TOP-SECRET -DOCUMENTS IMPLICATE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT IN CHIQUITA TERROR SCANDAL

Company’s Paramilitary Payoffs made through Military’s ‘Convivir’

U.S. Embassy told of “potential” for groups “to devolve into full-fledged paramilitaries”

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 217

U.S. intelligence assessments like this 1997 CIA report were consistently pessimistic about the prospects that the Colombian military would take on illegal paramilitary groups.

Washington D.C., October 18, 2011 – New documents published today by the National Security Archive shed light on recent revelations about the links between bananas and terror in Colombia and the Colombian government’s own ties to the country’s illegal paramilitary forces.

The scandal is further detailed in an article by National Security Archive Colombia analyst Michael Evans published today on the Web site of The Nation magazine.

The March 9, 2007, indictment against Chiquita Brands International sheds light on both corporate and state ties to Colombia’s illegal paramilitary forces.

Earlier this month, Chiquita, the international fruit corporation, admitted to funding a Colombian terrorist group and agreed to pay a $25 million fine. The Justice Department indictment, filed March 13 in D.C. Federal Court, states that Chiquita gave more than $1.7 million to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC), an illegal right-wing anti-guerrilla group tied to many of the country’s most notorious civilian massacres.

Key documents from the Chiquita case, along with a collection of newly-available declassified documents, are posted here today.

The payments were made over seven years from 1997-2004. At least $825,000 in payments came after the AUC was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department in 2001.

Many of these payments were made through “intermediaries” in a Colombian government-sponsored program known as Convivir, a network of rural security cooperatives established by the military to police rural areas and provide intelligence on leftist insurgents. Declassified documents suggest that Convivir members often collaborated with paramilitary operations.

The Convivir connection is especially important now, as current President Álvaro Uribe was a key sponsor of the program while governor of Anitoquia department. Antioquia’s banana-growing Urabá region is also the locus of Chiquita’s Colombia operations. As president, Uribe has implemented similar programs involving the use of civilian informants and soldiers.

The article published today, along with additional documents included here, describes a pattern of increasingly-strong links between military and paramilitary forces in Urabá over the period of Chiquita’s payments to the AUC. Chiquita’s relationship with the group coincided with a massive projection of paramilitary power thoughout Colombia. U.S. officials strongly suspected that these operations were at least tolerated by–and at times coordinated with–Colombian security forces.

The Chiquita-Convivir scandal comes as the Los Angeles Times has published a report that the CIA has new information connecting Colombia’s Army chief, Gen. Mario Montoya, one of President Uribe’s top advisers, to a paramilitary group. The new allegation adds fuel to the “para-politics” scandal, which has already taken down several top government officials and implicated many others in connection to the AUC.

Today’s posting is the first in a series of new Archive postings on the U.S. government’s perception of Colombia’s paramiltary movement and its links to Colombian security forces. Under a program developed by the Uribe government to disarm and demobilize the AUC, paramilitary leaders are eligible for reduced prison sentences in exchange for voluntary confessions and the payment of reparations to their victims. However, the commission established to adjudicate this process is not authorized to investigate state crimes or the history of the government’s links to paramilitary forces.

Documents made available on the Archive Web site today include:

  • the Justice Department’s indictment in the Chiquita case, detailing the company’s relationship with AUC chief Carlos Castaño, the fugitive (and now deceased) paramilitary leader;
  • a U.S. Embassy cable in which Colombia’s police intelligence chief “sheepishly” admitted that his forces “do not act” in parts of the country under AUC control;
  • another Embassy cable in which Ambassador Myles Frechette warned that the government’s Convivir program was liable to “degenerate into uncontrolled paramilitary groups”;
  • a U.S. military intelligence report on a Colombian Army colonel who told of the “potential” for the Convivir “to devolve into full-fledged paramilitaries”;
  • and CIA reports on the Colombian Army’s paramilitary ties, one of which found that armed forces commanders had “little inclination to combat paramilitary groups.”

The full article is available on the Web site of The Nation.


Documents
The following documents are in PDF format.
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NOTE: With the exception of the Justice Department indictment, all documents published here were obtained by the Archive’s Colombia Documentation Project through Freedom of Information Act requests.

THE INDICTMENT

United States of America v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Defendant, March 13, 2007

The indictment details Chiquita’s seven-year relationship with Carlos Castaño’s AUC. The paramilitary chief arranged the payments in 1997 with Banadex, a wholly-owned Chiquita subsidiary. Castaño “informed the [Banadex] General Manager that the AUC was about to drive the FARC [guerrillas] out of Urabá,” and also that “failure to make the payments could result in physical harm to Banadex personnel and property.”

The company was to “make payments to an intermediary known as a ‘convivir,'” groups used by the AUC “as fronts to collect money from businesses for use to support its illegal activities.” The Convivir were rural security cooperatives established by the military to police rural areas and provide intelligence on leftist insurgents.

The Justice Department lists some 50 payments made by Chiquita after the State Deparment designated the AUC a terrorist organization in September 2001. The company made at least 19 of these payments after the company voluntarily disclosed the payments to the Justice Department in April 2003, and despite strong warnings from its lawyers to terminate the relationship.

Must stop payments,” read one note quoted in the indictment.

Bottom Line: CANNOT MAKE THE PAYMENT
“Advised NOT TO MAKE ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT throught CONVIVIR.”
“General Rule: Cannot do indirectly what you cannot do directly.”

“You voluntarily put yourself in this position. Duress defense can wear out through repetition. Buz [business] decision to stay in harm’s way. Chiquita should leave Colombia.”

DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

Document 1: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, Botero Human Rights Letter to A/S Shattuck, December 9, 1994

The U.S. Embassy was skeptical when first confronted with the Colombian defense ministry’s plan to create the network of “rural security cooperatives” that would ultimately come to be known as Convivir. In a cable that covered an array of human rights issues, Ambassador Myles Frechette was emphatic about the proposal’s inherent dangers:

“We believe that the point that needs to be made to the minister is that Colombia’s protracted, vaguely ideological internal conflict is quite sui generis and that there has never been an example in Colombia of a para-statal security group that has not ultimately operated with wanton disregard for human rights or been corrupted by local economic interests.”

Document 2: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report, Colar 17th Brigade Responsible for the Uraba Antioquia Region, April 29, 1996

This report from the U.S. military attaché in Colombia describes the security situation in Urabá, the region where much of Chiquita’s operations are located. The document describes a tense situation involving ongoing struggles between EPL and FARC guerrillas, “fighting each other for control of unions and politics in the banana area.” According to the indictment, from 1989 until the AUC payments began in 1997, Chiquita had been making similar payments to Colombian guerilla groups. The commander of the Army’s local 17th Brigade, Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, told the attaché “that paramilitaries are the only individuals that subversive elements fear.”

Document 3: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, Samper Hosts Governors’ Meeting on Crime, October 9, 1996

Following a meeting with Colombian President Ernesto Samper and other government officials, the U.S. Embassy reported that Antioquia Governor Álvaro Uribe (the current president of Colombia) had called for “the proliferation of the controversial civilian rural security cooperatives known collectively as ‘Convivir.'” Uribe said that the Convivir had “led to the capture of guerrilla leaders in the region,” and called on the government to arm some of the groups. The Embassy adds the comment that “most human rights observers believe the Convivir groups pose a serious danger of becoming little more that vigilante organizations.” The government’s human rights ombudsman had “begun to receive complaints against these groups for exceeding their mandate,” according to the Embassy report.

Document 4: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, 40,000 Colombians March to Protest Wave of Kidnappings; Paramilitary Group Releases Two Guerrilla Relatives, December 2, 1996

In a testament to the AUC’s growing influence among Colombian security forces, Colombia’s police intelligence chief “sheepishly” told U.S. Embassy officers that “the police ‘do not act’ in the part of Urabá under [Carlos] Castano’s control.” The statement came in response to an Embassy query as to why Colombian police had not arrested Castaño, “who had openly admitted to kidnapping guerrilla relatives.”

Document 5: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report, Colombian Prosecutor Comments on Paramilitaries in Uraba, December 7, 1996

Paramilitaries had become “a law unto themselves” in Urabá constituting “a potentially greater threat to the government than … the guerrillas,” according to this military intelligence report, based on comments from a Colombian prosecutor. The document describes the violence there as “basically a turf war to determine which group [paramilitaries or guerrillas] will control the rich banana-growing region (and the lucrative illicit narcotics operations within it).” The report adds that, “The military’s influence and control over paramilitaries that we so often logically assume to exist may, in fact, be tenuous at best and non-existent in some cases.”

Document 6: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, Retired Army Colonel Lambastes Military for Inaction Against Paramilitaries, January 11, 1997

In January 1997, retired Army Colonel Carlos Alfonso Velásquez publicly criticized the Colombian Army, particularly 17th Brigade Commander Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, for tolerance of paramilitary forces in Urabá. In this cable, the U.S. Embassy characterizes Velásquez as a man of “unquestionable integrity,” adding that his statements “bring extra pressure to bear on the Colombian military” and “add credibility” to the State Department’s critical human rights report on Colombia.

Document 7: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report, Guerrillas Launch New Wave of Bombings in Uraba and Cordoba — Paramilitaries Respond with Murder and Kidnappings (Laser Strike), March 14, 1997

U.S. military intelligence reports ongoing violence in Urabá, noting that, “Recent events contrast sharply with earlier 17th Brigade reports claiming that Uraba had largely been pacified.” The report says it remains unclear whether a recent shift by FARC guerillas to “terrorist-style bombings” represents “a long-term FARC strategy, or a temporary tactic for retaliating against the paramilitaries for driving them out of certain conflictive zones and discouraging the civilian population from assisting paramilitary organizations.” The document adds that the Colombian government had only recently “acknowledged that paramilitaries are a valid threat to public order that requires attention.”

Document 8: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report, The Convivir in Antioquia — Becoming Institutionalized and Spreading Its Reach, April 7, 1997

In this document, an undisclosed source describes how the Convivir operate in Antioquia. The interlocutor was “insistent that there are striking differences between the legal … sanctioned Convivirs and the illegal paramilitaries that are declared enemies of the state.” The Convivir are merely “one more ‘legal tool’ for integrating counterguerrilla-oriented elements into society.”

Document 9: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, MoD Alleged to have Authorized Illegal Arms Sales to Convivirs and Narcotraffickers, April 9, 1997

In April 1997, a Colombian magazine published allegations that officials in Colombia’s Ministry of Defense had illegally sold weapons to Convivir linked to narcotraffickers and paramilitaries. This highly-excised document indicates that U.S. Embassy military and diplomatic contacts had “lent a significant degree of credibility to the allegations.”

Document 10: U.S. State Department, cable, Bedoya Call for Militia, April 11, 1997

In this cable, the State Department’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin America, Peter Romero, criticizes a new plan by Gen. Harold Bedoya, the armed forces commander, to create “national militias.” Romero mentions problems the government has had with the Convivir program, adding that “establishing yet another set of armed combatants would, if experience is any guide, bring a host of more flagrant human rights abuses.”

Document 11: CIA, Intelligence Report, Colombia: Paramilitaries Gaining Strength, June 13, 1997

This CIA report finds “scant indication that the [Colombian] military leadership is making an effort to directly confront the paramilitary groups or to devote men or resources to stop their activities in an amount commensurate with the dimensions of the problem.” Logistical problems and the “popular perception that the military is ‘losing the war’ against the guerrillas” has had a profound effect on military forces. As a result of these frustrations, “informational links and instances of active coordination between military and paramilitaries are likely to continue,” according the the CIA.

The following month–in an operation that signalled the beginning of a major expansion of paramilitary power throughout Colombia–Urabá-based paramilitaries under the direction of Carlos Castaño would massacre some 30 civilians at Mapiripán, an act later shown to have been facilitated by local military forces.

Document 12: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report, Senior Colombian Army Officer Biding His Time During Remainder of Samper Regime, July 15, 1997

A “senior Colombian Army officer” told U.S. offiicials in July 1997 that there were “serious problems with the legal ‘Convivir’ movement,” according to this military intelligence report. The unnamed officer compared the Convivir to the “Rondas Campesinas” in Peru, calling them “very difficult to control.” According to the colonel, the Ministry of Defense was aware of the “potential for Convivir’s to devolve into full-fledged paramilitaries,” but was “reluctant to admit it publicly.”

Document 13: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, Scandal Over Army Request to Convivir in Antioquia, October 8, 1997

This cable reports on the October 1997 revelation by Colombian Senator Fabio Valencia that a high-ranking Colombian Army officer had circulated a memo asking local Convivir organizations to “to send the Army lists of local candidates, including their political affiliations, degree of acceptance among the people, their sympathies toward democratic institutions, government and military forces, and what degree of local influence they wield.”

Document 14: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, Paramilitary Massacres Leave 21 Dead, November 24, 1997

After Mapiripán, one of the next major projections of paramilitary power in Colombia was the November 21, 1997, La Horqueta massacre, in which paramilitaries killed 14 people in a village outside the Colombian capital. Eyewitnesses believed the attackers came from Colombia’s northern coast, which the Embassy notes is “home of Carlos Castaño‘s paramilitary group.” A prominent Colombian expert told the Embassy that the massacre “sent a message to the FARC that the paramilitaries can go anywhere and do anything.” “The fact that no trace of the killers has turned up yet despite the presence of hundreds of police and soldiers in the wake of the killings is not encouraging,” according to the cable.

Document 15: CIA, Intelligence Report, Colombia: Update on Links Between Military, Paramilitary Forces, December 2, 1997

This highly-excised CIA report states that “prospects for a concerted effort by the military high command to crack down on paramilitaries–and the officers that cooperate with them–appear dim.” Both the current and former armed forces chiefs–Gens. Manuel Bonett and Harold Bedoya–had shown “little inclination to combat paramilitary groups.” Tacit acceptance of paramilitary operations by some officers “are longstanding and will not be easily reversed,” according to the report.

The CIA calls the recent paramilitary expansion into traditionally guerrilla-controlled territory “the most significant change we have seen in recent months and one which has further degraded Colombia’s already poor security and human rights situation.” The Mapiripán massacre was one notable example. One intelligence source told the CIA “that Castano would not have flown forces and weapons into a civilian airport known to have a large police presence if he had not received prior assurances that they would be allowed to pass through.”

Document 16: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report, Cashiered Colonel Talks Freely about the Army He Left Behind (Laser Strike), December 24, 1997

There is a “body count syndrome” in the Colombian Army’s counterinsurgency strategy that “tends to fuel human rights abuses by otherwise well-meaning soldiers trying to get their quota to impress superiors,” according to a recently-retired Colombian Army colonel whose comments form the basis of this intelligence report. According to the officer, the obsession with body counts is in part responsible for commanders “allowing the paramilitaries to serve as proxies for the [Colombian army] in contributing to the guerrilla body count.” The 17th Brigade in Urabá had been cooperating with paramilitaries “for a number of years,” he said, but it “had gotten much worse” under the command of Gen. Rito Alejo del Río. Gen. Del Río was later indicted but ultimately acquitted of collusion with paramilitaries by the Prosecutor General’s office in May 2003.

The officer was critical of several other high-level military commanders, including Gen. Jorge Enrique Mora, who would later serve as armed forces commander. Mora had a clean public reputation, according to the officer, but was “probably was one of those who looked the other way” with respect to collaboration with paramilitaries. Former armed forces commander Gen. Harold Bedoya “fell into the same category,” in that both officers “never allowed themselves to become directly involved in encouraging or supporting paramilitary activities, but they turned their backs to what was happening and felt the [Colombian army] should in no way be blamed for any resulting human rights atrocities committed.”

Document 17: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, Narcos Arrested for La Horqueta Paramilitary Massacre, January 28, 1998

One of the perpetrators of the November 1997 La Horqueta massacre (see Document 14) was identified as the president of an Urabá-based Convivir, according to this U.S. Embassy cable. The Convivir member was “imported to the region” by a “local landowner and presumed narcotrafficker who had hired … Uraba-based paramilitaries to execute the massacre.”

The local Army 13th Brigade was “strangely non-reactive” to the killings, according to the cable. The brigade, the Embassy adds, “recently came under the command of BG Rito Alejo del Rio, who earned considerable attention as the commander of the 17th Brigade covering the heartland of Carlos Castano’s paramilitaries in Cordoba and Uraba.”

Document 18: CIA, Intelligence Report, Colombia: Paramilitaries Assuming a Higher Profile, August 31, 1998

Similar to a previous document on the matter, this CIA report finds that “some senior military officers–already suspicious of the peace process and frustrated with the military’s dismal performance on the battlefield–may increasingly view turning a blind eye–and perhaps even offering tacit support to–the paramilitaries as their best option for striking back at the guerrillas.” Like the previous report, this one also predicts that “informational links and instances of active coordination between the military and the paramilitaries” were “likely to continue and perhaps even increase.”

Document 19: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, A Closer Look at Uribe’s Auxiliary Forces, September 11, 2002

Soon after taking office in 2002, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe announced that a key aspect of his national security strategy would involve the use of civilian soldiers organized into local militias. Key portions of this U.S. Embassy cable on the use of “auxiliary forces” were deleted before release by the State Department, suggesting that the Embassy may have harbored reservations about the program based on the government’s previous experience with the Convivir.

TOP-SECRET:Los documentos de Chiquita

Este es un fragmento de una nota manuscrita de 2000 en la que se describe que Chiquita pagó a grupos armados por seguridad y no como una extorsión. National Security Archive.Haga clic en la foto para ampliar.

Cientos de memorandos internos de la multinacional bananera Chiquita Brands, desclasificados por el National Security Archive, muestran que la empresa hizo pagos a guerrilleros, paramilitares y miembros del Ejército a cambio de seguridad.

Por Michael Evans especial para VerdadAbierta.com*

Memorandos confidenciales internos de Chiquita Brands International revelan que el gigante del banano se benefició de sus pagos a grupos paramilitares colombianos y la guerrilla, contradiciendo el acuerdo de culpabilidad (plea agreement) que firmó con fiscales de Estados Unidos de 2007, en el que alegó que nunca había recibido “ningún servicio de seguridad o equipos de seguridad a cambio de los pagos”. Chiquita había tildado estos pagos como una “extorsión”.

Chiquita entregó miles de documentos al Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos como parte de un acuerdo de sentencia, en el que admitió años de pagos ilegales a las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, Auc, grupo que el Departamento de Estado había señalado como “organización terrorista extranjera” y con el que acordó pagar una multa de 25 millones de dólares.

El National Security Archive obtuvo más de 5.500 páginas de documentos internos de Chiquita del Departamento de Justicia bajo un derecho de petición en EE.UU (Freedom of Information Act) y publica en línea varios de estos documentos que están incluídos en la colección: Colombia y los Estados Unidos: Violencia Política, Narcotráfico y Derechos Humanos, 1948-2010.

Los papeles proporcionan evidencia de “transacciones” de beneficio mutuo entre las filiales colombianas de Chiquita y varios grupos armados ilegales en Colombia y arroja claridad sobre más de una década de pagos relacionados con la seguridad a la guerrilla, los paramilitares, las fuerzas colombianas de seguridad y las cooperativas privadas Convivir, grupos armados auspiciados por el gobierno.

La colección de documentos también detalla los esfuerzos de la compañía por ocultar lo que denominaron pagos “delicados” en las cuentas de gastos de los directivos de la empresa y a través de diferentes trucos contables (Ver documento).

La investigación del Departamento de Justicia concluyó que muchos de los pagos de Chiquita a las Auc (también llamadas como “Autodefensas” en muchos de los documentos) se realizaron a través de organizaciones legales Convivir supervisadas por el ejército colombiano.

Estas nuevas pruebas de que Chiquita se benefició de los pagos ilícitos pueden aumentar su exposición a demandas de las víctimas de grupos armados ilegales de Colombia. La colección es el resultado de una colaboración National Security Archive con la Universidad de Georgetown, su Escuela de Leyes y Derechos Humanos y la Clínica de Abogados y Justicia Pública, y se ha utilizado en apoyo de una demanda civil contra Chiquita encabezado por Earth Rights International a nombre de cientos de víctimas colombianas de los paramilitares.

“Estos registros extraordinarios son las pruebas más detalladas hasta la fecha del verdadero costo de hacer negocios en Colombia”, dijo Michael Evans, director del proyecto de documentación de Colombia del National Security Archive. “El aparente acuerdo de Chiquita con las guerrillas y paramilitares es responsable de los incontables asesinatos, desmiente el acuerdo de culpabilidad firmado por la empresa con el Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos”.

El esfuerzo de la compañía para ocultar los indicios de sus nexos con grupos armados ilegales en Colombia es evidente en un par de memorandos legales de enero de 1994. El primero de ellos indica que las guerrillas le prestaban seguridad en algunas de las plantaciones de Chiquita.

El director general de operaciones de Chiquita en Turbo dijo a abogados de la compañía que los guerrilleros fueron “utilizados para suministrar el personal de seguridad en diferentes granjas”.

Una anotación manuscrita en un documento membreteado de la compañía, clasificado como confidencial, se pregunta: “¿Por qué es relevante?” y, “¿Por qué está siendo escrito?”. En el documento los abogados han tachado la palabra “transacciones” – lo que sugiere un acuerdo de canje- y lo sustituyeron por el término más neutro de “pagos”. Los contables de la empresa incluyeron los gastos como “pagos de extorsión de guerrillas”, pero los registraron en los libros como “seguridad ciudadana”, de acuerdo con estas notas.

Otro documento muestra que Chiquita también pagó a paramilitares por servicios de seguridad -incluyendo información de inteligencia sobre las operaciones de la guerrilla- después de que las Auc arrebataron el control de la región a la guerrilla, a mediados de la década de 1990.

En marzo de 2000, el abogado senior de Chiquita, Robert Thomas, escribió un memo (ver) de una conversación con los directores de la filial en Colombia de Chiquita, Banadex, en la que indican que los paramilitares de Santa Marta crearon una empresa ficticia, Inversiones Manglar, para ocultar “el verdadero propósito de garantizar la seguridad”.

Inversiones Manglar se presentaba como una empresa de exportación agrícola, pero producía “información sobre los movimientos guerrilleros”, según la nota. Según Thomas, funcionarios de Banadex le dijeron que “todas las compañías bananeras están contribuyendo en Santa Marta” y que Chiquita “debe continuar haciendo los pagos”, ya que “no se puede obtener el mismo nivel de apoyo (seguridad) de los militares”.

Los papeles de Chiquita también destacan el papel de los militares colombianos para presionar a la empresa a financiar a las Auc a través de las Convivir y para facilitar los pagos ilegales.

Un indicio de esto se encuentra en otro documento escrito por Thomas, en septiembre de 2000, que describe una reunión en 1997, con el líder de las Auc, Carlos Castaño, quien sugirió por primera vez a los directores de Banadex apoyar la creación de la Convivir llamada La Tagua del Darién.

Según la nota, los funcionarios de Banadex adujeron que “no tenían más remedio que asistir a la reunión” porque no hacerlo sería “antagonizar con los militares de Colombia, funcionarios locales y estatales, y las Autodefensas”.

Entre los funcionarios que más apoyaron las Convivir durante este tiempo se encontraba Álvaro Uribe, entonces gobernador de Antioquia, en el que tenía su centro de operaciones Chiquita en Colombia. En el memo de septiembre de 2000, Thomas señala: “Es bien conocido en el momento en que oficiales de alto rango del ejército colombiano y el Gobernador del Departamento de Antioquia estaban haciendo campaña para el establecimiento de una organización Convivir de Urabá”.

Un memorando de 1995 indica que, tanto Uribe como otro político de la región, Alfonso Núñez, recibieron donaciones de otra de las filiales en Colombia de Chiquita, la Compañía Frutera de Sevilla. Uribe fue presidente de Colombia desde 2002 hasta 2010.

Más tarde, un memo legal de agosto de 1997 escrito en papel membretado de Chiquita, dice que la empresa era “miembro de una Convivir llamada Puntepiedra, SA”, que el autor clasifica como “una persona jurídica en la que participamos con otros exportadores de banano en la región de Turbo”. La nota dice que la “única función” de las Convivir era “proporcionar información sobre los movimientos guerrilleros.”

La compañía había estado haciendo pagos sensibles de seguridad durante años – primero en forma directa a militares y grupos guerrilleros, y luego, a través de organizaciones comerciales locales y Convivir-. Para 1991, unos 15 mil dólares de “pagos delicados” para las diversas unidades del ejército colombiano se muestran junto a un desembolso de más de 31 dólares a “guerrilla” (Ver documento).

Una versión diferente del mismo documento no solo omite los nombres de los beneficiarios de pagos, sino que incluye una anotación manuscrita junto a la “guerrilla”. Una entrada dice: “Pago extorsión.” Otra anotación dice: “Sobre todo no son pagos ilegales – estos son legales – gasolina, el ejército, la policía, los políticos . El pago no ofrece nada, ni beneficios”.

Registros contables de 1997-1998 también señalan el papel de las fuerzas de seguridad colombianas en el fomento de pagos de la empresa a paramilitares.

A partir del segundo trimestre de 1997 y hasta el segundo trimestre de 1998, Banamex realizó pagos a cooperativas “Convivir”, que registraron como “donación al grupo de ciudadanos de reconocimiento a petición del Ejército.” En 2002(ver documento) y 2003(ver documento), la empresa realizó pagos similares a cooperativas Convivir junto con desembolsos a “funcionarios militares y de Policía” para “pagos de servicios de seguridad.”

Otro documento escrito a mano de 1999 revela un aparente esfuerzo por un general del Ejército de Colombia para establecerse como un intermediario en los pagos de los paramilitares. El documento describe a un “general que ha estado en la zona desde hace varios años” que había sido acusado por el alcalde de San José de Apartadó de ser parte de “[un] escuadrón de la muerte” y que había sido “suspendido del Ejército”.

El documento señala que el general “nos ha ayudado personalmente” con “seguridad” y con “información que impidió secuestros”. Las notas hacen referencia indirecta a un pago de 9 mil dólares, agregando que “otras compañías están poniendo en sus…”

“Los papeles de Chiquita refuerzan la idea de que, en 1997, las Auc crecieron en las regiones bananeras del norte de Colombia, y que los funcionarios del gobierno local, oficiales militares y líderes empresariales apoyaron a sus operaciones paramilitares”, dijo Evans.

“Estas revelaciones son más que académicas”, dijo el profesor Arturo Carrillo, Director de la Clínica Internacional de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Georgetown. “Los documentos refuerzan la media docena de demandas federales pendientes en contra de Chiquita, que la empresa fue cómplice, y por lo tanto responsable de las atrocidades cometidas por las Auc en Urabá. Uno sólo puede esperar que revelando la información obtenida y publicada por el National Security Archive se dará lugar a una mayor responsabilidad por las acciones criminales de Chiquita en Colombia, ya que con el acuerdo de la empresa con el Departamento de Justicia, este se ha negado a procesar a los ejecutivos de Chiquita por su mal accionar”.

“La publicación de estos documentos es sólo el comienzo”, agregó Evans. “Las miles de páginas de registros financieros y jurídicos incluidos en esta colección son las semillas de futuros proyectos de investigación para los que estén dispuestos a reconstruir la compleja red de legales, pseudo-legales, y las entidades ilegales que participaron en operaciones de seguridad de Chiquita, incluyendo oficiales militares, la guerrilla, los paramilitares, empresarios prominentes, las asociaciones comerciales y las milicias Convivir”.

* Michael Evans es director del Proyecto Documental de Colombia del National Security Archive.

Última actualización el Viernes, 08 de Abril de 2011 06:00

TOP-SECRET: The Chiquita Papers-Banana Giant’s Paramilitary Payoffs Detailed in Trove of Declassified Legal, Financial Documents

March 2000 notes of Chiquita Senior Counsel Robert Thomas indicate awareness that payments were for security services.

Banana Giant’s Paramilitary Payoffs Detailed in Trove of Declassified Legal, Financial Documents

Evidence of Quid Pro Quo with Guerrilla, Paramilitary Groups Contradicts 2007 Plea Deal

Colombian Military Officials Encouraged, Facilitated Company’s Payments to Death Squads

More than 5,500 Pages of Chiquita Records Published Online by National Security Archive

Bogotá, Colombia, April 7, 2011 – Confidential internal memos from Chiquita Brands International reveal that the banana giant benefited from its payments to Colombian paramilitary and guerrilla groups, contradicting the company’s 2007 plea agreement with U.S. prosecutors, which claimed that the company had never received “any actual security services or actual security equipment in exchange for the payments.” Chiquita had characterized the payments as “extortion.”

These documents are among thousands that Chiquita turned over to the U.S. Justice Department as part of a sentencing deal in which the company admitted to years of illegal payments to the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)–a State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization–and agreed to pay a $25 million fine. The Archive has obtained more than 5,500 pages of Chiquita’s internal documents from the Justice Department under the Freedom of Information Act and is publishing the entire set online today. Key documents from the Chiquita Papers are included in the recently-published document collection, Colombia and the United States: Political Violence, Narcotics, and Human Rights, 1948-2010, now available as part of the Digital National Security Archive from ProQuest.

The documents provide evidence of mutually-beneficial “transactions” between Chiquita’s Colombian subsidiaries and several illegal armed groups in Colombia and shed light on more than a decade of security-related payments to guerrillas, paramilitaries, Colombian security forces, and government-sponsored Convivir militia groups. The collection also details the company’s efforts to conceal the so-called “sensitive payments” in the expense accounts of company managers and through other accounting tricks. The Justice Department investigation concluded that many of Chiquita’s payments to the AUC (also referred to as “Autodefensas” in many of the documents) were made through legal Convivir organizations ostensibly overseen by the Colombian army.

New evidence indicating that Chiquita benefited from the illicit payments may increase the company’s exposure to lawsuits representing victims of Colombia’s illegal armed groups. The collection is the result of an Archive collaboration with George Washington University Law School’s International Human Rights and Public Justice Advocacy Clinics and has been used in support of a civil suit brought against Chiquita led by Earth Rights International on behalf of hundreds of Colombian victims of paramilitary violence.

“These extraordinary records are the most detailed account to date of the true cost of doing business in Colombia,” said Michael Evans, director of the National Security Archive’s Colombia documentation project. “Chiquita’s apparent quid pro quo with guerrillas and paramilitaries responsible for countless killings belies the company’s 2007 plea deal with the Justice Department. What we still don’t know is why U.S. prosecutors overlooked what appears to be clear evidence that Chiquita benefited from these transactions.”

The company’s effort to conceal indications that it benefited from the payments is evident in a pair of legal memos from January 1994. The first of these indicates that leftist guerrillas provided security at some of Chiquita’s plantations. The general manager of Chiquita operations in Turbó told company attorneys that guerrillas were “used to supply security personnel at the various farms.” A handwritten annotation on a subsequent draft of the document asks, “Why is this relevant?” and, “Why is this being written?” Throughout the document, lawyers have crossed out the word “transactions”–suggestive of a quid pro quo arrangement–and replaced it with the more neutral term “payments.” Company accountants characterized the expenditures as “guerrilla extortion payments” but recorded them in the books as “citizen security,” according to these memos. (Note 1)

Another document shows that Chiquita also paid right-wing paramilitary forces for security services–including intelligence on guerrilla operations–after the AUC wrested control of the region from guerrillas in the mid-1990s. The March 2000 memo, written by Chiquita Senior Counsel Robert Thomas and based on a convesation with managers from Chiquita’s wholly-owned subsidiary, Banadex, indicate that Santa Marta-based paramilitaries formed a front company, Inversiones Manglar, to disguise “the real purpose of providing security.” (Note 2)

Ostensibly an agricultural export business, Inversiones Manglar actually produced “info on guerrilla movements,” according to the memo. Banadex officials told Thomas that “all other banana companies are contributing in Santa Marta” and that Chiquita “should continue making the payments” as they “can’t get the same level of support from the military.”

The Chiquita Papers also highlight the role of the Colombian military in pressuring the company to finance the AUC through the Convivir groups and in facilitating the illegal payments.

One indication of this is found in another document written by Thomas in September 2000 describing the 1997 meeting where notorious AUC leader Carlos Castaño first suggested to Banadex managers that they support a newly-established Convivir called La Tagua del Darien. According to the memo, the Banadex officials said that they had “no choice but to attend the meeting” as “refusing to meet would antagonize the Colombia military, local and state govenment officials, and Autodefensas.” (Note 3)

Among the officials most supportive of the Convivir groups during this time was Álvaro Uribe, then the governor of Antioquia, the hub of Chiquita’s operations in Colombia. Thomas’ September 2000 memo notes that, “It was well-known at the time that senior officers of the Colombian military and the Governor of the Department of Antioquia were campaigning for the establishment of a Convivir organization in Uraba.” A 1995 memo indicates that both Uribe and another politician, Alfonso Nuñez, received substantial donations from another of Chiquita’s Colombian subsidiaries, Compañía Frutera de Sevilla. Uribe was president of Colombia from 2002-2010.

Later that year, an August 1997 legal memo written on Chiquita letterhead says that the company was “member[s] of an organization called CONVIVIR Puntepiedra, S.A.,” which the author characterizes as “a legal entity in which we participate with other banana exporting companies in the Turbó region.” The memo says that the “sole function” of the the Convivir was “to provide information on guerrilla movements.”

The company had been making sensitive security payments for years–first in the form of direct payoffs to military officers and guerrilla groups, then through local trade organizations and the Convivir militias. For 1991, some $15,000 worth of “sensitive payments” to various units of the Colombian military are listed alongside a more than $31,000 disbursement to “Guerrilla.” A different version of the same document omits the names of the payment recipients but includes a handwritten annotation next to the “Guerrilla” entry that says, “Extortion Payment.” Another annotation reads, “Mainly not illegal payments — these are legal — pay gasoline, army, police, politicians — payment doesn’t provide anything or benefits.” [Emphasis added.]

Accounting records from 1997-1998 also point to the role of Colombian security forces in encouraging the company’s illegal paramilitary payments. Beginning in the second quarter of 1997 and continuing through the second quarter of 1998, sensitive payment schedules for Banadex record large payments to “Convivir” as “Donation to citizen reconaissance group made at request of Army.” Similar records from 2002 and 2003 list Convivir payments alongside disbursements to “Military and Police Officials” for “Facilitating payments for security services.”

Another handwritten document from 1999 reveals an apparent effort by a Colombian Army general to establish himself as an intermediary for the paramilitary payments. The document (transcribed here) describes a “General in the zone for several years” who had been accused of being “with [a] death squad” by the mayor of San José de Apartadó (Note 4) and had been “suspended from the Army.” The document notes that the general had “helped us personally” with “Security” and “information that prevented kidnaps.” The notes make oblique reference to a $9,000 payment, adding that “Other companies are putting in their…”

“The Chiquita Papers reinforce the idea that, by 1997, the AUC ran the show in the banana-growing regions of northern Colombia, and that local government officials, military officers, and business leaders supported their paramilitary operations,” said Evans.

“These troublesome revelations are more than academic,” said Professor Arturo Carrillo, Director of GW’s International Human Rights Clinic. “They reinforce the claim, advanced in half a dozen federal lawsuits currently pending against Chiquita, that the company was knowingly complicit in, and thus liable for, the atrocities committed by the AUC in Urabá while on the Chiquita payroll. One can only hope that the revealing information obtained and published by the National Security Archive will lead to greater accountability for Chiquita’s criminal actions in Colombia, since the company’s plea agreement with the Justice Department, which has refused to prosecute Chiquita executives for wrongdoing, amounts to little more than a slap on the corporate wrist.”

“The publication of these documents is just the beginning,” added Evans. “The thousands of pages of financial and legal records included in this collection are the seeds of future research projects for investigators prepared to deconstruct the complex web of legal, psuedo-legal, and illegal entities involved in Chiquita’s security operations, including military officers, guerrillas, paramilitary thugs, prominent businessmen, trade associations, and Convivir militias.”


The Chiquita Papers – A Selected Chronology

The following is a chronological list of some of the most interesting documents in the Chiquita Papers as selected by the National Security Archive.

1990 April 19First of many Chiquita memos on the subject of “Accounting for Sensitive Payments.”

1992 February 21 – Lists “Sensitive Payments” for Chiquita subsidiary Compañía Frutera de Sevilla in 1991, including disbursements to the Naval Station, Operative Command, the Army in Turbó, and the Guerrilla. Purpose for all: “Expedite Turbo operation.” [See annotated version.]

1992 May 8 – Chiquita legal memo on whether support for Colombian military counterinsurgency operations through a “trade association of banana exporters” known as Fundiban is a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

1992 February 21 – Some $15,000 worth of “sensitive payments” to various units of the Colombian military are listed alongside a more than $31,000 disbursement to “Guerrilla.” A different version of the same document omits the names of the payment recipients but includes a handwritten annotation next to the “Guerrilla” entry that says, “Extortion Payment.” Another annotation reads, “Mainly not illegal payments — these are legal — pay gasoline, army, police, politicians — payment doesn’t provide anything or benefits.” [Emphasis added.]

1992 September 20 – Transcription of voicemail left for Chiquita’s general counsel from contact in Medellín, Colombia.

1993 August 10A handwritten note based on discussion with Chiquita in-house counsel notes indicates that company has begun to channel its security payments to the Colombian Army through a “banana association” in Turbó known as “Agura” at a price of three cents per box of bananas shipped.

1994 January 4Draft legal memo describes reporting of transactions in Turbó and Santa Marta for “security purposes and payments to the respective trade association.” The outlays are described as “guerrilla extortion payments” made through “our intermediary or Security Consultant, Rene Osorio,” who is said to be the company’s “contact with the various guerrilla groups in both Divisions.” The guerrilla payments are called “citizen security” and are “expensed via the Manager’s Expense Account.” The author of the memo was told by the General Manager in Turbó “that the Guerrilla Groups are used to supply security personnel at the various farms.”

1994 January 5 – Second draft of January 4, 1994, memo includes annotations asking, “Why is this relevant?” and, “Why is this being written?”

1994 June 10 – Memo from Chiquita counsel (Medellín) to Chiquita in-house counsel discusses Colombian legal standards in cases of kidnapping and exotortion; notes that Constitutional Court decision that “when a person acts under one of the justified circumstances” they act in a “State of Necessity” and “cannot be penalized.”

1995 February 20Chiquita memo describes payments to Álvaro Uribe ($5935 on Oct. 24, 1994) and Alfonso Nuñez ($2000 on Oct. 30, 1994), both candidates for governor of Antioquia.

1997 February 3 – Memo from local outside counsel (Medellín) to Chiquita in-house counsel discusses application of Colombian law in cases of extortion and finds that “when one acts in a state of necessity, no punishment will be applied.” … “In other words, a person who pays for extortion is a victim, not an accomplice to the crime, and therefore cannot be punished.”

1997 May 7 – Handwritten notes: “Spent approx $575,000 over last 4 years on security payments = Guerrilla payments”; “$222,000 in 1996 — $21,763 Convivir – Rest guerrillas”; “Budget for 1997 — $80,000 Guerrillas — $120,000 Convivir”; “[Deleted] indicates Convivirs legal”; “Not FCPA issue”

“Cost of doing business in Colombia – Maybe the question is not why are we doing this but rather we are in Colombia and do we want to ship bananas from Colombia.”
“Need to keep this very confidential – People can get killed.”

1997-1998 – Sensitive payment schedules for Banadex record large payments to “Convivir” as “Donation to citizen reconaissance group made at request of Army.”

1997 August ca. – In-house attorney handwritten notes regarding “Convivir”:
“CONVIVIR PUNTE PIEDRA, S.A.”
“(We have our own)”
“Organismo Juridico … Participamos con las otras bananeras. (We were last to participate)”
“We pay [cents]0.03/box. Wk 18/1997 – Wk 17/199[8?]”
“Under military supervision. Proporcionan información and some are armed (but they’re not paramilitary groups?). Radios, motorcycles”
Legalmente operan en Colombia
“Negotiate through a lawyer. We are not shareholders. We don’t know who the owners are. Pushed by the gov’t locally and the military.”

1997 August 29 – Memo written Chiquita in-house counsel says, “we currently are members of an organization called CONVIVIR Puntepiedra, S.A., a legal entity in which we participate with other banana exporting companies in the Turbo region. Banadex currently pays $0.03 per box to this CONVIVIR.” Memo also says that the Convivir “operate under military supervision (and have offices at the military bases)” and that “their sole function is to provide information on guerrilla movements.”

1997 September 9Memo from local outside counsel (Baker & McKenzie) regarding “Payments to guerrilla groups” in response to Chiquita query regarding legal consequences of such payments “in case of extortion or kidnapping.” Baker memo highlights Colombian Constitutional Court challenge to 1993 law that made it a crime for foreign companies to pay extortion/ransom and that “necessity” is a condition under which such payments are permitted. However, the memo also says that “he who obtains personal benefit from a state of necessity … incurs in a criminal action.”

1999 July 6In-house counsel notes discuss former Colombian “general” forced out of military for supposed association with “death squads.” Notes indicate that the officer “helped us personally” with “security” and “information that prevented kidnaps.” Notes also say that “Turbo improved while he was there.” Note also refers obliquely to $9,000 payment.

2000 March 6Chiquita in-house counsel handwritten notes about front company set up by paramilitaries in Santa Marta to collect security payments from Banadex.
“disguised the real purpose of providing security”
“don’t know who the shareholders are”
“Same people who formed Convivir formed this new company; govt won’t permit another Convivir; too much political pressure re: para-military”
“Don’t know whether the gov’t is aware what this organization does.”
“Military in Santa Marta may know what this company does. Military won’t acknowledge formally that they know what the corporation does.”
“Note: In Turbo we issue a check to Convivir [or/of] another code name and deliver it to a variety of intermediaries for transfer to Convivir.”
“Tagua del Darien is name of cooperative formed as part of Convivir movement.”
“Santa Marta  3[cents]/box; first payment in October 1999. Money for info on guerrilla movements; info not given to gov’t military.”
“Checks made out to Inversiones Manglar SA à Asociacion Para la Paz Del Magdalena.”
“Natural persons w/ no affiliation to military formed Inversions Manglar S.A.”
“[Deleted] says we should continue making the payments; can’t get the same level of support from the military.”

2000 September ca.Draft memo details initial meetings between paramilitaries and Banadex officials.

2001 May 7 – Outside local counsel (Posse, Herrera & Ruiz) provides legal analysis of Convivir organizations: “We should underline that the legality of payments, is subject to the due observance of the requisites described above. In addition the actual use … of contributed funds should be borne in mind. If funds are used for the conduction of activities that comply with legal requirements, legality of such payments will be preserved. However, if funds are used in connection of activities beyond the scope authorized … including the conductions of activities that are contrary to law, the actual (or even constructive) knowledge of such activities by the contributing party may taint such payments as illegal and even result in criminal prosecution.”

2003 ca.PowerPoint presentation on options for how to conceal improper payments.

2004 January 28 – Chiquita turns over attorney-client privileged documents to Dept. of Justice. Memo from counsel Kirkland & Ellis describes scope and limitations of the documents provided.

2007 March 13 – The U.S. Department of Justice reaches a plea deal with Chiquita for making payments to the AUC, a designated foreign terrorist organization.


Notes

1. A 1997 legal memo drawn up by Chiquita’s U.S. counsel specifically warned that an extortion defense would not apply in situations where the company actually benefited from the payments. Another legal memo from the company’s attorneys in Colombia cautioned that payments to ostensibly legal Convivir militias could be considered illegal if there were actual or constructive knowledge that they were connected to illegal activities.

2. Although Thomas’ name does not appear in any of these records, his authorship has been confirmend by comparing the documents to the report of the Special Litigation Committee (SLC) established by Chiquita’s Board of Directors that issued its final report in 2009.

3. Although the identity of the paramilitary leader who first approached the Banadex officials is not revealed in the redacted document, both the SLC report and the sentencing agreement confirm that it was Castaño who was at the meeting and who personally requested that the company support the La Tagua group.

4. The “Peace Community” of San José de Apartadó is one of several Colombia towns that during this time had taken a neutral position in the country’s civil conflict.