VZCZCXRO7040 OO RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHNP DE RUEHRO #0710/01 0961009 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 061009Z APR 07 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7637 INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0550 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0310 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0369 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0651 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0359 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0464 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0939 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 4301 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0219 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2310 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0430 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8544 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2462 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0733 RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0393 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000710 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT. FOR EUR E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 TAGS: PREL NATO UNSC EUN IT SUBJECT: ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE, MEPP, LEBANON, IRAN SANCTIONS, GUANTANAMO AND ABU OMAR REF: A. STATE 36991 ¶B. STATE 37005 ¶C. STATE 41871 ¶D. STATE 42573 ¶E. ROME 625 ¶F. ROME 702 Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SPOGLI, REASONS 1.4 B AND D. SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (C/NF) Amb. Spogli got FM D'Alema's agreement to make a clear statement in support of the Athisaari plan for Kosovo and was told that the FM did not think he could or should control an Italian NGO threatening to close its hospitals in Afghanistan unless one of its employees was released by the Afghan Government. During an April 5 tour d'horizon, the Ambassador and FM also discussed Iran sanctions (D'Alema said Italy was applying the rules thoroughly), the Middle East peace process (D'Alema worried the Israelis and Palestinians would miss an opportunity for progress), Lebanon (where everything but UNIFIL is at an impasse, according to the FM), and the Abu Omar case. The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the request that Italy consider taking some Guantanamo detainees to help speed the closure of the facility. D'Alema said trying to close Guantanamo was a noble step and that if Italy could help, it would try to do so (see also septel on Guantanamo). End Summary. Afghanistan and Emergency Now ----------------------------- ¶2. (C/NF) On April 5, Ambassador Spogli and Foreign Minister D'Alema discussed key issues on the foreign policy agenda. The Ambassador raised concerns about the statements of Gino Strada, head of the Italian NGO Emergency Now, who was threatening to close his hospitals in Afghanistan unless the Afghan Government released one of his staff being held for possible terrorist affiliations. The Amb. said such an unwelcome step would be punishing the Afghan people and asked if D'Alema could help get Strada to stop making threats. D'Alema replied that he had spoken with Strada, who told him that if his employees are going to be arrested in Afghanistan, he would move his operations to a country that doesn't arrest his staff. D'Alema told the Amb. that all sides needed to show flexibility and that if the Afghan Government had evidence against the individual being held, it should be shared. D'Alema noted that Italy was grateful to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul for helping secure Red Cross access to the detained individual. Then, somewhat exasperated, he said, "Strada is who he is. He runs an NGO. He is not part of the Italian Government. He says they cannot work in Helmand without having contact with the Taliban. He thinks the Taliban have the legitimate support of the people there. We have urged him to be prudent. But we do not control him and he feels threatened." D'Alema then said that during the Mastrogiacomo kidnapping the Taliban cell phones that were traced all had Pakistani numbers, and that if terror bosses could live carefree in a Pakistan that could not be reproached because of its alliance with the U.S., we would not win this war. Kosovo - Firm Support for Status -------------------------------- ¶3. (C/NF) The Ambassador noted that the Italian position on the Athisaari plan for Kosovo had generated some confusion and that a clear statement of support would be very helpful. D'Alema emphatically insisted that Italy supported the Athisaari plan's core status provisions ("they should not be touched"). Italy continued to believe that some non-status issues, like protection of religious sites and minority rights, however, could still be improved. He said there were two unacceptable outcomes: continuing the status quo and a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The latter would tear Europe apart and pull the legal legs out from under the European mission to Kosovo. He argued that a UNSCR was needed that would help soften the Russian position, and a proposal needed to be crafted for Serbia - something conditional with flexible rewards - that could be offered to Belgrade when Serbia inevitably rejects Kosovar independence. Without these elements, the region could be destabilized, he said. He added that Italy had been clear in its talks with Russia and everywhere else that it would absolutely support Athisaari's core status proposal without prolonging talks and without new negotiations. The Ambassador asked if D'Alema could make a public statement to that effect. D'Alema agreed to do so. Iran Sanctions - Italy in Compliance ------------------------------------ ¶4. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked how Iran sanctions were proceeding for Italy, and noted our disappointment that when action was taken against Bank Sepah in Italy all funds had already been moved. D'Alema said the Iranians knew it was coming and were a step ahead, as they had been elsewhere. He added that when he had spoken with Larijani early in the week to urge the release of the UK sailors, Larijani had protested vigorously about the action against Bank Sepah. D'Alema asserted "we are applying the sanctions rules. We are in compliance. But Italy is also the victim of the sanctions and is excluded from negotiations with Iran and from the group with primary responsibility for decisions on Iran, despite being a UNSC member." Israel-Palestine: About to Miss an Opportunity? --------------------------------------------- -- ¶5. (C/NF) The Ambassador thanked D'Alema for his recent helpful comments insisting that Palestinian leaders accept the three Quartet conditions before Italian officials would meet with them. The FM said he feared a moment of opportunity was being lost. Abu Mazen was stronger than before but needed to find a way to get results out of his dialogue with Olmert. Both sides, he said, need to be pushed and encouraged. Without progress the risk of violence would increase. He suggested what was needed now was a confidence building phase with limited ambition focusing on releasing prisoners, improving Palestinian quality of life, granting more freedom of access/movement and getting credible security assurances for Israel. The Palestinians, he said, would never accept an independent state within provisional borders, because they believe this means they will never get final status issues resolved. He envisions an eventual regional final status conference, but not until the open final status questions have been resolved by the two sides. He said with both sides weak and lacking strategies to reach solutions, the international community needed to step in and offer hope for positive movement. Europe should press the Palestinians and the U.S. should press the Israelis in a coordinated division of labor, he suggested, adding that the Palestinians needed to hear the message that when the time comes, the U.S. would be willing to push Israel to resolve the final status issues. He informed the Amb. that Abu Mazen would be in Rome in the coming weeks. Lebanon - D'Alema Concerned --------------------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Turning to Lebanon, D'Alema said he was very concerned because the only thing working there was UNIFIL. Everything else was totally blocked. Parliament was not meeting. Reconstruction was at a standstill. The economy was in danger. There was no progress on the arms embargo or Sheba Farms. He said the Lebanon Contact Group meeting in London had been a good step and hoped that the group would meet at the political level to help bolster UN action. He also said some way had to be found to get Syrian buy-in or the embargo would never work. Guantanamo Detainees - Closure a Noble Idea ------------------------------------------- ¶7. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the request for Italy to consider taking some of the 25 releasable Guantanamo detainees who could not be returned to their countries of origin. D'Alema said it was a delicate issue, but the idea of trying to close Guantanamo was noble, and if Italy could find a way to help, it would. The devil would be in practicalities of whether Italy could take any of the detainees. (See septel for PM and Min. of Interior views on taking Guantanamo detainees.) Abu Omar - Pre-emptive Letters ------------------------------ ¶8. (S/NF) D'Alema closed the hour-long meeting by noting that he had asked the Secretary if the Department could send something in writing to him explaining that the U.S. would not act on extradition requests in the Abu Omar case if tendered. This, he explained, could be used pre-emptively by the GOI to fend off action by Italian magistrates to seek the extradition of the implicated Americans. D'Alema said he understood that L had discussed this with the Italian Ambassador in Washington.Amb. Spogli explained that we were waiting for the constitutional court to decide on the merits of the case before deciding on our next steps, because Min. of Justice Mastella had suspended action until that court rendered a decision. The FM noted that there was still the risk of action by the magistrates at any time. The Ambassador agreed that we should work to avoid having extradition requests forwarded. SPOGLI
Tag: collective priority
SECRET: REQUEST FOR 212(F) VISA REVOCATION FOR CORRUPT DOMINICAN CONSUL IN HONG KONG
VZCZCXYZ0014 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHDG #1692/01 1941101 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 131101Z JUL 07 FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8758 INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0094 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 0131 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0079 S E C R E T SANTO DOMINGO 001692 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR P, WHA, WHA/CAR, CA/VO/L/C ANDREW KOTUAL, ALSO FOR CA/VO/L/A BRIAN HUNT E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2027 TAGS: CVIS OPRC PHUM KCRM KCOR CH DR SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR 212(F) VISA REVOCATION FOR CORRUPT DOMINICAN CONSUL IN HONG KONG REF: A. TD-314/30639-06 ¶B. SANTO DOMINGO 0733 Classified By: ECOPOL COUNSELOR MICHAEL MEIGS. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) This is an advisory opinion requesting the revocation of the B1/B2 nonimmigrant visas issued to Casilda Teonilde CASADO DE CHEUNG; her husband, Pak Shing CHEUNG; her brother, Roger CASADO ALCANTARA; and her children, Yin Mey, Yin Ney, Sheung Leung, and Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO, under the Presidential Proclamation under section 212(f) of the INA suspending "the entry into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, of certain persons who have committed, participated in, or are the beneficiaries of corruption in the performance of public functions where that corruption has serious adverse effects on" (...) "U.S. foreign assistance goals (or) the security of the United States against transnational crime and terrorism." ¶2. (SBU) Casilda Teonilde CASADO DE CHEUNG is the Director of the Dominican Trade and Development Office in Hong Kong, which is the Dominican Republic's diplomatic mission to the People's Republic of China (PRC) (the Dominican government recognizes Taiwan, rather than the PRC). Cheung was appointed to this position by the Fernandez administration. Her brother, Roger CASADO ALCANTARA, serves as the mission's deputy director, and her daughter, Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO, is the assistant director, according to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) sources. Cheung is married to a Chinese national by the name of Pak Shing CHEUNG. ¶3. (S//NF) According to SAA sources, prior to traveling to Hong Kong to take up her new position, Cheung commented that she intended to become extremely wealthy in her new job. As noted in Ref B, she has followed through on this pledge primarily through the corrupt sale of visas to intending migrants. According to sources in the local Chinese community who have given reliable information on this issue in the past, Cheung's husband works directly with Chinese human smuggling organizations to identify potential migrants. In many cases these migrants seek to use the Dominican Republic as a stepping stone in efforts to reach U.S. territory (refs A and B). ¶4. (S//NF) Once the migrants are identified, Cheung works to issue them with valid Dominican visas. The going rate for these visas is reported by various sources in the Foreign Ministry (Dominican Embassy to France), Chinese community and SAA to be approximately USD 10,000. The visa recipients almost never qualify for these visas; they lack the skills and/or resources that are prerequisites for investor classification, for example, or they have no family members in the Dominican Republic to justify classification under "family reunification." This means that those visas are issued in violation of Dominican law. Payments for this service are made in cash either directly at the Trade and Development Office in Hong Kong or at a nail salon in Santo Domingo that is owned by the brother of Cheung's husband, according to sources in the local Chinese community. ¶5. (S//NF) SAA has estimated the number of Chinese nationals smuggled through this arrangement at "roughly 4-20 (...) almost every week (since at least 2004)" (Ref A). As of early 2006 most all of these individuals traveled using visas that had been personally signed by Mrs. Cheung (Ref A). According to media reports and SAA contacts, these Chinese migrants are able to bypass regular processing at the airport and the scrutiny it entails because they travel with both their valid visas and with letters personally signed by Migration Director Amarante Baret. These letters are not issued to travelers from other countries, according to investigative reporting by independent newspaper Clave Digital. SAA is in possession of scores of such letters signed by Amarante Baret confirming the issuance of valid Dominican visas to hundreds (if not thousands) of Chinese nationals. In addition, Dominican authorities determined that the addresses declared by some of the arriving Chinese were incorrect and were not the actual destinations of those individuals. ¶6. (S//NF) Few of these travelers ever return to their country of origin. As noted in Ref B, investigative reporting by Clave Digital asserted that of 2,948 Chinese nationals who had entered the Dominican Republic over the last two years using temporary business visas, only 432 had returned to China. The Foreign Ministry has gone on record disputing these numbers. ¶7. (C) Embassy requests a finding of ineligibility under section 212(f) in order revoke the nonimmigrant visas issued to Casilda Teonilde CASADO DE CHEUNG; her husband, Pak Shing CHEUNG; her brother, Roger CASADO ALCANTARA; and their daughter, Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO as individuals who have "committed or participated in" (...) "corruption in the performance of public functions." Casilda CASADO DE CHEUNG manages the mission and is in charge of the issuance of Dominican visas to intending migrants in violation of Dominican law. Her husband, Pak Shing CHEUNG, works directly with the smuggling organizations to identify migrants, and works with his brother in Santo Domingo to arrange for the transfer of funds supporting this scheme. Roger CASADO ALCANTARA and Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO both work in upper management positions at the mission in Hong Kong, and are involved or, at the least, are the "beneficiaries of" the corruption that goes on at the mission. Embassy requests the revocation of the visas issued to the minor children of Cheung -- Yin Mey, Yin Ney, and Sheung Leung CHEUNG CASADO -- because they are "beneficiaries of corruption in the performance of public functions." ¶8. (C) Cheung's corruption has "serious adverse effects on" (...) "U.S. foreign assistance goals." Many of the Chinese nationals smuggled under this scheme appear to be victims of trafficking in persons, the eradication of which is a major U.S. foreign policy objective. For example, upon arrival in the Dominican Republic, many of these migrants are forced to work in conditions of involuntary servitude (ref A). It is possible that others are trafficked to work as "mistresses for some men from the Dominican elite" (ref B). These credible allegations of high-level official complicity in trafficking were a major factor in the Department's decision to return the Dominican Republic to the Tier 2 Watch List this year, as noted in the 2006 trafficking report's text. Revoking Cheung and her family's visas would send a powerful message to Dominican authorities that the U.S. Government takes these allegations seriously. It could encourage Dominican authorities to investigate and prosecute these and other corrupt officials who have conspired in trafficking, something authorities have declined to do thus far despite specific accusations in the trafficking report. ¶9. (C) Cheung's corruption also has "serious adverse effects on" (...) "the security of the United States against transnational crime and terrorism." The Caribbean is often referred to as the "third border" of the United States. Ref B outlines credible allegations that significant numbers of Chinese migrants smuggled under this system are using the Dominican Republic as a stepping stone in efforts to migrate illegally to the United States. This network could conceivably be exploited by organized criminals and terrorists, who would threaten the security of the United States if they were allowed to reach U.S. territory. BULLEN
SECRET: ANWAR IBRAHIM’S SODOMY TRIAL II – A PRIMER
VZCZCXRO3046 PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH DE RUEHKL #0529/01 1820541 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 010541Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2918 INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2796 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0639 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0001 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2610 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2652 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0227 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0904 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KUALA LUMPUR 000529 SIPDIS FOR EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS MY SUBJECT: ANWAR IBRAHIM'S SODOMY TRIAL II - A PRIMER Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D). Summary and Comment ------------------- ¶1. (C) Malaysian Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim will go on trial beginning July 8 on charges of sodomy -- a criminal offense in Malaysia -- with a former aide. Anwar was previously tried and convicted of sodomy in 2000 in a heavily manipulated trial that the U.S. concluded "was marred by deep flaws in the judicial process." The verdict was overturned on appeal in 2004. Senior Malaysian authorities were very aggressive in handling the present case during the initial period of June-September 2008, but, coinciding with the passing of Anwar's deadline to bring down the government through Parliamentary cross-overs, have since taken a more measured "rule-of-law" approach in public. Authorities have not taken all the legal and extra-legal measures available to them, for example, to challenge Anwar's bail provisions or resolve an earlier impasse regarding the court venue. Anwar's conviction in this trial, which may last many months, could end his political career; the judge would decide whether Anwar would remain free pending an appeal. This cable provides a primer for the Department's reference, including background on the 2000 conviction and the present case, a synopsis of the specific legal charges and penalties, a summary of likely evidence to be presented in court, and three possible scenarios for the trial. ¶2. (C) Comment: The issue of the specific actions between Anwar and his aide will play out in court and, we suspect, in a very sensationalistic fashion. The facts surrounding the case, however, make a compelling argument that the government's prosecution of the case is foremost a political act against the Opposition leader. Whether the incident in question was wholly concocted or has some basis in fact, the case is not part of a morals campaign or a normal criminal matter and has been the subject of extensive political interference and manipulation. As one consequence, much of the Malaysian public remains deeply sceptical about the government's prosecution of Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar's flawed trials in 1998-2000 produced a public uproar and attracted international condemnation; in today's information-intensive environment, such effects may be exacerbated depending on events in court. Embassy will provide draft press guidance for the Department's consideration prior to the July 8 trial date. End Summary and Comment. Sodomy Case I, 1998-2000 ------------------------ ¶3. (SBU) Under the government of former Prime Minister Mahathir, Anwar Ibrahim was charged and convicted of sodomy (and abuse of power) in a sensationalistic trials in 1998-2000, directed and heavily manipulated by Mahathir against his former deputy. Anwar was charged with sodomizing his wife's driver. During his pre-trial detention, Anwar was beaten by the then Inspector General of Police. The High Court convicted Anwar of sodomy in August 2000 and sentenced him to nine years imprisonment. The U.S. expressed deep concern with the first sodomy trial, noting "that the trial and (Anwar's) resulting conviction and nine-year jail sentence were marred by deep flaws in the judicial process." After Mahathir stepped down in favor of Abdullah Badawi, the Federal Court overturned the conviction in September 2004 and released Anwar from prison (Anwar's separate conviction for abuse of power remained in place). The Federal Court found there were "many unusual things that happened regarding the arrest and confession" of certain prosecution witnesses, including the fact that Anwar's driver stated that he was paid to make the allegations against Anwar. In an unusual move and possible political compromise, the Federal Court judges included in their judgment the conclusion that there was evidence to confirm "the appellants were involved in homosexual activities," but added that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged offenses beyond reasonable doubt. Because Anwar's conviction on the separate charge of abuse of power was not overturned, he was barred from political office until April 2008. Sodomy Case II, 2008 -------------------- ¶4. (SBU) Less than four months after Anwar Ibrahim's People's Justice Party (PKR) and its opposition partners made significant advances in the March 2008 national elections, and three months after Anwar became eligible for political office, an aide to Anwar, Mohd Saiful Bukhari Azlan, filed a police report on June 28, 2008, alleging that he had been forcibly sodomized by Anwar on several occasions. The following day, Anwar took refuge in the Turkish ambassador's residence, claiming that he feared a repetition of his 1998 arrest and for his personal safety. He remained with the Turkish ambassador for only one day, departing after public assurances of his safety from the Foreign Minister and Home Minister. In the midst of a highly charged political atmosphere, which included Anwar's claims that he could bring down the government through Parliamentary defections by September 16, 2008, and new allegations linking then DPM Najib with the Altantuya murder case, the police investigation proceeded. It came to light that Saiful had had contact with the office of then DPM Najib prior to working with Anwar, and more significantly Saiful had met with Najib (and allegedly his wife Rosmah) at Najib's home just prior to filing his police complaint. Najib first denied publicly he had any connection with the case, and then acknowledged meeting Saiful, an admission that preempted internet reports about to be released by blogger Raja Petra (who is now a fugitive from sedition charges). ¶5. (SBU) As authorities made known their intention to arrest and charge Anwar for sodomy, Anwar's lawyers arranged for his voluntary appearance before police for questioning and charging. Contrary to the agreement, on July 16, police in commando-style outfits waylaid Anwar's convoy en route to the police station and arrested him on the street. Police questioned Anwar, took him to a hospital to provide a DNA sample (which Anwar refused, citing lawyers' advice and fear of "manipulation"), and held him overnight. Anwar was released on police bail by a magistrate on July 17. The Charges ----------- ¶6. (SBU) On August 7, 2008, prosecutors charged Anwar Ibrahim before a Sessions Court under Section 377B of the Penal Code, which reads: "Whoever voluntarily commits carnal intercourse against the order of nature shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years and shall be liable to whipping." Section 377A of the Penal Code defines "carnal intercourse against the order of nature" as including sodomy. Prosecutors specifically charged Anwar with the sodomizing of Saiful Bukhari Azlan at a Kuala Lumpur condominium (owned by Anwar's friend) on June 26, 2008. Although Saiful originally claimed he was forcibly sodomized on several occasions, the prosecutors chose not to pursue charges against Anwar under a separate Penal Code section (377C), which pertains to non-consensual sodomy (with a higher burden of proof), and also to focus on only one alleged incident. It is important to note that under Malaysia's legal system, prosecutors may amend the charges during the course of the trial. Saiful himself does not face charges for the alleged acts. The Court ordered Anwar to remain free on a personal bond of US $5,700 RM 20,000 and did not impose other restrictions (for example, Anwar has been free to travel abroad and has done so on many occasions since August 2008). The government did not attempt to dispute or revoke the bail provisions. Wrangle and Delay over Court Venue ---------------------------------- ¶7. (SBU) Following Anwar's formal charging, and with Anwar's 9/16 deadline looming in the background, prosecutors quickly moved to transfer the case from the Sessions Court to the High Court. The prosecution argued on September 10, 2008, that such an important case with possibly complicated legal issues should be dealt with at the High Court and produced a certificate signed by the Attorney General to move the case, which under normal circumstances automatically results in a transfer. However, Anwar's lawyers objected to the transfer out of concern that the more politicized High Court level would result in a pro-prosecution judge hearing the case, as happened during the first sodomy trial in 1999-2000. In November 2008, independent-minded Sessions Court judge Komathy Suppiah rejected the certificate of transfer, noting that Attorney General Gani Patail faced allegations of evidence tampering in Anwar's 1998 case and the transfer order signed by the AG would "undermine the public perception of the judiciary." ¶8. (C) Judge Komathy was overruled in March 2009 by High Court judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah who decided the Sessions Court has no authority to refuse the Attorney General's transfer order; Zabidin himself was then assigned to preside over the sodomy trial. Anwar's lawyers filed an appeal against the transfer; the Court of Appeals only began to hear the appeal on June 30; based on precedent, Anwar's camp admits the appeal has little chance of success. Zabidin initially attempted to schedule the trial to begin in May 2009; defense lawyers argued they needed more time and hoped their appeal would be heard prior to the trial. (Note: The High Court often takes one to two years before setting trial dates in normal criminal cases. End Note.) Zabidin subsequently set the trial to begin on July 1. Anwar's lawyers filed an application to compel the prosecution to provide them with full documentation and evidence that will be introduced at the trial, which the prosecution has thus far failed to do in apparent violation of the Criminal Procedure Code. With the hearing on the disclosure of evidence set for July 1 (now pushed back to July 3), Judge Zabidin postponed the trial start to July 8. The judge originally specified a three-week duration for the trial, but lawyers assume that the trial will take many months to conclude. The High Court Judge -------------------- ¶9. (C) High Court Judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah is a lawyer by training. After private law practice, he joined the judicial service as a Sessions Court judge and was elevated to judicial commissioner in 2004. After two years on contract, Zabidin was promoted to become a permanent High Court judge in 2006. Zabidin is not a well-known judge and is not associated with high profile or controversial judgments, according to our senior legal contacts. Anwar's lawyers allege that Zabidin is beholden to the government and will favor the prosecution; the judge's unusual rush to bring the case to trial is viewed by the defense as an early indication of his bias. Government Switches Gears ------------------------- ¶10. (C) Senior government and UMNO party officials adopted a very aggressive public and private approach to the Anwar case during the June-September 2008 period. This included frequent, prejudicial statements in public, and strong claims in private to other politicians and diplomats regarding Anwar's guilt. This intensive phase encompassed the initial news of the allegations and Anwar's formal charging, but also Anwar's own aggressive political posturing and claims that he could bring down the government by September 2008 through Parliamentary crossovers. After Anwar's deadline passed in September, and after resolution of the UMNO leadership battle in favor of Najib's succession in October 2008, we observed a definite toning down of the Government's approach, and a shifting to a lower gear. For example, we did not hear reports of government intervention to quickly resolve the matter of the court venue, which effectively delayed the prosecution by some seven months. Anwar's bail provisions remained in place and unchallenged. Public statements by senior government officials, outside of by-election campaigns, became infrequent. This toned down approach has continued through the present; it would fit within a hypothetical decision to demonstrate that the trial is a law enforcement matter, rather than a political battle. Regardless, it is clear that the government has not taken all the legal and extra-legal steps against Anwar that it could have since September 2008. GOM Confidence: Waning or Recalculating? ----------------------------------------- ¶11. (C) Many of our government and UMNO contacts have insisted to us, emphatically so in the early months of the case, that the evidence against Anwar is very conclusive, often hinting at video footage and physical evidence like DNA (see below). Recently, some contacts sympathetic to Anwar but not part of his team claimed the government over time had become less certain it had sufficient evidence to convict Anwar. According to one unconfirmed account, in June several key aides to PM Najib advised him to drop the case against Anwar because the evidence was not strong enough for an easy conviction and the political cost of forcing through a guilty verdict would be too high. It is also possible that the toned down rhetoric from the government has been misinterpreted as uncertainty on the authorities' part. Evidence at the Trial --------------------- ¶12. (C) Based on available information, we believe the following evidentiary aspects will feature in Anwar's trial: Saiful's complaint: The testimony of Saiful is central to the government's case, and he is expected to take the stand. Saiful has continued to assert that he was forcibly sodomized, although the charges under Section 377B do not require proof of a non-consensual act; given his youth (age 23) and physical size, Saiful will need to explain specific circumstances of the incident to support his assertion of rape. Medical reports: As publicly revealed by defense lawyers, Saiful underwent two medical examinations on June 28, 2008, just prior to lodging a police report. The first examination by a Burmese doctor at a local hospital concluded there was "no conclusive clinical findings" suggestive of sodomy, and the doctor recommended he be examined at a government hospital in line with police procedures in such cases. (Note: The Burmese doctor briefly left Malaysia after being held for questioning by police. End Note.) The second examination at the police-approved government hospital also failed to uncover medical evidence of sodomy, according to copies of hospital reports released by the defense. DNA: The defense team believes prosecutors will introduce DNA evidence, based on DNA samples held by the police since 1998, and are preparing expert witnesses. The government's hurried passage in Parliament of a DNA bill, approved by the lower house on June 23, is widely seen as tied to the Anwar trial and will permit the government to utilize the 11-year old samples. The defense could claim the samples were planted, as is widely believed to be the case in Anwar's earlier prosecution. Anwar's alibi: Anwar's lawyers claim that five persons will testify that Anwar was with them at the time of the alleged incident. They also claim that police attempted but failed to intimidate some of these defense witnesses to change their accounts. CCTV: The prosecution may use CCTV footage from the condominium where the alleged incident took place to confirm Anwar's presence at a specific date and time. Character witnesses: As happened in the 1999 case, it is very possible that prosecutors introduce witnesses to attack Anwar's character and actions aside from the alleged 2008 sodomy incident. There are unconfirmed reports that the prosecution will call 30 witnesses to the stand. Defense witnesses (PM Najib and wife Rosmah?): In an effort to demonstrate the political motivation in the government's case, defense lawyers could call PM Najib, his wife Rosmah, and other senior officials such as Najib's aide Khairil Anas Yusof who appear connected to the case (Najib and Rosmah because they met Saiful and discussed his reporting to the police). While this will make for momentary drama, we expect the judge to disallow such moves. Bail and other Conditions during the Trial ------------------------------------------ ¶13. (C) Anwar's legal team has expressed concern that the prosecution may apply to revoke the personal bond that allows Anwar to be free pending the trial or seek to impose other conditions, such as impounding his passport or restricting his movement to within Kuala Lumpur. The lawyers acknowledge that there is not a strong precedent for overturning the existing bail decision. In several recent politically-charged court cases, however, Malaysian judges have ignored precedent decisions. (Note: We have no information on the prosecution's intentions in this matter. End Note.) What if Anwar is Convicted? --------------------------- ¶14. (C) Most observers conclude that a conviction in Anwar's case, one upheld on appeal, would essentially end Anwar's political career given the legal penalties and Anwar's age (62). According to the Federal Constitution, a member of Parliament will be disqualified from holding his seat if he is convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year or to a fine of not less than US $570 RM 2,000 and has not received a free pardon. This stipulation comes into effect after all appeals are exhausted (at the Court of Appeals and Federal Court). The constitution also provides that a convicted person can only be active in politics after five years from the date of his release from prison. At age 62, a second conviction could effectively bar Anwar permanently from political life. In the event of a conviction, Anwar will certainly appeal. The judge will decide whether Anwar remains free pending appeal or immediately goes to jail. While officially remaining a Member of Parliament pending the final outcome, he would be unable to operate from prison as the Opposition leader. Political Interference and Manipulation --------------------------------------- ¶15. (C) The issue of the alleged actions between Anwar and Saiful will play out in court, and sodomy, even a consensual act, is a crime under Malaysian law. The facts surrounding the case, however, make it clear that the government's prosecution of the case is foremost a political act against the Opposition leader. The Malaysian government does not aggressively prosecute cases of sodomy; we find record of some 55 cases since 1991, or an average of 3 per year. The vast majority of such cases involve adults assaulting minors. Anwar's prosecution is not part of a morals campaign. The GOM does not aggressively target non-heterosexual behavior; if it did so, a recent cabinet minister, senior staff associated with PM Najib and other prominent citizens linked to the government also would find themselves under investigation. ¶16. (C) Aside from the immediate comparison with Anwar's previous prosecution for sodomy, which was grossly manipulated by former Prime Minister Mahathir, the indications of political interference and manipulation in the present case are compelling; much of the information is in the public realm. Collateral reporting, not addressed here, provides further substantiation. Najib connection: Keeping in mind that Najib and Anwar remain bitter enemies, it is striking that Najib met personally with the complainant Saiful prior to the police report, and allegedly arranged for Saiful to have intensive contact with senior police officials in the days before he filed the complaint. Senior officials' involvement: From the very early stages, the senior-most officials in the government, including then PM Abdullah, current PM Najib, cabinet ministers, the AGO and national police chief (the latter two having played important roles in Anwar's 1998-1999 flawed trials) and officials of the ruling UMNO party have been intimately involved in decisions regarding the case, according to Embassy contacts and publicly available sources. Despite the current toned-down government approach, and emphasis that the Anwar trial is a normal law enforcement matter, senior-most executive and UMNO party officials continue such a directing role. Leakage of information: Senior government leaders provided law enforcement information on the case to leaders of Anwar's coalition partner, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), in an unsuccessful attempt to split PAS from the opposition. A recent internet report claims that the government has provided some government-directed press editors with a "sneak preview" of evidence against Anwar. Public statements: From the initial public reports of the complaint against Anwar in June 2008 to Anwar's election to Parliament in August 2008, PM Abdullah and other senior leaders spoke publicly and frequently about Anwar's alleged crime and the need for justice, and the case featured prominently in the parliamentary campaign against Anwar. There have been far fewer statements since September 2008, except during by-election campaigns. Press: The Government-directed mainstream press, which includes all major dailies and all TV stations, provided extensive coverage of Saiful's allegations while severely limiting reporting on Anwar's response during the heated period of June-August 2008. Alleged intimidation: The police detained for questioning the doctor who first examined Saiful, causing him to leave Malaysia temporarily out of concern for his safety. Police also pressured the hospital in question to hold a press conference to state that the doctor was not qualified to conduct such an examination, according to our sources. According to defence lawyers, several of their witnesses have been threatened by police in an effort to change their testimony. The Imam for the Federal Territories (including Kuala Lumpur and the administrative capital Putra Jaya) claimed publicly that he was forced to witness an "improper" Islamic oath taken by Saiful; he was subsequently sacked by the Prime Minister's Department. Customized Legislation, the DNA bill: The government hurriedly prepared a bill on DNA evidence, following shortly after Anwar's refusal to provide a DNA sample at the time of his arrest, which compels suspects to provide samples and allows authorities to utilize previously stored samples in new criminal cases. The government originally introduced the bill in August 2008 and voted it through the lower house only on June 23, 2009; several steps remain before it becomes law. Public Scepticism ----------------- ¶17. (C) In the run-up to Anwar's August 2008 arraignment, public opinion polling conducted by the Merdeka Center, Malaysia's most respected opinion survey group, revealed that a preponderance of Malaysians believed the charges against Anwar were unjust, indicating a deep public scepticism regarding the government's case. We understand that new polling on this question will be released before the July 8 trial date. Pollsters have informed us that the new data continues to reflect widespread public suspicions. Reportedly, only 15 percent of ethnic Malays and 10 percent of Malaysians overall believe Anwar's prosecution to be justified. Outside of government circles, many Embassy contacts, including those who give credence to rumors of Anwar's personal life, take it as a matter of fact that the government is prosecuting Anwar for political reasons. In a public statement made on June 24, former Bar Council president (and U.S. Woman of Courage awardee in 2009) Ambiga Sreenvasan urged the government to drop the charges against Anwar in order to restore credibility to PM Najib's ruling coalition. Scenarios --------- ¶18. (C) When viewed as a political matter, a number of potential scenarios for the Anwar prosecution present themselves; below we review three that are most apparent. In these scenarios we assume that Najib will exercise the deciding voice on how and whether to proceed, though he also will need to weigh the opinions of other UMNO ruling party elites. -- Conviction at all costs: Based on an assessment that Anwar is a threat to UMNO's continued rule at least at the time of the next national elections, Najib and UMNO elites decide that the political costs of prosecuting Anwar are acceptable and pursue the matter aggressively inside and outside the courtroom with the overriding goal of convicting Anwar and removing him permanently from politics. While asserting that this is purely a law enforcement matter, the government exerts political pressure as necessary, accepting reputational risks in the process, and achieves a conviction after months of high-profile drama in the courtroom. The courts hear and reject Anwar's appeals in an expedited manner, well ahead of the next national elections in 2012 or ¶2013. This scenario appeared to be in play during the initial months of the case and in the lead up to Anwar's September 2008 deadline to overturn the ruling coalition's majority; it has been less apparent since then. Recalling the deep personal animosity between Najib and Anwar, and the singular importance of Anwar to the opposition coalition, this scenario remains plausible, even though Anwar's immediate threat to UMNO's rule has passed. -- Merits of the case, reputational damage: In a second scenario, the government proceeds with the prosecution but refrains from exerting undue pressure to achieve conviction, believing that the evidence presented and/or the court proceedings themselves will sufficiently damage Anwar's reputation and this will outweigh harm to the Najib administration's credibility. Conviction remains the desired outcome, supported by sufficient evidence, but the government accepts some risk of a final verdict of innocence after all appeals are heard. This scenario rests on the assumption of sufficiently clear evidence against Anwar that will swing public opinion in favor of the government even in the event of an eventual acquittal. Absent greater information on the government's evidence against Anwar, it is difficult to judge the prospects for this scenario. -- Withdrawal: In a third scenario, Najib and UMNO elites decide that the government's case is not strong enough to pursue, entails unacceptable political costs, or is no longer necessary because of the diminished threat from Anwar. The government withdraws the charges prior to the trial start of July 8, or shortly after the trial begins, possibly under conditions of "discharge not amounting to acquittal." (Lawyers tell us that such a discharge in theory would allow the government to reactivate the case at a future time, thus maintaining this as a lever over Anwar.) Najib, confident that he can beat back an opposition challenge in the next election, attributes the original decision to prosecute to the previous administration of Abdullah Badawi and takes credit for respecting the rule of law in this high profile case involving his determined political nemesis. In contrast to 2008, Najib's currently secure position as UMNO leader and Prime Minister, along with Anwar's diminished threat, make this scenario a political possibility, though some UMNO elites and perhaps Najib himself may not want to give up the opportunity to remove Anwar Ibrahim from politics once and for all. KEITH
CONFIDENTIAL: PLD LEADER MEDINA KEEPS DISTANCE FROM FERNANDEZ
VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHDG #1340/01 2381957 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 251957Z AUG 08 FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1330 INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PRIORITY 2182 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0920 RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN PRIORITY 1094 RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON PRIORITY 2885 RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO PRIORITY 1219 RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 4848 RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY 1920 RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0199 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUMISTA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTO DOMINGO 001340 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CAR E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2028 TAGS: PGOV PBIO SNAR ECON DR SUBJECT: PLD LEADER MEDINA KEEPS DISTANCE FROM FERNANDEZ REF: A. SANTO DOMINGO 01327 ¶B. SANTO DOMINGO 01167 ¶C. SANTO DOMINGO 01296 Classified By: P. Robert Fannin, Ambassador, Reasons 1.4(b), (d) ¶1. (C) BACKGROUND: Danilo Medina is the second-most powerful leader in the PLD party, after President Fernandez himself, and is seen as the strategic brains behind the organization's rise from third-party status in the 1980s to control of the presidency and both houses of congress by 2006. Medina served as Fernandez's Minister of the Presidency until late-2006. He then left the administration to challenge the President for the PLD's 2008 nomination after Fernandez, according to Medina, broke a pledge to support his candidacy and instead ran for re-election. Medina lost the 2008 PLD primary by a large margin, but later allowed his supporters to join the Fernandez campaign. On August 11, he attended his first party meeting since the break with the President. ¶2. (C) POLCHIEF met with Danilo Medina on August 20 and inquired about the prospects for constitutional reform. Medina said that Fernandez called a meeting of the PLD's Political Committee on August 11 and that the President pressed for his proposed constitutional amendments to be endorsed quickly, citing a need for an agreement prior to his August 16 inauguration speech. A key proposed amendment would maintain the two-term limit on the presidency, but would permit the head of state to run again four years after leaving office. Medina said that he voted against the amendment, even though it would allow him to run in 2012, because he is against re-election in any form; however, the proposed constitutional change was approved by the party. Medina was critical of the fact that Fernandez -- after calling the meeting on the 11th knowing the party would want to please him before cabinet appointments were made on August 16 -- did not introduce the proposed amendments during his inauguration speech. ¶3. (C) Medina was critical of Fernandez's inauguration speech, sharing the view of other commentators that the address proposed more public works projects than the Government can afford (Ref A). Medina argued that the Government will simply go into more debt to finance the President's projects. He was also critical of what he considers the excessive defense of the peso, which has caused interests rates to rise, as well as of Finance Minister Bengoa, who he described as a "yes man." ¶4. (C) POLCHIEF praised the recent success of the Dominican justice system in achieving convictions in the Baninter bank fraud (Ref B) and inquired about the prospects for prosecution of public-sector corruption. Medina replied that the fight against corruption should start within political parties, where the problem is serious. He said that many politicians accept campaign contributions from narcotics traffickers. These types of contributions range, according to Medina, from officials who do not know (or fail to investigate whether) they are receiving narco money, to those who proactively approach narcos in their districts to essentially shake them down. Regarding the recent drug-related multiple murder case in Bani, Medina praised Sen. Wilton Guerrero (PLD-Peravia), who has made allegations of official complicity in the drug trade in that area (Ref C). ¶5. (C) In a review of opposition parties, Medina contradicted prevailing wisdom by saying that the PRD party is doing well. He argued that the PRD lost the presidential election not because of the party's reputation, but because their candidate, Miguel Vargas Maldonado, was widely seen as having been deeply corrupt during his prior government service. Medina noted that, if the votes of allied parties are not counted, the PRD beat the PLD in a majority of the country's provinces. Regarding the PRSC, which received less than five percent of the vote, Medina said that the party does not have a clear future. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Medina has always kept his criticism of Fernandez out of the press; however, this meeting showed that behind closed doors he has the dagger out for the President. At times, Medina sounded more like a member of the opposition than a fellow PLD leader. He is very powerful within the party, particularly in the congress, where the vote on constitutional reform will be an opportunity for him to flex his muscles. With Fernandez likely to be barred from running again in 2012, all indications are that Medina will be the front-runner for the PLD nomination. (U) Please visit us at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/santodomingo/ FANNIN
SECRET: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA)
VZCZCXRO3142 OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH DE RUEHKL #1114/01 3580721 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 230721Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2163 INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0552 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2711 RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 001114 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2028 TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM KJUS KDEM SUBJECT: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA) REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1026 - DPM NAJIB DISCUSSES ISA ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 990 - RAJA PETRA RELEASED ¶C. KUALA LUMPUR 944 - MCA AND GERAKAN CRITICIZE UMNO ¶D. KUALA LUMPUR 846 - UPDATE ON RAJA PETRA ¶E. KUALA LUMPUR 834 - KOK RELEASED FROM ISA ¶F. KUALA LUMPUR 810 - UPROAR OVER ISA ¶G. KUALA LUMPUR 806 - JOURNALIST DETAINED UNDER ISA ¶H. 07 KUALA LUMPUR 902 - BEYOND ISA Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b, c and d). NOTE: THIS CABLE TRANSMITS AN EDITED VERSION OF KUALA LUMPUR 1102 SENT ON 12/18/08 IN MORE RESTRICTED CHANNELS. END NOTE. ¶1. (S) Summary: The Malaysian government's use of the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention without trial and is central to the GOM's intelligence-driven CT effort, has come under increasing political pressure over the past three months. The GOM's employment of the ISA in September to carry out three politically-motivated ISA detentions unrelated to terrorism sparked unprecedented public criticism. At least eight component parties from the governing National Front (BN) coalition have since broken ranks with the leading United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and called for amending or abolishing the ISA. The opposition party alliance led by Anwar Ibrahim has made the revocation of ISA one of its highest profile policy goals. In November, a High Court judge delivered a legal blow to the GOM's wide discretion in using the ISA in a ruling that freed blogger Raja Petra, and the GOM is appealing the decision. Prime Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib and Home Minister Syed Hamid have defended the ISA as essential to national security, while Najib told the Ambassador privately ISA should be retained but used more judiciously. The GOM released 17 ISA detainees, among them 10 previously linked to terrorist groups, including Yazid Sufaat, from November 5 to December 4. ¶2. (S) Comment: The ISA is the cornerstone of Malaysia's CT effort and has allowed Special Branch to take successful preemptive action against suspected terrorists and their supporters. Given the GOM's exclusive reliance on the ISA "crutch" and on Special Branch's role, police and prosecutors remain ill-prepared to investigate and bring to trial terrorist suspects (or prosecute other complex criminal conspiracies). The ISA also is subject to misuse for political ends and is an important insurance policy for maintaining UMNO in power. For both CT and political reasons, the GOM will not readily give up the ISA. We doubt that the increased political pressure and seeming swing in public opinion against the ISA, due in part to its misuse in September, will result in the ISA's amendment or revocation in the near future, absent the Opposition coming to power. These developments, however, reinforce the conclusion (ref H) that Malaysia cannot take for granted the availability of the ISA as a CT tool in the long run. It remains in the U.S. interest to encourage and assist Malaysia to develop an approach centered on prosecutions and convictions before an independent judiciary to combat terrorism. ¶3. (C) Comment continued: It is unclear to what extent outside political pressures played a direct role in the GOM's latest release of ISA detainees. The decisions may have more to do with Syed Hamid's personal exercise of authority as Home Minister. Syed Hamid has taken a more proactive role as Home Minister, compared to PM Abdullah who held the position through March 2008 and tended not to become involved in details. End Summary and Comment. ¶4. (C) The Malaysian government's use of the Internal Security Act (ISA), central to the GOM's intelligence-driven counterterrorism efforts, has come under increasing political pressure since the September ISA arrests of three persons based on political rather security considerations. The September 12 ISA detentions of an ethnic Chinese journalist, an ethnic Chinese Opposition MP (Teresa Kok), and a prominent blogger (Raja Petra Kamaruddin) served the ruling UMNO party's immediate political purpose of sending a warning to opposition politicians and those considering defecting from BN, as some UMNO politicians have told us. This came at a time when Anwar Ibrahim was publicly threatening to bring down the BN government via parliamentary crossovers by September 16. The arrests, however, also sparked unprecedented public criticism of the ISA, including from UMNO's ethnic minority partners within BN. The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the key ethnic Chinese BN component party, reportedly threatened to leave BN unless the GOM released the Chinese journalist; the GOM complied within less than 24 hours (ref F). Authorities freed MP Teresa Kok after seven days. Home Minister Syed Hamid ordered a two-year ISA detention period for Raja Petra, who was freed on appeal in November in a surprise court ruling (see below). ¶5. (C) Comment: Unlike his predecessor Mahathir, PM Abdullah refrained from using the ISA for political purposes until December 2007 when police detained five leaders of the ethnic Indian activist group HINDRAF that organized large street protests. The public viewed the GOM's September 2008 ISA arrests as more transparently political, in part because of the lack of public order concerns. End Comment. ¶6. (C) Political pressure against the ISA did not dissipate following the release of the first two of the three recent ISA detainees. At least eight component parties from the governing BN coalition of 14 parties have since broken ranks with UMNO and called for amending or reviewing the grounds for the ISA, while several have supported the law's abolition. In late September MCA, BN's second largest party, called for "a comprehensive review of the ISA so that it will apply strictly to cases relating to terrorism and subversive elements," and also argued for the introduction of "checks and balances in the use of ISA." The leader of the Gerakan party, Koh Tsu Koon, called on the GOM to "abolish the ISA once and for all," and rely on the judicial system instead. The leader of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) also initially called for ISA to be abolished, and on December 1 said PPP would withdraw from BN unless if the ISA were not amended before the next election. In response, Prime Minister Abdullah called PPP's bluff and said the small party, which holds no seats in Parliament, could leave BN if it wished. BN MPs so far have not backed up their criticism of ISA with action. In response to a petition circulated in Parliament for the review or repeal of ISA, only one BN MP signed his name. ¶7. (C) The opposition party alliance (Pakatan Rakyat, or Pakatan) led by Anwar Ibrahim has vocally condemned ISA as undemocratic and unjust, and made the abolishment of ISA one of its highest profile policy goals. A number of senior officials from Pakatan's three parties, Anwar's Peoples Justice Party (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) were detained under ISA during the era of former Prime Minister Mahathir. Not surprisingly, the three parties have vowed to revoke ISA if they come to power. "Abolish ISA" was the most prominent theme at PKR's annual party conference on November 29, which Polcouns observed. The keynote event concluded with a focus on ISA and featured large screens that scrolled through the list of all 60-plus ISA detainees with the several thousand attendees reciting the detainees' names as they appeared. Well-known blogger Raja Petra, released from ISA detention only days before, mounted the stage as the surprise guest of the grand finale. ¶8. (SBU) On November 7, a High Court judge delivered an unanticipated legal blow to the GOM's wide discretion in using the ISA in a habeas corpus ruling that freed blogger Raja Petra. The Embassy obtained the full text of the judge's 22-page ruling. ISA Section 8.B states "there shall be no judicial review in any court" of the Home Minister's exercise of "discretionary powers in accordance with this Act," except for compliance with procedural requirements. The judge ruled, however, that the Home Minister decisions could not be "unfettered and arbitrary," allowing for the court to consider whether the Minister's ISA detention order was "in accordance with the Act," and its focus on threats to national security, including the national economy; threats to maintenance of essential services; and threats to the public emanating from a "substantial body of persons" who intend to change the government through unlawful means. In the case of Raja Petra, the judge concluded that the grounds for his detention did not fall within the purview of the ISA. The government has appealed the ruling and as of mid-December the appeal remains pending. ¶9. (C) Many civil society groups took the opportunity over the past three months to highlight their standing opposition to the ISA, as well as other emergency ordinances that allow for detention without trial. Both conservative and liberal Muslim NGOs called on the GOM to abolish the ISA, as did the inter-faith Consultative Forum that groups the leaders of all major religions except Islam. The National Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) chairman Abu Talib restated the commission's existing position, namely "detention without trial is against human rights principles; that's why we advised the Government years ago to repeal the ISA." ¶10. (C) As questions over the ISA have mounted, Prime Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib, and other senior UMNO leaders defended the ISA as essential to national security. In the wake of public criticism over the September ISA arrests, Home Minister Syed Hamid, who has authority under the ISA to approve detention orders, defended the Act as essential and stated clearly that "we have no plans to do away with ISA." In early December, Syed Hamid waved off criticisms, arguing that the ISA "has never been abused or used for politics." He also commented that, "Malaysians sometimes don't know how lucky we are in that we have not experienced what is happening in Mumbai (the terrorist attack) and Bangkok (political unrest) now." He said the fact that there have been no post 9/11 terrors attacks in Malaysia was in part due to the ISA. On December 15, Syed Hamid again publicly defended use of the ISA, stating, "More apt, faster and better to use the ISA... detention under the act is early action to prevent the security of the country from being adversely affected." ¶11. (C) DPM Najib, who is anticipated to become Prime Minister in late March 2009, told the Ambassador privately on November 11 that the government continued to need the ISA, "even though there are civil liberty concerns," but should reserve ISA only for those who pose "serious threats, like terrorists" (ref A). On December 8, PM Abdullah publicly rejected calls for amendments to the ISA. ¶12. (SBU) In early December, local and international press reported that the GOM had released 17 ISA detainees from November 5 through December 4. Of those released, 10 had been held for suspected links to Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, and/or the Darul Islam terrorist groups. The released terrorist suspects included Yazid Sufaat, who played an important role in Al Qaeda's anthrax development program, according to the 9/11 Commission. The remaining seven persons released consisted of suspected foreign agents (2 persons), southern Thailand separatists (2), document forgers (2), and prominent blogger Raja Petra, according to an NGO that consistently and accurately monitors ISA detentions. In his public remarks, Syed Hamid said those recently released ISA detainees had been rehabilitated and no longer posed a security threat to Malaysia. ¶13. (S) Note: Authorities had detained the terrorist suspects for periods between two and (in the case of Yazid Sufaat) seven years, for an average detention period of four years for the ten individuals. Special Branch relies on a process for rehabilitating ISA detainees, and eventually releasing them under restricted and monitored conditions when judged necessary. The GOM has never attempted to prosecute any terrorist suspects, including those held under the ISA. This is due in large part to the fact that the GOM pursues almost exclusively an intelligence approach to CT, as opposed to a law enforcement approach that would involve criminal investigations, collection of legally admissible evidence, and development of cases for prosecution in the courts. In 2007, Malaysia amended anti-terrorism provisions in its penal code and criminal procedures code, but authorities have not yet utilized these provisions. Malaysia also has a poor track record of prosecuting other complex criminal conspiracies, including drug trafficking cases, preferring instead to utilize the ISA and other emergency ordinances to detain suspects without trial. End Note. ¶14. (S) A well-known journalist contacted us in early December and said that officers of the Police Special Branch had complained to him that Home Minister Syed Hamid had ordered the recent releases of terrorist suspects without adequate consultation and in some cases against the recommendation of Special Branch. Australian and British diplomats, speaking with Polcouns December 16, stated that Syed Hamid, who is a lawyer by training, personally reviewed the dossiers of ISA detainees and was inclined to approve releases absent compelling justification from the Special Branch. ¶15. (C) The Thai embassy contacted Poloff on December 15 to express concern over the release of two ISA detainees (Abdul Rahman bin Ahmad and Mat Tarmizi bin Shamsudin, who apparently are dual-citizens of Malaysia and Thailand) who had been held for their connection to the insurgency in southern Thailand. The Thai diplomat said Bangkok considered Abdul Rahman in particular to be a major player in the insurgency. He noted that those released are required to remain in Malaysia and check in periodically with the police. The Thai diplomat said he believed the GOM released the detainees in order to diffuse criticism of the ISA. We learned that the Thai embassy also has contacted other Western embassies (UK, France, Australia) to express concern over the recent ISA releases. KEITH
SECRET//NOFORN: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY
VZCZCXRO9472 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #0384/01 1541323 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 031323Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6431 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000384 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018 TAGS: PREL SY SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: As the U.S. continues its re-engagement with Syria, it may help us achieve our goals if we understand how SARG officials pursue diplomatic goals. Syrian President Bashar al-Asad is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his father but he, too, prefers to engage diplomatically on a level of abstraction that seems designed to frustrate any direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by extension, his judgment. Bashar's vanity represents another Achilles heel: the degree to which USG visitors add to his consequence to some degree affects the prospects for a successful meeting. The SARG foreign policy apparatus suffers from apparent dysfunctionality and weaknesses in terms of depth and resources but the SARG punches above its weight because of the talents of key individuals. SARG officials generally have clear, if tactical, guidance from Bashar and they are sufficiently professional to translate those instructions into recognizable diplomatic practice. But in a diplomatic world that is generally oiled by courtesy and euphemism, the Syrians don't hesitate to be nasty in order to achieve their objectives. The behaviors they employ as diplomatic "force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal. End Summary. ------------------- Gaming Out the SARG ------------------- ¶2. (S/NF) As the U.S. moves forward to re-engage Syria, we are well aware that Syrian officials have long been famous for their abilities as tough negotiators. The late President Hafiz al-Asad could wear down his interlocutors through sheer staying power in 10-hour meetings without breaks; the wealth of detail and historical perspective he brought to those discussions also tested the mettle of those who were attempting to persuade him to a course of action he questioned. His son Bashar is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his father but he, too, prefers to engage diplomatically on a level of abstraction that seems designed to frustrate any direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by extension, his judgment. Bashar's presentations on world affairs suggest that he would prefer to see himself as a sort of philosopher-king, the Pericles of Damascus. Playing to Bashar's intellectual pretentions is one stratagem for gaining his confidence and acquiescence; it may be time-consuming but could well produce results. Bashar's vanity represents another Achilles heel: the degree to which USG visitors add to his consequence to some degree affects the prospects for achieving our goals. Every interaction we have with the SARG is, in fact, a transaction and the better equipped we are to understand the dynamics of our negotiations the better able we will be to achieve our objectives. Post has assembled the compendium below in an attempt to reflect our experience in dealing with the SARG in the hope that Washington-based interlocutors will find it useful. ------------------------------------ A Compendium of Diplomatic Behaviors ------------------------------------ ¶3. (S/NF) Capacity: SARG scope of action is limited the President's span of control. He is generally able to monitor the activities of his foreign minister, political/media advisor, intelligence chiefs, and brother Maher. At various times, his vice president and national security advisor are also active and therefore under his direct supervision. While communication flows between him and his subordinates, it appears not to be formalized and information is highly compartmented. Subordinates' portfolios are not clearly delineated; overlapping areas create tension and competition. There is no "interagency" policy development process that lays out advantages and disadvantages of policy choices. There are, as far as we know, no briefing or decision memos. The bench is not deep; beyond the principals lie only a few trusted staffers. Bashar and his team also find it difficult to juggle more than one major foreign policy issue at a time. ¶4. (S/NF) Protocol: SARG officials are sticklers for diplomatic protocol, although they are not experts on the international conventions from which it is derived. The SARG places a high value on protocolary forms that ensure respectful treatment of state officials (despite bilateral differences) because such forms guarantee that the President and his representatives are shown proper courtesies by a world that is often at odds with Syria. (This focus on protocol underlies the continuing Syrian unhappiness over the absence of a U.S. ambassador.) Protocol conventions also reinforce the notion of equal relations between sovereign states and the SARG insists that communications between it and foreign embassies comply with traditional diplomatic practice. The MFA receives a flood of diplomatic notes from Damascus-based foreign missions daily which are apportioned out to various offices for action. The diplomatic notes, translated into Arabic by the senders, become the paper trail for SARG decisions. The MFA bureaucracy does not appear to generate cover memoranda that provide background to requests or recommendations for decisions. Many such notes, possibly all notes from the U.S. Embassy, are sent to the Minister himself for review. The MFA does not have internal email, only fax and phone. Instructions to Syrian missions abroad are often sent by fax; sometimes the MFA fails to provide instructions at all. ¶5. (S/NF) The Suq: In dealing with the U.S., the Syrians see every encounter as a transaction. The level and composition of the Syrian side of any meeting is carefully calculated in terms of protocol and the political message being sent; a lunch invitation must be interpreted as more than just the Arab compulsion to hospitality ) who hosts the lunch is as important as who attends the meetings. When it comes to content, the Syrians seek to gain the highest value deliverable for the lowest price or no price at all. During the re-engagement process, the SARG has attempted to extract high profile USG gestures in exchange for relief of operational constraints on the Embassy. The SARG has been uncharacteristically forward-leaning in allowing discussions on a New Embassy Compound site to develop as far as they have; actual closure on a land deal, however, is probably contingent on U.S. delivery of a SARG desirable, e.g., the announcement that a U.S. ambassador will be sent to Damascus. The SARG's focus on embassy operations is in part rooted in their paranoia over USG intelligence collection and penetration of Syrian society but the imposition of constraints on mission activities has also conveniently created an embassy list of desiderata that the SARG seeks to use as cost-free concessions. FM Muallim candidly acknowledged this approach when he commented in February to Charge that he had not yet decided what he needed in exchange for permission to reopen the American School in Damascus. ¶6. (S/NF) Vanity and Self-preservation: The President's self-image plays a disproportionate role in policy formulation and diplomatic activity. Meetings, visits, trips abroad that enhance his respectability and prestige are pursued; encounters that may involve negotiations or difficult debate are declined or delegated to subordinates. The President responds with anger if he finds himself challenged by visitors, but not until after the meeting. He seems to avoid direct confrontation. When engaged in summit diplomacy, he often seeks to include allies to bolster his confidence (e.g., Quadripartite Summit in September 2008, Riyadh Summit in April 2009). His foreign policy subordinates are all "employees" without constituencies or influence independent of the President's favor. Their overriding concern when engaging foreigners is to avoid the appearance of overstepping or violating their instructions. They are particularly cautious in the presence of other Syrians; requests to meet one-on-one often yield more expansive and candid responses. ¶7. (S/NF) Deceit: SARG officials at every level lie. They persist in a lie even in the face of evidence to the contrary. They are not embarrassed to be caught in a lie. While lower level officials often lie to avoid potential punitive action from their own government, senior level officials generally lie when they deem a topic too "dangerous" to discuss (e.g., Al-Kibar, IAEA) or when they have not yet determined whether or how to respond (FFN, Hezbollah arms supplies, etc). When a senior SARG official is lying, the key challenge is not demonstrating the lack of veracity but discovering the true reasons for it. ¶8. (S/NF) Passivity: SARG foreign policy is formulated in response to external developments (changes in regional leadership, initiatives from the West, etc). The SARG does not launch initiatives and generally seeks cover from allies when exploring new courses of action. The SARG is much more confident on the Arab level than on the international level. SARG policy responses are generally tactical and operational, exploratory rather than decisive, oblique instead of direct. Strategy, to the extent it exists, emerges from a series of tactical choices. The lack of initiative appears rooted in an underlying sense of diplomatic powerlessness. Every foreign policy embarrassment in Syria's history lies under the surface of a generally false projection of assertiveness. That assertiveness is sometimes read as arrogance. ¶9. (S/NF) Antagonism: Every Syrian diplomatic relationship contains an element of friction. There is some current friction, for example, in the Syrians' relations with the Turks and the French. The Syrians are not troubled by discord; they seek an upper hand in any relationship by relying on foreign diplomats' instinctive desire to resolve problems. By withholding a solution, the SARG seeks to control the pace and temperature of the relationship. SARG officials artificially restrict their availability and can engage in harsh verbal attacks to intimidate and rattle foreign diplomats. SARG officials delight in disparaging their interlocutors behind their backs for allowing themselves to be cowed. On the international level, the President has indulged in personal criticisms of foreign leaders; unlike his father, he deliberately makes enemies when he doesn't necessarily have to. FM Muallim can behave similarly but he probably does so on the President's instructions. ¶10. (S/NF) Complacency: SARG leadership genuinely believes that SARG foreign policy has been, is being, and will be vindicated by events. They also genuinely believe their foreign policy is based on morally defensible and intellectually solid principles, although it is usually reactive and opportunistic. Existing policy choices are immutable unless the President decides to change them, in which case, his new policies, despite any appearances to the contrary, are consistent with "traditional" principles. Baathism infuses foreign policy principles (Pan-Arabism) but pragmatism is more important. More recently, Bashar's like or dislike of other leaders plays a role in policy formulation. ¶11. (S/NF) The Non Sequitur: When Syrian officials don't like a point that has been made to them, they frequently resort to an awkward changes in subject to deflect perceived criticism. Syrian officials seem to think they've scored a verbal hit by employing a facile non sequitur, usually in the form of a counter-accusation. When the SARG's human rights record is raised with Muallim, for example, he often raises Israel's December-January Gaza operation or, more recently, asks if the U.S. will accept the 1300 Al Qaeda sympathizers in Syrian jails. The non sequitur is intended to stop discussion of the unwelcome topic while subtly intimidating the interlocutor with the threat of raising a subject that is putatively embarrassing to him or her. When the non sequitur is deployed, it is clear that the SARG official is on the defensive. ¶12. (S/NF) Comment: Given the apparent dysfunctionality of the SARG foreign policy apparatus and its weaknesses in terms of depth and resources, the SARG's ability to punch above its weight internationally is noteworthy. Much of its strength appears to lie in the talents of key individuals and their ability to collaborate with each other, despite tensions and rivalries. SARG officials generally have clear, if tactical, guidance from Bashar and they are sufficiently professional to translate those instructions into recognizable diplomatic practice. But the behaviors they employ as diplomatic "force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal. At the end of the day, there are few who really like to deal with the Syrians. The SARG, well aware of its reputation, however, spends much of its energy ensuring that we have to. CONNELLY
SECRET: PREMATURE RUMORS OF ASIF SHAWKAT’S DEMISE
VZCZCXRO7077 PP RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #0251/01 1051417 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 141417Z APR 08 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4849 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5535 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0846 RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0378 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000251 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR JORDAN; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV SY IZ SUBJECT: PREMATURE RUMORS OF ASIF SHAWKAT'S DEMISE REF: DAMASCUS 142 Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (S) Summary: Widespread reports that Syrian Military Intelligence Chief Asif Shawkat is under house arrest and that Shawkat's wife (and Bashar Asad's sister) Bushra al-Asad is trying to flee the country likely reflect Bashar's successful moves to limit Shawkat's influence. While our sources suspect both stories are untrue and blame the external opposition for stirring the rumor mill to weaken Bashar, Shawkat's star definitely appears to be on the wane. End Summary ------------------------------- The Rumor Mill Working Overtime ------------------------------- ¶2. (SBU) Many Embassy contacts point to a report published by opposition website "Free Syria" as the original source of a number of news stories reporting Shawkat's house arrest. Sources here also contend that former Syrian VP (and now leader of the expat opposition group National Salvation Front) Abdel Halim Khaddam has attempted to weaken Bashar by repeating this rumor during recent anti-SARG interviews on SkyTV and Lebanese TV station al Moustaqbal in which he alleged Shawkat's house arrest and predicted Shawkat would suffer the same fate as now deceased head of Syrian intelligence operations in Lebanon, Ghazi Kanaan. ¶3. (SBU) Opposition website "al Haqiqa" published an April 6 story reporting that President Asad would replace Shawkat with SMI deputy Ali Yunis, a story similar to a "Debka" website report on Bashar's decision to fire Shawkat. Saudi daily "Sharq al Awsaat" reported Shawkat's house arrest; according to this version, Shawkat overstepped his authority in negotiating (via the Turks) with the USG about withdrawing Syria's support for Hizballah in exchange for agreement that the International Tribunal would not indict senior Syrian officials. Another version reported by the French-based opposition website "Ihraar Suriya" (the Free People of Syria) alleged that Shawkat had been implicated in the assassination plot against Hizballah leader Imad Mugniyah and that Hizballah and Iran were demanding his prosecution. ¶4. (C) Another rumor circulating in diplomatic circles (perhaps reflecting wishful thinking) is that Bashar has decided to turn Shawkat over to the International Tribunal for the murder for former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri in exchange for immunity. ----------------------------------- Bushra al-Asad to Flee the Country? ----------------------------------- ¶5. (C) Different stories regarding Shawkat's arrest also allege that his wife (and Bashar older sister) has or is attempting to leave the country and seek political asylum in possibly France or a Gulf country such as the UAE. The Kuwaiti daily "al-Siyasiya," for example, reported that Shawkat allegedly told his wife, Busra, to leave Syria with the couple's children, and she had applied for asylum in France (later denied by the French government, according to an April 13 story in "al Hayat.") According to a few contacts here, however, Bushra remains in Syria and her children are still attending school. A French Embassy contact told us that Bushra had been to Paris earlier in the year on a routine shopping excursion but there was no truth to stories that she had sought political asylum. ---------------------- Rumors Discounted Here ---------------------- ¶6. (SBU) In what many are viewing as a SARG response to the growing wave of rumors, an April 10 Syrian TV evening newscast showed footage of Shawkat attending a military academy graduation ceremony. The footage highlighted Shawkat wearing his military uniform and appearing with Minister of Defense Hasan Turkumani, who delivered the key note address. Meanwhile, pro-government Syrian website "Shafaf al-Sham" ran a story describing Shawkat as the "most powerful man in Syria" and reporting government plans to appoint Shawkat as Vice President for National Security Affairs. (Note: This position was a job briefly held by Bashar's paternal uncle Rifa't al-Asad before being exiled by the late Hafez al Asad.) ¶7. (S) Most of our contacts heavily discount reports of Shawkat's dismissal and house arrest. Well connected As-Safir correspondent Ziad Haydar called the reports "rubbish." Ihsan Sanker, a longtime Embassy contact who claims occassional access to Asad family members, reported April 10 seeing Shawkat at the funeral of a mutual friend a week earlier. According to Sanker, mutual acquaintances say they have seen Shawkat "regularly" over the last month. ----------------------------- Shawkat's Star on the Decline? ----------------------------- ¶8. (S) Describing Shawkat as "dejected and withdrawn," Sanker said Shawkat was "not even trying to hide" his unhappiness over his continuing loss of influence. The assassination of Hizballah luminary Imad Mugniyeh led to a series of accusations between SMI and GID, with the outcome coming out in GID's favor, Sanker reported. Additionally, Sanker said he had heard Shawkat's portfolio had been pared down to military issues, while Bashar's cousin Hafez Makhluf had all but taken over the national security portfolio. As-Safir correspondent Haydar reported he had heard the same thing, saying Bashar had recently further marginalized Shawkat's national security role. ¶9. (S) Orient Center Director and MFA Advisor Samir al-Taki told us recently that Shawkat and GID chief Ali Mamluk had exchanged mutual recriminations of blame and negligence in the wake of the Mugniyeh assassination (reftel). In an attempt to discredit GID, Shawkat ordered SMI to question a number of Syrians with ties to France and the U.S. (including al-Taki) under possible suspicion of involvement in the Mugniyeh affair. In the meantime, al-Taqi added, the GID had assumed primary responsibility for investigating the Mugniyeh killing, under the overall direction of Bashar's cousin, Hafez Makhluf, a prominent GID officer. Against the backdrop of these recent events, an ongoing reorganization of security organizations has made it difficult to determine who was up and who was down, al-Taqi explained. Separate reporting and diplomatic circles point to Mamluk's rise and Shawkat's relative retreat. But Al-Taqi cast doubt on reports of Shawkat's removal, saying "we've heard such reports before," only to see Shawkat maintain his position as a key insider. ------------------------- Shawkat in the Dog House? ------------------------- ¶10. (S) A UK-Syrian business contact with low level regime ties told us April 13 that Shawkat's problems with Bashar had come to head before the Arab League Summit. According to this source, SMI arrested a Saudi national suspected of involvement in the Mugniyeh assassination. This Saudi died in SMI custody, complicating Bashar's already strained relations with the Saudi royal family. A variant of this rumor which has appeared in the press was that the deceased Saudi was a diplomat working in the Saudi Embassy. Our contact discounted this rumor because "not even Shawkat would be stupid enough" to apprehend someone with diplomatic immunity. ¶11. (S) Comment: It seems highly unlikely that Bashar would arrest Shawkat unless he perceived a direct challenge to his authority, especially at a time when Syrians are openly talking about the possibility of war with Israel and worsening economic conditions that require greater regime cohesion. Moreover, we strongly doubt Bashar feels pressured enough on Lebanon to be preparing to turn over Shawkat to the Tribunal. Rather, we believe Bashar's continuing efforts to erode Shawkat's influence reflect his perception of Shawkat as a potential threat that must be managed. Separately, we assess that Bashar is most comfortable with Bushra here in Syria under his thumb and that he would not cause her to flee. We also believe that unless family matters worsen, Bushra prefers to reside in Syria, particularly given her desire to stay close to her elderly mother. CORBIN
SECRET: HIZBALLAH’S IMAD MUGNIYAH KILLED BY CAR BOMB
VZCZCXRO7049 PP RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #0107 0441447 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 131447Z FEB 08 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4627 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000107 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018 TAGS: PGOV PTER SY LE SUBJECT: HIZBALLAH'S IMAD MUGNIYAH KILLED BY CAR BOMB IN DAMASCUS Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, reasons 1.5 b and d. ¶1. (SBU) Syria's tightly controlled press remained silent on reports of Imad Mugniyah's death in a car bomb that exploded near Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) headquarters in the neighborhood of Kafr Sousa at approximately 10:00 pm local February 12. According to contacts who were on the scene, SMI secured and cleared the area and kept other police services away. Tow trucks removed several vehicles within 45 minutes after the explosion which jarred surrounding buildings and could be felt at the American Ambassador's residence three miles away. Syrian officials reported the blast had been the result of a butane gas leak and that one unidentified person (later two) had been killed. ¶2. (C) Media and other contacts reported mid-morning February 13 that unknown assailants had launched a car bomb attack against notorious Hizballah military operative Imad Mugniyah. The story broke simultaneously on wire services and Arab satellite television stations al Jazeera, al Arabyia, and al Manar. Western press was also reporting that the second victim was Hizballah MP al Hajj Hussein, although Hizballah denied this. As of COB local, Syrian authorities had yet to provide any further comment on the incident. (A Fox News affiliate told us MFA officials seemed "shocked" by reports of Mugniyah's death but offered no comment.) ¶3. (C) The most frequent theory suggested by media and diplomatic contacts was that Israel conducted the attack to embarrass Syria on the eve of a previously scheduled visit by Iranian FM Manuchehr Mottaki. Going to the other extreme, others were unwilling to rule out that Hizballah itself had conducted the assassination to neutralize Mugniyah's challenge to Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. One contact even suggested that Syria could have undertaken the operation as a sign of its desire to engage Israel and the West. ¶4. (S) Saudi XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect) told us Mugniyah's presence in Damascus might have been related to a possible February 13 meeting in Damascus among Lebanese March 8 MPs with SARG officials. He also noted that SMI Director Assaf Shawkat's offices were close to where the explosion occurred, and Mugniyah could have been going to or coming from the meeting. British and Egyptian Embassy sources suggested Iranian FM Mottaki planned to meet with Hizballah and March 8 representatives during his February 13-14 visit to Damascus as a counter to March 14's planned public demonstration to mark the third anniversary of the February 14 assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri. ¶5. (C) Comment: This apparent targeted assassination of one of Hizballah's most notorious operatives coincides with a busy week of official visits meant to refute suggestions that Syria's Lebanon policy is resulting in a new period of Western and Arab diplomatic isolation. Syria's ongoing silence regarding the attack is a characteristic regime response, most recently observed (and still in effect) after Israel's September 6 air strike near Deir az-Zur. This silence likely reflects a deep sense of regime embarrassment from the acknowledged assassination of a wanted-terrorist whose presence in Syria it denied for years. The event also impacts Syrian-Iranian-Hizballah cooperation on the eve of FM Mottaki's visit likely meant to bolster Syria's position in the face of escalating March 14 rhetoric and growing Western impatience with Syria's Lebanon policy. CORBIN
SECRET: ATTACKING BASHAR’S MONEY
VZCZCXRO0088 PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #0054/01 0241517 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 241517Z JAN 08 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4564 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0339 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000054 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA/ELA NSC FOR SINGH TREASURY FOR GLASER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2027 TAGS: EFIN ETTC PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: ATTACKING BASHAR'S MONEY REF: A. 07 DAMASCUS 2066 ¶B. 07 DAMASCUS 1926 ¶C. 07 DAMASCUS 68 Classified By: CDA Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.5 b/d ¶1. (S) Summary. As Washington policy makers consider ways to pressure the regime, one possibility would be to go after President Asad's money-men. Four individuals Asad uses to make and move money are Zuhair Sahloul, Nabil Kuzbari, Asad's uncle Mohammad Makhlouf, and his father-in-law, Fawas Akhras. Each is important to Asad and each plays a somewhat different role in facilitating regime graft. End summary. ¶2. (S) Sahloul (AKA Abu Shafic) is the most important black-market money changer in Syria. When the Syrian Pound (SYP) devalued precipitously in the fall of 2005, the SARG gave Sahloul an office in the Central Bank and access to its hard currency reserves so he could intervene in the black market to stabilize the currency. (Note. Sahloul was surprisingly effective and within weeks the SYP appreciated 20 percent, allowing Sahloul in the process a handsome profit for both himself and a handful of regime-insiders. End note.) Sahloul moves Asad's money using his own network and his access to Hawalis worldwide. A Sahloul intimate bragged to us recently that Sahloul could move ten million dollars anywhere in the world in 24-hours. ¶3. (S) In addition to being the father of Syria's poster-boy for corruption, Rami Makhlouf, Mohammad Makhlouf has long served as a financial advisor to the Asad family. If Rami is the face of corruption, Mohammad is the brain. When Asad agreed to open the telecom sector to cellphone providers, it was Mohammad that some credit with conceptualizing the deal whereby Rami took over the first provider, SyriaTel, (long Rami's biggest cash-cow), and the second license (originally to SpaceTel, then Areeba 94, and now MTN) went to the first-lady's family (see para five below). Long held in check by his brother-in-law, the late president Hafiz Asad, under Bashar Asad, Mohammad's avarice reportedly has no bounds. As a result, the Makhloufs have had an at-times problematic relationship with Bashar and were forced to leave the country for a number of months in 2005 following one particularly heated exchange. ¶4. (S) Because of the Makhlouf's excesses and Asad's inherited propensity to limit the power and influence of his family members, Nabil Kuzbari has played an increasingly important role for the first-family. Known locally as "the Paper King," Kuzbari's base of operations has long been in Vienna. In the last two years, however, he has developed an increasingly collaborative relationship with Rami and Mohammed Makhlouf. Last year he served as Rami's frontman in establishing his holding company, Sham Holding, which brought together 70 of Syria's most-important business families to fund a number of Rami's most ambitious entrepreneurial projects. In addition to lobbying European politicians to engage the Asad regime, Kuzbari reportedly uses his contacts in the Austrian business and banking circles to move regime assets abroad. ¶5. (S) In addition to being Asad's father-in-law, Fawas Akhras has been increasingly active in business here in Syria. Akhras is the force behind the Syrian-British Business Council and recently put together a visit to London by a large group of Syrian businessmen. Coming only lately to business, Akhras has stepped on a number of established business families who increasingly resent his assertiveness and willingness to use his son-in-law's position to advance his nascent Syria-based businesses. Contacts in the banking sector have commented on the large amount of funds that have begun to move recently through his accounts. A long-time resident of London, he is suspected of being another avenue used by Asad to stash funds abroad. ¶6. (S) Comment. Post has long advocated moving against individuals, like those listed above, who are intregal to allowing the regime to profit from its corruption. Taking action against those linked to corruption is a win-win proposition: not only does it bring pressure on the regime where it hurts most - its pocketbook, but such a move would also be popular with the average Syrian who is the most common victim of the regime's avarice. CORBIN
SECRET: TREASURY TEAM’S DAMASCUS CONSULTATIONS ON
VZCZCXRO6583 PP RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #0269/01 0741541 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 151541Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3157 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000269 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA/ELA;TREASURY FOR LEBENSON/GLASER/SZUBIN; NSC FOR MARCHESE EO 12958 DECL: 03/06/2017 TAGS EFIN, ECON, ETTC, SY, SANC SUBJECT: TREASURY TEAM’S DAMASCUS CONSULTATIONS ON FINANCIAL SANCTIONS REF: A. DAMASCUS 0108 B. 05 DAMASCUS 6224 Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Michael Corbin, reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Treasury representatives recently visited Post to discuss options for using financial sanctions to apply pressure to the Syrian regime. We discussed: -- Treasury’s requirements for finalizing the pending designations of Mohammad Sulayman and Ali Mamluk, and Treasury’s information requirements for a public statement; -- Treasury’s need to maintain the legal thread between the classified designation packet and the public statement announcing the designation; -- Post’s support for designating Mohammad Nassif Kheirbek, SARG pointman for its relationship with Iran; -- How designating regime financiers like Rami and Mohammad Mahlouf could be problematic without a new Executive Order on corruption. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) PENDING DESIGNATIONS: Post understands the designations for Mohammad Sulieman, Syrian Special Presidential Advisor for Arms Procurement and Strategic Weapons and Ali Mamluk, Chief of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, are pending due to a lack of unclassified material necessary for Treasury’s public SIPDIS designation statement. In post’s estimate, Mohammad Sulayman is a relatively low-payoff target. His activities are not widely known, which will make it difficult to obtain unclassified information for a public statement and, SIPDIS likewise, make it unlikely that his designation would resonate inside Syria. Ali Mamluk, on the other hand, is more well-known within Syria, especially for involvement in his objectionable activities regarding Lebanon, and his suppressing Syrian civil society and the internal opposition. Therefore, Mamluk’s designation will likely have a larger impact with local and regional audiences if the public statement announcing his designation also discusses his oppression of Syrian society. ¶3. (S/NF) We understood from our visit with Treasury representatives that although we are limited to designating regime members under the existing Executive Orders, there is some flexibility in Treasury,s public statement announcing the designation. Post has advocated that no matter the legal basis of the designation, any public designation should focus on themes that resonate inside Syria: corruption, suppression of civil society, and denial of basic human rights (ref A). The need to maintain the “legal thread” between the designation packet and the public announcement could be challenging on cases like Mohamad Sulieman whose links to corruption are less clear. In cases like Ali Mamluk, however, the role of the organization he heads in suppressing internal dissent is publicly known in Syria and stating as much in our statement would resonate well here. ¶4. (S/NF) Post also supports moving forward with the designation packet on Mohammad Nasif Kheirbek, Syrian Deputy Vice-President for Security and lead Syrian liaison to Iran. Keirbek’s designation could play to a SARG vulnerability, in this case, the SARG’s relationship with Iran, which worries the Sunni majority. Designation of regime pillars involved with the SARG’s partnership with Iran could heighten Syrian and regional concerns about the SARG’s willingness to accomodate an expansionary Iranian agenda. ¶5. (S/NF) REGIEME FINANCIERS: We also discussed the possibility of targeting high-profile inner circle members and regime financiers like Rami Mahklouf (Asad’s first cousin) and Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami’s father) in the next phase of targeted financial sanctions. Based on our consultation with the Treasury representatives, it seemed apparent that without an Executive Order on corruption it would be difficult to compile enough information to designate this group under the current executive orders. The other option for pursuing this group would be to show how these individuals provided financial support to previously designated individuals such as Asif Shawkat. This course of action could prove highly problematic given the regime’s proficiency at obfuscating its financial transactions (ref B). DAMASCUS 00000269 002 OF 002 ¶6. (S) Comment. Post thanks Treasury for its team’s February 25-27 visit and welcomes any additional feedback that Washington agencies may have on our recommendations covered in ref A. Post continues to believe targeted financial sanctions are a tool appropriate for the Syrian setting but this tool requires further work to fully develop. ROEBUCK
CONFIDENTIAL: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA
VZCZCXRO2381 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHDM #0068/01 0041408 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 041408Z JAN 06 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6460 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0694 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0055 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000068 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS NEA/ELA NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2015 TAGS: EAIR ECON ETTC SY SANC SUBJECT: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA REF: A. A: DAMASCUS 5567 ¶B. REF B: DAMASCUS 6224 Classified By: CDA: Stephen Seche for Reasons 1.5 ¶1. (C) Summary. As post has reported previously, the average Syrian would welcome targeted sanctions that focus on regressive elements within the Asad regime. The best mix in our judgement would be sanctions that are phased, multi-lateral, and widely publicized. Most of our Syrian interlocutors concur that if done correctly, these sanctions would delegitimize those elements within the SARG perceived to be obstacles to change, strengthen progressive elements both within the regime and the wider society, and increase pressure on the SARG to substantively change its destabilizing behavior. End summary. ¶2. (C) Financial and travel sanctions that target individuals remain popular with the majority of our Syrian interlocutors (ref A, B). They argue that targeting individuals would make clear for the average Syrian that the international community opposes the regime and its policies, but does not wish to punish the Syrian people. At the same time, targeted sanctions would also help delegitimize those individuals who pose the greatest internal and external threat to progress. Additionally, if designated individuals could neither travel nor conduct legitimate business, they would become an increasing liability for President Bashar al-Asad,s regime. Popular resentment against the sanctioned individuals would add to the pressure to change. ¶3. (C) Syrians we speak with argue that future designations should be multi-lateral. Some tools for doing so already exist. UNSCR 1636 makes provision for designation of individuals named under the Hariri investigation. A case should be made for additional designations under existing or new UNSC resolutions. The USG designated Dhu al Himma as-Shaleesh and Asif Issa as-Shalesh, cousins of President Asad, under E.O. 13315 ) a derivative of UNSCR 1483 - for their role in procuring defense-related items for Saddam Hussein. We should lobby our allies to pursue similar designations, under the umbrella of new or existing UNSC resolutions of both the Shaleeshes and any new Syrians we designate concerning Lebanon, Iraq, WMD, and the peace process. Though it is unlikely that any significant financial resources would be frozen by these designations (ref B), the naming and shaming of the most recalcitrant elements within the regime would delegitimize them internationally, which in turn, would work to undermine the hardliners domestically. ¶4. (C) Pursuing multilateral designations would greatly multiply the effectiveness of targeted sanctions, but a carefully timed campaign to widely publicize the designations is equally important. Without media coverage and publicity to raise the profile of designations, the effort would lose its most effective element - &name and shame.8 The Shaleesh case mentioned above is a case in point. Despite the Shaleesh family having a high profile within Syria, very few Syrians at any level are aware the USG imposed financial sanctions on them. The head of one of the leading Sunni business families in Damascus approached us recently to ask why the USG did not aggressively pursue sanctioning criminal elements within the regime. When asked for examples of who should be sanctioned, our contact pointed to Dhu al Himma as-Shaleesh who, he asserted, took much of the 580 million USD in Iraqi funds the Commercial Bank of Syria illegally paid out in 2003 and has yet to reconcile with the Iraqis. Needless to say, our contact was surprised to find out Dhu al Himma as well as his nephew, Asif Issa Shaleesh, were already sanctioned. ¶5. (C) Phasing in future targeted sanctions can maximize their impact. The first phase could start with those most clearly the architects of objectionable SARG policies relating to Iraq, Lebanon, WMD, and support for the Palestinian rejectionist groups, and then extend to those continuing to support the original group in an ever widening circle. In addition to all of the Mehlis suspects, the first batch of new designees might include a core group of eight to ten, such as Asif Shawkat (Asad,s brother-in-law and head of Syrian Military Intelligence), Maher Asad (President Asad,s brother and commander of the Republican Guard), Rami Makhlouf (Asad,s first cousin and Syria,s poster boy for corruption), Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami,s father), Riyad Issa Shaleesh (principal director of SES International ) an entity already designated under E.O. 13315; in addition, we should push our allies to sanction the other two Shaleeshes mentioned above), Hisham Ikhtiyar (chairman of the Regional Command's National Security Bureau), Abdel Fatah Qudsia (Presidential advisor on Palestinian issues), and Mohammad Suleiman (Presidential advisor responsible for procurement). A second tranch of designations could then move on to this group's lieutenants and business partners. ¶6. (C) Most Syrians we talk to believe that President Asad still represents their best hope for change without instability. It is their fear of instability that stops the majority of Syrians from pushing harder for internal change. For this reason, they argue that sanctions focusing on individuals would help empower Asad to scuttle the regime,s pariahs. According to this school of thought, Bashar himself should not be designated at this point as it would limit our options and signal that the USG is intent on regime change, greatly limiting the number of Syrians willing to join us in pressuring the SARG for change. ¶7. (C) Comment. Pursuing targeted sanctions would send a powerful message to the regime and those associated with it: "if you are perceived to be proponents of the policies causing regional instability, you will be designated. If you provide aid and assistance to those designated, you risk designation yourself." Both internal and external pressure on the regime to change would likewise increase incrementally as the number of designations increased. If conventional Syrian wisdom is correct, the obstacles stopping Bashar from doing the right thing would proportionally decrease as targeted sanctions progressed. Even if that view is wrong, the same result will occur, as the supports of Bashar,s failed policies are eroded. In the end, the USG will advance its policy objectives by undermining the regime,s ability to pursue policies at odds with regional stability. SECHE
SECRET: TIBET: MFA ORGANIZES TIGHTLY CONTROLLED TRIP
VZCZCXRO8966 OO RUEHAG RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHROV RUEHVC DE RUEHBJ #1210/01 0911303 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 311303Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6186 INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0368 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8974 RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 9347 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 BEIJING 001210 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2028 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KIRF NP IN JA BR GM CA IT SP, SI, SL, TZ, UK, AU, FR, RS, CH SUBJECT: TIBET: MFA ORGANIZES TIGHTLY CONTROLLED TRIP TO LHASA FOR DIPLOMATS, MARCH 28-29 REF: BEIJING 975 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary ------- ¶1. (C) With less than 24-hours notice to participating Embassies, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) Government, organized an overnight trip to Lhasa March 28 to 29. Fifteen Beijing-based diplomats, including PolOff, participated. Diplomats were shown destroyed shops, a burnt school building and two hospitals treating wounded security officers and civilians. The trip was tightly controlled and Chinese journalists were present at nearly all meetings. PolOff observed extensive damage to shops starting two to three blocks east of the Potala Palace and increasing in areas closer to the Tibetan quarter. TAR officials sought to demonstrate that both Han and Tibetans had suffered as a result of the violence and rioting. While PolOff saw a significant presence of regular police, there was a noticeable absence of military vehicles or anti- riot equipment. The delegation met with TAR Chairman Qiangba Puncog. At the meeting with Qiangba Puncog, diplomats pressed for details about the number of dead and the charges against those currently under detention. PolOff urged China to exercise restraint and engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama's representatives. PolOff also repeated to the TAR Chairman the USG's request for unfettered access for diplomats to all Tibetan areas. ¶2. (C) Summary continued. In response to the diplomatic delegation's collective request to visit the Jokhang Temple and speak with monks involved in a March 27 demonstration in front of an MFA-led group of foreign journalists, MFA and TAR officials arranged a hasty visit to Barkhor Square and the Jokhang on the morning of March 29. Diplomats met with a single monk, who said all of his colleagues were "sleeping" and thus "unavailable" to meet with the delegation. The Barkhor area was almost devoid of people, save for security attached to the delegation. Organizers denied PolOff's requests to venture into the city to meet with Amcits, but PolOff was given the opportunity to meet with one Amcit at the delegation's hotel. Government organizers also arranged for foreign residents of Lhasa, including two American NGO workers, to attend a briefing with Tibetan scholars and Buddhist figures, where PolOff was able to speak with them. The foreign residents were mainly chosen by the TAR Government, however, not the participating diplomats. Comment: Although some of the events on this trip were crudely stage-managed, it is clear that Lhasa has suffered widespread ethnic-based violence and rioting. A large percentage of the population, Han and Tibetan, have suffered great economic loss, both from the rioting itself and the cancellation of tour groups. Interlocutors' complete lack of candor about the underlying social factors contributing to the riots, while not unexpected, was disturbing nonetheless. End Summary. "We Leave For Lhasa Tomorrow" ----------------------------- ¶3. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs U.S. Affairs Division Director An Gang told PolOff March 27 that the MFA's Department of External Security Affairs, in cooperation with the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Foreign Affairs Office (FAO), was organizing a trip for foreign diplomats to Lhasa, leaving the next morning, March 28. Embassy Beijing was given one hour by the MFA to register a participant for the trip, which would involve a total of 25 hours on the ground in Lhasa. In addition to U.S. Embassy Beijing, the Beijing Embassies/Missions of Brazil, Japan, Germany, Canada, the European Commission, Italy, Spain, Slovenia (as EU President), Singapore, Tanzania (as Africa Union President), the United Kingdom, Australia, France and Russia also sent BEIJING 00001210 002 OF 008 representatives. At 17:00 on March 27, participating diplomats were called to a briefing presided over by Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) Wu Dawei. VFM Wu told the group that the MFA was organizing the trip so that diplomats could provide "more correct reports" on the situation in Lhasa and Tibet to their respective capitals. VFM Wu offered no details about the itinerary, other than the TAR FAO would provide the schedule to the delegation upon arrival in Lhasa. VFM Wu also said that, although the situation in Lhasa was "generally stable," for safety reasons everyone must abide by the "arrangements" set by the MFA and the TAR Government. PolOff told VFM Wu that AmEmbassy Beijing viewed the trip, and a similar trip organized the same week for foreign journalists, as a "first step" but reiterated the USG's request that diplomats and journalists have free and unfettered access to all Tibetan areas affected by recent unrest. Chinese Media Presence ---------------------- ¶4. (C) In addition to numerous minders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, plain-clothes security personnel and the TAR FAO, at least two Xinhua print journalists and a China Central Television (CCTV) journalist and cameraman accompanied the delegation. CCTV crews filmed most events on the trip, including the arrival and departure at Lhasa airport. Xinhua News Agency quoted accurately, though selectively, some delegation member's positive comments about the trip, particularly a statement by Tanzanian Minister George Manongi (representing the African Union) that "no government would tolerate" violent protests. Security Presence Observed in Lhasa ----------------------------------- ¶5. (C) The delegation's motorcade included both police and People's Armed Police (PAP) escorts. (Plate numbers for PAP vehicles seen by PolOff, including those attached to the motorcade, all started with WJ 23.) The airport road appeared to be open to other traffic during the delegation's arrival and departure from Lhasa. PolOff saw at least two groups of Tibetans picnicking very close to the road. As the motorcade neared Lhasa proper, PolOff saw numerous PRC flags flying over Tibetan-style homes. At nearly every intersection where village roads met the main airport road, a single officer was stationed with his or her back to the motorcade, looking down the approaching roadway. PolOff observed no checkpoints at any point on the trip except for one on the airport road that appeared little different from a normal traffic police checkpoint. ¶6. (C) The security presence in Lhasa was noticeable and significantly larger than that observed by PolOff during a visit to Lhasa with ConGen Chengdu officers February 26-29, 2008. At least one police vehicle (mainly sedans and SUVs) and one to three officers were seen at most intersections. Police officers were mainly sitting in, or standing next to, their vehicles rather than walking the streets. At one point, PolOff saw several police poke their heads out of a police station doorway to watch the motorcade pass by. PolOff saw only scattered PAP vehicles other than those attached to the delegation. PolOff observed no officers in riot gear, nor did he see any heavier police vehicles such as water cannon trucks. During a visit to the Jokhang Temple March 29, some diplomats reported seeing a few helmeted police in side streets leading off Barkhor Square. Over the course of the trip, PolOff saw three canvas-covered military transport trucks; one had its plates covered, the other two were without plates entirely. (Note: An Amcit resident (protect) told PolOff that a large number of security forces remained in Lhasa but they had been confined to compounds during the Government- organized visits that week by foreign journalists and diplomats. A TAR FAO minder told delegation members that no PLA assets were used to suppress the March 14 riots.) BEIJING 00001210 003 OF 008 Fewer People onStreets ----------------------- ¶7. (C) At est, PolOff observed pedestrian traffic at a tir of the level it was in late February, thoug in some areas it was much less. During te late afternoon of March 28, PolOff observedfewer than ten Tibetan pilgrims with prayer weels walking in front of the Potala Palace. Te next day, March 29, PolOff observed well over a hundred pilgrims walking on the Potala circumambulation route. During this second drive-by, a TAR FAO minder highlighted the presence of the pilgrims to PolOff. In contrast to February, when pilgrims of various ages and dress could be seen in Lhasa, the pilgrims observed during this visit, in addition to being fewer in number, also appeared to be primarily elderly Tibetans. Also, areas in the Tibetan quarter that were packed with pilgrims in February looked nearly abandoned. One street near the Ramoche Temple was blocked by a police cordon, and behind this barrier, PolOff could see few, if any, people. From the motorcade on Beijing East Road looking into the Barkhor area, PolOff also saw streets that were nearly devoid of people. Diplomats who participated in a March 29 stop at the Jokhang Temple reported that the streets in the Barkhor district were practically abandoned. Arrival and Visit to Affected Areas ----------------------------------- ¶8. (C) Immediately upon arrival in Lhasa on March 28, organizers took the delegation to a clothing store on Beijing Middle Road where four Han and one Tibetan shopkeeper had been killed. As the delegation pulled up to the store, the Han Chinese owner and a surviving Tibetan shop assistant were kneeling before a memorial altar set up in the burnt-out shop. Shortly after the delegation's arrival, they emerged to speak with diplomats as television cameras rolled. Next, the delegation was led on a driving tour of Beijing Road, Qingnian Road, and North and East Linkuo Road to view damaged businesses and homes. TAR FAO interpreters pointed out damage to Xinhua News Agency offices, the Tibet Daily and a Bank of China branch. An FAO minder also pointed out that a local television station and stores carrying mobile phones, foreign-branded goods and precious gems had been specifically target by rioters/looters. Visit to Damaged School ----------------------- ¶9. (C) The delegation was then taken to Lhasa Second Middle School where an entire classroom building had been gutted by fire. The Tibetan principal of the school described the efforts of staff to protect the children on March 14 and how rioters had allegedly set fire to the building and then blocked fire trucks from arriving on the scene. The fire also consumed many of the schools' textbooks, she said. According to the principal, 80 percent of the school's 839 students are ethnic Tibetan, in keeping with the population of the surrounding neighborhood. The teaching staff was 90 percent Tibetan. In addition to standard Mandarin Chinese curriculum taught in China, students at Lhasa Second Middle School receive 280 minutes of Tibetan and 200 minutes of English instruction per week. Diplomats then observed primary school students taking a history lesson in a science lab that had been converted into an ordinary classroom since the March 14 fire. At the back of the classroom was a display condemning the March 14 riots. An FAO handler remarked to a delegation member that the "lawbreakers do not want to see good schools and the development of society." Extent of Damage ---------------- ¶10. (C) Judging by the very limited tour given to the diplomats, the area of Lhasa west of the Potala Palace seemed unaffected by the rioting. Individual burned out stores could be seen starting two to three blocks BEIJING 00001210 004 OF 008 east of the Potala, with the ratio of damaged to undamaged shops increasing as one neared the Ramoche Temple/Barkhor area. At some points along Beijing East and Lingkhor North and East Roads, entire rows of shops had been burned or damaged. On Beijing East Road, PolOff saw that the (Nepali/Tibetan operated) Kyichu Hotel had only a single broken window while the neighboring six shops, by contrast, including a Han- run sunglass store visited by PolOff in February, had been completely burned out. Despite extensive damage to stores, all roads were clean, and PolOff saw little debris on sidewalks. In the areas east of the Potala Palace, about a third of stores remained shuttered, making it difficult to assess whether shops were damaged or just closed. For every store that was burned out, at least ten others showed signs of damage to the metal rolling shutter or broken windows. All over Lhasa, PolOff saw white katas (Tibetan greeting scarves) affixed to storefronts, an indication that the store is Tibetan-owned (reftel). Meeting with TAR Chairman ------------------------- ¶11. (SBU) Following the tour and check-in at the Lhasa Hotel (in a largely unaffected area of west Lhasa) on the evening of March 28, the delegation arrived at the TAR Government compound for a meeting with TAR Chairman Qiangba Puncog and a large contingent of high-level TAR officials, including the Mayor of Lhasa Doje Cezhug. (Note: As TAR Chairman, Qiangba Puncog is equivalent to a provincial governor and is ranked behind the top PRC official in Tibet, TAR Party Chairman Zhang Qingli.) After introductions and before Qiangba Puncog could read his prepared report, the Slovenian Counselor, Bernard Srajner asked the TAR Chairman a series of questions prepared in advance by the EU participants. A summary of the EU questions and Qiangba Puncog's answers (both in his prepared remarks and response to follow up questions) follows: --What is the fate of 13 people arrested in a demonstration on March 10? The TAR Chairman said 15 people (13 monks and 2 lay people) had participated in the March 10 demonstration in Lhasa, which included raising the "snow mountain flag." The thirteen monks are among 303 total people detained, but Qiangba Puncog gave no additional information on what the 13 monks were charged with. (Note: The figure of 303 detained appeared to be a figure for detainees related to demonstrations prior to March 14.) --What happened in the first 24 hours of March 14? Why did security forces "hold back" at first? Qiangba Puncog repeated a standard Government version of events, saying the March 14 "beating, smashing, looting, and burning" incident had been "masterminded" by the Dalai Lama clique in an attempt to sabotage the Olypics. Police and PAP officers had exercised estraint. Government forces had not used fireams, though authorities confiscated some "lead bullet" guns from some rioters. (Comment: The term "lead bullet" guns seemed to indicate non-police, makeshift firearms.) The TAR Chairman said the TAR Government had failed to protect civilians, and he apologized to victims in the hospitals. --How many people were killed and injured? The TAR Chairman repeated published casualty figures. He said 382 innocent civilians had been injured, 58 seriously. Eighteen "innocent civilians" had been killed, including an infant below the age of one. In addition, one police officer and three rioters were killed. Seven schools, 5 hospitals, 908 shops and 120 private residences had been damaged with total losses amounting to RMB 250 million ($36 million). --What is the nature of charges against detainees? Will independent observers be allowed at trials? As a result of the March 14 riot, 414 people had been detained. An additional 289 had turned themselves in, although 111 of these people had already been released because their crimes were "minor." Qiangba Puncog said PRC law prohibits splittism. Defendants will be BEIJING 00001210 005 OF 008 charged not for their views, but for their "public actions." All cases will be dealt with according to law. Some who committed "small crimes" will be released but the more "serious" cases will go to trial. All defendants will have access to legal counsel, including legal aid for those who have no money to afford a defense attorney. (Note: While Qiangba Puncog did not directly answer the question about outside observers, the Canadian participant said the head of the TAR Justice Department (si fa ting) later told her at a banquet immediately afterward that outside observers would not be possible.) --What has happened to monks who demonstrated at the Jokhang Temple in front of visiting journalists? Qiangba Puncog characterized the incident as an example of "Government tolerance." It was "natural" for some people to have different views, and the monks will not be punished, he said. The Australian participant, in a follow-up question, asked for a visit to the Jokhang Temple to speak with the monks involved in the incident. The Chairman said TAR authorities would consider adding a Jokhang visit to the schedule. (Note: A hastily arranged visit to the Jokhang was arranged the next morning, as reported below.) "We Are Already Restrained and Non-Violent" ------------------------------------------- ¶12. (C) During the meeting with the TAR Chairman, PolOff stated USG points regarding the need for China to exercise restraint and for all sides to refrain from violence. China should respect the legal rights of peaceful protestors and enter substantive dialogue with representatives of the Dalai Lama. PolOff ended by saying, while the current trip was a positive step in the right direction, the USG still seeks unfettered access for diplomats to all Tibetan areas, inside and outside the TAR. More and better access was in the interests of all sides, PolOff said. Qiangba Puncog responded that he already understood the U.S. position and that Chinese President Hu Jintao had already discussed the Tibet situation directly with President Bush. China is "already exercising restraint and refraining from violence," so such calls are unnecessary. It was because of this restraint, including no use of lethal weapons by security forces, that the riot took so long to get under control. The TAR Government places great importance on the visit by diplomats, Qiangba Puncog said, urging delegation members to report the "real situation" to their respective "highest leaders." ¶13. (SBU) Qiangba Puncog also defended China's economic and religious policies in Tibet. The TAR Governor highlighted a string of new measures, announced the following day in TAR newspapers, designed to provide economic relief to victims of the rioting. He noted that Tibet was experiencing high growth rates and rising income, thanks in no small part to Central Government support. Prices were stable in the TAR following the unrest, he asserted. There was no need to adjust Government policies regarding religion, he said. After the meeting, Qiangba Puncog hosted a banquet for the delegation, followed by the screening of a documentary film on the March 14 riots. Meeting with U.S. Citizens -------------------------- ¶14. (C) PolOff requested that, instead of watching the documentary on March 28, he be allowed to go out on his own to visit with American citizens in Lhasa. Several other diplomats also requested time to meet with their citizens in lieu of the film. The TAR FAO agreed to excuse PolOff and other diplomats from the film, but only on condition that meetings with citizens take place at the Lhasa Hotel. PolOff was told he could not venture outside of the hotel "for safety reasons." PolOff contacted three Amcits. Two noted that foreigners were still instructed to stay indoors at night, making a 21:00 meeting at the hotel impractical. One Amcit, a long-term Lhasa resident who lives close to the hotel, agreed to visit with BEIJING 00001210 006 OF 008 PolOff in the hotel lobby. (Note: The Amcit reported that he was fine, though some money had been looted from one of his downtown Lhasa shops, which had also been sprayed by gunfire. The Amcit also noted that tension in the city between ethnic Tibetans and Han remains.) ¶15. (C) Delegation members were given a second chance to meet with their respective citizens, though trip organizers, not the diplomats, controlled who was invited. During the pre-trip briefing with VFM Wu Dawei, several diplomats requested that they be given a chance to meet with their respective citizens in Lhasa. VFM Wu said such meetings would likely be possible but had to take place at the delegation's hotel. Some Embassies, but not the United States, provided contact information for their citizens in Lhasa to the MFA to facilitate meetings. The TAR FAO, in response to this request, then apparently invited about ten foreign residents to attend the final meeting of the trip March 29, a briefing by TAR scholars and official religious figures. The delegation was not provided with any name list prior to the meeting. Upon arrival, PolOff learned that two Amcit NGO workers, one of whom had declined an invitation to meet PolOff at the hotel the previous evening, were present. The foreign residents mainly sat and listened as the Tibetan scholars denounced the Dalai Lama. PolOff asked that the meeting be cut short to allow time for individual discussions with citizens. One of the Amcits told PolOff his organization's "local partner" had encouraged him to attend the meeting, which he did for the sake of maintaining cooperative relations. The other, the Tibet director for a multi-national environmental NGO, indicated that his boss at the NGO had requested that he attend. PolOff told both that they were under no obligation to meet with USG officials. However, both voluntarily met with PolOff for about 15 minutes each. (Note: Both Amcits reported that they were fine and that, after being unable to venture outside for four days following the March 14 riots, things in Lhasa were now beginning to return to normal.) Other diplomats later complained that citizens whom they had requested that the MFA/TAR FAO invite were not contacted. Visit to Jokhang Temple, "Monks are Sleeping" --------------------------------------------- ¶16. (C) Around 01:00 March 29, all delegation members, except PolOff, received calls in their hotel rooms that the start time for the next morning had been moved up from 08:30 to 08:00. According to the Australian participant, when delegation members boarded the vans just before 08:00, organizers told them there had been a "change in the schedule" but offered no details. As the motorcade departed just prior to 08:00, several delegation members noted the absence of some of the diplomats and requested that the motorcade wait. MFA/TAR FAO handlers refused. (Note: Three other diplomats who, unlike PolOff, knew about the time change but arrived at the motorcade just at 08:00, were left behind and also missed the trip to the Jokhang.) PolOff's request that he be allowed to catch up to the motorcade by taxi was refused. The Government minders, according to those who made it on the bus, were extremely nervous and appeared desperate to complete the visit to Jokhang as rapidly as possible. The diplomats only realized that they were being taken to the Jokhang Temple as they pulled into Barkhor Square. ¶17. (C) Upon arrival, the diplomats noticed a much larger security contingent than at other events on the trip. Officials were "extremely nervous" during the visit, several diplomats later told PolOff. Other than the delegation and the escorts/security, Barkhor Square and the surrounding streets were abandoned. Little, if any, damage to shops in the Barkhor was noticeable, according to U.K. Political Counselor Peter Wilson. The MFA/TAR FAO officials escorted the group into the temple where they met with a single monk who is a member of the Jokhang's Democratic BEIJING 00001210 007 OF 008 Management Committee. When the group asked to see the monks involved in the March 27 demonstration in front of foreign journalists, the monk said they and the other monks were all in their dorm "sleeping." The monk said that his colleagues who had participated in the incident were "young and lacked understanding," but they would not be punished. Wilson noted that the Jokhang is usually packed with pilgrims. The monk said that the temple was closed for the day but would reopen tomorrow. Several diplomats left the Temple early in disgust and then staged a mini-protest, refusing to get back on the bus while they debated whether to continue with the visit. They eventually decided to proceed with the schedule. Australian Political Officer Eleanor Lawson, who had requested to TAR Chairman Qiangba Puncog that the Jokhang be added to the schedule and later was outspokenly critical of the poor handling of the Temple visit, told PolOff that MFA Director General for External Security Affairs Wang Min later pulled her aside and demanded that she "stop causing trouble." (Comment: PolOff's requests on March 28 to venture out alone, as well as his delivery of USG points on Tibet to both TAR Chairman Qiangba and MFA VFM Wu, may have prompted organizers to exclude PolOff from the sensitive Jokhang trip. While a simple administrative oversight cannot be ruled out, when PolOff complained about being excluded, TAR FAO officials merely insisted that "everyone was called.") More Visits with Victims, Hospitals ----------------------------------- ¶18. (C) Following the Jokhang Temple stop (after which PolOff and others who had missed the Jokhang visit rejoined the main group), the diplomats visited the offices of the Chengguan District Government. While there, four Tibetans and one Han resident described the events of March 14. Several told of having their stores and homes destroyed, saying they were living on Government assistance. Chen Xiaoxiong (a Han Chinese) told of how her shop was destroyed, causing RMB 2.6 million ($370,000) in damage, and how ethnic Tibetans had protected her and provided her with shelter. "With the support of the Party and my friends, I am confident I can start my life again," Chen said. ¶19. (C) This meeting produced the most unscripted moment of the entire trip: In response to a question regarding the composition of the rioters, a Tibetan resident offered that most were "unemployed." A Chengguan District Government official then chimed in saying that, actually, the rioters were "lazy" people who refused to work despite abundant opportunities to participate in Government job-training programs. The same official, in contradiction to the TAR Chairman's comments that prices are stable, said inflation is a problem and that the Government is providing extra support for victims to cope with rising costs. The group then visited a People's Armed Police hospital and saw injured PAP officers (both Han and Tibetan), including some in intensive care beds. The delegation then proceeded to Lhasa's Regional People's Hospital. Outside the second hospital, ambulances with smashed windows were on display. Hospital officials relayed a story that a mob had attacked one ambulance, which was carrying a small child at the time. Diplomats later met with a (Tibetan) doctor injured during the attack on the ambulance. Living Buddhas Denounce "Splittist" Dalai Lama --------------------------------------------- -- ¶20. (C) At the final meeting of the trip (the one mentioned above that included foreign residents), diplomats heard a briefing by Tibetan scholars and religious figures. The briefing was heavy on propaganda with an emphasis on Tibet's social and economic progress since the "peaceful liberation" of ¶1951. The primary speaker was Drubkang, the Chairman of the Tibetan Buddhist Association. Drupkang, in response to a question on whether he considered the Dalai Lama a real living Buddha, gave a lengthy denunciation of the "unpatriotic" 14th Dalai Lama but BEIJING 00001210 008 OF 008 fell short of denouncing the Dalai Lama's legitimacy as a reincarnate. The Dalai Lama's use of violence runs counter to the key tenets of Buddhism, he said. Drubkang added that the participation of monks in the unrest shows that monasteries need to increase their legal education of young monks. Another living Buddha asserted that Western countries should do more to educate their young people about the "real" situation in Tibet and counter widespread "prejudice" against Tibet outside China. The Government has spent huge sums rebuilding monasteries and providing medical care and other benefits to monks, he said, adding that the only "conflict" in Tibet was the long-standing struggle between separatists and anti-separatists. Following this meeting, the delegation departed for the airport and returned to Beijing. Comment ------- ¶21. (C) Although some of the events on this trip were crudely stage managed, it is clear that Lhasa has suffered widespread ethnic-based violence and rioting. A large percentage of the population, Han and Tibetan, have suffered great economic loss, both from the rioting itself and the cancellation of tour groups. Despite our hosts' efforts to portray Lhasa as a city quickly bouncing back, the frantic visit to the Barkhor/Jokhang Temple, with its heavy security presence, appeared to indicate that tensions remain high in the Tibetan quarter of the city. ¶22. (C) Comment continued: Interlocutors' complete lack of candor regarding the underlying social factors contributing to the riots, while not unexpected, was disturbing nonetheless. Even the "average people" diplomats met with resorted to stock propaganda phrases (e.g., "Dalai Lama clique" and "beating, smashing, looting, burning") while denying Tibetan society had any problems other than the lingering presence of a few "separatists." One Amcit resident of Lhasa (protect), however, told PolOff during the trip that he believes the city's Tibetan youths are becoming "radicalized." An increasing number of young Tibetans in Lhasa, he said, become angry when they are addressed in Mandarin Chinese and refuse to speak China's official language. Nevertheless, he and the other long-term foreign residents PolOff spoke with appeared to believe that, even if ethnic tensions remain, tourists will return, NGO projects will go forward and Lhasa will continue its current path of rapid, albeit increasingly Han-dominated, development. RANDIT
CONFIDENTIAL: CHANCELLOR ANGELA “TEFLON” MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT
VZCZCXRO1733 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHRL #1106/01 2521657 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 091657Z SEP 09 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5130 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001106 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019 TAGS: GM PREL PGOV SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR ANGELA "TEFLON" MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT AS FDP WAITS IN THE WINGS Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE GLASS FO R REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (C) Less than two weeks after her party suffered losses in two state elections, CDU Chancellor Angela Merkel found her fighting spirit before 8,000 party faithful at a September 6 election rally in Duesseldorf launching the "hot phase" of the CDU/CSU electoral campaign. The CDU has been shifting party tactics after its losses in the August 30 elections in Saarland and Thuringia, where the Social Democratic Party (SPD) may now be in a position to form coalitions with the Left Party. Merkel -- to great applause -- focused in on the specter of a so-called red-red government composed of the SPD and The Left Party. She described the SPD as suffering from an "identity crisis," and needing a vacation from political decision-making and time in opposition. Along with the entire CDU leadership and incumbent CDU/CSU Ministers-president, Merkel made her case for a CDU/CSU coalition with the pro-business but socially liberal FDP. She repeated the CDU/CSU's election mantra: "we have the strength" throughout her speech, aiming to convince the German electorate that a strong CDU/CSU is required for Germany to emerge from its worst economic recession in post-war history. CDU views on whether the issue of Germany's role in Afghanistan would become a more prominent campaign theme were mixed. ¶2. (C) With three weeks to go before the parliamentary elections, all signs point to Chancellor Merkel returning to office, although she and her party recognize that they face a difficult campaign. It remains uncertain whether the CDU and the FDP will gain enough support to form a majority coalition. If not, another Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) is very likely; other options require a three-party constellation that would force the ill-suited Greens and FDP to work together. But, there seems to be an almost one hundred percent certainty -- given the SPD's chronic slump in the polls and limited coalition options -- that SPD Foreign Minister and Chancellor-candidate Frank Walter Steinmeier will not become Chancellor. End summary. MERKEL CASTS ASIDE SPD, EMBRACES FDP ------------------------------------ ¶3. (C) Chancellor Merkel -- to rapturous cries of "Angie, Angie" and a standing ovation -- took to the floor at her party's September 6 rally before some 8,000 supporters affirming that the CDU/CSU "have the best chance to win the parliamentary elections" but also cautioning that "the election's outcome has not yet been decided." On the one hand, she praised her Grand Coalition government's record, noting its success in countering Germany's economic and financial crisis. On the other hand, she called for a new CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP after the upcoming elections-- casting aside the SPD. She asserted that such a coalition would anchor Germany in the "middle" of the political spectrum and take the country out of its current economic crisis faster. Merkel said: "Our country needs a government that will support growth, security and work for everyone." In a swipe at the SPD (COMMENT: Merkel never mentioned Steinmeier by name. END COMMENT.), she said the party is currently plagued by an "identity crisis," adding that, "The SPD is devoid of any reality and is distraught." She asked, "How can a party that achieved 10, 18, and 24 percent at the recent state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Saarland be taken seriously?" Dismissing SPD warnings against a so-called "black-yellow" (CDU/CSU-FDP) coalition, Merkel said that the country should be more worried about the SPD's plans to form coalitions with The Left Party on the state and federal levels. (Note: The SPD has warned that a black-yellow coalition would represent wealthy Germany and business interest at the expense of the middle and lower classes.) ¶4. (U) CDU leaders also tried to cast the CDU at the state level in a positive light after its poor showing in the Saarland and Thuringia state elections on August, causing the Minister President of the latter state to resign. Lower Saxony's CDU Minister President Christian Wulff asserted that the most prosperous and successful "Laender" (states) in Germany are those ruled by the CDU/CSU and FDP. He cited Berlin, governed by SPD Mayor Klaus Wowereit's Berlin (NOTE: in Berlin the SPD rules with The Left Party. END NOTE), as being the worst case. Hesse's Minister President Roland Koch -- to great applause -- noted that he could not understand how the SPD could possibly cooperate on a state or national level with a Left Party that is "anti-American and anti-European." (Note: In Saarland and Thuringia the option BERLIN 00001106 002 OF 003 exists for the SPD to form a governing coalition with the Left Party. END NOTE.) CSU Truce with FDP? ------------------- ¶5. (C) CSU Bavarian Minister-President Horst Seehofer threw his party's support behind a CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP, despite his well-publicized doubts about the FDP's real coalition intentions after the parliamentary elections. Even as Seehofer pronounced his support for the FDP in Duesseldorf, however, media reports from Munich confirmed that the CSU had decided to continue attacking the FDP. The CSU has been buffing its economic bona fides by attacking the FDP on its own themes while basking in the reflected glory from popular Economics Minister zu Guttenberg, the new CSU champion. Seehofer has publicly suspected that FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle -- in an attempt to enter government at all costs -- might support a "traffic light" coalition with the SPD and the Greens, although this political constellation appears unlikely at present. In addition, Bavarian politics trump national politics, especially during a time when the CSU longs for the days when their party alone wielded political power in Munich, rather than as it does today, in a coalition with the FDP. Seehofer is also aware that the CSU needs to be strong and the FDP proportionally more weak for the CSU to win more and better ministerial posts in a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. He did not use his appearance in Duesseldorf to chide the FDP, to the great delight of those pleading that recent CDU/CSU-FDP bickering had been harmful and counter-productive during the campaign. AFGHANISTAN - A DOMESTIC CAMPAIGN ISSUE? ---------------------------------------- ¶6. (C) The September 4 air strike against two fuel tankers near Kunduz, Afghanistan hit the press right before the CDU/CSU rally. In light of the German media's frenzy, PolOff asked the CDU's Head of International Relations Klemens Moemkes whether Germany's ISAF commitment might emerge as a potential domestic campaign issue. Moemkes noted that the SPD could make Afghanistan an issue but this would be very odd given Foreign Minister Steinmeier's support for Germany's military role in ISAF. However, the prospect of Afghanistan becoming a major theme clearly had the CDU's xxxxx spooked. He told PolOff that it would be very difficult for the Chancellor not to address Germany's role in Afghanistan in the coming weeks. Given the German public's overwhelming support for a withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan, this was not an issue the Chancellor wanted to address in the run-up to the parliamentary elections. COMMENT ------- ¶7. (C) While it is all but certain that Chancellor Merkel will return to office as Chancellor after the next parliamentary elections on September 27, it is too close to call whether she will achieve a coalition with the FDP. Bavarian MP Seehofer's attacks on the FDP in Bavaria could weaken that party there and further undermine the chances of a coalition. The FDP wants the same but political bickering over future ministerial positions and CSU attacks on the FDP in Bavaria and on FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle suggest that a possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition will not be a marriage made in heaven. Some FDP contacts admit that they harbor doubts about the Chancellor's promise to form a coalition with the FDP. They insinuate that in reality she may prefer another Grand Coalition with the SPD, although Chancellor Merkel has used every public opportunity to advertise for a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. Backing down on this pledge would call into question her reputation. ¶8. (C) Paradoxically, however, it is the CDU/CSU's relative weakness in the polls (35-36 percent) that threatens a possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. The FDP is clearly riding on a high with double-digit successes in the state elections of Saarland, Saxony, and Thuringia, but this may not be enough. The CDU refuses to engage in any self-introspection after its defeats in Saarland and Thuringia and the party can really only take comfort from the SPD's perennial weakness. The fear in the CDU is acute that the Chancellor's high popularity ratings may not be enough to ensure a comfortable win for the CDU/CSU at the parliamentary elections. ¶9. (C) Merkel, once again, vehemently denies any intention to form a Grand Coalition with the SPD but the electoral math on September 27 may force her -- despite intense CDU/CSU reservations, not to mention those of the German public -- to look at the SPD as a partner. As for the SPD, Steinmeier is BERLIN 00001106 003 OF 003 looking desperate. The SPD has failed to reach over 25 percent in the last six elections and Steinmeier's unlikely path to the chancellorship is only possible if he reneges on a campaign promise not to form a coalition with The Left Party. This will not happen in 2009 but the CDU/CSU will not tire of raising the fear of a red-red coalition in 2009 or in ¶2013. The Chancellor appears to be in a win-win situation but three weeks on the campaign trail can be an eternity. End comment. Murphy
CONFIDENTIAL: VZCZCXYZ0005 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #1542/01 3191825 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 141825Z NOV 08 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2636 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001542 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV AF RS GG UP GM SUBJECT: GERMANY REMAINS STUBBORN ON MAP AND ADDITIONAL TROOPS FOR AFGHANISTAN Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 ( B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Top German government officials emphasized to visiting USNATO Ambassador Kurt Volker November 10-11 that Germany remains strongly opposed to granting Ukraine and Georgia member action plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. While open to giving the applicant countries a “navigation aid” or action plan to help guide their reforms, Germany is not ready at this point to substitute this “navigation aid” for MAP — it wants to keep open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership. Volker warned that adding an additional hurdle to the accession process would give the impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest commitment and capitulating to Russian pressure. German officials also stressed that over the next year, they had little political flexibility for increasing the number of German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF parliamentary mandate approved last month. In response to MFAs view that the April 2009 NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit should be primarily an anniversary meeting and avoid “confrontational issues,” Volker emphasized the need to address key questions like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the east. The Germans are disdainful of Medvedevs European security proposal, but they believe they have to “deal with it” and are hopeful that discussing it can “improve the atmosphere” with Russia. While warning against “cornering” Russia in regards to MAP and the conflict with Georgia, Germans have been very critical of Medvedevs announcement about stationing short-range missiles in Kaliningrad. END SUMMARY. INTERLOCUTORS ¶2. (U) During his November 10-11 visit to Berlin, USNATO Ambassador Volker met separately with National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen, MFA State Secretary Reinhard Silberberg and MOD Parliamentary Secretary Christian Schmidt. He also met with a number of key parliamentarians, including Christian Democratic Union (CDU) foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von Klaeden, Christian Social Union (CSU) Secretary General Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, Social Democratic Party (SPD) defense policy spokesman Rainer Arnold, Greens defense policy spokesman Winfried Nachtwei, Free Democratic Party (FDP) foreign policy spokesman Werner Hoyer and Deputy Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD). MAP FOR GEORGIA/UKRAINE ¶3. (C) Both Heusgen and Silberberg reiterated Germanys strong opposition to granting Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. Silberberg said flatly that “no decision can be taken” in December, making reference to the Bucharest Summit declaration that this should be only a “first review.” Noting that both countries have “lots of deficits,” Heusgen said that Ukraine was “a nightmare” because of ongoing political turmoil and that Georgia lacked a multiparty system and was not truly a pluralistic society. Silberberg said that because of its role in the August conflict with Russia, Germany considered Georgia to be “further from MAP” than it was before. However, both agreed with Volker that the Alliance could not be seen backing away from its Bucharest commitment that both countries would one day become members of NATO. They also conceded that NATO had to avoid giving the perception that Russia, in using force against Georgia, had successfully drawn a new line across Europe and had achieved an unchallenged sphere of influence. They proposed repeating the Bucharest language at the December ministerial and “coming back to this later.” ¶4. (C) Heusgen also favored giving the two applicant countries a “clear idea” of what they needed to do. Heusgen said that when Chancellor Merkel visited Kyiv in July, she had proposed setting up a “navigation aid” or action plan to help guide Ukraine in making the necessary reforms, but had never received a response. Heusgen emphasized, however, that Germany was not ready at this point to substitute this “navigation aid” for MAP — it wanted to keep open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership. He expressed concern that the applicant countries, especially Ukraine, could start clamoring immediately for membership after satisfying the technical requirements in an action plan. Along the same lines, Silberberg said the Alliance had to make clear to the applicants that the final decision on membership was political, not technical, and not automatic based on fulfilling a checklist. Volker welcomed creative thinking on the way forward, but said that adding an additional hurdle to the accession process would give the impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest commitment and could allow Russia to claim “victory.” ¶5. (C) In separate meetings with leading parliamentarians from all the major parties, no one expressed support for moving forward with MAP for Georgia and Ukraine. Most had extremely negative opinions of Georgian President Saakashvili, variously describing him as “crazy,” “a hot head,” and “dangerous.” The general opinion was that Saakashvili was as much at fault for the outbreak of the August war as Russia. Volker challenged this view and reminded them that Russias provocative acts and pressure had set the stage for the conflict. The parliamentarians also worried that pursuing MAP would “corner the Russians” and make them less cooperative on important questions like Afghanistan, Iran, energy, etc. AFGHANISTAN ¶6. (C) Every government interlocutor, including Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt, emphasized that over the next year, through the Bundestag election in September 2009, Germany had little political flexibility for increasing the number of German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF parliamentary mandate approved last month. Silberberg said flatly: “Were in the north and were staying there.” With regard to getting Germany to send combat troops to the south, he advised: “Dont try it. It wont happen.” Heusgen was relaxed about possible U.S. requests to do more, asserting that when Obama visited Berlin in July, he had indicated that he was “perfectly happy” with the German contribution. Silberberg claimed that the SPD-controlled MFA was more receptive than the CDU-controlled MOD about deploying German forces outside the north. He said, for example, that the MFA had pushed for embedded German trainers (OMLTs) to be allowed to deploy outside the north with their assigned Afghan National Army (ANA) units, but that MOD had refused. ¶7. (C) While generally ruling out new military contributions to Afghanistan, Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt confirmed that Germany planned to support and participate in the proposed deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft to Afghanistan, which will require the government to seek a stand-alone mandate from the Bundestag. In separate meetings, parliamentarians confirmed that there was broad support for the AWACS mission. Silberberg warned, however, that any connection made between the AWACS and the controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan could be a “problem” in obtaining Bundestag approval. He indicated that he had already passed this concern on to SACEUR GEN Craddock. ¶8. (C) Volker noted that new CENTCOM Commander GEN Patreus was currently conducting a strategic review of the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. It was possible the review might recommend to the incoming Administration the deployment of significantly more troops and other resources to meet the current challenges. In that event, the U.S. would almost certainly turn to its European Allies to help shoulder the burden and to get behind a single, unified effort. If additional combat troops were out of the question, Volker encouraged German officials to think creatively about what other military contributions Germany could make, such as deploying additional helicopters and MEDEVAC assets on a country-wide basis, or widening its deployment area by erasing the dividing line between regional commands north and west. ¶9. (C) SPD Defense Policy Spokesman Rainer Arnold gave the standard line that Germany had no more armored helicopters to deploy and probably would not have any until the next generation of NH-90 and Tiger helicopters was delivered. Schmidt revealed, however, that Germany had recently launched a program to armor eight additional C-53 helicopters. (Comment: Germany has some 80 CH-53 helicopters, but only 20 of them are armored and suitable for operating in a combat environment. Germany currently has six armored C-53s in Afghanistan and claims that it cannot afford to deploy additional ones until the inventory of armored helicopters is increased. End Comment.) Schmidt also noted that he planned to talk to the Bavarian interior minister about sending Bavarian policemen to Afghanistan to serve as trainers for the Afghan National Police. (Comment: Up to now, Bavaria has been one of the few German states that has declined to let its police officers serve in Afghanistan. End Comment.) ¶10. (C) Parliamentarians generally welcomed the prospect of greater U.S. attention and commitment to Afghanistan and agreed that Germany should increase its own efforts, especially in reconstruction and development and in the training of the Afghan national security forces. However, they echoed the view that there was little political maneuver room for Germany to increase its military contributions to Afghanistan over the next year, given the electoral season and low popular support for the mission. FDP foreign policy spokesman Hoyer pointed out that mistrust between the two Grand Coalition parties complicated matters. He thought Chancellor Merkel (CDU) would be very wary about taking an initiative to increase Germanys military contribution to Afghanistan before the Bundestag election, for fear of playing into the hands of her electoral rival, FM Steinmeier (SPD). SPD defense policy spokesman Arnold argued that deployment of German soldiers to the south and the likely resulting increase in German soldiers “killing and being killed” could put the whole deployment at risk. NATO SUMMIT ¶11. (C) Silberberg said Germany viewed next years Strasbourg/Kehl Summit as primarily a “family” anniversary meeting, largely without partners. There were no plans to invite Russian president Medvedev or to deal with “confrontational issues.” While Volker agreed that the summit offered an excellent opportunity to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Alliance and to recognize its role in Franco-German reconciliation, it could not just be a celebration. There had to be real substance. Key issues like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the east had to be addressed. Silberberg expressed some surprise that Russia would be on the agenda, but took the point. ¶12. (C) Volker also noted that some in Washington remained to be convinced about the wisdom of launching work on a new strategic concept at the summit, believing the exercise could prove divisive and distract the Alliance from more practical cooperation. Silberberg responded that there was too much momentum behind the idea of a new strategic concept to stop it now. He said Germany favored releasing a “short, political” Declaration on Alliance Security at the Summit to launch the strategic concept review. MEDVEDEVS PROPOSAL ON A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ¶13. (C) While acknowledging that Medvedevs proposal for a new European security architecture was hypocritical and did nothing to address current problems (like CFE and Georgia), Silberberg said that “we have to deal with it.” He noted that the proposal had come as a surprise to the Russian MFA, which had to scramble after the fact to propose some ideas for fleshing out the concept. He was disdainful of the content, but hopeful that discussing the proposal would “improve the atmosphere” with Russia. He complained that the current EU troika dialogue with Russia, where each side reads prepared statements, was not very useful. He also pressed for resumption of meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and for the NRC to be improved as a political forum. He suggested that the Alliance pre-coordinate in advance of NRC meetings and not hold internal political debates in front of the Russians. ¶14. (C) On Medvedevs proposal, Volker said there was already a pan-European security organization (the OSCE), so the Russians had to answer the question: where was the value-added? From the U.S. point of view, the Medvedev proposal appeared to be nothing more than the OSCE minus the Helsinki Accords, the Paris Charter, and the United States. The Russians should be forced to be specific on the substance of their proposal, and the forum for discussing this should be the OSCE in Vienna. Regarding the NRC, Volker noted the original intention had been to treat Russia as an equal partner. Given its aggression against Georgia, the U.S. would have trouble going back to that format for now, but agreed that dialogue with Russia should continue in some form. MISSILE DEFENSE ¶15. (C) Silberberg called Medvedevs November 5 announcement about deploying short-range rockets in Kaliningrad in response to U.S. MD plans as “simply stupid.” He noted that FM Steinmeier had immediately issued a public statement criticizing the announcement. It was clear that the timing, coming right after the U.S. presidential election, was deliberate and not a mistake. Silberberg noted that while his counterparts at the Russian MFA “seem very reasonable” on this issue, they are obviously “very far” from the locus of Russian decision-making. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ¶16. (U) Volker also participated in several public diplomacy events during his November 10-11 visit. On November 10, on the margins of the opening ceremony of the annual conference of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), he did separate interviews with Germanys two main public broadcasters, ARD and ZDF, responding to questions on NATO enlargement and the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Also on November 10, he participated in an hour-long panel discussion hosted by Deutschland Radio Kultur on the future of U.S. foreign policy following the U.S. elections. The roundtable, which included Luxembourg FM Jean Asselborn and German Deputy Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD), was broadcast live over radio and was recorded for broadcast by Phoenix television on November 15. ¶17. (U) On November 11, Volker participated in a panel discussion on NATO and the challenges of the eastern dimension, hosted by the U.S. Embassy before a audience of ¶180. The panel was one of six held simultaneously in various embassies in Berlin as part of the ATA annual conference. The other panelists included former Polish NATO Ambassador Jerzy Nowak and German foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von Klaeden (CDU). In a press conference in the U.S. Embassy at the conclusion of his visit, Volker took questions from six print journalists on Afghanistan, NATO enlargement, Georgia, and the NATO C-17 strategic airlift consortium. ¶18. (U) Ambassador Volker has reviewed and cleared this cable. TIMKEN JRGERMANY REMAINS STUBBORN ON MAP AND ADDITIONAL
VZCZCXYZ0005 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #1542/01 3191825 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 141825Z NOV 08 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2636 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001542 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV AF RS GG UP GM SUBJECT: GERMANY REMAINS STUBBORN ON MAP AND ADDITIONAL TROOPS FOR AFGHANISTAN Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 ( B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Top German government officials emphasized to visiting USNATO Ambassador Kurt Volker November 10-11 that Germany remains strongly opposed to granting Ukraine and Georgia member action plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. While open to giving the applicant countries a "navigation aid" or action plan to help guide their reforms, Germany is not ready at this point to substitute this "navigation aid" for MAP -- it wants to keep open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership. Volker warned that adding an additional hurdle to the accession process would give the impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest commitment and capitulating to Russian pressure. German officials also stressed that over the next year, they had little political flexibility for increasing the number of German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF parliamentary mandate approved last month. In response to MFAs view that the April 2009 NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit should be primarily an anniversary meeting and avoid "confrontational issues," Volker emphasized the need to address key questions like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the east. The Germans are disdainful of Medvedevs European security proposal, but they believe they have to "deal with it" and are hopeful that discussing it can "improve the atmosphere" with Russia. While warning against "cornering" Russia in regards to MAP and the conflict with Georgia, Germans have been very critical of Medvedevs announcement about stationing short-range missiles in Kaliningrad. END SUMMARY. INTERLOCUTORS ¶2. (U) During his November 10-11 visit to Berlin, USNATO Ambassador Volker met separately with National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen, MFA State Secretary Reinhard Silberberg and MOD Parliamentary Secretary Christian Schmidt. He also met with a number of key parliamentarians, including Christian Democratic Union (CDU) foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von Klaeden, Christian Social Union (CSU) Secretary General Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, Social Democratic Party (SPD) defense policy spokesman Rainer Arnold, Greens defense policy spokesman Winfried Nachtwei, Free Democratic Party (FDP) foreign policy spokesman Werner Hoyer and Deputy Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD). MAP FOR GEORGIA/UKRAINE ¶3. (C) Both Heusgen and Silberberg reiterated Germanys strong opposition to granting Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. Silberberg said flatly that "no decision can be taken" in December, making reference to the Bucharest Summit declaration that this should be only a "first review." Noting that both countries have "lots of deficits," Heusgen said that Ukraine was "a nightmare" because of ongoing political turmoil and that Georgia lacked a multiparty system and was not truly a pluralistic society. Silberberg said that because of its role in the August conflict with Russia, Germany considered Georgia to be "further from MAP" than it was before. However, both agreed with Volker that the Alliance could not be seen backing away from its Bucharest commitment that both countries would one day become members of NATO. They also conceded that NATO had to avoid giving the perception that Russia, in using force against Georgia, had successfully drawn a new line across Europe and had achieved an unchallenged sphere of influence. They proposed repeating the Bucharest language at the December ministerial and "coming back to this later." ¶4. (C) Heusgen also favored giving the two applicant countries a "clear idea" of what they needed to do. Heusgen said that when Chancellor Merkel visited Kyiv in July, she had proposed setting up a "navigation aid" or action plan to help guide Ukraine in making the necessary reforms, but had never received a response. Heusgen emphasized, however, that Germany was not ready at this point to substitute this "navigation aid" for MAP -- it wanted to keep open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership. He expressed concern that the applicant countries, especially Ukraine, could start clamoring immediately for membership after satisfying the technical requirements in an action plan. Along the same lines, Silberberg said the Alliance had to make clear to the applicants that the final decision on membership was political, not technical, and not automatic based on fulfilling a checklist. Volker welcomed creative thinking on the way forward, but said that adding an additional hurdle to the accession process would give the impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest commitment and could allow Russia to claim "victory." ¶5. (C) In separate meetings with leading parliamentarians from all the major parties, no one expressed support for moving forward with MAP for Georgia and Ukraine. Most had extremely negative opinions of Georgian President Saakashvili, variously describing him as "crazy," "a hot head," and "dangerous." The general opinion was that Saakashvili was as much at fault for the outbreak of the August war as Russia. Volker challenged this view and reminded them that Russias provocative acts and pressure had set the stage for the conflict. The parliamentarians also worried that pursuing MAP would "corner the Russians" and make them less cooperative on important questions like Afghanistan, Iran, energy, etc. AFGHANISTAN ¶6. (C) Every government interlocutor, including Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt, emphasized that over the next year, through the Bundestag election in September 2009, Germany had little political flexibility for increasing the number of German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF parliamentary mandate approved last month. Silberberg said flatly: "Were in the north and were staying there." With regard to getting Germany to send combat troops to the south, he advised: "Dont try it. It wont happen." Heusgen was relaxed about possible U.S. requests to do more, asserting that when Obama visited Berlin in July, he had indicated that he was "perfectly happy" with the German contribution. Silberberg claimed that the SPD-controlled MFA was more receptive than the CDU-controlled MOD about deploying German forces outside the north. He said, for example, that the MFA had pushed for embedded German trainers (OMLTs) to be allowed to deploy outside the north with their assigned Afghan National Army (ANA) units, but that MOD had refused. ¶7. (C) While generally ruling out new military contributions to Afghanistan, Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt confirmed that Germany planned to support and participate in the proposed deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft to Afghanistan, which will require the government to seek a stand-alone mandate from the Bundestag. In separate meetings, parliamentarians confirmed that there was broad support for the AWACS mission. Silberberg warned, however, that any connection made between the AWACS and the controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan could be a "problem" in obtaining Bundestag approval. He indicated that he had already passed this concern on to SACEUR GEN Craddock. ¶8. (C) Volker noted that new CENTCOM Commander GEN Patreus was currently conducting a strategic review of the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. It was possible the review might recommend to the incoming Administration the deployment of significantly more troops and other resources to meet the current challenges. In that event, the U.S. would almost certainly turn to its European Allies to help shoulder the burden and to get behind a single, unified effort. If additional combat troops were out of the question, Volker encouraged German officials to think creatively about what other military contributions Germany could make, such as deploying additional helicopters and MEDEVAC assets on a country-wide basis, or widening its deployment area by erasing the dividing line between regional commands north and west. ¶9. (C) SPD Defense Policy Spokesman Rainer Arnold gave the standard line that Germany had no more armored helicopters to deploy and probably would not have any until the next generation of NH-90 and Tiger helicopters was delivered. Schmidt revealed, however, that Germany had recently launched a program to armor eight additional C-53 helicopters. (Comment: Germany has some 80 CH-53 helicopters, but only 20 of them are armored and suitable for operating in a combat environment. Germany currently has six armored C-53s in Afghanistan and claims that it cannot afford to deploy additional ones until the inventory of armored helicopters is increased. End Comment.) Schmidt also noted that he planned to talk to the Bavarian interior minister about sending Bavarian policemen to Afghanistan to serve as trainers for the Afghan National Police. (Comment: Up to now, Bavaria has been one of the few German states that has declined to let its police officers serve in Afghanistan. End Comment.) ¶10. (C) Parliamentarians generally welcomed the prospect of greater U.S. attention and commitment to Afghanistan and agreed that Germany should increase its own efforts, especially in reconstruction and development and in the training of the Afghan national security forces. However, they echoed the view that there was little political maneuver room for Germany to increase its military contributions to Afghanistan over the next year, given the electoral season and low popular support for the mission. FDP foreign policy spokesman Hoyer pointed out that mistrust between the two Grand Coalition parties complicated matters. He thought Chancellor Merkel (CDU) would be very wary about taking an initiative to increase Germanys military contribution to Afghanistan before the Bundestag election, for fear of playing into the hands of her electoral rival, FM Steinmeier (SPD). SPD defense policy spokesman Arnold argued that deployment of German soldiers to the south and the likely resulting increase in German soldiers "killing and being killed" could put the whole deployment at risk. NATO SUMMIT ¶11. (C) Silberberg said Germany viewed next years Strasbourg/Kehl Summit as primarily a "family" anniversary meeting, largely without partners. There were no plans to invite Russian president Medvedev or to deal with "confrontational issues." While Volker agreed that the summit offered an excellent opportunity to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Alliance and to recognize its role in Franco-German reconciliation, it could not just be a celebration. There had to be real substance. Key issues like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the east had to be addressed. Silberberg expressed some surprise that Russia would be on the agenda, but took the point. ¶12. (C) Volker also noted that some in Washington remained to be convinced about the wisdom of launching work on a new strategic concept at the summit, believing the exercise could prove divisive and distract the Alliance from more practical cooperation. Silberberg responded that there was too much momentum behind the idea of a new strategic concept to stop it now. He said Germany favored releasing a "short, political" Declaration on Alliance Security at the Summit to launch the strategic concept review. MEDVEDEVS PROPOSAL ON A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ¶13. (C) While acknowledging that Medvedevs proposal for a new European security architecture was hypocritical and did nothing to address current problems (like CFE and Georgia), Silberberg said that "we have to deal with it." He noted that the proposal had come as a surprise to the Russian MFA, which had to scramble after the fact to propose some ideas for fleshing out the concept. He was disdainful of the content, but hopeful that discussing the proposal would "improve the atmosphere" with Russia. He complained that the current EU troika dialogue with Russia, where each side reads prepared statements, was not very useful. He also pressed for resumption of meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and for the NRC to be improved as a political forum. He suggested that the Alliance pre-coordinate in advance of NRC meetings and not hold internal political debates in front of the Russians. ¶14. (C) On Medvedevs proposal, Volker said there was already a pan-European security organization (the OSCE), so the Russians had to answer the question: where was the value-added? From the U.S. point of view, the Medvedev proposal appeared to be nothing more than the OSCE minus the Helsinki Accords, the Paris Charter, and the United States. The Russians should be forced to be specific on the substance of their proposal, and the forum for discussing this should be the OSCE in Vienna. Regarding the NRC, Volker noted the original intention had been to treat Russia as an equal partner. Given its aggression against Georgia, the U.S. would have trouble going back to that format for now, but agreed that dialogue with Russia should continue in some form. MISSILE DEFENSE ¶15. (C) Silberberg called Medvedevs November 5 announcement about deploying short-range rockets in Kaliningrad in response to U.S. MD plans as "simply stupid." He noted that FM Steinmeier had immediately issued a public statement criticizing the announcement. It was clear that the timing, coming right after the U.S. presidential election, was deliberate and not a mistake. Silberberg noted that while his counterparts at the Russian MFA "seem very reasonable" on this issue, they are obviously "very far" from the locus of Russian decision-making. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ¶16. (U) Volker also participated in several public diplomacy events during his November 10-11 visit. On November 10, on the margins of the opening ceremony of the annual conference of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), he did separate interviews with Germanys two main public broadcasters, ARD and ZDF, responding to questions on NATO enlargement and the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Also on November 10, he participated in an hour-long panel discussion hosted by Deutschland Radio Kultur on the future of U.S. foreign policy following the U.S. elections. The roundtable, which included Luxembourg FM Jean Asselborn and German Deputy Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD), was broadcast live over radio and was recorded for broadcast by Phoenix television on November 15. ¶17. (U) On November 11, Volker participated in a panel discussion on NATO and the challenges of the eastern dimension, hosted by the U.S. Embassy before a audience of ¶180. The panel was one of six held simultaneously in various embassies in Berlin as part of the ATA annual conference. The other panelists included former Polish NATO Ambassador Jerzy Nowak and German foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von Klaeden (CDU). In a press conference in the U.S. Embassy at the conclusion of his visit, Volker took questions from six print journalists on Afghanistan, NATO enlargement, Georgia, and the NATO C-17 strategic airlift consortium. ¶18. (U) Ambassador Volker has reviewed and cleared this cable. TIMKEN JR
CONFIDENTIAL: LEBANON: BELLEMARE ANXIOUS FOR MORE USG ASSISTANCE
VZCZCXRO3042 PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHLB #1348/01 2591418 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 151418Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3034 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2905 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001348 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, IO/FO-HOOK, WARLICK, IO/UNP-AMORRISON, L/FO-JBELLINGER, JTHESSIN, L/AN-LJACOBSON, L/UNA-TBUCHWALD, INR/GGI-MARGULIES, CIA/CNC-JFINKEL, JBRODERERICK, CIA/CTC-JBEAN, DOJ-JEVY, USUN-KHALILZAD, WOLFF, SCHEDLBAUER, NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PINR UNSC LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: BELLEMARE ANXIOUS FOR MORE USG ASSISTANCE THAN HE HAS SEEN REF: THE HAGUE 744 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (S/NF) In a September 12 meeting with the Ambassador, Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC) made three specific requests for USG assistance and additional requests for USG action. First, he asked that the USG provide intelligence information that UNIIIC has formally requested. Second, that the USG loan UNIIIC two criminal investigators TDY. UNIIIC needs "investigators who can question a witness" to interview some 200 persons currently in prison who may have some relevant information. Third, that the USG urge the UK to do more to help UNIIIC, particularly with intelligence information (the UK has provided loaned personnel). ¶2. (S/NF) In addition, Bellemare asked for USG support when the Management Committee considers the Tribunal operating budget on September 25 -- the same day that Lebanese President Sleiman will meet President Bush in Washington. He also raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a new resolution to clarify some legal issues. Finally he repeated earlier requests for a USG reaction to 26 sketches of possible suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG and asked about getting access to alleged Hizballah defectors reportedly in the U.S. ¶3. (S/NF) On other matters, Bellemare said that the GOL has not asked that UNIIIC investigate the latest political assassination (the September 10 attack on opposition Druze member Saleh Aridi). He is concerned about a new Telecommunication Ministry directive that may impede his plans for using wiretaps. End Summary. GOL HAS NOT ASKED THAT UNIIIC INVESTIGATE LATEST ASSASSINATION -------------------------------- ¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador and DCM met on September 12 with Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC), in his office in Monteverde. The Ambassador asked if UNIIIC would investigate the case of Saleh Aridi, a Druze political official assassinated in a car bomb attack near Beirut on September 10. Bellemare explained that for UNIIIC to take on a case, first the GOL must ask the UN SYG, then the SYG and Security Council must approve. He said that the GOL had shown no indication that it would request that UNIIIC investigate the Aridi killing. UNIIIC is interested in finding out more about the Aridi attack, since details are similar to other cases it is investigating. If it is not invited to investigate but wants information about a case, UNIIIC must submit a request to the Lebanese chief prosecutor. The criteria the GOL uses to decide on requesting UNIIIC assistance is "a mystery to me" Bellemare said. (NOTE: The Aridi assassination is the first of a pro-Syrian politician. END NOTE.) WIRETAPPING ----------- ¶5. (S/NF) Bellemare was concerned about something he had learned the day before that might affect wiretapping. The Telecommunications Ministry had directed two private telecom companies in Lebanon to inform the Ministry about any requests for wiretapping. He noted that it is well known that the Internal Security Forces (ISF), the national police, conduct wiretapping even though the legal basis for their authority to do so is weak. The Telecom Ministry's move may have been directed against the ISF. The order, however, also could limit the ability of UNIIIC to conduct wiretaps if the phone companies fear that they will have to report those efforts to the Telecommunications Ministry. ¶6. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked if Bellemare believed the action was targeted at UNIIIC, noting that the new Telecommunications Minister is from the opposition. Bellemare replied that he was not in a position to say. At his meeting with PM Fouad Siniora earlier in the week, on September 8, Siniora told Bellemare to inform him if he runs into any problems with cooperation from government officials. He said he might discuss this with the PM if it looks as if this new telecom directive will be a problem, but first he will meet with officials of the two telecom companies next week. The Ambassador offered to support his efforts at resolving this issue. ¶7. (S/NF) Bellemare noted that at his August 14 meeting in The Hague with the USG Interagency Working Group (IWG), he had asked for USG help with wiretapping capability. He said that trying to work wiretapping through the Lebanese ISF or military intelligence would be like "putting the names (of targets) in the paper". He explained that UN legal experts were currently looking into the possibility that UNIIIC has legal authority to carry out wiretaps. Beyond legal authority for wiretapping, though, Bellemare said he needs technical capability. ASSISTANCE FROM THE USG ----------------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Bellemare expressed frustration that USG has not provided more in response to his requests for assistance, and noted that he has discussed this with State Department officials. He outlined three requests for USG assistance for his investigation. -- One, provide intelligence information that UNIIIC has formally requested, or inform him that it cannot be provided, so that he knows not to pursue the requests. -- Two, provide two loaned criminal analysts on TDY. UNIIIC needs "investigators who can question a witness" to interview some 200 persons currently in prison who may have some relevant informtion. -- Three, using USG influence, urge the U government to provide more to UNIIIC, particulaly regarding intelligence information. Bellemare said he has requests in to MI-6, but has not received much. On personnel, Scotland Yard has provided a loaned investigator. ¶9. (S/NF) Bellemare showed a good understanding of the problems associated with complying with the first two requests from his several meetings with USG officials, but his frustration was nonetheless evident. "You are the key player. If the U.S. doesn't help me, who will?" The USG has "a big investment in the Tribunal" and being more forthcoming on UNIIIC's requests is a way of making that investment pay off, he said. ¶10. (S/NF) During the meeting, Bellemare made several other requests for USG action: -- USG support when the Committee considers the Tribunal operating budget, scheduled for September 25, the same day that Lebanese President Sleiman will meet President Bush in Washington. He warned that the budget includes high travel costs, but that these are necessary because of the need for frequent travel between the Hague and Lebanon. Bellemare thanked the USG for what he said was a much improved attitude on the part of the Tribunal Management Committee. His requests have been more favorably received than was the case previously. -- He raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a new resolution to clarify some legal issues. He mused about the possibility of getting Chapter VII authority for the Tribunal via such a new resolution, but seemed to think that was not doable in the Council. -- He asked for a reaction to the 26 sketches of possible suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG. -- Finally, he asked about getting access to alleged Hizballah defectors reportedly in the U.S., or a definitive negative response to the request. The answers the USG has given him so far on this subject, he said, have been not sufficiently definitive. INTERVIEWS IN SYRIA ------------------- ¶11. (S/NF) On this issue, Bellemare repeated what he said in the IWG meeting (reftel): that he did not want to go to Syria until the USG or other sources had provided names of leads he should ask to interview and other information. If Syria denied his request to interview these people, then he would have evidence of Syrian non-cooperation. Just asking would give some indication to others in Syria where his investigation might be headed, which could provoke more cooperation "if I hit the right person." ¶12. (S/NF) Bellemare emphasized the urgency for responding to his request related to Syria, first, because UNIIIC's mandate and with it Chapter VII authority expires at the end of the year, and second, the importance of conducting the interviews before the interviewees disappear by being killed or other means. OTHER ISSUES: NEW MINISTER OF JUSTICE, UNIIIC PRESS SPOKESPERSON ------------------------------ ¶13. (C ) Bellemare said he had a very positive impression of new GOL Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar, who had told Bellemare he wanted to be helpful. Najjar's predecessor, Charles Rizk, was a vocal supporter of the Tribunal but also known for public criticisms of Bellemare and the previous Commissioner, Serge Brammertz. Bellemare, a Canadian, noted that Najjar had taught at McGill University in Montreal and they had some mutual acquaintances. ¶14. (SBU) UNIIIC now has a press spokesperson who started work the week before, Bellemare reported. The official had good relevant experience as the spokesperson for the Yugoslavia Tribunal and most recently for the UN Legal Affairs office. The new spokesperson is currently working up a strategy for UNIIIC's press interaction. ¶15. (C) Bellemare said he had been advised by several persons to not make statements in public that might be seen as disrupting the current relative calm in Lebanon. He planned to follow that advice, (NOTE: Bellemare traveled to Saudi Arabia September 15, we understand. We will seek further information from UNIIIC contacts. END NOTE.) SISON
CONFIDENTIAL: DEFLATED EXPECTATIONS FOR MERKEL’S DREAM COALITION
VZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #0153/01 0341656 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 031656Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6467 INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000153 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL EFIN ECON GM SUBJECT: DEFLATED EXPECTATIONS FOR MERKEL'S DREAM COALITION AFTER FIRST 100 DAYS REF: 2009 BERLIN 1528 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Greg Delawie for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: One hundred days after Germany's black-yellow coalition took office, a strong, unified government led by Chancellor Merkel has yet to materialize. The much anticipated “dream coalition” comprised of Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister the Christian Social Union (CSU), and Free Democratic Party (FDP) which promised a unified conservative approach to the economy and “like minded” thinking on social welfare, the environment, and foreign policy has become bogged down in party politics with no end in sight. Recent polls show that the bickering may be at least partly to blame for the FDP's 5.6 percent fall in the polls, with it now down to 9 percent from its historic 14.6 percent election results (see septel) and the CSU plummet to an historic low of 41 percent. Indeed one minister is now threatening resignation. Sources from the three coalition parties have admitted to problems, blaming the other coalition parties, and downplaying their significance. Merkel has come under criticism within her own party for not taking strong public stands and reining in her coalition partners, instead staying above the political fray. The opposition, particularly the Social Democratic Party (SPD), is trying to capitalize on this “divided we rule” coalition with an eye toward unseating a teetering CDU-FDP coalition in North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) in May elections, thereby tipping the CDU-FDP Bundesrat majority in its favor. Merkel is counting on better economic and political indicators after the NRW election followed by the release of the annual tax forecasts to congeal the coalition. If the CDU/FDP coalition fails in NRW, coalition divisions are likely to become more pronounced. End Summary. Off to a Rocky Start --------------------- ¶2. (C) Concluding a coalition agreement in only three weeks, prior to her November 2 departure for Washington to address Congress and in time for the 9 November 20 year anniversary of German unity may have been Chancellor Merkel's first and only major success to date in marshaling coalition unity. But the feat may have had consequences. The haste to sign has left half-resolved differences on tax cuts, economic policy, Afghanistan, Turkey, health care, data protection (see reftel) and other issues that continue to gurgle to the surface. Important to recognize is that each party is operating under its own political pressures from different voting constituencies. The FDP's main goal is to deliver on campaign promises – particularly tax relief – and shore up its base, the CSU is desperate to regain its dominance in Bavaria, and the CDU is seeking to rebuild its eroded voter base. All three parties and the opposition are now gearing up for May 9 elections in NRW. This election in Germany's most populous state, referred to as a “small national election,” is regarded as a partial vote of confidence on the national coalition, and will determine the Bundesrat majority. If the NRW CDU-FDP coalition fails to return to government, the national CDU-FDP coalition will fall by six seats in the Bundesrat – from 37 to 31 seats – it will lose its majority. Such a loss could well hamper the government's ability to pass major financial or economic legislation. ¶3. (C) Each of the three coalition parties have pointed to the others for instigating tension. CDU party contact xxxxx accused the FDP of functioning as if it were still in the opposition. Senior SPD parliamentarian Hans-Ulrich Klose attributed the coalition strains to the FDP adjusting to being in government after 11 years in the opposition. FDP contact xxxxx accused the CDU/CSU of reacting to their own internal problems: for the CDU, its controversy over the Kunduz airstrike, and for the CSU, its involvement in a major bank scandal. The FDP also points to the CSU's strong rivalry with the FDP, with which it now governs in Bavaria. The CSU is still trying to recover from its historic low voting results in the September 2008 state elections, which forced it for the first time in 46 years to govern within a coalition. All parties, however, have downplayed the significance of the feuds, with senior CDU party operative xxxxx explaining in January that the party leaderships are just now settling in after an exhausting election campaign and intense coalition negotiations. He hoped (more than predicted) that the parties would soon settle into a more cooperative relationship. In January, Merkel called a small summit for coalition leadership with Westerwelle and Seehofer to smooth things over and commit to a new beginning. While the coalition's political edginess receded for a time, policy divisions continue to surface. CDU/CSU vs FDP – the Economy ----------------------------- ¶4. (C) While CDU/CSU and FDP voters may be the most likely to cross over to the other party, their mainstay voter bases are different, with the CDU/CSU appealing to economically conservative voters who also support the social market economy, but are socially conservative. The FDP base is composed of free-market advocates, who are socially liberal and strong advocates of civil liberties. The FDP's campaign and continuing mantra has been for much larger tax cuts in 2011, worth 20-24 billion euros, apparently at the expense of both coalition unity and the better judgment of economic experts. The cuts would make getting the deficit back under the EU ceiling of 3 percent of GDP by 2013 nearly impossible. National debt will rise from 66 percent of GDP to 80 percent. There are growing public concerns over rising debt, but also about perceived disarray in the coalition's tax and budget policies. Merkel insists that a decision regarding the tax reduction plans will not be taken before May, when the overall tax revenue forecast is due. Waiting until May also means the coalition will not have to go public with unpopular consolidation measures until after the NRW elections. Finance Minister Schaeuble (CDU) appears unenthusiastic at best about further tax cuts. He has already said deficit reduction measures would have to start in 2011. The CSU has also called the FDP's call for speedy tax relief measures “unrealistic” despite the fact that it had included such a demand during its election campaign. The most recent squabble between the FDP and CSU is over FDP Health Minister Roesler's plans for health care reform which foresees more care options and the introduction of competition. Seehofer has rejected the proposal, holding fast against radical changes to the system. Roesler has indicated he might resign over this issue. Foreign Policy -------------- ¶5. (C) Coalition feuding over economic and tax policy has trumped coalition divisions over foreign policy, although FM Westerwelle has managed a few disruptions in the latter. As a harbinger of hard times to come, as one of his first actions, Westerwelle opposed the naming of CDU Bundestag member Erika Steinbach to the foundation “Flight Expulsion and Reconciliation” citing possible damage to relations with Poland. As President of Germany's Federation of Expellees, Steinbach is disliked in Poland. While the numbers are disputed, the expellee community, which mainly votes CSU or CDU, has exerted influence on the issue. National and State CDU and CSU politicians came out in support of Steinbach with only Merkel keeping mum. The controversy continues, despite ongoing attempts to reach a compromise, threatening to drain coalition attention and good-will. ¶6. (C) Coalition strains have also surfaced on the issue of overseas deployments. Regarding a troop increase in Afghanistan, Westerwelle's position was at first muddled, as he tried to reflect his party's general negativity toward overseas military deployments while at the same time tending to his role as Germany's chief diplomat in the run-up to the London Conference. In the end, he (together with the opposition) likely played a role in achieving a lower-than-expected troop increase. Westerwelle also convinced the CDU to agree on gradually reducing German participation in UNIFIL. The CSU also rocked the coalition boat on Afghanistan, with Seehofer expressing general skepticism on a troop increase, although he later came around. In addition, CSU Secretary General Dobrindt has ridiculed the federal government's reconciliation concept in Afghanistan as a “cash for clunkers version for the Taliban.” Comment --------- ¶7. (C) Chancellor Merkel may have ironically cast off the yoke of the Grand Coalition only now to be encumbered with a new FDP-CSU double yoke, restrained by an FDP bent on delivering on campaign promises and a CSU distracted over its rivalry with the FDP and internal problems. High expectations for the “dream coalition” are certainly in part to blame for the current polls, with popularity numbers for Merkel and Westerwelle both having suffered. Worried most, however, are the CDU and FDP politicians in NRW, who fear that the national coalition's squabbling could negatively impact their own chances in the May 9 elections. The leadership threesome – Merkel, Westerwelle, and Seehofer – may make an extra effort to get along, or at least appear to get along, as the NRW elections near. It is not clear that Westerwelle and the FDP, however, believe that it is the squabbling that is unhelpful, or rather its own inability to deliver as yet on certain campaign promises. If it is the latter, more coalition tensions could ensue as Westerwelle begins to expend more energy as FDP Chairman and less as Foreign Minister, gearing up his party for its NRW campaign. Berlin is once again becoming bogged down in political squabbles as the NRW elections near. ¶8. (U) Consulate Munich contributed to this cable. Murphy
CONFIDENTIAL: FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS STRUGGLE
VZCZCXRO6323 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHRL #0157/01 0351607 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 041607Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6478 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000157 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS STRUGGLE WITH FM WESTERWELLE ON TROOP INCREASE FOR AFGHANISTAN REF: A. BERLIN 138 ¶B. BERLIN 112 Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Defense Minister zu Guttenberg revealed in a February 3 meeting with Ambassador Murphy that coalition partner FM Westerwelle -- not the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) -- had been the single biggest obstacle to the government seeking a bigger increase in German troops for Afghanistan. But even with the modest planned troop increase of 500 (with 350 more in reserve), zu Guttenberg said a restructuring of the current Bundeswehr presence would allow Germany to increase the number of soldiers involved in the training of Afghan National Army (ANA) by more than 1,000. While Westerwelle has portrayed his skepticism about additional troops as principled, it was also motivated by a desire to put zu Guttenberg "in his place." While the size of the troop increase is settled, the length of the new ISAF mandate remains open. The government is hoping to have the new mandate approved by the Bundestag before the end of February, with significant (if not majority) support from the opposition SPD and Greens. END SUMMARY. WESTERWELLE: BIGGEST OBSTACLE ¶2. (C) In explaining the lower-than-expected planned increase in the number of German troops for Afghanistan, zu Guttenberg told the Ambassador that Westerwelle's opening position in the coalition negotiations on the new mandate had been "not one additional soldier." In that context, it had been difficult to get agreement on any increase at all. (Comment: Zu Guttenberg proposed 1,500 additional troops at the initial January 4 mini-cabinet meeting on this issue. End Comment.) DOING A LOT MORE WITH A LITTLE MORE ¶3. (C) To help justify the need for more troops, zu Guttenberg said he had forced the Bundeswehr to do a complete review of all the existing positions in Afghanistan, which had confirmed that some could be eliminated in light of the new ISAF counterinsurgency strategy. He said a restructuring of the current Bundeswehr presence, combined with the troop increase, would boost the number of soldiers involved in the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) from 280 to 1,400. The restructuring includes turning the battalion-size quick reaction force based in Mazar into a "protection and training" battalion. A second such battalion will be created in Kunduz by augmenting the existing infantry company there with new troops. Zu Guttenberg reiterated that Germany strongly supports COMISAF's focus on protection of the population and partnering with the Afghan national security forces (ANSF), and that the German "trainers" (i.e., the two new maneuver battalions) will operate in the field with the ANSF. PUTTING ZU GUTTENBERG IN HIS PLACE ¶4. (C) While zu Guttenberg said he is avoiding public comment on whether the outcome of the coalition talks on the new mandate is a "victory" for him or Westerwelle, FDP Defense Policy Spokesman Elke Hoff told poloff separately that Westerwelle's hard line against additional troops had been motivated in part to "teach zu Guttenberg a lesson." She claimed that zu Guttenberg had been too presumptuous last fall in making speeches in Canada and the U.S. about how Germany would significantly increase its troop contribution to ISAF. He might have been able to get agreement on a higher ceiling had he engaged parliamentarians first and showed "greater respect for the political process." OPEN QUESTION: LENGTH OF THE MANDATE ¶5. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that the cabinet would formally agree on the proposed new ISAF mandate February 9 and that the first reading in the Bundestag would be February 10. FM Westerwelle is scheduled to speak on behalf of the government in introducing the proposed mandate. The government is aiming to hold the final Bundestag vote on the mandate -- following two weeks of committee hearings -- on February 26. Zu Guttenberg was BERLIN 00000157 002 OF 002 confident that a large number (if not a majority) of opposition politicians from the SPD and Greens would vote in favor of the new mandate. ¶6. (C) A February 2 meeting of state secretaries tentatively agreed that the new mandate should run, as is the custom, for one year, expiring in February 2011. Zu Guttenberg indicated, however, that it might be preferable to stick to the length of the current mandate, which expires in December 2010. He expressed concern that having the mandate lap over into early 2011 could lead to a premature debate on withdrawal, before the new strategy really had a chance to work. (Comment: Another option under consideration -- and favored by some in the Chancellery -- is a 18-month mandate, so that any debate on the future of the troop presence would be put off until the fall of ¶2011. But the MFA objects that this would only raise the ire of the opposition and give them an excuse to oppose the mandate. End Comment.) REASSURING THE GERMANS ON COMMAND OF THE NORTH ¶7. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that Germany very much welcomed the planned inflow of U.S. forces into the north, especially the helicopter assets, which filled a long-standing shortfall. He noted, however, that many in Germany question whether the U.S. will be willing to accept continued German leadership of RC-North in view of the increased U.S. presence. Ambassador Murphy assured him that the U.S. had no issues working for the German command in the North. Murphy
CONFIDENTIAL: COURT ACQUITS NAJIB’S EX-ADVISOR IN MURDER TRIAL
VZCZCXRO9992 PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH DE RUEHKL #0959/01 3051103 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 311103Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1839 INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2672 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0510 RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 0082 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000959 SIPDIS FOR EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2028 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KJUS KDEM MY SUBJECT: COURT ACQUITS NAJIB'S EX-ADVISOR IN MURDER TRIAL Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d). Summary and Comment ------------------- ¶1. (SBU) High Court Justice Mohamad Zaki on October 31 acquitted Political Analyst Abdul Razak Baginda, former advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, of the charge of abetting the murder of Mongolian national Altantuya Shaariibuu in October 2006, but ordered the continuation of the murder trial for two policemen. Defense lawyers announced they sought to call to the stand two men who have linked DPM Najib to the case: Razak's former private investigator Balasubramaniam, who has disappeared from public, and controversial blogger Raja Petra who is detained under the Internal Security Act. The trial of the two police defendants is set to continue November 10. In immediate commentary, political opposition leaders, including Anwar Ibrahim, did not focus on Razak's guilt or innocence, but called into question the conduct of the proceedings and suggested a cover-up to protect DPM Najib. ¶2. (C) Comment: Many observers anticipated Razak's acquittal given the prosecution's poor performance, Razak's connections to DPM Najib, and the alleged and widely-perceived political manipulation in the case. The Razak verdict momentarily attracts more attention to the allegations of Najib's linkages to the case; so too would the testimony of either Balasubramaniam or Raja Petra, though it is not clear either man will be able to take the stand. Allegations stemming from the Altantuya case, however, have not prevented Najib from securing all the nominations so far for the UMNO party elections. Absent dramatic and compelling new evidence prejudicial to the DPM, the Altantuya case will not slow down Najib's drive to become Malaysia's next Prime Minister. End Summary and Comment. Razak Acquitted, Trial for Policemen Continues --------------------------------------------- - ¶3. (U) High Court Justice Mohamad Zaki on October 31 acquitted Political Analyst Abdul Razak Baginda, former advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, of charges of abetting the murder of Mongolian national Altantuya Shaariibuu in October 2006, but ordered the continuation of the murder trial for two policemen. Embassy FSN Political Assistant attended the judgment hearing. The ruling came roughly two years after Razak's arrest, and followed a lengthy 17-month trial involving the presentation of 84 witnesses. The prosecution had argued that Razak had asked the policemen to murder Altantuya, Razak's former lover who had harassed Razak for money. The judge ruled that the prosecution team failed to prove a prima facie case against Razak, and ordered his release. The judge found a sufficiently strong prosecution case against the two police defendants, Chief Inspector Azilah Hadri and Corporal Sirul Azha Umar, charged with carrying out Altantuya's murder. At the time of the crime, Azilah and Azha were members of the protection detail for DPM Najib. Defense to Call Controversial Witnesses --------------------------------------- ¶4. (U) The Justice requested the defense to begin their arguments later on the afternoon of October 31, but the defense requested and was granted a continuance as their witnesses were not available. In the day's most surprising turn, Kamarul Hisham, lead defense counsel for one of the accused police officers, stated he wished to place on the witness chair Razak's private investigator P. Balasubramaniam and Malaysia Today editor Raja Petra Kamaruddin. Both witnesses have previously made sworn statements linking DPM Najib to the murdered Altantuya, and in the case of Raja Petra, implicating Najib's wife in the murder. Balasubramaniam, who was an early witness for the prosecution, has not been seen publicly since he issued a sworn statement in July on DPM Najib's links to the Altantuya case, and then retracted the statement the next day, allegedly under duress according to some accounts. Raja Petra is currently detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA). (Note: Although the court may order Raja Petra's presence as a witness, Section 18 of the ISA gives the Home Minister discretion to ignore the court order. End note.) The Judge set November 10 for the defense to begin its presentation. ¶5. (SBU) For the October 31 judgment hearing, a crowd of approximately 200 waited outside the courthouse while some 100 (primarily family members of the defendants and journalists) filled the packed courtroom. Razak's family appeared confident and remained calm throughout the whole hearing and showed no sign of surprise in Razak's acquittal. The verdict also appeared to come as no surprise to the attending crowd. The victim's father, Setev Shaariibuu, attended the judgment and afterward through an interpreter expressed his disappointment to reporters: "I am not satisfied. My daughter (knew) only one Malaysian and that is Razak Baginda. Now my daughter is dead and Baginda is freed. The country (Malaysia) has lost credibility..." Opposition Suggests Cover-Up ---------------------------- ¶6. (U) In immediate comments, political opposition figures, who have suggested repeatedly that the government had engaged in a cover-up to protect DPM Najib, did not focus on Razak's guilt or innocence, but called into question the conduct of the proceedings. Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim noted, "On a personal level, I wish Razak Baginda well, but the issue here resolves around the court procedure and investigations. There is a general and growing perception that the investigation was not done professionally, that there is a clear motive to cover up." Anwar also drew attention to recent Internet revelations of an SMS exchange between Najib and Razak Baginda's former lawyer in which Najib reportedly wrote that Razak "will face a tentative charge but all is not lost." KEITH
CONFIDENTIAL: BULGARIA AND THE ENERGY KNOT: SCENESETTER FOR OCT
VZCZCXRO6805 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHSF #0641/01 2761002 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 021002Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5430 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000641 SIPDIS FOR SPECIAL ENVOY BOYDEN GRAY E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018 TAGS: ECON ENRG PGOV BU SUBJECT: BULGARIA AND THE ENERGY KNOT: SCENESETTER FOR OCT 7 VISIT OF SPE GRAY Classified By: Ambassador Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) Summary: The quandary over energy facing all our European partners is particularly acute here in Bulgaria. With few hydrocarbons of its own, Bulgaria relies on Russia for seventy percent of its total energy needs and over ninety percent of its gas. Though previously a net exporter of electricity, the EU's decision to force closure of blocks 3 and 4 of the communist-era nuclear plant Kozluduy cost the Bulgarian economy over USD 1.4 billion and put a squeeze on Serbia, Macedonia and Greece, who had purchased the bulk of the exports. The hard reality of today's energy picture is that Russia is not only the dominant supplier, it is also the dominant player -- your visit here is the first by a senior U.S. energy official in a year, whereas Putin has personally engaged both the President and Prime Minister on energy issues in multiple sessions over the past ten months. But the cartoon strip portraying a passionately eager Bulgaria in bed with the muscle bound duo of Gazprom and Lukoil is only partially true -- it is a tryst driven less by passion and more by a perceived lack of options. Prime Minister Stanishev recently described Russian tactics on South Stream as blackmail and Energy Minister Dimitrov complains openly of psychological warfare. At the same time, the Bulgarians are deeply worried about the prospects for Nabucco and are convinced that Azeri gas supplies will be held up by Turkey. Their bid to hold an energy summit in the spring, the ostensible focus of your visit, is designed to catalyze greater coordination -- and negotiating leverage -- amongst transit countries while also getting the United States more actively engaged. Background on specific issues likely to arise in your discussions with President Parvanov, Prime Minister Stanishev, Foreign Minister Kalfin and Energy Minister Dimitrov follows below. End Summary. TIMING ------ ¶2. (C) Your visit to Sofia comes when Bulgaria is striving to sell itself as a European energy center. With six active or potential pipelines transiting the country, the creation of a new energy mega-holding company, and the construction of a new nuclear plant, Bulgaria is setting itself up to be an important regional energy player, despite being overly dependent on Russian energy sources. The proposal to host a major gas summit in April 2009 -- which Putin has already promised to attend -- is the latest attempt to put Bulgaria on the energy map. Your visit will guide the Bulgarians as they formulate an agenda and goals for this summit. It will also focus Bulgarian policy makers on U.S. views on Russian energy strategy and South Stream, answer growing skepticism about Nabucco's prospects, and give solid counter-arguments to those who say there is no real alternative to dependence on Russian energy. THE SUMMIT ---------- ¶3. (C) At the January 19 signing of the South Stream Intergovernmental Agreement, President Parvanov, with Putin at his side, announced Bulgaria would host an energy summit intended as a follow-on to the June 2007 Zagreb energy conference. Upon Putin's departure, Sofia fell under heavy criticism both at home and abroad for hastily joining South Stream, and the energy summit idea lost steam. Ambassador for Energy Security Peter Poptchev told us the Bulgarians resented perceived Russian pressure to hold such a summit. In July the Bulgarians independently resurrected the summit idea as a way to show Bulgarian support for Nabucco and diversification, as well to balance European, U.S. and Russian interests in the Caspian and Black Sea regions. With the potential for six pipelines passing through its territory, the Bulgarians also have high hopes to become a regional energy hub. The summit, they believe, will help put Sofia on the map not only as an energy center, but as a place that brokers discussions between the West, Russia and Eurasia. ¶4. (C) The Bulgarians requested your visit to advise on the summit. They envision a spring conference (tentatively April 24-25) that would bring together heads of state from Eurasian and European producer, transit and consumer countries. PM Stanishev told Ambassador September 19 that Putin has agreed to attend. The summit will be gas-focused and will attempt to put "real solutions" on sources, routes and quantities on the table. Well-aware of the potential for East European energy conference fatigue in the first half of 2009, the Bulgarians are proposing that all key participants, including the EU, the United States and Russia, view the proposed Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czech conferences as a linked continuum. The April Sofia conference would take care of any unfinished business left from the January Hungary Conference and the proposed Czech conference would take up where the Sofia conference leaves off. To distinguish the Bulgarian summit, Sofia is considering including an as-yet undeveloped "industry component." ¶5. (C) The Bulgarians will seek U.S. views and your advice on the proposed agenda of the summit and whether it will advance U.S. goals in the region. They want recommendations on how to coordinate the Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czech conferences and may seek advice on the proposed industry component of the Sofia summit. They are interested in, but may not ask directly about, U.S. views on whether Sofia has a future as an intermediary between Europe, the United States and Russia on energy and other issues affecting the Black Sea region. They are interested in your analysis of recent Azeri and Turkish energy moves. They will also request high level U.S. attendance at the summit. BULGARIAN ENERGY PROJECTS -------------------------- ¶6. (C) SOUTH STREAM: The Bulgarians signed the South Stream intergovernmental agreement in January and Parliament ratified the agreement in July. Negotiations between Bulgargaz and Gazprom resumed in September to work out a pre-shareholders agreement. At our recommendation, and at the direction of the Government, state-owned Bulgargaz reluctantly hired outside legal counsel (the U.S. law firm Paul Hastings) to represent it in South Stream negotiations. With the creation of a new, state-owned energy mega-holding in September, Bulgargaz has lost much of its previously-considerable independence. The acting head of the Bulgarian Energy Holding is Deputy Energy Minister Galina Tosheva, previously lead South Stream negotiator for the Bulgarian Government. Tosheva has a healthy suspicion of Russia's intentions in Bulgaria and has directed Bulgargaz to rely on its legal counsel for expert advice. Tosheva told us that Gazprom negotiators are taking a hard line now that negotiations have resumed. They are proposing to re-route gas currently transiting Bulgaria (for which Bulgartransgas makes a healthy profit) to South Stream, meaning South Stream would not represent 31 bcm of new gas for Europe, but something significantly lower. The Bulgarians state that this is contrary to the spirit of the IGA and are preparing to fight the Russian proposal. ¶7. (C) NABUCCO: Despite the strong public support they have shown Nabucco this year, the Bulgarians are turning into Nabucco-skeptics. In March, Sofia signed what it thought was an agreement for Azerbaijan to supply 1 bcm of gas that Bulgaria would eventually take as its Nabucco quota. In advance of Nabucco, Bulgaria planned to access the gas via a potential hook-up to the Turkey-Greece-Italy interconnector. Realizing now that the agreement was not, in fact, a commitment on Azerbaijan's part, the Bulgarians feel burned. The government is now in dire need of a pep talk on the Nabucco. They state firmly that both South Stream and Nabucco are critical and that one cannot be allowed to preclude the other. At the same time, they are nervous about both Azerbaijani willingness to supply Nabucco and Turkish willingness to support the project. They will be interested in your view of Nabucco's prospects. ¶8. (C) TGI HOOK-UP: The Bulgarians are in negotiations with Greece about this possible interconnector. Energy Holding CEO Tosheva said this is Bulgaria's most immediate source of diversification and energy security. The Greeks apparently are cool to the idea, saying there is insufficient gas. In response, the Bulgarians have proposed the purchase of LNG to be delivered to Greece in exchange for either TGI access or gas currently going through the export pipeline from Russia and transiting Bulgarian territory. Your Bulgarian interlocutors may ask for U.S. support for these schemes in our discussions with the Greeks and Turks. ¶9. (C) BURGAS-ALEXANDROUPOLIS (BAP) and AMBO: The Bulgarians, Russians and Greeks signed a shareholders agreement for the BAP oil pipeline in January during the Putin visit. Since then, the project company has been registered, but little more progress has been made. The Bulgarians are still confident the pipeline will be built, and seem surprisingly uninterested in the dynamics surrounding CPC expansion. With BAP's relative progress, the AMBO (Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria) oil pipeline project has lost momentum. Still, Bulgaria remains committed to AMBO and is ready to move forward if and when AMBO attracts supply and financing. ¶10. (C) BELENE: In 2006 the GOB selected Russian AtomstroyExport as the contractor for the new Belene nuclear plant. Bulgaria is keeping majority ownership of the plant, but is in the process of selecting a strategic investor for the other 49 percent. RWE and the Belgian Electrabel are in the running. We have stated repeatedly that the choice of a Russian contractor for Belene decreased Bulgaria's bid for greater independence from Russian energy sources. The lack of transparency surrounding the tender has led to the inescapable conclusion that the decision to choose Russia as the Belene contractor was linked to the re-negotiation of Bulgaria's long-term gas transit contract with Gazprom in December 2006. YOUR MEETINGS ------------- ¶11. (C) President Parvanov began his second five-year term in 2007. Parvanov's desire to exercise behind-the-scenes influence over the government has led to tensions with his former protege, Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev. Parvanov has close ties to Russian politicians and held no less than eight meetings with Vladimir Putin in the last seven years. The energy summit will be under his aegis. --Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev is a 42-year-old progressive Socialist. He is pro-west and eager to have Bulgaria viewed as a good friend and partner of the United States. He returned September 30 from a week-long visit to the United States where he met with U/S Burns, spoke at the Harvard Business School and held an investment forum. He understands that Bulgaria is overly dependent on Russian energy sources, but sees Bulgaria as having few options for greater energy independence. --Foreign Minister Kalfin is close to both Stanishev and Parvanov and as Deputy Prime Minister oversees the Economy and Energy Ministry. He is a strong supporter of close Bulgarian-U.S. relations and is highly conversant on energy issues. --Economy and Energy Minister Petar Dimitrov is a relative new-comer to energy issues. He is largely seen as taking direction on energy matters from former Energy Minister Rumen Ovcharov, who is linked with Russian energy interests and left office in June 2007 after a corruption scandal. ¶12. (C) Your visit will also highlight, though meetings and press outreach, the need for Bulgaria to focus on a long-term energy strategy not solely based on the transit of hydrocarbons or the production of Russian-based nuclear energy, but on the development of renewables, clean coal and greater energy efficiency. Bulgaria will always be dependent on Russian energy to one extent or another. But as the most energy inefficient economy in Europe, it can make meaningful strides toward greater diversity away from Russian energy sources. With the price of energy at near record highs, Russia's hydrocarbon-generated wealth is increasingly circulating through the Bulgarian economy, making Bulgaria all the more susceptible to Russian leverage. An energy strategy that focuses on renewables and efficiency is one tool Bulgaria can use to put a noticeable dent in negative Russian influence. The other tool is transparency. Hub status in any industry is bestowed only on places which offer transparent, efficient service. To achieve its goal of becoming a true energy center, we should recommend that Bulgaria present itself not as the place with closest ties to Russia, but as the most transparent place to do energy deals. McEldowney
CONFIDENTIAL: OPPOSITION JOURNALIST DETAILED UNDER THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
Magister Bernd Pulch
Viewing cable 08KUALALUMPUR806, OPPOSITION JOURNALIST DETAILED UNDER THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
VZCZCXRO1610 OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH DE RUEHKL #0806/01 2561240 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 121240Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1642 INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000806 SIPDIS FOR EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018 TAGS: PGOV KDEM MY SUBJECT: OPPOSITION JOURNALIST DETAILED UNDER THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT REF: KUALA LUMPUR 787 Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Malaysian police on September 12 arrested controversial blogger Raja Petra Kamaruddin under the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention without trial. Raja Petra's arrest came days after Prime Minister Abdullah threatened to use the ISA to clamp down on those allegedly stoking racial and religious tensions. The arrest stands as a warning to the growing Internet media, but also sends a signal to the political Opposition, which has vowed to topple Abdullah's coalition later this month, that the UMNO-led government could take stern measures to defend itself. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Malaysian police detained Raja Petra Kamaruddin, prominent blogger and editor of the controversial website "Malaysia Today", under the Internal Security Act (ISA) on September 12. The ISA allows for detention without trial. This is the first time the Act has been implemented for blogging. Raja Petra's detention came days after Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi told reporters that the government would use the ISA on those who stoke racial and religious tensions, following inter-racial feuding in this coalition and mounting challenges to Abdullah's authority and political position (Septel). ¶3. (U) Home Minister Syed Hamid Albar, who approved Raja Petra's ISA detention order, told reporters that the blogger was detained under Section 73(1) of the ISA because he was deemed a threat to security, peace, and public order. The Minister explained that Raja Petra's detention came in the wake of various statements published by him in his blog "Malaysia Today," the latest being a commentary which allegedly ridiculed Islam and the Prophet Muhammad. Syed Hamid stated, "We have called and advised him many times following the publishing of his statements but he has continued to write, so much so that they (the statements) could pose a threat (to security and public order)." The Minister added that under Section 73(1) of the Act, Raja Petra would be detained for 60 days and the police will do an assessment during the period. Syed Hamid added "if they feel he should be held more than 60 days, the police will then refer to me". Traditionally the minister will accept the recommendations made by the police and sign the order under Section 8(1) of the Act, which allows the person to be detained for renewable two-year periods. ¶4. (U) This is the second time Raja Petra has been detained under the ISA. The government of then Prime Minister Mahathir detained Raja Petra under the ISA in April 2001 for his involvement in former DPM Anwar Ibrahim initiated "reformasi" movement. He was held for 53 days before being unconditionally released, reportedly due to pressure from the King, the late Sultan of Selangor who was Raja Petra,s uncle. The current Sultan of Selangor is his cousin. ¶5. (U) Raja Petra's arrest came a day after the Cabinet ordered the Multimedia and Communications Commission (MCMC) to re-instate access to all blocked websites, including Raja Petra's "Malaysia Today" website (which was blocked on August 27). Energy, Water and Com-mu-nications Minister Shaziman Abu Mansor stated on September 12 that the Cabinet ordered the move because there were other "harsher" laws in the country, including the ISA, to "control the irresponsible dissemination of information over the Internet and to bring those irresponsible websites and blogs to book." ¶6. (C) Comment: Malaysia's on-line news sources and blogs have blossomed over recent years as an alternative to the government dominated mainstream media. This trend has only increased after the March 8 elections, in which Abdullah and his UMNO party suffered a major setback. Raja Petra is considered the most outspoken and controversial Internet journalist, and is often a proponent of opposition views. Aside from his ISA arrest, Raja Petra faces sedition charges for articles implicating Deputy Prime Minister Najib in an ongoing high profile murder case. Raja Petra's arrest is another sign of insecurity on the part of Abdullah and the UMNO party. The government's use of ISA sends a strong warning to other opposition bloggers to curb their activities. This arrest may intimidate some activists, but it also could result in a backlash by the independent media and bloggers, and increase public disaffection with Abdullah's leadership. ¶7. (C) As PM Abdullah and his UMNO party become increasingly concerned over threats to bring down their government through the crossover of 30 more BN members of Parliament, Raja Petra's arrest also will be interpreted here as a warning to the political opposition and its leader Anwar Ibrahim. Opposition officials consistently have expressed concern that the government could invoke ISA if they advance too far. While not determinate given the fluid political situation and UMNO's disarray, today's arrest of Raja Petra lends support to the view that the UMNO-led government will take stern measures to defend itself. End Comment. ¶8. (U) The Embassy offers the following draft "if asked" press guidance. Q: WHAT IS THE U.S. REACTION TO THE ARREST TODAY (SEPTEMBER 12) OF BLOGGER RAJA PETRA KAMARDUDDIN UNDER MALAYSIA'S INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA)? A: We understand from press accounts that Malaysian police detained Raja Petra, who is associated with the "Malaysia Today" website, under an article of the Internal Security Act covering threats to "security, peace, and public order". We cannot comment further on the specific grounds for the Malaysian government's actions. We are aware that Raja Petra also faces legal complaints and charges of sedition related to information posted on the website. The United States firmly believes that freedom of the press and freedom of speech are fundamental components of a vibrant democracy. Freedom of expression is a basic right embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The peaceful expression of political views is a cornerstone of democratic rights and practice, as is the impartial application of the rule of law. (IF ASKED SPECIFICALLY ON MALAYSIA'S USE OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT) A: As a matter of principle, we hope that countries refrain from using national security laws to curtail the peaceful expression of political views and media freedom. KEITH
Bernd Pulch 
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