C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000766 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF HA BF SUBJECT: BAHAMAS UNLIKELY TO PRESSURE ARISTIDE Classified By: DCM Robert M. Witajewski, Reasons 1.5(b) and (d) Summary ¶1. (C) After returning from the OAS/CARICOM meeting on Haiti in Miami, Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell dismissed the possibility of invoking the democracy provision of the OAS Charter in the case of Haiti. He acknowledged problems with democracy in Haiti, but made it clear that the Bahamian government preferred continued engagement with President Aristide to any type of public confrontation. He also announced a decision to provide $500,000 in economic assistance to Haiti, while admitting that it would not do much good if the political situation did not improve. Mitchell's main concern is doing whatever he can to slow down illegal immigration from Haiti - a key domestic political imperative - and he has been fruitlessly pursuing an immigration accord with the Government of Haiti for several months. A high official at the Foreign Ministry, although he proclaimed himself "not competent" to comment on Haiti policy (or much of anything else), confirmed that Haiti believes it must stay engaged with the Aristide government to prevent a mass migration. End Summary. Democracy in Crisis... ¶2. (U) Upon his return from Miami, Foreign Minister Mitchell discussed the situation there with the press. He admitted that the CARICOM Foreign Ministers were "frustrated with the situation in Haiti, and said that Aristide had put the international community "in a difficult position" by not living up to his commitments. He spoke frankly about Haiti's failure to: select an appropriate police commissioner, arrest an important fugitive involved in political violence, and plan for elections. While he placed some of the blame for the lack of progress toward a political solution on the opposition, he acknowledged the government's greater share of blame and discussed the reasons why the opposition might feel threatened and unwilling to make concessions. ... But Need to Give Aristide Another Chance ¶3. (U) However, Mitchell went on to say that he thought it was "likely that the deadline will be extended," and Aristide should be given yet another chance to meet his commitments. He pointed out that The Bahamas, in his opinion has no choice: "We cannot afford to disengage from Haiti because disengaging for us is not an option." According to Mitchell, the issue of Haitian migrants and the potential for mass migration is the key issue for The Bahamas. Such a mass migration must be prevented at all costs, and Mitchell made it clear that he believed the best way to do that was continued engagement with the Aristide government in an attempt to improve Haiti's political and economic situation. ¶4. (U) Mitchell was dismissive of the possibility of invoking the democracy provisions of the OAS Charter, saying that although "Some people argue that's the case in Haiti ... I think that is taking it a little bit too far." He described the U.S. position on Haiti as "hard-minded", and called for continued dialogue. Mitchell also announced a $500,000 economic assistance package for Haiti. In announcing it, he acknowledged that the assistance would likely not do much good unless the political impasse were resolved. Mitchell defended the package, however, by reiterating that the Government of the Bahamas must do whatever it can to improve the economic situation in Haiti because of the impact The Bahamas would likely feel if further economic and political crisis resulted in a mass migration. He made it very clear that this is the paramount issue for The Bahamas. Who Is Competent Then? ¶5. (C) DCM and POL/ECON section chief raised the issue of Haiti with Ministry of Foreign Affairs Undersecretary for Political Affairs Marco Rolle in an April 15 meeting requested by Rolle to go over the list of pending items between the Embassy and the MFA. Rolle, despite being the number three official at the Ministry of Embassy (he is the Bahamian equivalent of Undersecretary Grossman) and having accompanied Mitchell to both Miami and the press conference, told us that he "was not competent" to talk about Haiti policy with us. He couldn't even confirm any details about the aid package the Minister had announced in his presence. Nor could he comment on progress made toward an immigration accord with Haiti or the upcoming visit by Mitchell to Haiti in late March beyond confirming the dates (May 22-23). The one specific response we received to a question was whether or not Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell planned to make any trips or telephone calls to Haitian counterparts prior to the April 30 OAS meeting in Washington. The answer is: No. Consistently Not Competent ¶6. (C) Inability to provide specific responses to queries was a consistent theme of our conversation with Rolle. Of the fifteen pending items on our agenda, he was unable to comment meaningfully on any single one of them, and could not point to MFA progress in resolving any of the issues which have been pending anywhere from 2-3 weeks (dip notes regarding a trade dispute, RBDF training and a proposal to form an anti-alien-smuggling task force) to 6 years (request for a bilateral work agreement). Rolle, a career civil servant with no background in foreign affairs, has only been with the ministry for about seven months, so it can be understood that he might not be familiar with every issue, but we would think he could do better than 0 for 15. The Bahamian civil service has honed sloth and delay disguised as deliberation and consensus-building to a fine art. Comment ¶7. (C) We believe the bottom line for The Bahamas on Haiti is their fear of mass migration and doing anything that might trigger an outflow. Mitchell in particular has made conclusion of an immigration agreement his top foreign policy priority. Our sources in the Immigration Department tell us the negotiations are not going well, stalled over Haitian insistence on an amnesty for the 30,000 - 100,000 Haitians already in The Bahamas (most illegally). Such a concession would be suicide for Mitchell in the xenophobic Bahamian political landscape. Pursuit of this agreement and any other means to slow down migration will continue to push any concerns for democracy and human rights into the backseat. While The Bahamas will remain engaged on Haiti, the Christie government will resist any effort to put real teeth into any diplomatic effort to pressure President Aristide, preferring (endless) conversation and dialogue to the alternative. BLANKENSHIP
Tag: president aristide
CONFIDENTIAL: BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000384 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2014 TAGS: BF HA PGOV PREL SMIG SUBJECT: BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON HAITI REF: A) NASSAU 211 B) NASSAU 212 C) NASSAU 263 D) NASSAU 322 E) NASSAU 364 Classified By: Charge Abdelnour Zaiback for reasons 1.5 (B) and 1.5 (D) - - - - SUMMARY - - - - 1) (C) On February 24, Acting Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Marilyn Zonicle separately demarched each UN Security Council member with representation in The Bahamas for support for a possible UN Security Council meeting on Haiti that may be requested by Jamaica Prime Minister Patterson as early as Thursday. The original plan was to request the Security Council to meet on February 25 on Haiti, however, President Aristide asked that the meeting be deferred for 24 hours while he pursued the ongoing negotiations. For its part, The Bahamas seeks the active support of the U.S. as the "most important" member of the Security Council as it engages on a full scale diplomatic press to achieve peace in Haiti. If diplomacy fails, The Bahamas believes that military assistance will be essential, and is willing to contribute troops to a multinational effort to maintain law and order. END SUMMARY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - FOREIGN MINISTER MITCHELL ON STAND BY TO NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2) (C) Anticipating that Prime Minister Patterson would make the request for the Security Council to hold a special session on Haiti tomorrow, FM Mitchell had already packed his bags and made plans to fly to New York tonight. Patterson and CARICOM delayed making the request for the session only because Aristide convinced them that the opposition and rebels could still agree to CARICOM's peace plan. However, as the situation on the ground in Haiti continues to deteriorate, Zonicle anticipates that Mitchell will fly to New York tomorrow for a requested Security Council special session on Thursday. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SIX TALKING POINTS FOR PROJECTED SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3) (C) Follows are the six talking points presented to Charge. i) (C) Pending the outcome of the OAS/CARICOM-sponsored negotiations between the Government and the Opposition in Haiti, the CARICOM countries may request the convening of an emergency meeting of the Security Council to address the matter, considering the deteriorating situation in that country and the inability of the Haitian National Police (HNP) to deal with the insurgency. ii) (C) An open debate in the Security Council would allow it to pronounce on the matter and would provide Haiti with the opportunity to request military/police assistance, and, perhaps, increased humanitarian assistance, as may be necessary. Haiti is reluctant to take the matter to the Security Council before the current political negotiations have been exhausted and wishes to avoid the matter being dealt with on "parallel tracks" by OAS/CARICOM and the UN. iii) (C) While France has indicated a willingness to send military assistance to Haiti, the specter of French troops in Haiti at this time is a very sensitive issue, particularly as France is the former colonizer and Haiti is currently "celebrating" the 200th anniversary of discarding that yoke. A joint dispatch under the UN banner would be more palatable. iv) (C) With the United Nations, CARICOM Ambassadors are seeking the support of the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC) for the initiative and a meeting of the GRULAC to discuss the matter is being convened Wednesday afternoon. Brazil and Chile, the two members of GRULAC on the Security Council have indicated their support for the initiative. Other member of the GRULAC that have voiced strong support are Mexico and Venezuela. v) (C) Beyond the GRULAC, CARICOM Ambassadors are in touch with Canada and France, as well as with President of the GA, Ambassador Colin Granderson of the CARICOM Secretariat, and the other Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs in seeking to garner support for the initiative and move it forward, as appropriate. vi) (C) It has been said, although not officially announced that, Ambassador Reggie Dumas, of Trinidad and Tobago, has been appointed as the Special Advisor on Haiti by the UN Secretary-general. Perhaps, the stigma of a direct request from Haitian authorities for military assistance could be alleviated by having the request channeled through the Special Advisor. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - BAHAMAS VIEW ON OUTSIDE INTERVENTION CLARIFIED - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4) (C) Charge and Political Chief sought clarification on Mitchell's vision for outside intervention. In recent days Mitchell has made several statements that international support for Haiti's police was crucial, including "to disarm the rebels if they did not disarm themselves." Zonicle relayed that the first priority of The Bahamas is the principles in the CARICOM proposal, most notably reinforcing the ability of the Haitian police to maintain law and order. However, if this fails, Zonicle reiterated Mitchell's oft stated plea of late, that "law and order must be restored." Zonicle volunteered that The Bahamas was prepared to contribute troops, "perhaps as many as 100." While the preferred mechanism is the United Nations, Zonicle confirmed Mitchell's view that any outside intervention would be preferable to continued and increased chaos. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - BAHAMIAN AMBASSADOR TO CARICOM SEEKS INSIGHTS ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPPOSITION AND REBELS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5) (C) Ambassador to CARICOM Leonard Archer sought Charge's insight on the relationship between the rebels and the opposition, but in the exchange of views it became clear that all sides knew about the same. Several rebel leaders have connections with the former military. While the opposition may currently feel that they are the beneficiaries of rebel activity, they may soon learn that "the enemy of my enemy is not always my friend." Archer is an experienced diplomat who has studied Haiti at length. - - - - COMMENT - - - - 6) (C) As reported reftels, The Bahamas is seized on the Haitian crisis. It is certainly Foreign Minister Mitchell's dominant preoccupation. It is also clear that The Bahamas regards U.S. leadership and engagement on Haiti as crucial to any peaceful outcome. As has also become increasingly explicit in Mitchell's recent statements, while The Bahamas and CARICOM lobby for peace, they have concluded that a peaceful outcome without international intervention is increasingly unlikely. WITAJEWSKI
CONFIDENTIAL: CARICOM SURPRISED, UPSET, BUT NOT ANGRY BEING LEFT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000487 SIPDIS NSC FOR TOM SHANNON E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV SMIG HA BF SUBJECT: CARICOM SURPRISED, UPSET, BUT NOT ANGRY BEING LEFT OUT OF ARISTIDE'S DEPARTURE Classified By: CHARGE ROBERT M. WITAJEWSKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). SUMMARY - - - - ¶1. (C) Charge and Political Officer met with the Bahamian Ambassador to Haiti, Dr. Eugene Newry, and the Under Secretary in the Consular Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Bahamian-Haitian expert, Mr. Carlton Wright, on March 8, 2004 to discuss Bahamian views of the current situation in Haiti. Ambassador Newry claimed that Caricom is not "angry" with the U.S. involvement in the departure of Aristide, but rather was "surprised" by the abrupt decision-making, and Caricom's lack of involvement. Newry downplayed incendiary phrases in Caricom's statement on Haiti such as expressing "alarm and dismay" as matter-of-fact descriptions of members' disappointment, but on a positive note he was quick to say that Caricom will be satisfied as long as their 10-point action plan remains the basis for post-Aristide Haiti and is implemented "as quickly and painlessly as possible." Only history, declared Newry, can determine whether or not ex-President Aristide left voluntarily, because neither he (i.e., The Bahamas) nor his regional colleagues were involved in that process. Bahamian officials were extremely complimentary and positive about joint U.S.-Bahamian efforts to deter or interdict intending Haitian immigrants. END SUMMARY. "LIKE A RIVER, THINGS MUST MOVE ON" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) At a meeting with the Charge, Bahamian Ambassador to Haiti, Dr. Eugene Newry, characterized Caricom's harshly worded "Statement on the Situation in Haiti" as "frank," but was not a message of "anger." In fact, he said he and fellow Bahamian officials were quite pleased that changes being implemented now in Haiti, such as the Tripartite Council and the Council of Eminent Persons, come straight from the 10-Point Caricom Plan for Haiti. In Newry's opinion, the only place in which Caricom has disagreed with the Opposition was in its desire for the Democratic Platform to be the only political group. ¶3. (C) Although Ambassador Newry suggested that Caricom's members were irritated with the lack of consultation and the abruptness by which Aristide left office, he also indicated that Caricom is pleased, nonetheless, that its plan is apparently still being implemented. As he put it, "a rose by any other name is still a rose." He said he will leave it to the historians to determine what exactly happened on the night Aristide fled Haiti. However, he concluded, Caricom needs to get over its pique because "like a river, things must move on", and he understood that Haiti cannot advance without the help that only the United States with the ancillary support of other "major powers" such as Canada and France could deliver. WHEN WILL CARICOM RE-ENGAGE? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) When asked at what The Bahamas would "re-engage" in Haiti, Ambassador Newry ardently argued that neither Caricom nor The Bahamas has ever "disengaged" from Haiti. He stressed that he only left Haiti for "consultations" with the Bahamian Government, and that as the only Caricom ambassador actually resident in Haiti, he plans to return "shortly." When pressed, however, Ambassador Newry acknowledged that he couldn't define a time frame. But, he hastened to add, from Nassau he was in "daily contact" with Ambassador Foley and both pro-Aristide and opposition figures in Haiti. ¶5. (C) From a personnel standpoint, Ambassador Newry admitted that Caricom would not be involved in the initial multinational interim force in Haiti, but said that Caricom would be willing to participate -- if only symbolically -- in the follow-on stabilization UN presence. He thinks that this stabilization phase could start as early as the next 60 days. INTERIM HAITIAN GOVERNMENT - NOT TOO SHABBY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Ambassador Newry told Charge and political officer that he was pleasantly surprised with the transition now occurring. He indicated that it was a good sign that the Haitian people overall had focused their mistrust and dislike on the ex-President. He said that his contacts with the opposition has assured him that they would continue to work with the Lavalas party and that the party itself had not been tainted by the same image of corruption as was ex-President Aristide. Newry also found to be positive the fact that the interim government retained some of the people closely associated with ex-President Aristide in positions of power. Ambassador Newry took this as a sign of good faith on the part of the opposition. ¶7. (C) Discussing the composition of the interim authority, Ambassador Newry was optimistic. He knew personally and professionally many of the members of the Tripartite Committee as well as the Council of Eminent Persons and considered them of high calibre. He also considered it an asset that these individuals were not predominantly attorneys, but rather surgeons, sociologists, and other professionals. ¶8. (C) The Bahamian representative in Haiti believed that it would be premature to try to hold elections in the near future. In his view, he thought that it would take at least 90 days for the interim government to re-establish itself. Newry did not believe that the country's political parties would be prepared to hold meaningful elections for at least twelve to eighteen months, at best. ¶9. (C) Asked about the danger of the interim authority using the period until elections to consolidate its power and thereby arrange to win the forthcoming elections, Ambassador Newry said that this had been anticipated by Caricom in its action plan. As a consequence, one of the key elements in Caricom's action plan was a stipulation that no one in the transitional government in Haiti can run for office once the permanent government is established. Ambassador Newry saw this provision as a "sign of maturity" and a way to prevent innumerable problems. U.S.- BAHAMIAN COOPERATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) Turning to U.S.-Bahamian cooperation to prevent an outflow of Haitian migrants to either The Bahamas or to the United States, the Bahamian Foreign Ministry officials were effusive in their praise of the current effort. The U.S., and Bahamian, presence in the Windward Passage had "never been so successful" in deterring an outflow of illegal migrants, Newry declared. While noting the costs of such an on-going operation, both Newry and Wright acknowledged that it was still much less expensive for The Bahamas that would be the total costs of detaining, maintaining, and then re-patriating illegal Haitian migrants once they reached The Bahamas. COMMENT - - - - ¶10. (C) Ambassador Newry was perhaps overreaching in trying to put a positive spin on Caricom's March 3 statement on Haiti and reflecting more of the real politik position that The Bahamas takes regarding Haitian migration than the more ideological position of some of the other, less affected, Caricom members. Newry has also briefed both the Prime Minister and the Cabinet en banc on the situation in Haiti and his effusive praise of U.S.-Bahamian cooperation in the Windward Passage reflects the realism of Prime Minister Perry Christie and Deputy Prime Minister Cynthia Pratt than Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell. Surprisingly, Newry downplayed ex-President Aristide's attempt to remain engaged from afar. He did not think that Aristide's attempts to regain support via press encounters in the Central African Republic would impact on future Haiti developments. His one caveat was that Aristide's Lavalas Party is still extremely organized, especially relative to the loose coalition of opposition "parties" united only by a negative...their opposition to Aristide. His fear was that Aristide's support network would re-group in time for the next set of elections while the Opposition coalition would fall apart fall once the "negative force," i.e., Aristide, disappeared from the scene as an effective player. WITAJEWSKI
NIGERIA OFFERS ARISTIDE A “STAGING POST”
UNCLAS ABUJA 000506 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL HA NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA OFFERS ARISTIDE A "STAGING POST" FOR A FEW WEEKS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, NOT FOR PUBLICATION ON THE INTERNET OR INTRANET. ¶1. (SBU) In response to what it said was a request from the Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM), on March 22 the GON offered Haitian ex-president Aristide refuge in Nigeria for a few weeks before moving on to another destination. President Obasanjo's press spokesman, Oluremi ("Remi") Oyo, issued a press release (text below) to that effect and said much the same thing in interviews carried by BBC radio and other outlets. ¶2. (SBU) The press release says the GON agreed after consultations with African leaders, the African Union leadership, the USG and "other concerned authorities." Staff at the Foreign Ministry and at the office of the National Security Advisor told us March 23 they learned of the offer from the press, and know nothing about such consultations. The Presidency told us Aristide has not yet responded to the offer (as of noon March 23), and said it had no information on the USG and other consultations mentioned in the press release. ¶3. (SBU) COMMENT: Two items seem important: Will Aristide come, and if so under what terms? Confusion over what was agreed when Charles Taylor came to Nigeria has long been a problem. Taylor is not the only political exile in Nigeria, which has a history of offering asylum to fleeing leaders. Post requests guidance from the Department on discussing Aristide with the GON, and talking points for the public on whatever USG role there may or may not have been in the Nigerian offer to Aristide. ¶4. (U) Begin text of the Nigerian Presidency press release: NIGERIA GRANTS CARICOM REQUEST ON FORMER HAITIAN LEADER The Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM) under the leadership of Prime Minister P.J. Patterson of Jamaica, has requested Nigeria to consider giving former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti "a staging post" for a few weeks until his movement to another destination. After receiving the CARICOM request, Nigeria undertook widespread consultations with African leaders, the leadership of the African Union, the U.S. Government and other concerned authorities. Following the concurrence received after those consultations, Nigeria has agreed to grant the request from CARICOM. Oluremi Oyo (Mrs.) SSA to the President end text. ROBERTS
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