CONFIDENTIAL: BRAZIL: MORE OBSERVATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7162
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 5761
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 3987
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4384
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 3488
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA PRIORITY 0311
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 4961
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 3228
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 6570
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1003
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 0158
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2020
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 5900
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE PRIORITY 5757
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 3227
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO PRIORITY 8490
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002293 

SIPDIS 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: MORE OBSERVATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY IN
LULA'S SECOND TERM 

REF: BRASILIA 2245 

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D). 

1. (C) Introduction.  Reftel discussed Mission,s views that,
despite interesting media reports that President Lula da
Silva,s foreign policy in a second term could shift toward
closer ties with the U.S., we could not see yet concrete
evidence of such a trend.  We remain circumspect on this
question.  At the same time, candid and encouraging
conversations with top GOB officials on the day after Lula,s
strong victory at the polls left Ambassador and emboffs
wondering about the possibility that some change may be
brewing.  We report what we heard below, with the caveat that
we remain in a cautious "wait and see mode" for the time
being.  End introduction. 

2. (C) Ambassador and PolCouns visited the Planalto Palace on
30 October, and found a Presidency in an open mood of
jubilant celebration.  A steady column of VIPs streamed
through for audiences with re-elected President Lula.  A
relieved and buoyant Gilberto Carvalho, Chief of Lula,s
Personal Staff, received Ambassador and poloff for a courtesy
call, which turned into a compelling conversation about the
direction of policy in Lula,s second term.  Carvalho, who is
perhaps Lula,s closest long-time advisor, made the following
comments: 

--On foreign policy, Carvalho said that Lula,s first term
had seen a broad opening of Brazil to new alliances and
diplomatic arrangements worldwide.  Now, with this base
established, the second Lula government will re-focus
priority on "quality relationships with traditional
partners."  Specifically, for Brazil to grow with new
investment, the GOB will need to engage more intensively with
the United States, Carvalho stressed. 

--Ambassador welcomed this observation, but said he remained
concerned when he heard certain Brazilian officials speak of
the need to "counterbalance" against the U.S., and opined
that two democracies should be able to debate and work
together directly, without such contrivances.  Carvalho was
emphatic in agreeing, said there will be no further
discussion of counterbalances, and asked for the
Ambassador,s understanding if rhetoric during the election
campaign had occasionally seemed critical of the U.S.  He
again assured Ambassador that the second Lula government
wants investment and growth, and sees relations with the U.S.
as central to this. 

--At the conclusion of the meeting, Carvalho provided his
private telephone numbers to Ambassador and PolCouns and
encouraged them to contact him directly at any time if there
was problematic development in relations between the two
governments, of if they wished to present an issue directly
to President Lula.  Carvalho said he would welcome this
direct channel with the Ambassador. 

3. (S/NF) In a separate meeting at Planalto with General
Jorge Armando Felix, Lula,s Minister for Institutional
Security, Ambassador, PolCouns and Regional Affairs Chief
raised the subject of intensified U.S.-Brazil exchanges and
cooperation in intelligence and security.  Ambassador noted
that President Lula, in a brief aside at the UNGA in New
York, had encouraged continued engagement with General Felix,
presumably on such issues.  General Felix then announced that
he had, subsequent to an earlier meeting with Ambassador,
commissioned a formal paper outlining specific areas for
consultation and collaboration at the policy level with the
USG in the intelligence field.   Ambassador and Felix agreed 

BRASILIA 00002293  002 OF 002 

that the GOB could also specify in the paper specific
equipment or training they might require, and decided to plan
together for a high-level bilateral intelligence meeting
early in 2007 in Brasilia. 

4. (C) In an earlier conversation on the same day,
Development and Industry Minister Luiz Furlan told Ambassador
that Lula was pressing him to stay on in a second government,
and Furlan appeared to be considering this option.  Furlan, a
moderate with a business background who has long pressed
within Lula,s cabinet for closer cooperation with the United
States, seemed to be of the view that Lula,s second term
priorities would be shifting in the direction of closer
engagement with the U.S. and other developed nations. 

5. (C) Comment.  Our senior interlocutors were in high
spirits yesterday, with a kind word for the world, including
the U.S.   But without major changes in the foreign
ministry's senior staffing and orientation, we wonder about
the viability of a tilt toward the U.S. and developing world,
and away from the south-south priorities of the first Lula
term.  Nonetheless, it is intriguing that we have received
such a steady stream of strong signals from senior Lula
advisors on the day after his victory.  Watch this space. 

Sobel

CONFIDENTIAL: HAITIAN AMBASSADOR TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC RESIGNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANTO DOMINGO 007536 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR WHA/CAR, DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USOAS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR DR HA
SUBJECT: HAITIAN AMBASSADOR TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC RESIGNS:
ANOTHER BLOW TO ARISTIDE 

REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 2540
     B. SANTO DOMINGO 4930 

Classified By: ACTING DCM MARY B. MARSHALL FOR REASONS 1.5 B/D 

SUMMARY 

1. (C) On December 18 the Haitian Ambassador to the Dominican
Republic Guy Alexandre called on the Ambassador and Acting
DCM to confirm his resignation.  The sudden news (prompted by
the violent December 5 crackdown on student demonstrators in
Haiti) was widely covered December 16 while Ambassador
Alexandre was out of the country visiting his wife in Puerto
Rico.  Ambassdor Alexandre's resignation is due to what he
described as "incompatible principles" with Arisitide's
government.  Composed but staunch in his resolve, Alexandre
assured the Ambassador that he has no plans to seek asylum in
the United States for now.  Requesting asylum, he explained,
would "further complicate Dominican-Haitian bilateral
relations" and would not be in his nor Haiti's best
interests.  Instead, Alexandre said he would seek residency
in the Dominican Republic and teach at a university.  End
Summary. 

ALEXANDRE RESIGNS AS AMBASSADOR TO THE DR 

2. (C) Ambassador Guy Alexandre met with the Ambassador and
Acting DCM on December 18 to discuss his recent resignation.
He said that he had planned to leave his post in January 2004
after Haiti's independence bicentennial celebrations, which
would have also marked two years in his assignment.  However,
he could not ignore the recent violence against students in
Haiti because of his strong links to the academic community
there.  According to Alexandre, police officers broke both
knees of one of his friends, a vice-rector at a university
(Ref A).  The December 5 violence, he lamented, "produced an
irrevocable situation that cannot be easily fixed,"
following months of extreme polarization and resulting chaos. 

3. (C) According to Ambassador Alexandre's contacts in Haiti,
there are daily protests or preemptive crackdowns by police
on potential protests.  He warned of an upsurge in armed
civilians looking for trouble.  Alexandre expressed his
concern that the environment in Haiti is ripe for
confrontation, which might subside briefly during Christmas
but is sure to resume in January.  He commented that Haiti
has minimal capacity to maintain order and that "none of the
Haitian politicians realize that the country is a ticking
time bomb." 

REMOVE ARISTIDE...THEN WHAT? 

4. (C) Ambassador Alexandre criticized opposition groups'
preoccupation with forcing Aristide's departure without
considering the consequences.  He emphasized that Aristide's
exit will not solve Haiti's socio-economic problems.
Alexandre also criticized his countrymen for their focus on
grabbing power rather than tackling the difficult problems of
health, education and infrastructure.  The Ambassador asked
Alexandre whether there are clandestine movements in the
Dominican Republic working to overthrow Aristide, to which
Alexandre responded that he does not know of any such
activity.  He acknowledged that some disgruntled former
Haitian military officers reside in the Dominican Republic,
but said most of the pressure on Aristide originates in
Haiti.  He recalled the 1991-94 period when many Haitians
fled the country, but claimed there was no no mass migration.
 During that time Alexandre personally assisted 30 Haitians,
including a former Army chief. 

DOMINICAN-HAITIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS 

5. (C) Less than three weeks before his resignation,
Ambassador Alexandre met with the Ambassador on December 1 to
discuss concerns about Dominican-Haitian bilateral relations.
 He was disturbed about the GODR's apparent nonchalant
investigations regarding the Haitian bodies discovered along
the border in September (Ref B).  Alexandre also said the
GODR is not doing enough to document Haitians.  He complained
that the GODR often uses Article 11 of the Dominican
Constitution (providing that anyone born on Dominican soil is
Dominican except offspring of diplomats or foreigners in
transit) to deny citizenship to Haitians for being
"foreigners in transit."  Ambassador Alexandre also blamed
the failure of the 2001 OAS initiative on a lack of OAS
impartiality (Note: This argument was reiterated at the
follow-up meeting on December 18.  End note). 

ALEXANDRE'S ONWARD PLANS 

6. (C) Alexandre said he currently plans to reside in the
Dominican Republic, not flee to the United States.  He was
traveling to Puerto Rico when his resignation hit the press
and returned quickly thereafter.  He emphasized his desire to
get involved in academia and denied having strong ties to
successful Haitian expats in the United States.  Alexandre
did ask the Acting DCM (Consul General) that his B1/B2
nonimmigrant visa be transferred to his tourist passport.
Alexandre said the GOH had not yet accepted his resignation.
He claimed to have no interest in politics because he "knows
too well what Haiti needs."
HERTELL