O 271830Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6146 INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS AMCONSUL RECIFE AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO AMCONSUL SAO PAULO SECDEF WASHDC NSC WASHDC CIA WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001511 E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2016 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV MARR BR CO SUBJECT: BRAZIL GRANTS ASYLUM TO FARC TERRORIST REF: BRASILIA 719 Classified By: PolCouns Dennis Hearne, 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. This is an action cable. Please see paragraph 10 for action request. ¶2. (C) Summary: The Colombian government has called on Brazil to reverse a July 14 decision to grant asylum to wanted FARC terrorist Francisco Antonio Cadena. Some media in Brazil greeted the decision with speculation that the judicial asylum process was subverted by President Lula da Silva and elements of his Workers Party, who maintained close ties with FARC leader Cadena, who lived in Brazil before his arrest last year and who has a minor child with his Brazilian wife. The Colombian Embassy in Brasilia will meet July 28 with the head of the Brazilian refugee committee which granted the asylum request, apparently on the strength of a written statement by Cadena promising to sever all ties with the Colombian terrorist group, the FARC. The granting of asylum to a known terrorist flies in the face of Brazilian claims to oppose international terrorism. Particularly troubling are the allegations of the Presidency subverting the judicial process and pressuring the refugee committee to take a decision contrary to its own guidelines, allegations we find credible. We, like the Colombians, will try to discover the official rationale for the decision and how the GOB reconciles it with its public opposition to international terrorism. We would also appreciate instructions on other actions, if any, we should be taking. End Summary. ¶3. (C) In a decision taken and kept in secret, the Brazilian National Committee on Refuges (CONARE) July 14 granted political refugee status to Francisco Antonio Cadena Collazos (known in Brazil as Olivera Medina), the so-called Ambassador to Brazil of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), who was arrested in Brazil in August 2005 at the request of Interpol, based on a Colombian arrest warrant which included charges of murder for terrorist purposes, kidnapping, extortion and terrorism. The decision will make it impossible for Cadena to be extradited to Colombia as the Colombian government requested on August 24, 2005 (reftel). ¶4. (C) In a statement issued July 19 in Bogota, the Colombian government requested the Brazilian government to reconsider the decision to grant asylum to Cadena and reiterated its previous request for his extradition. The Political Counselor of the Colombian Embassy in Brasilia, Juan Manuel Gonzalez Ayerbe, pointed out to poloff July 27 that CONARE guidelines preclude the granting of asylum to persons who have committed war crimes or crimes against peace or humanity, heinous crimes or acts of terrorism or drug trafficking. Gonzalez added that, aside from providing an official notification of the decision through its Embassy in Bogota, the GOB had made no comment on the case to the Colombians and had not provided an official explanation of the decision. Gonzalez said that one of his contacts at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry had told him unofficially that Cadena had signed a statement saying he would cut all ties with the FARC, and that CONARE had made its decision on that basis. ¶5. (C) Gonzalez said the Colombia Embassy would meet July 28 with Luis Paulo Barreto, the General Secretary of the Ministry of Justice, who serves as the chair of CONARE, to seek a full explanation and to reiterate its request that asylum be revoked and extradition proceed. CONARE's other members include the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Vice-Chair), Labor, Health, Education, the Federal Police, UNHCR and NGO's from Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. The press spokesman of the CONARE told the Embassy July 27 that all CONARE documents are confidential; there are no public records or press releases concerning decisions, neither are decisions published in the official government gazette. The rationale behind the secrecy is that persons requesting refugee status are assumed to be in danger, so their names cannot be released to the public. ¶6. (C) An article in the July 27 edition of the daily newspaper Correio Brasiliense repeated the claim made to the Colombian Embassy that the decision by CONARE was taken on account of Cadena's commitment to cease terrorist activities and quotes him as saying he will devote all his efforts from now on to taking care of his Brazilian family. The article notes that the Justice Ministry had denied there had been political pressure concerning the decision and gave assurances that the decision was taken for technical reasons. That claim is at variance with what Correio reported in April (reftel). ¶7. (C) At that time, the daily reported that CONARE members were complaining that the Office of the Presidency had usurped the role of CONARE in assessing Cadena's asylum request, calling the action a dangerous precedent that politicized an issue that should be handled on its legal and technical merits. CONARE members accused Presidential International Affairs Advisor Marcos Aurelio Garcia of being behind the transfer of authority over the extradition request from the Foreign Ministry to the Office of the Presidency (The Colombian Ambassador echoed that view to the Charge, adding that Garcia was known to have "sympathy" for the FARC). An advisor to Garcia rejected the charge, saying Garcia was not involved in the issue. ¶8. (C) Counselor Gonzalez raised Garcia's name during our July 27 meeting as a key player in the decision-making process. He added that, during the many years Cadena spent in Brazil prior to his arrest last year, he had cultivated close ties with President Lula's Labor Party (PT) and had met with leaders of the PT in a house just outside of Brasilia (called the Red Heart Mansion) owned by a PT member of Congress . He also echoed press and other public accounts that PT leaders had met with Cadena in prison. While pointing out that claims of FARC donations to PT campaigns had never been proven, he insisted there was ample proof of Cadena's ties with PT leaders. ¶9. (C) Comment: The decision by the Brazilian committee is audacious but not necessarily surprising, as is the near silence surrounding it. Aside from a few articles in the Brazilian press, there has been little notice of the decision and no statements from Brazilian leftists (including those who have run a web site in support of his asylum claim) or the FARC itself. Of course, the GOB's silence on the issue is not surprising. Granting refugee status to a man accused of terrorism against a friendly, democratically elected government of a neighboring country is hardly the thing President Lula or his associates would be eager to defend publicly, especially since it would inevitably result during this election period in a new airing of the claims of FARC support for PT 2002 campaigns, possibly including Lula's. Embassy believes that high level political pressure resulted in this decision. ¶10. (C) Action Request: We, like the Colombians, will be trying to find out what the official rationale for the asylum decision was and how that can be reconciled with the GOB's supposed opposition to international terrorism. We would also appreciate instructions from Washington regarding other actions we should be taking. Chicola
Tag: lula da silva
CONFIDENTIAL: BRAZIL: MORE OBSERVATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY
VZCZCXRO6643 OO RUEHRG DE RUEHBR #2293/01 3051751 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 011751Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7162 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 5761 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 3987 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4384 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 3488 RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA PRIORITY 0311 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 4961 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 3228 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 6570 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1003 RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 0158 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2020 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 5900 RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE PRIORITY 5757 RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 3227 RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO PRIORITY 8490 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002293 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016 TAGS: PREL BR SUBJECT: BRAZIL: MORE OBSERVATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY IN LULA'S SECOND TERM REF: BRASILIA 2245 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D). ¶1. (C) Introduction. Reftel discussed Mission,s views that, despite interesting media reports that President Lula da Silva,s foreign policy in a second term could shift toward closer ties with the U.S., we could not see yet concrete evidence of such a trend. We remain circumspect on this question. At the same time, candid and encouraging conversations with top GOB officials on the day after Lula,s strong victory at the polls left Ambassador and emboffs wondering about the possibility that some change may be brewing. We report what we heard below, with the caveat that we remain in a cautious "wait and see mode" for the time being. End introduction. ¶2. (C) Ambassador and PolCouns visited the Planalto Palace on 30 October, and found a Presidency in an open mood of jubilant celebration. A steady column of VIPs streamed through for audiences with re-elected President Lula. A relieved and buoyant Gilberto Carvalho, Chief of Lula,s Personal Staff, received Ambassador and poloff for a courtesy call, which turned into a compelling conversation about the direction of policy in Lula,s second term. Carvalho, who is perhaps Lula,s closest long-time advisor, made the following comments: --On foreign policy, Carvalho said that Lula,s first term had seen a broad opening of Brazil to new alliances and diplomatic arrangements worldwide. Now, with this base established, the second Lula government will re-focus priority on "quality relationships with traditional partners." Specifically, for Brazil to grow with new investment, the GOB will need to engage more intensively with the United States, Carvalho stressed. --Ambassador welcomed this observation, but said he remained concerned when he heard certain Brazilian officials speak of the need to "counterbalance" against the U.S., and opined that two democracies should be able to debate and work together directly, without such contrivances. Carvalho was emphatic in agreeing, said there will be no further discussion of counterbalances, and asked for the Ambassador,s understanding if rhetoric during the election campaign had occasionally seemed critical of the U.S. He again assured Ambassador that the second Lula government wants investment and growth, and sees relations with the U.S. as central to this. --At the conclusion of the meeting, Carvalho provided his private telephone numbers to Ambassador and PolCouns and encouraged them to contact him directly at any time if there was problematic development in relations between the two governments, of if they wished to present an issue directly to President Lula. Carvalho said he would welcome this direct channel with the Ambassador. ¶3. (S/NF) In a separate meeting at Planalto with General Jorge Armando Felix, Lula,s Minister for Institutional Security, Ambassador, PolCouns and Regional Affairs Chief raised the subject of intensified U.S.-Brazil exchanges and cooperation in intelligence and security. Ambassador noted that President Lula, in a brief aside at the UNGA in New York, had encouraged continued engagement with General Felix, presumably on such issues. General Felix then announced that he had, subsequent to an earlier meeting with Ambassador, commissioned a formal paper outlining specific areas for consultation and collaboration at the policy level with the USG in the intelligence field. Ambassador and Felix agreed BRASILIA 00002293 002 OF 002 that the GOB could also specify in the paper specific equipment or training they might require, and decided to plan together for a high-level bilateral intelligence meeting early in 2007 in Brasilia. ¶4. (C) In an earlier conversation on the same day, Development and Industry Minister Luiz Furlan told Ambassador that Lula was pressing him to stay on in a second government, and Furlan appeared to be considering this option. Furlan, a moderate with a business background who has long pressed within Lula,s cabinet for closer cooperation with the United States, seemed to be of the view that Lula,s second term priorities would be shifting in the direction of closer engagement with the U.S. and other developed nations. ¶5. (C) Comment. Our senior interlocutors were in high spirits yesterday, with a kind word for the world, including the U.S. But without major changes in the foreign ministry's senior staffing and orientation, we wonder about the viability of a tilt toward the U.S. and developing world, and away from the south-south priorities of the first Lula term. Nonetheless, it is intriguing that we have received such a steady stream of strong signals from senior Lula advisors on the day after his victory. Watch this space. Sobel
