SECRET: ITALY: FM D’ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE,

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000710 

SIPDIS 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

DEPT. FOR EUR 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PREL NATO UNSC EUN IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE,
MEPP, LEBANON, IRAN SANCTIONS, GUANTANAMO AND ABU OMAR

REF: A. STATE 36991
     B. STATE 37005
     C. STATE 41871
     D. STATE 42573
     E. ROME 625
     F. ROME 702 

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SPOGLI, REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 

SUMMARY
------- 

1. (C/NF) Amb. Spogli got FM D'Alema's agreement to make a
clear statement in support of the Athisaari plan for Kosovo
and was told that the FM did not think he could or should
control an Italian NGO threatening to close its hospitals in
Afghanistan unless one of its employees was released by the
Afghan Government.  During an April 5 tour d'horizon, the
Ambassador and FM also discussed Iran sanctions (D'Alema said
Italy was applying the rules thoroughly), the Middle East
peace process (D'Alema worried the Israelis and Palestinians
would miss an opportunity for progress), Lebanon (where
everything but UNIFIL is at an impasse, according to the FM),
and the Abu Omar case.  The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the
request that Italy consider taking some Guantanamo detainees
to help speed the closure of the facility.  D'Alema said
trying to close Guantanamo was a noble step and that if Italy
could help, it would try to do so (see also septel on
Guantanamo).  End Summary. 

Afghanistan and Emergency Now
----------------------------- 

2. (C/NF) On April 5, Ambassador Spogli and Foreign Minister
D'Alema discussed key issues on the foreign policy agenda.
The Ambassador raised concerns about the statements of Gino
Strada, head of the Italian NGO Emergency Now, who was
threatening to close his hospitals in Afghanistan unless the
Afghan Government released one of his staff being held for
possible terrorist affiliations.  The Amb. said such an
unwelcome step would be punishing the Afghan people and asked
if D'Alema could help get Strada to stop making threats.
D'Alema replied that he had spoken with Strada, who told him
that if his employees are going to be arrested in
Afghanistan, he would move his operations to a country that
doesn't arrest his staff.  D'Alema told the Amb. that all
sides needed to show flexibility and that if the Afghan
Government had evidence against the individual being held, it
should be shared. D'Alema noted that Italy was grateful to
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul for helping secure Red Cross access
to the detained individual.  Then, somewhat exasperated, he
said, "Strada is who he is.  He runs an NGO. He is not part
of the Italian Government.  He says they cannot work in
Helmand without having contact with the Taliban.  He thinks
the Taliban have the legitimate support of the people there.
We have urged him to be prudent.  But we do not control him
and he feels threatened."  D'Alema then said that during the
Mastrogiacomo kidnapping the Taliban cell phones that were
traced all had Pakistani numbers, and that if terror bosses
could live carefree in a Pakistan that could not be
reproached because of its alliance with the U.S., we would
not win this war. 

Kosovo - Firm Support for Status
-------------------------------- 

3. (C/NF) The Ambassador noted that the Italian position on
the Athisaari plan for Kosovo had generated some confusion
and that a clear statement of support would be very helpful.
D'Alema emphatically insisted that Italy supported the
Athisaari plan's core status provisions ("they should not be
touched").  Italy continued to believe that some non-status
issues, like protection of religious sites and minority
rights, however, could still be improved.  He said there were
two unacceptable outcomes: continuing the status quo and a
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The latter
would tear Europe apart and pull the legal legs out from
under the European mission to Kosovo.  He argued that a UNSCR
was needed that would help soften the Russian position, and a
proposal needed to be crafted for Serbia - something
conditional with flexible rewards - that could be offered to
Belgrade when Serbia inevitably rejects Kosovar independence.
 Without these elements, the region could be destabilized, he
said.  He added that Italy had been clear in its talks with
Russia and everywhere else that it would absolutely support
Athisaari's core status proposal without prolonging talks and
without new negotiations.  The Ambassador asked if D'Alema
could make a public statement to that effect.  D'Alema agreed
to do so. 

Iran Sanctions - Italy in Compliance
------------------------------------  

4. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked how Iran sanctions were
proceeding for Italy, and noted our disappointment that when
action was taken against Bank Sepah in Italy all funds had
already been moved.  D'Alema said the Iranians knew it was
coming and were a step ahead, as they had been elsewhere.  He
added that when he had spoken with Larijani early in the week
to urge the release of the UK sailors, Larijani had protested
vigorously about the action against Bank Sepah.  D'Alema
asserted "we are applying the sanctions rules.  We are in
compliance.  But Italy is also the victim of the sanctions
and is excluded from negotiations with Iran and from the
group with primary responsibility for decisions on Iran,
despite being a UNSC member." 

Israel-Palestine: About to Miss an Opportunity?
--------------------------------------------- -- 

5. (C/NF) The Ambassador thanked D'Alema for his recent
helpful comments insisting that Palestinian leaders accept
the three Quartet conditions before Italian officials would
meet with them.  The FM said he feared a moment of
opportunity was being lost.  Abu Mazen was stronger than
before but needed to find a way to get results out of his
dialogue with Olmert.  Both sides, he said, need to be pushed
and encouraged.  Without progress the risk of violence would
increase.  He suggested what was needed now was a confidence
building phase with limited ambition focusing on releasing
prisoners, improving Palestinian quality of life, granting
more freedom of access/movement and getting credible security
assurances for Israel.  The Palestinians, he said, would
never accept an independent state within provisional borders,
because they believe this means they will never get final
status issues resolved.  He envisions an eventual regional
final status conference, but not until the open final status
questions have been resolved by the two sides.  He said with
both sides weak and lacking strategies to reach solutions,
the international community needed to step in and offer hope
for positive movement.  Europe should press the Palestinians
and the U.S. should press the Israelis in a coordinated
division of labor, he suggested, adding that the Palestinians
needed to hear the message that when the time comes, the U.S.
would be willing to push Israel to resolve the final status
issues.  He informed the Amb. that Abu Mazen would be in Rome
in the coming weeks. 

Lebanon - D'Alema Concerned
--------------------------- 

6. (C/NF) Turning to Lebanon, D'Alema said he was very
concerned because the only thing working there was UNIFIL.
Everything else was totally blocked.  Parliament was not
meeting.  Reconstruction was at a standstill.  The economy
was in danger.  There was no progress on the arms embargo or
Sheba Farms.  He said the Lebanon Contact Group meeting in
London had been a good step and hoped that the group would
meet at the political level to help bolster UN action.  He
also said some way had to be found to get Syrian buy-in or
the embargo would never work. 

Guantanamo Detainees - Closure a Noble Idea
------------------------------------------- 

7. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the request for
Italy to consider taking some of the 25 releasable Guantanamo
detainees who could not be returned to their countries of
origin.  D'Alema said it was a delicate issue, but the idea
of trying to close Guantanamo was noble, and if Italy could
find a way to help, it would.  The devil would be in
practicalities of whether Italy could take any of the
detainees. (See septel for PM and Min. of Interior views on
taking Guantanamo detainees.) 

Abu Omar - Pre-emptive Letters
------------------------------ 

8. (S/NF) D'Alema closed the hour-long meeting by noting that
he had asked the Secretary if the Department could send
something in writing to him explaining that the U.S. would
not act on extradition requests in the Abu Omar case if
tendered.  This, he explained, could be used pre-emptively by
the GOI to fend off action by Italian magistrates to seek the
extradition of the implicated Americans.  D'Alema said he
understood that L had discussed this with the Italian
Ambassador in Washington.Amb. Spogli explained that we were
waiting for the constitutional court to decide on the merits
of the case before deciding on our next steps, because Min.
of Justice Mastella had suspended action until that court
rendered a decision.  The FM noted that there was still the
risk of action by the magistrates at any time.  The
Ambassador agreed that we should work to avoid having
extradition requests forwarded.
SPOGLI

SECRET: ATTACKING BASHAR’S MONEY

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SIPDIS 

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NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SINGH
TREASURY FOR GLASER 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2027
TAGS: EFIN ETTC PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: ATTACKING BASHAR'S MONEY 

REF: A. 07 DAMASCUS 2066
     B. 07 DAMASCUS 1926
     C. 07 DAMASCUS 68 

Classified By: CDA Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.5 b/d 

1.  (S) Summary. As Washington policy makers consider ways to
pressure the regime, one possibility would be to go after
President Asad's money-men.  Four individuals Asad uses to
make and move money are Zuhair Sahloul, Nabil Kuzbari, Asad's
uncle Mohammad Makhlouf, and his father-in-law, Fawas Akhras.
 Each is important to Asad and each plays a somewhat
different role in facilitating regime graft.  End summary. 

2.  (S) Sahloul (AKA Abu Shafic) is the most important
black-market money changer in Syria.  When the Syrian Pound
(SYP) devalued precipitously in the fall of 2005, the SARG
gave Sahloul an office in the Central Bank and access to its
hard currency reserves so he could intervene in the black
market to stabilize the currency.  (Note.  Sahloul was
surprisingly effective and within weeks the SYP appreciated
20 percent, allowing Sahloul in the process a handsome profit
for both himself and a handful of regime-insiders.  End
note.)  Sahloul moves Asad's money using his own network and
his access to Hawalis worldwide.  A Sahloul intimate bragged
to us recently that Sahloul could move ten million dollars
anywhere in the world in 24-hours. 

3.  (S) In addition to being the father of Syria's poster-boy
for corruption, Rami Makhlouf, Mohammad Makhlouf has long
served as a financial advisor to the Asad family.  If Rami is
the face of corruption, Mohammad is the brain.  When Asad
agreed to open the telecom sector to cellphone providers, it
was Mohammad that some credit with conceptualizing the deal
whereby Rami took over the first provider, SyriaTel, (long
Rami's biggest cash-cow), and the second license (originally
to SpaceTel, then Areeba 94, and now MTN) went to the
first-lady's family (see para five below).  Long held in
check by his brother-in-law, the late president Hafiz Asad,
under Bashar Asad, Mohammad's avarice reportedly has no
bounds.  As a result, the Makhloufs have had an at-times
problematic relationship with Bashar and were forced to leave
the country for a number of months in 2005 following one
particularly heated exchange. 

4.  (S) Because of the Makhlouf's excesses and Asad's
inherited propensity to limit the power and influence of his
family members, Nabil Kuzbari has played an increasingly
important role for the first-family. Known locally as "the
Paper King," Kuzbari's base of operations has long been in
Vienna.  In the last two years, however, he has developed an
increasingly collaborative relationship with Rami and
Mohammed Makhlouf.  Last year he served as Rami's frontman in
establishing his holding company, Sham Holding, which brought
together 70 of Syria's most-important business families to
fund a number of Rami's most ambitious entrepreneurial
projects.  In addition to lobbying European politicians to
engage the Asad regime, Kuzbari reportedly uses his contacts
in the Austrian business and banking circles to move regime
assets abroad. 

5.  (S) In addition to being Asad's father-in-law, Fawas
Akhras has been increasingly active in business here in
Syria.  Akhras is the force behind the Syrian-British
Business Council and recently put together a visit to London
by a large group of Syrian businessmen.  Coming only lately
to business, Akhras has stepped on a number of established
business families who increasingly resent his assertiveness
and willingness to use his son-in-law's position to advance
his nascent Syria-based businesses.  Contacts in the banking
sector have commented on the large amount of funds that have
begun to move recently through his accounts.  A long-time
resident of London, he is suspected of being another avenue
used by Asad to stash funds abroad. 

6.  (S) Comment. Post has long advocated moving against
individuals, like those listed above, who are intregal to
allowing the regime to profit from its corruption.  Taking
action against those linked to corruption is a win-win
proposition: not only does it bring pressure on the regime
where it hurts most - its pocketbook, but such a move would
also be popular with the average Syrian who is the most
common victim of the regime's avarice. 

CORBIN

CONFIDENTIAL: INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END

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SIPDIS 

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NEA/ELA
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TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END OF 2006 

Classified By: CDA William Roebuck, for reasons 1.5 b/d 

1.  (S) Summary.  The SARG ends 2006 in a much stronger
position domestically and internationally than it did 2005.
While there may be additional bilateral or multilateral
pressure that can impact Syria, the regime is based on a
small clique that is largely immune to such pressure.
However, Bashar Asad's growing self-confidence )- and
reliance on this small clique -- could lead him to make
mistakes and ill-judged policy decisions through trademark
emotional reactions to challenges, providing us with new
opportunities.  For example, Bashar,s reaction to the
prospect of Hariri tribunal and to publicity for Khaddam and
the National Salvation Front borders on the irrational.
Additionally, Bashar,s reported preoccupation with his image
and how he is perceived internationally is a potential
liability in his decision making process.  We believe
Bashar,s weaknesses are in how he chooses to react to
looming issues, both perceived and real, such as a the
conflict between economic reform steps (however limited) and
entrenched, corrupt forces, the Kurdish question, and the
potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence
of transiting Islamist extremists.  This cable summarizes our
assessment of these vulnerabilities and suggests that there
may be actions, statements, and signals that the USG can send
that will improve the likelihood of such opportunities
arising.  These proposals will need to be fleshed out and
converted into real actions and we need to be ready to move
quickly to take advantage of such opportunities.  Many of our
suggestions underline using Public Diplomacy and more
indirect means to send messages that influence the inner
circle.   End Summary. 

2.  (S) As the end of 2006 approaches, Bashar appears in some
ways stronger than he has in two years.  The country is
economically stable (at least for the short term), internal
opposition the regime faces is weak and intimidated, and
regional issues seem to be going Syria,s way, from
Damascus, perspective.  Nonetheless, there are some
long-standing vulnerabilities and looming issues that may
provide opportunities to up the pressure on Bashar and his
inner circle.  Regime decision-making is limited to Bashar
and an inner circle that often produces poorly thought-out
tactical decisions and sometimes emotional approaches, such
as Bashar,s universally derided August 15 speech.  Some of
these vulnerabilities, such as the regime,s near-irrational
views on Lebanon, can be exploited to put pressure on the
regime.  Actions that cause Bashar to lose balance and
increase his insecurity are in our interest because his
inexperience and his regime,s extremely small
decision-making circle make him prone to diplomatic stumbles
that can weaken him domestically and regionally.  While the
consequences of his mistakes are hard to predict and the
benefits may vary, if we are prepared to move quickly to take
advantage of the opportunities that may open up, we may
directly impact regime behavior where it matters--Bashar and
his inner circle. 

3.  (S) The following provides our summary of potential
vulnerabilities and possible means to exploit them: 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE HARIRI INVESTIGATION AND THE TRIBUNAL:  The Hariri
investigation ) and the prospect of a Lebanon Tribunal --
has provoked powerful SARG reactions, primarily because of
the embarrassment the investigation causes.  Rationally, the
regime should calculate that it can deal with any summons of
Syrian officials by refusing to turn any suspects over, or,
in extreme cases by engineering "suicides.8  But it seems
the real issue for Bashar is that Syria,s dignity and its
international reputation are put in question.  Fiercely-held
sentiments that Syria should continue to exercise dominant
control in Lebanon play into these sensitivities.   We should
seek to exploit this raw nerve, without waiting for formation
of the tribunal. 

-- Possible action: 

-- PUBLICITY:  Publicly highlighting the consequences of the
ongoing investigation a la Mehlis causes Bashar personal
angst and may lead him to act irrationally.  The regime has
deep-seated fears about the international scrutiny that a
tribunal -- or Brammertz accusations even against
lower-echelon figures -- would prompt.  The Mehlis
accusations of October 2005 caused the most serious strains
in Bashar's inner circle.  While the family got back
together, these splits may lie just below the surface. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE ALLIANCE WITH TEHRAN: Bashar is walking a fine line in
his increasingly strong relations with Iran, seeking
necessary support while not completely alienating Syria,s
moderate Sunni Arab neighbors by being perceived as aiding
Persian and fundamentalist Shia interests.  Bashar's decision
to not attend the Talabani ) Ahmadinejad summit in Tehran
following FM Moallem,s trip to Iraq can be seen as a
manifestation of Bashar's sensitivity to the Arab optic on
his Iranian alliance. 

-- Possible action: 

-- PLAY ON SUNNI FEARS OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE:  There are fears
in Syria that the Iranians are active in both Shia
proselytizing and conversion of, mostly poor, Sunnis.  Though
often exaggerated, such fears reflect an element of the Sunni
community in Syria that is increasingly upset by and focused
on the spread of Iranian influence in their country through
activities ranging from mosque construction to business.
Both the local Egyptian and Saudi missions here, (as well as
prominent Syrian Sunni religious leaders), are giving
increasing attention to the matter and we should coordinate
more closely with their governments on ways to better
publicize and focus regional attention on the issue. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE INNER CIRCLE:  At the end of the day, the regime is
dominated by the Asad family and to a lesser degree by Bashar
Asad,s maternal family, the Makhlufs, with many family
members believe to be increasingly corrupt. The family, and
hangers on, as well as the larger Alawite sect, are not
immune to feuds and anti-regime conspiracies, as was evident
last year when intimates of various regime pillars (including
the Makhloufs) approached us about post-Bashar possibilities.
 Corruption is a great divider and Bashar's inner circle is
subject to the usual feuds and squabbles related to graft and
corruption.  For example, it is generally known that Maher
Asad is particularly corrupt and incorrigible.  He has no
scruples in his feuds with family members or others.  There
is also tremendous fear in the Alawite community about
retribution if the Sunni majority ever regains power. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS: Targeted sanctions against regime
members and their intimates are generally welcomed by most
elements of Syrian society.  But the way designations are
applied must exploit fissures and render the inner circle
weaker rather than drive its members closer together.  The
designation of Shawkat caused him some personal irritation
and was the subject of considerable discussion in the
business community here. While the public reaction to
corruption tends to be muted, continued reminders of
corruption in the inner circle have resonance.  We should
look for ways to remind the public of our previous
designations. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE KHADDAM FACTOR:  Khaddam knows where the regime
skeletons are hidden, which provokes enormous irritation from
Bashar, vastly disproportionate to any support Khaddam has
within Syria.  Bashar Asad personally, and his regime in
general, follow every news item involving Khaddam with
tremendous emotional interest.  The regime reacts with
self-defeating anger whenever another Arab country hosts
Khaddam or allows him to make a public statement through any
of its media outlets. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- We should continue to encourage the Saudis and others to
allow Khaddam access to their media outlets, providing him
with venues for airing the SARG,s dirty laundry.  We should
anticipate an overreaction by the regime that will add to its
isolation and alienation from its Arab neighbors. 

Vulnerability: 

  -- DIVISIONS IN THE MILITARY-SECURITY SERVICES:  Bashar
constantly guards against challenges from those with ties
inside the military and security services.  He is also
nervous about any loyalties senior officers (or former senior
officers) feel toward disaffected former regime elements like
Rif,at Asad and Khaddam.  The inner circle focuses
continuously on who gets what piece of the corruption action.
 Some moves by Bashar in narrowing the circle of those who
benefit from high-level graft has increased those with ties
to the security services who have axes to grind. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- ENCOURAGE RUMORS AND SIGNALS OF EXTERNAL PLOTTING:
The regime is intensely sensitive to rumors about
coup-plotting and restlessness in the security services and
military.  Regional allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia should
be encouraged to meet with figures like Khaddam and Rif,at
Asad as a way of sending such signals, with appropriate
leaking of the meetings afterwards.  This again touches on
this insular regime,s paranoia and increases the possibility
of a self-defeating over-reaction. 

Vulnerability: 

-- REFORM FORCES VERSUS BAATHISTS-OTHER CORRUPT ELITES:
Bashar keeps unveiling a steady stream of initiatives on
economic reform and it is certainly possible he believes this
issue is his legacy to Syria.  While limited and ineffectual,
these steps have brought back Syrian expats to invest and
have created at least the illusion of increasing openness.
Finding ways to publicly call into question Bashar,s reform
efforts )- pointing, for example to the use of reform to
disguise cronyism -- would embarrass Bashar and undercut
these efforts to shore up his legitimacy.  Revealing Asad
family/inner circle corruption would have a similar effect. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- HIGHLIGHTING FAILURES OF REFORM:  Highlighting failures of
reform, especially in the run-up to the 2007 Presidential
elections, is a move that Bashar would find highly
embarrassing and de-legitimizing.  Comparing and contrasting
puny Syrian reform efforts with the rest of the Middle East
would also embarrass and irritate Bashar. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE ECONOMY: Perpetually under-performing, the Syrian
economy creates jobs for less than 50 percent of the
country,s university graduates.  Oil accounts for 70 percent
of exports and 30 percent of government revenue, but
production is in steady decline.  By 2010 Syria is expected
to become a net importer of oil.  Few experts believe the
SARG is capable of managing successfully the expected
economic dislocations. 

-- DISCOURAGE FDI, ESPECIALLY FROM THE GULF:  Syria has
enjoyed a considerable up-tick in foreign direct investment
(FDI) in the last two years that appears to be picking up
steam.  The most important new FDI is undoubtedly from the
Gulf. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE KURDS:  The most organized and daring political
opposition and civil society groups are among the ethnic
minority Kurds, concentrated in Syria,s northeast, as well
as in communities in Damascus and Aleppo.  This group has
been willing to protest violently in its home territory when
others would dare not.  There are few threats that loom
larger in Bashar,s mind than unrest with the Kurds.  In what
is a rare occurrence, our DATT was convoked by Syrian
Military Intelligence in May of 2006 to protest what the
Syrians believed were US efforts to provide military training
and equipment to the Kurds in Syria. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- HIGHLIGHT KURDISH COMPLAINTS: Highlighting Kurdish
complaints in public statements, including publicizing human
rights abuses will exacerbate regime,s concerns about the
Kurdish population.  Focus on economic hardship in Kurdish
areas and the SARG,s long-standing refusal to offer
citizenship to some 200,000 stateless Kurds.  This issue
would need to be handled carefully, since giving the wrong
kind of prominence to Kurdish issues in Syria could be a
liability for our efforts at uniting the opposition, given
Syrian (mostly Arab) civil society,s skepticism of Kurdish
objectives. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- Extremist elements increasingly use Syria as a base, while
the SARG has taken some actions against groups stating links
to Al-Qaeda.  With the killing of the al-Qaida leader on the
border with Lebanon in early December and the increasing
terrorist attacks inside Syria culminating in the September
12 attack against the US embassy, the SARG,s policies in
Iraq and support for terrorists elsewhere as well can be seen
to be coming home to roost. 

-- Possible Actions: 

-- Publicize presence of transiting (or externally focused)
extremist groups in Syria, not limited to mention of Hamas
and PIJ.  Publicize Syrian efforts against extremist groups
in a way that suggests weakness, signs of instability, and
uncontrolled blowback.  The SARG,s argument (usually used
after terror attacks in Syria) that it too is a victim of
terrorism should be used against it to give greater
prominence to increasing signs of instability within Syria. 

4.  (S) CONCLUSION:  This analysis leaves out the anti-regime
Syrian Islamists because it is difficult to get an accurate
picture of the threat within Syria that such groups pose.
They are certainly a long-term threat.  While it alludes to
the vulnerabilities that Syria faces because of its alliance
with Iran, it does not elaborate fully on this topic.  The
bottom line is that Bashar is entering the new year in a
stronger position than he has been in several years, but
those strengths also carry with them -- or sometimes mask )
vulnerabilities.  If we are ready to capitalize, they will
offer us opportunities to disrupt his decision-making, keep
him off-balance, and make him pay a premium for his mistakes. 

ROEBUCK

CONFIDENTIAL: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA

VZCZCXRO2381
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHDM #0068/01 0041408
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041408Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6460
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0694
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0055
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000068 

SIPDIS 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS 

NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH
TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON
EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2015
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETTC SY SANC
SUBJECT: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA 

REF: A. A: DAMASCUS 5567
     B. REF B: DAMASCUS 6224 

Classified By: CDA: Stephen Seche for Reasons 1.5 

1.  (C) Summary.  As post has reported previously, the
average Syrian would welcome targeted sanctions that focus on
regressive elements within the Asad regime.  The best mix in
our judgement would be sanctions that are phased,
multi-lateral, and widely publicized.  Most of our Syrian
interlocutors concur that if done correctly, these sanctions
would delegitimize those elements within the SARG perceived
to be obstacles to change, strengthen progressive elements
both within the regime and the wider society, and increase
pressure on the SARG to substantively change its
destabilizing behavior.  End summary. 

2.  (C) Financial and travel sanctions that target
individuals remain popular with the majority of our Syrian
interlocutors (ref A, B).  They argue that targeting
individuals would make clear for the average Syrian that the
international community opposes the regime and its policies,
but does not wish to punish the Syrian people.  At the same
time, targeted sanctions would also help delegitimize those
individuals who pose the greatest internal and external
threat to progress.  Additionally, if designated individuals
could neither travel nor conduct legitimate business, they
would become an increasing liability for President Bashar
al-Asad,s regime.  Popular resentment against the sanctioned
individuals would add to the pressure to change. 

3.  (C) Syrians we speak with argue that future designations
should be multi-lateral.  Some tools for doing so already
exist.  UNSCR 1636 makes provision for designation of
individuals named under the Hariri investigation.  A case
should be made for additional designations under existing or
new UNSC resolutions.  The USG designated Dhu al Himma
as-Shaleesh and Asif Issa as-Shalesh, cousins of President
Asad, under E.O. 13315 ) a derivative of UNSCR 1483 - for
their role in procuring defense-related items for Saddam
Hussein.  We should lobby our allies to pursue similar
designations, under the umbrella of new or existing UNSC
resolutions of both the Shaleeshes and any new Syrians we
designate concerning Lebanon, Iraq, WMD, and the peace
process.  Though it is unlikely that any significant
financial resources would be frozen by these designations
(ref B), the naming and shaming of the most recalcitrant
elements within the regime would delegitimize them
internationally, which in turn, would work to undermine the
hardliners domestically. 

4.  (C) Pursuing multilateral designations would greatly
multiply the effectiveness of targeted sanctions, but a
carefully timed campaign to widely publicize the designations
is equally important.  Without media coverage and publicity
to raise the profile of designations, the effort would lose
its most effective element - &name and shame.8  The
Shaleesh case mentioned above is a case in point.  Despite
the Shaleesh family having a high profile within Syria, very
few Syrians at any level are aware the USG imposed financial
sanctions on them.  The head of one of the leading Sunni
business families in Damascus approached us recently to ask
why the USG did not aggressively pursue sanctioning criminal
elements within the regime.  When asked for examples of who
should be sanctioned, our contact pointed to Dhu al Himma
as-Shaleesh who, he asserted, took much of the 580 million
USD in Iraqi funds the Commercial Bank of Syria illegally
paid out in 2003 and has yet to reconcile with the Iraqis.
Needless to say, our contact was surprised to find out Dhu al
Himma as well as his nephew, Asif Issa Shaleesh, were already
sanctioned. 

5.  (C) Phasing in future targeted sanctions can maximize
their impact.  The first phase could start with those most
clearly the architects of objectionable SARG policies
relating to Iraq, Lebanon, WMD, and support for the
Palestinian rejectionist groups, and then extend to those
continuing to support the original group in an ever widening
circle.  In addition to all of the Mehlis suspects, the first
batch of new designees might include a core group of eight to
ten, such as Asif Shawkat (Asad,s brother-in-law and head of
Syrian Military Intelligence), Maher Asad (President Asad,s
brother and commander of the Republican Guard), Rami Makhlouf
(Asad,s first cousin and Syria,s poster boy for
corruption), Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami,s father), Riyad Issa
Shaleesh (principal director of SES International ) an
entity already designated under E.O. 13315; in addition, we
should push our allies to sanction the other two Shaleeshes
mentioned above), Hisham Ikhtiyar (chairman of the Regional
Command's National Security Bureau), Abdel Fatah Qudsia
(Presidential advisor on Palestinian issues), and Mohammad
Suleiman (Presidential advisor responsible for procurement).
A second tranch of designations could then move on to this
group's lieutenants and business partners. 

6.  (C) Most Syrians we talk to believe that President Asad
still represents their best hope for change without
instability.  It is their fear of instability that stops the
majority of Syrians from pushing harder for internal change.
For this reason, they argue that sanctions focusing on
individuals would help empower Asad to scuttle the regime,s
pariahs.  According to this school of thought, Bashar himself
should not be designated at this point as it would limit our
options and signal that the USG is intent on regime change,
greatly limiting the number of Syrians willing to join us in
pressuring the SARG for change. 

7.  (C) Comment.  Pursuing targeted sanctions would send a
powerful message to the regime and those associated with it:
"if you are perceived to be proponents of the policies
causing regional instability, you will be designated.  If you
provide aid and assistance to those designated, you risk
designation yourself."  Both internal and external pressure
on the regime to change would likewise increase incrementally
as the number of designations increased.  If conventional
Syrian wisdom is correct, the obstacles stopping Bashar from
doing the right thing would proportionally decrease as
targeted sanctions progressed.  Even if that view is wrong,
the same result will occur, as the supports of Bashar,s
failed policies are eroded.  In the end, the USG will advance
its policy objectives by undermining the regime,s ability to
pursue policies at odds with regional stability.
SECHE

CONFIDENTIAL: LEBANON: BELLEMARE ANXIOUS FOR MORE USG ASSISTANCE

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3034
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2905
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001348 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, IO/FO-HOOK, WARLICK,
IO/UNP-AMORRISON, L/FO-JBELLINGER, JTHESSIN,
L/AN-LJACOBSON, L/UNA-TBUCHWALD, INR/GGI-MARGULIES,
CIA/CNC-JFINKEL, JBRODERERICK, CIA/CTC-JBEAN, DOJ-JEVY,
USUN-KHALILZAD, WOLFF, SCHEDLBAUER, NSC FOR
ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PINR UNSC LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BELLEMARE ANXIOUS FOR MORE USG ASSISTANCE
THAN HE HAS SEEN 

REF: THE HAGUE 744 

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 

SUMMARY
------- 

1. (S/NF)  In a September 12 meeting with the Ambassador,
Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent
International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC) made three
specific requests for USG assistance and additional requests
for USG action.  First, he asked that the USG provide
intelligence information that UNIIIC has formally requested.
Second, that the USG loan UNIIIC two criminal investigators
TDY.  UNIIIC needs "investigators who can question a witness"
to interview some 200 persons currently in prison who may
have some relevant information.  Third, that the USG urge the
UK to do more to help UNIIIC, particularly with intelligence
information (the UK has provided loaned personnel). 

2. (S/NF)  In addition, Bellemare asked for USG support when
the Management Committee considers the Tribunal operating
budget on September 25 -- the same day that Lebanese
President Sleiman will meet President Bush in Washington.  He
also raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a
new resolution to clarify some legal issues.  Finally he
repeated earlier requests for a USG reaction to 26 sketches
of possible suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG and asked
about getting access to alleged Hizballah defectors
reportedly in the U.S. 

3. (S/NF)  On other matters, Bellemare said that the GOL has
not asked that UNIIIC investigate the latest political
assassination (the September 10 attack on opposition Druze
member Saleh Aridi).  He is concerned about a new
Telecommunication Ministry directive that may impede his
plans for using wiretaps.  End Summary. 

GOL HAS NOT ASKED THAT UNIIIC
INVESTIGATE LATEST ASSASSINATION
-------------------------------- 

4. (S/NF)  The Ambassador and DCM met on September 12 with
Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent
International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC), in his
office in Monteverde.  The Ambassador asked if UNIIIC would
investigate the case of Saleh Aridi, a Druze political
official assassinated in a car bomb attack near Beirut on
September 10.  Bellemare explained that for UNIIIC to take on
a case, first the GOL must ask the UN SYG, then the SYG and
Security Council must approve.  He said that the GOL had
shown no indication that it would request that UNIIIC
investigate the Aridi killing.  UNIIIC is interested in
finding out more about the Aridi attack, since details are
similar to other cases it is investigating.  If it is not
invited to investigate but wants information about a case,
UNIIIC must submit a request to the Lebanese chief
prosecutor.  The criteria the GOL uses to decide on
requesting UNIIIC assistance is "a mystery to me" Bellemare
said.  (NOTE:  The Aridi assassination is the first of a
pro-Syrian politician.  END NOTE.) 

WIRETAPPING
----------- 

5. (S/NF)  Bellemare was concerned about something he had
learned the day before that might affect wiretapping.  The
Telecommunications Ministry had directed two private telecom
companies in Lebanon to inform the Ministry about any
requests for wiretapping.  He noted that it is well known
that the Internal Security Forces (ISF), the national police,
conduct wiretapping even though the legal basis for their
authority to do so is weak.  The Telecom Ministry's move may
have been directed against the ISF.  The order, however, also
could limit the ability of UNIIIC to conduct wiretaps if the
phone companies fear that they will have to report those
efforts to the Telecommunications Ministry. 

6. (S/NF)  The Ambassador asked if Bellemare believed the
action was targeted at UNIIIC, noting that the new
Telecommunications Minister is from the opposition.
Bellemare replied that he was not in a position to say.  At
his meeting with PM Fouad Siniora earlier in the week, on
September 8, Siniora told Bellemare to inform him if he runs
into any problems with cooperation from government officials.
 He said he might discuss this with the PM if it looks as if
this new telecom directive will be a problem, but first he
will meet with officials of the two telecom companies next
week.  The Ambassador offered to support his efforts at
resolving this issue. 

7. (S/NF)  Bellemare noted that at his August 14 meeting in
The Hague with the USG Interagency Working Group (IWG), he
had asked for USG help with wiretapping capability.  He said
that trying to work wiretapping through the Lebanese ISF or
military intelligence would be like "putting the names (of
targets) in the paper".  He explained that UN legal experts
were currently looking into the possibility that UNIIIC has
legal authority to carry out wiretaps.  Beyond legal
authority for wiretapping, though, Bellemare said he needs
technical capability. 

ASSISTANCE FROM THE USG
----------------------- 

8. (S/NF)  Bellemare expressed frustration that USG has not
provided more in response to his requests for assistance, and
noted that he has discussed this with State Department
officials.  He outlined three requests for USG assistance for
his investigation. 

-- One, provide intelligence information that UNIIIC has
formally requested, or inform him that it cannot be provided,
so that he knows not to pursue the requests. 

-- Two, provide two loaned criminal analysts on TDY.  UNIIIC
needs "investigators who can question a witness" to interview
some 200 persons currently in prison who may have some
relevant informtion. 

-- Three, using USG influence, urge the U government to
provide more to UNIIIC, particulaly regarding intelligence
information.  Bellemare said he has requests in to MI-6, but
has not received much.  On personnel, Scotland Yard has
provided a loaned investigator. 

9. (S/NF)  Bellemare showed a good understanding of the
problems associated with complying with the first two
requests from his several meetings with USG officials, but
his frustration was nonetheless evident.  "You are the key
player.  If the U.S. doesn't help me, who will?"  The USG has
"a big investment in the Tribunal" and being more forthcoming
on UNIIIC's requests is a way of making that investment pay
off, he said. 

10. (S/NF)  During the meeting, Bellemare made several other
requests for USG action: 

-- USG support when the Committee considers the Tribunal
operating budget, scheduled for September 25, the same day
that Lebanese President Sleiman will meet President Bush in
Washington.  He warned that the budget includes high travel
costs, but that these are necessary because of the need for
frequent travel between the Hague and Lebanon. Bellemare
thanked the USG for what he said was a much improved attitude
on the part of the Tribunal Management Committee.  His
requests have been more favorably received than was the case
previously. 

-- He raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a
new resolution to clarify some legal issues.  He mused about
the possibility of getting Chapter VII authority for the
Tribunal via such a new resolution, but seemed to think that
was not doable in the Council. 

-- He asked for a reaction to the 26 sketches of possible
suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG. 

-- Finally, he asked about getting access to alleged
Hizballah defectors reportedly in the U.S., or a definitive
negative response to the request.  The answers the USG has
given him so far on this subject, he said, have been not
sufficiently definitive. 

INTERVIEWS IN SYRIA
------------------- 

11. (S/NF)  On this issue, Bellemare repeated what he said in
the IWG meeting (reftel): that he did not want to go to Syria
until the USG or other sources had provided names of leads he
should ask to interview and other information.  If Syria
denied his request to interview these people, then he would
have evidence of Syrian non-cooperation.  Just asking would
give some indication to others in Syria where his
investigation might be headed, which could provoke more
cooperation "if I hit the right person." 

12. (S/NF)  Bellemare emphasized the urgency for responding
to his request related to Syria, first, because UNIIIC's
mandate and with it Chapter VII authority expires at the end
of the year, and second, the importance of conducting the
interviews before the interviewees disappear by being killed
or other means. 

OTHER ISSUES: NEW MINISTER OF JUSTICE,
UNIIIC PRESS SPOKESPERSON
------------------------------ 

13. (C )  Bellemare said he had a very positive impression of
new GOL Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar, who had told
Bellemare he wanted to be helpful.  Najjar's predecessor,
Charles Rizk, was a vocal supporter of the Tribunal but also
known for public criticisms of Bellemare and the previous
Commissioner, Serge Brammertz.  Bellemare, a Canadian, noted
that Najjar had taught at McGill University in Montreal and
they had some mutual acquaintances. 

14. (SBU)  UNIIIC now has a press spokesperson who started
work the week before, Bellemare reported. The official had
good relevant experience as the spokesperson for the
Yugoslavia Tribunal and most recently for the UN Legal
Affairs office.  The new spokesperson is currently working up
a strategy for UNIIIC's press interaction. 

15. (C)  Bellemare said he had been advised by several
persons to not make statements in public that might be seen
as disrupting the current relative calm in Lebanon.  He
planned to follow that advice,  (NOTE: Bellemare traveled to
Saudi Arabia September 15, we understand.  We will seek
further information from UNIIIC contacts.  END NOTE.)
SISON