TOP-SECRET: BELARUS BI-WEEKLY POL/ECON REPORT

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STATE FOR EUR/UMB (ASHEMA), DRL (DNADEL), AND EUR/ACE (KSALINGER)
EMBASSY KYIV FOR USAID (JRIORDAN AND KMONAGHAN) 

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON ENRG ETRD BO
SUBJECT: BELARUS BI-WEEKLY POL/ECON REPORT - FEBRUARY 26, 2009 

MINSK 00000059  001.3 OF 004 

1. The following are brief items of interest compiled by Embassy
Minsk. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Civil Society
-------------
- GOB Crackdown on Polish Minority Sparks Flash Point with EU
- The Aggressive Suppression of Peaceful Demonstrations Returns
- New Election Law But GOB Control of Election Commission Endures
- State Media is Encouraged to Criticize Opposition Candidates 

Economy
-------
- Belarus Accepts New Russian Oil Tariff, But Only for Six Months
- Gazprom Now Has 50% of Beltransgaz, But May Want Majority
- IMF Most Likely To Issue Final SBA Tranche in late March
- Belarus Suspends Unilateral WTO Accession Talks 

Quote of the Week
----------------- 

-------------
Civil Society
------------- 

2. GOB Crackdown on the Polish Minority Sparks Flash Point with
EU 

During his meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw
Sikorski in Kyiv on February 25, President Lukashenka termed the
conflict between Polish minority groups in Belarus a
"misunderstanding" that would be resolved.  He stated that there
were no bilateral problems stemming from differences between the
Union of Poles of Belarus (UPB) recognized by the GOB and the
Warsaw-backed UPB.  Sikorski said that Lukashenka had agreed to
set up an expert group to study the issue of Belarus' Polish
minority.  The meeting came as a European Parliament (EP)
delegation arrived in Minsk on February 25 for a three-day
fact-finding mission.  The delegation will meet with GOB
officials, representatives of civil society, and opposition
forces.  The mission is expected to issue a report based on its
findings that will be incorporated into an EP resolution on the
human rights situation in Belarus.  The report will also include
recommendations on membership of a Belarus' delegation to the
EU-Neighborhood East Parliamentary Assembly Euronest to be
comprised of ten participants with observer status, likely
representing MPs and civil society and opposition parties, a
position the GOB opposes.  Anzhelika Borys, Leader of the
Warsaw-backed UPB, was in Brussels and Warsaw recently for a
series of meetings with EP members and the Polish President who
expressed solidarity with the Polish minority in Belarus.  Borys
explained that the GOB has sought "to present it as an internal
conflict in order to distract peoples' attention, so that the
issue is not seen in the context of human rights."  The
Spokesperson for Catherine Ashton, the EU's High Representative
on foreign policy, expressed EU FMs' concerns about the human
rights situation in Belarus and announced that the EU will
"remain vigilant and continue to raise the issue."  In addition,
Ashton condemned police action against the Warsaw-backed union
and what she called "attempts by authorities to impose a new
leadership on the Polish community."  Critical statements and
yet another round of confrontation between the official and
unrecognized unions stemmed from the February 17 GOB ruling that
ordered Borys' union to vacate the Polish House in Ivyanets.  In
addition, Borys was sentenced February 15 to a $365 fine for
participating in an unsanctioned demonstration in Hrodna on
February 10 in support of Teresa Sobal, the ousted manager of
the Ivyanets Polish House.  Borys' three senior associates
received five-day jail sentences for similar charges on February
15.  A senior Polish MFA official was quoted on February 19 as
saying that all the 16 Polish Houses in Belarus should be under
control of the Borys' union.  Only two of the Polish Houses,
which serve as social and cultural centers, still remain outside
control of the GOB-controlled union. 

3. The Aggressive Suppression of Peaceful Demonstrations Returns 

After permitting the monthly Solidarity Day demonstrations to
take place this fall (reftel Minsk 024), authorities cracked
down aggressively, manhandling and arresting demonstrators, as 

MINSK 00000059  002.3 OF 004 

activists attempted to stage three public protests in February.
Belarus security forces arrested 29 democratic activists
demonstrating in downtown Minsk on February 16 in remembrance of
opposition leaders who disappeared in 1999-2000.  Police for the
first time grabbed people as they approached the venue dragged
them off to waiting vans, while others were arrested in the
square a few minutes later.  Only two of the several dozen
policemen on site were in uniform.  Officers in plainclothes
used force against journalists, blocking photo and video
cameras, and pushing them away from the demonstrators.  In a
separate incident on February 14, police broke up a St.
Valentine's Day march staged by the Malady Front and arrested 22
activists, including four legal minors.  Young Belarus and
European Belarus civil groups held three rallies at different
venues on February 8 in support of the two Vaukavysk activists,
Mikalay Autukhovich and Uladzimir Asipenka, who have been held
in pretrial detention on terrorism charges since February 8,
2009.  Approximately 20 activists from those groups were
detained.  On all three days, people detained were eventually
released without charges but many reported being fingerprinted
and recorded on video and complained of suffering bruises and
scratches while in police detention, as well being threatened
verbally. 

4. New Election Law But GOB Control of Election Commission
Endures 

At a press conference on February 1, Central Election Commission
(CEC) Chairwoman Lidziya Yarmoshyna said that for the April 25
local elections 1,495 territorial election commissions covering
regional, town, and village councils have been established in
Belarus, with a total membership of 11,697.  Of those, 51.9
percent were nominated through the collection of voter
signatures, 35.3 percent were nominated by NGOs and political
parties, and 12.8 percent by "workers' collectives."  The
requirement that one-third of commissions' membership be
nominated by NGOs and political parties is a new requirement in
the electoral law.  However, as it has turned out only 105
persons or 0.9 percent of the total territorial commission
members are affiliated with political parties; and of these only
15 represent opposition parties, including nine with the
Spravedlivy Mir Belarusian Party of the Left, four with the
United Civic Party, and two with the Belarusian Social
Democratic Party Hramada.  There are 4,024 NGO members on the
territorial commission, but the vast majority are associated
with the state-controlled NGOs or associations such as Belaya
Rus, National Youth Union, Women's Union, Veterans' Union,
Federation of Trade Unions and others.  Independent observers
concluded that the overwhelming majority of territorial
commission members had served on commissions during previous
elections campaigns in Belarus and described them as
"ideologically" loyal to the regime.  At the district level,
there are 367 elections commissions (covering Oblast/Regional
councils and the Minsk city council).  The district commissions
have a total of 4,542 members, of whom 43 percent were nominated
by NGOs, mostly GOB-controlled, 18.2 percent by "workers'
collectives," 6.7 percent by political parties; 32.1 percent
sought membership through the collection of signatures.  Of the
political party representatives, only 72 come from opposition
parties.  The deadline for establishment of precinct-level
electoral commissions is March 7. 

5. State Media is Encouraged to Criticize Opposition Candidates 

On February 16, CEC Chairwoman Yarmoshyna stated at a workshop
on the role of the media in the election process that state
media have the right to criticize "opposition candidates" during
the election campaign.  The First Deputy Head of the
Presidential Administration Natallya Pyatkevich echoed her
remarks, saying that any journalist has the right to hold an
opinion and "report" it.  It is up to the journalist to do this
"correctly," she said, arguing that the interest of freedom of
information should be counterbalanced by responsibility on the
part of reporters. 

-------
Economy
------- 

6. Belarus Accepts New Russian Oil Tariff, But Only for Six
Months 

MINSK 00000059  003.3 OF 004 

Lukashenka issued an edict on February 12 approving the January
27 bilateral agreement on oil imports from Russia.  Russian
President Medvedev signed the amendments into law on February
15.  According to the new agreement, Belarus will receive 6.3
million tons of Russian oil duty-free in 2010 for internal use;
but additional supplies for refinement and export to any market
other than Russia will be subject to a 100% export duty.
Russian duty-free quota for Belarus may be reduced if Belarus
imposes additional transit duties on Russian oil passing through
Belarus to Europe.  Domestic consumption of crude oil for each
year will be adjusted by October 1.  While Lukashenka made no
public comments after signing the amendments, some senior GOB
officials have repeatedly argued that the export duty applied to
Russian oil supplies to Belarus violates Russia's commitments
under principles of the Custom Union of Belarus, Russian and
Kazakhstan.  Belarus' Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Yevdochenko
announced on February 16 that Belarus will insist that the
export duty be abolished starting July 1, 2010, when the single
Customs Union is scheduled to become operational.  In the
meantime, the GOB is looking for ways maintain the profitability
of the country's two oil refineries, which are facing serious
difficulty in adjusting to terms of the new oil supply agreement
with Russia.  IMF has calculated that GOB will lose no less than
$2 billion dollars in revenues since it is no longer able to
pocket the difference between the subsidized oil it use to
receive from Russia, and the refined petroleum products it sold
mainly to Europe at market rates. 

7. Gazprom Now Has 50% of Beltransgaz, But May Want Majority 

According to media reports, Russia's Gazprom transferred $625
million on February 24 for 12.5% stock in the Beltransgaz
natural gas transportation company, thus increasing its stake in
Beltransgaz to 50%. This was the final tranche under $2.5
billion agreement signed on May 18, 2007.  On February 25, the
Russian Ambassador to Belarus Alexander Surikov told the press
that Gazprom is interested in acquiring a controlling stake in
OAO Beltransgaz. "If Gazprom paid for 50% in Beltransgaz, it
definitely wants to have more. What other reason is there to buy
a 50% stake?" he explained.  On a separate issue, according to
the First Deputy Director of Beltransgaz Sorokhan, Belarus did
pay for Russian gas delivered in January 2010 under the terms
outlined in the five-year gas supply contract signed with
Gazprom in 2006, that will remove Russian subsidies on gas in
full by 2011.  The average import price Belarus paid in 2009 was
$148 per 1,000 cubic meters.  In the first quarter of 2010,
Belarus will pay $168, and given the current trends in world
prices, expects the price to go up $4 in the 2nd quarter "unless
we have contract adjustments," the official explained.  Belarus
has already been forced to raise natural gas prices for its
industrial consumers by 25% to $217.7 per 1,000 cubic meters.
The country imported a total of 17.6 billion cubic meters of
Russian natural gas in 2009 - 20.4% short of the agreed volume,
but Gazprom, according to Russian Ambassador to Belarus
Alexander Surikov, is not likely to seek compensation from
Belarus for importing less than agreed.  At the same time,
Belarus' Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Yevdochenko stated on
February 16 that Belarus objected to the Gazprom's monopoly of
gas supply within the Belarusian, Russian, and Kazakhstani
Customs Union. Commenting on the wish of the Belarusian
authorities to revise Gazprom's monopoly on gas supplies to
Belarus the Russian Ambassador said that Belarus must respect
the monopoly of Russia's Gazprom on natural gas export. When
Belarusian monopoly exporters supply tractors and trucks to
Russia, "this is considered normal but when a single Russian
exporter supplies natural gas, it is considered wrong," he argued 

8. IMF Most Likely To Issue Final SBA Tranche in late March 

An IMF staff mission and the GOB have reached an agreement,
subject to approval by the IMF Executive Board at the end of
March, on completion of the fourth and final review of the $3.52
billion Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Belarus, the IMF
announced.  The final tranche is valued at approximately $700
million under the current SBA.  According to the IMF staff
mission statement, "performance under the economic program
supported by the SBA has been good.  All end-December
performance criteria and structural benchmarks were met~ The
recent agreement with Russia on the pricing of imported crude
oil, in the absence of any offsetting measures, would widen
significantly the current account deficit and the general
government deficit.  The government is taking strong actions to 

MINSK 00000059  004.3 OF 004 

contain the effects of the oil price increase on the budget and
the balance of payments, and Fund staff support these measures.
Monetary policy and, more specifically, further tightening of
the limits on lending under government programs would support
the credibility of the exchange rate regime.  The current
exchange rate regime remains appropriate~  The authorities made
good progress on the financial sector issues~ The privatization
process has been slower than expected and the authorities need
to step it up to reduce government intervention in the economy
and to attract foreign direct investment.  The mission reached
understandings with the authorities on the measures which would
move the privatization process forward~  The authorities
expressed interest in continued cooperation with the IMF after
the expiration of the current program.  A possible follow-up
program with the Fund could be considered upon the completion of
the current [15-month] SBA."  The estimated external financial
gap that GOB will face in 2010 is $2 billion. 

9. Belarus Suspends Unilateral WTO Accession Talks 

Belarus Foreign Ministry official, Anton Kudasaw, announced on
February 19 that the WTO will soon take up consideration of the
possibility of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia jointly joining
WTO as a single Customs Union.  A negotiating team has been
formed to hold consultations with WTO members on the
simultaneous accession of the three countries. "Our side is
suspending unilateral negotiations on accession to the WTO," the
official explained.  Negotiations may begin after WTO members
study the explanatory notes for the Customs Union that are
expected to be submitted soon. 

-----------------
Quote of the Week
----------------- 

10. Speaking at the seminar for ideology officials of Minsk
region on February 17 the Fist Deputy Head of the Presidential
Administration Natalia Petkevich said: 

"Political and economic culture of Belarusians has grown. As a
result, their attitude to life and the world has become more
critical. In this context, ideology methods should change. They
should not be prohibitive. One should act subtler, wiser and
more cunningly~ We need an informal approach. The time of
slogans is gone. We should proceed from life and follow the
needs of people. If they need information, you should give it to
them. Otherwise, they will get it from other sources~ Let the
information originate from ideology services rather than
opposition websites."
SCANLAN

SECRET: ATTACKING BASHAR’S MONEY

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TREASURY FOR GLASER 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2027
TAGS: EFIN ETTC PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: ATTACKING BASHAR'S MONEY 

REF: A. 07 DAMASCUS 2066
     B. 07 DAMASCUS 1926
     C. 07 DAMASCUS 68 

Classified By: CDA Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.5 b/d 

1.  (S) Summary. As Washington policy makers consider ways to
pressure the regime, one possibility would be to go after
President Asad's money-men.  Four individuals Asad uses to
make and move money are Zuhair Sahloul, Nabil Kuzbari, Asad's
uncle Mohammad Makhlouf, and his father-in-law, Fawas Akhras.
 Each is important to Asad and each plays a somewhat
different role in facilitating regime graft.  End summary. 

2.  (S) Sahloul (AKA Abu Shafic) is the most important
black-market money changer in Syria.  When the Syrian Pound
(SYP) devalued precipitously in the fall of 2005, the SARG
gave Sahloul an office in the Central Bank and access to its
hard currency reserves so he could intervene in the black
market to stabilize the currency.  (Note.  Sahloul was
surprisingly effective and within weeks the SYP appreciated
20 percent, allowing Sahloul in the process a handsome profit
for both himself and a handful of regime-insiders.  End
note.)  Sahloul moves Asad's money using his own network and
his access to Hawalis worldwide.  A Sahloul intimate bragged
to us recently that Sahloul could move ten million dollars
anywhere in the world in 24-hours. 

3.  (S) In addition to being the father of Syria's poster-boy
for corruption, Rami Makhlouf, Mohammad Makhlouf has long
served as a financial advisor to the Asad family.  If Rami is
the face of corruption, Mohammad is the brain.  When Asad
agreed to open the telecom sector to cellphone providers, it
was Mohammad that some credit with conceptualizing the deal
whereby Rami took over the first provider, SyriaTel, (long
Rami's biggest cash-cow), and the second license (originally
to SpaceTel, then Areeba 94, and now MTN) went to the
first-lady's family (see para five below).  Long held in
check by his brother-in-law, the late president Hafiz Asad,
under Bashar Asad, Mohammad's avarice reportedly has no
bounds.  As a result, the Makhloufs have had an at-times
problematic relationship with Bashar and were forced to leave
the country for a number of months in 2005 following one
particularly heated exchange. 

4.  (S) Because of the Makhlouf's excesses and Asad's
inherited propensity to limit the power and influence of his
family members, Nabil Kuzbari has played an increasingly
important role for the first-family. Known locally as "the
Paper King," Kuzbari's base of operations has long been in
Vienna.  In the last two years, however, he has developed an
increasingly collaborative relationship with Rami and
Mohammed Makhlouf.  Last year he served as Rami's frontman in
establishing his holding company, Sham Holding, which brought
together 70 of Syria's most-important business families to
fund a number of Rami's most ambitious entrepreneurial
projects.  In addition to lobbying European politicians to
engage the Asad regime, Kuzbari reportedly uses his contacts
in the Austrian business and banking circles to move regime
assets abroad. 

5.  (S) In addition to being Asad's father-in-law, Fawas
Akhras has been increasingly active in business here in
Syria.  Akhras is the force behind the Syrian-British
Business Council and recently put together a visit to London
by a large group of Syrian businessmen.  Coming only lately
to business, Akhras has stepped on a number of established
business families who increasingly resent his assertiveness
and willingness to use his son-in-law's position to advance
his nascent Syria-based businesses.  Contacts in the banking
sector have commented on the large amount of funds that have
begun to move recently through his accounts.  A long-time
resident of London, he is suspected of being another avenue
used by Asad to stash funds abroad. 

6.  (S) Comment. Post has long advocated moving against
individuals, like those listed above, who are intregal to
allowing the regime to profit from its corruption.  Taking
action against those linked to corruption is a win-win
proposition: not only does it bring pressure on the regime
where it hurts most - its pocketbook, but such a move would
also be popular with the average Syrian who is the most
common victim of the regime's avarice. 

CORBIN

CONFIDENTIAL: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA

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SIPDIS 

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TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON
EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2015
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETTC SY SANC
SUBJECT: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA 

REF: A. A: DAMASCUS 5567
     B. REF B: DAMASCUS 6224 

Classified By: CDA: Stephen Seche for Reasons 1.5 

1.  (C) Summary.  As post has reported previously, the
average Syrian would welcome targeted sanctions that focus on
regressive elements within the Asad regime.  The best mix in
our judgement would be sanctions that are phased,
multi-lateral, and widely publicized.  Most of our Syrian
interlocutors concur that if done correctly, these sanctions
would delegitimize those elements within the SARG perceived
to be obstacles to change, strengthen progressive elements
both within the regime and the wider society, and increase
pressure on the SARG to substantively change its
destabilizing behavior.  End summary. 

2.  (C) Financial and travel sanctions that target
individuals remain popular with the majority of our Syrian
interlocutors (ref A, B).  They argue that targeting
individuals would make clear for the average Syrian that the
international community opposes the regime and its policies,
but does not wish to punish the Syrian people.  At the same
time, targeted sanctions would also help delegitimize those
individuals who pose the greatest internal and external
threat to progress.  Additionally, if designated individuals
could neither travel nor conduct legitimate business, they
would become an increasing liability for President Bashar
al-Asad,s regime.  Popular resentment against the sanctioned
individuals would add to the pressure to change. 

3.  (C) Syrians we speak with argue that future designations
should be multi-lateral.  Some tools for doing so already
exist.  UNSCR 1636 makes provision for designation of
individuals named under the Hariri investigation.  A case
should be made for additional designations under existing or
new UNSC resolutions.  The USG designated Dhu al Himma
as-Shaleesh and Asif Issa as-Shalesh, cousins of President
Asad, under E.O. 13315 ) a derivative of UNSCR 1483 - for
their role in procuring defense-related items for Saddam
Hussein.  We should lobby our allies to pursue similar
designations, under the umbrella of new or existing UNSC
resolutions of both the Shaleeshes and any new Syrians we
designate concerning Lebanon, Iraq, WMD, and the peace
process.  Though it is unlikely that any significant
financial resources would be frozen by these designations
(ref B), the naming and shaming of the most recalcitrant
elements within the regime would delegitimize them
internationally, which in turn, would work to undermine the
hardliners domestically. 

4.  (C) Pursuing multilateral designations would greatly
multiply the effectiveness of targeted sanctions, but a
carefully timed campaign to widely publicize the designations
is equally important.  Without media coverage and publicity
to raise the profile of designations, the effort would lose
its most effective element - &name and shame.8  The
Shaleesh case mentioned above is a case in point.  Despite
the Shaleesh family having a high profile within Syria, very
few Syrians at any level are aware the USG imposed financial
sanctions on them.  The head of one of the leading Sunni
business families in Damascus approached us recently to ask
why the USG did not aggressively pursue sanctioning criminal
elements within the regime.  When asked for examples of who
should be sanctioned, our contact pointed to Dhu al Himma
as-Shaleesh who, he asserted, took much of the 580 million
USD in Iraqi funds the Commercial Bank of Syria illegally
paid out in 2003 and has yet to reconcile with the Iraqis.
Needless to say, our contact was surprised to find out Dhu al
Himma as well as his nephew, Asif Issa Shaleesh, were already
sanctioned. 

5.  (C) Phasing in future targeted sanctions can maximize
their impact.  The first phase could start with those most
clearly the architects of objectionable SARG policies
relating to Iraq, Lebanon, WMD, and support for the
Palestinian rejectionist groups, and then extend to those
continuing to support the original group in an ever widening
circle.  In addition to all of the Mehlis suspects, the first
batch of new designees might include a core group of eight to
ten, such as Asif Shawkat (Asad,s brother-in-law and head of
Syrian Military Intelligence), Maher Asad (President Asad,s
brother and commander of the Republican Guard), Rami Makhlouf
(Asad,s first cousin and Syria,s poster boy for
corruption), Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami,s father), Riyad Issa
Shaleesh (principal director of SES International ) an
entity already designated under E.O. 13315; in addition, we
should push our allies to sanction the other two Shaleeshes
mentioned above), Hisham Ikhtiyar (chairman of the Regional
Command's National Security Bureau), Abdel Fatah Qudsia
(Presidential advisor on Palestinian issues), and Mohammad
Suleiman (Presidential advisor responsible for procurement).
A second tranch of designations could then move on to this
group's lieutenants and business partners. 

6.  (C) Most Syrians we talk to believe that President Asad
still represents their best hope for change without
instability.  It is their fear of instability that stops the
majority of Syrians from pushing harder for internal change.
For this reason, they argue that sanctions focusing on
individuals would help empower Asad to scuttle the regime,s
pariahs.  According to this school of thought, Bashar himself
should not be designated at this point as it would limit our
options and signal that the USG is intent on regime change,
greatly limiting the number of Syrians willing to join us in
pressuring the SARG for change. 

7.  (C) Comment.  Pursuing targeted sanctions would send a
powerful message to the regime and those associated with it:
"if you are perceived to be proponents of the policies
causing regional instability, you will be designated.  If you
provide aid and assistance to those designated, you risk
designation yourself."  Both internal and external pressure
on the regime to change would likewise increase incrementally
as the number of designations increased.  If conventional
Syrian wisdom is correct, the obstacles stopping Bashar from
doing the right thing would proportionally decrease as
targeted sanctions progressed.  Even if that view is wrong,
the same result will occur, as the supports of Bashar,s
failed policies are eroded.  In the end, the USG will advance
its policy objectives by undermining the regime,s ability to
pursue policies at odds with regional stability.
SECHE