Tag: national security archive

CONFIDENTIAL – The End of the USSR, 20 Years Later

The End of the USSR, 20 Years Later

Moscow Conference Debates Breakup of the Soviet Union

Documents Show U.S.-Soviet Cooperation on Regional Conflicts in 1991

Gorbachev Decries Lack of Western Aid to Support Perestroika

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 364

Washington D.C., November 24, 2011 – Marking the 20th anniversary of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Gorbachev Foundationhosted a two-day conference in Moscow on November 10-11, co-organized by the National Security Archive and the Carnegie Moscow Center, examining the historical experience of 1989-1991 and the echoes today. The conference briefing book, compiled and edited by the Archive and posted on the Web today together with the conference program and speaker biographies, includes previously classified Soviet and American documents ranging from Politburo notes to CIA assessments to transcripts of phone calls between George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in the final months of the Soviet Union.At the Moscow event, panels of distinguished eyewitnesses, veterans and scholars discussed Gorbachev’s political reforms of the 1980s, the crisis in the Soviet economy, the origins and impact of the “new thinking,” the role of society and social movements, and the ways the history is used and abused in current political debates. While Gorbachev himself was unable to participate for health reasons, he subsequently met with the conference organizers to give his reactions and retrospective analysis.

The Carnegie Moscow Center followed up the conference with a November 14 discussion, also co-organized by the Archive, using the same format of expert panels to analyze the impact of nationalism and separatism in the events of 1991, the role of the Soviet military, military reform today in the Russian armed forces, and the situation today in the North Caucasus and other ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet space.

At the Gorbachev Foundation conference, the panel on political reform debated the role of leaders as opposed to structural forces in the decline of the USSR, the competition between Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin especially in 1991, the particular Yeltsin factor including his arrangement with the presidents of Ukraine and Belarus in December 1991 to dissolve the USSR, and in the big picture, the declining legitimacy of the Soviet system over the duration of the Cold War.

The panel on economics discussed various options for modernizing the Soviet economy in the 1980s, whether the system was even reformable, the efforts of the Communist apparat to sabotage even modest reforms, the barriers in Western thinking that prevented any significant foreign aid to the Soviet Union in its last years, and the role of international financial institutions.

The panel on “new thinking” analyzed the dramatic changes in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev, the ultimately failed efforts at integrating Russia with Europe, the successes in U.S.-Soviet cooperation for settling regional conflicts, and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988-89. This discussion also sparked a debate within the audience about the Gorbachev-Reagan ideas of nuclear abolition and their relevance for today.

The society panel described the extensive social demand for glasnost during the 1980s in stark contrast to today, the disintegration of social structures and public space in Russia since 1991, the importance of the dissident discourse of the 1960s and 1970s to the reformist elite and perestroika in the 1980s, and the unpreparedness of society for the various forms of extreme nationalist discourse that erupted at the end of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev himself sat down with the conference organizers on November 14 after his return from Germany and following the two events at the Gorbachev Foundation and the Carnegie Moscow Center. He discussed the current political situation in Russia, with the “tandem” of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev trading jobs with only a façade of elections, and under conditions of growing authoritarianism; but he predicted the “exhaustion” of this program and the eventual introduction of real change, rather than indefinite stagnation.

Gorbachev also commented on the issue of the lack of Western aid for his project of perestroika and glasnost – transforming the Soviet Union into a demilitarized, social democratic state that would work with the U.S. and other countries to resolve regional conflicts and build a “common home” in Europe and cooperative security arrangements globally. Coming back “empty-handed” from the G-7 meeting in the summer of 1991, Gorbachev commented, undermined his reform efforts, helped precipitate the August coup attempt, and undercut any possibility of gradual transition for the USSR. Participating in the discussion with Gorbachev were Pulitzer-Prize winners William Taubman and David Hoffman, Professor Jane Taubman, and National Security Archive representatives Tom Blanton, Malcolm Byrne, and Svetlana Savranskaya.

 

CIA History of DCI William Colby Finally Qualifies as “Non-Secret”


DCI William Colby speaks during a National Security Council meeting on the situation on Vietnam. April 28, 1975. Clockwise, left to right, Colby; Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State; Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State; President Ford: James Schlesinger, Defense Secretary; William Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Vice President Nelson Rockefeller; General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (lower left corner). Image A4234-11A ,http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/avproj/vietnam.asp Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI

CIA History of DCI William Colby

Finally Qualifies as “Non-Secret”

CIA Director Distinguishes “bad”/”good”/”lesser” and “non-secrets”

Colby Bio-Documentary Opens in Washington October 28

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 362

Washington, D.C., November 6, 2011 – CIA director William Colby rebuffed criticisms from senior Agency operators about disclosure of CIA misdeeds by describing the difference between “bad secrets,” “non-secrets,” “good secrets” and “lesser” secrets, according to a previously SECRET internal CIA history of the Colby tenure, published today on the Web by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org).

Colby responded in March 1974 to the head of the CIA’s clandestine service, who claimed that any public discussion would “degrade the fabric of our security” and “lead inevitably to a further exposure of intelligence sources and methods,” by writing:

“There are some ‘bad secrets’ which are properly revealed by an aggressive press. there are some older ‘non-secrets’ which no longer need to be kept secret and which we should gradually surface, but there are some ‘good secrets’ which deserve greater protection than we have been able to give them, in part by reason of their association with ‘secrets’ of lesser importance.”

The latest declassification (in August 2011) from a series of secret studies by the CIA History Staff of the agency’s directors, the volume gains credibility from its authorship by veteran CIA analyst and operative Harold Ford, who courageously presented to the Congress well-documented internal critiques of CIA director-designate Robert Gates during his confirmation hearings in 1991. To win confirmation, Gates had to promise Congress not to fire Ford in retaliation. The history, William Colby as Director of Central Intelligence, 1973-1976, provides detailed accounts of key episodes such as the firing of counterintelligence chief James Angleton, Colby’s role in the revelation of the CIA “family jewels,” and the collapse of South Vietnam, where Colby had spent much of his career.

The posting features an introduction and review written by Archive senior fellow John Prados, author of the widely-praised biography, William Colby and the CIA: The Secret Wars of a Controversial Spymaster (University Press of Kansas, 2009). The favorable Prados review points out some shortcomings as well, including the history’s lack of attention to Colby’s fraught relationships with Presidents Nixon and Ford, and most of all, Henry Kissinger. Declassified Kissinger transcripts show Kissinger fuming about Colby’s airing of the CIA’s dirty laundry, but Prados concludes that Colby in effect saved the CIA from possible abolition as an agency.

Opening in Washington, D.C. on October 28 at the Landmark E Street Theater is a biographic documentary produced by Colby’s son Carl, an award-winning documentary filmmaker, The Man Nobody Knew: In Search of My Father, CIA Spymaster William Colby.

From the film’s Web site: “A son’s riveting look at a father whose life seemed straight out of a spy thriller . the story is at once a probing history of the CIA, a personal memoir of a family living in clandestine shadows, and an inquiry into the hard costs of a nation’s most cloaked actions .. The film forges a fascinating mix of rare archival footage, never-before-seen photos, and interviews with the ‘who’s who’ of American intelligence, including former National Security Advisers Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense and Director of CIA James Schlesinger, as well PulitzerPrize journalists Bob Woodward, Seymour Hersh and Tim Weiner.”

By John Prados

For many years it has been a CIA practice to employ its History Staff to compile secret studies of the stewardships of the agency’s leaders. This newly declassified official account covers William Egan Colby’s tenure, during an extraordinary period of modern American political history. Colby’s directorship lasted from 1973 through early 1976 and encompassed the end of the Vietnam war, the collapse of détente with the Soviet Union, and the “Year of Intelligence,” the time of the Church and Pike Committee congressional investigations of U.S. intelligence, and the Rockefeller Commission inquiry into CIA domestic activities. Bill Colby led U.S. intelligence at the watershed moment when these events led to the gestation of the modern era of American practice, where the CIA and other agencies function amid a framework of congressional oversight committees and independent inspectors general.the Colby study covers the end of the Vietnam War, the collapse of détente with the Soviet Union, and the “Year of Intelligence,” when the Church and Pike congressional committees investigated U.S. intelligence and the Rockefeller Commission reviewed CIA domestic activities. Bill Colby led U.S. intelligence at a watershed moment which led to some modicum of accountability by the CIA and other agencies, when they began to operate within a framework of congressional oversight committees and independent inspectors general.

Within the CIA, Bill Colby was and remains one of the more controversial figures in the agency’s history. There are several reasons why CIA rank and file disputed Colby’s role. It was his fate to head the agency at a moment when Richard M. Helms, Colby’s predecessor, came under fire for perjury in his own congressional testimony regarding CIA covert operations in Chile. Some charged Colby with failing to protect an agency officer assailed from the outside. World events during his tenure were also a source of controversy, in particular the fall of South Vietnam. Saigon’s collapse, the hurried U.S. evacuation, and the abandonment of CIA assets in Vietnam seared many agency officers who had had Southeast Asia as their main concern for over a decade. One senior analyst, Frank Snepp, went public with a critique of U.S. intelligence before South Vietnam fell, and of agency actions in the evacuation that was highly damaging to Colby, who had been one of CIA’s primary action officers on Vietnam throughout that period.1 But the central reason for the controversy over Bill Colby’s leadership flows from the intelligence investigations of 1975, set off by press revelations of widespread CIA domestic activity against the Vietnam antiwar movement. Both CIA officers and White House officials, including President Gerald R. Ford and national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger, condemned Colby for allegedly “giving away the store” to the inquisitors of the “Year of Intelligence.”

Given this context the CIA’s internal history of Colby’s directorship is especially interesting and significant. The volume, William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence, was written by the late Harold P. Ford, a former CIA official who prepared it on contract completing it in 1993.2 The selection of “Hal” Ford for this writing assignment is important. Ford had joined the CIA in the same year as Colby, and had been active on both the clandestine and analytical sides of the agency, including work as a CIA station chief (in Taiwan) and on the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Ford had worked with Colby on interagency groups dealing with Vietnam in the early 1960s, when the latter headed the Far East Division of CIA’s operations directorate, and again as a senior assistant before his 1974 retirement. More than that, Ford had labored on a futile agency paramilitary operation (against China during the Korean war), just as Colby had done as station chief in Saigon, aiming at North Vietnam during the early days of the Southeast Asian conflict. And Hal Ford had also worked the other side of the street-as a consultant to the Church Committee during its 1975 investigation and as a staff member of the newly-created Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Thus Harold Ford had an independent perspective on many of the issues which figured in the controversies over Colby and are reflected in the agency’s internal history. The result is apparent in his narrative.

In keeping with the function of the CIA History Staff, Ford’s account does not neglect Colby’s innovations and the managerial accomplishments achieved on his watch. These have for the most part been overshadowed by the controversies over the man. It was Colby who established the National Intelligence Officers (NIO) system which became the key component of the NIC, the top analytical unit of U.S. intelligence to this day, more than three decades later. That was undoubtedly his most important accomplishment, but Colby also created the highly successful National Intelligence Daily, and he refreshed CIA methods for learning through experience by means of compiling systematic postmortems of key episodes-although refusal to conduct a study of Saigon’s fall was among Frank Snepp’s grievances against the agency-as well as its system for alert and warning. Other Colby innovations proved less enduring. Ford concludes that “ingrained institutional drag throughout the Intelligence Community was the chief culprit in frustrating his managerial initiatives.”3

This CIA history passes lightly over a number of important events that took place on Colby’s watch. The coup against Salvador Allende in Chile took place a week after the new director was sworn in. The CIA’s contribution to laying the groundwork for a coup are well-known and Colby had headed the agency’s operations directorate during at least part of the time when the project evolved. This would have been a good place to provide some background on the CIA’s operations in Chile, but here Ford discusses the Chile project mostly in terms of the resulting perjury charges against Richard Helms. Similarly the fall of Saigon, the CIA covert actions in Angola and Kurdistan, and the attempt to raise a sunken Soviet submarine with using the vessel Glomar Explorer pass by in a few paragraphs. Some of these projects set or changed key limits on Colby’s ability to act and merited more extensive discussion. For example, Director Colby obtained the cooperation of journalist Seymour Hersh in keeping quiet the Glomar Explorer story, and that favor stayed Colby’s hand when Hersh went for the even more explosive story of CIA domestic activity in what Hal Ford terms Colby’s “Black December.” The end in Vietnam was intrinsically so important that it figures in the same category. Also underreported in the narrative is the bureaucratic infighting within U.S. intelligence on its estimates of Soviet military power and defense spending, which began to come under major attack from more alarmist observers during the Colby era.

White House pressures on CIA to act in Angola and with the Kurds in Iraq helped set the context in which subsequent events occurred, along with White House attitudes toward the agency as well as Colby’s sense of how his problems would be perceived by presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford and their associates. The CIA history does a good job of sketching Nixon’s animosities toward the agency-and clearly its historian made use of Nixon administration official records-which makes it striking that apparently no such effort was made to consult equivalent Ford administration documents. Hal Ford quotes Colby himself to the effect that it never occurred to anyone at CIA-starting with then-director James R. Schlesinger-to tell the White House about the internal document collection known as the “Family Jewels,” which contained a number of the revelations that would explode in “Black December.” But Schlesinger was feuding with Kissinger, and when Colby took over Kissinger continued to keep the agency at arms’ length, and in any case the Family Jewels had been created for the private use of the CIA director. The Colby history does not make this clear.

It was Seymour Hersh again, in the New York Times of December 22, 1974, who set off the explosion that led to the Year of Intelligence, by revealing agency illegal domestic activity, followed over subsequent days by further revelations.4 During the months which led up to this Black December, Hersh was already onto the story of the CIA in Chile, as well as Glomar. Hersh’s investigative reporting had been discussed in Gerald Ford’s White House, and even in Richard Helms’s morning staff meetings before he left the agency. The CIA’s Colby history repeats the conventional wisdom that the director blind-sided the White House by not providing advance notice. The suggestion that White House officials needed any warning from Bill Colby to be on notice that Hersh had more agency revelations up his sleeve strains credulity. Consulting Ford administration records should clarify this problem.

The most troublesome aspect of that oversight arises in the CIA history’s treatment of the months that followed, including the creation of and investigations by the Rockefeller Commission and the Church and Pike Committees. By narrating these events solely from the agency’s side the history overstates Director Colby’s freedom of action in responding to the inquiries and neglects to treat White House efforts to constrain the investigations. For example, from CIA records the history relates several conversations between agency officials and White House aide John O. (“Jack”) Marsh, all of which are to the effect of President Ford’s emissary cautioning against exposing too much of the CIA’s secret world. The history leaves the impression this was simply an attitude, casually expressed. In fact, White House records make clear that Marsh, and Ford counsel Phil Buchen, played the key roles in shaping the administration’s response. Ford officials made specific decisions on what materials would be provided to investigators, they forced a fight on what would be revealed about the covert action policymaking unit known as the 40 Committee, formed a working group specifically to deal with the CIA political crisis, coordinated with Colby on the basic ground rules the agency set with the Church committee, backed the CIA director in his later fights with the Pike committee, and stonewalled on the release of material until achieving an understanding with Congress that recognized White House primacy in this area.5

Both of Colby’s two substantive one-on-one meetings with President Ford during 1975 concerned the CIA troubles. At the first, Ford informed the CIA that he was about to set up a presidential commission to head off congressional action. At the second, Ford reviewed with Colby the testimony on covert operations the CIA director would present the next day at the Church committee (this latter presidential action goes entirely unrecorded in the CIA internal history). Without engaging the question of the legality of information denials, in the face of long-standing law that recognized Congress had an absolute right to investigate government affairs, and an unlimited entitlement to such information as necessary for such inquiries, the CIA’s Colby history treats this entire period somewhat mechanically, as a bureaucratic dispute over who got access to what and when and whether Congressional disclosures damaged national security.

Colby’s difficulties during the Year of Intelligence would be greatly compounded by the fact he was already under fire inside CIA when Black December came. This was due to charges that Richard Helms had perjured himself in sworn testimony before Congress on the covert operation in Chile. Helms too had been caught in a dilemma-between Richard Nixon’s strict orders for secrecy on Chile and Congress’s demand for answers. The Justice Department eventually took over that inquiry and would ultimately indict Helms on this charge, which the former CIA director would not contest once it came to trial in 1977. Here Bill Colby was mousetrapped on the matter of forwarding the charge to Justice, and agency rank and file took sides with Helms or, to a lesser degree, with Colby. Even most CIA veterans do not know what really happened in the Helms affair-Director Colby initially refused to forward the charges but was forced to do so by backbench insistence and pressure from Justice Department officials. Hal Ford’s account of the Helms case is quite detailed, as is his narrative of Colby’s firing of CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton-a close friend and ally of Helms-which further inflamed passions against Colby within the agency. The CIA internal history is very useful on these matters.

Harold Ford has some sympathy for Director Colby’s basic predicament. The political disputes of the Vietnam War and the presidential excesses of Watergate had strengthened the position of Congress, while the CIA had precious little support inside the White House. The simple fact of Black December signaled that a new era was dawning for U.S. intelligence. Bill Colby’s challenge was to chart a course between the contending forces that preserved the agency, while fending off demands to do business the old way, not only from the White House but his own CIA officers. Colby, criticized as a Boy Scout or naïf, actually understood better than his associates that in 1975 the Central Intelligence Agency was in real danger of being swept away. Until the doubts that have arisen regarding the CIA in the wake of the September 11 attacks, this Year of Intelligence posed the most serious threat to the agency’s existence.

Within its limitations, the CIA secret history represents the most detailed account yet available from the agency’s perspective of the investigations of the Year of Intelligence. With most of the key actors now gone-starting with William Colby himself but including Vernon Walters, Walt Elder, Mitchell Rogovin and others-a better history of this kind seems unlikely.

It is especially worth reading for the attention it brings to a number of issues, including its major focus on the Year of Intelligence. Harold Ford has refined our understanding of the precursor events that helped create the modern American intelligence system. These origins throw needed backlight on arrangements for congressional oversight, and the competition between that oversight and presidential control which still drives the U.S. intelligence community today.

NOTES

  1. Frank Snepp, Decent Interval An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End Told by the CIA’s Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1977.
  2. Harold P. Ford, William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency: CIA History Staff, 1993 (declassified August 10, 2011).
  3. Harold Ford, William E. Colby, p. 61.
  4. Seymour Hersh, “Huge CIA Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years,” New York Times, December 22, 1974.
  5. Ibid, pp. 304-317.

TOP-SECRET – The precise US Invasion Plans for the Iraq as PDF downloads

TOP SECRET POLO STEP

Iraq War Plan Assumed Only 5,000 U.S. Troops Still There by December 2006

CentCom PowerPoint Slides Briefed to White House and Rumsfeld in 2002, Obtained by National Security Archive through Freedom of Information Act

Washington D.C., November 3, 2011 – The U.S. Central Command’s war plan for invading Iraq postulated in August 2002 that the U.S. would have only 5,000 troops left in Iraq as of December 2006, according to the Command’s PowerPoint briefing slides, which were obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and are posted on the Web today by the National Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org).

The PowerPoint slides, prepared by CentCom planners for Gen. Tommy Franks under code name POLO STEP, for briefings during 2002 for President Bush, the NSC, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, the JCS, and Franks’ commanders, refer to the “Phase IV” post-hostilities period as “UNKNOWN” and “months” in duration, but assume that U.S. forces would be almost completely “re-deployed” out of Iraq within 45 months of the invasion (i.e. December 2006).

“Completely unrealistic assumptions about a post-Saddam Iraq permeate these war plans,” said National Security Archive Executive Director Thomas Blanton. “First, they assumed that a provisional government would be in place by ‘D-Day’, then that the Iraqis would stay in their garrisons and be reliable partners, and finally that the post-hostilities phase would be a matter of mere ‘months’. All of these were delusions.”

The PowerPoint slides reflect the continuous debate over the size of the invasion force that took place within the Bush administration. In late November 2001, President Bush asked Rumsfeld about the status of plans for war with Iraq. He asked for an updated approach, but did not want to attract attention. Rumsfeld ordered Gen. Franks to prepare a commander’s estimate of improvements needed, and Franks convened a planning group that adopted the codeword POLO STEP.

POLO STEP was a coded compartment created during the Clinton administration to encompass covert Iraq and counter-terrorism plans and activities. In the mid-1990s, the compartment specifically included the targeting of Osama bin Laden. Following the September 11 attacks, CentCom, among other military and national security components, used the designation to cover planning for the war in Iraq. (Note 1)

In mid-2002, military analyst William Arkin obtained a leaked copy of a briefing on the Iraq plans and revealed the existence of POLO STEP in an op-ed for the Los Angeles Times (June 23, 2002, p. M1). According to Arkin, the revelation unleashed the fury of Gen. Franks and Secretary Rumsfeld who immediately ordered a probe of the leak that lasted until the end of 2003 and subjected more than 1,000 military and contractor personnel to sometimes repeated questioning. (Note 2)

The slides in this Web posting are a compilation reflecting various iterations in war planning. The U.S. government maintains plans for conflict with a multitude of possible adversaries. The contingency operating plan for Iraq–OPLAN 1003-98–had last been fully reviewed in 1996 and was updated in 1998. It envisioned an invasion force of more than 380,000 troops. Former CentCom commander Gen. Anthony Zinni (who saw gaps in the plan–particularly in regard to the post-war order) organized a war game–Desert Crossing–in 1999 to examine additional contingencies.

Under pressure from Secretary Rumsfeld for a leaner force (according to accounts in books by Michael Gordon/Bernard Trainor, Thomas Ricks, and Bob Woodward), Zinni’s successor, Gen. Franks, reduced the number to 275,000 in the commander’s estimate he gave to President Bush on December 28, 2001. During the course of 2002 alternative versions of the plan were developed reflecting various assumptions about levels of allied support–“robust”, “reduced”, or “unilateral”–and about the amount of lead time available between the order to invade and the deployment of forces. Under the Generated Start option Bush would have provided CentCom with 30 days notice for war, and 60 days to deploy. Following Rumsfeld’s mandate to reduce deployment time to prepare for any contingency, Franks developed the alternative Running Start option: conflict would begin with escalating Red, White, and Blue air strikes followed by ground war as troops were deployed. By mid-August 2002 a Hybrid concept had been developed–the U.S. military would quickly mobilize forces in the region, initiate an air strike campaign, then launch a ground invasion.

One account written after the war points out a basic problem with the concept of scaled-down ground forces – a “contradiction” between ends and means (Michael R. Gordon & Gen. Bernard Trainor, Cobra II, pp. 503-504):

“Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Tommy Franks spent most of their time and energy on the least demanding task – defeating Saddam’s weakened conventional forces – and the least amount on the most demanding – rehabilitation of and security for the new Iraq. The result was a surprising contradiction. The United States did not have nearly enough troops to secure the hundreds of suspected WMD sites that had supposedly been identified in Iraq or to secure the nation’s long, porous borders. Had the Iraqis possessed WMD and terrorist groups been prevalent in Iraq as the Bush administration so loudly asserted, U.S. forces might well have failed to prevent the WMD from being spirited out of the country and falling into the hands of the dark forces the administration had declared war against.”

In the end, Secretary of State Colin Powell and British Prime Minister Tony Blair persuaded President Bush that the U.S. needed to go to the U.N. to try to legitimize the invasion. Diplomatic efforts over the next few months allowed more time for war preparations and the final option embraced by Rumsfeld – Lt. Gen. David McKiernan’s Cobra II – was closer to Generated Start, the original plan, than the various iterations that were subsequently developed and are reflected in the declassified PowerPoint slides.

Lt. Gen. McKiernan later told Washington Post reporter Thomas Ricks (Fiasco, p. 75):

“It’s quite frustrating the way this works, but the way we do things nowadays is combatant commanders brief their products in PowerPoint up in Washington to OSD and Secretary of Defense… In lieu of an order, or a frag [fragmentary] order, or plan, you get a set of PowerPoint slides… [T]hat is frustrating, because nobody wants to plan against PowerPoint slides.”

Retired Army Col. Andrew Bacevich told Ricks (Fiasco, pp. 75-76) that PowerPoint war planning was the ultimate insult:

“Here may be the clearest manifestation of OSD’s [Office of Secretary of Defense] contempt for the accumulated wisdom of the military profession and of the assumption among forward thinkers that technology — above all information technology — has rendered obsolete the conventions traditionally governing the preparation and conduct of war. To imagine that PowerPoint slides can substitute for such means is really the height of recklessness.”

National Security Archive senior analyst Joyce Battle asked the U.S. Army under the FOIA in 2004 for documents related to the 2001-2003 debates over troop levels for the Iraq war. In response, the Army referred the request to Central Command in 2005; and CentCom responded to the FOIA request in January 2007 with the declassified PowerPoint slides. The slides were compiled at CentCom with tabs labeled “A” through “L” (one slide is unlabeled). The Web posting today reproduces the documents as they were released by CentCom, together with additional items prepared by the National Security Archive: a brief chronology of Iraq war planning based on secondary sources, a glossary of military acronyms (essential for translating the otherwise cryptic references on the slides), and an introduction written by Ms. Battle.

Chronology:

[Based on accounts in Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006); Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier (New York: Regan Books, 2004); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006); Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).]

November 21, 2001 – President Bush asks Defense Secretary Rumsfeld about contingencies for war with Iraq, and directs him to initiate planning.

November 26, 2001 – Rumsfeld meets with Gen. Franks at CentCom headquarters in Tampa and they review the existing operating plan, OPLAN 1003.

December 1, 2001 – Rumsfeld asks Franks to develop a commander’s estimate as the basis for a new war plan.

December 4, 2001 – Franks presents a video conference for Rumsfeld on his commander’s estimate, outlining robust, reduced, and unilateral plans based on levels of regional support (see Tab A).

December 28, 2001 – Gen. Franks briefs President Bush at Crawford on the commander’s estimate calling for an invasion force of 275,000 troops.

January 29, 2002 – President Bush targets Iraq in his “axis of evil” State of the Union speech.

February 1, 2002 – Gen. Franks presents Generated Start, a plan building to 275,000 troops, to Rumsfeld at the Pentagon.

March 3, 2002 – Gen. Franks briefs President Bush again on Generated Start, but there is pressure from Rumsfeld to reduce troop levels.

March 10, 2002 – Vice President Cheney begins a Middle East tour seeking support from friendly governments for the invasion of Iraq.

March 21, 2002 – Gen. Franks meets with commanders at Ramstein, Germany on planning that still calls for 5 and 2/3rds divisions but emphasizes a faster march to Baghdad.

March 29, 2002 – Gen. Franks briefs the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

April 20, 2002 – Gen. Franks briefs President Bush at Camp David on planning, calling for war to begin with 180,000 troops, ramping up to 250,000.

April 20, 2002 – A PowerPoint slide on “Phase I Operations” lists the following, among other steps: 1) Secure international/regional support; 2) Posture forces for offensive operations; 3) Enhance intelligence and targeting; 4) Degrade and deceive Iraqi regime; 5) Deter Iraqi internal and external operations; 6) Prepare Iraqi opposition groups for action (see Tab D).

May 10, 2002 – PowerPoint slides on a “Compartmented Plan Update” summarize several matters: timing; “enabling actions” for war, including continuing “OGA [CIA] covert action” in U.S.-controlled northern Iraq “which started 4-5 months earlier,” “post-regime government strategy,” and “strategic information operations;” force deployment; and Phase IV (post-conflict) actions, including “ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq,” The expected duration of Phase IV: months (see Tab C).

May 11, 2002 – Gen. Franks presents the “Running Start” plan to Bush at Camp David, speeding up the invasion, using “Red, White, and Blue air strike plans” as a bridge to war, launching with only one Marine Expeditionary Unit and 2 Army brigades or, maximum version, two divisions.

May 21, 2002 – When asked by the press “how many troops,” Gen. Franks says, “That’s a great question and one for which I don’t have an answer because my boss has not yet asked me to put together a plan to do that. They have not asked me for those kinds of numbers. And I guess I would tell you, if there comes a time when my boss asks me that, then I’d rather provide those sorts of assessments to him. But thanks for the question.” (Gordon/Trainor p. 52, Ricks p. 38)

June 19, 2002 – Gen. Franks briefs President Bush again on Generated Start and discusses ongoing work on Running Start.

June 27-28, 2002 – Gen. Franks tells his commanders at Ramstein to focus on Running Start because of the administration’s impatience.

August 1-2, 2002 – Gen. Franks meets his commanders at Tampa and tells them they need to be prepared to attack Iraq immediately if so ordered. But there are concerns that Running Start will result in a larger number of U.S. casualties.

August 4, 2002 – PowerPoint slides on “Compartmented Concept Update 4 Aug 2002” summarize the Generated Start plan, the Running Start plan, a Modified plan, and Phase IV actions, including “Establish a secure environment and assist in recovery and reconstruction” and “free individuals unjustly detained” (see Tab L).

August 5, 2002 – Gen. Franks briefs the president and the NSC on war planning (see Tab K and Tab L), and discusses the Hybrid concept. According to Gordon/Trainor, “it was a hit at the White House,” though Franks saw that Secretary of State Colin Powell had doubts. Powell later called Franks to express his concern about force levels.

August 5, 2002 – Colin Powell tells President Bush after dinner, “You are going to be the proud owner of 25 million people . . . . You’ll own it all.” (Woodward, p. 150) (This the supposed “Pottery Barn rule”: you break it, you own it.)

August 14, 2002 – Gen. Franks and Maj. Gen. Gene Renuart meet with Rumsfeld and update him on the Hybrid option.

August 15, 2002 – PowerPoint slides on “Compartmented Planning Effort 15 August 2002” (Tab I) provide background on planning, noting “POTUS/SECDEF directed effort; limited to a very small group . . . Integrate / consider all elements of national power . . . Thinking ‘outside the box’, but ‘inside a compartment’.” “Key Planning Assumptions” for Generated Start included “DoS will promote creation of a broad-based, credible provisional government – prior to D-day” [invasion], and “Iraqi regime has WMD capability.”

August 26, 2002 – Vice President Cheney speaks to the Veterans of Foreign Wars targeting Iraq.

September 6, 2002 – Gen. Franks meets with President Bush and the NSC to review war planning. “Can we win this thing?” asks Bush. “Absolutely,” says Franks. (Gordon/Trainor 74)

December 12, 2002 – Rumsfeld meets with Gen. Franks and with Lt. Gen. McKiernan, who argues that the Hybrid plan should be replaced with the Cobra II alternative that he has developed calling for a larger invading force. By the end of the month it is understood that Rumsfeld has essentially endorsed Cobra II. (Gordon/Trainor 93)

March 20, 2003 – The U.S. invades Iraq.

See here the detailed invasion plans as PDF downloads

Tab A – page 8

Tab H – page 5

Tab I – page 2

Tab I – page 4

Tab K

Tab K – page 1

Tab L

Bombing of Cuban Jetliner 30 Years Later

Bombing of Cuban Jetliner
30 Years LaterNew Documents on Luis Posada Posted as Texas Court Weighs Release from Custody

Colgate Toothpaste Disguised Plastic Explosives in 1976 Terrorist Attack

Confessions, Kissinger Reports, and Overview of Posada Career Posted

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 202
This November 5, 1976, report from FBI director Clarence Kelly to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger suggested that Posada had attended meetings in Caracas where the plane bombing was planned.

Washington D.C., November 2, 2011 – On the 30th anniversary of the first and only mid-air bombing of a civilian airliner in the Western Hemisphere, the National Security Archive today posted on the Web new investigative records that further implicate Luis Posada Carriles in that crime of international terrorism. Among the documents posted is an annotated list of four volumes of still-secret records on Posada’s career with the CIA, his acts of violence, and his suspected involvement in the bombing of Cubana flight 455 on October 6, 1976, which took the lives of all 73 people on board, many of them teenagers.

The National Security Archive, which has sought the declassification of the Posada files through the Freedom of Information Act, today called on the U.S. government to release all intelligence files on Posada. “Now is the time for the government to come clean on Posada’s covert past and his involvement in international terrorism,” said Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive’s Cuba Documentation Project. “His victims, the public, and the courts have a right to know.”

Posada has been in detention in El Paso, Texas, for illegal entry into the United States, but a magistrate has recommended that he be released this week because the Bush administration has not certified that he is a terrorist.

Among the documents posted today are four sworn affidavits by police officials in Trinidad and Tobago, who were the first to interrogate the two Venezuelans–Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo–who were arrested for placing the bomb on flight 455. (Their statements were turned over as evidence to a special investigative commission in Barbados after the crime.) Information derived from the interrogations suggested that the first call the bombers placed after the attack was to the office of Luis Posada’s security company ICI, which employed Ricardo. Ricardo claimed to have been a CIA agent (but later retracted that claim). He said that he had been paid $16,000 to sabotage the plane and that Lugo was paid $8,000.

The interrogations revealed that a tube of Colgate toothpaste had been used to disguise plastic explosives that were set off with a “pencil-type” detonator on a timer after Ricardo and Lugo got off the plane during a stopover in Barbados. Ricardo “in his own handwriting recorded the steps to be taken before a bomb was placed in an aircraft and how a plastic bomb is detonated,” deputy commissioner of police Dennis Elliott Ramdwar testified in his affidavit.

The Archive also released three declassified FBI intelligence reports that were sent to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger after the bombing. The updates, classified “secret” and signed by director Clarence Kelly, focused on the relations between the FBI legal attaché in Caracas, Joseph Leo, Posada, and one of the Venezuelans who placed the bomb on the plane, to whom Leo had provided a visa. One report from Kelly, based on the word of an informant in Venezuela, suggested that Posada had attended meetings in Caracas where the plane bombing was planned. The document also quoted an informant as stating that after the plane went into the ocean one of the bombers placed a call to Orlando Bosch, the leading conspirator in the plot, and stated: “a bus with 73 dogs went off a cliff and all got killed.”

Another State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research report to Kissinger, posted again today, noted that the CIA had a source in Venezuela who had overheard Posada saying “we are going to hit a Cuban airplane” and “Orlando has the details” only days before the plane was blown up off the coast of Barbados.

Both Bosch and Posada were arrested and imprisoned in Venezuela after the attack. Posada escaped from prison in September 1985; Bosch was released in 1987 and returned to the United States illegally. Like Posada, he was detained by immigration authorities; over the objections of the Justice Department, which determined he was a threat to public security, the first President Bush’s White House issued him an administrative pardon in 1990.

Still-secret intelligence documents cited in the file review released today suggest that the CIA assigned several cryptonyms to Posada when he was working for them, first as an operative and trainer in demolitions and later as an informant based in the Venezuelan secret police service DISIP. In 1965 he was assigned the codename “AMCLEVE-15.” In 1972 he “was given a new crypt CIFENCE-4,” according to a still-unreleased CIA document, and later referred to as “WKSCARLET-3.”

Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view. House Select Committee on Assassinations, LUIS POSADA CARRILES, ca. 1978

In 1978, investigators for a special committee investigation into the death of President John F. Kennedy conducted a comprehensive review of CIA, FBI, DEA and State Department intelligence files relating to the life, operations and violent activities of Luis Posada Carriles. The committee examined four volumes containing dozens of secret memos, cables and reports, dating from 1963 to 1977, relating to Posada’s employment by the CIA, his efforts to overthrow the Castro government, his transfer to Venezuela, and his involvement in the bombing of Cubana flight 455. Investigators for the committee were able to take notes on the documents and compile this list, which was declassified by the CIA as part of the Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board work in the late 1990s. The annotated list of documents represents a rare but comprehensive overview of Posada’s relations with U.S. intelligence agencies and his career in violence. The National Security Archive is seeking the full declassification of documents through the Freedom of Information Act.

State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Memorandum, “Castro’s Allegations,” October 18, 1976

The first report to Secretary of State Kissinger from the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research on the bombing of Cubana Airlines Flight 455 details Cuba’s allegation that the CIA was involved in the bombing and provides an outline of the suspects’ relationship to the U.S. The report notes that a CIA source had overheard Posada prior to the bombing in late September 1976 stating that, “We are going to hit a Cuban airliner.” This information was apparently not passed to the CIA until after the plane went down. (This document was originally posted on May 18, 2005.)

FBI, Letter to Kissinger, [Regarding Special Agent Leo], October 20, 1976

This report to Secretary of State Kissinger from Clarence M. Kelly, director of the FBI, explains the association between Joseph S. Leo, Special Agent and Legal Attaché in Caracas, to the suspects of the Cubana Airlines Flight 455 bombing. Investigators found Leo’s name among the possessions of Hernan Ricardo Lozano, one of the suspects implicated in the bombing. The report notes that there were at least two contacts between Lozano and Leo in the weeks leading up to the bombing.

FBI, Letter to Kissinger, [Regarding Contact with Bombing Suspects], October 29, 1976

The second report to Secretary of State Kissinger from Clarence M. Kelly, director of the FBI, provides additional information regarding the relationship between Special Agent Leo and the Cubana Airlines bombing suspects. The report details Leo’s contacts with Lozano and Posada going back to the summer of 1975, and notes that Leo suspected Posada and Hernan Ricardo Lozano of acts of terrorism, but still granted Ricardo’s request for a visa to the United States.

FBI, Letter to Kissinger, [Regarding Ricardo Morales Navarette], November 5, 1976

A third report to Secretary of State Kissinger from Clarence M. Kelly, director of the FBI, relays information from a confidential FBI source that the bombing of the Cubana Airlines flight was planned in Caracas, Venezuela by Luis Posada Carriles, Frank Castro, and Ricardo Morales Navarrete. The source states that the group had made previous unsuccessful attempts to bomb Cuban aircraft in Jamaica and Panama. Shortly after the plane crashed, bombing suspect Hernan Ricardo Lozano telephoned Bosch stating, “a bus with 73 dogs went off a cliff and all got killed.” The source also states that anti-Castro Cuban exiles working with the Chilean National Directorate for Intelligence (DINA) carried out the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, DC on September 21, 1976.

Statements to Police in Trinidad and Tobago

Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of National Security, October 27, 1976, [Randolph Burroughs deposition regarding Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo]

Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, Randolph Burroughs’ report notes that Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo checked into the Holiday Inn Hotel near the airport in Port-of-Spain under the names Jose Garcia and Freddy Perez on the day of the crash. Burroughs’ report also states that Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo originally said that they knew nothing about the Cubana airlines plane crash when he approached them for questioning at their hotel on the morning of October 7, 1976.

Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of National Security, October 27, 1976, [Oscar King deposition regarding Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo]

Corporal Oscar King of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service attended the interviews with Freddy Lugo and Hernan Ricardo Lozano. His statement records Lozano saying that Freddy Lugo boarded the plane with two cameras and that on his arrival in Barbados he only had one camera. Lozano further states that he is sure that the bomb was inside of the other camera.

Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of National Security, October 26, 1976, [Gordon Waterman deposition regarding Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo]

Trinidad and Tobago Senior Superintendent of Police Gordon Waterman’s written deposition attests to statements made by Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo while the two were detained by the Criminal Investigation Department in Port-of-Spain. According to Waterman’s report, Lozano states that he and Lugo are paid members of the CIA. (He later retracted that statement.) Prior to admitting that he and Lugo bombed the plane, Lozano tells Deputy Commissioner Ramdwar, “If you use your police brain, it would be clear to you who bombed the plane.”

Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of National Security, October 26, 1976, [Dennis Elliott Ramdwar deposition regarding Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo]

Trinidad and Tobago Deputy Commissioner of Police Dennis Ramdwar led the inquiries regarding the crash of Cubana Airline Flight 455. In his written statement he notes that Freddy Lugo initially denied knowledge of the crash. Eight days later, Lugo tells Ramdwar that he is convinced that Lozano placed the bomb on the aircraft. He states that Ricardo told him twice that he was going to blow up a Cubana aircraft as the two were headed to the airport prior to the bombing. In a separate interview, Lozano gives Ramdwar details of how a “certain chemical is filled in a tube of Colgate toothpaste after the toothpaste is extracted” to construct the bomb.

The Robert Gates File – The Iran-Contra Scandal

The Robert Gates File

The Iran-Contra Scandal,Confirmation Hearings, and Excerpts from new book Safe for Democracy

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 208

Related article

“Robert Gates: A Look at the Record”
By Tom Blanton and Peter Kornbluh
The New York Times
May 27, 1991

Praise for Safe for Democracy

“John Prados has written the first really comprehensive history of the CIA, thereby illluminating a basic fact of American intelligence–if you want to know what the CIA is doing, listen to what the president is saying; and if you want to know what the president really wants, watch what the CIA is doing. Safe for Democracy is history for adults–not White House spin but what really happened and why. For more than half a century the CIA, with marching orders from the president, has been trying to make the world safe for democracy. As Prados describes it, the result of these adventures–little safety, less democracy–tells us what to expect from the latest crusade in Iraq.”
— THOMAS POWERS, Pulitzer Prize-winner for national reporting and author of Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qeada

“A masterful account of the CIA’s covert and not-so-covert activities around the globe. Drawing on thousands of newly declassified documents, Prados brings together in one colorful narrative a sweeping history of America’s covert wars from the high plains of Tibet to the back alleys of Cairo. The result is an authoritative book that demythologizes the agency and poses hard questions about the true costs of secrecy to democracies everywhere.”
— KAI BIRD, co-author of American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer, winner of the 2006 Pulitzer Prize for biography

“John Prados is one of the most prolific and respected authors on national security issues today. In his troubling new book, Safe for Democracy, he draws on his many years of research to show that while the CIA wields the dagger, its aim is directed by the White House, often with disastrous results over the decades. At a time when the CIA is swallowed up in preemptive wars overseas and bureaucratic battles at home, this definitive history of covert action is both timely and necessary.”
— JAMES BAMFORD, author of The Puzzle Palace, Body of Secrets, and A Pretext for War
“John Prados has put it all together here in one great panorama of the CIA’s covert actions. The chapters on Eisenhower make clear that he was the key president in promoting the schemes, setting the pattern for the Cold War. Highly readable, this is intelligence history, and intelligent history, at its best.”
— LLOYD GARDNER, author of Approaching Vietnam, Spheres of Influence, and Pay Any Price


“John Prados has again demonstrated his excellence as a researcher and writer–coupled with his in-depth understanding of intelligence issues–to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date account of the CIA’s ‘secret wars.’ Safe for Democracy will be carefully read by those in and out of the intelligence community–in many countries.”
— NORMAN POLMAR, co-author, Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage

 

Washington D.C., November 10, 2006 – Bush administration nominee for Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates had a long career in government which showed a notable combination of ambition and caution, according to a new book by Archive senior analyst John Prados [Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006)] which deals with Gates among its much wider coverage of the agency since its inception.

As Director of Central Intelligence in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Gates faced criticism for moving slowly with reforming the agency for the new era, and thus missing a moment of extraordinary opportunity that occurred at that time. In earlier posts at top levels of the CIA, Gates figured in the Iran-Contra affair, in which he engaged in sins of omission if not commission, hesitating to make inquiries and pass warnings that might have headed off this abuse of power. As the CIA’s top manager for intelligence analysis in the early 1980s he was accused of slanting intelligence to suit the predilections of the Reagan administration and his boss, Director William J. Casey.

Excerpts from Safe for Democracy related to Mr. Gates are here posted by the Archive. They are accompanied by the full three volumes of the extraordinary confirmation hearings of Gates for CIA director which took place in 1991, and which at the time constituted the most detailed examination of U.S. intelligence practices carried out since the Church and Pike investigations of the 1970s. Also posted is the portion of the report by Iran-Contra special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh which concerns Mr. Gates, along with his response to those findings.

Six Presidents Served

A career intelligence officer, Robert M. Gates has emphasized the number of presidents he served and the long sweep of history he witnessed. The sixty-three year old Gates indeed worked under every U.S. president from Richard M. Nixon to George Herbert Walker Bush, and has now been nominated by the second President Bush as secretary of defense. His resume includes some key periods in contemporary history, serving in a White House role as Deputy National Security Adviser during the first Gulf War, leading the U.S. intelligence community in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, being implicated in the Iran-Contra affair, taking an active role in directing CIA intelligence analysis during the Reagan administration, fulfilling assignment as a staff aide to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski during the Carter administration, working on U.S. national intelligence estimates on the Soviet Union, and playing a peripheral role in nuclear arms limitation talks during their early years. Gates holds a PhD from Georgetown University, graduated from the University of Indiana, and was born and raised in Wichita, Kansas. His only direct military experience was as a young officer in the United States Air Force, where he worked primarily as an intelligence analyst, including for the Minuteman ICBM missile wing stationed at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.

The record suggests that Gates combines caution and ambition. As Director of Central Intelligence, leading the CIA after the Cold War, Gates promised many reforms but went slowly in implementing them, carefully marshaling agency support before embarking on those reforms. In Iran-Contra, the record of the special prosecutor’s investigation shows that Gates learned of a number of the key developments at a time when he could have intervened, but remained hesitant to do so. That caution cost him the first two times he was nominated for Senate confirmation-in both cases, to head the CIA-in 1987 and 1991. In the first instance, he was forced to withdraw from consideration. Gates’ second nomination, in 1991, led to the contentious hearings posted here.

As a manager of intelligence analysis under CIA Director Casey, Gates again demonstrated his two most recognizable traits. Knowing that Casey wanted to see certain kinds of analyses, for instance that painted the Soviet threat in bleak terms, Gates, according to former intelligence officers, demanded that his staff comply and encouraged reporting that some insisted was blatantly slanted, to a degree that led a variety of intelligence analysts to oppose his nomination as director. Such opposition was and remains unprecedented in the history of the CIA. On the other hand, on the Nicaragua covert operation of the mid-1980s, Gates showed caution in advising Casey near the end of 1984, when Congress was on the verge of cutting off all aid to the U.S.-backed Contra rebels to hand off the project to some other U.S. agency, which would protect CIA from charges that resulted from questionable activities. In the Carter White House and as an aide to CIA Director Stansfield Turner, Gates also displayed his guardedness. Until 1986, when he emerged as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Gates functioned in a quintessentially staff role.

Given his narrow background in military affairs, Robert Gates may be expected to go slowly in innovating new policy or strategy as Secretary of Defense, to devote considerable effort to reestablishing rapport between the Secretary’s office and the military service chiefs, and to work loyally in support of White House objectives. On Iraq, that may mean shifts in nuance but not direction. On the other hand, the Gates appointment may be a moderating influence on U.S. Iran policy, since he has dealt with this issue and has knowledge of the players going back more than two decades, was burned by policy missteps on Iran during the Reagan administration, and has in the past favored an opening to the Teheran government.

Excerpts from Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006)
By John PradosPages 572-574:

AN UNCOMFORTABLE INTERREGNUM followed Bill Casey’s collapse [on December 15,1986]. With Casey in and out of the hospital, Robert M. Gates served as acting DCI. On February 2, 1987, Casey resigned. The White House faced the sudden need to find a new director of central intelligence. Years before, at the outset of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, Gates had told colleagues he wanted the top job. Now he came close to getting it. So close. The day Casey resigned, President Reagan nominated Gates as DCI in his own right. Perhaps the Reagan White House, beset by Iran-Contra, had not the energy or vision to seek out a new candidate for DCI. Or possibly Reagan saw Gates as a loyalist. Perhaps the call was for a professional but not someone with roots in the clandestine service. Gates fit that bill too. In any event, for a time it looked like Bob Gates would be moving into the director’s office.

The Senate would have to approve the Gates nomination, but the White House had clearly felt out the ground there. In the 1986 off-year elections the Democrats regained control of Congress, making Oklahoma Senator David L. Boren chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Boren and a number of others reacted positively to the Gates nomination. Even Vermont’s Pat Leahy saw the Gates appointment as a wise move. Opinion held that Gates would be asked tough questions on Iran-Contra but then confirmed.

Bob Gates put his best foot forward. There could be no denying his background as a superbly qualified intelligence officer. He had done that work for the air force and the CIA, beginning with Soviet nuclear weapons. He had seen diplomacy on the U.S. delegation to arms control talks. Gates had crafted the NIEs as an assistant national intelligence officer, as national intelligence officer, and later as ex officio chairman of the National Intelligence Council. He had done management as an assistant to a CIA director, an executive staff director, and as deputy director. Gates had headed one of the agency’s tribes as deputy director for intelligence. He knew the White House, serving there under Jimmy Carter. As DDCI he had gotten a taste of covert operations and the clandestine service. In twenty-one years, in other words, Robert Gates had acquired wide agency experience. He had made some enemies, in particular as he handled intelligence reporting during the Reagan years, but in 1987 those people did not contest his nomination, which seemed unstoppable.

Except for Iran-Contra. Gates gave that his best shot too. Not coincidentally it became known that when he took over as acting director, Gates had recorded a classified video affirming that the CIA would act only under legal authorities and would never again do anything like the Iran arms shipments without a proper presidential finding. When hearings opened on February 17 [1987], Gates quickly made it known that he felt Iran-Contra had broken all the rules. He would resign if ordered to do something like that. Gates regretted not following up on the scattered indications of illegality he had perceived, But the nominee’s assurances foundered on the rocks of the Iran-Contra investigations. A number of questions had yet to be answered then, including whether Gates had helped mislead Congress, the extent of his participation in concocting false chronologies, his role in efforts to have the CIA take over the Secord “Enterprise,” when Gates learned of the diversion of funds to the contras, and what he had done once he knew it.

The more questions, the more Bob Gates’s chances disappeared into the maw of assorted illegalities. Had Gates known of violations o the Arms Export Control Act? Had he known of the “retrospective” finding? What had he done? Again and again. At this point Congress created a joint committee to investigate Iran-Contra, and it did not expect answers for months. Then, on February 22, the public learned that in 1985 Gates had sent the White House a memorandum from one of his national intelligence officers advocating the improvement of relations with Iran through arms sales, a view at variance with existing estimates. Two days later the Joint committee asked that Gates s nomination be put on hold. Senator Boren posed the alternatives of a vote or a withdrawal of the nomination while senior congressional leaders warned the White House that a fight over Gates would concentrate yet more attention on Iran Contra. Reagan who had just released a presidential commission report in an effort to put the scandal behind him did not care to hear that.

Robert Gates decided to withdraw. The next day the administration took back the nomination. Gates issued a statement defending his actions during the Iran-Contra affair denying he had covered up evidence or suppressed improprieties. Eventually the joint committee cleared Gates of illegal actions, and the Iran Contra special prosecutor affirmed that conclusion, but there had been failings. Gates cites mitigating circumstances in his memoirs, where he writes:

I would go over those points in my mind a thousand times in the months and years to come, but the criticisms still hit home. A thousand times I would go over the “might-have-beens” if I had raised more hell than I did with Casey about nonnotification of Congress, if I had demanded that the NSC get out of covert action, if I had insisted that CIA not play by NSC rules, if I had been more aggressive with the DO in my first months as DDCI, if I had gone to the Attorney General.

It became Robert Gates’s misfortune to be swept up in a web of illegality so immense it brought dangers of the impeachment of a president, which made Gates small fry indeed and virtually overnight neutered Ronald Reagan.

In withdrawing the Gates nomination, President Reagan simultaneously announced his appointment of William B. Webster to lead the agency. Webster liked to be called “Judge”-he had been a jurist on the federal bench, eventually on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Where CIA denizens begrudged Stansfield Turner his preferred title of admiral, no one held back with Judge Webster. Dedication to the law and to his native St. Louis, at least as deep as Turner’s to the navy, had seen Webster through law school at Washington University, then a decade as a St. Louis attorney, another as a U.S. district attorney, and then the bench. In 1978 President Carter named Webster to head the FBI, the post he held when Reagan asked him to move to Langley. Three days shy of his fifty-third birthday, Judge Webster came with stellar reviews-squeaky clean, exactly what Reagan then needed. The Senate intelligence committee approved his nomination in early May, and the full Senate consented to it shortly thereafter. Judge Webster was sworn in immediately.

Bob Gates felt the weight of Iran-Contra lifted from his shoulders, only to hear from his brother that their father had just died. As Gates dealt with personal tragedy, Webster established himself at Langley. Again like Admiral Turner, Judge Webster brought in a coterie as his inner circle-this time of former FBI aides. That move scarcely endeared Webster to CIA staff, though he took some of the sting away by announcing Gates would remain DDCI.

The new CIA director had a background in government and even in the security field, where his ‘time at the FBI had included notable investigations of corruption among congressmen, the Korean CIA, and, of course, Iran-Contra. In Webster’s last months at the FBI the Bureau had looked into Southern Air Transport, the agency’s quasi-proprietary. But Webster’s knowledge of intelligence, mostly peripheral, resulted from participation in the National Foreign Intelligence Board, the DCI’s committee of the directors of all the U.S. intelligence agencies. His background in foreign affairs, even thinner, did not help in the corridors at Langley.

Webster’s tenure has received mixed reviews. Melissa Boyle Mahle, an officer with the DO’s Near East Division, saw the Judge as isolating himself, managing rather than leading CIA, passing Olympian judgments, treating the agency as something dirty or infectious. “He did not lead the troops, or ever really try to get to know them,” she writes. The chief of station in Brussels, Richard Holm, felt Webster never really fit in but nevertheless had been a good choice, and Holm was sorry when he left. Floyd Paseman, by 1987 a branch chief in the East Asia Division soon elevated to the management staff, believes Webster “did a terrific job of restoring the CIA’s image.” Dewey Clarridge asserts that Webster “didn’t have the stomach for bold moves of any sort.” Robert Gates acknowledges the criticisms but calls Webster a “godsend” to the CIA, observing that none of the complaints “amounted to a hill of beans compared to what he brought to CIA that May: leadership, the respect of Congress, and a sterling character.”

Pages 582-585:

Judge Webster may have been the most prominent casualty of the Gulf War. During the long interregnum between Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the beginning of the coalition military campaign came a period of diplomacy and economic sanctions. In Capitol Hill debates and the struggle for public opinion, Webster was called upon to render opinions on the effectiveness of sanctions, Iraqi intent, and the balance of forces. Others seized on Webster’s words as ammunition. This did not please Bush. Never that comfortable at Langley, Judge Webster decided he had had enough. He let a few weeks go by after the Gulf triumph, then stepped down. The DO shed few tears.

The White House announced the resignation on May 8, 1991. Appearing briefly with Webster, President Bush said he had yet to think of a successor but praised Robert Gates. That same day Bush summoned Gates to his cabin aboard Air Force One and asked if the former spook would accept the CIA nomination. Gates immediately agreed. He expected a painful confirmation process, and he got one. Iran-Contra investigations continued, and Bob Gates would not be definitively cleared until the special prosecutor’s final report, still two years in the future. When Alan Fiers pleaded guilty in July 1991, Gates feared that Fiers would implicate him in some way. “The lowest point in my life came the day before the plea bargain was announced,” Gates recalls. Acutely conscious of the fact that civil servants rarely rise to head their departments, Gates realized it had been a generation since Bill Colby had been confirmed. Gates had been close to some quite controversial people, from Kissinger to Casey. Then the summer of 1991 brought the final collapse of the Soviet Union, kicking off the debate as to whether the CIA had failed to predict it. Of course Gates had had a dominant role in CIA analysis of Russia for years. But this time, unlike 1987, Gates resolved to proceed with the confirmation process no matter what.

Charges that Robert Gates had politicized intelligence took center stage when confirmation hearings opened in September [1991]. At first an extended examination of the nominee was not planned. Marvin C. Ott, deputy director of the SSCI staff at the time, recalls that the predisposition to let Gates sail through created a staff presumption that there was nothing to look into. Committee staff and members were flummoxed by the appearance of a succession of analysts who gave chapter and verse on many Gates interventions in intelligence analysis. Reports on Afghanistan and Nicaragua were among those cited. Evidence emerged that current employees, reluctant to criticize openly, also saw Gates as an interventionist. Far from pro forma nomination hearings, those on Gates morphed into a major CIA inquiry.

The nominee presented a preemptive defense, attempting to disarm critics with examples of how he had simply tried to push analysts to back up their assertions, picturing some alleged interventions as his effort to tease out better reporting. Then a number of former analysts went before the committee to dispute that rendering, most notably Mel Goodman, who had been a colleague for years; Jennifer L. Glaudemans, a former Soviet analyst; and Harold P. Ford, one of the CIA’s grand old men. Alan Fiers appeared as part of the committee’s fairly extensive coverage of Iran-Contra, but his testimony did Gates no harm. Others supported the nomination. Gates himself returned for “something fairly dramatic,” a round of follow-up testimony refuting critics. The hearings became the most extensive examination of U.S. intelligence since the Church and Pike investigations. Work at Langley ground to a halt as CIA officers watched every minute on television, much like Americans riveted by the 0. J. Simpson murder trial.

The intelligence committee wrestled with its quandary. President Bush intervened, invoking party discipline to ensure that members backed the nominee. Ott believes Gates appealed to the White House for this measure. Committee chairman David Boren staged his own covert operation, acting impartially in the camera’s eye while laboring in secret to build support for the nominee. Boren agreed to one of the most extensive committee reports on a nomination ever, in which his committee attempted to reconcile Gates’s testimony with the charges against him. In Ott’s view, this episode became the first time in a decade where partisanship reigned on the SSCI. Finally the committee approved Bush’s appointee. Gates was confirmed early in November.

For all the drama of the hearings, the sequel did not live up to the fears of opponents. Director Gates strove to preserve flexibility as Langley marched into the post-Cold War era. He showed a healthy appreciation for the need to change, forming a whole range of task forces, fourteen in all, each to recommend changes in some aspect of CIA activity. A group on openness figured among them, advising that a swath of records be made public. In 1992 Gates spoke before a conference of diplomatic historians and promised that the agency would open up, even in regard to covert operations. As an earnest of its intentions, the CIA declassified large portions of the body of NIEs on the Soviet Union and that December sponsored a conference reflecting on the period. Stansfield Turner gave the keynote address.

One of the Gates study groups considered politicization. Although its instructions were drawn so narrowly it could conclude there had been none, Gates gathered a large contingent of officers in The Bubble in March 1992 to ventilate the issue. Directly confronting the matter that had clouded his confirmation, Gates squared the circle by acknowledging that whether or not there had been politicization in the past, it was a danger to be guarded against. The director declared his determination to find better ways to prevent policy driven analysis.

Another task force focused on covert action. Among the novelties there, a delegation of senior clandestine services officers met with scholars at the Institute of Policy Studies, a leftist think tank, to solicit their views on directions the agency might take. They did not flinch when told the DCI ought to abolish the Directorate for Operations. Of course no such advice made its way into the final report, but DDO Thomas Twetten was placed on notice that the old days were gone. Twetten, one of the anointed, who thought nothing of rejecting a Freedom of Information Act request for Mongoose documents whose substance was already in the Church Committee report, was forced to retrench. The directorate consolidated operations in several African countries closing a number of stations-a move that soon came back to haunt the agency.

A national center to target human intelligence assets flowed from Gates’s concern for more spies. But DO officers in the field met with silence when they proposed new operations or recruitments. Iran Contra showed that Langley would not back its officers in trouble, and now morale became difficult to sustain. One Latin American division field man told his mates, “Pay attention this is the end of an era.” Clandestine officer Melissa Mahle pictures the atmosphere well: “We were not listening. Operations officers felt they had been made the scapegoat of a failed White House policy… We did not hear the call to do …business in a new way, in a way that would be more attuned to the attitudes of the post-Cold War 1990s. In a climate in which the agency’s goal seemed to have been achieved, Robert Gates could not stem the retirements and resignations that began about then. The clandestine service denigrated him as a mere analyst who did not understand operations.

As far as covert action is concerned, Mahle makes the apt point that part of the CIA’s problem was rooted in Reagan-era practice, in which covert operations were conducted openly and made the subject of political debate and partisan accusation, all to avoid explanations when projects did not go as advertised. She writes: “The CIA entered into a new phase of ‘overt covert action,’ a marvelous oxymoron that should join the ranks of ‘jumbo shrimp’ and ‘military intelligence.” The consequences of acting overtly included constant demands for specifics-from Congress, the press, the public, foreign governments-that meant secrecy headaches. Operational details could be exposed. Political tumult could terminate actions in midstream, magnifying the fear of abandonment of CIA’s proxies. And overt action amplified tensions between CIA and the Pentagon too, as the special warfare community pressed for greater control. Worse, the CIA’s role became that of bag man, hiring the proxies, whether foreign security services or local factions, as spearpoints for U.S. action. Paramilitary capabilities atrophied with cutbacks in the Special Activities Division. Operations also became less controllable as CIA steadily reduced its direct role.

The growing importance of proxies had implications for the use of covert action to implant democracy. To the old dilemma of shady means in service of lofty goals was added the spoiler of agents who acted in America’s name with their own agendas, or those who took the CIA cash and wouldn’t stay “bought.” These problems were, and are, intractable.

As director, Robert Gates’s vision involved gradual, planned change. He put teeth into the idea of support for military operations. One of the task forces worked on that alone. He tried to turn the agency toward the challenges of proliferation and transnational threats. Director Gates wanted more and better training for analysts, use of open source information, and techniques like competitive analysis. He ordered the revamping of CIA file systems. He opposed restructuring, including talk of a national agency for mapping and photographic interpretation, but agreed with the Pentagon on reforms at the National Reconnaissance Office. When Gates came to Langley, 6o percent of the CIA budget aimed at Russia; when he left that figure had dropped to 13 percent. But Gates never completed his mission. George H. W. Bush lost the 1992 election to William J. Clinton. A few days later, on November 7, Gates announced his retirement. He stayed only long enough for Clinton to choose his own director.

Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.Chapter 16, “Robert M. Gates” – Excerpt from the Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Volume I: Investigations and Prosecutions, August 4, 1993

Robert M. Gates, Letter in Response to Findings of Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh, September 22, 1993 – Excerpt from Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Volume III: Comments and Materials Submitted by Individuals and Their Attorneys Responding to Volume I of the Final Report, December 3, 1993

“Nomination of Robert M. Gates,” Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume I, September 16, 17, 19, 20, 1991 – Part 1 of 2 (16MB) – Part 2 of 2 (16MB)

“Nomination of Robert M. Gates,” Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume II, September 24, October 1, 2, 1991 – Part 1 of 2 (10MB) – Part 2 of 2 (17MB)

“Nomination of Robert M. Gates,” Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume III, October 3, 4, 18, 1991 (15MB)

Official Report Released on Mexico’s “Dirty War”

Detainee profile included in Chaper 8 of the Special Prosecutor’s report, which details the role of the DFS in forced disappearances.

Official Report Released
on Mexico’s “Dirty War”

Government Acknowledges Responsibility for Massacres, Torture, Disappearances and Genocide

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 209

Posted – November 21, 2006

For more information contact
Kate Doyle – 646/670-8841
kadoyle@gwu.edu

Research Assistance: Jesse Franzblau
About the Above Image
During their investigations of forced disappearances, the Special Prosecutor’s office reviewed documents produced by the Federal Security Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad-DFS), including their prisoner files. These detainee registries included many individuals who were detained extra judicially, and held in clandestine security facilities where they were subject to torture. The above image is from chapter 8 of the Special Prosecutor’s report, detailing the role of the DFS in forced disappearances. When an individual was detained by security officials, a DFS official filled out a biographical sketch. The document included socio-economic information such as the prisoner’s religion, languages, political affiliation, and ideological affinity. The back of the document contained general observations, as well as the date and motivation of detention. The record was then stamped, and signed by the official in charge of the security section in which the prisoner was registered. In most of the cases examined by the Special Prosecutor’s office, however, the signature of the security authority was omitted from the documents. The report observes that “the omission of the signature by those in charge of detention appears to indicate that they were conscious of the crimes they were committing and attempting to elude responsibility” (p. 504).


 

Communiqué from Authors of the Draft Report of the Special Prosecutor
(in Spanish)
Click here to read the press release (also in Spanish)The authors of the draft report of the Special Prosecutor, “¡Que no vuelva a suceder…!” (parts of which were posted by the National Security Archive on February 26, 2006), have written a critique of the government’s official report, “Informe Histórico a la Sociedad Mexicana – 2006.” In their communiqué, the authors object to changes made to their original findings and ask the government to recognize the conclusions and recommendations of their version of the report. The Mexico Project is posting this document, which José Sotelo Marbán, coordinator of the Special Prosecutor’s investigations, sent to the National Security Archive in an e-mail last week.

NOTE: The National Security Archive would like to clarify a factual error made in footnote 2 of the Communiqué, which states that the Archive surreptitiously (“subrepticiamente“) obtained draft chapters of the “Informe” for the posting of February 26. In point of fact, Kate Doyle was offered an unsolicited copy of the document by one of the many people who had it in February 2006. When we learned that a national magazine also had a copy and was planning to publish a detailed article about its contents, we proposed that the Archive post the document in full on our Web site – thereby granting victims of Mexico’s dirty war and families of the disappeared the same access that a group of notable writers, academics and journalists in Mexico City already had.

NOTA: El National Security Archive quisiera esclarecer un error factual en la nota número dos que aparece al pie de página del comunicado, en la cual se establece que el Archive subrepticiamente obtuvo borradores de capítulos del informe publicado en nuestra página de Internet el 26 de febrero de 2006. A manera de aclaración, Kate Doyle no solicitó a nadie una copia del documento. Esta copia le fue ofrecida por una de las muchas personas que la tenía en su poder en febrero de 2006. Al enterarnos que una revista de circulación nacional también tenía una copia del documento y que además tenía planeado publicar un artículo sobre su contenido, propusimos que el National Security Archive publicara el documento en su totalidad- permitiendo a las víctimas de la guerra sucia y a los familiares de los desaparecidos el mismo acceso que un grupo de destacados escritores, académicos y periodistas en la Cuidad de México ya tenían.

Washington D.C., October 30, 2011 – Mexican authorities released a groundbreaking report over the weekend on the government’s use of violent repression to crush its opponents during the 1960s-80s. The full report has now been posted here on the Web site of the National Security Archive.

The report by the Office of Special Prosecutor Ignacio Carrillo Prieto, named by President Vicente Fox in 2002 to investigate past human rights crimes, accuses three Mexican presidents of a sustained policy of violence targeting armed guerrillas and student protesters alike, including the use of “massacres, forced disappearance, systematic torture, and genocide.” The report makes clear that the abuses were not the work of individual military units or renegade officers, but official practice under Presidents Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970), Echeverría (1970-1976) and López Portillo (1976-1982).

The document’s release marks the first time the Mexican government has accepted responsibility for waging a secret and illicit war against its perceived enemies. Unlike prior investigations into the Mexican “dirty war,” the Special Prosecutor’s report draws on thousands of secret records from the vaults of Mexican military, intelligence and police agencies. It traces for the first time the flow of orders from the President, the Defense Secretary and the Interior Ministry down to the soldiers and security agents in the field, and the returning flow of reports back to Mexico City. The official sources are complemented by testimonies and eyewitness accounts gathered by the investigators.

Last February, the National Security Archive posted an earlier draft of the report, when it became clear that the Fox government was hesitating to publish the official document. Today’s version was released late on Friday night, November 17, at the start of a long weekend in Mexico, and posted on the Web site of the Mexican Attorney General’s office. It is over 800 pages long, and contains photographs, declassified government records, and lengthy indexes to organizations and names.

The report includes chapters on the 1968 and 1971 student massacres in Mexico City, the counterinsurgency waged against armed guerrillas in Guerrero during the 1970s, and the broader attack on dissidence throughout the country over the almost two decades covered by the investigation. The report describes and names the victims in 645 disappearances, 99 extrajudicial executions, and more than two thousand cases of torture, among other human rights violations documented.

“The release of the Special Prosecutor’s report is a direct result of the demand of Mexican citizens to know what happened during the dirty war,” Kate Doyle, Director of the Archive’s Mexico Project, said today, “and is unique in the annals of Latin American truth commissions for the access investigators had to government records. In the past, not only did the authoritarian regime violently attack its opponents, it sought to cover up its role through lies, terror and intimidation for years afterwards. But while the report takes an important step toward reversing Mexico’s legacy of impunity, the Fox administration failed in its attempts to prosecute those responsible for the crimes described in it. That job is left to the new government of Felipe Calderón, who takes office on December 1.”

Informe Histórico a la Sociedad Mexicana – 2006
Historical Report to the Mexican Society – 2006
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.Introducción – Informe Histórico a la Sociedad Mexicana
Introduction – Historical Report to the Mexican Society

Tema 1 – Mandato y procedimiento de trabajo
Chapter 1 – Mandate and work procedure

Tema 2 – La Segunda Guerra Mundial prefigura el escenario que nos ocupa
Chapter 2- World War II and how it prefigures the modern day situation

Tema 3 – Movimiento Estudiantil de 1968
Chapter 3 – The student movement of 1968

Tema 4 – El 10 de Junio de 1971 y la disidencia Estudiantil
Chapter 4 – 10 June 1971 and student dissidence

Tema 5 – Orígenes de la Guerrilla Moderna en México
Chapter 5 – Origins of Mexico’s modern day guerrilla movement

Tema 6 – Lo que explica el surgimiento de la guerra sucia
Chapter 6 – The explanation of the origins of the dirty war

Tema 7 – Grupos Armados: La guerrilla se extiende por todo el país
Chapter 7 – Armed Groups: The guerrilla extends throughout the entire country

Tema 8 – Genocidio
Chapter 8 – Genocide

Tema 9 – Se acreditan las condiciones de un Conflicto Armado Interno en que aplica el Derecho Humanitario Internacional
Chapter 9 – Applying the conditions of Internal Armed Conflict to the applications of International Human Rights

Tema 10 – Desviaciones del poder por el régimen autoritario y corrupción de las instituciones de estado
Chapter 10 – Deviations of power by the authoritarian regime and corruption of the state institutions

Tema 11 – Derecho a la verdad, al duelo y al reconocimiento del honor de los caídos en la lucha por la justicia
Chapter 11 – The right to truth, recognition and the honor of those fallen in the fight for justice.

Tema 12 – Luchadores sociales y organismos que demandan verdad y justicia
Chapter 12 – Civil society organizations that demand truth and justice

TOP-SECRET FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE-PINOCHET: A Declassified Documentary Obit

Archive Posts Records on former Dictator’s Repression, Acts of Terrorism, U.S. Support

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 212

The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability
By Peter Kornbluh
A Los Angeles Times
Best Nonfiction Book of 2003

Washington D.C., October 18, 2011 – As Chile prepared to bury General Augusto Pinochet, the National Security Archive today posted a selection of declassified U.S. documents that illuminate the former dictator’s record of repression. The documents include CIA records on Pinochet’s role in the Washington D.C. car bombing that killed former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier and his American colleague Ronni Moffitt, Defense Intelligence Agency biographic reports on Pinochet, and transcripts of meetings in which Secretary of State Henry Kissinger resisted bringing pressure on the Chilean military for its human rights atrocities.

“Pinochet’s death has denied his victims a final judicial reckoning,” said Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive’s Chile Documentation Project. “But the declassified documents do contribute to the ultimate verdict of history on his atrocities.”

Most of the documents posted today are drawn from a collection of 24,000 declassified records that were released by the Clinton administration after Pinochet’s October, 1998, arrest in London. Many of them are reproduced in Kornbluh’s book, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability.

Pinochet died of complications from a heart attack on December 10, which was, by coincidence, International Human Rights Day.

Read the Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.Initial Reports on Pinochet’s Repression

Department of State, SECRET Memorandum, “Chilean Executions,” includes “Fact Sheet-Human Rights in Chile,” November 27, 1973

Updated “Fact Sheet-Human Rights in Chile,” January 15, 1974

This memo, sent to the Secretary of State by Jack Kubisch, states that summary executions in the nineteen days following the coup totaled 320–more than three times the publicly acknowledged figure. At the same time, Kubisch reports on new economic assistance just authorized by the Nixon administration. The memo provides information about the Chilean military’s justification for the continued executions. It also includes a situation report and human rights fact sheet on Chile. An updated fact sheet showing the situation two months later is also included.

Central Intelligence Agency, SECRET Intelligence Report, [Executions in Chile since the Coup], October 27, 1973

This Intelligence Report states that between September 11, 1973 and October 10, 1973 a total of 13,500 prisoners had been registered as detained by the Chilean armed forces. During that same time period, an estimated 1,600 civilian deaths occurred as a result of the coup. The report also notes that eighty civilians were either executed on the spot or killed by firing squads after military trials.

Central Intelligence Agency, SECRET Report, “Chile: Violations of Human Rights,” May 24, 1977

This secret CIA report acknowledges that Chile’s National Intelligence Directorate is behind the recent increase in torture, illegal detentions, and unexplained “disappearances.” The report notes that the increase in gross violations of human rights in Chile comes at a particularly bad time for the country.

Defense Intelligence Agency, CONFIDENTIAL Report, “Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) Expands Operations and Facilities,” April 15, 1975

This DIA report on Chile’s Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) discusses the organization’s structure and its relationship with the Chilean Armed Forces and the country’s governing Junta. DINA is identified as the sole agency responsible handling internal subversive matters. The report warns that the possibility of DINA becoming a modern day Gestapo may be coming to fruition. It concludes that any advantages gained by humanitarian practices in Chile could easily be offset by DINA’s terror tactics.
U.S. Support for the Pinochet Regime

Department of State, SENSITIVE Cable, “USG Attitude Toward Junta,” September 13, 1973

This DOS cable sent two days after the coup states that the “US government wishes to make clear its desire to cooperate with the military Junta and to assist in any appropriate way.” This official welcome agreed that it was best to avoid too much public identification between the Junta and the United States government.

Department of State, SENSITIVE Cable, “Continuation of Relations with GOC and Request for Flares and Helmets,” September 18, 1973

This DOS cable was sent in response to a note from the Junta regarding the continuation of relations. It stress the US government’s “strongest desire to cooperate closely with the Chilean Junta.”

Department of State, Memorandum, “Ambassador Popper’s Policy Paper,” July 11, 1975

ARA analyst Richard Bloomfield’s memo notes that “in the eyes of the world at large, we are closely associated with this Junta, ergo with fascists and torturers.” In this memo he makes clear his disagreement with Kissinger’s position and argues that the human rights problem in Chile should be of primary interest to the U.S. government.

Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Carvajal, September 29, 1975

This transcript records a meeting between Secretary Kissinger and Pinochet’s foreign minister, Patricio Carvajal, following Chile’s decision to cancel a visit by the United Nations Human Rights Commission investigating human rights crimes. Kissinger begins the meeting by disparaging his staff “who have a vocation for the ministry” for focusing on human rights in the briefing papers prepared for the meeting. He tells Carvajal that condemnation of the Pinochet regime’s human rights record is “a total injustice,” but that “somewhat visible” efforts by the regime to alleviate the situation would be useful in changing Congressional attitudes. “Our point of view is if you do something, let us know so we can use it with Congress.” Kissinger, Carvajal, and Assistant Secretary Rogers then discuss U.S. efforts to expedite Ex-Im Bank credits and multilateral loans to Chile as well as cash sales of military equipment. At the end of the meeting, Kissinger voices support for the regime’s idea to host the June 1976 OAS meeting in Santiago as a way of increasing Pinochet’s prestige and improving Chile’s negative image.

Department of State, SECRET, “The Secretary’s 8:00 a.m. Regional Staff Meeting,” December 5, 1974

At this staff meeting, Secretary Kissinger spends considerable time discussing Congressional efforts, led by Senator Edward Kennedy, to restrict U.S. military assistance to the Pinochet regime. The transcript records Kissinger’s vehement opposition to such legislative initiatives, on the grounds that they are unfair to the Chilean military government, could lead to its collapse, and set a dangerous precedent for cutting assistance to other unsavory governments the Ford Administration is supporting. “Well, am I wrong that this sort of thing is likely to finish off that government?” he demands to know. Later he asks: “Is this government worse than the Allende government? Is human rights more severely threatened by this government than Allende?” According to Kissinger, “the worse crime of this government is that it is pro-American.” In response, Assistant Secretary for Latin America, William Rogers informs the Secretary, “in terms of freedom of association, Allende didn’t close down the opposition party. In terms of freedom of the press, Allende didn’t close down all the newspapers.”

Department of State, SECRET Memorandum of Conversation between Henry Kissinger and Augusto Pinochet, “U.S.-Chilean Relations,” June 8, 1976

In this secret memorandum of conversation, Kissinger briefs Pinochet in advance of his speech to the Organization of American States (OAS) in Santiago in June 1976. He lets Pinochet know that he will treat the issue of human rights in general terms only. He stresses that his speech is not aimed at Chile but that it is intended to appease the U.S. Congress. But, he notes, “we have a practical problem we have to take into account, without bringing about pressures incompatible with your dignity, and at the same time which does not lead to U.S. laws which will undermine our relationship.”
Pinochet and the Letelier-Moffitt Assassination

Central Intelligence Agency, SECRET Intelligence Information Cable, [Assassination of Orlando Letelier], October 6, 1976

Two weeks after the car bombing assassination of Orlando Letelier this CIA field report states that its source “believes that the Chilean government is directly involved in Letelier’s death and feels that investigation into the incident will so indicate.”

Central Intelligence Agency, SECRET Intelligence Assessment, “Chile: Implications of the Letelier Case,” May 1978

This CIA intelligence assessment alludes to the strain placed on U.S.-Chilean relations in light of recent findings in the investigation of the murder of Orlando Letelier that firmly linked the former Foreign Minister to the highest levels of the Chilean government. CIA analysts write, “The sensational developments have evoked speculation about President Pinochet’s survival.”

Central Intelligence Agency, SECRET Intelligence Report, “[Deleted] Strategy of Chilean Government with Respect to Letelier Case, and Impact of Case on Stability of President Pinochet,” June 23, 1978

This secret intelligence report outlines Pinochet’s strategy to cover up his regime’s complicity in the Letelier assassination. The four-point strategy would protect General Contreras from successful prosecution in the murder, stonewall requests from the U.S. government that would help them build a case against Chileans involved in the terrorist act, prevent the Supreme Court from honoring U.S. extradition requests, and convince the Chilean people that the investigation into the Letelier assassination is a politically motivated tool to destabilize the Pinochet regime.

Pinochet Biographic Reports

Defense Intelligence Agency, SECRET, “Biographic Data on Augusto Pinochet,” January 1975 (unredacted version)

Two versions of DIA’s biographic profile on Pinochet – one fully uncensored, the other curiously redacted. Please see the Archive’s prior posting regarding the two different versions of the document.

Central Intelligence Agency, SECRET, “Biographic Handbook [on] Chile,” November 1974

This CIA bio describes Pinochet as an intelligent, disciplined, and professional military officer who is known for his toughness. The document states that Pinochet is dedicated to the national reconstruction of his country and will not tolerate any opposition to that goal.

TOP-SECRET -DOCUMENTS IMPLICATE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT IN CHIQUITA TERROR SCANDAL

Company’s Paramilitary Payoffs made through Military’s ‘Convivir’

U.S. Embassy told of “potential” for groups “to devolve into full-fledged paramilitaries”

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 217
U.S. intelligence assessments like this 1997 CIA report were consistently pessimistic about the prospects that the Colombian military would take on illegal paramilitary groups.

Washington D.C., October 18, 2011 – New documents published today by the National Security Archive shed light on recent revelations about the links between bananas and terror in Colombia and the Colombian government’s own ties to the country’s illegal paramilitary forces.

The scandal is further detailed in an article by National Security Archive Colombia analyst Michael Evans published today on the Web site of The Nation magazine.

The March 9, 2007, indictment against Chiquita Brands International sheds light on both corporate and state ties to Colombia’s illegal paramilitary forces.

Earlier this month, Chiquita, the international fruit corporation, admitted to funding a Colombian terrorist group and agreed to pay a $25 million fine. The Justice Department indictment, filed March 13 in D.C. Federal Court, states that Chiquita gave more than $1.7 million to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC), an illegal right-wing anti-guerrilla group tied to many of the country’s most notorious civilian massacres.

Key documents from the Chiquita case, along with a collection of newly-available declassified documents, are posted here today.

The payments were made over seven years from 1997-2004. At least $825,000 in payments came after the AUC was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department in 2001.

Many of these payments were made through “intermediaries” in a Colombian government-sponsored program known as Convivir, a network of rural security cooperatives established by the military to police rural areas and provide intelligence on leftist insurgents. Declassified documents suggest that Convivir members often collaborated with paramilitary operations.

The Convivir connection is especially important now, as current President Álvaro Uribe was a key sponsor of the program while governor of Anitoquia department. Antioquia’s banana-growing Urabá region is also the locus of Chiquita’s Colombia operations. As president, Uribe has implemented similar programs involving the use of civilian informants and soldiers.

The article published today, along with additional documents included here, describes a pattern of increasingly-strong links between military and paramilitary forces in Urabá over the period of Chiquita’s payments to the AUC. Chiquita’s relationship with the group coincided with a massive projection of paramilitary power thoughout Colombia. U.S. officials strongly suspected that these operations were at least tolerated by–and at times coordinated with–Colombian security forces.

The Chiquita-Convivir scandal comes as the Los Angeles Times has published a report that the CIA has new information connecting Colombia’s Army chief, Gen. Mario Montoya, one of President Uribe’s top advisers, to a paramilitary group. The new allegation adds fuel to the “para-politics” scandal, which has already taken down several top government officials and implicated many others in connection to the AUC.

Today’s posting is the first in a series of new Archive postings on the U.S. government’s perception of Colombia’s paramiltary movement and its links to Colombian security forces. Under a program developed by the Uribe government to disarm and demobilize the AUC, paramilitary leaders are eligible for reduced prison sentences in exchange for voluntary confessions and the payment of reparations to their victims. However, the commission established to adjudicate this process is not authorized to investigate state crimes or the history of the government’s links to paramilitary forces.

Documents made available on the Archive Web site today include:

  • the Justice Department’s indictment in the Chiquita case, detailing the company’s relationship with AUC chief Carlos Castaño, the fugitive (and now deceased) paramilitary leader;
  • a U.S. Embassy cable in which Colombia’s police intelligence chief “sheepishly” admitted that his forces “do not act” in parts of the country under AUC control;
  • another Embassy cable in which Ambassador Myles Frechette warned that the government’s Convivir program was liable to “degenerate into uncontrolled paramilitary groups”;
  • a U.S. military intelligence report on a Colombian Army colonel who told of the “potential” for the Convivir “to devolve into full-fledged paramilitaries”;
  • and CIA reports on the Colombian Army’s paramilitary ties, one of which found that armed forces commanders had “little inclination to combat paramilitary groups.”

The full article is available on the Web site of The Nation.

Documents
The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.NOTE: With the exception of the Justice Department indictment, all documents published here were obtained by the Archive’s Colombia Documentation Project through Freedom of Information Act requests.

THE INDICTMENT

United States of America v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Defendant, March 13, 2007

The indictment details Chiquita’s seven-year relationship with Carlos Castaño’s AUC. The paramilitary chief arranged the payments in 1997 with Banadex, a wholly-owned Chiquita subsidiary. Castaño “informed the [Banadex] General Manager that the AUC was about to drive the FARC [guerrillas] out of Urabá,” and also that “failure to make the payments could result in physical harm to Banadex personnel and property.”

The company was to “make payments to an intermediary known as a ‘convivir,'” groups used by the AUC “as fronts to collect money from businesses for use to support its illegal activities.” The Convivir were rural security cooperatives established by the military to police rural areas and provide intelligence on leftist insurgents.

The Justice Department lists some 50 payments made by Chiquita after the State Deparment designated the AUC a terrorist organization in September 2001. The company made at least 19 of these payments after the company voluntarily disclosed the payments to the Justice Department in April 2003, and despite strong warnings from its lawyers to terminate the relationship.

“Must stop payments,” read one note quoted in the indictment.

“Bottom Line: CANNOT MAKE THE PAYMENT”
“Advised NOT TO MAKE ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT throught CONVIVIR.”
“General Rule: Cannot do indirectly what you cannot do directly.”

“You voluntarily put yourself in this position. Duress defense can wear out through repetition. Buz [business] decision to stay in harm’s way. Chiquita should leave Colombia.”

DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

Document 1: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, Botero Human Rights Letter to A/S Shattuck, December 9, 1994

The U.S. Embassy was skeptical when first confronted with the Colombian defense ministry’s plan to create the network of “rural security cooperatives” that would ultimately come to be known as Convivir. In a cable that covered an array of human rights issues, Ambassador Myles Frechette was emphatic about the proposal’s inherent dangers:

“We believe that the point that needs to be made to the minister is that Colombia’s protracted, vaguely ideological internal conflict is quite sui generis and that there has never been an example in Colombia of a para-statal security group that has not ultimately operated with wanton disregard for human rights or been corrupted by local economic interests.”

Document 2: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report, Colar 17th Brigade Responsible for the Uraba Antioquia Region, April 29, 1996

This report from the U.S. military attaché in Colombia describes the security situation in Urabá, the region where much of Chiquita’s operations are located. The document describes a tense situation involving ongoing struggles between EPL and FARC guerrillas, “fighting each other for control of unions and politics in the banana area.” According to the indictment, from 1989 until the AUC payments began in 1997, Chiquita had been making similar payments to Colombian guerilla groups. The commander of the Army’s local 17th Brigade, Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, told the attaché “that paramilitaries are the only individuals that subversive elements fear.”

Document 3: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, Samper Hosts Governors’ Meeting on Crime, October 9, 1996

Following a meeting with Colombian President Ernesto Samper and other government officials, the U.S. Embassy reported that Antioquia Governor Álvaro Uribe (the current president of Colombia) had called for “the proliferation of the controversial civilian rural security cooperatives known collectively as ‘Convivir.'” Uribe said that the Convivir had “led to the capture of guerrilla leaders in the region,” and called on the government to arm some of the groups. The Embassy adds the comment that “most human rights observers believe the Convivir groups pose a serious danger of becoming little more that vigilante organizations.” The government’s human rights ombudsman had “begun to receive complaints against these groups for exceeding their mandate,” according to the Embassy report.

Document 4: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, 40,000 Colombians March to Protest Wave of Kidnappings; Paramilitary Group Releases Two Guerrilla Relatives, December 2, 1996

In a testament to the AUC’s growing influence among Colombian security forces, Colombia’s police intelligence chief “sheepishly” told U.S. Embassy officers that “the police ‘do not act’ in the part of Urabá under [Carlos] Castano’s control.” The statement came in response to an Embassy query as to why Colombian police had not arrested Castaño, “who had openly admitted to kidnapping guerrilla relatives.”

Document 5: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report, Colombian Prosecutor Comments on Paramilitaries in Uraba, December 7, 1996

Paramilitaries had become “a law unto themselves” in Urabá constituting “a potentially greater threat to the government than … the guerrillas,” according to this military intelligence report, based on comments from a Colombian prosecutor. The document describes the violence there as “basically a turf war to determine which group [paramilitaries or guerrillas] will control the rich banana-growing region (and the lucrative illicit narcotics operations within it).” The report adds that, “The military’s influence and control over paramilitaries that we so often logically assume to exist may, in fact, be tenuous at best and non-existent in some cases.”

Document 6: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, Retired Army Colonel Lambastes Military for Inaction Against Paramilitaries, January 11, 1997

In January 1997, retired Army Colonel Carlos Alfonso Velásquez publicly criticized the Colombian Army, particularly 17th Brigade Commander Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, for tolerance of paramilitary forces in Urabá. In this cable, the U.S. Embassy characterizes Velásquez as a man of “unquestionable integrity,” adding that his statements “bring extra pressure to bear on the Colombian military” and “add credibility” to the State Department’s critical human rights report on Colombia.

Document 7: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report, Guerrillas Launch New Wave of Bombings in Uraba and Cordoba — Paramilitaries Respond with Murder and Kidnappings (Laser Strike), March 14, 1997

U.S. military intelligence reports ongoing violence in Urabá, noting that, “Recent events contrast sharply with earlier 17th Brigade reports claiming that Uraba had largely been pacified.” The report says it remains unclear whether a recent shift by FARC guerillas to “terrorist-style bombings” represents “a long-term FARC strategy, or a temporary tactic for retaliating against the paramilitaries for driving them out of certain conflictive zones and discouraging the civilian population from assisting paramilitary organizations.” The document adds that the Colombian government had only recently “acknowledged that paramilitaries are a valid threat to public order that requires attention.”

Document 8: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report, The Convivir in Antioquia — Becoming Institutionalized and Spreading Its Reach, April 7, 1997

In this document, an undisclosed source describes how the Convivir operate in Antioquia. The interlocutor was “insistent that there are striking differences between the legal … sanctioned Convivirs and the illegal paramilitaries that are declared enemies of the state.” The Convivir are merely “one more ‘legal tool’ for integrating counterguerrilla-oriented elements into society.”

Document 9: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, MoD Alleged to have Authorized Illegal Arms Sales to Convivirs and Narcotraffickers, April 9, 1997

In April 1997, a Colombian magazine published allegations that officials in Colombia’s Ministry of Defense had illegally sold weapons to Convivir linked to narcotraffickers and paramilitaries. This highly-excised document indicates that U.S. Embassy military and diplomatic contacts had “lent a significant degree of credibility to the allegations.”

Document 10: U.S. State Department, cable, Bedoya Call for Militia, April 11, 1997

In this cable, the State Department’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin America, Peter Romero, criticizes a new plan by Gen. Harold Bedoya, the armed forces commander, to create “national militias.” Romero mentions problems the government has had with the Convivir program, adding that “establishing yet another set of armed combatants would, if experience is any guide, bring a host of more flagrant human rights abuses.”

Document 11: CIA, Intelligence Report, Colombia: Paramilitaries Gaining Strength, June 13, 1997

This CIA report finds “scant indication that the [Colombian] military leadership is making an effort to directly confront the paramilitary groups or to devote men or resources to stop their activities in an amount commensurate with the dimensions of the problem.” Logistical problems and the “popular perception that the military is ‘losing the war’ against the guerrillas” has had a profound effect on military forces. As a result of these frustrations, “informational links and instances of active coordination between military and paramilitaries are likely to continue,” according the the CIA.

The following month–in an operation that signalled the beginning of a major expansion of paramilitary power throughout Colombia–Urabá-based paramilitaries under the direction of Carlos Castaño would massacre some 30 civilians at Mapiripán, an act later shown to have been facilitated by local military forces.

Document 12: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report, Senior Colombian Army Officer Biding His Time During Remainder of Samper Regime, July 15, 1997

A “senior Colombian Army officer” told U.S. offiicials in July 1997 that there were “serious problems with the legal ‘Convivir’ movement,” according to this military intelligence report. The unnamed officer compared the Convivir to the “Rondas Campesinas” in Peru, calling them “very difficult to control.” According to the colonel, the Ministry of Defense was aware of the “potential for Convivir’s to devolve into full-fledged paramilitaries,” but was “reluctant to admit it publicly.”

Document 13: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, Scandal Over Army Request to Convivir in Antioquia, October 8, 1997

This cable reports on the October 1997 revelation by Colombian Senator Fabio Valencia that a high-ranking Colombian Army officer had circulated a memo asking local Convivir organizations to “to send the Army lists of local candidates, including their political affiliations, degree of acceptance among the people, their sympathies toward democratic institutions, government and military forces, and what degree of local influence they wield.”

Document 14: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, Paramilitary Massacres Leave 21 Dead, November 24, 1997

After Mapiripán, one of the next major projections of paramilitary power in Colombia was the November 21, 1997, La Horqueta massacre, in which paramilitaries killed 14 people in a village outside the Colombian capital. Eyewitnesses believed the attackers came from Colombia’s northern coast, which the Embassy notes is “home of Carlos Castaño‘s paramilitary group.” A prominent Colombian expert told the Embassy that the massacre “sent a message to the FARC that the paramilitaries can go anywhere and do anything.” “The fact that no trace of the killers has turned up yet despite the presence of hundreds of police and soldiers in the wake of the killings is not encouraging,” according to the cable.

Document 15: CIA, Intelligence Report, Colombia: Update on Links Between Military, Paramilitary Forces, December 2, 1997

This highly-excised CIA report states that “prospects for a concerted effort by the military high command to crack down on paramilitaries–and the officers that cooperate with them–appear dim.” Both the current and former armed forces chiefs–Gens. Manuel Bonett and Harold Bedoya–had shown “little inclination to combat paramilitary groups.” Tacit acceptance of paramilitary operations by some officers “are longstanding and will not be easily reversed,” according to the report.

The CIA calls the recent paramilitary expansion into traditionally guerrilla-controlled territory “the most significant change we have seen in recent months and one which has further degraded Colombia’s already poor security and human rights situation.” The Mapiripán massacre was one notable example. One intelligence source told the CIA “that Castano would not have flown forces and weapons into a civilian airport known to have a large police presence if he had not received prior assurances that they would be allowed to pass through.”

Document 16: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report, Cashiered Colonel Talks Freely about the Army He Left Behind (Laser Strike), December 24, 1997

There is a “body count syndrome” in the Colombian Army’s counterinsurgency strategy that “tends to fuel human rights abuses by otherwise well-meaning soldiers trying to get their quota to impress superiors,” according to a recently-retired Colombian Army colonel whose comments form the basis of this intelligence report. According to the officer, the obsession with body counts is in part responsible for commanders “allowing the paramilitaries to serve as proxies for the [Colombian army] in contributing to the guerrilla body count.” The 17th Brigade in Urabá had been cooperating with paramilitaries “for a number of years,” he said, but it “had gotten much worse” under the command of Gen. Rito Alejo del Río. Gen. Del Río was later indicted but ultimately acquitted of collusion with paramilitaries by the Prosecutor General’s office in May 2003.

The officer was critical of several other high-level military commanders, including Gen. Jorge Enrique Mora, who would later serve as armed forces commander. Mora had a clean public reputation, according to the officer, but was “probably was one of those who looked the other way” with respect to collaboration with paramilitaries. Former armed forces commander Gen. Harold Bedoya “fell into the same category,” in that both officers “never allowed themselves to become directly involved in encouraging or supporting paramilitary activities, but they turned their backs to what was happening and felt the [Colombian army] should in no way be blamed for any resulting human rights atrocities committed.”

Document 17: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, Narcos Arrested for La Horqueta Paramilitary Massacre, January 28, 1998

One of the perpetrators of the November 1997 La Horqueta massacre (see Document 14) was identified as the president of an Urabá-based Convivir, according to this U.S. Embassy cable. The Convivir member was “imported to the region” by a “local landowner and presumed narcotrafficker who had hired … Uraba-based paramilitaries to execute the massacre.”

The local Army 13th Brigade was “strangely non-reactive” to the killings, according to the cable. The brigade, the Embassy adds, “recently came under the command of BG Rito Alejo del Rio, who earned considerable attention as the commander of the 17th Brigade covering the heartland of Carlos Castano’s paramilitaries in Cordoba and Uraba.”

Document 18: CIA, Intelligence Report, Colombia: Paramilitaries Assuming a Higher Profile, August 31, 1998

Similar to a previous document on the matter, this CIA report finds that “some senior military officers–already suspicious of the peace process and frustrated with the military’s dismal performance on the battlefield–may increasingly view turning a blind eye–and perhaps even offering tacit support to–the paramilitaries as their best option for striking back at the guerrillas.” Like the previous report, this one also predicts that “informational links and instances of active coordination between the military and the paramilitaries” were “likely to continue and perhaps even increase.”

Document 19: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, A Closer Look at Uribe’s Auxiliary Forces, September 11, 2002

Soon after taking office in 2002, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe announced that a key aspect of his national security strategy would involve the use of civilian soldiers organized into local militias. Key portions of this U.S. Embassy cable on the use of “auxiliary forces” were deleted before release by the State Department, suggesting that the Embassy may have harbored reservations about the program based on the government’s previous experience with the Convivir.

TOP-SECRET FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE – Who Killed Jaime Garzón?

Jaime Garzón (Photo – Semana.com)

Who Killed Jaime Garzón?

Document Points to Military/Paramilitary Nexus in Murder of Popular Colombian Comedian

Garzón Had Been “Deeply Troubled” by Meeting with Senior Army Officer

Ongoing Impunity in 12-year-old Case Spurs Inter-American Commission Complaint

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 360

Washington, D.C., October 13, 2011 – Twelve years after the assassination of beloved Colombian journalist and political satirist Jaime Garzón, a newly-declassified State Department cable, published on the Web today by the National Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org), supports longstanding allegations that Colombian military officials ordered the killing. Written just days after the murder, the cable from the U.S. Embassy in Colombia says that Garzón “had been killed by paramilitaries in league with ‘loose cannon’ active or retired members of the security forces.”

One of Colombia’s most popular television personalities, Garzón was also a high-profile advocate for government talks with leftist rebel groups when he was gunned down on August 13, 1999. Carlos Castaño, top leader of an illegal right-wing militia known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), was convicted in absentia of masterminding the plot in 2001 but was never brought to justice and is now presumed dead. Castaño remains the only individual ever sentenced in the case, though the involvement of Colombian security forces has long been suspected.

The document published today is among key evidence cited by lawyers representing Garzón’s family who are seeking to hold the Colombian state responsible for his murder. Last month, human rights attorneys from the Colectivo de Abogados “José Alvear Restrepo” and the Comisión Colombiana de Juristas jointly requested a hearing on the Garzón case before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR).

Of particular interest in the newly-declassified cable is the revelation that retired general Rito Alejo del Río Rojas may have lied in a 2001 declaration before Colombian prosecutors when he denied that he had ever met Garzón. Quite the contrary, the embassy report says that Del Río “upbraided” Garzón when the two met to discuss his efforts to restart peace negotiations with the ELN guerrilla group. The embassy’s confidential source said that Garzón “came away from the meeting very troubled by the depths of the anger that Del Río vented.”

“The general lied to the Prosecutor General’s office, and the question is why,” said Rafael Barrios, a lawyer from the Colectivo de Abogados.

Forced out of the military in 1999, Gen. Del Río is currently on trial for a separate murder charge and for collaboration with paramilitary death squads while he was commander of the Army’s 17th Brigade in Urabá. Former President Álvaro Uribe (who worked closely with Gen. Del Río while governor of Antioquia from 1995-1997) has been one of the general’s staunchest supporters and was the keynote speaker at the general’s retirement ceremony.

The newly-released embassy cable on the Garzón killing adds to a growing body of declassified evidence pointing to Del Río’s “systematic” use of illegal paramilitary forces.

  • A U.S. embassy “biographic note” from 1998 said that Del Río’s “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries” had been “pivotal” to the brigade’s success against guerrilla groups in the mid-1990s.
  • One of the general’s deputies told U.S. military officials that paramilitary collaboration at the 17th Brigade “had gotten much worse under Del Río.”
  • Another retired Colombian military officer told the embassy that Del Río was one of “the two most corrupt army officers in Colombia” and said that the general “told 17th Brigade personnel to cooperate with paramilitaries whenever Del Río was physically absent from the area.”

The cable backs up the testimony of former AUC paramilitary leaders who have also linked top military officials to the Garzón murder. Freddy Rendón Herrera (“El Alemán”) told a judicial panel that Castaño had authorized the Garzón slaying “at the specific request of a senior military leader of the time.” Another top paramilitary leader, Ever Veloza García (“HH”), told Colombian authorities that Castaño ordered the killing “as a favor to some friends in the National Army.”

Additional details linking Rendón’s “Elmer Cárdenas” bloc to the 17th Brigade were uncovered earlier this year in the Wikileaks material and published by El Espectador. The leaked embassy cable said that the 17th Brigade had illegally incorporated former members of Rendón’s paramilitary gang into a network of civilian informants (Red de Cooperantes) promoted by President Uribe. The official said his unit had been secretly authorized by the government to work with ex-members of the Elmer Cárdenas bloc and that they were “providing good information” on illegal armed groups in the conflictive Urabá region.

Urabá was the wellspring of the paramilitary AUC, which was responsible for thousands of killings and many of the country’s most egregious human rights atrocities. The U.S. State Department added the AUC to its official list of foreign terrorist organizations in 2001, in part due to its suspected role in the Garzón assassination.

Colombian prosecutors have also opened an investigation into charges that the country’s former top intelligence chief, José Miguel Narváez, was behind the killing.

The cable published today provides a chilling description of the killing, which occurred just a few blocks from the U.S. Embassy compound in Bogotá:

TOP-SECRET – CHE GUEVARA’S HAIR AUCTIONED OFF

CHE GUEVARA’S HAIR AUCTIONED OFF

Scrapbook of memorabilia kept by CIA operative who buried Che renews attention to Guevara’s execution, U.S. Role

Selling of history, including captured Cuban records,
intercepts and communications, raises questions about future access

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 232


Washington, DC, October 3, 2011 – As a lock of Che Guevara’s hair along with photos, captured documents, intelligence intercepts, and original fingerprints relating to the capture, execution and secret burial of the Argentine-born revolutionary sold at auction for $100,000, the National Security Archive posted declassified U.S. documents relating to his death 40 years ago this month. (Censored versions of some of the documents were first posted on the 30th anniversary of Guevara’s execution, which took place on October 9, 1967 in Bolivia.)

The macabre collection of memorabilia purchased yesterday by a lone bidder was compiled by a Cuban exile CIA operative named Gustavo Villoldo, who was tasked to help capture Guevara and, after his execution by the Bolivian military, secretly bury him in the middle of the night. Before Guevara’s hands were cut off, Villoldo helped fingerprint his corpse, and a “death mask”–a plaster cast of his face–was made as proof that the real Che had been captured and killed. The covert operative also clipped a portion of Che’s beard as a memento of the CIA’s triumph over Latin America’s most famous revolutionary.

“This collection of memorabilia records one of the most dramatic episodes in the history of revolution and counterrevolution during the Cold War,” said Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive’s Cuba Documentation Project. “The documents and photos are of high value to current and future students of Latin America and U.S. policy toward the region.”

The documents posted today by the Archive include secret memos to President Lyndon Johnson on Che’s capture and death and a declassified debriefing with another CIA operative, Félix Rodríguez, who was present when Che was executed.

The government of Venezuela had reportedly expressed interest in bidding on the collection, but the hair and original documents and photos were purchased by a Houston boosktore owner, Bill Butler. Kornbluh said he hoped the new owner would make the documents and scrapbook available for public study or donate them to a museum.

Read the Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
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CIA Debriefing of Félix Rodríguez [aka Benton Mizones], June 3, 1975
When Che Guevara was executed in La Higuera, one CIA operative was present–a Cuban-American operative named Félix Rodríguez. Rodríguez, who used the codename “Félix Ramos” in Bolivia and posed as a Bolivian military officer, was secretly debriefed on his role by the CIA’s office of the Inspector General in June, 1975. (At the time, he was identified as Benton H. Mizones; the name of the second operative, Gustavo Villoldo, is deleted in the document in the spaces marked [ 06 ].)  Rodríguez recounts the details of his mission to Bolivia, where the CIA sent him and Villoldo to assist in the capture of Guevara and destruction of his guerrilla band. Rodríguez and Villoldo became part of a CIA task force in Bolivia that included the case officer for the operation, “Jim”, another Cuban American, Mario Osiris Riveron, and two agents in charge of communications in Santa Clara. Rodríguez emerged as the most important member of the group; after a lengthy interrogation of one captured guerrilla, he was instrumental in focusing the efforts of the 2nd Ranger Battalion on the Vallegrande region, where he believed Guevara’s rebels were operating. Although he apparently was under CIA instructions to “do everything possible to keep him alive,” Rodríguez claims to have transmitted the order to execute Guevara from the Bolivian High Command to the soldiers at La Higueras–he also directed them not to shoot Guevara in the face so that his wounds would appear to be combat-related–and personally informed Che that he would be killed. After the execution, Rodríguez took Che’s Rolex watch. He accompanied Guevara’s body back to Vallegrande, where Villoldo “took charge of the remains.”

State Department Cable, Official Confirmation of Death of Che Guevara, October 18, 1967
Ten days after his capture, U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia Douglas Henderson transmitted confirmation of Guevara’s death to Washington. The evidence included autopsy reports and fingerprint analysis conducted by Argentine police officials on Che’s amputated hands. (Che’s hands were cut off to provide proof that he was actually dead; under the supervision of CIA agent Gustavo Villoldo, his body was then secretly buried  at a desolate airstrip at Vallegrande, where it was discovered only in June 1997.) The various death documents, notes Ambassador Henderson, leave “unsaid the time of death”–“an attempt to bridge the difference between a series of earlier divergent statements from Armed Forces sources, ranging from assertions that he died during or shortly after battle to those suggesting he survived at least twenty-four hours.”

White House Memorandum, October 14, 1967
In a final update, Walt Rostow informs Lyndon Johnson that the CIA has intercepted messages between Havana and Che from earlier in 1967 regarding the intent of the Bolivian operation to create a “continental movement.” CIA intelligence, originally redacted from the document but released in 2003, noted attempts by then Chilean Senator Salvador Allende to recover Guevara’s remains and the efforts by the Bolivian military to cover up his execution.

White House Memorandum, October 11, 1967
In another update for President Johnson, Walt Rostow reports to President Johnson that “we are 99% sure that ‘Che’ Guevara is dead.” Rostow believes the decision to execute Guevara “is stupid,” but he also points out that his death “shows the soundness of our ‘preventive medicine’ assistance to countries facing incipient insurgency–it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion, trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year, that cornered him and got him.”

CIA, Intelligence Information Cable, October 9, 1967
The CIA sends its first intelligence report on the capture of Che Guevara. The cable states that the Bolivian army is dispatching an interrogator to confirm Che’s identity. The CIA also dispatched its own operative, Félix Rodríguez, who interrogated Guevara, gathered intelligence on his operation, and took photos of his documents and supervised his execution.

White House Memorandum, October 9, 1967
Walt Rostow reports in this memorandum to President Johnson that unconfirmed information suggests that the Bolivian battalion–“the one we have been training”–“got Che Guevara.”

White House Memorandum, June 23, 1967
In a secret-sensitive memo to President Johnson, his aide Walt Rostow passes on the first evidence that Che Guevara may be leading a small band of insurgents in Bolivia. The memo outlines the rapid U.S. military assistance to Bolivia and notes CIA is “following developments closely.” It is around this time that Gustavo Villoldo and Félix Rodríguez are sent to Bolivia to assist the training of a special battalion, and to track the rebel forces.

TOP-SECRET – Fujimori on Trial

FUJIMORI ON TRIAL
SECRET DIA INTELLIGENCE CABLE TIES
FORMER PRESIDENT TO SUMMARY EXECUTIONS

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 237

Washington, DC, October 3, 2011:  As disgraced former president Alberto Fujimori goes on trial in Lima, Peru, for human rights atrocities, the National Security Archive posted a declassified Defense Intelligence Agency cable tying him directly to the executions of unarmed rebels who had surrendered after the seizure of the residence of Japanese ambassador in 1997. “President Fujimori issued the order to ‘take no prisoners,’” states the secret “roger channel” intelligence cable. “Because of this even MRTA [Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement members] who were taken alive did not survive the rescue operation.”

The new DIA cable was released on the Archive Web site along with other declassified documents that shed light on human rights crimes under Fujimori’s government, his close ties to his intelligence chieftain, Vladimiro Montecinos, and the two cases for which the imprisoned former president is now being prosecuted: the death squad kidnapping and disappearance of nine students and one professor at La Cantuta University in July 1992, and the massacre of a group of 15 leftists and an eight-year-old child during a neighborhood community barbeque in Barrios Altos in November 1991.

The documents were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by analysts at the Archive’s Peru Documentation Project. The project has provided declassified evidence drawn from U.S. records to Peruvian human rights advocates and officials for over a decade.

“The prosecution of Alberto Fujimori is nothing less than a historic event in the history of the human rights movement in Latin America,” according to Peter Kornbluh, a senior analyst on Latin America at the Archive.  “It is a major step toward truth and justice in Peru and the Western Hemisphere.”

READ THE DOCUMENTS

l) Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, [Deleted] Commando Execution of Two MRTA Hostage Takers and “Take No Prisoners” Order, June 10, 1997, Secret, 2 pp.

This DIA cable, classified SECRET and sent from Lima through a special “roger channel” to the Pentagon, ties President Alberto Fujimori to a specific human rights atrocity committed at the end of the siege of the Japanese Ambassador’s residence by MRTA guerrillas.  An intelligence source who appeared to have participated in the assault to retake the residence, stated that two rebels surrendered and were then summarily executed. According to the source, “The order to take no MRTA alive was given by President Alberto Fujimori. …because of this, even MRTA who were taken alive did not survive the rescue operation.” The document also describes the way Peruvian paramilitary commandos attempted to cover up the execution of the guerrillas. (Another source later reported that three rebels, two men and a woman, were executed after surrendering.)

2) State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Peru, Freefall,” July 31, 1997. Top Secret/Codeword, 2 pp.

In a classified report, State Department intelligence analysts summarize the dramatic decline of President Fujimori’s popular support in Peru.  The report describes Fujimori’s “murky” relationship to his top military and intelligence aides and states that they have “alienated most Peruvians with strong-arm measures.”

3) U.S. Embassy Cable, [Excised] Comments on Fujimori, Montesinos, but not on Barrios Altos, January 22, 1993, Secret, 10 pp. (previously posted)

An undisclosed source describes the close and complicated relationship between President Fujimori and his top intelligence aide, Vladimiro Montesinos. The source notes that while Fujimori understands the importance of human rights, in practice he “is prepared to sacrifice principles to achieve a quick victory over terrorism.”  He is “absolutely committed to destroying Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA within his five year term and is prepared to countenance any methods that achieve that goal.”

4) US Embassy Cable, Systematic Human Rights Violations Under Fujimori: Ex-Army Officer Describes his Role in Assassinations, Letter Bombs, Rape and Torture, June 30, 1994, Secret, 29pp. (previously posted)

In one of the most “detailed accounts” of human rights violations ever transmitted by the U.S. Embassy, this cable describes the history of state-sponsored abuses from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s in Peru, covering both the Garcia and Fujimori eras of power.  The source, an ex-Army officer, outlines the structure of the army and intelligence units who participated in atrocities such as torture, rape, and terrorism, as well as his personal involvement in human rights abuses. The summary includes detailed descriptions of the types of torture used by the military; their assassination targets; and the use of anti-bomb training assistance from the U.S. to create better bombs for assassination attempts.  “None of the source’s statements on methods are new,” the Embassy political officer reports. “What was striking, not to say chilling, about his allegations – apart from his total lack of remorse – was his insistence that such violations were the norm, rather than excesses.”

5) U.S. Embassy, Cable, Claimed Member of ‘Colina’ Describes Barrios Altos Executions, March 15, 1994, Secret, 11 pp. (previously posted)

The Embassy cables a highly classified summary of a report allegedly drafted by a member of the feared Peruvian death squad known as “La Colina.” The report details the creation, organization, leadership, training and atrocities committed by the death squad.  It includes some of its nick names such as “Special Intelligence Annihilation Group.” The cable contains a graphic account of how death squad members prepared for the Barrios Altos operation, which was authorized by President Fujimori’s top advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos.  The victims were lined up against a wall. “Using submachine guns with silencers, the shooting took 20 seconds,” according to the report. An eight-year old boy who witnessed the executions was then also shot.

6) U.S. Embassy Cable, Military Watcher on Army Attitudes to La Cantuta Disappearances, June 3, 1993. confidential. 2 pp.

An embassy contact discusses with US officials the feeling among the Peruvian military that the Army Commander and President of the Joint Armed Force Command, General Nicolas Hermoza, should “take responsibility” for the La Cantuta massacre. The source claims that “senior and mid-grade officers acknowledge the existence of military hit squads” and believe that the operation at La Cantuta University, was “terribly planned and the details too widely known.” But the military reportedly feels that the death squad who carried out the attack should not be punished “just for killing terrorists.”

7. U.S.  Embassy Cable, Reported Secret Annex to National Pacification/Human Rights Plan, August 23, 1990. Secret, 4 pp.

Following the Fujimori government’s announcement of a “National Pacification/Human Rights Plan” in 1990, the US embassy reports that there is “an alleged secret” annex to the public plan. The secret plan calls for the military to take a greater role in security operations, and allows for the National Intelligence Service (SIN) to form new sub-committees to direct the “pacification” plan. The plan also alters the SIN’s charter to expand the power of the secret police. The cable goes on to question if the plan was actually put into effect by Fujimori, or whether it was just the product of a group of retired military officers close to Montesinos. They refer to reports that Fujimori may be trying to distance himself from Montesinos because of public exposure of his links to drug traffickers. Embassy officials conclude, however, that even if the secret plan did not receive Fujimori’s endorsement, it does in fact exist, and is held by a group of men who “at least one time had considerable influence and access to decision-making circles.”

TOP-SECRET – Localizar y detener al Dr. Goiburú

Documentos del Archivo del Terror de Paraguay implican a Fuerzas de Seguridad paraguayas y argentinas en el secuestro

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 239 – Part III

Editado por Carlos Osorio y Marianna Enamoneta

Publicado – Diciembre 21, 2007

Para más información contactar a:
Carlos Osorio: (202) 994-7061

cosorio@gwu.edu

Peter Kornbluh: (202) 994-7116

peter.kornbluh@gmail.com

 
Menos de un mes antes de su desaparición, un agente de la inteligencia argentina remitió al Paraguay una serie de fotografías del seguimiento al Dr. Goiburú, incluyendo esta que muestra su casa y su automóvil.

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Washington D.C., Septiembre 25, 2011 – En el marco de la celebración del 15 aniversario del descubrimiento del Archivo del Terror, el National Security Archive publica hoy evidencias que las autoridades Paraguayas y Argentinas están implicadas en la desaparición del  Doctor paraguayo refugiado en Argentina, Agustín Goiburú, el 9 de febrero de 1977. Los documentos demuestran que perpetradores daban un seguimiento minucioso a Goiburú desde un año atrás hasta solo horas antes que este fuera secuestrado.

La selección aquí presentada incluye desde un informe de la inteligencia militar paraguaya, requiriendo la “localización  y detención del Dr. Agustín Goiburú” en Argentina  a finales de 1975, pasando por una reunión de coordinación entre la Policía Federal Argentina con la Policía de Asunción en 1976, hasta el seguimiento día a día de la inteligencia argentina en enero de 1977 y los informes del Cónsul paraguayo  solo 48 horas antes de la desaparición de Goiburú. A decir del Director del Proyecto del Cono Sur del National Security Archive, Carlos Osorio, “Los documentos no dejan duda que las autoridades paraguayas tuvieron los medios, la motivación y la oportunidad de secuestrar al Dr. Goiburú”.

Goiburú que por años fuera dirigente de la oposición a la dictadura del General Alfredo Stroessner, se escapó de prisión del Paraguay y se refugió en Argentina en 1970. Para 1977 se encontraba viviendo en la ciudad argentina de Paraná y era dirigente del Movimiento Popular Colorado (MOPOCO) al momento de desaparecer. Según el informe de los testigos a la policía de la ciudad de Paraná, el 9 de febrero de 1977, personas desconocidas secuestraron al Dr. Agustín Goiburú; el  automóvil de este estacionado frente a su casa fue embestido y al salir a ver que ocurría, Goiburú “fue reducido mediante armas de fuego cortas por el conductor… [Goiburú] fue introducido al automóvil Ford Falcon desapareciendo con rumbo o desconocido.”

Los documentos se encuentran entre la voluminosa evidencia albergada en el Archivo del Terror de Paraguay que sirve hoy de prueba en el caso de extradición contra el ex Ministro de Interior Paraguayo en la época, actualmente viviendo en Honduras, Sabino Montanaro, y en la reciente condena a diez años de cárcel del ex Cónsul paraguayo en la ciudad de Posadas, Argentina, Francisco Ortiz Téllez,

La evidencia ha sido acumulada gracias a la excelente pesquisa en el Archivo del Terror por  los investigadores paraguayos Rosa Palau, Alfredo Boccia Paz y Miriam Gonzalez y resumida en su libro “Es mi informe: los archivos secretos de la policía de Stroessner (Asunción : CDE, 1994)”. Esta gacetilla electrónica fue estructurada en base a este libro que aun continua siendo referencia investigativa obligada sobre el Archivo del Terror.

La selección que presentamos hoy aquí, se complementa con nuevos documentos encontrados por medio de la máquina de búsqueda del Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD), instalada por el National Security Archive en convenio con La Corte Suprema de Paraguay, en apoyo del trabajo del Centro de Documentación y Archivo (CDyA) que alberga el Archivo del Terror del Paraguay. Entre la nueva evidencia, se encuentra informes del agente de inteligencia paraguayo basado en Argentina, alias “Gendar”, que entre otros  informa que en el control del tráfico fronterizo entre Argentina y Paraguay el día de la desaparición “Hay un coche que no figura el ingreso ni egreso. Esto tiene que ver algo con el caso Goiburú (secuestro)”.

Documentos
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Octubre 8, 1975 – Informe [Confidencial] Número 62
(Fotograma: 00050F 2475)

[Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”]

El agudo interés de todo el aparataje de seguridad paraguayo por atrapar al Dr. Goiburú refugiado hacia cinco años en Argentina, transpira de este informe de agentes especiales paraguayos basados en Buenos Aires. Retransmitido por la  Dirección de Inteligencia del Estado Mayor General de las Fuerzas Armadas de Paraguay (D-2 ESMAGENFA) el informe requiere la “localización  y detención del Dr. Agustín Goiburú”  y termina diciendo  que si  Goiburú es capturado, “se solicita informar de inmediato a fin de viajar personal de esta que trabaja especialmente en este caso.”

Circa Junio, 1976 – Memorando del jefe de Investigaciones para su Excelencia, el Señor Presidente de la República
(Fotograma: 00088F 0171-0172)

[Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”]

 

A pocos meses que el golpe de estado instalara la dictadura militar y desatara una ofensiva contrainsurgente en Argentina, el Jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones de Asunción Pastor Coronel, informa directamente al dictador Alfredo Stroessner que dos altos delegados de la Policía Federal Argentina han llegado a Asunción a “buscar la forma de coordinar labores.”  Pastor Coronel da cuenta que estableció con los Argentinos que “con mucho gusto intercambiaríamos  informaciones e incluso detenidos”.  “Que elementos subversivos de conocida militancia comunista… como Agustín Goiburú, trabajaron y trabajan libremente, en la Argentina…” “Que no tendríamos probablemente ningún inconveniente de entregarlo a [Amílcar] Santucho [hermano del líder guerrillero argentino Roberto Santucho,  capturado y detenido en Asunción desde mediados de 1975]  siempre y cuando también de parte de ellos tengamos la misma respuesta sobre algunos subversivos nuestros…” La coordinación entre la inteligencia paraguaya y argentina para monitorear y capturar al Dr. Agustín Goiburú dará un salto a mediados de 1976 luego de producido este Memorando y producirá numerosos informes de seguimiento al Dr. Goiburú.

Junio 18, 1976 – Antecedentes
(Fotograma: 00008F 0007-0009)

[Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”]

 

En este informe de inteligencia del Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policía de Asunción, Paraguay sobre la historia política de Agustín Goiburú, se informa que el Dr. Goiburú es miembro del Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR), “apoyado económicamente por la Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria [JCR]” y que ha mantenido contacto con sus miembros a través del MIR chileno, ERP argentino, ELN uruguayo e incluso con el dirigente del MLN boliviano “General Juan Jose Torres recientemente fallecido” [el subrayado es del original]. La coordinación de los  aparatos de seguridad e inteligencia de Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay y Bolivia conocida como Operación Cóndor, tenía planteado destruir a la JCR. Así, al mismo tiempo que este Memorando era escrito, en Junio de 1976, en operaciones conjuntas en Buenos Aires, fueron asesinados el Senador uruguayo  Zelmar Michellini, el ex presidente boliviano, Juan José Torres y varios opositores de izquierda chilenos, uruguayos y bolivianos refugiados en Argentina.

Enero 1977 – [Seguimiento a Agustín Goiburú Giménez]
(Fotograma: 00050F 2445-2447)
[Fotografías de espionaje]
(Fotograma: 00050F 2448-2455)

[Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”]

 

A mediados de Enero de 1977,  un par de semanas antes de la desaparición del Dr. Goiburú, un documento probablemente de la inteligencia Argentina enumera  información detallada sobre sus antecedentes, su familia, su cuenta bancaria, su horario de actividades, las personas con quien trabajaba, amistades personales, y sus actividades cotidianas. El documento que consta de 3 páginas, concluye con una descripción de sus actividades diarias descritas por una persona que lo siguió durante 5 días consecutivos entre el viernes 7 y el martes 11 de enero de 1977. El agente que escribe informa que los paraguayos residentes en Paraná, Argentina, realizaran una reunión “la próxima semana… lo que será auscultado convenientemente.” El documento es también acompañado por 8 fotografías de espionaje al  Dr. Goiburú en Paraná, su ciudad de exilio en Argentina: El Dr. y su hijo caminando por la calle, su lugar de residencia, las clínicas donde trabajaba y su automóvil.

Febrero 6, 1977 – Remitir Informe e Impartir Orden
(Fotograma: 00050F 1830)

[Inédito. Publicado por primera vez aquí]

 

Un documento de inteligencia “reservado” de origen desconocido redactado el 6 de febrero en la ciudad de Corrientes, Argentina, tres días antes de la desaparición del Dr. Goiburú, requiere que se eleve el nivel de control del paso de personas entre Paraguay y Argentina. El documento cita otro informe de inteligencia donde da cuenta de una reunión sostenida en la ciudad de Paraná, Argentina por opositores al régimen Paraguayo el 29 y 30 de enero de 1977 en la que habría participado el Dr. Goiburú. El documento da cuenta que los participantes venidos de Paraguay viajaban en tres vehículos “con patente de Asunción, Nros: 18559 – 18572 y 18573” y termina diciendo que “Se continuara investigando, se ampliara”

Febrero 7, 1977 – [Informe del Cónsul Paraguayo en Posadas]
(Fotograma: 00050F2460-1)

[Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”]

 

Dos días antes de la desaparición del Doctor Goiburú, el Cónsul de  Paraguay en Posadas, Argentina,  Francisco Ortiz Téllez, informa al Ministro del Interior del Paraguay, Sabino Montanaro,  que según información del Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército, los paraguayos de oposición residentes en la Ciudad de Paraná, Argentina, sostuvieron una reunión a finales de Enero  y se han organizado en un frente común incluyendo al MOPOCO (Movimiento Popular Colorado), Partido Comunista Paraguayo y Febrerista Liberal. “Entre las personas más conocidas se encontraban el Dr. Agustín Goiburú…” Según el informe, los opositores estarían planeando iniciar un movimiento de guerrilla armada en el Paraguay. La descripción relatada por el Cónsul paraguayo de la reunión durante la cual se formó el ‘Frente de Paraguayos Unidos’ coincide exactamente palabra por palabra, con el documento de inteligencia fechado el 6 de febrero de 1977.

Circa Marzo, 1977 – [Los Mopocos Tienen Miedo]
(Fotograma: 00153F 0155-0156)

[Inédito. Publicado por primera vez aqui]

 

Gendar, un agente secreto del Paraguay que informa regularmente al jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones Pastor Coronel sobre las actividades en las ciudades argentinas fronterizas con Paraguay, Clorinda y Formosa, envía un informe diciendo que los refugiados paraguayos del MOPOCO “se encuentran muy preocupados por el secuestro de Goiburú [en la ciudad de Paraná], que los de acá corren igual peligro.” Gendar, quien está infiltrado en la Gendarmería argentina y firma regularmente como “G5” y en una ocasión como “Benites”, termina informando que “se está controlando los elementos que arriban de otros puntos.”

Circa Marzo 1977 – [Tránsito fronterizo el día del secuestro]
(Fotograma: 00153F0149)

[Inédito. Publicado por primera vez aqui]

 

Gendar envía al jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones, “la nomina de las personas que pasaron a la Argentina en enero 1977 y que probablemente tendrían algo que ver con la reunión en Paraná” a la que asistió el Dr. Goiburú a finales de enero. Gendar confirma los números de las patentes de los automóviles en que se desplazaron los opositores Paraguayos que asistieron a la reunión, tal como lo indican informes de inteligencia previos. Sin embargo, de manera remarcable, termina diciendo “Hay un coche que no figura el ingreso ni egreso. Esto tiene que ver algo con el caso Goiburú (secuestro)”.

Septiembre 1º, 1977 – [Informe del Cónsul Paraguayo en Posadas]
(Fotograma: 0050F 2476-8)

[Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”]

Siete meses tras el secuestro y desaparición del Doctor Goiburú, el Cónsul de  Paraguay en Posadas, Argentina, Francisco Ortiz Téllez informa sobre  “la versión elevada a este Consulado Nacional, por las Autoridades Militares del Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército, sobre el supuesto secuestro del extremista Agustín Goiburú.” En lo que pareciera contradecir informes anteriores del cónsul Ortiz Téllez, la versión del Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército en Argentina da a entender que este no tuvo nada que ver en el seguimiento los días previos al secuestro del Dr. Goiburú, y que solo tiene información policial recabada entre testigos sobre el caso del secuestro del Dr. Goiburú en la ciudad de Paraná. La aparente contradicción no es posible aclararla sin más documentación que explique el contexto de este documento. Mas allá de la contradicción sin embargo, el documento muestra el profundo interés que aun suscitaba el secuestro del Dr. Goiburú, y los esfuerzos de los aparatos de inteligencia de Argentina y Paraguay en desligarse del mismo. Por otra parte, el  informe policial contenido en este documento da una idea cabal de lo ocurrido: “El día 091115-Feb-1977, personas desconocidas secuestraron… al Dr. Agustín Goiburú…” El  automóvil de este estacionado frente a su casa fue embestido, dice el documento, y que al salir a ver que ocurría, Goiburú “fue reducido mediante armas de fuego cortas por el conductor… [Goiburú] fue introducido al automóvil Ford Falcon desapareciendo con rumbo o desconocido.”

TOP-SECRET – EN EL 15 ANIVERSARIO DEL ARCHIVO DEL TERROR

EN EL 15 ANIVERSARIO DEL ARCHIVO DEL TERROR

EL NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE PONE EN LINEA 60,000 REGISTROS DE LA POLICIA SECRETA DEL DICTADOR STROESSNER

Bajo convenio de cooperación con la Corte Suprema de Justicia del Paraguay,
el Archive lanza simultáneamente en Asunción el Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD)

Más de 300,000 documentos digitalizados para fortalecer al Centro de Documentación y Archivo para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (CDyA)

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 239 – Part I

 

 

 

Washington, D.C., Septiembre 24, 2011 – En conmemoración del 15 aniversario del Archivo del Terror, el National Security Archive pone  hoy en línea el catálogo público de 60,000 registros de documentos del acervo y devela en Asunción el sistema Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD) con más de 300,000 documentos digitalizados. Acompañando la celebración el National Security Archive lanza una serie de iniciativas para dar más acceso a este acervo único en América Latina.

Carta del Jefe de la Inteligencia Chilena  al Jefe de Investigaciones Pastor Coronel del Paraguay en el marco de Operación Cóndor.

El catálogo puesto hoy en línea gracias a la cooperación del National Security Archive y la Biblioteca de la George Washington University, permite a los usuarios hacer búsquedas por nombres y fechas sobre 60,000 registros e identificar los documentos a consultar por su código de fotograma de microfilmación. Por su parte, el Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD) instalado  en las oficinas del Centro de Documentación y Archivo para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (CDyA), repositorio del Archivo del Terror, permite buscar sobre el acervo total de 300,000 documentos. Desde que fuera instalado como prueba en 2006, el ATD permitió doblar el número de respuestas documentales al público por el CDyA. Las dos iniciativas son el  resultado de varios convenios entre la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Paraguay y el National Security Archive, en apoyo y del CDyA.

Simultáneamente, hoy el National Security Archive pone en línea una imagen espejo del sitio web del CDyA y presenta dos gacetillas electrónicas conmemorativas con nuevas evidencias de la participación de los estados del Cono Sur en la desaparición de sus ciudadanos obtenidas con estas herramientas electrónicas junto a documentos famosos encontrados previamente en el Archivo del Terror sobre Operación Cóndor, y la desaparición del Doctor Paraguayo Agustin Goiburú en 1977.

El catálogo en línea fue originalmente desarrollado en 2002 bajo el  convenio Memoria Histórica, Democracia y Derechos Humanos (MHDDH) entre la Corte Suprema, la Universidad Católica de Asunción y el National Security Archive como un instrumento para apoyar el trabajo del CDyA. Desde entonces ha ayudado a multiplicar el número de respuesta al público. Los 60,000 documentos cuyos registros están en el MHDDH fueron  identificados por el personal experto del CDyA como más susceptibles de contener información pertinente en respuesta a peticiones de Habeas Data.

“La documentación del Archivo de Terror da prueba de cómo los estados del Cono Sur en su ceguera antiterrorista cometieron detenciones ilegales, torturas y extradiciones clandestinas. Hoy, en momentos en que estas prácticas son de común uso en aras de la guerra contra el terrorismo y cuando se destruyen documentos de este tipo por agencias de inteligencia en los Estados Unidos, es de encomiar el esfuerzo de la Corte Suprema de Justicia por preservar y hacer público este acervo para que estos abusos no se repitan.” Dice Carlos Osorio, Director del Proyecto de Documentación del Cono Sur del National Security Archive.

El National Security Archive se complace en unirse a la celebración de este 15 aniversario y se congratula de ser parte de aquellos que han apoyado a través de los años los esfuerzos de los paraguayos victimas, organismos de derechos humanos, investigadores y  jueces por preservar y dar acceso al Archivo del Terror.

***

COOPERACIÓN
National Security Archive – Corte Suprema de Justicia

En apoyo al Archivo del Terror

Carlos Osorio del National Security Archive, el Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia Raúl Sapena Brugada, la Decana de Ciencias Sociales de la UCA, Carmen Quintana de Horak, y la Co-Directora del CDyA Rosa Palau durante el lanzamiento del proyecto MHDDH  

2000

Primer convenio de cooperación

El 17 de Febrero 2000 el National Security Archive y la Corte Suprema de Justicia lanzaron una iniciativa de cooperación a fin de recaudar fondos y recursos para digitalizar el acervo del CDyA, adquirir el hardware y software necesarios para hacer accesible el acervo a través del internet y capacitar al personal del CDyA. En esa ocasión se adquirió un nuevo equipo de computación y se estableció el acceso a internet del CDyA

2001 – 2002

Memoria Histórica, Democracia y Derechos Humanos (MHDDH)

En 2001, La Corte Suprema de Justicia y la Universidad Católica de Asunción, con el apoyo del National Security Archive en Washington DC, lanzaron un proyecto de dos años diseñado  para atender a los desafíos de responder al incremento de peticiones de habeas data y del público en general y el acelerado desarrollo  la tecnología digital y el internet.  El proyecto “Memoria Histórica, Democracia y Derechos Humanos (MHDDH)”. El proyecto fue financiado por el Fondo para la Democracia y los Derechos Humanos del Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos  y fue administrado por la US AID.  Un equipo asesor de la Corte Suprema de Justicia coordino el proyecto y sus miembros fueron Rosa Palau, Co-Directora del CDyA, el Embajador Jorge Lara Castro, catedrático de la UCA, y Carlos Osorio, Director del Proyecto de Documentación del Cono Sur del National Security Archive. Entre Septiembre 2001 y Diciembre 2002, el proyecto logro:

1)      Microfilmar 200,000 páginas del Acervo del CDyA.

El apoyo inicial proveído por US AID y la Corte Suprema de Justicia en 1993 permitió microfilmar el 60% del acervo del Archivo. El proyecto MHDDH proveyó los recursos financieros que permitieron al personal cualificado de la Corte Suprema de Justicia llevar a cabo el resto de la microfilmación. El proyecto ayudo a pagar salarios de operadores y técnicos, adquirir rollos y materiales para reencuadernar los libros microfilmados.

2) Catalogación de Sesenta Mil Documentos para responder a Habeas Data

Catálogo de 60,000 de los documentos mas pedidos

Un equipo supervisado por la Universidad Católica y dirigido por un archivista profesional, catálogo 60,000 documentos considerados los más pertinentes para responder a los centenares de peticiones de Habeas Data que recibe el CDyA anualmente. El catálogo montado en una base de datos WinIsis, permite realizar búsquedas en los campos básicos siguientes: Fecha, Nombres, Organizaciones, Términos Geográficos, Tipo de Documento, Fondo, Ubicación Física y Rollo y Número de Fotograma.

3) Acceso público al catálogo de 60,000 documentos

El proyecto diseñó el sistema para publicar este catálogo en el internet como una manera de facilitar el acceso del público al acervo del CDyA.

4) Digitalización de 300,000 documentos

El proyecto MHDDH financio la producción de más de 500,000 imágenes digitales de los documentos del acervo del CDyA, estableciendo así las bases para una futura instalación de un sistema de administración y búsqueda de un archivo digital.

5) Re equipamiento del CDyA

Se instalaron estanterías metálicas deslizantes y se adquirió material de computación

6) Gira por Washington DC

En diciembre 2002, el National Security Archive organizó una gira de capacitación para el personal del CDyA que incluyo visitas y talleres en la Universidad George Washington, el Instituto por una Sociedad Abierta, el Archivo Nacional, la Biblioteca del Congreso y la Biblioteca de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de los Estados Unidos.

 

2003 – 2007

Convenio de Archivo Digital

Se firma convenio de Cooperación entre la Corte Suprema de Justicia y el National Security Archive que busca construir el Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD) a fin de disminuir o eliminar la manipulación y así preservar los textos del acervo del CDyA: procesar las imágenes de los 300,000 documentos del acervo del CDyA por OCR, montar un sistema de administración y búsqueda sobre las imágenes, e instalar equipo  de computación e impresoras. El convenio establece las pautas para la publicación de análisis de documentación del CDyA en gacetillas electrónicas en la página web del National Security Archive. Se instaló el sistema ATD y se obtuvo impresora laser.

2007

Catálogo en Línea y Sitio Espejo

 

Se firma convenio de Cooperación entre la Corte Suprema de Justicia y el National Security Archive a fin de poner en línea el catálogo de 60,000 documentos con el apoyo de la Gelman Library de la George Washington University. El convenio incluye la puesta en línea de una imagen espejo del sitio web del CDyA

TOP-SECRET – Colombian Paramilitaries and the United States: “Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web”

Wanted Poster: Pablo Escobar Gaviria, ca. 1993

Washington, D.C., September 21, 2011 – U.S. espionage operations targeting top Colombian government officials in 1993 provided key evidence linking the U.S.-Colombia task force charged with tracking down fugitive drug lord Pablo Escobar to one of Colombia’s most notorious paramilitary chiefs, according to a new collection of declassified documents published today by the National Security Archive. The affair sparked a special CIA investigation into whether U.S. intelligence was shared with Colombian terrorists and narcotraffickers every bit as dangerous as Escobar himself.

The new documents, released under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, are the most definitive declassified evidence to date linking the U.S. to a Colombian paramilitary group and are the subject of an investigation published today in Colombia’s Semana magazine.

The documents reveal that the U.S.-Colombia Medellin Task Force, known in Spanish as the Bloque de Búsqueda or ‘Search Block,’ was sharing intelligence information with Fidel Castaño, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes (Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar or ‘People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar’), a clandestine terrorist organization that waged a bloody campaign against people and property associated with the reputed narcotics kingpin. One cable describes a key meeting from April 1993 where, according to sensitive US intelligence sources, Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio Gómez Padilla said “that he had directed a senior CNP intelligence officer to maintain contact with Fidel Castano, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes, for the purposes of intelligence collection.”

The no-holds-barred search for Escobar began in July 1992 after his escape from a luxury prison where he had been confined since surrendering under a special plea agreement with Colombian authorities. U.S. anti-narcotics strategy in Colombia was intensely focused on Escobar, the legendary Medellín Cartel kingpin who for years had waged a violent campaign of bombings and assassinations against Colombian law enforcement. This gloves-off strategy forged alliances between Colombian intelligence agencies, rival drug traffickers and disaffected former Escobar associates like Castaño, the godfather of a new generation of narcotics-fueled paramilitary forces that still plagues Colombia today.

The new collection also sheds light on the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Colombia’s conflict—both the close cooperation with Colombian security forces evident in the Task Force as well as the highly-sensitive U.S. intelligence operations that targeted the Colombian government itself. Key information about links between the Task Force and the Pepes was derived from U.S. intelligence sources that closely monitored meetings between the Colombian president and his top security officials.

Several of the documents included in this collection were released as the result of a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act brought by the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), a Washington-based policy group. To support its request, IPS relied on information revealed in Mark Bowden’s 2001 book, Killing Pablo, a work that drew heavily on classified sources and interviews with former U.S. and Colombian officials. Since then, the National Security Archive has been working to assemble a definitive collection of declassified documents on the Pepes episode, precisely because the documents cited by Bowden have yet to see the light of day.

“The collaboration between paramilitaries and government security forces evident in the Pepes episode is a direct precursor of today’s ‘para-political’ scandal,” said Michael Evans, director of the National Security Archive’s Colombia Documentation Project. “The Pepes affair is the archetype for the pattern of collaboration between drug cartels, paramilitary warlords and Colombian security forces that developed over the next decade into one of the most dangerous threats to Colombian security and U.S. anti-narcotics programs. Evidence still concealed within secret U.S. intelligence files forms a critical part of that hidden history.”

“Sensitive PALO Reporting”

The documents include two heavily-censored CIA memos (Documents 25 and 28) describing briefings provided by members of a “Blue Ribbon Panel” of CIA investigators to members of U.S. congressional intelligence committees and the National Security Council. The Panel—which included personnel from the CIA’s directorate for clandestine intelligence operations—had been investigating the possibility that intelligence shared with the Medellín Task Force in 1993 ended up in the hands of Colombian paramilitaries and narcotraffickers from the Pepes. That investigation concluded on December 3, 1993, the day Escobar was killed.

The CIA Panel aimed to compile a complete inventory of all U.S. intelligence information shared with the Task Force that may have been passed to the Pepes. And while the group’s conclusions were not declassified, the briefing led one congressional staffer to comment that it was “one of the most bizarre stories” that he had ever heard, and to question why the CIA had been chosen to look into the matter rather than “some outside element.” Why, in other words, would the CIA be put in charge of an investigation that so directly implicated the Agency itself?

For months, U.S. intelligence had been reporting about Task Force links with the Pepes:

  • The Embassy suspected some level of cooperation between Los Pepes and the Task Force as early as February 1993, when it reported that the Pepes attacks could be the work of “rogue policemen taking advantage of the rash of bombings to give Escobar a taste of his own medicine.” (Document 8)
  • A secret CIA report from March 1993 found that, “Unofficial paramilitary groups with a variety of backgrounds and motives are assisting Bogota’s efforts against both the Medellin druglord Pablo Escobar and radical leftist insurgents. (Document 10)
  • Around the same time, the CIA reported that the Colombian defense minister, Rafael Pardo, was “concerned that the police are providing intelligence to Los Pepes.” In a document titled, “Colombia: Extralegal Steps Against Escobar Possible,” Agency analysts predicted that President Gaviria’s “demand for an intensified effort to capture Escobar may lead some subordinates to rely more heavily on Los Pepes and on extralegal means.” [Emphasis added] (Document 15)

By far the most detailed declassified record on the Pepes affair, the August 1993 Embassy cable, “Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web,” reveals that the Colombian government was both the recipient of U.S. intelligence information and the target of U.S. intelligence operations. Just as technical and investigative intelligence techniques tracked Escobar’s movements and communications, other agents eavesdropped on the Colombian president’s inner circle.

The most important information in the cable is attributed to “PALO” sources, an acronym that likely refers to the CIA. One indication of this is the fact that the cable—which includes the sensitive “NODIS” designation, limiting its distribution to a highly-select group of addressees—was referred to CIA before declassification.

According to the cable, Colombian prosecutor Gustavo DeGreiff had “new, ‘very good’ evidence linking key members of the police task force in Medellin charged with capturing Pablo Escobar Gaviria (the “Bloque de Busqueda”) to criminal activities and human rights abuses committed by Los Pepes.”

The cable describes a series of meetings from the previous April, including one where, according to “PALO” intelligence sources, Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio Gómez Padilla said “that he had directed a senior CNP intelligence officer to maintain contact with Fidel Castano, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes, for the purposes of intelligence collection.”

A few days later, “PALO” reported that Colombian President César Gaviria ordered intelligence cooperation with Los Pepes to cease and told police intelligence commander General Luis Enrique Montenegro Rinco, “to ‘pass the word’ that Los Pepes must be dissolved immediately.” Montenegro, according to the source, “was not a member of Los Pepes, but as commander of police intelligence knew some of the members, and was aware of their activities.”

The very fact that Gaviria chose to deliver his message to Los Pepes through one of his senior police commanders was also significant, according to the Embassy, as an indication that “the president believed police officials were in contact with Los Pepes.”

“Fidel Castano, Super Drug-Thug”

Besides the possible transfer of U.S. intelligence to the Pepes, a big concern among U.S. officials was the possibility that information connecting the Pepes to the Task Force—or an official investigation into the matter—would undermine the anti-Escobar effort and could provide significant leverage to the Cali Cartel in surrender negotiations with the Colombian government.

The Embassy reported in the “Tangled Web” cable that President Gaviria “must deal with the issue in such a way as to remove the offenders, but at the same time, not discredit the police efforts against Escobar.” (Document 20)

If Cali has concrete information of Bloque misdeeds that could embarrass the [Government of Colombia], it could be a powerful tool as they pursue surrender negotiations… The implication of key police officials and perhaps other high-level [Colombian government] officials in these activities, or the fact that high-level officers may be operating in the pay of the Cali cartel, could dramatically improve Cali’s position.

An Embassy post-mortem cable on the Escobar affair, written less than a month after his death, similarly reported that “any substantiation of Cali-police complicity in the activities of Los Pepes would have seriously damaged the Bloque’s credibility in their efforts against Escobar.” (Document 30)

More importantly, U.S. military intelligence doubted that the Gaviria government was sincere about cracking down on Castaño’s gang, questioning whether it made sense to target a group that shared a common enemy: leftist Colombian guerrilla groups. One briefing document prepared by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in the midst of the Pepes episode concluded that the Colombian government’s willingness to pursue Pepes military chief Castaño “may depend more on how his paramilitary agenda complements Bogota’s counterinsurgent objectives rather than on his drug trafficking activities.” (Document 16)

By May 1994, only five months after the Task Force was dissolved, the State Department’s intelligence branch was calling Fidel Castaño a “super drug-thug” and “one of Colombia’s most ruthless criminals” who “could become a new Escobar.” Castaño, the report read, “is more ferocious than Escobar, has more military capability, and can count on fellow antiguerrillas in the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police.” It was, State reported, “unlikely that police or military officials would be willing to vigorously search for him if he did, in fact, act as an intermediary to deliver Cali bribes to senior police and military officers.” (Document 32)

The warnings proved to be deadly accurate. While Fidel disappeared in the mid-1990s and is presumed dead, his brother, Carlos Castaño, took over after Fidel’s disappearance, uniting and strengthening Colombia’s paramilitary armies under the banner of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a ruthless killing machine that vied with guerrilla groups for control of the country’s lurcrative drug trade and which for many years met with little to no resistance from government security forces. A third Castaño brother, Vicente, allegedly murdered his brother Carlos and is said to be leading a new generation of Colombian narco-paramilitary groups.

Concerns that former Pepes would use their knowledge of official corruption to extract concessions from the Colombian government in surrender agreements resontate in the ongoing negotations with demobilized paramilitary leaders under the Justice and Peace law. Unlike the Cali traffickers–many of whom actually were taken down by authorities in the years that followed–Castaño and many of the other paramilitary thugs from Los Pepes largely escaped justice and have gone on to become major drug trafficking and paramilitary bosses in their own right. Former Pepe Diego Fernando “Don Berna” Murillo is currently in custody and seeking a reduced sentence under the law.

Hidden History

Unfortunately, the vast majority of U.S. diplomatic and intelligence reporting on Los Pepes remains classified. A more complete declassified account of the matter—including the conclusions of the CIA investigation—would be of tremendous value both to historians and to ongoing peace and reconciliation efforts in Colombia. Among other things, the release of this material would support the Colombian government’s National Commission on Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR) in the production of its report on the emergence and evolution of Colombia’s illegal armed groups.

At issue is the exact nature of the relationship between the U.S.-Colombia Task Force and narco-terrorists led by Fidel Castaño, perhaps the most important single figure in the birth of Colombia’s modern paramilitary movement. While it is certain that the Task Force was exchanging information with Castaño and Los Pepes, we do not know how long the Task Force maintained these ties and whether the relationship was sanctioned—either tacitly or explicitly—by U.S. participants in the Task Force, the Embassy, or at a more senior level of the U.S. government.

And while we know about the CIA’s investigation, its conclusions are far from clear. Nor is it at all certain that the “Blue Ribbon Panel,” which issued its findings only days after Escobar was killed, was the final word on the matter. Until the CIA is forced to open its files on the Pepes, we may never fully understand one of the key periods in the history of Colombian paramilitarism.

Read the Documents
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U.S. Intelligence and Colombian Narcotics Cartels

Document 1
1992 July 29
ARA Guidances, Wednesday, July 29, 1992 [Colombia: Chasing Escobar]
Department of State cable, Unclassified, 4 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Department of State press guidance prepared just after Escobar’s escape from confinement indicates that Colombia has the “full support” of the U.S. in the search for Escobar.

Document 2
1992 July 31
Council of State Plans Hearings on Overflights, Gaviria Responds
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 5 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Challenged over his decision permitting U.S. overflights of Colombian territory, Colombian President César Gaviria says that his order was constitutional and, according to this cable, “that the Colombian police authorities need the technical assistance of the [U.S. government] in order to find Pablo Escobar. Gaviria’s explains that the U.S. C-130 aircraft “carry technical equipment, not armament” and are not “warplanes,” and that his authorization of the overflights without informing the Council of State should thus not trigger any constitutional concerns.

Document 3
1992 August 10
GoC to Begin Hitting Narcs on All Fronts
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 17 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Shortly after Escobar’s escape from confinement, Colombian Defense Minister Rafael Pardo assured Ambassador Busby that Colombia would “apply pressure on all the narco trafficking fronts” and that he had “ordered acting Armed Forces Commander General Manual Alberto Murillo Gonzalez to develop a plan that fully involved the Army, Navy and Air Force. The heavily-excised document adds that, “Pardo’s enthusiasm and determination to go after the narcos using all of the above tactics fits squarely with our counternarcotics interests in Colombia. We need to be as responsive as possible to the [Colombian government’s] requests for assistance.”

Document 4
1992 August 11
Monthly Status Report – July 1992
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 16 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

A brief Embassy post-mortem on Escobar’s escape during an operation to move him to a conventional prison, calls the affair “an example of the correct strategic decision (to shut Escobar down) executed with unbelievable incompetence,” concluding that corruption was “the determining factor.” The cable reports that the Colombian government “has launched a full-court press to capture Escobar” and that the Embassy was “now looking at longer-range tactics.” Well-publicized U.S. intelligence overflights of Colombia “may have spooked” Escobar, according to the report.

Document 5
1992 September 28
Results of General Joulwan Visit to Colombia
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 16 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Following the visit to Colombia by General George Joulwan, commander-in-chief of U.S. Southern Command, the Embassy reports that he met with Embassy staff for a discussion focused on “the US/Colombian effort to capture Escobar.” Much of the remainder of this heavily-censored cable concerns the importance of strengthening  both U.S.-Colombia intelligence cooperation and military-police coordination in Colombia.

Document 6
1992 December 04
Colombians to Continue the Fight Through the Holidays
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA

Colombian government contacts have assured U.S. Embassy staff “that no operational unit commanders are being granted holiday leave” and that, “Police continue planning operations involving interdiction, fumigation, hunt for Pablo Escobar, and visits by senior officers to field operating units.”

Document 7
1993 March 29
Beyond Support Justice IV (SJIV)
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 12 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

As the hunt for Escobar continues, Embassy reporting reflects its recommendation that the U.S. widen the scope of the counternarcotics effort in Colombia “to include the full array of military support” and going “far beyond” previous levels of assistance. The Embassy contrasts “increasingly successful” intelligence and operational cooperation under the “Support Justice” program with other bilateral policy issues where there is more friction (like trade). Among many other issues, the Embassy lauds the “great strides in tactical capability (which we provided) made in the search for Pablo Escobar.”

Los Pepes

Document 8
1993 February 01
Escobar Family Target of Medellin Bombings
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 3 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

The Embassy speculates that recent attacks directed against Escobar family members are “almost certainly related, [and] perhaps carried out by[,] members of the Galeano-Moncada organization retaliating for Escobar’s murder of the two former colleagues.” Another possibility is that the attacks were the work of “rogue policemen taking advantage of the rash of bombings to give Escobar a taste of his own medicine.”

Document 9
1993 February 24
[Operation Envigado / Pablo Escobar-Gaviria]
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Limited Official Use, 6 pp.
Source: DEA declassification release under FOIA

The DEA reports on the emergence of a new anti-Escobar group called Colombia Libre (Free Colombia) whose alleged purpose is “to employ and pay informants for information in connection with the whereabouts of Escobar and his cohorts.” The group claims to be non-violent and is said to “cooperate fully with government officials.” The report adds that “the Colombia Libre group does not command a great deal of credibility at this time.”

Document 10
1993 March
“Alliances of Military Convenience,” from Latin American Military Issues, Number 3
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Secret, extract, 2pp.
Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA

A classified CIA periodical on Latin American military issues reports that, “Unofficial paramilitary groups with a variety of backgrounds and motives are assisting Bogota’s efforts against both the Medellin druglord Pablo Escobar and radical leftist insurgents.”

Document 11
1993 April 06
Monthly Status Report – March 1993
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 7 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

This Embassy “summary of significant events” for March 1993 reports that the ebb in terrorist attacks attributed to Escobar’s organization “could be attributed to a combination of the unrelenting pressure exerted by the Colombian security forces and the Pepes (People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar) against Escobar and his associates.” So far in March, “four top lieutenants of Pablo Escobar were killed—two by Colombian security forces and two by the Pepes,” according to the Embassy.

Document 12
1993 April 06
GoC Denies Negotiations in Response to Pepes
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

In response to allegations advanced by Los Pepes,Colombian officials deny that the government is negotiating the surrender of Pablo Escobar, adding that they “energetically reject any criminal form of fighting crime, as well as all types of private justice which attempt to assume responsibilities which correspond constitutionally to law enforcement authorities and the judiciary.”

Document 13
1993 April 15
GoC Foreign Policy Advisor on Latest Development in the Search for Escobar
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

In the midst of a series of high-level Colombian government meetings concerning ties between the Medellín Task Force and Los Pepes (see Document 20), the Embassy reports that President Gaviria’s foreign policy advisor, Gabriel Silva, had said in an April 13 meeting “that it was not entirely coincidental that publicity regarding the search for Pablo Escobar had cooled off somewhat in the past few weeks.” Silva told Ambassador Busby “that the GoC had become concerned about the expectations which had been built up concerning the Pablo Escobar Task Force (Bloque de Busqueda) in Medellin in the minds of the public” and that “expectations were running away from reality.”

Interestingly, a subsequent reference to this same meeting from the “Tangled Web” cable (Document 20) reports that Busby had met with Silva that day “to express his strongest reservations” about Los Pepes, indicating that he suspected links between Colombian security forces and the terrorist group. These reservations are not mentioned in the April 15 account of the meeting.

Document 14
1993 April 26
Los Pepes Declare Victory and Call it Quits
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Shortly after the mid-April meetings described above (and in greater detail in the “Tangled Web” cable), Los Pepes announced that the group’s “military objective” against Escobar “has been completed in its majority” and that they would dissolve their organization in an effort to “assist the authorities, who in the end will be the ones to bring Pablo Escobar to justice.” The letter further requests that “if military actions against Pablo Escobar and his organization continue in the name of the ‘Pepes,’ that they launch an exhaustive investigation to determine the real perpetrators.”

Commenting, the Embassy says: “The entire Pepes episode has been bizarre at best,” citing “rumors … of government involvement with the Pepes at the local police and military level.” However, discussions with the Colombian government “lead us to believe it rejected the Pepes’ tactics, were [sic] fearful of the implications of the appearance of yet another criminal organization, and were [sic] sincere in their offer of rewards to try to stop the organization.”

The cable concludes with the Embassy’s promise to “offer our own speculation and such information as we have in a separate cable.”

Document 15
Undated, Ca. April 1993
Colombia: Extralegal Steps Against Escobar Possible
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Classification unknown, extract, 3pp.
Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA

A heavily-censored CIA intelligence report finds that Colombian President César Gaviria “is worried that his political leverage and economic program will suffer unless Pablo Escobar is captured soon.” Minster of Defense Rafael Pardo, meanwhile, “is concerned that the police are providing intelligence to Los Pepes, a violent paramilitary group of anti-Escobar traffickers.” The report concludes that while there is “no evidence Gaviria would sanction police support for Los Pepes, his demand for an intensified effort to capture Escobar my lead some subordinates to rely more heavily on Los Pepes and on extralegal means.”

Document 16
Undated, Ca. April 1993
Information Paper on “Los Pepes”
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: DIA declassification decision under FOIA

This DIA information paper prepared for the FBI provides general background information on Los Pepes, including its origins, composition and activities. The report finds that “Fidel Castano Gil,” identified as “chief of operations” for the Pepes, could pose new and different challenges in a post-Escobar era,” noting that “Castano’s drug trafficking activities provide him the financing necessary to further an anti-left agenda.” DIA concludes that the Colombian government’s willingness to take on Castaño “may depend more on how his paramilitary agenda complements Bogota’s counterinsurgent activities rather than on his drug trafficking activities.”

Document 17
1993 May 07
Text of Escobar’s Latest Letter to the Fiscal
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Limited Official Use, 5 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

The Embassy forwards the unreleased text of a letter from Pablo Escobar to the Colombian attorney general, Gustavo De Greiff. Escobar says that the Pepes have not disbanded and that “it is simply a stratagem” to “get the government to stop running its little television reward offer” for information on the Pepes. Escobar blames Fidel Castaño, the Cali cartel, and others for his problems and suggests that he could never get justice in Colombia’s corrupt judicial system.

Document 18
1993 June 08
Los Pepes Deny Involvement in Anti-Escobar Terrorism
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Classification unknown, 2 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

After the Pepes issued a communiqué denying responsibility for continuing attacks against Escobar associates, the Embassy comments that the Pepes likely are still involved in anti-Escobar terrorism “but publicly deny this in order to avoid [Colombian govnerment] persecution.”

Document 19
1993 July 08
Family Diaspora: Tracking Down the Escobars
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 5 pp.
Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA

By July 1993, the Medellín Task Force and Los Pepes had Escobar on the run, and his family had spread out across the globe, as reported in this cable. The Embassy speculates that one reason for this might be that, “Pablo and his brother Roberto are trying to protect family members from reprisals similar to those the anti-Escobar group ‘Los Pepes’ conducted” earlier in 1993.

Document 20
1993 August 06
Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret/NODIS, 10 pp.
Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA
[NOTE: Portions of this document released on appeal appear with white letters on black background and can be difficult to read.]

By far the most detailed declassified record on the Pepes affair, this August 1993 Embassy cable reveals that the Colombian government was both the recipient of U.S. intelligence information and the target of U.S. intelligence operations. Just as technical and investigative intelligence techniques tracked Escobar’s movements and communications, other agents eavesdropped on the Colombian president’s inner circle.

The most important information in the cable is attributed to “PALO” sources, an acronym that probably refers to the CIA. One indication of this is the fact that the cable—which includes the sensitive “NODIS” designation, limiting its distribution to a highly-select group of addressees—was referred to CIA before declassification.

According to the cable, Colombian prosecutor Gustavo DeGreiff had “new, ‘very good’ evidence linking key members of the police task force in Medellin charged with capturing Pablo Escobar Gaviria (the “Bloque de Busqueda”) to criminal activities and human rights abuses committed by Los Pepes.”

The cable describes a series of meetings from the previous April, including one where, according to “PALO” intelligence sources, Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio Gómez Padilla said “that he had directed a senior CNP intelligence officer to maintain contact with Fidel Castano, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes, for the purposes of intelligence collection.”

A few days later, “PALO” reported that Colombian President César Gaviria ordered intelligence cooperation with Los Pepes to cease and told police intelligence commander General Luis Enrique Montenegro Rinco, “to ‘pass the word’ that Los Pepes must be dissolved immediately.” Montenegro, according to the source, “was not a member of Los Pepes, but as commander of police intelligence knew some of the members, and was aware of their activities.”

The very fact that Gaviria chose to deliver his message to Los Pepes through one of his senior police commanders was also significant, according to the Embassy, as an indication that “the president believed police officials were in contact with Los Pepes.”

The Embassy concludes that President Gaviria “must deal with the issue in such a way as to remove the offenders, but at the same time, not discredit the police efforts against Escobar.” Incriminating information about the Task Force known by the Cali Cartel “could be a powerful tool as they pursue surrender negotiations,” according to the cable, and “the implication of key police officials and perhaps other high-level [Colombian government] officials in these activities, or the fact that high-level officers may be operating in the pay of the Cali cartel, could dramatically improve Cali’s position.”

Document 21
1993 October 26
The Hunt for Escobar: Next Steps
U.S. State Department cable, Secret/NODIS, 2 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

In another highly-sensitve “NODIS” cable, the State Department, in a message meant exclusively for Ambassador Morris Busby or his deputy, requests a “detailed analysis” of certain U.S. support operations in Colombia connected to the “hunt for Pablo Escobar.” The analysis is to focus on the contribution of each support element and also “put into perspective the evolution of our participation and the Colombian effort.”

Noting with concern allegations of “human rights abuses” connected to the Escobar Task Force, the State Department also instructs the Embassy to press President Gaviria for the “immediate removal from duty” of a member of the Task Force “pending resolution of the investigation into the charges against him.” The cable references the August 6, 1993, “Tangled Web” cable, indicating that the issues discussed in that message–including specific information tying the U.S.-Colombia Task Force and the Colombian National Police to the Pepes–was probably the source of the State Department’s concern.

Document 22
1993 October 27
The Hunt for Escobar: Next Steps
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret/NODIS, 2 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Resonding to the State Department’s cable of October 26 (Document 21), Ambassador Busby says that the so-called “debate” about the future of U.S. “hunt for Pablo Escobar” operations “frankly mystifies” the Embassy. Busby notes that a “complete review of our intelligence and operations traffic so far reveals nothing extraordinary” and that nothing had changed over the last two-and-a-half months “which would prompt such a ‘debate.'” Busby adds that the Embassy “would very much appreciate the Department articulating to us the origin and substance of this debate.”

Document 23
1993 December 06
Colombian Law Enforcement Action Against Pablo Escobar
U.S. Department of State cable, Unclassified, 1 p.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Acting Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff sends a congratulatory cable to Ambassador Busby, commending his “success in coordinating the many U.S. government agencies which worked with the Colombian government for more than seventeen months to end Pablo Escobar’s ability to evade Colombian law.” Tarnoff wants to maintain momentum as they continue “efforts to strengthen Colombia’s ability to arrest, prosecute and imprison cartel kingpins.”

The Aftermath: Colombia After Escobar

Document 24
1993 November
The Illicit Drug Situation in Colombia
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Drug Intelligence Report, Classification unknown, 67 pp.
Source: DEA declassification release under FOIA

This is an unclassified DEA overview of the illegal narcotics industry in Colombia.

Document 25
1993 December 06
Briefing of NSC and SSCI on “Los Pepes” Affair
Central Intelligence Agency memorandum for the record, Secret, 3 pp.
Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA

In two separate briefings, members of the CIA’s “Blue Ribbon Panel” on the Pepes matter—including officials from the Directorate of Operations and the chief of the CIA’s independent investigations unit—brief the National Security Council and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staffers just days after Escobar is killed. Assembled in early November, the Panel was to look at whether U.S. intelligence information provided to the anti-Escobar Task Force was shared with members of the Pepes terror group, which was by then known to have connections to senior Colombian police officials leading the Task Force. The Panel told the NSC that the “Embassy Joint Task Force” on Escobar “maintained no record of information passed to the Colombians,” but that another source, excised from the declassified memo on the briefing, “kept a log of all information passed to the Colombians,” that the Panel was trying to obtain. The SSCI staff received a shorter briefing, asked no questions, and was not told about the existence of a separate log.

A separate memo reports the briefing given by the Panel to members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (see Document 28)

Document 26
1993 December 17
President Gaviria Threatened by Escobar Associates
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

A ‘Secret’ cable from the Embassy reports that President Gaviria had received a letter from Escobar’s group “The Extraditables” threatening to assassinate the president. Commenting, the Embassy says that “the threat from the Escobar organization is being interpreted as a retaliation against the government not only for the death of Escobar, but also for the favoritism the [Government of Colombia] is showing towards the Cali cartel.”

Document 27
1993 December 20
New National Police Chief Appointed
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA

Longtime Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio Gomez Padilla has resigned and will be replaced by General Octavio Vargas Silva, the man “who headed the successful anti-Escobar task force.” A portion of the cable redacted upon first review but later released by the State Department’s Appeals Review Panel says that Gomez “was especially disturbed over the influence of the Cali cartel in numerous levels of government” and that he “had simply had enough of the situation.” The career of General Vargas, the Embassy adds, has been tainted by “press reports which attributed part of his success in hunting Escobar to assistance by Cali traffickers.”

Document 28
1993 December 27
Briefing for HPSCI Staff on Results of “Los Pepes” Panel and on Death of Pablo Escobar
Central Intelligence Agency memorandum for the record, Secret, 6 pp.
Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA

In a briefing similar to those reported in Document 25, the CIA’s “Blue Ribbon Panel” on the Pepes affair met with staffers from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on December 6.

Attached to a memo about the meeting is a heavily-redacted copy of a paper on the “findings and conclusions” of the Panel. Also attached is a “background” paper on the Panel itself. The Panel “met full time from 8 November through 3 December 1993” and produced “daily ‘fact sheets’ for the [Executive Director] beginning on 15 November” as well as a “final Panel report” that “integrates these fact sheets.”

After the briefing, HPSCI staffer Dick Giza called the issue “one of the most bizarre stories” he’d ever heard of, “both in how it arose and how it was investigated,” asking why the investigation had not been assigned to an “outside element” like the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).

Document 29
1994 January 04
Secret Witness Linked to Villa Alzate Missing
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 4 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

A news item on the disappearance of a former member of the anti-Escobar Task Force and secret paid witness of the attorney general’s office catches the Embassy’s attention. Ex-police agent Jaime Rincon Lezama (“Fernando”) disappeared in May 1993 and had been allegedly providing prosecutors with “information on the identities and activities of Los Pepes within the Bloque [Task Force].” Rincon reportedly worked for the former delegate attorney general for judicial police affairs, Guillermo Villa Alzate, who has been linked to the Cali cartel and “whose exact whereabouts remain unclear.” Despite Villa’s ties to the cartel, the Embassy comments that “it would be premature to discount altogether unofficial police participation in his disappearance considering that Fernando supposedly fingered over 10 of his former colleagues as operatives of Los Pepes.”

Document 30
1994 January 07
Villa Alzate Speaks: Denies Any Connection with Disappearance of Secret Witness
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 5 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Former delegate attorney general for judicial police affairs and alleged Cali cartel conspirator Guillermo Villa Alzate reemerges to defend himself following accusations (detailed above) that he is connected to the disappearance of a former police official who had been providing him information on the Task Force’s connections to Los Pepes. The Embassy notes that the development “once again raises questions as to the extent of possible Cali cartel influence,” adding that “it is also clear that any substantiation of Cali-police complicity in the activities of Los Pepes would have seriously damaged the Bloque’s credibility in their efforts against Escobar.”

Document 31
1994 February 11
Presidential Contender Samper and Ambassador Discuss Narcotics, Political, and Economic Issues
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 9 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Amidst a discussion about the death of Pablo Escobar, Colombian presidential candidate and later president Ernesto Samper tells U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette that the Cali cartel “is worse” than Escobar “because its level of sophistication has permitted it to penetrate Colombian society at virtually all levels.” However, Samper says that “the door should be kept open for those who wish to exercise the option to use legal procedures” to dismantle the Cali cartel. Ambassador Frechette doubts that the Cali capos would hold up their end of the bargain, observing that “the cartel’s armed branch, the ‘Pepes’ was capable of assassinations and violent crime.” Samper campaign finance director and ex-justice minister Monica DeGreiff replies that “her sources within the cartel had warned her that the deal would greatly reduce the possibility of violence from ‘difficult to control cartel elements.'”

Document 32
1994 May 26
Profile of Fidel Castano, Super Drug-Thug
Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Assessment, Secret, 3 pp.
Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA

This State Department intelligence profile of Fidel Castano says that the former Escobar strongman was “a principal leader of Los Pepes, which provided officials with information on the whereabouts of Escobar and attacked supporters and properties of Escobar.” Castano “reportedly acted as an intermediary between the Cali cartel and the Escobar search force.” The Pepes were “financially backed by the Cali cartel” and “reportedly had the tacit support of some senior Colombian police officials,” according to the report. The report details the Castano family’s long history of involvement in violent narcotrafficking and anti-guerrilla activities. According to the report, Castano is “more ferocious than Escobar, has more military capability, and can count on fellow antiguerrillas in the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police.” The report says that Castano “hopes his work with Los Pepes will earn him judicial leniency,” adding that “it is unlikely that police or military officials would be willing to vigorously search for him if he did, in fact, act as an intermediary to deliver Cali bribes to senior police and military officers.”

Document 33
1994 June 30
Delivery of Demarche to President Gaviria
U.S. Department of State cable, Secret, 5 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

A toughly-worded diplomatic note to Colombian president-elect Ernesto Samper makes clear that the State Department expects results from the new administration, which has been tainted by a narcotics scandal. The State Department says that it is “deeply troubled by the information pointing to the influence of drug trafficking organizations” in Samper’s presidential campaign,” which create the impression “that drug traffickers have used intimidation and financial power to purchase influence in your administration.” The State Department also reminds the Embassy that “our bilateral relationship will be predicated on Samper taking a tough counternarcotics stance.”

Document 34
1994 September 07
GoC Overhauls Police Leadership
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 7 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Colonel Hugo Martinez, commander of the “Search Bloc” that hunted down Pablo Escobar in 1993, is named director of the National Judicial Police (DIJIN) a special police intelligence organization. The Embassy notes that Martinez, “as head of the unit,” was “responsible for directing the actions of the Bloque,” which, according to the Colombian attorney general, had “a high incidence of human rights complaints” and about which there were “allegations that the Bloque (and Martinez) was closely tied with “Los Pepes” (a group committed to killing Pablo Escobar) because of their common goal.”

Document 35
1997 January 17
Police General Montenegro to Head DAS
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

In January 1997, Colombian National Police commander General Rosso Jose Serrano named Gen. Luis Enrique Montenegro Rinco, the former police intelligence commander, as the new director of the Administrative Security Department (DAS – similar to U.S. FBI). As police intelligence chief, Montenegro had been a key informational link between the Medellín Task Force and Los Pepes.

Document 36
2003 October 03
Medellin Snapshot
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

This 2003 ‘snapshot’ of Medellín reports that unidentified individuals had told the Embassy that, “elements of the army” were supportive of paramilitaries from the Nutibara Block, “composed of former leaders of the ultra-violent ‘Pepes’ group that played a key role in bringing down drug kingpin Pablo Escobar.”

TOP-SECRET – SOUTHERN CONE RENDITION PROGRAM: PERU’S PARTICIPATION
Former Peruvian President General Enrique Morales Bermudez (left) and and his Army chief Pedro Richter Prada (right) are among 140 South American military officers indicted in the investigation.
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 244

Washington, D.C., September 21, 2011 – Declassified U.S. documents posted today on the Web by the National Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org) show that the U.S. government had detailed knowledge of collaboration between the Peruvian, Bolivian and Argentine secret police forces to kidnap, torture and “permanently disappear” three militants in a Cold War rendition operation in Lima in June 1980—but took insufficient action to save the victims.

The Archive’s documents are part of a sweeping Italian investigation of Condor that has issued arrest warrants for 140 former top officials from seven South American countries and, in the words of today’s New York Times, has “agitated political establishments up and down the continent.”

The documents address what has become known as “the case of the missing Montoneros,” a covert operation by a death squad unit of Argentina’s feared Battalion 601 to kidnap three members of a militant group living in Lima, Peru, on June 12, 1980, and render them through Bolivia back to Argentina. (A fourth member, previously captured, was brought to Lima to identify his colleagues and then disappeared with them.) “The present situation is that the four Argentines will be held in Peru and then expelled to Bolivia where they will be expelled to Argentina,” a U.S. official reported from Buenos Aires four days after Esther Gianetti de Molfino, María Inés Raverta and Julio César Ramírez were kidnapped in broad daylight in downtown Lima. “Once in Argentina they will be interrogated and then permanently disappeared.”

The case was first detailed at length in The Condor Years, a book by National Security Archive board member John Dinges. In his own book, The Pinochet File, Archive senior analyst Peter Kornbluh identified the Montonero operation as “one of the last recorded cases of a Condor operation.” Condor was founded in November 1975, in Santiago, Chile, by the Pinochet regime, which became known as “Condor One.” Operation Condor became infamous for terrorist activities after Chilean agents, in collaboration with Paraguay, planted a bomb under the car of former ambassador Orlando Letelier in September 1976, killing him and his colleague, Ronni Moffitt, in Washington D.C.

Peru’s former military ruler, General Enrique Morales Bermudez, has admitted authorizing the Montonero kidnappings but continues to deny that Peru was a member of Operation Condor. But a secret CIA report, dated August 22, 1978, and titled “A Brief Look at Operation Condor” described Condor as “a cooperative effort by intelligence/security services in several South American countries to combat terrorism and subversion. The original members included services from Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil and Bolivia. Peru and Ecuador recently became members.” (Emphasis added) A Chilean intelligence document confirms that Peru formally joined Operation Condor in March 1978.

A State Department cable dated several weeks after the kidnapping stated that “there seems to be little doubt that the Peruvian army, acting in concert with its Argentine counterpart, resorted to the kinds of illegal repressive measures more familiar in the Southern Cone” than Peru.

Italy’s indictments include General Morales Bermudez and his military deputy Pedro Richter Prada, among 138 other military officers from Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay who were involved in the kidnapping, torture and disappearances of 25 Latin Americans who had dual Italian citizenship. The indictments, in a 250-page court filing by Italian judge Luisianna Figliolia last December, come after a six-year investigation by investigative magistrate Giancarlo Capaldo, who drew on hundreds of declassified documents provided by the National Security Archive’s Southern Cone project. “These documents provide hard evidence of Condor crimes,” according to project director Carlos Osorio, “that almost 30 years later still demand the resolution of justice.”

The New York Times story, “Italy Follows Trail of Secret South American Abductions,” noted that the Italian effort at universal jurisdiction “deals not only with individual cases involving Italian citizens but also with the broader responsibilities of Condor’s cross-border kidnapping and torture operations.” The story also suggested that Condor’s allied effort to track down, kidnap, and secretly transport targets to third countries, according to historians, was “reminiscent of the United States’ modern terrorist rendition program.”

The Archive’s Peter Kornbluh noted “sinister similarities between Condor and the current U.S. rendition, enhanced interrogation, and black site detention operations.”

Read the Documents
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Document 1: CIA, Secret report, “A Brief Look at Operation Condor,” August 22, 1978.

In August 1978, the CIA prepared a short briefing paper for Department of Justice lawyers who were investigating the September 21, 1976, assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in Washington D.C.  The report identifies the members of Condor, including Peru. The report also identifies Condor’s use of “executive action”—assassination—against specific targets outside the territory of member nations.

Document 2: State Department, memo, “Meeting with Argentine Intelligence Service, June 19, 1980.

Four days after the Montoneros were seized in a public park in Lima, the Regional Security Officer in Buenos Aires, James Blystone, met with a high-level source in Argentina’s intelligence service. Blystone reports to U.S. Ambassador Raul H. Castro in this memo that the source has told him: “The present situation is that the four Argentines will be held in Peru and then expelled to Bolivia where they will be expelled to Argentina. Once in Argentina they will be interrogated and then permanently disappeared.” The three seized Argentines are Esther Gianetti de Molfino, who was a member of “Madres del Plaza de Mayo,” María Inés Raverta and Julio César Ramírez. A fourth Argentine, Federico Frias Alberga, had been previously captured and taken to Lima by Argentine agents to identify his colleagues. He then disappeared along with them. This document was discovered by Long Island University professor J. Patrice McSherry, who provided it to Newsweek Magazine several years ago.

Document 3: State Department, cable, “Argentine Involvement in Lima Kidnappings,” June 19, 1980.

The U.S. Ambassador to Buenos Aires, Raul H. Castro, cables the State Department with some of the information Blystone had learned. The cable states that the rendition operation “hit a snag” because it became public, and that Battalion 601 agents had decided to take the Montoneros to a third country, Bolivia.

Document 4: State Department, INR Report, Argentina-Peru: Attempted Repatriation of Montoneros Apparently Foiled,” June 25, 1980.

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research attempts to analyze the covert rendition operation run by Argentina in Peru. The report concludes that “this incident is not unique. In recent years, there have been several similar cases that attest to the high degree of cooperation among intelligence and security agencies of the southern South American countries and to their tendency to resort to illegal means of treating suspected subversives.”

Document 5: State Department, Cable, “Montoneros: Amnesty International Reportedly Claims 3 Killed in Peru; Foreign Minister Comments Further, July 3, 1980. 

In this nearly illegible cable, the U.S. Embassy analyzes the uproar in Peru over new allegations made by Amnesty International on the fate of the three Montoneros. On page 3, the cable notes that the situation is “very clearly” a serious matter but that the details are still “obscured.” But Embassy analysts conclude that “there seems to be little doubt that the Peruvian army, acting in concert with its Argentine counterpart, resorted to the kinds of illegal repressive measures more familiar in the Southern Cone than here.”

Document 6: State Department, Cable, “The Case of the Missing Montoneros,” July 11, 1980.

In a cable from Lima, U.S. Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman reports on his conversation with Prime Minister Richter Prada about the missing Montoneros. Richter claims that the three Argentines were “legally expelled and delivered to a Bolivian immigration official in accordance with long-standing practice.” Shlaudeman concludes that two other Montoneros who Richter says are fugitives are probably “permanent disappearances.”

Document 7: State Department, Cable, “Purported Discovery of Missing Montonero,” August 4, 1980.

The body of one of those seized in Peru, Esther Gianetti de Molfino, is discovered in an apartment in Madrid. The apartment is supposedly rented by another of the kidnapped Montoneros. The elaborate effort by Battalion 601 to cover up their disappearances by making her body reappear in Spain is reminiscent of Operation Colombo, when disfigured bodies appeared on the streets of Buenos Aires with identification cards of missing Chilean political figures. (Medical examinations proved that the bodies were not those individuals.) The Argentine Foreign Ministry used the discovery of de Molfino’s corpse to denounce the “falseness of the campaign against Argentina and Peru” over the missing Montoneros, according to the cable.

Document 8: State Department, Memo, “Hypothesis—The GOA as Prisoner of Army Intelligence,” August 18, 1980.

A political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, Townsend Friedman, offers a strange assessment of the implications of the Montonero case on the equations of power in the Argentine military regime. “Disappearance is 601 work,” he writes. Due to the embarrassment factor, he suggests, “Anyone with an ounce of political sense in the GOA would have aborted, if he had been able, these operations.” Rather than obvious collaborators, Friedman concludes that General Videla and the Junta are “victims” of Battalion 601 and the secret police.

Document 9: State Department, Memo, “The Case of the Missing Montoneros,” August 19, 1980.

In another memo to the Embassy Charge, Townsend Friedman provides a short chronology and reevaluation of the Montonero case. He focuses on what he calls “the intimate relationship” between Argentina’s and Bolivia’s intelligence services. He cites a July communication between Prime Minister Richter and Argentine Army Commander, Galtieri, who tells Richter that there could be “an interesting development” in the case. That development turns out to be the discovery of the corpse of Esther Gianetti de Molfino in an apartment in Madrid, clearly planted there by agents of Battalion 601 to suggest that the Montoneros had not been kidnapped after all.

Document 10: State Department, Memo, “Conversation with Argentine Intelligence Source,” April 7, 1980.

The interest of Italian judge Giancarlo Capaldo in the case of the Montoneros derives from his belief that it is connected to other Condor operations that took the lives of Italian-Argentines, among them the case of the disappearance of Horacio Campiglia who was abducted in March 1980 in Rio de Janiero by Argentine agents collaborating with Brazil’s intelligence service. This report from Regional Security Officer James Blystone provides perhaps the most comprehensive detail on joint secret police collaboration to track down, abduct and render targeted victims in the Southern Cone. Blystone reports on the communications, travel, and even type of plane used in this rendition operation, and on the steps taken to provide a cover up of the plot.

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TOP-SECRET – NEW KISSINGER ‘TELCONS’ REVEAL CHILE PLOTTING AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

NEW KISSINGER ‘TELCONS’ REVEAL CHILE PLOTTING
AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

Nixon Vetoed Proposed Coexistence with an Allende Government
Kissinger to the CIA: “We will not let Chile go down the drain.”

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 255

Washington D.C., September 19, 2011 – On the eve of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the military coup in Chile, the National Security Archive today published for the first time formerly secret transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s telephone conversations that set in motion a massive U.S. effort to overthrow the newly-elected socialist government of Salvador Allende. “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger told CIA director Richard Helms in one phone call. “I am with you,” the September 12, 1970 transcript records Helms responding.

The telephone call transcripts—known as ‘telcons’—include previously-unreported conversations between Kissinger and President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers.  Just eight days after Allende’s election, Kissinger informed the president that the State Department had recommended an approach to “see what we can work out [with Allende].”   Nixon responded by instructing Kissinger: “Don’t let them do it.”

After Nixon spoke directly to Rogers, Kissinger recorded a conversation in which the Secretary of State agreed that “we ought, as you say, to cold-bloodedly decide what to do and then do it,” but warned it should be done “discreetly so that it doesn’t backfire.” Secretary Rogers predicted that “after all we have said about elections, if the first time a Communist wins the U.S. tries to prevent the constitutional process from coming into play we will look very bad.”

The telcons also reveal that just nine weeks before the Chilean military, led by Gen. Augusto Pinochet and supported by the CIA, overthrew the Allende government on September 11, 1973, Nixon called Kissinger on July 4 to say “I think that Chilean guy might have some problems.” “Yes, I think he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responded. Nixon then blamed CIA director Helms and former U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry for failing to block Allende’s inauguration three years earlier. “They screwed it up,” the President declared.

Although Kissinger never intended the public to know about these conversations, observed Peter Kornbluh, who directs the National Security Archive’s Chile Documentation Project, he “bestowed on history a gift that keeps on giving by secretly taping and transcribing his phone calls.”  The transcripts, Kornbluh noted, provide historians with the ability to “eavesdrop on the most candid conversations of the highest and most powerful U.S. officials as they plotted covert intervention against a democratically-elected government.”

Kissinger began secretly taping all his incoming and outgoing phone conversations when he became national security advisor in 1969; his secretaries transcribed the calls from audio tapes that were later destroyed.  When Kissinger left office in January 1977, he took more than 30,000 pages of the transcripts, claiming they were “personal papers,” and used them, selectively, to write his memoirs.  In 1999, the National Security Archive initiated legal proceedings to force Kissinger to return these records to the U.S. government so they could be subject to the freedom of information act and declassification.  At the request of Archive senior analyst William Burr, telcons on foreign policy crises from the early 1970s, including these four previously-unknown conversations on Chile, were recently declassified by the Nixon Presidential library.

On November 30, 2008 the National Security Archive will publish a comprehensive collection of Kissinger telcons in the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA). Comprising 15,502 telcons, this collection documents Kissinger’s conversations with top officials in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including President Richard Nixon; Defense Secretaries Melvin Laird, Elliot Richardson, and James Schlesinger; Secretary of State William P. Rogers; Ambassador to the U.N. George H.W. Bush; and White House Counselor Donald Rumsfeld; along with noted journalists, ambassadors, and business leaders with close White House ties.  Wide-ranging topics discussed in the telcons include détente with Moscow, military actions during the Vietnam War and the negotiations that led to its end, Middle East peace talks, the 1970 crisis in Jordan, U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, and Chile, rapprochement with China, the Cyprus crisis (1974- ), and the unfolding Watergate affair.  When combined with the Archive’s previous electronic publication of Kissinger’s memoranda of conversation — The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977 — users of the DNSA will have access to comprehensive records of Kissinger’s talks with myriad U.S. officials and world leaders.  Like the Archive’s earlier publication, the Kissinger telcons will be comprehensively and expertly indexed, providing users with have easy access to the information they seek.  The collection also includes 158 White House tapes, some of which dovetail with transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations with Nixon and others.  Users of the set will thus be able to read the “telcon” and listen to the tape simultaneously.

READ THE DOCUMENTS

l. Helms/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:00 noon.

Eight days after Salvador Allende’s narrow election, Kissinger tells CIA director Richard Helms that he is calling a meeting of the 40 committee—the committee that determines covert operations abroad.  “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger declares.  Helms reports he has sent a CIA emissary to Chile to obtain a first-hand assessment of the situation.

2. President/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:32 p.m.

In the middle of a Kissinger report to Nixon on the status of a terrorist hostage crisis in Amman, Jordan, he tells the president that “the big problem today is Chile.”  Former CIA director and ITT board member John McCone has called to press for action against Allende; Nixon’s friend Pepsi CEO Donald Kendall has brought Chilean media mogul Augustine Edwards to Washington.  Nixon blasts a State Department proposal to “see what we can work out [with Allende], and orders Kissinger “don’t let them do that.” The president demands to see all State Department cable traffic on Chile and to get an appraisal of “what the options are.”

3. Secretary Rogers, September 14, 1970, 12:15pm (page 2)

After Nixon speaks to Secretary of State William Rogers about Chile, Kissinger speaks to him on September 14. Rogers reluctantly agrees that the CIA should “encourage a different result” in Chile, but warns it should be done discreetly lest U.S. intervention against a democratically-elected government be exposed.  Kissinger firmly tells Secretary Rogers that “the president’s view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an Allende takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture.”

4) President/Kissinger, July 4, 1973, 11:00 a.m.

Vacationing in San Clemente, Nixon calls Kissinger and discusses the deteriorating situation in Chile.  Two weeks earlier, a coup attempt against Allende failed, but Nixon and Kissinger predict further turmoil.  “I think that Chilean guy may have some problems,” Nixon states.  “Oh, he has massive problems.  He has massive problems…he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responds.  The two share recollections of three years earlier when they had covertly attempted to block Allende’s inauguration.  Nixon blames CIA director Richard Helms and former U.S. ambassador Edward Korry for failing to stop Allende; “they screwed it up,” he states.  The conversation then turns to Kissinger’s evaluation of the Los Angeles premiere of the play “Gigi.”

5) President/Kissinger, September 16, 1973, 11:50 a.m. (previously posted May 26, 2004)

In their first substantive conversation following the military coup in Chile, Kissinger and Nixon discuss the U.S. role in the overthrow of Allende, and the adverse reaction in the new media. When Nixon asks if the U.S. “hand” will show in the coup, Kissinger admits “we helped them” and that “[deleted reference] created conditions as great as possible.”  The two commiserate over what Kissinger calls the “bleating” liberal press. In the Eisenhower period, he states, “we would be heroes.” Nixon assures him that the people will appreciate what they did: “let me say they aren’t going to buy this crap from the liberals on this one.”

TOP-SECRET – COMPLETE PENTAGON PAPERS AT LAST!

June 13, 1971: The New York Times begins to publish the Pentagon Papers.

COMPLETE PENTAGON PAPERS AT LAST!
All Three Versions Posted, Allowing Side-by-Side Comparison

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 359

Posted – September 16, 2011

Edited By John Prados

For more information contact:
John Prados – 202/994-7000

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“After 40 Years, the Complete Pentagon Papers”
By Michael Cooper and Sam Roberts
The New York Times
June 7, 2011

More on the Pentagon Papers

Pentagon Papers Home

The Secret Briefs and the Secret Evidence.
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Audio and transcripts

Intelligence and Vietnam.
The Top Secret 1969 State Department Study

Excerpts from Nixon, Kissinger and Haldeman Memoirs

Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 508-515.

Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pp. 115-118.

H.R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries (New York: Berkeley Books, 1995), pp. 363-371, 378.

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Edited by John Prados and Margaret Pratt Porter
University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0-7006-1325-0

 

What Were the 11 Missing Words?
Enter the National Security Archive’s Reader Contest!

Washington, DC, September 16, 2011 – For the first time ever, all three major editions of the Pentagon Papers are being made available simultaneously online. The posting today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org), allows for a unique side-by-side comparison, showing readers exactly what the U.S. government tried to hide for 40 years by means of deletions from the original text.

To make the most of this new resource, the Archive is unveiling a special contest inviting readers to make their own nominations for the infamous “11 words” that some officials tried to keep secret even this year!

Today’s posting includes the full texts of the “Gravel” edition entered into Congressional proceedings in 1971 by Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) and later published by the Beacon Press, the authorized 1971 declassified version issued by the House Armed Services Committee with deletions insisted on by the Nixon administration, and the new 2011 “complete” edition released in June by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

Accompanying the posting is the National Security Archive’s invitation for readers to identify their own favorite nominees for the “11 words” that securocrats attempted to delete during the declassification process for the Papers earlier this year, until alert NARA staffers realized those words actually had been declassified back in 1971.  Best submissions for the “11 words” — as judged by National Security Archive experts — will appear in the Archive’s blog, Unredacted, and on the Archive’s Facebook page.  National Security Archive senior fellow John Prados wrote the introduction and analysis for the posting. Archive analyst Carlos Osorio coordinated the data processing for publication. Archive staff Wendy Valdes and Charlotte Karrlsson-Willis did the input, indexing and cross-referencing, and the Archive’s webmaster Michael Evans managed the online publication of the Pentagon Papers.

*               *               *

With a simple press release on June 8, 2011 the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) announced that five days later the United States Government would declassify and make public the full forty-seven volumes of the set of studies universally known as the “Pentagon Papers.” The studies acquired that name when they were leaked by Daniel Ellsberg, one of the analysts who had worked on them but had subsequently gone into the opposition on U.S. policy in the Vietnam war. The National Security Archive here posts, for the first time anywhere, a combined, comparative, and searchable set of all the major editions of the Pentagon Papers together with a cross-referencing index to all the sets.

As it happens NARA’s release of the Pentagon Papers coincided exactly with the 40th anniversary of the day in 1971 when the leaked documents began to appear in the press, at first the New York Times, but then also the Washington Post and many other news media. The Nixon administration attempted to suppress the leak of the Papers by seeking a prior injunction against their publication from the U.S. Court. It succeeded thereby in making the Pentagon Papers into one of the significant political documents of the 20th Century. The case went to the Supreme Court, which decided against the government in a notable First Amendment decision affirming freedom of the press.

With this background the reader can begin to understand the secrecy issues that swirled around this set of materials. The first point is that the Ellsberg leak involved the disclosure of official documents. The study’s actual title, “United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967,” reveals that the contents of the papers concerned the Vietnam policies of Lyndon B. Johnson and previous presidents back to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Second, these were official documents classified at a high level. Those who worked on the Pentagon Papers have affirmed that the materials were classified this way in order to prevent the Johnson White House from discovering that this review was underway, but Nixon officials argued the documents were secret only because they included information whose disclosure damaged the national security of the United States. The administration argued this both in the Pentagon Papers court case and in the subsequent criminal prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and his confederate, Anthony J. Russo. For forty years from 1971 until 2011 the U.S. Government has continued to take the position that the Pentagon Papers remained secret even though anyone could read them. Repeated efforts to secure the declassification of the Pentagon Papers were denied or ignored.

In the meantime the clamor for access to the Pentagon Papers resulted in the appearance of several editions of the documents. The most widely available and best-known of these versions is The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times, which compiled in one place the series of articles and set of documents that newspaper had published. (Note 1) This edition attracted huge public attention and went through many printings but was flawed in that it represented a very narrow selection among the plethora of materials contained in the original. The Times reporters had distilled the 43 studies of the original to which they had access into a single volume. That version was far surpassed after an Alaska Democrat, Senator Mike Gravel, read the Pentagon Papers into the Congressional Record. This material was taken by the Beacon Press of Boston and published as a four-volume (2,901 page) set that contained nearly all the material in the actual studies and also added in a series of documents that the original had lacked (this will be called the “Gravel Edition”). (Note 2) Meanwhile the Nixon administration itself had promised to release a set of the Pentagon Papers and it did so through the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives. This appeared in twelve volumes, or “books” (6,742 pages), and was published by the U.S. Government Printing Office. (Note 3) This edition (hereafter termed the “HASC edition”) exactly reproduced the original, minus numerous deletions that reflected the Nixon administration’s claims for national security damage framed in its court cases.

As a result of the way the Pentagon Papers surfaced there have always been difficulties in using them. The Times version, widely available, only scratched the surface. Both the Gravel and HASC editions appeared in only a few, or one printing, and were therefore not very accessible to the public. Restricted availability—in many cases limited to good college libraries—kept the full set of materials away from most of the public. The Gravel edition had the virtues of having a straightforward presentation and including Johnson administration documents. The HASC edition’s advantage lay in its much more ample documentation on the presidencies of FDR, Harry Truman, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. On the other hand this version used the pagination of the original Department of Defense compilation, which was confusing and changed almost as often as the studies themselves.

None of the 1971 editions included four volumes of diplomatic accounts of Johnson administration peace feelers to North Vietnam, which Ellsberg had withheld when leaking the rest of the Pentagon Papers. An expurgated set of those studies only became available in 1983. (Note 4) The complete Diplomatic Volumes were finally declassified in 2002. That release resulted in the stunning contradiction that the Diplomatic Volumes of the Pentagon Papers—deemed too sensitive even to leak in 1971—were fully available to the public while the major portion of the review—which has been available to the public ever since 1971—remained secret.

In any case, until now the United States Government has insisted that the Pentagon Papers are secret while those who sought to learn from them have been able to read whatever version they could access, each with its own flaws. The NARA action in releasing the full set of studies, a token of its commitment to major declassification initiatives, permits comprehensive examination of the Pentagon Papers for the first time.

However, readers remain hampered by the confusing organization and structure of the original Department of Defense review. Using the Gravel edition to find material, and then looking it up in the original actually remains a suitable way to proceed. This has been problematical not only because of the confusing pagination in the original but due to the differences in availability of the various editions. Even the new NARA release, although it is online, limits the user to one item at a time because it is organized by file corresponding to study volume.

The National Security Archive has undertaken to make the full Pentagon Papers completely accessible. We have done this by arranging a full-matrix display. This presentation shows each page of the fully declassified NARA version of the Pentagon Papers side-by-side with the corresponding page of the HASC edition and corresponding material from the Gravel set. From this display it is possible to instantly identify the passages deleted by the Nixon administration in 1971, as well as how editors changed material in the original when compiling the Gravel edition. We have excluded the Times version because that consists of the summarizations of authors and only a limited portion of text.

The Archive has also undertaken to make available an Index that permits cross-referencing among the various versions we are displaying—not only the pdf panels but also the page numbers in the printed editions of these works. An introduction to the Index makes clear how it is organized and can be used.

This posting of nearly 20,000 pages has been an enormous undertaking and required the cooperation of many Archive personnel. Information technology and Latin America specialist Carlos Osorio conceptualized and coordinated the data processing for the multi version publication. Analyst Wendy Valdes organized and verified the inputs. Analyst Charlotte Karrlsson-Willis created the Index with assistance from Valdes. Webmaster Michael Evans (also a Latin Americanist) accomplished the final work of getting the page matrix display up on our website.

*               *               *

NARA’s release of the Pentagon Papers was accompanied by a fresh demonstration of inappropriate secrecy policy. In reviewing these documents for declassification, one authority sought to suppress eleven words on one page. What was silly about this exercise was that the “11 Words” were not classified. That is, in effect an agency sought to make secret a passage of the Pentagon Papers that had already been reviewed and declassified by the United States Government in 1971. Since classification is supposed to protect information that can damage the national security of the United States, the idea that the “11 Words” pose a danger to the nation in 2011 after having been in the open for four decades was startling. Calmer heads finally prevailed and the government relented and released the documents with no deletions. But it has not revealed what the “11 Words” actually were.

Needless to say, the “11 Words” episode occasioned a playful guessing game in which people have tried to identify the offending passage. The National Security Archive posted its own set of eleven candidates. Here we would like to extend an invitation to interested readers to send us your own guesses. Accordingly we are sponsoring an “11 Words Contest.” Good candidate passages will be posted as articles in our blog Unredacted and on the Archive’s Facebook page, and the best ones will be incorporated into an Electronic Briefing Book as we proceed. There will be prizes for the best candidate passage and for runners-up.

“11  WORDS”  CONTEST  RULES 

Beginning with the date of this posting we open a contest for readers to nominate their own favorite candidates for the “11 Words” a government agency wanted to suppress in the Pentagon Papers. Readers can examine the side-by-side page display of all the Pentagon Papers content posted here to find items to nominate. All entries must be received by 12:00 Midnight of Friday, November 16, 2011. Entries will be judged by National Security Archive panelists. The Grand Prize winner and Runners-Up will be announced by posting in the blog Unredacted on the National Security Archive website during the week that starts on December 17th.

Prizes: The National Security Archive will award the best Pentagon Papers candidate for deletion a Grand Prize consisting of a set of the available Archive Readers—books on major international issues which include compilations of documents obtained by the Archive along with analysis by Archive experts. In keeping with the “11 Words” theme, in addition to the Grand Prize winner there will be ten Runners-Up. Each of these winners will receive a copy of the book Inside the Pentagon Papers edited by John Prados and Margaret Pratt Porter.

Entries: Enter early and often! There is no limit to the number of candidate passages a reader may submit to the “11 Words” competition. However, entries must follow the format prescribed below. Only one candidate passage may be nominated in any single entry. Multiple entries must be submitted separately. All entries must be in writing, in an email to the Archive (at nsarchiv@gwu.edu ) or through our Facebook page. Please do not use Twitter, as a proper entry cannot be fitted within the Twitter message format. By submitting an entry the reader agrees in advance to cede to the National Security Archive the right to publish her/his entry in our blog Unredacted, on our Facebook page,and/or in one of our Electronic Briefing Books. The National Security Archive will be solely responsible for the selection of entries that we publish and when they may appear. Entries that are published become finalists in the prize competition but there will be no monetary or other compensation. Those which do not rise to that level will not be circulated. Entries that do not follow the prescribed format will automatically be rejected. When entries do appear in Unredacted or on Facebook, readers should feel free to comment on them just as they do regarding any of our other articles.

Format: All contest submissions must contain the true name and address of the entrant for purposes of the Prize awards. Each entry must contain the following information:

  • Quotation: The entrant must pick a specific phrase of the Pentagon Papers, precisely 11 words long, and the phrase nominated must be quoted verbatim in the text, enclosed in quotation marks. The entrant is free to nominate an 11 word passage embedded in a longer sentence—but in that case the full sentence must appear as the quotation and the 11 word phrase must be highlighted in bold. Candidate phrases longer than 11 words are not acceptable.
  • Reference: The entry must provide the exact Pentagon Papers page citation for the 11 Words nominee. The page numbers will be found on our side-by-side display or they may be taken from the original published NARA/HASC edition. Page numbers taken from the Gravel or other editions of the Pentagon Papers are not acceptable.
  • Eligibility of Phrases: What made the 11 Words controversial was that this exercise was an attempt to make secret anew a text that had been declassified and lay in the public domain since 1971. At that time the declassified version of the Pentagon Papers was the HASC edition. Consequently, to be eligible for nomination a phrase must appear in the HASC edition of the Pentagon Papers. Readers will easily be able to establish whether any given text was published in the HASC edition simply by referring to the side-by-side pages we have displayed in this posting. The eleven phrases already nominated by the Archive (in EBB 350) are not eligible for selection. Any entries that do nominate them will simply be regarded as thoughtful comments on work already done.
  • Argumentation: The entry must explain precisely why the reader believes the nominated phrase could be the 11 Words the government wished to suppress. It should also comment on what agency or agencies could expect to profit from such a deletion. The reader’s argument should be clear and concise. It may rely on historical analysis or arguments regarding government secrecy policy, or both, and the reader may weigh the factors in any way she/he wishes. Remember, there is no “right” answer until the U.S. Government reveals which were the real 11 Words. There is no set word count to the length of the reader’s argument, but the Archive reserves the right to exclude entries of excessive length. (For a sample of the kind of argumentation an entry should contain see the candidate phrases nominated by the Archive in EBB 350.)

Judging: All entries will be reviewed by a panel of National Security Archive experts. Our criteria will be the plausibility of a government secrecy claim with respect to each set of 11 Words nominated, along with the substance and quality of the reader’s argument for why a particular phrase must be the real 11 Words. Since there is no “right” answer, everything will depend on the reader’s selections and the quality of her/his argumentation. The Archive has no preconceived notion as to the true identity of the 11 Words. Entries will be judged solely on the basis of the case they make. Inaccurate quotation or source referencing, frivolous argumentation, and failure to incorporate required elements of the format will be grounds for rejection. All decisions of the judges will be final.

Notes

1. Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield, The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times. New York: Bantam Books, 1971.

2. The Senator Gravel Edition: The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

3. Leslie H. Gelb, et. al, eds., United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971.

4. George C. Herring, ed. The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin (TX): University of Texas Press, 1983.

TOP-SECRET – 2 DE OCTUBRE DE 1968 – Verdad Bajo Resguardo

Mexican President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (right) and Government Minister Luis Echeverría Alvarez

2 DE OCTUBRE DE 1968 – Verdad Bajo Resguardo

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 258
Mexican army soldiers with detainees from the Tlatelolco massacre, October 2, 1968
Washington D.C., September 17, 2011 – We have arrived at the fortieth anniversary of the massacre at Tlatelolco with little to report. The events of that terrible day remain shrouded in the kind of secrecy that characterizes repressive dictatorships rather than the modern, developed and democratic nation that Mexico is today. This shameful state of affairs is due first and foremost to the lies, misinformation and equivocations of those originally responsable: the late President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz; his hardline deputy, Government Minister Luis Echeverría Alvarez; Marcellino García Barragán, Secretary of National Defense; Chief of the Presidential Staff Luis Gutiérrez Oropeza; Mario Ballesteros Prieto, Chief of Staff to the Secretary of National Defense; and Alfonso Corona del Rosal, Regent of the Federal District.But those men, and the era they represented, have receded into the distant past and no longer pose the greatest obstacle to understanding what happened to Tlatelolco. That honor belongs to the current government of Mexico, which has steadfastly refused to provide the records and testimony necessary to clarify October 2nd once and for all. The dishonest and incomplete efforts of ex-President Vicente Fox to compel his agencies to turn over their files related to Tlatelolco and to launch competent criminal investigations of former Mexican officials is exacerbated today by stonewalling on the part of President Calderón’s government. To investigate Tlatelolco among the files preserved at the Archivo General de la Naciónis to lose oneself in a black hole of missing documentation, enduring secrecy and an intransigent and arrogant staff.To mark the solemn occasion of the anniversary of Tlatelolco, Archivos Abiertos offers the most complete account to date of what files exist on October 2nd – and what remains hidden.  It is our hope that the survivors of Tlatelolco, families of the victims, historians, journalists and human rights investigators will use this account as a guide to insist on a full and truthful version of the events of the massacre. Así – y solo así – podamos llegar a un México verdaderamente abierto. Washington D.C., 2 de octubre 2008 – Nosotros hemos arrivado en el cuadragésimo aniversario de la masacre de Tlatelolco con poco que reportar. Los eventos de ese terrible día continuan envolviendo los secretos que caracterizaron el régimen represivo y dictatorial que se vivió en México en aquella época, a diferencia de la actualidad en donde México es una nación moderna, desarrollada y democrática. Este vergonzoso suceso se dió gracias a las mentiras, a la desinformación y a los errores de los originales responsables: el ex Presidente Gustavo Díaz Ordaz; su segundo al mando, el Secretario de Gobernación Luis Echeverría Álvarez; Marcellino García Barragán secretario de la Defensa Nacional; al Jefe del Estado Mayor Presidencial Luis Gutiérrez Oropeza; a mario Ballesteros Prieto, Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional; y a Alfonso Corona del Rosal, regente del Distrito Federal.Pero esos hombres, la era que representaron y los grandes obstáculo para entender lo que sucedio en Tlatelolco quedaron enterrados en el pasado. Ese honor correponde al gobierno actual de México, el cual se ha negado a dar información que pudiese aclarar todo lo que sucedio el 2 de Octubre de una vez por todas. Lo deshonesto y los esfuerzos incompletos del ex Presidente Vicente Fox para obligar a sus agencias a abrir los archivos e iniciar una investigación criminal, es agravado hoy en día por el gobierno del actual Presidente Felipe Calderón el cual obstruye la investigación entre los archivos preservados en el Archivo General de la Nación, en donde esforzarse a investigar es perderse en un hoyo negro de falta de documentación, aguantando al personal intransigente y prepotente.Para marcar la solemne ocasión del aniversario de Tlatelolco, Archivos Abiertos ofrece la más completa información hasta la fecha de los archivos que existen acerca del 2 de Octubre, y lo que permanece escondido bajo resguardo. Es nuestra esperanza que los sobrevivientes de Tlatelolco, las familias de las víctimas, los historiadores,  los periodistas y los investigadores de los derechos humanos utilizen esta información como guía para insistir en una versión completa y veraz de los acontecimientos de la masacre. Así – y sólo así – podamos llegar a un México verdaderamente abierto.

2 DE OCTUBRE DE 1968 – Verdad Bajo Resguardo
Editado por Kate Doyle y Susana Zavala

Para Mayor Información Contactar a
Kate Doyle kadoyle@gwu.edu
Susana Zavala  zavalasusana@gmail.com

Durante el sexenio de Vicente Fox Quesada, se decretó el acuerdo presidencial, 27 de noviembre de 2001, mediante el cual se disponía de diversas medidas para la procuración de justicia por delitos cometidos contra personas vinculadas con movimientos sociales y políticos del pasado.

Una de las disposiciones ordenó que la documentación en poder de las dependencias federales fuera transferida al Archivo General de la Nación (AGN) para atender la recomendación 26/2001 de la Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH), que había documentado 532 casos de desaparición forzada de personas por motivos políticos. A estas investigaciones se les daría seguimiento a través de una fiscalía especial dependiente de la Procuraduría General de la República.

En 2002 la Oficina del Fiscal Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (OFEMOSPP), encabezada por Ignacio Carrillo Prieto, abrió sus puertas para integrar las averiguaciones previas de los casos investigados previamente por la CNDH. Tiempo después, Carrillo atrajo también las denuncias de los acontecimientos del 2 de octubre de 1968 y los hechos del 10 de junio de 1971. Su misión era comprobar la responsabilidad de funcionarios, de todos los niveles (que ejercieron funciones en las décadas de los sesenta, setenta y ochenta) en delitos en contra de personas vinculadas a grupos de oposición al gobierno mexicano de aquellos años.

Pero, ¿cuáles fueron las Secretarías de Estado que atendieron esta medida? ¿Cuáles no cumplieron y estaban obligadas? ¿Cuándo y en dónde se resguardó la documentación de aquellas que acataron el acuerdo? ¿Quiénes pueden tener acceso a estos documentos? ¿Quiénes se hicieron cargo de monitorear el total cumplimiento del mandado presidencial? Estas y muchas otras preguntas motivaron a The National Security Archive a realizar una exhaustiva investigación haciendo uso de la Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental (LFTAIPG) para conocer los detalles del cumplimiento a la disposición presidencial y su vigencia actual.

Dependencias que cumplieron

SEDENA (DOCUMENTO 1)

Former Mexican President Vicente Fox

Sólo algunas de las Secretarías de Estado atendieron el acuerdo de Fox. De las primeras en hacer entrega de parte de su archivo histórico fueron las Fuerzas Armadas.  El 22 de enero de 2002, la SEDENA, mediante Acta de Transferencia, hace entrega de información generada desde 1965 hasta 1985.

 “En la Ciudad de México, DF, siendo las dieciocho horas del día veintidós del mes de enero del año dos mil dos, en las instalaciones del Archivo General de la Nación, se precede a suscribir la presente acta de cumplimiento al acuerdo presidencial. Publicado en el Diario Oficial de la Federación el 27 de noviembre del 2001. Mediante el cual dispone diversas medidas para la procuración de justicia por delitos cometidos contra personas vinculadas con movimientos sociales y políticos del pasado, con la representación por parte de la Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional el C. General de División EM Roberto Miranda Sánchez, Director General de Archivo e Historia y por parte de la Secretaría de Gobernación la C. Dra. Stella María González Cicero, Directora del Archivo General de la Nación…”

El documento termina asentando “Por lo anterior la Dirección del Archivo General de la Nación, custodiará y conservará el acervo documental que constituye la información que le es transferida en estricto acatamiento al Acuerdo Presidencial de mérito.”  El acta consta de 9 fojas de las que se resume la siguiente cifra: Cajas 486, legajos 1,653 y un total de 150,713 hojas de 36 Zonas Militares de las 45 que actualmente existen.

La consulta de este fondo documental no tiene mayores restricciones que las señaladas por el área de referencia del AGN. Sin embargo, éste no cuenta con  un índice temático completo que facilite la búsqueda de información, aunque el AGN en su Centro de Referencias tiene a disposición de los investigadores el que le entregó SEDENA.

Por otra parte, hemos identificado documentos que adjuntan anexos los cuales aportan información complementaria en las comunicaciones entre las áreas militares u otras dependencias. Realizamos una exhaustiva búsqueda tratando de ubicar estos anexos en la colección transferida al AGN sin éxito. Y haciendo uso del Sistema de Solicitudes de Información (SISI) del IFAI cuestionamos al respecto a la dependencia castrense, lamentablemente los funcionarios actuales del Archivo Histórico Militar desconocen el paradero de los anexos ya que categóricamente pronunciaron la inexistencia de esta información.

CISEN (DOCUMENTO 2)

El Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional (CISEN) envió a las instalaciones del ex Palacio de Lecumberri, en febrero de 2002, el fondo documental perteneciente a la extinta Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) y la información de la Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (DGIPS) que se encontraban bajo su custodia desde 1947 hasta 1985.

El Acta entrega-recepción signada por el entonces director del CISEN, Eduardo Medina Mora y la directora del AGN Stella María González Cicero, contabilizaron 4223 cajas con un número aproximado de 58,302 (expedientes). Además se transfirieron de una serie de tarjetas, contabilizadas en aproximadamente 7 millones y que hacen posible la búsqueda de los documentos en sus expedientes, que no fueron especificadas en el  acta de entrega.

También el acta de recepción omite detalles sobre la descripción y el formato de la información resguardada en la Galería No. 1. Sólo señala la procedencia de ésta. Cabe mencionar que las autoridades actuales del AGN aseguran que existen miles de imágenes en diversos tamaños, no obstante descartan por completo que la colección incluyera audiocintas o vídeos.

Para corroborar lo dicho por las autoridades hemos solicitado al CISEN y al AGN un cotejo entre la información resguardada y lo que realmente se trasladó mediante el acta de entrega. Esto debido a las contradicciones en que ambas dependencias han incurrido pues el CISEN manifiesta haber remitido al AGN todo los documentos y el AGN ha respondido que no llegó información en formatos de audio y video.

Sobre su acceso, cuando se trate de un personaje, la vía corta es una solicitud electrónica a través del SISI, en su modalidad de Versión Pública (VP). En los documentos que el AGN entrega en esta modalidad se testan (se suprime con cintos negros) los datos personales del individuo en cuestión. Cuando se desee consultar sobre un tema en particular es decir algún grupo armado, institución, dependencia, etc., lo recomendable es visitar la Galería No. 1 del AGN.

El AGN, desde 1998, ya tenía en resguardo un fondo documental perteneciente a la DGIPS, órgano que dependía de la Secretaría de Gobernación (SEGOB) también extinta DFS reportaba a esta dependencia. Este fondo actualmente se  ubican en la Galería No. 2 del archivo y cuenta con 3052 cajas de información. En este fondo está totalmente abierto al público y fue trasladado al AGN en otro momento y circunstancias. En parte de esta colección es posible consultar cerca de 500 cajas con copia de informes de la DFS de 1969 a 1976.

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (DOCUMENTO 3)

Esta dependencia da respuesta al acuerdo presidencial el 14 de enero de 2002.  Por parte de la Dirección General de Derechos Humanos de la SER, la Subsecretaría para Derechos Humanos y Democracia, Mariclaire Acosta, manifiesta:

“En cumplimiento del citado Acuerdo y después de haberlo conversado con el titular de la Unidad de Estudios Legislativos de la Secretaría de Gobernación, le transmito los citados expedientes en paquetes de 4 y 10 sobres cerrados, respectivamente, con el fin de que los mismos se integren al Archivo General de la Nación.”

Los citados paquetes no han sido posibles de localizar ni en la SER ni en el AGN, ignorándose pues el total de fojas, tipo de material y descripción de su contenido.

La Secretaría de Gobernación (DOCUMENTO 4)

El entonces Secretario de Gobernación, Santiago Creel Miranda, dio instrucciones a las Direcciones Generales a su cargo de enviar, a más tardar al 31 de enero de 2002, la documentación relativa al acuerdo presidencial.

Por su parte, el 16 de enero de 2002, Felipe de Jesús Preciado Coronado, Comisionado del Instituto Nacional de Migración informa: “…me permito transferir al Archivo General de la Nación un total de 15 expedientes originales pertenecientes al archivo de la Coordinación de Control y Verificación Migratoria y que contiene información presumiblemente relacionada con los hechos materia del citado Acuerdo Presidencial…”

Su lista no cuantifica el número de fojas o formato de la información, sólo precisa una breve descripción y algunas fechas. Por ello sabemos que la celda número 7 menciona un informe confidencial del año 1968 y la 13 refiere uno a los disturbios estudiantiles en el mes de julio en la Ciudad de México.

El comisionado finaliza comentando “… se carece de elementos para determinar cuales (expedientes) estarían vinculados con hechos del pasado relacionados con violaciones a los derechos humanos o probablemente constitutivos de delitos cometidos en contra de personas vinculadas con movimientos sociales y políticos, por lo que desde luego, dicho acervo está a disposición de las instancias competentes que requieran consultarlo.”

A pesar de que este memorándum está dirigido a la entonces Directora Stella María González haciendo entrega del mismo, esta información no se encuentra disponible al público pues se desconoce su ubicación dentro del AGN.

Los que no acataron la disposición

Hubo direcciones generales dependientes de la SEGOB que no cumplieron el acuerdo argumentando no contar con expedientes que aportaran datos a las investigaciones. Por ejemplo, la Dirección General del Registro Nacional de Población e Identificación Personal, informó lo siguiente el 22 de enero: “…esta Unidad Administrativa no cuenta con archivo documental de acuerdo a lo solicitado.”  El memorándum lo firma el Director General, Fernando Tovar y de Teresa. (DOCUMENTO 5)

La Dirección General de Asociaciones Religiosas, Dirección de Registro y Certificaciones refiere el titular, Guillermo Fuentes Maldonado, el 10 de enero de 2002: “Sobre el particular me permito informarle que en los archivos dependientes de la Dirección General de Asociaciones Religiosas de la Subsecretaría de Población, Migración y Asuntos Religiosos, no existen expedientes, documentos e información general que pudiera ser considerado como relevante para la investigación de los hechos del pasado.”  (DOCUMENTO 6)

Entre las negativas que más afectaron el proceso de acopio sin duda fueron la hechas por el Estado Mayor Presidencial y la Procuraduría General de la República, pues estas dependencias fueron protagonistas de los hechos sus archivos en 1968 seguramente generaron pilas de información. Sus registros podrían resolver dudas que por años han dejado incompleta la verdad sobre su injerencia en el conflicto.

Además muchas otras como el Tribunal Superior de Justicia, la Secretaría de Educación Pública, la Secretaría de Salud, la Secretaría de Telecomunicaciones y Transporte no realizaron búsquedas en sus archivos para contribuir con la recopilación de expedientes relacionados a las investigaciones del pasado ni tuvieron siquiera la intención de transferir documentación solicitada. No son creíbles los argumentos de estas secretarías que dicen carecer de documentos que pudieran ayudar a descifrar algunas de las incógnitas que por años sólo se han quedado en especulaciones y otras ni siquiera se tomaron la molestia de responder al acuerdo.

Es importante señalar que el decreto presidencial incluía sólo dependencias federales. Sin embargo, para garantizar el buen cumplimiento de esta medida se debió  incluir también dependencias del Gobierno del Distrito Federal, ya que en los registros del servicio forense, delegaciones, hospitales, corporaciones policíacas, departamento de limpia, panteones, etc. es posible obtener datos imprescindibles para la reconstrucción de los hechos.

Intentos fallidos de justicia y esclarecimiento

El año pasado la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (SCJN) consideró que las causas penales para resolver el caso del 2 de octubre de 1968 ya habían prescrito. Esta resolución prácticamente da por concluido el proceso judicial que se había iniciado en contra del ex presidente Luis Echeverría Álvarez por el delito de genocidio. Esto originó que se descalificara la actuación del ex fiscal Carrillo Prieto, ya que repetidamente se le señalaron las escasas probabilidades de enjuiciar al ex mandatario bajo el delito de genocidio, dejando en duda su capacidad de integrar correctamente la averiguación previa.

A 40 años de aquella noche en la Plaza de las Tres Culturas, el caso aparentemente cerrado continúa siendo objeto de controversia. La demanda de justicia para quienes el 2 de octubre de 1968 perdieron a un ser querido o que purgaron un condena por delitos que no habían cometido sigue vigente más que nunca a pesar del dictamen de la Corte.

Muchos pensaron que de no concluir el caso en una sentencia jurídica promovida por la OFEMOSPP, por lo menos sería posible que su titular determinara, a través de un “Libro Blanco”, una sanción histórica a los funcionarios que reprendieron ferozmente la manifestación estudiantil pacífica. La tarea de esclarecer los hechos del 2 de octubre de 1968 sigue pendiente, pues ni el “Informe a la Sociedad Mexicana 2006” que elaboró el Fiscal Carrillo, al término de sus funciones, ni el informe elaborado por sus colaboradores del área histórica, “Que jamás vuelva a suceder” dio cabal respuesta a la sociedad mexicana.

La verdad bajo resguardo.

Uno de los problemas que denunciaron los integrantes del Comité 68, conformado en 1998 por el Congreso de la Unión (LVII Legislatura), fue la magra voluntad de las autoridades federales de esclarecer los hechos del 2 de octubre. Su desinterés y nulo apoyo se reflejó en los resultados obtenidos. La intención del Comité fue frustrada cuando solicitaron acceso a los archivos de las dependencias federales, pues éste fue restringido en la mayoría de los casos. Sin la documentación generada por las administraciones de Gustavo Díaz Ordaz y Luis Echeverría Álvarez este trabajo no pasó de ser un mero anecdotario.

La OFEMOSPP tenía la ventaja del contar, previo a su creación, con un acuerdo que disponía otorgarle todas las facilidades para su indagación y aún así los resultados fueron cuestionados. ¿Qué sigue? ¿Una comisión de la verdad? No lo sabemos. Lo que sí sabemos es que la información trasladada al AGN está incompleta y que la propia fiscalía dejó al final de sus funciones miles de documentos en la bóveda se seguridad del AGN, lugar a donde van a parar los documentos que por alguna razón de suma delicadeza tienen que ser sacados de sus colecciones de origen. Dichos documentos no pueden ser consultados por los ciudadanos. Peor aún, la Unidad de Coordinación de Investigaciones Especiales de la Procuraduría General de la República, la cual atrajo los casos sin resolver, continúa con esta practica de secretismo.

Existe un catálogo de 350 expedientes en reserva, todos ellos pertenecientes a información que Agentes de Ministerio Público de la Federación (AMPF), colaboradores de la OFEMOSPP y ahora de la Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales sacaron de sus fondos documentales impidiendo que investigadores de DDHH, abogados, periodistas, académicos o estudiantes puedan consultarlos.

De acuerdo con el índice proveído por el AGN, la práctica de ocultamiento se inicio en 2003. En una primera etapa los resguardos fueron decisión de Ministerios Públicos adscritos a la OFEMOSPP, los fechados después de noviembre de 2006 fueron designados a la unidad especial. Cada página en resguardo fue seleccionada según el criterio de los agentes con el argumento de servir como evidencia fundamental de una determinada averiguación previa.

La lista completa puede ser consultada en la página electrónica del AGN, ya que es obligación de toda dependencia contar con un Portal de Obligaciones de Transparencia (POT) el cual debe ser actualizado periódicamente. En el rubro XII del POT del AGN, refiere la Información Relevante del archivo y en esta pestaña está incorporado el Índice de Expedientes Reservados, es decir toda aquella información que haya sido etiquetada como reservada. (DOCUMENTO 7)

Un total de 9,294 fojas y 27 fotografías fueron separadas de sus expedientes, volúmenes y legajos originales; además de tres cajas íntegras. Si bien el índice de expedientes señala la fecha de resguardo, fundamento legal, periodo, número de fojas, dependencia donde se encuentra en reserva y el responsable de ésta.

La autoridad (PGR) que llevó a cabo el resguardo es una distinta del depositario (AGN). Debido a esto los datos no son suficientes para saber si dicha información en reserva fue destinada a una averiguación previa del caso 68 o a algún caso de desaparición forzada. Sólo sabemos que la documentación en resguardo se encuentra físicamente en el AGN.

Las 350 celdas, que describen los resguardos ejecutados por el Ministerio Público,  no especifican datos sobre el fondo documental al que pertenecen, el número de averiguación previa que motiva su resguardo, la clasificación del documento dentro de su acervo o la descripción del documento.

Se entiende que algunos de los resguardos deben continuar bajo este esquema, pues las AP siguen su proceso de integración, sobre todo las que denuncian casos de desaparición forzada. Pero es indispensable que la PGR garantice a las víctimas y familiares que la documentación integrada a las AP es protegida, además debe ser integrada a los Índices de Expedientes Reservados de su POT con una descripción de cada página señalando a que averiguación pertenece de esa manera los denunciantes y representantes legales podrán llevar registro de los avances en sus casos pero mientras se buscan mecanismos para optimizar esto, la documentación sobre los disturbios de 1968 debe ser depositada inmediatamente en sus acervos originales y ponerla a disposición de público de nueva cuenta.

Con estas acciones nos queda claro que los pasos que se dieron en la administración de Vicente Fox, para esclarecer uno de los pasajes más obscuros de la historia reciente de México, fueron discretamente en retroceso. No obstante la reconstrucción de los acontecimientos en Tlatelolco que el decreto presidencial en 2001 preveía debe ser un reclamo que trascienda en cualquier administración federal.

El Estado Mexicano está obligado a garantizar el derecho a conocer la verdad sin importar el partido político en turno. Debe ordenar a las Secretarías de Estado, sobre todo aquellas que hicieron caso omiso en 2002, que continúen trasfiriendo al AGN la documentación que vayan identificando en sus archivos; que localicé la que se perdió o se traspapeló en el AGN, que decrete máxima publicidad a los documentos bajo resguardo y que ordene inmediatamente a la PGR integrar a sus expedientes originales la información relativa a los acontecimientos del 2 de octubre para su libre consulta.

Esta investigación concluye que la verdad sobre el conflicto estudiantil en 1968 estará lejos todavía si el gobierno en turno no tiene interés o voluntad en que se conozca. No hay explicaciones congruentes de por qué siguen en reserva cerca de 10.000 documentos, si el proceso en las instancias procuradoras de justicia ya finalizó; no las hay para el extravío de documentos y menos para el desacato en que incurrieron muchas dependencias.

DOCUMENTOS

DOCUMENTO 1
Enero 22, 2002
Acta de Transferencia de Documentación
9 páginas

El acta da cumplimiento al acuerdo presidencial, publicado en el Diario Oficial de la Federación el 27 de noviembre de 2001, mediante el cual se disponen diversas medidas para la procuración de justicia por delitos cometidos contra personas vinculadas con movimientos sociales y políticos del pasado.  Se resume la siguiente cifra: cajas 486, legajos 1,653 y un total de 150,713 hojas generadas en 36 Zonas Militares. El documento se encuentra firmado por la Dra. Stella María González Cicero, Directora General del Archivo General de la Nación y el Gral. De Div. DEM Roberto Miranda Sánchez, Director de la Dirección General del Archivo e Historia.

Fuente:
Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional

DOCUMENTO 2
Febrero 19, 2002
Acta Administrativa de Entrega-Recepción del Acervo Documental Transferido al Archivo General de la Nación
6 páginas

En cumplimiento al acuerdo presidencial del 27 de noviembre de 2002, la Secretaría de Gobernación transferiría al Archivo General de la Nación la totalidad de los archivos, expedientes, documentos e información en general que fueron generados por las extintas Dirección General de Seguridad y Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales. Dicha información actualmente se encuentran bajo custodia y conservación del Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional a efecto de que pueda ser consultada en los términos de dicho acuerdo. El Acta entrega-recepción fue signada por el entonces director del CISEN Eduardo Medina Mora Icaza y la directora del Archivo General de la Nación Dra. Stella María González Cicero contabilizaron 4223 cajas con un número aproximado de 58,302 (expedientes).

Fuente:
Archivo General de la Nación

DOCUMENTO 3
Enero 14, 2002
Memorándum Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
1 página

Para cumplimiento del Acuerdo, del 27 de noviembre de 2001, la Subsecretaria para Derechos Humanos y Democracia, Mariclaire Acosta, transfiere dos expedientes relacionados con violaciones, generados hasta 1985, mismos que pudieran ser relevantes para la investigación. Los citados expedientes son remitidos en paquetes de 4 y 10 sobres cerrados, respectivamente, con el fin de que los mismos se integren al Archivo General de la Nación.

Fuente:
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores

DOCUMENTO 4
Enero 16, 2002
Memorándum

Felipe de Jesús Preciado Coronado, Comisionado del Instituto Nacional de Migración informa: “…me permito transferir al Archivo General de la Nación un total de 15 expedientes originales pertenecientes al archivo de la Coordinación de Control y Verificación Migratoria y que contiene información presumiblemente relacionada con los hechos materia del citado Acuerdo Presidencial…”

El Comisionado concluye: “… se carece de elementos para determinar cuales (expedientes) estarían vinculados con hechos del pasado relacionados con violaciones a los derechos humanos o probablemente constitutivos de delitos cometidos en contra de personas vinculadas con movimientos sociales y políticos, por lo que desde luego, dicho acervo está a disposición de las instancias competentes que requieran consultarlo.”

Fuente:
Archivo General de la Nación

DOCUMENTO 5
Enero 22, 2002
Memorándum

La Dirección General del Registro Nacional de Población e Identificación Personal, informó lo siguiente el 22 de enero: “…esta Unidad Administrativa no cuenta con archivo documental de acuerdo a lo solicitado.”  El memorándum lo firma el Director General, Fernando Tovar y de Teresa.

Fuente:
Archivo General de la Nación

DOCUMENTO 6
Enero 10, 2002
Memorándum

La Dirección General de Asociaciones Religiosas, Dirección de Registro y Certificaciones refiere el titular, Guillermo Fuentes Maldonado, el 10 de enero de 2002: “Sobre el particular me permito informarle que en los archivos dependientes de la Dirección General de Asociaciones Religiosas de la Subsecretaría de Población, Migración y Asuntos Religiosos, no existen expedientes, documentos e información general que pudiera ser considerado como relevante para la investigación de los hechos del pasado.”

Fuente:
Archivo General de la Nación

DOCUMENTO 7
De junio 26, 2003 a enero 29, 2007
Lista de resguardos POT-AGN

Esta lista describe la información que Agentes de Ministerio Público de la Federación (AMPF), colaboradores de la OFEMOSPP y ahora de la Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales sacaron de sus fondos documentales Un total de 9294 fojas y 27 fotografías fueron separadas de sus expedientes, volúmenes y legajos originales; además de tres cajas íntegras. El índice de expedientes señala la fecha de resguardo, fundamento legal, periodo, número de fojas, dependencia donde se encuentra en reserva y el responsable de ésta.

TOP-SECRET – Trujillo Declassified

Citizens of Trujillo gather at a memorial for the victims (Semana.com)

Trujillo Declassified
Documenting Colombia’s ‘tragedy without end’

Documents Detail U.S. Concerns about Impunity in Major Human Rights Case

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 259

“Justice, Reparation, Memory, Truth”: Stones at the entrance to the memorial for the victims of the Trujillo massacre. (Michael Evans)

Washington D.C., Septemnber 16, 2011 – As Colombian prosecutors begin to reopen investigations against individuals connected to one of the worst massacres in the country’s modern history, the National Security Archive today publishes on the Web a collection of declassified documents detailing U.S. concerns about the wall of impunity that has long surrounded the case. These documents are central to an article published this weekend in Spanish on the Web site of Semana magazine, Colombia’s largest newsweekly. An English version of the article is available below and on the Web site of the new Semana International.

The new movement on the Trujillo massacre follows closely the release of a major new report on the case, the first issued by the Historical Memory Group (GMH) of the National Commission on Reparations and Reconciliation (CNRR). Led by a distinguished group of researchers, the GMH is charged with writing a comprehensive history of the Colombian conflict focusing on the country’s illegal armed groups.

The Archive’s Colombia Documentation Project is proud to be assisting the GMH and other researchers with investigations of the major human rights cases over the last four decades of violence in Colombia.

Trujillo Declassified: Documenting a ‘tragedy without end’
By Michael Evans

[NOTE: Click on the highlighted links to read the source documents in PDF.]

With a number of recent arrests connected to the infamous Trujillo massacres of 1988-1994, Colombia reopens one of the most enduring cases of impunity in its modern history. The investigation of these drug traffickers, assassins and paramilitaries, along with at least 12 retired members of the Colombian security forces, is another hopeful sign that Colombia will finally come to grips with a case that has long foundered on the rocky shoals of Colombian justice. But it also raises an uncomfortable question: Will the investigations pursue senior military officials responsible for the pattern of impunity that has perpetuated the suffering over these many years? And what, if any, responsibility does the United States bear for having supported the institutions behind this wall of silence?

To truly understand the Trujillo case, it is important to recognize the pervasive climate of impunity that lies at the core of the tragedy. Thirteen years after President Ernesto Samper accepted responsibility for the state’s role in the Trujillo killings, and 18 years after the murders themselves, not a single perpetrator has been sentenced in connection to the case.

Earlier this month, a special report on the Trujillo killings assembled by the Historical Memory Group (GMH) established under the “Justice and Peace” law found that impunity in the Trujillo case was not simply a symptom of state impotence or a lack of resources.“To the contrary,” writes Gonzalo Sánchez, the group’s director,

“it is part of the logic that surrounds and/or causes these crimes. It is precisely this impunity that guarantees that the crimes can continue being committed, that the perpetrators can continue committing them, and that those responsible are not punished.”

As Colombia revisits this “tragedy without end,” the country is faced with the possibility that yet another investigation will end without convictions.

Inscription at a special memorial for Father Tiberio Fernandez, one of some 342 victims of violence in Trujillo. (Michael Evans)

The ongoing political violence and the history of impunity that surrounds this case make it all the more important that groups investigating human rights crimes have access to a broad array of data from international organizations, courts and advocacy groups. One particularly rich source on Colombia’s impunity problem turns out to be one of its closest friends: the United States government. Colombia’s human rights record has been on the radar of American diplomats and intelligence officials for over 30 years, particularly those cases tied to the U.S. through training or other support. Thanks to hundreds of Freedom of Information Act requests by the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C., many of these formerly secret documents have now been declassified. These records tell us what U.S. officials said behind the scenes about their top Andean ally, and whether they believed that Colombia’s senior military and civilian leaders were serious about pursuing justice in Trujillo and other cases.

By the mid-1990s, increasing international outcry over the human rights situation in Colombia meant that the U.S. had to be much more careful about which units and officers of the Colombian armed forces it could support. Credible reports focused specifically on the abuses of U.S.-supported military units and officers complicated the U.S.-Colombia security relationship, particularly when meaningful prosecutions were practically non-existent.

For the U.S., Trujillo would be an important test of President Samper’s stated commitment to improve Colombia’s human rights record and his pledge to break the military’s ties to paramilitaries. The mere admission of state responsibility would not be enough. Clinton administration officials wanted to see real progress on the case, including the prosecution of military officials connected to the killings.

Chief among these was Maj. Alirio Uruena, a Third Brigade officer who, in addition to his association with the paramilitaries and drug traffickers behind Trujillo, had an uncomfortably close connection to the U.S. One Embassy cable noted that Uruena had “received USG [U.S. Government]-sponsored training on two occasions”: in 1976, at a “cadet orientation at the School of the Americas,” and at a “DIA-sponsored intelligence officer course” in December 1988 and January 1989, just a year or so before the killings in which he was specifically implicated. [19950207.pdf]

The sheer brutality of the killings made Uruena’s connection to the U.S. especially worrisome. Uruena had “personally directed the torture of 11 detainees and their subsequent execution,” according to one cable. The key witness in the case, a civilian army informant who participated in the murders, said that the killings “were carried out by cutting off the limbs and heads of the still living victims with a chain saw.” His testimony, according to the Embassy, was corroborated by “more than a dozen witnesses.” [19900727.pdf] Perhaps even more troubling, the case also tied Maj. Uruena to a narco-paramilitary group led by infamous paramilitary chiefs Diego Montoya and Henry Loaiza (both of whom are now under investigation for the Trujillo killings).

The U.S. connection to Trujillo, and the U.S. desire to continue supporting the strategically-located Third Brigade, made it all the more important that Samper back up his historic acceptance of state responsibility with punitive action against the perpetrators. The State Department’s top human rights official, John Shattuck, told Samper in one 1995 meeting that “rhetorical advances” needed to be followed by “evidence that the Colombian state can and will attack the underlying cause of its high levels of human rights violations and general violence: impunity.”Referring to Trujillo and two other cases, Shattuck said that “until the Colombian military and/or civilian justice systems are capable of investigating, trying, convicting, and sentencing those responsible for the massacres, the institutional reforms would be empty gestures.” What mattered, Shattuck said, was that Colombia begin to “show results … in instances of human rights violations attributed to the state security forces.” [19950327.pdf]

U.S. intelligence was also skeptical that Colombia was serious about its promise to break ties with paramilitary groups. The CIA reported in March 1995 that Samper had “yet to demonstrate resolve in addressing abuses by paramilitary groups that operate with the tacit approval of the military.” Samper had also “failed to arrest and prosecute [notorious paramilitary chief] Fidel Castano” and had “endorsed [Minister of Defense] Botero’s proposal to create rural security cooperatives,” many of which operated alongside illegal paramilitary groups, according to the CIA.[19950322.pdf]

Neither did Samper’s admission of state responsibility in the Trujillo case atone for the Colombian Army’s failure to bring charges against personnel involved in other serious abuses. Army commander Gen. Harold Bedoya’s response, in December 1996, to an Embassy request for information on 18 human rights cases tied to the military by Amnesty International was a “de facto admission of institutional culpability,” according to one cable. But rather than embarrass Bedoya by publicly challenging his shameful” response, the cable suggested that it be used “to pressure him into beginning to genuinely clean up the [Colombian Army’s] sordid performance on human rights, particularly the pattern of quasi-impunity posing as military justice.” “We should not shirk at some gentlemanly blackmail,” the Embassy added, “if that is what it takes to get our human rights agenda moving forward.” [19961227.pdf]

One year later, things had only gotten worse.  The CIA’s December 1997 “Update on Links Between Military, Paramilitary Forces” grimly predicted that “prospects for a concerted effort by the military high command to crack down on paramilitaries—and the officers that cooperate with them—appear dim.” The new Armed Forces commander, Gen. Manuel Bonett, “like his predecessor Harold Bedoya,” showed “little inclination to combat paramilitary groups.” [19971202.pdf]

Despite overwhelming evidence, Uruena was never convicted for his role in Trujillo, and his eventual dismissal from the Army was openly opposed by senior military officers. Even firing Uruena came at great political cost for Samper, who was subsequently unwilling to push for the actual prosecution of the perpetrators—most especially Uruena, but also those that the Embassy said had “whitewashed” and “perverted” the initial investigations, including Gen. Bonett, who had served as the first instance military judge in the case. [19980306.pdf]

Nevertheless, the reopening of the Trujillo case in the immediate wake of the GMH report is a hopeful sign that the recovery of historical memory in Colombia may finally be helping to lift the veil of impunity. It is perhaps too early to know whether these latest developments are signs of real progress or merely “empty gestures” without tangible legal consequences, but they are clearly part of a trend that has seen a number of high-profile military officers put under investigation in recent months.

Given Colombia’s recent history, it is perhaps not surprising that the U.S. may now hold the evidence that could make or break these cases. Fourteen top Colombian paramilitary commanders await prosecution in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges. It is not yet clear whether Colombian investigators will have the opportunity to question these men, who are responsible for some of the worst atrocities of the conflict, or if the memories of their crimes, their victims, and their collaborators in the Colombian security forces, will remain locked inside the U.S. prison system.

Either way, as Colombians boldly press forward with these investigations, declassified U.S. documents could prove to be a valuable source of evidence otherwise unavailable to prosecutors on Colombia’s conflict and, above all, the system of unchecked impunity that lies at its core.

TOP-SECRET – “Body count mentalities” Colombia’s “False Positives” Scandal, Declassified

Gen. Mario Montoya Uribe announces his resigation as Colombian Army Commander in November 2008. (Photo credit: Semana.com)

Body count mentalities”
Colombia’s “False Positives” Scandal, Declassified

Documents Describe History of Abuses by Colombian Army

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 266

Washington, D.C., September 16, 2011 – The CIA and senior U.S. diplomats were aware as early as 1994 that U.S.-backed Colombian security forces engaged in “death squad tactics,” cooperated with drug-running paramilitary groups, and encouraged a “body count syndrome,” according to declassified documents published on the Web today by the National Security Archive. These records shed light on a policy—recently examined in a still-undisclosed Colombian Army report—that influenced the behavior of Colombian military officers for years, leading to extrajudicial executions and collaboration with paramilitary drug traffickers. The secret report has led to the dismissal of 30 Army officers and the resignation of Gen. Mario Montoya Uribe, the Colombian Army Commander who had long promoted the idea of using body counts to measure progress against guerrillas.

Archive Colombia analyst, Michael Evans, whose article on the matter was published today in Spanish on the Web site of Colombia’s Semana magazine, said that, “These documents and the recent scandal over the still-secret Colombian Army report raise important questions about the historical and legal responsibilities the Army has to come clean about what appears to be a longstanding, institutional incentive to commit murder.”

Highlights from today’s posting include:

  • A 1994 report from U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette decrying “body count mentalities” among Colombian Army officers seeking to advance through the ranks. “Field officers who cannot show track records of aggressive anti-guerrilla activity (wherein the majority of the military’s human rights abuses occur) disadvantage themselves at promotion time.”
  • A CIA intelligence report from 1994 finding that the Colombian security forces “employ death squad tactics in their counterinsurgency campaign” and had “a history of assassinating leftwing civilians in guerrilla areas, cooperating with narcotics-related paramilitary groups in attacks against suspected guerrilla sympathizers, and killing captured combatants.”
  • A Colombian Army colonel’s comments in 1997 that there was a “body count syndrome” in the Colombian Army that “tends to fuel human rights abuses by well-meaning soldiers trying to get their quota to impress superiors” and a “cavalier, or at least passive, approach when it comes to allowing the paramilitaries to serve as proxies … for the COLAR in contributing to the guerrilla body count.”
  • The same colonel’s assertion that military collaboration with illegal paramilitary groups “had gotten much worse” under Gen. Rito Alejo Del Río Rojas, who is now under investigation for a murder that occurred during that same era.
  • A declassified U.S. Embassy cable describing a February 2000 false positives operation in which both the ACCU paramilitaries and the Colombian Army almost simultaneously claimed credit for having killed two long-demobilized guerrillas near Medellín. Ambassador Curtis Kamman called it “a clear case of Army-paramilitary complicity,” adding that it was “difficult to conclude anything other than that the paramilitary and Army members simply failed to get their stories straight in advance.”

“Body count mentalities”
Colombia’s “False Positives” Scandal, Declassified

By Michael Evans

Recently, the Colombian and U.S. media have been fixated on the scandal over “false positives”—the extrajudicial killing by the Colombian Army of civilians who are subsequently presented as guerrilla casualties to inflate the combat “body count.” A still-undisclosed military report on the matter has led to the dismissal of 30 Army officers in relation to the scandal and the resignation of Gen. Mario Montoya Uribe, the Army commander who had long promoted the idea of using body counts to measure progress against guerrillas. But the manner in which the investigation was conducted—in absolute secrecy and with little or no legal consequences for those implicated—raises a number of important questions. Is yet another personnel purge absent an impartial, civilian-led, criminal investigation really enough to change the culture in the Colombian Army? And when, if ever, will the Colombian Army divulge the contents of its internal report?

Amidst these lingering questions, a new collection of declassified U.S. diplomatic, military and intelligence documents published today by the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C., describe the “body count syndrome” that has been one of the guiding principles of Colombian military behavior in Colombia for years, leading to human rights abuses—such as false positives—and encouraging collaboration with illegal paramilitary groups. As such, the documents raise important questions about the historical and legal responsibilities the Army has to come clean about what appears to be a longstanding, institutional incentive to commit murder.

The earliest record in the Archive’s collection referring specifically to the phenomenon dates back to 1990. That document, a cable approved by U.S. Ambassador Thomas McNamara, reported a disturbing increase in abuses attributed to the Colombian Army. In one case, McNamara disputed the military’s claim that it had killed nine guerrillas in El Ramal, Santander, on June 7 of that year.

The investigation by Instruccion Criminal and the Procuraduria strongly suggests … that the nine were executed by the Army and then dressed in military fatigues. A military judge who arrived on the scene apparently realized that there were no bullet holes in the military uniforms to match the wounds in the victims’ bodies…”

At the same time, the Embassy was also beginning to see a connection between the Colombian security forces and the country’s burgeoning paramilitary groups. Many of the Army’s recent abuses had “come in the course of operations by armed para-military groups in which Army officers and enlisted men have participated,” according to the declassified cable. [19900727.pdf]

Similar tendencies were highlighted four years later in a cable cleared by U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette. He found that “body count mentalities” persisted among Colombian Army officers seeking promotions. The Embassy’s Defense Attaché Office (DAO) had reported that, “Field officers who cannot show track records of aggressive anti-guerrilla activity (wherein the majority of the military’s human rights abuses occur) disadvantage themselves at promotion time.” Moreover, the claim by Minister of Defense Fernando Botero that there was “a growing awareness that committing human rights abuses will block an officer’s path to promotion” reflected “wishful thinking,” according to the DAO. [19941021.pdf]

A CIA intelligence report, also from 1994, went even further, finding that the Colombian security forces continued to “employ death squad tactics in their counterinsurgency campaign.” The document, a review of President César Gaviria’s anti-guerrilla policy, noted that the Colombian military had “a history of assassinating leftwing civilians in guerrilla areas, cooperating with narcotics-related paramilitary groups in attacks against suspected guerrilla sympathizers, and killing captured combatants.” Traditionally, the Army had “not taken guerrilla prisoners,” according to report, and the military had “treated Gaviria’s new human rights guidelines as pro forma.” [19940126.pdf]

Just over ten years ago, another U.S. intelligence report, previously published by the National Security Archive, and based on a conversation with a Colombian Army colonel, suggested that the steep rise in paramilitarism during that era was related to a “body count syndrome” in the Colombian Army.

This mindset tends to fuel human rights abuses by well-meaning soldiers trying to get their quota to impress superiors. It could also lead to a cavalier, or at least passive, approach when it comes to allowing the paramilitaries to serve as proxies for the COLAR  [Colombian Army] in contributing to the guerrilla body count.

The unidentified officer was also “intimately familiar” with General Rito Alejo Del Río Rojas, “about whom he had [few] nice things to say.” Military cooperation with paramilitaries “had been occurring for a number of years,” he said, but “had gotten much worse under Del Río.” Two other commanders, Gen. Jorge Enrique Mora and Gen. Harold Bedoya Pizarro were among those “who looked the other way” with respect to military-paramilitary collusion, the colonel said, referring to “the time frame when Mora was a BG [brigadier general] commanding the large and critical 4th Brigade in Medellín … back in 1994-95.” [19971224.pdf]

The 4th Brigade, a traditional launching point for officers seeking to move up the military chain-of-command, has long been accused of collusion with local paramilitary groups. The Los Angeles Times reported in 2007 on a classified CIA report linking Gen. Montoya to joint military-paramilitary operations in Medellín while he served as brigade commander in 2002. His replacement as Army commander, General Oscar Gonzalez, also commanded the 4th Brigade, as well as other units in the conflictive area around Medellín.

In no case were the 4th Brigade’s paramilitary ties more evident than in a February 2000 false positives operation in which both the ACCU paramilitaries and the Colombian Army almost simultaneously claimed credit for having killed two long-demobilized guerrillas near Medellín. A declassified U.S. Embassy cable on the matter, signed by Ambassador Curtis Kamman, reported the case with shocked disbelief.

The ACCU (which witnesses say kidnapped the two) claims its forces executed them, while the Army’s Fourth Brigade (which released the bodies the next day) presented the dead as ELN guerrillas killed in combat with the Army. After these competing claims sparked localized fear and confusion, armed men stole the cadavers from the morgue…

Kamman called the killings “a clear case of Army-paramilitary complicity” that would “further increase the already high-level of international NGO interest in the issue of 4th Brigade ties to paramilitaries.” The ambassador added that it was “difficult to conclude anything other than that the paramilitary and Army members simply failed to get their stories straight in advance.” [20000208.pdf]

So while Colombian Army officials scramble to get their “stories straight” in response to the recent scandal, it seems worth noting that “body counts” and “false positives” have an institutional history in the Colombian armed forces going back many years. And while recent steps to cleanse the Army’s ranks of officials associated with the policy are welcome, they are clearly not enough. What are the facts? Who is responsible? How long has this been happening? Who are the victims? And where are the bodies buried?

Declassified U.S. documents can provide some clues, but it seems unlikely that we will learn the answers to these questions unless the Colombian Army declassifies and releases its full report on the “false positives” scandal. Until then, it seems, secrecy and impunity will continue to prevail over transparency and justice in Colombia.

Michael Evans is director of the Colombia Documentation Project at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. The Colombia Documentation Project would like to thank the John Merck Fund for their generous support of this project.

TOP-SECRET-NEW KISSINGER ‘TELCONS’ REVEAL CHILE PLOTTING AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

NEW KISSINGER ‘TELCONS’ REVEAL CHILE PLOTTING
AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

Nixon Vetoed Proposed Coexistence with an Allende Government
Kissinger to the CIA: “We will not let Chile go down the drain.”

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 255

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Washington D.C., September 13, 2001- On the eve of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the military coup in Chile, the National Security Archive today published for the first time formerly secret transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s telephone conversations that set in motion a massive U.S. effort to overthrow the newly-elected socialist government of Salvador Allende. “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger told CIA director Richard Helms in one phone call. “I am with you,” the September 12, 1970 transcript records Helms responding.

The telephone call transcripts—known as ‘telcons’—include previously-unreported conversations between Kissinger and President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers.  Just eight days after Allende’s election, Kissinger informed the president that the State Department had recommended an approach to “see what we can work out [with Allende].”   Nixon responded by instructing Kissinger: “Don’t let them do it.”

After Nixon spoke directly to Rogers, Kissinger recorded a conversation in which the Secretary of State agreed that “we ought, as you say, to cold-bloodedly decide what to do and then do it,” but warned it should be done “discreetly so that it doesn’t backfire.” Secretary Rogers predicted that “after all we have said about elections, if the first time a Communist wins the U.S. tries to prevent the constitutional process from coming into play we will look very bad.”

The telcons also reveal that just nine weeks before the Chilean military, led by Gen. Augusto Pinochet and supported by the CIA, overthrew the Allende government on September 11, 1973, Nixon called Kissinger on July 4 to say “I think that Chilean guy might have some problems.” “Yes, I think he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responded. Nixon then blamed CIA director Helms and former U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry for failing to block Allende’s inauguration three years earlier. “They screwed it up,” the President declared.

Although Kissinger never intended the public to know about these conversations, observed Peter Kornbluh, who directs the National Security Archive’s Chile Documentation Project, he “bestowed on history a gift that keeps on giving by secretly taping and transcribing his phone calls.”  The transcripts, Kornbluh noted, provide historians with the ability to “eavesdrop on the most candid conversations of the highest and most powerful U.S. officials as they plotted covert intervention against a democratically-elected government.”

Kissinger began secretly taping all his incoming and outgoing phone conversations when he became national security advisor in 1969; his secretaries transcribed the calls from audio tapes that were later destroyed.  When Kissinger left office in January 1977, he took more than 30,000 pages of the transcripts, claiming they were “personal papers,” and used them, selectively, to write his memoirs.  In 1999, the National Security Archive initiated legal proceedings to force Kissinger to return these records to the U.S. government so they could be subject to the freedom of information act and declassification.  At the request of Archive senior analyst William Burr, telcons on foreign policy crises from the early 1970s, including these four previously-unknown conversations on Chile, were recently declassified by the Nixon Presidential library.

On November 30, 2008 the National Security Archive will publish a comprehensive collection of Kissinger telcons in the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA). Comprising 15,502 telcons, this collection documents Kissinger’s conversations with top officials in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including President Richard Nixon; Defense Secretaries Melvin Laird, Elliot Richardson, and James Schlesinger; Secretary of State William P. Rogers; Ambassador to the U.N. George H.W. Bush; and White House Counselor Donald Rumsfeld; along with noted journalists, ambassadors, and business leaders with close White House ties.  Wide-ranging topics discussed in the telcons include détente with Moscow, military actions during the Vietnam War and the negotiations that led to its end, Middle East peace talks, the 1970 crisis in Jordan, U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, and Chile, rapprochement with China, the Cyprus crisis (1974- ), and the unfolding Watergate affair.  When combined with the Archive’s previous electronic publication of Kissinger’s memoranda of conversation — The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977 — users of the DNSA will have access to comprehensive records of Kissinger’s talks with myriad U.S. officials and world leaders.  Like the Archive’s earlier publication, the Kissinger telcons will be comprehensively and expertly indexed, providing users with have easy access to the information they seek.  The collection also includes 158 White House tapes, some of which dovetail with transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations with Nixon and others.  Users of the set will thus be able to read the “telcon” and listen to the tape simultaneously.

READ THE DOCUMENTS

l. Helms/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:00 noon.

Eight days after Salvador Allende’s narrow election, Kissinger tells CIA director Richard Helms that he is calling a meeting of the 40 committee—the committee that determines covert operations abroad.  “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger declares.  Helms reports he has sent a CIA emissary to Chile to obtain a first-hand assessment of the situation.

2. President/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:32 p.m.

In the middle of a Kissinger report to Nixon on the status of a terrorist hostage crisis in Amman, Jordan, he tells the president that “the big problem today is Chile.”  Former CIA director and ITT board member John McCone has called to press for action against Allende; Nixon’s friend Pepsi CEO Donald Kendall has brought Chilean media mogul Augustine Edwards to Washington.  Nixon blasts a State Department proposal to “see what we can work out [with Allende], and orders Kissinger “don’t let them do that.” The president demands to see all State Department cable traffic on Chile and to get an appraisal of “what the options are.”

3. Secretary Rogers, September 14, 1970, 12:15pm (page 2)

After Nixon speaks to Secretary of State William Rogers about Chile, Kissinger speaks to him on September 14. Rogers reluctantly agrees that the CIA should “encourage a different result” in Chile, but warns it should be done discreetly lest U.S. intervention against a democratically-elected government be exposed.  Kissinger firmly tells Secretary Rogers that “the president’s view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an Allende takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture.”

4) President/Kissinger, July 4, 1973, 11:00 a.m.

Vacationing in San Clemente, Nixon calls Kissinger and discusses the deteriorating situation in Chile.  Two weeks earlier, a coup attempt against Allende failed, but Nixon and Kissinger predict further turmoil.  “I think that Chilean guy may have some problems,” Nixon states.  “Oh, he has massive problems.  He has massive problems…he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responds.  The two share recollections of three years earlier when they had covertly attempted to block Allende’s inauguration.  Nixon blames CIA director Richard Helms and former U.S. ambassador Edward Korry for failing to stop Allende; “they screwed it up,” he states.  The conversation then turns to Kissinger’s evaluation of the Los Angeles premiere of the play “Gigi.”

5) President/Kissinger, September 16, 1973, 11:50 a.m. (previously posted May 26, 2004)

In their first substantive conversation following the military coup in Chile, Kissinger and Nixon discuss the U.S. role in the overthrow of Allende, and the adverse reaction in the new media. When Nixon asks if the U.S. “hand” will show in the coup, Kissinger admits “we helped them” and that “[deleted reference] created conditions as great as possible.”  The two commiserate over what Kissinger calls the “bleating” liberal press. In the Eisenhower period, he states, “we would be heroes.” Nixon assures him that the people will appreciate what they did: “let me say they aren’t going to buy this crap from the liberals on this one.”

TOP-SECRET-Historical Archives Lead to Arrest of Police Officers in Guatemalan Disappearance

Demonstration by the GAM on April 13, 1985 following the deaths of GAM leaders, Héctor Gómez and Rosario Godoy de Cuevas. Photo from; “Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyrany.” [Courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon]

Historical Archives Lead to Arrest of Police
Officers in Guatemalan Disappearance

Declassified documents show U.S. Embassy knew
that Guatemalan security forces were behind
wave of abductions of students and labor leaders

National Security Archive calls for release of military files
and investigation into intellectual authors of the 1984
abduction of Fernando García and other disappearances

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 273

By Kate Doyle and Jesse Franzblau

Washington, DC, September 14, – Following a stunning breakthrough in a 25-year-old case of political terror in Guatemala, the National Security Archive today is posting declassified U.S. documents about the disappearance of Edgar Fernando García, a student leader and trade union activist captured by Guatemalan security forces in 1984.The documents show that García’s capture was an organized political abduction orchestrated at the highest levels of the Guatemalan government.

Guatemalan authorities made the first arrest ever in the long-dormant kidnapping case when they detained Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos, a senior police officer in Quezaltenango, on March 5th and retired policeman Abraham Lancerio Gómez on March 6th as a result of an investigation into García’s abduction by Guatemala’s Human Rights Prosecutor (Procurador de Derechos Humanos—PDH). Arrest warrants have been issued for two more suspects, Hugo Rolando Gómez Osorio and Alfonso Guillermo de León Marroquín. The two are former officers with the notorious Special Operations Brigade (BROE) of the National Police, a unit linked to death squad activities during the 1980s by human rights groups.

According to the prosecutor Sergio Morales, the suspects were identified using evidence found in the vast archives of the former National Police. The massive, moldering cache of documents was discovered accidentally by the PDH in 2005, and has since been cleaned, organized and reviewed by dozens of investigators. The National Security Archive provided expert advice in the rescue of the archive and posted photographs and analysis on its Web site. Last week, Morales turned over hundreds of additional records to the Public Ministry containing evidence of state security force involvement in the disappearance of other student leaders between 1978 and 1980. As the Historical Archive of the National Police prepares to issue its first major report on March 24, more evidence of human rights crimes can be expected to be made public.

Government Campaign of Terror

The abduction of Fernando García was part of a government campaign of terror designed to destroy Guatemala’s urban and rural social movements during the 1980s. On February 18, 1984, the young student leader was captured on the outskirts of a market near his home in Guatemala City. He was never seen again. Although witnesses pointed to police involvement, the government under then-Chief of State Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores always denied any role in his kidnapping. According to the Historical Clarification Commission’s report released in 1999, García was one of an estimated 40,000 civilians disappeared by state agents during Guatemala’s 36-year civil conflict.

In the wake of García’s capture, his wife, Nineth Montenegro – now a member of Congress – launched the Mutual Support Group (Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo—GAM), a new human rights organization that pressed the government for information about missing relatives. Co-founded with other families of the disappeared , GAM took shape in June of 1984, holding demonstrations, meeting with government officials and leading a domestic and international advocacy campaign over the years to find the truth behind the thousands of Guatemala’s disappeared. The organization was quickly joined by hundreds more family members of victims of government-sponsored violence, including Mayan Indians affected by a brutal army counterinsurgency campaign that decimated indigenous communities in the country’s rural highlands during the early 1980s.

Declassified U.S. records obtained by the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act indicate that the United States was well-aware of the government campaign to kidnap, torture and kill Guatemalan labor leaders at the time of García’s abduction. “Government security services have employed assassination to eliminate persons suspected of involvement with the guerrillas or who are otherwise left-wing in orientation,” wrote the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research four days after García disappeared, pointing in particular to the Army’s “notorious presidential intelligence service (archivos)” and the National Police, “who have traditionally considered labor activists to be communists.”

The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala considered the wave of state-sponsored kidnappings part of an effort to gather information on “Marxist-Leninist” trade unions. “The government is obviously rounding up people connected with the extreme left-wing labor movement for interrogation,” wrote U.S. Ambassador Frederic Chapin in a cable naming six labor leaders recently captured by security forces, including García. Despite reports that García was already dead, the ambassador was “optimistic” that he and other detainees would be released after questioning.

Many of the kidnapping victims noted in U.S. records included in this briefing book also appear in the “Death Squad Dossier,” an army intelligence logbook listing 183 people disappeared by security forces in the mid-1980s. In 1999, the National Security Archive obtained the original logbook and released a public copy. The logbook indicates that García was among dozens of students, professors, doctors, journalists, labor leaders and others subjected to intensive army and police surveillance in the weeks leading up to their capture, disappearance and – in about half of the cases – execution. The logbook entry listing Fernando García includes his alleged subversive alias names and affiliation to the Guatemalan Communist Party, as well as detailed personal information taken from official documents such as his national identification card and his passport. Other victims listed in the Death Squad Dossier who are named in the U.S. documents posted today include Amancio Samuel Villatoro, Alfonso Alvarado Palencia, José Luis Villagrán Díaz and Santiago López Aguilar. U.S. records describe their disappearances in the context of the government campaign to systematically dismantle Guatemala’s labor movement.

The U.S. records posted today contain illuminating information on how the use of illegal kidnapping as a counterinsurgency strategy reached a peak during the government of Oscar Mejía Víctores. U.S. figures estimated that there was an average of 137 abductions a month under the Mejía Víctores regime during 1984. According to one extensive State Department report written in 1986, part of the modus operandi of government kidnapping involved interrogating victims at military bases, police stations, or government safe houses, where information about alleged connections with insurgents was “extracted through torture.” The security forces used the information to conduct joint military/police raids on houses throughout the city, secretly capturing hundreds of individuals who were never seen again, or whose discarded bodies were later discovered showing signs of torture. The National Police, subservient to the Army hierarchy, created special units to assist the military in the urban counter-guerrilla operations.

The records also demonstrate military efforts to cover up their role in the extra-legal activities. In 1985, for example, as Guatemala prepared to transition to a civilian government for the first time in a quarter of a century, the Army ordered the Archivos – which the State Department called “a secret group in the President’s office that collected information on insurgents and operated against them” – to move its files out of presidential control and into the Intelligence Directorate (D-2) section of the military.

U.S. documents also chronicled developments as members of GAM became targets of government violence themselves. GAM members suffered the worst period of violence during Easter “holy week” in 1985, beginning with the kidnapping of senior member Héctor Gómez Calito, whose tortured and mutilated body was found on March 30, 1985. According to one U.S. Embassy source, agents from the Detectives Corps of the National Police had been gathering information on Gómez in the days leading to his abduction. Two weeks before his disappearance, Chief of State Oscar Mejía Víctores publicly charged that GAM members were being manipulated by guerrillas and questioned the sources of their funding. Following his murder, GAM co-founder and widow of missing student leader Carlos Ernesto Cuevas Molina, Rosario Godoy de Cuevas, who had delivered the eulogy at Gómez Calito’s funeral, was found dead at the bottom of a ditch two miles outside Guatemala City, along with her 2-year-old son and 21-year-old brother. While the government claimed their deaths was an accident, Embassy sources discounted the official version of the events, and claimed that Godoy was targeted and her death a premeditated homicide. Human rights monitors who had seen the bodies reported that the infant’s fingernails had been torn out.

Future Investigations

The arrest of the police officers in Guatemala is an unprecedented step in the struggle against impunity, and a testament to the investigative efforts being carried out in the historical National Police archive. The declassified records, however, demonstrate that Fernando García’s disappearance was not an ordinary police arrest, but rather an organized political abduction orchestrated by the highest-levels of government. In addition to the police files that have already proven so crucial to breaking new ground in this case, the release of the relevant military files is critical to unraveling what role the Army High Command and Chief of State played in this crime. In addition to the material authors of the crime, those who planned and ordered García’s kidnapping must also be investigated. At the time of his disappearance, the key military and police personnel overseeing Guatemala’s urban counter-terror campaign were:

Head of the Army Intelligence Directorate (D-2): Byron Disrael Lima Estrada
Director of the Presidential General Staff (EMP): Juan José Marroquín Siliezar
Directors of the Archivos: Marco Antonio González Taracena and Pablo Nuila Hub
Chief of the National Police: Héctor Rafael Bol de la Cruz

Oscar Mejía Víctores, Guatemala’s former chief of state, is currently named as one of eight defendants charged with genocide and other crimes in an international criminal case that is being investigated by Judge Santiago Pedraz in the Audiencia Nacional (National Court) of Spain.

The García case is also important in the context of Guatemala’s current struggle against organized crime. The same week authorities arrested the police officers involved in Fernando García’s kidnapping 25 years ago, the PDH announced that retired and active duty police are involved in today’s organized kidnapping gangs. Government prosecutors have announced they are currently investigating at least 10 members of the police’s elite anti-kidnapping unit for involvement in contemporary abductions. The struggle for justice and accountability for Guatemala’s past crimes has a direct relationship to the current efforts to dismantle illegal armed networks. Last week’s arrests marked an important initial step in the right direction towards ending blanket impunity in Guatemala.

U.S. documents on government death squad operations, the disappearance of Edgar Fernando García, and attacks on Guatemala’s Mutual Support Group – GAM

Document 1
February 23, 1984
Trade-Union Leaders Abducted
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Classified Cable

The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala informs Washington about the abduction of Fernando García and other trade-union officials in the recent weeks. According to press accounts on his disappearance, armed men kidnapped him while he was walking in Guatemala City on February 18, 1984. The cable provides information on related incidents of abductions of labor activists in the weeks leading up to Fernando García’s capture, describing the disappearances in the context of the widespread government targeting of Guatemala’s labor leaders. The document provides information on the political and organizational affiliation of the recently disappeared labor activists. According to the cable, Fernando García was part of CAVISA, the industrial glass union, which is an “affiliate of the communist trade-union confederation FASGUA,” Guatemala’s autonomous federal trade-union.

It also mentions that the disappeared victims were associated with the CNT (Confederacion Nacional de Trabajadores), and makes reference to the case of the 28 CNT labor leaders, who “disappeared in 1980 in one fell swoop. It is believed that GOG security forces murdered all of them.” The other group mentioned is the National Council for Trade Union Unity – CNUS, which asserted that Fernando García was already dead. Despite those claims, the U.S. Embassy remained “optimistic that Fernando García of CAVISA will be released.” Edgar Fernando García was never seen or heard from again.

Document 2
February 23, 1984
Guatemala: Political Violence Up
U.S. Department of State, secret intelligence analysis

The same day that Embassy officials inform Washington of Fernando García’s disappearance, the State Department produces an intelligence report on the recent spike in political assassinations and disappearances. The intelligence report describes several notable cases of victims in the “new wave of violence,” over the past several weeks, and provides key information on police coordination with military intelligence in government kidnappings. It mentions the recent abduction and release of a labor leader and confirms that “he had been kidnapped by the National Police, who have traditionally considered labor activists to be communists.” It states that the detective corps (the DIT) of the National Police has traditionally been involved in “extra-legal” activities, working alongside the Army’s presidential intelligence unit, the Archivos. 

(Document previously posted: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB15/index.html)

Document 3
March 19, 1984
Guatemala: Democratic Trade Union Confederation CUSG Protests Abductions of Trade-Union Leaders
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, confidential cable

Less than a month after Fernando García’s disappearance, the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission in Guatemala, Paul D. Taylor reports on the growing protests from the Confederation of Syndicalist Unity (CUSG) over the recent disappearance of trade-union leaders, “especially the disappearance of STICAVISA trade-union official Edgar Fernando García.” The CUSG blames the disappearances on the “government attempts to destabilize the Guatemalan labor movement,” a charge which the government denies. The cable goes on to describe the individual cases of the disappeared, including the case of the escaped prisoner Álvaro René Sosa Ramos, who “fled to asylum in the Belgian Ambassador’s residence after being shot in an attempt to escape his captors. Once recovered from gunshot wounds, he will be going into exile.” Sosa Ramos is mentioned in the Death Squad Dossier as entry number 87.

The document offers further background as to why the labor leaders are disappearing. According to the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission Paul D. Taylor, “By picking up leftist trade-union leaders connected with the CNT and the FASGUA, the government of Guatemala – advertently or inadvertently – is destabilizing the Marxist-Leninist wing of the Guatemalan labor movement.” His analysis concludes that the individuals were most likely targeted due to government suspicion that they were connected to armed insurgent groups, and that “security forces are after them for that reason.”

Document 4
April 3, 1984
Guatemala: March 25-29 Visit of U.S. Trade-Union Delegation
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, classified cable

International pressure continues to mount for investigations into the disappearances of Fernando García and other labor leaders. The cable reports on a trade-union delegation visit to Guatemala, led by former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Pat Derian. The delegation presses Embassy officials for information on the missing trade-union leaders. The Embassy continues to make the point that “all of these abducted union leaders are from the leftist CNT,” emphasizing the political orientation of the disappeared victims.

The delegation maintains that Fernando García was being held by the army, and asked the Embassy to look into his disappearance, as well as that of Jose Luis Villagrán, “disappeared February 11, 1984 in zone 11.” U.S. officials promise they will “make inquiries to the government about all these people.” Ms. Derian presses further, asking them to make “representations,” not just “inquiries” into the disappearances. Deputy Chief of Mission Paul D. Taylor still maintains, however, that it has yet to be demonstrated “whether government forces seized all these trade-unionists” and further comments “If the GOG has picked them up, it is almost certainly for matters other than their trade-union activities.”

Document 5
April 1, 1985
Murder of Member of Mutual Support Group (GAM)
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, limited officials use cable

The cable reports on the death of Héctor Orlando Gómez Galito, a member of the activist Mutual Support Group (GAM). The Embassy reports that he was “abducted and assassinated the weekend of March 30-31.” Gómez was kidnapped by unidentified men after leaving a weekly GAM meeting in Zone 11 of Guatemala City, and his body was discovered near the Pacific highway 15 miles from the city. “His assassination follows in the wake of reports that members of the groups had been the subject of unspecified threats.”

The cable lists the co-directors of GAM as Beatriz Velasquez de Estrada, Aura Farfán, Maria Rosario Godoy de Cuevas, Maria Choxom de Castañón, Nineth Montenegro de García, and another Mrs. García, the mother of Edgar Fernando. The cable examines Héctor Gómez Calito’s involvement in the organization, concluding that he may have acted as a spokesperson unofficially because of security concerns. Gómez was one of the group’s planner for a march to be held on April 12 or 13, and, “According to reports, the GAM claims that Gómez was killed because of his involvement with the organization.”

Document 6
April 3, 1985
Background on Case of Héctor Orlando Gómez Calito, Murdered “Mutual Support Group” (GAM) Member: Embassy Discussions with Two Sources
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, confidential cable

GAM director, Nineth Montonegro de García, and Father Alain Richard, member of Peace Brigades International (PBI), meet with U.S. officials to provide the Embassy with background information on the death of Héctor Gómez. They explain that Gómez had joined GAM following the disappearance of his brother, and had acted as a publicist for the group. Richard tells officials that the police detective corps (DIT) had asked the mayor of the town of Amatitlan, where Gómez was from, for information about his activities, and that his house was reportedly under surveillance by “men in automobiles.”

The Embassy also states “Richard had no doubts that the GOG [the Government of Guatemala] was directly responsible for Gomez’s murder.” Richard added that regardless of the belief that the entire group was being watched, GAM would continue their advocacy efforts. The cable ends by noting “Embassy officers will meet GAM directors on Monday, April 8.”

Document 7
April 4, 1985
Background and Recent Developments of the Mutual Support Group (GAM)
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Confidential Cable

The Embassy provides a summary of GAM organizing in March, “with some emphasis on its activist activities (blocking traffic, occupation of government offices, etc.) and the GOG reaction to those activities.” It gives background on the creation of the group, dating its first public appearance in early July 1984, when GAM members began publicly campaigning for an investigation into the disappearances of their relatives and calling upon others to join. They approached the Embassy shortly thereafter, “asking for our assistance on behalf of 67 missing persons.”

A few days after a GAM event in November 1984, they were received by Chief of State General Mejía, where “they repeated their demands” to investigate the disappeared. They met with Mejía a second time, which led to the formation of a government commission ostensibly to look into the GAM charges. In March 1985, they occupied the offices of the Guatemalan Attorney General, “protesting the lack of action by the GOG Tripartite Commission.” Beginning in mid March, the government began to express disapproval of the tactics chosen by GAM to pursue their objectives. Press reports carried warnings issued by Mejía Víctores in which he “charged that the GAM was being manipulated by the insurgents and questioned the source of the group’s funds.”

According to the cable, the Embassy had informed Washington on March 25 that four members of GAM had allegedly received various threats. One of the names on their list was Héctor Gómez, even though he was “not then known to the Embassy in any capacity related to GAM. Additional information regarding the specifics of Gómez’s murder have been provided.”

Document 8
April 6, 1985
Death of Maria Rosario Godoy de Cuevas, a Director of the “Mutual Support Group” (GAM)
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Confidential Cable

Before Embassy officials had the chance to meet with GAM members again, another one of their members was killed. “At about 8:00 pm April 4, Maria del Rosario Godoy Aldana de Cuevas, a founder and member of the board of directors of GAM was found dead in her automobile.” Three days after Rosario Godoy de Cuevas delivered the eulogy at Héctor Gómez’ funeral, she was found dead along with her 2-year-old son and 21-year-old brother. U.S. Embassy provides the official story given by the Guatemalan government, that she was “the victim of an apparent vehicular accident.” Embassy sources, however, believe the death was premeditated, and note several contradictory facts in the official version of events. Rosario de Cuevas helped found GAM following the disappearance of her husband, Carlos Ernesto Cuevas Molina, another labor leader who was kidnapped on May 15, 1984.

Document 9
April 9, 1985
Mutual Support Group (GAM) Update
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Confidential Cable

Provides further information on the death of Maria Godoy de Cuevas, and describes the “sense of threats felt by GAM members.” In press broadcasts Archbishop Prospero Penados referred to the recent events, including the Cuevas deaths, as the “holy week of shame and fear” in Guatemala, and called the deaths a “bloody act.”

Embassy comments on the matter of the autopsy, noting that it is unclear what examination was completed by “police forensic specialists.” An Embassy source also said “he had heard that the victims had died of asphyxiation and that a ‘bogus autopsy’ had been performed … another rumor circulating said that the victims had died from gunfire. But again, no details or proof have been offered.” The Guatemalan Interior Minister said he had the “official report that showed the Cuevas case to have been an accident.”

The cable reiterates that “GAM members had recently began to receive anonymous threats by letter and telephone,” and that other press reports spoke of anonymous threats against the organization. Threats notwithstanding, the group announced plans for another public protest later that month.

Document 10
April 9, 1985
Conversation with the Chief of State on Human Rights
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Confidential Cable

Five days after the death of Rosario Godoy de Cuevas, U.S. Ambassador-at-large for Central America Harry Shlaudeman visits Guatemala and meets with Mejía Víctores and Foreign Minister Fernando Andrade. During the meeting, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Alberto M. Piedra takes Mejía Víctores aside to express U.S. concern over the recent events, “especially the death of Maria Rosario Godoy de Cuevas.” He indicates that “even if the government had nothing to do with the matter, public opinion abroad would definitely blame the military.” The Ambassador explains that the high profile violence was making it difficult to defend Guatemala’s position, especially in Congress, and this could endanger their efforts to increase aid to the government.

Piedra also takes aside the Foreign Minister, who tells the Ambassador that he was against the “continuance of these types of crime.” He added that the U.S. Embassy should continue opposing such violations to all sectors of Guatemalan society, “and in a very special way to the military.”

Document 11
March 28, 1986
Guatemala’s Disappeared: 1977-86
Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, secret report

This Department of State report from 1986 provides details on the evolution of the use of forced disappearance by security forces over the decade prior, and how this tactic became institutionalized under the Mejía Víctores regime. “In the cities, out of frustration from the judiciary’s unwillingness to convict and sentence insurgents, and convinced that the kidnapping of suspected insurgents and their relatives would lead to a quick destruction of the guerilla urban networks, the security forces began to systematically kidnap anyone suspected of insurgent connections.” The documents estimates there were 183 reported cases of government kidnapping the first month of the Mejía government, and an average of 137 abductions a month through the end of 1984. Part of the modus operandi of government kidnapping involved interrogating victims at military bases, police stations, or government safe houses, where information about alleged connections with insurgents was “extracted through torture.”

The document concludes that the U.S. embassy and the State Department have failed in the past to adequately grasp the magnitude of Guatemala’s problem of government kidnapping.

(Document previously posted: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB15/index.html)
Former police official Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos, accused of participating in the abduction of Fernando García, taken in to custody for charges of illegal detention and forced disappearance. [Courtesy of Prensa Libre]
Family snapshot of Nineth de García, daughter Alejandra and husband Fernando before his abduction on February 18, 1984. Photo from “Guatemala, The Group for Mutual Support,” An Americas Watch Report. [Courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon]
Nineth Montenegro removed by police officials after occupying a government building with other GAM members during the administration of Vinicio Cerezo. [Courtesy of Prensa Libre]
Plainclothes National Police agent standing with a U.S.-made carbine outside the judicial headquarters in Zone 1 of Guatemala City. [Courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon]
Fernando García’s entry in the military intelligence document, the diario militar
Rosario Godoy de Cuevas addressing a GAM rally two months before she was assassinated. [Photo Courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon]
Caption: Óscar Humberto Mejía Víctores, Head of State at the time of Fernando García’s abduction. Mejía Víctores is wanted in international courts for crimes against humanity, such as forced disappearances, carried out under his command. [Photo Courtesy of Prensa L

TOP-SECRET – FUJIMORI FOUND GUILTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES

UJIMORI FOUND GUILTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES

National Security Archive Posts Declassified Evidence Used in Trial
U.S. Documents Implicated Fujimori in Repression, Cover-up

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 274

Washington, DC, September 13 – As a special tribunal in Peru pronounced former president Alberto Fujimori guilty of human rights atrocities, the National Security Archive today posted key declassified U.S. documents that were submitted as evidence in the court proceedings. The declassified records contain intelligence gathered by U.S. officials from Peruvian sources on the secret creation of “assassination teams” as part of Fujimori’s counterterrorism operations, the role of the Peruvian security forces in human rights atrocities and Fujimori’s participation in protecting the military from investigation.

Fujimori was tried for two major massacres: the execution of fourteen adults and an eight-year old boy in the Barrios Altos neighborhood of Lima on November 3, 1991; and the kidnapping, disappearance and assassination of nine students and a professor from La Cantuta University on July 18, 1992. Both atrocities were committed by a military death squad known as La Colina, believed to be supervised by Fujimori’s closest advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos. Fujimori, who was Peru’s president from 1990 to 2000 when he was forced to resign in a major corruption scandal, was also convicted for the abduction of a well known journalist, Gustavo Gorriti, in April 1992, and a prominent businessman, Samuel Dyer on July 27, 1992.

The trial began on December 10, 2007. Since then dozens of witnesses have testified on Fujimori’s responsibility as commander-in-chief for the operations of his security forces.

In September 2008, Archive Senior Analyst Kate Doyle gave expert testimony in the trial on the nature of the 21 U.S. documents that were submitted to the court as evidence by the prosecution team. During her testimony she noted that the documents reflected the conclusions of the U.S. Embassy that Fujimori had engaged in a “covert strategy to aggressively fight against subversion through terror operations, disregarding human rights, and legal norms.”

Among the key documents used during the trial is a U.S. embassy report, classified secret, from August 1990, just after Fujimori’s election. Based on a debriefing of a former intelligence agent in Peru, the Embassy reported that Fujimori planned a “two tiered anti-subversion plan”—a public policy that adhered to human rights, and a covert set of operations that would “include army special operations units trained in extra-judicial assassinations.”

The prosecution of Fujimori comes ten years after the ground-breaking arrest of Gen. Augusto Pinochet, and is part of an accelerated movement in Latin America to hold human rights violators accountable. “The exercise of justice in the Fujimori case,” noted Peter Kornbluh, a senior analyst at the Archive who attended the trial last fall, “sends a signal through Latin America, and onto the United States, that those who authorize human rights abuses in the name of fighting terrorism are not immune from prosecution.”

Fujimori faces up to 30 years in prison.

Read the Documents

Note: These documents were among 21 declassified U.S. records provided by the National Security Archive to the special tribunal conducting the Fujimori trial. They were originally obtained through the Freedom of Information Act by Peru analyst Tamara Feinstein, and FOIA specialist Jeremy Bigwood.

Document 1: U.S. Embassy, Cable, Secret, Reported Secret Annex to National Pacification/Human Rights Plan, Aug. 23, 1990, 5 pp.

Only weeks after Fujimori’s election, an intelligence officer working with the SIN (the National Intelligence Service) reported to U.S. embassy officials on a covert plan, purportedly “the brainchild of presidential advisor Vladimiro Montesinos,” to conduct extra-judicial assassinations of suspected terrorists. “The training of these new ‘assassination teams’ is already underway,” the source reported. He also stated that the plan had “the tacit approval of President Fujimori.”

Document 2: U.S. Embassy Cable, Secret, Barrios Altos Massacre: One Month Later, December 4, 1991, Secret, 2 pp.

The Fujimori government has showed little “political will” to investigate the Barrios Altos massacre and find the perpetrators of the crime, the embassy reported. At this early stage, the Embassy has concluded that the security forces were involved in the killing. “There is no high level political pressure to root out the culprits in this case,” according to the cable. “President Fujimori has not made a public issue of it.”

Document 3: U.S. Embassy, Cable, Secret, Barrios Altos Massacre, December 13, 1991, 2 pp.

Ambassador Quainton reports on meeting with Fujimori, and other government officials, at graduation ceremonies at the Peruvian Military Academy.  Quainton makes it clear that the U.S. embassy is concerned about military involvement in the Barrios Altos massacre and the lack of any investigation. “”I told him,” as Quainton cabled, that “the very institution—the Army—which he had been praising at the graduation ceremonies was being discredited by allegations of paramilitary involvement in the Barrios Altos killing.” According to Gloria Cano, the lead lawyer for the Peruvian human rights group, APRODEH, this document provided critical evidence that Fujimori was cognizant of the involvement of his security forces almost a year before he admitted it publicly.

Document 4: U.S. Embassy Cable, [Excised] Comments on Fujimori, Montesinos, but not on Barrios Altos, January 22, 1993, Secret, 10 pp.

An undisclosed source describes the close and complicated relationship between President Fujimori and his top intelligence aide, Vladimiro Montesinos. The source notes that while Fujimori understands the importance of human rights, in practice he “is prepared to sacrifice principles to achieve a quick victory over terrorism.” He is “absolutely committed to destroying Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA within his five year term and is prepared to countenance any methods that achieve that goal.”

Document 5: U.S. Embassy, Cable, Secret, Army Officers on ‘Show of Force;’ Barrios Altos and Death Squads, April 27, 1993, 4 pp.

The Embassy reports on how the military is justifying its public show of force—tanks in the street—to repel any type of Congressional investigation into official complicity in the Barrios Altos massacre. The Embassy source, described as an “Army field grade officer,” admits that the military was responsible for both the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta atrocities, which he describes as “stupidly planned and executed.”

Document 6: U.S. State Department, Cable, Secret, La Cantuta Demarche, June 8, 1993, 3 pp.

Peter Tarnoff, a high-ranking State Department official, instructs the embassy to issue a demarche to Fujimori on the La Cantuta atrocity and to demand that the allegations of Peruvian government involvement be “thoroughly and impartially investigated.” Among the talking points sent by Washington are: “recent allegations suggest that a unit organized within the armed forces carried out a series of disappearances at La Cantuta and was responsible for the Barrios Altos incident.” The embassy is ordered to tell Fujimori: “If it is indeed true that the armed forces have organized such units, this is a very serious affair.”

TOP-SECRET – ROBERT F. KENNEDY URGED LIFTING TRAVEL BAN TO CUBA IN ’63

Source: Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

ROBERT F. KENNEDY URGED LIFTING
TRAVEL BAN TO CUBA IN ’63

Attorney General cited inconsistency with “our views as a free society”
State Department overruled RFK proposal to withdraw prohibitions on travel

Documents Record First Internal Debate to Lift Ban

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 158

Washington D.C. September 13, 2011 – Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy sought to lift the ban on U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba in December 1963, according to declassified records re-posted today by the National Security Archive. In a December 12, 1963, memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Kennedy urged a quick decision “to withdraw the existing regulation prohibiting such trips.”

Kennedy’s memo, written less than a month after his brother’s assassination in Dallas, argues that the travel ban imposed at the end of the Eisenhower administration was a violation of American freedoms and impractical in terms of law enforcement. Among his “principal arguments” for removing the restrictions on travel to Cuba was that freedom to travel “is more consistent with our views as a free society and would contrast with such things as the Berlin Wall and Communist controls on such travel.”

This document, and others relating to the first internal debate over lifting the Cuba travel ban, are quoted in an opinion piece in the Washington Post today, written by Robert Kennedy’s daughter, Kathleen Kennedy Townsend. Her article argued that President Obama should consider her father’s position and support the Free Travel To Cuba Act that has been introduced in the U.S. Congress.

Robert Kennedy’s memo prompted what senior National Security Council officials described as “an in-house fight to permit non-subversive Americans to travel to Cuba.” Several State Department officials supported Kennedy’s position that “the present travel restrictions are inconsistent with traditional American liberties,” and that “it would be extremely difficult to enforce the present prohibitions on travel to Cuba without resorting to mass indictments.” But in a December 13, 1963 meeting at the State Department, with no representatives present from the Attorney General’s office, Undersecretary of State George Ball ruled out any relaxation of regulations on travel to Cuba.

A principal argument, as national security advisor McGeorge Bundy informed President Johnson in a subsequent memorandum on “Student Travel to Cuba” was that “a relaxation of U.S. restrictions would make it very difficult for us to urge Latin American governments to prevent their nationals from going to Cuba-where many would receive subversive training.”

The ban on travel was maintained until President Jimmy Carter lifted it in 1977; but restrictions were re-imposed during the Reagan administration and were tightened further by the Bush administration in 2004. President Obama recently announced he was lifting all restrictions on Cuban-Americans who want to travel to the island. The vast majority of U.S. citizens, however, still face stiff penalties if they travel to Cuba.

According to Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive’s Cuba Documentation Project, the documents “shed significant light on the genesis of the travel ban to Cuba, and the first internal debate over ending it.” The original rationale for the ban “is no longer applicable,” he noted, “but RFK’s arguments remain relevant to the current debate over the wisdom of restricting the freedom to travel.”

The documents were found among the papers of State Department advisor Averill Harriman at the Library of Congress and in declassified NSC files at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston. The Archive first posted them in April 2005.

Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view. Document 1: Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, “Travel to Cuba,” December 12, 1963

In a comprehensive memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Robert Kennedy presented the arguments for legalizing travel to Cuba before a number of student groups traveled there at Christmas time. There were two courses of action, he wrote: new efforts to block increased travel to Cuba, or “to withdraw the existing regulation prohibiting such trips. The first is unlikely to meet the problem and I favor the second,” Kennedy informed Rusk. In his memo he presented several arguments for lifting the travel ban: that it was a violation of American liberties to restrict free travel; that it was impractical to arrest, indict and engage in “distasteful prosecutions” of scores of U.S. citizens who sought to go to Cuba; and that lifting the travel ban was likely to diminish the attraction of leftists who were organizing protest trips to Havana. “For all these reasons I believe that it would be wise to remove restrictions on travel to Cuba before we are faced with problems which are likely to be created in the immediate future.”

Document 2: State Department, “Travel Regulations,” December 13, 1963

Two State Department officers, legal advisor Abram Chayes and Abba Schwartz summarize Kennedy’s arguments that “the ban on travel to Cuba be removed immediately,” including that “the present travel restrictions are inconsistent with traditional American liberties.” They note that lifting restrictions to Cuba is likely to be undertaken in the context of lifting most travel restrictions to other nations. They support Kennedy’s proposal but favor passport validation which would require those who travel to apply for permission from the Secretary of State to go to Cuba.

Document 3: NSC, “Travel Controls-Cuba,” December 18, 1963

This memo, written by the NSC’s Latin American specialist Gordon Chase to national security advisor McGeorge Bundy, reveals that the Attorney General’s proposal has been overruled at the State Department. At a meeting on December 13, to which Justice department officials were not invited, State Department officials from the Latin American division successfully argued that lifting the ban would compromise U.S. pressures on other nations in the hemisphere to isolate Cuba and block students from traveling there. In addition, according to Chase, Abba Schwartz believed that Lyndon Johnson could not politically afford to lift the ban because it would “make him look unacceptably soft.” The State Department’s attention turns to steps the government can take to prevent U.S. students from violating the ban and traveling to Cuba.

Document 4: NSC, “Student Travel to Cuba,” May 21, 1964

In an options memorandum for President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy informs him of the continuing debate over lifting restrictions on travel to Cuba. As summer begins, the administration expects about 100 students to try and travel to Cuba. Bundy lays out the “two distinct schools of thought” on the travel issue: Robert Kennedy’s effort to end controls on the basis of “our libertarian tradition and the difficulty of controlling travel” and current U.S. policy which is built on a tough line toward Cuba and efforts to enlist other Latin American nations to isolate Cuba politically and culturally, and to “prevent their nationals from going to Cuba.” Bundy correctly assumes that President Johnson does not want to relax controls on travel to Cuba and informs him that an interagency group is studying ways to further “reduce the interest in and to control student travel to Cuba this summer.”

TOP-SECRET-Breaking the Silence The Mexican Army and the 1997 Acteal Massacre

Mexican troops training at a Military Camp in Chiapas.
(Photo courtesy of Adolfo Gutiérrez)

Breaking the Silence
The Mexican Army and the 1997 Acteal Massacre

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 283

Washington, D.C., September, 2011 – As Mexicans debate last week’s Supreme Court ruling vacating the conviction of 20 men for the Acteal massacre, newly declassified documents from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency describe the Army’s role in backing paramilitary groups in Chiapas at the time of the killings. The secret cables confirm reporting about military support for indigenous armed groups carrying out attacks on pro-Zapatista communities in the region and add important new details. They also revive a question that has lingered for almost 12 years: when will the Army come clean about its role in Acteal?

Since the brutal attack of December 22, 1997, the Mexican government has offered multiple versions of the military’s involvement in the conflictive Chiapas zone around Acteal. The problem is the accounts have been incomplete or untrue. The most important of the DIA documents directly contradicts the official story told about the massacre by the government of then-President Ernesto Zedillo.

In the report issued by the nation’s Attorney General Jorge Madrazo in 1998, Libro Blanco Sobre Acteal, the government asserted that “The Attorney General’s office has documented the existence of groups of armed civilians in the municipality of Chenalhó, neither organized, created, trained, nor financed by the Mexican Army nor by any other government entity, but whose management and organization respond to an internal logic determined by the confrontation, between and within the communities, with the Zapatista bases of support.” (p. 32, emphasis added)

But in a telegram sent to DIA headquarters in Washington on May 4, 1999, the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Mexico points to “direct support” by the Army to armed groups in the highland areas of Chiapas, where the killings took place. The document describes a clandestine network of “human intelligence teams,” created in mid-1994 with approval from then-President Carlos Salinas, working inside Indian communities to gather intelligence information on Zapatista “sympathizers.” In order to promote anti-Zapatista armed groups, the teams provided “training and protection from arrests by law enforcement agencies and military units patrolling the region.”

Although the cable was written in 1999, the attaché took care to point out that Army intelligence officers were overseeing the armed groups in December 1997. The document provides details never mentioned in the many declarations of the Mexican Army following the attack. The human intelligence teams, explains the Defense Attaché Office, “were composed primarily of young officers in the rank of second and first captain, as well as select sergeants who spoke the regional dialects. The HUMINT teams were composed of three to four persons, who were assigned to cover select communities for a period of three to four months. After three months the teams’ officer members were rotated to a different community in Chiapas. Concern over the teams’ safety and security were paramount reasons for the rotations every three months.”

The Defense Intelligence Agency released the excised documents to the National Security Archive in 2008 in response to a Freedom Information Act request. (An appeal for additional records is pending.) The information was compiled by the agency’s representatives in Mexico, defense attaché officers whose primary task is to gather intelligence on the Mexican armed forces and send it to headquarters in Washington for analysis. The analysis is then used by the government to assist in crafting national security policy in Mexico. The agency is the eyes and ears of the U.S. Secretary of Defense abroad: think of it as the Pentagon’s CIA.

So the “internal logic” turns out to be the military’s, in the form of a carefully planned counterinsurgency strategy that combined civic action programs – frequently trumpeted by the Defense Secretariat in statements to the press – with secret intelligence operations designed to strengthen the paramilitaries and provoke conflict against EZLN supporters.

In the almost twelve years since the massacre human rights groups, journalists and investigators have been able to unearth a smattering of true facts about the slaughter at Acteal, but without the help of official transparency. Requests for government information made through the Mexican freedom of information law–such as the ones filed by the National Security Archive last year–meet a resounding silence. The Attorney General’s office helpfully steers the requester to the library to find its 1998 report. The Interior Ministry responds with a copy of a public communiqué the agency issued five days after the massacre summarizing “Actions Taken” in the Acteal case. The nation’s intelligence center replies that it has no control over what should be military files, and therefore no documents. And the Army? “After a meticulous search in the archives of this Secretariat,” writes the institution to the National Security Archive, emphasis added, “the requested information was not located.”

Perhaps even more unsettling than the supposed non-existence of documents in the Defense Secretariat is the response of the Office of the President to requests about Acteal. The staff of President Felipe Calderón told this requester to look in the Presidential Archives of the General Archive of the Nation for files relevant to the massacre. We did. We found many. They are all located in the section “Unprocessed Files,” where letters, telegrams and other forms of complaints from Mexican citizens have languished for years without reply. The communications that poured in after December 22, 1997, from every state in Mexico as well as from international human rights groups and academic institutions contain expressions of anger, despair, and condemnation for the attack. They also include specific charges made by residents of Chiapas about instances of violence, energy blackouts, and land seizures: potential leads for further investigation by the government into the conflict destroying the region.

The cries for attention sent to the highest mandate in the land went unanswered. They were routinely tagged as unprocessed files and can be perused today by any researcher who cares to look in the national archives.

Until the current administration decides to honor its obligations to inform its citizens about the truth of the 1997 massacre, the people’s call for facts will remain lost in the unprocessed files.

And we will be left to rely on the United States for information about the Mexican Army and Acteal.

Read the Documents

Document 1
December 31, 1997
Mexican Military Presence Increases Following the Massacre in Chiapas
Defense Intelligence Agency, secret intelligence information report

In this heavily redacted cable sent to DIA headquarters in Washington on December 31, 1997, the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Mexico describes the deployment of troops by the Mexican military to the conflict zones of Chiapas. Citing secret and open source accounts, the document indicates that President Ernesto Zedillo committed thousands of new troops to the region following the December 22 massacre of 45 Tzotzil Indian men, women and children, with other units “placed on alert to assist in the event of an uprising.”

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act
FOIA Request No. 38,435, released February 2008
Under appeal

Document 2
May 4, 1999
Military Involvement with Chiapas Paramilitary Groups
Defense Intelligence Agency, secret intelligence information report

In a telegram sent to DIA headquarters in Washington on May 4, 1999, the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Mexico points to “direct support” by the Army to armed groups in the highland areas of Chiapas, where the Acteal killings took place. The document describes a clandestine network of “human intelligence teams,” created in mid-1994 with approval from then-President Carlos Salinas, working inside Indian communities to gather intelligence information on Zapatista “sympathizers.”

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act
FOIA Request No. 38,435, released February 2008
Under appeal

TOP-SECRET-State Department Cable says Colombian Army Responsible for Palace of Justice Deaths, Disappearances

Colombian security forces lead survivors of the Palace of Justice across the street to the Casa del Florero. [Photo: Revista Semana]

Document Introduced as Evidence in Trial of Col. Alfonso Plazas Vega

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 289

Updated – September 2001
Secrets and Lies: The U.S. Embassy and Col. Plazas Vega

Col. Luis Alfonso Plazas Vega (ret.) [Photo: Revista Semana]

The recent appearance of a declassified U.S. Embassy report blaming the Colombian Army and Col. Luis Alfonso Plazas Vega for deaths and disappearances during operations to retake the Palace of Justice building in November 1985 has stirred up heated debate on both sides of the issue. As it happens, both sides have it wrong, at least in part. As the person who first uncovered the document, the result of a declassification request to the U.S. State Department, I submit the following points for the sake of clarification and in the hope that the real significance of the document is not lost in the confusion of the moment.

Initial reports on the matter dramatically mischaracterized the document and distorted its meaning. El Espectador, for example, attributed the information to supposed “intelligence agents at the service of the U.S. Embassy in Colombia” and reported that the document had been “brought to the attention of Colombian authorities in 1998”, details that the document simply does not support. Since El Espectador also failed to publish the document itself, many other Colombian news organizations simply followed its lead, repeating the same erroneous details.

Seizing the opportunity, defenders of Col. Plazas have sought to discredit the entire document, including what are by far the most important, verifiable and incriminating details. Pouncing on these inaccuracies in a letter to the editor, the colonel’s wife, Thania Vega de Plazas, said that the original report in El Espectador was “completely false” and went on to invent some facts of her own. Her assertion that the document is merely a summary of “the affirmations of some Colombian human rights NGOs” is 100 percent wrong and a gross mischaracterization of the document. (The colonel’s son, Miguel Plazas, made the same points, in the exact same words, in a letter to El Tiempo.)

She is correct that the document is not primarily about the Palace of Justice case or Col. Plazas. Rather, it is a report that mentions Col. Plazas in another context altogether: his participation in a January 1999 meeting between members of the Colombian Armed Forces and local human rights organizations—one of a series of gatherings meant to bridge the divide between the two groups. A U.S. Embassy representative (“Poloff” for Political Officer) also attended the meeting, hence this cable.

Declassified records are tricky things. It is not always easy to determine the provenance or meaning of a particular document, especially when parts have been redacted. Nevertheless, the meaning of the passage concerning Col. Plazas is unambiguous:

The presence among the “NGO representatives” of two military officers (one active duty, one retired), who killed time with lengthy, pro-military diatribes, also detracted from the military-NGO exchange. One of the two was retired Colonel Alfonso Plazas Vargas [sic], representing the “Office for Human Rights of Retired Military Officers.” Plazas commanded the November, 1985 raid on the Supreme Court building after it had been taken over by the M-19. That raid resulted in the deaths of more than 70 people, including eleven Supreme Court justices. Soldiers killed a number of M-19 members and suspected collaborators hors de combat, including the Palace’s cafeteria staff.

It is not entirely clear on the basis of what evidence the Embassy made these statements about the Palace of Justice case, or why the cable’s author chose to include them here. And it certainly is not possible to determine whether the information was ever brought to the attention of the Colombian authorities, as the report in El Espectador disingenuouslyclaimed. But to attribute these statements to Colombian human rights groups, and to deny that they represent the view of the U.S. Embassy, is simply wrong. Anyone with a working knowledge of the English language can clearly see the meaning of these words.

This brief description of Col. Plazas represents the clearest and most concise statement yet declassified about the Army’s responsibility for the deaths and disappearances in the Palace of Justice case. It is extremely unlikely that the Embassy would make such accusations, however tangential they may be to the central subject of the document, without carefully evaluating the available evidence.

While it is appropriate for the defenders of Col. Plazas to question the hyperbolic and in some cases fabricated information that has appeared in some of the reporting on this matter, such objections do not justify the fabrication of equally erroneous information and cannot refute what is plainly evident in the document: that the U.S. Embassy, in January 1999, under Ambassador Curtis Kamman, believed that the Colombian military, under the command of Col. Plazas, was responsible for the vast majority of the deaths and disappearances in the Palace of Justice case.

Any further questions about the meaning of the document or the information therein should be directed to the U.S. State Department. With the case against Col. Plazas moving through the Colombian courts, and with the Truth Commission on the Palace of Justice in its final months, now is the time for the U.S.  Government to do the right thing and declassify all human rights related information it has pertaining to the Palace of Justice tragedy.

Original Post – October 8, 2009

State Department Cable says Colombian Army Responsible for Palace of Justice Deaths, Disappearances

Document Introduced as Evidence in Trial of Col. Alfonso Plazas Vega

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 289

Washington, D.C., October 8, 2009 – A declassified U.S. State Department document filed in a Colombian court yesterday blames the Colombian Army, and Col. Alfonso Plazas Vega in particular, for the deaths of over 70 people during military operations to retake the Palace of Justice building from insurgents who had seized the building in November 1985. The document, a January 1999 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Colombia, was obtained by the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act.

The Palace of Justice burned to the ground during military efforts to retake the building from M-19 guerrillas. Eleven Supreme Court justices died in the blaze, along with dozens of others. [Photo: Revista Semana]

The cable states in paragraph four that Col. Plazas Vega (misspelled as “Plazas Vargas”) “commanded the November, 1985 Army raid on the Supreme Court building” and that the operation “resulted in the deaths of more than 70 people, including eleven Supreme Court justices.” The Embassy adds that soldiers under the command of Col. Plazas Vega “killed a number of M-19 members and suspected collaborators hors de combat, including the Palace’s cafeteria staff.”

Col. Plazas Vega is currently on trial for the disappearances of eleven civilians during the course of the operation, several of whom worked in the Palace cafeteria. The Palace of Justice tragedy began on November 6, 1985, after insurgents from the M-19 guerrilla group seized the building, taking a number of hostages. The building caught fire and burned to the ground during Colombian military and police force efforts to retake the Palace, killing most of the guerrillas and hostages still inside.

“The information included in this brief description of Col. Plazas Vega is the clearest, most concise statement we have seen in declassified records about the Army’s responsibility for the deaths and disappearances in the Palace of Justice case,” said Michael Evans, director of the Archive’s Colombia documentation project.

“The Palace of Justice tragedy is one of the most searing events in Colombian history,” Evans added, “and with both this case and the Truth Commission on the Palace of Justice in progress, now is the time for the U.S. government to come forward with all human rights related information it has pertaining to the Palace of Justice tragedy.”

Other documents published today provide new details on military operations to retake the building and on Colombia’s fruitless efforts to find a diplomatic post for Col. Plazas Vega in the mid-1990s.

  • In the midst of the crisis, the Embassy reported, “We understand that orders are to use all necessary force to retake building.” Another cable reported that, “FonMin [Foreign Minister] said that President, DefMin [Defense Minster], Chief of National Police, and he are all together, completely in accord and do not intend to let this matter drag out.”
  • A pair of contradictory Embassy cables: one reporting that “surviving guerrillas have all been taken prisoner,” followed by another, two days later, reporting that “None of the guerrillas survived.”
  • A February 1986 Embassy cable reporting that Colombian military influence on society and politics, “no doubt exercised at times of crisis such as the Palace of Justice takeover, is also sometimes overdrawn.”
  • A highly-redacted U.S. Embassy document from 1996 regarding an inquiry about “human rights and narcotics allegations” against Col. Plazas Vega. Discussing his rejection as Colombian Consul to Hamburg by the German government, the cable notes that “[the State] Department concurred that the [Colombian government] be informally asked to withdraw Plazas’ nomination…” The Embassy adds that, “None of the above allegations [against Plazas] were ever investigated by the authorities — a common problem during the 1980’s in Colombia.”

TOP-SECRET-Operation Sofia: Documenting Genocide in Guatemala

Army occupation of Río Azul model village, Nebaj, Quiché. Photograph courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny.

Operation Sofia: Documenting Genocide in Guatemala

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 297

September 10, 2011, Washington, DC – The Guatemalan army, under the direction of military ruler Efraín Ríos Montt, carried out a deliberate counterinsurgency campaign in the summer of 1982 aimed at massacring thousands of indigenous peasants, according to a comprehensive set of internal records presented as evidence to the Spanish National Court and posted today by the National Security Archive on its Web site. The files on “Operation Sofia” detail official responsibility for what the 1999 UN-sponsored Historical Clarification Commission determined were “acts of genocide against groups of Mayan people.”

The National Security Archive’s Kate Doyle presented the documentation as evidence in the international genocide case, which is under investigation by Judge Santiago Pedraz in Madrid. Ms. Doyle testified today before Judge Pedraz on the authenticity of the documents, which were obtained from military intelligence sources in Guatemala. Earlier this year, Defense Minister Gen. Abraham Valenzuela González claimed that the military could not locate the documents or turn them over to a judge in Guatemala, as ordered by the Guatemalan Constitutional Court in 2008.

After months of analysis, which included evaluations of letterheads and signatures on the documents and comparisons to other available military records, Doyle said, “we have determined that these records were created by military officials during the regime of Efraín Ríos Montt to plan and implement a ‘scorched earth’ policy on Mayan communities in El Quiché. The documents record the military’s genocidal assault against indigenous populations in Guatemala.”

The Archive’s Guatemala project has a long track record of obtaining and authenticating internal records on Guatemalan repression. In 1999, Ms. Doyle obtained a “death squad diary”—a logbook of kidnappings, secret detentions, torture, disappearances and executions between 1983 and 1985 kept by the feared “Archivo,” a secret intelligence unit controlled by President Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores. Although the military claimed the document was a fabrication, a team of experts led by Doyle was able to establish its authenticity. The logbook has been accepted as official, authentic evidence by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.

The appearance of the original “Operation Sofía” documents provides the first public glimpse into secret military files on the counterinsurgency campaign that resulted in massacres of tens of thousands of unarmed Mayan civilians during the early 1980s, and displaced hundreds of thousands more as they fled the Army’s attacks on their communities. The records contain explicit references to the killing of unarmed men, women and children, the burning of homes, destruction of crops, slaughter of animals and indiscriminate aerial bombing of refugees trying to escape the violence.

Among the 359 pages of original planning documents, directives, telegrams, maps, and hand-written patrol reports is the initial order to launch the operation issued on July 8, 1982, by Army Chief of Staff Héctor Mario López Fuentes. The records make clear that “Operation Sofía” was executed as part of the military strategy of Guatemala’s de facto president, Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt, under the command and control of the country’s senior military officers, including then Vice Minister of Defense Gen. Mejía Víctores. Both men are defendants in the international genocide case in front of the Spanish Court.

In 1999, the UN-sponsored Historical Clarification Commission concluded that the Guatemalan Army had committed “massacres, human rights violations, and other atrocities” against Mayan communities that “illustrated a government policy of genocide.” Due to military stonewalling, which included refusing to turn over internal records, the Commission based its findings almost exclusively on testimony from witnesses and perpetrators, human rights reports, and data from exhumations. The Commission also drew on declassified U.S. government documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and provided by the National Security Archive.

The posting today includes an analysis by Kate Doyle of the Operation Sofia documents, as well as photographs from the Ixil region taken in 1982 by photojournalist and human rights advocate, Jean-Marie Simon.

Documents

Document 1
July 8 – August 20, 1982
Operación Sofía
Guatemalan Armed Forces

Complete report – Low resolution – (18 MB) | High resolution – (70 MB)

Report in sections – Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4

The Operation Sofía archive is a bound collection of 359 pages of documents sent to and from the Army General Staff (Estado Mayor General del Ejército – EMGE), the Commander of the Guatemalan Airborne Troops – who planned and ran the operation – the Commander of the special counterinsurgency Task Force “Gumarcaj,” the Commander of the Huehuetenango Military Zone, and the commanding officers of the Army battalions, companies and patrol units assigned to carry out the offensive.

Document 2 – Excerpt from an analysis of the Operation Sofía documents by Kate Doyle

Refugees being brought into town on trucks following army sweeps into mountainsides, Nebaj, Quiche. Photograph courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny.

Interrogation of woman and child, suspected subversives, at army garrison, Chajul, Quiché. Photograph courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny.

TOP-SECRET-Archival Evidence of Mexico’s Human Rights Crimes: The Case of Aleida Gallangos

Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, following his detention on July 26, 1968, in the midst of the student protests. The photograph was part of the Mexican intelligence files compiled by DFS agents, and made available in the AGN years later.

[Source: AGN, DFS files, 11-235, Legajo 30, Folio 17]

Archival Evidence of Mexico’s Human Rights Crimes: The Case of Aleida Gallangos National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 307

Washington, DC, September 9, 2011 – A Mexican human rights activist who was orphaned in infancy when her parents disappeared at the hands of government forces filed a petition before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) yesterday, drawing on dozens of declassified U.S. and Mexican documents as evidence. Aleida Gallangos Vargas–whose case became widely known in 2004 when she tracked down her long-lost brother through intelligence records found in Mexico’s national archives–joined with her paternal grandmother to charge the State with responsibility for the secret detention and disappearance in 1975 of her parents, Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz and Carmen Vargas Pérez, among other family members. Today the National Security Archive is posting a selection of the documents being used in the case, obtained by the Archive through the Freedom of Information Act and from the Mexican government. Aleida was two years old when her parents were captured; she was rescued by a friend of her parents who himself was killed by security forces in 1976. Aleida was adopted by his family and renamed Luz Elba Gorostiola Herrera. Aleida’s brother Lucio Antonio, who was three when Roberto Antonio and Carmen disappeared, was taken by members of the government death squad that raided their home in June 1975; shortly afterwards he was delivered to an orphanage and in February 1976 was adopted by a couple and christened Juan Carlos Hernández Valadez. The two children grew up in separate lives knowing nothing of their true identities or of their relationship. The history of the Gallangos-Vargas family emerged in 2001 when a magazine published an interview with Roberto Antonio’s mother, Quirina Cruz Calvo, along with photographs of the disappeared couple and their two small children. Aleida’s adoptive family recognized Luz Elba’s face in the pictures and Aleida was reunited with her grandmother. She spent the next several years piecing together the circumstances of the Mexican government’s role in abducting and secretly detaining her parents. Using government records that had been located by the office of the Special Prosecutor assigned to investigate past political crimes, Aleida managed to track down her brother in the United States in 2004, 29 years after their separation. The records Aleida used to find Lucio Antonio–along with dozens more obtained by the National Security Archive through requests to the Mexican and U.S. governments–now serve as critical evidence in the case brought by Aleida on March 8 before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. The Inter-American system has been an important venue for victims and activists seeking recourse from the Mexican government for state-sponsored human rights crimes committed during the 1960s-80s. On November 23, 2009, the Inter-American Human Rights Court issued a landmark decision, finding Mexico responsible for the illegal detention and disappearance of Rosendo Radilla, a schoolteacher and social activist stopped at a military checkpoint in Atoyac, Guerrero on August 25, 1974. Radilla–known for his songs of social protest and his admiration of Lucio Cabañas, the popular guerrilla leader from Guerrero–was disappeared at the height of the State’s extralegal counterinsurgency campaign against rebels and their supporters in southern Mexico in the early 1970s [see NSA briefing book on Lucio Cabañas, and the Dawn of the Dirty War]. The 2009 ruling marked the first Inter-American decision against Mexico for abuses committed during the “dirty war.” The court ordered the government to pay reparations to the family members for the years of suffering inflicted as a result of the crime. The Radilla decision established an important precedent for future legal action targeting Mexico’s unresolved human rights crimes of the past. To date, Mexico’s political and judicial systems have proven incapable of dealing with even the most notorious atrocities of the “dirty war,” such as the 1968 and 1971 student massacres and the hundreds of cases of illegal detentions, torture, and forced disappearances carried out around the country in the 1970s and early 1980s. In addition to the Army’s rural counterinsurgency violence, Mexico’s intelligence services carried out a carefully orchestrated program of kidnappings and disappearances in the country’s urban centers in an effort to dismantle guerrilla networks and eliminate social and political opposition. One of the victims of the government’s urban counterinsurgency was Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, an activist involved in the 1968 student movement and later a militant in the radical 23rd of September Communist League. In the summer of ’68, Roberto Antonio joined the anti-war protests in Mexico City and marched for greater democratic openness from Mexico’s closed political system. He became one of the hundreds of protestors monitored by government spies gathering information on student activists. Internal Mexican intelligence records report that Roberto Antonio participated in rallies, reciting anti-war poems such as “los tres pueblos,” which he delivered during a demonstration on April 23, 1968 [see Doc 5; DFS report on Roberto Antonio]. Security forces detained Roberto Antonio on July 26 during government round-ups of student agitators that culminated in the October 2 Tlatelolco massacre. (Note 1) He was held in the infamous Lecumberri prison in Mexico City for over two months, where state intelligence agents kept close tabs on his visitors. While the charges against him were insufficient to keep him in prison, the Federal Security Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad – DFS) continued to monitor his activities following his release. Over the next seven years, government security services assembled a thick intelligence file documenting Roberto Antonio’s association with Mexico’s guerrilla groups. The violent efforts of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institutional—PRI) to crush the peaceful 1968 student movement was a pivotal moment that dramatically radicalized the social and political opposition, increasing popular support for Mexico’s insurgent groups. The 23rd of September Communist League (Liga Comunista de 23 de Septiembre) was one of the urban guerrilla groups that grew in strength as a result, and in turn became a central target of the organized violence that characterized the government’s counterinsurgency efforts during the period. Following the kidnapping by leftists of U.S. Consul General Terrance Leonhardy in May 1973 and U.S. Vice-Consul John L. Patterson in March 1974, Mexican security forces were given even greater freedom to attack insurgent groups and their supporters. The DFS in particular became the driving force behind State terror, serving as Mexico’s internal political police force [see Doc 1: on the growth of the DFS]. U.S. agencies also expanded their coordination with their Mexican intelligence counterparts, increasing their information gathering on Mexico’s leftists groups. The DFS agents regularly shared intelligence with the FBI attachés in the U.S. Embassy and consulates in Mexico’s northern cities [see FBI memorandum: Doc 2 on the 23 of September group]. The long connection between the DFS and the CIA also provided a central source of information for Mexico’s internal security apparatus to confront the armed groups. (Note 2) It was during this period of urban counterinsurgency that the web of Mexico’s intelligence services grew, as information flowed to and from Mexico City to the Army and police installations throughout the country. The DFS institutionalized the State’s ability to gather information, detain suspects, torture and disappear with ultimate deniability. Seven years after the 1968 crackdown, Roberto Antonio Gallangos became a victim of the DFS campaign of disappearances. According to Mexican intelligence documents obtained by the National Security Archive, Roberto Antonio – by then living underground as a member of the 23rd of September Communist League – was spotted walking on a Mexico City street by a police sergeant. After a brief shootout, police captured Gallangos and turned him over to the DFS [Doc 4]. DFS agents interrogated and tortured him, extracting information about his family, social, and organizational affiliations. The declassified Mexican documents describe Roberto Antonio Gallangos as a radical criminal, with links to a network of subversive organizations and a background in bank robberies, kidnapping and murder. It is difficult to evaluate the veracity of the many allegations made in the documents against him, his family, friends and associates. Federal security agents often exaggerated the threat from leftist groups in order to justify aggressive counterinsurgency measures. (Note 3) Torture and forced confessions were commonly used against suspected subversives, and photos taken of Gallangos during detention seem to show signs of torture [Doc 6]. But while the DFS files reported on his alleged crimes, the information was never meant for use as legal evidence in a court of law. Rather, intelligence gathered through surveillance, abduction and torture was used to locate associates of suspected guerrillas, dismantle social networks, and terrorize their base of support. In the case of Gallangos, the DFS agents sought information about his wife and other militant friends and family members, but it is uncertain whether or not what Gallangos told his interrogators was true. Security forces did not capture his wife Carmen Vargas Pérez for more than a month after his kidnapping (detained July 26, 1975); his brother Avelino Francisco Gallangos Cruz was caught one month after that (August 22, 1975). Both remain among Mexico’s disappeared (Note 4). What is clear is that the government’s detention of Gallangos on June 19, 1975, had tragic and lasting repercussions for Roberto’s family, including the “disappearance” of his children until they discovered their identities years later. The case exemplifies how government terror functioned not only to combat the guerrillas, but also destroy the social fabric of groups who opposed the government’s authority. The secret DFS documents obtained by the Archive expose the inner workings of Mexico’s urban counterinsurgency campaign in the 1970s and reveal the involvement of the highest levels of government in political crimes of state. The abuses included illegal spying and infiltration of leftist groups, unwarranted police raids, secret detentions and transfers of prisoners, abduction, torture, and murder. The intelligence files were signed by then-Chief of the agency, Capitan Luis de la Barreda Moreno (head from 1970-75). Senior DFS agents such as Miguel Nazar Haro participated directly in the operations, interrogation and torture of prisoners. (Note 5) The information gathered flowed to the Interior Ministry (Secretaría de Gobernación), at the time led by Mario Moya Palencia. Number two in Gobernación was the career-spy chief Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, who served in the DFS for over 20 years and directed the agency from 1964 until his long-time friend de la Barreda took over in 1970. Gutiérrez Barrios occupied Mexico’s most senior intelligence position as Deputy Minister of the Interior, regularly receiving DFS traffic on suspected subversives, and playing a central role in the extermination campaign against Mexico’s left. At the top of the chain of command was Luis Echeverría, Interior Minister from 1964-70, and head of state from 1970-76. Despite evidence demonstrating direct government involvement in the urban disappearances, a special prosecutor assigned in 2002 by President Vicente Fox to investigate past human rights crimes failed to bring Luis Echeverría or any of his senior military, police or intelligence commanders to justice. In 2003, the prosecutor, Dr. Ignacio Carillo Prieto, asked the United State Embassy in Mexico City for declassified cables on de la Barreda and Nazar Haro [Doc 13] and brought charges against the officials for the forced disappearance of Jesús Piedra Ibarra, another member of the 23rd of September group detained in April 1975. But the special prosecutor was unable to win convictions and the charges were dropped. The DFS officials who have gone to jail since the “dirty war” have done so for their involvement in drug trafficking rather than for human rights crimes. There is a deep connection between the former Mexican intelligence service and the country’s drug mafias. As DFS agents took command of counterinsurgency raids in the 1970s, they often stumbled upon narcotics safe houses and quickly took on the job of protecting Mexico’s drug cartels. The DFS was disbanded in 1985 following revelations that it was behind the murder of DEA agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, and Mexican journalist Manuel Buendia. (Note 6) Some 1,500 agents suddenly unemployed with the abolishment of the DFS found their training in covert activities and brutal counterinsurgency operations easily adaptable to the needs of the criminal underworld. Many joined the ranks of the powerful drug cartels or served the traffickers while working on local and federal police forces [see Doc 11 & Doc 12 on DFS agents and drugs]. By failing to prosecute a single case against the former agents, the Special Prosecutor missed a crucial opportunity to bring some of Mexico’s most corrupt officials to justice, allowing impunity to remain entrenched in Mexican society. The Special Prosecutor also failed to fully clarify the crimes of the past or locate any of Mexico’s disappeared. Carrillo Prieto claimed as his own success the discovery and identification of Lucio Antonio Gallangos Vargas, the missing son of Roberto Antonio Gallangos and Carmen Vargas. (Note 7) In fact it was due to the efforts Aleida Gallangos that her brother was located. Although she began her search as part of the “Citizen’s Committee” created by the Special Prosecutor’s office, she resigned from the committee in disgust with the prosecutor’s fruitless investigations. After traveling to Washington, where she says she was threatened by the Mexican consulate, she finally located her brother in the winter of 2004. The Special Prosecutor then organized an ad-hoc press conference in an attempt to take credit for locating Lucio Antonio. In a cable to Washington, U.S. Embassy officials discounted Carrillo Prieto’s claims and cited an independent evaluation of his work that called his office “unresponsive” to victims’ needs. [see Doc 14]. With yesterday’s filing of the case “Luz Elba Gorostiola Herrera and Quirina Cruz Calvo against the State of Mexico” before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, Aleida and her biological and adoptive families have underscored the failure of the Mexican government to bring the perpetrators of past human rights atrocities to justice. Mexico’s inability to resolve these cases has left survivors of the dirty war and families of the disappeared without legal recourse at the national level. With the groundbreaking Radilla decision of 2009, the Inter-American system offers new hope for victims of Mexico’s dirty war to find a measure of justice at last. It is a critical juncture for Mexican citizens searching for truth about the country’s dark period of state-sponsored violence that remains an impediment to justice in Mexico today.

U.S. and Mexican Documents on the Dirty War Disappearances, Drugs, and the Failure of the Special Prosecutor Document 1 January 4, 1974 The Current Security Situation in Mexico: An Appraisal U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Secret Airgram 13 pages The U.S. Embassy in Mexico reports on a rising wave of crime beginning in mid-September 1973, creating a “climate of some anxiety” in Mexico. The report provides background on the rising tide of armed opposition to the Mexican government, tracing the growing rebellion to the government’s brutal “counteraction” against 1968 student demonstrations. It also provides a list of “politically-motivated acts of violence” that characterized the first three years of the Echeverría administration, including the 1971 student killings by government forces, and the kidnapping by leftists of U.S. Consul General Terrance G. Leonhardy. To U.S. officials, these incidents demonstrated the “deficiencies” of the army and police forces, and highlighted the importance of covert operations under the direction of the Federal Security Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad – DFS). The Embassy believed that the DFS, “whose responsibilities also include protection of the president, intelligence collection and coordination, surveillance of some foreign embassies, etc.”, was the only body to have “emerged from this period with reason for pride in its accomplishments.” While Luis Echeverría had increased DFS staff and power, the Embassy predicts that sporadic acts of political violence will continue until “security agencies have improved their capabilities to the point where they can quickly apprehend the perpetrators in a high percentage of cases and infiltrate terrorist groups in order to dismantle them completely.” Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 2 March 11, 1974 Characterization of Mexican Revolutionary, Terrorist and Guerrilla Groups FBI, Legal Attaché in Mexico City, Secret Memorandum 12 pages The FBI attachés in Mexico produced regular reports on the urban guerrilla groups during this period, relating back to Washington the information they received from Mexican intelligence agents. This memorandum provides profiles of ten Mexican revolutionary and guerrilla groups, including the 23rd of September Communist League (LCS). It refers to the 23rd of September group as one of the most highly organized guerrilla organizations, and says that its many of its members have been involved in other revolutionary groups in Mexico. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 3 December 6, 1974 Mexican Terrorist Captured in Abortive Attempt to Negotiate Safe Passage out of Mexico U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Unclassified Cable 1 page DFS agents not only coordinated counterinsurgency strategies during the 1970s, but participated directly in operations, including detentions, extralegal raids, and forced disappearances. This cable reports on the arrest of Miguel Angel Torres Enríquez, an alleged member of the 23rd of September Communist League, on December 5, 1974, after he had taken two French embassy consular officers hostage in an attempt to secure safe passage to France. Working undercover, then-DFS agent Miguel Nazar Haro participated directly in the operation, posing as a Mexican Foreign Secretary official and, after exchanging himself for the hostages, bringing Torres to the airport where he was arrested. According to the Special Prosecutor’s report released years later, the search for Torres Enríquez involved raids by DFS agents on his house and violent attacks against his family and friends. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 4 June 19, 1975 “23 of September” Communist League; “Red Brigade” Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 1 page This document, signed by DFS Director Luis de la Barreda Moreno, gives the agency’s version of the events that led to the arrest of Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, alias “Simón.” According to the report, at 3:00 pm, July 19, 1975, police sergeant Lázaro Juárez Almaguer noticed an individual with a pistol hidden in his waist, who, when asked to identify himself, removed the weapon and fired, hitting one policeman in the arm. More police quickly arrived on the scene and detained the subject. DFS agents took custody of Roberto Antonio and interrogated him, identifying him as part of a clandestine cell of the urban guerrilla group the 23rd of September Communist League. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 5 June 19, 1975 Antecedents of Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz (a) “Simón” Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 7 pages This intelligence report reveals that prior to the 1975 arrest of Roberto Antonio Gallangos, government agents had him under surveillance for years. The type of information gathered since at least the late 1960s included personal details such as his birthplace, education, physical characteristics, organizational affiliation, and previous arrests. The report also contains extensive information about his political activities, beginning with his involvement in the 1968 student protests. At a demonstration on April 23, 1968, for example, RobertoAntonio recited the anti-war poem, Los Tres Pueblos, “referring to the horrors of war, and demands for peace.” The report describes his detention on July 26, 1968 in the midst of the student round-ups, and the government’s attempts to charge Roberto Antonio with crimes such as damage to public property, robbery, resisting arrest, and causing injury to state authorities. It also tracks his visitors during his time in prison. The surveillance continued after his release. According to DFS intelligence, Roberto Antonio went on to participate in political meetings with Mexico’s leftist organizations and became involved with a wide variety of insurgent groups. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 6 Photo Undated, taken after June 19, 1975 detention Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 2 pages This photograph of Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz was taken following his detention on June 19, 1975. The photo shows Roberto Antonio with a mark over his right eye, and a wet shirt; signs of the torture used by the DFS agents during his interrogation. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), DFS Exp. 11-235, Legajo 30, Folio 123 Document 7 June 20, 1975 “23 of September” Communist League Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 1 page A report filed by DFS director Luis de la Barreda 24 hours after Gallangos Cruz’s capture contains the first results of the agency’s interrogation of their prisoner, when he reveals the address of a supposed guerrilla safe house. The police proceeded to conduct a raid on the house, finding communist propaganda from the Liga Comunista “23 de Septiembre” and other incriminating material. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office[Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 8 July 1, 1975 “23 of September” Communist League Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 1 page Under interrogation, Gallangos Cruz identified his wife and brother as fellow members of the Liga Comunista “23 de Septiembre.” This DFS report gives biographical background for Carmen Vargas Perez (“Sofía”) and Avelino Francisco Gallangos Cruz (“Federico,”). Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 9 August 22, 1975 “23 of September” Communist League Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 3 pages Roberto Antonio’s brother, Avelino Francisco Gallangos Cruz, was arrested in Mexico City at 9:40 am by three police officers. He was reportedly carrying a gun that they determined belonged to a police agent who was assassinated on November 30, 1974. The document gives biographical details and intelligence information about “Federico,” compiled through interrogations of his family and friends. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 10 August 23, 1975 Liga Comunista “23 de Septiembre” Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 2 pages This document summarizes the result of the interrogations of Avelino Francisco Gallangos Cruz “Federico” and another member of the Liga Comunista “23 de Septiembre.” It describes how the Gallangos Cruz brothers joined the organization and contains details about the League’s purported activities. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 11 March 27, 1990 Senior Customs Representative Hermosillo – Intelligence Report U.S. Consulate in Hermosillo, Mexico, redacted cable 7 pages Five years after the DFS was disbanded due to abuses and pervasive corruption, a U.S. Customs agent stationed in the Hermosillo Consulate, issues this report conveying growing concern over connections between former DFS agents and drug traffickers. The heavily redacted cable reports on drug kingpins who had worked with the DFS, and states that “several members of the DFS became heavily involved in drug trafficking and then in the murder of United States Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar.” Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 12 March 12, 1991 Javier García Paniagua to Head National Lottery, is Replaced by Santiago Tapia as Mexico City’s Police Chief U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Confidential Cable On March 7, 1991, Javier García Paniagua, former Director of Mexico’s Directorate of Federal Security (DFS), resigned as Mexico City’s Police Chief to become Director General of the National Lottery. García Paniagua had been police chief since 1988, and his appointment caused controversy due to accusations that he approved and used torture during his years in the DFS.  In the cable, Embassy officials describe the DFS as “an agency with a reputation for corruption and ruthlessness.” The cable notes that Miguel Nazar Haro, García Paniagua’s police deputy and intelligence chief, was accused of carrying out political killings and human rights abuses when he headed the DFS in the 1980s. In 1989, he was forced to resign from the Mexico City police amidst allegations that he protected drug traffickers. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 13 June 13, 2003 Mexican Supreme Court Hands Down Landmark Decision on Extradition of Ricardo Cavallo for Crimes Against Humanity U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Unclassified Cable 3 pages On September 12, 2000, the Mexican Supreme Court handed down a decision upholding the legal basis for the extradition of Argentine national Ricardo Miguel Cavallo to Spain. Cavallo was arrested by Mexican Interpol on August 24 and was extradited to Spain for crimes of genocide and terrorism committed between 1976 and 1983. In this cable the Embassy comments on the possibility of the decision affecting Mexican domestic human rights cases, such as the case against Miguel Nazar Haro and Luis de la Barreda, who were “both accused of torture and ‘disappearing’ leftists during the so-called ‘Dirty War’ in Mexico during the 60s, 70s, and 80s.” The cable reports that Special Prosecutor Ignacio Carrillo Prieto, assigned to investigate human rights cases of the past, asked the Embassy to provide copies of declassified cables with information on the two former intelligence chiefs and their involvement in human rights abuses. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 14 January 13, 2005 Special Prosecutor Makes Headlines but Limited Progress in Unraveling Past Human Rights Crimes U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Confidential Cable 3 pages The U.S. Embassy reports that the Special Prosecutor’s Office is moving slowly to prosecute Mexico’s political crimes of the past. Although the office had achieved some incremental progress, it was slow to locate victims and bring the perpetrators to trial. The cable cites the case of Aleida Gallangos and her efforts to locate her brother Lucio, almost 30 years after they were separated from their parents at the hands of government forces. Aleida had strongly criticized the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which, according to the cable, offered her little support in her search for her brother, but nevertheless tried to take the credit in a “hastily-called press conference,” after Aleida found Lucio living in the United States in December 2004. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act

Notes

1. Chapter 6 of the Special Prosecutor’s Report lists Roberto Antonio among those detained on July 26, 1968.
2. For more information on the historical collaboration between the CIA station in Mexico and DFS intelligence agents, see NSA briefing book “LITEMPO: The CIA’s Eyes on Tlatelolco”.
3. See for example Sergio Aguayo, La charola: una historia de los servicios de intelligencia en México, México, D.F, Grijalbo; Hoja Editorial; Hechos Confiables, 2001, pp. 133-34 for a reference to the “fantasies and exaggerations” employed in DFS documents about student protesters in 1968.
4. Chapter 8 of the Special Prosecutor’s report lists Avelino Gallangos and Carmen Vargas among the 69 individuals disappeared in Mexico City during the dirty war.
5. Chapter 10 of the Special Prosecutor’s report describes the counterinsurgency operations carried out by DFS agents in the early 1970s, and reports that Nazar Haro participated directly in extralegal detentions and interrogations of suspected guerrillas.
6. DFS chief Zorrilla was charged and sentence in 1989 to thirty-five years for the 1984 murder of Manuel Buendia, a journalist who exposed DFS official links to narco-trade. Another DFS chief, Nazar Haro, was linked to the murder of U.S. DEA agent Enrique Camarena. For more information on the DFS and drugs, see Julia Preston and Samuel Dillon, Opening Mexico: The Making of a Democracy, New York, Straus and Giroux, 2004.
7. See chapter 10 of the Special Prosecutor’s report.
In front of Lecumberri, the “Black Palace” – formerly a detention center for political prisoners, now home to the historical National Archives (AGN) – activists hang pictures of Mexico’s disappeared [Undated Photo. Source: AGN files].
Luis Echeverría (president from 1970-76) visiting Mexican officers and soldiers in Guerrero during the height of the military’s “dirty war” counterinsurgency campaign against Lucio Cabañas and his Party of the Poor [Source: AGN files]
Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, taken sometime in between 1968 and 1975. This picture was part of the DFS intelligence files, and was retrieved prior to his disappearance as part of the government’s surveillance efforts to monitor his activities after the 1968 protests [Source: AGN, DFS files]
Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, with his hands tied behind his back, after being detained on June 19, 1975. [Source: AGN, DFS files, 11-235, Legajo 30, Folio 124]
Carmen Vargas Pérez, prior to her detention and disappearance by DFS agents. This picture was part of the DFS intelligence files, and was retrieved by intelligence agents as part of the government’s surveillance efforts [Source: AGN, DFS files, 11-235, Legajo 30, Folio 43]
Carmen Vargas Pérez, prior to her detention and disappearance by DFS agents [Source: family’s personal files]
Weapons and leftist propaganda reportedly obtained through counterinsurgency raids in Mexico’s urban centers
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<div align=”justify”>Suspected guerrillas detained by Mexican authorities

TOP-SECRET – Operación México: Programa argentino de rendición extraordinaria revelado por documentos desclasificados

En julio de 1978, fuerzas de seguridad argentinas, enviaron documentación a sus pares en Paraguay buscando al fugado Jaime Dri, único testigo sobreviviente de la Operación México.

Operación México: Programa argentino de rendición extraordinaria revelado por documentos desclasificados

Analista del National Security Archive presenta nueva evidencia ante un tribunal argentino

Septiembre 9, 2009, Washington, DC – El National Security Archive revela hoy un documento que Jaime Dri, único sobreviviente, conoció directamente sobre la Operación México que forzó a desaparecidos detenidos en Rosario a participar en un escuadrón de la muerte para infiltrar a la dirección de Montoneros en Ciudad de México en enero de 1978. “DRI JAIME ‘Pelado'” indica el documento, estuvo presente cuando vino “de regreso de México, la comisión oficial” que salió de Rosario.

Dri fue capturado en diciembre de 1977 y luego pasó por un periplo que lo llevó a varios centros de detención clandestina incluyendo el de Rosario donde encontró a 14 detenidos hoy desaparecidos, a Tucho Valenzuela y a agentes de inteligencia que forzaron a algunos a viajar a México. El 19 de Julio Dri se escapó a Asunción, Paraguay. Sus captores clandestinos, enviaron desesperadas peticiones a sus pares en Paraguay y dejaron pistas sobre lo que vio Dri durante esos ocho meses. Un informe del 21 de julio de 1978  del Estado Mayor General del Ejercito de las Fuerzas Armadas Paraguayas encontrado en el Archivo del Terror dice que han recibido un pedido de búsqueda de una agencia secreta argentina por Jaime Dri quien “se escapó de las Autoridades Argentinas de Pilcomayo, Argentina” hacia Paraguay. El pedido de Argentina incluye un prontuario de dos páginas sobre Dri donde claramente establecen que “De regreso de México, la comisión oficial que acompaño a ‘TUCHO’ le hizo saber a DRI JAIME ‘Pelado'” noticias de México. ‘TUCHO'” Valenzuela, fue uno de los secuestrados sacado de una prisión en Argentina y forzado a viajar con los agentes de inteligencia.

El informe descubierto por Carlos Osorio, director del Proyecto de Documentación del Cono Sur del National Security Archive, en el Archivo del Terror del Paraguay, fue presentado ayer ante el tribunal numero 1 de Rosario Argentina, donde se enjuicia a agentes del destacamento de inteligencia 121. La causa Guerrieri, por el nombre de uno de los imputados, trata de la detención ilegal y posterior asesinato de 14 insurgentes Montoneros en una cárcel secreta en la ciudad de Rosario, Argentina. Los prisioneros habrían sido testigos y forzados a colaborar en lo que se conoce como Operación México, un escuadrón de inteligencia militar enviado a Ciudad de México a liquidar a cabecillas Montoneros en enero de 1978. [Ver 1978: Operación Clandestina de la Inteligencia Militar Argentina en México, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 241]

Los documentos de Paraguay se complementan con la media docena de otros publicados en enero de 2008 por el National Security Archive provenientes de la Dirección Federal de Seguridad de México (DFS) que dan cuenta que la DFS capturó e interrogó a dos de los agentes secretos argentinos y los expulsó de vuelta a su país. “Los nuevos documentos concluyen una triangulación de evidencia documental internacional sobre Operación México y confirman la veracidad del testimonio de Dri que por años, fue conocido solamente por el libro Recuerdos de la Muerte” dijo Carlos Osorio.

Esta gacetilla electrónica incluye los documentos centrales provenientes del Archivo del Terror y están acompañados de otros doce de EEUU, Argentina y México que verifican la solidez de la historia aparecida en el libro Recuerdo de la Muerte. Paso a paso, los documentos que presentamos hoy en esta gacetilla presentan una narrativa que calza perfectamente con el testimonio de Dri: su captura y herida en Uruguay, su traslado clandestino a la Escuela Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA) en Buenos Aires y luego Rosario, el haber sido testigo de Operación México, estar nuevamente en la ESMA y haberse escapado a través de Asunción Paraguay. Un informe de la Embajada de EEUU por ejemplo informa que Dri fue “detenido cerca de Montevideo el pasado 15 de diciembre” y SERA entregado “solapadamente a las autoridades argentinas” en 1977. Por otra parte un documento secreto de una agencia de inteligencia argentina informa que en julio de 1978 “se escapó de un Taxi camino a Itá Enramada [Paraguay] de su custodia”.

Luego de escapar a Paraguay, Dri se refugió en la Embajada de Panamá, país de origen de su esposa y donde finalmente se radicó.

Documentos
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Los documentos del Archivo del Terror usados en esta publicación son propiedad de la Corte Suprema de Justicia y han sido puestos a disposición pública gracias a la cortesía y anuencia de la Excelentísima Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el marco de varios Convenios en apoyo del Centro de Documentación y Archivo (CDyA). Copias oficiales de los originales pueden ser pedidas al CDyA, PALACIO DE JUSTICIA, Testanova y Mariano Roque Alonso, 8vo. Piso Of.13, Asunción -Paraguay, Tel: 595-21-424212/15 Interno: 2269, e-mail: cdya_py@hotmail.com, http://www.pj.gov.py/cdya. Los nuevos descubrimientos han sido hechos usando una  herramienta clave de investigación del CDyA, el Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD). El ATD es un instrumento que cuenta con la digitalización en una base de datos de los más de 300,00 documentos del Archivo del Terror.


Diciembre 30, 1977 – Derechos Humanos: Arresto por el GOU del Pianista Miguel Estrella y Otros Presuntos Montoneros en Uruguay
Cable Secreto de la Embajada de EEUU en Montevideo

La Embajada de EEUU en Uruguay informa que el arresto del pianista argentino refugiado en Uruguay Miguel Ángel Estrella es parte de una serie de redadas llevadas a cabo entre el 15 y 16 de diciembre donde han sido capturados ocho Montoneros. Estos últimos “se encuentran esperando ser extraditados a Argentina”.

Jaime Dri, en el recuento de su detención clandestina, da cuenta* que él cayó en esta redada. La palabra “extraditados” es usada en el cable como un eufemismo. Investigaciones realizadas posteriormente dan prueba que los prisioneros fueron trasladados ilegalmente de una fuerza de seguridad uruguaya a una fuerza de seguridad argentina.

*”Al  menos era todo lo que el Pelado [Jaime Dri] recordaba. La explicación más sencilla era que toda la estructura clandestina había caído a partir de la vigilancia de la punta del iceberg: la casa de [Miguel Ángel] Estrella”.
(Bonasso, 56)


Enero 4, 1978 – Derechos Humanos: Rubén De Gregorio
Cable Secreto de la Embajada de EEUU en Montevideo

La Embajada estadounidense en Montevideo informa que el ciudadano argentino Rubén De Gregorio fue capturado por autoridades uruguayas mientras intentaba ingresar al país…. Al ser arrestado, De Gregorio tenía en su posesión un revolver calibre .38…” Posteriormente, dice el cable, fue “entregado a las autoridades argentinas”.

Jaime Dri en sus declaraciones* da cuenta de haber estado prisionero con De Gregorio en el centro clandestino de detención de la Escuela Mecánica de la Armada Argentina, ESMA.

*”‘Sordo De Gregorio, un oficial superior del Partido [Montoneros] que  había  caído en Colonia, cuando le encontraron un revólver  dentro  de  un  termo  para  el  mate” (Bonasso, 55-56)


Enero 6, 1978 – Rubén De Gregorio
Cable secreto de la Embajada de EEUU en Buenos Aires

Dando seguimiento al cable de la Embajada en Montevideo del 4 de enero, la Embajada de EEUU en Argentina informa que “una fuente de de habitud  confiable…. Dijo el 19 de diciembre de 1977 que De Gregorio era un oficial de alto rango dentro de los Montoneros y que estaba detenido en le Escuela Mecánica de la Armada”.

De Gregorio desapareció luego de ser visto prisionero en la ESMA por varios testigos incluyendo a Jaime Dri*.

*”Ya en las proximidades de la ESMA los del Falcon llamaron a Selenio, anunciando el regreso. Diez minutos después los enfermeros depositaban  al  Sordo [De Gregorio]  en  una  camilla de la enfermería”. (Bonasso, 321)


Enero 12, 1978 – Petición de Asistencia de EEUU para Encontrar a Parlamentario
Cable Secreto de la Embajada de EEUU en Roma

El Ministro Consejero (Deputy Chief of Mission) estadounidense en Roma explica al Departamento de Estado y las Embajadas en Montevideo y Buenos Aires que el Embajador ha recibido una carta del Nuncio Apostólico pidiendo ayuda para localizar a parlamentario argentino Jaime Dri. El Nuncio ha tomado esta iniciativa a instancias del hermano de Jaime Dri, quien es sacerdote en Roma. Según la información proporcionada, Jaime Dri se encontraba en Uruguay cuando se dejo de comunicar con su familia en diciembre. Se dice que la familia Dri tiene amistad con el presidente panameño Omar Torrijos. El Nuncio solicita que la embajada estadounidense en Montevideo investigue para aclarar lo que ha sido de Jaime Dri.


Enero 18, 1978 – [Conferencia de Prensa de Tucho Valenzuela]
Transcripción de la Dirección Federal de Seguridad de México

En una explosiva conferencia de prensa en Ciudad de México, el Montonero Tulio [Tucho] Valenzuela cuenta como fue capturado en Rosario, Argentina, a finales del año 1977, detenido clandestinamente junto a un grupo de Montoneros forzados a colaborar con el ejército argentino, y traído a México junto a otro colaborador y agentes de inteligencia argentinos con el fin de dar un golpe a Montoneros que tiene una base política en México. Una vez en esta ciudad, Valenzuela escapa al control de los agentes de inteligencia argentinos y denuncia la operación ante la prensa. Este documento obtenido de la Dirección Federal de Seguridad de México, transcribe las declaraciones de Valenzuela. Entre otras revelaciones, Valenzuela da cuenta que:

“En una parte del Segundo Cuerpo del Ejercito [argentino en Rosario] uno de los compañeros que está en esa quinta es el compañero Jaime Dri, quien me relata su historia de su detención y como llegó hasta ahí. El compañero fue detenido en la calle cuando estaba en un auto, después de una cita junto con el compañero Juan Alejandro Barry. Los chocaron en un auto. Ellos estaban desarmados. Esto fue en Uruguay. Trataron de escaparse… al compañero Barry lo matan y el compañero Jaime Dri recibe dos impactos, uno en cada pierna. Inmediatamente es trasladado… [a] dependencias militares del ejército del Uruguay y torturado salvajemente por 15 días…. Participan en el interrogatorio miembros de la Escuela Mecánica de la Armada de la Argentina… Trasladan al compañero Jaime Dri a la Escuela Mecánica de la Armada… posteriormente el compañero Jaime Dri es trasladado a Rosario, a la misma quinta donde estoy yo… Me relata también las circunstancias de la caída de un comandante segundo del partido [Montoneros], compañero De Gregorio, que fue capturado en Colonia [Uruguay] el 14 de Noviembre…”

Tulio Valenzuela informa además que antes de llegar a México los agentes de inteligencia y prisioneros pasaron por Brasil y Guatemala. En sus declaraciones aparecidas en el libro Recuerdo de la Muerte, Jaime Dri cuenta que fue trasladado de la ESMA a Rosario temporalmente, donde encontró a Tulio Valenzuela y se enteró de la operación de la inteligencia militar a México.

Nota: El transcriptor de la conferencia de prensa es seguramente un agente de inteligencia mexicano que desconoce el contexto por lo que varios nombres en la transcripción están cambiados seguramente por ignorancia del transcriptor sobre como deletrear los nombres originales. Jaime Dri por  ejemplo aparece como Jaime Lee. Una versión original de estas declaraciones encontrada entre los documentos del Departamento de EEUU, fue publicada en 2008 en la gacetilla electrónica Operación Clandestina de la Inteligencia Militar Argentina en México, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 241.


Enero 20, 1978 – [Carta al Presidente de EEUU James Carter de Olimpia Díaz]
Copia de carta en archivos del Departamento de Estado de EEUU

Dos días después de enterarse del testimonio del ciudadano argentino Tulio Valenzuela en México, la esposa de Jaime Dri, la panameña Olimpia Díaz, envía una carta dirigida al presidente estadounidense James Carter solicitando su ayuda para localizar a su esposo. Olimpia explica que antes de desaparecer, su esposo fue visto por última vez en Montevideo el 10 de diciembre de 1977, de camino a Panamá. Además, se ha enterado que a mediados de diciembre, varios argentinos fueron detenidos en Uruguay y trasladados a Argentina, lo cual coincide con la desaparición de su esposo y teme que él se encuentre entre ellos. Lo que confirmó sus sospechas fueron las declaraciones hechas por Tulio Valenzuela. Al final de su carta, Olimpia añade que su cuñado, hermano de Jaime Dri, “ha realizado gestiones ante la Santa Sede”.


Enero 23, 1978 – Parlamentario Desaparecido – Jaime Feliciano Dri Lodi
Cable Secreto de la Embajada de EEUU en Montevideo

En respuesta a la solicitud de la embajada estadounidense en Roma el 12 de enero de 1978, la embajada estadounidense en Montevideo envía un cable secreto dirigido a sus homólogos en Roma, explicando que Jaime Dri fue “detenido cerca de Montevideo el pasado 15 de diciembre, durante una redada de las fuerzas de seguridad locales contra terroristas argentinos Montoneros”. Y agrega que “el sujeto ofreció resistencia armada y fue herido en la pierna antes de su captura. Además nos han informado que el GOU [Gobierno de Uruguay] tiene la intención de entregar a todos los detenidos solapadamente a las autoridades argentinas… la detención del sujeto [Dri] no es, repito, no es de conocimiento público… Los detalles del incidente, las identidades de los arrestados que no han sido publicadas y su eventual destino, es información retenida firmemente por el GOU”. El cable termina diciendo que “la información anterior es clasificada y extremadamente sensible y es todo lo que está a disposición de la embajada y no pensamos que sea posible extraer información útil y desclasificada que pueda ser transmitida al Nuncio Apostólico en Roma”.


Marzo 17, 1978 – [Carta a Olimpia Díaz]
Inquisitoria Respecto de Jaime Dri
Documentos de la Embajada de EEUU en Panamá

A instancias de la Casa Blanca, la Segunda Secretaria de la embajada estadounidense en Panamá, Ruth Hansen, se comunica con Olimpia Díaz informándole que están requiriendo a la Embajada de EEUU en Argentina que recaben cualquier información que tengan respecto de Jaime Dri. Ese mismo día, Hansen envía un memorándum a la Embajada de EEUU en Buenos Aires pidiéndole información sobre el caso de Jaime Dri. Sorprendentemente, no se menciona por ninguna parte la información que tiene la Embajada de EEUU en Montevideo sobre la efectiva detención de Jaime Dri y su probable traslado a fuerzas de seguridad argentinas.


Abril 10, 1978 – [Carta de Horacio Domingo Maggio a Prensa Asociada]
[Carta de Horacio Domingo Maggio al Embajador de Estados Unidos]
Carta personal en los archivos del Departamento de Estado

Un prisionero clandestino que ha escapado de la Escuela Mecánica de la Armada envía una larga carta al Embajador de los Estados Unidos Raúl Castro y a la Prensa Asociada (Associated Press, AP). En ella da cuenta de un inmenso centro de detención en esas instalaciones y de las aberrantes prácticas de tortura. En particular, Horacio Domingo Maggio cuenta que “Me trasladaron a lo que luego supe era la Escuela Mecánica de la Armada. Fui sometido a torturas (‘picana’ o ‘maquina’ y ‘submarino’) al igual que la mayoría de la gente que estaba allí y que aun sigue estando. Entre otros… el dirigente nacional del Movimiento Peronista Montonero, Jaime Dri, que fuera secuestrado en Uruguay”.


Junio 23, 1978 – Desaparición de Jaime Dri  

En respuesta a la carta de la embajada estadounidense en Panamá del 17 de marzo de 1978, la embajada en Buenos Aires informa que presentó el caso de Jaime Dri al Grupo de Trabajo de Derechos Humanos de la Oficina del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores argentino. Sin embargo, Buenos Aires hace notar que esa oficina sólo suele responder a “solicitudes donde las personas han sido detenidas legalmente bajo cargos criminales o por decreto del ejecutivo”. La implicación es que probablemente no obtendrán respuesta positiva debido a que Dri está desaparecido, es decir detenido clandestinamente. Sorprende que al final el cable deje entrever que no conocen la información que la Embajada de Montevideo tiene respecto de la efectiva detención de Dri. El Embajador Castro concluye remitiendo “Para la Embajada de Montevideo: Materiales sobre este caso están siendo enviados por valija diplomática pues parece que el secuestro ocurrió en Uruguay”.


Julio 20, 1978 – Desaparición de Jaime Dri

Una breve nota de la Embajada de Panamá  responde al memo de Buenos Aires e indica que Olimpia Díaz fue notificada de los magros resultados que se han obtenido en Argentina. Según el informe, Olimpia Díaz también se ha puesto en contacto con el gobierno de Panamá, que supuestamente está investigando el caso a través de su embajada en Argentina.


Julio 20, 1978 – [Datos Personales del Sujeto Jaime Dri]
Nota de la Policía de Asunción, Paraguay

El Jefe de la policía de Asunción, Paraguay, remite a su subalterno Jefe de la Dirección de Investigaciones “fotocopia de la fotografía y datos personales del sujeto Jaime Dri, a fin de que se sirva disponer su captura”. Los datos han sido proveídos evidentemente a los paraguayos por una fuerza de seguridad argentina.

Junto a la fotografía, una serie de datos indican “Jaime Dri, ‘Pelado’, Oficial de Montoneros… Camisa a cuadros, pantalón gris”. Y concluyen “Ayer, se escapo de un Taxi camino a Itá Enramada de su custodia”*.

* En Recuerdo de la Muerte este episodio es relatado así: “- Yo me tomo un taxi…
-¡Vamos a Itá Enramada! – ordena [el custodia] Alberto… Antes de que se detenga la marcha, el Pelado [Jaime Dri] abre la puerta y se lanza…” (Bonasso, 428)


Julio 21, 1978

  1. Pedido de búsqueda N° 020/78:  Actividades de elementos subversivos Montoneros
  2. Anexo 1: Fotos, factura y documento de identidad

Documento del Estado Mayor General de la Fuerza Armada de  Paraguay (ESMAGENFA)

La Policía de Asunción, Paraguay, transcribe un informe del Departamento II de Inteligencia del Estado Mayor General de las Fuerzas Armadas Paraguayas (ESMAGENFA). El Ejército ha recibido de una “Agencia de Inteligencia de país amigo” una petición de capturar a Jaime Dri quien “se escapó de las Autoridades Argentinas de Pilcomayo, Argentina” hacia el Paraguay. “En el momento de la fuga, el causante vestía una camisa mangas largas a rayas verticales, color rosado y pantalones gris”*. Entre los anexos al pedido de búsqueda se incluyen fotos, una factura, documento de identidad y un Prontuario sobre Jaime Dri.

*En Recuerdo de la Muerte, Jaime Dri reflexiona que “[l]a policía debe tener ya la descripción de un hombre alto, calvo, así y así, vestido con un vaquero y una camisa de color rosado” (Bonasso, 430).


Julio 21, 1978 – Anexo 1: Prontuario: Informe Acerca de la Situación Personal de Jaime Dri, Pelado
Documento de Agencia de Seguridad Argentina

El Pedido de Búsqueda No 020/78 de la ESAMGENFA del Paraguay incluye un Prontuario de una agencia de inteligencia Argentina desconocida. El documento da un panorama general de Jaime Dri y sus actitudes disidentes de Montoneros. En un remarcable párrafo, el documento confirma media docena de aspectos secretos clave de Operación México, que hasta hoy sólo se conocían por el testimonio de Jaime Dri. Lanzada en enero de 1978, Operación México implicó a oficiales de inteligencia argentina, junto a Montoneros capturados, quienes viajaron desde Argentina hacia México a fin de asesinar a la dirigencia de Montoneros en Ciudad de México. La Operación falló, los agentes volvieron a Argentina y asesinaron a los prisioneros testigos. Jaime Dri sobrevivió.

Entre otros, Dri en su testimonio publicado da cuenta que:

  1. el  grupo de inteligencia salió en misión oficial de Rosario, Argentina rumbo a México
  2. llevaban prisionero al Montonero Tulio [Tucho] Valenzuela
  3. los agentes de inteligencia iban en misión oficial a México
  4. en el camino hicieron que Tucho aparentara no estar capturado y llamara a sus contactos en México
  5. respondió la esposa de Jaime Dri Olimpia Díaz quien informó volvería pronto a Panamá.
  6. Jaime Dri vio volver a los agentes de inteligencia luego de la fallida Operación México

El prontuario ratifica este recuento diciendo,

“De regreso de México, la comisión oficial que acompaño a ‘TUCHO’ le hizo saber a DRI JAIME ‘Pelado’, que en oportunidad de llamar ‘TUCHO’ desde Brasil a la casa Argentina en México, se comunicó con ella [su esposa] que en ese momento se encontraba allí; y había manifestado que el día siguiente regresaba a Panamá”.

*En recuerdo de la muerte varios episodios son relatados así:

“Valenzuela llama a México… Para su sorpresa lo atiende Olimpia Díaz. La negra le comenta… que regresa a Panamá…” (Bonasso, 208)

“Los protagonistas de la Operación México ya se habían reintegrado….” (Bonasso, 280)


Octubre 04, 1978 – Desaparición de Jaime Dri

En octubre del 1978, la embajada estadounidense en Argentina, envía un informe a la embajada de Panamá lamentando la falta de información conseguida en el caso de Jaime Dri. Según el informe, “Nos parece que el Jaime Dri es uno de entre miles de desaparecidos cuyo destino es desconocido… en muy pocas ocasiones alguien que estaba desaparecido aparecerá en una lista de una prisión. La respuesta estándar por alguien que ha desaparecido es no hay registro de detención”.

Y concluye “Sentimos no poder ofrecer a la señora Dri algún tipo de aliento positivo o incluso información sólida.
Los oficiales de la embajada [de Panamá] se darán cuenta del nivel de secretividad que prevalece entre los oficiales argentinos sobre esta faceta de la campaña anti subversiva, y de por qué es improbable que alguna vez se conozca el destino de Jaime Dri a menos – que por alguna casualidad – este todavía vivo y las autoridades militares decidan hacerlo aparecer”.

TOP-SECRET – Archival Evidence of Mexico’s Human Rights Crimes: The Case of Aleida Gallangos

Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, following his detention on July 26, 1968, in the midst of the student protests. The photograph was part of the Mexican intelligence files compiled by DFS agents, and made available in the AGN years later.

[Source: AGN, DFS files, 11-235, Legajo 30, Folio 17]

rchival Evidence of Mexico’s Human Rights Crimes: The Case of Aleida GallangosNational Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 307

Washington, DC, September 9, 2011 – A Mexican human rights activist who was orphaned in infancy when her parents disappeared at the hands of government forces filed a petition before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) yesterday, drawing on dozens of declassified U.S. and Mexican documents as evidence. Aleida Gallangos Vargas–whose case became widely known in 2004 when she tracked down her long-lost brother through intelligence records found in Mexico’s national archives–joined with her paternal grandmother to charge the State with responsibility for the secret detention and disappearance in 1975 of her parents, Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz and Carmen Vargas Pérez, among other family members. Today the National Security Archive is posting a selection of the documents being used in the case, obtained by the Archive through the Freedom of Information Act and from the Mexican government. Aleida was two years old when her parents were captured; she was rescued by a friend of her parents who himself was killed by security forces in 1976. Aleida was adopted by his family and renamed Luz Elba Gorostiola Herrera. Aleida’s brother Lucio Antonio, who was three when Roberto Antonio and Carmen disappeared, was taken by members of the government death squad that raided their home in June 1975; shortly afterwards he was delivered to an orphanage and in February 1976 was adopted by a couple and christened Juan Carlos Hernández Valadez. The two children grew up in separate lives knowing nothing of their true identities or of their relationship. The history of the Gallangos-Vargas family emerged in 2001 when a magazine published an interview with Roberto Antonio’s mother, Quirina Cruz Calvo, along with photographs of the disappeared couple and their two small children. Aleida’s adoptive family recognized Luz Elba’s face in the pictures and Aleida was reunited with her grandmother. She spent the next several years piecing together the circumstances of the Mexican government’s role in abducting and secretly detaining her parents. Using government records that had been located by the office of the Special Prosecutor assigned to investigate past political crimes, Aleida managed to track down her brother in the United States in 2004, 29 years after their separation. The records Aleida used to find Lucio Antonio–along with dozens more obtained by the National Security Archive through requests to the Mexican and U.S. governments–now serve as critical evidence in the case brought by Aleida on March 8 before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. The Inter-American system has been an important venue for victims and activists seeking recourse from the Mexican government for state-sponsored human rights crimes committed during the 1960s-80s. On November 23, 2009, the Inter-American Human Rights Court issued a landmark decision, finding Mexico responsible for the illegal detention and disappearance of Rosendo Radilla, a schoolteacher and social activist stopped at a military checkpoint in Atoyac, Guerrero on August 25, 1974. Radilla–known for his songs of social protest and his admiration of Lucio Cabañas, the popular guerrilla leader from Guerrero–was disappeared at the height of the State’s extralegal counterinsurgency campaign against rebels and their supporters in southern Mexico in the early 1970s [see NSA briefing book on Lucio Cabañas, and the Dawn of the Dirty War]. The 2009 ruling marked the first Inter-American decision against Mexico for abuses committed during the “dirty war.” The court ordered the government to pay reparations to the family members for the years of suffering inflicted as a result of the crime. The Radilla decision established an important precedent for future legal action targeting Mexico’s unresolved human rights crimes of the past. To date, Mexico’s political and judicial systems have proven incapable of dealing with even the most notorious atrocities of the “dirty war,” such as the 1968 and 1971 student massacres and the hundreds of cases of illegal detentions, torture, and forced disappearances carried out around the country in the 1970s and early 1980s. In addition to the Army’s rural counterinsurgency violence, Mexico’s intelligence services carried out a carefully orchestrated program of kidnappings and disappearances in the country’s urban centers in an effort to dismantle guerrilla networks and eliminate social and political opposition. One of the victims of the government’s urban counterinsurgency was Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, an activist involved in the 1968 student movement and later a militant in the radical 23rd of September Communist League. In the summer of ’68, Roberto Antonio joined the anti-war protests in Mexico City and marched for greater democratic openness from Mexico’s closed political system. He became one of the hundreds of protestors monitored by government spies gathering information on student activists. Internal Mexican intelligence records report that Roberto Antonio participated in rallies, reciting anti-war poems such as “los tres pueblos,” which he delivered during a demonstration on April 23, 1968 [see Doc 5; DFS report on Roberto Antonio]. Security forces detained Roberto Antonio on July 26 during government round-ups of student agitators that culminated in the October 2 Tlatelolco massacre. (Note 1) He was held in the infamous Lecumberri prison in Mexico City for over two months, where state intelligence agents kept close tabs on his visitors. While the charges against him were insufficient to keep him in prison, the Federal Security Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad – DFS) continued to monitor his activities following his release. Over the next seven years, government security services assembled a thick intelligence file documenting Roberto Antonio’s association with Mexico’s guerrilla groups. The violent efforts of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institutional—PRI) to crush the peaceful 1968 student movement was a pivotal moment that dramatically radicalized the social and political opposition, increasing popular support for Mexico’s insurgent groups. The 23rd of September Communist League (Liga Comunista de 23 de Septiembre) was one of the urban guerrilla groups that grew in strength as a result, and in turn became a central target of the organized violence that characterized the government’s counterinsurgency efforts during the period. Following the kidnapping by leftists of U.S. Consul General Terrance Leonhardy in May 1973 and U.S. Vice-Consul John L. Patterson in March 1974, Mexican security forces were given even greater freedom to attack insurgent groups and their supporters. The DFS in particular became the driving force behind State terror, serving as Mexico’s internal political police force [see Doc 1: on the growth of the DFS]. U.S. agencies also expanded their coordination with their Mexican intelligence counterparts, increasing their information gathering on Mexico’s leftists groups. The DFS agents regularly shared intelligence with the FBI attachés in the U.S. Embassy and consulates in Mexico’s northern cities [see FBI memorandum: Doc 2 on the 23 of September group]. The long connection between the DFS and the CIA also provided a central source of information for Mexico’s internal security apparatus to confront the armed groups. (Note 2) It was during this period of urban counterinsurgency that the web of Mexico’s intelligence services grew, as information flowed to and from Mexico City to the Army and police installations throughout the country. The DFS institutionalized the State’s ability to gather information, detain suspects, torture and disappear with ultimate deniability. Seven years after the 1968 crackdown, Roberto Antonio Gallangos became a victim of the DFS campaign of disappearances. According to Mexican intelligence documents obtained by the National Security Archive, Roberto Antonio – by then living underground as a member of the 23rd of September Communist League – was spotted walking on a Mexico City street by a police sergeant. After a brief shootout, police captured Gallangos and turned him over to the DFS [Doc 4]. DFS agents interrogated and tortured him, extracting information about his family, social, and organizational affiliations. The declassified Mexican documents describe Roberto Antonio Gallangos as a radical criminal, with links to a network of subversive organizations and a background in bank robberies, kidnapping and murder. It is difficult to evaluate the veracity of the many allegations made in the documents against him, his family, friends and associates. Federal security agents often exaggerated the threat from leftist groups in order to justify aggressive counterinsurgency measures. (Note 3) Torture and forced confessions were commonly used against suspected subversives, and photos taken of Gallangos during detention seem to show signs of torture [Doc 6]. But while the DFS files reported on his alleged crimes, the information was never meant for use as legal evidence in a court of law. Rather, intelligence gathered through surveillance, abduction and torture was used to locate associates of suspected guerrillas, dismantle social networks, and terrorize their base of support. In the case of Gallangos, the DFS agents sought information about his wife and other militant friends and family members, but it is uncertain whether or not what Gallangos told his interrogators was true. Security forces did not capture his wife Carmen Vargas Pérez for more than a month after his kidnapping (detained July 26, 1975); his brother Avelino Francisco Gallangos Cruz was caught one month after that (August 22, 1975). Both remain among Mexico’s disappeared (Note 4). What is clear is that the government’s detention of Gallangos on June 19, 1975, had tragic and lasting repercussions for Roberto’s family, including the “disappearance” of his children until they discovered their identities years later. The case exemplifies how government terror functioned not only to combat the guerrillas, but also destroy the social fabric of groups who opposed the government’s authority. The secret DFS documents obtained by the Archive expose the inner workings of Mexico’s urban counterinsurgency campaign in the 1970s and reveal the involvement of the highest levels of government in political crimes of state. The abuses included illegal spying and infiltration of leftist groups, unwarranted police raids, secret detentions and transfers of prisoners, abduction, torture, and murder. The intelligence files were signed by then-Chief of the agency, Capitan Luis de la Barreda Moreno (head from 1970-75). Senior DFS agents such as Miguel Nazar Haro participated directly in the operations, interrogation and torture of prisoners. (Note 5) The information gathered flowed to the Interior Ministry (Secretaría de Gobernación), at the time led by Mario Moya Palencia. Number two in Gobernación was the career-spy chief Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, who served in the DFS for over 20 years and directed the agency from 1964 until his long-time friend de la Barreda took over in 1970. Gutiérrez Barrios occupied Mexico’s most senior intelligence position as Deputy Minister of the Interior, regularly receiving DFS traffic on suspected subversives, and playing a central role in the extermination campaign against Mexico’s left. At the top of the chain of command was Luis Echeverría, Interior Minister from 1964-70, and head of state from 1970-76. Despite evidence demonstrating direct government involvement in the urban disappearances, a special prosecutor assigned in 2002 by President Vicente Fox to investigate past human rights crimes failed to bring Luis Echeverría or any of his senior military, police or intelligence commanders to justice. In 2003, the prosecutor, Dr. Ignacio Carillo Prieto, asked the United State Embassy in Mexico City for declassified cables on de la Barreda and Nazar Haro [Doc 13] and brought charges against the officials for the forced disappearance of Jesús Piedra Ibarra, another member of the 23rd of September group detained in April 1975. But the special prosecutor was unable to win convictions and the charges were dropped. The DFS officials who have gone to jail since the “dirty war” have done so for their involvement in drug trafficking rather than for human rights crimes. There is a deep connection between the former Mexican intelligence service and the country’s drug mafias. As DFS agents took command of counterinsurgency raids in the 1970s, they often stumbled upon narcotics safe houses and quickly took on the job of protecting Mexico’s drug cartels. The DFS was disbanded in 1985 following revelations that it was behind the murder of DEA agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, and Mexican journalist Manuel Buendia. (Note 6) Some 1,500 agents suddenly unemployed with the abolishment of the DFS found their training in covert activities and brutal counterinsurgency operations easily adaptable to the needs of the criminal underworld. Many joined the ranks of the powerful drug cartels or served the traffickers while working on local and federal police forces [see Doc 11 & Doc 12 on DFS agents and drugs]. By failing to prosecute a single case against the former agents, the Special Prosecutor missed a crucial opportunity to bring some of Mexico’s most corrupt officials to justice, allowing impunity to remain entrenched in Mexican society. The Special Prosecutor also failed to fully clarify the crimes of the past or locate any of Mexico’s disappeared. Carrillo Prieto claimed as his own success the discovery and identification of Lucio Antonio Gallangos Vargas, the missing son of Roberto Antonio Gallangos and Carmen Vargas. (Note 7) In fact it was due to the efforts Aleida Gallangos that her brother was located. Although she began her search as part of the “Citizen’s Committee” created by the Special Prosecutor’s office, she resigned from the committee in disgust with the prosecutor’s fruitless investigations. After traveling to Washington, where she says she was threatened by the Mexican consulate, she finally located her brother in the winter of 2004. The Special Prosecutor then organized an ad-hoc press conference in an attempt to take credit for locating Lucio Antonio. In a cable to Washington, U.S. Embassy officials discounted Carrillo Prieto’s claims and cited an independent evaluation of his work that called his office “unresponsive” to victims’ needs. [see Doc 14]. With yesterday’s filing of the case “Luz Elba Gorostiola Herrera and Quirina Cruz Calvo against the State of Mexico” before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, Aleida and her biological and adoptive families have underscored the failure of the Mexican government to bring the perpetrators of past human rights atrocities to justice. Mexico’s inability to resolve these cases has left survivors of the dirty war and families of the disappeared without legal recourse at the national level. With the groundbreaking Radilla decision of 2009, the Inter-American system offers new hope for victims of Mexico’s dirty war to find a measure of justice at last. It is a critical juncture for Mexican citizens searching for truth about the country’s dark period of state-sponsored violence that remains an impediment to justice in Mexico today.

U.S. and Mexican Documents on the Dirty War Disappearances, Drugs, and the Failure of the Special Prosecutor Document 1 January 4, 1974 The Current Security Situation in Mexico: An Appraisal U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Secret Airgram 13 pages The U.S. Embassy in Mexico reports on a rising wave of crime beginning in mid-September 1973, creating a “climate of some anxiety” in Mexico. The report provides background on the rising tide of armed opposition to the Mexican government, tracing the growing rebellion to the government’s brutal “counteraction” against 1968 student demonstrations. It also provides a list of “politically-motivated acts of violence” that characterized the first three years of the Echeverría administration, including the 1971 student killings by government forces, and the kidnapping by leftists of U.S. Consul General Terrance G. Leonhardy. To U.S. officials, these incidents demonstrated the “deficiencies” of the army and police forces, and highlighted the importance of covert operations under the direction of the Federal Security Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad – DFS). The Embassy believed that the DFS, “whose responsibilities also include protection of the president, intelligence collection and coordination, surveillance of some foreign embassies, etc.”, was the only body to have “emerged from this period with reason for pride in its accomplishments.” While Luis Echeverría had increased DFS staff and power, the Embassy predicts that sporadic acts of political violence will continue until “security agencies have improved their capabilities to the point where they can quickly apprehend the perpetrators in a high percentage of cases and infiltrate terrorist groups in order to dismantle them completely.” Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 2 March 11, 1974 Characterization of Mexican Revolutionary, Terrorist and Guerrilla Groups FBI, Legal Attaché in Mexico City, Secret Memorandum 12 pages The FBI attachés in Mexico produced regular reports on the urban guerrilla groups during this period, relating back to Washington the information they received from Mexican intelligence agents. This memorandum provides profiles of ten Mexican revolutionary and guerrilla groups, including the 23rd of September Communist League (LCS). It refers to the 23rd of September group as one of the most highly organized guerrilla organizations, and says that its many of its members have been involved in other revolutionary groups in Mexico. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 3 December 6, 1974 Mexican Terrorist Captured in Abortive Attempt to Negotiate Safe Passage out of Mexico U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Unclassified Cable 1 page DFS agents not only coordinated counterinsurgency strategies during the 1970s, but participated directly in operations, including detentions, extralegal raids, and forced disappearances. This cable reports on the arrest of Miguel Angel Torres Enríquez, an alleged member of the 23rd of September Communist League, on December 5, 1974, after he had taken two French embassy consular officers hostage in an attempt to secure safe passage to France. Working undercover, then-DFS agent Miguel Nazar Haro participated directly in the operation, posing as a Mexican Foreign Secretary official and, after exchanging himself for the hostages, bringing Torres to the airport where he was arrested. According to the Special Prosecutor’s report released years later, the search for Torres Enríquez involved raids by DFS agents on his house and violent attacks against his family and friends. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 4 June 19, 1975 “23 of September” Communist League; “Red Brigade” Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 1 page This document, signed by DFS Director Luis de la Barreda Moreno, gives the agency’s version of the events that led to the arrest of Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, alias “Simón.” According to the report, at 3:00 pm, July 19, 1975, police sergeant Lázaro Juárez Almaguer noticed an individual with a pistol hidden in his waist, who, when asked to identify himself, removed the weapon and fired, hitting one policeman in the arm. More police quickly arrived on the scene and detained the subject. DFS agents took custody of Roberto Antonio and interrogated him, identifying him as part of a clandestine cell of the urban guerrilla group the 23rd of September Communist League. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 5 June 19, 1975 Antecedents of Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz (a) “Simón” Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 7 pages This intelligence report reveals that prior to the 1975 arrest of Roberto Antonio Gallangos, government agents had him under surveillance for years. The type of information gathered since at least the late 1960s included personal details such as his birthplace, education, physical characteristics, organizational affiliation, and previous arrests. The report also contains extensive information about his political activities, beginning with his involvement in the 1968 student protests. At a demonstration on April 23, 1968, for example, RobertoAntonio recited the anti-war poem, Los Tres Pueblos, “referring to the horrors of war, and demands for peace.” The report describes his detention on July 26, 1968 in the midst of the student round-ups, and the government’s attempts to charge Roberto Antonio with crimes such as damage to public property, robbery, resisting arrest, and causing injury to state authorities. It also tracks his visitors during his time in prison. The surveillance continued after his release. According to DFS intelligence, Roberto Antonio went on to participate in political meetings with Mexico’s leftist organizations and became involved with a wide variety of insurgent groups. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 6 Photo Undated, taken after June 19, 1975 detention Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 2 pages This photograph of Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz was taken following his detention on June 19, 1975. The photo shows Roberto Antonio with a mark over his right eye, and a wet shirt; signs of the torture used by the DFS agents during his interrogation. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), DFS Exp. 11-235, Legajo 30, Folio 123 Document 7 June 20, 1975 “23 of September” Communist League Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 1 page A report filed by DFS director Luis de la Barreda 24 hours after Gallangos Cruz’s capture contains the first results of the agency’s interrogation of their prisoner, when he reveals the address of a supposed guerrilla safe house. The police proceeded to conduct a raid on the house, finding communist propaganda from the Liga Comunista “23 de Septiembre” and other incriminating material. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office[Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 8 July 1, 1975 “23 of September” Communist League Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 1 page Under interrogation, Gallangos Cruz identified his wife and brother as fellow members of the Liga Comunista “23 de Septiembre.” This DFS report gives biographical background for Carmen Vargas Perez (“Sofía”) and Avelino Francisco Gallangos Cruz (“Federico,”). Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 9 August 22, 1975 “23 of September” Communist League Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 3 pages Roberto Antonio’s brother, Avelino Francisco Gallangos Cruz, was arrested in Mexico City at 9:40 am by three police officers. He was reportedly carrying a gun that they determined belonged to a police agent who was assassinated on November 30, 1974. The document gives biographical details and intelligence information about “Federico,” compiled through interrogations of his family and friends. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 10 August 23, 1975 Liga Comunista “23 de Septiembre” Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 2 pages This document summarizes the result of the interrogations of Avelino Francisco Gallangos Cruz “Federico” and another member of the Liga Comunista “23 de Septiembre.” It describes how the Gallangos Cruz brothers joined the organization and contains details about the League’s purported activities. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 11 March 27, 1990 Senior Customs Representative Hermosillo – Intelligence Report U.S. Consulate in Hermosillo, Mexico, redacted cable 7 pages Five years after the DFS was disbanded due to abuses and pervasive corruption, a U.S. Customs agent stationed in the Hermosillo Consulate, issues this report conveying growing concern over connections between former DFS agents and drug traffickers. The heavily redacted cable reports on drug kingpins who had worked with the DFS, and states that “several members of the DFS became heavily involved in drug trafficking and then in the murder of United States Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar.” Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 12 March 12, 1991 Javier García Paniagua to Head National Lottery, is Replaced by Santiago Tapia as Mexico City’s Police Chief U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Confidential Cable On March 7, 1991, Javier García Paniagua, former Director of Mexico’s Directorate of Federal Security (DFS), resigned as Mexico City’s Police Chief to become Director General of the National Lottery. García Paniagua had been police chief since 1988, and his appointment caused controversy due to accusations that he approved and used torture during his years in the DFS.  In the cable, Embassy officials describe the DFS as “an agency with a reputation for corruption and ruthlessness.” The cable notes that Miguel Nazar Haro, García Paniagua’s police deputy and intelligence chief, was accused of carrying out political killings and human rights abuses when he headed the DFS in the 1980s. In 1989, he was forced to resign from the Mexico City police amidst allegations that he protected drug traffickers. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 13 June 13, 2003 Mexican Supreme Court Hands Down Landmark Decision on Extradition of Ricardo Cavallo for Crimes Against Humanity U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Unclassified Cable 3 pages On September 12, 2000, the Mexican Supreme Court handed down a decision upholding the legal basis for the extradition of Argentine national Ricardo Miguel Cavallo to Spain. Cavallo was arrested by Mexican Interpol on August 24 and was extradited to Spain for crimes of genocide and terrorism committed between 1976 and 1983. In this cable the Embassy comments on the possibility of the decision affecting Mexican domestic human rights cases, such as the case against Miguel Nazar Haro and Luis de la Barreda, who were “both accused of torture and ‘disappearing’ leftists during the so-called ‘Dirty War’ in Mexico during the 60s, 70s, and 80s.” The cable reports that Special Prosecutor Ignacio Carrillo Prieto, assigned to investigate human rights cases of the past, asked the Embassy to provide copies of declassified cables with information on the two former intelligence chiefs and their involvement in human rights abuses. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 14 January 13, 2005 Special Prosecutor Makes Headlines but Limited Progress in Unraveling Past Human Rights Crimes U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Confidential Cable 3 pages The U.S. Embassy reports that the Special Prosecutor’s Office is moving slowly to prosecute Mexico’s political crimes of the past. Although the office had achieved some incremental progress, it was slow to locate victims and bring the perpetrators to trial. The cable cites the case of Aleida Gallangos and her efforts to locate her brother Lucio, almost 30 years after they were separated from their parents at the hands of government forces. Aleida had strongly criticized the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which, according to the cable, offered her little support in her search for her brother, but nevertheless tried to take the credit in a “hastily-called press conference,” after Aleida found Lucio living in the United States in December 2004. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act

Notes

1. Chapter 6 of the Special Prosecutor’s Report lists Roberto Antonio among those detained on July 26, 1968.
2. For more information on the historical collaboration between the CIA station in Mexico and DFS intelligence agents, see NSA briefing book “LITEMPO: The CIA’s Eyes on Tlatelolco”.
3. See for example Sergio Aguayo, La charola: una historia de los servicios de intelligencia en México, México, D.F, Grijalbo; Hoja Editorial; Hechos Confiables, 2001, pp. 133-34 for a reference to the “fantasies and exaggerations” employed in DFS documents about student protesters in 1968.
4. Chapter 8 of the Special Prosecutor’s report lists Avelino Gallangos and Carmen Vargas among the 69 individuals disappeared in Mexico City during the dirty war.
5. Chapter 10 of the Special Prosecutor’s report describes the counterinsurgency operations carried out by DFS agents in the early 1970s, and reports that Nazar Haro participated directly in extralegal detentions and interrogations of suspected guerrillas.
6. DFS chief Zorrilla was charged and sentence in 1989 to thirty-five years for the 1984 murder of Manuel Buendia, a journalist who exposed DFS official links to narco-trade. Another DFS chief, Nazar Haro, was linked to the murder of U.S. DEA agent Enrique Camarena. For more information on the DFS and drugs, see Julia Preston and Samuel Dillon, Opening Mexico: The Making of a Democracy, New York, Straus and Giroux, 2004.
7. See chapter 10 of the Special Prosecutor’s report.
In front of Lecumberri, the “Black Palace” – formerly a detention center for political prisoners, now home to the historical National Archives (AGN) – activists hang pictures of Mexico’s disappeared [Undated Photo. Source: AGN files].
Luis Echeverría (president from 1970-76) visiting Mexican officers and soldiers in Guerrero during the height of the military’s “dirty war” counterinsurgency campaign against Lucio Cabañas and his Party of the Poor [Source: AGN files]
Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, taken sometime in between 1968 and 1975. This picture was part of the DFS intelligence files, and was retrieved prior to his disappearance as part of the government’s surveillance efforts to monitor his activities after the 1968 protests [Source: AGN, DFS files]
Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, with his hands tied behind his back, after being detained on June 19, 1975. [Source: AGN, DFS files, 11-235, Legajo 30, Folio 124]
Carmen Vargas Pérez, prior to her detention and disappearance by DFS agents. This picture was part of the DFS intelligence files, and was retrieved by intelligence agents as part of the government’s surveillance efforts [Source: AGN, DFS files, 11-235, Legajo 30, Folio 43]
Carmen Vargas Pérez, prior to her detention and disappearance by DFS agents [Source: family’s personal files]
Weapons and leftist propaganda reportedly obtained through counterinsurgency raids in Mexico’s urban centers
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<div align=”justify”>Suspected guerrillas detained by Mexican authorities

TOP-SECRET: KISSINGER BLOCKED DEMARCHE ON INTERNATIONAL ASSASSINATIONS TO CONDOR STATES

Washington, DC, September 1, 2011 – Only five days before a car bomb planted by agents of the Pinochet regime rocked downtown Washington D.C. on September 21, 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger rescinded instructions sent to, but never implemented by, U.S. ambassadors in the Southern Cone to warn military leaders there against orchestrating “a series of international murders,” declassified documents obtained and posted by the National Security Archive revealed today.

The Secretary “has instructed that no further action be taken on this matter,” stated a September 16, 1976, cable sent from Lusaka (where Kissinger was traveling) to his assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs, Harry Shlaudeman. The instructions effectively ended efforts by senior State Department officials to deliver a diplomatic demarche, approved by Kissinger only three weeks earlier, to express “our deep concern” over “plans for the assassination of subversives, politicians, and prominent figures both within the national borders of certain Southern Cone countries and abroad.” Aimed at the heads of state of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, the demarche was never delivered.

“The September 16th cable is the missing piece of the historical puzzle on Kissinger’s role in the action, and inaction, of the U.S. government after learning of Condor assassination plots,” according to Peter Kornbluh, the Archive’s senior analyst on Chile and author of the book, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. “We know now what happened: The State Department initiated a timely effort to thwart a ‘Murder Inc’ in the Southern Cone, and Kissinger, without explanation, aborted it,” Kornbluh said. “The Kissinger cancellation on warning the Condor nations prevented the delivery of a diplomatic protest that conceivably could have deterred an act of terrorism in Washington D.C.”

Kissinger’s September 16 instructions responded to an August 30, 1976 secret memorandum from Shlaudeman, titled “Operation Condor,” that advised him: “what we are trying to head off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage to the international status and reputation of the countries involved.” After receiving Kissinger’s orders, on September 20, Shlaudeman directed his deputy, William Luers, to “instruct the [U.S.] ambassadors to take no further action noting that there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme.”

The next day, a massive car bomb claimed the life of former Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier and his 26-year old American colleague, Ronni Karpen Moffitt, as they drove down Massachusetts Avenue in Washington, D.C. The bombing remains the most infamous attack of “Condor”—a collaboration between the secret police services in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil and several other Latin American military dictatorships, to track down and kill opponents of their regimes. Until 9/11, the Letelier-Moffitt assassination was known as the most significant act of international terrorism ever committed in the capital city of the United States.

In the August 30th memorandum Shlaudeman informed Kissinger that the U.S. ambassador to Montevideo, Ernest Siracusa, had resisted delivering the demarche against Condor assassinations to the Uruguayan generals for fear that his life would be endangered, and wanted further instructions. Shlaudeman recommended that Kissinger authorize a telegram to Siracusa “to talk to both [Foreign Minister Juan Carlos] Blanco and [military commander-in-chief] General [Julio César] Vadora” and a “parallel approach” in which Shlaudeman would meet with the Uruguayan ambassador in Washington. He also offered an alternative of having a CIA official meet with his counterpart in Montevideo. (This memo was obtained under the FOIA by Kornbluh.)

Several days earlier, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, David Popper, had also protested the order to present the demarche to General Augusto Pinochet. “[G]iven Pinochet’s sensitivities,” Popper cabled, “he might well take as an insult any inference that he was connected with such assassination plots.”  Like Siracusa, Popper requested further instructions.

Kissinger did not respond to the Shlaudeman memo for more than two weeks. In his September 16th cable, Kissinger “declined to approve message to Montevideo” and effectively reversed instructions to the U.S. ambassadors in Chile and Argentina to deliver the demarche to General Augusto Pinochet and General Jorge Videla.

The cable was discovered by Archive Southern Cone analyst Carlos Osorio among tens of thousands of routinely declassified State Department cables from 1976.

“We now know that it was Kissinger himself who was responsible,” stated John Dinges, author of The Condor Years, and a National Security Archive associate fellow. “He cancelled his own order; and Chile went ahead with the assassination in Washington.”

Only after the Letelier-Moffitt assassination did a member of the CIA station in Santiago meet with the head of the Chilean secret police, Col. Manuel Contreras, to discuss the demarche. The meeting took place the first week of October. In a secret memorandum from Shlaudeman to Kissinger—also obtained by Kornbluh under the FOIA—he reported that passing U.S. concerns to Contreras “seems to me sufficient action for the time being. The Chileans are the prime movers in Operation Condor.”

The memorandum makes no mention of the CIA pressing Contreras on the issue of the Letelier-Moffitt assassination. Several years later, the FBI identified him as responsible for that atrocity, and the U.S. demanded his extradition, which the Pinochet regime refused. In November 1993, after Pinochet left power, a Chilean court found Contreras guilty for the Condor murders and sentenced him to seven years in a specially-constructed prison.

Henry Kissinger’s role in rescinding the Condor demarche was at the center of a contentious controversy at the prestigious journal, Foreign Affairs (FA), in 2004. In a FA review of Kornbluh’s book, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow Kenneth Maxwell referred to the undelivered demarche, and Shlaudeman’s September 20th instructions to the ambassadors to “take no further action.” In a response, the late William D. Rogers, Kissinger’s close associate, lawyer, and a former assistant secretary of State, stated—incorrectly it is now clear—that “Kissinger had nothing to do with the cable.” When Maxwell responded to the Rogers letter, he reiterated that the demarche was never made in Chile, and that the Letelier-Moffitt assassination “was a tragedy that might have been prevented” if it had.

In response, Kissinger enlisted two wealthy members of the Council to pressure the editor of FA, James Hoge, to allow Rogers to have the last word. In a second letter-to-the-editor, Rogers accused Maxwell of “bias,” and of challenging Shlaudeman’s integrity by suggesting that he had countermanded “a direct, personal instruction from Kissinger” to issue the demarche, “and to do it behind his back” while Kissinger was on a diplomatic mission in Africa. When Hoge refused to publish Maxwell’s response, Maxwell resigned from his positions at FA and the Council.

In the letter that his own employer refused to publish, Maxwell wrote that, to the contrary, “it is hard to believe that Shlaudeman would have sent a cable rescinding the [demarche] without the approval of the Secretary of State who had authorized [it] in the first place.” He called on Kissinger to step forward and clarify the progression of policy decisions leading up to the Letelier-Moffitt assassination, and for the full record to be declassified.

The declassification of Kissinger’s September 16th cable demonstrates that Maxwell was correct. It was Kissinger who ordered an end to diplomatic attempts to deliver the demarche and call a halt to Condor murder operations.

Documents

Document 1 – Department of State, Cable, “Operation Condor”, drafted August 18, 1976 and sent August 23, 1976

This action cable signed by Secretary of State Kissinger reflects a decision by the Latin American bureau in the State Department to try to stop the Condor plans known to be underway, especially those outside of Latin America. Kissinger instructs the ambassadors of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay to meet as soon as possible with the chief of state or the highest appropriate official of their respective countries and to convey a direct message, known in diplomatic language as a “demarche.” The ambassadors are instructed to tell the officials the U.S. government has received information that Operation Condor goes beyond information exchange and may “include plans for the assassination of subversives, politicians and prominent figures both within the national borders of certain Southern Cone countries and abroad.” Further, the ambassadors are to express the U.S. government’s “deep concern,” about the reports and to warn that, if true, they would “create a most serious moral and political problem.”

Document 2 – Department of State, Action Memorandum, Ambassador Harry Schlaudeman to Secretary Kissinger, “Operation Condor,” August 30, 1976

In his memo to Kissinger dated August 30, 1976, Schlaudeman spelled out the U.S. position on Condor assassination plots: “What we are trying to head off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage to the international status and reputation of the countries involved.” Shlaudeman’s memo requests approval from Kissinger to direct U.S. ambassador to Uruguay, Ernest Siracusa, to proceed to meet with high officials in Montevideo and present the Condor demarche.

Document 3 – Department of State, Cable, “Actions Taken,” September 16, 1976

In this cable, sent from Lusaka where Kissinger is traveling, the Secretary of State refuses to authorize sending a telegram to U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay, Ernest Siracusa, instructing him to proceed with the Condor demarche. Kissinger than broadens his instructions to cover the delivery of the demarche in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay: “The Secretary has instructed that no further action be taken on this matter.”  These instructions effectively end the State Department initiative to warn the Condor military regimes not to proceed with international assassination operations, since the demarche has not been delivered in Chile or Argentina.

Document 4 – Department of State, Cable, “Operation Condor,” Septmber 20, 1976

Kissinger’s Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs received his instructions on turning off the Condor demarche on September 16th. Three days later, while in Costa Rica, Shlaudeman receives another cable, which remains secret, from his deputy, William Luers, regarding how to proceed on the demarche. At this point, on September 20, Shlaudeman directs Luers, to “instruct the [U.S.] ambassadors to take no further action noting that there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme.”

Condor’s most infamous “scheme” comes to fruition the very next day when a car-bomb planted by agents of the Chilean secret police takes the life of former Chilean diplomat, and leading Pinochet opponent, Orlando Letelier, and his 26-year old American colleague, Ronni Karpen Moffitt, in downtown Washington D.C.

Document 5 – Briefing Memorandum, Ambassador Harry Schlaudeman to Secretary Kissinger, “Operation Condor,” October 8, 1976

In his October 8 memo to Kissinger transmitting a CIA memorandum of conversation with Col. Contreras, Schlaudeman argued that “the approach to Contreras seems to me to be sufficient action for the time being” because “the Chileans are the prime movers in Operation Condor.”


TOP-SECRET: The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río

Former Colombian Army Gen. Rito Alejo del Río Rojas (ret.)

The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río

Ambassador Cited Accused Colombian General’s Reliance on Death Squads

“Systematic” Support of Paramilitaries “Pivotal to his Military Success”

Infamous General a “Not-So-Success” Story of U.S. Military Training

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 327

Former U.S. ambassador to Colombia Curtis Kamman called Del Río’s reliance on paramilitaries “pivotal.”

Washington, D.C., September 29, 2010 – The U.S. ambassador to Colombia reported in 1998 that the “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries” was “pivotal” to the military success of Gen. Rito Alejo del Río Rojas, now on trial for murder and collaboration with paramilitary death squads while commander of a key army unit in northern Colombia.

The Secret “Biographic Note” from Ambassador Curtis Kamman is one of several documents published today by the National Security Archive pertaining to Del Río, whose trial resumes this month after years of impunity and delay. The documents are also the subject of an article published today in Spanish at VerdadAbierta.com, the leading online gateway for information on paramilitarism in Colombia. The article was also published in English today on the Web site of the National Security Archive.

“The collection is a unique and potentially valuable source of evidence in the case against Del Río, reflecting years of reports linking the senior army commander to paramilitarism,” said Michael Evans, director of the Archive’s Colombia Documentation Project. “As Del Río’s trial resumes, the court should examine the contemporaneous accounts of U.S. officials who were required by law to monitor and certify Colombia’s human rights performance.”

Other revelations include:

  • The U.S. embassy takes a favorable view of Col. Carlos Alfonso Velásquez, who called for an investigation of Del Río’s ties to paramilitary groups, noting that his statements “add credibility to our human rights report.”
  • A report on a conversation with Col. Velásquez, who told U.S. military officials that cooperation with paramilitaries “had gotten much worse under Del Río.”
  • Documents reporting conspicuous increases in anti-paramilitary operations after Del Río’s transfer out of northern Colombia. The embassy said it was “more than coincidental that the recent anti-paramilitary actions have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of military personnel believed to favor paramilitaries.”
  • The embassy notes a disturbing instance of possible military-paramilitary complicity in a paramilitary attack outside Bogotá just weeks after Del Río took command of the nearby military brigade.
  • The shifting U.S. opinion about Del Río is clearly evident in two U.S. military reports from early 1998. In the first, Del Río, who attended the U.S. Army School of the Americas, is lauded as a U.S. military training “success story.” But a second, corrected, report from March 1998 lists Del Río instead as a “not-so-success” story, citing his alleged paramilitary ties.

The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río
By Michael Evans

Curtis Kamman will not be called to testify in the trial of Rito Alejo del Río, the former Colombian Army general on trial for murder and collaboration with paramilitary death squads, but we do have some idea what the former U.S. ambassador to Colombia might have said, thanks to declassified documents published today on the Web site of the National Security Archive.

In a Secret “Biographic Note” attached to an August 1998 cable to Washington, Kamman asserted that the former 17th Brigade commander’s “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success” in northern Colombia.

Obtained through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, these documents are a unique and potentially valuable source of evidence in the case against Del Río, reflecting years of reports linking the senior army commander to paramilitarism. As Del Río’s trial resumes, the court would do well to examine the contemporaneous accounts of U.S. officials who were required by law to monitor and certify Colombia’s human rights performance.

Once lauded as a staunch anti-guerrilla fighter, Del Río first came under scrutiny in 1996 after his deputy at the Urabá-based 17th Brigade, Col. Carlos Alfonso Velásquez, wrote an internal report (published last week by VerdadAbierta) calling on the Army to investigate the unit’s paramilitary ties and accusing Del Río of turning a blind eye to paramilitary activity. Rather than heed his warning, the Army fired Velásquez, forcing him into early retirement for insubordination. Velásquez offered similar testimony last week as a key witness in the case.

Interviewed by the embassy in December 1997, Velásquez directly implicated his former commander, lamenting the “body count syndrome” that “fueled human rights abuses” and stressing that 17th Brigade collaboration with paramilitaries “had gotten much worse under Del Río.” Another embassy report on the Velásquez episode testifies to the colonel’s integrity, noting that Velásquez was an “admired and much-decorated” military officer who had helped bring down the Cali drug mafia and had once gone public about an extramarital affair rather than submit to a cartel blackmail attempt.

His statements “bring extra pressure to bear on the Colombian military,” noted U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette, who was then involved in tense negotiations with the army over its rights record. “They will add credibility to our human rights report.”

By then the embassy had begun to notice that paramilitary activity tended to flourish in areas where Del Río commanded troops and that anti-paramilitary operations seemed to increase in those same zones after he left. In January 1998, the embassy noted that an unprecedented string of 17th Brigade actions against paramilitaries “took place only about a week after the departure of the Brigade’s commander, Brig. Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, who was long-alleged to be not unfriendly toward paramilitaries.” A February report called it “more than coincidental” that a recent series of military blows against paramilitaries had “all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of former First Brigade commander MG Iván Ramírez and his 17th Brigade commander BG Rito Alejo Del Río, who were widely believed to have contributed to a command climate conducive to turning a blind eye to paramilitaries, or worse.”

At the same time, the embassy noted a disturbing instance of possible military-paramilitary complicity in a paramilitary attack in La Horqueta, outside Bogotá, just weeks after Del Río left Urabá to take command of the nearby military brigade. “Why was it necessary,” the embassy asked in a January 1998 cable, “for another army unit to travel all the way from Bogotá in order to intervene?”

Del Río’s 13th Brigade was “strangely non-reactive” to the killing, notable as the first paramilitary massacre to occur so close to the Colombian capital. Also implicating Del Río was the discovery that the paramilitary who led the attack was the president of a legal Convivir militia group from Urabá, Del Río’s former area of operations, “who had been imported to the region to strike back against the FARC.”

The general’s star was falling so fast in 1998 that U.S. reporting could barely keep up. The shifting opinion about Del Río is clearly evident in two U.S. military reports from early 1998. In the first, Del Río, a 1967 graduate of the U.S. Army School of the Americas, is lauded as a U.S. military training “success story.” But a second, corrected, report from March 1998 lists Del Río instead as a “not-so-success” story, noting that he was “alleged to have ties not only to paramilitary elements on the north coast and in the Urabá region…but also in the conflictive ‘Magdalena Medio’ region before that” and was also”implicated in the 1985 theft of a [Colombian Army] weapons shipment destined for Magdalena Medio paramilitaries.”

By August 1998, Colombian prosecutors had opened a preliminary investigation of the general’s ties to paramilitaries, a development Kamman said would “serve as a marker to those army officers who continue to assist or otherwise work with paramilitary groups.” Del Río had been “very successful” against FARC guerrillas, the ambassador said in his Secret “Biographic Note,” and his “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success at the time.”

The ambassador’s reports had an impact in Washington, where human rights figured prominently in negotiations over the nascent Plan Colombia aid package. In January 1999, two senior State Department officials wrote to Kamman to express their dissatisfaction with Colombia’s progress on human rights, noting in particular the “appointment to key positions of several generals credibly alleged to have ties to paramilitaries” including Del Río, who had recently been named the army’s operations director.

Frustrated and essentially out of options, the State Department took the unusual step of cancelling Del Río’s visa for “drug trafficking and terrorist activities” precipitating his forced retirement and the end of his military career in April 1999.

As years went on, the United States became increasingly concerned about official impunity in Colombia, especially for senior military officers like Del Río, prompting sharp discussions after Prosecutor General Luis Camilo Osorio dropped all charges against the former general in 2001. A briefing paper for the State Department’s top human rights official, Lorne Craner, notes “concern in Congress” that Osorio’s dismissal of the case showed that he was “less focused on prosecuting paramilitaries and military personnel accused of colluding with paramilitary.” A 2005 State Department memorandum found it “troubling” that the government had not yet sent “a clear message” regarding impunity for Del Río.

More than five years later, the case has finally come to trial, and the court will hear the testimony of many important witnesses, each of whom brings a unique perspective to the proceedings. And while no U.S. officials will appear, the court should consider the declassified perspective of the U.S. government and the formerly secret files on one of its “not-so-success” stories.

Read the Documents

Document 1
1998 August 13
General Ramirez Lashes Out at State Department; Two More Generals Under Investigation for Paramilitary Links
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 9345

This U.S. Embassy cable from August 13, 1998, reports, among other things, that Gen. Del Río was under investigation for links to illegal paramilitary groups. In a “Biographic Note,” the Embassy says that Del Río’s “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success at the time.”

Biographic Note: Although brigade commands are generally rotated every year, General Del Rio was allowed to remain in command of the 17th Brigade in highly-conflictive Uraba region for two years, apparently because he had been very successful in bloodying the FARC’s nose during the period of his command. His systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success at the time.

Document 2
1997 January 11
Retired Army Colonel Lambastes Military for Inaction against Paramilitaries
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1997 Bogota 274

In this cable, the U.S. Embassy in Colombia reports the public statements of former Colombian Army colonel Carlos Alfonso Velásquez that his commanding officer at the 17th Brigade, Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, had been negligent in not combating paramilitary groups in Urabá. In its analysis of the information, the Embassy takes a favorable view of Velásquez:

[Embassy officers] who know Velasquez speak highly of his performance as head of the anti-narcotics special joint command’s Army component in Cali. When the cartel tried to blackmail him, then Minister of Defense Botero saved him from dismissal. Botero characterized him as clean, among the best, and of unquestionable integrity. [Several lines deleted] Velasquez’s statements bring extra pressure to bear on the Colombian military as they prepare for a new defense minister. They will add credibility to our human rights report.

Document 3
1997 December 24
Retired Army Colonel Talks Freely About the Army He Left Behind
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report

In this document, a U.S. military attaché reports his conversation with a retired Colombian Army colonel (almost certainly Carlos Alfonso Velásquez) about his time at the 17th Brigade in Urabá. The report notes that the colonel “seems to know a lot about paramilitaries and their links to drug traffickers and the Army.” The colonel says that there is a “body count syndrome” in the Colombian Army “when it comes to pursuing the guerrillas.” This way of thinking “tends to fuel human rights abuses by otherwise well-meaning soldiers trying to get their quota to impress superiors.” The colonel said he had served under one commander he respected, as well as Rito Alejo del Río, “about whom he had fewer nice things to say.”

[Name deleted] was asked if the paramilitary wave of violence in the Uraba region and related military collusion were recent phenomena. [Deleted] replied in the negative, saying that military cooperation with the paramilitaries had been occurring for a number of years, but that it had gotten much worse under Del Río.”

Document 4
1998 January 09
Colombians Strike Two Blows Against the Paras
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 120

The U.S. Embassy noted with interest the sudden surge of anti-paramilitary activity by the 17th Brigade immediately after the departure of Del Río as brigade commander.

It is interesting to note that the 17th Brigade confrontation took place only about a week after the departure of the brigade’s commander, Brig. Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, who was long-alleged to by not unfriendly toward paramilitaries. His own former deputy, Col. Carlos Alfonso Velasquez, was retired from the Army under a cloud in January 1997 for privately criticizing Del Río’s refusal to combat the paramilitaries headquartered in the region. Although the Army has claimed for some time that the 17th Brigade has moved against the paramilitaries, we are unaware of any other such encounters that have been publicly confirmed.

Document 5
1998 January 28
Narcos Arrested for La Horqueta Paramilitary Massacre
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable

The U.S. Embassy questions why it was another military unit, and not the Army’s 13th Brigade, under the command of Gen. Del Río, that finally responded to the January 1998 La Horqueta paramilitary massacre.

If the Army was immediately in the area in the immediate aftermath of the killings, however, as the priest asserts, why was it necessary for another Army unit to travel all the way from Bogotá in order to intervene? That is precisely the question prosecutors are now asking. Finally, the strangely non-reactive 13th Brigade recently came under the command of BG Rito Alejo Del Rio, who earned considerable attention as commander of the 17th Brigade covering the heartland of Carlos Castaño’s paramilitaries in Cordoba and Uraba.

Document 6
1998 February 09
Colombian Army Reportedly Captures 23 Paramilitaries
U.S. Embassy cable, 1998 Bogota 1249

The Embassy speculates that a recent surge in 17th Brigade anti-paramilitary activity in Urabá may be related to the departure of Gen. Rito Alejo del Río as commander.

We are encouraged by this development but we are not yet sure how to interpret it. Until recently, the military has had little success in capturing paramilitaries… The 17th Brigade has a new commander, which may also have contributed to an increased surge in anti-paramilitary activity. The previous commander, Brigadier General Rito Alejo Del Rio, now the head of the 13th Brigade in Bogota, was rumored to have been quite tolerant of paramilitary activity in Uraba.

Document 7
1998 February 25
U.S. Army School of the Americas Success Stories
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report

A U.S. military intelligence report, subsequently revised (see Document 9), lists Gen. Del Río among U.S. military training “success stories.”

Document 8
1998 February 26
Military and Police Begin Clearly Cracking Down on Paramilitaries Around Carlos Castano
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 2097

The U.S. Embassy says that it “seems more than coincidental” that recent anti-paramilitary operations by the military “have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia” of First Division commander Gen. Iván Ramírez and 17th Brigade commander Gen. Rito Alejo del Río.

We note that these latest anti-paramilitary incidents have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of former first division commander MG Ivan Ramirez and his 17th Brigade commander BG Rio [sic] Alejo Del Rio, who were widely believed to have contributed to a command climate conducive to turning a blind eye to paramilitaries, or worse. Nothing is irreversible, but at long last those days appear to be over.
…
We note that this new-found effectiveness in curbing the paramilitaries correlates closely with the recent change of command in several key military positions in northern Colombia, including the First Division in Santa Marta (formerly headed by Major General Ivan Ramirez), the 17th Brigade in Uraba, and the 11th Brigade in Monteria… It seems more than coincidental that the recent anti-paramilitary actions have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of military personnel believed to favor paramilitaries.

Document 9
1998 March 31
U.S. Army School of the Americas Not-So-Success Stories – Digging Back into History (Corrected Report)
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report

The U.S. military attaché in Colombia corrects an earlier report on Colombian military graduates from the U.S. Army School of the Americas, noting that Gen. Rito Alejo del Río was alleged to have ties to paramilitaries in Urabá as well as the Magdalena Medio, where “he was implicated in the 1985 theft of a [Colombian Army] weapons shipment destined for Magdalena Medio paramilitaries.”

Report follows up earlier detailed IIR on high-ranking/high-visibility Colombian military/national police graduates of the School of the Americas. Since then, additional—mostly derogatory—info on some of the older, mostly now retired, officers has come to light.
…
Brigadier General Rito Alejo ((Del Rio)) Rojas—Alleged to have ties not only to paramilitary elements on the north coast and in the Uraba region (adjacent to the Darien region of Panama), but also in the conflictive “Magdalena Medio” region before that. For example, he was implicated in the 1985 theft of a [Colombian Army] weapons shipment destined for Magdalena Medio paramilitaries. The case came to light only because the overloaded airplane crashed. BG Del Rio is currently serving as commander of the 13th Brigade in Bogota.

Document 10
1998 May 14
Army/Fiscalia Raid on a Church Based NGO Viewed as a Major Blunder
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 5554

The U.S. Embassy asserts that a raid by the Army’s 13th Brigade on the offices of the Comisión Interclesial de Justicia y Paz might be “related to long-standing friction between the Jesuit director of the NGO and the commander of the Army’s 13th Brigade.

Comment. [Two lines deleted] Jesuit priest Father Javier Giraldo worked in Uraba during the time period in which General Rito Alejo Del Rio was commanding the 17th Brigade there. [Two lines deleted] Recently, General Del Rio was reassigned to his new, more responsible position commanding the 13th Brigade; the brigade which participated in the raid on Justicia y Paz.

Document 11
1999 January 25
Official Informal for Ambassador Kamman from WHA/AND Director Chicola and DRL DAS Gerson
U.S. State Department cable, 1999 State 13985

Two senior U.S. officials register their dissatisfaction with Colombia’s progress on human rights during the first six months of the Pastrana government, noting the “appointment to key positions of several generals credibly alleged to have ties to paramilitaries. These include Generals Fernando Millan Perez, Rito Aleto Del Rio Rojas, and Rafael Hernandez Lopez.”

Document 12
2001 December 13
Your Meeting with Fiscal General Luis Camilo Osorio
U.S. State Department briefing memorandum

A briefing paper for the State Department’s top human rights official, Lorne Craner, notes “concern in the US Congress” that Osorio is “less focused on prosecuting paramilitaries and military personnel accused of colluding with paramilitary,” citing his dismissal of charges against Rito Alejo del Río.

Document 13
Circa 2005
Memorandum of Justification Concerning Human Rights Conditions with Respect to Assistance for Colombian Armed Forces
U.S. State Department memorandum

A U.S. State Department review of Colombia’s human rights performance finds it “troubling” that the government had not yet sent “a clear message” regarding impunity for Del Río.

TOP-SECRET: THE CIA FILE ON LUIS POSADA CARRILES

T

THE CIA FILE
ON LUIS POSADA CARRILES

A FORMER AGENCY ASSET GOES ON TRIAL IN THE U.S

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 334

Washington, D.C., January 11, 2011 – As the unprecedented trial of Cuban exile Luis Posada Carriles begins this week in El Paso, Texas, the National Security Archive today posted a series of CIA records covering his association with the agency in the 1960s and 1970s. CIA personnel records described Posada, using his codename, “AMCLEVE/15,” as “a paid agent” at $300 a month, being utilized as a training instructor for other exile operatives, as well as an informant.  “Subject is of good character, very reliable and security conscious,” the CIA reported in 1965. Posada, another CIA document observed, incorrectly, was “not a typical ‘boom and bang’ type of individual.”

Today’s posting includes key items from Posada’s CIA file, including several previously published by the Archive, and for the first time online, the indictment from Posada’s previous prosecution–in Panama–on charges of trying to assassinate Fidel Castro with 200 pounds of dynamite and C-4 explosives (in Spanish).

“This explosive has the capacity to destroy any armored vehicle, buildings, steel doors, and the effects can extend for 200 meters…if a person were in the center of the explosion, even if they were in an armored car, they would not survive,” as the indictment described the destructive capacity of the explosives found in Posada’s possession in Panama City, where Fidel Castro was attending an Ibero-American summit in November 2000.

The judge presiding over the perjury trial of Posada has ruled that the prosecution can introduce unclassified evidence of his CIA background which might be relevant to his “state of mind” when he allegedly lied to immigration officials about his role in a series of hotel bombings in Havana in 1997. In pre-trial motions, the prosecution has introduced a short unclassified “summary” of Posada’s CIA career, which is included below.  Among other things, the summary (first cited last year in Tracey Eaton’s informative blog, “Along the Malecon”) reveals that in 1993, only four years before he instigated the hotel bombings in Havana, the CIA anonymously warned former agent and accused terrorist Luis Posada of an assassination threat on his life.

A number of the Archive’s CIA documents were cited in articles in the Washington Post, and CNN coverage today on the start of the Posada trial. “The C.I.A. trained and unleashed a Frankenstein,” the New York Times quoted Archive Cuba Documentation Project director Peter Kornbluh as stating.  “It is long past time he be identified as a terrorist and be held accountable as a terrorist.”

Posada was convicted in Panama in 2001, along with three accomplices, of endangering public safety; he was sentenced to eight years in prison. After lobbying by prominent Cuban-American politicians from Miami, Panamanian president Mireya Moscoso pardoned all four in August 2004. A fugitive from justice in Venezuela where he escaped from prison while being tried for the October 6, 1976, mid air bombing of a Cuban jetliner which killed all 73 people on board, Posada showed up in Miami in March 2005. He was arrested on May 17 of that year by the Department of Homeland Security and held in an immigration detention center in El Paso for two years, charged with immigration fraud during the Bush administration.  Since mid 2007, he has been living on bail in Miami. In April 2009, the Obama Justice Department added several counts of perjury relating to Posada denials about his role in organizing a series of hotel, restaurant and discotheque bombings in 1997.  Since mid 2007, he has been living on bail in Miami

According to Kornbluh, “it is poetic justice that the same U.S. Government whose secret agencies created, trained, paid and deployed Posada is finally taking steps to hold him accountable in a court of law for his terrorist crimes.”

Read the Documents

Document 1: CIA, Unclassified, “Unclassified Summary of the CIA’s Relationship With Luis Clemente Posada Carriles,” Undated.

This unclassified summary of the relationship between Luis Posada Carriles and the CIA, which was provided to the court by the US Justice Department, says the CIA first had contact with Posada in connection with planning the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. He remained a paid agent of the CIA from 1965-1967 and again from 1968-1974. From 1974-76, Posada provided unsolicited threat reporting. (Additional documents introduced in court show that he officially severed ties with the CIA in February 1976.) According to this document, the CIA last had contact with Posada in 1993 when they anonymously contacted him in Honduras by telephone to warn him of a threat to his life. (This document was first cited last year in Tracey Eaton’s informative blog, “Along the Malecon.”)

Document 2: CIA, “PRQ Part II for AMCLEVE/15,” September 22, 1965.

“PRQ Part II,” or the second part of Posada’s Personal Record Questionnaire, provides operational information. Within the text of the document, Posada is described as “strongly anti-Communist” as well as a sincere believer in democracy. The document describes Posada having a “good character,” not to mention the fact that he is “very reliable, and security conscious.” The CIA recommends that he be considered for a civil position in a post-Castro government in Cuba (codenamed PBRUMEN).

Document 3: CIA, Cable, “Plan of the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) to Blow Up a Cuban or Soviet Vessel in Veracruz, Mexico,” July 1, 1965.

This CIA cable summarizes intelligence on a demolition project proposed by Jorge Mas Canosa, then the head of RECE. On the third page, a source is quoted as having informed the CIA of a payment that Mas Canosa has made to Luis Posada in order to finance a sabotage operation against ships in Mexico. Posada reportedly has “100 pounds of C-4 explosives and some detonators” and limpet mines to use in the operation.

 Document 4: CIA, Memorandum, “AMCLEVE /15,” July 21, 1966.

This document includes two parts-a cover letter written by Grover T. Lythcott, Posada’s CIA handler, and an attached request written by Posada to accept a position on new coordinating Junta composed of several anti-Castro organizations. In the cover letter, Lythcbtt refers to Posada by his codename, AMCLEVE/I5, and discusses his previous involvement withthe Agency. He lionizes Posada, writing that his ”performance in all assigned tasks has been excellent,” and urges that he be permitted to work with the combined anti-Castro exile groups. According to the document, Lythcott suggests that Posada be taken off the CIA payroll to facilitate his joining the anti-Castro militant junta, which will be led by RECE. Lythcott insists that Posada will function as an effective moderating force considering he is “acutely aware of the international implications of ill planned or over enthusiastic activities against Cuba.” In an attached memo, Posada, using the name “Pete,” writes that if he is on the Junta, “they will never do anything to endanger the security of this Country (like blow up Russian ships)” and volunteers to “give the Company all the intelligence that I can collect.”

Document 5: CIA, Personal Record Questionnaire on Posada, April 17, 1972.

This “PRQ” was compiled in 1972 at a time Posada was a high level official at the Venezuelan intelligence service, DISIP, in charge of demolitions. The CIA was beginning to have some concerns about him, based on reports that he had taken CIA explosives equipment to Venezuela, and that he had ties to a Miami mafia figure named Lefty Rosenthal. The PRQ spells out Posada’s personal background and includes his travel to various countries between 1956 and 1971. It also confirms that one of his many aliases was “Bambi Carriles.”

Document 6: CIA, Report, “Traces on Persons Involved in 6 Oct 1976 Cubana Crash,” October 13, 1976.

In the aftermath of the bombing of Cubana flight 455, the CIA ran a file check on all names associated with the terror attack. In a report to the FBI the Agency stated that it had no association with the two Venezuelans who were arrested. A section on Luis Posada Carriles was heavily redacted when the document was declassified. But the FBI retransmitted the report three days later and that version was released uncensored revealing Posada’s relations with the CIA.

Document 7: CIA, Secret Intelligence Report, “Activities of Cuban Exile Leader Orlando Bosch During his Stay in Venezuela,” October 14, 1976.

A source in Venezuela supplied the CIA with detailed intelligence on a fund raiser held for Orlando Bosch and his organization CORU after he arrived in Caracas in September 1976. The source described the dinner at the house of a Cuban exile doctor, Hildo Folgar, which included Venezuelan government officials. Bosch was said to have essentially asked for a bribe in order to refrain from acts of violence during the United Nations meeting in November 1976, which would be attended by Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez. He was also quoted as saying that his group had done a “great job” in assassinating former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier in Washington D.C. on September 21, and now was going to “try something else.” A few days later, according to this intelligence report, Luis Posada Carriles was overheard to say that “we are going to hit a Cuban airplane” and “Orlando has the details.”

Document 8: First Circuit Court of Panama, “Fiscalia Primera Del Primer Circuito Judicial De Panama: Vista Fiscal No. 200”, September 28, 2001.

This lengthy document is the official indictment in Panama of Luis Posada Carriles and 4 others for the attempted assassination of Fidel Castro at the 10th Ibero-American Summit in November 2000. In this indictment, Posada Carriles is accused of possession of explosives, endangerment of public safety, illicit association, and falsification of documents. After traveling to Panama, according to the evidence gathered, “Luis Posada Carriles and Raul Rodriguez Hamouzova rented a red Mitsubishi Lancer at the International Airport of Tocumen, in which they transported the explosives and other devices necessary to create a bomb.” (Original Spanish: “Luis Posada Carriles y Raul Rodriguez Hamouzova rentaron en el Aeropuerto Internacional de Tocumen de la referida empresa el vehículo marca Mitsubishi Lancer, color rojo, dentro del cual se transportaron los explosives y artefactos indicados para elaborar una bomba.”)  This bomb was intended to take the life of Fidel Castro; Castro was to present at the Summit on November 17th, and what Carriles had proposed to do “wasn’t easy, because it occurred at the Summit, and security measures would be extreme.” (Original Spanish: “lo que se proponía hacer no era fácil, porque ocurría en plena Cumbre, y las medidas de seguridad serían extremas.”)

After being discovered by agents of the Explosives Division of the National Police, they ascertained that “this explosive has the capacity to destroy an armored vehicle, buildings, steel doors, and the effects of an explosive of this class and quality can extend for 200 meters.” Additionally, “to a human, from a distance of 200 meters it would affect the senses, internal hemorrhages, and if the person were in the center of the explosion, even if they were in an armored car, they would not survive…the destructive capacity of this material is complete.” (Original Spanish: “Este explosivo tiene la capacidad de destruir cualquier carro blindado, puede destruir edificios, puertas de acero, y que la onda expansiva de esta calidad y clase de explosive puede alcanzar hasta 200 metros…Al ser humano, sostienen, a la distancia de 200 metros le afectaría los sentidos, hemorragios internos, y si la persona estuviese en el centro de la explosion, aunque estuviese dentro de un carro blindado no sobreviviría…la capacidad destructive de este material es total.”)

The indictment states that when Posada was “asked about the charges against him, including possession of explosives, possession of explosives that endanger public safety, illicit association, and falsification of documents…he expresses having fought subversion against democratic regimes along several fronts, specifically Castro-sponsored subversion.” (Original Spanish: “Preguntado sobre los cargos formulados, es decir Posesión de Explosivos, Posesión de Explosivos que implica Peligro Común, Asociación Ilicita, y Falsedad de Documentos…Expresa haber combatido en distintos frentes la subversión contra regimens democráticos, ‘quiero decir la subversión castrista.’”)

Posada and his accomplices were eventually convicted of endangering public safety and sentenced to 8 years in prison. He was pardoned by Panamanian president, Mireya Moscosa, after only four years in August 2004 and lived as a fugitive in Honduras until March 2005 when he illegally entered the United States and applied for political asylum.


TOP-SECRET: Landmark Conviction in Colombia’s Palace of Justice Case

Former Colombian Army Col. Luis Alfonso Plazas Vega (ret.) [Photo: Revista Semana]
andmark Conviction in Colombia’s Palace of Justice CaseFirst-Ever Criminal Sentence Handed Down in Infamous Army AssaultDeclassified Documents Implicate Colonel, Army, in Civilian Killings, Disappearances

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 319

The Palace of Justice burned to the ground during military efforts to retake the building from M-19 guerrillas. Eleven Supreme Court justices died in the blaze, along with dozens of others. [Photo: Revista Semana]

Washington, D.C., August 30, 2011 – To mark the first-ever criminal conviction in Colombia’s infamous Palace of Justice case, the Archive today posts a selection of key declassified documents pertaining to the episode, including a 1999 U.S. Embassy cable that found that Colombian Army soldiers under the command of Col. Alfonso Plazas Vega had “killed a number of M-19 members and suspected collaborators hors de combat [“outside of combat”], including the Palace’s cafeteria staff.”

On Wednesday, a Colombian court sentenced retired Col. Plazas Vega to 30 years in prison for the disappearances of 11 people, including members of the cafeteria staff, during Army operations to retake the building from M-19 guerrillas who seized control of the building in November 1985. In all, more than 100 people died in the conflagration that followed, including 11 Supreme Court justices.

U.S. Embassy Situation Reports obtained by the National Security Archive in collaboration with the Truth Commission on the Palace of Justice shed light on how the Colombian government and military forces responded to the crisis, indicating widespread agreement that the operation be carried out expeditiously and using whatever force necessary. In one cable sent to Washington during the crisis, the Embassy said: “We understand that orders are to use all necessary force to retake building.” Another cable reported : “FonMin [Foreign Minister] said that President, DefMin [Defense Minster], Chief of National Police, and he are all together, completely in accord and do not intend to let this matter drag out.”

The Embassy documents also include a pair of reports on the fate of “guerrillas” detained during the operation: one saying that “surviving guerrillas have all been taken prisoner,” and another, two days later, reporting that “None of the guerrillas survived.”

The landmark ruling, coming nearly 25 years after these tragic events, was welcomed by the families of the victims and hailed by human rights groups, but harshly condemned by President Álvaro Uribe and members of the military high command, who said they were saddened by the decision. Yesterday, Uribe called an emergency meeting with the country’s top military commanders to discuss the outcome of the case, and last night proposed new legislation to shield the military from civil prosecution. The Colombian military has long resisted efforts by civilian authorities to prosecute senior military commanders and a military judge unsuccessfully tried to seize control of the case in 2009. Members of the M-19 guerrilla group are covered by a general amnesty declared as part of disarmament negotiations in 1990.

The conviction of Plazas Vega comes six months after the Truth Commission on the Palace of Justice, established by the Colombian Supreme Court, issued its final report, finding that “there never was a real or effective plan by the national government to try to save the lives of the hostages.” The Commission found that state responsibility for deaths and disappearances during the crisis stemmed from two fundamental decisions by President Betancur: “the decision to not participate in a dialogue (with the insurgents)” and the decision “to authorize or tolerate military operations [to retake the building] until its final consequences.”

At least three other former Army officers face similar charges in the case, including former Army commander Gen. Jesús Armando Arias Cabrales, and former Army intelligence officers Gen. Ivan Ramirez Quintero and Col. Edilberto Sánchez Rubiano.

Colombian security forces lead survivors of the Palace of Justice assault across the street to the Casa del Florero. [Photo: Revista Semana]

Col. Plazas defended his role in the Palace of Justice operation in a 1995 meeting with U.S. Embassy officials after being denied consular positions in Germany and the United States on human rights grounds. Embassy officials told Plazas that the U.S. “took no position on the veracity of the charges against him, and that he should get an official explanation for the withdrawal of his nomination to San Francisco from the [Colombian] Foreign Ministry.” Plazas offered that “if any guerrillas were captured alive [during the Palace of Justice assault], the only ones that might have taken them away would have been from Army Intelligence, about whose operations he knew nothing,” according to the Embassy report. A subsequent Embassy document found that, “None of the above allegations [against Plazas] were ever investigated by the authorities – a common problem during the 1980’s in Colombia.”

Gen. Arias Cabrales, the former armed forces commander, was sanctioned in 1990 by the government’s inspector general (Procuraduría) for failure to take the necessary measures to protect civilian lives during the assault and was forcibly retired from the military in 1994. That investigation caused considerable friction between the military and the watchdog agency, with public denouncements similar to those heard this week from Uribe and others. Arias now faces criminal charges in his role as commander of the Army brigade that oversaw the assault on the Palace.

Also under investigation is Gen. Ramírez Quintero, considered the architect of Colombia’s military intelligence program during the 1990s. Ramírez and others connected to the Army’s 20th Intelligence Brigade came under scrutiny in the mid-1990s for connections to illegal paramilitary death squads. The U.S. revoked his visa in 1998.

Read the Documents

Document 1
1985 November 6
Terrorist Attack on Colombian Palace of Justice
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Secret

During the midst of the crisis, the U.S. Embassy reports its understanding “that orders are to use all necessary force to retake the building.”

Document 2
1985 November 7 (Sitrep as of November 6, 7:00 PM)
Terrorist Attack on Colombian Palace of Justice
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Secret

Another crisis report from the U.S. Embassy, based on a conversation with Colombian Foreign Minister Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, says that “FonMin [Foreign Minister] said that President, DefMin [Defense Minster], Chief of National Police, and he are all together, completely in accord and do not intend to let this matter drag out.”

Document 3
1985 November 7 (Sitrep as of November 7, 5:00 PM)
Terrorist Attack on Colombian Palace of Justice
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Secret

This Embassy report notes that “surviving guerrillas have all been taken prisoner.”

Document 4
1985 November 9
The Palace of Justice Attack – Losses and Gains
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

An initial Embassy post-mortem on the Palace of Justice attack notes that “none of the guerrillas survived,” differing from the November 7 report that surviving guerrillas had been “taken prisoner.”

Document 5
1990 November 2
Charges Brought in Palace of Justice Case
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

Charges brought by the Procuraduría (Inspector General) against Colombian Army officers, including Gen. Arias Cabrales, for excessive use of force in the Palace of Justice case “may lead to increased friction between the Army and the independent institution,” according to this Embassy report. “Many officers will note that, while Sanchez and Arias face public condemnation, the M-19, whose terrorist assault led to the 1985 massacre, has converted itself into a respected political party.”

Document 6
1990 November 7
Palace of Justice—Procuraduria Disciplinary Sanctions Provoke a Storm of Criticism
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

The decision by the Procuraduría to officially remove from office retired Gen. Arias Cabrales “has generated a firestorm of criticism,” according to this Embassy cable. The outcry over the ruling from influential circles of the government and top military commanders is likely “to limit the independent institution’s ability to perform its constitutional responsibility as a watchdog for human rights and other abuses committed by government officials effectively.”
The Embassy concludes:

It seems inevitable that the virtually universal condemnation of the Procuraduria will undermine the prestige of the independent institution. Undoubtedly, some military officers will insist on inaccurately interpreting the decision against Arias and recent investigations by the Procuraduria into Army human rights abuses as reflections of a conspiracy to cripple the Army as an institution.

Document 7
1994 April 15
General’s Dismissal Stirs Controversy
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

The dismissal of Gen. Arias Cabrales has provoked a round of intense criticism, according to this cable. The Embassy says it agrees “with General Arias that [in dismissing him] both President Gaviria and Minister Pardo were forced into action.”

Document 8
1995 October 5
Conversation with Retired Colonel Alfonso Plazas Vega
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

In a meeting with U.S. Embassy officials, Col. Plazas defends his role in the Palace of Justice operation after being denied consular positions in Germany and the United States on human rights grounds. Embassy officials told Plazas that the U.S. “took no position on the veracity of the charges against him, and that he should get an official explanation for the withdrawal of his nomination to San Francisco from the [Colombian] Foreign Ministry.” Plazas noted that “if any guerrillas were captured alive, the only ones that might have taken them away would have been from Army Intelligence, about whose operations he knew nothing.”

Document 9
1996 February 7
Information on Colombian [Deleted]
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

In response to an inquiry for human rights-related information on Col. Plazas Vega, the Embassy concludes that, “None of the above allegations [against Plazas] were ever investigated by the authorities — a common problem during the 1980’s in Colombia.”

Document 10
1999 January 15
Colombian Military: Our Judiciary Requires No Reform, and Police Have Responsibility for Combatting Paramilitaries
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

A U.S. Embassy cable about a meeting between military officials and members of civilian non-governmental organizations appears to blame the Colombian Army and Col. Plazas Vega for civilian deaths following the Palace of Justice assault.[Please note that the French phrase “hors de combat“, means, literally, “outside of combat”.]

The presence among the “NGO representatives” of two military officers (one active duty, one retired), who killed time with lengthy, pro-military diatribes, also detracted from the military-NGO exchange. One of the two was retired Colonel Alfonso Plazas Vargas [sic], representing the “Office for Human Rights of Retired Military Officers.” Plazas commanded the November, 1985 raid on the Supreme Court building after it had been taken over by the M-19. That raid resulted in the deaths of more than 70 people, including eleven Supreme Court justices. Soldiers killed a number of M-19 members and suspected collaborators hors de combat, including the Palace’s cafeteria staff.

TOP-SECRET:TO SAVE DAN MITRIONE NIXON ADMINISTRATION URGED DEATH THREATS FOR URUGUAYAN PRISONERS

Dan Mitrione

TO SAVE DAN MITRIONE NIXON ADMINISTRATION URGED
DEATH THREATS FOR URUGUAYAN PRISONERS

In Response Uruguayan Security Forces Launched Death Squads to Hunt and Kill Insurgents

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 324

President Richard M. Nixon
Secretary of State William Rogers
U.S. ambassador to Uruguay Charles Adair
Uruguayan Foreign Minister Jorge Peirano

Washington, D.C., August 11, 2010 – Documents posted by the National Security Archive on the 40th anniversary of the death of U.S. advisor Dan Mitrione in Uruguay show the Nixon administration recommended a “threat to kill [detained insurgent] Sendic and other key [leftist insurgent] MLN prisoners if Mitrione is killed.” The secret cable from U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, made public here for the first time, instructed U.S. Ambassador Charles Adair: “If this has not been considered, you should raise it with the Government of Uruguay at once.”

The message to the Uruguayan government, received by the U.S. Embassy at 11:30 am on August 9, 1970, was an attempt to deter Tupamaro insurgents from killing Mitrione at noon on that day. A few minutes later, Ambassador Adair reported back, in another newly-released cable, that “a threat was made to these prisoners that members of the ‘Escuadrón de la Muerte’ [death squad] would take action against the prisoners’ relatives if Mitrione were killed.”

Dan Mitrione, Director of the U.S. AID Office of Public Safety (OPS) in Uruguay and the main American advisor to the Uruguayan police at the time, had been held for ten days by MLN-Tupamaro insurgents demanding the release of some 150 guerrilla prisoners held by the Uruguayan government. Mitrione was found dead the morning of August 10, 1970, killed by the Tupamaros after their demands were not met.

“The documents reveal the U.S. went to the edge of ethics in an effort to save Mitrione—an aspect of the case that remained hidden in secret documents for years,” said Carlos Osorio, who directs the National Security Archive’s Southern Cone project. “There should be a full declassification to set the record straight on U.S. policy to Uruguay in the 1960’s and 1970’s.”

“In the aftermath of Dan Mitrione’s death, the Uruguayan government unleashed the illegal death squads to hunt and kill insurgents,” said Clara Aldrighi, professor of history at Uruguay’s Universidad de la República, and author of “El Caso Mitrione” (Montevideo: Ediciones Trilce, 2007). “The U.S. documents are irrefutable proof that the death squads were a policy of the Uruguayan government, and will serve as key evidence in the death squads cases open now in Uruguay’s courts,” Osorio added. “It is a shame that the U.S. documents are writing Uruguayan history. There should be declassification in Uruguay as well,” stated Aldrighi, who collaborated in the production of this briefing book.

Uruguay, with a long-standing democratic tradition, entered a crisis during most of the 1960’s and 1970’s. The U.S. government feared the strongest Latin American insurgency at the time, the leftist Movimiento Nacional de Liberación (MLN-Tupamaros) would topple a weak Uruguayan government so they therefore supported the Uruguayan Government with economic and security assistance. The U.S. AID Office of Public Safety helped enhance the counterinsurgency techniques of a Uruguayan police renowned for the wide use of torture among prisoners. Under Dan Mitrione, the OPS consolidated the Uruguayan police’s National Directorate for Information and Intelligence (Dirección Nacional de Información e Inteligencia, DNII). It was right at this time that the Tupamaro insurgents kidnapped Mitrione on July 31, 1970, and demanded the release of 150 Tupamaro prisoners.

During the ten days Mitrione was kidnapped, the U.S. went to great lengths to secure his release. Nixon administration officials pressured the Uruguayan government to negotiate, offer ransom and, in the words of President Richard Nixon himself, “spare no effort to secure the safe return of Mr. Mitrione.”

Dan Mitrione was a policeman from Richmond, Indiana who later became an FBI agent. In the mid 1960’s, he was hired by the U.S. AID Office of Public Safety to train policemen in Brazil and Uruguay. According to A. J. Langguth in his book Hidden Terrors (Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 286) in Uruguay, as the U.S.-trained officers came to occupy key positions in the police, the claims of torture grew. Langguth believed Mitrione taught torture to Uruguayan officers. Mitrione’s activities inspired filmmaker Costa Gavras for his film “State of Siege” which portrays the U.S. support for a dictatorial government and the widespread use of torture by security forces in Uruguay.

The nine documents posted today by the National Security Archive contain evidence that the Government of Uruguay unleashed death squads activity in the wake of Mitrione’s execution, and that the United States was aware of these extra-judicial operations. While further declassification is needed to fully comprehend the development of death squad activities in Uruguay, the release of these documents is an important step in advancing international understanding of the Mitrione case and this chapter of U.S. and Uruguayan history.

Read the Documents

July 31, 1970 – [Kidnapping of Dan Mitrione]
(Time: 13:31 UR – 11:31 US – 16:31 Z)
[National Security Archive Southern Cone FOIA Project]

At 1:31 pm, Uruguay time, the CIA Director is informed that “[D]uring morning 31 July [excised] terrorists, presumably MLN or FARO, made four kidnapping attempts in Montevideo. Kidnapped and still missing as of 1300 hours [excised] time are U.S. Public Safety advisor Daniel Mitrione and Brazilian Consul in Montevideo Aloysio Mares Dias Gomide. Embassy economic officer Gordon Jones was also kidnapped but escaped shortly thereafter. Police reports also indicate that an unsuccessful attempt was made against Uruguayan Minister of Public Works Walter Pintos Risso.”

Note: U.S. government documents bear a Zulu (z) or Greenwich standard time. For clarity as to how events evolved, we have included here Uruguayan (UR) and (US) times also.


August 1970 – DNII Memoria Mensual Mes de Agosto 1970 [part one]

DNII Memoria Mensual Mes de Agosto 1970 [part two]
[Obtained by Clara Aldrighi at DNII Archive, Uruguay]

This monthly summary of insurgent activities by the National Directorate of Information and Intelligence (Dirección Nacional de Información e Inteligencia-DNII) of the Uruguayan police includes information on the kidnapping and eventual death of Dan Mitrione on August 10. Some of the entries report:

On August 1st the MLN-Tupamaros issue a communiqué requesting the liberation of detained Tupamaros which at the time amounted to 150 prisoners. The communiqué reports on the health situation of Mitrione who had a wound on his upper abdomen.

In the morning of August 7, Tupamaros kidnap American agricultural advisor Claude Fly. Later in the day, police forces capture Tupamaro founder and leader Raul Sendic along with other eight high-ranking Tupamaros.

On August 8, the Tupamaros announce that their demand for the release of insurgent prisoners has not been met and that they will kill Dan Mitrione at noon on Sunday, August 9.

Note: This document was found by Clara Aldrighi who was granted access to the DNII archives in Montevideo along with a group of researchers in 2005.
August 6, 1970 – Mitrione Kidnapping
(Time: 17:05 UR – 15:05 US – 20:05 Z )
[Obtained by Clara Aldrighi at U.S. National Archive, NARA]

In a personal message addressed to Uruguayan President Pacheco, President Richard Nixon expresses his appreciation for “your assurances in your cable of August 2 to employ every means available to you to secure the most rapid release of Dan Anthony Mitrione […]” Nixon concludes by stressing “I am confident that consistent with the spirit of your cable you will not foreclose any actions which could bring about the safe return of Mr. Mitrione […]”
August 09, 1970 – Mitrione Kidnapping – Meeting at Foreign Ministry
(Time: 22:34 UR – 20:34 US – 01:34 Z)
[Obtained by Clara Aldrighi at US National Archive, NARA]

On Saturday, August 8, U.S. Ambassador Charles Adair, along with Embassy officials and Uruguayan Foreign Minister Peirano and his staff, meet in Montevideo for half an hour at around 19:00 hours. The day before, nine top MLN-Tupamaro leaders had been captured by the police and the Tupamaros announced that they would kill Mitrione at noon on Sunday if their request for the release of all MLN members in prisons is not met.

In this cable, Adair reviews his conversation: “I briefly reviewed current situation and expressed growing concern over now critical position of Mitrione… I then handed him a list of four suggestions for activity:

A. Appeal publicly to those few who are holding Mitrione for safe delivery Mitrione. Offer them amnesty or amnesty plus an award (5 million pesos).

B. Offer amnesty to key persons now being held in return for information leading to release of the three men [Mitrione, Dias Gomide, Fly]

C. Repeat (and repeat) offer of reward for information.

D. If information has been received and 5 million pesos paid– thank the person (not identified) publicly and urge others to come forth with more information.”

Peirano dismisses public calls for a reward for information and favors communication with the insurgents through discreet channels. Adair reports that Peirano “wanted to suggest to me that the US government (Repeat, US government) itself undertake secret ransom effort directly with MLN.” Adair rejects the idea and Peirano accepts it.

An official whose name is excised in the cable, states that the “Uruguayan Government is now asking judge for authority to utilize sodium pentathol [truth serum] on MLN prisoners and has requested assistance from Buenos Aires. Also interior Ministry would shortly issue communiqué saying it intended to undertake most extreme police measures to locate kidnap victims.”

Adair adds in the cable that Peirano called him after this meeting to say that a private channel had been established to negotiate amnesty and reward to someone within the Tupamaros. Adair closes his report by asking the Department of State to get ready to come through with the U.S. government offer for cash “as it is conceivable GOU or private contact (unknown to us) who now dealing with subject may before noon tomorrow approach us for participation in funding the operation.”

Note: Brazilian Consul Dias Gomide and American agricultural advisor Claude Fly were eventually released unharmed after months of being captive.
August 9, 1970 – Ambassador from the Secretary
(Time: 11:35 UR – 09:35 US – 14:35 Z)
[National Security Archive Southern Cone FOIA Project]

Nine days after Dan Mitrione’s kidnapping, the Uruguayan security forces still had no information of his whereabouts. They did, however, capture Raúl Sendic, MLN leader/founder, and several other important MLN leaders on August 7.

On August 9, thirty minutes before the deadline set by the Tupamaros to kill Mitrione, in a “flash” secret cable urging action from Ambassador Adair, Secretary of State William Rogers writes,

“[w]e have assumed that the Government of Uruguay has considered use of threat to kill Sendic and other key MLN prisoners if Mitrione is killed. If this has not been considered, you should raise it with GOU at once.”

The cable bears the Exclusive Distribution caption EXDIS, meaning that the information in this message is highly classified and should be shared only with the recipient (Adair), the Secretary of State and the White House.

Note: Raul Sendic escaped from prison in 1971, was recaptured by police in 1972 and remained in prison until the military dictatorship ended in 1985.


August 09, 1970, – Mitrione/Fly kidnapping – Last Minute Meeting with Foreign Minister
(Time: 12:01 UR – 10:01 US – 15:01 Z)
[Obtained by Clara Aldrighi at US National Archive, NARA]

Right at the time of the noon deadline, Ambassador Adair reports in this cable about a meeting he held at 11 am with the Uruguayan Foreign Minister to discuss the situation.

Adair reports that he spoke to Foreign Minister Peirano who had just “returned from President Pacheco’s office. I told him that at this last moment, we were receiving number of telephone calls and (as a backdoor method of bringing up subject of possible U.S. contribution to Uruguayan Government efforts) I told him one had been from Uruguayan vigorously complaining that money offered by Uruguayan Government was not sufficient.” Adair states that the Uruguayan government now is clear that money should not be an issue and implies that the U.S. is ready to provide whatever is necessary. He then goes on to describe ongoing secret meetings with undisclosed contacts.

Nevertheless, Adair writes that the Uruguayans have “an increasing feeling that in fact Mitrione is dead.” Adair reports that “[w]hen the noon deadline is reached, the Uruguayan Government intends to take what [excised] called ‘severe measures’ (which he did not describe).”

August 9, 1970 – For Secretary from Ambassador
(Time: 12:03 UR – 10:03 US – 15:03 Z)
[National Security Archive Southern Cone FOIA Project]

In his response to Secretary Rogers’ suggestions, Ambassador Adair explains that he showed the Secretary of State’s message to the Uruguayan Foreign Minister. While the latter stated that “his type of government did not permit such action,” but “he [the Foreign Minister] understood that through indirect means, a threat was made to these prisoners that members of the ‘Escuadrón de Muerte’ (Death Squad) would take action against the prisoners’ relatives if Mitrione were killed.”

This cable represents the earliest recorded recognition of the existence of Uruguayan death squads by the U.S. government, and evidence of Washington’s knowledge of their use.

Note: This document was found by National Security Archive Southern Cone FOIA Project intern George Leyh.
August 09, 1970 – [Letter from President Nixon to President Pacheco]
(Time: 18:07 UR – 16:07 US – 21:07 Z)
[Obtained by Clara Aldrighi at US National Archive, NARA]

Since there is no conclusive reports that Dan Mitrione is dead, on the evening of August 9, 1970, President Nixon sends a message to President Pacheco insisting that his government “spare no effort to secure the safe return of Mr. Mitrione and Dr. Fly.”


August 1987 – The Mitrione Kidnapping in Uruguay
[National Security Archive Southern Cone FOIA Project]

This sixty page joint study report by the RAND Corporation for the Department of State concludes that

“Policemen found Mitrione’s body at 4:15 a.m… August 10… He had been shot several times at close range. U.S. Public Safety advisers, including two experienced homicide detectives, rushed to the scene… [They] concluded without doubt that death must have occurred at or shortly before 4:00 a.m., well after the Tupamaro deadline.”

Written originally in 1981, the report was later revised to include additional declassified records documenting the policies and actions of the U.S., the Uruguayan government and the Tupamaros during the 11 days of Mitrione’s kidnapping.

“Heavy police and military operations were authorized…” by the Uruguayan government during that period. The U.S. government efforts included “urgent diplomatic suggestions and even pressure for the Uruguayan government to break the communications impasse and open some channel to the kidnappers; [and] intensive participation of Public Safety Advisers in local police operations.”

The report writers evidently did not have access to the key documents showing U.S. support of death threats against prisoners nor the Uruguayan government’s launching of death squads. Nevertheless, a brief mention of the subject on page 55 states that at the time of the kidnappings, “[o]minous talk…hinted at the prospective formation of death-squad and vigilante paramilitary organizations.”

TOP-SECRET: The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río

Former Colombian Army Gen. Rito Alejo del Río Rojas (ret.)

The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río

Ambassador Cited Accused Colombian General’s Reliance on Death Squads

“Systematic” Support of Paramilitaries “Pivotal to his Military Success”

Infamous General a “Not-So-Success” Story of U.S. Military Training

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 327

Former U.S. ambassador to Colombia Curtis Kamman called Del Río’s reliance on paramilitaries “pivotal.”

Washington, D.C., August 29, 2011 – The U.S. ambassador to Colombia reported in 1998 that the “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries” was “pivotal” to the military success of Gen. Rito Alejo del Río Rojas, now on trial for murder and collaboration with paramilitary death squads while commander of a key army unit in northern Colombia.

The Secret “Biographic Note” from Ambassador Curtis Kamman is one of several documents published today by the National Security Archive pertaining to Del Río, whose trial resumes this month after years of impunity and delay. The documents are also the subject of an article published today in Spanish at VerdadAbierta.com, the leading online gateway for information on paramilitarism in Colombia. The article was also published in English today on the Web site of the National Security Archive.

“The collection is a unique and potentially valuable source of evidence in the case against Del Río, reflecting years of reports linking the senior army commander to paramilitarism,” said Michael Evans, director of the Archive’s Colombia Documentation Project. “As Del Río’s trial resumes, the court should examine the contemporaneous accounts of U.S. officials who were required by law to monitor and certify Colombia’s human rights performance.”

Other revelations include:

  • The U.S. embassy takes a favorable view of Col. Carlos Alfonso Velásquez, who called for an investigation of Del Río’s ties to paramilitary groups, noting that his statements “add credibility to our human rights report.”
  • A report on a conversation with Col. Velásquez, who told U.S. military officials that cooperation with paramilitaries “had gotten much worse under Del Río.”
  • Documents reporting conspicuous increases in anti-paramilitary operations after Del Río’s transfer out of northern Colombia. The embassy said it was “more than coincidental that the recent anti-paramilitary actions have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of military personnel believed to favor paramilitaries.”
  • The embassy notes a disturbing instance of possible military-paramilitary complicity in a paramilitary attack outside Bogotá just weeks after Del Río took command of the nearby military brigade.
  • The shifting U.S. opinion about Del Río is clearly evident in two U.S. military reports from early 1998. In the first, Del Río, who attended the U.S. Army School of the Americas, is lauded as a U.S. military training “success story.” But a second, corrected, report from March 1998 lists Del Río instead as a “not-so-success” story, citing his alleged paramilitary ties.

The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río
By Michael Evans

Curtis Kamman will not be called to testify in the trial of Rito Alejo del Río, the former Colombian Army general on trial for murder and collaboration with paramilitary death squads, but we do have some idea what the former U.S. ambassador to Colombia might have said, thanks to declassified documents published today on the Web site of the National Security Archive.

In a Secret “Biographic Note” attached to an August 1998 cable to Washington, Kamman asserted that the former 17th Brigade commander’s “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success” in northern Colombia.

Obtained through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, these documents are a unique and potentially valuable source of evidence in the case against Del Río, reflecting years of reports linking the senior army commander to paramilitarism. As Del Río’s trial resumes, the court would do well to examine the contemporaneous accounts of U.S. officials who were required by law to monitor and certify Colombia’s human rights performance.

Once lauded as a staunch anti-guerrilla fighter, Del Río first came under scrutiny in 1996 after his deputy at the Urabá-based 17th Brigade, Col. Carlos Alfonso Velásquez, wrote an internal report (published last week by VerdadAbierta) calling on the Army to investigate the unit’s paramilitary ties and accusing Del Río of turning a blind eye to paramilitary activity. Rather than heed his warning, the Army fired Velásquez, forcing him into early retirement for insubordination. Velásquez offered similar testimony last week as a key witness in the case.

Interviewed by the embassy in December 1997, Velásquez directly implicated his former commander, lamenting the “body count syndrome” that “fueled human rights abuses” and stressing that 17th Brigade collaboration with paramilitaries “had gotten much worse under Del Río.” Another embassy report on the Velásquez episode testifies to the colonel’s integrity, noting that Velásquez was an “admired and much-decorated” military officer who had helped bring down the Cali drug mafia and had once gone public about an extramarital affair rather than submit to a cartel blackmail attempt.

His statements “bring extra pressure to bear on the Colombian military,” noted U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette, who was then involved in tense negotiations with the army over its rights record. “They will add credibility to our human rights report.”

By then the embassy had begun to notice that paramilitary activity tended to flourish in areas where Del Río commanded troops and that anti-paramilitary operations seemed to increase in those same zones after he left. In January 1998, the embassy noted that an unprecedented string of 17th Brigade actions against paramilitaries “took place only about a week after the departure of the Brigade’s commander, Brig. Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, who was long-alleged to be not unfriendly toward paramilitaries.” A February report called it “more than coincidental” that a recent series of military blows against paramilitaries had “all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of former First Brigade commander MG Iván Ramírez and his 17th Brigade commander BG Rito Alejo Del Río, who were widely believed to have contributed to a command climate conducive to turning a blind eye to paramilitaries, or worse.”

At the same time, the embassy noted a disturbing instance of possible military-paramilitary complicity in a paramilitary attack in La Horqueta, outside Bogotá, just weeks after Del Río left Urabá to take command of the nearby military brigade. “Why was it necessary,” the embassy asked in a January 1998 cable, “for another army unit to travel all the way from Bogotá in order to intervene?”

Del Río’s 13th Brigade was “strangely non-reactive” to the killing, notable as the first paramilitary massacre to occur so close to the Colombian capital. Also implicating Del Río was the discovery that the paramilitary who led the attack was the president of a legal Convivir militia group from Urabá, Del Río’s former area of operations, “who had been imported to the region to strike back against the FARC.”

The general’s star was falling so fast in 1998 that U.S. reporting could barely keep up. The shifting opinion about Del Río is clearly evident in two U.S. military reports from early 1998. In the first, Del Río, a 1967 graduate of the U.S. Army School of the Americas, is lauded as a U.S. military training “success story.” But a second, corrected, report from March 1998 lists Del Río instead as a “not-so-success” story, noting that he was “alleged to have ties not only to paramilitary elements on the north coast and in the Urabá region…but also in the conflictive ‘Magdalena Medio’ region before that” and was also”implicated in the 1985 theft of a [Colombian Army] weapons shipment destined for Magdalena Medio paramilitaries.”

By August 1998, Colombian prosecutors had opened a preliminary investigation of the general’s ties to paramilitaries, a development Kamman said would “serve as a marker to those army officers who continue to assist or otherwise work with paramilitary groups.” Del Río had been “very successful” against FARC guerrillas, the ambassador said in his Secret “Biographic Note,” and his “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success at the time.”

The ambassador’s reports had an impact in Washington, where human rights figured prominently in negotiations over the nascent Plan Colombia aid package. In January 1999, two senior State Department officials wrote to Kamman to express their dissatisfaction with Colombia’s progress on human rights, noting in particular the “appointment to key positions of several generals credibly alleged to have ties to paramilitaries” including Del Río, who had recently been named the army’s operations director.

Frustrated and essentially out of options, the State Department took the unusual step of cancelling Del Río’s visa for “drug trafficking and terrorist activities” precipitating his forced retirement and the end of his military career in April 1999.

As years went on, the United States became increasingly concerned about official impunity in Colombia, especially for senior military officers like Del Río, prompting sharp discussions after Prosecutor General Luis Camilo Osorio dropped all charges against the former general in 2001. A briefing paper for the State Department’s top human rights official, Lorne Craner, notes “concern in Congress” that Osorio’s dismissal of the case showed that he was “less focused on prosecuting paramilitaries and military personnel accused of colluding with paramilitary.” A 2005 State Department memorandum found it “troubling” that the government had not yet sent “a clear message” regarding impunity for Del Río.

More than five years later, the case has finally come to trial, and the court will hear the testimony of many important witnesses, each of whom brings a unique perspective to the proceedings. And while no U.S. officials will appear, the court should consider the declassified perspective of the U.S. government and the formerly secret files on one of its “not-so-success” stories.

Read the Documents

Document 1
1998 August 13
General Ramirez Lashes Out at State Department; Two More Generals Under Investigation for Paramilitary Links
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 9345

This U.S. Embassy cable from August 13, 1998, reports, among other things, that Gen. Del Río was under investigation for links to illegal paramilitary groups. In a “Biographic Note,” the Embassy says that Del Río’s “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success at the time.”

Biographic Note: Although brigade commands are generally rotated every year, General Del Rio was allowed to remain in command of the 17th Brigade in highly-conflictive Uraba region for two years, apparently because he had been very successful in bloodying the FARC’s nose during the period of his command. His systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success at the time.

Document 2
1997 January 11
Retired Army Colonel Lambastes Military for Inaction against Paramilitaries
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1997 Bogota 274

In this cable, the U.S. Embassy in Colombia reports the public statements of former Colombian Army colonel Carlos Alfonso Velásquez that his commanding officer at the 17th Brigade, Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, had been negligent in not combating paramilitary groups in Urabá. In its analysis of the information, the Embassy takes a favorable view of Velásquez:

[Embassy officers] who know Velasquez speak highly of his performance as head of the anti-narcotics special joint command’s Army component in Cali. When the cartel tried to blackmail him, then Minister of Defense Botero saved him from dismissal. Botero characterized him as clean, among the best, and of unquestionable integrity. [Several lines deleted] Velasquez’s statements bring extra pressure to bear on the Colombian military as they prepare for a new defense minister. They will add credibility to our human rights report.

Document 3
1997 December 24
Retired Army Colonel Talks Freely About the Army He Left Behind
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report

In this document, a U.S. military attaché reports his conversation with a retired Colombian Army colonel (almost certainly Carlos Alfonso Velásquez) about his time at the 17th Brigade in Urabá. The report notes that the colonel “seems to know a lot about paramilitaries and their links to drug traffickers and the Army.” The colonel says that there is a “body count syndrome” in the Colombian Army “when it comes to pursuing the guerrillas.” This way of thinking “tends to fuel human rights abuses by otherwise well-meaning soldiers trying to get their quota to impress superiors.” The colonel said he had served under one commander he respected, as well as Rito Alejo del Río, “about whom he had fewer nice things to say.”

[Name deleted] was asked if the paramilitary wave of violence in the Uraba region and related military collusion were recent phenomena. [Deleted] replied in the negative, saying that military cooperation with the paramilitaries had been occurring for a number of years, but that it had gotten much worse under Del Río.”

Document 4
1998 January 09
Colombians Strike Two Blows Against the Paras
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 120

The U.S. Embassy noted with interest the sudden surge of anti-paramilitary activity by the 17th Brigade immediately after the departure of Del Río as brigade commander.

It is interesting to note that the 17th Brigade confrontation took place only about a week after the departure of the brigade’s commander, Brig. Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, who was long-alleged to by not unfriendly toward paramilitaries. His own former deputy, Col. Carlos Alfonso Velasquez, was retired from the Army under a cloud in January 1997 for privately criticizing Del Río’s refusal to combat the paramilitaries headquartered in the region. Although the Army has claimed for some time that the 17th Brigade has moved against the paramilitaries, we are unaware of any other such encounters that have been publicly confirmed.

Document 5
1998 January 28
Narcos Arrested for La Horqueta Paramilitary Massacre
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable

The U.S. Embassy questions why it was another military unit, and not the Army’s 13th Brigade, under the command of Gen. Del Río, that finally responded to the January 1998 La Horqueta paramilitary massacre.

If the Army was immediately in the area in the immediate aftermath of the killings, however, as the priest asserts, why was it necessary for another Army unit to travel all the way from Bogotá in order to intervene? That is precisely the question prosecutors are now asking. Finally, the strangely non-reactive 13th Brigade recently came under the command of BG Rito Alejo Del Rio, who earned considerable attention as commander of the 17th Brigade covering the heartland of Carlos Castaño’s paramilitaries in Cordoba and Uraba.

Document 6
1998 February 09
Colombian Army Reportedly Captures 23 Paramilitaries
U.S. Embassy cable, 1998 Bogota 1249

The Embassy speculates that a recent surge in 17th Brigade anti-paramilitary activity in Urabá may be related to the departure of Gen. Rito Alejo del Río as commander.

We are encouraged by this development but we are not yet sure how to interpret it. Until recently, the military has had little success in capturing paramilitaries… The 17th Brigade has a new commander, which may also have contributed to an increased surge in anti-paramilitary activity. The previous commander, Brigadier General Rito Alejo Del Rio, now the head of the 13th Brigade in Bogota, was rumored to have been quite tolerant of paramilitary activity in Uraba.

Document 7
1998 February 25
U.S. Army School of the Americas Success Stories
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report

A U.S. military intelligence report, subsequently revised (see Document 9), lists Gen. Del Río among U.S. military training “success stories.”

Document 8
1998 February 26
Military and Police Begin Clearly Cracking Down on Paramilitaries Around Carlos Castano
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 2097

The U.S. Embassy says that it “seems more than coincidental” that recent anti-paramilitary operations by the military “have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia” of First Division commander Gen. Iván Ramírez and 17th Brigade commander Gen. Rito Alejo del Río.

We note that these latest anti-paramilitary incidents have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of former first division commander MG Ivan Ramirez and his 17th Brigade commander BG Rio [sic] Alejo Del Rio, who were widely believed to have contributed to a command climate conducive to turning a blind eye to paramilitaries, or worse. Nothing is irreversible, but at long last those days appear to be over.
…
We note that this new-found effectiveness in curbing the paramilitaries correlates closely with the recent change of command in several key military positions in northern Colombia, including the First Division in Santa Marta (formerly headed by Major General Ivan Ramirez), the 17th Brigade in Uraba, and the 11th Brigade in Monteria… It seems more than coincidental that the recent anti-paramilitary actions have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of military personnel believed to favor paramilitaries.

Document 9
1998 March 31
U.S. Army School of the Americas Not-So-Success Stories – Digging Back into History (Corrected Report)
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report

The U.S. military attaché in Colombia corrects an earlier report on Colombian military graduates from the U.S. Army School of the Americas, noting that Gen. Rito Alejo del Río was alleged to have ties to paramilitaries in Urabá as well as the Magdalena Medio, where “he was implicated in the 1985 theft of a [Colombian Army] weapons shipment destined for Magdalena Medio paramilitaries.”

Report follows up earlier detailed IIR on high-ranking/high-visibility Colombian military/national police graduates of the School of the Americas. Since then, additional—mostly derogatory—info on some of the older, mostly now retired, officers has come to light.
…
Brigadier General Rito Alejo ((Del Rio)) Rojas—Alleged to have ties not only to paramilitary elements on the north coast and in the Uraba region (adjacent to the Darien region of Panama), but also in the conflictive “Magdalena Medio” region before that. For example, he was implicated in the 1985 theft of a [Colombian Army] weapons shipment destined for Magdalena Medio paramilitaries. The case came to light only because the overloaded airplane crashed. BG Del Rio is currently serving as commander of the 13th Brigade in Bogota.

Document 10
1998 May 14
Army/Fiscalia Raid on a Church Based NGO Viewed as a Major Blunder
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 5554

The U.S. Embassy asserts that a raid by the Army’s 13th Brigade on the offices of the Comisión Interclesial de Justicia y Paz might be “related to long-standing friction between the Jesuit director of the NGO and the commander of the Army’s 13th Brigade.

Comment. [Two lines deleted] Jesuit priest Father Javier Giraldo worked in Uraba during the time period in which General Rito Alejo Del Rio was commanding the 17th Brigade there. [Two lines deleted] Recently, General Del Rio was reassigned to his new, more responsible position commanding the 13th Brigade; the brigade which participated in the raid on Justicia y Paz.

Document 11
1999 January 25
Official Informal for Ambassador Kamman from WHA/AND Director Chicola and DRL DAS Gerson
U.S. State Department cable, 1999 State 13985

Two senior U.S. officials register their dissatisfaction with Colombia’s progress on human rights during the first six months of the Pastrana government, noting the “appointment to key positions of several generals credibly alleged to have ties to paramilitaries. These include Generals Fernando Millan Perez, Rito Aleto Del Rio Rojas, and Rafael Hernandez Lopez.”

Document 12
2001 December 13
Your Meeting with Fiscal General Luis Camilo Osorio
U.S. State Department briefing memorandum

A briefing paper for the State Department’s top human rights official, Lorne Craner, notes “concern in the US Congress” that Osorio is “less focused on prosecuting paramilitaries and military personnel accused of colluding with paramilitary,” citing his dismissal of charges against Rito Alejo del Río.

Document 13
Circa 2005
Memorandum of Justification Concerning Human Rights Conditions with Respect to Assistance for Colombian Armed Forces
U.S. State Department memorandum

A U.S. State Department review of Colombia’s human rights performance finds it “troubling” that the government had not yet sent “a clear message” regarding impunity for Del Río.

TOP-SECRET: THE CIA FILE ON LUIS POSADA CARRILES

Washington, D.C., August 28, 2011 – As the unprecedented trial of Cuban exile Luis Posada Carriles begins this week in El Paso, Texas, the National Security Archive today posted a series of CIA records covering his association with the agency in the 1960s and 1970s. CIA personnel records described Posada, using his codename, “AMCLEVE/15,” as “a paid agent” at $300 a month, being utilized as a training instructor for other exile operatives, as well as an informant.  “Subject is of good character, very reliable and security conscious,” the CIA reported in 1965. Posada, another CIA document observed, incorrectly, was “not a typical ‘boom and bang’ type of individual.”

Today’s posting includes key items from Posada’s CIA file, including several previously published by the Archive, and for the first time online, the indictment from Posada’s previous prosecution–in Panama–on charges of trying to assassinate Fidel Castro with 200 pounds of dynamite and C-4 explosives (in Spanish).

“This explosive has the capacity to destroy any armored vehicle, buildings, steel doors, and the effects can extend for 200 meters…if a person were in the center of the explosion, even if they were in an armored car, they would not survive,” as the indictment described the destructive capacity of the explosives found in Posada’s possession in Panama City, where Fidel Castro was attending an Ibero-American summit in November 2000.

The judge presiding over the perjury trial of Posada has ruled that the prosecution can introduce unclassified evidence of his CIA background which might be relevant to his “state of mind” when he allegedly lied to immigration officials about his role in a series of hotel bombings in Havana in 1997. In pre-trial motions, the prosecution has introduced a short unclassified “summary” of Posada’s CIA career, which is included below.  Among other things, the summary (first cited last year in Tracey Eaton’s informative blog, “Along the Malecon”) reveals that in 1993, only four years before he instigated the hotel bombings in Havana, the CIA anonymously warned former agent and accused terrorist Luis Posada of an assassination threat on his life.

A number of the Archive’s CIA documents were cited in articles in the Washington Post, and CNN coverage today on the start of the Posada trial. “The C.I.A. trained and unleashed a Frankenstein,” the New York Times quoted Archive Cuba Documentation Project director Peter Kornbluh as stating.  “It is long past time he be identified as a terrorist and be held accountable as a terrorist.”

Posada was convicted in Panama in 2001, along with three accomplices, of endangering public safety; he was sentenced to eight years in prison. After lobbying by prominent Cuban-American politicians from Miami, Panamanian president Mireya Moscoso pardoned all four in August 2004. A fugitive from justice in Venezuela where he escaped from prison while being tried for the October 6, 1976, mid air bombing of a Cuban jetliner which killed all 73 people on board, Posada showed up in Miami in March 2005. He was arrested on May 17 of that year by the Department of Homeland Security and held in an immigration detention center in El Paso for two years, charged with immigration fraud during the Bush administration.  Since mid 2007, he has been living on bail in Miami. In April 2009, the Obama Justice Department added several counts of perjury relating to Posada denials about his role in organizing a series of hotel, restaurant and discotheque bombings in 1997.  Since mid 2007, he has been living on bail in Miami

According to Kornbluh, “it is poetic justice that the same U.S. Government whose secret agencies created, trained, paid and deployed Posada is finally taking steps to hold him accountable in a court of law for his terrorist crimes.”

Read the Documents

Document 1: CIA, Unclassified, “Unclassified Summary of the CIA’s Relationship With Luis Clemente Posada Carriles,” Undated.

This unclassified summary of the relationship between Luis Posada Carriles and the CIA, which was provided to the court by the US Justice Department, says the CIA first had contact with Posada in connection with planning the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. He remained a paid agent of the CIA from 1965-1967 and again from 1968-1974. From 1974-76, Posada provided unsolicited threat reporting. (Additional documents introduced in court show that he officially severed ties with the CIA in February 1976.) According to this document, the CIA last had contact with Posada in 1993 when they anonymously contacted him in Honduras by telephone to warn him of a threat to his life. (This document was first cited last year in Tracey Eaton’s informative blog, “Along the Malecon.”)

Document 2: CIA, “PRQ Part II for AMCLEVE/15,” September 22, 1965.

“PRQ Part II,” or the second part of Posada’s Personal Record Questionnaire, provides operational information. Within the text of the document, Posada is described as “strongly anti-Communist” as well as a sincere believer in democracy. The document describes Posada having a “good character,” not to mention the fact that he is “very reliable, and security conscious.” The CIA recommends that he be considered for a civil position in a post-Castro government in Cuba (codenamed PBRUMEN).

Document 3: CIA, Cable, “Plan of the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) to Blow Up a Cuban or Soviet Vessel in Veracruz, Mexico,” July 1, 1965.

This CIA cable summarizes intelligence on a demolition project proposed by Jorge Mas Canosa, then the head of RECE. On the third page, a source is quoted as having informed the CIA of a payment that Mas Canosa has made to Luis Posada in order to finance a sabotage operation against ships in Mexico. Posada reportedly has “100 pounds of C-4 explosives and some detonators” and limpet mines to use in the operation.

 Document 4: CIA, Memorandum, “AMCLEVE /15,” July 21, 1966.

This document includes two parts-a cover letter written by Grover T. Lythcott, Posada’s CIA handler, and an attached request written by Posada to accept a position on new coordinating Junta composed of several anti-Castro organizations. In the cover letter, Lythcbtt refers to Posada by his codename, AMCLEVE/I5, and discusses his previous involvement withthe Agency. He lionizes Posada, writing that his ”performance in all assigned tasks has been excellent,” and urges that he be permitted to work with the combined anti-Castro exile groups. According to the document, Lythcott suggests that Posada be taken off the CIA payroll to facilitate his joining the anti-Castro militant junta, which will be led by RECE. Lythcott insists that Posada will function as an effective moderating force considering he is “acutely aware of the international implications of ill planned or over enthusiastic activities against Cuba.” In an attached memo, Posada, using the name “Pete,” writes that if he is on the Junta, “they will never do anything to endanger the security of this Country (like blow up Russian ships)” and volunteers to “give the Company all the intelligence that I can collect.”

Document 5: CIA, Personal Record Questionnaire on Posada, April 17, 1972.

This “PRQ” was compiled in 1972 at a time Posada was a high level official at the Venezuelan intelligence service, DISIP, in charge of demolitions. The CIA was beginning to have some concerns about him, based on reports that he had taken CIA explosives equipment to Venezuela, and that he had ties to a Miami mafia figure named Lefty Rosenthal. The PRQ spells out Posada’s personal background and includes his travel to various countries between 1956 and 1971. It also confirms that one of his many aliases was “Bambi Carriles.”

Document 6: CIA, Report, “Traces on Persons Involved in 6 Oct 1976 Cubana Crash,” October 13, 1976.

In the aftermath of the bombing of Cubana flight 455, the CIA ran a file check on all names associated with the terror attack. In a report to the FBI the Agency stated that it had no association with the two Venezuelans who were arrested. A section on Luis Posada Carriles was heavily redacted when the document was declassified. But the FBI retransmitted the report three days later and that version was released uncensored revealing Posada’s relations with the CIA.

Document 7: CIA, Secret Intelligence Report, “Activities of Cuban Exile Leader Orlando Bosch During his Stay in Venezuela,” October 14, 1976.

A source in Venezuela supplied the CIA with detailed intelligence on a fund raiser held for Orlando Bosch and his organization CORU after he arrived in Caracas in September 1976. The source described the dinner at the house of a Cuban exile doctor, Hildo Folgar, which included Venezuelan government officials. Bosch was said to have essentially asked for a bribe in order to refrain from acts of violence during the United Nations meeting in November 1976, which would be attended by Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez. He was also quoted as saying that his group had done a “great job” in assassinating former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier in Washington D.C. on September 21, and now was going to “try something else.” A few days later, according to this intelligence report, Luis Posada Carriles was overheard to say that “we are going to hit a Cuban airplane” and “Orlando has the details.”

Document 8: First Circuit Court of Panama, “Fiscalia Primera Del Primer Circuito Judicial De Panama: Vista Fiscal No. 200”, September 28, 2001.

This lengthy document is the official indictment in Panama of Luis Posada Carriles and 4 others for the attempted assassination of Fidel Castro at the 10th Ibero-American Summit in November 2000. In this indictment, Posada Carriles is accused of possession of explosives, endangerment of public safety, illicit association, and falsification of documents. After traveling to Panama, according to the evidence gathered, “Luis Posada Carriles and Raul Rodriguez Hamouzova rented a red Mitsubishi Lancer at the International Airport of Tocumen, in which they transported the explosives and other devices necessary to create a bomb.” (Original Spanish: “Luis Posada Carriles y Raul Rodriguez Hamouzova rentaron en el Aeropuerto Internacional de Tocumen de la referida empresa el vehículo marca Mitsubishi Lancer, color rojo, dentro del cual se transportaron los explosives y artefactos indicados para elaborar una bomba.”)  This bomb was intended to take the life of Fidel Castro; Castro was to present at the Summit on November 17th, and what Carriles had proposed to do “wasn’t easy, because it occurred at the Summit, and security measures would be extreme.” (Original Spanish: “lo que se proponía hacer no era fácil, porque ocurría en plena Cumbre, y las medidas de seguridad serían extremas.”)

After being discovered by agents of the Explosives Division of the National Police, they ascertained that “this explosive has the capacity to destroy an armored vehicle, buildings, steel doors, and the effects of an explosive of this class and quality can extend for 200 meters.” Additionally, “to a human, from a distance of 200 meters it would affect the senses, internal hemorrhages, and if the person were in the center of the explosion, even if they were in an armored car, they would not survive…the destructive capacity of this material is complete.” (Original Spanish: “Este explosivo tiene la capacidad de destruir cualquier carro blindado, puede destruir edificios, puertas de acero, y que la onda expansiva de esta calidad y clase de explosive puede alcanzar hasta 200 metros…Al ser humano, sostienen, a la distancia de 200 metros le afectaría los sentidos, hemorragios internos, y si la persona estuviese en el centro de la explosion, aunque estuviese dentro de un carro blindado no sobreviviría…la capacidad destructive de este material es total.”)

The indictment states that when Posada was “asked about the charges against him, including possession of explosives, possession of explosives that endanger public safety, illicit association, and falsification of documents…he expresses having fought subversion against democratic regimes along several fronts, specifically Castro-sponsored subversion.” (Original Spanish: “Preguntado sobre los cargos formulados, es decir Posesión de Explosivos, Posesión de Explosivos que implica Peligro Común, Asociación Ilicita, y Falsedad de Documentos…Expresa haber combatido en distintos frentes la subversión contra regimens democráticos, ‘quiero decir la subversión castrista.’”)

Posada and his accomplices were eventually convicted of endangering public safety and sentenced to 8 years in prison. He was pardoned by Panamanian president, Mireya Moscosa, after only four years in August 2004 and lived as a fugitive in Honduras until March 2005 when he illegally entered the United States and applied for political asylum.

27 Years Later, Justice for Fernando García

Family snapshot of Nineth de García, daughter Alejandra and husband Fernando before his abduction on February 18, 1984. Photo from “Guatemala, The Group for Mutual Support,” An Americas Watch Report. [Courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon]
Update on the conviction of the Guatemalan police officers
responsible for Fernando García’s “forced disappearance”

Washington, D.C., February 18, 2011 – Twenty-seven years ago today, Guatemalan labor activist Edgar Fernando García was shot and kidnapped by government security forces off a street in downtown Guatemala City. He was never seen again. In recognition of the anniversary of his disappearance, the National Security Archive today posts the complete text of the historic ruling issued last October by a Guatemalan court that convicted two former policemen to 40 years in prison for the crime, as well as key documents from the Guatemalan National Police Archive that were used in the prosecution.

Fernando García’s family continues to fight for justice inside Guatemala and internationally. The groundbreaking trial that found Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos and Abraham Lancerio Gómez – both low-ranking police agents at the time of the abduction – guilty of García’s “forced disappearance” ended with the court’s unprecedented order that the government investigate their superior officers. Meanwhile in Washington, where the García case has been pending before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission for over a decade, the commission announced on February 9 its decision to send the case to the Inter-American Court in Costa Rica due to Guatemala’s failure to act on commission findings.

The Fernando García trial took place over several days last October in a crowded courtroom in the “Tribunals Tower” in downtown Guatemala City, and brought together an extraordinary array of experts and witnesses testifying on behalf of the prosecution. (To see a more complete description of the first days of the trial, see Kate Doyle’s blog posting.) Congresswomen Nineth Montenegro, García’s wife and mother of their infant daughter, Alejandra, at the time of his abduction, told the court about her anguished search for her husband in the months following his disappearance, leading to the creation of one of Guatemala’s first human rights organizations, the Mutual Support Group (GAM). Alejandra García Montenegro, now a lawyer who served as the querellante adhesivo or “private prosecutor” in the case, spoke movingly at the trial’s end about the impact of his disappearance on her family and her own childhood. García’s elderly mother also testified, expressing the pain she has endured for almost three decades in losing her son without knowing his ultimate fate.

At the heart of the prosecution’s case were the official records of the former National Police of Guatemala, recovered by the Office of the Human Rights Prosecutor in 2005 and now being examined for evidence of human right crimes. Velia Muralles Bautista, an investigator with the Historic Archives of the National Police (AHPN), gave expert testimony on hundreds of police records connected to the February 1984 counterinsurgency operation that resulted in Fernando García’s abduction. Muralles drew particular attention to a handful of key documents that contained powerful evidence of the Guatemalan government’s role in planning and carrying out García’s capture. They included records of the police Joint Operations Center (Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas, or COC), which controlled and commanded the police units involved in the operation [documents 3, 4, 5, and 6]; a hand-drawn map of Guatemala City, assigning Zone 11— where García and his companion, Danilo Chinchilla, were captured — to the Fourth Corps of the National Police [document 7]; and the recommendation from the National Police hierarchy that the defendants be considered for medals for their heroic actions in the counterinsurgency operation on that day, at the time, and in the place of the capture of Edgar [document 2].

On the last days of the trial, Marco Tulio Alvarez, head of Guatemala’s Archivos de la Paz (Archives of Peace), testified on the political and historical context of Fernando García’s disappearance. His testimony addressed the coordination between government agencies in “cleansing operations”, specifically between the military and the National Police. In his testimony, Tulio Alvarez referred to documents from the AHPN, the Death Squad Diary, and declassified U.S. documents obtained by the National Security Archive, among other Guatemalan government documents. Tulio Alvarez used this documentary evidence to paint a picture for the court of government repression of those who spoke against the government, groups the Guatemalan government considered “internal enemies.” His testimony touched on the regime’s desire to “annihilate local secret communities, and military units…” which was described in a military document, Plan Victoria 82.

For a more detailed account of the last days of the trial and other witnesses, see the report written by C. Carolina López, our associate in Guatemala.

Now, the pressure is on the Guatemalan government, not only from the ruling of the three judges in Guatemala who heard this case, but also the pending hearing before the Inter-American Court in Costa Rica. An indictment and trial of superior officers allegedly responsible for ordering the cleansing operations would truly be a landmark development for human rights justice in Guatemala.

Read the Documents

Document 1
October 28, 2010
Organismo Judicial, Guatemala. C-01069-1997-00001 Oficial Tercero. Tribunal Octavo de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos Contra el Ambiente, Guatemala.(Judicial Body of Guatemala, Third Official, Eighth Criminal Court Convcition, Drug-trafficking and Environmental Crimes, Guatemala)
93 pages

This document is the official ruling of the Guatemalan court, which convicted former National Police officers Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos and Abraham Lancerio Gómez of forced disappearance in the case of Edgar Fernando García. The two men received the maximum sentence of 40 years in prison. The ruling, written by three Guatemala judges, acknowledges that Edgar Fernando García was illegally detained; the disappearance was committed by state security agents within national security policy; and the crime was against the individual liberties and freedoms of Fernando García.

The official ruling also includes parts of the testimony from eye witnesses, as well as expert witness testimony on the documents from the Historical Archive of the National Police (AHPN) and the declassified U.S. government documents from the National Security Archive collections.

Document 2
Undated
Cuarto Cuerpo Guatemala, Nomina del Personal del Cuarto Cuerpo de la Policia Nacional que se hace a distinciones, según el reclamento de condecoraciones. (Fourth Corps Guatemala, Nomination of Personnel of the Fourth Corps of the National Police for distinction, according to regulations for awards)
Souce: Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
3 pages

This documents records the nomination of four police officers, Hector Roderico Ramírez Ríos, Alfonso Guillermo de Leon, Hugo Rolando Gomez Osorio, and Abraham Lancerio Gómez to receive awards for their actions on February 18, 1984 at 11:00 in the morning with their encounter with “two subversives” who had subversive propaganda and fire arms at the “Mercado de Guarda” in zone 11. This was the exact date, time, and place that Fernando García and his companion Danilo Chinchilla were abducted. In her testimony, expert witness Velia Muralles used this document to demonstrate that these four former National Police officers took part in the crime of the forced disappearance of Fernando García because of the awards they received for participating in the cleansing operation the morning he was shot and disappeared.

Document 3
February 10, 1984
Oficio COC – 165 – WA, Guatemala.
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Souce: Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1 page

Document 4
February 11, 1984
Oficio COC – 173 – WA, Guatemala.
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Source: Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1 page

Document 5
February 12, 1984
Oficio COC/185-opp, Guatemala.
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1 page

Document 6
February 17, 1984
Oficio COC/207-laov, Guatemala
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1 page

These four documents (three through six) are from the “Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas” or COC, which was the “Center of Cooperative Operations” between the military and the police. These documents are from February 1984, days before Fernando García was disappeared. Expert witness Muralles explained that this document showed the coordination between the military and police in the overall national strategy of “cleansing operations” or “operación limpieza.”
Document 6, from February 17, 1984 shows detailed instructions from COC Chief, Monico Antonio Cano Perez for a member of the National Police to carry out an operation on the morning of February 18, between 9:00am and 12:00pm, the exact window during which Fernando García was abducted.

Document 7
February 17, 1984
Oficio COC/201/WA, Guatemala
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
4 pages

This is another document from Joint Operations Center giving instructions to the National Police regarding cleansing operations. This documents contains two pages that show which sectors of the city were assigned to specific corps of the National Police. The second to last page, titled “Sectores de la Ciudad Capital para Operaciones Limpieza de los Cuerpos P.N.” shows that the Fourth Corps was in charge of Zone 11 for the patrol for “operacion limpieza”. The defendents, Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos and Abraham Lancerio Gómez, were members of the fourth corps. The last page, titled “Croquis Demostrativo Sectores Ciudad Capital Para Operacion Limpeza de los Cuerpos P.N.” is a hand-drawn map shows a yellow-gold outline for Zone 11, where Fernando García was captured.

Document 8
February 18, 1984
Cuadro para control de operaciones, de los cuerpos, escuela y narcoticos, de la policia nacional en diferentes zonas de la ciudad capital. (Chart for orders of operations, of the corps, school and narcotics, and of the National Police in different zones of the capital city.)
Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1page

This document is a logbook list of which units were assigned to patrol which areas on certain days. We see that the Fourth Corps of the National Police was assigned to patrol Zones 11 and 12 during the hours of 9:00am and 12:00pm on Feburary 18, 1984. The defendents, Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos and Abraham Lancerio Gómez, were members of the fourth corps.

“Learn from History”, 31st Anniversary of the Assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero

Archbishop Romero minutes after he was shot celebrating mass at a small chapel located in a hospital called “La Divina Providencia” at around 6:30pm on March 24, 1980.

Washington, D.C., August 27, 2011 – Thirty one years ago tomorrow, El Salvador’s Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero was shot and killed by right-wing assassins seeking to silence his message of solidarity with the country’s poor and oppressed. The assassination shocked Salvadorans already reeling in early 1980 from attacks by security forces and government-backed death squads on a growing opposition movement. Romero’s murder further polarized the country and set the stage for the civil war that would rage for the next twelve years. In commemoration of the anniversary, the National Security Archive is posting a selection from our digital archive of 12 declassified U.S. documents that describe the months before his death, his assassination and funeral, as well as later revelations about those involved in his murder.

The documents are being posted as President Barack Obama leaves El Salvador, his final stop on a five-day trip to Latin America. Obama spent part of his time in the country with a visit to Monsignor Romero’s tomb last night. Although the United States funneled billions of dollars to the tiny country in support of the brutal army and security forces during a counterinsurgency war that left 75,000 civilians dead, the president made no reference to the U.S. role, seeking in his speeches instead to focus on immigration and security concerns. The day before his visit to Romero’s gravesite, Obama had told an audience in Chile that it was important that the United States and Latin America “learn from history, that we understand history, but that we not be trapped by history, because many challenges lie ahead.”

Just weeks before his murder, Archbishop Romero published an open letter to President Jimmy Carter in the Salvadoran press, asking the United States not to intervene in El Salvador’s fate by arming brutal security forces against a popular opposition movement. Romero warned that U.S. support would only “sharpen the injustice and repression against the organizations of the people which repeatedly have been struggling to gain respect for their fundamental human rights.” Despite his plea, President Carter moved to approve $5 million in military aid less than one year after the archbishop’s murder, as Carter was leaving office in January 1981.

Included in the posting are documents reporting on a secret, behind-the-scene effort by the United States to enlist the Vatican in pressuring Romero over his perceived support for the Salvadoran left; an account of the archbishop’s powerful March 23, 1980, homily, given the day before his assassination; a description of the murder by the U.S. defense attaché in El Salvador; and an extraordinary embassy cable describing a meeting organized by rightist leader Roberto D’Aubuisson in which participants draw lots to determine who would be the triggerman to kill Romero.

Although the declassified documents do not reveal the extent of the plot to kill Romero or the names of those who murdered him, details in them support the findings of the 1993 report by the U.N.-mandated Truth Commission for El Salvador. Released shortly after the signing of the peace accords that ended the war in El Salvador, the report identified D’Aubuisson, Captains Alvaro Rafael Saravia and Eduardo Avila, and Fernando (“El Negro”) Sagrera as among those responsible for the assassination. On March 25 of last year, Carlos Dada of El Salvador’s on-line news site El Faro published an extraordinary interview with Alvaro Saravia, one of the masterminds of Romero’s killing. In the interview, Saravia revealed chilling details of the plot to murder Romero; see a transcript of the interview, “How We Killed the Archbishop”, here and here en español.

The documents posted below are from the National Security Archive’s Digital National Security Archive’s two El Salvador collections, El Salvador: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1977–1984 and El Salvador: War, Peace, and Human Rights, 1980–1994. These two full collections, among others, are available through a subscription with the ProQuest research database.

Read the Documents

Document 1
October 11, 1979
Confidential, Cable, “The Archbishop and the Military”, 2 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

In his homily, Archbishop Romero decries repression by the Salvadoran military and criticizes the army for abandoning its role as the nation’s defender to become “guardian of the interests of the oligarchy.”

Document 2
December 17, 1979
Unclassified, Cable, “Archbishop Strongly Urges Agrarian Reform”, 3 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

Archbishop Oscar A. Romero speaks in support of agrarian reform, criticizing the oligarchy for arming those who seek to preserve the status quo and citing the Catholic Church’s Medellin Council recognition of “right of oppressed to exert pressure, but not through armed violence.”

Document 3
January 31, 1980
Secret, Memorandum, [Draft Letter Attached], “Letter from Dr. Brzezinski to the Pope”, 5 pp.
United States. Department of State, Office of the Secretary

Presents draft of letter to Pope John Paul II outlining areas of concern in Central America and requesting assistance in persuading Archbishop Romero not to “abandon” Revolutionary Governing Junta in favor of more radical leftists in El Salvador.

Document 4
February 19, 1980
Unclassified, Cable, “Text of Archbishop’s Letter to President Carter“, 1 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

Archbishop Romero addresses President Jimmy Carter, imploring him not to provide military aid or any other form of assistance that could exacerbate state violence targeting Salvadoran citizens. “I am very worried by the news that the government of the United States is studying a form of abetting the arming of El Salvador,” Romero writes. “The contribution of your government instead of promoting greater justice and peace in El Salvador will without doubt sharpen the injustice and repression against the organizations of the people which repeatedly have been struggling to gain respect for their fundamental human rights.”

Document 5
March 1, 1980
Confidential, Cable, “Reply to Archbishop’s Letter to President Carter“,1 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance responds to Archbishop Romero’s letter regarding criticisms of U.S. security assistance to El Salvador, assuring him that President Carter shares his concerns about the human rights of Salvadoran citizens. “Any equipment and training which we might provide would be designed to overcome the most serious deficiencies of the Armed Forces, enhancing their professionalism so that they can fulfill their essential role of maintaining order with a minimum of lethal force.”

Document 6
March 23, 1980
Confidential, Cable “Archbishop’s Homily, March 23”, 4 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

This cable reports on Archbishop Romero’s homily, the day before he was assassinated. He speaks of the increasing tension with Salvadoran security forces and condemns rampant killings: “In the name of God, in the name of this suffering people whose cries rise to heaven more loudly each day, I implore you, I beg you, I order you in the name of God: stop the repression!”

Document 7
March 25, 1980
Confidential, Cable, “Archbishop Romero Assassinated”, 2 pp.
United States Defense Intelligence Agency. Office of the Defense Attaché, El Salvador

This document reports the assassination of Archbishop Romero and includes brief description of events.

Document 8
March 26, 1980
Confidential, Cable, “Archbishop’s Assassination: Peaceful Procession”, 2 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

This cable reports on the procession of thousands of people accompanying Archbishop Romero’s coffin from the basilica to the National Cathedral.

Document 9
March 26, 1980,
Unclassified, Cable, “White House Statement on Archbishop Romero’s Assassination”, 2 pp.
United States. Department of State

The United States government issues statement condemning the assassination of Archbishop Romero.

Document 10
November 19, 1980,
Secret, Cable “Conversation with National Guard Officer”, 3 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

A source from the National Guard tells a U.S. embassy political officer that National Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacional—ARENA) founder Roberto D’Aubuisson organized a meeting a day or two before the assassination of Archbishop Romero in which “participants drew lots for the task of killing the archbishop.”

Document 11
February 25, 1981
Unclassified, Cable, “El Salvador: Army Officers Implicated in Romero Killing”, 1 pp.
United States. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Panama

Radio Venceremos clandestinely broadcasts an interview with “disillusioned army officer” Lt. Col. Ricardo Bruno Navarrete implicating Roberto D’Aubuisson, and members of the Salvadoran armed forces in the assassination of Archbishop Romero.

Document 12
December 21, 1981
Secret, Cable, “Assassination of Archbishop Romero”, 2 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

This document is a follow-up to the November 19 embassy cable concerning a meeting to plan the assassination of Archbishop Romero. In it, a U.S. political officer reports additional information from the same National Guard source indicating that Romero’s killer was Walter “Musa” Antonio Alvarez. [The UN Truth Commission Report on El Salvador would later identify Alvarez as involved in conveying money supplied by Roberto D’Aubuisson as payment to Romero’s assassin, see pp. 130-1.]

TOP-SECRET:Los documentos de Chiquita

Este es un fragmento de una nota manuscrita de 2000 en la que se describe que Chiquita pagó a grupos armados por seguridad y no como una extorsión. National Security Archive.Haga clic en la foto para ampliar.

Cientos de memorandos internos de la multinacional bananera Chiquita Brands, desclasificados por el National Security Archive, muestran que la empresa hizo pagos a guerrilleros, paramilitares y miembros del Ejército a cambio de seguridad.

Por Michael Evans especial para VerdadAbierta.com*

Memorandos confidenciales internos de Chiquita Brands International revelan que el gigante del banano se benefició de sus pagos a grupos paramilitares colombianos y la guerrilla, contradiciendo el acuerdo de culpabilidad (plea agreement) que firmó con fiscales de Estados Unidos de 2007, en el que alegó que nunca había recibido “ningún servicio de seguridad o equipos de seguridad a cambio de los pagos”. Chiquita había tildado estos pagos como una “extorsión”.

Chiquita entregó miles de documentos al Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos como parte de un acuerdo de sentencia, en el que admitió años de pagos ilegales a las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, Auc, grupo que el Departamento de Estado había señalado como “organización terrorista extranjera” y con el que acordó pagar una multa de 25 millones de dólares.

El National Security Archive obtuvo más de 5.500 páginas de documentos internos de Chiquita del Departamento de Justicia bajo un derecho de petición en EE.UU (Freedom of Information Act) y publica en línea varios de estos documentos que están incluídos en la colección: Colombia y los Estados Unidos: Violencia Política, Narcotráfico y Derechos Humanos, 1948-2010.

Los papeles proporcionan evidencia de “transacciones” de beneficio mutuo entre las filiales colombianas de Chiquita y varios grupos armados ilegales en Colombia y arroja claridad sobre más de una década de pagos relacionados con la seguridad a la guerrilla, los paramilitares, las fuerzas colombianas de seguridad y las cooperativas privadas Convivir, grupos armados auspiciados por el gobierno.

La colección de documentos también detalla los esfuerzos de la compañía por ocultar lo que denominaron pagos “delicados” en las cuentas de gastos de los directivos de la empresa y a través de diferentes trucos contables (Ver documento).

La investigación del Departamento de Justicia concluyó que muchos de los pagos de Chiquita a las Auc (también llamadas como “Autodefensas” en muchos de los documentos) se realizaron a través de organizaciones legales Convivir supervisadas por el ejército colombiano.

Estas nuevas pruebas de que Chiquita se benefició de los pagos ilícitos pueden aumentar su exposición a demandas de las víctimas de grupos armados ilegales de Colombia. La colección es el resultado de una colaboración National Security Archive con la Universidad de Georgetown, su Escuela de Leyes y Derechos Humanos y la Clínica de Abogados y Justicia Pública, y se ha utilizado en apoyo de una demanda civil contra Chiquita encabezado por Earth Rights International a nombre de cientos de víctimas colombianas de los paramilitares.

“Estos registros extraordinarios son las pruebas más detalladas hasta la fecha del verdadero costo de hacer negocios en Colombia”, dijo Michael Evans, director del proyecto de documentación de Colombia del National Security Archive. “El aparente acuerdo de Chiquita con las guerrillas y paramilitares es responsable de los incontables asesinatos, desmiente el acuerdo de culpabilidad firmado por la empresa con el Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos”.

El esfuerzo de la compañía para ocultar los indicios de sus nexos con grupos armados ilegales en Colombia es evidente en un par de memorandos legales de enero de 1994. El primero de ellos indica que las guerrillas le prestaban seguridad en algunas de las plantaciones de Chiquita.

El director general de operaciones de Chiquita en Turbo dijo a abogados de la compañía que los guerrilleros fueron “utilizados para suministrar el personal de seguridad en diferentes granjas”.

Una anotación manuscrita en un documento membreteado de la compañía, clasificado como confidencial, se pregunta: “¿Por qué es relevante?” y, “¿Por qué está siendo escrito?”. En el documento los abogados han tachado la palabra “transacciones” – lo que sugiere un acuerdo de canje- y lo sustituyeron por el término más neutro de “pagos”. Los contables de la empresa incluyeron los gastos como “pagos de extorsión de guerrillas”, pero los registraron en los libros como “seguridad ciudadana”, de acuerdo con estas notas.

Otro documento muestra que Chiquita también pagó a paramilitares por servicios de seguridad -incluyendo información de inteligencia sobre las operaciones de la guerrilla- después de que las Auc arrebataron el control de la región a la guerrilla, a mediados de la década de 1990.

En marzo de 2000, el abogado senior de Chiquita, Robert Thomas, escribió un memo (ver) de una conversación con los directores de la filial en Colombia de Chiquita, Banadex, en la que indican que los paramilitares de Santa Marta crearon una empresa ficticia, Inversiones Manglar, para ocultar “el verdadero propósito de garantizar la seguridad”.

Inversiones Manglar se presentaba como una empresa de exportación agrícola, pero producía “información sobre los movimientos guerrilleros”, según la nota. Según Thomas, funcionarios de Banadex le dijeron que “todas las compañías bananeras están contribuyendo en Santa Marta” y que Chiquita “debe continuar haciendo los pagos”, ya que “no se puede obtener el mismo nivel de apoyo (seguridad) de los militares”.

Los papeles de Chiquita también destacan el papel de los militares colombianos para presionar a la empresa a financiar a las Auc a través de las Convivir y para facilitar los pagos ilegales.

Un indicio de esto se encuentra en otro documento escrito por Thomas, en septiembre de 2000, que describe una reunión en 1997, con el líder de las Auc, Carlos Castaño, quien sugirió por primera vez a los directores de Banadex apoyar la creación de la Convivir llamada La Tagua del Darién.

Según la nota, los funcionarios de Banadex adujeron que “no tenían más remedio que asistir a la reunión” porque no hacerlo sería “antagonizar con los militares de Colombia, funcionarios locales y estatales, y las Autodefensas”.

Entre los funcionarios que más apoyaron las Convivir durante este tiempo se encontraba Álvaro Uribe, entonces gobernador de Antioquia, en el que tenía su centro de operaciones Chiquita en Colombia. En el memo de septiembre de 2000, Thomas señala: “Es bien conocido en el momento en que oficiales de alto rango del ejército colombiano y el Gobernador del Departamento de Antioquia estaban haciendo campaña para el establecimiento de una organización Convivir de Urabá”.

Un memorando de 1995 indica que, tanto Uribe como otro político de la región, Alfonso Núñez, recibieron donaciones de otra de las filiales en Colombia de Chiquita, la Compañía Frutera de Sevilla. Uribe fue presidente de Colombia desde 2002 hasta 2010.

Más tarde, un memo legal de agosto de 1997 escrito en papel membretado de Chiquita, dice que la empresa era “miembro de una Convivir llamada Puntepiedra, SA”, que el autor clasifica como “una persona jurídica en la que participamos con otros exportadores de banano en la región de Turbo”. La nota dice que la “única función” de las Convivir era “proporcionar información sobre los movimientos guerrilleros.”

La compañía había estado haciendo pagos sensibles de seguridad durante años – primero en forma directa a militares y grupos guerrilleros, y luego, a través de organizaciones comerciales locales y Convivir-. Para 1991, unos 15 mil dólares de “pagos delicados” para las diversas unidades del ejército colombiano se muestran junto a un desembolso de más de 31 dólares a “guerrilla” (Ver documento).

Una versión diferente del mismo documento no solo omite los nombres de los beneficiarios de pagos, sino que incluye una anotación manuscrita junto a la “guerrilla”. Una entrada dice: “Pago extorsión.” Otra anotación dice: “Sobre todo no son pagos ilegales – estos son legales – gasolina, el ejército, la policía, los políticos . El pago no ofrece nada, ni beneficios”.

Registros contables de 1997-1998 también señalan el papel de las fuerzas de seguridad colombianas en el fomento de pagos de la empresa a paramilitares.

A partir del segundo trimestre de 1997 y hasta el segundo trimestre de 1998, Banamex realizó pagos a cooperativas “Convivir”, que registraron como “donación al grupo de ciudadanos de reconocimiento a petición del Ejército.” En 2002(ver documento) y 2003(ver documento), la empresa realizó pagos similares a cooperativas Convivir junto con desembolsos a “funcionarios militares y de Policía” para “pagos de servicios de seguridad.”

Otro documento escrito a mano de 1999 revela un aparente esfuerzo por un general del Ejército de Colombia para establecerse como un intermediario en los pagos de los paramilitares. El documento describe a un “general que ha estado en la zona desde hace varios años” que había sido acusado por el alcalde de San José de Apartadó de ser parte de “[un] escuadrón de la muerte” y que había sido “suspendido del Ejército”.

El documento señala que el general “nos ha ayudado personalmente” con “seguridad” y con “información que impidió secuestros”. Las notas hacen referencia indirecta a un pago de 9 mil dólares, agregando que “otras compañías están poniendo en sus…”

“Los papeles de Chiquita refuerzan la idea de que, en 1997, las Auc crecieron en las regiones bananeras del norte de Colombia, y que los funcionarios del gobierno local, oficiales militares y líderes empresariales apoyaron a sus operaciones paramilitares”, dijo Evans.

“Estas revelaciones son más que académicas”, dijo el profesor Arturo Carrillo, Director de la Clínica Internacional de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Georgetown. “Los documentos refuerzan la media docena de demandas federales pendientes en contra de Chiquita, que la empresa fue cómplice, y por lo tanto responsable de las atrocidades cometidas por las Auc en Urabá. Uno sólo puede esperar que revelando la información obtenida y publicada por el National Security Archive se dará lugar a una mayor responsabilidad por las acciones criminales de Chiquita en Colombia, ya que con el acuerdo de la empresa con el Departamento de Justicia, este se ha negado a procesar a los ejecutivos de Chiquita por su mal accionar”.

“La publicación de estos documentos es sólo el comienzo”, agregó Evans. “Las miles de páginas de registros financieros y jurídicos incluidos en esta colección son las semillas de futuros proyectos de investigación para los que estén dispuestos a reconstruir la compleja red de legales, pseudo-legales, y las entidades ilegales que participaron en operaciones de seguridad de Chiquita, incluyendo oficiales militares, la guerrilla, los paramilitares, empresarios prominentes, las asociaciones comerciales y las milicias Convivir”.

* Michael Evans es director del Proyecto Documental de Colombia del National Security Archive.

Última actualización el Viernes, 08 de Abril de 2011 06:00

TOP-SECRET: The Chiquita Papers-Banana Giant’s Paramilitary Payoffs Detailed in Trove of Declassified Legal, Financial Documents

March 2000 notes of Chiquita Senior Counsel Robert Thomas indicate awareness that payments were for security services.

Banana Giant’s Paramilitary Payoffs Detailed in Trove of Declassified Legal, Financial Documents

Evidence of Quid Pro Quo with Guerrilla, Paramilitary Groups Contradicts 2007 Plea Deal

Colombian Military Officials Encouraged, Facilitated Company’s Payments to Death Squads

More than 5,500 Pages of Chiquita Records Published Online by National Security Archive

Bogotá, Colombia, April 7, 2011 – Confidential internal memos from Chiquita Brands International reveal that the banana giant benefited from its payments to Colombian paramilitary and guerrilla groups, contradicting the company’s 2007 plea agreement with U.S. prosecutors, which claimed that the company had never received “any actual security services or actual security equipment in exchange for the payments.” Chiquita had characterized the payments as “extortion.”

These documents are among thousands that Chiquita turned over to the U.S. Justice Department as part of a sentencing deal in which the company admitted to years of illegal payments to the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)–a State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization–and agreed to pay a $25 million fine. The Archive has obtained more than 5,500 pages of Chiquita’s internal documents from the Justice Department under the Freedom of Information Act and is publishing the entire set online today. Key documents from the Chiquita Papers are included in the recently-published document collection, Colombia and the United States: Political Violence, Narcotics, and Human Rights, 1948-2010, now available as part of the Digital National Security Archive from ProQuest.

The documents provide evidence of mutually-beneficial “transactions” between Chiquita’s Colombian subsidiaries and several illegal armed groups in Colombia and shed light on more than a decade of security-related payments to guerrillas, paramilitaries, Colombian security forces, and government-sponsored Convivir militia groups. The collection also details the company’s efforts to conceal the so-called “sensitive payments” in the expense accounts of company managers and through other accounting tricks. The Justice Department investigation concluded that many of Chiquita’s payments to the AUC (also referred to as “Autodefensas” in many of the documents) were made through legal Convivir organizations ostensibly overseen by the Colombian army.

New evidence indicating that Chiquita benefited from the illicit payments may increase the company’s exposure to lawsuits representing victims of Colombia’s illegal armed groups. The collection is the result of an Archive collaboration with George Washington University Law School’s International Human Rights and Public Justice Advocacy Clinics and has been used in support of a civil suit brought against Chiquita led by Earth Rights International on behalf of hundreds of Colombian victims of paramilitary violence.

“These extraordinary records are the most detailed account to date of the true cost of doing business in Colombia,” said Michael Evans, director of the National Security Archive’s Colombia documentation project. “Chiquita’s apparent quid pro quo with guerrillas and paramilitaries responsible for countless killings belies the company’s 2007 plea deal with the Justice Department. What we still don’t know is why U.S. prosecutors overlooked what appears to be clear evidence that Chiquita benefited from these transactions.”

The company’s effort to conceal indications that it benefited from the payments is evident in a pair of legal memos from January 1994. The first of these indicates that leftist guerrillas provided security at some of Chiquita’s plantations. The general manager of Chiquita operations in Turbó told company attorneys that guerrillas were “used to supply security personnel at the various farms.” A handwritten annotation on a subsequent draft of the document asks, “Why is this relevant?” and, “Why is this being written?” Throughout the document, lawyers have crossed out the word “transactions”–suggestive of a quid pro quo arrangement–and replaced it with the more neutral term “payments.” Company accountants characterized the expenditures as “guerrilla extortion payments” but recorded them in the books as “citizen security,” according to these memos. (Note 1)

Another document shows that Chiquita also paid right-wing paramilitary forces for security services–including intelligence on guerrilla operations–after the AUC wrested control of the region from guerrillas in the mid-1990s. The March 2000 memo, written by Chiquita Senior Counsel Robert Thomas and based on a convesation with managers from Chiquita’s wholly-owned subsidiary, Banadex, indicate that Santa Marta-based paramilitaries formed a front company, Inversiones Manglar, to disguise “the real purpose of providing security.” (Note 2)

Ostensibly an agricultural export business, Inversiones Manglar actually produced “info on guerrilla movements,” according to the memo. Banadex officials told Thomas that “all other banana companies are contributing in Santa Marta” and that Chiquita “should continue making the payments” as they “can’t get the same level of support from the military.”

The Chiquita Papers also highlight the role of the Colombian military in pressuring the company to finance the AUC through the Convivir groups and in facilitating the illegal payments.

One indication of this is found in another document written by Thomas in September 2000 describing the 1997 meeting where notorious AUC leader Carlos Castaño first suggested to Banadex managers that they support a newly-established Convivir called La Tagua del Darien. According to the memo, the Banadex officials said that they had “no choice but to attend the meeting” as “refusing to meet would antagonize the Colombia military, local and state govenment officials, and Autodefensas.” (Note 3)

Among the officials most supportive of the Convivir groups during this time was Álvaro Uribe, then the governor of Antioquia, the hub of Chiquita’s operations in Colombia. Thomas’ September 2000 memo notes that, “It was well-known at the time that senior officers of the Colombian military and the Governor of the Department of Antioquia were campaigning for the establishment of a Convivir organization in Uraba.” A 1995 memo indicates that both Uribe and another politician, Alfonso Nuñez, received substantial donations from another of Chiquita’s Colombian subsidiaries, Compañía Frutera de Sevilla. Uribe was president of Colombia from 2002-2010.

Later that year, an August 1997 legal memo written on Chiquita letterhead says that the company was “member[s] of an organization called CONVIVIR Puntepiedra, S.A.,” which the author characterizes as “a legal entity in which we participate with other banana exporting companies in the Turbó region.” The memo says that the “sole function” of the the Convivir was “to provide information on guerrilla movements.”

The company had been making sensitive security payments for years–first in the form of direct payoffs to military officers and guerrilla groups, then through local trade organizations and the Convivir militias. For 1991, some $15,000 worth of “sensitive payments” to various units of the Colombian military are listed alongside a more than $31,000 disbursement to “Guerrilla.” A different version of the same document omits the names of the payment recipients but includes a handwritten annotation next to the “Guerrilla” entry that says, “Extortion Payment.” Another annotation reads, “Mainly not illegal payments — these are legal — pay gasoline, army, police, politicians — payment doesn’t provide anything or benefits.” [Emphasis added.]

Accounting records from 1997-1998 also point to the role of Colombian security forces in encouraging the company’s illegal paramilitary payments. Beginning in the second quarter of 1997 and continuing through the second quarter of 1998, sensitive payment schedules for Banadex record large payments to “Convivir” as “Donation to citizen reconaissance group made at request of Army.” Similar records from 2002 and 2003 list Convivir payments alongside disbursements to “Military and Police Officials” for “Facilitating payments for security services.”

Another handwritten document from 1999 reveals an apparent effort by a Colombian Army general to establish himself as an intermediary for the paramilitary payments. The document (transcribed here) describes a “General in the zone for several years” who had been accused of being “with [a] death squad” by the mayor of San José de Apartadó (Note 4) and had been “suspended from the Army.” The document notes that the general had “helped us personally” with “Security” and “information that prevented kidnaps.” The notes make oblique reference to a $9,000 payment, adding that “Other companies are putting in their…”

“The Chiquita Papers reinforce the idea that, by 1997, the AUC ran the show in the banana-growing regions of northern Colombia, and that local government officials, military officers, and business leaders supported their paramilitary operations,” said Evans.

“These troublesome revelations are more than academic,” said Professor Arturo Carrillo, Director of GW’s International Human Rights Clinic. “They reinforce the claim, advanced in half a dozen federal lawsuits currently pending against Chiquita, that the company was knowingly complicit in, and thus liable for, the atrocities committed by the AUC in Urabá while on the Chiquita payroll. One can only hope that the revealing information obtained and published by the National Security Archive will lead to greater accountability for Chiquita’s criminal actions in Colombia, since the company’s plea agreement with the Justice Department, which has refused to prosecute Chiquita executives for wrongdoing, amounts to little more than a slap on the corporate wrist.”

“The publication of these documents is just the beginning,” added Evans. “The thousands of pages of financial and legal records included in this collection are the seeds of future research projects for investigators prepared to deconstruct the complex web of legal, psuedo-legal, and illegal entities involved in Chiquita’s security operations, including military officers, guerrillas, paramilitary thugs, prominent businessmen, trade associations, and Convivir militias.”

The Chiquita Papers – A Selected Chronology

The following is a chronological list of some of the most interesting documents in the Chiquita Papers as selected by the National Security Archive.

1990 April 19 – First of many Chiquita memos on the subject of “Accounting for Sensitive Payments.”

1992 February 21 – Lists “Sensitive Payments” for Chiquita subsidiary Compañía Frutera de Sevilla in 1991, including disbursements to the Naval Station, Operative Command, the Army in Turbó, and the Guerrilla. Purpose for all: “Expedite Turbo operation.” [See annotated version.]

1992 May 8 – Chiquita legal memo on whether support for Colombian military counterinsurgency operations through a “trade association of banana exporters” known as Fundiban is a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

1992 February 21 – Some $15,000 worth of “sensitive payments” to various units of the Colombian military are listed alongside a more than $31,000 disbursement to “Guerrilla.” A different version of the same document omits the names of the payment recipients but includes a handwritten annotation next to the “Guerrilla” entry that says, “Extortion Payment.” Another annotation reads, “Mainly not illegal payments — these are legal — pay gasoline, army, police, politicians — payment doesn’t provide anything or benefits.” [Emphasis added.]

1992 September 20 – Transcription of voicemail left for Chiquita’s general counsel from contact in Medellín, Colombia.

1993 August 10 – A handwritten note based on discussion with Chiquita in-house counsel notes indicates that company has begun to channel its security payments to the Colombian Army through a “banana association” in Turbó known as “Agura” at a price of three cents per box of bananas shipped.

1994 January 4 – Draft legal memo describes reporting of transactions in Turbó and Santa Marta for “security purposes and payments to the respective trade association.” The outlays are described as “guerrilla extortion payments” made through “our intermediary or Security Consultant, Rene Osorio,” who is said to be the company’s “contact with the various guerrilla groups in both Divisions.” The guerrilla payments are called “citizen security” and are “expensed via the Manager’s Expense Account.” The author of the memo was told by the General Manager in Turbó “that the Guerrilla Groups are used to supply security personnel at the various farms.”

1994 January 5 – Second draft of January 4, 1994, memo includes annotations asking, “Why is this relevant?” and, “Why is this being written?”

1994 June 10 – Memo from Chiquita counsel (Medellín) to Chiquita in-house counsel discusses Colombian legal standards in cases of kidnapping and exotortion; notes that Constitutional Court decision that “when a person acts under one of the justified circumstances” they act in a “State of Necessity” and “cannot be penalized.”

1995 February 20 – Chiquita memo describes payments to Álvaro Uribe ($5935 on Oct. 24, 1994) and Alfonso Nuñez ($2000 on Oct. 30, 1994), both candidates for governor of Antioquia.

1997 February 3 – Memo from local outside counsel (Medellín) to Chiquita in-house counsel discusses application of Colombian law in cases of extortion and finds that “when one acts in a state of necessity, no punishment will be applied.” … “In other words, a person who pays for extortion is a victim, not an accomplice to the crime, and therefore cannot be punished.”

1997 May 7 – Handwritten notes: “Spent approx $575,000 over last 4 years on security payments = Guerrilla payments”; “$222,000 in 1996 — $21,763 Convivir – Rest guerrillas”; “Budget for 1997 — $80,000 Guerrillas — $120,000 Convivir”; “[Deleted] indicates Convivirs legal”; “Not FCPA issue”
…
“Cost of doing business in Colombia – Maybe the question is not why are we doing this but rather we are in Colombia and do we want to ship bananas from Colombia.”
“Need to keep this very confidential – People can get killed.”

1997-1998 – Sensitive payment schedules for Banadex record large payments to “Convivir” as “Donation to citizen reconaissance group made at request of Army.”

1997 August ca. – In-house attorney handwritten notes regarding “Convivir”:
“CONVIVIR PUNTE PIEDRA, S.A.”
“(We have our own)”
“Organismo Juridico … Participamos con las otras bananeras. (We were last to participate)”
“We pay [cents]0.03/box. Wk 18/1997 – Wk 17/199[8?]”
“Under military supervision. Proporcionan información and some are armed (but they’re not paramilitary groups?). Radios, motorcycles”
“Legalmente operan en Colombia”
“Negotiate through a lawyer. We are not shareholders. We don’t know who the owners are. Pushed by the gov’t locally and the military.”

1997 August 29 – Memo written Chiquita in-house counsel says, “we currently are members of an organization called CONVIVIR Puntepiedra, S.A., a legal entity in which we participate with other banana exporting companies in the Turbo region. Banadex currently pays $0.03 per box to this CONVIVIR.” Memo also says that the Convivir “operate under military supervision (and have offices at the military bases)” and that “their sole function is to provide information on guerrilla movements.”

1997 September 9 – Memo from local outside counsel (Baker & McKenzie) regarding “Payments to guerrilla groups” in response to Chiquita query regarding legal consequences of such payments “in case of extortion or kidnapping.” Baker memo highlights Colombian Constitutional Court challenge to 1993 law that made it a crime for foreign companies to pay extortion/ransom and that “necessity” is a condition under which such payments are permitted. However, the memo also says that “he who obtains personal benefit from a state of necessity … incurs in a criminal action.”

1999 July 6 – In-house counsel notes discuss former Colombian “general” forced out of military for supposed association with “death squads.” Notes indicate that the officer “helped us personally” with “security” and “information that prevented kidnaps.” Notes also say that “Turbo improved while he was there.” Note also refers obliquely to $9,000 payment.

2000 March 6 – Chiquita in-house counsel handwritten notes about front company set up by paramilitaries in Santa Marta to collect security payments from Banadex.
“disguised the real purpose of providing security”
“don’t know who the shareholders are”
“Same people who formed Convivir formed this new company; govt won’t permit another Convivir; too much political pressure re: para-military”
“Don’t know whether the gov’t is aware what this organization does.”
“Military in Santa Marta may know what this company does. Military won’t acknowledge formally that they know what the corporation does.”
“Note: In Turbo we issue a check to Convivir [or/of] another code name and deliver it to a variety of intermediaries for transfer to Convivir.”
“Tagua del Darien is name of cooperative formed as part of Convivir movement.”
“Santa Marta  3[cents]/box; first payment in October 1999. Money for info on guerrilla movements; info not given to gov’t military.”
“Checks made out to Inversiones Manglar SA à Asociacion Para la Paz Del Magdalena.”
“Natural persons w/ no affiliation to military formed Inversions Manglar S.A.”
“[Deleted] says we should continue making the payments; can’t get the same level of support from the military.”

2000 September ca. – Draft memo details initial meetings between paramilitaries and Banadex officials.

2001 May 7 – Outside local counsel (Posse, Herrera & Ruiz) provides legal analysis of Convivir organizations: “We should underline that the legality of payments, is subject to the due observance of the requisites described above. In addition the actual use … of contributed funds should be borne in mind. If funds are used for the conduction of activities that comply with legal requirements, legality of such payments will be preserved. However, if funds are used in connection of activities beyond the scope authorized … including the conductions of activities that are contrary to law, the actual (or even constructive) knowledge of such activities by the contributing party may taint such payments as illegal and even result in criminal prosecution.”

2003 ca. – PowerPoint presentation on options for how to conceal improper payments.

2004 January 28 – Chiquita turns over attorney-client privileged documents to Dept. of Justice. Memo from counsel Kirkland & Ellis describes scope and limitations of the documents provided.

2007 March 13 – The U.S. Department of Justice reaches a plea deal with Chiquita for making payments to the AUC, a designated foreign terrorist organization.

Notes

1. A 1997 legal memo drawn up by Chiquita’s U.S. counsel specifically warned that an extortion defense would not apply in situations where the company actually benefited from the payments. Another legal memo from the company’s attorneys in Colombia cautioned that payments to ostensibly legal Convivir militias could be considered illegal if there were actual or constructive knowledge that they were connected to illegal activities.

2. Although Thomas’ name does not appear in any of these records, his authorship has been confirmend by comparing the documents to the report of the Special Litigation Committee (SLC) established by Chiquita’s Board of Directors that issued its final report in 2009.

3. Although the identity of the paramilitary leader who first approached the Banadex officials is not revealed in the redacted document, both the SLC report and the sentencing agreement confirm that it was Castaño who was at the meeting and who personally requested that the company support the La Tagua group.

4. The “Peace Community” of San José de Apartadó is one of several Colombia towns that during this time had taken a neutral position in the country’s civil conflict.

TOP-SECRET: CIA SUED FOR ‘HOLDING HISTORY HOSTAGE’ ON BAY OF PIGS INVASION

The Houston, a supply ship for the CIA’s invasion force, was sunk by Cuban T-33s on the morning of April 17, 1961 (CIA photo)

Washington, D.C., April 14, 2011 – Fifty years after the failed CIA-led assault on Cuba, the National Security Archive today filed a FOIA lawsuit to compel the Agency to release its “Official History of the Bay of Pigs Invasion.” The suit charges that the CIA has “wrongfully withheld” the multi-volume study, which the Archive requested under the FOIA in 2005.  As the “official history,” the court filing noted, the document “is, by definition, the most important and substantive CIA-produced study of this episode.”

The Top Secret report, researched and written by CIA historian Jack Pfeiffer, is based on dozens of interviews with key operatives and officials and a review of hundreds of CIA documents and was compiled over the course of nine years that Pfeiffer served as the CIA’s in-house historian. Pfeiffer’s internal study is divided into five volumes: I, Air Operations; II, Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy; III, Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies, 1951-January 1961; IV, The Taylor Committee Report; and V, Internal Investigation Report.  (In 1998 the CIA released Vol. III under the Kennedy Assassination Records Act.)

In 1987, Pfeiffer himself filed a FOIA lawsuit seeking the release of Vol 5; the CIA successfully convinced the court that it could not be declassified.

“The CIA is holding history hostage,” according to Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive’s Cuba Documentation Project. Kornbluh called on the CIA to release the report under President Obama’s Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information which states that “no information may remain classified indefinitely.” He noted that “fifty years after the invasion, it is well past time for the official history to be declassified and studied for the lessons it contains for the future of U.S.-Cuban relations.”

In 1998, the Archive’s Cuba project successfully obtained the declassification of the CIA’s internal investigation into the failure of the invasion, the “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation,” written in 1961 by the Agency’s Inspector General, Lyman Kirkpatrick. The report provided a scathing critique of the CIA misconduct and ineptitude in conducting a massive paramilitary operation that went “beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.”

To commemorate the 50th anniversary of the invasion, which began with a preliminary airstrike on April 15, 1961, the Archive re-posted a collection of the major reports and documents that address the Bay of Pigs, among them the Inspector General’s report, and Vol. III of the Pfeiffer report which was originally discovered and posted by Villanova professor David Barrett in 2005.

The Archive also posted the only existing interview with the two managers of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Jacob Esterline and Col. Jack Hawkins, that Peter Kornbluh conducted in 1996. The interview was published in Kornbluh’s book, Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.

In March of 2001, the National Security Archive organized a 40th anniversary conference in Havana, Cuba on the Bahia de Cochinos. The conference brought together retired CIA officers, Kennedy White House officials, and members of the exile brigade with Fidel Castro and his military commanders to discuss this history. Other documents and revelations generated by the conference can be accessed here.

Read the Documents

Lawsuit – On April 14, 2011, the National Security Archive filed a lawsuit against the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to secure the declassification of several volumes of an Official history of the Bay of Pigs Operation compiled between 1974 and 1983. Nearly a decade after the failed invasion, on August 8, 1973, CIA Director William Colby tasked the Agency’s History Staff to “develop accurate accounts of certain of CIA’s past activities in terms suitable for inclusion in Government-wide historical and declassification programs, while protecting intelligence sources and methods.” Historian Jack Pfeiffer assumed responsibility for this history, which was written over the course of 9 years and is divided into 5 volumes; it is based on dozens of interviews with key operatives and officials and hundreds of CIA documents. Volume III of the Pfeiffer report was declassified by the CIA in 1998, and the rest of the report is now the last major internal study that remains secret, fifty years after the Bay of Pigs.

Document 1 – CIA, “Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume III: Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies, 1951- January 1961”

Jack Pfeiffer, the chief historian at the CIA, researched and wrote a comprehensive history of the Bay of Pigs operation between 1974 and 1983.  The CIA declassified only Volume III of the five-volume history in 1998, under the Kennedy Assassination Records Act. This three-hundred page report was discovered in the National Archives by Villanova professor of political science David Barrett in 2005, and first posted on his university’s website. Volume III focuses on the last two years of the Eisenhower administration and the transition to the Kennedy presidency. It is newsworthy for clarifying the role of Vice-President Richard Nixon, who, the report reveals, intervened in the planning of the invasion on behalf of a wealthy donor.

This volume also contains the extraordinary revelation that CIA task force in charge of the invasion did not believe it could succeed. On page 149, Pfeiffer quotes minutes of the Task Force meeting held on November 15, 1960, to prepare a briefing for the new President-elect, John F. Kennedy: “Our original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted,” the document states. “Our second concept (1,500-3000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.”

This candid assessment was not shared with the President-elect then, nor later after the inauguration. As Pfeiffer points out, “what was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 became the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs Operation in March 1961”—run only by the CIA, and with a force of 1,200 men.

Document 2 – CIA, October 1961, “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation and Associated Documents”

This internal analysis of the CIA’s Bay of Pigs operation, written by CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick after a six month investigation, is highly critical of the top CIA officials who conceived and ran the operation, and places blame for the embarrassing failure squarely on the CIA itself. The report cites bad planning, inadequate intelligence, poor staffing, and misleading of White House officials including the President, as key reasons for the failure of the operation.  “Plausible denial was a pathetic illusion,” the report concluded. “The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.” The declassified report also contains a rebuttal to Kirkpatrick from the office of deputy director Richard Bissell, challenging those conclusions.  Volume V of the Pfeiffer report, titled “Internal Investigation Report,” which remains classified, also critiques Kirkpatrick’s conclusions.

Document 3 – DOD,  5/5/1961, “Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba, 17 March 1960- May 1961”

This May 5, 1961 report was written by Colonel Jack Hawkins, the paramilitary chief of the Bay of Pigs operation. His 48-page report cites poor CIA organization, and “political considerations” imposed by the Kennedy administration, such as the decision to cancel D-day airstrikes which “doomed the operation,” as key elements of its failure. “Paramilitary operations cannot be effectively conducted on a ration-card basis,” the report concludes. “The Government and the people of the United States are not yet psychologically conditioned to participate in the cold war with resort to the harsh, rigorous, and often dangerous and painful measures which must be taken in order to win.” Hawkins also recommended that further covert operations to depose Castro, unless accompanied by a military invasion, “should not be made.” Castro, according to the report, could “not be overthrown by means short of overt application” of U.S. force.

Document 4 – CIA, 3/9/1960, “First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, 9 March 1960”

This is a memorandum of conversation of the first CIA Task Force meeting to plan what became the Bay of Pigs, a covert operation to recruit, train, and infiltrate paramilitary units into Cuba to overthrow Fidel Castro. The meeting is noteworthy because the chief of the Western Hemisphere division, J.C. King states that “unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in one package—which is highly unlikely—this operation can be a long, drawn out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force.”

Document 5 – CIA, 3/16/1960, “A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime”

This memorandum outlines the original plans for what became the Bay of Pigs. It was presented to and authorized by President Eisenhower on March 17, 1960. Components of the plan include the creation of a unified Cuban opposition, development of broadcasting facilities, and the training of paramilitary forces.  The purpose of the operations, according to the proposal, is to “bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention.” The original proposed budget is $4.4 million; by the time of the invasion the budget has risen to $45 million.

Document 6 – NSC, 3/11/1961, “Memorandum of Discussion on Cuba, March 11, 1961”

This top secret memorandum of conversation from a meeting of the National Security Council describes continued planning of paramilitary operations in Cuba. President Kennedy says he plans to authorize an operation in which “patriotic Cubans return to their homeland.”

Document 7 – White House, 3/2/1963, [Audio conversation between President John F. Kennedy and Attorney General Robert Kennedy]

[Part 1 – mp3] [Part 2 – mp3]

In this telephone conversation between President Kennedy and his brother Attorney General Robert Kennedy, they discuss concerns that a Senate investigating committee might reveal that the President had authorized jets from the US aircraft carrier Essex to provide one hour of air coverage, to create a no-fly zone for Bay of Pigs B-26 bombers the morning of April 19. Due to a timing mistake, the jets never met up with the bombers; 2 bombers were shot down, leading to the deaths of 4 Americans.

Document 8 – White House, “Memorandum for the President: Conversation with Commandante Ernesto Guevara of Cuba,” August 22, 1961.

In this memorandum of conversation, aide Richard Goodwin recounts for President Kennedy his conversation with Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who seeks to establish a “modus vivendi” with the U.S. government. This document is noteworth for the Bay of Pigs because Guevara “wanted to thank us very much for the invasion- that it had been a great political victory for them- enabled them to consolidate- and transformed them from an aggrieved little country to an equal.”

Interview – In October 1996, the National Security Archive’s Cuba Documentation project arranged for the two chief managers of the Bay of Pigs operation, Jacob Esterline and Colonel Jack Hawkins, to meet in a Washington DC hotel for a lengthy filmed interview on the invasion. The meeting marked the first time they had seen each other since the weekend of April 17-19, 1961, and the first time they had together recalled the events surrounding the failed invasion. This interview was conducted by the Archive’s Peter Kornbluh and is excerpted in his book, Bay of Pigs Declassified (New York: The New Press, 1998).

TOP-SECRET FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVES: The Report of the Historical Archives of the National Police

Members of the archive’s National Advisory Board stand with Ana Carla Ericastilla, director of the General Archives of Central America (front, center), Gustavo Meoño (back, right), representatives from several embassies (back), and National Security Archive’s Kate Doyle at release of the report, “Del Silencio a la Memoria” at the University of San Carlos in Guatemala City, Guatemala on June 7, 2011. [Daniel Hernández-Salazar © 2011]
he Police Archive’s new Web page was launched with the publication of the report, containing photographs, texts, links, and an electronic portal to submit information requests to the archive directly. http://www.archivohistoricopn.org/
Bookmark and Share

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Colonel Byron Disrael Lima Estrada

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Mexico’s Southern Front: Guatemala and the Search for Security

 

Guatemala City, Guatemala, June 7, 2011 – This text is a copy of the speech given by Kate Doyle at the ceremony of the presentation of the report, “From Silence to Memory: Revelations of the Historical Archive of the National Police” at the University of San Carlos in Guatemala City, Guatemala.

**********

I’m honored to be here today on behalf of the International Advisory Board of the Project to Recover the Historical Archives of the National Police in order to congratulate the archive’s staff for its tremendous work in rescuing documents that represent a critical aspect of the country’s political and social history and the patrimony of the people of Guatemala. Archives – and in particular the Historical Archive of the National Police (AHPN) – play an indispensible role in the defense of human rights in Guatemala and the struggle against forgetting. The fruits of your labor, including the report being presented here today, are now apparent, both inside and outside the country.

The International Advisory Board  consists of representatives of archives and human rights organizations from diverse countries, and includes Dr. Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, Nobel Peace Prize winner and President of the Provincial Commission for Memory in Argentina; Fina Solá, International Secretary of Archives Without Borders, based in Barcelona; Spain’s renowned expert in archives, Antonio González Quintana; Maripaz Vergara Low, Executive Secretary of the Vicariate of Solidarity in Chile; Dr. Patrick Ball, scientist and statistician from the Benetech Group in California; and your own Arturo Taracena, writer, researcher and doctor of history, a Guatemalan living in Mexico – among others. We form part of a broad international community of experts in the fields of archives and human rights that are firm supporters of the Historic Archive of the National Police, admirers of your achievements, standing with you in solidarity in the fight against impunity.  The Archive, in short, should feel well accompanied.

The title of the AHPN publication is a tribute to the final report of the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), “Memory of Silence”: not only in the sense that the commission was able to deliver to the people of Guatemala the results of an unprecedented and powerful investigation, but as an implicit reference to one of the thorniest problems the commission faced – the lack of official information.  Not the lack of testimony from survivors. Not the lack of bones, unearthed in exhumations. Not the lack of publications of human rights organizations, or the decisions of inter-American institutions. Not the lack of press clippings, reports of the church, the family requests or eyewitness testimony. Only the lack of official government information in Guatemala: from the Army and from its accomplice and subordinate institution, the National Police.

In the twelfth and final volume of its report, the CEH published dozens of letters exchanged between the three commissioners and the high command of the country’s security institutions, including the then-Minister of Defense, Héctor Mario Barrios Celada, and Interior Minister Rodolfo Mendoza Rosales. The communications capture the commission’s exasperation and intense frustration in trying to obtain even the most basic documents from the parties to the internal conflict in order to be able to carry out their investigations in a rigorous and balanced way. They also capture the implacable and inevitable response of the officials: No. There were no documents, the documents never existed, they were destroyed, they were lost, or worse, the documents were still classified under the seal of national security.

In one letter to President Alvaro Arzú Irigoyen dated May 24, 1998, the commissioners wrote, “It is difficult to accept that the information does not exist in Government archives. If that were true, then every time we perceived a serious irregularity indicating the State’s responsibility in human rights violations, we would consider it necessary to receive assurances of the investigative measures adopted to determine the precise causes of the loss of historic documents of an official nature. We consider that such measures form part of the Government’s obligation to cooperate with the Commission, as well as the State’s duty to investigate and sanction human rights violations…”

Of course, Guatemala is not the only country in Latin America that suffers from the silence, denial and secrecy of its own institutions in relation to the region’s painful history of repression. Peru, for example, has very similar problems, as the prosecutors named in the Fujimori case discovered. When they requested archives from the armed forces in order to be able to analyze the characteristics of military units involved in massacres, the Army responded that all the relevant documents had been burned. Burned? How were they burned, and when? The prosecutors never received a response – the Army never submitted a copy of an order to burn records nor a list of the archives supposedly destroyed. They did not consider it necessary – as though these were their own documents and not the property of the people of Peru – and they were right. The government of Peru did not demand accountability from the military in the matter.

In its call for the State’s obligation to produce its archives – and in particular in its insistence that the authorities justify any missing information and make an effort to recover it through internal investigations – the CEH anticipated by more than ten years an extraordinary ruling from the Inter-American Court, issued in December of last year. In “Gomes Lund v. Brazil,” the Court resolved that Brazilian authorities had to turn over all official documents to family members of a group of some 60 militants disappeared by security forces during the 1970s in the Araguaia region. The Court emphasized the existence of a “regional consensus about the importance of access to public information.” (§198) The Court affirmed the right to the truth of people affected by atrocities committed during the counterinsurgency campaign against the Araguaia militants. The Court established that “in cases of human rights violations, government authorities cannot hide behind mechanisms such as State secrecy or the confidentiality of the information, or for reasons of public interest or national security, in order to avoid providing information required by judicial or administrative authorities charged with a pending investigation or process. In addition, when an investigation concerns a punishable offense, the decision to qualify information as secret and refuse its disclosure must never depend exclusively on the government organ whose members are implicated in the commission of the crime.” (§202)

Finally, and very important in the case of Guatemala, “In the opinion of this Tribunal, the State cannot seek protection by using the lack of evidence concerning the existence of the documents; on the contrary, it must justify the refusal to provide them, demonstrating that it has taken every measure to confirm that, effectively, the requested information does not exist. It is clearly essential that, in order to guarantee the right to information, the authorities act in good faith and diligently carry out the necessary actions to secure the effectiveness of this right, especially when it involves the truth about serious human rights violations like the forced disappearances and the extrajudicial execution of the present case.” (§211)

For too long the Guatemalan State institutions have been able to use silence, denial, and secrecy to cover up the violations committed by their own agents without fear of sanction. The work of the Historical Archive of the National Police – and in particular the publication of the extraordinary report that we celebrate today – is a direct challenge to this dark legacy.

For Guatemala, the report reveals some ugly truths about the principle institution charged with the protection of citizens’ security. How, for example, the anti-communist functions of the National Security Directorate – established shortly after the installation of the military dictatorship in the 1950s – were granted as powers to investigate, monitor, arrest, interrogate and detain any person under the flimsiest of pretexts.  How the directorate’s functions quickly exceeded in importance and prestige the ordinary anti-crime functions of the police— ultimately infecting the culture of the police. How the National Police were militarized just as quickly, in all aspects: their structure, their ranks, their reporting, and their operations. How they were subordinated to the army. How, in the 60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s, the intensity of the social control exercised by the police and the ferocity of their repressive actions, were mirrored negatively by their total incompetence and lack of interest in their supposed main function: to investigate crimes, including the crimes of kidnapping and assassination.

For the United States, the report has lessons of a different nature. Because although some documents located within the AHPN tell of the close relations between the security forces and their North American supporters and sponsors, hundreds of declassified documents from the United States already existed that describe our ignominious history in relation to the National Police. Instead, for us, the report serves as a reminder of the role we played for decades in Guatemala, providing every kind of assistance possible in line with our notorious national security doctrine to the repressive forces in this country.

Of course, you will read the report yourselves; interested people from all over the world will read it: historians, researchers, journalists, specialists, archivists, activists, family, and prosecutors. You will discover the riches that it offers on your own. But I would like to emphasize an aspect of the report that you might miss: that is, the transparency of the archival process that underlies the document.

Read the introduction to see how carefully the mechanisms and research methodology behind the AHPN investigations are explained: the analysis, statistical studies, and internal and external debate about the issue of public access. Read pages 38-39 about “The criteria to record the names that appear in the AHPN documents,”—a profound and serious reflection about the decision to publish without restriction all of the names that appear in the report. It is worth quoting: “The armed internal conflict and repressive practices characterized a recent historic period in Guatemala that affected and continues to affect society enormously. In the face of this reality, the conclusion is inevitable that the political events that took place between 1960 and 1996 form part of the collective history of the Nation. This should be understood in its fullest dimension, so that no one has the right to hide information that comes from the actions by the State and its officials.”

In reference to the legal instruments that guarantee the right to information – such as, for example, Article 24 of the Access to Information Law, which prohibits the withholding as confidential or classified any information that could contribute to the clarification of violations against fundamental human rights – the AHPN chose to include “the first and last names of all actors, active and passive, mentioned in the documents, be they government or public employees (in the case of the National Police and other state entities such as the Army), confidential collaborators, individuals such as victims and their family members, those who file criminal complaints, individuals with police files, and petitioners, among others.”

And read the hundreds of footnotes referring to documents cited in the text – read them and enjoy the links that were incorporated in the digital version of the report so that we can go directly to the scanned image of the document and read it in its entirety, if we want. This is transparency: an obligation for the State authorities, and a valuable tool for civil society.

I am here on behalf of my own archive and NGO, the National Security Archive in Washington, and have visited and worked in several other archives throughout the Americas. Based on that experience, I can say with certainty that there are very few examples of archival institutions that provide indexes, not to mention an investigative report, such as the one we celebrate today. The example of Mexico is sufficient. In 2002, President Vicente Fox took the decision—in the context of the political transition—to order his military, defense, and intelligence institutions to transfer documents related to the so-called “dirty war” (1968-1983) to the Mexican National Archives (Archivo General Nacional – AGN).  I was living in Mexico at that time and it seemed to us a wonderful idea and we congratulated the government. Then we went to the archives to try to actually use the famous documents from the dirty war, and guess what? It was an exercise in complete frustration. Because no one had created an index to the collections, and no one thought to sensitize AGN employees how to manage this special collection, not to mention the researchers – among them family members, sometimes humble, vulnerable or fearful people arriving at the archives for the first time. In the section where the most sensitive documents were stored, records from the Federal Security Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad – DFS)—the Mexican version of the CIA and FBI combined—an official from the very same intelligence agency was placed in charge of providing public access to the intelligence files. Needless to say, after a few months, the public stopped coming to the AGN to consult the “dirty war” documents.

So access to information is much, much more, than announcing the declassification of documents. It means organizing the documents in a way that is clear to ordinary people; it means creating indexes, catalogs and databases – instruments, that is, to render the files readable, comprehensible and searchable. It means preparing and training the staff so they can cater to special users: those same family members, or prosecutors working on criminal cases. In very rare instances does it mean publishing an investigative report such as this one – From Silence to Memory – which offers us indispensable insights into the treasure trove that is the Historical Archive of the National Police. The report will serve as a guide to the collections for researcher for years to come, but also as a history of the security institutions of Guatemala, a deep analysis of the logic of urban counterinsurgency and the instruments of repression, and an assessment of seven specific human rights cases. It is a gift to all of us – to Guatemalan society and to all those interested in history, memory and justice.

Thank you.

_________________________________________________________________

Documents

From Silence to Memory: Revelations of the Historical Archive of the National Police

Complete Report – (9.61 MB)

The following is a selection of document highlights from the report:


Document 1
(pg. 90 of report)
Fotografía I.1.a
28 October 1981
 “Información confidencial con remisión manuscrita al COCP 1981”

This document illuminates the role of the Joint Operations Center of the National Police (Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas de la Policía – COCP). The command center directed communications between the National Police headquarters (Dirección General – DG) and units in the Military.

The police Joint Operations Center transmitted information from the police investigations unit to the military intelligence command, such as the President’s own intelligence service, the Archivo General y Servicios de Apoyo del EMP. The Archivo was part of the President’s General Staff (EMP) and maintained personal information on civilians since its inception in the 1960s. The intelligence and operational unit was at the heart of the urban terror campaign to kidnap, torture, and disappear suspected subversives during under the governments of Fernando Romero Lucas García (1978-1982), Efraín Rios Montt (1982-1983) and Oscar Mejía Víctores (1983-1985).

This document was sent to the Archivo to notify its agents of “delinquent subversives,” and gives the exact address of where they could be found. It also describes the weapons maintained by the bodyguard of the local police chief, and of the local chief of transportation.

Document 2
(pg. 93 of report, footnote number 148)
Undated
“Nace un nuevo cuerpo“,

This internal newsletter, the National Police Review (Revista Policía Nacional),titled “Birth of a new corps” (“Nace un nuevo cuerpo“), reported on the formation of the new “Fifth Corps” of the police, also known as the Special Operations Command (COE – Comando de Operaciones Especiales) or the Reaction and Special Operations Battalion (BROE – Batallón de Reacción y Operaciones Especiales). The unit would go on to become notorious for its brutal countersubversive sweeps aimed at dismantling insurgent networks, and is linked to dozens of documented forced disappearances.

The newsletter contains the follow sections, among others: “National Police Infrastructure”, “Women and Public Security”, the “Sacrifice of Police Work”, “Daily Living of an Agent”, “Anonymous Heroes”, and the importance and origin of “School Security Patrols.”
The newsletter also contains a section titled “Human Rights,” where it states that, “human rights continue to be the first priority when each police officer carries out civil control duties.”

Document 3
(pg. 140 of report)
Fotografía I.25
circa 1981
“Ejemplo de nómina de personal 1981”

The police documents include personnel lists for all the major police units in the capital as well as in major cities across Guatemala. These lists provide key information for investigators documenting individual responsibility for government-sponsored abuses.

This record, from 1981, lists names of personnel and their positions from January 1, 1980 through December 31, 1980. The director general, German Chupina Barahona is listed as the director general, along with two other senior staff, administrative staff, corps chiefs, and department chiefs.

Document 4
(pg. 341 of report, footnote 106)
Undated
“Interrogatorio”

Throughout the conflict the Guatemalan government used what it called the “management of information” to identify and destroy networks of guerrillas and suspected subversives in what was known among security officials as the “urban guerrilla war” (guerra de guerillas urbanas). The collecting of first-hand information from captured resistance leaders and militants through interrogation and torture was one of the main methods of “managing” information. The first-hand information enabled the security forces to analyze the infrastructure of the guerrilla movement and quickly move to capture its members.

This document provides instruction to police forces on how to properly conduct an interrogation:

“The captured enemy will talk only if the interrogator is properly prepared to carry out the interrogation. The information that is extracted will serve future operations and correct errors in those operations.”

In order to properly carry out the interrogation, the police official is instructed to personally observe the prisoner, taking notes on clothing, mood, and attitude. The interrogator is instructed to know details of the prisoner’s capture, and how he/she was treated by other officers when they were captured.

The document then continues with a list of questions the interrogator should ask them self while preparing for the interrogation, including:

“a. What appears to be his attitude?  Afraid, calm, willing to cooperate, etc.
b. What can you do to increase or prolong his fear?
c. What can you do to eliminate or alleviate his fear?
d. What documents or effects that the individual was carrying when captured that could be used to help you during questioning?
e. What information is required urgently?”

Document 5
(pg. 404 in report)
Fotografía IV.7
20 September 1978

These pictures are from a confidential report prepared by the Detective Corps in relation to student protests held in solidarity with Nicaragua on September 20, 1978. In the third photograph, the student with the white pants with a cross marked on his leg is Oliverio Castañeda de Leon.

Castañeda, an economics student at San Carlos University, was the Secretary General of the University Student Association and an iconic figure for the democratic and revolutionary left. He was a member of many student groups that were constantly monitored by state security forces because of suspected subversive activities. This set of photographs, only a few from a vast collection, exemplifies the level of control and vigilance with which the National Police monitored student leaders. Two months after this photo was taken, on October 20, 1978, the 23 year-old Castañeda was assassinated just blocks away from the presidential palace after leaving a demonstration in Guatemala City’s central plaza.


Document 6
(pg. 407 in report, footnote number 18)
19 October 1978
“Ejército Secreto Anti-Comunista – Boletin No. 3”

One day before Oliverio Castañeda de León’s murder, on October 19, his name appeared on the Secret Anti-Communist Army’s “Condemned to Death” list, published in the group’s Bulletin Number Three. Castañeda’s name is underlined in the bulletin, a copy of which was discovered in the AHPN.

Document 7
(pg. 466 in report)
Fotografía IV.13
11 August 1980
“Ficha post mortem de Vicente Hernández Camey”

The large cache of records from the Police Archive’s Identification Bureau (Gabinete de Identificación) was significantly deteriorated when discovered in July 2005. Despite their poor condition, the documents are an essential key to identifying the bodies of the unknown from the conflict.

In February 1969, the National Police implemented the “Henry Fingerprinting System” as part of a cold-war police training program headed by Sergio Roberto Lima Morales, Chief of the Identification Bureau. This system enabled the police to identify cadáveres xx, or “unidentified bodies”. This document displays the product of the “Henry” fingerprinting system, named after a British police inspector who developed his method for criminal investigations in colonial India.

These are the post-mortem fingerprints of Vincente Hernández Camey a member of the Vecinos Mundial, or “Global Neighbors”, a private organization of the indigenous Kaqchiquel community in Chimaltenango. Hernández Camey was forcibly disappeared along with a companion, Roberto Xihuac—also a member of Global Neighbors—on August 7, 1979. Originally, Hernández Camey entered the National Police system as an unidentified body; however, the police were able to positively identify him by using the fingerprinting system.
National Security Archive’s Kate Doyle speaks at the ceremony for the release of the report, “From Silence to Memory: Revelations of the Historical Archive of the National Police” in Guatemala City, Guatemala on June 7, 2011. [Daniel Hernández-Salazar © 2011]
Coordinator of the Historical Archives of the National Police (AHPN), Gustavo Meoño, speaks to audience at release of the report, “Del Silencio a la Memoria” at the University of San Carlos in Guatemala City, Guatemala on June 7, 2011. [Daniel Hernández-Salazar © 2011]
Coordinator of the Historical Archives of the National Police (AHPN) Gustavo Meoño, and AHPN Investigator, Velia Muralles recieve the Intstitute for Policy Studies (IPS) Letelier-Moffitt Human Rights Special Recognition Award in October 2010 on behalf of the AHPN. Joy Zarembka, interim director of IPS, presents the award. [Photo (c) Intstitute for Policy Studies]
Oliverio Castañeda de Leon, Secretary General of San Carlos University Student Association and iconic figure for democratic and revolutionary left, was assassinated on October 20, 1978. Castañeda had been named by the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA) in its “Death List” published in the Guatemalan press on October 19, 1978. AHPN documents about Castañeda are included in the AHPN report on page 397.
A copy of an internal newsletter, The National Police Reivew, is incorporated in the Historical Archives of the National Police (AHPN) report being released today. see page 93 of report, footnote number 148.
Piles of documents at the Historical Archives of the National Police (AHPN) in Guatemala City, Guatemala. [Daniel Hernández-Salazar © 2005]

TOP SECRET CIA ‘OFFICIAL HISTORY’ OF THE BAY OF PIGS: REVELATIONS

TOP SECRET CIA ‘OFFICIAL HISTORY’ OF THE BAY OF PIGS: REVELATIONS

‘Friendly Fire’ Reported as CIA Personnel Shot at Own Aircraft
New Revelations on Assassination Plots, Use of Americans in Combat

National Security Archive FOIA Lawsuit Obtains Release of Last Major Internal Agency Compilation on Paramilitary Invasion of Cuba

Washington, D.C., August 24, 2011 – In the heat of the battle at the Bay of Pigs, the lead CIA field operative aboard one of the transport boats fired 75mm recoilless rifles and .50-caliber machine guns on aircraft his own agency had supplied to the exile invasion force, striking some of them.  With the CIA-provided B-26 aircraft configured to match those in the Cuban air force, “we couldn’t tell them from the Castro planes,” according to the operative, Grayston Lynch. “We ended up shooting at two or three of them. We hit some of them there because when they came at us…it was a silhouette, that was all you could see.”

This episode of ‘friendly fire’ is one of many revelations contained in the Top Secret multi-volume, internal CIA report, “The Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation.”  Pursuant to a Freedom of Information lawsuit (FOIA) filed by the National Security Archive on the 50th anniversary of the invasion last April, the CIA has now declassified four volumes of the massive, detailed, study–over 1200 pages of comprehensive narrative and documentary appendices.

Archive Cuba specialist Peter Kornbluh, who filed the lawsuit, hailed the release as “a major advance in obtaining the fullest possible record of the most infamous debacle in the history of the CIA’s covert operations.” The Bay of Pigs, he noted, “remains fundamentally relevant to the history of the CIA, of U.S. foreign policy, and of U.S. intervention in Cuba and Latin America. It is a clandestine history that must be understood in all its inglorious detail.”

In an article published today in the “Daily Beast,” Kornbluh described the ongoing “FOIA wars” with the CIA to obtain the declassification of historical documents the CIA continues to keep secret. He characterized the process of pressing the CIA to release the Official History and other historically significant documents as “the bureaucratic equivalent of passing a kidney stone.”

The “Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations” was written between 1974 and 1984 by Jack Pfeiffer, a member of the Agency’s staff who rose to become the CIA’s Chief Historian. After he retired in the mid 1980s, Pfeiffer attempted to obtain the declassification of Volumes 4 and 5 of his study, which contained his lengthy and harsh critiques of two previous official investigations of the Bay of Pigs: the report of the Presidential Commission led by Gen. Maxwell Taylor; and the CIA’s own Inspector General’s report written in the aftermath of the failed assault. Both the Taylor Commission and the IG report held the CIA primarily responsible for the failure of the invasion—a position Pfeiffer rejected.  The CIA released only the Taylor critique, but Pfeiffer never circulated it.

According to Kornbluh, Pfeiffer saw as his mission to spread the blame for the debacle of “JMATE”—the codename for the operation—beyond the CIA headquarters at Langley, VA.  Kornbluh characterized the study as “not only the official history, but the official defense of the CIA’s legacy that was so badly damaged on the shores of Cuba;” and he predicted its declassification “would revive the ‘who-lost-Cuba’ blame game” that has accompanied the historical debate over the failed invasion for fifty years.

The Archive is posting all four volumes today.  They are described below:

Volume 1: Air Operations, March 1960 to April 1961 (Part 1| Part 2 | Part 3)

The opening volume examines the critical component of the invasion—the CIA-created air force, the preliminary airstrikes, and the air battle over Cuba during the three day attack.  The study forcefully addresses the central “who-lost-Cuba” debate that broke out in the aftermath of the failed invasion. It absolves the CIA of blame, and places it on the Kennedy White House and other agencies for decisions relating to the preliminary airstrikes and overt air cover that, according to the Official History, critically compromised the success of the operation.  “[I]in its attempts to meet its official obligations in support of the official, authorized policy of the U.S. government—to bring about the ouster of Fidel Castro—the agency was not well served by the Kennedy White House, Secretary of State Rusk, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the U.S. Navy,” the CIA historian concludes.  “The changes, modifications, distortions, and lack of firm, positive guidance related to air operations—the key to the success or failure of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Castro—make clear that the collapse of the beachhead at Playa Giron was a shared responsibility.  When President Kennedy [during his post-invasion press conference] proclaimed his sole responsibility for the operation there was more truth to his statement than he really believed or than his apologists will accept.”

Besides the ‘friendly fire” episode, Volume 1 contains a number of colorful revelations. Among them:

  • Only days before the invasion, the CIA tried to entice Cuba’s top diplomat, foreign minister Raul Roa, to defect. “Our contact with Raul Roa reports that this defection attempt is still alive although Roa would make no firm commitment or promise on whether he would defect in the U.N.,” operations manager, Jacob Esterline, noted in a secret April 11, 1961 progress report on invasion planning. “Roa has requested that no further contact be made at this time.” Like the invasion itself, the Agency’s effort for a dramatic propaganda victory over Cuba was unsuccessful. “The planned defection did not come off,” concedes the Official History.
  • In coordination with the preliminary airstrike on April 14, the CIA, with the support of the Pentagon, requested permission for a series of “large-scale sonic booms” over Havana—a psychological operations tactic the Agency had successfully employed in the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954.  “We were trying to create confusion, and so on,” a top-level CIA invasion planner stated. “I thought a sonic boom would be a helluva swell thing, you know. Break all the windows in downtown Havana…distract Castro.” Trying to maintain “plausible denial” of Washington’s role, the State Department rejected the request as “too obviously U.S.”  The Official History records General Curtis  Lemay demanding on the telephone to know “who was the sonofabitch who didn’t approve” the request.
  • Several damaged invasion airplanes made emergency landings on the Grand Cayman Islands, and were seized by local authorities. The situation created an awkward diplomatic situation with Great Britain; details of the negotiations between the U.S. and England are redacted but the CIA did suggest making the argument that if the planes were not released, Castro would think the Caymans were being used as a launch site for the invasion and respond aggressively.
  • As Castro’s forces gained the upper hand against the invasion, Agency planners reversed a decision against widespread use of napalm bombs “in favor of anything that might reverse the situation in Cuba in favor of the Brigade forces.”
  • Although the CIA had been admonished by both the Eisenhower and Kennedy White House to make sure that the U.S. hand did not show in the invasion, during the fighting headquarters authorized American pilots to fly planes over Cuba.  Secret instructions quoted in the Official History state that Americans could pilot planes but only over the beachhead and not inland. “American crews must not fall into hands enemy,” warned the instructions. If they did “[the] U.S. will deny any knowledge.”  Four American pilots and crew died when their planes were shot down over Cuba. The Official History contains private correspondence with family members of some of the pilots.

Volume II: “Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy” (Part 1 | Part 2)

Volume 2 provides new details on the negotiations and tensions with other countries which the CIA needed to provide logistical and infrastructure support for the invasion preparations. The volume describes Kennedy Administration efforts to sustain the cooperation of Guatemala, where the main CIA-led exile brigade force was trained, as well as the deals made with Gen. Anastacio Somoza and his brother Luis, then the President of Nicaragua. The Official History points out that CIA personnel simply took over diplomatic functions from the State Department in both countries. “In the instance of Guatemala, the U.S. Ambassador for all practical purposes became ‘inoperative’; and in Nicaragua the opposite condition prevailed—anything that the Agency suggested received ambassadorial blessing.”  Among the revelations:

  • While attending John F. Kennedy’s inauguration in Washington in January 1961, General Anastacio Somoza met secretly with CIA director Allen Dulles to discuss the creation of JMTIDE, the cryptonym for the airbase the CIA wanted to use in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua to launch the attack on Cuba. Somoza explicitly raised Nicaragua’s need for two development loans totaling $10 million. The CIA subsequently pressed the State Department to support the loans, one of which was from the World Bank.
  • President Luis Somoza demanded assurances that the U.S. would stand behind Nicaragua once it became known that the Somozas had supported the invasion. Somoza told the CIA representative that “there are some long-haired Department of State liberals who are not in favor of Somoza and they would welcome this as a source of embarrassment for his government.”
  • Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes repeatedly told CIA officials that he wanted to “see Guatemalan Army and Air Force personnel participate in the air operations against Castro’s Cuba.”
  • The dictator of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo, offered his country’s territory in support of the invasion. His quid pro quo was a U.S. assurance to let Trujillo “live out the rest of his days in peace.” The State Department rejected the offer; Trujillo, whose repression and corruption was radicalizing the left in the Dominican Republic, was later assassinated by CIA-backed groups.

Volume III: “Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies, 1951- January 1961”

This volume provides the most detailed available account of the decision making process in the White House, CIA and State Department during the Eisenhower administration that led to the Bay of Pigs invasion.  The CIA previously declassified this 300-page report in 1998, pursuant to the Kennedy Assassination Records Act; but it was not made public until 2005 when Villanova professor of political science David Barrett found it in an obscure file at the National Archives, and first posted it on his university’s website.

This volume contains significant new information, and a number of major revelations, particularly regarding Vice-President Richard Nixon’s role and the CIA’s own expectations for the invasion, and on CIA assassination attempts against Fidel Castro.

  • A small group of high-level CIA officials sought to use part of the budget of the invasion to finance a collaboration with the Mafia to assassinate Castro. In an interview with the CIA historian, former chief of the invasion task force, Jacob Esterline, said that he had been asked to provide money from the invasion budget by J.C. King, the head of the Western Hemisphere. “Esterline claimed that on one occasion as chief/w4, he refused to grant Col J.C. King, chief WH Division, a blank check when King refused to tell Jake the purpose for which the check was intended. Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN number from the Office of Finance and that the money was used to pay the Mafia-types.”  The Official History also notes that invasion planners discussed pursuing “Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination”—although few details were provided.   In November 1960, Edward Lansdale, a counterinsurgency specialist in the U.S. military who later conceived of Operation Mongoose, sent the invasion task force a “MUST GO LIST” of 11 top Cuban officials, including Che Guevera, Raul Castro, Blas Roca and Carlos Raphael Rodriguez.
  • Vice-President Nixon, who portrayed himself in his memoirs as one of the original architects of the plan to overthrow Castro, proposed to the CIA that they support “goon squads and other direct action groups” inside and outside of Cuba. The Vice President repeatedly sought to interfere in the invasion planning.  Through his national security aide, Nixon demanded that William Pawley, “a big fat political cat,” as Nixon’s aide described him to the CIA, be given briefings and access to CIA officers to share ideas. Pawley pushed the CIA to support untrustworthy exiles as part of the effort to overthrow Castro. “Security already has been damaged severely,” the head of the invasion planning reported, about the communications made with one, Rubio Padilla, one of Pawley’s favorite militants.
  • In perhaps the most important revelation of the entire official history, the CIA task force in charge of the paramilitary assault did not believe it could succeed without becoming an open invasion supported by the U.S. military. On page 149 of Volume III, Pfeiffer quotes still-secret minutes of the Task Force meeting held on November 15, 1960, to prepare a briefing for the new President-elect, John F. Kennedy: “Our original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted,” the document states. “Our second concept (1,500-3000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.”

This candid assessment was not shared with the President-elect then, nor later after the inauguration. As Pfeiffer points out, “what was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 became the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs Operation in March 1961”—run only by the CIA, and with a force of 1,200 men.

Volume IV: The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs

This volume, which Pfeiffer wrote in an “unclassified” form with the intention of publishing it after he left the CIA, represents his forceful rebuttal to the findings of the Presidential Commission that Kennedy appointed after the failed invasion, headed by General Maxwell Taylor.  In the introduction to the 300 pages volume, Pfeiffer noted that the CIA had been given a historical “bum rap” for “a political decision that insured the military defeat of the anti-Castro forces”—a reference to President Kennedy’s decision not to provide overt air cover and invade Cuba after Castro’s forces overwhelmed the CIA-trained exile Brigade. The Taylor Commission, which included Attorney General Robert Kennedy, he implied, was biased to defend the President at the expense of the CIA. General Taylor’s “strongest tilts were toward deflecting criticism of the White House,” according to the CIA historian.

According to Pfeiffer, this volume would present “the first and only detailed examination of the work of, and findings of, the Taylor Commission to be based on the complete record.”  His objective was to offer “a better understanding of where the responsibility for the fiasco truly lies.” To make sure the reader fully understood his point, Pfeiffer ended the study with an “epilogue” consisting of a one paragraph quote from an interview that Raul Castro gave to a Mexican journalist in 1975. “Kennedy vacillated,” Castro stated. “If at that moment he had decided to invade us, he could have suffocated the island in a sea of blood, but he would have destroyed the revolution. Lucky for us, he vacillated.”

After leaving the CIA in the mid 1980s, Pfeiffer filed a freedom of information act suit to obtain the declassification of this volume, and volume V, of his study, which he intended to publish as a book, defending the CIA. The CIA did eventually declassify volume IV, but withheld volume V in its entirety. Pfeiffer never published the book and this volume never really circulated publicly.

Volume V: The Internal Investigation Report [Still Classified]

Like his forceful critique of the Taylor Commission, Pfeiffer also wrote a critique of the CIA’s own Inspector General’s report on the Bay of Pigs—“Inspector General’s Survey of Cuban Operation”–written by a top CIA officer, Lyman Kirkpatrick in 1961. Much to the surprise and chagrin of top CIA officers at the time, Kirkpatrick laid the blame for the failure squarely at the feet of his own agency, and particularly the chief architect of the operation, Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell. The operation was characterized by “bad planning,” “poor” staffing, faulty intelligence and assumptions, and “a failure to advise the President that success had become dubious.” Moreover, “plausible denial was a pathetic illusion,” the report concluded. “The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.” In his cover letter to the new CIA director, John McCone, Kirkpatrick identified what he called “a tendency in the Agency to gloss over CIA inadequacies and to attempt to fix all of the blame for the failure of the invasion upon other elements of the Government, rather than to recognize the Agency’s weaknesses.”

Pfeiffer’s final volume contains a forceful rebuttal of Kirkpatrick’s focus on the CIA’s own culpability for the events at the Bay of Pigs.  Like the rest of the Official History, the CIA historian defends the CIA against criticism from its own Inspector General and seeks to spread the “Who Lost Cuba” blame to other agencies and authorities of the U.S. government, most notably the Kennedy White House.

When Pfeiffer first sought to obtain declassification of his critique, the Kirkpatrick report was still secret.  The CIA was able to convince a judge that national security would be compromised by the declassification of Pfeiffer’s critique which called attention to this extremely sensitive Top Secret report.  But in 1998, Peter Kornbluh and the National Security Archive used the FOIA to force the CIA to declassify the Inspector General’s report. (Kornbluh subsequently published it as a book: Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.) Since the Kirkpatrick report has been declassified for over 13 years, it is unclear why the CIA continues to refuse to declassify a single word of Pfeiffer’s final volume.

The National Security Archive remains committed to using all means of legal persuasion to obtain the complete declassification of the final volume of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation.


TOP-SECRET FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVES: Did NATO Win the Cold War?

Documentary supplement to the article “Did NATO Win the Cold War? Looking over the Wall,” by Vojtech Mastny, Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3 (May-June 1999): 176-89
April 23, 1999

This documentary supplement to the article, “Did NATO Win the Cold War? Looking over the Wall,” has been prepared on the occasion of the Washington summit marking the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is intended to provide the reader with the most important sources referred to in the text of the article that are relevant to the view of NATO “from the other side.”

Some of the sources have been obtained as a result of the project on the “Parallel History of the Cold War Alliances,” conducted by the National Security Archive in cooperation with the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. More information about the project can be found on the websites of the two institutions.

Other sources were made available through the National Security Archive’s partner organization, the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, and have been published in its Bulletin. More information about the Project can be found on its website.

The documents refer to the text of the article according to the numbers that appear on its margins. They are published in full or in part, as indicated, and are preceded by brief introductions explaining their origins. In some cases, reproductions of the original documents are included as samples.

Catherine Nielsen and John Martinez, both of the National Security Archive, assisted in the preparation of the texts for online publication.

Vojtech Mastny

Document 1.

George F. Kennan, the architect of America’s policy of containment and a frequent critic of its execution, was U.S. ambassador to Moscow in one of the darkest years of the Cold War, 1952. On September 8, 1952, shortly before he was expelled from the Soviet Union as a persona non grata, he sent a dispatch to Washington in which he tried to assess NATO from the Soviet point of view. In retrospect, he regarded this assessment so important that he included it as the only appendix to his volume of memoirs published in 1971. While some of Kennan’s conclusions may not have withstood the test of time, his warning against being “fascinated and enmeshed by the relentless and deceptive logic of the military equation” remained topical throughout the Cold War.

[George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1950-1963 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, pp. 327-51]

Document 2.

A confidential information bulletin provided by Soviet intelligence to top eastern European party leaders has been preserved in the files of the Czechoslovak communist party central committee in Prague. As shown on the sample, the reports sometimes quoted verbatim statements made by high Western officials at top secret meetings.

The bulletin included the following passage referring to the alleged American disclosure at a secret NATO meeting in December 1950:

“In connection with their failures in Korea the Americans apparently intend to provoke in the summer of 1951 a military conflict in eastern Europe with the goal of seizing the eastern zone of Austria. To realize this goal, the Americans intend to utilize Yugoslavia.”

[“O deiatelnosti organov Severo-atlanticheskogo Soiuza v sviazi s sozdaniem atlanticheskoi armii i remilitarizatsiei zapadnoi Germanii,” February 1951, 92/1093, 100/24, Central State Archives, Prague; translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, National Security Archive]
Document 3.

Karel Kaplan, an official researcher who had enjoyed unlimited access to the Czechoslovak communist party archives prior to his defection to the West, learned about a meeting with Stalin on January 9-12, 1951, from one of its participants, the country’s minister of defense Alexej Cepicka. In 1978, Kaplan created a stir by publishing his findings, suggesting that Stalin had told his eastern European followers to prepare for an offensive war against Western Europe:  “After a report by representatives of the bloc about the condition of their respective armies, Stalin took the floor to elaborate on the idea of the military occupation of the whole of Wurope, insisting on the necessity of preparing it very well.

Since the Korean War had demonstrated the military weakness of the United States, despite its use of highly advanced technology, it seemed appropriate to Stalin to take advantage of this in Europe. He developed arguments in support of the following thesis: `No European army is in a position to seriously oppose the Soviet army and it can even be anticipated that there will be no resistance at all. The current military power of the United States is not very great. For the time being, the Soviet camp therefore enjoys a distinct superiority. But this is merely temporary, for some three or four years. Afterward, the United States will have at its disposal means for transporting reinforcements to Europe and will also be able to take advantage of its atomic superiority. Consequently, it will be necessary to make use of this brief interval to systematically prepare our armies by mobilizing all our economic, political, and human resources. During the forthcoming three or four years, all of our domestic and international policies will be subordinated to this goal. Only the total mobilization of our resources will allow us to grasp this unique opportunity to extend socialism throughout the whole of Europe.'”

[Karel Kaplan, Dans les Archives du comité central: Trente ans de secrets du bloc soviétique, Paris: Michel, 1978, pp. 165-66; translated by Vojtech Mastny]

Another record of the Moscow meeting, written shortly afterward by its Romanian participant, Minister of the Armed Forces Emil Bodnaras, has been preserved in Bucharest and was published there in 1995. According to this document, Stalin urged a buildup of the eastern European armies to deter an American attack rather than to prepare them for an attack on western Europe. But his insistence on exploiting what he regarded as current American weakness to achieve combat readiness within three years could be interpreted as a call for offensive action at the right time. The three-year framework he mentioned corresponded to the period of “maximum danger” that also underlay NATO’s contemporary plans for the development of its armed forces –another indication that those secret plans were no secret to Stalin.

[C. Cristescu, “Ianuarie 1951: Stalin decide înarmarea Romanei,” Magazin Istoric, 1995, no. 10, pp. 15-23; translated by Vladimir Socor]
Document 4.

This description of presumed Soviet military capabilities is from one of the annual estimates compiled by NATO from 1950 onward and is preserved in its archives in Brussels.

[“Estimate of the Relative Strength and Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Bloc Forces at Present and in the Immediate Future,” November 23, 1951, C8-D/4 (M.C. 33), International Staff, NATO Archives, Brussels]

Document 5.

The excerpt from the record of the 99th meeting of NATO’s Military Representatives Committee shows some of the doubts that spread by 1955 about the accuracy of the alliance’s estimates of Soviet capabilities:

[Record of 99th meeting of the Military Representatives Committee with the North Atlantic Council in Washington, 18 May 1955, International Military Staff, NATO Archives, Brussels]

Document 6.

The conclusive answer to the question of who started the Korean War and why could finally be given in 1995, following the release of the Soviet documents proving Kim Il Sung’s initiative and Stalin’s indispensable support. Some of the relevant documents were given by Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin to South Korean President Kim Young-Sam during his state visit to Moscow, others were subsequently made available from Russian archives. They were translated into English and published with commentaries for the first time by American historian Kathryn Weathersby in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 5 and 6-7.

Go to Documents 7-10

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY: POLANDS REVOLUTION

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On April 5 Poland celebrates the twelfth anniversary of the signing of the Round Table Agreements — a landmark power-sharing agreement negotiated by representatives of the Communist Polish government, leaders of the long-outlawed union Solidarity, and leaders of the Catholic Church that allowed for the first free elections in Eastern Europe in nearly 50 years.  To mark the anniversary, the National Security Archive is publishing a new electronic briefing book, featuring recently declassified Department of State documents detailing the U.S. embassy’s analysis of and participation in events during Poland’s revolution.     The year 1989 began with a contentious Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) Plenum in January that led directly to the Round Table Negotiations from February 6 to April 5.  Later, on June 4 and 18, Solidarity candidates won landslide victories in elections to the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish Parliament) and the Senate.  These elections were followed by a presidential crisis, then a presidential visit by George Bush on July 10-11.  In a year of surprises, the Solidarity leadership would pull off their most daring coup when in mid-August they orchestrated a Solidarity-led coalition in the Sejm, electing Tadeusz Mazowiecki — a leading member of Solidarity — as prime minister and forming Poland’s and the Eastern Bloc’s first non-Communist government since World War II. Ultimately, Poland would be overshadowed by events in Budapest, Prague, and Berlin; however, it was the Poles that led the way for Eastern Europe’s revolutions of 1989.

From the American perspective, President George Bush has characterized American policy toward Eastern Europe during 1989 as that of a “responsible catalyst.”2  Presumably this meant that the U.S. worked to support Solidarity in its drive to become part of the Polish government, while pushing the Communists to give up their monopoly on power.  This characterization seems correct for the first half of the year.  However, shortly before the first round of elections on June 4, the U.S. switched gears from pushing for change to restricting the pace of that change.  Concerned that a radicalizing public and an increasingly anxious Communist Party could plunge an unstable Poland into chaos, Washington metamorphosed from a “responsible catalyst” to a “reluctant inhibitor.”  Thus during the crisis months of mid-1989, as Solidarity jousted with the PZPR for control of the office of president and then prime minister, Washington aired on the side of caution, working to restrict Solidarity’s push for power and attempting to insure that the Communists were not left behind.  When Solidarity made their final push for prime minister, the American’s were reluctant to take such a drastic step.  However, by that point in time there was little the U.S. could do as Solidarity took its destiny into its own hands.

Contemporary observers, as well as scholars, have tended to be critical of the Bush administration’s first six months in office, during which most foreign policy decisions were put on hold until a comprehensive policy review was completed.3  Outside of President Bush’s April 17 speech in Hamtramck, which pledged to make the process of self-determination in Eastern Europe the central test of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” as well as to give economic aid and moral support for the reforms occurring in Eastern Europe, America took no new or striking policy initiatives — prompting U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock and Anatoly Chernaev, Gorbachev’s chief foreign policy aide, to entitle the chapters in their memoirs on the first half of 1989 “Washington Fumbles” and “The Lost Year,” respectively.4  In contrast to this perspective, the U.S. Ambassador to Poland during 1989, John R. Davis, Jr., jokingly admits that he enjoyed the extra freedom of movement a lack of interest from Washington afforded him.5  However, this greater freedom did not translate into any new or proactive policy on the ground in Poland, either.     What the recently declassified cables below show is that during the first half of the year no radical policy changes were made in large measure because the Poles and Solidarity were making significant progress on their own toward fulfilling American goals. Since the declaration of martial law in December 1981, the United States had three simple and publicly acknowledged goals:  to obtain the lifting of martial law, to gain the release of all political prisoners, and to realize the resumption of an open dialogue between the Communist government, Solidarity, and the Catholic Church.  Martial law was lifted rather quickly.  But throughout the 1980’s the U.S. government worked both publicly and covertly to fund, equip, and morally support Solidarity to insure its continuing viability as a dissident voice.  The Reagan administration also utilized economic sanctions and leverage over international lending institutions as both carrot and stick to pressure the Polish government toward negotiations and compromise.  In mid-1986, the Polish government passed a resolution calling for the release of the last political prisoners in a mass amnesty, fulfilling the U.S.’s second goal.  Following miners’ strikes in the summer of 1988, Lech Walesa and Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak met secretly throughout the fall and winter of 1988 opening a Solidarity-government dialogue.  During a heated PZPR Plenum in January 1989, the Communist Party finally acquiesced to the last prerequisite for further dialogue—the willingness to discuss the re-legalization of Solidarity. Most importantly, beginning on February 6, 1989, representatives of the Communist coalition,6 the Catholic Church, and Solidarity sat down around a donut-shaped, round table to negotiate Poland’s future.  In the minds of American policy-makers in both Washington and Warsaw,7 events were progressing better than could be expected.  For the first six months of 1989, there was no need for the U.S. to change directions or push harder on the ground in Poland.

This is not to say that the embassy staff was sitting on their hands; on the contrary, they were sending some absolutely spectacular bits of reporting back to Foggy Bottom, keeping Washington extremely well informed.  Throughout the Reagan years, in spite of political roadblocks set by the Communists, John Davis and his staff worked to maintain contact and at least limited discussion with his Communist counterparts, so that by 1989 he had a healthy working relationship with the PZPR.8  More importantly, the American embassy worked to create and nurture intimate ties with the Solidarity leadership.  Throughout his tenure in Warsaw, Ambassador Davis held frequent informal gatherings—evenings ostensibly spent socializing, watching recent American movies, and eating large batches of beef stroganoff or lasagna in the ambassador’s residence—allowing members of Solidarity to meet with each other and to talk with the ambassador.  By 1989 Ambassador Davis had assumed the role of a close confidant and advisor to Solidarity’s leadership, allowing the dissidents to act as they saw fit but nonetheless offering his support and input on the most important issues when it was requested.9  More importantly, the embassy’s relationship with Solidarity’s inner circle gave American diplomats an unusually deep understanding of the situation.

This depth of understanding is evident in most of the cables from the first half of 1989, but it is perhaps best exemplified by Davis’s analysis following the signing of the Round Table Agreements.  The embassy understood what the Round Table agreements and impending free elections meant:  an overwhelming victory for Solidarity.  As Davis wrote on April 19 after returning from a 10-day trip to the U.S., “[The Communist authorities] are more likely to meet total defeat and great embarrassment.”  Surveying the mood of the PZPR, the public, and Solidarity, Davis sent back word to Washington that Solidarity would win, and win big.  While few others were openly predicting a “Solidarity sweep in the Senate,” Davis clearly saw that June 4 would be nothing but an outright victory for Solidarity.  (Document No. 1)  In retrospect, the U.S. embassy’s analysis of events in this instance, as in many others, was first rate and dead on.

In the two months between the signing of the Round Table Agreement and the first round of elections, American satisfaction was replaced with concern.  On the eve of the first round of elections, Solidarity’s impending electoral victory was no longer a cause for celebration—it became a threat to the stability of the Round Table framework.  Until this point, Washington and the embassy assumed that the elections would lead to a situation in which Solidarity and the Communists would lead jointly over the next six years with Solidarity gaining a full voice in the government only after subsequent elections—a slow transition toward political liberalization.10  In a June 2 cable, Ambassador Davis predicted a “nearly-total Solidarity victory” with the Party only winning 2 or 3 Senate seats.  For the first time since the Agreements were signed, Davis even wrote about a possible “rejection of the National List.”11  In the embassy’s analysis this type of complete victory for Solidarity was not a positive development; instead, it “threaten[ed] a sharp defensive reaction from the regime.” A Solidarity victory was now a “specter of utter catastrophe” in which the reform wing of the communist Party could be humiliated and lose its hold on power within the Party, plunging Poland into uncertainty, a military coup d’etat, or even civil war. (Document No. 2)

By the evening of June 5, even the Party had acknowledged their overwhelming defeat.  Solidarity had won 160 out of 161 Sejm seats it was eligible for, as well as, 92 seats in the Senate.  More surprisingly, only 2 of a possible 35 Party candidates on the National List received the necessary 50% of votes to be elected to the Sejm.  The specter of utter catastrophe still loomed large on the horizon, and the American embassy quickly became concerned that a crisis might ensue over the election of the new Polish president.  According to American calculations the Communist coalition would have only a two-vote majority in the National Assembly.  With expected defections by at least 10 Communist or Communist-coalition deputies, this gave Solidarity a majority.  So, “the assumed election of Wojciech Jaruzelski as president will be re-examined by many” and that “if Jaruzelski is still to be elected president, it will only be with Solidarity acquiescence if not more active support.”  Because the election of Jaruzelski as president was an unwritten assumption of the Round Table Agreements, the embassy, Washington, and many Solidarity activists correctly felt that if Solidarity reneged on this part of the deal, the whole framework of the agreement might fall apart.  Amid other signs of possible radicalization in the public sphere—Davis was particularly concerned with the low voter turn out and the public’s decision to disregard Lech Walesa’s pleas to accept the National List—it now became imperative to insure that General Jaruzelski be elected president.  In a stunning shift of policy, the Americans were now campaigning for the Communist incumbent. (Document No. 3)

In the next round of elections two weeks later, Solidarity candidates won the only Sejm seat they had not yet taken and 7 of the last 8 remaining seats in the Senate they were allowed to compete for, only strengthening the specter of a presidential crisis.  Publicly, tension continued to rise with demonstrations occurring in Krakow calling for Jaruzelski to resign from the government.  Privately, members of the PZPR leadership began to pressure American diplomats by stating that if Jaruzelski was not elected president it would effect the upcoming visit of President Bush.  Still other communist officials made it clear that “military and militia officers indicated that they would feel personally threatened if Jaruzelski were not president and would move to overturn the Round-Table and election results.”12  In direct communications between the PZPR and the Church, Kiszczak said that if Jaruzelski “was not elected president then we would be facing a further destabilization and the whole process of political transformation would have to end.  No other president would be [listened to] in the security forces and in the army.”13

In this increasingly tense situation, Ambassador Davis met over dinner on June 22 with “some leading Solidarity legislators, who had better remain nameless.”14  According to a secret cable sent the following day most Solidarity leaders felt that “if Jaruzelski is not elected president, there is a genuine danger of civil war ending . . . with a reluctant but brutal Soviet intervention.”  However, most Solidarity leaders had also pledged publicly not to vote for Jaruzelski, so they found themselves in a jam and came to Ambassador Davis looking for advice.  In a rather stunning example of the type of close, advisory position the ambassador had earned within Solidarity, Davis jotted a few numbers on the back of an embassy matchbook to explain the “arcane western political practice known as head-counting” whereby a large number of Solidarity delegates might not attend the election session.  The Solidarity delegates in attendance could then abstain from voting because the Party delegates would have such an overwhelming majority. (Document No. 4)  The U.S. embassy had moved beyond a policy of concern toward the situation and was now actively advising Solidarity on how to elect General Jaruzelski.

By the end of June with President Bush’s visit rapidly approaching, the newly elected government had not yet settled the presidential crisis.  In fact, General Jaruzelski began to show signs that he was not willing to run for election, further endangering the precarious balance.  As Davis noted in his June 23 Cable:

the General is determined that he will not ‘creep’ into the presidency.  He is understandably reluctant to face another public humiliation after the defeat of Party reformers on the National List in round one of the elections.  Consequently, Jaruzelski is doing his own head-counting and, if the numbers don’t come out right, might well decline the nomination.15

Privately, Jaruzelski voiced his reluctance to run for president during the 13th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee on June 30,16confirming Davis’s fears.     On the evening of July 9, President Bush landed in Warsaw for a two-day visit which included private meetings with General Jaruzelski and Lech Walesa, a reception at the Ambassador’s residence, and the historic opportunity to speak before the Polish parliament.  In the words of the embassy, President Bush would “find himself in the center of the world’s most pro-American country,” nearly guaranteeing that Washington’s goal of utilizing the trip to show moral support for the reform process in Poland would be a success.  On a less positive note, Davis also notes the Poles’ “hopes [for economic assistance that are] certain to exceed our capacity to deliver.” (Document No. 5)17  In the private conversation between Bush and Jaruzelski at Belwedere Palace on the morning of July 10, however, a main purpose of his trip seems to have been to push General Jaruzelski to run for president.  As President Bush recalls:

Jaruzelski opened his heart and asked me what role I thought he should now play.  He told me of his reluctance to run for president and his desire to avoid a political tug-of-war that Poland did not need.  I told him his refusal to run might inadvertently lead to serious instability and I urged him to reconsider.  It was ironic:  Here was an American president trying to persuade a senior Communist leader to run for office.18

According to others present during the meeting, President Bush may have overstated the degree to which Jaruzelski “opened up his heart,” and the actual affects this conversation had on Jaruzelski’s thoughts are a matter of interpretation.19  But, with these recently declassified documents, Bush’s motivation for pushing a senior Communist leader to run for office becomes clear — Jaruzelski was an absolutely necessary part of any new government if Poland were to remain stable.  Similarly, when in public with General Jaruzelski, Bush’s body language was very open and positive towards Jaruzelski.  Some observers have commented that Bush seemed more comfortable with Jaruzelski than he did with Walesa.  In light of the fact that the U.S. embassy had been reporting for months on the increasing radicalization of the Polish public and the fear and concern anti-Jaruzelski demonstrations caused amongst Party members, it was completely consistent for President Bush to demonstrate America’s support for Jaruzelski — anything less would have only increased criticism and upped the tension.  A week after President Bush departed Poland for Hungary, General Jaruzelski became President Jaruzelski, narrowly winning victory in the National Assembly by one vote.     Unfortunately, before President Jaruzelski was even elected, Poland was already in another crisis situation, this time surrounding the question of a prime minister and the creation of a government.  From the beginning, the U.S. embassy had assumed that the PZPR and its coalition partners would utilize their mandated majority to create a communist coalition government.  On July 3 in the midst of the presidential crisis, Adam Michnik, a leading Solidarity intellectual, proposed an agreement that would allow the PZPR to retain the presidency while a member of Solidarity would become prime minister.20  The Communists countered this offer with their own compromise to create a “grand coalition” in which PZPR delegates would maintain control over key power ministries such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  In return, Solidarity delegates would receive key positions in economic and social ministries, as well as a deputy prime minister position.

At the beginning of August, however, Walesa openly rejected the idea of a “grand coalition” government, and Bronislaw Geremek (another leading Solidarity figure) stated that the Solidarity delegates would not support Czeslaw Kiszczak for prime minister.  Moreover, Lech Walesa and Solidarity leaders began to court members of the Communist Party’s coalition partners to join a Solidarity-led coalition.  Although a few U.S. cables had mentioned the possibility of members of the Communist coalition — particularly the SD and ZSL — breaking ranks with the PZPR and voting with Solidarity,21 the reality of the situation seems to have taken Ambassador Davis by surprise.  As he recalls:

What I didn’t predict, what I couldn’t predict was that the two satellite parties would be willing to break away and form a government with Solidarity.  …  It was an item of doctrine with [the Solidarity leadership] that these were contemptible satellites that had no independent views of any kind and should never be treated as anything separate from the Party itself.  That was the general view that prevailed for many, many years.  And it misled us in the end, because [the ZSL and SD] turned out to have their own interests.  Walesa and some of his people saw this and knew how to exploit it…  It was a brilliant political maneuver.22

Walesa’s coup was effective, and by August 7 Walesa’s work had paralyzed General Kiszczak’s efforts to create a government.     Four days later on August 11, Davis met with Kiszczak as the crisis came near a breaking point.  According to the cable, Kiszczak “explained that Solidarity’s latest proposal that it take over the government in coalition with the Peasant party and Democratic Party … was unacceptable to the senior officers of the army and police and to the Czechs, East Germans, and Soviets.”  The interior minister continued, explaining that a Solidarity coalition was “regarded as breaking the deal made at the Round Table” — something the U.S. had attempted to keep alive and viable at all costs.  Kiszczak even alluded to the recent events in Tiananmen Square, but he was not worried about a Soviet military intervention, only the drastic effects Soviet economic measures could have in Poland. Later in the meeting, Ambassador Davis strongly defended the U.S. against charges that the West was behind Solidarity’s push to take control of the government; however, he seems to have taken Kiszczak’s warning about the crisis very seriously.  As the cable concluded:

The clear message conveyed was that a Solidarity government is not acceptable at this time although they are more than welcome to take over a number of ministries.  There was also the very thinly-veiled appeal to the U.S. to restrain the opposition’s thrust for power, something which is probably beyond our capacity now even if we chose to try.  I fear that food shortages and price increases here have taken the situation right to the brink and it will take all the efforts of cooler heads of both sides to avoid a crisis with unpredictable consequences. (Document No. 6)

America could no longer act as the “inhibitor,” and this worried the embassy.     As events continued on their own momentum, the embassy continued to report back to Washington but received no guidance other than “to keep all lines of communication open” between Solidarity and the PZPR. (Document No. 7)  However, Washington did take Kiszczak’s warnings23 seriously, and requested analysis from the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, regarding the probable Soviet reaction to a Solidarity-led government in Poland.  Matlock’s response was really quite remarkable.  As the cable concluded:

The Soviet response to the Polish political crisis has thus far been restrained, and barring a major misstep by Solidarity is likely to remain so.  In keeping with Soviet “new thinking” in foreign policy, a strong reaction to Polish events does not seem to be appropriate. …in the final analysis, although Solidarity may be a bitter pill to swallow, our best guess is that the Soviets will do so, if it comes to that, after much gagging and gulping.  Their essential interests in Poland will be satisfied by any regime, Solidarity-led or not, that can promote domestic stability and avoid anti-Soviet outbursts.(Document No. 8)

By Matlock’s analysis, Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking” had superceded “fraternal assistance.”  He now believed that the Soviets were willing to accept a non-Communist government in Eastern Europe, so long as that government was not anti-Soviet.  Fortunately, Lech Walesa and Solidarity had played their cards perfectly up to this point to sooth Soviet fears by publicly stating that they would not leave the Warsaw Pact, and by recognizing the importance of a continued, positive Polish-Soviet relationship.  Most importantly, in this August 16, 1989 cable, the embassy in Moscow realized that the Soviet’s trump card in Eastern Europe — military intervention — would no longer be used.  Matlock understood that the Brezhnev Doctrine was dead, and the Cold War would not last much longer.     With reassurances from Moscow that the situation was not as dire as Kiszczak had made it out to be, the embassy in Warsaw took no new action.  They continued to worry about the outcome; however, it is clear that the Solidarity leadership was now exclusively in control of its own destiny and was no longer turning towards their friends in the American embassy for advice.  By August 19 an agreement had been reached for a Solidarity prime minister to create a coalition government with ministers from Solidarity, the SD, the ZSL, and the PZPR.24  (Document No. 9)  The crisis officially ended on August 24 when Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a long-time Solidarity leader, was confirmed by the Sejm as prime minister and charged to create a government.  With that, Poland peacefully ended nearly a half-century of Communist rule.

In terms of American policy, Ambassador Davis had successfully fulfilled the political tasks assigned to him and he requested new orders. (Document No. 10a) Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger responded, “Your next task is to promote and ensure the realization of economic prosperity in Poland, to include stable growth, full employment, low inflation, high productivity and a Mercedes (or equivalent) in every garage.” (Document No. 10b)  Although Eagleberger’s comments do not lack sarcasm, they are indicative of a fundamental change in American policy.  For the entirety of the Cold War, the U.S. sought to promote free elections in Eastern Europe and see a popularly elected, democratic government take control.  Poland succeeded first, and a major—if not the major—prerequisite condition of the Cold War in Europe ceased to exist.  American policy was no longer to end Soviet domination and Communist control of Poland, but to take the next step to promote its economic growth and reintroduce Poland into Europe.  On August 24, the Cold War ended in Poland — the rest of Eastern Europe would not be far off.

Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

Document 1
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Election ’89:  The Year of Solidarity,” April 19, 1989.

Document 2
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Election ’89: Solidarity’s Coming Victory:  Big or Too Big?,” June 2, 1989.

Document 3
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Election ’89:  Solidarity’s Victory Raises Questions,” June 6, 1989.

Document 4
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “How to Elect Jaruzelski without Voting for Him, and Will He Run?,” June 23, 1989.

Document 5
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Poland Looks to President Bush,” June 27, 1989.

Document 6
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Conversation with General Kiszczak,” August 11, 1989.

Document 7
Cable from Secstate to Warsaw, “Solidarity-Government Dialogue,” August 12, 1989.

Document 8
Cable from Moscow to Secstate, “If Solidarity Takes Charge, What Will the Soviets Do?,” August 16, 1989.

Document 9
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Bronislaw Geremek Explains Next Steps Toward a Solidarity Government,” August 19, 1989.

Documents 10a & 10b
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Request for Instructions,” August 24, 1989; and Cable from Secstate to Warsaw, “Ambassador’s Instructions,” August 24, 1989.

Notes

1.  Source Note:  Tom Blanton, director of the National Security Archive, filed the original Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request that the cables referred to in this essay were declassified in response to, as part of a larger, international study of the end of the Cold War.  These studies culminated in three critical oral history conferences held in Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw in the summer and fall of 1999.  Context for analyzing these documents comes from the conference sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies (Warsaw), the National Security Archive, and the Cold War International History Project, and held in Miedzezyn-Warsaw, Poland in October 1999.  A compendium of documents compiled for that conference was also essential in the author’s analysis:  Tom Blanton and Malcolm Byrne, ed., Poland 1986-1989:  The End of the System (Washington, D.C.:  The National Security Archive, 1999); hereafter referred to as Compendium.
This electronic briefing book is also part of a larger Master’s thesis project on U.S. policy toward Poland from 1986-1989.

2.  George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 117.

3.  Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.:  Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997).

4.  Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, trans. by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (State College, P.A.:  Penn State Press, 2000), pp. 201-232; Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy of an Empire (New York:  Random House, 1995), pp. 177-200.

5.  Author’s interview with John R. Davis, Jr. (U.S. Charge d’Affaires ad interim to Poland 1983-1987, U.S. Charge d’Affaires to Poland 1987-1988, U.S. Ambassador to Poland 1988-1990), November 23, 1999.

6.  The government in Poland consisted of politicians from a number of parties including the PZPR, the Democratic Party (SD), and the United Peasants’ Party (ZSL).  These parties worked together in a PZPR-dominated coalition.

7.  Davis interview, November 23, 1999; and author’s interview with Thomas W. Simons (Assistant Secretary of State for the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia, 1986-1989), July 7, 2000.

8.  See Document No. 8.

9.  See Document No. 6.

10.  Hutchings, p. 64.

11.  The “National List” was a grouping of leading Party officials who ran unopposed on the ballot.  In order to be elected, these candidates need only receive 50% of the vote.

12.  Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, ” Politburo Member Warns that U.S. has been ‘Dragged into the War’ over Election of Jaruzelski as President,” June 16, 1989. (Not reproduced here.)

13.  Compendium, “Chronology,” p. 20.

14.  Unfortunately, Ambassador Davis does not recall which legislators these were.  Author’s interview with Davis, October 5, 2000.

15.  See Document No. 6.

16.  Compendium, “Chronology,” p. 21.

17.  Unfortunately, the cable traffic from July 1989 has not yet been declassified, so this document offers the best, however incomplete, analysis of the build-up for the President’s trip.  A FOIA request is pending for these July cables.

18.  A World Transformed, p. 117.

19.  Author’s interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

20.  See Adam Michnik, “Your President, Our Prime Minister,” Gazetta Wyborcza, July 5, 1989.

21.  See Document No. 5; and cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Peasants’ Party Loosening Its Bonds with PZPR,” June 16, 1989. (Not reproduced here.)

22.  Author’s interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

23.  It should be noted that on August 12, the Polish charge in Washington met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Curtis W. Kamman to pass on a similar message of impending crisis. Cable from Secstate to Warsaw, “Polish Charge Krystosik’s 812 Call on EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Kamman,” August 12, 1989.

24.  In Document 9, it is interesting to note the emphasis put on the positive role President Jaruzelski played in the process and the fact that the Mazowiecki government was basically a grand coalition.  The “cooler heads of both sides” did prevail.

TOP-SECRET: The Velvet Revolution Declassified

Washington, D.C., August 20,  2011 – Fifteen years ago today, a modest, officially sanctioned student demonstration in Prague spontaneously grew into a major outburst of popular revulsion toward the ruling Communist regime. At that point the largest protest in 20 years, the demonstrations helped to spark the Velvet Revolution that brought down communism in Czechoslovakia and put dissident playwright Václav Havel in the Presidential Palace.

The November 17, 1989 march commemorated a student leader, Jan Opletal, who was killed by Nazi occupiers 50 years before, but quickly took on a starkly anti-regime character with calls of “Jakeš into the wastebasket,” referring to the communist party general secretary, and demands for free elections. The authorities used blunt force to disperse the students, injuring scores of people including several foreign journalists. Hundreds were arrested.

The result was more demonstrations over the next three days that completely exposed the bankruptcy of the regime. Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution soon joined the historic chain of events begun with Poland’s roundtable talks and elections, Hungary’s reintroduction of a multi-party system, and just a week before the Prague protests, the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Now a new joint English-Czech edition volume has been published in Prague which tells the extraordinary tale of the revolution. The volume is entitled Prague-Washington-Prague: Reports from the United States Embassy in Czechoslovakia, November-December 1989. What sets this volume apart from other accounts is that it is a compilation of recently declassified U.S. State Department cable traffic from the period. Released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the non-governmental National Security Archive, the cables not only provide quite accurate reporting of the unfolding events but offer insights into U.S. thinking at the time, including how the first demonstrations on this date in 1989 completely surprised American officials and forced them to dramatically revise their estimates on the survivability of the Communist regime in Prague.

Of particular note, this new volume is the first publication of the Václav Havel Library, which is still in the process of being formed. (Its website, currently being developed, offers further information about the book.)

The book’s editor, Vilém Precan, is a long-time partner of the National Security Archive who has been instrumental in bringing new documentation to light and organizing international conferences on the hidden history of Czechoslovakia and the Cold War. As indicated by Radio Prague, the international service of Czech Radio, Dr. Precan “worked untiringly with the National Security Archive … to have the documents released.”

From the book’s Introduction: “It is unusual for documents related to diplomacy to be published so soon after their having been written … That the set of documents published in this volume got into the hands of independent historians so soon after their having originated is thanks to an American nongovernmental institution with a name that will probably mean little to the layman and might even be confusing. That institution is the National Security Archive. It was established to gather and publish documents that have been declassified on the basis of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) …. The [Archive] has been more than successful in achieving this aim.”

From Vilém Precan’s Acknowledgements: “This volume is the result of the work of many people, whom I as Editor now wish to thank. First and foremost I express my gratitude to my friends and colleagues at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C.: Tom Blanton, Catherine Nielsen, Svetlana Savranskaya, and Sue Bechtel, owing to whose efforts the telegrams were made available to independent researchers and were passed on to Prague, and who were of great assistance to me while I was working in Washington. ”

Note about the book cover: Václav Bartuska, the director of the Havel Library, made the following comment: The photograph “is from the meeting where the transition of power from commies to Civic Forum was discussed … The back of the man you see at the bottom of the picture belongs to … guess whom … I liked this idea of having Václav Havel there right at the centre of all things, yet not visible at first. I think this had been his place for a long time.”

Why was the revolution non-violent? One of the many subplots of the new compilation is the fact that, despite the authorities’ initial use of force to break up the November demonstrations, the Velvet Revolution and similar events in other East European states (with the notable exception of Romania) were allowed to take place without Moscow resorting to bloody repression to keep its clients in power. An earlier National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book from 1999 also explores this topic in some detail, drawing on declassified records from a range of Russian and East European archives.

The spontaneous eruption of student protests in Prague instantly recalled to the minds of U.S. embassy staff (as indicated in cables included in this briefing book) earlier demonstrations in Eastern Europe, such as in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia on the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion of 1968. In that context, readers should note that some of the materials in the new Havel Library volume are also to become part of an acclaimed book series published by Central European University Press under the rubric, The National Security Archive Cold War Reader Series. This series comprises volumes of once-secret documentation from the former Soviet bloc and the West on each of the major upheavals in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. The series will feature a special emphasis on the revolutions of 1989 with separate volumes on Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Titles already in print or at the publishers include:

The Prague Spring 1968, edited by Járomír Navrátil et al (1998)
“I am happy that the cooperation between the National Security Archive in Washington and the Czech foundation, Prague Spring 1968, has resulted in this voluminous collection of documents.” – Václav Havel

Uprising in East Germany, 1953, edited by Christian Ostermann (2001)
“This excellent collection of documents pulls together what’s been learned about [the uprising] since the Cold War … It is an indispensable new source for the study of Cold War history.” – John Lewis Gaddis

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, edited by Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne and János Rainer (2002)
“There is no publication, in any language, that would even approach the thoroughness, reliability, and novelty of this monumental work.” – István Deák

A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, edited by Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (Forthcoming, 2005)

Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.Document No. 1: Confidential Cable #08082 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Brutal Suppression of Czech Students’ Demonstration,” November 18, 1989, 14:18Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 2: Unclassified Cable #08087 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Embassy Protest of Attack on American Journalists during November 17-19 Demonstrations in Prague,” November 20, 1989, 12:20Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 3: Confidential Cable #08097 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Demonstrations Continue Over Weekend in Prague,” November 20, 1989, 12:42Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 4: Unclassified Cable #08106 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Czechoslovak Press Coverage of Demonstration Aftermath Shows Contradictory Lines,” November 20, 1989, 16:48Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 5: Limited Official Use Cable from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Czechoslovak Independents Establish New Organization and List Agenda of Demands,” November 20, 1989, 16:52Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 6: Confidential Cable #08109 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “American Woman’s Account of November 17 Demonstration and the Death of a Czech Student,” November 20, 1989, 16:54Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 7: Confidential Cable #08110 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Popular and Soviet Pressure for Reform Converge on the Jakes Leadership,” November 20, 1989, 16:57Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 8: Confidential Cable #08144 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Demonstrations in Prague and Other Czechoslovak Cities November 20,” November 21, 1989, 15:20Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 9: Confidential Cable #08153 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Student Strike Situation Report,” November 21, 1989, 18:59Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 10: Confidential Cable #08155 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Morning Demonstration at Wenceslas Square: Overheard Conversations,” November 21, 1989, 19:01Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Contents of this website Copyright 1995-2004 National Security Archive. All rights r

TOP-SECRET: The Velvet Revolution Declassified

Washington, D.C., August 18, 2011 – Fifteen years ago today, a modest, officially sanctioned student demonstration in Prague spontaneously grew into a major outburst of popular revulsion toward the ruling Communist regime. At that point the largest protest in 20 years, the demonstrations helped to spark the Velvet Revolution that brought down communism in Czechoslovakia and put dissident playwright Václav Havel in the Presidential Palace.

The November 17, 1989 march commemorated a student leader, Jan Opletal, who was killed by Nazi occupiers 50 years before, but quickly took on a starkly anti-regime character with calls of “Jakeš into the wastebasket,” referring to the communist party general secretary, and demands for free elections. The authorities used blunt force to disperse the students, injuring scores of people including several foreign journalists. Hundreds were arrested.

The result was more demonstrations over the next three days that completely exposed the bankruptcy of the regime. Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution soon joined the historic chain of events begun with Poland’s roundtable talks and elections, Hungary’s reintroduction of a multi-party system, and just a week before the Prague protests, the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Now a new joint English-Czech edition volume has been published in Prague which tells the extraordinary tale of the revolution. The volume is entitled Prague-Washington-Prague: Reports from the United States Embassy in Czechoslovakia, November-December 1989. What sets this volume apart from other accounts is that it is a compilation of recently declassified U.S. State Department cable traffic from the period. Released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the non-governmental National Security Archive, the cables not only provide quite accurate reporting of the unfolding events but offer insights into U.S. thinking at the time, including how the first demonstrations on this date in 1989 completely surprised American officials and forced them to dramatically revise their estimates on the survivability of the Communist regime in Prague.

Of particular note, this new volume is the first publication of the Václav Havel Library, which is still in the process of being formed. (Its website, currently being developed, offers further information about the book.)

The book’s editor, Vilém Precan, is a long-time partner of the National Security Archive who has been instrumental in bringing new documentation to light and organizing international conferences on the hidden history of Czechoslovakia and the Cold War. As indicated by Radio Prague, the international service of Czech Radio, Dr. Precan “worked untiringly with the National Security Archive … to have the documents released.”

From the book’s Introduction: “It is unusual for documents related to diplomacy to be published so soon after their having been written … That the set of documents published in this volume got into the hands of independent historians so soon after their having originated is thanks to an American nongovernmental institution with a name that will probably mean little to the layman and might even be confusing. That institution is the National Security Archive. It was established to gather and publish documents that have been declassified on the basis of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) …. The [Archive] has been more than successful in achieving this aim.”

From Vilém Precan’s Acknowledgements: “This volume is the result of the work of many people, whom I as Editor now wish to thank. First and foremost I express my gratitude to my friends and colleagues at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C.: Tom Blanton, Catherine Nielsen, Svetlana Savranskaya, and Sue Bechtel, owing to whose efforts the telegrams were made available to independent researchers and were passed on to Prague, and who were of great assistance to me while I was working in Washington. ”

Note about the book cover: Václav Bartuska, the director of the Havel Library, made the following comment: The photograph “is from the meeting where the transition of power from commies to Civic Forum was discussed … The back of the man you see at the bottom of the picture belongs to … guess whom … I liked this idea of having Václav Havel there right at the centre of all things, yet not visible at first. I think this had been his place for a long time.”

Why was the revolution non-violent? One of the many subplots of the new compilation is the fact that, despite the authorities’ initial use of force to break up the November demonstrations, the Velvet Revolution and similar events in other East European states (with the notable exception of Romania) were allowed to take place without Moscow resorting to bloody repression to keep its clients in power. An earlier National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book from 1999 also explores this topic in some detail, drawing on declassified records from a range of Russian and East European archives.

The spontaneous eruption of student protests in Prague instantly recalled to the minds of U.S. embassy staff (as indicated in cables included in this briefing book) earlier demonstrations in Eastern Europe, such as in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia on the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion of 1968. In that context, readers should note that some of the materials in the new Havel Library volume are also to become part of an acclaimed book series published by Central European University Press under the rubric, The National Security Archive Cold War Reader Series. This series comprises volumes of once-secret documentation from the former Soviet bloc and the West on each of the major upheavals in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. The series will feature a special emphasis on the revolutions of 1989 with separate volumes on Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Titles already in print or at the publishers include:

The Prague Spring 1968, edited by Járomír Navrátil et al (1998)
“I am happy that the cooperation between the National Security Archive in Washington and the Czech foundation, Prague Spring 1968, has resulted in this voluminous collection of documents.” – Václav Havel

Uprising in East Germany, 1953, edited by Christian Ostermann (2001)
“This excellent collection of documents pulls together what’s been learned about [the uprising] since the Cold War … It is an indispensable new source for the study of Cold War history.” – John Lewis Gaddis

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, edited by Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne and János Rainer (2002)
“There is no publication, in any language, that would even approach the thoroughness, reliability, and novelty of this monumental work.” – István Deák

A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, edited by Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (Forthcoming, 2005)

Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.Document No. 1: Confidential Cable #08082 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Brutal Suppression of Czech Students’ Demonstration,” November 18, 1989, 14:18Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 2: Unclassified Cable #08087 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Embassy Protest of Attack on American Journalists during November 17-19 Demonstrations in Prague,” November 20, 1989, 12:20Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 3: Confidential Cable #08097 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Demonstrations Continue Over Weekend in Prague,” November 20, 1989, 12:42Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 4: Unclassified Cable #08106 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Czechoslovak Press Coverage of Demonstration Aftermath Shows Contradictory Lines,” November 20, 1989, 16:48Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 5: Limited Official Use Cable from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Czechoslovak Independents Establish New Organization and List Agenda of Demands,” November 20, 1989, 16:52Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 6: Confidential Cable #08109 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “American Woman’s Account of November 17 Demonstration and the Death of a Czech Student,” November 20, 1989, 16:54Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 7: Confidential Cable #08110 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Popular and Soviet Pressure for Reform Converge on the Jakes Leadership,” November 20, 1989, 16:57Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 8: Confidential Cable #08144 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Demonstrations in Prague and Other Czechoslovak Cities November 20,” November 21, 1989, 15:20Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 9: Confidential Cable #08153 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Student Strike Situation Report,” November 21, 1989, 18:59Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 10: Confidential Cable #08155 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Morning Demonstration at Wenceslas Square: Overheard Conversations,” November 21, 1989, 19:01Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

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TOP-SECRET: KISSINGER CONSPIRED WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO KEEP SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE DARK

Henry Kissinger and Anatoly Dobrynin in the Map Room at the White House, March 17, 1972 (Source: Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972


The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow
Edited by William Burr

Washington, DC, August 17, 2011 – Then-national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger colluded with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to keep the U.S. Secretary of State in the dark about ongoing secret discussions between the Soviets and the Nixon White House, according to newly released Soviet-era documents, released last week by the Department of State.

In February 1972, with the Moscow summit approaching, Kissinger met with Soviet ambassador Dobrynin, who was scheduled to meet with Secretary of State William Rogers, to talk about what the Secretary knew and did not know about “the state of U.S.-Soviet relations.” Commenting on the meeting in his memorandum of conversation forwarded to Moscow, Dobrynin observed that it was a “unique situation when the Special Assistant to the President secretly informs a foreign ambassador about what the Secretary of State knows and does not know.” This memorandum appears for the first time in an extraordinary State Department collection of U.S. and Soviet documents on the Dobrynin-Kissinger meetings, produced through a U.S.-Russian cooperative effort, with selections posted on-line today by the National Security Archive.

On October 22, 2007, the State Department’s Office of the Historian released Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972, edited by David C. Geyer and Douglas E. Selvage. Over a thousand pages long with 380 documents and introductions by Dobrynin and Kissinger, this volume (initially released in CD form by the office of the historian) includes the most secret and sensitive U.S.-Soviet exchanges of the superpower détente, the so-called “back channel” or “confidential channel” Dobrynin-Kissinger meetings. (Note 1) Besides Kissinger’s records of his meetings with Dobrynin, which had already been declassified, this extraordinary volume includes translations of previously secret cables and memoranda of conversations reporting on Dobrynin’s meetings with Kissinger as well as President Richard Nixon. Simultaneously, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s History and Records Department is publishing a Russian language edition of the documents under the title, Sovetsko-Amerikanskie Otnosheniia: Gody Razriadki, 1969-1976, Tom I, 1969-Mai 1972. The Foreign Ministry will release this volume in a few weeks, during a conference in Moscow. (Note 2) A successor U.S.-Russian volume, covering 1972-1976, is now in the planning stages.

What made this remarkable publication possible is the superb cooperation of the Russian Republic’s Foreign Ministry, which provided unmatched access to its formerly classified files. This cooperative effort began with a letter, shepherded by Douglas E. Selvage through the State Department bureaucracy, from former Secretary of State Colin Powell to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov suggesting a joint historical volume on the U.S.-Soviet détente. Frustrated by the problem of access to détente-era Soviet diplomatic records, interested diplomatic historians, in particular National Security Archive fellows James Hershberg of George Washington University and Vladislav Zubok of Temple University, played a significant role in encouraging this high-level approach to the Foreign Ministry (Zubok also reviewed the translations). The volume’s detailed introduction explains how the project unfolded under the general direction of Marc J. Susser, the Historian, U.S. Department of State, and Piotr V. Stegny, Aleksandr A. Churillin, and Konstantin A. Provalov, successive directors of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs History and Records Department.

The Russian Foreign Ministry provided more documents than could be used, but the volume includes detailed annotations, completed by lead editor David C. Geyer, based on many of the unpublished documents. Scholars with Russian language skills will be interested to know that copies of all of the documents declassified by the Foreign Ministry will become available for research at the U.S. National Archives (a parallel collection will be available at the Archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry).

During a State Department conference held on October 22-23 to announce the publication of the volume, a number of the participants emphasized that what made it especially significant was 1) that is now possible to make side-by-side comparisons of records of the same Dobrynin-Kissinger meeting, and 2) that Dobrynin often prepared the only records of a number of his talks with Kissinger. Indeed, Dobrynin’s high-quality accounts of the meetings are often far more detailed, not only providing more on the context and atmosphere (which Kissinger sometimes did), but also recounting statements not mentioned in Kissinger’s versions, for example, on sensitive domestic political matters.  What explains this difference is that participating in and documenting his meetings with Kissinger and Nixon was Dobrynin’s full-time responsibility; the Foreign Ministry and the Politburo wanted the most comprehensive reports possible. By contrast, Kissinger met with Nixon almost every weekday and could brief him personally about the meetings, without providing highly-detailed reports; moreover, as he became responsible for more and more problems, Kissinger had less time to sit down and dictate his account of the meetings. (Note 3) For example, during the crucial April-May 1972 period, when North Vietnam launched a major offensive and the U.S.-Soviet summit was impending, Dobrynin prepared the only record of some of the discussions. That Dobrynin’s reports are now available makes it possible to look at the back channel meetings and superpower détente generally from an entirely fresh perspective.

Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972 is not yet available in print form yet or on-line, but the Office of the Historian released a special CD with the volume on it. To give interested readers a flavor of the material, the National Security Archive is publishing on its Web site some illuminating examples of the new documents. This sampling includes:

  • a unique record of Dobrynin’s first “one-on-one” back-channel meeting with Kissinger,
  • accounts of Kissinger’s September 1970 demarche to Kissinger on the Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba,
  • Nixon’s unsuccessful attempt to discourage the Soviet leadership from meeting with Democratic presidential aspirant Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Me) to preserve the White House’s political advantages,
  • Dobrynin’s initial reactions—from the notion that Beijing and Washington would exploit the “factor of U.S.-Chinese relations in order to exert pressure on us,” to the disclosure of Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to China in July 1971,
  • Kissinger’s briefing to Dobrynin on what he should and should not tell Secretary of State Rogers about more sensitive issues that only Nixon and Kissinger had discussed with the Soviets
  • initial White House and Soviet reactions to the North Vietnamese 1972 Spring Offensive,
  • and Dobrynin’s mistaken estimate that the pressures for a successful summit would hold Nixon back from approving major military action against Hanoi during the spring of 1972.

Read the Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

Selected Documents from Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972

 

Document 8:  Their First “One-on-One”: Dobrynin’s record of meeting with Kissinger, 21 February 1969, pp. 20-25

In an earlier meeting with Dobrynin, Nixon established arrangements for the Ambassador and Kissinger to hold private meetings, without the knowledge of the State Department (which Nixon despised) to discuss matters of mutual concern.  Flowing from Nixon’s publicly declared emphasis on the need for an “era of negotiations”, the new president wanted to find ways to mitigate, if not prevent, clashes between the nuclear-armed superpowers. This conversation, for which Dobrynin prepared the sole record, covered a wide range of issues: Middle East, European security, Berlin, Vietnam, China, arms control, signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations (including possible summit meeting). Of special interest are Kissinger’s general assurances concerning the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.  He said that Nixon “would like to assure the Soviet Government that … he does not have the slightest intention of intervening in the affairs of Eastern Europe.” Moreover, Dobrynin reported that Kissinger “intimated–although he did not say outright–that they favor maintaining the postwar borders in Europe.” Certainly, the Nixon administration never made an iron-clad pledge as to the inviolability of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, but Kissinger’s first assurance suggests that his statement in the introduction to the volume, that the White House never made assurances “with respect to the internal conditions in Eastern Europe,” needs some qualification. On possible U.S. relations with China, Kissinger mentioned that attempts to hold talks with Chinese diplomats in Warsaw had failed, but that Washington remained interested in holding talks in the future. The United States wanted to have talks with Beijing, Moscow’s major enemy, not from an “unfriendly designs” against the Soviet Union but from a “natural desire” for better relations with China.

Document 22: “A Reasonable Interval”: Dobrynin record of meeting with Kissinger and Nixon, 14 May 1969, pp. 59-62

In another unique record, Dobrynin reported on a meeting with Kissinger and Nixon in the latter’s White House living quarters.  After some brief discussion of the Middle East, the aftermath of the North Korean shoot-down of the U.S. EC-121, and arms control, Nixon turned to Vietnam, which was the subject of a TV address he was going to make that evening. During Nixon’s briefing on his speech, he argued that North Vietnamese diplomats refused to negotiate seriously because they believed that “time will work against” Nixon and “that he will ultimately have to give in, mainly owing to pressure from public opinion.” Nixon, however, believed that if the North Vietnamese did not change their tack and become more responsive to U.S. negotiating positions, he could convince the American public on the “need for ‘other measures’”, implicitly massive bombing strikes to coerce North Vietnam. Nixon’s veiled threats provide an example of the “madman theory”–the threat of disproportionate force–at work. While Nixon and Kissinger would not accept North Vietnam’s proposal for a coalition government, during the conversation before the meeting with Nixon, Kissinger showed considerable flexibility about the ultimate outcome of the war. He told Dobrynin that he was “prepared to accept any political system in South Vietnam, ‘provided there is a fairly reasonable interval between conclusion of an agreement and [the establishment of] such a system.” Implicitly, even if South Vietnam became a Communist regime, that would be acceptable as long as there was a “reasonable interval” after the U.S. military withdrawal.

Documents 31-34: “The War in Vietnam is the Main Obstacle”: Dobrynin and Kissinger records of meeting with Nixon, 20 October 1969, pp. 90-97

During the summer and fall of 1969, frustrated with the slowness of the Paris talks and convinced that Moscow was not doing enough to get Hanoi to settle, the Nixon administration continued to follow the madman approach by carrying out a campaign of threats to escalate the Vietnam War by striking North Vietnam. Not long after warning Dobrynin in late September that the “train was leaving the station,” Nixon and Kissinger ordered a low-level secret alert of strategic and conventional forces, not to “alarm” the Soviets but to “jar” them into a more cooperative frame of mind.  While the Soviets never mentioned the alert to the Nixon administration, they were also unhappy with the way that the U.S.-Soviet relationship was developing and the leadership tasked Dobrynin to convey those misgivings directly to President Nixon. Both Dobrynin and Kissinger created records of this key meeting, although the farmer’s account is substantially more detailed on Vietnam and the Middle East, but also on the atmospherics.

During the meeting, Dobrynin read a statement from the Soviet leadership, which maintained that U.S. positions on European security, the Middle East, China, and Vietnam “ran counter to [its] declarations in favor of improving relations.” According to Dobrynin, the leadership’s critique made Nixon nervous, but he “pulled himself together” and gave a calm and clear response, outlining his thinking on a number of issues.

While the Soviets had objected to U.S. implied threats against Hanoi, Nixon declared that the Soviets would not “break him” and that “if the Soviet Union does not want to provide any assistance now in settling the Vietnam conflict, the United States will go its own way, using its own methods and taking the appropriate steps.” One of Dobrynin’s conclusions was that “the fate of his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, is beginning to really worry [Nixon].”


Documents 82-84: “A Turning Point in their Relationship”: Kissinger and Dobrynin records of meetings, 25 September 1970, pp. 191-197

During late September 1970, the Jordan crisis, the Soviet construction of a naval base in Cienfuegos, Cuba, and elections in Chile preoccupied the Nixon Administration. These documents begin with discussion of a summit meeting as well as problems raised by the Syrian invasion of Jordan, with Kissinger concerned about Moscow’s relations with Damascus and Dobrynin worried about U.S. military preparations. Later in the day, after a Pentagon press officer had mistakenly disclosed Soviet activities at Cienfuegos, the talks became more difficult when Kissinger, according to his record, declared that “we would view it with utmost gravity if construction [of the submarine base] continued” and that the “installation [had been] completed with maximum deception.” He also reportedly told Dobrynin that Moscow and Washington had “reached a turning point in their relationship” and that “it is now up to the Soviets whether to go the hard route—whether it wanted to go the route of conciliation or the route of confrontation.” Interestingly, Dobrynin’s version does not cite Kissinger’s language about “turning point” or “hard route” (or “deception”). It is difficult to believe (although not inconceivable) that Dobrynin, who appears to have been most careful about sending detailed accounts of his meetings, would not have mentioned this. Kissinger, however, may have wanted to include some tough language in the record to satisfy the more confrontational Nixon.


Documents 104 and 105: “Get Beyond the Immediate Irritations”: Kissinger and Dobrynin records of meeting, 22 December 1970, pp. 241-248

During what Kissinger called a “cordial” luncheon, Dobrynin and Kissinger discussed the recent publication of Khrushchev’s memoirs and Soviet naval activities in Cuba, and the general problem of “worsening U.S.-Soviet relations,” including continued disagreements over the Middle East and Vietnam, and what could be done to improve the situation. Both agreed that the impasse had to be broken and that a meeting in early January could be used to advance positions on SALT, the Middle East, and Vietnam. While Kissinger’s version is fuller than Dobrynin (probably one of the few instances where this is so), the latter’s account provides interesting detail on Kissinger’s mood, e.g., that he “was on the defensive during the conversation.” Thus, Kissinger became “noticeably agitated” after Dobyrnin told him that both he and the Soviet leadership believed that despite their many talks we’re not getting anywhere.” Also unmentioned in Kissinger’s account is his apparent irritation over the fact that the head of the Soviet SALT Delegation had leaked to his U.S. counterpart information on the highly secret back channel U.S.-Soviet discussions of a summit, information which Kissinger had thought was held by only a handful of people.


Documents 106 and 107: “All the More Fitting to Receive Senator Muskie in Moscow”: Kissinger and Dobrynin records of telephone conversation, 24 December 1970, pp. 248-251

A few days later, during a phone conversation Kissinger obliquely raised a very delicate matter on Nixon’s behalf: the possibility that Democratic Party aspirants for the presidency would visit the Soviet Union to advance their causes. This was a reference to Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Me), who was planning to visit the Soviet Union. Nixon did not want Muskie or other Democrats to get any advantages from such trips and Kissinger suggested that the Soviets do what they had done with Nixon in 1967, not schedule meetings with senior officials. After Dobrynin observed that Nixon had not asked to meet with Soviet leaders during his visit as a “tourist” and “went on to ask what Nixon’s reaction would have been if the President at that time had advised us not to meet with him in Moscow,” Kissinger soon changed the subject. This intervention backfired. In his reporting message, Dobrynin advised Moscow that, given Nixon’s concerns, “it would be all the more fitting to receive Senator Muskie in Moscow,” and that Moscow should not discourage such visits because they could “be a fairly important instrument for pressuring” Nixon.


Documents 109 and 110: “All that Realistically Remains is Just 1971”: Kissinger and Dobrynin records of meeting, 9 January 1971, pp. 257-263

During a meeting on 9 January 1971, Dobrynin and Kissinger began breaking the ice by taking new positions on issues that had troubled U.S-Soviet relations.  Kissinger took an important initiative by suggesting compromise proposals on Berlin and SALT; the latter would include a separate ABM agreement as well as a “freeze” of ICBM deployments. Kissinger also proposed new efforts to work with the Soviets in laying the “ground-work for a settlement” in the Middle East as well as new approaches to the Vietnam problem, for example, the U.S. would no longer insist on the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam. Dobrynin’s version includes highly significant detail not covered in Kissinger’s account, such as the latter’s presentation of Nixon’s view on the interrelationship between the election cycle and U.S.-Soviet negotiations. According to Kissinger, because of electoral preoccupations during 1972, “all that realistically remains is just 1971, which essentially will be decisive in regard to whether the two countries will manage to [resolve] major international issues.”

On Vietnam, Kissinger expressed renewed interest in the possibility of a “decent interval” solution (although he did not use the term); once Washington reached a military agreement with Hanoi, the Vietnamese would have to make their own political settlement. Then “it will no longer be [the Americans’] concern, but that of the Vietnamese themselves if some time after the U.S. troop withdrawal they start fighting with each other again.” “If a war does break out again between North and South Vietnam, it will be a lengthy affair, and … will obviously ‘spill over’ into the period after the Nixon administration has left office.”


Document 122: “The State Department has … Been Generally Sidelined”: Telegram from Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, 14 February 1971, pp. 293-296

This fascinating cable gives Dobrynin’s appraisal of the significance of the back channel, the interrelationships of the various pending negotiations, White House strategy, and ways and means for Moscow to exert pressure on the White House to realize Soviet diplomatic objectives.  Dobrynin believed that Nixon’s chief goal was a summit meeting and SALT agreement that would be “in hand” when a summit took place, but that the White House was less interested in a Berlin agreement. Because that was a greater priority for Moscow, Nixon could not be too negative on the Berlin talks without making “it more difficult to secure our final consent to a summit meeting,” but couldn’t be too positive either because the prospect of a Berlin agreement served for the U.S. as a “kind of guarantee of a summit.” Dobrynin thought that Nixon and Kissinger wanted to use the back-channel to reach “agreement in principle” before use diplomatic channel for more detailed agreements, but until that happened they wanted to keep the talks secret before the “outcome of the dialogue is itself clear.” This meant that the State Department was “sidelined” but it also meant that the Dobrynin-Kissinger talks unfolded on a high level of generality. According to Dobrynin, Kissinger “is noticeably apprehensive about getting into a discussion of details … lest he be ‘caught flat-footed’ without professional expertise on these matters.” Over the years, historians and critics have argued that this was one of the flaws of Kissinger’s conduct of the back-channel.  While Dobrynin could rely on Foreign Ministry experts, who were aware of the secret talks, Kissinger would not discuss them with State Department officials, who could have helped him avoid some pitfalls during the SALT talks (e.g., Kissinger’s initial commitment to exclude SLBMs from the strategic forces “freeze”, which caused great complications later on).


Documents 177-180:  “The Americans and the Chinese Will Intensify their Game”: Dobrynin cable on U.S.-China rapprochement and Kissinger and Dobrynin records of meeting, 19 July 1971, pp. 401-414

One of the stunning events in Cold War history, Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 had the impact on the Soviet Union that Nixon and Kissinger, and no doubt Mao Zedong, had sought: it made the Soviets more worried than ever about the prospect and possibility that Beijing and Washington would exaggerate and exploit the “factor of U.S.-Chinese relations in order to exert pressure on us.”  Soon after Nixon’s announcement of his forthcoming trip to China, Dobrynin sent the Foreign Ministry an analysis of the new U.S.-China relationship, the strategic and political considerations that underlay the new U.S. policy, and the possible Soviet response. While Dobrynin thought it important that Moscow continue its “current policy” toward the United States, he believed it “important that we give Washington no reason to believe that … we might make concessions under the influence of the ‘Chinese’ factor.” Two days after he sent the cable, Dobrynin met with Kissinger, at the suggestion of the latter so that he could “get a feeling for Dobrynin’s attitude.”

Dobrynin’s record of the meeting is typically more detailed and at one interesting point it contradicts Kissinger’s account: according to the latter, Dobrynin “asked” for a briefing, but according to Dobrynin, Kissinger brought up China himself because he was “impatiently waiting for me to ask many questions.” Whatever Dobrynin actually said, his version shows Kissinger providing more information and observations on the substance of the discussions in Beijing. For example, Kissinger could not resist discussing Zhou En-lai who, Dobrynin observed, had “made quite a strong impression on him.”  Kissinger also discussed the difficulties raised by the U.S. relationship with Taiwan and gave his assessment of Beijing’s thinking about nuclear strategy. Kissinger believed that Chinese “backwardness” on nuclear issues was “due to the still very great shortcomings in China’s own nuclear missile capabilities.” He also suggested that Beijing was more worried about Japan than it was about the Soviet Union; Chinese leaders “are convinced there are strong undercurrents of revanchist sentiment among the Japanese and are clearly afraid Japan might decide to become a nuclear power.” To calm the Soviets about the possibility of U.S.-China collusion, Kissinger assured a skeptical Dobynin that he “had had no conversations, and was having none, with the Chinese that affected the Soviet Union’s interests in any way.”


Documents 227-228: Another “Watershed in Our Relations”: Kissinger and Vorontsov records of meeting, 5 December 1971, pp. 529-532

The South Asian Crisis of 1971—the break-up of East and West Pakistan, Pakistan’s brutal repression about the people of East Pakistan, the creation of Bangladesh, the conflict between Indian and West Pakistan, and then war–involved complex machinations by the Nixon administration, which “tilted” toward Pakistan, in part because of the latter’s crucial role in expediting rapprochement with Beijing. While India and the Soviet Union had signed a friendship treaty a few months earlier (partly to offset the U.S.-China rapprochement), local and regional concerns fueled the South Asian conflict, but Nixon and Kissinger were quick to assume that Moscow had a hidden hand in the conflict. These records of Kissinger’s conversation with Soviet diplomat Yuli Vorontsov, who filled in during Dobrynin’s absence, on 5 December 1971, illustrate the problem. To Kissinger’s claim that the Soviets encouraged the Indian “military aggression” against Pakistan,” Vorontsov reported that he “expressed surprise on a purely personal level and questioned why events between India and Pakistan are so insistently and obviously being extended to relations between our two countries.”

Kissinger’s account does not include this language or Vorontsov’s observations that Moscow also wanted to end the fighting and had called for a “political solution to the crisis.” “So what does this have to do with U.S.-Soviet relations … or even more with predictions about a ‘critical juncture.’?” In any event, Nixon quickly sent an accusatory letter condemning Moscow for “supporting [India’s] open use of force against the independence and integrity of Pakistan.”


Document 257: “A Unique Situation”: Dobrynin record of meeting with Kissinger, 4 February 1972, pp. 580-581

The tensions over the South Asian crisis notwithstanding, the plans for a U.S.-Soviet summit, announced in the fall of 1971 and scheduled for late May 1972, remained on track. While Secretary of State Rogers and the Department of State were becoming more involved in the summit planning process, Nixon and Kissinger strictly circumscribed their role.  This became a problem in early February 1972 when Dobrynin accepted Rogers’ invitation to a meeting to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. Not wanting Rogers to know any more than was necessary, Kissinger arranged to meet with Dobrynin to update him “about what specifically the Secretary of State knows concerning the state of Soviet-U.S. relations.” Dobrynin produced the only record of this meeting, which shows Kissinger telling him that Rogers did not know about “confidential conversations on the Middle East” or Nixon’s proposal about limitations on numbers of missile-carrying nuclear submarines. Kissinger also asked Dobrynin not to discuss the summit agenda with Rogers. As Dobrynin observed, it was a “unique situation when the Special Assistant to the President secretly informs a foreign ambassador about what the Secretary of State knows and does not know.”


Document 279: “Yet Another Crisis”: Dobrynin record of meeting with Kissinger, 3 April 1972, pp. 638-641

In another unique document, Dobrynin recorded a difficult talk with Kissinger on the North Vietnamese Spring Offensive and its implications for Moscow-Washington relations. Arguing that the offensive amounted to a “large-scale armed invasion of South Vietnam” and a “flagrant violation” of the 1968 bombing-halt agreement, Kissinger suggested that Hanoi’s actions were aimed at humiliating President Nixon and “from an objective standpoint [were] unquestionably aimed at complicating the situation on the eve of the Soviet-U.S. summit. That is the only possible conclusion.” Mentioning that the North Vietnamese troops were armed with Soviet weapons, Kissinger told Dobryin that he believed that Hanoi was acting on its own and that the Soviet Union had not encouraged the offensive. Nevertheless, because North Vietnam and the Soviet Union were allies he did not want Moscow to believe that any U.S. military response to North Vietnam was “deliberately directed against the interests of the Soviet Union.” Dobrynin could only repeat what Brezhnev had already written: that the “bombing of the DRV can only complicate the situation, and consequently, the atmosphere leading up to and during the Soviet-U.S. talks in Moscow.” During the discussion that followed, Kissinger observed that “Apparently we will have to go through yet another crisis that neither of us precipitated.”


Document 323: “A Restraining Influence”: Dobrynin record of meeting with Kissinger, 5 May 1972, pp. 796-797

While Nixon and Kissinger escalated attacks on North Vietnamese forces, they held back from major air strikes on the Hanoi area or from long-standing contingency plans to mine Haiphong Harbor. By early May, however, Nixon was making decisions to move in that direction and on 8 May he gave a TV speech announcing the U.S. escalation.  Dobrynin, however, misjudged Nixon’s course of action. In another unique memcon with Kissinger, he recorded Kissinger’s assertion that the Nixon wanted the Moscow Summit to take place although he recognized that the Vietnam situation “will probably have an unfavorable impact on the meeting in some respects.”  Dobrynin’s conclusion that Nixon had made a “firm decision” to go to Moscow led him to believe that the White House desire for “productive talks [was] having a restraining influence on Nixon in terms of taking any particularly serious military measures against the DRV.”  That would remain the case, Dobrynin thought, until the summit, unless the Vietnam situation turned disastrous.  The possibility that Nixon would escalate the war, taking the chance that the Soviets would not cancel the summit (which Nixon believed was unlikely), apparently did not occur to the ambassador.  Nixon’s gamble paid off and the summit was highly successful, despite the Vietnam War escalation.

Notes

1. The Kissinger-Dobrynin talks during 1969-1973 have been characterized as “back channel” because State Department contacts with embassies and foreign offices are understood as the regular “front channel” for diplomatic communications.

2. A selection of Russian documents from the first several months of 1969 was initially published in a leading Russian journal on postwar history. See Vladimir O. Pechatnov, ed., “Sekretnyi Kanal A.F. Dobrynin-G. Kissindzher: Dokumenty Arkhiva Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia, No. 5 (September-October 2006): 108-38. Pechatnov, a professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), played a key role as adviser and compiler on the Russian side of the joint project.

3. This is not to say that no Kissinger records of those meetings exist; he may have recounted them in personal diaries or in hand-written records of the discussions.

TOP-SECRET: The INF Treaty and the Washington Summit

Washington D.C., August, 2011 – Previously secret Soviet Politburo records and declassified American transcripts of the Washington summit 20 years ago between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev show that Gorbachev was willing to go much further than the Americans expected or were able to reciprocate on arms cuts and resolving regional conflicts, according to documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

Today’s posting includes the internal Soviet deliberations leading up to the summit, full transcripts of the two leaders’ discussions, the Soviet record of negotiations with top American diplomats, and other historic records being published for the first time.

The documents show that the Soviet Union made significant changes to its initial position to accommodate the U.S. demands, beginning with “untying the package” of strategic arms, missile defense, and INF in February 1987 and then agreeing to eliminate its newly deployed OKA/SS-23 missiles, while pressing the U.S. leadership to agree on substantial reductions of strategic nuclear weapons.  Gorbachev’s goal was to prepare and sign the START Treaty on the basis of 50 percent reductions of strategic offensive weapons in 1988 before the Reagan administration left office.  In the course of negotiations, the Soviet Union also proposed cutting conventional forces in Europe by 25% and starting negotiations to eliminate chemical weapons.

The documents also detail Gorbachev’s desire for genuine collaboration with the U.S. in resolving regional conflicts, especially the Iran-Iraq War, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Nicaragua.  However, the documents show that the U.S. side was unwilling and unable to pursue many of the Soviet initiatives at the time due to political struggles within the Reagan administration.  Reading these documents one gets a visceral sense of missed opportunities for achieving even deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals, resolving regional conflicts, and ending the Cold War even earlier.

The documents paint the fullest declassified portrait yet available of the Washington summit which ended 20 years ago today and centered on the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty – the only treaty of its kind in actually eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons.  By eliminating mainly the missiles based in Europe, the treaty lowered the threat of nuclear war in Europe substantially and cleared the way for negotiations on tactical nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as negotiations on conventional forces in Europe.

Under the Treaty, the Soviet Union destroyed 889 of its intermediate-range missiles and 957 shorter-range missiles, and the U.S. destroyed 677 and 169 respectively.  These were the missiles with very short flight time to targets in the Soviet Union, which made them “most likely to spur escalation to general nuclear war from any local hostilities that might erupt.” (Note 1)  These weapons were perceived as most threatening by the Soviet leadership, which is why the Soviet military supported the Treaty, even though there was a significant opposition among them to including the shorter-range weapons.

The Treaty included remarkably extensive and intrusive verification inspection and monitoring arrangements, based on the “any time and place” proposal of March 1987, which was accepted by the Soviets to the Americans’ surprise; and the documents show that the Soviets were willing to go beyond the American position in the depth of verification regime.  The new Soviet position on verification not only removed the hurdle that seemed insurmountable, but according to then-U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock, became a symbol of the new trust developing in U.S.-Soviet relations, which made the treaty and further progress on arms control possible.

The documents published here for the first time give the reader a unique and never-previously-available opportunity to look into the process of internal deliberations on both sides and the negotiations both before and during the summit in December 1987.

Read the Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.February 4, 1987
Record of Conversation of Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeev and H. Brown, C. Vance, H. Kissinger, and D. Jones.

This meeting takes place during the visit of the Council on Foreign Relations Group, to Moscow on February 2-6.  In addition to meeting with Marshal Akhromeev, the members of the group also met with Mikhail Gorbachev and Alexander Yakovlev.  Marshal Akhromeev discusses problems of U.S.-Soviet arms control process, which has slowed down considerably after the Reykjavik summit and criticizes the U.S. side for backtracking after the summit, especially on the issue of deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons.  He expresses doubts that any progress could be achieved in the last two years of the Reagan administration in Geneva, but also emphasized the Soviet willingness to move ahead, however on the basis of “package,” i.e. linkage between INF, strategic offensive weapons and the ABM systems.  Members of the Council on Foreign Relations Group express their disagreement with the idea of elimination of offensive ballistic missiles and total elimination of nuclear weapons proposed by Reagan in Reykjavik on the grounds of security, citing Soviet superiority in conventional weapons in Europe (Kissinger and Jones) and also arguing that if the agreement was reached, the U.S. Congress would have never ratified that agreement.  The U.S. representatives suggest that further progress would be impossible on the basis of the Soviet “package” approach, and that to make it possible, negotiations should proceed on separate issues without linking them with each other.  The conversation also involves detailed discussion of Soviet objections to SDI and the balance of conventional weapons in Europe, on which Akhromeev reminds the Americans of the Soviet proposal of June 1986 to reduce conventional weapons in Europe by 25%, to which they received no response.

February 25, 1987
Alexander Yakovlev, Memorandum for Gorbachev
“Toward an Analysis of the Fact of the Visit of Prominent American Political Leaders to the USSR (Kissinger, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Brown, and others)

This long memorandum analyzes the statements and impressions of members of the group of the Council on Foreign Relations, which visited the Soviet Union earlier in the month, and provides recommendations for Gorbachev on next Soviet moves in arms control and Soviet-American relations.  The document contains the single most powerful argument for “untying the package” of INF strategic offensive weapons and ABM systems, which was the basis of the Soviet arms control position in Reykjavik. Surprisingly, Yakovlev does not argue from positions of Soviet security or linkage to the SDI. His argument concerns mainly the domestic political situation in the United States, with right-wing forces running the show in the administration and the fact that the Irangate scandal has weakened President Reagan significantly.  If the Soviet Union is to have any chance to achieve any arms control agreements in the next two years, before the end of the Reagan term, it needs major new initiatives, which would persuade the U.S. administration to engage in serious arms control. Therefore, the timing is ripe for untying the package to show the seriousness of Soviet intentions.  He implies that the Soviet side must be ready to make concessions, but that they would not affect Soviet security.  The second argument, which makes the timing even more important is that the resumption of Soviet nuclear testing (with the first test coming on February 26, 1987) would damage the image of Soviet perestroika in Europe. An announcement of a major new initiative such as untying the package would counteract the damage produced by the resumption of testing. This memorandum shows the impact of the visit of the representatives of the Council on Foreign relations on policymakers in the Soviet Union, and the attentiveness of the Soviet leaders to the perceptions of perestroika abroad.

February 26, 1987
Politburo Session [Excerpt]

At this Politburo session the historic decision to “untie the package” is made ostensibly following the proposal by Gromyko (most likely the preliminary decision had already been made in the Walnut Room before the session started).  Gorbachev argued strongly for this decision as the only way to jumpstart the negotiations that had been “stuck” in Geneva.  Here he also proposes to invite George Shultz to Moscow, and to proceed to a quick conclusion of the agreement on INF and then on strategic offensive weapons.  He shows his frustration with U.S. backtracking on arms control after Reykjavik.  All present Politburo members speak in favor “untying the package,” including Yegor Ligachev and Defense Minister Yuri Sokolov, who later criticized the treaty and concessionary.  Shevardnadze makes an argument about timing linking the decision to the need to restore trust in European public opinion after the resumption of Soviet nuclear tests.  Gorbachev and Shevardnadze’s arguments follow very closely the argument presented in the Yakovlev memo of the day before (see Document 2).

April 14, 1987
Memorandum of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. Excerpt.

During this meeting with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze (joined by Marshal Akhromeev after the break), Shultz presses Gorbachev for inclusion of shorter-range nuclear missiles into the treaty, and specifically for inclusion of the new Soviet OKA/SS-23 missile, which according to the Soviet side had a range of only 400 km (as a result of the INF agreement, the USSR had to destroy 239 of these modern, newly deployed and highly mobile missiles, which allowed for the breakthrough in the negotiations but resulted in heavy criticism among the military).  Shultz also insists on the principle of “equality,” which would allow the United States to match the number of Soviet SRINF even though the U.S. did not have those at the time.  Gorbachev tries very hard to counteract this argument and persuade Shultz that since the Soviet Union was willing to eliminate all weapons of that class, the U.S. should reserve for itself the right to develop those. Gorbachev also expresses Soviet agreement with the U.S. idea of global double zero on INF and SRINF for the first time, but Shultz does not seem to grasp it most likely because his instructions did not give him a mandate to pursue that proposal. To Shultz’s expressed concern about issues of verification, Gorbachev offers the deepest and most comprehensive verification regime going beyond what the U.S. was prepared to.  In discussion of strategic offensive weapons, Shultz raises the issue of sub-ceiling for elements of the strategic triad, and Gorbachev emotionally accuses him of backtracking on the Reykjavik understandings—to cut the strategic triad by half.  Gorbachev raises the linkage between SDI and strategic offensive weapons but offers a new Soviet understanding of laboratory testing, which would be permitted in the treaty. This meeting signified a real breakthrough in INF negotiations due to three major new Soviet initiatives:  agreement to include SRINF, comprehensive verification regime, and willingness to accept the U.S. principle of “equality.”

April 10, 1987
Letter from President Reagan to General Secretary Gorbachev

April 9, 1987
Rejected Draft of Letter from President Reagan to General Secretary Gorbachev

President Reagan’s deputy national security adviser Colin Powell forwarded a 10-page draft to Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger on April 9, but the actual 2-page letter signed by President Reagan and carried by Shultz to Moscow, dated April 10, contained only a few phrases carried over from the draft.  Especially notable is the muted language in the final letter about the then-raging espionage controversy over the U.S. Embassy’s Marine guards – which led to a U.S. Senate resolution urging Shultz not to go to Moscow, but ultimately proved to be based on coerced false confessions by the guards.  The President downplayed the problems in his Los Angeles speech of April 10, when he said “If I had to characterize U.S.-Soviet relations in one word, it would be this: proceeding.  No great cause for excitement; no great cause for alarm.”  The same day, Gorbachev proposed to deal with the shorter-range INF issue by freezing and then cutting these systems.

April 16, 1987
Politburo session.

Gorbachev informs the Politburo about his conversation with Shultz.  The surprising assessment is that “conversation was good but empty—we did not move anywhere.”  He accuses Shultz as being focused on extracting concessions from the Soviet Union.  Nothing is said of specific Soviet concessions on shorter-range nuclear missiles.    Shevardnadze shares Gorbachev’s frustration with American abandonment of the Reykjavik position saying “the general tendency is hardening on all directions after Reykjavik—they want to keep 100 units and are against the global zero. However, Gorbachev makes it very clear that the treaty and more radical progress on arms control are in Soviet interests and that he would continue to press the American leaders in this direction.

May 1987
Plan of Conversation
Between M.S. Gorbachev and the President of the United States R. Reagan before the first trip to Washington. May 1987.
(A draft dictated by Gorbachev to his adviser Anatoly Chernyaev)

In this draft Gorbachev outlines his ideas for the first one-on-one conversation he will have with Reagan.  He is coming with a very ambitious agenda—not limited to the INF treaty but in fact looking far beyond it.  In the very first conversation, he is prepared to engage Reagan on START, chemical weapons, conventional weapons and regional problems.  The scope of issues mentioned in this draft and the solutions proposed on each of them show what a monumental opportunity the summit could be with the Soviet leadership willing to be flexible on practically all the issues that before represented stumbling blocks not only in U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations but in resolving regional conflicts such as the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq war and the situation in Central America.  Gorbachev shows unbendable optimism in his and Reagan’s ability to deal with all these issues decisively and successfully.

May 7, 1987
National Security Decision Directive Number 271: Instructions for the Eighth NST Negotiating Round

This directive signed by President Reagan two days after the beginning of the eighth round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva provided specific instructions for each of the three U.S. negotiating teams.  The INF instructions in particular represented a holding pattern (“Washington is currently examining the Soviet proposal”) on the issue of shorter-range missiles (SRINF), even though both Gorbachev and Shultz at different points in the April discussions had embraced the idea of a “double zero” for these missiles.  In other respects, the instructions moved backward from the Reykjavik summit positions, with a seven-year as opposed to a ten-year period for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and resurrection of the “sublimits” approach to counting nuclear weapons.

June 13, 1987
National Security Decision Directive Number 278: Establishing a U.S. Negotiating Position on SRINF Missiles

This directive essentially codified the “double zero” agreement announced formally the previous day at the semiannual NATO ministerial meeting, after a period of heated debate among NATO leaders, with West Germany’s Kohl most in favor of the approach and Britain’s Thatcher most dubious.  But the document’s second paragraph ends with what would become the sticking point to the negotiations – the status of the Pershing missiles belonging to West Germany.  Ultimately, after what President Reagan described in his memoirs as his own private plea to Kohl, the West German leader would announce on August 26 that the German Pershings would be eliminated once the U.S. and Soviet missiles were.

July 9, 1987
Politburo Session.

Gorbachev formally announces to the Politburo that the Soviet Union adopts the double global zero platform agreeing to destroy its intermediate-range missiles in Asia (formal announcement would be made on July 23).  He also formally announces the decision to add tactical missiles (like SS-23/OKA) to be covered in the INF Treaty justifying that step by saying that it would “deliver a blow” to “Pershings IB” stationed in the FRG.  He calls for a third zero—eliminating tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.  What is striking here is that he already made the exact same proposals to Shultz in April, but Shultz was not able at the time to respond to them, and only after NATO formally adopted the global double zero position on June 12, Gorbachev announces it as his new position at the Politburo.  Gorbachev is sensitive to the criticism of his own military about the Soviet disproportionate cuts under the INF treaty—therefore he raises the issue of the imbalance, but noting that even disproportionate cuts would be justified since the intention is to “clear Europe from nuclear weapons.”

August 11, 1987
Department of State Briefing Papers: Nuclear and Space Talks, START, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, Defense and Space, Nuclear Testing, Compliance Issues, ABM Treaty Interpretation, Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Documents 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d and 4e)

These State Department briefing papers provide a snapshot of U.S. negotiating positions across the range of U.S.-Soviet issues going into the fall discussions that would produce the INF Treaty and the Washington summit.  From internal evidence (repeated references to “as of August 11”), the typed text appears to date from August 11, but the handwritten notes and editing comments were added subsequent to Chancellor Kohl’s August 26 offer to eliminate the German Pershings.

September 5, 1987
GRIP 27D  [“Should the U.S. change its current stance on U.S. warheads on FRG Pershing IA missiles?”]

Written by National Security Council staff, this memorandum bears the codeword GRIP signifying the particular secrecy compartment used for NSC documents on U.S.-Soviet arms discussions in 1987 and 1988 (there would ultimately be at least 96 separate GRIP items, according to the finding aide to the Robert Linhard Papers at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).  The issue of U.S. warheads on the German Pershings came up in June 1987 when the U.S. Defense Department responded to the “double zero” consensus by proposing the conversion of Pershing IIs into shorter range Pe-1Bs for turnover to the West Germans, much to the Soviets’ dismay.  Even after Kohl’s August 26 announcement on elimination of the German Pershings, the Soviets suspected backsliding when the U.S. would not commit in writing to destroy the Pershing warheads; but this memo outlined the position that the U.S. would take: sticking to the principle of not negotiating about an ally’s weapons, while reassuring the Soviets that the warheads would not be used in some other configuration.

September 8, 1987
Meeting with the National Security Planning Group [Briefing Memorandum for President Reagan from National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci]

This briefing memo and attached talking points were drafted by NSC staffers Linton Brooks and Will Tobey and forwarded by the national security adviser, Frank Carlucci, to President Reagan to prepare him for a key NSPG meeting on the upcoming visit by Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze to Washington.  Although the memo suggests there would be a debate over how flexible the U.S. negotiating positions should be on START and SDI, the outcome of the NSPG meeting was that President Reagan sided with defense secretary Weinberger against any change in those positions (Weinberger had separately argued for keeping some non-nuclear-tipped INF missiles, but Reagan overruled him).

September 10, 1987
Letter from General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan, Russian and English versions [Documents 7a and 7b]

Foreign minister Shevardnadze arrives in Washington on September 15 bearing this five-page letter from Gorbachev to Reagan (8 pages in the unofficial translation given to the President).  Together with a plea for progress on INF and arms reductions generally, the letter contains an interesting distinction related to the issue that had derailed the Reykjavik summit, the Strategic Defense Initiative.  Gorbachev refers to “strategic offensive weapons in space” as the problem for the Soviets – the fear that U.S. development of the SDI would create the capacity for a Hitler-style blitzkrieg from space.  Reagan had always insisted the U.S. was not seeking this capacity, but as Raymond Garthoff has noted, the President missed the opening to combine constraints on such weapons with the cooperative SDI program he always envisioned with the Soviets.  The Shultz-Shevardnadze talks during this visit ultimately produce only an agreement in principle on the INF Treaty and on a subsequent summit in Washington with a date to be determined later.

October 23, 1987
Memorandum of conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. Excerpt.

In this long and fascinating conversation Gorbachev was trying to show the new Soviet flexibility to move closer to the U.S. position on the issues of sub-ceilings on elements of the strategic triad, including willingness to have a lower level of Soviet heavy ICBMs, laboratory testing of SDI elements, and verification.  At the same time, he notes that the U.S. side tries to “squeeze as much as possible out of us.”  Gorbachev’s main objective for the meeting is to get Shultz to agree to draft key provisions for the START treaty that could be discussed in Washington during his visit.  However, Shultz’s response to this proposal is inconclusive—he would prefer delegations in Geneva to work more on clarifying the issues under dispute and leave the “key provisions” for the principals to discuss at the summit.  Gorbachev vents his frustration calling Shultz’ position “foggy, “ complains about U.S. lack of willingness to move on arms control, and doubts U.S. support for Soviet domestic changes.  No decisions on “key provisions” were achieved and even dates of the summit were left undecided.  The document also contains a fascinating discussion of U.S.-Soviet collaboration in trying to resolve the Iran-Iraq conflict.

October 28, 1987
Gorbachev Letter to Reagan.

This letter is Gorbachev’s final call for progress in discussions of the key provisions of START treaty so that the principals could agree on those in Washington.  The last obstacle to such agreement is the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which the Soviet Union proposed to be ten years and to which Shultz did not agree in Moscow.  Gorbachev proposes to open a direct channel through the Ambassadors to discuss this issue before the summit to find a speedy solution.  Gorbachev believes that it is realistic to achieve an agreement on strategic weapons and to start discussion on banning chemical weapons.  He suggests that “we want to crown your visit to the Soviet Union with concluding an agreement on strategic offensive weapons” referring to the planned Reagan visit to Moscow in May-June 1988.  In the letter, Gorbachev also gives final dates of his visit to Washington—during the first ten days of December 1987.

October 30, 1987
Memorandum For: The President From: George P. Shultz [Secretary of State] Subject: Gorbachev’s Letter

The Secretary of State summarizes for the President the contents of Gorbachev’s “fairly positive” letter, which would be hand delivered to Reagan by Shevardnadze later that day.  Shultz remarks on the Soviet agreement for an early December summit in Washington, and notes the flexibility in various of Gorbachev’s proposals.  After formally receiving the letter from Shevardnadze, Reagan would announce the summit agreement in the White House press room, with Shultz and Shevardnadze at his side.

November 4, 1987
Letter from the Director of the United States Information Agency Charles Z. Wick to the Secretary of State George P. Shultz and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Frank Carlucci

The top U.S. public relations official proposes in this memo that Reagan fly to Europe and attend a NATO summit immediately after the one with Gorbachev in Washington – a suggestion that would not be accepted.  But the memo provides interesting inside detail about the President’s standing in European public opinion: “Our own polling of European publics continues to show by overwhelming margins that Gorbachev is viewed more favorably than President Reagan (e.g. Britain (83%), Germany (80%), Italy (76%) and France (51%), and more the advocate of peace and arms control.”

November 10, 1987
National Security Decision Directive Number 288: My Objectives at the Summit

This directive written in the first person summarizes President Reagan’s expectations for the Washington summit, and perhaps most strikingly asserts that the summit “must in no way complicate our efforts to maintain a strong defense budget and key programs like SDI” and the Reagan doctrine support to anticommunist armed forces abroad.  Frances Fitzgerald commented in her book Way Out There in the Blue (p. 434) that “Both of these policies were history in the Hollywood sense of the word, yet administration officials followed the guidance quite faithfully” to the point of missing Gorbachev’s offer on Central America for both the U.S. and the USSR to stop shipping arms there if the peace plan proposed by Costa Rica’s Oscar Arias was accepted.  Since the U.S. Congress was not going to approve more arms anyway, given the Iran-contra scandal, Gorbachev’s offer amounted to exactly the cessation of Soviet arms that the U.S. claimed it sought.

November 24, 1987
Memorandum Subject: Gorbachev’s Gameplan: The Long View [By Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency]

On the eve of the Washington summit, the top U.S. intelligence analyst on the Soviet Union – Robert M. Gates, then the deputy director of CIA – gets Gorbachev almost completely wrong.  In this memo (forwarded by the CIA director William Webster to Vice President Bush and other top officials), Gates predicts that the Soviet reforms are merely a “breathing space” before the resumption of the “further increase in Soviet military power and political influence.”  Gates misses the Soviet recognition that the Stalinist economic system had failed; he incorrectly predicts that Gorbachev will only agree to arms reductions that “protect existing Soviet advantages”; he claims the Soviets are still committed to the protection of their Third World clients – only three months later, Gorbachev would announce the pullout from Afghanistan; and Gates sees any Gorbachev force reductions as a threat to “Alliance cohesion” rather than a gain for security in Europe.  This hard-line assessment of Gorbachev is not shared by President Reagan, who would rescind his “evil empire” rhetoric while standing in Red Square in May 1988.

November 28, 1987
Information Memorandum TO: The Secretary, From: INR- Morton I. Abramowitz, Subject: Gorbachev’s Private Summit Agenda

This two-page cover memo from the head of the State Department’s intelligence and research bureau to Secretary Shultz summarizes a seven-page INR study looking at “what might be some of the ‘wild cards’ on the summit agenda.”  While generally accurate in its assessment of Gorbachev’s intentions, even the State Department analysts closest to the Shultz view of Soviet behavior do not predict several of the Gorbachev surprises during the summit such as the offer on Central America and on conventional forces in Europe.  The prediction of “something splashy on Afghanistan” would be off by a few months, but the memo’s anticipation of a possible SDI compromise would be only slightly behind Gorbachev’s own thinking.

December 7, 1987
Memo: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-290) on Arms Control Position for the US-USSR Summit

On the Friday before the Washington summit, President Reagan signs this directive setting out what journalist Don Oberdorfer later described as “seemingly impossible” negotiating goals on SDI with Gorbachev, including explicit Soviet approval of tests in space, and Soviet approval of US deployment of strategic defenses after the end of an agreed period of non-withdrawal from ABM Treaty.  Gorbachev had rejected both of these ideas repeatedly in earlier meetings, but would surprise the Americans at the Washington summit with his tactics if not his underlying posture on SDI.

December 8, 1987
Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 10:45 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.

December 8, 1987
Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 2:30 p.m. – 3:15 p.m.

December 8, 1987
Record of Conversation
Between S.F. Akhromeev and P. Nitze at the U.S. State Department

In the first conversations of military experts Marshal Akhromeev outlines the Soviet position on the strategic nuclear weapons negotiations.  The main point remained the linkage between ABM compliance and START issues.  The other remaining issue is verification, on which now Soviets were prepared to go further than the Americans in reversal of the traditional positions.  When Akhromeev offers on-site inspections to count the number of bombs deployed on each bomber, Nitze responds:  “We cannot agree to that.”  The discussion also covers issues of counting Soviet “Backfire” bomber and U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles.

December 9, 1987
Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 10:35 a.m. – 10:45 a.m.

December 9, 1987
Draft Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 10:55 a.m. – 12:35 p.m.

December 9, 1987
Record of Conversations between Sergey Fyodorovich Akhromeev and Paul Nitze at the U.S. State Department. Excerpt.

In this excerpt of a very long conversation of military experts Akhromeev shows his frustration with the Americans’ unwillingness to meet the Soviet delegation halfway even after all the flexibility shown by the Soviet side on reducing heavy ICBMs and counting heavy bombers.  When he suggests that the draft of key provisions should contain a commitment of both sides to reduce the total throw-weight of the sides’ ICBMs and SLBMs by 50%, Nitze replies that this paragraph should be recorded only as a “unilateral statement.”

December 9, 1987
Record of Conversation
Between S.F. Akhromeev and F. Carlucci at the Pentagon

Akhromeev and Carlucci discuss issues of possible cooperation on SDI research during the period of non-withdrawal and non-deployment of SDI systems.  Carlucci makes a very strong argument in defense of the SDI saying that it is widely supported in the country and that there was no chance for a strategic offensive weapons treaty to be ratified by the U.S. Congress “regardless of how great it was if only it was said that it undermined the concept of SDI.”  Akhromeev counters with questioning the SDI feasibility and suggesting that the Soviet Union was capable of producing an asymmetrical response to the program.

December 10, 1987
Draft Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 10 a.m. – 12 p.m.

December 10, 1987
Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at a Working Luncheon, 12:40 p.m. – 2:10 p.m

December 10, 1987
Record of Conversation Between Chief of USSR General Staff Marshal Sergey Fyodorovich Akhromeev and William J. Crowe with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon

Akhromeev and members of U.S. JCS discuss measures of cooperation between representatives of U.S. and Soviet armed forces as means of building trust between the two militaries.  Akhromeev proposes more human contacts between the officers, visits to bases, exchanges of basketball teams or military bands.  The conversation also involves the issues of reductions of conventional weapons in Europe, including dual-use weapons.  During the discussion of conventional weapons Akhromeev for the first time admits that there are “imbalances” in the European theater, including the Soviet advantage in tanks and U.S. advantage in combat aircraft.  Verification and nuclear safety centers are also discussed.

December 12, 1987
Telegram: Secretary’s 12/11 NAC Briefing on Washington Summit

This telegram summarizes Secretary of State Shultz’s briefing to the North Atlantic Council immediately after the Washington summit, and provides talking points for U.S. diplomats around the world to use when briefing their host governments on the summit.  Sent by the deputy secretary of state (acting secretary in Shultz’s absence) John Whitehead, the cable says the Washington summit “has taken us a gigantic step forward” on strategic arms, and hails the INF Treaty as a “bipartisan achievement for the U.S.”

December 16, 1987
Anatoly Chernyaev Memorandum to Gorbachev.

In this memorandum prepared for Gorbachev’s report to the Politburo on the results of the Washington summit Chernyaev lists all the accomplishments of the summit—primarily in dealing with negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons.  According to Chernyaev, there was a real danger that the summit results would have been limited to the INF treaty without progress on START issues.  He notes progress in finding solutions to the following difficult issues:  provision on compliance with the AMB treaty, limits for warheads on strategic missiles and for warheads on sea-launched cruise missiles.  Chernyaev also discusses Reagan’s negotiating style “his incompetence,” pointing that the real power “rests with the group of Bush, Carlucci and others around him”—but Gorbachev decides not to use this part of memo in his actual Politburo presentation and spoke about Reagan very favorably in his report on December 17.

December 17, 1987
Politburo Session.

At this Politburo session devoted to the results of Gorbachev’s visit to Washington, Gorbachev gives a very high assessment of the summit and the INF treaty.  He considers the Washington summit as “bigger than Geneva or Reykjavik” in terms of building mutual understanding with the U.S. leadership.  He notes the change in Reagan’s behavior and emphasizes that the principals were speaking “as equals and seriously each keeping his ideology to himself.”  Gorbachev stresses the historic nature of the INF treaty and the full Politburo support for it, because “the entire development of Soviet-American relations and the normalization of international situation in general” depended on the outcome of this issue.  He also informs members of the Politburo about his and the delegation’s meetings with Americans of all ways of life and describes strong support for perestroika in the United States.

December 29, 1987
National Security Decision Directive Number 292: Organizing for the INF Ratification Effort [Document 23]

This directive signed by President Reagan sets up the White House teams working for Senate ratification of the INF Treaty.  This was not a hard sell politically:  On December 15th the Washington Post published the first post-summit poll, showing Reagan’s approval ratings at their highest since the Iran-contra scandal broke in November 1986, up from 50 to 58%, with 61% having a “favorable impression” of Reagan.  Remarkably, 65% had a “favorable impression” of Gorbachev!  Yet a chorus of critics (including former President Nixon, former secretary of state Kissinger, and former – and future – national security adviser Scowcroft) were attacking the INF treaty for removing nuclear weapons from Europe while leaving a large Soviet conventional arms advantage.  Unbeknownst to the critics, in part because Reagan was unprepared to take up the conventional forces issue when Gorbachev raised it during the summit, the Soviets were ready to move on major cuts in non-nuclear forces as well, and Gorbachev would announce such cuts in his United Nations speech less than a year later.

Note

1. Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition:  American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. (The Brookings Institution:  Washington, D.C. 1994), p. 327.

TOP-SECRET: Characterization of Darfur violence as “genocide” had no “legal consequences” for U.S., according to 2004 State Department Memo

 

Different Conclusions
The State Department’s June 25, 2004 memo, “Genocide and Darfur,” found that the use of the term “genocide” by the U.S. carried no “legal consequences.”
A May 1994 State Department discussion paper on violence in Rwanda expressed concernt that use of the term “genocide” might obligate the Clinton administration “to actually ‘do something.'”

Washington, DC, August 17, 2011 – A secret June 25, 2004 Department of State memo entitled “Genocide and Darfur” written by William Taft IV, the legal advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell, stated that “a determination that genocide has occurred in Darfur would have no immediate legal–as opposed to moral, political or policy–consequences for the United States.”

Writing for The Atlantic, National Security Archive Fellow Rebecca Hamilton argues that the memo’s determination that calling the conflict in Darfur genocide would yield no “legal consequences” influenced Secretary of State Colin Powell’s “judgment call” to become the first member of any US administration to apply the label genocide to an ongoing conflict.

The June 25, 2004 memo stands in stark contrast to a secret May 1994 State Department discussion paper on Rwanda–also declassified in response to a National Security Archive request–which warned that a finding of genocide in Rwanda might obligate the Clinton administration “to actually ‘do something.’” The briefing paper helps explain why, with clear evidence to the contrary, U.S. officials refused to label the massacres of over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in Rwanda as genocide.

In her book, Fighting for Darfur, Hamilton interviewed Assistant Secretary of State Lorne Craner, who crafted the State Department’s investigation into whether genocide was occurring in Darfur. He recounted that the Department of State was heavily influenced by massacres in Rwanda a decade earlier. He remembers Powell instructing him, “There is not going to be another Rwanda.”

In addition to advising Powell that terming the events in Darfur genocide had no “legal consequences,” the 2004 memo also stated that “a finding of genocide can act as a spur to the international community to take more forceful and immediate actions to respond to ongoing atrocities.”

On September 9, 2004, free from the “legal implications” of the term and hoping to “spur” the international community into action, Secretary of State Colin Powell sat before Senate Foreign Relations Committee and testified that the Department of State had “concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the jinjaweid bear responsibility —and that genocide may still be occurring.”
Read Rebecca Hamilton’s article at The Atlantic.

TOP SECRET CIA ‘OFFICIAL HISTORY’ OF THE BAY OF PIGS: REVELATIONS


Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba

Washington, D.C., August 17, 2011 – In the heat of the battle at the Bay of Pigs, the lead CIA field operative aboard one of the transport boats fired 75mm recoilless rifles and .50-caliber machine guns on aircraft his own agency had supplied to the exile invasion force, striking some of them.  With the CIA-provided B-26 aircraft configured to match those in the Cuban air force, “we couldn’t tell them from the Castro planes,” according to the operative, Grayston Lynch. “We ended up shooting at two or three of them. We hit some of them there because when they came at us…it was a silhouette, that was all you could see.”

This episode of ‘friendly fire’ is one of many revelations contained in the Top Secret multi-volume, internal CIA report, “The Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation.”  Pursuant to a Freedom of Information lawsuit (FOIA) filed by the National Security Archive on the 50th anniversary of the invasion last April, the CIA has now declassified four volumes of the massive, detailed, study–over 1200 pages of comprehensive narrative and documentary appendices.

Archive Cuba specialist Peter Kornbluh, who filed the lawsuit, hailed the release as “a major advance in obtaining the fullest possible record of the most infamous debacle in the history of the CIA’s covert operations.” The Bay of Pigs, he noted, “remains fundamentally relevant to the history of the CIA, of U.S. foreign policy, and of U.S. intervention in Cuba and Latin America. It is a clandestine history that must be understood in all its inglorious detail.”

In an article published today in the “Daily Beast,” Kornbluh described the ongoing “FOIA wars” with the CIA to obtain the declassification of historical documents the CIA continues to keep secret. He characterized the process of pressing the CIA to release the Official History and other historically significant documents as “the bureaucratic equivalent of passing a kidney stone.”

The “Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations” was written between 1974 and 1984 by Jack Pfeiffer, a member of the Agency’s staff who rose to become the CIA’s Chief Historian. After he retired in the mid 1980s, Pfeiffer attempted to obtain the declassification of Volumes 4 and 5 of his study, which contained his lengthy and harsh critiques of two previous official investigations of the Bay of Pigs: the report of the Presidential Commission led by Gen. Maxwell Taylor; and the CIA’s own Inspector General’s report written in the aftermath of the failed assault. Both the Taylor Commission and the IG report held the CIA primarily responsible for the failure of the invasion—a position Pfeiffer rejected.  The CIA released only the Taylor critique, but Pfeiffer never circulated it.

According to Kornbluh, Pfeiffer saw as his mission to spread the blame for the debacle of “JMATE”—the codename for the operation—beyond the CIA headquarters at Langley, VA.  Kornbluh characterized the study as “not only the official history, but the official defense of the CIA’s legacy that was so badly damaged on the shores of Cuba;” and he predicted its declassification “would revive the ‘who-lost-Cuba’ blame game” that has accompanied the historical debate over the failed invasion for fifty years.

The Archive is posting all four volumes today.  They are described below:

Volume 1: Air Operations, March 1960 to April 1961 (Part 1| Part 2 | Part 3)

The opening volume examines the critical component of the invasion—the CIA-created air force, the preliminary airstrikes, and the air battle over Cuba during the three day attack.  The study forcefully addresses the central “who-lost-Cuba” debate that broke out in the aftermath of the failed invasion. It absolves the CIA of blame, and places it on the Kennedy White House and other agencies for decisions relating to the preliminary airstrikes and overt air cover that, according to the Official History, critically compromised the success of the operation.  “[I]in its attempts to meet its official obligations in support of the official, authorized policy of the U.S. government—to bring about the ouster of Fidel Castro—the agency was not well served by the Kennedy White House, Secretary of State Rusk, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the U.S. Navy,” the CIA historian concludes.  “The changes, modifications, distortions, and lack of firm, positive guidance related to air operations—the key to the success or failure of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Castro—make clear that the collapse of the beachhead at Playa Giron was a shared responsibility.  When President Kennedy [during his post-invasion press conference] proclaimed his sole responsibility for the operation there was more truth to his statement than he really believed or than his apologists will accept.”

Besides the ‘friendly fire” episode, Volume 1 contains a number of colorful revelations. Among them:

  • Only days before the invasion, the CIA tried to entice Cuba’s top diplomat, foreign minister Raul Roa, to defect. “Our contact with Raul Roa reports that this defection attempt is still alive although Roa would make no firm commitment or promise on whether he would defect in the U.N.,” operations manager, Jacob Esterline, noted in a secret April 11, 1961 progress report on invasion planning. “Roa has requested that no further contact be made at this time.” Like the invasion itself, the Agency’s effort for a dramatic propaganda victory over Cuba was unsuccessful. “The planned defection did not come off,” concedes the Official History.
  • In coordination with the preliminary airstrike on April 14, the CIA, with the support of the Pentagon, requested permission for a series of “large-scale sonic booms” over Havana—a psychological operations tactic the Agency had successfully employed in the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954.  “We were trying to create confusion, and so on,” a top-level CIA invasion planner stated. “I thought a sonic boom would be a helluva swell thing, you know. Break all the windows in downtown Havana…distract Castro.” Trying to maintain “plausible denial” of Washington’s role, the State Department rejected the request as “too obviously U.S.”  The Official History records General Curtis  Lemay demanding on the telephone to know “who was the sonofabitch who didn’t approve” the request.
  • Several damaged invasion airplanes made emergency landings on the Grand Cayman Islands, and were seized by local authorities. The situation created an awkward diplomatic situation with Great Britain; details of the negotiations between the U.S. and England are redacted but the CIA did suggest making the argument that if the planes were not released, Castro would think the Caymans were being used as a launch site for the invasion and respond aggressively.
  • As Castro’s forces gained the upper hand against the invasion, Agency planners reversed a decision against widespread use of napalm bombs “in favor of anything that might reverse the situation in Cuba in favor of the Brigade forces.”
  • Although the CIA had been admonished by both the Eisenhower and Kennedy White House to make sure that the U.S. hand did not show in the invasion, during the fighting headquarters authorized American pilots to fly planes over Cuba.  Secret instructions quoted in the Official History state that Americans could pilot planes but only over the beachhead and not inland. “American crews must not fall into hands enemy,” warned the instructions. If they did “[the] U.S. will deny any knowledge.”  Four American pilots and crew died when their planes were shot down over Cuba. The Official History contains private correspondence with family members of some of the pilots.

Volume II: “Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy” (Part 1 | Part 2)

Volume 2 provides new details on the negotiations and tensions with other countries which the CIA needed to provide logistical and infrastructure support for the invasion preparations. The volume describes Kennedy Administration efforts to sustain the cooperation of Guatemala, where the main CIA-led exile brigade force was trained, as well as the deals made with Gen. Anastacio Somoza and his brother Luis, then the President of Nicaragua. The Official History points out that CIA personnel simply took over diplomatic functions from the State Department in both countries. “In the instance of Guatemala, the U.S. Ambassador for all practical purposes became ‘inoperative’; and in Nicaragua the opposite condition prevailed—anything that the Agency suggested received ambassadorial blessing.”  Among the revelations:

  • While attending John F. Kennedy’s inauguration in Washington in January 1961, General Anastacio Somoza met secretly with CIA director Allen Dulles to discuss the creation of JMTIDE, the cryptonym for the airbase the CIA wanted to use in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua to launch the attack on Cuba. Somoza explicitly raised Nicaragua’s need for two development loans totaling $10 million. The CIA subsequently pressed the State Department to support the loans, one of which was from the World Bank.
  • President Luis Somoza demanded assurances that the U.S. would stand behind Nicaragua once it became known that the Somozas had supported the invasion. Somoza told the CIA representative that “there are some long-haired Department of State liberals who are not in favor of Somoza and they would welcome this as a source of embarrassment for his government.”
  • Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes repeatedly told CIA officials that he wanted to “see Guatemalan Army and Air Force personnel participate in the air operations against Castro’s Cuba.”
  • The dictator of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo, offered his country’s territory in support of the invasion. His quid pro quo was a U.S. assurance to let Trujillo “live out the rest of his days in peace.” The State Department rejected the offer; Trujillo, whose repression and corruption was radicalizing the left in the Dominican Republic, was later assassinated by CIA-backed groups.

Volume III: “Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies, 1951- January 1961”

This volume provides the most detailed available account of the decision making process in the White House, CIA and State Department during the Eisenhower administration that led to the Bay of Pigs invasion.  The CIA previously declassified this 300-page report in 1998, pursuant to the Kennedy Assassination Records Act; but it was not made public until 2005 when Villanova professor of political science David Barrett found it in an obscure file at the National Archives, and first posted it on his university’s website.

This volume contains significant new information, and a number of major revelations, particularly regarding Vice-President Richard Nixon’s role and the CIA’s own expectations for the invasion, and on CIA assassination attempts against Fidel Castro.

  • A small group of high-level CIA officials sought to use part of the budget of the invasion to finance a collaboration with the Mafia to assassinate Castro. In an interview with the CIA historian, former chief of the invasion task force, Jacob Esterline, said that he had been asked to provide money from the invasion budget by J.C. King, the head of the Western Hemisphere. “Esterline claimed that on one occasion as chief/w4, he refused to grant Col J.C. King, chief WH Division, a blank check when King refused to tell Jake the purpose for which the check was intended. Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN number from the Office of Finance and that the money was used to pay the Mafia-types.”  The Official History also notes that invasion planners discussed pursuing “Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination”—although few details were provided.   In November 1960, Edward Lansdale, a counterinsurgency specialist in the U.S. military who later conceived of Operation Mongoose, sent the invasion task force a “MUST GO LIST” of 11 top Cuban officials, including Che Guevera, Raul Castro, Blas Roca and Carlos Raphael Rodriguez.
  • Vice-President Nixon, who portrayed himself in his memoirs as one of the original architects of the plan to overthrow Castro, proposed to the CIA that they support “goon squads and other direct action groups” inside and outside of Cuba. The Vice President repeatedly sought to interfere in the invasion planning.  Through his national security aide, Nixon demanded that William Pawley, “a big fat political cat,” as Nixon’s aide described him to the CIA, be given briefings and access to CIA officers to share ideas. Pawley pushed the CIA to support untrustworthy exiles as part of the effort to overthrow Castro. “Security already has been damaged severely,” the head of the invasion planning reported, about the communications made with one, Rubio Padilla, one of Pawley’s favorite militants.
  • In perhaps the most important revelation of the entire official history, the CIA task force in charge of the paramilitary assault did not believe it could succeed without becoming an open invasion supported by the U.S. military. On page 149 of Volume III, Pfeiffer quotes still-secret minutes of the Task Force meeting held on November 15, 1960, to prepare a briefing for the new President-elect, John F. Kennedy: “Our original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted,” the document states. “Our second concept (1,500-3000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.”

This candid assessment was not shared with the President-elect then, nor later after the inauguration. As Pfeiffer points out, “what was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 became the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs Operation in March 1961”—run only by the CIA, and with a force of 1,200 men.

Volume IV: The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs

This volume, which Pfeiffer wrote in an “unclassified” form with the intention of publishing it after he left the CIA, represents his forceful rebuttal to the findings of the Presidential Commission that Kennedy appointed after the failed invasion, headed by General Maxwell Taylor.  In the introduction to the 300 pages volume, Pfeiffer noted that the CIA had been given a historical “bum rap” for “a political decision that insured the military defeat of the anti-Castro forces”—a reference to President Kennedy’s decision not to provide overt air cover and invade Cuba after Castro’s forces overwhelmed the CIA-trained exile Brigade. The Taylor Commission, which included Attorney General Robert Kennedy, he implied, was biased to defend the President at the expense of the CIA. General Taylor’s “strongest tilts were toward deflecting criticism of the White House,” according to the CIA historian.

According to Pfeiffer, this volume would present “the first and only detailed examination of the work of, and findings of, the Taylor Commission to be based on the complete record.”  His objective was to offer “a better understanding of where the responsibility for the fiasco truly lies.” To make sure the reader fully understood his point, Pfeiffer ended the study with an “epilogue” consisting of a one paragraph quote from an interview that Raul Castro gave to a Mexican journalist in 1975. “Kennedy vacillated,” Castro stated. “If at that moment he had decided to invade us, he could have suffocated the island in a sea of blood, but he would have destroyed the revolution. Lucky for us, he vacillated.”

After leaving the CIA in the mid 1980s, Pfeiffer filed a freedom of information act suit to obtain the declassification of this volume, and volume V, of his study, which he intended to publish as a book, defending the CIA. The CIA did eventually declassify volume IV, but withheld volume V in its entirety. Pfeiffer never published the book and this volume never really circulated publicly.

Volume V: The Internal Investigation Report [Still Classified]

Like his forceful critique of the Taylor Commission, Pfeiffer also wrote a critique of the CIA’s own Inspector General’s report on the Bay of Pigs—“Inspector General’s Survey of Cuban Operation”–written by a top CIA officer, Lyman Kirkpatrick in 1961. Much to the surprise and chagrin of top CIA officers at the time, Kirkpatrick laid the blame for the failure squarely at the feet of his own agency, and particularly the chief architect of the operation, Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell. The operation was characterized by “bad planning,” “poor” staffing, faulty intelligence and assumptions, and “a failure to advise the President that success had become dubious.” Moreover, “plausible denial was a pathetic illusion,” the report concluded. “The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.” In his cover letter to the new CIA director, John McCone, Kirkpatrick identified what he called “a tendency in the Agency to gloss over CIA inadequacies and to attempt to fix all of the blame for the failure of the invasion upon other elements of the Government, rather than to recognize the Agency’s weaknesses.”

Pfeiffer’s final volume contains a forceful rebuttal of Kirkpatrick’s focus on the CIA’s own culpability for the events at the Bay of Pigs.  Like the rest of the Official History, the CIA historian defends the CIA against criticism from its own Inspector General and seeks to spread the “Who Lost Cuba” blame to other agencies and authorities of the U.S. government, most notably the Kennedy White House.

When Pfeiffer first sought to obtain declassification of his critique, the Kirkpatrick report was still secret.  The CIA was able to convince a judge that national security would be compromised by the declassification of Pfeiffer’s critique which called attention to this extremely sensitive Top Secret report.  But in 1998, Peter Kornbluh and the National Security Archive used the FOIA to force the CIA to declassify the Inspector General’s report. (Kornbluh subsequently published it as a book: Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.) Since the Kirkpatrick report has been declassified for over 13 years, it is unclear why the CIA continues to refuse to declassify a single word of Pfeiffer’s final volume.

The National Security Archive remains committed to using all means of legal persuasion to obtain the complete declassification of the final volume of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation.

TOP-SECRET: The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev Former Top Soviet Adviser’s Journal Chronicles Final Years of the Cold War

Washington, DC, August 13th, 2011 – Today the National Security Archive is publishing the first installment of the diary of one of the key behind-the-scenes figures of the Gorbachev era – Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev. This document is being published in English here for the first time.

It is hard to overestimate the uniqueness and importance of this diary for our understanding of the end of the Cold War – and specifically for the peaceful withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The document allows the reader a rare opportunity to become a fly on the wall during the heady discussions of early perestroika, and to witness such fascinating phenomena as how the dying ideology of Soviet-style communism held sway over the hearts and minds of Soviet society.

In 2004, Anatoly Chernyaev donated the originals of his diaries from 1972 to 1991 to the National Security Archive in order to ensure full and permanent public access to his notes – beyond the reach of the political uncertainties of contemporary Russia. The Archive is planning to publish the complete English translation of the diaries in regular installments.

This first installment covers the year 1985, which saw the election of Mikhail Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the beginning of the changes that were evident first in the “style,” and then in the practice of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. The diary gives a detailed account of Gorbachev’s election and of the political struggle associated with it. The author is observing the changes in 1985 from his position as a senior analyst in the International Department of the Central Committee (CC), where Chernyaev was in charge of relations with West European Communist parties.

The author documents all the major developments of 1985 – beginning from the first revelations about the sad state of the Soviet economy and the extent of such societal problems as alcoholism, to anguished discussions about the war in Afghanistan, to the first summit with President Ronald Reagan in Geneva. Throughout the year, the most noticeable change is the process of radical “cleansing” of the party – the great turnover of personnel designed to replace the old dogmatic Brezhnevite elite. The diary sheds light on how, gradually but persistently, Gorbachev built his reform coalition, making such fateful decisions as appointing Eduard Shevardnadze to the post of Foreign Minister, and bringing Boris Yeltsin to Moscow.

The pages of the diary provide a gallery of living portraits of all the influential figures in the highest echelons of the Soviet elite who in 1985 were engaged in a struggle for political survival under the new leadership. Chernyaev observes his colleagues in the Central Committee trying to reconcile their ingrained ideology with the new “Gorbachev style,” or “Gorbachev thinking.” He himself, as is clear from his notes, remained committed to the Leninist romanticism of communist ideology and argued for going back to Lenin in an effort to purify and reform the Soviet society.

One line of Chernyaev’s narrative follows developments in the influential International Department of the CC CPSU as its staff tried to find answers about the future of the international communist movement as the Soviet Union itself began to change. Gorbachev at that time chose to renounce Moscow’s Big Brother role with regard to socialist countries and non-ruling Communist parties, both in terms of dictating to them but also bankrolling them. Chernyaev presents us with an intimate portrait of one of the most influential figures in the Soviet leadership – the head of the International Department, Boris N. Ponomarev.

The diary gives a detailed account about one of the most important (and long poorly-understood) dynamics of foreign policy making in the Soviet Union – the interaction between the Central Committee and the Foreign Ministry in every step of the preparation of major events and decisions. From its pages, one can see the tremendous role of experts and consultants – the free-thinking intellectuals of the Soviet elite – in forming policy priorities for the leadership. The International Department was a major oasis of enlightened thinking in the Soviet nomenklatura; it provided Gorbachev with people on whom he could rely for new ideas and honest estimates of the situation after coming to power – beginning with Anatoly Chernyaev, whom Gorbachev chose as his foreign policy adviser in March 1986. One can confidently say that every bold foreign policy initiative advanced by Gorbachev in the years 1986-1991 bears Chernyaev’s mark on it. Thus, the diary gives insights into the thought processes of one of most influential new thinkers in Moscow.

Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev was born on May 25, 1921 in Moscow. He fought in World War II beginning in 1941. After the war, he returned to his studies at Moscow State University in the Department of History, which he completed in 1948. From 1950-1958, he taught contemporary history at Moscow State University. From 1958-1961, Chernyaev worked in Prague on the editorial board of the theoretical journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, joining the International Department in 1961. In 1986, he became foreign policy adviser to the General Secretary, and later to the first and the last President of the USSR. A prolific writer, Chernyaev has published five monographs in addition to numerous articles in Soviet, Russian, European and U.S. journals.

The National Security Archive takes great pleasure in wishing a happy birthday to Anatoly Sergeevich, who for years has been our partner in the mission to fight government secrecy through glasnost. Anatoly Sergeevich turns 85 today.

The Chernyaev Diary was translated by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

TOP-SECRET: CIA HAD SINGLE OFFICER IN HUNGARY 1956

Washington D.C., August 9th, 2011 – Fifty years ago today the Soviet Presidium overturned its earlier decision to pull its troops out of Hungary in the face of a popular uprising, yet the CIA–with only one Hungarian-speaking officer stationed in Budapest at the time–failed to foresee either the uprising or the Soviet invasion to come, according to declassified CIA histories posted on the Web by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org).

Describing the several days in early November 1956 when it seemed the Hungarian Revolution had succeeded (before the Soviet tanks rolled in on November 4), a CIA Clandestine Service History written in 1958 commented: “This breath-taking and undreamed-of state of affairs not only caught many Hungarians off-guard, it also caught us off-guard, for which we can hardly be blamed since we had no inside information, little outside information, and could not read the Russians’ minds.”

Through a Freedom of Information Act request and appeal, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS) professor Charles Gati obtained the heavily-censored extracts from two previously secret CIA histories in the Clandestine Service History series for his critically-praised new book Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Stanford University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006).

The extracts come from a two-volume history of CIA operations in Hungary (dated May 1972 and only 2 copies made) and from a two-volume history titled “The Hungarian Revolution and Planning for the Future” (dated January 1958). Because of the extensive security deletions, it is impossible to determine the length of each document, but judging by the page numbers, the first pair of volumes totals at least 99 and 71 pages, and the second at least 106 pages.

The CIA histories show that the Agency had essentially only one Hungarian-speaking officer based in Hungary during the 1950-1957 period, and for several years that person spent “95 percent” of his time on “cover duties.” “He mailed letters, purchased stamps and stationery …,” among other “support tasks,” the history noted. At the time of the Revolution in fall 1956, he was preoccupied with official contacts and doing interviews with Hungarian visitors.

The name of the sole CIA officer in Budapest in 1956, Geza Katona, is censored from the CIA histories but included in Professor Gati’s book with Katona’s permission. Katona is also the subject of an extensive oral history interview in the Summer 2006 issue of Hungarian Quarterly (pp. 109-131), which repeats his cover story as a State Department official. According to the CIA histories, Katona took part in no operational activities because he had no time and was “constrained from so doing by the US policy of nonintervention.” In fact, the histories say, “At no time in the period 23 October – 4 November, if one looks at the situation realistically, did we have anything that could or should have been mistaken for an intelligence operation.”

The CIA documents admit that the bulk of the reports CIA received were from the border areas near Austria. The Agency had no steady information from Budapest (“the storm center”) or on a country-wide basis. The histories acknowledge this meant intelligence was “one-sided” and that therefore planning based on that intelligence was also “one-sided.”

On the issue of whether support from outside the country would have been useful or welcome (which may seem an obvious point, but until now the evidence has consisted only of memoir accounts and second-hand literature citing unnamed intelligence sources), the CIA histories reflect this lingering controversy, reporting with some feeling that, based on “the whole picture we now have of the mentality of the revolutionaries … almost anyone from the West, of whatever nationality, color or purpose would have been received with open arms by any of the revolutionary councils in the cities of Hungary during the period in question.”

Two related issues have remained open to debate since the revolution–whether the United States sent weapons or ammunition to the rebels or deployed specially trained émigré forces into Hungary. The CIA records appear to put both questions to rest.

A few days after the revolt broke out, Katona queried the agency on official policy regarding arms and ammunition. On October 28, Headquarters responded, “we must restrict ourselves to information collection only [and] not get involved in anything that would reveal U.S. interest or give cause to claim intervention.” The next day, Washington replied more specifically “that it was not permitted to send U.S. weapons in.” In fact, the implication in the histories is that transferring arms was never seriously contemplated: “At this date no one had checked precisely on the exact location and nature of U.S. or other weapons available to CIA. This was done finally in early December” of 1956.

Numerous published accounts have indicated the existence of secret U.S.-trained émigré groups in the 1950s identified under such rubrics as Red Sox/Red Cap or the Volunteer Freedom Corps. But it has never been officially confirmed whether any groups of this kind played a part in Hungary in 1956. From the Clandestine Service Histories, it seems clear they did not. Although the new documents confirm that small psychological warfare and paramilitary units came into being in the early 1950s, (including the Hungarian National Council headed by Bela Varga), and occasional reconnaissance missions took place at that time, the prospects for penetrating into Hungary deteriorated by 1953 when stepped up controls by Hungarian security forces and “the meager talent available” among potential agents made cross-border operations essentially untenable.

Thus, far from revealing the deployment of any organized contingents that may have existed, the new documents imply that something much more spur-of-the-moment took place: on October 31, “Headquarters seconded a scheme which had shortly before come out of [deleted] and which proposed that certain defectors [deleted] who had volunteered to go back into Hungary be allowed to go.”

The histories contain other interesting insights into CIA operations, including the complaint that another obstacle to their activities was the involvement of the U.S. military (presaging current conflicts between the two bureaucracies in Iraq). The authors sarcastically write that “If we [the CIA] were in no position to act efficiently … the military is, was, and always will be even worse off.” They recommend that in the future the CIA keep the military “at arm’s length” and only do what’s necessary “to keep them happy.”

Of course, according to Soviet documents previously published by the National Security Archive (click here for more selections from The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents, edited by Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, and Janos M. Rainer, from Central European University Press), the availability of an abundance of intelligence assets does not necessarily provide all the answers. Moscow was also taken by surprise by the Revolution despite the thousands of Soviet soldiers, KGB officers, and Party informants present in Hungary. Rather than understanding the sources of the discontent, it was easier for Soviet operatives and even the leadership to cast woefully misdirected blame on the CIA for the unrest. Klement Voroshilov remarked at the October 28 Presidium session: “The American Secret Services are more active in Hungary than Comrades Suslov and Mikoyan are,” referring to the two Party leaders sent to Budapest to negotiate a modus vivendi with the new Nagy government. At that moment, of course, the Soviet Presidium had more active members (2) in Budapest than the CIA had case officers (1).

Documents
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CIA Histories

Document 1: CIA Clandestine Services History, The Hungarian Revolution and Planning for the Future, 23 October – 4 November 1956, Volume I of II, January 1958

Document 2: CIA Historical Staff, The Clandestine Service Historical Series, Hungary, Volume I, [Deleted], May 1972

Document 3: CIA Historical Staff, The Clandestine Service Historical Series, Hungary, Volume II, External Operations, 1946 – 1965, May 1972

Soviet Documents

Document 4: Working Notes from the CPSU CC Presidium Session, October 28, 1956

Document 5: Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on October 30, 1956 (Re: Point 1 of Protocol No. 49)

Document 6: Working Notes and Attached Extract from the Minutes of the CPSU CC Presidium Meeting, October 31, 1956

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev: 1987-1988

Washington D.C., August 3rd 2011 – Today, the National Security Archive publishes its third installment of the diary of one of the main supporters of Mikhail Gorbachev and strongest proponents of glasnost during the perestroika period in the Soviet Union — Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev. This section of the diary, covering two key years of history, is being published in English here for the first time.

By 1987 Chernyaev has become a member of Gorbachev’s inner circle, a close adviser the General Secretary relies on for drafting his speeches, writing his book on perestroika, and often for baring his soul and sharing doubts and concerns about the speed and the direction that the reform is taking. Even though Chernyaev’s position focuses his responsibilities on foreign policy, the diary shows how deeply involved he was in developing the ideas of perestroika in philosophical terms, and in applying them to Soviet domestic political structures and ideology. He is especially vocal in his encouragement of openness and freedom of the press.

At the start of the year, Chernyaev gives a brief overview of how the policy of glasnost has been changing the Soviet press, which becomes truly free and vibrant in this period, with many previously banned manuscripts finding their way into scholarly and literary journals. The speed of the reform process picks up with the January 1987 Central Committee Plenum focusing on “cadres” — the Communist Party’s personnel policy. In spring 1987, Chernyaev is very busy preparing materials for U.S.-Soviet negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces, (resulting in the landmark treaty signed in December 1987), as well as Geneva and Reykjavik which leads to his “neglecting” his diary for a time.

The summer entries give a glimpse of Gorbachev’s uneasy reaction to the flight of Mathias Rust, the young West German pilot who landed his small plane near the Red Square after evading the vaunted Soviet air defense systems. Eventually, Gorbachev uses the Rust incident to conduct a profound purge of the military leadership, removing those who are known for their opposition to the reform, including Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov.

In fall 1987, virtually all of Chernyaev’s attention is given over to preparations for a seminal event — the Central Committee Plenum commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. These preparations involve addressing some of the most painful spots in Soviet history — Stalin’s purges beginning in the 1930s.

The year 1988 begins with another important Plenum — this time focusing on school reform. The February party gathering addresses fundamental ideological issues head-on within the framework of discussions on the teaching of history in secondary schools and in institutions of higher education. Chernyaev notes attacks on glasnost at the Plenum, which later culminate in a famous letter by Nina Andreeva, a teacher from Leningrad, published in the conservative newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya in March, which in turn provokes an intense discussion and a drawing of lines of disagreement within the Central Committee. Gorbachev openly challenges those in the leadership who side with Andreeva’s Stalinist version of Soviet history, and he later gradually removes practically all of these individuals from the Central Committee — including Vitalii Vorotnikov, Yegor Ligachev, Andrei Gromyko, Mikhail Solomentsev, Viktor Nikonov and Viktor Chebrikov.

The first half of 1988, as reflected in the diary, is devoted to preparations for the 19th Party Conference of June 28-July 1, which becomes the main turning point toward political reform and democratization in Soviet society.  Chernyaev’s diary perceptively captures all the difficult debates over these issues within the leadership and among the drafters of the theses for the conference.  Assessing Gorbachev’s performance there, Chernyaev notes his bold and consistent speeches, but also his inability to deal effectively with voices of the opposition, including Ligachev on the right and Boris Yeltsin on the left.  Afterwards, during a trip with Gorbachev to the Black Sea, Chernyaev works on implementing the decisions of the conference — primarily drafting proposals for a radical reform of the central party apparatus, which is eventually carried out at the September 1988 Plenum of the Central Committee.

Chernyaev is also involved in drafting arguably the most important Gorbachev speech of 1988 — the U.N. General Assembly address announcing drastic cuts in Soviet conventional forces in Europe, which makes it clear to the East Europeans that the new Soviet leadership is serious about not resorting to force to maintain Communist political control in the region.  In preparing the speech, Soviet reformers must overcome emerging opposition among the military brass, who make every effort to prevent deep unilateral cuts in Soviet armaments, and are especially adamant in resisting the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe. Specific figures and other content from the speech have to be kept secret, even from other members of the Central Committee, practically until Gorbachev’s departure for the United States.

These diary entries cover the two most successful years of Soviet perestroika — the years when Gorbachev enjoyed immense popularity both at home and especially in the West, and before the conservative opposition to reform began to coalesce, leading eventually to the coup of August 1991. Beneath the surface, however, these processes were already beginning to rock the reformers’ boat, and Chernyaev, subtly but precisely, notes the first signs of this agitation in these pages.

The Chernyaev Diary was translated by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Reagan, Gorbachev and Bush at Governor’s Island

governor's island

Washington DC, August 2nd 2011 – Previously secret Soviet documentation shows that Mikhail Gorbachev was prepared for rapid arms control progress leading towards nuclear abolition at the time of his last official meeting with President Reagan, at Governor’s Island, New York in December 1988; but President-elect George H. W. Bush, who also attended the meeting, said “he would need a little time to review the issues” and lost at least a year of dramatic arms reductions that were possible had there been a more forthcoming U.S. position.

The new documentation posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org) includes highest-level memos from Gorbachev advisors leading up to Gorbachev’s famous speech at the United Nations during the New York visit, notes of Politburo discussions before and after the speech and the Reagan-Bush meeting, CIA estimates before and after the speech showing how surprised American officials had been and how reluctant the new Bush administration was to meet Gorbachev even half-way, and the declassified U.S. transcript of the private meeting between Reagan, Bush and Gorbachev on December 7.

The Governor’s Island Summit, December 1988

The last official meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev – after four spectacular summits that commanded worldwide attention at Geneva 1985, Reykjavik 1986, Washington 1987 and Moscow 1988 – took place on an island in New York harbor on December 7, 1988 during the Soviet leader’s trip to deliver his now-famous United Nations speech announcing unilateral arms cuts and – to many observers – the ideological end of the Cold War.

Adding particular interest to this abbreviated summit was the participation of then-President-elect George H.W. Bush, who was at that moment constructing a national security team of aides who were distinctly more skeptical of Gorbachev’s motives than President Reagan or his top officials were.  In fact, the transition from the Reagan to the Bush administrations at the end of 1988 and beginning of 1989 might be described as a transition from doves to hawks.  (One of the leading hawks was Bush’s deputy national security adviser Robert Gates, now serving as Secretary of Defense for President George W. Bush and President-elect Barack Obama.)

According to evidence from the Soviet side – much of it published here for the first time anywhere – Gorbachev explicitly prepared the U.N. speech as a means to speed up arms reductions, engage the new American leader, and end the Cold War.   After the successful signing of the INF Treaty at the Washington summit in 1987 eliminated that entire class of nuclear weapons, the Soviet leadership was prepared for a very quick progress on the strategic offensive weapons treaty START.  Building on the personal understanding and chemistry between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, the Soviets were counting on signing the treaty with Reagan, before the U.S. presidential election of 1988.

Having made substantial concessions on verification and shorter-range missiles for the INF Treaty, Gorbachev was signaling Reagan throughout the spring of 1988 trying to push for faster progress on START.  But Reagan’s conventionally-minded advisers – particularly Frank Carlucci at the Defense Department and Colin Powell at the White House – undercut Secretary of State George Shultz with their go-slow approach, even though Shultz saw the opportunities for radical arms reductions.  Opposition from the U.S. Navy over submarine-launched cruise missiles also stalled progress, even though the withdrawal of such missiles was manifestly in the U.S. national security interest. (Note 1) Then result was that the Americans were not ready to agree on START in time for the Moscow summit in May-June 1988.  Even after the summit, Gorbachev still kept hope alive for signing the treaty; but there was no progress, at least in part because then Vice-President Bush – in the middle of a presidential campaign where securing the conservative base of the Republican Party was key to his strategy – was not eager to move any arms control forward. (Note 2)

During the summer of 1988, gradually, the documents show that the Soviet leadership realized that the treaty would have to wait until the new administration came to power in Washington, and therefore, the most important priority for Soviet foreign policy now was not to lose the momentum and to hit the ground running with the new administration.  Georgy Arbatov in his June 1988 memo to Gorbachev [Document 1] emphasized the importance of being prepared for the new administration – not slowing down the pace of negotiations, keeping the initiative, and building a base of support in Europe – thus keeping the pressure for comprehensive cuts in conventional arms, including elimination of asymmetries and reductions of Soviet forces by 500,000.  However, in the summer of 1988, the Soviet side still saw this plan as part of mutual reductions in Europe.

In the summer of 1988, the groundbreaking Soviet XIX Party Conference discussed the main ideas that later became part of the Gorbachev U.N. address and adopted them as guidelines for Soviet foreign policy.  But even that significant ideological shift did not produce any response in the United States preoccupied with the electoral campaign.  In the fall of 1988, however, after various Soviet initiatives did not result in U.S. engagement, the Soviets felt the need to radicalize their approach if they were to achieve quick progress with the new administration.  Former ambassador to Washington and now key Central Committee official Anatoly Dobrynin in his September memorandum to Gorbachev [Document 3] suggested that the General Secretary should meet with the President-elect as early as possible, preferably during his visit to New York for the session of the U.N. General Assembly.  Dobrynin suggested that if Gorbachev delivered an address at the U.N., it would be helpful in his relations with the new administration and would have positive impact on the American public opinion.

Late October 1988 brought a major break with past Soviet positions, when Gorbachev decided to offer deep reductions in Soviet forces in Europe as a unilateral initiative, and to deliver a major address at the United Nations.  Gorbachev conceptualized this speech as an “anti-Fulton, Fulton in reverse” in its significance – comparing it with the historic Winston Churchill “Iron Curtain” speech of 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, at the beginning of the Cold War.  Gorbachev wanted his speech to signify the end of the Cold War, offering deep Soviet reductions in conventional weapons as proof of his policy.  These reductions would address the most important Western concern about the threat of war in Europe, where the Soviets enjoyed significant conventional superiority.  This move, in Gorbachev’s mind, would build trust and open the way for a very fast progress with the new American administration.  His meeting with President-elect Bush and President Reagan would take place immediately after the U.N. speech.

However, the documents show that Gorbachev and his advisers had first to convince their own military of the wisdom of making such unilateral unbalanced reductions, including the problem of what to do with the personnel being withdrawn from Europe [Document 5].  Gorbachev seemed well aware of the potential opposition to his initiative both in the Politburo and in the Armed Forces – a very sensitive issue to handle.  The decision making on the U.N. speech involved a very narrow circle of advisers, and the full scope of numbers was never discussed at the Politburo or published, partly because as Gorbachev stated in an unprecedented direct way on November 3, “If we publish how the matters stand, that we spend over twice as much as the US on military needs, if we let the scope of our expenses be known, all our new thinking and our new foreign policy will go to hell.  Not one country in the world spends as much per capita on weapons as we do, except perhaps the developing nations that we are swamping with weapons and getting nothing in return” [Document 4].

Gorbachev’s U.N. speech on December 7 explicitly endorsed the “common interests of mankind” (no longer the class struggle) as the basis of Soviet foreign policy and, significantly for Eastern Europe, declared “the compelling necessity of the principle of freedom of choice” as “a universal principle to which there should be no exceptions.”  Gorbachev particularly surprised CIA and NATO officials with his announcement of unilateral cuts in Soviet forces totaling 500,000 soldiers, and the withdrawal from Eastern Europe of thousands of tanks and tens of thousands of troops.

Reaction in the West ranged from disbelief to astonishment.  The New York Times editorialized, “Perhaps not since Woodrow Wilson presented his Fourteen Points in 1918 or since Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill promulgated the Atlantic Charter in 1941 has a world figure demonstrated the vision Mikhail Gorbachev displayed yesterday at the United Nations.” (Note 3)  U.S. Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan called this speech “the most astounding statement of surrender in the history of ideological struggle,” while retired Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, a former NATO commander and top aide to President Eisenhower, described Gorbachev’s announcement of unilateral troop cuts as “the most significant step since NATO was founded.” (Note 4)

Little of this world-shaking impact was evident in the highest-level U.S. government reaction.  At the Governors Island meeting, for example, President Reagan remarked only that “he had had a brief report on it, and it all sounded good to him”; while Vice-President and President-elect Bush remarked that he “would like to build on what President Reagan had done” but “he would need a little time to review the issues….”  Bush described the “theory” behind his “new team” as “to revitalize things by putting in new people.”

But the new Bush advisers were more than skeptical of Gorbachev.  In subsequent memoirs, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft dismissed the U.N. speech when he described his staunch opposition to any early summit with Gorbachev in 1989:  “Unless there were substantive accomplishments, such as in arms control, the Soviets would be able to capitalize on the one outcome left – the good feelings generated by the meeting.  They would use the resulting euphoria to undermine Western resolve, and a sense of complacency would encourage some to believe the United States could relax its vigilance.  The Soviets in general and Gorbachev in particular were masters at creating these enervating atmospheres.  Gorbachev’s UN speech had established, with a largely rhetorical flourish, a heady atmosphere of optimism.  He could exploit an early meeting with a new president as evidence to declare the Cold War over without providing substantive actions from a ‘new’ Soviet Union.  Under the circumstances which prevailed [in 1989], I believed an early summit would only abet the current Soviet propaganda campaign.” (Note 5)

Ironies abound in this statement.  The Soviet evidence shows that substantive accomplishments in arms control were very much on the table and available at the very beginning of the Bush administration.  These included the START agreement for 50% reductions in strategic arms that the Bush administration would not actually sign until 1991, or the withdrawn deployments of tactical nuclear weapons that President Bush did not order until the fall of 1991, to immediate reciprocation by Gorbachev.  The U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Jack Matlock, titled his chapter on this initial period of the Bush administration, “Washington Fumbles”; while Gorbachev’s advisor Anatoly Chernyaev is even harsher with his chapter title, “The Lost Year.” (Note 6)

Chernyaev subsequently wrote:  “Much has been written about the impression that Gorbachev made on the world in his UN speech.  But we also have to consider the impact on him of the world’s response to his speech…. Having received such broad recognition and support, having been ‘certified’ a world class leader of great authority, he could be faster and surer in shaking off the fetters of the past in all aspects of foreign policy.” (Note 7) Regrettably, exactly those “fetters of the past” continued to restrain the highest levels of the George H.W. Bush administration from meeting Gorbachev half-way, and arguably prevented dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons, fissile materials, and conventional armaments, to the detriment of international security today.

Read the Documents

Document 1:  Arbatov memorandum to Gorbachev, June 1988

This memorandum to the General Secretary from the influential advisor to Soviet leaders and director of the U.S. and Canada Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Georgy Arbatov, provides an after-action assessment of the Moscow summit and the state of U.S.-Soviet relations.  Arbatov points to the significance of the summit as being a “discovery” of the Soviet Union by America and the West and the breaking of the enemy image.  He outlines the broad arms control agenda that remains, but cautions Gorbachev that during the last stages of the electoral campaign in the United States it would not be realistic to expect any serious progress.  Arbatov clearly believes the Reagan administration has spent its potential to make any serious steps on strategic or conventional weapons.  In one part of the memorandum, he carefully suggests that it might be time for the Soviet Union to undertake some unilateral initiative on conventional weapons in Europe, like significant reductions in tanks, which would impress European public opinion and make quick progress with the new U.S. administration more likely.

[Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation. Fond 2.
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.]

Document 2:  Dobrynin Memorandum to Gorbachev on U.S.-Soviet relations. September 18, 1988

Here, the former Soviet Ambassador to the United States and future head of the International Commission of the Central Committee Anatoly Dobrynin advises Gorbachev on the next moves toward the United States.  Dobrynin explains perceptively the dynamics of the presidential campaign in the U.S. and suggests that Gorbachev should try to meet with the president-elect as early as possible, before he is inaugurated, in order to preserve the continuity and momentum in U.S.-Soviet relations.  The best time and location for such a meeting would be in New York especially if Gorbachev was making an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations.  The address then could provide a major stimulus for a new start in U.S.-Soviet relations.

[Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation. Fond 2.
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.]

Document 3: Gorbachev’s Conference with Advisers on Drafting the U.N. Speech, October 31, 1988

In this document Gorbachev thinks aloud in the presence of a narrow circle of foreign policy experts, in effect brainstorming with them on the content of his upcoming speech to the U.N. General Assembly.  In addition to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Gorbachev’s foreign policy assistant Chernyaev, the circle also includes Alexander Yakovlev as head of the International Commission, former ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin as head of the Central Committee’s International Department, and Dobrynin’s deputy, Valentin Falin.  The major thrust of Gorbachev’s initiative, as he envisions it, is about disarmament and the gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. But the spirit is less pragmatic than messianic. The Soviet leader visualizes himself as a world figure who will not only assuage the security fears of Western countries, but will outline an entirely new cooperative global order.  When Gorbachev says, “In general this speech should be an anti-Fulton – Fulton in reverse,” he means to undo the Cold War that was declared most dramatically in the “Iron Curtain” speech delivered by Winston Churchill in Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946.

[Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation. Fond 2.
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.]

Document 4: Chernyaev Diary, November 3, 1988

In this diary entry, Chernyaev records a “historic” conversation at the Politburo, after the formal agenda items.  This is the first time Gorbachev presents his decision to announce deep unilateral cuts in his UN speech to the full Politburo.  Chernyaev notes that Gorbachev is “clearly nervous,” because he is aware of the radical nature of the steps he is going to undertake, and because of the presence of Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov in the room, who would have to approve the cuts.  The General Secretary makes an unprecedented push for cutting Soviet military expenses and publishing the numbers as a matter of building trust.  He tries to impress the Politburo with the unreasonably high Soviet military expenses and the need to withdraw from Eastern Europe.  Gorbachev has  to walk a fine line—making the conservatives feel that they are part of the decision making process, and yet leaving them out of decisions on actual scope of the cuts—therefore he never mentions the actual numbers.  Only at the end of his intervention does Gorbachev mention that the cuts will be unilateral—a huge break with the past Soviet position, which demanded reciprocal cuts in conventional weapons in Europe.
Chernyaev predicts this is “an event that may well take the second place of importance after the April of 1985” – referring to the party plenum when the policy of perestroika was formally announced.

[Source:  Anatoly Chernayev Diary Manuscript, donated to the National Security Archive
Translated by Anna Melyakova for the National Security Archive]

Document 5: Chernyaev Memorandum to Gorbachev on the Armed Forces, November 10, 1988

Here, Gorbachev’s foreign policy adviser and confidant Anatoly Chernyaev provides suggestions to Gorbachev in anticipation of the opposition among the military to the deep unilateral cuts that would be announced in Gorbachev’s U.N. speech.  Chernyaev suggests that the initiatives should be presented in such a way that would co-opt the military as much as possible even though they were not involved in the real decision making leading to the U.N. initiative.  In addition, Chernyaev suggests taking preliminary measures to accommodate the large numbers of officers who would have to be retired before their turn, and moved to temporary housing.  The advice would never be fully followed, which indeed would lead to strong frustration and rising opposition among the military, culminated in the August 1991 coup against Gorbachev.

[Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation. Fond 2.
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.]

Document 6: Director of Central Intelligence, Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-16-88, “Soviet Policy During the Next Phase of Arms Control in Europe,” November 1988 (Key Judgments only)

This Top Secret SNIE, produced just two weeks before Gorbachev’s speech at the U.N., demonstrates how much the Soviet leader took the US government by surprise with the unilateral cuts in Soviet ground forces (by 500,000 out of a total force of 5 million)) and the withdrawals from Eastern Europe (50,000 troops, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft).  The intelligence community consensus reflected here posits that the Soviets “prefer to negotiate with NATO to achieve mutual reductions of conventional forces” because “it makes more sense to trade force reductions, thereby retaining a balance in the correlation of forces.”  The SNIE goes on to suggest that “the Warsaw Pact probably realizes that negotiating an agreement with NATO that is acceptable to the Soviets could take years – and might not even be possible” – a judgment that would become obsolete within days, yet would live on into the new Bush administration as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, would move to the White House as deputy national security advisor.  Just in case, however, the authors of the SNIE mention that “for political effect, the Soviets may also take unilateral initiatives” such as withdrawing some troops from Hungary.  But they completely misjudge the troops cuts, claiming that the “Soviets may attempt to portray force restructuring as a unilateral force reduction” but really this is “intended primarily to make units more effective for prolonged conventional combat operations against NATO.”

[Source: released by CIA for 1999 conference at George H. W. Bush Center for Presidential Studies, Texas A & M University, published in Benjamin B. Fischer, ed., At Cold War’s End (CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999)]

Document 7: U. S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Task Force, Wednesday, December 7, 1988
(Testimony of Doug MacEachin, Director, Office of Soviet Analysis, CIA; Bob Blackwell, National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union, CIA; and Paul Erickson, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Analysis, CIA)

This remarkable closed-door testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee by the top three CIA analysts of the Soviet Union occurs at the precise moment that Gorbachev is speaking to the United Nations on December 7, 1988.  MacEachin opens his testimony by saying “in about 15 minutes or so we may find out if one of my analytical judgments is going to turn out to be correct,” referring to his prediction that Gorbachev will have to cut the proportion of Soviet resources that go to the military.  At the same time, MacEachin disparages the “plausible but totally unfounded story of very large cuts.”  (page 3)  Later (page 32) he says that “Blackwell just went down the hall to watch some” of the U.N. speech on television, and (page 36) he mentions the “news bulletin” of the 500,000 troop cut, calling the discussion “analysis on the fly.”

Most striking is the way this testimony illustrates the rifts within the U.S. government between Gorbachev skeptics like Robert Gates and the new national security advisor Brent Scowcroft on one side, and the career analysts like MacEachin on the other.  MacEachin remarks (page 37) that “if Gorbachev is successful he will cause major social displacement in the United States” because “[t]here are not many homes for old wizards of Armageddon, and it is kind of like old case officers trying to find employment.”  And MacEachin offers a true confession in the extraordinary passage on page 38, which demonstrates how prior assumptions about Soviet behavior, rather than actual intelligence data points, actually drove intelligence findings:

“Now, we spend megadollars studying political instability in various places around the world, but we never really looked at the Soviet Union as a political entity in which there were factors building which could lead to the kind of – at least the initiation of political transformation that we seem to see.  It does not exist to my knowledge.  Moreover, had it existed inside the government, we never would have been able to publish it anyway, quite frankly.  And had we done so, people would have been calling for my head.  And I wouldn’t have published it.  In all honesty, had we said a week ago that Gorbachev might come to the UN and offer a unilateral cut of 500,000 in the military, we would have been told we were crazy.  We had a difficult enough time getting air space for the prospect of some unilateral cuts of 50 to 60,000.”

[Source: published by the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee in 1992 in the three-volume record of the 1991 confirmation hearings on Robert Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence]

Document 8: Memorandum of Conversation, “The President’s Private Meeting With Gorbachev,” December 7, 1988, 1:05 – 1:30 p.m., Commandant’s residence, Governors Island, New York

This poignant transcript of the last official meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev shows the two leaders practically avoiding any substantive discussion of the momentous changes in Soviet policy Gorbachev had just announced at the U.N.  Instead, they wax nostalgic for their series of summits dating back to Geneva 1985, and Reagan presents the Soviet leader with an inscribed photograph of that meeting.  Gorbachev is clearly eager to move forward with the President-elect, who demurs that “he would need a little time to review the issues” (even after eight years at Reagan’s right hand?) but “wished to build on what President Reagan had accomplished, working with Gorbachev.”  Ironically, Bush says “he had no intention of stalling things.  He naturally wanted to formulate prudent national security policies, but he intended to go forward.”  Yet, the transition to new hard-line advisers and the Bush White House determination to commission a months-long review of national security policy actually would stall forward progress on arms reductions and even any engagement with Gorbachev.  The two men would not meet again for an entire year (until the Malta summit in December 1989), and by that time, the world would have changed around them, the Berlin Wall would be gone, German unification would be the absorbing controversy, and Gorbachev would be losing the ability on his side to deliver more of what he announced at the U.N. that very day.

[Source: released by the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, National Security Archive FOIA request]

Document 9: Yakovlev-Matlock Conversation December 26, 1988

In this conversation, requested by the U.S. ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock, the Ambassador assures Politburo member and head of the International Commission Alexander Yakovlev that there would be continuity in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union under the new President George H. W. Bush.  Matlock praises the new President’s seriousness and professionalism, compares him favorably to Reagan in terms of his experience in foreign policy, including being personally involved in developing the policy line toward the Soviet Union.  At the same time, however, Matlock states bluntly that the United States would not be ready with its approaches on strategic arms negotiations by February 15 (the deadline for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan), and that the new President needed time for an in-depth study and analysis of these issues.  Yakovlev emphasizes especially that the Soviet leadership is hoping for “enhanced continuity” and resolution on arms control issues and regional conflicts and that Gorbachev’s goal in his meetings in New York was precisely to prevent a long pause in U.S.-Soviet relations after the new administration comes to power.  Yakovlev also expresses his frustration with the U.S. position on the settlement in Afghanistan: “the United States so far has not shown any desire to actually encourage the Afghan settlement.”

[Source:  State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fond 100063, opis 2, delo 148
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive]

Document 10: Politburo Session December 27-28, 1988

This is one of very few official records of Soviet Politburo proceedings that are available publicly.  This December meeting is the first after Gorbachev’s return from the United States, having cut short his travels in order to deal with the results of the disastrous earthquake in Armenia.  Gorbachev devotes much time to summaries of the increasingly grave forecasts for his perestroika program by foreign analysts, but then dismisses their seriousness.  Part of the context for Gorbachev’s lengthy monologues and Shevardnadze’s proposals for a “businesslike” withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe is the growing bewilderment of certain military and KGB leaders who were not fully informed in advance about the scale and tempo of Gorbachev’s announced unilateral arms cuts.  Still, there is no trace of real opposition to Gorbachev’s course.  The Soviet party leader has learned a lesson from the military’s lack of reaction to the previous discussions of “sufficiency,” and he is now ramming change down their throats. Ever obedient, Defense Minister Yazov states, “everyone reacted with understanding,” even after Shevardnadze aggressively attacks the military for retrograde thinking, for directly contradicting the U.N. speech, and for proposing only “admissible” openness rather than true glasnost.  Ironically, when Shevardnadze and Ligachev suggest announcing the size of Soviet reductions “publicly,” Gorbachev objects: if the Soviet people and party learn how huge the Soviet defense expenditures really are, it will undermine the propaganda effect of his U.N. speech.  In yet another call for strategy vis-a-vis Eastern Europe, a conservative Politburo member, Vitaly Vorotnikov, says, “I consider the situation in a number of socialist countries to be so complicated that we should clarify our thinking in one document or another.”  No such integrated strategy ever appeared.

[Source: RGANI. Published in the Russian historical magazine Istochnik, Issue 5-6, 1993.  Translated by Vladislav Zubok for the National Security Archive]

Document 11: Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate 11-4-89, “Soviet Policy Toward the West: The Gorbachev Challenge,” April 1989 (Key Judgments only)

The remarkable section headlined “Disagreements” provides a striking contrast to President Reagan’s comment in the Governor’s Island summit that “we were all on Gorbachev’s side concerning the reforms he was trying to make in the Soviet system.”  Here, in a summary of the thinking of President Bush’s own top advisers Scowcroft and Gates, the estimate says “Some analysts see current policy changes as largely tactical, driven by the need for breathing space from the competition…. They judge that there is a serious risk of Moscow returning to traditionally combative behavior when the hoped for gains in economic performance are achieved.”  In contrast, “Other analysts believe Gorbachev’s policies reflect a fundamental re-thinking of national interests and ideology as well as more tactical considerations…” and amount to “historic shifts in the Soviet definition of national interest” and “lasting shifts in Soviet behavior.”  The evidence now available from the Soviet side, including the documents included in this posting and the others in the National Security Archive’s series on the U.S.-Soviet summits, demonstrates that the latter analysts were precisely correct; yet they did not have nearly the influence on U.S. policy after the 1986 Reykjavik summit, or especially in the first year of the George H.W. Bush administration, that the hard-liners did who were so wrong because of their presumptions about the Soviet Union.  These disagreements within the U.S. side and the suspicions of top policymakers in Washington would create a kind of paralysis in the process of arms reductions after Governors Island, leaving worldwide persistence of nuclear weapons and fissile material in particular at far higher levels than the U.S. and the Soviet Union could have achieved if a more accurate U.S. view of Gorbachev’s reforms had carried the day.

[Source: released by CIA for 1999 conference at George H. W. Bush Center for Presidential Studies, Texas A & M University; published in Benjamin B. Fischer, ed., At Cold War’s End (CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999)]

Notes

1. For the inside story on the Navy’s shortsighted refusal of on-site verification for SLCMs, see Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Reagan and Gorbachev (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 277-279.

2. See Jack F. Matlock Jr., Reagan and Gorbachev, p. 306.

3. The New York Times, 8 December 1988, p. 34.

4. For the Moynihan, Goodpaster and other international reaction, see Thomas Blanton, “When did the Cold War End?” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 10 (March 1998), p.184.

5. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 46.

6. Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empire (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 177; Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years With Gorbachev, p. 201.

7. Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years With Gorbachev (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), p. 203.

Afghanistan and the Soviet Withdrawal 1989 20 Years Later

Alexander Lyakhovsky

Washington D.C., July 31st 2011 – Twenty years ago today, the commander of the Soviet Limited Contingent in Afghanistan Boris Gromov crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, thus marking the end of the Soviet war which lasted almost ten years and cost tens of thousands of Soviet and Afghan lives.

As a tribute and memorial to the late Russian historian, General Alexander Antonovich Lyakhovsky, the National Security Archive today posted on the Web (www.nsarchive.org) a series of previously secret Soviet documents including Politburo and diary notes published here in English for the first time.  The documents suggest that the Soviet decision to withdraw occurred as early as 1985, but the process of implementing that decision was excruciatingly slow, in part because the Soviet-backed Afghan regime was never able to achieve the necessary domestic support and legitimacy – a key problem even today for the current U.S. and NATO-supported government in Kabul.

The Soviet documents show that ending the war in Afghanistan, which Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev called “the bleeding wound,” was among his highest priorities from the moment he assumed power in 1985 – a point he made clear to then-Afghan Communist leader Babrak Karmal in their first conversation on March 14, 1985.  Already in 1985, according to the documents, the Soviet Politburo was discussing ways of disengaging from Afghanistan, and actually reached the decision in principle on October 17, 1985.

But the road from Gorbachev’s decision to the actual withdrawal was long and painful.  The documents show the Soviet leaders did not come up with an actual timetable until the fall of 1987.  Gorbachev made the public announcement on February 8, 1988, and the first troops started coming out in May 1988, with complete withdrawal on February 15, 1989.  Gorbachev himself, in his recent book (Mikhail Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroiku … Pochemu eto vazhno seichas. (Moscow: Alpina Books 2006)), cites at least two factors to explain why it took the reformers so long to withdraw the troops.  According to Gorbachev, the Cold War frame held back the Soviet leaders from making more timely and rational moves, because of fear of the international perception that any such withdrawal would be a humiliating retreat.  In addition to saving face, the Soviet leaders kept trying against all odds to ensure the existence of a stable and friendly Afghanistan with some semblance of a national reconciliation process in place before they left.

The documents detail the Soviet leadership’s preoccupation that, before withdrawal of troops could be carried out, the Afghan internal situation had to be stabilized and a new government should be able to rely on its domestic power base and a trained and equipped army able to deal with the mujahadeen opposition.  The Soviets sought to secure the Afghan borders through some kind of compromise with the two other most important outside players—Pakistan, through which weapons and aid reached the opposition, and the United States, provider of the bulk of that aid.  In the process of Geneva negotiations on Afghanistan, which were initiated by the United Nations in 1982, the United States, in the view of the Soviet reformers, was dragging its feet, unwilling to stop arms supplies to the rebels and hoping and planning for the fall of the pro-Soviet Najibullah regime after the Soviet withdrawal.

Internally, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan did everything possible to prevent or slow down the Soviet withdrawal, putting pressure on the Soviet military and government representatives to expand military operations against the rebels.

Persistent pleading on the part of Najibullah government as late as January 1989 created an uncharacteristic split in the Soviet leadership, with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze suggesting that the withdrawal should be slowed down or some forces should remain to help protect the regime, while the military leadership argued strongly in favor of a complete and decisive withdrawal.

According to the American record, Shevardnadze had already informed Secretary of State George Shultz as early as September 1987 of the specific timetable for withdrawal.  But many senior officials did not believe the Soviet assurances; in fact, deputy CIA director Robert Gates famously bet a State Department diplomat on New Year’s Eve 1987 that Gorbachev would make no withdrawal announcement until after the end of the Reagan administration.  Gates believed the Chinese saying about the Soviet appetite for territory: “What the bear has eaten, he never spits out” – and only in his memoirs did he admit he was making “an intelligence forecast based on fortune cookie wisdom.”  (Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York:  Simon&Shuster, 1996, pp. 430-431).  Of course, Gates’ hardline views on Gorbachev would take over U.S. policy as the George H.W. Bush administration came into office in January 1989.

By this time, however, the Soviet leaders well realized that the goal of building socialism in Afghanistan was illusory; and at the same time the goal of securing the southern borders of the Soviet Union seemed to be still within reach with the policy of national reconciliation of the Najibullah government.  So the troops came out completely by February 15, 1989.  Soon after the Soviet withdrawal, however, both superpowers seemed to lose interest in what had been so recently the hottest spot of the Cold War.

Najibullah would outlast Gorbachev’s tenure in the Kremlin, but not by much:  Within three years Najibullah would be removed from power and brutally murdered, and Afghanistan would plunge into the darkness of civil war and the coming to power of the Taliban.  Twenty years later, the other superpower and its Cold War alliance are fighting a war in Afghanistan against forces of darkness that were born among the fundamentalist parts of mujahadeen resistance to the Soviet occupation.  In such a context, the language and the dilemmas in these 20-year-old documents still provide some resonance today.

This posting is also a tribute to and a commemoration of one of our long-standing partners in the pursuit of opening secrets and writing the new truly international history of the Cold War.   General Alexander Lyakhovsky passed away from a heart attack while standing on a Moscow Metro platform on February 3, 2009, less than two weeks before the 20th anniversary of the end of the war in which he served as an officer, and which he studied for many years as a scholar.  He is survived by his wife Tatyana and their children Vladimir and Galina.

The National Security Archive mourns the passing of our dear friend and partner, Alexander Antonovich.  It is fitting and proper that here we express our deepest appreciation for his remarkable knowledge, his scholarly and personal integrity, and his generosity both in expertise and the documents that he always shared with us, while he educated us and the world.  His memory lives on in all of us who ever read his work, heard him speak, or best of all, listened to him sing the sad songs of the Afghan war.

— Svetlana Savranskaya, director of Russia programs, Thomas Blanton, executive director, National Security Archive, and Malcolm Byrne, Deputy Director, National Security Archive.

Documents:

Document 1. Memorandum of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Conversation with Babrak Karmal, March 14, 1985

In his first conversation with the leader of Afghanistan, who was installed by the Soviet troops in December of 1979, Gorbachev underscored two main points: first that “the Soviet troops cannot stay in Afghanistan forever,” and second, that the Afghan revolution was presently in its “national-democratic” stage, whereas its socialist stage was only “a course of the future.” He also encouraged the Afghan leader to expand the base of the regime to unite all the “progressive forces.” In no uncertain terms, Karmal was told that the Soviet troops would be leaving soon and that his government would have to rely on its own forces.

Document 2.  Anatoly Chernyaev Diary, April 4, 1985

Chernyaev reflects on the “torrent of letters” about Afghanistan received recently by the Central Committee and the Pravda newspaper.  They reflect the growing dissatisfaction of the population with the drawn-out war and the consensus that the troops should be withdrawn.

Document 3 Anatoly Chernyaev Diary, October 17, 1985.

At the Politburo session of October 17, 1985, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed to make a final decision on Afghanistan and quoted from citizens’ letters regarding the dissatisfaction in the country with the Soviet actions in Afghanistan.  He also described his meeting with Babrak Karmal during which Gorbachev told the Afghan leader: “we will help you, but with arms only, not troops.”Chernyaev noted Gorbachev’s negative reaction to the assessment of the situation given by Defense Minister Marshal Sergey Sokolov.

Document 4.  Politburo Session, June 26, 1986.

The Politburo discusses the first results of Najibullah’s policy of national reconciliation.  Gorbachev emphasizes that the decision to withdraw the troops is firm, but that the United States seems to be a problem as far as the national reconciliation is concerned.  He proposes early withdrawals of portions of troops to give the process a boost, and proposes to “pull the USA and Pakistan by their tail” to encourage them to participate in it more actively.

Document 5 Politburo Session, November 13, 1986.

The first detailed Politburo discussion of the process and difficulties of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which included the testimony of Marshal Sergei Akhromeev.

Document 6 Politburo Session, January 21, 1987

The Politburo discusses the results of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Head of the Central Committee International Department Anatoly Dobrynin’s trip to Afghanistan.  Shevardnadze’s report is very blunt and pessimistic about the war and the internal situation.  The main concern of the Politburo is how to end the war but save face and ensure a friendly and neutral Afghanistan.

Document 7 Politburo Session, February 23, 1987

Gorbachev talks about the need to withdraw while engaging the United States and Pakistan in negotiations on the final settlement.  He is willing to meet with the Pakistani leader Zia ul Khaq, and maybe even offer him some payoff.  The Soviet leader also shows concern about the Soviet reputation among non-aligned countries and national liberation movements.

Document 8 Politburo Session, February 26, 1987

In his remarks to the Politburo, General Secretary returns to the issue of the need to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan several times.  He emphasizes the need to withdraw the troops, and at the same time struggles with the explanation for the withdrawal, noting that “we not going to open up the discussion about who is to blame now.”  Gromyko admits that it was a mistake to introduce the troops, but notes that it was done after 11 requests from the Afghan government.

Document 9  Colonel Tsagolov Letter to USSR Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov on the Situation in Afghanistan, August 13, 1987

Criticism of the Soviet policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan and analysis of general failures of the Soviet military mission there are presented in Colonel Tsagolov’s letter to USSR Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov of August 13, 1987.  This letter represents the first open criticism of the Afghan war from within the military establishment.  Colonel Tsagolov paid for his attempt to make his criticism public in his interview with Soviet influential progressive magazine “Ogonek” by his career—he was expelled from the Army in 1988.

Document 10  CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan, May 10, 1988

On May 10, 1988, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR issued a “closed” (internal use) letter to all Communist Party members of the Soviet Union on the issue of withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.  The letter presents the Central Committee analysis of events in Afghanistan and Soviet actions in that country, the problems and the difficulties the Soviet troops had to face in carrying out their mission.  In particular, the letter stated that important historic and ethnic factors were overlooked when the decisions on Afghanistan were made in the Soviet Union. The letter analyzes Soviet interests in Afghanistan and the reasons for the withdrawal of troops.

Document 11 Politburo Session January 24, 1989

This Politburo session deals with the issue of the completion of the withdrawal and the post-war Soviet role in Afghanistan, as well as possible future development of the situation there.  The discussion shows the split among the Soviet leadership with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arguing for leaving some personnel behind to help protect the Najibullah regime or delaying the full withdrawal.

Document 12 Excerpt from Alexander Lyakhovsky and Vyacheslav Nekrasov, Grazhdanin, Politik, Voin: Pamyati Shakha Masuda (Citizen, Politician, Fighter: In Memory of Shah Masoud), (Moscow, 2007), pp. 202-205

Document 13  Excerpt from Statement of the Soviet Military Command in Afghanistan on the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops, February 14, 1989

On April 7, 1988, USSR Defense Minister signed an order on withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.  In February 1989, the Defense Ministry prepared a statement of the Soviet Military Command in Afghanistan on the issue of withdrawal of troops, which was delivered to the Head of the UN Mission in Afghanistan on February 14, 1989—the day when the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan.  The statement gave an overview of Soviet-Afghan relations before 1979, Soviet interpretation of the reasons for providing internationalist assistance to Afghanistan, and sending troops there after the repeated requests of the Afghan government.  It criticized the U.S. role in arming the opposition in disregard of the Geneva agreements, and thus destabilizing the situation in the country.  In an important acknowledgement that the Vietnam metaphor was used to analyze Soviet actions in Afghanistan, they military explicitly referred to “unfair and absurd” comparisons between the American actions in Vietnam and the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Document 14. Official Chronology of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan with quotes from documents from the Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow.

Books By Alexander Lyakhovsky
Grazhdanin,Politik,Voin, Plamya Afgana and Zacharovannye svobodoj

 

TOP-SECRET: The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev 1989

Washington, DC, July 31st – The National Security Archive publishes its fourth installment of the diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, the man who was behind some of the most momentous transformations in Soviet foreign policy at the end of the 1980s in his role as Mikhail Gorbachev’s main foreign policy aide.  In addition to his contributions to perestroika and new thinking, Anatoly Sergeevich was and remains a paragon of openness and transparency, providing his diaries and notes to historians who are trying to understand the end of the Cold War.  This section of the diary, covering 1989—the year of miracles—is published here in English for the first time.

After the “turning point year,” 1988, the Soviet reformers around Gorbachev expected fast progress on all fronts—domestically in implementation of the results of the XIX party conference and further democratization of the Soviet system, and internationally following the groundbreaking UN speech of December 1988, especially in the sphere of nuclear arms control and in integrating the Soviet Union into Europe.  However, those hopes were not realized, and the year brought quite unexpected challenges and outcomes.  By the end of the year, no new arms control agreements would be signed, but the Berlin Wall would fall, nationalist movements would start threatening the unity of the Soviet Union, and popular revolutions would sweepEastern Europewhile the Soviets stuck to their pledge not to use force.  By the end of 1989,Europewas transformed and the Cold War had ended.  Anatoly Chernyaev documented all those changes meticulously and reflected on their meaning in real time.

For Chernyaev, the year began with an argument over the final withdrawal of Soviet forces fromAfghanistan.  Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze tried to delay the full withdrawal of troops and to send an additional brigade to help the Afghan leader Najibullah repel attacks of Pakistani-supported mujahaddin and stabilize his government.  Chernyaev and Alexander Yakovlev actively opposed that course of action on the grounds that it would cost hundreds of lives of Soviet soldiers and undermine Soviet trustworthiness in the eyes of international partners.  The troops were withdrawn on schedule by February 15, 1989.

Domestically, the most important event was the first contested election to the Congress of People’s Deputies on March 26, 1989.  Chernyaev himself was elected as a Deputy, but expressed unease about being among the 100 candidates on the “guaranteed” party list.  His reflections on the electoral campaign and the results of the elections show his sincere belief that the Soviet system could be transformed by deepening the democratization and his concerns over the limitations and resistance by the conservative elements within the party.  The electoral campaign takes place at the time when the economic situation deteriorates quite significantly, leading to unprecedented discontent of the population and ultimately miners’ strikes in the summer.

An important theme of 1989 is the growing nationalism and the threat of possible breakup of theSoviet Union—“the nationalities bomb.”  On this issue, Chernyaev seems to understand the situation much better than Gorbachev, who until very late does not comprehend the fact that the Baltic states genuinely want to leave the Soviet Union, maybe up until the human chain of protesters forms on August 23, 1989.  Gorbachev believes that they could be kept in by negotiations and economic pressure.  The events inTbilision April 9, 1989, where the police killed 20 civilians trying to disperse nationalist rallies, should have been a wake-up call.  Chernyaev wonders if Gorbachev understands all the depth of the nationalities issue or if he is still under the influence of the Soviet official narrative of harmonious relations between ethnic groups under socialism.

The summer of 1989 brings the Solidarity victory in the Polish elections and the start of the Hungarian roundtable negotiations culminating in the first non-communist government in Eastern Europe inPolandand the Soviet acceptance of those events.  On the heels of the Polish and Hungarian breakthroughs comes the change of leadership inEast Germanyand the almost accidental yet fateful fall of the Berlin Wall.  In this case, just as on the issue of nationalism, Chernyaev shows a much better understanding of its true meaning than most other Soviet leaders.  In the fall of the Wall, he sees an end of an era, the true transformation of the international system, and a beginning of a new chapter in the European history.  The start of the process of German reunification and theMaltasummit signified the end of the Cold War.

However, for Chernyaev, his position notwithstanding, the year’s main concern was the domestic developments in theSoviet Union, and specifically the insufficient progress in radical economic and political reform.  A lot of entries deal with his disappointment in Gorbachev’s slow or ambivalent actions where he seems to be siding with conservatives, his inability to move more decisively even on the issues that he himself proclaimed, such as land reform.  Chernyaev’s main lament is that Gorbachev is losing time and political power as a result of his indecisiveness while the opposition is growing strong using “the Russian factor” and becoming more anti-Gorbachev and siding with Yeltsin more and more often in the Congress of People’s Deputies.

All through the tumultuous events of 1989, Anatoly Chernyaev remains at Gorbachev’s side, faithful to the ideas and the promise of the reform, but at the same time more and more critical at the weaknesses and inconsistencies of his boss and growing more dissatisfied by the emerging distance in their personal relationship.  The last entry of the year, for December 31, is written in the form of a letter to Gorbachev, expressing all his disappointments and worries about the fate of the reform.  The diary entries allow historians an opportunity to see the days of 1989 as they unfolded, through the eyes of a most perceptive and involved participant.

The Chernyaev Diary was translated by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Afghanistan Déjà vu? Lessons from the Soviet Experience

Bernd Pulch, MA (Magister Artium)

Washington, D.C., July 29 th 2011 – The debate over U.S. policy in the Afghanistan war features striking and troubling parallels with the choices faced by Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s, according to Soviet documents posted today on the Web by the National Security Archive. The documents have sparked a series of recent articles by Rodric Braithwaite (“New Afghan Myths Bode Ill for Western Aims,” October 15, 2008) in the Financial Times, Peter Beaumont (“Same Old Mistakes in Afghanistan,” October 18, 2009) in the Observer, Mark Thomson (“Soviets in Afghanistan … Obama’s Déjà vu?”, October 19, 2009 in Time, and Victor Sebestyen (“Transcripts of Defeat,” October 28, 2009) in the New York Times.

The documents obtained by the National Security Archive from the Russian archives show that even if history does not repeat, it almost certainly rhymes—more than 20 years later, U.S. policy makers are encountering very similar choices and analyses as they discuss the options for prosecuting or ending the war.

In terms that parallel those offered to President Obama by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the Soviet military told their leaders in the mid-1980s that the war was not winnable by purely political means and that the initial analysis on the basis of which the troops were introduced did not take into account the historical and religious context of the country. Most strikingly, the Soviets complained that the top leader they helped to install lacked political legitimacy and probably would need to be replaced.

The Soviet military bemoaned the fact that even though every single piece of land was at some point controlled by the Soviet military, the moment the Soviet troops moved on, the territory was immediately re-taken by the armed resistance.  Even after Babrak Karmal was replaced by Najubullah and the policy of national reconciliation was introduced, the internal resistance kept intensifying.  In January 1987, for example, Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov reports that “the military situation has deteriorated sharply.  The number of shelling of our garrisons has doubled.  […]  This war cannot be won militarily.” The growing numbers of Soviet casualties are cited in every report and discussion.

The choice between putting in more troops and delaying the withdrawal or withdrawing decisively and on schedule eventually put a rift between Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who argued for a delayed withdrawal and providing more military support for Najibullah.  In the end, the Soviets withdrew on February 15, 1989, fully anticipating the fall of Najibulah government. A major factor mentioned repeatedly in the internal Soviet exchanges was the need for comprehensive international mediation with Pakistan and the United States at the center of any such process – a condition that did not exist at the time of the Soviet pullout and would not come to pass.

Read the Documents

Politburo Session, November 13, 1986
(Full text also available from the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 1787-181)

The first detailed Politburo discussion of the process and difficulties of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which included the testimony of Marshal Sergei Akhromeev.

Politburo Session, January 21, 1987

The Politburo discusses the results of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Head of the Central Committee International Department Anatoly Dobrynin’s trip to Afghanistan. Shevardnadze’s report is very blunt and pessimistic about the war and the internal situation. The main concern of the Politburo is how to end the war but save face and ensure a friendly and neutral Afghanistan.

Colonel Tsagolov Letter to USSR Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov on the Situation in Afghanistan, August 13, 1987

Criticism of the Soviet policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan and analysis of general failures of the Soviet military mission there are presented in Colonel Tsagolov’s letter to USSR Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov of August 13, 1987. This letter represents the first open criticism of the Afghan war from within the military establishment.  Colonel Tsagolov paid for his attempt to make his criticism public in his interview with Soviet influential progressive magazine “Ogonek” by his career—he was expelled from the Army in 1988.

CONDIDENTIAL: East German Refugee Crisis in Embassies in Prague Turned Hardliners into Advocates for Change

Magister Bernd Pulch

Prague 1989:

Washington, D.C., July 28th, 2011 – Just before the fall of the Berlin Wall 20 years ago, even the hardline Czechoslovak Communist leaders called for the opening of the German border, according to documents from high-level archives in Berlin, Bonn and Prague published for the first time in English and posted on the Web today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

Czech police try to stop wall jumpers

Compiled and edited by Czech historian Vilem Precan and translated by Todd Hammond, the documents show that waves of East German refugees fleeing to the West through Czechoslovakia (more than 62,000 just in the period from November 4 to 10, 1989) so alarmed the Czechoslovak Communist authorities – who previously had resisted the reforms under way in Poland, Hungary and in Moscow – that they asked the East German leadership on November 8 to allow its citizens to go directly to West Germany, in effect to open the border.

The documents posted today include the secret diplomatic exchanges between the West German foreign ministry and its embassy in Prague where thousands of refugees took shelter, between East German diplomats in Prague and their bosses in East Berlin, between Czechoslovak diplomats and Party officials and their counterparts, and eyewitness accounts by dissident Charter 77 spokespeople about the refugee crisis.

The posting also includes contemporaneous photographs of the scene at the West German embassy in Prague, Czech police attempting to prevent refugees from scaling the embassy walls, the tent city that arose in its courtyard, and rows of abandoned Trabant cars in the streets of Prague.

The detailed essay by Vilem Precan, “Through Prague to Freedom,” that accompanies the documents cites the Czechoslovak government’s demarche to East Berlin on November 8 as “a kind of ultimatum” that forced the East German Communists into a rapid “modification of rules for permanent exit” – a reform famously announced and flubbed by an East German Politburo member at a press conference on November 9.  The statements by Gunter Schabowski led Western TV reporters to declare the Berlin Wall open when it was not, but the televised news brought crowds of East Germans to the checkpoints in East Berlin that evening who eventually forced their way through and made the media reports ultimately accurate.

Partners of long standing with the National Security Archive, the Czechoslovak Documentation Centre also acknowledges the generous support of the Fritz Thyssen Foundation specifically for the intensive archival and translation efforts involving in researching and compiling the previously secret history of the refugee crisis of 1989.

Through Prague to Freedom
The Exodus of GDR Citizens through Czechoslovakia to the Federal Republic of Germany, September 30 – November 10, 1989
An introductory essay by Vilém Prečan (PDF version)

East Germans line up in Prague

Document 1
August 22, 1989, Bonn – Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany to the embassy in Prague. Orders dealing with the temporary closing of the Prague embassy to the public.

PA AA Berlin, Record group B85, Vol. 2346E. Drahterlass No. 402.
Translation (extract) by Todd Hammond.

Document 2
September 12, 1989, Prague – Statement from Czechoslovak Press Agency on the alleged anti-Czechoslovak campaign by the media and some political circles in the Federal Republic concerning the “illegal emigration” of GDR citizens.

CTK (Czech Press Agency), Prague. Archival database, 9/12/1989.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 3
September 14, 1989, Prague – Charter 77 spokepersons to the CSSR government. Letter on the situation of East German refugees at the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Prague.

Informace o Chartě 77, Vol. 12 (1989), No. 17, p. 2.
Translation (extract) by Todd Hammond.

Document 4
September 20, 1989, Prague – GDR Ambassador Helmut Ziebart to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin. Reports on measures taken by the Czechoslovak authorities against attempts by citizens of the GDR to cross into Hungary, and the situation at the Federal Republic embassy in Prague.

BStU Berlin. MfS, ZAIG, 22477, Fol. 17 f.
Translation (extract) by Todd Hammond.

Document 5
September 21, 1989, Berlin – Memorandum of conversation between GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer and director of the fourth territorial department of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Kadnár. With the authorization of the General Secretary of the CPCz Central Committee and the CSSR Government, Kadnár relays the Czechoslovak position on the question of the GDR citizens at the Embassy of Federal Republic in Prague. “The Czechoslovak side asks that the GDR consider the possibility of solving the problem in Prague with a one-time measure explicitly described as a great exception.”

SAPMO-BArch. Berlin. DY 30, 11621.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

In the courtyard of the West German embassy

Document 6
September 29, 1989, Prague – Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs to CSSR Permanent UN Mission in New York. Report of the territorial department IV for Minister Johanes on the newest Czechoslovak proposals and other steps to resolve the situation at the embassy of the Federal Republic in Prague. “The GDR must take a more active part in the interest of easing the entire set of problems…”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, Prague. Telegrams sent, 1989, vol. 9, ref. no. 3335
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 7
September 29, 1989, Prague – Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the CSSR Permanent UN Mission in New York. Report by the Territorial Department IV for Minister Johanes on the meeting between Soviet ambassador Lomakin and Secretary of the CPCz Central Committee Jozef Lenárt over the issue of the GDR citizens at the Federal Republic embassy in Prague.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, Prague. Telegrams sent, 1989, vol. 9, ref. no. 3338.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 8
September 29, 1989, 16:35, Prague – GDR Ambassador Helmut Ziebart to the SED Central Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, relaying his observations from conversations with officials of the CPCz and the CSSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

BStU Berlin, MfS, HA II, 32922, Fol. 5 – 7.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 9
September 30, 1989, Prague – Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the CSSR Permanent UN Mission in New York. Report of the Territorial Department IV for Minister Johanes on proposals by the GDR leadership for transport of GDR citizens from the Prague embassy of the Federal Republic, and agreement by CSSR officials with this solution.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, Prague. Telegrams sent, 1989, vol. 9, ref. no. 3340.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 10
October 2, 1989, Prague – Embassy of the Federal Republic in Prague to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bonn. Summary report on the one-time transfer of citizens of the GDR to the Federal Republic on the night of September 30 – October 1 after intervention by Foreign Minister Genscher, and another wave of refugees on the embassy grounds.

PA AA Berlin. Record group AV, Vol. 20.682E. Drahtbericht  No.2294.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Outside the West German embassy

Document 11
October 3, 1989, 17:40, Prague – GDR Ambassador Helmut Ziebart to the GDR Foreign Ministry and the SED Central Committee, conveying a plea by the CPCz leadership and the CSSR Government to have some understanding for Czechoslovakia’s difficult situation resulting from the mass influx of GDR citizens; expressing the CSSR Government’s thanks for finding a solution; and informing the GDR Foreign Ministry of the Czechoslovak intention to stand behind the GDR position.

BStU Berlin, MfS, HA II, 38061, Fol. 110 f.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 12
October 3, 1989, Prague – CSSR Government statement about the gathering of citizens of the GDR at the Embassy of the Federal Republic, and their departure to the Federal Republic, with criticism of the allegedly irresponsible measures taken by the Federal Republic.

CTK (Czech Press Agency), Prague. Archival database, 10/3/1989.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 13
October 3, 1989, Berlin – CSSR Ambassador to the GDR František Langer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague. Reports on the decision of the SED leadership to temporarily suspend private travel by GDR citizens to Czechoslovakia, and resolve the situation at the Federal Republic embassy in Prague as was done on September 30.

Foreign Ministry Archive, Prague. Telegrams received, 1989, vol. 35.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 14
October 4, 1989, Berlin – First Deputy Foreign Minister Herbert Krolikowski to General Secretary of the SED Central Committee and Chairman of the GDR State Council Erich Honecker. Relays information from Ambassador Helmut Ziebart with urgent inquiries and messages from CSSR officials. “Comrade Jakeš asks that Comrade Honecker himself be told that the situation in Prague is highly critical.”

BStU Berlin. MfS, Sekr. des Ministers, 63, Fol. 23 f.
Translation (extract) by Todd Hammond.

Document 15
October 4, 1989, Berlin – Resolution by the SED Politburo on measures to be taken in regard to the emigration of GDR citizens gathering at the embassy of the Federal Republic in Prague, further limitations on the visa- and passport-free travel regime with the CSSR, and increased patrolling of the GRD’s border with Poland.

SAPMO-BArch. Berlin. DY 30, 5195, Fol. 14 f.  Also SAPMO-BArch. Berlin. DY 30, J IV/2/2, 2530, Fols. 1–3.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Abandoned East German Trabants
line the streets of Prague

Document 16
October 5, 1989, Prague – Czechoslovak State Security Headquarters, Second Department. Information on the exodus of GDR citizens from the Prague embassy of the Federal Republic through GDR territory, and the situation in and around the embassy on October 1–4, 1989

Security Services Archive, Prague. Object file reg. no. 845 (“Obora”), Fols. 209–212.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 17
October 5, 1989, Berlin – Summary of information by the GDR Ministry of State Security about the transport to the Federal Republic of East German citizens taking refuge at West German embassy, and related events, occurring on the territory of the GDR, especially in Dresden.

BStU Berlin, MfS, Arbeitsbereich Neiber, 613, Fols. 22-27.
Translation (extract) by Todd Hammond.

Document 18
October 5–6, 1989, Prague – Report from Charter 77 signatory Jan Urban on the second exodus of GDR citizens from Prague to the Federal Republic, published in the independent samizdat bulletin Information on Charter 77.

Informace o Chartě 77, Vol. 12 (1989), No. 18, 9—11 pp.
Translation (extract) by Todd Hammond.

Document 19
October 19, 1989, Prague – Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the CSSR embassies. Summary from the department of information and documentation on the situation in the GDR and personnel changes in the SED leadership.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, Prague. Telegrams sent, 1989, vol. 9, ref. no. 3550.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 20
October 23, 1989, Berlin – CSSR Ambassador to the GDR František Langer to the Foreign Ministry in Prague. Reports on politics of the new SED leadership, and the political situation in the country. “The Party and state leadership is now being pressured into a number of reforms in a wide range of areas, beginning with travel and ending for example with revising the results of local elections.”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, Prague. Telegrams received, 1989, vol. 38.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 21
October 24, 1989, Berlin – Resolution of the Politburo of the SED CC, concerning the rescinding of the temporary suspension of travel to the CSSR without a passport or visa, effective November 1, 1989.

SAPMO-BAr Berlin, DY 30, 5195, Fols. 275-277.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 22
October 25, 1989, Berlin – CSSR Ambassador to the GDR František Langer to the foreign ministry in Prague. He reports on the intention of the GDR to reopen the border for private travel to Czechoslovakia. “The GDR intends to issue the decision on the allowing of tourist traffic to the same extent as it was in the past.”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, Prague. Telegrams received, 1989, vol. 38.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 23
November 3, 1989, Berlin – GDR Minister of Foreign Affairs Oskar Fischer to General Secretary of the SED Central Committee Egon Krenz. Relays a telephone message from Prague with proposals by General Secretary Jakeš about the situation at the FRG embassy in Prague, and proposes to resolve the situation by allowing direct travel by citizens of the GDR from Czechoslovakia to the Federal Republic without formal release from GDR citizenship. (Below the address on the letterhead is the handwritten note, “Einverstanden [I agree], Egon Krenz”.)

SAPMO-BArch, Berlin. DY 30, 5196, Fols. 17–19; also DY 30 IV/2/2.039 (Bureau Egon Krenz), Vol. 342, Fols. 155–157.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 24
November 3, 1989, Berlin – CSSR Ambassador František Langer to the Foreign Ministry in Prague. Reports on the fecklessness of SED officials in the face of the situation created after the reopening of the border for free travel from the GDR to Czechoslovakia. Langer tells East Berlin officials that “no one in the CSSR understands why citizens of the GDR must travel to the FRG through the CSSR”.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, Prague. Telegrams received, 1989, vol. 39.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 25
November 4, 1989, Prague – Embassy of the Federal Republic to the Foreign Ministry in Bonn. Direct travel by 4600 GDR citizens from Czechoslovakia to the Federal Republic of Germany, organized by the embassy. “The third mass departure through the Prague embassy organized over the past few weeks is now largely at an end.”

PA AA Berlin. Record group B85, Vol. 2347E. Drahtbericht No. 2578.
Translation by Todd Hammond

Document 26
November 5, 1989, Prague – GDR Ambassador Helmut Ziebart to the foreign ministry in Berlin. Reports on the numbers of GDR citizens who departed from Prague to the Federal Republic on November 3–5 with only GDR personal identification card, and problems that the new arrangement is causing on the Czechoslovak side. “The Czechoslovak comrades are asking more and more often when citizens of the GDR will be permitted to use the border crossings between the GDR and FRG under the same conditions they can do right now through the territory of the CSSR.”

BStU, Berlin. MfS, HA II, 32922, Fol. 22.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 27
November 8, 1989, Prague – GDR Ambassador Helmut Ziebart to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin. Ziebart was asked “to relay the request that departures by citizens of the GDR to the FRG be handled directly, and not through the territory of the CSSR.”

BStU Berlin. MfS, Arbeitsbereich Neiber, 553, Fol. 2
Translation by Todd Hammond..

Document 28
November 9, 1989, Prague – Information summary from the CPCz Central Committee to the various branches of the CPCz apparatus about the emigration of GDR citizens to the Federal Republic through the territory of the CSSR on November 1– 8, 1989.

National Archive, Prague. Record Group ÚV KSČ (CPCz CC), Documentation 1989 (unsorted). Teletext messages and letters of the CPCz Central Committee.
Translation (extract) by Todd Hammond.

Document 29
November 10, 1989, Berlin (West) – Chief of the CSSR Military Mission in West Berlin Sochor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague on the situation after the opening of the Berlin Wall in the night of November 9–10, 1989.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, Prague. Telegrams received, 1989, vol. 40.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 30
November 10, 1989, Prague – Statement by the Federal Ministry of the Interior press officer, on the number of East German citizens who emigrated through Czechoslovakia to the Federal Republic during November 4–10, 1989.

CTK (Czech Press Agency), Prague.  Archival database, 11/10/1989.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Notes

Deutsche Reichsbahn: the name adopted by the GDR for its railway system from 1949 to 1994; PA AA Berlin (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes): Archive of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin; BStU (Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR): Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives; Drahtbericht: an encrypted telegram from the Embassy of the Federal Republic; Drahterlass: an encrypted telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn; MfS: Ministry of State Security, Berlin (East)

TOP-SECRET: The Soviet Origins of Helmut Kohl’s 10 Points

Magister Bernd Pulch

Documents show secret messages from Moscow sparked West German chancellor to announce German unification plans on November 28, 1989

Unintended consequences – the backchannel backfires: shock in Moscow and dismay in Washington

Washington, D.C., July 28th 2011 – Secret messages from senior Soviet officials to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl after the fall of the Berlin Wall led directly to Kohl’s famous “10 Points” speech on German unification, but the speech produced shock in both Moscow and Washington, according to documents from Soviet, German and American files posted today on the Web by the National Security Archive.

Published for the first time in English in the Archive’s forthcoming book, “Masterpieces of History,” the documents include highest-level conversations between President George H.W. Bush and Kohl; the text of the letter Kohl had delivered to Bush just as he announced the “10 Points” to the Bundestag on November 28, 1989; excerpts on Germany from the transcript of the Malta summit between Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev; Gorbachev’s own incendiary meeting with the German foreign minister after Kohl’s speech; and more.

The documents show the American administration’s devotion to stability and “reserve” while the West German leader rushes to get out in front of the rapid changes in the East, at the same time that neither Bush nor Kohl expects unification to happen so quickly.  Most strikingly, the documents and related accounts by Kohl’s aide, Horst Teltschik, and Gorbachev’s aide, Andrei Grachev, show that Kohl’s famous “10 Points” speech was based in large part directly on secret messages from Moscow – but unbeknownst to Gorbachev.

The new history of the “10 Points” speech hinges on a back-channel communication from Soviet Central Committee expert Valentin Falin (head of the International Department and former Soviet ambassador to West Germany in the 1970s), through long-time Soviet interlocutor Nikolai Portugalov, to Teltschik, on November 21, 1989, about the idea of “confederation” between West Germany and the rapidly collapsing East German regime – a way to prop up the East by getting some equal status for the two states before the bottom fell out.  According to Grachev, Falin’s rivalry with top Gorbachev assistant Anatoly Chernyaev had prevented Falin from getting his ideas to Gorbachev directly, so he decided to use a long-standing “confidential channel” through Portugalov to Teltschik, anticipating that Teltschik would then persuade Kohl to call Gorbachev and discuss the idea of confederation while reassuring the Soviets that it would only take place in the context of the “common European home.”

Falin drafted two position papers, an “official” one, cleared with Chernyaev, that mostly reaffirmed the pledges made by Kohl to Gorbachev and stated that if they were kept, then “everything becomes possible;” and an “unofficial” one, which declared that the idea of confederation was something the Soviets were already discussing at the level of the Politburo and were prepared to accept in principle.  But when Portugalov delivered these messages on November 21, Teltschik and then Kohl did not realize they were supposed to call Gorbachev and bring him along, but thought the messages were coming from Gorbachev and that he was already on board.  Furthermore, if Moscow was thinking this way, Kohl needed to go public quickly just to keep up and regain the initiative.  Teltschik therefore drafted the “10 Points” on the basis of the Soviet positions, leading with a commitment to the pan-European process (Gorbachev’s core vision) and making the idea of confederation (however gradual) the center of the German unification discourse.

The now-available documents show that Kohl did not inform either Bush, his allies, or his own foreign minister before delivering his speech in the Bundestag on November 28.  In fact, Kohl arranged for Bush to receive his letter combining advice for the forthcoming Malta summit and a summary of the “10 Points” just as Kohl was actually speaking in Bonn.  The result was consternation in Washington.  Bush aide Brent Scowcroft commented, “If he was prepared to go off on his own whenever he worried that we might object, we had very little influence.”  At the Malta summit on December 2 and 3, Gorbachev complained to Bush that “Kohl does not act seriously and responsibly,” while the American reassured Gorbachev that “[w]e are trying to act with a certain reserve” and couched his position on Germany in double negatives.

Bush’s reserve seemed to change after he actually met with Kohl on December 3 in Brussels, when the West German leader outlined a gradual process towards federation and predicted a timeline of more than two years.  (Unification would actually happen within just 10 months).  But Gorbachev’s ire rose to a crescendo in his meeting with German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on December 5 – just as the East German Communist Party was resigning en masse and the government collapsing, and just after the NATO allies including Bush had publicly announced support for Kohl.   Gorbachev told Genscher that the West Germans were preparing a “funeral for the European process” while Shevardnadze even invoked a comparison with Hitler!

After Genscher reported the conversation back to Bonn, Teltschik hastened to do damage control, writing a memo to Kohl on December 6, attaching the Portugalov positions, specifically telling Kohl that the “10 Points” were based directly on the Soviet messages, and emphasizing that Kohl needed to talk to Gorbachev.  But the Soviet leader would decline such overtures until February 1990.

Teltschik first mentioned the story of the Soviet messages in his memoirs published in 1991, and the new book by Mary Sarotte (1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe) includes a colorful recreation of the Portugalov mission, but without the Soviet backstory.  The Soviet context as well as Falin’s role in originating the Soviet messages are detailed for the first time in Andrei Grachev’s book, Gorbachev’s Gamble (2008) and were personally confirmed to the authors of this posting by Teltschik and Grachev.

Read the Documents

Document No. 1: Record of Telephone Conversation between George H.W. Bush and Helmut Kohl, November 17, 1989

Only nine days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the West German leader initiates this telephone conversation with President Bush.  Here, Kohl reports on his talks with Gorbachev and with East German leader Egon Krenz, and promises “we will do nothing that will destabilize the situation in the GDR.”  Bush responds: “The euphoric excitement in the U.S. runs the risk of forcing unforeseen action in the USSR or the GDR that would be very bad.”  But he assures Kohl that “[w]e will not exacerbate the problem by having the President of the United States posturing on the Berlin Wall.”  Kohl’s initiative also shows in his offer to match a U.S. contribution of up to $250 million for a proposed Polish stabilization fund; (earlier in 1989, Bush had offered only $125 million for Poland over three years).  Bush tells Kohl “I am absolutely determined to get advice and suggestions from you personally before I meet with Gorbachev [at Malta]… so that I can understand every nuance of the German Question… [and] nuances of difference in the Alliance.” But Kohl remarks that “[w]ith the developing situation, I would like to stay here.”  Kohl would give his advice on Gorbachev in the same November 28 letter to Bush that tells the American president about the “10 Points.”  Ultimately Bush and Kohl would meet face to face only after Malta.

Document No. 2: Letter from Helmut Kohl to George H.W. Bush, November 28, 1989

This remarkable letter arrives at the White House at the very moment that Chancellor Kohl is surprising both the allies and the Soviets with his “10 Points” speech at the Bundestag in Bonn, pointing towards reunification.  The letter is couched as a response to Bush’s repeated entreaties to Kohl (for example in phone calls on November 10 and 17) for his input before the Malta meeting with Gorbachev; in fact, Bush had practically implored Kohl to meet in person, but the chancellor demurred in order to tend to his domestic political situation.

The letter has a much more formal tone than the telephone transcripts convey, likely due to the participation of Kohl’s aides in drafting and editing it.  Here, the German leader encourages Bush to engage with Gorbachev across the board, but uses the president’s own mantra of “stability” to emphasize that “the most important decisions over stability or destabilization will be made by the countries in Central and Eastern Europe.  The duty of the West on the other hand must be to support the ongoing reform process from the outside.”  Kohl emphasizes that “Western help is coming far too slowly” to Poland and Hungary in particular–a rebuke to Bush’s caution.  Kohl also pays quite a compliment to Gorbachev, telling Bush that for the reform changes in Eastern Europe, “we have General Secretary Gorbachev’s policies to thank.  His perestroika loosed, made easier, or accelerated these reforms.  He pushed governments unwilling to make reforms towards openness and towards acceptance of the people’s wishes; and he accepted developments that in some instances far surpassed the Soviet Union’s own standards.”

But all the Malta advice is really secondary to the letter’s final section laying out the “10 Points,” along with a personal appeal in which he attempts to cover his bases with Bush.  Kohl had informed neither the Americans nor the NATO allies (nor his own foreign minister) in advance of his speech.  In his joint memoir with Scowcroft, Bush writes that Kohl was “[a]fraid of leaks, or perhaps of being talked out of it” and that “I was surprised, but not too worried,” because Kohl “couldn’t pursue reunification on his own.”  Scowcroft was more concerned:  “If he was prepared to go off on his own whenever he worried that we might object, we had very little influence.”  Scowcroft commented that in his telephone conversation the next day, November 29, Kohl over and over “pledged that there would be no going it alone–only one day after he had, in fact, ‘gone it alone.'” (Note 1)  These phrases, such as “little influence” and “support … from the outside” provide further testimony of how American policy lagged, instead of led, the miracles of 1989.

Document No. 3: Excerpts from the Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, December 2-3, 1989

While the U.S. transcript of Malta is not yet declassified, the Gorbachev Foundation has published excerpts of the Russian version, and the most complete version may be found in “Masterpieces of History.”  Posted here are the parts of the summit conversation in which the two leaders focused on the German question.  Interestingly, neither leader expects events to move as fast as they would the following year.  Just days earlier, on November 28, Helmut Kohl announced his “10 Points” towards confederation in a Bundestag speech that the Soviet Foreign Ministry denounced as pushing change in “a nationalist direction;” and here, Gorbachev attributes the speech to Kohl’s domestic politics and says Kohl “does not act seriously and responsibly.”  But then Gorbachev asks whether a united Germany would be neutral or a member of NATO, suggesting that at least theoretically he imagines the latter, although he may simply be acknowledging the U.S. position.  His clear preference is for the continuation of two states in Germany and only very slow progress towards any unification:  “let history decide.”  The president is not eager for rapid progress either; he says “I hope that you understand that you cannot expect us not to approve of German reunification.  At the same time … [w]e are trying to act with a certain reserve.”

Document No. 4: Memorandum of Conversation of George H.W. Bush, John Sununu, Brent Scowcroft, and Helmut Kohl, December 3, 1989

This conversation immediately after the Malta summit marks a turning point in the process of German unification, where President Bush effectively joins Chancellor Kohl’s program–yet neither man expects unification to happen even in two years, much less by October 1990 when West and East would actually join .  Bush gives Kohl a rundown on the conversation at Malta, describing Gorbachev as “tense” during talks about Germany and convinced that Kohl is moving too quickly:  “I don’t want to say he went ‘ballistic’ about it–he was just uneasy.”  Both men agree to reassure Gorbachev and “not do anything reckless.”

The key moment here comes when Kohl tells Bush the opposite, in effect, of what Bush told Gorbachev about the inviolability of borders under the Helsinki Final Act.  Kohl reminds the American that Helsinki actually allows borders to be “changed by peaceful means;” and this seems to be the first time Bush internalizes this possibility.  At the same time, Kohl outlines three deliberate steps: first, a free government in the former GDR, second, “confederative structures, but with two independent states,” and finally a “federation; that is a matter for the future and could be stretched out.  But I cannot say that will never happen.”  Kohl scoffs at predictions that this will take only two years: “It is not possible; the economic imbalance is too great.”  Here his language is similar to Gorbachev’s–“the integration of Europe is a precondition for change in Eastern Europe to be effective”–but he says that European resistance to unification really comes from envy over Germany’s economic growth (“[f]rankly, 62 million prosperous Germans are difficult to tolerate–add 17 million more and they have big problems”).

Bush asks about GDR opinions on unification, and neither he nor Kohl foresees the rush to reunify that would dominate the March 1990 elections there.  As for European views, Kohl gives a candid summary, calling Mitterrand “wise” for disliking unification but not opposing it, while “Great Britain is rather reticent.”  Bush exclaims, “That is the understatement of the year”–referring to Thatcher’s total opposition.  Kohl says, “She thinks history is not just.  Germany is so rich and Great Britain is struggling.  They won a war but lost an empire and their economy.”  The German version of this conversation contains more detail than the American version below, including an interesting discussion of Gorbachev and values (12 lines in the German, but only a parenthetical comment below) where Bush says “the entire discussion about economic issues had an unreal aspect to it more because of ignorance on the Russian side rather than narrow-mindedness.  For example, Gorbachev took offense to the expression ‘Western values.'”

Document No. 5: Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Hans Dietrich Genscher, December 5, 1989

A week has passed since Helmut Kohl announced his “10 Points” in a Bundestag speech, and Gorbachev, unlike his demeanor regarding Germany at Malta (see reference in Document No. 4), does go “ballistic” in this conversation.  This is perhaps because he is receiving the German foreign minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, who heads a separate political party from Kohl but participates in the coalition government, but more likely it is because Bush has apparently weighed in on Kohl’s side, despite the cautious talk at Malta, and the government in East Germany has collapsed.  Gorbachev angrily remarks: “Yesterday, Chancellor Kohl, without much thought, stated that President Bush supported the idea of a confederation. What is next? …What will happen to existing agreements between us? … I cannot call him [Kohl] a responsible and predictable politician.”  Gorbachev says he thought Kohl would at least consult with Moscow, but “[h]e probably already thinks that his music is playing–a march–and that he is already marching with it.”

From the Soviet view, the “10 Points” are “ultimatums” and “crude interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.”  Gorbachev is personally offended because “[j]udging from all this, you have prepared a funeral for the European processes”–i.e., his own vision of the common European home.  Genscher tries to defend the “10 Points” as requiring “no conditions” and representing “just suggestions,” and that “the GDR should decide whether they are suitable or not.”  Gorbachev rebukes Genscher for becoming Kohl’s “defense attorney” and raises the rhetorical attack to the point of making a reference to the Nazi era: “You have to remember what mindless politics has led to in the past.”  Genscher responds, “We are aware of our historical mistakes, and we are not going to repeat them.  The processes that are going on now in the GDR and in the FRG do not deserve such harsh judgment.”  (Shevardnadze is even more blunt with his comparisons, mentioning Hitler by name.)  As a final debating point, Gorbachev notes that Genscher himself only heard about the “10 Points” for the first time in the Bundestag speech.  The German confirms it–“Yes, that is true”–but then deftly slips in a rejoinder to the new champion of non-interference that “this is our internal affair.”  Gorbachev replies, “You can see that your internal affair is making everybody concerned.”

Document No. 6: Horst Teltschik’s Memorandum for Chancellor Kohl, Bonn, December 6, 1989

In this memorandum, foreign policy adviser Horst Teltschik confirms to the chancellor that the “10 Points” program did not disagree with the Soviet proposals presented to him through the confidential channel, but rather was based on those positions, which he attaches to his memo.  The actual memos that CPSU Central Committee staff member Nikolai Portugalov brought to Teltschik on November 21, 1989 are not known to exist in other copies, except for these.  Apparently, the reason Teltschik writes his memorandum to Kohl on December 6 is that the Germans are perplexed by the vehemently negative Soviet reaction to the “10 Points” (especially in Gorbachev’s conversation with Genscher on December 5).  In his memorandum, Teltschik recommends that Kohl meet with Gorbachev and discuss the situation, but the Soviet leader puts off any such discussions until February.

Document No. 7: British Ambassador to the USSR Sir Rodric Braithwaite’s Telegram to Douglas Hurd, December 8, 1989

In this confidential telegram the perceptive British Ambassador describes the “suspicious and emotional mood” of the Soviet leadership regarding Kohl’s “10 Points” and German unification.  Braithwaite is not aware of the Portugalov mission, but he vividly describes the author of the ploy – Valentin Falin – as having “the depressed air of a man whose life’s work was crumbling.”  Falin, according to Braithwaite, was “strikingly bitter about Kohl’s alleged failure to warn Gorbachev about the 10 points.”  That bitterness probably explains the fact that there is no mention of this story in Falin’s memoirs.

Notes

1. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 194-196.

Bush and Gorbachev at Malta – Secret Documents from Soviet and U.S. Files

Soviet and American leaders at the dinner table during the Malta Summit

Washington, D.C., July 28th – President George H.W. Bush approached the Malta summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 20 years ago this week determined to avoid arms control topics and simply promote a public image of “new pace and purpose” with him “leading as much as Gorbachev”; but realized from his face-to-face discussions that Gorbachev was offering an arms race in reverse, according to previously secret documents posted today on the Web by the National Security Archive (www. nsarchive.org).

Mikhail and Raisa Gorbachev with Pope John Paul II, December 1, 1989

The documents include the most complete transcript of the Malta summit ever published – excerpted from the forthcoming book, “Masterpieces of History”: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989 (edited by Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok for the Central European University Press). The transcript is a translation of the Soviet record from the Gorbachev Foundation, since the U.S. memcons remain, astonishingly, still classified at the George H.W. Bush Library in Texas.

The posting also includes the transcript of Gorbachev’s historic meeting before Malta with Pope John Paul II at the Vatican, featuring remarkable agreement on values and the “common European home,” including the Polish pontiff’s statement that “Europe should breathe with two lungs.” From the American side, the documents include the before-and-after National Security Council talking points prepared for Bush, the preparatory memos to Bush from Secretary of State James Baker and other top aides, intelligence briefings for Bush from the CIA and the State Department, and the Bush script and briefing book contents list for Malta itself – all obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.

The documents show profound misjudgments of Gorbachev on the American side, including the President’s assumption that the Soviet leader would press for the removal of U.S. troops from Europe, not realizing until talking to Gorbachev directly that, just as Gorbachev had already announced publicly on multiple occasions, he believed the U.S. presence along with the NATO alliance to be a stabilizing force in Europe, particularly against any danger of German revanchism.

The documents signal a major missed opportunity at Malta to meet Soviet arms reductions proposals halfway, and suggest that the Bush “pause” in U.S.-Soviet relations during 1989 effectively delayed both strategic and tactical demilitarization for at least two years (the START treaty would not be signed until 1991, and only in September 1991 would Bush withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. Navy ships), at which point Gorbachev had effectively lost the domestic power to deliver on his side.

Gorbachev had sought to engage president-elect Bush as early as the Governor’s Island meeting in New York in December 1988, but Bush demurred, instead launching a strategic review of U.S.-Soviet relations that cloaked the reality that the transition from Reagan to Bush was one from doves to hawks, that is, disbelievers in Gorbachev as a true reformer. Throughout 1989, judging by the candid memoir authored by President Bush with his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft (Note 1), the Bush mentality was marked by insecurity and anxiety that Gorbachev was more popular globally and had the initiative on proposing new departures in security policy – never quite recognizing that Gorbachev’s proposals might well be in the U.S. national security interest. (Note 2)

Not until Bush went to Eastern Europe himself in July 1989, where he heard the reform Communists like Jaruzelski in Poland and Nemeth in Hungary plead with him to reach out to Gorbachev because that created political space for them to make change – and even more importantly, where he met the dissidents and oppositionists like Lech Walesa in Poland, who called U.S. aid proposals “pathetic,” (Note 3) or Janos Kis in Hungary whom Bush quickly concluded should not be running his country – did Bush overrule his advisers and ask Gorbachev for a meeting, meaning to slow down the process of change in Eastern Europe. Bush wrote in his memoir:  “I realized that to put off a meeting with Gorbachev was becoming dangerous. Too much was happening in the East – I had seen it myself – and if the superpowers did not begin to manage events [!], those very events could destabilize Eastern Europe and Soviet-American relations… I saw that the Eastern Europeans themselves would try to push matters as far as they could.” (Note 4)

Minister Genscher presents Bush with a piece of the Berlin Wall during his visit to Washington on November 21, 1989

Characteristically, on the plane ride home from Europe in July when Bush sent a note to Gorbachev inviting the Malta meeting, the President spent more time (and far more space in his memoir (Note 5)) reaching out to the Communist dictators in China who had murdered their pro-democracy demonstrators in 1989, than to the Communist reformer in Moscow who had refused to do so.

Gorbachev’s own frustration with the Bush “pause” and review of policy made the Soviet leader more than eager for such a meeting; but between the July idea and the December reality, Eastern Europeans rushed in and took apart the Stalinist empire including the Berlin Wall. Originally intended as an “interim” meeting to prepare for a full-scale summit in 1990, the Bush-Gorbachev meeting at Malta would take on a life of its own, symbolically closing the Cold War.  Stormy weather and raging seas in Malta would play havoc with the meeting planners’ idea of alternating U.S. and Soviet ships as picturesque sites for the meetings – thus providing something of a metaphor for the rush of events in Eastern Europe that ran out of the control of both superpowers.

Going into the Malta summit, the Bush team was determined to do the opposite of what Ronald Reagan had so successfully achieved in relieving the Soviet sense of threat through substantive arms control discussions, including remarkable commitments to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Instead, as the NSC preparatory points make clear, Malta was meant to avoid any substantive discussion of arms control, and simply convey, as Secretary of State Baker wrote in his briefing memo on November 29, “a public sense, here and abroad, of a new pace and purpose to the U.S.-Soviet dialogue with you leading as much as Gorbachev” – public relations in place of substance. The briefing memo from arms negotiation advisor Gen. Edward Rowny described the START treaty as having “potential risks and few gains” and any reductions in naval weapons “all losers for us” – recommending that Bush should say up front that the “US Navy is not on the bargaining table.”

Bush’s briefing book for Malta betrays the administration’s actual priorities – Eastern Europe and its revolutionary changes were way down the contents list, along with arms control. Pride of place was Central America, where Bush’s right flank in domestic politics believed Castro was the devil, the Nicaraguan Sandinistas were a Communist beachhead pointed at Texas, and Gorbachev himself was merely a new glove around the iron fist. In the Malta discussions, the Soviet leader called the American presumptions laughable: “It is not quite clear to us what you want from Nicaragua. There is political pluralism in that country, there are more parties than in the United States.  And the Sandinistas – what kind of Marxists are they? This is laughable. Where are the roots of the problem?  At the core are economic and social issues.” Likewise on Cuba: “The issue now is how to improve the current situation. There is a simple and well-proven method: one has to speak directly to Castro. You must learn: nobody can lord it over Castro.”

Malta’s most significant outcome would simply be the reassurance it provided to the two leaders through a face-to-face meeting, and the building of a personal relationship on which both would rely in the difficult next two years. Gorbachev, for example, told Bush: “First and foremost, the new U.S. president must know that the Soviet Union will not under any circumstances initiate a war. This is so important that I wanted to repeat the announcement to you personally. Moreover, the USSR is prepared to cease considering the U.S. as an enemy and announce this openly.”

Gorbachev also made an impact on Bush in the discussion of values. He bristled at Bush’s repeated reference to “Western values” (a phrase found throughout the U.S. briefing materials for Malta) and argued that the U.S. approach of “exporting ‘Western values'” would cause “ideological confrontations [to] flare up again” in “propaganda battles” with “no point.” Just before Malta, Gorbachev had found agreement on this point with Pope John Paul II, when the two of them discussed “universal human values” and the Pope commented, “it would be wrong for someone to claim that changes in Europe and the world should follow the Western model.” Even though Bush told Helmut Kohl on December 3 that Gorbachev did not understand Western values, the American president subsequently adopted Gorbachev’s phrasing, saying in his Brussels remarks immediately after the summit that the need to end the division of Europe was in accord with “values that are becoming universal ideals.”

After Malta, the Americans raced to catch up with the arms control opportunities on offer from Gorbachev.  NSC aide Condoleezza Rice wrote the preparatory memo for the NSC meeting on December 5, 1989, saying “The President has now committed himself to an ambitious arms control agenda before the June 1990 summit” and “the bureaucracy must not get in the way of the completion of the treaties” – yet the START deal would not be done until 1991 because of recalcitrance from Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and the U.S. Navy over on-site verification (the Soviets were willing to be more open than the American sailors) and cherished weapons like submarine-launched cruise missiles (in a classic contradiction between actual national security interest and the parochial interest of the military service involved, the U.S. had far more coastal metropolises that could be threatened with these weapons than the Soviet Union did).

DocumentsDocument 1
Department of State, U.S. Embassy Moscow, “Preparing for Malta: Trade Policy Toward the USSR,” [cable from Ambassador Jack Matlock], November 14, 1989

The U.S. Ambassador to Moscow starts his recommendations for Malta with the objective that “we should be searching for ways in which we can, in a practical way, signal U.S. support for perestroyka.”  At the same time, he finds that this support should be the mission of primarily the private sector because “the United States government can have little direct economic impact, since there is no way in which we can or should practically or politically mount an economic aid program for the USSR.”  While expressing his preference that the Jackson-Vanik amendment limiting aid to the USSR should be waived, he realized that it would probably not be done before Malta.  In this situation, he suggests that even before the formal waiver of the amendment, the President should send a signal of encouragement to the U.S. business community to “enter trade and investment relations with Soviet firms.”

Document 2
Department of State.  Information Memorandum to Secretary Baker from Douglas P. Mulholland (INR). “Regional Issues at Malta:  Gorbachev’s Agenda.”  November 17, 1989

This assessment of Gorbachev’s positions on regional issues, from State’s Intelligence and Research bureau, is quite accurate in pointing out that regional issues, apart from Afghanistan, do not represent priorities for the Soviet leader, and that he would prefer to discuss arms control and Eastern Europe instead.  On Afghanistan, the memo correctly states that “Gorbachev will probably claim Pakistani and at least implicitly US violations of the Geneva accords” and draw implications for the ability of the US and the USSR to work together on other regional issues.  The memo underestimates Gorbachev’s willingness to engage in constructive discussion on Central America.  However, one prediction comes very close—Gorbachev does seem to “decide that the best approach [on Central America] is to go on the offensive”—which he does during the summit, questioning the US use of force in Colombia, Panama and the Philippines.

Document 3
Department of State. Information Memorandum to Secretary Baker from Gen. Edward L. Rowny [Special Adviser for Arms Control].  November 17, 1989

This concise memo sums up the American position going into Malta, that “the meeting must not become an ‘arms control summit'” – since the Bush administration believed that Reagan had gone much too far in embracing Gorbachev and major arms reductions.  Long-time SALT negotiator and retired Army general Rowny even goes so far as to recommend “If Gorbachev says that Malta should move arms control forward, we should focus the discussion on process and not engage on substance…” since “there are potential risks and few gains in discussing START,” various potential Gorbachev offers such as “moratoria on fissionable materials and production of strategic weapons” “are all losers for us,” and naval arms control is a “no-win situation.”  By 1991, of course, Bush would reverse course on almost all these positions, but too late to help Gorbachev demilitarize the Soviet Union.

Document 4
National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-89. The Soviet System in Crisis: Prospects for the Next Two Years

This consensus view of the U.S. intelligence community two weeks before Malta helps explain the lack of urgency on the part of the Bush administration to wrap up arms control deals with Gorbachev.  This Estimate assumes that the current crisis in the USSR would continue even beyond the two-year timeframe, that “the regime will maintain the present course,” that Gorbachev was “relatively secure” in his leadership role, and there was a less likely scenario of “unmanageable” decline that would lead to a “repressive crackdown.”   In hindsight, the dissenting view from the CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence, John Helgerson, is more correct, predicting more progress towards a “pluralist – albeit chaotic – democratic system” in which Gorbachev’s political strength would “erode” and he would “progressively lose control of events.”

Document 5
Department of State. Information Memorandum to Secretary Baker from Douglas P. Mulholland (INR). “Soviet Thinking on the Eve of Malta.” November 29, 1989

This prescient memo clearly draws on reporting from recent interlocutors with Gorbachev such as Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney, and predicts Gorbachev’s agenda at Malta as “a chance to polish his image and probe US thinking” on such issues as arms control and Eastern Europe.  The assessment of Gorbachev’s substantive priorities is generally accurate, as well as the prediction of the Soviet leader’s push for faster START and CFE negotiations and concrete results.  In contrast to the Cold War suspicions that dominated thinking in the Bush White House, Mulholland is aware that Gorbachev is not trying to push the United States out of Europe, but in fact “is more likely, however, to argue that US and Soviet forces in Europe have a stabilizing effect.”  He correctly predicts that Gorbachev would insist that German unification “can only occur in the context of the creation of a “common European home,” but misses the point in suggesting that “given the Kohl [10 point] proposal, Gorbachev might raise the eventual creation of a German ‘confederation.'”

Document 6
Department of State. Memorandum for The President from Secretary of State James Baker. “Your December Meeting With Gorbachev.” November 29, 1989

This five-page memo from President Bush’s most trusted long-time friend and adviser provides a scene-setter and a provisional script for the President to use with Gorbachev.  Baker’s summary details the limited expectations on the American side for the Malta meeting, merely “to gain a clearer understanding” and to “probe Gorbachev’s thinking” while kicking the major issues down the road to a full-scale summit in 1990.  Perhaps most interesting is the third sentence of the first paragraph, which reveals the underlying public relations concern of the Bush administration about Gorbachev’s popularity and criticisms of Bush’s “pause”: “Further, Malta could promote a public sense, here and abroad, of a new pace and purpose to the U.S.-Soviet dialogue with you leading as much as Gorbachev.”

Document 7
The White House. Memorandum to The President from National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. “National Security Council Meeting, November 30, 1989.” [With attachments: Agenda, Points to be Made, List of Participants]

This preparatory memo for the NSC meeting just before Bush went to Malta is perhaps most interesting for the contrast with the NSC meeting that occurred when Bush returned (see Document 12 below).  Here the focus is to “put a damper on expectations” about Malta, to stop people from “getting carried away” given the changes in Eastern Europe, and to reiterate that the President is determined not “to negotiate arms control; the future of Europe; or economic issues.”

Document 8
Transcript of Gorbachev-John Paul II Meeting, Vatican City, December 1, 1989 [Transcribed notes by Aleksandr Yakovlev.]

On the way to the Malta summit, Mikhail Gorbachev stops in Vatican City for his historic meeting with Pope John Paul II, the Polish pontiff from Krakow who had been such an inspiration to the Solidarity movement. Only the second time a leader of Russia had met with a pope, the first being the meeting between Tsar Nicholas I and Pope Gregory XVI in 1845, (Note 6) here the Soviet leader and his wife Raisa would hear the Vatican band performing the Internationale first and then the Papal Hymn. In this conversation, transcribed from notes by Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev (and published here for the first time in any language), the Pope raises concerns about religious freedom in the Soviet Union and the Vatican’s relations with various Orthodox and Catholic denominations, while the Soviet leader talks about issues that he planned to discuss with President Bush in Malta, such as the concept of universal human values, particularly objecting to the use of the phrase “Western values” as the basis for world order. Gorbachev describes his vision of Europe and the new world where “universal human values should become the primary goal, while the choice of this or that political system should be left up to the people.” That vision would also include gradual change of structures with respect for human rights and freedom of conscience. The Pope responds by saying he shared Gorbachev’s vision, especially as far as values are concerned—”[i]t would be wrong for someone to claim that changes in Europe and the world should follow the Western model. This goes against my deep convictions. Europe, as a participant in world history, should breathe with two lungs.”

Document 9
The President’s Meetings with Soviet President Gorbachev, December 2-3, 1989, Malta [Briefing Book for the President]. Excerpts (contents pages, selected released pages). Source: George H.W. Bush Library, FOIA request 99-0273-F

The table of contents for President Bush’s briefing book going into the Malta meeting provides a useful summary of American priorities for the discussions with the Soviet leader. The highest priority does not go the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe, which come second on the American list to regional issues and specifically developments in Central America and Cuba – issues of greatest interest to President Bush’s conservative critics in the Republican Party, not to mention his electoral base in Florida. And arms control issues, where Gorbachev is ready and eager to move forward, rank sixth on the list. The complete set of background papers has not yet been declassified, but included in this package are several interesting summary papers, including the first three on Central America and Cuba, two on U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe and the GDR, one on the Soviet domestic situation, and one on the conventional forces negotiations.

Document 10
Transcript of the Malta Meeting, December 2-3, 1989. Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Fond 1, Opis 1

The Soviet record of the Malta meeting has been available to scholars at the Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow starting in 1993, and the Foundation’s documents books as well as memoirs by Gorbachev aides and the former Soviet leader himself have published a variety of lengthy excerpts amounting to an almost complete transcript of the Malta meeting from the Soviet side, while the American transcripts still have not been declassified at the George Bush Library (Texas A & M University) despite Freedom of Information requests that date back at least 10 years. Here, National Security Archive experts combine the various published and unpublished excerpts to produce and translate the most complete transcript yet available anywhere.

The transcript shows little trace of the fierce winter storm that disrupted the planned back-and-forth between U.S. and Soviet ships as the meeting venues at Malta, but instead demonstrates the growth of personal reassurance between the American and Soviet leaders, along with a few tempests over issues like “Western values” (see discussion above) and American pressures on Central America. Interestingly, in an extended discussion with Baker and Shevardnadze, the two sides approach agreement on a negotiation to end the protracted war in Afghanistan, where the Soviets had already completed their withdrawal but the Najibullah government had not fallen as the Americans had expected.  Baker bluntly remarks, “Stop your massive assistance to Kabul” – to which Gorbachev responds, “Leave this empty talk behind” and tells the Americans that tribal leaders are already talking with Najibullah, that the Afghan “dialogue itself will clarify this issue” in a “transition period” and “If the Afghans themselves decide that Najibullah must leave – God help them. This is their business.”

Apparently the biggest surprise to the Americans is Gorbachev’s insistence that the U.S. should stay in Europe, that the U.S. and USSR “are equally integrated into European problems” and that they need to work together to keep those problems from exploding. (Note 7) The American president responds with classic expressions of reserve and prudence, insisting that he does not intend to posture over East Germany even though he was under severe domestic political pressure to “climb the Berlin Wall and to make broad declarations.” Bush affirms his support for perestroika, and reassures Gorbachev that they both remember the Helsinki Final Act’s pronouncements on the inviolability of borders. In general, the American wants to talk about practical details, such as specific congressional amendments on the U.S. side or arms deliveries in Central America from the Soviet bloc, while Gorbachev initiates broader philosophical discussions: “The world is experiencing a major regrouping of forces.”

But both men are clearly uneasy about the dramatic transformations taking place. Bush frankly pronounces himself “shocked by the swiftness” while Gorbachev says “look at how nervous we are.” After warning Bush not to provoke or accelerate the changes, the Soviet leader in particular seems to ask what kind of collective action they should take. He stresses the Helsinki process as the new European process and also mentions the Giscard d’Estaing comment in January 1989 about a federal state of Western Europe: “Therefore, all of Europe is on the move, and it is moving in the direction of something new. We also consider ourselves Europeans, and we associate this movement with the idea of a common European home.” Gorbachev hopes for the dissolution of the blocs – “what to do with institutions created in another age?” – and suggests that the Warsaw Pact and NATO become, to an even greater degree, political organizations rather than military ones.

On the German question, neither leader expects events to move as fast as they would the following year. Just days before Malta, on November 28, Helmut Kohl announced his “10 Points” towards confederation in a Bundestag speech that the Soviet Foreign Ministry denounced as pushing change in “a nationalist direction.” At Malta, Gorbachev attributes the speech to politics and said Kohl “does not act seriously and responsibly.” But then Gorbachev asks whether a united Germany would be neutral or a member of NATO, suggesting that at least theoretically he imagined the latter, although he may simply have been acknowledging the U.S. position. His clear preference is for the continuation of two states in Germany and only very slow progress towards any unification:  “let history decide.” Bush is not eager for rapid progress either: “I hope that you understand that you cannot expect us not to approve of German reunification.  At the same time … [w]e are trying to act with a certain reserve.”

Document 11
Directives for the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the United States. Draft by Soviet delegation at Malta. December 3, 1989. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, FOIA request

This draft prepared by Gorbachev’s aides envisions quick progress across the entire spectrum of U.S.-Soviet relations, starting with the proclamation that the Presidents at Malta “came to a common conclusion that the period of cold war was over and that the emerging era of peace opened up unprecedented opportunities for multilateral and bilateral partnership.” The draft calls for preparation for a full-scale “watershed” summit in 1990, and puts “harmonizing national interests with universal human values” as a top priority for the two countries. The Soviet proposal outlines a comprehensive program of arms control with the goal of “creating a fundamentally new model of security.” In addition to quick progress on START and “radical reduction of Soviet and U.S. stationed forces in Europe,” the Soviet draft calls for discussion of “Open Skies, Open Seas, Open Land and Open Space” proposals. This draft shows that the Soviet side came to Malta with an ambitious arms control program – exactly what the Bush administration was trying to avoid – but the Malta discussions would lead directly to a growing Bush embrace of the arms reduction possibilities on offer.

Document 12
National Security Council. Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft from Condoleezza Rice. December 5, 1989. [With attachments: Memo to the President. Points to be Made. List of Participants (for NSC meeting on December 5, 1989). Agenda.]

The contrast between the NSC meetings before Malta (“dampen expectations,” no negotiating arms control) and after Malta comes through clearly in this concise cover memo from Soviet specialist Condoleezza Rice to her boss, the national security adviser, enclosing the briefing memo and talking points that Scowcroft would then forward to President Bush. “The President has now committed himself to an ambitious arms control agenda before the June 1990 summit” and “bureaucracy must not get in the way,” Rice writes. If such urgency had been present at the White House earlier in 1989, perhaps it would not have taken two more years to finish the START treaty or make the withdrawals of nuclear weapons that would not be accomplished until the month after the August 1991 coup against Gorbachev.

Document 13
Excerpt from Anatoly S. Chernyaev’s Diary, January 2, 1990

In this entry Gorbachev’s senior foreign policy aide reflects on Gorbachev’s meeting with the Pope and the legacy of the Malta summit, since in the press of events, he had not managed to write down his commentary in the moment. The main point Chernyaev sees about Malta, a month later, is the “normalcy” of the summit, the shared understanding that the Soviet Union and the United States are partners and nobody would attack the other, therefore, the threat of nuclear war is a thing of the past, as is the Cold War itself. Chernyaev sees Gorbachev making an intentional effort at Malta to discard this old reality of the Soviet threat, of the “terror” projected by the Soviet Union in Europe as a result of its invasions and repressions. In Malta, according to Chernyaev, Gorbachev and Bush “gave hope to all humanity,” and at the Vatican, Gorbachev and the Pope “spoke like two good Christians.” The world has changed indeed.

Notes

1. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), see for example pp. 40, 43, 71, 78, 114.

2. For extended analysis of the Bush administration’s characteristic insecurity, see Thomas Blanton, “U.S. Policy and the Revolutions of 1989,” in Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton and Vladislav Zubok, eds., “Masterpieces of History”: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989 (Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2010).

3. For the colorful details of these uncomfortable meetings, see Victor Sebestyan, Revolution 1989:  The Fall of the Soviet Empire (New York, Pantheon Boooks, 2009), pp. 303-305.

4. Bush and Scowcroft, p. 130.

5. Bush and Scowcroft, p. 132 compared to pp. 156-159.

6.Victor Sebestyen, Revolution 1989:  The Fall of the Soviet Empire, (New York, Pantheon Books, 2009), p. 401.

7. Condoleezza Rice subsequently called Gorbachev’s position at Malta on the U.S. staying in Europe “revolutionary change” and “something I never imagined I would hear from a Soviet leader” (see Victor Sebestyan, Revolution 1989, p. 403), but Gorbachev had explicitly made such assurances to the Trilateral Commission delegation in January 1989 in answering a question from Henry Kissinger, repeatedly in conversations with Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, among other leaders, and publicly in his famous Strasbourg speech on June 6, 1989.  The Americans were apparently not listening, and as late as November 21, 1989, President Bush had suggested to West German foreign minister Genscher, much to the latter’s surprise and disagreement, that Gorbachev would propose at Malta the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany and Europe – the old American fear that the Soviets were attempting to “decouple” the U.S. from Europe.  See Bush-Genscher memcon, November 21, 1989, George Bush Library, released under 2007-0051-MR.