The Robert Gates File – The Iran-Contra Scandal

The Robert Gates File

The Iran-Contra Scandal,Confirmation Hearings, and Excerpts from new book Safe for Democracy

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 208

Related article

“Robert Gates: A Look at the Record”
By Tom Blanton and Peter Kornbluh
The New York Times
May 27, 1991

Praise for Safe for Democracy

“John Prados has written the first really comprehensive history of the CIA, thereby illluminating a basic fact of American intelligence–if you want to know what the CIA is doing, listen to what the president is saying; and if you want to know what the president really wants, watch what the CIA is doing. Safe for Democracy is history for adults–not White House spin but what really happened and why. For more than half a century the CIA, with marching orders from the president, has been trying to make the world safe for democracy. As Prados describes it, the result of these adventures–little safety, less democracy–tells us what to expect from the latest crusade in Iraq.”
— THOMAS POWERS, Pulitzer Prize-winner for national reporting and author of Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qeada

“A masterful account of the CIA’s covert and not-so-covert activities around the globe. Drawing on thousands of newly declassified documents, Prados brings together in one colorful narrative a sweeping history of America’s covert wars from the high plains of Tibet to the back alleys of Cairo. The result is an authoritative book that demythologizes the agency and poses hard questions about the true costs of secrecy to democracies everywhere.”
— KAI BIRD, co-author of American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer, winner of the 2006 Pulitzer Prize for biography

“John Prados is one of the most prolific and respected authors on national security issues today. In his troubling new book, Safe for Democracy, he draws on his many years of research to show that while the CIA wields the dagger, its aim is directed by the White House, often with disastrous results over the decades. At a time when the CIA is swallowed up in preemptive wars overseas and bureaucratic battles at home, this definitive history of covert action is both timely and necessary.”
— JAMES BAMFORD, author of The Puzzle Palace, Body of Secrets, and A Pretext for War
“John Prados has put it all together here in one great panorama of the CIA’s covert actions. The chapters on Eisenhower make clear that he was the key president in promoting the schemes, setting the pattern for the Cold War. Highly readable, this is intelligence history, and intelligent history, at its best.”
— LLOYD GARDNER, author of Approaching Vietnam, Spheres of Influence, and Pay Any Price


“John Prados has again demonstrated his excellence as a researcher and writer–coupled with his in-depth understanding of intelligence issues–to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date account of the CIA’s ‘secret wars.’ Safe for Democracy will be carefully read by those in and out of the intelligence community–in many countries.”
NORMAN POLMAR, co-author, Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage

 

Washington D.C., November 10, 2006 – Bush administration nominee for Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates had a long career in government which showed a notable combination of ambition and caution, according to a new book by Archive senior analyst John Prados [Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006)] which deals with Gates among its much wider coverage of the agency since its inception.

As Director of Central Intelligence in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Gates faced criticism for moving slowly with reforming the agency for the new era, and thus missing a moment of extraordinary opportunity that occurred at that time. In earlier posts at top levels of the CIA, Gates figured in the Iran-Contra affair, in which he engaged in sins of omission if not commission, hesitating to make inquiries and pass warnings that might have headed off this abuse of power. As the CIA’s top manager for intelligence analysis in the early 1980s he was accused of slanting intelligence to suit the predilections of the Reagan administration and his boss, Director William J. Casey.

Excerpts from Safe for Democracy related to Mr. Gates are here posted by the Archive. They are accompanied by the full three volumes of the extraordinary confirmation hearings of Gates for CIA director which took place in 1991, and which at the time constituted the most detailed examination of U.S. intelligence practices carried out since the Church and Pike investigations of the 1970s. Also posted is the portion of the report by Iran-Contra special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh which concerns Mr. Gates, along with his response to those findings.

Six Presidents Served

A career intelligence officer, Robert M. Gates has emphasized the number of presidents he served and the long sweep of history he witnessed. The sixty-three year old Gates indeed worked under every U.S. president from Richard M. Nixon to George Herbert Walker Bush, and has now been nominated by the second President Bush as secretary of defense. His resume includes some key periods in contemporary history, serving in a White House role as Deputy National Security Adviser during the first Gulf War, leading the U.S. intelligence community in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, being implicated in the Iran-Contra affair, taking an active role in directing CIA intelligence analysis during the Reagan administration, fulfilling assignment as a staff aide to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski during the Carter administration, working on U.S. national intelligence estimates on the Soviet Union, and playing a peripheral role in nuclear arms limitation talks during their early years. Gates holds a PhD from Georgetown University, graduated from the University of Indiana, and was born and raised in Wichita, Kansas. His only direct military experience was as a young officer in the United States Air Force, where he worked primarily as an intelligence analyst, including for the Minuteman ICBM missile wing stationed at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.

The record suggests that Gates combines caution and ambition. As Director of Central Intelligence, leading the CIA after the Cold War, Gates promised many reforms but went slowly in implementing them, carefully marshaling agency support before embarking on those reforms. In Iran-Contra, the record of the special prosecutor’s investigation shows that Gates learned of a number of the key developments at a time when he could have intervened, but remained hesitant to do so. That caution cost him the first two times he was nominated for Senate confirmation-in both cases, to head the CIA-in 1987 and 1991. In the first instance, he was forced to withdraw from consideration. Gates’ second nomination, in 1991, led to the contentious hearings posted here.

As a manager of intelligence analysis under CIA Director Casey, Gates again demonstrated his two most recognizable traits. Knowing that Casey wanted to see certain kinds of analyses, for instance that painted the Soviet threat in bleak terms, Gates, according to former intelligence officers, demanded that his staff comply and encouraged reporting that some insisted was blatantly slanted, to a degree that led a variety of intelligence analysts to oppose his nomination as director. Such opposition was and remains unprecedented in the history of the CIA. On the other hand, on the Nicaragua covert operation of the mid-1980s, Gates showed caution in advising Casey near the end of 1984, when Congress was on the verge of cutting off all aid to the U.S.-backed Contra rebels to hand off the project to some other U.S. agency, which would protect CIA from charges that resulted from questionable activities. In the Carter White House and as an aide to CIA Director Stansfield Turner, Gates also displayed his guardedness. Until 1986, when he emerged as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Gates functioned in a quintessentially staff role.

Given his narrow background in military affairs, Robert Gates may be expected to go slowly in innovating new policy or strategy as Secretary of Defense, to devote considerable effort to reestablishing rapport between the Secretary’s office and the military service chiefs, and to work loyally in support of White House objectives. On Iraq, that may mean shifts in nuance but not direction. On the other hand, the Gates appointment may be a moderating influence on U.S. Iran policy, since he has dealt with this issue and has knowledge of the players going back more than two decades, was burned by policy missteps on Iran during the Reagan administration, and has in the past favored an opening to the Teheran government.


Excerpts from Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006)
By John Prados
Pages 572-574:

AN UNCOMFORTABLE INTERREGNUM followed Bill Casey’s collapse [on December 15,1986]. With Casey in and out of the hospital, Robert M. Gates served as acting DCI. On February 2, 1987, Casey resigned. The White House faced the sudden need to find a new director of central intelligence. Years before, at the outset of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, Gates had told colleagues he wanted the top job. Now he came close to getting it. So close. The day Casey resigned, President Reagan nominated Gates as DCI in his own right. Perhaps the Reagan White House, beset by Iran-Contra, had not the energy or vision to seek out a new candidate for DCI. Or possibly Reagan saw Gates as a loyalist. Perhaps the call was for a professional but not someone with roots in the clandestine service. Gates fit that bill too. In any event, for a time it looked like Bob Gates would be moving into the director’s office.

The Senate would have to approve the Gates nomination, but the White House had clearly felt out the ground there. In the 1986 off-year elections the Democrats regained control of Congress, making Oklahoma Senator David L. Boren chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Boren and a number of others reacted positively to the Gates nomination. Even Vermont’s Pat Leahy saw the Gates appointment as a wise move. Opinion held that Gates would be asked tough questions on Iran-Contra but then confirmed.

Bob Gates put his best foot forward. There could be no denying his background as a superbly qualified intelligence officer. He had done that work for the air force and the CIA, beginning with Soviet nuclear weapons. He had seen diplomacy on the U.S. delegation to arms control talks. Gates had crafted the NIEs as an assistant national intelligence officer, as national intelligence officer, and later as ex officio chairman of the National Intelligence Council. He had done management as an assistant to a CIA director, an executive staff director, and as deputy director. Gates had headed one of the agency’s tribes as deputy director for intelligence. He knew the White House, serving there under Jimmy Carter. As DDCI he had gotten a taste of covert operations and the clandestine service. In twenty-one years, in other words, Robert Gates had acquired wide agency experience. He had made some enemies, in particular as he handled intelligence reporting during the Reagan years, but in 1987 those people did not contest his nomination, which seemed unstoppable.

Except for Iran-Contra. Gates gave that his best shot too. Not coincidentally it became known that when he took over as acting director, Gates had recorded a classified video affirming that the CIA would act only under legal authorities and would never again do anything like the Iran arms shipments without a proper presidential finding. When hearings opened on February 17 [1987], Gates quickly made it known that he felt Iran-Contra had broken all the rules. He would resign if ordered to do something like that. Gates regretted not following up on the scattered indications of illegality he had perceived, But the nominee’s assurances foundered on the rocks of the Iran-Contra investigations. A number of questions had yet to be answered then, including whether Gates had helped mislead Congress, the extent of his participation in concocting false chronologies, his role in efforts to have the CIA take over the Secord “Enterprise,” when Gates learned of the diversion of funds to the contras, and what he had done once he knew it.

The more questions, the more Bob Gates’s chances disappeared into the maw of assorted illegalities. Had Gates known of violations o the Arms Export Control Act? Had he known of the “retrospective” finding? What had he done? Again and again. At this point Congress created a joint committee to investigate Iran-Contra, and it did not expect answers for months. Then, on February 22, the public learned that in 1985 Gates had sent the White House a memorandum from one of his national intelligence officers advocating the improvement of relations with Iran through arms sales, a view at variance with existing estimates. Two days later the Joint committee asked that Gates s nomination be put on hold. Senator Boren posed the alternatives of a vote or a withdrawal of the nomination while senior congressional leaders warned the White House that a fight over Gates would concentrate yet more attention on Iran Contra. Reagan who had just released a presidential commission report in an effort to put the scandal behind him did not care to hear that.

Robert Gates decided to withdraw. The next day the administration took back the nomination. Gates issued a statement defending his actions during the Iran-Contra affair denying he had covered up evidence or suppressed improprieties. Eventually the joint committee cleared Gates of illegal actions, and the Iran Contra special prosecutor affirmed that conclusion, but there had been failings. Gates cites mitigating circumstances in his memoirs, where he writes:

I would go over those points in my mind a thousand times in the months and years to come, but the criticisms still hit home. A thousand times I would go over the “might-have-beens” if I had raised more hell than I did with Casey about nonnotification of Congress, if I had demanded that the NSC get out of covert action, if I had insisted that CIA not play by NSC rules, if I had been more aggressive with the DO in my first months as DDCI, if I had gone to the Attorney General.

It became Robert Gates’s misfortune to be swept up in a web of illegality so immense it brought dangers of the impeachment of a president, which made Gates small fry indeed and virtually overnight neutered Ronald Reagan.

In withdrawing the Gates nomination, President Reagan simultaneously announced his appointment of William B. Webster to lead the agency. Webster liked to be called “Judge”-he had been a jurist on the federal bench, eventually on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Where CIA denizens begrudged Stansfield Turner his preferred title of admiral, no one held back with Judge Webster. Dedication to the law and to his native St. Louis, at least as deep as Turner’s to the navy, had seen Webster through law school at Washington University, then a decade as a St. Louis attorney, another as a U.S. district attorney, and then the bench. In 1978 President Carter named Webster to head the FBI, the post he held when Reagan asked him to move to Langley. Three days shy of his fifty-third birthday, Judge Webster came with stellar reviews-squeaky clean, exactly what Reagan then needed. The Senate intelligence committee approved his nomination in early May, and the full Senate consented to it shortly thereafter. Judge Webster was sworn in immediately.

Bob Gates felt the weight of Iran-Contra lifted from his shoulders, only to hear from his brother that their father had just died. As Gates dealt with personal tragedy, Webster established himself at Langley. Again like Admiral Turner, Judge Webster brought in a coterie as his inner circle-this time of former FBI aides. That move scarcely endeared Webster to CIA staff, though he took some of the sting away by announcing Gates would remain DDCI.

The new CIA director had a background in government and even in the security field, where his ‘time at the FBI had included notable investigations of corruption among congressmen, the Korean CIA, and, of course, Iran-Contra. In Webster’s last months at the FBI the Bureau had looked into Southern Air Transport, the agency’s quasi-proprietary. But Webster’s knowledge of intelligence, mostly peripheral, resulted from participation in the National Foreign Intelligence Board, the DCI’s committee of the directors of all the U.S. intelligence agencies. His background in foreign affairs, even thinner, did not help in the corridors at Langley.

Webster’s tenure has received mixed reviews. Melissa Boyle Mahle, an officer with the DO’s Near East Division, saw the Judge as isolating himself, managing rather than leading CIA, passing Olympian judgments, treating the agency as something dirty or infectious. “He did not lead the troops, or ever really try to get to know them,” she writes. The chief of station in Brussels, Richard Holm, felt Webster never really fit in but nevertheless had been a good choice, and Holm was sorry when he left. Floyd Paseman, by 1987 a branch chief in the East Asia Division soon elevated to the management staff, believes Webster “did a terrific job of restoring the CIA’s image.” Dewey Clarridge asserts that Webster “didn’t have the stomach for bold moves of any sort.” Robert Gates acknowledges the criticisms but calls Webster a “godsend” to the CIA, observing that none of the complaints “amounted to a hill of beans compared to what he brought to CIA that May: leadership, the respect of Congress, and a sterling character.”

Pages 582-585:

Judge Webster may have been the most prominent casualty of the Gulf War. During the long interregnum between Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the beginning of the coalition military campaign came a period of diplomacy and economic sanctions. In Capitol Hill debates and the struggle for public opinion, Webster was called upon to render opinions on the effectiveness of sanctions, Iraqi intent, and the balance of forces. Others seized on Webster’s words as ammunition. This did not please Bush. Never that comfortable at Langley, Judge Webster decided he had had enough. He let a few weeks go by after the Gulf triumph, then stepped down. The DO shed few tears.

The White House announced the resignation on May 8, 1991. Appearing briefly with Webster, President Bush said he had yet to think of a successor but praised Robert Gates. That same day Bush summoned Gates to his cabin aboard Air Force One and asked if the former spook would accept the CIA nomination. Gates immediately agreed. He expected a painful confirmation process, and he got one. Iran-Contra investigations continued, and Bob Gates would not be definitively cleared until the special prosecutor’s final report, still two years in the future. When Alan Fiers pleaded guilty in July 1991, Gates feared that Fiers would implicate him in some way. “The lowest point in my life came the day before the plea bargain was announced,” Gates recalls. Acutely conscious of the fact that civil servants rarely rise to head their departments, Gates realized it had been a generation since Bill Colby had been confirmed. Gates had been close to some quite controversial people, from Kissinger to Casey. Then the summer of 1991 brought the final collapse of the Soviet Union, kicking off the debate as to whether the CIA had failed to predict it. Of course Gates had had a dominant role in CIA analysis of Russia for years. But this time, unlike 1987, Gates resolved to proceed with the confirmation process no matter what.

Charges that Robert Gates had politicized intelligence took center stage when confirmation hearings opened in September [1991]. At first an extended examination of the nominee was not planned. Marvin C. Ott, deputy director of the SSCI staff at the time, recalls that the predisposition to let Gates sail through created a staff presumption that there was nothing to look into. Committee staff and members were flummoxed by the appearance of a succession of analysts who gave chapter and verse on many Gates interventions in intelligence analysis. Reports on Afghanistan and Nicaragua were among those cited. Evidence emerged that current employees, reluctant to criticize openly, also saw Gates as an interventionist. Far from pro forma nomination hearings, those on Gates morphed into a major CIA inquiry.

The nominee presented a preemptive defense, attempting to disarm critics with examples of how he had simply tried to push analysts to back up their assertions, picturing some alleged interventions as his effort to tease out better reporting. Then a number of former analysts went before the committee to dispute that rendering, most notably Mel Goodman, who had been a colleague for years; Jennifer L. Glaudemans, a former Soviet analyst; and Harold P. Ford, one of the CIA’s grand old men. Alan Fiers appeared as part of the committee’s fairly extensive coverage of Iran-Contra, but his testimony did Gates no harm. Others supported the nomination. Gates himself returned for “something fairly dramatic,” a round of follow-up testimony refuting critics. The hearings became the most extensive examination of U.S. intelligence since the Church and Pike investigations. Work at Langley ground to a halt as CIA officers watched every minute on television, much like Americans riveted by the 0. J. Simpson murder trial.

The intelligence committee wrestled with its quandary. President Bush intervened, invoking party discipline to ensure that members backed the nominee. Ott believes Gates appealed to the White House for this measure. Committee chairman David Boren staged his own covert operation, acting impartially in the camera’s eye while laboring in secret to build support for the nominee. Boren agreed to one of the most extensive committee reports on a nomination ever, in which his committee attempted to reconcile Gates’s testimony with the charges against him. In Ott’s view, this episode became the first time in a decade where partisanship reigned on the SSCI. Finally the committee approved Bush’s appointee. Gates was confirmed early in November.

For all the drama of the hearings, the sequel did not live up to the fears of opponents. Director Gates strove to preserve flexibility as Langley marched into the post-Cold War era. He showed a healthy appreciation for the need to change, forming a whole range of task forces, fourteen in all, each to recommend changes in some aspect of CIA activity. A group on openness figured among them, advising that a swath of records be made public. In 1992 Gates spoke before a conference of diplomatic historians and promised that the agency would open up, even in regard to covert operations. As an earnest of its intentions, the CIA declassified large portions of the body of NIEs on the Soviet Union and that December sponsored a conference reflecting on the period. Stansfield Turner gave the keynote address.

One of the Gates study groups considered politicization. Although its instructions were drawn so narrowly it could conclude there had been none, Gates gathered a large contingent of officers in The Bubble in March 1992 to ventilate the issue. Directly confronting the matter that had clouded his confirmation, Gates squared the circle by acknowledging that whether or not there had been politicization in the past, it was a danger to be guarded against. The director declared his determination to find better ways to prevent policy driven analysis.

Another task force focused on covert action. Among the novelties there, a delegation of senior clandestine services officers met with scholars at the Institute of Policy Studies, a leftist think tank, to solicit their views on directions the agency might take. They did not flinch when told the DCI ought to abolish the Directorate for Operations. Of course no such advice made its way into the final report, but DDO Thomas Twetten was placed on notice that the old days were gone. Twetten, one of the anointed, who thought nothing of rejecting a Freedom of Information Act request for Mongoose documents whose substance was already in the Church Committee report, was forced to retrench. The directorate consolidated operations in several African countries closing a number of stations-a move that soon came back to haunt the agency.

A national center to target human intelligence assets flowed from Gates’s concern for more spies. But DO officers in the field met with silence when they proposed new operations or recruitments. Iran Contra showed that Langley would not back its officers in trouble, and now morale became difficult to sustain. One Latin American division field man told his mates, “Pay attention this is the end of an era.” Clandestine officer Melissa Mahle pictures the atmosphere well: “We were not listening. Operations officers felt they had been made the scapegoat of a failed White House policy… We did not hear the call to do …business in a new way, in a way that would be more attuned to the attitudes of the post-Cold War 1990s. In a climate in which the agency’s goal seemed to have been achieved, Robert Gates could not stem the retirements and resignations that began about then. The clandestine service denigrated him as a mere analyst who did not understand operations.

As far as covert action is concerned, Mahle makes the apt point that part of the CIA’s problem was rooted in Reagan-era practice, in which covert operations were conducted openly and made the subject of political debate and partisan accusation, all to avoid explanations when projects did not go as advertised. She writes: “The CIA entered into a new phase of ‘overt covert action,’ a marvelous oxymoron that should join the ranks of ‘jumbo shrimp’ and ‘military intelligence.” The consequences of acting overtly included constant demands for specifics-from Congress, the press, the public, foreign governments-that meant secrecy headaches. Operational details could be exposed. Political tumult could terminate actions in midstream, magnifying the fear of abandonment of CIA’s proxies. And overt action amplified tensions between CIA and the Pentagon too, as the special warfare community pressed for greater control. Worse, the CIA’s role became that of bag man, hiring the proxies, whether foreign security services or local factions, as spearpoints for U.S. action. Paramilitary capabilities atrophied with cutbacks in the Special Activities Division. Operations also became less controllable as CIA steadily reduced its direct role.

The growing importance of proxies had implications for the use of covert action to implant democracy. To the old dilemma of shady means in service of lofty goals was added the spoiler of agents who acted in America’s name with their own agendas, or those who took the CIA cash and wouldn’t stay “bought.” These problems were, and are, intractable.

As director, Robert Gates’s vision involved gradual, planned change. He put teeth into the idea of support for military operations. One of the task forces worked on that alone. He tried to turn the agency toward the challenges of proliferation and transnational threats. Director Gates wanted more and better training for analysts, use of open source information, and techniques like competitive analysis. He ordered the revamping of CIA file systems. He opposed restructuring, including talk of a national agency for mapping and photographic interpretation, but agreed with the Pentagon on reforms at the National Reconnaissance Office. When Gates came to Langley, 6o percent of the CIA budget aimed at Russia; when he left that figure had dropped to 13 percent. But Gates never completed his mission. George H. W. Bush lost the 1992 election to William J. Clinton. A few days later, on November 7, Gates announced his retirement. He stayed only long enough for Clinton to choose his own director.


Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Chapter 16, “Robert M. Gates” – Excerpt from the Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Volume I: Investigations and Prosecutions, August 4, 1993

Robert M. Gates, Letter in Response to Findings of Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh, September 22, 1993 – Excerpt from Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Volume III: Comments and Materials Submitted by Individuals and Their Attorneys Responding to Volume I of the Final Report, December 3, 1993

“Nomination of Robert M. Gates,” Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume I, September 16, 17, 19, 20, 1991 – Part 1 of 2 (16MB) – Part 2 of 2 (16MB)

“Nomination of Robert M. Gates,” Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume II, September 24, October 1, 2, 1991 – Part 1 of 2 (10MB) – Part 2 of 2 (17MB)

“Nomination of Robert M. Gates,” Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume III, October 3, 4, 18, 1991 (15MB)

The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On Documents Spotlight Role of Reagan, Top Aides

President Reagan meets with Contra leaders in the Oval Office. Oliver North is at far right. When this photo was officially released North’s image was cut out.

The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On

Documents Spotlight Role of Reagan, Top Aides

Pentagon Nominee Robert Gates Among Many
Prominent Figures Involved in the Scandal

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 210

Posted – November 24, 2006

For more information contact:
Malcolm Byrne – 202/994-7043
Peter Kornbluh – 202/994-7116
Thomas Blanton – 202/994-7000



The Iran-Contra Scandal:
The Declassified History


Washington D.C., November 24, 2006 – On November 25, 1986, the biggest political and constitutional scandal since Watergate exploded in Washington when President Ronald Reagan told a packed White House news conference that funds derived from covert arms deals with the Islamic Republic of Iran had been diverted to buy weapons for the U.S.-backed Contra rebels in Nicaragua.

In the weeks leading up to this shocking admission, news reports had exposed the U.S. role in both the Iran deals and the secret support for the Contras, but Reagan’s announcement, in which he named two subordinates — National Security Advisor John M. Poindexter and NSC staffer Oliver L. North — as the responsible parties, was the first to link the two operations.

The scandal was almost the undoing of the Teflon President. Of all the revelations that emerged, the most galling for the American public was the president’s abandonment of the long-standing policy against dealing with terrorists, which Reagan repeatedly denied doing in spite of overwhelming evidence that made it appear he was simply lying to cover up the story.

Despite the damage to his image, the president arguably got off easy, escaping the ultimate political sanction of impeachment. From what is now known from documents and testimony — but perhaps not widely appreciated — while Reagan may not have known about the diversion or certain other details of the operations being carried out in his name, he directed that both support for the Contras (whom he ordered to be kept together “body and soul”) and the arms-for-hostages deals go forward, and was at least privy to other actions that were no less significant.

In this connection, it is worth noting that Poindexter, although he refused to implicate Reagan by testifying that he had told him about the diversion, declared that if he had informed the president he was sure Reagan would have approved. Reagan’s success in avoiding a harsher political penalty was due to a great extent to Poindexter’s testimony (which left many observers deeply skeptical about its plausibility). But it was also due in large part to a tactic developed mainly by Attorney General Edwin Meese, which was to keep congressional and public attention tightly focused on the diversion. By spotlighting that single episode, which they felt sure Reagan could credibly deny, his aides managed to minimize public scrutiny of the president’s other questionable actions, some of which even he understood might be illegal.

Twenty years later, the Iran-Contra affair continues to resonate on many levels, especially as Washington gears up for a new season of political inquiry with the pending inauguration of the 110th Congress and the seeming inevitability of hearings into a range of Bush administration policies.

For at its heart Iran-Contra was a battle over presidential power dating back directly to the Richard Nixon era of Watergate, Vietnam and CIA dirty tricks. That clash continues under the presidency of George W. Bush, which has come under frequent fire for the controversial efforts of the president, as well as Vice President Richard Cheney, to expand Executive Branch authority over numerous areas of public life.

Iran-Contra also echoes in the re-emergence of several prominent public figures who played a part in, or were touched by, the scandal. The most recent is Robert M. Gates, President Bush’s nominee to replace Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense (see below and the documents in this compilation for more on Gates’ role).

This sampling of some of the most revealing documentation (Note 1) to come out of the affair gives a clear indication of how deeply involved the president was in terms of personally directing or approving different aspects of the affair. The list of other officials who also played significant parts, despite their later denials, includes Vice President George H.W. Bush, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, CIA Director William J. Casey, White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, and numerous other senior and mid-level officials, making this a far broader scandal than the White House portrayed it at the time.

In that connection, what follows is a partial list of some of the more prominent individuals who were either directly a part of the Iran-Contra events or figured in some other way during the affair or its aftermath:

  • Elliott Abrams – currently deputy assistant to President Bush and deputy national security advisor for global democracy strategy, Abrams was one of the Reagan administration’s most controversial figures as the senior State Department official for Latin America in the mid-1980s. He entered into a plea bargain in federal court after being indicted for providing false testimony about his fund-raising activities on behalf of the Contras, although he later accused the independent counsel’s office of forcing him to accept guilt on two counts. President George H. W. Bush later pardoned him.
  • David Addington – now Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff, and by numerous press accounts a stanch advocate of expanded presidential power, Addington was a congressional staffer during the joint select committee hearings in 1986 who worked closely with Cheney.
  • John Bolton – the controversial U.N. ambassador whose recess appointment by President Bush is now in jeopardy was a senior Justice Department official who participated in meetings with Attorney General Edwin Meese on how to handle the burgeoning Iran-Contra political and legal scandal in late November 1986. There is little indication of his precise role at the time.
  • Richard Cheney – now the vice president, he played a prominent part as a member of the joint congressional Iran-Contra inquiry of 1986, taking the position that Congress deserved major blame for asserting itself unjustifiably onto presidential turf. He later pointed to the committees’ Minority Report as an important statement on the proper roles of the Executive and Legislative branches of government.
  • Robert M. Gates – President Bush’s nominee to succeed Donald Rumsfeld, Gates nearly saw his career go up in flames over charges that he knew more about Iran-Contra while it was underway than he admitted once the scandal broke. He was forced to give up his bid to head the CIA in early 1987 because of suspicions about his role but managed to attain the position when he was re-nominated in 1991. (See previous Electronic Briefing Book)
  • Manuchehr Ghorbanifar – the quintessential middleman, who helped broker the arms deals involving the United States, Israel and Iran ostensibly to bring about the release of American hostages being held in Lebanon, Ghorbanifar was almost universally discredited for misrepresenting all sides’ goals and interests. Even before the Iran deals got underway, the CIA had ruled Ghorbanifar off-limits for purveying bad information to U.S. intelligence. Yet, in 2006 his name has resurfaced as an important source for the Pentagon on current Iranian affairs, again over CIA objections.
  • Michael Ledeen – a neo-conservative who is vocal on the subject of regime change in Iran, Ledeen helped bring together the main players in what developed into the Iran arms-for-hostages deals in 1985 before being relegated to a bit part. He reportedly reprised his role shortly after 9/11, introducing Ghorbanifar to Pentagon officials interested in exploring contacts inside Iran.
  • Edwin Meese – currently a member of the blue-ribbon Iraq Study Group headed by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, he was Ronald Reagan’s controversial attorney general who spearheaded an internal administration probe into the Iran-Contra connection in November 1986 that was widely criticized as a political exercise in protecting the president rather than a genuine inquiry by the nation’s top law enforcement officer.
  • John Negroponte – the career diplomat who worked quietly to boost the U.S. military and intelligence presence in Central America as ambassador to Honduras, he also participated in efforts to get the Honduran government to support the Contras after Congress banned direct U.S. aid to the rebels. Negroponte’s profile has risen spectacularly with his appointments as ambassador to Iraq in 2004 and director of national intelligence in 2005. (See previous Electronic Briefing Book)
  • Oliver L. North – now a radio talk show host and columnist, he was at the center of the Iran-Contra spotlight as the point man for both covert activities. A Marine serving on the NSC staff, he steadfastly maintained that he received high-level approval for everything he did, and that “the diversion was a diversion.” He was found guilty on three counts at a criminal trial but had those verdicts overturned on the grounds that his protected congressional testimony might have influenced his trial. He ran unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate from Virginia in 1996. (See previous Electronic Briefing Book)
  • Daniel Ortega – the newly elected president of Nicaragua was the principal target of several years of covert warfare by the United States in the 1980s as the leader of the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front. His democratic election in November 2006 was not the only irony — it’s been suggested by one of Oliver North’s former colleagues in the Reagan administration that North’s public statements in Nicaragua in late October 2006 may have taken votes away from the candidate preferred by the Bush administration and thus helped Ortega at the polls.
  • John Poindexter – who found a niche deep in the U.S. government’s post-9/11 security bureaucracy as head of the Pentagon’s Total Information Awareness program (formally disbanded by Congress in 2003), was Oliver North’s superior during the Iran-Contra period and personally approved or directed many of his activities. His assertion that he never told President Reagan about the diversion of Iranian funds to the Contras ensured Reagan would not face impeachment.
  • Otto Reich – President George W. Bush’s one-time assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Reich ran a covert public diplomacy operation designed to build support for Ronald Reagan’s Contra policies. A U.S. comptroller-general investigation concluded the program amounted to “prohibited, covert propaganda activities,” although no charges were ever filed against him. Reich paid a price in terms of congressional opposition to his nomination to run Latin America policy, resulting in a recess appointment in 2002 that lasted less than a year. (See previous Electronic Briefing Book)


Documents
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THE CONTRAS

Document 1: White House, Presidential Finding on Covert Operations in Nicaragua (with attached Scope Note), SECRET, September 19, 1983

On December 1, 1981, President Reagan signed an initial, one-paragraph “Finding” authorizing the CIA’s paramilitary war against Nicaragua. A signed Finding confirms that the president has personally authorized a covert action, “finding” it to be in the national security interests of the United States. In this second Finding on covert action in Nicaragua, Reagan responds to mounting political pressure from Congress to halt U.S. efforts to overthrow the Sandinista government. This document defines CIA support for the Contras as a broad “interdiction” operation, rather than an explicit counter-revolution. The language, however, is deliberately vague enough to justify violent actions by the Contras and the CIA and to enable the CIA to work with other nations such as Honduras in the effort to undermine the Nicaraguan government.

Document 2: NSC, National Security Planning Group Minutes, “Subject: Central America,” SECRET, June 25, 1984

At a pivotal meeting of the highest officials in the Reagan Administration, the President and Vice President and their top aides discuss how to sustain the Contra war in the face of mounting Congressional opposition. The discussion focuses on asking third countries to fund and maintain the effort, circumventing Congressional power to curtail the CIA’s paramilitary operations. In a remarkable passage, Secretary of State George P. Shultz warns the president that White House adviser James Baker has said that “if we go out and try to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable offense.” But Vice President George Bush argues the contrary: “How can anyone object to the US encouraging third parties to provide help to the anti-Sandinistas…? The only problem that might come up is if the United States were to promise to give these third parties something in return so that some people could interpret this as some kind of exchange.” Later, Bush participated in arranging a quid pro quo deal with Honduras in which the U.S. did provide substantial overt and covert aid to the Honduran military in return for Honduran support of the Contra war effort.

Document 3: CIA, Memorandum from DDI Robert M. Gates to DCI William J. Casey, “Nicaragua,” SECRET, December 14, 1984

In a “straight talk” memorandum to Casey, Robert Gates concedes that the CIA’s paramilitary force, the Contras, cannot overthrow the Sandinista government. Invoking the Monroe Doctrine and the U.S. loss in Vietnam, Gates argues that the CIA-run Contra war is “an essentially half-hearted policy.” He recommends that the Reagan administration initiate a “comprehensive campaign openly aimed at bringing down the regime,” including “the use of air strikes” against Nicaraguan military targets. “The fact is that the Western Hemisphere is the sphere of influence of the United States,” Gates advises. “If we have decided totally to abandon the Monroe Doctrine … then we ought to save political capital in Washington, acknowledge our helplessness and stop wasting everybody’s time.”

Document 4: NSC, Memorandum from Oliver L. North to Robert C. McFarlane, “Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance,” TOP SECRET, March 16, 1985 (with version altered by North in November 1986)

In a comprehensive memo to National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane, Oliver North describes a plan to sustain the Contra war if Congress refuses to vote more funds. The plan calls for approaching key donor nations, such as Saudi Arabia, for more funds and having Honduras play a key support role. A year later, when Congress began to investigate illegal Contra support operations, North attempted to cover up these activities by drafting altered versions of certain memos, including this one, for Congressional investigators.

Document 5: NSC, Memorandum from Robert C. McFarlane to the President, “Recommended Telephone Call,” SECRET, April 25, 1985

To convince the Honduran government to not to shut down Contra bases in Honduras after Congress refused further appropriations, Robert McFarlane had President Reagan personally call President Roberto Suazo Cordova. “It is imperative … that you make clear the Executive Branch’s political commitment to maintaining pressure on the Sandinistas, regardless of what action Congress takes,” McFarlane advises in this briefing paper for the call. At the end of the call Reagan added some notes at the end of the document indicating that Suazo “pledged we must continue to support the friends in Nicaragua.”

Documents 6 a-c: Documents relating to Robert Gates’ awareness of North’s Contra Activities:

Document 6a: NSC, Memorandum from Vincent M. Cannistraro to John M. Poindexter, “Agenda for Your Weekly Meeting with the DCI, Thursday, May 15, 1986,” TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE, May 14, 1986

Document 6b: NSC, PROFS Note, Oliver L. North to John M. Poindexter, “Private Blank Check,” July 24, 1986

Document 6c: NSC, PROFS Note, John M. Poindexter to Oliver L. North , “Private Blank Check,” July 24, 1986

Robert Gates faced intense investigative scrutiny in the aftermath of Iran-Contra over his knowledge of, and forthrightness about, North’s role in the Contra resupply effort. Gates has maintained that he was unaware of the NSC aide’s operational activities in support of the rebels. However, two of his former colleagues believe that he was aware, according to the Iran-Contra independent counsel’s final report, which notes several pieces of evidence that appear to support that conclusion. Among them are these three documents, which relate to North’s campaign to get the CIA to buy various assets his “Enterprise” had acquired in the course of working with the Contras.

The first document, from Vincent Cannistraro, a career CIA official then on the NSC staff, specifically mentions “Ollie’s ship,” a vessel North and his associates used to ferry arms to the rebels, and indicates the subject will come up at Poindexter’s next meeting with CIA Director Casey and DDCI Gates. Cannistraro later concluded from the discussion that followed that Gates was aware of the ship’s use in the resupply operations and of North’s connection to it.

The second and third documents are e-mails between North and Poindexter. In his note, North says it appears the NSC (and possibly Poindexter himself) has instructed the CIA not to buy “Project Democracy’s” assets. Poindexter’s response, which is difficult to read, states: “I did not give Casey any such guidance. I did tell Gates that I thought the private effort should be phased out. Please talk to Casey about this. I agree with you.”

Document 7: NSC, Diagram of “Enterprise” for Contra Support, July 1986

Oliver North sketched this organizational flow chart of the private sector entities that he had organized to provide ongoing support for the Contra war, after Congress terminated official assistance. The diagram identifies the complex covert “off-the-shelf” resource management, financial accounting, and armaments and paramilitary operational structures that the NSC created to illicitly sustain the Contra campaign in Nicaragua.

Document 8: U.S. Embassy Brunei, Cables, “Brunei Project,” SECRET, August 2, 1986 & September 16, 1986

In preparation for a secret mission by an emissary — Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Elliott Abrams – to seek secret funds for the Contra war from the Sultan of Brunei, the U.S. Ambassador in Brunei sent a cable stating that a meeting time had been organized during the Sultan’s upcoming trip to London. Abrams used the alias “Mr. Kenilworth” in his meetings, and arranged for the Sultan to secretly transfer $10 million into a bank account controlled by Oliver North. “I said that we deeply appreciate his understanding our needs and his valuable assistance,” Abrams cabled on September 16th, after the secret meeting. (The Sultan was given a private tour of the USS Vinson as a token of appreciation.) The funds were lost, however, because the account number Abrams provided was incorrect. Eventually Abrams was forced to plead guilty to charges of misleading Congress after testimony such as: “We’re not, you know, we’re not in the fund-raising business.”

Document 9: NSC, Diaries, North Notebook Entries on Manuel Noriega, August 24 & September 22, 1986

In one of the most controversial efforts to enlist third country support for the Contra war, Oliver North arranged to meet Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega in a London hotel in September 1986. In return for ending U.S. pressure on Panama for Noriega’s drug smuggling operations and helping to “clean up” his image, Noriega proposed to engage in efforts to assassinate the Sandinista leadership. With authorization from National Security Advisor John Poindexter, North met with Noriega in a London hotel on September 22 and discussed how Panama could help with sophisticated sabotage operations against Nicaraguan targets, including the airport, oil refinery and port facilities. According to notes taken by North at the meeting, they also discussed setting up training camps in Panama for Contra operatives.

Document 10: CIA, Memorandum for the record from Robert M. Gates, “Lunch with Ollie North,” TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY, October 10, 1986

Robert Gates faced additional criticism for attempting to avoid hearing about the Iran and Contra operations as they were unfolding, instead of taking a more active role in stopping them. As Gates testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee in October 1986, his approach was to keep the agency’s distance from the so-called private Contra resupply operation. “… [W]e have, I think, conscientiously tried to avoid knowing what is going on in terms of any of this private funding … we will say I don’t want to hear anything about it.” In this memo for the record, Gates, clearly continuing to protect the CIA, relates that North told him the “CIA is completely clean” on the private resupply matter. The independent counsel’s report later commented that “Gates recorded North’s purportedly exculpatory statement uncritically, even though he was by then clearly aware of the possible diversion of U.S. funds through the ‘private benefactors.'”

Document 11: Independent Counsel, Court Record, “U.S. Government Stipulation on Quid Pro Quos with Other Governments as Part of Contra Operation,” April 6, 1989

The most secret part of the Iran-Contra operations were the quid pro quo arrangements the White House made with countries such as Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Israel and other governments who were enlisted to support the Contra war. As part of his defense, Oliver North attempted to “grey mail” the U.S. government by insisting that all top secret documents on the quid pro quos should be declassified for trial. Instead, the government agreed to the “stipulation” – a summary of the evidence in the documents — presented here.

This comprehensive synopsis reveals the approaches to, and arrangements with, numerous other governments made by the CIA and NSC in an effort to acquire funding, arms, logistics and strategic support for the Contra war. The effort ranged from CIA acquisitions of PLO arms seized by Israel, to Oliver North’s secret effort to trade favors with Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. In the case of Saudi Arabia, President Reagan personally urged King Fahd to replace funds cut by the U.S. Congress. In the end, the Saudis contributed $32 million dollars to finance the Contra war campaign.

IRAN ARMS-FOR-HOSTAGES

Document 12: CIA, Memorandum, “Subject: Fabricator Notice – Manuchehr ((Gorbanifar)),” SECRET, July 25, 1984

One of the key figures in the disastrous arms-for-hostages deals with Iran was weapons broker Manuchehr Ghorbanifar. Despite the CIA’s dismissal of him as a “fabricator,” by 1985 Ghorbanifar managed to persuade senior officials in three governments — the United States, Iran and Israel — to utilize him as their middleman. The parallels with Iraq in 2003 are apparent: American officials (in this case) lacking a fundamental understanding of, information about, or contacts in the country in question allowed themselves to rely on individuals whose motives and qualifications required far greater scrutiny. Ironically, press reports featuring interviews with former officials indicate that Ghorbanifar has met with Pentagon representatives interested in his take on current Iranian politics. (See also the reference to Ghorbanifar in the Introduction to this briefing book.)

Document 13: CIA, Draft Presidential Finding, “Scope: Hostage Rescue – Middle East,” (with cover note from William J. Casey), November 26, 1985

Of the six covert transactions with Iran in 1985-1986, the most controversial was a shipment of 18 HAWK (Homing-All-the-Way-Killer) anti-aircraft missiles in November 1985. Not only did the delivery run afoul — for which the American operatives blamed their Israeli counterparts — but it took place without the required written presidential authorization. The CIA drafted this document only after Deputy Director John McMahon discovered that one had not been prepared prior to the shipment. It was considered so sensitive that once Reagan signed off retroactively on December 5, John Poindexter kept it in his office safe until the scandal erupted a year later — then tore it up, as he acknowledged, in order to spare the president “political embarrassment.” The version presented here is a draft of the one Poindexter destroyed.

Document 14: Diary, Caspar W. Weinberger, December 7, 1985

The disastrous November HAWK shipment prompted U.S. officials to take direct control of the arms deals with Iran. Until then, Israel had been responsible for making the deliveries, for which the U.S. agreed to replenish their stocks of American weapons. Before making this important decision, President Reagan convened an extraordinary meeting of several top advisers in the White House family quarters on December 7, 1985, to discuss the issue. Among those attending were Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger. Both men objected vehemently to the idea of shipping arms to Iran, which the U.S. had declared a sponsor of international terrorism. But in this remarkable set of notes, Weinberger captures the president’s determination to move ahead regardless of the obstacles, legal or otherwise: “President sd. he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn’t answer charge that ‘big strong President Reagan passed up chance to free hostages.'”

Document 15: White House, John M. Poindexter Memorandum to President Reagan, “Covert Action Finding Regarding Iran,” (with attached presidential finding), January 17, 1986

While the Finding Reagan signed retroactively to cover the November 1985 HAWK shipment was destroyed, this Finding and cover memo from which Reagan received a briefing on the status of the Iran operation survived intact. It reflects the president’s personal authorization for direct U.S. arms sales to Iran, a directive that remained in force until the arms deals were exposed in November 1986.

Document 16: NSC, Oliver L. North Memorandum, “Release of American Hostages in Beirut,” (so-called “Diversion Memo”), TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE, April 4, 1986

At the center of the public’s perception of the scandal was the revelation that the two previously unconnected covert activities — trading arms for hostages with Iran and backing the Nicaraguan Contras against congressional prohibitions — had become joined. This memo from Oliver North is the main piece of evidence to survive which spells out the plan to use “residuals” from the arms deals to fund the rebels. Justice Department investigators discovered it in North’s NSC files in late November 1986. For unknown reasons it escaped North’s notorious document “shredding party” which took place after the scandal became public.

Document 17: White House, Draft National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” TOP SECRET, (with cover memo from Robert C. McFarlane to George P. Shultz and Caspar W. Weinberger), June 17, 1986

The secret deals with Iran were mainly aimed at freeing American hostages who were being held in Lebanon by forces linked to the Tehran regime. But there was another, subsidiary motivation on the part of some officials, which was to press for renewed ties with the Islamic Republic. One of the proponents of this controversial idea was National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, who eventually took the lead on the U.S. side in the arms-for-hostages deals until his resignation in December 1985. This draft of a National Security Decision Directive, prepared at his behest by NSC and CIA staff, puts forward the argument for developing ties with Iran based on the traditional Cold War concern that isolating the Khomeini regime could open the way for Moscow to assert its influence in a strategically vital part of the world. To counter that possibility, the document proposes allowing limited amounts of arms to be supplied to the Iranians. The idea did not get far, as the next document testifies.

Document 18: Defense Department, Handwritten Notes, Caspar W. Weinberger Reaction to Draft NSDD on Iran (with attached note and transcription by Colin Powell), June 18, 1986

While CIA Director William J. Casey, for one, supported McFarlane’s idea of reaching out to Iran through limited supplies of arms, among other approaches, President Reagan’s two senior foreign policy advisers strongly opposed the notion. In this scrawled note to his military assistant, Colin Powell, Weinberger belittles the proposal as “almost too absurd to comment on … It’s like asking Qadhafi to Washington for a cozy chat.” Richard Armitage, who is mentioned in Powell’s note to his boss, was an assistant secretary of defense at the time and later became deputy secretary of state under Powell.

Document 19: George H. W. Bush Diary, November 4-5, 1986

Then-Vice President George H.W. Bush became entangled in controversy over his knowledge of Iran-Contra. Although he asserted publicly that he was “out of the loop — no operational role,” he was well informed of events, particularly the Iran deals, as evidenced in part by this diary excerpt just after the Iran operation was exposed: “I’m one of the few people that know fully the details …” The problem for Bush was greatly magnified because he was preparing to run for president just as the scandal burst. He managed to escape significant blame — ultimately winning the 1988 election — but he came under fire later for repeatedly failing to disclose the existence of his diary to investigators and then for pardoning several Iran-Contra figures, including former Defense Secretary Weinberger just days before his trial was set to begin. As a result of the pardons, the independent counsel’s final report pointedly noted: “The criminal investigation of Bush was regrettably incomplete.”

Document 20: Caspar W. Weinberger Memorandum for the Record, “Meeting … with the President … in the Oval Office,” November 10, 1986

This memo is one of several documents relating to the Reagan administration’s attempts to produce a unified response to the growing scandal. The session Weinberger memorializes here was the first that included all the relevant senior officials and it is notable as much for what it omits as for what it describes. For example, there is no mention of the most damaging episode of the Iran initiative — the November 1985 HAWK missile shipment — and the absence of an advance presidential finding to make it legal. This issue was at the center of administration political concerns since it, along with the matter of the “diversion,” were the most likely to raise the prospect of impeachment.