A sends:
The following 5 cables contain both the word “TEMPEST” and “countermeasures”, all are SECRET//NOFORN:
– 09STATE29527 (Appears to be duplicate of 09STATE29526)
Also:
– 09STATE23578 (Appears to be duplicate of 09STATE29526)
Source: http://laurelai.info/mirrors/cablegate/
The State Department section 12 FAH (Foreign Affairs Handbook) is classified.
VZCZCXYZ0001 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHEK #0293/01 0870902 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 270902Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0846 S E C R E T BISHKEK 000293 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR ACTION OF OIG DEPT FOR NEA/SCA/EX BILL HAUGH DEPT FOR SCA/CEN DAVID GEHRENBECK E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2033 TAGS: AMGT ASEC ASIG AISG SUBJECT: EMBASSY BISHKEK RESPONSES TO RECOMMENDATIONS LISTED IN OIG REPORT NUMBER ISP-S-08-14A, FEBRUARY 2008 REF: A. MCCORMICK/AMBASSADOR YOVANOVITCH E-MAIL DATED FEBRUARY 29 2008 B. OIG REPORT NUMBER ISP-S-08-14A FEBRUARY 2008 Classified By: DCM Lee Litzenberger for Reasons 1.4(g) Here follows Embassy Bishkek responses to the formal and informal recommendations listed in OIG report number ISP-S-08-14A. 1. (C/NF) Recommendation 1: Embassy Bishkek should continue to coordinate with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations to ensure near term installation of locally fabricated mantraps for the vehicle entrances to the embassy compound. (Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with OBO) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post has contracted via RPSO Frankfurt with a German Architectural and Engineering firm to provide 100% design and construction documents for the Mantrap project. To date, Post and OBO have received the 35% design submittal for review and have returned comments. Although most recently some contractual problems have slowed the design effort, Post is confident these issues will be resolved quickly and 100% design documents can be delivered by 30 April. After receiving the final construction documents and OBO Building Permit, Post will proceed to the contracting and construction phase. 2. (C/NF) Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should replace the damaged forced-entry/ballistic-resistant window on the compound access control guard booth servicing the employee parking lot. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post identified the proper replacement glass and ordered the glass directly from Norshield in coordination with OBO/PE/CC/SPE via purchases order SKG-100-08-M-0057. The order for the replacement glass was placed on 01/17/08. On 03/05/08, Post learned that the window reached our dispatch agent in New Jersey. Post anticipates the window will arrive 06/08. Once the replacement glass is received, Post will coordinate with Larry Best and Koburn Stoll from OBO/PE/CC/SPE to request an FE/BR door and window team for installation. 3. (SBU) Recommendation 3: Embassy Bishkek should implement flexible work hours for embassy personnel and encourage employees to vary their arrival and departure times. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs in part. Response: Post is not prepared to implement flexible working hours Embassy wide, but prefers a stepped approach to arrival times by section to help alleviate vehicles waiting outside of the compound to be screened, which is a the security concern that prompted this recommendation. Post has analyzed the congestion problems and contends that the congestion is primarily focused at Post 26 (vehicle CAC) from between 0800 to 0830 while vehicles are waiting for security screening. Post Management has instructed the Facilities Maintenance Section to alter their working hours so that this section would start work at 0800 vice 0830. The Facilities Maintenance Section is by far the largest section that reports directly to the Embassy every morning and modifying their arrival time by 30 minutes should eliminate waiting lines for security screening while still maintaining positive management controls over staff. In addition, the RSO regularly advises all American Staff to vary their routes and times to and from work. 4. (C/NF) Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations should assess the integrity of all affected chancery windows and advise the embassy of any needed work to bring the windows into compliance with security standards. (Action: OBO) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Yvonne Manderville from OBO/PE/DE/SEB visited Post in March 2008. Manderville stated that adhesive properties of the gasket material have failed and caused the gasket to separate from the window pane which has resulted in the degradation of the ballistic properties of the window assemblies. Manderville recommended that Post petition for inclusion in the FEBR window and door replacement program. Post is drafting a cable to OBO and DS requesting a formal condition survey of all FE/BR windows and doors. In this cable Post will also petition for inclusion in the Life Cycle Replacement program. Request will be submitted by May 1, 2008. 5. (S/NF) Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should conduct a complete TEMPEST review of all permanent and temporary classified processing areas at post and provide detailed instructions regarding countermeasures that should be employed to mitigate any proven TEMPEST noncompliance or threat. (Action: DS in coordination with Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post will review and implement the recommendations from the May 2007 Technical Security Assessment. Post has contacted Lee Mason and Mark Steakley from DS/ST/CMP/ECB to request and schedule a TEMPEST review. Mason and Steakley were contacted in mid March and Post is waiting follow-up and confirmation. 6. (SBU) Recommendation 6: Embassy Bishkek should establish a viable alternate command center. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post does not concur. Response: The current alternate command center represents the best option presently available to Embassy Bishkek. The alternate command center is located south of Bishkek not far from the Kyrgyz Presidential mansion and the Diplomatic village. While the road infrastructure could be improved, the location is not remote. In addition, the location is well suited for a helicopter landing zone. There is a large field approximately 600 meters wide and 2 kilometers in length that could accommodate several transport helicopters in the event of an evacuation. The alternate command center has a HF radio base station that when last tested in December 2007 had excellent link quality between Embassy Dushanbe (82%) and Embassy Tashkent (91%). The alternate command center has two computer workstations with dial-up internet access, a photocopier, and a fax. There are two landlines, one IVG line and two satellite phones. The alternate command center can be placed into operation within 30 minutes as demonstrated in a test in December 2007. Furthermore, the location has been fully stocked with medical supplies, emergency rations and water. Embassy Bishkek could not find any blast protection requirements in the applicable Alternate Command Center references in 12 FAH-1 H-261c and 12 FAH 1, Appendix 3. As the Post housing pool evolves, Post will continue to seek a better Alternate Command Center, but the current location is the best option at the present time. 7. (SBU) Recommendation 7: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should evaluate post's current safe haven and initiate a physical security upgrade project to bring the safe haven into conformance with current requirements. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post's safe haven area is too small to protect all employees assigned to Embassy Bishkek. Until the annex is built, Post initiated coordination with Yvonne Manderville OBO/PE/DE/SEB and Dale Amdahl DS/PCB/PSD to identify and implement viable alternatives such as constructing safe areas in the warehouse, facilities maintenance building and health unit/caf. Post's floor warden training addresses refuge locations within the Chancery. 8. (SBU) Recommendation 8: Embassy Bishkek should develop and implement a formal agreement with Manas Air Base for the evacuation of Americans and qualifying locally employed staff members. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: The Embassy has explored the recommendation. In doing so we have learned that a formal agreement between Embassy Bishkek and Manas Coalition Airbase for the evacuation of Americans and qualifying locally employed staff members and selected foreign nationals, is not necessary to ensure Noncombatant Evacuation Operations are accomplished, and the base is not authorized by USCENTCOM to conclude such an agreement. There are mechanisms in place for the efficient and proper coordination and planning for this contingency which should be followed to ensure forces and assets are available during emergency situations. Embassy Bishkek has therefore coordinated with USCENTCOM to ensure contingency planning options are in-place, to include evacuation of Embassy personnel, and fully coordinated with other affected agencies (USTRANSCOM, DOS, and JCS) IAW applicable directives. 9. (SBU) Recommendation 9: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should conduct a security assessment to determine whether static residential guards are required in addition to the centralized alarm monitoring system and mobile patrol. (Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with DS) Management decision: Post concurs, with comment. Response: Post will conduct, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic security an assessment outlined in 12 FAH-6 H-521.1. Post is confident the assessment will reaffirm that the residential security program is necessary for the safety and security of personnel assigned to Embassy Bishkek. Targeted date for completion is 30 June 2008. The greatest threat against Americans in Bishkek is crime. In February 1994 Embassy Bishkek instructed the Local Guard Commander to implement a night residential security program. In October 2002, the RSO identified a local alarm company that had the technical capability to install and monitor alarms and panic buttons at Embassy residences. However, in January 2008 the new Minister of Internal Affairs announced that MVD would no longer provide a quick reaction force to respond to alarms. In addition, RSO Bishkek is only authorized one, 24 hour mobile patrol. This means that response time to residences in the event of an emergency is too slow. Although the distance between the southernmost and northernmost residence is only 8 miles, the infrastructure and traffic can delay response time by more than 30 minutes. In addition, Mobile Patrol can only check each residence two or three times in a 12 hour shift. This situation is untenable. Since 2006, residential LGF have detected and deterred 4 instances of attempted vandalism to Embassy employee vehicles at their residences. LGF residential guards have deterred assault and when tasked provided temporary 24 hour residential security for American Officers who the RSO had reason to believe were being threatened by host nation intelligence and or organized crime. Finally, residential security guards were able to monitor and report regarding an incident in which a vehicle belonging to the son-in-law of the former deputy chief of the Kyrgyz Intelligence service was deliberately torched within 30 feet of an apartment building which, at the time, housed four Embassy employees and their families. Since the Embassy began using the alarm company, the Police have not had to respond to incidents at residences during the night when the guards were present. The alarms have only been needed during the day when the guards are not present. The statistic speaks for itself. The residential guards are a definite deterrent against acts of violence and vandalism against American Officers. Embassy Bishkek, if required to choose between residential alarms and residential guards, would choose to maintain the residential guards, as a more viable means of protecting the lives of the American officers and their dependents. 10. (C/NF) Recommendation 10: Embassy Bishkek should install shatter-resistant window film on all windows that the regional security officer considers vulnerable at the chief of mission residence. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post's Facilities Maintenance Section has scheduled a survey of the CMR to identify all windows that are not currently protected by shatter-resistant window film. Post currently has film on hand and will contract with a local contractor for installation. Targeted date of completion is May 31, 2008. 11. (SBU) Recommendation 11: Embassy Bishkek should install grilles on all accessible windows in the chief of mission residence safe area and fit one window grille with an interior emergency release device for emergency egress. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: RSO in conjunction with the FM at Post has scheduled a review and update of the existing physical security assessment of the CMR in accordance with residential security standards 12 FAH-6 H-400, 12 FAH-6 H-113.10 and 12 FAH-8 H-520. Any deficiencies discovered during this review will be corrected to conform to the standards. Targeted date of completion is July 31, 2008. 12. (U) Recommendation 12: Embassy Bishkek should pursue and secure a formal agreement with Manas Air force Base, including reimbursement, for investigative support provided by the regional security office. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post FMO has contacted Manas Air Base Chief Financial Officer regarding this recomendation and has requested a meeting to explore the concept of reimbursement for investigative services provided by the Embassy on behalf of Manas Air Base. Post RSO and FMO are working closley to accurately identify and quantify associated cost related to investigations. Once Post's analysis is complete the FMO will coordinate with Manas Air Base Chief Finance Officer to establish a formal agreement that outlines workload counts and a reimbursement plan for investigations completed by RSO Foreign Service National Investigators on behalf of Manas Air Base. 13. (C/NF) Recommendation 13: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with the Bureaus of Overseas Buildings Operations and Diplomatic Security, should modify the facility manager's existing office space to bring it into compliance with current physical security protection standards. (Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with OBO and DS) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Although Post concurs with this recommendation, a short term solution is unlikely. The existing Facilities Managers Office is a loft in the Maintenance Shop Building. This building is a pre-engineered building (Butler Building) and is physically unable to handle the load that would be applied to the structure by the addition of making this area compliant with current physical security protection standards. Post has been actively pursuing with OBO a new office annex (NOX), which is a long term solution to holistically address all of our space and space related security concerns. Post is currently on the "Top 80 List" for 2011 and a back-up for 2010. However, Embassy Bishkek Facilities Maintenance Officer and the Regional Security Officer will prepare a waiver and exception package for DS/PSD/PCB review and approval. Targeted date for submission of the waiver and exception request to DS/PSD/PCB is June 2008. 14. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 1: The inner CAC building (post two) lacks any form of protective window treatment on its windows. Occupants are susceptible to flying glass if a bomb attack occurred on the east side of the compound. Embassy Bishkek should install shatter-resistant window film on all post two windows that the regional security officer deems vulnerable to blast. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post's Facilities Maintenance Section will conduct a survey of Post 2 and identify all windows that are not currently protected by shatter-resistant window film. Post currently has film on hand and will contract with a local contractor for installation. Targeted date of completion is May 31, 2008. 15. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 2: The presence of a concrete barrier adjacent to the east side vehicular CAC, a large boulder adjacent to the northwest corner of the compound wall, and a stoplight fixture adjacent to the service CAC provide footholds that an intruder could use to scale the compound wall. Embassy Bishkek should remove or relocate the concrete barrier, boulder, and stoplight that are adjacent to the embassy compound fence. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: In March Post relocated the concrete barriers and large boulders so that they are at least 2.75 meters from the compound wall and can no longer be used as a foothold. The location of the stoplight fixture will be relocated during the construction of the mantrap for that CAC later this year. 16. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 3: The rear hardline door leading to the temporary trailers is not covered by an exterior camera. The Marine at Post One cannot positively determine who he is letting into the chancery. Without a camera, he could either allow an intruder to enter or deny entry to a trusted employee in an emergency. Embassy Bishkek should install a camera to cover this area. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: The regional ESO from Astana concurs with this recommendation; ESO will relocate camera #28 so that it provides video coverage of this entrance to the Chancery. Additional materials required for this project are on-hand and this project has been added to the active work list as a priority. Targeted completion date is June 30th 17. (SBU) Informal Recommendation 4: The emergency plan for Embassy Bishkek has not been entered into the crisis and emergency planning application. Embassy Bishkek should direct section heads to input the missing data before February 2008. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: In February Post completed the unclassified portion of the EAP and entered it into the crisis and emergency planning application. Post is waiting for DS/IP/SPC/EP to advise that the software glitch has been fixed to allow Post to publish the classified sections as well. 18. (SBU) Informal Recommendation 5: The emergency notification system does not cover the embassy's built-in conference room or the workspace just outside the two CAA temporary office trailers. Embassy Bishkek should install speaker systems at these two locations. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: The regional ESO from Astana concurs with this recommendation; additional speakers and other materials required for this project are on-hand and this project has been added to the active work list as a priority. Targeted completion date is June 30th. 19. (SBU) Informal Recommendation 6: The physical security exceptions for three locations within the compound are not valid. Embassy Bishkek should update the existing physical security exceptions for the medical unit, cafeteria, and CAA office trailers. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: The waiver for exceptions to physical security standards for the CAA office trailer is valid. However, the Health Unit/Caf waiver is no longer valid. As a result of post growth, the Health Unit and Cafeteria are now staffed by employees more than 4 hours per day. Embassy Bishkek will resubmit a waiver and exception packet for the health unit/cafeteria. Targeted submission date is 30 June. 20. (U) Informal Recommendation 7: Several apartment stairwells do not have lighting at night. Embassy Bishkek should explore gaining landlord agreement to install motion activated lights in stairwells and issue flashlights to employees in the interim. Management decision: Post does not concur. Response: Post has conducted an informal survey of all direct hire American staff who receive Embassy provide housing and other than individual incidents of actual light bulbs being burned out, all stairwells have adequate lighting installed. In addition to this, every Friday, the Facilities Maintenance Section Electricians in conjunction with the Local Guard Force make inspections of existing security lighting. Lights are tested in guard booths and stairwells and any maintenance work orders that have been submitted citing security lighting issues are repaired at this time. 21. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 8: The grilles on the CMR rear doors do not have latches and cannot be secured from inside the residence. Embassy Bishkek should secure these grilles. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: RSO in conjunction with the FM at Post will review and update the existing physical security assessment of the CMR in accordance with residential security standards 12 FAH-6 H-400, 12 FAH-6 H-113.10 and 12 FAH-8 H-520. Any deficiencies discovered during this review will be corrected to conform to the standards. Expected completion date is 1 May 2008. 22. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 9: The passive infrared sensor in the living room of the CMR on the rear of the building is inoperative. Embassy Bishkek should repair this infrared sensor. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: The local security company that installs and maintains all of our residential alarm systems visited the CMR on March 19, 2008. The entire alarm system was inspected and tested. It was found that some faulty wiring was causing the infrared sensor from operating properly, wiring was repaired and a complete operational test was conducted with satisfactory results. YOVANOVITCH
R 061518Z JAN 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMCONSUL ISTANBUL INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA CIA WASHINGTON DC/DO/MSP-MCGSOC/ 2364 DIA WASHINGTON DC/ JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3SOD// HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL/ HQ EUCOM VAIHINGEN GE/ COMSOCEUR/ USASOC FT BRAGG NC/ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL S E C R E T STATE 000869 DDSO FOR CAPT. SONG USSOCOM FOR MR. BRIAN MILLER POST FOR RSO POST FOR IMO POST FOR ADANA PRETORIA FOR RIMC E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018 TAGS: ACOA AEMR AMGT ASEC SUBJECT: EUCOM(AF) REGIONAL SURVEY TEAM PCC ACCESS - AMEMBASSY ANKARA REF: A. USSOCOM SCSO J2 MACDILL AFB B. FL 111131Z DEC 08 C. 08 ANKARA 2153 Classified By: JAMES MCDERMOTT, DIRECTOR, DS/IP/SPC, REASON 1.4(G) 1. (U) ACTION POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS TELEGRAM VIA CABLE TO INFO DS/IP/SPC AND IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/CSB STATING CONCURRENCE AND/OR NONCONCURRENCE. 2. (U) FOR ATO AF: PLEASE FORWARD YOUR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION REQUEST TO IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/CSB AND INFO DS/IP/SPC. ANY FURTHER INQUIRIES CAN BE DIRECTED TO YOUR OC/COMSEC. 3. (U) IRM/BPC/CST/LD/OB AND IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/CSB HAVE CLEARED THIS TELEGRAM. 4. (S) THE FOLLOWING RST MEMBERS WILL VISIT AMEMBASSY ANKARA AS WELL AS CONSULATE GENERAL ISTANBUL AND US CONSULATE ADANA ON JANUARY 14, 2009 TO FEBRUARY 14, 2009 TO CONDUCT A SECURITY PROGRAM SURVEY OF THE FACILITY. THE FOLLOWING TEAM MEMBERS WHO POSSESS TOP SECRET (TS) CLEARANCES ARE AUTHORIZED ESCORTED ACCESS TO THE PCC IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5FAH-6 H124.4 E, G, H: NAME SSN CLEARANCE MANN, JAMES R. XXX-XX-XXXX TS/SCI MCKINNON, ISAIAH XXX-XX-XXXX TS/SCI DRAPER, DONALD W. XXX-XX-XXXX TS/SCI 5. (S) PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE PCC IS AUTHORIZED UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: (A) THE SHIELDED ENCLOSURE, MG SET, AC POWER FILTERS, AND ISOLATION TRANSFORMER ARE NOT TO BE FILMED OR PHOTOGRAPHED; THEREFORE, ARRANGE TO HAVE THIS EQUIPMENT COVERED DURING FILMING/PHOTOGRAPHY OF AREA. (B) ALL ELECTRONIC PROCESSING OF CLASSIFIED DATA MUST HALT DURING THE USE OF ANY ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT UTILIZED BY THE TEAM. (C) ANY VIDEO TAPE OR PHOTOS TAKEN WITHIN THE PCC SHALL BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL AND MARKED AND HANDLED AS SUCH. (D) PLAY BACK OF CLASSIFIED VIDEO/AUDIO TAPE MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A TEMPEST APPROVED MANNER. (E) CLASSIFIED PLAIN TEXT MUST BE SECURED AND THE SURVEY TEAM MUST REMAIN UNDER ESCORT BY PCC PERSONNEL. 6. (U) POC: DS/IP/SPC/SO: JAMES SPOO, BRANCH CHIEF, STE (571) 345-2532. RICE
VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #3578 0711843 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 121826Z MAR 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0000 INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0000 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0000 RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0000 S E C R E T STATE 023578 NOFORN SEOUL FOR RSO IMO AND ESO BEIJING FOR ESC MANILA FOR RDSE (ACTING) BANGKOK FOR RIMC SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON CLOSURE OF U.S. EMBASSY SEOUL TAGS: AADP ABLD ACOA AMGT ASEC KSEO KRIM KGIT KNET KCIP SUBJECT: TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES REQUIREMENTS - SEOUL REF: 00 STATE 126075 Classified By: M.J. STEAKLEY, DS/ST/CMP, REASON: 1.4 (C) AND (G) 1. (S/NF) These revised TEMPEST countermeasures requirements are effective immediately. Requirements apply to the Chancery at Seoul, located at 82 Sejong-ro. Post's relevant threat levels at the time of this telegram are High for Technical and High for Human Intelligence. 2. (S) TEMPEST requirements are determined by the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) and approved by the Countermeasures Division Director. These requirements apply to all information processing systems for this facility. A. (S) TOP SECRET and SCI CLASSIFIED Automated Information System (AIS): Post is authorized to use TEMPEST Level 1 AIS equipment for processing classified national security information (NSI) at the TOP SECRET or SCI level within the Embassy core area of the CAA. Post is authorized to use Commercial-off- the-Shelf (COTS) AIS equipment within a CSE or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. Use of higher level equipment is approved. B. (S) SECRET (COLLATERAL) CLASSIFIED (AIS): Seoul is authorized to use TEMPEST Level 1 AIS equipment for processing classified NSI at the SECRET level within restricted and core areas of the CAA. Post was previously authorized Zone A equipment, but that equipment category is being phased out and is no longer being procured. By October 1, 2013, Seoul must have replaced all Zone A classified processing equipment with TEMPEST Level 1 equipment. Post is authorized to use COTS AIS equipment within a certified shielded enclosure (CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. C. (S) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AIS: Use of COTS AIS for processing unclassified and sensitive but unclassified (SBU) within the Embassy restricted area and core area of the CAA is approved. Unclassified and multimedia equipped unclassified processing equipment to be used within a CAA must be purchased, shipped, stored, installed, maintained and repaired in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-542, and may not be located inside a CSE. 3. (S) Secure video teleconferencing (SVDC), if requested, will be addressed in a SEPTEL following completion of coordination with VCI/VO. 4. (S) All Classified Automated Information System (CAIS) equipment, components and peripherals must be secured in accordance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) requirements for classified discussion, processing and/or storage overseas. Thin Clients with embedded flash memory, at facilities with 24-hour cleared American presence, are permitted to remain unsecured within the Controlled Access Areas (CAA) as long as the equipment is rebooted prior to vacating the premises. 5. (S) Fiber optic cabling is required for classified connectivity. Fiber optic cabling is also required for unclassified (SBU) connectivity for any IT equipment located within a CSE. Equipment used to process classified information outside a CSE must be installed, to the maximum extent possible, in accordance with Recommendation A of NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95 with the following additional requirements: - Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical) from other computer and electronic equipment used for unclassified information processing. - Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical) from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded telephone or signal lines that do not leave USG-controlled property (for example, phone lines that go to the post phone switch). - Be located a minimum of two meters (six feet spherical) from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded telephone or signal lines that transit USG-controlled property (for example, direct phone lines that do not go through the post telephone switch, telephone switch lines going out, any wire going to antennas on the roof, etc). - Be located a minimum of 3 meters (ten feet spherical) from active radio transmitters (two-way radios, high frequency transceivers, satellite transceivers, cellular devices, Wi-Fi devices, Bluetooth, etc.) and must not use the same AC power circuit as active radio transmitters (to include cell phone chargers). - Be located a minimum of three meters (ten feet spherical) from cable television antenna feeds and any Warren switch with the switch on. This distance can be reduced to one meter if the Warren switch is off when processing classified. - Be located to have no physical contact with any other office equipment or cabling. 6. (S) Classified conversations up to SECRET may be conducted in the CAA offices or vaults in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-313.10-4. Classified discussions shall be conducted in CAA spaces with DS-approved acoustic countermeasures or in secure conference rooms (SCRs) or equivalent according to the OSPB Conduct of Classified Conversations standard. Classified conversations above the SECRET level are restricted to relevant core areas. 7. (U) All requirements apply to all agencies under Chief of Mission authority and pertain to the Chancery building only. Tenant agencies may employ additional TEMPEST countermeasures within their respective offices. 8. (U) For further information or clarification regarding 12 FAH-6 H-540 Automated Information Systems Standards, please contact DS/CS/ETPA. For other, TEMPEST related issues, please contact the Department CTTA at DSCTTA@state.sgov.gov. 9. (U) Post must verify that these TEMPEST countermeasures have been implemented and report so in an updated Technical Security Assessment (TSA). All proposed change requests to a CAA countermeasures environment must be sent to the Department, identified for DS/ST/CMP action. 10. (U) This telegram should be retained by Post until superseding requirements are received. CLINTON
VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #9526 0861053 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 271035Z MAR 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0000 INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0000 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0000 RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 0000 RUEHNW/DIR DTSPO WASHINGTON DC S E C R E T STATE 029526 NOFORN AMMAN FOR RSO IMO AND ESO ABU DHABI FOR ESC CAIRO FOR RDSE FRANKFURT FOR RIMC DTSPO FOR BRS/CMD/TCSC SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON CLOSURE OF U.S. EMBASSY AMMAN TAGS: AADP ABLD ACOA AMGT ASEC KSEO KRIM KGIT KNET KCIP SUBJECT: TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES REQUIREMENTS - AMMAN REF: A. 95 STATE 230596 B. 06 STATE 13022 Classified By: M.J. STEAKLEY, DS/ST/CMP, REASON: 1.4 (C) AND (G) 1. (S/NF) These revised TEMPEST countermeasures requirements are effective immediately. Requirements apply to the Chancery at Amman, Jordan, located at Abdoun, Al-Umawyeen Street, Amman, Jordan. Amman,s threat levels at the time of this telegram are MEDIUM for Technical and MEDIUM for Human Intelligence. 2. (S) TEMPEST requirements are determined by the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) and approved by the Countermeasures Division Director. These requirements apply to all information processing systems for this facility. A. (S) TOP SECRET and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) CLASSIFIED Automated Information System (AIS): Post is authorized to use TEMPEST Level 2 AIS equipment for processing classified national security information (NSI) at the TOP SECRET or SCI level within the Embassy core area of the controlled access area (CAA). Within a certified shielded enclosure (CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications, post is authorized to use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) AIS equipment. B. (S) SECRET (COLLATERAL) CLASSIFIED (AIS): Post is authorized to use TEMPEST Level 2 AIS equipment for processing classified NSI at the SECRET level within restricted and core areas of the CAA. Post is authorized to use COTS AIS equipment within a certified shielded enclosure (CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. NOTE: Post currently has COTS equipment installed for classified processing at the SECRET level outside of a CSE. This equipment must be replaced with TEMPEST Level 2 or TEMPEST Level 1 compliant AIS within 24 months of the date of this telegram. Effective immediately, all new procurements must be for TEMPEST Level 2 or TEMPEST Level 1 compliant equipment. C. (S) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AIS: Use of COTS AIS for processing unclassified and sensitive but unclassified (SBU) within the Embassy restricted and core area of the CAA is approved. Unclassified and multimedia-equipped unclassified processing equipment to be used within a CAA must be purchased, shipped, stored, installed, maintained and repaired in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-542, and may not be located inside a CSE. 3. (S) Secure video-teleconferencing and data collaboration (SVDC) system installation and operation was previously authorized in REFTEL (B). As a result of the TEMPEST requirements change announced in this telegram, the current SVDC equipment must either be replaced with TEMPEST Level 1 compliant equipment or the existing SVDC COTS equipment must be relocated and installed inside a CSE. Request that Post,s RSO notify DS/CMP/ECB within 60 days of this telegram whether SVDC equipment will remain in its current location and be upgraded to TEMPEST Level 1 or if the existing SVDC COTS equipment will be moved inside a CSE. Should Post decide to move the existing SVDC COTS equipment to a different location inside a CSE, a new SVDC check list must be prepared and submitted, and a new authorization telegram will be issued by DS/ST/CMP to formalize the decision. 4. (S) All Classified Automated Information System (CAIS) equipment, components and peripherals must be secured in accordance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) requirements for classified discussion, processing and/or storage overseas. Thin clients with embedded flash memory, at facilities with 24-hour cleared American presence, are permitted to remain unsecured within the CAA as long as the equipment is rebooted prior to vacating the premises. 5. (S) Fiber optic cabling is required for classified connectivity. Fiber optic cabling is also required for unclassified (SBU) connectivity for any information technology equipment located within a CSE. Equipment used to process classified information outside a CSE must be installed, to the maximum extent possible, in accordance with Recommendation E of NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95A with the following additional requirements: - Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical) from other computer and electronic equipment used for unclassified information processing. - Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical) from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded telephone or signal lines that do not leave USG-controlled property (for example, phone lines that go to the post phone switch). - Be located a minimum of two meters (six feet spherical) from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded telephone or signal lines that transit USG-controlled property (for example, direct phone lines that do not go through the post telephone switch, telephone switch lines going out, any wire going to antennas on the roof, etc). - Be located a minimum of 3 meters (ten feet spherical) from active radio transmitters (two-way radios, high frequency transceivers, satellite transceivers, cellular devices, Wi-Fi devices, Bluetooth, etc.) and must not use the same AC power circuit as active radio transmitters (to include cell phone chargers). - Be located a minimum of three meters (ten feet spherical) from cable television antenna feeds and any Warren switch with the switch on. This distance can be reduced to one meter if the Warren switch is off when processing classified. - Be located to have no physical contact with any other office equipment or cabling. 6. (S) Classified conversations up to SECRET may be conducted in the CAA offices or vaults in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-311.10-4. Classified conversations above the SECRET level are restricted to relevant core areas. 7. (U) All requirements apply to all agencies under Chief of Mission authority, and pertain to the Chancery building only. Tenant agencies may employ additional TEMPEST countermeasures within their respective offices. 8. (U) For further information or clarification regarding 12 FAH-6 H-540 Automated Information Systems Standards, please contact DS/CS/ETPA. For other TEMPEST-related issues, please contact Department CTTA at DSCTTA@state.sgov.gov. 9. (U) In accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-533.2, Post must verify that these TEMPEST countermeasures have been implemented; DS/ST/CMP requests Post report so in an updated Technical Security Assessment (TSA). All proposed change requests to a CAA countermeasures environment must be sent to the Department, identified for DS/ST/CMP action. 10. (U) This telegram should be retained by Post until superseding requirements are received. CLINTON
VZCZCXRO1998 RR RUEHCI DE RUEHC #9527/01 0861055 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 271037Z MAR 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 3202 INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 9276 RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0314 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3759 RUEHNW/DIR DTSPO WASHINGTON DC S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 029527 NOFORN KOLKATA FOR RSO AND IMO NEW DELHI FOR ESC AND RIMC MANILA FOR RDSE (ACTING) BANGKOK FOR RIMC DTSPO FOR BRS/CMD/TCSC SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON CLOSURE OF U.S. CONSULATE KOLKATA TAGS: AADP ABLD AMGT ACOA ASEC KSEO KRIM KGIT KNET KCIP SUBJECT: TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES REQUIREMENTS - KOLKATA REF: 94 STATE 261557 Classified By: M.J. STEAKLEY, DS/ST/CMP, REASON: 1.4 (C) AND (G) 1. (S/NF) These revised TEMPEST countermeasures requirements are effective immediately. Requirements apply to the Chancery at Kolkata, located at 5/1 Ho Chi Minh Sarani, Kolkata West Bengal, India. Kolkata,s relevant threat levels at the time of this telegram are Medium for Technical and Medium for Human Intelligence. 2. (S) TEMPEST requirements are determined by the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) and approved by the Countermeasures Division Director. These requirements apply to all information processing systems for this facility. A. (S) TOP SECRET and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) CLASSIFIED Automated Information System (AIS): Post is not currently authorized for processing classified national security information (NSI) at the TOP SECRET or SCI level. TEMPEST requirements will be provided for processing at this level once authorized. B. (S) SECRET (COLLATERAL) CLASSIFIED AIS: Post is authorized to use TEMPEST Zone B or TEMPEST Level 2 AIS equipment for processing classified NSI at the SECRET level within restricted and core areas of the controlled access area (CAA). Use of higher level equipment is approved. Post is authorized to use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) AIS equipment within a certified shielded enclosure (CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. NOTE: Post currently has Zone B compliant equipment installed for classified processing, and this equipment may continue to be used for processing at the SECRET level until September, 2011. All new procurements must be for TEMPEST Level 2 compliant equipment. By October 2011, all classified processing at Post must be on TEMPEST Level 2 equipment. Use of higher level equipment is approved. C. (S) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED (SBU) AIS: Use of COTS AIS for processing SBU information within the restricted and core area of the Embassy CAA is approved. 3. (S) Secret-High Video-teleconferencing and Data Collaboration (SVDC), if requested, will be addressed in a SEPTEL following completion of coordination with VCI/VO. 4. (S) All Classified Automated Information System (CAIS) equipment, components and peripherals must be secured in accordance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) requirements for classified discussion, processing and/or storage overseas. Thin clients with embedded flash memory, at facilities with a 24-hour cleared American presence, are permitted to remain unsecured within the CAA as long as the equipment is rebooted prior to vacating the premises. 5. (S) Fiber optic cabling is required for classified connectivity. Fiber optic cabling is also required for SBU connectivity for any information technology equipment located within a CSE. Equipment used to process classified information outside a CSE must be installed, to the maximum extent possible, in accordance with Recommendation E of NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95 with the following additional requirements: - Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical) from other computer and electronic equipment used for unclassified information processing. - Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical) from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded telephone or signal lines that do not leave USG-controlled property (for example, phone lines that go to the post phone switch). - Be located a minimum of two meters (six feet spherical) STATE 00029527 002 OF 002 from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded telephone or signal lines that transit USG-controlled property (for example, direct phone lines that do not go through the post telephone switch, telephone switch lines going out, any wire going to antennas on the roof, etc). - Be located a minimum of 3 meters (ten feet spherical) from active radio transmitters (two-way radios, high frequency transceivers, satellite transceivers, cellular devices, Wi-Fi devices, Bluetooth, etc.) and must not use the same AC power circuit as active radio transmitters (to include cell phone chargers). - Be located a minimum of three meters (ten feet spherical) from cable television antenna feeds and any Warren switch with the switch on. This distance can be reduced to one meter if the Warren switch is off when processing classified. - Be located to have no physical contact with any other office equipment or cabling. 6. (S) Classified conversations up to SECRET may be conducted in the CAA offices or vaults in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-312.10-4. Classified conversations above the SECRET level are restricted to relevant core areas. 7. (U) All requirements apply to all agencies under Chief of Mission authority and pertain to the Chancery building only. Tenant agencies may employ additional TEMPEST countermeasures within their respective offices. 8. (U) For further information or clarification regarding 12 FAH-6 H-540 Automated Information Systems Standards, please contact DS/CS/ETPA. For other TEMPEST-related issues, please contact the Department CTTA at DSCTTA@state.sgov.gov. 9. (U) In accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-533.2, Post must verify that these TEMPEST countermeasures have been implemented; DS/ST/CMP requests Post report so in an updated Technical Security Assessment (TSA). All proposed change requests to a CAA countermeasures environment must be sent to the Department, identified for DS/ST/CMP action. 10. (U) This telegram should be retained by Post until superseding requirements are received. CLINTON
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