โœŒ”Chinaโ€™s Financial Meltdown: 40 Banks Vanish in Days, Property Crisis Cripples Economy”โœŒ

ไธญๅ›ฝๅธ‚ๅœบ้œ‡ๅŠจ๏ผš้“ถ่กŒๅŽ‹ๅŠ›ใ€ไธๅ‹•็”ฃไฝŽ่ฟทไธŽ็ปๆตŽ็ดงๅผ  / ไธญๅ›ฝๅธ‚ๅ ดใฎๆบใ‚Œ๏ผš้Š€่กŒใฎๅœงๅŠ›ใ€ไธๅ‹•็”ฃไฝŽ่ฟทใ€็ตŒๆธˆ็š„็ทŠๅผต

“Floating Lanterns Light Up a Shuttered Street: Hope Flickers Amid Chinaโ€™s Financial Turmoil / ๅ…ณ้—ญ็š„่ก—้“ไธŠๆผ‚ๆตฎ็š„็ฏ็ฌผ๏ผšไธญๅ›ฝ้‡‘่žๅŠจ่กไธญ็š„ๅธŒๆœ›ไน‹ๅ…‰”

“Floating Lanterns Over a Shuttered Bank: A Symbol of Hope Amid China’s Financial Collapse”

BY BERND PULCH

Key Points

  • It seems likely that 40 Chinese banks closed recently, mainly small rural lenders, due to property sector issues and local government debt, though exact details are unclear.
  • Research suggests the worst-performing banks include rural banks like Jiangxi Bank and major ones like ICBC, facing high non-performing loans (NPLs).
  • The evidence leans toward Chinese stocks, finance firms, and property firms like Evergrande being heavily impacted by economic slowdowns.
  • The Chinese economy, especially property, appears to be in crisis, with prices dropping and recovery not expected until 2026, affecting global markets.

Recent Bank Closures

In July 2024, reports indicate that 40 Chinese banks, primarily small rural lenders, closed or were merged, with 36 absorbed by Liaoning Rural Commercial Bank and Jiangxi Bank collapsing amid customer panic. The exact list of these banks is not fully disclosed, reflecting China’s opaque financial system, but they were high-risk with significant exposure to real estate and local government debts.

Rankings of Worst Entities

Below are rankings based on available data, focusing on NPLs, profit declines, and sector exposure:

Worst Chinese Banks

  1. Rural Commercial Banks in Liaoning Province (NPL ratios up to 40%)
  2. Jiangxi Bank (collapsed in July 2024, profits down 30%)
  3. Henan Rural Banks (past scandals, deposit freezes)
  4. Inner Mongolia Small Banks (high risk from indebted regions)
  5. Big Five Banks (ICBC, CCB, BoC, AgBank, BoCom, with profit drops like ICBC -4%)

Worst Chinese Bank Stocks

  1. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) (601398.SS, 4% profit drop, high local debt exposure)
  2. China Construction Bank (CCB) (601939.SS, 4% profit decline)
  3. Bank of China (BoC) (601988.SS, 2.9% profit drop, rising NPLs)
  4. Agricultural Bank of China (AgBank) (601288.SS, high NPL ratios)
  5. Hong Kong-Listed Banking Sector Index (.HSMBI, plummeted 10% in 2023)

Worst Finance Firms

  1. Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs, $4.2 trillion debt, major bank risk)
  2. China Investment Corp (under anti-corruption scrutiny)
  3. China Renaissance (chairman disappeared in 2023, investor confidence shaken)
  4. Small-Scale Wealth Management Firms (tied to rural banks, real estate risks)
  5. Third-Party Auditors (lack of oversight exacerbates small bank risks)

Worst Property Firms

  1. China Evergrande (liquidated in 2024, massive debt default)
  2. Vanke (000002.SZ, shares down 19% from 2007 peak)
  3. Country Garden (struggling with debt repayments)
  4. Sunac China (defaulted on bonds, part of $1 trillion debt crisis)
  5. Kaisa Group (heavily indebted, defaults strained lenders)

Derivatives and Corporates

  • Derivatives: China’s market is opaque, with banks exposed to property-linked products, posing systemic risks.
  • Worst Corporates: State-owned enterprises in coal and steel face overcapacity, private firms tied to Evergrandeโ€™s supply chain are defaulting.

Analysis of Chinese Economy and Property

Research suggests Chinaโ€™s economy is struggling, with the property sectorโ€”a key 13.4% of GDP since 2013โ€”in crisis. Home prices are dropping, with recovery not expected until 2026 . Developer defaults like Evergrandeโ€™s have left banks with high NPLs, up to 40% for some rural lenders. Local government debt, held by major banks, adds pressure, and the lack of a Financial Stability Law hinders crisis management. Exports are weak, consumer spending cautious, and U.S.-China trade tensions worsen the outlook, potentially slowing Chinaโ€™s 5% growth target for 2025.


Survey Note: Detailed Analysis of Chinaโ€™s Banking and Economic Crisis

Introduction
On May 16, 2025, reports from July 2024 highlight a significant banking crisis in China, with 40 banks closing or being merged in a single week, primarily small rural lenders. This event, coupled with ongoing economic challenges, particularly in the property sector, underscores systemic vulnerabilities. This note provides a comprehensive analysis, including a partial list of closed banks, rankings of worst-performing entities, and an in-depth look at the Chinese economy, focusing on property, based on available data from 2023-2025.

Recent Bank Closures and Context
The closure of 40 banks in July 2024, as reported by sources like 40 banks were closed in one week in China and Mergers and closures loom for China’s 3,800 rural banks, involved 36 banks absorbed by Liaoning Rural Commercial Bank and Jiangxi Bankโ€™s collapse amid customer panic. These banks, averaging RMB 15 billion ($2.1 billion) in assets, were high-risk rural lenders with significant exposure to real estate and local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). The lack of a complete list reflects Chinaโ€™s opaque financial system, a tactic seen in past crises like the 2022 Henan banking scandal, where depositors faced delays in compensation. This opacity suggests more closures among the 3,800 rural banks, holding $7.5 trillion in assets (13% of Chinaโ€™s banking system), are possible.

Ranking of Worst-Performing Entities
The crisis reveals vulnerabilities across sectors, with rankings based on NPL ratios, profit declines, and exposure to troubled sectors like real estate and LGFVs.

Worst Chinese Banks

Table 1 lists the worst-performing banks, with rural banks leading due to high NPL ratios (up to 40% versus the industry average of 1.6%, per Let Chinaโ€™s small banks failโ€“ analyst) and collapses like Jiangxi Bank. Major banks like ICBC and CCB also face pressure, with Q1 2025 profit drops of 4% .

RankBankKey Issue
1Rural Commercial Banks in Liaoning ProvinceNPL ratios up to 40%, absorbed in mergers
2Jiangxi BankCollapsed in July 2024, profits down 30%
3Henan Rural BanksPast scandals, deposit freezes
4Inner Mongolia Small BanksHigh risk from indebted regions
5Big Five Banks (ICBC, CCB, BoC, AgBank, BoCom)Profit drops (e.g., ICBC -4%), shrinking margins

Worst Chinese Bank Stocks

Bank stocks, particularly those of major lenders, have been hit hard. ICBC (601398.SS) saw shares fall after a 4% profit drop, with exposure to $4.2 trillion in local government debt. The Hong Kong-Listed Banking Sector Index (.HSMBI) plummeted 10% in 2023 sessions after downgrades .

RankStockKey Issue
1Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)4% profit drop, high local debt exposure
2China Construction Bank (CCB)4% profit decline, narrowing margins
3Bank of China (BoC)2.9% profit drop, rising NPLs
4Agricultural Bank of China (AgBank)High NPL ratios, property-related losses
5Hong Kong-Listed Banking Sector IndexPlummeted 10% in 2023, post-downgrade

Worst Finance Firms

Finance firms, especially those tied to LGFVs and shadow banking, face significant risks. LGFVs hold $4.2 trillion in debt, a major burden on banks. China Investment Corp is under scrutiny in Xi Jinpingโ€™s anti-corruption campaign, while China Renaissanceโ€™s chairman disappearance in 2023 shook investor confidence .

RankFinance FirmKey Issue
1Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs)$4.2 trillion debt, major bank risk
2China Investment CorpUnder anti-corruption scrutiny
3China RenaissanceChairman disappeared in 2023, investor shakeup
4Small-Scale Wealth Management FirmsTied to rural banks, real estate risks
5Third-Party AuditorsLack of oversight, exacerbates small bank risks

Worst Property Firms

The property sector, accounting for 13.4% of GDP since 2013, is in crisis, with developers like Evergrande ordered to liquidate in 2024, triggering banking losses. Vankeโ€™s shares dropped 19% from their 2007 peak, and Country Garden struggles with debt repayments .

RankProperty FirmKey Issue
1China EvergrandeLiquidated in 2024, massive debt default
2VankeShares down 19% from 2007 peak
3Country GardenStruggling with debt repayments
4Sunac ChinaDefaulted on bonds, part of $1 trillion crisis
5Kaisa GroupHeavily indebted, defaults strained lenders

Derivatives and Corporates

Chinaโ€™s derivatives market is opaque, with banks exposed to property-linked financial products, posing systemic risks due to the lack of a robust bankruptcy framework. Corporates, especially state-owned enterprises in coal and steel, face overcapacity, increasing NPLs, while private firms tied to Evergrandeโ€™s supply chain are defaulting .

Analysis of Chinese Economy and Property Sector
The Chinese economy, as of May 2025, is grappling with a structural slowdown, with the property sector in crisis. Home prices are dropping, with a 4.60% year-over-year decline in March 2025 , and recovery not expected until 2026 . Developer defaults have left banks with rising NPLs, up to 40% for some rural lenders, per Let Chinaโ€™s small banks failโ€“ analyst. LGFVs add pressure, with major banks holding $4.2 trillion in debt, and the absence of a Financial Stability Law, delayed in June 2024, hinders crisis management. Exports are weak, consumer spending cautious post-pandemic, and U.S.-China trade tensions, with rising tariffs, darken prospects, potentially slowing Chinaโ€™s 5% growth target for 2025 . Xi Jinpingโ€™s anti-corruption crackdown, targeting financial elites, aims to centralize control but risks spooking investors, while the governmentโ€™s reluctance to let small banks fail, unlike Spainโ€™s FROB model, reflects fears of social unrest, as seen in Henanโ€™s 2022 protests.

Global Implications
A Chinese banking crisis could ripple globally, with $7.5 trillion in rural bank assets and the property sectorโ€™s $1 trillion debt threatening stability. Tightened credit could curb investment and consumption, slowing growth, and reduced Chinese demand for commodities could depress global markets, destabilizing foreign investors holding Chinese bonds or equities .

Conclusion
The closure of 40 banks in July 2024 is a symptom of deeper malaise, with opaque governance, unchecked lending, and a property bubble creating a perfect storm. While consolidation buys time, structural reforms are needed to prevent further turbulence as Chinaโ€™s economic engine sputters.

ไธญๅ›ฝๅธ‚ๅœบ้œ‡ๅŠจ๏ผš้“ถ่กŒๅŽ‹ๅŠ›ใ€ไธๅ‹•็”ฃไฝŽ่ฟทไธŽ็ปๆตŽ็ดงๅผ 

ๅ…ณ้—ญ็š„่ก—้“ไธŠๆผ‚ๆตฎ็š„็ฏ็ฌผ๏ผšไธญๅ›ฝ้‡‘่žๅŠจ่กไธญ็š„ๅธŒๆœ›ไน‹ๅ…‰

้‡่ฆ่ฆ็‚น

  • ๆˆช่‡ณ2025ๅนด5ๆœˆ19ๆ—ฅ๏ผŒไธญๅ›ฝๆœ€่ฟ‘ๆœชๆŠฅๅ‘Š้‡ๅคง้“ถ่กŒๅ…ณ้—ญ๏ผŒไฝ†ๆฎๅคง็บชๅ…ƒๆŠฅ้“๏ผŒ2024ๅนดๆœ‰199ๅฎถไธญๅฐ้“ถ่กŒๆณจ้”€๏ผŒๆ˜พ็คบ้‡‘่žไฝ“็ณป็š„่„†ๅผฑๆ€งใ€‚
  • ๆœ€ๅทฎ่กจ็Žฐ็š„้“ถ่กŒๅŒ…ๆ‹ฌๅœฐๆ–น้“ถ่กŒ๏ผŒ่ฟ™ไบ›้“ถ่กŒๅฏนไธ่‰ฏ่ดทๆฌพ๏ผˆNPL๏ผ‰ๅ’Œๅ•†ไธšๆˆฟๅœฐไบง๏ผˆCRE๏ผ‰ๆœ‰้ซ˜ๆ›ๅ…‰ๅบฆ๏ผŒไปฅๅŠๅƒไธญๅ›ฝๅŽ่ž่ฟ™ๆ ท็š„ๅคงๅž‹่ต„ไบง็ฎก็†ๅ…ฌๅธ๏ผŒ้ขไธด่ต„ไบง่ดŸๅ€บ่กจ่†จ่ƒ€้—ฎ้ข˜ใ€‚
  • ่‚กๅธ‚ใ€้‡‘่žๅ…ฌๅธๅ’Œๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๅ…ฌๅธๅ—ๅˆฐไธๅ‹•็”ฃไปทๅ€ผไธ‹้™ใ€้ซ˜ๅˆฉ็އๅ’Œๅ‡บๅฃ็–ฒ่ฝฏ็š„ๅŽ‹ๅŠ›๏ผŒๅƒๆ’ๅคง่ฟ™ๆ ท็š„ๅ…ฌๅธๅทฒ่ฟ็บฆ๏ผŒๅŠ ๅ‰งไบ†็ปๆตŽๅ›ฐๅขƒใ€‚
  • ไธญๅ›ฝ็ปๆตŽๆ˜พ็คบๅ‡บ่„†ๅผฑๆ€ง๏ผŒๆˆฟๅœฐไบง่กŒไธšๅฐคๅ…ถๆ˜ฏCREๅค„ไบŽๅฑๆœบไน‹ไธญ๏ผŒๆถˆ่ดน็–ฒ่ฝฏๅ’Œ่ดธๆ˜“ๆˆ˜่ฟ›ไธ€ๆญฅๅŠ ๅ‰งไบ†้—ฎ้ข˜ใ€‚

ๆœ€่ฟ‘็š„้“ถ่กŒๅ…ณ้—ญ

ๆˆช่‡ณ2025ๅนด5ๆœˆ19ๆ—ฅ๏ผŒไธญๅ›ฝๅฐšๆœช็ปๅކ็ฑปไผผ2024ๅนด7ๆœˆ40ๅฎถ้“ถ่กŒๅ€’้—ญ็š„ๅคง่ง„ๆจก้“ถ่กŒๅ…ณ้—ญๆตชๆฝฎใ€‚็„ถ่€Œ๏ผŒ้‡‘่ž็ณป็ปŸๆญฃๆ‰ฟๅ—ๅทจๅคงๅŽ‹ๅŠ›ใ€‚ๆ นๆฎๅคง็บชๅ…ƒ็š„ๆ•ฐๆฎ๏ผŒ2024ๅนดๆœ‰199ๅฎถไธญๅฐ้“ถ่กŒ่ขซๆณจ้”€๏ผŒๆ˜พ็คบๅ‡บๅœฐๆ–น้“ถ่กŒ็š„่„†ๅผฑๆ€งใ€‚ไธญๅ›ฝ็š„โ€œๅ››ๅคงโ€่ต„ไบง็ฎก็†ๅ…ฌๅธโ€”โ€”ไธญๅ›ฝไฟก่พพใ€ไธญๅ›ฝๅŽ่žใ€ไธญๅ›ฝ้•ฟๅŸŽๅ’Œไธญๅ›ฝไธœๆ–นโ€”โ€”่ขซ็งฐไธบโ€œ้‡‘่žๆ€ช็‰ฉโ€๏ผŒๅ…ถ่ต„ไบง่ดŸๅ€บ่กจๅทฒ่†จ่ƒ€ๅˆฐ้™ๅˆถๅ…ถๆ•‘ๅŠฉ่ƒฝๅŠ›็š„็จ‹ๅบฆใ€‚ๅŽ่žๅœจ2021ๅนด4ๆœˆ็š„้—ฎ้ข˜ๆ›พๅผ•ๅ‘ๆŠ•่ต„่€…ๅฏนไธญๅ›ฝ็พŽๅ…ƒๅ€บๅˆธๅธ‚ๅœบ็š„ๆๆ…Œ๏ผŒ่€Œ้•ฟๅŸŽๅœจ2022ๅนดๆŽจ่ฟŸๅ‘ๅธƒๅนดๅบฆๆŠฅๅ‘Š๏ผŒ่ฟ›ไธ€ๆญฅๆšด้œฒไบ†่กŒไธšๅผฑ็‚นใ€‚ๆ’ๅคง็ญ‰ไธป่ฆๅผ€ๅ‘ๅ•†็š„่ฟ็บฆๅผ•ๅ‘ไบ†่ฟž้”ๅๅบ”๏ผŒๅขžๅŠ ไบ†ไธ่‰ฏ่ดทๆฌพ๏ผŒๅจ่ƒๅˆฐๆ•ดไธช้‡‘่žไฝ“็ณปใ€‚


ๆœ€ๅทฎ่กจ็Žฐๅฎžไฝ“็š„ๆŽ’ๅ

ไธญๅ›ฝๆœ€ๅทฎ้“ถ่กŒ

  1. ๅœฐๆ–น้“ถ่กŒ๏ผˆCRE้ซ˜ๆ›ๅ…‰๏ผ‰๏ผšไธ่‰ฏ่ดทๆฌพๆฏ”ไพ‹ไธŠๅ‡๏ผŒๅฐคๅ…ถๆ˜ฏๅ•†ไธšๆˆฟๅœฐไบง่ดทๆฌพใ€‚
  2. ไธญๅ›ฝๅŽ่ž่ต„ไบง็ฎก็†ๅ…ฌๅธ๏ผš่ต„ไบง่ดŸๅ€บ่กจ่†จ่ƒ€๏ผŒ2021ๅนด้—ฎ้ข˜ๅผ•ๅ‘ๅ€บๅˆธๅธ‚ๅœบๆๆ…Œใ€‚
  3. ไธญๅ›ฝ้•ฟๅŸŽ่ต„ไบง็ฎก็†ๅ…ฌๅธ๏ผš2022ๅนดๆŽจ่ฟŸๅ‘ๅธƒๅนดๆŠฅ๏ผŒๆ˜พ็คบ่ดขๅŠกๅŽ‹ๅŠ›ใ€‚
  4. ไธญๅ›ฝไธœๆ–น่ต„ไบง็ฎก็†ๅ…ฌๅธ๏ผšๆˆฟๅœฐไบงไธ่‰ฏๅ€บๅŠกๅค„็†่ƒฝๅŠ›ๅ—้™ใ€‚
  5. ไธญๅฐ้“ถ่กŒ๏ผš2024ๅนด199ๅฎถ้“ถ่กŒๆณจ้”€๏ผŒๅœฐๆ–น็ปๆตŽไฝŽ่ฟทๅŠ ๅ‰ง้ฃŽ้™ฉใ€‚

ๆœ€ๅทฎ้“ถ่กŒ่‚ก็ฅจ

  1. ไธญๅ›ฝๅŽ่ž๏ผˆHuarong๏ผ‰๏ผš2021ๅนดๅ€บๅˆธไปทๆ ผๆšด่ทŒ๏ผŒๆŠ•่ต„่€…ไฟกๅฟƒๅ—ๆŒซใ€‚
  2. ไธญๅ›ฝ้•ฟๅŸŽ๏ผˆGreat Wall๏ผ‰๏ผšๆŽจ่ฟŸ่ดขๅŠกๆŠฅๅ‘Š๏ผŒๅ€บๅˆธไปทๆ ผๆณขๅŠจใ€‚
  3. ไธญๅ›ฝไฟก่พพ๏ผˆCinda๏ผ‰๏ผš2022ๅนด7ๆœˆๅ‘ๅธƒ็›ˆๅˆฉ้ข„่ญฆ๏ผŒๅˆฉๆถฆไธ‹้™30-35%ใ€‚
  4. ๅœฐๆ–น้“ถ่กŒๆŒ‡ๆ•ฐ๏ผšๅๆ˜ ไธญๅฐ้“ถ่กŒ็š„ๆ•ดไฝ“ๅŽ‹ๅŠ›ใ€‚
  5. ไธญๅ›ฝ้“ถ่กŒ๏ผˆBank of China๏ผ‰๏ผšๆˆฟๅœฐไบง่ดทๆฌพ้ฃŽ้™ฉไธŠๅ‡ใ€‚

ๆœ€ๅทฎ้‡‘่žๅ…ฌๅธ

  1. ๅฝฑๅญ้“ถ่กŒ๏ผšๅฏนไธญๅ›ฝๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๆณกๆฒซ็š„้ซ˜้ฃŽ้™ฉๆŠ•่ต„ใ€‚
  2. ๅœฐๆ–น่ต„ไบง็ฎก็†ๅ…ฌๅธ๏ผˆAMC๏ผ‰๏ผšไธŽๅœฐๆ–นๆ”ฟๅบœๅ…ณ็ณปๅฏ†ๅˆ‡๏ผŒไฝ†่ƒฝๅŠ›ๆœ‰้™ใ€‚
  3. ้ž้“ถ่กŒ่ดทๆฌพๆœบๆž„๏ผšๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๅธ‚ๅœบไฝŽ่ฟทๅฏผ่‡ด่ฟ็บฆๅขžๅŠ ใ€‚
  4. ๅฏนๅ†ฒๅŸบ้‡‘๏ผˆCREๆŠ•่ต„๏ผ‰๏ผšไธๅ‹•็”ฃไปทๅ€ผไธ‹้™ๅฏผ่‡ดๆŸๅคฑใ€‚
  5. ไฟ้™ฉๅ…ฌๅธ๏ผˆCRE็ป„ๅˆ๏ผ‰๏ผšๆˆฟๅœฐไบงไฝŽ่ฟทๅธฆๆฅ็š„ๆฝœๅœจๆŸๅคฑใ€‚

ๆœ€ๅทฎๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๅ…ฌๅธ

  1. ไธญๅ›ฝๆ’ๅคง๏ผˆEvergrande๏ผ‰๏ผš่ฟ็บฆๅผ•ๅ‘ๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๅฑๆœบ่ฟž้”ๅๅบ”ใ€‚
  2. ่žๅˆ›ไธญๅ›ฝ๏ผˆSunac๏ผ‰๏ผš้ซ˜ๅ€บๅŠกๅ’ŒๆตๅŠจๆ€ง้—ฎ้ข˜ใ€‚
  3. ็ขงๆก‚ๅ›ญ๏ผˆCountry Garden๏ผ‰๏ผš้”€ๅ”ฎไธ‹ๆป‘๏ผŒ่ดขๅŠกๅŽ‹ๅŠ›ๅขžๅคงใ€‚
  4. ไธ–่Œ‚้›†ๅ›ข๏ผˆShimao Group๏ผ‰๏ผšๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๅธ‚ๅœบไฝŽ่ฟทๅฏผ่‡ด่ฟ็บฆใ€‚
  5. ไฝณๅ…†ไธš๏ผˆKaisa Group๏ผ‰๏ผšๅ—ๅˆฐ็›‘็ฎก้™ๅˆถๅ’Œ้ซ˜ๅ€บๅŠกๅฝฑๅ“ใ€‚

่ก็”Ÿๅ“ๅ’Œไผไธš

  • ่ก็”Ÿๅ“๏ผš้“ถ่กŒๆŒๆœ‰็š„CRE็›ธๅ…ณ่ก็”Ÿๅ“้ขไธดไปทๅ€ผไธ‹้™้ฃŽ้™ฉใ€‚
  • ๆœ€ๅทฎไผไธš๏ผšๅปบ็ญ‘ใ€ๅปบๆๅ’Œๅฎถ็”ต่กŒไธšไผไธšๅ—ๅˆฐๆˆฟๅœฐไบงไฝŽ่ฟท็š„ๅ†ฒๅ‡ปใ€‚

ไธญๅ›ฝ็ปๆตŽไธŽๆˆฟๅœฐไบง่กŒไธš็š„ๅˆ†ๆž

2025ๅนด5ๆœˆ๏ผŒไธญๅ›ฝ็š„็ปๆตŽๅค่‹ๅ—ๅˆฐๆˆฟๅœฐไบงไฝŽ่ฟทๅ’Œๆถˆ่ดน็–ฒ่ฝฏ็š„ๆ‹–็ดฏใ€‚ๆ นๆฎๅ›ฝๅฎถ็ปŸ่ฎกๅฑ€็š„ๆ•ฐๆฎ๏ผŒ2024ๅนด7ๆœˆๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๆŠ•่ต„ๅŒๆฏ”ไธ‹้™10.2%๏ผŒๅปถ็ปญไบ†ๅนดๅˆไปฅๆฅ็š„่ถ‹ๅŠฟใ€‚ๆ’ๅคง็ญ‰ๅผ€ๅ‘ๅ•†็š„่ฟ็บฆๅฏผ่‡ดๆœชๅฎŒๅทฅ้กน็›ฎๆฟ€ๅขž๏ผŒๅฝฑๅ“ไบ†ๅปบ็ญ‘ใ€ๅปบๆๅ’Œๅฎถ็”ต็ญ‰็›ธๅ…ณ่กŒไธšใ€‚ๅœฐๆ–นๆ”ฟๅบœ้€š่ฟ‡ๅคง่ง„ๆจกๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๅผ€ๅ‘่Žทๅˆฉ๏ผˆ้ซ˜็››ไผฐ่ฎกไธบ8.4ไธ‡ไบฟ็พŽๅ…ƒ๏ผŒๅ GDP็š„่ฟ‘50%๏ผ‰๏ผŒไฝ†ไปทๆ ผไธ‹่ทŒๅ’Œๅบ“ๅญ˜่ฟ‡ๅ‰ฉๅŠ ๅ‰งไบ†ๅฑๆœบใ€‚2020ๅนด8ๆœˆๆŽจๅ‡บ็š„โ€œไธ‰ๆก็บข็บฟโ€ๆ”ฟ็ญ–้™ๅˆถไบ†ๅผ€ๅ‘ๅ•†็š„ๅ€Ÿ่ดท๏ผŒๅฏผ่‡ด่ฎธๅคšๅ…ฌๅธ็ ดไบง๏ผŒ่ฟ›ไธ€ๆญฅๅŽ‹ไฝŽไบ†ๆˆฟไปทใ€‚

ๆถˆ่ดนๅขž้•ฟๆ”พ็ผ“๏ผŒๅฑ…ๆฐ‘ไฟกๅฟƒ่„†ๅผฑใ€‚2025ๅนดๅˆ๏ผŒ้€š่ดง่†จ่ƒ€็އไธบ2.5%๏ผŒๅŠ ไธŠ่ดธๆ˜“ๆˆ˜๏ผˆ็พŽไธญๅ…ณ็จŽๆˆ˜ๅฐ†ๅ…ณ็จŽไปŽ145%้™่‡ณ30%๏ผ‰ๅฏผ่‡ดๅ‡บๅฃไธ‹้™๏ผŒไผ ็ปŸๅขž้•ฟๅผ•ๆ“Žๅ—้˜ปใ€‚2024ๅนด4ๆœˆ๏ผŒๆ–ฐๅขžไบบๆฐ‘ๅธ่ดทๆฌพไป…2800ไบฟๅ…ƒ๏ผŒๅŒๆฏ”ๆšด่ทŒ61%๏ผŒ่ฟœไฝŽไบŽๅธ‚ๅœบ้ข„ๆœŸ็š„7250ไบฟๅ…ƒ๏ผŒๆ˜พ็คบ่ดทๆฌพ้œ€ๆฑ‚ๅˆ›ๅކๅฒไฝŽ็‚นใ€‚ๅฑ…ๆฐ‘ๅ‚จ่“„ไธญ็š„ๅฎšๆœŸๅญ˜ๆฌพๅ ๆฏ”ๅˆ›ๅކๅฒๆ–ฐ้ซ˜๏ผŒ่กจๆ˜Žๆถˆ่ดน่€…ไปๅค„ไบŽโ€œๅŽปๆ ๆ†ๅŒ–โ€็Šถๆ€ใ€‚


่ฐƒๆŸฅๆŠฅๅ‘Š๏ผšไธญๅ›ฝ้“ถ่กŒไธŽ็ปๆตŽๆŒ‘ๆˆ˜็š„่ฏฆ็ป†ๅˆ†ๆž

ๅผ•่จ€
ๆˆช่‡ณ2025ๅนด5ๆœˆ19ๆ—ฅ๏ผŒไธญๅ›ฝๅฐšๆœช็ปๅކ2024ๅนด7ๆœˆ้‚ฃๆ ท็š„40ๅฎถ้“ถ่กŒๅ€’้—ญๅฑๆœบ๏ผŒไฝ†ๆˆฟๅœฐไบงไฝŽ่ฟทใ€ไธ่‰ฏ่ดทๆฌพๅขžๅŠ ๅ’Œ็ปๆตŽๆ”พ็ผ“ๅฏน้“ถ่กŒ็ณป็ปŸๆž„ๆˆๅจ่ƒใ€‚ๆœฌๆŠฅๅ‘Šๅˆ†ๆž้“ถ่กŒ็š„่„†ๅผฑๆ€ง๏ผŒๆŽ’ๅๆœ€ๅทฎ่กจ็Žฐ็š„ๅฎžไฝ“๏ผŒๅนถ่š็„ฆๆˆฟๅœฐไบง่กŒไธš๏ผŒๆŽข่ฎจไธญๅ›ฝ็ปๆตŽ็Žฐ็Šถใ€‚

ๆœ€่ฟ‘็š„้“ถ่กŒๅ…ณ้—ญไธŽ่ƒŒๆ™ฏ
2024ๅนด199ๅฎถไธญๅฐ้“ถ่กŒๆณจ้”€ๆ˜พ็คบๅ‡บ้‡‘่žไฝ“็ณป็š„ๅŽ‹ๅŠ›ใ€‚ๅ››ๅคง่ต„ไบง็ฎก็†ๅ…ฌๅธ่ต„ไบง่ดŸๅ€บ่กจ่†จ่ƒ€๏ผŒ้™ๅˆถไบ†ๅ…ถๆ•‘ๅŠฉ่ƒฝๅŠ›ใ€‚ๆ’ๅคง่ฟ็บฆๅผ•ๅ‘็š„่ฟž้”ๅๅบ”ๅขžๅŠ ไบ†ไธ่‰ฏ่ดทๆฌพ๏ผŒไธญๅฐ้“ถ่กŒๅ› ๅœฐๆ–นๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๅธ‚ๅœบ็š„้ซ˜ๆ›ๅ…‰ๅบฆ่€Œๅฐคไธบ่„†ๅผฑใ€‚

ๆœ€ๅทฎ่กจ็Žฐๅฎžไฝ“็š„ๆŽ’ๅ

ๆœ€ๅทฎ้“ถ่กŒ

ๆŽ’ๅ้“ถ่กŒไธป่ฆ้—ฎ้ข˜
1ๅœฐๆ–น้“ถ่กŒ๏ผˆCRE้ซ˜ๆ›ๅ…‰๏ผ‰ไธ่‰ฏ่ดทๆฌพๆฏ”ไพ‹ไธŠๅ‡๏ผŒๆˆฟๅœฐไบง่ดทๆฌพ้ฃŽ้™ฉ้ซ˜
2ไธญๅ›ฝๅŽ่ž่ต„ไบง็ฎก็†ๅ…ฌๅธ่ต„ไบง่ดŸๅ€บ่กจ่†จ่ƒ€๏ผŒๅ€บๅˆธๅธ‚ๅœบๆๆ…Œ
3ไธญๅ›ฝ้•ฟๅŸŽ่ต„ไบง็ฎก็†ๅ…ฌๅธๆŽจ่ฟŸ่ดขๅŠกๆŠฅๅ‘Š๏ผŒ่ดขๅŠกๅŽ‹ๅŠ›ๆ˜พ็Žฐ
4ไธญๅ›ฝไธœๆ–น่ต„ไบง็ฎก็†ๅ…ฌๅธๆˆฟๅœฐไบงไธ่‰ฏๅ€บๅŠกๅค„็†่ƒฝๅŠ›ๅ—้™
5ไธญๅฐ้“ถ่กŒ2024ๅนด199ๅฎถๆณจ้”€๏ผŒๅœฐๆ–น็ปๆตŽไฝŽ่ฟทๅŠ ๅ‰ง้ฃŽ้™ฉ

ๆœ€ๅทฎ้“ถ่กŒ่‚ก็ฅจ

ๆŽ’ๅ่‚ก็ฅจไธป่ฆ้—ฎ้ข˜
1ไธญๅ›ฝๅŽ่ž2021ๅนดๅ€บๅˆธไปทๆ ผๆšด่ทŒ๏ผŒๆŠ•่ต„่€…ไฟกๅฟƒๅ—ๆŒซ
2ไธญๅ›ฝ้•ฟๅŸŽๆŽจ่ฟŸ่ดขๅŠกๆŠฅๅ‘Š๏ผŒๅ€บๅˆธไปทๆ ผๆณขๅŠจ
3ไธญๅ›ฝไฟก่พพ2022ๅนดๅˆฉๆถฆไธ‹้™30-35%
4ๅœฐๆ–น้“ถ่กŒๆŒ‡ๆ•ฐๅๆ˜ ไธญๅฐ้“ถ่กŒ็š„ๆ•ดไฝ“ๅŽ‹ๅŠ›
5ไธญๅ›ฝ้“ถ่กŒๆˆฟๅœฐไบง่ดทๆฌพ้ฃŽ้™ฉไธŠๅ‡

ๆœ€ๅทฎ้‡‘่žๅ…ฌๅธ

ๆŽ’ๅ้‡‘่žๅ…ฌๅธไธป่ฆ้—ฎ้ข˜
1ๅฝฑๅญ้“ถ่กŒๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๆณกๆฒซ้ซ˜้ฃŽ้™ฉๆŠ•่ต„
2ๅœฐๆ–น่ต„ไบง็ฎก็†ๅ…ฌๅธ๏ผˆAMC๏ผ‰่ƒฝๅŠ›ๆœ‰้™๏ผŒๅœฐๆ–นๆ”ฟๅบœๅ€บๅŠกๅŽ‹ๅŠ›
3้ž้“ถ่กŒ่ดทๆฌพๆœบๆž„ๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๅธ‚ๅœบไฝŽ่ฟทๅฏผ่‡ด่ฟ็บฆๅขžๅŠ 
4ๅฏนๅ†ฒๅŸบ้‡‘๏ผˆCREๆŠ•่ต„๏ผ‰ไธๅ‹•็”ฃไปทๅ€ผไธ‹้™ๅฏผ่‡ดๆŸๅคฑ
5ไฟ้™ฉๅ…ฌๅธ๏ผˆCRE็ป„ๅˆ๏ผ‰ๆˆฟๅœฐไบงไฝŽ่ฟทๅธฆๆฅ็š„ๆฝœๅœจๆŸๅคฑ

ๆœ€ๅทฎๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๅ…ฌๅธ

ๆŽ’ๅๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๅ…ฌๅธไธป่ฆ้—ฎ้ข˜
1ไธญๅ›ฝๆ’ๅคง๏ผˆEvergrande๏ผ‰่ฟ็บฆๅผ•ๅ‘ๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๅฑๆœบ่ฟž้”ๅๅบ”
2่žๅˆ›ไธญๅ›ฝ๏ผˆSunac๏ผ‰้ซ˜ๅ€บๅŠกๅ’ŒๆตๅŠจๆ€ง้—ฎ้ข˜
3็ขงๆก‚ๅ›ญ๏ผˆCountry Garden๏ผ‰้”€ๅ”ฎไธ‹ๆป‘๏ผŒ่ดขๅŠกๅŽ‹ๅŠ›ๅขžๅคง
4ไธ–่Œ‚้›†ๅ›ข๏ผˆShimao Group๏ผ‰ๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๅธ‚ๅœบไฝŽ่ฟทๅฏผ่‡ด่ฟ็บฆ
5ไฝณๅ…†ไธš๏ผˆKaisa Group๏ผ‰็›‘็ฎก้™ๅˆถๅ’Œ้ซ˜ๅ€บๅŠกๅฝฑๅ“

่ก็”Ÿๅ“ๅ’Œไผไธš

  • ่ก็”Ÿๅ“๏ผš้“ถ่กŒๆŒๆœ‰็š„CRE็›ธๅ…ณ่ก็”Ÿๅ“้ขไธดไปทๅ€ผไธ‹้™้ฃŽ้™ฉใ€‚
  • ๆœ€ๅทฎไผไธš๏ผšๅปบ็ญ‘ใ€ๅปบๆๅ’Œๅฎถ็”ต่กŒไธšไผไธšๅ—ๅˆฐๆˆฟๅœฐไบงไฝŽ่ฟท็š„ๅ†ฒๅ‡ปใ€‚

ไธญๅ›ฝ็ปๆตŽไธŽๆˆฟๅœฐไบง่กŒไธš็š„ๅˆ†ๆž
2024ๅนด7ๆœˆ๏ผŒๆˆฟๅœฐไบงๆŠ•่ต„ไธ‹้™10.2%๏ผŒๆถˆ่ดน็–ฒ่ฝฏๆ‹–็ดฏ็ปๆตŽๅค่‹ใ€‚่ดธๆ˜“ๆˆ˜ๅ’Œๅ‡บๅฃไธ‹้™ๅ‰Šๅผฑไบ†ไผ ็ปŸๅขž้•ฟๅผ•ๆ“Ž๏ผŒ่€Œๅœฐๆ–นๆ”ฟๅบœๅ€บๅŠก๏ผˆๅ GDP็š„50%๏ผ‰ๅ’Œๅบ“ๅญ˜่ฟ‡ๅ‰ฉๅŠ ๅ‰งไบ†ๅฑๆœบใ€‚ๅฑ…ๆฐ‘ไฟกๅฟƒไฝŽ่ฟท๏ผŒ่ดทๆฌพ้œ€ๆฑ‚ๅˆ›ๅކๅฒไฝŽ็‚น๏ผŒๅฎšๆœŸๅญ˜ๆฌพๅ ๆฏ”ๅˆ›ๆ–ฐ้ซ˜ใ€‚

ๅ…จ็ƒๅฝฑๅ“
ไธญๅ›ฝ้‡‘่žไธ็จณๅฎšๅฏ่ƒฝๆณขๅŠๅ…จ็ƒๅธ‚ๅœบ๏ผŒๅ‡บๅฃไธ‹้™ๅฝฑๅ“่ดธๆ˜“๏ผŒ้“ถ่กŒ็ณป็ปŸๅŽ‹ๅŠ›ๅฏ่ƒฝๅฏผ่‡ดไฟก่ดท็ดง็ผฉ๏ผŒๅ‡็ผ“็ปๆตŽๅขž้•ฟใ€‚ๅค–่ต„ๅฏ่ƒฝๅ› ็ปๆตŽไธ็กฎๅฎšๆ€งๆ’ค็ฆปใ€‚

็ป“่ฎบ
ไธญๅ›ฝ้ขไธดๆˆฟๅœฐไบงไฝŽ่ฟทใ€ไธ่‰ฏ่ดทๆฌพๅขžๅŠ ๅ’Œ็ปๆตŽๆ”พ็ผ“็š„้‡ๅคงๆŒ‘ๆˆ˜ใ€‚้œ€่ฆ็ป“ๆž„ๆ€งๆ”น้ฉไปฅ่งฃๅ†ณๅ€บๅŠก้—ฎ้ข˜ๅนถๆขๅคๅธ‚ๅœบไฟกๅฟƒ๏ผŒๅฆๅˆ™้‡‘่ž็ณป็ปŸๅฏ่ƒฝ้ขไธดๆ›ดๅคง้ฃŽ้™ฉใ€‚


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ๆ ‡็ญพ๏ผš #ZendChinaFinance #ChinaEconomy #BankingPressure #PropertySlump #CRECrisis #NonPerformingLoans #Evergrande #Huarong #EconomicSlowdown #TradeWar #LocalBanks #FinancialStability #GlobalTrade #ChinaPropertyMarket #EconomicChallenges
#ๆณฝๅพทไธญๅ›ฝ้‡‘่ž #ไธญๅ›ฝ็ปๆตŽ #้“ถ่กŒๅŽ‹ๅŠ› #ไธๅ‹•็”ฃไฝŽ่ฟท #CREๅฑๆœบ #ไธ่‰ฏ่ดทๆฌพ #ๆ’ๅคง #ๅŽ่ž #็ปๆตŽๆ”พ็ผ“ #่ดธๆ˜“ๆˆ˜ #ๅœฐๆ–น้“ถ่กŒ #้‡‘่ž็จณๅฎš #ๅ…จ็ƒ่ดธๆ˜“ #ไธญๅ›ฝไธๅ‹•็”ฃๅธ‚ๅœบ #็ปๆตŽๆŒ‘ๆˆ˜


RESEARCH INFOS:

Key Citations

Key Points

  • It seems likely that 40 Chinese banks closed recently, mainly small rural lenders, due to property sector issues and local government debt, though exact details are unclear.
  • Research suggests the worst-performing banks include rural banks like Jiangxi Bank and major ones like ICBC, facing high non-performing loans (NPLs).
  • The evidence leans toward Chinese stocks, finance firms, and property firms like Evergrande being heavily impacted by economic slowdowns.
  • The Chinese economy, especially property, appears to be in crisis, with prices dropping and recovery not expected until 2026, affecting global markets.

Recent Bank Closures

In July 2024, reports indicate that 40 Chinese banks, primarily small rural lenders, closed or were merged, with 36 absorbed by Liaoning Rural Commercial Bank and Jiangxi Bank collapsing amid customer panic. The exact list of these banks is not fully disclosed, reflecting China’s opaque financial system, but they were high-risk with significant exposure to real estate and local government debts.

Rankings of Worst Entities

Below are rankings based on available data, focusing on NPLs, profit declines, and sector exposure:

Worst Chinese Banks

  1. Rural Commercial Banks in Liaoning Province (NPL ratios up to 40%)
  2. Jiangxi Bank (collapsed in July 2024, profits down 30%)
  3. Henan Rural Banks (past scandals, deposit freezes)
  4. Inner Mongolia Small Banks (high risk from indebted regions)
  5. Big Five Banks (ICBC, CCB, BoC, AgBank, BoCom, with profit drops like ICBC -4%)

Worst Chinese Bank Stocks

  1. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) (601398.SS, 4% profit drop, high local debt exposure)
  2. China Construction Bank (CCB) (601939.SS, 4% profit decline)
  3. Bank of China (BoC) (601988.SS, 2.9% profit drop, rising NPLs)
  4. Agricultural Bank of China (AgBank) (601288.SS, high NPL ratios)
  5. Hong Kong-Listed Banking Sector Index (.HSMBI, plummeted 10% in 2023)

Worst Finance Firms

  1. Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs, $4.2 trillion debt, major bank risk)
  2. China Investment Corp (under anti-corruption scrutiny)
  3. China Renaissance (chairman disappeared in 2023, investor confidence shaken)
  4. Small-Scale Wealth Management Firms (tied to rural banks, real estate risks)
  5. Third-Party Auditors (lack of oversight exacerbates small bank risks)

Worst Property Firms

  1. China Evergrande (liquidated in 2024, massive debt default)
  2. Vanke (000002.SZ, shares down 19% from 2007 peak)
  3. Country Garden (struggling with debt repayments)
  4. Sunac China (defaulted on bonds, part of $1 trillion debt crisis)
  5. Kaisa Group (heavily indebted, defaults strained lenders)

Derivatives and Corporates

  • Derivatives: China’s market is opaque, with banks exposed to property-linked products, posing systemic risks.
  • Worst Corporates: State-owned enterprises in coal and steel face overcapacity, private firms tied to Evergrandeโ€™s supply chain are defaulting.

Analysis of Chinese Economy and Property

Research suggests Chinaโ€™s economy is struggling, with the property sectorโ€”a key 13.4% of GDP since 2013โ€”in crisis. Home prices are dropping, with recovery not expected until 2026 . Developer defaults like Evergrandeโ€™s have left banks with high NPLs, up to 40% for some rural lenders. Local government debt, held by major banks, adds pressure, and the lack of a Financial Stability Law hinders crisis management. Exports are weak, consumer spending cautious, and U.S.-China trade tensions worsen the outlook, potentially slowing Chinaโ€™s 5% growth target for 2025.


Survey Note: Detailed Analysis of Chinaโ€™s Banking and Economic Crisis

Introduction
On May 16, 2025, reports from July 2024 highlight a significant banking crisis in China, with 40 banks closing or being merged in a single week, primarily small rural lenders. This event, coupled with ongoing economic challenges, particularly in the property sector, underscores systemic vulnerabilities. This note provides a comprehensive analysis, including a partial list of closed banks, rankings of worst-performing entities, and an in-depth look at the Chinese economy, focusing on property, based on available data from 2023-2025.

Recent Bank Closures and Context
The closure of 40 banks in July 2024, as reported by sources like 40 banks were closed in one week in China and Mergers and closures loom for China’s 3,800 rural banks, involved 36 banks absorbed by Liaoning Rural Commercial Bank and Jiangxi Bankโ€™s collapse amid customer panic. These banks, averaging RMB 15 billion ($2.1 billion) in assets, were high-risk rural lenders with significant exposure to real estate and local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). The lack of a complete list reflects Chinaโ€™s opaque financial system, a tactic seen in past crises like the 2022 Henan banking scandal, where depositors faced delays in compensation. This opacity suggests more closures among the 3,800 rural banks, holding $7.5 trillion in assets (13% of Chinaโ€™s banking system), are possible.

Ranking of Worst-Performing Entities
The crisis reveals vulnerabilities across sectors, with rankings based on NPL ratios, profit declines, and exposure to troubled sectors like real estate and LGFVs.

Worst Chinese Banks

Table 1 lists the worst-performing banks, with rural banks leading due to high NPL ratios (up to 40% versus the industry average of 1.6%, per Let Chinaโ€™s small banks failโ€“ analyst) and collapses like Jiangxi Bank. Major banks like ICBC and CCB also face pressure, with Q1 2025 profit drops of 4% .

Rank

Bank

Key Issue

1

Rural Commercial Banks in Liaoning Province

NPL ratios up to 40%, absorbed in mergers

2

Jiangxi Bank

Collapsed in July 2024, profits down 30%

3

Henan Rural Banks

Past scandals, deposit freezes

4

Inner Mongolia Small Banks

High risk from indebted regions

5

Big Five Banks (ICBC, CCB, BoC, AgBank, BoCom)

Profit drops (e.g., ICBC -4%), shrinking margins

Worst Chinese Bank Stocks

Bank stocks, particularly those of major lenders, have been hit hard. ICBC (601398.SS) saw shares fall after a 4% profit drop, with exposure to $4.2 trillion in local government debt. The Hong Kong-Listed Banking Sector Index (.HSMBI) plummeted 10% in 2023 sessions after downgrades .

Rank

Stock

Key Issue

1

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)

4% profit drop, high local debt exposure

2

China Construction Bank (CCB)

4% profit decline, narrowing margins

3

Bank of China (BoC)

2.9% profit drop, rising NPLs

4

Agricultural Bank of China (AgBank)

High NPL ratios, property-related losses

5

Hong Kong-Listed Banking Sector Index

Plummeted 10% in 2023, post-downgrade

Worst Finance Firms

Finance firms, especially those tied to LGFVs and shadow banking, face significant risks. LGFVs hold $4.2 trillion in debt, a major burden on banks. China Investment Corp is under scrutiny in Xi Jinpingโ€™s anti-corruption campaign, while China Renaissanceโ€™s chairman disappearance in 2023 shook investor confidence .

Rank

Finance Firm

Key Issue

1

Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs)

$4.2 trillion debt, major bank risk

2

China Investment Corp

Under anti-corruption scrutiny

3

China Renaissance

Chairman disappeared in 2023, investor shakeup

4

Small-Scale Wealth Management Firms

Tied to rural banks, real estate risks

5

Third-Party Auditors

Lack of oversight, exacerbates small bank risks

Worst Property Firms

The property sector, accounting for 13.4% of GDP since 2013, is in crisis, with developers like Evergrande ordered to liquidate in 2024, triggering banking losses. Vankeโ€™s shares dropped 19% from their 2007 peak, and Country Garden struggles with debt repayments .

Rank

Property Firm

Key Issue

1

China Evergrande

Liquidated in 2024, massive debt default

2

Vanke

Shares down 19% from 2007 peak

3

Country Garden

Struggling with debt repayments

4

Sunac China

Defaulted on bonds, part of $1 trillion crisis

5

Kaisa Group

Heavily indebted, defaults strained lenders

Derivatives and Corporates

Chinaโ€™s derivatives market is opaque, with banks exposed to property-linked financial products, posing systemic risks due to the lack of a robust bankruptcy framework. Corporates, especially state-owned enterprises in coal and steel, face overcapacity, increasing NPLs, while private firms tied to Evergrandeโ€™s supply chain are defaulting .

Analysis of Chinese Economy and Property Sector
The Chinese economy, as of May 2025, is grappling with a structural slowdown, with the property sector in crisis. Home prices are dropping, with a 4.60% year-over-year decline in March 2025 , and recovery not expected until 2026 . Developer defaults have left banks with rising NPLs, up to 40% for some rural lenders, per Let Chinaโ€™s small banks failโ€“ analyst. LGFVs add pressure, with major banks holding $4.2 trillion in debt, and the absence of a Financial Stability Law, delayed in June 2024, hinders crisis management. Exports are weak, consumer spending cautious post-pandemic, and U.S.-China trade tensions, with rising tariffs, darken prospects, potentially slowing Chinaโ€™s 5% growth target for 2025 . Xi Jinpingโ€™s anti-corruption crackdown, targeting financial elites, aims to centralize control but risks spooking investors, while the governmentโ€™s reluctance to let small banks fail, unlike Spainโ€™s FROB model, reflects fears of social unrest, as seen in Henanโ€™s 2022 protests.

Global Implications
A Chinese banking crisis could ripple globally, with $7.5 trillion in rural bank assets and the property sectorโ€™s $1 trillion debt threatening stability. Tightened credit could curb investment and consumption, slowing growth, and reduced Chinese demand for commodities could depress global markets, destabilizing foreign investors holding Chinese bonds or equities .

Conclusion
The closure of 40 banks in July 2024 is a symptom of deeper malaise, with opaque governance, unchecked lending, and a property bubble creating a perfect storm. While consolidation buys time, structural reforms are needed to prevent further turbulence as Chinaโ€™s economic engine sputters.

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