CONFIDENTIAL: BRAZIL GRANTS ASYLUM TO FARC TERRORIST

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV MARR BR CO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL GRANTS ASYLUM TO FARC TERRORIST 

REF: BRASILIA 719 

Classified By: PolCouns Dennis Hearne, 1.4 (B) and (D) 

1.  This is an action cable.  Please see paragraph 10 for
action request. 

2.  (C)  Summary: The Colombian government has called on
Brazil to reverse a July 14  decision to grant asylum to
wanted FARC terrorist Francisco Antonio Cadena.  Some media
in Brazil greeted the decision with speculation that the
judicial asylum process was subverted by President Lula da
Silva and elements of his Workers Party, who maintained close
ties with FARC leader Cadena, who lived in Brazil before his
arrest last year and who has a minor child with his Brazilian
wife.  The Colombian Embassy in Brasilia will meet July 28
with the head of the Brazilian refugee committee which
granted the asylum request, apparently on the strength of a
written statement by Cadena promising to sever all ties with
the Colombian terrorist group, the FARC.  The granting of
asylum to a known terrorist flies in the face of Brazilian
claims to oppose international terrorism.  Particularly
troubling are the allegations of the Presidency subverting
the judicial process and pressuring the refugee committee to
take a decision contrary to its own guidelines, allegations
we find credible.  We, like the Colombians, will try to
discover the official rationale for the decision and how the
GOB reconciles it with its public opposition to international
terrorism.  We would also appreciate instructions on other
actions, if any, we should be taking.  End Summary. 

3.  (C) In a decision taken and kept in secret, the Brazilian
National Committee on Refuges (CONARE) July 14 granted
political refugee status to Francisco Antonio Cadena Collazos
(known in Brazil as Olivera Medina), the so-called Ambassador
to Brazil of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia), who was arrested in Brazil in August 2005 at the
request of Interpol, based on a Colombian arrest warrant
which included charges of murder for terrorist purposes,
kidnapping, extortion and terrorism.  The decision will make
it impossible for Cadena to be extradited to Colombia as the
Colombian government requested on August 24, 2005 (reftel). 

4.  (C) In a statement issued July 19 in Bogota, the
Colombian government requested the Brazilian government to
reconsider the decision to grant asylum to Cadena and
reiterated its previous request for his extradition.  The
Political Counselor of the Colombian Embassy in Brasilia,
Juan Manuel Gonzalez Ayerbe, pointed out to poloff July 27
that CONARE guidelines preclude the granting of asylum to
persons who have committed war crimes or crimes against peace
or humanity, heinous crimes or acts of terrorism or drug
trafficking.  Gonzalez added that, aside from providing an
official notification of the decision through its Embassy in
Bogota, the GOB had made no comment on the case to the
Colombians and had not provided an official explanation of
the decision.  Gonzalez said that one of his contacts at the
Brazilian Foreign Ministry had told him unofficially that
Cadena had signed a statement saying he would cut all ties
with the FARC, and that CONARE had made its decision on that
basis. 

5.  (C) Gonzalez said the Colombia Embassy would meet July 28
with Luis Paulo Barreto, the General Secretary of the
Ministry of Justice, who serves as the chair of CONARE, to
seek a full explanation and to reiterate its request that
asylum be revoked and extradition proceed.  CONARE's other
members include the Ministries of Foreign Affairs
(Vice-Chair), Labor, Health, Education, the Federal Police,
UNHCR and NGO's from Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.  The press
spokesman of the CONARE told the Embassy July 27 that all
CONARE documents are confidential; there are no public
records or press releases concerning decisions, neither are
decisions published in the official government gazette.  The
rationale behind the secrecy is that persons requesting
refugee status are assumed to be in danger, so their names
cannot be released to the public. 

6.  (C) An article in the July 27 edition of the daily
newspaper Correio Brasiliense repeated the claim made to the
Colombian Embassy that the decision by CONARE was taken on
account of Cadena's commitment to cease terrorist activities
and quotes him as saying he will devote all his efforts from
now on to taking care of his Brazilian family.  The article
notes that the Justice Ministry had denied there had been
political pressure concerning the decision and gave
assurances that the decision was taken for technical reasons.
That claim is at variance with what Correio reported in
April (reftel). 

7.  (C) At that time, the daily reported that CONARE members
were complaining that the Office of the Presidency had
usurped the role of CONARE in assessing Cadena's asylum
request, calling the action a dangerous precedent that
politicized an issue that should be handled on its legal and
technical merits.  CONARE members accused Presidential
International Affairs Advisor Marcos Aurelio Garcia of being
behind the transfer of authority over the extradition request
from the Foreign Ministry to the Office of the Presidency
(The Colombian Ambassador echoed that view to the Charge,
adding that Garcia was known to have "sympathy" for the
FARC).  An advisor to Garcia rejected the charge, saying
Garcia was not involved in the issue. 

8.  (C) Counselor Gonzalez raised Garcia's name during our
July 27 meeting as a key player in the decision-making
process.  He added that, during the many years Cadena spent
in Brazil prior to his arrest last year, he had cultivated
close ties with President Lula's Labor Party (PT) and had met
with leaders of the PT in a house just outside of Brasilia
(called the Red Heart Mansion) owned by a PT member of
Congress .  He also echoed press and other public accounts
that PT leaders had met with Cadena in prison.  While
pointing out that claims of FARC donations to PT campaigns
had never been proven, he insisted there was ample proof of
Cadena's ties with PT leaders. 

9.  (C) Comment:  The decision by the Brazilian committee is
audacious but not necessarily surprising, as is the near
silence surrounding it.  Aside from a few articles in the
Brazilian press, there has been little notice of the decision
and no statements from Brazilian leftists (including those
who have run a web site in support of his asylum claim) or
the FARC itself.  Of course,  the GOB's silence on the issue
is not surprising.  Granting refugee status to a man accused
of terrorism against a friendly, democratically elected
government of a neighboring country is hardly the thing
President Lula or his associates would be eager to defend
publicly, especially since it would inevitably result during
this election period in a new airing  of the claims of FARC
support for PT 2002 campaigns, possibly including Lula's.
Embassy believes that high level political pressure resulted
in this decision. 

10.  (C) Action Request:  We, like the Colombians, will be
trying to find out what the official rationale for the asylum
decision was and how that can be reconciled with the GOB's
supposed opposition to international terrorism.  We would
also appreciate instructions from Washington regarding other
actions we should be taking. 

Chicola

CONFIDENTIAL: BRAZIL: MORE OBSERVATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY

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RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 4961
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 3228
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RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 0158
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2020
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002293 

SIPDIS 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: MORE OBSERVATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY IN
LULA'S SECOND TERM 

REF: BRASILIA 2245 

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D). 

1. (C) Introduction.  Reftel discussed Mission,s views that,
despite interesting media reports that President Lula da
Silva,s foreign policy in a second term could shift toward
closer ties with the U.S., we could not see yet concrete
evidence of such a trend.  We remain circumspect on this
question.  At the same time, candid and encouraging
conversations with top GOB officials on the day after Lula,s
strong victory at the polls left Ambassador and emboffs
wondering about the possibility that some change may be
brewing.  We report what we heard below, with the caveat that
we remain in a cautious "wait and see mode" for the time
being.  End introduction. 

2. (C) Ambassador and PolCouns visited the Planalto Palace on
30 October, and found a Presidency in an open mood of
jubilant celebration.  A steady column of VIPs streamed
through for audiences with re-elected President Lula.  A
relieved and buoyant Gilberto Carvalho, Chief of Lula,s
Personal Staff, received Ambassador and poloff for a courtesy
call, which turned into a compelling conversation about the
direction of policy in Lula,s second term.  Carvalho, who is
perhaps Lula,s closest long-time advisor, made the following
comments: 

--On foreign policy, Carvalho said that Lula,s first term
had seen a broad opening of Brazil to new alliances and
diplomatic arrangements worldwide.  Now, with this base
established, the second Lula government will re-focus
priority on "quality relationships with traditional
partners."  Specifically, for Brazil to grow with new
investment, the GOB will need to engage more intensively with
the United States, Carvalho stressed. 

--Ambassador welcomed this observation, but said he remained
concerned when he heard certain Brazilian officials speak of
the need to "counterbalance" against the U.S., and opined
that two democracies should be able to debate and work
together directly, without such contrivances.  Carvalho was
emphatic in agreeing, said there will be no further
discussion of counterbalances, and asked for the
Ambassador,s understanding if rhetoric during the election
campaign had occasionally seemed critical of the U.S.  He
again assured Ambassador that the second Lula government
wants investment and growth, and sees relations with the U.S.
as central to this. 

--At the conclusion of the meeting, Carvalho provided his
private telephone numbers to Ambassador and PolCouns and
encouraged them to contact him directly at any time if there
was problematic development in relations between the two
governments, of if they wished to present an issue directly
to President Lula.  Carvalho said he would welcome this
direct channel with the Ambassador. 

3. (S/NF) In a separate meeting at Planalto with General
Jorge Armando Felix, Lula,s Minister for Institutional
Security, Ambassador, PolCouns and Regional Affairs Chief
raised the subject of intensified U.S.-Brazil exchanges and
cooperation in intelligence and security.  Ambassador noted
that President Lula, in a brief aside at the UNGA in New
York, had encouraged continued engagement with General Felix,
presumably on such issues.  General Felix then announced that
he had, subsequent to an earlier meeting with Ambassador,
commissioned a formal paper outlining specific areas for
consultation and collaboration at the policy level with the
USG in the intelligence field.   Ambassador and Felix agreed 

BRASILIA 00002293  002 OF 002 

that the GOB could also specify in the paper specific
equipment or training they might require, and decided to plan
together for a high-level bilateral intelligence meeting
early in 2007 in Brasilia. 

4. (C) In an earlier conversation on the same day,
Development and Industry Minister Luiz Furlan told Ambassador
that Lula was pressing him to stay on in a second government,
and Furlan appeared to be considering this option.  Furlan, a
moderate with a business background who has long pressed
within Lula,s cabinet for closer cooperation with the United
States, seemed to be of the view that Lula,s second term
priorities would be shifting in the direction of closer
engagement with the U.S. and other developed nations. 

5. (C) Comment.  Our senior interlocutors were in high
spirits yesterday, with a kind word for the world, including
the U.S.   But without major changes in the foreign
ministry's senior staffing and orientation, we wonder about
the viability of a tilt toward the U.S. and developing world,
and away from the south-south priorities of the first Lula
term.  Nonetheless, it is intriguing that we have received
such a steady stream of strong signals from senior Lula
advisors on the day after his victory.  Watch this space. 

Sobel