VZCZCXRO2381
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHDM #0068/01 0041408
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041408Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6460
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0694
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0055
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000068 

SIPDIS 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS 

NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH
TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON
EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2015
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETTC SY SANC
SUBJECT: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA 

REF: A. A: DAMASCUS 5567
     ¶B. REF B: DAMASCUS 6224 

Classified By: CDA: Stephen Seche for Reasons 1.5 

¶1.  (C) Summary.  As post has reported previously, the
average Syrian would welcome targeted sanctions that focus on
regressive elements within the Asad regime.  The best mix in
our judgement would be sanctions that are phased,
multi-lateral, and widely publicized.  Most of our Syrian
interlocutors concur that if done correctly, these sanctions
would delegitimize those elements within the SARG perceived
to be obstacles to change, strengthen progressive elements
both within the regime and the wider society, and increase
pressure on the SARG to substantively change its
destabilizing behavior.  End summary. 

¶2.  (C) Financial and travel sanctions that target
individuals remain popular with the majority of our Syrian
interlocutors (ref A, B).  They argue that targeting
individuals would make clear for the average Syrian that the
international community opposes the regime and its policies,
but does not wish to punish the Syrian people.  At the same
time, targeted sanctions would also help delegitimize those
individuals who pose the greatest internal and external
threat to progress.  Additionally, if designated individuals
could neither travel nor conduct legitimate business, they
would become an increasing liability for President Bashar
al-Asad,s regime.  Popular resentment against the sanctioned
individuals would add to the pressure to change. 

¶3.  (C) Syrians we speak with argue that future designations
should be multi-lateral.  Some tools for doing so already
exist.  UNSCR 1636 makes provision for designation of
individuals named under the Hariri investigation.  A case
should be made for additional designations under existing or
new UNSC resolutions.  The USG designated Dhu al Himma
as-Shaleesh and Asif Issa as-Shalesh, cousins of President
Asad, under E.O. 13315 ) a derivative of UNSCR 1483 - for
their role in procuring defense-related items for Saddam
Hussein.  We should lobby our allies to pursue similar
designations, under the umbrella of new or existing UNSC
resolutions of both the Shaleeshes and any new Syrians we
designate concerning Lebanon, Iraq, WMD, and the peace
process.  Though it is unlikely that any significant
financial resources would be frozen by these designations
(ref B), the naming and shaming of the most recalcitrant
elements within the regime would delegitimize them
internationally, which in turn, would work to undermine the
hardliners domestically. 

¶4.  (C) Pursuing multilateral designations would greatly
multiply the effectiveness of targeted sanctions, but a
carefully timed campaign to widely publicize the designations
is equally important.  Without media coverage and publicity
to raise the profile of designations, the effort would lose
its most effective element - &name and shame.8  The
Shaleesh case mentioned above is a case in point.  Despite
the Shaleesh family having a high profile within Syria, very
few Syrians at any level are aware the USG imposed financial
sanctions on them.  The head of one of the leading Sunni
business families in Damascus approached us recently to ask
why the USG did not aggressively pursue sanctioning criminal
elements within the regime.  When asked for examples of who
should be sanctioned, our contact pointed to Dhu al Himma
as-Shaleesh who, he asserted, took much of the 580 million
USD in Iraqi funds the Commercial Bank of Syria illegally
paid out in 2003 and has yet to reconcile with the Iraqis.
Needless to say, our contact was surprised to find out Dhu al
Himma as well as his nephew, Asif Issa Shaleesh, were already
sanctioned. 

¶5.  (C) Phasing in future targeted sanctions can maximize
their impact.  The first phase could start with those most
clearly the architects of objectionable SARG policies
relating to Iraq, Lebanon, WMD, and support for the
Palestinian rejectionist groups, and then extend to those
continuing to support the original group in an ever widening
circle.  In addition to all of the Mehlis suspects, the first
batch of new designees might include a core group of eight to
ten, such as Asif Shawkat (Asad,s brother-in-law and head of
Syrian Military Intelligence), Maher Asad (President Asad,s
brother and commander of the Republican Guard), Rami Makhlouf
(Asad,s first cousin and Syria,s poster boy for
corruption), Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami,s father), Riyad Issa
Shaleesh (principal director of SES International ) an
entity already designated under E.O. 13315; in addition, we
should push our allies to sanction the other two Shaleeshes
mentioned above), Hisham Ikhtiyar (chairman of the Regional
Command's National Security Bureau), Abdel Fatah Qudsia
(Presidential advisor on Palestinian issues), and Mohammad
Suleiman (Presidential advisor responsible for procurement).
A second tranch of designations could then move on to this
group's lieutenants and business partners. 

¶6.  (C) Most Syrians we talk to believe that President Asad
still represents their best hope for change without
instability.  It is their fear of instability that stops the
majority of Syrians from pushing harder for internal change.
For this reason, they argue that sanctions focusing on
individuals would help empower Asad to scuttle the regime,s
pariahs.  According to this school of thought, Bashar himself
should not be designated at this point as it would limit our
options and signal that the USG is intent on regime change,
greatly limiting the number of Syrians willing to join us in
pressuring the SARG for change. 

¶7.  (C) Comment.  Pursuing targeted sanctions would send a
powerful message to the regime and those associated with it:
"if you are perceived to be proponents of the policies
causing regional instability, you will be designated.  If you
provide aid and assistance to those designated, you risk
designation yourself."  Both internal and external pressure
on the regime to change would likewise increase incrementally
as the number of designations increased.  If conventional
Syrian wisdom is correct, the obstacles stopping Bashar from
doing the right thing would proportionally decrease as
targeted sanctions progressed.  Even if that view is wrong,
the same result will occur, as the supports of Bashar,s
failed policies are eroded.  In the end, the USG will advance
its policy objectives by undermining the regime,s ability to
pursue policies at odds with regional stability.
SECHE