Video Skid – Monty Python – Football

http://youtu.be/ur5fGSBsfq8

Memorial Day – Full Movie

 

The Files TV – IED bombs new Syrian rebel strategy

Monty Python – Upper Class Twit of the Year – Video Skid

http://youtu.be/MqObJtGrKaA

The Distinguished Gentleman (1992) Eddie Murphy – Full Movie

 

2001 A Space Travesty – Full Movie

 

Deuce Bigalow Male Gigolo – Full Movie

Deuce Bigalow: Male Gigolo is a 1999 comedy film starring Rob Schneider. Other cast members include Eddie Griffin, Amy Poehler, Oded Fehr, Arija Bareikis, and William Forsythe.

The story is about a hapless fishtank cleaner who goes into business as a male prostitute in an attempt to earn enough money to repair damage he caused while house-sitting.

Dracula – Dead And Loving It – Full Movie

 

TOP-SECRET – Defense Security Service Cybersecurity Operations Division Counterintelligence Presentation

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/DSS-CyberCI.png

 

Defense Security Service Cybersecurity Operations Division

  • 33 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • December 2012

Download

DSS Supports national security and the warfighter, secures the nation’s technological base, and oversees the protection of U.S. and foreign classified information in the hands of Industry

CI Mission

DSS CI identifies unlawful penetrators of cleared U.S. defense industry and articulates the threat for industry and government leaders

Scope

-10K+ firms; 13K+ facilities; 1.2m personnel
-1 CI professional / 261 facilities
-10.5% of facilities report

Capability

• (U) 11 personnel conducting analysis, liaison, field support, strategic development and program management
• (U) Wide range of skill sets – CI, CT, LE, Cyber, Security, Intel, IA, CNO and more
• (U) Direct access to cleared industry across 25 DSS field offices nationwide
• (U) Large roles at U.S. Cyber Command, National Security Agency, National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force and the Department of Homeland Security

Challenges

• (U) Secure sharing of threat information with industry partners
• (U) Identifying and reporting suspicious network activity
• (U) Limited resources to execute for an quickly expanding mission area Significant Achievements and Notable Events
• (U) Since September, 2009 – Assessed over 3,000 cyber-related suspicious contact reports from Industry and the Intelligence Community; facilitating action on over 170 federal investigations/operations
• (U) Developed four benchmark product lines for Industry and the Intelligence Community to include the 3rd edition of the DSS Cyber Trends
• (U) Briefed at 24 venues and over 1,000 personnel in FY12 on the cyber threat
• (U) In FY12, delivered over 350 threat notifications to industry, detailing adversary activity occurring on their networks.

(U) FY12 Industry Cyber Reporting

• (U//FOUO) 1,678 suspicious contact reports (SCR) categorized as cyber incidents (+102% from FY11)
• (U//FOUO) 1,322 of these were assessed as having a counterintelligence (CI) nexus or were of some positive intelligence (PI) value (+186% increase from FY11)
• (U//FOUO) 263 were categorized as successful intrusions (+78% increase from FY11)
• (U//FOUO) 82 SCRs resulted in an official investigation or operation by an action agency (+37% increase from FY11)

Hot Shots – Full Movie

 

 

Parody of “Top Gun” in which a talented but unstable fighter pilot must overcome the ghosts of his father and save a mission sabotaged by greedy weapons manufacturers.

The Files TV – The Hidden Costs of Hamburgers

Americans love hamburgers — we eat about three burgers a week. But what are the hidden environmental costs? See sources from the Center for Investigative Reporting.http://cironline.org/reports/hidden-c…

Directed and produced by Carrie Ching, Reported by Sarah Terry-Cobo and Carrie Ching, Illustrated and animated by Arthur Jones.

This animation is part of The Food for 9 Billion series, a yearlong look at the challenge of feeding the world at a time of social and environmental change.

http://cironline.org/projects/food-fo…

For more great stories, subscribe to The I Files:http://www.youtube.com/subscription_c…
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SECRECY NEWS – SUBPOENA OF AP PHONE RECORDS SAID TO DAMAGE PRESS FREEDOM

The government seizure of Associated Press telephone records in the course
of a leak investigation undermined freedom of the press in the United
States, congressional critics said yesterday.

"It seems to me the damage done to a free press is substantial," said Rep.
Zoe Lofgren at a hearing of the House Judiciary Committee.

Pursuant to subpoena, the government captured call records for 20
telephone lines of Associated Press reporters and editors over a two month
period last year.  The records are logs of calls made and received, but do
not include their contents.  It was a "massive and unprecedented intrusion"
into newsgathering activities, wrote the AP's president Gary Pruitt in a
May 13 letter.

The Justice Department denied that the action deviated from established
policy.

"We understand your position that these subpoenas should have been more
narrowly drawn, but in fact, consistent with Department policy, the
subpoenas were limited in both time and scope," wrote Deputy Attorney
General James M. Cole in a May 14 reply.

The  move arose from an AP story about a disrupted bomb plot originating
in Yemen that led to the revelation of a classified counterterrorism
operation and the existence of a valued agent. "This is among the top two
or three serious leaks that I've ever seen" said Attorney General Eric
Holder. He did not elaborate.

Meanwhile, the upshot is that any presumption of confidentiality in the
source-reporter relationship has been compromised across the board,
especially but not only in national security reporting.

        http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=183984442

"Reporters who might have previously believed that a confidential source
would speak to them would no longer have that level of confidence, because
those confidential sources are now going to be chilled in their
relationship with the press," Rep. Lofgren said yesterday.

Last year, congressional leaders harshly criticized the Obama
Administration for supposedly failing to aggressively combat leaks of
classified information, including in the present case.

"The Administration's disregard for the Constitution and rule of law not
only undermines our democracy, it threatens our national security," said
Rep. Lamar Smith, at a hearing of the House Judiciary Committee on June 7
of last year. "The Justice Department has not taken the initiative to
prosecute leaks of national security secrets. Recent leaks about a foiled
bomb plot out of Yemen and a cyberattack against Iran are, in the words of
Senate Intelligence Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein, quote, 'very detrimental,
very concerning, and hurt our country,' end quote."

The irony was not lost on Rep. Jerrold Nadler.

"I think we should put this in context, and remember that less than a year
ago this committee's Republican leadership demanded aggressive
investigation of press leaks, accusing the administration itself of
orchestrating those leaks," he noted. "Then, members of this committee
wanted the reporters subpoenaed, put in front of grand juries and
potentially jailed for contempt. Now, of course, it is convenient to attack
the attorney general for being too aggressive or the Justice Department for
being too aggressive."

"But this inconsistency on the part of my Republican colleagues should not
distract us from legitimate questions worthy of congressional oversight,
including whether the Espionage Act has been inappropriately used looking
at leakers, whether there is a need for a greater press shield,... and
Congress' broad grants of surveillance authority and immunity," Rep. Nadler
said.

Rep. Lofgren said that the damage done to freedom of the press by the
clandestine seizure of AP phone records "will continue until corrective
action is taken."

GPO SUSPENDS PUBLIC ACCESS TO SOME NASA RECORDS

The Government Printing Office is blocking public access to some
previously released records of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, while the records are reviewed to see if they contain
export-controlled information.  The move follows the controversial
disabling and partial restoration of the NASA Technical Reports Server
(NTRS) ("NASA Technical Report Database Partly Back Online," Secrecy News,
May 9.)

"GPO has been asked to suspend any activity related to making these
documents available if they have not been reviewed," GPO said in a notice
today.

        http://beta.fdlp.gov/news-and-events/

"During this time, PURLs that GPO has created for the electronic versions
of NASA Technical Reports found in cataloging records accessed through the
Catalog of U.S. Government Publications (CGP) may not link to the documents
that the catalog record describes."

US-CHINA MOTOR VEHICLE TRADE, AND MORE FROM CRS

"In 2009, China overtook the United States to become both the world's
largest producer of and market for motor vehicles," a new report from the
Congressional Research Service notes.

That is not altogether bad news. "Every year since 2010, General Motors
has sold more cars in China (through exports and its joint ventures there)
than in the United States," CRS said. "On the other hand, China maintains a
number of trade and investment barriers that affect trade flows in autos
and auto parts."

See U.S.-Chinese Motor Vehicle Trade: Overview and Issues, May 13, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43071.pdf

Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that
Congress has declined to make publicly available include the following.

Regulation of Fertilizers: Ammonium Nitrate and Anhydrous Ammonia, May 9,
2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43070.pdf

Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional
Concerns, May 10, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42559.pdf

Women in Combat: Issues for Congress, May 9, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42075.pdf

The Peace Corps: Current Issues, May 10, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21168.pdf

Proposals to Eliminate Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns, May 10,
2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41604.pdf

The Federal Budget: Issues for FY2014 and Beyond, May 9, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43068.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/subscribe/

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/unsubscribe/

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     https://members.fas.org/donate

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Video Skid – Monty Python’s Flying Circus: Brontasauraus Theory

Neue schwere Straftaten wohl wieder von “Gomopa” im Auftrag ihrer “Partner” – mutmasslich “Peter Ehlers” und “Otmar Knoll”

graph

Liebe Leser,

obenestehende Graphik zeigt die tagelangen, schweren Internetatatcken wohl immer wieder der Hacker der “GoMoPa” im Auftrag von mutmasslich “Peter Ehlers” und “Otmar Knoll” auf unsere Server – wie sie es auch bei Heinz Gewrlach machten – kurz vor seinem für fast alle überraschenden Tode.

“Otmar Knoll” von “Fairvesta” hat diese Angriffe uns gegenüber schriftlich angekündigt, ebenso wie “Peter Ehlers”, verstrickt mit der Fondsfirma “SJB” seines Parners “Gerd Bennewirtz”, uns mit Mordanschlägen gedroht hat !

Wür den Sie diesen Charaktern vertrauen und Ihr Geld anvertrauen ?

Sie sehen, mit welchen Figuren wir es hier zu tun haben…

Hier noch einmal die wichtigsten Infos zu diesen schweren Straftaten:

Neue Serverangriffe der vorbestraften Finanzbetrüger der “GoMoPa” und ihrer “Partner” mutmasslich “Peter Ehlers” und “Otmar Knoll”

Hier sehen Sie obenstehend den Beleg für die Internet-Attacken der er vorbestraften Finanzbetrüger der “GoMoPa” und ihrer “Partner” mutmasslich “Peter Ehlers” und “Otmar Knoll”

Das Urteil zu den vorbestraften Finanzbetrügern der “GoMoPa” wegen Betruges am eigenen Anleger finden Sie unter

https://berndpulch.org/das-betrugsurteil-gegen-bennewirtz-und-peter-ehlers-gomopa-partner-maurischat-und-vornkahl-wg-betruges-am-eigen-anleger/

These graphs below show the cyberattacks on our website initiated by the suspects we already mentioned and who even announced in an email that tehy would do this illegal internet crime. The email was by Otmar Knoll, Fairvesta, who announced the cybercrime. The suspected hackers are from “GoMoPa” and their thugs.

The graph shows the DDos attacks on our servers.

What is a DDos attack ?

Read here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack

These internet crimes are punished with longterm jail sentences and financial compensation..

Die obenstehende Graphik zeigen die Hackerangriffe auf unsere Webseiten, die seit Jahren durchgeführt werden im Ausschnitt. In einer Email an uns hat Otmar Knoll, Fairvesta, die Hackerangriffe, somit schwere Internetverbrechen angekündigt. Wir haben diese Emails bereits veröffentlicht. Mutmasslich arbeitet Otmar Knoll mit den üblichen Verdächtigen der “GoMoPa”, ihren Informanten und Hackern zusammen:

Die Graphiken zeigt die sogenannten DDos-Angriffe auf unsere Server.

Was ist eine DDos Attacke ?

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial_of_Service

Lesen Sie hier:

Diese Vergehen werden mit langjährigen Freiheitsstrafen und Schadensersatz bestraft.

The Files TV – Captive Radio

This excerpt from Lauren Rosenfeld’s documentary profiles the families of kidnapping victims in Colombia who use a weekly radio program to communicate with loved ones held hostage in the jungle. Winner of the 2012 Hearst Documentary Award, UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism.

Part of our New Voices series, featuring the next generation of video journalists.

The Files TV – City of No Illusions

Nearly one in six homes in Buffalo, NY is vacant, overwhelming the cash-strapped city. But residents of its most blighted neighborhood are taking matters into their own hands. Produced in 2011 by Vanessa Carr at UC Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism. Part of our New Voices series, featuring the next generation of video journalists.

Cryptome – Uncle Fester Decries Copyright Infringement

Uncle Fester Decries Copyright Infringement

 


A sends:

Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2013 18:55:23 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: uncle fester decries copyright infringement

“Steve Preisler” = Uncle Fester.

I am amazed that his name is public. His personal story is sympathetic personally. But I think his attitude towards “piracy” is biassed because he’s a “content creator”. If you don’t recognize his pseudonym, please read all the way through. His “piracy” opinions are to be excused in the Grand Scheme because of his other saintly behaviors, and also, they’re just his opinion.

Summary: the premiere author of accurate practical clandestine chemistry books does not like Kim Dot Com because the latter supports “theft” of the former’s publications. Overall though Steve Preisler seems brilliant, articulate, and as effective as say Julian or Jim Bell or Kim.com or Dread Pirate Roberts or even yourself 🙂 as an Army of One cultural destabilization / freedom fighter.

First, enjoy this:

“The worst thing of all about the net is the prevalence of copyright piracy. People have come to expect the right to steal! That is one way to get valid information on controversial topics off the net. Just download a stolen copy of a genuine book on the subject you are interested in. The people who run these download sites are repulsive in every way. Take the example of Mr. Dotcom who ran Megaupload. Fat-assed, pimple-faced and cowardly are just some of his better traits. I would simply love to be locked inside a cage with him for a few weeks. We would have one-on-one counseling sessions as I would teach him about the evils of stealing other people’s work.” –Uncle Fester

http://hooverhog.typepad.com/hognotes/2012/07/porno-for-chemists-
an-interview-with-uncle-fester.html

Now some background and I suggest that googling “Steve Preisler” will amaze.

He gets pissed at being jailed for applied chemistry so he opens Pandora’s Box. For two decades and some change, the underground writer known as “Uncle Fester” has been writing genuinely influential books. While his name may not come up  in graduate dissertations and intellectual salons, the import of Fester’s oeuvre can be descried in the hand-written labels of sealed evidence bags and in the photo-documented environs of police-cordoned clandestine drug labs all over the globe.

Although they present information that can be gleaned from standard chemistry texts, books like Home Workshop Explosives, Silent Death, and of course, Secrets of Methamphetamine Manufacture are perennial candidates for state censorship. Indeed, the mere existence of such literature can be enough to disturb the sensibilities of otherwise stalwart defenders of the First Amendment.

It may not help that Fester is a competent ­ and damn entertaining ­ writer who knows his shit and does his homework. A onetime National Merit Finalist who repeatedly aced his SATs, Fester double majored in chemistry and biology at Marquette University, graduating with a BS degree and a bright future. It was around this time that a taste for tweak landed Fester ­ then known as Steve Preisler ­ behind bars, a fateful turn out of which, like Sade and Genet, he would find his true calling, and have his revenge.

 

TOP-SECRET – UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/UNODC-OpiumSurvey-2012.png

 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012

  • 112 pages
  • May 2013

Download

Afghanistan cultivates, produces and process narcotics that are a threat to the region and worldwide. However, the international community also needs to understand that Afghanistan itself is a victim of this phenomenon. The existence of hundreds of thousands of problem drug users, as well as decades of civil war, terrorism and instability are all related to the existence of narcotics in the country.

According to the findings of this survey, the total area under cultivation was estimated at 154,000 hectares, an 18 per cent increase from the previous year. Comparisons of the gross and net values with Afghan’s licit GDP for 2012 also serve to highlight the opium economy’s impact on the country. In 2012, net opium exports were worth some 10 per cent of licit GDP, while the farmgate value of the opium needed to produce those exports alone was equivalent to 4 per cent of licit GDP.

On the basis of shared responsibility and the special session of the United Nation’s General assembly in 1998, the international community needs to take a balanced approach by addressing both the supply and the demand side equally. In addition, more attention needs to be paid to reduce demand and the smuggling of precursors as well as provide further support to the Government of Afghanistan.

  • The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2012 was estimated at 154,000 hectares, a 18% increase from the previous year.
  • The vast majority (95%) of opium cultivation took place in nine provinces in Afghanistan’s Southern and Western regions, which include the country’s most insecure provinces. In mirroring the polarization in the security situation between the lawless south and the relatively stable north of the country, this confirms the link between security and opium cultivation observed in previous years.
  • Hilmand remained Afghanistan’s major opium-cultivating province, followed by Farah, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Nimroz, Nangarhar, Badghis, Badakhshan, Kunar, Day Kundi, Hirat, Laghman, Zabul, Kapisa, Ghor and Kabul.
  • Opium cultivation increased in most of the main poppy-cultivating provinces, including in Hilmand itself (19%). However, relatively less poppy was cultivated inside the Hilmand “Food Zone”, where agricultural support programmes are implemented, than in the rest of the province.
  • Based on preliminary results from other countries, opium cultivation in Afghanistan represented 64% of global cultivation in 2012.
  • Total eradication of opium poppy increased by 154% in 2012 due to an increase in Governor-led eradication (GLE) in all regions, which accounted for 9,672 hectares.
  • Even though the area eradicated was the equivalent of less than 6.5 % of the total area under opium cultivation, with a total of 102 fatalities and 127 injured, the human cost of the eradication campaign was far higher in 2012 than in the preceding year.
  • Average opium yield amounted to 23.7 kilograms per hectare in 2012, which is 47% less than in 2011 (44.5 kilograms per hectare). This was due to a combination of a disease of the opium poppy and adverse weather conditions, particularly in the Eastern, Western and Southern regions of the country.
  • Potential opium production was estimated at 3,700 tons in 2012. While a 36% decrease from the previous year, based on preliminary results for some countries and regions, this figure represented 74% of global potential production.
  • The opium yield and production estimates of the years 2006 to 2009 were revised downward after a careful review revealed data quality problems which had led to an overestimation of the per-hectare yield.
  • Accounting for 69% of national production, the Southern region continued to produce the vast majority of opium in Afghanistan in 2012. The Western region was the country’s second most important opium-producing region, with 23% of national production.
  • At US$ 0.73 billion, or the equivalent of roughly 4% of the country’s estimated GDP, the farm-gate value of opium production in 2012 fell by 49%.
  • The gross export value of opium and heroin/morphine exports in 2012 was US$ 2.0 billion (US$ 2.6 billion in 2011). The net export value of Afghan opiates in 2012 was US$ 1.94 billion. Far smaller, the gross value of the domestic market for the drugs was estimated to be US$ 0.16 billion.
  • A comparison of these gross and net values with the licit 2012 GDP of Afghanistan (US$ 18.95 billion) shows the magnitude of the Afghan opium economy. In 2012, net opium exports were worth some 10% of licit GDP, while the farm-gate value of the opium needed to produce those exports alone was equivalent to 4% of licit GDP. The net value of the domestic market for opiates is small by comparison, but still worth approximately 1% of licit GDP.
  • On average, poppy-growing households in Afghanistan continue to have a higher cash income than households that do not grow poppy.
  • Between 2011 and 2012, per-hectare gross income from opium cultivation decreased by 57% to US$ 4,600, virtually the same level as in 2010. Farmers reported average expenditure corresponding to 28% of gross income, leading to a net income of US$ 3,300 per hectare.
  • In 2012, opium prices remained very high but decreased slightly in all regions of Afghanistan, though in the Eastern, Western and Southern regions, in particular, they showed signs of stabilization at a high level. There is thus a clear incentive for Afghan farmers to continue cultivating opium.
  • In general, opium-growing villages are situated significantly further from the nearest agricultural market than non-opium-growing villages, suggesting that market accessibility and farmers’ options for cultivating legitimate agricultural produce and to cultivate opium are issues that needs to be addressed.
  • The link between opium cultivation and lack of development is shown by the fact that while over 90% of non-poppy-growing villages have a boys’ school and almost three quarters a girls’ school, these proportions drop to 61% (boys’ school) and 19% (girls’ school) in poppy-growing villages. The possible negative long-term effect of having less access to education than their contemporaries, and the absence of schools for girls in over four fifths of poppy-growing villages in particular, is worrying.
  • Cannabis cultivation is closely related to poppy cultivation: 71% of poppy-growing villages reported cannabis cultivation in 2012, while only 2% of poppy-free villages reported it.

Monty Python and the Holy Grail – Knights Who Say Ni – Film

 

Exposed – The I Files Preview – Investigate Your World

Video Skid – Monty Python’s Military Fairy

TOP-SECRET – Unveiled – Iran’s New Sea-based Missiles

                         GMT – 21:54 / تهران – 02:24

گروههاي خبري
عناوين کل اخبار
انتخابات ٩٢
اجتماعي
اقتصادي
بين الملل
سياسي
دانشگاه
فرهنگي
ورزشي
استانها
عکس
صوت و تصوير
سياست خارجي
ديدگاه
فضاي مجازي
حماسه و مقاومت
ديپلماسي عمومي و جنگ نرم
انتشارات
آرشيو اخبار :
92/02/22 – 10:31
شماره: 13920216000464
نسخه چاپيارسال به دوستان
سردار فرحی در گفت‌وگو با فارس اعلام کرد
تجهیز شناورهای سپاه به موشک‌های کروز با برد بیش از ۳۰۰ کیلومتر

رئیس سازمان هوافضای وزارت دفاع و پشتیبانی نیروهای مسلح از برنامه‌ریزی برای تحویل موشک‌های کروز پیشرفته با برد بیش از ۳۰۰ کیلومتر به نیروی دریایی سپاه خبر داد.

خبرگزاری فارس: تجهیز شناورهای سپاه به موشک‌های کروز با برد بیش از ۳۰۰ کیلومتر

 

سردار سید مهدی فرحی رئیس سازمان هوافضای وزارت دفاع و پشتیبانی نیروهای مسلح در گفتگو با خبرنگار دفاعی خبرگزاری فارس، با اشاره به تجهیز نیروهای مسلح از سوی این وزارتخانه به انواع تسلیحات نظامی ازجمله موشک و راکت گفت: تاکتیک‌ها و نحوه استفاده از این تجهیزات و تسلیحات به عهده فرماندهان نیروهای مسلح است.

وی ادامه داد: محصولات متعددی از جمله موشک‌های 300 کیلومتری در اختیار نیروی دریایی سپاه است.

فرحی تاکید کرد: بزودی محصولات جدید دیگری با بردهای مختلف و قابلیت‌های فوق‌العاده پیشرفته و از نوع کروز در اختیار نیروی دریایی سپاه قرار می‌گیرد.

رئیس سازمان هوافضای وزارت دفاع و پشتیبانی نیروهای مسلح اظهار داشت: دقت و برد موشک‌های جدید نسبت به موشک‌های 300 کیلومتری که اکنون در اختیار نیروی دریایی سپاه است، افزایش یافته است.

فرحی همچنین تاکید کرد: این موشک می‌‌تواند توان دفاعی ما را در نبردهای دریایی افزایش دهد.

به گزارش فارس، موشک‌های کروز ساحل به دریا و سطح به سطح با قابلیت‌های خاص خود، می‌توانند در مقابله با انواع تهدیدات، تاکتیک های خود را تغییر داده و این تغییر تاکتیک‌ها نیز در اختیار فرمانده نیرو قرار دارد.

موشک های کروز که امکان شلیک آنها از روی شناور نیز وجود دارد، می‌توانند از روی شناورهای با سرعت بالای 30 نات (حدود 60 کیلومتر) نیز شلیک شوند که از نمونه های قبلی در این حوزه می توان به موشک های کروز ظفر، نصر، نور، قادر و غدیر اشاره کرد.

انتهای پیام/

 

 

Iran’s New Sea-based Missiles

 


A sends:

Source : http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920216000464

Today 5-12-2013, General Farahi, the chief of the Iranian Ministry of Defense’s Aerospace Organization, has announced a new series of fast-acting sea-based rockets and missiles have been produced and turned over to IRGC’s Navy force. This force is responsible for “the security” of the Persian Gulf and the infamous Hormoz Strait.

According to publications by FarsNews, a semi-state-run media, IRGC’s Navy has been operating a series of fast-acting rockets and missiles fit to be fired from small-scale fast boats named “Zafar”, “Nasr”, “Nour”, Ghader” and “Ghadir”, but the newly produced “Cruise Type” missile which is unnamed in the report, has a firing speed of 300 Km/h and can be fired from a moving boat at a speed of 30 knots.

Netizens.

 


Film – Monty Python’s Flying Circus 1×08 Full Frontal Nudity

 

Unveiled by Crpytome – $45M ATM Hack Complaint

rodriguez-001

Monty Python Holy Grail – Killer Rabbit – Video Skid

http://youtu.be/Nvs5pqf-DMA

Cryptome unveils – Francis “Frank” Archibald, Jr. CIA Covert Head

 Francis “Frank” Archibald, Jr.

A sends: Archibald is reported to be the new head of CIA Clandestine Service.

http://archibaldinsc.blogspot.com/2010_12_01_archive.html (Blog of Francis X. Archibald, Sr.)

Francis “Frank” X. Archibald, Jr. and his wife, Lisa, of McLean, VA.

 


 

Francis “Frank” Archibald, Jr., CIA Covert Head

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Public Intellligence – DHS Infrastructure Protection Report: Elementary and Secondary Schools

 

DHS Infrastructure Protection Report Series

  • 2 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • September 15, 2011

Download

Approximately fifty million students attend nearly 100,000 public elementary and secondary schools throughout the Nation. Elementary and secondary schools are relatively open-access, limited egress congregation points for children, and have been successfully targeted by terrorists in the past.

Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity

Terrorists have a wide variety of weapons and tactics available to achieve their objectives. Specific threats of most concern to schools include:

  • Small arms attack
  • Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
  • Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)
  • Arson or incendiary attack
  • Chemical or biological attack

Terrorist activity indicators are observable anomalies or incidents that may precede a terrorist attack. Indicators of an imminent attack requiring immediate action may include the following:

  • Persons in crowded areas (e.g., school auditorium, cafeteria, athletic facilities) wearing unusually bulky clothing that might conceal suicide explosives or weapons
  • Vehicles approaching the school at an unusually high speed or steering around barriers and traffic controls
  • Suspicious or illegally parked vehicles on or near school grounds
  • Unattended packages (e.g., backpack, briefcase, box) that may contain explosives. Packages may be left in open areas or may be hidden in trash receptacles, lockers, or similar containers.
  • Evidence of unauthorized access to heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) areas of a school; indications of unusual substances near air intakes
  • Suspicious packages and/or letters received by mail that might contain explosives or chemical/biological/ radiological agents.

Indicators of potential surveillance by terrorists include:

  • Persons using or carrying video/camera/observation equipment in or near the school over an extended period
  • Persons parking, standing, or loitering in the same area over a multiple-day period with no reasonable explanation
  • Persons questioning school employees off-site about practices pertaining to the school and its operations
  • Persons discovered with school maps, photos, or diagrams with key components or sensitive areas highlighted
  • Suspicious personal e-mail, telephone, fax, or postal mail requests for information about the school or its operations
  • A noted pattern of false alarms requiring a response by law enforcement or emergency services
  • Threats by telephone, mail, or e-mail and/or increase in reports of threats from known reliable sources

Common Vulnerabilities

The following are key common vulnerabilities of elementary and secondary schools:

  • Relatively open access to school grounds and buildings
  • Limited or no vehicle access controls
  • Large concentrations of students gathering in open areas outside school buildings on a regular and readily observable schedule
  • Proximity of schools and neighboring facilities, especially in urban areas
  • Limited or no inspection of students’ personal articles, particularly in lower-crime areas
  • Limited security on school buses

Protective Measures

Protective measures include equipment, personnel, and procedures designed to protect a facility against threats and to mitigate the effects of an attack. Protective measures for elementary and secondary schools include:

Planning and Preparedness

  • Designate an employee as security director to develop, implement, and coordinate all security-related activities
  • Conduct security audits on a regular and continuing basis. Develop a comprehensive security plan and emergency response plan for the school
  • Conduct regular exercises of emergency plans
  • Establish liaison and regular communication with local law enforcement and emergency responders

Personnel

  • Conduct background checks on all school employees
  • Incorporate security into employee training programs
  • Provide security information and training to all students

Access Control

  • Define the facility perimeter and areas within the facility that require access control. Maintain building access points to the minimum needed
  • Issue photo identification badges to all school employees and students
  • Require visitors check in with the front office upon arrival and departure
  • Provide visitors with school issued identification badges when on school grounds.
  • Positively identify all vehicles and drivers that enter the school parking lots
  • Institute a policy restricting other vehicles from accessing the bus-loading zone
  • Secure ladders, awnings, and parapets that provide access to building roofs, HVAC systems, and other critical equipment

Barriers

  • Install appropriate perimeter barriers and gates. Maintain clear area at perimeter barriers to enable continuous monitoring and to inhibit concealment of people or packages
  • Establish a clear zone adjacent to buildings. Keep zone free of vegetation and other obstructions
  • Install barriers to protect doors and windows from small arms fire and explosive blast effects

Communication and Notification

  • Install system(s) that provide communication with all people at the school, including employees, students, emergency response teams, and visitors
  • Develop a plan for communicating with parents during emergency situations
  • Develop a notification protocol that outlines who should be contacted in emergencies.
  • Develop a procedure for communicating with the public and the media regarding security issues

Monitoring, Surveillance, Inspection

  • Evaluate needs and design a monitoring, surveillance, and inspection program
  • Provide visual surveillance capability (e.g., designated surveillance points, cleared lines of sight)
  • Install intrusion detection and alarm systems
  • Deploy personnel assigned to security duty to regularly inspect sensitive or critical areas
  • Continuously monitor all people entering and leaving the facility for suspicious behavior
  • Continuously monitor all vehicles approaching the facility for signs of threatening behavior

Infrastructure Interdependencies

  • Ensure that the school has adequate utility service capacity to meet normal and emergency needs
  • Ensure that employees are familiar with how to shut off utility services
  • Provide adequate physical security for utility services

Cyber Security

  • Develop and implement a security plan for computer and information systems hardware and software
  • Maintain a well-trained computer security staff
  • Incident Response
  • Ensure that an adequate number of emergency response personnel are on duty and/or on call
  • Provide training and equipment to emergency response personnel to enable them to deal with terrorist-related incidents
  • Check the status of all emergency response equipment and supplies on a regular basis
  • Develop a plan for discharging students following incident resolution

Unveiled by Cryptome – Gina Cheri Haspel, ex-Acting CIA Covert Head

Gina Cheri Haspel, ex-Acting CIA Covert Head

 


Thanks to John Dinges, Gawker,  HENRIE @CHIMUCHYO, Cryptocomb and others.

Gina Cheri Haspel served as acting head of CIA Clandestine Service until the recent appointment of Francis “Frank” Archibald. Both are “undercover” officers — until now.

In addition to information provided by others above, Haspel served in New York in 2012 (MyLife) and in Ethiopia in 1988 (Key officers of foreign service posts (May 1988)).

From Intelius (addresses 1 and 2 are London; address 8 is Ankara):

[Image]

 


Thanks to Henrie for pointing.

From The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in Clandestine Service, Henry Crumpton, 2012:

My NR [CIA National Resources] deputy, who had served me well, departed after my first year for another assignment. I was able to convince Gina to be my new deputy. She had multiple overseas tours, serving as a chief of station in one especially challenging place. She also had honchoed an important office in CTC. But soon after her arrival, the new DDO, Jose Rodriguez, asked that she be bumped upstairs to serve as his chief of staff.

I needed to find another deputy fast. I was sulking in Gina’s office, asking her if she had any ideas about her replacement.

“Sure. Right here in NR. She’s pulled together a crack team of young officers who love her. She’s a leader. Donna.”

“Well, of course. She would be great. Why didn’t I think of her?” I knew the reason. She was not an operations officer. She was a reports officer. I served a bias, like other operations officers, and it was a fault. Donna had had multiple tours abroad. She knew the division as well as anybody, and she understood the substantive issues better than anybody. Her collection initiatives had helped the division more than double intelligence production in a year. With her help, the division had also boosted its recruitment of foreign agents. She could lead, and not just those under her direct command. She could build and lead effective networks across the Agency, across the intelligence community. Best of all, she would not tolerate any bullshit, including mine. I had seen her rip the bark off a few arrogant, macho case officers who had challenged her.

I stuck my head out the door and asked my secretary to get Donna.   She arrived in a few seconds, pad and pen in hand, and plopped down on the couch. Gina was behind her desk.

“Well, what do you want?” Donna asked, wondering about our silence and grins.

“Hank has decided on his new deputy,” Gina said.

“Oh, good. Who?”

“You,” I answered. Donna gasped, then blinked rapidly.

“You have to be kidding,” Donna finally responded.

“Nope,” I said. “You are the best. You, in fact, are the only candidate,” Gina added.

“Gina, you can start her in-brief,” I instructed, as I walked out the door, leaving them to sort out the transition. That was one of the best management decisions that I ever made.

 


Video Skid – Monty Python’s Flying Circus – Merchant Banker

http://youtu.be/YUhb0XII93I

SECRECY NEWS – SENATE CONFIRMS CHAIR OF PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES BOARD

Almost a year and a half after he was nominated by President Obama in December 2011, the Senate yesterday confirmed David Medine to be the chairman of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board by a vote of 53-45. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2013_cr/medine.html Republicans, led by Sen. Charles Grassley, opposed the nominee and voted against him. “I was disappointed that he failed to answer a basic yes-or-no question about national security law: ‘Do you believe that we are engaged in a war on terrorism?’,” Sen. Grassley said. “Instead of a simple yes or no, he opted for a more limited answer that military power is permissible in appropriate cases.” Democrats, led by Sen. Patrick Leahy, praised Mr. Medine and the Board that he will now lead. “The confirmation of this nominee is a significant victory for all Americans who care about safeguarding our privacy rights and civil liberties,” Sen. Leahy said. “The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is a guardian of Americans’ privacy rights and civil liberties as well as an essential part of our national security strategy,” he said. But this seems like an overstatement. The size of the five-member Board and the resources available to it are not commensurate with the responsibilities it has nominally been assigned. It cannot possibly perform comprehensive oversight of the broad range of privacy or civil liberties concerns that arise in the national security domain. Expectations to the contrary are bound to be disappointed. At best, the Board may serve as a boutique oversight shop that tackles a couple of discrete policy issues each year. For background on the origins and development of the Board, see Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: New Independent Agency Status, Congressional Research Service, August 27, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34385.pdf INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS, AND OTHER DOD DIRECTIVES The procedures by which the U.S. Air Force establishes international agreements for the exchange of intelligence information with foreign military services were described in a new Air Force Instruction. “Foreign military organizations being considered for inclusion in an IIA (international intelligence agreement) must clearly support U.S. security and foreign policy objectives. The foreign government must have favorable relations with the United States; a well-developed, secure intelligence service; and a stable domestic environment and military unity. Known national characteristics of the foreign government in question must fall within the guidelines of the United States national disclosure and security policy, and be reasonably expected to have adequate fiscal means, and conform to legal guidelines,” the Instruction states. Such agreements must “Provide for mutual support (quid pro quo)” and must “Provide intelligence that would otherwise be denied to the United States.” See Air Force Instruction 14-102, International Intelligence Agreements, April 29, 2013: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afi14-102.pdf Another new Department of Defense Instruction governs records management within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “It is DoD policy,” it states, “to limit the creation of records to those essential for the efficient conduct of official business and to preserve those of continuing value while systematically eliminating all others.” See OSD Records and Information Management Program, Administrative Instruction 15, May 3, 2013: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/ai15.pdf Other noteworthy new military publications include the following. Information Operations (IO), DoD Directive 3600.01, May 2, 2013: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3600_01.pdf DODD 5134.10 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), DoD Directive 5134.10, May 7, 2013: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5134_10.pdf THE U.S. SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING WORKFORCE, AND MORE FROM CRS New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has not made available to the public include the following. The U.S. Science and Engineering Workforce: Recent, Current, and Projected Employment, Wages, and Unemployment, May 6, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43061.pdf Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues, May 7, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42834.pdf Tax Reform in the 113th Congress: An Overview of Proposals, May 6, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43060.pdf Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, May 3, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42138.pdf Terrorist Watch List Screening and Background Checks for Firearms, May 1, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R42336.pdf Missing Adults: Background, Federal Programs, and Issues for Congress, May 7, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34616.pdf Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, May 7, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21721.pdf Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, May 7, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41731.pdf Expulsion, Censure, Reprimand, and Fine: Legislative Discipline in the House of Representatives, May 2, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31382.pdf No-Fly Zones: Strategic, Operational, and Legal Considerations for Congress, May 3, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41701.pdf Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2013, May 3, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/subscribe/ To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/unsubscribe/ OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: https://members.fas.org/donate _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: http://www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood@fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691

Trotz Internet-Attacken der “GoMoPa”:Wer wirklich und tatsächlich Geld erhielt: “GoMoPa” und Genossen !

hacker

Alle Internettacken der mutmasslichen STASI-Typen der “GoMoPa” können die Wahrheit nicht stoppen.

Klar ist, nicht ich, sondern “GoMoPa” erhielt Geld von S&K.

Nicht ich, sondern “Dr. Rainer Zitelmann” wurde bei Springer als Immobilienredakteur entfernt, nachdem sich der Verlag mit seinen Schriften zu Adolf Hitler und Auschwitz auseinandergesetzt hat.

Ich habe nie bei Axel Springer gearbeitet. Dies kann jeder bei Springer nachprüfen.

Nicht ich, sondern “GoMoPa” und “Dr. Rainer Zitelmann”  haben Beraterverträge mit deutschen Immobilienfirmen.

Die Latrinenparolen sollen doch nur von den tatsächlichem Korruptionsnetzwerk und den alten Genossen und deren Seilschaften ablenken,

wie dies bereits oft versucht wurde.

Und dann wenn alles nichts hilft, werden unseren Seiten gehackt und mit DDoS-Hacker-Attacken angegriffen…

Das leuchtet doch jedem ein ! Hilflose Versuche der korrupten Seilschaften von “GoMoPa” und Genossen.

Und ganz sicher ist auch: Ich bin kein Fähnchen im Wind !

Hier noch einmal meine detaillierte Stellungnahme.

Bernd Pulch

Liebe Leser,

wieder einmal versucht die dubiose “GoMoPa” und deren Handlanger, Konsorten und Komparsen mutmasslich “Peter Ehlers” und “Nawito” von mutmasslich eigenen Taten abzulenken und mir perfide den “Schwarzen Peter” zuzuschieben.

Wie bereits im Falle meines angeblichen falschen Magistertitels, dem Fall Meridian Capital etc pp die Liste ist endlos.

Ein Sammelsurium von  Kolportagen, Fabeln, Märchen und Latrinenpatrolen…

Dabei liegen die Beweis klar auf dem Tisch:

Die renommierten und etablierten Medien wie “ZEIT” und “Süddeutsche Zeitung” haben es aufgedeckt, was hier im Fall “S &K”/”GoMoPa” wirklich lief.

http://www.zeit.de/2013/11/Finanznachrichtendienst-Gomopa

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/geld/mutmassliche-anlagebetrueger-sk-die-akte-midas-1.1620191-4

Nachdem zahlreiche Internetangriffe nichts gebracht haben, nun wieder dieser Unsinn.

Hier noch einmal meine Stellungnahme zu der “GoMoPa”/Ehlers/Nawito-Absurdistan-Agit-Propaganda:

Dear Readers,

let me just briefly comment a mental cyberattack which should distract your attention from the real issues.

I have never had any consulting position or contract for any German company.

I have never worked for the Axel Springer Publishing House – not even as a freelance journalist.

These facts are clear and can be verified easily – just by calling Axel Springer.

The facts are

1) Dr. Rainer Zitelmann worked for the Axel Springer Company. You can esaily find out what happened there. I just mention the word “Auschwitz” in this context…As you see from his website and in the internet Zitelmann is in fact consulting many German companies.

2) “GoMoPa” had in fact a consultation contract with estavis and got in fact money from estavis and many various companies i.e. “S&K”

These contracts are known and 100% true and published by various media i.e. “ZEIT”, “MANAGER MAGAZIN”, “SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG” etc.

3) Meridian Capital was the subject of “GoMoPa”s articles.

4) “Nawito” whover or whatever it is did not even bother to contact us.

5) The “information” about one of our companies is false.

6) The “Nawito” informer “Peter Ehlers” did in fact attack Chancellor Merkel and the Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble as “Deutschlands bekannteste Hehler” to name just one fact about “Peter Ehlers” or whatever his name might be who by the way got a lot of money from the bancrupt SAM AG which was also subject of “GoMoPa”‘s reporting and we know similiar cases of this endeavour.

7) The last editor who was attacked by such cyberattacks died in a very mysterious way, Heinz Gerlach. He might have been controversial but nevertheless – the truth is the truth.

He was the first journalist to publish the truth about the mysterious headquarter of “GoMoPa” in New York and their consulting contract with estavis and died suddenly and totally unexpected for most of us – not for all.

The circumstances of his death remain unsolved for me.

We are ready to proof this everytime and do not work with “colportations”.

Obviously cyberattacks on our websites since years are not enough to keep the truth down – defamation must be added – a wellknown STASI technique to irritate the public – MENTAL AND PYSICAL CYBERATTACKS done by the well-know suspects.

Sincerely your

Bernd Pulch

Magister Artium der Publizistik, Germanistik und Komparatistik

PS

COPIES OF PHYSICAL CYBER ATTACKS ON OUR SERVERS BY THE SUSPECTS AND “INFORMERS” OF “NAWITO”

graph eastern

graph 3

graph2

graph

The attacked website are for example:

http://www.investment-on.com

http://www.berndpulch.org

http://investment-magazin.com

http://www.investment-magazin.tv

and about 20 more.

CONFIDENTIAL-Taiwanese Violating U.S. Laws to Prevent Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHICAGO—A resident of Taiwan whom the U.S. government has linked to the supply of weapons machinery to North Korea, and his son, who resides in suburban Chicago, are facing federal charges here for allegedly conspiring to violate U.S. laws designed to thwart the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, federal law enforcement officials announced today.

Hsien Tai Tsai, also known as “Alex Tsai,” who is believed to reside in Taiwan, was arrested last Wednesday in Tallinn, Estonia, while his son, Yueh-Hsun Tsai, also known as “Gary Tsai,” who is from Taiwan and is a legal permanent resident in the United States, was arrested the same day at his home in Glenview, Illinios.

Gary Tsai, 36, was ordered held in custody pending a detention hearing at 1:30 p.m. today before Magistrate Judge Susan Cox in U.S. District Court in Chicago. Alex Tsai, 67, remains in custody in Estonia pending proceedings to extradite him to the United States.

Both men were charged in federal court in Chicago with three identical offenses in separate complaints that were filed previously and unsealed following their arrests. Each was charged with one count of conspiring to defraud the United States in its enforcement of laws and regulations prohibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, one count of conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by conspiring to evade the restrictions imposed on Alex Tsai and two of his companies by the U.S. Treasury Department, and one count of money laundering.

The arrests and charges were announced by Gary S. Shapiro, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois; Cory B. Nelson, Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Office of the FBI; Gary Hartwig, Special Agent in Charge of Homeland Security Investigations in Chicago; and Ronald B. Orzel, Special Agent in Charge of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Export Enforcement, Chicago Field Office. The Justice Department’s National Security Division and Office of International Affairs assisted with the investigation. U.S. officials thanked the Estonian Internal Security Service and the Estonian Prosecutor’s Office for their cooperation.

According to both complaint affidavits, agents have been investigating Alex and Gary Tsai, as well as Individual A (a Taiwanese associate of Alex Tsai) and a network of companies engaged in the export of U.S. origin goods and machinery that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction. The investigation has revealed that Alex and Gary Tsai and Individual A are associated with at least three companies based in Taiwan—Global Interface Company Inc., Trans Merits Co. Ltd., and Trans Multi Mechanics Co. Ltd.—that have purchased and then exported, and attempted to purchase and then export, from the United States machinery used to fabricate metals and other materials with a high degree of precision.

On January 16, 2009, under Executive Order 13382, which sanctions proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Alex Tsai, Global Interface, and Trans Merits as proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems and prohibiting any person or company in the United States from knowingly engaging in any transaction or dealing with Alex Tsai and the two Taiwanese companies.

In announcing the January 2009 OFAC order, the Treasury Department said that Alex Tsai was designated for providing, or attempting to provide, financial, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID), which was designated as a proliferator by President George W. Bush in June 2005. The Treasury Department asserted that Alex Tsai “has been supplying goods with weapons production capabilities to KOMID and its subordinates since the late 1990s, and he has been involved in shipping items to North Korea that could be used to support North Korea’s advanced weapons program.” The Treasury Department further said that Global Interface was designated “for being owned or controlled by Tsai,” who is a shareholder of the company and acts as its president. Tsai is also the general manager of Trans Merits Co. Ltd., which was designated for being a subsidiary owned or controlled by Global Interface Company Inc.

After the OFAC designations, Alex and Gary Tsai and Individual A allegedly continued to conduct business together but attempted to hide Alex Tsai’s and Trans Merit’s involvement in those transactions by conducting business under different company names, including Trans Multi Mechanics. For example, by August 2009—approximately eight months after the OFAC designations—Alex and Gary Tsai, Individual A, and others allegedly began using Trans Multi Mechanics to purchase and export machinery on behalf of Trans Merits and Alex Tsai. Specifically, the charges allege that in September 2009, they purchased a Bryant center hole grinder from a U.S. company based in suburban Chicago and exported it to Taiwan using the company Trans Multi Mechanics. A Bryant center hole grinder is a machine tool used to grind a center hole, with precisely smooth sides, through the length of a material.

The charges further allege that by at least September 2009, Gary Tsai had formed a machine tool company named Factory Direct Machine Tools in Glenview, Illinois, which was in the business of importing and exporting machine tools, parts, and other items to and from the United States. However, the charges allege that Alex Tsai and Trans Merits were active partners in Factory Direct Machine Tools, in some instances procuring the goods for import to the United States for Factory Direct Machine Tool customers.

Violating IEEPA carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a $1 million fine; money laundering carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a $500,000 fine; and conspiracy to defraud the United States carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine. If convicted, the court must impose a reasonable sentence under federal statutes and the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The government is being represented by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Patrick Pope and Brian Hayes.

The public is reminded that a complaint is not evidence of guilt. The defendants are presumed innocent and are entitled to a fair trial at which the government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Cryptome unveils Wikipedia Pressure Cooker Bomb Guide

wikipedia-mom-bomb

Public Intelligence – National Counterterrorism Center Says IED Precursors Widely Available in U.S.

A video posted on YouTube shows 4 pounds of tannerite and 3 gallons of gasoline being detonated inside of a refrigerator. A March 2013 bulletin from the FBI warned that materials like tannerite, used for exploding targets, and other commercial products could provide alternative sources of ammonium nitrate and precursor material used to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Public Intelligence

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) warned in November of last year that precursor components needed to produce improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are “widely and legally available in sufficient quantities through a variety of sources” in the U.S. and are difficult to regulate due to their legitimate uses.

Last fall the NCTC conducted a “facilitated brainstorming session” on domestic terrorism in order to identify “the most common misconceptions about conventional Homeland plotting” based on “inquiries received from Federal, state, local, tribal, and private-sector consumers and from articles published by outside experts and in the media.” NCTC analysts determined the six most common misconceptions and compared these against current analytical trends. In a bulletin detailing the NCTC’s findings, one of the most common misconceptions listed is the belief that precursors needed to manufacture improvised explosives are “difficult to legally acquire in the US without raising suspicion.” The bulletin adds that public “reporting and unclassified government assessments that highlight regulations and law enforcement ‘tripwires’ designed to prevent the acquisition of explosives precursor material give an incomplete depiction of the availability of explosive material.” In fact, the bulletin states that many of the “precursors used to construct IEDs are widely and legally available in sufficient quantities through a variety of sources because their legitimate uses hinder regulation, allowing extremists to obtain suitable amounts without attracting attention.”

Following the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995, the U.S. government created a program to monitor the potential use of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizers in explosive devices. Since then, these law enforcement “tripwire” programs have been extended to other chemicals that could potentially be used in in the construction of explosive devices, such as hydrogen peroxide. An FBI bulletin from March says that “at least 18 incidents related to attempts to directly purchase ammonium nitrate” have been detected since 2008 because of the ammonium nitrate tripwire program, though none were found to found to be connected with terrorism. The same bulletin warns that monitoring of ammonium nitrate purchases has caused criminals and extremists to adapt, seeking “alternative commercial products containing ammonium nitrate.” Other commercially available products providing a potential source of ammonium nitrate include first-aid cold packs and exploding targets. The bulletin warns that the “FBI assesses with medium confidence criminals and extremists may actively be attempting to acquire [exploding targets] to obtain the ammonium nitrate for use in the manufacture of improvised explosives based on FBI investigations of individuals interested in manufacturing explosives.”

Other materials of concern to law enforcement include chemicals used in swimming pools and water filtration systems, beauty supply products such as hydrogen peroxide and acetone, and industrial cleaning supplies like sulfuric acid. In October 2011, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security sent out a bulletin to police stating that “public and state and local official awareness, as well as tightened legal controls, have made it more difficult to purchase certain products that contain explosive precursors in bulk quantities or concentrated forms.” This regulation has made terrorists “more likely to use surreptitious, though legal, methods—such as multiple purchases in smaller quantities—to acquire sufficient amounts to create explosives.”

Video Skid – Monty Python – The Spanish Inquisition

Uncensored Video – Michael Moore- The Awful Truth

Meeting Hitler and Lenin: George Seldes Interview – Film

Unveiled – FAA Drone Listening Session

faa-drones-13-0403

Video Skid – Monty Python’s – Meaning of Life – Death

Video Discussion – Investigative Journalists – a dying breed ?

Sir Harold Evans, former Editor of The Sunday Times, discusses the state of journalism today.

Unveiled – Consultant for Willbros International Sentenced in Connection with Foreign Bribery Scheme

WASHINGTON—A former consultant for Willbros International, Inc. (Willbros International), a subsidiary of Houston-based Willbros Group, Inc. (Willbros), was sentenced today for his role in a conspiracy to pay more than $6 million in bribes to government officials of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and officials from a Nigerian political party, Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman of the Criminal Division and Assistant Director in Charge Valerie Parlave of the FBI’s Washington Field Office announced today.

Paul G. Novak, 46, was sentenced today to serve 15 months in prison by U.S. District Judge Simeon T. Lake, III of the Southern District of Texas. The court took into consideration Novak’s cooperation, and the sentence was consistent with the government’s recommendation. In addition to the prison sentence, Novak was ordered to pay a $1 million fine and to serve two years of supervised release following his release from prison. In sentencing Novak, the court took into consideration the assistance Novak provided the government in ongoing investigations.

Novak pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and one substantive count of violating the FCPA. Novak admitted that from approximately late 2003 to March 2005, he conspired with others to make a series of corrupt payments totaling more than $6 million to various Nigerian government officials and officials from a Nigerian political party to assist Willbros and its joint venture partner, a construction company based in Mannheim, Germany, in obtaining and retaining the Eastern Gas Gathering System (EGGS) Project, which was valued at approximately $387 million. The EGGS project was a natural gas pipeline system in the Niger Delta designed to relieve existing pipeline capacity constraints.

According to court records, Novak and his alleged co-conspirators, Kenneth Tillery, Jason Steph, Jim Bob Brown—three employees from Willbros’ joint venture partner—and others agreed to make the corrupt payments to, among others, government officials from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the National Petroleum Investment Management Services, a senior official in the executive branch of the federal government of Nigeria, and members of a Nigerian political party. Court documents state the bribes were paid to assist in obtaining and retaining the EGGS contract and additional optional scopes of work.

According to information contained in plea documents, to secure the funds for those corrupt payments, Novak and his alleged conspirators caused Willbros West Africa Inc., a subsidiary of Willbros International, to enter into so-called “consultancy agreements” with two consulting companies Novak represented in exchange for purportedly legitimate consultancy services. In reality, those consulting companies were used to facilitate the payment of bribes.

In addition to Novak, to date, two Willbros employees have pleaded guilty for their roles in the EGGS bribery scheme, and Willbros has entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the government:

On May 14, 2008, Willbros Group, Inc. and Willbros International entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the government and agreed to pay a $22 million penalty in connection with the company’s payment of bribes to government officials in Nigeria and Ecuador. On March 30, 2012, the government moved to dismiss the charges following Willbros’ satisfaction of its obligations under the deferred prosecution agreement, and on April 2, 2012, the court granted the United States’ motion.

On September 14, 2006, Jim Bob Brown, a former Willbros executive, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA, in connection with his role in making corrupt payments to Nigerian government officials to obtain and retain the EGGS contract and in connection with his role in making corrupt payments in Ecuador. After a reduction for cooperation, Brown was sentenced on January 28, 2010 to 12 months and one day in prison, two years of supervised release, and a $17,500 fine.

On November 5, 2007, Jason Steph, also a former Willbros executive, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA in connection with his role in making corrupt payments to Nigerian government officials to obtain and retain the EGGS contract. After a reduction for cooperation, Steph was sentenced on January 28, 2010 to 15 months in prison, two years of supervised release and a $2,000 fine.

Kenneth Tillery was charged, along with Novak, for his alleged role in the bribery scheme in an indictment unsealed on December 19, 2008. According to the indictment, Tillery was a Willbros International employee and executive from the 1980s through January 2005. From 2002 until January 2005, Tillery served as executive vice president and, later, as president of Willbros International. Tillery remains a fugitive. The charges against Tillery are merely accusations, and he is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

The case is being investigated by FBI agents who are part of the Washington Field Office’s dedicated FCPA squad. Significant assistance was provided by the Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs. This case is being prosecuted by Senior Trial Attorney Laura N. Perkins of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section.

Additional information about the Justice Department’s FCPA enforcement efforts can be found at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa.

Revealed – CipherCloud DMCA Takedown

ciphercloud-dmca

Film – Monty Python – The Universe Song

http://youtu.be/JWVshkVF0SY

Michael Moore – Sicko – Full Movie

Video – The Future of News: Investigative Journalism – Bob Woodward

As newsrooms around the country downsize, investigative reporting is facing a crisis. The Washington Post’s Bob Woodward and Bill Buzenberg of the Center for Public Policy, take a close look at what investigative reporting means in keeping government and business accountable.

Revealed – Aaron Swartz Estate-v-USA-MIT-JSTOR Gang

3 May 2013

Aaron Swartz Estate v. USA-MIT-JSTOR

This presents the court docket and filings after the death of Aaron Swartz as his estate seeks disclosure of unreleased information from USA, MIT and JSTOR.

CLOSED,VICTIM
United States District Court
District of Massachusetts (Boston)
CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:11-cr-10260-NMG All Defendants

Case title: USA v. Swartz
Date Filed: 07/14/2011
Date Terminated: 01/14/2013

Assigned to: Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton

Defendant (1)
Aaron Swartz
TERMINATED: 01/14/2013 represented by Daniel E. Purcell
Keker & Van Nest, LLP
633 Battery Street
San Francisco, CA 94111-1809
415-391-5400
Email: dpurcell@kvn.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Retained

Elliot R. Peters
Keker & Van Nest LLP
633 Battery Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
415-391-5400
Email: epeters@kvn.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Retained

Martin G. Weinberg
Martin G. Weinberg, PC
20 Park Plaza
Suite 1000
Boston, MA 02116
617-227-3700
Fax: 617-338-9538
Email: owlmcb@att.net
TERMINATED: 11/01/2012
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Retained

Michael J. Pineault
Clements & Pineault, LLP
24 Federal Street
Boston, MA 02110
857-445-0135
Fax: 857-366-5404
Email: mpineault@clementspineault.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Retained

Andrew Good
Good & Cormier
3rd Floor
83 Atlantic Ave.
Boston, MA 02110
617-523-5933
Fax: 617-523-7554
Email: agood@goodcormier.com
TERMINATED: 11/03/2011
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Retained

Matthias A. Kamber
Keker & Van Nest LLP
710 Sansome Street
San Francisco, CA 94107
415-391-5400
Fax: 415-397-7188
Email: mkamber@kvn.com
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Retained

Pending Counts
Disposition
None

Highest Offense Level (Opening)
None

Terminated Counts
Disposition
18:1343 & 2…WIRE FRAUD
(1) Dismissed on government motion.
18:1343 & 2…WIRE FRAUD
(1s-2s) Dismissed on government motion.
18:1030(a)(4) & 2…COMPUTER FRAUD
(2) Dismissed on government motion.
18:1030(a)(2), (c)(2)(B)(iii) & 2 …UNLAWFULLY OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM A PROTECTED COMPUTER
(3) Dismissed on government motion.
18:1030(a)(4),(b)&2…COMPUTER FRAUD
(3s-7s) Dismissed on government motion.
18:1030(a)(5)(B),(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)(VI) & 2 …RECKLESSLY DAMAGING A PROTECTED COMPUTER
(4) Dismissed on government motion.
18:1030(a)(2),(b),(c)(2)(B)(iii) & 2…UNLAWFULLY OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM A PROTECTED COMPUTER
(8s-12s) Dismissed on government motion.
18:1030(a)(5),(B),(c)(4)(A)(i)(I),(VI) &2…RECKLESSLY DAMAGING A PROTECTED COMPUTER
(13s) Dismissed on government motion.

Highest Offense Level (Terminated)
Felony

Complaints
Disposition
None

Interested Party
Massachusetts Institute of Technology represented by Christopher H. Lindstrom
Nutter, McClennen & Fish, LLP
Seaport West
155 Seaport Boulevard
Boston, MA 02210-2604
617-439-2698
Fax: 617-310-9698
Email: clindstrom@nutter.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Retained

Jonathan L. Kotlier
Nutter, McClennen & Fish, LLP
Seaport West
155 Seaport Boulevard
Boston, MA 02210-2604
617-439-2000
Fax: 617-310-9683
Email: jkotlier@nutter.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Retained

Interested Party
JSTOR represented by Mark W. Pearlstein
McDermott Will & Emery
28 State Street
Boston, MA 02109
617-535-4000
Fax: 617-535-3800
Email: mpearlstein@mwe.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Retained

Plaintiff
USA represented by Jack W. Pirozzolo
United States Attorney’s Office MA
1 Courthouse Way
Boston, MA 02210
617-748-3189
Fax: 617-748-3960
Email: jack.pirozzolo@usdoj.gov
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Garland
United States Attorney’s Office
John J. Moakley U.S. Courthouse
Suite 9200
Boston, MA 02210
617-748-3148
Fax: 617-748-3960
Email: scott.garland@usdoj.gov
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen P. Heymann
United States Attorney’s Office
John Joseph Moakley Federal Courthouse
1 Courthouse Way
Suite 9200
Boston, MA 02210
617-748-3100
Email: Stephen.Heymann@usdoj.gov
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Filings prior to Swartz’s death and charges are dismissed are omitted.

01/14/2013 105 DISMISSAL as to Aaron Swartz (Heymann, Stephen) (Entered: 01/14/2013)
01/14/2013 106 Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ORDER entered. DISMISSAL OF COUNTS on Government Motion as to Aaron Swartz. Counts dismissed: All counts dismissed. (Patch, Christine) (Entered: 01/14/2013)
02/22/2013 107 Transcript of Status Conference as to Aaron Swartz held on December 14, 2012, before Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton. Court Reporter Name and Contact Information: Cheryl Dahlstrom at cheryldahlstrom@comcast.net The Transcript may be purchased through the Court Reporter, viewed at the public terminal, or viewed through PACER after it is released. Redaction Request due 3/15/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/25/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/23/2013. (Scalfani, Deborah) (Entered: 02/22/2013)
02/22/2013 108 NOTICE is hereby given that an official transcript of a proceeding has been filed by the court reporter in the above-captioned matter. Counsel are referred to the Court’s Transcript Redaction Policy, available on the court website at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/attorneys/general-info.htm (Scalfani, Deborah) (Entered: 02/22/2013)
03/15/2013 109 MOTION Modification of Protective Order as to Aaron Swartz. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Resnick Decl ISO, # 2 Affidavit Pineault Decl ISO, # 3 Exhibit Pineault Decl – Ex A, # 4 Exhibit Pineault Decl – Ex B, # 5 Exhibit Pineault Decl – Ex C)(Peters, Elliot) (Entered: 03/15/2013)
03/15/2013 110 NOTICE OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE Jack W. Pirozzolo appearing for USA. (Pirozzolo, Jack) (Entered: 03/15/2013)
03/29/2013 111 RESPONSE to Motion by USA as to Aaron Swartz re 109 MOTION Modification of Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Tab A)(Pirozzolo, Jack) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
03/29/2013 112 AFFIDAVIT of Jack W. Pirozzolo by USA as to Aaron Swartz 111 Response to Motion filed by USA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Tab A, # 2 Exhibit Tab B, # 3 Exhibit Tab C, # 4 Exhibit Tab D, # 5 Exhibit Tab E, # 6 Exhibit Tab F, # 7 Exhibit Tab G)(Pirozzolo, Jack) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
03/29/2013 113 RESPONSE to Motion by Massachusetts Institute of Technology as to Aaron Swartz re 109 MOTION Modification of Protective Order and MOTION to Intervene by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Kotlier, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
03/29/2013 114 MEMORANDUM in Opposition by Massachusetts Institute of Technology as to Aaron Swartz re 109 MOTION Modification of Protective Order and in Support of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Motion to Intervene (Kotlier, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
03/29/2013 115 AFFIDAVIT of Emily J. Grannon by Massachusetts Institute of Technology as to Aaron Swartz 114 Memorandum in Opposition, filed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O)(Kotlier, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
03/29/2013 116 RESPONSE to Motion by JSTOR as to Aaron Swartz re 109 MOTION Modification of Protective Order and Motion to Intervene by JSTOR (Pearlstein, Mark) Modified event on 4/1/2013 (Moore, Kellyann). (Entered: 03/29/2013)
03/29/2013 117 MEMORANDUM in Support by JSTOR as to Aaron Swartz re 109 MOTION Modification of Protective Order Memorandum of Law of JSTOR In Support of Its Motion to Intervene and In Support of Modification of the Protective Order (Pearlstein, Mark) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
03/29/2013 118 AFFIDAVIT of Jeremy Feigelson by JSTOR as to Aaron Swartz 116 Response to Motion filed by JSTOR, 117 Memorandum in Support, filed by JSTOR (Pearlstein, Mark) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
03/29/2013 119 AFFIDAVIT of Kevin Guthrie by JSTOR as to Aaron Swartz 116 Response to Motion filed by JSTOR, 117 Memorandum in Support, filed by JSTOR (Pearlstein, Mark) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
03/29/2013 120 NOTICE of Appearance of Jonathan L. Kotlier Appearing for Massachusetts Institute of Technology by Massachusetts Institute of Technology as to Aaron Swartz (Kotlier, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
03/29/2013 121 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance of Christopher H. Lindstrom for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology by Massachusetts Institute of Technology as to Aaron Swartz (Lindstrom, Christopher) (Entered: 03/29/2013)

Unveiled – DoD Report to Congress on North Korea Military and Security Developments

DoD-DPRK-2012-1

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2012

26 pages
May 2, 2013

Download

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges in Northeast Asia. North Korea remains a security threat because of its willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of its international agreements and United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

North Korean aspiration for reunification – attainable in its mind in part by expelling U.S. forces from the Peninsula – and its commitment to perpetuating the Kim family regime are largely unchanged since the nation’s founding in 1948, but its strategies to achieve these goals have evolved significantly. Under Kim Jong Il, DPRK strategy had been focused on internal security; coercive diplomacy to compel acceptance of its diplomatic, economic and security interests; development of strategic military capabilities to deter external attack; and challenging the ROK and the U.S.-ROK Alliance. We anticipate these strategic goals will be consistent under North Korea’s new leader, Kim Jong Un.

North Korea fields a large, forward-deployed military that retains the capability to inflict serious damage on the ROK, despite significant resource shortfalls and aging hardware. The DPRK continues to be deterred from conducting attacks on the ROK largely because of the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. On a smaller scale, however, the DPRK has demonstrated its willingness to use military provocation to achieve national goals, such as in 2010 when it sank the ROK naval vessel CHEONAN, killing 46 ROK Navy sailors, and shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing two ROK Marines and two civilians.

North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear technology and capabilities and development of long-range ballistic missile programs, as reflected in the December 2012 Taepo Dong 2 missile launch and April 2012 display of a new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, underscores the threat to regional stability and U.S. national security posed by North Korea. These programs, as well as North Korea’s expressed hostility toward the ROK and proliferation of items prohibited under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2087 make the DPRK a continued security challenge for the United States and its Allies and partners.

North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013 and its 2010 revelation of a uranium enrichment facility highlight the continued challenge posed by North Korea’s nuclear programs. Both the September 19 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2087 call for the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. Given North Korea’s unwillingness to abide by these commitments, the Department of Defense will continue to manage the North Korean security challenge through close coordination and consultation with the international community, particularly with our ROK and Japanese Allies.

The United States remains vigilant in the face of North Korea’s continued provocations and steadfast in commitments to Allies in the region, including the security provided by extended deterrence commitments through both the nuclear umbrella and conventional forces.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH KOREAN AND PENINSULAR SECURITY

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has stated that it is entering what it calls “the door in a strong and prosperous nation” in 2012. The transfer of power to Kim Jong Un, after the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, has shaped the internal political landscape of North Korea and its international relations. In April 2012, Kim Jong Un assumed top-level positions in the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) and the National Defense Commission, formalizing his role as the North’s top leader.

Yet North Korea continues to fall behind the rising national power of its regional neighbors, creating a widening military disparity and fueling its commitment to improving asymmetric and strategic deterrent capabilities as the primary guarantor of regime survival.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have grown as relations between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK) worsened through 2011 and remained uneasy through mid-2012. The DPRK’s frustration with the ROK’s close policy coordination with the United States and its linkage of assistance to the North to progress in denuclearization grew over the past five years of President Lee Myung-bak, and is unlikely to change significantly under the tenure of President Park Geun-hye.

NORTH KOREAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS

North Korean threat perceptions are shaped by a legacy of guerilla warfare dating back to its anti–colonial struggle against the Japanese, political and economic isolation, experience during wartime, and a political culture that is defined by an unending existential struggle with outside forces. North Korea has portrayed the ROK and the United States as constant threats to North Korea’s sovereignty, in a probable attempt to legitimize and justify the Kim family rule, its draconian internal control mechanisms, and its existing strategies as the best defense against encroachments on the North’s sovereignty.

The regime’s greatest security concern is opposition from within, and outside forces – primarily South Korea – taking advantage of internal instability to topple the regime and achieve unification of the Korean Peninsula. In North Korea’s view, the destruction of regimes such as Ceausescu, Hussain, and Qadhafi was not an inevitable consequence of repressive governments, but rather a failure to secure the necessary capabilities to defend their respective autocratic regime’s survival.

Video Skid – Monty Python – Life of Brian – What have the Romans ever done for us ?

TOP-SECRET- Identifying IP Addresses, Hostnames Associated With Malicious Cyber Activity

DHS-FBI Bulletins Identifying IP Addresses, Hostnames Associated With Malicious Cyber Activity Against the U.S. Government

May 2, 2013 in Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The following bulletins were released in February 2013 by the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) on a limited basis to “confirmed members of the cybersecurity community of practice, which may include critical infrastructure owners and operators, systems administrators, and information security practitioners.” Both versions of the bulletin were found to be available on a number of public websites associated with various professional associations and trade groups.

Joint Indicator Bulletin (JIB) – INC260425 27 pages February 18, 2013 Download
Joint Indicator Bulletin (JIB) – INC260425-2 10 pages February 26, 2013 Download

Various cyber actors have engaged in malicious activity against Government and Private Sector entities. The apparent objective of this activity has been the theft of intellectual property, trade secrets, and other sensitive business information. To this end, the malicious actors have employed a variety of techniques in order to infiltrate targeted organizations, establish a foothold, move laterally through the targets’ networks, and exfiltrate confidential or proprietary data. The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other partners, has created this Joint Indicator Bulletin, containing cyber indicators related to this activity. Organizations are advised to examine current and historical security logs for evidence of malicious activity related to the indicators in this bulletin and deploy additional protections as appropriate. In addition, DHS would welcome any additional information your organization may be able to share regarding this or similar activity, which may be provided to the US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) at soc@uscert.gov.

Document Overview

This Joint Indicator Bulletin is comprised of several sections covering malware indicators, network traffic, tool indicators, hostnames, and IP addresses known to be associated with the ongoing malicious activity. If suspicious network traffic or malware is identified based on these indicators, affected systems should be investigated for signs of compromise.

To support developing shared situational awareness of cyber threats, DHS welcomes any additional information your organization may be able to share regarding this or similar activity. Such information can be provided to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) at soc@us-cert.gov.

Indicator Descriptions

As a general matter, malicious cyber actors have multiple tools at their disposal and can represent a significant threat to targeted victim organizations. Such actors frequently compromise victim organizations with targeted spear-phishing campaigns, understand how to move laterally within a network to acquire targeted data, and often maintain undetected persistence on victim networks for months or even years. The indicators provided in this Bulletin include malware and compromised IP addresses and domains used by such actors.

Malware

Malicious activity like that described in this Bulletin usually originates via targeted spear phishing email campaigns that compromise victim organizations. These emails can result in the installation of one or more pieces of malware used to enable complete control of those systems. The presence of such malware is a strong indication the computer or network has been compromised.

Client Tools

During the course of a computer intrusion, malicious actors often download additional tools to victim systems for the purpose of evading local security measures and to compromise additional computers on victim networks. These tools might have legitimate uses, but, when combined with other indications of an intrusion, could indicate that the computer has been compromised. The presence of these tools alone is not necessarily a positive indication of malicious activity, but may enable an organization to identify malicious activity.
IP Addresses, Hostnames and Second-Level Domains

Malicious actors routinely compromise hosts on the Internet for the purpose of obscuring their activity, particularly the exfiltration of computer files from end-point victims. The majority of these compromised hosts have been configured to prevent identification of the source of the intrusion activity. The traffic from these hosts is generally legitimate, but, because they have been compromised, activity to and from these IPs should be reviewed for indications of malicious traffic.

Malicious actors also make use of numerous Internet hostnames for the purpose of compromising and controlling victim systems. Actors have been known to register second-level domains for their exclusive use in these activities. In addition, malicious actors have been known to use DNS providers that allow the use of specific hostnames that are part of shared second-level domains.

Many of these hostnames and domains may be legitimate hosts or domains that have been co-opted by malicious actors. Any number of the IP addresses or domains in this Bulletin may have been remediated prior to publication of this list. In some cases, a single IP address from this indicator list may represent hundreds or even thousands of legitimate independent websites, or may represent a small business network. A number of indicators contained in this Bulletin resolve back to large scale service providers whose services are being abused. For these reasons, outright blocking of these indicators is not recommended. Rather, traffic from these IPs or domains should be investigated for signs of compromise.

******************************
IP Address Awareness List
******************************

107[.]6[.]38[.]55
108[.]171[.]207[.]62
108[.]171[.]244[.]138
108[.]171[.]246[.]87
108[.]171[.]248[.]182
108[.]171[.]248[.]83
108[.]171[.]248[.]86
108[.]171[.]252[.]41
108[.]171[.]254[.]76
112[.]121[.]164[.]2
112[.]133[.]203[.]215
112[.]133[.]203[.]250
115[.]119[.]92[.]178
115[.]178[.]60[.]19
116[.]212[.]100[.]94
117[.]121[.]241[.]186
119[.]75[.]5[.]132
119[.]75[.]5[.]134
12[.]10[.]250[.]105
12[.]10[.]250[.]109
12[.]10[.]250[.]110
12[.]10[.]250[.]97
12[.]100[.]63[.]135
12[.]147[.]51[.]99
12[.]162[.]189[.]184
12[.]173[.]220[.]231
12[.]173[.]220[.]233
12[.]182[.]10[.]124
12[.]218[.]86[.]2
12[.]233[.]148[.]145
12[.]233[.]148[.]185
12[.]235[.]72[.]138
12[.]235[.]72[.]140
12[.]36[.]96[.]236
12[.]51[.]6[.]132
12[.]7[.]168[.]121
122[.]126[.]32[.]234
122[.]155[.]3[.]147
122[.]160[.]137[.]76
124[.]122[.]156[.]219
128[.]173[.]95[.]6
128[.]95[.]9[.]2
129[.]25[.]5[.]200
129[.]44[.]254[.]145
134[.]208[.]10[.]195
141[.]151[.]164[.]87
142[.]0[.]143[.]207
146[.]145[.]183[.]100
150[.]176[.]56[.]194
158[.]255[.]208[.]211
161[.]58[.]179[.]230
164[.]106[.]102[.]188
164[.]119[.]10[.]170
164[.]119[.]11[.]2
164[.]119[.]54[.]244
164[.]119[.]54[.]247
165[.]165[.]38[.]19
168[.]215[.]137[.]6
168[.]93[.]98[.]3
173[.]10[.]48[.]243
173[.]224[.]208[.]155
173[.]224[.]211[.]14
173[.]224[.]211[.]16
173[.]224[.]214[.]70
173[.]224[.]215[.]73
173[.]224[.]216[.]217
173[.]252[.]255[.]52
182[.]173[.]77[.]26
184[.]105[.]135[.]166
184[.]22[.]26[.]50
184[.]72[.]82[.]144
184[.]82[.]164[.]104
184[.]82[.]47[.]200
189[.]87[.]87[.]3
190[.]13[.]160[.]114
193[.]219[.]90[.]29
194[.]106[.]162[.]203
195[.]22[.]21[.]72
195[.]29[.]247[.]78
196[.]36[.]199[.]217
198[.]15[.]88[.]37
198[.]15[.]88[.]39
198[.]69[.]219[.]173
199[.]119[.]201[.]162
199[.]119[.]201[.]167
199[.]119[.]201[.]67
199[.]119[.]206[.]11
199[.]119[.]206[.]111
199[.]119[.]206[.]19
199[.]119[.]206[.]99
199[.]119[.]207[.]237
199[.]15[.]113[.]218
199[.]15[.]117[.]98
199[.]67[.]16[.]122
199[.]67[.]23[.]45
199[.]71[.]213[.]17
199[.]71[.]213[.]91
199[.]83[.]88[.]98
199[.]83[.]89[.]45
199[.]83[.]93[.]22
199[.]83[.]93[.]51
199[.]83[.]93[.]88
199[.]83[.]95[.]51
199[.]83[.]95[.]60
200[.]53[.]40[.]219
202[.]176[.]81[.]175
202[.]180[.]175[.]16
202[.]43[.]33[.]5
202[.]95[.]222[.]143
202[.]95[.]222[.]145
202[.]95[.]222[.]158
202[.]95[.]222[.]182
202[.]95[.]222[.]183
203[.]118[.]56[.]213
203[.]123[.]147[.]34
203[.]146[.]102[.]166
203[.]146[.]249[.]189
203[.]150[.]230[.]121
203[.]238[.]57[.]1
203[.]64[.]84[.]226
203[.]81[.]38[.]54
203[.]81[.]53[.]14
203[.]82[.]57[.]109
204[.]111[.]73[.]156
204[.]111[.]75[.]107
204[.]12[.]11[.]212
204[.]12[.]11[.]54
204[.]12[.]116[.]166
204[.]12[.]208[.]122
204[.]12[.]208[.]125
204[.]12[.]21[.]69
204[.]12[.]22[.]114
204[.]12[.]224[.]75
204[.]12[.]236[.]182
204[.]12[.]236[.]183
204[.]12[.]63[.]133
204[.]12[.]9[.]251
204[.]13[.]24[.]14
204[.]15[.]132[.]254
204[.]152[.]198[.]194
204[.]16[.]139[.]5
204[.]17[.]34[.]150
204[.]180[.]235[.]103
204[.]180[.]235[.]106
204[.]45[.]101[.]246
204[.]45[.]108[.]237
204[.]45[.]117[.]174
204[.]45[.]123[.]141
204[.]45[.]124[.]100
204[.]45[.]124[.]162
204[.]45[.]124[.]163
204[.]45[.]137[.]74
204[.]45[.]146[.]250
204[.]45[.]147[.]19
204[.]45[.]153[.]52
204[.]45[.]190[.]89
204[.]45[.]198[.]18
204[.]45[.]201[.]107
204[.]45[.]205[.]44
204[.]45[.]230[.]75
204[.]45[.]39[.]4
204[.]45[.]52[.]20
204[.]45[.]64[.]66
204[.]45[.]75[.]250
204[.]45[.]79[.]180
204[.]45[.]79[.]20
204[.]45[.]79[.]218
205[.]159[.]83[.]11
205[.]159[.]83[.]31
205[.]159[.]83[.]91
205[.]164[.]0[.]34
205[.]172[.]20[.]42
205[.]196[.]178[.]23
205[.]209[.]161[.]195
205[.]209[.]161[.]5
205[.]237[.]192[.]123
205[.]242[.]114[.]4
206[.]125[.]45[.]187
206[.]192[.]55[.]117
206[.]204[.]190[.]237
207[.]150[.]197[.]155
207[.]179[.]111[.]5
207[.]182[.]238[.]195
207[.]210[.]252[.]17
207[.]250[.]229[.]52
207[.]250[.]49[.]172
207[.]250[.]49[.]173
207[.]36[.]0[.]193
207[.]36[.]17[.]15
207[.]46[.]17[.]125
207[.]59[.]239[.]122
207[.]65[.]231[.]21
207[.]75[.]209[.]108
207[.]97[.]226[.]130
208[.]106[.]145[.]153
208[.]106[.]146[.]98
208[.]106[.]82[.]119
208[.]109[.]238[.]15
208[.]109[.]238[.]72
208[.]109[.]238[.]80
208[.]109[.]238[.]96
208[.]109[.]49[.]66
208[.]118[.]188[.]166
208[.]118[.]188[.]179
208[.]118[.]188[.]57
208[.]186[.]112[.]40
208[.]221[.]198[.]12
208[.]43[.]154[.]7
208[.]43[.]175[.]82
208[.]43[.]208[.]14
208[.]43[.]225[.]196
208[.]43[.]255[.]135
208[.]43[.]54[.]164
208[.]43[.]71[.]116
208[.]44[.]238[.]249
208[.]57[.]237[.]141
208[.]67[.]248[.]66
208[.]69[.]32[.]230
208[.]77[.]45[.]61
208[.]77[.]45[.]69
208[.]87[.]242[.]93
209[.]104[.]217[.]69
209[.]104[.]217[.]72
209[.]104[.]217[.]76
209[.]114[.]160[.]115
209[.]114[.]222[.]100
209[.]116[.]102[.]225
209[.]158[.]71[.]20
209[.]175[.]175[.]227
209[.]175[.]175[.]230
209[.]200[.]117[.]198
209[.]208[.]95[.]158
209[.]208[.]95[.]86
209[.]212[.]104[.]171
209[.]234[.]81[.]205
209[.]242[.]13[.]230
209[.]242[.]21[.]134
209[.]34[.]224[.]52
209[.]34[.]231[.]197
209[.]34[.]231[.]59
209[.]34[.]233[.]26
209[.]67[.]56[.]252
209[.]75[.]160[.]176
209[.]75[.]160[.]98
210[.]184[.]116[.]198
210[.]193[.]52[.]160
210[.]202[.]22[.]129
210[.]205[.]6[.]219
210[.]220[.]197[.]2
210[.]245[.]64[.]107
210[.]249[.]80[.]141
211[.]115[.]70[.]114
211[.]232[.]57[.]150
211[.]232[.]57[.]235
211[.]232[.]57[.]249
211[.]233[.]58[.]69
212[.]116[.]151[.]146
212[.]150[.]22[.]228
213[.]79[.]32[.]179
216[.]134[.]222[.]200
216[.]136[.]62[.]143
216[.]174[.]25[.]177
216[.]183[.]190[.]162
216[.]183[.]40[.]56
216[.]185[.]0[.]220
216[.]185[.]0[.]9
216[.]196[.]249[.]210
216[.]213[.]99[.]218
216[.]215[.]112[.]83
216[.]226[.]191[.]103
216[.]24[.]192[.]117
216[.]24[.]192[.]121
216[.]24[.]192[.]206
216[.]24[.]192[.]28
216[.]24[.]192[.]44
216[.]24[.]192[.]7
216[.]24[.]192[.]81
216[.]24[.]192[.]83
216[.]24[.]192[.]95
216[.]24[.]196[.]113
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216[.]24[.]198[.]20
216[.]24[.]199[.]243
216[.]24[.]199[.]62
216[.]24[.]200[.]180
216[.]24[.]201[.]166
216[.]24[.]201[.]198
216[.]24[.]203[.]58
216[.]24[.]204[.]124
216[.]24[.]205[.]30
216[.]24[.]205[.]36
216[.]24[.]205[.]69
216[.]36[.]123[.]12
216[.]68[.]165[.]14
216[.]83[.]42[.]66
216[.]9[.]65[.]6
216[.]99[.]146[.]18
216[.]99[.]148[.]18
217[.]20[.]138[.]42
217[.]22[.]119[.]13
217[.]23[.]9[.]215
218[.]233[.]206[.]2
218[.]234[.]17[.]30
218[.]234[.]21[.]219
220[.]68[.]224[.]116
222[.]231[.]46[.]51
24[.]120[.]244[.]9
24[.]123[.]91[.]130
24[.]123[.]91[.]198
24[.]123[.]91[.]206
24[.]123[.]91[.]6
24[.]123[.]91[.]70
24[.]123[.]91[.]98
24[.]129[.]188[.]158
24[.]172[.]220[.]130
24[.]173[.]220[.]130
24[.]173[.]34[.]139
24[.]199[.]240[.]74
24[.]227[.]145[.]210
24[.]248[.]197[.]112
24[.]249[.]191[.]150
24[.]39[.]42[.]50
24[.]39[.]5[.]85
24[.]43[.]98[.]12
24[.]73[.]123[.]50
24[.]96[.]236[.]182
24[.]97[.]167[.]250
27[.]254[.]34[.]246
38[.]104[.]203[.]222
38[.]104[.]203[.]242
38[.]107[.]179[.]5
4[.]22[.]103[.]26
59[.]116[.]133[.]122
59[.]12[.]137[.]111
59[.]12[.]137[.]146
59[.]12[.]137[.]148
59[.]12[.]137[.]149
59[.]12[.]137[.]150
59[.]12[.]137[.]181
59[.]12[.]137[.]182
59[.]12[.]137[.]183
59[.]12[.]137[.]194
59[.]120[.]140[.]156
59[.]120[.]199[.]82
60[.]51[.]214[.]129
61[.]19[.]248[.]201
61[.]19[.]248[.]203
61[.]218[.]191[.]55
61[.]218[.]191[.]60
61[.]219[.]136[.]132
61[.]72[.]144[.]248
61[.]78[.]60[.]130
62[.]2[.]205[.]146
62[.]244[.]209[.]98
63[.]102[.]52[.]138
63[.]105[.]34[.]53
63[.]105[.]34[.]59
63[.]126[.]12[.]3
63[.]134[.]215[.]111
63[.]134[.]215[.]34
63[.]139[.]221[.]10
63[.]139[.]45[.]83
63[.]147[.]185[.]60
63[.]147[.]31[.]177
63[.]149[.]11[.]233
63[.]149[.]120[.]135
63[.]150[.]10[.]200
63[.]175[.]119[.]46
63[.]200[.]116[.]50
63[.]202[.]58[.]43
63[.]209[.]10[.]247
63[.]224[.]141[.]199
63[.]64[.]153[.]68
63[.]73[.]10[.]131
63[.]73[.]11[.]12
63[.]73[.]11[.]6
63[.]84[.]30[.]211
63[.]86[.]122[.]121
63[.]93[.]109[.]217
63[.]97[.]151[.]230
64[.]124[.]105[.]75
64[.]14[.]253[.]120
64[.]151[.]127[.]68
64[.]151[.]127[.]70
64[.]198[.]120[.]50
64[.]2[.]115[.]238
64[.]222[.]187[.]237
64[.]233[.]222[.]39
64[.]28[.]82[.]36
64[.]3[.]53[.]146
64[.]3[.]53[.]148
64[.]30[.]223[.]147
64[.]45[.]251[.]11
64[.]5[.]38[.]17
64[.]52[.]255[.]20
64[.]6[.]188[.]250
64[.]6[.]188[.]253
64[.]62[.]136[.]154
64[.]62[.]136[.]157
64[.]73[.]238[.]72
64[.]8[.]114[.]123
64[.]80[.]153[.]108
64[.]85[.]177[.]5
64[.]85[.]19[.]6
64[.]88[.]7[.]113
64[.]9[.]204[.]233
65[.]107[.]54[.]151
65[.]114[.]166[.]37
65[.]14[.]25[.]67
65[.]183[.]217[.]55
65[.]49[.]145[.]3
65[.]66[.]118[.]57
65[.]89[.]156[.]126
65[.]97[.]169[.]210
66[.]0[.]135[.]16
66[.]109[.]21[.]182
66[.]111[.]37[.]26
66[.]116[.]58[.]230
66[.]124[.]120[.]193
66[.]129[.]222[.]10
66[.]139[.]186[.]199
66[.]140[.]144[.]70
66[.]153[.]20[.]170
66[.]159[.]250[.]224
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66[.]181[.]65[.]4
66[.]197[.]231[.]160
66[.]197[.]242[.]218
66[.]197[.]242[.]221
66[.]197[.]242[.]222
66[.]199[.]231[.]210
66[.]199[.]231[.]243
66[.]202[.]107[.]117
66[.]202[.]29[.]73
66[.]220[.]10[.]72
66[.]220[.]10[.]93
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66[.]228[.]114[.]54
66[.]235[.]214[.]66
66[.]35[.]32[.]70
66[.]36[.]28[.]222
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66[.]52[.]140[.]13
66[.]55[.]14[.]77
66[.]59[.]109[.]179
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66[.]92[.]181[.]123
66[.]92[.]241[.]200
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67[.]102[.]105[.]76
67[.]102[.]7[.]4
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67[.]222[.]165[.]4
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67[.]77[.]204[.]97
67[.]91[.]212[.]115
67[.]93[.]1[.]197
67[.]93[.]1[.]204
67[.]93[.]1[.]228
67[.]93[.]15[.]229
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67[.]93[.]15[.]240
67[.]93[.]16[.]219
67[.]93[.]255[.]249
67[.]93[.]3[.]3
67[.]93[.]30[.]146
67[.]93[.]30[.]189
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67[.]93[.]4[.]71
67[.]93[.]4[.]72
67[.]93[.]4[.]89
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67[.]93[.]54[.]98
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69[.]2[.]71[.]205
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69[.]20[.]20[.]129
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69[.]20[.]57[.]71
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69[.]57[.]60[.]42
69[.]68[.]56[.]35
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69[.]94[.]69[.]101
70[.]166[.]13[.]132
70[.]166[.]13[.]148
70[.]168[.]88[.]230
70[.]85[.]134[.]234
70[.]86[.]77[.]114
70[.]89[.]213[.]145
70[.]89[.]213[.]181
70[.]89[.]213[.]201
70[.]89[.]213[.]22
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70[.]89[.]213[.]241
70[.]89[.]213[.]249
70[.]89[.]213[.]66
70[.]90[.]53[.]170
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72[.]148[.]171[.]41
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74[.]117[.]60[.]141
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74[.]117[.]63[.]250
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74[.]52[.]63[.]138
75[.]146[.]252[.]217
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75[.]148[.]254[.]115
75[.]149[.]183[.]228
75[.]52[.]111[.]62
75[.]77[.]82[.]225
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75[.]77[.]82[.]70
76[.]12[.]37[.]97
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76[.]164[.]171[.]6
76[.]76[.]146[.]89
76[.]76[.]54[.]137
8[.]4[.]112[.]2
82[.]165[.]181[.]105
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87[.]229[.]126[.]60
89[.]175[.]175[.]186
89[.]175[.]175[.]187
89[.]175[.]175[.]188
93[.]152[.]156[.]106
96[.]10[.]19[.]210
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96[.]47[.]232[.]161
96[.]57[.]145[.]11
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98[.]126[.]0[.]12
98[.]126[.]0[.]163
98[.]126[.]10[.]124
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98[.]126[.]106[.]19
98[.]126[.]114[.]4
98[.]126[.]15[.]250
98[.]126[.]18[.]74
98[.]126[.]18[.]82
98[.]126[.]18[.]83
98[.]126[.]19[.]163
98[.]126[.]203[.]45
98[.]126[.]21[.]116
98[.]126[.]25[.]35
98[.]126[.]28[.]245
98[.]126[.]3[.]235
98[.]126[.]3[.]236
98[.]126[.]3[.]237
98[.]126[.]41[.]178
98[.]126[.]5[.]35
98[.]126[.]6[.]104
98[.]126[.]6[.]105
98[.]126[.]66[.]147
98[.]126[.]68[.]186
98[.]126[.]7[.]220
98[.]126[.]7[.]250
98[.]126[.]7[.]251
98[.]126[.]91[.]27
98[.]126[.]97[.]197
99[.]13[.]110[.]214
99[.]4[.]102[.]249

******************************
Domain Name Awareness List
******************************

a-af[.]arrowservice[.]net
able[.]arrowservice[.]net
a-cl[.]arrowservice[.]net
a-dl[.]arrowservice[.]net
admin[.]arrowservice[.]net
adtkl[.]bigish[.]net
adtkl[.]gmailboxes[.]com
a-ep[.]arrowservice[.]net
a-ex[.]arrowservice[.]net
a-f[.]gmailboxes[.]com
afghanistan[.]toutges[.]us
aga[.]toh[.]info
a-gon[.]arrowservice[.]net
a-he[.]arrowservice[.]net
a-if[.]arrowservice[.]net
a-iho[.]arrowservice[.]net
aiic[.]arrowservice[.]net
a-ip[.]arrowservice[.]net
ait[.]busketball[.]com
alarm[.]arrowservice[.]net
amne[.]purpledaily[.]com
ams[.]busketball[.]com
a-ne[.]arrowservice[.]net
anglo[.]arrowservice[.]net
aol[.]arrowservice[.]net
a-ol[.]arrowservice[.]net
apejack[.]bigish[.]net
a-pep[.]arrowservice[.]net
a-rdr[.]arrowservice[.]net
arm[.]armed[.]us
ascn[.]arrowservice[.]net
asp[.]arrowservice[.]net
asp[.]busketball[.]com
a-te[.]arrowservice[.]net
atom[.]busketball[.]com
atomic[.]bigish[.]net
a-uac[.]arrowservice[.]net
auto[.]gmailboxes[.]com
a-za[.]arrowservice[.]net
backsun[.]busketball[.]com
barity[.]gmailboxes[.]com
bass[.]busketball[.]com
bbs[.]busketball[.]com
bbs[.]marsbrother[.]com
bda[.]arrowservice[.]net
blacman[.]busketball[.]com
blog[.]arrowservice[.]net
blog[.]busketball[.]com
bring[.]busketball[.]com
built[.]arrowservice[.]net
busketball[.]com
buycow[.]busketball[.]com
buyer[.]arrowservice[.]net
buywater[.]busketball[.]com
bwbc[.]bigish[.]net
center[.]arrowservice[.]net
chamus[.]gmailboxes[.]com
cirfsun[.]gmailboxes[.]com
city[.]gmailboxes[.]com
class[.]arrowservice[.]net
cleanbeef[.]gmailboxes[.]com
cliffkl[.]gmailboxes[.]com
cmf[.]busketball[.]com
cmf[.]gmailboxes[.]com
cmp[.]gmailboxes[.]com
contact[.]arrowservice[.]net
contact[.]bigish[.]net
corn[.]busketball[.]com
cov[.]arrowservice[.]net
covclient[.]arrowservice[.]net
cow[.]arrowservice[.]net
cowboy[.]bigish[.]net
crab[.]arrowservice[.]net
ctimoon[.]marsbrother[.]com
ctisu[.]bigish[.]net
ctisun[.]gmailboxes[.]com
ctx[.]bigish[.]net
ctx-na[.]purpledaily[.]com
cws[.]gmailboxes[.]com
date[.]gmailboxes[.]com
dec[.]globalsecuriy[.]org
default[.]arrowservice[.]net
demavda[.]arrowservice[.]net
diaup[.]gmailboxes[.]com
diplomatism[.]nsmp[.]ru
documents[.]busketball[.]com
domain[.]arrowservice[.]net
domain[.]busketball[.]com
dowjs[.]busketball[.]com
dowjs[.]gmailboxes[.]com
download[.]gmailboxes[.]com
downupdate[.]bigish[.]net
dowph[.]bigish[.]net
drb[.]arrowservice[.]net
drinkwater[.]gmailboxes[.]com
eatbeef[.]gmailboxes[.]com
eciie[.]marsbrother[.]com
ecliar[.]marsbrother[.]com
eclimx[.]marsbrother[.]com
ecli-mxcdb[.]arrowservice[.]net
ecli-newf[.]marsbrother[.]com
ecli-noa[.]marsbrother[.]com
ecli-tda[.]marsbrother[.]com
ecli-tmp[.]marsbrother[.]com
ecli-un[.]marsbrother[.]com
eshop[.]gmailboxes[.]com
ever[.]arrowservice[.]net
fbtel[.]gmailboxes[.]com
finekl[.]bigish[.]net
fme[.]busketball[.]com
fmp[.]bigish[.]net
fn[.]bigish[.]net
follow[.]purpledaily[.]com
food[.]busketball[.]com
foreignpolicy[.]zonet[.]us
free[.]gmailboxes[.]com
frickl[.]purpledaily[.]com
friends[.]arrowservice[.]net
fsol[.]businessformars[.]com
ftel[.]businessformars[.]com
gao[.]gaokew[.]com
gatu[.]arrowservice[.]net
gg[.]arrowservice[.]net
gl[.]gmailboxes[.]com
glj[.]purpledaily[.]com
gmailboxes[.]com
happy[.]arrowservice[.]net
help[.]gmailboxes[.]com
hill[.]arrowservice[.]net
home[.]arrowservice[.]net
honeywater[.]keren[.]la
host[.]arrowservice[.]net
house[.]gmailboxes[.]com
index[.]arrowservice[.]net
info[.]bigish[.]net
info[.]hj-spa[.]com
information[.]trickip[.]org
int[.]busketball[.]com
intel[.]busketball[.]com
intel[.]gmailboxes[.]com
invest[.]gmailboxes[.]com
itlove[.]bigish[.]net
jackhouse[.]bigish[.]net
junier[.]busketball[.]com
kbwfj[.]arrowservice[.]net
klbis[.]bigish[.]net
kl-hqun[.]gmailboxes[.]com
kllhd[.]bigish[.]net
klwest[.]purpledaily[.]com
klzafin[.]bigish[.]net
loading[.]bigish[.]net
love[.]arrowservice[.]net
love[.]busketball[.]com
lovecow[.]homenet[.]org
lovewater[.]now[.]im
mail[.]bigish[.]net
mail[.]gmailboxes[.]com
mail-na[.]businessformars[.]com
main[.]busketball[.]com
main[.]gmailboxes[.]com
max[.]arrowservice[.]net
mbc[.]busketball[.]com
mc[.]bigish[.]net
me[.]busketball[.]com
micyuisyahooapis[.]com
midstate[.]arrowservice[.]net
milk[.]arrowservice[.]net
mini[.]arrowservice[.]net
miss[.]pwnz[.]org
mko[.]busketball[.]com
mkx[.]arrowservice[.]net
mkx[.]gmailboxes[.]com
monewf[.]bigish[.]net
monlc[.]marsbrother[.]com
mos[.]arrowservice[.]net
moto[.]busketball[.]com
mpe[.]arrowservice[.]net
msdn[.]bigish[.]net
new[.]arrowservice[.]net
newfe[.]purpledaily[.]com
news[.]busketball[.]com
newspappers[.]org
nokkia[.]bigish[.]net
nousage[.]arrowservice[.]net
nrcod[.]arrowservice[.]net
oliver[.]arrowservice[.]net
omin[.]marsbrother[.]com
ope[.]coastmaritime[.]org
opp[.]coastmaritime[.]org
opp[.]globalsecuriy[.]org
orca[.]arrowservice[.]net
paekl[.]gmailboxes[.]com
pdns[.]info[.]tm
phb[.]arrowservice[.]net
pieckl[.]bigish[.]net
point[.]gmailboxes[.]com
ppt[.]arrowservice[.]net
ppt[.]ezua[.]com
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Malware Indicator Awareness List
******************************

MD5 Checksum

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IP Address Awareness List
******************************

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Domain Name Awareness List
******************************

advanbusiness[.]com
aoldaily[.]com
applesoftupdate[.]com
arrowservice[.]net
articles[.]twilightparadox[.]com
aunewsonline[.]com
bechtel[.]chickenkiller[.]com
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Video Skid – Monty Python – Lion Tamer

 

Declassified – China May Have Helped Pakistan Nuclear Weapons Design

CIA in 1977 Correctly Estimated South Africa Could Produce Enough Weapons-Grade Uranium “to Make Several Nuclear Devices Per Year”

Report on the Libyan Nuclear Program Found that “Serious Deficiencies,” “Poor Leadership” and Lack of “Coherent Planning” Made it “Highly Unlikely to Achieve a Nuclear Weapons Capability “Within the Next 10 years”

Intelligence Estimates on Argentina and Brazil Raised Questions About Their Nuclear Programs and Whether they Sought a Weapons Capability

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 423

Khushab plutonium production reactor, Pakistan, 1998 (Photo from spaceimaging.com, courtesy of Institute for Science and International Security)

Washington, D.C., May 2, 2013 – China was exporting nuclear materials to Third World countries without safeguards beginning in the early 1980s, and may have given Pakistan weapons design information in the early years of its clandestine program, according to recently declassified CIA records. The formerly Top Secret reports, published today by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, are the CIA’s first-ever declassifications of allegations that Beijing supported Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions.

The newly released records, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and Mandatory Declassification Review process, indicate growing U.S. concern from the 1960s to the early 1990s about the intentions of other embryonic or potential nuclear states, including Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and Libya. Among the disclosures in these reports:

  • A 1966 estimate discussed what would become an important problem: the possibility of “covert” nuclear programs and the prospect that a “country could go far toward a weapons program” under the disguise of a “peaceful program.”
  • On South Africa, a 1977 CIA analysis of the uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba included the estimate that South Africa would be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium “to make several nuclear devices per year.”
  • According to a 1982 estimate, nuclear proliferation could become a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years.” Nuclear R&D alone, without producing any weapons, could contribute to regional instability and the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.”
  • In 1981, U.S. intelligence became aware of a “secret nuclear facility” at Pilcaniyeu that the Argentines later announced was a uranium enrichment (gaseous diffusion) pilot plant.
  • A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) prepared after the 1982 Argentine-British conflict over the Falkland Islands professed “great uncertainty” over Argentina’s nuclear intentions: “emotionally” the Argentine military leadership was interested in a weapons option, but it had “reduced capability to fulfill this desire.” By 1985, uncertainty had passed: U.S. intelligence believed that Argentina had no program to develop nuclear weapons.
  • According to the estimates on Brazil, the leaders of the nuclear establishment sought to “keep … options open to develop a nuclear weapons capability.” The 1985 estimate asserted that the prominent role of the Brazilian military in nuclear activities, “the direction of Brazil’s nuclear r&d,” and the “reputation” of the National Nuclear Energy Commission’s president for “favoring a nuclear option” all posed a “danger to US interests.”
  • A report on Indian efforts to purchase nuclear-related supplies in world markets described it as a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls” over sensitive technologies. Japan and Western Europe resisted U.S. pressure by arguing that “they will be replaced by the Soviets in the Indian market if they are curtailed.”
  • The analysis of the Libyan nuclear program was severe: the program’s “serious deficiencies,” including “poor leadership” and the lack of both “coherent planning” and trained personnel made it “highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years.”
Image of South African nuclear facilities near Pretoria in 1991. The uranium enrichment plant at Valindiba is indicated as the Y-Plant. (Courtesy of Institute for Science and International Security and http://www.terraform.com)

Since its inception, the U.S. intelligence community has been investigating and analyzing overseas nuclear activities, whether explicitly weapons-oriented or simply suspicious.[1] At the heart of the earliest effort was the monitoring of the former Soviet Union and its European allies for signs of a weapons program. Beginning in the late 1950s, however with concern about France, China, Israel, and other countries mounting, the Central Intelligence Agency began to focus on global trends. While the CIA has declassified dozens of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on the former Soviet Union and its nuclear forces, NIEs and other detailed reports on proliferation issues have been relatively scarce, especially for the 1970s and 1980s, and often heavily excised. Nevertheless, the Agency has been taking a more forthcoming approach to nuclear proliferation intelligence and the releases are significant. NIEs have had the reputation, sometimes disputed, of being the most authoritative intelligence product on a given topic and their declassification is important for understanding how the intelligence establishment understood this problem during various time periods. [2]

These intelligence estimates alert us to the challenge of interpreting the motives of other countries. Some of the estimates present a rather pessimistic view of the future of the nuclear nonproliferation system, raising questions about the intentions of countries that did not actually seek a nuclear weapons option. With more information available from overseas archives and other sources it is becoming possible to evaluate the acuity of U.S. intelligence analysis for understanding nuclear motivations. For example, new sources in Brazil indicate that the country’s leadership did not want a weapons capability but aimed instead for major accomplishments in advanced technology. Like Iran today, Brazil had initiated a gas centrifuge program (although without the international opprobrium). Nevertheless, the NIEs pointed to a “determination” to have a weapons option, although it also more accurately cited the quest for technological progress. Indeed, Brazil and Argentina, another suspect country, eventually signed off on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty despite longstanding objections (which persist in Brazil). Determining the intentions of the leadership in such countries as Iran and North Korea remains a continuing and important challenge because the outcome will have profound implications for the future of the nonproliferation system. Declassified NIEs can serve as a primary source data set for illuminating contemporary proliferation controversies and for drawing lessons from earlier ones.

Except for a few items, the CIA released these documents as a result of Freedom of Information and mandatory declassification review requests by the National Security Archive. Some of the estimates appear on the CIA FOIA Web site and the editor of this posting requested a new review to see if more information would be declassified. In some cases, that happened: the CIA released more details, for example, on Argentina and Brazil. In some instances, as in Pakistan, the CIA released no new information and the estimates are under appeal. Other pending requests and appeals, if successful, will illuminate CIA and intelligence community perspectives on the problem of nuclear proliferation.


THE DOCUMENTS

Document 1: “Covert Programs”

National Intelligence Estimate, “The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation,” NIE 4-66, 20 January 1966, Secret, Excised copy, released on appeal by Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel

This estimate, previously released in massively excised form, updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern-predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Sweden was also in the “might” category, although the estimators acknowledged the strong opposition of public opinion to a weapons program. Why Israel was in the “might” category, even though it would have weapons by mid-1967, must have reflected debate among U.S. government experts as to the purposes of the Dimona reactor.

The estimate ruled out nuclear programs by a number of countries (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, etc.) for the “foreseeable future,” while it found that other countries “warranted more detailed discussion” because their “incentives” could be strong enough to acquire nuclear weapons in the next 10 years. In addition to India, Israel, and Sweden, these included Japan and South Africa, among others. For plausible reasons (lack of incentive and ample disincentives) the estimate ruled out Italy from the second list, but it is worth noting that in early 1967 its top officials were so angry about the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that they briefly debated whether to initiate a national nuclear weapons program. [3]

A short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggested that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear. The snowball effect could be limited by various considerations; for example, if close allies such as Japan or West Germany felt the pressure, they were less likely to go nuclear if the United States “strongly opposed” it. An interesting but heavily excised section on “The Detection of Covert Programs” is the first time that an NIE on nuclear proliferation addressed this problem at length, although the possibility had long been known. This section includes deletions on intelligence capabilities and U.S. efforts to inspect Israel’s Dimona reactor. In this connection, the estimate treated the “ultracentrifuge process” as a “feasible” source of weapons-grade uranium where an enrichment plant could be “built and operated without attracting attention.” Unlike some of the earlier estimates, there is little discussion of adverse consequences of nuclear proliferation; no doubt by 1966, the drafters of this estimate assumed that its readers recognized that the implications were harmful to U.S. interests and there was no need to belabor the point.

Document 2: National Intelligence Estimate, “French Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities,” NIE 22-68, 31 December 1968, Secret, excised copy, released under appeal

The French nuclear program had been of great concern to U.S. presidents during the 1960s because Paris had defied U.S. pressure and was also suspected of supporting proliferation by aiding the Israeli nuclear program. This recently declassified estimate, prepared at the close of the Johnson administration, gives a picture of a program that was slowing down because of internal financial and economic problems, in part by the impact of the May 1968 student and worker uprising. While President Charles de Gaulle saw a nuclear arsenal as indispensable for “great-power status,” the plans for bomber, missile, and submarine-launched delivery systems were difficult to realize. Even the bomber force that was in place could only undertake one-way missions to Soviet targets. Despite the heavy excisions in the section on nuclear weapons, it comes across that the French had not yet produced a deliverable thermonuclear weapon. Although the French had provided Israel with a small nuclear reactor in the 1950s, the estimators did not believe that they would take further action to abet nuclear weapons proliferation, yet the sale of advanced delivery capabilities was not ruled out “if the price was right.”

The document hinted at the possibility of special arrangements with the United States to get “US nuclear know-how,” but De Gaulle would reject any quid pro quo that involved external control of French forces. The same would be true of any continental nuclear arrangements, for example, special cooperation with West Germany; DeGaulle would insist on “French control” of the weapons. Within a few years, the Nixon administration would begin to provide secret aid to the French nuclear weapons program, beginning first with assistance to missile systems, but no information on a quid pro quo has surfaced.

Documents 3A-B: China and Nuclear Proliferation

A: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, Central Intelligence Agency, to Christine Dodson, National Security Council, 7 December 1979, enclosing report, “A Review of the Evidence of Chinese Involvement in Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” 7 December 1979, Top Secret, Excised Copy

B: Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Chinese Policy and Practices Regarding Sensitive Nuclear Transfers,” SNIE 13/32-83, 20 January 1983, Top Secret, Excised Copy

Nuclear proliferation issues posed a sensitive problem in the early development of U.S.-China relations. With nuclear proliferation a policy priority for the Jimmy Carter administration, and Pakistan already a special concern, the possibility that China and Pakistan were sharing nuclear weapons-related information began worry U.S. government officials. They had no hard evidence–and the soft evidence that concerned them is massively excised in the December 1979 report just as Beijing and Washington were normalizing relations-so the “precise nature and extent of this cooperation is uncertain.” These concerns did not go away during the Reagan administration. While nuclear proliferation was not a top priority, the administration was apprehensive about the implications of the spread of nuclear capabilities and that China may have been aiding and abetting some potential proliferators by selling unsafeguarded nuclear materials. That China was selling nuclear materials to meet national objectives (hard currency earnings, etc.) and flouting international standards, however, did not mean that it was intent upon supporting further nuclear proliferation.

On Pakistan specifically, the CIA had evidence suggesting close Chinese nuclear cooperation, to the point of facilitating a nuclear weapons capability, although the intelligence community saw this as possibly a special case based on an alliance that had existed since 1963. This allegation has come up before, for example in a State Department document and in major news stories but this is the first time the CIA has released some of its own information. [4] The estimate highlights some of the main developments, including “verbal consent [in 1974] to help Pakistan develop a ‘nuclear blast’ capability”, “hedged and conditional commitment” in 1976 to provide nuclear weapons technology, and unspecified excised information that raised the “possibility that China has provided a fairly comprehensive package of proven nuclear weapon design information.” The exchanges may not have been one-way and the reference to Chinese “involvement” in Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program probably refers to gas centrifuge technology, which Pakistan shared with the Chinese. [5] Significant portions of the document covering technology sharing are excised, but more may be learned if additional details are released under appeal.

Document 4: A “Greater Threat to US Interests”

National Intelligence Estimate, “Nuclear Proliferation Trends Through 1987,” NIE-4-82, July 1982, Secret, Excised copy, under appeal

This pessimistic appraisal portrayed a deeply troubled nonproliferation regime, with “the development of small nuclear forces … increasingly feasible,” declining confidence in International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and research and development programs exacerbating regional tensions. With proliferation becoming a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years,” intelligence analysts believed that the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.” While the estimators saw “low potential” for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of terrorist/extortionist hoaxes was on the upswing.

Significant portions of the NIE are excised, especially the estimate of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its impact in the Middle East. Nevertheless, much information remains on the countries of greatest concern: Iraq and Libya in the Near East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as those of lesser concern: Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and the two Koreas. The title of the last section, “Implications for U.S.-Soviet relations” suggests that the analysts saw the nuclear proliferation problem in largely cold war terms.

While describing suspect nuclear activity in a number of countries, the estimate provided little evidence of intentions. For example, Argentina was “unlikely” to try to test a device in the next five years and the incentives to do so were weak, but beginning in 1984 it could potentially produce one to four weapons a year using safeguarded plutonium. But whether Argentina was likely to make a decision to build weapons is not discussed (but see documents 5A-B).

On Pakistan, a state where evidence of intentions was strong, the estimate found that by the end of 1986 it “could accumulate five to ten enriched uranium implosion weapons” and five to ten plutonium weapons. Yet this projection was highly exaggerated because Pakistan would barely have one weapon in 1987 and did not have a truly deliverable weapon (by fighter jet) until 1995. Plainly the Pakistani nuclear effort was less efficient than the estimators recognized but this report does not get into the nuts and bolts of program efficiency. [6]

On one crucial point there may have been a misunderstanding. The estimate identified the Iraqi nuclear reactor project destroyed by an Israeli attack in 1981 as having a “plutonium production capability.” Yet recent research indicates that the French had taken action to ensure that the reactor had low value as a plutonium producer; that the reactor would have been under IAEA safeguards; and that French technicians were staffing the project to prevent untoward uses. Nevertheless, the estimate correctly suggests that the Israeli attack had been a counter-proliferation failure by raising Iraq’s determination: it “[increased the] desire for secrecy in attempting to acquire nuclear-related assistance from foreign sources.” [7]

Documents 5A-C: Argentina

A: Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Argentina’s Nuclear Policies in Light of the Falkland’s Defeat,” SNIE 91-2-82, 1 September 1982, Secret, Excised copy, under appeal

B: Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Argentina’s Nuclear Policies Under Alfonsin,” SNIE 91/3-84, 31 July 1984, Secret, Excised copy, under appeal

C: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “Argentina: Seeking Nuclear Independence: An Intelligence Assessment,” September 1985, Secret, excised copy

Source: CIA CREST Database, National Archives II, College Park, MD

Argentina, like its neighbor, Brazil, was determined to develop an “independent nuclear fuel cycle,” with the capacity to reprocess plutonium and enrich uranium. Also like Brazil, Argentina was one of the few Latin American countries to refuse to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Thus, Argentina’s nuclear activities were under routine scrutiny to see if they involved anything that suggested an interest in a weapons capability. U.S. intelligence agencies continued to monitor developments but perspectives shifted as Argentina’s domestic politics evolved. Prepared after the Argentine-British conflict over the Falklands Islands, in which Washington helped London, this special estimate professed “great uncertainty” over Argentina’s nuclear intentions. While “emotionally” the Argentine military leadership was interested in a weapons option, it had “reduced capability to fulfill this desire.” Nevertheless, rightly or wrongly, the intelligence establishment assumed that the leadership had “carefully reserved an option to develop nuclear weapons.” [8] Therefore, if the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) decided to implement the option, it had two “plausible” routes for securing plutonium: 1) diverting spent fuel from a safeguarded reactor, or 2) diverting spent fuel from an unsafeguarded reactor that was in the works.

The 1982 estimate does not mention the gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment project at Pilcaniyeu, which the Argentines began in 1978 when the Carter administration cut off sales of enriched uranium to countries refusing to sign the NPT. Nevertheless, according to the 1985 report (Document 5C), in 1981 U.S. intelligence became aware of a “secret nuclear facility.” As military rule was collapsing in November 1983, the outgoing head of the Atomic Energy Commission, Vice Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, announced the achievement of an enrichment capability and the Pilcaniyeu plant became known to the world.

Almost two years later military rule had collapsed and a democratically-elected government led by Raul Alfonsin was taking an unambiguous stand on nuclear weapons. In its 1984 assessment, the intelligence community was more certain about Argentina’s nuclear policies: “on the basis of discernible evidence … Argentina does not have a program to develop or test nuclear explosives.” Nevertheless, Alfonsin was unlikely to change “Argentina’s long-term efforts to achieve its goal of acquiring a full range of nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities.” Consistent with this, the military–which still played a central role in the nuclear energy program–was “likely to continue its involvement in some of the most sensitive nuclear programs, including uranium enrichment and reprocessing.” Despite the CNEA claim that it had developed a capability to enrich uranium, the estimate could not confirm that “indigenous equipment has functioned successfully.

A year later, the CIA was still more definite about Argentine capabilities. According to the 1985 report, the Argentines “have achieved at least a proof of principle of uranium enrichment via gaseous diffusion.” In other words, they had a workable system. Nevertheless, the enrichment plant would not be “fully operational until 1987-1988.” While the assessment of Argentine interest in nuclear weapons did not change, CIA analysts asserted that “Argentina continues to develop the necessary facilities and capabilities that could support a nuclear weapons development effort.”

Documents 6A-C: Brazil

A: Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints,” SNIE 93-83, 21 October 1983, Secret, excised copy[9]

B: Special National Intelligence Estimate, Memorandum to Holders, “Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints,” SNIE 93-83, December 1985, Secret, excised copy

C: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “President Sarney and Brazil’s Nuclear Policy,” 8 September 1986, Secret, Excised copy.

Source: CREST, National Archives

Brazilian nationalism has often posed a challenge to U.S. official precepts on the way the world should work and these estimates convey the deep Brasilia-Washington gap over nuclear policy during the 1980s. SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to U.S. or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities.

Even though Brazil had cut back its civilian nuclear program and had virtually withdrawn from the controversial agreement with West Germany, the military services were going ahead with a variety of secret nuclear R&D projects which are described but excised in the two reports. For example, the Nuclear Energy Research Institute [Portuguese acronym, IPEN] role in developing gas centrifuge technology is spelled out, but any information on its purposes is excised. While it sought to produce nuclear submarine reactor fuel, it will not be clear whether the CIA knew until more information is declassified. Less than a year after the 1985 SNIE, the IPEN centrifuges had successfully enriched uranium, but whether the CIA was aware how close it was to success remains to be learned. The 1985 SNIE predicted the requisite capabilities for developing nuclear weapons by 1990. [10]

On the key issues of nuclear weapons and capabilities, both reports assume that a decision had not been made. Nevertheless, the estimates portray leaders of the nuclear establishment as wishing to “keep … options open to develop a nuclear weapons capability.” Indeed, Brazil’s refusal to sign the NPT and the insistence that the Treaty of Tlalelolco permitted PNEs [peaceful nuclear explosives] “demonstrates a determination … to preserve a nuclear weapons option.” U.S. intelligence analysts saw this as worrisome: according to the 1985 report the prominent role of the military in nuclear activities, “the direction of Brazil’s nuclear r&d,” and the CNEN president’s “reputation of favoring a nuclear option” posed a “danger to US interests in Brazil.” But the alleged interest in a nuclear weapons option was probably overstated in light of recent research that indicates that Brazilian leaders were not thinking in those terms.[11]

A Directorate of Intelligence analysis, prepared later the following year, provides an interesting contrast with excisions in the NIEs on the indigenous program; it includes details on the major Navy, Air Force, and Army components of the indigenous program, including the nuclear submarine objective. As with the NIEs, the authors of this report saw no “political decision” on nuclear weapons and further noted President Sarney’s public statements against a weapons program. But a piece of political intelligence initially excised from this report suggested, rightly or wrongly, that Sarney may have been personally ambivalent.

Documents 7A-B: India

A: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Assessment, “India’s Nuclear Program: Energy and Weapons,” July 1982, Top Secret, excised copy, under appeal

B: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” December 1982, Secret, excised copy

Source: CREST, National Archives

This massively excised report indicates the Agency’s strong views about releasing its knowledge of India’s nuclear weapons activities, even when the information is decades old. That many of the pages are classified “Top Secret Umbra” suggests that some of the information draws on communications intelligence intercepts, another highly sensitive matter. A CIA report on India produced a few months later, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” has comparatively fewer excisions. It discusses in some detail Indian efforts to support its nuclear power and nuclear weapons development program by circumventing international controls through purchases of sensitive technology on “gray markets.” The report depicts a “growing crisis in the Indian civil nuclear program,” which combined with meeting nuclear weapons development goals, was forcing India to expand imports of nuclear-related supplies. The purchasing activities posed a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls.”

Document 8: Pakistan

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Research Paper, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Personnel and Organizations,” November 1985, Top Secret, Excised copy, under appeal

This heavily excised report on the “well-educated committed cadre” that managed the Pakistani nuclear program demonstrates how the CIA protects its intelligence on Pakistani nuclear activities. This is the same version of the report that can be found on the Agency’s FOIA Web page; the recent version includes no new information. Details on Khan Research Laboratories and the gas centrifuge program are entirely withheld, but some information is made available on the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission and the Directorate of Nuclear Fuels and Materials. The latter includes details on the status and purpose of major projects, for example, the Kundian Nuclear Complex, also known as the Chasma Reprocessing Plant, which was not completed until 1990. For the purposes of producing plutonium for weapons, the Pakistanis were interested in a heavy water moderated reactor of the NRX (National Research Experimental) type that Canada built at Chalk River. In 1985, the Pakistanis started that project in earnest, with construction beginning in 1987 of what became known as Khushab Chemical Plant II.[12]

Documents 9A-B: South Africa

A: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Scientific Intelligence, “South African Uranium Enrichment Program,” August 1977, Secret, excised copy, under appeal

B: National Intelligence Estimate, “Trends in South Africa’s Nuclear Security Policies and Programs,” NIE 73/5-84, 5 October 1984, Top Secret, excised copy, under appeal

These reports remain heavily excised even though the institutions and activities that they describe have not existed for years (although perhaps some details have been withheld on nonproliferation grounds. With South Africa’s status as a pariah state, its nuclear program was a thorny problem for a series of U.S. presidents. In August 1977, the Carter administration, working with the Soviet Union, lodged protests against South Africa’s apparent preparations for a nuclear test, forcing a shut-down of the Kalahari test site if not the entire nuclear program itself. Indeed the CIA’s analysis of South Africa’s innovative “aerodynamic” uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba brought it to the conclusion that South Africa would be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium “to make several nuclear devices per year.”

Seeking “constructive engagement” with the apartheid regime, the Reagan administration wanted the South Africans to keep a lid on their nuclear weapons program. The NIE’s top-secret status was compatible with one of the elements of the 1984 estimate: that any revelations that broke the regime’s “calculated ambiguity” about its nuclear status would put Washington in an “awkward position” by “fir[ing] the drive” for the sanctions and disinvestment campaigns which the administration was trying to avoid. Analyzing the motives for the nuclear program, the CIA found it “irrelevant” to any threat that the regime was likely to face.

A key issue was whether South Africa had a nuclear arsenal. On that problem, the NIE dovetailed with the view taken by NIE-4-82: South Africa “probably has the capability to produce nuclear weapons on short notice.” That was accurate, but U.S. intelligence may not have known that the regime’s leaders had already decided to build a stockpile of 7 weapons, with six weapons assembled during the 1980s. [13] A lengthy annex detailed South Africa’s nuclear test capabilities, with some coverage of the mysterious South Atlantic flash of September 1979. This portion is significantly excised so the event remains a puzzle, with debate continuing over whether South Africa tested the weapon, whether it even had a suitable device for atmospheric testing in September 1979, or whether another country, possibly Israel, was the guilty party.

Document 10: Libya – “Serious Deficiencies”

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “The Libyan Nuclear Program: A Technical Perspective,” February 1985, Top Secret, excised copy

For years, U.S. intelligence agencies did not take seriously Muammar Gaddafi’s efforts to develop a Libyan nuclear capability and this report provides early evidence of the perspective that the Libyan program “did not know what it was doing.” [14] According to the CIA, the program’s “serious deficiencies,” including “poor leadership” and lack of both “coherent planning” and trained personnel made it “highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years.” The Libyan effort was in such a “rudimentary stage” that they were trying to acquire any technology that would be relevant to producing plutonium or enriched uranium. While the Soviets had provided some nuclear assistance, that relationship was stagnating and the Libyans were trying to acquire enrichment-related technology from Belgium, but even if that happened it was likely to be provided under safeguards narrowing Gaddafi’s freedom of action. The denouement of Gaddafi’s failed quest for the bomb was the discovery in 2003 of a shipment of material en route from the A.Q. Khan network. While the Pakistanis had provided centrifuge equipment it was not working or had not been installed, remaining in packing crates – more evidence of the “rudimentary” nature of Libya’s nuclear efforts.

Document 11: “Special Weapons” Proliferation

Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate, “Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control,” NIE 5-91C, Volume I: The Estimate, and Volume II: Annexes A (“Country Studies), B (Weapons and Technologies) and C (Control Regimes), July 1991, Top Secret, excised copy, under appeal

With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries. The estimate presents a fairly bleak picture of continuing proliferation “despite efforts by the United States and others to arrest the spread.” Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, even with the recent war, remained a concern and so did Iran’s, although it was deemed unlikely to achieve a nuclear capability “over the next decade.” North Korea was likely to have a nuclear device in 2 to 5 years (surely an overestimate) while India and Pakistan were estimated to have the ability to “assemble nuclear weapons quickly.” Also troubling was the ability of would-be nuclear proliferators to acquire sensitive technologies. Sometimes that was done through “dummy corporations” and other such devices, but “West European reluctance or inability to enforce controls” did not help, nor did China’s role as a supplier of nuclear technology.

The picture was not entirely bleak. Brazil had “halt[ed] the development of nuclear weapons” and the current Argentine government “will not attempt to develop nuclear weapons,” although no evidence is provided that either country had been trying. With the downfall of apartheid, South Africa’s nuclear weapons were “less troublesome,” although it is not clear whether the analysts were aware that country had already dismantled its nuclear arsenal.


NOTES

[1] See Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York, 2006), for the most comprehensive survey.

[2] Controversies over NIEs, in and outside the U.S. government, have been a running theme in the history of U.S. intelligence. See, for example, Harold R. Ford, CIA and Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968 (Washington, D.C. 1998), 1-24, Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York, 1979), 204-207, and Anne Hessing Cahn, Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA (University Park, 1998).

[3] Leopoldo Nuti, “Italy’s Nuclear Choices,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 25, January 2011 (on-line).

[4] R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, “A Nuclear Power’s Act of Proliferation,” The Washington Post, 13 November 2009.

[5] For more detail on China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation, see Feroz Khan, Eating Grass, (Stanford CA, 2012) 188, among other references.

[6] Khan, Eating Grass, 186, 189-190

[7] Jacques Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation (New York, 2012), 96-97

[8] For an argument that the Argentine program had non-weapons motivations, see Jacques Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identify, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (New York, 2006), 141-170.

[9] CIA reviewed the SNIEs on Brazilian nuclear activities in 2011 for another requester and under the two-year limitations of Executive Order 13526 they cannot be re-requested until later in 2013.

[10] For background on the military programs, see Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” (Stanford University, Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1997), and John R. Reddick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil. Henry L. Stimson Center Occasional Paper No. 25, December 1995. For recently available documents on Brazilian nuclear activities, see the Web site of the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.

[11] Presentation by Matias Spektor, Getulio Vargas Foundation, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project workshop, Vienna, 1 February 2013.

[12] Khan, Eating Grass, 196-197.

[14] Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, 242.

ELEPHANT (2003) Full Movie by Gus Van Sant

 

Michael Moore – Bowling For Columbine (2002) – Full Movie

 

Unveiled – Officer of Now-Defunct New Frontier Bank Sentenced to Charges Related to the Bank’s Collapse

DENVER—Gregory William Bell, age 54, of Weld County, Colorado, was sentenced yesterday by U.S. District Court Judge Lewis T. Babcock to serve 30 months in federal prison for false bank entries, bank misapplication, bank fraud, and money laundering, the United States Attorney’s Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation, and the FDIC-Office of Inspector General announced. Following his prison sentence, Bell was ordered to spend three years on supervised release. Judge Babcock has scheduled a hearing on June 12, 2013, to determine how much and to whom the restitution Bell could be ordered to pay should go to.

Bell was charged by information on December 12, 2012, and pled guilty on February 5, 2013. According to the facts contained in the information as well as the stipulated facts contained in the plea agreement, Gregory Bell was an officer of New Frontier Bank, which was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. On October 31, 2005, Bell made a false entry in a bank book, report, or statement with intent to defraud the bank and deceive one or more of the bank’s officers. Specifically, the defendant allegedly prepared a form entitled “Credit Presentation and Committee Approval” for a $5,583,500 loan to two individuals on which he failed to disclose that a certificate of deposit, the value of which was $106,759, which the two individuals pledged as collateral, in fact belonged to another individual and that Bell would benefit personally as a result of the loan. On March 14, 2008, Bell willfully misapplied approximately $662,045.79 of New Frontier’s funds.

On June 17, 2008 and continuing until September 9, 2008, Bell devised and participated in a scheme to defraud the bank and to obtain money owned by and under the custody and control of the bank by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses. As part of the scheme, Bell, knowing that state and federal regulators had directed New Frontier Bank to raise capital, arranged for eight bank customers to borrow money from the bank and use the proceeds of those loans to purchase shares of bank stock so New Frontier could inject some of the money paid for the stock into the bank. As part of the scheme, Bell failed to disclose the deteriorating condition of the bank to its customers. He also prepared and caused others to prepare bank forms entitled “Credit Presentation and Committee Approval” for the eight loans described above. Bell failed to disclose on the credit presentation forms that proceeds of the loans would be used to purchase shares of stock in New Frontier Bancorp.

Bell also allegedly caused false and misleading statements to be included on the credit presentation forms. He presented the credit presentation forms to bank loan committees and caused other persons to present them to bank loan committees. As part of the scheme, Bell caused the bank to loan approximately $20,145,979.23 to the eight borrowers mentioned above and caused those borrowers to use approximately $4,310,215 of those proceeds to purchase shares of stock in the bank. On August 29, 2008, Bell executed a scheme by causing the bank to transfer approximately $260,000 of the proceeds of one of the bank loans to an account of one of the borrowers of that loan.

On June 27, 2008, Bell conducted a financial transaction affecting interstate commerce. Specifically, he deposited a check in the amount of $160,000 into his account at the bank. The transaction involved the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, knowing that the transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal and disguise the source and the ownership of the proceeds of the unlawful activity.

“Those responsible for bank failures were also ultimately responsible for the weakening of our economy,” said U.S. Attorney John Walsh. “Thanks to the hard work of the Assistant U.S. Attorneys, the FBI, IRS-Criminal Investigation, and the FDIC, the officer of one of these failed banks has been held personally accountable, is now a felon, and will spend time in federal prison.”

“This case demonstrates the FBI’s continued commitment to investigating bank fraud violations,” said FBI Denver Acting Special Agent in Charge Steven Olson. “We place a high priority wherein senior bank officials utilize their positions to defraud financial institutions for personal gain. These criminal acts undermine our banking system and will be aggressively pursued.”

“This sentencing is a direct result of outstanding teamwork between IRS-CI, FBI, FDIC-OIG, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office in combating violations of federal law,” said Stephen Boyd, Special Agent in Charge, IRS-Criminal Investigation, Denver Field Office. “This sentence should serve as a deterrent to those who might contemplate similar fraudulent actions.”

This case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-Office of the Inspector General (FDIC-OIG).

The defendant was prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Suneeta Hazra and another prosecutor from the Economic Crimes Section of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

SECRECY NEWS – FISA SURVEILLANCE APPLICATIONS ROSE SLIGHTLY IN 2012

“During calendar year 2012, the Government made 1,856 applications to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for authority to conduct electronic
surveillance and/or physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes.”

That somewhat opaque statistic was disclosed in the Justice Department’s
latest annual report to Congress on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, filed on Tuesday. As is usually the case, none of the requests for
electronic surveillance were denied by the Court.

Click to access 2012rept.pdf

No matter how it is sliced and diced, the newly disclosed number of
applications does not yield much substance. It means that the government
submitted an average of 5 requests per day last year for intelligence
surveillance or physical search. It is about 5% higher than the number of
applications the year before (1,745), but quite a bit lower than the figure
from 2007 (2,371).

The number of applications does not correspond directly to the number of
targets, since multiple applications may be submitted in the course of an
individual investigation. Nor is the outcome of the surveillance or search
activity indicated in a way that would tend to validate or invalidate the
authorization after the fact.

In any case, the FIS Court did not deny any of the government’s requests
for authority to conduct electronic surveillance in whole or in part, the
report said, although unspecified modifications were made to 40 proposed
orders. The report does not say whether or not any requests for physical
search were disapproved or modified.

The government also made 212 applications for access to business records
and “tangible things” for foreign intelligence purposes, almost the same as
the 205 the year before.

And also in 2012, the FBI submitted 15,229 National Security Letter
requests for information concerning 6,223 different U.S. persons
(“excluding requests for subscriber information only”), down somewhat from
the 16,511 requests (concerning 7,201 different persons) the year before.

As an instrument of public oversight, the annual reports on FISA are only
minimally informative. They register gross levels of activity, but they
provide no measures of quality, performance or significance. Neither
counterintelligence successes nor failures can be discerned from the
reports. Nor can one conclude from the data presented that the FISA
process is functioning as intended, or that it needs to be curbed or
refined.

Congressional leaders blocked efforts to impose new or stronger public
reporting requirements when the FISA Amendments Act was reauthorized late
last year. However, Sen. Jeff Merkley and several Senate colleagues asked
the FIS Court to summarize its opinions in such a way as to facilitate
their eventual declassification and disclosure. This request has produced
no known results to date.

The FISA itself is a product of a rich period of political ferment in the
1970s when public and private institutions converged to promote increased
transparency, improved oversight and meaningful new constraints on
government authority. Investigative journalists wrote groundbreaking
stories, Congressional committees held historic hearings, political
activists and ordinary citizens mobilized to defend their interests,
leading to real and lasting changes. On the legislative front, these
included passage of an invigorated Freedom of Information Act, along with
the Privacy Act, the Government in the Sunshine Act, and the FISA, which
subjected intelligence surveillance activities to at least a degree of
independent judicial review.

An interesting account of that momentous period can be found in the new
book “Reining in the State: Civil Society and Congress in the Vietnam and
Watergate Eras” by Katherine A. Scott, University Press of Kansas, March
2013.

http://amazon.com/Reining-State-Society-Congress-Watergate/dp/070061897X

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
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Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
https://members.fas.org/donate

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web: http://www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email: saftergood@fas.org
voice: (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Revealed – IMF Fiscal Affairs Department Cyprus Options for Short-Term Expenditure Rationalization

IMF-CyprusExpenditureRationalization

Increasing public spending had contributed to a substantial deterioration of public finances in Cyprus over recent years. To address fiscal imbalances, the government introduced an initial set of fiscal reform’s in late 2012. However, additional measures are needed to ensure the sustainability of public finances. The size of the necessary adjustment will depend, among other things, on the magnitude of spillovers from financial sector restructuring.

This report provides options for further rationalizing public spending, both in support of ongoing fiscal consolidation efforts and to enhance the efficiency and equity of public spending. The report focuses on rationalization of the public sector wage bill, education and health spending and social protection spending (including pension and non-pension social benefits). A menu of possible expenditure measures is identified and their short-term fiscal impact quantified.

Expenditure rationalization should give priority to reducing the public sector wage bill, especially in education. While total public spending as a percent of GOP is similar to the average for EU countries, spending on wages and on education arc among the highest in the EU. Also, while public pension spending is low by EU standards, the existing system is extremely favorable to public sector workers, and any further spending cuts should address this inequity in a progressive manner.

Public Sector Wage Bill. The relatively large size of the wage bill is mainly the result of high average compensation–even after the recent wage bill measures, a premium of about 30 percent in government pay remains relative to the EU average. Government employment is also similar to the EU average, although pockets of excess employment seem to exist in certain areas such as education. The wage bill could be reduced through flat rate pay reductions, including the elimination of the 13th wage. More targeted reductions could aim to reduce the premium for seniority instead of focusing on gross salary levels. In the medium term, the wage grid could be revised to better link compensation and performance. In terms of employment, targeted reductions focused on casual employees, particularly in education, could deliver some savings. In addition, mandatory unpaid leave could be required to some workers in low priority areas.

Education. In spite of high spending, the quality of primary and secondary education is compromised by several practices related to the hiring, evaluation and promotion processes for teachers. Measures to improve the quality of public education include increasing teaching hours (particularly for senior teachers), extending school schedules, and further consolidating with in and across schools aiming to reduce class size. Wages could be adjusted in the short term following adjustments to the overall wage grid. Public spending on tertiary education is especially high, reflecting high salaries and allowances and the creation of two new public universities over the past decade. Expenditure allocations to tertiary education could be reduced through the introduction of tuition fees and the elimination of the “incentive” allowance for professors. In the medium term, compensation for public sector teachers could be brought more in line with private sector remuneration and the hiring of teachers could be based on merit rather than on waiting lists. The administrative structure, including school boards, should also be reviewed.

Public Pensions. Recent parametric reforms address the long-term rise in spending. In GSIS, little room remains for further savings. However, substantial savings could be achieved by further adjusting benefits for government employees (including pensions in payment), which are much larger than what would be justified on the basis of their contributions. A significant reduction of the lump-sum gratuity could also be considered, either through outright termination or a reduction coupled with mandatory annuitization. Relatively large savings could be achieved by progressive reductions to GEPS and state officials’ benefits in service. These spending reforms can be supplemented by reforms in other areas focused on containing, or even reducing, spending and enhancing its efficiency and equity. This could be achieved as follows:

Public Health Spending. Public and also total spending on health care is relatively low. However, the absence of a universal public health care system, and the limited public sector capacity to serve those patients that are eligible for free public health care, results in long waiting times in the public sector and large out-of-pocket spending for private health care. This raises affordability and equity concerns. The healthcare system is also fragmented with health services delivered by public and private providers in a largely uncoordinated manner. This causes inefficiencies in terms of the cost and quality of health care provision. The introduction of the General Health Insurance System would address many of these problems but will take time and should only go ahead if correct costing and functional financing arrangements to safeguard the system’s fiscal sustainability are in place. [n the meantime, pressure on the public healthcare system can be reduced by tightening eligibility criteria for subsidized public health care and increasing the number of patients that pay for public services. The collected revenues could be used to buy additional services from the private sector to address identified bottlenecks in public service delivery.

Other Social Protection Spending. Although spending is low by EU standards, the current system is fragmented and benefits are not sufficiently targeted to those most in need. The system also needs to be reformed to better address the social challenges resulting from the economic down tum, in particular the rise in unemployment. Expenditure savings generated through better targeting and the scaling back or elimination of some social benefits can help to finance an expansion of active labor market programs with a focus on incentivizing the unemployed to reenter the labor market. Specific attention needs to be given to addressing the sharp rise in youth unemployment, including through enhanced public employment services and training. Consideration could also be given to introducing a flat-rate means-tested unemployment assistance benefit for those not eligible for unemployment insurance. To improve the overall cost-effectiveness of these social benefits, existing plans to streamline administrative structures and consolidate benefits should be expedited.

The menu of expenditure reforms identified in the report can make a significant contribution to short-term fiscal consolidation efforts and improve the efficiency and equity of public spending. However, the actual package of measures adopted and their timeline will reflect a range of factors, including: (i) the extent of short-term expenditure consolidation required; (ii) the possibilities for generating fiscal space in other areas, including on the revenue side and by decreasing other public spending not covered by this report (e.g., spending on goods and services and capital spending); and (iii) the administrative, political, and social constraints facing the government. Table I provides a summary of identified measures, including a quantification of their likely fiscal impact.


IMF-CyprusExpenditureRationalization_Page_09-724x1024IMF-CyprusExpenditureRationalization

Video Skid – Monty Python – Mr. Hilter

SECRECY NEWS – SEQUESTRATION SLOWS DOCUMENT DECLASSIFICATION

The process of declassifying national security records, which is hardly
expeditious under the best of circumstances, will become slower as a result
of the mandatory budget cuts known as sequestration.

Due to sequestration, “NARA has reduced funding dedicated to the
declassification of Presidential records,” the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA) said in a report last week.

“Instead, NARA staff will prepare documents for declassification, in
addition to their existing duties. This will slow declassification
processes and delay other work, including FOIA responses and special access
requests,” said the new report, which also identified several other adverse
effects of the across-the-board cuts.

Click to access nara-seq.pdf

Meanwhile, because of the basic asymmetry between classification and
declassification, there is no particular reason to expect a corresponding
reduction in the rate at which new records are classified.

Classification is an integral part of the production of new national
security information that cannot be deferred, while declassification is a
distinct process that can easily be put on hold. Likewise, there is no
dedicated budget for “classification” to cut in the way that NARA has cut
declassification spending. And while Congress has erected barriers to
declassification (such as the Kyl-Lott Amendment to prohibit automatic
declassification of records without review), it has simultaneously allowed
declassification requirements to go overlooked and unenforced.

Some declassification is actually mandated by law. A 1991 statute on the
Foreign Relations of the United States series requires the Department of
State to publish a “thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of
major United States foreign policy decisions” no later than 30 years after
the fact, necessitating the timely declassification of the underlying
records. But law or no law, the government has not complied with this
publication schedule.

EGYPT AND THE IMF, AND MORE FROM CRS

A new report from the Congressional Research Service assesses the economic
state of post-revolution Egypt and finds it fairly grim.

“After more than two years of social unrest and economic stagnation
following the 2011 popular uprising, the government of Egypt is facing
serious economic pressures that, if not remedied, could lead to economic
collapse and possibly new levels of violence,” the report says.

“Egyptian authorities and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been
in negotiations for more than two years over an IMF loan to Egypt in
exchange for policy reforms that, if successful, could stave off economic
collapse and create more ‘inclusive’ growth…. [but] No agreement has been
finalized or implemented to date. Egyptian authorities have been reluctant
to commit to economic reforms that may be politically unpopular and
increase the country’s debt.”

Background on the negotiations and on U.S. aid to Egypt are presented in
Egypt and the IMF: Overview and Issues for Congress, April 29, 2013:

Click to access R43053.pdf

Some other CRS reports on Middle Eastern countries that have been recently
updated include the following.

Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, April 26, 2013:

Click to access RS21968.pdf

Iran Sanctions, April 24, 2013:

Click to access RS20871.pdf

U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, April 11, 2013:

Click to access RL33222.pdf

Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, April 4, 2013:

Click to access RL32048.pdf

Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, April 1, 2013:

Click to access RL33546.pdf

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, AND MORE FROM CRS

The international agreements that constitute the infrastructure of
international trade and investment are spotlighted in an informative new
report from the Congressional Research Service.

“In the absence of an overarching multilateral framework on investment,
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investment chapters in free trade
agreements (FTAs), collectively referred to as ‘international investment
agreements,’ have emerged as the primary mechanism for promoting a
rules-based system for international investment,” the new report explains.

“Presently, there are over 3,000 BITs globally. The United States has
concluded 47 BITs, 41 of which have entered into force.” These treaties
were tabulated by CRS and presented along with other little-known data on
the subject in U.S. International Investment Agreements: Issues for
Congress, April 29, 2013:

Click to access R43052.pdf

Other new or newly updated CRS reports obtained by Secrecy News include
the following.

Mountaintop Mining: Background on Current Controversies, April 29, 2013:

Click to access RS21421.pdf

National Park System: Establishing New Units, April 25, 2013:

Click to access RS20158.pdf

The Administrative Process by Which Groups May Be Acknowledged as Indian
Tribes by the Department of the Interior, April 26, 2013:

Click to access R43051.pdf

Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Reform: An Overview of
Proposals to Reduce the Growth in SSDI Rolls, April 29, 2013:

Click to access R43054.pdf

Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues, April 26, 2013:

Click to access R41464.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
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Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
https://members.fas.org/donate

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web: http://www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email: saftergood@fas.org
voice: (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Unveiled – Lessons Learned on the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq

SIGIR-IraqCERP

The CERP was formally established by the Coalition Provisional Authority in July 2003 to provide U.S. military commanders in Iraq with a stabilization tool that benefitted the Iraqi people. The program supported urgent, small-scale projects that local governments could sustain, that generally cost less than $25,000, and that provided employment. DoD defined urgent as “any chronic and acute inadequacy of an essential good or service that, in the judgment of the local commander, calls for immediate action.”

Among other things, CERP funds were used to: build schools, health clinics, roads, and sewers; pay condolence payments; support economic development; purchase equipment; and perform civic cleanup. DoD used CERP as a “combat multiplier” whose projects helped improve and maintain security in Iraq through non-lethal means. The program was considered “critical to supporting military commanders in the field in executing counterinsurgency operations” and its pacification effects important to saving lives.

CERP Guidance

The authoritative guidance for using CERP is the DoD document, Money As A Weapon System (MAAWS), which provides the policies and procedures for administering the program. MAAWS establishes important procedures regarding accountability, including requiring project data to be entered into a system called the CERP Project Tracker when funds were committed to a project. The tracker was supposed to be updated to track obligations, disbursements, and project completion status, among other things.

MAAWS describes the reporting requirements and performance metrics that are to be used to capture how CERP projects benefit the Iraqi people. Specifically, it requires the inclusion of performance metrics in a letter of justification for individual projects costing $50,000 or more.

MAAWS further required that commanders in Iraq coordinate reconstruction efforts and determine project needs with the Department of State (DoS), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Government of Iraq (GOI) to gain the greatest effect. SIGIR previously found that this happened too infrequently. A DoD review of CERP, issued in July 2010, stated that the Department was working to enhance weak coordination with U.S. government agencies, the GOI, and other partners to ensure that CERP projects were appropriately designed and implemented, and met key criteria including a requirement that they be sustainable.

Stringent Financial Controls are Essential to Deter Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

In Iraq, cash transactions were prevalent due to the post-invasion broken banking system. CERP projects were primarily funded with cash. Such cash transactions must have strong controls, especially in a war zone where they are highly vulnerable to theft or misappropriation.

SIGIR’s audit work and investigations found instances of weak controls over CERP cash transactions.

Our January 2011 report on the SOI program concluded the MNC- I exercised weak financial controls over its cash payments to the SOI. In our review of 98 SOI project files, we found that payments were often made directly to an SOI leader to distribute instead of to the individual SOI members directly, without any means of verifying that each SOI received his salary. In addition, the MNC-I often provided the same amount of money each month without determining how many SOI were actually working during that period.

In some instances where payments were made to individual SOI members, the payments were lower than the original agreed-upon estimate. Furthermore, key financial control documents including cash receipts and vouchers were often missing from the project files. Among the most significant missing documents were receipts and statements of agent accounts which are important internal control documents to ensure funds are used appropriately.

Symptomatic of loose controls over cash, SIGIR’s investigative work caught many individuals who stole CERP funds. For example, a U.S. Army Major was convicted of stealing more than $47,000 in CERP funds that were to be used for humanitarian relief or rebuilding purposes and depositing the funds in his bank account. The Major was deployed with the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Mosul, Iraq, from September 2004 to September 2005. From September 2004 to January 2005, he was appointed the paying agent for CERP funds and was responsible for requesting and obtaining the funds from the Army finance office and disbursing the funds. The Major was the Contracting Officer’s Representative and was responsible for day-to-day contact with contractors in Iraq on behalf of the U.S. government. He pleaded guilty in February 2011 and was subsequently sentenced to three years’ probation and required to pay $47,241 in restitution.

In another example, a U.S. Army Captain pleaded guilty to stealing approximately $690,000 in CERP funds while deployed to Iraq. He gained access to the funds (which were intended as payments of security contracts with the Sons of Iraq and humanitarian relief and reconstruction programs) in his capacity as the project purchasing officer for the U.S. Army. The Captain was sentenced to 30 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release and was required to pay $200,000 in restitution, and forfeit his interest in all personal property bought with the stolen money.
SIGIR-IraqCERP

Video – Monty Python – Crunchy Frog

NATURE | Murder in the Troop | Baboon Grooming | PBS Video

Buy the DVD: http://www.shoppbs.org/entry.point?en… Being groomed is a highly pleasurable experience for baboons. The pulling of hair is just sufficiently painful to release endorphins, the hormones that produce natural highs.

From NATURE’s Murder in the Troop airing Sunday, May 20th at 8 p.m. (ET) on PBS (check local listings). For more information, visit http://www.pbs.org/nature