VZCZCXRO7040 OO RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHNP DE RUEHRO #0710/01 0961009 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 061009Z APR 07 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7637 INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0550 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0310 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0369 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0651 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0359 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0464 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0939 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 4301 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0219 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2310 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0430 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8544 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2462 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0733 RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0393 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000710 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT. FOR EUR E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 TAGS: PREL NATO UNSC EUN IT SUBJECT: ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE, MEPP, LEBANON, IRAN SANCTIONS, GUANTANAMO AND ABU OMAR REF: A. STATE 36991 ¶B. STATE 37005 ¶C. STATE 41871 ¶D. STATE 42573 ¶E. ROME 625 ¶F. ROME 702 Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SPOGLI, REASONS 1.4 B AND D. SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (C/NF) Amb. Spogli got FM D'Alema's agreement to make a clear statement in support of the Athisaari plan for Kosovo and was told that the FM did not think he could or should control an Italian NGO threatening to close its hospitals in Afghanistan unless one of its employees was released by the Afghan Government. During an April 5 tour d'horizon, the Ambassador and FM also discussed Iran sanctions (D'Alema said Italy was applying the rules thoroughly), the Middle East peace process (D'Alema worried the Israelis and Palestinians would miss an opportunity for progress), Lebanon (where everything but UNIFIL is at an impasse, according to the FM), and the Abu Omar case. The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the request that Italy consider taking some Guantanamo detainees to help speed the closure of the facility. D'Alema said trying to close Guantanamo was a noble step and that if Italy could help, it would try to do so (see also septel on Guantanamo). End Summary. Afghanistan and Emergency Now ----------------------------- ¶2. (C/NF) On April 5, Ambassador Spogli and Foreign Minister D'Alema discussed key issues on the foreign policy agenda. The Ambassador raised concerns about the statements of Gino Strada, head of the Italian NGO Emergency Now, who was threatening to close his hospitals in Afghanistan unless the Afghan Government released one of his staff being held for possible terrorist affiliations. The Amb. said such an unwelcome step would be punishing the Afghan people and asked if D'Alema could help get Strada to stop making threats. D'Alema replied that he had spoken with Strada, who told him that if his employees are going to be arrested in Afghanistan, he would move his operations to a country that doesn't arrest his staff. D'Alema told the Amb. that all sides needed to show flexibility and that if the Afghan Government had evidence against the individual being held, it should be shared. D'Alema noted that Italy was grateful to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul for helping secure Red Cross access to the detained individual. Then, somewhat exasperated, he said, "Strada is who he is. He runs an NGO. He is not part of the Italian Government. He says they cannot work in Helmand without having contact with the Taliban. He thinks the Taliban have the legitimate support of the people there. We have urged him to be prudent. But we do not control him and he feels threatened." D'Alema then said that during the Mastrogiacomo kidnapping the Taliban cell phones that were traced all had Pakistani numbers, and that if terror bosses could live carefree in a Pakistan that could not be reproached because of its alliance with the U.S., we would not win this war. Kosovo - Firm Support for Status -------------------------------- ¶3. (C/NF) The Ambassador noted that the Italian position on the Athisaari plan for Kosovo had generated some confusion and that a clear statement of support would be very helpful. D'Alema emphatically insisted that Italy supported the Athisaari plan's core status provisions ("they should not be touched"). Italy continued to believe that some non-status issues, like protection of religious sites and minority rights, however, could still be improved. He said there were two unacceptable outcomes: continuing the status quo and a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The latter would tear Europe apart and pull the legal legs out from under the European mission to Kosovo. He argued that a UNSCR was needed that would help soften the Russian position, and a proposal needed to be crafted for Serbia - something conditional with flexible rewards - that could be offered to Belgrade when Serbia inevitably rejects Kosovar independence. Without these elements, the region could be destabilized, he said. He added that Italy had been clear in its talks with Russia and everywhere else that it would absolutely support Athisaari's core status proposal without prolonging talks and without new negotiations. The Ambassador asked if D'Alema could make a public statement to that effect. D'Alema agreed to do so. Iran Sanctions - Italy in Compliance ------------------------------------ ¶4. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked how Iran sanctions were proceeding for Italy, and noted our disappointment that when action was taken against Bank Sepah in Italy all funds had already been moved. D'Alema said the Iranians knew it was coming and were a step ahead, as they had been elsewhere. He added that when he had spoken with Larijani early in the week to urge the release of the UK sailors, Larijani had protested vigorously about the action against Bank Sepah. D'Alema asserted "we are applying the sanctions rules. We are in compliance. But Italy is also the victim of the sanctions and is excluded from negotiations with Iran and from the group with primary responsibility for decisions on Iran, despite being a UNSC member." Israel-Palestine: About to Miss an Opportunity? --------------------------------------------- -- ¶5. (C/NF) The Ambassador thanked D'Alema for his recent helpful comments insisting that Palestinian leaders accept the three Quartet conditions before Italian officials would meet with them. The FM said he feared a moment of opportunity was being lost. Abu Mazen was stronger than before but needed to find a way to get results out of his dialogue with Olmert. Both sides, he said, need to be pushed and encouraged. Without progress the risk of violence would increase. He suggested what was needed now was a confidence building phase with limited ambition focusing on releasing prisoners, improving Palestinian quality of life, granting more freedom of access/movement and getting credible security assurances for Israel. The Palestinians, he said, would never accept an independent state within provisional borders, because they believe this means they will never get final status issues resolved. He envisions an eventual regional final status conference, but not until the open final status questions have been resolved by the two sides. He said with both sides weak and lacking strategies to reach solutions, the international community needed to step in and offer hope for positive movement. Europe should press the Palestinians and the U.S. should press the Israelis in a coordinated division of labor, he suggested, adding that the Palestinians needed to hear the message that when the time comes, the U.S. would be willing to push Israel to resolve the final status issues. He informed the Amb. that Abu Mazen would be in Rome in the coming weeks. Lebanon - D'Alema Concerned --------------------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Turning to Lebanon, D'Alema said he was very concerned because the only thing working there was UNIFIL. Everything else was totally blocked. Parliament was not meeting. Reconstruction was at a standstill. The economy was in danger. There was no progress on the arms embargo or Sheba Farms. He said the Lebanon Contact Group meeting in London had been a good step and hoped that the group would meet at the political level to help bolster UN action. He also said some way had to be found to get Syrian buy-in or the embargo would never work. Guantanamo Detainees - Closure a Noble Idea ------------------------------------------- ¶7. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the request for Italy to consider taking some of the 25 releasable Guantanamo detainees who could not be returned to their countries of origin. D'Alema said it was a delicate issue, but the idea of trying to close Guantanamo was noble, and if Italy could find a way to help, it would. The devil would be in practicalities of whether Italy could take any of the detainees. (See septel for PM and Min. of Interior views on taking Guantanamo detainees.) Abu Omar - Pre-emptive Letters ------------------------------ ¶8. (S/NF) D'Alema closed the hour-long meeting by noting that he had asked the Secretary if the Department could send something in writing to him explaining that the U.S. would not act on extradition requests in the Abu Omar case if tendered. This, he explained, could be used pre-emptively by the GOI to fend off action by Italian magistrates to seek the extradition of the implicated Americans. D'Alema said he understood that L had discussed this with the Italian Ambassador in Washington.Amb. Spogli explained that we were waiting for the constitutional court to decide on the merits of the case before deciding on our next steps, because Min. of Justice Mastella had suspended action until that court rendered a decision. The FM noted that there was still the risk of action by the magistrates at any time. The Ambassador agreed that we should work to avoid having extradition requests forwarded. SPOGLI
Tag: macdill afb
SECRET: ATTACKING BASHAR’S MONEY
VZCZCXRO0088 PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #0054/01 0241517 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 241517Z JAN 08 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4564 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0339 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000054 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA/ELA NSC FOR SINGH TREASURY FOR GLASER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2027 TAGS: EFIN ETTC PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: ATTACKING BASHAR'S MONEY REF: A. 07 DAMASCUS 2066 ¶B. 07 DAMASCUS 1926 ¶C. 07 DAMASCUS 68 Classified By: CDA Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.5 b/d ¶1. (S) Summary. As Washington policy makers consider ways to pressure the regime, one possibility would be to go after President Asad's money-men. Four individuals Asad uses to make and move money are Zuhair Sahloul, Nabil Kuzbari, Asad's uncle Mohammad Makhlouf, and his father-in-law, Fawas Akhras. Each is important to Asad and each plays a somewhat different role in facilitating regime graft. End summary. ¶2. (S) Sahloul (AKA Abu Shafic) is the most important black-market money changer in Syria. When the Syrian Pound (SYP) devalued precipitously in the fall of 2005, the SARG gave Sahloul an office in the Central Bank and access to its hard currency reserves so he could intervene in the black market to stabilize the currency. (Note. Sahloul was surprisingly effective and within weeks the SYP appreciated 20 percent, allowing Sahloul in the process a handsome profit for both himself and a handful of regime-insiders. End note.) Sahloul moves Asad's money using his own network and his access to Hawalis worldwide. A Sahloul intimate bragged to us recently that Sahloul could move ten million dollars anywhere in the world in 24-hours. ¶3. (S) In addition to being the father of Syria's poster-boy for corruption, Rami Makhlouf, Mohammad Makhlouf has long served as a financial advisor to the Asad family. If Rami is the face of corruption, Mohammad is the brain. When Asad agreed to open the telecom sector to cellphone providers, it was Mohammad that some credit with conceptualizing the deal whereby Rami took over the first provider, SyriaTel, (long Rami's biggest cash-cow), and the second license (originally to SpaceTel, then Areeba 94, and now MTN) went to the first-lady's family (see para five below). Long held in check by his brother-in-law, the late president Hafiz Asad, under Bashar Asad, Mohammad's avarice reportedly has no bounds. As a result, the Makhloufs have had an at-times problematic relationship with Bashar and were forced to leave the country for a number of months in 2005 following one particularly heated exchange. ¶4. (S) Because of the Makhlouf's excesses and Asad's inherited propensity to limit the power and influence of his family members, Nabil Kuzbari has played an increasingly important role for the first-family. Known locally as "the Paper King," Kuzbari's base of operations has long been in Vienna. In the last two years, however, he has developed an increasingly collaborative relationship with Rami and Mohammed Makhlouf. Last year he served as Rami's frontman in establishing his holding company, Sham Holding, which brought together 70 of Syria's most-important business families to fund a number of Rami's most ambitious entrepreneurial projects. In addition to lobbying European politicians to engage the Asad regime, Kuzbari reportedly uses his contacts in the Austrian business and banking circles to move regime assets abroad. ¶5. (S) In addition to being Asad's father-in-law, Fawas Akhras has been increasingly active in business here in Syria. Akhras is the force behind the Syrian-British Business Council and recently put together a visit to London by a large group of Syrian businessmen. Coming only lately to business, Akhras has stepped on a number of established business families who increasingly resent his assertiveness and willingness to use his son-in-law's position to advance his nascent Syria-based businesses. Contacts in the banking sector have commented on the large amount of funds that have begun to move recently through his accounts. A long-time resident of London, he is suspected of being another avenue used by Asad to stash funds abroad. ¶6. (S) Comment. Post has long advocated moving against individuals, like those listed above, who are intregal to allowing the regime to profit from its corruption. Taking action against those linked to corruption is a win-win proposition: not only does it bring pressure on the regime where it hurts most - its pocketbook, but such a move would also be popular with the average Syrian who is the most common victim of the regime's avarice. CORBIN
CONFIDENTIAL: INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END
VZCZCXRO4219 OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #5399/01 3471603 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 131603Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1450 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0200 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 005399 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA/ELA NSC FOR MARCHESE TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END OF 2006 Classified By: CDA William Roebuck, for reasons 1.5 b/d ¶1. (S) Summary. The SARG ends 2006 in a much stronger position domestically and internationally than it did 2005. While there may be additional bilateral or multilateral pressure that can impact Syria, the regime is based on a small clique that is largely immune to such pressure. However, Bashar Asad's growing self-confidence )- and reliance on this small clique -- could lead him to make mistakes and ill-judged policy decisions through trademark emotional reactions to challenges, providing us with new opportunities. For example, Bashar,s reaction to the prospect of Hariri tribunal and to publicity for Khaddam and the National Salvation Front borders on the irrational. Additionally, Bashar,s reported preoccupation with his image and how he is perceived internationally is a potential liability in his decision making process. We believe Bashar,s weaknesses are in how he chooses to react to looming issues, both perceived and real, such as a the conflict between economic reform steps (however limited) and entrenched, corrupt forces, the Kurdish question, and the potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence of transiting Islamist extremists. This cable summarizes our assessment of these vulnerabilities and suggests that there may be actions, statements, and signals that the USG can send that will improve the likelihood of such opportunities arising. These proposals will need to be fleshed out and converted into real actions and we need to be ready to move quickly to take advantage of such opportunities. Many of our suggestions underline using Public Diplomacy and more indirect means to send messages that influence the inner circle. End Summary. ¶2. (S) As the end of 2006 approaches, Bashar appears in some ways stronger than he has in two years. The country is economically stable (at least for the short term), internal opposition the regime faces is weak and intimidated, and regional issues seem to be going Syria,s way, from Damascus, perspective. Nonetheless, there are some long-standing vulnerabilities and looming issues that may provide opportunities to up the pressure on Bashar and his inner circle. Regime decision-making is limited to Bashar and an inner circle that often produces poorly thought-out tactical decisions and sometimes emotional approaches, such as Bashar,s universally derided August 15 speech. Some of these vulnerabilities, such as the regime,s near-irrational views on Lebanon, can be exploited to put pressure on the regime. Actions that cause Bashar to lose balance and increase his insecurity are in our interest because his inexperience and his regime,s extremely small decision-making circle make him prone to diplomatic stumbles that can weaken him domestically and regionally. While the consequences of his mistakes are hard to predict and the benefits may vary, if we are prepared to move quickly to take advantage of the opportunities that may open up, we may directly impact regime behavior where it matters--Bashar and his inner circle. ¶3. (S) The following provides our summary of potential vulnerabilities and possible means to exploit them: -- Vulnerability: -- THE HARIRI INVESTIGATION AND THE TRIBUNAL: The Hariri investigation ) and the prospect of a Lebanon Tribunal -- has provoked powerful SARG reactions, primarily because of the embarrassment the investigation causes. Rationally, the regime should calculate that it can deal with any summons of Syrian officials by refusing to turn any suspects over, or, in extreme cases by engineering "suicides.8 But it seems the real issue for Bashar is that Syria,s dignity and its international reputation are put in question. Fiercely-held sentiments that Syria should continue to exercise dominant control in Lebanon play into these sensitivities. We should seek to exploit this raw nerve, without waiting for formation of the tribunal. -- Possible action: -- PUBLICITY: Publicly highlighting the consequences of the ongoing investigation a la Mehlis causes Bashar personal angst and may lead him to act irrationally. The regime has deep-seated fears about the international scrutiny that a tribunal -- or Brammertz accusations even against lower-echelon figures -- would prompt. The Mehlis accusations of October 2005 caused the most serious strains in Bashar's inner circle. While the family got back together, these splits may lie just below the surface. -- Vulnerability: -- THE ALLIANCE WITH TEHRAN: Bashar is walking a fine line in his increasingly strong relations with Iran, seeking necessary support while not completely alienating Syria,s moderate Sunni Arab neighbors by being perceived as aiding Persian and fundamentalist Shia interests. Bashar's decision to not attend the Talabani ) Ahmadinejad summit in Tehran following FM Moallem,s trip to Iraq can be seen as a manifestation of Bashar's sensitivity to the Arab optic on his Iranian alliance. -- Possible action: -- PLAY ON SUNNI FEARS OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE: There are fears in Syria that the Iranians are active in both Shia proselytizing and conversion of, mostly poor, Sunnis. Though often exaggerated, such fears reflect an element of the Sunni community in Syria that is increasingly upset by and focused on the spread of Iranian influence in their country through activities ranging from mosque construction to business. Both the local Egyptian and Saudi missions here, (as well as prominent Syrian Sunni religious leaders), are giving increasing attention to the matter and we should coordinate more closely with their governments on ways to better publicize and focus regional attention on the issue. -- Vulnerability: -- THE INNER CIRCLE: At the end of the day, the regime is dominated by the Asad family and to a lesser degree by Bashar Asad,s maternal family, the Makhlufs, with many family members believe to be increasingly corrupt. The family, and hangers on, as well as the larger Alawite sect, are not immune to feuds and anti-regime conspiracies, as was evident last year when intimates of various regime pillars (including the Makhloufs) approached us about post-Bashar possibilities. Corruption is a great divider and Bashar's inner circle is subject to the usual feuds and squabbles related to graft and corruption. For example, it is generally known that Maher Asad is particularly corrupt and incorrigible. He has no scruples in his feuds with family members or others. There is also tremendous fear in the Alawite community about retribution if the Sunni majority ever regains power. -- Possible Action: -- ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS: Targeted sanctions against regime members and their intimates are generally welcomed by most elements of Syrian society. But the way designations are applied must exploit fissures and render the inner circle weaker rather than drive its members closer together. The designation of Shawkat caused him some personal irritation and was the subject of considerable discussion in the business community here. While the public reaction to corruption tends to be muted, continued reminders of corruption in the inner circle have resonance. We should look for ways to remind the public of our previous designations. -- Vulnerability: -- THE KHADDAM FACTOR: Khaddam knows where the regime skeletons are hidden, which provokes enormous irritation from Bashar, vastly disproportionate to any support Khaddam has within Syria. Bashar Asad personally, and his regime in general, follow every news item involving Khaddam with tremendous emotional interest. The regime reacts with self-defeating anger whenever another Arab country hosts Khaddam or allows him to make a public statement through any of its media outlets. -- Possible Action: -- We should continue to encourage the Saudis and others to allow Khaddam access to their media outlets, providing him with venues for airing the SARG,s dirty laundry. We should anticipate an overreaction by the regime that will add to its isolation and alienation from its Arab neighbors. Vulnerability: -- DIVISIONS IN THE MILITARY-SECURITY SERVICES: Bashar constantly guards against challenges from those with ties inside the military and security services. He is also nervous about any loyalties senior officers (or former senior officers) feel toward disaffected former regime elements like Rif,at Asad and Khaddam. The inner circle focuses continuously on who gets what piece of the corruption action. Some moves by Bashar in narrowing the circle of those who benefit from high-level graft has increased those with ties to the security services who have axes to grind. -- Possible Action: -- ENCOURAGE RUMORS AND SIGNALS OF EXTERNAL PLOTTING: The regime is intensely sensitive to rumors about coup-plotting and restlessness in the security services and military. Regional allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia should be encouraged to meet with figures like Khaddam and Rif,at Asad as a way of sending such signals, with appropriate leaking of the meetings afterwards. This again touches on this insular regime,s paranoia and increases the possibility of a self-defeating over-reaction. Vulnerability: -- REFORM FORCES VERSUS BAATHISTS-OTHER CORRUPT ELITES: Bashar keeps unveiling a steady stream of initiatives on economic reform and it is certainly possible he believes this issue is his legacy to Syria. While limited and ineffectual, these steps have brought back Syrian expats to invest and have created at least the illusion of increasing openness. Finding ways to publicly call into question Bashar,s reform efforts )- pointing, for example to the use of reform to disguise cronyism -- would embarrass Bashar and undercut these efforts to shore up his legitimacy. Revealing Asad family/inner circle corruption would have a similar effect. -- Possible Action: -- HIGHLIGHTING FAILURES OF REFORM: Highlighting failures of reform, especially in the run-up to the 2007 Presidential elections, is a move that Bashar would find highly embarrassing and de-legitimizing. Comparing and contrasting puny Syrian reform efforts with the rest of the Middle East would also embarrass and irritate Bashar. -- Vulnerability: -- THE ECONOMY: Perpetually under-performing, the Syrian economy creates jobs for less than 50 percent of the country,s university graduates. Oil accounts for 70 percent of exports and 30 percent of government revenue, but production is in steady decline. By 2010 Syria is expected to become a net importer of oil. Few experts believe the SARG is capable of managing successfully the expected economic dislocations. -- DISCOURAGE FDI, ESPECIALLY FROM THE GULF: Syria has enjoyed a considerable up-tick in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the last two years that appears to be picking up steam. The most important new FDI is undoubtedly from the Gulf. -- Vulnerability: -- THE KURDS: The most organized and daring political opposition and civil society groups are among the ethnic minority Kurds, concentrated in Syria,s northeast, as well as in communities in Damascus and Aleppo. This group has been willing to protest violently in its home territory when others would dare not. There are few threats that loom larger in Bashar,s mind than unrest with the Kurds. In what is a rare occurrence, our DATT was convoked by Syrian Military Intelligence in May of 2006 to protest what the Syrians believed were US efforts to provide military training and equipment to the Kurds in Syria. -- Possible Action: -- HIGHLIGHT KURDISH COMPLAINTS: Highlighting Kurdish complaints in public statements, including publicizing human rights abuses will exacerbate regime,s concerns about the Kurdish population. Focus on economic hardship in Kurdish areas and the SARG,s long-standing refusal to offer citizenship to some 200,000 stateless Kurds. This issue would need to be handled carefully, since giving the wrong kind of prominence to Kurdish issues in Syria could be a liability for our efforts at uniting the opposition, given Syrian (mostly Arab) civil society,s skepticism of Kurdish objectives. -- Vulnerability: -- Extremist elements increasingly use Syria as a base, while the SARG has taken some actions against groups stating links to Al-Qaeda. With the killing of the al-Qaida leader on the border with Lebanon in early December and the increasing terrorist attacks inside Syria culminating in the September 12 attack against the US embassy, the SARG,s policies in Iraq and support for terrorists elsewhere as well can be seen to be coming home to roost. -- Possible Actions: -- Publicize presence of transiting (or externally focused) extremist groups in Syria, not limited to mention of Hamas and PIJ. Publicize Syrian efforts against extremist groups in a way that suggests weakness, signs of instability, and uncontrolled blowback. The SARG,s argument (usually used after terror attacks in Syria) that it too is a victim of terrorism should be used against it to give greater prominence to increasing signs of instability within Syria. ¶4. (S) CONCLUSION: This analysis leaves out the anti-regime Syrian Islamists because it is difficult to get an accurate picture of the threat within Syria that such groups pose. They are certainly a long-term threat. While it alludes to the vulnerabilities that Syria faces because of its alliance with Iran, it does not elaborate fully on this topic. The bottom line is that Bashar is entering the new year in a stronger position than he has been in several years, but those strengths also carry with them -- or sometimes mask ) vulnerabilities. If we are ready to capitalize, they will offer us opportunities to disrupt his decision-making, keep him off-balance, and make him pay a premium for his mistakes. ROEBUCK
CONFIDENTIAL: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA
VZCZCXRO2381 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHDM #0068/01 0041408 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 041408Z JAN 06 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6460 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0694 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0055 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000068 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS NEA/ELA NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2015 TAGS: EAIR ECON ETTC SY SANC SUBJECT: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA REF: A. A: DAMASCUS 5567 ¶B. REF B: DAMASCUS 6224 Classified By: CDA: Stephen Seche for Reasons 1.5 ¶1. (C) Summary. As post has reported previously, the average Syrian would welcome targeted sanctions that focus on regressive elements within the Asad regime. The best mix in our judgement would be sanctions that are phased, multi-lateral, and widely publicized. Most of our Syrian interlocutors concur that if done correctly, these sanctions would delegitimize those elements within the SARG perceived to be obstacles to change, strengthen progressive elements both within the regime and the wider society, and increase pressure on the SARG to substantively change its destabilizing behavior. End summary. ¶2. (C) Financial and travel sanctions that target individuals remain popular with the majority of our Syrian interlocutors (ref A, B). They argue that targeting individuals would make clear for the average Syrian that the international community opposes the regime and its policies, but does not wish to punish the Syrian people. At the same time, targeted sanctions would also help delegitimize those individuals who pose the greatest internal and external threat to progress. Additionally, if designated individuals could neither travel nor conduct legitimate business, they would become an increasing liability for President Bashar al-Asad,s regime. Popular resentment against the sanctioned individuals would add to the pressure to change. ¶3. (C) Syrians we speak with argue that future designations should be multi-lateral. Some tools for doing so already exist. UNSCR 1636 makes provision for designation of individuals named under the Hariri investigation. A case should be made for additional designations under existing or new UNSC resolutions. The USG designated Dhu al Himma as-Shaleesh and Asif Issa as-Shalesh, cousins of President Asad, under E.O. 13315 ) a derivative of UNSCR 1483 - for their role in procuring defense-related items for Saddam Hussein. We should lobby our allies to pursue similar designations, under the umbrella of new or existing UNSC resolutions of both the Shaleeshes and any new Syrians we designate concerning Lebanon, Iraq, WMD, and the peace process. Though it is unlikely that any significant financial resources would be frozen by these designations (ref B), the naming and shaming of the most recalcitrant elements within the regime would delegitimize them internationally, which in turn, would work to undermine the hardliners domestically. ¶4. (C) Pursuing multilateral designations would greatly multiply the effectiveness of targeted sanctions, but a carefully timed campaign to widely publicize the designations is equally important. Without media coverage and publicity to raise the profile of designations, the effort would lose its most effective element - &name and shame.8 The Shaleesh case mentioned above is a case in point. Despite the Shaleesh family having a high profile within Syria, very few Syrians at any level are aware the USG imposed financial sanctions on them. The head of one of the leading Sunni business families in Damascus approached us recently to ask why the USG did not aggressively pursue sanctioning criminal elements within the regime. When asked for examples of who should be sanctioned, our contact pointed to Dhu al Himma as-Shaleesh who, he asserted, took much of the 580 million USD in Iraqi funds the Commercial Bank of Syria illegally paid out in 2003 and has yet to reconcile with the Iraqis. Needless to say, our contact was surprised to find out Dhu al Himma as well as his nephew, Asif Issa Shaleesh, were already sanctioned. ¶5. (C) Phasing in future targeted sanctions can maximize their impact. The first phase could start with those most clearly the architects of objectionable SARG policies relating to Iraq, Lebanon, WMD, and support for the Palestinian rejectionist groups, and then extend to those continuing to support the original group in an ever widening circle. In addition to all of the Mehlis suspects, the first batch of new designees might include a core group of eight to ten, such as Asif Shawkat (Asad,s brother-in-law and head of Syrian Military Intelligence), Maher Asad (President Asad,s brother and commander of the Republican Guard), Rami Makhlouf (Asad,s first cousin and Syria,s poster boy for corruption), Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami,s father), Riyad Issa Shaleesh (principal director of SES International ) an entity already designated under E.O. 13315; in addition, we should push our allies to sanction the other two Shaleeshes mentioned above), Hisham Ikhtiyar (chairman of the Regional Command's National Security Bureau), Abdel Fatah Qudsia (Presidential advisor on Palestinian issues), and Mohammad Suleiman (Presidential advisor responsible for procurement). A second tranch of designations could then move on to this group's lieutenants and business partners. ¶6. (C) Most Syrians we talk to believe that President Asad still represents their best hope for change without instability. It is their fear of instability that stops the majority of Syrians from pushing harder for internal change. For this reason, they argue that sanctions focusing on individuals would help empower Asad to scuttle the regime,s pariahs. According to this school of thought, Bashar himself should not be designated at this point as it would limit our options and signal that the USG is intent on regime change, greatly limiting the number of Syrians willing to join us in pressuring the SARG for change. ¶7. (C) Comment. Pursuing targeted sanctions would send a powerful message to the regime and those associated with it: "if you are perceived to be proponents of the policies causing regional instability, you will be designated. If you provide aid and assistance to those designated, you risk designation yourself." Both internal and external pressure on the regime to change would likewise increase incrementally as the number of designations increased. If conventional Syrian wisdom is correct, the obstacles stopping Bashar from doing the right thing would proportionally decrease as targeted sanctions progressed. Even if that view is wrong, the same result will occur, as the supports of Bashar,s failed policies are eroded. In the end, the USG will advance its policy objectives by undermining the regime,s ability to pursue policies at odds with regional stability. SECHE
CONFIDENTIAL: LEBANON: BELLEMARE ANXIOUS FOR MORE USG ASSISTANCE
VZCZCXRO3042 PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHLB #1348/01 2591418 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 151418Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3034 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2905 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001348 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, IO/FO-HOOK, WARLICK, IO/UNP-AMORRISON, L/FO-JBELLINGER, JTHESSIN, L/AN-LJACOBSON, L/UNA-TBUCHWALD, INR/GGI-MARGULIES, CIA/CNC-JFINKEL, JBRODERERICK, CIA/CTC-JBEAN, DOJ-JEVY, USUN-KHALILZAD, WOLFF, SCHEDLBAUER, NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PINR UNSC LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: BELLEMARE ANXIOUS FOR MORE USG ASSISTANCE THAN HE HAS SEEN REF: THE HAGUE 744 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (S/NF) In a September 12 meeting with the Ambassador, Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC) made three specific requests for USG assistance and additional requests for USG action. First, he asked that the USG provide intelligence information that UNIIIC has formally requested. Second, that the USG loan UNIIIC two criminal investigators TDY. UNIIIC needs "investigators who can question a witness" to interview some 200 persons currently in prison who may have some relevant information. Third, that the USG urge the UK to do more to help UNIIIC, particularly with intelligence information (the UK has provided loaned personnel). ¶2. (S/NF) In addition, Bellemare asked for USG support when the Management Committee considers the Tribunal operating budget on September 25 -- the same day that Lebanese President Sleiman will meet President Bush in Washington. He also raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a new resolution to clarify some legal issues. Finally he repeated earlier requests for a USG reaction to 26 sketches of possible suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG and asked about getting access to alleged Hizballah defectors reportedly in the U.S. ¶3. (S/NF) On other matters, Bellemare said that the GOL has not asked that UNIIIC investigate the latest political assassination (the September 10 attack on opposition Druze member Saleh Aridi). He is concerned about a new Telecommunication Ministry directive that may impede his plans for using wiretaps. End Summary. GOL HAS NOT ASKED THAT UNIIIC INVESTIGATE LATEST ASSASSINATION -------------------------------- ¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador and DCM met on September 12 with Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC), in his office in Monteverde. The Ambassador asked if UNIIIC would investigate the case of Saleh Aridi, a Druze political official assassinated in a car bomb attack near Beirut on September 10. Bellemare explained that for UNIIIC to take on a case, first the GOL must ask the UN SYG, then the SYG and Security Council must approve. He said that the GOL had shown no indication that it would request that UNIIIC investigate the Aridi killing. UNIIIC is interested in finding out more about the Aridi attack, since details are similar to other cases it is investigating. If it is not invited to investigate but wants information about a case, UNIIIC must submit a request to the Lebanese chief prosecutor. The criteria the GOL uses to decide on requesting UNIIIC assistance is "a mystery to me" Bellemare said. (NOTE: The Aridi assassination is the first of a pro-Syrian politician. END NOTE.) WIRETAPPING ----------- ¶5. (S/NF) Bellemare was concerned about something he had learned the day before that might affect wiretapping. The Telecommunications Ministry had directed two private telecom companies in Lebanon to inform the Ministry about any requests for wiretapping. He noted that it is well known that the Internal Security Forces (ISF), the national police, conduct wiretapping even though the legal basis for their authority to do so is weak. The Telecom Ministry's move may have been directed against the ISF. The order, however, also could limit the ability of UNIIIC to conduct wiretaps if the phone companies fear that they will have to report those efforts to the Telecommunications Ministry. ¶6. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked if Bellemare believed the action was targeted at UNIIIC, noting that the new Telecommunications Minister is from the opposition. Bellemare replied that he was not in a position to say. At his meeting with PM Fouad Siniora earlier in the week, on September 8, Siniora told Bellemare to inform him if he runs into any problems with cooperation from government officials. He said he might discuss this with the PM if it looks as if this new telecom directive will be a problem, but first he will meet with officials of the two telecom companies next week. The Ambassador offered to support his efforts at resolving this issue. ¶7. (S/NF) Bellemare noted that at his August 14 meeting in The Hague with the USG Interagency Working Group (IWG), he had asked for USG help with wiretapping capability. He said that trying to work wiretapping through the Lebanese ISF or military intelligence would be like "putting the names (of targets) in the paper". He explained that UN legal experts were currently looking into the possibility that UNIIIC has legal authority to carry out wiretaps. Beyond legal authority for wiretapping, though, Bellemare said he needs technical capability. ASSISTANCE FROM THE USG ----------------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Bellemare expressed frustration that USG has not provided more in response to his requests for assistance, and noted that he has discussed this with State Department officials. He outlined three requests for USG assistance for his investigation. -- One, provide intelligence information that UNIIIC has formally requested, or inform him that it cannot be provided, so that he knows not to pursue the requests. -- Two, provide two loaned criminal analysts on TDY. UNIIIC needs "investigators who can question a witness" to interview some 200 persons currently in prison who may have some relevant informtion. -- Three, using USG influence, urge the U government to provide more to UNIIIC, particulaly regarding intelligence information. Bellemare said he has requests in to MI-6, but has not received much. On personnel, Scotland Yard has provided a loaned investigator. ¶9. (S/NF) Bellemare showed a good understanding of the problems associated with complying with the first two requests from his several meetings with USG officials, but his frustration was nonetheless evident. "You are the key player. If the U.S. doesn't help me, who will?" The USG has "a big investment in the Tribunal" and being more forthcoming on UNIIIC's requests is a way of making that investment pay off, he said. ¶10. (S/NF) During the meeting, Bellemare made several other requests for USG action: -- USG support when the Committee considers the Tribunal operating budget, scheduled for September 25, the same day that Lebanese President Sleiman will meet President Bush in Washington. He warned that the budget includes high travel costs, but that these are necessary because of the need for frequent travel between the Hague and Lebanon. Bellemare thanked the USG for what he said was a much improved attitude on the part of the Tribunal Management Committee. His requests have been more favorably received than was the case previously. -- He raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a new resolution to clarify some legal issues. He mused about the possibility of getting Chapter VII authority for the Tribunal via such a new resolution, but seemed to think that was not doable in the Council. -- He asked for a reaction to the 26 sketches of possible suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG. -- Finally, he asked about getting access to alleged Hizballah defectors reportedly in the U.S., or a definitive negative response to the request. The answers the USG has given him so far on this subject, he said, have been not sufficiently definitive. INTERVIEWS IN SYRIA ------------------- ¶11. (S/NF) On this issue, Bellemare repeated what he said in the IWG meeting (reftel): that he did not want to go to Syria until the USG or other sources had provided names of leads he should ask to interview and other information. If Syria denied his request to interview these people, then he would have evidence of Syrian non-cooperation. Just asking would give some indication to others in Syria where his investigation might be headed, which could provoke more cooperation "if I hit the right person." ¶12. (S/NF) Bellemare emphasized the urgency for responding to his request related to Syria, first, because UNIIIC's mandate and with it Chapter VII authority expires at the end of the year, and second, the importance of conducting the interviews before the interviewees disappear by being killed or other means. OTHER ISSUES: NEW MINISTER OF JUSTICE, UNIIIC PRESS SPOKESPERSON ------------------------------ ¶13. (C ) Bellemare said he had a very positive impression of new GOL Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar, who had told Bellemare he wanted to be helpful. Najjar's predecessor, Charles Rizk, was a vocal supporter of the Tribunal but also known for public criticisms of Bellemare and the previous Commissioner, Serge Brammertz. Bellemare, a Canadian, noted that Najjar had taught at McGill University in Montreal and they had some mutual acquaintances. ¶14. (SBU) UNIIIC now has a press spokesperson who started work the week before, Bellemare reported. The official had good relevant experience as the spokesperson for the Yugoslavia Tribunal and most recently for the UN Legal Affairs office. The new spokesperson is currently working up a strategy for UNIIIC's press interaction. ¶15. (C) Bellemare said he had been advised by several persons to not make statements in public that might be seen as disrupting the current relative calm in Lebanon. He planned to follow that advice, (NOTE: Bellemare traveled to Saudi Arabia September 15, we understand. We will seek further information from UNIIIC contacts. END NOTE.) SISON
