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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004988 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2015
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER TELLS AMBASSADOR ABOUT PENDING
PROBLEMS WITH DEMOBILIZED PARAMILITARIES 

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 

-------
SUMMARY
------- 

¶1.  (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo said in a May
26 meeting with Ambassador Wood that he expects dissident
factions of the paramilitary groups to demobilize soon.  The
GOC expects to confront the few remaining paramilitary groups
who refused to lay down their arms.  Restrepo said the GOC is
concerned about the emergence of a new generation of criminal
organizations, and called on the Prosecutor General's Office
(Fiscalia) to begin Justice and Peace legal processing as
soon possible.  End summary. 

---------------------------------
LAST TWO DEMOBILIZATIONS EXPECTED
--------------------------------- 

¶2.  (C) Restrepo noted that the last two groups to demobilize
are the final faction of the Elmer Cardenas Bloc and the
Cacique Pipinta.  The Constitutional Court's press release on
the Justice and Peace (J&P) Law on May 18, however, had
persuaded them to postpone their demobilization until after
the presidential election.  This 800-strong faction of the
Elmer Cardenas Bloc, which was a dissident AUC bloc in Choco
and Antioquia departments, is led by one of the founders of
the AUC and a loyal friend of former AUC leader Carlos
Castano, AKA "El Aleman."Restrepo explained that the reason
behind the delay in demobilizing is that the GOC has not been
able to supply the necessary security in this crucial
corridor that leads to Panama.  The fear by the locals is
that the FARC, which is currently located in the south of
Choco Department, would take over once the bloc demobilizes. 

¶3.  (C) The CaciquiPipinta Bloc, which is a dissident
faction of the Central Bolivar Bloc, is made up of some 300
men that operate in the north of Caldas Department.  Even
though this group is linked with AUC political leader Ernesto
Baez, Restrepo explained that it really does not belong to
anyone, and the group members do not accept orders from Baez.
 The faction's leaders have told Restrepo they have not
wanted to associate themselves with Baez and other more
recognized AUC leaders like "Macaco" because they did not
want to link themselves with narcotrafficking.  Restrepo
noted that this group is mainly known to be involved in
extortion. 

--------------------------------------------- --------
REMAINING AND RE-EMERGING GROUPS, A MAJOR GOC CONCERN
--------------------------------------------- -------- 

¶4.  (C) Restrepo warned that the GOC was not going to accept
the demobilizations of any additional groups besides Elmer
Cardenas and Cacique Pipinta.Restrepo had already
instructed the Operational Community for Laying Down Arms
(CODA), which certifies the demobilization of the individual
deserters, not to accept anymore AUC members.  He thought it
was important that the GOC demonstrate its willingness to
confront these groups. 

¶5.  (C) One group that has chosen not to demobilize, the
Martin Llanos Bloc, located in Casanare Department, has been
in inconclusive talks with the GOC for sometime now.
Restrepo described his talks with this group among the most
difficult and complicated.  Restrepo said he gets the
"chills" every time he talks to them.  Their philosophy is
very similar to the FARC; they want the GOC to offer them
territory to control.  According to Colombian intelligence
reports, some factions of this bloc are being regrouped into
new criminal organizations led by Hector Buitrago, who is the
father of Martin Llanos. 

¶6.  (C) Restrepo explained that the GOC is calling this
phenomenon the "new emerging anti-communist criminal groups," 

of which there are between 10 to 30 (reftel).  One of the
most prominent is the New Generation Group (ONG) located in
the Pacific Coast of Narino Department and led by former
paramilitary leader "Varela," who has been associated with
the North Valle drug cartel.  Other groups that are becoming
well-known around the country are the "Aguilas" (Eagles) and
"Halcones" (Falcons). 

¶7.  (C) In a conversation Restrepo had with former AUC
founder Carlos Castano in 2003, Castano warned he was fearful
of the possibility of new groups forming whose membership
included former members of the mafia, AUC, and FARC.  This
combination would be very dangerous and hard to detect since
they would have the know-how and experience of the three
groups and they would operate in small groups of 8 to 10 men. 

¶8.  (C) The Ambassador related his most recent trip to Tumaco
on the Pacific Coast and how concerned he was with the
vulnerability of this region where problems of
overpopulation, poverty, drugs, lack of infrastructure, and
ELN and FARC pressure converged.  In conversations with
locals, he heard of the growing presence of the ELN and their
gradual involvement in the drug trade.  ELN fronts in Narino
appear to be independent from the ELN's Central Command
(COCE).

--------------------------------------------- ----
JUSTICE AND PEACE LISTS ON HOLD: FISCALIA FEARFUL
--------------------------------------------- ---- 

¶9.  (C) Restrepo warned the Fiscalia must start processing
those on the Justice and Peace list soon to avoid the risk of
"a return to the mountains".  Restrepo expressed frustration
with the Ministry of Interior and Justice (MoIJ) and the
Fiscalia for sitting on the lists that he turned in over a
month ago.  He said it took him three months to convince over
2,284 paramilitaries to sign up for J&P and now this effort
might be in vain.  Of the 2,284, only 200 to 250 had open
cases, which meant that over 2,000 were willing to testify to
things the State was not aware of or did not have sufficient
information about.  Moreover, there were 2,400 individuals in
prisons who have included their names on the lists.  This was
a historic opportunity that could go to waste if the Fiscalia
did not act quickly.  According to Restrepo, the Fiscalia
should at least focus on the 200 paramilitary leaders who
have open cases. 

¶10.  (C) Restrepo understood that the Fiscalia has been
unable to process all these cases at once, but should try to
focus its resources on this endeavor.  Instead, between the
MoIJ and the Fiscalia, they have been sending messages back
and forth to his office, in his view, to obstruct movement on
the lists.  Restrepo noted that his relationship with
Minister of Interior and Justice SabasPretelt was worsening.
Pretelt was constantly meeting with paramilitary leaders and
"speaking badly about him behind his back."  Restrepo said
Pretelt and Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran are fearful of
what is to come: Pretelt, because he will have a hard time
fulfilling the behind-the-scenes promises he made to these
individuals, and Iguaran, because he is primarily responsible
for the success of this process.  Restrepo criticized Pretelt
for having a poor understanding of the reality of the former
combatants.  For example, in a Cabinet meeting, Pretelt
reported that over 70 percent of demobilized paramilitaries
are currently employed and the true figure is close to 7
percent.  (In a May 29 meeting with the Ambassador, Pretelt
said 11,675 former paramilitaries are employed in one form or
another, or about 35 percent of the total.) 

--------------------------------------
ARMS BEING TURNED OVER TO THE FISCALIA
-------------------------------------- 

¶11.  (C) Restrepo told the Ambassador the GOC was in the
process of handing over to the Prosecutor General's Office
(Fiscalia) 128 tons of arms turned in by the demobilized 

paramilitaries.  The GOC would like to consolidate these arms
in one location as soon as possible since they are located in
23 different cites around the country.  The GOC's
Antiterrorist Analysis Interinstitutional Group
(GIAT)--responsible for registering the trafficking of
weapons--has already recorded and identified the origin of
the arms (septel).  The Fiscalia is supposed to use GIAT
records in its investigations and help determine which are to
be deposited or destroyed.  Restrepo said, for security
reasons, all explosive material that was turned over by the
demobilized blocs had already been destroyed.  Anecdotally,
Restrepo commented that in just one of the demobilizations,
1,500 grenades were handed over in a truck as if they had
been potatoes. 

------------------------------
AMBASSADOR WILL VOICE CONCERNS
------------------------------ 

¶12.  (C) The Ambassador said the GOC needs to do a better job
at monitoring the demobilized paramilitaries and cracking
down on these newly formed criminal groups (septel).  This
process cannot be voluntary; the State needs to go after
those unwilling to cooperate.  If there are insufficient
resources, the GOC needs to refocus its efforts.  The USG has
authorized aid to the GOC, but the monies cannot be delivered
if the GOC does not show strong commitment to the process.
WOOD