Tag: fm secstate washdc

SECRET: URGENT DEMARCHE TO GOA

VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8040 3392140
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 042134Z DEC 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0000
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 0000
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 0000
S E C R E T STATE 128040 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ ES RO AS EN
SUBJECT: URGENT DEMARCHE TO GOA 

REF: BAGHDAD 03794 

Classified By: DAS G Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d 

Summary
------- 

1. (S) Department requests that Embassy Canberra demarche
the Australian Government on the way forward in the GOA's
negotiations with the Government of Iraq on an agreement
to permit Australian forces to remain in Iraq after the
expiration of the UNSCR 1790 mandate for the multinational
force.  Please report GOA response, in particular any
indication that the GOA will communicate with its mission
in Baghdad.  Info addressee posts should feel free to use
points below as the basis of their own approaches to host
government on this issue. Please slug replies for EAP/ANP,
NEA/I, and S/I.  End Summary. 

Background
---------- 

2. (S)  As the GOI moves beyond the process of gaining
agreement for the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, it
is focusing on the terms for the continued presence of
four Coalition partners (Australia, Romania, El Salvador
and Estonia) beyond December 31. (The British are engaging
with the GOI at the highest level and have made
significant progress on a mechanism to permit them to stay
in Iraq.) Regarding the other four, the GOI made clear its
conditions for agreement: 1) that the Government will not
present any more security agreements to the Council of
Representatives (COR) and 2) that the forces of the four
must conduct non-combat missions. The GOI is pressing for
the simplest exchange of letters or diplomatic notes or
signed MOUs to permit continued operations. 

3. (S) The Australians have a high-level team in Baghdad
and are working with the GOI but to date remain
convinced that they need an agreement that would require
COR approval. Given the importance of the Australian
staff officers to MNF-I operations in Iraq, it would be
most helpful for Embassy Canberra to press the GOA to
look for a mechanism short of COR ratification to allow
the continued presence of its military officers. 

Points
-------- 

4. (S/REL AS EN ES RO UK) Department suggests that the
demarche be based on the following points: 

--Now that the U.S. has concluded its complex
negotiations with the GOI for a bilateral security
agreement, the GOI is focused on negotiating terms to
allow Coalition partners to remain in Iraq. 

--The U.S. strongly supports the presence of Australian
staff officers in MNF-I beyond January 1, 2009 and
Australia's other significant contributions to Operation
Iraqi Freedom. 

--The GOI has made it clear that Australia's continued
presence will be in a non-combat assistance capacity. 

--PM al-Maliki has stated that he will not present any
other bilateral security agreements to the COR. 

--Canberra should explore whether there are other
mechanisms that would allow Iraq to conclude a legally
binding agreement without the approval of the COR. Such
arrangements or agreement could be in the form of an
exchange of diplomatic notes or a MOU, and draw upon
relevant provisions in the U.S. Security Agreement with
Iraq in order to establish a basis for the continued
presence of Australian officers in Iraq. 

Additional Point As Appropriate
-------------------------------
5. If this remains an issue: We understand that the GOA
wishes to include its combat forces in TF158 in its
bilateral agreement. We recommend that this be addressed
separately given the GOI's position against combat
missions for coalition forces and that the GOA focus on
a security agreement covering the Australian staff
officers embedded with MNF-I only. 

Reporting Deadline
------------------ 

6.  Embassy should report results of efforts by cable to
the Department before December 12. 

7.  Please contact EAP/ANP's Aleisha Woodward or NEA/I's
Shaun Mandelkorn for any necessary further background
information or argumentation to meet our objectives.
RICE

SECRET: SHIPMENT OF UAVS FROM IRAN TO VENEZUELA

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8302 0870151
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 242145Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 7721-7722
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0298-0299
S E C R E T STATE 028302 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CAPTION ADDED 

SIPDIS
NOFORN 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL MASS ETTC TU VE IR
SUBJECT: (S) SHIPMENT OF UAVS FROM IRAN TO VENEZUELA 

REF: A. ANKARA 3
B. ANKARA 126 

Classified By: EUR/PRA Dir. Anita Friedt,
Reason 1.4 (b), (c) and (d) 

----------
BACKGROUND
----------- 

1. (S//NF) Venezuelan officials expected to receive a
shipment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and related
material from Iran, via Turkey, by May 2009. As of early
March, Venezuelan officials believed that the equipment would
be repackaged and labeled as electronic equipment, then
transported overland from Iran to Turkey. Once in Turkey,
the equipment would be loaded onto a maritime vessel for
continued shipment to Venezuela. The U.S. believes this
shipment constitutes arms and related materiel, which Iran is
prohibited from transferring pursuant to UN Security Council
Resolution 1747, paragraph 5. 

2. (S) This case appears to be similar to one from January
2009 where Iran attempted to ship drums of nitrate and
sulphite chemicals and dismantled laboratory instruments,
which could possibly be used for making bombs to Venezuela
via Turkey. In response to U.S. concerns that the shipment
may have been a violation of UNSCR 1747, Turkish officials
inspected the cargo and made a decision to return it to Iran.
(REFS A and B) 

--------------
ACTION REQUEST
-------------- 

3. (S) Drawing from the points in paragraph 5, which may be
left as a nonpaper, post is instructed to approach
appropriate-level Turkish officials and request that they
investigate this activity, and if the cargo is found to be in
violation of UNSCR 1747 that the GOT use all available means
to prevent the transshipment of this cargo and detain it. 

----------
OBJECTIVES
---------- 

4. (S) Post should seek to achieve the following:
-- Provide Turkish officials with information regarding
Iran,s attempt to ship unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
related material to Venezuela via Turkey; 

-- Emphasize to the Turkish officials that UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran
from transferring any arms or related materiel; 

-- Emphasize that these goods are produced by an Iranian
entity listed in the Annex to UNSCR 1747. 

-- Urge the Government of Turkey (GOT) to take action against
this shipment pursuant to UNSCR 1747 and possibly 1737, and
in accordance with the GOT's laws and authorities; 

-- Thank the GOT for its willingness to interdict and take
positive action with regards to a similar shipment in
January. As a NATO Ally, we try to provide Turkey with as
much info as possible on these issues, which could help lead
them to take action in detaining shipments; and
-- Emphasized that, should we receive additional information
regarding this shipment, we will provide it as expeditiously
as possible. 

------------------------
TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
------------------------ 

5. (S//REL Turkey) Begin talking points/non-paper: 

--We would like to share some information with you in an
effort to highlight a transfer of proliferation concern and
to ensure that Iran does not make use of your territory to
transfer items proscribed by UN Security Council resolutions
1737, 1747, and 1803. 

-- The U.S. has information indicating that Venezuelan
officials expected to receive a shipment of UAV and
UAV-related equipment from Iran by May 2009. 

-- As of early March, Venezuelan officials believed that the
equipment would be repackaged and labeled as electronic
equipment, then transported overland from Iran to Turkey.
Once in Turkey, the equipment would be loaded onto a maritime
vessel for continued shipment to Venezuela. 

--Venezuelan officials assessed that a shipment of
electronics coming from Turkey to Venezuela would be less
alerting than a shipment directly from Iran. 

--We believe these items are military UAVs and related items,
constituting arms and related materials and are thus captured
by UNSCR 1747 and subject to the asset freeze called for in
UNSCR 1737. 

-- UN Security Council Resolution 1747, paragraph 5,
prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring any
arms or related materiel. It also requires all states to
prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and
whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of
Iran. 

--This system is produced by the Qods Aviation Industries. 

-- Qods Aeronautics Industries (aka Qods Aviations
Industries) is designated in the Annex to UNSCR 1747 and as
such these items would be subject to the asset freeze
provision of UNSCR 1737 regardless of whether the item is
MTCR- controlled or otherwise prohibited in paragraphs 3 or 4
of the resolution. 

-- As such, we request your assistance in preventing the
transfer of goods in violation of UNSCR 1747 and 1737. 

-- Additionally, it is possible that some UAV-related
equipment may be MTCR-controlled, per MTCR Item 12.A.1., if
the equipment is designed or modified to support other
Iranian UAVs that meet the Item 1.A.2. or 19.A.2. criteria.
Such items are included in document S/2006/815, the list of
items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to
ballistic missile programs. Transfer of these items would be
a violation of UNSCR 1737 per paragraph 3. 

-- We deeply appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued
cooperation, support and willingness to enact prompt and
thorough efforts in promoting interdictions designed to
prevent the transfer of sensitive materials by Iran. 

END POINTS. 

---------------------
REPORTING REQUIREMENT
--------------------- 

6. (U) Post is instructed to report results of its efforts
as soon as possible. 

-----------------
POINTS OF CONTACT
----------------- 

7. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are and
Margaret Mitchell, ISN/CATR (mitchellmt2@state.gov) and Matt
Hardiman, EUR/PRA. 

8. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance. Please
slug all responses for ISN, EUR, NEA, IO, WHA, and T.
CLINTON