P 041421Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1740
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY
AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
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USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 000478 

NOFORN 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2034
TAGS: PREL PTER PK
SUBJECT: NEW WAZIRISTAN TERRORIST ALLIANCE 

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Rival Pakistani Taliban leaders Baitullah
Mehsud, Maulvi Nazir, and Hafiz Gul Bahadur formed a new
militant alliance on February 23. The new alliance
recognizes Taliban leader Mullah Omar as its leader, and its
goal is to fight the planned U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani militant leaders will maintain their
independent militants groups but will now facilitate
cooperation in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan. It is
too early to say how effective this new alliance will be in
launching cross-border attacks against U.S./NATO forces in
Afghanistan, but it does give the largest and most powerful
Pakistani Taliban leaders unfettered access across North and
South Waziristan. Formation of the alliance demonstrates
that the GOP's tribal "divide and conquer" strategy is not
working, at least not to our advantage. Civilian leaders are
concerned about the continuing loss of government writ in the
Waziristans after this agreement, but Pakistan's security
forces may see few downsides to an alliance that focuses its
attacks outside of Pakistan. End summary. 

¶2. (SBU) On February 23, Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) leader
Baitullah Mehsud signed a deal with two powerful rival
Taliban commanders Maulvi Nazir of South Waziristan and Hafiz
Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan. The three, according to
press reports, have formed a new group called Shura
Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Unity Council), that they
claim will unite them against external forces trying to
divide the multiple Taliban groups based in Pakistan. They
have formed a 13-member shura to run the affairs of the new
alliance. The militants named Mullah Omar as their supreme
leader, but the group did not choose a leader of its
operational shura. According to a joint public statement,
the militant leaders praised Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar
as defenders of Islam and Muslims. The spokesman for
Baitullah Mehsud, Mufti Waliullah, said that the three
Taliban commanders would now operate from a single platform
under the new alliance. Currently Baitullah Mehsud controls
the eastern portion of South Waziristan, which is populated
largely by Mehsud tribesmen. Maulvi Nazir is based out of
the Ahmedzai Wazir area of South Waziristan on the agency's
western border with Afghanistan. Hafiz Gul Bahadur leads his
Utmanzai Wazir militants from Miram Shah, North Waziristan. 

¶3. (C) The formation of the new alliance follows Baitullah
Mehsud's December 2007 formation of TTP as an umbrella group
to better coordinate pro-Taliban activities. The creation of
the TTP was the merger of various Pakistani militant groups
operating under disparate commands in different tribal
agencies. The TTP alliance runs as a loose federation rather
than a strictly controlled organization. Each of the
militant leaders maintains a degree of autonomy and Baitullah
Mehsud, as the strongest leader of Pakistani Taliban, lends
his support and coordination to the various TTP subcommanders
in places such as Bajaur and Swat. Nazir, who broke openly
with Mehsud in the spring of 2007 (see para 6), was not a
part of TTP. Bahadur, who had jockeyed with Mehsud for the
title of pre-eminent local militant leader in the
Waziristans, had maintained some distance from the TTP label
before now. 

¶4. (C) The new Mujahideen Unity Council will likely be
another loose federation with each Taliban commander
maintaining his own authority. Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) Secretariat Additional Chief Secretary
Habibullah Khan expressed concern to Peshawar Principal
Officer in a February 24 meeting that this new body provides
all three militant leaders with unfettered access to all of
South and North Waziristan. Baitullah Mehsud will be a main
beneficiary of this new access, giving his fighters easier
entry to the Afghanistan border through Maulvi Nazir's
Wazir-held territory. Before the deal, Mehsud had limited
access to the border from his portion of South Waziristan
because he was blocked either by Maulvi Nazir or Gul Bahadur.
While the alliance will not work as a tight top-down
militant organization, it will facilitate access and
coordination of various Pakistani Taliban as they cross into
Afghanistan. 

¶5. (C) While Khan had no hard facts, he detected the hand of
the Haqqani network in bringing these rival commanders
together. The new coordination, he feared, will allow the
Taliban to focus on sending militants across the border into
Afghanistan. Sirajuddin Haqqani also claimed in the press
that he had convinced the three rival Taliban leaders to
meet. Sirajuddin and his father Jalaluddin Haqqani lead much
of the Taliban militancy in eastern Afghanistan. Sirajuddin
often travels to the tribal areas of Pakistan, North
Waziristan in particular, and has served as a mediator
between these rival Taliban leaders. 

¶6. (S/NF) In the past, the Pakistani government has supported
Maulvi Nazir in an attempt to counter Baitullah Mehsud in
South Waziristan. In the spring of 2007, an open break
between Nazir and Mehsud took place over the presence of
"Uzbek" fighters in South Waziristan. The disagreement
culminated in an operation in which Pakistani security forces
fought alongside Nazir's followers to oust Uzbeks from the
area. While Nazir appeared to draw on genuine local anger
and desire to remove "Uzbeks," his activities as an al-Qaida
facilitator and promoter of cross-border attacks have always
complicated Pakistani efforts to sell this episode as a
"success" story. A South Waziristan-based contact told
Principal Officer Peshawar on February 24 that Mehsud and
Nazir are showing signs of getting past old disagreements and
that "Uzbeks" are re-appearing in growing numbers in the
area. 

¶7. (SBU) According to Pakistani newspapers, Ahmedzai Wazir
elders of South Waziristan, who are concerned about the new
alliance and the possibility of "Uzbeks" coming back into
their territory, questioned Maulvi Nazir about the deal with
rival Mehsud. At a meeting in Wana, South Waziristan Maulvi
Nazir assured the elders that each militant group will
continue to have its own independent status and remain
sovereign in their own territory. Nazir explained that the
alliance was formed "only to act together against the United
States" because the Taliban was concerned about the troop
surge in Afghanistan, according to Pakistan press reports.
The elders publicly cautioned Nazir that they would turn
against him if this new deal brought any harm to their areas. 

¶8. (C) While he did not touch on a possible ISI role in
brokering this new alliance, Habibullah Khan noted that
pressure has been building on the Pakistani military in the
Waziristans. The Pakistani military and then Northwest
Frontier Province Governor Orakzai quietly entered peace
deals with North Waziristan commanders in December 2007 and
with Baitullah Mehsud in February 2008 in order to achieve
relative peace. Those agreements came after a series of high
profile attacks on the military in the Waziristans, including
the kidnapping of over 250 security forces by Baitullah
Mehsud and Jan 2008 fighting at Ladha Fort in South
Waziristan. While violence directed at the military in the
Waziristans has been minor in the last few months, Peshawar
observers regularly note that the military remains concerned
with its ability to keep a lid on trouble in these two
agencies. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani believes the
respite offered by this latest agreement is necessary for his
stretched forces to continue fighting in Bajaur and Mohmand
agencies. However, the relative quiet in South and North
Waziristan has allowed Baitullah Mehsud to increasingly send
his fighters in other parts of the FATA and Northwest
Frontier Province, including Swat. 

¶9. (C) Khan also noted with deep dismay that this
announcement demonstrates that these militant commanders see
themselves in a strong enough position to form an alliance
that takes them one step closer to a formal territorial
takeover of the Waziristan as an "Islamic Emirate." South
Waziristan contacts also commented that there is an
increasing presence of Punjabi militants from Jaish-e
Muhammad in the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan. (Comment:
A development if accurate that is almost certainly of concern
to the Pakistani military. It is significant that Baitullah
Mehsud's strength and open militancy are drawing fighters
from places such as southern Punjab.) 

¶10. (C) As this new alliance formed, Mullah Omar ordered
militants in North and South Waziristan to immediately stop
their attacks on Pakistani security forces, according to
press reports. Omar said in a letter to the militants, "If
anybody really wants to wage jihad, they must fight the U.S.
and NATO troops inside Afghanistan." The letter also stated
that Omar was responsible for the agreement between Mehsud,
Nazir, and Bahadur, and that after this agreement "the
attacks on Pakistani security forces by the local Taliban
will decrease if not end completely." Mullah Omar continues
to exert considerable influence on the militants in South and
North Waziristan. Halting attacks against Pakistani forces
may increase the militants' safe haven space in Pakistan,
allowing the militants to cross the border to attack NATO
forces in Afghanistan. 

¶11. (C) Comment: It is too early to predict how effective
this new alliance will be in launching cross-border attacks
on U.S./NATO forces, but its formation will provide the group
with unfettered access to Afghanistan across North and South
Waziristan. It is another indication that the GOP's tribal
divide and conquer strategy against militants is not working,
at least not to our advantage. Pakistan's security forces,
however, may see limited downsides to an arrangement that
focuses militant attacks outside of Pakistan.