Tag: human rights atrocities

TOP-SECRET FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE-PINOCHET: A Declassified Documentary Obit

Archive Posts Records on former Dictator’s Repression, Acts of Terrorism, U.S. Support

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 212

The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability
By Peter Kornbluh
A Los Angeles Times
Best Nonfiction Book of 2003

Washington D.C., October 18, 2011 – As Chile prepared to bury General Augusto Pinochet, the National Security Archive today posted a selection of declassified U.S. documents that illuminate the former dictator’s record of repression. The documents include CIA records on Pinochet’s role in the Washington D.C. car bombing that killed former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier and his American colleague Ronni Moffitt, Defense Intelligence Agency biographic reports on Pinochet, and transcripts of meetings in which Secretary of State Henry Kissinger resisted bringing pressure on the Chilean military for its human rights atrocities.

“Pinochet’s death has denied his victims a final judicial reckoning,” said Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive’s Chile Documentation Project. “But the declassified documents do contribute to the ultimate verdict of history on his atrocities.”

Most of the documents posted today are drawn from a collection of 24,000 declassified records that were released by the Clinton administration after Pinochet’s October, 1998, arrest in London. Many of them are reproduced in Kornbluh’s book, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability.

Pinochet died of complications from a heart attack on December 10, which was, by coincidence, International Human Rights Day.

Read the Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.Initial Reports on Pinochet’s Repression

Department of State, SECRET Memorandum, “Chilean Executions,” includes “Fact Sheet-Human Rights in Chile,” November 27, 1973

Updated “Fact Sheet-Human Rights in Chile,” January 15, 1974

This memo, sent to the Secretary of State by Jack Kubisch, states that summary executions in the nineteen days following the coup totaled 320–more than three times the publicly acknowledged figure. At the same time, Kubisch reports on new economic assistance just authorized by the Nixon administration. The memo provides information about the Chilean military’s justification for the continued executions. It also includes a situation report and human rights fact sheet on Chile. An updated fact sheet showing the situation two months later is also included.

Central Intelligence Agency, SECRET Intelligence Report, [Executions in Chile since the Coup], October 27, 1973

This Intelligence Report states that between September 11, 1973 and October 10, 1973 a total of 13,500 prisoners had been registered as detained by the Chilean armed forces. During that same time period, an estimated 1,600 civilian deaths occurred as a result of the coup. The report also notes that eighty civilians were either executed on the spot or killed by firing squads after military trials.

Central Intelligence Agency, SECRET Report, “Chile: Violations of Human Rights,” May 24, 1977

This secret CIA report acknowledges that Chile’s National Intelligence Directorate is behind the recent increase in torture, illegal detentions, and unexplained “disappearances.” The report notes that the increase in gross violations of human rights in Chile comes at a particularly bad time for the country.

Defense Intelligence Agency, CONFIDENTIAL Report, “Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) Expands Operations and Facilities,” April 15, 1975

This DIA report on Chile’s Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) discusses the organization’s structure and its relationship with the Chilean Armed Forces and the country’s governing Junta. DINA is identified as the sole agency responsible handling internal subversive matters. The report warns that the possibility of DINA becoming a modern day Gestapo may be coming to fruition. It concludes that any advantages gained by humanitarian practices in Chile could easily be offset by DINA’s terror tactics.
U.S. Support for the Pinochet Regime

Department of State, SENSITIVE Cable, “USG Attitude Toward Junta,” September 13, 1973

This DOS cable sent two days after the coup states that the “US government wishes to make clear its desire to cooperate with the military Junta and to assist in any appropriate way.” This official welcome agreed that it was best to avoid too much public identification between the Junta and the United States government.

Department of State, SENSITIVE Cable, “Continuation of Relations with GOC and Request for Flares and Helmets,” September 18, 1973

This DOS cable was sent in response to a note from the Junta regarding the continuation of relations. It stress the US government’s “strongest desire to cooperate closely with the Chilean Junta.”

Department of State, Memorandum, “Ambassador Popper’s Policy Paper,” July 11, 1975

ARA analyst Richard Bloomfield’s memo notes that “in the eyes of the world at large, we are closely associated with this Junta, ergo with fascists and torturers.” In this memo he makes clear his disagreement with Kissinger’s position and argues that the human rights problem in Chile should be of primary interest to the U.S. government.

Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Carvajal, September 29, 1975

This transcript records a meeting between Secretary Kissinger and Pinochet’s foreign minister, Patricio Carvajal, following Chile’s decision to cancel a visit by the United Nations Human Rights Commission investigating human rights crimes. Kissinger begins the meeting by disparaging his staff “who have a vocation for the ministry” for focusing on human rights in the briefing papers prepared for the meeting. He tells Carvajal that condemnation of the Pinochet regime’s human rights record is “a total injustice,” but that “somewhat visible” efforts by the regime to alleviate the situation would be useful in changing Congressional attitudes. “Our point of view is if you do something, let us know so we can use it with Congress.” Kissinger, Carvajal, and Assistant Secretary Rogers then discuss U.S. efforts to expedite Ex-Im Bank credits and multilateral loans to Chile as well as cash sales of military equipment. At the end of the meeting, Kissinger voices support for the regime’s idea to host the June 1976 OAS meeting in Santiago as a way of increasing Pinochet’s prestige and improving Chile’s negative image.

Department of State, SECRET, “The Secretary’s 8:00 a.m. Regional Staff Meeting,” December 5, 1974

At this staff meeting, Secretary Kissinger spends considerable time discussing Congressional efforts, led by Senator Edward Kennedy, to restrict U.S. military assistance to the Pinochet regime. The transcript records Kissinger’s vehement opposition to such legislative initiatives, on the grounds that they are unfair to the Chilean military government, could lead to its collapse, and set a dangerous precedent for cutting assistance to other unsavory governments the Ford Administration is supporting. “Well, am I wrong that this sort of thing is likely to finish off that government?” he demands to know. Later he asks: “Is this government worse than the Allende government? Is human rights more severely threatened by this government than Allende?” According to Kissinger, “the worse crime of this government is that it is pro-American.” In response, Assistant Secretary for Latin America, William Rogers informs the Secretary, “in terms of freedom of association, Allende didn’t close down the opposition party. In terms of freedom of the press, Allende didn’t close down all the newspapers.”

Department of State, SECRET Memorandum of Conversation between Henry Kissinger and Augusto Pinochet, “U.S.-Chilean Relations,” June 8, 1976

In this secret memorandum of conversation, Kissinger briefs Pinochet in advance of his speech to the Organization of American States (OAS) in Santiago in June 1976. He lets Pinochet know that he will treat the issue of human rights in general terms only. He stresses that his speech is not aimed at Chile but that it is intended to appease the U.S. Congress. But, he notes, “we have a practical problem we have to take into account, without bringing about pressures incompatible with your dignity, and at the same time which does not lead to U.S. laws which will undermine our relationship.”
Pinochet and the Letelier-Moffitt Assassination

Central Intelligence Agency, SECRET Intelligence Information Cable, [Assassination of Orlando Letelier], October 6, 1976

Two weeks after the car bombing assassination of Orlando Letelier this CIA field report states that its source “believes that the Chilean government is directly involved in Letelier’s death and feels that investigation into the incident will so indicate.”

Central Intelligence Agency, SECRET Intelligence Assessment, “Chile: Implications of the Letelier Case,” May 1978

This CIA intelligence assessment alludes to the strain placed on U.S.-Chilean relations in light of recent findings in the investigation of the murder of Orlando Letelier that firmly linked the former Foreign Minister to the highest levels of the Chilean government. CIA analysts write, “The sensational developments have evoked speculation about President Pinochet’s survival.”

Central Intelligence Agency, SECRET Intelligence Report, “[Deleted] Strategy of Chilean Government with Respect to Letelier Case, and Impact of Case on Stability of President Pinochet,” June 23, 1978

This secret intelligence report outlines Pinochet’s strategy to cover up his regime’s complicity in the Letelier assassination. The four-point strategy would protect General Contreras from successful prosecution in the murder, stonewall requests from the U.S. government that would help them build a case against Chileans involved in the terrorist act, prevent the Supreme Court from honoring U.S. extradition requests, and convince the Chilean people that the investigation into the Letelier assassination is a politically motivated tool to destabilize the Pinochet regime.

Pinochet Biographic Reports

Defense Intelligence Agency, SECRET, “Biographic Data on Augusto Pinochet,” January 1975 (unredacted version)

Two versions of DIA’s biographic profile on Pinochet – one fully uncensored, the other curiously redacted. Please see the Archive’s prior posting regarding the two different versions of the document.

Central Intelligence Agency, SECRET, “Biographic Handbook [on] Chile,” November 1974

This CIA bio describes Pinochet as an intelligent, disciplined, and professional military officer who is known for his toughness. The document states that Pinochet is dedicated to the national reconstruction of his country and will not tolerate any opposition to that goal.

TOP-SECRET – FUJIMORI FOUND GUILTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES

UJIMORI FOUND GUILTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES

National Security Archive Posts Declassified Evidence Used in Trial
U.S. Documents Implicated Fujimori in Repression, Cover-up

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 274

Washington, DC, September 13 – As a special tribunal in Peru pronounced former president Alberto Fujimori guilty of human rights atrocities, the National Security Archive today posted key declassified U.S. documents that were submitted as evidence in the court proceedings. The declassified records contain intelligence gathered by U.S. officials from Peruvian sources on the secret creation of “assassination teams” as part of Fujimori’s counterterrorism operations, the role of the Peruvian security forces in human rights atrocities and Fujimori’s participation in protecting the military from investigation.

Fujimori was tried for two major massacres: the execution of fourteen adults and an eight-year old boy in the Barrios Altos neighborhood of Lima on November 3, 1991; and the kidnapping, disappearance and assassination of nine students and a professor from La Cantuta University on July 18, 1992. Both atrocities were committed by a military death squad known as La Colina, believed to be supervised by Fujimori’s closest advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos. Fujimori, who was Peru’s president from 1990 to 2000 when he was forced to resign in a major corruption scandal, was also convicted for the abduction of a well known journalist, Gustavo Gorriti, in April 1992, and a prominent businessman, Samuel Dyer on July 27, 1992.

The trial began on December 10, 2007. Since then dozens of witnesses have testified on Fujimori’s responsibility as commander-in-chief for the operations of his security forces.

In September 2008, Archive Senior Analyst Kate Doyle gave expert testimony in the trial on the nature of the 21 U.S. documents that were submitted to the court as evidence by the prosecution team. During her testimony she noted that the documents reflected the conclusions of the U.S. Embassy that Fujimori had engaged in a “covert strategy to aggressively fight against subversion through terror operations, disregarding human rights, and legal norms.”

Among the key documents used during the trial is a U.S. embassy report, classified secret, from August 1990, just after Fujimori’s election. Based on a debriefing of a former intelligence agent in Peru, the Embassy reported that Fujimori planned a “two tiered anti-subversion plan”—a public policy that adhered to human rights, and a covert set of operations that would “include army special operations units trained in extra-judicial assassinations.”

The prosecution of Fujimori comes ten years after the ground-breaking arrest of Gen. Augusto Pinochet, and is part of an accelerated movement in Latin America to hold human rights violators accountable. “The exercise of justice in the Fujimori case,” noted Peter Kornbluh, a senior analyst at the Archive who attended the trial last fall, “sends a signal through Latin America, and onto the United States, that those who authorize human rights abuses in the name of fighting terrorism are not immune from prosecution.”

Fujimori faces up to 30 years in prison.

Read the Documents

Note: These documents were among 21 declassified U.S. records provided by the National Security Archive to the special tribunal conducting the Fujimori trial. They were originally obtained through the Freedom of Information Act by Peru analyst Tamara Feinstein, and FOIA specialist Jeremy Bigwood.

Document 1: U.S. Embassy, Cable, Secret, Reported Secret Annex to National Pacification/Human Rights Plan, Aug. 23, 1990, 5 pp.

Only weeks after Fujimori’s election, an intelligence officer working with the SIN (the National Intelligence Service) reported to U.S. embassy officials on a covert plan, purportedly “the brainchild of presidential advisor Vladimiro Montesinos,” to conduct extra-judicial assassinations of suspected terrorists. “The training of these new ‘assassination teams’ is already underway,” the source reported. He also stated that the plan had “the tacit approval of President Fujimori.”

Document 2: U.S. Embassy Cable, Secret, Barrios Altos Massacre: One Month Later, December 4, 1991, Secret, 2 pp.

The Fujimori government has showed little “political will” to investigate the Barrios Altos massacre and find the perpetrators of the crime, the embassy reported. At this early stage, the Embassy has concluded that the security forces were involved in the killing. “There is no high level political pressure to root out the culprits in this case,” according to the cable. “President Fujimori has not made a public issue of it.”

Document 3: U.S. Embassy, Cable, Secret, Barrios Altos Massacre, December 13, 1991, 2 pp.

Ambassador Quainton reports on meeting with Fujimori, and other government officials, at graduation ceremonies at the Peruvian Military Academy.  Quainton makes it clear that the U.S. embassy is concerned about military involvement in the Barrios Altos massacre and the lack of any investigation. “”I told him,” as Quainton cabled, that “the very institution—the Army—which he had been praising at the graduation ceremonies was being discredited by allegations of paramilitary involvement in the Barrios Altos killing.” According to Gloria Cano, the lead lawyer for the Peruvian human rights group, APRODEH, this document provided critical evidence that Fujimori was cognizant of the involvement of his security forces almost a year before he admitted it publicly.

Document 4: U.S. Embassy Cable, [Excised] Comments on Fujimori, Montesinos, but not on Barrios Altos, January 22, 1993, Secret, 10 pp.

An undisclosed source describes the close and complicated relationship between President Fujimori and his top intelligence aide, Vladimiro Montesinos. The source notes that while Fujimori understands the importance of human rights, in practice he “is prepared to sacrifice principles to achieve a quick victory over terrorism.” He is “absolutely committed to destroying Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA within his five year term and is prepared to countenance any methods that achieve that goal.”

Document 5: U.S. Embassy, Cable, Secret, Army Officers on ‘Show of Force;’ Barrios Altos and Death Squads, April 27, 1993, 4 pp.

The Embassy reports on how the military is justifying its public show of force—tanks in the street—to repel any type of Congressional investigation into official complicity in the Barrios Altos massacre. The Embassy source, described as an “Army field grade officer,” admits that the military was responsible for both the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta atrocities, which he describes as “stupidly planned and executed.”

Document 6: U.S. State Department, Cable, Secret, La Cantuta Demarche, June 8, 1993, 3 pp.

Peter Tarnoff, a high-ranking State Department official, instructs the embassy to issue a demarche to Fujimori on the La Cantuta atrocity and to demand that the allegations of Peruvian government involvement be “thoroughly and impartially investigated.” Among the talking points sent by Washington are: “recent allegations suggest that a unit organized within the armed forces carried out a series of disappearances at La Cantuta and was responsible for the Barrios Altos incident.” The embassy is ordered to tell Fujimori: “If it is indeed true that the armed forces have organized such units, this is a very serious affair.”