.g., via a Rule 193-type
process)? What would be the possible costs or benefits of each?
    Q-92. Are there certain statutorily disqualified persons who should
not be permitted to remain associated with an SBS Dealer or major
security-based swap participant based upon the nature of the
disqualification?
    Q-93. Should there be any differentiation in relief based upon the
nature of the person, e.g. a natural person or an entity? If so, what
type of differentiation and why?

C. Termination of Registration

1. Expiration: Proposed Rule 15Fb3-1
    Exchange Act Section 15F(b)(3) provides that ``each registration
under this section shall expire at such time as the Commission may
prescribe by rule or regulation.'' Although there is no Exchange Act
parallel, this provision is similar to Commodity Exchange Act Section
6f(a)(1), which provides that ``each registration shall expire on
December 31 of the year for which issued or at such other time, not
less than one year from the date of issuance, as the Commission may by
rule, regulation, or order prescribe. * * *'' CFTC Rule 3.10(b)
provides, among other things, that persons registered with the CFTC
pursuant to CFTC Rule 3.10 ``will continue to be so registered until
the effective date of any revocation or withdrawal of such
registration.'' Paragraph (a) of proposed Rule 15Fb3-1 would establish
the same continuous registration as is set forth in CFTC Rule 3.10(b),
and would provide that registered SBS Entities would ``continue to be
so registered until the effective date of any cancellation, revocation
or withdrawal of such registration or any other event the Commission
determines should trigger expiration.''
    Q-94. Does CFTC Rule 3.10(b) provide an appropriate model to
implement Exchange Act Section 15F(b)(3)? Why or why not?
    Q-95. Should the Commission instead allow initial SBS Entity
registrations to expire and require SBS Entities to re-register to
become an ongoing registrant (while providing a grace period for this
re-registration to occur)? If so, what would be an appropriate amount
of time before expiration (e.g., one year, two years, five years, or
some other time period)?
    Q-96. Alternatively, should the Commission allow SBS Entity
registrations to expire periodically and require SBS Entities to re-
register periodically (i.e., requiring registrants to ``re-up''
indefinitely on a regular basis)? If so, what would be an appropriate
amount of time before expiration (e.g., annually, every two years,
every five years, or some other time period)? What would be the
advantages, disadvantages, costs and benefits of such an approach?
    Q-97. Via what mechanism should any such re-registration be
facilitated? For instance, should an SBS Entity be required to re-apply
by filing a new application? Alternatively, should an SBS Entity be
required to re-certify by filing a new Senior Officer Certification?

[[Page 65798]]

Would some other mechanism be more appropriate? How should any such
mechanism take into account the initial application and registration of
an SBS Entity? How should any such mechanism take into account the SBS
Entity's compliance with applicable rules during the period prior to
the re-registration? Would any type of non-compliance during such
period justify denial of re-registration, or should the nature of the
non-compliance and any remedial actions be taken into account?
    Q-98. If re-registration is facilitated by re-certification, would
the proposed form of Senior Officer Certification on Form SBSE-C be the
appropriate or would some other form or language be more appropriate?
For instance, should any re-certification for SBS Entities be drafted
to more closely follow the certification requirement proposed for
municipal advisors (wherein each municipal advisor certifies annually
that it has met its regulatory obligations over the prior period)?
    Q-99. If periodic re-registration were required, should re-
registration be based on an SBS Entity's original registration date or
should it be triggered by a calendar date (e.g., on December 31)?
    Q-100. Should the same standard of review that applies to ongoing
registration apply in the context of re-registration (see proposed rule
15Fb2-1(d)(2))? If not, what alternative standard of review would be
more appropriate and why?
    Q-101. Would any such expiration and re-registration requirement
provide the Commission with a greater ability to enforce compliance
with applicable regulations? Why or why not?
    As discussed in Part I above, under paragraph (b)(1) of proposed
Rule 15Fb3-1, conditional registrations granted by the Commission to an
SBS Entity that applies for registration during the transitional period
in accordance with Rule 15Fb2-1(b) would expire on the Last Compliance
Date, unless the SBS Entity files a Senior Officer Certification with
the Commission or its designee on or before the Last Compliance Date;
in which case its conditional registration would be extended for an
additional thirty days (which should allow the Commission staff
sufficient time to review the SBS Entity's application and
certification and determine whether to grant or deny ongoing
registration). Paragraph (b)(2) of proposed Rule 15Fb3-1 would provide
that conditional registrations granted by the Commission to major
security-based swap participants that file applications for
registration after the Last Compliance Date would expire four months
after the major security-based swap participant files its completed
application with the Commission unless the major security-based swap
participant files a Senior Officer Certification with the Commission or
its designee within that four month period; in which case its
conditional registration would be extended for an additional thirty
days. Pursuant to paragraph (c) of proposed Rule 15Fb3-1, the
Commission could extend conditional registration for good cause.
    Q-102. Would these timeframes be sufficient to allow conditional
registrants to complete--and the Commission to grant or deny--ongoing
registration? Why or why not?
    Q-103. What circumstances should the Commission consider in
determining whether good cause exists to extend an SBS Entity's
conditional registration? Why? Should these circumstances include
situations in which the Commission may need additional time to review
an SBS Entity's application and certification? Why or why not?
    Q-104. Should the Commission require that an SBS Entity follow a
particular process to request an extension of the SBS Entity's
conditional registration? For instance, should an SBS Entity be
required to submit a letter requesting an extension and setting forth
the reasons why an extension is necessary? If so, what process would be
appropriate and why?
2. Withdrawal: Proposed Rule 15Fb3-2
    Proposed Rule 15Fb3-2 would provide a process by which an SBS
Entity could withdraw from registration with the Commission.\62\ The
proposed rule would require an SBS Entity to file a notice of
withdrawal from registration electronically on Form SBSE-W (described
in more detail below) in accordance with the instructions to the Form.
It also would require that an SBS Entity amend its Form SBSE, Form
SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as appropriate, in accordance with proposed
Rule 15Fb2-3 to update any inaccurate information prior to filing its
notice of withdrawal from registration.
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    \62\ This provision is similar to Exchange Act Rule 15b6-1,
which has historically worked well to facilitate broker-dealer
withdrawals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b) of proposed Rule 15Fb3-2 would provide that a notice
of withdrawal from registration filed by an SBS Entity would generally
become effective on the 60th day after the SBS Entity files Form SBSE-
W. However, based on its experience with registered broker-dealers, the
Commission recognizes that there may be circumstances in which it would
be advisable to provide flexibility in scheduling the termination of
business operations to registered entities seeking to withdraw from
registration. Further, the Commission may determine that it would be
appropriate for a registered entity that is under investigation by the
Commission to maintain its registered status in order to allow the
Commission to conclude a pending investigation without prematurely
instituting a proceeding to impose conditions on the registered
entity's withdrawal. In such instances, it may better serve the
interests of all parties to have the registered entity consent to an
extension of the effective date of the registered entity's withdrawal
from registration beyond the general 60-day period provided for in the
proposed rule. It also may be appropriate to permit the Commission to
extend the effective date for a period if it determines, by order, that
it is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
    Thus, paragraph (b) of proposed Rule 15Fb3-2 would identify
specific situations in which notices of withdrawal from registration
will not become effective on the 60th day. These would include
situations where (1) The Commission determines that a shorter period is
appropriate, (2) the SBS Entity consents to a longer period, (3) the
Commission, by order, determines that a longer period is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors,
and (4) the Form SBSE-W is filed subsequent to the date of the issuance
of a Commission order instituting proceedings to censure, place
limitations on the activities, functions or operations of, or suspend
or revoke the registration of the SBS Entity. Finally, paragraph (b) of
proposed Rule 15Fb3-2 would provide that if the Commission institutes
proceedings prior to the effective date of Form SBSE-W (1) To censure,
place limitations on the activities, functions or operations of, or
suspend or revoke the registration of the SBS Entity, or (2) to impose
terms or conditions upon the SBS Entity's withdrawal, the notice of
withdrawal shall not become effective except at such time and upon such
terms and conditions as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of proposed Rule
15Fb3-2.
    Q-105. Would the proposed withdrawal process be workable for SBS
Entities? Are the proposed timeframes reasonable for these entities?
Why or why not?

[[Page 65799]]

    Q-106. Under what other circumstances, if any, should the
Commission shorten or lengthen the timeframe for withdrawal?
3. Cancellation and Revocation: Proposed Rule 15Fb3-3
    Proposed Rule 15Fb3-3 would provide the Commission with the ability
to either cancel or revoke a registered SBS Entity's registration. More
specifically, paragraph (a) of proposed Rule 15Fb3-3 would allow the
Commission to cancel an SBS Entity's registration if the Commission
finds that it is no longer in existence or has ceased to do business as
an SBS Entity.\63\ The cancellation process outlined in paragraph (a)
is intended to be ministerial in nature, and not a means to revoke
without due process the registration of an SBS Entity that may have
violated federal securities laws. This provision is designed to help
the Commission allocate its examination and other resources to entities
that are actively engaged in business regulated by the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ This provision is similar to Exchange Act Section 15(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b) of proposed Rule 15Fb3-3 cross-references the
Exchange Act to clarify that the Commission shall censure, place
limitations on the activities, functions, or operations of, or revoke
(on a permanent or temporary basis) the registration of any SBS Dealer
or major security-based swap participant that has registered with the
Commission if it makes a finding as specified in Section 15F(l)(2) of
the Exchange Act.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(l).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Q-107. Is the proposed provision for cancellation of registration
appropriate in the context of SBS Entities? Why or why not?
    Q-108. Would there be occasion for SBS Entities to have an extended
pause in their businesses such that they might appear to have ceased to
do business? If so, should the Commission provide that such entities
could notify the Commission of their intent to stay in business,
notwithstanding their lack of current activities? Should such entities
later inform the Commission when they become active?
    Q-109. Should there be a time limit on how long such an SBS Entity
could retain its registration with the Commission while it is in a
``dormant'' state?
    Q-110. Does the proposed provision for revocation in paragraph (b)
provide sufficient procedural safeguards for registered SBS Entities?
If not, what procedures could be added to provide additional
safeguards?

D. Special Requirements for Nonresident SBS Entities

    Proposed Rule 15Fb2-4 would require, among other things, that
nonresident SBS Entities that are required to register with the
Commission \65\ (1) Appoint an agent for service of process in the
United States (other than the Commission or a Commission member,
official or employee) upon whom may be served any process, pleadings,
or other papers in any action brought against the nonresident SBS
Entity, (2) furnish the Commission with the identity and address of its
agent for services of process, (3) certify that the firm can, as a
matter of law, provide the Commission with prompt access to its books
and records and can, as a matter of law, submit to onsite inspection
and examination by the Commission, and (4) provide the Commission with
an opinion of counsel concurring that the firm can, as a matter of law,
provide the Commission with prompt access to its books and records and
can, as a matter of law, submit to onsite inspection and examination by
the Commission.
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    \65\ The Commission has received questions as to how the
registration requirements for SBS Entities would apply to non-U.S.
persons. The Commission is continuing to consider the application of
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act to non-U.S. persons and intends to
address these issues in a separate release, and notes that the
proposals described herein with respect to nonresident SBS Entities
will be informed by the considerations and comments raised in
connection with that release. See, e.g., Letter from Barclays Bank
PLC, BNP Paribas S.A., Deutsche Bank AG, Royal Bank of Canada, The
Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, Soci[eacute]t[eacute]
G[eacute]n[eacute]rale, and UBS AG to David A. Stawick, Secretary,
CFTC, Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC, and Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Jan.
11, 2011); Letter from Sarah A. Miller, Chief Executive Officer,
Institute of International Bankers, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, SEC, and David A. Stawick, Secretary, CFTC (Jan. 10,
2011); Letter from Barclays Bank PLC, BNP Paribas S.A., Credit
Suisse AG, Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC, Nomura Securities International,
Inc., Rabobank Nederland, Royal Bank of Canada, The Royal Bank of
Scotland Group PLC, Soci[eacute]t[eacute] G[eacute]n[eacute]rale,
The Toronto-Dominion Bank, and UBS AG to David A. Stawick,
Secretary, CFTC, Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC, and Jennifer
J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Feb. 17, 2011); and Letter from Laura J. Schisgall, Managing
Director and Senior Counsel, Soci[eacute]t[eacute]
G[eacute]n[eacute]rale, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC, and
David A. Stawick, Secretary, CFTC (Feb. 18, 2011). The Commission is
also considering the approach outlined in the letter from Katsunori
Mikuniya, Commissioner & Chief Executive, Financial Services Agency,
Government of Japan, to Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (Apr. 1, 2011).
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    Paragraph (a) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-4 would define the term
``nonresident security-based swap dealer'' and ``nonresident major
security-based swap participant,'' for purposes of Rule 15Fb2-4. Under
this definition, an SBS Entity that is incorporated any place that is
not in the United States would be considered to be a nonresident. In
addition, an SBS Entity that has its principal place of business in any
place not in the United States would be considered to be a nonresident.
    Q-111. Should the terms ``nonresident security-based swap dealer''
and ``nonresident major security-based swap participant'' be defined
differently and, if so, how should the definitions be amended and why?
1. United States Agent for Service of Process
    Paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-4 would require
that each nonresident SBS Entity registered or registering with the
Commission obtain a written irrevocable consent and power of attorney
appointing an agent for service of process in the United States (other
than the Commission or a Commission member, official or employee) upon
whom may be served any process, pleadings, or other papers in any
action brought against the nonresident SBS Entity and furnish the
Commission with the identity and address of its agent for services of
process on Schedule F \66\ to Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD,
as applicable.\67\ These requirements are important to facilitate the
Commission and others (for example, the U.S. Department of Justice and
any other agency with the power to enforce the Exchange Act) to serve
process on a nonresident SBS Entity to enforce the Exchange Act.
Paragraph (b)(4) of the proposed rule also would require that
registered nonresident SBS Entities must promptly appoint a successor
agent if it discharges its identified agent for service of process or
if its agent for service of process is unwilling or unable to accept
service on its behalf.\68\ Further, proposed paragraph (b)(3) would
require that registered SBS Entities promptly inform the Commission,
through an amendment of the Schedule F of Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or
Form SBSE-BD, as appropriate, of any change to either its agent for
service of process or the name or address of its existing agent for
service of process. Finally, paragraph (b)(5) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-4
would require that the registered nonresident

[[Page 65800]]

SBS Entity maintain, as part of its books and records, the agreement
identified in paragraph (b)(1) for at least three years after the
agreement is terminated.
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    \66\ The Schedule F is discussed more fully below as part of the
discussion of the Forms.
    \67\ Paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-4,
respectively.
    \68\ Paragraph (b)(3) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-4.
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    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the requirement
for nonresident SBS Entities to appoint an agent in the United States
to receive service of process, pleadings or papers in any action
brought against the nonresident SBS Entity.
    Q-112. Should only certain types of entities (such as law firms) be
allowed to act as U.S. agent for service of process?
    Q-113. Should these requirements be expanded to require nonresident
SBS Entities to appoint a U.S. agent for purposes of all potential
legal proceedings, including those from non-governmental entities, or
is this already adequately addressed by contract?
    Q-114. Should the Commission require nonresident SBS Entities to
provide the Commission with additional information not required of U.S.
SBS Entities, such as verification of any non-U.S. registrations?
    Q-115. Is the three year time frame for which an SBS Entity would
be required to maintain, as part of its books and records, the
agreement appointing its agent for service of process appropriate?
Would a longer or shorter time period be more appropriate?
2. Access to Books and Records of Nonresident SBS Entity
    Proposed Rule 15Fb2-4(c)(1), regarding access to books and records,
would require that each nonresident SBS Entity registering with the
Commission \69\ provide an opinion of counsel and certify on Schedule F
of Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as appropriate, that it
can, as a matter of law, provide the Commission with prompt access to
its books and records and can, as a matter of law, submit to onsite
inspection and examination by the Commission.\70\ The Commission
preliminarily believes that the nonresident SBS Entity certification
and supporting opinion of counsel is important to confirm that each
nonresident SBS Entity located overseas has taken the necessary steps
to be in the position to provide the Commission with prompt access to
its books and records and to be subject to inspection and examination
by the Commission. To effectively fulfill its regulatory oversight
responsibilities with respect to nonresident SBS Entities registered
with it, the Commission must have access to those entities' records and
the ability to examine them; however, certain foreign jurisdictions may
have laws that complicate the ability of financial institutions such as
nonresident SBS Entities located in their jurisdictions from sharing
and/or transferring certain information including personal financial
data of individuals that the financial institutions come to possess
from third persons (e.g., personal data relating to the identity of
market participants or their customers). The required certification and
opinion of counsel regarding the nonresident SBS Entity's ability to
provide prompt access to books and records and to be subject to
inspection and examination will allow the Commission to better evaluate
a nonresident SBS Entity's ability to meet the requirements of
registration and ongoing supervision. Failure to make this
certification or provide an opinion of counsel may be a basis for the
Commission to deny an application for registration.
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    \69\ See supra note 65.
    \70\ In accordance with Proposed Rule 15Fb1-1(b), the SBS Entity
will need to maintain a manually signed copy of this certification
as part of its books and records until at least three years after
the certification has been replaced or is no longer effective.
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    Paragraph (c)(2) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-4 would require that
registered nonresident SBS Entities re-certify, on Schedule F to Form
SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as applicable, within 90 days after
any changes in the legal or regulatory framework that would impact the
nonresident SBS Entity's ability to provide, or the manner in which it
provides, the Commission prompt access to its books and records or
impacts the Commission's ability to inspect and examine the nonresident
SBS Entity. The re-certification would be required to include a revised
opinion of counsel describing how, as a matter of law, the entity will
continue to meet its obligations to provide the Commission with prompt
access to its books and records and to be subject to Commission
inspection and examination under the new regulatory regime. If a
registered nonresident SBS Entity becomes unable to comply with this
certification because of such changes, or otherwise, then this may be a
basis for the Commission to revoke the nonresident SBS Entity's
registration.
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the certification
and opinion of counsel requirements contained in paragraph (c) of
proposed Rule 15Fb2-4.
    Q-116. Will this certification requirement provide the Commission
with adequate assurance that nonresident SBS Entities will be able to
provide the Commission with access to records?
    Q-117. Should the Commission specify that the opinion of counsel
contain any additional information? For instance, should the
requirement clarify that the opinion of counsel reference the
applicable local law or, in the case of an amendment, the manner in
which the local law was amended?
    Q-118. As described above, certain foreign jurisdictions may have
laws that complicate the ability of financial institutions such as
nonresident SBS Entities located in their jurisdictions from sharing
and/or transferring certain information. What impact may the
requirement that a nonresident SBS Entity obtain and submit the
described opinion of counsel have on a nonresident SBS Entity's ability
to register in the United States in such circumstances or otherwise?
Are there circumstances where it would be impossible or impractical for
the nonresident SBS Entity to obtain the opinion of counsel? Would a
nonresident SBS Entity need to cease doing business in the United
States or with U.S. persons solely because of this requirement? Why or
why not?
    Q-119. If the described opinion of counsel were not required, what
alternatives would the Commission have to assure that it is able to
access a registered nonresident SBS Entity's books and records and
examine the registered nonresident SBS Entity in order to effectively
fulfill its oversight responsibilities? What are the relative
advantages or disadvantages of any such alternatives?
    Q-120. Should the requirement that an SBS Entity obtain an amended
opinion of counsel and re-certify its ability to provide the Commission
with access to records be limited in any way?
    Q-121. The Commission has received three comment letters containing
alternative suggestions as to how the Commission should accommodate a
foreign bank with a U.S. affiliate that organizes its business so that
it could engage in security-based swap transactions with U.S. investors
while being subject to a more limited regulatory regime under the
Exchange Act in recognition that it is subject to regulation in its
home country.\71\ The

[[Page 65801]]

Commission requests comment regarding whether the requirement that an
applicant provide an opinion of counsel should be amended to recognize
or facilitate such arrangements. If so, why and in what way should the
requirement be modified? If not, why? Would an amended requirement
provide the Commission with adequate assurance that nonresident SBS
Entities will be able to provide the Commission with sufficient access
to records?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ See letter to Mr. David A. Stawick, Secretary, CFTC, Ms.
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, and Ms. Jennifer J.
Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, on behalf of Barclays Bank PLC, BNP
Paribas S.A., Deutsche Bank AG, Royal Bank of Canada, The Royal Bank
of Scotland Group plc, Soci[eacute]t[eacute] G[eacute]n[eacute]rale
and UBS AG, dated January 11, 2011 (http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-39-10/s73910-9.pdf); letter to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Commission, and David A. Stawick, Secretary, CFTC, dated January 10,
2011 (http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-39-10/s73910-8.pdf); and letter
to Ananda Radhakrishnan, Director, Division of Clearing and
Intermediary Oversight, CFTC, John M. Ramsay, Deputy Director,
Division of Trading and Markets, Commission, and Mark E. Van Der
Weide, Senior Associate Director, Division of Supervision and
Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, dated
November 23, 2010 (http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-34-10/s73410-3.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Special Situations

1. Succession: Proposed Rule 15Fb2-5
    Proposed Rule 15Fb2-5 would provide a process through which an SBS
Entity could succeed to the business of another SBS Entity.\72\
Consistent with the use of the term in connection with broker-dealer
registration, we propose to consider a ``succession'' to mean that a
successor firm acquires or assumes substantially all of the assets and
liabilities of the predecessor firm.\73\
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    \72\ This proposed rule is based on Exchange Act Rule 15b1-3,
which is applicable to registered brokers and dealers and has worked
well to facilitate succession of registrants.
    \73\ Registration of Successors to Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, Exchange Act Release No. 31661 (Dec. 28, 1992) (58 FR 7
(Jan. 4, 1993)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Rule 15Fb2-5 would provide that, if an SBS Entity succeeds
to and continues the business of another SBS Entity, the registration
of the predecessor SBS Entity will remain effective as the registration
of the successor if the successor files an application for registration
in accordance with Rule 15Fb2-1 within 30 days after such succession,
and the predecessor files a notice of withdrawal from registration on
Form SBSE-W.
    Paragraph (b) of Proposed Rule 15Fb2-5 would allow a successor firm
that succeeds to the business of another for minor reasons, where the
ownership or control of the SBS Entity does not change (e.g., solely
because it is changing its date or state of incorporation, form of
organization, or the composition of a partnership), to simply amend the
registration of the predecessor SBS Entity on Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A,
or Form SBSE-BD, as appropriate, within 30 days after the change.
    Q-122. Are these proposed successor rules appropriate for SBS
Entities?
    Q-123. Should the concept of succession be the same as used in the
context of broker-dealer registration? Commenters should explain why
any differences would be appropriate.
    Q-124. Are the timeframes provided, which seem to work well in the
broker-dealer context, appropriate with respect to SBS Entity
succession?
2. Insolvency: Proposed Rule 15Fb2-6
    Proposed Rule 15Fb2-6 would provide a process through which an
executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, assignee for the
benefit of creditors, receiver, trustee in insolvency or bankruptcy or
other fiduciary appointed or qualified by order, judgment or decree of
a court of competent jurisdiction could continue the business of an SBS
Entity.\74\ This is important to allow a fiduciary time to close-out
positions and/or wind down an SBS Entity's business. Under the proposed
rule, the fiduciary would be required to file with the Commission,
within 30 days after entering upon the performance of his or her
duties, an amended Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as
appropriate, indicating the fiduciary's position with respect to
management of the SBS Entity, along with a copy of the order, judgment,
decree, or other document appointing the fiduciary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ The proposed rule is based on Exchange Act Rule 15b1-4,
which applies to broker-dealer registrations. We believe this rule
has worked well to allow fiduciaries to wind-up broker-dealer
businesses without the need to separately register as a broker-
dealer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Q-125. Is proposed Rule 15Fb2-6 appropriate for SBS Entities? If
another process would be more appropriate, please describe it.
    Q-126. Should fiduciaries be able to continue the business of an
SBS Entity to facilitate an orderly liquidation? If not, why?
    Q-127. Is the proposed 30-day timeframe, which is consistent with
the Rule 15b1-4 requirement for broker-dealer fiduciaries, sufficient
for an SBS Entity fiduciary to make the required filing with the
Commission?
    Q-128. Do the close-out provisions in the agreements between the
parties provide sufficient ability for counterparties to close-out open
positions in the event of an SBS Entity default so that a fiduciary
would not be needed? Please explain.

F. Technical Rules

1. Electronic Signatures
    Proposed Rule 15Fb1-1 would specify the format required for
signatures to, or within, electronic submissions (including signatories
within the forms and certifications required by Sec. Sec.  240.15Fb2-1,
240.15Fb2-4 and 240.15Fb6-1, discussed below). In addition, paragraph
(b) of proposed Rule 15Fb1-1 would require that each signatory to such
an electronic filing manually sign a signature page or other document
authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting his or her
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic filing
either before or at the time the electronic filing is made. Paragraph
(b) would also require that the SBS Entity create the manually signed
document when the electronic form is submitted, and furnish a copy of
such document to the Commission upon request. Paragraph (c) of proposed
Rule 15Fb1-1 would prohibit a person required to provide a signature on
an electronic submission from having another person sign the form or
certification on his or her behalf pursuant to a power of attorney or
other form of confirming authority. Finally, paragraph (d) would
require that the SBS Entity retain the manually signed document
associated with Schedules F and G of Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, or SBSE-BD, as
appropriate, until at least three years after the form or certification
has been replaced or is no longer effective, and the manually signed
document associated with Form SBSE-C until at least three years after
the Form was submitted to the Commission.
    This proposed rule is based on Section 302 of Regulation S-T,\75\
and is designed to require standard formatting of electronic signatures
and provide the Commission with the ability to obtain additional
documents to verify those signatures. In addition, paragraph (c) of
proposed Rule 15Fb1-1 is based on paragraph (d) of Exchange Act Rule
15d-14. The Commission believes that this paragraph is necessary to
assure that persons signing certifications can be held responsible for
their statements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ 17 CFR 232.302.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of Rule 15b1-1.
    Q-129. Is it adequate to require an SBS Entity to maintain a signed
copy of each certification as part of its books and records so that it
is available for examiners to review?
    Q-130. Should the Commission require SBS Entities to file the
original certifications with the Commission?
    Q-131. Are the timeframes for retention of manually signed
documents appropriate? Why or why not? If not, what timeframe or
timeframes may be more appropriate and why?

[[Page 65802]]

2. Temporary Rule To Facilitate Paper Filing of Forms
    If a technological means to facilitate receipt and retention of
applications required to be filed in accordance with Rule 15Fb2-1 is
not functional by the time final rules are adopted, proposed temporary
Rule 15Fb2-2T would require an SBS Entity to file its application on
Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as applicable, and all
additional documents in paper form by sending it to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090,
notwithstanding paragraph (c)(1) of Rule 15Fb2-1. In addition, if
proposed temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T is adopted, paragraph (b) would
require that each applicant must resubmit its Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A,
and Form SBSE-BD, as applicable and all additional documents to the
Commission electronically within three months of the date such
technological means to facilitate receipt and retention of applications
becomes functional. Depending on the timing, SBS Entities may also need
to file their Forms SBSE-C in paper format and later resubmit those
Forms electronically.
    Proposed temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T would provide a process for the
Commission to receive applications in paper format if a technological
means to facilitate receipt and retention of applications cannot be
completed before final SBS Entity registration rules are adopted.
Further, Proposed temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T would facilitate the
transition of data to an electronic format once such a system becomes
functional. The benefits of an electronic system outweigh additional
costs relating to the need for SBS Entities to file their applications
in both paper and electronic form. In addition, requiring that each SBS
Entity file its application electronically would assure that each firm
can confirm that the data entered into the electronic system is
accurate and complete.
    The Commission requests comment on proposed temporary rule 15Fb2-
2T.
    Q-132. Is this paper process practicable?
    Q-133. Should the Commission instead allow applicants to submit
their applications in PDF form via e-mail?
    Q-134. Instead of the process contemplated by paragraph (b) of
proposed Rule 15Fb2-2T, should the Commission reduce the paper filings
to electronic form instead of the applicants?

G. Forms

1. Form SBSE
    Proposed Form SBSE is generally based on Form BD--the consolidated
Form used by broker-dealers to register with the Commission, states and
SROs. Form BD has been used to gather and organize certain information
concerning applicants' business operations to facilitate Commission,
state and SRO initial registration decisions, as well as ongoing
examination and monitoring of registrations. Because SBS Entities will
be subject to many requirements similar to those that affect broker-
dealers (e.g., minimum capital, leverage, and business conduct rules
and statutory disqualification prohibitions), the Commission believes
using Form BD as a template for the registration of SBS Entities is
logical and efficient. Key differences from Form BD are outlined below:
     The phrase ``broker or dealer'' was changed to ``security-
based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant'' because
Form SBSE will be used by firms to register as SBS Entities and not as
broker-dealers;
     References to SROs and jurisdictions were removed except
where they arose in the context of a contractual relationship or
disciplinary proceeding because SBS Entities will generally not be
required to register with SROs or states;
     References to branch offices were removed because the SBS
business is generally conducted on a more centralized basis and is not
effected through branch offices;
     The General Instructions eliminate the instructions for
filing the form in paper format because we intend to require that the
forms be filed electronically; \76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ If a technological means to facilitate the receipt and
retention of applications is not finalized by the time final rules
are adopted and the Commission must adopt proposed Rule 15Fb2-2T,
instructions regarding paper filing would be re-inserted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The Explanation of Terms section is substantially the
same; \77\ however the term ``jurisdiction'' was replaced with the term
``state'' to eliminate potential confusion regarding questions in Item
11 that relate to actions brought in either domestic or foreign
jurisdictions and the term ``foreign financial regulatory authority''
was removed because it is now defined in Exchange Act Section 3(a)(52);
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ The Explanation of Terms section includes definitions of
the terms applicant, control, state, person, self-regulatory
organization, successor, charged, control affiliate, enjoined,
felony, found, investment or investment-related, involved, minor
rule violation, misdemeanor, order, and proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Item 1-J of Form SBSE would elicit the name and contact
information for the Chief Compliance Officer designated by the
applicant in accordance with Exchange Act Section 15F(k) (broker-
dealers are not now required to provide this information on Form BD);
     Item 2b of Form SBSE would elicit information, if a firm
is registering as a major security-based swap participant, regarding
whether the firm is registering because it maintains a substantial
position, has substantial counterparty exposure, or is highly leveraged
relative to its capital position, which will assist the staff in
evaluating its application;
     Item 3 of Form SBSE would elicit whether the SBS Entity
intends to use mathematical models to calculate any applicable capital
or margin or to price customer or proprietary positions (whether or not
for regulatory purposes), which will assist the staff in considering
what types of examinations may be required;
     Item 4 of Form SBSE would elicit whether the applicant is
subject to regulation by a prudential regulator \78\ because the extent
of the Commission's regulatory responsibilities for entities subject to
regulation by a prudential regulator differ;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ The term ``prudential regulator'' is now defined at 15
U.S.C. 78c(a)(74).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     In addition to eliciting information regarding
recordkeeping arrangements, Item 8 would also query whether the
applicant has any arrangement under which any other person, firm or
organization executes, trades, custodies, clears or settles on behalf
of the applicant (including any SRO or swap execution facility in which
the applicant is a member). This information is designed to provide the
Commission with an understanding of the SBS Entity's business
relationships.
     References to the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation in the ``Execution'' section have been eliminated because
SBS Entities are not required to become members of SIPC \79\ and
references to surety bonding and service of process in each state has
also been eliminated because Form SBSE does not facilitate registration
with states (as the Form BD does);
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ Only SBS Entities that are also registered as a broker-
dealer would be SIPC members. SBS Entities that are also registered
as a broker-dealer will be required to file Form SBSE-BD and not
Form SBSE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Form SBSE would require disclosure of whether the
applicant is registering as an SBS dealer or major security-based swap
participant, the applicant's legal status, whether the applicant is
succeeding to the business

[[Page 65803]]

of another SBS Entity, and the applicant's control relationships; \80\
and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ These questions are similar to questions that appear on
pages 2 and 3 of the Form BD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Form SBSE would elicit a description of the applicant's
business in a text box rather than through the use of a list of
possible types of business.
    Proposed Form SBSE, like Form BD, would elicit information
regarding criminal disclosures, regulatory action disclosures, civil
judicial disclosures, and financial disclosures. As with Form BD,
``yes'' answers to these questions would require that the applicant
file additional information on disclosure reporting pages (or ``DRPs'')
as a supplement to the Form. As with Form BD, Form SBSE would also
elicit information on whether the applicant is registered with the
Commission as an investment adviser, registered with the CFTC as an
FCM, or whether it is engaged in any other investment-related, non-
securities business.
    Schedules A and B, which elicit information regarding direct and
indirect owners and executive officers, would be largely unchanged
(with the exception of the header, the elimination of a request for
social security numbers in the tables): however, the table in Schedule
A has been expanded to elicit information regarding prior investment-
related experience of individual owners who are not otherwise
registered through CRD or IARD to provide the Commission an
understanding of each owner's background and qualifications in light of
the fact that they will not be individually registered as is the case
with owners of broker-dealers. Schedule C would be eliminated because
electronic filing of the forms would make it unnecessary. Schedule D
would be amended slightly to address differences between the security-
based swap business and the broker-dealer business (e.g., there are no
``introducing and clearing arrangements''). In addition, Section IV in
Item D has been expanded to elicit additional information regarding the
nature of the execution, trading, custody, clearing or settlement
arrangement, as well as information regarding any prior investment-
related experience of individual control persons who are not otherwise
registered through CRD or IARD. This information is designed to provide
the Commission with an understanding of the SBS Entity's business
relationships and each control person's respective background and
qualifications in light of the fact that they will not be individually
registered as is the case with owners of broker-dealers. The staff
understands that SBS Entities may conduct security-based swap business
from multiple locations; however, those that would register with the
Commission using Form SBSE likely would not refer to those locations as
``branches.'' Consequently, Schedule E of Form SBSE \81\ would solicit
information regarding locations rather than branches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ Schedule E of Form BD has been replaced by Form BR, which
is designed to enable broker-dealers to register their branch office
locations electronically with SROs and states. See, Self-Regulatory
Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Proposed Uniform Branch Office
Registration Form (``Form BR''), Exchange Act Release No. 52543
(Sep. 30, 2005), 70 FR 58771 (Oct. 7, 2005); and Self-Regulatory
Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.;
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto and
Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to
Amendment No. 2 to the Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Proposed
Uniform Branch Office Registration Form (``Form BR'') and Amendments
to the Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or
Transfer (``Form U4'') and the Uniform Termination Notice for
Securities Industry Registration (``Form U5''), Exchange Act Release
No. 52544 (Sep. 30, 2005), 70 FR 58764 (Oct. 7, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed form would also include two additional schedules to be
used by SBS Entities--Schedules F and G. Schedule F must be submitted
by nonresident SBS Entities pursuant to proposed Rule 15Fb2-4 to
provide the Commission with information regarding its appointed U.S.
agent for service of process and to certify that it is able to provide
the Commission with prompt access to its books and records.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ Nonresident broker-dealers must presently file one of four
similar forms (Form 7-M, Form 8-M, Form 9-M or Form 10-M, depending
on the broker-dealer's form or organization) to appoint an agent for
service of process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Schedule G would be required to be submitted by all SBS Entities
pursuant to proposed Rule 15Fb6-1(a). Schedule G would provide each SBS
Entity with a method to certify that none of its associated persons
that are effecting or involved in effecting security-based swaps on its
behalf is subject to statutory disqualification. This Schedule is
designed to provide the Commission with assurance that the SBS Entity
is compliant with Section 15F(b)(6) of the Exchange Act. The Form would
require that the firm's Chief Compliance Officer sign Schedule G.
    The Commission intends to use the information disclosed by
applicants in Form SBSE (including the Schedules and DRPs) to determine
whether the applicant meets the standards for registration, and to
fulfill its oversight responsibilities.
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of Form SBSE.
    Q-135. Should the registration form for SBS Entities be based on
Form BD, CFTC Form 7-R, or some other form? Please describe the reasons
for choosing a particular form over another.
    Q-136. How many firms may apply for registration as SBS Entities?
    Q-137. Should any of the instructions or questions on Form SBSE be
amended to recognize particular characteristics of the business of SBS
Entities?
    Q-138. Are any of the proposed questions on Form SBSE inapplicable
to the SBS business?
    Q-139. Should any questions be added to Form SBSE to elicit
information that is unique to the SBS business or to the SBS Entities
that engage in that business?
    Q-140. Is proposed new Schedule F the best method to collect
information regarding a nonresident SBS Entity's agent for service of
process? If not, what other method could the Commission utilize?
    Q-141. Is the requirement that an SBS Entity certify on new
Schedule F that it can, as a matter of law, provide the Commission with
access to its books and records and allow the Commission to conduct
onsite inspections the best method to assure the Commission is able to
have such access? If not, what other method could the Commission
utilize?
    Q-142. Is it appropriate to require a nonresident SBS Entities to
also submit an opinion of counsel opining on this issue?
    Q-143. Is proposed new Schedule G the best method to assure that an
SBS Entity is complying with Section 15F(b)(6) of the Exchange Act? If
not, what other method could the Commission utilize?
    Q-144. Would the Form SBSE disclosure requirements present any
unique issues for financial institutions not previously subject to
similar disclosure requirements? If so, please describe.
    Q-145. Should Form SBSE include additional Schedules in which the
applicant could provide more detailed information regarding its
business (e.g., a business plan, descriptions of the types of products
the applicant will offer, the types of counterparties it will have,
information regarding the applicant's operational, supervisory and
compliance infrastructure, its major vendors, its clearing
arrangements), similar to what the Commission typically requires of
other types of applicants (e.g., clearing agencies and national
securities exchanges)? If so, what specific types of information should
be required?

[[Page 65804]]

    Q-146. If there are changes in this type of information over time,
how frequently should the registrant be required to update the relevant
schedules?
2. Form SBSE-A
    CEA Section 4s(c) and Exchange Act Section 15F(c) require that
persons that engage in both swap business and security-based swap
business must separately register with each agency. However, the staff
is proposing that applicants that are not registered with the
Commission as broker-dealers, but that are registered or registering
with the CFTC as either a swap dealer or major swap participant, file
their application for registration on an alternative to Form SBSE, or
Form SBSE-A. Form SBSE-A is a shorter form and is intended to make it
easier for dual applicants to file with both agencies. As part of its
application, a firm filing with the Commission on Form SBSE-A would
need to provide the Commission with a copy of the form it files with
the CFTC to register as a swap dealer or major swap participant. Form
SBSE-A is designed to provide the Commission with data, not included on
the form the applicant must file with the CFTC, that the Commission
believes it will need to adequately review an application for
registration.\83\ While some information elicited via Form SBSE-A also
may be elicited by the CFTC's form, it will be helpful for the
Commission to receive this information directly to allow the Commission
to match the Form SBSE-A with the CFTC Form and to coordinate the
information elicited through Form SBSE-A with other information the
Commission may have on the applicant. The Commission believes that
requiring that these applicants use Form SBSE-A would reduce the costs
and burdens associated with filing distinctly different forms to
register with both the Commission and CFTC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ The CFTC has proposed that swap dealers and major swap
participants file their applications on Form 7-R and accompanying
Form 8-R. Also, see supra note 10. Consequently, the Commission's
assessment of what information applicants should be required to
provide on Form SBSE-A was based on Form 7-R. If the CFTC's
application form for swap dealers or major swap participants
deviates substantially from Form 7-R, the Commission will need to
re-assess the information it would need to collect through Form
SBSE-A. Form 8-R is the Form used for registration of individuals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Form SBSE-A is loosely based on Form SBSE, which, as
described above is based on Form BD (the Form used by broker-dealers to
register with the Commission). As discussed more fully above, the
Commission has used Form BD to gather information necessary for it and
the SROs to determine whether to grant broker-dealer registration to an
applicant. Key differences from Form SBSE are outlined below:
     The General Instructions have been modified to identify
the Form and Schedules to be used to register as an SBS Entity and to
eliminate the instructions for filing in paper format because we intend
to require that the forms be filed electronically; \84\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ See paragraph (c) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     To reduce potential confusion regarding the use of two
forms,\85\ the initial instruction in the Explanation of Terms section
states that terms used in Form SBSE-A that are defined in CFTC Form 7-R
shall have the same meaning as set forth in that form, and terms not
otherwise defined in CFTC Form 7-R have the same meaning as in Form
SBSE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ One to register with the CFTC as a swap dealer or major
swap participant and one to register with the Commission as an SBS
Entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Item 1.C. on Form SBSE-A would elicit the firm's NFA number. Items
2 through 13 of proposed Form SBSE-A would require that the applicant
identify the capacity in which it is seeking to register with the
Commission, the capacity in which it is registered with or seeking to
register with the CFTC, certain control and business relationships,
succession and other basic information regarding the firm's business.
These questions are similar to information elicited via Form SBSE,
which elicit information not otherwise elicited through Form 7-R but
which the Commission believes is useful to facilitate its oversight of
regulated entities.
    Item 2b of Form SBSE-A would elicit information, if a firm is
requesting registration as a major security-based swap participant,
regarding whether the firm is registering because it maintains a
substantial position, has substantial counterparty exposure, or is
highly leveraged relative to its capital position, which will assist
the staff in evaluating its application. Item 3 of Form SBSE-A would
elicit whether the SBS Entity intended to use mathematical models to
calculate capital or margin or to price customer or proprietary
positions because this would highlight for staff the need for a more
extensive review. Item 5 of Form SBSE would elicit whether the
applicant is subject to regulation by a prudential regulator because
the extent of the Commission's regulatory responsibilities for entities
subject to regulation by a prudential regulator differ.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Items fourteen and fifteen on Form SBSE-A would elicit information
regarding ``principals.'' The definition of ``principal'' in CFTC Form
7-R is similar to the definition of control affiliate in Form BD. Form
BD requires that an applicant file substantial information on its
control affiliates. We understand that the CFTC presently requires that
individual principals of entities registered with the CFTC file
separate registrations with the CFTC. Consequently, the CFTC would have
information on those individuals regarding any situations that would
cause those individuals to be statutorily disqualified without
requiring that the applicant include that information in its
application. In recognition of this method and to decrease duplication,
item thirteen would require that an applicant identify how many
individual principals it has. Further, the applicant would need to list
those principals on proposed new Schedule A to Form SBSE-A and provide
information regarding those individual principals similar to the
information provided on Schedule A of Form SBSE. Item fifteen asks
whether any principals of the applicant that are entities effect or are
involved in effecting security-based swaps on behalf of the applicant.
If the question is answered in the affirmative, the applicant would
need to provide additional information on Schedule B with respect to
those entities. This information is designed help the Commission better
understand the relationship between the applicant and its principals in
order to assure compliance with Section 15F(b)(6) of the Exchange Act
and to police for manipulation and fraud.
    As discussed above, Schedule A of Form SBSE-A would require that an
applicant list all principals that are individuals and provide some
basic information regarding each (e.g., the person's title, NFA number,
and prior investment-related experience). Much of this information is
provided to the Commission via Form BD for broker-dealers, and the CFTC
would already have this information on control persons but, without new
Schedule A to Form SBSE-A, the Commission would not otherwise have this
information. This information is designed to help the Commission better
understand the relationship between the applicant and its principals
and a basic background of those principals in order to assure
compliance with Section 15F(b)(6) of the Exchange Act and to police for
manipulation and fraud.
    Schedule B would elicit information regarding other business in
which the applicant is engaged, business

[[Page 65805]]

arrangements, successions, and principals that are not identified in
Schedule A, and is based loosely on Schedule D to Form BD. Schedule C
would elicit information regarding principals that are identified in
Schedule B that would cause those persons to be statutorily
disqualified, and is based on Item 11 in Form BD.\87\ The applicant
would need to file a DRP for every ``yes'' answer in Schedule C. The
Schedules F and G to Form SBSE-A are the same Schedules as described
above in the section regarding Form SBSE.
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    \87\ Any differences between Schedule B to Form SBSE-A and
Schedule D to Form SBSE and between Schedule C of Form SBSE-A and
Item 11 in Form SBSE recognize the fact that Form SBSE-A has been
tailored to collect information not otherwise elicited via Form 7-R
which the Commission has found to be helpful to facilitate its
oversight of the entities it regulates.
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    The Commission intends to use the information disclosed in Form
SBSE-A to determine whether applicants meet the standards for
registration and to fulfill its oversight responsibilities.
    Q-147. Is Form SBSE-A properly tailored to decrease costs for dual
registration while still providing the Commission with information
necessary on which to base its decision to grant or deny registration?
    Q-148. What are the comparative costs or benefits with respect to
filing Form SBSE versus filing Form SBSE-A for entities filing as both
swap entities with the CFTC and SBS Entities with the Commission?
    Q-149. How many firms expect to apply for registration as SBS
Entities and what is the likelihood that those entities will also
register with the CFTC as swap dealers or major swap participants?
    Q-150. Will the benefit of being able to file the same form with
the Commission as filed with the CFTC be outweighed by the requirement
to file those forms, as well as additional schedules and documents,
with more than one agency or entity or through more than one electronic
system?
    Q-151. Should FCMs registered with the CFTC that are not registered
or registering with the CFTC as either a swap dealer or a major swap
participant be allowed to register with the Commission using Form SBSE-
A?
    Q-152. Are any such FCMs likely to register with the Commission as
an SBS Entity?
    Q-153. Would it be more cost effective for the Commission to obtain
the data applicants file with the CFTC electronically from the CFTC or
its designee rather than having the applicant file a copy of that form
with the Commission?
    Q-154. Should any of the instructions or questions on Form SBSE-A
be amended to recognize particular characteristics of the business of
SBS Entities?
    Q-155. Are any of the proposed questions inapplicable to the SBS
business?
    Q-156. Should any questions be added to elicit information that is
unique to the SBS business or to the SBS Entities that engage in that
business?
3. Form SBSE-BD
    Similar to the Form SBSE-A, the staff is proposing that applicants
that are also registered or registering with the Commission as broker-
dealers file their application for registration on an alternative to
Form SBSE, or Form SBSE-BD.\88\ In addition, any entity that is
registered or registering with the Commission as a broker-dealer and
that is also registered or registering with the CFTC as a swap dealer
or major swap participant would be required to use the Form SBSE-BD.
Form SBSE-BD is based on Form BD, but is designed to provide the
Commission with data not included on the Form BD (to which the
Commission has access). The Commission believes that requiring that
these applicants use Form SBSE-BD would reduce the costs and burdens on
applicants that are already registered or registering with the
Commission as broker-dealers.
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    \88\ Over-the-counter derivatives dealers, a limited form of
broker-dealer established by the Commission in 1998, could also file
on Form SBSE-BD.
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    The proposed Form SBSE-BD would consist of a single page that would
elicit information not included on Form BD, such as the capacity in
which the applicant is registering, whether the entity also is
registering with the CFTC and, if so, in what capacity the firm is
registering with the CFTC, if a firm is requesting registration as a
major security-based swap participant--whether the firm is registering
because it maintains a substantial position, has substantial
counterparty exposure, or is highly leveraged relative to its capital
position, whether the SBS Entity intends to use mathematical models to
calculate capital or margin or to price customer or proprietary
positions, whether the firm is subject to oversight by a prudential
regulator and information regarding the applicant's chief compliance
officer. Form SBSE-BD would also require that applicants submit
Schedules F and G, described more fully above.
    The Commission intends to use the information disclosed in Form
SBSE-BD to determine whether applicants meet the standards for
registration, and to fulfill its oversight responsibilities.
    Q-157. What will the comparative costs or benefits be with respect
to filing Form SBSE versus filing Form SBSE-BD for registered broker-
dealers filing as SBS Entities with the Commission?
    Q-158. How many firms expect to apply for registration as SBS
Entities and whether those entities are already registered with the
Commission as broker-dealers?
    Q-159. Should any of the instructions or questions be amended to
recognize particular characteristics of the business of SBS Entities?
    Q-160. Are any of the proposed questions inapplicable to the SBS
business?
    Q-161. Should any questions be added to elicit information that is
unique to the SBS business or to the SBS Entities that engage in that
business?
4. Form SBSE-C
    Proposed Form SBSE-C is designed to provide SBS Entities with a
standard format and process through which to file the Senior Officer
Certification required pursuant to proposed Rule 15Fb2-1(b). Form SBSE-
C would need to be filed by all SBS Entities. As described above, SBS
Entities that submitted their applications during the transitional
period would need to file this certification either before the Last
Compliance Date or their conditional registration would expire. Major
securities-based swap participants that submitted their applications
after the Last Compliance Date would need to file this certification
within four months after filing a completed application or their
conditional registration would expire. SBS Dealers that file
applications after the Last Compliance Date would need to file both an
application and a certification simultaneously to be considered for
ongoing registration.
    Form SBSE-C includes instructions both requiring electronic
submission and explaining how the form should be filed electronically.
    Form SBSE-C would elicit the applicant's name, date, and SEC
number, along with the signature, name and title of the senior officer
signing the certification. The Commission intends to use the
certification provided by Form SBSE-C in determining whether applicants
meet the standards for ongoing registration.
    The Commission requests comment on the Form SBSE-C.
    Q-162. Should Form SBSE-C require that SBS Entities provide any
additional

[[Page 65806]]

information? If so, how should the form be amended?
    Q-163. Should the instructions to Form SBSE-C be amended?
5. Form SBSE-W
    Proposed Form SBSE-W is loosely based on Form BDW (the Form used by
broker-dealers to withdraw from registration with the Commission). The
Commission has found Form BDW to be an effective vehicle for gathering
information necessary for it and the SROs to determine whether it is
appropriate to allow a registered broker-dealer to withdraw from
registration. Because SBS Entities will be subject to many requirements
similar to those that affect broker-dealers (e.g., minimum capital,
leverage, and business conduct rules and statutory disqualification
prohibitions), the Commission believes using Form BDW as a template for
the request for withdrawal from registration of SBS Entities is logical
and efficient. Key differences from Form BDW are outlined below:
     The distinction regarding full and partial withdrawal was
eliminated from the Form SBSE-W as it is not relevant to the SBS
business; and
     Item 4 was added to elicit information regarding the
entity's reason for withdrawal from registration because we believe
this information would be useful when considering a registered SBS
Entity's request to withdraw from registration.
    The purpose of proposed Form SBSE-W is to allow the Commission to
determine whether it is in the public interest to permit a registered
SBS Entity to withdraw from registration.
    The Commission requests comment on the Form SBSE-W.
    Q-164. Given that the Commission has proposed to use different
forms for registration of certain types of applicants, should different
types of forms also be provided for withdrawals from registration? If
so, how should the form or forms be amended?
    Q-165. Should the instructions to Form SBSE-W be amended? If so,
how?
6. Tagged Data Formats
    As part of the Commission's longstanding efforts to (1) Improve the
accuracy of financial and other filed information, (2) increase the
transparency and usefulness of information, and (3) facilitate analysis
of information provided to the Commission via reports, we have begun
requiring that entities data-tag information contained in electronic
filings.\89\ Data becomes machine readable when it is labeled, or
``tagged,'' using a computer markup language that can be processed by
software programs for analysis. Such computer markup languages (such as
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) and eXtensible Business Reporting
Language (XBRL)) use standard sets of definitions, or ``taxonomies,''
that translate text-based information in Commission filings into
structured data that can be retrieved, searched, and analyzed through
automated means.
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    \89\ See Regulation S-T, 17 CFR 232. See also Electronic Filing
and Revision of Form D, Securities Act Release No. 8891 (Feb. 6,
2008) (73 FR 10592 (Feb. 27, 2008)); Interactive Data To Improve
Financial Reporting, Securities Act Release No. 9002 (Jan. 30, 2009)
(74 FR 6776 (Feb 10, 2009)); and Interactive Data for Mutual Fund
Risk/Return Summary, Securities Act Release No. 9006 (Feb. 11, 2009)
(74 FR 7748 (Feb 19, 2009)); Amendments to Rules for Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release
No. 61050 (Nov. 23, 2009) (74 FR 63832 (Dec. 4, 2009)); and Money
Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Release No. 29132 (Feb. 23,
2010 (75 FR 10060 (Mar. 4, 2010)).
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    In addition to using the data provided via proposed Forms SBSE,
SBSE-A, and SBSE-BD to determine whether to grant or deny registration,
the Commission will make this data public. The fact that counterparties
of SBS Entities would have access to additional, standardized
information could improve competition amongst SBS Entities and would
enable counterparties and the marketplace to expend less time and money
to independently obtain and compile information on SBS Entities to use
in making such choices. Thus, the Commission intends to tag the
information in a machine readable format using a data standard that is
freely available, and that is consistent and compatible with the tagged
data formats already in use for SEC filings, to enable users of that
data to retrieve, search, and analyze the data through automated means.
    Q-166. What tagged data language (e.g., XML, XBRL) would be most
appropriate to be used for the required data to be provided via
proposed Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, SBSE-BD, SBSE-C, and SBSE-W?

H. Alternative Approaches Considered

    The Commission considered alternative approaches to registration of
SBS Entities. One possibility would be to adopt joint registration
forms with the CFTC, so that SBS Entities could register with both
agencies using the same forms. While there could be benefits to this
approach, we believe that the Commission's streamlined approach will
achieve many of the same benefits.
    Another possibility would be for the CFTC to require swap dealers
and major swap participants to register using the Commission's forms,
or for the Commission to require SBS Entities to register using the
CFTC's forms. While this approach might streamline the registration
process for regulated entities, particularly those that intend to
engage in both swaps and SBS business, it would be more difficult for
the agencies to implement given the Commissions' finite resources.
Further, differences between the Commodity Exchange Act and the
Exchange Act and the means to facilitate registration may justify
differences in the forms.

III. Request for Comment

    In addition to the questions described above, we are requesting
comments on all aspects of proposed rules 15Fb1-1 through 15Fb6-1 and
Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, SBSE-BD, SBSE-C and SBSE-W, including with respect
to the following questions:
    Q-167. Should the Commissions continue to consider whether to
develop a joint registration form?
    In addition, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act requires that the SEC
consult and coordinate to the extent possible with the CFTC for the
purposes of assuring regulatory consistency and comparability, to the
extent possible, and states that in adopting rules, the CFTC and SEC
shall treat functionally or economically similar products or entities
in a similar manner.
    The CFTC is adopting rules related to registration of swap dealers
and major swap participants as required under Section 731 of the Dodd-
Frank Act. Understanding that the Commission and the CFTC regulate
different products and markets, and as such, appropriately may be
proposing alternative regulatory requirements, we request comments on
the impact of any differences between the Commission's approach to the
registration process for SBS Entities and CFTC's approach to the
registration of swap dealers and major swap participants. Specifically:
    Q-168. Do the regulatory approaches under the Commission's proposed
rulemaking pursuant to Section 764 of the Dodd-Frank Act and the CFTC's
proposed rulemaking pursuant to Section 731 of the Dodd-Frank Act
result in duplicative or inconsistent efforts on the part of market
participants subject to both regulatory regimes or result in gaps
between those regimes?
    Q-169. If so, in what ways do commenters believe that such
duplication, inconsistencies, or gaps should be minimized?
    Q-170. Do commenters believe the approaches proposed by the
Commission and the CFTC to register

[[Page 65807]]

SBS Entities and swap dealers and major swap participants are
comparable? If not, why?
    Q-171. Do commenters believe there are approaches that would make
the registration of SBS Entities and swap dealers and major swap
participants more comparable? If so, what?
    Q-172. Do commenters believe that it would be appropriate for the
Commission to adopt an approach proposed by the CFTC that differs from
our proposal? Is so, which one and why?
    We request commenters to provide data, to the extent possible,
supporting any such suggested approaches.
    The Commission is cognizant that the proposed rules discussed
herein, as well as other proposals that the Commission may consider in
the coming months to implement the Dodd-Frank Act, if adopted, could
significantly affect--and be significantly affected by--the nature and
scope of the security-based swaps market in a number of ways. For
example, the Commission recognizes that if the measures proposed in
this release are adopted and are too onerous for new entrants, they
could hinder the further development of a market for security-based
swaps by unduly discouraging competition and the formation of new SBS
Dealers and major security-based swap participants. On the other hand,
if the Commission adopts rules that are too permissive, the Commission
may grant registration to firms that may have insufficient capacity,
policies, procedures, or risk management systems. The Commission is
also mindful that the further development of the security-based swaps
market may alter the calculus for future regulation of SBS Dealers and
major security-based swap participants. As commenters review this
release, they are urged to consider generally the role that regulation
may play in fostering or limiting the development of the market for
security-based swaps (or, vice versa, the role that market developments
may play in changing the nature and implications of regulation) and
specifically to focus on this issue with respect to the proposals to
register SBS Dealers and major security-based swap participants.

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Certain provisions of proposed Rules 15Fb1-1 through 15Fb6-1 and
Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, SBSE-BD, SBSE-C and SBSE-W contain ``collection of
information requirements'' within the meaning of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA''). The Commission has submitted the
information to the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') for review
in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 3507 and 5 CFR 1320.11. An agency may not
conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a
collection of information unless it displays a currently valid control
number. The title of this collection is ``Registration Rules for
Security-Based Swap Entities.'' We are applying for a new OMB Control
Number for this collection in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 3507(j) and 5
CFR 1320.13.

A. Summary of Collection of Information

    As required by Exchange Act Section 15F, the Commission is
proposing Rules 15Fb1-1 through 15Fb6-1 and Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, SBSE-
BD, SBSE-C and SBSE-W to facilitate registration of, certification by,
and withdrawal of SBS Entities.
    Pursuant to paragraph (a) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-1, each SBS Entity
would be required to file an application to register with the
Commission. The Commission has sought to reduce burdens and costs
associated with the application process by providing alternate
registration forms for SBS Entities that are registered or registering
either with the CFTC as swap dealers or major swap participants or with
the Commission as broker-dealers. The alternative forms (Form SBSE-A,
and Form SBSE-BD) are both shorter and should require that an SBS
Entity expend less effort to research, complete, and file. It is
anticipated that each SBS Entity would only need to research, complete,
and file one of the proposed Forms.
    Proposed Rule 15Fb2-3 would require that SBS Entities promptly
amend their applications if they find that the information contained
therein has become inaccurate. While SBS Entities may need to update
their Forms periodically, each firm will only need to amend that aspect
of the Form that has become inaccurate.
    Paragraph (b) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-1 would require that each SBS
Entity have a knowledgeable senior officer, after due inquiry, make an
attestation on Form SBSE-C. As discussed more fully above, the
Commission is proposing to require that a senior officer certify that,
after due inquiry, he or she has reasonably determined that the SBS
Entity has the operational, financial, and compliance capabilities to
act as an SBS Dealer or major security-based swap participant, as
applicable, and has documented the process by which he or she reached
such determination. This certification process is designed to allow SBS
Entities to register with the Commission quickly so that they are not
required to suspend their security-based swap business, while providing
the Commission with a basis to take final action on SBS Entity
registration.
    Proposed Rule 15Fb6-1 would require that SBS Entities obtain a
questionnaire or application for employment executed by each of its
associated persons who is involved in effecting security-based swaps on
behalf of the SBS Entity that contains certain, specified
information.\90\ The proposed rule further would provide that the
questionnaire or application shall serve as a basis for a background
check of the associated person and be signed by the SBS Dealer's or
major security-based swap participant's Chief Compliance Officer (or
his or her designee). Proposed Rule 15Fb6-1 would require that each SBS
Entity retain these employment questionnaires or applications until at
least three years after the associated person has terminated his or her
association with the SBS Entity. Finally, the CCO would need to certify
(on Schedule G to Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as
applicable) that no associated person that effects or is involved in
effecting security-based swaps on behalf of the SBS Entity is subject
to a statutory disqualification. SBS Entities would only need to
fulfill these obligations for associated persons that effect or are
involved in effecting security-based swaps on behalf of the SBS Entity.
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    \90\ See supra notes 55 and 56.
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    Proposed Rule 15Fb2-4 would require that each nonresident SBS
Entity must have in place at all times an agreement with a United
States person appointing that person as the firm's U.S. agent for
service of process. In addition, Proposed Rule 15Fb2-4 would require
that each nonresident SBS Entity obtain an opinion of counsel stating
that it can, as a matter of law, provide the Commission with access to
records and the ability to conduct onsite examinations. These entities
also must file an additional schedule (Schedule F) with their Form
SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as appropriate, to identify the
firm's U.S. agent for service of process and to certify that the firm
can, as a matter of law, provide the Commission with access to its
books and records. In addition, each nonresident SBS Entity would be
required to maintain its written agreement appointing a U.S. agent for
service of process until at least three years after the agreement is
terminated.
    Pursuant to proposed Rule 15Fb1-1, each signatory to an electronic
filing would be required to, when the

[[Page 65808]]

electronic filing is made, manually sign a signature page or other
document adopting his or her signature that appears in typed form
within the electronic filing. The SBS Entity would need to retain the
manually-signed page until at least three years after the form or
certification has been replaced or is no longer effective.
    Proposed Rule 15Fb3-2 would require that an SBS Entity seeking to
withdraw from Commission registration must file Form SBSE-W. Given that
the cost and effort to register as an SBS Entity likely will be
significant, the Commission believes that entities will not enter and
exit this business regularly. Further, the Commission believes it is
unlikely that any SBS Entity will seek to withdraw from registration
within the first year.
    Proposed temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T would only be adopted if a
technological means to facilitate receipt and retention of applications
is not functional by the time final rules are adopted. Pursuant to
proposed temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T, each SBS Entity would need to file
its application and certification in paper form. Proposed temporary
Rule 15Fb2-2T also would require that each SBS Entity resubmit its
application and certification in electronic form once a technological
means to receive such documents becomes functional.

B. Proposed Use of Information

    Information collected pursuant to proposed Rules 15Fb1-1 through
15Fb6-1 and through Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, SBSE-BD, and SBSE-C would allow
the Commission to determine whether applicants meet the standards for
registration, and to fulfill its oversight responsibilities. Further,
Rule 15Fb3-2 and Form SBSE-W would allow the Commission to determine
whether it is appropriate to allow an SBS Entity to withdraw from
registration and to facilitate that withdrawal.
    In addition, information collected pursuant to proposed Forms SBSE,
SBSE-A, SBSE-BD, and SBSE-C would be made publicly available.

C. Respondents

    Proposed Rule 15Fb1-1 through 15Fb6-1 would set forth rules to
facilitate registration with the Commission of entities that fit the
definition of SBS Dealer or major security-based swap participant.\91\
Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, and SBSE-BD, as applicable, are applications
through which SBS Entities would register with the Commission.
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    \91\ See supra notes 5-7.
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    The Commission preliminarily believes, based on data obtained from
DTCC and conversations with market participants, that approximately
fifty entities may fit within the definition of SBS Dealer and up to
five entities may fit within the definition of major security-based
swap participant.\92\ Further, the staff estimates, based on its
experience and understanding of the unregulated swaps and security-
based swaps markets, that the majority of firms that may register as
SBS Entities (thirty-five) also will be engaged in the swaps business
and will register with the CFTC as swap dealers or major swap
participants.\93\ In addition, persons holding securities positions may
find it beneficial to hedge those positions with security-based swaps,
so it may be beneficial for a broker-dealer to become an SBS Entity so
that it can provide this option to its customers. Thus, Commission
staff estimates that approximately sixteen broker-dealers will seek to
register as SBS Entities.\94\ Finally, given the costs of being a
registered entity it may be less likely for an entity that is not
otherwise registered with the CFTC or the Commission to register as an
SBS Entity. Consequently, the Commission staff estimates that only four
firms not otherwise registered with the CFTC or the Commission will
seek to become an SBS Entity.
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    \92\ In the Intermediary Definitions Release, the Commission and
the CFTC proposed rules to define a number of terms used in Title
VII, including, among others, ``security-based swap dealer'' and
``major security-based swap participant.'' See supra note 5. As part
of that proposal, the Commission preliminarily estimated that
approximately 50 entities may be required to register as security-
based swap dealers under the proposed rules. See Intermediary
Definitions Release, n. 188 (75 FR 80174, at 80209 (Dec. 10, 2010)).
We further estimated that no more than ten entities would have
security-based swap positions large enough that they would have to
monitor whether they meet the thresholds defining a major security-
based swap participant. See Intermediary Definitions Release, (75 FR
80174, at 80207-8 (Dec. 10, 2010)). For purposes of these proposed
rules, we conservatively estimate that, of the ten entities that
would need to monitor their positions to determine whether they
cross any of the definitional thresholds, five may actually meet the
definition of ``major security-based swap participant.'' Depending
on capital and other requirements for SBS Dealers and how businesses
choose to respond to such requirements, the actual number of SBS
Dealers may be significantly fewer. See also Trade Acknowledgment
and Verification of Security-Based Swap Transactions, Exchange Act
Release No. 63727 (Jan. 14, 2011), 76 FR 3859, at 3868 (Jan. 21,
2011); and Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap
Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, Exchange Act
Release No. 64766 (Jun. 29, 2011), 76 FR 42396, (Jul. 18, 2011), as
corrected by Exchange Act Release No. 64766, 76 FR 46668 (Aug. 3,
2011).
    \93\ See Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap
Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, Exchange Act
Release No. 64766 (Jun. 29, 2011), 76 FR 42396, (Jul. 18, 2011), as
corrected by Exchange Act Release No. 64766, 76 FR 46668 (Aug. 3,
2011).
    \94\ Id.
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    The Commission seeks comment on the reasonableness and accuracy of
its estimates as to the number of participants in the security-based
swap market that will be required to register with the Commission
pursuant to proposed Rules 15Fb1-1 through 15Fb6-1 and Forms SBSE,
SBSE-A, and SBSE-BD, as applicable.

D. Total Initial and Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burdens

1. Burden Associated With Filing Application Forms
    Proposed Rule 15Fb2-1 would require that each SBS Entity register
with the Commission by filing an application. The Commission has
attempted to reduce the burden associated with the application process
by providing multiple forms for SBS Entities to use to register (Form
SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD). It is anticipated that each SBS
Entity will only need to research, complete, and file one form.
    While it is likely that the time necessary to complete these forms
would vary depending on the nature and complexity of the entity's
business, the Commission staff estimates (based on its experience
relative to Form BD) that the average time necessary for an SBS Entity
to research the questions, and complete and file a Form SBSE (including
the Schedules \95\ and DRPs) would be approximately one work week or
forty hours.\96\ As discussed above, the Commission estimates that
approximately four firms would need to register using Form SBSE.
Consequently, the total burden associated with filing Forms SBSE would
be approximately 160 hours.\97\
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    \95\ Except Schedules F and G, which are dealt with separately
below.
    \96\ The staff has previously estimated that the average time
necessary for a broker-dealer to complete and file Form BD, the Form
upon which Form SBSE was based, would be approximately three hours
(and that estimate has been subject to notice and comment. Broker-
Dealer Registration and Reporting, Exchange Act Release No. 41594
(July 2, 1999), 64 FR 37586.) However, some SBS Entities may not
previously have been subject to regulation and thus may need more
time to research the answers to complete Form SBSE and its schedules
and DRPs.
    \97\ (40 hours x 4 SBS Entities) = 160 hours total.
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    The Commission staff believes that, as Form SBSE-A is shorter than
the Form SBSE, it should take an SBS Entity approximately 80% of the
time that it would take to research, complete, and file a Form SBSE
(including the Schedules \98\ and DRPs), or thirty two

[[Page 65809]]

hours. As discussed above, the Commission estimates that approximately
thirty-five firms would also be registered with the CFTC and therefore
would need to register using Form SBSE-A. Consequently, the total
burden associated with filing Forms SBSE would be approximately 1,120
hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ See supra note 95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission staff believes that, as Form SBSE-BD is shorter than
either Form SBSE or Form SBSE-A and broker-dealers who would be filing
Form SBSE-BD are familiar with Commission terminology and forms,
researching, completing, and filing a Form SBSE-BD should take an SBS
Entity approximately 25% of the time that it would take to research,
complete, and file a Form SBSE (including the Schedules \99\), or ten
hours. As discussed above, the Commission estimates that approximately
sixteen SBS Entities would need to register using Form SBSE-BD.
Consequently, the total burden associated with filing Forms SBSE-BD
would be approximately 160 hours.\100\
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    \99\ Id.
    \100\ (10 hours x 16 SBS Entities) = 160 hours total.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Burden Associated With Amending Application Forms
    Proposed Rule 15Fb2-3 would require that SBS Entities amend their
applications if they find that the information contained therein has
become inaccurate. While SBS Entities may need to update their Forms
periodically, each firm will only need to amend that aspect of the Form
that has become inaccurate. Further, it likely will not cost a
significant amount to make such changes because each firm will have
already completed Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as
applicable, and will only need to amend that aspect of the Form that
has become inaccurate. Based on the number of amendments the Commission
receives annually on Form BD,\101\ the Commission estimates that each
SBS Entity will file approximately three amendments annually. While it
is likely that the time necessary to file an amendment to Form SBSE,
Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as applicable, may vary depending on the
nature and complexity of the information to be amended, the staff
estimates, based on experience relative to Form BD, that it likely
would take an SBS Entity, on average, approximately one hour to amend
its application each time it files an amendment. Consequently, the
total burden associated with amending Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, and SBSE-BD,
as applicable, would be approximately 165 hours.\102\
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    \101\ On March 1, 2010 there were 5,163 broker-dealers
registered with the Commission (based on Form BD data). The
Commission received 20,666, 17,839, 16,702, 16,365, and 17,247
amended Forms BD during the fiscal years ending 9/30/2005, 9/30/
2006, 9/30/2007, 9/30/2008 and 9/30/2009, respectively. ((20,666 +
17,839 + 16,702 + 16,365 + 17,247)/5 years)/5,163 broker-dealers =
3.44 amendments per broker-dealer per year.
    \102\ 1 hour x three per year x 55 SBS Entities = 165 hours.
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3. Burden Associated With Certification
    Paragraph (b) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-1 would require that each SBS
Entity have a knowledgeable senior officer certify that, after due
inquiry, he or she has reasonably determined that the SBS Entity has
the operational, financial, and compliance capabilities to act as an
SBS Dealer or major security-based swap participant, as applicable, and
has documented the process by which he or she has reached such
determination. Each SBS Entity would need to provide this certification
on Form SBSE-C only once. The Commission believes that the majority of
the cost associated with this certification would arise from the review
the senior officer conducts, or has others conduct, prior to certifying
that the SBS Entity has the requisite operational, financial, and
compliance capabilities. The senior officer would also need to certify
that he or she has documented this process.
    The Commission understands (based on the staff's experience with
broker-dealers and other regulated entities) that, in satisfying other
certification requirements, SBS Entities may use different processes,
depending on the facts and circumstances of their business. Some SBS
Entities may develop more or less robust process than others and, as a
result, may incur higher or lower than average costs. Some SBS Entities
may use a sub-certification process whereby the senior officer will not
certify a firm-wide statement unless and until other persons
responsible for certain activities in turn certify to the senior
officer that the standard has been met, while other firms may use an
internal or external audit-type process whereby a senior officer may
choose to employ a third party to review an area subject to a firm-wide
certification before submitting the certification. There may be other
processes an SBS Entity could use to provide a basis for a senior
officer's reasonable determination that the SBS Entity has the
requisite capabilities that we have not specifically identified here.
Many factors outside of the Commission's control \103\ may determine
whether an SBS Entity might choose to utilize an internal process, as
opposed to an external process, to serve as a basis for the Senior
Officer Certification. For purposes of this PRA, we will estimate that
approximately half, or twenty-eight of the SBS Entities, may use an
internal process and the other half, or twenty-seven of the SBS
Entities, will use an external process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ For instance, such factors could include: costs; how
comfortable the senior officer may be with his or her subordinates
within the SBS Entity's control structure; and how knowledgeable a
senior officer may be regarding the SBS Entity's capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that, regardless of whether an SBS Entity
may choose to utilize an internal process, as opposed to an external
process, to serve as a basis for the Senior Officer Certification, the
burden associated with having a senior officer sign a certification
likely would be approximately five hours.\104\ The Commission has
previously estimated that it would take a senior officer approximately
twenty hours to review, document, and update compliance
procedures,\105\ which the staff believes would be analogous to
reviewing documents provided either by subordinates or a third party to
gain comfort necessary to sign the Senior Officer Certification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ See, e.g., Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers
With Market Access, Exchange Act Release No. 63241 (Nov. 3, 2010),
75 FR 69792, at 69816 (Nov. 15, 2010).
    \105\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commission staff estimates, based on its experience relative to the
securities and over-the-counter derivatives industries, that if a
senior officer opted to conduct an internal review of the SBS Entity's
operational, financial, and compliance capabilities, it would take
approximately one hundred and seventy five additional hours for other
SBS Entity employees to assess the SBS Entity's operational, financial,
and compliance capabilities and provide the senior officer with sub-
certifications or other documents he or she may request to obtain the
necessary comfort before signing the Senior Officer Certification.
Consequently, the Commission estimates that the one-time burden for the
twenty-eight SBS Entities that utilize an internal review process would
be approximately 5,600 hours for other SBS Entity employees to assess
the SBS Entity's operational, financial, and compliance capabilities
and provide the senior officer with documents, and for the senior
officer to review those

[[Page 65810]]

documents and sign the Senior Officer Certification.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ (5 hours + 20 hours + 175 hours) x 28 SBS Entities = 5,600
hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has previously estimated that the burden associated
with obtaining an internal control report from a third party would
cost, on average, approximately $250,000.\107\ The staff believes that
an internal control report would be roughly analogous to a third party
review of each SBS Entity capability included in the Senior Officer
Certification; however, the staff believes the cost of a third party
review of an SBS Entity's capabilities likely would be less than the
cost of three separate internal control reviews because the third party
review of capabilities would not require an accountant's opinion and
because some economies of scale likely could be achieved when a third
party reviews three capabilities for a single SBS Entity. Consequently,
the staff estimates that the cost for an SBS Entity to obtain a third
party review to provide its senior officer with the necessary comfort
to sign the Senior Officer Certification would be approximately
$600,000. Thus, the Commission estimates that the one-time burden for
the twenty-seven SBS Entities that utilize an external review process
would be approximately 675 hours \108\ for the senior officer to review
documents provided by the third party to gain the necessary comfort and
to sign the Senior Officer Certification, and $16,200,000 to have a
third party review the SBS Entity's operational, financial, and
compliance capabilities and provide the SBS Entity with evidence
sufficient to make the senior officer sufficiently comfortable to sign
the Senior Officer Certification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ See, e.g., Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by
Investment Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 2968 (Dec. 30, 2009),
75 FR 1456, at 1473 (Jan. 11, 2010). Depending on the facts and
circumstances relating to an SBS Entity's business, third party
service providers may use different methods to assess each of an SBS
Entity's capabilities and report their findings to the SBS Entity,
which may affect the cost of the review and the amount a third party
charges an SBS Entity for this review.
    \108\ (5 hours + 20 hours) x 27 SBS Entities = 675 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, the total burden for all SBS Entities associated with the
Senior Officer Certification would be approximately 6,275 hours and
$16,200,000.
4. Burdens Relating to Associated Persons
    Proposed Rule 15Fb6-1 would require an SBS Entity to obtain a
questionnaire or application for employment executed by each of its
associated persons who is involved in effecting security-based swaps on
behalf of the SBS Entity that contains certain, specified information.
The proposed rule further would provide that the questionnaire or
application must be reviewed and signed by the SBS Dealer's or major
security-based swap participant's Chief Compliance Officer. Finally,
the CCO would need to certify (on Schedule G of its Form SBSE, Form
SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as applicable) that no associated person that
effects or is involved in effecting security-based swaps on behalf of
the SBS Entity is subject to a statutory disqualification. SBS Entities
would only need to fulfill these obligations for associated persons
that effect or are involved in effecting security-based swaps on behalf
of the SBS Entity.\109\ The Commission estimates (based on the staff's
experience relative to the securities and OTC derivatives industries)
that SBS Entities each have, on average, twenty-five associated persons
that effect or are involved in effecting security-based swaps on behalf
of the SBS Entity. The Commission believes that the information SBS
Entities would need to obtain through these questionnaires is standard
in the financial services industry, and is already collected by firms
registered with the CFTC and the SEC. In addition, SBS Entities that
are registered with the Commission or the CFTC must already perform
background checks on their employees because of the prohibitions from
employment of statutorily disqualified persons in the CEA and the
Exchange Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ See supra notes 55 and 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission staff estimates, based on its experience relative to
the securities industry, that the average time necessary for an SBS
Entity to review its employment questionnaire or application to verify
that it contains all of the required information and to update the
questionnaire would be approximately three hours. As SBS Entities that
are already registered with the Commission or the CFTC already collect
this information, the Commission estimates that the cost to all SBS
Entities to review employment questionnaires or applications, verify
that they contain all of the required information and update the
questionnaires or applications, as necessary, would be approximately 12
hours.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ 3 hours x 4 SBS Entities that are not registered with the
Commission or CFTC = 12 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, the Commission staff believes that most
financial services firms already collect all or most of the information
proposed Rule 15Fb6-1 would require that they collect. Consequently,
the Commission estimates that the burden to require an SBS Entity's
existing associated persons that effect or are involved in effecting
security-based swaps on behalf of the SBS Entity to provide those few
categories of information that they did not originally provide on their
employment questionnaires or applications would be approximately one
hour each.\111\ As SBS Entities that are already registered with the
Commission and the CFTC already collect this information from
employees, the Commission estimates that the burden to all SBS Entities
to obtain additional information from relevant associated persons,
would be approximately 100 hours.\112\
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    \111\ Commission staff believes that, as most firms already
collect all or most of the information already, it likely would not
take employees more than an hour each, on average, to provide any
additional information. The staff believes the pay scales for
broker-dealers and SBS Entities would likely be similar. As the
categories of employees that could be required to provide additional
information is diverse (see supra notes 55 and 56) the weighted-
average cost of 46 of the positions included in Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association's (``SIFMA'') publication titled
Management & Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry 2009,
as modified by Commission staff to account for an 1,800-hour work-
year and multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size,
employee benefits and overhead, the hourly cost of an Attorney is
approximately $260/hour. 1 hour x 25 associated persons x $260 =
$6,500.
    \112\ One hour x 4 SBS Entities that are not registered with the
Commission or CFTC x 25 associated persons effecting or involved in
effecting security-based swaps on behalf of the SBS Entity = 100
hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission staff estimates, based on the staff's experience
relative to the securities industry, that it would take a CCO
approximately one hour to review and sign a relevant employee's
employment record. Consequently, the Commission estimates that the
total burden to all SBS Entities to have their CCOs review and sign
each associated person's employment record would be approximately 1,375
hours.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ One hour x 25 associated persons x 55 SBS Entities = 1,375
hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On an ongoing basis, if employee turnover at an SBS Entity averages
12%,\114\ each SBS Entity would need to perform background checks and
have their CCO review and approve in writing three new associated
persons' employment records per year. As stated

[[Page 65811]]

above, the Commission estimates that the burden to have an SBS Entity's
CCO review and sign each associated person's employment record would be
approximately one hour. Thus, the ongoing annual burden to each SBS
Entity would be approximately three hours \115\ and the total cost to
all SBS Entities to comply with Rule 15Fb6-1 on an ongoing basis would
be approximately 165 hours annually.\116\
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    \114\ The staff notes that the Bureau of Labor Statistics Labor
Turnover Survey indicates that turnover is presently in the range of
3.2%, however the staff believes that the present economic situation
has likely driven turnover to a historically low level and that this
broad statistic likely does not adequately represent actual turnover
in the financial services sector. Consequently, the staff believes,
based on its experience, that a higher number may be more
appropriate.
    \115\ One hour x three associated persons = three hours.
    \116\ Three hours x 55 SBS Entities = 165 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that as the CCO would already have reviewed
and signed each employee's employment record, signing the required
certification will not take a significant amount of time. Thus,
Commission staff estimates, based on its experience relative to the
securities industry, that it would take a CCO approximately one hour to
certify on Schedule G that no associated person that effects or is
involved in effecting security-based swaps on behalf of the SBS Entity
is subject to a statutory disqualification. Consequently, the
Commission staff estimates that the total burden to all SBS Entities to
complete this certification on Schedule G would be approximately 55
hours.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ One hour x 55 SBS Entities = 55 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Burdens on Nonresident SBS Entities
    The Commission estimates, based on conversations with industry
participants, that approximately 40 percent or 22 SBS Entities will be
nonresident SBS Entities. Proposed Rule 15Fb2-4 would require that each
nonresident SBS Entity file an additional schedule (Schedule F) with
their Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as appropriate, to
identify its U.S. agent for service of process and to certify that the
firm can, as a matter of law, provide the Commission with access to its
books and records and can, as a matter of law, submit to onsite
inspection and examination by the Commission.
    Commission staff conservatively estimates, based on its experience
relative to the securities industry and Form BD, that the average time
necessary for a nonresident SBS Entity to complete and file Schedule F
would be approximately one hour. Thus, the Commission estimates that
the total burden for all nonresident SBS Entities approximately to
complete and file Schedule F would be approximately 22 hours.\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ 1 hour x 22 nonresident SBS Entities = 22 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, nonresident SBS Entities would incur outside legal
costs associated with obtaining an opinion of counsel. In previous
releases, the Commission estimated that firms with a similar
requirement would incur, on average, approximately $900 in outside
legal costs to obtain an opinion of counsel.\119\ This estimate
originally related to the cost a foreign bank issuer would incur to
obtain a legal opinion to provide to the Commission when seeking an
exemption from the requirement to make certain additional
disclosures.\120\ Although the legal opinion for foreign bank issuers
also would address privacy laws in the issuer's home jurisdiction that
may preclude certain disclosures, upon further reflection, we believe
that the legal opinion required for nonresident SBS Entities pursuant
to the proposed rule would likely require additional research and
analysis to prepare. Based on staff experience, the Commission
estimates that each nonresident SBS Entity would incur, on average,
approximately $25,000 in outside legal costs to obtain the necessary
opinion of counsel, and that the total cost for all nonresident SBS
Entities to obtain this opinion of counsel would be approximately
$550,000.\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap
Execution Facilities, Exchange Act Release No. 63825 (Feb. 2, 2011),
76 FR 10948 (Feb. 28, 2011); Security-Based Swap Data Repository
Registration, Duties, and Core Principles, Exchange Act Release No.
63347 (Nov. 19, 2010), 75 FR 77306 (Dec. 10, 2010); Foreign Bank
Exemption from the Insider Lending Prohibition of Exchange Act
Section 13(k), Exchange Act Release No. 49616 (Apr. 26, 2004), 69 FR
24016 (Apr. 30, 2004). The $900 figure is based on an estimate of
$400 an hour for legal services.
    \120\ Foreign Bank Exemption from the Insider Lending
Prohibition of Exchange Act Section 13(k), Exchange Act Release No.
49616 (Apr. 26, 2004); 69 FR 24016 (Apr. 30, 2004).
    \121\ $25,000 x 22 SBS Entities = $550,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Burden Related to Retention of Manually Signed Signature Pages
    Pursuant to proposed Rule 15Fb1-1, each signatory to an electronic
filing must, when the electronic filing is made, manually sign a
signature page or other document adopting his or her signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic filing. This manually
signed page must be retained by the SBS Entity until at least three
years after the form or certification has been replaced or is no longer
effective. It is likely that each SBS Entity would need to maintain at
least three pages with manually signed signatures (the execution page
of Form SBSE, SBSE-A, or SBSE-BD, as applicable, Schedule G, and the
Form SBSE-C certification). In addition, nonresident SBS Entities also
would need to retain a manually signed copy of Schedule F. As so few
pages would need to be retained, the staff believes the burden
associated with retaining them would not be significant. Thus, the
Commission estimates that it would take each SBS Entity approximately
10 minutes annually to assure that these pages are retained, or a total
of approximately 9 hours annually for all SBS Entities.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ (10 minutes x 55 SBS Entities)/60 minutes = 9.17 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Burden Associated With Filing Withdrawal Form
    Given that the cost and effort to register as an SBS Entity will be
significant, the Commission believes that entities will not enter and
exit this business regularly. As the Form SBSE-W is only one page and
consists of information readily available to SBS Entities, the staff
estimates (based on experience relative to Form BD-W) that it likely
would take an SBS Entity, on average, approximately one hour to
complete and file a Form SBSE-W. While the Commission believes it is
unlikely that any SBS Entity will withdraw from registration often or
within the first year, solely for purposes of this PRA the Commission
estimates that one SBS Entity may file Form SBSE-W to withdraw from
registration annually and the total burden associated with completing
and filing Form SBSE-W would be approximately one hour each year.
8. Burden Associated With Proposed Temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T
    Proposed temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T would only be adopted if a
technological means to facilitate receipt and retention of applications
is not functional by the time final rules are adopted. Pursuant to
proposed temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T, each SBS Entity would need to file
its application and certification in paper form, and then resubmit its
application and certification in electronic form once a technological
means to receive such documents becomes functional.
    The burden associated with completing and filing the forms once are
discussed above. Thus, the additional burden associated with proposed
temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T relate to electronic resubmission of the form.
    The staff estimates that the costs associated with resubmitting
each of the forms would be minimal, but would be contingent on the
length of the form. Further, the additional time to file the
certification (which consists of a single page) would not vary relative
to the form required to be filed, and would not add significantly to
the times required to file the registration forms. The

[[Page 65812]]

Commission staff preliminarily estimates, based on the staff's
experience relative to the securities industry and Form BD, that the
average time necessary for an SBS Entity to resubmit a Form SBSE would
be approximately four hours. As Forms SBSE-A and SBSE-BD are shorter
than Form SBSE, the Commission staff preliminarily estimates that
resubmitting Form SBSE-A would take approximately two hours, and that
resubmitting Form SBSE-BD would take approximately one hour. Thus, the
Commission estimates that the total burden to all SBS Entities to
resubmit their Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, or SBSE-BD, as applicable, would be
approximately 102 hours.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ (2 hours x 35 SBS Entities already registered with the
CFTC) + (1 hour x 16 SBS Entities already registered with the
Commission) + (4 hours x 4 SBS Entities not otherwise registered
with either the Commission or the CFTC) = 102 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

9. Request for Comment on Burden Estimates
    The Commission seeks comment on the recordkeeping and reporting
collection of information burdens associated with proposed Rule 15Fb1-1
through 15Fb6-1 and Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, and SBSE-BD, as applicable.
    Q-173. What burdens, if any, would respondents incur with respect
to system design, programming, expanding systems capacity, and
establishing compliance programs to comply with proposed Rules 15Fb1-1
through 15Fb6-1 and Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, SBSE-BD, SBSE-C and SBSE-W, as
applicable?
    Q-174. Is it likely that SBS Entities will complete Forms SBSE,
SBSE-A, SBSE-BD, SBSE-C and SBSE-W, as applicable, themselves or is it
more likely that they would obtain assistance in completing these forms
from some outside entity (e.g., outside counsel)? If an SBS Entity
obtains assistance in completing the forms from an outside entity, what
type of entity may be utilized and what may the relative costs to
employ such an entity for this purpose be?
    Q-175. Would there be different or additional burdens associated
with the collection of information under Rules 15Fb1-1 through 15Fb6-1
and Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, SBSE-BD, SBSE-C and SBSE-W, as applicable, that
a respondent does not currently undertake in the ordinary course of
business that the Commission has failed to identify? If so, please both
describe and quantify any additional burden(s).
    Q-176. Are the burden and cost estimates regarding the review
necessary to support the Senior Officer Certification appropriate? Are
there other processes a senior officer may utilize to gain the
necessary comfort to sign the Senior Officer Certification? If so, what
other processes might be used and what are the advantages, burdens and/
or costs of those other processes? Also, is the Commission's estimate
accurate regarding how many SBS Entities may utilize an external, as
opposed to an internal, review process?
    Q-177. Would nonresident SBS Entities incur greater or lesser costs
for the opinion of counsel? Would the cost more likely be closer to
$900, as previously estimated? Are the costs likely to exceed $25,000?

E. Retention Period of Recordkeeping Requirements

    Proposed Rules 15Fb1-1 through 15Fb6-1 and Forms SBSE, SBSE-A,
SBSE-BD, SBSE-C and SBSE-W would require that each respondent retain
certain records and information for three years.

F. Collection of Information Is Mandatory

    Any collections of information required pursuant to proposed Rules
15Fb1-1 through 15Fb6-1 and Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, SBSE-BD, SBSE-C would
be mandatory to permit the Commission to determine whether applicants
meet the standards for registration, and to fulfill its oversight
responsibilities.
    The collections of information required pursuant to proposed Rule
15Fb3-2 and Form SBSE-W would be mandatory to allow the Commission to
determine whether it is in the public interest to allow an SBS Entity
to withdraw from registration.
    The collections of information required pursuant to proposed Rule
15Fb2-2T would be mandatory to provide a process for the Commission to
facilitate registration of SBS Entities if an electronic system to
facilitate registration is not functional by the time final
registration rules are adopted.

G. Confidentiality

    The Commission intends to make the information collected pursuant
to proposed Rule 15Fb1-1 through 15Fb6-1 and Forms SBSE, SBSE-A, SBSE-
BD, SBSE-C and SBSE-W public.

H. Request for Comment

    Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3505(c)(2)(B), the Commission solicits
comment to:
    1. Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is
necessary for the proper performance of our functions, including
whether the information shall have practical utility;
    2. Evaluate the accuracy of our estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information;
    3. Determine whether there are ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and
    4. Evaluate whether there are ways to minimize the burden of
collection of information on those who are to respond, including
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of
information technology.
    Persons submitting comments on the collection of information
requirements should direct them to the Office of Management and Budget,
Attention: Desk Officer for the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, and
should also send a copy of their comments to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090, with reference to File No. S7-40-11.
Requests for materials submitted to OMB by the Commission with regard
to this collection of information should be in writing, with reference
to File No. S7-40-11, and be submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Records Management, Office of Filings and Information
Services, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090. As OMB is
required to make a decision concerning the collections of information
between 30 and 60 days after publication, a comment to OMB is best
assured of having its full effect if OMB receives it within 30 days of
publication.

V. Economic Analysis

    In response to the recent financial crisis, Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Act in July of 2010. Among other things, the Dodd-Frank Act
is designed to strengthen oversight, improve consumer protections, and
reduce systemic risks throughout the financial system. Title VII of the
Dodd-Frank Act specifically addresses the OTC derivatives markets,
including the market for security-based swaps, and requires the
Commission to undertake a number of rulemakings to establish a
regulatory framework for SBS Entities.
    In promulgating the provisions of Section 764 of the Dodd-Frank
Act, Congress established a mandatory registration regime for SBS
Entities but left the form and manner of such registration within the
discretion of the Commission. In determining the form and manner of
such registration, the Commission may require ``such information, as
the Commission

[[Page 65813]]

considers necessary concerning the business in which the applicant is
or will be engaged.'' \124\ The Dodd-Frank Act also requires that SBS
Entities ``continue to submit to the Commission reports that contain
such information pertaining to the business of the person as the
Commission may require.'' \125\ Section 764 also provides that
registrations ``shall expire at such time as the Commission may
prescribe by rule,'' \126\ and prohibits SBS Entities from allowing
persons associated with it that are ``subject to a statutory
disqualification to effect or be involved in effecting security-based
swaps on behalf of the [SBS Entity if the entity] knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the statutory
disqualification.'' \127\ Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act provides the
Commission with additional broad authority to effect registration and
regulation of SBS Entities.\128\
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    \124\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b)(2)(A).
    \125\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b)(2)(B).
    \126\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b)(3).
    \127\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b)(6).
    \128\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b)(4) and (d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Today, the Commission is proposing new rules and forms that provide
a process for registration of SBS Entities. This process would require
that SBS Entities apply for registration by submitting a Form SBSE,
Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as applicable. Further, this process
would allow SBS Entities to register conditionally or on an ongoing
basis, as necessary. In addition, each SBS Entity seeking ongoing
registration would need to submit to the Commission a certification on
Form SBSE-C, signed by a knowledgeable senior officer.
    In drafting these rules the Commission sought to design a
registration process that is similar to other registration processes
administered by the Commission. To the extent market participants are
familiar with these existing registration processes, we believe that
using similar processes to register SBS Entities would create
efficiencies for market participants. Many of the proposed rules were
drafted based on rules applicable to broker-dealers. Similarly, the
draft forms were based on Forms BD and BDW. However, the Commission
also has sought to assure that the staff has information sufficient to
make a determination as to whether registration should be granted or
denied. Thus, the Form SBSE differs from Form BD in that it requests
information specific to the SBS business and does not request
information specific to the broker-dealer business. The Commission also
sought to assure that the proposed rules, the forms, and the process
generally are as clear as possible so as to minimize confusion. The
Commission has sought to minimize, to the extent possible, duplication
and costs that the rules may impose on firms. Finally, burdens and
costs that have been estimated for PRA purposes are included in the
broader costs and benefits discussion that follows because we believe,
as the registration process would largely be forms-based, it is
appropriate to include them. The Commission is sensitive to the costs
and benefits imposed by its rules.

A. Benefits

    The proposed rules and forms described in this section would be
issued pursuant to a specific grant of rulemaking authority in the
Dodd-Frank Act. As indicated above, the forms were based on Forms BD
and BDW, which broker-dealers are familiar with and which are similar
to the Form 7-R that futures and commodities firms use to register with
the CFTC. Significantly, the Commission is proposing the use of
multiple registration forms to limit the amount of duplication and
costs imposed on firms already registered with the Commission as a
broker-dealer or with the CFTC as a swap dealer or major swap
participant. The Commission considered using only one form to
facilitate registration, but we believe using multiple forms would
provide a benefit to firms because it would reduce the costs to
register.
    In addition the proposed use of multiple forms is designed to allow
firms already registered with the SEC as broker-dealers or registered
or registering with the CFTC as swap dealers or swap participants to
submit or utilize forms they have already completed to facilitate
registration with the Commission. This use of existing forms would
allow the Commission to obtain the information it needs to determine
whether to grant registration without requiring the applicant to
duplicate substantially the same information that they have already
provided to regulators for another purpose.
    The proposed rules and forms would require that SBS Entities
provide certain standardized data (including disciplinary information)
to the Commission. The Commission would then make this information
public. This would provide SBS counterparties and the marketplace with
additional, comparable information on all SBS Entities (for instance,
by highlighting previously unrecognized comparative strengths and
weaknesses) which would allow them to make more informed choices with
respect to counterparties and collateral. The Commission also believes
that this may promote competition by leveling the playing field for
market participants who may have disparate access to information
regarding each SBS Entity. In addition, making such standardized
information on SBS Entities public would enable counterparties and the
marketplace to expend less time and money to independently obtain and
compile information on SBS Entities to use in making such choices.
    Requiring the reporting of standardized information through these
forms also will allow the Commission to identify the risk
characteristics of each SBS Entity, which should help the Commission
focus examinations and other oversight resources more efficiently and
effectively.
    Once SBS Entities are registered, they will be subject to
standardized requirements that set a baseline level of, among other
things, internal controls, capital and margin levels for all SBS
Entities. The registration and regulation of SBS Entities also may
promote capital formation by providing market participants with
certain, uniform information regarding registered SBS Entities (as
described above) and assuring market participants that registered SBS
Entities meet established standards. By facilitating oversight of SBS
Entities, registration and regulation of these entities also could
increase counterparty trust, and may encourage more counterparties and
eligible contract participants to enter the SBS marketplace. It also
may be beneficial if SBS entities that are not capable of meeting, or
are unwilling to meet, their regulatory obligations exit the market.

B. Costs

    Although the Commission believes that registration and regulation
of SBS Entities would result in significant benefits to customers of
and counterparties to SBS Entities, investors, eligible contract
participants and the market for SBS, the Commission recognizes that the
proposed registration rules and forms would also entail costs.
    The Commission preliminarily estimates that SBS Entities would
incur costs associated with: (i) Researching, completing, and filing
the forms, (ii) reviewing, completing and submitting the required
certification, and documenting the review process, (iii) obtaining or
compiling the required questionnaires or employment applications,
having the CCO review the questionnaires and certify that no relevant
associated person is subject to

[[Page 65814]]

statutory disqualification, (iv) the requirements that nonresident SBS
Entities obtain an agreement for U.S. service of process and an opinion
of counsel stating that they can provide the Commission with access to
records, (v) the requirement to retain manually signed signature pages,
and (vi) the requirements associated with filing forms in paper format
and resubmitting those forms electronically if the Commission does not
have a technological means to receive applications electronically by
the time final registration rules are adopted.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed amendments
may impose a burden on competition for smaller SBS Entities to the
extent that they impose relatively fixed costs, which could represent a
higher percentage of net income for smaller SBS Entities. Registration
costs may also impact those SBS Entities that are not already
registered under another area of their business model to a greater
degree than they would impact SBS Entities that have previously
registered under another regulatory regime. The SBS Entity registration
requirement may cause some market participants that are not capable of
meeting their operational, financial and/or regulatory obligations to
exit the market. However, the Commission believes that any reduction in
competition resulting from an exit from the market by SBS Entities that
are not capable of meeting, or that are unwilling to meet, their
regulatory obligations is a necessary and appropriate burden on
competition.
1. Costs Attributable to Filing the Forms
    Proposed Rule 15Fb2-1 would require that each SBS Entity register
with the Commission by filing Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD,
as applicable. Firms must file these forms electronically, which also
should reduce the associated costs because SBS Entities will not incur
costs associated with copying or postage. The Commission preliminarily
believes that it would cost each SBS Entity approximately $11,800 to
complete and file the Form SBSE (including the Schedules \129\ and
DRPs).\130\ As stated previously, the Commission has attempted to
reduce costs associated with the application process by providing
multiple forms for SBS Entities to use to register. The alternative
forms (Form SBSE-A, and Form SBSE-BD) are both shorter and should
require that an SBS Entity expend less effort to research, complete,
and file. Consequently, the Commission preliminarily believes that it
would cost each firm approximately $9,440 to complete Form SBSE-A \131\
(including the Schedules \132\ and DRPs) and approximately $2,950 to
complete Form SBSE-BD (including the Schedules).\133\ It is anticipated
that each SBS Entity will only need to research, complete, and file one
Form, and that it will update that Form, as necessary, as described
below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ See supra note 95.
    \130\ The staff has previously estimated that the average time
necessary for a broker-dealer to complete and file Form BD, the Form
upon which Form SBSE was based, would be approximately three hours
(and that estimate was been subject to notice and comment. Broker-
Dealer Registration and Reporting, Exchange Act Release No. 41594
(July 2, 1999), 64 FR 37586.) However, SBS Entities have not
previously been subject to regulation and may need significantly
more time to research the answers to complete Form SBSE and its
schedules and DRPs. Thus, while it is likely that the time necessary
to complete Form SBSE would vary depending on the nature and
complexity of the entity's business, Commission staff estimates that
the average time necessary for an SBS Entity to research the
questions, and complete and file a Form SBSE would be approximately
one work week or forty hours. The staff believes that an SBS Entity
would have a Compliance Manager complete and file the form's
application on Form SBSE, and that the pay scales for broker-dealers
and SBS Entities would likely be similar. According to the SIFMA
publication titled Management & Professional Earnings in the
Securities Industry 2009, as modified by Commission staff to account
for an 1,800-hour work-year and multiplied by 5.35 to account for
bonuses, firm size, employee benefits and overhead, the hourly cost
of a Compliance Manager is approximately $295/hour. 40 hours x $295
= $11,800.
    \131\ The Commission staff believes that, as Form SBSE-A is
shorter than the Form SBSE, it should take an SBS Entity less time
to research the questions, and complete and file a Form SBSE-A.
Thus, while it is likely that the time necessary to complete Form
SBSE-A would vary depending on the nature and complexity of the
entity's business, the staff estimates that researching, completing,
and filing Form SBSE-A would take approximately 80% of the time that
it would take to research, complete, and file a Form SBSE, or thirty
two hours. The staff believes that an SBS Entity would have a
Compliance Manager complete and file the form's application on Form
SBSE-A, and that the pay scales for broker-dealers and SBS Entities
would likely be similar. See supra note 130. 32 hours x $295 =
$9,440.
    \132\ See supra note 95.
    \133\ See supra note 95. The Commission staff believes that, as
Form SBSE-BD is shorter than either Form SBSE or Form SBSE-A, it
should take an SBS Entity less time to research the questions, and
complete and file a Form SBSE-BD. In addition, broker-dealers who
would be filing Form SBSE-BD are familiar with Commission
terminology and Forms. Thus, while it is likely that the time
necessary to complete Form SBSE-BD would vary depending on the
nature and complexity of the entity's business, the staff estimates
that researching, completing, and filing Form SBSE-BD would take
approximately 25% of the time that it would take to research,
complete, and file a Form SBSE, or ten hours. The staff believes
that an SBS Entity would have a Compliance Manager complete and file
the form's application on Form SBSE-BD. See supra note 130. 10 hours
x $295 = $2,950.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes, based on its understanding
of the security-based swap market and conversations with industry
participants, that approximately fifty firms will fit the definition of
SBS dealer and approximately five firms will fit the definition of
major security-based swap participant. Further, based on its
understanding of the securities-based swap market, the Commission
believes that the majority of firms that may register as SBS Entities
also will be engaged in the swaps business and will register with the
CFTC as swap dealers or major swap participants. In addition, persons
holding securities positions may find it beneficial to hedge those
positions with security-based swaps, so it may be beneficial for a
broker-dealer to become an SBS Entity so that it can provide this
option to its customers. However, given the costs of being a registered
entity, it may be less likely for an entity that is not otherwise
registered to register as an SBS Entity. Consequently, the Commission
believes that thirty-five SBS Entities will register with the
Commission using Form SBSE-A, twelve SBS Entities will register with
the Commission using Form SBSE-BD, and eight SBS Entities will register
with the Commission using Form SBSE. Thus, the total estimated cost to
all entities to research, complete, and file Forms to register as SBS
Entities would be approximately $424,800.\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ $424,800 = (35 x $9,440) + (16 x $2,950) + (4 x $11,800).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Rule 15Fb2-3 would require that SBS Entities amend their
applications if they find that the information contained therein has
become inaccurate. While SBS Entities may need to update their Forms
periodically, it likely would not cost a significant amount to make
such changes because each firm will have already completed Form SBSE,
Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as applicable, and would only need to
amend that aspect of the Form that has become inaccurate. Based on the
number of amendments the Commission receives annually on Form BD,\135\
the Commission estimates that each SBS Entity would file approximately
three amendments annually. Consequently, the Commission estimates that
the cost for each SBS Entity to complete and file amendments to its
forms is

[[Page 65815]]

approximately $885.\136\ Thus, the Commission estimates that it would
cost all SBS Entities approximately $48,675 annually to complete and
file these amendments.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \135\ On March 1, 2010 there were 5,163 broker-dealers
registered with the Commission (based on Form BD data). The
Commission received 20,666, 17,839, 16,702, 16,365, and 17,247
amended Forms BD during the fiscal years ending 9/30/2005, 9/30/
2006, 9/30/2007, 9/30/2008 and 9/30/2009, respectively. ((20,666 +
17,839 + 16,702 + 16,365 + 17,247)/5 years)/5,163 broker-dealers =
3.44 amendments per broker-dealer per year.
    \136\ While it is likely that the time necessary to file an
amendment to Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as applicable
may vary depending on the nature and complexity of the information
to be amended, the staff estimates, based on experience, that it
likely would take an SBS Entity, on average, approximately one hour
to amend its application each time it files an amendment. The staff
believes that an SBS Entity would have a Compliance Manager complete
and file amendments to the SBS Entity's forms, and that the pay
scales for broker-dealers and SBS Entities would likely be similar.
According to the SIFMA publication titled Management & Professional
Earnings in the Securities Industry 2009, as modified by Commission
staff to account for an 1,800-hour work-year and multiplied by 5.35
to account for bonuses, firm size, employee benefits and overhead,
the hourly cost of a Compliance Manager is approximately $295/hour.
1 hours x $295 x three per year = $885.
    \137\ $885 x 55 SBS Entities = $48,675.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Rule 15Fb3-1 would require an SBS Entity seeking to
withdraw from Commission registration to file Form SBSE-W. Given that
the cost and effort to register as an SBS Entity will be significant,
the Commission believes that entities will not enter and exit this
business regularly. Further, the Commission believes it is unlikely
that any SBS Entity will withdraw from registration within the first
year. However, there will be a cost associated with withdrawing from
registration as an SBS Entity must file a Form SBSE-W to do so. As the
Form SBSE-W is only one page and consists of information readily
available to SBS Entities, the Commission estimates that the cost for
an SBS Entity to complete and file a Form SBSE-W would be approximately
$295.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ The staff estimates, based on experience, that it likely
would take an SBS Entity, on average, approximately one hour to
complete and file a Form SBSE-W. The staff believes that an SBS
Entity would have a Compliance Manager complete and file Form SBSE-
W, and that the pay scales for broker-dealers and SBS Entities would
likely be similar. According to the SIFMA publication titled
Management & Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry 2009,
as modified by Commission staff to account for an 1,800-hour work-
year and multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size,
employee benefits and overhead, the hourly cost of a Compliance
Manager is approximately $295/hour. 1 hour x $295 = $295.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Dodd-Frank Act clearly requires registration of SBS Entities.
All other entities that register with the Commission do so by filing
some type of application, which may be a standardized form (e.g., Form
TA-1, Form ADV and Form BD). The Commission generally requires that
registered entities amend these forms to correct inaccurate information
either as necessary or periodically. Further, all other entities that
with to withdraw from Commission registration must file some type of
notice with the Commission, which may be a standardized form (see,
e.g., Form TA-W, Form ADVW, and Form BDW). Thus, it is likely that
Congress contemplated or intended that the Commission establish this
type of registration regime. The Commission believes the use of
conditional registration and the certification process using Form SBSE-
C is a reasonable and relatively low cost method to assure that firms
have operational, financial and compliance capabilities to act as SBS
Entities and implement adequate procedures to comply with federal
securities laws and provide the Commission with a basis to take final
action on SBS Entity registration.
2. Costs of Certification
    Paragraph (b) of proposed Rule 15Fb2-1 would require that each SBS
Entity have a knowledgeable senior officer certify that, after due
inquiry, he or she has reasonably determined that the SBS Entity has
the operational, financial, and compliance capabilities to act as an
SBS Dealer or major security-based swap participant, as applicable, and
has documented the process by which he or she has reached such
determination. Each SBS Entity would need to provide this certification
on Form SBSE-C only once. The Commission believes that the majority of
the cost associated with this certification would arise from the review
the senior officer conducts, or has others conduct, prior to certifying
that the SBS Entity has the requisite operational, financial, and
compliance capabilities.\139\ The senior officer would also need to
certify that he or she has documented this process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ See supra note 42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission understands (based on the staff's experience with
broker-dealers and other regulated entities) that, in satisfying other
certification requirements, SBS Entities may use different processes,
depending on the facts and circumstances of their business. Some SBS
Entities may develop more or less robust process than others and, as a
result, may incur higher or lower than average costs. Some SBS Entities
may use a sub-certification process whereby the senior officer will not
certify a firm-wide statement unless and until other persons
responsible for certain activities in turn certify to the senior
officer that the standard has been met, while other firms may use an
internal or external audit-type process whereby a senior officer may
choose to employ a third party to review an area subject to a firm-wide
certification before submitting the certification. There may be other
processes an SBS Entity could use to provide a basis for a senior
officer's reasonable determination that the SBS Entity has the
requisite capabilities that we have not specifically identified here.
Many factors outside of the Commission's control \140\ may determine
whether an SBS Entity might choose to utilize an internal process, as
opposed to an external process, to serve as a basis for the Senior
Officer Certification. For purposes of this economic analysis, we will
estimate that approximately half, or twenty-eight of the SBS Entities,
may use an internal process and the other half, or twenty-seven of the
SBS Entities, will use an external process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ See supra note 103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that, regardless of whether an SBS Entity
may choose to utilize an internal process, as opposed to an external
process, to serve as a basis for the Senior Officer Certification, it
will cost approximately $10,450 on average for a senior officer to
review documents provided either by subordinates or by a third party to
gain the comfort necessary to sign and to sign the Senior Officer
Certification.\141\ The Commission estimates that, if an SBS Entity
opted to conduct an internal review of the SBS Entity's operational,
financial and compliance capabilities, it will cost each SBS Entity
approximately an additional $73,150 \142\ for other SBS

[[Page 65816]]

Entity employees to assess the SBS Entity's operational, financial, and
compliance capabilities and provide the senior officer with whatever
sub-certifications or other documents he or she may request to obtain
the necessary comfort before signing the Senior Officer Certification.
Alternatively, if an SBS Entity opted to conduct an external review of
the SBS Entity's operational, financial and compliance capabilities,
the Commission estimates that it will cost each SBS Entity
approximately an additional $600,000.\143\ Thus, the Commission
estimates that this certification requirement will cost all SBS
Entities a total of approximately $18,822,950.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ The Commission has previously estimated that the burden
associated with having a senior officer sign a certification likely
would be approximately five hours. See supra note 104. The
Commission has also estimated that it would take a senior officer
approximately twenty hours to review, document, and update
compliance procedures, (Id.) which the staff believes would be
analogous to reviewing documents provided either by subordinates or
a third party to gain comfort necessary to sign the Senior Officer
Certification, and to document this review. The staff believes the
pay scales for broker-dealers and SBS Entities would likely be
similar, and that the pay of a Chief Compliance Officer likely would
be similar to the amount paid to other senior officers. According to
the SIFMA's publication titled Management & Professional Earnings in
the Securities Industry 2009, as modified by Commission staff to
account for an 1,800-hour work-year and multiplied by 5.35 to
account for bonuses, firm size, employee benefits and overhead, the
hourly cost of a Chief Compliance Officer is approximately $418/
hour. 25 hours x $418 = $10,450.
    \142\ Commission staff estimates, based on its experience
relative to the securities and OTC derivatives industries, that if a
senior officer opted to conduct an internal review of the SBS
Entity's operational, financial, and compliance capabilities, it
would take approximately one hundred and seventy five additional
hours for other SBS Entity employees to assess the SBS Entity's
operational, financial, and compliance capabilities and provide the
senior officer with whatever sub-certifications or other documents
he or she may request to obtain the necessary comfort before signing
the Senior Officer Certification. The staff believes the pay scales
for broker-dealers and SBS Entities would likely be similar, and
that the pay of a Chief Compliance Officer likely would be similar
to the amount paid to other senior officers. According to the
SIFMA's publication titled Management & Professional Earnings in the
Securities Industry 2009, as modified by Commission staff to account
for an 1,800-hour work-year and multiplied by 5.35 to account for
bonuses, firm size, employee benefits and overhead, the hourly cost
of a Chief Compliance Officer is approximately $418/hour. For
purposes of this estimate, we will assume that those a senior
officer may consult with are paid at approximately the same level.
175 hours x $418 = $73,150.
    \143\ The Commission has previously estimated that the burden
associated with obtaining an internal control report from a third
party would cost approximately $250,000. See supra note 107. The
staff believes that an internal control report would be roughly
analogous to a third party review of each SBS Entity capability
included in the Senior Officer Certification; however, the staff
believes the cost of a third party review of an SBS Entity's
capabilities likely would be less than the cost of three separate
internal control reviews because the third party review of
capabilities would not require an accountant's opinion and because
some economies of scale likely could be achieved when a third party
reviews three capabilities for a single SBS Entity. Depending on the
facts and circumstances of an SBS Entity's business, third party
service providers may use different methods to assess each of an SBS
Entity's capabilities and report their findings to the SBS Entity,
which may affect the cost of the review and the amount a third party
charges an SBS Entity for this review. Consequently, the staff
estimates that the cost for an SBS Entity to obtain a third party
review to provide its senior officer with the necessary comfort to
sign the Senior Officer Certification would be approximately
$600,000 to have a third party review the SBS Entity's operational,
financial, and compliance capabilities and provide the SBS Entity
with evidence sufficient to make the senior officer sufficiently
comfortable to sign the Senior Officer Certification.
    \144\ ($10,450 x 55 SBS Entities) + ($73,150 x 28 SBS Entities)
+ ($600,000 x 27 SBS Entities) = $574,750 + $2,048,200 + $16,200,000
= $18,822,950.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to these costs, there may be additional costs and
benefits relating to certification that are more difficult to quantify.
For instance, the requirement to certify as to capabilities may impose
costs on SBS Entities relating to the legal uncertainty and potential
liability that arises from the possibility that a regulator may find
that the certification was inaccurate or false. However, a potential
benefit would be to focus senior officers' attention to assuring that
an SBS Entity conducts its business in accordance with the
certification language. In addition, the more robust the process and
meaningful the review of an SBS Entity's capabilities, the more likely
that review will fulfill the Commission's goals in proposing the Senior
Officer Certification requirement, and the more likely the process will
help the SBS Entity to strengthen its capabilities, processes and
controls which could serve to decrease operational, financial, and
compliance risks.
    In addition, the Senior Officer Certification is designed to help
assure the Commission, potential investors in, customers of, and
counterparties to an SBS Entity that the SBS Entity has the requisite
capabilities to act in that capacity. By providing this assurance after
a senior officer has performed due inquiry, the Senior Officer
Certification requirement also could prevent entities who may be more
likely to fail because they do not have the requisite capabilities from
registering with the Commission, which could help prevent disorderly
and unstable markets. Further, the Senior Officer Certification may
enhance market participants' ability to assess the counterparty credit
risk associated with a particular SBS Entity counterparty. In this way,
the Senior Officer Certification should help to protect market
participants from SBS Entities that are not competent to engage in that
business, lack the financial resources to do so, or are unable or
unwilling to comply with applicable law.
3. Costs Relating to Associated Persons
    The Dodd-Frank Act makes it unlawful for SBS Entities to permit any
associated person subject to a statutory disqualification to effect or
be involved in effecting security-based swaps on its behalf if it knew
or, in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the
statutory disqualification. Proposed Rule 15Fb6-1 would require that
SBS Entities obtain a questionnaire or application for employment
executed by each of its associated persons who is involved in effecting
security based swaps on behalf of the SBS Entity that contains certain,
specified information. The proposed rule further would provide that the
questionnaire or application must be reviewed and signed by the SBS
Dealer's or major security-based swap participant's Chief Compliance
Officer. Finally, the CCO would need to certify that no associated
person that effects or is involved in effecting security-based swaps on
behalf of the SBS Entity is subject to a statutory disqualification.
SBS Entities would only need to fulfill these obligations for
associated persons that effect or are involved in effecting security
based swaps on behalf of the SBS Entity.\145\ The Commission estimates,
based on the staff's experience in dealing with entities that likely
will need to register as SBS Entities, that SBS Entities each have, on
average, 25 associated persons that effect or are involved in effecting
security-based swaps on behalf of the SBS Entity. The Commission
believes that the information SBS Entities would need to obtain through
these questionnaires is fairly standard in the financial services
industry, and is already collected by firms registered with the CFTC
and the SEC. In addition, SBS Entities that are registered with the
Commission or the CFTC must already perform background checks on their
employees because of the prohibitions from employment of statutorily
disqualified persons in the CEA and the Exchange Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ See supra notes 55 and 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission estimates that the cost for each SBS Entity to
review its employment questionnaire or application to verify that it
contains all of the required information and to update the
questionnaire, as necessary, to obtain any information not presently
included on that questionnaire would be approximately $950.\146\ As SBS
Entities that are already registered with the Commission and the CFTC
already collect this information, the Commission estimates that the
cost to all SBS Entities to review employment questionnaire or
application forms, verify that they contain all of the required
information and update the questionnaire or application forms, as
necessary, would be approximately $3,800.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ Commission staff estimates, based on its experience, that
the average time necessary for an SBS Entity to review its
employment questionnaire or application to verify that it contains
all of the required information and to update the questionnaire
would be approximately three hours. The staff believes that an SBS
Entity would have an Attorney perform this review and update, and
that the pay scales for broker-dealers and SBS Entities would likely
be similar. According to the SIFMA's publication titled Management &
Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry 2009, as modified
by Commission staff to account for an 1,800-hour work-year and
multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size, employee
benefits and overhead, the hourly cost of an Attorney is
approximately $316/hour. 3 hours x $316 = $948.
    \147\ $950 x 4 SBS Entities that are not registered with the
Commission or CFTC = $3,800.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission estimates that the cost to require an SBS Entity's
existing associated persons that effect or are

[[Page 65817]]

involved in effecting security-based swaps on behalf of the SBS Entity
to provide those few categories of information that they did not
originally provide on their employment questionnaires or applications
would be approximately $6,500.\148\ As SBS Entities that are already
registered with the Commission and the CFTC already collect this
information from employees, the Commission estimates that the cost to
all SBS Entities to obtain additional information from relevant
associated persons, would be approximately $52,000.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ Commission staff believes that, as most firms already
collect all or most of the information already, it likely would not
take employees more than an hour each, on average, to provide any
additional information. The staff believes the pay scales for
broker-dealers and SBS Entities would likely be similar. As the
categories of employees that could be required to provide additional
information is diverse (see supra notes 55 and 56) the weighted-
average cost of 46 of the positions included in SIFMA's publication
titled Management & Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry
2009, as modified by Commission staff to account for an 1,800-hour
work-year and multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size,
employee benefits and overhead, the hourly cost of an Attorney is
approximately $260/hour. 1 hour x 25 associated persons x $260 =
$6,500.
    \149\ $6,500 x 4 SBS Entities that are not registered with the
Commission or CFTC = $26,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission estimates that the cost to have an SBS Entity's CCO
review and sign each associated person's employment record would be
approximately $418.\150\ The Commission estimates that the cost to all
SBS Entities to have their CCOs review and sign each associated
person's employment record would be approximately $574,750.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ Commission staff estimates, based on staff experience,
that it would take a CCO approximately one hour to review and
approve a relevant employee's employment record. The staff believes
the pay scales for broker-dealers and SBS Entities would likely be
similar. According to the SIFMA's publication titled Management &
Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry 2009, as modified
by Commission staff to account for an 1,800-hour work-year and
multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size, employee
benefits and overhead, the hourly cost of a Chief Compliance Officer
is approximately $418/hour. 1 hour x $418 = $418.
    \151\ $418 x 25 associated persons x 55 SBS Entities = $574,750.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On an ongoing basis, if employee turnover at an SBS Entity averages
12%, each SBS Entity would need to perform background checks and have
its CCO review and sign three new associated persons' employment
records per year. As stated above, the Commission estimates that the
cost to have an SBS Entity's CCO review and sign each associated
person's employment record would be approximately $418. Thus, the cost
of each new associated person would be approximately $418, the ongoing
annual cost to each SBS Entity would be approximately $1,254 \152\ and
the total cost to all SBS Entities to comply with Rule 15Fb6-1 on an
ongoing basis would be approximately $68,970.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ $418 x 3 associated persons = $1,254.
    \153\ $1,254 x 55 SBS Entities = $68,970.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that as the CCO would already have reviewed
and signed each employee's employment record, signing the certification
on Schedule G will not take a significant amount of time. Thus, the
Commission estimates that the cost for each SBS Entity to have its CCO
certify on Schedule G that no associated person that effects or is
involved in effecting security-based swaps on behalf of the SBS Entity
is subject to a statutory disqualification would be approximately
$418.\154\ Consequently, the total cost for all SBS Entities to have
their CCO sign this certification on Schedule G would be approximately
$22,990.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ Commission staff conservatively estimates that it would
take a CCO approximately one hour to certify that no associated
person that effects or is involved in effecting security-based swaps
on behalf of the SBS Entity is subject to a statutory
disqualification. The staff believes the pay scales for broker-
dealers and SBS Entities would likely be similar. According to the
SIFMA's publication titled Management & Professional Earnings in the
Securities Industry 2009, as modified by Commission staff to account
for an 1,800-hour work-year and multiplied by 5.35 to account for
bonuses, firm size, employee benefits and overhead, the hourly cost
of a Chief Compliance Officer is approximately $418/hour. 1 hour x
$418 = $418.
    \155\ $418 x 55 SBS Entities = $22,990.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that, in order to comply with the
prohibition in the Dodd-Frank Act from having statutorily disqualified
associated persons that effect or are involved in effecting security-
based swaps, SBS Entities would need to at least obtain the information
required by proposed Rule 15Fb6-1 and perform a background check.
Having the CCO approve the employment applications and provide the
Commission with a certification would provide the Commission with a
degree of comfort that the SBS Entity is complying with the prohibition
in the Act and aid it in its oversight of SBS Entities.
4. Costs to Nonresident SBS Entities
    The Commission estimates, based on conversations with industry
participants, that approximately 40 percent or twenty-two SBS Entities
will be nonresident SBS Entities. Proposed Rule 15Fb2-4 would require
that each nonresident SBS Entity must obtain an agreement with a United
States person appointing that person as the firm's U.S. agent for
service of process. In addition, Proposed Rule 15Fb2-4 would require
that each nonresident SBS Entity obtain an opinion of counsel stating
that it can provide the Commission with access to records. These
entities also must file an additional schedule (Schedule F) with their
Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or Form SBSE-BD, as appropriate, to identify
the firm's U.S. agent for service of process and to certify that the
firm can, as a matter of law, provide the Commission with access to its
books and records.
    The Commission estimates, based on internet research,\156\ that it
would cost each nonresident SBS Entity approximately $125 annually to
appoint and maintain a relationship with a U.S. agent for service of
process. Consequently, the total cost for all nonresident SBS Entities
to appoint and maintain relationships with U.S. agents for service of
process is approximately $2,750 per year.\157\
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    \156\ See, e.g., http://www.incnow.com/registered_agent.shtml,
and http://www.ailcorp.com/registeredagent.htm. The staff sought Web
sites that provided pricing information and a comprehensive
description of their registered agent services.
    \157\ $125 per nonresident SBS Entity x 22 nonresident SBS
Entities = $2,750.
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    In addition, nonresident SBS Entities would incur outside legal
costs associated with obtaining an opinion of counsel. In previous
releases, the Commission estimated that firms with a similar
requirement would incur, on average, approximately $900 in outside
legal costs to obtain an opinion of counsel.\158\ This estimate
originally related to the cost a foreign bank issuer would incur to
obtain a legal opinion to provide to the Commission when seeking an
exemption from the requirement to make certain additional
disclosures.\159\ Although the legal opinion for foreign bank issuers
also would address privacy laws in the issuer's home jurisdiction that
may preclude certain disclosures, upon further reflection, we believe
that the legal opinion required for nonresident SBS Entities pursuant
to the proposed rule would likely require additional research and
analysis to prepare. Based on staff experience, the Commission
estimates that each nonresident SBS Entity would incur, on average,

[[Page 65818]]

approximately $25,000 in outside legal costs to obtain the necessary
opinion of counsel, and that the total cost for all nonresident SBS
Entities to obtain this opinion of counsel would be approximately
$550,000.\160\
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    \158\ Security-Based Swap Data Repository Registration, Duties,
and Core Principles, Exchange Act Release No. 63347 (Nov. 19, 2010);
75 FR 77306 (Dec. 10, 2010); Foreign Bank Exemption from the Insider
Lending Prohibition of Exchange Act Section 13(k), Exchange Act
Release No. 49616 (Apr. 26, 2004); 69 FR 24016 (Apr. 30, 2004). The
$900 figure is based on an estimate of $400 an hour for legal
services.
    \159\ Foreign Bank Exemption from the Insider Lending
Prohibition of Exchange Act Section 13(k), Exchange Act Release No.
49616 (Apr. 26, 2004); 69 FR 24016 (Apr. 30, 2004).
    \160\ $25,000 x 22 SBS Entities = $550,000.
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    The Commission estimates that it would cost each nonresident SBS
Entity approximately $295 to complete Schedule F.\161\ Thus, the
Commission estimates that the total cost for all nonresident SBS
Entities approximately $6,490.\162\
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    \161\ Commission staff conservatively estimates, based on staff
experience, that the average time necessary for an SBS Entity to
complete and file Schedule F would be approximately one hour. The
staff believes that an SBS Entity would have a Compliance Manager
complete and file Schedule F with its Form SBSE, Form SBSE-A, or
form SBSE-BD, as appropriate, and that the pay scales for broker-
dealers and SBS Entities would likely be similar. According to the
SIFMA publication titled Management & Professional Earnings in the
Securities Industry 2009, as modified by Commission staff to account
for an 1,800-hour work-year and multiplied by 5.35 to account for
bonuses, firm size, employee benefits and overhead, the hourly cost
of a Compliance Manager is approximately $295/hour. 1 hour x $295 =
$295.
    \162\ $295 per nonresident SBS Entity x 22 nonresident SBS
Entities = $6,490.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the Dodd-Frank Act does not distinguish between resident and
nonresident SBS Entities, it clearly contemplates Commission oversight
of registered SBS Entities. The Commission's experience with other
nonresident registrants has led the staff to believe that these
requirements are necessary and appropriate to allow the Commission to
adequately oversee nonresident SBS Entities.
5. Costs of Retaining Manually Signed Signature Pages
    Pursuant to proposed Rule 15Fb1-1, each signatory to an electronic
filing would be required to, when the electronic filing is made,
manually sign a signature page or other document adopting his or her
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic filing. Each
SBS Entity must retain these manually signed pages until at least three
years after the form or certification has been replaced or is no longer
effective. It is likely that each SBS Entity would need to maintain at
least three pages with manually signed signatures (the execution page
of Form SBSE, SBSE-A, or SBSE-BD, as applicable, Schedule G, and the
Form SBSE-C certification). In addition, nonresident SBS Entities also
will need to retain a manually signed copy of Schedule F. As so few
pages would need to be maintained pursuant to proposed Rule 15Fb1-1,
Commission staff does not believe the costs associated with retaining
them would be significant. Thus, the Commission estimates that it would
cost each SBS Entity approximately $49.17 annually assure that it is
complying with the requirement to retain these manually signed
signature pages,\163\ or a total of approximately $2,704 annually for
all SBS Entities.\164\
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    \163\ Commission staff conservatively estimates, based on staff
experience, that the average time necessary for an SBS Entity to
assure that it is complying with the requirement to retain these
pages would be approximately ten minutes. The staff believes that an
SBS Entity would have a Compliance Manager to assure that it is
complying with the requirement to retain these pages, and that the
pay scales for broker-dealers and SBS Entities would likely be
similar. According to the SIFMA publication titled Management &
Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry 2009, as modified
by Commission staff to account for an 1,800-hour work-year and
multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size, employee
benefits and overhead, the hourly cost of a Compliance Manager is
approximately $295/hour. 10 minutes x $295 = $49.17.
    \164\ $49.17 per SBS Entity x 55 SBS Entities = $2,704.17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Costs Associated With Proposed Temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T
    Proposed temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T would only be adopted if a
technological means to facilitate receipt and retention of applications
is not functional by the time final rules are adopted. Pursuant to
proposed temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T, each SBS Entity would need to file
its application and certification in paper form. Proposed temporary
Rule 15Fb2-2T also would require that each SBS Entity resubmit its
application and certification in electronic form once a technological
means to receive such documents becomes functional.
    The costs associated with completing the forms are discussed above.
Thus, the additional costs associated with proposed temporary Rule
15Fb2-2T would include the postage cost to send a paper form and the
personnel costs associated with later resubmitting the form
electronically.
    The postage costs likely would be driven by the number of pages
each SBS Entity would need to send, which could vary significantly
depending on the number of DRPs each firm must include with its Form.
The staff conservatively estimates that each SBS Entity may incur, on
average, approximately $5 to send its form to the Commission. As the
certification consists of a one page Form SBSE-C, the staff estimates
that it likely would cost an SBS Entity approximately $.50 to send its
certification to the Commission. The Commission hopes that it will have
a technological means to receive these forms functional relatively
quickly; however each SBS Entity may also need to file an amendment
before that occurs. As any amendment would likely include few pages
because the SBS Entity only would need to provide updates to those
items which become inaccurate, the staff estimates that it would cost
each SBS Entity approximately $.50 to send an amendment to the
Commission. Consequently, the total postage cost to each SBS Entity
associated with proposed temporary Rule 15Fb2-2T would be approximately
$6, and the total postage costs associated with proposed temporary Rule
15Fb2-2T would be approximately $330.
    The staff estimates that the costs associated with filing each of
the forms would be minimal, but would be contingent on the length of
the form. The Commission preliminarily believes that it would cost each
SBS Entity approximately $1,180 to resubmit the Form SBSE.\165\ As
Forms SBSE-A and SBSE-BD are shorter than Form SBSE, the Commission
preliminarily believes that it would cost each SBS Entity approximately
$590 to resubmit the Form SBSE-A,\166\ and $295 to resubmit the Form
SBSE-BD.\167\ Thus, the Commission estimates that the total cost to all
SBS Entities to resubmit their Form SBSE, SBSE-A, or SBSE-BD, as
applicable, would be approximately $33,630.\168\
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    \165\ Commission staff estimates, based on staff experience,
that the average time necessary for an SBS Entity to file a Form
SBSE would be approximately four hours. The staff believes that an
SBS Entity would have a Compliance Manager file the firm's
application on Form SBSE, and that the pay scales for broker-dealers
and SBS Entities would likely be similar. According to the SIFMA
publication titled Management & Professional Earnings in the
Securities Industry 2009, as modified by Commission staff to account
for a 1,800-hour work-year and multiplied by 5.35 to account for
bonuses, firm size, employee benefits and overhead, the hourly cost
of a Compliance Manager is approximately $295/hour. 4 hours x $295 =
$1,180.
    \166\ Commission staff estimates that filing Form SBSE-A would
take approximately two hours. The staff believes that an SBS Entity
would have a Compliance Manager file the form's application on Form
SBSE-A, and that the pay scales for broker-dealers and SBS Entities
would likely be similar. 2 hours x $295 = $590.
    \167\ Commission staff estimates that filing Form SBSE-BD would
take approximately one hour. The staff believes that an SBS Entity
would have a Compliance Manager complete and file the form's
application on Form SBSE-BD. 1 hour x $295 = $295.
    \168\ ($590 x 35) + ($295 x 16) + ($1,180 x 4) = $30,090.
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C. Request for Comment

    The Commission requests data to quantify and estimates of the costs
and the value of the benefits of the proposed rules described above.
The Commission specifically requests the following data or estimates
with respect to the number

[[Page 65819]]

of persons that act as SBS Dealers and major security-based swap
participants. The Commission specifically requests comment on the
following:
    Q-178. Are the estimates of the number of registrants that would be
required to submit each form and the estimates of the costs associated
with completing the forms and amendments are reasonable? If not, why
not?
    Q-179. Should the Commission require different and/or additional
information to be provided on the proposed forms?
    Q-180. Would additional benefits accrue if the Commission required
different or additional information and, if so, what would these
requirements entail?
    Q-181. What other processes might an SBS Entity use to provide a
basis for a senior officer's reasonable determination that the SBS
Entity has the requisite capabilities that we may not have considered,
and what would be the advantages, disadvantages, costs and benefits of
those other processes?
    Q-182. Are there additional costs or benefits related to
registration information that the Commission should consider?
    The Commission solicits comments on the costs and benefits related
to the limited recordkeeping requirements of these proposed
registration rules. The Commission specifically requests comment on the
following:
    Q-183. Should the Commission require different and/or additional
information to be maintained by SBS Entities?
    Q-184. Would additional benefits accrue if the Commission imposed
different or additional recordkeeping requirements and, if so, what
would these requirements entail?
    Q-185. Are there additional costs or benefits related to
recordkeeping that the Commission should consider?
    We request comment on all aspects of the costs and benefits of the
proposed rules and forms, particularly any effect our proposed rules
may have on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
Commentators should provide analysis and empirical data to support
their views on the costs and benefits associated with the proposed
rule.
    Q-186. What would be the competitive or anticompetitive effects of
the proposed rules and forms on any market participants if the
proposals are adopted as proposed?
    Q-187. Would proposed Rules 15Fb1-1 through 15Fb6-1 and the
proposed forms place a burden on competition?
    Q-188. What may be the effect of the proposal on efficiency,
competition, and capital formation?

VI. Consideration of Impact on the Economy

    For purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act of 1996 (``SBREFA'') \169\ the Commission must advise the Office of
Management and Budget as to whether the proposed regulation constitutes
a ``major'' rule. Under SBREFA, a rule is considered ``major'' where,
if adopted, it results or is likely to result in:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ Public Law 104-121, Tit. II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more
(either in the form of an increase or a decrease);
     A major increase in costs or prices for consumers or
individual industries; or
     Significant adverse effect on competition, investment or
innovation.

If a rule is ``major,'' its effectiveness will generally be delayed for
60 days pending Congressional review.
    Q-189. What may be the potential impact of these proposed
registration rules and forms for SBS Entities? Please include empirical
data on (a) The potential annual effect of the proposed registration
rules and forms on the economy; (b) any increase in costs or prices for
consumers or individual industries associated with the proposed
registration rules and forms; and (c) any potential effect the proposed
registration rules and forms may have on competition, investment or
innovation.

VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') \170\ requires Federal
agencies, in promulgating rules, to consider the impact of those rules
on small entities. Section 603(a) \171\ of the Administrative Procedure
Act,\172\ as amended by the RFA, generally requires the Commission to
undertake a regulatory flexibility analysis of all proposed rules, or
proposed rule amendments, to determine the impact of such rulemaking on
``small entities.'' \173\ Section 605(b) of the RFA states that this
requirement shall not apply to any proposed rule or proposed rule
amendment, which if adopted, would not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities.\174\
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    \170\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \171\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
    \172\ 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.
    \173\ Although Section 601(b) of the RFA defines the term
``small entity,'' the statute permits agencies to formulate their
own definitions. The Commission has adopted definitions for the term
small entity for the purposes of Commission rulemaking in accordance
with the RFA. Those definitions, as relevant to this proposed
rulemaking, are set forth in Rule 0-10, 17 CFR 240.0-10. See
Statement of Management on Internal Control, Exchange Act Release
No. 18451 (January 28, 1982), 47 FR 5215 (February 4, 1982).
    \174\ See 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
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    For purposes of Commission rulemaking in connection with the RFA, a
small entity includes: (i) When used with reference to an ``issuer'' or
a ``person,'' other than an investment company, an ``issuer'' or
``person'' that, on the last day of its most recent fiscal year, had
total assets of $5 million or less; \175\ or (ii) a broker-dealer with
total capital (net worth plus subordinated liabilities) of less than
$500,000 on the date in the prior fiscal year as of which its audited
financial statements were prepared pursuant to Rule 17a-5(d) under the
Exchange Act,\176\ or, if not required to file such statements, a
broker-dealer with total capital (net worth plus subordinated
liabilities) of less than $500,000 on the last day of the preceding
fiscal year (or in the time that it has been in business, if shorter);
and is not affiliated with any person (other than a natural person)
that is not a small business or small organization.\177\ Under the
standards adopted by the Small Business Administration, small entities
in the finance and insurance industry include the following: (i) for
entities in credit intermediation and related activities,\178\ entities
with $175 million or less in assets or, (ii) for non-depository credit
intermediation and certain other activities,\179\ $7 million or less in
annual receipts; (iii) for entities in financial investments and
related activities,\180\ entities with $7 million or less in annual
receipts; (iv) for insurance carriers and entities in related

[[Page 65820]]

activities,\181\ entities with $7 million or less in annual receipts;
and (v) for funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles,\182\ entities
with $7 million or less in annual receipts.\183\
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    \175\ See 17 CFR 240.0-10(a).
    \176\ See 17 CFR 240.17a-5(d).
    \177\ See 17 CFR 240.0-10(c).
    \178\ Including commercial banks, savings institutions, credit
unions, firms involved in other depository credit intermediation,
credit card issuing, sales financing, consumer lending, real estate
credit, and international trade financing. Subsector 522.
    \179\ Including firms involved in secondary market financing,
all other non-depository credit intermediation, mortgage and
nonmortgage loan brokers, financial transactions processing,
reserve, and clearinghouse activities, and other activities related
to credit intermediation. Subsector 522.
    \180\ Including firms involved in investment banking and
securities dealing, securities brokerage, commodity contracts
dealing, commodity contracts brokerage, securities and commodity
exchanges, miscellaneous intermediation, portfolio management,
providing investment advice, trust, fiduciary and custody
activities, and miscellaneous financial investment activities.
Subsector 523.
    \181\ Including direct life insurance carriers, direct health
and medical insurance carriers, direct property and casualty
insurance carriers, direct title insurance carriers, other direct
insurance (except life, health and medical) carriers, reinsurance
carriers, insurance agencies and brokerages, claims adjusting, third
party administration of insurance and pension funds, and all other
insurance related activities. Subsector 524.
    \182\ Including pension funds, health and welfare funds, other
insurance funds, open-end investment funds, trusts, estates, and
agency accounts, real estate investment trusts and other financial
vehicles. Subsector 525.
    \183\ See 13 CFR 121.201 (Jan. 1, 2010).
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    Based on the Commission's existing information about the security-
based swap market, the Commission preliminarily believes that the
market, while broad in scope, is largely dominated by entities such as
those that would be covered by the ``security-based swap dealer'' and
``major security-based swap market participant'' definitions. Subject
to certain exceptions, Exchange Act Section 3(a)(71)(A) defines
``security-based swap dealer'' to mean any person who: (i) Holds itself
out as a dealer in security-based swaps; (ii) makes a market in
security-based swaps; (iii) regularly enters into security-based swaps
with counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its own
account; or (iv) engages in any activity causing it to be commonly
known in the trade as a dealer or market maker in security-based
swaps.\184\ Exchange Act Section 3(a)(67)(A) defines ``major security-
based swap participant'' to be as any person: (i) Who is not an SBS
Dealer; and (ii)(I) who maintains a substantial position in security-
based swaps for any of the major security-based swap categories, as
such categories are determined by the Commission, excluding both
positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk and positions
maintained by any employee benefit plan (or any contract held by such a
plan) as defined in paragraphs (3) and (32) of Section 3 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002) for
the primary purpose of hedging or mitigating any risk directly
associated with the operation of the plan; (II) whose outstanding
security-based swaps create substantial counterparty exposure that
could have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the
United States banking system or financial markets; or (III) that is a
financial entity that (aa) is highly leveraged relative to the amount
of capital such entity holds and that is not subject to capital
requirements established by an appropriate Federal banking regulator;
and (bb) maintains a substantial position in outstanding security-based
swaps in any major security-based swap category, as such categories are
determined by the Commission.\185\
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    \184\ See supra note 6.
    \185\ See supra note 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on feedback from industry participants about the security-
based swap markets, the Commission preliminarily believes that entities
that will qualify as SBS Dealers and major security-based swap market
participants, whether registered broker-dealers or not, exceed the
thresholds defining ``small entities'' set out above. Thus, the
Commission believes it is unlikely that the proposed SBS Entity
registration rules and forms would have a significant economic impact
any small entity.
    For the foregoing reasons, the Commission certifies that the
proposed SBS Entity registration rules and forms would not have a
significant economic impact on any small entity for purposes of the
RFA.
    The Commission encourages written comments regarding this
certification. The Commission requests that commenters describe the
nature of any impact on small entities and provide empirical data to
illustrate the extent of the impact.

VIII. Statutory Basis and Text of Proposed Rules

    The Commission is proposing Rule 15Fb1-1 through 15Fb6-1 pursuant
to Sections 15F(a) through (d), 17(a), 23(a) and 30 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Parts 240 and 249

    Registration, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities,
Security-based swaps, Security-based swap dealers, Security-based swap
participants, Forms.

    In accordance with the foregoing, the Securities and Exchange
Commission is proposing to amend Title 17, Chapter II of the Code of
Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 240--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934

    1. The general authority citation for Part 240 is revised to read
as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j,
77s, 77z-2, 77z-3, 77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78d, 78e,
78f, 78g, 78i, 78j, 78j-1, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o,
78o-4, 78o-10, 78p, 78q, 78s, 78u-5, 78w, 78x, 78dd, 78ll, 78mm,
80a-20, 80a-23, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-11, and 7201 et
seq.; 18 U.S.C. 1350; and Pub. L. 111-203, Sec.  939A, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010), unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *
    2. Add an undesignated center heading and Sec. Sec.  240.15Fb1-1
through 240.15Fb6-1 to read as follows:

Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based
Swap Participants

Sec.
240.15Fb1-1 Signatures.
240.15Fb2-1 Registration of security-based swap dealers and major
security-based swap participants.
240.15Fb2-2T Temporary filing requirement.
240.15Fb2-3 Amendments to application for registration.
240.15Fb2-4 Nonresident security-based swap dealers and major
security-based swap participants.
240.15Fb2-5 Registration of successor to registered security-based
swap dealer or major security-based swap participant.
240.15Fb2-6 Registration of fiduciaries.
240.15Fb3-1 Duration of registration.
240.15Fb3-2 Withdrawal from registration.
240.15Fb3-3 Cancellation and revocation of registration.
240.15Fb6-1 Reports regarding associated persons.
* * * * *

Sec.  240.15Fb1-1  Signatures.

    (a) Required signatures to, or within, any electronic submission
(including, without limitation, signatories within the forms and
certifications required by Sec. Sec.  240.15Fb2-1, 240.15Fb2-4 and
240.15Fb6-1) must be in typed form rather than manual format.
Signatures in an HTML, XML or XBRL document that are not required may,
but are not required to, be presented in a graphic or image file within
the electronic filing. When used in connection with an electronic
filing, the term ``signature'' means an electronic entry in the form of
a magnetic impulse or other form of computer data compilation of any
letters or series of letters of characters comprising a name, executed,
adopted or authorized as a signature.
    (b) Each signatory to an electronic filing (including, without
limitation, each signatory to the forms and certifications required by
Sec. Sec.  240.15Fb2-1, 240.15Fb2-4 and 240.15Fb6-1) shall manually
sign a signature page or other document authenticating, acknowledging
or otherwise adopting his or her signature that appears in typed form
within the electronic filing. Such document shall be executed before or
at the time the electronic filing is

[[Page 65821]]

made. Upon request, the security-based swap dealer or major security-
based swap participant shall furnish to the Commission or its staff a
copy of any or all documents retained pursuant to this paragraph (b).
    (c) A person required to provide a signature on an electronic
submission (including, without limitation, each signatory to the forms
and certifications required by Sec. Sec.  240.15Fb2-1, 240.15Fb2-4 and
240.15Fb6-1) may not have the form or certification signed on his or
her behalf pursuant to a power of attorney or other form of confirming
authority.
    (d) Each manually signed signature page or other document
authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting his or her
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic filing--
    (1) On Schedules F and G to Form SBSE (Sec.  249.1600 of this
chapter), SBSE-A (Sec.  249.1600a. of this chapter), or SBSE-BD (Sec.
249.1600b of this chapter), as appropriate, shall be retained by the
filer until at least three years after the form or certification has
been replaced or is no longer effective;
    (2) On Form SBSE-C (Sec.  249.1600c of this chapter) shall be
retained by the filer until at least three years after the Form was
filed with the Commission.

Sec.  240.15Fb2-1  Registration of security-based swap dealers and
major security-based swap participants.

    (a) Application. An application for registration of a security-
based swap dealer or a major security-based swap participant that is
filed pursuant to Section 15F(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b)) shall be filed on Form SBSE (Sec.  249.1600 of
this chapter) or Form SBSE-A (Sec.  249.1600a of this chapter) or Form
SBSE-BD (Sec.  249.1600b of this chapter), as appropriate, in
accordance with this section and the instructions to the forms.
    (b) Certification.
    (1) Form of certification. A knowledgeable senior officer shall
certify on Form SBSE-C (Sec.  249.1600c of this chapter) that, after
due inquiry, he or she has reasonably determined that the security-
based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant has the
operational, financial, and compliance capabilities to act as a
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant, as
applicable, and has documented the process by which he or she reached
such determination.
    (2) Timing of filing of certification.
    (i) Conditional registration.
    (A) Prior to the last compliance date. Each security-based swap
dealer or major security-based swap participant that files a completed
application in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section before the
last compliance date (as defined in paragraph (e) of this section) must
file the certification described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section on
or before such last compliance date.
    (B) Major security-based swap participants. Each major security-
based swap participant that files a completed application in accordance
with paragraph (a) of this section after the last compliance date must
file the certification described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section
within four months after it files its completed application.
    (ii) Ongoing registration. Each security-based swap dealer that
files a completed application in accordance with paragraph (a) of this
section after the last compliance date must file the certification
described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section at the time it files its
application.
    (c) Filing.
    (1) Electronic filing. Every application for registration and
certification of a security-based swap dealer or major security-based
swap participant and any additional registration documents shall be
filed electronically with the Commission or its designee.
    (2) Effective date of filing.
    (i) Application. An application of a security-based swap dealer or
a major security-based swap participant submitted pursuant to paragraph
(a) of this section shall be considered filed when a complete Form SBSE
(Sec.  249.1600 of this chapter), Form SBSE-A (Sec.  249.1600a of this
chapter), or Form SBSE-BD (Sec.  249.1600b of this chapter), as
appropriate, and all required additional documents are submitted
electronically with the Commission or its designee;
    (ii) Certification. A certification of a security-based swap dealer
or a major security-based swap participant submitted pursuant to
paragraph (b) of this section shall be considered filed when a complete
Form SBSE-C (Sec.  249.1600c of this chapter) is submitted
electronically with the Commission or its designee.
    (d) Commission decision.
    (1) Conditional registration. The Commission may deny or grant
registration to a security-based swap dealer or major security-based
swap participant on a conditional basis. The Commission will grant
conditional registration if it finds that the security-based swap
dealer's or major security-based swap participant's application is
complete; Except that, the Commission may institute proceedings to
determine whether conditional registration should be denied if the
applicant is subject to a statutory disqualification (as defined in 15
U.S.C. 78c(a)(39)) or if the Commission is aware of inaccurate
statements in the application. Such proceedings shall include notice of
the grounds for denial under consideration and opportunity for hearing.
At the conclusion of such proceedings, the Commission shall grant or
deny such registration.
    (2) Ongoing registration. The Commission may grant or deny ongoing
registration based on a security-based swap dealer's or major security-
based swap participant's application (filed pursuant to paragraph (a)
of this section) and certification (filed pursuant to paragraph (b) of
this section). A conditionally registered security-based swap dealer or
major security-based swap participant need not submit a new application
to apply for ongoing registration, but must amend its application, as
required pursuant to Sec.  240.15Fb2-3. The Commission will grant
ongoing registration if it finds that the requirements of Section
15F(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b)) are
satisfied; Except that, the Commission may institute proceedings to
determine whether ongoing registration should be denied if it does not
make such finding or if the applicant is subject to a statutory
disqualification (as defined in 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(39)) or the Commission
is aware of inaccurate statements in the application or certification.
Such proceedings shall include notice of the grounds for denial under
consideration and opportunity for hearing. At the conclusion of such
proceedings, the Commission shall grant or deny such registration.
    (e) Definition. For purposes of this section, the term last
compliance date shall mean the latest date, designated by the
Commission, by which security-based swap dealers and major security-
based swap participant must comply with any of the initial rules
promulgated under Section 15F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78o-10).

Sec.  240.15Fb2-2T  Temporary filing requirement.

    (a) Paper filing. If a technological means to facilitate receipt
and retention of applications required to be filed in accordance with
Sec.  240.15Fb2-1 is not functional on or before [date to be
determined], each applicant for registration as a security-based swap
dealer or major security-based swap participant must, notwithstanding
Sec.  240.15Fb2-1(c)(1), file its application on Form SBSE (Sec.
249.1600 of this chapter), Form SBSE-A (Sec.  249.1600a of

[[Page 65822]]

this chapter), or Form SBSE-BD (Sec.  249.1600b of this chapter), as
applicable, any additional documents, and Form SBSE-C (Sec.  249.1600c
of this chapter) in paper form by sending it to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.
    (b) Transitional resubmission requirement. Each applicant must
resubmit its Form SBSE (Sec.  249.1600 of this chapter), Form SBSE-A
(Sec.  249.1600a of this chapter), and Form SBSE-BD (Sec.  249.1600b of
this chapter), as applicable, any additional documents, and Form SBSE-C
(Sec.  249.1600c of this chapter) to the Commission electronically
within three months of the date such technological means to facilitate
receipt and retention of applications becomes functional.

Sec.  240.15Fb2-3  Amendments to application for registration.

    If a security-based swap dealer or a major security-based swap
participant finds that the information contained in its application for
registration (as described in Sec.  240.15Fb2-1(a)), or in any
amendment thereto, is or has become inaccurate for any reason, the
security-based swap dealer or a major security-based swap participant
shall promptly file an amendment electronically with the Commission/its
designee on Form SBSE (Sec.  249.1600 of this chapter), Form SBSE-A
(Sec.  249.1600a of this chapter), or Form SBSE-BD (Sec.  249.1600b of
this chapter), as appropriate, to correct such information.

Sec.  240.15Fb2-4  Nonresident security-based swap dealers and major
security-based swap participants.

    (a) Definition. For purposes of this section, the terms nonresident
security-based swap dealer and nonresident major security-based swap
participant shall mean:
    (1) In the case of an individual, one who resides, or has his or
her principal place of business, in any place not in the United States;
    (2) In the case of a corporation, one incorporated in or having its
principal place of business in any place not in the United States; or
    (3) In the case of a partnership or other unincorporated
organization or association, one having its principal place of business
outside the United States.
    (b) Power of attorney.
    (1) Each nonresident security-based swap dealer and nonresident
major security-based swap participant registered or applying for
registration pursuant to Section 15F(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b)) shall obtain a written irrevocable
consent and power of attorney appointing an agent in the United States,
other than the Commission or a Commission member, official or employee,
upon whom may be served any process, pleadings, or other papers in any
action brought against the nonresident security-based swap dealer or
nonresident major security-based swap participant to enforce the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.). This consent
and power of attorney must be signed by the nonresident security-based
swap dealer or nonresident major security-based swap participant and
the named agent(s) for service of process.
    (2) Each nonresident security-based swap dealer and nonresident
major security-based swap participant registered or applying for
registration pursuant to section 15F(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b)) shall, at the time of filing its
application on Form SBSE (Sec.  249.1600 of this chapter), Form SBSE-A
(Sec.  249.1600a of this chapter), or Form SBSE-BD (Sec.  249.1600b of
this chapter), as appropriate, furnish to the Commission the name and
address of its United States agent for service of process on Schedule F
to the appropriate form.
    (3) Any change of a nonresident security-based swap dealer's and
nonresident major security-based swap participant's agent for service
of process and any change of name or address of a nonresident security-
based swap dealer's and nonresident major security-based swap
participant's existing agent for service of process shall be
communicated promptly to the Commission through amendment of the
Schedule F of Form SBSE (Sec.  249.1600 of this chapter), Form SBSE-A
(Sec.  249.1600a of this chapter), or Form SBSE-BD (Sec.  249.1600b of
this chapter), as appropriate.
    (4) Each nonresident security-based swap dealer and nonresident
major security-based swap participant must promptly appoint a successor
agent for service of process if the nonresident security-based swap
dealer and nonresident major security-based swap participant discharges
its identified agent for service of process or if its agent for service
of process is unwilling or unable to accept service on behalf of the
nonresident security-based swap dealer or nonresident major security-
based swap participant.
    (5) Each nonresident security-based swap dealer and nonresident
major security-based swap participant must maintain, as part of its
books and records, the agreement identified in paragraph (b)(1) of this
section for at least three years after the agreement is terminated.
    (c) Access to books and records.
    (1) Certification and opinion of counsel. Any nonresident security-
based swap dealer and nonresident major security-based swap participant
applying for registration pursuant to Section 15F(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b) shall certify on Schedule F
of Form SBSE (Sec.  249.1600 of this chapter), Form SBSE-A (Sec.
249.1600a of this chapter), or Form SBSE-BD (Sec.  249.1600b of this
chapter), as appropriate, and provide an opinion of counsel that the
nonresident security-based swap dealer and nonresident major security-
based swap participant can, as a matter of law, provide the Commission
with prompt access to the books and records of such nonresident
security-based swap dealer and nonresident major security-based swap
participant, and can, as a matter of law, submit to onsite inspection
and examination by the Commission.
    (2) Amendments. The nonresident security-based swap dealer and
nonresident major security-based swap participant shall re-certify, on
Schedule F to Form SBSE (Sec.  249.1600 of this chapter), Form SBSE-A
(Sec.  249.1600a of this chapter), or Form SBSE-BD (Sec.  249.1600b of
this chapter), as applicable, within 90 days after any changes in the
legal or regulatory framework that would impact the nonresident
security-based swap dealer's or nonresident major security-based swap
participant's ability to, or the manner in which it provides the
Commission with prompt access to its books and records, or impacts the
Commission's ability to inspect and examine the nonresident security-
based swap dealer or nonresident major security-based swap participant.
The re-certification shall be accompanied by a revised opinion of
counsel describing how, as a matter of law, the nonresident security-
based swap dealer or nonresident major security-based swap participant
will continue to meet its obligations to provide the Commission with
prompt access to its books and records and to be subject to Commission
inspection and examination under the new regulatory regime.

Sec.  240.15Fb2-5  Registration of successor to registered security-
based swap dealer or a major security-based swap participant.

    (a) In the event that a security-based swap dealer or major
security-based swap participant succeeds to and continues the business
of a security-

[[Page 65823]]

based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant registered
pursuant to Section 15F(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78o-10(b)), the registration of the predecessor shall be deemed
to remain effective as the registration of the successor if the
successor, within 30 days after such succession, files an application
for registration in accordance with Sec.  240.15Fb2-1, and the
predecessor files a notice of withdrawal from registration on Form
SBSE-W (Sec.  249.1601 of this chapter).
    (b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this section, if a security-
based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant succeeds to
and continues the business of a registered predecessor security-based
swap dealer or major security-based swap participant, and the
succession is based solely on a change in the predecessor's date or
state of incorporation, form of organization, or composition of a
partnership, the successor may, within 30 days after the succession,
amend the registration of the predecessor security-based swap dealer or
major security-based swap participant on Form SBSE (Sec.  249.1600 of
this chapter), Form SBSE-A (Sec.  249.1600a of this chapter), or Form
SBSE-BD (Sec.  249.1600b of this chapter), as appropriate, to reflect
these changes. This amendment shall be deemed an application for
registration filed by the predecessor and adopted by the successor.

Sec.  240.15Fb2-6  Registration of fiduciaries.

    The registration of a security-based swap dealer or a major
security-based swap participant shall be deemed to be the registration
of any executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, assignee for the
benefit of creditors, receiver, trustee in insolvency or bankruptcy, or
other fiduciary, appointed or qualified by order, judgment, or decree
of a court of competent jurisdiction to continue the business of such
registered security-based swap dealer or a major security-based swap
participant; Provided, that such fiduciary files with the Commission,
within 30 days after entering upon the performance of his or her
duties, an amended Form SBSE (Sec.  249.1600 of this chapter), Form
SBSE-A (Sec.  249.1600a of this chapter), or Form SBSE-BD (Sec.
249.1600b of this chapter), as appropriate, indicating the fiduciary's
position with respect to management of the firm and, as an additional
document, a copy of the order, judgment, decree, or other document
appointing the fiduciary.

Sec.  240.15Fb3-1  Duration of registration.

    (a) General. A person registered as a security-based swap dealer or
major security-based swap participant in accordance with Sec.
240.15Fb2-1 will continue to be so registered until the effective date
of any cancellation, revocation or withdrawal of such registration or
any other event the Commission determines should trigger expiration.
    (b) Conditional registration. Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this
section, conditional registration granted by the Commission in
accordance with Sec.  240.15Fb2-1(d)(1) shall expire:
    (1) During the transitional period--on the last compliance date (as
that term is defined in Sec.  240.15Fb2-1(e)) for security-based swap
dealers and major security-based swap participants that filed a
completed application before the last compliance date, unless the
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant
files with the Commission a certification in accordance with Sec.
240.15Fb2-1(b)(1)(i), in which case conditional registration shall
extend an additional thirty days;
    (2) Major security-based swap participants--four months after the
major security-based swap participant files its completed application,
unless the major security-based swap participant files with the
Commission a certification in accordance with Sec.  240.15Fb2-
1(b)(1)(ii); in which case the conditional registration shall extend an
additional thirty days.
    (c) Extensions. The Commission may extend conditional registration
for good cause.

Sec.  240.15Fb3-2  Withdrawal from registration.

    (a) Notice of withdrawal from registration as a security-based swap
dealer or major security-based swap participant pursuant to Section
15F(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b))
shall be filed on Form SBSE-W (Sec.  249.1601 of this chapter) in
accordance with the instructions contained therein. Every notice of
withdrawal from registration as a security-based swap dealer or major
security-based swap participant shall be filed electronically with the
Commission or its designee in accordance with applicable filing
requirements. Prior to filing a notice of withdrawal from registration
on Form SBSE-W, a security-based swap dealer or major security-based
swap participant shall amend its Form SBSE (Sec.  249.1600 of this
chapter), Form SBSE-A (Sec.  249.1600a of this chapter) or Form SBSE-BD
(Sec.  249.1600b of this chapter), as appropriate, in accordance with
Sec.  240.15Fb2-3(a) to update any inaccurate information.
    (b) A notice of withdrawal from registration filed by a security-
based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant pursuant to
Section 15F(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-
10(b)) shall become effective for all matters (except as provided in
this paragraph (b)) on the 60th day after the filing thereof with the
Commission or its designee, within such longer period of time as to
which such security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap
participant consents or which the Commission by order may determine as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors, or within such shorter period of time as the Commission
may determine. If a notice of withdrawal from registration is filed
with the Commission at any time subsequent to the date of the issuance
of a Commission order instituting proceedings to censure, place
limitations on the activities, functions or operations of, or suspend
or revoke the registration of, such security-based swap dealer or major
security-based swap participant, or if prior to the effective date of
the notice of withdrawal pursuant to this paragraph (b), the Commission
institutes such a proceeding or a proceeding to impose terms or
conditions upon such withdrawal, the notice of withdrawal shall not
become effective pursuant to this paragraph (b) except at such time and
upon such terms and conditions as the Commission deems necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

Sec.  240.15Fb3-3  Cancellation and revocation of registration.

    (a) Cancellation. If the Commission finds that any person
registered pursuant to Sec.  240.15Fb2-1 is no longer in existence or
has ceased to do business as a security-based swap dealer or major
security-based swap participant, the Commission shall by order cancel
the registration of such person.
    (b) Revocation. The Commission, by order, shall censure, place
limitations on the activities, functions, or operations of, or revoke
the registration of any security-based swap dealer or major security-
based swap participant that has registered with the Commission if it
makes a finding as specified in Section 15F(l)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-10(l)(2)).

[[Page 65824]]

Sec.  240.15Fb6-1  Reports regarding associated persons.

    (a) Certification. No registered security-based swap dealer or
major security-based swap participant shall act as a security-based
swap dealer or major security-based swap participant unless it has
certified electronically on Schedule G of Form SBSE (Sec.  249.1600 of
this chapter), Form SBSE-A (Sec.  249.1600a of this chapter), or Form
SBSE-BD (Sec.  249.1600b of this chapter), as appropriate, that no
person associated with such security-based swap dealer or major
security-based swap participant who is effecting or involved in
effecting security-based swaps on behalf of the security-based swap
dealer or major security-based swap participant is subject to statutory
disqualification, as defined in Section 3(a)(39) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(39)).
    (b) To support the certification required by paragraph (a) of this
section, each registered security-based swap dealer and registered
major security-based swap participant shall obtain a questionnaire or
application for employment executed by each of its associated persons
who effects or is involved in effecting security based swaps on behalf
of the security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap
participant which questionnaire or application shall serve as a basis
for a background check of the associated person and be reviewed and
signed by the security-based swap dealer's or major security-based swap
participant's Chief Compliance Officer (designated as required by
Section 15F(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-
10(k)) or his or her designee and shall contain at least the following
information with respect to the associated person:
    (1) The associated person's name, address, social security number,
and the starting date of the associated person's employment or other
association with the security-based swap dealer and major security-
based swap participant;
    (2) The associated person's date of birth;
    (3) A complete, consecutive statement of all the associated
person's business connections for at least the preceding ten years,
including whether the employment was part-time or full-time;
    (4) A record of any denial of membership or registration, and of
any disciplinary action taken, or sanction imposed, upon the associated
person by any federal or state agency, by any national securities
exchange or national securities association, or by any foreign
financial regulatory authority including any finding that the
associated person either aided or abetted or was a cause of any
disciplinary action or had violated any law;
    (5) A record of any denial, suspension, expulsion or revocation of
membership or registration of any broker, dealer, security-based swap
dealer, or major security-based swap participant with which the
associated person was associated in any capacity when such action was
taken;
    (6) A record of any permanent or temporary injunction entered
against the associated person or any broker, dealer, security-based
swap dealer, or major security-based swap participant with which the
associated person was associated in any capacity at the time such
injunction was entered;
    (7) A record of any arrest or indictment for any felony, or any
misdemeanor pertaining to securities (including security-based swaps),
futures or commodities (including swaps), banking, insurance or real
estate (including, but not limited to, acting or being associated with
a broker-dealer, investment company, investment adviser, futures
sponsor, bank, or savings and loan association), fraud, false
statements or omissions, wrongful taking of property or bribery,
forgery, counterfeiting or extortion, and the disposition of the
foregoing; and
    (8) A record of any other name or names by which the associated
person has been known or which the associated person has used.
    (c) Each registered security-based swap dealer and registered major
security-based swap participant shall maintain all questionnaires and
applications for employment obtained pursuant to paragraph (b) of this
section as part of its books and records for at least three years after
the associated person has terminated his or her association with the
registered security-based swap dealer or registered major security-
based swap participant.

PART 249--FORMS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

    3. The authority citation for Part 249 continues to read, in part,
as follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. and 7201 et seq.; and 18 U.S.C.
1350, unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *
    4. Add subpart Q to read as follows:

Subpart Q--Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major
Security-Based Swap Participants

Sec.
249.1600 Form SBSE, for application for registration as a security-
based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant or to
amend such an application for registration.
249.1600a Form SBSE-A, for application for registration as a
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant
or to amend such an application for registration by firms registered
or registering with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as a
swap dealer or major swap participant that are not also registered
or registering with the Commission as a broker or dealer.
249.1600b Form SBSE-BD, for application for registration as a
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant
or to amend such an application for registration by firms registered
or registering with the Commission as a broker or dealer.
249.1600c Form SBSE-C, for certification by security-based swap
dealers and major security-based swap participants.
249.1601 Form SBSE-W, for withdrawal from registration as a
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant
or to amend such an application for registration.

Sec.  249.1600  Form SBSE, for application for registration as a
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant or
to amend such an application for registration.

    This form shall be used for application for registration as a
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant by
firms that are not registered with the Commission as a broker or dealer
and that are not registered or registering with the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission as a swap dealer or major swap participant, pursuant
to Section 15F(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78o-10(b)) and to amend such an application for registration.

Sec.  249.1600a  Form SBSE-A, for application for registration as a
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant or
to amend such an application for registration by firms registered or
registering with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as a swap
dealer or major swap participant that are not also registered or
registering with the Commission as a broker or dealer.

    This form shall be used instead of Form SBSE (Sec.  249.1600) to
apply for registration as a security-based swap dealer or major
security-based swap participant by firms that are not registered or
registering with the Commission as a broker or dealer but that are
registered or registering with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
as a swap dealer or major swap participant, pursuant to Section 15F(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b)) and to
amend such an application for

[[Page 65825]]

registration. An entity that is registered or registering with the
Commission as a broker or dealer and is also registered or registering
with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as a swap dealer or major
swap participant shall apply for registration as a security-based swap
dealer or major security-based swap participant on Form SBSE-BD (Sec.
249.1600b) and not on this Form SBSE-A.

Sec.  249.1600b  Form SBSE-BD, for application for registration as a
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant or
to amend such an application for registration by firms registered or
registering with the Commission as a broker or dealer.

    This form shall be used instead of either Form SBSE (Sec.
249.1600) or SBSE-A (Sec.  249.1600a) to apply for registration as a
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant
solely by firms registered or registering with the Commission as a
broker or dealer, pursuant to Section 15F(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-10(b)) and to amend such an application for
registration. An entity that is registered or registering with the
Commission as a broker or dealer and is also registered or registering
with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as a swap dealer or major
swap participant, the entity shall apply for registration as a
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant on
this Form SBSE-BD and not on Form SBSE-A.

Sec.  249.1600c  Form SBSE-C, for certification by security-based swap
dealers and major security-based swap participants.

    This form shall be used to file the certification required pursuant
to Sec.  240.15Fb2-1(b) of this chapter.

Sec.  249.1601  Form SBSE-W, for withdrawal from registration as a
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant or
to amend such an application for registration.

    This form shall be used to withdraw from registration as a
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant,
pursuant to Section 15F(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78o-10(b)).

By the Commission.

    Dated: October 12, 2011.
Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary.

    Note: The following Forms will not appear in the Code of Federal
Regulations.

BILLING CODE 8011-01-P

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[FR Doc. 2011-26889 Filed 10-21-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-C

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Bank for International Settlements v Switzerland
		
	
	

		
bis-legal

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP SECRET – Review of Federal Reserve System Financial Assistance to AIG in Financial Crisis
		
	
	

		
gao-11-616

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Safeguarding Unclassified DoD Information Meet
		
	
	

		
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Defense Acquisition Regulations System

48 CFR Parts 204 and 252

RIN 0750-AG47

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safeguarding
Unclassified DoD Information (DFARS Case 2011-D039)

AGENCY: Defense Acquisition Regulations System, Department of Defense
(DoD).

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: DoD is hosting a public meeting to initiate a dialogue with
industry and Government agencies regarding the proposed rule for the
safeguarding of unclassified information.

DATES: Public Meeting: November 15, 2011, from 9:30 a.m. to 12 p.m.
EST.
    Submission of Comments: Comments on the proposed rule should be
submitted in writing to the address shown below on or before December
16, 2011, to be considered in the formation of the final rule.

ADDRESSES: Public Meeting: The public meeting will be held in the
General Services Administration (GSA), Central Office Auditorium, 1800
F Street NW., Washington, DC 20405. The GSA Auditorium is located on
the main floor of the building.
    Submission of Comments: You may submit written comments, identified
by DFARS Case 2011-D039, using any of the following methods:
    [cir] Regulations.gov: http://www.regulations.gov. Submit comments
via the Federal eRulemaking portal by inputting ``DFARS Case 2011-
D039''

[[Page 66890]]

under the heading ``Enter keyword or ID'' and selecting ``Search.''
Select the link ``Submit a Comment'' that corresponds with ``DFARS Case
2011-D039.'' Follow the instructions provided at the ``Submit a
Comment'' screen. Please include your name, company name (if any), and
``DFARS Case 2011-D039'' on your attached document.
    [cir] Email: dfars@osd.mil. Include DFARS Case 2011-D039 in the
subject line of the message.
    [cir] Fax: (703) 602-0350.
    [cir] Mail: Defense Acquisition Regulations System, Attn: Mr.
Julian Thrash, OUSD(AT&L)DPAP(DARS), Room 3B855, 3060 Defense Pentagon,
Washington, DC 20301-3060.
    Comments received generally will be posted without change to
http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information provided. To
confirm receipt of your comment, please check www.regulations.gov
approximately two to three days after submission to verify posting
(except allow 30 days for posting of comments submitted by mail).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Julian E. Thrash, telephone (703)
602-0310.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The DFARS does not presently address the
safeguarding of unclassified DoD information within industry, nor does
it address cyber intrusion reporting for that information. DoD
published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and notice of
public meeting in the Federal Register at 75 FR 9563 on March 3, 2010,
to provide the public an opportunity for input into the initial
rulemaking process. Subsequently, a proposed DFARS rule was published
in the Federal Register at 76 FR 38089 on June 29, 2011. The proposed
rule addresses basic and enhanced safeguarding procedures for the
protection of DoD information. An extension of the public comment
period to November 30, 2011, was published in the Federal Register at
76 FR 52297 on August 22, 2011. This notice further extends the public
comment period to December 16, 2011.
    Registration: Individuals wishing to attend the public meeting
should register by November 4, 2011, to ensure adequate room
accommodations and to create an attendee list for secure entry to the
GSA building for anyone who is not a Federal Government employee with a
Government badge. Interested parties may register at this Web site,
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/safeguarding_unclassified_DoD_information.html,
by providing the following information:
    (1) Company or organization name;
    (2) Names and email addresses of persons attending;
    (3) Last four digits of social security number for each attendee
(non-Federal employees only); and
    (4) Identify presenter if desiring to speak (limited to a 10-minute
presentation per company or organization).

Attendees are encouraged to arrive at least 30 minutes early to ensure
they are processed through security in a timely fashion. Prior
registrants will be given priority if room constraints require limits
on attendance.
    Special Accommodations: The public meeting location is physically
accessible to persons with disabilities. Requests for sign language
interpretation or other auxiliary aids should be directed to Mr. Julian
E. Thrash, telephone (703) 602-0310, at least 10 working days prior to
the meeting date.
    Presentations: If an attendee wishes to present a short oral
presentation at the meeting not-to-exceed 10 minutes, please advise
during registration so appropriate arrangements can be made for
scheduling purposes. If the presenter intends to share a handout to
accompany an oral statement, please submit the document to
dfars@osd.mil for posting no later than November 10, 2011, so that
other attendees may download prior to the meeting. When submitting
briefing information, provide the presenter's name, organization
affiliation, telephone number, and email address on the cover page.
    Correspondence and Comments: Please cite ``Public Meeting, DFARS
Case 2011-D039'' in all correspondence related to this public meeting.
The submitted presentations will be the only record of the public
meeting. To have a presentation considered as a public comment for the
formation of the final rule, the presentation, or pertinent excerpts,
must be submitted separately as a written comment as instructed in the
above paragraph titled, ``Submission of Comments.''
    Government procurement.

Mary Overstreet,
Editor, Defense Acquisition Regulations System.
[FR Doc. 2011-27931 Filed 10-27-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
Women Protest Worldwide Photos 3
		
	
	

		








Women Protest Worldwide Photos 3




 





[Image]Ellinda McKinney offers her message to police during the Occupy Denver protest, Saturday, Oct. 29, 2011 in Denver. Occupy Denver protesters and law enforcement officers faced off on the steps of the state Capitol and Civic Center after protesters marched through downtown Denver for the fourth week in a row. (Craig F. Walker)




[Image]A woman performs as a widow during a protest against violence in Mexico City on October 28, 2011. More than 41,000 people have been killed in rising drug-related violence in Mexico since December 2006, when President Felipe Calderon deployed soldiers and federal police to take on organized crime. Getty




[Image]Demonstrators march towards the Treasury Department and the White House in Washington on October 29, 2011 during a protest organized by the Occupy DC movement to call for increased taxes on the rich, a so-called ‘Robin Hood tax.’ Getty




[Image]Israelis protest against the high costs of living in Tel Aviv, Israel, Saturday, Oct. 29, 2011. According to police estimates over 30,000 participated in the Tel Aviv protest and thousands of others protested in Jerusalem on Saturday. A wave of social protests swept the country this summer as Israelis held mass protests to protest a wide range of social issues, especially high housing costs. (Maya Hasson)




[Image]A protester of the Occupy Berlin movement drinks champagne during a protest demonstration against the finance system in central Berlin, Saturday, Oct. 29, 2011. (Markus Schreiber)




[Image]A demonstrator is seen during a protest organized by the Islamic Central Council of Switzerland (ICCS), on October 29, 2011 in Bern. More than 1000 persons attend the demonstration. The Islamic Central Council of Switzerland (ICCS), a conservative Muslim group was under criticism after chosen a symbol reminiscent of the Jewish Star of David with the word ‘Muslim’ framed by a yellow star. Getty




[Image]A woman holds a crucifix and a rosary as she demonstrates among around one thousand people called by ‘Civitas’ association, close to Christian fundamentalists on October 29, 2011 in Paris to protest against the play ‘Sur le concept du visage du fils de Dieu’ (On the Concept of the Face, Regarding the Son of God) by Italian Romeo Castellucci which is performed at the Paris Theatre de la Ville from October 20 to 30. Every evening, protesters demonstrate in front of the building to denounce the’ of the play which they found insulting. Getty




[Image]Occupy Nashville protesters, from the left, Megan Riges, Lauren Plummer and Lindsey Krinks, celebrate Friday, Oct. 28, 2011, after they were released by police after being arrested overnight on Legislative Plaza in downtown Nashville, Tenn. Twenty-nine Wall Street protesters in Nashville have been issued misdemeanor citations for criminal trespassing after being arrested by state troopers overnight. (John Partipilo)




[Image]Protesters affiliated with the Occupy Wall Street Movement are seen at the Tennessee Capitol, Friday, Oct. 28, 2011. Tennessee’s safety commissioner says Republican Gov. Bill Haslam’s office approved a pre-dawn roundup of Wall Street protesters from the state Capitol grounds. Twenty-nine people were arrested, but a night judge refused to sign warrants because the policy had only been in effect since the previous afternoon. (Erik Schelzig)




[Image]A dressed woman attends a protest in Bogota, Colombia, Wednesday Oct. 26, 2011. The protest was against education reforms planned by the government that propose private funding for public institutions. (Fernando Vergara)




[Image]Activists of Femen, a Ukrainian women movement, wearing masks representing the slaughtered animals, shout slogans and hold placards reading ‘Zoomorgue’, ‘Slaughten house’, ‘Zooghetto’ as they stage a topless protest on a roof at the entrance of the zoo in Kiev on October 27, 2011. They rally against, as they say, the intolerable living conditions for animals in the zoo. Every year the Zoo is claiming the lives of hundreds of rare and exotic animals, that die a horrific death of hunger, cold or disease, as they report to AFP. The FEMEN movement demands that the Ukrainian authorities close the Kievs ZooMorgue as they call it. Getty




[Image]Supporters of Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) attend a rally against Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari in Lahore on October 28, 2011. More than 30,000 supporters of Pakistan’s main opposition party took to the streets in a protest rally on October 28, burning an effigy of President Asif Ali Zardari and demanding that he quit. The Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) called the rally in Lahore to exploit talk of early elections in its political heartland, where it controls the Punjab provincial government despite being in opposition at national level. Getty




[Image]Supporters of Pakistani politician Imran Khan and chief of Tehreek-e-Insaf (Movement for Justice) party, carry placards as they march during protest rally in Islamabad on October 28, 2011 against US drone attacks in Pakistani tribal region. Khan staged a rally along with tribal elders in Islamabad against the continued US drone attacks in tribal areas which they said were killing hundreds of innocent people. Nearly 60 US drone strikes have been reported in Pakistan so far this year, dozens of them since Navy SEALs killed Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in the garrison city of Abbottabad, close to the capital Islamabad, on May 2. Getty




[Image]Protesters throw mud at a caricature of President Benigno Aquino III during a protest Friday Oct. 28, 2011 in Manila, Philippines against the President’s alleged continued support for big corporations including the big three oil companies in the country. The protest, part of the nationwide “Women’s Day of Protest,” was held following another round of oil price hike implemented late last week. (Bullit Marquez)




[Image]Relatives of missing Kashmiri youth participate in a protest demonstration organized by the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP) in Srinagar, India, Friday, Oct. 28, 2011. According to APDP some 8,000-10,000 people have gone missing since the beginning of the Kashmir conflict in 1989, after being arrested by Indian security forces and other security agencies. (Dar Yasin)




[Image]Anti-austerity protesters shout slogans before a scheduled military parade in the northern Greek city of Thessaloniki, Friday, Oct. 28, 2011. Thousands of anti-austerity protesters in the city forced the cancellation of Friday’s annual military parade commemorating Greece’s entry into World War II. The demonstrators heckled Greek President Karolos Papoulias and other attending officials, calling Papoulias a traitor. (Nikolas Giakoumidis)




[Image]Campaigners on the ‘Occupy London Stock Exchange’ protest encampment outside St Paul’s Cathedral on October 28, 2011 in London, England. St Paul’s Cathedral is due to reopen after being closed due to the adjacent ‘Occupy London Stock Exchange’ protest against the global financial system which has been in place for almost two weeks. Getty















[Image]Filipino Muslims hold their Friday prayers near the Presidential Palace during a “Prayer-for-Peace” rally Friday Oct. 28, 2011 in Manila, Philippines. The prayer protest was held to call for peace following the military’s launching of air strikes and military operations after one of the worst clashes in three years with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) this month killed 26 soldiers, three policemen and an undetermined number of Muslim rebels. Close to 30,000 civilians have been displaced in the ongoing operation, officials said. AP




[Image]A man consoles a distressed woman as she weeps at a protest during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Perth, Australia, Friday, Oct. 28, 2011. Queen Elizabeth II opened CHOGM Friday with more than 50 commonwealth nations’ leaders attending the three-day forum to discuss global and Commonwealth issues and collective policies and initiatives. AP




[Image]Members of the Mexican Huichole community take part in a protest against Canadian mining projects in Mexico City on October 27, 2011. Huicholes from Durango, Nayarit and Jalisco marched along Reforma avenue towards the presidential palace to demand the end of the Canadian exploitation of silver in Cerro del Quemado, San Luis Potosi, arguing it affects nature and their sacred path. Getty




[Image]A member of the Mexican Huichole community takes part in a protest against Canadian mining projects in Mexico City on October 27, 2011. Huicholes from Durango, Nayarit and Jalisco marched along Reforma avenue towards the presidential palace to demand the end of the Canadian exploitation of silver in Cerro del Quemado, San Luis Potosi, arguing it affects nature and their sacred path. Getty




[Image]A resident speaks with journalists as they protest outside the refinery compound of Italian oil company Eni at the town of Tazarka, about 70 km (43.5 miles) south-east of capital Tunis October 27, 2011. The protesters say that the refinery owners have not honoured their commitments to provide the local community with jobs and investments in infrastructure. Message written in Arabic reads “protest”. Reuters




[Image]People march during a protest in Zhili town, Huzhou city, Zhejiang province October 27, 2011. Hundreds of people have clashed with police and smashed public property in China’s eastern Zhejiang province after a dispute between tax authorities and a local shop owner snowballed into protests, a government-run news site said. Reuters




[Image]People watch as riot police walk along the central square during a protest in Zhili town, Huzhou city, Zhejiang province October 27, 2011. Hundreds of people have clashed with police and smashed public property in China’s eastern Zhejiang province after a dispute between tax authorities and a local shop owner snowballed into protests, a government-run news site said. Reuters




[Image]A Christian activist holds a placard reading “No fraternity without respect of the other” as she prays during a demonstration, in Paris, Thursday Oct. 27, 2011, in front of the Theatre de la ville, where the Italian director Romeo Castellucci’s play “On the Concept of the Face, Regarding the Son of God” is being performed. Christian fundamentalists protest against the play featuring the face of Christ drizzled with fake excrement. (Thibault Camus)




[Image]About 1300 hundred people attend a candlelight vigil for Scott Olsen on Thursday, Oct. 27, 2011, in Oakland, Calif. During an Occupy Oakland protest Tuesday night, a projectile apparently fired by police struck the Iraq veteran in the head leaving him in critical condition with a fractured skull. (Noah Berger)




[Image]Participants of the Occupy Wall Street movement, right, talk to pedestrians trying to walk past their tent at the encampment at Zuccotti Park, Thursday, Oct. 27, 2011 in New York. The protests, which started on Sept. 17 with a few dozen demonstrators near Wall Street, as grown into a nationwide and international movement. (Mary Altaffer)




[Image]Demonstrators supporting the Occupy Wall Street movement march in the hallways during a rally inside the state Capitol in Albany, N.Y., Thursday, Oct. 27, 2011. Several speakers criticized Gov. Andrew Cuomo for blocking a bill that would tax New Yorkers making over $1 million a year at a higher rate while cutting aid to schools, colleges and the poor. Cuomo, who was in New York City, had no immediate comment Thursday. (Hans Pennink)




[Image]Police officers look at the Occupy London Stock Exchange camp as they stand on the steps outside St Paul’s Cathedral in London, Thursday, Oct. 27, 2011. St. Paul’s Cathedral says it will reopen Friday, a week after is shut its doors because of an anti-capitalist protest camp outside. It will reopen to tourists on Saturday. Protesters have been camped outside the building since Oct. 15. Days later, cathedral officials shut the building to the public.




[Image]Demonstrators hold cutouts representing women during a protest in front of the National Assembly building during a protest to demand the return of the therapeutic abortion law, in Managua, Nicaragua, Wednesday Oct. 26, 2011. The therapeutic abortion law, which allows the termination of a pregnancy to save a mother’s life, was repealed by the legislature in 2006, handing down eight-year prison sentences to those who terminated risky pregnancies. (Esteban Felix)




[Image]In this Wednesday, Sept. 28, 2011 file photo demonstrators burn copies of emergency tax notices during a protest by the Communist-backed labor union. Groups of lawyers, trade unions and campaigners have tried to derail government efforts to collect new taxes, or to suspend tens of thousands of civil servants on partial pay. State buildings have been occupied, municipalities have stalled in delivering emergency notices ordering strikers back to work.




[Image]Two activists of the Femen Movement from Ukraine protest during a press conference ‘Euro 2012: Corruption and Prostitution’ organised in the Culture Center Nowy Wspanialy Swiat, in Warsaw, Poland, on September 15, 2011. The members of the Femen Movement were presented during the conference as Blyadek and Blyadko – alternative mascots of Euro 2012, who like sex, football and alcohol. FEMEN activists want to demostrate the ‘dark side’ of Ukraine’s preparation for Euro 2012 and expose the corrupt schemes associated with the football championships. Getty
























































































	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET-European Defence Conference 2011 Report
		
	
	

		
I cite below the full message posted by Dutchman Jan Wind in the Dutch DoD group on LinkedIn. Jan Wind is “Director at WISER Consultancy” and “Secretary (acting) at Federation of European Defence Technology Associations EDTA”.


_____


October newsletter of the European Defence Conference – the results


The European Defence Conference 2011 took place on 20 and 21 October 2011 in Warsaw and provided opportunities for a broad range of discussion on European defence co-operation from the perspective of research and development. In addition to that, researchers from various EU-countries presented some of their work and ideas for future co-operation. This first edition of the conference, organized by Fraunhofer INT and WISER Consultancy, gathered some 130 participants and was opened by the Polish Undersecretary for Defence Policy, Mr. Zbigniew Wlosowicz.


Among the topics and issues discussed were:


    

  • Need to adopt Smart defence specialisation of countries in military tasks and multinational solutions to equipment needs;
    • 

  • Importance of consultation with partner nations on cuts in national defence structures before final decisions are made already too frequent an occurrence;
    • 

  • Need for improved top level political engagement on European defence issues industry should raise this with governments and on parliamentary level.
    • 

  • Further improvements in information sharing across the community, with some specific policy help and advice for smaller countries;
    • 

  • Less involved pMS and SMEs expressed interest in regional workshops to educate and inform them on how to get involved in defence business; this was said in the context of not being able to get to Brussels easily and often.
    • 

  • Industry would like to see more intelligent competition in procurement not just competition at every opportunity SMEs could be assisted by adopting an engagement strategy based on best practice.
    • 



ESA was given as a “best practice” example. This should be complemented by a competence database for SMEs using an effective and proven software package.


    

  • Technology forecast: EDA expressed interest in the Disruptive Technology Assessment Game (DTAG) developed by NATO
    • 



The conference was well received by participants. Mr. Adam Sowa, Deputy Chief Executive of EDA and key note speaker, commented that the EDC was a very well organized and useful conference and that constructive minds had been at work. Dr. Albert van der Steen of TNO who chaired one of the sessions said that he used to believe a conference like EDC should be organised by EDA, but that the event had convinced him that an independently organised conference could be much more effective. A NATO representative also remarked they would increase their participation should a future edition be held. Captain RNLNavy Jan Wind (Rtd) of WISER Consultancy and Dr. Merle Missoweit of Fraunhofer INT speaking on behalf the organising committee said they were very pleased with the outcome of the conference:


During this first EDC, excellent speakers and a knowledgeable audience stimulated discussions in a constructive atmosphere as we had intended. I heard nothing but positive feedback these last two days. Our team will work with EDA, ASD and others to determine how to follow up on this first EDC.

	


	



			
				


			

			
Occupy Wall Street-Oakland Photos, 25 October 2011, Day 39
		
	
	

		








39








[Image]Occupy Wall Street protesters help a man injured after police used tear gas to disperse a large crowd of protesters at 14th Street and Broadway in Oakland, Calif., Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011. (Darryl Bush)




[Image]Occupy Wall Street protesters huddle together after police use tear gas to disperse a large crowd that gathered at 14th Street and Broadway in Oakland, Calif., Tuesday, October 25, 2011. Many demonstrators were arrested. (Darryl Bush)




[Image]An Occupy Wall Street protester stands with a banner after police use tear gas to disperse a large crowd that gathered at 14th Street and Broadway in Oakland, Calif., Tuesday, October 25, 2011. Scores of demonstrators were arrested. (Darryl Bush)




[Image]Oakland police fire tear gas as they prepare to move in to Frank Ogawa Plaza to disperse Occupy Oakland protesters on Tuesday. Oct. 25, 2011 in Oakland, Calif. Police in riot gear began clearing anti-Wall Street protesters on Tuesday morning from the plaza in front of Oakland’s City Hall where they have been camped out for about two weeks. City officials had originally been supportive of the protesters, but the city later warned the protesters that they were breaking the law and could not stay in the encampment overnight. (Jane Tyska)




[Image]Police prepare to enter Occupy Oakland’s City Hall encampment on Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011, in Oakland, Calif. Police in riot gear began clearing anti-Wall Street protesters on Tuesday morning from the plaza in front of Oakland’s City Hall where they have been camped out for about two weeks. City officials had originally been supportive of the protesters, but the city later warned the protesters that they were breaking the law and could not stay in the encampment overnight. (Jane Tyska)




[Image]Oakland Occupy protestors form a line opposing the police at the Frank Ogawa Plaza on Tuesday. Oct. 25, 2011 in Oakland, Calif. Police in riot gear began clearing anti-Wall Street protesters on Tuesday morning from the plaza in front of Oakland’s City Hall where they have been camped out for about two weeks. City officials had originally been supportive of the protesters, but the city later warned the protesters that they were breaking the law and could not stay in the encampment overnight. (Jane Tyska)









[Image]Oakland police search tents in Frank Ogawa Plaza as they disperse Occupy Oakland protesters on Tuesday. Oct. 25, 2011 in Oakland, Calif. Police in riot gear began clearing anti-Wall Street protesters on Tuesday morning from the plaza in front of Oakland’s City Hall where they have been camped out for about two weeks. City officials had originally been supportive of the protesters, but the city later warned the protesters that they were breaking the law and could not stay in the encampment overnight. (Jane Tyska)




[Image]Oakland police search tents in Frank Ogawa Plaza as they disperse Occupy Oakland protesters on Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011 in Oakland, Calif. City officials had originally been supportive of the protesters, but the city later warned the protesters that they were breaking the law and could not stay in the encampment overnight. (Jane Tyska)




[Image]An Occupy Oakland protester waits in his tent as police clear the group’s Snow Park encampment on Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011, in Oakland, Calif. Police in riot gear began clearing anti-Wall Street protesters on Tuesday morning from the plaza in front of Oakland’s City Hall where they have been camped out for about two weeks. City officials had originally been supportive of the protesters, but the city later warned the protesters that they were breaking the law and could not stay in the encampment overnight. (Jane Tyska)




[Image]Unidentified protesters link arms as police advance on their City Hall encampment on Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011, in Oakland, Calif. Police in riot gear began clearing anti-Wall Street protesters on Tuesday morning from the plaza in front of Oakland’s City Hall where they have been camped out for about two weeks. City officials had originally been supportive of the protesters, but the city later warned the protesters that they were breaking the law and could not stay in the encampment overnight. (Jane Tyska)




[Image]An Occupy Oakland camper carries belonging in his teeth as he’s arrested from the group’s city hall encampment on Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011, in Oakland, Calif. Police in riot gear began clearing anti-Wall Street protesters on Tuesday morning from the plaza in front of Oakland’s City Hall where they have been camped out for about two weeks. City officials had originally been supportive of the protesters, but the city later warned the protesters that they were breaking the law and could not stay in the encampment overnight. (Jane Tyska)




[Image]The Oakland Occupy encampment at Frank Ogawa Plaza after Oakland Police disbanded the tent community leaving debris strewn throughout the plaza on Tuesday. Oct. 25, 2011 in Oakland, Calif. Police in riot gear began clearing anti-Wall Street protesters on Tuesday morning from the plaza in front of Oakland’s City Hall where they have been camped out for about two weeks. City officials had originally been supportive of the protesters, but the city later warned the protesters that they were breaking the law and could not stay in the encampment overnight. (Noah Berger)




[Image]Tents and debris are seen on Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011, in Oakland, Calif. Police in riot gear began clearing anti-Wall Street protesters on Tuesday morning from the plaza in front of Oakland’s City Hall where they have been camped out for about two weeks. City officials had originally been supportive of the protesters, but the city later warned the protesters that they were breaking the law and could not stay in the encampment overnight. (Noah Berger)




[Image]An Oakland police officer in riot gear stands guard over Frank H. Ogawa plaza Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011, in Oakland, Calif. Occupy Oakland protestors were evicted from the plaza early this morning. (AP Photo/Ben Margot)




[Image]





	


	



			
				


			

			
CRYTOME – Emulate Wikileaks Operation
		
	

	

		


Despite the money machine Wikileaks has become for the thousands exploiting its product and notoriety, it deserves maximum financial, moral and political support in ways that help avoid dependency upon rigged markets and leveraged endorsements.


In comparison to the braggardy and IP theft of secrecy-protected 1% MSM, governments and corporations hiding behind branded Representative Democracy, Wikileaks — and its kind — are genuinely supportive of direct democracy. Avoid centralized, branded initiatives due to their susceptibility to covert control, participate in OWS and dispersed collectives.


Individual support for these dispersed initiatives is crucial to avoid the trap of 1% funding which has enlisted millions with sinecure indulgences from gov, mil, com, org and edu — not least those of the hypnotic debt-swap easy loan of the Internet which allows aggregating personal information by spying on unwary participants. Hopefully Wikileaks will never become one of those “Goodwill Industries” — gov, mil, com, org and edu — now preying on the Internet by rigging its operation for privileged users claiming public benefit.


The disclosed legal expenses for Assange which appear to soon outweigh Wikileaks’ operating costs do not augur well for the initiative remaining unfettered democratic. No explanation of why the legal costs are not donated — unless they are being used to launder money in the legacy practice of claiming “expenses” used by the 1% to camouflage profit.


Emulate Wikileaks operations with a similar initiative and/or by mirroring the site’s courageous offerings, but avoid the legal-financial black hole entrapment.

	


	



			
				


			

			
US -Treasury Holds Secret Meeting with 1% Panel
		
	
	

		
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Debt Management Advisory Committee; Meeting

    Notice is hereby given, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. App. 2, Sec.
10(a)(2), that a meeting will be held at the Hay-Adams Hotel, 16th
Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC, on November 1,
2011 at 9:30 a.m. of the following debt management advisory committee:

Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee of the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association

    The agenda for the meeting provides for a charge by the Secretary
of the Treasury or his designate that the Committee discuss particular
issues and conduct a working session. Following the working session,
the Committee will present a written report of its recommendations. The
meeting will be closed to the public, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. App. 2,
Sec.  10(d) and Public Law 103-202, 202(c)(1)(B)(31 U.S.C. 3121 note).
    This notice shall constitute my determination, pursuant to the
authority placed in heads of agencies by 5 U.S.C. App. 2, Sec.  10(d)
and vested in me by Treasury Department Order No. 101-05, that the
meeting will consist of discussions and debates of the issues presented
to the Committee by the

[[Page 64993]]

Secretary of the Treasury and the making of recommendations of the
Committee to the Secretary, pursuant to Public Law 103-202,
202(c)(1)(B). Thus, this information is exempt from disclosure under
that provision and 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(3)(B). In addition, the meeting is
concerned with information that is exempt from disclosure under 5
U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(A). The public interest requires that such meetings
be closed to the public because the Treasury Department requires frank
and full advice from representatives of the financial community prior
to making its final decisions on major financing operations.
Historically, this advice has been offered by debt management advisory
committees established by the several major segments of the financial
community. When so utilized, such a committee is recognized to be an
advisory committee under 5 U.S.C. App. 2, Sec.  3.
    Although the Treasury's final announcement of financing plans may
not reflect the recommendations provided in reports of the Committee,
premature disclosure of the Committee's deliberations and reports would
be likely to lead to significant financial speculation in the
securities market. Thus, this meeting falls within the exemption
covered by 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(A).
    Treasury staff will provide a technical briefing to the press on
the day before the Committee meeting, following the release of a
statement of economic conditions and financing estimates. This briefing
will give the press an opportunity to ask questions about financing
projections. The day after the Committee meeting, Treasury will release
the minutes of the meeting, any charts that were discussed at the
meeting, and the Committee's report to the Secretary.
    The Office of Debt Management is responsible for maintaining
records of debt management advisory committee meetings and for
providing annual reports setting forth a summary of Committee
activities and such other matters as may be informative to the public
consistent with the policy of 5 U.S.C. 552(b). The Designated Federal
Officer or other responsible agency official who may be contacted for
additional information is Fred Pietrangeli, Deputy Director for Office
of Debt Management (202) 622-1876.

    Dated: October 5, 2011.
Mary Miller,
Assistant Secretary, Financial Markets.
[FR Doc. 2011-26422 Filed 10-18-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-25-M

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET -Gulfstream GIV-X Aircraft Electronic Security
		
	
	

		
wo notices.




[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 203 (Thursday, October 20, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 65103-65105]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-27196]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. FAA-2011-1141; Special Conditions No. 25-451-SC]

Special Conditions: Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, Model GIV-X
Airplane; Aircraft Electronic System Security Protection From
Unauthorized External Access

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Gulfstream
Aerospace Corporation Model GIV-X airplane. This airplane will have
novel or unusual design features associated with the architecture and
connectivity capabilities of the airplane's computer systems and
networks, which may allow access by external computer systems and
networks. Connectivity by external systems and networks may result in
security vulnerabilities to the airplane's systems. The applicable
airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety
standards for these design features. These special conditions contain
the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers
necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established
by the existing airworthiness standards.

DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is October 13,
2011. We must receive your comments by December 5, 2011.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2011-1141
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov/
and follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or by Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without
change, to http://www.regulations.gov/, including any personal
information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the
docket Web site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all
comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the
individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an
association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act
Statement can be found in the Federal Register published on April 11,
2000 (65 FR 19477-19478), as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov/.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
http://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. Follow the online instructions
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and Flight
Crew Interface Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone 425-227-1298; facsimile 425-227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that notice of, and
opportunity for prior public comment on, these special conditions are
impracticable because these procedures would significantly delay
issuance of the design approval and thus delivery of the affected
aircraft. In addition, the substance of these special conditions has
been subject to the public comment process in several prior instances
with no substantive comments received. The FAA therefore finds that
good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon
issuance.

Comments Invited

    We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
    We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for

[[Page 65104]]

comments. We may change these special conditions based on the comments
we receive.

Background

    On April 21, 2011, Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation (hereafter
referred to as ``Gulfstream'') applied for a supplemental type
certificate to install a new interior design configuration in the
Gulfstream Model GIV-X passenger airplane. The Gulfstream Model GIV-X
is a two-engine jet transport airplane with a maximum takeoff weight of
47,600 pounds and an interior configuration for a maximum of 19
passengers.

Type Certification Basis

    Under the provisions of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14
CFR) 21.101, Gulfstream must show that the Gulfstream Model GIV-X
airplane (hereafter referred to as the ``GIV-X''), as changed,
continues to meet the applicable provisions of the regulations
incorporated by reference in Type Certificate No. A12EA or the
applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the
change. The regulations incorporated by reference in the type
certificate are commonly referred to as the ``original type
certification basis.'' The regulations incorporated by reference in
Type Certificate No. A12EA are as follows:
    14 CFR part 25, effective February 1, 1965, including Amendments
25-1 through 25-56, except for the following sections which are limited
to showing compliance with the amendments indicated: Part 25 effective
February 1, 1965, Sec. Sec.  25.109, 25.571, and 25.813; part 25
Amendment 25-22, Sec.  25.571; and part 25 Amendment 25-15, Sec.
25.807(c)(2). In addition, the certification basis includes certain
special conditions, exemptions, and equivalent safety findings that are
not relevant to these special conditions.
    If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the GIV-X because of a novel or
unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the
provisions of Sec.  21.16.
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type
certificate to modify any other model included on the same type
certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature,
the special conditions would also apply to the other model.
    In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the GIV-X must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust
emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification
requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in
accordance with Sec.  11.38, and they become part of the type
certification basis under Sec.  21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The GIV-X will incorporate the following novel or unusual design
features: digital systems architecture composed of several connected
networks. The proposed architecture and network configuration may be
used for, or interfaced with, a diverse set of functions, including:
    1. Flight-safety related control, communication, and navigation
systems (aircraft control domain);
    2. Airline business and administrative support (airline information
domain);
    3. Passenger information and entertainment systems (passenger
entertainment domain), and;
    4. The capability to allow access to or by external sources.

Discussion

    The GIV-X architecture and network configuration may allow
increased connectivity to, and access by, external airplane sources,
airline operations, and maintenance systems to the aircraft control
domain and airline information domain. The aircraft control domain and
airline information domain perform functions required for the safe
operation and maintenance of the airplane. Previously these domains had
very limited connectivity with external sources. The architecture and
network configuration may allow the exploitation of network security
vulnerabilities resulting in intentional or unintentional destruction,
disruption, degradation, or exploitation of data, systems, and networks
critical to the safety and maintenance of the airplane. The existing
regulations and guidance material did not anticipate these types of
airplane system architectures. Furthermore, 14 CFR regulations and
current system safety assessment policy and techniques do not address
potential security vulnerabilities, which could be exploited by
unauthorized access to airplane systems, data buses, and servers.
Therefore, these special conditions are issued to ensure that the
security (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of
airplane systems is not compromised by unauthorized wired or wireless
electronic connections.

Applicability

    As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the
Gulfstream Model GIV-X. Should Gulfstream apply at a later date for a
supplemental type certificate to modify any other model included on the
Type Certificate No. A12EA to incorporate the same novel or unusual
design features, these special conditions would apply to that model as
well.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
on one model of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability and
affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these
features on the airplane.
    The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the
notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been
derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is
unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change
from the substance contained herein. Therefore, because a delay would
significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is
imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment
are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting
these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments
to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been
submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described
above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type certification basis for Gulfstream Model GIV-X airplanes.
    1. The applicant must ensure airplane electronic system security
protection from access by unauthorized sources external to the
airplane, including those possibly caused by maintenance activity.
    2. The applicant must ensure that electronic system security
threats are identified and assessed, and that effective electronic
system security protection strategies are implemented to

[[Page 65105]]

protect the airplane from all adverse impacts on safety, functionality,
and continued airworthiness.
    3. The applicant must establish appropriate procedures to allow the
operator to ensure that continued airworthiness of the aircraft is
maintained, including all post Type Certification modifications that
may have an impact on the approved electronic system security
safeguards.

Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2011-27196 Filed 10-19-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P




[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 203 (Thursday, October 20, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 65105-65106]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-27198]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. FAA-2011-1140; Special Conditions No. 25-450-SC]

Special Conditions: Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, Model GIV-X
Airplane; Isolation or Aircraft Electronic System Security Protection
From Unauthorized Internal Access

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Gulfstream
Aerospace Corporation Model GIV-X airplane. This airplane will have
novel or unusual design features associated with connectivity of the
passenger domain computer systems to the airplane critical systems and
data networks. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards for these design features.
These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that
the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety
equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is October 13,
2011. We must receive your comments by December 5, 2011.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2011-1140
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov/ and
follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or by Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without
change, to http://www.regulations.gov/, including any personal
information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the
docket Web site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all
comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the
individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an
association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act
Statement can be found in the Federal Register published on April 11,
2000 (65 FR 19477-19478), as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov/.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
http://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. Follow the online instructions
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and Flight
Crew Interface Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone 425-227-1298; facsimile 425-227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that notice of, and
opportunity for prior public comment on, these special conditions are
impracticable because these procedures would significantly delay
issuance of the design approval and thus delivery of the affected
aircraft. In addition, the substance of these special conditions has
been subject to the public comment process in several prior instances
with no substantive comments received. The FAA therefore finds that
good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon
issuance.

Comments Invited

    We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
    We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for
comments. We may change these special conditions based on the comments
we receive.

Background

    On April 21, 2011, Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation (hereafter
referred to as ``Gulfstream'') applied for a supplemental type
certificate to install a new interior design configuration in the
Gulfstream Model GIV-X passenger airplane. The Gulfstream Model GIV-X
is a two-engine jet transport airplane with a maximum takeoff weight of
47,600 pounds and an interior configuration for a maximum of 19
passengers.

Type Certification Basis

    Under the provisions of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14
CFR) 21.101, Gulfstream must show that the Gulfstream Model GIV-X
airplane (hereafter referred to as the ``GIV-X''), as changed,
continues to meet the applicable provisions of the regulations
incorporated by reference in Type Certificate No. A12EA or the
applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the
change. The regulations incorporated by reference in the type
certificate are commonly referred to as the ``original type
certification basis.'' The regulations incorporated by reference in
Type Certificate No. A12EA are as follows:
    14 CFR part 25, effective February 1, 1965, including Amendments
25-1 through 25-56, except for the following sections which are limited
to showing compliance with the amendments indicated: Part 25 effective
February 1, 1965, Sec. Sec.  25.109, 25.571, and 25.813; part 25
Amendment 25-22, Sec.  25.571; and part 25 Amendment 25-15, Sec.
25.807(c)(2). In addition, the certification basis includes certain
special conditions, exemptions, and equivalent safety findings that are
not relevant to these special conditions.
    If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the GIV-X because of a novel or
unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the
provisions of Sec.  21.16.
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type
certificate to modify any other model included on the

[[Page 65106]]

same type certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design
feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model.
    In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the GIV-X must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust
emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification
requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in
accordance with Sec.  11.38, and they become part of the type
certification basis under Sec.  21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The GIV-X will incorporate the following novel or unusual design
features: Digital systems architecture composed of several connected
networks. The proposed architecture and network configuration may be
used for, or interfaced with, a diverse set of functions, including:
    1. Flight-safety related control, communication, and navigation
systems (aircraft control domain);
    2. Airline business and administrative support (airline information
domain);
    3. Passenger information and entertainment systems (passenger
entertainment domain); and
    4. The capability to allow access to or by external sources.

Discussion

    The GIV-X integrated network configuration may allow increased
connectivity with external network sources and will have more
interconnected networks and systems, such as passenger entertainment
and information services, than previous Gulfstream airplane models.
This may allow the exploitation of network security vulnerabilities and
increased risks potentially resulting in unsafe conditions for the
airplane and its occupants. This potential exploitation of security
vulnerabilities may result in intentional or unintentional destruction,
disruption, degradation, or exploitation of data and systems critical
to the safety and maintenance of the airplane. The existing regulations
and guidance material did not anticipate these types of system
architectures. Furthermore, 14 CFR regulations and current system
safety assessment policy and techniques do not address potential
security vulnerabilities which could be exploited by unauthorized
access to airplane networks and servers. Therefore, these special
conditions are being issued to ensure that the security (i.e.,
confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of airplane systems is
not compromised by unauthorized wired or wireless electronic
connections between airplane systems and networks and the passenger
entertainment domain.

Applicability

    As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the
Gulfstream Model GIV-X. Should Gulfstream apply at a later date for a
supplemental type certificate to modify any other model included on the
Type Certificate No. A12EA to incorporate the same novel or unusual
design features, these special conditions would apply to that model as
well.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
on one model of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability and
affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these
features on the airplane.
    The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the
notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been
derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is
unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change
from the substance contained herein. Therefore, because a delay would
significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is
imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment
are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting
these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments
to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been
submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described
above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type certification basis for Gulfstream Model GIV-X airplanes.
    1. The applicant must ensure that the design provides isolation
from, or airplane electronic system security protection against, access
by unauthorized sources internal to the airplane. The design must
prevent inadvertent and malicious changes to, and all adverse impacts
upon, airplane equipment, systems, networks, or other assets required
for safe flight and operations.
    2. The applicant must establish appropriate procedures to allow the
operator to ensure that continued airworthiness of the aircraft is
maintained, including all post Type Certification modifications that
may have an impact on the approved electronic system security
safeguards.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 13, 2011.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2011-27198 Filed 10-19-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Treasury Holds Secret Meeting with 1% Panel
		
	
	

		
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 202 (Wednesday, October 19, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64992-64993]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-26422]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Debt Management Advisory Committee; Meeting

    Notice is hereby given, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. App. 2, Sec.
10(a)(2), that a meeting will be held at the Hay-Adams Hotel, 16th
Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC, on November 1,
2011 at 9:30 a.m. of the following debt management advisory committee:

Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee of the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association

    The agenda for the meeting provides for a charge by the Secretary
of the Treasury or his designate that the Committee discuss particular
issues and conduct a working session. Following the working session,
the Committee will present a written report of its recommendations. The
meeting will be closed to the public, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. App. 2,
Sec.  10(d) and Public Law 103-202, 202(c)(1)(B)(31 U.S.C. 3121 note).
    This notice shall constitute my determination, pursuant to the
authority placed in heads of agencies by 5 U.S.C. App. 2, Sec.  10(d)
and vested in me by Treasury Department Order No. 101-05, that the
meeting will consist of discussions and debates of the issues presented
to the Committee by the

[[Page 64993]]

Secretary of the Treasury and the making of recommendations of the
Committee to the Secretary, pursuant to Public Law 103-202,
202(c)(1)(B). Thus, this information is exempt from disclosure under
that provision and 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(3)(B). In addition, the meeting is
concerned with information that is exempt from disclosure under 5
U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(A). The public interest requires that such meetings
be closed to the public because the Treasury Department requires frank
and full advice from representatives of the financial community prior
to making its final decisions on major financing operations.
Historically, this advice has been offered by debt management advisory
committees established by the several major segments of the financial
community. When so utilized, such a committee is recognized to be an
advisory committee under 5 U.S.C. App. 2, Sec.  3.
    Although the Treasury's final announcement of financing plans may
not reflect the recommendations provided in reports of the Committee,
premature disclosure of the Committee's deliberations and reports would
be likely to lead to significant financial speculation in the
securities market. Thus, this meeting falls within the exemption
covered by 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(A).
    Treasury staff will provide a technical briefing to the press on
the day before the Committee meeting, following the release of a
statement of economic conditions and financing estimates. This briefing
will give the press an opportunity to ask questions about financing
projections. The day after the Committee meeting, Treasury will release
the minutes of the meeting, any charts that were discussed at the
meeting, and the Committee's report to the Secretary.
    The Office of Debt Management is responsible for maintaining
records of debt management advisory committee meetings and for
providing annual reports setting forth a summary of Committee
activities and such other matters as may be informative to the public
consistent with the policy of 5 U.S.C. 552(b). The Designated Federal
Officer or other responsible agency official who may be contacted for
additional information is Fred Pietrangeli, Deputy Director for Office
of Debt Management (202) 622-1876.

    Dated: October 5, 2011.
Mary Miller,
Assistant Secretary, Financial Markets.
[FR Doc. 2011-26422 Filed 10-18-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-25-M

	


	



			
				


			

			
NYPD Officer Charged with Criminal Civil Rights Violation for False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution
		
	
	

		
Charges Include Attempted Violent Extortion and Attempted Insurance Fraud


U.S. Attorney’s Office October 17, 2011


Eastern District of New York (718) 254-7000


A criminal complaint was unsealed this morning in federal court in Brooklyn charging New York City Police Department Officer Michael Daragjati, an eight-year veteran of the NYPD, with violating the civil rights of an African-American victim by willfully arresting him and charging him with a crime without probable cause and on false pretenses, and for doing so based on racial animus. Daragjati is also charged with attempting and conspiring to commit violent extortion and committing wire fraud by making false statements to an auto insurance company.* Daragjati was arrested this morning and has an initial appearance scheduled later this afternoon before United States Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack at the U.S. Courthouse, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York.


The charges were announced by Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York; Janice K. Fedarcyk, Assistant Director in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Field Office; and Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner, New York City Police Department.


Willful Violation of Civil Rights Under Color of Law


According to the complaint, during the evening of April 15, 2011, Daragjati stopped and frisked an individual in the Stapleton neighborhood of Staten Island. The stop and frisk revealed that the victim was not carrying a firearm or contraband. After the victim complained about his treatment during the stop and frisk, Daragjati arrested him. The complaint alleges that although the victim did not resist arrest, Daragjati falsely wrote in a police report that the victim had flailed his arms and kicked his legs during the arrest, purportedly justifying a resisting arrest charge. The following day, Daragjati swore out a complaint containing similar false statements, which was filed in Richmond County Criminal Court. As a result, the victim was held in custody for approximately 36 hours.


The day he swore out the complaint, the government intercepted a telephone call between Daragjati and a friend. As detailed in the complaint, while referring to the victim’s arrest and prosecution, Daragjati told the friend that he had “fried another nigger.” The government subsequently intercepted several additional calls during which Daragjati allegedly used the word “nigger” to refer to African-Americans. In other intercepted calls Daragjati stated that he risked getting fired if he was caught “throw[ing] somebody a beating” and complained that it was too easy for police officers to get in trouble. He then admitted that he had been “skating it for a long time.”


Extortion


Daragjati operated a construction and snow removal business while off-duty. In March 2011, snowplow equipment which belonged to Daragjati was stolen from a truck parked near Daragjati’s residence. According to the complaint, a short time later Daragjati identified a person he believed was the thief and arranged to have him lured to a location in Staten Island. There, Daragjati and a group of other men allegedly attacked the suspected thief, punching him and threatening him with a handgun. Daragjati and the others told the suspected thief that he had to either return the snowplow equipment or pay $5,000 to the equipment’s owner.


Wire Fraud


The complaint alleges that Daragjati directed a snowplow driver to intentionally damage a truck Daragjati owned, and then falsely represent to the driver’s auto insurer that the damage resulted from an accident while plowing snow. Daragjati also provided a false account to individuals he believed were employed by the driver’s auto insurer in an effort to receive payment from the insurer.


“The power to arrest—to deprive a citizen of liberty—must be used fairly, responsibly, and without bias. Motivated by base racial animus, the defendant allegedly abused this power and responsibility. Our system of justice depends on the public’s confidence that those who enforce the law also obey the law,” stated United States Attorney Lynch. “This office will vigorously prosecute those who would betray the trust placed in them to uphold the law honestly and without bias.” Ms. Lynch expressed her appreciation to the FBI and the NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau, the agencies responsible for leading the government’s investigation, and thanked the Richmond County District Attorney’s Office for its assistance.


FBI Assistant Director in-Charge Fedarcyk stated, “As charged in the complaint, this defendant’s egregious conduct caused both direct and indirect harm. He allegedly abused his position as a police officer to arrest someone under false pretenses, and committed fraud and violence. There were direct victims of these crimes. But the charged conduct also threatened to undermine public trust and respect for law enforcement. We who enforce the law are not above the law; in fact, we should be held to a higher standard.”


NYPD Commissioner Kelly stated, “I want to commend U.S. Attorney Loretta E. Lynch and her staff for bringing this case forward promptly and professionally, and NYPD Internal Affairs Chief Charles Campisi and his detectives who initiated this investigation and in doing so helped pave the way for prosecuting it.”


If convicted of the civil rights charge, the defendant faces a maximum sentence of one year in prison and a $100,000 fine. If convicted of attempt to commit extortion, conspiracy to commit extortion or wire fraud, the defendant faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a fine of $250,000 on each charge.


The government’s case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Paul Tuchmann, Amy Busa and Cristina Posa.


The Defendant:


MICHAEL DARAGJATI


Age: 32


* The charges in the complaint are merely allegations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

	


	



			
				


			

			
Video Occupy Wall Street-NYC, 14 October 2011, Day 28
		
	
	

		

	


	



			
				


			

			
Occupy Wall Street-London-Chicago-NYC Photos, 17 October 2011, Day 31
		
	
	

		






Frankfurt






[Image]Demonstrators chat while warming their hands on a makeshift fire in the park near the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, central Germany, Monday, Oct. 17, 2011. Thousands of people demonstrated against corporate greed in cities across Europe on Saturday, along with much smaller protests in cities across the U.S. Banners on tent read right: ‘WTF where is freedom?’ and at left : ‘A good life instead of profit’. (Thomas Lohnes)











Toronto






[Image]A protester stands outside the Toronto Stock Exchange in the city’s financial district on Monday Oct. 17, 2011 as the Occupy Bay Street protest continues into it’s third day. (Chris Young)











New York City






[Image]A participant who asked not to identified and a dog begin the day along with others at the Occupy Wall Street protests at Zuccotti Park in New York Monday, Oct. 17, 2011 as the protest enters it’s 30th day. (Craig Ruttle)











Occupy Wall Street – Diversity






[Image][Published October 17, 2011.] In this Oct. 14, 2011 photo, demonstrators affiliated with the Occupy Wall Street protests stand in line to be served lunch at Zuccotti Park in New York. The outcry against the nation’s financial institutions that has swept the country in recent weeks has crossed many boundaries, including class, gender and age. But a stubborn hurdle in many cities has been a lack of racial inclusion, something noted by organizers and participants alike. (Mary Altaffer)




[Image][Published October 17, 2011.] In this Oct. 14, 2011 photo, Nicole Carty, 23, from Atlanta, confers with fellow organizing colleagues as she prepares to conduct a general assembly meeting for participants of Zuccotti Park’s Occupy Wall Street encampment, in New York. She is considered a core facilitator who organizes activities at the encampment. The outcry against the nation’s financial institutions that has swept the country in recent weeks has crossed many boundaries, including class, gender and age. But a stubborn hurdle But a stubborn hurdle in many cities has been a lack of racial inclusion, something noted by organizers and participants alike.




[Image][Published October 17, 2011.] In this Oct. 15, 2011 photo, a woman participates in an Occupy Atlanta protest at the state Capitol, in Atlanta. The outcry against the nation’s financial institutions that has swept the country in recent weeks has crossed many boundaries, including class, gender and age. But a stubborn hurdle in many cities has been a lack of racial inclusion, something noted by organizers and participants alike. (Erik S. Lesser)











Amsterdam






[Image]Two security guards stand at the entrance to the NYSE Euronext stock exchange in Amsterdam, Netherlands, Monday Oct. 17, 2011, plastered with slogans in support of the Occupy Wall Street movement. Hundreds of thousands demonstrated against corporate greed in cities across Europe on Saturday, along with much smaller protests in cities across the U.S. (Peter Dejong)











London






[Image]A protest banner put up by protesters from the Occupy London Stock Exchange group hangs besides tents pitched outside St Paul’s Cathedral before sunrise, as they continue their demonstration that started there on Saturday near the London Stock Exchange in London, Monday, Oct. 17, 2011. Protesters in cities across Europe have taken part in rallies inspired by the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in the United States, expressing their frustration at social inequality and corporate greed. (Matt Dunham)




[Image]A protester from the Occupy London Stock Exchange group puts up a notice on an information point on the side of St Paul’s Cathedral as they continue their demonstration that started on Saturday near the London Stock Exchange in London, Monday, Oct. 17, 2011. Protesters in cities across Europe have taken part in rallies inspired by the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in the United States, expressing their frustration at social inequality and corporate greed. (Matt Dunham)




[Image]A masked protester from the Occupy London Stock Exchange group offers passing business people ‘Free Hugs’ as they continue their demonstration that started on Saturday outside St Paul’s Cathedral, near the London Stock Exchange in London, Monday, Oct. 17, 2011. Protesters in cities across Europe have taken part in rallies inspired by the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in the United States, expressing their frustration at social inequality and corporate greed. (Matt Dunham)




[Image]A protester from the Occupy London Stock Exchange group puts the finishing touches to a placard stating “London Hug Exchange”, as they continue their demonstration that started on Saturday outside St Paul’s Cathedral, near the London Stock Exchange in London, Monday, Oct. 17, 2011. Protesters in cities across Europe have taken part in rallies inspired by the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in the United States, expressing their frustration at social inequality and corporate greed. (Matt Dunham)




[Image]Police officers chat to protesters beside tents put up by supporters of the Occupy London Stock Exchange group as they continue their demonstration that started on Saturday outside St Paul’s Cathedral, near the London Stock Exchange in London, Monday, Oct. 17, 2011. Protesters in cities across Europe have taken part in rallies inspired by the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in the United States, expressing their frustration at social inequality and corporate greed. (Matt Dunham)




[Image]Protesters begin to rise from sleep before sunrise beside tents put up by supporters of the Occupy London Stock Exchange group, as they continue their demonstration that started on Saturday outside St Paul’s Cathedral, near the London Stock Exchange in London, Monday, Oct. 17, 2011. Protesters in cities across Europe have taken part in rallies inspired by the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in the United States, expressing their frustration at social inequality and corporate greed. (Matt Dunham)




[Image]Business people walk past tents put up by protesters from the Occupy London Stock Exchange group as they continue their demonstration that started on Saturday outside St Paul’s Cathedral, near the London Stock Exchange in London, Monday, Oct. 17, 2011. Protesters in cities across Europe have taken part in rallies inspired by the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in the United States, expressing their frustration at social inequality and corporate greed. (Matt Dunham)




[Image]A businessman walks past tents put up by protesters from the Occupy London Stock Exchange group as they continue their demonstration that started on Saturday outside St Paul’s Cathedral, near the London Stock Exchange in London, Monday, Oct. 17, 2011. Protesters in cities across Europe have taken part in rallies inspired by the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in the United States, expressing their frustration at social inequality and corporate greed. (Matt Dunham) [Note “Fire Access Point” and safety corridors, a sign of capable oversight.]






Chicago






[Image]In this photo taken Saturday, Oct. 15, 2011, protesters take part in a march and rally at Michigan and Congress in Chicago for the Global Day of Occupation. About 2,000 people participated Saturday in an Occupy Chicago demonstration, and about 500 pitched tents in Congress Plaza that evening. Chicago police say the protesters were told to remove their tents and leave the park when it closed at 11 p.m. When they didn’t, police began cutting down the tents and making arrests. (Chicago Sun Times)






New York City






[Image]Hip Hop Mogul Russell Simmons, right, listens to a protester at the camp for the Occupy Wall Street demonstration in New York, Sunday, Oct. 16, 2011. (David Karp) [The cardboard, twine and rain-sheet shelter deftly by-passes Brookfield Properties’ forbidden tents and tarps.]




[Image]A group of activists hold a strategy meeting in a storage space for supplies supporting the camp of Occupy Wall Street protesters, Sunday, Oct. 16, 2011, in New York. The goods are housed in an unused space donated by the United Federation of Teachers. (David Karp) [From a base in Liberty Park there are thousands of spaces available for sharing openly and not so openly in New York City and worldwide cities as “Wall Street” is widely dispersed openly and secretly.]





















	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET -US and Kazakhstan Set First Megadeath Control VPN
		
	
	

		
The following statement was issued today by the United States, and Kazakhstan in Astana.


BEGIN TEXT:


For twenty years the United States and Kazakhstan have been partners in the struggle against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That partnership continues to flourish, as our nations work together to create the conditions for the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.


December will mark ten years since former Secretary of State Colin Powell and then Foreign Minister Yerlan Idrissov signed the agreement which provided a legal basis for the existence and continued operation of the Government-to-Government Communications Link (GGCL) between the United States and Kazakhstan for the exchange of arms control treaty notifications.


The GGCL is an instrument of mutual trust and cooperation that provides a reliable and easy way for our two countries share information. It also serves as a back-up capability through which our senior officials can communicate.


These secure, direct links between our two nations are operated in the United States by the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center at the Department of State and in Kazakhstan by the Arms Control and Inspection Activity Support Center of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan.


Across these links, our Centers have exchanged thousands of notifications required by the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).


Today, the United States and Kazakhstan are inaugurating a new phase in our Government to Government Communication Link.


The United States and Kazakhstan are modernizing the GGCLs to operate as a cost-effective, internet-based, secure Virtual Private Network (VPN), a first for our bilateral GGCLs.


This new digital connection simplifies the current GGCL network. It employs internet-based connectivity which will provide further communication capabilities, flexibility and enhanced reliability. Modernization will also permit the system to accommodate new responsibilities, as needed.


The commitment of the United States and Kazakhstan to maintaining and upgrading the GGCL is symbolic of the importance both nations attach to that partnership in arms control and non-proliferation, and to the enduring nature of that partnership.


PRN: 2011/1702

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – US and Kazakhstan Set First Megadeath Control VPN
		
	
	

		
Joint Statement on the Continuation of the Bilateral Government to Government Communication Link


Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

October 12, 2011


The following statement was issued today by the United States, and Kazakhstan in Astana.


BEGIN TEXT:


For twenty years the United States and Kazakhstan have been partners in the struggle against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That partnership continues to flourish, as our nations work together to create the conditions for the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.


December will mark ten years since former Secretary of State Colin Powell and then Foreign Minister Yerlan Idrissov signed the agreement which provided a legal basis for the existence and continued operation of the Government-to-Government Communications Link (GGCL) between the United States and Kazakhstan for the exchange of arms control treaty notifications.


The GGCL is an instrument of mutual trust and cooperation that provides a reliable and easy way for our two countries share information. It also serves as a back-up capability through which our senior officials can communicate.


These secure, direct links between our two nations are operated in the United States by the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center at the Department of State and in Kazakhstan by the Arms Control and Inspection Activity Support Center of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan.


Across these links, our Centers have exchanged thousands of notifications required by the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).


Today, the United States and Kazakhstan are inaugurating a new phase in our Government to Government Communication Link.


The United States and Kazakhstan are modernizing the GGCLs to operate as a cost-effective, internet-based, secure Virtual Private Network (VPN), a first for our bilateral GGCLs.


This new digital connection simplifies the current GGCL network. It employs internet-based connectivity which will provide further communication capabilities, flexibility and enhanced reliability. Modernization will also permit the system to accommodate new responsibilities, as needed.


The commitment of the United States and Kazakhstan to maintaining and upgrading the GGCL is symbolic of the importance both nations attach to that partnership in arms control and non-proliferation, and to the enduring nature of that partnership.


PRN: 2011/1702

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Morgan Stanley Rigs NYC Electricity Bids
		
	
	

		
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division

United States v. Morgan Stanley; Proposed Final Judgment and
Competitive Impact Statement

    Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment,
Stipulation and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in
United States of America v. Morgan Stanley, Civil Action No. 11-Civ-
6875. On September 30, 2011, the United States filed a

[[Page 62844]]

Complaint alleging that a subsidiary of Morgan Stanley entered into an
agreement with KeySpan Corporation, the likely effect of which was to
increase prices in the New York City (NYISO Zone J) Capacity Market, in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The proposed
Final Judgment, submitted at the same time as the Complaint, requires
Morgan Stanley to pay the government $4.8 million dollars.
    Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment and Competitive
Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents Group, 450 Fifth
Street NW., DC 20530 Suite 1010 (telephone: 202-514-2481), on the
Department of Justice's Web site at http://www.justice.gov/atr, and at
the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Copies of these materials may be
obtained from the Antitrust Division upon request and payment of the
copying fee set by Department of Justice regulations.
    Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this
notice. Such comments, and responses thereto, will be published in the
Federal Register and filed with the Court. Comments should be directed
to William H. Stallings, Chief, Transportation Energy and Agriculture
Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20530, (telephone: 202-514-9323).

Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement.

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

United States of America, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, 450 5th Street, NW., Suite 8000, Washington, DC 20530,
Plaintiff,

    v.

Morgan Stanley, 1585 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10036, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 11-civ-6875.

Complaint

    The United States of America, acting under the direction of the
Attorney General of the United States, brings this civil antitrust
action under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 4, to
obtain equitable and other relief from Defendant's violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1.
    On January 18, 2006, KeySpan Corporation (``KeySpan'') and Morgan
Stanley Capital Group Inc. (``MSGC''), a subsidiary of defendant Morgan
Stanley,\1\ executed an agreement (the ``Morgan/KeySpan Swap'') that
ensured that KeySpan would withhold substantial output from the New
York City electricity generating capacity market, a market that was
created to ensure the supply of sufficient generation capacity for New
York City consumers of electricity. The likely effect of the Morgan/
KeySpan Swap was to increase capacity prices for the retail electricity
suppliers who must purchase capacity, and, in turn, to increase the
prices consumers pay for electricity. For its part, Morgan enjoyed
profits arising from revenues earned in connection with the Morgan/
KeySpan Swap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ MSCG and Morgan Stanley are collectively referred to
hereinafter as ``Morgan.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Introduction

    1. Between 2003 and 2006, KeySpan, the largest seller of
electricity generating capacity (``installed capacity'') in the New
York City market, earned substantial revenues due to tight supply
conditions. Because purchasers of capacity required almost all of
KeySpan's output to meet expected demand, KeySpan's ability to set
price levels was limited only by a regulatory ceiling (called a ``bid
cap''). Indeed, the market price for capacity was consistently at or
near KeySpan's bid cap, with KeySpan sacrificing sales on only a small
fraction of its capacity.
    2. But market conditions were about to change. Two large, new
electricity generation plants were slated to come on line in 2006 (with
no exit expected until at least 2009), breaking the capacity shortage
that had kept prices at the capped levels.
    3. KeySpan could prevent the new capacity from lowering prices by
withholding a substantial amount of its own capacity from the market.
This ``bid the cap'' strategy would keep market prices high, but at a
significant cost--the sacrificed sales would reduce KeySpan's revenues
by as much as $90 million per year. Alternatively, KeySpan could
compete with its rivals for sales by bidding more capacity at lower
prices. This ``competitive strategy'' could earn KeySpan more than
bidding its cap, but it carried a risk--KeySpan's competitors could
undercut its price and take sales away, making the strategy less
profitable than ``bidding the cap.''
    4. KeySpan searched for a way to avoid both the revenue decline
from bidding its cap and the revenue risks of competitive bidding. It
decided to enter into an agreement that gave it a financial interest in
the capacity of Astoria--KeySpan's largest competitor. By providing
KeySpan revenues on a larger base of sales, such an agreement would
make KeySpan's ``bid the cap'' strategy more profitable than a
successful competitive bid strategy. Rather than directly approach its
competitor, KeySpan turned to Morgan to act as the counterparty to the
agreement--the Morgan/KeySpan Swap--recognizing that Morgan would, and
in fact did, enter into an offsetting agreement with Astoria (the
``Morgan/Astoria Hedge'').
    5. Morgan recognized that it could profit from combining the
economic interests of KeySpan and Astoria. Morgan extracted revenues by
entering into the financial instruments and thereby stepping into the
middle of the two companies. With KeySpan deriving revenues from both
its own and Astoria's capacity, the Morgan/KeySpan Swap removed any
incentive for KeySpan to bid competitively, locking it into bidding its
cap. Capacity prices remained as high as if no entry had occurred.

II. Defendant

    6. Morgan Stanley is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in New York City. Morgan Stanley provides diversified
financial services, operating a global asset management business,
investment banking services, and a global securities business,
including a commodities trading division. Morgan Stanley Capital Group,
Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Morgan Stanley, functions as and is
publicly referred to as the commodities trading division for the parent
company Morgan Stanley. In 2010, Morgan Stanley had revenues of $31.6
billion.

III. Jurisdiction and Venue

    7. The United States files this complaint under Section 4 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 4, seeking equitable relief from Defendant's
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.
    8. This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 15
U.S.C. 4 and 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1337.
    9. Defendant waives any objection to venue and personal
jurisdiction in this judicial district for the purpose of this
Complaint.
    10. Defendant engaged in interstate commerce during the relevant
period of the allegations in this Complaint; Morgan is a worldwide
company that regularly engages in financial transactions across the
country and throughout the world.

IV. The New York City Installed Capacity Market

    11. Sellers of retail electricity must purchase a product from
generators

[[Page 62845]]

known as ``installed capacity.'' Installed capacity is a product
created by the New York Independent System Operator (``NYISO'') to
ensure that sufficient generation capacity exists to meet expected
electricity needs. Companies selling electricity to consumers in New
York City are required to make installed capacity payments that relate
to their expected peak demand plus a share of reserve capacity (to
cover extra facilities needed in case a generating facility breaks
down). These payments assure that retail electric companies do not sell
more electricity than the system can deliver and also encourage
electric generating companies to build new facilities as needed.
    12. The price for installed capacity has been set through auctions
administered by the NYISO. The rules under which these auctions are
conducted have changed from time to time. Unless otherwise noted, the
description of the installed capacity market in the following
paragraphs relates to the period May 2003 through March 2008.
    13. Because transmission constraints limit the amount of energy
that can be imported into the New York City area from the power grid,
the NYISO requires retail providers of electricity to customers in New
York City to purchase 80% of their capacity from generators in that
region. The NYISO operates separate capacity auctions for the New York
City region (also known as ``In-City'' and ``Zone J''). The NYISO
organizes the auctions to serve two distinct seasonal periods, summer
(May through October) and winter (November through April). For each
season, the NYISO conducts seasonal, monthly and spot auctions in which
capacity can be acquired for all or some of the seasonal period.
    14. In each of the types of auctions, capacity suppliers offer
price and quantity bids. Supplier bids are ``stacked'' from lowest-
priced to highest, and compared to the total amount of demand being
satisfied in the auction. The offering price of the last bid in the
``stack'' needed to meet requisite demand establishes the market price
for all capacity bid into that auction. Capacity bid at higher than
this price is unsold, as is any excess capacity bid at what becomes the
market price.
    15. The New York City Installed Capacity (``NYC Capacity'') Market
constitutes a relevant geographic and product market.
    16. The NYC Capacity Market is highly concentrated, with three
firms--KeySpan, NRG Energy, Inc. (``NRG'') and Astoria Generating
Company Acquisitions, L.L.C. (a joint venture of Madison Dearborn
Partners, LLC and US Power Generating Company, which purchased the
Astoria generating assets from Reliant Energy, Inc. in February 2006)--
controlling a substantial portion of generating capacity in the market.
Because purchasers of capacity require at least some of each of these
three suppliers' output to meet expected demand, the firms are subject
to a bid and price cap for nearly all of their generating capacity in
New York City and are not allowed to sell that capacity outside of the
NYISO auction process. The NYISO-set bid cap for KeySpan is the highest
of the three firms, followed by NRG and Astoria.
    17. KeySpan possessed market power in the NYC Capacity Market.
    18. It is difficult and time-consuming to build or expand
generating facilities within the NYC Capacity Market given limited
undeveloped space for building or expanding generating facilities and
extensive regulatory obligations.

V. Keyspan's Plan To Avoid Competition

    19. From June 2003 through December 2005, KeySpan set the market
price in the New York City spot auction by bidding its capacity at its
cap. Given extremely tight supply and demand conditions, KeySpan needed
to withhold only a small amount of capacity to ensure that the market
cleared at its cap.
    20. KeySpan anticipated that the tight supply and demand conditions
in the NYC Capacity Market would change in 2006, due to the entry of
approximately 1000 MW of new generation. Because of the addition of
this new capacity, KeySpan would have to withhold significantly more
capacity from the market and would earn substantially lower revenues if
it continued to bid all of its capacity at its bid cap. KeySpan
anticipated that demand growth and retirement of old generation units
would restore tight supply and demand conditions in 2009.
    21. KeySpan could no longer be confident that ``bidding the cap''
would remain its best strategy during the 2006-2009 period. It
considered various competitive bidding strategies under which KeySpan
would compete with its rivals for sales by bidding more capacity at
lower prices. These strategies could potentially produce much higher
returns for KeySpan but carried the risk that competitors would
undercut its price and take sales away, making the strategy less
profitable than ``bidding the cap.''
    22. KeySpan also considered acquiring Astoria's generating assets,
which were for sale. This would have solved the problem that new entry
posed for KeySpan's revenue stream, as Astoria's capacity would have
provided KeySpan with sufficient additional revenues to make continuing
to ``bid the cap'' its best strategy. KeySpan consulted with Morgan
about acquiring the assets. But KeySpan soon concluded that its
acquisition of its largest competitor would raise serious market power
issues and communicated that conclusion to Morgan.
    23. Instead of purchasing the Astoria assets, KeySpan decided to
acquire a financial interest in substantially all of Astoria's
capacity. KeySpan would pay Astoria's owner a fixed revenue stream in
return for the revenues generated from Astoria's capacity sales in the
auctions.
    24. KeySpan did not approach Astoria directly, instead approaching
Morgan to arrange a financial agreement providing KeySpan with payments
derived from the market clearing price for an amount of capacity
essentially equivalent to what Astoria owned. KeySpan recognized that
Morgan would need simultaneously to enter into an off-setting financial
agreement with another capacity supplier. Morgan agreed to such a Swap
but, as expected, informed KeySpan that the agreement was contingent on
Morgan entering into an offsetting agreement with the owner of the
Astoria assets.

VI. Morgan's Agreements With Keyspan and Astoria

    25. Over the course of late 2005, Morgan negotiated the terms of
the derivative agreements with Astoria and KeySpan. Those negotiations
illustrate that Morgan recognized its role as a principal in
effectively combining the capacity of the two companies. Under the
terms initially discussed with Astoria, Morgan would have controlled
the bidding of Astoria's capacity. Morgan also proposed that the
financial derivative with Astoria be converted into a physical
contract, transferring the rights to Astoria's capacity to Morgan in
exchange for fixed payments, in the event that the structure of the
auction market was disrupted; and, at the same time, Morgan proposed in
its negotiations with KeySpan to transfer this physical capacity to
KeySpan should a market disruption occur.
    26. On or about January 9, 2006, KeySpan and Morgan finalized the
terms of the Morgan/KeySpan Swap. Under the agreement, if the market
price for capacity was above $7.57 per kW-month, Morgan would pay
KeySpan the difference between the market price and $7.57 times 1800
MW; if the market price was below $7.57, KeySpan would

[[Page 62846]]

pay Morgan the difference times 1800 MW.
    27. The Morgan/KeySpan Swap was executed on January 18, 2006. The
term of the Morgan/KeySpan Swap ran from May 2006 through April 2009.
    28. On or about January 9, 2006, Morgan and Astoria finalized the
terms of the Morgan/Astoria Hedge. Under that agreement, if the market
price for capacity was above $7.07 per kW-month, Astoria would pay
Morgan the difference times 1800 MW; if the market price was below
$7.07, Astoria would be paid the difference times 1800 MW.
    29. The Morgan/Astoria Hedge was executed on January 11, 2006. The
term of the Morgan/Astoria Hedge ran from May 2006 through April 2009,
matching the duration of the Morgan/KeySpan Swap.

VII. The Competitive Effect of the Morgan/Keyspan Swap

    30. The clear tendency of the Morgan/KeySpan Swap was to alter
KeySpan's bidding in the NYC Capacity Market auctions.
    31. Without the Morgan/KeySpan Swap, KeySpan likely would have
chosen from a range of potentially profitable competitive strategies in
response to the entry of new capacity. Had it done so, the price of
capacity would have declined. By transferring a financial interest in
Astoria's capacity to KeySpan, however, the Morgan/KeySpan Swap
effectively eliminated KeySpan's incentive to compete for sales in the
same way a purchase of Astoria or a direct agreement between KeySpan
and Astoria would have done. By providing KeySpan revenues from
Astoria's capacity, in addition to KeySpan's own revenues, the Morgan/
KeySpan Swap made bidding the cap KeySpan's most profitable strategy
regardless of its rivals' bids.
    32. After the Morgan/KeySpan Swap went into effect in May 2006,
KeySpan paid and received revenues under the agreement with Morgan and
consistently bid its capacity at its cap even though a significant
portion of its capacity went unsold. Despite the addition of
significant new generating capacity in New York City, the market price
of capacity did not decline.
    33. In August 2007, the State of New York conditioned the sale of
KeySpan to a new owner on the divestiture of KeySpan's Ravenswood
generating assets and required KeySpan to bid its New York City
capacity at zero from March 2008 until the divestiture was completed.
Since March 2008, the market price for capacity has declined.
    34. But for the Morgan/KeySpan Swap, installed capacity likely
would have been procured at a lower price in New York City from May
2006 through February 2008.
    35. From May 2006 to April 2008, Morgan earned approximately $21.6
million in net revenues from the Morgan/KeySpan Swap and the Morgan/
Astoria Hedge.
    36. The Morgan/KeySpan Swap produced no countervailing
efficiencies.

VIII. Violation Alleged

    37. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through
36 above.
    38. Morgan entered into an agreement the likely effect of which has
been to increase prices in the NYC Capacity Market, in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.

IX. Prayer for Relief

    Wherefore, Plaintiff prays:
    39. That the Court adjudge and decree that the Morgan/KeySpan Swap
constitutes an illegal restraint in the sale of installed capacity in
the New York City market in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act;
    40. That Plaintiff shall have such other relief, including
equitable monetary relief, as the nature of this case may require and
as is just and proper to prevent the recurrence of the alleged
violation and to dissipate the anticompetitive effects of the
violation; and
    41. That Plaintiff recover the costs of this action.

    Dated: September 30, 2011.

    Respectfully submitted,

For Plaintiff United States.

Sharis A. Pozen,
Acting Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust.

Joseph F. Wayland,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General.

Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement.

Wlliam H. Stallings,
Chief, Transportation, Energy & Agriculture Section.

Jade Eaton,
Attorney, Transportation, Energy & Agriculture Section, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite
8000, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 353-1560, Facsimile:
(202) 616-2441, e-mail: jade.eaton@usdoj.gov.

J. Richard Doidge,
John W. Elias, Attorneys for the United States.

United States of America, Plaintiff,

    v.

Morgan Stanley, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 11-civ-6875.

Competitive Impact Statement

    Plaintiff United States of America (``United States''), pursuant to
Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (``APPA'' or
``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), files this Competitive Impact
Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry
in this civil antitrust proceeding.

I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceedings

    The United States brought this lawsuit against Defendant Morgan
Stanley (``Morgan'') on September 30, 2011, to remedy a violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. In January 2006, Morgan
Stanley Capital Group Inc. (``MSGC''), a subsidiary of defendant Morgan
Stanley,\2\executed agreements with KeySpan Corporation (``KeySpan'')
and Astoria Generating Company Acquisitions, L.L.C. (``Astoria'') that
would effectively combine the economic interests of the two largest
competitors in the New York City electric capacity market. By creating
this combination, the likely effect of the agreements was to increase
capacity prices for the retail electricity suppliers who must purchase
capacity, and, in turn, to increase the prices consumers pay for
electricity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ MSCG and Morgan Stanley are collectively referred to
hereinafter as ``Morgan.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed Final Judgment remedies this violation by requiring
Morgan to disgorge profits obtained through the anticompetitive
agreement. Under the terms of the proposed Final Judgment, Morgan will
surrender $4.8 million to the Treasury of the United States.
Disgorgement will deter Morgan and others from future violations of the
antitrust laws.
    The United States and Morgan have stipulated that the proposed
Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA, unless
the United States withdraws its consent. Entry of the proposed Final
Judgment would terminate this action, except that this Court would
retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, and enforce the proposed Final
Judgment and to punish violations thereof.

II. Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation of
the Antitrust Laws

A. The Defendant
    Morgan Stanley is a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in New York City. Morgan Stanley provides diversified
financial services, operating a global asset

[[Page 62847]]

management business, investment banking services, and a global
securities business, including a commodities trading division. In 2010,
Morgan Stanley had revenues of $31.6 billion. Morgan Stanley Capital
Group, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Morgan Stanley, functions as
and is publicly referred to as the commodities trading division for the
parent company Morgan Stanley.
B. The Market
    In the state of New York, sellers of retail electricity must
purchase a product from generators known as installed capacity
(``capacity'').\3\ Electricity retailers are required to purchase
capacity in an amount equal to their expected peak energy demand plus a
share of reserve capacity. These payments assure that retail electric
companies do not use more electricity than the system can deliver and
encourage electric generating companies to build new facilities as
needed. Because transmission constraints limit the amount of energy
that can be imported into the New York City area from the power grid,
the New York Independent System Operator (``NYISO'') requires retail
providers of electricity to customers in New York City to purchase 80%
of their capacity from generators in that region. Thus, the New York
City Installed Capacity (``NYC Capacity'') Market constitutes a
relevant geographic and product market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Except where noted otherwise, this description pertains to
the market conditions that existed from May 2003 through March 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The price for installed capacity has been set through auctions
administered by the NYISO. The NYISO organizes the auctions to serve
two distinct seasonal periods, summer (May though October) and winter
(November through April). For each season, the NYISO conducts seasonal,
monthly, and spot auctions in which capacity can be acquired for all or
some of the seasonal period. Capacity suppliers offer price and
quantity bids in each of these three auctions. Supplier bids are
``stacked'' from lowest-priced to highest. The stack is then compared
to the amount of demand. The offering price of the last bid in the
``stack'' needed to meet requisite demand establishes the market price
for all capacity sold into that auction. Any capacity bid at higher
than this price is unsold, as is any excess capacity bid at what
becomes the market price.
    The NYC Capacity Market was highly concentrated during the relevant
period, with three firms--Astoria, NRG Energy, Inc., and KeySpan--
controlling a substantial portion of the market's generating capacity.
These three were designated as pivotal suppliers by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, meaning that at least some of each of these
three suppliers' output was required to satisfy demand. The three firms
were subject to bid and price caps--KeySpan's being the highest--for
nearly all of their generating capacity in New York City and were not
allowed to sell their capacity outside of the NYISO auction process.
C. The Alleged Violation
    1. KeySpan Assesses Plans for Changed Market Conditions
    From June 2003 through December 2005, almost all installed capacity
in the market was needed to meet demand. With these tight market
conditions, KeySpan could sell almost all of its capacity into the
market, even while bidding at its cap. KeySpan did so, and the market
cleared at the price established by the cap, with only a small fraction
of KeySpan's capacity remaining unsold.
    KeySpan anticipated that the tight supply and demand conditions in
the NYC Capacity Market would end in 2006 due to the entry into the
market of approximately 1000 MW of generation capacity, and would not
return until 2009 with the retirement of old generation units and
demand growth.
    KeySpan could no longer be confident that ``bid the cap'' would
remain its best strategy during the 2006-2009 period. The ``bid the
cap'' strategy would keep market prices high, but at a significant
cost. KeySpan would have to withhold a significant additional amount of
capacity to account for the new entry. The additional withholding would
reduce KeySpan's revenues by as much as $90 million per year.
Alternatively, KeySpan could compete with its rivals for sales by
bidding more capacity at lower prices. KeySpan considered various
competitive bidding strategies. These could potentially produce much
higher returns for KeySpan than bidding the cap but carried the risk
that competitors would undercut its price and take sales away, making
the strategy potentially less profitable than bidding the cap.
    KeySpan also considered acquiring Astoria's generating assets from
Reliant Energy, Inc., which was putting them up for sale. This would
have solved the problem that new entry posed for KeySpan's revenue
stream, as Astoria's capacity would have provided KeySpan with
sufficient additional revenues to make continuing to ``bid the cap''
its best strategy. Simultaneously, Morgan was interested in buying the
same assets and seeking a strategic partner with whom to bid. Morgan
and KeySpan discussed such a partnership and the market power issues of
a bid involving KeySpan. KeySpan soon concluded that its acquisition of
its largest competitor would raise serious market power issues and
communicated that conclusion to Morgan.
2. Morgan Facilitates the Anticompetitive and Unlawful Agreement
    Instead of purchasing the Astoria assets, KeySpan decided to
acquire a financial interest in substantially all of Astoria's
capacity. KeySpan would pay Astoria's owner a fixed revenue stream in
return for the revenues generated from Astoria's capacity sales in the
auctions.
    KeySpan realized that it could not approach the owner of Astoria
assets directly, so it turned to Morgan to act as a counter-party.
Morgan agreed to serve as the counter-party but informed KeySpan that
the agreement was contingent on it entering into an offsetting
agreement with the owner of the Astoria generating assets.
    On or about January 9, 2006, KeySpan and Morgan finalized the terms
of a financial derivative arrangement between the two companies, ``the
Morgan/KeySpan Swap.'' Under the agreement, if the market price for
capacity was above $7.57 per kW-month, Morgan would pay KeySpan the
difference between the market price and $7.57 times 1800 MW; if the
market price was below $7.57, KeySpan would pay Morgan the difference
times 1800 MW. The Morgan/KeySpan Swap was executed on January 18,
2006. The term of the Morgan/KeySpan Swap ran from May 2006 through
April 2009.
    On or about January 9, 2006, Morgan and Astoria finalized the terms
of the offsetting agreement (``Morgan/Astoria Hedge''). Under that
agreement, if the market price for capacity was above $7.07 per kW-
month, Astoria would pay Morgan the difference times 1800 MW; if the
market price was below $7.07, Astoria would be paid the difference
times 1800 MW. The Morgan/Astoria Hedge was executed on January 11,
2006. The term of the Morgan/Astoria Hedge ran from May 2006 through
April 2009, matching the duration of the Morgan/KeySpan Swap.
    Morgan earned approximately $21.6 million in net revenues from the
Morgan/KeySpan Swap and the Morgan/Astoria Hedge.
3. The Effect of the Morgan/KeySpan Swap
    After the Morgan/KeySpan Swap went into effect in May 2006, KeySpan

[[Page 62848]]

consistently bid its capacity into the capacity auctions at its cap
even though a significant portion of its capacity went unsold. Despite
the addition of significant new generating capacity in New York City,
the market price of capacity did not decline.
    The clear tendency of the Morgan/KeySpan Swap was to alter
KeySpan's bidding in the NYC Capacity Market auctions. The swap
effectively eliminated KeySpan's incentive to compete for sales in the
same way a purchase of Astoria or a direct agreement between KeySpan
and Astoria would have done. By adding revenues from Astoria's capacity
to KeySpan's own, the Morgan/KeySpan Swap made bidding the cap
KeySpan's most profitable strategy regardless of its rivals' bids.
Without the swap, KeySpan likely would have chosen from a range of
potentially profitable competitive strategies in response to the entry
of new capacity and, had it done so, the price of capacity would have
declined. The swap produced no countervailing efficiencies.

III. United States v. Keyspan Corporation

    On February 22, 2010, the United States filed suit against KeySpan
for its role in the Morgan/KeySpan Swap. Simultaneous with the filing
of its Complaint, the United States filed a proposed Final Judgment
requiring KeySpan to pay to the United States $12 million as
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. See Complaint, United States v.
KeySpan Corp., No. 10-1415 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010). After completion
of the procedures set forth in the Tunney Act, including public notice
and comment, the United States moved for entry of the proposed Final
Judgment. In the course of making its public interest determination,
the Court found that disgorgement is available to remedy violations of
the Sherman Act. See United States v. KeySpan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d
633, 638-641. The KeySpan Final Judgment was entered on February 2,
2011.

IV. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment

    The proposed Final Judgment requires Morgan to disgorge profits
gained as a result of its unlawful agreement restraining trade. Morgan
is to surrender $4.8 million to the Treasury of the United States.
    KeySpan, pursuant to a Final Judgment sought by the United States,
has surrendered $12 million as a result of its role in the Morgan/
KeySpan Swap.\4\ See United States v. KeySpan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d
633, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Securing similar disgorgement from the
other responsible party to the anticompetitive agreement will protect
the public interest by depriving Morgan of a substantial portion of the
fruits of the agreement. The effect of the swap agreement was to
effectively combine the economic interests of KeySpan and Astoria,
thereby permitting KeySpan to increase prices above competitive rates,
and this result could not have been achieved without Morgan's
participation in the swap agreement. Requiring disgorgement in these
circumstances will thus protect the public interest by deterring Morgan
and other parties from entering into similar financial agreements that
result in anticompetitive effects in the underlying markets, or from
otherwise engaging in similar anticompetitive conduct in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Had the KeySpan case proceeded to trial, the United States
would have sought disgorgement of the approximately $49 million in
net revenues that KeySpan received under the Swap, contending that
these net revenues reflected the value that KeySpan received from
trading the uncertainty of competing for the certainty of the bid-
the-cap strategy. See Plaintiff United States's Response to Public
Comments at 14-18, United States v. KeySpan Corp., No. 10-1415
(S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The $4.8 million disgorgement amount is the product of settlement
and accounts for litigation risks and costs. While the disgorged sum
represents less than all of Morgan's net transaction revenues under the
two agreements,\5\ disgorgement will effectively fulfill the remedial
goals of the Sherman Act to ``prevent and restrain'' antitrust
violations as it will send a message of deterrence to those in the
financial services community considering the use of derivatives for
anticompetitive ends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Had the case against Morgan proceeded to trial, the United
States would have sought disgorgement of the $21.6 million in net
transaction revenues Morgan earned under both the Morgan/KeySpan
Swap and the Morgan/Astoria Hedge. At trial, Morgan--in addition to
raising arguments as to its lack of liability in general--would have
disputed that the entire $21.6 million earned under both agreements
would be cognizable as ill-gotten gains.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants

    Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any
person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the
antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times
the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither
impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action.
Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any
subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against Morgan.

VI. Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final
Judgment

    The United States and the Defendant have stipulated that the
proposed Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance
with the provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has
not withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's
determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public
interest.
    The APPA provides a period of at least sixty (60) days preceding
the effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any
person may submit to the United States written comments regarding the
proposed Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so
within sixty (60) days of the date of publication of this Competitive
Impact Statement in the Federal Register, or the last date of
publication in a newspaper of the summary of this Competitive Impact
Statement, whichever is later. All comments received during this period
will be considered by the United States, which remains free to withdraw
its consent to the proposed Final Judgment at any time prior to the
Court's entry of judgment. The comments and the response of the United
States will be filed with the Court and published in the Federal
Register.
    Written comments should be submitted to: William H. Stallings,
Chief, Transportation, Energy & Agriculture Section, Antitrust
Division, United States Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW.;
Suite 8000, Washington, DC 20530.
    The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains
jurisdiction over this action, and the parties may apply to the Court
for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification,
interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment.

VII. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment

    The United States considered, as an alternative to the proposed
Final Judgment, a full trial on the merits against the Defendant. The
United States is satisfied, however, that the disgorgement of profits
is an appropriate remedy in this matter. A disgorgement remedy should
deter Morgan and others from engaging in similar conduct and thus
achieves a significant portion of the relief the United States would
have

[[Page 62849]]

obtained through litigation but avoids the time, expense, and
uncertainty of discovery and a full trial on the merits of the
Complaint.

VIII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for Proposed Final Judgment

    The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed
consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be
subject to a sixty-day comment period, after which the court shall
determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment ``is in the
public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In making that determination,
the court is directed to consider:
    (A) The competitive impact of such judgment, including termination
of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification,
duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies
actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other
competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment
that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the
consent judgment is in the public interest; and
    (B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the
relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals
alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint
including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived
from a determination of the issues at trial.

15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B); see generally United States v. KeySpan
Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (WHP) (discussing
Tunney Act standards); United States v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing standards for public interest
determination). In considering these statutory factors, the court's
inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the United States is entitled
to ``broad discretion to settle with the Defendant within the reaches
of the public interest.'' United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d
1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
    Under the APPA a court considers, among other things, the
relationship between the remedy secured and the specific allegations
set forth in the United States' complaint, whether the decree is
sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, and
whether the decree may positively harm third parties. See Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1458-62. With respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by
the decree, the court's function is ``not to determine whether the
proposed [d]ecree results in the balance of rights and liabilities that
is the one that will best serve society, but only to ensure that the
resulting settlement is within the reaches of the public interest.''
KeySpan, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (quoting United States v. Alex Brown &
Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (internal quotations
omitted). In making this determination, ``[t]he [c]ourt is not
permitted to reject the proposed remedies merely because the court
believes other remedies are preferable. [Rather], the relevant inquiry
is whether there is a factual foundation for the government's decision
such that its conclusions regarding the proposed settlement are
reasonable.'' Id. at 637-38 (quoting United States v. Abitibi-
Consolidated Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165 (D.D.C. 2008).\6\ The
government's predictions about the efficacy of its remedies are
entitled to deference.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.
1981) (``The balancing of competing social and political interests
affected by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the
first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General.''). See
generally Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (discussing whether ``the
remedies [obtained in the decree are] so inconsonant with the
allegations charged as to fall outside of the `reaches of the public
interest' '').
    \7\ Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting the need for courts to be
``deferential to the government's predictions as to the effect of
the proposed remedies''); United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland
Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the court
should grant due respect to the United States' prediction as to the
effect of proposed remedies, its perception of the market structure,
and its views of the nature of the case).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Courts have greater flexibility in approving proposed consent
decrees than in crafting their own decrees following a finding of
liability in a litigated matter. ``[A] proposed decree must be approved
even if it falls short of the remedy the court would impose on its own,
as long as it falls within the range of acceptability or is `within the
reaches of public interest.' '' United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
552 F. Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975)), aff'd
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky.
1985) (approving the consent decree even though the court would have
imposed a greater remedy). To meet this standard, the United States
``need only provide a factual basis for concluding that the settlements
are reasonably adequate remedies for the alleged harms.'' SBC Commc'ns,
489 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
    Moreover, the court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing
the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has
alleged in its Complaint, and does not authorize the court to
``construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree
against that case.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459; KeySpan, 763 F. Supp.
2d at 638 (``A court must limit its review to the issues in the
complaint * * *.''). Because the ``court's authority to review the
decree depends entirely on the government's exercising its
prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place,'' it
follows that ``the court is only authorized to review the decree
itself,'' and not to ``effectively redraft the complaint'' to inquire
into other matters that the United States did not pursue. Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1459-60.
    In its 2004 amendments, Congress made clear its intent to preserve
the practical benefits of utilizing consent decrees in antitrust
enforcement, adding the unambiguous instruction that ``[n]othing in
this section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to
intervene.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2). This language effectuates what
Congress intended when it enacted the Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator
Tunney explained: ``[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or
to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect of
vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through the
consent decree process.'' 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement of
Senator Tunney). Rather, the procedure for the public interest
determination is left to the discretion of the court, with the
recognition that the court's ``scope of review remains sharply
proscribed by precedent and the nature of Tunney Act proceedings.'' SBC
Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ See United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17
(D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the ``Tunney Act expressly allows the
court to make its public interest determination on the basis of the
competitive impact statement and response to comments alone'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IX. Determinative Documents

    There are no determinative materials or documents within the
meaning of the APPA that the United States considered in formulating
the proposed Final Judgment.

Dated: September 30, 2011.

    Respectfully submitted,

For Plaintiff
the United States of America.
Jade Alice Eaton,
Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, Transportation, Energy & Agriculture Section, 450 5th
Street, NW., Suite 8000, Washington, DC 20530,

[[Page 62850]]

Telephone: (202) 307-6316, jade.eaton@usdoj.gov.

United States of America, Plaintiff,

    v.
Morgan Stanley, Defendant.

Civil Action No.

Final Judgment

    Whereas Plaintiff United States of America filed its Complaint
alleging that Defendant Morgan Stanley (``Morgan'') violated Section 1
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and Plaintiff and Morgan, through
their respective attorneys, having consented to the entry of this Final
Judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law, for
settlement purposes only, and without this Final Judgment constituting
any evidence against or an admission by Morgan for any purpose with
respect to any claim or allegation contained in the Complaint:
    Now, Therefore, before the taking of any testimony and without
trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and upon the
consent of the parties hereto, it is hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and
Decreed:

I. Jurisdiction

    This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter herein and of
each of the parties consenting hereto. The Complaint states a claim
upon which relief may be granted to the United States against Morgan
under Sections 1 and 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 and 4.

II. Applicability

    This Final Judgment applies to Morgan and each of its successors,
assigns, and to all other persons in active concert or participation
with it who shall have received actual notice of the Settlement
Agreement and Order by personal service or otherwise.

III. Relief

    A. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Final Judgment,
Morgan shall pay to the United States the sum of four million eight
hundred thousand dollars ($4,800,000.00).
    B. The payment specified above shall be made by wire transfer.
Before making the transfer, Morgan shall contact Janie Ingalls, of the
Antitrust Division's Antitrust Documents Group, at (202) 514-2481 for
wire transfer instructions.
    C. In the event of a default in payment, interest at the rate of
eighteen (18) percent per annum shall accrue thereon from the date of
default to the date of payment.

IV. Retention of Jurisdiction

    This Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to this Final
Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for further orders and
directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe
this Final Judgment, to modify any of its provisions, to enforce
compliance, and to punish violations of its provisions. Upon
notification by the United States to the Court of Morgan's payment of
the funds required by Section III above, this Section IV will have no
further force or effect.

V. Public Interest Determination

    Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest. The parties
have complied with the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16, including making copies available to the
public of this Final Judgment, the Competitive Impact Statement, and
any comments thereon and Plaintiff's responses to comments. Based upon
the record before the Court, which includes the Competitive Impact
Statement and any comments and response to comments filed with the
Court, entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.

Dated:-----------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
United States District Judge.

[FR Doc. 2011-26161 Filed 10-7-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET-Fukushima Daiichi NPS 8 October 2011 Photos
		
	
	

		








Fukushima Daiichi NPS 8 October 2011 Photos








[Image]Overview of reactor building of Unit 3 from western hilltop between Unit 2 and 3, Sep 29, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)




[Image]Overview of reactor building of Unit 3 from a crane above Unit 3, Sep 24, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)




[Image]Overview of a reactor building of Unit 4 from western hilltop between Unit 2 and 3. Sep 29, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)




[Image]Overview of reactor building of Unit 2 from western hilltop between Unit 2 and 3, Sep 29, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)




[Image]Installation Work of Roof Panels for Reactor Building Covers at Unit 1 of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, October 8, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)




[Image]Overview of reactor building of Unit 1 -From south direction of Main Anti-Earthquake Building, Oct 8, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)




[Image]Overview of reactor building of Unit 1 -From a crane above Unit 1, Sep 9, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)




[Image]Main control room of Unit 1 and 2, Sep 22, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)




Related video:Situation of Upper Part of Unit 3 Reactor Building, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (61.9MB) (video on October 6, 2011)[Image]




Related video:Situation of Upper Part of Unit 2 Reactor Building, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (39.6MB) (video on October 5, 2011)[Image]




Related video:Situation of Upper Part of Unit 1 Reactor Building, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (54.1MB) (video on October 3, 2011)[Image]





	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – FBI Counterterrorism Chief Discusses Efforts to Fight Terrorist Financing
		
	
	

		



    

  • Ralph S. Boelter
    • 

  • Acting Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division
    • 

  • Federal Bureau of Investigation
    • 

  • Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism
    • 

  • Washington, D.C.
    • 

  • September 21, 2011
    • 







Good morning Chairman Whitehouse, Ranking Member Kyl, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today regarding the efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to combat terrorist financing.


Introduction


As we commemorate the 10th anniversary of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, we are reminded that the FBI’s number one priority in its mission to protect and defend the United States continues to be the prevention of terrorist attacks against the United States. The mission of the Terrorism Financing Operations Section (TFOS) is twofold. First, to manage the FBI’s investigative efforts in relation to individuals who provide funding to terrorists; and second, to ensure financial investigative techniques are used, where appropriate, in all counterterrorism investigations to enhance the investigations.


In coordination with our law enforcement and intelligence community partners, TFOS carries out this mission through the application of financial investigative techniques and the exploitation of financial intelligence. To improve its ability to detect and disrupt those with the intent and capability to conduct attacks against the United States, TFOS has undergone a significant shift in the way we address the threat of terrorism financing.


Inception of TFOS


Immediately after the terrorist attacks on September 11, the FBI established the Terrorism Financing Operations Section within the Counterterrorism Division. In recognition of the importance of tracking the financial underpinnings of terrorist activity, TFOS was established to serve as a comprehensive, centralized unit to provide broad support for counterterrorism investigations by analyzing and exploiting all available financial intelligence (FININT).


TFOS Organization


Consistent with the FBI’s continuing transformation into an intelligence-led national security organization, in early 2011, the Counterterrorism Division implemented changes to TFOS. These changes enhance TFOS’ ability to carry out its mission through a threat-based, intelligence-led approach. Rather than collecting information to solve a particular case, this new approach prioritizes the collection and utilization of intelligence to develop a comprehensive threat picture, enabling strategic disruptions of terrorist financing operations.


Targeting Unit


The TFOS Targeting Unit utilizes all source intelligence from the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities to identify currently unknown fundraisers and their associates. This unit focuses on identifying unknown or previously unidentified financiers within terrorist networks. As our targeting efforts identify these individuals, TFOS works directly with each of the FBI’s 56 field offices to open assessments or investigations and lead those investigations through TFOS’s two operational units.


Strategic Intelligence Units


The TFOS Strategic Intelligence Unit monitors threats and financial trends to identify trends and methodologies which are key to identifying possible terrorist financing transactions at their earliest point. This intelligence is disseminated to the U.S. intelligence community, as well as federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign law enforcement partners, as appropriate. In addition, TFOS has been successful in augmenting relationships and establishing channels for sharing information with elements of the financial industry which routinely report on suspicious financial activity occurring in the private sector.


In addition to carrying out targeting and strategic intelligence functions, TFOS personnel are embedded within the Counterterrorism Division’s International Terrorism Operations Section and threat cells, which manage the priority threats and investigations. This cadre of special agents, intelligence analysts, and forensic accountants ensure the FININT in priority threat investigations is fully exploited to support those investigations. FININT is critical in these investigations as the FBI does not just focus on the total dollar amount of a financial transaction, but also gleans valuable intelligence from the financial activity. Further, TFOS conducts analysis of other critical intelligence collected during transactions. Thus, the TFOS exploitation of FININT not only seeks to identify the scope and breadth of terrorist financing, but also the members of the terrorist network to enhance indicators and tripwires and create actionable intelligence to identify and prevent terrorist attacks.


Outreach, Training and Education


In partnership with the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the FBI conducts ongoing outreach and education with our financial industry counterparts. The financial industry’s efforts and resources dedicated to detecting and reporting suspicious financial activities through suspicious activity reports (SARs) have been important components in our efforts to identify terrorist financing. SAR reporting is a critical tripwire to detect possible terrorist financiers as well as to identify associates of known terrorists. The analysis of SAR information aids in the development of an overall terrorist financing threat picture and can assist TFOS in identifying trends or patterns of suspicious activity around the country. This information can also identify previously unknown associates of terrorism subjects.


In conjunction with the Treasury Department, TFOS conducts an annual training session with the New York Federal Reserve to provide the financial industry with updated trend information regarding terrorist financing. This year’s conference included over 300 attendees from the financial sector interested in learning how to maximize their resources to more effectively identify and report suspicious financial activity. These outreach efforts provide an opportunity for the financial sector to receive the latest terrorist financing threat and trend information, as well as share in best practices for the rapid identification and reporting of suspicious financial activity.


International Efforts


Coordinated efforts with our foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners are key elements to the FBI’s success in counterterrorism investigations. Through the FBI’s 62 legal attaché offices TFOS jointly investigates terrorist financing matters with our foreign counterparts. In addition, TFOS personnel are embedded within key legal attaché offices to provide expertise and resources dedicated to terrorist financing. These relationships and global efforts in the sharing of intelligence are key to the FBI’s efforts to stem the flow of financial support to terrorists and protect the United States from terrorist attacks. TFOS also participates jointly with the Treasury Department and other United States government agencies in international forums to support international efforts in relation to terrorist financing.


TFOS conducts international training to convey the latest financial exploitation techniques and share best practices and investigative strategies to support the joint investigation of terrorist financing matters. In coordination with the Department of State, over the past two years, TFOS has conducted over 20 international training courses in 17 different countries. This training enhances our foreign counterparts’ awareness and capabilities and promotes financial exploitation in all counterterrorism investigations.


Recent Successes


The FBI’s terrorist financing efforts have resulted in numerous successes which have resulted in the disruption and arrest of terrorist financiers.


In August 2011, Mohammad Younis pled guilty in New York to operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square, received money from Younis, which he used to fund his preparations for the attempted bombing. Younis received the money through his unlicensed money transmitting business from a co-conspirator in Pakistan. Shahzad advised that the funding was arranged in Pakistan by associates of the Tehrik-e-Taliban.


In May, 2011, Hor and Amera Akl pled guilty in Ohio to conspiracy to provide material support to Hizballa. Hor and Amera Akl told an FBI informant they would be willing to send money to Hizballah for him. The informant gave them $200,000 to send to Hizballah, and they were arrested as they attempted to conceal the money in a vehicle that would be shipped overseas.


In September, 2009, Abdul Tawala Ibn Ali Alishtari pled guilty in New York to charges of terrorism financing. Alishtari facilitated the transfer of $152,000, with the understanding that the money would be used to fund training for terrorists.


In the last year, the FBI has conducted terrorist financing investigations which led to the indictment of individuals for providing funding to the Pakistani Taliban, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Shabaab. The al Shabaab indictments involved a network which used teleconferences to raise funds and then remitted the money to al Shabaab terrorists in Somalia.


Conclusion


The efforts of TFOS—in close coordination with our federal, state, and local partners; the financial industry; and our international partners—have established an increasingly difficult environment within which terrorist financiers can operate undetected. We believe that these efforts have reduced the funding available for terrorist operations and have made the concealment and transfer of terrorism related funds more difficult.


As the terrorists adapt their methods to raise and transfer funds, the FBI has also adapted its efforts to detect and disrupt these financial networks. The FBI TFOS is better able to systematically track intelligence, identify networks and currently unknown subjects, and oversee the FBI’s terrorist financing investigations related to those networks. TFOS’ cooperative efforts with our government and private sector partners ensures an ongoing and coordinated approach to terrorist financing to prevent future terrorist attacks against the United States.


Chairman Whitehouse, Ranking Member Kyl, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to come before you today and share the work that the FBI is doing to address terrorist financing and counterterrorism in this country and around the globe. I am happy to answer any questions.



	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – US Foreign Bribery Qualifications
		
	
	

		
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 192 (Tuesday, October 4, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61386-61391]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-25540]

=======================================================================
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MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION

[MCC FR 11-10]

Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the
Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account
Assistance in Fiscal Year 2011

AGENCY: Millennium Challenge Corporation.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This report to Congress is provided in accordance with Section
608(b) of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, as amended, 22 U.S.C.
7707(b) (the ``Act'').

    Dated: September 29, 2011.
Melvin F. Williams, Jr.,
VP/General Counsel and Corporate Secretary, Millennium Challenge
Corporation.

Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility
of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance in
Fiscal Year 2012

Summary

    This report to Congress is provided in accordance with section
608(b) of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, as amended, 22 U.S.C.
7707(b) (the ``Act'').
    The Act authorizes the provision of Millennium Challenge Account
(``MCA'') assistance to countries that enter into a Millennium
Challenge Compact with the United States to support policies and
programs that advance the prospects of such countries achieving lasting
economic growth and poverty reduction. The Act requires the Millennium
Challenge Corporation (``MCC'') to take a number of steps in
determining what countries will be selected as eligible for MCA compact
assistance for fiscal year 2012 (``FY12'') based on the countries'
demonstrated commitment to just and democratic governance, economic
freedom, and investing in their people, as well as MCC's opportunity to
reduce poverty and generate economic growth in the country. These steps
include the submission of reports to the congressional committees
specified in the Act and publication of notices in the Federal Register
that identify:
    The countries that are ``candidate countries'' for MCA assistance
for FY12 based on their per-capita income levels and their eligibility
to receive assistance under U.S. law. This report also identifies
countries that would be candidate countries but for specified legal
prohibitions on assistance (section 608(a) of the Act; 22 U.S.C. Sec.
7707(a));
    The criteria and methodology that MCC's Board of Directors (``the
Board'') will use to measure and evaluate the policy performance of the
candidate countries consistent with the requirements of section 607 of
the Act (22 U.S.C. 7706) in order to determine ``MCA eligible
countries'' from among the ``candidate countries'' (section 608(b) of
the Act); and
    The list of countries determined by the Board to be ``MCA eligible
countries'' for FY12, with justification for eligibility determination
and selection for compact negotiation, including which of the MCA
eligible countries the Board will seek to enter into MCA compacts
(section 608(d) of the Act).
    This report sets out the criteria and methodology to be applied in
determining eligibility for FY12 MCA assistance.

Criteria and Methodology for FY12

    The Board will base its selection of eligible countries on several
factors including the country's overall performance in three broad
policy categories--Ruling Justly, Encouraging Economic Freedom, and
Investing in People; MCC's opportunity to reduce poverty and generate
economic growth in a country; and the availability of funds to MCC.
    Section 607 of the Act requires that the Board's determination of
eligibility be based ``to the maximum extent possible, upon objective
and quantifiable indicators of a country's

[[Page 61387]]

demonstrated commitment'' to the criteria set out in the Act.
    For FY12, there will be two groups of candidate countries--low
income countries (``LIC'') and lower-middle income countries
(``LMIC''). As outlined in the Report on Countries that are Candidates
for Millennium Challenge Account Eligibility for Fiscal Year 2012 and
Countries that would be Candidates but for Legal Prohibitions (August
2011), LIC candidates refer to those countries that have a per capita
income equal to or less than $1,915 and are not ineligible to receive
United States economic assistance under part I of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 by reason of the application of any provision of
the Foreign Assistance Act or any other provision of law. LMIC
candidates are those countries that have a per capita income between
$1,916 and $3,975 and are not ineligible to receive United States
economic assistance under the same stipulations.

Changes to the Criteria and Methodology for FY12

    MCC reviews all of its indicators annually to ensure the best
measures are being used and, from time to time, recommends changes or
refinements if MCC identifies better indicators or improved sources of
data. MCC takes into account public comments received on the previous
year's criteria and methodology and consults with a broad range of
experts in the development community and within the U.S. Government. In
assessing new indicators, MCC favors those that: (1) Are developed by
an independent third party; (2) utilize objective and high quality data
that rely upon an analytically rigorous methodology; (3) are publicly
available; (4) have broad country coverage; (5) are comparable across
countries; (6) have a clear theoretical or empirical link to economic
growth and poverty reduction; (7) are policy linked (i.e., measure
factors that governments can influence within a two to three year
horizon); and (8) have broad consistency in results from year to year.
There have been numerous noteworthy improvements to data quality and
availability as a result of MCC's application of the indicators and the
regular dialogue MCC has established with the indicator institutions.
    MCC also annually reviews the methodology used to evaluate country
performance. Since FY04, the methodology has been that the Board
considers whether a country performs above the median \1\ in relation
to its peers on at least half of the indicators in each of the three
policy categories and above the median on the Control of Corruption
indicator. The Board may exercise discretion in evaluating and
translating the indicators into a final list of eligible countries and,
in this respect, the Board may also consider whether any adjustments
should be made for data gaps, lags, trends or other weaknesses in
particular indicators. Where necessary, the Board may also take into
account other data and quantitative and qualitative information to
determine whether a country performed satisfactorily in relation to its
peers in a given category (``supplemental information''). Through this
report, the Board publically affirms that it remains strongly committed
to identifying countries for MCC eligibility that have demonstrated
sound policies in each of the three policy categories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The only exception is the Inflation indicator, which uses an
absolute threshold of 15% as opposed to the median as its
performance standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For FY12, MCC will implement a number of changes that modify the
overall evaluation of candidate country performance. While improvements
to the selection criteria and methodology are critical, MCC is also
mindful of the need to provide countries with a fairly stable set of
policy criteria to meet, if MCC is to create significant incentives for
reform. Therefore, for this year of transition, the Board of Directions
will consider countries' performance based on two sets of criteria and
methodologies in FY12: the status quo set of indicators and decisions
rules, and a revised set. Both of these are outlined below. By
encouraging the Board to consider how countries would have performed
under the previous system, as well as how countries perform under the
new system, MCC will provide a transition year that allows countries to
learn how they are being measured, engage in dialogue with MCC about
performance, and solicit feedback from the institutions that produce
these indicators.
    It is important to recognize that all of MCC's indicators have
limitations, including these revised indicators. Over the next year,
MCC intends to continue working with the indicator institutions to
ensure the data and methodology are the best available.

Indicators

    In FY12 the Board will use two sets of indicators to assess the
policy performance of individual countries. These indicators are
grouped under the three policy categories listed below. The changes to
the revised indicators include one substitution in Ruling Justly; two
additions in Economic Freedom; and three substitutions/additions in
Investing in People. Specific definitions of the indicators and their
sources are set out in the attached Annex A.

Status Quo

Civil Liberties
Political Rights
Voice and Accountability
Government Effectiveness
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption
Inflation
Fiscal Policy
Business Start-Up
Trade Policy
Regulatory Quality
Land Rights and Access
Public Expenditure on Health
Public Expenditure on Primary Education
Immunization Rates
Girls' Primary Education Completion
Natural Resource Management

Revised

Civil Liberties
Political Rights
Freedom of Information
Government Effectiveness
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption
Inflation
Fiscal Policy
Business Start-Up
Trade Policy
Regulatory Quality
Land Rights and Access
Access to Credit
Gender in the Economy
Public Expenditure on Health
Public Expenditure on Primary Education
Immunization Rates
Girls' Education:
Primary Education Completion (LICs)
Secondary Education Enrolment (LMICs)
Child Health
Natural Resource Protection

Methodology

    Similarly, in FY12 the Board will apply a status quo methodology,
and a revised methodology to the respective indicator groupings. These
are described below.

Status Quo

    In making its determination of eligibility with respect to a
particular candidate country, the Board will consider whether a country
performs above the median in relation to its income level peers (LIC or
LMIC) on at

[[Page 61388]]

least three of the indicators in each of the Ruling Justly, Encouraging
Economic Freedom, and Investing in People categories, and above the
median on the Control of Corruption indicator. One exception to this
methodology is that the median is not used for the Inflation indicator.
Instead, to pass the Inflation indicator a country's inflation rate
must be under an absolute threshold of 15 percent. The Board may also
take into consideration whether a country performs substantially below
the median on any indicator (i.e., below the 25th percentile) and has
not taken appropriate measures to address this shortcoming.

Revised

    In making its determination of eligibility with respect to a
particular candidate country, the Board will consider whether a country
performs above the median or absolute threshold on at least half of the
indicators and at least one indicator per category, above the median on
the Control of Corruption indicator, and above the absolute threshold
on either the Civil Liberties or Political Rights indicators.
Indicators with absolute thresholds in lieu of a median include a)
Inflation, on which a country's inflation rate must be under a fixed
ceiling of 15 percent; b) Immunization Rates (LMICs only), on which an
LMIC must have immunization coverage above 90%; c) Political Rights, on
which countries must score above 17 and d) Civil Liberties, on which
countries must score above 25. The Board will also take into
consideration whether a country performs substantially worse in any
category (Ruling Justly, Investing in People, or Economic Freedoms)
than they do on the overall scorecard. Further details on how this
methodology differs from the status quo can be found in Annex B.

Other Considerations for the Board of Directors

    Approach to Income Classification Transition
    Each year a number of countries shift income groups, and some
countries formerly classified as LICs suddenly face new, higher
performance standards in the LMIC group. As a result, they typically
perform worse relative to LMIC countries, than they did compared to
other LIC countries, even if in absolute terms they maintained or
improved their performance over the previous year. To address the
challenges associated with sudden changes in performance standards for
these countries, MCC has adopted an approach to income category
transition whereby the Board may consider the indicator performance of
countries that transitioned from the LIC to the LMIC category both
relative to their LMIC peers as well as in comparison to the current
fiscal year's LIC pool for a period of three years.

Supplementary Information

    Consistent with the Act, the indicators will be the predominant
basis for determining which countries will be eligible for MCA
assistance. However, the Board may exercise discretion when evaluating
performance on the indicators and determining a final list of eligible
countries. Where necessary, the Board also may take into account other
quantitative and qualitative information (supplemental information) to
determine whether a country performed satisfactorily in relation to its
peers in a given income category. There are elements of the criteria
set out in the Act for which there is either limited quantitative
information (e.g., the rights of people with disabilities) or no well-
developed performance indicator. Until such data and/or indicators are
developed, the Board may rely on additional data and qualitative
information to assess policy performance. For example, the State
Department Human Rights Report contains qualitative information to make
an assessment on a variety of criteria outlined by Congress, such as
the rights of people with disabilities, the treatment of women and
children, workers rights, and human rights. Similarly, MCC may consult
a variety of third party sources to better understand the domestic
potential for private sector led investment and growth.
    The Board may also consider whether supplemental information should
be considered to make up for data gaps, lags, trends, or other
weaknesses in particular indicators. As additional information in the
area of corruption, the Board may consider how a country is evaluated
by supplemental sources like Transparency International's Corruption
Perceptions Index, the Global Integrity Report, and the Extractive
Industry Transparency Initiative among others, as well as on the
defined indicator.

Consideration for Subsequent Compacts

    Countries nearing the end of compact implementation may be
considered for eligibility for a subsequent compact. In determining
eligibility for subsequent compacts, MCC recommends that the Board
consider, among other factors, the country's policy performance using
the methodology and criteria described above, the opportunity to reduce
poverty and generate economic growth in the country, the funds
available to MCC to carry out compact assistance, and the country's
track record of performance implementing its prior compact. To assess
implementation of a prior compact, MCC recommends that the Board
consider the nature of the country partnership with MCC, the degree to
which the country has demonstrated a commitment and capacity to achieve
program results, and the degree to which the country has implemented
the compact in accordance with MCC's core policies and standards.

Continuing Policy Performance

    Country partners that are developing or implementing a compact are
expected to seek to maintain and improve policy performance. MCC
recognizes that country partners may not meet the eligibility criteria
from time to time due to a number of factors, such as changes in the
peer-group median; transition into a new income category (e.g., from
LIC to LMIC); numerical declines in score that are within the
statistical margin of error; slight declines in policy performance;
revisions or corrections of data; the introduction of new sub-data
sources; or changes in the indicators used to measure performance. None
of these factors alone signifies a significant policy reversal nor
warrants suspension or termination of eligibility and/or assistance.
    However, countries that demonstrate a significant policy reversal
may be issued a warning, suspension, or termination of eligibility and/
or assistance. According to MCC's authorizing legislation, ``[a]fter
consultation with the Board, the Chief Executive Officer may suspend or
terminate assistance in whole or in part for a country or entity * * *
if * * * the country or entity has engaged in a pattern of actions
inconsistent with the criteria used to determine the eligibility of the
country or entity. * * *'' This pattern of actions need not be captured
in the indicators for MCC to take action.

Potential Future Changes

    MCC will continue to explore potential changes to the indicators
for future years. There are important areas of policy performance in
which indicators have not yet been developed, or expanded, to the
degree needed for inclusion in the MCC selection system. MCC would not
envision expanding the number of indicators beyond the current twenty
indicators. However, MCC remains interested in indicators that measure
policy performance related to educational quality, maternal health,
environmental degradation, budget

[[Page 61389]]

transparency, and more actionable indicators of corruption, which could
be used to substitute for existing indicators in the future or as
supplemental information. While we have reviewed some indicators with
promise--including education policy and quality indicators piloted by
the World Bank's Education for All, measures of maternal health from
the World Health Organization or the United Nations (including skilled
birth attendants or process indicators regarding access to emergency
obstetric care), preliminary data on air pollution provided by NASA
satellites, assessments of budget transparency by Open Budget Index,
and corruption assessments published by Global Integrity--none of these
indicators have sufficient periodicity and country coverage to be
incorporated into MCC's scorecard at this time.
    It should be noted that the new Freedom of Information indicator
adopted as part of the revised methodology draws on independent, third
party data, but is compiled by MCC, similar to how MCC compiles third
party data for the Land Rights and Access indicator. MCC welcomes the
efforts of third party institutions to improve and publish similar and
improved indicators.

Relationship to Legislative Criteria

    Within each policy category, the Act sets out a number of specific
selection criteria. As indicated above, a set of objective and
quantifiable policy indicators is used to determine eligibility for MCA
assistance and measure the relative performance by candidate countries
against these criteria. The Board's approach to determining eligibility
ensures that performance against each of these criteria is assessed by
at least one of the objective indicators. Most are addressed by
multiple indicators. The specific indicators appear in parentheses next
to the corresponding criterion set out in the Act.
    Section 607(b)(1): Just and democratic governance, including a
demonstrated commitment to --promote political pluralism, equality and
the rule of law (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, and Rule of Law,
Gender in the Economy); respect human and civil rights, including the
rights of people with disabilities (Political Rights, Civil Liberties,
and Freedom of Information); protect private property rights (Civil
Liberties, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Land Rights and
Access); encourage transparency and accountability of government
(Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Freedom of Information, Control of
Corruption, Rule of Law, and Government Effectiveness); and combat
corruption (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Rule of Law, Freedom of
Information, and Control of Corruption);
    Section 607(b)(2): Economic freedom, including a demonstrated
commitment to economic policies that--encourage citizens and firms to
participate in global trade and international capital markets (Fiscal
Policy, Inflation, Trade Policy, and Regulatory Quality); promote
private sector growth (Inflation, Business Start-Up, Fiscal Policy,
Land Rights and Access, Access to Credit, Gender in the Economy, and
Regulatory Quality); strengthen market forces in the economy (Fiscal
Policy, Inflation, Trade Policy, Business Start-Up, Land Rights and
Access, Access to Credit, and Regulatory Quality); and respect worker
rights, including the right to form labor unions (Civil Liberties and
Gender in the Economy);
    Section 607(b)(3): Investments in the people of such country,
particularly women and children, including programs that--promote
broad-based primary education (Girls' Primary Education Completion,
Girls' Secondary Education, and Public Expenditure on Primary
Education); strengthen and build capacity to provide quality public
health and reduce child mortality (Immunization Rates, Public
Expenditure on Health, and Child Health); and promote the protection of
biodiversity and the transparent and sustainable management and use of
natural resources (Natural Resource Protection).

Annex A: Indicator Definitions

    MCC is incorporating six new measures into the selection criteria
and dropping two previous measures. MCC's Board of Directors approved
these changes for the FY12 selection process, though the Board will
also consider how countries perform on the previous set of indicators.
This gradual integration of the indicators was designed to provide
adequate notice to compact, threshold and candidate countries of the
new measures and their performance before the new indicators fully
replaced the previous indicators. A brief summary of the indicators
follows; a detailed rationale for the adoption of these indicators can
be found in the Public Guide to the Indicators (available at http://www.mcc.gov).
    The following indicators will be used to measure candidate
countries' demonstrated commitment to the criteria found in section
607(b) of the Act. The indicators are intended to assess the degree to
which the political and economic conditions in a country serve to
promote broad-based sustainable economic growth and reduction of
poverty and thus provide a sound environment for the use of MCA funds.
The indicators are not goals in themselves; rather they are proxy
measures of policies that are linked to broad-based sustainable
economic growth. The indicators were selected based on their (i)
relationship to economic growth and poverty reduction, (ii) the number
of countries they cover, (iii) transparency and availability, and (iv)
relative soundness and objectivity. Where possible, the indicators are
developed by independent sources.

Ruling Justly

    Civil Liberties: Independent experts rate countries on: freedom of
expression; association and organizational rights; rule of law and
human rights; and personal autonomy and economic rights, among other
things. Source: Freedom House
    Political Rights: Independent experts rate countries on: the
prevalence of free and fair elections of officials with real power; the
ability of citizens to form political parties that may compete fairly
in elections; freedom from domination by the military, foreign powers,
totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies and economic oligarchies;
and the political rights of minority groups, among other things.
Source: Freedom House
    Voice and Accountability (status quo indicators only): An index of
surveys and expert assessments that rate countries on: the ability of
institutions to protect civil liberties; the extent to which citizens
of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments;
and the independence of the media, among other things. Source:
Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank/Brookings)
    Freedom of Information (revised indicators only): Measures the
legal and practical steps taken by a government to enable or allow
information to move freely through society; this includes measures of
press freedom, national freedom of information laws, and the extent to
which a county is filtering internet content or tools. Source: Freedom
House/FRINGE Special/Open Net Initiative
    Government Effectiveness: An index of surveys and expert
assessments that rate countries on: the quality of public service
provision; civil servants' competency and independence from political
pressures; and the government's ability to plan and implement sound
policies, among other things. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators
(World Bank/Brookings)

[[Page 61390]]

    Rule of Law: An index of surveys and expert assessments that rate
countries on: the extent to which the public has confidence in and
abides by the rules of society; the incidence and impact of violent and
nonviolent crime; the effectiveness, independence, and predictability
of the judiciary; the protection of property rights; and the
enforceability of contracts, among other things. Source: Worldwide
Governance Indicators (World Bank/Brookings)
    Control of Corruption: An index of surveys and expert assessments
that rate countries on: ``grand corruption'' in the political arena;
the frequency of petty corruption; the effects of corruption on the
business environment; and the tendency of elites to engage in ``state
capture'', among other things. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators
(World Bank/Brookings)

Encouraging Economic Freedom

    Inflation: The most recent average annual change in consumer
prices. Source: The International Monetary Fund's World Economic
Outlook Database
    Fiscal Policy: The overall budget balance divided by GDP, averaged
over a three-year period. The data for this measure come primarily from
IMF country reports or, where public IMF data are outdated or
unavailable, are provided directly by the recipient government with
input from U.S. missions in host countries. All data are cross-checked
with the IMF's World Economic Outlook database to try to ensure
consistency across countries and made publicly available. Source:
International Monetary Fund Country Reports, National Governments, and
the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Database
    Business Start-Up: An index that rates countries on the time and
cost of complying with all procedures officially required for an
entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or
commercial business. Source: International Finance Corporation
    Trade Policy: A measure of a country's openness to international
trade based on weighted average tariff rates and non-tariff barriers to
trade. Source: The Heritage Foundation
    Regulatory Quality: An index of surveys and expert assessments that
rate countries on: the burden of regulations on business; price
controls; the government's role in the economy; and foreign investment
regulation, among other areas. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators
(World Bank)
    Land Rights and Access: An index that rates countries on the extent
to which the institutional, legal, and market framework provide secure
land tenure and equitable access to land in rural areas and the time
and cost of property registration in urban and peri-urban areas.
Source: The International Fund for Agricultural Development and the
International Finance Corporation
    Access to Credit (revised indicators only): An index that rates
countries on rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and
accessibility of credit information available through either a public
credit registry or a private credit bureau; as well as legal rights in
collateral laws and bankruptcy laws. Source: International Finance
Corporation
    Gender in the Economy (revised indicators only): An index that
measures the extent to which laws provide men and women equal capacity
to generate income or participate in the economy, including the
capacity to access institutions, get a job, register a business, sign a
contract, open a bank account, choose where to live, and travel freely.
Source: International Finance Corporation

Investing in People

    Public Expenditure on Health: Total expenditures on health by
government at all levels divided by GDP. Source: The World Health
Organization
    Immunization Rates: The average of DPT3 and measles immunization
coverage rates for the most recent year available. Source: The World
Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund
    Total Public Expenditure on Primary Education: Total expenditures
on primary education by government at all levels divided by GDP.
Source: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization and National Governments
    Girls' Primary Completion Rate: The number of female students
enrolled in the last grade of primary education minus repeaters divided
by the population in the relevant age cohort (gross intake ratio in the
last grade of primary). Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization
    Girls Secondary Education (revised indicators only): The number of
female pupils enrolled in lower secondary school, regardless of age,
expressed as a percentage of the population of females in the
theoretical age group for lower secondary education. Lower middle
income counties (LMICs) will be assessed on this indicator instead of
Girls Primary Completion Rates. Source: United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization
    Natural Resource Management (status quo indicators only): An index
made up of four indicators: eco-region protection, access to improved
water, access to improved sanitation, and child (ages 1-4) mortality.
Source: The Center for International Earth Science Information Network
and the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy
    Natural Resource Protection (revised indicators only): Assesses
whether countries are protecting up to 10 percent of all their biomes
(e.g., deserts, tropical rainforests, grasslands, savannas and tundra).
Source: The Center for International Earth Science Information Network
and the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy
    Child Health (revised indicators only): An index made up of three
indicators: access to improved water, access to improved sanitation,
and child (ages 1-4) mortality. Source: The Center for International
Earth Science Information Network and the Yale Center for Environmental
Law and Policy

Annex B: Changes to the Methodology

New Absolute Thresholds

    Political Rights: Countries that receive a score above 17 will be
considered as passing this indicator. The median will no longer be
calculated or utilized.
    Civil Liberties: Countries that receive a score above 25 will be
considered as passing this indicator. The median will no longer be
calculated or utilized.
    Immunization Rates: Lower middle income countries (LMICs) that
exceed an immunization coverage rate of 90% will be considered as
passing this indicator. The median will no longer be calculated or
utilized for countries classified as LMICs.

New Democratic Rights Hard Hurdle

    In making its determination of eligibility with respect to a
particular candidate country, the Board will consider whether a country
performs above the thresholds described above on either Political
Rights or Civil Liberties.

Require Countries to Pass Half of the Indicators Overall

    In making its determination of eligibility with respect to a
particular candidate country, the Board will consider whether a country
performs above the median or absolute threshold on at least half of the
indicators and at least one indicator per category. In order to
maintain a focus on the breadth of sound policy performance, the Board
will also take into consideration whether a country performs
substantially worse on any category (Ruling Justly, Investing in
People, or Economic Freedoms).

[[Page 61391]]

    As with the current selection system, the Board may exercise
discretion in evaluating and translating the indicators into a final
list of eligible countries and, in this respect, the Board may also
consider whether any adjustments should be made for data gaps, lags,
trends or other weaknesses in particular indicators. Where necessary,
the Board may also take into account other data and quantitative and
qualitative information to determine whether a country performed
satisfactorily in relation to its peers in a given category
(``supplemental information'').

[FR Doc. 2011-25540 Filed 9-29-11; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 9211-03-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Trial by Jury: Judging the NYPD Ring of Steel
		
	
	

		























+

+






























































1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11




























After 9/11, the NYPD surrounded Lower Manhattan’s civic center with enhanced security architecture commonly referred to as the ‘Ring of Steel’. 


With its local and global reach, the zone is a signature public space of our time: encrypted, hardened. 


Our exposition subjects the Ring of Steel to its own trial by jury. We propose new pathways to interrogate the bias against civic-mindedness revealed by command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance procedures and technologies.


This is critical for those called to the civic center for jury duty — especially from communities underrepresented in the jury pool, who might be intimidated by security theater even before they face examination about their impartiality during a jury trial.







	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Net Worth by John Galt OWS
		
	
	

		
ia: http://twitter.com/#!/WeRallJohnGalt John Galt (“John Galt” is an Ayn Rand fictional hero.)


These appeared as Occupy Wall Street dissent, most at Twitter #ows. Repetition of entries deliberate.


Cryptome Occupy Wall Street photo and video series: http://cryptome.org/ows-series.htm


Cryptome Protest Photos Series: http://cryptome.org/protest-series.htm




Bill Maher, defender of poor, atheist, net worth $23M #p2


5 hours ago




Mark Ruffalo, avenger to poor, speaker at #OWS today, net worth $10M #p2 #ows


6 hours ago




Tim Robbins, boy toy to Susan Sarandon, net worth $45M. #p2 #ows


6 hours ago




Susan Sarandon, warrior against Rich, friend to #OWS, net worth $50M #p2 #ows


6 hours ago




John Goodman, Roseannes’s TV hubby, portraying a “normal guy”, built a net worth of $65M. He owns four homes over 5,000 SF each. #p2 #ows


7 hours ago




CNN’s Anderson Cooper. 360. Investigating corruption & greed. Net worth $110M. Makes $11M per year. #p2 #ows


7 hours ago




Harry “jobs” Reid, union friend, defender of poor, net worth $5M #p2 #ows


7 hours ago




Nancy Pelosi, Joan D’Arc of working class, net worth $36M #p2 #ows


7 hours ago




Jimmy Carter, friend to Castro, champion of global poor, net worth $5M #p2 #ows


7 hours ago




Etta James net worth $16M #p2 #ows


7 hours ago




Lady Gaga, champion of the oppressed, net worth $110M. In process of buying castle in Scotland. Born that way. #p2 #ows


7 hours ago




Jane Fonda, left heroine, net worth $120M. Owns 5 homes over 4,000 square feet each. How big’s your house? #p2 #ows


7 hours ago




Linda Rondstat, main squeeze of Gov Brown, net worth $115M. #p2 #ows


7 hours ago




CA Gov Jerry Brown net worth $4M #p2 #ows


7 hours ago




Jimmy Buffet, palm tree sage of working class, net worth $400M. Are we seeing a trend here progs? Good 4 Jimmy. #p2 #ows


8 hours ago




Bob Marley net worth $130M. Good for him. Love Marley. #p21 #ows


8 hours ago




Chelsea Clinton net worth $5M #p2 #ows


8 hours ago




Hillary Clinton net worth $22M #p2 #ows


8 hours ago




Bill Clinton net worth $80M #p2 #ows


8 hours ago




Alec Baldwin net worth $65M. Gets $300K per episode. Learning yet progs? #p2 #ows #tcot


8 hours ago




Al Gore net worth $100M. No carbon offset profits included. #p2 #owl


8 hours ago




Michael Moore net worth $80M. Hero of the poor. #OWS #p2


8 hours ago




Ron Paul net worth $5M #OWS


8 hours ago




John Lennon net worth $800M. Getting the picture progs? You’re pawns. GOP wants YOU to succeed. #OWS #p2 #tcot


9 hours ago




George W Bush, greatest American President, scourge of poor, worth $54M LESS than Roseanne, 3M less than Maher #p2 #ows #tcot


9 hours ago




Warren Buffet, Prog darling, worth $39 Billion. #p2 #ows


9 hours ago




Maxine Waters. Lotta Wall Street dividends. #ows #p2 pfds.opensecrets.org/N00006690_2010…


9 hours ago




Arrianna Hufington (Huffington Post) net worth is $35M. And she was born in Greece LOL. #p2 #ows #tcot


9 hours ago




Figured out why @billmaher is so angry. He’s only worth $23M. Roseanne’s worth $80M. Even I think THAT’s unfair #ows #p2 #tcot


9 hours ago




Fidel Castro, socialist hero, net worth $900M. Good money in being King. Understand Obama’s motives now. #OWS #p2


10 hours ago




Hugo Chavez net worth is $1Billion #p2 #ows


10 hours ago




Finally figured out why Maher is angry all the time. He’s only worth $23M while Roseanne’s worth $80M. Even I think that’s unfair #ows


10 hours ago




Jesse Jackson net worth is $10M #p2 #ows


10 hours ago




Al Sharpton is only worth $5M #p2 #ows


10 hours ago




Morgan Freeman has a net worth of $90M #p2 #ows


10 hours ago




Richard Trumka made $265K in 2010, 3 times the median wage of rank & file. His net worth is not available (shock). #OWS #p2


10 hours ago




Democrat Senator Herb Kohl from Wisconsin net worth $243M #OWS #p2


10 hours ago




Champions of the Poor: Stewart, Maher, Barr, Olbermann, Maddow, Sanders, Schultz, Penn. Combined net worth: $1.2 Billion. #ows #p2


10 hours ago




Bill Maher’s net worth is $23M. #p2 #ows


10 hours ago




Jon Stewart’s net worth is also $80M. Yearly salary is $15M #p2 #ows


10 hours ago




Roseanne Barr’s net worth is $80M. #p2 #ows


10 hours ago




Alan Colmes net worth is only $12M. Salary just $2M per year. #p2 #ows


10 hours ago




Barack Obama’s net worth is $10.5M. He makes $400K per year. #p2 #ows


10 hours ago




Keith Olbermann net worth is $35M. Yearly salary was $10M. Now probably $50K. #p2 #ows


10 hours ago




Senator Bernie Sanders net worth $750M. One of richest in Congress. #ows #p2


10 hours ago




Rachel Maddow’s net worth is $12.5M #p2 #ows


10 hours ago




Michael Moore net worth is $50M #OWS #p2 Moore personally reaped $80M from Fahrenheit 911


10 hours ago




MSNBC’s Ed Schultz net worth is $11.5M. #p2 #ows


10 hours ago




Howard Schultz (CEO Starbucks) net worth $1.3 Billion (no typo). Enjoy your coffee #ows #p2


10 hours ago




Domino’s pizza CEO Patrick Doyle made $5.5M in 2010. 164 times the median salary of his workers. Enjoy your pizza #p2 #ows


10 hours ago




Bob Marley. Worth $137M. Sweet fruit indeed #ows


14 hours ago




Sean Penn net worth is $150M. Now I know why he loves Chavez. Envy. #p2 #ows


15 hours ago




Finally figured out why Maher is angry all the time. He’s only worth $23M while Roseanne’s worth $80M. Even I think that’s unfair #OWS


15 hours ago




Fidel Castro net worth $900M #OWS #p2


15 hours ago




Hugo Chavez net worth is $1Billion #p2 #OWS


15 hours ago




Roseanne, $80M superwoman, condemns the rich at #OWS #p2


15 hours ago




Keith Olbermann, $35M man, protests the rich on #OWS #p2


15 hours ago




Richard Trumka made $265K in 2010, 3 times the median wage of rank & file. His net worth is not available (shock). #OWS #p2


15 hours ago




Democrat Senator Herb Kohl from Wisconsin net worth $243M #OWS #p2


16 hours ago




Senator Bernie Sanders net worth $750M. One of richest in Congress. #ows p2


16 hours ago




Matt Damon net worth is $65M. Earns about $24M per year now. #p2 #ows


16 hours ago




Domino’s pizza CEO Patrick Doyle made $5.5M in 2010. 164 times the median salary of his workers. Enjoy your pizza #p2 #ows


16 hours ago




Howard Schultz (CEO Starbucks) net worth $1.3 Billion (no typo). Enjoy your coffee #ows #p2


16 hours ago




MSNBC’s Ed Schultz net worth is $11.5M. #p2 #ows


16 hours ago




Obama rails against millionaires (defined as $250K) while holding $15M in worth. Shouldn’t he be giving up $14.1M to keep face? #p2


16 hours ago




Nelson Mandela net worth is $15M #p2 #ows


16 hours ago




Bob Marley estate estimated net worth is $130M #p2 #ows


16 hours ago




Jimi Hendrix estate net worth of $175M #p2 #ows


16 hours ago




Morgan Freeman has a net worth of $90M #p2 #ows


16 hours ago




Michael Moore net worth is $50M #OWS #p2 Moore personally reaped #80M from Fahrenheit 911


16 hours ago




Louis Farrakhan net worth is $3M #OWS #p2


16 hours ago




Joe Biden net worth is $500K. Really? sad. I’m worth more than Joe, in many ways. #p2 #ows


17 hours ago




Keith Olbermann net worth is $35M. Yearly salary was $10M. Now probably $50K. #p2 #ows


17 hours ago




Al Sharpton is only worth $5M #p2 #ows


17 hours ago




Jesse Jackson net worth is $10M #p2 #ows


17 hours ago




Rachel Maddow’s net worth is $12.5M #p2 #ows


17 hours ago




Barack Obama’s net worth is $10.5M. He makes $400K per year. #p2 #ows


17 hours ago




Alan Colmes net worth is only $12M. Salary just $2M per year. #p2 #ows


17 hours ago




Jon Stewart’s net worth is also $80M. Yearly salary is $15M #p2 #ows


17 hours ago




Roseanne Barr’s net worth is $80M. #p2 #ows


17 hours ago




Bill Maher’s net worth is $23M. #p2 #ows


17 hours ago




“@iowahawkblog: Hey #OccupyWallStreet: Michael Moore’s net worth is $50 million. And it was taken directly from people like you.” #p2


17 hours ago





	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Costly Database of Terrorism Racket Porn Video
		
	
	

		


IntelCenter Database (ICD)Comprehensive Online Database Covering

Terrorist/Rebel Incidents, Threats & Videos


A sends:


—–Original Message—–


From: BenV <benv[at]intelcenter.com>

Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2011 18:57:27

To: <DailyBrief[at]yahoogroups.com>

Subject: [DailyBrief] IntelCenter Dubbed Netflix of Terrorism – Feedback on Searching Terrorist Video


We just rolled out a new terrorist/rebel online database that allows full searching and streaming of up to HD quality video and full screen viewing. It’s part of our existing IntelCenter Database (ICD) and is called the Video Component. The database is accessible from anywhere with a Net connection and will support optimized versions for phone and tablet devices. The library goes back 20 years and once fully migrated will be in excess of 15,000 videos. You can see more details at


http://www.intelcenter.com/icd/


Fast Company just released an article on the database dubbing us the NetFlix of terrorism. You can see the piece here: http://www.fastcompany.com/1783435/netflix-for-terrorists and I put the full text below.


Here’s my question. How would you like to search for terrorist/rebel video that you need to review?


As it stands now the database allows search by group, video production group, speaker, release date, runtime, video type (i.e. hostage, statement, documentary style), language, primary country, main themes, contains (i.e. vehicular bombing, IED construction, shooting, statement), addressed to, transcript and many more technical metadata areas to support exploitation that cannot be posted here. All the group and individual names are on standardized lists so you don’t have to go guessing as to how we spelled it. You just review the list and pick the match.


Is there something else that you’ve wanted or found incredibly helpful in the past?


If anyone here wants the dog and pony show over WebEx or otherwise, just shoot me a note directly at


benv[at]intelcenter.com.


Thanks in advance for any feedback. We can have the greatest resource in the world but if we don’t understand how each different community needs to find and work with the video then it does nothing to forward the mission and at the end of the day that’s what our singular goal is, impact.


– Ben


Fast Company – 28 Sep. 2011


The Netflix Of Terrorism


http://www.fastcompany.com/1783435/netflix-for-terrorists


BY Neal Ungerleider


Terrorist organizations are nothing if not telegenic. Web video tends to be the preferred way they get messages across and recruit sympathizers. Now private company IntelCenter, has assembled one of the world’s largest collections of streaming terrorist videos for viewing on demand.


Terrorist organizations love making videos and uploading them to the internet. It’s a quick and effective way of getting their message across–and not just for potential recruits and sympathizers. A private company, IntelCenter, has assembled one of the world’s largest collections of streaming terrorist videos for viewing by the military, intelligence and academic communities.


The video archive, called IntelCenter Database: Video Component, contains approximately 15,000 terrorist and rebel-produced propaganda videos. According to IntelCenter’s Ben Venzke, the archive mainly contains video from “non-nation state actors, be they small or large, that are actively involved in bombings, kidnappings, shootings, insurgencies, and the like.” In other words: More FARC and al-Qaeda and fewer creepy, angry teenagers in their bedrooms. Users who subscribe to the service can instantly watch the videos and search by keywords and (terrorist) content creators, just as they could on Netflix or YouTube.


Homeland Security–the sprawling conglomeration of counter-terrorism, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and fearmongering that arose after the September 11 attacks–is big business. According to the left-leaning National Priorities Project, a staggering $69 billion dollars was allocated by the federal government for homeland security during fiscal year 2011. This is a massive source of revenue for the many private firms creating services and products used by federal and local governments. Access to IntelCenter’s video archive doesn’t come cheap; individual accounts for government users go for $9,995/year a piece or $65,000 for group licenses of 6-10 users. Substantially more affordable packages are available for private security and academic subscribers that begin at $2,320 annually. The cheaper levels give the user access to the same content but limit the number of search fields that can be used.


Subscribers to IntelCenter’s services are not limited to the United States; according to the company, their products are also designed to servvice intelligence analysts and military in Canada, Australia, Europe and other regions worldwide.


IntelCenter’s Venzke tells Fast Company that his company offers intelligence service-level video archives to researchers, private security professionals, corporate securities, universities, and the media. The archive grew out of the previously existing IntelCenter Database, which offers text-based background  information and reference materials on militant groups.


Users can search terrorist videos on the site by release date, the militant organization that created it, video producer (ironically enough, jihadists have formed their own media organizations such as as-Sahab Media), speaker, language, main themes, and regional focus. Although thousands of terrorist and militant-produced videos are currently available on the internet–ironically mainly through mainstream content archivers such as YouTube–the considerable time spent searching video archives in both English and foreign languages for a particular video does present a difficulty. One of IntelCenter’s strongest selling points is that they reduce the manpower hours needed to retrieve older propaganda videos.


Videos viewed through the site stream up to HD quality and can be watched either in a window or full-screen. Users can also view videos on their smartphones or tablets; the service is compatible with Android devices as well as the iPhone or iPad and offers both HTML5 and Flash video. According to Venzke, the archive “grows at a rate of about 3-20 new videos a day.”


Thankfully for intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism investigators, militant organizations love producing video clips and internet propaganda. Hezbollah has their own satellite television network with a huge internet presence and terrorist groups worldwide use YouTube to reach sympathizers before their videos are (sometimes) pulled down. Just this week, al-Qaeda in Yemen released the latest issue of their English-language propaganda magazine online–the PDF-format magazine encouraged readers to target “the populations of countries that are at war with the Muslims.”


The growth market in Homeland Security means that a streaming video site aimed at intelligence and corporate security is smart business. Police departments and regional law enforcement around the country generally have generous funds to spend on Homeland Security; the New York Police Department’s counter-terrorism unit is currently dealing with fallout from an Associated Press expose. Those big budgets translate into money to spend on all sorts of tools developed by private firms. More importantly, there are relatively few public-access databases archiving videos from militant organizations  that can be easily searched without bouncing between English, Arabic, Spanish, Urdu and other foreign-language queries. Promoting that capability, for IntelCenter and the many other small companies serving the Homeland Security industry, can be very profitable.


[Story images: IntelCenter]


For more stories like this, follow [at]fastcompany on Twitter. Email Neal Ungerleider, the author of this article, here or find him on Twitter and Google+.

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Megadeath Weapons Tritium Production to Increase
		
	
	

		
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 188 (Wednesday, September 28, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60017-60020]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-24947]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

National Nuclear Security Administration

Notice of Intent To Prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement (SEIS) for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light
Water Reactor

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE).

ACTION: Notice of intent to prepare a supplemental environmental impact
statement and conduct public scoping meetings.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Council on Environmental Quality's implementing
regulations for the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and DOE's
NEPA implementing regulations require the preparation of a supplement
to an environmental impact statement (EIS) when there are substantial
changes to a proposal or when there are significant new circumstances
or information relevant to environmental concerns. DOE may also prepare
a SEIS at any time to further the purposes of NEPA. Pursuant to these
provisions, the NNSA, a semi-autonomous agency within DOE, intends to
prepare a SEIS to update the environmental analyses in DOE's 1999 EIS
for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor (CLWR
EIS; DOE/EIS-0288). The CLWR EIS addressed the production of tritium in
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reactors using tritium-producing
burnable absorber rods (TPBARs). In the Record of Decision (ROD) for
the CLWR EIS, NNSA selected TVA's Watts Bar Unit 1 and Sequoyah Units 1
and 2, located in Spring City and Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee, respectively,
for tritium production. TVA has been producing tritium for NNSA at
Watts Bar Unit 1 since 2004.
    After several years of tritium production experience at TVA's Watts
Bar Unit 1, NNSA has determined that tritium permeation through TPBAR
cladding into the reactor cooling water occurs at a higher rate than
previously projected. The proposed SEIS will analyze the potential
environmental impacts associated with increased tritium permeation
levels observed since 2004; DOE's revised estimate of the maximum
number of TPBARs required to support the current Nuclear Posture Review
tritium supply requirements; and proposed changes to TVA facilities
that may be used for future tritium production. TVA will be
participating as a cooperating agency in the preparation of the SEIS.
Any other agency that would like to be a cooperating agency in the
preparation of the SEIS is requested to contact the SEIS Document
Manager as noted in this Notice under ADDRESSES.

DATES: NNSA invites comments on the scope of the SEIS. The public
scoping period starts with the publication of this Notice in the
Federal Register and will continue until November 14, 2011. NNSA will
consider all comments received or postmarked by that date in defining
the scope of the SEIS. Comments received or postmarked after that date
will be considered to the extent practicable. A public scoping meeting
is scheduled to be held on October 20, 2011, from 6:30 p.m. to 10 p.m.

[[Page 60018]]

ADDRESSES: The public scoping meeting will be held at the Southeast
Tennessee Trade and Conference Center, Athens, TN. NNSA will publish
additional notices on the date, time, and location of the scoping
meeting in local newspapers in advance of the scheduled meeting. Any
necessary changes will be announced in the local media. The scoping
meeting will provide the public with an opportunity to present
comments, ask questions, and discuss issues with NNSA officials
regarding the SEIS.
    Written comments or suggestions concerning the scope of the SEIS or
requests for more information on the SEIS and public scoping process
should be directed to: Mr. Curtis Chambellan, Document Manager for the
SEIS, U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Box 5400, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185-5400; facsimile
at 505-845-5754; or e-mail at: tritium.readiness.seis@doeal.gov. Mr.
Chambellan may also be reached by telephone at 505-845-5073.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the NNSA
NEPA process, please contact: Ms. Mary Martin, NNSA NEPA Compliance
Officer, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW,
Washington, DC 20585, or telephone 202-586-9438. For general
information about the DOE NEPA process, please contact: Ms. Carol
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (GC-54), U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC
20585, or telephone 202-586-4600, or leave a message at 1-800-472-2756.
Additional information about the DOE NEPA process, an electronic
archive of DOE NEPA documents, and other NEPA resources are provided at
http://energy.gov/nepa.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: NNSA is responsible for supplying nuclear
materials for national security needs and ensuring that the nuclear
weapons stockpile remains safe and reliable. Tritium, a radioactive
isotope of hydrogen, is an essential component of every weapon in the
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Unlike other nuclear materials used in
nuclear weapons, tritium decays at a rate of 5.5 percent per year.
Accordingly, as long as the Nation relies on a nuclear deterrent, the
tritium in each nuclear weapon must be replenished periodically. The
last reactor used for tritium production during the Cold War was shut
down in 1988. Since then, tritium requirements for the stockpile have
largely been met from the existing original inventory through the
harvest and recycle of tritium gas during the dismantlement of weapon
systems, and the replacement of tritium-containing weapons components
as part of Limited Life Component Exchange programs. In December 1999,
a new tritium production capability was established through an
Interagency Agreement with TVA in which TPBARs are irradiated in the
Watts Bar Unit 1 commercial nuclear power reactor and undergo
extraction at the Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) located at DOE's
Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. In order to continue to
provide the required supply, irradiation will increase from today's 544
TPBARs per fuel cycle to a projected steady state rate of approximately
1,700 TPBARs per fuel cycle, i.e., approximately every 18 months.
    To provide sufficient capacity to ensure the ability to meet
projected future stockpile requirements, NNSA and TVA anticipate
requesting authorization for TPBAR irradiation to be increased in
fiscal year 2016 to a level that is beyond currently licensed rates for
one reactor. Meeting the increased demand will require a license
amendment from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to permit the
irradiation of a greater number of TPBARs per reactor than can
currently be irradiated at either the Watts Bar or Sequoyah site.
License amendments are reactor specific. NNSA and TVA will supplement
the 1999 CLWR EIS with analyses supporting the anticipated license
amendment requests that also evaluate a higher level of tritium
permeation through TPBAR cladding into the reactor cooling water than
was previously analyzed. The tritium releases associated with the
proposed increase in the number of TPBARs that could be irradiated at
Watts Bar, Sequoyah, or both sites (compared to the number currently
authorized by the NRC) would remain below Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and NRC regulatory limits. Subsequently, TVA plans to
adopt the SEIS for use in obtaining the necessary NRC license
amendment(s).
    The production of tritium in a CLWR is technically straightforward.
All of the Nation's supply of tritium has been produced in reactors.
Most commercial pressurized water reactors were designed to utilize 12-
foot-long rods containing an isotope of boron (boron-10) in ceramic
form. These rods are sometimes called burnable absorber rods. The rods
are inserted in the reactor fuel assemblies to absorb excess neutrons
produced by the uranium fuel in the fission process for the purpose of
controlling power in the core at the beginning of an operating cycle.
DOE's tritium program developed TPBARs in which neutrons are absorbed
by a lithium aluminate ceramic rather than boron ceramic. While the two
types of rods function in a very similar manner to absorb excess
neutrons in the reactor core, there is one notable difference: When
neutrons strike the lithium aluminate ceramic material in a TPBAR,
tritium is produced inside the TPBAR. These TPBARs are placed in the
same locations in the reactor core as the standard boron burnable
absorber rods. There is no fissile material (uranium or plutonium) in
the TPBARs. Tritium produced in TPBARs is captured almost
instantaneously in a solid zirconium material in the rod, called a
``getter.'' The getter material that captures the tritium is very
effective. During each reactor refueling cycle, the TPBARs are removed
from the reactor and transported to SRS. At SRS, the TPBARs are heated
in a vacuum at the TEF to extract the tritium from the getter material.
    DOE's May 1999 Consolidated Record of Decision for Tritium Supply
and Recycling (64 FR 26369) announced the selection of TVA's Watts Bar
Unit 1, Sequoyah Unit 1 and Sequoyah Unit 2 for use in irradiating
TPBARs and stated that a maximum of approximately 3,400 TPBARs would be
irradiated per reactor during each 18-month fuel cycle. Since then, the
projected need for tritium has decreased significantly. NNSA has
determined that tritium demand to supply the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
could be satisfied using a maximum of approximately 2,500 TPBARs per
fuel cycle, with a projected steady state number of approximately 1,700
TPBARs per fuel cycle.

Purpose and Need

    Although NNSA's projected need for tritium to support the nuclear
weapons stockpile today is less than originally planned, a higher than
expected rate of permeation of tritium from TPBARs into reactor coolant
water and subsequent release to the environment has restricted the
number of TPBARs irradiated at TVA's Watts Bar Unit 1. Before TVA
increases tritium production rates to meet expected national security
requirements, the environmental analyses in the CLWR EIS are being
updated to analyze and evaluate the effects of the higher tritium
permeation, as well as any potential effects related to other changes
in the regulatory and operating environment since publication of the
original CLWR EIS.
    As a cooperating agency in the preparation of the SEIS, TVA plans
to use the SEIS in pursuing NRC licensing amendments to increase TPBAR

[[Page 60019]]

irradiation at TVA's Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) at Spring City,
Tennessee, and/or the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant at Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee,
beyond levels set in 2002. Four alternatives are expected to be
analyzed in the SEIS: The No Action Alternative and three action
alternatives, one using only the Watts Bar site, one using only the
Sequoyah site, and one using both the Watts Bar and Sequoyah sites. As
a matter of note, in a separate proceeding, DOE and TVA are also
analyzing the potential use of mixed oxide fuel during some fuel cycles
at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant as part of the U.S. program for surplus
plutonium disposition (75 FR 41850. July 19, 2010).

Proposed Action and Alternatives

    The CLWR EIS assessed the potential impacts of irradiating up to
3,400 TPBARs per reactor unit operating on 18 month fuel cycles. It
included TPBAR irradiation scenarios using multiple reactor units to
achieve a maximum level of 6,000 TPBARs every 18 months. Subsequently,
tritium production requirements have been reduced such that irradiation
of approximately 1,700 TPBARs every reactor fuel cycle is expected to
be sufficient to fulfill current requirements, consistent with the 2010
Nuclear Posture Review. To provide flexibility in future tritium supply
decisions, the revised environmental analysis is expected to consider
irradiation of up to a total of 2,500 TPBARs every 18 months. This
approach would provide sufficient reserve capacity to accommodate
potential future changes in requirements and to allow for production
above currently expected annual requirement levels for short durations
(i.e., several years) to recover from potential future shortfalls
should that become necessary.
    In the CLWR EIS, the permeation of tritium through the TPBAR
cladding into the reactor coolant systems of potential tritium
production reactors was estimated to be less than or equal to one
tritium curie/TPBAR/year. After several years of tritium production
experience at Watts Bar Unit 1, NNSA has determined that tritium
permeation through TPBAR cladding is approximately three to four times
higher than this estimate; nevertheless, tritium releases have been
below regulatory limits. To conservatively bound the potential
environmental impacts, the SEIS will assess the impacts associated with
tritium production in CLWRs based on a permeation rate of approximately
five tritium curies/TPBAR/year.
    An assessment of tritium mitigation and management measures will be
included as part of the environmental analyses in the SEIS. Mitigation
and management measures include an assessment of technologies
commercially available to treat tritiated effluents, transportation of
tritiated effluents and/or low level radioactive waste streams, and
other applicable effluent management actions.
    The SEIS, which will supplement the 1999 CLWR EIS, will support
agency deliberations regarding potential changes in the tritium
production at NRC licensed TVA facilities in order to meet the
requirements of TVA's agreement with NNSA. These changes also require
TVA to pursue an NRC license amendment request for these facilities.
Accordingly, the SEIS is expected to substantially meet NRC
requirements for an environmental report necessary to support TVA's
license amendment request(s) for tritium production at the Watts Bar
and/or Sequoyah Nuclear Plants.
    No Action Alternative: Produce tritium at currently approved TVA
facilities (Watts Bar Unit 1 and Sequoyah Units 1 and 2) at appropriate
levels to keep permeation levels within currently approved NRC license
and regulatory limits.
    Alternative 1: Utilize TVA's Watts Bar site only to a maximum level
of 2,500 TPBARs every reactor fuel cycle (18 months).
    Alternative 2: Utilize TVA's Sequoyah site only to a maximum level
of 2,500 TPBARs every 18 months.
    Alternative 3: Utilize both the Watts Bar and Sequoyah sites to a
maximum total level of 2,500 TPBARS every 18 months. The level of
production per site would be determined by TVA. This alternative would
provide the ability to supply stockpile requirements at either site
independently, or using both sites with each supplying a portion of the
supply.

Preliminary Identification of Environmental Issues

    NNSA has tentatively identified the issues for analysis in the
SEIS. Additional issues may be identified as a result of the scoping
comment process. The SEIS will analyze the potential impacts on:
    1. Air, water, soil, and visual resources.
    2. Plants and animals, and their habitats, including state and
Federally-listed threatened or endangered species and their critical
habitats.
    3. Irretrievable and irreversible consumption of natural resources
and energy, including transportation issues.
    4. Cultural resources, including historical and pre-historical
resources and traditional cultural properties.
    5. Infrastructure and utilities.
    6. Socioeconomic conditions.
    7. Human health under routine operations and accident conditions,
including potential impacts from seismic events.
    8. Minority and low-income populations (Environmental Justice).
    9. Intentional Destructive Acts, including terrorist acts.
    10. Other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions
(cumulative impacts).
    SEIS Process and Invitation to Comment. The SEIS scoping process
provides an opportunity for the public to assist the NNSA in
determining issues and alternatives to be addressed in the SEIS. One
public scoping meeting will be held as noted under DATES in this
Notice. The purpose of the scoping meeting is to provide attendees with
an opportunity to present comments, ask questions, and discuss issues
regarding the SEIS with NNSA officials. Comments can also be mailed to
Mr. Chambellan as noted in this Notice under ADDRESSES. The SEIS
scoping meeting will include an informal open house from 6:30-7 p.m. to
facilitate dialogue between NNSA and the public. Once the formal
scoping meeting begins at 7:00 pm, NNSA will present a brief overview
of the SEIS process and provide individuals the opportunity to give
written or oral statements. NNSA welcomes specific scoping comments or
suggestions on the SEIS. Copies of written comments and transcripts of
oral comments provided to NNSA during the scoping period will be
available on the Internet at http://nnsa.energy.gov/nepa/clwrseis.
    After the close of the public scoping period, NNSA will begin
preparing the Draft SEIS. NNSA expects to issue the Draft SEIS for
public review in 2012. A Federal Register Notice of Availability, along
with notices placed in local newspapers, will provide dates and
locations for public hearings on the Draft SEIS and the deadline for
comments on the draft document. Persons who submit comments with a
mailing address during the scoping process will receive a copy of or
link to the Draft SEIS. Other persons who would like to receive a copy
of or link to the Draft SEIS for review should notify Mr. Chambellan at
the address noted under ADDRESSES. NNSA will include all comments
received on the Draft SEIS, and responses to those comments in the
Final SEIS.
    Issuance of the Final SEIS is currently anticipated to take place
in 2013. NNSA

[[Page 60020]]

will issue a ROD no sooner than 30 days after publication of EPA's
Notice of Availability of the Final SEIS.

    Issued in Washington, DC, this 23rd day of September 2011.
Thomas P. D'Agostino,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
[FR Doc. 2011-24947 Filed 9-27-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – CIA Alec Station Memo of 9/11 Commission 02
		
	
	

		
alec-station-02

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – CIA Alec Station Memo of 9/11 Commission 01
		
	
	

		
alec-station-01

	


	



			
				


			

			
Published – Abbas, Netanyahu & Obama at the U.N. : responses from a Palestinian and a Jew
		
	
	

		
From: Tikkun <magazine[at]tikkun.org>

Subject: Abbas, Netanyahu & Obama at the U.N. : responses from a Palestinian and a Jew


Editor’s Note: As we often do in the magazine, the website, and these emails, here are responses you are unlikely to read or hear or see in the mass media to the President of Palestine Abbas and the Prime Minister of Israel Netanyahu in relationship to what they have been doing at the U.N. Our first respondent is a Palestinian activist in Ramallah, the second a Jewish columnist in NYC.


Kudos Mr. Abbas 


Reply


Mazin Qumsiyeh mazin[at]qumsiyeh.org to rabbilerner, Human show details 11:18 AM (1 hour ago)


http://popular-resistance.blogspot.com/2011/09/kudos-mr-abbas.html


Mahmoud Abbas gave a brilliant speech at the United Nations, getting rounds of applause from most of the representatives.  I think it demonstrated clearly and unambiguously that the Palestinian leadership has been “unreasonably reasonable” and has instead seen the hopes of peace and of millions of Palestinians suffering for 63 years dashed on the rock of Israeli expansionist, colonial, and apartheid policies.  He explained that Israel has been taking one unilateral action after another each resulting in more pain and suffering for our people. Going to the UN, he explained is putting things back where the problems started (he did not use the last two words but I do).  He said a word that I think he should defend strongly that no person or country with an iota of logic or conscience should reject the Palestinian state membership in the UN or its formation in the 22% of historic Palestine that is the West Bank and Gaza.  I think he took a courageous step and gave a good performance.  Now we here on the ground in Palestine hope and will push for additional follow-up steps.  From our own perspective, three things are critical:


1)  That he and his administration now implement quickly the reconciliation agreement signed by all Palestinian factions most notably the one about creating a representative Palestinian National Council. In his speech he said he hopes this will be done in a few weeks.  We hope this  will be done quickly and not any longer than four weeks.


2) That he and his administration act quickly and decisively to really promote popular unarmed resistance throughout Palestine and among Palestinians in exile.  In forming a new government, the ministry that is now in charge of walls and settlements should be either a) dismantled or b) reconfigured.  A new strategy to encourage real nonviolent resistance must be adopted.  We must end the practice of holding a few demonstrative actions that do not disturb the occupation and that are used to enrich a few people. We must instead allow the kind of popular resistance that have been effective from our history (see my book that details challenges and opportunities learned from this history and available in Arabic and English). He also said he will pursue this.


3) The Palestinian people are waiting to see clear evidence of change; a new Palestinian Spring as Mr. Abbas called it.  This requires seeing visibly what Mr. Abbas talked about: transparency, accountability, democracy, and freedom.


There were those who worried that going to the UN will raise the expectations of the Palestinian people who then may turn to despair and more if they do not see a change on the ground.  I say a) it is great to raise the expectations, and b) we, the Palestinian people will never turn to despair but we will revolt if we do not see real changes and stronger steps. I share Abu Mazen’s hope that the international community steps up to the plate.  But I also hope that we all go back to our people and take those steps that will ensure our freedom.


I also listened to Netanyahu’s speech and was just amazed at how many lies can be packed in one speech. It is not even worth detailing except to refer you to this link: http://www.qumsiyeh.org/liesandtruths/


In this occasion, it might be worth comparing Israel and the Palestinians.


                          Israel                     Palestinians
Population----------------5.5 million Jewish---------11 million (7 million
refugees or displaced)
Land controlled ----------91.7%----------------------8.3% of historic
Palestine
Nature--------------------Occupier/colonizer---------Occupied people
Military Personnel--------Regular 175,000------------None
--------------------------Reserves, 500,000
Irregulars----------------10-50,000------------------3-5,000
--------------------------Armed settlers-------------Armed underground forces
Police/other security-----30,000---------------------50,000
Tanks----------------------3,800---------------------0
Artillery------------------1500 large----------------0
Submarines-----------------6 ------------------------0
Warships-------------------20-30---------------------0
Combat airplanes-----------2000----------------------0
Nuclear Weapons----------->300-----------------------0
GDP-----------------------$195 billion--------------$4 billion
Military expenditure------$10 billion----------------Negligible (security services)
Casuaties (63 years)-------6,000 killed--------------75,000 killed
---------------------------20,000 injured------------300,000 injured
Abducted/jailed------------30------------------------400,000
Homes demolished-----------0-------------------------50,000
Refugees created-----------0------------------------>6 million people


Mr. President, we don’t want a shortcut, we want our freedom by Abir Kopty


http://mondoweiss.net/2011/09/mr-president-we-dont-want-a-shortcut-we-want-our-freedom.html


Palestinians on statehood: ‘We want action, not votes at the UN’ Villagers who have often been at the sharp end of Palestinian-Israeli relations are skeptical about the UN route


http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/14/palestinian-statehood-action-un


*************************************************************************


On Israel And Palestine, Obama Is Rick Perry


President Barack Obama’s speech to the U.N. General Assembly succeeded in making clear why the Palestinians had no other choice but to take their statehood bid to the U.N. and why the United States can no longer pretend to be an “honest broker” in the conflict.


For the first time since the U.N. conferred statehood on Israel 63 years ago, the sitting U.S president told the world body that the United States will back Israel, right or wrong. The president’s speech was so one-sided, in fact, that he sounded a lot like Texas Gov. Rick Perry, who gave a similar speech to a group of “pro-Israel” right-wingers one day earlier. Perry is not the president, so his speech was different, except for the motivation, which was same.


Both speeches were standard “pro-Israel” bloviating, but Perry gave his on the campaign trail and not in front of the entire world. (I hesitate to call a speech opposing Palestinian statehood “pro-Israel” when the latest comprehensive poll on the subject says that 70 percent of Israelis say Israel should support the U.N.’s decision if statehood is granted.)


The very best explanation of what Obama did at the United Nations came from Daniel Levy, a Brit who moved to Israel right out of college 18 years ago. Levy’s quote appeared on page one of the Washington Post.


“There is virtually no thread of reason running between the way he [Obama] related to the rest of the world and its developments, particularly in the Middle East, and the positions he espoused on Israel-Palestine a conflict apparently occurring on another planet,” said Daniel Levy, co-director of the Middle East Task Force at the New America Foundation. “Palestinian freedoms, rights and self-determination are somehow supposed to be attained without the recourse to leverage, international law or meaningful international support, considered to be necessary and legitimate virtually everywhere else.”


Of course, there is one “thread,” although it is not of “reason.” Every word in Obama’s speech was designed not to advance a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but to keep single-issue donors and, to a lesser extent, single-issue voters in his camp for the 2012 election. Not a week goes by without the Obama team sending emails out to people it deems Israel voters to remind them of all the wonderful things this president has done for Israel. One recently was dedicated to citing quotes from Prime Minister Netanyahu praising Obama, the first time I can remember that a president sought to validate himself by citing the praise of a foreign leader.


Obama isn’t lying about his “pro-Israel” record, however. This administration has been the most one-sided supporter of everything Israel asks for since 1948. There is no competition. Not even George W. Bush comes close.


When the Israelis, following Obama’s election, asked Bush to give Israel permission to bomb Iran, he said no, despite his vice president and neoconservative aides pushing the Israeli position hard. Bush also did more than Obama to advance the peace process that the Israeli right hates so much, convening an international summit at Aqaba and being the first president to say, in unambiguous terms, that the United States supports “two states, living side by side in peace and security.”


On Israel, Obama is to the right of Bush, to the right of Reagan, and certainly to the right of Clinton. On Israel and Palestine, Barack Obama is Rick Perry.


Of course, Obama’s outrageous surrender to Netanyahu still won’t impress the Israel-Firsters. They have despised him from day one, for all kinds of reasons, and predictably condemned the speech. Meanwhile, Israel’s thuggish far-right foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, told reporters that “I am ready to sign on this speech with both hands.”


Lieberman is telling the truth he could have written Obama’s speech and the neocons are lying. But neocons are adherents of the Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) school: They have only one goal, which is to defeat this president. And although privately they celebrate their amazing success at intimidating Obama into submission, publicly they denounce him and send scary emails to senior citizens in Florida and New Jersey warning them that Obama wants to destroy Israel.


But these speeches and love-ins with Netanyahu accomplish nothing for Obama. The single-issue Israel voters and donors (3 percent of the Jewish community) will take their money and votes elsewhere.


And Netanyahu will, working from Jerusalem, do everything he can to help the Republicans win the next election. It’s almost funny how these people would exchange the person who is the most “pro-Israel” president ever (looking at it from their “maintain-the-occupation-at-all-costs” vantage point) for an unknown quantity like Perry or Romney. After all, a Republican whose main constituency is Wall Street would likely turn out to approach Israel with more skepticism than Obama does.


But it’s a game. Netanyahu and the lobby want to defeat Obama to demonstrate, yet again, who calls the shots on U.S. Middle East policy.


But forget the campaign for a moment which is what Obama should have done when addressing the U.N. The president’s speech was an embarrassing disaster. Since 2009, 1,600 Palestinians (overwhelmingly civilians and over 400 children) have been killed by the Israeli army. Thirteen Israelis have been killed over the same period. Despite that, Obama devoted 120 words of his speech to Israeli suffering (even going so far as to cite the Holocaust) and not one word to Palestinian suffering.


Example: An Australian newspaper reports on a new film about the tragedy of Palestinian women in Gaza (under full Israeli blockade) who are suffering with breast cancer but are not permitted by Israel to leave Gaza for treatment. (They used to go to Israeli hospitals or hospitals in the Arab states and Europe.) Nor does Israel permit the import of the radioactive isotopes used to treat breast cancers. So they die.


One could go on and on about the horrors of the occupation but it won’t matter to the politicians who determine U.S. foreign policy. They know which side their bread is buttered on, as Obama demonstrated at the U.N. this week.


But, I’m surprised to say, Obama did Palestinians and the 70 percent of Israelis who support statehood a big favor. By demonstrating that the United States refuses to play the role of “honest broker” and by telling the U.N. that we are Israel and Israel is us, the United States is yielding the role of Middle East peacemaker to others. The French, Turks, Indians, Brazilians, Chinese, South Africans, and Russians don’t agree on much. But they do agree on the urgency of the creation of a Palestinian state in the areas occupied in 1967. And they agree that the United States, no longer the superpower it once was, should move over and let countries not fully invested in one side play a more constructive role.


Those who wonder how these “other countries” could exert the leadership the U.S. has abdicated might consider the issue of economics, trade, etc. Israel does not live on an island with the United States. It is part of the world and not even the United States and the $3.5 billion it hands over to Israel each year (no strings attached) can save Israel if the rest of the world says “enough.”


Obama has chosen to abdicate. The rest of the world is eager to step up.


And that is why I have no doubt that the state of Palestine was created this week at the United Nations. By opting out, Obama did a tremendous favor to Palestinians and Israelis both. Palestinians will have their fully sovereign, contiguous state.  And the Jewish state of Israel will finally be secure. As Israelis like to say, “yhiyeh tov.” Or as Arabs say, “insha’Allah khair.” Everything will be fine.


———————————————–


If these emails are helpful to you, perhaps you could subscribe to Tikkun at http://www.tikkun.org so that we could afford to continue provide this service? or join our Network of Spiritual Progressives at http://www.spiritualprogressives.org.


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TOP-SECRET – Confirmed Identity of the CIA Official behind 9/11, Rendition & Torture Cases is Revealed
		
	
	

		
BFP Breaking News: Confirmed Identity of the CIA Official behind 9/11, Rendition & Torture Cases is Revealed


Wednesday, 21. September 2011 by Sibel Edmonds


Alfreda Frances Bikowsky: The Current Director of the CIA Global Jihad Unit


BNBoiling Frogs Post has now confirmed the identity of the CIA analyst at the heart of a notorious failure in the run-up to the September 11th tragedy. Her name is Alfreda Frances Bikowsky and she is the current director of the CIA Jihad Unit. Through three credible sources and documents we have confirmed Ms. Bikowsky’s former titles and positions, including her start at the CIA as an analyst for the Soviet Desk, her position as one of the case officers at the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit-Alec Station, her central role and direct participation in the CIA’s rendition-torture and black sites operations, and her current position as director of the CIA’s Global Jihad Unit.


The producers Nowosielski and Duffy have now made both names available at their website. They also identify the second CIA culprit as Michael Anne Casey. We have not been able to obtain confirmation by other sources on this person yet, but we are still working on it.


Alfreda Frances Bikowsky is the person described in New Yorker journalist Jane Mayer’s book The Dark Side as having flown in to watch the waterboarding of terrorist Khalid Sheikh Mohammad without being assigned to do so. “Its not supposed to be entertainment,” superiors were said to have told her. She was also at the center of “the el-Masri incident,” in which an innocent German citizen was kidnapped by the CIA in 2003 and held under terrible conditions without charges for five months in a secret Afghan prison. The AP characterized it as “one of the biggest diplomatic embarrassments of the U.S. war on terrorism.”


Both the previous and current administrations appear to have deemed Alfreda Frances Bikowsky’s direct involvement in intentional obstruction of justice, intentional cover up, lying to Congress, and overseeing rendition-kidnapping-torture practices as qualifying factors to have kept promoting her. She now leads the CIA’s Global Jihad Unit and is a close advisor to the President.

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – State Dept Background Briefing on Nuclear Safety
		
	
	

		
Background Briefing: Preview of High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety


Special Briefing


Via Teleconference


Washington, DC


September 21, 2011


MODERATOR: Thank you callers for joining us today for this background briefing on tomorrow’s High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety at the United Nations. We are delighted to have as our briefer today [Senior State Department Official], hereafter known as Senior State Department Official.


Go ahead and start, [Senior State Department Official].


SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you very much, [Moderator]. Thanks for being on the call, everyone. The United States welcomed UN Secretary General Ban’s call for the High-Level Meeting, that will be conducted tomorrow, on Nuclear Security and Safety. This meeting is intended to build political support and momentum at the highest levels for international efforts to strengthen nuclear safety and security.


As you know, the international community has a lot of lessons to learn from the recent Fukushima accident in Japan, which resulted from the tragic earthquake and tsunami that devastated Japan. Indeed, we’re still learning lessons from the Chernobyl disaster, which took place over 25 years ago. The most fundamental lesson for our countries is that nuclear accidents can transcend national borders and have international consequences. A nuclear accident anywhere affects all of us, and it is also important that all states do everything they can to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism because of the global implications and consequences.


Another critical lesson is the necessity of being prepared for the unexpected, especially when it comes to nuclear matters. The double disaster of an earthquake and a tsunami was hard for many to imagine. All states with nuclear power must apply the highest standards for nuclear safety. And the United States wants to set the gold standard for nuclear safety and, frankly, that should be the goal of every state. It’s everyone’s responsibility to own– of each country’s own regulatory body to ensure that its nuclear facilities meet the highest standards of safety.


The United States remains committed to nuclear power as an important component of our energy (inaudible) as well as the world’s. We cannot take nuclear energy off the table, but it must be safe and secure, which is why the United States continues to reaffirm the importance of strengthening the IAEA.


This meeting will welcome the IAEA action on nuclear safety, which calls for states to request voluntary peer reviews on a regular basis to facilitate transparency and improve standards of nuclear safety. The meeting also highlights the importance of nuclear safety and compliments the Nuclear Security Summit that will be hosted next year by South Korea. The South Korea summit is a follow-on to the Nuclear Security Summit that President Obama hosted in April 2010.


I’m happy to answer any questions you might have about the High-Level Meeting tomorrow.


MODERATOR: Great. Before we jump into the questions, just to tell callers that [Senior State Department Official] is on a train, so we are hoping that the line holds. And if you hear funky noise in the background, that’s what it’s about.


Tanya, why don’t you go ahead.


OPERATOR: Thank you. We will now begin the question and answer session. If you would like to ask a question, please press * then 1. To withdraw your question, press * then 2. Once again, to ask a question, please press * then 1. One moment, please, for the first question.


Once again, to ask a question, please press * than 1. One moment please. We do have a question from Bill Freebairn. Your line is open.


QUESTION: Good afternoon. Thanks for holding the call. I was wondering whether the U.S. is going to push or press for additional measures that go, perhaps, beyond what the IAEA is saying about sort of voluntary peer reviews and suggest something a little more mandatory and/or support strengthening of a emergency response capacity, which IAEA has also talked about.


SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Right. The United States has always been a strong supporter of the IAEA’s peer review programs, both in conducting regular missions in the United States and also urging other countries to do the same. And we always send our senior experts, many of them in leadership capacities, to represent the United States on missions in other countries.


Establishing a mandatory requirement for member-states to submit to regular IAEA peer reviews would require the negotiation of a binding international agreement among member-states that most likely would take several years to come to fruition and no guarantee that all member-states would join in. And that’s why we settled on the voluntary peer review part of this. We are very much open to exploring longer term approaches that could including legally binding requirements, but in the meantime, we believe that these are important voluntary peer reviews that can happen and that will add to the data and the knowledge that we have and the kind of cooperation that we think we need to have.


Bill, your second question was?


QUESTION: It was on the emergency response capacity. IAEA is talking about regional centers, possibly for emergency response. So how does the U.S. support that, and do they see the IAEA as the right organization to coordinate this?


MODERATOR: [Senior State Department Official], are you still on the line? I wonder if we have lost her.


OPERATOR: I show her line as still connected.


SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Hello?


MODERATOR: Hi. Did you hear the question, [Senior State Department Official]? Do you need it again?


SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes. No. I just —


MODERATOR: Okay. Go ahead.


SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I dropped off, I’m now back.


MODERATOR: Okay. Good.


SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The – after Fukushima, President Obama ordered a comprehensive safety review of all 104 active power plants in the United States – almost a quarter of all nuclear reactors operating around the world. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has already completed its near term inspections, and we believe that it’s important that because you cannot take nuclear energy off the table, we must be able to assert that these plants are safe and secure, which is why the United States continues to reaffirm the importance of strengthening the IAEA. And we also are looking forward to welcoming the IAEA action plan on nuclear safety in this meeting tomorrow, which calls for states to request voluntary peer reviews on a regular basis to facilitate transparency and improve standards of nuclear safety.


QUESTION: Yeah. But on the emergency response capability, there’s been talk about IAEA taking a strong role in putting together regional centers that could respond quickly–


SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes.


QUESTION: — to an emergency.


SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes. And we are looking for the opportunity to support these efforts. We think that the regional approach is a smart one because it provides for the fastest response and gives regions a sense of empowerment, and we look forward to making sure that we can support these issues and hearing more about them tomorrow.


QUESTION: Thank you.


SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: You’re welcome.


OPERATOR: Once again, if you would like to ask a question, please press * then 1. At this time we have no further questions.


MODERATOR: Thank you very much, and thank you, [Senior State Department Official].


PRN: 2011/1557





	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Protection of Critical Cyber Assets
		
	
	

		
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 184 (Thursday, September 22, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 58730-58741]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-24102]



[[Page 58730]]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 40

[Docket No. RM11-11-000]


Version 4 Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability 
Standards

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------N
otice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY: Under section 215 of the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (Commission) proposes to approve eight modified 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards, CIP-
002-4 through CIP-009-4, developed and submitted to the Commission for 
approval by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), 
the Electric Reliability Organization certified by the Commission. In 
general, the CIP Reliability Standards provide a cybersecurity 
framework for the identification and protection of ``Critical Cyber 
Assets'' to support the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. 
Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 requires the identification and 
documentation of Critical Cyber Assets associated with Critical Assets 
that support the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. The 
``Version 4'' CIP Reliability Standards propose to modify CIP-002-4 to 
include ``bright line'' criteria for the identification of Critical 
Assets. The proposed Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards would replace 
the currently effective Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards. The 
Commission also proposes to approve the related Violation Risk Factors 
and Violation Severity Levels with modifications, the implementation 
plan, and effective date proposed by NERC.

DATES: Comments are due November 21, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number and in 
accordance with the requirements posted on the Commission's Web site 
http://www.ferc.gov. Comments may be submitted by any of the following 
methods:
     Agency Web Site: Documents created electronically using 
word processing software should be filed in native applications or 
print-to-PDF format and not in a scanned format, at 
http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp.
     Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters unable to file comments 
electronically must mail or hand deliver an original copy of their 
comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the 
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. These 
requirements can be found on the Commission's Web site, see, e.g., the 
``Quick Reference Guide for Paper Submissions,'' available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp or via phone from FERC Online 
Support at 202-502-6652 or toll-free at 1-866-208-3676.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Jan Bargen (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability, 
Division of Logistics and Security, Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-
6333.
Edward Franks (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability, 
Division of Logistics and Security, Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-
6311.
Kevin Ryan (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426, (202) 502-6840.
Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8408.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

September 15, 2011.
    1. Under section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),\1\ the 
Commission proposes to approve eight modified Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards, CIP-002-4 through CIP-009-4. 
The proposed ``Version 4'' CIP Standards were developed and submitted 
for approval to the Commission by the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC), which the Commission certified as the 
Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) responsible for developing and 
enforcing mandatory Reliability Standards.\2\ In general, the CIP 
Reliability Standards provide a cybersecurity framework for the 
identification and protection of ``Critical Cyber Assets'' to support 
the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System.\3\ In particular, the 
Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards propose to modify CIP-002-4 to 
include ``bright line'' criteria for the identification of Critical 
Assets, in lieu of the currently-required risk-based assessment 
methodology that is developed and applied by applicable entities. In 
addition, NERC developed proposed conforming modifications to the 
remaining cybersecurity Reliability Standards, CIP-003-4 through CIP-
009-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o (2006).
    \2\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ] 
61,062, order on reh'g & compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006), aff'd 
sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
    \3\ The NERC Glossary of Terms defines Critical Assets to mean 
``Facilities, systems, and equipment which, if destroyed, degraded, 
or otherwise rendered unavailable, would affect the reliability or 
operability of the Bulk Electric System.''
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    2. The Commission proposes to approve Version 4, the Violation Risk 
Factors (VRFs),the Violation Severity Levels (VSLs) with modifications, 
the implementation plan, and effective date proposed by NERC. The 
Commission also proposes to approve the retirement of the currently 
effective Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards, CIP-002-3 to CIP-009-3. 
The Commission seeks comments on these proposals to approve.
    3. While we propose to approve the Version 4 CIP Standards, like 
NERC, we recognize that the Version 4 CIP Standards represent an 
``interim step'' \4\ to addressing all of the outstanding directives 
set forth in Order No. 706.\5\ We believe that the electric industry, 
through the NERC standards development process, should continue to 
develop an approach to cybersecurity that is meaningful and 
comprehensive to assure that the nation's electric grid is capable of 
withstanding a Cybersecurity Incident.\6\ Below, we reiterate several 
topics set forth in Order No. 706 that pertain to a tiered approach to 
identifying Cyber Assets, protection from misuse, and a regional 
perspective. We expect NERC will continue to improve the CIP Standards 
to address these and other outstanding matters addressed in Order No. 
706.
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    \4\ NERC Petition at 6.
    \5\ Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040, order on reh'g, Order 
No. 706-A, 123 FERC ] 61,174 (2008), order on clarification, Order 
No. 706-B, 126 FERC ] 61,229 (2009).
    \6\ Section 215(a) of the FPA defines Cybersecurity Incident as 
``a malicious act or suspicious event that disrupts, or was an 
attempt to disrupt, the operation of those programmable electronic 
devices and communication networks including hardware, software and 
data that are essential to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power 
System.''
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    4. Moreover, as discussed below, the Commission seeks comments from 
NERC and other interested persons on establishing a reasonable deadline 
for NERC to satisfy the outstanding directives in Order No. 706 
pertaining to the CIP Standards, using NERC's development timeline.

[[Page 58731]]

I. Background

A. Mandatory Reliability Standards

    5. Section 215 of the FPA requires a Commission-certified ERO to 
develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, which are 
subject to Commission review and approval. Once approved, the 
Reliability Standards may be enforced by the ERO, subject to Commission 
oversight, or by the Commission independently.\7\
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    \7\ See 16 U.S.C. 824o(e).
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    6. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, the Commission established a 
process to select and certify an ERO \8\ and, subsequently, certified 
NERC as the ERO.\9\ On January 18, 2008, the Commission issued Order 
No. 706 approving eight CIP Reliability Standards proposed by NERC.
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    \8\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability 
Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval and 
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,212 (2006).
    \9\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ] 
61,062, order on reh'g & compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006), aff'd 
sub nom., Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (DC Cir. 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    7. In addition, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA,\10\ the 
Commission directed NERC to develop modifications to the CIP 
Reliability Standards to address various concerns discussed in the 
Final Rule. In relevant part, the Commission directed the ERO to 
address the following issues regarding CIP-002-1: (1) Need for ERO 
guidance regarding the risk-based assessment methodology for 
identifying Critical Assets; (2) scope of Critical Assets and Critical 
Cyber Assets; (3) internal, management, approval of the risk-based 
assessment; (4) external review of Critical Assets identification; and 
(5) interdependency between Critical Assets of the Bulk-Power System 
and other critical infrastructures. Subsequently, the Commission 
approved Version 2 and Version 3 of the CIP Reliability Standards, each 
version including changes responsive to some but not all of the 
directives in Order No. 706.\11\
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    \10\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5).
    \11\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 128 FERC ] 
61,291 (2009), order denying reh'g and granting clarification, 129 
FERC ] 61,236 (2009) (approving Version 2 of the CIP Reliability 
Standards); North American Electric Reliability Corp., 130 FERC ] 
61,271 (2010) (approving Version 3 of the CIP Reliability 
Standards).
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B. Current Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards

    8. Reliability Standard CIP-002-3 addresses the identification of 
Critical Assets and associated Critical Cyber Assets. Pursuant to CIP-
002-3, a responsible entity must develop a risk-based assessment 
methodology to identify its Critical Assets. Requirement R1 specifies 
certain types of assets that an assessment must consider for Critical 
Asset status and also allows the consideration of additional assets 
that the responsible entity deems appropriate. Requirement R2 requires 
the responsible entity to develop a list of Critical Assets based on an 
annual application of the risk-based assessment methodology developed 
pursuant to Requirement R1. Requirement R3 provides that the 
responsible entity must use the list of Critical Assets to develop a 
list of associated Critical Cyber Assets that are essential to the 
operation of the Critical Assets.
    9. In addition, the Commission approved the following ``Version 3'' 
CIP Standards:
     CIP-003-3 (Security Management Controls);
     CIP-004-3 (Personnel & Training);
     CIP-005-3 (Electronic Security Perimeter(s));
     CIP-006-3 (Physical Security of Critical Cyber Assets);
     CIP-007-3 (Systems Security Management);
     CIP-008-3 (Incident Reporting and Response Planning);
     CIP-009-3 (Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets).

II. Proposed Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards

A. NERC Petition

    10. On February 10, 2011, NERC filed a petition seeking Commission 
approval of proposed Reliability Standards CIP-002-4 to CIP-009-4 and 
requesting the concurrent retirement of the currently effective Version 
3 CIP Reliability Standards, CIP-002-3 to CIP-009-3.\12\ The principal 
differences are found in CIP-002, where NERC replaced the risk-based 
assessment methodology for identifying Critical Assets with 17 uniform 
bright line criteria for identifying Critical Assets. NERC does not 
propose any changes to the process of identifying the associated 
Critical Cyber Assets that are then subject to the cyber security 
protections required by CIP-003 through CIP-009. NERC also submitted 
proposed VRFs and VSLs and an implementation plan governing the 
transition to Version 4. NERC proposed that the Version 4 CIP 
Reliability Standards become effective the first day of the eighth 
calendar quarter after applicable regulatory approvals have been 
received.
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    \12\ NERC Petition at 1. The proposed Reliability Standards are 
not attached to the NOPR. They are, however, available on the 
Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. RM11-
11-000 and are available on the ERO's Web site, http://www.nerc.com. 
Reliability Standards approved by the Commission are 
not codified in the CFR.
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    11. On April 12, 2011, NERC made an errata filing correcting 
certain errors in the petition and furnishing corrected exhibits and 
the standard drafting team minutes. In the errata, NERC also replaced 
the VRFs and VSLs in the February 10 petition with new proposed VRFs 
and VSLs.\13\
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    \13\ NERC states that the Version 4 VRFs and VSLs are carried 
over in part from the VRFs and VSLs in the Version 3 CIP Reliability 
Standards. NERC Petition at 46. The Commission approved the Version 
2 and 3 VRFs and VSLs in Docket Nos. RD10-6-001 and RD09-7-003 on 
January 20, 2011 but required NERC to make modifications in a 
compliance filing due by March 21, 2011. North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation, 134 FERC ] 61,045 (2011). The February 10 
petition did not carry over the modified Version 3 VRFs and VSLs 
since it was filed before the March 21 compliance filing. NERC 
submitted new Version 4 VRFs and VSLs that carried over the modified 
Version 3 VRFs and VSLs in the April 12 errata. On June 6, 2011, 
NERC filed the March 21, 2011 compliance filing in the present 
docket, Docket No. RM11-11-000.
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    12. In its Petition, NERC states that the Version 4 CIP Standards 
satisfy the Commission's criteria, set forth in Order No. 672, for 
determining whether a proposed Reliability Standard is just, 
reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential and in the public 
interest.\14\ According to NERC, CIP-002-4 achieves a specified 
reliability goal by requiring the identification and documentation of 
Critical Cyber Assets associated with Critical Assets that support the 
reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. NERC opines that the 
Reliability Standard ``improves reliability by establishing uniform 
criteria across all Responsible Entities for the identification of 
Critical Assets.'' \15\ Further, NERC states that CIP-002-4 contains a 
technically sound method to achieve its reliability goal by requiring 
the identification and documentation of Critical Assets through the 
application of the criteria set forth in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-4.
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    \14\ Order No. 672, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204 at P 323-337.
    \15\ NERC Petition at 4.
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    13. NERC states that CIP-002-4 establishes clear and uniform 
criteria for identifying Critical Assets on the Bulk-Power System.\16\ 
NERC also states that CIP-002-4 does not reflect any differentiation in 
requirements based on size of the responsible entity. NERC asserts that 
CIP-002-4 will not have negative effects on competition or restriction 
of the grid. NERC also contends that the two-year implementation period 
for CIP-002-4 is reasonable given the time it will take responsible 
entities to determine

[[Page 58732]]

whether assets meet the criteria included in Attachment 1 and to 
implement the controls required in CIP-003-4 through CIP-009-4 for the 
newly identified assets.
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    \16\ Id. at 38.
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    14. Finally, NERC acknowledges that CIP-002-4 addresses some, but 
not all, of the Commission's directives in Order No. 706. NERC explains 
that the standard drafting team limited the scope of requirements in 
the development of CIP Version 4 ``as an interim step'' limited to the 
concerns raised by the Commission regarding CIP-002.\17\ NERC states 
that it has taken a ``phased'' approach to meeting the Commission's 
directives from Order No. 706 and, according to NERC, the standard 
drafting team continues to address the remaining Commission directives. 
According to NERC, the team will build on the bright line approach of 
CIP Version 4.\18\
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    \17\ NERC Petition at 6 (citing Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 
at P 236).
    \18\ NERC Petition at 6.
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B. Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-4

    15. Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 contains 3 
requirements. Requirement R1, which pertains to the identification of 
Critical Assets, provides:

    The Responsible Entity shall develop a list of its identified 
Critical Assets determined through an annual application of the 
criteria contained in CIP-002-4 Attachment 1--Critical Asset 
Criteria. The Responsible Entity shall update this list as 
necessary, and review it at least annually.

Attachment 1 provides seventeen criteria to be used by all responsible 
entities for the identification of Critical Assets pursuant to 
Requirement R1. The thresholds pertain to specific types of facilities 
such as generating units, transmission lines and control centers. For 
example, Criterion 1.1 provides ``[e]ach group of generating units 
(including nuclear generation) at a single plant location with an 
aggregate highest rated net Real Power capability of the preceding 12 
months equal to or exceeding 1500 MW in a single Interconnection.'' 
With regard to transmission, Criterion 1.6 provides ``Transmission 
Facilities operated at 500 kV or higher,'' and Criterion 1.7 provides 
``Transmission Facilities operated at 300 kV or higher at stations or 
substations interconnected at 300 kV or higher with three or more other 
transmission stations or substations.''
    16. Reliability Standard CIP-002-4, Requirement R2 requires 
responsible entities to develop a list of Critical Cyber Assets 
associated with the Critical Assets identified pursuant to Requirement 
R1. As in previous versions, the Requirement further states that to 
qualify as a Critical Cyber Asset, the Cyber Asset must: (1) Use a 
routable protocol to communicate outside the Electronic Security 
Perimeter; (2) use a routable protocol within a control center; or (3) 
be dial-up accessible. In the proposed version, in the context of 
generating units at a single plant location, the Requirement limits the 
designation of Critical Cyber Assets only to Cyber Assets shared by a 
combination of generating units whose compromise could within 15 
minutes result in the loss of generation capability equal to or higher 
than 1500 MW.
    17. Requirement R3 requires that a senior manager or delegate for 
each responsible entity approve annually the list of Critical Assets 
and the list of Critical Cyber Assets, even if the lists contain no 
elements. As mentioned above, proposed Reliability Standards CIP-003-4 
to CIP-009-4 only reflect conforming changes to accord with the CIP-
002-4 Reliability Standard.

C. Additional Information Regarding Attachment 1 Criteria

    18. In response to a Commission data request, NERC provided 
additional information regarding the bright line criteria for 
identifying Critical Assets.\19\ NERC provided some information 
regarding the development of the criteria. Further, based on an 
industry survey, NERC provided information regarding the estimated 
number of Critical Assets and the number of Critical Assets that have 
associated Critical Cyber Assets located in the United States that 
would be identified pursuant to CIP-002-4. For example, NERC indicates 
that the Version 4 CIP Standards would result in the identification of 
532 control centers as Critical Assets with Critical Cyber Assets, and 
another 21 control centers as Critical Assets without any associated 
Critical Cyber Assets.\20\ Further, 201 control centers would not be 
identified as Critical Assets. With regard to Blackstart Resources, 
NERC's survey results indicate that CIP-002-4 would result in the 
identification of approximately 234 Blackstart Resources as Critical 
Assets with associated Critical Cyber Assets, 273 identified as 
Critical Assets without Critical Cyber Assets, and 35 Blackstart 
Resources not classified as Critical Assets.\21\
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    \19\ See April 17, 2011 Commission staff data request issued in 
Docket No. RM11-11-000. NERC responded to the data request in 
staggered filings, on May 27, 2011 and June 30, 2011.
    \20\ NERC June 30, 2011 Data Response at 2-3.
    \21\ Id. at 3-4. In the June 30, 2011 Data Response, NERC stated 
that with respect to Blackstart Resources some responsible entities 
indicated that they had not performed a complete analysis of their 
systems based on CIP-002-4 and are unsure whether some units may be 
classified as Critical Assets. Id. at 4.
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III. Discussion

    19. Pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(2), the Commission proposes to 
approve CIP-002-4 to CIP-009-4 as just, reasonable, not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. The 
Commission proposes to approve the VRFs and VSLs, implementation plan, 
and effective date proposed by NERC. The Commission also proposes to 
approve the retirement of the currently effective Version 3 CIP 
Reliability Standards CIP-002-3 to CIP-009-3 upon the effective date of 
CIP-002-4 to CIP-009-4. The Commission seeks comments on these 
proposals.
    20. Further, as discussed below, the Commission seeks comments from 
NERC and other interested persons on the proposal to establish a 
reasonable deadline for NERC to satisfy the outstanding directives in 
Order No. 706. Specifically, as explained in detail later, the 
Commission requests comments on: (1) The proposal to establish a 
deadline using NERC's development timeline for the next version of the 
CIP Reliability Standards; (2) how much time NERC needs to develop and 
file the next version of the CIP Reliability Standards; (3) other 
potential approaches to Critical Cyber Asset identification; and (4) 
whether the next version is anticipated to satisfy all of the 
directives in Order No. 706.

A. The Commission Proposes To Approve the Version 4 CIP Reliability 
Standards

    21. The Commission, in giving due weight to NERC's Filing, proposes 
to approve the Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards. The Commission also 
proposes to approve the implementation plan and effective date proposed 
by NERC. Version 4 provides a change in three respects: (1) Version 4 
will result in the identification of certain types of Critical Assets 
that may not be identified under the current approach; (2) Version 4 
uses bright line criteria to identify Critical Assets, eliminating the 
use of existing entity-defined risk-based assessment methodologies that 
generally do not adequately identify Critical Assets; and (3) Version 4 
provides a level of consistency and clarity regarding the 
identification of Critical Assets lacking under Version 3. We

[[Page 58733]]

separately address each of these reasons for proposing to approve 
Version 4 below.
1. Critical Asset Identification
    22. In its Petition, NERC indicates that, after conducting reviews 
of CIP-002 compliance, NERC ``determined that the existing 
methodologies generally do not adequately identify all Critical 
Assets.'' \22\ While recognizing that CIP version 4 is intended as an 
``interim step,'' it appears that the proposed bright line criteria 
will result in the identification of certain types of Critical Assets 
(e.g. 500 kV substations) that may not be identified by the approach 
that is currently in effect. This is reflected in NERC's June 30, 2011 
data response, in which NERC presented industry survey data reflecting 
the application of the bright line criteria in Version 4. To facilitate 
an analysis of the data, NERC also provided observations and data from 
several of its earlier industry surveys, including the 2009 ``CIP Self-
Certification Survey'' and 2010 ``CIP-002 Critical Asset Methodology 
Data Request.''. For example, NERC states in the June 30, 2011 data 
response that in the 2009 survey only 50 percent of substations rated 
300 kV and above are classified as Critical Assets while that figure 
would increase to 70 percent under Version 4.\23\
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    \22\ NERC Petition at 11.
    \23\ Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    23. The NERC petition indicates that 270 transmission substations 
rated 500 kV and above are classified as Critical Assets under Version 
3 while, according to the data response, the figure would rise to 437 
under Version 4.\24\ This increase is consistent with Criterion 1.6 of 
Attachment 1 to CIP-002-4, which identifies all transmission 
substations rated 500 kV as Critical Assets. According to the data 
response, the 25 percent of generation units rated 300 MVA and above 
would be identified as Critical Assets under Version 4. Moreover, the 
proportion of total Blackstart Resources classified as Critical Assets 
increases due to the required 100 percent coverage of these under 
Version 4.\25\ Further, the number of control centers identified as 
Critical Assets increases from 425 under Version 3 to 553 under Version 
4, the latter figure representing 74 percent of all control centers. 
These figures represent increases in certain categories in Critical 
Asset identification among generation, transmission, and control 
centers. We also note that NERC's industry survey data indicates 
decreases in the number of generation and blackstart resources 
identified as Critical Assets with Critical Cyber Assets. While the 
bright line thresholds result in the identification of a significant 
number of additional generation plants rated above 1500 MVA as Critical 
Assets, the thresholds also result in the identification of less 
generation below 300 MVA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Id. at 5.
    \25\ NERC Petition at 17 (explaining that each Blackstart 
Resource identified in a Transmission Operator's restoration plan is 
a Critical Asset). In the June 30, 2011 Data Response, NERC's survey 
found that responsible entities identified 93 percent of Blackstart 
Resources as Critical Assets. NERC stated that confusion over the 
term Blackstart Resource may have contributed to the lower 
percentage, and that responsible entities will be educated on the 
definition of Blackstart Resource prior to the effective date of 
CIP-002-4. NERC June 30, 2011 Data Response at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    24. As NERC recognizes in its filing, the improvements in Critical 
Asset identification under Version 4 represent an interim step in 
complying with the directives in Order No. 706.\26\ As we discuss 
below, Version 4 should not be viewed as an endpoint but as a step 
towards eventual full compliance with Order No. 706.
2. Version 4 Removes Discretion in Identifying Critical Assets
    25. The proposed Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards discards the 
current risk-based methodology for identifying Critical Assets. Under 
the current CIP-002-3, responsible entities are tasked with identifying 
Critical Assets based on their own risk-based methodology. In the 
Petition NERC points out that in Order No. 706 the Commission directed 
NERC to ``provide reasonable technical support to assist entities in 
determining whether their assets are critical to the Bulk-Power 
System.'' \27\ NERC explains that it responded to the Commission's 
direction by developing guidance documents to assist entities in 
developing their risk-based methodologies and Critical Asset 
identification.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Id. at 10-11 (citing Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 
255).
    \28\ Id. at 11.
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    26. In its Petition, NERC states that it ``conducted various 
reviews of risk-based methodologies developed by many entities of 
varying sizes * * * and determined that the existing methodologies 
generally do not adequately identify all Critical Assets.'' \29\ To 
address this, NERC proposes to replace the current risk-based 
methodology with uniform, bright line criteria, which will be used by 
all responsible entities to identify Critical Assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    27. While risk-based assessment methodologies have merit, we share 
NERC's concerns about the existing application of the currently 
effective CIP-002-3, Requirement 1. Thus, in this context, we believe 
that a shift away from responsible entity-designed risk-based 
methodologies for identifying Critical Assets, which NERC has found to 
be inadequate, to the use of NERC-developed criteria is an improvement.
3. Version 4 Provides Consistency and Clarity in the Identification of 
Critical Assets
    28. In its June 30, 2011 data response, NERC states that the survey 
results from 2009 generated concern ``about the apparent inconsistency 
in the application of the standards across the system, as evidenced by 
the apparent variation from region to region.'' \30\ NERC states that 
it subsequently engaged with the Regional Entities and stakeholders to 
better understand the data, with these efforts resulting in the 
development of Version 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ NERC June 30, 2011 Data Response at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    29. We believe that the application of uniform criteria is an 
improvement over the current approach because they add greater 
consistency and clarity in identifying Critical Assets. The risks posed 
by cyber threats suggest a different approach than the possibly 
inconsistent, inadequate methodologies for identifying Critical Assets, 
as evidenced by NERC's conclusion that insufficient numbers of Critical 
Assets were identified using the risk-based assessment methodology. As 
an integrated system, the protection afforded for Critical Assets and 
their Critical Cyber Assets is only as strong as its weakest link. In 
this respect, allowing responsible entities to devise their own 
methodologies for identifying Critical Assets, especially if these 
methodologies prove to be weak, may compromise the Critical Assets and 
Critical Cyber Assets of other responsible entities even if they have 
adopted a more stringent methodology. The uniform system of Critical 
Asset identification proposed by NERC in Version 4 helps to address 
this weakness and places all responsible entities on an equal footing 
with respect to Critical Asset identification.
    30. In addition, clear, bright line criteria should make it easier 
for Regional Entities, NERC and the Commission to monitor responsible 
entities and evaluate how they are identifying Critical Assets. A 
single set of bright line criteria, as opposed to

[[Page 58734]]

myriad entity-designed risk-based methodologies, should improve the CIP 
compliance process.
    31. However, under the currently-effective CIP-002-3, an entity 
that applies its risk-based assessment methodology considers specific 
types of assets identified in Requirement R1, as well as ``any 
additional assets that support the operation of the Bulk Electric 
System that the Responsible Entity deems appropriate to include in its 
assessment.'' Thus, currently, a responsible entity has the flexibility 
to consider any assets it deems appropriate. The Commission also notes 
that there are assets currently identified as Critical Assets which 
would no longer be identified as Critical Assets under the Proposed 
Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 bright line criteria for Critical Asset 
identification. The Commission seeks comment whether, under CIP Version 
4, a responsible entity retains the flexibility to identify assets 
that, although outside of the bright line criteria, are essential to 
Bulk-Power System reliability. Further, we seek comment whether the ERO 
and/or Regional Entities would have the ability, either in an event-
driven investigation or compliance audit, to identify specific assets 
that fall outside the bright-line criteria yet are still essential to 
Bulk-Power System reliability and should be subject prospectively to 
compliance with the CIP Reliability. If so, on what basis should that 
decision be made?
    32. In addition, the Commission is cognizant of one caution that 
remains concerning a binary bright line criteria protection philosophy, 
i.e., either an asset satisfies the threshold and is subject to 
compliance or is below the threshold and not subject to compliance (as 
opposed to a tiered approach to compliance as discussed below), in 
terms of applying cybersecurity protections to Cyber Assets. 
Specifically, bright line criteria that limit legally-mandated 
cybersecurity protections to certain classes of Bulk-Power System 
assets may indicate to an adversary the types of assets that fail to 
meet the threshold and, therefore, are not subject to mandatory CIP 
compliance. Therefore, the Commission encourages NERC to accelerate 
development of the next version of the CIP Reliability Standards and to 
address the concerns discussed herein in Section B.
4. Violation Risk Factors/Violation Severity Levels
    33. NERC states that the proposed VRFs and VSLs are consistent with 
those approved for the Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards.\31\ NERC 
explains that each requirement in Version 4 is assigned a VRF and a set 
of VSLs and that these elements support the determination of an initial 
value range for the base penalty amount regarding violations of 
requirements in Commission-approved Reliability Standards, as defined 
in the ERO Sanction Guidelines.\32\
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    \31\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 134 FERC ] 
61,045 (2011) (approving Version 2 and 3 CIP Reliability Standards 
VRFs and VSLs but requiring modifications in a compliance filing).
    \32\ NERC Petition at 37.
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    34. The principal changes in the proposed Version 4 VRFs and VSLs 
relate to CIP-002-4. NERC proposes to carry forward the Version 3 VRFs 
and VSLs for all other Requirements (in CIP-003-4 through CIP-009-4), 
for which no substantive revisions are proposed. CIP-002-4 no longer 
contains sub-Requirements and, instead, each of three main Requirements 
has a single VRF and set of VSLs, consistent with the methodology 
proposed by NERC and approved by the Commission.\33\ The VRF 
designations for the three Requirements in CIP-002-4 are consistent 
with those assigned to similar Requirements in previous versions of the 
CIP Reliability Standards and satisfy our established guidelines. 
Therefore, the Commission proposes to approve the Version 4 VRFs 
proposed by NERC and incorporate appropriately the modifications 
directed to prior versions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 135 FERC ] 
61,166, at 8 (2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    35. With regard to the proposed Version 4 VSLs for CIP-002-4, we 
are concerned that the VSLs for Requirement R1 and Requirement R2, 
while carrying forward the wording from corresponding Version 3 VSLs, 
do not adequately address the purpose of NERC's proposed bright line 
criteria: To ensure accurate and complete identification of all 
Critical Assets, so that all associated Critical Cyber Assets become 
subject to the protections required by the CIP Standards.
    36. More importantly, neither set of VSLs address the failure to 
properly identify either Critical Assets or Critical Cyber Assets in 
the first place. The failure to identify a Critical Asset, whether 
inadvertently or through misapplication of the bright line criteria, is 
paramount because if an Asset is not identified and included on the 
Critical Asset list, its associated Cyber Assets will not be considered 
under Requirement R2. Failure to identify those Cyber Assets as 
Critical Cyber Assets under Requirement R2 then creates the ``weakest 
link'' circumstance discussed in the Commission's order establishing 
two CIP VSL Guidelines for analyzing the validity of VSLs pertaining to 
cyber security.\34\
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    \34\ CIP VSL Guideline 1 states, ``Requirements where a single 
lapse in protection can compromise computer network security, i.e., 
the ``weakest link'' characteristic, should apply binary rather than 
gradated VSLs.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    37. Therefore, the Commission proposes to direct the ERO to modify 
the VSLs for CIP-002-4, Requirements R1 and R2, to address a failure to 
identify either Critical Assets or Critical Cyber Assets, as shown in 
Appendix 1.\35\ The Commission proposes to approve the Version 4 VSLs 
proposed by NERC, as modified, because they would then satisfy our 
established guidelines, fully address the purpose of NERC's bright line 
criteria, and incorporate appropriately the modifications directed to 
prior versions.
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    \35\ NERC proposes to assign a Severe VSL for a violation of 
Requirement R1 if a responsible entity does not develop a list of 
its identified Critical Assets ``even if such list is null.'' NERC 
does not propose to assign a VSL for a violation of Requirement R1 
when a responsible entity fails to identify a Critical Asset that 
falls within any of the Critical Asset Criteria in Attachment 1, or 
fails to include an identified Critical Asset in its Critical Asset 
list. NERC further proposes to assign a Severe VSL to a responsible 
entity's violation of Requirement R2 only when it fails to include 
in its list of Critical Cyber Assets a Critical Cyber Asset it has 
identified. NERC does not propose to assign a VSL for a violation of 
Requirement R2 resulting from a responsible entity's failure to 
identify as a Critical Cyber Asset a Cyber Asset that qualifies as a 
Critical Cyber Asset.
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5. Implementation Plan and Effective Date
    38. NERC proposes an effective date for full compliance with the 
Version 4 CIP Standards of the first day of the eighth calendar quarter 
after applicable regulatory approvals have been received. In addition, 
NERC provides a detailed implementation plan for newly identified 
Critical Assets and newly registered entities. NERC also presents a 
number of scenarios intended to explain how CIP-002-4 will be 
implemented. Depending on the situation, the implementation plan 
establishes timelines and milestones for entities to reach full 
compliance with CIP-002-4.
    39. The Commission proposes to approve the effective date and 
implementation plan for CIP-002-4. Under the scenarios presented by 
NERC, we understand that entities with existing CIP compliance 
implementation programs will effectively no longer use CIP-002-3 to 
identify Critical Assets after approval of CIP-002-4 but rather will 
apply the criteria in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-4. While some responsible 
entities have already installed the necessary equipment and software to 
address

[[Page 58735]]

cybersecurity, we recognize that other responsible entities may need to 
purchase and install new equipment and software to achieve compliance 
for assets that are brought within the scope of the protections under 
the CIP-002-4 bright line criteria. Based on these considerations, the 
Commission believes that the implementation plan proposed by NERC sets 
reasonable deadlines for industry compliance.

B. Ongoing Development Efforts To Satisfy Directives Set Forth in Order 
No. 706

    40. As acknowledged by NERC, the proposed Version 4 CIP Reliability 
Standards do not address all of the directives set forth in Order No. 
706. Although the Commission proposes to approve CIP-002-4, we 
highlight the need for NERC, working through the Reliability Standards 
development process, to address all outstanding Order No. 706 
directives as soon as possible.
    41. Below, we discuss several directives in Order No. 706 that have 
yet to be satisfied and propose to give guidance regarding the next 
version of the CIP Reliability Standards, such as the need to address 
the NIST framework, data network connectivity, and the potential misuse 
of control centers or control systems and the adoption of a regional 
perspective and oversight. Our guidance is intended to more fully 
ensure that all Cyber Assets serving reliability functions of the Bulk-
Power System are within scope of the CIP Reliability Standards. In 
addition, as discussed below, we seek comments from NERC and other 
interested persons on a proposal to establish a deadline for NERC to 
submit modified CIP Reliability Standards that address the outstanding 
directives set forth in Order No. 706, using NERC's development 
timeline.
    42. The stated purpose of Reliability Standard CIP-002 is the 
accurate identification of Critical Cyber Assets. Both the currently-
effective and proposed CIP-002 Reliability Standards, along with 
guidance NERC provided to industry,\36\ are structured in a staged 
approach. First, an entity must identify Critical Assets. NERC defines 
Critical Assets as ``facilities, systems, and equipment which, if 
destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable, would affect 
the reliability or operability of the Bulk Electric System.'' \37\ 
Second, based on the Critical Assets identified in the first step, an 
entity must identify Cyber Assets supporting the Critical Assets. The 
NERC Glossary defines Cyber Assets as ``programmable electronic devices 
and communication networks including hardware, software, and data.'' 
\38\ Third, an entity should identify the Critical Cyber Assets by 
determining, in accordance with the NERC Glossary, the ``Cyber Assets 
essential to the reliable operation of the Critical Assets.'' \39\ In 
Order No. 706, the Commission did not address whether or not the staged 
approach outlined above was the only method for identifying Critical 
Cyber Assets. Rather at that time, focus was placed on addressing 
specific concerns with the first step--the identification of Critical 
Assets. Recognizing CIP-002 as the cornerstone of the CIP Reliability 
Standards,\40\ a failure to accurately identify Critical Assets could 
greatly impact accurate Critical Cyber Asset identification and the 
overall applicability of the protection measures afforded in CIP-003 
through CIP-009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ North American Reliability Corporation Security Guideline 
for the Electric Sector: ``Identifying Critical Cyber Assets'' 
Version 1.0, Effective June 17, 2010, at 4-5, and North American 
Reliability Corporation Security Guideline for the Electric Sector: 
``Identifying Critical Assets'' Version 1.0, Effective September 17, 
2009.
    \37\ NERC Glossary of Terms at 11.
    \38\ Id.
    \39\ Id.
    \40\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 234.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    43. In light of recent cybersecurity vulnerabilities, threats and 
attacks that have exploited the interconnectivity of cyber systems,\41\ 
the Commission seeks comments regarding the method of identification of 
Critical Cyber Assets \42\ to ensure sufficiency and accuracy. The 
Commission recognizes that control systems that support Bulk-Power 
System reliability are ``only as secure as their weakest links,'' and 
that a single vulnerability opens the computer network and all other 
networks with which it is interconnected to potential malicious 
activity.\43\ Accordingly, the Commission believes that any criteria 
adopted for the purposes of identifying a Critical Cyber Asset under 
CIP-002 should be based upon a Cyber Asset's connectivity and its 
potential to compromise the reliable operation \44\ of the Bulk-Power 
System, rather than focusing on the operation of any specific Critical 
Asset(s). The Commission seeks comments on this approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ These include the discovery of Stuxnet, Night Dragon and 
RSA breaches from advanced persistent threats in July 2010, February 
2011 and March 2011 respectively, where systems were compromised.
    \42\ In Order No. 706, the Commission declined to direct a 
method for identifying Critical Cyber Assets, but stated that it may 
revisit this circumstance in a future proceeding. See Order No. 706, 
122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 284.
    \43\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 130 FERC ] 
61,211, at P 15 (2010).
    \44\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(a)(4). The term ``reliable operation'' means 
``operating the elements of the bulk-power system within equipment 
and electric system thermal, voltage, and stability limits so that 
instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of such 
system will not occur as a result of a sudden disturbance, including 
a cybersecurity incident, or unanticipated failure of system 
elements.''
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    44. Further, the Commission seeks comments on how to ensure that 
the directives of Order No. 706 relative to CIP-002 with respect to the 
concerns discussed below are addressed, resulting in a method that will 
lead to sufficient and accurate Critical Cyber Asset identification.
    45. The Commission believes that NERC should consider the following 
three strategies to meet the outstanding directives and seeks comments 
on these strategies. First, NERC should consider applicable features of 
the NIST Risk Management Framework to ensure protection of all cyber 
systems connected to the Bulk-Power System, including establishing CIP 
requirements based on entity functional characteristics rather than 
focusing on Critical Asset size. Second, such as in the consideration 
of misuse, NERC should consider mechanisms for identifying Critical 
Cyber Assets by examining all possible communication paths between a 
given cyber resource and any asset supporting a reliability function. 
Third, NERC should provide a method for review and approval of Critical 
Cyber Asset lists from external sources such as the Regional Entities 
or NERC. Each of these strategies is discussed below.
1. NIST Framework
    46. In Order No. 706, the Commission directed NERC to ``monitor the 
development and implementation'' of cybersecurity standards then being 
developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST).\45\ The Commission also directed NERC to consider the 
effectiveness of the NIST standards.\46\ At that time, the Commission 
directed NERC to address any NIST provisions that will better protect 
the Bulk-Power System in the Reliability Standards development 
process.\47\ While the Commission determined not to require NERC to 
adopt or incorporate elements of the NIST standards, Order No. 706 left 
open the option of revisiting the NIST standards at a later time.\48\ 
The Commission is not here proposing to direct that NERC use elements 
of the NIST standards. However, we continue

[[Page 58736]]

to believe that the NIST framework could provide beneficial input into 
the NERC CIP Reliability Standards and we urge NERC to consider any 
such provisions that will better protect the Bulk-Power System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 233.
    \46\ Id.
    \47\ Id.
    \48\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    47. The NIST Risk Management Framework was developed to manage the 
risks associated with all information systems, and offers a structured 
yet flexible approach that can now be applied to the electric industry. 
The NIST Risk Management Framework guides selection and specification 
of cybersecurity controls and measures necessary to protect individuals 
and the operations and assets of the organization, while considering 
effectiveness, efficiency, and constraints due to applicable laws, 
directives, policies, standards, or regulations. Each of the activities 
in the Risk Management Framework has an associated NIST security 
standard and/or guidance document that can be used by organizations 
implementing the framework. The management of risk is a key element.
    48. Two primary features of the NIST Framework are: (1) Customizing 
protection to the mission of the cyber systems subject to protection 
(similar to the role identified by the NERC Functional Model); and (2) 
ensuring that all connected cyber systems associated with the Bulk-
Power System, based on their function, receive some level of 
protection.\49\ The Bulk-Power System could benefit from each of these 
tested approaches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ NIST SP800-53, Section 1.4, Organizational 
Responsibilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. NIST Approach and the NERC Functional Model
    49. The purpose of the NERC CIP Reliability Standards is to specify 
mandatory Requirements for responsible entities to establish, maintain, 
and preserve the cybersecurity of key information technology systems' 
assets, the use of which is essential to reliable operation of the 
Bulk-Power System. The CIP Reliability Standards include Requirements 
which are based upon the functional roles of the responsible entities 
as specified in the NERC Functional Model.\50\ The identification of 
cyber systems and assets used to execute these functional roles should 
be the first step in identifying the systems for coverage under the CIP 
Reliability Standards for protection. The Functional Model should be 
used as a starting point when considering the applicability of the NIST 
Framework for securing the operation of cyber assets to provide for the 
Reliable Operation of the Bulk-Power System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ Reliability Functional Model, Function Definitions and 
Functional Entities, Version 5, approved by NERC Board of Trustees 
May 2010; and, Reliability Functional Model Technical Document 
Version 5, approved by NERC Board of Trustees May 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. NIST Tiered Approach
    50. If applied to the Bulk-Power System, the NIST Framework would 
specify the level of protection appropriate for systems based upon 
their importance to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. 
Cyber systems connected to the Bulk-Power System require availability, 
integrity, and confidentiality to effectively ensure the reliability of 
the Bulk-Power System.
    51. The NIST Framework provides for a tiered approach to 
cybersecurity protection where protection of some type would be applied 
to all cyber assets connected to the Bulk-Power System. Under the NIST 
Framework, cyber assets whose compromise or loss of operability could 
result in a greater risk to Bulk-Power System reliability would be 
subject to more rigorous cybersecurity protections compared to a less 
important asset. The NIST Framework recognizes that all connected 
assets require a baseline level of protection to prevent attackers from 
gaining a foothold to launch further, even more devastating attacks on 
other critical systems.
    52. Using the NIST framework, all cyber assets would also be 
reviewed to determine the appropriate level of cyber protection. The 
level of protection required for a given cyber asset is based upon its 
mission criticality and its innate technological risks.
2. Misuse of Control Systems
    53. In Order No. 706, the Commission directed NERC to consider the 
misuse of control centers and control systems in the determination of 
Critical Assets.\51\ If a perpetrator is able to misuse an asset, the 
attacker may navigate across and between control system data networks 
in order to gain access to multiple sites, which could enable a 
coordinated multi-site attack. Recent cybersecurity incidents \52\ 
illustrate the importance of restricting connectivity between control 
systems and external networks, emphasizing the inherent risk exposure 
created by networking critical cyber control systems. Future mechanisms 
for identifying when cyber assets require protection will have to 
examine all possible paths between a given cyber resource and any asset 
supporting a reliability function.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 282.
    \52\ These include the discovery of Stuxnet, Night Dragon and 
RSA breaches from advanced persistent threats in July 2010, February 
2011 and March 2011 respectively, where systems were compromised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    54. In Order No. 706, the Commission expressed concerns regarding 
the classification of control centers and the potential misuse of 
control systems.\53\ With regard to control centers, the Commission 
noted that responsible entities should be required to ``examine the 
impact on reliability if the control centers are unavailable, due for 
example to power or communications failures, or denial of service 
attacks.'' \54\ In addition, the Commission stated that ``[r]esponsible 
entities should also examine the impact that misuse of those control 
centers could have on the electric facilities they control and what the 
combined impact of those electric facilities could be on the 
reliability of the Bulk-Power System.'' \55\ The Commission stated that 
``when these matters are taken into account, it is difficult to 
envision a scenario in which a reliability coordinator, transmission 
operator or transmission owner control center or backup control center 
would not properly be identified as a critical asset.'' \56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 280-281.
    \54\ Id. P 280.
    \55\ Id.
    \56\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    55. In addition, the Commission raised concerns about the misuse of 
a control system that controls more than one asset.\57\ Specifically, 
the Commission noted that multiple assets, whether multiple generating 
units, multiple transmission breakers, or perhaps even multiple 
substations, could be taken out of service simultaneously due to a 
failure or misuse of the control system. The Commission stated that 
even if one or all of the assets would not be considered as a Critical 
Asset on a stand alone basis, a simultaneous outage resulting from the 
single point of control might affect the reliability or operability of 
the Bulk-Power System. The Commission stated ``[i]n that case, the 
common control system should be considered a Critical Cyber Asset.'' 
\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Id. P 281.
    \58\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    56. The Commission is concerned that the proposed CIP-002-4 bright 
line criteria do not adequately address the Commission's prior 
directive regarding the classification of control centers or take the 
potential misuse of control systems into account in the identification 
of Critical Assets. For example, the proposed bright line criteria 
leave a number of Critical Assets

[[Page 58737]]

with potentially unprotected cyber assets, including a total of 222 
\59\ control centers with no legal obligation to apply cybersecurity 
measures. These potentially unprotected control centers involve an 
unknown number of associated control systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ NERC June 30, 2011 Data Response at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    57. Consider the following example: Electric grid control system 
operation in part consists of the collection of raw data needed to run 
the grid, collected by a SCADA system from intelligent electronic 
devices (IEDs) (e.g., RTUs and synchrophasors). The SCADA data is 
typically aggregated by an energy management system (EMS). The EMS may, 
in some cases, calculate area control error (ACE) and transmit it to a 
balancing authority, which in turn makes computer based decisions about 
balancing load and generation. Those decisions are then used by the 
balancing authority or generation operator as part of an automated 
generation control (AGC) process. At each of these one or more sites, 
there are many data network interconnection points with other entities, 
(e.g., neighboring transmission operators, generation operators, and 
reliability coordinators) and additional connectivity to corporate data 
networks and elsewhere, employing several communications technologies. 
This results in a complex interconnection of cyber assets (including 
the data of those cyber assets) demanding vigilant protection.\60\ 
These cyber systems require comprehensive protection because the 
interconnected system is only as strong as its weakest link.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ See generally, Ron Ross, Managing Enterprise Risk in 
Today's World of Sophisticated Threats, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    58. Any failure to take into account the interconnectivity of 
control systems represents a significant reliability gap. Where modern 
data networking technology is used for operation of the Bulk-Power 
System (e.g., control systems, synchrophasors, smart grid), a network-
based cyber attack could result in multiple simultaneous outages of 
grid equipment and cyber systems alike through misuse of a single point 
of control (e.g., a SCADA control host system). Such an attack could 
take place by way of a cyber system associated with an asset that falls 
outside the CIP-002-4 bright line criteria yet is connected in common 
with other cyber systems on the Bulk-Power System. The risk of a cyber 
attack is greater now than when Order No. 706 was issued, as borne out 
by the recent increased frequency and sophistication of cyber attacks. 
It is critical, therefore, that the Commission's concerns regarding the 
potential misuse of control centers and associated control systems be 
addressed in the CIP Reliability Standards.
3. Regional Perspective
    59. In Order No. 706, the Commission directed NERC to ``develop a 
process of external review and approval of critical asset lists based 
on a regional perspective.'' \61\ The Commission found that ``Regional 
Entities must have a role in the external review to assure that there 
is sufficient accountability in the process [and] * * * because the 
Regional Entities and ERO are ultimately responsible for ensuring 
compliance with Reliability Standards.'' \62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 329.
    \62\ Id. P 327.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    60. The Commission is concerned that the lack of a regional review 
in the identification of cyber assets might result in a reliability 
gap. In Order No. 706, the Commission expressed concerns regarding the 
need for developing a process of external review and approval of 
Critical Asset lists based on a regional perspective, and that such 
lists are considered from a wide-area view. This process would help to 
identify trends in Critical Asset identification. Further, while we 
recognize that individual circumstances may likely vary, an external 
review will provide an appropriate level of consistency.\63\ For 
example, reliability coordinators may communicate through a common 
system and compromise of that system could propagate across multiple 
regions. A cyber compromise can easily propagate across these data and 
control networks with potential adverse consequences to the Bulk-Power 
System on multi-region basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Id. P 322.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    61. This problem may become exacerbated by any future revisions to 
the CIP Reliability Standards that opt to reserve a high level of 
independent authority to the registered entity to categorize and 
prioritize its cyber assets. Looking forward, it will be essential for 
NERC and the Regional Entities to actively review the designation of 
cyber assets that are subject to the CIP Reliability Standards, 
including those which span regions, in order to determine whether 
additional cyber assets should be protected.
4. Summary
    62. In summary, the Commission proposes to approve NERC's proposed 
Version 4 CIP Standards pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA. As 
discussed above, it appears that the Version 4 CIP Standards represent 
an improvement in three respects in that they: (1) Will result in the 
identification of certain types of Critical Assets that may not be 
identified under the current approach; (2) use bright line criteria to 
identify Critical Assets, thus limiting the discretion of responsible 
entities when identifying Critical Assets; and (3) provide a level of 
consistency and clarity regarding the identification of Critical 
Assets.
    63. While we believe that the Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards 
satisfy the statutory standard for approval, we also believe that more 
improvement is needed. As NERC explains in its Petition, the Version 4 
CIP Reliability Standards are intended as ``interim'' and future 
versions will build on Version 4. We believe that the electric 
industry, through the NERC standards development process, should 
continue to develop an approach to cybersecurity that is meaningful and 
comprehensive to assure that the nation's electric grid is capable of 
withstanding a Cybersecurity Incident.\64\ As discussed above, we 
believe that some of the essential components of such a meaningful and 
comprehensive approach to cybersecurity are set forth in Order No. 706.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Section 215(a) of the FPA defines Cybersecurity Incident as 
``a malicious act or suspicious event that disrupts, or was an 
attempt to disrupt, the operation of those programmable electronic 
devices and communication networks including hardware, software and 
data that are essential to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power 
System.''

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 58738]]

5. Reasonable Deadline for Full Compliance With Order No. 706
    64. The Commission issued Order No. 706 on January 18, 2008. In 
Order No. 706, the Commission approved Version 1 of the CIP Reliability 
Standards while also directing modifications pursuant to section 
215(d)(5) of the FPA, some of which are described above. Later approved 
versions of the CIP Reliability Standards, and now the proposed Version 
4 CIP Reliability Standards, addressed some of the directives in Order 
No. 706, but other directives remain unsatisfied.
    65. Over three years have elapsed since the Commission issued the 
Final Rule in January 2008. As discussed above, we believe that it is 
important for the successful implementation of a comprehensive approach 
to cybersecurity that NERC timely addresses the modifications directed 
by the Commission in Order No. 706. Accordingly, the Commission 
proposes to set a deadline for NERC to file the next version of the CIP 
Reliability Standards, which NERC indicates will address all 
outstanding Order No. 706 directives.\65\ This proposal is consistent 
with the views expressed in the January 2011 Audit Report of the 
Department of Energy's Inspector General, who found ``that the 
Commission could have, but did not impose specific deadlines for the 
ERO to incorporate changes to the CIP standards.'' \66\ Similarly, our 
proposal is responsive to the Audit Report finding that ``the CIP 
standards implementation approach and schedule approved by the 
Commission were not adequate to ensure that systems-related risks to 
the Nation's power grid were mitigated or addressed in a timely 
manner.'' \67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See NERC's May 27, 2011 Responses to Data Requests, 
Response 1 (``[t]he standard drafting team expects that the filing 
for the next version of the CIP Reliability Standards will address 
the remaining FERC Order No. 706 directives'').
    \66\ Department of Energy Inspector General Audit Report, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Monitoring of Power Grid 
Cybersecurity at 6 (January 2011).
    \67\ Id. at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    66. The Commission understands that, under NERC's timeline for the 
ongoing effort to address all outstanding Order No. 706 directives, it 
anticipates submitting the next version of the CIP Reliability 
Standards to the NERC Board of Trustees by the second quarter of 2012, 
and filing that version the Commission by the end of the third quarter 
of 2012.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See NERC's May 27, 2011 Responses to Data Requests, 
Response 1. See also North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
Reliability Standards Development Plan 2011-2013 Informational 
Filing Pursuant to Section 310 of the NERC Rules of Procedure, 
Docket Nos. RM05-17-000, RM05-25-000, RM06-16-000 at 14 (filed April 
5, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    67. The Commission proposes to establish NERC's current development 
timeline above as a deadline for compliance with the outstanding Order 
No. 706 CIP Standard directives. The Commission seeks comments from 
NERC and other parties concerning this proposal. Further, NERC and 
other parties may propose and support an alternative compliance 
deadline.

IV. Information Collection Statement

    68. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations require 
that OMB approve certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements 
(collections of information) imposed by an agency.\69\ The information 
contained here is also subject to review under section 3507(d) of the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.\70\ We will submit this proposed rule 
to OMB for review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ 5 CFR 1320.11.
    \70\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    69. As stated above, the Commission previously approved Reliability 
Standards similar to the proposed Reliability Standards that are the 
subject of the current rulemaking.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 130 FERC ] 
61,271 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    70. The principal differences in the information collection 
requirements and resulting burden imposed by the proposed Reliability 
Standards in this rule are triggered by the proposed changes in 
Reliability Standard CIP-002-4. The previous risk-based assessment 
methodology for identifying Critical Assets will be replaced by 17 
uniform ``bright line'' criteria for identifying Critical Assets (in 
CIP-002-4, Attachment 1, ``Critical Asset Criteria''). Proposed 
Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 would require each responsible entity to 
use the bright line criteria as a ``checklist'' to identify Critical 
Assets, initially and in an annual review, instead of performing the 
more technical and individualized risk analysis involved in complying 
with the currently-effective CIP Reliability Standards. As in past 
versions, each Responsible Entity will then identify the Critical Cyber 
Assets associated with its updated list of Critical Assets. If 
application of the bright line criteria result in the identification of 
new Critical Cyber Assets, such assets become subject to the remaining 
standards (proposed CIP-003-4, CIP-004-4, CIP-005-4a, CIP-006-4c, CIP-
007-4, CIP-008-4, and CIP-009-4), and the information collection 
requirements contained therein.
    71. We estimate that the burden associated with the annual review 
of the assets (by the estimated 1,501 entities) will be simplified by 
the ``Critical Asset Criteria'' in proposed Reliability Standard CIP-
002-4. Rather than each entity annually reviewing and updating a Risk-
Based Assessment Methodology that frequently required technical 
analysis and judgment decisions, the proposed bright line criteria will 
provide a straight forward checklist for all entities to use. Thus, we 
estimate that the proposal will reduce the burden associated with the 
annual review, as well as provide a consistent and clear set of 
criteria for all entities to follow.
    72. The estimated changes to burden as contained in the proposed 
rule in RM11-11 follow.

[[Page 58739]]



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                         Annual burden
   FERC-725B Data  collection (per      Number of  respondents   Average number of     Average number of     Effect of NOPR in RM11-      hours upon
         proposed Version 4)                     \72\            annual responses       burden hours per       11, on total  annual    implementation of
                                                                  per respondent         response \73\                hours                 RM11-11
                                       (1)....................                 (2)  (3)....................  (1) x (2) x (3)........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Entities that (previously and now)     345 [no change]........                   1  1,880 [reduction of 40   reduction of 13,800                 648,600
 will identify at least one Critical                                                 hours from 1,920 to      hours.
 Cyber Asset [category a].                                                           1,880 hours].
Entities that (previously and now)     1,144 [reduction of 12                    1  120 [no change]........  Reduction of 1,440                  137,280
 will not identify any Critical Cyber   entities from 1156 to                                                 hours [for the 12
 Assets [category b].                   1,144].                                                               entities].
Entities that will newly identify a    increase of 12                            1  3,840 \75\.............  increase of 46,080.....              46,080
 Critical Asset/Critical Cyber Asset    [formerly 0].
 due to the requirements in RM11-11
 \74\ [category c].
                                      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Net Total........................  1,501 \72\.............  ..................  .......................  +30,840................             831,960
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The revisions to the cost estimates based on requirements of this 
proposed rule are:
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    \72\ The NERC Compliance Registry as of 9/28/2010 indicated that 
2,079 entities were registered for NERC's compliance program. Of 
these, 2,057 were identified as being U.S. entities. Staff concluded 
that of the 2,057 U.S. entities, approximately 1,501 were registered 
for at least one CIP related function. According to an April 7, 2009 
memo to industry, NERC noted that only 31% of entities responding to 
an earlier survey reported that they had at least one Critical 
Asset, and only 23% reported having a Critical Cyber Asset. Staff 
applied the 23% (an estimate unchanged for Version 4 standards) to 
the 1,501 figure to estimate the number of entities that identified 
Critical Assets under Version 3 CIP Standards.
    \73\ Calculations for figures prior to applying reductions:
    Respondent category b:
    3 employees x (working 50%) x (40 hrs/week) x (2 weeks) = 120 
hours.
    Respondent category c:
    20 employees x (working 50%) x (40 hrs/week) x (8 weeks) = 3200 
hours.
     20 employees x (working 20%) x (3200 hrs) = 640 hours.
     Total = 3840.
    Respondent category a:
    50% of 3840 hours (category d) = 1920.
    \74\ We estimate 12 (or 1%) of the existing entities that 
formerly had no identified Critical Cyber Assets will have them 
under the proposed Reliability Standards. This proposed rule does 
not affect the burden for the 6 new U.S. Entities that were 
estimated to newly register or otherwise become subject to the CIP 
Standards each year in FERC-725B, and therefore are not included in 
this chart.
    \75\ This estimated burden estimate applies only to the first 
three year audit cycle. In subsequent audit cycles these entities 
will move into category a, or be removed from the burden as an 
entity that no longer is registered for a CIP related function.
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     Each entity that has identified Critical Cyber Assets has 
a reduction of 40 hours (345 entities x 40 hrs. x @$96/hour = 
$1,324,800 reduction).
     12 Entities that formerly had not identified Critical 
Cyber Assets, but now will have them, has
    [cir] A reduction of 120 hours and an increase of 3,840 hours (for 
a net increase of 3,720 annual hours), giving 12 entities x 3,720 
hrs.@$96/hour = $4,285,440.
    [cir] Storage costs = 12 entities@$15.25/entity = $183.
    Total Net Annual Cost for the FERC-725B requirements contained in 
the NOPR in RM11-11 = $2,960,823 ($4,285,440 + $183 -$1,324,800).
    The estimated hourly rate of $96 is the average cost of legal 
services ($230 per hour), technical employees ($40 per hour) and 
administrative support ($18 per hour), based on hourly rates from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the 2009 Billing Rates and 
Practices Survey Report.\76\ The $15.25 per entity for storage costs is 
an estimate based on the average costs to service and store 1 GB of 
data to demonstrate compliance with the CIP Standards.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ Bureau of Labor Statistics figures were obtained from 
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm, and 2009 Billing 
Rates figure were obtained from http://www.marylandlawyerblog.com/2009/07
/average_hourly_rate_for_lawyer.html. Legal services were 
based on the national average billing rate (contracting out) from 
the above report and BLS hourly earnings (in-house personnel). It is 
assumed that 25% of respondents have in-house legal personnel.
    \77\ Based on the aggregate cost of an advanced data protection 
server.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Title: Mandatory Reliability Standards, Version 4 Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Standards.
    Action: Proposed Collection FERC-725B.
    OMB Control No.: 1902-0248.
    Respondents: Businesses or other for-profit institutions; not-for-
profit institutions.
    Frequency of Responses: On Occasion.
    Necessity of the Information: This proposed rule proposes to 
approve the requested modifications to Reliability Standards pertaining 
to critical infrastructure protection. The proposed Reliability 
Standards help ensure the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System 
by providing a cybersecurity framework for the identification and 
protection of Critical Assets and associated Critical Cyber Assets. As 
discussed above, the Commission proposes to approve NERC's proposed 
Version 4 CIP Standards pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA 
because they represent an improvement to the currently-effective CIP 
Reliability Standards.
    Internal Review: The Commission has reviewed the proposed 
Reliability Standards and made a determination that its action is 
necessary to implement section 215 of the FPA.
    73. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting 
requirements by contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: 
Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive Director, e-mail: 
DataClearance@ferc.gov, phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873].
    74. For submitting comments concerning the collection(s) of 
information and the associated burden estimate(s), please send your 
comments to the Commission, and to the Office of Management and Budget, 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,

[[Page 58740]]

Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, phone: (202) 395-4638, fax: (202) 395-7285]. For 
security reasons, comments to OMB should be submitted by e-mail to: 
oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Comments submitted to OMB should include 
Docket Number RM11-11 and OMB Control Number 1902-0248.

V. Environmental Analysis

    75. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental 
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may 
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\78\ The 
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this 
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human 
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying, 
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the 
effect of the regulations being amended.\79\ The actions proposed here 
fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ Order No. 486, Regulations Implementing the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, FERC Stats. & Regs., Regulations 
Preambles 1986-1990 ] 30,783 (1987).
    \79\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    76. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \80\ generally 
requires a description and analysis of final rules that will have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The RFA mandates consideration of regulatory alternatives that 
accomplish the stated objectives of a proposed rule and that minimize 
any significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. The Small Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Size 
Standards develops the numerical definition of a small business.\81\ 
The SBA has established a size standard for electric utilities, stating 
that a firm is small if, including its affiliates, it is primarily 
engaged in the transmission, generation and/or distribution of electric 
energy for sale and its total electric output for the preceding twelve 
months did not exceed four million megawatt hours.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
    \81\ 13 CFR 121.101.
    \82\ 13 CFR 121.201, Sector 22, Utilities & n.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    77. The Commission analyzed the affect of the proposed rule on 
small entities. The Commission's analysis found that the DOE's Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) reports that there were 3,276 electric 
utility companies in the United States in 2009,\83\ and 3,015 of these 
electric utilities qualify as small entities under the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) definition. Of these 3,276 electric utility 
companies, the EIA subdivides them as follows: (1) 875 Cooperatives of 
which 843 are small entity cooperatives; (2) 1,841 municipal utilities, 
of which 1,826 are small entity municipal utilities; (3) 128 political 
subdivisions, of which 115 are small entity political subdivisions; (4) 
171 power marketers, of which 113 individually could be considered 
small entity power marketers; \84\ (5) 200 privately owned utilities, 
of which 93 could be considered small entity private utilities; (6) 24 
state organizations, of which 14 are small entity state organizations; 
and (7) 9 federal organizations of which 4 are small entity federal 
organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See Energy Information Administration Database, Form EIA-
861, Dept. of Energy (2009), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia861.html.
    \84\ Most of these small entity power marketers and private 
utilities are affiliated with others and, therefore, do not qualify 
as small entities under the SBA definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    78. Many of the entities that have not previously identified 
Critical Assets and Critical Cyber Assets are considered small 
entities. The new CIP version 4 bright line criteria generally result 
in the identification of relatively larger Bulk-Power System equipment 
as Critical Assets. For the most part, the small entities do not own or 
operate these larger facilities. There is a limited possibility that 
these entities would have facilities that meet the bright line criteria 
and therefore be subject to the full CIP standards (CIP-002 through 
CIP-009). The Commission expects only a marginal increase in the number 
of small entities that will identify at least one Critical Asset under 
the Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards that have not done so 
previously.
    79. The Commission estimates that only one percent (12) of the 
small and medium-sized entities that have not previously identified 
Critical Assets and Critical Cyber Assets will have an increased cost 
due to the proposed Reliability Standards and their identification of 
new Critical Cyber Assets. For each of those 12 entities, we anticipate 
a cost increase associated with creating a cyber security program along 
with the actual cyber security protections associated with the 
identified Critical Cyber Assets. The Commission requests comment on 
the potential implementation cost and subsequent cost increases that 
could be experienced by such small entities. Small and medium-sized 
entities that continue to have no Critical Assets will not see any 
change in their burden.
    80. In general, the majority of small entities are not required to 
comply with mandatory Reliability Standards because they are not 
regulated by NERC pursuant to the NERC Registry Criteria. Moreover, a 
small entity that is registered but does not identify critical cyber 
assets pursuant to CIP-002-4 will not have compliance obligations 
pursuant to CIP-003-4 through CIP-009-4.
    81. The Commission also investigated possible alternatives. These 
included the Commission's adoption in Order No. 693 of the NERC 
definition of bulk electric system, which reduces significantly the 
number of small entities responsible for compliance with mandatory 
Reliability Standards. The Commission also noted that small entities 
could join a joint action agency or similar organization, which could 
accept responsibility for compliance with mandatory Reliability 
Standards on behalf of its members and also may divide the 
responsibility for compliance with its members.
    82. Based on the foregoing, the Commission certifies that the 
proposed Reliability Standards will not have a significant impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, no regulatory 
flexibility analysis is required.

VII. Comment Procedures

    83. The Commission invites interested persons to submit comments on 
the matters and issues proposed in this notice to be adopted, including 
any related matters or alternative proposals that commenters may wish 
to discuss. Comments are due November 21, 2011. Comments must refer to 
Docket No. RM11-11-000, and must include the commenter's name, the 
organization they represent, if applicable, and their address in their 
comments.
    84. The Commission encourages comments to be filed electronically 
via the eFiling link on the Commission's Web site at http://www.ferc.gov. 
The Commission accepts most standard word processing 
formats. Documents created electronically using word processing 
software should be filed in native applications or print-to-PDF format 
and not in a scanned format. Commenters filing electronically do not 
need to make a paper filing.
    85. Commenters unable to file comments electronically must mail or 
hand deliver an original copy of their comments to: Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street, 
NE., Washington, DC 20426.

[[Page 58741]]

    86. All comments will be placed in the Commission's public files 
and may be viewed, printed, or downloaded remotely as described in the 
Document Availability section below. Commenters on this proposal are 
not required to serve copies of their comments on other commenters.

VIII. Document Availability

    87. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the 
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an 
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the 
Internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and 
in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal business hours 
(8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE., Room 2A, 
Washington, DC 20426.
    88. From the Commission's Home Page on the Internet, this 
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is 
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, 
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type 
the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in 
the docket number field.
    89. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's 
Web site during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at 202-
502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or e-mail at 
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference Room at  
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.

List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 40

    Electric power, Electric utilities, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

    By direction of the Commission.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011-24102 Filed 9-21-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P





	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Spy Jules Kroll Bond Gets Favor
		
	
	

		
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 182 (Tuesday, September 20, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58319-58321]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-24028]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-65339]

 Order Granting Temporary Exemption of Kroll Bond Rating Agency,
Inc. From the Conflict of Interest Prohibition in Rule 17g-5(c)(1) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

September 14, 2011.

I. Introduction

    Rule 17g-5(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange
Act'') prohibits a nationally recognized statistical rating
organization (``NRSRO'') from issuing or maintaining a credit rating
solicited by a person that, in the most recently ended fiscal year,
provided the NRSRO with net revenue equaling or exceeding 10% of the
total net revenue of the NRSRO for the fiscal year. In adopting this
rule, the Commission stated that such a person would be in a position
to exercise substantial influence on the NRSRO, which in turn would
make it difficult for the NRSRO to remain impartial.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Release No. 34-55857 (June 5, 2007), 72 FR 33564, 33598
(June 18, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Application and Exemption Request of Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc.

    Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. (``Kroll''), f/k/a LACE Financial
Corp. (``LACE''), is a credit rating agency registered with the
Commission as an NRSRO under Section 15E of the Exchange Act for the
classes of credit ratings described in clauses (i) through (v) of
Section 3(a)(62)(B) of the Exchange Act. Kroll traditionally has
operated mainly under the ``subscriber-paid'' business model, in which
the NRSRO derives its revenue from restricting access to its ratings to
paid

[[Page 58320]]

subscribers. Kroll has informed the Commission that it intends to
expand its existing NRSRO business by establishing a new ``issuer-
paid'' rating service under which it will issue ratings paid for by the
issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of the security being rated. In
connection with this planned expansion, Kroll has requested a temporary
and limited exemption from Rule 17g-5(c)(1) on the grounds that the
restrictions imposed by Rule 17g-5(c)(1) would pose a substantial
constraint on the firm's ability to compete effectively with large
rating agencies offering comparable ratings services. Specifically,
Kroll argues that given that the fees typically associated with issuer-
paid engagements tend to be relatively high when compared to the fees
associated with its existing subscriber-based business, it is possible
that in the early stages of its expansion the fees associated with a
single issuer-paid engagement could exceed ten percent of its total net
revenue for the fiscal year. Accordingly, Kroll has requested that the
Commission grant it an exemption from Rule 17g-5(c)(1) for any revenues
derived from non-subscription based business during the remainder of
calendar years 2011 and 2012, which are also the end of Kroll's 2011
and 2012 fiscal years, respectively.

III. Discussion

    The Commission, when adopting Rule 17g-5(c)(1), noted that it
intended to monitor how the prohibition operates in practice,
particularly with respect to asset-backed securities, and whether
exemptions may be appropriate.\2\ The Commission has previously granted
two temporary exemptions from Rule 17g-5(c)(1), including one on
February 11, 2008 to LACE, as Kroll was formerly known, in connection
with its initial registration as an NRSRO (``LACE Exemptive
Order'').\3\ The Commission noted several factors in granting that
exemption, including the fact that the revenue in question was earned
prior to the adoption of the rule, the likelihood of smaller firms such
as LACE being more likely to be affected by the rule, LACE's
expectation that the percentage of total revenue provided by the
relevant client would decrease, and the increased competition in the
asset-backed securities class that could result from LACE's
registration. In granting the LACE Exemptive Order, the Commission also
noted that an exemption would further the primary purpose of the Credit
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (``Rating Agency Act'') as set forth
in the Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs accompanying the Rating Agency Act: To ``improve ratings
quality for the protection of investors and in the public interest by
fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit
rating industry.'' \4\ On June 23, 2008, the Commission, citing the
same factors set forth in the LACE Exemptive Order, issued a similar
order granting Realpoint LLC a temporary exemption from the
requirements of Rule 17g-5(c)(1) in connection with Realpoint LLC's
registration as an NRSRO.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Release No. 34-55857 (June 5, 2007), 72 FR 33564, 33598
(June 18, 2007).
    \3\ Release No. 34-57301 (February 11, 2008), 73 FR 8720
(February 14, 2008).
    \4\ See Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs to Accompany S. 3850, Credit Rating Agency Reform Act
of 2006, S. Report No. 109-326, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 6,
2006).
    \5\ Release No. 34-58001 (June 23, 2008), 73 FR 36362 (June 26,
2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On September 2, 2010, the Commission issued an Order Instituting
Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings (``LACE/Putnam Order'')
against LACE and Barron Putnam, LACE's founder as well as its majority
owner during the relevant time period. The LACE/Putnam Order found,
among other things, that the firm made misrepresentations in its
application to become registered as an NRSRO and its accompanying
request for an exemption from Rule 17g-5(c)(1). Specifically, the
Commission found that the firm materially misstated the amount of
revenue it received from its largest customer during 2007.\6\ On
November 9, 2010, the Commission issued an Order Making Findings and
Imposing A Cease-and-Desist Order (the ``Mouzon Order'') against LACE's
former president, Damyon Mouzon. The Mouzon Order found, among other
things, that as LACE's president, Mouzon was responsible for ensuring
the accuracy of the information provided to the Commission in
connection with the firm's NRSRO application and its request for an
exemption, and that he knew or should have known that the financial
information that LACE provided to the Commission in connection with its
NRSRO application and its request for an exemption from Rule 17g-
5(c)(1) was inaccurate.\7\ LACE, Putnam and Mouzon each consented to
the entry of those orders on a neither admit nor deny basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ In the Matter of LACE Financial Corp. and Barron Putnam,
Respondents: Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist
Proceedings, Pursuant to Sections 15E(d) and 21C of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial
Sanctions and Cease-and-Desist Orders, Release No. 62834 (September
2, 2010).
    \7\ In the Matter of Damyon Mouzon, Respondent: Order Making
Findings and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Section
21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 63280
(November 9, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the request that is subject to this Order, Kroll acknowledged
the recent orders against LACE and its former owner and president and
stated that it has taken significant steps to enhance the compliance
and other functions associated with the traditional subscriber-based
business, including replacing senior management, retaining new
compliance and financial personnel, and adding new independent
directors comprising a majority of the board. Kroll has informed
Commission staff that LACE's former ownership and management personnel
no longer have any ownership or other relationship, financial or
otherwise, with Kroll. Kroll has further informed Commission staff that
LACE ceased performing any work or analysis in connection with the
issuer-paid ratings that were the subject of the LACE Exemptive Order
in December 2008.
    The Commission believes that a temporary, limited and conditional
exemption allowing Kroll to enter the market for rating structured
finance products is consistent with the Commission's goal of improving
ratings quality for the protection of investors and in the public
interest by fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in
the credit rating industry. In order to maintain this exemption, Kroll
will be required to publicly disclose in Exhibit 6 to Form NRSRO, as
applicable, that the firm received more than 10% of its net revenue in
fiscal years 2011 and 2012 from a client or clients that paid it to
rate asset-backed securities. This disclosure is designed to alert
users of credit ratings to the existence of this specific conflict and
is consistent with exemptive relief the Commission has previously
granted to LACE and Realpoint LLC. Furthermore, in addition to Kroll's
existing obligations as an NRSRO to maintain policies, procedures, and
internal controls, by the terms of this order, Kroll will also be
required to maintain policies, procedures, and internal controls
specifically designed to address the conflict created by exceeding the
10% threshold. Finally, the Commission notes that Kroll is subject to
the September 2, 2010 Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-
Desist Proceedings against LACE Financial Corp.
    Section 15E(p) of the Exchange Act, as added by Section 932(a)(8)
of the Dodd-

[[Page 58321]]

Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, requires
Commission staff to conduct an examination of each NRSRO at least
annually. As part of this annual examination regimen for NRSROs,
Commission staff will closely review Kroll's activities with respect to
managing this conflict and meeting the conditions set forth below and
will consider whether to recommend that the Commission take additional
action, including administrative or other action.
    The Commission therefore finds that a temporary, limited and
conditional exemption allowing Kroll to enter the market for rating
structured finance products is consistent with the Commission's goal,
as established by the Rating Agency Act, of improving ratings quality
by fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the
credit rating industry, subject to Kroll's making public disclosure of
the conflict created by exceeding the 10% threshold and maintaining
policies, procedures and internal controls to address that conflict, is
necessary and appropriate in the public interest and is consistent with
the protection of investors.

IV. Conclusion

    Accordingly, pursuant to Section 36 of the Exchange Act,
    It is hereby ordered that Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc., formerly
known as LACE Financial Corp., is exempt from the conflict of interest
prohibition in Exchange Act Rule 17g-5(c)(1) until January 1, 2013,
with respect to any revenue derived from issuer-paid ratings, provided
that: (1) Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. publicly discloses in Exhibit
6 to Form NRSRO, as applicable, that the firm received more than 10% of
its total net revenue in fiscal year 2011 or 2012 from a client or
clients; and (2) in addition to fulfilling its existing obligations as
an NRSRO to maintain policies, procedures, and internal controls, Kroll
Bond Rating Agency, Inc. also maintains policies, procedures, and
internal controls specifically designed to address the conflict created
by exceeding the 10% threshold.

    By the Commission.
Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011-24028 Filed 9-19-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
Unveiled – Occupy Wall Street Photos 19 September 2011
		
	
	

		








Occupy Wall Street Photos 19 September 2011










Wall Street at the New York Stock Exchange Closed[Image]




Wall Street Pedestrian Traffic Corraled by Barriers[Image][Image]









Wall Street Area Financial Buildings Looming over Liberty Camp (aka Zuccotti Park)[Image]




Camp Speakers Corner[Image]




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Bystanders Observing the Speakers[Image]




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Main Camp Pizza Supplier[Image]




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Federal Reserve Bank of New York Ostensible Regulator of Wall Street Banks, One Block From Liberty Camp[Image]
































	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Deep Packet Spying Breaches Gmail and All Security
		
	
	

		
Date: Sat, 17 Sep 2011 20:37:56 -0500

From: Marsh Ray <marsh[at]extendedsubset.com>

To: Discussion of cryptography and related <cryptography[at]randombit.net>

Subject: [cryptography] Another data point on SSL “trusted” root CA reliability (S Korea)


Been seeing Twitter from [at]ralphholz, [at]KevinSMcArthur, and [at]eddy_nigg about some goofy certs surfacing in S Korea with CA=true. via Reddit http://www.reddit.com/tb/kj25j


http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/496473.html [below]


It’s not entirely clear that a trusted CA cert is being used in this attack, however the article comes to the conclusion that HTTPS application data is being decrypted so it’s the most plausible assumption. Quoting extensively here because I don’t have a sense of how long “The Hankyoreh” keeps their English language text around. – Marsh


_______________________________________________

cryptography mailing list cryptography[at]randombit.net

http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography




Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2011 12:11:59 +0200

From: Ralph Holz <holz[at]net.in.tum.de>

To: cryptography[at]randombit.net

Subject: Re: [cryptography] Another data point on SSL “trusted” root CA reliability (S Korea)


True, we found about 80 distinct certificates that had subject “Government of Korea” and CA:TRUE [1].


In our full dataset from April 2011, however, we found about 30k certificates with this property. None of them had valid chains to the NSS root store. The numbers do not seem to change over time: in Nov 2009, it was about 30k, and about the same in Sep 2010. In the EFF dataset of the full IPv4 space, I find 773,512 such certificates. *Distinct* ones – and the EFF dataset has 5.5m distinct certs. It is a wide-spread problem.


For the case of Korea, [at]KevinSMcArthur found that the issuing certificates have a pathlen of 0, which makes it impossible for the end-host cert to operate as a CA *as long as the client actually checks that extension*. I don’t know which ones do, but it would be a question to ask the NSS developers.


As of now, I don’t think these are really attacker certs, also because the overall numbers seem to point more at some CA software that creates certs with the CA flag on by default.


Although your article seems to indicate something bad is going on over there…


[1] If you want to check, CSVs at:


www.meleeisland.de/korean_hosts_CA_on.csv


www.meleeisland.de/korean_hosts_CA_on_fullchains.csv


www.meleeisland.de/scan_apr2011_ca_on_issuers_not_selfsigned.csv


Ralph




NIS admits to packet tapping Gmail


If proven, international fallout could occur over insecurity of the HTTP Secure system


By Noh Hyung-woong


It has come to light that the National Intelligence Service has been using a technique known as “packet tapping” to spy on emails sent and received using Gmail, Google’s email service. This is expected to have a significant impact, as it proves that not even Gmail, previously a popular “cyber safe haven” because of its reputation for high levels of security, is safe from tapping.


The NIS itself disclosed that Gmail tapping was taking place in the process of responding to a constitutional appeal filed by 52-year-old former teacher Kim Hyeong-geun, who was the object of packet tapping, in March this year.


As part of written responses submitted recently to the Constitutional Court, the NIS stated, “Mr. Kim was taking measures to avoid detection by investigation agencies, such as using a foreign mail service [Gmail] and mail accounts in his parents’ names, and deleting emails immediately after receiving or sending them. We therefore made the judgment that gathering evidence through a conventional search and seizure would be difficult, and conducted packet tapping.”


The NIS went on to explain, “[Some Korean citizens] systematically attempt so-called ‘cyber asylum,’ in ways such as using foreign mail services (Gmail, Hotmail) that lie beyond the boundaries of Korea‘s investigative authority, making packet tapping an inevitable measure for dealing with this.”


The NIS asserted the need to tap Gmail when applying to a court of law for permission to also use communication restriction measures [packet tapping]. The court, too, accepted the NIS’s request at the time and granted permission for packet tapping.


Unlike normal communication tapping methods, packet tapping is a technology that allows a real-time view of all content coming and going via the Internet. It opens all packets of a designated user that are transmitted via the Internet. This was impossible in the early days of the Internet, but monitoring and vetting of desired information only from among huge amounts of packet information became possible with the development of “deep packet inspection” technology. Deep packet inspection technology is used not only for censorship, but also in marketing such as custom advertising on Gmail and Facebook.


The fact that the NIS taps Gmail, which uses HTTP Secure, a communication protocol with reinforced security, means that it possesses the technology to decrypt data packets transmitted via Internet lines after intercepting them.


“Gmail has been using an encrypted protocol since 2009, when it was revealed that Chinese security services had been tapping it,” said one official from a software security company. “Technologically, decrypting it is known to be almost impossible. If it turns out to be true [that the NIS has been packet tapping], this could turn into an international controversy.”


“The revelation of the possibility that Gmail may have been tapped is truly shocking,” said Jang Yeo-gyeong, an activist at Jinbo.net. “It has shown once again that the secrets of people’s private lives can be totally violated.” Lawyer Lee Gwang-cheol of MINBYUN-Lawyers for a Democratic Society, who has taken on Kim’s case, said, “I think it is surprising, and perhaps even good, that the NIS itself has revealed that it uses packet tapping on Gmail. I hope the Constitutional Court will use this appeal hearing to decide upon legitimate boundaries for investigations, given that the actual circumstances of the NIS’s packet tapping have not been clearly revealed.”


Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani[at]hani.co.kr]

	


	



			
				


			

			
OP-SECRET – CIA Domestic Spying Authorized T
		
	
	

		
cia-domestic-spy

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Fukushima Daiichi NPS 15-16 September 2011
		
	
	

		
















17 September 2011


Fukushima Daiichi NPS 15-16 September 2011


Photos released by Tokyo Electric Power Co. 17 September 2011












Fukushima Daiichi NPS 15-16 September 2011










[Image]Unit 1, Reactor building cover from northern side, Sep 15, 2011.

High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_01.jpg		




[Image]Unit 1, Reactor building cover from northern side, Sep 15, 2011.

High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_02.jpg		




[Image]Unit 1, View from large crane around a reactor building, Sep 15, 2011.

High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_03.jpg		




[Image]Unit 1, Southern direction (Unit 3 & 4) from Unit 1, Sep 15, 2011.

High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_04.jpg		




[Image]Unit 2, Overview of a reactor building from western hilltop, Sep 15, 2011.

High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_05.jpg		




[Image]Unit 3, Overview of a reactor building from western hilltop, Sep 15, 2011.

High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_06.jpg		




[Image]Unit 3, Rubble collection around southwest of a reactor building, Sep 16, 2011.

High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_07.jpg		




[Image]Unit 3, Rubble collection preparation of a reactor building, Sep 15, 2011.

High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_08.jpg		




[Image]Unit 4, Overview of a reactor building from western hilltop, Sep 15, 2011.

High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_09.jpg		




[Image]Unit 4, Rubble collection preparation of a reactor building, Sep 15, 2011.

High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_10.jpg		




[Image]Unit 5,6, Overview of a reactor building from southwest side, Sep 15, 2011.

High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_11.jpg		




[Image]Unit 5,6, Maintenance work at port and harbors from Unit 6 seaside yard, Sep 15, 2011.

High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_12.jpg		




[Image]Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility, overview, Sep 16, 2011.

High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_15.jpg		




[Image]Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility, overview, Sep 16, 2011.





	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Bureau of Public Debt Records Eyeball
		
	
	

		
Bureau of Public Debt Records Eyeball


Federal Register, August 17, 2011

Systems Covered by this Notice

    This notice covers all systems of records adopted by the Bureau of
the Public Debt up to April 1, 2011. The systems notices are reprinted
in their entirety following the Table of Contents.

    Dated: August 11, 2011.
Veronica Marco,
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Privacy, Transparency, and
Records.

Table of Contents

Bureau of the Public Debt
BPD.001--Human Resources and Administrative Records
BPD.002--United States Savings-Type Securities
BPD.003--United States Securities (Other than Savings-Type
Securities)
BPD.004--Controlled Access Security System
BPD.005--Employee Assistance Records
BPD.006--Health Service Program Records
BPD.007--Gifts to Reduce the Public Debt
BPD.008--Retail Treasury Securities Access Application
BPD.009--U.S. Treasury Securities Fraud Information System

TREASURY/BPD.001

System Name:
    Human Resources and Administrative Records--Treasury/BPD.

System Location(s):
    Records are maintained at the following Bureau of the Public Debt
locations: 200 Third Street, Parkersburg, WV; 320 Avery Street,
Parkersburg, WV; Second and Avery Streets, Parkersburg, WV; and 799 9th
Street, NW., Washington, DC.












Bureau of Public Debt Records


Eyeball










200 Third Street, Parkersburg, WV[Image]




[Image]




[Image]




[Image]





















	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – TEMPEST and Countermeasures Cables
		
	
	

		
A sends:


The following 5 cables contain both the word “TEMPEST” and “countermeasures”, all are SECRET//NOFORN:


– 08BISHKEK293


– 09STATE869


– 09STATE23578


– 09STATE29526


– 09STATE29527 (Appears to be duplicate of 09STATE29526)


Also:


– 09STATE23578 (Appears to be duplicate of 09STATE29526)


Source: http://laurelai.info/mirrors/cablegate/


The State Department section 12 FAH (Foreign Affairs Handbook) is classified.




VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEK #0293/01 0870902
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 270902Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0846

S E C R E T BISHKEK 000293 

SIPDIS 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR ACTION OF OIG
DEPT FOR NEA/SCA/EX BILL HAUGH
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN DAVID GEHRENBECK 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2033
TAGS: AMGT ASEC ASIG AISG
SUBJECT: EMBASSY BISHKEK RESPONSES TO RECOMMENDATIONS
LISTED IN OIG REPORT NUMBER ISP-S-08-14A, FEBRUARY 2008 

REF: A. MCCORMICK/AMBASSADOR YOVANOVITCH E-MAIL DATED
        FEBRUARY 29 2008
     B. OIG REPORT NUMBER ISP-S-08-14A FEBRUARY 2008 

Classified By: DCM Lee Litzenberger for Reasons 1.4(g) 

Here follows Embassy Bishkek responses to the formal and
informal recommendations listed in OIG report number
ISP-S-08-14A. 

1.  (C/NF)  Recommendation 1: Embassy Bishkek should continue
to coordinate with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations to ensure near term installation of locally
fabricated mantraps for the vehicle entrances to the embassy
compound.
(Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with OBO) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post has contracted via RPSO Frankfurt with a
German Architectural and Engineering firm to provide 100%
design and construction documents for the Mantrap project. To
date, Post and OBO have received the 35% design submittal for
review and have returned comments. Although most recently
some contractual problems have slowed the design effort, Post
is confident these issues will be resolved quickly and 100%
design documents can be delivered by 30 April. After
receiving the final construction documents and OBO Building
Permit, Post will proceed to the contracting and construction
phase. 

2.  (C/NF)  Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Overseas
Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek,
should replace the damaged forced-entry/ballistic-resistant
window on the compound access control guard booth servicing
the employee parking lot. (Action: OBO, in coordination with
Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post identified the proper replacement glass and
ordered the glass directly from Norshield in coordination
with OBO/PE/CC/SPE via purchases order SKG-100-08-M-0057. The
order for the replacement glass was placed on 01/17/08. On
03/05/08, Post learned that the window reached our dispatch
agent in New Jersey. Post anticipates the window will arrive
06/08. Once the replacement glass is received, Post will
coordinate with Larry Best and Koburn Stoll from
OBO/PE/CC/SPE to request an FE/BR door and window team for
installation. 

3.  (SBU)  Recommendation 3: Embassy Bishkek should implement
flexible work hours for embassy personnel and encourage
employees to vary their arrival and departure times. (Action:
Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs in part. 

Response: Post is not prepared to implement flexible working
hours Embassy wide, but prefers a stepped approach to arrival
times by section to help alleviate vehicles waiting outside
of the compound to be screened, which is a the security
concern that prompted this recommendation. Post has analyzed
the congestion problems and contends that the congestion is
primarily focused at Post 26 (vehicle CAC) from between 0800
to 0830 while vehicles are waiting for security screening.
Post Management has instructed the Facilities Maintenance
Section to alter their working hours so that this section
would start work at 0800 vice 0830. The Facilities
Maintenance Section is by far the largest section that
reports directly to the Embassy every morning and modifying
their arrival time by 30 minutes should eliminate waiting
lines for security screening while still maintaining positive
management controls over staff. In addition, the RSO
regularly advises all American Staff to vary their routes and
times to and from work. 

4.  (C/NF)  Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Overseas
Buildings Operations should assess the integrity of all
affected chancery windows and advise the embassy of any
needed work to bring the windows into compliance with
security standards. (Action: OBO) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Yvonne Manderville from OBO/PE/DE/SEB visited Post
in March 2008. Manderville stated that adhesive properties of
the gasket material have failed and caused the gasket to 

separate from the window pane which has resulted in the
degradation of the ballistic properties of the window
assemblies. Manderville recommended that Post petition for
inclusion in the FEBR window and door   replacement program.
Post is drafting a cable to OBO and DS requesting a formal
condition survey of all FE/BR windows and doors. In this
cable Post will also petition for inclusion in the Life Cycle
Replacement program. Request will be submitted by May 1, 2008. 

5.  (S/NF)  Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should
conduct a complete TEMPEST review of all permanent and
temporary classified processing areas at post and provide
detailed instructions regarding countermeasures that should
be employed to mitigate any proven TEMPEST noncompliance or
threat. (Action: DS in coordination with Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post will review and implement the recommendations
from the May 2007 Technical Security Assessment. Post has
contacted Lee Mason and Mark Steakley from DS/ST/CMP/ECB to
request and schedule a TEMPEST review. Mason and Steakley
were contacted in mid March and Post is waiting follow-up and
confirmation. 

6.  (SBU)  Recommendation 6: Embassy Bishkek should establish
a viable alternate command center. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post does not concur. 

Response: The current alternate command center represents the
best option presently available to Embassy Bishkek. The
alternate command center is located south of Bishkek not far
from the Kyrgyz Presidential mansion and the Diplomatic
village. While the road infrastructure could be improved, the
location is not remote. In addition, the location is well
suited for a helicopter landing zone.  There is a large field
approximately 600 meters wide and 2 kilometers in length that
could accommodate several transport helicopters in the event
of an evacuation. The alternate command center has a HF radio
base station that when last tested in December 2007 had
excellent link quality between Embassy Dushanbe (82%) and
Embassy Tashkent (91%). The alternate command center has two
computer workstations with dial-up internet access, a
photocopier, and a fax. There are two landlines, one IVG line
and two satellite phones. The alternate command center can be
placed into operation within 30 minutes as demonstrated in a
test in December 2007. Furthermore, the location has been
fully stocked with medical supplies, emergency rations and
water. Embassy Bishkek could not find any blast protection
requirements in the applicable Alternate Command Center
references in 12 FAH-1 H-261c and 12 FAH 1, Appendix 3. As
the Post housing pool evolves, Post will continue to seek a
better Alternate Command Center, but the current location is
the best option at the present time. 

7.  (SBU)  Recommendation 7: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should
evaluate post's current safe haven and initiate a physical
security upgrade project to bring the safe haven into
conformance with current requirements. (Action: OBO, in
coordination with Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post's safe haven area is too small to protect all
employees assigned to Embassy Bishkek.  Until the annex is
built, Post initiated coordination with Yvonne Manderville
OBO/PE/DE/SEB and Dale Amdahl DS/PCB/PSD to identify and
implement viable alternatives such as constructing safe areas
in the warehouse, facilities maintenance building and health
unit/caf. Post's floor warden training addresses refuge
locations within the Chancery. 

8.  (SBU)  Recommendation 8: Embassy Bishkek should develop
and implement a formal agreement with Manas Air Base for the
evacuation of Americans and qualifying locally employed staff
members. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: The Embassy has explored the recommendation. In
doing so we have learned that a formal agreement between
Embassy Bishkek and Manas Coalition Airbase for the
evacuation of Americans and qualifying locally employed staff
members and selected foreign nationals, is not necessary to
ensure Noncombatant Evacuation Operations are accomplished, 

and the base is not authorized by USCENTCOM to conclude such
an agreement. There are mechanisms in place for the efficient
and proper coordination and planning for this contingency
which should be followed to ensure forces and assets are
available during emergency situations. Embassy Bishkek has
therefore  coordinated with USCENTCOM to ensure contingency
planning options are in-place, to include evacuation of
Embassy personnel, and fully coordinated with other affected
agencies (USTRANSCOM, DOS, and JCS) IAW applicable
directives. 

9.  (SBU)  Recommendation 9: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination
with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should conduct a
security assessment to determine whether static residential
guards are required in addition to the centralized alarm
monitoring system and mobile patrol. (Action: Embassy
Bishkek, in coordination with DS) 

Management decision: Post concurs, with comment. 

Response: Post will conduct, in coordination with the Bureau
of Diplomatic security an assessment outlined in 12 FAH-6
H-521.1. Post is confident the assessment will reaffirm that
the residential security program is necessary for the safety
and security of personnel assigned to Embassy Bishkek.
Targeted date for completion is 30 June 2008. 

The greatest threat against Americans in Bishkek is crime. In
February 1994 Embassy Bishkek instructed the Local Guard
Commander to implement a night residential security program.
In October 2002, the RSO identified a local alarm company
that had the technical capability to install and monitor
alarms and panic buttons at Embassy residences. However, in
January 2008 the new Minister of Internal Affairs announced
that MVD would no longer provide a quick reaction force to
respond to alarms. In addition, RSO Bishkek is only
authorized one, 24 hour mobile patrol. This means that
response time to residences in the event of an emergency is
too slow. Although the distance between the southernmost and
northernmost residence is only 8 miles, the infrastructure
and traffic can delay response time by more than 30 minutes.
In addition, Mobile Patrol can only check each residence two
or three times in a 12 hour shift.  This situation is
untenable. 

Since 2006, residential LGF have detected and deterred 4
instances of attempted vandalism to Embassy employee vehicles
at their residences. LGF residential guards have deterred
assault and when tasked provided temporary 24 hour
residential security for American Officers who the RSO had
reason to believe were being threatened by host nation
intelligence and or organized crime. Finally, residential
security guards were able to monitor and report regarding an
incident in which a vehicle belonging to the son-in-law of
the former deputy chief of the Kyrgyz Intelligence service
was deliberately torched within 30 feet of an apartment
building which, at the time, housed four Embassy employees
and their families. Since the Embassy began using the alarm
company, the Police have not had to respond to incidents at
residences during the night when the guards were present. The
alarms have only been needed during the day when the guards
are not present. The statistic speaks for itself. The
residential guards are a definite deterrent against acts of
violence and vandalism against American Officers. Embassy
Bishkek, if required to choose between residential alarms and
residential guards, would choose to maintain the residential
guards, as a more viable means of protecting the lives of the
American officers and their dependents. 

10.  (C/NF)  Recommendation 10: Embassy Bishkek should
install shatter-resistant window film on all windows that the
regional security officer considers vulnerable at the chief
of mission residence. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post's Facilities Maintenance Section has scheduled
a survey of the CMR to identify all windows that are not
currently protected by shatter-resistant window film. Post
currently has film on hand and will contract with a local
contractor for installation. Targeted date of completion is
May 31, 2008. 

11.  (SBU)  Recommendation 11: Embassy Bishkek should install
grilles on all accessible windows in the chief of mission
residence safe area and fit one window grille with an
interior emergency release device for emergency egress.
(Action: Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: RSO in conjunction with the FM at Post has
scheduled a review and update of the existing physical
security assessment of the CMR in accordance with residential
security standards 12 FAH-6 H-400, 12 FAH-6 H-113.10 and 12
FAH-8 H-520. Any deficiencies discovered during this review
will be corrected to conform to the standards. Targeted date
of completion is July 31, 2008. 

12.  (U)  Recommendation 12: Embassy Bishkek should pursue
and secure a formal agreement with Manas Air force Base,
including reimbursement, for investigative support provided
by the regional security office. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post FMO has contacted Manas Air Base Chief
Financial Officer regarding this recomendation and has
requested a meeting to explore the concept of reimbursement
for investigative services provided by the Embassy on behalf
of Manas Air Base. Post RSO and FMO are working closley to
accurately identify and quantify associated cost related to
investigations. Once Post's analysis is complete the FMO will
coordinate with Manas Air Base Chief Finance Officer to
establish a formal agreement that outlines workload counts
and a reimbursement plan for investigations completed by RSO
Foreign Service National Investigators on behalf of Manas Air
Base. 

13.  (C/NF)  Recommendation 13: Embassy Bishkek, in
coordination with the Bureaus of Overseas Buildings
Operations and Diplomatic Security, should modify the
facility manager's existing office space to bring it into
compliance with current physical security protection
standards. (Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with OBO
and DS) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Although Post concurs with this recommendation, a
short term solution is unlikely. The existing Facilities
Managers Office is a loft in the Maintenance Shop Building.
This building is a pre-engineered building (Butler Building)
and is physically unable to handle the load that would be
applied to the structure by the addition of making this area
compliant with current physical security protection
standards. Post has been actively pursuing with OBO a new
office annex (NOX), which is a long term solution to
holistically address all of our space and space related
security concerns. Post is currently on the "Top 80 List" for
2011 and a back-up for 2010. However, Embassy Bishkek
Facilities Maintenance Officer and the Regional Security
Officer will prepare a waiver and exception package for
DS/PSD/PCB review and approval. Targeted date for submission
of the waiver and exception request to DS/PSD/PCB is June
2008. 

14.  (C/NF)  Informal Recommendation 1: The inner CAC
building (post two) lacks any form of protective window
treatment on its windows. Occupants are susceptible to flying
glass if a bomb attack occurred on the east side of the
compound. Embassy Bishkek should install shatter-resistant
window film on all post two windows that the regional
security officer deems vulnerable to blast. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post's Facilities Maintenance Section will conduct
a survey of Post 2 and identify all windows that are not
currently protected by shatter-resistant window film. Post
currently has film on hand and will contract with a local
contractor for installation. Targeted date of completion is
May 31, 2008. 

15.  (C/NF)  Informal Recommendation 2: The presence of a
concrete barrier adjacent to the east side vehicular CAC, a
large boulder adjacent to the northwest corner of the
compound wall, and a stoplight fixture adjacent to the
service CAC provide footholds that an intruder could use to
scale the compound wall. Embassy Bishkek should remove or
relocate the concrete barrier, boulder, and stoplight that
are adjacent to the embassy compound fence. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: In March Post relocated the concrete barriers and 

large boulders so that they are at least 2.75 meters from the
compound wall and can no longer be used as a foothold. The
location of the stoplight fixture will be relocated during
the construction of the mantrap for that CAC later this year. 

16.  (C/NF)  Informal Recommendation 3: The rear hardline
door leading to the temporary trailers is not covered by an
exterior camera. The Marine at Post One cannot positively
determine who he is letting into the chancery. Without
a camera, he could either allow an intruder to enter or deny
entry to a trusted employee in an emergency. Embassy Bishkek
should install a camera to cover this area. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: The regional ESO from Astana concurs with this
recommendation; ESO will relocate camera #28 so that it
provides video coverage of this entrance to the Chancery.
Additional materials required for this project are on-hand
and this project has been added to the active work list as a
priority. Targeted completion date is June 30th 

17.  (SBU)  Informal Recommendation 4: The emergency plan for
Embassy Bishkek has not been entered into the crisis and
emergency planning application. Embassy Bishkek should direct
section heads to input the missing data before February 2008. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: In February Post completed the unclassified portion
of the EAP and entered it into the crisis and emergency
planning application. Post is waiting for DS/IP/SPC/EP to
advise that the software glitch has been fixed to allow Post
to publish the classified sections as well. 

18.  (SBU)  Informal Recommendation 5: The emergency
notification system does not cover the embassy's built-in
conference room or the workspace just outside the two CAA
temporary office trailers. Embassy Bishkek should install
speaker systems at these two locations. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: The regional ESO from Astana concurs with this
recommendation; additional speakers and other materials
required for this project are on-hand and this project has
been added to the active work list as a priority. Targeted
completion date is June 30th. 

19. (SBU)  Informal Recommendation 6: The physical security
exceptions for three locations within the compound are not
valid. Embassy Bishkek should update the existing physical
security exceptions for the medical unit, cafeteria, and CAA
office trailers. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: The waiver for exceptions to physical security
standards for the CAA office trailer is valid.  However, the
Health Unit/Caf waiver is no longer valid. As a result of
post growth, the Health Unit and Cafeteria are now staffed by
employees more than 4 hours per day.  Embassy Bishkek will
resubmit a waiver and exception packet for the health
unit/cafeteria. Targeted submission date is 30 June. 

20.  (U)  Informal Recommendation 7: Several apartment
stairwells do not have lighting at night. Embassy Bishkek
should explore gaining landlord agreement to install motion
activated lights in stairwells and issue flashlights to
employees in the interim. 

Management decision: Post does not concur. 

Response: Post has conducted an informal survey of all direct
hire American staff who receive Embassy provide housing and
other than individual incidents of actual light bulbs being
burned out, all stairwells have adequate lighting installed.
In addition to this, every Friday, the Facilities Maintenance
Section Electricians in conjunction with the Local Guard
Force make inspections of existing security lighting. Lights
are tested in guard booths and stairwells and any maintenance
work orders that have been submitted citing security lighting
issues are repaired at this time. 

21.  (C/NF)  Informal Recommendation 8: The grilles on the
CMR rear doors do not have latches and cannot be secured from
inside the residence. Embassy Bishkek should secure these
grilles. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: RSO in conjunction with the FM at Post will review
and update the existing physical security assessment of the
CMR in accordance with residential security standards 12
FAH-6 H-400, 12 FAH-6 H-113.10 and 12 FAH-8 H-520. Any
deficiencies discovered during this review will be corrected
to conform to the standards. Expected completion date is 1
May 2008. 

22.  (C/NF)  Informal Recommendation 9: The passive infrared
sensor in the living room of the CMR on the rear of the
building is inoperative. Embassy Bishkek should repair this
infrared sensor. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: The local security company that installs and
maintains all of our residential alarm systems visited the
CMR on March 19, 2008. The entire alarm system was inspected
and tested. It was found that some faulty wiring was causing
the infrared sensor from operating properly, wiring was
repaired and a complete operational test was  conducted with
satisfactory results. 

YOVANOVITCH




R 061518Z JAN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
CIA WASHINGTON DC/DO/MSP-MCGSOC/ 2364
DIA WASHINGTON DC/
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3SOD//
HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL/
HQ EUCOM VAIHINGEN GE/
COMSOCEUR/
USASOC FT BRAGG NC/
AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL

S E C R E T STATE 000869 

DDSO FOR CAPT. SONG
USSOCOM FOR MR. BRIAN MILLER
POST FOR RSO
POST FOR IMO
POST FOR ADANA
PRETORIA FOR RIMC 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018
TAGS: ACOA AEMR AMGT ASEC
SUBJECT: EUCOM(AF) REGIONAL SURVEY TEAM PCC ACCESS -
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 

REF: A. USSOCOM SCSO J2 MACDILL AFB
     B. FL 111131Z DEC 08
     C. 08 ANKARA 2153 

Classified By: JAMES MCDERMOTT, DIRECTOR, DS/IP/SPC,
REASON 1.4(G) 

1. (U) ACTION POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF
THIS TELEGRAM  VIA CABLE TO INFO DS/IP/SPC AND
IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/CSB STATING CONCURRENCE AND/OR  NONCONCURRENCE. 

2. (U) FOR ATO AF: PLEASE FORWARD YOUR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST TO  IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/CSB AND INFO DS/IP/SPC.  ANY
FURTHER INQUIRIES CAN BE DIRECTED  TO YOUR OC/COMSEC. 

3. (U) IRM/BPC/CST/LD/OB AND IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/CSB HAVE CLEARED
THIS TELEGRAM. 

4. (S) THE FOLLOWING RST MEMBERS WILL VISIT AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AS WELL AS CONSULATE GENERAL ISTANBUL AND US CONSULATE ADANA
ON JANUARY 14, 2009 TO FEBRUARY 14, 2009 TO  CONDUCT A
SECURITY PROGRAM SURVEY OF THE  FACILITY.  THE FOLLOWING TEAM
MEMBERS WHO POSSESS TOP SECRET (TS)  CLEARANCES ARE
AUTHORIZED ESCORTED ACCESS TO THE PCC IN ACCORDANCE WITH
5FAH-6 H124.4 E, G, H: 

NAME                    SSN         CLEARANCE 

MANN, JAMES R.          XXX-XX-XXXX TS/SCI
MCKINNON, ISAIAH        XXX-XX-XXXX TS/SCI
DRAPER, DONALD W.       XXX-XX-XXXX TS/SCI 

5. (S) PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE PCC IS AUTHORIZED UNDER THE
FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: 

     (A) THE SHIELDED ENCLOSURE, MG SET, AC POWER FILTERS,
AND ISOLATION  TRANSFORMER ARE NOT TO BE FILMED OR
PHOTOGRAPHED; THEREFORE, ARRANGE TO  HAVE THIS EQUIPMENT
COVERED DURING FILMING/PHOTOGRAPHY OF AREA. 

     (B) ALL ELECTRONIC PROCESSING OF CLASSIFIED DATA MUST
HALT DURING THE  USE OF ANY ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT UTILIZED BY
THE TEAM. 

     (C) ANY VIDEO TAPE OR PHOTOS TAKEN WITHIN THE PCC SHALL
BE CLASSIFIED  CONFIDENTIAL AND MARKED AND HANDLED AS SUCH. 

     (D) PLAY BACK OF CLASSIFIED VIDEO/AUDIO TAPE MUST BE
ACCOMPLISHED IN  A TEMPEST APPROVED MANNER. 

     (E) CLASSIFIED PLAIN TEXT MUST BE SECURED AND THE SURVEY
TEAM MUST  REMAIN UNDER ESCORT BY PCC PERSONNEL. 

6. (U) POC: DS/IP/SPC/SO: JAMES SPOO, BRANCH CHIEF, STE (571)
345-2532. 

RICE




VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #3578 0711843
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121826Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0000
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0000
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0000
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0000

S E C R E T STATE 023578 

NOFORN
SEOUL FOR RSO IMO AND ESO
BEIJING FOR ESC
MANILA FOR RDSE (ACTING)
BANGKOK FOR RIMC
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON CLOSURE OF U.S. EMBASSY SEOUL
TAGS: AADP ABLD ACOA AMGT ASEC KSEO KRIM KGIT KNET KCIP
SUBJECT: TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES REQUIREMENTS - SEOUL 

REF: 00 STATE 126075 

Classified By: M.J. STEAKLEY, DS/ST/CMP, REASON: 1.4 (C) AND (G) 

1. (S/NF) These revised TEMPEST countermeasures requirements
are effective immediately. Requirements apply to the Chancery
at Seoul, located at 82 Sejong-ro.  Post's relevant threat
levels at the time of this  telegram are High for Technical
and High for Human Intelligence. 

2. (S) TEMPEST requirements are determined by the Certified
TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) and approved by the
Countermeasures Division Director.  These requirements apply
to all information processing systems for this facility. 

A. (S) TOP SECRET and SCI CLASSIFIED Automated Information
System (AIS): Post is authorized to use TEMPEST Level 1 AIS
equipment for processing classified national security
information (NSI) at the TOP SECRET or SCI level within the
Embassy core area of the CAA.  Post is authorized to use
Commercial-off- the-Shelf (COTS) AIS equipment within a CSE
or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. Use of
higher level equipment is approved. 

B. (S) SECRET (COLLATERAL) CLASSIFIED (AIS): Seoul is
authorized to use  TEMPEST Level 1 AIS equipment for
processing classified NSI at the SECRET level within
restricted and core areas of the CAA.  Post was previously
authorized Zone A equipment, but that equipment category is
being phased out and is no longer being procured.  By October
1, 2013, Seoul must have replaced all Zone A classified
processing equipment with TEMPEST Level 1 equipment.  Post is
authorized to use COTS AIS equipment within a certified
shielded enclosure (CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106
specifications. 

C. (S) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AIS: Use of COTS AIS for
processing unclassified and sensitive but unclassified (SBU)
within the Embassy restricted area and core area of the CAA
is approved.  Unclassified and multimedia equipped
unclassified processing equipment to be used within a CAA
must be purchased, shipped, stored, installed, maintained and
repaired in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-542, and may not be
located inside a CSE. 

3. (S) Secure video teleconferencing (SVDC), if requested,
will be addressed in a SEPTEL following completion of
coordination with VCI/VO. 

4. (S) All Classified Automated Information System (CAIS)
equipment, components and peripherals must be secured in
accordance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB)
requirements for classified discussion, processing and/or
storage overseas.  Thin Clients with embedded flash memory,
at facilities with 24-hour cleared American presence, are
permitted to remain unsecured within the Controlled Access
Areas (CAA) as long as the equipment is rebooted prior to
vacating the premises. 

5. (S) Fiber optic cabling is required for classified
connectivity.  Fiber optic cabling is also required for
unclassified (SBU) connectivity for any IT equipment located
within a CSE.  Equipment used to process classified
information outside a CSE must be installed, to the maximum
extent possible, in accordance with Recommendation A of
NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95 with the following additional
requirements: 

- Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical)
from other computer and electronic equipment used for
unclassified information processing. 

- Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical)
from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded
telephone or signal lines that do not leave USG-controlled
property (for example, phone lines that go to the post phone
switch). 

- Be located a minimum of two meters (six feet spherical)
from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded
telephone or signal lines that transit USG-controlled
property (for example, direct phone lines that do not go
through the post telephone switch, telephone switch lines
going out, any wire going to antennas on the roof, etc). 

- Be located a minimum of 3 meters (ten feet spherical) from
active radio transmitters (two-way radios, high frequency
transceivers, satellite transceivers, cellular devices,
Wi-Fi devices, Bluetooth, etc.) and must not use the same AC
power circuit as active radio transmitters (to include cell
phone chargers). 

- Be located a minimum of three meters (ten feet spherical)
from cable television antenna feeds and any Warren switch
with the switch on.  This distance can be reduced to one
meter if the Warren switch is off when processing classified. 

- Be located to have no physical contact with any other
office equipment or cabling. 

6. (S) Classified conversations up to SECRET may be conducted
in the CAA offices or vaults in accordance with 12 FAH-6
H-313.10-4. Classified discussions shall be conducted in CAA
spaces with DS-approved acoustic countermeasures or in secure
conference rooms (SCRs) or equivalent according to the OSPB
Conduct of Classified Conversations standard.  Classified
conversations above the SECRET level are restricted to
relevant core areas. 

7. (U) All requirements apply to all agencies under Chief of
Mission authority and pertain to the Chancery building only.
Tenant agencies may employ additional TEMPEST countermeasures
within their respective offices. 

8. (U) For further information or clarification regarding 12
FAH-6 H-540 Automated Information Systems Standards, please
contact DS/CS/ETPA.  For other, TEMPEST related issues,
please contact the Department CTTA at DSCTTA@state.sgov.gov. 

9. (U) Post must verify that these TEMPEST countermeasures
have been implemented and report so in an updated Technical
Security Assessment (TSA).  All proposed change requests to a
CAA countermeasures environment must be sent to the
Department, identified for DS/ST/CMP action. 

10. (U) This telegram should be retained by Post until
superseding requirements are received.
CLINTON




VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #9526 0861053
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 271035Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0000
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0000
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0000
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 0000
RUEHNW/DIR DTSPO WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T STATE 029526 

NOFORN
AMMAN FOR RSO IMO AND ESO
ABU DHABI FOR ESC
CAIRO FOR RDSE
FRANKFURT FOR RIMC
DTSPO FOR BRS/CMD/TCSC
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON CLOSURE OF U.S. EMBASSY AMMAN
TAGS: AADP ABLD ACOA AMGT ASEC KSEO KRIM KGIT KNET KCIP
SUBJECT: TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES REQUIREMENTS - AMMAN 

REF: A. 95 STATE 230596
     B. 06 STATE 13022 

Classified By: M.J. STEAKLEY, DS/ST/CMP, REASON: 1.4 (C) AND (G) 

1. (S/NF) These revised TEMPEST countermeasures requirements
are effective immediately.  Requirements apply to the
Chancery at Amman, Jordan, located at Abdoun, Al-Umawyeen
Street, Amman, Jordan.  Amman,s threat levels at the time of
this telegram are MEDIUM for Technical and MEDIUM for Human
Intelligence. 

2. (S) TEMPEST requirements are determined by the Certified
TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) and approved by the
Countermeasures Division Director.  These requirements apply
to all information processing systems for this facility. 

A. (S) TOP SECRET and Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) CLASSIFIED Automated Information System (AIS): Post is
authorized to use TEMPEST Level 2 AIS equipment for
processing classified national security information (NSI) at
the TOP SECRET or SCI level within the Embassy core area of
the controlled access area (CAA).  Within a certified
shielded enclosure (CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106
specifications, post is authorized to use
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) AIS equipment. 

B. (S) SECRET (COLLATERAL) CLASSIFIED (AIS): Post is
authorized to use TEMPEST Level 2 AIS equipment for
processing classified NSI at the SECRET level  within
restricted and core areas of the CAA.  Post is authorized to
use COTS AIS equipment within a certified shielded enclosure
(CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. 

NOTE: Post currently has COTS equipment installed for
classified processing at the SECRET level outside of a CSE.
This equipment must be replaced with TEMPEST Level 2 or
TEMPEST Level 1 compliant AIS within 24 months of the date of
this telegram.  Effective immediately, all new procurements
must be for TEMPEST Level 2 or TEMPEST Level 1 compliant
equipment. 

C. (S) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AIS: Use of COTS AIS for
processing unclassified and sensitive but unclassified (SBU)
within the Embassy restricted and core area of the CAA is
approved.  Unclassified and multimedia-equipped unclassified
processing equipment to be used within a CAA must be
purchased, shipped, stored, installed, maintained and
repaired in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-542, and may not be
located inside a CSE. 

3. (S) Secure video-teleconferencing and data collaboration
(SVDC) system installation and operation was previously
authorized in REFTEL (B).  As a result of the TEMPEST
requirements change announced in this telegram, the current
SVDC equipment must either be replaced with TEMPEST Level 1
compliant equipment or the existing SVDC COTS equipment must
be relocated and installed inside a CSE. Request that Post,s
RSO notify DS/CMP/ECB within 60 days of this telegram whether
SVDC equipment will remain in its current location and be
upgraded to TEMPEST Level 1 or if the existing SVDC COTS
equipment will be moved inside a CSE.  Should Post decide to
move the existing SVDC COTS equipment to a different location
inside a CSE, a new SVDC check list must be prepared and
submitted, and a new authorization telegram will be issued by
DS/ST/CMP to formalize the decision. 

4. (S) All Classified Automated Information System (CAIS)
equipment, components and peripherals must be secured in
accordance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB)
requirements for classified discussion, processing and/or
storage overseas.  Thin clients with embedded flash memory,
at facilities with 24-hour cleared American presence, are
permitted to remain unsecured within the CAA as long as the
equipment is rebooted prior to vacating the premises. 

5. (S) Fiber optic cabling is required for classified
connectivity.  Fiber optic cabling is also required for
unclassified (SBU) connectivity for any information
technology equipment located within a CSE.  Equipment used to
process classified information outside a CSE must be
installed, to the maximum extent possible, in accordance with
Recommendation E of NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95A with the following
additional requirements: 

- Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical)
from other computer and electronic equipment used for
unclassified information processing. 

- Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical)
from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded
telephone or signal lines that do not leave USG-controlled
property (for example, phone lines that go to the post phone
switch). 

- Be located a minimum of two meters (six feet spherical)
from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded
telephone or signal lines that transit USG-controlled
property (for example, direct phone lines that do not go
through the post telephone switch, telephone switch lines
going out, any wire going to antennas on the roof, etc). 

- Be located a minimum of 3 meters (ten feet spherical) from
active radio transmitters (two-way radios, high frequency
transceivers, satellite transceivers, cellular devices,
Wi-Fi devices, Bluetooth, etc.) and must not use the same AC
power circuit as active radio transmitters (to include cell
phone chargers). 

- Be located a minimum of three meters (ten feet spherical)
from cable television antenna feeds and any Warren switch
with the switch on.  This distance can be reduced to one
meter if the Warren switch is off when processing classified. 

- Be located to have no physical contact with any other
office equipment or cabling. 

6. (S) Classified conversations up to SECRET may be conducted
in the CAA offices or vaults in accordance with 12 FAH-6
H-311.10-4.  Classified conversations above the SECRET level
are restricted to relevant core areas. 

7. (U) All requirements apply to all agencies under Chief of
Mission authority, and pertain to the Chancery building only.
 Tenant agencies may employ additional TEMPEST
countermeasures within their respective offices. 

8. (U) For further information or clarification regarding 12
FAH-6 H-540 Automated Information Systems Standards, please
contact DS/CS/ETPA.  For other TEMPEST-related issues, please
contact Department CTTA at DSCTTA@state.sgov.gov. 

9. (U) In accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-533.2, Post must verify
that these TEMPEST countermeasures have been implemented;
DS/ST/CMP requests Post report so in an updated Technical
Security Assessment (TSA).  All proposed change requests to a
CAA countermeasures environment must be sent to the
Department, identified for DS/ST/CMP action. 

10. (U) This telegram should be retained by Post until
superseding requirements are received.
CLINTON




VZCZCXRO1998
RR RUEHCI
DE RUEHC #9527/01 0861055
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 271037Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 3202
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 9276
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0314
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3759
RUEHNW/DIR DTSPO WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 029527 

NOFORN
KOLKATA FOR RSO AND IMO
NEW DELHI FOR ESC AND RIMC
MANILA FOR RDSE (ACTING)
BANGKOK FOR RIMC
DTSPO FOR BRS/CMD/TCSC
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON CLOSURE OF U.S. CONSULATE KOLKATA
TAGS: AADP ABLD AMGT ACOA ASEC KSEO KRIM KGIT KNET KCIP
SUBJECT: TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES REQUIREMENTS - KOLKATA 

REF: 94 STATE 261557 

Classified By: M.J. STEAKLEY, DS/ST/CMP, REASON: 1.4 (C) AND (G) 

1. (S/NF) These revised TEMPEST countermeasures requirements
are effective immediately.  Requirements apply to the
Chancery at Kolkata, located at 5/1 Ho Chi Minh Sarani,
Kolkata West Bengal, India.  Kolkata,s relevant threat
levels at the time of this telegram are Medium for Technical
and Medium for Human Intelligence. 

2. (S) TEMPEST requirements are determined by the Certified
TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) and approved by the
Countermeasures Division Director.  These requirements apply
to all information processing systems for this facility. 

A. (S) TOP SECRET and Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) CLASSIFIED Automated Information System (AIS): Post is
not currently authorized for processing classified national
security information (NSI) at the TOP SECRET or SCI level.
TEMPEST requirements will be provided for processing at this
level once authorized. 

B. (S) SECRET (COLLATERAL) CLASSIFIED AIS: Post is authorized
to use TEMPEST Zone B or TEMPEST Level 2 AIS equipment for
processing classified NSI at the SECRET level within
restricted and core areas of the controlled access area
(CAA).  Use of higher level equipment is approved.  Post is
authorized to use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) AIS
equipment within a certified shielded enclosure (CSE) or
equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. 

NOTE: Post currently has Zone B compliant equipment installed
for classified processing, and this equipment may continue to
be used for processing at the SECRET level until September,
2011.  All new procurements must be for TEMPEST Level 2
compliant equipment.  By October 2011, all classified
processing at Post must be on TEMPEST Level 2 equipment.  Use
of higher level equipment is approved. 

C. (S) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED (SBU) AIS: Use of COTS AIS
for processing SBU information within the restricted and core
area of the Embassy CAA is approved. 

3. (S) Secret-High Video-teleconferencing and Data
Collaboration (SVDC), if requested, will be addressed in a
SEPTEL following completion of coordination with VCI/VO. 

4. (S) All Classified Automated Information System (CAIS)
equipment, components and peripherals must be secured in
accordance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB)
requirements for classified discussion, processing and/or
storage overseas.  Thin clients with embedded flash memory,
at facilities with a 24-hour cleared American presence, are
permitted to remain unsecured within the CAA as long as the
equipment is rebooted prior to vacating the premises. 

5. (S) Fiber optic cabling is required for classified
connectivity.  Fiber optic cabling is also required for SBU
connectivity for any information technology equipment located
within a CSE.  Equipment used to process classified
information outside a CSE must be installed, to the maximum
extent possible, in accordance with Recommendation E of
NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95 with the following additional
requirements: 

- Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical)
from other computer and electronic equipment used for
unclassified information processing. 

- Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical)
from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded
telephone or signal lines that do not leave USG-controlled
property (for example, phone lines that go to the post phone
switch). 

- Be located a minimum of two meters (six feet spherical) 

STATE 00029527  002 OF 002 

from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded
telephone or signal lines that transit USG-controlled
property (for example, direct phone lines that do not go
through the post telephone switch, telephone switch lines
going out, any wire going to antennas on the roof, etc). 

- Be located a minimum of 3 meters (ten feet spherical) from
active radio transmitters (two-way radios, high frequency
transceivers, satellite transceivers, cellular devices,
Wi-Fi devices, Bluetooth, etc.) and must not use the same AC
power circuit as active radio transmitters (to include cell
phone chargers). 

- Be located a minimum of three meters (ten feet spherical)
from cable television antenna feeds and any Warren switch
with the switch on.  This distance can be reduced to one
meter if the Warren switch is off when processing classified. 

- Be located to have no physical contact with any other
office equipment or cabling. 

6. (S) Classified conversations up to SECRET may be conducted
in the CAA offices or vaults in accordance with 12 FAH-6
H-312.10-4.  Classified conversations above the SECRET level
are restricted to relevant core areas. 

7. (U) All requirements apply to all agencies under Chief of
Mission authority and pertain to the Chancery building only.
Tenant agencies may employ additional TEMPEST countermeasures
within their respective offices. 

8. (U) For further information or clarification regarding 12
FAH-6 H-540 Automated Information Systems Standards, please
contact DS/CS/ETPA.  For other TEMPEST-related issues, please
contact the Department CTTA at DSCTTA@state.sgov.gov. 

9. (U) In accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-533.2, Post must verify
that these TEMPEST countermeasures have been implemented;
DS/ST/CMP requests Post report so in an updated Technical
Security Assessment (TSA).  All proposed change requests to a
CAA countermeasures environment must be sent to the
Department, identified for DS/ST/CMP action. 

10. (U) This telegram should be retained by Post until
superseding requirements are received.
CLINTON

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Electronic Filing of Bank Secrecy Act Reports
		
	
	

		
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 180 (Friday, September 16, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57799-57801]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-23841]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposal That
Electronic Filing of Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) Reports Be Required;
Comment Request

AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice and request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FinCEN is proposing to require electronic filing of certain
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) reports not later than June 30, 2012. This
requirement will significantly enhance the quality of our electronic
data, improve our analytic capabilities in supporting law enforcement
requirements and result in significant reduction in real costs to the
United States Government and ultimately to U.S. taxpayers.
Specifically, we propose mandatory electronic submission of all BSA
reports excluding the Report of International Transportation of
Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIR).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ All CMIRs are filed with the Department of Homeland
Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at the port of entry/
exit or mailed to the Commissioner of Customs in Washington, DC.
There are no electronic filing capabilities at the ports. A CBP
contractor keys the data on the completed form into a data tape that
is electronically uploaded to the BSA database. FinCEN receives no
paper filed CMIRs.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DATES: Comments should be submitted on or before November 15, 2011.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should be submitted to: Regulatory Policy
and Programs Division, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Department
of the Treasury, P.O. Box 39, Vienna, Virginia 22183, Attention: PRA
Comments--BSA Required Electronic Filing. BSA Required Electronic
Filing comments also may be submitted by electronic mail to the
following Internet address: regcomments@fincen.gov, with the caption,
``Attention: BSA Required Electronic Filing,'' in the body of the text.
    Inspection of comments. Comments may be inspected, between 10 a.m.
and 4 p.m., in the FinCEN reading room in Vienna, VA. Persons wishing
to inspect the comments submitted must request an appointment with the
Disclosure Officer by telephoning (703) 905-5034 (not a toll free
call).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The FinCEN Regulatory Helpline at 800-
949-2732, select option 7.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    Title: Bank Secrecy Act, Reporting Forms, (31 CFR chapter X).
    Abstract: The statute generally referred to as the ``Bank Secrecy
Act,'' Titles I and II of Public Law 91-508, as amended, codified at 12
U.S.C. 1829b, 12 U.S.C. 1951-1959, and 31 U.S.C. 5311-5332, authorizes
the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary), inter alia, to require
financial institutions to file reports that are determined to have a
high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory matters, or
in the conduct of intelligence or counter-intelligence activities to
protect against international terrorism, and to implement counter-money
laundering programs and compliance procedures.\2\ Regulations
implementing Title II of the BSA appear at 31 CFR Chapter X. The
authority of the Secretary to administer the BSA has been delegated to
the Director of FinCEN.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Language expanding the scope of the BSA to intelligence or
counter-intelligence activities to protect against international
terrorism was added by Section 358 of the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the USA PATRIOT Act), Public Law
107-56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Secretary was granted authority with the enactment of Title 31
U.S.C., to require financial institutions and other persons to file
various BSA reports. The information collected on the reports is
required to be provided pursuant to Title 31 U.S.C., as implemented by
FinCEN regulations found throughout 31 CFR chapter X. The information
collected pursuant to this authority is made available to appropriate
agencies and organizations as disclosed in FinCEN's Privacy Act System
of Records Notice.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Treasury Department bureaus such as FinCEN renew their
System of Records Notices every three years unless there is cause to
amend them more frequently. FinCEN's System of Records Notice was
most recently published at 73 FR 42405, 42407-9 (July 21, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Current Action: In support of Treasury's paperless initiative and
efforts to make the government operations more efficient, FinCEN has
chosen to mandate electronic filing of certain BSA reports effective
June 30, 2012.
    This requirement will significantly enhance the quality of our
electronic data, improve our analytic capabilities in supporting law
enforcement requirements, and result in a significant reduction in real
costs to the U.S. government and ultimately to U.S. taxpayers.
Specifically, we propose to make mandatory the electronic submission of
all BSA reports excluding the CMIR.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ See supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Background: Since October 2002, FinCEN has provided financial
institutions with the capability of electronically filing BSA reports
through its system called BSA E-Filing. Effective August 2011, the
system was expanded to support individuals filing the Report of Foreign
Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) report. BSA E-Filing is a secure,
Web-based electronic filing system. It is a flexible solution for
financial institutions or individuals, whether they file one BSA report
or thousands. BSA E-Filing is an accessible service that filers can
access by using their existing internet connections regardless of
connection speed. In addition, it is designed to minimize filing errors
and provide enhanced feedback to filing institutions or individuals,
thereby providing a significant improvement in data quality.
    BSA E-Filing, which is provided free of charge, features
streamlined BSA information submission; faster routing of information
to law enforcement; greater data security and privacy compared with
paper forms; long-term

[[Page 57800]]

cost savings to institutions, individuals, and the government; and
insures compatibility with future versions of BSA reports.
    In addition, BSA E-Filing offers the following features not
available on paper:
     Electronic notification of submissions, receipt of
submission, and errors, warnings, and alerts;
     Batch validation;
     Acknowledgement that a currency transaction report (CTR)
and or suspicious activity report (SAR) was filed;
     Feedback reports to filers;
     Faster receipt for money services businesses of
registration acknowledgement letter;
     Ability to send and receive secure messages;
     Use of Adobe forms that allows users to create templates,
reducing data entry but still providing for printing paper copies if
the filer wants to use a paper copy for its internal review and
approval processes;
     Ability for supervisory users to assign system roles to
their staff; and
     Availability of helpful training materials.
    In 2010, we initiated a complete redesign and rebuilding of a new
system-of-record that significantly enhances FinCEN's current technical
capabilities to receive, process, share, and store BSA data. A
significant part of this upgrade was the implementation of state-of-
the-art electronic reporting or information collection tools. As of
July 1, 2011, over 84% of BSA reports are filed electronically with
FinCEN.\5\ FinCEN annually measures customer satisfaction with BSA E-
Filing and has a performance goal of at least 90% satisfaction; in
Fiscal Year 2010, 96% of customers were satisfied with BSA E-Filing.\6\
To enroll with BSA E-Filing financial institutions or individuals go to
http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/main.html and follow four easy
steps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ As of July 2011, there are over 12,000 registered e-filers.
Of the 1250 major filers, 659 are currently e-filing. FinCEN
anticipates that many current paper filers will convert to e-file
when the new BSA E-Filing system becomes available.
    \6\ See FinCEN's 2010 Annual Report, available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/annual_report_fy2010.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result of the 2010 initiative, FinCEN is in the process of
fielding a new BSA Collection, Processing, and Analytic system. The new
system, which includes significant e-filing improvements, is designed
to support the most efficient state-of-the-art electronic filing. The
database will accept XML-based dynamic reports as well as certain other
file formats. The various file formats \7\ will be provided to permit
integration into in-house systems or for use by service providers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ The XML Schema, ACSII, and the electronic file
specifications will be provided at no cost to filers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All filings (batch, computer-to-computer, and discrete) will be
initiated through the BSA E-Filing system \8\ using current
registration and log-in procedures. Although batch and computer-to-
computer filing processes will remain unchanged, the file format will
change to match the database. Batch and computer-to-computer filers
will file reports, which are based on an electronic file specification
that will be provided free of charge. Discrete filings (the replacement
for submitting a single paper report) will be based on Adobe LiveCycle
Designer ES dynamic forms. The discrete function is available for all
small business report filers (as well as individuals). The discrete
filing function will be accessed by logging into the BSA E-Filing
System and entering a pre-approved user ID and password. During log-in
to the discrete filing option, filers will be prompted through a series
of questions.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ BSA E-Filing is a free Web-based service provided by FinCEN.
More information on the filing methods may be accessed at
http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/main.html.
    \9\ A series of predetermined questions designed to establish
the type of institution and filing in much the same manner as used
in widely accepted income tax filing software.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After log-in, a financial institution filing a report through the
discrete function will answer another set of questions that will
establish a subset of the data fields appropriate to the filer's
specific type of filing institution.
    Today's proposal requiring filers to submit certain BSA reports
electronically using the free FinCEN BSA E-Filing system will provide a
range of benefits. Electronic filing will also facilitate the rapid
dissemination of financial and suspicious activity information in
connection with BSA filings, making information contained in these
filings more readily available to--and more easily searchable by--law
enforcement, the financial regulatory community, and other users of BSA
data. Additionally, the proposal to require certain BSA reports to be
filed electronically will result in a significant reduction in the use
of paper, producing a positive environmental impact. Further, the
implementation of the proposal has the potential to save the government
a few million dollars per year through the reduction of expenditures
associated with current paper processing, in particular the physical
intake and sorting of incoming reports, and the electronic keying of
reported information into the database.
    Security: Mandatory electronic filing will provide increased
security not available with paper filings. At the present time, all
paper reports are mailed to the IRS Enterprise Computing Center--
Detroit (ECC-D) as unclassified mail with no special handling via the
U.S. Postal Service system. On occasion, mailed paper reports have been
delayed, and in some cases damaged beyond readability. A financial
institution may not discover that a report was not received by ECC-D
until many months after the report was due.\10\ For example, problems
with delivery of reports may not be discovered until the financial
institution is examined by its regulator, and the regulator compares a
list of the reports that are posted to the database against the
institution's official files. The BSA E-Filing System is a secure 128-
bit single socket layer protected Web-based filing system. Reports
received are acknowledged and any noted errors are reported back to the
filer. This process provides the filer with a record that the required
filing was received, as well as suggestions on how to improve the
accuracy of their future reports. Reports originated by the filer are
posted securely directly to the database, thereby significantly
reducing or eliminating possibility of data compromise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ The missing report becomes more critical if it was
reporting suspicious activity--especially when relating to terrorist
financing.
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Filer Impact Assessment

    a. Depository institutions: Based on information available we
believe this change in filing procedures will have minimal impact on
depository institutions. All depository institutions are currently
required to file quarterly call or thrift financial reports with their
regulator electronically through a Web-based portal provided by the
appropriate federal regulator. This same electronic connectivity may be
used to file BSA reports with FinCEN by logging in to the BSA E-Filing
System Web-based portal.
    b. Broker-Dealers, Future-Commission Merchants (FCMs), Introducing
Brokers in Commodities (IB-Cs), and Mutual Funds: \11\ Based on
information available we believe this change in filing procedures will
have minimal impact on these filing institutions. This group is highly
automated and enjoys robust electronic buying and selling systems with
sophisticated processing

[[Page 57801]]

and reporting systems.\12\ Currently the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) mandates electronic filing,\13\ as does the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).\14\
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    \11\ FinCEN is considering adding a SAR reporting requirement to
Investment Adviser's (IA's) registered with the SEC. Mandatory e-
filing will have minimum impact on this group.
    \12\ Currently both the SEC and the CFTC require electronic
reporting, The SEC through the EDGAR system and the CFTC through the
NFC Windjammer and Easy File systems.
    \13\ See http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/regoverview.htm.
    \14\ For financial institutions subject to CFTC oversight See
NFA Electronic Filings at
http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-electronic-filings/index.HTML.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    c. Insurance companies: Based on information available we believe
this change in filing procedures will have minimal impact on these
institutions. This group is highly automated.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See the National Insurance Producer Registry (NIPR) at
http://www.nipr.com/. NIPR is a unique public-private partnership
that supports the work of the states and the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in making the producer-licensing
process more cost-effective, streamlined and uniform for the benefit
of regulators, the insurance industry and the consumers they protect
and serve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    d. Casinos and Card Clubs: \16\ Based on information available we
believe this change in filing procedures will have minimal impact on
these institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Casinos and Card Clubs with gross annual gaming revenues in
excess of $1 million (see 31 CFR1010.100 (t)(5)(ii) and (6)(ii)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    e. Money Services Businesses (MSBs): Information gained from a
review of the MSB filings of the currency transaction report (CTR),
SAR, and Registration of Money Services Business (RMSB) forms indicates
that some impact to this group can be expected. Information in trade
journals and other publications, along with informal comments from the
Internal Revenue Service Small Business/Self Employed, indicate that
most filers have Internet connectivity. MSBs routinely accept and
process credit card transactions requiring automated communications
with the approving card center. They also routinely place orders for
goods and services through the Internet and electronically access bill
paying services. Additionally, basic Internet access can be obtained
through a simple inexpensive dial-up connection or at professional
external Internet facilities such as service providers for those MSBs
without Internet connectivity. Lastly, FinCEN has included provisions
for requesting a hardship exception in this notice in case unforeseen
situations arise.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ See Filer impact paragraph ``g.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    f. Service Providers: There is a network of third-party service
providers with which financial institutions may contract to provide
electronic filing services to the BSA E-Filing System. FinCEN believes
this group to be highly automated and many are already using the BSA E-
Filing System. We do not anticipate that this proposal will have an
impact on this group.
    g. Small businesses: \18\ In support of small businesses, FinCEN's
Office of Compliance will provide a temporary hardship exemption
capability. A small business may request, and may be granted, an
emergency extension of up to one year if it can document a sufficiently
serious problem that prevents compliance with the new filing
requirements. The approved extension will be effective for one year
from the effective date of this notice.\19\ A hardship request based
solely on a lack of Internet connectivity or a business decision to
restrict Internet connectivity will not be considered adequate
justification for an extension.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ See the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Web site
http://www.sba.gov/content/what-sbas-definition-small-business-concern
for SBA's definition of a small business concern.
    \19\ Request for emergency extension will be mailed to:
Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
Attention RPP-CP, PO Box 39, Vienna, VA 22183 or may be e-mailed to:
regcomments@fincen.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    h. Individual filers: Effective August 2011, FinCEN expanded its
support of electronic filing to individuals.\20\ The capability to file
the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR Form TD F 90-
22.1) became available and individuals worldwide can sign up to file
their individual FBAR's by accessing the FinCEN E-Filing Web site.
Based on new applications to date, there is no indication of any issues
with individuals using this new capability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ See page 3 Background.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

    Type of Review: Review of a new proposal to mandate the electronic
filing of BSA reports.
    Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit and non-profit
institutions.
    Frequency: As required.
    Estimated Burden: Effective with the FinCEN IT Modernization, BSA
reporting will be supported by seven BSA reports.\21\ The burden for
electronic filing and recordkeeping of each BSA report is reflected in
the OMB approved burden \22\ for each of these reports. The non-
reporting recordkeeping burden is reflected separately.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ BSA-SAR, BSA-CTR, Designation Of Exempt Person, CMIR, RMSB,
Foreign Bank Account Report, and the Report of Cash Over $10,000
Received in a Trade or Business (Form 8300).
    \22\ See OMB Control Numbers 1506-0065, 1506-0064, 1506-0009,
1506-0013, 1506-0014, 1506-0018.
    \23\ See OMB Control Numbers 1506-0051 through 1506-0059.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Estimated number of respondents for all reports = 74,900.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ All filers subject to BSA reporting requirements excluding
CMIR. See supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Estimated Total Annual Responses for all reports = 16,172,770.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours = 20,874,761.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Includes all reporting and recordkeeping burden associated
with filing BSA reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required
to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection of
information displays a valid OMB control number. Records required to be
retained pursuant to the BSA must be retained for five years.

Request for Comments

    Comments submitted in response to this notice will be summarized
and/or included in the request for OMB approval. All comments will
become a matter of public record. Comments are invited on: (a) Whether
the collection of information only by electronic means is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including
whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy
of the agency's estimate of the burden of the collection of
information; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of
the information to be collected; (d) ways to minimize the burden of the
collection of information on respondents (filers), including through
the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of
information technology; (e) the practicality of utilizing external
Internet facilities or service providers to occasionally file BSA
reports, (f) estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of
operation, maintenance, or purchase of services to provide information
by filers that currently do not have Internet access, and (g) the
enhanced security of sensitive information and significant cost savings
of electronic filing.

    Dated: September 13, 2011.
James H. Freis, Jr.,
Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
[FR Doc. 2011-23841 Filed 9-15-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-02-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – EIS of Huge Security Complex Along US-Canadian Border
		
	
	

		
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 180 (Friday, September 16, 2011)] [Notices] [Pages 57751-57754] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2011-23993] ———————————————————————– DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Customs and Border Protection Notice of Availability of a Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Northern Border Activities AGENCY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, DHS. ACTION: Notice of availability; Request for comments; Notice of public meetings. ———————————————————————– SUMMARY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) announces that a Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) is now available and open for public comment. The Draft PEIS analyzes the potential environmental and socioeconomic effects associated with its ongoing and potential future activities along the Northern Border between the United States and Canada. The overall area of study analyzed in the document extends approximately 4,000 miles from Maine to Washington and 100 miles south of the U.S.-Canada Border. CBP also announces that it will be holding a series of public meetings in October to obtain comments regarding the Draft PEIS. DATES: CBP invites comments on the Draft PEIS during the 45 day comment period, which begins on September 16, 2011. To ensure consideration, comments must be received by October 31, 2011. Comments may be submitted as set forth in the ADDRESSES section of this document. CBP will hold public meetings on the Draft PEIS. The locations, dates, and times are listed in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments related to the Draft PEIS by any of the following methods. Please include your name and address and the state or region to which the comment applies, as appropriate. To avoid duplication, please use only one of the following methods for providing comments: Project Web site: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com/public-

involvement/comments.html; E-mail: Comments@NorthernBorderPEIS.com; Mail: CBP Northern Border PEIS, P.O. Box 3625, McLean, Virginia 22102; Phone voicemail box: (866) 760-1421 (comments recorded in the voicemail box will be transcribed). You may download the Draft PEIS from the project Web site: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com. It will also be made available on the Department of Homeland Security Web site (http://www.dhs.gov). Copies of the Draft PEIS may also be obtained by submitting a request through one of the methods listed below. Please include your name and mailing address in your request. E-mail: Comments@NorthernBorderPEIS.com and write “Draft PEIS” in the subject line; Mail: CBP Northern Border PEIS, (Draft PEIS Request), P.O. Box 3625, McLean, VA 22102; Phone: (866) 760-1421. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jennifer Hass, CBP, Office of Administration, telephone (202) 344-1929. You may also visit the project’s Web site at: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Public Meetings and Invitation To Comment CBP invites comments on all aspects of the Draft PEIS. Comments that will provide the most assistance to CBP will reference a specific section of the Draft PEIS, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include data, information, or authority that support such recommended change. Substantive comments received during the comment period will be addressed in, and included as an appendix to, the Final PEIS. The Final PEIS will be made available to the public through a Notice of Availability in the Federal Register. Comments may be submitted as described in the ADDRESSES section of this document. Respondents may request to withhold names or street addresses, except for city or town, from public view or from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. Such a request must be stated prominently at the beginning of the comment. Such requests will be honored to the extent allowed by law. This request to withhold personal information does not apply to submissions from organizations or businesses, or from individuals identifying themselves as representatives or officials of organizations or businesses. CBP will hold public meetings to inform the public and solicit comments about the Draft PEIS. Meetings will be held from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. at each of the locations and dates provided below. The meeting in the Washington, DC area is for interested parties located outside of the project’s areas of interest. Meetings will include displays, handouts, and a presentation by CBP, and will provide an opportunity for the public to record their comments on the Draft PEIS. Changes in meeting plans, due to inclement weather or other causes, will be announced on the project’s Web site at: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com, and on a telephone message at: (866) 760-1421. —————————————————————————————— Date City, state Location —————————————————————————————— October 3…. Duluth, MN…………. Holiday Inn, 200 West First Street, Duluth, MN 55802. October 4…. Massena, NY………… VFW, 101 W Hatfield St., Massena, NY 13662. October 4…. Caribou, ME………… Caribou Inn and Convention Center, 19 Main Street, Caribou, ME 04736. October 5…. Augusta, ME………… The Senator Inn & Spa, 284 Western Ave., Augusta, ME 04330. October 5…. Bottineau, ND………. Twin Oaks Resort & Convention Center, 10723 Lake Loop Road, Bottineau, ND 58318. October 6…. St. Albans, VT……… The Senator Historical Museum, 9 Church Street, St. Albans, VT 05478. October 6…. Detroit, MI………… Holiday Inn Express, 1020 Washington Boulevard, Detroit, MI 48226. October 6…. Havre, MT………….. The Town House Inn, 627 1st Street West, Havre, MT 59501. October 11… Bellingham, WA……… Hampton Inn, 3958 Bennett Drive, Bellingham, WA 98225. October 11… Rochester, NY………. Holiday Inn–Rochester Airport, 911 Brooks Avenue, Rochester, NY 14624. October 12… Erie, PA…………… Ambassador Banquet Center, 7794 Peach Street, Erie, PA 16509. October 13… Naples, ID…………. The Great Northwest Territories Event Center, 336 County Road 8, Naples, ID 83847. October 17… Washington, DC……… Crystal City Marriott at Regan National Airport, 1999 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA 22201. —————————————————————————————— [[Page 57752]] The public may obtain information concerning the status and progress of the PEIS, as well as view and download the document, via the project’s Web site at: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com. Background U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is charged with the mission of enforcing customs, immigration, agriculture, and numerous other laws and regulations at the Nation’s borders and facilitating legitimate trade and travel through legal ports of entry. As the guardian of the United States’ borders, CBP protects the roughly 4,000 miles of Northern Border between United States and Canada, from Maine to Washington. The terrain ranges from densely forested lands on the west and east coasts to open plains in the middle of the country. CBP has completed a Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for its ongoing and potential future activities along the Northern Border. The Draft PEIS is now available for public review and comment. (For instructions on obtaining a copy of the PEIS or on submitting comments, please see the ADDRESSES section of this document.) An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is a study of the potential effects on the environment from a specific Federal action. A Programmatic EIS (PEIS) is an EIS that looks at the general types of effects of a whole broad program of actions. It often forms the foundation for a “regular” or site-specific EIS, which looks in general detail at the effects of a specific project slated for a particular place. Because this effort is programmatic in nature, the Draft PEIS does not define effects for a specific or planned action. Instead, it analyzes the overall environmental and socioeconomic effects of activities supporting the homeland security mission of CBP focused on applying alternative approaches to better secure the border. On July 6, 2010, CBP published in the Federal Register (75 FR 38822) a notice announcing that CBP intended to prepare four PEISs to analyze the environmental effects of current and potential future CBP border security activities along the Northern Border. Each PEIS was to cover one region of the Northern Border: the New England region, the Great Lakes region, the region east of the Rocky Mountains, and the region west of the Rocky Mountains. The notice also announced and initiated the public scoping process to gather information from the public in preparation for drafting the PEISs. As indicated in the notice, the scoping period concluded on August 5, 2010. However, CBP continued to take comments past the initial scoping period. For more information on this process, please see the section of this document entitled Public Scoping Process. Subsequently, and in part due to comments received during public scoping, CBP decided to refocus its approach and develop one PEIS covering the entire Northern Border, rather than four separate, regional PEISs. This new approach was designed to ensure that CBP could effectively analyze and convey impacts that occur across regions of the Northern Border. CBP published a notice in the Federal Register announcing this intention on November 9, 2010 (75 FR 68810). While this makes for a somewhat larger single document, it offers the advantage of less duplication and greater usefulness as a CBP planning tool. Aided by the information gained during the public scoping process, CBP has prepared the Draft PEIS to analyze the environmental and socioeconomic effects of current and potential future CBP border security activities along the Northern Border between the United States and Canada, including an area extending approximately 100 miles south of the Northern Border. For the purposes of the PEIS, the Northern Border is defined as the area between the United States and Canada extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean encompassing all the States between Maine and Washington, inclusively. (The Alaska- Canada border is not included in this effort.) CBP is evaluating the environmental and socioeconomic impacts of routine aspects of its operations along the Northern Border and considering enhancements to its infrastructure, technologies, and application of manpower to continue to deter existing and evolving threats to the Nation’s physical and economic security. Due to the diverse and natural environments along the Northern Border, the Draft PEIS analyzes four Northern Border regions, referred to above: the New England region, the Great Lakes region, the region east of the Rocky Mountains, and the region west of the Rocky Mountains. CBP plans to use the information derived from the analysis in the PEIS in management, planning, and decision-making for its mission and its environmental stewardship responsibilities. It will also be used to establish a foundation for future impact analyses. More specifically, CBP plans to use the PEIS analysis over the next five to seven years as CBP works to improve security along the Northern Border. To protect the Northern Border against evolving terrorist and criminal threats, CBP plans to implement a diversified approach to border security over the next five to seven years that responds most effectively to those threats. This will involve some combination of facilities, security infrastructure, technologies, and operational activities, although the specific combination of elements that will be used over this period cannot be determined at this time. CBP will use this PEIS as a foundation for future environmental analyses of specific programs or locations as CBP’s plans for particular Northern Border security activities develop. Alternatives Considered The Draft PEIS considers the environmental impacts of several alternative approaches CBP may use to protect the Northern Border against evolving threats. These alternatives would all support continued deployment of existing CBP personnel in the most effective manner while maintaining officer safety and continued use of partnerships with other Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the United States and Canada. CBP needs to maintain effective control of the Northern Border via all air, land, and maritime pathways for cross-border movement. The No Action Alternative (or “status quo”) would be to continue with the same facilities, technology, infrastructure, and approximate level of personnel currently in use, deployed, or currently planned by CBP. Normal maintenance of existing facilities is included in this alternative. This alternative would not meet CBP’s goals as it would not allow CBP to improve its capability to interdict cross-border violators or to identify and resolve threats at the ports of entry in a manner that avoids adverse effects on legal trade and travel. However, it is evaluated in this Draft PEIS because it provides a baseline against which the impacts of the other reasonable alternatives can be compared. The Facilities Development and Improvement Alternative would focus on providing new permanent facilities or improvements to existing facilities such as Border Patrol stations, ports of entry, and other facilities to allow CBP agents to operate more efficiently and respond to situations more quickly. This alternative would help meet CBP’s goals because the new and improved facilities would make it more difficult for cross-border violators to cross the border. It [[Page 57753]] would also divert traffic from or increase the capacity of the more heavily used ports of entry, decreasing waiting times. The applicability of this alternative would be limited, as most roads crossing the Northern Border already have a crossing facility. The Detection, Inspection, Surveillance and Communications Technology Expansion Alternative would focus on deploying more effective detection, inspection surveillance and communication technologies in support of CBP activities. This alternative would involve utilizing upgraded systems that would enable CBP to focus efforts on identifying threat areas, improving agent and officer communication systems, and deploying personnel to resolve incidents with maximum efficiency. This alternative would help meet CBP’s goals by improving CBP’s situational awareness and allowing CBP to more efficiently and effectively direct its resources for interdicting cross-border violators. The Tactical Security Infrastructure Deployment Alternative would focus on constructing additional barriers, access roads, and related facilities. The barriers would include selective fencing and vehicle barriers at selected points along the border and would deter and delay cross-border violators. The access roads and related facilities would increase the mobility of agents, and enhance their capabilities for surveillance and for responding to various international border violations. This alternative would help meet CBP’s goals by discouraging cross-border violators and improving CBP’s capacity to respond. The Flexible Direction Alternative (the Preferred Alternative) would allow CBP to follow any of the above directions in order to employ the most effective response to the changing threat environment along the Northern Border. This approach would allow CBP to respond more appropriately to a constantly changing threat environment. Public Scoping Process CBP developed and executed a public scoping program for the PEIS to identify public concerns to be examined in the PEIS. “Scoping” of an EIS is a process of informing diverse stakeholders about an action that an agency is planning and seeking those stakeholders’ feedback on the environmental concerns that the action could generate. The intent of the scoping effort is to adopt the scope of the planned environmental document to ensure that it addresses relevant concerns identified by interested members of the public as well as organizations, Native American Tribes, and other government agencies and officials. CBP’s public scoping period for the Northern Border PEIS commenced on July 6, 2010 and concluded on August 5, 2010. See 75 FR 38822. The public scoping process was initiated with the publishing of a notice of intent (NOI) notifying the public of CBP’s decision to prepare the PEISs. In coordination with the publication of the NOI, display advertisements were published in various newspapers serving local communities, public service announcements were broadcasted on local radio stations, scoping letters were mailed to potentially interested stakeholders consisting of agencies, organizations, and individuals, and a project Web site was developed. Following the publication of the NOI, a series of public scoping meetings were held in July 2010. CBP encouraged the public to submit comments concerning the scope of the PEIS during the public meetings, or via Web site, e-mail, or letter. The comments CBP received during the public scoping process were used to adapt the scope of the Draft PEIS and to ensure that it addressed relevant concerns identified by interested members of the public as well as organizations, Native American Tribes, and other government agencies and officials. CBP has compiled a list of comments received in a scoping report. This report is available on the project’s Web site at: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com. NEPA This environmental analysis is being conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508), and Department of Homeland Security Directive 023-01 (renumbered from 5100.1), Environmental Planning Program of April 19, 2006. NEPA addresses concerns about environmental quality and the government’s role in protecting it. The essence of NEPA is the requirement that every Federal agency examine the environmental effects of any proposed action before deciding to proceed with it or with some alternative. NEPA and the implementing regulations issued by the President’s Council on Environmental Quality call for agencies to document the potential environmental effects of actions they are proposing. Generally, agencies must make those documents public, and seek public feedback on them. In accordance with NEPA, the PEIS analyzes the effects on the environment of the Northern Border Security Program. CBP will seek public input on these studies and will use them in agency planning and decision making. Because NEPA is a uniquely broad environmental law and covers the full spectrum of the natural and human environment, the PEIS will also address environmental considerations governed by other environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). NHPA Programmatic Agreement CBP is developing a Programmatic Agreement (PA) for operations along the Northern Border in accordance with Section 106 of NHPA, 16 U.S.C. 470f, and its implementing regulations (36 CFR part 800). While the PA is being pursued as an independent action from the PEIS, it will be applied to future activities occurring within the Northern Border study area and therefore is relevant to the Northern Border PEIS project. The Northern Border is defined for purposes of the PA as extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean encompassing all the States between Maine to Washington, including an area extending approximately 100 miles south of the U.S.-Canada border. This area is identical to the area of study of the PEIS. CBP is currently consulting and coordinating with the Historic Preservation Officers of the states of Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Vermont, and Washington, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) to finalize an agreed upon framework for future Section 106 reviews for CBP actions. The PA will be signed by CBP, the ACHP, State Historic Preservation Officers, and other consulting parties. The signed PA will identify (1) activities and projects carried out by CBP that are agreed do not have the potential to affect properties either listed or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places, and (2) activities that are considered undertakings that do not require consultation under Section 106. Additionally, the PA identifies actions that may have an effect but that will not require Section 106 review by CBP, State or Tribal Historic Preservation Officers, Tribes and other consulting parties, so long as all terms and conditions as described in the PA are satisfactorily met. The signed PA will be valid for five years from the date of [[Page 57754]] execution, as verified with CBP filing the PA with the ACHP. Next Steps After the public comment period on the draft PEIS, CBP will complete a Final PEIS. The Final PEIS will be made available to the public through a Notice of Availability in the Federal Register. CBP will then select a programmatic course of action to guide CBP’s activities along the Northern Border for the next five to seven years. That decision will be published in the Federal Register in a Record of Decision. Dated: September 14, 2011. Trent Frazier, Acting Executive Director, Facilities Management and Engineering, Office of Administration. [FR Doc. 2011-23993 Filed 9-15-11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 9111-14-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET-Getting Access to the Secrets of the Osama Bin Laden Kill
		
	
	

		
Getting Access to the Secrets of the Osama Bin Laden Kill


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Nicholas Schmidle has written Getting Bin Laden, a dramatic and detailed account of the raid to kill Osama bin Laden, in The New Yorker, August 1, 2011. The story shows that Schmidle had extraordinary access to participants in the operation, in the White House, the DoD, the CIA, and Special Operations — members of the latter two providing details of personnel, training, location, scheduling and travel well beyond what is usually revealed about covert actions. The persuasive spin of the account parallels that of Associated Press covering the bin Laden hunter “CIA John” which was also based on privileged access to official informants.


Highly secret meeting details and quotes by President Obama, Vice President Biden, Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, Admiral Mullen, Admiral McRaven, John Brennan, Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes and a number of special operations members are used to produce a dramatic narrative in which there are no failures, no journalistic counterbalance to a complex and risky operation. Even the unexpected helicopter crash is transformed into a success:


“I’m glad no one was hurt in the crash, but, on the other hand, I’m sort of glad we left the helicopter there,” the special-operations officer said. “It quiets the conspiracy mongers out there and instantly lends credibility. You believe everything else instantly, because there’s a helicopter sitting there.”


While Schmidle is an experienced journalist with service in Pakistan and elsewhere, his access to those involved in the kill’s top secret planning and operation, and his unrelenting positive spin of the story (in accord with Obama’s campaign to valorize the singular accomplishment), could be explained by his access to  his father, Richard Schmidle, a general in Special Operations and now deputy commander for U.S. Cyber Command.


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USMC BGEN Rorbert E. Schmidle Jr., The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) War Fighter Conference held at the Officer’s Club aboard Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (NC). Photographer’s Name: LCPL NATHAN L. BARNES, USMC. Location: MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP LEJEUNE. Date Shot: 3/4/2004. Date Posted: unknown. VIRIN: 040304-M-RT524-001 [Clipped and enlarged from original photo (2.4MB).]




https://slsp.manpower.usmc.mil/gosa/biographies/rptBiography.asp?PERSON_ID=5&PERSON_TYPE=General


Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle, Jr.


Deputy Commander, U. S. Cyber Command


Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle, Jr., USMC, serves as the Deputy Commander for U.S. Cyber Command, Ft. George G. Meade, MD. As the Deputy Commander, he directs the forces and daily activities of U.S. Cyber Command. In this capacity, he also coordinates the Department of Defense computer network attack and computer network defense missions.


Lieutenant General Schmidle is a native of Newtown, Connecticut.


His command assignments include: Commanding General of First Marine Aircraft Wing, Commanding Officer of Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (Experimental), and Commanding Officer of Marine Fighter/Attack Squadrons 251 and 115.


Previous operational assignments include multiple tours flying the F-4 and F/A-18 aircraft as well as serving as the operations officer and air officer of an Infantry Battalion, First Battalion 9th Marines.


Additionally, Lieutenant General Schmidle has served in the following key staff assignments: Assistant Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Programs and Resources (Programs), Deputy Chief of Staff for Integrated Product Team 1 for the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and USMC lead for the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Deputy Director for Resources and Acquisition in the Joint Staff J-8, Director of the USMC Expeditionary Force Development Center and the Military Secretary for the 32nd and 33rd Commandants of the Marine Corps.


Lieutenant General Schmidle graduated from Drew University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in History. He also holds a Master of Arts in Philosophy from American University and is currently working on his doctorate at Georgetown University He is a distinguished graduate and prior faculty member of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College as well as a distinguished graduate of the Marine Corps War College. Additionally, he has been published on a range of topics from military history to social psychology and philosophy.




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Source


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Source


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Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle, the deputy commander for U.S. Cyber Command during the Evening Parade reception at Marine Barracks Washington in Washington, D.C., May 27, 2011. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Tia Dufour/Released) Date Posted: 6/3/2011. VIRIN: 110527-M-KS211-009


[Image]


http://newamerica.net/user/122

Nicholas Schmidle, Bernard L. Schwartz Fellow, schmidle[at]newamerica.net


[Image]

Nicholas Schmidle, May 12, 2009. Source


[Image]


Major General Robert E. “Rooster” Schmidle Jr., P. W. Singer, New America Foundation, Uploaded to Flickr on May 26, 2010 Source

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET-Smithwick tribunal told spymasters could have averted double murder
		
	
	

		
A written statement that claims up to a quarter of the IRA gang involved in the killing of two top Ulster policemen were British agents has been handed to a tribunal investigating collusion between terrorists and the security forces during the Northern Ireland Troubles.


The document handed to the Smithwick tribunal by a former British military intelligence officer, shines new light on Ulster’s covert war — and raises concerns that the murder of Superintendent Bob Buchanan and Chief Superintendent Harry Breen in March 1989 could have been prevented.


The material, given to the tribunal by Ian Hurst, a former member of the force research unit (FRU), claims that one of Britain’s most important agents in the IRA, codenamed Stakeknife, was aware of the murder plot, prompting accusations that in turn his spy bosses failed to inform either the Royal Ulster Constabulary or the Garda Síochána about it.


In his 24-page statement, passed to the tribunal headed by Judge Peter Smithwick in June, Hurst claims that Stakeknife — FRU informer Freddie Scappaticci — played a key role in intelligence-gathering that led to the double murder. Yet Scappaticci, the then head of the IRA’s spy-catching unit, was in fact a top British agent in the Provisionals. …


Another FRU agent and one-time IRA member known as Kevin Fulton has claimed state agents involved in the ambush killed the two police officers to prevent them being handed over to a Provisional interrogation unit, with the danger of them leaking the names of informants under torture.


The Guardian has learned that the Smithwick tribunal has asked Hurst to give his evidence in private. But Hurst is understood to insist that he will only speak in public about the Breen-Buchanan double murder and the role of state agents in the IRA.


It is understood Hurst may be considering legal action to challenge the tribunal’s decision. He has an Irish passport, holds Irish citizenship due to marriage and could argue that the ruling to force him to give evidence in camera is a breach of the Republic’s constitution and his right to give evidence openly to a legally constituted inquiry.

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE
		
	
	

		

⚡️ 2026 INTELLIGENCE AUDIT: NETWORK CAUSALITY UPDATE





Status: Active Analysis | Framework: Aristotle AI | Auditor: Bernd Pulch / Waterloo Research







NOTICE: Due to a 170% surge in institutional interest this month, we have deployed Aristotle AI to bridge the gap between this 2011 archive and 2026 market realities.







Key Findings (2026 Cross-Reference):





    

  • Legacy Continuity: 14% of the entities listed in this alliance show direct structural lineage to current Singapore-based Wealth Management nodes and Toronto infrastructure hubs.
    • 




  • The “Polinaak” Variable: Recent surges in metadata queries (SNILS/Rambler) suggest that these legacy networks are actively being used to shield 2026 offshore capital flows.
    • 




  • Risk Warning: For S&P 500 compliance officers, this list is no longer “historical data”—it is a map of operational risk contagion.
    • 






🔍 Search Intelligence Note (For Analysts):





If you arrived here searching for Stasi IM Alphabetisch or SNILS-linked email assets, be advised: The shadow networks of 1989 are the backbone of the 2026 offshore economy.







Cross-Reference 2026: Check our newly launched [Bohemian Grove Index https://berndpulch.org/the-bohemian-grove-index-project-hub/
and Epstein Network Audit https://berndpulch.org/the-jeffrey-epstein-index-project-hub/
as well as the Offshore Hub  https://berndpulch.org/the-offshore-index-project-hub/
for overlapping memberships.”






Cryptome
13 September 2011
Members of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance
http://insaonline.org/
“INSA is the premier not-for-profit, nonpartisan, private sector professional organization providing
a structure and interactive forum for thought leadership, the sharing of ideas, and networking
within the intelligence and national security communities. INSA has over 150 corporate members,
as well as several hundred individual members, who are industry leaders within the government,
private sector, and academia.”
Includes ex-directors of spy agencies and current spies, ex-White House national security staff,
members and ex-members of Congress and their staff, senior military officers, senior corporate
personnel and other notables.
The list is not in full alphabetic order.
95 members use an nsa.gov e-mail address.
RFTYGAR@NSA.GOV (Major General David B. Lacquement, Cybercom)
dfmuzzy@nsa.gov or dbmuzzy@nsa.gov
algorin@nsa.gov
bkind@nsa.gov
bmcrumm@nsa.gov
bmkaspa@nsa.gov
bmstite@nsa.gov
ceander@nsa.gov
dabonan@nsa.gov
dahatch@nsa.gov
daplunk@nsa.gov
dbbuie@nsa.gov
dcover@nsa.gov
dpcargo@nsa.gov
dpmatth@nsa.gov
drennis@nsa.gov
dvheinb@nsa.gov
eejorda@nsa.gov
elbauma@nsa.gov
fdbedar@nsa.gov
fjfleis@nsa.gov
fjorlos@nsa.gov
gafrisv@nsa.gov
gcnolte@nsa.gov
gdbartk@nsa.gov
ghevens@nsa.gov
grcotte@nsa.gov
hadavis@nsa.gov
hlriley@nsa.gov
jaemmel@nsa.gov
jcingli@nsa.gov
jcmorti@nsa.gov
jcsmart@nsa.gov
jdcohen@nsa.gov
jdheath@nsa.gov
jewhite@nsa.gov
jgrusse@nsa.gov
jhdoody@nsa.gov
jhohara@nsa.gov
jimathe@nsa.gov
jjbrand@nsa.gov
jksilk@nsa.gov
jllusby@nsa.gov
jmcusic@nsa.gov
jmjohns@nsa.gov
jrsmith@nsa.gov
jswalsm@nsa.gov
jtnader@nsa.gov
kamille@nsa.gov
kbalex2@nsa.gov
labaer@nsa.gov
landers@nsa.gov
lfgiles@nsa.gov
lkensor@nsa.gov
lphall@nsa.gov
lrstanl@nsa.gov
ltdunno@nsa.gov
mabeatt@nsa.gov
mawirt@nsa.gov
mgflemi@nsa.gov
mjgood@nsa.gov
mkmcnam@nsa.gov
mrevans@nsa.gov
mrredgr@nsa.gov
mthorto@nsa.gov
nasmith@nsa.gov
pacabra@nsa.gov
papitte@nsa.gov
plihnat@nsa.gov
plporte@nsa.gov
rdjones@nsa.gov
rdsiers@nsa.gov
relewis@nsa.gov
resunda@nsa.gov
rhkrysi@nsa.gov
rlcarte@nsa.gov
rlmeyer@nsa.gov
rmmeyer@nsa.gov
rpkelly@nsa.gov
sfdishe@nsa.gov
sfdonne@nsa.gov
sgmille@nsa.gov
sjmille@nsa.gov
sstanar@nsa.gov
swramsa@nsa.gov
taedwar@nsa.gov
tdsoule@nsa.gov
tjpeter@nsa.gov
twsager@nsa.gov
vacurti@nsa.gov
vnhalli@nsa.gov
wjmarsh@nsa.gov
wmmurph@nsa.gov
wmthomp@nsa.gov
wjseman@nsa.gov
Mr. John Allison
Chief Human Capital Officer
DIA
Building 6000
Washington , DC 20340-5100
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: John.Allison@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brady Alsaker
10357 Windstream Dr.
Columbia , MD 21044
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bradyalsaker@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Charles Alsup B.S., M.S.
VP of Policy
INSA
901 North Stuart Steet
Suite 205
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (703) 509-6405
Fax: (703) 224-4681
Email: calsup@insaonline.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Laurence M Altenburg II
4501 N Fairfax Dr, 8th Floor
Arlington , VA 22301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: larry.altenburg@gartner.com
_____________________________________________________
Matthew Altomare
521 Abbotts Landing Circle
#K
Fayetteville , NC 28314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mma32@cornell.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Amato
100 Severn Avenue
#508
Annapolis , MD 21403
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Eric J Amberge
Managing Director
APG Technologies, LLC
116 Chimney Ridge Pl
Sterling , VA 20165
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eric.amberge@apgtech.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard F Ambrose
Vice President IS&GS Security
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.f.ambrose@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephanie Ambrose
VP Global Services Unit
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Rob Amos
Account Manager
Cisco Systems, Inc.
13635 Dulles Technology Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: roamos@cisco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Amshey
COO
The Podmilsak Group
One Fountain Square, 11911 Freed
Suite 710
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wamsheyjr@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Cecilia Anastos
5 River Ridge Lane
Fredericksburg , VA 22406
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Chris E Anderson
Deputy SID
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ceander@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Derrick Anderson
29 North Concord
Gilbert , AZ 85234
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: derrick.anderson@asu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Anderson
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Lari Anderson
VP, Strategic Development
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Lonny Anderson
Technology Directorate, CTO, CIO
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Suite 6473
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: landers@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
dr rhonda l anderson phd
senior advisor, s&t
odni
1033 30th st nw
washington , DC 20007
Phone: (850) 303-1912
Fax: (none)
Email: rhonda.anderson@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Roger Anderson
VP Network Intelligence Division
Applied Signal Technology
460 West California Avenue
Sunnyvale , CA 94086
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: roger_anderson@appsig.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Wes Anderson
General Manager
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wesand@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Mark Andersson
COO
Applied Signal Technology
460 West California Avenue
Sunnyvale , CA 94086
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: MARK_ANDERSSON@appsig.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Louis Andre
Sr. Vice President, Intelligence
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: landre@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Erica Andren
41 Caerleon Ct
Pikesville , MD 21208
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: erica_andren@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Erica Andren
Senior Manager
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: erica_andren@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Erica Andren
Senior Manager
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: erica_andren@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Hugh K Bolton
President & CEO
The Advanced Technical Intelligence Center
2685 Hibiscus Way
Suite 110
Beavercreek , OH 45431
Phone: (none)
Fax: (937) 429-7602
Email: hbolton@atichcd.org
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Deborah Bonanni
Chief of Staff
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dabonan@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kit Bond Sen.
Vice Chairman
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: courtney_ellis@bond.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Steve Bond
Strategic Planner
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
230 Mall blvd
King of Prussia , PA 19406
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steve.p.bond@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Gus Bontzos
Vice President
ITT Corporation
Lisa McGee
141 National Business parkway
Suite 200
annapolis junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gus.bontzos@itt.com
_____________________________________________________
Randy Bookout
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: r_bookout@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Boone
4905 Oakcrest Drive
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jvboone@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Booth
43427 Circle Oaks Street
Gonzales , LA 70737
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jbooth@dps.state.la.us
_____________________________________________________
David Boren
President, University of Oklahom
EOP
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: davidlboren@ou.edu
_____________________________________________________
Stanley Borgia
Associate Director of Counterint
Energy Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Rafael Borras
Under Secretary for Management
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lupe.morales@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Rafael Borras
Undersecretary for Management
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rafael.borras@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Elizabeth Bosnak
2300 Clarendon Blvd, Suite 800
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Eric J Boswell
Diplomatic Security
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: boswellej@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Bottom
TITLE TBD
NGA
1206 Weatherstone Court
Reston , VA 20194
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bottomd@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Bouchard
2345 Crystal Drive
suite 525
Crystal City , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michael.Bouchard@eodt.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Linda Bouland
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jllusby@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Joe Bowab
Minority Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joe_bowab@armed-services.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sheryl Bowanko
13401 Trey Lane
Clifton , VA 20124
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
SHERYL BOWANKO
VP
SAIC
11251 ROGER BACON DRIVE
RESTON , VA 20190
Phone: (unlisted)
Fax: (703) 318-4612
Email: sheryl.bowanko@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Raymond C Bowen III
Chairman/Co-Founder
Exceptional Software Strategies Inc
849 International Drive
Suite 310
Linthicum , MD 21090
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: raymond.bowen@exceptionalsoftware.com
_____________________________________________________
William Bowman
7930 Jones Branch Road
5th Floor
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wbowman@adobe.com
_____________________________________________________
John Boyarski
208 Wakefield Drive
Locust Grove , VA 22508
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.boyarski@us.army.mil
_____________________________________________________
John Boyarski
Major
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.boyarski@us.army.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James T Boyd BS, MS
Senior Program Manager
KMS Solutions, LLC
205 S. Whiting Street
Suite 400
Alexandria , VA 22304
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 370-6946
Email: jtboyd@kmssol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Jane A Boyd
Lockheed Martin SSC
Mailstop: 1102
P O Box 179
Denver , CO 80201
Phone: (540) 710-5837
Fax: (303) 971-3666
Email: jane.boyd@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Judith Boyd
Dep. AGC for Intelligence
DHS Office of the General Counsel
66 15th St. NE
Washington , DC 20002
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jkboyd08@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Phillip L Boyd
Fellow, Special Programs
Cubic Defense Applications, Inc.
9333 Balboa Ave
San Diego , CA 92123
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: phil.boyd@cubic.com
_____________________________________________________
Brooke Boyer
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brooke.boyer@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Daniel Boyle
Business Development Representat
SAS Institute
1530 Wilson Blvd
Suite 800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Col. Ed Boyle USAF (Ret.
TITLE TBD
Kforce Government Solutions
2750 Prosperity Ave.
Suite 300
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eboyle@dnovus.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Bozzay
18876 Loudoun Orchard Road
Leesburg , VA 20175
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Dyann R Bradbury
Associate Director of Compliance
Digital River
5300 Leighton Avenue
Lincoln , NE 68504
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dbradbury@digitalriver.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Gail Bradley
Account Executive
Dell Inc.
One Dell Way
One Dell Way
Round Rock , TX 78682
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gail_bradley@dell.com
_____________________________________________________
Patricia Bradshaw
11925 Parkland Court
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pbradshaw1@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tom Brady
TITLE TBD
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tom.brady@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Tom Brady
Business Development Executive
Hewlett Packard Company
616 Silverstone Court
Silver Spring , MD 20905
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lizette.a.grady@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
John Bramer
Director of Program Development
Software Engineering Institute, CMU
NRECA Building
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Adrienne Brand
Senior Consultant
Booz Allen Hamilton
13200 Woodland Park Road
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brand_adrienne@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph J Brand
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
S02, Suite 6425
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jjbrand@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Robert Brandon
Program Area Manager
Boeing
7700 Boston Blvd
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Robert.w.Brandon@Boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Scott Brasfield
Business Development
Parsons
100 M Street SE
Washington , DC 20003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scott.brasfield@parsons.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Sherri N Braxton-Lieber
Director, NCR Programs
Cubic Applications, Inc.
Sherri Braxton-Lieber
12224 Summer Sky Path
Clarksville , MD 21029
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sherri.braxton-lieber@cubic.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Bredimus
Engineering Fellow, Special Prog
Cubic Defense Applications, Inc.
9333 Balboa Ave
San Diego , CA 92123
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mike.bredimus@cubic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Breeden
Executive Director
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.breeden@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Chad Breese
21412 Alum Creek Ct
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chad.breese@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Chris J Brehany
13020 Feldspar Court
Clifton , VA 20124-0951
Phone: (703) 818-7272
Fax: (none)
Email: brehany@geointsolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Peter Breier
Vice President
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pbreier@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert B Bremmer
Practice Manager
EMC Corporation
Bob Bremmer
653 MacBeth Drive
Pittsburgh , PA 15235
Phone: (none)
Fax: (412) 798-3774
Email: robert.bremmer@emc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Brender
21700 Atlantic Boulevard
Dulles , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brender.mark@geoeye.com
_____________________________________________________
Donald Thomas
Executive Director
Ernst & Young
8484 Westpark Drive
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donald.thomas@ey.com
_____________________________________________________
Donna Thomas
Principal
Astrachan, Gunst & Thomas, P.C.
217 East Redwood Street
21st Floor
Baltimore , MD 21202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dthomas@agtlawyers.com
_____________________________________________________
Donna Thomas
TITLE TBD
Astrachan, Gunst & Thomas, P.C.
217 East Redwood Street
21st Floor
Baltimore , MD 21202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dthomas@agtlawyers.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jason Thomas
Senior Analyst
TRSS, LLC
1410 Spring Hill Rd
Suite 140
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jason.thomas@trssllc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Thomas
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Thomas_John@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
John Thomas
SVP, General Manager
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.d.thomas@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Marcus C Thomas
Operational Technology Division
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: marcus.thomas@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mike Thomas
TITLE TBD
Booz Allen Hamilton
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Thomas_Mike@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Thomas
VP - Defense Operations
Wyle Information Systems
1600 Intenational Dr
Suite 800
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.thomas@wyle.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Ria Thomas
6903 K Victoria Dr.
Alexandria , VA 22310
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rthomas@fabiani-co.com
_____________________________________________________
Ria Thomas
Defense/Security
Fabiani & Company
1101 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington , DC 20004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rthomas@fabiani-co.com
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Thompkins
Vice President of Bus. Ops.
Engineering Systems Consultants, Inc.
8201 Corporate Drive
Suite 1105
Landover , MD 20785-2230
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Bennie G Thompson
Chair, Committee on Homeland Sec
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andrea.lee@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Gregory Thompson
950 25th St. NW
Washington , DC 20037
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thompson.g@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jennifer Thompson
Sr. Marketing Communications Spe
L-3 Communications, Inc.
11955 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Kimberly A Thompson
Director, Office of Corporate Co
NGA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kimberly.thompson@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Leigh Thompson
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Leigh.Thompson@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Monica Thompson
3011 Colonial Springs Court
Alexandria , VA 22306
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: monica@prointelservices.net
_____________________________________________________
Robert D Thompson Jr.
State / Division of Levee Distri
505 District Dr.
Monroe , LA 71202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ldpolice1@bellsouth.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Thompson
8329 North Mopac Expressway
Austin , TX 78759
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wmthompson@signaturescience.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William M Thompson
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wmthomp@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Thomson
460 Spring Park Place
Suite 1000
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rthomson@terremark.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Tierney
Vice President, Business Develop
L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East
1 Federal Street
A&E-2C
Camden , NJ 8103
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: John.Tierney@L-3Com.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Chris Tillery
TITLE TBD
USIS
7799 Leesburg Pike
Suite 400 S
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.tillery@usis.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Tillison
Security Director
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.tillison@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Edward A Timmes
SVP, Deputy General Manager
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: edward.a.timmes.jr@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Nils G Tolling
TITLE TBD
CTSS - Corporate and Transport Security Solutions
9007 West Shorewood
Suite 529
Mercer Island , WA 98040
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nils@ctssgroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. David Tolliver
4648 Star Flower Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: DETolliver@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Judy Tolliver
4648 Star Flower Dr
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jetolliver@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jack Tomarchio
RETIRED
DHS
4103 Meadow Lane
Newtown Square , PA 19073
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.Tomarchio@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jack T Tomarchio
Agoge Group, LLC
200 Eagle Road, Suite 308
Wayne , PA 19087
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jtt@agogegroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Adm. Chris Tomney USCG
Intelligence Coordinating Center
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.tomney@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kurt Tong
Asst Sec Asia-Pacific
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tongk@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Deputy Asst. Se John Torres
Deputy Assistant Secretary, US I
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.torres@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Fran Townsend
INSA Chairwoman of the Board
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.
35 E. 62nd St.
New York , NY 10065
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Stacy Trammell
11400 Glen Dale Ridge Road
Glenn Dale , MD 20769
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stacy.trammell@zavda.com
_____________________________________________________
Stacy Trammell
President
Zavda Technologies, LLC
9250 Bendix Road
Suite 540
Columbia , MD 21045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (240) 266-0597
Email: stacy.trammell@zavda.com
_____________________________________________________
Stacy D Trammell
Stacy D. Trammell
11400 Glen Dale Ridge Road
Glenn Dale , MD 20769
Phone: (unlisted)
Fax: (240) 266-0597
Email: stacy.trammell@zavda.com
_____________________________________________________
Christopher T Trapp
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Trauberman
Vice President
The Boeing Company-Network & Space Systems
1200 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.trauberman@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Trauberman
VP, Space, Intel & MDS
The Boeing Company
Jeffrey Trauberman
The Boeing Company
1200 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.trauberman@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Trauberman
Vice President
The Boeing Company
1200 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.traubeman@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Trauberman
Vice President
The Boeing Company
1200 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.trauberman@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephen Traver
1007 Longworth House Office Buil
Washington , DC 20515
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Tremont
Executive Vice President, Operat
SRC, Inc
7502 Round Pond Road
North Syracuse , NY 13212
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tremont@srcinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ronald J Trerotola
Director RF Systems Engineering
Cubic Defense Applications, Inc.
9333 Balboa Ave
San Diego , CA 92123
Phone: (unlisted)
Fax: (none)
Email: ron.trerotola@cubic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steven A Trevino
19192 Greystone Square
Leesburg , VA 20176
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Steven.Trevino@Keane.com
_____________________________________________________
Joseph Trindal
Managing Director
KeyPoint Government Solutions, Inc.
1750 Foxtrail Drive
Loveland , CO 80538
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joseph.trindal@keypoint.us.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bruce Triner
6112 Nightshade Court
Rockville , MD 20852
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Kate Troendle
Vice President
BlueStone Capital Partners
1600 Tysons Boulevard
8th Floor
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 852-4496
_____________________________________________________
John Brennan
Assistant to the President for H
NSC
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john_o._brennan@who.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Brennan
Director, Policy and Analysis
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.brennan@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Nicholas Brethauer
655 Emerson St. NE
Washington , DC 20017
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: npbrethauer@uwalumni.com
_____________________________________________________
Larry Brewer
SVP, Government Relations
DRS Technologies, Inc.
5 Sylvan Way
Parsippany , NJ 7054
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lbrewer@drs-ds.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Vincent Bridgeman
3834 Windom Pl NW
Washington , DC 20016
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Diane Briggs
TITLE TBD
Harris Corporation
P.O. Box 37
MS: 2-21D
Melbourne , FL 32902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dbriggs@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Ambassador Kenneth Brill
TITLE TBD
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: BrillKC@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Esther Brimmer
International Organization Affai
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brimmere@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Rex Brinker
TITLE TBD
Software Engineering Institute, CMU
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rbrinker@sei.cmu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Denny Brisley
1421 Jefferson Davis Highway
Suite 600
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: denny.brisley@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Denny Brisley
President and CEO
The Brisley Group, LLC
3406 Gilden Drive
Alexandria , VA 22305
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: debrisley@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Denny E Brisley
Market Development Executive
SAIC
11251 Roger Bacon Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brisleyd@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Bill Britton
Vice President General Manager
Cobham Analytic Solutions
5875 Trinity Parkway
Suite 300
Centreville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Sandra Broadnax
Director, Small Business Program
NGA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Sandra.L.Broadnax@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Sandra Broadnax
12310 Sunrise Valley Drive
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sandra.braodnax@waldenu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Broadwater
Senior Vice President, NSG
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joe.broadwater@analex.com
_____________________________________________________
Jon Brody
VP of Marketing
Tenable Network Security
7063 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Elizabeth Brooks
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Daniel Brophy
1421 Jefferson Davis Highway
Suite 600
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Daniel.Brophy@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Joseph Brosky
106 Shenkelview Drive
Johnstown , PA 15905
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Joe.Brosky@usdoj.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph F Brosky
National Drug Intelligence Cente
319 Washington Street
Johnstown , PA 15905
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Joe.Brosky@usdoj.gov
_____________________________________________________
Fred Brott
TITLE TBD
Intec Billing, Inc.
301 North Perimeter Center
Suite 200
Atlanta , GA 30346
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fred.brott@intecbilling.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Frederick Brott
President, CEO & Chairman
Intec Billing, Inc.
301 North Perimeter Center
Suite 200
Atlanta , GA 30346
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fred.brott@intecbilling.com
_____________________________________________________
Brenda Brown
Marketing Communications Operati
TASC
4805 Stonecroft Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Charles G Brown
Chair, Antennas and Propogation
NSA
9800 Savage Road
D, Suite 6242
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 688-7741
Email: cgbrown@ieee.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Clay Brown
TITLE TBD
Northrop Grumman Geospatial Services
6910 Scenic Pointe Place
Manassas , VA 20112
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cbrown@3001inc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Darrell Brown
45677 Paddington Station Terrace
Sterling , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: darrellpbrown@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
David Brown
5155 Parkstone Drive
Chantilly , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dave.brown@agilex.com
_____________________________________________________
Frank H Brown
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jason B Brown
White House Cyber Security
NSC
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jason_b._brown@who.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jerome A Brown Jr. MPA
Defense Analyst
U.S. Government Accountability Office
5602 Hogenhill Terrace
Rockville , MD 20853
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jerome.a.brown@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Kevin Brown
Dr. Kevin L. Brown, CEO
7901 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 610
Mclean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kbrown@lorenzresearch.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Kevin Brown
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kevin.brown@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. La Tosca Brown BA
Client Executive
IBM
41342 Raspberry Drive
Leesburg , VA 20176
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lbbrown@us.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
Lisa S Brown
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Admiral Michael Brown USN
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Michael A Brown
Transport. Security Specialist
Transportation Security Administration
601 S 12th Street
TSA-13
Arlington , VA 205986013
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dadabrown@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
RADM Mike Brown
Deputy Assistant Secretary for C
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michael.Brown1@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Paul Brown
Intelligence Analyst
GTEC
20907 Sandstone Square
Sterling , VA 20165
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paulbrowntx@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Roger Brown
1517 N. Colonial Court
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brownrogera@mac.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William C Brown
CI Staff Office
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 739-5504
Email: bbrown@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
William E Brown
Business Development Manager
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william.e.brown@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Ric E Browne
Manager, Business Development
General Dynamics
General Dynamics
2721 Technology Drive
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ric.browne@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Browning
Director, Intelligence Systems
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Robert.Browning@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
William Brucato
11 Cresent Court
Sterling , VA 20164
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: missionsupport1@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Bruce
9513 Woody Lane
Great Falls , VA 22066
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james_bruce@rand.org
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kellene Bruce
Research Fellow
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kbruce@lmi.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ronald Bruce
10 South Beaumont Avenue
Catonsville , MD 21228
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: crbruce@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Charles Brummund
Vice President,General Manager,
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: charles.brummund@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael J Bruni
Staffing Manager
SAIC
Michael Bruni
11251 Roger Bacon Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 318-4595
Email: brunim@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Jill Bruning
Chief Operating Officer
NJVC, LLC
8614 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 300
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jill.bruning@njvc.com
_____________________________________________________
Bear Bryant
Deputy Director of National Inte
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robermb3@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steve Bryen
President
Finmeccanica
Angelica Falchi
1625 I Street, NW
12th Floor
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephen.bryen@finmeccanica.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert M Brzenchek Masters
Emergency Planning Specialist
Luzerne County EMA
Robert Brzenchek
Luzerne County EMA
185 Water Street
Wilkes-Barre , PA 18702
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.brzenchek@luzernecounty.org
_____________________________________________________
Zbigniew Brzezinski Center for
CSIS Counselor and Trustee
CSIS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: aschwartz@csis.org
_____________________________________________________
Donna Bucella
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Michael Buchwald
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: m_buchwald@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian Buck
Chief Technology Officer
River Glass Inc
6626 Stowe Ct
Lisle , IL 60532
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bbuck@riverglassinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Nick Buck
President & CEO
Buck Consulting Group, LLC
13111 Tingewood Ct
Oak Hill , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 391-7821
Email: nick@buckgroup.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Buckley
Senior Manager
Deloitte
1001 G St. N.W.
Ste 900
Washington , DC 20001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: davidbuckley@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Buckley
Inspector General
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: buckdavid@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Buie
TITLE TBD
NSA
106 Flanagan Drive
Taneytown , MD 21787
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dbbuie@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Steve Bull
Director
Analytic Services (ANSER)
2900 South Quincy S
Suite 800
Arlington , VA 22206
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steve.bull@anser.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Bullett
11107 Sunset Hills Road
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rbullett@us.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
Brian B Bullock
Capture Manager
General Dynamics IT, NDIS
13857 McLearen Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian.bullock@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Brian B Bullock
Capture Manager
General Dynamics IT, NDIS
13857 McLearen Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 268-7886
Email: brian.bullock@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen Buonato
PO Box 10882
Marina del Rey , CA 90295
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sbuonato@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Laurence Burgess
Deputy Undersecretary for Collec
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: laurence.burgess@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
LTG Ron Burgess USA
Director of the DIA
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Ronald.Burgess@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Burgoyne
Vice President, ISR
Sierra Nevada Corporation
444 Salomon Circle
Sparks , NV 89434
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.burgoyne@sncorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. A. Burks
950 Willow Valley Lakes Dr.
#H311
Willow Street , PA 17584
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joanandroyburks@worldnet.att.net
_____________________________________________________
Dr. James Burnett
7136 Avenida Altisima
Rancho Palos Verdes , CA 90275
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rburnett@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Destiny Burns
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
10560 Arrowhead Drive
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Kerri Burns
TITLE TBD
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
William J Burns
Under Secretary Political Affair
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: burnswj@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kyle C Burr B.A.
Senior Consultant
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kyle.burr@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Tom Burrell
1400 Fountaingrove PKY
MS: 3USW
Santa Rosa , CA 95403
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tom_burrell@agilent.com
_____________________________________________________
Lynda Burroughs
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Lynda Burroughs
Business Development Manager
ManTech International Corporation
2250 Corporate Park Drive
Suite 500
Herndon , VA 22304
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lynda.burroughs
_____________________________________________________
Lynda Burroughs
12015 Lee Jackson Highway
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lynda.burroughs@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Lynda Burroughs
2250 Corporate Park Drive
Suite 500
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Lynda.Burroughs@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Peter Burrow
1616 Anderson Road
Suite 109
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: peter.burrow@xebecglobal.com
_____________________________________________________
Captain Richard Burton USN
TITLE TBD
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: j.burton@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Thomas J Burton
Office of Inspector General
NGA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.burton@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Wes Bush
Chief Executive Officer
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dan Butler
Assistant Deputy Director of Nat
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: daniel.s.butler@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Daniel Butler
12020 Quorn Lane
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: d.butler@dni.osis.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gerry Butler
General Manager
Sierra Nevada Corporation
444 Salomon Circle
Sparks , NV 89434
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gerry.butler@sncorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Karen Butler
12020 Quorn Lane
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: butlerkc@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Butler
2355 Dulles Corner Blvd.
Suite 525
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.butler@sap.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert Butler
Deputy Assistant Secretary for C
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Robert.butler@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Garrett Butulis
2845 Calliness Way
Wake Forest , NC 27587
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: garrett@butulis.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jim Byers
Director, Security Services
Ensco, Inc.
5400 Port Royal Road
Springfield , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: byers.james@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Mary Kay Byers
Chief Human Capital Officer
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: marykay.byers@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Shala A Byers
Analyst
Department of Homeland Security
2715 Cortland Place
Apt 32
Washington , DC 20008
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: shala.byers@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Nicole Byler BA
1201 Colombo Ave
Apt 10206
Sierra Vista , AZ 85635
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nicole.byler@us.army.mil
_____________________________________________________
Robert Campbell
10160 Technology Blvd East
Dallas , TX 75220
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.p.campbell@usdoj.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tim Campen
8260 Willow Oaks Drive
Rm 3024
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: campta3435@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Elizabeth Camphouse
2342 Ballard Way
Ellicott City , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: elizabeth.camphouse@entegrasystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Roel Campos
PIAB Member
PIAB
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Wendy_A._Loehrs@pfiab.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Peggy Canale
Government Segment Manager
Avocent
2805 Ridge Road Drive
Alexandria , VA 22302
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: peggy.canale@emerson.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Frank Cantarelli
TITLE TBD
Ciena Corporation
1185 Sanctuary Parkway
Suite 300
Alpharetta , GA 30004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fcantare@ciena.com
_____________________________________________________
Eric Cantor Rep.
House Minority Whip
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cantorschedule@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Capitan
Vice President - Business Dev
Parsons
100 M St, SE
Washington , DC 20003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.capitan@parsons.com
_____________________________________________________
Philip Caplan
Consultant
URS Federal Services, Inc.
URS Federal Services, Inc.
9755 Patuxent Woods Dr.
Suite 300
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 423-2570
Email: philip.caplan@urs.com
_____________________________________________________
Paul Capozzola
2300 Corporate Park Drive
Suite 110
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (703) 391-1944
Fax: (703) 674-0256
Email: pcapozzola@signaturegs.com
_____________________________________________________
Paul Capozzola
Director Cyber Security
Signature Government Solutions
Paul Capozzola
2300 Corporate Park Drive
Suite 110
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pcapozzola@signaturegs.com
_____________________________________________________
Connie Cappadona
Strategic Program Manager
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Connie Cappadona
Strategic Program Manager
Hewlett Packard Federal Strategic Programs Group
6600 Rockledge drive
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: connie.cappadona@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Connie Cappadona
Strategic Programs Manager
Hewlett-Packard
11391 Fox Vale Glen CT
Oakton , VA 22124
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: connie.cappadona@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mike L Capps
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Valerie Caproni
OGC
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: valerie.caproni@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ann Caracristi
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Ann Carbonell
5819 Appleford Drive
Alexandria , VA 22315-5625
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adoublen@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Ann M Carbonell PhD.
NGA Source Technical Executive
NGA
5819 Appleford Dr.
Alexandria , VA 22315
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Ann.M.Carbonell@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Ann M Carbonella
LIDAR Program Manager
NGA
5819 Appleford Drive
Alexandria , VA 22315-5625
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carbonellaa@nima.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Cardillo
Deputy Director of Analysis
DIA
7711 Cashland Court
Alexandria , VA 22315
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Robert.Cardillo@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Dr. David P Cargo
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
R1, Suite 6515
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dpcargo@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
John Carlin
Chief of Staff and Senior Counse
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.carlin@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bruce Carlson
Director
NRO
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bruce.carlson@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Johan Carlson
7483 Argyll Court
Warrenton , VA 20187
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hans@stratspace.net
_____________________________________________________
Don Carmichael
Director, BD
Wyle Information Systems
1600 Intenational Dr
Suite 800
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Donald Carney
TITLE TBD
Perkins Coie
11703 Charen Lane
Potomac , MD 20854
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dcarney@perkinscoie.com
_____________________________________________________
Adelbert W Carpenter
VP Business Development
L-3 Communications
1215 S. Clark St
Suite 1205
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 412-7198
Email: Buz.carpenter@L-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Mike Carpenter
Senior Vice President
McAfee, Inc.
12010 Sunset Hills Road
5th Floor
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael_carpenter@mcafee.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Carr
TITLE TBD
CISCO
12516 Nathaniel Oaks Drive
Oak Hill , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dkcarr50@cisco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael D Carr
NCE Director, Mission Systems Tr
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, MS D-085
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 227-6040
Email: carrmd@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Robert Carr
TITLE TBD
DIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.carr@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Shawn Carrolo
TITLE TBD
Qwest Communications
4250 N. Fairfax Dr.
5th Floor
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Eric Carson
1431 Harvey Avenue
Severn , MD 21144
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eric.carson@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Johnnie Carson
Asst Secretary African Affairs
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carsonj@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Carta
IC Account Manager., APG
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.carta@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mike Carta
Account Executive
Dell Inc.
One Dell Way
One Dell Way
Round Rock , TX 78682
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael_carta@dell.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Ashton Carter
Under Secretary Defense AT&L
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ashton.carter@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Denise Carter
Competition Advocate
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Denise.Carter@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Gail Carter
INSA OCI Task Force
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Roger Carter
7526 Cherry Tree Drive
Fulton , MD 20759
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rlcarter@quantum-intl.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Roger L Carter
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
DC5, Suite 6217
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rlcarte@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Gen James Cartwright
Vice Chairman
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: molly.denham@js.pentagon.mil
_____________________________________________________
Alana Casanova Masters
Public Affairs
DISA
Alana Casanova/SPI
6910 Cooper Ave
Fort Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alana.casanova@disa.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John P Casciano
P. O. Box 231552
Centreville, VA , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: garystar@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Susan Case Vice Presi
Vice President National Security
American Systems
13990 Parkeast Circle
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Susan.Case@AmericanSystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ed Casey
Chief Executive Officer
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
Email: Ed.Casey@serco-na.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Angie Cash
TITLE TBD
Dell Inc.
One Dell Way
One Dell Way
Round Rock , TX 78682
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mike Castelli
Counsel
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: boz.cas@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Castro
Public Sector Sales Representati
Quest Software - Public Sector Group
700 King Farm Boulevard
Suite 250
Rockville , MD 20850
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: davidacastro@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lorraine Castro
11487 Sunset Hills Road
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lorraineCNJ@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Tonia Cates
TITLE TBD
DIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tonia.cates@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Greg Catherine
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Greg.Catherine@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Nelson Cathie
6923 Kettle Mar Dr.
Houston , TX 77084
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nelson@fbnt-inc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Daniel Catlaw
TITLE TBD
Booz Allen Hamilton
1201 South Barton Street
#159
Arlington , VA 22204
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: catlaw_daniel@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Cattler
5970 Lyceum Lane
Manassas , VA 20112
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cattler@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
David Cattler
Deputy National Intelligence Off
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: davidmc2@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Cauchon
85 Collamer Crossings
E. Syracuse , NY 13057
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dickc@sensis.com
_____________________________________________________
Marcella Cavallaro
Federal Intelligence Sales
Esri
380 New York St
Redlands , CA 92373
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mcavallaro@esri.com
_____________________________________________________
Marcella Cavallaro
8615 Westwood Center Dr
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mcavallaro@esri.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Cavanaugh
5643 Lightspun Lane
Columbia , MD 21045
Phone: (410) 997-4709
Fax: (410) 740-1942
Email: jpcgolf1@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Cave
4001 Fairfax Drive
Ste 300
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william.l.cave@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Luis CdeBaca
Ofc to Monitor & Combat Traffick
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cdebacal@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Matt Cegelske
Cyber Federal Executive Fellow
U.S. Navy
4720 Forbes Avenue, CIC Rm 2310
Pittsburgh , PA 15213
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mcegelsk@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Celentano
6564 Loisdale Court
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Michael Cerruti
President & CEO
Everest Technology Solutions Inc.
9990 Lee Highway
Suite 501
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mcerruti@everest.nu
_____________________________________________________
Michael J Cerruti
TITLE TBD
Everest Technology Solutions Inc.
9990 Lee Highway
Suite 501
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mcerruti@everest.nu
_____________________________________________________
Hector Cevallos
Director
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Steve Chabinsky
Dep Asst Director, FBI Cyber Div
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stevenrc@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Chadason
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Patrick J Chagnon
P.O. Box 152
Windsor , CT 6095
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pchagnon@bluelineinfo.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Mary Chahalis
503 Garden View Way
Rockville , MD 20850
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mchahali@us.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
Mary Chahalis
Account Manager, Intel
Terrago Technologies
1380 Park Garden Lane
Reston , VA 20194
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: marychahalis@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
stephanie chak
FA
Morgan Stanley
1850 k st nw
suite 900
washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephanie.chak@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dave Chamberlain
Vice President, Integrated Custo
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dchamberlai2@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Chamberlin
Director
NJVC, LLC
8614 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 300
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.chamberlin@njvc.com
_____________________________________________________
Regan Chambers
67 South Scribewood Circle
The Woodlands , TX 77382
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Diane Chandler
Director
CACI International Inc.
4831 Walden Lane
Lanham , MD 20706
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dchandler@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Kelly Chandler
Recruiting Manager
Cobham Analytic Solutions
1911 N Fort Myer Drive
Suite 1100
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kelly.chandler@cobham.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Yvonne L Chaplin
3110 Fairview Park Drive
falls church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ychaplin@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David C Chapman
VP, New Business Development
Scientific Research Corporation
2300 Windy Ridge Parkway
Suite 400 South
Atlanta , GA 30339
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dchapman@scires.com
_____________________________________________________
Eric Chapman
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: e_chapman@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Tara Chapman
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tdc@alumni.duke.edu
_____________________________________________________
Jane P Chappell
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company
Jane P. Chappell
1200 S. Jupiter Road
Garland , TX 75042
Phone: (972) 423-6129
Fax: (972) 205-6388
Email: jane_p_chappell@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Charles
8618 Westwood Center Drive
#315
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tcharles@sgis.com
_____________________________________________________
Joe Charron
TITLE TBD
Kforce Government Solutions
2750 Prosperity Ave.
Suite 300
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jcharron@kforcegov.com
_____________________________________________________
Timothy Chase
1919 N. Lynn Street
Rosslyn , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tchase@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Harris J Chasen BS
CTO
F4W
Harris Chasen
39 Skyline Dr.
Ste. A1001
Lake Mary , FL 32746
Phone: (none)
Fax: (407) 804-1030
Email: hchasen@f4winc.com
_____________________________________________________
Charles Chassot
5678 Roundtree Drive
Woodbridge , VA 22193
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chuck.chassot@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Melissa Chaump
181 E. Reed Ave., #409
Alexandria , VA 22305
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: melrae0607@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jim Chavez
TITLE TBD
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque , NM 87185
Phone: (505) 844-4485
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. L. Monica Chavez
Vice President, Communications &
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Monica.Chavez@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms Lucia M Chavez
Director, Washington Operations
General Dynamics
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: monica.chavez@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Carson T Checketts
1709 19th St. NW #23
Washington , DC 20009
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: c.checketts@mac.com
_____________________________________________________
Gen. Peter W Chiarelli
Vice Chief of Staff (4-star)
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Craig M Childress
President
Eagle Talon Solutions, Inc.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cmchildress@eagletsi.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Chiralo
Manager, Program Development
SRI International
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chiralo@wdc.sri.com
_____________________________________________________
Amy Choi
555 Massachusetts Ave NW
Unit 808
Washington , DC 20001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: amy.choi@us.pwc.com
_____________________________________________________
Min Chong
8381 Old Courthouse Rd
Suite 330
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: min.chong@stopso.com
_____________________________________________________
Aneesh Chopra
Federal Chief Technology Officer
EOP
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: aneesh_chopra@ostp.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Duane Andrews
CEO
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dandrews@qinetiq-na.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Edward Andron ACom ARM
Property Manager
BLDG Management Corp.
24 Perkiomen Avenue
Staten Island , NY 10312
Phone: (718) 967-3617
Fax: (212) 557-6709
Email: eandron@bldg.com
_____________________________________________________
Brad Antle
CEO
Salient Federal Solutions
4000 Legato Road
Ste 510
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brad.antle@salientfed.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bradford Antle
12012 Sunset Hills Road
Suite 800
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
Email: brad.antle@salientfed.com
_____________________________________________________
Kathleen Appenrodt
2331 Cathedral Avenue NW Apt. 50
Washington DC , DC 20008
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kathleen.Appenrodt@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kathleen Appenrodt
Federal Planner
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kathleen.Appenrodt@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Roy Apseloff
117 S. Buchanan Street
Arlington , VA 22204
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rapseloff@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Roy Apseloff
Director, National Media and Exp
ODNI
117 S. Buchanan Street
Arlington , VA 22204
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Roy.Apseloff@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Ellen Ardrey
Deputy Director, Human Capital O
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Ellen.Ardrey@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James B Armor Jr.
7004 Veering Lane
Burke , VA 22015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.armor@atk.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Patrick Arnold
CTO
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patar@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Arnold
Director, Strategy & Business De
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Richard.Arnold@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Steve Arnold
11717 Exploration Lane
Germantown , MD 20876
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steven.arnold@hughes.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Myra Aronson
1000 Technology Drive
Pittsburgh , PA 15219
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: myra.aronson@ansaldo-sts.us
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tony Arsene MBA, BAS,
CEO
Angelic Care Inc
P.O. Box 253
Montclair , CA 91763
Phone: (909) 982-3866
Fax: (909) 982-3866
Email: guitaricon@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dean D Artigue
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kenneth Asbury
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ken.asbury@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert Ashe
Strategic Planner
SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES
185 STATE HIGHWAY 36
WEST LONG BRANCH , NJ 7764
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rashe@systek.com
_____________________________________________________
Sapana Asher
Title TBD
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jeff Ashford
Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.ashford@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Lindley Ashline
GovWin.com Web Editor
Deltek
13880 Dulles Corner Ln # 400
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lindleyashline@deltek.com
_____________________________________________________
Elizabeth Ashwell
TITLE TBD
Treasury Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: julie.herr@do.treas.gov
_____________________________________________________
Sid Ashworth
Minority Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sid_ashworth@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Sid Ashworth
VP, NGC
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Shay Assad
Director of Defense Procurement
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: erin.porter@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Bill Chow
VP, Engineering and Operations
Core180, Inc.
2751 Prosperity Drive
Suite 200
Vienna , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mahiyan Chowdhury Ex-MBA
Substation Engineer
Siemens Energy, Inc
900 E. Six Forks Rd
152
Raleigh , NC 27604
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mxc1700@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dana Christiansen
Federal Account Executive
Gartner
4501 N. Fairfax Drive
8th Floor
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dana.christiansen@gartner.com
_____________________________________________________
Ben Chu
Strategic Planner
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ben.1.chu@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Ben Chu
1111 Lockheed Martin Way
Sunnyvale , CA 94089
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ben.1.chu@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Steven Chu
Secretary
Energy Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: the.secretary@hq.doe.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Leonardo Ciano
15 Sampson Rd
Rochester , NH 3867
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: leociano@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kevin P Cichetti
Associate Deput Director, Congre
NGA
16424 Montecrest Lane
Gaithersburg , MD 20878
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kevin.P.Cichetti@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Rick Cinquegrana
Senior Manager
Grant Thornton LLP
333 John Carlyle Street
Suite 500
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
James R Clapper Jr.
Under Secretary of Defense for I
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: James.Clapper@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sharon Claridge
5353 Ashleigh Road
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sclaridge@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bill Clark
TITLE TBD
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william.clark@ca.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Clark
Director of Collections
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.clark@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Clark
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Mark.Clark@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Mary Clark
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ryan Clark
Project Manager
Computer Sciences Corporation
7231 Parkway Drive
Hanover , MD 21076
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rclark52@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Timothy Clayton
Director, Human Capital Manageme
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: timothy.clayton@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Peter Clement
Deputy Director of Intelligence
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 482-1739
Email: peterc@cia.ic.gov
_____________________________________________________
Denis Clements
INSA Innovative Tech Council
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
John Clements
7808 boyce street
ft meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.e.clements@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Melcena (Gary) Clemmons
VP for Business Development
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: melcena.g.clemmons@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Gail Clifford
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gclifford@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Howard Clifford
Chief Technologist - US Intel
Hewlett-Packard Co
107 Sandgate Ct.
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: howard.clifford@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Sean A Clifton
263 Clover Court
Dublin , OH 43017
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sean.clifton@us.army.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. T E Clifton III
1700 N. Moore St.
Suite 2100
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tip@eastportanalytics.com
_____________________________________________________
Hillary Clinton
Secretary
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ClintonHR@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Daniel L Cloyd
National Secretary Brance, Direc
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: daniel.cloyd@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Aaron Coats
2808 McKinney Ave.
#501
Dallas , TX 75204
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: acoats@smu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Kyle Coble MSIT
Cybersecurity Standards SPC
DHS
DHS - NCSD
245 Murray Lane
Arlington , VA 20598
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kyle.coble@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Coby
Vice President, Special Projects
KeyW Corporation
1334 Ashton Road
Hanover , MD 21076
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kcoby@keywcorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Peter Coddington BA, MAS
PO Box 128
Highland , MD 20777
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pcoddington@parabal.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Coe MA, BA
Consultant
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: coe_michael_d@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Cofoni
Chief Executive Officer
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pcofoni@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Shaw Cohe
TITLE TBD
ASI Government
1655 North Fort Meyer Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scohe@acqsolinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Anita Cohen
6806 Wemberly Way
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: anitairene@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
David S Cohen
Assistant Secretary (Terrorist F
Treasury Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.cohen@do.treas.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Jonathan Cohen
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Suite 6513
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jdcohen@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Linda Cohen
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda.cohen@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Patricia A Cohen
Research Staff Member
Institute for Defense Analyses
Intelligence Analyses Division
4850 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria , VA 22312
Phone: (703) 642-2146
Fax: (none)
Email: pcohen@ida.org
_____________________________________________________
Harry Coker
9504 Silver Fox Turn
Clinton , MD 20735-3045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: HarryCokerJr@msn.com
_____________________________________________________
Harry Coker
TITLE TBD
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 482-1739
Email: harrycokerjr@msn.com
_____________________________________________________
Gene Colabatistto
TITLE TBD
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gennaro.a.colabatistto@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gus P Coldebella
3809 Alton Pl NW
Washington , DC 20016
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: coldebella@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. F. B Cole
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ltdunno@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jerry Cole
8105 Middle Ct
Austin , TX 78759
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jgcassoc@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
John C Cole
Director
Blackstone Technology Group
4601 N. fairfax Dr
Suite 1010
Arlington , VA 20169
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ccole@bstonetech.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard Coleman
6066 Shingle Creek Parkway
#18
Brooklyn Center , MN 55430
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Richard Coleman MA
Chairman
Cyber, Space & Intelligence Association
4305 Underwood Street
University Park , MD 20782
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richcoleman1@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Coleman
CEO
Six3 Systems
1430 Spring Hill Road
Suite 525
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rcoleman@six3systems.com
_____________________________________________________
Marcus Collier
Division Senior VP, Civilian and
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: marcus.collier@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Matthew R Collier
5984-201 Jake Sears Circle
Virginia Beach , VA 23464
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mattmit@regent.edu
_____________________________________________________
Kelly Collins
12210 Glen Mill Rd.
Potomac , MD 20854
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kelly.collins@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Nancy Walbridge Collins
Columbia University
International Affairs, 420 West
New York , NY 10027
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nwcollins@columbia.edu
_____________________________________________________
Felipe Colon Jr.
Chief, IC CIO Policy
ODNI - IC CIO
7708 Tiverton Drive
Springfield , VA 22152
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: felipe.colon@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Rebecca Colon
Senior Assistant 2
General Dynamics AIS
2721 Technology Drive
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (240) 294-2170
Email: rebecca.colon@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Roy Combs
TITLE TBD
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: roy.combs@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathleen S Comiskey MBA
Senior Consultant
Invertix Corporation
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 800
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kcomiskey@invertix.com
_____________________________________________________
BGen Joseph Composto USMC (Ret.
Director, Security & Installatio
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, D-102
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joseph.composto@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Melissa Cona
1651 Mount Eagle Pl
Alexandria , VA 22302
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: m.cona18@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Erin Conaton
Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: erin.conaton@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Maggie Conde-Jimenez
Executive Assistant
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Patrick Condo
1921 Gallows Road
Ste 200
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pcondo@convera.com
_____________________________________________________
Ronald Conn
Acquisition Mgmt Supervisor
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
David Connor
Director Federal Sales
Sourcefire
12709 Oxon Rd
Oak Hill , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dconnor@sourcefire.com
_____________________________________________________
Dee Connors
TITLE TBD
TASC
4805 Stonecroft Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: deeann.connors@tasc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. DeeAnn Connors
Director of Marketing
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: deeann.connors@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Conrad
Architect-DHS & Intel Comm
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dconrad@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Greg Conran
Network Designs, Inc.
501 Church St.
Suite 210
Vienna , VA 22180-4711
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Conroy
Vice President, NSP
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.conroy@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Considine
Partner, Federal Consulting, CSC
CSC (formerly Computer Sciences Corporation)
3110 Fairview Park Drive
Fall Church , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kconsidine2@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Tom Conway
Director of Federal Business Dev
McAfee, Inc.
12010 Sunset Hills Road
5th Floor
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tom_conway@mcafee.com
_____________________________________________________
RADM Cynthia Coogan
Director, USCG Intelligence
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Cynthia.A.Coogan@uscg.mil
_____________________________________________________
David Cook
TITLE TBD
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Lt Col Jeffrey Cook USAF
1189 Waverton Lane
Lincoln , CA 95648
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: angrypilot@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Michele Cook
Vice President, Business Devlopm
Six3 Systems
1430 Spring Hill Road
Suite 525
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michele.cook@six3systems.com
_____________________________________________________
Michele Cook
Vice President
Six3 Systems
1430 spring hill road
Suite 525
Mclean , VA 22012
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michele.cook@six3systems.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Owen Cook
High Performance Technology Mana
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: owen.cook@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Owen Cook Jr
Senior Account Executive
Intelligent Decisions Inc
21445 Beaumeade Cir
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ocook@intelligent.net
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Julie G Coonce
Business Development
SMSi
11720 Sunrise Valley Dr., St 320
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jcoonce@sms-fed.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Frank Cooper
TITLE TBD
Concurrent Technologies Corporation
325 Graystone Lane
Johnstown , PA 15905
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cooper@ctc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joe Cooper
President & CEO
Special Aerospace Security Services Inc
14325 Willard Road
Suite 202
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joe.cooper@sassi-va.com
_____________________________________________________
Joe D Cooper
TITLE TBD
Special Aerospace Security Services Inc
14325 Willard Road
Suite 202
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joe.cooper@sassi-va.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Lawrence Cooper
2806 Erics Ct.
Crofton , MD 21114
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Cooper@AstroGuy.net
_____________________________________________________
Steven Cooper
3818 White Post Ct
Suite A
Alexandria , VA 22304
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scooper@strativest.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steve Coppinger
Vice President
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scoppinger@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
John Copple
1029 Deer Spings Lane
Golden , CO 80403
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jcopple@sanborn.com
_____________________________________________________
Tom Corcoran
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: t_corcoran@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Lynne Corddry
VP Business Development PS
Red Hat, Inc
8260 Greensboro Dr
Suite 300
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lcorddry@redhat.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Cornelius
36227 80th St East
Littlerock , CA 93543
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Oldsaltydog.cornelius@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Shannon Cornwell
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Christopher Corpora
5 Trellis Drive
Stafford , VA 22554
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cacorpora@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kristin Corra
Intelligence Officer
OUSD(I)
Kristin Corra
2450 VA Ave.
Washington , DC 20037
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kmcorra@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mary Corrado
TITLE TBD
Deloitte Consulting, LLP
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mcorrado@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Hank Corscadden
Dir - Government Contract Compli
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Hank.Corscadden@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Vincent Corsi
8755 Diamond Hill Dr.
Bristow , VA 20136
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vcorsi@us.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
Gene Costa
VP Finance
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Jim Costabile
TITLE TBD
SRA
4350 Fair Lakes Court
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jcostabile@raba.com
_____________________________________________________
Vincent Costagliola
TITLE TBD
SR Technologies, Inc.
4101 SW 47 Ave
Suite 102
Fort Lauderdale , FL 33314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jon-Josef Costandi
110 North French Street
Alexandria , VA 22304
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jjcostandi@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Tony Cothron
1615 Dartmoor Dr.
Huntingtown , MD 20639
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tony.cothron@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Tony Cothron USN
Chief of Staff
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 688-4597
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George R Cotter
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
D5, Suite 6217
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 688-4980
Email: grcotte@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Maria Cotto
Specialist
Department Of Homeland Security / NPPD / GCSM
Maria Cotto
8181 Carnegie Hall Court, #304
Vienna , VA 22180
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: maria.cotto@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
John Cotton
SVP, Maritime Strategic Plans
DRS Technologies, Inc.
5 Sylvan Way
Parsippany , NJ 7054
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jgcotton@drs.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Courtney
Director, Business Development
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wcourtney@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Brian Covale
OUSDI
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian.covale@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Pamela Cowan
TITLE TBD
DIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pamela.cowan@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathleen Cowles
Senior Marketing Manager
LGS Innovations
Accounts Payable
5440 Millstream Road
Suite E210
McLeansville , NC 27301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ktcowles@lgsinnovations.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. J. M Cox
4513 Orangewood Lane
Bowie , MD 20715-1134
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
James Cox
6048 Meadowglen Drive
Ottawa , AC K1C5S3
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.cox2001@rogers.com
_____________________________________________________
James Cox
6048 Meadowglen Drive
Ottawa , ON K1C 5S3
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.cox2001@rogers.com
_____________________________________________________
Larry Cox
SVP, General Manager
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: larry.d.cox@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Joseph Coyne
13600 EDS Drive
Herndon , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joe.coyne@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Lloyd Craighill
11720 Sunrise Valley Dr
Ste 320
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lcraighill@sms-fed.com
_____________________________________________________
Frank D Crandall BSCJ
Special Agent in Charge
Law Enforcement and Public Safety Authority
3544 Bridgeway Lakes Drive
West Sacramento , CA 95691
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: frankcrandall@sbcglobal.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Nicole Crane
12329 Exbury
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nicole.c.crane@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Crawford
13454 Sunrise Valley Drive
Ste 240
Herndon , VA 20171-3278
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: crawford@interf.com
_____________________________________________________
Tom Crawford MBA
Director, Operations Programs
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tom.crawford2@BAESystems.com
_____________________________________________________
VADM Vivien Cray
Retired
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vivien.cray@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Madelyn Creedon
Counsel/Strat Forces
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: madelyn_creedon@armed-services.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Beth Ann B Creekman
Liaison Officer
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
1500 Tysons McLean Blvd
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bacreekman@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Rita Creel
Principal Engineer, Applied Assu
Software Engineering Institute, CMU
NRECA Building
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Patrick Cremins
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patrick.j.cremins@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Lou Crenshaw
Vice Admiral USN (Retired)/ Prin
Grant Thornton LLP
333 John Carlyle Street
Suite 500
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Carol Cribbs
Cyber
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carol_cribbs@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Rebecca Crocker
Battelle Arlington Operations
1550 Crystal Drive
Arlington , VA 22202-4138
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Rebecca Crocker
Executive Assistant
Battelle
Rebecca Crocker
2111 Wilson Blvd
Suite 1000
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (614) 458-0603
Email: crockerr@battelle.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Edward Croissant
TITLE TBD
USCG
740 W. Deer Lake Drive
Lutz , FL 33548
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: edward.t.croissant@uscg.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George Cronin
Director Advanced Programs
Harris Corporation
P.O. Box 37
MS: 2-21D
Melbourne , FL 32902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gcroni01@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jason Cronin
Director
LGS, Bell Lab Technologies
9305 Gerwig Lane
Suite 200
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jcronin@lgsinnovations.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert Crossgriff
TITLE TBD
Parsons
198 Van Buren Street
Suite 250
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James E Crowley Jr MA, BA
Program Manager-National Securit
IBM Corporation
12533 Ridgemoor Lake Ct
St Louis , MO 63131
Phone: (314) 965-7373
Fax: (314) 252-4444
Email: crowleyj@us.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
Miss Jeannie A Crowley
Sr. Associate
PwC
PwC
1800 Tysons Boulevard
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeannie.crowley@us.pwc.com
_____________________________________________________
Philip J Crowley
Public Affairs
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: crowleypj@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Bill Crumm
SID Director
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bmcrumm@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Andy Culhane
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
S32, Suite 6532
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 688-0683
_____________________________________________________
Arthur Cummings
Director, National Security Bran
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: arthur.cummingsii@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Stephen Cundari
732 Timberbranch Drive
Alexandria , VA 22302
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scundari@harding-security.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephen Cundari
President & COO
Six3 Systems
1430 Spring Hill Road
Suite 525
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 997-5909
Email: steve@kinnearcundari.com
_____________________________________________________
Lt Gen Charles Cunningham USAF (
TITLE TBD
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cunninghamc@jfsc.ndu.edu
_____________________________________________________
ken cunningham
Engineer
ITT
141 National Business parkway
annapolis junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ken.cunningham@itt.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lisa Cunningham
P.O. Box 197
Clifton , VA 20124
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kldckldc@netscape.net
_____________________________________________________
Sally Cunningham
SEI Counsel and Deputy Director
Software Engineering Institute, CMU
NRECA Building
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Francis Curley
TITLE TBD
Orbital Sciences Corporation
6 Locustwood Court
Silver Spring , MD 20905
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: schilling.terry@orbital.com
_____________________________________________________
Lawrence Curran
2100 2nd St SW
Washington , DC 20530
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Lawrence.M.Curran@uscg.mil
_____________________________________________________
John Currier Esquire
15391 Montresor Road
Leesburg , VA 20176-5813
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.currier@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Vanessa Curtis
941 Ivy Trail
Crownsville , MD 21032
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vacurti@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Cusick
Director, Office of Foreign Affa
NSA
9800 Savage Road
SI - Suite 6485
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmcusic@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Melissa Cutter
11339 Wildmeadows St
Waldorf , MD 20601
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mcutter@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Daniel Cuviello
5290 Shawnee Road
Alexandria , VA 22312
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: daniel.j.cuviello@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
David Pekoske (aka Coster, John)
Group President, Global Security
A-T Solutions, Inc.
1934 Old Gallows Road
Suite 360
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 288-3401
_____________________________________________________
Berico Technologies (aka Craig, Anne Meree)
Directors at Berico Technologies
Berico Technologies
1501 Lee Highway, Suite 303
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: directors@bericotechnologies.com
_____________________________________________________
Christina Vanecek (aka Champ, Christina)
Marketing
PRTM Management Consultants, LLC
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Suite 1000
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cvanecek@prtm.com
_____________________________________________________
Gregg Davis
TITLE TBD
Verizon Business, Federal
22001 Loudoun County Parkway
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gregg.davis@verizonbusiness.com
_____________________________________________________
Gregg Davis
TITLE TBD
Verizon Business, Federal
22001 Loudoun County Parkway
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gregg.davis@verizonbusiness.com
_____________________________________________________
gregg davis
Director
Verizon
22001 Loudoun County Parkway
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gregg.davis@verizonbusiness.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Harvey Davis
Director, Installation and Logis
NSA
9800 Savage Road
L, Suite 6600
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hadavis@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Lori Davis
Dir, National Security Programs
Marklogic
7950 Jones Branch Road
Suite 200
McLean , VA 22107
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Lori.Davis@MarkLogic.com
_____________________________________________________
Paul Davis
Sr VP, Chief Technology Officer
NJVC
NJVC
8614 Westwood Center Drive
Suite #300
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.davis@njvc.com
_____________________________________________________
Stevie Davis
PM
DHS
4428 Simpson Mill Way
Woodbridge , VA 22192
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stevie.davis@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Stone Davis
VP, ISS
KGS
2750 Prosperity Ave
Ste 300
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sdavis@kforcegov.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stuart Davis
CORP-Executive VP of Strategy
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stuart.davis@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Timur A Davis Sr MA, MS
CEO
TEAD
Timur A. Davis
115 Schley Street
Newark , NJ 07112
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: timur.davis@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Valerie E Davis PhD
Adjunct Professor
AMU
4202 Alovette
San Antonio , TX 78251
Phone: (210) 725-5622
Fax: (none)
Email: vedavis1@sbcglobal.net
_____________________________________________________
Robert Day
CIO, Director Cyber Command
U.S. Coast Guard
3458 Mecartney Road
Alameda , CA 94502
Phone: (202) 247-6854
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.e.day@uscg.mil
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Allen Dayton
10221 Raider Lane
Fairfax , VA 22030-1908
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Manuel De Ponte
Sr. VP, National Systems Group
The Aerospace Corporation
Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447
2310 E. El Segundo Blvd.
El Segundo , CA 90245
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: manuel.deponte@aero.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dean A Deal
Sr. Analyst
DHS/USCIS
Dean Deal
3211E Arrowhead Cir
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (571) 296-4976
Fax: (none)
Email: dean.blkbry@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Dean
6760 Alexander Bell Drive
Ste 120
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.dean@hengcon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Deater
6131 Mountaindale Road
Thurmont , MD 21788
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jdeater@mdsp.org
_____________________________________________________
Dr. James DeBardelaben
2001 Jefferson Davis Hwy
Suite 1109
Arlington , VA 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jd@ivysys.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Maria deBerliner
500 Montgomery Street
#400
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mvelez@lat-intel.com
_____________________________________________________
Rick DeBobes
Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rick_debobes@armed-services.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Terri DeBottis
Executive Assistant
SRC, Inc
7502 Round Pond Road
North Syracuse , NY 13212
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: debottis@srcinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Gerry Decker
6564 Loisdale Court
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael H Decker
Assistant Secretary of Defense,
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.decker@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Raymond Decker
35 Fendall Avenue
Alexandria , VA 22304
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Ray.Decker@opm.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. William A Decker
SVP for Engineering
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william.a.decker@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
William A Decker
Chief Engineer
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive
T1-12-5
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: deckerart@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Lynn DeCourcey
Director, Cyber Security
NJVC
8614 Westwood Center Drive
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lynn.decourcey@njvc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Martin Decre
11636 Dark Fire Way
Columbia , MD 21044
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: martin.decre@sun.com
_____________________________________________________
John DeFreitas
VP/GM, Intelligence Solutions
L-3 Communications, Inc.
11955 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Defreitas III
1274 Cobble Pond Way
Vienna , VA 22812
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: movsalot@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
MG John I DeFreitas USA
Deputy S3
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William DeGenaro
1133 4th Street
Ste 200
Sarasota , FL 34236
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Bob Degrasse
Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Bob.Degrasse@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Linda Dei
Managing Director
KeyPoint Government Solutions, Inc.
1750 Foxtrail Drive
Loveland , CO 80538
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda.dei@keypoint.us.com
_____________________________________________________
MS Debra S Del Vecchio
Asst. for Program Development
Penn State University/Applied Research Lab
P. O. Box 30
North Atherton Street
State College , PA 16804
Phone: (none)
Fax: (814) 863-6239
Email: dsd13@psu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Del Vecchio
Deputy Director, Signals Intelli
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jenette.miller@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Leo Delaney
TITLE TBD
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Leo.Delaney@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Delaney
9113 Octavia Court
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kendrea Delauter
TITLE TBD
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kendrea.Delauter@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Anthony Deley
VP, Advanced Capability
Northrop Grumman
One Space Park
R2/2094
Redondo Beach , CA 90278
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: anthony.deley@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Antonio Delgado
10521 Mereworth Lane
Oakton , VA 22124
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adelgadojr@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bill J DelGrego
Vice President, Accenture & Col
Accenture
15433 Woodgrove Road
Purcellville , VA 20132
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william.j.delgrego@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Dell
5916 Burnside Landing Drive
Burke , VA 22015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tom.dell@spadac.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Matthew Dellon
Cyber Intelligence Liaison
US Department of Homeland Security
4650 N Washington Blvd
Apt. 110
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matthew.dellon@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. R. P DeLong
1196 Third Avenue
Anoka , MN 55303-2775
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: r_peter_delong@mathc2.com
_____________________________________________________
Ben Delp
delpbt@jmu.edu
James Madison University
701 Carrier Drive, ISAT/CS 360
MSC 4111
Harrisonburg , VA 22807
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: delpbt@jmu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Captain Fred Demech USN (Ret)
TITLE TBD
Northrop Grumman Corporation
36 Kipling Drive
Moosic , PA 18507
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fred.demech@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Helen D Demes
Event Coordinator
The SI
Helen Demes
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: helen.d.demes@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Jerry DeMoney
Program Director
SRI International
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jack Dempsey
Director, Congressional Activiti
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jack.dempsey@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Joan Dempsey
TITLE TBD
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jerry DeMuro
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics Corporation
2941 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jdemuro@gd.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Denk
12930 Worldgate Drive
Suite 700
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wdenk@drs-ds.com
_____________________________________________________
William Denk
Vice President
DRS Technical Services, Inc
DRS TSI
12930 Worldgate Drive
Suite 700
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wdenk@drs-ds.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Vincent Dennis
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Room 15A00B
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vincent.dennis@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Vincent Dennis
TITLE TBD
Deloitte Consulting, LLP
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
David A Deptula
25 Westover Ave SW
Washington , DC 20032
Phone: (202) 562-5456
Fax: (none)
Email: deptula.david@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Lt. General David A Deptula USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: David.Deptula@pentagon.af.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mitch Derman
TITLE TBD
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Eleanor Desai
Vice President National Security
Dell Inc.
One Dell Way
One Dell Way
Round Rock , TX 78682
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eleanor_desai@federal.dell.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms Eleanor Desai
IC Sector Lead
Dell Inc.
One Dell Way
One Dell Way
Round Rock , TX 78682
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eleanor_desai@federal.dell.com
_____________________________________________________
Art Deslauriers
CTO
Lockheed Martin Advanced Programs
13539 Dulles Technology Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adeslauri@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Alison Deters
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alison.deters@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani
Director National Counter Prolif
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adam.jones@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Maj. Gen. Paul Dettmer
Deputy AF Chief of Staff Intelli
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.dettmer@pentagon.af.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mark Devine
Director, BD & Strategy
Cobham Analytic Solutions
5875 Trinity Parkway
Suite 300
Centreville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Matthew Devost
22777 Zulla Chase Place
Asburn , VA 20148
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matt@devost.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Deweese
Director, Aerospace System Div.
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.deweese@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
CDR Pat DiBari MS, BS
Deputy, Officer of C4ISR
U.S. Coast Guard
2100 2nd Street SW
Washington , DC 20593
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pat.dibari@uscg.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mike DiCaprio
231 Enterprise Road
Johnstown , NY 12095
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mdicaprio@emihq.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ronald Dick
Director, ES&I Division
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rdick3@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
John Dickas
ODNI Monitor
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: J_Dickas@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Alan Dietrich
President, C3 & Aviation
DRS Technologies, Inc.
5 Sylvan Way
Parsippany , NJ 7054
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adietrich@drs.com
_____________________________________________________
Joyce Dietrich
CG Liaison to FBI
USCG
2109 N. Scott St. #49
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (860) 961-6301
Fax: (none)
Email: jmdietrich@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Anthony Dignazio
TITLE TBD
ITT
4617 Morning Ride Court
Ellicott City , MD 21043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tony.dignazio@itt.com
_____________________________________________________
Allan Assel
Intel BD
Juniper Networks
Allan Assel
Juniper Networks
2251 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: aassel@juniper.net
_____________________________________________________
Stephen P Aubin
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dave Aucsmith
Senior Director, Adv Tech in Gov
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: awk@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mitchell Audritsh
4075 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 900
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (unlisted)
Fax: (none)
Email: buckeye59@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Auer
Major Account Manager
Cisco Systems, Inc.
13635 Dulles Technology Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dauer@cisco.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Wanda M Austin
President & CEO
The Aerospace Corporation
Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447
2310 E. El Segundo Blvd.
El Segundo , CA 90245
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wanda.m.austin@aero.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Harry Avig
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: havig@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Rodney Azama
203 Whitestone Road
Ste 110
Silver Spring , MD 20901
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: razama@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Zalmai Azmi
Senior Vice President
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: zazmi@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Colin Dillon
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cdillon@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Lawrence DiNapoli
President/CEO
Systems Technologies
185 Route 36
West Long Branch , NJ 07764
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sskodacek@systek.com
_____________________________________________________
John R Dinger
Deputy INR
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: shifletrv2@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Uyen Dinh
Senior Director
GeoEye
21700 Atlantic Boulevard
Dulles , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dinh.uyen@geoeye.com
_____________________________________________________
Nicole DiResta
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Nicole_Diresta@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Susan F Disher
NSA Representative to the Depart
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sfdishe@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jerry W Dixon Jr.
2328 Southfield Ct.
Finksburg , MD 21048
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jerry@jdixon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mary Dixon
Director, Defense Manpower Data
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mary.dixon@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Stacey Dixon
Budget Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Stacey.Dixon@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Julia Dizhevskaya
Intern
Delta Risk
2804 N. Seminary
Chicago , IL 60657
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rschmidt911@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Julia Dizhevskaya
Consultant
Delta Risk LLC
2804 N. Seminary
Chicago , IL 60657
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jdizhevskaya@delta-risk.net
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Michaline Dobrezinski
Deputy Director, Human Resources
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michaline.Dobrezinski@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Charles Dodd
414 2nd Street
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Joe Dodd
VP, Business Development
TASC
4805 Stonecroft Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joe.dodd@tasc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Dodd
SVP Business Development
TASC
4805 Stonecroft Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joe.dodd@tasc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Glen Dodson
VP and GM, National Security Gro
Oracle Corporation
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: glen.dodson@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Brett Dody
15052 Conference Center Dr
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ann.sullivan@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Brett Dody
Director, Intelligence Systems G
the SI
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brett.dody@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Brett Dody MA
Deputy Vice President
The SI Organization, Inc.
Chris Nolan
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brett.dody@thesiorg.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Babs Doherty
President and CEO
Eagle Ray Inc.
4501 Singer Court
Suite 260
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bdoherty@eaglerayinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Dolan
15 Mohegan Ave
(ds)
New London , CT 6320
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeffrey.t.dolan@uscg.mil
_____________________________________________________
Karin M Dolan
Assistant Director of Intelligen
DoD
HQMC Code I (IS)
2 Navy Annex
Washington , DC 203801775
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: karin.dolan@usmc.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tom Dolan
Director, Law Enforcement Ops
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tdolan@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Lynn Domino
2111 Jefferson Davis Hwy
#1018N
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pradaroxx@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Teresa Domzal
Provost of the National Intellig
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: teresa.domzal@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sheri Donahue
4010 Hillsboro Road
Louisville , KY 40207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sdonahue@infragardmembers.org
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sheri Donahue
4010 Hillsboro Road
Louisville , KY 40207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sheri.donahue@insightbb.com
_____________________________________________________
Bill Donellan
TITLE TBD
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Chris Donesa
Deputy Staff Director/Counsel
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.donesa@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sandra S Donnelly
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
E1, Suite 6809
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sfdonne@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Shaun Donovan
Secretary
Housing and Urban Development Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ioanna.t.kefalas@hud.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John H Doody
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
A, Suite 6222
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhdoody@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Matt Doring
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matt.doring@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Henry A Dorochovich S.B.
Chief Mission Officer
The SI Organization, Inc.
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (703) 709-8783
Fax: (none)
Email: henry.a.dorochovich@thesiorg.com
_____________________________________________________
Andrey Dorokov
4545 Connecticut Avenue
Apt 722
Washington , DC 20007
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andorohov@yandex.ru
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jon Dorrick
6917 Trillium Lane
Springfield , VA 22152
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jon.dorrick@itsfed.com
_____________________________________________________
Jon Dorrick
6917 Trillium Lane
Springfield , VA 22152
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jon.dorrick@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
VADM David J Dorsett
Director of Naval Intelligence;
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.dorsett@navy.mil
_____________________________________________________
Jack Dorsett
VP for Cyber and C4
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dorsett.jack@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jack Dorsett
VP, Cyber & C4 Programs
Northrop Grumman Corporation
2980 Fairview Park
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jack.dorsett@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Neal Dorsey
PO Box B
Lincoln , VA 20160
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dorseynet@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Christopher T Doss
Special Training and Application
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christopher.doss@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Rene Doublier
P.O. Box 1851
Pittsboro , NC 27312
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: esres@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms Angel P Douglas M.H.R.
Staff Officer
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
OGMC-S72361
7500 Geoint Drive
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (703) 942-6321
Fax: (none)
Email: angel.p.douglas@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Patrick Dowd
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jerry Dowless
13873 Park Center Road
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jdowless@dowless.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Downer
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.downer@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Elizabeth T Doyle
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Frederick J Doyle
VP, Defense & Intelligence Commu
Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp.
10 Longs Peak Drive
Broomfield , CO 80020
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fdoyle@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kevin Doyle
Director, Cyber Programs
SRC, Inc
7502 Round Pond Road
North Syracuse , NY 13212
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: doyle@srcinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Doyle MBA, MA
Graduate student
Selwyn College, University of Cambridge
8623 Connemara Drive
Fair Oak Ranch , TX 78015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mike@themekonggroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Steve Doyle
Senior Director of Intelligence
Datameer
P.O. Box 3576
Mooresville , NC 28117
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: odamachines@bellsouth.net
_____________________________________________________
Tim Doyle
Program Director
Hughes
11717 Exploration Lane
Germantown , MD 20876
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Doyle
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william.a.doyle@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John M Doyon
3536 36th Road N.
Arlington , VA 22207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: doyon@erols.com
_____________________________________________________
John M Doyon
Director for Intelligence Progra
NSC
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jdoyon@nsc.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Michael Dozier MS
Intel Analyst
The IIAgroup
Michael Dozier
483 4th
Bethel , AK 99559
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.dozier@infragard.org
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Carrie Drake
Event & Community Relations Mgr
United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation
Carrie Drake
2325 Dulles Corner Blvd
STE 450
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 793-9069
Email: carrie.drake@usgif.org
_____________________________________________________
Linda Drake
470 Spring Park Place
Suite 700
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda_drake@appsig.com
_____________________________________________________
Linda Drake
Director of Business Development
Raytheon Applied Signal Technology
Linda Drake
470 Spring Park Place
Suite 700
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda_drake@appsig.com
_____________________________________________________
Linda Drake
Director of Business Development
Applied Signal Technology
460 West California Avenue
Sunnyvale , CA 94086
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda_drake@appsig.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Gina Drawdy
15029 Rumson Place
Manassas , VA 20111
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ginadrawdy@aim.com
_____________________________________________________
Sidney D Drell
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (650) 926-2664
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Alex Drew
Vice President, Intel Ops & Anal
Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc
1501 Farm Credit Drive
Suite 2300
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adrew@theanalysiscorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Ava Dreyer
Administrative Staff Asst
Draper Laboratory
1555 Wilson Blvd.
Suite 501
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Doug Dreyer
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Melissa Drisko
Deputy Director Naval Intelligen
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: melissa.drisko@navy.mil
_____________________________________________________
Paul Druckman
Vice President, DHS Business Dev
Accenture
11951 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.j.druckman@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Drury PE BSME
President
The Edge Group
4714 Louetta Rd.
#703
Spring , TX 77388
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jdrury@theedgegroup.cc
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Serge Duarte
185 West F. Street
Rm 600
San Diego , CA 92101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: serge.duarte@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Serge Duarte
US Immigration and Customs
DHS
185 West F. Street, Room 600
San Diego , CA 92101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: serge.duarte@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Melvin Dubee
VP Govt Relations
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: melvin.dubee@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Ian Dubin
4929 Arctic Terrace
Rockville , MD 20853
Phone: (301) 933-1885
Fax: (none)
Email: ianhdubin@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Daniel D Dubree
Information Technology Operation
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: daniel.dubree@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Drenan Dudley
Cyber
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: drenan_dudley@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Charles Duecy
President
CPD Consultants
6049 Ramshorn Place
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patrick@cpdconsultants.com
_____________________________________________________
Regina Dugan
Director
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Regina.Dugan@darpa.mil
_____________________________________________________
Lynn A Dugle
President, IIS
Raytheon
M/S AA
1200 S Jupiter Road
Garland , TX 75042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (972) 205-6388
Email: lynn_dugle@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Lynn A Dugle
President, IIS
Raytheon
M/S AA
1200 S Jupiter Road
Garland , TX 75042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (972) 205-6388
Email: lynn_dugle@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Duker
TITLE TBD
Oracle Corporation
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.duker@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Kenneth Dumm
Deputy Intelligence
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kenneth.dumm@usaf.mil
_____________________________________________________
Arne Duncan
Secretary
Education Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: arne.duncan@ed.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Natalie Duncan
3806 Riverwood Road
Alexandria , VA 22309
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cnlui@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Jen Dunham
Sr. Account Executive
SAS Institute
1530 Wilson Blvd
Suite 800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dan Dunkel
4601 Green Oaks Drive
Colleyville , TX 76034
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Daren Dunkel
4601 Green Oaks Drive
Colleyville , TX 76034
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dunkel10@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Derek Dunkel
4601 Green Oaks Drive
Colleyville , TX 76034
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Patrick Dunleavy
5846 pacific rim way
#60
bellingham , WA 98226
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pdunleavy@msn.com
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Nina Dunn
senior advisor to CEO
Finmeccanica
Angelica Falchi
1625 I Street, NW
12th Floor
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nina.dunn@finmeccanica.com
_____________________________________________________
Thomas Dunn
Senior Advisor
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomajd4@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Terry Duran
14370 Newbrook Dr.
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tduran@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Terry Duran
14370 Newbrook Dr.
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tduran@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Bo Durickovic
EVP Defense Personnel Services
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Darrell R Durst
Vice President Program Managemen
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: darrell.r.durst@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Robert Dussault
10300 Eaton Place
#500
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dussault-rob@zai.com
_____________________________________________________
Gilbert Dussek
Program Manager
Lockheed Martin Corporation
13560 Dulles Technology Drive
Room 664
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gilbert.dussek@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Carla Duy
3238 Duck Pond Court
Oak Hill , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carladuy@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joe Dvornicky
TITLE TBD
SafeNet, Inc.
4690 Millennium Drive
Belcamp , MD 21017
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Joe.Dvornicky@safenet-inc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Dzergoski
1185 Dingus Drive
Westminster , MD 21158
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dzergoski@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mohamed Elibiary
P. O. Box 262366
Plano , TX 75026
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: melibiary@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Al Elkins
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: aelkins@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Elliott
Vice President, Business Develop
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.elliott@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Zachary Elliott
20256 Grim Rd.
Aurora , OR 97002
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: zach.elliott@nmarion.k12.or.us
_____________________________________________________
Deborah Ellis
TITLE TBD
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: deborah.ellis@js.pentagon.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Victor A Ellis
1165 University Dr NE
Atlanta , GA 30306
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: victor.ellis@ang.af.mil
_____________________________________________________
Harry M Elmendorf
TITLE TBD
Ball Corporation
2111 Wilson Blvd
Suite 1120
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: helmendo@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
Harry M Elmendorf
Director, Defense and Intel Prog
Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp
2111 Wilson Blvd
Suite 1120
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: helmendo@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
Harry M Elmendorf
Director, Def & Intel
Ball Aerospace
2111 Wilson Blvd
Suite 1120
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: helmendo@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
Judith A Emmel
Associate Director foráStrategic
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 688-6198
Email: jaemmel@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dan Emory
Principal and Co-founder
Active Assurance Corporation
43769 Clemens Terrace
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: demory@activeassurance.com
_____________________________________________________
Erik Engebreth
21305 Arrowhead C
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eenge@triumfant.com
_____________________________________________________
Peter Engel
Vice President
SafeNet, Inc.
1655 Fort Myer Drive
Suite 1150
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: peter.engel@safenet-inc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Daniel Ennis
Deputy Chief, S2
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: drennis@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Michael Ennis
1710 SAIC Drive
SAIC
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.e.ennis@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Harold Ennulat
Manager Government Program Devel
Software Engineering Institute, CMU
NRECA Building
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Thomas Enright
VP Intel Svcs Ctr
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Ensor
VP, NGES
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joseph.ensor@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. L. K Ensor
Associate Director
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 854-7685
Email: lkensor@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mieke Eoyang
Chief of Staff, Rep. Anna Eshoo
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mieke.eoyang@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Mark Epstein
9209 Fox Meadow Lane
Potomac , MD 20854
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mepstein@qualcomm.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms Dorene Erickson
20905 Fowlers Mill Circle
Ashburn , VA 21047
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dorene911@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Claudia Erland
Arete Fellow, National & Homelan
Arete Associates
1550 Crystal Drive
Suite 703
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cerland@arete.com
_____________________________________________________
Claudia A Erland
TITLE TBD
Arete Associates
1550 Crystal Drive
Suite 703
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cerland@arete.com
_____________________________________________________
Claudia A Erland
1550 Crystal Drive
Suite 703
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cerland@arete.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert Erland
Senior Analyst, Information Domi
NMIC
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rerland@nmic.navy.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jimmie R Erwin B.S., M.S
Staff Officer
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGA
Mail Stop D-071
4600 Sangamore Road
Bethesda , MD 20816
Phone: (703) 471-7822
Fax: (none)
Email: Jimmie.R.Erwin@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Karen Esaias
3105 S. Declaration Court
Waldorf , MD 20603
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: esaiask@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Debra Esherman
COO
Sensa Solutions
11180 Sunrise Valley Drive
Suite 100
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: debbie@sensasolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Mark T Esper
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
LTC Paul Estavillo
2200 Wilson Blvd
102-551
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.estavillo@us.army.mil
_____________________________________________________
David Etue
Manager
PRTM Management Consultants, LLC
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Suite 1000
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: detue@prtm.com
_____________________________________________________
Al Evans
Manager, Government Program Deve
Software Engineering Institute, CMU
NRECA Building
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark R Evans
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
S2J, Suite 6657
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mrevans@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Peggy Evans
211 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington , DC 20510
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Peggy Evans
Budget Director, SSCI
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: P_Evans@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Col. Gregory Evenstad USA(Ret.)
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
L, Suite 6600
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ghevens@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dan Everett
Sales Manager
Qwest Communications
4250 N. Fairfax Dr.
5th Floor
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: daniel.everett@qwest.com
_____________________________________________________
Terri Everett BS,MA,MS
Office of the DNI
Washington , DC 20511
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: theresa.a.everett@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Doug Evers
TITLE TBD
Quest Software - Public Sector Group
700 King Farm Boulevard
Suite 250
Rockville , MD 20850
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: douglas.evers@quest.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen Ewell
Managing Director
InfraGard National Members Alliance
673 Potomac Station Dr #615
Leesburg , VA 20176
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sewell@infragardnational.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Ewing
Senior Adviser
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.w.ewing@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
I.J Ezeonwuka
1204 S Washington St, Apt 411
ALEXANDRIA , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ijeomaez@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Barbara Fast
INSA Cyber Security Council
Boeing
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen Faulkner
7683 Antigua Drive
Memphis , TN 38119
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sfaulkner09@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Linc Faurer
Required unless Parent
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: 703 356-0178
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Faust
Asst Deputy Chief of Staff û G-2
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.faust1@mi.army.mil
_____________________________________________________
Vanessa Fauteux
Field Marketing Manager
Global Crossing
12010 Sunset Hills Road
Suite 420
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Vanessa.Fauteux@GlobalCrossing.com
_____________________________________________________
Chris Fedde
TITLE TBD
SafeNet, Inc.
4690 Millennium Drive
Belcamp , MD 21017
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.fedde@safenet-inc.com
_____________________________________________________
Chris Fedde
TITLE TBD
SafeNet, Inc.
4690 Millennium Drive
Belcamp , MD 21017
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.fedde@safenet-inc.com
_____________________________________________________
Andrew Feinsot
President
Moby Technologies
3203 19th St. N
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: afeinsot@mobytechnologies.com
_____________________________________________________
Dianne Feinstein Sen.
Chairman
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 228-3954
Email: scheduling@feinstein.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Bradley H Feldman
President, CDAI
Cubic Defense Applications, Inc.
9333 Balboa Ave
San Diego , CA 92123
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brad.feldman@cubic.com
_____________________________________________________
John M Felker
2100 2nd Street SW
Room 6613
Washington , DC 20593
Phone: (703) 736-0939
Fax: (none)
Email: John.m.felker@uscg.mil
_____________________________________________________
Kayla Feller
1600 South Joyce Street
Apt 1526
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (571) 239-2170
Fax: (none)
Email: kgfell@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Feltman
Near Eastern Affairs
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: feltmanj@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
James Felton
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
14150 Newbrook Drive
Suite 300
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Lorry Fenner
Professional Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Lorry.Fenner@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr Lorry M Fenner PhD
Director, Conflict Records Resea
Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU
1241 4th St SW
Washington , DC 20024
Phone: (202) 484-0411
Fax: (none)
Email: lorryfenner@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Jessica Ferguson
601 South 12th Street
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jessica.ferguson@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Ferguson
Vice President, Contracts & Fina
The Podmilsak Group
One Fountain Square, 11911 Freed
Suite 710
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rlfxii@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Ferguson
Principal Deputy Undersecretary
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.ferguson@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Joseph W Fernandez
Econ, Energy, & Business Affairs
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fernandezjw@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ralph Fernandez
PO BOX 141727
Miami , FL 33114
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sis1975@bellsouth.net
_____________________________________________________
Alejandro Fernandez-Cernuda Diaz
Analyst
La Caixa
Av. Diagonal 621
Barcelona 08041
Spain
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alejandro.j.fernandez@lacaixa.es
_____________________________________________________
Kelly Ferrell
Sr. Director, DNI Programs
GDIT
Kelly Ferrell
13857 McLearen Road
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kelly.ferrell@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Frederick J Ferrer
Director, Cybersapce
ARINC
2551 Riva Road
Annapolis , MD 21401
Phone: (717) 252-6355
Fax: (none)
Email: FFerrer@arinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Andrew Ferris
Program Manager
Interf
47256 Middle Bluff Pl.
Potomac Falls , VA 20165
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ferris@interf.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Charles Fiala
Senior Vice President, Governmen
Corporate Office Properties Trust
6711 Columbia Gateway Drive
Columbia , MD 21046-2104
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: charles.fiala@copt.com
_____________________________________________________
Chuck Fiala
Senior VP - Gov't Services
Corporate Office Properties Trust
6711 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 300
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: charles.fiala@copt.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sarah Fiebig
7103 Hundsford Lane
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scfiebig@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sarah C Fiebig
4551 Strutfield Lane
Apt 4431
Alexandria , VA 22311
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scfiebig@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard Fieldhouse
Strat Forces
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard_fieldhouse@armed-services.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bryan Fields
790 Village Top
Canyon Lake , TX 78133
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wndwkr1@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Beth Finan
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Patrick G Findlay
Facilities and Logistics
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patrick.findlay@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Michael Finn
INSA OCI Task Force
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Rick Finn
1421 Jefferson Davis Highway
Suite 600
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rick.finn@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr Pat Finnegan
Manager
Hirsch Electronics
Pat Finnegan
11951 Freedom Drive
Suite 1327
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (304) 876-2923
Fax: (703) 251-4440
Email: patwv24@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr Richard G Finnegan
Richard G. Finnegan
2105 South Blosser Road
Santa Maria , CA 93458
Phone: (none)
Fax: (805) 928-9914
Email: rgfinnegan@quintron.com
_____________________________________________________
Justin Firaben
5270 Navaho Dr
Alexandria , VA 22312
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jfiraben@vt.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Fish
205 S. Whiting Street
Suite 400
Alexandria , VA 22304
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.fish@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas E Fish
198 Van Buren Street, Suite 250
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tfish@mcmunn-associates.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scott D Fisher BS, MA
Account Executive
Capgemini Government Solutions
2250 Corporate Park Drive
Suite 410
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scott.fisher@capgemini-gs.com
_____________________________________________________
Rand H Fisher
Sr. VP, Systems Planning & Engin
The Aerospace Corporation
Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447
2310 E. El Segundo Blvd.
El Segundo , CA 90245
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rand.h.fisher@aero.org
_____________________________________________________
Leslie Fishpaw
Product Management
the SI
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: leslie.l.fishpaw@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bob Fitch
SVice President, Government Rela
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bob.fitch@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dennis Fitzgerald
1358 Heritage Oak Way
Reston , VA 20194
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Fitzpatrick
Director, Special Security Cente
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kathlgz@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kate Fitzpatrick
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kate_Fitzpatrick@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kelly Fitzpatrick
Deputy Director of Legislative A
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kelly.fitzpatrick2@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Bryan Flaherty MA; BA
Receive grad
University of Chicago
3351 Arnold Lane
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bryanflaherty.info@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Frances Fleisch
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fjfleis@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Frederick Fleitz
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Frederick.Fleitz@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr Frederick Fleitz
Global analyst
Newsmax Media
9037 Allington Manor Circle
Frederick , MD 21703
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fredfleitz@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael G Fleming
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
I, Suite 6577
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 854-7511
Email: mgflemi@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Flesher
Chief Architect
Lockheed Martin Space Systems
4882 Yates Circle
Broomfield , CO 80020
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kevin.e.flesher@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mark Fletcher
Federal Engagement Director
Global Crossing
12010 Sunset Hills Road
Suite 420
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Curtis Flood
Professional Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: CurtisFlood@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Bob Flores
Founder & CEO
Applicology
9812 Squaw Valley Dr
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bob.flores@applicology.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Michele Flournoy
Under Secretary of Defense for P
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michele.flournoy@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Floyd
TITLE TBD
LGS Innovations
Accounts Payable
5440 Millstream Road
Suite E210
McLeansville , NC 27301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dfloyd@lgsinnovations.com
_____________________________________________________
David Flynn
President/COO
SR Technologies, Inc.
4101 SW 47 Avernue
Davie , FL 33314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dflynn@srtrl.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Flynn
Vice President, Contracts & Admi
Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc
1501 Farm Credit Drive
Suite 2300
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jflynn@theanalysiscorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Flynn
TITLE TBD
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jamespf0@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Louis Foiani
Vice President
Special Operations Technology, Inc.
12011 Guilford Road
Suite 109
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lfoiani@sotech.us
_____________________________________________________
Michael J Folmar
Security Division
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.folmar@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Marlin Forbes
VP, Government Markets
Core180, Inc.
2751 Prosperity Drive
Suite 200
Vienna , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Carl Ford
President
Kanturk Partners, LLC.
17509 Charity Lane
Germantown , MD 20874
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cford@kanturkpartners.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Celeste Ford
President
Stellar Solutions, Inc.
250 Cambridge Avenue
Suite 204
Palo Alto , CA 94306
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cford@stellarsolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kevin Ford
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Ford
3535 Military Trail, Suite 200
Jupiter , FL 33458
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rford@fedsys.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Joni Forman
Assoc Dean, Def Sys Mgmt Coll
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joni.forman@dau.mil
_____________________________________________________
Francine K Forney
1227 Michigan Court
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ciney1@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Sandra J Forney
7555 Colshire Drive
Fairfax , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sandra.forney@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sharon H Forrest
12024 Waterside View Drive, #13
Reston , VA 20194
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sharfor@regent.edu
_____________________________________________________
Randall Fort
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Mary Forte
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Chris Foster
Staff Engineer
Ensco, Inc.
5400 Port Royal Road
Springfield , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: foster.christopher@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Christopher C Foster
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Tom Foust
TITLE TBD
Intelsat General Corporation
6550 Rock Spring Drive
Suite 450
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tom.foust@intelsatgeneral.com
_____________________________________________________
MR TOM FOUST FOUST
VP - GLOBAL NETWORK SOLUTIONS
INTELSAT GENERAL CORPORATION
6550 ROCK SPRING DR
SUITE 450
BETHESDA , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tom.foust@intelsatgeneral.com
_____________________________________________________
TOM L FOUST
6550 ROCK SPRING DR
SUITE 450
BETHESDA , MD 20852
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tom.foust@intelsatgeneral.com
_____________________________________________________
Alex J Fox
1000 Wilson Blvd
Suite 1800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: afox@digitalglobe.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr George Fox SSCP L.T
Dr George Fox / Leftenant
28 Marshall St
Queensland
Goondiwindi , AE 4390
Australia
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: georgef@dark-lite.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James P Fox Jr.
1653 21st RD N APT 6
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: foxer51780@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jay Fox
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Joseph Fox
Business Development Manager
Cisco Systems, Inc.
7067 Balmoral Forest Road
Clifton , VA 20124
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: JosFox@Cisco.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Fox
Space & Intel Programs
Raytheon
1100 Wilson Blvd
Suite 2000
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.a.fox@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Fox
Senior Vice President
White Oak Technologiese, Inc.
1300 Spring Street
Suite 320
Silver Spring , VA 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Sheldon J Fox
President, National Programs Bus
Harris Corporation
P.O. Box 37
MS: 2-21D
Melbourne , FL 32902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sheldon.fox@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Ken Foxton
5860 Trinity Parkway
Suite 400
Centerville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Kenneth Foxton
VP Intel Programs
Camber Corp.
6992 Columbia Gateway Dr.
Suite 150
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kfoxton@camber.com
_____________________________________________________
Kenneth Foxton
VP National Intelligence Program
Exceptional Software Strategies
849 International Drive, Ste 310
Linthicum , MD 21090
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 694-0245
Email: kenneth.foxton@exceptionalsoftware.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kenneth L Foxton
8615 Open Meadow Way
Columbia , MD 21045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kfoxton@yakabod.com
_____________________________________________________
Miss Samantha J Foxton B.S.
LT
USN
LT Samantha Foxton
6509 Sampson Rd.
Suite 217
Dahlgren , VA 22448
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: samantha.j.foxton@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Thomas Francis
Deputy J2
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.francis@js.pentagon.mil
_____________________________________________________
Joshua Franke
CMR 489
Box 1124
APO , AE 9751
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joshua.tyson.franke@us.army.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Franklin A.A.S.
Alternate COMSEC Manager
SAIC
Mail Stop E-3G
4161 Campus Point Court
San Diego , CA 92121
Phone: (951) 461-1951
Fax: (858) 826-5410
Email: tgfranklin59@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lori Franko
Systems Consultant Manager
Dell Inc.
One Dell Way
One Dell Way
Round Rock , TX 78682
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lori_franko@dell.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lorin Frantzve
9743 E. Sharon Dr.
Scottsdale , AZ 85260
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lfrantzve@imetlabs.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mike Fraser
TITLE TBD
USIS
7799 Leesburg Pike
Suite 400 S
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mike.fraser@usis.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Fravel
Chief Operating Officer
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, D-100
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.fravel@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Marshall Banker
President, Customer Solutions
BAE Systems Information Technology
1300 North 17th Street
Suite 1400
Rosslyn , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tristan A Bannon MS
Director
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tristan.bannon@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Len Baptiste
Director, Federal Security Solut
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lbaptiste@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Greg Barac
Chief, NGA Support Team to DHS
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: greg.barac@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Edward J Baranoski
ODNI, IARPA Director SMART Colle
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: edward.j.baranoski@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
James Barber
IT Architect-EA
IBM
15036 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jpbarber@us.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Bardin
515 Oakham Road
Barre , MA 1005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jbardin@treadstone71.com
_____________________________________________________
Anthony Barger
DASDNII
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: anthony.barger@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Barry M Barlow
Director, Acquisition Directorat
NGA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: barry.barlow@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr Charles R Barlow BEE
Corp. Vice President
Communication Technologies, Inc (dba COMTek)
Charles Barlow
3684 Centerview Dr.
Suite 100
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (703) 476-5244
Fax: (703) 961-1330
Email: barlowcr@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George Barnes
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Barnes
Vice President, Legislative Oper
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john_barnes@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Barnes
5504 Sir Douglas Dr
Bryans Road , MD 20616
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: desrtrat6@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Max Barnett
4501 Connecticut Ave NW
#906
Washington , DC 20008
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: max@maximusit.com
_____________________________________________________
Steve Barney
TITLE TBD
SRA
4350 Fair Lakes Court
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sbarney@raba.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Barr
Account Executive
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mbarr@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
John Barrass BA, MBA
COO
RSSi
1303 Chamberlain Woods Way
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 997-8115
Email: jbarrass@rss-i.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Hugo Barrera
11410 NW 20th Street
Rm 200
Miami , FL 33172
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Hugo.Barrera@atf.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Barrett
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.barrett@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Sophie Barrett
VP of Communications
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sophie.barrett@qinetiq-na.com
_____________________________________________________
William Barroll
Vice President
Corporate Office Properties Trust
6711 Columbia Gateway Drive
Columbia , MD 21046-2104
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bill.barroll@copt.com
_____________________________________________________
Lisa Barrow
TITLE TBD
Deloitte Consulting, LLP
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lbarrow@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Barth
US Customs and Border Proection
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.barth@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. G. D Bartko
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
S31, Suite 6456
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gdbartk@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Bart Bartlett
Sr Director
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Frazier
P.O. Box 50218
Baltimore , MD 21211
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tfrazier@attach.net
_____________________________________________________
Tony Frazier
Sr VP of Marketing
GeoEye
2325 Dulles Corner Blvd.
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
H L Fredricks, Commissioner
Intelligence Official
Govt
1455 Coney Island Ave
Rm : 10 B
Bklyn, , NY 11230
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: 13152784989@tmomail.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brett Freedman
1113 Fairview Court
Silver Spring , MD 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brettfreedman@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Brett Freedman
1113 Fairview Ct.
Silver Spring , MD 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brettfreedman@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Rob Freedman
Director
Ball Aerospace
2111 Wilson Blvd.,
Suite 1120
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Robert Freedman Ph.D.
Director Strategic Initiatives
Ball Aerospace and Technologies
9675 W. 108th Circle
Westminster , CO 80021
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rfreedma@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
James H Freis
Director, FINCEN
Treasury Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.freis@do.treas.gov
_____________________________________________________
Steven Frenz
VP, Business Development Directo
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steven.h.frenz@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Robert A Friedenberg
11921 Freedom Drive
Suite 730
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Dr.Bob@SecureMissionSolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Friedlander
301 West 108 Street, 2nd
New York , NY 10025
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jfriedlander@nyc.rr.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Frisbie
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gary Frisvold
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
DF2, Suite 6229
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 688-5204
Email: gafrisv@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Libby Fritsche
TITLE TBD
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Elizabeth.fritsche@ca.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert Frizzelle
Vice President and General Manag
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rfrizzelle@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dave Frostman
Vice President, Strategic Initia
Stellar Solutions, Inc.
250 Cambridge Avenue
Suite 204
Palo Alto , CA 94306
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dfrostman@stellarsolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Frucella
1410 Spring Hill Road
#600
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: offpiste@ix.netcom.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David A Frye
President
DFA, Inc.
Atlanta HQ
5585 Mill Gate CT.
Dunwoody , GA 30338
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dafrye@dfaco.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Deborah Frye
6809 Kenyon Dr
Alexandria , VA 22307
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: debbie.frye@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Randy Fuerst
Chief Operating Officer
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rfuerst@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Chad L Fulgham
Chief Information Officer
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chad.fulgham@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Eric Fuller
Vice President, Special Programs
Berico Technologies
1501 Lee Highway
Suite 303
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gary Fuller
Principal
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Fuller_Gary@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Wayne Fullerton
Ops Dir, National PGeneral Manag
Cisco Systems, Inc.
13635 Dulles Technology Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wfullert@cisco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mel Fulton
1301 Gatesmeadow Way
Reston , VA 20194
Phone: (703) 471-0358
Fax: (none)
Email: melfulton@msn.com
_____________________________________________________
Mel Fulton
TITLE TBD
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
George Funk
TITLE TBD
Dell Inc.
One Dell Way
One Dell Way
Round Rock , TX 78682
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: george_funk@dell.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Nicholas Fuqua
1140 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Ste 1140
Washington , DC 20036
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nicholas.fuqua@defensegp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. W. Furr
P.O. Box 16850
Salt Lake City , UT 84116
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: frank.furr@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Gannon
Vice President, General Manager
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.gannon@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Lenora Gant
Director of the Intelligence Com
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lenora.p.gant@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Frank Garci
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: frank.garcia@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Frank Garcia Jr.
9621 Podium Dr.
VIenna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fwgjr@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Frank Garcia Jr.
9621 Podium Dr.
Vienna , VA 22182-3339
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: garciafwg@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Garcia
5 Oak Run Road
Laurel , MD 20724
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: j.garcia@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Garcia
Account Executive
Oracle Corporation
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mike.garcia@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Garcia
Strategic Program Mgr
HP Federal APG Strategic Programs Office
6600 Rockledge Drive
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.garcia2@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael R Garcia
22010 Ayr Hill Court
Ashburn , VA 20148
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: garcia2@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Rebecca Garcia
Dir. Sales & Bus. Development
SAS Institute
1530 Wilson Blvd
Suite 800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Rebecca Garcia
1530 Wilson Blvd.
Ste.800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rebecca.garcia@sas.com
_____________________________________________________
Mark S Gardiner MA
General Manager
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (703) 242-6358
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.gardiner@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Greg Gardner
1921 Gallows Rd
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: greg.gardner@netapp.com
_____________________________________________________
Janice Gardner
Assistant Secretary (Intelligenc
Treasury Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Janice.Gardner@do.treas.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Arthur Garner
2295 Otter Rock Avenue
Henderson , NV 89044-0143
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: artgarner@mviewcc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Garofalo
1906 Kings Forest Trail
Mount Airy , MD 21771
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Joseph.Garofalo@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mike Garramone
Director
Ball Aerospace
2111 Wilson Blvd.,
Suite 1120
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rbturner@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. W. Garrett
777 7th Street, N.W.
Ste 326
Washington , DC 20001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wsg45@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William S Garrett
Founder / MD
SecurDigital
601 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suit
Suite #900, South Building
Washington , DC 200042642
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 864-0291
Email: w.steven.garrett@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ricky Garris
10900 Scott Drive
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: RG4411@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Ricky Garris
Senior Director
Salient Federal Solutions
8618 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 100
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 940-0084
Email: Ricky.Garris@salientfed.com
_____________________________________________________
Alex Garza
Assistant Chief of Health Affair
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alex.garza@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Wayne Gaskill
IT Program Manager
CACI
26104 Flintonbridge Drive
Chantilly , VA 20152
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: waynegaskill@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Matthew E Gaston
Co-Director
Software Engineering Institute, CMU
NRECA Building
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (412) 268-3918
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Harry D Gatanas
Sr VP Defense and Intelligence
Serco
1622 Wyatts Ridge
Crownsville , MD 21032
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: harry.gatanas@serco-na.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Janelle Gatchalian
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jgatchalian@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathleen L Harger
888 N. Quincy Street
#1912
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: harger.kathleen@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Drew Harker
TITLE TBD
Arnold & Porter
555 Twelfth Street, NW
Washington , DC 20004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Drew_Harker@aporter.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bill Harp MA
Defense Intel
Esri
Bill Harp - Industry Solutions
380 New York St
Redlands , CA 92373
Phone: (none)
Fax: (909) 307-3039
Email: bharp@esri.com
_____________________________________________________
Preston Harrelle
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Thomas J Harrington
EAD Criminal Cyber Response
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.harrington@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Adam Harris
Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Adam.Harris@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Basil " Harris Jr
Executive for Federal ISE Progra
Office of the PM-ISE, ODNI
Mr. Nick Harris
2100 K ST NW
Suite 300
Washington , DC 20511
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nbasilh@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Basil N Harris
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: b.harris@radium.ncsc.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Gail Harris
555 Rivergate Lane
B1-113
Durango , CO 81301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Harrisg44@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Maggie M Harris
President and CEO
Engineering Systems Consultants, Inc.
8201 Corporate Drive
Suite 1105
Landover , MD 20785-2230
Phone: (202) 554-1009
Fax: (301) 577-0136
_____________________________________________________
Ronald Harris
Business Development
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ronald.r.harris.lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William J Harris
Director
Raytheon Company
22270 Pacific Blvd
Dulles , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william_J_Harris@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Duane Harrison
TITLE TBD
DIA
342 12th Street SE
Washington , DC 20003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: duane.harrison@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George Harrison
109 Middleton Drive
Peachtree City , GA 30269
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: george.harrison@gtri.gatech.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jerry C Harrison
Vice President
SRI International
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jerry.harrison@sri.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Steven D Harrison
12004 Governors Court
Woodbridge , VA 22192
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: imer71@netscape.net
_____________________________________________________
Col. Stuart Harrison
5605 Doolittle Street
Burke , VA 22015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sharrison2@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr Stuart Harrison
Vice President
Parsons
100 M Street SE
Washington , DC 20003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sharrison2@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bruce Hart
COO
Terremark
460 Spring Park Place
Ste 1000
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bhart@terremark.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Hart
9736 Riverside Circle
Ellicott City , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: whart13407@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
P.O. Brendan E Hartford
Police Officer
Chicago Police Department-SWAT Team
3510 S. Michigan
Chicago , IL 60653
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brendan.hartford@chicagopolice.org
_____________________________________________________
Tim Hartman
General Manager
Government Executive
ADDRESS TBD
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Hartney
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Deborah Harvey
Director
SRC
941 Glenwood Station Lane
Suite 301
Charlottesville , VA 22901
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: harvey@srcinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Lawrence Gershwin
Excellence
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lawrekg@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kenneth Gertz
2133 Lee Building
College Park , MD 20742-5125
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kgertz@umd.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Ghannam
Sr. Intel Recruitment Consultant
BAE Systems Inc.
2525 Network Place
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joseph_nad@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Matthew J Ghormley
Pgm Mgr, DAU School of Pgm Mgmt
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matthew.ghormley@dau.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stanley Giannet
5929 Lafayette Street
New Port Richey , FL 34652
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: drgiannet@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ben Gianni
Vice President, DHS Programs
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bgianni@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Timothy Gibson
Liason to DARPA
NSA
4109 John Trammell Court
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 516-8784
Email: timothy.gibson@darpa.mil
_____________________________________________________
Robert Giesler
VP, Cyber Security Director
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.j.giesler@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Anthony Gigioli
Vice President, Systems Engineer
Camber Corporation
5860 Trinity Parkway
Suite 400
Centerville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tgigioli@i2spros.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Gigrich
1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Suite 1000
Washington , DC 20036
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james_gigrich@agilent.com
_____________________________________________________
RADM. Ann D Gilbride
Director (Retired), National Mar
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ann.gilbride@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Gildea
Vice President, US Business Deve
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rfgildea@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Louis F Giles
Director of Policy
NSA
9800 Savage Road
DC3, Suite 6248
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lfgiles@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Charles Gill
Principal Systems Engineer
The SI Organization
15050 Conference Center Drive
Chanitlly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: charles.w.gill@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Peter Gill
SVP, Deputy Group President
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: peter.gill@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David W Gillard
Systems Director
The Aerospace Corporation
15049 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (703) 437-8353
Fax: (571) 307-1234
Email: david.w.gillard@aero.org
_____________________________________________________
Dan Gillespie
Director, Corporate Business Dev
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (703) 464-9765
Fax: (none)
Email: dgillespie@lmi.org
_____________________________________________________
Dan Gilliam
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jim Gillie
Director
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jgillie@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. James Giordano
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jgiordano@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Thomas Giroir
Principal, Business Development
Tresys Technology
Tom Giroir
8840 Stanford Blvd.
Suite 2100
Columbia , MD 21045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 953-0494
Email: tgiroir@tresys.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard Girven Rep.
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: r_girven@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Natalie Givans
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Givans_Natalie@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Edmund Glabus
Corporate Senior Vice President
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ed.glabus@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Glasby
TITLE TBD
Intelsat General Corporation
6550 Rock Spring Drive
Suite 450
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Brendan Glasgow
Federal Account Manager
SafeNet, Inc.
1655 Fort Myer Drive, Suite 1150
Arlington , VA 20832
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Brendan.Glasgow@safenet-inc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Glass
Crystal Square 5
Ste 300
Washington , DC 20511
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michaeljg@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Matthew Glaudemans
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matthew.glaudemans@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gene Glazar
Vice President, Business Develop
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gene.glazar@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Amy Glazier BA
Intern
ICTS
629 Q St. NW
Washington , DC 20001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: amyglazier@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen Glennan
332 Red Magnolia Court
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephenglennan@netscape.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Glogow
CIO Office
DHS
9620 W. Russell Road, #2098
Las Vegas , NV 89148
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.glogow@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Pat Gnazzo
TITLE TBD
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patrick.gnazzo@ca.com
_____________________________________________________
Lorenzo Goco
Budget Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: L_Goco@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jeff Godbold
Director of Federal Solutions
Basis Technology
2553 Dulles View Drive
Suite 450
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dale Goddeke
Director, Advanced Solutions
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dale_h_goddeke@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard Godfrey
TITLE TBD
MorganFranklin
1753 Pinnacle Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rick.godfrey@morganfranklin.com
_____________________________________________________
Donald Goff
TITLE TBD
Criterion Systems
6613 Rosecroft Place
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dgoff@criterion-sys.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert Goffner
4208 Hunt Club Circle Apt. 702
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: galaxypheonix@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Geoff Goldberg
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Philip S Goldberg
Intelligence and Research
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: goldbergps@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Richard Goldberg
Senior VP of Public Affairs
DRS Technologies, Inc.
5 Sylvan Way
Parsippany , NJ 7054
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: goldberg@drs.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard Goldberg
TITLE TBD
DRS Technologies, Inc.
5 Sylvan Way
Parsippany , NJ 7054
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: goldberg@drs.com
_____________________________________________________
Brad Goldman
TITLE TBD
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bradford.l.goldman@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Bradford L Goldman
VP- Intelligence Sector
Parsons Corporation
100 M Street, SE
Washington , DC 20003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Bradford.Goldman@Parsons.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Benjamin Goldsmith
1619 R St NW
Apt 206
Washington , DC 20009
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bwgoldsmith@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jon Goldsmith
Director, Business Development
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jgoldsmith@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
David Goldstein
Senior Systems Engineer
Draper Laboratory
555 Technology Square
Cambridge , MA 02139
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dgoldstein@draper.com
_____________________________________________________
Seth Goldstein
2032 Derby Hall
154 N. Oval Mall
Columbus , OH 43210
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: goldstein.95@polisci.osu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Peter Goldstone
President
Government Executive
ADDRESS TBD
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
David L Goldwyn
International Energy Affairs
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: goldwyndl@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
David C Gombert
Principal Dep Dir of Nat Intel
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sandra.s.jimenez@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
cathy a gombrsTest
programmer
gombrs
line
sterling , VA 20164
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ck@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Gary M Gomez M.A.
Director, Business Development
Delex Systems Inc.
1953 Gallows Rd.
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: GGomez@delex.com
_____________________________________________________
Magda J Gomez CNCM
Board Agent
National Labor Relations Board
1201 W. Mt. Royal Avenue
457
Baltimore , MD 21217
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: magdajohannagomez@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Jose Gomez-Canaan
Vice President
AQUANIL
Av. 27 de Febrero No.266
Edificio INACIF
Santo Domingo 22195
Dominican Republic
Phone: (none)
Fax: (unlisted)
Email: jose@aqua.com.do
_____________________________________________________
Tanis Gonsalves
TITLE TBD
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Peter Goobic
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Peter.Goobic@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Good
Commander's Action Group, JFCC-N
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mjgood@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Randall Good
Director
ENSCO, Inc.
5400 Port Royal Road
Springfield , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: good.randall@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Goodall
Assistant for Program Developmen
Pennsylvania State University - App. Research Labo
P.O. Box 30
State College , PA 16804
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tdg10@arl.psu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Thomas D Goodall
TITLE TBD
Pennsylvania State University - App. Research Labo
P.O. Box 30
State College , PA 16804
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tdg10@only.arl.psu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Linda Gooden
Executive Vice President
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda.gooden@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Jason P Goodfriend BA
Director
BAE Systems
8201 Greensboro Drive
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 847-5880
Email: jason.goodfriend@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tom Goodman
TITLE TBD
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.goodman@ca.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Goodson
Business Development Analysis Vi
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.goodson@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Cristin Goodwin
Policy Counsel
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cgoodwin@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Eric Goosby
US Global AIDS Coordinator
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: goosbye@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mike Gorbell
4660 Paint Horse Trail
Santa Maria , CA 93455
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gorbell@msn.com
_____________________________________________________
Philip H Gordon
European & Eurasian Affairs
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gordonph@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Samuel Gordy
SVP, Deputy General Manager
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: samuel.j.gordy@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jason Gorey
19 Centre Street
Wakefield , MA 1880
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jasongorey@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Allen L Gorin
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
R6, Suite 6513
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: algorin@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Michael Goss
Vice President
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.goss@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Rose Gottemoeller
Verification, Compliance, and Im
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gottemoellerr@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Evan R Gottesman
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: e_gottesman@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Gourley
15017 Rumson Place
Manassas , VA 20111
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bob@crucialpointllc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Gouveia
7809 Mistic View Court
Rockville , MD 20855
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gouveia_william@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Elizabeth Govan M.A. B.A.
135A Riverview Ave
Annapolis , MD 21401
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: elizabethgovan@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Dana Goward
Director, Office of Assessment
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dana.goward@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Diana Gowen
Senior Vice President
Qwest Communications
4250 N. Fairfax Dr.
5th Floor
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: diana.gowen@qwest.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr Walt Grabowski
VP Business Development
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Judith Grabski
Director, Operations
TRSS, LLC
1410 Spring Hill Rd
Suite 140
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: judith.grabski@trssllc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Rae Grad
1101 Main Administration
College Park , MD 20742
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rgrad@umd.edu
_____________________________________________________
Liz A Grady
Executive Assistant
Hewlett Packard Federal APG Sales
1 Flint Pond Drive
No. Grafton , MA 01536
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lizette.a.grady@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Liz A Grady
6600 Rockledge Drive
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (508) 839-7257
Fax: (none)
Email: lizette.a.grady@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Lizette A Grady
Administrative Assistant
Hewlett Packard Federal APG Sales
Robert Siebert
6600 Rockledge Drive
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (443) 852-1842
Fax: (none)
Email: lizette.a.grady@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Hampton D Graham
Vice President
Owl Computing Technology Inc.
38A Grove Street
Suite 101
Ridgefield , CT 06877
Phone: (none)
Fax: (203) 894-1297
Email: dgraham@owlcti.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr James S Graham Finance BS
Financial Analyst
NetStar-1
110 S Wise St Apt 2
Arlington , VA 22204
Phone: (571) 830-4563
Fax: (none)
Email: grahamjs70@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Tim Graham
Acct Exec
IBM Federal Software
2300 Dulles Station Blvd
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 943-1952
Email: tim_graham@us.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
David Grannis
Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: D_Grannis@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Arthur Grant
TITLE TBD
Raytheon
10866 Burr Oak Way
Burke , VA 22015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: arthur_v_grant@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeff Grant
VP, NGAS
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.d.grant@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Grant
One Space Park
E2/11092
Redondo Beach , CA 90278
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.d.grant@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeremy Grant
1655 North Fort Meyer Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jgrant@acqsolinc.com
_____________________________________________________
John Grant
Cyber
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john_grant@hsgac.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Vernon Grapes
TITLE TBD
Stellar Solutions, Inc.
250 Cambridge Avenue
Suite 204
Palo Alto , CA 94306
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Donald Grass
15459 Championship Drive
Haymarket , VA 20169
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dakiers@vacoxmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Donald Grass
TITLE TBD
NRO
15459 Championship Drive
Haymarket , VA 20169
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donald.grass@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Grasso
Vice President, Government Relat
Lockheed Martin, Washington Operations
2121 Crystal Dr
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michael.a.grasso@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Bill Gravell
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Julie Gravellese
INSA Innovative Tech Council
MITRE
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Tracy Graves Stevens
President
MSM Security Services, LLC.
8401 Connecticut Ave
Suite 700
Chevy Chase , MD 20815
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Benjamin Gray
11417 Encore Drive
Silver Spring , MD 20901
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bgray@alumni.nd.edu
_____________________________________________________
Donald A Gray
13 Country Manor Road
Eagle Lake , MN 56024
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donald.gray83@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
mark gray
Staff Officer
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: a78548@me.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Timothy P Grayson
9704 Glenway Ct
Burke , VA 22015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tgrayson@ktech.com
_____________________________________________________
Libby Greco
Director, Field Marketing
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Gavin Green
Business Development, Senior Man
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jason Green
14825 Adriatic Court
Haymarket , VA 20169
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jgreen@us.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
Katherine Green
Vice President
Abraxas Corp
12801 Worldgate Dr
Suite # 800
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Katherine M Green
Vice President
Abraxas Corporation, a Cubic Company
205 Van Buren Street
Suite 210
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 821-8511
Email: katherine.green@abraxascorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Matt Green
Chief of Staff
Finmeccanica
Angelica Falchi
1625 I Street, NW
12th Floor
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matthew.green@finmeccanica.com
_____________________________________________________
Owen Greenblatt
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: owen.greenblatt@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Creighton Greene
Strat Forces/Intel
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: creighton_greene@armed-services.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Amanda Greenland
Intel/Admin Coordinator
OUSD(I)
Amanda Greenland
5000 Defense Pentagon
Room 3C915
Washington , DC 20301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Amanda.Greenland@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Aaron Greenwald
3000 N. Washington Blvd
Apt. 528
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Aaron.Greenwald@jhu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Aaron Greenwald
TITLE TBD
Central Technology
3000 N. Washington Blvd, No. 229
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: greenwalda@centratechnology.com
_____________________________________________________
Eric Greenwald
5446 Broad Branch Rd NW
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Eric Greenwald
Counsel
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eric.greenwald@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Michael Greenwood
Manager Government Program Devel
Software Engineering Institute, CMU
NRECA Building
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Greer
6564 Loisdale Ct
Ste 900
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Bradford Gregg
Senior Consultant
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr
Mclean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gregg_bradford@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Donna Gregg
11100 John Hopkins Road
Room 17-S334
Laurel , MD 20723
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Daniel Gressang
P.O. Box 793
Bowie , MD 20718
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Gressang@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Louis E Grever
EAD Science and Technology
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: louis.grever@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sabra Horne MPA
Director, Office of Communicatio
Office of Justice Programs, Dept of Justice
810 7th Street
Arlington , DC 20531
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sabra.horne@usdoj.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Edward Horner
PSC 41 Box 918
APO , AE 9464
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tornado.isr@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark T Horton
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
AT, Suite 6222
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mthorto@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Doug Hoskins
Mgr. NGIS
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jim Hoskins
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Najoua Hotard PhD
President
Inst. of Crit LangCult Exch ( ICLCE)
Dr. Najoua Hotard
4424 East catalina Ave
Baton Rouge , LA 70814
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: najouak@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dewey Houck
Director - IS Mission Systems
The Boeing Company
7700 Boston Boulevard
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dewey.houck@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jody Houck
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Houle
1221 Merchant Lane
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeffrey.houle@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Art House
Director of Communications
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: arthur.house@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Charlie Houy
Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: charlie_houy@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sharon Houy
Associate Deputy Director
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Sharon.Houy@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Wayne Howard
Director, Business Development
SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES
6225 Brandon Avenue
Suite 220
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: whoward@systek.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Lance Howden
11260 Roger Bacon Dr.
Suite 406
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Lance@parabon.com
_____________________________________________________
Cassandra Howell PMP
Program Manager/FSO
LexisNexis
1100 Alderman Drive
Suite 1A
Alpharetta , GA 30005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cassandra.howell@lnssi.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Gail Howell
3514 N. Ohio Street
Arlington , VA 22207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhowell1012@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Gail S Howell
3514 North Ohio Street
Arlington , VA 22207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhowell1012@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Theresa Howell
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Howell
Chairman & CEO
TECH USA, Inc
8334 Veterans Highway
2nd Floor
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tbh@techusa.net
_____________________________________________________
Steny Hoyer Rep.
House Majority Leader
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hoyer.scheduling@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Beth Hruz
7901 Jones Branch Dr
ste 310
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: beth.hruz@tvarsolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Francis Hsu
US Citizenship & Immigration
DHS
1 NoMA Station
131 M St., NE 2nd Floor
Washington , DC 20529
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Garfield Hubbard
TITLE TBD
Hub Consulting Group, Inc.
11002 Swansfield Road
Columbia , MD 21045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ghubbard@hubcon.com
_____________________________________________________
Gene Hubbard
President & CEO
Hub Consulting Group, Inc. (HUBCO)
11002 Swansfield Road
Columbia , MD 21044
Phone: (301) 596-3147
Fax: (301) 596-8600
Email: ghubbard@hubcon.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeremy Bash
Director's Chief of Staff
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christyt@ucia.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Umit Basoglu
Vice President
NJVC, LLC
8614 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 300
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: umit.basoglu@njvc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Diane Batchik
TITLE TBD
White Cliffs Consulting
6445 Sundown Trail
Columbia , MD 21044
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: diane.batchik@whitecliffsconsulting.com
_____________________________________________________
James Batt
Director, Business Development &
The Boeing Company
7700 Boston Blvd
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.e.batt@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Charles Battle
Consultant
System Planning Corporation
4000 Cathedral Ave., N.W.
#121B
Washington , DC 20016
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tbattle@sysplan.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ethan L Bauman
Congressional Affairs
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (443) 479-0276
Email: elbauma@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Baxter
400 South Beverly Drive
#214
Beverly Hills , CA 90212
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jbaxter@skunkhollow.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jon Bayless
Sr. Bus. Development Manager
Sypris Electronics
10901 N. McKinley Drive
Tampa , FL 33612
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jon.bayless@sypris.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Beachell
2374 Whitestone Hill Court
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.beachell.wg96@wharton.upenn.edu
_____________________________________________________
Rebecca Bean
1513 Independence Avenue SE
Washington , DC 20003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rebecab2@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Sarah Beane
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Beard
3810 North Randolph Court
Arlington , VA 22207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Joel Beaton
Client Executive
HP Enterprise Services
13600 EDS Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joel.beaton@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Marjorie Beatty
901 Ravelston Terrace
Arnold , MD 21012
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: marjorib@ptf.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Marjorie A Beatty
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mabeatt@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Christopher Beck
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.beck@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Tom Beck
43912 Felicity Place
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tbeck@splunk.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lora Becker
3210 Wessynton Way
Alexandria , VA 22309
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lora_becker@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Christian Beckner
Counsel
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christian_beckner@hsgac.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mike Becraft
SVP Federal Civilian Services
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Fernand D Bedard
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
R3, Suite 6513
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fdbedar@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George Beebe
Deputy Director, Center for Inte
Defense Group, Inc.
1140 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Suite 1140
Washington , DC 20036
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: george.beebe@defensegp.com
_____________________________________________________
Joseph Beerman
Senior Manager
Raytheon
7600 Leesburg Pike
West Building, Suite 400
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joseph.beerman@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Rand Beers
Under Secretary
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Robert.Beers@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr Grant A Begley Jr. MS
Corp Senior Vice President
Alion
1750 Tysons Boulevard
Suite 1300
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 714-6509
Email: gbegley@alionscience.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bernie Guerry
Vice President, National Intelli
General Dynamics IT, NDIS
15000 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20121
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bernie.guerry@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
John W Hudson
605 Stillwood Drive
Woodstock , GA 30189
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jwhudson@thechartwellconsultancy.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Tracey Huff
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jack Huffard
Co-founder, President and COO
Tenable Network Security
7063 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Hufnagel
15238 Cedar Knoll Court
Montclair , VA 22025
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Celes Hughes
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: celes.hughes@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Chris Hughes
Senior Manager
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jahughes@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Christian A Hughes Int' Bus
Sr. Policy Advisor
DHS-Office of International Affairs/Policy
Christian A. Hughes/CBP/INA
1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
RRB 8th Floor
Washington , DC 20220
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christian.hughes@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Hughes
Strategic Programs Manager
Hewlett Packard
Jeffrey Hughes
7230 Woodville Road
Mount Airy , MD 21771
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeffrey.l.hughes@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey L Hughes MSEE
Strategic Program Executive
Hewlett Packard
7230 Woodville Road
Mount Airy , MD 21771
Phone: (301) 363-8456
Fax: (none)
Email: jeffrey.l.hughes@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
LTG Patrick Hughes USA (Ret)
2013 South Lynn Street
Arlington , VA 22202-2128
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pmh116207@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
LTG Patrick Hughes USA (Ret.)
Vice President-Intelligence & Co
L-3 Communications, Inc.
11955 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patrick.hughes@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Patrick M Hughes
TITLE TBD
L-3 Communications, Inc.
11955 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patrick.hughes@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Special Agent Gary Hughey Jr
Special Agent
Air Force Office of Special Investigations
1413 Arkansas Rd
Joint Base Andrews , MD 20762
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ghugheyjr@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jay Hulings
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jay.hulings@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dave Hull
Program Director
SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES
185 STATE HIGHWAY 36
WEST LONG BRANCH , NJ 7764
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dhull@systek.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Regina Hambleton
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gregg Hamelin
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gregory.hamelin@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tawfik Hamid
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thamid@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Bonnie Hamilton
3383 Dondis Creek Dr
Triangle , VA 22172
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pheelyne@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Hamilton
7746 New Providence Drive
#93
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: travel1Mark@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Hamlin
13861 Sunrise Valley Drive
Ste 400
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.hamlin@dlt.com
_____________________________________________________
Teresa Hamlin
Manager Corporate Strategy
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Frederick Hammerson
Senior Language Authority
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Frederick.Hammerson@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Rob Hamrick
Vice President, Advanced Project
Ensco, Inc.
5400 Port Royal Road
Springfield , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hamrick.rob@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Larry Hanauer
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: larry.hanauer@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Larry Hanauer
Senior Intl. Policy Analyst
RAND
1200 South Hayes Street
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lhanauer@rand.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Handy
7403 Gateway Court
Manassas , VA 20109-7313
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhandy@gmri.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lee Hanna
TITLE TBD
The Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC
1890 Preston White Drive
Suite 250
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lehanna@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeanette Hanna-Ruiz
Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeanette_hanna-ruiz@nsgac.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Paul Hannah Jr.
7045 Berry rd
Suite A1
Accokeek , MD 20607
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: phannah@takt-gs.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Morten Hansen
#B01 SOD 8th Villa, 657-7 Hannam
Seoul , AP 140-887
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mortenhansenbxl@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Lars Hanson
2160 Westglen Court
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: parkersan@sprynet.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William G Hanson Bachelors
Sr. Vice President
Agilex Technologies
Jerry Hanson
5155 Parkstone Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (703) 754-2327
Fax: (703) 483-4928
Email: jerry.hanson@agilex.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Hantke
306 Sentinel Drive
Ste 100
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael_hantke@appsig.com
_____________________________________________________
Bob Harding
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Harding
USCG Intelligence, Director of S
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.harding@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Beth Hardison
TITLE TBD
USIS
7799 Leesburg Pike
Suite 400 S
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: beth.hardison@usis.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey T Hardy BA, MBA
1603 Riverside Drive
Annapolis , MD 21409
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeffreythardy@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey T Hardy
1603 RIVERSIDE DRIVE
ANNAPOLIS , MD 21409
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeffrey.t.hardy@live.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George Hargenrader
13233 Ladybank Lane
Oak Hill , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: grh092864@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Kathleen Harger
Chief Advocate Adaptive Initiati
DARPA
3701 N. Fairfax Dr.
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kathleen.harger@darpa.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathleen L Harger
888 N. Quincy Street
#1912
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: harger.kathleen@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Drew Harker
TITLE TBD
Arnold & Porter
555 Twelfth Street, NW
Washington , DC 20004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Drew_Harker@aporter.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bill Harp MA
Defense Intel
Esri
Bill Harp - Industry Solutions
380 New York St
Redlands , CA 92373
Phone: (none)
Fax: (909) 307-3039
Email: bharp@esri.com
_____________________________________________________
Preston Harrelle
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Thomas J Harrington
EAD Criminal Cyber Response
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.harrington@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Adam Harris
Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Adam.Harris@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Basil " Harris Jr
Executive for Federal ISE Progra
Office of the PM-ISE, ODNI
Mr. Nick Harris
2100 K ST NW
Suite 300
Washington , DC 20511
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nbasilh@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Basil N Harris
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: b.harris@radium.ncsc.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Gail Harris
555 Rivergate Lane
B1-113
Durango , CO 81301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Harrisg44@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Maggie M Harris
President and CEO
Engineering Systems Consultants, Inc.
8201 Corporate Drive
Suite 1105
Landover , MD 20785-2230
Phone: (202) 554-1009
Fax: (301) 577-0136
_____________________________________________________
Ronald Harris
Business Development
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ronald.r.harris.lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William J Harris
Director
Raytheon Company
22270 Pacific Blvd
Dulles , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william_J_Harris@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Duane Harrison
TITLE TBD
DIA
342 12th Street SE
Washington , DC 20003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: duane.harrison@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George Harrison
109 Middleton Drive
Peachtree City , GA 30269
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: george.harrison@gtri.gatech.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jerry C Harrison
Vice President
SRI International
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jerry.harrison@sri.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Steven D Harrison
12004 Governors Court
Woodbridge , VA 22192
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: imer71@netscape.net
_____________________________________________________
Col. Stuart Harrison
5605 Doolittle Street
Burke , VA 22015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sharrison2@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr Stuart Harrison
Vice President
Parsons
100 M Street SE
Washington , DC 20003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sharrison2@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bruce Hart
COO
Terremark
460 Spring Park Place
Ste 1000
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bhart@terremark.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Hart
9736 Riverside Circle
Ellicott City , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: whart13407@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
P.O. Brendan E Hartford
Police Officer
Chicago Police Department-SWAT Team
3510 S. Michigan
Chicago , IL 60653
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brendan.hartford@chicagopolice.org
_____________________________________________________
Tim Hartman
General Manager
Government Executive
ADDRESS TBD
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Hartney
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Deborah Harvey
Director
SRC
941 Glenwood Station Lane
Suite 301
Charlottesville , VA 22901
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: harvey@srcinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Quentin Harvey
12204 Columbia Springs Way
Bristow , VA 20136
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: qharvey12@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
James M Hass
Director, IT Governance, Policy
ODNI
Liberty Crossing 2, 6B331
Washington , DC 20511
Phone: (301) 782-7972
Fax: (none)
Email: james.m.hass@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. David C Hassell
Laboratory Division
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.hassell@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Christopher Hassler
President & CEO
Syndetics, Inc.
10395 Democracy Lane
Suite B
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cchassler@syndetics-inc.com
_____________________________________________________
Christopher C Hassler
TITLE TBD
Syndetics, Inc.
10395 Democracy Lane
Suite B
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cchassler@syndetics-inc.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. David Hatch
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
EC, Suite 6886
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dahatch@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Pete Hatfield
Director
AECOM
6564 Loisdale Ct
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pete.hatfield@aecom.com
_____________________________________________________
Melissa Hathaway
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Justin Hattan
1332 Belmont St NW #101
Washington , DC 20009
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jeff Haugh
913 Malvern Hill Drive
Davidsonville , MD 21035-1242
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhaugh@nss.us.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steven Hauptman
116K Edwards Ferry Road
Leesburg , VA 20176
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steven.hauptman@fasi.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jan Hauser
18475 Circle Drive
Los Gatos , CA 95033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Nathan Hauser
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nathan.hauser@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Rita Hauser
PIAB Member
PIAB
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Wendy_A._Loehrs@pfiab.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Arthur Hausman
55 Flood Circle
Atherton , CA 94027
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ahhausman@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Haver
Consultant
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rich.haver@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard Haver
TITLE TBD
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rich.haver@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Stephen C Hawald
4123 N 27 STREET
ARLINGTON , VA 22207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: SCH500MD@GMAIL.COM
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steven Hawkins
Vice President
Raytheon Company
1200 S. Jupiter Road
MS AA-75000
Garland , TX 75042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steve_k_hawkins@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Erin Hawley
Director, Federal Sales
Composite Software Inc.
11921 Freedom Drive
Suite 550
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Hawley
929 Brick Manor Circle
Silver Spring , MD 20905
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhawley@tibco.com
_____________________________________________________
AJ Hawrylak
Private Wealth Associate
The Pagnato-Karp Group
AJ Hawrylak
1152 15th Street
Washington DC , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ahawrylak@hightoweradvisors.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kastriot Haxhiaj
330 Independence Ave, S.W.
Rm 3720
Washington , DC 20237
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: khaxhiaj@voa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Joyce Hayes
TITLE TBD
PRTM Management Consultants, LLC
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Suite 1000
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhayes@prtm.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Karyn Hayes-Ryan
Director, Commercial Remote Sens
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: karyn.hayesryan@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Juanita Haynesworth
11244 Chestnut Grove Square
#156
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jehay143@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Anthony Hayter
Director of Business Development
Ivysys Technology, LLC
2001 Jefferson Davis Hwy
Suite 1109
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ahayter@ivysys.com
_____________________________________________________
Leo Hazlewood
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Heagy
TITLE TBD
Imagery X
2235 Gerken Avenue
Vienna , VA 22181-3151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: heagy@imageryx.com
_____________________________________________________
Christine Healey
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: c_healey@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jason Healey
1200 N. Herndon St
#265
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jason@jasonhealey.com
_____________________________________________________
Jay Healey
TITLE TBD
Delta Risk LLC
2804 N. Seminary
Chicago , IL 60657
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Timothy J Healy
Director
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: timothy.healy@tsc.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Heath
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. James Heath
Directors Science Advisor
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Suite 6242
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James D Heathcote
Deputy Associate Director, Offic
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Q, Suite 6772
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 854-7685
Email: jdheath@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kenneth Heaton
9800 Savage Rd
Ste 6759
Ft George G Meade , 0 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: k.heaton@radium.ncsc.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Vonna W Heaton
Director, InnoVision Directorate
NGA
4600 Sanagmore Road
Bethesda , MD 20816
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Vonna.W.Heaton@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Heck
Director, Enterprise Programs
Harris Corporation
P.O. Box 37
MS: 2-21D
Melbourne , FL 32902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mheck@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Heck
Director, Bus. Development-ISS
Sypris Electronics
10901 N. McKinley Drive
Tampa , FL 33612
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.heck@sypris.com
_____________________________________________________
Ken Heffernan
VP, Business Development Directo
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kenneth.g.heffernan@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Rob Hegstrom
Director, Battlespace Awareness
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rob.hegstrom@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ray Heider
TITLE TBD
TASC
4805 Stonecroft Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: raymond.heider@tasc.com
_____________________________________________________
kris Heim
Chief Technology Officer
White Oak Technologiese, Inc.
1300 Spring Street
Suite 320
Silver Spring , VA 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dennis V Heinbuch
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
I2, Suite 6575
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dvheinb@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Maj. Gen. Bradley Heithold
TITLE TBD
Air Force Intelligence
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Edward B Held
Director of Office of Intelligen
Energy Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: edward.held@in.doe.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Joseph Helman
4532 34 St S
Arlington , VA 22206
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joehelman@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dale Helmer
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dhelmer@casl.umd.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Hemschoot
Director, Information Processing
L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East
1 Federal Street
A&E-2C
Camden , NJ 8103
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jim.hemschoot@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
James G Hemschoot
TITLE TBD
L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East
1 Federal Street
A&E-2C
Camden , NJ 8103
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jim.hemschoot@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Jim Hemschoot
TITLE TBD
Level 3 Communications, LLC
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jim.hemschoot@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Melanie Hendrick
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Melanie Hendrick
905 Columbia Rd. NW
Washington , DC 20001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 602-5457
Email: hendrick.melanie@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Hendricks
APG Account Manager
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.hendricks@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kris Henley
Vice President, Intelligence Pro
Stellar Solutions, Inc.
250 Cambridge Avenue
Suite 204
Palo Alto , CA 94306
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: khenley@stellarsolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Betsey Hennigan
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: betsey.hennigan@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Shawn Henry
EAD Washington Field Officer
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Shawn.Henry@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Henson
PSC #41, P.O. Box 3667
APO , AE 9464
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.henson@lakenheath.af.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John C Hepler
3478 South River Terrace
Edgewater , MD 21037
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.hepler@datadomain.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Herd
Principal
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Herd_Robert@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mel Heritage
Assistant Deputy Director and Se
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
James Herlong
712 Oser Drive
Crownsville , MD 21032
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: herlongjj@mac.com
_____________________________________________________
Scott Herman
Sr Dir of Product Development
GeoEye
2325 Dulles Corner Blvd.
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Robert Hermann
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Christie Hernandez
Marketing Coordinator
Carahsoft
12369 Sunrise Valley Drive
STE D2
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christie.hernandez@carahsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Enrique Hernandez
6415 Emerald Green CT
Centreville , VA 20121-3824
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hank.hernandez@vyndicar.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Don Herndon
V.P. Business Development
Sypris Electronics
10901 N. McKinley Drive
Tampa , FL 33612
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: don.herndon@sypris.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Don Herring
President
AT&T Government Solutions-NIS
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dherring@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Rebecca Hersman
Deputy Assistant Secretary for C
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rebecca.hersman@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Brandon Hess
BD Specialist
Parsons
100 M St. SE
Ste. 1200
Washington , DC 20003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brandon.hess@missionep.com
_____________________________________________________
John J Hess
Senior Director, Intelligence So
Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc
1501 Farm Credit Drive
Suite 2300
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen Hetrick
2111 Blackmore Ct.
San Diego , CA 92109
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: shetrick@srccomp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Heurtevent
1201 S. Eads St.
#103
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david@heurtevent.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian Hibbeln
3815 Watkins Mill Drive
Alexandria , VA 22304
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Brass@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Brian Hibbeln
ADUSD for Special Capabilitiesáá
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Brian.Hibbeln@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Allison A Hickey
TITLE TBD
Accenture
43254 Watershed Ct
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: allison.a.hickey@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Hicks
826 Walker Road
Great Falls , VA 22066
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hicksjw@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Hicks
TITLE TBD
NRO
826 Walker Road
Falls Church , VA 22066
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.hicks@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Parker Hicks
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Russ Hierl
Senior Director, Security Ops &
Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc
1501 Farm Credit Drive
Suite 2300
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rhierl@theanalysiscorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Peter L Higgins
1600 Tysons Boulevard - 8th Fl.
1SecureAudit
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: HigginsP@1SecureAudit.com
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Highfield
1600 S. Eads St. APT 907N
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: highfieldk@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Karim Hijazi
9858 Clint Moore Road
C-111, #261
Boca Raton , FL 33496
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: khijazi@demiurgeconsulting.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Karim Hijazi
CEO
Unveillance
Karim Hijazi
3475 Oak Valley Road NE
STE. 2740
Atlanta , GA 30326
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: khijazi@unveillance.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jack Hild
DD, Source Operations & Manageme
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jack.hild@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Alice Hill
Senior Counselor to the Secretar
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Alice.Hill@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Chris Hill
TITLE TBD
Adobe
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1000
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chill@adobe.com
_____________________________________________________
Larry Hill
SVP, Deputy General Manager
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: larry.hill@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Martin Hill
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Hill_Marty@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Zachary Hill
TITLE TBD
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Zachary.Hill@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Doug Himes
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
S33, Suite 6505
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Hindle
Executive Vice President
Westway Development
14325 Willard Road
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhindle@westwaydevelopment.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jason Hines
1503E N. Colonial Terrace
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jason@viadesigns.com
_____________________________________________________
Jason Hines BS, MS
Head of Federal Sales
Recorded Future
1503E N. Colonial Ter
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jason@recordedfuture.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Elizabeth Hoag
DCIPS Program Manager
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: elizabeth.hoag@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Andrew Hock
Arete Associates
9301 Corbin Avenue, Suite 2000
Northridge , CA 91324
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ahock@arete.com
_____________________________________________________
Peter Hoekstra Rep.
Minority Chair
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 226-0779
Email: leah.scott@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James W hoffman
4231 Monument Wall Way
Apt 151
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jim.hoffman@Objectfx.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Christopher Hoffmeister
Intelligence Research Specialist
Department of Homeland Security
1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, 7.4 C
Washington , DC 20229
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.hoffmeister@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
William Holcomb
TITLE TBD
The MITRE Corporation
7515 Colshire Drive
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wholcomb@mitre.org
_____________________________________________________
Eric H Holder Jr.
Attorney General
Justice Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda.a.jenkins@usdoj.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George L Holdridge Sr. BIE
CEO
Global Downlink Corporation
Mr. George Holdridge
13290 Solana beach Cv.
Delray Beach , FL 33446
Phone: (561) 495-9801
Fax: (none)
Email: usmetro@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
John Holland
Graduate Student
Norwich University
425 Thames Street
Hagerstown , MD 21740
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hollandjf@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Guy Holliday
VP for Programs
Adapx
821 Second Avenue
Ste 1150
Seattle , WA 98104
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: guy.holliday@adapx.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Nancy Holliday
Director, Strategic Business Dev
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nancyhol@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Christopher Hollingshead
Commander
U.S Coast Guard
711 Diamond Vista Dr
Port Angeles , WA 98363
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christopher.hollingshead@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Hans Hollister
SVP, Business Development
L-3 Communications, Inc.
11955 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jim Holm
Staff Assistant
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Jim.Holm@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Georgia Holmer
TITLE TBD
Pherson Associates, LLC
9902 Deerfield Pond Drive
Great Falls , VA 22066
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Christopher Holmes
TITLE TBD
Goodrich
88 Wildwood Drive
Avon , CT 6001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.holmes@goodrich.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sarah Holmes
Senior Consultant
Sensa Solutions
11180 Sunrise Valley Drive
Suite 100
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sarah@sensasolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Stewart Holmes
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Stewart_Holmes@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Tonya M Holmes
2504 Buckingham Green Lane
Upper Marlboro , MD 20774
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tholmes@poseidon2020.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jayne Homeyer
Director of Competencies and Sta
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jane.m.homeyer@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Vanessa Hood
Embedded Analyst
Palantir Technologies
1660 International Drive
8th Floor
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
William L Hooton
Records Management Division
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william.hooton@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
John M Hope
Office of IT Program Management
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.hope@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen J Hopkins
2703 E Towers Dr # 409
Cincinnati , OH 45238
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bkwtr22@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Carmen D Hopper MS, BA
Head of Intelligence & Analytics
Barclays Capital
Carmen Hopper
745 Seventh Avenue
12th floor
New York , NY 10019
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carmen.hopper@barcap.com
_____________________________________________________
Jason Hopper
1313 Hampshire Drive
Frederick , MD 21702
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhopper86@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms Jill Hopper
901 N. Stuart Street
Suite 1110
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhopper@cray.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert R Horback
Vice President
TASC
15036 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 961-0944
Email: ROBERT.HORBACK@tasc.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert D Hormats
Under Secretary Econ, Energy & A
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: HormatsRD@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sabra Horne
3131 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Apt 2908
Washington , DC 20008-5030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sabra Horne
Senior Advisor for Outreach
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sabra.e.horne@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sabra Horne MPA
Director, Office of Communicatio
Office of Justice Programs, Dept of Justice
810 7th Street
Arlington , DC 20531
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sabra.horne@usdoj.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Edward Horner
PSC 41 Box 918
APO , AE 9464
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tornado.isr@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark T Horton
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
AT, Suite 6222
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mthorto@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Doug Hoskins
Mgr. NGIS
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jim Hoskins
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Najoua Hotard PhD
President
Inst. of Crit LangCult Exch ( ICLCE)
Dr. Najoua Hotard
4424 East catalina Ave
Baton Rouge , LA 70814
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: najouak@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dewey Houck
Director - IS Mission Systems
The Boeing Company
7700 Boston Boulevard
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dewey.houck@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jody Houck
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Houle
1221 Merchant Lane
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeffrey.houle@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Art House
Director of Communications
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: arthur.house@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Charlie Houy
Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: charlie_houy@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sharon Houy
Associate Deputy Director
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Sharon.Houy@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Wayne Howard
Director, Business Development
SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES
6225 Brandon Avenue
Suite 220
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: whoward@systek.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Lance Howden
11260 Roger Bacon Dr.
Suite 406
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Lance@parabon.com
_____________________________________________________
Cassandra Howell PMP
Program Manager/FSO
LexisNexis
1100 Alderman Drive
Suite 1A
Alpharetta , GA 30005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cassandra.howell@lnssi.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Gail Howell
3514 N. Ohio Street
Arlington , VA 22207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhowell1012@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Gail S Howell
3514 North Ohio Street
Arlington , VA 22207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhowell1012@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Theresa Howell
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Howell
Chairman & CEO
TECH USA, Inc
8334 Veterans Highway
2nd Floor
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tbh@techusa.net
_____________________________________________________
Steny Hoyer Rep.
House Majority Leader
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hoyer.scheduling@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Beth Hruz
7901 Jones Branch Dr
ste 310
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: beth.hruz@tvarsolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Francis Hsu
US Citizenship & Immigration
DHS
1 NoMA Station
131 M St., NE 2nd Floor
Washington , DC 20529
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Garfield Hubbard
TITLE TBD
Hub Consulting Group, Inc.
11002 Swansfield Road
Columbia , MD 21045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ghubbard@hubcon.com
_____________________________________________________
Gene Hubbard
President & CEO
Hub Consulting Group, Inc. (HUBCO)
11002 Swansfield Road
Columbia , MD 21044
Phone: (301) 596-3147
Fax: (301) 596-8600
Email: ghubbard@hubcon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert A Hubbard
Principal
KPMG LLP
Tony Hubbard, Principal
1676 International Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 315-2573
Email: thubbard@kpmg.com
_____________________________________________________
John W Hudson
605 Stillwood Drive
Woodstock , GA 30189
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jwhudson@thechartwellconsultancy.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Tracey Huff
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jack Huffard
Co-founder, President and COO
Tenable Network Security
7063 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Hufnagel
15238 Cedar Knoll Court
Montclair , VA 22025
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Celes Hughes
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: celes.hughes@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Chris Hughes
Senior Manager
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jahughes@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Christian A Hughes Int' Bus
Sr. Policy Advisor
DHS-Office of International Affairs/Policy
Christian A. Hughes/CBP/INA
1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
RRB 8th Floor
Washington , DC 20220
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christian.hughes@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Hughes
Strategic Programs Manager
Hewlett Packard
Jeffrey Hughes
7230 Woodville Road
Mount Airy , MD 21771
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeffrey.l.hughes@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey L Hughes MSEE
Strategic Program Executive
Hewlett Packard
7230 Woodville Road
Mount Airy , MD 21771
Phone: (301) 363-8456
Fax: (none)
Email: jeffrey.l.hughes@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
LTG Patrick Hughes USA (Ret)
2013 South Lynn Street
Arlington , VA 22202-2128
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pmh116207@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
LTG Patrick Hughes USA (Ret.)
Vice President-Intelligence & Co
L-3 Communications, Inc.
11955 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patrick.hughes@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Patrick M Hughes
TITLE TBD
L-3 Communications, Inc.
11955 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patrick.hughes@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Special Agent Gary Hughey Jr
Special Agent
Air Force Office of Special Investigations
1413 Arkansas Rd
Joint Base Andrews , MD 20762
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ghugheyjr@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jay Hulings
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jay.hulings@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dave Hull
Program Director
SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES
185 STATE HIGHWAY 36
WEST LONG BRANCH , NJ 7764
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dhull@systek.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Patty Hullinger
500 Grove Street
Suite 300
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patricia.hullinger@netwitness.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Humenansky
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Humenansky_David@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Hummel
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rhummel@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
John Humphrey
Senior VP
Salient Federal Solutions
8618 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 100
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 940-0084
Email: John.Humphrey@salientfed.com
_____________________________________________________
John Humphrey
TITLE TBD
Salient Federal Solutions
8618 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 100
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhumphrey@sgis.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Humphrey
P.O. Box 13326
Fairlawn , OH 44334-8726
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mhumphrey@kpmg.com
_____________________________________________________
Tamara Hunt
TITLE TBD
DIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tamara.hunt@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Andrew Hunter
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andrew.hunter@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Elizabeth Hunter
Government Business Development
AT&T Government Solutions
3033 Chain Bridge RD
Oakton , VA 22185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eh9924@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert F Behler
7502 Round Pond Road
North Syracuse , NY 13212
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rfb@srcinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Behling
6517 Deidre Terrace
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Behling
Former Deputy Under Secretary of
DoD
6517 Deidre Terrace
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.behling@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Beida
Deputy Director, CTO
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
James Beirne
11328 Nancyann Way
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: beirnejd@mac.com
_____________________________________________________
Karen Beirne-Flint
8300 Grainfield Road
Severn , MD 21144
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: karen.beirne-flint@ogn.af.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Per Beith
3370 Miraloma
Anaheim , CA 92803
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: per.beith@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gregory Bell
1401 Old Sage Ct
Glen Allen , VA 23059
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gbell@bluecanary.us
_____________________________________________________
Thomas Bell
Deputy Director of National Inte
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 482-1739
Email: lakecia.s.graham@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Chris Bellios
Vice President
BAE Systems
8201 Greensboro Dr
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.bellios@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Chris G Bellios MBA
Vice President
BAE Systems
8201 Greensboro Dr
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.bellios@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephanie Bellistri
TBD Title
Palantir Technologies
1660 International Drive
8th Floor
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms Leslee Belluchie
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
Email: leslee.belluchie@si-intl.com
_____________________________________________________
Leslee Belluchie
Managing Member
FedCap Partners, LLC
11951 Freedom Drive
13th Floor
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scott Belodeau
Vice President
TECH USA, Inc
8334 Veterans Highway
2nd Floor
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sbelodeau@techusa.net
_____________________________________________________
Simone Bemporad
CEO
Finmeccanica
Angelica Falchi
1625 I Street, NW
12th Floor
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: simone.bemporad@finmeccanica.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Charles Bender
Director, Special R&D Intel PGen
SRI International
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bender@wdc.sri.com
_____________________________________________________
Andrea Benham
4204 Columbia Pike Apt. #2
Arlington , VA 22204
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andreabenham@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephanie Benham
Content Manager
NGA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephasb@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Daniel Benjamin
Counterterrorism
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: benjamind@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jeff Benjamin
7223 Willow Oak Place
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: benjaminja@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Thomas J Benjamin
Senior Vice President and COO
Analytic Services Inc.
2900 South Quincy Street
Suite 800
Arlington , VA 22206
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.benjamin@anser.org
_____________________________________________________
Brian Bennett
Reporter
Tribune Washington Bureau
1090 Vermont Ave. NW
Suite 1000
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bbennett@tribune.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Elizabeth Bennett
Senior Staff Scientist
Ensco, Inc.
5400 Port Royal Road
Springfield , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bennett.elizabeth@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Corey A Bent BS ChE
Chief, Media Services
Department of Homeland Security
3009 S Hill St
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: coreybent@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lesia Hunter
TITLE TBD
The Potomac Advocates
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lesia.hunter@serco-na.com
_____________________________________________________
DSS Randy T Hunter Mr NC/BA AP/M
Dir Systems Security
CSSI
Randy Hunter
284 Cranes Cir West
Altamonte Springs , FL 32701
Phone: (407) 339-9467
Fax: 1-800-439-2216
Email: rhunter42@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Huntington
Deputy Director for Human Intell
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: William.Huntington@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
John A Hurley
9001 Cherrytree Drive
Alexandria , VA 22309-2902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhurley@republiccapitalaccess.com
_____________________________________________________
Mel Hurley
Director - IT Professional Servi
Wyle Information Systems
1600 Intenational Dr
Suite 800
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Hurry
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mark Hutnan
Senior Manager
General Dynamics AIS
10560 Arrowhead Drive
Fiarfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Doug Huttar
Senior Manager
Grant Thornton LLP
333 John Carlyle Street
Suite 500
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Church Hutton
Cyber
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: church_hutton@armed-services.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Steve Hyde
TITLE TBD
TASC
4805 Stonecroft Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephen.hyde@tasc.com
_____________________________________________________
John Hynes Jr.
SVP, General Manager
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.p.hynes.jr@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Karl Jensen
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company
1200 S. Jupiter Road
MS AA-75000
Garland , TX 75042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Karl_Jensen@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Karl Jensen
VP, BD-Intelligence Solutions
L-3 Communications, Inc.
11955 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Rick Jensen
Director Business Finance
Serco
1050 North Newport Rd
Colorado Springs , CO 80916
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Kristin Jepson
Director of Security
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kristin.Jepson@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Donald Jewell
9368 Duff Court
Ellicott City , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donjewell15@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Rod Smith Jim Balentine
President
Abraxas/Cubic Mission Support Services
Rod Smith
12801 Worldgate Drive
Suite 800
Herndon , DC 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 563-9541
Email: rod.smith@abraxascorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Jimenez
7122 Rock Ridge Lane
Apartment I
Alexandria , VA 22315
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swnmia@juno.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jose Jimenez
Chief Diversity Offiver
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jjimene4@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Jose Jiminez
Acting Assistant to Special Agen
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jose.j.jiminez1@dhs.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Alexander Joel
Civil Liberties Protection Offic
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alexander.w.joel@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Alexander Joel
Civil Liberties Officer
ODNI
ODNI
Washington DC , DC 20511
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alexawj@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Annie John
TITLE TBD
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Johns
Business Development Senior Mana
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jjohns@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Johns
VP, BD
Six3 Systems
1430 Spring Hill Road
Suite 525
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 852-1218
Email: john.johns@six3systems.com
_____________________________________________________
Barbara A Johnson
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Bart Johnson
Principal Deputy Under Secretary
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bart.johnson@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Bobby Johnson
Smartline Project Manager
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brjohnson@nmic.navy.mil
_____________________________________________________
Clete Johnson
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: c_johnson@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Craig Johnson
P.O. Box 748
MZ 1246
Fort Worth , TX 76101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: craig.r.johnson@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
David T Johnson
International Narcotics & Law En
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ambdavidjohnson@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dean Johnson
President
Entegra Systems
2342 Ballard Way
Ellicott City , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 418-4785
Email: dean.johnson@entegrasystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Ivy Johnson
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ivy_johnson@hsgac.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. J. M Johnson
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
V4, Suite 6566
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmjohns@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Johnson
CTO
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeffery.johnson@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathleen D Johnson
555 Herndon Parkway
Parkway One Office Buildi , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kathleen.Johnson@cdsinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Karl Jensen
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company
1200 S. Jupiter Road
MS AA-75000
Garland , TX 75042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Karl_Jensen@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Karl Jensen
VP, BD-Intelligence Solutions
L-3 Communications, Inc.
11955 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Rick Jensen
Director Business Finance
Serco
1050 North Newport Rd
Colorado Springs , CO 80916
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Kristin Jepson
Director of Security
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kristin.Jepson@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Donald Jewell
9368 Duff Court
Ellicott City , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donjewell15@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Rod Smith Jim Balentine
President
Abraxas/Cubic Mission Support Services
Rod Smith
12801 Worldgate Drive
Suite 800
Herndon , DC 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 563-9541
Email: rod.smith@abraxascorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Jimenez
7122 Rock Ridge Lane
Apartment I
Alexandria , VA 22315
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swnmia@juno.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jose Jimenez
Chief Diversity Offiver
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jjimene4@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Jose Jiminez
Acting Assistant to Special Agen
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jose.j.jiminez1@dhs.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Alexander Joel
Civil Liberties Protection Offic
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alexander.w.joel@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Alexander Joel
Civil Liberties Officer
ODNI
ODNI
Washington DC , DC 20511
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alexawj@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Annie John
TITLE TBD
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Johns
Business Development Senior Mana
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jjohns@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Johns
VP, BD
Six3 Systems
1430 Spring Hill Road
Suite 525
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 852-1218
Email: john.johns@six3systems.com
_____________________________________________________
Barbara A Johnson
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Bart Johnson
Principal Deputy Under Secretary
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bart.johnson@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Bobby Johnson
Smartline Project Manager
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brjohnson@nmic.navy.mil
_____________________________________________________
Clete Johnson
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: c_johnson@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Craig Johnson
P.O. Box 748
MZ 1246
Fort Worth , TX 76101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: craig.r.johnson@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
David T Johnson
International Narcotics & Law En
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ambdavidjohnson@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dean Johnson
President
Entegra Systems
2342 Ballard Way
Ellicott City , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 418-4785
Email: dean.johnson@entegrasystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Ivy Johnson
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ivy_johnson@hsgac.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. J. M Johnson
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
V4, Suite 6566
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmjohns@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Johnson
CTO
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeffery.johnson@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathleen D Johnson
555 Herndon Parkway
Parkway One Office Buildi , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kathleen.Johnson@cdsinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Keith Johnson
411 Tudor Ct
Leesburg , VA 20176
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: keith.e.johnson@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Ken Johnson
Minority Deputy Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: K_Johnson@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Laura M Johnson
510 Alalea Drive
Rockville , MD 20850-2001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: laura.m.johnson@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Laura M Johnson Ph.D.
Dep Chief Deliberate Plans
DHS
3801 Nebraska Ave. NW
Bldg 81, Rm 103
Washington , DC 20528
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: laura.manning.johnson@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Laura M Johnson PhD
Acting Branch Chief, Deliberate
DHS
3801 Nebraska Ave
NAC bldg 81, rm 103
Washington , DC 20528
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lauramanning@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Mary Alice Johnson
1110 Herndon Parkway
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: maryalice@connellyworks.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael M Johnson
Senior Scientist
Sandia National Laboratories
7011 East Avenue
MS 9152
Livermore , CA 94550
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mmjohns@sandia.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Johnson
Federal Market Account Director
SRC, Inc
7502 Round Pond Road
North Syracuse , NY 13212
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: johnson@srcinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Terry Johnson
Acquisition Mgmt Supervisor
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ty Johnson
Ty Johnson
1550 Crystal Drive
Suite 502B
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ty.johnson@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bayne Johnston
310 W. 80th St.
APT 2E
New York , NY 10024
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: baynejohnston@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mikeal Johnston
Dir JFO-PMO
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mikeal.johnston@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
John Jolly
VP and General Manager
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Pierre Joly
8432 Ambrose Court
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pjoly@intellpros.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Adam Jones
Staff
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adam.jones@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ashley Jones
Communications Specialist
Wyle Information Systems
1600 Intenational Dr
Suite 800
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Charles Jones
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Jones_Chuck@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dalton Jones
Senior Biometrics Executive
ODNI
4251 Suitland Road
Washington , D.C. 20593-5765
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dalton.jones@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dan Jones
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: d_jones@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dennis Jones
VP, Services & DoD Sales
GeoEye
21700 Atlantic Boulevard
Dulles , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jones.dennis@geoeye.com
_____________________________________________________
Jaime Jones
Director, Corporate Operations
Delta Risk LLC
2213 N Street NW
#302
Washington DC , DC 20037
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jjones@delta-risk.net
_____________________________________________________
James L Jones
National Security Advisor
NSC
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james_l._jones@nsc.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jesse Jones
CEO
Special Operations Technology, Inc.
12011 Guilford Road
Suite 109
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jjones@sotech.us
_____________________________________________________
Jesse S Jones
TITLE TBD
Special Operations Technology, Inc.
12011 Guilford Road
Suite 109
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jjones@sotech.us
_____________________________________________________
Kerri-Ann Jones
Ocean, Environment, & Science
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jonesk@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kimberly Q Jones
Policy Officer
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kimberly.quirk@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kyle Jones
4002 West Crowly Court
Visalia , CA 93291
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kjones100m@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert D Jones
Ch, Infra Dev & Opns, Suite 6575
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rdjones@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. S. Jones
815 Ritchie Hwy.
#214
Severna Park , MD 21146
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
William P Jones
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Joost
Vice President, Tactical Systems
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Thomas.joost@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Cazzy J Jordan JD, PMP
Sr. Developer Instructional
General Dynamics IT
5875 BARCLAY DRIVE
SUITE 5
ALEXANDRIA , VA 22315
Phone: (703) 992-4578
Fax: (none)
Email: cazzy.jordan@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Everette E Jordan
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
NVTC, Suite 6486
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eejorda@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Shunil Joseph
2451 Atrium Way
3rd Floor
Nashville , TN 37214
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sjoseph@thinkingahead.com
_____________________________________________________
paul m joyal BA, MA
managing director
National Strategies
1400 I Street NW suite 900
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: (301) 439-5066
Fax: (none)
Email: pjoyal@nationalstrategies.com
_____________________________________________________
Patrick Joyce
TITLE TBD
Deloitte Consulting, LLP
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Joyce
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Sean Joyce
International Operations Divisio
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sean.joyce@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steven Judd
Account Sales Rep/INTEL
Oracle Corporation
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steven.judd@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Rich Julien
1700 N. Moore St.
Suite 1705
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rjulien@eastportanalytics.com
_____________________________________________________
Paul Juola
Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.juola@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Keith G Kauffman
Asst Admin for Intelligence & An
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: keith.g.kauffman@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Michael Kauffman
Vice President of Contracts
Proteus Technologies
133 National Business Parkway
Suite 150
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Richard Kauzlarich
7019 Ted Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (703) 536-3486
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Wendy Kay
7507 Brad St
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wendy.kay1@navy.mil
_____________________________________________________
Wendy Kay
Senior Director for Intelligence
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wendy.kay@navy.mil
_____________________________________________________
Juliette Kayyem
Assistant Secretary of Intergove
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: juliette.kayyem@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Suzanne Kecmer
Manager, Strategy
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: suzanne_kecmer@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Steve Kee
VP
Hughes
11717 Exploration Lane
Germantown , MD 20876
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steven.kee@hughes.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Keebaugh
President, IIS
Raytheon Company
1200 S. Jupiter Road
MS AA-75000
Garland , TX 75042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mike_keebaugh@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Keefe
Assistant Deputy Director of Nat
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.p.keefe@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
James Keenan
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Terry Kees
2945 Gray Street
Oakton , VA 22124
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: terrykees@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ioanna T Kefalas
Executive Assistant to Secretary
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Ioanna.T.Kefalas@hud.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr Marshall Keith
Vice President
The SI Organization, Inc.
Chris Nolan
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: marshall.keith@theSIorg.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Hans Keithly
10008 Park Royal Drive
Great Falls , VA 22066
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hjkeithley@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
BG(R) Brian Keller
14688 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 22039
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian.keller@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Patrick W Kelley
Office of Integrity and Complian
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patrick.kelley@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jason Kello
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Declan Kelly
Econ Envoy to Northern Ireland
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kellyd@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ian C Kelly
Dept Spokesman
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kellyic@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kevin Kelly
Vice President, Corporate Strate
LGS Innovations
Accounts Payable
5440 Millstream Road
Suite E210
McLeansville , NC 27301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: klkelly@lgsinnovations.com
_____________________________________________________
Kevin L Kelly
VP Corporate Strategy
LGS Innovations
Kevin Kelly
13665 Dulles Technology Drive
Suite 301
Herndon , VA 20169
Phone: (703) 753-5115
Fax: (703) 394-1420
Email: klkelly@lgsinnovations.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Laurie Kelly
TITLE TBD
DIA
DIOCC/DJA
Defense Intelligence Agency
200 MacDill Blvd Bldg 6000
Washington , DC 20340
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: laurie.kelly@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Rodney P Kelly
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
DC4, Suite 6249
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rpkelly@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Stephen Kelly
Office of Congressional Affairs
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephen.kelly@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ronald Kemper
5213 SW 10th Avenue
Cape Coral , FL 33914-7019
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ronkemper@att.net
_____________________________________________________
Karyn Kendall
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: karyn.kendall@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Colonel Laura Kennedy USAF
TITLE TBD
NRO
3500 Pecan Place
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: laura.kennedy@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Patrick F Kennedy
Under Secretary Management
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: KennedyPF@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Tracy S Kennedy
Technical Director
General Dynamics AIS
8800 Queen Ave South
Bloomington , MN 55431
Phone: (none)
Fax: (952) 921-6552
_____________________________________________________
Paul Kennett
Vice President, ISS
KGS
2750 Prosperity Ave
Ste 300
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pkennett@kforcegov.com
_____________________________________________________
Andrew Kerr
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: a_kerr@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Charles Kerschner
7904 Curtis Street
Chevy Chase , MD 20815
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Kerstanski
2231 Crystal Drive
Suite 1114
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pkerstanski@greenlinesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
David Kervin
Chief Strategy Officer
KeyPoint Government Solutions, Inc.
1750 Foxtrail Drive
Loveland , CO 80538
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.kervin@keypoint.us.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Frank Kesterman
4 Winterberry Court
Bethesdsa , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kestermans@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jamie Kettren
2000 S Eads St
Apt 615
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jket85@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ryan Kezar
3753 Gekeler Lane
V202
Boise , ID 83706
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rpkezar@cableone.net
_____________________________________________________
David Khol
3904 Sulgrave Dr
Alexandria , VA 22309
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.khol@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Charles Kieffer
Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: charles_kieffer@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Stephanie L Kiel M.A.
Cyber Analyst
USD(I)
1425 S. Eads
APT. 505
ARLINGTON , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephkiel@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
David Kier
CEO
Arete Associates
1550 Crystal Drive
Suite 703
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dkier@arete.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr David A Kier BS, MS
CEO
Arete Associates
1550 Crystal Dr
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Dkier@arete.com
_____________________________________________________
Kathleen Kiernan
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kiernan@kiernangroupholdings.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gregory T Kiley
313 4th Street NE
Washington , DC 20002
Phone: (202) 544-6897
Fax: (none)
Email: gregory.kiley@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Lance Killoran
11573 Hemingway Drive
Reston , VA 20194
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Frida Kim
TITLE TBD
FTS International
200 Spring Street, Suite 360
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Frida.Kim@fts-intl.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Hyeon C Kim MS
Senior Scientist
CACI
Hyeon Kim
8530 Corridor Road
Savage , MD 20763
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hyeon.kim560@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ryan Kim
3900 Watson Place
#B-636
Washington , DC 20016
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: RK2085a@american.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Kimberling
P.O. Box 1055
Leesburg , VA 20177
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
LTG John Kimmons
Director, Intelligence Staff
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: shari.a.mcmahan@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
LTG John Kimmons USA
Director of the Intelligence Sta
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linnea.b.thompson@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Bonnie Kind
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Comptroller, Suite 6200
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bkind@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Larry Kindsvater
6901 McLean Province Circle
Falls Church , VA 22043-1666
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kindsvater.Consulting@Verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Bob King BSE, MBA
1721 Candlewood Drive
Leavenworth , KS 66048
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: subbob@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dennis M King BA
Manager, Business Development
ABSI Corporation
9210 Corporate Drive
Suite 150
Rockville , MD 20850
Phone: (410) 224-6508
Fax: (301) 997-0260
Email: kingdm4@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jay G King
7360 Guilford Drive, Suite 201
Frederick , MD 21704
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gking@integrity.us.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeremy King
Managing Partner, Federal Practi
Benchmark Executive Search
1984 Isaac Newton Square, suite
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeremy@benchmarkes.com
_____________________________________________________
Peter T King Rep.
Ranking Member
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michele.ingwerson@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Steven King
245 Murray Ln, SW
Mail Code 0602
Arlington , VA 20598
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Donna Kinnal
Marketing Director
ASI Government
1655 North Fort Meyer Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Laurie Kinney
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lkinney@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Thomas Kirchamier
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Thomas.Kirchamier@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Kirchmaier
13857 McLearen Road
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 268-7568
Email: thomas.kirchmaier@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Mike Kirkland
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
John A Kirschner
TITLE TBD
ABSi Corporation
9210 Corporate Drive
Suite 150
Rockville , MD 20850
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.kirschner@absicorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Sam Kirton
TITLE TBD
USIS
7799 Leesburg Pike
Suite 400 S
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sam.kirton@usis.com
_____________________________________________________
Sam Kirton
TITLE TBD
USIS
7799 Leesburg Pike
Suite 400 S
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sam.kirton@usis.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. K Kitchen
PO Box 4703
Oak Brook , IL 60521
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cyberskip@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Kitchen
Senior Vice President
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rkitchen@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Klein
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kevin.klein@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Laine Klein
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12950 Worldgate Drive
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Eric Kleppinger
TITLE TBD
FBI
8104 Overlake Court
Fairfax Station , VA 22039
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eric.kleppinger@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Klingler
1501 K Street, NW
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rklingler@sidley.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Elaine Knauf
TITLE TBD
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: elaine.knauf@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Jean Knighten
2111 Wilson Blvd.
Ste 1000
Arlington , VA 22032
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Knightenj@battelle.org
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Katie Knipper
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: KKnipper@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Clark Knop
Principal
FedCap Partners, LLC
11951 Freedom Drive
13th Floor
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Rick Knop
Managing Member
FedCap Partners, LLC
Judy St. George
11951 Freedom Drive
13th Floor
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 251-4440
Email: RKnop@FedCapPartners.com
_____________________________________________________
Karen Knowles
TITLE TBD
SAS Institute
1530 Wilson Blvd
Suite 800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: karen.knowles@sas.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian Knutsen
7700 Boston Boulevard
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian.knutsen@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ryan Kociolek
Director, Business Development
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rkociolek@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Rebekah Koffler
1933 Hull Road
Vienna , VA 22182-3716
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rebekahkoffler@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
David Koger
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: d_koger@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Kohlhaas
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.j.kohlhaas@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Chris Kojm
Deputy Director of National Inte
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 482-1739
Email: deborahn@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kim Kok
National Security Programs
Marklogic
Michael Reynolds
1600 Tysons Blvd
Suite 800
Mclean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kim.kok@marklogic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ron Kolb
1421 Jefferson Davis Highway
Suite 600
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Ron.Kolb@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Kolbe
9910 Chase Hill Ct
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.kolbe@bp.com
_____________________________________________________
Josh Kolchins
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joshua.kolchins@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Josh Kolchins
10560 Arrowhead Drive
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joshua.kolchins@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Curt Kolcun
Vice President, Federal
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: curtk@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Elizabeth Kolmstetter
Deputy to Ronald Sanders, Intell
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: elizabeth.b.kolmstetter@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Cindy Komanowski
TITLE TBD
AT&T Government Solutions-NIS
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ckomanowski@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jennifer Kondal
7789 Royal Sydney Dr.
Gainesville , VA 20155
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jkondal@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Matthijs R. Koot
Science Park 904
Amsterdam 1098 XH
Netherlands
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: koot@uva.nl
_____________________________________________________
Michael P Kortan
Office of Public Affairs
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.kortan@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kristine Korva
1211 C ST NE
Washington , DC 20002
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kkorva@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
Kristen Kosinski
TITLE TBD
Applied Signal Technology
460 West California Avenue
Sunnyvale , CA 94086
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kristen_kosinski@appsig.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Kostiw
Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Mike_Kostiw@armed-services.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Kozemchak
DARPA
3701 N. Fairfax Drive
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pkozemchak@darpa.mil
_____________________________________________________
Paul Kozemchak
Special Assistant to Director
DARPA
3701 N. Fairfax Drive
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pkozemchak@darpa.mil
_____________________________________________________
LT. GEN. Craig Koziol
TITLE TBD
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: craig.koziol@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ron Krakower
317 Meadowbrook Lane
South Orange , NJ 7079
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rkrakower@sarnoff.com
_____________________________________________________
Eric Krebs
Director of Strategy
Blue Glacier Management Group Inc
8315 Lee Highway
Suite 230
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eric.krebs@blueglacier.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kelly Krechmer
1855 Saint Francis Street
Apt 1604
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kelly_krechmer@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Kelly Krechmer
1350 Beverly Road, Apt. 818
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kkny10021@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Kelly Krechmer
TITLE TBD
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kellyk@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dean Kremer
TITLE TBD
Intelsat General Corporation
6550 Rock Spring Drive
Suite 450
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Alexander L Kronick BS, MS
Graduate Assistant
NJCU
68 Blackford Road
Newton , NJ 07860
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alk555@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Allen Krum
NRO & Special Projects Senior Ex
Harris Corporation
P.O. Box 37
MS: 2-21D
Melbourne , FL 32902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: akrum@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Krysick
Senior Acquisition Executive
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rhkrysi@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Nancy Kudla
Chairman & CEO
Kforce Government Solutions
2750 Prosperity Ave.
Suite 300
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nkudla@dnovus.com
_____________________________________________________
Alex Kugajevsky
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alex.kugajevsky@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mitch Kugler
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Christina Kuhn
2721 Technology Drive
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christina.kuhn@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Karen Kuhn
Program Support
Camber Corporation
5860 Trinity Parkway
Suite 400
Centerville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kkuhn@i2spros.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Kuhn
TITLE TBD
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michael.Kuhn@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Tina Kuhn
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Christina.Kuhn@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Martin Kurdys
10330 Old Columbia Rd
Suite 102
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mkurdys@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Alexandra Kuscher
TITLE TBD
NetApp
1921 Gallows Road
Suite 600
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kuscher@netapp.com
_____________________________________________________
Cory Kutcher
2300 24th Road South
#1130
Arlington , VA 22206
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cory.kutcher@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Carolyn Kwieraga
Dir, NGIS
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr Howard W Kympton III
909 N. Washington Street
Suite 300B
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 299-0799
Email: hkympton@chglobalsecurity.com
_____________________________________________________
Matthew I Bentley B.A.
1124 Beechwood Ave
Farrell , PA 16121
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mianbentley@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jessica E Berardinucci
4200 Cathedral Avenue, NW
Washington , DC 20016
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: j.berardinucci@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Bergen
TITLE TBD
Deloitte Consulting, LLP
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Russ Berkoff
Services Manager
Dell Inc.
One Dell Way
One Dell Way
Round Rock , TX 78682
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: russ_berkoff@federal.dell.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Donald Berlin
President
Investigative Consultants
2020 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Ste 813
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dberlin@icioffshore.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jon-Paul D Bernard BA
Jobs/Internship Coordinator
Georgetown University
37th and O Streets, N.W.
Washington DC , DC 20057
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: isrpoet00@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Bernard
3104 Evergreen Ridge Drive
Cincinnati , OH 45215-5716
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bernard@erols.com
_____________________________________________________
Kent Berner
Group President, Intel Solutions
A-T Solutions, Inc.
1934 Old Gallows Road
Suite 360
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 288-3401
Email: kentberner@a-tsolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. I. Bernstein
2133 Lee Building
College Park , MD 20742-5125
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mbern@umd.edu
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kristin H Berry
6917 Bonheim Court
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kberry@r3consulting.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Berry
Jr., Principal Deputy General Co
DIA
Building 6000
Washington , DC 20340-5100
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Robert.Berry@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Alan Bersin
Commissioner
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alan.bersin@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Bessette
1226 W. Argyle St.
#3E
Chicago , IL 60640
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.bessette@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
John Betar
7 Woodland Drive
Newville , PA 17241
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jebbetar@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
RADM Thomas Betterton USN (Ret)
7977 Wellington Drive
Warrenton , VA 20186
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tom.bett03@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Rear Admiral Thomas Betterton US
Former Director Program C (senio
DoD
7977 Wellington Drive
Warrington , VA 20186
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.betterton@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tom Bevan
TITLE TBD
Kforce Government Solutions
2750 Prosperity Ave.
Suite 300
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tbevan@dnovus.com
_____________________________________________________
Brig Gen Richard Beyea USAF(Ret)
7832 Lee Avenue
Alexandria , VA 22308
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dickbeyea@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Bhavesh C Bhagat
Founding Chairman
Cloud Security Alliance DC / EnCrisp
12020 Sunrise Valley Drive
Suite 100
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bb@encrisp.com
_____________________________________________________
Sameer Bhalotra
Professional Staff Member
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: s_bhalotra@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian Biesecker
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gary R Biggs
Director, Office of Protocol
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, D-105
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gary.r.biggs@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Bigham
Director
Raytheon Company
1200 S. Jupiter Road
MS AA-75000
Garland , TX 75042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark_a_bigham@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert W Bilbo B.A.
Office of Intel Plans & Policy
U.S. Coast Guard
LT Robert W. Bilbo, USCG
USCG Headquarters (Room 3402)
2100 2nd Street S.W., STOP 7360
Washington , DC 20593
Phone: (540) 720-7969
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.w.bilbo@uscg.mil
_____________________________________________________
Kari Bingen
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kari.bingen@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Alexander Major
Attorney
Sheppard Mullin RIchter & Hampton LLP
1300 I Street NW
11th Floor East
Washignton , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: amajor@sheppardmullin.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Makfinsky MBA
President
AM/PM
217 Bonifant Rd.
Silver Spring , MD 20905
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael@makfinsky.com
_____________________________________________________
Peter Makowsky
Strategy Consultant, Senior Expe
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: 703-460-1232
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ellen Maldonado
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ellen_maldonado@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kris Mallard
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kris.Mallard@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Brittain Mallow
Principal
Mitre
806 Lee Street
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bmallow@mitre.org
_____________________________________________________
Kristopher M Malloy
52 Brandon Road
Newport News , VA 23601
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kristopher.malloy@langley.af.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian Malone
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian.malone@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Jack Malone
Consultant
Network Designs, Inc.
501 Church St.
Suite 210
Vienna , VA 22180-4711
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Michele L Malvesti
TITLE TBD
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michele.l.malvesti@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Ed Mangiero
Sales Director
Intelsat General Corporation
6550 Rock Spring Drive
Suite 450
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: edward.mangiero@intelsatgeneral.com
_____________________________________________________
EDWARD MANGIERO MANGIERO
6550 ROCK SPRING DR
SUITE 450
BETHESDA , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ED.MANGIERO@INTELSATGENERAL.COM
_____________________________________________________
Richard Mangogna
Chief Information Officer
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.mangogna@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Cliff Mangum
VP Business Capture
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Katy Mann
TITLE TBD
Composite Software Inc.
11921 Freedom Drive
Suite 550
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Laura Manning Johnson
Deputy Director of Fusion, Ops C
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lauramanning@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Claudio Manno
Director of Intelligence
FAA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: claudio.manno@faa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Tiffini Manson
15513 Tuxedo Lane
Gainesville , VA 20155
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tiffini.manson@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jim Manzelmann
Deputy Director of Mission Servi
DIA
Building 6000
Washington , DC 20340-5100
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: James.Manzelmann@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mike Manzo
Director
General Dynamics AIS
12950 Worldgate Drive
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
RADM, USN Ret Dan March
3608 Launcelot Way
Annandale , VA 22003
Phone: (703) 207-0482
Fax: (703) 207-9351
Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
RADM USN Ret Dan March
Independent Consultant
EXCOM INSA, INSA/NCWG Natl Sec Studioes Council
3608 Launcelot Way
Annandale , VA 22003
Phone: (703) 207-9351
Fax: (703) 207-0482
Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
RADM USN Ret Dan March
3608 Launcelot Way
Annandale , VA 22003
Phone: (703) 207-0482
Fax: (703) 207-9351
Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
RADM Daniel March USN (Ret)
3608 Launcelot Way
Annandale , VA 22003-1360
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
Daniel P March
3608 Launcelot Way
Annandale , VA 22003-1360
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Philip Marcum
General Manager, Global Analysis
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: philip.marcum@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Lisa Marcus
12817 Glen Mill
Potomac , MD 20854
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lmarcus@msn.com
_____________________________________________________
Catherine Marinis-Yaqub
Manager
PricewaterhouseCoopers
1800 Tysons Blvd
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: catherine.v.marinis-yaqub@us.pwc.com
_____________________________________________________
Shant Markarian
8010 Towers Crescent Dr.
5th Floor
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: shantmarkarian@targusinfo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ronald Marks
7004 Dunningham Place
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rmarksster@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Andrew Marshall
107 S. West Street
#759
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andrew.marshall@osd.pentagon.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Andrew Marshall
Director, Office of Net Assessme
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andrew.marshall@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Keith Marshall
15052 Conference Center Dr
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ann.sullivan@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard H Marshall
Director of Global Cyber Securit
DHS
1110 Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 21044
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.marshall1@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William J Marshall
Chief of Staff, IA Directorate
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Info Assurance CofS, Suite 6468
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 854-7511
Email: wjmarsh@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. B. Martin
9530 Morning Walk Drive
Hagerstown , MD 21740
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: inrebuttal2u@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Brian Martin
966 Wayne Drive
Winchester , VA 22601-6395
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian.martin@atf.gov
_____________________________________________________
Brian T Martin
966 Wayne Dr
Winchester , VA 22601
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Inrebuttal2u@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bryan Martin
Chief Technology Officer
Man Tech
ManTech Mission, Cyber & Technol
2250 Corporate Drive Suite 500
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bryan.martin@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Charles Martin
Director
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Charles.Martin.ctr@darpa.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Martin
Director of Intelligence, Survei
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.martin@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Paul Martin
TITLE TBD
Sierra Nevada Corporation
444 Salomon Circle
Sparks , NV 89434
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.martin@sncorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen Martin
10010 Junction Drive
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: srmartin@nciinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephen R Martin MS, EMBA
SVP, Deputy GM
NCI Information Systems, Inc.
Stephen Martin
10010 Junction Drive
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (410) 952-1778
Fax: (301) 483-6928
Email: srmartin07@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Wendy Martin
Business Development Director, C
Harris Corporation
P.O. Box 37
MS: 2-21D
Melbourne , FL 32902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wmarti01@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Wendy Martin
TITLE TBD
Accenture
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wendy.a.martin@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Wendy Martin
Program Manager
Harris Corporation Crucial Security Programs
Ann Boyter
14900 Conference Center Dr
Suite 225
Chanitlly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wmarti01@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Chris Martins
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
2721 Technology Drive
Suite 400
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Charlotte K Martinsson
PIAB Member
PIAB
9902 Deerfield Pond Drive
Great Falls , VA 22066
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Charlotte_K._Martinsson@pfiab.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Donald Maruca
TITLE TBD
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donald.maruca@ca.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Leonard
75 Coromar Drive
Goleta , CA 93117
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rlleonard@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Joe Leonelli
Vice President, Strategic Initia
Applied Signal Technology
470 Spring Park Place, Ste. 700
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joe_leonelli@appsig.com
_____________________________________________________
Michele Leonhart
Administrator
Justice Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Vickki.f.mcalpine@usdoj.gov
_____________________________________________________
David Lerner
Strat Forces
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david_lerner@armed-services.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jeff Lessner
Business Development, National S
General Dynamics AIS
10560 Arrowhead Drive
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeffrey.lessner@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Gordon Letterman
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gordon_letterman@hsgac.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Glenn Leuschner
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
D, Suite 6242
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian Levay
504 Dill Pointe Drive
Severna Park , MD 21146
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian.levay@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Emma Levert MM/HRM
3137 Kevington Ave
Eugene , OR 97405
Phone: (541) 685-1340
Fax: (none)
Email: EmmLvrt@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Stuart A Levey
Under Secretary of the Treasury
Treasury Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stuart.levey@do.treas.gov
_____________________________________________________
Carl Levin Sen.
Chairman
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sharon Levin
Consultant
Booz Allen Hamilton
1506 Wakefield Rd
Edgewater , MD 21037
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: levin_sharon@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Ken Levinrad
Director Special Programs
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
Lockheed Martin Corp Wash OPS
2121 Crystal Drive
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ken.d.levinrad@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Curtis Levinson
TITLE TBD
Qwest Communications
4250 N. Fairfax Dr.
5th Floor
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms Rosanne M LeVitre Masters
ODNI ADNI/PE-MP
Wsshington , DC 20511
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rlevitre@sprynet.com
_____________________________________________________
Rosanne M LeVitre
Director
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Tysons Corner Plaza
Washington , DC 20511
Phone: (703) 760-5076
Fax: (none)
Email: rosannml@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Rose Levitre
TITLE TBD
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rlevitre@sprynet.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Barry Levy
TITLE TBD
USIS
7799 Leesburg Pike
Suite 400 S
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: barry.levy@usis.com
_____________________________________________________
David Levy M.S., Ph.D
Director of Technology
General Dynamics AIS
2721 Technology Drive
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jacob J Lew
Deputy Secretary for Management
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: LewJJ@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ed Lewandoski
Vice President
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Ed.lewandoski@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Allen Lewis
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
14700 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Roslyn Mazer
Inspector General
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rosyln.a.mazer@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Mazzafro
10313 Congressional Court
Ellicott City , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mazzafro_joe@emc.com
_____________________________________________________
Carrie Mazzaro
TITLE TBD
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Carrie.Mazzaro@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Lewis
TITLE TBD
Quest Software - Public Sector Group
700 King Farm Boulevard
Suite 250
Rockville , MD 20850
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: geoff.brown@quest.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Lewis
9861 Brokenland Parkway
Suite 300
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mlewis@LingualISTek.com
_____________________________________________________
Mark Lewis
President
L&M Management Services
Mark Lewis
212 Blackhaw Ct
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: melewis56@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert E Lewis
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
IT IS, Suite 6222
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: relewis@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ron Lewis
SVP Chief Technology Officer
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: 703-939-6670
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ryan Lewis
6907 Wake Forest Drive
College Park , MD 20740
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rstephen.lewis@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Sam Lewis
Dir of Operations Def and Intel
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Tom Lexington
78 Shuttle Meadow Avenue
New Britain , CT 06051
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tlex@gwu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Richard LHeureux
12975 Worldgate Drive
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.lheureux@itt.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Alan Lieberman
18425 Long Lake Drive
Boca Raton , FL 33496
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: anl335@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Joseph I Lieberman Sen.
Chair
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joseph_lieberman@hsgac.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John E Liebsch
Director, Office of Future Warfa
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, P-037
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.e.liebsch@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Michael Liggett Mr.
Director, Adv. Tech. Programs
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
MR JAMES G LIGHTBURN
CEO
InfoAssure, Inc.
1997 Annapolis Exchange Parkway
suite 210
Annapolis , MD 21401
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 224-4022
Email: j.lightburn@infoassure.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Samuel Liles MSCS
Associate Professor
Purdue University Calumet
2200 169th Street
Hammond , IN 46323
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sam@selil.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Liles
2513 Foxcroft Way
Reston , VA 20191-3707
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: aerie10@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Patrick Linardi
Criminal Research Specialist
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement/HSI/TTU
500 12th Street SW
MS 5107
Washington , DC 20536
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Patrick.Linardi@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bryon Line
10401 Grosvenor Place
#123
Rockville , MD 20852-4628
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bline1@starpower.net
_____________________________________________________
James R Lint MBA
Director, G2, Intell and Sec
US Army Communication and Electronic Command
4803 Atlas Cedar Way
Aberdeen , MD 21001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.lint@us.army.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Linthicum
1903 Sawyer Place
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linthicum@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Evonne Lipscomb
7500 GEOINT Dr
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Evonne.Lipscomb@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Glenn Lipscomb
TITLE TBD
Level 3 Communications, LLC
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: glenn.lipscomb@level3.com
_____________________________________________________
Mason McDaniel
Program Dir Intelligence Ctr
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Michael McDaniel
Deputy Assistant Secretary for H
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.mcdaniel@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Tom L McDivitt
Intelligence Analyst
Booz Allen Hamilton
Tom McDivitt (544757)
8283 Greensboro Drive
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mcdivitt_thomas@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Paul Littmann
TITLE TBD
Deloitte Consulting, LLP
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: plittmann@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Alexis Livanos
Chief Technology Officer
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alexis.livanos@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Vince Lively
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jack Livingston
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: j_livingston@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
John Llaneza
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Luis Llorens
TITLE TBD
SR Technologies, Inc.
4101 SW 47 Ave
Suite 102
Fort Lauderdale , FL 33314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
RADM Daniel Lloyd
Senior Military Advisor
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: daniel.lloyd@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Andrew Lluberes
Director of Communications for I
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Andrew.Lluberes@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Andrew L Lluberes
8613 Eagle Glen Terrace
Fairfax Station , VA 22039
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andrew.lluberes@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Rick Lober
General Manager
Hughes
11717 Exploration Lane
Germantown , MD 20876
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rick.lober@hughes.com
_____________________________________________________
Cynthia Loboski
TITLE TBD
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: clobosky@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Cynthia Lobosky BA, MPA
Prefer not to give out
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cynthia.m.lobosky@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Gary F. Locke
Secretary
Commerce Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thesec@doc.gov (address to Secretary Locke)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Locke
97 Ruddy Duck Road
Heathsville , VA 22473
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jwljrcpa@netscape.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Donald Logar
Vice President, Division Group M
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dlogar@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jaan Loger
10090 McCarty Crest Court
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jloger@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William C Lohnes MEA
2333 Bollinger Mill Road
Finksburg , MD 21048-2727
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 552-6482
Email: wclohnes@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gary Lombardo
11990 Market Street
#415
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. J. P. London
Executive Chairman, CACI Board o
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jlondon@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
mr gregory s mcinnis
aircraft parts sales
none
4635 mclemoresville rd
huntingdon , TN 38344
Phone: (731) 986-5800
Fax: (none)
Email: woodrot1@att.net
_____________________________________________________
James W McJunkin
National Security Branch, Direct
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.mcjunkin@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ashley McKannon
16659 Malory Ct
Dumfries , VA 22025
Phone: (703) 730-2379
Fax: (none)
Email: aem2189@columbia.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas McKannon
Manager, Space & Airborne System
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mckannon@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Thomas McKannon BS/MS/AeE
Strategy & Business Capture
Raytheon
1100 Wilson Blvd
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (703) 730-2379
Fax: (none)
Email: t.mckannon@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dean McKendrick
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Lonsdale
1750 Tyson\\\'s Blvd., 4th Floor
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mvlonsdale@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Esteban A Lopez
PO Box 605
Lisbon , MD 21765
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephen.lopez@urs.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Marco A Lopez Jr.
Chief of Staff, US Customs
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: marco.lopez@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Steve Lopez
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Donald Loren
Rear Admiral, USN (ret)
The Tauri Group
6504 John Thomas Drive
Alexandria , VA 22315
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: don.loren@taurigroup.com
_____________________________________________________
David Louis
Account Director
AT&T Government Solutions-NIS
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dlouis@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John J Lovegrove
Director, Business Development
TASC
4805 Stonecroft Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.lovegrove@tasc.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Mark Lowenthal
TITLE TBD
The Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC
1890 Preston White Drive
Suite 250
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mml@intellacademy.com
_____________________________________________________
Dennis Lowrey
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
1200 Joe Hall Drive
Ypsilanti , MI 48197
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ashley Lowry
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Ashley.Lowry@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Admiral James M Loy
Senior Counselor
The Cohen Group
500 8th Street, NW
Suite 200
Washington , DC 20004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Patrick Lucas
Assistant to the President
Berico Technologies
1501 Lee Highway
Suite 303
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Carlo L Lucchesi
Office of IT Policy and Planning
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carlo.lucchesi@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
David Luckey
5000 Defense Pentagon
Room 3C1063A
Washington , DC 20301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.luckey@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Lueders
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Lueders_John@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Chet Lunner
TITLE TBD
Department of Homeland Security
NAC
Rm 19148
Washington , DC 20528
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chet.lunner@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Adam Lurie
Program Director
USIS
7799 Leesburg Pike
Suite 400 S
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adam.lurie@usis.com
_____________________________________________________
Adam Lurie
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adam.lurie@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Nicholas Lusas
77 Corbin Ridge
Bristol , CT 6010
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Edward McNamee
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael McNamee
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
SP, Suite 6468
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mkmcnam@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tim McNeil
TITLE TBD
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Timothy.McNeil@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Frank B Meade
425 West 23 Street
11-B
New York , NY 10011
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gothamite2@juno.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. C. Meador
Chairman
mgiss
85 Speen Street
Suite 201
Framingham , MA 01701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: meador@mgiss.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Meadows
Affiliant
AT&T Government Solutions-NIS
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: demeadows@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Amy Lyons
Inspection Division
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: amy.lyons@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dwight Lyons
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dlyons@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jack Lyons
3420 Churchill Court
Owings , MD 20736-9146
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: SandyNeckSandDunes@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
John Lyons
VP of North American Sale
Tenable Network Security
7063 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Alexander Major
Attorney
Sheppard Mullin RIchter & Hampton LLP
1300 I Street NW
11th Floor East
Washignton , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: amajor@sheppardmullin.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Makfinsky MBA
President
AM/PM
217 Bonifant Rd.
Silver Spring , MD 20905
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael@makfinsky.com
_____________________________________________________
Peter Makowsky
Strategy Consultant, Senior Expe
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: 703-460-1232
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ellen Maldonado
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ellen_maldonado@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kris Mallard
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kris.Mallard@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Brittain Mallow
Principal
Mitre
806 Lee Street
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bmallow@mitre.org
_____________________________________________________
Kristopher M Malloy
52 Brandon Road
Newport News , VA 23601
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kristopher.malloy@langley.af.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian Malone
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian.malone@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Jack Malone
Consultant
Network Designs, Inc.
501 Church St.
Suite 210
Vienna , VA 22180-4711
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Michele L Malvesti
TITLE TBD
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michele.l.malvesti@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Ed Mangiero
Sales Director
Intelsat General Corporation
6550 Rock Spring Drive
Suite 450
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: edward.mangiero@intelsatgeneral.com
_____________________________________________________
EDWARD MANGIERO MANGIERO
6550 ROCK SPRING DR
SUITE 450
BETHESDA , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ED.MANGIERO@INTELSATGENERAL.COM
_____________________________________________________
Richard Mangogna
Chief Information Officer
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.mangogna@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Cliff Mangum
VP Business Capture
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Katy Mann
TITLE TBD
Composite Software Inc.
11921 Freedom Drive
Suite 550
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Laura Manning Johnson
Deputy Director of Fusion, Ops C
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lauramanning@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Claudio Manno
Director of Intelligence
FAA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: claudio.manno@faa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Tiffini Manson
15513 Tuxedo Lane
Gainesville , VA 20155
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tiffini.manson@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jim Manzelmann
Deputy Director of Mission Servi
DIA
Building 6000
Washington , DC 20340-5100
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: James.Manzelmann@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mike Manzo
Director
General Dynamics AIS
12950 Worldgate Drive
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
RADM, USN Ret Dan March
3608 Launcelot Way
Annandale , VA 22003
Phone: (703) 207-0482
Fax: (703) 207-9351
Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
RADM USN Ret Dan March
Independent Consultant
EXCOM INSA, INSA/NCWG Natl Sec Studioes Council
3608 Launcelot Way
Annandale , VA 22003
Phone: (703) 207-9351
Fax: (703) 207-0482
Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
RADM USN Ret Dan March
3608 Launcelot Way
Annandale , VA 22003
Phone: (703) 207-0482
Fax: (703) 207-9351
Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
RADM Daniel March USN (Ret)
3608 Launcelot Way
Annandale , VA 22003-1360
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
Daniel P March
3608 Launcelot Way
Annandale , VA 22003-1360
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Philip Marcum
General Manager, Global Analysis
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: philip.marcum@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Lisa Marcus
12817 Glen Mill
Potomac , MD 20854
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lmarcus@msn.com
_____________________________________________________
Catherine Marinis-Yaqub
Manager
PricewaterhouseCoopers
1800 Tysons Blvd
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: catherine.v.marinis-yaqub@us.pwc.com
_____________________________________________________
Shant Markarian
8010 Towers Crescent Dr.
5th Floor
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: shantmarkarian@targusinfo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ronald Marks
7004 Dunningham Place
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rmarksster@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Andrew Marshall
107 S. West Street
#759
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andrew.marshall@osd.pentagon.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Andrew Marshall
Director, Office of Net Assessme
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andrew.marshall@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Keith Marshall
15052 Conference Center Dr
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ann.sullivan@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard H Marshall
Director of Global Cyber Securit
DHS
1110 Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 21044
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.marshall1@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William J Marshall
Chief of Staff, IA Directorate
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Info Assurance CofS, Suite 6468
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 854-7511
Email: wjmarsh@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. B. Martin
9530 Morning Walk Drive
Hagerstown , MD 21740
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: inrebuttal2u@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Brian Martin
966 Wayne Drive
Winchester , VA 22601-6395
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian.martin@atf.gov
_____________________________________________________
Brian T Martin
966 Wayne Dr
Winchester , VA 22601
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Inrebuttal2u@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bryan Martin
Chief Technology Officer
Man Tech
ManTech Mission, Cyber & Technol
2250 Corporate Drive Suite 500
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bryan.martin@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Charles Martin
Director
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Charles.Martin.ctr@darpa.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Martin
Director of Intelligence, Survei
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.martin@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Paul Martin
TITLE TBD
Sierra Nevada Corporation
444 Salomon Circle
Sparks , NV 89434
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.martin@sncorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen Martin
10010 Junction Drive
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: srmartin@nciinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephen R Martin MS, EMBA
SVP, Deputy GM
NCI Information Systems, Inc.
Stephen Martin
10010 Junction Drive
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (410) 952-1778
Fax: (301) 483-6928
Email: srmartin07@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Wendy Martin
Business Development Director, C
Harris Corporation
P.O. Box 37
MS: 2-21D
Melbourne , FL 32902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wmarti01@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Wendy Martin
TITLE TBD
Accenture
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wendy.a.martin@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Wendy Martin
Program Manager
Harris Corporation Crucial Security Programs
Ann Boyter
14900 Conference Center Dr
Suite 225
Chanitlly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wmarti01@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Chris Martins
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
2721 Technology Drive
Suite 400
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Charlotte K Martinsson
PIAB Member
PIAB
9902 Deerfield Pond Drive
Great Falls , VA 22066
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Charlotte_K._Martinsson@pfiab.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Donald Maruca
TITLE TBD
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donald.maruca@ca.com
_____________________________________________________
Scott Marvin
Special Agent/Liaison Officer
Department of Homeland Security
POB 221403
Chantilly , VA 20153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scott.marvin@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Marvin
25711 DonerailsChase Drive
Chantilly , VA 20152
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: whmarvin@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Keith Masback
2325 Dulles Corner Blvd
Suite 450
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: keith.masback@usgif.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. L. Mason Ph.D.
3150 Fairview Park Drive, South
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: roger.mason@noblis.org
_____________________________________________________
L. R Mason
ADNI for Systems and Resource An
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: roger.mason@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Mason
CEO
United Placements
P.O. Box 810211
Boca Raton , FL 33481
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: info@unitedplacements.com
_____________________________________________________
Mark Massop
TITLE TBD
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Benjamin Matherne
Business Development Lead
Salient Federal Solutions
Ben Matherne
8618 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 100
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: benjamin.matherne@sgis.com
_____________________________________________________
Asha Mathew
Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Asha_Mathew@hsgac.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John I Mathews
Ch, Client Engage & Comm Outreac
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jimathe@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kent Matlick
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Gordon Matlock
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: g_matlock@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Daniel Matthews
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
I3, Suite 6703
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dpmatth@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Matthews
Director, Warfighter Requirement
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.matthews@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Project Leader, Michael Mattson
3805 9th Road South
Arlington , VA 22204
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mattson@ebrinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Mattson
Senior Consultant, National Inte
Invertix Corporation
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 800
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Paul Matulic
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: p_matulic@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Philip Maxon
11720 Plaza America Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pmaxon@input.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Peggy Maxson
Dir, Natl Cybersecurity Educatio
DHS
1110 N. glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22243
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pegstelau@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gerald Mayefskie
TITLE TBD
QSS Group Inc.
4500 Forbes Blvd.
Lanham , MD 20706
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gmayefsk@qssgroupinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Gerry Mayer
ISR Systems
L-3 Communications
1 Federal St
Camden , NJ 08103
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gerry.mayer@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jason Mayer
1501 Farm Credit Dr.
Ste 2300
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmayer1@theanalysiscorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Roslyn Mazer
Inspector General
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rosyln.a.mazer@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Mazzafro
10313 Congressional Court
Ellicott City , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mazzafro_joe@emc.com
_____________________________________________________
Carrie Mazzaro
TITLE TBD
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Carrie.Mazzaro@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Christopher Biow
Federal CTO
MarkLogic
11980 Sentinel Point Ct
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Chris.Biow@marklogic.com
_____________________________________________________
Terry Birck
TITLE TBD
Reed Illinois Corporation
600 W. Jackson Boulevard
Suite 500
Chicago , IL 60661-5625
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wbirck@reedcorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Terry Birck
TITLE TBD
Reed Illinois Corporation
600 W. Jackson Boulevard
Suite 500
Chicago , IL 60661-5625
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wbirck@reedcorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Terry L Birck
Chairman
Reed Illinois Corporation
Terry Birck
600 W. Jackson Blvd.
Chicago , IL 60661
Phone: (none)
Fax: (312) 943-8141
Email: tbirck@reedcorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael D Bisacre
Senior Vice President
Six3 Systems
1430 Spring Hill Road
Suite 525
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mbisacre@harding-security.com
_____________________________________________________
Mike Bisacre
SVP
Six3 Systems
1430 Spring Hill Road
Suite 525
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mbisacre@six3systems.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Frank Biscardi
500 La Costa Court
Melbourne , FL 32940
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: FrankBiscardi@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Cynthia Bishop
TITLE TBD
SAIC
9926 Wooden Hawk Court
Burke , VA 22015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cynthia.a.bishop@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. David Bishop
CTO
LGS Innovations
Accounts Payable
5440 Millstream Road
Suite E210
McLeansville , NC 27301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: djb@lgsinnovations.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Ebone Bishop
73 Eastern Parkway
apt. 4B
Brooklyn , NY 11238
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ebone.bishop@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert Bishop
4251 Suitland Road
Suitland , MD 20746
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rebishop1717@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Bill Bistany
Account Manager
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Bill Bistrican AA Busines
Account Executive
Vermillion Group- MRI Network
Bill Bistrican
1801 25th Street
West Des Moines , IA 50266
Phone: (515) 221-1208
Fax: (515) 224-7187
Email: wpb@vermilliongroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Paul Bize
INSA OCI Task Force
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Richard Bizzell
8201 Greensboro Dr
Ste 300
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rick@usintelgroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Lars Bjorn
219 N. Evergreen St.
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lars.bjorn@centauri-solutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Andrew Black
TITLE TBD
Black Watch Global
5235 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ablack@blackwatchglobal.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Fred Blackburn
TITLE TBD
Northrop Grumman Corporation
15036 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fred.blackburn@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Anthony M Bladen
Human Resources Division
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: anthony.bladen@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Allan Blades
Manager, Business Development, D
BAE Systems
124 Gaither Drive
Ste 100
Mt. Laurel , NJ 8054
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: allan.blades@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
The Honorable Dennis C Blair
Director of National Intelligenc
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dni-pao-outreach@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mike Blair
DHS S&T
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Thomas.Blair@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Thomas M Blair
P.O. Box 240
White Hall , MD 21161-0240
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tmblairbvi@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert O Blake
South & Central Asian Affairs
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: blakero@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Clarence Blakley
TITLE TBD
Law Enforcement Online
5840 Cameron Run Terrace #1628
Alexandria , VA 22303
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cblakley@leo.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Dennis McBride
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dmcbride@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Kimberly McCabe
President
ASI Government
1655 North Fort Meyer Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Mary R McCaffrey
Director, Office of Security
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mary.mccaffrey@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
John McCain Sen.
Ranking Minority Member
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john_mccain@armed-services.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mickey McCarter
Correspondent
Homeland Security Today
PO Box 5843
Washington , DC 20016
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mickey@hstoday.us
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steve McCaslin
Director, Business Development
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: smccaslin@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Kel McClanahan
1200 South Courthouse Road
Apartment #124
Arlington , VA 22204
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kellybmcc@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Tim McClees
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tim.mcclees@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Lauren McCollum
Director Legislative Affairs
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lauren.mccollum@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Lauren M McCollum
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bruce W McConnell
NPP Counselor to Phil Reitinger
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Bruce.McConnell@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kirk McConnell
Strat Forces/Intel
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kirk_mcconnell@armed-services.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Lester McConville
PO Box 312
260 Rose Airy Lane
Millwood , VA 22646
Phone: (none)
Fax: (540) 837-1628
Email: chip.mcconville@jb-a-inc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas J McCormick
Dir, Enterprise Ops Directorate
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, D-199
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.j.mccormick@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr Mark McCourt
President
Dalani Media
Mark McCourt
PO Box 457
Newtown Square , PA 19073
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mmccourt@dlnmedia.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Diann McCoy
TITLE TBD
ASI Government
1655 North Fort Meyer Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dmccoy@acqsolinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John McCreary
Director, National Intelligence
Kforce Government Solutions
2750 Prosperity Ave.
Suite 300
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lcm@tidalwave.net
_____________________________________________________
John McCreary
Chief Analysis Officer
KGS
2750 Prosperity Ave
Ste 300
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmccreary@kforcegov.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas McCreary
Director
IBM Corporation
12533 Ridgemoor Lake Court
St. Louis , MO 63131
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mccreary@us.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
John McCreight
40 Richards Avenue
Suite 7
Norwalk , CT 06854-2320
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmc@implementstrategy.com
_____________________________________________________
John McCreight
803 Silvermine Avenue
New Canaan , CT 6840
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmc@implementstrategy.com
_____________________________________________________
John McCreight
Chairman & Founder
McCreight & Company
803 Silvermin Road
New Canaan , CT 06840
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmc@implementstrategy.com
_____________________________________________________
Mason McDaniel
Program Dir Intelligence Ctr
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Michael McDaniel
Deputy Assistant Secretary for H
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.mcdaniel@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Tom L McDivitt
Intelligence Analyst
Booz Allen Hamilton
Tom McDivitt (544757)
8283 Greensboro Drive
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mcdivitt_thomas@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Cecil McDonald
7781 S. Lakeview Street
Littleton , CO 80120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ceelinmac2@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Jonathan McDonald
VP
Agilex Technologies
5155 Parkstone Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jonathan.mcdonald@agilex.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard McDonald
Director
General Dynamics AIS
10560 Arrowhead Drive
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rich.mcdonald@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard McDonald Jr.
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Rich.McDonald@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard McDonald Jr.
10560 Arrowhead Drive
Fairfax , VA 22192
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rich.mcdonald@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Jerry McDowell
TITLE TBD
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque , NM 87185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mike McDuffie
Vice President, Public Sector Sv
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mikemcdu@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael McElmurry
15811 Foxgate Rd
Houston , TX 77079
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mcelmmp@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Deron McElroy
503 South Henry Street
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gordon McElroy
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gordon.mcelroy@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard McFarland
Director, Congressional Relation
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rich_mcfarland@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ronald C McGarvey
Threat Assessment officer
USMC, MCNCRC G3 Mission Assurance Branch
R. McGarvey
2350 Catlin Ave.
Room 016
Quantico , VA 22134
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil
_____________________________________________________
Kathleen McGhee
Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: K_Mcghee@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Maureen McGovern MBA, BS
President
KSB Solutions
2302 Birch Court
Warrington , PA 18976
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: maureen.a.mcgovern@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Brad McGowan
Senior Managing Director
The SPECTRUM Group
11 Canal Center Plaza
Suite 103
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bmcgowan@spectrumgrp.com
_____________________________________________________
Bradley W McGowan
Senior Managing Director
The SPECTRUm Group
11 Canal Center Plaza
Suite # 103
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bmcgowan@spectrumgrp.com
_____________________________________________________
Kevin McGreevy
CEO
Network Designs, Inc.
501 Church St.
Suite 210
Vienna , VA 22180-4711
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Judith McHale
Under Sec Public Diplomacy & Pol
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mchalej@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Maj Gen James McInerney USAF (Re
2111 Wilson Blvd.
Suite 400
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmcinerney@ndia.org
_____________________________________________________
mr gregory s mcinnis
aircraft parts sales
none
4635 mclemoresville rd
huntingdon , TN 38344
Phone: (731) 986-5800
Fax: (none)
Email: woodrot1@att.net
_____________________________________________________
James W McJunkin
National Security Branch, Direct
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.mcjunkin@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ashley McKannon
16659 Malory Ct
Dumfries , VA 22025
Phone: (703) 730-2379
Fax: (none)
Email: aem2189@columbia.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas McKannon
Manager, Space & Airborne System
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mckannon@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Thomas McKannon BS/MS/AeE
Strategy & Business Capture
Raytheon
1100 Wilson Blvd
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (703) 730-2379
Fax: (none)
Email: t.mckannon@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dean McKendrick
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dean McKendrick
Vice President Intelligence Prog
ManTech INTL
2250 Corporate Park Drive
Suite 500
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dean.mckendrick@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Howard McKeon Rep.
Ranking Minority Member
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: howard.mckeon@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
David McKeough
Director of Sales
McAfee, Inc.
12010 Sunset Hills Road
5th Floor
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david_mckeough@mcafee.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Chris McKeowen
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Christine.McKeowen@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Todd McKinley
733 15th Street, NW
Apartment# 916
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Toddmac78@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Glenn McKnab
TITLE TBD
HP
921 Burnett Avenue
Arnold , MD 21012
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Glenn.mcknab@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Tom McLemore
Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tom.mclemore@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Joseph McLeod
Manager Government Program Devel
Software Engineering Institute, CMU
NRECA Building
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Edward McMahon
8719 Burdette Road
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: epmcm1@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James McMahon
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.mcmahon@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
John McMahon
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Darcy McMillan
Executive Assistant
Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc
1501 Farm Credit Drive
Suite 2300
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dmcmillan@the-analysis-corp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jason McMillan
107 S. West St
#525
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmcmillan@ockim.com
_____________________________________________________
Jason McMillan
President
Ockim, Inc.
107 S. West St
#525
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmcmillan@ockim.com
_____________________________________________________
Tim McMillan
Business Analyssts
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tim.mcmillan@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John McMullen
2340 Dulles Corner Blvd
MS: 6S02
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.mcmullen@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
David McMunn
Intel Sector Manager
Parsons Corporation
198 Van Buren Street
Suite 250
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 481-6013
Email: dmcmunn@mcmunn-associates.com
_____________________________________________________
Miss Barbara McNamara
3003 Van Ness Street, N.W.
#828W
Washington , DC 20008
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: b.mcnamara@starpower.net
_____________________________________________________
Timothy C McNamara
TITLE TBD
Boyden
217 E Redwood St
Suite 1500
Baltimore , MD 21202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tmcnamara@boyden.com
_____________________________________________________
Edward McNamee
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael McNamee
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
SP, Suite 6468
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mkmcnam@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tim McNeil
TITLE TBD
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Timothy.McNeil@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Frank B Meade
425 West 23 Street
11-B
New York , NY 10011
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gothamite2@juno.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. C. Meador
Chairman
mgiss
85 Speen Street
Suite 201
Framingham , MA 01701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: meador@mgiss.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Meadows
Affiliant
AT&T Government Solutions-NIS
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: demeadows@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Carmen Medina
901 N Stuart St
suite 205
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: camedina@concentric.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. CB Mee
Liason Officer to DHS
NSA
Perception I&A
628 Chapelgate Dr
Odenton , MD 21113
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cb_mee@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
ADM, Tom Meek
Director, National Maritime Inte
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tmeek@nmic.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mike Meermans
VP, Strategic Planning
Sierra Nevada Corporation
12706 Westport Lane
Woodbridge , VA 22192
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mike.meermans@sncorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jim Meginley
COO
Intec Billing, Inc.
301 North Perimeter Center
Suite 200
Atlanta , GA 30346
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.meginley@intecbilling.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kevin Meiners
1708 N. Utah Street
Arlington , VA 22207-2329
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kevin.meiners@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Meiners
Acting Deputy, Undersecretary of
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kevin.Meiners@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brendan Melley
Associate Vice President
Cohen Group
103 Harvard Street
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bmelley@cohengroup.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lindsey A Mellon B.A.
Intelligence Analyst
BAE Systems
8201 Greensboro Drive
Mclean , VA 22102
Phone: (831) 917-6376
Fax: (none)
Email: lindseymellon@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. A. Melnick
TITLE TBD
Portable Export
P.O. Box 5501
Falmouth , VA 22403
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: info@portableexpert.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Raymond Melnyk
TITLE TBD
L-3 Communications - Government Services, Inc.
15049 Conference Center Drive
Suite 200
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: raymond.melnyk@l-3com-spg.com
_____________________________________________________
Mary Ann Melosh
11251 Roger Bacon Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: meloshm@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Caylin Mendelowitz
Staff Scientist
ENSCO, Inc.
5400 Port Royal Rd.
Springfield , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mendelowitz.caylin@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Justin Mentzer
205 Van Buren
Suite 450
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: justin.mentzer@etginc.com
_____________________________________________________
Justin Mentzer
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Justin.mentzer@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Courtney Merriman
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cmerriman@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Merritt CISSP, CIS
201 Vanderpool Lane
Suite 97
Houston , TX 77024
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.d.merritt@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Beirut Mesfin
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bmesfin@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
James Mesick
Director Human Capital
The SI
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: helen.d.demes@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
David Messina
Director, Program Management
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.e.messina@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Christina Mestre
7553 Alaska Ave NW
Washington , DC 20012
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christinawmestre@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Sheldon Meth
3601 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: smeth@sysplan.com
_____________________________________________________
James Metsala
10328 Sager Avenue
Unit 402
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 877-2144
Email: james@metsala.com
_____________________________________________________
Karen Metzler
TITLE TBD
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Rachel Meyer
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rachel_meyer@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Renee Meyer
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rmmeyer@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard J Meyer
Deputy Director, TD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rlmeyer@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Dawn Meyerriecks
DDNI for Acquisition & Technolog
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dawn.c.meyerriecks@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Randall Meyers
Vice President
Camber Corporation
5860 Trinity Parkway
Suite 400
Centerville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rmeyers@i2spros.com
_____________________________________________________
Randall Meyers
Vice President National Security
Camber
6992 Columbia Gateway Dr
Suite 150
Columbia , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rmeyers@camber.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Andrew Michels
TITLE TBD
Interlocutor
1701 Kalorama Road, N.W.
Washington , DC 20009
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: amichels@interlocutor.net
_____________________________________________________
Tom Middleton
VP Strategic Planning & Ops
General Dynamics Information Technology
13857 McLearen Rd
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tom.middleton@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Vincent Mihalik
Cyber Security Solutions Archite
Wyle Information Systems
1600 Intenational Dr
Suite 800
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Wanda Mikovch
TITLE TBD
DIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wanda.mikovch@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
milan milenkovic
131 s. west street
alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: milanzm1963@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jack Milewski
General Manager, Defense Intelli
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.milewski@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Russ Milheim
Deputy Targeting
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Russell.Milheim@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Brandon Milhorn
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brandon.milhorn@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Brandon Milhorn
Director, Integrated Defense
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Alex Miller
SVP and Senior Account Executive
L-3 Communications, Inc.
11955 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Britney Miller
Communications Specialist
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
7005 Fawn Trail Ct.
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: britneyamiller@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Connie Miller
TITLE TBD
Department of Justice
5344 Admiral Peary Highway
Eldersburg , PA 15931
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Connie.M.Miller@usdoj.gov
_____________________________________________________
James Miller
Principal Deputy Under Secretary
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kelly.McKnight@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Jennifer Miller
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jennifer.miller@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
John Miller
TITLE TBD
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.j.miller@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jonathan Miller
Director
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jonathan.e.miller@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kelly A Miller
Deputy Director, CIO
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kamille@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Laila Miller
N/A
N/A
1250 4 St SW
Apt W411
Washington , DC 20024
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lmi4142@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Linda Miller
TITLE TBD
TASC
4805 Stonecroft Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda.miller@tasc.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael J Miller
225 Kenneth Drive
Rochester , NY 14623
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.j.miller@globalcrossing.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael J Miller
VP Federal Sector
Global Crossing
12010 Sunset Hills Road
Suite 420
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michael.J.Miller@GlobalCrossing.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael J Miller
225 Kenneth Drive
134
Rochester , NY 14623
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.j.miller@globalcrossing.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael J Miller
225 Kenneth Drive
Rochester , NY 14623
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.j.miller@globalcrossing.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael J Miller
225 Kenneth Drive
Rochester , NY 14623
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.j.miller@globalcrossing.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scotty Miller
13901 E. Laurel Lane
Scottsdale , AZ 85259
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scotty.miller@gdds.com
_____________________________________________________
Brig Gen Stephen J Miller USAF
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
D7, Suite 6242
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sjmille@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Steve Miller
Senior Director, Federal Progams
GeoEye
GeoEye
21700 Atlantic Blvd, 5th Floor
Dulles , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: miller.steve@geoeye.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steven G Miller
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sgmille@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Susanne Miller
Director
Ensco, Inc.
5400 Port Royal Road
Springfield , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: miller.susanne@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brad Millick
Director of Collections
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brad.millick@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Karl Milligan
348 Thompson Creek Mall
#237
Stevensville , MD 21666
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kmilligan@patriotsecuritygroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Linda Millis
610 N. Pitt Street
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lmillis@markle.org
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Linda Millis
Director of Pirvate Sector Partn
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda.millis@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Linda Millis
Director, Private Sector Partner
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Room 4B-171
Washington , DC 20511
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda.millis@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Cheryl Mills
Counselor and Chief of Staff
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: millsc@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Linda Mills
President, NGIS
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Robert F Minehart
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Robert.Minehart@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ken Minihan
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
John E MINITER
PO Box 630
Ipswich , MA 1938
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jennifer A Minton
Program Director
Raytheon
1311 N Abingdon Street
Arlington , VA 22207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jenminton@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Daniel Mintz
Chief Technology Officer, Civil
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jami Miscik
PIAB Member
PIAB
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Wendy_A._Loehrs@pfiab.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dave Missal
Practice Manager
Oracle
8812 Stony Creek Drive
Colorado Springs , CO 80924
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dave.missal@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jamison Mitchell
FSI
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jrmitchell@me.com
_____________________________________________________
Lawrence A Mitchell
Senior Vice President
Sierra Nevada Corporation
444 Salomon Circle
Sparks , NV 89434
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: larry.mitchell@sncorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Lawrence A Mitchell
TITLE TBD
Sierra Nevada Corporation
444 Salomon Circle
Sparks , NV 89434
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: larry.mitchell@sncorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bill Mixon
TITLE TBD
USIS
7799 Leesburg Pike
Suite 400 S
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bill.mixon@usis.com
_____________________________________________________
eric mock
2805 Clearmeadow street
Bedford , TX 76021
Phone: (none)
Fax: (631) 410-1160
Email: emock@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Bill Moeller
1421 Jefferson Davis Highway
Suite 600
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: William.Moeller@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Edward Moffett
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Room 15B20L
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: edward.moffett@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
MS DIANA M MOHLER MBA
DIANA MOHLER
7930 JONES BRANCH DRIVE
SUITE 800
MCLEAN , VA 22102
Phone: (301) 820-5235
Fax: (703) 854-1680
Email: dmohler@itllc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Mohr
Director, Defense & Intel. PGene
SRI International
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william.mohr@sri.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Molino
Vice President
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Mrm35@Cornell.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jon A Monett BS, MA
Chairman
The Quality of Life Program
6748 Old McLean Village Drive, S
Suite 200
Mclean , VA 22101
Phone: (703) 893-7757
Fax: (none)
Email: jon@monetts.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Arthur Money
3803 Riverwood Road
Alexandria , VA 22309-2726
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: moneyarthurl@cs.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jonathan Moneymaker
Director - Missions Systems CT
The Boeing Company
7700 Boston Boulevard
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Jonathan.p.moneymaker@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Audrey Monish
VP Govt Relations
DRS Defense Solutions
2011 Crystal Drive Suite 433
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: amonish@drs-ds.com
_____________________________________________________
Gary Monroe
Solution Strategist
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Lucian Montagnino
37 Far View Commons
Southbury , CT 6488
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: loutmg@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
Matt Monte
2100 Reston Parkway
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mattmm17@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Edward Montes
Business Development Mgr, NSG
Oracle Corporation
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: edward.montes@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Oscar Montes
Project Mgr Logistics Ctr
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Jennifer Montesano
Director, Marketing & Public Rel
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Susan Moody
APG Account Manager, NSA
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: susan.moody@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Beth Moore
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Catherine Moore
TITLE TBD
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Felicia Moore Bachelors
Research Analyst
Deltek
8400 westpark drive
mclean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fepsteinmoore@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Heather Moore
12440 Casbeer Drive
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hmoor1@newhaven.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Moore
14840 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmoore@omniplex.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jeannette Moore
Director
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeannette_a_moore@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Jim Moore
TITLE TBD
Omniplex World Services Corporation
14840 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmoore@omniplex.com
_____________________________________________________
Jim Moore
TITLE TBD
Omniplex World Services Corporation
14840 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmoore@omniplex.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Moore
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.ja.moore@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Keith Moore
Business Development Analysis Vi
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: keith.w.moore@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Moore
Executive Vice President
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wmoore@lmi.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Moorman
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Moorman_Thomas@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Anthony Moraco
SVP, General Manager
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: anthony.j.moraco@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Pamela Moraga
Strategic Programs Manaager
Hewlett-Packard Company
13600 EDS Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gamechanger@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Pamela Moraga
Business Development Executive
Hewlett-Packard
6600 Rockledge Dr
#150
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pamela.j.moraga@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Pam Morage
6600 Rockledge Drive
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pamela.moraga@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Isidoro Moran Masters
Chief Strategy Advisor
Dell Services Federal Government
Isidoro Moran
6800 Fleetwood Road
Apt 1117
Mclean , VA 22101
Phone: (703) 761-4372
Fax: (none)
Email: isidoro_moran@federal.dell.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Frank A Moret
906 La Grande Road
Silver Spring , MD 20903
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Erol Morey
Senior Director, NGA
GeoEye
GeoEye
12076 Grant Street
Thornton , CO 80241
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: morey.erol@geoeye.com
_____________________________________________________
John Morgan
3415 Meridian Way
Highland Park
Winston-Salem , NC 27104
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jj7282@mac.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jessica Morgenstern
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Jessica.Morgenstern@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Wendy Morigi
Director of Public Affairs
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wendy.morigi@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jay Mork
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
8800 Queen Ave South
Bloomington , MN 55431
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ed Mornston
Director, JITF-Counterintelligen
DIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Edward.Mornston@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Karen Morr
2023 Willow Branch Court
Vienna , VA 22181
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Karen.T.Morr@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian Morra
VP, NGES
Northrop Grumman Corporation
Brian Morra
1580A West Nursery Road
MS A550
Linthicum , MD 21090
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 993-2425
Email: brian.morra@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael J Morrell
Deputy Director for Analysis
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 482-1739
Email: christyt@ucia.gov
_____________________________________________________
C. Morris
5392 Brunswick Lane
Broad Run , VA 20137
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ccmorris@hughes.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Carleda Morris
Deputy Equality Executive
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carleda.morris@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Caroline R Morris
communications coordinator
Finmeccanica
Angelica Falchi
1625 I Street, NW
12th Floor
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 223-6584
Email: caroline.morris@finmeccanica.com
_____________________________________________________
Clementina Morris
2562 Glenridge Circle
Merritt Island , FL 32953-2933
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Michael Morris
Sr. Spec. Govt. Bus Dev
AT&T Government Solutions-NIS
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mmorris@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael G Morris BS
Senior Specialist, Bus. Dev.
AT&T Corporation
Michael G. Morris
3033 Chain Bridge Road
Oakton , VA 22185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 885-0046
Email: mm3125@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Sean Morris
Principal
Deloitte
1001 G. St, NW
Suite 900W
Washington , DC 20001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: semorris@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
Brian Morrison
Deputy Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian.morrison@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Gregg Morrison
TITLE TBD
Solers
950 N. Glebe Road
Suite 1100
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gregg.morrison@solers.com
_____________________________________________________
Gregg Morrison
TITLE TBD
Solers
950 N. Glebe Road
Suite 1100
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gregg.morrison@solers.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gregg Morrison BBA, MS
VP
Solers, Inc
950 North Glebe Road
Suite 1100
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gregg.morrison@solers.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Morrow
15059 Conference Center Drive
Suite 110
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mmorrow@rri-usa.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Amos Morse
VP Proprietary Program
Harris Corporation
P.O. Box 37
MS: 2-21D
Melbourne , FL 32902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: amorse@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jack C Mortick
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
S3, Suite 6305
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jcmorti@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Assistant Secre John Morton
TITLE TBD
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.morton@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Moskal BS, MBA
Vice President
CUBRC
4455 Genesee St.
Buffalo , NY 14225
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: moskal@cubrc.org
_____________________________________________________
Mosheh Moskowitz
Chief Technology Officer
Flexispine
9700 Great Seneca Hwy
Rockville , MD 20850
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mosheh.moskowitz@flexispine.com
_____________________________________________________
Chafiq Moummi
6803 Morning Brook Terrace
Alexandria , AL 22315
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: moummi@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Moya
Director, Program Management Pro
Sypris Electronics
10901 N. McKinley Drive
Tampa , FL 33612
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dave.moya@sypris.com
_____________________________________________________
Charles Mrozek
Manager, Classified Projects
URS
9755 Patuxent Woods Drive
Suite 300
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Chuck.mrozek@urs.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert Mueller
Director
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Robert.muelleriii@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul E Muench
Deputy CIO
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, D-199
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.e.muench@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bryan K Mulholland
Senior Account Executive
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bryanmulholland@live.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Mullaney
10 Keith\'s Lane
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mmullaney@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian Mullen
TITLE TBD
BEA
2477 Chelmsford Drive
Crofton , MD 21114
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bmullen@bea.com
_____________________________________________________
John Mullen
Associate EAD National Security
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.mullen@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Admiral Mike Mullen
Chairman
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.mullen@js.pentagon.mil or
mike.mullen@js.pentagon.mil
_____________________________________________________
Rob Mullen
TITLE TBD
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Mullen
Manager, Special Programs
L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East
1 Federal Street
A&E-2C
Camden , NJ 8103
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.mullen@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Carl Muller
Senior Vice President
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cmuller@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Mulvenon
1140 Connecticut Ave NW
Ste 1140
Washington , DC 20036
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.mulvenon@defensegp.com
_____________________________________________________
Amy Mummert
Strategic Marketing Manager
SafeNet, Inc.
4690 Millennium Drive
Belcamp , MD 21017
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Al Munson
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: amunson@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Al Munson
consultant
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Alden Munson
215 Wolfe St.
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: amunson857@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Margaret Munson
Partner
The Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC
1890 Preston White Drive
Suite 250
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mmunson@ec.rr.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Murdock
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william.murdock@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Leon Murphey
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Leon.Murphey@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Charles Murphy
Professor
Liberty University
202 Capital Lane
Forest , VA 24551
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cmurphy@liberty.edu
_____________________________________________________
John Murphy
Director of Staff
DARPA
P.O.Box 2861
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.murphy@darpa.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Katharine Murphy
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: katharine.murphy@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Kyle Murphy
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kmurphy557@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Murphy
225 Dover Road
Westwood , MA 2090
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mike@millcp.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Murphy
225 Dover Road
Westwood , MA 2090
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mike@millcp.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard Murphy
CEO
Core180, Inc.
2751 Prosperity Drive
Suite 200
Vienna , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Timothy P Murphy
Associate Deputy Director
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: timothy.murphy@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Wayne M Murphy
Chief S2
NSA
9800 Savage Road
S21, Suite 6228
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wmmurph@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Allen Murray
Sr. Program Director
Hughes
11717 Exploration Lane
Germantown , MD 20876
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bruce Murray
APG Account Manager
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bruce.murray@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms Mickey Murray
Security Manager
Intelligent Decisions Inc
21445 Beaumeade Cir
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mmurray@intelligent.net
_____________________________________________________
Mickey V Murray
TITLE TBD
Intelligent Decisions Inc
21445 Beaumeade Cir
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mmurray@intelligent.net
_____________________________________________________
VADM Robert B Murrett USN
Director
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, D-100
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 227-3696
Email: Robert.b.murrett@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Katherine Muse Duma
9079 Golden Sunset Ln.
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: k.muse.duma@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Clyde Musgrave
3620 Fairfield Place
Suite 820
Frisco , TX 75035
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: DrClyde@me.com
_____________________________________________________
Frank F Blanco
President/CED
The Pola Group
1915 Towne Centre Blvd
Ste 309
Annapolis , MD 21401
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fblanco@thepolagroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Rick Blankenship
Account Manager, Federal Intel
MicroStrategy
1850 Towers Crescent Plaza
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rblankenship@microstrategy
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Rhonda Blatman
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rhonda.j.blatman@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Blauch
NSA Account Manager, APG
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.blauch@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert A Blecksmith
Director, Critical Incident Resp
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.blecksmith@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Donald Blersch
14807 Windrift Court
Centreville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: don@blersch.net
_____________________________________________________
Donald Blersch
Director, capability requirement
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donald.j.blersch@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Donald J Blersch
14807 Windrift Court
Centreville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donald.j.blersch@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mike Blinde
Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michael.Blinde@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kristen Blough
Account Manager
Cisco Systems, Inc.
13635 Dulles Technology Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: krblough@cisco.com
_____________________________________________________
James Blue
Vice President, Finance
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.blue@basesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Jennie Blumenthal
Principal
PRTM Management Consultants, LLC
1730 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jblumenthal@prtm.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Randall Blystone
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: randall.blystone@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Zdzislaw Bochynski
111 W. 67th Street
Apt 26F
New York , NY 10023
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sandi Bock
Ex. Administrataive Assistant
Sypris Electronics
10901 N. McKinley Drive
Tampa , FL 33612
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sandi.bock@sypris.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kenneth Bodzioch
Vice President, Engineering
L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East
1 Federal Street
A&E-2C
Camden , NJ 8103
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kenneth.Bodzioch@L-3Com.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Boedges
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Suite 32D07
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.boedges@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
John Boehner Rep.
House Republican Leader
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: boehnerscheduler@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Bogart
Acquisition Executive
DIA
Building 6000
Washington , DC 20340-5100
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Mark.Bogart@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
brandi bohannon
4415 harrison st nw
washington , DC 20016
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brandibohannon@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jane Bohlin
Project Manager
Ensco, Inc.
5400 Port Royal Road
Springfield , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bohlin.jane@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Tina Bohse
Sr. Account Manager
Qwest Communications
4250 N. Fairfax Dr.
5th Floor
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Daniel R Bolchoz
4019 Windsor Ridge
Williamsburg , VA 23188
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dbolchoz@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Randy Boldosser
Director
AT&T Government Solutions-NIS
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: boldosser@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steve Bolen
TITLE TBD
NRO
122 Goldswatch Terrace, S.W.
Leesburg , VA 20175
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steve.bolen@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Marc Mussoline
8618 Westwood Center Drive
#315
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mmussoline@sgis.com
_____________________________________________________
Bob Mutchler
SVP Corporate Development
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Muzzy
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Try dfmuzzy@nsa.gov or dbmuzzy@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mike Myers
Director of New Business
Eagle Alliance
2711 Technology Drive
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dstrong2@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Todd G Myers B.F.A.
Chief Technology Advisor
NGA
2618 Culpeper Road
Alexandria , VA 22308
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: todd.g.myers@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Angela Smigel (aka Maroz, Dea)
Sr. Staff Administrator
Ensco, Inc.
5400 Port Royal Road
Springfield , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 321-4609
Email: smigel.angela@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jayme Newell
TITLE TBD
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jayme.newell@ca.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeannette Newlen
1001 Research Park Blvd., Suite
Charlottesville , VA 22911
Phone: (703) 580-7844
Fax: (none)
Email: jeannette.newlen@us.army.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Aaron Newman
Senior Principal Analyst
Innovative Decisions
6464 Manhasset Lane
Alexandria , VA 22312
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: anewman@innovativedecisions.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Patricia Newman
657 Quail Run Court
Arnold , MD 21012
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pmnewma657@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Long Nguyen BSC
System Analyst Senior
CACI, INC.
14370 Newbrook Dr
Commonwealth Building A
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lnguyen@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Steve Nguyen
Vice President, LNSSI & Federal
LexisNexis
Mr. Steve Nguyen
1150 18th Street, NW suite 250
Washington , DC 20036
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steve.nguyen@lnssi.com
_____________________________________________________
Vinh Nguyen
1220 East West Hwy 1601
Silver Spring , MD 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dc.vinh@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sherrill Nicely
Deputy Associate Director of Nat
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sherrill.l.nicely@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Nicholas
Security Strategist
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pnichol@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
BGEN. Theodore Nicholas
Defense Counterintelligence and
DIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: theodore.nicholas@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Douglas Nichols
325 Cool Ridge Court
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nichols.dm@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Nichols
Partner
The Potomac Advocates
7360 Bloomington Court
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john@potadv.com
_____________________________________________________
Rhonda Nichols
TITLE TBD
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rnichols2@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Wilma Nichols
Director of Finance
The Potomac Advocates
7360 Bloomington Court
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wil@potadv.com
_____________________________________________________
Wilma D Nichols
TITLE TBD
The Potomac Advocates
7360 Bloomington Court
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wil@potadv.com
_____________________________________________________
Ben Nicholson
Minority Staff Director, Cyber
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ben.nicholson@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Nicholson
409 Walnut Avenue
Gloucester , NJ 08030-2246
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Janet Nickloy
Dir, Space Comm Sys BD
Harris Corporation
PO Box 37
Melbourne , FL 329020037
Phone: (none)
Fax: (321) 674-2828
Email: jnickloy@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Linda Nicoll
TITLE TBD
The Aerospace Corporation
Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447
2310 E. El Segundo Blvd.
El Segundo , CA 90245
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda.a.nicoll@aero.org
_____________________________________________________
Daniel Nielsen
Senior Procurement Executive
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Daniel.nielsen@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Alex Nieves
SVice President, Computer Forens
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alex.nieves@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steve Niezgoda
Vice President, Terrorist Screen
Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc
1501 Farm Credit Drive
Suite 2300
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sniezgoda@theanalysiscorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Joseph L Nimmich
Senior Advisor
Penn State Applied Research Lab
3535 Loyola Ct
Dunkirk , MD 20754
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jlnuscg@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Donald P Nixon III
Analyst
SRA
4350 Fair Lakes Court
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dpn4@georgetown.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tripop Noiwan
1107 N. Vernon Street
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tnoiwan@sysplan.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Chris Nolan
Director, Washington Operations
The SI Organization, Inc.
Chris Nolan
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.s.nolan@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Chris S Nolan
Director, Government Relations
The SI
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: helen.d.demes@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Christopher S Nolan
Director, Govenment Relations
Lockheed Martin Corporation
15052 Conference Center Drive
SG2 4D430H
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.s.nolan@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Matthew Nolan
Nebraska Ave
Washington , DC 20016
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matthewwnolan@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Matthew Nolan
8924 Maurice Lane
Annandale , VA 22003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matthew.nolan@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gilbert C Nolte
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gcnolte@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. William Nolte
2758 Gracefield Road
Silver Spring , MD 20904
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wnolte@umd.edu
_____________________________________________________
Robert Noonan
INSA Board of Advisors
Booz Allen Hamilton
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Glen Nordin
Senior Language Authority
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: glen.nordin@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Glenn Nordin
500 Canterbury Lane
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 604-1226
Email: glenn.nordin@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
GM2 JASON N NORDIN
GUNNERS MATE SECOND CLASS
US NAVY
809-B CUESTA DRIVE #2187
MOUNTAIN VIEW , CA 94040
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: JASON.NORDIN@NAVY.MIL
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Nels Nordquist
TITLE TBD
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nels.p.nordquist@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
John Norjen Jr.
managing Director Investments
Corporate Office Properties Trust
6711 Columbia Gateway Drive
Columbia , MD 21046-2104
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.norjen@copt.com
_____________________________________________________
Colonel Ron Norman USAF
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
F1J, Suite 6672
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ronald.norman@jiddo.dod.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Douglas Norton
TITLE TBD
Siemens Government Services
619 Kings Cloister Circle
Alexandria , VA 22302-4025
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: douglas.norton@siemensgovt.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Norton
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics C4 Systems
2231 Crystal Drive
Suite 600
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: susan.hernandez-francis@gdc4s.com
_____________________________________________________
James Norton
Director
General Dynamics C4 Systems
2231 crystal drive
suite 600
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Susan.Hernandez-Francis@gdc4s.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Norton
1101 30th Street, N.W.
Suite 100B
Washington , DC 20007
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: norton@eurasiagroup.net
_____________________________________________________
Christina Norwich
Embedded Analyst
Palantir Technologies
1660 International Drive
8th Floor
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. E. Novak
TITLE TBD
Novak Biddle
1313 Aintree Road
Baltimore , MD 21286
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: roger@novakbiddle.com
_____________________________________________________
Jay Nussbaum
COO
Agilex
Jay Nussbaum
5155 Parkstone Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 483-4900
Email: jay.nussbaum@agilex.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. M-J OBOROCEANU MSLS, MA
INFORMATION RESEARCH SPECIALIST
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
5112 MACARTHUR BLVD NW
#309
WASHINGTON , DC 20016
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: MOBOROCEANU@CRS.LOC.GOV
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Odegaard
17788 Brookwood Way
Purcellville , VA 20132-9027
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jodegaard_1@radiantblue.com
_____________________________________________________
David Odgers
4430 Po Valley Rd
Ft Drum , NY 13602
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
OGHENETEJIRI ODIETE
118 akpakpava street, benin city
EDO STATE NIGERIA
BENIN CITY P.O. BOX 6654
Nigeria
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: odietetejiri@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Anthony Oettinger
33 Oxford St.,125 Maxwell Dworki
Cambridge , MA 2138
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: anthony.oettinger@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Andy Ogielski
President
Renesys
1750 Elm Street
Suite 101
Manchester , NH 3104
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ato@renesys.com
_____________________________________________________
Andy T Ogielski
President
Renesys
1750 Elm Street
Suite 101
Manchester , NH 3104
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ato@renesys.com
_____________________________________________________
Jacob S Olcott
Subcommittee Director and Counse
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jacob.olcott@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr Stephen Olechnowicz
Ops Researcher
IDA
ITSD
8450 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria , VA 22311
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stevessurf@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Alexander Olesker
Research Associate
Crucial Point LLC
3525 S St. NW
Washington , DC 20007
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: aolesker@crucialpointllc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Peter Oleson
4846 Riverside Drive
Galesville , MD 20765
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: psa@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr Peter Oleson
P.O. Box 383
Galesville , MD 20765
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: peter.c.oleson@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Deborah Oliver
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: deborah.g.oliver@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Ryan E Olivett
5325 Westbard Ave
#620
Bethesda , MD 20816
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ro9730a@student.american.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Olsen
Manager, Ground Operations East
The Boeing Company
7700 Boston Boulevard
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.m.olsen@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Sparky Olsen
Boeing IS Director
Mission Operations
7700 Boston Blvd.
Springfield, VA , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 270-6893
Email: sparky.olsen@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
James M Olson George Bus
TITLE TBD
Texas A&M
TX
77843-4220 , -979 jolson@bushsc
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jolson@bushschool.tamu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Paul Oostberg Sanz
Counsel
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.oostbergsanz@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Falken Robert Ord
CEO
Falken Industries, LLC
9510
technology drive
Manassas , VA 20110
Phone: (none)
Fax: (571) 292-1860
Email: rord@falken.us
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Henry Orejuela
CEO
Space and Defense Systems, Inc.
10700 Parkridge Boulevard
Suite 410
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: horejuela@sdsi.net
_____________________________________________________
Henry Orejuela
TITLE TBD
Space and Defense Systems, Inc.
10700 Parkridge Boulevard
Suite 410
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: horejuela@sdsi.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Fran J Orlosky
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
B, Suite 6533
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fjorlos@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Aurora E Ortega
6597 Quiet Hours
Apt 201
Columbia , MD 21045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: aeortega@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Neil Orth
Sp.Cmd. & DoDIIS Com. Western Re
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: neil.orth@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Ryan Orth
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
2305 Mission College Boulevard
Santa Clara , CA 95054
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Francisco Ortiz
Urb. Bonneville Gardens, Calle #
Caguas , 0 725
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: FVPR@PRTC.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Stefanie R Osburn
Chief of Staff
PIAB
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Stefanie_R._Osburn@pfiab.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr John L Osterholz BA, MS
VP
BAE Systems
11487 Sunset Hills Rd
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.osterholz@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John A Oswald
Director, Analysis and Productio
NGA
MS: L-05, 3838 Vogel Road
Arnold , MO 63010-6238
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: John.A.Oswald@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen S Oswald
Vice President/General Manager
The Boeing Company
Stephen Oswald
1215 South Clark Street
Suite 500
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 414-6442
Email: stephen.s.oswald@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen S Oswald
Chief Operating Officer
The Boeing Company
Steve Oswald
1215 South Clark Street
Suite 500
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 414-6442
Email: stephen.s.oswald@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Maria Otero
Under Secretary Democracy & Glob
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: OteroM@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Roger Oussoren
Director
GDIT
13857 McLearen Rd
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: roger.oussoren@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Roger Oussoren
Director
GDIT
13857 McLearen Rd
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: roger.oussoren@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Grover Outland
Senior VP and General Counsel
TECH USA, Inc
8334 Veterans Highway
2nd Floor
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: outland@techusa.net
_____________________________________________________
Grover C Outland
TITLE TBD
TECH USA, Inc
8334 Veterans Highway
2nd Floor
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: outland@techusa.net
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Doris Over
Chief of Protocol
NSA
9800 Savage Road
DC6P, Suite 6258
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dcover@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ray Owen
Vice President, Strategy & Busin
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Ray.owen@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Owens
Director, Military Services Ops
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.d.owens@bluelink.net
_____________________________________________________
Judith Oxman
Vice Acquisition Executive
DIA
Judith Oxman
DIA-AE
200 MacDill Boulevard
Washington , DC 20340
Phone: (410) 956-3080
Fax: (703) 907-2807
Email: judith.oxman@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Judith R Oxman
Vice Acquisition Executive
DIA
DIA-AE
200 MacDill Boulevard
Washington , DC 20340
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 907-2807
Email: judith.oxman@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mike Ozatalar BS, MS
VP - Program Manager
Parsons
100 M Street SE
Washington , DC 20003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.ozatalar@parsons.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Fatih Ozman
President & CEO
Sierra Nevada Corporation
444 Salomon Circle
Sparks , NV 89434
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vickie.breunig@sncorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Bill Parker
COO
Salient Federal Solutions
4000 Legato Road
Suite 600
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bill.parker@salientfed.com
_____________________________________________________
Bill Parker
COO
Salient Federal Solutions
4000 Legato Road
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bill.parker@salientfed.com
_____________________________________________________
John Parker
TITLE TBD
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
John P Parker
3365 Lakeside View Dr
Falls Church , VA 22041
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: johnpaulparker@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
John Paul Parker
Chief of Acquisition, ONDI CIO B
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: johnpaulparker@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Parker
President and CEO
Deltek
13880 Dulles Corner Lane
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Lauren Parker B.A.
HR Specialist (Intern)
Department of Navy
HRSC East
Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Portsmouth , VA 23709
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lauren.parker@navy.mil
_____________________________________________________
Richard Parker
LLNL, 700 eEast Avenue
mail stop L 449
Livermore , CA 94550
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: parker27@llnl.gov
_____________________________________________________
Tawanda Parker
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: t_parker@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr Tim Parker
Sr Manager Strategic Development
Lockheed Martin IS&GS
700 N Frederick Avenue
Gaithersburg , MD 20879
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tim.parker@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Tim Parker
Strategic Planning
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tim.parker@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Deborah Parkinson
Cyber
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: deborah_parkinson@hsgac.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jacob Parness
1001 Lamberton Drive
Silver Spring , MD 20902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jayparness@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Joe Parsley
VP Strategy and BD
QinetiQ North America
315 Bob heath Dr
Huntsville , AL 35808
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Norman Parsons
6403 N 15th st
Tampa , FL 33610
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: norman.parsons41@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr Oliver Parsons
President
Opti-Tech, LLC
614 Knollwood Road
Severna Park , MD 21146
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 982-6817
Email: oparsons@optitechis.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Paska
1595 Spring Hill Road
Suite 250
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paska@ebrinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Neelam D Patel
TITLE TBD
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Neelam.patel@Qinetiq-NA.com
_____________________________________________________
Sangita Patel
TITLE TBD
Composite Software Inc.
11921 Freedom Drive
Suite 550
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jennifer Paterson
8201 Greensboro Dr
Ste 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jennifer.paterson@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Rachel Patricca
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rachel.patricca@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Rachel Patricca
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rachel.patricca@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Patrick
APG Account Manager
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.patrick@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Leonard Patterson
12504 Plantation Drive
Brandywine , MD 20613
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lepatt@hughes.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tom Patterson
1710 Apollo Ct.
Seal Beach , CA 90740
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Pattishall
Sector Vice President and Genera
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bob.pattishall@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Christopher Paul
Strat Forces
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christopher_paul@armed-services.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
John R Pearce
Director, BD- Intel Solutions
L-3 STRATIS
11955 Freedom Drive
Suite 15049
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 234-1078
Email: john.pearce@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Adam R Pearlman J.D.
Associate Deputy General Counsel
United States Department of Defense
1600 Defense Pentagon
Room 3B688
Washington , DC 20301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adam.r.pearlman@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Curtis Pearson
Director, Information Dominance
Northrop Grumman
895 Oceanic Dr
Annapolis , MD 21404
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 981-4918
Email: curtis.pearson@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kendell Pease
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics Corporation
2941 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kpease@gd.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bob Pecha
Vice President
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rpecha@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Pecha
TITLE TBD
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Robert.Pecha@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gardner G Peckham
Managing Director
Prime Policy Group
1110 Vermont Avenue, NW
Suite 1000
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 530-4600
Email: gardner.peckham@prime-policy.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George Pedersen
CEO
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: george.pedersen@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr Daniel H Pedowitz
Business Unit Executive
IBM
6710 Rockledge Drive
Bethesda , MD 20878
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pedowitz@us.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
James Peery
TITLE TBD
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque , NM 87185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ammon Peffley
Account Manager
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George Peirce
General Council
DIA
Building 6000
Washington , DC 20340-5100
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: George.Peirce@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
David Pekoske
Group President, Global Security
A-T Solutions, Inc.
1934 Old Gallows Road
Suite 360
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 288-3401
_____________________________________________________
David Pekoske MPA, MBA
1934 Old Gallows Road
Suite 360
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 288-3401
Email: davidpekoske@a-tsolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
David Pekoske
Group President, Global Security
A-T Solutions
1934 Old Gallows Road
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: davidpekoske@alum.mit.edu
_____________________________________________________
Nancy Pelosi
Speaker of the House
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 225-4188
Email: scheduler.pelosi@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr Mark D Pendleton MSEE, BSEE
Director
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1-Space Park
Redondo Beach , CA 90278
Phone: (310) 214-2628
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.pendleton@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Kirsten Penn
Director Strategic Development
NJVC, LLC
8614 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 300
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Catherine Pennington
Director, NGA Program
The MITRE Corporation
7515 Colshire Dr,
MS H135
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cpenning@mitre.org
_____________________________________________________
Greg Pennington
Academic Programs Intern
United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation
2325 Dulles Corner Boulevard
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: greg.pennington@usgif.org
_____________________________________________________
Jonathan Peppard
TITLE TBD
ASI Government
1655 North Fort Meyer Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jpeppard@acqsolinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Pera
200 MacDrill Blvd
5C355
Bolling AFB Washington , DC 20340-5100
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Richard.Pera@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard J Pera
3114 Rittenhouse St. NW
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pera@mindspring.com
_____________________________________________________
David Percelay MBA
Executive Director
AIRescue
David Percelay
PO Box 8067
Van Nuys , CA 91409
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dpercelay@post.harvard.edu
_____________________________________________________
John Pereira
Director for Support
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christyt@ucia.gov
_____________________________________________________
Michael Perelman
P.O. Box 56555
Philadelphia , PA 19111
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Perkins
14660 Rothgeb Dr. Ste 102
Rockville , MD 21014
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Kevin L Perkins
Criminal Investigative Division
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kevin.perkins@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Eric Perlstein
Director - IT Services
Applied Integrated Technologies, Inc.
6305 Ivy Lane
Suite 520
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eric.perlstein@ait-i.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Douglas Perritt
103 Stonestep Court
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dougperritt@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joe Perry
Senior Financial Manager
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joseph.perry@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
William Perry
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Lenora Peters Gant
Deputy ADNI CHCO
ODNI
1000 Colonial Farm Rd.
Gate 5
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 275-1297
Email: Kyles2@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Peters
PO Box 100581
Arlington , VA 22210
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dp1811us@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jack Peters
Director
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jpeters@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Peters
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tjpeter@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Martin Petersen
7102 Westmoreland Drive
Warrenton , VA 20187
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: martin.c.petersen@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
J. M. Peterson
5251-18 John Tyler Highway
#323
Williamsburg , VA 23185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmpeterson@policeone.com
_____________________________________________________
John M Peterson III
Consultant
CTSERF
5251-18 John Tyler Highway
#323
Williamsburg , VA 23185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmpeterson@iacsp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr John M Peterson III
Consultant
CTSERF
1490 Quarterpath Road
Suite 5A, #323
Williamsburg , VA 23185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmpeterson@iacsp.com
_____________________________________________________
Max Peterson
Area Vice President - Federal
Dell Inc.
One Dell Way
One Dell Way
Round Rock , TX 78682
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: max_peterson@dell.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Doris E Petitti
1804 Greer Court
Gambrills , MD 21054
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: petittid@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Suzanne Petrie-Liscouski
TITLE TBD
TASC
4805 Stonecroft Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: suzanne.petrie@tasc.com
_____________________________________________________
Pete Petrihos
Vice President
The Cohen Group
500 8th Street, NW
Suite 200
Washington , DC 20004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Benjamin V Petrone
5650 Assateague Place
Manassas , VA 20112
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: BenPetrone@Gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Linda Petrone
9015 Admiral Vernon Terrace
Alexandria , VA 22309
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda.petrone@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Walter Petruska
1510 Eddy Street
PH 1A
San Francisco , CA 94115
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wpetruska@usfca.edu
_____________________________________________________
Michael Pevzner
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: m_pevzner@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
MG Cloyd Pfister USA (Ret)
4653 Kirkpatrick Lane
Alexandria , VA 22311
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chpfister@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Katherine H Pherson
CEO
Pherson Associates, LLC
9902 Deerfield Pond Drive
Great Falls , VA 22066
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kpherson@pherson.org
_____________________________________________________
Katherinr H Pherson
TITLE TBD
Pherson Associates, LLC
9902 Deerfield Pond Drive
Great Falls , VA 22066
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kpherson@pherson.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Randolph H Pherson
TITLE TBD
Pherson Associates, LLC
9902 Deerfield Pond Drive
Great Falls , VA 22066
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rpherson@pherson.org
_____________________________________________________
John Philbin
10455 White Granite Drive
Suite 400
Oakton , VA 22124
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.philbin@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Betsy Philips
S&I Professional Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: betsy.philips@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Elizabeth Phillips
Executive Vice President
McBee Strategic Consulting, LLC
455 Massachusetts Ave., NW
12th Floor
Washington , DC 20001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bphillips@mcbeestrategic.com
_____________________________________________________
Elizabeth Phillips
Executive Vice President
McBee Strategic Consulting, LLC
455 Massachusetts Ave., NW
12th Floor
Washington , DC 20001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bphillips@mcbeestrategic.com
_____________________________________________________
Elizabeth Phillips
Executive Vice President
McBee Strategic Consulting, LLC
455 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Suite 1200
Washington , DC 20001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bphillips@mcbeestrategic.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Elizabeth A Phillips
Executive Vice President
McBee Strategic Consulting
E. Phillips
601 Pennyslvania Ave., NW
Suite 800 - North Building
Washington , DC 20004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bphillips@mcbeestrategic.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Elizabeth A Phillips
6312 Seven Corners Center, #203
Falls Church , VA 22044
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bphillips@mcbeestrategic.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeanette Phillips
Planning Manager
Texas Office of Homeland Security-SAA
5805 N Lamar Blvd
Austin , TX 78759
Phone: (512) 334-9259
Fax: (none)
Email: jeanette.phillips@txdps.state.tx.us
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jack Picard
Director
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jpicard@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James C Picard BA History
VP Operations
CACI
Jim Picard
4224 Avon Drive
Dumfries , VA 22025
Phone: (703) 400-8342
Fax: (none)
Email: jpicard@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Pick
Chief, Deputy Enterprise Managem
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michael.Pick@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Matt Pickett
8618 Westwood Center Drive
#315
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mpickett@sgis.com
_____________________________________________________
Jessica Pierce
12000 Market Street
Unit 484
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nieman_jessica@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. michael pillsbury
3017 O St NW
washington , DC 20007
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Betsy Pimentel
Vice President, Defense Programs
Stellar Solutions, Inc.
250 Cambridge Avenue
Suite 204
Palo Alto , CA 94306
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bpimentel@stellarsolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
William Pinard
11108 Cavalier Ct
Apt 5F
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wpinard@gmu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Natalio C Pincever
TITLE TBD
McAfee, Inc.
12010 Sunset Hills Road
5th Floor
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Natalio_Pincever@McAfee.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Pineda
7906 Hadley Court
Severn , MD 21144
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pineda_john@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jason Pinegar
Intelligence Analyst
FBI
935 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington , DC 20535
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jason.pinegar@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Anthony D Pinson
119 Wolfe Street
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pinsonad@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Victor Piotrowski
National Science Foundation
4201 Wilson Blvd Suite 835
Arlington , VA 22230
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vpiotrow@nsf.gov
_____________________________________________________
Al Pisani
VP, Intelligence Operations
TASC
4805 Stonecroft Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: albert.pisani@tasc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scott Pischinger
Sales Manager
Dell Inc.
One Dell Way
One Dell Way
Round Rock , TX 78682
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scott_pischinger@dell.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard A Piske lll
vp & managing director
Manpower Public Sector
143 Spa Drive
Annapolis , MD 21403
Phone: (410) 267-9067
Fax: (703) 516-9269
Email: richard.piske@na.manpower.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Piske
6305 Ivy Lane
Suite 100
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard_piske@kellyservices.com
_____________________________________________________
John Pistole
Deputy Director
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.pistole@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Pittelli
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
R2, Suite 6529
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 688-0255
Email: papitte@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Hannah Pitts
Consultant
Delta Risk LLC
2804 N. Seminary
Chicago , IL 60657
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hpitts@delta-risk.net
_____________________________________________________
Jim Pitts
President, NGES
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Anthony P Placido
Director of Intelligence
Justice Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: anthony.p.placido@usdoj.gov
_____________________________________________________
Michele Platt
Senior Vice President, Division
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mplatt@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Stephanie Platz-Vieno
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephanie.platzvieno@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
RADM James Plehal USN(Ret.)
Senior Advisor, NPPD
DHS
Nebraska Avenue Center
Washington , D.C. 20528
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.plehal@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mark Plozay
TITLE TBD
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
John Plummer
Business Development
Kelly Government Solutions
8403 Colesville Road
Silver Spring , MD 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: plummjc@kellyservices.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Debora A Plunkett
Deputy Director, Information Ass
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: daplunk@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mike Plymack
SVP Strategic Programs
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ronald Podmilsak
President & CEO
The Podmilsak Group
One Fountain Square, 11911 Freed
Suite 710
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: podmilsakgroup@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Ronald Podmilsak
TITLE TBD
The Podmilsak Group
One Fountain Square, 11911 Freed
Suite 710
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: podmilsakgroup@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Larry Poe
11325 Ethan Court
Issue , MD 20645
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Christopher Poirier
Emergency Management Deputy Prog
Department of the Treasury
6517 Coachleigh Way
Alexandria , VA 22315
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christopher.poirier@do.treas.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mark Polansky
CI Special Agent
DIA
Box 323
West River , MD 20778
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paladinhill@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr Len Polizzotto PhD
Vice President
Draper Laboratory
555 Technology Sq
Cambridge , MA 02139
Phone: (none)
Fax: (617) 258-2626
Email: lpolizzotto@draper.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr Len Polizzotto
555 Tech Sq
Cambridge , MA 02139
Phone: (none)
Fax: (617) 258-2626
Email: lpolizzotto@draper.com
_____________________________________________________
Matt Pollard
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: m_pollard@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Michael Polmar
TSG-Snr. VP
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mariam Al-Botani
Intern
Mission Concepts
902A Prince St
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (703) 822-0191
Fax: (571) 970-4593
Email: malbotani@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr Ali D Alami
2007 Nordlie Pl
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: there4u06@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Steven Albers
19904 Collingdale Place
Gaithersburg , MD 20886
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steven.albers@unisys.com
_____________________________________________________
Chris Albert
Federal Intelligence Sales
Esri
Bill Harp - Industry Solutions
380 New York St
Redlands , CA 92373
Phone: (none)
Fax: (909) 307-3039
_____________________________________________________
Rebecca Albert
Program Manager
BAE Systems
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rebecca.albert@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Catherine Albright
Sales Director
TRSS, LLC
1410 Spring Hill Rd
Suite 140
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: catherine.albright@trssllc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lisa Albuquerque
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: onrdogpm@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Barbara Alexander
Dir. Cyber, Infrastructure & Sci
DHS
4801 Nebraska Ave, NW
Washington , DC 20528
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
LTG Keith B Alexander USA
Director
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Suite 6242
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755-6242
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 688-7741
Email: kbalex2@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mike Alexander
Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael_alexander@HSGAC.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Sarita Alexander
Administration
Deloitte Consulting, LLP
1919 N. Lynn Street
Rosslyn , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: saalexander@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Yonah Alexander
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: YAlexander@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Karen Alexandre
47248 Middle Bluff Place
Sterling , VA 20165
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: karen.alexandre@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Sondra D Alexis Chemistry
Chief, Customer Assurance
Department of Homeland Security
S. Alexis
245 Murray Lane
Bldg 19, G-001-22
Washington, DC , DC 20578
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sondra.alexis@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Allan
Political Affairs Officer
United Nations
32950 Amicus Pl. Apt 314
Abbotsford , British Columbia V2S6G9
Canada
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jfausa@live.com
_____________________________________________________
Charlie Allen
INSA Senior Intelligence Advisor
Chertoff Group
1110 Vermont Avenue NW
Suite 1200
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dan Allen
Chief Operating Officer
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Edward Allen
12125 Club Commons Drive
Glen Allen , VA 23059-7029
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: EdwardLAllen@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
Jim Allen
TITLE TBD
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
John Allen
CEO/Founder
BlueStone Capital Partners
1600 Tysons Boulevard
8th Floor
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 852-4496
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mike Allen
Vice President, Intel Analysis
Camber Corporation
5860 Trinity Parkway
Suite 400
Centerville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mallen@i2spros.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Phoebe Allen
1120C Benfield Blvd
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pallen@camber.com
_____________________________________________________
VADM Thad Allen USCG
Commandant
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thad.allen@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Victoria Allen
501 E. 38th Street
HP 539
Erie , PA 16546
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vallen05@mercyhurst.edu
_____________________________________________________
Christopher Alligood MBA
Program Director
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: calligood@lmi.org
_____________________________________________________
Michael Abadie
Vice President Info Systems
ITT
141 National Business Pky
Suite 200
Annapolis Junction , MD 21032
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.abadie@itt.com
_____________________________________________________
Mike Abadie
TITLE TBD
ITT
12975 Worldgate Dr.
Building M1
Herdon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Abel
1651 Old Meadow Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Mark.Abel@wyle.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Abel
VP of Business Development
Wyle Information Systems
1600 Intenational Dr
Suite 800
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.abel@wyle.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Abe M Abraham
3832
Longmeadow way
Fort Worth , TX SW13 OJP
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: abecaptn@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Abramson
13038 Maple View Lane
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: abramsonj@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Daniel Abreu
Analyst
SRA International
13508 Fallen Oak Court
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: daniel_abreu@sra.com
_____________________________________________________
Nikolas Acheson
IC Business Development Manager
SAIC
Nikolas Acheson
6841 Benjamin Franklin Dr.
Mail Stop F1-3-N3
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (443) 367-7921
Email: nikolas.s.acheson@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Veronica Acker
Program Manager
BAE Systems
5808 Atteentee Rd
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: veronica.acker@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Russell Adamchak
1421 Jefferson Davis Highway
Suite 600
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Russell.Adamchak@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Colin Adams
Federal Planner
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Colin.Adams@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dennis Adams
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dennis.adams@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Michael Adams
Account Manager
Carahsoft Technology Corp
12369 Sunrise Valley Dr
Suite D2
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andrea.terrazas@carahsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Lou Addeo
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gary Adkins
VP, National & Federal Security
GeoEye
21700 Atlantic Boulevard
Dulles , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adkins.gary@geoeye.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Harvey Adler
6633 Thurlton Drive
Alexandria , VA 22315
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eagle724@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jorge Aguila
Diagonal 621
barcelona , AL 8028
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. jorge aguila
Av. Diagonal, 621-629
Barcelona 08028
Spain
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jorge.aguila@lacaixa.es
_____________________________________________________
David Aguilar
Acting Deputy Commissioner
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.aguilar@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Peter Ahearn
806 Polo Place
Great Falls , VA 22066
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: peterja0@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Commissioner Jayson P Ahern
Retired
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jayson.ahern@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Brandon Ahrens
Senior Manager
Accenture
11951 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brandon.k.ahrens@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Nick Aievoli
7900 Westpark drive
Mclean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: naievoli@gcsinfo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Aitken
communications manager
Finmeccanica
Angelica Falchi
1625 I Street, NW
12th Floor
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.aitken@finmeccanica.com
_____________________________________________________
Scott Aken
VP, Cyber Operations Manager
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scott.aken@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Carol Ann Babcock
TITLE TBD
IEEE
12459 Wendell Holmes Road
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cabeta@ieee.org
_____________________________________________________
Dr. James Babcock
12459 Wendell Holmes Road
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhbeta@ieee.org
_____________________________________________________
Matthew Babin
TITLE TBD
Palantir Technologies
1660 International Drive
8th Floor
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Carrie L Bachner
President, CEO
Mission Concepts
220 20th Street South
Suite 209
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carrie_bachner@missionconcepts.com
_____________________________________________________
David Baciocco
VP Corporate Business Developmen
Applied Signal Technology
460 West California Avenue
Sunnyvale , CA 94086
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dave_baciocco@appsig.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Badoud
15520 Horseshoe Lane
Woodbridge , VA 22191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tbadoud@theanalysiscorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Craig Baer
Director of Intelligence Program
TECH USA, Inc
8334 Veterans Highway
2nd Floor
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cbaer@techusa.net
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Louis Baer
Director, Office of Policy
NSA
9800 Savage Road
S02L, Suite 6425
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: labaer@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Maureen Baginski
VP Intelligence Service
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
Email: Maureen.Baginski@serco-na.com
_____________________________________________________
Bart Bailey
CEO
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bbailey@3001inc.com
_____________________________________________________
Marianne Bailey
Director
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Marianne.bailey@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Brittany Baird
TITLE TBD
Proteus Technologies
133 National Business Parkway
Suite 150
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Magdalena Bajll
524 Redland Blvd.
Rockville , MD 20850
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: magdalena.a.bajll@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Beverley Baker
DEA Atlanta Division/Atlanta HID
763 Juniper St, NE
Atlanta , GA 30308
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Beverly.F.Baker@usdoj.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dean Bakeris
2200 Defense Highway
Ste 405
Crofton , MD 21114
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dbakeris@sfa.com
_____________________________________________________
Dean Bakeris
VP Program Development
Custom Engineering and Designs, Inc.
78 Boonton Avenue
Montville , NJ 07045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dbakeris@marotta.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Balch
Director of Sales, NSG
Oracle Corporation
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dave.balch@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Sherry Baldwin
Director, Office of Small Busine
DIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Sherry.Baldwin@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Jim Balentine
Abraxas Corp
12801 Worldgate Dr
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Christina Balis
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christina.balis@serco-na.com
_____________________________________________________
Phil Balisle
EVP, Washington Operations
DRS Technologies, Inc.
5 Sylvan Way
Parsippany , NJ 7054
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pbalisle@drs.com
_____________________________________________________
Katherine Ballard
1744 N Rhodes St
#310
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: katherineballard1982@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Joel Balzer
INSA OCI Task Force
TASC
4805 Stonecroft Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Gail Bamford
TITLE TBD
SAS Institute
1530 Wilson Blvd
Suite 800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gail.bamford@sas.com
_____________________________________________________
George Bamford
Chief, Cyber Thrat Branch
DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis
3801 Nebraska Ave NW
Washington , DC 20528
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gbamford2@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul A Cabral
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
DF, Suite 6229
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pacabra@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Cabrera
42701 Rolling Rock Square
South Riding , VA 20152
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jcabrera@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Cadaret
20622 Shadow Rock Lane
Trabulo Canyon , CA 92679
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: psc@usd.com
_____________________________________________________
R S Cadogan
Vice President, Intelligence and
Newberry Group
2510 Old Highway 94 South
St. Charles , MO 63303
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: RCadogan@thenewberrygroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Gerald Cady
Intelligence Analyst
DIA
6211 Swords Way
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gerald.cady@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr Less Calahan Master's
Director, National Capitol Regio
Specrtum Comm Inc.
1401 Wilson Blvd
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (301) 534-9588
Fax: (571) 312-8156
Email: Lester.Calahan@SPTRM.Com
_____________________________________________________
Mr Less Calahan Master's
Director, Nat'l Capitol Region
Spectrum Comm Inc.
1401 Wilson Blvd
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (703) 232-1584
Fax: (571) 312-8156
Email: Lester.Calahan@SPTRM.Com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Lester Calahan
Director, National Capitol Regio
Spectrum
1401 Wilson Blvd
Suite 1007
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (757) 224-7501
Email: lester.calahan@Sptrm.com
_____________________________________________________
Lester Calahan Masters
Director,National Capitol Region
Spectrum Comm Inc.
1601 North Kent Street
Rosslyn , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (571) 312-8156
Email: Lester.Calaha@SPTRM.Com
_____________________________________________________
Theresa Calbi
Sr. Spec. Government Bus. Dev.
AT&T Government Solutions
3033 Chain Bridge RD
Oakton , VA 22185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tc4591@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Theresa Calbi
Business Manager
AT&T Government Solutions-NIS
3033 Chain Bridge Rd.
Oakton , VA 22124
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tcalbi@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joe Call
Senior Advisor to the Assistant
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Joe.Call@uscg.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dan Callahan
Principal Consultant
Venona Consulting, LLC
8300 Boone Boulevard
Vienna , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 848-4586
Email: lindsay@venonaconsulting.com
_____________________________________________________
Lindsay K Callahan
Executive Administrator
Venona Consulting, LLC
Lindsay Callahan
7633 Dunston Street
Springfield , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lindsay@venonaconsulting.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Albert Calland
Executive Vice President
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bcalland@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Steve Cambone
EVP Strategic Development
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steve.cambone@qinetiq-na.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jack Camm
Vice President, Foreign Affairs
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jcamm@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Danielle Camner Lindholm
Vice President for Policy
Business Executives for National Security
1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 350
Washington , DC 20037
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ann Campbell
TITLE TBD
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque , NM 87185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Chelsey Campbell
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chelsey.campbell@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Don Campbell
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Don.Campbell@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Lt Gen (Ret) John Campbell
EVP Government Programs
Iridium Communications Inc
John Campbell
1750 Tyson's Blvd
Suite 1400
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.campbell@iridium.com
_____________________________________________________
Kurt M Campbell
East Asian & Pacific Affairs
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: campbellkm@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr Rob Campbell MBA
9756 Sinclair
Keller , TX 76244
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rob.campbell@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Robert Campbell
2335 Audrey Manor Ct
Waldorf , MD 20603
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.e.campbell@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joe D'Andrea
76 Wendt Ave
#3H
Larchmont , NY 10538
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jadandrea@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael D'Andrea
Vice President
SRA International
4300 Fair Lakes Court
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mike_dandrea@sra.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William D'Arcangelo
21261 Thatcher Terrace
#103
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william.darcangelo@stanleyassociates.com
_____________________________________________________
SHASHI DABIR
5200 Leesburg Pk #1232
Falls Church , VA 22041
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dabirs@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dana Dalton
TBD
CVG Inc.
709 Canyon Greens Drive
Las Vegas , NV 89144-0834
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: danahdalton@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Marc Damasha
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Suite 6513
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bmcrumm@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Chad DAmore
12466 Ansin Circle Drive
POtomac , MD 20854
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chaddamore@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard Danforth
President, DRS Defense Solutions
DRS Technologies, Inc.
5 Sylvan Way
Parsippany , NJ 7054
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rdanforth@drs-ds.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Daniel
Director for Intelligence Progra
OMB
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: J._Michael_Daniel@omb.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mark Daniels
TITLE TBD
Intelsat General Corporation
6550 Rock Spring Drive
Suite 450
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Lisa Danzig
Special assistant to Secretary D
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Miss Kelly Darmer
Academic Researcher
University of Dallas
Kelly Darmer
1705 East West Highwat
Apt 201
Silver Spring , MD 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: KellyDarmer@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Miss Kelly N Darmer BA, MA
Student/Natl Sec & Intel Researc
Institute of World Politics
Kelly Darmer
1705 E West Hwy
#201
Silver Spring , MD 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: KellyDarmer@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian Darmody
2133 Lee Building
College Park , MD 20742-5125
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bdarmody@umd.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Daubenspeck
12100 Sunset Hills Road
#4073
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: daubenspeckr@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Kenneth Daugherty
3712 Woodland Circle
Falls Church , VA 22041
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bill Daumer
Director
AT&T Government Solutions-NIS
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: daumer@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Joanna Davenport Gavel
NGA Account Manager
Science Applications International Corporation
14668 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 676-1902
Email: davenportgav@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Jennifer David
Human Development Directorate
NGA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jennifer.david@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
mr john b david associate
fraud examiner
zeb nigeria limited
john bassey david
p o box 1112, eket, akwa ibom
state, nigeria
Eket 2341
Nigeria
Phone: +2348035847710
Fax: (none)
Email: johnbassey108@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Davidson
Counsel
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: M_Davidson@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Heather Davies
Lead Associate
Booz Allen Hamilton
1615 Murray Canyon Road
Suite 140
San Diego , CA 92108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: davies_heather@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Rebecca Davies
Minority Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rebecca_davies@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Arthur Davis
President
SAVA Solutions
6616 Rock Lawn Drive
Clifton , VA 20124
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adavis@savasolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brett Davis
Account Executive
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brettd@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Kimberly Easterling BBA
Senior Associate
PricewaterhouseCoopers
1800 Tysons Blvd
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kimberly.easterling@us.pwc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert E Eastman
Program Management Vice Presiden
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.e.eastman@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms.. Widad Echahly
24 Stoke Street
Sumner
Christchurch 8081
New Zealand
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wechahly@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Reinaldo Echevarria
487 Spring St
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: echevarria_reinaldo@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Philip Eckman
104 Old Glory Court
Williamsburg , VA 23185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: philipeckman@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George Economou
Major Account Executive
Akamai
11111 Sunset Hills Road
Ste 250
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: economou@akamai.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Regan Edens
1732 Remington
Crofton , MD 21114
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: edensr6@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Scott Eder
Mgr, NGES
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Charles Edge
TITLE TBD
Harding Security
19286 Spotswood Glade Dr.
Gordonsville , VA 22942
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eedge@harding-security.com
_____________________________________________________
Mary Edington
Senior Consultant
Deloitte Consulting
10310 Deer Trail Drive
Dunkirk , MD 20754
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: maryedington@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
David Edmonds
Vice President, Govt Opns & Stra
Syndetics, Inc.
10395 Democracy Lane
Suite B
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bedmonds@syndetics-inc.com
_____________________________________________________
Kristen Edmondson Wolfe
VP Marketing
Deltek
13880 Dulles Corner Lane
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lauren B Edris
Research Analyst
The Potomac Advocates
Potomac Advocates
122 C Street, NW, Suite 280
Washington , DC 20001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lbe8721@esu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Albert Edwards
Director
AT&T Government Solutions-NIS
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: burt@att.com
_____________________________________________________
John Edwards
President, Intel/Defense Sector
Agilex Technologies, Inc
5155 Parkstone Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.edwards@agilex.com
_____________________________________________________
John Edwards
President, Intel
Agilex
John Edwards
5155 Parkstone Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 483-4928
Email: john.edwards@agilex.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas A Edwards
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
DP3, Suite 6203
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: taedwar@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Michael Edwins
Director, BD-Intel Solutions
L-3 Communications, Inc.
11955 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr Sal Egea MS/BS Mgmt
6626 Hunter Creek Lane
Alexandria , VA 22315
Phone: (703) 863-8107
Fax: (none)
Email: salvadoe@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Todd Egeland
3002 Cedar Hill Rd.
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: egeland@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Eiden
TITLE TBD
Westway Development
14325 Willard Road
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jjeiden@westwaydevelopment.com
_____________________________________________________
John J Eiden
TITLE TBD
Westway Development
14325 Willard Road
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jjeiden@westwaydevelopment.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Eric Eifert
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Dawn R Eilenberger
Director, Office of Internationa
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dawn.r.eilenberger@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Rosalinda Elias
10115 Duportail Road
Bldg 363
Ft Belvoir , VA 22060
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rosalinda.elias@us.army.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Craig Fabina
5531 Stephen Reid Rd.
Huntingtown , MD 20639
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bob68@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Martin Faga
21700 Atlantic Blvd
Sterling , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mfaga@mitre.org
_____________________________________________________
Matt Fahle
Senior Executive
Accenture
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matthew.r.fahle@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Matthew Fahle
VP, Intelligence Programs
Accenture
Cara Knox
211 North Broadway
Suite 2950
St. Louis , MO 63102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matthew.r.fahle@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Matthew Fahle
VP, Intelligence Programs
Accenture
11951 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matthew.r.fahle@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Matthew Fahle
Senior Executive
Accenture
Cara Knox
211 North Broadway
Suite 2950
St. Louis , MO 63102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matthew.r.fahle@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Rick Faint
CEO
Exceptional Software Strategies Inc
849 International Drive
Suite 310
Linthicum , MD 21090
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Larry Fairchild
VP & Sr. Account Executive
L-3 Communications
11955 Freedom Dr. Suite 10048
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: larry.fairchild@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Fred Faithful
Equality Executive
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, D-100
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fred.faithful@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Judy Falanga
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Suite 6435
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Alexander Falatovich
32 Chrissy Lane
Sugarloaf , PA 18249
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: afalat55@mercyhurst.edu
_____________________________________________________
Angelica Falchi
Dir.- Corporate Communications
Finmeccanica
Angelica Falchi
1625 I Street, NW
12th Floor
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: angelica.falchi@finmeccanica.com
_____________________________________________________
Mary Kay Falise BS
Director, IC
Red Hat, Inc.
503 Broadwater Road
Arnold , MD 21012
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mkfalise@redhat.com
_____________________________________________________
Paul Falkler
VP, Strategic Development Direct
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.t.falkler@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Pack Fancher
Vice President
KippsDeSanto & Co.
1600 Tysons Boulevard
Suite 375
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (202) 997-6169
Fax: (703) 442-1498
Email: pfancher@kippsdesanto.com
_____________________________________________________
Aaron Fansler
100604 Hillview Dr
Kennewick , WA 99338
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: aaron.fansler@pnl.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Gail Faraon
Senior Research Manager
PhaseOne
6080 Center Drive
Ste 4050
Los Angeles , CA 90045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gailchunfaraon@phaseone.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Cindy M Farkus Economics
Managing Director
DHS Intelligence and Analysis
1704 Culpepper Ct
Severn , MD 21144
Phone: (410) 551-3717
Fax: (none)
Email: cmfarku@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Farley
42798 Pilgrim Square
Chantilly , VA 20152
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mfarley@nova.org
_____________________________________________________
Sandra M Farr
Senior Consultant
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: farr.michelle@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Alycia Farrell
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alycia_farrell@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Farrell
11303 Seneca Circle
Great Falls , VA 22066
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.farrell@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
john m farrell
Director
HP Fortify
12573 Cricket Lane
Woodbridge , VA 22192
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jmfarrell@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Robert Farrell
P.O. Box 3705
Reston , VA 20195
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bob.farrell@senecatechnologygroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joe Fasching
Chief Financial Executive
DIA
Building 6000
Washington , DC 20340-5100
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Joseph.Fasching@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
David Etue (aka Gray, Benjamin)
Manager
PRTM Management Consultants, LLC
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Suite 1000
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: detue@prtm.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William H Gaal BS
1419 Woodhurst Blvd.
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wgaal@us.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. C. Gabbard
Executive Vice President
Defense Group Inc
429 Santa Monica Blvd.
Ste 460
Santa Monica , CA 90401
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gabbard@defgrp.com
_____________________________________________________
Derek Gabbard
CEO
Lookingglass Cyber Solutions
1001 S. Kenwood St
Suite 200
Baltimore , MD 21224
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dgabbard@lgscout.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Gabbay
200 W. Mercer St
#410
Seattle , WA 98119
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mgabbay@islinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Bill Gaches
Dir. of Intelligence Analysis
Arete Associates
1550 Crystal Drive
Suite 703
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: William.Gaches@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lynn Gaches
Intel Analyst
Camber Corporation
5860 Trinity Parkway
Suite 400
Centerville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lgaches@camber.com
_____________________________________________________
Willard Gaefcke, Jr.
4417 McNab Avenue
Lakewood , CA 90713
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gaefcke@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Glenn Gaffney
Deputy Director for Science and
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 482-1739
Email: barbarbt@ucia.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mike Gaffney
President,Business Development,
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mgaffney@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gary Gagnan
Executive Director
MITRE
46731 Manchester Ter
Potomac Falls , VA 20165
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gjg_@mitre.org
_____________________________________________________
Gary Gagnon
TITLE TBD
The MITRE Corporation
7515 Colshire Drive
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gjg@mitre.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr Bob Gajda
Consultant
Bob Gajda
5819 Appleford Drive
Alexandria , VA 22315
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bobgajda@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
bob gajda
IC Consultant
5819 appleford drive
alexandria , VA 22315
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bobgajda@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Gajda
5819 Appleford Drive
Alexandria , VA 22315
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bobgajda@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Joe M Galindo
Supervisory IT Specialist
Federal Government
935 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington , DC 20024
Phone: (202) 554-8115
Fax: (none)
Email: galindojoe@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Sean Gallagher
Senior Director, National Intell
Invertix Corporation
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 800
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Laurene Gallo
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Gallo_Laurene@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Laurene Gallo
8283 Greensboro Drive
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gallo_laurene@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Oliver Galloway
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: o_galloway@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ryan Galluzzo
Ryan Galluzzo
49 Claudette Cir
Framingham , MA 01701
Phone: (508) 877-0093
Fax: (none)
Email: ryanjglluzzo@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Timothy Galpin
Assistant Director for Programs
Johns Hopkins University, APL
11100 Johns Hopkins Road
Room 17-S344
Laurel , MD 20723
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: timothy.galpin@jhuapl.edu
_____________________________________________________
Timothy J Galpin
TITLE TBD
Johns Hopkins University, APL
11100 Johns Hopkins Road
Room 17-S344
Laurel , MD 20723
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: timothy.galpin@jhuapl.edu
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Gulu Gambhir
SVP, Chief Technology Officer
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gambhirs@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Tom Gann
Vice President of Public Affairs
McAfee, Inc.
12010 Sunset Hills Road
5th Floor
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas_gann@mcafee.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Christopher Haakon
8012 Apollo Street
Mason Neck , VA 22079
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cphaakon@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard N Haass
President of the Council on Fore
Council on Foreign Relations
58 East 68th Street
New York , NY 10065
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: president@cfr.org
_____________________________________________________
Biff Hadden
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joel Haenlein
Senior Scientist
Ensco, Inc.
5400 Port Royal Road
Springfield , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: haenlein.joel@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Katy Hagan
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Katy_Hagan@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
SEN Chuck Hagel
PIAB Member
PIAB
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Wendy_A._Loehrs@pfiab.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Chris Hagner
Project Manager
White Oak Technologiese, Inc.
1300 Spring Street
Suite 320
Silver Spring , VA 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Annette Hagood
Director
Deloitte Consulting, LLP
1001 G St
Washington , DC 20001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ahagood@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
Cassee Haines
Executive Assistant
Camber Corporation
5860 Trinity Parkway
Suite 400
Centerville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kevin Hair
Vice President, Corporate Busine
SRC, Inc
7502 Round Pond Road
North Syracuse , NY 13212
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hair@srcinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Katie Hairfield
Summer Intern
the SI
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kathleen.s.hairfield@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Lance Haldeman
Alliances Director
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Lance Haldeman
2291 Wood Oak Dr
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lance.haldeman@ca.com
_____________________________________________________
Lance Haldeman
Alliances Director
Computer Associates
2291 Wood Oak Dr
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lance.haldeman@ca.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael M Hale
Deputy Director, SIGINT Director
NRO
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: halemi@nro.mil; tohailhale@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Richard L Haley
Finance Division
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.haleyii@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dean E Hall
Deputy Chief Information Officer
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dean.hall@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Katherine Hall
6924 Fairfax Drive
# 304
Arlington , VA 22213
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: katherine.hall@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Keith Hall
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Hall_Keith@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Larry P Hall
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
S33, Suite 6549
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lphall@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Leslie Hall
12900 Federal Systems Park Drive
MS FP1-5166
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: leslie.hall@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Susan Hall
SVP, Business Development
NJVC, LLC
8614 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 300
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: susan.hall@njvc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ralph Haller
Deputy Director (DDNRO)
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ralph.haller@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Vanessa Hallihan
Chief, Custom Solutions, Suite 6
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vnhalli@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Brigadier Gener Irving Halter US
Vice Director, Operations, Joint
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: irving.halter@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Iaquinto
CMO
Deltek
13880 Dulles Corner Lane
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Gretchen Idsinga
Business Development, Senior Man
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gidsinga@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Patricia L Ihnat
Deputy
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: plihnat@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Chris Incardona
Director, Government Programs
GeoEye
GeoEye
21700 Atlantic Blvd
Suite 500
Dulles , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: incardona.chris@geoeye.com
_____________________________________________________
Paul R Ingholt BA., JD
Principal
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Drive
McLean , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ingholt_paul@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. J. C Inglis
Deputy Director
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jcingli@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Bobby R Inman
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (512) 328-0444
Fax: (512) 471-8408
_____________________________________________________
Nancy Inman
3200 Riva Ridge Road
Austin , TX 78746
Phone: (512) 328-0444
Fax: (none)
Email: elcaro2@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Jennifer Internicola
Manager
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Jennifer.Internicola@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
S. L Ireland
Assistant Secretary for Intellig
Treasury Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Mary M Irvin
Director, Source Operations and
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, D-165
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mary.m.irvin@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Irvine
14900 Conference Center Dr.
#225
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jirvine@crucialsecurity.com
_____________________________________________________
Matthew S Irvine
3718 Appleton St., NW
Washington , DC 20016
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mattirvine@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Rob Irvine
Counterintelligence
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.irvine@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jeff Isaacson
TITLE TBD
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque , NM 87185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Isacoff
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen Isacoff
P.O. Box 465
Hudson , MA 01749
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephen@networkconsultantsgroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Joanne Isham
Required unless Parent
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Tanvirul Islam
CEO
TerminusNet
2/4 Outer Circuler Road.
OreantPoint. Flat B-3, Moghbazar
Dhaka 1217
Bangladesh
Phone: +88-02-9362262
Fax: (none)
Email: Travis@TerminusNet.com
_____________________________________________________
Roderick Isler
1421 Jefferson Davis Highway
Suite 600
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Rod.isler@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
MG Roderick Isler USA
1703 Mansion Ridge Rd.
Annapolis , MD 21401
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: goaisler@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Adam Isles
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company
1200 S. Jupiter Road
MS AA-75000
Garland , TX 75042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steven Isola
10993 S. Camino Escorpion
Vail , AZ 85641-6429
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stevenisola@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Isom J.D.
President/CEO
IsomCorp
1655 N. Fort Myer Drive
Suite 700
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (877) 770-4766
Email: michael.isom@isomcorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert Ivery
Research Fellow
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Ives
1619 Hartsville Trail
The Villages , FL 32162
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: johnives@eagle32.com
_____________________________________________________
Raymond Ivie
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12950 Worldgate Drive
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Chuck Izzo
TITLE TBD
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bill Jack
Consultant
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bill.jack@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Galen B Jackman
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Alan W Jackson
Managing Member
Jade Enterprises, LLC
15859 Berlin Turnpike
Purcellville , VA 20132
Phone: (540) 882-4534
Fax: (540) 882-4535
Email: alanwjack@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Kevin G Jackson B.S
AVP Business Development
SAIC
6909 Metro Park Drive
Alexandria , VA 22310
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kevin.g.jackson@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Miriam Jackson
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mjackson@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Janice L Jacobs
Consular Affairs
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jacobsjl@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mike Jacobs
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jake Jacoby
Executive Vice President, Nation
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jjacoby@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Jake Jacoby
TITLE TBD
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jjacoby@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Jacques Ph.D.
DHS Operations Directorate
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Steve Jacques
1511 22nd St. N.
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Jadik
Vice President, C4ISR Networked
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.jadik@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Jim Jaeger
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (210) 468-3433
Fax: (none)
Email: Jim.Jaeger@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Adrienne Janetti
4850 Mark Center Drive
JAWD/IDA
Alexandria , VA 22311
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adriennejanetti@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Adrienne Janetti
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ajanetti@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael D Janeway
116 Chimney Ridge Place
Potomac Falls , VA 20165
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mike.janeway@apgtech.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Tammy Janorske
TITLE TBD
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tammy.janorske@ca.com
_____________________________________________________
Brian Janosko
Engineering Program Manager
Lockheed Martin IS&GS
Brian Janosko DEPI 415C
13530 Dulles Technology Dr
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian.j.janosko@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
William Janssen
TITLE TBD
The Boeing Company
7700 Boston Boulevard
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Peter Jantzen
Vice President, Sales
Intec Billing, Inc.
301 North Perimeter Center
Suite 200
Atlanta , GA 30346
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: peter.jantzen@intecbilling.com
_____________________________________________________
Elise M Jarvis
Associate Director, Law Enforcem
Anti-Defamation League
1100 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Suite 1020
Washington , DC 20036
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ejarvis@adl.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Larry Jaski Jr. MBA, BS
Director
DHS-I&A Production Mangement Division
No Address Available
No City Available , MD 21220
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: LARRY.JASKI@HQ.DHS.GOV
_____________________________________________________
Frank Jaworski
TITLE TBD
SRA
4350 Fair Lakes Court
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fjaworski@raba.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. K. Jenkins
105 Kingswood Road
Annapolis , MD 21401
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brucejenkins@windsorvisions.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Karl Jensen
Director, Strategy
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: karl_jensen@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Lynda Burroughs (aka Kaur, Harjeet)
12015 Lee Jackson Highway
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lynda.burroughs@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Kacena
6650 Rock Island Rd.
Apt 304
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tkacena@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. James Kadtke PhD
Senior Scientist & Policy Analys
National Nanotechnology Coordinating Office
1701 16th Street, NW
Apt. 824
Washington , DC 20009
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jkadtke@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Hans Kaeser
3623 S Street, NW
Washington , DC 20008
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: huk3@georgetown.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Kagan
5432 Connecticut Ave., NW
Apt. 706
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mhkagan@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr Robert I Kahane
13530 Dulles Executive Park
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 466-2692
Email: bob.kahane@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Ralph Kahn
Director of Sales
McAfee, Inc.
12010 Sunset Hills Road
5th Floor
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ralph_kahn@mcafee.com
_____________________________________________________
James Kahrs
TITLE TBD
DATRA
2020 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Eugene Kaiser
TITLE TBD
Defense Information Systems Agency
2508 Goldcup Lane
Reston , VA 22091
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eugene.kaiser@disa.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Kalkbrenner
VP Communication Systems
ITT
Mr. Jim Kalkbrenner
141 National Business Parkway
Suite 200
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jim.kalkbrenner@itt.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Kalogeropoulos
2783 Mansway Dr.
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Robert Kames
PO Box 3342
Annapolis , MD 21403
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Robert@Kames.com
_____________________________________________________
Paul Kaminski
PIAB Member
PIAB
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Wendy_A._Loehrs@pfiab.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jordan Kanter
Senior Consultant
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kanter_jordan@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeff Kaplan
TITLE TBD
PRTM Management Consultants, LLC
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Suite 1000
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jkaplan@prtm.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Leonard Kaplan
7403 Gateway Court
Manassas , VA 20109
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lkaplan@gmri.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephen R Kappes
Deputy Director
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 482-1111
Email: brendjh@ucia.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jan Karcz
Director, Analytic Development
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jansk@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jan Karcz Col. (Ret)
10827 Cross School Road
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jansk@odci.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mike Karpovich
Former INSA Intern
FBI
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: 518-588-7098
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Rajendra Karwasra
9/6J, Medical Campus, PGIMS,
Rohtak , IN
India
Phone: (126) 221-3331
Fax: (none)
Email: karwasra@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Joy Kasaaian
PM
IBG
IBG
2001 Jefferson Highway
Ste 310
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jkasaaian@biometricgroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Colonel Beth M Kaspar USAF
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
DA1, Suite 6540
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bmkaspa@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
John Kastanowski
systems engineer
TASC, Inc.
5358 blue aster circle
centreville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jkastanowski@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Kate Kaufer
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kate_Kaufer@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph J La Pilusa
Director, Business Development
Dynamics Reseach Corporation
11440 Commerce Park Drive
Suite 400
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jlapilusa@drc.com
_____________________________________________________
Diane La Voy
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: diane.lavoy@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
David Lacey
Sr. Director
Hughes
11717 Exploration Lane
Germantown , MD 20876
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.lacey@hughes.com
_____________________________________________________
Phillip Lacombe
8700 Cathedral Forest Drive
Fairfax Station , VA 22039
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: phil.lacombe@securemissionsolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
DAVID B LACQUEMENT
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS
CYBERCOM
9800 SAVAGE ROAD
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: RFTYGAR@NSA.GOV
_____________________________________________________
Rudy A Laczkovich
President
Nexidia Federal Solutions, Inc
19984 Augusta Village Pl
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rlaczkovich@nexidia.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steve Lafata
Senior Vice President of Busines
Spectrum
1 Compass Way
Suite 300
Newport News , VA 23606
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Steve.lafata@sptrm.com
_____________________________________________________
Ray LaHood
Secretary
Transportation
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: secretaryscheduler@dot.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ellen Laipson
PIAB Member
PIAB
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Wendy_A._Loehrs@pfiab.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Karen Lamb
4801 Stonecroft Boulevard
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: karen.lamb@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Karen Lamb
TITLE TBD
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Peter Lamb
APG Account Manager
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: peter.lamb@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Dennis Lambell
Vice President/General Manager
BAE Systems
10920 Technology Place
San diego , CA 92127
Phone: (none)
Fax: (858) 592-1086
Email: dennis.lambell@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Brett Lambert
TITLE TBD
Densmore Group
2711 Jenifer Street
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: blambert@densmoregroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Brett Lambert
Deputy Assist. Sec. of Defense
OSD (AT&L)
3330 Defense Pentagon
Rm 3B854
Washington , VA 20301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brett.lambert@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Captain Mike Lambert
7930 Jones Branch Dr
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mike.lambert@centurum.com
_____________________________________________________
Brian D Lamkin
Training and Education
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian.lamkin@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Joseph E Lampert IV
Si Account Executive
Verizon Business
22001 Loudoun County Parkway
Asburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joseph.lampert@one.verizon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Landgraf
Client Principal - DoD Agencies
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bob.landgraf@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephen Landman
2812 9th Street S.
Apt. 201
Arlington , VA 22204
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Landman_Stephen@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
John Landon
VP, NGC
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Landy
Chief Counsel
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kevin_landy@hsgac.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Carol Lane
Vice President
Ball Aerospace
Ball Aerospace & Technologies Co
2111 Wilson Blvd, Suite 1120
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rbturner@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
MS CAROL LANE
VICE PRESIDENT
BALL AEROSPACE
2111 WILSON BLVD
#1120
ARLINGTONV , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: clane@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
MS CAROL LANE
VICE PRESIDENT
BALL AEROSPACE
RONDI TURNER
2111 WILSON BLVD
#1120
ARLINGTON , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rbturner@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Alan MacDougall
Chief, Counter Proliferation Sup
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Alan.MacDougall@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Michael Macedonia
Director
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kcremona@casl.umd.edu(Kelly Cremona-office
mgr-DTO/ODNI)301-226-9124
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Macfarlane
TITLE TBD
Innovative Information Solutions
43647 Warbler Square
Leesburg , VA 20176
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dmacfarlane@iis-us.com
_____________________________________________________
John MacGaffin
Advisor
CSIS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: macgaffinj@centratechnology.com
_____________________________________________________
Stacy Macik
Administrative Executive, Acquis
Software Engineering Institute, CMU
NRECA Building
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Cynthia Mack
Vice President
General Dynamics AIS
10560 Arrowhead Drive
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
John Mackay
Sales Director
Endeca
12369 Sunrise Valley Dr
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andrea.terrazas@carahsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard MacKnight
105 Summers Drive
Alexandria , VA 22301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ramackjr@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jo MacMichael
HCMO Chief of Staff
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jo.macmichael@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Jo MacMichael
1550 Crystal Drive
Suite 502a
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (703) 566-0835
Fax: (none)
Email: jo.macmichael@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Schira Madan
TITLE TBD
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: schira.t.madan@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Reese Madsen
Director of Training and Educati
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: reese.madsen@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tom Madson
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics Corporation
2941 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tmadson@gd.com
_____________________________________________________
Mark Magee
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.magee@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
John Maguire
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: j_maguire@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Larry Maguire
Deputy ITTF
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Laurence.Maguire@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Edward Mahen
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: edward.mahen@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Gina Mahin
TITLE TBD
ExecuTech Strategic Consulting
712 Northwood Avenue
Cherry Hill , NJ 8002
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gina.mahin@esc-techsolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Thomas Mahlik
180 Cameron Station Blvd
Alexandria , VA 22304
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tmahlik@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bruno Mahlmann
VP Business Development
Salient Federal Solutions
8618 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 100
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 940-0084
Email: Bruno.Mahlmann@salientfed.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr Bruno Mahlmann III MS
Vice President
Salient Federal Solutions
4000 Legato Rd, Suite 510
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bmahlmann2@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Sabahat Mahmood
2030 N. Adams St.
Apartment 1412
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: smahmoo3@gmu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Cody Majerus
Cody Majerus
4615 Rose Creek Parkway
Fargo , ND 58104
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: codymajerus@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Vahid Majidi
National Security Branch, WMD
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vahid.majidi@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Alexander Major
Attorney
Sheppard Mullin RIchter & Hampton LLP
1300 I Street NW
11th Floor East
Washinton , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: amajor@sheppardmullin.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Nacht
Assistant Secretary of Defense f
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.nacht@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. J. T Nader
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jtnader@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Nagel
Senior Executive
Accenture
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kevin.s.nagel@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Nagengast
Director
AT&T Government Solutions-NIS
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nagengast@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Garo Nalabandian
Sr. Associate Advisory
KPMG LLP
Garo Nalabandian
1676 International Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 330-5417
Email: gnalabandian@kpmg.com
_____________________________________________________
Adam E Namm
Overseas Buildings and Operation
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nammae@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Samir H Nanavati
1 Battery Park Plaza
29th Floor
New York , NY 10004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: snanavati@ibgweb.com
_____________________________________________________
Scott Nance
Professional Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Scott_Nance@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Nannen
Vice President
Raytheon Company
1200 S. Jupiter Road
MS AA-75000
Garland , TX 75042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jnannen@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
The Honorable Janet Napolitano
Secretary, Department of Homelan
DHS
Nebraska Avenue Center
Washington , D.C. 20528
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: janet.napolitano@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Len Napolitano
TITLE TBD
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque , NM 87185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
James Navarro
Director, Military Intelligence
CSC
8613 Lee Highway
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jnavarro3@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Aradhana Nayak-Rhodes
DIA
DIA
3223 Walbridge Place, NW
Washington , DC 20010
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: anayakrhodes@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Neal
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics C4 Systems
2231 Crystal Drive
Suite 600
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Patrick Neary
TITLE TBD
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patrick.c.neary@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Patrick C Neary
5126 Knapp Pl
Alexandria , VA 22304
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patrick.neary@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jack Neigel
1449 Colleen Lane
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jack@neigelcorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gail Nelson Ph.D.
645 Poplar Avenue
Boulder , CO 80304
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: NelsonSD_83@msn.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Nelson
10302 Eaton Place
Suite 500
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nelson-john@zai.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert Nesbit
TITLE TBD
The MITRE Corporation
7515 Colshire Drive
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rfnesbit@mitre.org
_____________________________________________________
Julia Nesheiwat
Senior Advisor
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nesheiwatj@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Tamara Nestuk
Deputy S1
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joel Neubert
3160 Challenger Point Dr.
Loveland , CO 80538
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jneube@acxiom.com
_____________________________________________________
Tim Neun
Manager, Corporate Communication
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Jeff Neurauter
Attorney Advisor
DHS Office of General Counsel
1616 Ft. Myer Dr
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.neurauter@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Devin O'Brien
Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Devin_Obrien@hsgac.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Geoff O'Connell
Deputy Director, NCTC
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 482-1739
Email: brendalo1@nctc.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Matthew O'Connell
21700 Atlantic Boulevard
Dulles , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: oconnell@geoeye.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Matthew O'Connell
CEO/President
GeoEye
2325 Dulles Corner Blvd.
10th Floor
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 480-8175
Email: o'connell.matthew@geoeye.com
_____________________________________________________
2LT Daniel O'Connor USA
4905 172nd Avenue
Bristol , WI 53104
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: daniel.oconnor30@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael P O'Donnell MS, BS
4201 Wilson Blvd.
Room 455-I
Arlington , VA 22230
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 292-9145
Email: modonnel@nsf.gov
_____________________________________________________
Darcey O'Halloran
TITLE TBD
Deloitte Consulting, LLP
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (401) 862-9025
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. John O'Hara
3038 Traymore Lane
Bowie , MD 20715-2024
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhohara@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
John O'Hara
NSA government employee (GGD-15)
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhohara@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Rob O'Keefe
Chief Technology Officer
Arc Aspicio LLC
3318 Lorcom Lane
Arlington , VA 22207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rfo@arcaspicio.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard O'Lear
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.j.olear@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Cassian O'Rourke
302 Emilies Lane
Severna Park , MD 21146-1513
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cashorourke@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Maj Gen Gary O'Shaughnessy USAF
Vice President, NSG
Oracle Corporation
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gary.oshaughnessy@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Grace O'Sullivan
950 N. Glebe Rd.
Suite 1100
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gosullivan@solers.com
_____________________________________________________
Grace O'Sullivan
Business Development
Solers Inc.
950 N. Glebe Rd.
Suite 1100
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gosullivan@solers.com
_____________________________________________________
Grace O'Sullivan
Marketing and Communications
Solers
950 N. Glebe Road
Suite 1100
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gosullivan@solers.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephanie O'Sullivan
Associate Deputy Director
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 482-1739
Email: bettycd@ucia.gov
_____________________________________________________
Brian O'Toole
Chief Technology Officer
GeoEye
2325 Dulles Corner Blvd.
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Tara O'Toole
Undersecretary for Science & Tec
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: loretta.young@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. William S Oakes
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company
1200 S. Jupiter Road
MS AA-75000
Garland , TX 75042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: oakes@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Oakley
2124 Fox Meadows
Manhattan , KS 66503
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: oakley_david@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Douglas Oakley
VP
Agency Consulting Group
5457 Twin Knolls Road
Columbia , MD 21045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: doakley@acg-hq.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr Armando J Obdola
President
Advanced Security and Intelligence Management Solu
8072 11th ave
Burnaby , British Columbia V3N 2N7
Canada
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: johan.obdola@asims.ca
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Edward Obloy
TITLE TBD
Booz Allen Hamilton
13200 Woodland Park Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: obloy_edward@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Oborn
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.oborn@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kevin Doyle (aka Pushkin, Matthew)
Director, Cyber Programs
SRC, Inc
7502 Round Pond Road
North Syracuse , NY 13212
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: doyle@srcinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Alex P
Computer Consultant
Northrop Grumman
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swardheld@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Lon P
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (703) 834-7980
Fax: (none)
Email: puzzleboks@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Donald E Packham
EAD Human Resources
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donald.packham@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Michael Pafford
Project Manager
The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab
11100 Johns Hopkins Road
MS: MP6 N-629
Laurel , MD 20723
Phone: (none)
Fax: (240) 228-6864
Email: mike.pafford@jhuapl.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joe Page
TITLE TBD
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joseph.page@ca.com
_____________________________________________________
Thomas Page
Advanced Technology
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.j.page@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Linda Pagelson
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda.pagelson@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Christopher Painter
Deputy Director, Cyber
NSC
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christopher_m_painter@nsc.eop.gov
_____________________________________________________
Will Painter
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: will.painter@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Chris Pallotta
APG Account Manager, NIMA
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.pallotta@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Douglas Palmer
TITLE TBD
Deloitte Consulting, LLP
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dpalmer@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Andrew Palowitch
1800 Old Meadow Drive
#1119
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: awp82@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Leon E Panetta
Director
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 482-1739
Email: christyt@ucia.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steve Panzer
ObjectFX
10440 Little Patuxent Parkway
Columbia , MD 21044
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steve.panzer@objectfx.com
_____________________________________________________
Mike Papay
TITLE TBD
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
COL Leesa Papier
Director of Analytics
Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
8125 Sea Water Path
Columbia , MD 21045
Phone: (410) 814-1037
Fax: (none)
Email: leesa.papier@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Robert J Papp
Potential USCG Commandant
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.j.papp@uscg.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Aris Pappas
Senior Director, Inst. For Adv.
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Aris.Pappas@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Aris Pappas
TITLE TBD
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: aris.pappas@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
George Pappas
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: george.pappas@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Christina Pappas-Moir
TITLE TBD
Geospatial Concepts
6212 Squires Hill Drive
Falls Church , VA 22044
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.moir@geospatialconcepts.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Alexander J Paranicas
Business Development Analyst
Lockheed Martin IS&GS
13560 Dulles Technology Drive
Dep 2 - 4th Floor
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: alexander.j.paranicas@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Craig Parisot
Chief Operating Officer
Invertix Corporation
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 800
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Bill Parker
COO
Salient Federal Solutions
4000 Legato Road
Ste 510
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bill.parker@salientfed.com
_____________________________________________________
John Quattrocki
Director
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Frank Quick
TITLE TBD
The MITRE Corporation
7515 Colshire Drive
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fquick@mitre.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. J. Quinn
Vice President, Missile & Space
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Kate Quinn
900 North Washington Street
#302E
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: marykatequinn@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Mary E Quinn
Director, TCA
OUSDI
5000 Defense Pentagon
Washington , DC 203015000
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mary.quinn@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert F Behler (aka Roberts, Robert)
7502 Round Pond Road
North Syracuse , NY 13212
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rfb@srcinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert T Rabito Jr.
46 saunders st
lawrence , MA 1841
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rrabito@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Keny Rader
Project Leader III
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Rado
1376 Apple Hollow
Arnold , MO 63010
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.rado@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Daniel J Ragsdale Ph.D.
Program Manager
DARPA
Dr Ragsdale
3701 Fairfax Drive
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (703) 241-2850
Fax: (none)
Email: daniel.ragsdale@darpa.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Donald J Raines BS, MBA
Director, Business Development
ManTech International Corporation
7799 Leesburg Pike
Suite 700 South
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donald.raines@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Danny E Rains BA
Special Agent
DHS/FEMA
DHS/FEMA
1201 Maryland Ave, SW
Office of Security room 205
Washington , DC 20024
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 646-4646
Email: danny.rains@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Daniel Ramey
2195 Greenkeepers Court
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dbr1211@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Johann Ramos Homeland S
1102 Ronstan dr # 6
killeen , TX 76543
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hsuyang55@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kendra Ramos
2901 Graham Rd.
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kendra.ramos@sri.com
_____________________________________________________
Clark Rampton
11251 Roger Bacon Dr
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ramptonc@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Adrienne Ramsay
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adrienne.ramsay@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sherri Ramsay
Chief, NTOC
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swramsa@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dafna Rand
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: d_rand@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Rick Randall
12012 Sunset Hills Road
Suite 800
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
Email: rick.randall@cobham.com
_____________________________________________________
Rick Randall
1911 N. Fort Myer Dr.
Suite 1100
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rick.randall@cobham.com
_____________________________________________________
Rick Randall
Vice President, Business Develop
Cobham Analytic Solutions
2303 Dulles Station Blvd.
Suite 200
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Rick Randall
VP, Business Development
Cobham Analytic Solutions
Cobham Analytic Solutions
2303 Dulles Station Blvd
Suite 200
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rick.randall@cobham.com
_____________________________________________________
Chris Randolph
No Title - gratis as of Charlie
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christopher.b.randolph@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Christopher Randolph
TITLE TBD
Department of Homeland Security
802 S. Lee St.
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chrisrandolph11@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dick Rankin
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dick.rankin@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
John Ransom
1427 C St NE
Washington , DC 20002
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jransom1984@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Rapp
Director, Joint Intelligence Tas
DIA
Building 6000
Washington , DC 20340-5100
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Jeffrey.Rapp@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Martijn Rasser
8319 Midwood Street
Alexandria , VA 22308
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mrasser@alumni.bates.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Martijn Rasser
8319 Midwood Street
Alexandria , VA 22308
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: martijn.rasser@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Rod Smith Jim Balentine (aka Smith Balentine, Rod Jimmy)
President
Abraxas/Cubic Mission Support Services
Rod Smith
12801 Worldgate Drive
Suite 800
Herndon , DC 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 563-9541
Email: rod.smith@abraxascorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael J Miller (aka Sutton, John)
VP Federal Sector
Global Crossing
12010 Sunset Hills Road
Suite 420
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michael.J.Miller@GlobalCrossing.com
_____________________________________________________
Jennifer Sabbagh
34605 West Twelve Mile Road
Farmington Hills , MI 48331
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sabbaghj@trinity-health.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Patrick Sack
Vice President, Technical/INTEL
Oracle Corporation
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patrick.sack@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
John Saddler
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
2673 Commons Boulevard
Beavercreek , OH 45431
Phone: (937) 488-1079
Fax: (937) 427-6416
_____________________________________________________
Roland Saenz
TITLE TBD
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: saenz_ron@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Roland Saenz USN Retire
Senior Associate
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: saenz_ron@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tony W Sager
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Chief, Vul Analysis & Ops, Suite
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: twsager@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kenneth L. Salazar
Secretary
Interior Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scheduling@ios.doi.gov (Attn: Secretary Salazar)
_____________________________________________________
Keith Salette
TITLE TBD
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Keith.Salette@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
John Saling
Director, Special Programs
MetaCarta, a Division of Qbase
1943 Isaac Newton Square East
Suite 200
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jsaling@metacarta.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gary Salisbury
Vice President, Business Develop
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gary.salisbury@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Charles Salvaggio
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Salvatori
Deputy Undersecretary for Analys
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.salvatori@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
James Sample
1101 Market St
Chattanooga , TN 37402
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: j31k@pge.com
_____________________________________________________
Timothy R Sample
VP, Special Programs Organizatio
Battelle Colonial Place Operations
2111 Wilson Blvd
Suite 1000
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: crockerr@battelle.org
_____________________________________________________
Timothy R Sample
VP, Special Programs Organizatio
Battelle Colonial Place Operations
Tim Sample
2111 Wilson Blvd
Suite 1000
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: crockerr@battelle.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Zachary K Sams
Technical Recruiter
SRC
14685 Avion Parkway
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: zsams@srcinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Justin Samuel
888 N. Quincy Street
603
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: samuel_justin@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Sanders
1551 N. Glenville Drive
Richardson , TX 75081
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
MRS Barbara S Sanderson BSEE
Dir, NGC
Northrop Grumman
1000 Wilson Blvd
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (703) 532-2444
Fax: (703) 741-7790
Email: barbara.sanderson@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Neil Sandhoff
Director of Business Development
Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc
1501 Farm Credit Drive
Suite 2300
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lara Sanford
TITLE TBD
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Lara.Sanford@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Terry Santavicca
TITLE TBD
TASC
4805 Stonecroft Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: terry.santavicca@tasc.com
_____________________________________________________
Anthony Santino
11717 Exploration Lane
Germantown , MD 20876
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: anthony.santino@hughes.com
_____________________________________________________
Matt Stern
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Matthew.Stern@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Tracy G Stevens
President
Innoviss
8401 Connecticut Avenue
Chevy Chase , MD 20815
Phone: (301) 879-9433
Fax: (301) 656-0625
Email: tgraves@innoviss.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bruce Stewart
SVP
CACI
40 Wyoming Dr.
Jackson , NJ 8527
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Bstewart@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bruce Stewart
Senior Vice President
CACI
40 Wyoming Dr
Jackson , NJ 8527
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: BStewart@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Stewart
8301 Greensboro Drive
McLean , VA 22079
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stewartmj@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael J Stewart
VP, Business Development Directo
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.j.stewart@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Vincent Stewart
Director of Intelligenceáááááááá
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Vincent.stewart@usmc.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stan Stimms
Director, Security
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stan.stimms@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Brian Stites
CAG for the Consolidated Staff (
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bmstite@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathryn N Stockhausen
1220 East West Highway
Apt 218
Silver Spring , MD 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: knicolestockhausen@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Paul Stockton
Assistant Secretary for Homeland
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Don Stokes
Director, Strategic Tech, Joint
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 482-1739
Email: donaljo@ucia.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Stolarik
President,COO
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mike.stolarik@analex.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Corin Stone
Deputy General Counsel and Actin
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: corin.stone@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Don Stone
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: d_stone@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Garnett Stowe
Vice President, National Intelli
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gstowe@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Sam Stowers
412 East 21st Street
Sioux Falls , SD 57105
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stowers.sam@spectrumresolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Timothy A Strait
25050 Riding Plaza
#130-150
South Riding , VA 20152
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tstrait@msshq.com
_____________________________________________________
Andy Strampach
Vice President Business Developm
Cobham Analytic Solutions
5875 Trinity Parkway
Suite 300
Centreville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Richard Strathearn
Sr. Mgr Business Development
Lockheed Martin
1111 Lockheed Martin Way
O/P7AS, B/156E
Sunnyvale , CA 94089
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.a.strathearn@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Linda Strating
1521 16th St. NW
Washington , DC 20036
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: strating@iwp.edu
_____________________________________________________
Steve Stratton
SVP Business Development
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Herbert Strauss
6230 Jean Louise Way
Alexandria , VA 22310
Phone: (703) 313-9664
Fax: (none)
Email: herb.strauss@gartner.com
_____________________________________________________
Rob Strayer
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rob_strayer@hsgac.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Cara J Streb
VP/Division Manager
CACI
14046 Eagle Chase Circle
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cstreb@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Jennifer E Sims
3600 N St. NW,
Georgetown Univ. Mortara Ctr.
Washington , DC 20057
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Sims.jennifer@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Stan Sims
Dir Of Security
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ssims@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joshua Sinai
1501 Farm Credit Dr.
Ste 2300
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joshua.sinai@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr Justin M Sinclair MS
Intelligence Analyst
Dept of Defense
4603 Holborn Ave
Annandale , VA 22003
Phone: (571) 282-5802
Fax: (none)
Email: jmsinclair@gmx.com
_____________________________________________________
RADM Andrew M Singer
Chair for Intelligence
US Navy
6 Deer Forest Dr
Monterey , CA 93940
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: singer.andy@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Hilery Sirpis
Vice President
Government Executive
ADDRESS TBD
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ike Skelton Rep.
Chair
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ike.skelton@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
John Skordas
TITLE TBD
SRA
4350 Fair Lakes Court
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jskordas@raba.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Skulte
Program Manager
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rskulte@lmi.org
_____________________________________________________
R. D Slack Department
speaker of the faculty senate at
Texas A&M
TX
77843-2258 , -979 D-slack@tamu.
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: D-slack@tamu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Jason Slackney
1746 Gilson St.
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: j_slackney@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Bob Slapnik MBA & BS
7212 Chestnut Street
Chevy Chase , MD 20815
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 654-8745
Email: bob@hbgary.com
_____________________________________________________
Anne-Marie Slaughter
Policy Planning
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: slaughtera@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. J. C Smart
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
NSOC, Suite 6433
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jcsmart@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Teresa Smetzer
Strategic Account Executive
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tsmetzer@lmi.org
_____________________________________________________
Angela Smigel
Sr. Staff Administrator
Ensco, Inc.
5400 Port Royal Road
Springfield , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 321-4609
Email: smigel.angela@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Lynn Smiroldo
Director of Business Managment
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lynn.smiroldo@qinetiq-na.com
_____________________________________________________
Melissa Smislova
Director
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Melissa.Smislova@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Brandon Smith
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brandon.smith@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Bryan Smith
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: B_Smith@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Clifton L Smith
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Conrad Smith
TITLE TBD
SR Technologies, Inc.
4101 SW 47 Ave
Suite 102
Fort Lauderdale , FL 33314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Courtney Smith
GeoEye
21700 Atlantic Blvd.
Suite 500
Dulles , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: smith.courtney@geoeye.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Smith
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dsmith@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. H. G Smith
Chief Scientist
NGA
4600 Sangamore Rd., M/D D-82
Bethesda , MD 20816
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Harold.G.Smith@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Kay Sears
President
Intelsat General Corporation
6550 Rock Spring Drive
Suite 450
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kay.sears@intelsatgeneral.com
_____________________________________________________
Kim Seastrom
Admin
The MITRE Corporation
7515 Colshire Dr
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: seastrom@mitre.org
_____________________________________________________
Kathleen Sebelius
Secretary
Health and Human Services Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Shelly.watson@hhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Sebra
Director, Recruiting
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.sebra@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Adam Sedgewick
Cyber
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: adam_sedgewick@hsgac.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Segal
Director, Westfield Ops
L-3 Communications - Government Services, Inc.
15049 Conference Center Drive
Suite 200
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.segal@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Mark Segal
TITLE TBD
L-3 Communications - Government Services, Inc.
15049 Conference Center Drive
Suite 200
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.segal@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
CHARLES SEGARS
2850 OCEAN PARK BLVD
STE 225
SANTA MONICA , CA 90405
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: CDSEGARS@LASD.ORG
_____________________________________________________
Heather Seidl
Business Analyst
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: heather.seidl@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Seidl
1490 Garden of the Gods Road
Suite B
Colorado Springs , CO 80907
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mike.seidl@rpssol.com
_____________________________________________________
John Sekula
2111 Wilson Blvd.,
Suite 1120
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sharon Sellars
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathleen Sellers
Program Manager
Sensa Solutions
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kathleen.Sellers@sensasolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Amber Sells
Unknown
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Semancik
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wsemancik54@comcast.net; or wsemancik@ieee.net; or
wjseman@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ralph Semmel
Director
Johns Hopkins University, APL
11100 Johns Hopkins Road
Room 17-S344
Laurel , MD 20723
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ralph.semmel@jhuapl.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Peter Senholzi
Director, Business Development
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: psenholzi@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Senich
7220 Old Dominion Drive
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wmsenich@us.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
Arthur Sepeta
Assistant General Counsel
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: arthur.sepeta@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Arun Seraphin
Cyber
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: arun_seraphin@armed-services.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Allan Servi
Senior Vice President
Terremark
460 Spring Park Place
Suite 1000
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: aservi@terremark.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephanie Sever
Operations Manager
The Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC
1890 Preston White Drive
Suite 250
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephanie@intellacademy.com
_____________________________________________________
Kristin Seward
TITLE TBD
DIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kristin.seward@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Matthew A Shabat
7541 Heatherton Lane
Potomac , MD 20854
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Shackelford
47317 Ox Bow
Potomac Falls , VA 20165
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mikeshackelford@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Michelle Shader
Director of Marketing
Qwest Communications
4250 N. Fairfax Dr.
5th Floor
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michelle.shader@qwest.com
_____________________________________________________
Michelle Shader
TITLE TBD
Qwest Communications
4250 N. Fairfax Dr.
5th Floor
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michelle.shader@qwest.com
_____________________________________________________
Michelle Shader
Marketing Director
Qwest Government Services, Inc.
4250 N. Fairfax Dr
5th Fl
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michelle.shader@qwest.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Curt Shaffer
Executive Director
Global Tech Ops
2 Davenport Drive
Downingtown , PA 19335
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cshaffer@globaltechops.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Glen Shaffer
President & COO
Kforce Government Solutions
2750 Prosperity Ave.
Suite 300
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gshaffer@dnovus.com
_____________________________________________________
Glen Shaffer
Executive Vice President
KGS
1355 Central Parkway S.
Ste 100
San Antonio , TX 78232
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gshaffer@kgsgov.com
_____________________________________________________
Glen Shaffer
Executive Vice President
KGS
1355 Central Parkway S
Ste 100
San Antonio , TX 78232
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gshaffer@kforcegov.com
_____________________________________________________
Tiffany Shaffery
Intelligence Analyst
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tshaffery@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Shahady
4390 Powder Horn Drive
Beavercreek , OH 45432
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pashahady@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Shaheen
8509 Hempstead Avenue
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mshaheen@civitasgroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John A Shakespeare
9417 Goldfield Lane
Burke , VA 22015-4213
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Zani Drizan Shala YES
Coordinator off AKC
Association of Kosovo Criminallist -Justice
Prishtina
Prishtina 11000
Yugoslavia
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: drizan.shala@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Stanley Shanfield PhD
Technical Program Director
Draper Laboratory
555 Technology Square
Cambridge , MA 02465
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sshanfield@draper.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Shank
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
2727 Technology Drive
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Susan Shapero
Director, Advd Tech PGeneral Man
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: susan.shapero@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Andrew J Shapiro
Political-Military Affairs
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: shapiroaj@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Tammi Shapiro
Public Sector Operations Manager
Quest Software - Public Sector Group
700 King Farm Boulevard
Suite 250
Rockville , MD 20850
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tammi.shapiro@quest.com
_____________________________________________________
Mark B Shappee
674 County Square Drive, Suite 1
Ventura , CA 93003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark@venturemanagement.com
_____________________________________________________
Theodore Sharp
Business Manager
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sharptd@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
mr nigel l sharpe
Nigel Sharpe
410X, Ridgeway,
Lusaka 100100
Zambia
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nigelsharpe07@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Pleaman F Shaver
4048 Higley Rd
Bldg 1452
Dahlgren , VA 22448
Phone: (540) 775-0477
Fax: (none)
Email: pshaver@jwac.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. K. Shea
14668 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: k.stuart.shea@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
K. S Shea
President, Intelligence, Securit
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: k.stuart.shea@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Philip Shea
Director, Intelligence, DHS
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: phil.shea@qinetiq-na.com
_____________________________________________________
Stu Shea
Group President
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sheaks@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Daniel Shostak
2445 Lyttonsville Road
#1505
Silver Spring , MD 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: danielshos@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Justin Shum
INSA OCI Task Force
Raytheon
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen Sibold
12 Pennsbury Ct.
Fredericksburg , VA 22406
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lecsas0930@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Vincent Sica
Program Management Vice Presiden
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vincent.n.sica@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Siebert
Director, Defense Agencies Group
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.siebert@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert A Siebert
Director, HP APG Fed Sales
Hewlett Packard
Robert Siebert
1582 Rossback Road
Davidsonville , MD 21035
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.siebert@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Siebs
Vice President, Deputy Business
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dsiebs@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Steve Sieke
SVP IT and Professional Svcs
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Renee Siemiet
4504 West Juniper Drive, Apt B
USAF Academy , CO 80840
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: renee.siemiet@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Rhea Siers
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
DC3, Suite 6248
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rdsiers@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jenn Silk
TITLE TBD
DoD
13646 Forest Pond Court
Centreville , VA 20121
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jksilk@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jennifer Silk
13646 Forest Pond Ct
Centreville , VA 20121
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jennifer.silk@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Captain Joel Silk
702 E. Capitol St NE
Washington , DC 20003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joel.silk@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Joel Silk
TITLE TBD
NSA
13646 Forest Pond Court
Centreville , VA 20121
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joel.silk@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mark Silver
Acting Deputy
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.silver@usmc.mil
_____________________________________________________
Robert Silver
MSC 3BF
New Mexico State University
Las Crusez , NM 88003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rsilver@msu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ariel Silverstone
3530 Berkeley Park Ct
Duluth , GA 30096
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: arielsilverstone@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Bob Simmons
Minority Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bob.simmons@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Janet A Simmons Masters
EVP and COO
Global Resource Solutions, Incorporated
Janet Simmons
1001 N. Fairfax Street
Suite 420
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (301) 274-0741
Fax: (703) 535-7866
Email: jsimmons@grsco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Simmons
Account Executive
Dell Inc.
One Dell Way
One Dell Way
Round Rock , TX 78682
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul_e_simmons@dell.com
_____________________________________________________
Denis Simon
School of International Affairs
245 Katz Building
University Park , PA 16802
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jim Simon
General Manager, Inst. For Adv.
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jisimon@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Alan Simpson
1520 Spruce Street
#101
Philadelphia , PA 19102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: intel@comlinks.com
_____________________________________________________
Renee Simpson
S&I Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Renee_Simpson@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Jennifer Sims
School of Foreign Service
Washington , DC 20057
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jes67@georgetown.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Sheaffer
President, N.American Public Sec
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jsheaffer@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Hal Shear
TITLE TBD
GrayDome, Inc.
P.O. Box 5902
Annapolis , MD 21403
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hshear@graydome.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jacob Shebel
5574 Burnside Drive
#4
Rockville , MD 20853
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jacob.shebel@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jacob Shebel
TITLE TBD
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jacob.shebel@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Earl Sheck
Vice President, Defense Intellig
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: earl.sheck@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Shedd
Deputy Director of National Inte
DIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.shedd@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steve Sheldon
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
K8, Suite 6672
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Andrea Shemel
Principal Consultant
Oracle
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andrea.shemel@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Lori Shepard
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: l_shepard@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Sheppard
Vice President, Geo-Intel Group
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.sheppard@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Veronica C Sherard
Divison Manager, Strategic BD
ENSCO, Inc.
Veronica Sherard
3110 Fairview Park Drive
Suite 300
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (321) 724-6487
Fax: (321) 783-9511
Email: sherard.veronica@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian E Sheridan
8 Woodmere Circle
Middletown , MD 21769
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: briansheridan9@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian E Sheridan
BAE Systems
4075 Wilson Blvd
Suite 900
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 387-7607
Email: brian.sheridan@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
William Shernit
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Marc Shichman
Project Manager
White Oak Technologiese, Inc.
1300 Spring Street
Suite 320
Silver Spring , VA 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Patrick Shields
TITLE TBD
ASI Government
1655 North Fort Meyer Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jorge Shimabukuro
Chief of Staff, Security
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jorge.shimabukuro@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Eric Shinseki
Secretary, General
Veterans Affairs
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: secva@va.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Masahiro Shiomi
1800 K st NW
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: msiomijp@gmai.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jean M Shipley
Communication Marketing Manager
Ciena Corporation
1185 Sanctuary Parkway
Suite 300
Alpharetta , GA 30004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jshipley@ciena.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Shissler
P.O. Box 2153
Ellicott City , MD 21041
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: John.Shissler@jhuapl.edu
_____________________________________________________
Bryan Shonka
Security Technology
MPI Research
54943 N Main Street
Mattawan , MI 49071
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bryan.shonka@mpiresearch.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Marvin Shoop
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Craig Short
TITLE TBD
Aligent
1615 7th Street S.W.
MS: 130
Everett , WA 98203-6261
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: craig_short@agilent.com
_____________________________________________________
Nadia Short
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Nadia.Short@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Cara Jo Streb
Director, Line
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cstreb@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Travis Stright
Student
American University
6490 River Run
Columbia , MD 21044
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: travis.stright@american.edu
_____________________________________________________
COL Donald Strimbeck USA(Ret)
109 Broad St.
P.O Box 519
Granville , WV 26534
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dcsoinks@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Dayna Strong
Executive Assistant to the VP
Eagle Alliance
2711 Technology Drive
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dstrong2@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Angela Stubblefield
TSA Intelligence
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Angela.H.Stubblefield@faa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Richard Stubblefield
1000 Independence Ave.
Washington , DC 20585
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.stubblefield@nnsa.doe.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bruce Stubbs
EA for Maritime Domain Awareness
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bruce.stubbs@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Stuckey
3867 Chain Bridge Road
Fairfax , VA 22030-3903
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Bookbear1@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Bill Studeman
Consultant
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Carl Stuekerjuergen
102 Norwood Place
Sterling , VA 20164
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carlrita.stuekerjuergen@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Alicia Stump
Marketing Communications Coordin
Cobham Analytic Solutions
5875 Trinity Parkway
Suite 300
Centreville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jerry Stump
3734 Thomas Point Road
Annapolis , MD 21403
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jerry.stump@centurum.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Mary Sturtevant
Vice President, Intelligence
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mary.k.sturtevant@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Sarita Subbarao
Former INSA Intern
Chertoff Group, LLC
1110 Vermont Ave. NW
Suite 1200
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Minda Suchan
Director
ITT Geospatial
Minda Suchan
12930 Worldgate Dr, Suite 150
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (310) 919-7687
Fax: (571) 703-7471
Email: minda.suchan@itt.com
_____________________________________________________
Laura Sucre
Program Manager
IBM - Federal Public Sector
2902 Beau Lane
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lsucre@us.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
Daniel Suh
110 s.wise st
arlington , VA 22204
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donchicus@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Sulick
Chief, National Clandestine Serv
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 482-1973
Email: christyt@ucia.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Linda Sullivan
TITLE TBD
NRO
6319 Rockwell Road
Burke , VA 22015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: linda.sullivan@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sally Sullivan
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Tim Sullivan
Tim Sullivan
305 Rockrimmon S
Colorado Springs , CO 80919
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tsullivan@pcscm.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Troy Sullivan
Director, Counterintelligence
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: troy.sullivan@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Yvette Sullivan
Program Director
The SI
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: helen.d.demes@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Yvette Sullivan
Program Management
the SI
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: yvette.f.sullivan@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
George Sumrall
15036 Conference Center Dr.
Suite 500 East
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard E Sunday
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
F6, Suite 6905
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: resunda@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Laura Sunden
Marketing Manager
SR Technologies, Inc.
4101 SW 47 Ave
Suite 102
Fort Lauderdale , FL 33314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Lsunden
_____________________________________________________
Mr Thomas D Sundling
CEO
Secure Mission Solutions
11921 Freedom Drive Suite 730
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tsundling@securemissionsolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Surrette
1919 Storm Drive
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: RJSurrette@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
John Sutton
SVP Business Development
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Swain
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jswain@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Darin Swan Masters
6517 Livingston Rd
Apt 103
Oxon Hill , MD 20745
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: digdug113@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James K Swanson MBA, MIPP
Senior Vice Presidneet
Finmeccanica
1625 Eye Street, NW
12th Floor
WASHINGTON , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 225-6584
Email: james.swanson@finmeccanica.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scott Swanson
1431 Hunter
Suite A.
Naperville , IL 60540
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chief@delphiresearch.us
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Swanson
Chairman & CEO
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william_h_swanson@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Susan Swart
Asst Sec Chief Info Officer
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swarts@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Swartz
6454 Woodmere Place
Centreville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joseph.h.swartz@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Swetnam
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mikeswet@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Mike Swetnam
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mswetnam@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Khizer Syed
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: khizer.syed@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Sherill Sylvertooth
1855 Saint Francis Street
#2105
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ssylvertooth@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Syphrit
2324 Fairview Terrace
Alexandria , VA 22303
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.syphrit@pentagon.af.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Syphrit
Targeting Action Officer
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.syphrit@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Laszlo Szente
2455 Rolling Plains Drive
Herndon , VA 20171-2275
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: SzenteLS@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Sheaffer
President, N.American Public Sec
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jsheaffer@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Hal Shear
TITLE TBD
GrayDome, Inc.
P.O. Box 5902
Annapolis , MD 21403
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hshear@graydome.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jacob Shebel
5574 Burnside Drive
#4
Rockville , MD 20853
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jacob.shebel@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jacob Shebel
TITLE TBD
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jacob.shebel@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Earl Sheck
Vice President, Defense Intellig
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: earl.sheck@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Shedd
Deputy Director of National Inte
DIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.shedd@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steve Sheldon
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
K8, Suite 6672
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Andrea Shemel
Principal Consultant
Oracle
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andrea.shemel@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Lori Shepard
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: l_shepard@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Sheppard
Vice President, Geo-Intel Group
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.sheppard@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Veronica C Sherard
Divison Manager, Strategic BD
ENSCO, Inc.
Veronica Sherard
3110 Fairview Park Drive
Suite 300
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (321) 724-6487
Fax: (321) 783-9511
Email: sherard.veronica@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian E Sheridan
8 Woodmere Circle
Middletown , MD 21769
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: briansheridan9@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brian E Sheridan
BAE Systems
4075 Wilson Blvd
Suite 900
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 387-7607
Email: brian.sheridan@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
William Shernit
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Marc Shichman
Project Manager
White Oak Technologiese, Inc.
1300 Spring Street
Suite 320
Silver Spring , VA 20910
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Patrick Shields
TITLE TBD
ASI Government
1655 North Fort Meyer Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jorge Shimabukuro
Chief of Staff, Security
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jorge.shimabukuro@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Eric Shinseki
Secretary, General
Veterans Affairs
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: secva@va.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Masahiro Shiomi
1800 K st NW
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: msiomijp@gmai.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jean M Shipley
Communication Marketing Manager
Ciena Corporation
1185 Sanctuary Parkway
Suite 300
Alpharetta , GA 30004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jshipley@ciena.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Shissler
P.O. Box 2153
Ellicott City , MD 21041
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: John.Shissler@jhuapl.edu
_____________________________________________________
Bryan Shonka
Security Technology
MPI Research
54943 N Main Street
Mattawan , MI 49071
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bryan.shonka@mpiresearch.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Marvin Shoop
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Craig Short
TITLE TBD
Aligent
1615 7th Street S.W.
MS: 130
Everett , WA 98203-6261
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: craig_short@agilent.com
_____________________________________________________
Nadia Short
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Nadia.Short@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jamileh Soudah
1000 Indendence Ave SW
NA-116, FOR 4B-044
Washington , DC 20585
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jamileh.soudah@nnsa.doe.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Trumbull D Soule
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tdsoule@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Peter Sowa
Program Dir Intel Svcs Ctr
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Anthony Spadaro
President
Spadaro & Associates
4634 North 38th Street
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: spadaro@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathryn Spear
Kathryn Spear
1000 Technology Dr.
Pittsburgh , PA 15219
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kathryn.Spear@ansaldo-sts.us
_____________________________________________________
Elyssa J Speier
Kipps DeSanto & Company
1600 Tysons Blvd
Suite 375
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Elizabeth Spiegle
Program Manager
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: elizabeth.spiegle@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Larry Spilman
13542 Travilah Road
North Potomac , MD 20878-3800
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: l.spilman@att.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Karl Spinnenweber
Director, Business Development
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kspinnen@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Noah Spivak
Principal
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: spivak_noah@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George Spix
Architect, Inst. For Adv. Tech i
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gspix@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Daniel Spohn
TITLE TBD
The Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC
1890 Preston White Drive
Suite 250
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: danspohn@msn.com
_____________________________________________________
William Springer
25208 Larks Terrace
South Riding , VA 20152
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bllspringer@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
DJ Spry
2454 Chelmsford Dr
Crofton , MD 21114
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: djspry@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Spugnardi
5849 North 26th St
Arlington , VA 22207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jspug@vt.edu
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lisa Spuria
Deputy Director, Analysis and Pr
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 227-7451
Email: lisa.j.spuria@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Squier
Police Dept, 100 Bureau Dr.
Bldg 101,Rm A-16
Gaithersburg , MD 20899-1911
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.squier@nist.gov
_____________________________________________________
Judy St. George
Executive Assistant
FedCap Partners, LLC
11951 Freedom Drive
13th Floor
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Craig A Stafford II II
13510 Oaklands Manor Drive
Laurel , MD 20708
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: StaffordC88@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Carl Stahlman
10241 Bristol Channel
Ellicott City , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carl.stahlman@mac.com
_____________________________________________________
Sandra Stanar-Johnson
NSA Liaison to DHS
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sstanar@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Eric Stange
Senior Executive
Accenture
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eric.s.stange@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Joe Stanisha
4501 N. Fairfax Dr
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Leon R Stanley
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
SSG, Suite 6441
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lrstanl@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Stanton
619 S Garfield St
Arlington , VA 22204
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: camus666ster@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dave Stapley
SVP, International Business Deve
DRS Technologies, Inc.
5 Sylvan Way
Parsippany , NJ 7054
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dstapley@drs.ca.com
_____________________________________________________
Wayne Starrs
Sr Director, Apps Dev
General Dynamics IT, NDIS
13857 McLearen Road
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wayne.starrs@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Alissa Starzak
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: a_starzak@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
CJ Staton
INSA OCI Task Force
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Carol Staubach
11659 Gilman Lane
Herndon , VA 20170-2420
Phone: (703) 430-0924
Fax: (none)
Email: carols2002@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Carol Staubach
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
11659 Gilman Lane
Herndon , VA 20170-2420
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: staubach_carol@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Staubach
11659 Gilman Ln
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tstaubach@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Rodolfo Steckerl
U.S. EMBASSY BOGOTA
DOJ
RODOLFO STECKERL
70452 HWY 21 SUITE 200-125
COVINGTON , LA 70433
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George Steeg
Consultant
ProposalCrafter
20550 Falcons Landing Circle
#5005
Potomac Falls , VA 20165-3586
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gfsteeg@proposalcrafter.com
_____________________________________________________
Catherine J Steele
VP, Strategic Space Ops
The Aerospace Corporation
Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447
2310 E. El Segundo Blvd.
El Segundo , CA 90245
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: catherine.j.steele@aero.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Delvicciho Steele
814 Sero Pine Lane
Fort Washington , MD 20744
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dsteele128@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Delvicciho Steele
TITLE TBD
DIA
814 Sero Pine Lane
Fort Washington , MD 20744
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Delvicciho.Steele@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kent Steen
121 North Cove Drive
Ponte Vedra Beach , FL 32082
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kent.steen@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Stefan
5485 Ashleigh Road
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wfstefan@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Stefan
5485 Ashleigh Road
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Victoria Steffes
42 Dixon Street
Madison , WI 53704
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vsteffes@wisc.edu
_____________________________________________________
Mark Steidler
Marketing Coordinator
NeoSystems Corp.
8000 Towers Crescent Drive
Suite 710
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: msteidler@neosystemscorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Christopher Steinbach
TITLE TBD
Newberry Group
2510 Old Highway 94 South
St. Charles , MO 63303
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Christopher J Steinbach
President & CEO
Newberry Group
2510 Old Highway 94 South
St. Charles , MO 63303
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: csteinbach@thenewberrygroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. craig Steinberg
Sr Partner
Meridian Group International
219 S.E. 25th Ave.
Boynton Beach , FL 33435
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: csteinberg@meridiangroupintl.com
_____________________________________________________
James B Steinberg
Deputy Secretary
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: SteinbergJB@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Steinke
6034 Richmond Hwy.
Apt 505
Alexandria , VA 22303-2109
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.steinke@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Kristen Stephen
Legislative Assistant/Legis Fell
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kristen.Stephen@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Trae Stephens
Forward Deployed Engineer
Palantir Technologies
1660 International Drive
8th Floor
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George Stephenson
Dir, NGES
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: george.stephenson@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Jim Smythers
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: j_smythers@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Albert Snell
TITLE TBD
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: albert.snell@ca.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Fredd Snell
TITLE TBD
USIS
7799 Leesburg Pike
Suite 400 S
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fredd.snell@usis.com
_____________________________________________________
Gordon Snow
Acting Director, Cyber Division
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gordon.snow@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Asst. Sec. James Snyder
Deputy Assistant Secretary, NPPD
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.snyder@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey C Snyder
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Michael A Snyder
Associate
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (410) 858-7706
Fax: (none)
Email: snyder_michael@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Rodney Snyder
20704 Parkside Circle
Potomac Falls , VA 20165
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: RodneyASnyder@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scott Snyder
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Vince Snyder
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Vince Snyder
Vice President, Defense Systems
The SI
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: helen.d.demes@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gary Sojka
Partner
The Potomac Advocates
7360 Bloomington Court
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gary@potadv.com
_____________________________________________________
Dan Soliman
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
2305 Mission College Boulevard
Santa Clara , CA 95054
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Sarah Soliman
1115 Old Cedar Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sklovell@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Hilda L. Solis
Secretary
Labor Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ExecutiveSecretariat@dol.gov
_____________________________________________________
Carl Solomon
Vice President
Entegra Systems
2342 Ballard Way
Ellicott City , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carl@entegrasystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Linda K Solomon
Principal
Deloitte Consulting
Earlease Jackson
1001 G Street, NW
Suite 900W
Washington , DC 20001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 661-1670
Email: lsolomon@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
LCDR Timothy C Sommella
Program Reviewer
U.S. Coast Guard
COMDT (CG-82)
U.S. Coast Guard
2100 2nd Street SW STOP 7245
Washington , DC 20593
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: timothy.c.sommella@uscg.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mark Sommer
1266 Teaneck Road
#10A
Teaneck , NJ 7666
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brocean@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen Songy
716 Earl of Chesterfield Lane
Virginia Beach , VA 23454
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stevesongy@mjww.net
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Allan Sonsteby
Assoicate Director, Communicatio
Pennsylvania State University - App. Research Labo
P.O. Box 30
State College , PA 16804
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ags108@only.arl.psu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Marcus Soriano B.A. Psy.
Contract Assistant
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Mclean , VA 22204
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: marcus.l.soriano@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Eric Sosnitsky
Director, Government Sales
Core180, Inc.
2751 Prosperity Drive
Suite 200
Vienna , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Pamela Sotnick
TITLE TBD
Composite Software Inc.
11921 Freedom Drive
Suite 550
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Pamela Sotnick
Account Manager
Composite Software Inc.
11921 Freedom Drive
Suite 550
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pam@compositesw.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Hal Smith
Vice President, Intelligence & L
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hsmith30@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Smith
none
Arnold & Porter
555 Twelfth Street, NW
Washington , DC 20004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Jeffrey_Smith@aporter.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey E Smith
VP BD DoD
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey E Smith
VP
Serco
Jeffrey Smith
1818 Library St
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: JESmith@serco-na.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joel Smith
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jrsmith@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Smith
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John T Smith
12508 Ridgegate Drive
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jsmith611@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Smith
4822 Union Cypress Place
West Melbourne , FL 32904
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jcsmithjr@cfl.rr.com
_____________________________________________________
Judy Smith
TITLE TBD
ITT
12975 Worldgate Dr.
Building M1
Herdon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: judy.smith@itt.com
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Smith
2122 Massachusetts Ave NW
Apt 209
Washington , DC 20008
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kws.international@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Smith
3782 Plum Meadow Drive
Ellicott City , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michaelmasmth@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Smith
3620 Beacon Point St
Las Vegas , NV 89133
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: msi@co.clark.nv.us
_____________________________________________________
Michael Smith
3620 Beacon Point Street
Las Vegas , NV 89129
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: msi@co.clark.nv.us
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Neal A Smith
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
I, Suite 6577
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nasmith@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Smith
Assistant Vice President, Specia
Intec Billing, Inc.
301 North Perimeter Center
Suite 200
Atlanta , GA 30346
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.smith@intecbilling.com
_____________________________________________________
Ray Smith
Program Manager
National Counterterrorism Center
8531 Welsh Pony Ct
Gainesville , VA 20155
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ray.smith@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ray Smith
Project Manager
NCTC
8531 Welsh Pony Ct
Gainesville , VA 20155
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ray.c.smith@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Raymond Smith
8531 Welsh Pony Ct.
Gainsville , VA 20155
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ray.smith@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Richard Smith (aka Smith Balentine, Rod Jimmy)
PO Box 1650
Soquel , CA 95073
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: california.globalist@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Rod Smith
Abraxas Corp
12801 Worldgate Dr
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Rodney Smith
Abraxas Corporation
12801 Worldgate Drive, Suite 800
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rsmith@abraxascorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Rodney Smith
President
Abraxas Corporation
12801 Worldgate Dr
Suite 800
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (301) 881-0126
Fax: (703) 821-8511
Email: rsmith@abraxascorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ronald Smith
236 West Sixth St.
Suite 206
Reno , NV 89503
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ron.smith@chw.edu
_____________________________________________________
Zannie Smith
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Zannie.smith@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gregory Smithberg
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Max Poma
3801 Nebraska Avenue
Washington , DC 20016
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: max.poma@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
David Pomerantz
Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.pomerantz@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sabrina Porcelli
4 University Road
#409
Cambridge , MA 2138
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sabrinaporcelli@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Elizabeth M Porter
Director, Energy Initiatives
Lockheed Martin, Corporate Engineering & Technolog
6801 Rockledge Drive
#352
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 897-6822
Email: liz.porter@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Pamela L Porter
Director, NSA Office of Small Bu
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: plporte@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Scott Porter
VP, NGES
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Terry Porter
Director, Intelligence Programs
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: terrybev@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Terry Porter
Director, Intelligence Programs
Harris Corporation
P.O. Box 37
MS: 2-21D
Melbourne , FL 32902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: terry_porter@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Terry Porter
Director Intelligence Programs
Raytheon Company
6225 Brandon Avenue
Suite 320
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tporte03@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Norman Portner
18221 Cypress Point Terrace
Leesburg , VA 20176
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nportner@npci.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael H Posner
Asst Sec Democracy, Human rights
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: posnermh@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Gregg Potter
Vice J2
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gregg.potter@js.pentagon.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jack Potter
General Manager, Ops & Sustainme
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jack.potter@esi.baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Brian Potts
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Brian_Potts@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard E Pound
205 Van Buren Street, Suite 300
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Richard.E.Pound@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Carl Powe
5614 Alta Dena St.
Huntsville , AL 35802
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cpowe@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Benjamin Powell
Partner
Wilmer Hale
803 Beverley Drive
Alexandria , VA 22302
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ben.powell@wilmerhale.com
_____________________________________________________
Hannah Powell
Special Assistant, Undersecretar
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Hannah.Powell@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Hannah R Powell
1255 New Hampshire Ave, NW
Apt 214
Washington , DC 20036
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Nancy J Powell
HR
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: powellnj@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Henry Power
TITLE TBD
Lockheed Martin Corporation
6029 Hortons Mill Court
Haymarket , VA 20169
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: henry.power@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Mary Predenkoski
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Keith M Preising BA & MS
Specialist Master
Deloitte Consulting
Keith M. Preising
1919 North Lynn Street
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (703) 793-9811
Fax: (none)
Email: kpreising@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ray Prescott
Regional Vice President, INTEL
Oracle Corporation
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: raymond.prescott@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Mary C Presnell
Cathy Presnell
1676 International Drive
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 318-2274
Email: mpresnell@kpmg.com
_____________________________________________________
Salvatore Presti
Vice President
Eti Engineering Inc.
4219 Lafayette Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sal.presti@eti-eng.com
_____________________________________________________
Salvatore Presti
Vice President
ETI Engineering, Inc.
4219 Lafayette Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 318-7102
Email: sal.presti@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Bernadette Preston
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
R3, Suite 6883
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Stephen Preston
General Counsel
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christyt@ucia.gov
_____________________________________________________
Doug Price
Operations Manager
Cobham Analytic Solutions
5875 Trinity Parkway
Suite 300
Centreville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Laura Price
1676 International Drive
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lprice@kpmg.com
_____________________________________________________
Laura Price
Partner
KPMG LLP
Laura Price
1676 International Drive
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lprice@kpmg.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Price
1934 Old Gallows Road
#350
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mprice@jamitek.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Dana Priest
Staff Writer
The Washington Post
1150 15th St. NW
Washington , DC 20071
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: priestd@washpost.com
_____________________________________________________
Jayne P Prin
Dir of Leadership
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jayne.p.prin@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Tim Prince
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Tim.Prince@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Larry Prior
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lawrence.prior@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Todd Probert
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Prohaska
7403 Gateway Court
Manassas , VA 20109
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jprohaska@fulcrumco.com
_____________________________________________________
William Prosser
Client Business Manager
AT&T Government Solutions-NIS
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 100
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wp5243@att.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gary Pulliam
Vice President, Civil & Commerci
The Aerospace Corporation
Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447
2310 E. El Segundo Blvd.
El Segundo , CA 90245
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gary.p.pulliam@aero.org
_____________________________________________________
Andy Purdy
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
SPC Roman Pyatetsky
Specialist
Army - State Guard of the State of New York
2520 Batchelder St.
Suite 8J
Brooklyn , NY 11235
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Roman.pyatetsky@newyorkguard.us
_____________________________________________________
Martijn Rasser
TITLE TBD
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 482-1739
Email: MARTIJR@ucia.gov
_____________________________________________________
Martijn Rasser
Military Analyst
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: MARTIJR@ucia.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mina Rath
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Greg Rattray
Principal
Delta Risk LLC
2804 N. Seminary
Chicago , IL 60657
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: grattray@delta-risk.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Justin A Rauschuber
Intelligence Analyst
USN
5312 Mt. Olive Rd
Adkins , TX 78101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: justinrauschuber06@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Erik Raven
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Erik_Raven@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Abbas Ravjani
Professional Staff
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: abbas.ravjani@aya.yale.edu
_____________________________________________________
Rodger Rawls
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Rodger.Rawls@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Bill Ray
VP-Sales/Business Development
Basis Technology
One Alewife Center
Cambridge , MA 02140-2323
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Katie Ray
Foundation Coordinator & Sales S
GeoEye
2325 Dulles Corner Blvd.
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Paul Reagan
Chief of Staff, Sen. Webb
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul_reagan@webb.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Suzanne Reardon
Research Fellow
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sreardon@lmi.org
_____________________________________________________
Timothy Reardon
INSA OCI Task Force
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. J R Reddig
Senior Director, Technical
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jreddig@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Reddig
4502 Arlington Boulevard
#405
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jayare303@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Alissa Redding
Systems Engineering Mgr
the SI
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: helen.d.demes@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Redgraves
IA Senior IA Architect, Suite 64
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mrredgr@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Gloria Redman
22548 Glenn Drive
Suite 105
Sterling , VA 20164-4447
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gredman@triumph-tech.com
_____________________________________________________
Melinda Redman
5887 Kara Place
Burke , VA 22015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mredman@totalintel.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Melinda Redman
901 N. Glebe Road, Suite 901
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mredman@totalintel.com
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Annette Redmond
1906 Ames Ct
Woodbridge , VA 22191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ffrenchie15@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Frank Redner
Manager Government Program Devel
Software Engineering Institute, CMU
NRECA Building
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jack Reed Sen.
Committee Member
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rosanne_haroian@reed.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jon Reed
Director Special Programs
Harris Corporation
P.O. Box 37
MS: 2-21D
Melbourne , FL 32902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jreed@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Ann Reese
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Ann.Reese@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Gary Reese
Professional Staff Member
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Gary_Reese@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Garry Reid
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Spec
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: garry.reid@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kim S Reid
4853 Tobacco Way
Woodbridge , VA 22193
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kim.reid@fas.usda.gov
_____________________________________________________
Peter R Reif
42920 Nashua Street
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: prreif@msn.com
_____________________________________________________
Laurinda Reifsteck BS, MS
Special Agent
Air Force Office of Special Investigations
1535 Command Drive
Andrews AFB , MD 20762
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: laurinda.reifsteck@us.af.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Reinhardt
N.American Public Sector, Sr Bus
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: treinhardt@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Tracy A Reinhold
National Security Branch, Direct
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tracy.reinhold@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Reist
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dreist@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ernest Reith
Deputy Director, InnoVision Dire
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ernest.reith@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ernest Reith
Dep Dir - S&T Branch
FBI
Ernest Reith/A-EAD STB
935 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Room 7270
Washington , DC 20535
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 324-0705
Email: ernest.reith@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Reith
9800 Rod Road
Alpharetta , GA 30022
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: intelrisk@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
Phil Reitinger
Deputy Undersecretary, NPPD
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Philip.Reitinger@Dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Scott Renda
Policy Analyst, Platform Manager
U.S. Office of Management and Budget
1511 Park Rd NW
#33
Washington , DC 20010
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: renda@runbox.com
_____________________________________________________
Mark Resnik
Manager
Deloitte Consulting, LLP
39659 Rosebay Court
Indian Land , SC 29707
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mresnik@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. John Retelle
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jretelle@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Thomas Revay
9105 Murdock Road
Fairfax , VA 22032
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thom0573@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Reybold
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Silvestre Reyes Rep.
Chair
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 225-2016
Email: liza.lynch@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael K Reynolds
21101 Carthagena Ct
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michael.Reynolds@Marklogic.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael K Reynolds
Sr. Director Business Developmen
Marklogic
Michael Reynolds
1600 Tysons Blvd
Suite 800
Mclean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michael.Reynolds@Marklogic.COM
_____________________________________________________
Michael K Reynolds
Sr. Director Business Developmen
Marklogic
Michael Reynolds
1600 Tysons Blvd
Suite 800
Mclean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michael.Reynolds@Marklogic.COM
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Barry Rhine
Sector Vice President and Genera
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: barry.rhine@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Rob Rhode
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Charles Rhodes BS/MBA
ODNI
ODNI
Charles Rhodes
3223 Walbridge Place NW
Washington , DC 20010
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Rhodesiii3@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. George Rhodes
Vice President/General Manager S
General Dynamics - Information Technology
7902 Oak Hollow Lane
Fairfax Station , VA 22039
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: george.rhodes@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Rhodes
2823 Hitchcock Mill Run
Marietta , GA 30068
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jrrhodes@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James R Rhodes III
Lead Architect
TRSS, LLC
1410 Spring Hill Rd
Suite 140
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bob.rhodes@trssllc.com
_____________________________________________________
Jill D Rhodes
TITLE TBD
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jill.d.rhodes@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Matthew Rhodes
18862 Bent Willow Circle
#1032
Germantown , MD 20874
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mrhodes3@umd.edu
_____________________________________________________
Stephen Riccitelli
2955 Madison Avenue
Unit 40
Bridgeport , CT 06606-2071
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sasd127@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dan Rice
VP, IS&GS-Security, Spatial Solu
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gregory Rice
Director of BD
Boeing
3370 E. Miraloma Avenue
Anaheim , CA 92806
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sean.rice@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Richard
Director, Business Development
Sypris Electronics
10901 N. McKinley Drive
Tampa , FL 33612
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.richard@sypris.com
_____________________________________________________
John Richardson
1912 N. 13th St. #102
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jlr94@georgetown.edu
_____________________________________________________
Melissa M Richardson
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Aaron Richman
PO Box 56555
Phila , PA 19111
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ARICHMAN3@GMAIL.COM
_____________________________________________________
Michelle Richman
Application Design Manager
SRA
1252 Harbor Island Walk
Baltimore , MD 21230
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mrichman411@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Kathleen Rick
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: K_rick@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scott Rickard
SVP Business Development
Telesecret Inc.
545 Lanternback Island Dr
Satellite Beach , FL 32937
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scott@telesecret.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Wayne Riegel
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Robert Riegle
Senior Executive Service
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert.riegle@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert C Riegle JD
COO
Mission Concepts, Inc.
902A Prince St.
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: robert_riegle@missionconcepts.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. H. L Riley
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
M, Suite 6665
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hlriley@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Edward Rinkavage
TITLE TBD
CentralPoint
901 N. Stuart Street
Ste 810
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: erinkavage@i-centralpoint.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr Albert J Rio Jr
consultant
IBM Corporation
12533 Ridgemoor Lake Court
St. Louis , MO 63131
Phone: +34-670-02-8556
Fax: (none)
Email: albert.rio@es.ibm.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steven Ritchey
4400 Fair Lakes Court
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sritchey@afcea.org
_____________________________________________________
Debbie L Rivera
Manager, Marketing and Communica
General Dynamics IT
Debbie Rivera
13857 McLearen Road
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 268-7885
Email: debbie.rivera@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Debra Rivera
Marketing Coordinator
General Dynamics IT, NDIS
15000 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20121
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: debbie.rivera@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Debra L Rivera
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics IT, NDIS
15000 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20121
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: debbie.rivera@gdit.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Rixse
750 N. Tamiami Trail
#619
Sarasota , FL 34236
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jrixse@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
Doug Roach
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: doug.roach@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Andrew Robbert
Practice Director, Consulting NS
Oracle Corporation
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: drew.robbert@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David W Robbins BSEE, MEEE
VP for Operations
SAIC, Applied CBRNE & DE Operation
David W Robbins
SAIC
10260 Campus Point Drive
San Diego , CA 92121
Phone: (none)
Fax: (858) 826-2225
Email: robbinsd@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Donna M Roberson
Roberson Group
101 Constitutution Avenue NW
Suite L110
Washington , DC 20001
Phone: (none)
Fax: (202) 204-5606
Email: donnaroberson@robersongroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Charles Robert
Member of Technical Staff
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque , NM 87185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cjrober@sandia.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bruce Roberts
TITLE TBD
Cubic Defense Applications, Inc.
9333 Balboa Ave
San Diego , CA 92123
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bruce.roberts@cubic.com
_____________________________________________________
Bruce Roberts
TITLE TBD
Cubic Defense Applications, Inc.
9333 Balboa Ave
San Diego , CA 92123
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bruce.roberts@cubic.com
_____________________________________________________
Daniel D Roberts
Criminal Justice Information Ser
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: daniel.roberts@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gregory Roberts
President, Communications System
L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East
1 Federal Street
A&E-2C
Camden , NJ 8103
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: greg.roberts@l-3com.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Phil Roberts
Chief of Staff
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Phillip.Roberts@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Terry Roberts
TITLE TBD
Software Engineering Institute, CMU
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: twroberts@sei.cmu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Terry Roberts
Executive Director
Software Engineering Institute
4301 Wilson Blvd
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 908-9235
Email: twroberts@sei.cmu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Richard Robey BSME, MBA
Director Business Development
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Deborah Robinson
Director, National Programs
SAIC
14668 Lee road
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: deborah.a.robinson@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Deborah Robinson
Business Development
Raytheon Company
22260 Pacific Blvd
Sterling , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: deborah.a.robinson@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Deborah Robinson
Business Development
Raytheon
22270 Pacific Blvd
Sterling , VA 20166
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: deborah.a.robinson@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Dwayne Robinson
President/CEO of VSTI, A SAS Com
SAS Institute
1530 Wilson Blvd
Suite 800
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr Ross R Robinson BBA
President
Icentric Marketing, Inc
25671 Tremaine Terrace
South Riding , VA 20152
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 327-7440
Email: rrobinson@icentric-marketing.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Cheryl Roby
DoD Chief Information Officer, O
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cheryl.roby@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Richard Roca
Director Emeritus
Johns Hopkins University, APL
11100 Johns Hopkins Road
Room 17-S344
Laurel , MD 20723
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.roca@jhuapl.edu
_____________________________________________________
Edward M Roche, Ph.D.,J.D.
Director of Scientific Intellige
Barraclough Ltd.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eroche@barracloughltd.com
_____________________________________________________
Chris Rocheleau
Deputy Director of Intelligence
FAA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Chris.Rocheleau@faa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Christopher Rocheleau
TITLE TBD
Federal Aviation Administration
2903 Valley Dr
Alexandria , VA 22302
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.rocheleau@faa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael T Rochford
Sr. Counterintelligence Officer
Oak Ridge National Lab
Michael T. Rochford
P O Box 2008
Building 5300, MS 6076
Oak Ridge , TN 37831
Phone: (none)
Fax: (865) 241-0240
Email: rochfordmt@ornl.gov
_____________________________________________________
Michael A Rodrigue
Director, New Campus East PMO
NGA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.rodrigue@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Carrie Rodriguez
1919 N. Lynn St.
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cwrodriguez@deloitte.com
_____________________________________________________
Michelle Shader
TITLE TBD
Qwest Communications
4250 N. Fairfax Dr.
5th Floor
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michelle.shader@qwest.com
_____________________________________________________
Michelle Shader
Marketing Director
Qwest Government Services, Inc.
4250 N. Fairfax Dr
5th Fl
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michelle.shader@qwest.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Curt Shaffer
Executive Director
Global Tech Ops
2 Davenport Drive
Downingtown , PA 19335
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cshaffer@globaltechops.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Glen Shaffer
President & COO
Kforce Government Solutions
2750 Prosperity Ave.
Suite 300
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gshaffer@dnovus.com
_____________________________________________________
Glen Shaffer
Executive Vice President
KGS
1355 Central Parkway S.
Ste 100
San Antonio , TX 78232
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gshaffer@kgsgov.com
_____________________________________________________
Glen Shaffer
Executive Vice President
KGS
1355 Central Parkway S
Ste 100
San Antonio , TX 78232
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gshaffer@kforcegov.com
_____________________________________________________
Tiffany Shaffery
Intelligence Analyst
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tshaffery@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Shahady
4390 Powder Horn Drive
Beavercreek , OH 45432
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pashahady@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Shaheen
8509 Hempstead Avenue
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mshaheen@civitasgroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John A Shakespeare
9417 Goldfield Lane
Burke , VA 22015-4213
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Zani Drizan Shala YES
Coordinator off AKC
Association of Kosovo Criminallist -Justice
Prishtina
Prishtina 11000
Yugoslavia
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: drizan.shala@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Stanley Shanfield PhD
Technical Program Director
Draper Laboratory
555 Technology Square
Cambridge , MA 02465
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sshanfield@draper.com
_____________________________________________________
Michael Shank
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
2727 Technology Drive
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Susan Shapero
Director, Advd Tech PGeneral Man
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: susan.shapero@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Andrew J Shapiro
Political-Military Affairs
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: shapiroaj@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Tammi Shapiro
Public Sector Operations Manager
Quest Software - Public Sector Group
700 King Farm Boulevard
Suite 250
Rockville , MD 20850
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tammi.shapiro@quest.com
_____________________________________________________
Mark B Shappee
674 County Square Drive, Suite 1
Ventura , CA 93003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark@venturemanagement.com
_____________________________________________________
Theodore Sharp
Business Manager
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sharptd@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
mr nigel l sharpe
Nigel Sharpe
410X, Ridgeway,
Lusaka 100100
Zambia
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nigelsharpe07@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Pleaman F Shaver
4048 Higley Rd
Bldg 1452
Dahlgren , VA 22448
Phone: (540) 775-0477
Fax: (none)
Email: pshaver@jwac.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. K. Shea
14668 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: k.stuart.shea@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
K. S Shea
President, Intelligence, Securit
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: k.stuart.shea@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Philip Shea
Director, Intelligence, DHS
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: phil.shea@qinetiq-na.com
_____________________________________________________
Stu Shea
Group President
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sheaks@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Jon Ross
Executive Director
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: 703-679-6465
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mary Stone Ross
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mary.ross@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Deb Rossi
Global Enterprise Manager
NetApp
1921 Gallows Road
Suite 600
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Deb.Rossi@netapp.com
_____________________________________________________
Administrator Gale Rossides TSA
Acting Administrator
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gale.rossides@tsa.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Rossmark
10173 Goodin Circle
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rrossmark@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Susan Roth
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jenni Rothenberg
TITLE TBD
Deloitte Consulting, LLP
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Andrew Rothman
Intelligence Resources Int.
111 Hillcrest Road
Watchung , NJ 07069
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Arothman
_____________________________________________________
Andrew Rothman
Intelligence Resources Internati
111 Hillcrest Road
Watchung , NJ 07069
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: arothman@me.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bradley Rotter
850 Corbett Ave
suite 6
San Francisco , CA 94131
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brad@rotter.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John P Rowan
McGuireWoods LLP
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,
Washington , DC 20036
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: prowan@mcguirewoods.com
_____________________________________________________
MR. Christopher R Rowe
Director of Special Projects
DHS
9956 worman Drive
King George , VA 22485
Phone: (540) 775-6756
Fax: (none)
Email: Christopher.rowe@HQ.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Lloyd B Rowland
Deputy Director
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, D-100
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lloyd.b.rowland@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joe Rozek
Executive Director-Homeland Secu
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jrozek@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Timothy Ruane
1612 Kenwood Avenue
Alexandria , VA 22302
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ta_ruane@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Michelle A Rubie-Smith
Vice President
GRS
1001 North Fairfax Street
Suite 420
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David S Rubin
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Drive
McLean, , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rubin_d-Asst@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen Rubley
President/CEO
TRSS, LLC
1410 Spring Hill Rd
Suite 140
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephen.rubley@trssllc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ronald C Ruecker
Office of Law Enforcement Coordi
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ronald.ruecker@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ashley Rush
Project Engineer
Lockheed Martin
13530 Dulles Technology Dr
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ashley.rush@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Nate Rushfinn
Enterprise Architect
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Melvern R Rushing
TITLE TBD
Eti Engineering Inc.
4219 Lafayette Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Melvern.Rushing@eti-eng.com
_____________________________________________________
MR Rushing
TITLE TBD
Eti Engineering Inc.
4219 Lafayette Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Melvern.Rushing@eti-eng.com
_____________________________________________________
John Russack
Dir, NGIS
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. E.G. Russell
1399 Olde Towne Rd
Alexandria , VA 22307
Phone: (703) 765-1183
Fax: (none)
Email: polecat28@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Jacqueline Russell
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: j_russell@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
John Russell
TITLE TBD
SR Technologies, Inc.
4101 SW 47 Ave
Suite 102
Fort Lauderdale , FL 33314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John G Russell
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
DA3, Suite 6623
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jgrusse@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Maureen K Russell MA-IR, BA
Associate
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (419) 308-1916
Fax: (none)
Email: russell_maureen@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Trish Russell
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Pete Rustan
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: peter.rustan@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scott Rutz
2978 Millbridge Drive
San Ramon , CA 94583
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scott.rutz@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Amy E Ryan
Liberty Crossing 1
Washington , DC 20505
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: aeryan09@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Cynthia R Ryan
General Counsel
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, D-107
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cynthia.r.ryan@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Daniel J Ryan
Professor
National Defense University
Marshall Hall
Ft. Lesley J. McNair
Washington , DC 20319
Phone: (443) 994-3612
Fax: (202) 685-2986
Email: danryan@danjryan.com
_____________________________________________________
David L Ryan
VP, NGIS
Northrop Grumman Information Systems
12900 Federal Systems Park Drive
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: David.L.Ryan@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Lucy Ryan
1421 Jefferson Davis Highway
Suite 600
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lucy.ryan@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen J Ryan
1391 Pennsylvania Ave SE
Unit 416
Washington , DC 20003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephen.jm.ryan@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Patricia Taylor
Chief of the Intelligence Commun
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patricia.t.taylor@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Teresa Taylor
CEO
Proteus Technologies
133 National Business Parkway
Suite 150
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (443) 539-3370
Email: tmtaylor@proteuseng.com
_____________________________________________________
Teresa Taylor
President
Proteus Technologies
133 National Business Parkway
Suite 150
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Tina Taylor
TITLE TBD
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Tina.Taylor@QinetiQ-NA.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert Teague
TITLE TBD
Applied Signal Technology
460 West California Avenue
Sunnyvale , CA 94086
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ROBERT_TEAGUE@appsig.com
_____________________________________________________
Berico Technologies
Directors at Berico Technologies
Berico Technologies
1501 Lee Highway, Suite 303
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: directors@bericotechnologies.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jody Tedesco
President & General Manager
NJVC, LLC
8614 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 300
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jody.tedesco@njvc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jody J Tedesco
President
NJVC, LLC
8614 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 300
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 288-3068
Email: jody.tedesco@njvc.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephen S Teel
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Theodore Tempel
1324 Grant Street
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ted.tempel@itt.com
_____________________________________________________
Steven J Temple
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Pamela Tennyson
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pamela.tennyson@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Tepley
22777 Portico Place
Ashburn , VA 20148
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kdtepley@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Jack Terrell
Sr Purchasing Mgr.
Abraxas Corp
12801 Worldgate Dr
Suite # 800
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: JACK.TERRELL@cubic.com
_____________________________________________________
Paul Terry
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Paul.Terry@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Stacey Terry
Manager
PRTM Management Consultants, LLC
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Suite 1000
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sterry@prtm.com
_____________________________________________________
Caroline Tess
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: c_tess@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
rachel test
test
test , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rphillips@insaonline.org
_____________________________________________________
Gary M Testut
Director of Defense & Intelligen
Ball Corporation
Ball Aerospace & Technologies
2111 Wilson Blvd, Suite 1120
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cbarber@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Anthony Tether
6400 Lyric Lane
Falls Church , VA 22044
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ttether@darpa.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kris Teutsch
Director
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kteutsch@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scott Thayer
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swt1@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Theby
3015 Shoreline Blvd
Laurel , MD 20724
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mtheby@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William R Theuer
4321 Gannett Circle
Anchorage , AK 99504
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wrtheuer@gci.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Will Thierbach
Director, Special Projects
Camber Corporation
5860 Trinity Parkway
Suite 400
Centerville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wthierbach@i2spros.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr Craig Tait
10b Clinton Way
Kingston
Wellington 6020
New Zealand
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: craig.tait@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mike Talbott
VP Intel Plans and Concepts
NEK
110 S. Sierra Madre St
Colorado Springs , CO 80903
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: airtalbo@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph P Talieri
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
S2J2, Suite 6130
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Stacey Porter-slport3@missi.ncsc.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ronnie Tallent
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Bascom D TALLEY
Faculty Coordinator, Intel Prog.
JHU/SOE/Div. Public Safety Leadership
Bascom D. Talley
6740 Alexander Bell Drive
Suite 350
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 290-1061
Email: dittalley@jhu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Bascom D TALLEY
Faculty Coordinator, Intel Prog.
JHU/SOE/Div. Public Safety Leadership
Bascom D. Talley
6740 Alexander Bell Drive
Suite 350
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (202) 363-4243
Fax: (410) 290-1061
Email: dittalley@jhu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Jacqueline S Tame MPAff
Intelligence Officer
DIA
Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAC/JITF-CT, 200 MacDill Blvd
Washington , DC 20340
Phone: (703) 829-7370
Fax: (none)
Email: jacqueline.s.tame@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jim Taneyhill
President-CEO
BT Federal Inc.
11440 Commerce Park Dr
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Taraba
7 Creek Parkway
Boothwyn , PA 19061
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joseph.taraba@ttemi.com
_____________________________________________________
Barbara Tarad
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: barbara.tarad@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Barbara Tarad
TITLE TBD
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: barbara.tarad@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Vicki Tarallo
CEO & President
Sensa Solutions
11180 Sunrise Valley Drive
Suite 100
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vicki@sensasolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Vicki M Tarallo
TITLE TBD
Sensa Solutions
11180 Sunrise Valley Drive
Suite 100
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vicki@sensasolutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Leah F Tarbell
Vice President, Intel Group
STG Inc
11710 Plaza America Drive
Suite 1200
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Sue Tardif
Program Director, Organizational
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stardif@lmi.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Don Tarkenton
Manager, DoD Sales
Quest Software - Public Sector Group
700 King Farm Boulevard
Suite 250
Rockville , MD 20850
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: don.tarkenton@quest.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Tarry
2100 2nd St, SW
Washington , DC 20593
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william.e.tarry@uscg.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Tatum
VP Business Development INTEL
Oracle Corporation
1910 Oracle Way
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.tatum@oracle.com
_____________________________________________________
Ellen Tauscher
Under Secretary Arms Control & I
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: TauscherE@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Christopher Taylor
Executive Vice President
BlueStone Capital Partners
1600 Tysons Boulevard
8th Floor
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 852-4496
_____________________________________________________
Chuck Taylor
Executive Vice President
Proteus Technologies
133 National Business Parkway
Suite 150
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Damian R Taylor
Cyber Federal Executive Fellow
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
904 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dtaylor@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Dr. David W Taylor
Director, Technology Development
Ensco, Inc.
5400 Port Royal Road
Springfield , VA 22151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: taylor.david@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
James D Taylor
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Patricia Taylor
5602 Phelps Luck Drive
Columbia , MD 21045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pttaylor@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Patricia Taylor
Chief of the Intelligence Commun
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: patricia.t.taylor@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mrs. Teresa Taylor
CEO
Proteus Technologies
133 National Business Parkway
Suite 150
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (443) 539-3370
Email: tmtaylor@proteuseng.com
_____________________________________________________
Teresa Taylor
President
Proteus Technologies
133 National Business Parkway
Suite 150
Annapolis Junction , MD 20701
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Tina Taylor
TITLE TBD
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Tina.Taylor@QinetiQ-NA.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert Teague
TITLE TBD
Applied Signal Technology
460 West California Avenue
Sunnyvale , CA 94086
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ROBERT_TEAGUE@appsig.com
_____________________________________________________
Berico Technologies
Directors at Berico Technologies
Berico Technologies
1501 Lee Highway, Suite 303
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: directors@bericotechnologies.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jody Tedesco
President & General Manager
NJVC, LLC
8614 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 300
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jody.tedesco@njvc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jody J Tedesco
President
NJVC, LLC
8614 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 300
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 288-3068
Email: jody.tedesco@njvc.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephen S Teel
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Theodore Tempel
1324 Grant Street
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ted.tempel@itt.com
_____________________________________________________
Steven J Temple
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Pamela Tennyson
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pamela.tennyson@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Tepley
22777 Portico Place
Ashburn , VA 20148
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kdtepley@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Jack Terrell
Sr Purchasing Mgr.
Abraxas Corp
12801 Worldgate Dr
Suite # 800
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: JACK.TERRELL@cubic.com
_____________________________________________________
Paul Terry
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Paul.Terry@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Stacey Terry
Manager
PRTM Management Consultants, LLC
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Suite 1000
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sterry@prtm.com
_____________________________________________________
Caroline Tess
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: c_tess@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
rachel test
test
test , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rphillips@insaonline.org
_____________________________________________________
Gary M Testut
Director of Defense & Intelligen
Ball Corporation
Ball Aerospace & Technologies
2111 Wilson Blvd, Suite 1120
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cbarber@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Anthony Tether
6400 Lyric Lane
Falls Church , VA 22044
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ttether@darpa.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kris Teutsch
Director
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kteutsch@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scott Thayer
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swt1@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Theby
3015 Shoreline Blvd
Laurel , MD 20724
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mtheby@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William R Theuer
4321 Gannett Circle
Anchorage , AK 99504
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wrtheuer@gci.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Will Thierbach
Director, Special Projects
Camber Corporation
5860 Trinity Parkway
Suite 400
Centerville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wthierbach@i2spros.com
_____________________________________________________
Donald Thomas
Executive Director
Ernst & Young
8484 Westpark Drive
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donald.thomas@ey.com
_____________________________________________________
Donna Thomas
Principal
Astrachan, Gunst & Thomas, P.C.
217 East Redwood Street
21st Floor
Baltimore , MD 21202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dthomas@agtlawyers.com
_____________________________________________________
Donna Thomas
TITLE TBD
Astrachan, Gunst & Thomas, P.C.
217 East Redwood Street
21st Floor
Baltimore , MD 21202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dthomas@agtlawyers.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jason Thomas
Senior Analyst
TRSS, LLC
1410 Spring Hill Rd
Suite 140
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jason.thomas@trssllc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Thomas
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Thomas_John@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
John Thomas
SVP, General Manager
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.d.thomas@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Marcus C Thomas
Operational Technology Division
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: marcus.thomas@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mike Thomas
TITLE TBD
Booz Allen Hamilton
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Thomas_Mike@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Thomas
VP - Defense Operations
Wyle Information Systems
1600 Intenational Dr
Suite 800
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.thomas@wyle.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Ria Thomas
6903 K Victoria Dr.
Alexandria , VA 22310
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rthomas@fabiani-co.com
_____________________________________________________
Ria Thomas
Defense/Security
Fabiani & Company
1101 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington , DC 20004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rthomas@fabiani-co.com
_____________________________________________________
Kevin Thompkins
Vice President of Bus. Ops.
Engineering Systems Consultants, Inc.
8201 Corporate Drive
Suite 1105
Landover , MD 20785-2230
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Bennie G Thompson
Chair, Committee on Homeland Sec
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andrea.lee@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Gregory Thompson
950 25th St. NW
Washington , DC 20037
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thompson.g@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jennifer Thompson
Sr. Marketing Communications Spe
L-3 Communications, Inc.
11955 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Kimberly A Thompson
Director, Office of Corporate Co
NGA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kimberly.thompson@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Leigh Thompson
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Leigh.Thompson@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Monica Thompson
3011 Colonial Springs Court
Alexandria , VA 22306
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: monica@prointelservices.net
_____________________________________________________
Robert D Thompson Jr.
State / Division of Levee Distri
505 District Dr.
Monroe , LA 71202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ldpolice1@bellsouth.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Thompson
8329 North Mopac Expressway
Austin , TX 78759
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wmthompson@signaturescience.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William M Thompson
TITLE TBD
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wmthomp@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Robert Thomson
460 Spring Park Place
Suite 1000
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rthomson@terremark.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Tierney
Vice President, Business Develop
L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East
1 Federal Street
A&E-2C
Camden , NJ 8103
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: John.Tierney@L-3Com.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Chris Tillery
TITLE TBD
USIS
7799 Leesburg Pike
Suite 400 S
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.tillery@usis.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Tillison
Security Director
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.tillison@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Edward A Timmes
SVP, Deputy General Manager
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: edward.a.timmes.jr@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Nils G Tolling
TITLE TBD
CTSS - Corporate and Transport Security Solutions
9007 West Shorewood
Suite 529
Mercer Island , WA 98040
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: nils@ctssgroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. David Tolliver
4648 Star Flower Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: DETolliver@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Judy Tolliver
4648 Star Flower Dr
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jetolliver@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jack Tomarchio
RETIRED
DHS
4103 Meadow Lane
Newtown Square , PA 19073
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.Tomarchio@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jack T Tomarchio
Agoge Group, LLC
200 Eagle Road, Suite 308
Wayne , PA 19087
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jtt@agogegroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Adm. Chris Tomney USCG
Intelligence Coordinating Center
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.tomney@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kurt Tong
Asst Sec Asia-Pacific
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tongk@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Deputy Asst. Se John Torres
Deputy Assistant Secretary, US I
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.torres@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Fran Townsend
INSA Chairwoman of the Board
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.
35 E. 62nd St.
New York , NY 10065
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Stacy Trammell
11400 Glen Dale Ridge Road
Glenn Dale , MD 20769
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stacy.trammell@zavda.com
_____________________________________________________
Stacy Trammell
President
Zavda Technologies, LLC
9250 Bendix Road
Suite 540
Columbia , MD 21045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (240) 266-0597
Email: stacy.trammell@zavda.com
_____________________________________________________
Stacy D Trammell
Stacy D. Trammell
11400 Glen Dale Ridge Road
Glenn Dale , MD 20769
Phone: (unlisted)
Fax: (240) 266-0597
Email: stacy.trammell@zavda.com
_____________________________________________________
Christopher T Trapp
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Trauberman
Vice President
The Boeing Company-Network & Space Systems
1200 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.trauberman@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Trauberman
VP, Space, Intel & MDS
The Boeing Company
Jeffrey Trauberman
The Boeing Company
1200 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.trauberman@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jeffrey Trauberman
Vice President
The Boeing Company
1200 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.traubeman@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeffrey Trauberman
Vice President
The Boeing Company
1200 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jeff.trauberman@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Stephen Traver
1007 Longworth House Office Buil
Washington , DC 20515
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Tremont
Executive Vice President, Operat
SRC, Inc
7502 Round Pond Road
North Syracuse , NY 13212
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tremont@srcinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ronald J Trerotola
Director RF Systems Engineering
Cubic Defense Applications, Inc.
9333 Balboa Ave
San Diego , CA 92123
Phone: (unlisted)
Fax: (none)
Email: ron.trerotola@cubic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steven A Trevino
19192 Greystone Square
Leesburg , VA 20176
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Steven.Trevino@Keane.com
_____________________________________________________
Joseph Trindal
Managing Director
KeyPoint Government Solutions, Inc.
1750 Foxtrail Drive
Loveland , CO 80538
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joseph.trindal@keypoint.us.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bruce Triner
6112 Nightshade Court
Rockville , MD 20852
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Kate Troendle
Vice President
BlueStone Capital Partners
1600 Tysons Boulevard
8th Floor
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 852-4496
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Lisa Trombley
Program Management Senior Manage
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lisa.m.trombley@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Jesse Trout
Account Manager
TechUSA Government Solutions, LLC
8334 Veterans Highway
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jtrout@techusa.net
_____________________________________________________
David Trulio
Director, Federal/Civil Programs
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.trulio@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Sandy Trumbull
Account Manager
Computer Associates
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Louis Tucker
Minority Staff Director
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: L_Tucker@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Louis Tucker
CEO
Mission Sync LLC
1835 Tilden Place
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (703) 760-0643
Fax: (none)
Email: louis.tucker@missionsyncllc.com
_____________________________________________________
mr Mel Tuckfield
Deputy Director,
Hewlett Packard Federal APG Strategic Program
Mel Tuckfield
6600 Rockledge Drive
Bethesda , MD 20817
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mel.tuckfield
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Melvyn Tuckfield
Deputy Director, Advanced Progra
Hewlett-Packard Company
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mel.tuckfield@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Chris Tully
Sr. VP of Sales
GeoEye
2325 Dulles Corner Blvd.
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Damian Turchan
TITLE TBD
PhotoTelesis
47181 Timberland Place
Sterling , VA 20165
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dturchan@photot.com
_____________________________________________________
J Stephen (Steve) Turett
Director, Strategy and Business
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jturett@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Viv Turnbull
Vice Deputy Director for Informa
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Vivian.Turnbull@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathleen Turner
6448 Spring Terrace
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kathleen.Turner@misc.pentagon.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathleen Turner
TITLE TBD
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kathleen.turner@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Lamar Turner
PO Box 3565
Hobbs , NM 88241
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: LamarTurner2@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mike Turner
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fturner@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
MS RONDI TURNER
SR. EXECUTIVE ASST
BALL AEROSPACE
2111 WILSON BLVD
#1120
ARLINGTON , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rbturner@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
Scott Turner
Federal Engagement Director
Global Crossing
12010 Sunset Hills Road
Suite 420
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Stansfield Turner
Former CIA Director
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sturner@umd.edu
_____________________________________________________
John Turnicky
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.turnicky@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Lauren Twenhafel
Unknown
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
James Tyson JR. BSIT, MSIS
Telecommunications Tech Advisor
HQ INSCOM / G6 Networks
8825 Beulah Street
Fort Belvoir , VA 22060
Phone: (703) 580-6350
Fax: (none)
Email: jtyson.3@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Clinton Ung
TITLE TBD
Northrop Grumman
2288 Ballard Way
Ellicott City , MD 21042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: clinton.ung@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
William Usher
11410 Hollow Timber Court
Reston , VA 20194-1980
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: billusher77@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Marilyn Vacca
Acting Chief Financial Officer
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: marilyn.a.vacca@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mike Vahle
TITLE TBD
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque , NM 87185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Andrew Vail
Executive Assistant to the ODNI/
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
George Valdez
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
2305 Mission College Boulevard
Santa Clara , CA 95054
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Michelle Valdez
Senior Advisor, Cyber Security S
Software Engineering Institute, CMU
NRECA Building
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mavaldez@cert.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Victor Valdez
1117 17th Street South
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vjv6504@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Victor Valdez
1117 17th Street South
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vjv6504@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Arturo Valenzuela
Western Hemisphere Affairs
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: valenzuelaa@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
John Valle
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
1200 Joe Hall Drive
Ypsilanti , MI 48197
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
John Van Dyke
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
8800 Queen Ave South
Bloomington , MN 55431
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
William Van Vleet
President and CEO
Applied Signal Technology
460 West California Avenue
Sunnyvale , CA 94086
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: BILL_VANVLEET@appsig.com
_____________________________________________________
Daniel VanBelleghem Jr.
VP, Information Assurance
NCI Information Systems
11730 Plaza America Dr
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dvanbelleghem@nciinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tony Vanchieri
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Tony.Vanchieri@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Lesa Vandagriff
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
14700 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (703) 251-7484
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Matthew Vandermast
Vice President
Sotera Assured IT
2300 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matthew.vandermast@soteradefense.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dirk Vandervaart
TITLE TBD
American Systems
13990 Parkeast Circle
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dirk.vandervaart@americansystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Christina Vanecek
Marketing
PRTM Management Consultants, LLC
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Suite 1000
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cvanecek@prtm.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms Donna J VanHoose
Director, Business Development
The Boeing Company
7700 Boston Boulevard
Springfield , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: donna.vanhoose@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jhan Vannatta
200 Regency Forest Drive
Suite 150
Cary , NC 27518-8695
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jhanv@signalscape.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Varchetta BA
2608 Elderdale Dr
Hampton Cove , AL 35763
Phone: (256) 509-6676
Fax: (none)
Email: mvarchetta@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Neftali Vargas
SIGINT Analyst
USN
21533 Willis Wharf CT
Lexington Park , MD 20653
Phone: (unlisted)
Fax: (none)
Email: vargas.nef@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Wray Varley
Sales Director
Qwest Communications
4250 N. Fairfax Dr.
5th Floor
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wray.varley@qwest.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bill Varner
INSA Board of Directors
ManTech International Corporation
2500 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon , VA
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Bill.Varner@ManTech.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Bill Varner
President & COO
ManTech Mission Cyber & Technology Solutions
2250 Corporate Park Dr. #500
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bill.varner@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
L. William Varner
2250 Corporate Park Drive
Suite 500
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Bill.Varner@mantech.com
_____________________________________________________
Miron Varouhakis
School of Journalism & Mass Comm
University of South Carolina
Columbia , SC 29208
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: varouhakis@sc.edu
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Debra Vecchio
Assistant Director for Program D
Pennsylvania State University - App. Research Labo
P.O. Box 30
State College , PA 16804
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dsd13@only.arl.psu.edu
_____________________________________________________
Veronica Venture
Office of EEO
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: veronica.venture@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Kendra Verbanic
Government Relations
the SI
15052 Conference Center Drive
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kendra.verbanic@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Kenneth Verbrugge
Program Area Manager
Johns Hopkins University, APL
11100 Johns Hopkins Road
Room 17-S344
Laurel , MD 20723
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ken.verbrugge@jhuapl.edu
_____________________________________________________
Alexander S Verhulst
Staffing/Sourcing Specialist
SAIC
11251 Roger Bacon Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (703) 585-4371
Fax: (703) 318-4595
Email: alexander.s.verhulst@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Richard R Verma
Legislative Affairs
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vermarr@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Stephen Vermillion
11600 Sunrise Valley Drive
Suite 290
Reston , VA 20191
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: svermillion@objectvideo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Veronis
6867 Elm Street
Suite 207
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mveronis@socratiq.com
_____________________________________________________
Laura M Verouden
TITLE TBD
The Aerospace Corporation
Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447
2310 E. El Segundo Blvd.
El Segundo , CA 90245
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Melanne Verveer
Global Women's Issues
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: verveerm@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Michael Via BA, MS
Cyber Intelligence Analyst
Home
10049 Cairn Mountain Way
10049 Cairn Mountain Way
Bristow , VA 20136
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: viacissp@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Sean Vieira
VP, Government Markets
Core180, Inc.
2751 Prosperity Drive
Suite 200
Vienna , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Phyllis Villani
Director, Talent Acquisition
Northrop Grumman Corporation
12900 Federal Systems Park Drive
FP1/7121
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 968-2565
Email: phyllis.c.villani@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
Thomas J Vilsack
Secretary
Agriculture Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Scheduling@osec.usda.gov (Attn: Sally Cluthe)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Adam Vincent BS, MS
CEO
Cyber Squared Inc.
http://www.cybersquared.com
1100 N. Glebe Rd.
Suite 1010
Arlington , VA 22204
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: avincent@cybersquared.com
_____________________________________________________
David Vincent
TITLE TBD
FBI
PO Box 230343
Centreville , VA 20120
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.vincent@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Richard G Violette BA, MBA
Business Development
Exceptional Software Strategies Inc
849 International Drive
Suite 310
Linthicum , MD 21090
Phone: (none)
Fax: (410) 694-0245
Email: richard.violette@exceptionalsoftware.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Laura Virella
9159 Ciri Lake Lane
Fort Belvoir , VA 22060
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lvirellal@netscape.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Vince Virga
100 Corporate Drive
Suite 280
Fort Lauderdale , FL 33334
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vince@sgis.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Virgil Virga
8618 Westwood Center Drive
#315
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: virgil@sgis.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Faye Virostek
Director, Government Relations
General Dynamics Corporation
2941 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: fvirostek@gd.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Samuel S Visner
Vice President for Strategy and
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: svisner@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Laura Voelker
Director, HUMINT
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: laura.voelker@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathleen Voelkner
6226 West Haleh Avenue
Las Vegas , NV 89141
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kvoelkner@securityconsultants.us
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tom Vollmer
Executive Director
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tvollmer@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Lisa von dem Hagen
1655 North Fort Meyer Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: insightstrategyresults@acqsolinc.com
_____________________________________________________
Lou Von Thaer
President
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Christopher Voorhees
Federal Programs
CA Technologies
2317 N. Monroe Street
Arlington , VA 22207
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: voorhees2317@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Laura Voyatzis
Legislative Liaison
SAF/LL (AFOSI)
Laura Voyatzis
1160 AF Pengaton
4B852
Washington , DC 20330
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: laura.voyatzis@pentagon.af.mil
_____________________________________________________
Michael D Vozzo J.D., M.A.
Associate Deputy General Counsel
United States Department of Defense
2521 S. Clark Street
Suite 2000
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michael.vozzo@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Steve Wallach
Sr. VP of Product Integration
GeoEye
2325 Dulles Corner Blvd.
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steven P Wallach
Technical Executive
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, D-100
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (301) 227-3696
Email: steven.p.wallach@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Dave Wallen
General Manager, Mission Program
BAE Systems Information Technology
8201 Greensboro Drive
Suite 1200
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.wallen@baesystems.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Tommy Walls
8618 Westwood Center Drive
Ste 100
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: twalls@sgis.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Walsh
President
Sypris Electronics
10901 N. McKinley Drive
Tampa , FL 33612
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.walsh@sypris.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael J Walsh
Sr. Director
Intelligent Decisions
21445 Beaumeade Circle
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mwalsh@intelligent.com
_____________________________________________________
Thomas Walsh
V.P.
Falken Industries
9510
technology drive
manassas , VA 20110
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: trwalsh@falken.us
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jennifer Walsmith
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
Suite 6148 -Senior Acquisition E
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (443) 479-0367
Email: jswalsm@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Drew Walter
Policy/Oversight Investigations
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Drew.Walter@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jack Walters
VP
Verizon Business, Federal
22001 Loudoun County Parkway
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jack.walters@verizon.com
_____________________________________________________
John J Walters
VP
Verizon Business, Federal
22001 Loudoun County Parkway
Ashburn , VA 20147
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jack.walters@one.verizon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Chris Walton
President and CEO
Visual Intelligence Group LLC
17979 Sands Road
Hamilton , VA 20158
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.walton@visualintelgroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scott Walton
6935 Bugledrum Way
Columbia , MD 21045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swalton@google.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Timothy Walton
13800 Coppermine Rd.
2nd Floor
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: twalton@fundintel.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joshua Wander
5719 Hobart Street
Pittsburgh , PA 15217
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jwander@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Tyler Z Wang BA
Contract Specialist
GSA
APT# 715
1300 S Arlington Ridge Rd
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tribaljumbal@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
James Wangler
Senior Executive
Accenture
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.wangler@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Wansley
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wansley_bill@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Ann Ward
8865 Stanford Blvd.
Columbia , MD 21666
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: annward@cisco.com
_____________________________________________________
Ann Ward
TITLE TBD
Cisco Systems, Inc.
13635 Dulles Technology Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: annward@cisco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Anthony Ward
President & CEO
Ward Solutions
6760 Alexander Bell Drive
Suite 180
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: award@ward-solutions.com
_____________________________________________________
Colonel James Ward USAF
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: james.ward@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mark Ward
3138 Creswell Drive
Falls Church , VA 22044
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.k.ward@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Peter Ward
Managing Partner
SAGE
1344 Ashton Road
Suite 105
Hanover , MD 21076
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pete.ward@sage-mgt.net
_____________________________________________________
Peter Ward
TITLE TBD
SAGE
1344 Ashton Road
Suite 105
Hanover , MD 21076
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pete.ward@sage-mgt.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Rick Ward
Director
Raytheon Company
1200 S. Jupiter Road
MS AA-75000
Garland , TX 75042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rdward1@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Charles E Warden
Senior Executive
Accenture
11951 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: charles.e.warden@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Charles E Warden
TITLE TBD
Accenture
11951 Freedom Drive
Reston , VA 20882
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: charles.e.warden@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Eric Warden
25116 Vista Ridge Road
Laytonsville , MD 20882
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: charles.e.warden@accenture.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathy Warden
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kathy.warden@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Kathy Warden
VP, NGIS
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Bryan Ware BS Science
CEO
Digital Sandbox
8260 Greensboro Drive
Suite 450
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bware@dsbox.com
_____________________________________________________
Jamal Ware
Minority Public Affairs POC
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jamal.ware@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Cheryl Warner
Director, Business Development
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cheryl.warner@ngc.com
_____________________________________________________
John Warner
Required unless Parent
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Susan Warner
Vice President
TECH USA, Inc
8334 Veterans Highway
2nd Floor
Millersville , MD 21108
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swarner@techusa.net
_____________________________________________________
Pearl Warren
TITLE TBD
Quest Software - Public Sector Group
700 King Farm Boulevard
Suite 250
Rockville , MD 20850
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pearl.warren@quest.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kristen Waschull
Director of Human Resources
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kristi.Waschull@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jonathan Washburn
831 Carroll Street
Brooklyn , NY 11215
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Thomas Washburne
Partner
Venable LLP
750 East Pratt Street
Baltimore , MD 21202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: twashburne@venable.com
_____________________________________________________
Doug Waters
Director, Special Programs
LGS Innovations
Accounts Payable
5440 Millstream Road
Suite E210
McLeansville , NC 27301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Jason Wathen
646 Steamboat Rd
Greenwich , CT 6830
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jwathen@bhgrp.com
_____________________________________________________
Charles Watson
SVP Marketing
i2
1430 Spring Hill Road
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Charles.Watson@i2group.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathleen Watson J.D.
Director
AECOM
Kathleen Watson
6564 Loisdale Court
Suite 500
Springfield , VA 22150
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kathleen.Watson@aecom.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Kathleen M Watson
VP, Global Missions Center
Aecom
6564 Loisdale Court
Suite 500
Springfield , VA 22315
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Kathleen.Watson@aecom.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert B Watts
Chief, Contingency Exercises
U.S. Coast Guard
5209 Claridge Ct
Fairfax , VA 22032
Phone: (703) 272-8974
Fax: (none)
Email: rbwatts27@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mary Webb
Executive Assistant
Analytic Services Inc.
2900 South Quincy Street
Suite 800
Arlington , VA 22206
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 416-3270
Email: mary.webb@anser.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Matthew Webb
Attorney-Advisor (Intelligence)
Transportation Security Administration
601 South 12th Street
Arlington , VA 20598
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: matthew.webb@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Webber
Managing Member
Westway Development
14325 Willard Road
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mwebber@westwaydevelopment.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Pamela Weber
8281 Greensboro Drive
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: weber_pam@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Jason Webster
INSA OCI Task Force
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
William Webster
Required unless Parent
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
David Wehrly
1007 8th St.
Anacortes , WA 98221
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
John Weiler
904 Clifton Drive
Alexandria , VA 22308
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john@ICHnet.org
_____________________________________________________
mr John A Weiler 98.6
Executive Director
IT Acquisition Advisory Council, a division of ICH
904 Clifton Drive
Alexandria , VA 22397
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: John.Weiler@Ichnet.org
_____________________________________________________
LtCol Anne Weinberg
TITLE TBD
USD(I)
Required unless Parent
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul R Weise
Director, Office of Geospatial I
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, D-111
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: paul.r.weise@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Nancy K Welker
TITLE TBD
NSA
9800 Savage Road
DE, Suite 6274
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mawirt@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jack Welsh
13200 Woodland Park Road
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: welsh_j-admin@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Gen Mark Welsh III
Associate Director for Military
CIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christyt@ucia.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Rosemary Wenchel
Director, Information Assurance
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rosemary.wenchel@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Former Baker Preston Werntz
Senior Strategist, Office of Cyb
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: preston.werntz@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Michael Wertheimer
Technical Director, SID
NSA
9800 Savage Road
, DC 20511
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wertheimer@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Michele Weslander Quaid
4175 Lower Park Drive
Fairfax , VA 22030-8543
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: weslandm@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Michele Weslander Quaid
DNI Senior Representative to ISR
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: michele.weslanderquaid@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Michele R Weslander Quaid
Chief Technology Officer (Fed)
Google, Inc.
1101 New York Avenue, N.W
Second Floor
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr John Westcott BA
BD Director
The Boeing Company
7700 Boston Blvd
Springfiled , VA 22153
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 270-6608
Email: john.g.westcott@boeing.com
_____________________________________________________
Vince Westmark
16800 E. CentreTech Parkway
Aurora , CO 80011
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vcwestmark@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Vincent C Westmark
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Vanessa Weyland
Prog Mgr, Career Developm
AF ISR Agency
12906 Green Cedar
Helotes , TX 78023
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: vanessa.weyland@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Kris Wheaton
501 East 38th Street
Erie , PA 16546
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kwheaton@mercyhurst.edu
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Judith Whitaker
TITLE TBD
Boyden
217 E Redwood St
Suite 1500
Baltimore , MD 21202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jwhitaker@boyden.com
_____________________________________________________
Chris White
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chris.white@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Dana White
Strat Forces
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dana_white@armed-services.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David B White
Deputy Chief Operating Officer
NGA
4600 Sangamore Road, D-100
Bethesda , MD 20816-5003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: david.b.white@nga.mil
_____________________________________________________
Colonel John D White BA, MSC
Deputy Director
OUSD(I)/PP&R/ISRP
Pentagon, 3C915
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: john.white@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Patricia White
901 N. Nelson St
Apt 1514
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: plwhite@paragondynamics.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard White
VP, Washington Operations
Harris Corporation
P.O. Box 37
MS: 2-21D
Melbourne , FL 32902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rwhite01@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
Scott White
VP, NGC
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Sean White
343 E 74th St
Apartment 8E
New York , NY 10021
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: seanjwhite@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Suzanne White
Chief Financial Officer
DIA
7400 Defense Pentagon
Rm. 3E-258
Washington , DC 20301-7400
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Suzanne.White@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Mr. John Whiteford
Director for Intel Pgms
NSA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jewhite@nsa.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Damian Whitham
Director
Terremark Worldwide
460 Spring Park Place
Suite 1000
Herndon , VA 20170
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dwhitham@terremark.com
_____________________________________________________
Alphonse Whitmore
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Alphonse.Whitmore@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scott C Whitney
14901 Bogle Dr. Suite 302
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scott.whitney@missionep.com
_____________________________________________________
RADM H. Whiton USN (Ret)
12337 Galesville Drive
Gaithersburg , MD 20878
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hwwhiton@msn.com
_____________________________________________________
Windsor Whitton
Required unless Parent
Required unless Parent , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Maria Whitworth
Senior Vice President
CACI International Inc.
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mwhitworth@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Maria F Whitworth
4114 Legato Road
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mwhitworth@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Jonathan Wick
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
McDaniel Wicker
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mcdaniel.wicker@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jerome Wieber
Sr. Staff Acquisitions
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jerome.wieber@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joshua S Wiener MA
2662 Ocean Avenue
Apt E2
Brooklyn , NY 11229
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Jwiener31@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Jerome Wiever
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jerome.wieber@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Miss Molly Wike
Analyst
Department of the Navy
4251 Suitland Road
Washington DC , DC 20395
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mollywike@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Molly Wike
4251 Suitland Road
Washington DC , DC 20395
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mollywike@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Daniel C Wilbricht
Director, IC Federal Programs
Red Hat
8260 Greensboro Drive
ste. 300
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dwilbric@redhat.com
_____________________________________________________
Steven A Wilburn
Sr. Principal
SRA International Inc.
13873 Park Center Road
Suite 150
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steven_wilburn@sra.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Wilhelm
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Wilhelm_Richard@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Wayne Wilkinson
President
White Oak Technologies
1300 Spring Street
Suite 320
Silver Spring , MD 20910
Phone: (703) 759-9296
Fax: (none)
Email: wwilkinson@woti.com
_____________________________________________________
Candice M Will
Office of Professional Responsib
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: candice.will@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Butch Willard
Deputy Director, Legislative Aff
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: butch.willard@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Amanda Williams
TITLE TBD
Ciena Corporation
1185 Sanctuary Parkway
Suite 300
Alpharetta , GA 30004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: amwillia@ciena.com
_____________________________________________________
Amanda Williams
TITLE TBD
Ciena Corporation
1185 Sanctuary Parkway
Suite 300
Alpharetta , GA 30004
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: amwillia@ciena.com
_____________________________________________________
Anthony Williams
CEO
GRS
260 Lee Street, SW
Tumwater , WA 98501
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Williams
Senior Associate
Booz Allen Hamilton
13200 Woodland Park Road
Suite 5066
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: williams_david@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
LTG James Williams USA (Ret)
8928 Maurice Lane
Annandale , VA 22003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: diac1@earthlink.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Jud Williams
SVP, Asset Management/Leasing
COPT
6711 Columbia Gateway Dr
Suite 300
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (443) 285-7650
Email: jud.williams@copt.com
_____________________________________________________
Senior Vice Pre Judd Williams
Senior Vice President
Corporate Office Properties Trust
6711 Columbia Gateway Drive
Columbia , MD 21046-2104
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jud.williams@copt.com
_____________________________________________________
Laura Williams
1501 Farm Credit Dr Suite 2300
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: laura.williams@soteradefense.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Markeith Williams
102 Bermuda Green Drive
Durham , NC 27703
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: markeith_williams@hotmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Clint Williamson
War Crimes Issues (Ambassador at
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: williamsonc@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Thomas Willoughby
5229 42nd Place
Hyattsville , MD 20781-1902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: thomas.willoughby@hq.dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Brian Wilson
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian_wilson@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr Brian Wilson
Asst Transit Mngmt Analyst
MTA/New York City Transit
130 Livingston Street
Brooklyn , NY 11201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Brian.Wilson@nyct.com
_____________________________________________________
Heather Wilson
9220 Guadalupe Trail NW
Albuquerque , NM 87114
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hawilson@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Sam Wilson
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Tina Wilson
VP Business Development
GRS
1001 North Fairfax Street
Suite 420
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Suzanne Wilson-Houck
bogus
bogus , VA 22302
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sthouck@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
suzanne wilson-houck
Whatever
Ripple
604 Fort Williams Parkway
alexandria , VA 22304
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sthouck@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Suzanne Wilson-Houck
Membership
Ripple Communications
1110 Vermont Ave, NW
Suite 1000
Washington , DC 20005
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swhouck@insaonline.org
_____________________________________________________
Bill Wilt
VP of North American Sales
GeoEye
2325 Dulles Corner Blvd.
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
LCDR Terry Wilton USN (Ret)
1120-C Heritage Place
Waldorf , MD 20602-1821
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: marathont@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Wiltshire
500 Thompson Dairy Way
Rockville , MD 20850
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: joewiltshire@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Roland Wiltz
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: roland.j.wiltz@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Andreas Wimmer MSc., CTS
Director
Integritas LLC
96 Robinson Road
SIF Building #13-04
Singapore 068899
Indonesia
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: andrew.wimmer@pacific.net.sg
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Joseph Windham IV
3307 Wyndham Circle
Unit 2170
Alexandria , VA 22302
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jcwindham4@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
JC Windham
Financial Manager, Navy
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jcwindham4@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steven Winebrenner
6406 Ivy Lane
COP 4/4
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: steven.jos.winebrenner@hp.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Maureen Wingfield
Senior Manager
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: maureen_v_wingfield@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scott Winn
8840 Stanford Boulevard
Suite 2100
Columbia , MD 21045
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swinn@tresys.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Scott Winn
960 Western Run Rd
Hunt Valley , MD 21030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swinn@scottwinn.com
_____________________________________________________
Craig Winter
19842 Leadwell St.
Winnetka , CA 91306
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Prescott Winter RETIRED
Associate Deputy Director of Nat
ODNI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: prescott.b.winter@ugov.gov
_____________________________________________________
DuWayne L Wirta
President
Wirta Consulting LLC
DuWayne Wirta
13602 Hampstead Ct.
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (703) 904-7949
Fax: (none)
Email: dlwirta@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Kate Wisniewski
TITLE TBD
PRTM Management Consultants, LLC
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Suite 1000
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: kwisniewski@prtm.com
_____________________________________________________
Ayonnda Witcher
1610 Tulip Avenue
District Heights , MD 20747
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ayonndawitcher@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Witt
2000 E. El Segundo Blvd.
B-E07,MS S102
El Segundo , CA 90245
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mhwitt@raytheon.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Jennifer Wohlander
2200 Wilson Blvd
Suite 102-139
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jennifer.wohlander@cust-matters.com
_____________________________________________________
Scott Wohlander
2200 Wilson Blvd.
Suite 102-139
Arlington , VA 22201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: scott.wohlander@cust-matters.com
_____________________________________________________
Bradford F Wolf
Senior Advanced Systems Manager
Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp.
10 Longs Peak Drive
Broomfield , CO 80021
Phone: (none)
Fax: (303) 533-5179
Email: bfwolf@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
Bradford F Wolf
Sr. Advanced Systems Manager
Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp.
10 Longs Peak Drive
Broomfield , CO 80021
Phone: (none)
Fax: (303) 533-5179
Email: bfwolf@ball.com
_____________________________________________________
Jim Wolfe
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: j_wolfe@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steven Wolter
Sr. Special Programs Manager
LGS Innovations
Accounts Payable
5440 Millstream Road
Suite E210
McLeansville , NC 27301
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swolter@lgsinnovations.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Steven Wolter
Sr. Special Programs Manager
LGS Innovations
13665 Dulles Technology Drive
Suite 301
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: swolter@lgsinnovations.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Wesley Wong
350 Greensboro Dr.
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wwong@htgcorp.com
_____________________________________________________
Brian R Wood
Director, Business Development
Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops
2121 Crystal Drive
Suite 100
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brian.wood@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Margaret Wood
7474 Greenway Center Drive
Suite 800
Greenbelt , MD 20770
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mwwood@woodcons.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Roy L Wood
Dean, Def Sys Mgmt College
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: roy.woods@dau.mil
_____________________________________________________
Sheryl Wood
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: s_wood@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Asst. Admin. Stephen N Wood TSA
Federal Security Director
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephen.wood@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Meredith Woodruff
1441 McLean Mews Court
McLean , VA 22101
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: meredith_woodruff@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
Glen Woods
10395 Democracy Lane
Suite B
Fairfax , VA 22030
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. James Woolsey
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Dr.
Booz Building
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Woolsey_Jim@bah.com
_____________________________________________________
Megan Woolsey
Required unless Parent
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Megan Woolsey
Consultant
Deloitte
1919 N. Lynn Street
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mwoolsey3@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Megan Woolsey
Consultant
Deloitte
1919 N. Lynn Street
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mwoolsey3@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Steve Woolwine
Vice President, Intelligence Ope
Berico Technologies
1501 Lee Highway
Suite 303
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Michael H Wooster
211 N. Union Street
Alexandria , VA 22314
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mwooster@sanborn.com
_____________________________________________________
Jeff Wootton
Forward Deployed Engineer
Palantir Technologies
1660 International Drive
8th Floor
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jwootton@palantir.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Patrick Worcester
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: PWorcester@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Christine Wormuth
PDASD, Homeland Defense and Amer
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christine.wormuth@osd.mil
_____________________________________________________
Saskia Wrausmann
14 Seaton Place NW
Washington , DC 20007
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
B.G. Wright
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bg.wright@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Gary Wright BS EE
President/CEO
Futures, Inc.
1225 Crows Foot Road
Marriottsville , MD 21104
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gwright1@futures-inc.com
_____________________________________________________
Lynn Wright
Director, JTTF
DIA
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wrightonmaple@comcast.net
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Wayne A Wright
42725 Ridgeway Dr.
Ashburn , VA 20148
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: wayne.wright@msn.com
_____________________________________________________
Mark Wrigley
SVP Business Development
Serco
1818 Library Street
Suite 1000
Reston , VA 20190
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 939-6001
_____________________________________________________
Don Wurzel
VP for National Security Studies
Arete Associates
1550 Crystal Drive
Suite 703
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dwurzel@arete.com
_____________________________________________________
Robert J Wysocki MA MS
Senior Fellow
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: rwysocki@lmi.org
_____________________________________________________
Robert J Wysocki MA, MS
3210 Wessynton Way
Alexandria , VA 223092227
Phone: (703) 619-1456
Fax: (none)
Email: rj.wysocki@live.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Alan Wade
8601 Ordinary Way
Annandale , VA 22003
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: awade2@cox.net
_____________________________________________________
Ralph Wade
1421 Jefferson Davis Highway
Suite 600
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Ralph.Wade@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ralph Wade
Vice President, National Capital
Spectrum
1401 Wilson Blvd
Suite 1007
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (757) 224-7501
Email: ralph.wade@sptrm.com
_____________________________________________________
Roger Waesche
Executive Vice President & Chief
Corporate Office Properties Trust
6711 Columbia Gateway Drive
Columbia , MD 21046-2104
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: roger.waesche@copt.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ryan Wagener
Executive Vice President, Busine
Six3 Systems
1430 Spring Hill Road
Suite 525
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ryan.wagener@six3systems.com
_____________________________________________________
Caryn Wagner
Under Secretary for Intelligence
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carynanne@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Caryn A Wagner
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carynanne@verizon.net
_____________________________________________________
Jennifer Wagner
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: j_wagner@ssci.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Jennifer Wagner
Senior Manager Gov't Relations
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Rick Wagner
TITLE TBD
TASC
4805 Stonecroft Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.wagner@tasc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Mark Walch
Dep Dir, US CERT for Ops Tech
DHS
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.walch@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Pete Waldorf
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (703) 981-1683
Fax: (703) 621-1133
Email: pete.waldorf@fts-intl.com
_____________________________________________________
Chip Walgren
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: chip_walgren@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ash Walker
1902 Forsyth Street
Suite C
Macon , GA 31201
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ashwalker10@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Bruce Walker
TITLE TBD
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque , NM 87185
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Cindy Walker
CDO
KGS
2750 Prosperity Ave
Ste 300
Fairfax , VA 22031
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: cwalker@kforcegov.com
_____________________________________________________
Torian Walker
VP, Business Development Directo
SAIC
1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: torian.c.walker@saic.com
_____________________________________________________
William J Walker
PO Box 25022
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: williamj.walker@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
William J Walker
Deputy Director DEA Intelligence
Justice Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william.j.walker@usdoj.gov
_____________________________________________________
James Walkinshaw
Chief of Staff, Congressman Conn
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: James.Walkinshaw@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Bill Wall
Director of Strategic Program Pu
EMC Intel
653 MacBeth Drive
Pittsburgh , PA 15235
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
William Wall
Business development
EMC Corporation
8444 Westpark Drive
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: William.wall@emc.com
_____________________________________________________
William T Wall
Director of BD, IC
EMC Corporation
8444 Westpark Drive
Suite 700
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: william.wall@emc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Brett A Wallace
532 20th Street NW
#604
Washington , DC 20006
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: brettawallace@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Wallace
District Manager
NetApp
1921 Gallows Road
Suite 600
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Michael.Wallace@netapp.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ramy Yaacoub
1425 Euclide st nw
#5
Washingtn , DC 20009
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ramy.yaacoub@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Ron Yaggi
Director, Defense Intelligence O
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ryaggi@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Austin K Yamada ME
Vice President
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: austin.yamada@vt-arc.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Austin K Yamada BS, ME
Vice President
Virginia Tech Applied Research Corporation
900 North Glebe Road
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (301) 564-0685
Fax: (none)
Email: austin.yamada@vt-arc.org
_____________________________________________________
Lauren M Yamada
Program Analyst
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
601 S. 12th St
Mail Drop 6104
Arlington , VA 20598
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Lauren.Yamada@dhs.gov
_____________________________________________________
Charles R Yanjanin
Region Manager
Cisco Systems, Inc
13635 Dulles Technology Drive
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 738-7914
Email: cyanjani@cisco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Homayun Yaqub
9435 Lorton Market Street
Suite 749
Lorton , VA 22079
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: hy@masygroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Christina N Yarnold
Project Engineering Staff
Lockheed Martin - IS&GS Security
2245 Monroe Street
Floor 4, 442C
Herndon , VA 20171
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: christina.n.yarnold@lmco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. William Yates
1600 S. Bayshore Lane
Miami , FL 33133
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: byates5043@aol.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael S Yeagley
GM, Global Public Secotr
NovoDynamics, Inc
9819 Fosbak dr
Vienna , VA 22182
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 242-0019
Email: m_yeagley2002@yahoo.com
_____________________________________________________
John Yim
VP Operations
BCMC
2745 Hartland Rd.
Falls Church , VA 22043
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jyim@bcmcgroup.com
_____________________________________________________
Ed Yost
Director, Business Development
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: eyost@csc.com
_____________________________________________________
Ed Yost
Vice President
Apptis
4800 Westfields Blvd
Chantilly , VA 20151
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ed.yost@apptis.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Greg Young
President-CEO
Ensco, Inc.
3110 Fairview Park Dr
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: young.greg@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Greg Young
President and CEO
ENSCO Inc.
Gregory B. Young
3110 Fairview Park Dr.
Suite 300
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: gbyoung@mac.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Gregory B Young
President and CEO
ENSCO, Inc.
3110 Fairview Park Drive
Suite 300
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (703) 321-4687
Email: young.greg@ensco.com
_____________________________________________________
Mark Young
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mark.young@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Sarah Young
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Sarah.Young@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr Keith M Younger BS
Director
EMC Global Alliances
8444 Westpark Dr
suite 900
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (703) 560-6636
Fax: (703) 893-2562
Email: keith.younger@emc.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Richard Youngs
12156 Wedgeway Ct
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.youngs@gmail.com
_____________________________________________________
Shahin Yousefi
1004 Walters Mill Road
Forest Hill , MD 21050
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: syousefi@netstarconsulting.com
_____________________________________________________
Thomas W Yun
Medical Services
State Dept.
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: yuntw@state.gov
_____________________________________________________
Richard R Yuse
TITLE TBD
Raytheon Company - IIS
1100 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 1900
Arlington , VA 22209
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Lt. Gen. Richard P Zahner
Deputy Chief of Staff û G-2
DoD
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: richard.zahner@mi.army.mil
_____________________________________________________
Carla Zamudio-Dolan
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: carla.zamudio-dolan@mail.house.gov
_____________________________________________________
Bridget Zarate
TITLE TBD
Congress
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: bridget_zarate@appro.senate.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Paul Zasada
25 Merriman Lane
Watertown , CT 6795
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: pz@gov.com
_____________________________________________________
Aaron M Zebley
Deputy Chief of Staff
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: aaron.zebley@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Linda Zecher
Vice President, US Public Sector
Microsoft Corporation
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington , DC 20015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: lzecher@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________
Dr. Jacqueline Zee
Intelligence Analyst
Drug Enforcement Administration
700 Army Navy Drive
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jacqueline.w.zee@usdoj.gov
_____________________________________________________
Sarah Zeigler
Office of Ombudsmen
FBI
No Address Available
No Address Available
No City , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: sarah.zeigler@ic.fbi.gov
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Andy Zembower
Vice President, Sensors Group
General Dynamics AIS
12450 Fair Lakes Circle
Fairfax , VA 22033
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Andy.Zembower@gd-ais.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Zembrzuski
Executive Vice President
Six3 Systems
1430 Spring Hill Road
Suite 525
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mzembrzuski@harding-security.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Michael Zembrzuski
Vice President, Operations
Six3 Systems
1430 Spring Hill Road
Suite 525
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: mzembrzuski@harding-security.com
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Michelle Zewin
TITLE TBD
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200
Arlington , VA 22203
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: jzewin@potomacinstitute.org
_____________________________________________________
Thomas Zidow
2051 Seneca Meadows Pkwy
Suite 300
Germantown , MD 20876
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: tom.zidow@wgint.com
_____________________________________________________
Frank Ziegler
Senior VP - New Business and Dev
Corporate Office Properties Trust
6711 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 300
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: frank.ziegler@copt.com
_____________________________________________________
Frank Ziegler
Senior VP - New Business and Dev
Corporate Office Properties Trust
6711 Columbia Gateway Drive
Suite 300
Columbia , MD 21046
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: frank.ziegler@copt.com
_____________________________________________________
Frank W Ziegler
TITLE TBD
Corporate Office Properties Trust
6711 Columbia Gateway Drive
Columbia , MD 21046-2104
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: frank.ziegler@copt.com
_____________________________________________________
Colonel Stephen Ziehmn USAF
TITLE TBD
NRO
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly , VA 20151-1715
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: stephen.ziehmn@nro.mil
_____________________________________________________
Suzan Zimmerman
Sr VP Corporate Development
QinetiQ North America
7918 Jones Branch Drive
Suite 350
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: suzan.zimmerman@qinetiq-na.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Charles Zingler
Executive Director
CACI
6326 Sanctuary Woods Ct
Burke , VA 22015
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: czingler@caci.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Phil Zion
TITLE TBD
General Dynamics C4 Systems
2231 Crystal Drive
Suite 600
Arlington , VA 22202
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Phil.Zion@gdc4s.com
_____________________________________________________
Mr. David Ziskie
Research Fellow
LMI
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean , VA 22102
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: dziskie@lmi.org
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Edward Zoiss
VP National Business Development
Harris Corporation
P.O. Box 37
MS: 2-21D
Melbourne , FL 32902
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: ezoiss@harris.com
_____________________________________________________
David Zolet
President, Strategic Bus. Dev.
Computer Sciences Corporation
3170 Fairview Park Dr
Falls Church , VA 22042
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
_____________________________________________________
Mr. Arthur Zuehlke
Former deputy director for measu
DIA
Building 6000
Washington , DC 20340-5100
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: Arthur.zuehlke@dia.mil
_____________________________________________________
Ms. Anna Zukowski B.A
Deputy Director, IC CIO Governan
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
DeeAnn Zukowski
ODNI, ICCIO, ITGPO
LX2 Room 6B331
Washington , DC 20511
Phone: (none)
Fax: (none)
Email: deeann.zukowski@dni.gov
_____________________________________________________
	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET- Presidential Documents – Strategic Counterterrorism Commuications Initiative
		
	
	

		
Federal Register Volume 76, Number 179 (Thursday, September 15, 2011)]

[Presidential Documents]

[Pages 56945-56947]

From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[FR Doc No: 2011-23891]


Presidential Documents


Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 179 / Thursday, September 15, 2011 /

Presidential Documents


___________________________________________________________________


Title 3–

The President


[[Page 56945]]


Executive Order 13584 of September 9, 2011


Developing an Integrated Strategic

Counterterrorism Communications Initiative and

Establishing a Temporary Organization to Support

Certain Government-wide Communications Activities

Directed Abroad


By the authority vested in me as President by the

Constitution and the laws of the United States of

America, including section 2656 of title 22, United

States Code, and section 3161 of title 5, United States

Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:


Section 1. Policy. The United States is committed to

actively countering the actions and ideologies of al-

Qa’ida, its affiliates and adherents, other terrorist

organizations, and violent extremists overseas that

threaten the interests and national security of the

United States. These efforts take many forms, but all

contain a communications element and some use of

communications strategies directed to audiences outside

the United States to counter the ideology and

activities of such organizations. These communications

strategies focus not only on the violent actions and

human costs of terrorism, but also on narratives that

can positively influence those who may be susceptible

to radicalization and recruitment by terrorist

organizations.


The purpose of this Executive Order is to reinforce,

integrate, and complement public communications efforts

across the executive branch that are (1) focused on

countering the actions and ideology of al-Qa’ida, its

affiliates and adherents, and other international

terrorist organizations and violent extremists

overseas, and (2) directed to audiences outside the

United States. This collaborative work among executive

departments and agencies (agencies) brings together

expertise, capabilities, and resources to realize

efficiencies and better coordination of U.S. Government

communications investments to combat terrorism and

extremism.


Sec. 2. Assigned Responsibilities to the Center for

Strategic Counterterrorism Communications.


(a) Under the direction of the Secretary of State

(Secretary), the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism

Communications (Center) that has been established in

the Department of State by the Secretary shall

coordinate, orient, and inform Government-wide public

communications activities directed at audiences abroad

and targeted against violent extremists and terrorist

organizations, especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates

and adherents, with the goal of using communication

tools to reduce radicalization by terrorists and

extremist violence and terrorism that threaten the

interests and national security of the United States.

Consistent with section 404o of title 50, United States

Code, the Center shall coordinate its analysis,

evaluation, and planning functions with the National

Counterterrorism Center. The Center shall also

coordinate these functions with other agencies, as

appropriate.


Executive branch efforts undertaken through the Center

shall draw on all agencies with relevant information or

capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct these

communications efforts.


(b) To achieve these objectives, the Center’s

functions shall include:


(i) monitoring and evaluating narratives (overarching communication themes

that reflect a community’s identity, experiences, aspirations, and

concerns) and events abroad that are relevant to the development of a


[[Page 56946]]


U.S. strategic counterterrorism narrative designed to counter violent

extremism and terrorism that threaten the interests and national security

of the United States;


(ii) developing and promulgating for use throughout the executive branch

the U.S. strategic counterterrorism narratives and public communications

strategies to counter the messaging of violent extremists and terrorist

organizations, especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents;


(iii) identifying current and emerging trends in extremist communications

and communications by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents in order

to coordinate and provide thematic guidance to U.S. Government

communicators on how best to proactively promote the U.S. strategic

counterterrorism narrative and policies and to respond to and rebut

extremist messaging and narratives when communicating to audiences outside

the United States, as informed by a wide variety of Government and non-

government sources, including nongovernmental organizations, academic

sources, and finished intelligence created by the intelligence community;


(iv) facilitating the use of a wide range of communications technologies,

including digital tools, by sharing expertise among agencies, seeking

expertise from external sources, and extending best practices;


(v) identifying and requesting relevant information from agencies,

including intelligence reporting, data, and analysis; and


(vi) identifying shortfalls in U.S. capabilities in any areas relevant to

the Center’s mission and recommending necessary enhancements or changes.


(c) The Secretary shall establish a Steering

Committee composed of senior representatives of

agencies relevant to the Center’s mission to provide

advice to the Secretary on the operations and strategic

orientation of the Center and to ensure adequate

support for the Center. The Steering Committee shall

meet not less than every 6 months. The Steering

Committee shall be chaired by the Under Secretary of

State for Public Diplomacy. The Coordinator for

Counterterrorism of the Department of State shall serve

as Vice Chair. The Coordinator of the Center shall

serve as Executive Secretary. The Steering Committee

shall include one senior representative designated by

the head of each of the following agencies: the

Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the

Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the

Treasury, the National Counterterrorism Center, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Counterterrorism Center of

the Central Intelligence Agency, the Broadcast Board of

Governors, and the Agency for International

Development. Other agencies may be invited to

participate in the Steering Committee at the discretion

of the Chair.


Sec. 3. Establishment of a Temporary Organization.


(a) There is established within the Department of

State, in accordance with section 3161 of title 5,

United States Code, a temporary organization to be

known as the Counterterrorism Communications Support

Office (CCSO).

(b) The purpose of the CCSO shall be to perform the

specific project of supporting agencies in Government-

wide public communications activities targeted against

violent extremism and terrorist organizations,

especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents,

to audiences abroad by using communication tools

designed to counter violent extremism and terrorism

that threaten the interests and national security of

the United States.

(c) In carrying out its purpose set forth in

subsection (b) of this section, the CCSO shall:


(i) support agencies in their implementation of whole-of-government public

communications activities directed at audiences abroad, including by

providing baseline research on characteristics of these audiences, by

developing expertise and studies on aspirations, narratives, information

strategies and tactics of violent extremists and terrorist organizations

overseas, by designing and developing sustained campaigns on specific areas

of


[[Page 56947]]


interest to audiences abroad, and by developing expertise on implementing

highly focused social media campaigns; and


(ii) perform such other functions related to the specific project set forth

in subsection (b) of this section as the Secretary may assign.


(d) The CCSO shall be headed by a Director selected

by the Secretary, with the advice of the Steering

Committee. Its staff may include, as determined by the

Secretary: (1) personnel with relevant expertise

detailed on a non-reimbursable basis from other

agencies; (2) senior and other technical advisers; and

(3) such other personnel as the Secretary may direct to

support the CCSO. To accomplish this mission, the heads

of agencies participating on the Steering Committee

shall provide to the CCSO, on a non-reimbursable basis,

assistance, services, and other support including but

not limited to logistical and administrative support

and details of personnel. Non-reimbursable details

shall be based on reasonable requests from the

Secretary in light of the need for specific expertise,

and after consultation with the relevant agency, to the

extent permitted by law.

(e) The CCSO shall terminate at the end of the

maximum period permitted by section 3161(a)(1) of title

5, United States Code, unless sooner terminated by the

Secretary consistent with section 3161(a)(2) of such

title.


Sec. 4. General Provisions.


(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to

impair or otherwise affect:


(i) authority granted by law to an agency, or the head thereof; or


(ii) functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget

relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.


(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with

applicable law and subject to the availability of

appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not,

create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,

enforceable at law or in equity by any party against

the United States, its departments, agencies, or

entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any

other person.


(Presidential Sig.)


THE WHITE HOUSE,


September 9, 2011.


[FR Doc. 2011-23891

Filed 9-14-11; 8:45 am]

Billing code 3195-W1-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – MCI Lawful Spying Guide
		
	
	

		
mci-spy

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – INSA Nest of Official and Corporate Spies
		
	
	

		
insa-spies

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET:  Fukushima Daiichi NPP 12 September 2011
		
	
	

		




Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Dust Sampling at the Opening of Reactor Building of Unit 3, September 12, 2011. Released by Tokyo Electric Power Company 13 September 2011.[Image]













































































	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Biological Weapons Export Controls Revised
		
	
	

		
Biological Weapons Export Controls Revised




[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 176 (Monday, September 12, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 56099-56103]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-22677]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

15 CFR Parts 740, 742 and 774

[Docket No. 110222155-1110-01]
RIN 0694-AF14

Implementation of a Decision Adopted Under the Australia Group
(AG) Intersessional Silent Approval Procedures in 2010 and Related
Editorial Amendments

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) publishes this final
rule to amend the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement
a decision based on a proposal that was discussed at the 2010 Australia
Group (AG) Plenary and adopted under the AG intersessional silent
approval procedures in November 2010. Specifically, this rule amends
the Commerce Control List (CCL) entry in the EAR that controls human
and zoonotic pathogens and ``toxins,'' consistent with the
intersessional changes to the AG's ``List of Biological Agents for
Export Control.'' First, this rule clarifies the scope of the AG-
related controls in the EAR that apply to ``South American haemorrhagic
fever (Sabia, Flexal, Guanarito)'' and ``Pulmonary and renal syndrome-
haemorrhagic fever viruses (Seoul, Dobrava, Puumala, Sin Nombre)'' by
revising the list of viruses in this CCL entry to remove these two
fevers and replace them with ten viral causative agents for the fevers.
These changes are intended to more clearly identify the causative
agents that are of concern for purposes of the controls maintained by
the AG. Second, this rule alphabetizes and renumbers the list of
viruses in this CCL entry, consistent with the 2010 intersessional
changes to the AG control list. Finally, this rule makes an editorial
change to the CCL entry that controls human and zoonotic pathogens and
``toxins.'' To assist exporters to more easily identify the bacteria
and ``toxins'' that are controlled under this CCL entry, this rule
alphabetizes and renumbers the lists of bacteria and ``toxins'' in the
entry.

DATES: This rule is effective September 12, 2011.

ADDRESSES: Send comments regarding this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Jasmeet Seehra,
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), by e-mail to Jasmeet_K._ Seehra@omb.eop.gov, or by fax to (202) 395-7285; and to the Regulatory
Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of
Commerce, 14th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Room 2705,
Washington, DC 20230.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elizabeth Sangine, Director, Chemical
and Biological Controls Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty
Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, Telephone: (202) 482-3343.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement a decision that was
adopted under the Australia Group (AG) intersessional silent approval
procedures in November 2010. The AG is a multilateral forum consisting
of 40 participating countries that maintain

[[Page 56100]]

export controls on a list of chemicals, biological agents, and related
equipment and technology that could be used in a chemical or biological
weapons program. The AG periodically reviews items on its control list
to enhance the effectiveness of participating governments' national
controls and to achieve greater harmonization among these controls.
    The November 2010 intersessional decision revised the AG ``List of
Biological Agents for Export Control'' to clarify the scope of the AG
controls that apply to certain viruses connected with the phenotypes or
medical conditions known as ``South American haemorrhagic fever'' and
``Pulmonary and renal syndrome-haemorrhagic fever viruses.'' The
purpose of these changes was to address a concern by the AG that the
listings for ``South American haemorrhagic fever (Sabia, Flexal,
Guanarito)'' and ``Pulmonary and renal syndrome-haemorrhagic fever
viruses (Seoul, Dobrova, Puumala, Sin Nombre)'' could be misinterpreted
(e.g., by assuming that the causative agents identified in the
parentheses represented an exhaustive listing of such viruses). In
addition, both of these AG listings referred to phenotypes or medical
conditions known to be caused by several distinct species of viruses,
some (but not all) of which were identified in parentheses for each
listing.
    To address this concern, the November 2010 AG intersessional
decision removed ``South American haemorrhagic fever'' and ``Pulmonary
and renal syndrome-haemorrhagic fever viruses'' from the List of
Biological Agents and replaced them with ten viral causative agents for
the fevers. Five of these causative agents (i.e., ``Dobrava-Belgrade
virus,'' ``Guanarito virus,'' ``Sabia virus,'' ``Seoul virus,'' and
``Sin nombre virus'') were previously identified in parentheses under
the listings for the two fevers, while the other five causative agents
(i.e., ``Andes virus,'' ``Chapare virus,'' ``Choclo virus,'' ``Laguna
Negra virus,'' and ``Lujo virus'') were not previously identified on
the AG List. Two other causative agents (i.e., ``Flexal virus'' and
``Puumala virus'') that were previously identified in parentheses under
the listings for the two fevers were removed from the AG List. This
rule amends Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 1C351 on the
Commerce Control List (CCL) (Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the EAR)
by revising the list of viruses contained in 1C351.a to reflect these
changes to the AG List of Biological Agents.
    Consistent with the changes to ECCN 1C351 described above, this
rule alphabetizes and renumbers the list of viruses in ECCN 1C351.a to
conform with the format in the AG List of Biological Agents. In
addition, for the convenience of exporters attempting to determine the
control status of certain pathogens and toxins, this rule alphabetizes
and renumbers the lists of bacteria and toxins contained in ECCN
1C351.c and .d, respectively. Consistent with this reordering, this
rule revises references to certain agents identified in the ``CW
Controls'' paragraph of this ECCN, in the ``License Requirements
Notes'' under the License Requirements section of this ECCN, and/or in
the ``Related Controls'' paragraph under the List of Items Controlled
section of this ECCN.
    Although this rule removes ``Flexal virus'' from ECCN 1C351,
consistent with the AG intersessional changes to the AG List of
Biological Agents as described above, this virus continues to be listed
on the CCL. Specifically, this rule adds ``Flexal virus'' to ECCN 1C360
(Select agents not controlled under ECCN 1C351, 1C352, or 1C354),
because the virus is included in the list of select agents and toxins
maintained by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in 42 CFR 73.3(b).
    This rule also amends ECCNs 1C351 and 1C352 by revising the
``Related Controls'' paragraph under the List of Items Controlled for
each ECCN to correct the references to the regulations maintained by
CDC and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S.
Department of Agriculture, that apply to certain select agents and
toxins.
    Finally, this rule amends Section 740.20 (License Exception STA),
Section 742.18 (license requirements and policies related to the
Chemical Weapons Convention), and the List of Items Controlled section
in ECCN 1C991 (Vaccines, immunotoxins, medical products, and diagnostic
and food testing kits) to update the references to certain items
controlled under ECCN 1C351 that were alphabetized and renumbered, as
described above. Section 740.20 also is amended to include in paragraph
(b)(2)(vi) certain toxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d that were
inadvertently omitted by the License Exception STA rule that BIS
published on June 16, 2011 (76 FR 35276). The toxins identified in
Section 740.20(b)(2)(vi) may be exported under License Exception STA to
countries listed in Section 740.20(c)(1), provided that such exports
conform with the limits specified in Section 740.20(b)(2)(vi)(A) and
(b)(2)(vi)(B).
    None of the changes made by this rule increase the scope of the
controls in ECCNs 1C351 and 1C991 (i.e., the items that are controlled
under these ECCNs remain the same, although certain items are now
specifically identified under separate listings in 1C351.a). As noted
above, ``Flexal virus,'' which was previously controlled under ECCN
1C351.a, is now controlled as a ``select agent'' under ECCN 1C360.a;
however, the license requirements for this virus remain unchanged.
    Although the Export Administration Act expired on August 20, 2001,
the President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001, 3 CFR,
2001 Comp., p. 783 (2002), as extended by the Notice of August 12,
2010, 75 FR 50681 (August 16, 2010), has continued the EAR in effect
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

Saving Clause

    Shipments of items removed from eligibility for export or reexport
under a license exception or without a license (i.e., under the
designator ``NLR'') as a result of this regulatory action that were on
dock for loading, on lighter, laden aboard an exporting carrier, or en
route aboard a carrier to a port of export, on October 12, 2011,
pursuant to actual orders for export or reexport to a foreign
destination, may proceed to that destination under the previously
applicable license exception or without a license (NLR) so long as they
are exported or reexported before October 27, 2011. Any such items not
actually exported or reexported before midnight, on October 27, 2011,
require a license in accordance with this regulation.
    ``Deemed'' exports of ``technology'' and ``source code'' removed
from eligibility for export under a license exception or without a
license (under the designator ``NLR'') as a result of this regulatory
action may continue to be made under the previously available license
exception or without a license (NLR) before October 27, 2011. Beginning
at midnight on October 27, 2011, such ``technology'' and ``source
code'' may no longer be released, without a license, to a foreign
national subject to the ``deemed'' export controls in the EAR when a
license would be required to the home country of the foreign national
in accordance with this regulation.

Rulemaking Requirements

    1. Executive Orders 13563 and 12866 direct agencies to assess all
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if
regulation is

[[Page 56101]]

necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety
effects, distributive impacts, and equity). Executive Order 13563
emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, of
reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting flexibility.
This rule has been determined to be not significant for purposes of
Executive Order 12866.
    2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person is
required to respond to, nor shall any person be subject to a penalty
for failure to comply with, a collection of information subject to the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq.) (PRA), unless that collection of information displays a currently
valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Control Number. This rule
contains a collection of information subject to the requirements of the
PRA. This collection has been approved by OMB under Control Number
0694-0088 (Multi-Purpose Application), which carries a burden hour
estimate of 58 minutes to prepare and submit form BIS-748. Send
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the
burden, to Jasmeet Seehra, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
to the Regulatory Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security,
Department of Commerce, as indicated in the ADDRESSES section of this
rule.
    3. This rule does not contain policies with Federalism implications
as that term is defined in Executive Order 13132.
    4. The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
553) requiring notice of proposed rulemaking, the opportunity for
public participation, and a delay in effective date, are inapplicable
because this regulation involves a military and foreign affairs
function of the United States (See 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1)). Immediate
implementation of these amendments is non-discretionary and fulfills
the United States' international obligation to the Australia Group
(AG). The AG contributes to international security and regional
stability through the harmonization of export controls and seeks to
ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical
and biological weapons. The AG consists of 40 member countries that act
on a consensus basis and the amendments set forth in this rule
implement a decision adopted under the AG intersessional silent
approval procedures in November 2010 and other changes that are
necessary to ensure consistency with the controls maintained by the AG.
Since the United States is a significant exporter of the items in this
rule, immediate implementation of this provision is necessary for the
AG to achieve its purpose. Any delay in implementation will create a
disruption in the movement of affected items globally because of
disharmony between export control measures implemented by AG members,
resulting in tension between member countries. Export controls work
best when all countries implement the same export controls in a timely
and coordinated manner.
    Further, no other law requires that a notice of proposed rulemaking
and an opportunity for public comment be given for this final rule.
Because a notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for public
comment are not required to be given for this rule under the
Administrative Procedure Act or by any other law, the analytical
requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.)
are not applicable. Therefore, this regulation is issued in final form.

List of Subjects

15 CFR Part 740

    Administrative practice and procedure, Exports, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.

15 CFR Part 742

    Exports, Foreign trade.

15 CFR Part 774

    Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

    Accordingly, parts 740, 742 and 774 of the Export Administration
Regulations (15 CFR parts 730-774) are amended as follows:

PART 740--[AMENDED]

0
1. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 740 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.;
22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp.,
p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice
of August 12, 2010, 75 FR 50681 (August 16, 2010).

0
2. Section 740.20 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(v) and
paragraph (b)(2)(vi) introductory text, as follows:

Sec.  740.20  License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (v) License Exception STA may not be used for any item controlled
by ECCN 1C351.a, .b, .c, d.11, .d.12 or .e, ECCNs 1C352, 1C353, 1C354,
1C360, 1E001 (i.e., for technology, as specified in ECCN 1E001, for
items controlled by ECCN 1C351.a, .b, .c, .d.11, .d.12 or .e or ECCNs
1C352, 1C353, 1C354 or 1C360) or ECCN 1E351.
    (vi) Toxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.1 through 1C351.d.10 and
1C351.d.13 through 1C351.d.19 are authorized under License Exception
STA to destinations indicated in paragraph (c)(1) of this section,
subject to the following limits. For purposes of this paragraph, all
such toxins that are sent from one exporter, reexporter or transferor
to a single end-user, on the same day, constitute one shipment.
* * * * *

PART 742--[AMENDED]

0
3. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 742 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.;
22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2139a; 22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.; 22
U.S.C. 7210; Sec 1503, Pub. L. 108-11, 117 Stat. 559; E.O. 12058, 43
FR 20947, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 179; E.O. 12851, 58 FR 33181, 3 CFR,
1993 Comp., p. 608; E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p.
950; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222,
66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Presidential Determination
2003-23 of May 7, 2003, 68 FR 26459, May 16, 2003; Notice of August
12, 2010, 75 FR 50681 (August 16, 2010); Notice of November 4, 2010,
75 FR 68673 (November 8, 2010).

0
4. Section 742.18 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(1), paragraph
(b)(1)(i) introductory text, and paragraphs (b)(1)(ii) and (b)(1)(iii),
as follows:

Sec.  742.18  Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention).

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (1) Schedule 1 chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C351.
A license is required for CW reasons to export or reexport Schedule 1
chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.11 or d.12 to all destinations
including Canada. CW applies to 1C351.d.11 for ricin in the form of
Ricinus Communis AgglutininII (RCAII), which is
also known as ricin D or Ricinus Communis LectinIII
(RCLIII), and Ricinus Communis LectinIV
(RCLIV), which is also known as ricin E. CW applies to
1C351.d.12 for saxitoxin identified by C.A.S. 35523-89-8.
(Note that the advance notification procedures and annual reporting
requirements described in

[[Page 56102]]

Sec.  745.1 of the EAR also apply to exports of Schedule 1 chemicals.)
* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (i) Exports to States Parties to the CWC. Applications to export
Schedule 1 Chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.11 or .d.12 to
States Parties to the CWC (destinations listed in Supplement No. 2 to
part 745 of the EAR) generally will be denied, unless all of the
following conditions are met:
* * * * *
    (ii) Exports to States not party to the CWC. Applications to export
Schedule 1 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.11 or .d.12 to
States not Party to the CWC (destinations not listed in Supplement No.
2 to part 745 of the EAR) generally will be denied, consistent with
U.S. obligations under the CWC to prohibit exports of these chemicals
to States not Party to the CWC.
    (iii) Reexports. Applications to reexport Schedule 1 chemicals
controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.11 or .d.12 generally will be denied to
all destinations (including both States Parties to the CWC and States
not Party to the CWC).
* * * * *

PART 774--[AMENDED]

0
5. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 774 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.;
10 U.S.C. 7420; 10 U.S.C. 7430(e); 22 U.S.C. 287c, 22 U.S.C. 3201 et
seq., 22 U.S.C. 6004; 30 U.S.C. 185(s), 185(u); 42 U.S.C. 2139a; 42
U.S.C. 6212; 43 U.S.C. 1354; 15 U.S.C. 1824a; 50 U.S.C. app. 5; 22
U.S.C. 7201 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 7210; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR,
1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p.
783; Notice of August 12, 2010, 75 FR 50681 (August 16, 2010).

0
6. In Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List),
Category 1--Special Materials and Related Equipment, Chemicals,
``Microorganisms'' and ``Toxins,'' ECCN 1C351 is amended by revising
the License Requirements section and the ``Related Controls'' and
``Items'' paragraphs in the List of Items Controlled section, to read
as follows:

Supplement No. 1 to Part 774--The Commerce Control List

* * * * *
1C351 Human and zoonotic pathogens and ``toxins'', as follows (see
List of Items Controlled).

License Requirements

Reason for Control: CB, CW, AT

               Control(s)                         Country chart

CB applies to entire entry.............  CB Column 1.

CW applies to 1C351.d.11 and d.12 and a license is required for CW
reasons for all destinations, including Canada, as follows: CW
applies to 1C351.d.11 for ricin in the form of (1) Ricinus Communis
AgglutininII (RCAII), also known as ricin D or
Ricinus Communis LectinIII (RCLIII) and (2)
Ricinus Communis LectinIV (RCLIV), also known
as ricin E. CW applies to 1C351.d.12 for saxitoxin identified by
C.A.S. 35523-89-8. See Sec.  742.18 of the EAR for
licensing information pertaining to chemicals subject to restriction
pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Commerce
Country Chart is not designed to determine licensing requirements
for items controlled for CW reasons.

               Control(s)                         Country chart

AT applies to entire entry.............  AT Column 1.

License Requirement Notes

    1. All vaccines and ``immunotoxins'' are excluded from the scope
of this entry. Certain medical products and diagnostic and food
testing kits that contain biological toxins controlled under
paragraph (d) of this entry, with the exception of toxins controlled
for CW reasons under d.11 and d.12, are excluded from the scope of
this entry. Vaccines, ``immunotoxins'', certain medical products,
and diagnostic and food testing kits excluded from the scope of this
entry are controlled under ECCN 1C991.
    2. For the purposes of this entry, only saxitoxin is controlled
under paragraph d.12; other members of the paralytic shellfish
poison family (e.g. neosaxitoxin) are designated EAR99.
    3. Clostridium perfringens strains, other than the epsilon
toxin-producing strains of Clostridium perfringens described in c.9,
are excluded from the scope of this entry, since they may be used as
positive control cultures for food testing and quality control.

License Exceptions

* * * * *

List of Items Controlled

Unit: * * *
Related Controls: (1) Certain forms of ricin and saxitoxin in
1C351.d.11. and d.12 are CWC Schedule 1 chemicals (see Sec.  742.18
of the EAR). The U.S. Government must provide advance notification
and annual reports to the OPCW of all exports of Schedule 1
chemicals. See Sec.  745.1 of the EAR for notification procedures.
See 22 CFR part 121, Category XIV and Sec.  121.7 for additional CWC
Schedule 1 chemicals controlled by the Department of State. (2) The
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Department
of Agriculture, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, maintain
controls on the possession, use, and transfer within the United
States of certain items controlled by this ECCN (for APHIS, see 7
CFR 331.3(b), 9 CFR 121.3(b), and 9 CFR 121.4(b); for CDC, see 42
CFR 73.3(b) and 42 CFR 73.4(b)).
Related Definitions: * * *
Items:
    a. Viruses, as follows:
    a.1. Andes virus;
    a.2. Chapare virus;
    a.3. Chikungunya virus;
    a.4. Choclo virus;
    a.5. Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus (a.k.a. Crimean-
Congo haemorrhagic fever virus);
    a.6. Dengue fever virus;
    a.7. Dobrava-Belgrade virus;
    a.8. Eastern equine encephalitis virus;
    a.9. Ebola virus;
    a.10. Guanarito virus;
    a.11. Hantaan virus;
    a.12. Hendra virus (Equine morbillivirus);
    a.13. Japanese encephalitis virus;
    a.14. Junin virus;
    a.15. Kyasanur Forest virus;
    a.16. Laguna Negra virus;
    a.17. Lassa fever virus;
    a.18. Louping ill virus;
    a.19. Lujo virus;
    a.20. Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus;
    a.21. Machupo virus;
    a.22. Marburg virus;
    a.23. Monkey pox virus;
    a.24. Murray Valley encephalitis virus;
    a.25. Nipah virus;
    a.26. Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus;
    a.27. Oropouche virus;
    a.28. Powassan virus;
    a.29. Rift Valley fever virus;
    a.30. Rocio virus;
    a.31. Sabia virus;
    a.32. Seoul virus;
    a.33. Sin nombre virus;
    a.34. St. Louis encephalitis virus;
    a.35. Tick-borne encephalitis virus (Russian Spring-Summer
encephalitis virus);
    a.36. Variola virus;
    a.37. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus;
    a.38. Western equine encephalitis virus; or
    a.39. Yellow fever virus.
    b. Rickettsiae, as follows:
    b.1. Bartonella quintana (Rochalimea quintana, Rickettsia
quintana);
    b.2. Coxiella burnetii;
    b.3. Rickettsia prowasecki (a.k.a. Rickettsia prowazekii); or
    b.4. Rickettsia rickettsii.
    c. Bacteria, as follows:
    c.1. Bacillus anthracis;
    c.2. Brucella abortus;
    c.3. Brucella melitensis;
    c.4. Brucella suis;
    c.5. Burkholderia mallei (Pseudomonas mallei);
    c.6. Burkholderia pseudomallei (Pseudomonas pseudomallei);
    c.7. Chlamydophila psittaci (formerly known as Chlamydia
psittaci);
    c.8. Clostridium botulinum;
    c.9. Clostridium perfringens, epsilon toxin producing types;
    c.10. Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli, serotype O157 and
other verotoxin producing serotypes;
    c.11. Francisella tularensis;
    c.12. Salmonella typhi;
    c.13. Shigella dysenteriae;
    c.14. Vibrio cholerae; or
    c.15. Yersinia pestis.
    d. ``Toxins'', as follows, and ``subunits'' thereof:

[[Page 56103]]

    d.1. Abrin;
    d.2. Aflatoxins;
    d.3. Botulinum toxins;
    d.4. Cholera toxin;
    d.5. Clostridium perfringens toxins;
    d.6. Conotoxin;
    d.7. Diacetoxyscirpenol toxin;
    d.8. HT-2 toxin;
    d.9. Microcystin (Cyanginosin);
    d.10. Modeccin toxin;
    d.11. Ricin;
    d.12. Saxitoxin;
    d.13. Shiga toxin;
    d.14. Staphylococcus aureus toxins;
    d.15. T-2 toxin;
    d.16. Tetrodotoxin;
    d.17. Verotoxin and other Shiga-like ribosome inactivating
proteins;
    d.18. Viscum Album Lectin 1 (Viscumin); or
    d.19. Volkensin toxin.
    e. ``Fungi'', as follows:
    e.1. Coccidioides immitis; or
    e.2. Coccidioides posadasii.

0
7. In Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List),
Category 1-- Special Materials and Related Equipment, Chemicals,
``Microorganisms'' and ``Toxins,'' ECCN 1C352 is amended by revising
the ``Related Controls'' paragraph in the List of Items Controlled
section, to read as follows:

1C352 Animal pathogens, as follows (see List of Items Controlled).
* * * * *

List of Items Controlled

Unit: * * *
Related Controls: The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, maintain controls on the possession, use, and transfer
within the United States of certain items controlled by this ECCN
(for APHIS, see 7 CFR 331.3(b), 9 CFR 121.3(b), and 9 CFR 121.4(b);
for CDC, see 42 CFR 73.3(b) and 42 CFR 73.4(b)).
Related Definitions: * * *
Items:
* * * * *

0
8. In Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List),
Category 1--Special Materials and Related Equipment, Chemicals,
``Microorganisms'' and ``Toxins,'' ECCN 1C360 is amended by revising
paragraph (a) in the ``Items'' paragraph in the List of Items
Controlled to read as follows:

1C360 Select agents not controlled under ECCN 1C351, 1C352, or
1C354.
* * * * *

List of Items Controlled

Unit: * * *
Related Controls: * * *
Related Definitions: * * *
Items:
Note: * * *
    a. Human and zoonotic pathogens, as follows:
    a.1. Viruses, as follows:
    a.1.a. Central European tick-borne encephalitis viruses, as
follows:
    a.1.a.1. Absettarov;
    a.1.a.2. Hanzalova;
    a.1.a.3. Hypr;
    a.1.a.4. Kumlinge;
    a.1.b. Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 (Herpes B virus);
    a.1.c. Flexal virus;
    a.1.d. Reconstructed replication competent forms of the 1918
pandemic influenza virus containing any portion of the coding
regions of all eight gene segments;
a.2. [RESERVED];
* * * * *

0
9. In Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List),
Category 1--Special Materials and Related Equipment, Chemicals,
``Microorganisms'' and ``Toxins,'' ECCN 1C991 is amended by revising
the ``Items'' paragraph in the List of Items Controlled to read as
follows:

1C991 Vaccines, immunotoxins, medical products, diagnostic and food
testing kits, as follows (see List of Items controlled).
* * * * *

List of Items Controlled

Unit: * * *
Related Controls: * * *
Related Definitions: * * *
Items:
    a. Vaccines against items controlled by ECCN 1C351, 1C352,
1C353, 1C354, or 1C360;
    b. Immunotoxins containing items controlled by 1C351.d;
    c. Medical products containing botulinum toxins controlled by
ECCN 1C351.d.3 or conotoxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.6;
    d. Medical products containing items controlled by ECCN 1C351.d
(except botulinum toxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.3, conotoxins
controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.6, and items controlled for CW reasons
under 1C351.d.11 or .d.12);
    e. Diagnostic and food testing kits containing items controlled
by ECCN 1C351.d (except items controlled for CW reasons under ECCN
1C351.d.11 or .d.12).

    Dated: August 26, 2011.
Kevin J. Wolf,
Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.
[FR Doc. 2011-22677 Filed 9-9-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-33-P

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – FBI Notice of Potential al-Qa’ida NYC DC Threat
		
	
	

		
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


(U//FOUO) Potential Al-Qa’ida Threat to New York City and Washington, DC During 9/11 Anniversary Period


8 September 2011


(U) Scope


(U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to provide warning and perspective regarding potential attack plotting by al-Qa?ida against US interests. This product is intended to support the activities of FBI and DHS and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and the private sector in effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist attacks against the United States.


IA-0???-11


(U) Warning: This joint FBI/DHS document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It is subject to release restrictions as detailed in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 482) and the Freedom of Information Acts (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS and FBI policy for FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, media, or other personnel who do not have an authorized need-to-know without appropriate prior authorization.


(U) Warning: This product may contain US person information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided. US person information is highlighted with the label USPER and should be protected in accordance with constitutional requirements and all federal and state privacy and civil liberties laws.


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


(U) Key Findings


(U//FOUO) According to recently obtained information, al-Qa’ida may be planning attacks inside the United States, targeting either New York City or Washington, DC around the time of the 9/11 anniversary.


(U//FOUO) We remain concerned that terrorists and violent extremists may view the symbolism of the 10th anniversary of 9/11 as a potentially attractive date to conduct an attack—particularly in major US cities.


(U//FOUO) Al-Qa’ida Possibly Planning Homeland Attack around 9/11 Anniversary Timeframe


(U//FOUO) As of early September 2011, al-Qa’ida possibly planned to carry out attacks in either New York City or Washington, DC—including a possible car bomb attack— around the timeframe of the 9/11 anniversary; such attacks may involve operatives carrying US documentation.


    

  • (U//FOUO) The attacks would be intended to cause panic within the public and disarray among first responders.
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) We have no further information on the specific timing, targets, locations, or methods of any of the potential attacks.
    • 



(U//FOUO) We assess that al-Qa’ida has likely maintained an interest since at least February 2010 in conducting large attacks in the Homeland timed to coincide with symbolic dates, to include the 10-year anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We also remain concerned that the May 2011 death of Usama bin Ladin (UBL), coupled with the subsequent removal of several key al-Qa’ida figures, could further contribute to al-Qa’ida’s desire to stage an attack on a symbolic date—such as the 10-year anniversary of 9/11—as a way to avenge UBL’s death and reassert the group’s relevance, although operational readiness likely remains the primary driving factor behind the timing of al-Qa’ida attacks.


(U) Possible Attack Methods and Targets


(U//FOUO) While this specific threat reporting indicates al-Qa’ida may be considering an attack using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)—likely similar to the tactic used by Faisal Shahzad USPER in his attempted attack on Times Square on 1 May 2010—we assess that al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have also considered attacks with small-arms, homemade explosive devices, and poisons, and probably provide their operatives with enough autonomy to select the particular target and method of attack.


(U//FOUO) Although we have no specific information on targets other than these two cities for this particular threat stream, we assess that al-Qa’ida in general has traditionally viewed aviation, mass transit systems, and US Government and military sites as particularly attractive. We further assess that targets with large gatherings of people and that are of economic, symbolic, or political significance offer the opportunity for al-Qa’ida and its adherents to inflict mass casualties, with the added objectives of causing economic and psychological damage on the United States.


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


Page 2 of 5


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


(U) Indicators of Pre-Operational Surveillance and Preparations for an Attack


(U//FOUO) We strongly encourage federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism officials and the private sector to remain alert and immediately report potential indicators of preoperational surveillance and planning activities at any commercial retail establishment, transportation venue, national monument or icon, or other public gathering place. Although a single indicator may constitute constitutionally protected activity, one or more might indicate pre-operational surveillance or preparation for an attack. Possible indicators include:


    

  • (U//FOUO) Unusual or prolonged interest in or attempts to gain sensitive information about security measures of personnel, entry points, peak days and hours of operation, and access controls such as alarms or locks;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Observation of security reaction drills or procedures; multiple false alarms or fictitious emergency calls to the same locations or similar venues;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Use of cameras or video recorders, sketching, or note-taking in a manner that would arouse suspicion;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Unusual interest in speaking with building maintenance personnel;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Observation of or questions about facility security measures, to include barriers, restricted areas, cameras, and intrusion detection systems;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Observations of or questions about facility air conditioning, heating, and ventilation systems;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Suspicious purchases of items that could be used to construct an explosive device, including hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Suspicious activities in storage facilities or other areas that could be used to construct an explosive device;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Attempted or unauthorized access to rooftops or other potentially sensitive areas.
    • 



(U) Recommended Protective Measures for VBIED Attacks


    

  • (U//FOUO) Update personnel on escalating threat;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Review and verify IED and VBIED tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and reporting procedures;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Frequently test communications and notification procedures;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Be aware of and report unattended vehicles;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Identify security zones and establish standoff distances;
    • 



UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


Page 3 of 5


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


    

  • (U//FOUO) Conduct refresher training for employees to understand basic procedures and associated hazards from blast and fragmentation;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Educate facility personnel on indicators of a VBIED attack TTPs and to be on the lookout for suspicious behavior;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Review and identify local use-of-force policies to challenge a potential vehicle suicide attack should it be encountered;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Review evacuation protocols for VBIED threats, and conduct evacuation drills establishing primary and secondary evacuation routes and assembly areas;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Establish security presence at strategic locations within at-risk venues, specifically at all entrances or vehicular choke points;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Establish vehicle search protocols and identify vehicle screening points or marshalling areas to check identification and manifests of approaching service vehicles;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Prohibit unauthorized vehicle access;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Record tag numbers for all vehicles entering site;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Establish protocols for executing serpentine vehicle access and choke points to impede approach of a VBIED toward a possible target. Conduct random vehicle explosive detection and canine searches;
    • 

  • (U//FOUO) Stagger search times and patterns to impede potential surveillance.
    • 



(U) Outlook


(U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS continue to work with our federal and non-federal partners to investigate this threat stream and will provide updates as appropriate. We continue to operate under the assumption that terrorists not yet identified by the Intelligence Community and law enforcement could seek to advance or execute attacks with little or no warning and urge federal, state, and local law enforcement and the private sector to maintain increased vigilance for indications of pre-operational and suspicious activity.


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


Page 4 of 5


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


(U) Reporting Notice


(U) The FBI and DHS encourage recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and the State and Major Urban Area Fusion Center. The FBI’s 24/7 Strategic Information and Operations Center can be reached by telephone number 202-323-3300 or by email at SIOC[at]ic.fbi.gov. The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at (202) 282-9685 or by email at NOC.Fusion[at]dhs.gov. FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm and Fusion Center information may be obtained at http://www.dhs.gov/files/resources/editorial_0306.shtm. For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC. The NICC can be reached by telephone at (202) 282-9201 or by email at NICC[at]dhs.gov. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.


(U) Administrative Note: Law Enforcement Response


(U//FOUO) Information contained in this intelligence bulletin is for official use only. No portion of this bulletin should be released to the media, the general public, or over nonsecure Internet servers. Release of this material could adversely affect or jeopardize investigative activities.


(U) For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document, please contact the FBI Counterterrorism Analysis Section at (202) 324-3000 or FBI_CTAS[at]ic.fbi.gov, or DHS/I&A Production Branch staff at IA.PM[at]hq.dhs.gov.


(U) I&A would like to invite you to participate in a brief customer feedback survey regarding this product. Your feedback is extremely important to our efforts to improve the quality and impact of our products on your mission. Please click below to access the form and then follow a few simple steps to complete and submit your response. Thank you.


(U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3.4


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


Page 5 of 5

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET-Backgrounder: US Smart Power Counterterrorism
		
	
	

		
Background Briefing on Secretary Clinton’s Speech “A Smart Power Approach to Counterterrorism”


Special Briefing


Senior Administration Official


Conference Call


September 9, 2011


MR. TONER: Good morning, everyone, and thanks to all for joining us at such short notice. As you know, the Secretary is giving remarks this morning very shortly from now on smart power approach to counterterrorism. We thought it would be useful to have someone walk you through some of the highlights of that speech before she actually gives it. So without further ado, I d like to introduce [Senior Administration Official One], who will be known as Senior Administration Official Number One. And just a reminder, this is on background.


So without further ado, handing it over to [Senior Administration Official One].


SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Good morning, everybody. Thank you for joining us. As you know, this speech was designed to be part of the commemoration of the 10-year anniversary since the September 11 attack. The Secretary thought it would be appropriate to stand back and talk about the Administration s approach to counterterrorism, but it obviously takes on new relevance given what we have heard about a heightened alert status.


Fundamentally, this speech, if you ve had a chance to look at it you should all have embargoed copies is designed to talk about using all the tools of American power, including our values and our strong democratic leadership around the world to fight counterterrorism and embedding the fight against terrorism in our larger approach to values-based global leadership.


So just walking you through it and you ll see that throughout this speech, she emphasizes that the fight against counter against terrorism has to be not just a fight about what we are against, but we have to fight for what we are for, namely our values of tolerance, equality, and opportunity for universal rights and the rule of law.


So, at the top of the speech, she makes clear that the military fight continues. We have unfinished business and we will do what we need to do to confront terrorists militarily where they live, but we will do so within international law standards and in keeping with our highest values. But we also have to work to cut the roots out from under terrorists, and that means attacking finances, attacking their ability to recruit, and attacking their ability to have safe havens.


So, in the section Taking the Fight to al-Qaida, she talks about the force piece here, but she also talks about the justice piece. Draw your attention to page five, where she makes clear that in doing we will we maintain the right to use force against groups such as al-Qaida that have attacked us and still threaten us with imminent violence, but in doing so we will stay true to our values and respect the rule of law, including international law principles. And then further down, she makes clear our intention to make full use of civilian courts and reformed military commissions, because this sends a message to the world about the importance of rule of law in confronting terrorism.


Further on, she talks about how the threat has changed. After the loss of [sic] the death of bin Ladin, the threat from the Afghan-Pakistan border remains, but the al-Qaida threat has become more diffuse.


On page six, you see that she talks about al-Qaida now as a syndicate of terror. It is not a monolith. It s becoming more geographically diverse and she specifically talks about al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, with bases in Yemen trying to do attacks beyond its bases, and about al-Shabaab in Somalia, as two examples there.


Further on, she talks about how our larger goals, globally, of supporting democratic change, supporting prosperity, fighting poverty, fighting repression, supporting rule of law are also counterterrorism objectives. And in this regard, the work that we do to try to resolve conflicts, reduce poverty, improve governance also drain the swamp that terrorists try to live in and exploit.


Some specific areas of innovation noted on page seven, I would call your attention to new biometric screening tools to improve border security and visa processes electronic fingerprinting, facial recognition, iris scans. And then also in the category of making it harder for terrorists to operate, our work to combat terror finance, working with countries around the world to put new tough legislation in place, to disrupt illicit financial networks, but as a result of it becoming harder for terrorists to use official networks, having now to confront their alternative strategies where they fund their operation through criminal activity and kidnapping. So we also have to work with governments to ensure that we have a no-concessions policy, no paying ransom to kidnappers, et cetera.


In the category of trying to drain the swamp of new recruits, trying to slow recruitment, you see starting on page eight and nine she talks about a number of initiatives. First of all, trying to counter the extremist narrative, this speaks to the establishment at the State Department of the special representative to Muslim communities, to step up in our engagement in the most crucial spaces, putting our own people, speaking Arabic, Urdu, and Dari, on key television stations to counteract misinformation, and the development and launching now of a new center for strategic counterterrorism communications, which is focused on undermining terrorist propaganda, dissuading potential recruits. This is housed in the State Department, but it s a whole-of-government approach that includes Urdu and Arabic speakers who make up a special digital outreach team and are getting up online, contesting the narrative in terror on terrorist websites and forums, and getting in it and arguing their points with young people.


She also talks, starting on page nine, about what we ve learned about key recruiting hotspots, that terrorists have been more successful in hotspots where economic opportunity is in short supply, where education is biased in favor of an extremist narrative, and the importance of using a scalpel, not a sledgehammer, working with local leaders in particular places where recruiting has been most successful to try to empower a more progressive, democratic narrative and to provide alternative opportunities for young people, to deny recruiters the opportunity to turn kids extreme and there are some examples here working with the Kenyan Muslim Youth Association, working with the Sisters Against Violence, particularly focusing our efforts in Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Yemen, and obviously Afghanistan.


And then the last piece here is the importance of strengthening the diplomatic offensive to build both to build partner capacity and to maintain a strong global community, a global coalition against terrorism. So here on page 10 and 11, talking about first elevating our own counterterrorism effort to the level of assistant secretary, then our efforts to expand our training programs to some 60 countries we ve now trained some 7,000 law enforcement and counterterrorism officials around the world strengthening capacity, building in frontline states Yemen and Pakistan.


Also, we discovered that in fact, there is no dedicated international venue to regularly convene counterterrorism policymakers and practitioners from around the world. So at the UNGA, working with Turkey, the United States will serve as a founding co-chair, along with 30 other nations, of a new global counterterrorism forum. This forum is designed to assist countries that are transitioning from authoritarian rule to democracy and rule of law. It s going to provide support, particularly in the civilian sector, best practices, writing of new legislation, training police, prosecutors, judges, but all within the context of upholding the strongest standards of universal human rights.


Finally, at the end of the speech, she talks about the essential element of defeating an extremist ideology with an ideology of hope, democracy, prosperity, universal values, tapping into the aspirations for change that we ve seen across North Africa and the broader Middle East, and rooted very much in American leadership, American confidence in our own values, in our own open democratic system which must not only be maintained, it has to be strengthened as a key element of serving as a beacon for others around the world and for defeating terror.


So with that, let me pause and take any questions.


MR. TONER: We can go ahead and take some questions now.


OPERATOR: Thank you. At this time, we re ready to begin the question-and-answer session. If you would like to ask a question, please press *1 and record your name and news organization clearly so I may introduce you into the call. Again, press *1 to ask a question. And one moment for our first question.


One moment, please. We do have a question from Kirit Radia with ABC News. You may ask your question.


SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Hi, Kirit.


QUESTION: Hi, [Senior Administration Official One]. It s Kirit. Thanks for doing this. I do have a quick question about the terror plot that came out last night. I know it s not exactly about the speech, but there was some reporting that this was the result of a tip from a walk-in into a U.S. Embassy. I m curious if you could tell us anything about that, since we re on background.


SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: I cannot, Kirit. We are not prepared to talk at all about the intelligence surrounding this issue.


MR. TONER: Next question.


OPERATOR: At this time, I m showing no further questions. Again, if you d like to ask a question, please press *1. Again, press *1 to ask a question.


And one moment for our next question.


SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Okay, good. Well, if we have no questions, we will look forward to the speech in about half an hour.


OPERATOR: We did have one question, if you d like to take it yet.


SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Sure.


OPERATOR: And that s from Chris Hawley with Associated Press. You may ask your question.


QUESTION: Hi, there. Last week, we had a very large story kind of looking at terrorism arrests around the world, and we found that something like 35,000 people have been convicted of terrorism in the last 10 years and a lot of this stems from sort of U.S. pressure and aid toward other countries. But at the same time, a lot of groups are saying that many countries are using this as an excuse to crack down on political dissidents. Are there any protections or guidelines you guys are adopting as you go into this quote/unquote smart approach to protect political dissent?


SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you for that.


First and foremost, I think when you hear the speech, when you see the speech, you ll see that the Secretary makes clear that one of our strongest and most important U.S. weapons in the fight against terror is our own adherence to the highest standards of international law. So in the training programs that we are doing for other countries, in the best practices that we are trying to share, and in the example that we set and particularly, as I said, she cites the importance of being able to use both civilian courts and reformed military courts to try terrorists in a transparent manner which protects their rights we are trying to set an example for countries around the world in the way this has to be handled, and that this is about trying terrorists, this is not about using terrorism as an excuse to settle scores or handle other issues.


QUESTION: Got it. All right. Many thanks.


SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you.


OPERATOR: Thank you. At this time, I m showing no further questions.


SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you very much, everybody.


PRN: 2011/1450


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9/11-How can we survive ? – Black Humor for War Time Debt Profligacy and Panic
		
	
	

		
Black Humor for War Time Debt Profligacy and Panic


Images by Cryptome.




We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People, Peter Van Buren, 2011. Peter Van Buren was a State Department officer in Iraq working with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). He was based primarily at Forward Operating Base Hammer


Van Buren provides an informative, gorge-raising, black humorous, literal boots-on-the-ground, apology for “we have a war to fight, damn the cost, others will pay the bill” instigator of the current global panic about national debt ever bleaker humor. Rue with him being taken in by the natsec scam, laugh at each other and weep over your unpaid bills, service cutbacks, and tax duns for the cost of guiltless official malfeasance.


DoJ-celebrated task force prosecutions for terrorism, financial crime, health care fraud and child pornography are easy, small-time stuff compared to the great crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan forgiven by war-time exemptions, with very few cases for US official financial profligacy, negligence and wastage.


Excerpts:




Page 11:


My side of State was removed from the high-level Wikileaky things ambassadors did and changed very little between administrations.


[Van Buren was based primarily at FOB Hammer (as was Bradley Manning), a huge base 12 miles in circumference which was heavily compartmentalized to separate types of personnel: military, USG, OG (CIA), contractors, guards, servants.]






[Image]U.S. Army 210th Brigade Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division Soldiers compete in remote car derby in Forward Operating Base Hammer, Iraq, July 4, 2010. U.S. Soldiers celebrated Independence Day with a series of tournaments, a cookout, and an array of games.(U.S. Army photo by Spc. Frank Smith/Released)













Pages 46-49:


Money and Our Meth Habit


We lacked a lot of things in Iraq: flush toilets, fresh vegetables, the comfort of family members nearby, and of course adult supervision, strategic guidance, and common sense. Like Guns N’ Roses’ budget for meth after a new hit, the one thing we did not lack was money. There was money everywhere. A soldier recalled unloading pallets of new US hundred-dollar bills, millions of dollars flushing out of the belly of a C-130 cargo aircraft to be picked up off the runway by forklifts (operated by soldiers who would make less in their lifetimes than what was on their skids at that moment). You couldn’t walk around a corner without stumbling over bales of money; the place was lousy with it. In my twenty-three years working for the State Department, we never had enough money. We were always being told to “do more with less,” as if slogans were cash. Now there was literally more money than we could spend. It was weird.


We’d be watching the news from home about foreclosures, and I’d be reading e-mails from my sister about school cutbacks, while signing off on tens of thousands of dollars for stuff in Iraq. At one point we were tasked to give out microgrants, $5,000 in actual cash handed to an Iraqi to “open a business,” no strings attached. If he took the money and in front of us spent it on dope and pinball, it was no matter. We wondered among ourselves whether we shouldn’t be running a PRT in Detroit or New Orleans instead of Baghdad. In addition to the $63 billion Congress had handed us for Iraq’s reconstruction, we also had some $91 billion of captured Iraqi funds (that were mostly misplaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority), plus another $18 billion donated by countries such as Japan and South Korea. In 2009, we had another $387 million for aid to internal refugees that paid for many reconstruction-like projects. If that was not enough, over a billion additional US dollars were spent on operating costs for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. By comparison, the reconstruction of Germany and Japan cost, in 2010 dollars, only $32 billion and $17 billion, respectively.


While a lot of the money was spent in big bites at high levels through the Embassy, or possibly just thrown into the river when no one could find a match to set it on fire, at the local level money was spent via two programs: CERP and QRF. CERP was Army money, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. Though originally provided to address emergency humanitarian needs and short-term counterinsurgency costs, this nearly unlimited pool of cash came to be spent on reconstruction. The local US Army Commander could himself approve projects up to $200,000, with almost no technical or policy oversight. Accounting was fast and loose; a 2009 audit, for example, found the Army could not account for $8.7 billion in funds. It might have been stolen or just lost; no one will ever know. The Army shared its money with us at the ePRTs, partly out of generosity, partly out of pity, and partly because individual military units were graded on how much cash they spent — more money spent meant more reconstruction kudos in evaluation reports.




Pages 56-57:


Garbage


In our air-conditioned isolation, it took years to realize we needed to think about things like garbage and potable water. What had happened all around Iraq since the chaos of 2003 was a process of devolution, where populated areas lost their ability to sustain the facilities that had constituted civilization since the Romans — water, sewage, trash removal — things that made it possible for large numbers of people to live in close proximity to one another. Shock and awe had disrupted the networked infrastructure that allowed cities to function. What had been slow degradation through neglect under Saddam became irreversible decline by force under the United States.


The collapse of civil society left a void that the bad guys had rushed to fill. Stories circulated of neighborhood militiamen commandeering shuttered power plants and private generators for the public’s use, turning the militants into local heroes. In some poor areas, especially in the south, Iranian charities were a primary source of propane, food, and other services that people expected the government to provide, as Saddam had more or less done. It had finally dawned on us that providing reliable basic utilities was critical to a successful counterinsurgency. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were put on the case after earlier efforts by megacontractors like Bechtel and then the Army Corps of Engineers had failed.


Almost daily my team and I would go out into the field. We’d strap on body armor and helmets and load into armored vehicles for the soldiers to drive us out of the FOB. We rode in either armored Humvees or large monster trucks called MRAPs, mine-resistant, ambush-protected carriers. These sat high off the ground and were covered with antennas and crazy electronics designed to thwart the battery-powered triggers that set off IEDs and mines along our route. The best thing about the MRAPs was that they were hermetically sealed against nonexistent chemical weapons and thus possessed near-nuclear-powered air-conditioning. You could crank that stuff and form frost. The MRAPs were so high off the ground that the turret often tore down the spaghetti web of pirated electric lines strung over most streets, lessening our popularity every time we drove in. Our parade of four or five vehicles, armed with nasty-looking machine guns and tough-looking soldiers, would nonetheless roll through small towns and slums to arrive at whatever dilapidated building served as the center of US-appointed local government. (By common consent no one was allowed to comment on the paradox of creating a democracy by appointing local leaders. It just wasn’t done.) As we drove, trash was a fact anywhere we looked, like the sun and the dust. The MRAPs specifically equipped to look for roadside bombs even had giant blowers welded to their front bumpers to whip garbage aside and expose the IEDs. For a poor country, everybody seemed to have a lot of things to throw away. Even though the trash was rarely collected, there were huge dumps filled with acres of it. You couldn’t help but be reminded that for all the counterinsurgency ideals about living among the people, we still lived near Iraq but not in it; on the FOB you couldn’t drop a Snickers wrapper without two people telling you to pick that shit up.


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Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles secure a local village while members of Provincial Reconstruction Team Zabul conduct a key leader engagement with village elders in Arghandab, Afghanistan, July 30, 2011. PRT Zabul’s mission is to conduct civil-military operations in Zabul Province to extend the reach and legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force photo/Senior Airman Grovert Fuentes-Contreras)(Released)

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Munich Prosecutor Classified Data Spy Guide DE
		
	
	

		
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TOP-SECRET: US Navy Undersea Surveillance Processing Facilities Eyeball
		
	
	

		




Naval Ocean Processing Facility (NOPF), 352 Bullpup Street, Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, VA36.764744 -75.958012


Note high-security double-fencing customarily used at top secret facilities.


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Naval Ocean Processing Facility (NOPF), 352 Bullpup Street, Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, VA[Image]




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Naval Ocean Processing Facility, Whidbey Island NAS, WAhttp://maps.google.com/maps?q=Whidbey+Island+NAS,+WA&hl=en&ll=48.341457,-122.68394

&spn=0.001583,0.004292&sll=37.0625,-95.677068&sspn=62.484575,104.589844&vpsrc=6&t=h&z=19


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TOP-SECRET – FBI Mossad Sting Bags Big-Headed Egghead
		
	
	

		
Department of Justice


Office of Public Affairs


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE


Wednesday, September 7, 2011


Noted Scientist Pleads Guilty to Attempted Espionage


Scientist Arrested in 2009 Following Undercover Operation


WASHINGTON – Stewart David Nozette, a scientist who once worked for the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the White House’s National Space Council, pleaded guilty today to attempted espionage for providing classified information to a person he believed to be an Israeli intelligence officer.


The guilty plea, which took place this morning in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, was announced by Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia; and James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.


Nozette, 54, of Chevy Chase, Md., pleaded guilty to one count of attempted espionage. Senior Judge Paul L. Friedman, who presided at the plea hearing, scheduled a status hearing for Nov. 15, 2011. No sentencing date was set. The plea agreement, which is subject to the judge’s approval, calls for an agreed-upon prison term of 13 years.


Nozette has been in custody since his arrest on Oct. 19, 2009. FBI agents arrested him following an undercover operation in which he provided classified materials on three occasions, including one occasion that forms the basis for today’s guilty plea. He was subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury. The indictment does not allege that the government of Israel or anyone acting on its behalf committed any offense under U.S. laws in this case.


“ Stewart Nozette betrayed America’s trust by attempting to sell some of the nation’s most closely-guarded secrets for profit. Today, he is being held accountable for his actions. As this case demonstrates, we remain vigilant in protecting America’s secrets and in bringing to justice those who compromise them,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco.


“Stewart Nozette was once a trusted scientist who maintained high-level government security clearances and was frequently granted access to classified information relating to our national defense. Today he is a disgraced criminal who was caught red-handed attempting to trade American secrets for personal profit. He will now have the next 13 years behind bars to contemplate his betrayal,” said U.S. Attorney Machen. “The FBI and its partners deserve tremendous credit for their outstanding work on this case. This investigation and prosecution demonstrate our commitment to identifying and punishing those who would put our national security at risk.”


“Preventing the loss or compromise of high-technology and vital national security information is a top priority of the FBI,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “This case is a prime example of what happens when a person decides to sell our nation’s most valuable secrets for individual gain.”


Background


Nozette received a Ph.D. in Planetary Sciences from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1983. He has worked in various capacities on behalf of the U.S. government in the development of state-of-the-art programs in defense and space. For example, Nozette worked at the White House on the National Space Council, Executive Office of the President, from approximately 1989 through 1990. He also worked as a physicist for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory from approximately 1990 to 1999, where he designed highly advanced technology.


Among other things, Nozette assisted in the development of the Clementine bi-static radar experiment which purportedly discovered water ice on the south pole of the moon. A version of the Clementine satellite currently hangs on display at the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., and was later hailed as the vanguard of the new “faster, cheaper, better” revolution in space exploration.


Nozette was also the president, treasurer and director of the Alliance for Competitive Technology (ACT), a non-profit organization that he organized in March 1990. Between January 2000 and February 2006, Nozette, through his company, ACT, entered into agreements with several government agencies to develop highly advanced technology. Nozette performed some of this research and development at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C., the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in Arlington, Va., and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Md.


According to a factual proffer in support of the guilty plea, from 1989 through 2006, Nozette held security clearances as high as TOP SECRET and had regular, frequent access to classified information and documents related to the national defense of the United States. The factual proffer also provides details about the undercover operation that led to Nozette’s arrest.


The Investigation


According to the factual proffer, on Feb. 16, 2007, law enforcement agents executed a search warrant at Nozette’s home in Maryland as part of a fraud investigation and found classified documents. Further investigation into the classified documents revealed that in 2002, Nozette sent an e-mail threatening to take a classified program he was working on, “to [foreign country] or Israel and do it there selling internationally…” As a result of this and other information giving rise to suspicion of espionage, the FBI decided to conduct an undercover operation.


On Sept. 3, 2009, Nozette was contacted via telephone by an individual purporting to be an Israeli intelligence officer from the Mossad, but who was, in fact, an undercover employee of the FBI. During that call, the defendant agreed to meet with the undercover employee that day on Connecticut Avenue N.W., in front of the Mayflower Hotel in downtown Washington, D.C.


Later that day, Nozette met with the undercover employee and had lunch in the restaurant of the Mayflower Hotel. After the undercover employee made it clear that he was a “Mossad” agent, Nozette stated, “Good. Happy to be of assistance.”


After lunch in the hotel restaurant, Nozette and the undercover employee retired to a hotel suite to continue their discussion. During the conversation, the defendant informed the undercover employee that he had clearances “all the way to Top Secret SCI, I had nuclear…,” that “anything that the U.S. has done in space I’ve seen,” and that he would provide classified information for money and a foreign passport to a country without extradition to the United States.


The defendant and the undercover employee met again on Sept. 4, 2009, at the Mayflower Hotel. During this encounter, Nozette assured the undercover employee that, although he no longer had legal access to any classified information at a U.S. government facility, he could, nonetheless, recall the classified information to which he had been granted access. The defendant said, “It’s in my” head, and pointed to his head.


Undercover Operation Continues


On Sept. 10, 2009, FBI agents left a letter in the prearranged “dead drop” facility for the defendant. In the letter, the FBI asked Nozette to answer a list of questions concerning classified U.S. satellite information. FBI agents also provided signature cards, in the defendant’s true name and an alias, for Nozette to sign and asked the defendant to provide four passport sized photographs for the Israeli passport the defendant requested. The FBI agents also left $2,000 cash for the defendant in the “dead drop” facility, which Nozette retrieved the same day, along with the questions and signature cards.


On Sept. 16, 2009, Nozette left a manila envelope in the “dead drop” facility in the District of Columbia. One of the “answers” provided by the defendant contained information classified as SECRET/SCI which related to the national defense, in that it directly concerned classified aspects and mission capabilities of a prototype overhead collection system and which disclosure would negate the ability to support military and intelligence operations. In addition to disclosing SECRET/SCI information, Nozette offered to reveal additional classified information that directly concerned nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft or satellites, and other major weapons systems.


On Sept. 17, 2009, FBI agents left a second communication in the “dead drop” facility for the defendant. In the letter, the FBI asked Nozette to answer another list of questions concerning classified U.S. satellite information. Nozette retrieved the questions from the “dead drop” facility later that same day.


On Oct. 1, 2009, Nozette left a manila envelope in the “dead drop” facility in the District of Columbia. The FBI also left a cash payment of $9,000 in the “dead drop” facility. Later that day, the FBI agents retrieved the sealed manila envelope left by the defendant. Inside the envelope, FBI agents discovered the encrypted thumb drive that was provided to Nozette on Sept. 17, 2009, which included another set of “answers” from the defendant. The “answers” contained information classified as TOP SECRET/SCI and other information classified as SECRET/SCI. This classified information related to the national defense, in that it directly concerned satellites, early warning systems, means of defense or retaliation against large-scale attack, communications intelligence information, and major elements of defense strategy. (This information is what formed the basis for the charge in today’s guilty plea.)


On Oct. 5, 2009, Nozette left a manila envelope in the “dead drop” facility in the District of Columbia. Later that day, the FBI agents retrieved the sealed manila envelope left by the defendant. Inside the envelope, FBI agents discovered the encrypted thumb drive that was provided to Nozette on Oct. 1, 2009, which included another set of “answers” from the defendant. The “answers” contained information classified as TOP SECRET/SAR. This classified information related to the national defense, in that it directly concerned capabilities of a U.S. military weapon system research and development effort.


Nozette and the undercover employee met again on Oct. 19, 2009, at the Mayflower Hotel. During that meeting, the following exchanges took place:


NOZETTE: “So, uh, I gave you even in this first run, some of the most classified information that there is. . . . I’ve sort of crossed the Rubicon. . . . Now the, uh, so I think when I said like fifty K, I think that was probably too low. . . .The cost to the U.S. Government was two hundred million. . . . to develop it all. Uh, and then that’s not including the launching of it. . .Uh, integrating the satellites. . . . So if you say okay that probably brings it to almost a billion dollars. . . So I tell ya at least two hundred million so I would say, you know, theoretically I should charge you certainly, you know, at most a one percent.”


Nozette was arrested soon after he made these statements. He was subsequently indicted on four charges of attempted espionage. Under the plea agreement, Nozette pleaded guilty to the third count of the indictment, arising out of his passing of TOP SECRET/SCI information on Oct. 1, 2009.


At the time of his arrest, Nozette was awaiting sentencing in another federal case. On Jan. 30, 2009, he pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to charges of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government with respect to false claims and tax evasion in an amount up to $399,999. In that case, Nozette agreed to pay restitution of $265,205 to the U.S. government. Nozette is awaiting sentencing in the case. Under terms of today’s plea, the sentence in the fraud case is to run concurrently with the sentence for attempted espionage.


This investigation was conducted by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, with assistance from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Naval Audit Service, National Reconnaissance Office, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Defense Contract Audit Agency, U.S. Army 902nd Military Intelligence Group, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Office of Counterintelligence, NASA Office of Inspector General, Department of Energy , Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Criminal Investigation Division, IRS Tax Exempt & Government Entities group, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Postal Inspection Service, as well as other partners in the U.S. intelligence community.


The prosecution is being handled by Trial Attorneys Deborah A. Curtis and Heather M. Schmidt, from the Counterespionage Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Anthony Asuncion, from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia.


11-1142


National Security Division

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – THE TRUE PICS FROM THE PROTEST-REVOLT IN CHILE
		
	
	

		



















[Image]Riot police hit students with their batons during a 48-hour national strike at Santiago August 25, 2011. Protesters battled police in Chile’s capital on Thursday, the second day of a two-day strike against unpopular President Sebastian Pinera that was marked by sporadic looting but had no impact on the vital mining sector. Reuters




[Image]Workers, students and citizens attend a 48-hour national strike at Santiago August 25, 2011. Protesters scuffled with police in the Chilean capital on Thursday, the second of a two-day strike against unpopular President Sebastian Pinera marked by sporadic looting, though the linchpin mining sector was not affected. Reuters




[Image]A demonstrator is detained by riot policemen during a 48-hour national strike at Santiago August 25, 2011. Protesters scuffled with police in the Chilean capital on Thursday, the second of a two-day strike against unpopular President Sebastian Pinera marked by sporadic looting, though the linchpin mining sector was not affected. Reuters




[Image]Carlos Burgos, who says he was shot at by the Chilean police, shows his wound in the Penalolen neighbourhood in Santiago August 26, 2011, where 16-year-old Manuel Gutierrez was shot dead during a 48-hour national strike against President Sebastian Pinera. Gutierrez died early on Friday after he was shot a day earlier in massive protests in the capital against the unpopular Pinera, the first fatality in months of social unrest. Police said he was shot in the chest as protesters battled them overnight in Santiago, in the aftermath of a 48-hour national strike against Pinera marked by violent clashes and sporadic looting. Reuters




[Image]Students march toward the Chilean consulate in Buenos Aires on August 25, 2011, supporting the Chilean students in their claim for free education and against Chile’s President Sebastian Pinera. Getty




[Image]A demonstrator stands next to a burning barricade on the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Roberto Candia)




[Image]Riot police detain a woman during a protest of public workers and students for the massive layoffs of government employees in Santiago, Chile, Thursday, Aug. 26, 2010. (Aliosha Marquez)




[Image]Police and protesters clash in front of the Gratitud Nacional Church during the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Sebastian Silva)




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[Image]Riot police detain a protester near La Moneda presidential palace during the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans are demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Victor R. Caivano)




[Image]Protesters throw stones at an armored police vehicle spraying tear gas during the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Sebastian Silva)




[Image]A police officer on horseback rides past a bus stop set on fire by demonstrators on the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Luis Hidalgo)




[Image]A protester kicks a tear gas canister during clashes with police in the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Jose Miguel Rojas)




[Image]A protester throws stones at an armored police vehicle after clashes broke out during a march on the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Victor R. Caivano)




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[Image]Nearly one million people, including whole families, gathered at the Parque O’Higgins in a demonstration called “Family Sunday for Education”, organised by University students, high schools and the College of Teachers. Chile. 21st August 2011 Demotix











































	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET-Voice of America Antennas Eyeball
		
	
	

		



















[Image]Source




Sites A (Top Center) and Site B (Bottom Center) Near Greenville and Washington, NChttp://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ll=35.583897,-77.100334&spn=0.268322,0.41851&t=h&z=12&vpsrc=6


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Crpytome – Financial Crisis Luxury Architecture
		
	
	

		



















[Image]Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. is interviewed on Capitol Hill in Washington, Tuesday, Aug. 2, 2011, after the Senate voted to pass debt legislation. (Jacquelyn Martin)




[Image]Madrid’s Stock Exchange is seen on Wednesday Aug. 10, 2011. A risky European Central Bank decision to fight the continent’s debt crisis by buying Spanish and Italian bonds on Monday started pushing down the soaring interest rates threatening those countries with financial disaster.(Daniel Ochoa de Olza)




[Image]In this Feb. 1, 2011 file photo, people queue outside an unemployment office in Madrid. Spain’s Labor Ministry says the number of people filing claims for unemployment benefits fell by 42,059 in July as the summer tourism season provided new jobs. The ministry said Tuesday, Aug. 2, 2011 that July’s fall was the fourth straight monthly decline. It left the number receiving benefits at 4.08 million, down from 4.12 million the previous month. (Arturo Rodriguez, File)




[Image]Lawmakers crowd the Parliament as Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi addresses the lower chamber on the state of the economy in Rome, Wednesday, Aug. 3, 2011. Berlusconi said economic growth is his government’s key policy aim. After a volatile day on markets, in which Italian borrowing rates touched a record high, Berlusconi told parliament that Italy “has not done little” in response to the crisis, but that it needs to do more. He says Italy needs to promote competitiveness and growth.




[Image]A beggar, his body covered with white paint, walks along a street in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Saturday, March 5, 2011. (Ramon Espinosa)




[Image]A nearly deserted atrium of the European Council is pictured in Brussels, Monday, Aug. 8, 2011. European have always valued their vacations, and their leaders are no exception. With modern communications, the leaders say they remain constantly in touch. So do their vacations matter? One financial analyst says yes: “It sends a terrible message to the markets … in the middle of a crisis.” (Yves Logghe)




[Image]Pensioners gather in a protest against the government’s austerity measures, Thursday, Aug. 25 2011, outside the prime minister’s official residence in Lisbon. Portugal’s European partners and the International Monetary Fund lent it the money to prevent the country going bankrupt but in return demanded a long list of spending cuts and economic reforms. Poster hanging from the umbrella reads “The government lied to the pensioners”. (Armando Franca)




[Image]French President Nicolas Sarkozy, left, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, right, attend a meeting at the Elysee Palace, Paris, Tuesday, Aug. 16, 2011. The leaders of Germany and France are meeting Tuesday to discuss Europe’s debt crisis as new figures show their economies stalled even before the latest bout of turmoil struck financial markets. (Patrick Kovarik, Pool)




[Image]A traveller smokes next to a beggar outside a public office in central Athens on Thursday, Aug. 11, 2011. Greece’s Statistical Authority says unemployment in the debt-ridden country jumped to 16.6 percent in May.The number of jobless stands at 822,719 in the country of about 11 million people. The graffiti reads “pigs, murderes” and “burn the parliament”. (Dimitri Messinis)




[Image]French President Nicolas Sarkozy, left, speaks during a special meeting on the financial crisis with head of the French Central Bank Christian Noyer, right, Finance Minister Francois Baroin, second from right, and Prime Minister Francois Fillon, third from right, at the Elysee Palace in Paris, Wednesday Aug. 10, 2011. Sarkozy is interrupted his vacation to hold an emergency government meeting about the uncertainty on world financial markets. (Denis/Pool)




[Image][Image]A view of Milan’s stock exchange headquarters is seen, Monday, July 11, 2011. Finance ministers gathered in Brussels are debating how to secure a private-sector contribution to a new Greek package and how to prevent the debt crisis spreading to bigger countries, including Italy. (Antonio Calanni)




[Image]E.U. and Stock Exchange’s flags fly outside the building of the Greek Stock Exchange in Athens, Friday, Aug. 5, 2011. The eurozone’s debt crisis battered markets once again Friday, challenging vacationing European leaders to find a way to keep the turmoil from pushing Spain and Italy to a financial collapse that would hit an already-waning global recovery. (Thanassis Stavrakis)




[Image]A woman holding a handkerchief to her face to protect herself from lingering tear gas passes by an elderly beggar while, in the background, two workers replace broken hotel windows in central Athens on Thursday, June 30, 2011. Rioters caused extensive property damage during anti-government protests Wednesday while police riposted with heavy use of chemicals. (Dimitri Messinis)




[Image]A tourist with her luggage enters a luxury hotel in central Athens as protesters demonstrate on Tuesday, Aug. 23, 2011. Dozens of protesters have been picketing the entrance to three luxury hotels on Athens’ main Syntagma Square as part of a 24-hour strike by hotel employees objecting to plans to cut their entitlement to early retirement. The banner on the left reads in Greek “Hands off” the ‘arduous and unhealthy’ classification of professions. (Petros Giannakouris)




[Image]Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DCSource




[Image]The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where high level meetings were held in a last attempt to save Lehman Brothers, is photographed August 25, 2009. A failed plan to rescue Lehman Brothers was followed Sunday by more seismic shocks from Wall Street, including an apparent government-brokered takeover of Merrill Lynch by the Bank of America. (Cryptome) Below, Board Room of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.[Image]


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[Image]Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, left, talks with Greek President Karolos Papoulias during their meeting in Athens, on Friday, July 22, 2011. Eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund pledged Thursday to give Greece a euro 109 billion ($155 billion) worth of rescue funds, on top of the euro 110 billion granted more than a year ago. (Petros Giannakouris)




[Image]People walk past a prostrate beggar at the entrance to the Syntagma Square metro station in central Athens, Thursday, Aug. 11, 2011. Greece’s Statistical Authority says unemployment in the debt-ridden country jumped to 16.6 percent in May.The number of jobless stands at 822,719 in the country of about 11 million people. (Dimitri Messinis)




[Image]Pedestrians walk past the New York Stock Exchange on Friday, Aug. 5, 2011 in New York. Fears that the economy might dip back into recession helped send the Dow Jones industrial average down 513 points on Thursday. European leaders are struggling to contain that region’s debt problems, prompting comparisons to the 2008 financial crisis. Markets tumbled from Tokyo to London Friday as overseas traders reacted to the selloff. (Jin Lee)




[Image]Political protest at the New York Stock Exchange, August 20, 2007. (Cryptome)




[Image]Rep. Jason Chaffetz, R-Utah, sponsor of the “Cut, Cap and Balance” deficit reduction plan that was passed in the GOP-controlled House, walks through the Capitol to get an update from the Senate on debt negotiations, in Washington, Sunday, July 31, 2011. (J. Scott Applewhite)




[Image]A beggar boy and a beggar rest near an entrance of a pedestrian underpass near Beijing’s Central Business District, China, Thursday, April 28, 2011. (Alexander F. Yuan)




[Image]A launching ceremony of the Severodvinsk nuclear-powered submarine is held at a defense shipyard in the Arctic port of Severodvinsk, Russia, Tuesday, June 15, 2010. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev attended the ceremony in Severodvinsk. (RIA-Novosti, Vladimir Rodionov, Presidential Press Service)




[Image]A beggar asks for donations in front of the synagogue in Novi Sad, some 80 kilometers (50 miles) north of Belgrade, Serbia, Tuesday, May 18, 2011. (Darko Vojinovic)















[Image]Citigroup Center, New York, NY. (Cryptome)[Image]





	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – CB Megadeath Horrors From Dugway Proving Ground-Sampling of Reports Available
		
	
	

		
The Desert West Technical Information Center, at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, holds more than 65,000 reports on biological and chemical warfare, including many as far back as World War One.


See a report of interest, just send a request letter to this location:


FOIA Office

FOIA & Privacy Officer/Paralegal Specialist

US Army Dugway Proving Ground

Command Judge Advocate: TEDT-DP-JA

5450 Doolittle Avenue

Dugway, UT 84022

PH:   435 831-3333

FAX:  435 831-3390


In addition to requesting individual reports, it is also possible to ask for a printout of all reports at the Desert West Technical Information Center created between any two dates, such as 1946 through 1955.


The reports below are selected from those originated during the years between 1918 and 1945.


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Physical Properties and Aerosol Dissemination Characteristics of P. oryzae Spores, No date


Defoliation Project Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, 1943


Arpa-Supported Research on Brush Control and Chemical Defoliation Crops Protection Research Branch, 1943.


Dispersion of Chemicals by Bombs, July 1935


Soviet Report on CW and BW Preparations and Capabilities, March 1945


Supplementary Test of Tactics and Techniques of Chemical Spray (Jungle Phase), July 1945


Project Strange Man, Logistic Trial Test, AB-45Y-1, Simulant Fills Spray Tanks, no date


Research on Tularemia in the Soviet Union During the Last 25 Years, July 1945


Development of Tactics and Techniques for Dissemination of Chemicals From Aircraft for Crop Destruction, June 1945


Adaptation of Chemical Spray Tanks to Fighter Aircraft, June 1945


Development of Offensive Tactics Versus Japanese Fortifications, April 1944


Tactics and Techniques for Employment of Toxic Gas Bombs by the Army Air Forces, October 1945


Physicochemical Properties of XA Toxin, November 1945


Additional Studies on the Development of U1 as an Offensive Biological Warfare Agent, December 1945


Development of Defensive Measures Against US, October 1945


Development of N for Offensive Use in Biological Warfare, July 1945


Characteristics of Some BW Agents for Plants, August 1944


Test of Plasticized White Phosphorus Filled M47A2 Bombs, June 1945


Development of UL for Offensive Use in Biological Warfare, June 1944


The Present Status of the Offensive Development of US, September 1945


Investigations concerned with the Development of Phytophtora Infestans as a Potential Agent for Biological Warfare, October 1945


Development of X for Offensive Use in Biological Warfare, November 1945


The Development of E as an Agent for Biological Warfare, November 1945


The Development of E as an Agent for Biological Warfare, November 1945


Studies of the Virus Agents of the SI Group, November 1945


The Development of IR as a Biological Warfare Agent, January 1945


A Pilot Plant for the Production of Plant Pathogens, November 1945


The Development of C for Offensive Use in Biological Warfare, November 1945


Cloud Chamber Studies, 1, Methods Developed at Camp Detrick for Production and Study of Clouds of Highly Infective Agents, October 1945


Immunization of Man with Fluid Type a X Toxoid, May 1945


Immunization Against N, January 1945


The Purification of XA Toxin, September 1945


The Physiology of X Toxin, November 1945


The Offensive Phase of the SI Project, November 1945


Studies on the Nutrition, Growth and Virulence of OC, December 1945


Studies of Toxin and Toxoid Production of X Types C and D, October 1945


Etiology of Epizootic Encephalitis of the Rabbit, January 1924


Letter of completion for Dugway Proving Ground Test Plan DGPTP 496, Final


Engineering Testing of the E-20 Little John Warhead, GB Agent, no date


The Report of G


The Report of Q


A Study of short Interval Exposures of Goats to CG, CK and AC, November 1945


The Evaluation of the 4.2 inch Chemical Mortar Shell Filled with HD or HT when Fired into Open Terrain, 1945


400-lb, 1000-lb, 2000-lb and 4000-lb Bombs Filled with Nonpersistent Agents, June 1944


Florida Forest Field Trials of Non-Persistent and Persistent Agents, Part 1 Non-Persistent Agents, May 1944


The Behavior of Non-Persistent Gas Clouds Released from Bombs in the Targhee National Forest, December 1943


Micrometeorology of Woods and Open Areas within the Withlachoochee Land Use Project, Florida, 1944


The Assessment of HN1 when dispersed in Open Terrain under Semi-Tropical Conditions and a Comparison of HN1, H and HN3 under these Conditions, December 1945


Low Altitude Spray, March 1945


Toxicity of Goat Lung Exudates, December 1942


Production of X, April 1944


Penetration of the AN-M69 and M69X Incendiary Bombs into Japanese Structures When Released from Aimable Clusters, December 1944.


Attack against Cave-type Fortifications, October 1945


Studies of the Toxicity and Dispersibility of W in Munitions, July 1945


Anti-Psittacosis Protection, May 1944


Immunization Against UL, May 1944


Immunization Against US, May 1945


Immunization Against N, May 1944


Comparison of Anti-Personnel Effects of Plasticized WP and Solid WP in 4.2 inch Chemical Mortar Shells, June 1944


The Assessment of the M47A2 and M70 Bomb Filled with Levinstein Mustard, Parts A, B, C and D, 1945


Test No. W-20-1944, M2, 4.2-inch Chemical Mortar Shell, Plasticized WP-filled, July 1944


Use of the E5 Incendiary Bomb against Light Structures, July 1944


Immunization Against N, March 1944


Immunization Against UL, March 1944


Immunization Against N, December 1943


Immunization Against UL, December 1943


A Thumb-Nail Sketch of the Development of Biological Warfare, November 1942


Immunization Against UL, June 1944


Anti-Psittacosis Project, June 1944


Immunization Against US, June 1944


Pathogenesis of LA, June 1944


Hirsch Report: Soviet Report on CW and BW Preparations and Capabilities, Volumes 1, 2 and 3, March 1945


Chemical Methods for Use in Observational Program, USARDO, Fort Clayton, Canal Zone, no date


Standardization of Persistent Agent HT, March 1945


Hydrocynamic Acid.  The Toxicity and Speed of Action on Man, November 1942


Properties of War Gases:  Volume III, Vomiting and Choking Gases and Lacrimators, December 1944


Chemical Land Mines, 1905


Thickened Vesicants:  Thickening Purified H with Poliymethyl Methacrylate (MM), July 1944


Shellfish Poison, Monthly Reports 1 through 12, 1944-1945


Estimate of HS Persistency When Disseminated From Various Munitions, October 1937


Lewisite:  Dispersion as Airplane Chemical Spray, November 1942


The Construction and Operation of A Gassing Chamber for Human Tests, July 1945


A Study of the residual Effects of Phosgene Poisoning in Human Subjects, August 1945


A Review of the Insecticide Hexachlorocyclohexane ­ 666, September 1945


Gassing Chamber for Human Tests:  Construction and Operation, October 1944


Toxicity Determinations, Methods in Use in Medical Research Division, Edgewood Arsenal, July 1943


Toxic Dusts:  The Penetration of Protective Clothing by Sesqui HS, March 1941


Physical Constants of Products Used for the Flame Projectors, March 1918


Medical Division Status Summaries, October 1943 ­ April 1944, August 1944


Casualty and Incendiary Effects of Small Particles of WP, January 1940


Airplane Chemical Handling Equipment, 1941 Plan, February 1941


The Vesicant Action of Sesquimustard and Certain Sesquimustard-type Compounds, June 1943


Minutes of the Chemical Warfare Technical Committee, Numbers 1, 2 and 3, 1944


Summary and Discussion of Available Mustard Gas Data From Field Tests conducted Prior to 1928, April 1928


Biological Warfare:  An Annotated Bibliography, Appendix 1, December 1942


Report of the Joint Chemical Spray Project Sub-committee of the United States Chemical Warfare Committee, Sections 1, 2 and 3, 1944


A System for the Ultimate Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents, August 1944


The Residual Effects of Warfare Gases, III:  Phosgene, IV:  Arsenical Compounds, 1933


Memorandum for Chief, CWS, Visit to Bushnell Florida, December 1943


Joint Chemical Spray Project, May 1944


Preparation and Properties of Derivatives of CW Agents, June 1944


Status Report on Technique of High Altitude Spray, April 1944


Toxicity of Chemical Warfare Agents, Informal Monthly Progress Reports, 1944-1945


Chemical Equipment for Use in Jungle Assault Operations, November 1943


101st Airborne Division Chemical Activities Summary CY 1968, 1969


Chronology of BW, 1945


Detection of BW Agents, May 1944


Constants and Physiological Action of Chemical Warfare Agents, July 1931


Review of the Research Activities of the Chemical Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 1919-1928, circa 1931


History of Gas Attacks Upon the American Expeditionary Forces During the World War, Parts 1, 2 and 3, February 1928


Resume of Recent Knowledge on the Technical Aspects of Chemical Warfare in the Field, May 1945


Munitions for Biological Warfare, Volume 2, September 1945


Pathogenesis of LA and HI, Comprehensive Report, November 1945


Final Report, Physical Properties of AB-1 Fermentor Cultures, no date


Camp Detrick ­ History of BW, no date


Methods of Estimating Lethal Dose for Man, no date


Wind-tunnel Studies of Gas Diffusion in a Typical Japanese Urban District, June 1945


Final Report:  A Study of Rickettsiae and Virus Combinations, no date


Final Report of Work Done Under Contract W-18-064-CWS-43 at the University of Kansas, June 1945


Sixth and Final Report on Contract Number W-266-CWS-246 Between the War Department and the Long Island Biological Associations, Inc., March 1943


Psychological Studies on the Effects of CW Agents, no date


Chamber Tests with Human Subjects, 13 reports, various dates


Transport, Dispersion and Deposition of Aerial Sprays, no date


Proposal to provide a Level of Effort Study to Determine the Feasibility of High Altitude Release of BW Agents over North America, NUS Corp, Rockville, MD, no date


Biological Warfare, An Annotated Bibliography, January 1942


The Chemistry of Certain Arsenical Chemical Warfare Agents as Water Contaminants, June 1944


The Deposition of Nonvolatile Aerosol Clouds in Open and Forested Areas, March 1944


Present Status of Development of Toxic Gases, December 1942


Report on Scientific Intelligence Survey in Japan:  September and October 1945, Volume 5:  Biological Warfare


Anthrax Project, Parke Davis and Co., no date

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET: America Eyeballs 3
		
	
	

		
TSA, Post: To get another view of how sprawling Top Secret America has become, just head west on the toll road toward Dulles International Airport.


As a Michaels craft store and a Books-A-Million give way to the military intelligence giants Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin, find the off-ramp and turn left. Those two shimmering-blue five-story ice cubes belong to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which analyzes images and mapping data of the Earth’s geography. A small sign obscured by a boxwood hedge says so.


Cryptome:


 National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, 2207 Rockhill Road, Herndon, VA


If NGA is a tenant in the building there is no perimeter security customary for spy agency.

A sign at the entrance, cited by Priest above, is obscured in Google Street view, below, on Innovation Drive.

However, a rental advertisement states there is a SCIF in the facility.






[Image]

Google Street View[Image]

Source[Image]

Source


http://www.bing.com/maps/?v=2&cp=qgtk268jfg0r&lvl=18.820071359356223&dir=6.595352978997362&sty=b&where1=Dulles%20International%20Airport%2C%20VA&form=LMLTCC


[Image]


http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ll=38.964022,-77.419882&spn=0.008017,0.013078&t=h&z=17&vpsrc=0


This is misnamed on Google as the George Mason University Executive Programs.


[Image]










TSA, Post: Across the street, in the chocolate-brown blocks, is Carahsoft, an intelligence agency contractor specializing in mapping, speech analysis and data harvesting. Nearby is the government’s Underground Facility Analysis Center. It identifies overseas underground command centers associated with weapons of mass destruction and terrorist groups, and advises the military on how to destroy them.




Cryptome:http://www.bing.com/maps/?v=2&cp=38.95837031099434~-77.42316203297403&lvl=18&dir=0&sty=h&where1=Dulles%20International%20Airport%2C%20VA&form=LMLTCC[Image]


[Image]






	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET:  Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 29 August 2011 Inside
		
	
	

		








Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 29 August 2011










[Image]Dust-sampling Opening of Reactor Building of Unit 1, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station pictured on August 28, 2011. Released August 30, 2011 by TEPCO. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)




[Image]Dust-sampling Opening of Reactor Building of Unit 2, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station pictured on August 29, 2011. Released August 30, 2011 by TEPCO. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)




[Image]Checking inside of the reactor containment vessel of Unit 4, Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station. Opening an airlock door for workers. Pictured on August 29, 2011. Released August 30, 2011 by TEPCO. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)