VZCZCXYZ0012 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHUB #0781/01 2702018 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 262018Z SEP 08 FM USINT HAVANA TO RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3761 RUCOWCX/CCGDEIGHT NEW ORLEANS LA PRIORITY INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0547 RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU 0034 RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE 0009 RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 0027 RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM CMD CTR MACDILL AFB FL RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU RUESDM/JTLO MIAMI FL RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUCOWCA/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA 0125 RUCOWCV/COMCOGARD SECTOR KEY WEST FL RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000781 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2018 TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL SMIG PHUM CU SUBJECT: LIKELIHOOD OF A CUBAN MASS MIGRATION FOLLOWING HURRICANE DESTRUCTION Classified By: COM JONATHAN D. FARRAR, REASONS 1.4 B & D ¶1. (C) Summary: Hurricane season 2008 has been especially unkind to the island of Cuba. Four consecutive storms, concluding with the most recent, Hurricane IKE, left much of the island in shambles. Buildings and homes, tobacco and sugar crops, and island-wide infrastructure have all been affected, including 444,000 damaged houses, and 63,000 houses destroyed. The level of destruction has led many Cuba watchers to ask whether a Cuban mass migration is likely in the near future. While the aforementioned events have indeed been historic in proportion, from our vantage point we see no indication that a mass migration from Cuba is pending. However, U.S. Interests Section (USINT) believes this is an issue that must be given due deference as the outcome of post-hurricane recovery efforts will play a large role in determining whether Cubans take to the sea or remain on the island. End Summary. ¶2. (C) During post-hurricane interactions with a variety of sources in Cuba, USINT personnel have not detected any indication a mass migration from Cuba is pending. Further, Cubans who have regular contact with USINT (mainly dissidents, refugees, and religious groups), including those from Pinar del Rio, one of the worst hit and affected Cuban provinces, have not reported the existence of rumors or preparations by Cubans to depart the island in increased numbers or larger go-fast or rustica loads. ¶3. (C) In conversation with Cuban Ministry of Interior (MININT) personnel, specifically the Cuban Border Guard (CBG), the USINT Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) learned that some CBG coastal outpost units in Ciego de Avila, Camaguey, and Las Tunas provinces were damaged during the wave of hurricanes, and that CBG troops are busy making repairs to infrastructure there. However, as expected, a CBG Colonel informed the DIS that CBG patrols have not been scaled back. It should be noted that during a separate meeting with MININT/CBG personnel immediately following the passing of IKE, the same Colonel asked the DIS whether the US Coast Guard was planning "an operation" following that most recent hurricane; DIS believes the Colonel's question, in the context of the meeting and conversation, was an attempt to gauge whether the US government was concerned about an increase in Cuban migrant departures or mass migration, and inadvertently suggested himself that there was a fear on the part of the CBG that at least an increase in Cuban migration numbers was possible. ¶4. (C) Cubans we speak with are increasingly frustrated with the difficulties caused by the hurricanes and the GOC's refusal to accept some foreign assistance offers. However, the Cuban people possess a rather high boiling point: Cubans have adopted a wait-and-see posture, also doing the best they can in the interim to reinstall some sense of Cuban-style "normalcy." Via Cuban state broadcast television and radio, the GOC has urged Cubans to fight, be disciplined, and exhibit solidarity following each hurricane's destructive path, and encouraged Cubans to work harder to overcome current conditions. ¶5. (C) While there have been no suggestions of a mass migration event from Cuba, the ingredients necessary for the Cuban people and/or government to cook-up such a scenario have manifested in Cuba over the past two months- they include: multiple natural disasters, damaged or destroyed infrastructure, an apparent shortage of food on the island, significantly increased fuel prices, and a Cuban government whose post-hurricane response and recovery "expertise" are in demand and are apparently spread dangerously thin from the Province of Pinar del Rio in the west to Guantanamo Province in the east, and in every province in between. Further, as the rise and fall of Cuban migrant flow relies heavily on weather conditions and sea state, the chances for an increased egress of Cuban migrants prior to the winter cold fronts and subsequent heavy seas would be more likely. Many Cubans may attempt to depart the island hoping to beat the heavy seas or reunite with family in south Florida prior to the holiday season; this hurricane season may exacerbate that trend. ¶6. (C) Comment: While the international community has its eyes fixed on Cuba's pending response to the offers of financial and resource assistance from the US government to the GOC, it is possible that Cuban authorities will attempt to mitigate the departure of Cuban migrants from the island towards the United States to avoid negative press and embarrassment. However, as international interest wanes, Cuban authorities may also lose interest in curtailing the flow of Cubans towards the United States. End Comment. FARRAR
Tag: macdill afb fl
SECRET//NOFORN: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY
VZCZCXRO9472 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #0384/01 1541323 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 031323Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6431 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000384 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018 TAGS: PREL SY SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: As the U.S. continues its re-engagement with Syria, it may help us achieve our goals if we understand how SARG officials pursue diplomatic goals. Syrian President Bashar al-Asad is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his father but he, too, prefers to engage diplomatically on a level of abstraction that seems designed to frustrate any direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by extension, his judgment. Bashar's vanity represents another Achilles heel: the degree to which USG visitors add to his consequence to some degree affects the prospects for a successful meeting. The SARG foreign policy apparatus suffers from apparent dysfunctionality and weaknesses in terms of depth and resources but the SARG punches above its weight because of the talents of key individuals. SARG officials generally have clear, if tactical, guidance from Bashar and they are sufficiently professional to translate those instructions into recognizable diplomatic practice. But in a diplomatic world that is generally oiled by courtesy and euphemism, the Syrians don't hesitate to be nasty in order to achieve their objectives. The behaviors they employ as diplomatic "force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal. End Summary. ------------------- Gaming Out the SARG ------------------- ¶2. (S/NF) As the U.S. moves forward to re-engage Syria, we are well aware that Syrian officials have long been famous for their abilities as tough negotiators. The late President Hafiz al-Asad could wear down his interlocutors through sheer staying power in 10-hour meetings without breaks; the wealth of detail and historical perspective he brought to those discussions also tested the mettle of those who were attempting to persuade him to a course of action he questioned. His son Bashar is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his father but he, too, prefers to engage diplomatically on a level of abstraction that seems designed to frustrate any direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by extension, his judgment. Bashar's presentations on world affairs suggest that he would prefer to see himself as a sort of philosopher-king, the Pericles of Damascus. Playing to Bashar's intellectual pretentions is one stratagem for gaining his confidence and acquiescence; it may be time-consuming but could well produce results. Bashar's vanity represents another Achilles heel: the degree to which USG visitors add to his consequence to some degree affects the prospects for achieving our goals. Every interaction we have with the SARG is, in fact, a transaction and the better equipped we are to understand the dynamics of our negotiations the better able we will be to achieve our objectives. Post has assembled the compendium below in an attempt to reflect our experience in dealing with the SARG in the hope that Washington-based interlocutors will find it useful. ------------------------------------ A Compendium of Diplomatic Behaviors ------------------------------------ ¶3. (S/NF) Capacity: SARG scope of action is limited the President's span of control. He is generally able to monitor the activities of his foreign minister, political/media advisor, intelligence chiefs, and brother Maher. At various times, his vice president and national security advisor are also active and therefore under his direct supervision. While communication flows between him and his subordinates, it appears not to be formalized and information is highly compartmented. Subordinates' portfolios are not clearly delineated; overlapping areas create tension and competition. There is no "interagency" policy development process that lays out advantages and disadvantages of policy choices. There are, as far as we know, no briefing or decision memos. The bench is not deep; beyond the principals lie only a few trusted staffers. Bashar and his team also find it difficult to juggle more than one major foreign policy issue at a time. ¶4. (S/NF) Protocol: SARG officials are sticklers for diplomatic protocol, although they are not experts on the international conventions from which it is derived. The SARG places a high value on protocolary forms that ensure respectful treatment of state officials (despite bilateral differences) because such forms guarantee that the President and his representatives are shown proper courtesies by a world that is often at odds with Syria. (This focus on protocol underlies the continuing Syrian unhappiness over the absence of a U.S. ambassador.) Protocol conventions also reinforce the notion of equal relations between sovereign states and the SARG insists that communications between it and foreign embassies comply with traditional diplomatic practice. The MFA receives a flood of diplomatic notes from Damascus-based foreign missions daily which are apportioned out to various offices for action. The diplomatic notes, translated into Arabic by the senders, become the paper trail for SARG decisions. The MFA bureaucracy does not appear to generate cover memoranda that provide background to requests or recommendations for decisions. Many such notes, possibly all notes from the U.S. Embassy, are sent to the Minister himself for review. The MFA does not have internal email, only fax and phone. Instructions to Syrian missions abroad are often sent by fax; sometimes the MFA fails to provide instructions at all. ¶5. (S/NF) The Suq: In dealing with the U.S., the Syrians see every encounter as a transaction. The level and composition of the Syrian side of any meeting is carefully calculated in terms of protocol and the political message being sent; a lunch invitation must be interpreted as more than just the Arab compulsion to hospitality ) who hosts the lunch is as important as who attends the meetings. When it comes to content, the Syrians seek to gain the highest value deliverable for the lowest price or no price at all. During the re-engagement process, the SARG has attempted to extract high profile USG gestures in exchange for relief of operational constraints on the Embassy. The SARG has been uncharacteristically forward-leaning in allowing discussions on a New Embassy Compound site to develop as far as they have; actual closure on a land deal, however, is probably contingent on U.S. delivery of a SARG desirable, e.g., the announcement that a U.S. ambassador will be sent to Damascus. The SARG's focus on embassy operations is in part rooted in their paranoia over USG intelligence collection and penetration of Syrian society but the imposition of constraints on mission activities has also conveniently created an embassy list of desiderata that the SARG seeks to use as cost-free concessions. FM Muallim candidly acknowledged this approach when he commented in February to Charge that he had not yet decided what he needed in exchange for permission to reopen the American School in Damascus. ¶6. (S/NF) Vanity and Self-preservation: The President's self-image plays a disproportionate role in policy formulation and diplomatic activity. Meetings, visits, trips abroad that enhance his respectability and prestige are pursued; encounters that may involve negotiations or difficult debate are declined or delegated to subordinates. The President responds with anger if he finds himself challenged by visitors, but not until after the meeting. He seems to avoid direct confrontation. When engaged in summit diplomacy, he often seeks to include allies to bolster his confidence (e.g., Quadripartite Summit in September 2008, Riyadh Summit in April 2009). His foreign policy subordinates are all "employees" without constituencies or influence independent of the President's favor. Their overriding concern when engaging foreigners is to avoid the appearance of overstepping or violating their instructions. They are particularly cautious in the presence of other Syrians; requests to meet one-on-one often yield more expansive and candid responses. ¶7. (S/NF) Deceit: SARG officials at every level lie. They persist in a lie even in the face of evidence to the contrary. They are not embarrassed to be caught in a lie. While lower level officials often lie to avoid potential punitive action from their own government, senior level officials generally lie when they deem a topic too "dangerous" to discuss (e.g., Al-Kibar, IAEA) or when they have not yet determined whether or how to respond (FFN, Hezbollah arms supplies, etc). When a senior SARG official is lying, the key challenge is not demonstrating the lack of veracity but discovering the true reasons for it. ¶8. (S/NF) Passivity: SARG foreign policy is formulated in response to external developments (changes in regional leadership, initiatives from the West, etc). The SARG does not launch initiatives and generally seeks cover from allies when exploring new courses of action. The SARG is much more confident on the Arab level than on the international level. SARG policy responses are generally tactical and operational, exploratory rather than decisive, oblique instead of direct. Strategy, to the extent it exists, emerges from a series of tactical choices. The lack of initiative appears rooted in an underlying sense of diplomatic powerlessness. Every foreign policy embarrassment in Syria's history lies under the surface of a generally false projection of assertiveness. That assertiveness is sometimes read as arrogance. ¶9. (S/NF) Antagonism: Every Syrian diplomatic relationship contains an element of friction. There is some current friction, for example, in the Syrians' relations with the Turks and the French. The Syrians are not troubled by discord; they seek an upper hand in any relationship by relying on foreign diplomats' instinctive desire to resolve problems. By withholding a solution, the SARG seeks to control the pace and temperature of the relationship. SARG officials artificially restrict their availability and can engage in harsh verbal attacks to intimidate and rattle foreign diplomats. SARG officials delight in disparaging their interlocutors behind their backs for allowing themselves to be cowed. On the international level, the President has indulged in personal criticisms of foreign leaders; unlike his father, he deliberately makes enemies when he doesn't necessarily have to. FM Muallim can behave similarly but he probably does so on the President's instructions. ¶10. (S/NF) Complacency: SARG leadership genuinely believes that SARG foreign policy has been, is being, and will be vindicated by events. They also genuinely believe their foreign policy is based on morally defensible and intellectually solid principles, although it is usually reactive and opportunistic. Existing policy choices are immutable unless the President decides to change them, in which case, his new policies, despite any appearances to the contrary, are consistent with "traditional" principles. Baathism infuses foreign policy principles (Pan-Arabism) but pragmatism is more important. More recently, Bashar's like or dislike of other leaders plays a role in policy formulation. ¶11. (S/NF) The Non Sequitur: When Syrian officials don't like a point that has been made to them, they frequently resort to an awkward changes in subject to deflect perceived criticism. Syrian officials seem to think they've scored a verbal hit by employing a facile non sequitur, usually in the form of a counter-accusation. When the SARG's human rights record is raised with Muallim, for example, he often raises Israel's December-January Gaza operation or, more recently, asks if the U.S. will accept the 1300 Al Qaeda sympathizers in Syrian jails. The non sequitur is intended to stop discussion of the unwelcome topic while subtly intimidating the interlocutor with the threat of raising a subject that is putatively embarrassing to him or her. When the non sequitur is deployed, it is clear that the SARG official is on the defensive. ¶12. (S/NF) Comment: Given the apparent dysfunctionality of the SARG foreign policy apparatus and its weaknesses in terms of depth and resources, the SARG's ability to punch above its weight internationally is noteworthy. Much of its strength appears to lie in the talents of key individuals and their ability to collaborate with each other, despite tensions and rivalries. SARG officials generally have clear, if tactical, guidance from Bashar and they are sufficiently professional to translate those instructions into recognizable diplomatic practice. But the behaviors they employ as diplomatic "force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal. At the end of the day, there are few who really like to deal with the Syrians. The SARG, well aware of its reputation, however, spends much of its energy ensuring that we have to. CONNELLY
TOP-SECRET: NEW WAZIRISTAN TERRORIST ALLIANCE
P 041421Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1740 INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY CIA WASHDC PRIORITY JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 000478 NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2034 TAGS: PREL PTER PK SUBJECT: NEW WAZIRISTAN TERRORIST ALLIANCE Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Rival Pakistani Taliban leaders Baitullah Mehsud, Maulvi Nazir, and Hafiz Gul Bahadur formed a new militant alliance on February 23. The new alliance recognizes Taliban leader Mullah Omar as its leader, and its goal is to fight the planned U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan. The Pakistani militant leaders will maintain their independent militants groups but will now facilitate cooperation in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan. It is too early to say how effective this new alliance will be in launching cross-border attacks against U.S./NATO forces in Afghanistan, but it does give the largest and most powerful Pakistani Taliban leaders unfettered access across North and South Waziristan. Formation of the alliance demonstrates that the GOP's tribal "divide and conquer" strategy is not working, at least not to our advantage. Civilian leaders are concerned about the continuing loss of government writ in the Waziristans after this agreement, but Pakistan's security forces may see few downsides to an alliance that focuses its attacks outside of Pakistan. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) On February 23, Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) leader Baitullah Mehsud signed a deal with two powerful rival Taliban commanders Maulvi Nazir of South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan. The three, according to press reports, have formed a new group called Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Unity Council), that they claim will unite them against external forces trying to divide the multiple Taliban groups based in Pakistan. They have formed a 13-member shura to run the affairs of the new alliance. The militants named Mullah Omar as their supreme leader, but the group did not choose a leader of its operational shura. According to a joint public statement, the militant leaders praised Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar as defenders of Islam and Muslims. The spokesman for Baitullah Mehsud, Mufti Waliullah, said that the three Taliban commanders would now operate from a single platform under the new alliance. Currently Baitullah Mehsud controls the eastern portion of South Waziristan, which is populated largely by Mehsud tribesmen. Maulvi Nazir is based out of the Ahmedzai Wazir area of South Waziristan on the agency's western border with Afghanistan. Hafiz Gul Bahadur leads his Utmanzai Wazir militants from Miram Shah, North Waziristan. ¶3. (C) The formation of the new alliance follows Baitullah Mehsud's December 2007 formation of TTP as an umbrella group to better coordinate pro-Taliban activities. The creation of the TTP was the merger of various Pakistani militant groups operating under disparate commands in different tribal agencies. The TTP alliance runs as a loose federation rather than a strictly controlled organization. Each of the militant leaders maintains a degree of autonomy and Baitullah Mehsud, as the strongest leader of Pakistani Taliban, lends his support and coordination to the various TTP subcommanders in places such as Bajaur and Swat. Nazir, who broke openly with Mehsud in the spring of 2007 (see para 6), was not a part of TTP. Bahadur, who had jockeyed with Mehsud for the title of pre-eminent local militant leader in the Waziristans, had maintained some distance from the TTP label before now. ¶4. (C) The new Mujahideen Unity Council will likely be another loose federation with each Taliban commander maintaining his own authority. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Secretariat Additional Chief Secretary Habibullah Khan expressed concern to Peshawar Principal Officer in a February 24 meeting that this new body provides all three militant leaders with unfettered access to all of South and North Waziristan. Baitullah Mehsud will be a main beneficiary of this new access, giving his fighters easier entry to the Afghanistan border through Maulvi Nazir's Wazir-held territory. Before the deal, Mehsud had limited access to the border from his portion of South Waziristan because he was blocked either by Maulvi Nazir or Gul Bahadur. While the alliance will not work as a tight top-down militant organization, it will facilitate access and coordination of various Pakistani Taliban as they cross into Afghanistan. ¶5. (C) While Khan had no hard facts, he detected the hand of the Haqqani network in bringing these rival commanders together. The new coordination, he feared, will allow the Taliban to focus on sending militants across the border into Afghanistan. Sirajuddin Haqqani also claimed in the press that he had convinced the three rival Taliban leaders to meet. Sirajuddin and his father Jalaluddin Haqqani lead much of the Taliban militancy in eastern Afghanistan. Sirajuddin often travels to the tribal areas of Pakistan, North Waziristan in particular, and has served as a mediator between these rival Taliban leaders. ¶6. (S/NF) In the past, the Pakistani government has supported Maulvi Nazir in an attempt to counter Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan. In the spring of 2007, an open break between Nazir and Mehsud took place over the presence of "Uzbek" fighters in South Waziristan. The disagreement culminated in an operation in which Pakistani security forces fought alongside Nazir's followers to oust Uzbeks from the area. While Nazir appeared to draw on genuine local anger and desire to remove "Uzbeks," his activities as an al-Qaida facilitator and promoter of cross-border attacks have always complicated Pakistani efforts to sell this episode as a "success" story. A South Waziristan-based contact told Principal Officer Peshawar on February 24 that Mehsud and Nazir are showing signs of getting past old disagreements and that "Uzbeks" are re-appearing in growing numbers in the area. ¶7. (SBU) According to Pakistani newspapers, Ahmedzai Wazir elders of South Waziristan, who are concerned about the new alliance and the possibility of "Uzbeks" coming back into their territory, questioned Maulvi Nazir about the deal with rival Mehsud. At a meeting in Wana, South Waziristan Maulvi Nazir assured the elders that each militant group will continue to have its own independent status and remain sovereign in their own territory. Nazir explained that the alliance was formed "only to act together against the United States" because the Taliban was concerned about the troop surge in Afghanistan, according to Pakistan press reports. The elders publicly cautioned Nazir that they would turn against him if this new deal brought any harm to their areas. ¶8. (C) While he did not touch on a possible ISI role in brokering this new alliance, Habibullah Khan noted that pressure has been building on the Pakistani military in the Waziristans. The Pakistani military and then Northwest Frontier Province Governor Orakzai quietly entered peace deals with North Waziristan commanders in December 2007 and with Baitullah Mehsud in February 2008 in order to achieve relative peace. Those agreements came after a series of high profile attacks on the military in the Waziristans, including the kidnapping of over 250 security forces by Baitullah Mehsud and Jan 2008 fighting at Ladha Fort in South Waziristan. While violence directed at the military in the Waziristans has been minor in the last few months, Peshawar observers regularly note that the military remains concerned with its ability to keep a lid on trouble in these two agencies. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani believes the respite offered by this latest agreement is necessary for his stretched forces to continue fighting in Bajaur and Mohmand agencies. However, the relative quiet in South and North Waziristan has allowed Baitullah Mehsud to increasingly send his fighters in other parts of the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province, including Swat. ¶9. (C) Khan also noted with deep dismay that this announcement demonstrates that these militant commanders see themselves in a strong enough position to form an alliance that takes them one step closer to a formal territorial takeover of the Waziristan as an "Islamic Emirate." South Waziristan contacts also commented that there is an increasing presence of Punjabi militants from Jaish-e Muhammad in the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan. (Comment: A development if accurate that is almost certainly of concern to the Pakistani military. It is significant that Baitullah Mehsud's strength and open militancy are drawing fighters from places such as southern Punjab.) ¶10. (C) As this new alliance formed, Mullah Omar ordered militants in North and South Waziristan to immediately stop their attacks on Pakistani security forces, according to press reports. Omar said in a letter to the militants, "If anybody really wants to wage jihad, they must fight the U.S. and NATO troops inside Afghanistan." The letter also stated that Omar was responsible for the agreement between Mehsud, Nazir, and Bahadur, and that after this agreement "the attacks on Pakistani security forces by the local Taliban will decrease if not end completely." Mullah Omar continues to exert considerable influence on the militants in South and North Waziristan. Halting attacks against Pakistani forces may increase the militants' safe haven space in Pakistan, allowing the militants to cross the border to attack NATO forces in Afghanistan. ¶11. (C) Comment: It is too early to predict how effective this new alliance will be in launching cross-border attacks on U.S./NATO forces, but its formation will provide the group with unfettered access to Afghanistan across North and South Waziristan. It is another indication that the GOP's tribal divide and conquer strategy against militants is not working, at least not to our advantage. Pakistan's security forces, however, may see limited downsides to an arrangement that focuses militant attacks outside of Pakistan.
TOP-SECRET: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD’S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD?
VZCZCXRO3166 RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHTRO DE RUEHDIR #0316/01 2151125 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 031125Z AUG 09 FM RPO DUBAI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0474 INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0475 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000316 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/3/2019 TAGS: PREL PROP PGOV PINR IR SUBJECT: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD? DUBAI 00000316 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) ¶1. (U) This is a joint cable by the Iran Regional Presence Office and the Dubai Regional Media Hub. ¶2. (S/NF) Summary: Since Iran's June 12 presidential elections, Arab media have intensely focused their coverage on the demonstrations in Iran and the international community's response to the government crackdown. Whereas in recent years the Arab media have limited their commentary to Iran's external relations -- particularly its regional ambitions and the international implications of its nuclear program -- during the post-election crisis Arab commentators have, for the first time, poked a hole in the veneer of the Islamic Republic's internal political system and explored its underpinnings more closely, often challenging the system's very legitimacy in on-air commentary. A number of these commentators have opined that Ahmadinejad has, at least in the near term, lost standing among some moderate Arabs, who have come to view Ahmadinejad's administration as oppressive, unpopular, and undemocratic, much as they criticize many Arab governments. However, all of the Arab media figures we spoke to emphasized that Arab criticism of Ahmadinejad has not necessarily led to increased support for U.S. policy in the region. On the contrary, closer analysis suggests that Ahmadinejad's eroding popularity in the Arab world has created a scenario in which any U.S. effort to engage the current Iranian government will be perceived by a wide spectrum of Arabs as accommodation with Ahmadinejad. ALL EYES ON IRAN ---------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Iran's post-election crisis has dominated the Arab media's news coverage for the past seven weeks. The demonstrations have garnered special coverage on Al-Arabiya and have consistently been among the top headlines on Al-Jazeera. The marketing director of the Middle East Broadcasting Company (MBC), parent company of Al-Arabiya, told IRPO/DRMH that Al-Arabiya's viewership has skyrocketed since the June 12 election. Al-Arabiya's news website has also experienced a dramatic increase in visits from users living in the region between Tripoli and Amman, which the marketing director, a native of Lebanon, attributed to the tremendous interest Sunni Arabs have in watching the drama in Iran unfold. Coverage of Iran's election aftermath is not limited to straightforward news reporting; editorial pages, media commentaries, and the Arab blogosphere have also been abuzz with debate over the demonstrations, the international community's response, and the implications of these events for the Arab world. While Iran's elections may no longer command daily headlines in the Western media, nearly all the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke recognized that the Arab street remains firmly focused on the recent unrest and continuing political drama playing out in Iran. THE BENEVOLENT DICTATOR'S FALL FROM GRACE? ------------------------------------------ ¶4. (S/NF) A Syrian journalist and blogger, who owns a media consultancy firm in Dubai, believes that many in the Arab street initially viewed Ahmadinejad when he came to power in 2005 as a "benevolent dictator." Citing the tradition of the Mahdi, the media consultant argued that both Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are taught from early childhood to await the arrival of a strong and unimpeachable figure who will lead the Muslim world. The media consultant maintained that even secular Arabs view the world, albeit unintentionally, with this ingrained mindset. Our contact argued that Ahmadinejad played in to this narrative, and when Ahmadinejad arrived on the international stage many Arabs saw him, in contrast to their own flawed leaders, as a humble and pious man who was brave enough to stand up for his people and the greater Muslim world by confronting Israel and the West head on. However, both the intensely competitive campaign period and the forceful reaction by the Iranian people to the official election results have led some moderate Arabs to rethink Ahmadinejad's true disposition. The election, the media consultant said, led some Arabs to understand that despite his astutely crafted and well-marketed image in the Arab world, DUBAI 00000316 002.2 OF 003 Ahmadinejad is resented by many Iranians for domestic mismanagement, incompetence, and corruption. Because of this public fall from grace, so the media consultant told us, Ahmadinejad is no longer the "untouchable, holy figure" in the Arab world he once was -- his flaws have brought him down to the level of the Arab world's own imperfect leaders. An Al-Arabiya executive, speaking at a recent conference, said that the election aftermath had destroyed the image many Arabs had of the Islamic Revolution, and Ahmadinejad's legitimacy as a leader was now open to question. [NOTE: The media consultant attributed Iran's perceived "victories" over the U.S. and the West to Ahmadinejad, as opposed to Supreme Leader Khamenei. While conventional wisdom in the West is that Khamenei has the final say over Iran's most vital interests, including the nuclear program, the consultant's comments suggest that the Arab street views Ahmadinejad as much more influential in the Islamic Republic's decision-making system.] POST-ELECTION CRISIS NOT A SILVER BULLET FOR ARAB REGIMES --------------------------------------------- ------------ ¶5. (S/NF) Ahmadinejad's fall from grace notwithstanding, most of the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke agreed that Arab governments have a limited ability to capitalize on Ahmadinejad's missteps because of the skeletons in their own closets. Al-Arabiya's former Tehran bureau chief observed that Arab regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who no doubt would like to exploit Ahmadinejad's current vulnerabilities, have remained noticeably silent. In his view, they realize that any statement condemning Tehran's crackdown on peaceful dissidents would appear untenably hypocritical in the eyes of their own citizens. He considers this public silence yet another "missed opportunity" for Arab leaders to take a stand to counter Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and further detract from his popularity with the Arab street. NEW SPACE TO DISAGREE WITH AHMADINEJAD AND THE U.S. --------------------------------------------- ------ ¶6. (S/NF) All of the Arab commentators and news media figures we spoke to agreed that the U.S. "played it right" throughout the post-election crisis by staying away from detailed public comments that could be perceived as interventionist. However, the Arab commentators were quick to distinguish between criticism of Ahmadinejad in the Arab street and support for U.S. policies. The Syrian media consultant said that the heated debates before the election, in which the three challengers -- Mousavi, Karroubi, and Reza'i -- publicly criticized Ahmadinejad for corruption and economic mismanagement, made it clear to Arabs that this election was about Iran, not the U.S. This distinction, coupled with the U.S.' restraint in commenting on the election, provided an unprecedented window for Arab commentators to criticize Ahmadinejad without appearing to side with the U.S. ¶7. (S/NF) Examples of this played out during two separate appearances by the Dubai Regional Media Hub Acting Director on live panel discussions on Abu Dhabi TV and Lebanese New TV regarding regional issues, including events in Iran. Whereas fellow Arab panelist resolutely disagreed with her comments in support of U.S. policy in the region, in particular the peace process, they felt free to openly criticize Ahmadinejad's government, which they refrained from doing in the past, for its internal crackdown and regional ambitions. One Saudi commentator contrasted Turkish regional mediation, which he described as a positive force in the region, with Iranian regional intervention, which he called pernicious and destabilizing. A Lebanese commentator noted the irony of Iran accusing outsiders of interfering in its internal affairs when there is not "one corner of the Arab world" where Iran does not intervene behind the scenes. AHMADINEJAD DOWN BUT NOT OUT DUBAI 00000316 003.2 OF 003 ---------------------------- ¶8. (S/NF) As Al-Arabiya's Tehran bureau chief noted, while Ahmadinejad's image may have taken a hit in the Arab street as a result of the government's handling of domestic dissent, the damage is not necessarily permanent. In his view, the Arab street is notoriously emotional and "could easily be turned to support Ahmadinejad once again" with some trumped up slogans and public bravado. The bureau chief believed that, in the perceived leadership void left by Arab leaders on regional issues, Ahmadinejad could rally public opinion by capitalizing on any number of sensitive issues for the Arab street, most prominent among them Israel, at upcoming international fora. The Syrian media consultant, too, cautioned the U.S. not to overestimate any erosion in Ahmadinejad's popularity with Arabs. In his opinion, Ahmadinejad has only lost standing with a segment of moderates in the Arab street; he believes that most Arabs are so polarized, either for or against Ahmadinejad, that the allegations of voter fraud and the violent post-election crackdown on protesters will not permanently sway their positions one way or the other. ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN: NO PLEASING THE ARAB STREET --------------------------------------------- ---- ¶9. (S/NF) Comment: Once the dust settles on Iran's post-election crisis, Arabs will look to see if the U.S. deals with Ahmadinejad as it pursues its nuclear nonproliferation agenda despite the lingering questions over the legitimacy of his election. If the U.S. enters negotiations with Ahmadinejad's government, moderate Arab observers may argue that the U.S., for the sake of its own national interest, has cut a deal at the expense of pro-democracy advocates -- just as many in the Arab street believe the U.S. has done with a number of Arab regimes. Those Arabs who continue to support Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, may perceive negotiations as a personal victory for a humble leader who brought the U.S. to its knees through steadfast resistance. Thus, Ahmadinejad's "fall from grace" in the Arab world may have created yet another obstacle to improved Arab perceptions of the U.S. -- in which engagement with an Ahmadinejad-led government is now a potentially lose-lose scenario in which Arabs at both ends of the pro- and anti-Ahmadinejad spectrum will consider negotiations with Teheran an accommodation with the Iranian president. RICHARDSON