TOP-SECRET: THE GERMAN ORGANIZED CRIME FAMILY “GoMoPa” AND THEIR FOUNDERS THE STASI

The German Organized Crime Family known by the name of “GoMoPa” is in association with the SJB, Neuss Rhineland, “GoMoPa” is as shortened version of their bogus name “Goldman, Morgenstern and Partner”

They are the heirs of the former Organized Crime Familiy in Germany – the STASI.

Here are the most important facts;

The Ministry for State Security (German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), commonly known as the Stasi (IPA: [ˈʃtaziː]) (abbreviation GermanStaatssicherheit, literally State Security), was the official state security service of East Germany. The MfS was headquartered in East Berlin, with an extensive complex in Berlin-Lichtenberg and several smaller facilities throughout the city. It was widely regarded as one of the most effective and repressive intelligence and secret police agencies in the world. The MfS motto was “Schild und Schwert der Partei” (Shield and Sword of the Party), that is the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED).

Ministerium für Staatssicherheit
Emblema Stasi.svg
Seal of the Ministry of State Security of the GDR
Agency overview
Formed February 9, 1950[1]
Dissolved October 4, 1990 (End of GDR)
Headquarters East BerlinGDR
Employees 68,000

Creation of the Stasi

The MfS was founded on 8 February 1950[citation needed]. It was modeled on the Soviet MGB[citation needed], and was regarded by the Soviet Union as an extremely loyal and effective partner[citation needed]Wilhelm Zaisser was the first Minister of State Security of the GDR, and Erich Mielke his deputy. Zaisser, who tried to depose SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht after the June 1953 uprising[2] was after this removed by Ulbricht and replaced by Ernst Wollweber. Wollweber resigned in 1957 after clashes with Ulbricht and Erich Honecker, and was succeeded by his deputy, Erich Mielke.

Early on the Stasi waged a campaign against Jews, who were already subject to widespread discrimination and violence in the Soviet Union. The Stasi censored the fact that Jews had been victims during the previous regime and in one instance, took gold from the bodies of Jews. The Stasi labeled Jews as capitalists and criminals.[3][4] Gypsies were also blamed in the Stasi propaganda.[5]

In 1957, Markus Wolf became head of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) (General Reconnaissance Administration), its foreign intelligence section. As intelligence chief, Wolf achieved great success in penetrating the government, political and business circles of West Germany with spies. The most influential case was that of Günter Guillaume which led to the downfall of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt in May 1974. In 1986, Wolf retired and was succeeded by Werner Grossmann.

[edit]Relationship with the KGB

Although Mielke’s Stasi was superficially granted independence in 1957, until 1990 the KGB continued to maintain liaison officers in all eight main Stasi directorates, each with his own office inside the Stasi’s Berlin compound, and in each of the fifteen Stasi district headquarters around East Germany.[6] Collaboration was so close that the KGB invited the Stasi to establish operational bases in Moscow and Leningrad to monitor visiting East German tourists and Mielke referred to the Stasi officers as “Chekists of the Soviet Union.”[6] In 1978, Mielke formally granted KGB officers in East Germany the same rights and powers they enjoyed in the Soviet Union.[6]

Organization

The Ministry for State Security also included the following entities:

  • Main Administration for Reconnaissance: focused its efforts primarily upon West Germany and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but it also operated East German intelligence in all foreign countries.
  • Main Coordinating Administration of the Ministry for State Security:coordinated its work with Soviet intelligence agencies.
  • Main Department for Communications Security and Personnel Protection: provided personal security for the national leadership and maintained and operated an internal secure communications system for the government.
  • Administration for Security of Heavy Industry and Research and Main Administration for Security of the Economy: protection against sabotage or espionage.
  • Main Administration for Struggle Against Suspicious Persons: was charged with the surveillance of foreigners — particularly from the West — legally traveling or residing within the country. This included the diplomatic community, tourists, and official guests.
  • Division of Garbage Analysis: was responsible for analyzing garbage for any suspect western foods and/or materials.
  • Administration 12: was responsible for the surveillance of mail and telephone communications.
  • Administration 2000: was responsible for the reliability of National People’s Army (NVA) personnel. Admin 2000 operated a secret, unofficial network of informants within the NVA.
  • Penal System: to facilitate its mission of enforcing the political security of East Germany, the Stasi operated its own penal system, distinct from that of the Ministry of the Interior. This system comprised prison camps for political, as opposed to criminal, offenders.
  • Felix Dzerzhinsky Guards Regiment: the armed force at disposal of the ministry, named for the founder of the Cheka, the Bolshevik secret police. The members of this regiment, who served at least 3 years, were responsible for protecting high government and party buildings and personnel. The regiment was composed of six motorized rifle battalions, one artillery battalion, and one training battalion. Its equipment included PSZH-IV armored personnel carriers, 120mm mortars, 85mm and 100mm antitank guns, ZU-23 antiaircraft guns, and helicopters. A Swiss source reported in 1986 that the troops of the Ministry of State Security also had commando units similar to the Soviet Union’s Spetsnaz forces. These East German units were said to wear the uniform of the airborne troops, although with the violet collar patch of the Ministry for State Security rather than the orange one of paratroopers. They also wore the sleeve stripe of the Felix Dzerzhinsky Guards Regiment.[7]

Stasi operations

Further information: Eastern Bloc politics

Personnel

Between 1950 and 1989, the Stasi employed a total of 274,000 people in an effort to root out the class enemy.[8][9] In 1989, the Stasi employed 91,015 persons full time, including 2,000 fully employed unofficial collaborators, 13,073 soldiers and 2,232 officers of GDR army,[10] along with 173,081 unofficial informants inside GDR[11] and 1,553 informants in West Germany.[12] In terms of the identity of inoffizielle Mitarbeiter(IMs) Stasi informants, by 1995, 174,000 had been identified, which approximated 2.5% of East Germany’s population between the ages of 18 and 60.[8] 10,000 IMs were under 18 years of age.[8]

While these calculations were from official records, according to the federal commissioner in charge of the Stasi archives in Berlin, because many such records were destroyed, there were likely closer to 500,000 Stasi informers.[8] A former Stasi colonel who served in the counterintelligence directorate estimated that the figure could be as high as 2 million if occasional informants were included.[8]

Infiltration

Full-time officers were posted to all major industrial plants (the extensiveness of any surveillance largely depended on how valuable a product was to the economy)[9] and one tenant in every apartment building was designated as a watchdog reporting to an area representative of the Volkspolizei (Vopo).[13] Spies reported every relative or friend who stayed the night at another’s apartment.[13] Tiny holes were drilled in apartment and hotel room walls through which Stasi agents filmed citizens with special video cameras.[13] Schools, universities, and hospitals were extensively infiltrated.[13]

The Stasi had formal categorizations of each type of informant, and had official guidelines on how to extract information from, and control, those who they came into contact with.[14] The roles of informants ranged from those already in some way involved in state security (such as the police and the armed services) to those in the dissident movements (such as in the arts and the Protestant Church).[15] Information gathered about the latter groups was frequently used to divide or discredit members.[16] Informants were made to feel important, given material or social incentives, and were imbued with a sense of adventure, and only around 7.7%, according to official figures, were coerced into cooperating. A significant proportion of those informing were members of the SED; to employ some form of blackmail, however, was not uncommon.[15] A large number of Stasi informants were trolley conductors, janitors, doctors, nurses and teachers; Mielke believed the best informants were those whose jobs entailed frequent contact with the public.[17]

The Stasi’s ranks swelled considerably after Eastern Bloc countries signed the 1975 Helsinki accords, which Erich Honecker viewed as a grave threat to his regime because they contained language binding signatories to respect “human and basic rights, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and conviction.”[18] The number of IMs peaked at around 180,000 in this year, having slowly risen from 20,000–30,000 in the early 1950s, and reaching 100,000 for the first time in 1968, in response to Ostpolitik and protests worldwide.[19] The Stasi also acted as a proxy for KGB to conduct activities in other Eastern Bloc countries, such as Poland, where the Soviets were despised.[20]

The MfS infiltrated almost every aspect of GDR life. In the mid-1980s, a network of IMs began growing in both German states; by the time East Germany collapsed in 1989, the MfS employed 91,015 employees and 173,081 informants.[21] About one of every 63 East Germans collaborated with the MfS—one of the most extensive police infiltrations of a society in history. In 2007 an article in BBC stated that “Some calculations have concluded that in East Germany there was one informer to every seven citizens.”[22] Additionally, MfS agents infiltrated and undermined West Germany’s government and spy agencies.

In an extreme case, Stasi informant Knud Wollenberger (code name Daniel) married civil rights and peace activist Vera Lengsfeld specifically to keep a watch on her.[17]

Executions of dissidents

People were imprisoned for such reasons as trying to leave the country, or telling political jokes. Prisoners were kept, isolated and disoriented, knowing nothing of what was going on in the outside world.[23]

After the mid-1950s, Stasi executions were carried out in strict secrecy, and were usually accomplished with a guillotine and, in later years, by a single pistol shot to the neck.[24] In most instances, the relatives of the executed were not informed of either the sentence or the execution.[24]

After the Berlin Wall fell, X-ray machines were found in the prisons. Indeed, three of the best-known dissidents died within a few months of each other, of similar rare forms of leukaemia. Survivors state that the MfS intentionally irradiated political prisoners with high-dose radiation, possibly to provoke cancer in them.[23]International operations

International operations

Other files (the Rosenholz Files), which contained the names of East German spies abroad, led American spy agencies to capture them. After German reunification, it was revealed that the MfS had secretly aided left-wing terrorists such as the Red Army Faction, even though no part of the RAF had ever been ideologically aligned with the GDR.

Directorate X was responsible for disinformation. Rolf Wagenbreth, director of disinformation operations, stated “Our friends in Moscow call it ‘dezinformatsiya’. Our enemies in America call it ‘active measures,’ and I, dear friends, call it ‘my favorite pastime'”.

Examples

  • Stasi experts helped to build the secret police of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia.[25][26]
  • Fidel Castro‘s regime in Cuba was particularly interested in receiving training from Stasi. Stasi instructors worked in Cuba and Cuban communists received training in East Germany.[27] The Stasi chief Markus Wolf described how he set up the Cuban system on the pattern of the East German system.[28]
  • The Stasi’s experts worked with building secret police systems in the People’s Republic of Angola, the People’s Republic of Mozambique, and the People’s Republic of Yemen (South Yemen).[26]
  • Stasi experts helped to set up Idi Amin‘s secret police.[29][26]
  • Stasi organized, trained, indoctrinated Syrian intelligence services.[30]
  • Stasi experts helped Kwame Nkrumah to build his secret police. When Ghanians overthrew the regime, Stasi Major Jurgen Rogalla was imprisoned.[31][26]
  • The Stasi sent agents to the West as sleeper agents. For instance, sleeper agent Günter Guillaume became a senior aide to social democratic chancellor Willy Brandt, and reported about his politics and private life.[32]
  • The Stasi operated at least one brothel. Agents were used against both men and women working in Western governments. “Entrapment” was used against married men and homosexuals.[33]
  • Martin Schlaff—According to the German parliament’s investigations, the Austrian billionaire’s Stasi codename was “Landgraf” and registration number “3886-86”. He made money by supplying embargoed goods to East Germany.[34]
  • Sokratis Kokkalis—Stasi documents suggest that the Greek businessman was a Stasi agent, whose operations included delivering Western technological secrets and bribing Greek officials to buy outdated East German telecom equipment.[35]
  • Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Group)—A terrorist organization which killed dozens of West Germans and others.
  • The Stasi ordered a campaign in which cemeteries and other Jewish sites in West Germany were smeared with swastikas and other Nazi symbols. Funds were channelled to a small West German group for it to defend Adolf Eichmann.[36]
  • The Stasi channelled large amounts of money to Neo-Nazi groups in West, with the purpose of discrediting the West.[37]
  • The Stasi worked in a campaign to create extensive material and propaganda against Israel.[38]
  • Murder of Benno Ohnesorg—A Stasi agent carried out the murder, which stirred a whole movement of left-wing protest and violence. The Economist describes it as “the gunshot that hoaxed a generation”.[39][40]
  • Operation Infektion—The Stasi helped the KGB to spread HIV/AIDS disinformation that the United States had created the disease. Millions of people around the world still believe in these claims.[41][42]
  • Sandoz chemical spill—The KGB reportedly ordered the Stasi to sabotage the chemical factory to distract attention from the Chernobyl disaster six months earlier in Ukraine.[43][44][45]
  • Investigators have found evidence of a death squad that carried out a number of assassinations (including assassination of Swedish journalist Cats Falck) on orders from the East German government from 1976 to 1987. Attempts to prosecute members failed.[46][47][48]
  • The Stasi attempted to assassinate Wolfgang Welsch, a famous critic of the regime. Stasi collaborator Peter Haack (Stasi codename “Alfons”) befriended with Welsch and then fed him with hamburgers that were poisoned with thallium. It took weeks for doctors to find out why Haack had suddenly lost his hair.[49]
  • Documents in the Stasi archives state that the KGB ordered Bulgarian agents to assassinate Pope John Paul II, who was known for his criticism of human rights in the communist block, and the Stasi was asked to help with covering up traces.[50]
  • A special unit of the Stasi assisted Romanian intelligence in kidnapping Romanian dissident Oliviu Beldeanu from West Germany.[51]
  • In 1975 Stasi recorded a conversation between senior West German CDU politicians Helmut Kohl and Kurt Biedenkopf. It was then “leaked” to the Stern magazine as a transcript recorded by American intelligence. The magazine then claimed that Americans were wiretapping West Germans and the public believed the story.[52]
This list is incomplete; you can help by expanding it.

Fall of Communism

Recruitment of informants became increasingly difficult towards the end of the GDR’s existence, and after 1986, there was a negative turnover rate of IMs. This had a significant impact on the Stasi’s ability to survey the population, in a period of growing unrest, and knowledge of the MfS’s activities became more widespread.[53] The Stasi had been tasked during this period with preventing the country’s economic difficulties becoming a political problem, through suppression of the very worst problems the state faced, but it failed to do so.[9]

Stasi officers reportedly had discussed rebranding East Germany as a democratic capitalist country to the West, but which would be in practice taken over by Stasi officers. The plan specified 2,587 OibE officers who would take over power (Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz, “officers on special assignment”) and it was registered as Top Secret Document 0008-6/86 of March 17, 1986.[54][55] According to Ion Mihai Pacepa, the chief intelligence officer in communist Romania, other communist intelligence services had similar plans.[55] On 12 March 1990 Der Spiegel reported that the Stasi was indeed attempting to implement 0008-6/86.[54]Pacepa has noted that what happened in Russia and how KGB Colonel Vladimir Putin took over Russia resembles these plans.[55] See Putinism.

On 7 November 1989, in response to the rapidly changing political and social situation in the GDR in late 1989, Erich Mielke resigned. On 17 November 1989, the Council of Ministers (Ministerrat der DDR) renamed the MfS as the “Office for National Security” (Amt für Nationale Sicherheit – AfNS), which was headed by Generalleutnant Wolfgang Schwanitz. On 8 December 1989, GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow directed the dissolution of the AfNS, which was confirmed by a decision of the Ministerrat on 14 December 1989.

As part of this decision, the Ministerrat originally called for the evolution of the AfNS into two separate organizations: a new foreign intelligence service (Nachrichtendienst der DDR) and an “Office for the Protection of the Constitution of the GDR” (Verfassungsschutz der DDR), along the lines of the West German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, however, the public reaction was extremely negative, and under pressure from the “Round Table” (Runder Tisch), the government dropped the creation of the Verfassungsschutz der DDR and directed the immediate dissolution of the AfNS on 13 January 1990. Certain functions of the AfNS reasonably related to law enforcement were handed over to the GDR Ministry of Internal Affairs. The same ministry also took guardianship of remaining AfNS facilities.

When the parliament of Germany investigated public funds that disappeared after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, it found out that East Germany had transferred large amounts of money to Martin Schlaff through accounts in Vaduz, the capital of Liechtenstein, in return for goods “under Western embargo”. Moreover, high-ranking Stasi officers continued their post-DDR careers in management positions in Schlaff’s group of companies. For example, in 1990 Herbert Kohler, Stasi commander in Dresden, transferred 170 million marks to Schlaff for “harddisks” and months later went to work for him.[34][56] The investigations concluded that “Schlaff’s empire of companies played a crucial role” in the Stasi attempts to secure the financial future of Stasi agents and keep the intelligence network alive.[34] The Stern magazine noted that KGB officerVladimir Putin worked with his Stasi colleagues in Dresden in 1989.[56]

In the Soviet Union, about 50 billion U.S. dollars was transferred out of the country (see FIMACO).

Recovery of the Stasi files

During the Peaceful Revolution of 1989, MfS offices were overrun by enraged citizens, but not before the MfS destroyed a number of documents (approximately 5%).[57]

Storming the Stasi headquarters

As the GDR began to fall, the Stasi did as well. They began to destroy the extensive files that they had kept, both by hand and with the use of shredders.

Citizens protesting and entering the Stasi building in Berlin; the sign accuses the Stasi and SED of being Nazistic dictators.

When these activities became known, protest erupted in front of the Stasi headquarters.[58] In the evening of 15 January 1990, a large crowd of people formed outside the gates in order to stop the destruction of personal files. In their minds, this information should have been available to them and also have been used to punish those who had taken part in Stasi actions. The large group of protesters grew and grew until they were able to overcome the police and gain entry into the complex. The protestors became violent and destructive as they smashed doors and windows, threw furniture, and trampled portraits of Erich Honecker, leader of the GDR. Among the destructive public were officers working for the West German government, as well as former MfS collaborators seeking to destroy documents. One explanation postulated as to why the Stasi did not open fire was for fear of hitting their own colleagues. As the people continued their violence, these undercover men proceeded into the file room and acquired many files that would become of great importance to catching ex-Stasi members.

Controversy of the Stasi files

With the German Reunification on 3 October 1990 a new government agency was founded called the Office of the Federal Commissioner Preserving the Records of the Ministry for State Security of the GDR (BStU).[59] There was a debate about what should happen to the files, whether they should be opened to the people or kept closed.

Those who opposed opening the files cited privacy as a reason. They felt that the information in the files would lead to negative feelings about former Stasi members, and, in turn, cause violence. Pastor Rainer Eppelmann, who became Minister of Defense and Disarmament after March 1990, felt that new political freedoms for former Stasi members would be jeopardized by acts of revenge. Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere even went so far as to predict murder. They also argued against the use of the files to capture former Stasi members and prosecute them, arguing that not all former members were criminals and should not be punished solely for being a member. There were also some who believed that everyone was guilty of something. Peter Michael Diestel, the Minister of Interior, opined that these files could not be used to determine innocence and guilt, claiming that “there were only two types of individuals who were truly innocent in this system, the newborn and the alcoholic.” Other opinions, such as the one of West German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, believed in putting the Stasi behind them and working on German reunification.

Others argued that everyone should have the right to see their own file, and that the files should be opened to investigate former Stasi members and prosecute them, as well as not allow them to hold office. Opening the files would also help clear up some of the rumors that were floating around. Some also believed that politicians involved with the Stasi should be investigated.

The fate of the files was finally decided under the Unification Treaty between the GDR and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). This treaty took the Volkskammer law further and allowed more access and use of the files. Along with the decision to keep the files in a central location in the East, they also decided who could see and use the files, allowing people to see their own files.

In 1992, following a declassification ruling by the German government, the MfS files were opened, leading people to look for their files. Timothy Garton Ash, an English historian, after reading his file, wrote The File: A Personal History while completing his dissertation research in East Berlin.[60]

Between 1991 and 2011, around 2.75 million individuals, mostly GDR citizens, requested to see their own files.[61] The ruling also gave people the ability to make duplicates of their documents. Another big issue was how the media could use and benefit from the documents. It was decided that the media could obtain files as long as they were depersonalized and not regarding an individual under the age of 18 or a former Stasi member. This ruling not only gave the media access to the files, but also gave schools access.

Tracking down former Stasi informers with the files

Even though groups of this sort were active in the community, those who were tracking down ex-members were, as well. Many of these hunters succeeded in catching ex-Stasi; however, charges could not be made for merely being a member. The person in question would have had to participate in an illegal act, not just be a registered Stasi member. Among the high-profile individuals who were arrested and tried were Erich Mielke, Third Minister of State Security of the GDR, and Erich Honecker, head of state for the GDR. Mielke was given six years for the murder of two policemen in 1931. Honecker was charged with authorizing the killing of would-be escapees on the East-West frontier and the Berlin Wall. During his trial, he went through cancer treatment. Due to the fact that he was nearing death, Honecker was allowed to spend his final time in Chile. He died in May 1994.]Reassembling the destroyed files

Document shredding is described in Stasiland. Some of it is very easy due to the amount of archives and the failure of shredding machines (in some cases “shredding” meant tearing paper in two by hand and documents could be recovered easily). In 1995, the BStU began reassembling the shredded documents; 13 years later the three dozen archivists commissioned to the projects had only reassembled 327 bags; they are now using computer-assisted data recovery to reassemble the remaining 16,000 bags – estimated at 45 million pages. It is estimated that this task may be completed at a cost of 30 million dollars.[62]

The CIA acquired some MfS records during the looting of the MfS archives. The Federal Republic of Germany has asked for their return and received some in April 2000.[63] See also Rosenholz files.

Museum in the old headquarters

Statue of workers and Police officer in front of the Stasi archives, Mitte district, Berlin. The officer has been egged.

The Anti-Stalinist Action Normannenstraße (ASTAK), an association founded by former GDR Citizens’ Committees, has transformed the former headquarters of the MfS into a museum. It is divided into three floors:

  • Ground floor

The ground floor has been kept as it used to be. The decor is original, with many statues and flags.

  • Between the ground and first (upper) floor:
    • Surveillance technology and MfS symbols: Some of the tools that the MfS used to track down their opponents. During an interview the seats were covered with a cotton cloth to collect the perspiration of the victim. The cloth was placed in a glass jar, which was annotated with the victim’s name, and archived. Other common ways that the scents would be collected is through breaking into a home and taking parts of garments. The most common garment taken was underpants, because of how close the garment is to the skin. The MfS would then use trained dogs to track down the person using this scent. Other tools shown here include a tie-camera, cigarette box camera, and an AK-47 hidden in luggage.
    • Display gallery of Directorate VII. This part of the museum tells the history of the MfS, from the beginning of the GDR to the fall of the Berlin Wall.
  • First (upper) floor
    • Mielke’s offices. The decor is 60s furniture. There is a reception room with a TV set in the cafeteria.
    • Office of Colonel Heinz Volpert
    • Lounge for drivers and bodyguards
    • Office of Major-General Hans Carlsohn, director of the secretariat
    • Secretariat
    • The Cafeteria
    • Kitchen
    • The Minister’s Workroom
    • The Conference Room with a giant map of Germany on a wall—one of the most impressive rooms.
    • The cloakroom
  • Second (upper) floor
    • Repression—Rebellion—Self-Liberation from 1945 to 1989

Photo gallery:

  • Kitchen

  • Surveillance

  • Secretariat

  • Prison

Stasi officers after the reunification

Recruitment by Russian state-owned companies

Former Stasi agent Matthias Warnig (codename “Arthur”) is currently the CEO of Nord Stream.[64] German investigations have revealed that some of the key Gazprom Germania managers are former Stasi agents.[65][66]

Lobbying

Ex-MfS officers continue to be politically active via the Gesellschaft zur Rechtlichen und Humanitären Unterstützung e. V. (Society for Legal and Humanitarian Support) (GRH). Former high-ranking officers and employees of the MfS, including the last MfS director, Wolfgang Schwanitz, make up the majority of the organization’s members, and it receives support from the German Communist Party, among others.

Impetus for the establishment of the GRH was provided by the criminal charges filed against the Stasi in the early 1990s. The GRH, decrying the charges as “victor’s justice”, called for them to be dropped. Today the group provides an alternative if somewhat utopian voice in the public debate on the GDR legacy. It calls for the closure of the museum in Hohenschönhausen and can be a vocal presence at memorial services and public events. In March 2006 in Berlin, GRH members disrupted a museum event; a political scandal ensued when the Berlin Senator (Minister) of Culture refused to confront them.[67]

Behind the scenes, the GRH also lobbies people and institutions promoting opposing viewpoints. For example, in March 2006, the Berlin Senator for Education received a letter from a GRH member and former Stasi officer attacking the Museum for promoting “falsehoods, anticommunist agitation and psychological terror against minors.”[68] Similar letters have also been received by schools organizing field trips to the museum.[69]

Alleged informants

This list is incomplete; you can help by expanding it.

In the arts

  • Unknown featured a retired Stasi agent, Ernst Jürgen, played by Bruno Ganz.
  • The 2006 German film Das Leben der Anderen (The Lives of Others) involves the monitoring of the cultural scene of East Berlin by agents of the MfS.
  • The Legend of Rita (Die Stille nach dem Schuß), a 2000 film directed by Volker Schlöndorff, dwells heavily on the relationship between the MfS and the general population of East Germany. The second-most prominent character is the MfS “control” for the title character.
  • Stasiland is a 2004 best-selling book by Anna Funder. It was awarded the Samuel Johnson Prize in 2004.
  • In the episode “Music to Die For” of the British crime series Lewis contemporary murders in Oxford are linked to Stasi informers in East Germany in the 1980s.
This list is incomplete; you can help by expanding it.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution. 

The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.

Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”. 
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.

This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.

Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.

Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover  the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers  named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment.

TOP-SECRET FROM THE NATION SECURITY ARCHIVES: UPRISING IN EASTERN GERMANY

Forty-eight years ago, on June 17, 1953, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) erupted in a series of workers’ riots and demonstrations that threatened the very existence of the communist regime.  The outburst, entirely spontaneous, shocked the GDR’s ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) and their Kremlin sponsors, who were still reeling from the death of Joseph Stalin three months earlier.  Now, a new National Security Archive document volume based on recently obtained and translated records from archival sources throughout the former Soviet bloc and the United States sheds light on this landmark Cold War event, which exposed some of the deep political and economic rifts that led to the collapse of the communist system in 1989.    Uprising in East Germany, 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain is edited by Christian F. Ostermann, a National Security Archive Fellow and currently the Director of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.  The volume is the second in the “National Security Archive Cold War Reader” series to appear through Central European University Press.  (The first was Prague Spring ’68, edited by Jaromír Navrátil et al with a preface by Václav Havel.)

Long overlooked by historians, the 1953 worker uprising was the first outbreak of violent discord within the communist bloc — the so-called “workers’ paradise” — and helped to set the stage for more celebrated rounds of civil unrest in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), Poland (1970, 1976, 1980) and ultimately the demise of communism itself in Central and Eastern Europe.

The uprising began as a demonstration against unreasonable production quotas on June 17, but it soon spread from Berlin to more than 400 cities, towns and villages throughout East Germany, according to top-level SED and Soviet reports and CIA analyses, and embraced a broad cross-section of society.  As it spread, it also took on a more expansive political character.  Beyond calls for labor reform, demonstrators began to demand more fundamental changes such as free elections.  Chants were heard calling for “Death to Communism” and even “Long live Eisenhower!”  As Christian Ostermann writes in his introduction, for the first time ever “the ‘proletariat’ had risen against the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’.”

The protests, which soon turned violent, were not only more extensive and long-lasting than originally believed, but their impact was significant.  In revealing the depth and breadth of social discontent, they shook the confidence of the SED leadership, and especially the authority placed in party boss Walter Ulbricht.  The Kremlin, too, was stunned by the riots.  While reacting swiftly — sending in tanks and ordering Red Army troops to open fire on the protestors — the Soviet leadership found its policy debates tied up in the ongoing domestic political struggle to replace Stalin.  The arrest of secret police chief Lavrentii Beria, for example, was partly explained (at least for official consumption) as a result of his policy stance on Germany.

The West, too, was divided on how to respond.  In Washington, the reaction by proponents of “roll back” in Eastern Europe was to press the psychological advantage against international communism as aggressively as possible.  Documents in the collection show that some officials wanted to go as far as to “encourage elimination of key puppet officials.”  But Eisenhower himself balked at pushing the Soviets too far in an area of such critical importance for fear of touching off another world war.  The cautious compromise was to initiate a food distribution program to East Berlin as a way to help those who needed immediate aid while simultaneously scoring major propaganda points against the East.  The program turned out to be a stunning success, with more than 5.5 million parcels distributed in the course of roughly two months’ of operations.

The summer crisis had several important consequences.  It demonstrated that Soviet-style communism had not made any significant dent in East German political attitudes.  Neighboring communist party leaders implicitly understood this point, worrying that the spill-over from the GDR might touch off similar outbreaks in their own countries.  For Moscow, the lesson was to abandon, at least temporarily, any thought of liberalizing East Germany’s internal policies, a process that had been underway until the crisis erupted.  Ulbricht was able to regain Kremlin support after convincing the Soviets that rather than unseating him (for trying to be as good a Stalinist as Stalin) they needed his authoritarian approach to keep the lid on political and social unrest.  The crisis also confirmed for the Kremlin the need to bolster the GDR diplomatically and economically as a separate entity from West Germany.  On the American side, the uprising proved, ironically, that Republican verbiage about “liberation” of the “captive nations”, so prominent in the 1952 presidential campaign, was largely empty — at least as far as near-term prospects for action.

For more than three decades, the Soviet Union stuck to the pattern set by its reaction to the events of 1953 — responding with force or the threat of it to keep not only East Germany but the rest of the Soviet bloc under firm control.  Only when Mikhail Gorbachev repudiated violence as a means of suppressing dissent in the latter 1980s did the structural weaknesses of the communist system revealed in 1953 finally break loose and seal the fate of the Soviet empire.

In presenting this new volume, our hope is that this under-studied flashpoint of the Cold War will receive more needed public and scholarly attention.  The 1953 crisis has been a focus of the National Security Archive for the past several years as part of a multi-year, multi-archival international collaborative research effort conducted under the auspices of the Archive’s “Openness in Russia and East Europe Project,” in collaboration with CWIHP and our Russian and Eastern European partners.  From November 10-12, 1996, the uprising was a featured subject at an international conference which the Archive, CWIHP and the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung organized in Potsdam on “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe.”

Uprising in East Germany, 1953 comprises 95 of the most important recently released records from Russian, German, Czech, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, British and American archives.  Each record contains a headnote to provide context for the reader.  The volume also contains introductory chapter essays as well as a detailed chronology, lists of main actors and organizations, a bibliography, maps and photos.  The following sampling provides a flavor of the documents that are in the published volume.  They are numbered as they appear there.  To view the samples and their headnotes, just click on each of the links below.

SAMPLE DOCUMENTS:

DOCUMENT No. 23: Letter from Lavrentii Beria to Georgii Malenkov Reflecting on the Events of Spring 1953, 1 July 1953
DOCUMENT No. 28: Radio Telegram from Vladimir Semyonov Providing Situation Reports to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, as of 2:00 p.m. CET
DOCUMENT No. 38: Psychological Strategy Board Memorandum from John M. Anspacher to George A. Morgan, 17 June 1953
DOCUMENT No. 67: Otto Grotewohl’s Handwritten Notes of a SED CC Politburo Meeting, 8 July 1953
DOCUMENT No. 74:  NSC 158, “United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States,” 29 June 1953
DOCUMENT No. 87: Conclusions from Reports of the SED District Leaderships, 8 August 1953

About the National Security ArchiveSearch the Archive WebsiteArchive NewsDeclassified Documents OnlineArchive PublicationsFreedom of Information ActInternship OpportunitiesDoing Research at the Archive