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Overview of reactor building of Unit 3 from western hilltop between Unit 2 and 3, Sep 29, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) |
Overview of reactor building of Unit 3 from a crane above Unit 3, Sep 24, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) |
Overview of a reactor building of Unit 4 from western hilltop between Unit 2 and 3. Sep 29, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) |
Overview of reactor building of Unit 2 from western hilltop between Unit 2 and 3, Sep 29, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) |
Installation Work of Roof Panels for Reactor Building Covers at Unit 1 of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, October 8, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) |
Overview of reactor building of Unit 1 -From south direction of Main Anti-Earthquake Building, Oct 8, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) |
Overview of reactor building of Unit 1 -From a crane above Unit 1, Sep 9, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) |
Main control room of Unit 1 and 2, Sep 22, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) |
Related video:Situation of Upper Part of Unit 3 Reactor Building, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (61.9MB) (video on October 6, 2011)![]() |
Related video:Situation of Upper Part of Unit 2 Reactor Building, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (39.6MB) (video on October 5, 2011)![]() |
Related video:Situation of Upper Part of Unit 1 Reactor Building, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (54.1MB) (video on October 3, 2011)![]() |
Category: JOURNALISM
FBI – Two U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Employees and Two Others Indicted in $20 Million Bribery and Kickback Scheme
| U.S. Attorney’s Office October 08, 2011 |
WASHINGTON—Four Virginia men, including two longtime employees of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, were arrested today on charges stemming from an indictment that accuses them of taking part in a conspiracy involving more than $20 million in bribes and kickback payments and the planned steering of a $780 million government contract to a favored contractor.
The arrests were announced by U.S. Attorney Ronald C. Machen Jr.; James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office; Peggy E. Gustafson, Inspector General for the Small Business Administration (SBA); Robert E. Craig, Special Agent in Charge of the Mid-Atlantic Field Office of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS); Jeannine A. Hammett, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office of the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI); and James K. Podolak, Director of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command’s (CID) Major Procurement Fraud Unit.
The defendants include Kerry F. Khan, 53, of Alexandria, Va.; his son, Lee A. Khan, 30, of Fairfax, Va.; Michael A. Alexander, 55, of Woodbridge, Va.; and Harold F. Babb, 60, of Sterling, Va. Kerry Khan and Alexander are employed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Babb is director of contracts for a company that did business with the government.
All four men were taken into custody on charges contained in an indictment that was returned by a grand jury, under seal, on Sept. 16, 2011, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The arrests took place as authorities executed search warrants at seven locations in Virginia and one in the District of Columbia. The indictment was unsealed today.
According to the indictment, Kerry Khan and Alexander helped funnel more than $45 million in payments to a favored company through a federal government contract they oversaw, with plans to steer hundreds of millions more to the business. Approximately $20 million in fraudulent expenses were built into the invoices, and proceeds went to all four defendants.
All four defendants were indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit bribery and wire fraud and aiding and abetting and causing an illlegal act to be done, as well as one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. Kerry Khan and Alexander also were indicted on one count of receipt of a bribe by a public official, and Babb was indicted on one count of unlawful kickbacks.
If convicted of the charges, Kerry Khan and Alexander face a maximum of 40 years in prison. Babb faces up to 35 years, and Lee Khan faces a sentence of up to 25 years.
The United States has obtained warrants to seize funds in 29 bank accounts and to seize three luxury vehicles and seven high-end watches. In addition, the indictment includes a forfeiture allegation against 16 real properties financed in whole or in part with proceeds of the crimes. The United States has begun the process of securing forfeiture of those 16 properties, which include 14 properties in Virginia, one in West Virginia, and one in Florida.
The indictment also provides the defendants notice that, if convicted, the United States will seek forfeiture of all proceeds of the charged offenses.
“This indictment alleges one of the most brazen corruption schemes in the history of federal contracting,” said U.S. Attorney Machen. “As alleged by the indictment, corrupt public officials and crooked contractors devised a plan to funnel more than $20 million in taxpayer funds to themselves in an elaborate scheme of bribes and kickbacks. These charges are only the beginning of a far-reaching, steadfast effort by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Department of Justice, and our federal law enforcement partners to root out and hold accountable shameless government officials and those who entice them—through bribes and other personal benefits—to violate the public’s trust.”
“Abusing one’s position for personal gain blatantly disregards the oath that every government employee takes and everything that it represents,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “It’s offensive to citizens who trust the government and its contractors to use taxpayer money wisely.”
“The alleged actions of these individuals grossly undermine the honest work being done every day by federal employees and government contractors,” said Inspector General Gustafson of the SBA. “These individuals conspired to steal from the American people by perpetuating a fraud to siphon vital resources away from an organization that supports our military and reduces risks from disasters. The SBA OIG will relentlessly pursue such violations of public trust and seek justice on behalf of the taxpayers.”
“At a time when government and taxpayer resources are being stretched thin and our service members continue to make sacrifices to protect our national security across the globe, it is abhorrent that officials trusted with the oversight of Department of Defense resources and programs blatantly conspired with contractors to defraud the Government and, eventually, the American warfighter,” said Special Agent in Charge Craig of DCIS. “The Defense Criminal Investigative Service takes aggressive action to identify and investigate, alongside our federal investigative partners, those that endeavor to take advantage of the Department of Defense and the men and women of the Uniformed Services.”
“IRS Criminal Investigation often works jointly with other law enforcement agencies to provide financial investigative expertise. The charges brought in this case demonstrate our collective efforts to enforce the law and ensure public trust,” said Acting IRS Special Agent in Charge Hammett. “U.S. government employees hold positions of public trust, and they are responsible for managing public funds. The public has the right to know that those who work for them are doing so honestly. When we discover bribery schemes like the one alleged here, we will do everything in our power to hold both the bribe payer and the person accepting the bribe accountable.”
“Today’s arrests are a prime example of the teamwork among the special agents of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command’s Major Procurement Fraud Unit (MPFU), our fellow federal law enforcement agencies and the Department of Justice attorneys,” said Director Podolak. “U.S. Army CID will continue to see to it that anyone suspected of contract fraud and corruption is brought to justice.”
**
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is a branch of the U.S. Army with a stated mission to “provide vital public engineering services in peace and war to strengthen our Nation’s security, energize the economy, and reduce risks from disasters.”
The indictment details schemes to defraud two major federal contracts:
The TIGER Contract. The Technology for Instrastructure, Geospatial, and Environmental Requirements (TIGER) contract is what is known as an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contract. Authorized agencies and departments are not required to obtain three separate bids or to compare the TIGER contract to another contract before submitting an invoice for products and services through the TIGER contract. The current TIGER contract is a five-year contract running from Oct. 1, 2009 through Sept. 30, 2014. Over the term, the total award of orders placed against the TIGER contract is authorized to exceed $1 billion.
The CORES Contract. The Contingency Operations Readiness Engineering & Support (CORES) contract is a planned contract that is envisioned as an alternative or potential replacement to the TIGER contract. As planned, the CORES contract would be a five-year contract with an award potential for all contracts placed under it of up to $780 million.
The Defendants
Kerry Khan, who joined the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1994, is a program manager with the Directorate of Contingency Operations, based in Washington, D.C., which administers the TIGER contract. In that position, Kerry Khan had authority, among other things, to place orders for products and services through the TIGER contract, as well as other federal government contracts. He also had authority to certify that the work on the orders had been completed. In addition, Kerry Khan had the responsibility to prepare the CORES contract for solicitation to potential bidders and to approve the solicitation prior to its issuance to potential bidders.
Michael Alexander, who joined the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1985, is a program director with the Directorate of Contingency Operations. In that position, he had authority, among other things, to obtain funding for Army Corps of Engineers projects, including funding for orders placed through the TIGER contract and other federal government contracts. Alexander produced and actively managed a $54 million budget.
Harold Babb is the director of contracts at EyakTek, an Alaska Native-owned small business. EyakTek, based in Dulles, Va., was the prime contractor for the TIGER contract and subcontracted many of the orders from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to other businesses.
Lee Khan controlled a consulting company with his father and took part in numerous activities involving the bribery and kickback scheme.
All four defendants are accused of conspiring to hide the proceeds of their bribery and fraud scheme through a series of financial transactions, including payments to shell companies that were controlled by Kerry Khan and others.
An indictment is merely a formal charge that a defendant has committed a violation of criminal laws and is not evidence of guilt. Every defendant is presumed innocent until, and unless, proven guilty.
Allegations involving the TIGER Contract
According to the indictment, Kerry Khan and Alexander used their official positions at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Babb used his official position at EyakTek, to direct orders through the TIGER contract to a Virginia-based company identified in the indictment as “Company A.” With Kerry Khan’s knowledge and direction, that company’s chief technology officer, an unidentified co-conspirator, submitted fraudulently inflated quotes for work.
Kerry Khan then caused the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to approve and remit payment to EyakTek for these fraudulently inflated invoices. After subtracting its profit margin, EyakTek paid the remainder to “Company A.” The chief technology officer then caused “Company A” to pay part of this money for the benefit of Kerry Khan, his son, and Alexander and Babb.
In addition, Kerry Khan and Alexander caused the Army Corps of Engineers to award contracts directly to “Company A.” Once again, the chief technology officer submitted fraudulent paperwork for inflated costs. Kerry Khan then caused the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to pay “Company A,” and the chief technology officer in turn caused “Company A” to pay a portion of the money for the benefit of Kerry Khan, his son, and Alexander.
In this manner, from 2007 to the present, the chief technology officer caused invoices to be submitted to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, directly and through EyakTek, for total costs of more than $45 million. As directed by Khan, Alexander and Babb, the chief technology officer caused “Company A” to fraudulently inflate its quotes and invoices by about $20 million. The chief technology officer promised and paid the inflated amounts directly and indirectly to Khan, his son, Alexander and Babb.
The indictment alleges that the chief technology officer of “Company A” promised and made payments directly and indirectly to Kerry Khan in excess of $18 million. Among other things, Khan received cash, checks and wire transfers in excess of $5 million; home improvements and renovations for multiple properties; luxury cars for himself, his son and other family members; furnishings, including flat-screen televisions and computer equipment, highend liquor, and other items. Some of this money also went to Lee Khan and a second family member for employment with “Company A.” The promised payments for Kerry Khan included, among others, future payments of $2 million each to three shell companies controlled by him.
The payments to Kerry Khan came in large amounts, including a $1.2 million wire transfer from “Company A” to a Khan-controlled entity in August 2008 and a check for $3.3 million from “Company A” to a Khan controlled entity in February 2010. According to the indictment, Kerry Khan and his son together channeled $383,000 on Sept. 1, 2011 to another family member who had threatened to alert law enforcement authorities to the existence of the scheme.
The indictment alleges that the chief technology officer of “Company A” promised and made payments directly and indirectly to Alexander in excess of $1 million. Among other things, Alexander received more than $185,000 in cash and checks, a $21,000 Cartier watch, first-class airline tickets, and other items. The promises called for Alexander to secure future employment at “Company A.” In addition, the chief technology officer of “Company A” provided about $1 million for the purchase of a coffee shop for an associate of Alexander’s in South Korea.
According to the indictment, the chief technology officer of “Company A” promised and made payments directly and indirectly to Babb in excess of $700,000. Among other things, he received cash and checks, first-class airline tickets and promised future employment at the firm.
Allegations involving the CORES Contract
The indictment alleges that Kerry Khan, Alexander and Babb worked with the chief technology officer and others at “Company A” to devise a scheme to steer the award of the CORES contract to “Company A.” The intent was to use this contract as a way for “Company A” to funnel money and other things of value directly and indirectly to Khan, Alexander, Babb and others. Kerry Khan, Babb, the chief technology officer, and others at “Company A” worked on a statement of objectives and work for the CORES contract with the intent of tailoring it to fit “Company A” and interfere with the fairness of the bidding process. Kerry Khan, Alexander and Babb also planned to install certain employees from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to serve on the selection board to insure that “Company A” was awarded the valuable CORES contract.
**
This case was investigated by the FBI’s Washington Field Office; the Office of the Inspector General for the Small Business Administration; the Department of Defense’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service; the Defense Contract Audit Agency; the Washington Field Office of the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation, and the Army Criminal Investigation Command.
It is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael Atkinson and Bryan Seeley of the Fraud and Public Corruption Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Anthony Saler and Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher Dana of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, with assistance from Assistant U.S. Attorneys Mary Chris Dobbie and Jonathan Hooks. Assistance also was provided by Forensic Accountant Maria Boodoo; Legal Assistants Jared Forney, Krishawn Graham, Jessica McCormick, and Nicole Wattelet; and Paralegal Specialists Tasha Harris, Shanna Hays, Taryn McLaughlin, and Sarah Reis.
MORD-DROHUNG WG PUBLIKATION DER STASI-LISTEN MIT KLARNAMEN
TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Operation Smoking Dragon
| Charges against the subjects included smuggling real and phony drugs and other contraband into the U.S. along with counterfeit $100 bills. |
Operation Smoking Dragon
Dismantling an International Smuggling Ring
The judge who recently sentenced Yi Qing Chen noted that the smuggler “never saw a criminal scheme he didn’t want a part of.” The Southern California man was convicted last October of distributing methamphetamine, trafficking approximately 800,000 cases of counterfeit cigarettes, and conspiracy to import Chinese-made shoulder-fired missiles into the U.S.
Chen is now serving a 25-year prison sentence, and his case marks the end of a long-running investigation called Operation Smoking Dragon.
| The Wedding Ruse To coordinate arrests in the Operation Royal Charm case, agents came up with a clever ruse. Because many of the subjects lived outside the U.S., they were invited to a wedding aboard a yacht docked near Atlantic City, New Jersey. They were sent real invitations, but the wedding was a fake. When several of the individuals showed up for “transportation” to the ceremony, they were promptly arrested.
The Royal Charm and Smoking Dragon investigations were led by the FBI, but we had substantial assistance from partners including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and the U.S. Secret Service. |
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Smoking Dragon and a related case in New Jersey called Operation Royal Charm led to the indictment of 87 individuals from China, Taiwan, Canada, and the U.S. The investigations uncovered—and dismantled—an international smuggling ring that could have threatened the country’s national security.
Charges against the subjects included smuggling real and phony drugs and other contraband into the U.S. along with counterfeit $100 bills—believed to have been produced in North Korea—that were so nearly perfect and so much more sophisticated than typical counterfeit currency they were dubbed “Supernotes.”
“One of the most important things about Operation Smoking Dragon was that it demonstrated the broad range of international criminal activity conducted by today’s Asian organized crime groups,” said Special Agent Bud Spencer, who worked the case in our Los Angeles office.
The eight-year investigation began when FBI undercover agents, posing as underworld criminals, helped make sure that shipping containers full of counterfeit cigarettes made it past U.S. Customs officers undetected. Over time, as undercover agents won the smugglers’ trust, they were asked to facilitate other illegal shipments such as narcotics and millions of dollars in Supernotes. Later, the smugglers offered a variety of Chinese military-grade weapons, including the QW-2 surface-to-air missiles.
Some of the drugs—including methamphetamine and fake Viagra—were hidden in large cardboard boxes with false bottoms that contained toys. The Supernotes were placed between the pages of books or lined in large bolts of rolled-up fabric. All of the items were smuggled into the U.S. in 40-foot shipping containers.
| The smugglers offered a variety of Chinese military-grade weapons, including surface-to-air missiles. |
Between Smoking Dragon and Royal Charm, some $4.5 million in counterfeit currency was seized, along with more than $40 million worth of counterfeit cigarettes, drugs, and other real and phony items. The smugglers were also forced to forfeit a total of $24 million in cash, along with real estate, cars, and jewelry.
Most of the defendants were indicted in 2005 and have since pled guilty or been convicted. Chen was the final defendant to be sentenced relating to Operation Smoking Dragon. His was the nation’s first conviction under a 2004 anti-terrorism statute that outlaws the importation of missile systems designed to destroy aircraft.
“There is only one purpose for shoulder-fired missiles like the QW-2, and that is to bring down aircraft,” said Special Agent Omar Trevino, who worked the case from the beginning. “Smoking Dragon dismantled an international smuggling ring, and it illustrated that organized crime groups will stop at nothing to make a profit.”
Mark Aveis, an assistant United States attorney in Los Angeles who prosecuted the Chen case, agreed with Agent Trevino. “Chen and his associates didn’t care what they smuggled as long as they made money,” he said. “This case highlights the FBI’s ability to carry out successful long-term undercover investigations—and the continuing need for such investigations.”
Die “GoMoPa” – Wirecard Lüge – Das LKA Bayern ermittelt
TOP-SECRET FROM THE FBI – The Chicago Mafia Down But Not Out
A
Roman Catholic priest and former prison chaplain who ministered to Chicago mob boss Frank Calabrese, Sr., was indicted earlier this month for illegally passing jailhouse messages from Calabrese and plotting with his associates on the outside—a sobering reminder of how deeply organized crime can reach into the community, even from behind bars.
“Members of the mob will go to almost any lengths to carry out their criminal activity,” said Special Agent Ted McNamara, a veteran investigator who supervises the La Cosa Nostra (LCN) organized crime squad in our Chicago Field Office.
Calabrese, Sr., was sentenced to life in prison in 2009 for his role in 18 gangland slayings in the Chicago area dating back to 1970. His arrest—along with 13 others—was part of one of the most successful organized crime cases in FBI history, an eight-year investigation called Operation Family Secrets.
Because of the Family Secrets case—in which Calabrese’s son testified against him—“the Chicago mob does not have the power and influence it once had,” McNamara said. “But the mob still operates, and its members still represent a potentially serious criminal threat.”
Unlike New York’s infamous Five Families, the Chicago mob consists of only one family, often referred to as the “Outfit.” It is organized under a variety of crews that engage in various criminal activities. A portion of the crews’ illegal gains goes to the Outfit’s top bosses.
“New York gets most of the attention regarding LCN,” McNamara said, “but historically, going back to the days of Al Capone, Chicago LCN has always been a player, particularly in places like Las Vegas.”
Unlike their New York counterparts, the Outfit has traditionally stayed away from drug trafficking, preferring instead crimes such as loan-sharking and online gambling operations, and capitalizing on other profitable vices. One of the reasons it is so difficult to completely stamp out mob activity, McNamara said, is that over time the crews have insinuated themselves into unions and legitimate businesses.
“Typically they get into running restaurants and other legal businesses that they can use to hide money gained from their illicit activities,” McNamara explained. “Over the years the Outfit has learned that killing people brings too much heat from law enforcement. Today they might not even beat up a businessman who doesn’t pay back a debt,” he added. Instead, they take a piece of his business, and then, over time, exercise more and more control over the company.
The Family Secrets case, which began in 1999 and resulted in the indictment of 14 subjects in 2005 for racketeering and murder, dealt a crushing blow to the Chicago mob. “Our goal now,” McNamara said, “is to keep them from gaining strength again. We’ve got them down and we’ve got to keep them down.”
He noted that some of the mobsters currently in jail as a result of numerous prosecutions will be getting out in the next few years, and they will be under pressure to start making money again for the Outfit’s top bosses.
“As long as there is money to be made from criminal activity,” McNamara said, “these guys will never stop. So we need to continue to be vigilant and take the long view. The work we do on the LCN squad requires a lot of patience.”
Top-Secret: Previously Unnamed Co-Conspirator Pleads Guilty in $135 Million Phony Lease Scheme
| U.S. Attorney’s Office October 06, 2011 |
NEWARK, NJ—The owner of a purported medical equipment company based in New Jersey pleaded guilty today in connection with his role in a $135 million phony lease scheme, U.S. Attorney Paul J. Fishman announced.
Bruce Donner, 52, of Berkeley Heights, N.J., owner of Donner Medical Marketing Inc., a New Jersey corporation that purported to be a medical equipment vendor, admitted his role in assisting Charles Schwartz, 58, of Sparta, N.J., owner and president of Allied Health Care Services Inc., execute a $135 million phony lease scheme that caused losses of more than $80 million and victimized more than 50 financial institutions.
Donner pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud before U.S. District Judge Susan D. Wigenton in Newark federal court. Sentencing is scheduled for Jan. 11, 2012.
According to documents filed in this case and statements made in Newark federal court:
From at least 2002 through July 2010, Schwartz requested medical equipment invoices from Donner. Donner would, in turn, provide invoices that falsely stated Donner Medical was providing medical equipment to Allied when no such medical equipment was ever provided by Donner Medical to Allied.
Schwartz, through Allied, then convinced financial institutions to pay more than $135 million by telling them the money would be used to lease valuable medical equipment. Schwartz used Donner Medical’s phony supplier invoices to convince the financial institutions to enter into leasing arrangements. The financial institutions purchased the medical equipment—which they immediately leased to Schwartz and Allied—and sent payment for the medical equipment to Donner Medical. Throughout the scheme, Donner and Schwartz undertook efforts to deceive bank examiners who sought at various times to inspect the non-existent medical equipment, which had been purchased by the financial institutions.
Donner admitted today that after receiving the money from the financial institutions, he forwarded 95 to 97 percent of the money to an entity created by Schwartz to facilitate the fraud. The remainder of the funds Donner kept for himself as a commission. Donner also admitted today that more than 50 victim financial institutions were harmed as a result of the scheme.
The mail fraud charge to which Donner pleaded guilty carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense.
U.S. Attorney Fishman credited special agents of the FBI, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge Michael B. Ward, for the investigation that resulted in today’s guilty plea.
The government is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Joseph Mack and Jacob T. Elberg of the U.S. Attorney’s Office Health Care and Government Fraud Unit in Newark.
Defense Counsel: Keith N. Biebelberg Esq., Millburn, N.J.
FAZ – FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG -Cyberstalking: Im Netz
Former Loan Officer Pleads Guilty in $2.8 Million Mortgage Fraud Scheme
| U.S. Attorney’s Office October 06, 2011 |
MINNEAPOLIS—Earlier today in federal court, a former loan officer from Minneapolis pleaded guilty in connection to a $2.8 million mortgage fraud scheme that involved five properties. Hannah Noel Perlich, age 29, pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud. Perlich, who was indicted on June 21, 2011, entered her plea before United States District Court Judge Richard H. Kyle. Perlich worked as a loan officer for two mortgage brokerage companies–St. Joseph’s Financial and Legacy Lending.
In her plea agreement, Perlich admitted that from November of 2005 through September of 2006, she, aided and abetted by others, obtained mortgage loan proceeds through fraud. The purpose of the scheme was to obtain mortgage loans in substantially higher amounts than the purchase price of the properties involved. This was accomplished through the use of inflated appraisals and fraudulent underwriting and loan documentation. Perlich admittedly caused the false loan applications to be provided to potential lenders through wire transfers. In addition, Perlich admitted concealing payments to herself from the loan proceeds by diverting them to buyers and other co-conspirators. At least $350,000 in concealed payments were made.
Several co-conspirators already have been sentenced for their roles in the scheme, while others have been charged, and criminal proceedings against them are ongoing. For her crime, Perlich faces a potential maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. Judge Kyle will determine her sentence at a future hearing, yet to be scheduled. This case is the result of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Christian S. Wilton.
This law enforcement action is in part sponsored by the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. The task force was established to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. It includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general, and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch and, with state and local partners, investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.
FBI Releases Mortgage Fraud Report
Scope Note
The purpose of this study is to provide insight into the breadth and depth of mortgage fraud crimes perpetrated against the United States and its citizens during 2010. This report updates the 2009 Mortgage Fraud Report and addresses current mortgage fraud projections, issues, and the identification of mortgage fraud “hot spots.” The objective of this study is to provide FBI program managers and the general public with relevant data to better understand the threat posed by mortgage fraud. The report was requested by the Financial Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative Division (CID), and prepared by the Financial Crimes Intelligence Unit (FCIU), Directorate of Intelligence (DI).
This report is based on FBI; federal, state, and local law enforcement; mortgage industry; and open-source reporting. Information was also provided by other government agencies, including the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development-Office of Inspector General (HUD-OIG), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Industry reporting was obtained from LexisNexis, Mortgage Asset Research Institute (MARI), RealtyTrac, Inc., Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), Interthinx, and CoreLogic. Some industry reporting was acquired through open sources.
While the FBI has high confidence in all of these sources, some inconsistencies relative to the cataloging of statistics by some organizations are noted. For example, suspicious activity reports (SARs) are cataloged according to the year in which they are submitted, but the information contained within them may describe activity that occurred in previous months or years. The geographic specificity of industry reporting varies, as some companies report at the ZIP code level and others by city, region, or state. Many of the statistics provided by the external sources, including FinCEN, FHA, and HUD-OIG, are captured by fiscal year (FY); however, this report focuses on the calendar year findings as reported by mortgage industry and economic data sources. Additionally, there are also variances in the reporting of fraud depending on who the victim is (either a financial institution or a homeowner). While these discrepancies have minimal impact on the overall findings stated in this report, we have noted specific instances in the text where they may affect conclusions.
See Appendix A for additional information for these sources.
Geospatial maps were provided by the Crime Analysis Research and Development Unit, Criminal Justice Information Services Division.
- Mortgage fraud continued at elevated levels in 2010, consistent with levels seen in 2009. Mortgage fraud schemes are particularly resilient, and they readily adapt to economic changes and modifications in lending practices.
- Mortgage fraud perpetrators include licensed/registered and non-licensed/registered mortgage brokers, lenders, appraisers, underwriters, accountants, real estate agents, settlement attorneys, land developers, investors, builders, bank account representatives, and trust account representatives.
- Total dollar losses directly attributed to mortgage fraud are unknown.
- A continued decrease in loan originations from 2009 to 2010 (and expected through 2012), high levels of unemployment and housing inventory, lower housing prices, and an increase in defaults and foreclosures dominated the housing market in 2010. RealtyTrac reported 2.9 million foreclosures in 2010, representing a 2 percent increase in foreclosures since 2009 and a 23 percent increase since 2008.
- Analysis of available law enforcement and industry data indicates the top states for known or suspected mortgage fraud activity during 2010 were California, Florida, New York, Illinois, Nevada, Arizona, Michigan, Texas, Georgia, Maryland, and New Jersey; reflecting the same demographic market affected by mortgage fraud in 2009.
- Prevalent mortgage fraud schemes reported by law enforcement and industry in FY 2010 included loan origination, foreclosure rescue, real estate investment, equity skimming, short sale, illegal property flipping, title/escrow/settlement, commercial loan, and builder bailout schemes. Home equity line of credit (HELOC), reverse mortgage fraud, and fraud involving loan modifications are still a concern for law enforcement and industry.
- With elevated levels of mortgage fraud, the FBI has continued to dedicate significant resources to the threat. In June 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ), to include the FBI, announced a mortgage fraud takedown referred to as Operation Stolen Dreams. The takedown targeted mortgage fraudsters throughout the country and was the largest collective enforcement effort ever brought to bear in combating mortgage fraud.
- The current and continuing depressed housing market will likely remain an attractive environment for mortgage fraud perpetrators who will continue to seek new methods to circumvent loopholes and gaps in the mortgage lending market. These methods will likely remain effective in the near term, as the housing market is anticipated to remain stagnant through 2011.
| Mortgage FraudMortgage fraud is a material misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission relied on by an underwriter or lender to fund, purchase, or insure a loan. This type of fraud is usually defined as loan origination fraud. Mortgage fraud also includes schemes targeting consumers, such as foreclosure rescue, short sale, and loan modification. |
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Mortgage fraud remained elevated in 2010 despite modest improvements in various economic sectors and increased vigilance by financial institutions to mitigate it. Although recent economic indicators report improvements in various sectors, overall indicators associated with mortgage fraud––such as foreclosures, housing prices, contracting financial markets, and tighter lending practices by financial institutions––indicate that the housing market is still in distress and provide ample opportunities for fraud. National unemployment remains high, and housing inventory is at the same level it was in 2008 in the midst of the housing crisis.1 Mortgage delinquency rates and new foreclosures continued to increase in prime and subprime markets.
Mortgage fraud enables perpetrators to earn high profits through illicit activity that poses a relative low risk for discovery. Mortgage fraud perpetrators include licensed/registered and non-licensed/registered mortgage brokers, lenders, appraisers, underwriters, accountants, real estate agents, settlement attorneys, land developers, investors, builders, bank account representatives, and trust account representatives. There have been numerous instances in which various organized criminal groups were involved in mortgage fraud activity. Asian, Balkan, Armenian, La Cosa Nostra,2 Russian, and Eurasian3 organized crime groups have been linked to various mortgage fraud schemes, such as short sale fraud and loan origination schemes.
Mortgage fraud perpetrators using their experience in the banking and mortgage-related industries—including construction, finance, appraisal, brokerage, sales, law, and business—exploit vulnerabilities in the mortgage and banking sectors to conduct multifaceted mortgage fraud schemes. Mortgage fraud perpetrators have a high level of access to financial documents, systems, mortgage origination software, notary seals, and professional licensure information necessary to commit mortgage fraud and have demonstrated their ability to adapt to changes in legislation and mortgage lending regulations to modify existing schemes or create new ones.
Mortgage fraud perpetrators target victims from across a demographic range, with perpetrators identifying common characteristics such as ethnicity, nationality, age, and socioeconomic variables, to include occupation, education, and income. They recruit people who have access to tools that enable them to falsify bank statements, produce deposit verifications on bank letterhead, originate loans by falsifying income levels, engage in the illegal transfer of property, produce fraudulent tax return documents, and engage in various other forms of fraudulent activities. Mortgage fraud perpetrators have been known to recruit ethnic community members as co-conspirators and victims to participate in mortgage loan origination fraud.
Financial Impact of Mortgage Frauda
Losses
Total dollar losses attributed to mortgage fraud are unknown; however, law enforcement and mortgage industry participants have attempted to quantify them in recent years. According to CoreLogic (see Appendix A for source description) more than $10 billion in loans originated with fraudulent application data in 2010 (see Figure 1).4
Economic & Mortgage Market Conditions
Mortgage fraud both impacts and is impacted by various economic conditions such as mortgage loan originations; unemployment; mortgage loan delinquencies, defaults, and foreclosures; negative equity; loan modifications; housing prices and inventory; real estate sales; housing construction; and bank failures. As of December 2010, activity in the housing market remained very weak as new construction and permits declined, demand for housing remained depressed, home sales declined, and home prices decreased.
- According to the Federal Reserve Board, as of December 2010, real estate markets remained weak, sales declined, obtaining credit was reported as a constraint on demand for homes, existing home inventories remained at high levels, and home prices generally declined across most Federal Reserve Districts.5
- The National League of Cities reported that the fiscal condition of U.S. cities continued to weaken in 2010 as cities were confronted by the economic downturn.6
- A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia reported that low-income households still struggle to access credit.7 Organizations providing services to these households have seen an increase in demand for their services while trying to meet those demands with cuts in funding. The top three factors contributing to a lack of access to credit include lack of financial knowledge, underwriting standards/credit ratings, and lack of cash flow.
Mortgage Loan Originations
According to the MBA, mortgage loan originations for one to four units exceeded $1.6 trillion in 2010; however, this is a decrease from 2009, which reported $2 trillion in originations.8, 9
Unemployment
Unemployment is a factor that is expected to influence the number of foreclosures in the years to come.10 The unemployment rate as of December 2010 was 9.4 percent, an improvement from 9.9 percent as of December 2009.11 The Federal Reserve Board indicates that the jobless rate is anticipated to remain elevated at the end of 2012.12 According to the most recent report by the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program established by Congress, 58 percent of homeowners receiving foreclosure counseling listed unemployment as the main reason for default.13
Mortgage Loan Delinquencies, Defaults, & Foreclosures
Delinquencies
In addition to unemployment, mortgage loan delinquencies, defaults, and foreclosures are also contributing factors to an increasing pool of homeowners vulnerable to mortgage fraud. The MBA National Delinquency Survey (NDS)b reported 43.6 million first-lien mortgages on one- to four-unit residential properties in 2010.
- According to the MBA NDS, 8.2 percent (or 3.6 million) of all residential mortgage loans (seasonally adjusted) in 2010 were past due, excluding those already in the foreclosure process.14 In 2010, 8.8 percent of mortgage loans were seriously delinquent (more than 90 days past due per MBA NDS, to include those in the process of foreclosure).15 The NDS continues to report an increase in foreclosure rates for all loan types (prime, subprime, FHA, and Veteran’s Administration (VA)) from 2008 to 2010. States with the highest overall delinquency rates were Mississippi (13.3 percent), Nevada (12 percent), and Georgia (11.9 percent).
The number of commercial mortgage loan delinquencies increased 79 percent in 2010, from 4.9 percent in December 2009 to 8.79 percent in December 2010.16 Nevada (28.2 percent) and Alabama (16 percent) have the highest delinquency rates in the United States.
- The MBA NDS 2010 data indicate that while the seriously delinquent rate for subprime loans was 28.5 percent in 2010, the rate was 38.9 for subprime Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs). States with the most seriously delinquent subprime ARMs in 2010 were Florida (56.8 percent), New Jersey (52.7 percent), New York (51 percent), Nevada (46.2 percent), and Hawaii (43.3 percent) (see Figure 2).
Defaults
Fitch rating agency anticipates a re-default rate on loan modifications between 60 and 70 percent for subprime and Alt-A loans, and 50 to 60 percent for prime loans.17 Defects in servicer foreclosure procedures have stalled the process throughout the country thereby lengthening the process further. Fitch states that it will take four years to remove the backlog of properties and return the market to balance.18
Foreclosures
According to RealtyTrac, a record 2.9 million homes received foreclosure filings in 2010 (up from 2.8 million in 2009) as the problem became more widespread due to high unemployment.19 The number of foreclosures continues to outpace the number of loan modifications (see Figure 3).20
- The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) report that completed foreclosures in the fourth quarter of 2010 decreased by nearly 50 percent and newly initiated foreclosures decreased by almost 8 percent as a result of the moratorium on foreclosure actions by the largest mortgage service providers brought on by the robo-signing issue.21
- According to the MBA, foreclosure inventory is highly concentrated geographically, with more than 50 percent of foreclosed properties located in five states: Florida, California, Illinois, New York, and New Jersey.22
Negative Equity/Underwater Mortgages
According to CoreLogic, homeowners in negative equity positions add to the number of homeowners vulnerable to short sale fraud schemes. CoreLogic reported that negative equity was concentrated in five states at the close of 2010. Nevada had the highest percentage of mortgages with negative equity at 65 percent, followed by Arizona (51 percent), Florida (47 percent), Michigan (36 percent), and California (32 percent).23
- CoreLogic reporting indicates that 11.1 million, or 23.1 percent, of all residential properties with a mortgage were in negative equity ($750 billion) at the end of the fourth quarter 2010, up from 10.8 million, or 22.5 percent, in the previous quarter.24
Loan Modifications
Historic increases in delinquencies and foreclosures continue to burden the mortgage servicing system.25 According to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), of the 2.9 million eligible delinquent loans (60 or more days delinquent as reported by servicers through December 2010, but excluding FHA and VA loans), only 521,630 have been granted permanent modifications, while 1.5 million are in trial modifications.26
The OCC/OTS reported that 25.5 percent of loan modifications were re-defaulting in 2010, falling 60 or more days past due nine months after modification.27
While their position in rankings may change slightly, the top 10 states reporting active trial and permanent mortgage loan modifications in 2009 were also the top 10 states in 2010 and through March 2011 (see Figure 3).28
|
State |
Total Active Trial and Permanent Mortgage Loan Modifications as of 31 Dec. 2009 |
Total Active Trial and Permanent Mortgage Loan Modifications as of 31 Dec. 2010 |
Total Active Trial and Permanent Mortgage Loan Modifications as of March 2011 |
|
CA |
172,288 |
158,021 |
172,728 |
|
FL |
105,108 |
80,732 |
87,060 |
|
IL |
44,942 |
36,246 |
38,915 |
|
AZ |
43,126 |
31,947 |
33,083 |
|
NY |
38,282 |
30,435 |
32,988 |
|
GA |
33,774 |
24,563 |
26,483 |
|
MI |
29,103 |
22,481 |
23,817 |
|
NJ |
28,517 |
21,782 |
23,348 |
|
MD |
28,117 |
21,702 |
23,118 |
|
TX |
28,577 |
17,757 |
19,075 |
| Figure 3: Top 10 States Reporting Active Trial and Permanent Mortgage Loan Modifications, 2009 to March 2011. Source: U.S. Treasury Making Home Affordable Program: Servicer Performance Reports, 31 December 2009 through March 2011. |
|||
- Interthinx reports that property owners are fraudulently decreasing their income and property values to get their debt reduced for their loan modifications.29 They are fabricating hardships and filing false tax returns to this end. Also, individuals who first perpetrated fraud in loan origination are now attempting to defraud again during their loan modification.
- Freddie Mac reports that 2010 loan modification fraud trends include strategic defaults, which are accompanied by false statements about income, assets, or the homeowner’s inability to pay.30 Loan modification perpetrators are misrepresenting occupancy and income (by stating it is lower), altering pay stubs, and seeking modifications without an actual financial hardship.31
- HUD reported 2010 loan modification scams in the form of principal reduction scams, rent-to-own-leaseback, bankruptcy fraud, and false reconveyance.32 In addition, HUD reported that fraudsters are trolling unemployment offices, churches, and public foreclosure rescue fairs targeting vulnerable homeowners.
|
City |
% Change 2009-2010 |
% Change 2004-2010 |
| U.S. |
-1.4 |
-18.5 |
| Phoenix, AZ |
-8.3 |
-32.3 |
| Atlanta, GA |
-7.9 |
-19.0 |
| Portland, OR |
-7.8 |
2.4 |
| Chicago, IL |
-7.4 |
-20.8 |
| Detroit, MI |
-6.4 |
-44.9 |
| Seattle, WA |
-6.0 |
0.1 |
| Tampa, FL |
-5.9 |
-24.9 |
| Minneapolis, MN |
-5.1 |
-26.9 |
| Las Vegas, NV |
-4.7 |
-52.1 |
| Charlotte, NC |
-4.3 |
-1.3 |
| Figure 4: Top 10 Cities by Percent Change in Home Prices, through December 2010 Source: S & P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index & FiServe Data |
||
Housing Prices & Inventory
Housing prices continued to weaken and trends in sales continued to decrease in 2010 (see Figure 4). The economic downturn has resulted in home prices 1.6 percent lower than a year ago, slightly worse than industry predictions of 1.5 percent.33 Metropolitan statistical areas of Detroit, Atlanta, Cleveland, and Las Vegas each have home prices below their 2000 levels.
Housing inventory was reported to be at levels witnessed in 2008 during the financial crisis. Home values are expected to fall in 2011.
According to the National Association of Realtors, pending home sales decreased 6 percent from 2009 to 2010, and existing home sales decreased 5.7 percent for the same period.34
Top Geographical Areas for Mortgage Fraud
Methodology
Data from law enforcement and industry sources were compared and mapped to determine those areas of the country most affected by mortgage fraud during 2010. This was accomplished by compiling the state rankings by each data source, collating by state, and then mapping the information.
Combining information from states reporting fraud with those reporting significant vulnerability for fraud indicate the top states in 2010 were Florida, California, Arizona, Nevada, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Georgia, New Jersey, and Maryland (see Figure 5 on page 11).

Detailed Look at Fraud Indicators by Source Entity
Various data sources, to include the FBI, HUD-OIG, FinCEN, MARI, Interthinx, Fannie Mae, Radian Guaranty, CoreLogic, the U.S. Census, and the U.S. Department of Labor were used in this report to identify geographic fraud trends. This report also takes a more detailed look at information reported by law enforcement and industry to identify additional fraud patterns and trends.
FBI
FBI mortgage fraud pending investigations totaled 3,129 in FY 2010, a 12 percent increase from FY 2009 and a 90 percent increase from FY 2008 (see Figure 6). According to FBI data, 71 percent (2,222) of all pending FBI mortgage fraud investigations during FY 2010 (3,129) involved dollar losses totaling more than $1 million.

FBI field divisions that ranked in the top 10 for pending investigations during FY 2010 were Las Vegas, Los Angeles, New York, Tampa, Detroit, Washington Field, Miami, San Francisco, Chicago, and Salt Lake City, respectively (see Figure 7).

The FBI assesses that the majority of mortgage fraud cases opened in FY 2010 involved criminal activity that occurred in either 2009 or 2010 (see Figure 8).

Financial Institution Reporting of Suspicious Mortgage Fraud Related Activity Increases – FinCEN
SARs filed by financial institutions indicate that there were 70,533 mortgage fraud-related SARs filed with FinCEN in FY 2010—a 5 percent increase from FY 2009 and an 11 percent increase from FY 2008 filings (see Figure 9).c

SARs reported in FY 2010 revealed $3.2 billion in losses, a 16 percent increase from FY 2009 and a 117 percent increase from FY 2008 (see Figure 10). Only 25 percent of SARs in FY 2010 reported a loss, compared with 22 percent reporting a loss ($2.8 billion) in FY 2009 and also compared with 11 percent reporting a loss ($1.5 billion) in FY 2008.

The Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, Tampa, San Francisco, New York, Phoenix, Sacramento, Atlanta, and Las Vegas FBI Field Offices reported the largest number of SARs filed in FY 2010 (see Figure 11). Eight of the top 10 (Los Angeles, Miami, Tampa, San Francisco, Chicago, Sacramento, New York, and Atlanta) were consistently ranked in the top 10 for the last three years.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development–Office of Inspector General
In FY 2010, HUD-OIG had 765 pending single-family residential loan investigations, a 29 percent increase from the 591 pending during FY 2009.35 This also represented a 70 percent increase from the 451 pending during FY 2008 (see Figure 12 on page 15). Fraud schemes reported by HUD in ongoing investigations include flopping, reverse mortgages, builder bailout schemes, short sales, and robo-signing.36

According to HUD, the preventloanscams.org website has received more than 11,416 complaints as of December 31, 2010, with associated losses of more than $23 million.37
LexisNexis – Mortgage Asset Research Institute
During 2010, Florida, New York, California, New Jersey, Maryland, Michigan, Virginia, Ohio, Colorado, and Illinois were MARI’s top 10 states for reports of mortgage fraud across all originations.38 While half of the states in the top 10 are located in the Northeast, Florida has continued to rank first in fraud reporting since 2006, and its fraud rate was more than three times the expected amount of reported mortgage fraud for its origination volume in 2010.39 Additionally, MARI reports that 27 percent of all reported loans with fraud investigated (post-funding) in 2010 were for Florida properties.
MARI reports that misrepresentation on loan applications and verifications of deposit along with appraisal and valuation issues, presented the most egregious problems in 2010 originations.40
Interthinx
The top 10 states for possible fraudulent activity based on 2010 loan application submissions to Interthinx were Nevada, Arizona, California, Michigan, Florida, Colorado, Minnesota, Georgia, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts.41 According to Interthinx’s 2010 Annual Mortgage Fraud Risk Report, the states with the highest overall levels of mortgage fraud risk correlate closely to the states with the highest levels of foreclosure activity and underwater borrowers. Additionally, they report a strong correlation between mortgage fraud risk and foreclosure activity that is consistent with fraud schemes such as flopping and foreclosure-rescue-related schemes.
Fannie Mae
Fannie Mae’s top 10 mortgage fraud states based on significant misrepresentations discovered by the loan review process through the end of December 2010 were California, New York, Florida, Illinois, Texas, New Jersey, Arizona, Georgia, Alabama, and Michigan.
According to Fannie Mae, short sale, foreclosure rescue, and real estate owned (REO) sales fraud continue to thrive as a result of the opportunities created by defaulting markets. For example, Fannie Mae is investigating fraud schemes perpetrated by real estate agents who manipulate Multiple Listing Services (MLS) data to bolster sagging sales prices. Fannie Mae continues to investigate REO flipping involving real estate agents who withhold competitive offers on REO properties so that they can control the acquisition and subsequent flip.
In 2010 Fannie Mae reported the occurrence of loan origination fraud in the form of affinity fraud, reverse mortgages, condo conversion, and multi-family fraud schemes and stated that Fannie Mae is witnessing a shift in loan origination fraud from the Southeast to the Northeast.42Servicing fraud reported by Fannie Mae includes short sale fraud, fraud involving REOs, and loan modifications. Current reverse mortgage fraud schemes reported by Fannie Mae include the use of asset misrepresentation, occupancy fraud, and identity theft. Condo conversions currently represent 14 percent of Fannie Mae’s mortgage fraud investigations. Fraudsters are using payment abatements to delay defaults, inflated property values, and failure to disclose debt. In a majority of these schemes, the fraudsters made 15-18 payments before defaulting. Fraud involving multi-family properties includes valuation fraud, in which fraudsters misrepresent the condition of the rehabilitated units or factor in incomplete renovations—perpetrators divert funds to their own companies but do not complete the renovations. Perpetrators are also falsifying occupancy rates on their rent rolls and flipping properties to non-arms-length purchasers.
CoreLogic

CoreLogic reported a 20 percent increase in mortgage fraud and approximately $12 billion in originated fraud loan amounts in 2010 (which is flat due to declining origination volumes).43 While the majority of fraud reported by lenders involves income misrepresentation, there has been an 8 percent decrease in this fraud type from 2009 to 2010,44 while there were increased occurrences of occupancy, employment, and undisclosed debt for the same period.
CoreLogic also reports that mortgage fraud is becoming increasingly well-hidden and that lenders are reporting increases in hidden frauds such as short sale fraud, REO flipping fraud, and closing agent embezzlement. They are also seeing an increased frequency of flipping and straw buyer schemes in FHA loans.
RealtyTrac
According to RealtyTrac, a record 2.9 million homes received foreclosure filings in 2010 (up from 2.8 million in 2009) as the problem became more widespread due to high unemployment (see Figure 13).45 As in previous years, California, Florida, Nevada, and Arizona top the list of states with the highest rates of foreclosure.
An analysis of FBI reporting revealed that the most prevalent mortgage fraud schemes identified in FY 2010 included loan origination schemes (to include property flipping), followed by settlement-related schemes (to include kickbacks), real estate investment schemes, short sale schemes, commercial real estate loan frauds, foreclosure rescue schemes, advance fee schemes, builder bailout schemes, equity skimming schemes, and bankruptcy fraud (see Figure 14).

Loan Origination Schemes
Mortgage loan origination fraud is divided into two categories: fraud for property/housing and fraud for profit. Fraud for property/housing entails misrepresentations by the applicant for the purpose of purchasing a property for a primary residence. This scheme usually involves a single loan. Although applicants may embellish income and conceal debt, their intent is to repay the loan. Fraud for profit, however, often involves multiple loans and elaborate schemes perpetrated to gain illicit proceeds from property sales. Gross misrepresentations concerning appraisals and loan documents are common in fraud for profit schemes, and participants are frequently paid for their participation.
Loan origination fraud schemes remain a constant fraud scheme. These schemes involve falsifying a borrower’s financial information––such as income, assets, liabilities, employment, rent, and occupancy status––to qualify the buyer, who otherwise would be ineligible, for a mortgage loan. This is done by supplying fictitious bank statements, W-2 forms, and tax return documents to the borrower’s favor. Perpetrators may also employ the use of stolen identities. Specific schemes used to falsify information include asset rental, backwards application, and credit enhancement schemes.
Freddie Mac is reporting that the loan origination frauds they are witnessing include false documents, property flips with phantom rehabilitation, fictitious assets, and fabricated payroll documents.46 Fraudsters are also using phantom rehabilitations to increase the property values. However, Freddie Mac has been interviewing borrowers and their neighbors to determine if the rehabilitations are actually occurring. Also, Freddie Mac is reporting that fraudsters continue to use transactional “lenders” such as the “dough for a day” businesses that “loan” potential borrowers money so that underwriters will see they have assets when conducting their “proof of funds” due diligence risk assessment on the loan application.
Backwards Application Scheme
In a backwards application scheme, the mortgage fraud perpetrator fabricates the unqualified borrower’s income and assets to meet the loan’s minimum application requirements. Incomes are inflated or falsified, assets are created, credit reports are altered, and previous residences are altered to qualify the borrower for the loan.
Fraudulently Inflated Appraisals
Mortgage fraud perpetrators fraudulently inflate property appraisals during the mortgage loan origination process to generate false equity that they will later abscond. Perpetrators will either falsify the appraisal document or employ a rogue appraiser as a conspirator in the scheme who will create and attest to the inflated value of the property. Fraudulent appraisals often include overstated comparable properties to increase the value of the subject property.
Illegal Property Flipping
Illegal property flipping is a complex fraud that involves the purchase and subsequent resale of property at greatly inflated prices. The key to this scheme is the fraudulent appraisal, which occurs prior to selling the property. The artificially inflated property value enables the purchaser to obtain a greater loan than would otherwise be possible. Subsequently, a buyer purchases the property at the inflated rate. The difference between what the perpetrator paid for the property and the final purchase price of the home is the perpetrator’s profit.
Traditionally, any exchange of property occurring twice on the same day is considered highly suspect for illegal property flipping and often is accompanied by back-to-back closings where there is a purchase contract and a sales contract that are both presented to the same title company. FBI combined intelligence and case reporting for FY 2010 indicates that property flipping is occurring in 47 out of 56 field office territories. The fraud continues to involve the use of fraudulent bank statements, W-2s, and pay stubs; the use of straw buyer investors to purchase distressed properties for alleged rehabilitation; perpetrators receiving cash-back at closing; and the failure to make the first mortgage payment. This type of fraud often results in foreclosure. FBI information indicates the top 10 states reporting same-day property flips (as recorded by county clerk’s offices throughout the United States) in 2010 were Florida, Ohio, Georgia, Minnesota, Hawaii, Michigan, Tennessee, New York, Maryland, and Washington.
Among other industry sources reporting significant property flipping, Interthinx reports that it is still prevalent and trending upward.47 Current property flipping schemes reported by Interthinx involve fraud against servicers; piggybacking on bank accounts to qualify for mortgages; and forgeries. HUD reporting indicates the use of limited liability companies (LLCs) to perpetrate fraudulent property flipping.48
Title/Escrow/Settlement Fraud/Non-Satisfaction of Mortgage
A review of FBI cases opened in 2010 indicates that 38 percent of FBI field offices are reporting some form of title/escrow/settlement fraud. The majority of these frauds involve the diversion or embezzlement of funds for uses other than those specified in the lender’s closing instructions. Associated schemes include the failure to satisfy/pay off mortgage loans after closings for refinances; the reconveyance or transfer of property without the homeowner’s knowledge or consent; the failure to record closing documents such as property deeds; the recording of deeds without title insurance but charging the homeowner and absconding with the money; the use of settlement funds intended to pay subcontractors by general contractors to pay debts on previous projects; the use of dry closings; the delayed recording of loans; the filing of fraudulent liens to receive cash at closing; and the distribution of settlement funds among co-conspirators.
According to a review of FBI investigations opened in FY 2010, title agents and settlement attorneys in at least 21 investigations in 14 field office territories are involved in non-satisfaction of mortgage schemes. They are engaged in misappropriating and embezzling more than $27 million in settlement funds for their own personal use rather than using those escrowed funds to satisfy/pay off mortgages as directed per lender instructions provided at closing. Perpetrators diverted escrow monies intended for lenders to themselves or to entities that they controlled. In addition to embezzling escrow funds, perpetrators are also falsifying deeds, recording deeds without title insurance, and failing to record deeds and taxes.
Real Estate Investment Schemes
In a real estate investment scheme, mortgage fraud perpetrators persuade investors or borrowers to purchase investment properties generally at fraudulently inflated values. Borrowers are persuaded to purchase rental properties or land under the guise of quick appreciation. Victim borrowers pay artificially inflated prices for these investment properties and, as a result, experience a personal financial loss when the true value is later discovered. Analysis of FBI cases opened in FY 2010 revealed that 43 percent of FBI field offices are reporting this activity with losses exceeding $76 million.
Short Sale Schemes
A real estate short sale is a type of pre-foreclosure sale in which the lender agrees to sell a property for less than the mortgage owed. Short sale fraud consists of false statements made to loan servicers or lenders that take the form of buyer or seller affirmations of no hidden relationships or agreements in place to resell the property, typically for a period of 90 days. One of the most common forms of a short sale scheme occurs when the subject is alleged to be purchasing foreclosed properties via short sale, but not submitting the “best offer” to the lender and subsequently selling the property in a dual closing the same day or within a short time frame for a significant profit. Reverse staging and comparable shopping techniques are currently being used by fraud perpetrators in the commission of short sale frauds. The fraud primarily occurs in areas of the country that are experiencing high rates of foreclosure or homeowner distress.
Industry participants are reporting that short sale fraud schemes continue to be an increasing threat to the mortgage industry. A recent CoreLogic study indicated that short sale volume has tripled from 2009 to 2010.49 In June 2010, Freddie Mac reported that short sale transactions were up 700 percent compared to 2008.
Industry sources report that in the process of committing short sale fraud, fraudsters are manipulating the Broker Price Opinions (BPOs) and MLS; engaging in non-arms-length transactions;50 using LLCs to hide their involvement in short sale transactions;51 failing to record short sale deeds of trust; using back-to-back and multiple real estate agent closings; selling properties to an LLC or trust months before the sale;52 selling the property to a family member or other party the fraudsters control and deeding the property back to themselves; engaging in escrow thefts, simultaneous double sales to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and failing to pay off the original loan in a refinance transaction; property flopping;53 bribing brokers and appraisers; refusing to allow the broker or appraiser access to the property unless the fraudster is present; providing their own comparables to the appraiser; taking unflattering photographs of the property and pointing out defects in the property to the appraiser;54 providing false estimates of repair, rebuttal of appraisal, and selection of poor comparable properties;55 and facilitating the partnership of attorneys with non-attorneys to split fees acquired during short sale negotiations.56
Commercial Real Estate Loan Fraud
Commercial real estate loan fraud continues to mirror fraud in the residential mortgage loan market. Law enforcement investigations indicate that perpetrators such as real estate agents, attorneys, appraisers, loan officers, builders, developers, straw buyer investors, title companies,and others are engaged in same-day property flips; the falsification of financial documents, performance data, invoices, tax returns, and zoning letters during origination; the diversion of loan proceeds to personal use; the misrepresentation of assets and employment; the use of inflated appraisals; and money laundering.
FBI reporting indicates that some commercial real estate-driven bank failures may expose insider and accounting fraud in regional and community banks.57 According to FBI analysis, these frauds are emerging in addition to the residential mortgage frauds still being found in roughly half of all bank failures investigated by the FBI.58 FBI case information and open source financial reporting indicates some executives and loan officers may resort to issuing fraudulent loans, dishonest accounting, or other criminal activity to disguise the poor financial conditions of their institutions. A review of banks that failed due to overexposure to commercial real estate debt during the boom years revealed that a small percentage showed fraudulent commercial real estate activity, attempts to hide bank financial conditions, and insider loan schemes through which executives and other insiders benefited by controlling lending decisions.
The Congressional Oversight Panel examined commercial real estate losses and financial stability in February 2010 and found that poor-performing loans and defaults would affect banks into 2011 and beyond.59 Some banks are also extending the terms of some poor-performing commercial real estate loans, pushing the potential loan default dates past 2011.60
Foreclosure Rescue
Foreclosure rescue schemes are often used in association with advance fee/loan modification program schemes. The perpetrators convince homeowners that they can save their homes from foreclosure through deed transfers and the payment of up-front fees. This “foreclosure rescue” often involves a manipulated deed process that results in the preparation of forged deeds. In extreme instances, perpetrators may sell the home or secure a second loan without the homeowners’ knowledge, stripping the property’s equity for personal enrichment. For example, the perpetrator transfers the property to his name via quit claim deed and promises to make mortgage payments while allowing the former home owner to remain in the home paying rent. The perpetrator profits from the scheme by re-mortgaging the property or pocketing fees paid by desperate homeowners. Often, the original mortgage is not paid off by the perpetrator and foreclosure is only delayed.
Financial industry reporting indicates that foreclosure rescue schemes remain a current threat.61 Analysis of FBI intelligence reporting indicates that foreclosure rescue schemes were the sixth-highest reported mortgage fraud scheme in FY 2010. According to FBI case analysis, mortgage fraud foreclosure rescue investigations comprised 2 percent of all mortgage fraud cases opened in FY 2010.
Advance Fee Schemes
Mortgage fraud perpetrators such as rogue loan modification companies, foreclosure rescue operators, and debt elimination companies use advance fee schemes, which involve victims paying up-front fees for services that are never rendered, to acquire thousands of dollars from victim homeowners and straw buyers.
Builder Bailout Schemes
Builders are employing builder bailout schemes to offset losses and circumvent excessive debt and potential bankruptcy as home sales suffer from escalating foreclosures, rising inventory, and declining demand. Builder bailout schemes are common in any distressed real estate market and typically consist of builders offering excessive incentives to buyers, which are not disclosed on the mortgage loan documents. In a common scenario, the builder has difficulty selling the property and offers an incentive of a mortgage with no down payment. For example, a builder wishes to sell a property for $200,000. He inflates the value of the property to $240,000 and finds a buyer. The lender funds a mortgage loan of $200,000 believing that $40,000 was paid to the builder, thus creating home equity. However, the lender is actually funding 100 percent of the home’s value. The builder acquires $200,000 from the sale of the home, pays off his building costs, forgives the buyer’s $40,000 down payment, and keeps any profits.
Equity Skimming Schemes
Equity skimming schemes occur when mortgage fraud perpetrators drain all of the equity out of a property. For example, perpetrators charge inflated fees to “help” homeowners profit by refinancing their homes multiple times and thus skimming the equity from their property. A perpetrator will also help a homeowner establish a home equity line on a property. The perpetrator then encourages the homeowner to access these funds for investment in various scams.
Debt Elimination/Reduction Schemes
FBI reporting indicates a continued effort by sovereign citizen domestic extremists throughout the United States to perpetrate and train others in the use of debt elimination schemes. Victims pay advance fees to perpetrators espousing themselves as “sovereign citizens” or “tax deniers” who promise to train them in methods to reduce or eliminate their debts. While they also target credit card debt, they are primarily targeting mortgages and commercial loans, unsecured debts, and automobile loans. They are involved in coaching people on how to file fraudulent liens, proof of claim, entitlement orders, and other documents to prevent foreclosure and forfeiture of property.
Dodd-Frank Act
The Dodd Frank Act (DFA) was created to address various issues that occurred during the financial crisis. According to MBA, the DFA will establish the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and set strict standards and regulations for processing mortgage loans.62 To protect consumers from fraud, the CFPB will: (1) regulate strict guidelines for appraisers and licensing to appraisal management companies; (2) oversee and have total responsibility for consumer financial protection laws;d (3) add more layers to disclosures, licensing, and process regulation with loan originators, reverse mortgages, mortgage companies, and advertising practices; and (4) harmonize the TILA and RESPA disclosure.63, 64
The new act will prohibit the use of BPOs as the primary benchmark for the value of a property being purchased.65 Additionally, the CFPB will oversee consumer protection laws, including TILA and RESPA.66 The DFA will require lenders to be accountable for the cost it provides to borrowers during the loan application process.67 The legislation will modernize the real estate appraisal regulation by enforcing actions against states and appraisers that do not abide by the new regulation.68 Also, there will be a new appraisal standard board and appraisers should follow the new regulations.69 The DFA is set to better regulate consumer protection laws and help reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.70
Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Mortgage Assistance Relief Services (MARS) Rule
The FTC rule on MARS prohibits charging advance fees for loan modification services, but states that attorneys are the exception to the rule and are therefore permitted to charge an advance fee provided some stipulations are met.71
According to the FTC’s MARS, a company cannot charge an up-front fee for a loan modification until it provides the homeowner a written offer for the modification or other relief from their lender and the homeowner accepts the offer.72 The company must also provide the homeowner with a document from its lender showing the changes to the homeowner’s loan if the homeowner decides to move forward with the modification. In addition, the company must clearly disclose the total fee charged for its services. MARS also requires that companies spell out important information in their advertisements and telemarketing calls, such as disclaimers and consequences for securing their services.
The Secure and Fair Enforcement Act
The Secure and Fair Enforcement (SAFE) for Mortgage Licensing Act—enacted in July 2008— required states to have a licensing and registration system in place for all loan originators by July 31, 2010, to reduce mortgage fraud and enhance consumer protection.
With elevated levels of mortgage fraud, the FBI has continued to dedicate significant resources to the threat. In June 2010, the DOJ, to include the FBI, announced a mortgage fraud takedown referred to as Operation Stolen Dreams. The takedown targeted mortgage fraudsters throughout the country and was the largest collective enforcement effort ever brought to bear in combating mortgage fraud. Operation Stolen Dreams involved 1,215 criminal defendants and included 485 arrests, 673 informations and indictments, and 336 convictions. The defendants were allegedly responsible for more than $2.3 billion in losses.
The FBI continues to enhance liaison partnerships within the mortgage industry and law enforcement. As part of the effort to address mortgage fraud, the FBI continues to support 25 mortgage fraud task forces and 67 working groups. The FBI also participates in the DOJ National Mortgage Fraud and National Bank Fraud Working Groups, as well as the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF). The FFETF’s mission is to enhance the government’s effectiveness in sharing information to help prevent and combat financial fraud.
The FBI continues to foster relationships with representatives of the mortgage industry to promote mortgage fraud awareness and share intelligence. FBI personnel routinely participate in various mortgage industry conferences and seminars, including those sponsored by the MBA. Collaborative educational efforts are ongoing to raise public awareness of mortgage fraud schemes through the publication of the annual Mortgage Fraud Report and the Financial Crimes Report to the Public, and through the dissemination of information jointly or between various industry and consumer organizations. Analytic products are routinely distributed to a wide audience, including public and private sector industry partners, the intelligence community, and other federal, state, and local law enforcement partners.
The FBI employs sophisticated investigative techniques, such as undercover operations and wiretaps, which result in the collection of valuable evidence and provide an opportunity to apprehend criminals in the commission of their crimes. This ultimately reduces the losses to individuals and financial institutions. The FBI has also instituted several intelligence initiatives to support mortgage fraud investigations and has improved law enforcement and industry relationships. The FBI has established methodology to proactively identify potential mortgage fraud targets using tactical analysis coupled with advanced statistical correlations and computer technologies.
In a thriving economy, loan originations for both new purchases and refinances are plentiful. Schemes which thrive in such an economy include loan origination fraud, property flips, and equity conversion schemes. In a sluggish economy, delinquency and foreclosure rates soar, and loan originations slow dramatically. In this economy, the most prevalent schemes are those which target distressed homeowners, including foreclosure rescue, loan modification, and short sales.
The FBI assesses that the current and continuing depressed housing market will likely remain an attractive environment for mortgage fraud perpetrators who will continue to seek new methods to circumvent loopholes and gaps in the mortgage lending market. These methods will likely remain effective in the near term, as the housing market is anticipated to remain stagnant through 2011. Market participants are expected to continue employing and modifying old schemes and are likely to increasingly adopt new schemes in response to tighter lending practices.
CoreLogic – CoreLogic is the nation’s largest provider of advanced property and ownership information, analytics, and solutions. The company’s database covers more than 3,000 counties, representing 97 percent of U.S. real estate transactions. CoreLogic obtains property records, tax assessments, property characteristics, and parcel maps from tax assessors and county recorder offices across the nation and combines this data with flood, demographic, crime, site inspection, neighborhood, document image, and other information from proprietary sources.
Fannie Mae – Fannie Mae is the nation’s largest mortgage investor. To aid in mortgage fraud prevention and detection, the company publishes mortgage fraud statistics and mortgage fraud news articles and provides recorded training modules and fraud reference tools on their eFannieMae.com website.
FinCEN – Established by the U.S. Treasury Department, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s mission is to enhance U.S. national security, deter and detect criminal activity, and safeguard financial systems from abuse by promoting transparency in the U.S. and international financial systems. In accordance with the Bank Secrecy Act, SARs filed by various financial entities are collected and managed by FinCEN and used in this report.
Interthinx – Interthinx, Inc. is a provider of risk mitigation and regulatory compliance tools for the financial services industry. The Interthinx Fraud Risk Indices consist of the Mortgage Fraud Risk Index and the Property Valuation, Identity, Occupancy, and Employment/Income Indices, which measure the risk of these specific types of fraudulent activity. The Interthinx Fraud Risk Report represents an in-depth analysis of residential mortgage fraud risk throughout the United States as indicated by the Interthinx Fraud Risk Indices.
LexisNexis Mortgage Asset Research Institute – MARI maintains the Mortgage Industry Data Exchange (MIDEX) database, which contains information submitted by mortgage lenders, agencies, and insurers describing incidents of alleged fraud and material misrepresentations. MARI releases a report highlighting the geographical distribution of mortgage fraud based on these submissions.MARI ranks the states based on the MARI Fraud Index (MFI), which is an indication of the amount of mortgage fraud discovered through MIDEX.
Mortgage Bankers Association – The Mortgage Bankers Association is the national association representing the real estate finance industry. The MBA is a good source of information for regulatory, legislative, market, and industry data.
RealtyTrac – RealtyTrac is the leading real estate marketplace for foreclosure properties and publishes the country’s largest and most comprehensive foreclosure database with more than 1.5 million default, auction, and bank-owned homes from across the country.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development-Office of Inspector General – HUD-OIG is charged with detecting and preventing waste, fraud, and abuse in relation to various HUD programs, such as single– and multi-family housing. As part of this mission, HUD-OIG investigates mortgage fraud–related waste, fraud, and abuse of HUD programs and operations.
a The discovery of mortgage fraud via the mortgage industry loan review processes, quality control measures, regulatory and industry referrals, and consumer complaints lags behind economic indicators—often up to two years or more, with the impacts felt far beyond these years.
b The MBA NDS is estimated to cover 88 percent of the outstanding first-lien mortgages in the mortgage market.
c Mortgage Loan Fraud (MLF) SAR time lag versus fraud reporting for calendar year 2009: SAR filers reported suspicious activities that were more than a year old in 77 percent of MLF SARs; fourth quarter mortgage loan fraud SAR filings indicated that 65 percent of reported activities occurred more than two years prior to the filing compared with 43 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008. Source: FinCEN, April 2010.
d Including Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act (RESPA), Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
1 Online Article; S & P Indices, A Year in Review, January 2011 URL: http://www.indices.standardandpoors.com, accessed on 3 May 2011; Source is for background.
2 FBI; Electronic Communication dated 7 October 2010; UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source has good access, but reliability cannot be determined.
3 FBI; Electronic Communication dated 29 April 2010; UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is reliable with good access.
4 Online Report; Mortgage Fraud is Rising, With a Twist, 23 August 2010, Wall Street Journal, available at http://online.wsj.com/atricle/SB10001424052748703824304575435383161436658.html, accessed 13 December 2010.
5 Online Report; Federal Reserve Bank of Boston for the Federal Reserve Board, The Beige Book – Summary of Commentary on Current Economic Conditions, January 2011; URL:http://www.federalreserve.gov/FOMC/BeigeBook/2011/20110112/fullreport2010112.pdf, accessed on 14 June 2011.
6 Online Article; Christpher W. Hoene & Michael A. Pagano; National League of Cities Research Brief of America’s Cities, City Fiscal Conditions in 2010; October 2010, URL:http://www.nlc.org/news-center/press-room, accessed on 4 April 2011.
7 Online Article; Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1st Quarter 2011 Community Outlook Survey, May 2011; URL:http://www.philadelphiafed.org/community-development/community-outlook-survey/2011/2011q1.cfm, accessed on 19 May 2011; Online Article; Jon Prior for Housingwire, Low-Income Households Struggle to Access Credit, 17 May 2011, URL:http://www.housingwire.com/2011/05/17/low-income-households-struggle-to-access-credit, accessed 19 May 2011.
8 Online PowerPoint; Mortgage Banker’s Association, Economic Outlook, 28 March 2011; URL:http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Conferences/2011/Tech/Tech11RegulatoryOverviewMFratantoniMar28.pdf, accessed on 3 May 2011.
9 Online Data; Mortgage Banker’s Assocation, Mortgage Origination Estimates, March 2011; URL:http://www.mortgagebankers.org/ResearchandForecastsandCommentary, accessed on 3 May 2011.
10 Online Report; US Government Accountability Office, Loan Performance and Negative Home Equity in the Nonprime Mortgage Market, 16 December 2009, URL: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-146R, accessed on 18 March 2010.
11 Online Report; US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release-Table A-1. Employment Status of the Civilian Population by Sex and Age, data from January 2001 through May 2011, URL: http://www.data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet, accessed on 14 June 2011.
12 Online Report; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta for the Federal Reserve Board, The Beige Book – Summary, 2 March 2011; URL:http://www.federalreserve.gov/foomc/beigebook/2011/20110302/default.htm, accessed on 19 May 2011.
13 Online Report; NeighborWorks America, National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program Congressional Update, 31 January 2010, URL:http://www.nw.org/network/nfmcp/documents/ExecutiveSummary_001.pdf, accessed on 25 March 2011.
14 Report; Mortgage Banker’s Association, National Delinquency Survey, February 2011.
15 Report; Mortgage Banker’s Association, National Delinquency Survey, February 2011.
16 Online Article; Jason Philyaw for Housingwire, CMBS Delinquencies Rose 79% in 2010: Moody’s, 12 January 2011, URL:http://www.housingwire.com/2011/01/12/moodys-cmbs-delinquencies-rose-79-in-2010, accessed on 19 May 2011.
17 Online Article; DSNews.com, Fitch:Subpar Loan Mod Results Making US Foreclosures a Reality, 7 February 2011; URL:http://www.dsnews.com/articles/fitch-subpar-loan-mod-results-making-us-foreclosures-reality-2011-02-07?ref=nf, accessed on 3 May 2011.
18 Online Article; DSNews.com, Fitch:Subpar Loan Mod Results Making US Foreclosures a Reality, 7 February 2011; URL:http://www.dsnews.com/articles/fitch-subpar-loan-mod-results-making-us-foreclosures-reality-2011-02-07?ref=nf, accessed on 3 May 2011.
19 Online Report; RealtyTrac, Record 2.9 Million U.S. Properties Receive Foreclosure Filings in 2010 Despite 30-Month Low in December, 12 January 2011, URL: http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/record-29-million-us-properties-receive-foreclosure-filings-in-2010-despite-30-month-low-in-december-6309, accessed on 15 February 2011.
20 Online Report; Congressional Testimony of Julia Gordon, Center for Responsible Lending, “Robo-signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing,” 18 November 2010, URL:http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/congress/Gordon-Waters-testimony-final.pdf, accessed on 25 March 2011.
21 Online Report; The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision, OCC and OTS Mortgage Metrics Report: Fourth Quarter 2010, March 2011; URL:http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications/mortgage-metrics-q4-2010/mortgage-metrics-q4-2010.pdf, accessed on 17 May 2011.
22 Online PowerPoint; Mortgage Banker’s Association, Economic Outlook, 28 March 2011; URL:http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Conferences/2011/Tech/Tech11RegulatoryOverviewMFratantoniMar28.pdf, accessed on 3 May 2011.
23 Online Report; CoreLogic, New CoreLogic Data Shows 23 Percent of Borrowers Underwater with $750 Billion Dollars of Negative Equity, 8 March 2011, URL: http://www.corelogic.com/uploadedFiles/Pages/About_Us/ResearchTrends/CL_Q4_2010_Negative_Equity_FINAL.pdf, accessed on 25 April 2011.
24 Online Report; CoreLogic, New CoreLogic Data Shows 23 Percent of Borrowers Underwater with $750 Billion Dollars of Negative Equity, 8 March 2011, URL: http://www.corelogic.com/uploadedFiles/Pages/About_Us/ResearchTrends/CL_Q4_2010_Negative_Equity_FINAL.pdf, accessed on 25 April 2011.
25 Presentation; Elizabeth DeSilva and Robert Maddox, Fraud in Loss Mitigation and Loan Modification, April 27, 2010, Mortgage Banker’s Association’s National Fraud Issues Conference, Chicago, IL; Source is for background.
26 Online Report; Making Home Affordable, Servicer Performance Report Through December 2010, URL: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/Dec%202010%20MHA%20Report%20Final.pdf, accessed on 3 May 2011; Source is for background.
27 Online Report; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision, OCC and OTS Release Mortgage Metrics Report for Fourth Quarter of 2009, 25 March 2010, URL: http://www.occ.gov/ftp/release/printview/2010-36.htm, accessed on 7 May 2010; Source is for background.
28 Online Report; Making Home Affordable, Servicer Performance Report Through December 2010, URL: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/Dec%202010%20MHA%20Report%20Final.pdf, accessed on 3 May 2011; Source is for background.
29 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “The Full Fraud Solution;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
30 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in Fraud;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
31 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in Fraud;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
32 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in Fraud;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
33 Online Article; CNNMoney, Home Prices Slump Deepens, 25 January 2011; URL:http://money.cnn.com/2011/01/25/real_estate/november_home_prices/index.htm, accessed on 19 May 2011; Source is for housing prices.
34 Online Report; National Association of Realtors, Pending and Existing Home Sales Data, March 2011; URL:http://www.realtor.org/wps/wcm/connect/11ba7d00468defab88eccf60f51ebbfd/REL1103SF.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=11ba7d00468defab88eccf60f51ebbfd, accessed on 17 May 2011; Source is for pending and existing home sales data.
35 Data; US Department of Housing and Urban Development, provided on 3 March 2010.
36 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “Real Estate Owned, FHA, Home Affordable Refinance Program and Short Sales-the Latest Mortgage Fraud Schemes and Trends for 2011;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
37 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in Fraud;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
38 Online Report; Lexis Nexis Mortgage Asset Research Institute, Thirteenth Periodic Mortgage Fraud Case Report, p.6, 10 May 2011; URL:http://img.en25.com/Web/LexiNexis?mortgageFraudReport-13thEdition.pdf, accessed on 10 May 2011; Source is for background.
39 Online Report; Lexis Nexis Mortgage Asset Research Institute, Thirteenth Periodic Mortgage Fraud Case Report, p.6, 10 May 2011; URL:http://img.en25.com/Web/LexiNexis?mortgageFraudReport-13thEdition.pdf, accessed on 10 May 2011; Source is for background.
40 Online Report; Lexis Nexis Mortgage Asset Research Institute, Thirteenth Periodic Mortgage Fraud Case Report, p.1, 10 May 2011; URL:http://img.en25.com/Web/LexiNexis?mortgageFraudReport-13thEdition.pdf, accessed on 10 May 2011; Source is for background.
41 Online Report; Interthinx, 2010 Annual Mortgage Fraud Risk Report, January 2011, URL:http://www.interthinx.com/overview/fraud_reports.php, accessed on 25 April 2011; Source is for fraud information.
42 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in Fraud;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
43 Internet site; CoreLogic, 2010 Mortgage Fraud Trends Report, July 2010, URL: http://www.corelogic.com/uploadedFiles/Pages/About_Us/ResearchTrends/17-MFTR-0710-00%202010%20Mortgage%20Fraud%20Trends%20Report%20Screen%20071310.pdf, accessed on 22 September 2010; Source is for mortgage fraud trends.
44 Presentation document; CoreLogic, Fraud Trends and Patterns 2010, March 2011; Source is Powerpoint document provided to the FBI from CoreLogic.
45 Internet site; RealtyTrac, Record 2.9 Million U.S. Properties Receive Foreclosure Filings in 2010 Despite 30-Month Low in December, 12 January 2011, URL: http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/record-29-million-us-properties-receive-foreclosure-filings-in-2010-despite-30-month-low-in-december-6309, accessed on 15 February 2011; Source is for foreclosure data.
46 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in Fraud;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
47 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “The Full Fraud Solution;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
48 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in Fraud;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
49 CoreLogic, “2011 Short Sale Research Study,” May 2011,
50 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in Fraud;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
51 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “The Full Fraud Solution;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
52 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “The Full Fraud Solution;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
53 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in Fraud;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
54 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “The Full Fraud Solution;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
55 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in Fraud;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
56 FBI; Electronic Communication;19 April 2011; 28 March 2011; “The Shoe is on the Other Foot-Fraud Investigations Against Lenders for Document Fraud;” UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is presentation at the 28 March 2011 Mortgage Banker’s Association National Fraud Issues Conference.
57 FBI: Intelligence Bulletin, 2 September 2010; Commercial Real Estate-Driven Bank Failures May Expose Insider or Accounting Frauds in Regional and Community Banks,2 September 2010; UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED.
58 FBI e-mail and attachment: ”Operational Assessment of Intelligence Bulletin Email;” 20 August 2010; DOI 17 August 2010; UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED; Financial Institution Fraud Unit critique of Intelligence Bulletin draft. The critique is based on an agent review of FDIC and FBI bank failure case information.
59 Online Report; Congressional Oversight Panel, Commercial Real Estate Losses and the Risk to Financial Stability, 11 February 2010; URL: http://www.cop.senate.gov/reports/library/report-021110-copo.cfm; accessed on 7 December 2010; Source is for background.
60 Internet site; Carrick Mollenkamp and Lingling Wei; “To Fix Sour Property Deals, Lenders ‘Extend and Pretend,’ The Wall Street Journal; 7 July 2010; URL; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704764404515286882690834088.html; accessed on 25 April 2011; Source is for background.
61 Internet site; CoreLogic, 2010 Mortgage Fraud Trends Report, July 2010, URL: http://www.corelogic.com/uploadedFiles/Pages/About_Us/ResearchTrends/17-MFTR-0710-00%202010%20Mortgage%20Fraud%20Trends%20Report%20Screen%20071310.pdf, accessed on 22 September 2010; Source is for fraud trends.
62 Online Report; Mortgage Bankers Association, Summary of Mortgage Related Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; 2010; available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/ResourceCenter/MIRA/MBASummaryofDF.pdf; accessed 2 May 2011; Source is a reliable mortgage industry source for analysis of national mortgage fraud risk.
63 Ibid
64 Online Report; Appraisal Institute, Frequently Asked Questions- Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill (HR4173); 2010; available at http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/newsadvocacy/downloads/key_document/Dodd-Frank_FAQs.pdf; accessed 28 April 2011; Source is a research reporting industry that is deemed reliable.
65 Ibid
66 Online Report; Mortgage Banker Association, Mortgage Disclosures under RESPA and TILA Should Be Combined and Simplified While coordinating with Industry;2011; available at http://www.mbaa.org/files/IssueBriefs/2011RESPATILAIssueBriefs.pdf;ack; accessed 12 April 201; Source is a reliable mortgage industry source for analysis of national mortgage fraud risk.
67 Online Report; Mortgage Bankers Association, Summary of Mortgage Related Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; 2010; available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/ResourceCenter/MIRA/MBASummaryofDF.pdf; accessed 2 May 2011; Source is a reliable mortgage industry source for analysis of national mortgage fraud risk.
68 FBI; Electronic Communication; 25 March 2011; 3 May 2011; Mortgage Fraud Liaison Contact – Conversation with Appraisal Subcommittee Contact; UNCLASSIFEIED; Source information is from private industry who is reliable for mortgage industry analysis.
69 Ibid
70 Ibid
71 Online Article; Federal Trade Commission, FTC Issues Final Rule to Protect Struggling Homeowners from Mortgage Relief Scams, 19 November 2010; URL:http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/11/mars.shtm; accessed on 25 April 2011; Source is for background.
72 Online Article; Federal Trade Commission, FTC Issues Final Rule to Protect Struggling Homeowners from Mortgage Relief Scams, 19 November 2010; URL:http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/11/mars.shtm; accessed on 25 April 2011; Source is for backgroung
FBI Seeks Public Assistance in Solving a 1981 Domestic Terrorism Case
The FBI is asking for the public’s assistance in locating Donna Joan Borup. Borup is wanted for her alleged participation in the violent disruption of an anti-apartheid demonstration at JFK International Airport in Queens, New York, on September 26, 1981.
Borup allegedly tossed an acidic substance into the eyes of Port Authority Police Officer Evan Goodstein. As a result, Goodstein was partially blinded. At the time, Borup was a member of the 19th Communist Organization, a Marxist-Leninist Organization that advocated the armed revolution and violent overthrow of the United States government. Borup was arrested and released on bail pending a trail in May 1982.
On May 20, 1982, an arrest warrant was issued for Borup after she failed to appear for trial. On September 29, 1982, an unlawful flight to avoid ptosecution (UFAP) warrant was issued by the Eastern District of New York.
Borup is a white female between 5’4’’ and 5’6’’ tall and approximately 160-170 pounds. She has brown or blue eyes and uses multiple dates of birth that would put her between 59-64 years of age. Borup has used Rebecca Ann Morgan, Donna Borup, and Donna Austopchuk as aliases. She has family ties to New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
“Borup has been on the run for too long and deserves to be brought to justice for her alleged attack against a law enforcement officer. We’re asking the public to look at these photos and to contact the FBI if they recognize Borup, “said Supervisory Special Agent Tim Flannelly.
Borup’s wanted poster is currently on the Clear Channel billboard in Times Square. The slide flashes between her old photo and an age progressed photo.
Anyone with information is asked to call the FBI immediately at 212-384-1000. Tipsters may remain anonymous.

FBI – Be Aware of Recent Cyber Crime Scams
Internet Crime Complaint Center’s (IC3)
Scam Alerts
This report, which is based upon information from law enforcement and complaints
submitted to the IC3, details recent cyber crime trends and new twists to previously-existing
cyber scams.
“Mass Joinder Lawsuits” Promising Home Mortgage Relief
The IC3 has received several complaints from individuals who reported they received
a letter stating they were a potential plaintiff in a “Mass Joinder” lawsuit being
filed by a law firm located in California, against their mortgage companies. Consumers
stated they were requested to pay non-refundable, upfront fees of $2,000 to $5,000.
The law firm made a wide variety of claims and sales pitches and offered legal and
litigation services, with the goal of taking money from the victim.
Lawyers seeking plaintiffs to join a class for a class action lawsuit do not seek
up front commission from their class clients. Class action lawyers are typically
paid on a contingency basis. In a contingency fee arrangement, an attorney receives
approximately 40% of any judgment or settlement amount obtained on the client’s
behalf.
Warnings have been posted on-line regarding “Mass Joinder” by the California Department
of Real Estate; the Better Business Bureau; as well as consumers who have been scammed
and posted their experiences, insights, and warnings.
On-line Auction Site PlayStation Bundle Ad Scam
The IC3 has received several complaints from individuals who reported they received
an unsolicited e-mail stating their ad for a Sony Playstation 3 Metal Gear Solid
4 PS3 80 GB Bundle has been posted and a confirmation number was enclosed for the posting.
In each instance the victim claimed they did not place an ad on an on-line auction
site for the Sony Playstation Bundle. Some victims stated they did not even have
an on-line auction account.
Warnings have been posted on-line to beware of auction site phishing e-mail scams
and specifically mention the above-mentioned scam. One warning indicated the scam
was first reported in January 2009.
Fraud Trends Affecting The eCommerce Community
Ethoca recently provided the IC3 information pertaining to the increase in fraud
attempts incurred by on-line merchants. Ethoca was founded under the concept of
safely sharing transaction data to fight on-line credit card fraud. The company
serves as a data sharing platform for merchants to stop on-line fraud and is partnered
with the National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA).
The data received by Ethoca remains private and is only used for fraud prevention.
The following information is based on Ethoca’s data collection and information sharing
process.
Advisory On Military Addresses
On 07/11/2011, the hacker group Anonymous posted 90,000 e-mail addresses and passwords.
As a result of this posting, merchants have reported some orders containing military
e-mail addresses have been identified as fraudulent. Until this time, military e-mail
addresses typically meant an order was less likely to be fraudulent. The increase
in fraud orders has happened within the last 30 days.
E-mail Address Tumbling
E-mail address tumbling has been around for awhile and fraudsters have used it for
many years. On the other side, good consumers utilize address tagging to identify
orders.
The purpose of e-mail tagging is to allow consumers to have one e-mail address for
every purpose. The attractive feature of e-mail tagging is it allows the consumer
to vary their e-mail address to help differentiate when placing orders, shopping,
working, schooling, etc., but automatically forwards to the primary e-mail address.
This feature on Gmail works in two ways, either with a period or a plus sign. The
period works by allowing the consumer to take an e-mail address, JohnDoe@gmail.com,
and add as many periods as the consumer wants to the e-mail address, JohnDoe…..@gmail.com,
J.o.h.n.D.o.e@gmail.com, etc.
The feature most often used is the + feature, which allows a user to add additional
tags to their e-mail address to easily identify how someone obtained their name.
Using the above example, when shopping on-line, a consumer can tag their e-mail
as JohnDoe+081811OnlineRetailerName@gmail.com. This allows the user to know they
shopped on-line with a merchant on that specific day.
These features can be used in combination with rules to route e-mails into different
boxes, keeping inbox e-mail volume down, and helping users be more efficient.
Fraudsters have figured out this tip and use what has been termed e-mail address
tumbling, so the fraudster does not have to create unique user accounts for their
many fraud attempts. So far these features have only been found to work with Gmail
accounts.
BÖRSE ONLINE – GRÖSSTE GEFAHR DURCH FINGIERTE “GoMoPa” –
So wollte “GoMoPa” mich erpressen und stoppen
Von rufMÖRDERN u. Serienbetrügern erfundene “GoMoPa-SJB” beschreiben ihre ruf-MORDE höchstselbst
FREI ERFUNDENE LÜGEN DER FINGIERTEN “GoMoPa” – z.B.: MERIDIAN CAPITAL/PRESS RELEASER, PROFESSOR STELZER, WIRECARD
1) Meridian Capital – “GoMoPa”-Fälschung auf Pressreleaser.org (einer von “GoMoPa”‘s eigenen Tarnseiten ohne Impressum)
http://meridiancapital.wordpress.com/
2) Professor Minister Stelter
https://berndpulch.org/die-frei-erfundenen-gomopa-lugen-fall-professor-minister-stelter/
3) Wirecard
http://www.victims-opfer.com/?p=15261
FAZ:
Wirtschaftskriminalität Großrazzia wegen Verdachts auf Insiderhandel
Schlag gegen mutmaßliche Anlagebetrüger: Die Staatsanwaltschaft München hat in einer Großrazzia Dutzende Büros und Wohnungen nach Beweisen für Insiderhandel durchsucht. Drei Verdächtige wurden verhaftet. Durchsucht wurde auch die Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger.
24.09.2010 2010-09-24T08:31:05+0200
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© Wolfgang Eilmes / F.A.Z.
Betrugsverdacht: An der Börse sollen fast wertlose Papiere gekauft, die Kurse durch gezielt positive Nachrichten nach oben getrieben und dann wieder verkauft worden sein
Die Münchner Staatsanwaltschaft hat in einer Großrazzia umfangreiches Beweismaterial gegen mutmaßliche Anlagebetrüger sichergestellt. Ermittelt wird gegen ein Netzwerk von Investoren, Zockern und Gerüchtestreuern, die seit Jahren gemeinsame Sache gemacht haben sollen. Die Vorwürfe lauten auf Marktmanipulation und Insiderhandel mit Aktien, sagte die Sprecherin der Anklagebehörde, Barbara Stockinger. „Wir ermitteln gegen 31 Beschuldigte, und es besteht erheblicher Tatverdacht.“ Dabei laufen die Ermittlungen bereits seit 2007, und sie reichen bis hin zur Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger (SdK), deren Redner gern auf den Hauptversammlungen von Dax-Konzernen auftreten.
Nach Informationen der F.A.Z. sitzen die früheren SdK-Sprecher Markus Straub und Tobias Bosler in Untersuchungshaft. Sie gehören zum Kreis der Verdächtigen, die in windigen Börsenbriefen und Internetportalen Gerüchte über Aktien von Unternehmen wie Wirecard oder Nascacell verbreitet haben sollen. Erschwert würden die Untersuchungen, weil die Beschuldigten oft Namen und Firmenadressen wechselten und internationale Durchsuchungsbeschlüsse notwendig gewesen seien, sagte eine mit der Angelegenheit befasste Person dieser Zeitung. Die Masche selbst ist nach ihren Angaben leicht durchschaubar, aber schwer nachzuweisen. Vermutlich haben sämtliche Verdächtige Gerüchte über mindestens 20 kleine Aktiengesellschaften gestreut und an den Kursausschlägen der jeweiligen Aktien kräftig verdient. Gegenstand dieser Geschäfte waren bevorzugt im unregulierten Freihandel notierte und meist wertlose Aktien, sogenannte Pennystocks. Die Kurse dieser Werte sind wegen ihres hohen Streubesitzes leicht zu manipulieren.
Gezielt Gerüchte gestreut
Nach Informationen der F.A.Z. sollen unter anderem gezielt über den Finanznachrichtendienst Gomopa im Internet Gerüchte über Pennystocks gestreut worden sein. Gomopa steht für Goldman Morgenstern & Partners Consulting LLC. Auf ihrer Internetseite hat Gomopa „Transparenz in Sachen Finanzen, Vorsorge und Geldanlage“ versprochen, doch ihr Chef Klaus Maurischat saß als mutmaßlicher Betrüger schon in Untersuchungshaft.
Seit einigen Tagen ist die Internetseite http://www.gomopa.net offline, und es kursieren Gerüchte über finanzielle Unregelmäßigkeiten. Immer wieder ist Gomopa in juristische Streitigkeiten verwickelt. In einer einstweiligen Verfügung des Landgerichts Berlin vom 31. August (Az.: 27 O 658/10) ist das Unternehmen aufgefordert worden, nicht länger Falschinformationen über den Kasseler Immobilienhändler Immovation AG und seinen Finanzvorstand Lars Bergmann zu verbreiten. „Gomopa hat seinen Firmensitz bewusst in New York, weil die Firma dort presserechtlich nicht belangt werden kann“, sagte ein Kenner des Unternehmens der F.A.Z.
Die SdK räumte am Freitag ein, dass auch ihre Geschäftsräume durchsucht wurden. Es gebe jedoch „aus der Sicht der SdK keinerlei neue Vorwürfe gegen den Verein“. Die alten Vorwürfe gegen die SdK stehen im Zusammenhang mit Kursmanipulationen bei Aktien der Unternehmen Thielert und Wirecard. Staatsanwaltschaft und Allfinanzaufsicht Bafin ermittelten seinerzeit gegen den damaligen stellvertretenden SdK-Vorsitzenden Straub. Dieser hatte eingeräumt, Verkaufsoptionen auf das Zahlungsunternehmen Wirecard zu halten, dessen Kurs durch heftige Kritik der SdK unter Druck geraten war. Später trat Straub, der offenbar in kurzer Zeit ein Vermögen verdient hatte, zurück. Wirecard hatte Anzeige wegen Insiderhandels und Kursmanipulation gegen sechs Personen erstattet, darunter auch aktuelle und frühere SdK-Vorstände.
FBI Director Testifies on FBI Efforts Since 9/11
- Robert S. Mueller, III
- Director
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
- Washington, D.C.
- September 13, 2011
Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today to discuss the threats facing our nation and the efforts of the FBI to protect the United States over the past 10 years.
Introduction
The mission of the FBI is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, tribal, and international agencies and partners. The FBI’s number one priority in this mission continues to be the prevention of terrorist attacks against the United States. To improve its ability to detect and disrupt those with the intent and capability to conduct attacks in the United States, the FBI has undergone a paradigm shift in the way we collect and use intelligence.
The FBI significantly increased its intelligence capacity after the attacks of September 11, 2001, when the FBI elevated counterterrorism to its highest priority. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the FBI’s operations were heavily weighted towards its law enforcement mission; intelligence tools and authorities were primarily used for the counterintelligence mission. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the FBI quickly identified the need to enhance intelligence programs with improved analytical and information sharing capacities to detect and prevent future terrorist attacks.
Protecting the United States against terrorism demanded a new framework for the way the FBI carries out its mission: a threat-based, intelligence-led approach. Rather than collecting information to solve a particular case, the new approach prioritizes the collection and utilization of intelligence to develop a comprehensive threat picture, enabling strategic disruptions of terrorist networks before they act. This focus on the overall threat picture also elevates the need for information sharing, thereby changing the FBI’s role in and relationships with both the intelligence and law enforcement communities. Under this new model, intelligence drives how we understand threats, how we prioritize and investigate these threats, and how we target our resources to address these threats.
This new approach has driven significant changes in the Bureau’s structure and management, resource allocation, hiring, training, recruitment, information technology systems, interagency collaboration, and information sharing, as well as a paradigm shift in the FBI’s cultural mindset. These changes have transformed the Bureau into a national security organization that fuses traditional law enforcement and intelligence missions. At the same time, the FBI remains vigilant in upholding the Constitution, the rule of law, and protecting privacy rights and civil liberties.
Today’s FBI: A National Security Organization
In the years since 9/11, the FBI has integrated its intelligence mission with its traditional law enforcement mission, enhancing its ability as a national security organization. Like other intelligence agencies, the FBI collects, exploits, disseminates, and analyzes intelligence. The FBI combines these functions to collect and act on intelligence as a national security organization. As a result, the FBI is not solely an intelligence or law enforcement agency. The FBI’s actions are not limited to arrests and prosecutions; they take many forms—including recruiting potential intelligence sources; developing new collection requirements (pieces of information sought to complete a particular threat picture); and supporting our federal, state, local, and tribal partners to exercise their distinct authorities to disrupt plots before they cause harm.
The FBI has a long history of collecting intelligence to be used as evidence to dismantle criminal networks or to identify and prosecute spies. Historically, information was collected with a goal of using it to drive traditional law enforcement action: arrest and prosecution. However, being driven by threat rather than arrest and prosecution means prioritizing intelligence collection. Under the FBI’s new paradigm, intelligence enables a broader picture of the threat. Intelligence is not collected simply to further a particular case. This shift required the integration of intelligence and law enforcement capabilities. Intelligence is analyzed and disseminated to better understand the threat, to identify intelligence gaps, and to develop new collection requirements, which drive additional action in the field, leading to either additional collection or disruption. It is this continuous intelligence cycle that drives investigative strategies to ensure resources are targeting the most pressing threats.
Another key element of the FBI’s evolution into an effective national security organization has been augmenting relationships and information sharing with the United States intelligence community (the intelligence community), as well as federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign law enforcement partners. The Bureau has accomplished this interconnectivity through the development of and participation in joint operational programs and task forces, expansion of our presence overseas, and the development of information technology systems that support information sharing. Meeting the requirements of the intelligence cycle necessitated a significant enhancement of the Bureau’s intelligence capacity and expertise.
Building the Structure and Management Capability for a National Security Organization
The Initial Steps of the Transformation
To meet the immediate demands of the post-9/11 threat environment, the Bureau shifted resources from criminal investigations to national security matters, adding almost 2,000 agents to its national security programs within one year. Soon thereafter, the FBI began the process of creating a national security focus and aligning the organization to address this priority. One of the first steps was to centralize control and management of counterterrorism operations at Headquarters to avoid the “stove-piping” of information on terrorism cases in the 56 individual field offices across the country. Another was building the critical intelligence infrastructure to meet the needs of production and dissemination of intelligence products. The building blocks of this infrastructure included: establishing an intelligence office at Headquarters; creating a Field Intelligence Group (FIG) for each field office across the country; augmenting counterterrorism resources at Headquarters; hiring more intelligence and language analysts; creating systems to enable more efficient search and analysis capability; and developing new training.
As the various elements of the national security architecture grew both at Headquarters and in the field, a need to focus on and centralize not only counterterrorism operations but also the Bureau’s overall national security mission emerged. This led to the creation of the National Security Branch (NSB) in 2005, which combined the missions, capabilities, and resources of all of the national security components of the Bureau—counterterrorism, counterintelligence, intelligence, and weapons of mass destruction. In addition to managing the NSB’s internal components, the executive assistant director for NSB (EAD/NSB) serves as the Bureau’s lead intelligence official and representative to the intelligence community. With centralized management, the FBI’s national security functions have matured internally and the NSB has further integrated itself into the intelligence community. To accelerate this integration, NSB created an associate executive assistant director position that is filled by a senior official from the intelligence community. The NSB also has administrative responsibility for two interagency groups: the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG) (formally chartered in 2010) and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) (formally chartered in 2003).
Management Approach to Lead the Transformation: Strategy Management System (SMS)
While identifying the objective for and building the components of an intelligence-led organization were key steps in the FBI’s transformation, transitioning this new threat-based, intelligence-led model into practice required additional focus and attention from management. The challenge was to get the network of offices and personnel across the country and around the globe to accept a new mindset and approach to day-to-day operations. The Bureau developed a tool—the Strategy Management System (SMS)—based on the well-regarded balanced scorecard methodology, to measure the execution of its strategy and the progress of its transformation. The SMS is a method to communicate the FBI’s strategy, prioritize initiatives, identify each component’s role in pursuing the strategy, and measure progress. The core of the strategy is the intelligence cycle. The SMS lays out objectives in each of four categories: the expectations of the American public, internal processes, talent and technology, and resources against which objectives, measures, and initiatives are balanced. Through this structure, the SMS has helped to integrate intelligence into all aspects of the FBI’s mission. The SMS used at the Headquarters level cascades down to SMS at the branch and division level, thereby creating a cohesive plan under which every component of the Bureau, down to each employee, has a defined role in achieving the goals of the organization. Moreover, to ensure that the FBI’s national security mission is aligned with the greater intelligence community’s mission, NSB’s strategy is linked to both the FBI enterprise-wide strategy as well as the national intelligence strategy.
SMS reviews are conducted quarterly at the executive management level to review progress against the FBI’s strategy and at the branch and division levels to monitor the execution of the strategy, establish accountability for performance, and ensure alignment with the FBI corporate strategy. The SMS is also linked to and guides the core business processes within the FBI, including: the inspections process, the risk-based management process, spend plan reviews, major resource decisions, and executive performance plans.
Accelerating the Transformation: Strategic Execution Team (SET)
In 2007, recognizing that intelligence had not yet become central in FBI operations and to accelerate the growth of the Bureau’s intelligence cycle capabilities, the FBI formed a Strategic Execution Team (SET) initially comprised of almost 100 special agents, intelligence analysts, and other skilled professionals from field offices and FBI Headquarters. The SET examined the intelligence activities in each of the 56 field offices and identified two overarching impediments to transformation: integrating intelligence into operations in the field and building human capital for enhanced intelligence capabilities. For example, the SET found that while each field office had a FIG, many of the intelligence analysts were being utilized to support the tactical needs of individual cases, rather than being the engine driving strategic collection requirements and, in turn, operations. Following the recommendations of the SET, the FBI standardized the structure and responsibilities of the FIGs to increase collaboration between intelligence and operations and to provide accountability for intelligence collection, analysis, use, and production. In response to the need to build human capital, the FBI also devoted resources to recruiting and training an analytical workforce that could fulfill the critical functions of the intelligence cycle.
The SET also identified the need for a standardized intelligence role for the operational divisions at Headquarters, similar to the FIGs. SET designed Central Strategic Coordinating Components (CSCCs), where teams of intelligence personnel are embedded in each of the operational divisions to fulfill the primary functions of the intelligence cycle and to improve coordination between the field offices and Headquarters components.
Tracking the Progress of the Transformation: Strategy Performance Sessions (SPS)
To better track and measure the field offices’ progress towards a truly threat-based, intelligence-led approach, in 2008, management at Headquarters began conducting Strategy Performance Sessions (SPS) with field offices to review the field offices’ intelligence and operational performance. The sessions, conducted on a bi-annual basis1 by secure video teleconference with executives from Headquarters and the management team from two to four field offices, focus on the top threats by operational program facing each field office’s area of responsibility, or domain; the gaps in intelligence against those top threats; and the strategy to fill those intelligence gaps. The purpose of the SPS is to provide a forum for strategic dialogue, which enables informed decision-making, enhances intelligence and investigative program performance, and instills a culture of accountability. Through SPS sessions, Headquarters divisions gain better insight into the challenges field offices are facing in their areas of responsibility and use this knowledge to allocate resources strategically and assist the field offices to focus on the cases with the potential to neutralize the greatest threats while recruiting sources who have answers to the most pressing questions. Utilizing the SPS sessions, management has systematically led the cultural transition from a Bureau focused on cases and successful prosecutions to an intelligence-driven organization focused on comprehensive domain awareness and network disruptions.
Human Capital Development
The FBI’s current intelligence-led operational model relies in large part on analysts and language specialists who can quickly and effectively review, analyze, and disseminate the intelligence collected in the field. Post 9/11, the FBI’s challenge was to develop an intelligence analyst and language specialist cadre that could match the collection capabilities of the special agents. The creation of a workforce with the intelligence expertise necessary for today’s threats and those of the future required the Bureau to recruit beyond law enforcement and the military communities in order to attract individuals with a broader range of skill sets and advanced degrees in relevant fields. Furthermore, the traditional operational approach created a culture that emphasized the value of special agents. This necessitated a strategy that would elevate the stature of analysts. The FBI is meeting this two-part challenge by developing a targeted recruitment strategy, creating rewarding career paths for intelligence analysts, enhancing training programs, and establishing a Leadership Development Program.
Developing an Intelligence Analyst Cadre
Soon after 9/11, the FBI recruited experienced intelligence analysts from other agencies and students with critical skill sets from universities around the country. The FBI also created opportunities for entry-level positions with career paths that often lead to FBI intelligence analyst or special agent positions. Since 2001, the FBI has nearly tripled the number of intelligence analysts to 3,118, increased the supervisory intelligence analyst cadre to 285, and increased the number of GS-15 level analysts to 80. This increase in the quantity has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in the capabilities and expertise of the analyst corps. Today, almost half of the FBI’s special agents were hired post-9/11, and have “grown up” in the intelligence-led culture of today’s FBI working side-by-side with analysts.
The FBI has instituted programs to enhance the stature of and career options for analysts. In 2010, the NSB created three analyst career paths—tactical, collection/reporting, and strategic. By defining specific analyst functions, the FBI is creating a specialized, analytic workforce with the appropriate training, experiences, and opportunities for career development. Since 2005, 133 FBI agents and analysts have been certified as intelligence officers through the FBI Intelligence Officer Certification Program.
Analysts now also hold senior executive service (SES)-level leadership positions at Headquarters to manage a range of programs, including the CSCCs and the newly established Intelligence Watch. Starting in 2009, the Bureau began establishing senior supervisory intelligence analyst (SSIA) positions, which are the equivalent of assistant special agents in charge. SSIAs also perform a full range of managerial and liaison responsibilities with authority over strategic planning activities and personnel matters.
Training is another key element of cultivating a professional analyst workforce. In 2009, the FBI produced a five-year training strategy for intelligence analysts, which identified the need for new courses, instructors, and funding. Since then, the FBI’s Training Division has been working directly with training units in the NSB to drive training requirements for intelligence analysts.
Leadership Development Program
The FBI has a long history of hiring individuals with strong leadership skills, but the fast-paced and continuous changes in the organization created the need for an accelerated and enhanced leadership development program for all employees. In response, in 2009, the FBI established the Leadership Development Program (LDP), the first comprehensive, coordinated approach to leadership in the Bureau’s history. LDP’s primary goal is to ensure that FBI employees are fully prepared to lead before they assume leadership positions. The LDP’s programs, which are at various stages of development and piloting, will deliver a range of programs designed around a leadership doctrine that emphasizes character, courage, competence, and collaboration. LDP’s programs will be available to all employees in all locations across the Bureau from the day they are hired to the day they retire. Initially, programs are being offered to new employees, employees interested in becoming supervisors, and current supervisors and senior managers. Through its commitment to building the infrastructure to fully implement and sustain the LDP, the FBI will ensure that its employees are prepared to confront current and future challenges and threats.
Supporting the Core Functions of the Intelligence Cycle
The priority of staying ahead of the threat has changed the demand for intelligence as its utility expanded from supporting a particular case to identifying and understanding a broader picture of the threat. This shift required the integration of intelligence and law enforcement capabilities. Intelligence is analyzed and disseminated to better understand the threat, to identify intelligence gaps, and to develop new collection requirements, which drive additional action in the field, leading to either additional collection or disruption. It is this continuous intelligence cycle of collection, integration and dissemination, analysis, and action that drives investigative strategies to ensure resources are targeting the most pressing threats.
Intelligence Collection
Collection of intelligence is conducted by the FBI’s greatest asset: its people. Since 9/11, the FBI has more than doubled the number of agents and analysts assigned to its national security mission from 3,537 (2,514 agents/1,023 analysts) to 7,933 (4,815 agents/3,118 analysts). The FBI has a network of personnel spread around the globe, with 56 field offices and 399 resident agencies domestically and 62 international legal attaché offices around the world which support the collection of raw intelligence.
The Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) are interagency squads dedicated to investigating terrorism matters and coordinating counterterrorism efforts across the United States. The FBI has increased the number of JTTFs from 35 in 2001 to 104 today—one in each of the 56 field offices and 48 of the resident agencies across the country. In addition to FBI agents, the JTTFs are comprised of task force officers from 32 federal and 671 state, local, and tribal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. A single National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) was created at Headquarters to manage the JTTFs around the country and to provide a venue for collaboration with intelligence community personnel to exchange information, analyze data, and plan counterterrorism strategies.
Each of the FBI’s 56 field offices has a FIG composed of intelligence analysts, special agents, and staff operations specialists. FIGs, which did not exist prior to 2001, now have 1,662 intelligence analysts, 451 special agents, and 415 staff operations specialists. The mission of the FIGs is to identify the threats in their respective territories and develop “domain awareness” through collecting, exploiting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence.
Intelligence-driven investigations require a unity of effort with partners overseas, especially as global cooperation becomes increasingly necessary to combat terrorism. Through the 62 legal attaché offices around the world (an increase of 18 since 2001), the FBI has strengthened relationships with international partners. This expanded global reach not only benefits FBI’s foreign partners, but also aids FBI collection efforts and investigations.
The FBI has a leading role in human intelligence (HUMINT) collection in the United States. Simply defined, HUMINT is information learned from individuals. People are an invaluable source of intelligence and FBI special agents have a long history of developing human sources to uncover criminal conduct and foreign intelligence activities. With the expanded national security mission, the need for and value of HUMINT in understanding our adversaries and developing the threat picture has increased significantly. FBI Headquarters develops policies, training, and oversight to ensure adherence to policy directives and to ensure that information collected is accurate, authentic, reliable, free of undisclosed influence, and consistent with mission objectives across all FBI programs.
Collecting intelligence through physical surveillance is also critical for monitoring threats to our national security. The FBI’s physical surveillance program, which was consolidated into one division in 2010, consists of both armed and unarmed mobile surveillance teams and the field aviation program. The armed teams conduct surveillance of armed and dangerous counterterrorism and criminal targets with a propensity for violence. To meet the growing demand for surveillance, the Bureau has increased the number of unarmed surveillance teams by 127 percent since 2001.
Forensics is another critical source of intelligence. The FBI has earned a global reputation of having premier forensic examiners. Working with interagency partners, the FBI is applying and expanding upon traditional forensic capabilities in support of the counterterrorism mission. The FBI also leads an interagency group based at the FBI Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia, that supports Department of Defense operations in Iraq and Afghanistan: the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC). Established in 2003 and funded primarily by the Department of Defense’s Joint IED Defeat Organization, TEDAC is staffed by approximately 230 full time government and contract personnel who coordinate and manage a unified intelligence, military, and law enforcement effort to examine improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are of interest to the United States.
The FBI’s use of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) authorities is an important component of intelligence collection which is subject to a comprehensive oversight and compliance regime in which all three branches of government play a role. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) ensures that constitutional and statutory requirements are met related both to authorization and implementation of the use of the authorities. The Department of Justice’s National Security Division, in conjunction with the FBI’s Office of the General Counsel, conducts oversight of the FBI’s use of FISA authorities to ensure compliance both with the statute and minimization procedures. And, on a semi-annual basis, the government must report to Congress on its use of FISA electronic surveillance, physical search, and pen register and trap and trace authorities and submit a detailed annual report on its use of the business record authority.
Publicly available information is also an invaluable source of intelligence that is often overlooked by intelligence analysts in favor of classified or law enforcement sensitive information. Recognizing a need to include open source information in intelligence analysis, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) created an Open Source Center (OSC) in 2005. As part of its efforts to strengthen the open source community, the OSC has detailed an open source officer to the FBI for a year to help the Bureau build its own open source program.
Intelligence Analysis and Dissemination
Intelligence collection is only valuable if it is integrated, analyzed, and disseminated effectively and efficiently. As the Bureau has increased its intelligence collection, it has simultaneously developed the capability to exploit and share it. This function resides with the FIGs. The analysts and agents in the FIGs collect raw intelligence from various sources, including agents in the field and intelligence disseminated by other agencies. Analysts then disseminate the raw intelligence and/or create finished intelligence products for dissemination. Developing an analyst corps was only part of the solution to the Bureau’s need to increase intelligence dissemination and production. The analysts also needed the necessary information technology and analytic tools to succeed.
To streamline the dissemination of intelligence contained in intelligence information reports (IIRs), the FBI developed an information technology solution, the Collection Operations and Requirements Environment (CORE). CORE standardizes intelligence reporting across the FBI while integrating field intelligence operations with intelligence community requirements. An additional web-based software application, the IIR Dissemination System, streamlines, standardizes, and tracks the production of IIRs, and has improved the Bureau’s ability to effectively support our intelligence community partners. Since 2004, FBI dissemination of IIRs has increased dramatically, providing critical information to the intelligence community, law enforcement community, and policymakers.
The FBI continues to develop information technology solutions to minimize the time that intelligence analysts spend searching for relevant information, allowing them to focus on connecting the dots and analyzing the available information. The Data Integration and Visualization System (DIVS) is the FBI’s consolidated enterprise platform that further enhances both the search capabilities and the breadth of information that can be accessed through a single sign-on. DIVS will unify all data accessible to the FBI—intelligence, criminal investigative, and other mission data—through one user-friendly search interface, consistent with all applicable legal requirements pertaining to the data. Currently, DIVS houses records from the 11 FBI and other government agency data sources identified by users as most critical to the FBI’s counterterrorism mission. The FBI continues to roll-out this system across the FBI and to add datasets and user tools to provide additional functionality. DIVS is built on a modern platform that will easily expand to integrate tools developed internally, by private industry, or by intelligence community partners.
Integration into the United States Intelligence Community and Partnerships with Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement
Another key element of the FBI’s evolution into an effective national security organization has been augmenting relationships and information sharing with the United States intelligence community, as well as federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign law enforcement partners. The Bureau has accomplished this interconnectivity through the development of and participation in joint operational programs and task forces, expansion of our presence overseas, and through the development of information technology systems that support information sharing.
As mentioned previously, JTTFs are the primary vehicle by which the intelligence community and federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement are integrated with domestic counterterrorism operations. The JTTFs currently have almost 2,000 non-FBI employees (approximately 44 percent of all JTTF members). The FBI’s integration with the intelligence community is further enhanced by joint duty detailee programs through which law enforcement and intelligence professionals from other agencies are embedded in FBI units and FBI employees are embedded in other agencies. Having professionals from different agencies performing their missions side-by-side has broken down communication barriers and enhanced the mutual understanding of each agency’s unique contributions to the community.
Currently, the FBI has more than 200 employees working at other intelligence community agencies, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the National Counterterrorism Center, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Security Agency, and the Department of State. NSB employees also fill intelligence-related positions at the National Security Staff at the White House. Similarly, many of the detailees from other agencies work at joint operational entities administratively located within the FBI, such as the TSC, the HIG, the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, and the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force. These joint operational components along with other joint duty assignments and the EAD/NSB’s sustained interaction with the Director of National Intelligence ensure that the FBI is a full partner in the Intelligence Community.
In support of the DNI’s effort to create a single intelligence community enterprise that is coordinated, integrated, agile, and effective, the FBI and the ODNI piloted, and are in the process of institutionalizing, a domestic DNI representative program. Domestic DNI representatives are senior field FBI officials at designated offices across the United States who serve as the DNI’s principal domestic representative to the intelligence community within their respective areas of responsibility. This program supports the DNI’s mission of integrating foreign, military, and domestic intelligence in defense of the homeland and in support of United States national security interests at home and abroad.
Since 9/11, the FBI has evolved to respond to the complex and far-ranging threats we face today. The FBI collects, exploits, and disseminates more intelligence to a greater and more useful extent than ever before. This focus on intelligence has helped prioritize our top threats and increased our understanding of our vulnerability to those threats. As the FBI has undergone this transformation, it has remained vigilant in upholding the Constitution, the rule of law, and protecting privacy rights and civil liberties.
Conclusion
Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, I would like to conclude by thanking you and this committee for your service and support. I look forward to working with the committee to improve the FBI as our transformation continues in the future.
I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
1SPS were originally conducted on a quarterly basis. In 2009, in an effort to reduce the administrative workload on the field offices, the frequency was reduced to twice yearly.
TOP-SECRET – FBI Counterterrorism Chief Discusses Efforts to Fight Terrorist Financing
- Ralph S. Boelter
- Acting Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism
- Washington, D.C.
- September 21, 2011
Good morning Chairman Whitehouse, Ranking Member Kyl, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today regarding the efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to combat terrorist financing.
Introduction
As we commemorate the 10th anniversary of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, we are reminded that the FBI’s number one priority in its mission to protect and defend the United States continues to be the prevention of terrorist attacks against the United States. The mission of the Terrorism Financing Operations Section (TFOS) is twofold. First, to manage the FBI’s investigative efforts in relation to individuals who provide funding to terrorists; and second, to ensure financial investigative techniques are used, where appropriate, in all counterterrorism investigations to enhance the investigations.
In coordination with our law enforcement and intelligence community partners, TFOS carries out this mission through the application of financial investigative techniques and the exploitation of financial intelligence. To improve its ability to detect and disrupt those with the intent and capability to conduct attacks against the United States, TFOS has undergone a significant shift in the way we address the threat of terrorism financing.
Inception of TFOS
Immediately after the terrorist attacks on September 11, the FBI established the Terrorism Financing Operations Section within the Counterterrorism Division. In recognition of the importance of tracking the financial underpinnings of terrorist activity, TFOS was established to serve as a comprehensive, centralized unit to provide broad support for counterterrorism investigations by analyzing and exploiting all available financial intelligence (FININT).
TFOS Organization
Consistent with the FBI’s continuing transformation into an intelligence-led national security organization, in early 2011, the Counterterrorism Division implemented changes to TFOS. These changes enhance TFOS’ ability to carry out its mission through a threat-based, intelligence-led approach. Rather than collecting information to solve a particular case, this new approach prioritizes the collection and utilization of intelligence to develop a comprehensive threat picture, enabling strategic disruptions of terrorist financing operations.
Targeting Unit
The TFOS Targeting Unit utilizes all source intelligence from the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities to identify currently unknown fundraisers and their associates. This unit focuses on identifying unknown or previously unidentified financiers within terrorist networks. As our targeting efforts identify these individuals, TFOS works directly with each of the FBI’s 56 field offices to open assessments or investigations and lead those investigations through TFOS’s two operational units.
Strategic Intelligence Units
The TFOS Strategic Intelligence Unit monitors threats and financial trends to identify trends and methodologies which are key to identifying possible terrorist financing transactions at their earliest point. This intelligence is disseminated to the U.S. intelligence community, as well as federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign law enforcement partners, as appropriate. In addition, TFOS has been successful in augmenting relationships and establishing channels for sharing information with elements of the financial industry which routinely report on suspicious financial activity occurring in the private sector.
In addition to carrying out targeting and strategic intelligence functions, TFOS personnel are embedded within the Counterterrorism Division’s International Terrorism Operations Section and threat cells, which manage the priority threats and investigations. This cadre of special agents, intelligence analysts, and forensic accountants ensure the FININT in priority threat investigations is fully exploited to support those investigations. FININT is critical in these investigations as the FBI does not just focus on the total dollar amount of a financial transaction, but also gleans valuable intelligence from the financial activity. Further, TFOS conducts analysis of other critical intelligence collected during transactions. Thus, the TFOS exploitation of FININT not only seeks to identify the scope and breadth of terrorist financing, but also the members of the terrorist network to enhance indicators and tripwires and create actionable intelligence to identify and prevent terrorist attacks.
Outreach, Training and Education
In partnership with the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the FBI conducts ongoing outreach and education with our financial industry counterparts. The financial industry’s efforts and resources dedicated to detecting and reporting suspicious financial activities through suspicious activity reports (SARs) have been important components in our efforts to identify terrorist financing. SAR reporting is a critical tripwire to detect possible terrorist financiers as well as to identify associates of known terrorists. The analysis of SAR information aids in the development of an overall terrorist financing threat picture and can assist TFOS in identifying trends or patterns of suspicious activity around the country. This information can also identify previously unknown associates of terrorism subjects.
In conjunction with the Treasury Department, TFOS conducts an annual training session with the New York Federal Reserve to provide the financial industry with updated trend information regarding terrorist financing. This year’s conference included over 300 attendees from the financial sector interested in learning how to maximize their resources to more effectively identify and report suspicious financial activity. These outreach efforts provide an opportunity for the financial sector to receive the latest terrorist financing threat and trend information, as well as share in best practices for the rapid identification and reporting of suspicious financial activity.
International Efforts
Coordinated efforts with our foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners are key elements to the FBI’s success in counterterrorism investigations. Through the FBI’s 62 legal attaché offices TFOS jointly investigates terrorist financing matters with our foreign counterparts. In addition, TFOS personnel are embedded within key legal attaché offices to provide expertise and resources dedicated to terrorist financing. These relationships and global efforts in the sharing of intelligence are key to the FBI’s efforts to stem the flow of financial support to terrorists and protect the United States from terrorist attacks. TFOS also participates jointly with the Treasury Department and other United States government agencies in international forums to support international efforts in relation to terrorist financing.
TFOS conducts international training to convey the latest financial exploitation techniques and share best practices and investigative strategies to support the joint investigation of terrorist financing matters. In coordination with the Department of State, over the past two years, TFOS has conducted over 20 international training courses in 17 different countries. This training enhances our foreign counterparts’ awareness and capabilities and promotes financial exploitation in all counterterrorism investigations.
Recent Successes
The FBI’s terrorist financing efforts have resulted in numerous successes which have resulted in the disruption and arrest of terrorist financiers.
In August 2011, Mohammad Younis pled guilty in New York to operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square, received money from Younis, which he used to fund his preparations for the attempted bombing. Younis received the money through his unlicensed money transmitting business from a co-conspirator in Pakistan. Shahzad advised that the funding was arranged in Pakistan by associates of the Tehrik-e-Taliban.
In May, 2011, Hor and Amera Akl pled guilty in Ohio to conspiracy to provide material support to Hizballa. Hor and Amera Akl told an FBI informant they would be willing to send money to Hizballah for him. The informant gave them $200,000 to send to Hizballah, and they were arrested as they attempted to conceal the money in a vehicle that would be shipped overseas.
In September, 2009, Abdul Tawala Ibn Ali Alishtari pled guilty in New York to charges of terrorism financing. Alishtari facilitated the transfer of $152,000, with the understanding that the money would be used to fund training for terrorists.
In the last year, the FBI has conducted terrorist financing investigations which led to the indictment of individuals for providing funding to the Pakistani Taliban, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Shabaab. The al Shabaab indictments involved a network which used teleconferences to raise funds and then remitted the money to al Shabaab terrorists in Somalia.
Conclusion
The efforts of TFOS—in close coordination with our federal, state, and local partners; the financial industry; and our international partners—have established an increasingly difficult environment within which terrorist financiers can operate undetected. We believe that these efforts have reduced the funding available for terrorist operations and have made the concealment and transfer of terrorism related funds more difficult.
As the terrorists adapt their methods to raise and transfer funds, the FBI has also adapted its efforts to detect and disrupt these financial networks. The FBI TFOS is better able to systematically track intelligence, identify networks and currently unknown subjects, and oversee the FBI’s terrorist financing investigations related to those networks. TFOS’ cooperative efforts with our government and private sector partners ensures an ongoing and coordinated approach to terrorist financing to prevent future terrorist attacks against the United States.
Chairman Whitehouse, Ranking Member Kyl, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to come before you today and share the work that the FBI is doing to address terrorist financing and counterterrorism in this country and around the globe. I am happy to answer any questions.
TOP-SECRET- $2.1 Million Reward Paid for Information on Bulger
| FBI Boston September 23, 2011 |
BOSTON—the Boston Division of the FBI received final authorization from the United States Department of Justice to pay the $2.1 million reward to those responsible for providing information which directly led to the arrest of former Top Ten Fugitive James “Whitey” Bulger and his companion, Catherine Greig. This information was generated as a direct result of the FBI’s public service announcement campaign, which was initiated on June 20, 2011.
The FBI offered $2 million for information leading to the arrest of Mr. Bulger, and $100,000 for information leading to the arrest of Ms. Greig. As of Friday, September 23, 2011, the FBI has paid this reward money to more than one individual.
To protect the anonymity and privacy of those responsible for providing information which directly led to the arrests of Mr. Bulger and Ms. Greig, the FBI will not comment further regarding this matter. Any further inquiries relating to Mr. Bulger and Ms. Greig should be directed to the United States Attorney’s Office, District of Massachusetts, at 617.748.3100.
TOP-SECRET – FBI Arrest 23 Hondo and Uvalde-Based Texas Syndicate Members and Associates
| U.S. Attorney’s Office October 04, 2011 |
United States Attorney Robert Pitman, FBI Special Agent in Charge Cory B. Nelson, and Texas Department of Public Safety Director Steve McCraw announced that 23 Hondo and Uvalde, Texas-based members and associates of the Texas Syndicate (TS), including a Bandera County Sheriff’s Deputy, have been arrested based on two federal grand jury indictments returned on Wednesday and unsealed late yesterday.
RICO Indictment
Those arrested on Thursday and charged in a Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) conspiracy indictment include:
- Cristobal Velasquez (a.k.a. “Little Cris”), age 33, of Uvalde;
- Sotero Rodriguez Martinez (a.k.a. “June”), age 41, of Uvalde;
- Chuco Mario Martinez (a.k.a. “Mariachi”), age 35, of Uvalde;
- Larry Munoz, Jr. (a.k.a. “Little Larry”), age 36, of Uvalde;
- Brian Esparza (a.k.a. “Tata”), age 31, of Uvalde;
- Charles Esparza (a.k.a. “Horse”), age 32, of Uvalde;
- Ervey Sanchez (a.k.a. “Mad Max”), age 31, of Uvalde;
- Mark Anthony Vela, age 35, of Hondo;
- Charles Olan Quintanilla, age 32, of Hondo;
- George Sanchez (a.k.a. “Curious”), age 36, of Uvalde; and
- Inez Mata (a.k.a. “Bebito”), age 41, of Uvalde.
The seven-count RICO indictment charges the defendants with participating in a criminal organization whose members engage in acts of violence, including murder, extortion, robbery, and drug distribution. According to the indictment, from January 2002 to the date of the indictment, the defendants conspired to commit four murders, commit robbery, and distribute cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine.
The RICO indictment specifically alleges that: an indicted co-conspirator, whose identity will be revealed at his initial appearance, shot and killed 43-year-old Rogelio Mata on October 13, 2002; Velasquez and Chuco Martinez were responsible for the shooting death of 34-year-old Jose Guadalupe De La Garza on December 25, 2005; Ervey Sanchez shot and killed 36-year-old Jesse James Polanco on November 9 2009; and, on August 14, 2010, Sotero Rodriguez, Munoz, Torres, Brian Esparza, Charles Esparza, Ervey Sanchez, and George Sanchez conspired to kill 45-year-old Ramon Rodriguez.
During the conspiracy, the defendants were allegedly responsible for trafficking in the Hondo and Uvalde areas in excess of five kilograms of cocaine, 100 kilograms of marijuana, and three ounces of methamphetamine.
Each defendant faces up to life in federal prison upon conviction.
Non-RICO Indictment
Those arrested yesterday and charged in the non-RICO indictment include:
- Jose Alberto Ruiz (a.k.a. “Spike”), age 42, of Uvalde;
- Calletano Nira (a.k.a. “Cat), age 46, of Hondo;
- Joshua Leonard Benavides, age 20, of Hondo;
- Alfredo Tapia, III (a.k.a. “Nacho”), age 63, of Hondo;
- Ted Benavides (a.k.a. “TJ”), age 19, of Hondo;
- Jessica Escareno, age 40, of Hondo;
- Ruben Dominguez, age 35, of Hondo;
- Sandra Torres, age 33, of Uvalde;
- Jaime Corona, Jr., age 28, of Hondo;
- John Khosravi, age 31, of San Antonio;
- Eli Torres, age 35, of Uvalde; and,
- Thomas Cuellar, age 41, of Hondo.
The 12 defendants named in this indictment, all of whom are members or associates of the Texas Syndicate, are charged with one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. Ruiz, Nira, Joshua Benavides, Tapia, Ted Benavides, and Escareno are also charged with one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana. Cuellar is also charged with one count of unlawful use of a government computer.
From August 1, 2009 to the present, the defendants have allegedly conspired to distribute controlled substances in the Uvalde and Hondo areas. The indictment also alleges that on August 31, 2010, Cuellar, a Bandera County Sheriff’s Deputy, unlawfully accessed a department computer in order to obtain law enforcement information regarding co-conspirators.
Each drug charge calls for a sentence of between five and 40 years in federal prison upon conviction. Cuellar also faces up to five years in federal prison upon conviction of the unlawful use charge.
While executing the federal warrants on Thursday, authorities also arrested 22-year-old Diana Lizett Hernandez, of Bracketville, Texas. Hernandez is charged by a criminal complaint with possession with intent to distribute cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public housing facility. The complaint alleges that at the time of her arrest, Hernandez was in possession of 3.5 grams of cocaine and a digital scale. Upon conviction, Hernandez faces not less than one year and up to 40 years in federal prison.
This investigation was conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Safe Streets Task Force together with the Texas Department of Public Safety – Criminal Investigations Division, San Antonio Police Department, Medina County Sheriff’s Office, and the Bandera County Sheriff’s Office. Also assisting in the investigation was the 38th Judicial District Adult Probation Gang Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons. The U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement-Customs and Border Protection, and the Uvalde County Sheriff’s Department assisted in making the arrests. This case will be prosecuted in the Del Rio Division of the Western District of Texas.
An indictment is merely a charge and should not be considered as evidence of guilt. The defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.
TOP-SECRET – Edward P. May Sentenced for Orchestrating $350 Million Ponzi Scheme
Edward P. May Sentenced for Orchestrating $350 Million Ponzi Scheme
Largest-Ever in Michigan
| U.S. Attorney’s Office October 04, 2011 |
Edward P. May, age 75, was sentenced today to 16 years in federal prison for orchestrating the largest Ponzi scheme in the Eastern District of Michigan history, United States Attorney Barbara L. McQuade announced. McQuade was joined in the announcement by Andrew G. Arena, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Detroit Field Division. May was sentenced by the Honorable Arthur J. Tarnow.
On April 29, 2011, May pleaded guilty to all 59 counts of mail fraud alleged in a federal indictment charging him with orchestrating a decade-long investment fraud scheme. Specifically, the 59-count indictment alleged, in part, the following:
In 1997, EDWARD P. MAY formed E-M Management Co. LLC, which was located in rented office space in Lake Orion, Michigan. After forming E-M Management, MAY then formed more than 150 limited liability corporations (“LLCs”). MAY told hundreds of individuals in the Detroit metropolitan area and elsewhere across the country that the LLCs acquired telecommunications equipment and then provided telecommunications services to various hotels in Nevada, New York, New Jersey, California, elsewhere in the United States, and in foreign countries. MAY induced numerous people to invest large amounts of money in the LLCs, for what proved to be ficticious investments in “contracts” or “agreements” providing telecommunications equipment and services to various hotels.
MAY also caused fraudulent “private offering memoranda,” “subscription agreements,” and “investment recaps” for the LLCs to be drafted and distributed to potential investors. The offering memoranda fraudulently stated that E-M Management Co. had entered into agreements with various hotel corporations to “provide all of the telecommunication services to the hotel properties” and to “install new equipment where needed, to purchase existing equipment where practicable and to cut over the services from present providers,” and fraudulently promised investors that the funds raised “will be used solely for the purpose of purchasing telephone, high-speed Internet, low-speed Internet, [and] DVD equipment.”
The offering memorandums guaranteed a minimum monthly income to each investment LLC ranging from $30,000 to more than $100,000 per month. MAY deceived victim investors into believing that their funds were being invested as represented, and concealed from victim investors and others the fact that these “investments” were actually being used to support a pyramid or “Ponzi” scheme. May operated the pyramid scheme by paying purported investment returns to some investors with funds actually obtained from other investors.
MAY diverted and misappropriated the funds invested in the LLCs to his own personal use and to the benefit of his company, E-M Management. MAY spent some of the funds on travel to Las Vegas and gambling. Over the course of the scheme, MAY induced over 1,200 individuals to invest more than $350,000,000 in over 250 LLCs.
MAY’s scheme resulted in a total loss of over $49 million to the individuals who invested in the fraudulent LLCs.
United States Attorney Barbara L. McQuade stated, “Complex fraud schemes like this one rob investors of their savings and erode public confidence in legitimate investments. This loss of public confidence in investment opportunities, in turn, depresses our economy. By prosecuting those who commit fraud, we hope to deter others from committing similar crimes.”
Special Agent in Charge Andrew G. Arena stated, “The public should be aware that even though the FBI continues to vigilantly pursue these types of criminal violations, we live in a ’buyer beware’ investment environment. Investors should vigorously investigate the background information of all investment vehicles, and stick to the old adage that if it seems too good to be true, it probably is.”
U.S. Attorney McQuade congratulated the hard work of the FBI for its efforts in pursuing this case. The case was prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sarah Resnick Cohen, Craig Weier, and Stephen Hiyama.
TOP-SECRET FROM THE DESK OF THE FBI – Four arrests in $20 million bribery scheme involving government contracts
| U.S. Attorney’s Office October 04, 2011 |
WASHINGTON—Four Virginia men, including two longtime employees of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, were arrested today on charges stemming from an indictment that accuses them of taking part in a conspiracy involving more than $20 million in bribes and kickback payments and the planned steering of a $780 million government contract to a favored contractor.
The arrests were announced by U.S. Attorney Ronald C. Machen Jr.; James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office; Peggy E. Gustafson, Inspector General for the Small Business Administration (SBA); Robert E. Craig, Special Agent in Charge of the Mid-Atlantic Field Office of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS); Jeannine A. Hammett, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office of the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI); and James K. Podolak, Director of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command’s (CID) Major Procurement Fraud Unit.
The defendants include Kerry F. Khan, 53, of Alexandria, Va.; his son, Lee A. Khan, 30, of Fairfax, Va.; Michael A. Alexander, 55, of Woodbridge, Va.; and Harold F. Babb, 60, of Sterling, Va. Kerry Khan and Alexander are employed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Babb is director of contracts for a company that did business with the government.
All four men were taken into custody on charges contained in an indictment that was returned by a grand jury, under seal, on Sept. 16, 2011, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The arrests took place as authorities executed search warrants at seven locations in Virginia and one in the District of Columbia. The indictment was unsealed today.
According to the indictment, Kerry Khan and Alexander helped funnel more than $45 million in payments to a favored company through a federal government contract they oversaw, with plans to steer hundreds of millions more to the business. Approximately $20 million in fraudulent expenses were built into the invoices, and proceeds went to all four defendants.
All four defendants were indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit bribery and wire fraud and aiding and abetting and causing an illlegal act to be done, as well as one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. Kerry Khan and Alexander also were indicted on one count of receipt of a bribe by a public official, and Babb was indicted on one count of unlawful kickbacks.
If convicted of the charges, Kerry Khan and Alexander face a maximum of 40 years in prison. Babb faces up to 35 years, and Lee Khan faces a sentence of up to 25 years.
The United States has obtained warrants to seize funds in 29 bank accounts and to seize three luxury vehicles and seven high-end watches. In addition, the indictment includes a forfeiture allegation against 16 real properties financed in whole or in part with proceeds of the crimes. The United States has begun the process of securing forfeiture of those 16 properties, which include 14 properties in Virginia, one in West Virginia, and one in Florida.
The indictment also provides the defendants notice that, if convicted, the United States will seek forfeiture of all proceeds of the charged offenses.
“This indictment alleges one of the most brazen corruption schemes in the history of federal contracting,” said U.S. Attorney Machen. “As alleged by the indictment, corrupt public officials and crooked contractors devised a plan to funnel more than $20 million in taxpayer funds to themselves in an elaborate scheme of bribes and kickbacks. These charges are only the beginning of a far-reaching, steadfast effort by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Department of Justice, and our federal law enforcement partners to root out and hold accountable shameless government officials and those who entice them—through bribes and other personal benefits—to violate the public’s trust.”
“Abusing one’s position for personal gain blatantly disregards the oath that every government employee takes and everything that it represents,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “It’s offensive to citizens who trust the government and its contractors to use taxpayer money wisely.”
“The alleged actions of these individuals grossly undermine the honest work being done every day by federal employees and government contractors,” said Inspector General Gustafson of the SBA. “These individuals conspired to steal from the American people by perpetuating a fraud to siphon vital resources away from an organization that supports our military and reduces risks from disasters. The SBA OIG will relentlessly pursue such violations of public trust and seek justice on behalf of the taxpayers.”
“At a time when government and taxpayer resources are being stretched thin and our service members continue to make sacrifices to protect our national security across the globe, it is abhorrent that officials trusted with the oversight of Department of Defense resources and programs blatantly conspired with contractors to defraud the Government and, eventually, the American warfighter,” said Special Agent in Charge Craig of DCIS. “The Defense Criminal Investigative Service takes aggressive action to identify and investigate, alongside our federal investigative partners, those that endeavor to take advantage of the Department of Defense and the men and women of the Uniformed Services.”
“IRS Criminal Investigation often works jointly with other law enforcement agencies to provide financial investigative expertise. The charges brought in this case demonstrate our collective efforts to enforce the law and ensure public trust,” said Acting IRS Special Agent in Charge Hammett. “U.S. government employees hold positions of public trust, and they are responsible for managing public funds. The public has the right to know that those who work for them are doing so honestly. When we discover bribery schemes like the one alleged here, we will do everything in our power to hold both the bribe payer and the person accepting the bribe accountable.”
“Today’s arrests are a prime example of the teamwork among the special agents of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command’s Major Procurement Fraud Unit (MPFU), our fellow federal law enforcement agencies and the Department of Justice attorneys,” said Director Podolak. “U.S. Army CID will continue to see to it that anyone suspected of contract fraud and corruption is brought to justice.”
**
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is a branch of the U.S. Army with a stated mission to “provide vital public engineering services in peace and war to strengthen our Nation’s security, energize the economy, and reduce risks from disasters.”
The indictment details schemes to defraud two major federal contracts:
The TIGER Contract. The Technology for Instrastructure, Geospatial, and Environmental Requirements (TIGER) contract is what is known as an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contract. Authorized agencies and departments are not required to obtain three separate bids or to compare the TIGER contract to another contract before submitting an invoice for products and services through the TIGER contract. The current TIGER contract is a five-year contract running from Oct. 1, 2009 through Sept. 30, 2014. Over the term, the total award of orders placed against the TIGER contract is authorized to exceed $1 billion.
The CORES Contract. The Contingency Operations Readiness Engineering & Support (CORES) contract is a planned contract that is envisioned as an alternative or potential replacement to the TIGER contract. As planned, the CORES contract would be a five-year contract with an award potential for all contracts placed under it of up to $780 million.
The Defendants
Kerry Khan, who joined the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1994, is a program manager with the Directorate of Contingency Operations, based in Washington, D.C., which administers the TIGER contract. In that position, Kerry Khan had authority, among other things, to place orders for products and services through the TIGER contract, as well as other federal government contracts. He also had authority to certify that the work on the orders had been completed. In addition, Kerry Khan had the responsibility to prepare the CORES contract for solicitation to potential bidders and to approve the solicitation prior to its issuance to potential bidders.
Michael Alexander, who joined the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1985, is a program director with the Directorate of Contingency Operations. In that position, he had authority, among other things, to obtain funding for Army Corps of Engineers projects, including funding for orders placed through the TIGER contract and other federal government contracts. Alexander produced and actively managed a $54 million budget.
Harold Babb is the director of contracts at EyakTek, an Alaska Native-owned small business. EyakTek, based in Dulles, Va., was the prime contractor for the TIGER contract and subcontracted many of the orders from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to other businesses.
Lee Khan controlled a consulting company with his father and took part in numerous activities involving the bribery and kickback scheme.
All four defendants are accused of conspiring to hide the proceeds of their bribery and fraud scheme through a series of financial transactions, including payments to shell companies that were controlled by Kerry Khan and others.
An indictment is merely a formal charge that a defendant has committed a violation of criminal laws and is not evidence of guilt. Every defendant is presumed innocent until, and unless, proven guilty.
Allegations involving the TIGER Contract
According to the indictment, Kerry Khan and Alexander used their official positions at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Babb used his official position at EyakTek, to direct orders through the TIGER contract to a Virginia-based company identified in the indictment as “Company A.” With Kerry Khan’s knowledge and direction, that company’s chief technology officer, an unidentified co-conspirator, submitted fraudulently inflated quotes for work.
Kerry Khan then caused the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to approve and remit payment to EyakTek for these fraudulently inflated invoices. After subtracting its profit margin, EyakTek paid the remainder to “Company A.” The chief technology officer then caused “Company A” to pay part of this money for the benefit of Kerry Khan, his son, and Alexander and Babb.
In addition, Kerry Khan and Alexander caused the Army Corps of Engineers to award contracts directly to “Company A.” Once again, the chief technology officer submitted fraudulent paperwork for inflated costs. Kerry Khan then caused the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to pay “Company A,” and the chief technology officer in turn caused “Company A” to pay a portion of the money for the benefit of Kerry Khan, his son, and Alexander.
In this manner, from 2007 to the present, the chief technology officer caused invoices to be submitted to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, directly and through EyakTek, for total costs of more than $45 million. As directed by Khan, Alexander and Babb, the chief technology officer caused “Company A” to fraudulently inflate its quotes and invoices by about $20 million. The chief technology officer promised and paid the inflated amounts directly and indirectly to Khan, his son, Alexander and Babb.
The indictment alleges that the chief technology officer of “Company A” promised and made payments directly and indirectly to Kerry Khan in excess of $18 million. Among other things, Khan received cash, checks and wire transfers in excess of $5 million; home improvements and renovations for multiple properties; luxury cars for himself, his son and other family members; furnishings, including flat-screen televisions and computer equipment, highend liquor, and other items. Some of this money also went to Lee Khan and a second family member for employment with “Company A.” The promised payments for Kerry Khan included, among others, future payments of $2 million each to three shell companies controlled by him.
The payments to Kerry Khan came in large amounts, including a $1.2 million wire transfer from “Company A” to a Khan-controlled entity in August 2008 and a check for $3.3 million from “Company A” to a Khan controlled entity in February 2010. According to the indictment, Kerry Khan and his son together channeled $383,000 on Sept. 1, 2011 to another family member who had threatened to alert law enforcement authorities to the existence of the scheme.
The indictment alleges that the chief technology officer of “Company A” promised and made payments directly and indirectly to Alexander in excess of $1 million. Among other things, Alexander received more than $185,000 in cash and checks, a $21,000 Cartier watch, first-class airline tickets, and other items. The promises called for Alexander to secure future employment at “Company A.” In addition, the chief technology officer of “Company A” provided about $1 million for the purchase of a coffee shop for an associate of Alexander’s in South Korea.
According to the indictment, the chief technology officer of “Company A” promised and made payments directly and indirectly to Babb in excess of $700,000. Among other things, he received cash and checks, first-class airline tickets and promised future employment at the firm.
Allegations involving the CORES Contract
The indictment alleges that Kerry Khan, Alexander and Babb worked with the chief technology officer and others at “Company A” to devise a scheme to steer the award of the CORES contract to “Company A.” The intent was to use this contract as a way for “Company A” to funnel money and other things of value directly and indirectly to Khan, Alexander, Babb and others. Kerry Khan, Babb, the chief technology officer, and others at “Company A” worked on a statement of objectives and work for the CORES contract with the intent of tailoring it to fit “Company A” and interfere with the fairness of the bidding process. Kerry Khan, Alexander and Babb also planned to install certain employees from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to serve on the selection board to insure that “Company A” was awarded the valuable CORES contract.
**
This case was investigated by the FBI’s Washington Field Office; the Office of the Inspector General for the Small Business Administration; the Department of Defense’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service; the Defense Contract Audit Agency; the Washington Field Office of the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation, and the Army Criminal Investigation Command.
It is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael Atkinson and Bryan Seeley of the Fraud and Public Corruption Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Anthony Saler and Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher Dana of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, with assistance from Assistant U.S. Attorneys Mary Chris Dobbie and Jonathan Hooks. Assistance also was provided by Forensic Accountant Maria Boodoo; Legal Assistants Jared Forney, Krishawn Graham, Jessica McCormick, and Nicole Wattelet; and Paralegal Specialists Tasha Harris, Shanna Hays, Taryn McLaughlin, and Sarah Reis.
DIE WELT ÜBER DIE DIFFAMIERUNGSMETHODEN DER STASI – VORBILD FÜR “GoMoPa”
“GoMoPa” und ihr Kinderportal: Die gesamte deutsche Presse verabscheut “GoMoPa”
TOP-SECRET – US Foreign Bribery Qualifications
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 192 (Tuesday, October 4, 2011)] [Notices] [Pages 61386-61391] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2011-25540] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION [MCC FR 11-10] Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance in Fiscal Year 2011 AGENCY: Millennium Challenge Corporation. ACTION: Notice. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: This report to Congress is provided in accordance with Section 608(b) of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 7707(b) (the ``Act''). Dated: September 29, 2011. Melvin F. Williams, Jr., VP/General Counsel and Corporate Secretary, Millennium Challenge Corporation. Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance in Fiscal Year 2012 Summary This report to Congress is provided in accordance with section 608(b) of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 7707(b) (the ``Act''). The Act authorizes the provision of Millennium Challenge Account (``MCA'') assistance to countries that enter into a Millennium Challenge Compact with the United States to support policies and programs that advance the prospects of such countries achieving lasting economic growth and poverty reduction. The Act requires the Millennium Challenge Corporation (``MCC'') to take a number of steps in determining what countries will be selected as eligible for MCA compact assistance for fiscal year 2012 (``FY12'') based on the countries' demonstrated commitment to just and democratic governance, economic freedom, and investing in their people, as well as MCC's opportunity to reduce poverty and generate economic growth in the country. These steps include the submission of reports to the congressional committees specified in the Act and publication of notices in the Federal Register that identify: The countries that are ``candidate countries'' for MCA assistance for FY12 based on their per-capita income levels and their eligibility to receive assistance under U.S. law. This report also identifies countries that would be candidate countries but for specified legal prohibitions on assistance (section 608(a) of the Act; 22 U.S.C. Sec. 7707(a)); The criteria and methodology that MCC's Board of Directors (``the Board'') will use to measure and evaluate the policy performance of the candidate countries consistent with the requirements of section 607 of the Act (22 U.S.C. 7706) in order to determine ``MCA eligible countries'' from among the ``candidate countries'' (section 608(b) of the Act); and The list of countries determined by the Board to be ``MCA eligible countries'' for FY12, with justification for eligibility determination and selection for compact negotiation, including which of the MCA eligible countries the Board will seek to enter into MCA compacts (section 608(d) of the Act). This report sets out the criteria and methodology to be applied in determining eligibility for FY12 MCA assistance. Criteria and Methodology for FY12 The Board will base its selection of eligible countries on several factors including the country's overall performance in three broad policy categories--Ruling Justly, Encouraging Economic Freedom, and Investing in People; MCC's opportunity to reduce poverty and generate economic growth in a country; and the availability of funds to MCC. Section 607 of the Act requires that the Board's determination of eligibility be based ``to the maximum extent possible, upon objective and quantifiable indicators of a country's [[Page 61387]] demonstrated commitment'' to the criteria set out in the Act. For FY12, there will be two groups of candidate countries--low income countries (``LIC'') and lower-middle income countries (``LMIC''). As outlined in the Report on Countries that are Candidates for Millennium Challenge Account Eligibility for Fiscal Year 2012 and Countries that would be Candidates but for Legal Prohibitions (August 2011), LIC candidates refer to those countries that have a per capita income equal to or less than $1,915 and are not ineligible to receive United States economic assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by reason of the application of any provision of the Foreign Assistance Act or any other provision of law. LMIC candidates are those countries that have a per capita income between $1,916 and $3,975 and are not ineligible to receive United States economic assistance under the same stipulations. Changes to the Criteria and Methodology for FY12 MCC reviews all of its indicators annually to ensure the best measures are being used and, from time to time, recommends changes or refinements if MCC identifies better indicators or improved sources of data. MCC takes into account public comments received on the previous year's criteria and methodology and consults with a broad range of experts in the development community and within the U.S. Government. In assessing new indicators, MCC favors those that: (1) Are developed by an independent third party; (2) utilize objective and high quality data that rely upon an analytically rigorous methodology; (3) are publicly available; (4) have broad country coverage; (5) are comparable across countries; (6) have a clear theoretical or empirical link to economic growth and poverty reduction; (7) are policy linked (i.e., measure factors that governments can influence within a two to three year horizon); and (8) have broad consistency in results from year to year. There have been numerous noteworthy improvements to data quality and availability as a result of MCC's application of the indicators and the regular dialogue MCC has established with the indicator institutions. MCC also annually reviews the methodology used to evaluate country performance. Since FY04, the methodology has been that the Board considers whether a country performs above the median \1\ in relation to its peers on at least half of the indicators in each of the three policy categories and above the median on the Control of Corruption indicator. The Board may exercise discretion in evaluating and translating the indicators into a final list of eligible countries and, in this respect, the Board may also consider whether any adjustments should be made for data gaps, lags, trends or other weaknesses in particular indicators. Where necessary, the Board may also take into account other data and quantitative and qualitative information to determine whether a country performed satisfactorily in relation to its peers in a given category (``supplemental information''). Through this report, the Board publically affirms that it remains strongly committed to identifying countries for MCC eligibility that have demonstrated sound policies in each of the three policy categories. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The only exception is the Inflation indicator, which uses an absolute threshold of 15% as opposed to the median as its performance standard. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For FY12, MCC will implement a number of changes that modify the overall evaluation of candidate country performance. While improvements to the selection criteria and methodology are critical, MCC is also mindful of the need to provide countries with a fairly stable set of policy criteria to meet, if MCC is to create significant incentives for reform. Therefore, for this year of transition, the Board of Directions will consider countries' performance based on two sets of criteria and methodologies in FY12: the status quo set of indicators and decisions rules, and a revised set. Both of these are outlined below. By encouraging the Board to consider how countries would have performed under the previous system, as well as how countries perform under the new system, MCC will provide a transition year that allows countries to learn how they are being measured, engage in dialogue with MCC about performance, and solicit feedback from the institutions that produce these indicators. It is important to recognize that all of MCC's indicators have limitations, including these revised indicators. Over the next year, MCC intends to continue working with the indicator institutions to ensure the data and methodology are the best available. Indicators In FY12 the Board will use two sets of indicators to assess the policy performance of individual countries. These indicators are grouped under the three policy categories listed below. The changes to the revised indicators include one substitution in Ruling Justly; two additions in Economic Freedom; and three substitutions/additions in Investing in People. Specific definitions of the indicators and their sources are set out in the attached Annex A. Status Quo Civil Liberties Political Rights Voice and Accountability Government Effectiveness Rule of Law Control of Corruption Inflation Fiscal Policy Business Start-Up Trade Policy Regulatory Quality Land Rights and Access Public Expenditure on Health Public Expenditure on Primary Education Immunization Rates Girls' Primary Education Completion Natural Resource Management Revised Civil Liberties Political Rights Freedom of Information Government Effectiveness Rule of Law Control of Corruption Inflation Fiscal Policy Business Start-Up Trade Policy Regulatory Quality Land Rights and Access Access to Credit Gender in the Economy Public Expenditure on Health Public Expenditure on Primary Education Immunization Rates Girls' Education: Primary Education Completion (LICs) Secondary Education Enrolment (LMICs) Child Health Natural Resource Protection Methodology Similarly, in FY12 the Board will apply a status quo methodology, and a revised methodology to the respective indicator groupings. These are described below. Status Quo In making its determination of eligibility with respect to a particular candidate country, the Board will consider whether a country performs above the median in relation to its income level peers (LIC or LMIC) on at [[Page 61388]] least three of the indicators in each of the Ruling Justly, Encouraging Economic Freedom, and Investing in People categories, and above the median on the Control of Corruption indicator. One exception to this methodology is that the median is not used for the Inflation indicator. Instead, to pass the Inflation indicator a country's inflation rate must be under an absolute threshold of 15 percent. The Board may also take into consideration whether a country performs substantially below the median on any indicator (i.e., below the 25th percentile) and has not taken appropriate measures to address this shortcoming. Revised In making its determination of eligibility with respect to a particular candidate country, the Board will consider whether a country performs above the median or absolute threshold on at least half of the indicators and at least one indicator per category, above the median on the Control of Corruption indicator, and above the absolute threshold on either the Civil Liberties or Political Rights indicators. Indicators with absolute thresholds in lieu of a median include a) Inflation, on which a country's inflation rate must be under a fixed ceiling of 15 percent; b) Immunization Rates (LMICs only), on which an LMIC must have immunization coverage above 90%; c) Political Rights, on which countries must score above 17 and d) Civil Liberties, on which countries must score above 25. The Board will also take into consideration whether a country performs substantially worse in any category (Ruling Justly, Investing in People, or Economic Freedoms) than they do on the overall scorecard. Further details on how this methodology differs from the status quo can be found in Annex B. Other Considerations for the Board of Directors Approach to Income Classification Transition Each year a number of countries shift income groups, and some countries formerly classified as LICs suddenly face new, higher performance standards in the LMIC group. As a result, they typically perform worse relative to LMIC countries, than they did compared to other LIC countries, even if in absolute terms they maintained or improved their performance over the previous year. To address the challenges associated with sudden changes in performance standards for these countries, MCC has adopted an approach to income category transition whereby the Board may consider the indicator performance of countries that transitioned from the LIC to the LMIC category both relative to their LMIC peers as well as in comparison to the current fiscal year's LIC pool for a period of three years. Supplementary Information Consistent with the Act, the indicators will be the predominant basis for determining which countries will be eligible for MCA assistance. However, the Board may exercise discretion when evaluating performance on the indicators and determining a final list of eligible countries. Where necessary, the Board also may take into account other quantitative and qualitative information (supplemental information) to determine whether a country performed satisfactorily in relation to its peers in a given income category. There are elements of the criteria set out in the Act for which there is either limited quantitative information (e.g., the rights of people with disabilities) or no well- developed performance indicator. Until such data and/or indicators are developed, the Board may rely on additional data and qualitative information to assess policy performance. For example, the State Department Human Rights Report contains qualitative information to make an assessment on a variety of criteria outlined by Congress, such as the rights of people with disabilities, the treatment of women and children, workers rights, and human rights. Similarly, MCC may consult a variety of third party sources to better understand the domestic potential for private sector led investment and growth. The Board may also consider whether supplemental information should be considered to make up for data gaps, lags, trends, or other weaknesses in particular indicators. As additional information in the area of corruption, the Board may consider how a country is evaluated by supplemental sources like Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, the Global Integrity Report, and the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative among others, as well as on the defined indicator. Consideration for Subsequent Compacts Countries nearing the end of compact implementation may be considered for eligibility for a subsequent compact. In determining eligibility for subsequent compacts, MCC recommends that the Board consider, among other factors, the country's policy performance using the methodology and criteria described above, the opportunity to reduce poverty and generate economic growth in the country, the funds available to MCC to carry out compact assistance, and the country's track record of performance implementing its prior compact. To assess implementation of a prior compact, MCC recommends that the Board consider the nature of the country partnership with MCC, the degree to which the country has demonstrated a commitment and capacity to achieve program results, and the degree to which the country has implemented the compact in accordance with MCC's core policies and standards. Continuing Policy Performance Country partners that are developing or implementing a compact are expected to seek to maintain and improve policy performance. MCC recognizes that country partners may not meet the eligibility criteria from time to time due to a number of factors, such as changes in the peer-group median; transition into a new income category (e.g., from LIC to LMIC); numerical declines in score that are within the statistical margin of error; slight declines in policy performance; revisions or corrections of data; the introduction of new sub-data sources; or changes in the indicators used to measure performance. None of these factors alone signifies a significant policy reversal nor warrants suspension or termination of eligibility and/or assistance. However, countries that demonstrate a significant policy reversal may be issued a warning, suspension, or termination of eligibility and/ or assistance. According to MCC's authorizing legislation, ``[a]fter consultation with the Board, the Chief Executive Officer may suspend or terminate assistance in whole or in part for a country or entity * * * if * * * the country or entity has engaged in a pattern of actions inconsistent with the criteria used to determine the eligibility of the country or entity. * * *'' This pattern of actions need not be captured in the indicators for MCC to take action. Potential Future Changes MCC will continue to explore potential changes to the indicators for future years. There are important areas of policy performance in which indicators have not yet been developed, or expanded, to the degree needed for inclusion in the MCC selection system. MCC would not envision expanding the number of indicators beyond the current twenty indicators. However, MCC remains interested in indicators that measure policy performance related to educational quality, maternal health, environmental degradation, budget [[Page 61389]] transparency, and more actionable indicators of corruption, which could be used to substitute for existing indicators in the future or as supplemental information. While we have reviewed some indicators with promise--including education policy and quality indicators piloted by the World Bank's Education for All, measures of maternal health from the World Health Organization or the United Nations (including skilled birth attendants or process indicators regarding access to emergency obstetric care), preliminary data on air pollution provided by NASA satellites, assessments of budget transparency by Open Budget Index, and corruption assessments published by Global Integrity--none of these indicators have sufficient periodicity and country coverage to be incorporated into MCC's scorecard at this time. It should be noted that the new Freedom of Information indicator adopted as part of the revised methodology draws on independent, third party data, but is compiled by MCC, similar to how MCC compiles third party data for the Land Rights and Access indicator. MCC welcomes the efforts of third party institutions to improve and publish similar and improved indicators. Relationship to Legislative Criteria Within each policy category, the Act sets out a number of specific selection criteria. As indicated above, a set of objective and quantifiable policy indicators is used to determine eligibility for MCA assistance and measure the relative performance by candidate countries against these criteria. The Board's approach to determining eligibility ensures that performance against each of these criteria is assessed by at least one of the objective indicators. Most are addressed by multiple indicators. The specific indicators appear in parentheses next to the corresponding criterion set out in the Act. Section 607(b)(1): Just and democratic governance, including a demonstrated commitment to --promote political pluralism, equality and the rule of law (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, and Rule of Law, Gender in the Economy); respect human and civil rights, including the rights of people with disabilities (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, and Freedom of Information); protect private property rights (Civil Liberties, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Land Rights and Access); encourage transparency and accountability of government (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Freedom of Information, Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, and Government Effectiveness); and combat corruption (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Rule of Law, Freedom of Information, and Control of Corruption); Section 607(b)(2): Economic freedom, including a demonstrated commitment to economic policies that--encourage citizens and firms to participate in global trade and international capital markets (Fiscal Policy, Inflation, Trade Policy, and Regulatory Quality); promote private sector growth (Inflation, Business Start-Up, Fiscal Policy, Land Rights and Access, Access to Credit, Gender in the Economy, and Regulatory Quality); strengthen market forces in the economy (Fiscal Policy, Inflation, Trade Policy, Business Start-Up, Land Rights and Access, Access to Credit, and Regulatory Quality); and respect worker rights, including the right to form labor unions (Civil Liberties and Gender in the Economy); Section 607(b)(3): Investments in the people of such country, particularly women and children, including programs that--promote broad-based primary education (Girls' Primary Education Completion, Girls' Secondary Education, and Public Expenditure on Primary Education); strengthen and build capacity to provide quality public health and reduce child mortality (Immunization Rates, Public Expenditure on Health, and Child Health); and promote the protection of biodiversity and the transparent and sustainable management and use of natural resources (Natural Resource Protection). Annex A: Indicator Definitions MCC is incorporating six new measures into the selection criteria and dropping two previous measures. MCC's Board of Directors approved these changes for the FY12 selection process, though the Board will also consider how countries perform on the previous set of indicators. This gradual integration of the indicators was designed to provide adequate notice to compact, threshold and candidate countries of the new measures and their performance before the new indicators fully replaced the previous indicators. A brief summary of the indicators follows; a detailed rationale for the adoption of these indicators can be found in the Public Guide to the Indicators (available at http://www.mcc.gov). The following indicators will be used to measure candidate countries' demonstrated commitment to the criteria found in section 607(b) of the Act. The indicators are intended to assess the degree to which the political and economic conditions in a country serve to promote broad-based sustainable economic growth and reduction of poverty and thus provide a sound environment for the use of MCA funds. The indicators are not goals in themselves; rather they are proxy measures of policies that are linked to broad-based sustainable economic growth. The indicators were selected based on their (i) relationship to economic growth and poverty reduction, (ii) the number of countries they cover, (iii) transparency and availability, and (iv) relative soundness and objectivity. Where possible, the indicators are developed by independent sources. Ruling Justly Civil Liberties: Independent experts rate countries on: freedom of expression; association and organizational rights; rule of law and human rights; and personal autonomy and economic rights, among other things. Source: Freedom House Political Rights: Independent experts rate countries on: the prevalence of free and fair elections of officials with real power; the ability of citizens to form political parties that may compete fairly in elections; freedom from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies and economic oligarchies; and the political rights of minority groups, among other things. Source: Freedom House Voice and Accountability (status quo indicators only): An index of surveys and expert assessments that rate countries on: the ability of institutions to protect civil liberties; the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments; and the independence of the media, among other things. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank/Brookings) Freedom of Information (revised indicators only): Measures the legal and practical steps taken by a government to enable or allow information to move freely through society; this includes measures of press freedom, national freedom of information laws, and the extent to which a county is filtering internet content or tools. Source: Freedom House/FRINGE Special/Open Net Initiative Government Effectiveness: An index of surveys and expert assessments that rate countries on: the quality of public service provision; civil servants' competency and independence from political pressures; and the government's ability to plan and implement sound policies, among other things. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank/Brookings) [[Page 61390]] Rule of Law: An index of surveys and expert assessments that rate countries on: the extent to which the public has confidence in and abides by the rules of society; the incidence and impact of violent and nonviolent crime; the effectiveness, independence, and predictability of the judiciary; the protection of property rights; and the enforceability of contracts, among other things. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank/Brookings) Control of Corruption: An index of surveys and expert assessments that rate countries on: ``grand corruption'' in the political arena; the frequency of petty corruption; the effects of corruption on the business environment; and the tendency of elites to engage in ``state capture'', among other things. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank/Brookings) Encouraging Economic Freedom Inflation: The most recent average annual change in consumer prices. Source: The International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Database Fiscal Policy: The overall budget balance divided by GDP, averaged over a three-year period. The data for this measure come primarily from IMF country reports or, where public IMF data are outdated or unavailable, are provided directly by the recipient government with input from U.S. missions in host countries. All data are cross-checked with the IMF's World Economic Outlook database to try to ensure consistency across countries and made publicly available. Source: International Monetary Fund Country Reports, National Governments, and the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Database Business Start-Up: An index that rates countries on the time and cost of complying with all procedures officially required for an entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business. Source: International Finance Corporation Trade Policy: A measure of a country's openness to international trade based on weighted average tariff rates and non-tariff barriers to trade. Source: The Heritage Foundation Regulatory Quality: An index of surveys and expert assessments that rate countries on: the burden of regulations on business; price controls; the government's role in the economy; and foreign investment regulation, among other areas. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank) Land Rights and Access: An index that rates countries on the extent to which the institutional, legal, and market framework provide secure land tenure and equitable access to land in rural areas and the time and cost of property registration in urban and peri-urban areas. Source: The International Fund for Agricultural Development and the International Finance Corporation Access to Credit (revised indicators only): An index that rates countries on rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available through either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau; as well as legal rights in collateral laws and bankruptcy laws. Source: International Finance Corporation Gender in the Economy (revised indicators only): An index that measures the extent to which laws provide men and women equal capacity to generate income or participate in the economy, including the capacity to access institutions, get a job, register a business, sign a contract, open a bank account, choose where to live, and travel freely. Source: International Finance Corporation Investing in People Public Expenditure on Health: Total expenditures on health by government at all levels divided by GDP. Source: The World Health Organization Immunization Rates: The average of DPT3 and measles immunization coverage rates for the most recent year available. Source: The World Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund Total Public Expenditure on Primary Education: Total expenditures on primary education by government at all levels divided by GDP. Source: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and National Governments Girls' Primary Completion Rate: The number of female students enrolled in the last grade of primary education minus repeaters divided by the population in the relevant age cohort (gross intake ratio in the last grade of primary). Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Girls Secondary Education (revised indicators only): The number of female pupils enrolled in lower secondary school, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of females in the theoretical age group for lower secondary education. Lower middle income counties (LMICs) will be assessed on this indicator instead of Girls Primary Completion Rates. Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Natural Resource Management (status quo indicators only): An index made up of four indicators: eco-region protection, access to improved water, access to improved sanitation, and child (ages 1-4) mortality. Source: The Center for International Earth Science Information Network and the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy Natural Resource Protection (revised indicators only): Assesses whether countries are protecting up to 10 percent of all their biomes (e.g., deserts, tropical rainforests, grasslands, savannas and tundra). Source: The Center for International Earth Science Information Network and the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy Child Health (revised indicators only): An index made up of three indicators: access to improved water, access to improved sanitation, and child (ages 1-4) mortality. Source: The Center for International Earth Science Information Network and the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy Annex B: Changes to the Methodology New Absolute Thresholds Political Rights: Countries that receive a score above 17 will be considered as passing this indicator. The median will no longer be calculated or utilized. Civil Liberties: Countries that receive a score above 25 will be considered as passing this indicator. The median will no longer be calculated or utilized. Immunization Rates: Lower middle income countries (LMICs) that exceed an immunization coverage rate of 90% will be considered as passing this indicator. The median will no longer be calculated or utilized for countries classified as LMICs. New Democratic Rights Hard Hurdle In making its determination of eligibility with respect to a particular candidate country, the Board will consider whether a country performs above the thresholds described above on either Political Rights or Civil Liberties. Require Countries to Pass Half of the Indicators Overall In making its determination of eligibility with respect to a particular candidate country, the Board will consider whether a country performs above the median or absolute threshold on at least half of the indicators and at least one indicator per category. In order to maintain a focus on the breadth of sound policy performance, the Board will also take into consideration whether a country performs substantially worse on any category (Ruling Justly, Investing in People, or Economic Freedoms). [[Page 61391]] As with the current selection system, the Board may exercise discretion in evaluating and translating the indicators into a final list of eligible countries and, in this respect, the Board may also consider whether any adjustments should be made for data gaps, lags, trends or other weaknesses in particular indicators. Where necessary, the Board may also take into account other data and quantitative and qualitative information to determine whether a country performed satisfactorily in relation to its peers in a given category (``supplemental information''). [FR Doc. 2011-25540 Filed 9-29-11; 4:15 pm] BILLING CODE 9211-03-P
TOP-SECRET – FROM THE DESK OF THE FBI -Commodity Pool Operator Admits to Fraud Schemes and Tax Evasion in New Jersey
TRENTON, NJ—A commodity pool operator and day trader based in Hackensack, N.J., admitted today to directing two schemes to defraud individual investors and a financial institution of approximately $2 million and to evading more than $150,000 in tax payments, U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey Paul J. Fishman announced.
Victor E. Cilli, 46, pleaded guilty to an information charging him with one count of securities fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, and one count of tax evasion. Cilli entered his guilty plea before U.S. District Judge Garrett E. Brown in Trenton, N.J., federal court.
According to documents filed in this case and statements made during Cilli’s guilty plea proceeding:
Beginning in August 2006, Cilli was the sole owner and president of Progressive Investment Funds LLC (PIF), a commodity pool operator (CPO) engaged in an investment trust that solicited funds for the purpose of trading commodity futures. PIF was registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the National Futures Association (NFA), and was the CPO of Progressive Managed Futures Fund LP (PMFF), a commodity pool operated for the purpose of trading commodity futures. Cilli had sole trading authority over PMFF, which remained open until approximately February 2009.
Beginning as early as January 2007 and through September 2007, Cilli engaged in a Ponzi scheme to defraud at least four commodity pool participants of approximately $506,000. Though Cilli returned some funds to the investors, the payments were not from actual trading profits but from funds of existing pool participants. Cilli made false and misleading statements to the pool participants claiming he had made money for them when, in fact, most of his trading resulted in losses. Of the $506,000 invested, Cilli traded approximately $263,000, losing approximately $200,168. Cilli never disclosed to the pool participants that he had traded less than half of their money or that most of his trading had resulted in significant losses.
Cilli also misappropriated thousands of dollars in pool funds for personal expenses—including hair salon visits, skin care treatments, payments on his Harley Davidson motorcycle, and other personal entertainment, meals, and travel expenses.
In an unrelated scheme, from 2002 through September 2006, Cilli and approximately 16 others conspired to defraud KeyBank, a financial institution based in Cleveland of more than $1.5 million in student loans by falsely representing to KeyBank that they would use the funds to attend Tab Express International Inc., a pilot and flight crew training school in DeLand, Fla., and use the proceeds of student loans for educational expenses at Tab.
Based upon prior agreements between Cilli and his co-conspirators, they never intended to enroll at Tab, nor repay principal or interest on the student loans to KeyBank. After KeyBank disbursed the loan proceeds to the school, approximately $600,000 of the loan proceeds were deposited into bank accounts solely owned and operated by Cilli. Cilli then made kickback payments totaling approximately $130,000 to his co-conspirators for signing up for the loans. Tab retained approximately $900,000 of the total loan proceeds. KeyBank was never repaid any of the principal or accrued interest on the loans.
To conceal his fraudulent conduct, Cilli maintained bank accounts in the names of Northeast Flight Training Inc., which was not a flight training school, and United Charities of America Inc., which was not a charitable organization. Both accounts were maintained by Cilli solely to perpetuate his frauds and fund his personal expenditures.
Finally, for calendar years 2003 and 2004, Cilli intentionally failed to provide the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with any information regarding the proceeds that he received in connection with his conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in the aggregate amount of approximately $547,705, resulting in a tax loss to the United States of approximately $158,674.
The securities fraud charge carries a maximum potential penalty of 20 years in prison and a $5 million fine; the conspiracy to commit bank fraud charge carries a maximum potential penalty of 30 years in prison and a $1 million fine; and the tax evasion charge carries a maximum potential penalty of five years in prison and a $100,000 fine. Sentencing is currently scheduled for Jan. 11, 2012.
U.S. Attorney Fishman credited special agents of the FBI, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge Michael B. Ward; and IRS – Criminal Investigation, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge Victor W. Lessoff, for the investigation leading to today’s guilty plea. He also thanked the CFTC, Eastern Regional Office in New York, under the direction of Regional Counsel Stephen J. Obie. U.S. Attorney Fishman also credited the NFA, New York Office, under the direction of Director Cheryl Tulino, for its assistance.
The government is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorney Aaron Mendelsohn of the U.S. Attorney’s Office Economic Crimes Unit in Newark, N.J.
This case was brought in coordination with President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general, and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.
ENTTARNT – A-Z- 2.000 STASI OFFIZIERE IM BESONDEREN EINSATZ OibE – “SCHLÄFERLISTE DER STASI IN WESTDEUTSCHLAND”- STASI-SLEEPER LIST A-Z
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Stasi Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz (abgekürzt OibE)
Stasi Schläfer Liste
Technische Hinweise:
Diese Daten stammen aus der OibE-Liste. Die Tabellen wurden von H.T. per OCR usw. in HTML gewandelt.
Die Datensätze sind – anders geordnet – auch Teilmenge der (‘HAMSTER’-Liste/MA_Stasi.txt). Dort sind die mit Adressen versehenen und meist gedoppelten Datensätze diejenigen der OibE.
OibE dürfen nicht mit Inoffiziellen Mitarbeitern (IM) verwechselt werden. Sie hatten im Gegensatz zu den IM [Ausnahme: HIM] ein Dienstverhältnis mit der Stasi und einen Kampfauftrag.
Die OibE sollten unter allen Umständen zum MfS stehen und mussten sich vor der “Abordnung” ins Zivilleben durch besondere ideologische Zuverlässigkeit auszeichnen. Deshalb fühlen sich viele dieser Überzeugungstäter wahrscheinlich heute noch der Stasi verpflichtet, leben aber ganz unauffällig. Man könnte sie auch als “Schläfer” bezeichnen.
Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz (abgekürzt OibE) waren hauptamtliche Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit
Zudem kommen weitere STASI-Agenten in Westdeutschland, die noch besser getarnt wurden und deren Legenden sorgfältig aufbereitet wurden.
Viel schufen sich in den Wirren um 1989 eine neue Identität mit neuem Namen auch in Westdeutschland. Somit sind hier nur deren ALTE und RICHTIGE Namen erfasst.
Name, Vorname; Geb.-datum; DE: Zentrale, BV, KD; DE-Code; PLZ; Az. / Reg.-Nr.
Ackermann, Frank; 29.04.55; HVA; 961500; 1092; 4288/81, F
Ackermann, Kerstin; 22.02.58; HVA; 961500; 1092; 4288/81/1, F
Adelmeier, Lutz; 18.11.53; HVA; 961500; 1590; 650/75/12,
Ahrendt, Hans; 17.11.50; Abt. XI; 941100; 1092; 2382/74,
Amthor, Jürgen; 25.01.47; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 7263/75,
Anschütz, Günter; 07.04.54; Abt. XI; 941100; 6110; 3454/86,
Antoni, Detlef; 02.06.59; HVA; 961500; 1162; 2110/84, F
Arlt, Frank; 12.03.58; HVA; 961500; 1140; 650/75/54,
Auerbach, Christel; 01.04.36; HVA; 961500; 1020; 79/74, B
Auerbach, Hans- Dieter; 25.03.37; HVA; 961500; 1020; 80/74, J
Aul, Claus; 28.09.62; HVA; 961500; 1150; 3776/85, F
Autenrieb, Eckbert; 02.06.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1095; 5785/82,
Badelt, Dieter; 17.01.37; Rostock VII; 010700; 2520; 4909/75,
Bahl, Reinhard; 10.03.48; HVA; 961500; 2800; 527/88, M
Baltruschat, Klaus; 27.07.34; HVA; 961500; 1170; 13222/60, X
Balzer, Christian; 28.10.51; Abt. N; 906540; 1115; 1690/76,
Bandermann, Hans-Rainer; 12.05.45; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 4378/77,
Barnowsky, Wolfgang; 24.08.38; HVA; 961500; 1017; 962/83, M
Bartels, Klaus; 06.04.39; KD Stendal; 070054; 3500; BARTELS, KLAUS
Bartels, Uwe; 23.02.64; HVA; 961500; 1093; 5764/81/4, D
Barten, Günter; 27.11.38; Abt. XI; 941100; 1291; 179/78,
Barzik, Hans-Joachim; 30.08.46; HVA; 961500; 1190; 592/86, F
Barzik, Renate; 05.08.49; HVA; 961500; 1190; 592/86/1, F
Bassin, Dietrich; 28.04.34; BV Berlin XVIII; 151800; 1058; 1911/78,
Bauer, Gerhard; 29.08.47; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 4254/77,
Bauer, Ralf; 04.06.64; HVA; 961500; 1144; 2858/84, F
Baumann, Manfred; 25.04.39; OD TU/H Dresden; 120058; 8045; XII/1353/87,
Baumann, Reinhard; 25.05.40; KD Pirna; 120052; 8300; XII/1359/87,
Bauschmann, Rolf-Jürgen; 19.04.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1095; 7575/80,
Bazyli, Dieter; 10.08.35; Frankfurt/O. IX; 050900; 1200; V/425/88,
Bäumler, Hans; 29.06.33; HVA; 961500; 1144; 21/77, F
Becker, Günter; 24.02.38; HVA; 961500; 1120; 2649/80, F
Becker, Heidrun; 30.03.52; HVA; 961500; 1090; 2850/78, J
Becker, Ralf-Ekkehard; 16.04.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 5040/76,
Becke, Ronald; 07.03.57; HVA; 961500; 5062; 650/75/27,
Beier, Peter; 02.08.42; OD KKW Nord; 010050; 2200; 5678/84,
Beitz, Hans-Joachim; 07.10.37; Abt. XI; 941100; 1100; 2233/66,
Benjowski, Klaus; 22.08.35; HVA; 961500; 1162; 364/77, U
Benndorf, Roland; 11.03.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 1787/81,
Berger, Andreas; 16.11.62; Abt. XI; 941100; 7065; 1713/89,
Bergmann, Holger; 23.04.60; HVA; 961500; 8291; 650/75/25,
Bergmann, Thomas; 04.04.54; HVA; 961500; 1144; 1439/89, F
Berliner, Kurt; 16.12.35; HVA; 961500; 1080; 1858/89, F
Berndt, Walter; 03.01.31; Abt. XI; 941100; 1017; 246/77,
Bernhardt, Hans; 30.05.28; HVA; 961500; 1195; 9831/61, F
Bernhardt, Hans-Joachim; 15.02.56; Abt. XI; 941100; 4370; 1709/89,
Bertholf, Manfred; 02.02.37; BV Berlin XVIII; 151800; 1055; 867/80,
Bertsch-Herzog, Herbert; 21.07.29; HVA; 961500; 1080; 3665/60/1, U
Betsch, Brigitt; 16.01.55; HVA; 961500; 1055; 5010/87, U
Betsch, Michael; 30.11.46; HVA; 961500; 1140; 2259/73,
Bettzieche, Frank; 21.10.54; HVA; 961500; 1093; 904/84, F
Bettzüge, Eberhard; 22.01.35; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 1807/72
Beuster, Gerhard; 03.07.52; Abt. N; 906540; 1292; 7270/75,
Bevermann, Jürgen; 14.10.43; HVA; 961500; 1142; 209/81, F
Bewersdorf, Wolfram; 20.05.61; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 3022/84,
Beyer, Alfred; 30.05.38; HVA; 961500; 1190; 528/88, M
Beyer, Andreas; 23.01.61; HVA; 961500; 1580; 650/75/55,
Bezdicek, Rolf-Dieter; 20.09.58; Abt. XI; 941100; 1120; 844/83,
Bienert, Peter; 10.08.42; Abt. N; 906540; 1020; 4110/79,
Bilke, Paul; 02.06.28; HVA; 961500; 1020; 9/76, X
Birgel, Artur; 25.01.35; HVA; 961500; 1020; 4207/84, 0
Birnbach, Steffen; 23.10.53; Karl-Marx-Stadt XX; 142000; 9081; K/3505/89,
Blank, Gerhard; 16.12.31; HVA; 961500; 1130; 3156/89, E
Blank, Monika; 12.10.39; HVA; 961500; 1130; 3156/89/1, E
Blaudzun,Alfred; 26.10.38; Rostock VI; 010600; 2500; 5011/86,
Blei, Holger; 08.05.57; HVA; 961500; 1055; 4644/80, J
Block, Gerhard; 04.11.52; Abt. XI; 941100; 3530; 5125/85,
Bloß, Rolf; 08.04.33; Dresden XVIII; 121800; 8019; XII/1344/87,
Blumenberg, Igor; 27.06.52; Abt. XI; 941100; 1130; 311/80,
Blum, Ines; 02.04.62; HVA; 961500; 1199; 2410/79, J
Blutnick, Harry; 27.01.36; HVA; 961500; 1020; 1653/87, F
Bock, Andre; 01.11.67; Abt. N; 906540; 1095; 5546/88,
Bogacz, Carsten; 10.11.58; HVA; 961500; 7513; 650/75/56,
Bohm, Peter; 24.10.45; HVA; 961500; 1144; 1671/87, F
Bohn, Detlef; 12.05.59; Abt. XI; 941100; 4070; 492/87,
Bohn, Steffi; 14.10.59; HVA; 961500; 4070; 492/87/1, F
Bohn, Wolfgang; 16.05.51; HVA; 961500; 1092; 2112/72, F
Bollmann, Lutz; 16.12.68; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 5189/88,
Borchert, Detlef; 09.12.48; Abt. N; 906540; 1100; 255/73,
Borchert, Hans-Joachim; 19.11.54; HVA; 961500; 1142; 398/76, F
Bornschein, Horst; 20.04.30; Abt. XI; 941100; 1156; 3597/81,
Born, Joachim; 25.04.58; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 4325/87,
Böhm, Jürgen; 22.11.44; HVA; 961500; 1142; 2660/79, M
Börnchen, Peter; 20.07.39; HVA; 961500; 1250; 30/70, A
Brada, Wolfgang; 15.11.50; HVA; 961500; 1130; 650/75/11,
Brade, Rolf; 21.07.42; Abt. XI; 941100; 1600; 271/68,
Brate, Andreas; 11.12.54; HVA; 961500; 1142; 3039/82, M
Brändel, Lothar; 19.04.35; KD Leipzig/Land; 130041; 4090; K, 4232/86,
Brendtner, Werner; 23.03.42; Rostock VII; 010700; 2520; 4733/88,
Bretschneider, Jens; 29.08.67; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9271; 182,
Bruhn, Siegfried; 28.11.50; HVA; 961500; 2520; 650/75/39,
Brunner, Manfred; 26.04.29; HVA; 961500; 1144; 1920/75, J
Bruns, Beate; 05.06.62; HVA; 961500; 1140; 6555/82, J
Brüning, Falk; 11.06.63; HVA; 961500; 1095; 4361/84, M
Burckhardt, Dietmar; 03.08.44; HVA; 961500; 1020; 3467/86, L
Burde, Hans-Joachim; 18.05.47; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 2010/67,
Burkhardt, Marco; 12.10.59; HVA; 961500; 1142; 3887/83, E
Buschendorf, Lutz; 21.11.41; HVA; 961500; 1142; 3478/65, A
Bussin, Günter; 26.07.54; HVA; 961500; 1142; 3328/86, A
Büchner, Eckhard; 23.09.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1153; 3619/77,
Bürger, Heiderose; 05.05.50; Abt. N; 961500; 1140; 5764/81/3, D
Cantow, Hans-Gerhard; 11.01.44; HVA; 961500; 1143; 360/68, L
Christoph, Martin; 30.03.58; HVA; 961500; 9900; 650/75/26,
Claus, Werner; 29.03.26; HVA; 961500; 1017; 401/73, P
Cotte, Wolfgang; 16.11.51; HVA; 961500; 1600; 619/83, L
Czieselsky, Frank; 05.05.58; Abt. N; 906540; 1017; 2960/79,
Daum, Heinz; 09.09.35; BV Berlin VI; 150600; 1020; 4101/77,
Dau, Holger; 20.01.58; HVA; 961500; 1143; 7701/81, F
Dähn, Bernd; 23.07.48; Abt. XI; 941100; 1035; 97/75,
Degenhardt, Dieter; 12.07.31; HA VII; 970700; 1140; DEGENHARDT, DIETER
Dehmel, Wolfgang; 12.07.49; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 7401/81,
Derlath, Bettina; 08.02.56; HVA; 961500; 1090; 5182/84, M
Deters, Frank; 10.11.67; Abt. N; 906540; 1950; 4649/87,
Deutscher, Peter; 16.07.47; HVA; 961500; 8019; 1382/89, M
Deysing, Gerd; 04.10.53; HVA; 961500; 1142; 650/75/58,
Diettrich, Günter; 06.05.53; Abt. N; 906540; 1281; 1794/80,
Dietrich, Matthias; 30.07.66; HVA; 961500; 1156; 4383/86, F
Dietrich, Reinhilde; 25.07.37; Abt. N; 906540; 1110; 5004/80,
Diettrich, Heidi; 14.11.54; Abt. N; 906540; 1281; 2002/87,
Dittrich, Michael; 09.11.46; Abt. XI; 941100; 1141; 99/75,
Dittrich, Wolfgang; 08.07.49; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 1675/78,
Doegelsack, Uta; 20.01.63; Abt. N; 906540; 1093; 5808/84,
Donath, Martin; 03.04.51; HVA; 961500; 2520; 671/89, A
Dorgwarth, Reinhard; 10.11.48; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 4379/77,
Dott, Bernd; 01.07.41; BV Berlin VII; 150700; 1180; 241/78,
Döbel, Holger; 07.04.61; Abt. N; 906540; 1143; 4865/81,
Döbereiner, Rene; 02.08.67; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9072; 175,
Drechsler, Peter; 06.06.57; HVA; 961500; 1136; 3594/74, F
Dreger, Uwe; 25.12.51; Abt. N; 906540; 1281; 7271/75,
Drexler, Andreas; 03.12.50; HVA; 961500; 1120; 4675/85, A
Dumke, Bodo; 21.03.51; BV Berlin VI; 150600; 1080; 1299/85,
Dybiona, Detlef; 21.05.60; Abt. XI; 941100; 3090; 494/87,
Dylla, Bernd; 07.03.57; Abt. XI; 941100; 6902; 767/86,
Ebedus, Dieter; 17.01.59; Abt. XI; 941100; 4350; 1819/87,
Eckert, Gerhard; 24.09.31; KD Eisenhüttenstadt; 050045; 1220; V/481/88,
Effenberger, Helga; 10.07.38; HVA; 961500; 1017; 19666/60/1, E
Effenberger, Rudolf; 13.01.33; HVA; 961500; 1017; 19666/60, E
Eggert, Asmus; 17.12.47; HVA; 961500; 1130; 2394/85, J
Eggestein, Dieter; 20.12.38; Rostock XVIII; 011800; 2520; 3862/81,
Ehrke, Hans-Jürgen; 17.01.42; Abt. N; 906540; 1090; 4025/79,
Ehrenberg, Rolland; 25.09.47; Frankfurt/O. IX; 050900; 1200; V/447/88,
Eichentopf, Marlis; 27.06.61; HVA; 961500; 5080; 5362/89, F
Eichhorn, Hans; 14.10.38; HVA; 961500; 1054; 1305/68, P
Eichner, Ulla; 02.04.42; HVA; 961500; 1092; 4218/84, F
Eisenhardt, Joachim; 05.09.58; Abt. N; 906540; 1095; 3413/78,
Elfert, Wolfgang; 08.05.56; Abt. XI; 941100; 1250; 448/80,
Elliger, Gabriele; 06.12.61; HVA; 961500; 1142; 650/75/59/1,
Elliger, Uwe; 08.05.58; HVA; 961500; 1142; 650/75/59,
Ende, Michael; 30.06.52; BV Berlin VII; 150700; 1092; 4977/79,
Engelmann, Frank; 03.08.42; HVA; 961500; 1140; 5681/86, M
Engelmann, Gabriele; 15.08.46; HVA; 961500; 1140; 3876/86, M
Englberger, Wolfgang; 24.06.43; HVA; 961500; 1020; 3760/87, U
Enke, Brigitte; 04.08.44; HVA; 961500; 1280; 650/75/50/1,
Enke, Dieter; 02.07.45; HVA; 961500; 1280; 650/75/50,
Escherich, Rolf; 18.01.40; HVA; 961500; 1156; 3039/62, F
Euen, Wolf; 19.02.44; KD Riesa; 120053; 8400; XlI/2673/87,
Ewald, Peter; 28.01.50; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 3622/77,
Faber, Kurt; 30.07.27; Abt. XI; 941100; 1170; 8348/60,
Falkehagen, Bärbel; 10.04.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 3412/78,
Falkenhagen, Ingo; 29.07.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 2403/78,
Fauck, Alexa; 04.12.51; HVA; 961500; 1095; 3820/85/1, F
Fauck, Wolfgang; 21.01.50; HVA; 961500; 1095; 3820/85, F
Fähnrich, Alfred; 01.07.32; HA I; 970100; 1602; K, 4271/80
Fähnrich, Manfred; 29.03.33; Rostock XVIII; 011800; 2500; 549/60,
Fedtke, Simone; 02.03.66; HVA; 961500; 1092; 4462/81, A
Feige, Brigitte; 07.03.48; HVA; 961500; 1143; 592/88 F
Fell, Klaus; 30.05.35; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 7259/75,
Fichtmüller, Jens; 06.03.67; HVA; 961500; 4850; 3641/88, O
Fickel, Michael; 30.01.61; HVA; 961500; 1140; 4276/83, J
Fiedler, Gunter; 16.09.51; HVA; 961500; 1034; 2113/72, F
Finsterbusch, Werner; 08.07.56; HVA; 961500; 1093; 5693/81, A
Fischer, Gerd; 21.02.61; HA VI; 970600; 1144; K, 3435/89
Fischer, Hans; 11.10.50; HVA; 961500; 1142; 505/83, O
Fischer, Hartmut; 25.04.52; HVA; 961500; 1250; 2256/73, F
Fischer, Horst; 03.02.32; HVA; 961500; 1600; 1573/85, K
Fischer, Horst; 03.05.46; KD Berlin-Köpenick; 150041; 1170; 2562/80,
Fischer, Karl-Heinz; 19.08.28; HVA; 961500; 1136; 2110/73, Z
Fischer, Klaus-Dieter; 06.12.44; Rostock XVIII; 011800; 2551; 3875/80,
Fischer, Marion; 02.08.52; HVA; 961500; 1142; 2779/84, O
Flister, Magrit; 20.02.56; HVA; 961500; 1020; 4561/87, U
Fox, Erhard; 04.12.52; Abt. XI; 941100; 2355; 5313/88,
Fraatz, Helmut; 06.07.31; HVA; 961500; 1156; 221/75, M
Franke, Lothar; 04.11.47; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 5074/77,
Franke, Wilfried; 25.08.53; Rostock; 014300; 2500; 5952/84,
Franz, Bodo; 13.01.59; Abt. N; 906540; 1150; 1549/80,
Franz, Jürgen; 09.04.46; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 2112/66,
Franz, Jürgen; 30.06.55; Abt. XI; 941100; 3250; 6588/81,
Frauenstein, Rolf; 14.07.52; HVA; 961500; 1143; 3166/78, J
Fränkler, Sabine; 10.02.61; HVA; 961500; 1020; 2264/86, U
Freese, Frank; 25.03.62; Abt. N; 906540; 1095; 2567/87,
Freitag, Ilona; 02.10.52; Dresden XIX; 121900; 8060; XII/2747/87,
Freund, Mario; 10.01.64; Abt. XI; 941100; 3038; 2759/89,
Freyberg, Rudolf; 23.09.35; Abt. N; 906540; 1055; 7260/75,
Freyer, Ingolf; 10.07.30; HVA; 961500; 1120; 1347/85, F
Freyer, Thorsten; 10.11.60; HVA; 961500; 1136; 650/75/40,
Frey, Rainer; 02.06.42; HVA; 961500; 7500; 1586/87, F
Frick, Dieter; 28.06.58; HVA; 961500; 1140; 4054/81, F
Friebe, Günter; 28.09.43; HVA; 961500; 1090; 1640/88, F
Friedel, Hartmut; 12.02.49; HVA; 961500; 1093; 231/78, J
Friedrich, Gerhard; 21.12.29; HA VI; 970600; 1034; K, 862/80
Friedrich, Joachim; 06.07.48; Abt. XI; 941100; 1141; 67/78,
Friedrich, Jörg; 30.06.64; HVA; 961500; 1193; 3925/86, F
Fritzsche, Harald; 14.08.57; Abt. XI; 941100; 1054;
Fruck, Gerhard; 13.05.35; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 3706/73,
Fuchs, Eberhard; 04.10.50; HVA; 961500; 1153; 2879/78, J
Fuchs, Wolfgang; 18.11.53; HVA; 961500; 1156; 3547/82, M
Fungk, Torsten; 03.11.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 2956/79,
Funke, Dieter; 20.01.38; HVA; 961500; 1080; 2929/61, F
Funk, Lutz; 22.09.57; HVA; 961500; 1095; 650/75/60,
Funk, Margret; 22.05.55; HVA; 961500; 1095; 650/75/60/1,
Füßler, Hubertus ; 10.01.56; HVA; 961500; 5080; 529/88, M
Füßl, Boris; 06.06.61; Abt. XI; 941100; 1018; 2417/88,
Fydrich, Erhard; 15.05.42; HVA; 961500; 1250; 593/86, F
Gableske, Gunther; 08.04.60; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 7517/81,
Gallandt, Ronald; 16.08.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 1788/78,
Gander, Jürgen; 31.08.47; Abt. N; 906540; 1156; 7275/75,
Gawlitza, Peter-Michael ; 07.12.46; HVA; 961500; 1142; 2505/65, G
Gäbler, Eveline; 23.08.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1281; 5155/88,
Gäbler, Ralf-Detlef ; 01.11.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1281; 3324/76,
Gehrt, Wolf-Rüdiger ; 26.01.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1090; 1840/79,
Geißenhöner, Bernd; 26.08.43; Abt. XI; 941100; 1092; 377/69,
Gerber, Jürgen; 05.05.49; Dresden XIX; 121900; 8020; XII/2666/87,
Gerber, Lutz; 19.01.61; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 7472/80,
Gerhard, Henry; 23.02.32; KD Berlin-Köpenick; 150041; 1199; 1041/70,
Gerlach, Rainer; 25.02.53; HVA; 961500; 5080; 1477/87, F
Gerlach, Roland; 20.01.51; HVA; 961500; 1280; 4006/76, F
Gerstner, Christine; 01.07.43; HVA; 961500; 1136; 5255/85, D
Gerth, Peter; 21.05.54; Rostock XIX; 011900; 2540; 666/87,
Gielow, Hubert; 11.03.53; Abt. N; 906540; 1017; 2028/79,
Giesen, Gisela; 23.02.30; Abt. XI; 941100; 1197; 1866/69/2,
Gietl, Gottfried; 24.05.34; HVA; 961500; 1055; 18554/60, T
Gladitz, Dieter; 19.02.37; HVA; 961500; 1020; 3323/86, J
Gladitz, Edgar; 02.12.34; HVA; 961500; 1020; 2806/78, F
Gläßer, Axel; 18.07.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1020; 3100/80,
Glöckner, Hermann; 07.04.28; Dresden VI; 120600; 8060; XII/2657/87,
Goersch, Bärbel; 29.05.54; HVA; 961500; 1093; 5764/81/2, D
Golombek, Bernd; 30.07.62; Abt. XI; 941100; 1560; 5310/88,
Gompert, Dieter; 26.11.33; KD Strausberg; 050049; 1260; V/426/88,
Gorldt, Peter; 20.12.42; HVA; 961500; 9005; 530/88, M
Goutrie, Peter; 27.11.47; Abt. N; 906540; 1281; 3557/78,
Görke, Peter; 26.06.61; HVA; 961500; 1150; 921/83, F
Göthel, Jürgen ; 20.07.53; HVA; 961500; 1142; 8164/81, L
Grahmann, Dieter; 25.06.41; HVA; 961500; 1106; 5602/86, L
Gramß, Werner; 03.06.29; HVA; 961500; 1017; 2859/68, M
Grandel, Winfried; 12.03.43; KD Berlin-Köpenick; 150041; 1144; 3047/80,
Graßmann, Walter; 28.02.46; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 2009/67,
Gräser, Rolf; 14.07.42; HVA; 961500; 1140; 662/88, M
Gräser, Ute; 24.02.63; HVA; 961500; 1140; 609/88, M
Greve, Bernd; 25.09.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1017; 5075/77,
Grieger, Angela; 11.05.63; HVA; 961500; 1185; 3973/81, O
Grigat, Alfred; 26.05.39; HVA; 961500; 2850; 3317/84, M
Grimmek, Norbert; 24.05.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1281; 4711/78,
Grimm, Peter; 03.11.41; HVA; 961500; 1156; 200/66, F
Grohmann, Achim; 15.02.54; HVA; 961500; 1100; 2518/88, F
Grohs, Michael; 19.10.53; HVA; 961500; 1143; 327/81, M
Gromes, Wilfried; 29.09.51; HVA; 961500; 1170; 1679/88, E
Großer, Jürgen; 27.01.59; HVA; 961500; 1607; 650/75/37,
Große, Hans-Peter ; 02.03.38; HVA; 961500; 1136; 2677/82, J
Großmann, Dietrich ; 24.09.41; Abt. XI; 941100; 1130; 2260/66,
Großmann, Gerald; 23.03.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 1775/78,
Groß, Andreas; 29.11.55; Abt. XI; 941100; 9050; 6933/88,
Grotelüschen, Claus; 27.02.36; HVA; 961500; 1603; 2295/70, U
Grote, Konrad; 15.02.41; HVA; 961500; 1093; 1967/64, A
Groth, Rudi; 26.07.43; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 1991/69,
Grotsch, Olaf; 21.05.63; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 5152/88,
Gröpler, Peter; 12.06.44; HVA; 961500; 1020; 1643/68, O
Grötschel, Andrea; 28.09.57; HVA; 961500; 1540; 4463/84/1, F
Grötschel, Uwe; 28.12.58; HVA; 961500; 1540; 4463/84, F
Grube, Gerhard; 12.06.48; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 4565/77,
Grunert, Joachim; 10.08.33; HVA; 961500; 1017; 3121/64, L
Gruner, Andreas; 22.03.58; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; 479/83,
Gruner, Heidi; 09.09.59; HVA; 961500; 1156; 650/75/33/1,
Gruner, Michael; 28.07.55; HVA; 961500; 1156; 650/75/33,
Grünherz, Hans-Joachim; 07.04.45; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; 3046/66,
Grütze, Regina; 18.07.55; BV Berlin XVIII; 151800; 1140; 763/86,
Gubsch, Volkmar; 19.08.52; KD Dresden/Stadt; 120040; 8038; XII/1357/87,
Gundermann, Dieter; 02.12.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 2957/79,
Güntherodt, Ulrich; 28.04.46; HVA; 961500; 4090; 4273/89, M
Günther, Klaus; 06.08.55; HVA; 961500; 1130; 960/89, F
Günther, Norman; 19.11.65; HVA; 961500; 9900; 3734/88, Y
Haack, Jörg-Dieter; 06.09.52; Abt. N; 906540; 1110; 3718/76,
Haaser, Jutta; 23.11.33; Dresden VI; 120600; 8020; XII/2658/87,
Haase, Dieter; 27.06.31; Dresden IX; 120900; 8023; XII/2663/87,
Haberland, Lutz; 26.04.59; Abt. XI; 941100; 3038; 1894/87,
Hagenfeld, Wilfried; 18.02.40; HVA; 961500; 1020; 2990/76, M
Hagen, Rudolf; 24.02.39; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 2075/76,
Hallfarth, Günter; 01.10.44; Abt. XI; 941100; 1092; 499/70/1,
Hallfarth, Renate; 20.01.48; Abt. XI; 941100; 1092; 499/70/2,
Hampel, Bärbel; 03.04.59; Abt. XI; 941100; 1280; 2563/86,
Hampel, Bernd; 23.03.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 3388/76,
Hanke, Lutz; 04.02.56; HVA; 961500; 1195; 2378/88, F
Hanke, Peter; 21.10.53; HVA; 961500; 1143; 4174/88, A
Hantke, Gisela; 05.05.32; HVA; 961500; 1093; 3599/82, H
Hantke, Willi; 23.04.31; HVA; 961500; 1093; 6100/82, H
Harder, Dieter; 21.01.43; KD Riesa; 120053; 8400; XII/2674/87,
Hartmann, Andreas; 08.05.58; HVA; 961500; 1142; 650/75/52,
Hartmann, Gerd; 15.03.39; HVA; 961500; 1020; 647/87, A
Hartmann, Günter; 11.11.40; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 1769/71,
Hasterok, Günter; 16.05.44; HVA; 961500; 1092; 1391/86, M
Hasterok, Hannelore; 07.05.50; HVA; 961500; 1092; 1737/87, F
Haude, Klaus-Dieter; 27.04.39; BV Berlin XVIII; 151800; 1020; 2978/81,
Hauschild, Dieter; 04.06.39; Rostock, Abt. Hafen; 011969; 2500; 5293/88,
Havlik, Lutz; 30.11.54; Abt. N; 906540; 1093; 5015/85,
Häber, Hermann; 02.04.48; HVA; 961500; 1143; 139/74, F
Hähn, Doris; 01.01.63; HVA; 961500; 1200; 5352/88, F
Hähn, Harald; 27.01.60; Abt. XI; 941100; 1200; 3455/86,
Härdrich, Horst; 03.07.38; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; 3704/73,
Härtig, Uwe; 08.09.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1143; 3621/77,
Heckel, Reiner; 24.04.51; HVA; 961500; 1280; 2163/73, F
Heene, Edgar; 02.12.58; HVA; 961500; 2000; 1738/87, F
Heene, Elke; 12.02.60; HVA; 961500; 2000; 1738/87/1, F
Heerling, Frank; 01.09.62; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 5017/85,
Heer, Carsten; 15.12.36; Abt. N; 906540; 1020; 454/73,
Heiliger, Ullrich; 20.05.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1120; 1856/86,
Heinicke, Frank; 26.05.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1017; 2564/86,
Heinrich, Guido; 26.06.66; Abt. N; 906540; 1590; 1159/89,
Heinrich, Peter; 29.04.40; HA XX; 982000; 1092; K, 3971/71
Hein, Jürgen; 20.12.54; HVA; 961500; 1152; 372/73, F
Hein, Winfried; 10.08.50; HVA; 961500; 1142; 3855/85, F
Heitfeld, Michael; 23.06.53; HVA; 961500; 1140; 4198/81, L
Hellmich, Kurt; 22.08.30; Rostock XVIII; 011800; 2520; 171/70,
Hellwig, Frank; 25.02.56; HVA; 961500; 1144; 650/75/41,
Helm, Michael; 19.04.59; Abt. XI; 941100; 9438; 589/88,
Hempel, Günter; 25.04.34; KD Eisenhüttenstadt; 050045; 1220; V/1001/88,
Hempel, Reinhard; 28.06.51; HVA; 961500; 1153; 1746/89, E
Hempel, Wolfgang; 02.07.53; Abt. N; 906540; 1020; 5015/77,
Henckel, Peter; 04.05.58; Abt. N; 906540; 1144; 3891/77,
Henke, Frank; 25.12.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1071; 3891/76,
Hennemann, Lutz; 29.09.50; Abt. N; 906540; 1100; 7269/75,
Hennig, Dietmar; 07.01.52; HVA; 961500; 1090; 1226/70, F
Henning, Friedrich; 11.05.35; HVA; 961500; 1017; 440/87, U
Henrion, Lothar; 07.01.41; KD Plauen; 140054; 9900; 1435/89,
Hentschke, Angelika; 19.07.51; HVA; 961500; 1153; 4189/89/1, F
Hentschke, Günther ; 08.01.51; HVA; 961500; 1153; 4189/89, F
Herbert, Roland; 10.10.43; HVA; 961500; 1020; 494/69, F
Herbst, Manfred; 09.10.33; HVA; 961500; 1156; 1087/84, U
Herder, Edeltraut; 27.07.31; HVA; 961500; 1020; 867/61, O
Herer, Erhard; 18.06.40; HVA; 961500; 1130; 4010/70, E
Herkendell, Karl-Heinz; 31.01.43; Abt. N; 906540; 1020; 3894/77,
Herkendell, Martha; 01.03.46; Abt. N; 906540; 1020; 4053/85,
Herold, Gerhard; 29.05.53; HVA; 961500; 1250; 4484/84, F
Herold, Monika; 28.08.52; HA VI; 970600; 1040; K, 3315/86
Herrmann, Alexander; 08.03.51; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 3077/71,
Herrmann, Dietmar; 30.08.38; HA I; 970100; 8060; K, 5235/86
Herrmann, Günther; 28.01.30; HVA; 961500; 1020; 3627/74, A
Herschel, Steffen; 14.11.52; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 1607/76,
Hertel, Ralf; 12.04.59; Abt. N; 906540; 1040; 2958/79,
Hertzsch, Wilfried; 10.07.43; HVA; 961500; 2591; 3906/83, M
Herzog, Peter; 08.04.47; HVA; 961500; 8600; 2872/87, M
Herz, Rudolf; 16.05.35; HVA; 961500; 1136; 4391/83, M
Hesse, Christina; 25.12.50; HVA; 961500; 1560; 4040/88, F
Hesse, Klaus; 09.09.47; HVA; 961500; 1136; 2032/72, J
Hesse, Rainer; 24.04.48; Abt. XI; 941100; 1560; 4484/87,
Hexamer, Rene; 10.04.57; HVA; 961500; 1197; 8082/81, F
Hielscher, Dirk; 26.01.56; HVA; 961500; 1092; 417/86, O
Hiersche, Eveline; 16.06.36; HVA; 961500; 1110; 3073/89, K
Hildebrandt, Fred; 23.12.57; HVA; 961500; 6060; 650/75/31,
Hildebrandt, Marion; 28.09.51; HVA; 961500; 1140; 3721/88/1, F
Hildebrandt, Michael; 03.08.52; HVA; 961500; 1140; 3721/88, F
Hildebrandt, Sonja; 07.02.54; HVA; 961500; 1165; 3020/76/26, M
Hildebrand, Hans-Jürgen ; 09.05.39; Frankfurt/O. VI; 050600; 1200; V/427/88,
Hildebrand, Norbert; 23.05.55; Abt. XI; 941100; 5600; 480/83,
Hille, Thomas; 27.04.61; Abt. N; 906540; 1055; 1356/84,
Hinterthan, Bernd; 25.11.41; Rostock VI; 010600; 2551; 1748/89,
Hinz, Hans-Jürgen; 18.01.43; Abt. XI; 941100; 1115; 410/70,
Hirsch, Jürgen; 31.07.54; Abt. XI; 941100; 1195; 2740/77,
Hirt, Sigurd; 05.07.42; Abt. XI; 941100; 1130; 1601/68,
Hitschler, Helmut; 22.07.58; ZAIG; 995300; 8010; K/4402/88,
Hofert, Michael; 02.09.59; HVA; 961500; 1093; 947/84, F
Hoffmann, Frank; 28.02.44; HVA; 961500; 1120; 1587/87, F
Hoffmann, Gunter; 03.11.54; HVA; 961500; 1140; 650/75/17,
Hoffmann, Hartmut; 06.08.51; Abt. XI; 941100; 1095; 6732/80,
Hoffmann, Ines; 03.11.61; HVA; 961500; 1140; 650/75/17/1,
Hofmann, Dieter; 18.04.39; HVA; 961500; 1162; 2607/84, F
Hofmann, Ellen; 03.10.54; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 1680/81,
Hofmann, Udo; 20.02.41; HVA; 961500; 6019; 1492/86, F
Hohlfeld, Hartmut; 14.05.55; HVA; 961500; 1141; 2596/79, J
Hohnhold, Ulrich; 02.05.52; KD Fürstenwalde; 050047; 1240; V/453/88,
Hommel, Klaus; 14.09.52; HVA; 961500; 1142; 2503/77, F
Hoppe, Werner-Michael; 18.06.44; Abt. N; 906540; 1055; 2900/66,
Hornauer, Uwe; 16.08.46; HVA; 961500; 1092; 65/76, A
Hornemann, Rainer; 29.01.47; HVA; 961500; 1156; 1529/87, M
Hornig, Udo; 04.06.59; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; 5850/84,
Horn, Jochen; 22.06.59; HVA; 961500; 1297; 2613/84, E
Höhl, Volker; 15.10.60; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 1153/86,
Höhne, Siegfried; 10.10.39; KD Eisenhüttenstadt; 050045; 1220; V/1013/88,
Höhn, Marina; 22.03.60; HVA; 961500; 1150; 3022/89, A
Hölzel, Manfred; 29.05.39; Dresden VI; 120600; 8060; XII/1339/87,
Höppner, Matthias; 03.01.58; Abt. XI; 941100; 1143; 1710/89,
Hörnig, Klaus; 21.01.45; Abt. XI; 941100; 1092; 1903/72
Hösel, Karl; 08.11.35; Abt. XI; 941100; 1130; 434/68,
Hubatsch, Klaus; 02.12.55; HVA; 961500; 1143; 668/72, F
Hugel, Hans-Georg; 26.05.54; HVA; 961500; 1152; 4055/88, O
Huhn, Bernd; 02.12.52; HVA; 961500; 1142; 1565/86, M
Hundt, Thomas; 20.03.61; HVA; 961500; 1142; 650/75/62,
Hunger, Werner; 23.02.40; HVA; 961500; 1017; 415/81, F
Husung, Peter; 28.11.37; HVA; 961500; 1017; 2111/73, A
Huth, Andreas; 20.04.59; Dresden XIX; 121900; 8036; XII/2748/87,
Hübner, Henri; 18.11.58; Abt. N; 906540; 1034; 3892/79,
Hübner, Ina; 23.10.64; BV Berlin VI; 150600; 1090; K/4166/88,
Hübsch, Bernd; 20.09.43; HVA; 961500; 1080; 47/73, F
Hückel, Tino; 20.03.64; Abt. N; 906540; 1195; 3507/86,
Hühr, Bruno; 02.06.55; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 3558/78,
Hüter, Rolf; 01.01.37; HVA; 961500; 1144; 2148/74, F
Ibold, Manfred; 10.08.51; HVA; 961500; 1100; 1904/73, F
Ickert, Winfried; 23.07.56; HVA; 961500; 1153; 650/75/8,
Ide, Hans-Heinrich; 27.09.41; Abt. N; 906540; 1156; 1611/76,
Illig, Gerald; 22.02.58; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 2959/79,
Immermann, Gunter; 15.11.53; HVA; 961500; 1071; 959/89, F
Irmscher, Frank; 20.07.59; HVA; 961500; 1034; 2912/78, F
Jaenicke, Uwe; 23.06.53; HVA; 961500; 1156; 3057/89, F
Jahn, Heinz; 04.11.35; Rostock XIX; 011900; 2300; 3335/75,
Jahn, Klaus; 04.11.50; Abt. XI; 941100; 1120; 1515/75,
Jakowlow, Manfred; 29.03.50; Abt. N; 906540; 1281; 1058/86,
Janietz, Eberhard; 04.08.51; HVA; 961500; 1120; 2570/79, O
Janke, Erwin; 22.06.43; HVA; 961500; 7500; 3972/86, M
Jarchow, Hans-Jürgen; 06.04.44; HVA; 961500; 4850; 2355/88, M
Jasmann, Hans-Peter; 25.06.38; Rostock XIX; 011900; 2355; 4081/86,
Jautze, Stephan; 19.08.53; HVA; 961500; 1054; 2164/73, F
Jäger, Bernd; 04.11.47; Abt. XI; 941100; 1142; 245/77,
Jäger, Monika; 13.04.44; HVA; 961500; 1147; 618/86, M
Jäger, Siegfried; 10.01.43; HVA; 961500; 1147; 619/86, M
Jähne, Karsten; 24.06.57; HVA; 961500; 8060; 650/75/42,
Jähn, Rolf; 01.04.32; HVA; 961500; 1183; 187/61, J
Jedicke, Jürgen; 16.10.55; Abt. XI; 941100; 5060; 2415/88,
Jesse, Jan; 18.11.63; HVA; 961500; 1150; 503/82, M
John, Werner; 12.01.45; HVA; 961500; 9005; 2124/89, F
Jost, Rainer; 22.03.55; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9050; 167,
Jung, Herbert; 04.10.51; Abt. XI; 941100; 1600; 69/76,
Junkereit, Dieter; 14.05.62; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9050; 172,
Junkereit, Monika; 01.12.64; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9050; 173,
Jurisch, Hans; 11.08.32; HVA; 961500; 1130; 3730/66, K
Jürgens, Karl; 30.01.52; Abt. N; 906540; 1141; 1692/76,
Jürgens, Monika; 16.06.41; HVA; 961500; 3580; 2969/87, M
Jürgens, Peter; 13.03.41; HVA; 961500; 3580; 2968/87, M
Kaden, Horst; 13.01.35; Frankfurt/O. VI; 050600; 1200; V/430/88,
Kahl, Frank; 19.02.50; HVA; 961500; 8017; 2224/86, O
Kaiser, Karl; 16.12.36; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 4568/77,
Kalbaß, Herbert; 21.10.34; Abt. XI; 941100; 1071; 8569/60,
Kappelmann, Jens; 08.07.53; HVA; 961500; 1160; 2972/76, F
Kappis, Peter; 14.12.49; KD Berlin-Treptow; 150046; 1093; 5320/88,
Karasch, Klaus-Dieter; 02.10.51; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 5044/76,
Karlstedt, Manfred; 27.09.51; HVA; 961500; 1150; 1635/84, O
Kasper, Hans-Hendrik; 03.05.51; HVA; 961500; 1150; 2784/72, U
Kasper, Reiner; 16.01.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 3472/76,
Kathert, Klaus; 03.06.49; Abt. N; 906540; 1292; 1354/71,
Keindorf, Thomas; 09.05.66; HVA; 961500; 1156; 3732/87, O
Kellermann, Harald; 26.04.51; HVA; 961500; 1140; 4691/89, L
Keller, Hans-Joachim; 22.10.38; HVA; 961500; 1020; 2245/73, M
Keller, Klaus; 25.01.36; HVA; 961500; 1600; 2332/73, M
Keller, Rolf; 25.10.57; HVA; 961500; 2000; 5743/84, M
Kellner, Axel; 05.01.40; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; 759/66,
Kerlisch, Werner; 23.04.36; OD KKW Nord; 010050; 2200; 3477/73,
Kernchen, Eckehardt; 01.10.50; Abt. N; 906540; 1020; 5041/76,
Kettner, Bernd; 28.05.47; Rostock, Abt. Hafen; 011969; 2520; 4080/86,
Keyselt, Klaus; 30.04.51; HVA; 961500; 1142; 1938/75, F
Kießig, Horst; 02.05.37; HVA; 961500; 1156; 307/82, J
Kießling, Dirk; 11.03.69; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 5156/88,
Kirchbach, Rene; 05.04.64; HVA; 961500; 8010; 5865/84, F
Kirchhof, Jens; 04.12.61; HVA; 961500; 1020; 650/75/72,
Kirchner, Marianne; 18.10.43; HVA; 961500; 1130; 4718/88/1, F
Kirchner, Wolfgang; 23.08.39; HVA; 961500; 1130; 4718/88, F
Kirmse, Udo; 24.02.39; HVA; 961500; 1136; 2824/84, X
Kirsten, Falko; 11.02.50; HVA; 961500; 1600; 2511/77, M
Kirst, Alfred; 08.03.34; HA VI; 970600; 1080; K/4428/87,
Kißig, Jochen; 11.05.53; KD Löbau; 120049; 8700; KISSIG, JOCHEN
Kittler, Manfred; 13.03.33; Dresden XVIII; 121800; 8251; XII/1346/87,
Kittler, Roland; 25.01.58; Abt. XI; 941100; 4020; 5311/88,
Klarner, Volkmar; 23.03.54; Abt. XI; 941100; 9900; 2305/85,
Kleiber, Thomas; 02.01.55; HVA; 961500; 1020; 4365/86, U
Kleinhempel, Heinz; 04.07.57; Leipzig XVIII; 131800; 7050; K/5409/88,
Klemcke, Hermann; 15.11.51; KD Schwedt; 050050; 1330; V/446/88,
Klemens, Leo; 25.03.27; HVA; 961500; 1532; 19522/60, X
Klemme, Jan; 03.02.67; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 2976/86,
Klenz, Henry; 03.12.56; Abt. XI; 941100; 1130; 409/81,
Klingsieck, Ralf; 10.10.47; HVA; 961500; 1092; 1644/69, F
Klotzke, Jürgen; 05.07.48; HVA; 961500; 6908; 3914/85, A
Klutznik, Axel; 11.07.61; Abt. XI; 941100; 1580; :
Kluwe, Frank; 11.10.49; HVA; 961500; 1142; 465/74, F
Knackstedt, Hans-Jürgen; 02.03.41; Abt. XI; 941100; 1162; 40/69,
Knaupe, Henk; 14.10.65; HVA; 961500; 1090; 423/88, M
Knieling, Annelie; 09.11.50; HVA; 961500; 1115; 3167/78, U
Knobloch, Angelika; 11.07.49; Abt. N; 906540; 1281; 1997/77,
Knobloch, Hans-Uwe; 23.10.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 2487/77,
Knorr, Hans-Joachim; 25.04.38; HVA; 961500; 1615; 304/80, M
Knoth, Uwe; 08.04.57; Abt. XI; 941100; 1100; 6461/82,
Knöller, Sergej; 24.10.63; HVA; 961500; 1095; 5000/87, F
Knötel, Ronald; 14.10.63; BV Magdeburg, Abt. XV; 071500; 3080; :
Kobel, Werner; 07.03.38; HVA; 961500; 1600; 4710/80, L
Kobuch, Norbert; 22.12.51; HVA; 961500; 1058; 4980/88, O
Kochanek, Wolfgang; 14.09.41; HVA; 961500; 1055; 389/74, A
Kochsiek, Jürgen; 15.03.41; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9050; 178,
Koch, Arno; 18.02.37; KD Görlitz; 120047; 8903; XII/2406/88,
Koch, Bernhard; 12.02.44; HVA; 961500; 1142; 1566/86, M
Koch, Helmut; 20.12.49; Abt. N; 906540; 1153; 5340/84,
Koch, Jutta; 16.06.32; Abt. XI; 941100; 1162; 2390/70,
Koch, Paul; 09.05.44; HVA; 961500; 1910; 4651/85, M
Koch, Wilhelm; 22.08.41; Abt. XI; 941100; 1115; 416/70,
Koderhold, Dieter; 25.06.47; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 447/74,
Koglin, Mario; 11.08.66; HVA; 961500; 1110; 3900/85, M
Kohoutek, Sepp; 10.03.54; HVA; 961500; 1090; 4998/87, F
Kokscht, Thomas; 10.07.58; HVA; 961500; 1035; 836/77, F
Kolasinski, Helge; 04.04.63; Abt. N; 906540; 1054; 2220/83,
Kolleßer, Klaus; 11.03.51; HVA; 961500; 7072; 612/89, F
Kolleßer, Regina; 11.11.48; HVA; 961500; 7072; 6763/88, F
Kolletzky, Olaf; 08.07.54; Abt. XI; 941100; 9900; 862/83,
Konieczny, Frank; 04.09.44; HVA; 961500; 1600; 1762/89, N
Konnopka, Frank; 11.04.48; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 5003/80,
Konnopka, Gudrun; 27.12.48; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 4038/79,
Konschel, Peter; 30.03.49; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 4054/85,
Kopius, Elke; 24.04.51; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 1885/81,
Korn, Robert; 11.09.37; HVA; 961500; 1195; 43/63, L
Kosch, Bärbel; 07.08.60; HVA; 961500; 6500; 3153/89, F
Kosch, Gunter; 31.01.53; Abt. XI; 941100; 6500; 2414/88,
Kosin, Heinz; 07.03.26; HVA; 961500; 1020; 2148/72, U
Kowatzkl, Fred; 15.05.55; Abt. N; 906540; 1150; 4712/78,
Köhler, Erwin; 06.10.40; Frankfurt/O. XVIII; 051800; 1200; V/442/88,
Köhler, Klaus; 20.02.52; HVA; 961500; 1020; 2565/88, O
Köhler, Petra; 20.03.51; HVA; 961500; 1017; 318/78, E
Köhler, Wolfgang; 29.06.51; HVA; 961500; 1017; 3254/84, E
König, Hans; 23.05.36; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 7261/75,
Körner, Manfred; 26.01.43; Dresden VI; 120600; 8019; XII/414/89,
Köster, Sven; 18.04.66; Abt. N; 906500; 1150; 4732/87,
Köster, Ulrich; 20.11.42; Abt. N; 906540; 1292; 1687/76,
Kraatz, Jens-Peter; 27.09.60; Abt. N; 906540; 1090; 7603/81,
Krahl, Frank-Michael; 03.03.50; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 1614/75,
Krahmüller, Uwe; 14.12.65; HVA; 961500; 6018; 5265/85, Q
Krahn, Charlotte; 22.04.30; HVA; 961500; 1020; 46/72, U
Kramer, Bernd; 20.10.41; Karl-Marx-Stadt, BKG; 142900; 9005; K/6104/88
Krannich, Matthias; 20.03.57; Abt. XI; 941100; 1144; 5798/84,
Kranz, Herbert; 17.12.39; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 9805/61,
Kranz, Rosmarie; 21.12.40; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 4354/77,
Krause, Johannes; 24.10.49; Abt. XI; 941100; 1600; 3702/73,
Krauße, Günter; 25.05.37; HVA; 961500; 8360; 1498/87, F
Kraus, Bert; 03.03.61; HVA; 961500; 1143; 813/83, P
Kraus, Rudolf; 23.07.37; HVA; 961500; 1140; 340/81, F
Kreher, Ralf; 28.02.67; Abt. N; 906540; 9300; 1160/89,
Kreinberger, Rolf; 25.05.29; HVA; 961500; 1121; 2637/77, S
Krenz, Bianca; 23.12.62; HVA; 961500; 1120; 3899/86, U
Kresse, Lutz; 12.10.54; HVA; 961500; 2090; 2354/88, M
Krietsch, Sabine; 10.11.49; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 1922/76,
Kringler, Paul; 02.07.28; KD Stralsund; 010047; 2300; 1110/73,
Krohn, Heinz Günter; 28.01.56; Abt. XI; 941100; 7033; 493/87,
Krone, Reinhard; 23.07.48; HVA; 961500; 4090; 3823/86, M
Kröpelin, Detlef; 01.11.56; HVA; 961500; 1142; 51/80, F
Krumpfert, Joachim; 15.02.49; Abt. N; 906540; 1034; 1763/76,
Kruse, Gerlinde; 02.10.54; Abt. XI; 941100; 1142; 4701/89,
Kruse, Peter; 07.01.46; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 1989/76,
Krüger, Andreas; 11.04.61; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 7148/81,
Krüger, Brigitte; 11.02.37; HVA; 961500; 1130; 3419/84/1, O
Krüger, Hans; 15.06.37; HVA; 961500; 1130; 3419/84, O
Krüger, Holger; 26.04.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 3389/76,
Krüger, Horst; 05.10.43; Abt. N; 906540; 1034; 1622/76,
Krüger, Reinhard; 26.04.33; Abt. N; 906540; 1017; 7257/75,
Krüger, Uwe; 22.08.60; Abt. XI; 941100; 7513; 3385/84,
Krzebeck, Siegfried; 05.02.52; Abt. N; 906540; 1035; 1689/76,
Krzyzanowski, Claus; 28.11.53; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 1926/76,
Kudernatsch, Matthias; 18.03.65; Abt. N; 906540; 1150; 5032/89,
Kulitzscher, Manfred; 30.05.32; Rostock XVIII; 011800; 2555; 1530/70,
Kunisch, Frank; 20.02.59; Abt. N; 906540; 1150; 4107/79,
Kunze, Alfred; 30.03.32; KD Eberswalde; 050044; 1298; V/429/88,
Kunze, Heinz; 08.05.37; Dresden XVIII; 121800; 8101; XII/1345/87,
Kunze, Wilfried; 01.04.45; BV Berlin XVIII; 151800; 1145; 2809/88,
Kunzmann, Frank; 08.06.53; HVA; 961500; 9050; 650/75/64,
Kupferschmidt, Erich; 23.07.52; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 2808/79,
Kupferschmidt, Gudrun; 03.05.52; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; :
Kupsch, Michael; 28.04.58; HVA; 961500; 1090; 2686/79, F
Kurjuweit, Karlheinz; 27.03.50; KD Angermünde; 050041; 1330; V/439/88,
Küchenmeister, Hartmut; 31.03.54; HVA; 961500; 1144; 5042/86, N
Kücken, Werner; 31.08.28; BV Berlin XVIII; 151800; 1421; 1143/70,
Kynast, Klaus; 29.04.55; HVA; 961500; 1150; 1043/84, A
Ladebeck, Bernd; 22.05.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 4952/77,
Lagemann, Jürgen; 22.08.48; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; 7/76,
Lamberz, Ulrich; 02.07.52; HVA; 961500; 1092; 234/73, F
Lamm, Hans-Joachim; 03.01.42; Dresden VI; 120600; 8020; XII/2655/87,
Langer, Achim; 09.03.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 1864/78,
Langer, Karl; 06.10.34; Abt. N; 906540; 1297; 1796/80,
Lange, Frank; 31.12.50; Abt. XI; 941100; 1143; 2745/79,
Lange, Gerd; 15.12.60; HVA; 961500; 4300; 650/75/19,
Lange, Harald; 03.01.34; HVA; 961500; 1147; 2367/73, U
Lange, Karl-Heinz; 31.12.52; HVA; 961500; 1058; 107/75, F
Lange, Kathlen; 23.05.62; HVA; 961500; 4300; 1763/88, E
Lange, Matthias; 07.10.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1141; 3503/87,
Lange, Ralf; 15.08.60; HVA; 961500; 1100; 1433/85, J
Lange, Reiner; 12.06.36; HVA; 961500; 1017; 1046/67, M
Lauenroth, Hans-Peter; 08.08.61; HVA; 961500; 1136; 1078/81, F
Laue, Lutz; 25.02.53; Abt. N; 906540; 1143; 2528/82,
Laupert, Andrea; 16.09.61; HVA; 961500; 1140; 2816/80, O
Lätzer, Eberhard; 03.12.48; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; 3700/73,
Lechelt, Arno; 24.06.44; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; 8511/81,
Lehmann, Frank; 11.07.66; HVA; 961500; 7580; 3170/89, Q
Lehmann, Holger; 14.10.62; Abt. N; 906540; 1144; 6082/82,
Lehmann, Rainer; 08.03.49; HVA; 961500; 1150; 2987/77, J
Leibscher, Axel; 26.03.54; HVA; 961500; 7301; 650/75/65/,
Leinweber, Manfred; 04.03.42; HVA; 961500; 1136; 166/77, M
Leirich, Bernd; 02.06.55; Abt. XI; 941100; 2500; 2796/87,
Leistner, Dieter; 23.05.42; HVA; 961500; 1250; 3478/84, J
Lemke, Frank; 09.11.60; Abt. N; 906540; 1071; 3021/84,
Lemke, Sabine; 15.09.65; Abt. N; 906540; 1071; 969/86,
Lenhard, Peter; 27.09.51; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 1906/71,
Leonhardt, Heiko; 12.01.66; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 5391/86,
Lerche, Ruth; 12.03.33; HVA; 961500; 1092; 3899/63, U
Leuschner, Harald; 01.10.39; HVA; 961500; 1020; 3713/87, F
Leymann, Jan; 30.03.61; HVA; 961500; 1092; 3020/76/9, M
Liebholz, Gisela; 09.01.30; HVA; 961500; 1055; 225/78, U
Liedke, Peter; 04.12.50; HVA; 961500; 1140; 1476/87, F
Lieniger, Bruno; 01.11.31; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; 4167/83,
Ließneck, Walter; 12.10.37; HVA; 961500; 1115; 1990/72, M
Lietz, Peter; 13.02.54; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 1990/76,
Linck, Joachim; 27.02.48; HVA; 961500; 2330; 1528/87, M
Linck, Rita; 27.11.51; Abt. XI; 941100; 2330; 1533/87, M
Lindig, Hans-Dieter; 11.01.30; Rostock VI; 010600; 2540; 1397/86,
Lindner, Dietmar; 09.06.51; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 1988/76,
Lindner, Steffen; 18.04.68; HVA; 961500; 1035; 3948/86, M
Linke, Gerald; 29.06.39; HVA; 961500; 6504; 3871/87, F
Linke, Marga; 01.09.39; HVA; 961500; 6504; 3871/87/1, F
Linke, Reinhard; 18.07.30; HVA; 961500; 1199; 153/72, J
Lippert, Bodo; 04.01.62; Abt. N; 906540; 1071; 7402/81,
Lißke, Birgit; 13.03.55; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9050; 177,
Lißke, Gerhard; 17.01.51; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9050; 176,
Lobedan, Gerd; 21.05.54; HVA; 961500; 1143; 3961/83, M
Lode, Harald; 06.10.53; HVA; 961500; 8036; 2429/88, M
Lohse, Gerd; 24.07.46; Abt. N; 906540; 1144; 2007/67,
Loos, Siegfried; 30.06.40; HVA; 961500; 9061; 1750/72, M
Lorenz, Jörg; 21.05.62; HVA; 961500; 1017; 5026/84, F
Lorenz, Werner; 01.01.34; HVA; 961500; 1595; 4626/79, F
Lorenz, Wolfgang; 03.05.54; HVA; 961500; 1143; 95/76, F
Loudovici, Armin; 12.10.39; HVA; 961500; 1190; 4331/86, F
Löbnitz, Wolfram; 26.08.57; HVA; 961500; 1195; 1371/77, F
Löwa, Werner; 30.05.54; HVA; 961500; 1093; 425/79, F
Lubs, Bodo; 14.03.53; Abt. XI; 941100; 2103; 2026/86,
Lucas, Karl-Heinz; 27.02.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1090; 3705/77,
Ludwig, Horst; 27.08.31; HVA; 961500; 1017; 2588/77, P
Ludwig, Lutz; 15.10.53; HVA; 961500; 1143; 2113/89, E
Lux, Klaus; 19.08.43; KD Wolgast; 010049; 2220; 5577/81,
Lübke, Brigitte; 22.04.41; Rostock XVIII; 011800; 2500; 1119/79,
Lübke, Klaus; 27.03.52; HVA; 961500; 1220; 650/75/22,
Lücke, Karl-Ernst; 17.10.37; Abt. XI; 941100; 1035; 769/86,
Lück, Michael; 16.07.60; Abt. XI; 941100; 7260; 3814/85,
Lüdecke, Olaf; 15.06.48; Abt. XI; 941100; 1092; 2747/79,
Lüneburg, Karsten; 31.07.60; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 3079/83,
Maaske, Gudrun; 11.11.42; HVA; 961500; 1162; 1351/89, N
Maaske, Klaus; 26.07.39; HVA; 961500; 1162; 3997/85, N
Maaß, Uwe; 20.07.61; HVA; 961500; 1100; 1680/88, F
Maget, Gerhard; 18.12.51; HVA; 961500; 1142; 2576/77, F
Maigatter, Tino; 21.02.62; HVA; 961500; 1054; 2766/84, F
Malchow, Dieter; 19.07.54; HVA; 961500; 1110; 2730/89, F
Manikowski, Jürgen; 30.07.54; Abt. XI; 941100; 2540; 1607/88,
Maretzki, Peter; 27.03.57; HVA; 961500; 1093; 235/79, M
Marks, Stefan; 20.09.52; HVA; 961500; 1250; 2501/77, F
Marnitz, Andreas; 01.10.56; HVA; 961500; 1150; 3498/86, F
Marr, Donald; 10.04.37; Abt. XI; 941100; 1250; 8/74,
Masula, Jens; 23.08.64; HVA; 961500; 1152; 5863/84, F
Matros, Jürgen; 04.06.53; HVA; 961500; 1160; 4049/88, O
Mattner, Susanne; 02.12.61; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 3966/82,
Matusch, Klaus-Dieter; 20.09.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1090; 3685/82,
Maudrich, Peter; 10.02.58; Abt. XI; 941100; 6502; 4705/85,
Maune, Monika; 16.06.59; Dresden VI; 120600; 8023; XII/1334/89,
May, Jürgen; 19.04.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1156; 1508/80,
Märkel, Günter; 01.06.41; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 3325/76,
Märkel, Sigrid; 02.06.41; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 5272/76,
Mehlhorn, Lutz-Rainer; 15.11.40; HVA; 961500; 1020; 1029/67, J
Meichsner, Matthias; 03.09.58; HVA; 961500; 1090; 4416/80, F
Meier, Bernd; 08.08.54; Dresden XIX; 121900; 8020; XII/2749/87,
Meier, Detlef; 23.09.51; Abt. N; 906540; 1150; 448/74,
Meilick, Bernd; 11.06.47; HVA; 961500; 1092; 419/81, M
Mekelburg, Michaela; 21.03.61; HVA; 961500; 1140; 1346/85/1, F
Menzel, Harri; 27.01.35; Rostock VII; 010700; 2520; 5951/84,
Menz, Harry; 27.05.38; HVA; 961500; 1136; 12487/60, A
Merkel, Thomas; 19.01.59; HVA; 961500; 1055; 424/82, M
Messerle, Peter; 05.06.53; HVA; 961500; 1195; 2784/73, F
Metelmann, Bernd; 16.05.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 3390/76,
Meyer, Detlef; 09.08.52; KD Rostock; 010040; 2540; 379/88,
Meyer, Horst; 23.08.33; HVA; 961500; 1100; 1348/85, F
Meyer, Jürgen; 04.01.42; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 2587/65,
Michaelis, Holger; 20.10.58; HVA; 961500; 1152; 2611/84, F
Michel, Günther; 07.06.51; Abt. N; 906540; 1093; 2407/77,
Mieley, Siegfried; 30.07.36; Frankfurt/O. VII; 050700; 1200; V/431/88,
Mielke, Klaus; 11.07.39; Abt. XI; 941100; 1055; 2899/68,
Miersch, Harald; 26.11.51; HVA; 961500; 1142; 174/79, M
Mihm, Guido; 11.07.70; HVA; 961500; 1035; 4666/89,
Milde, Jörg; 16.11.54; BV Berlin XVIII; 151800; 1136; 4199/80,
Mirtschink, Jürgen; 09.01.48; HVA; 961500; 1034; 1902/72, F
Mischner, Jörg; 24.11.64; HVA; 961500; 1150; 1716/89, I
Mittelberger, Andreas; 15.02.65; Abt. N; 906540; 1020; 5221/84,
Mitzscherling, Peter; 27.02.36; Abt. XI; 941100; 1136; 410/81,
Monatsch, Jörg; 17.12.67; Schwerin II; 020200; 2755; :
Montwill, Frank; 25.04.54; HVA; 961500; 1144; 5630/86, A
Möckel, Joachim; 12.02.45; HVA; 961500; 9050; 3757/87, F
Mrosk, Dieter; 01.11.43; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; 211/74,
Muth, Rolf; 31.01.29; HVA; 961500; 1017; 269/68, P
Mutscher, Monika; 01.12.53; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 3684/82,
Mühlbauer, Dietmar; 02.06.47; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 374/75,
Mühle, Dieter; 07.03.40; KD Dresden/Stadt; 120040; 8010; XII/2671/87,
Müller, Bärbel; 12.03.41; HVA; 961500; 1170; 1675/84/1, C
Müller, Barbara; 22.09.52; Abt. XI; 941100; 2356; 1608/88/1,
Müller, Detlef; 04.02.58; HVA; 961500; 1020; 650/75/43,
Müller, Ernst-Peter; 24.07.40; HVA; 961500; 1170; 1675/84, C
Müller, Erwin; 19.07.44; Abt. N; 906540; 2081; 2626/65,
Müller, Hannelore; 22.06.46; Abt. N; 906540; 2081; 3339/78,
Müller, Heinz-Jürgen; 24.09.48; HVA; 961500; 2520; 499/87, F
Müller, Helga; 15.11.37; HVA; 961500; 1144; 5009/87, D
Müller, Helmut; 07.01.40; BV Berlin XVIII; 151800; 1080; 608/83,
Müller, Irina; 19.09.62; HVA; 961500; 1020; 650/75/43/1,
Müller, Johannes; 09.08.46; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 2006/67,
Müller, Jürgen; 07.08.59; HVA; 961500; 7930; 650/75/23,
Müller, Jürgen; 25.07.53; Abt. N; 906540; 1090; 3490/83,
Müller, Matthias; 03.06.53; HVA; 961500; 7840; 4729/89, M
Müller, Peter; 06.06.37; Dresden XVIII; 121800; 8023; XII/1348/87,
Müller, Uwe; 02.12.63; HVA; 961500; 1136; 3791/85, F
Müller, Uwe; 07.10.54; Abt. XI; 941100; 2356; 1608/88,
Münchow, Frank; 19.02.61; Abt. XI; 941100; 2830;
Münzel, Heinz; 20.07.47; HVA; 961500; 1020; 167/78, K
Mütschard, Peter; 28.01.52; HVA; 961500; 7060; 650/75/35,
Nareike, Kurt; 28.09.37; Rostock VI; 010600; 2520; 5283/78,
Nathe, Rolf; 27.09.30; HVA; 961500; 1170; 8/75, J
Naue, Rainer; 14.03.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 3077/83,
Naumann, Gerhard; 25.02.49; Cottbus XIX; 061900; 7500; K3504/89,
Naumann, Uwe; 15.07.56; HVA; 961500; 8321; 650/75/36,
Näther, Frank; 08.09.50; HVA; 961500; 1140; 2257/70, F
Neff, Gertrud; 25.04.31; Abt. XI; 941100; 1156; 8510/81,
Nehls, Jörg; 08.07.58; HVA; 961500; 1143; 2592/80, F
Nennhaus, Detlef; 30.06.47; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 7264/75,
Nestler, Olaf; 26.05.63; Abt. N; 906540; 1040; 2080/82,
Neumann, Klaus-Dieter; 24.07.47; Abt. XI; 941100; 1400; 3386/71,
Nicicky, Stephan; 23.04.55; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 1999/77,
Nier, Herbert; 28.08.54; HVA; 961500; 1100; 2477/75, F
Noculak, Johannes; 27.05.41; HVA; 961500; 1162; 113/74, L
Noetzel, Peter; 27.02.40; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 1608/76,
Noffke, Bernd; 11.10.59; Abt. N; 906540; 1197; 5016/85,
Nöbel, Manfred; 29.11.32; BV Berlin XVIII; 151800; 1020; 1341/83,
Nölte, Joachim; 11.11.48; HVA; 961500; 1017; 2553/80, P
Nücklich, Horst; 03.06.35; Dresden, BKG; 122900; 8010; XII/2753/87,
Oelschlaeger, Wolfgang; 06.03.39; Abt. XI; 941100; 1162; 9802/61,
Oertel, Hans-Joachim; 07.12.54; HVA; 961500; 1120; 3561/88, E
Oertel, Ulrich; 12.01.51; HVA; 961500; 1156; 19/76, F
Ola, Heinz; 25.06.34; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 3705/73,
Ondrej, Detlev; 31.01.52; Abt. XI; 941100; 1136; 3763/88,
Ondrej, Ilona ; 24.07.54; HVA; 961500; 1136; 3763/88/1, F
Ondrusch, Aribert; 11.06.52; HVA; 961500; 7063; 6372/81, U
Ostoike, Harry; 14.05.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 6979/80,
Otto, Hans; 03.06.50; HVA; 961500; 1144; 4692/89, L
Paasch, Uwe; 26.02.58; Abt. XI; 941100; 7280; 2794/87,
Pach, Detlef; 08.03.44; Dresden VII; 120700; 8101; XII/1342/87,
Pahlke, Lothar; 30.07.42; HVA; 961500; 6850; 650/75/18,
Pahlke, Gudrun; 15.08.49; HVA; 961500; 6850; 650/75/18/1,
Pangsy, Reiner; 12.11.40; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 2437/60,
Parke, Kerstin; 26.01.62; Abt. XI; 941100; 3018; 1894/87/1,
Paulick, Gunter; 30.06.57; HVA; 961500; 7513; 650/75/44,
Paul, Gerhard; 11.08.53; HVA; 961500; 1100; 2639/79, J
Paul, Werner; 28.04.52; Abt. N; 906540; 1150; 3893/77,
Pawlak, Norbert; 01.10.47; BV Berlin XX; 152000; 1140; 3005/84,
Päsler, Knut; 15.07.65; HVA; 961500; 2000; 5196/84, F
Pecher, Rudolf; 27.09.55; Abt. N; 906540; 1020; 7272/75,
Perschon, Andreas; 01.11.58; HVA; 961500; 1055; 1233/80, F
Petermann, Walter; 28.01.50; HVA; 961500; 1130; 4216/84, F
Peters, Joachim; 15.02.55; Abt. XI; 941100; 1580; 2797/87,
Petzold, Frank; 24.04.60; Abt. XI; 941100; 7840; 1711/89,
Pfarr, Wilfried; 04.09.38; HVA; 961500; 1080; 180/73, M
Philipp, Siegfried; 19.10.49; Abt. N; 906540; 1017; 3078/83,
Pieritz, Reiner; 10.06.49; Abt. XI; 941100; 1600; 3701/73,
Pierschel, Bernd; 25.02.40; HVA; 961500; 1280; 128/68, F
Pietschmann, Hans; 26.05.40; Dresden XVIII; 121800; 8010; XII/2665/87,
Piletzki, Doris; 20.04.54; Abt. N; 906540; 1120; 1603/76,
Pingel, Jürgen; 14.04.34; HVA; 961500; 1020; 250/81, M
Plogas, Lutz-Ulrich; 14.04.50; HVA; 961500; 1092; 3974/87, J
Plomann, Michael; 31.03.61; Abt. N; 906540; 1100; 3501/85,
Ploner, Ekhard; 08.06.30; HVA; 961500; 1020; 1041/67, M
Plumbohm, Ilona; 26.02.59; Abt. XI; 941100; 1092; 1844/88,
Pohl, Bernd; 07.11.52; Cottbus, Abt. KuSch; 064000; 7500; 1587/87,
Pohl, Heinrich; 05.10.53; ZAIG; 995300; 8036; K, 4401/88
Polcuch, Konrad; 03.12.53; HVA; 961500; 1055; 3671/88, M
Polcuch, Marion; 06.11.53; HVA; 961500; 1055; 3670/88, F
Polster, Claus; 07.07.50; HVA; 961500; 7034; 1530/87, M
Popp, Rudolf; 21.09.36; HVA; 961500; 1136; 4283/88, F
Porges, Brigitte; 09.06.49; HVA; 961500; 1280; 3137/89, F
Porges, Manfred; 18.12.45; HVA; 961500; 1280; 3136/89, F
Pötsch, Hans; 03.11.41; HVA; 961500; 1197; 112/76, M
Prade, Reiner; 19.09.56; HVA; 961500; 1145; 4527/87, A
Pratsch, Klaus; 21.07.39; HVA; 961500; 1017; 1331/63, T
Preißler, Steffen; 05.06.66; Abt. N; 906540; 8017; 1161/89,
Prestin, Uwe; 03.11.40; Abt. N; 906540; 1150; 7399/81,
Preusche, Dieter; 07.12.43; HVA; 961500; 1142; 6977/75, A
Proft, Andre; 09.10.63; HVA; 961500; 1017; 760/88, D
Prokop, Adolf; 02.02.39; AGM, Arbeitsgebiet R; 956024; 5066; K, 187/71
Propf, Ulrich; 12.06.57; HVA; 961500; 4350; 650/75/4,
Puchner, Albrecht; 05.07.53; Abt. N; 906540; 1200; 2319/84,
Puchta, Gerdt; 09.01.51; HVA; 961500; 2540; 1864/89, M
Pufe, Rainer; 21.02.52; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 1514/75,
Püstel, Brigitte; 27.04.43; Abt. XI; 941100; 1100; 239/85,
Püwick, Heinz; 01.08.28; HVA; 961500; 1280; 330/85, T
Pyritz, Frank; 08.10.58; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 2128/78,
Radke, Bernd; 29.09.46; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 1604/76,
Radke, Gudrun; 24.06.47; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 2286/74,
Radtke, Peter; 27.08.62; HVA; 961500; 1140; 2637/84, M
Radünz, Christine; 26.09.53; HVA; 961500; 1136; 2758/78, J
Rahn, Winfried; 25.04.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1090; 4142/79,
Ramme, Alwin; 12.03.32; HVA; 961500; 1017; 3321/71, U
Ramminger, Uwe; 04.01.54; Abt. XI; 941100; 8245; 3256/84,
Rasel, Klaus; 30.05.42; HVA; 961500; 1532; 650/75/45,
Rasmus, Hartmut; 04.02.43; Abt. XI; 941100; 5500; 702/86,
Ratschke, Lutz-Dieter; 04.12.53; Abt. N; 906540; 1034; 5042/76,
Ratzmann, Ingrid; 18.04.37; HVA; 961500; 1035; 1672/84, A
Rauch, Benno; 25.09.53; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 4146/79,
Rauch, Hannelore; 24.12.50; HVA; 961500; 2794; 650/75/30/1,
Rauch, Helmut; 09.01.53; HVA; 961500; 1092; 574/72, F
Rauch, Lothar; 04.11.53; HVA; 961500; 2794; 650/75/30,
Redlich, Hans-Joachim; 27.09.41; BV Berlin XIX; 151900; 1150; 1091/79,
Redlinghöfer, Ilse; 28.07.37; HA III; 940300; 1162; K, 1858/88,
Regner, Karsten; 19.03.63; HVA; 961500; 1092; 4311/84, M
Reichelt, Werner; 10.12.35; Abt. XI; 941100; 1020; 2046/64,
Reichelt, Wolfgang; 24.04.38; Rostock XVIII; 011800; 2520; 189/71,
Reichel, Joachim; 06.07.44; HVA; 961500; 2500; 1863/89, M
Reichel, Manfred; 14.04.59; HVA; 961500; 1093; 3062/78, F
Reichel, Reinhard; 20.09.45; Abt. XI; 941100; 1080; 17/71,
Reichert, Bernd; 11.06.50; Abt. N; 906540; 1093; 2094/72,
Reif, Frank; 05.10.58; HVA; 961500; 6016; 650/75/20,
Reiß, Alfred; 06.10.34; HVA; 961500; 1020; 4242/60, J
Reiter, Hermann; 11.10.37; HVA; 961500; 1100; 186/77, J
Renner, Andreas; 16.04.59; HVA; 961500; 1153; 19/81, F
Renner, Lothar; 05.06.45; HVA; 961500; 1054; 136/71, J
Rennhack, Lutz-Peter; 12.11.54; HVA; 961500; 4730; 650/75/46,
Retzlaff, Gerd; 06.07.39; HVA; 961500; 1142; 2756/84, G
Reuter, Simone; 19.06.67; HVA; 961500; 1140; 4274/89, M
Ribbecke, Horst; 19.04.25; HA XVIII; 981800; 1017; RIBBECKE, HORST
Richter, Andre; 21.09.61; Abt. N; 906540; 1143; 5786/82,
Richter, Detlef; 02.05.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1093; 7135/80,
Richter, Norbert; 24.09.47; KD Freiberg; 140047; 9200; K/1724/89,
Richter, Reinhard; 27.02.52; HVA; 961500; 1035; 4349/84, O
Richter, Willi; 21.06.32; HVA; 961500; 1130; 3776/87, F
Riedel, Dieter; 24.11.52; HVA; 961500; 1140; 3848/81, M
Riedel, Dietmar; 19.02.52; HVA; 961500; 1020; 2970/87, M
Riedel, Erhard; 26.03.46; HA III; 940300; 1136; K, 2963/89
Riedel, Winfried; 27.05.40; HVA; 961500; 1017; 777/65, M
Riemer, Rudi; 04.03.32; Frankfurt/O. XVIII; 051800; 1200; V/443/88,
Riesner, Wolfgang; 12.06.50; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 2279/74/1,
Riewe, Hartmut; 16.08.42; KD Wismar; 010048; 2402; 4910/75,
Ritzmann, Hartmut; 23.01.56; HVA; 961500; 1140; 1715/89, M
Roeßler, Jochen; 13.03.41; KD Dresden/Stadt; 120040; 8060; XII/2670/87,
Rolfs, Raimund; 16.10.57; HVA; 961500; 1136; 3891/83, F
Roll, Gerd; 05.09.55; HVA; 961500; 2200; 650/75/28,
Roloff, Herbert; 16.02.36; HVA; 961500; 1144; 1611/69, Q
Rosenkranz, Rudolf; 23.11.30; Rostock XVIII; 011800; 2565; 680/70,
Rosenthal, Ralf; 19.12.64; HVA; 961500; 1140; 5423/88, S
Rostek, Horst; 26.05.29; HVA; 961500; 1156; 18500/60, F
Rost, Andrea; 23.11.57; HVA; 961500; 1150; 4298/89, F
Rost, Dieter; 31.05.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1150; 7214/81,
Rothbauer, Edmund; 04.08.30; Frankfurt/O., SED-PO-Ltg.; 054100; 1200; V/432/88,
Roth, Andreas; 31.03.52; HVA; 961500; 1140; 121/69/35, AB
Roth, Hans-Jochen; 12.07.43; HVA; 961500; 1800; 1381/89, M
Rödel, Johannes; 05.07.33; HVA; 961500; 1614; 650/88, D
Röder, Detlev; 12.06.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 744/88, N
Röder, Siegmar; 03.05.37; HVA; 961500; 1156; 18/67, S
Röhling, Thomas; 30.04.59; Abt. XI; 941100; 1035; 1649/82,
Röhl, Gerhard; 26.07.52; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 1883/81,
Röhner, Bernd; 07.01.57; HVA; 961500; 1040; 4700/89, F
Römer, Heinz; 11.02.32; HVA; 961500; 1250; 5192/86, M
Römer, Lutz; 09.08.59; HVA; 961500; 1055; 3400/89, F
Rörster, Hans; 29.05.30; HVA; 961500; 1147; 1593/86, U
Rösch, Klaus; 28.04.41; Abt. XI; 941100; 1100; 9797/61,
Rösner, Andreas; 16.06.51; ZAIG; 995300; 8020; K, 2964/89
Rudolph, Peter; 05.10.29; HVA; 961500; 2520; 7095/60, A
Ruschel, Dietger; 15.08.43; HVA; 961500; 1140; 2111/72, F
Russ, Wolfgang; 08.01.48; HVA; 961500; 1153; 6983/75, M
Ruthenberg, Gerd-Wolfram; 08.11.53; HVA; 961500; 1093; 5714/81, L
Rücker, Frank; 20.01.63; HVA; 961500; 1130; 5361/89, F
Rücker, Ricarda; 21.05.66; HVA; 961500; 1130; 5361/89/1, F
Sacher, Hans; 06.11.26; HVA; 961500; 1162; 252/74, U
Sachse, Ingrid; 15.12.40; HVA; 961500; 1020; 580/89, F
Sachse, Manfred; 15.04.34; BV Berlin XX; 152000; 1193; 219/76,
Sahling, Frank; 12.07.50; HVA; 961500; 1136; 6908/82, F
Salm, Rainer; 11.05.58; HVA; 961500; 1143; 44/81, F
Salomon, Walter; 12.11.29; HVA; 961500; 1273; 2142/73, L
Salomo, Gerhard; 08.01.30; Dresden XX; 122000; 8023; XII/2667/87,
Salomo, Günther; 21.05.41; Dresden VI; 120600; 8060; XII/1885/89,
Sander, Gerhard; 25.05.52; HVA; 961500; 1093; 157/85, M
Sander, Rudolf; 14.11.33; HVA; 961500; 1188; 790/88, F
Sasse, Klaus-Jürgen; 01.12.42; Abteilung XI; 941100; 1092; 1339/68,
Sauer, Uwe; 09.05.58; Abt. N; 906540; 1150; 4551/77,
Sawatzki, Paul-Eckhard; 06.03.56; HVA; 961500; 1054; 2963/78, F
Schaarschmidt, Steffen; 06.10.58; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9001; 181,
Schade, Detlef; 10.11.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1090; 2195/82,
Schaffrath, Hans-Martin; 26.03.44; BV Berlin VI; 150600; 1156; 1352/75,
Scharfenberg, Anette; 02.12.63; Abt. N; 906540; 1093; 5559/83,
Schellenberger, Gerd; 11.11.50; BV Berlin XX; 152000; 1080; 3003/84,
Schemmel, Manfred; 18.02.54; Abt. XI; 941100; 7270; 2795/87,
Schering, Norbert; 24.03.55; HVA; 961500; 1195; 2729/89, A
Schiecke, Dieter; 12.10.54; HVA; 961500; 1153; 1960/75, M
Schiemann, Peter; 04.01.43; HVA; 961500; 1017; 693/86, E
Schiemann, Renate; 09.04.45; HVA; 961500; 1017; 693/86/1, E
Schierz, Rolf-Jörg; 13.02.61; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9050; 180,
Schilling, Aribert; 07.04.51; Abt. N; 906540; 1093; 3618/77,
Schilling, Klaus; 29.09.41; Leipzig VI; 130600; 7060; K, 1043/87
Schink, Peter; 30.12.55; HVA; 961500; 1130; 6659/80, M
Schlauß, Hannelore; 17.10.52; Abt. N; 906540; 1298; 5153/88,
Schleicher, Gerhard; 22.06.43; HVA; 961500; 1250; 36/77, M
Schlenkrich, Dieter; 07.05.41; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 1253/65,
Schlesinger, Harald; 10.10.62; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 5558/83,
Schliebe, Edda; 25.07.39; Abt. XI; 941100; 1130; 2758/89,
Schliesch, Erhard; 30.03.28; Dresden VII; 120700; 8060; XII/2660/87,
Schlinsog, Helfried; 16.06.44; HVA; 961500; 7022; 544/88, F
Schlinsog, Regina; 05.02.47; HVA; 961500; 7022; 544/88/02, F
Schlögl, Thomas; 01.08.64; Abt. N; 906540; 1141; 3020/84,
Schmidt-Bock, Peter; 04.05.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 2962/79,
Schmidt, Andreas; 16.01.63; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 5787/82,
Schmidt, Dietmar; 12.06.44; Abt. XI; 941100; 1093; 1276/73,
Schmidt, Eberhard; 22.09.47; HVA; 961500; 1280; 231/75, M
Schmidt, Gerd; 29.07.39; HVA; 961500; 5900; 551/86, F
Schmidt, Gudrun; 08.12.44; HVA; 961500; 4050; 1532/87, M
Schmidt, Hans-Dieter; 03.01.32; Dresden XVIII; 121800; 8019; XII/2664/87,
Schmidt, Hans-Dieter; 30.07.36; Frankfurt/O. XIX; 051900; 1200; V/449/88,
Schmidt, Hartmut; 10.02.62; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 4050/82,
Schmidt, Joachim; 19.12.43; HVA; 961500; 4050; 1531/87, M
Schmidt, Klaus-Peter; 28.03.56; Abt. XI; 941100; 1600; 407/78,
Schmidt, Kuno; 10.01.37; Abt. XI; 941100; 1020; 1868/69,
Schmidt, Manfred; 04.08.54; HVA; 961500; 1100; 2616/80, U
Schmidt, Werner; 18.07.36; Kreisdienststelle [KD] Bautzen; 120042; 8609; XII/1355/87,
Schmidt, Wilfried; 14.10.52; HVA; 961500; 1093; 237/73, F
Schmiedke, Günter; 04.10.33; Frankfurt/O., BKG; 052900; 1200; V/436/88,
Schneider, Astrid; 24.03.51; HVA; 961500; 1140; 3353/86, F
Schneider, Günter; 08.10.54; HVA; 961500; 5800; 3470/85, M
Schneider, Günter; 26.07.41; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 9806/61,
Schneider, Harald; 26.01.48; HVA; 961500; 1140; 4128/83, M
Schneider, Karl-Heinz; 24.12.34; HVA; 961500; 9900; 6857/82, M
Schneider, Lothar; 16.11.56; HVA; 961500; 1280; 1525/75, F
Schneider, Siegfried; 06.09.33; Frankfurt/O. XVIII; 051800; 1136; V/450/88,
Scholz, Gisela; 15.03.39; HVA; 961500; 1093; 5478/88, F
Schömann, Bodo; 12.12.61; Abt. XI; 941100; 1200; 5312/88,
Schönau, Lothar; 07.08.34; HVA; 961500; 1095; 3127/78, H
Schönau, Ruth; 23.02.33; HVA; 961500; 1095; 3127/78/1, H
Schönberg, Klaus; 27.12.51; Abt. XI; 941100; 9931; 3457/86,
Schönfeld, Dieter; 15.12.58; Abt. XI; 941100; 7570; 2806/89,
Schönfeld, Klaus; 14.09.41; HVA; 961500; 1136; 596/86, F
Schreyer, Harry; 16.01.38; HA I; 970100; 1185; K, 741/89
Schröder, Horst; 12.06.51; Abt. XI; 941100; 4090; 3458/86,
Schröter, Helmut; 14.08.35; KD Rostock; 010040; 2520; 552/75,
Schubert, Harry; 05.07.51; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 3693/78,
Schubert, Thomas; 10.05.57; HVA; 961500; 1090; 4848/80, F
Schulke, Klaus-Peter; 06.12.41; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 3953/76,
Schultze, Ralf; 30.04.56; HVA; 961500; 1150; 2306/74, F
Schulze, Alfred; 07.07.37; Abt. N; 906540; 1093; 4324/87,
Schulze, Frank; 09.07.60; HVA; 961500; 1197; 650/75/69,
Schulz, Dorelies; 11.03.49; HVA; 961500; 1136; 4640/89, M
Schulz, Michael; 03.03.65; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 4909/86,
Schulz, Ronald; 22.08.61; HVA; 961500; 7700; 650/75/68,
Schulz, Udo; 30.03.58; HVA; 961500; 1143; 113/75, F
Schulz, Werner; 09.02.35; Frankfurt/O. XIX; 051900; 1200; V/437/88,
Schumacher, Michael; 13.04.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1090; 3819/79,
Schurz, Günter; 25.03.33; KD Dresden/Stadt; 120040; 8060; XII/2669/87,
Schuster, Bernd; 29.01.42; HVA; 961500; 1140; 61/67, M
Schußmann, Heike; 18.05.58; Abt. XI; 941100; 2000; 1712/89/1,
Schußmann, Klaus; 10.01.60; Abt. XI; 941100; 2000; 1712/89,
Schübel, Andreas; 03.10.61; HVA; 961500; 6301; 650/75/67,
Schütz, Harald; 19.09.32; HVA; 961500; 1153; 2580/65, K
Schwabe, Karl Heinz; 01.07.54; HVA; 961500; 1150; 234/79, J
Schwalbe, Manfred; 04.08.33; Frankfurt/O. XVIII; 051800; 1200; V/454/88,
Schwarzbach, Walter; 01.04.44; HVA; 961500; 1092; 5018/87, F
Schwarze, Lothar; 19.09.35; Dresden XVIII; 121800; 8020; XII/1352/87,
Schwarz, Frank; 19.01.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1093; 5327/80,
Schwarz, Stefan; 26.02.65; HVA; 961500; 1152; 1656/69/2, P
Schwenk, Wilfried; 03.02.55; HVA; 961500; 2620; 650/75/48,
Schwoch, Gerth; 28.06.51; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 7274/75,
Schwunteck, Harald; 26.08.57; Abt. N; 906540; 8010; 2966/79,
Seckel, Peter; 11.09.60; HVA; 961500; 1143; 3543/81, F
Seckel, Wolfgang; 01.02.39; Karl-Marx-Stadt XX; 142000; 9005; K/3430/89,
Seeger, Regina; 22.03.51; HVA; 961500; 1140; 109/78, J
Seelig, Werner; 11.04.14; HVA; 961500; 1140; 1472/87, F
Seel, Ingolf; 31.07.57; HVA; 961500; 1035; 368/78, F
Seel, Uwe; 06.09.57; HVA; 961500; 1143; 3962/83, N
Seel, Werner; 28.12.32; HVA; 961500; 1142; 3502/61, T
Seibt, Eberhard; 31.08.36; Dresden VII; 120700; 8060; XII/1340/87,
Seibt, Rudolf; 15.09.30; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 350/73,
Seibt, Siegfried; 24.04.34; Dresden II; 120200; 8021; XII/1338/87,
Seidel, Knut; 02.10.66; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9050; 174,
Seidel, Marga; 07.07.36; HVA; 961500; 1092; 2310/88/1, E
Seidel, Matthias; 15.08.59; HVA; 961500; 1017; 491/80, F
Seidel, Michael; 21.07.52; HVA; 961500; 1092; 581/89, U
Seidel, Wolfgang; 24.05.31; HVA; 961500; 1092; 2310/88, E
Seiffert,Reimar; 12.11.29; KD Eisenhüttenstadt; 050045; 1220; V/433/88,
Sellig, Dieter; 11.07.34; Abt. N; 906540; 1020; 7258/75,
Sell, Andreas; 28.06.54; HVA; 961500; 1095; 2311/88, O
Sendsitzky, Peter; 10.09.47; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 3723/80,
Seyfarth, Stephan; 22.12.60; HVA; 961500; 1040; 4609/80, J
Siegert, Gerhard; 31.05.48; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 3883/76,
Siegler, Werner; 01.11.52; HVA; 961500; 1400; 1485/87, O
Sievers, Reinhard; 14.10.49; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 3822/77,
Siggelkow, Wolfgang; 03.11.60; Abt. XI; 941100; 2823; 590/88,
Sikorski, Joachim; 16.01.58; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 5261/82,
Sikorski, Wolfgang; 27.11.49; Abt. N; 906540; 1156; 2309/73,
Simbrick, Joachim; 21.12.51; Abt. XI; 941100; 1153; 6462/82,
Sitte, Jutta; 06.08.38; HVA; 961500; 1055; 4139/88, M
Sitte, Kurt; 08.09.38; HVA; 961500; 1055; 3009/89, M
Skibinski, Udo; 24.11.42; HVA; 961500; 1020; 326/73, F
Skirde, Udo; 18.01.38; HVA; 961500; 1130; 890/82, T
Smetana, Rüdiger; 18.02.39; BV Berlin XVIII; 151800; 1136; 417/79,
Smiejczak, Jan-Peter; 16.04.64; HVA; 961500; 1156; 2833/87, M
Smolinski, Hans-Joachim; 21.05.53; Abt. N; 906540; 9300; 4070/79,
Sodann, Peter; 23.09.39; HVA; 961500; 7060; 3932/87, M
Sommerfeld, Dirk; 20.06.50; HVA; 961500; 1280; 1555/87, F
Sonnenfeld, Kurt; 25.04.44; Abt. N; 906540; 1017; 2262/87,
Sonntag, Peter; 18.03.55; HVA; 961500; 1092; 2817/80, M
Spangenberg, Heinz; 09.10.56; Abt. XI; 941100; 6550; 6665/82,
Spenke, Günter; 24.01.32; Abt. N; 906540; 1020; 4550/77,
Sperling, Achim; 29.10.56; HVA; 961500; 1130; 4681/79, F
Sprenger, Gisela; 01.06.54; HVA; 961500; 1020; 2633/88, J
Springer, Dieter; 23.06.34; KD Schwedt; 050050; 1330; V/435/88,
Staigies, Artur; 26.10.30; OD KKW Nord; 010050; 2220; 1022/84,
Standke, Michael; 04.11.54; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9023; 179,
Stange, Detlef; 20.02.59; Abt. N; 906540; 1115; 5547/88,
Stapff, Dirk; 08.03.63; HVA; 961500; 1090; 2612/84, F
Starick, Hartmuth; 02.08.52; Abt. XI; 941100; 1080; 8509/81,
Städtke, Hartmut; 20.05.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 4029/79,
Steffin, Peter; 09.08.41; Rostock IX; 010900; 2520; 3762/82,
Steger, Ralph; 28.08.65; HVA; 961500; 1180; 2778/76/1, T
Stehr, Gerd; 29.03.58; Abt. XI; 941100; 1200; 3957/83,
Steinert, Joachim; 27.11.36; KD Rügen; 010046; 2355; 4028/86,
Steinmetz, Gerhard; 08.04.48; Abt. XI; 941100; 1017; 1904/72,
Steinmüller, Peter; 07.03.56; HVA; 961500; 1142; 1881/88, A
Stein, Peter; 05.02.61; Dresden XX; 122000; 8019; XII/2405/88,
Stein, Werner; 01.08.37; KD Berlin-Friedrichshain; 150040; 1197; 5579/88,
Stephan, Wolfgang; 29.06.37; KD Dresden/Stadt; 120040; 8060; XII/1358/87,
Sternberger, Dieter; 02.12.34; Abt. N; 906540; 1195; 1474/65/1,
Sternberger, Erika; 08.02.41; Abt. XI; 941100; 1195; 4586/85,
Steuding, Werner; 24.07.42; HA VI; 970600; 1190; K, 1042/87
Steyskal, Richard; 12.11.45; HVA; 961500; 1806; 650/75/53,
Stichler, Christian; 15.06.57; HVA; 961500; 1040; 3462/79, F
Stirzel, Werner; 10.06.34; KD Bautzen; 120042; 8600; XII/1354/87,
Stollmayer, Sabine; 10.03.51; HVA; 961500; 1293; 338/81, J
Stoll, Dietrich; 10.06.36; Rostock XVIII; 011800; 2551; 417/71,
Stopp, Helmar; 01.07.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1123; 5218/84,
Storbeck, Lutz; 30.09.59; HVA; 961500; 1095; 2769/84, F
Stoye, Andre; 28.11.60; HVA; 961500; 1152; 3261/84, F
Straube, Jost; 18.09.58; HVA; 961500; 1058; 3573/82, F
Strauhs, Rüdiger; 05.03.55; Abt. XI; 941100; 1017; 6370/81,
Strähler, Gisela; 28.02.42; Abt. N; 906540; 1281; 5150/88,
Strähler, Siegbert; 05.05.39; Abt. N; 906540; 1281; 5151/88,
Streda, Sylvia; 06.10.54; KD Schwedt; 050050; 1330; V/440/88,
Striegler, Ralf; 14.07.64; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 1642/85,
Strischek, Erika; 11.11.49; HVA; 961500; 1035; 4270/78/1, N
Strischek, Rudolf; 23.08.45; HVA; 961500; 1035; 4270/78, N
Strobel, Günter; 02.04.36; HA I; 970100; 8312; K, 5809/82,
Stroth, Elke; 28.06.59; Abt. XI; 941100; 2760; 498/86/1,
Stroth, Heiko; 15.06.58; Abt. XI; 941100; 2760; 498/86,
Strutz, Reiner; 01.06.52; HVA; 961500; 2861; 309/76, F
Stuhl, Diethard; 02.03.61; Abt. XI; 941100; 6018; 591/88,
Stüdemann, Robert; 14.11.50; HVA; 961500; 1071; 1870/87, L
Stümer, Hans; 18.03.31; HVA; 961500; 1156; 3032/82, J
Stürmer, Gerlinde; 24.01.60; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 2015/80,
Suhm, Rüdiger; 24.02.60; Abt. XI; 941100; 2831; 5346/85,
Swienty, Gerald; 25.03.51; Abt. XI; 941100; 1600; 2093/72,
Switalla, Heinz-Joachim; 12.01.46; HVA; 961500; 1017; 2105/73, O
Taubert, Gerald; 05.07.59; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 5326/80,
Tausend, Klaus; 06.04.47; Abt. XI; 941100; 1142; 6987/75/1,
Teichmeyer, Lutz; 28.10.50; HVA; 961500; 1144; 1603/75, M
Tellbrun, Wolfgang; 09.07.47; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 5133/76,
Telschow, Lieselotte; 24.03.35; HVA; 961500; 1136; 5181/84, U
Teuter, Maik; 21.12.64; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 2729/86,
Thale, Klaus; 06.04.44; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 666/66,
Thäter, Wolfgang; 23.02.45; KD Berlin-Weißensee; 150047; 1140; 1484/82,
Thiele, Horst; 26.09.34; HVA; 961500; 1093; 2481/88, F
Thiele, Ingrid; 04.08.38; HVA; 961500; 1093; 2481/88/1, F
Thiel, Manfred; 12.04.39; Abt. N; 906540; 1093; 9804/61,
Thomas, Heinz; 07.06.42; HVA; 961500; 6902; 3672/88, M
Thomas, Karsten; 18.02.62; HVA; 961500; 1153; 3407/84, F
Thomas, Manfred; 23.03.57; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 3475/76,
Thomas, Nikita; 18.06.51; HVA; 961500; 1092; 650/75/32,
Thümmel, Elke; 25.12.56; HVA; 961500; 8060; 2528/88/1, F
Thümmel, Volker; 16.01.59; Abt. XI; 941100; 8060; 2528/88,
Thürasch, Carola; 01.11.59; HVA; 961500; 1597; 3849/86, F
Thürasch, Werner; 06.06.50; Abt. XI; 941100; 1597; 4417/84,
Tiede, Lars; 16.02.67; HVA; 961500; 2560; 2767/89, F
Tietsche, Frank; 25.06.55; HVA; 961500; 1141; 361/74, F
Tietz, Gisa; 14.03.47; HVA; 961500; 1092; 2428/79, O.
Tietz, Hans-Joachim; 27.01.47; HVA; 961500; 2000; 514/87, F
Tippmann, Falk; 12.06.53; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9050; 169,
Tkatsch, Ingo; 06.11.66; HVA; 961500; 1150; 2143/86, A
Tondock, Heinz; 08.02.30; HVA; 961500; 1156; 1601/75, M
Tornau, Andre; 15.10.65; Schwerin II; 020200; 2755; :
Treder, Gerd; 30.06.40; Rostock , Abt. Hafen; 011969; 2520; 3062/85,
Trenkmann, Ute; 20.09.52; HVA; 961500; 1156; 3904/86/1, F
Trenkmann, Wolfgang; 10.07.51; HVA; 961500; 1156; 3904/86, F
Triegel, Rainer; 17.01.62; Abt. N; 906540; 1034; 5788/82,
Trinks, Hartmut; 24.07.55; Abt. N; 906540; 1150; 3474/76,
Troisch, Andreas; 15.11.57; HVA; 961500; 1020; 2691/80, F
Trommler, Werner; 28.02.51; HVA; 961500; 1156; 957/89, F
Tschiharz, Ute; 03.05.58; HVA; 961500; 3540; 650/75/49/1,
Tschiharz, Wolfgang; 12.06.51; HVA; 961500; 3540; 650/75/49,
Tusche, Hans-Jürgen; 11.07.43; Abt. XI; 941100; 1020; 288/67,
Uher, Edgar; 09.11.52; HVA; 961500; 1142; 175/75, F
Uhlig, Andrea; 01.05.57; HVA; 961500; 1250; 2664/84, J
Uhlig, Gerd; 16.11.46; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 2114/66,
Uhlig, Gunter; 17.10.52; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9044; 163,
Ulbrich, Fritz; 11.12.36; Abt. XI; 941100; 1095; 922/82,
Ullmann, Klaus; 16.10.51; Karl-Marx-Stadt VIII; 140800; 9001; 168,
Unger, Dieter; 29.12.52; HVA; 961500; 1156; 2427/74, F
Unger, Peter; 18.06.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 5095/77,
Unmack, Franz; 01.08.48; HVA; 961500; 1055; 177/79, M
Unseld, Werner; 26.05.28; HVA; 961500; 4500; 18264/60, Y
Unterlauf, Diethard; 05.04.46; HVA; 961500; 9999; 337/77, O
Urban, Hartmut; 08.04.45; Abt. N; 906540; 1162; 1346/68,
Van Rossum, Ralf; 20.03.43; HVA; 961500; 9999; 2856/80, M
Vieweg, Jens-Uwe; 27.12.58; Abt. XI; 941100; 1200; 4706/85,
Vogel, Michael; 25.10.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1093; 1551/80,
Vogler, Reinhard; 15.07.49; HVA; 961500; 5820; 650/75/70,
Vogl, Hansjochen; 09.07.37; HVA; 961500; 1100; 6183/82/1, L
Vogt, Ditmar; 02.05.38; Abt. N; 906540; 1199; 5073/77,
Voigtländer, Christian; 03.12.47; HVA; 961500; 4090; 476/88, A
Voigtländer, Gunter; 25.06.52; HVA; 961500; 1055; 2769/87, F
Voigt, Armin; 22.10.51; Abt. XI; 941100; 1600; 412/77,
Voigt, Helmut; 15.02.50; HVA; 961500; 1017; 2482/88, F
Voigt, Knut; 01.08.48; HVA; 961500; 1156; 1430/85, M
Vollmeyer, Wolfgang; 10.10.50; HA VI; 970600; 1054; K, 4427/87
Vopel, Dieter; 03.01.35; HVA; 961500; 1090; 4083/81, M
Vopel, Elke; 26.03.47; Abt. XI; 941100; 1600; 417/70/2,
Vopel, Hans; 11.08.45; Abt. XI; 941100; 1600; 417/70/1,
Vorberg, Horst; 10.04.53; KD Zwickau; 140061; 9561; K/1436/89,
Voßwinkel, Hartmut; 29.04.50; HVA; 961500; 1140; 353/77, A
Völkel, Alfred; 20.06.31; HVA; 961500; 1113; 18556/60, E
Völkel, Heiko; 23.03.62; HVA; 961500; 1020; 2859/84, U
Völz, Andreas; 29.12.56; Abt. XI; 941100; 9900; 4170/83,
Vtelensky, Rainer; 04.11.44; OD KKW Nord; 010050; 2200; 2678/70,
Wadewitz, Volker; 04.08.57; HVA; 961500; 1034; 2472/79, F
Wagenknecht, Bernd; 20.12.40; HA IX; 990900; 1020; K, 5799/82
Wagner, Michael; 28.08.61; Abt. XI; 941100; 7065; 6932/88,
Wagner, Silke; 28.12.64; HVA; 961500; 7065; 6932/88/1, F
Walter, Isolde; 27.02.48; Rostock VIII; 010800; 1153; 2832/85,
Warncke, Claus-Dieter; 06.04.44; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; 2496/74,
Warnecke, Siegfried; 27.12.59; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 1985/79,
Warzel, Franz; 14.05.28; HVA; 961500; 1020; 181/73, M
Wächter, Wolfgang; 28.09.49; HVA; 961500; 9270; 650/75/16,
Wäckerle, Andrej; 03.04.50; HVA; 961500; 1092; 4683/79, M
Wähner, Jürgen; 28.04.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1093; 3473/76,
Weber, Dieter; 16.06.49; HVA; 961500; 1120; 1779/71, F
Weber, Frank; 06.10.50; KD Dresden/Land; 120041; 8270; XII/2668/87,
Weber, Gerd; 02.07.65; HVA; 961500; 1090; 3383/85, Q
Weber, Hans; 11.07.43; HVA; 961500; 1130; 192/73, X
Weber, Rainer; 06.11.45; HVA; 961500; 1110; 6794/82, O
Weber, Ulrich; 09.03.45; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 1990/69,
Wedel, Kay; 07.03.64; Abt. N; 906540; 1144; 4933/86,
Weichman, Jürgen; 22.02.48; Abt. XI; 941100; 1156; 3212/77,
Weidehase, Jörg; 25.10.54; Abt. N; 906540; 1142; 3392/76,
Weigand, Andre; 09.04.68; HVA; 961500; 7024; 3118/89, S
Weigelt, Lutz; 22.01.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 3391/76,
Weigel, Jens-Friedrich; 28.06.50; Abt. N; 906540; 1291; 7268/75,
Weigold, Dieter; 13.02.41; Abt. N; 906540; 1058; 2901/66,
Weihrauch, Heike; 11.07.59; HVA; 961500; 2050; 650/75/71/1,
Weinert, Gerhard; 06.10.39; KD Grimmen; 010044; 2300; 1608/70,
Weirich, Manfred; 11.06.38; Abt. N; 906540; 1020; 9798/61,
Weller, Jörg; 11.01.63; HVA; 961500; 1092; 1047/82, M
Welzel, Herbert; 30.04.44; Abt. N; 906540; 1281; 7265/75,
Welzel, Jürgen; 12.05.54; KD Greifswald; 010042; 2200; 617/83,
Wenzel, Joachim; 04.01.53; HVA; 961500; 1142; 5693/83, F
Wenzel, Joachim; 10.12.41; Abt. XI; 941100; 1400; 182/70,
Wenzel, Rolf; 13.05.47; Abt. XI; 941100; 1144; 1748/75,
Werner, Dietmar; 12.04.47; Abt. N; 906540; 1017; 376/69,
Werner, Günter; 31.01.37; HVA; 961500; 1160; 4553/85, H
Werner, Hartmut; 19.01.45; Abt. XI; 941100; 1156; 176/72,
Werner, Uwe; 04.08.61; HVA; 961500; 1143; 1577/86, F
Werner, Wolfgang; 17.11.35; HA VI; 970600; 1140; K, 505/87
Werner, Wolfgang; 24.08.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1020; 3884/76,
Wernicke, Günter; 10.07.49; Abt. XI; 941100; 1157; 98/75,
Wessendorf, Volker; 09.12.51; HVA; 961500; 1190; 1478/87, F
Wesser, Andrea; 20.04.64; HVA; 961500; 1100; 661/86, J
Westland, Jürgen; 08.01.51; Abt. XI; 941100; 1156; 2895/77,
Wetzel, Katrin; 29.03.60; HVA; 961500; 1145; 475/78, J
Wiedemann, Günther; 12.07.56; Abt. N; 906540; 1280; 5219/84,
Wiertelorz, Horst; 05.07.49; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 3892/77,
Wiesel, Bernd; 20.04.58; Abt. N; 906540; 1143; 2129/78,
Wiesner, Erhard; 31.07.36; HVA; 961500; 1140; 3659/64, M
Wilde, Dirk; 24.12.63; Abt. XI; 941100; 2300; :
Wilde, Hans-Heinz; 27.07.32; Rostock XVIII; 011800; 2300; 5749/79,
Wilhelm, Ralf; 15.07.51; HVA; 961500; 1142; 23/77, F
Wilke, Hartmut; 09.05.60; Abt. N; 906540; 1092; 5019/85,
Winderlich, Jens; 10.10.67; HVA; 961500; 1093; 3453/86, O
Winkler, Anton; 22.03.42; HVA; 961500; 1156; 4674/89, M
Winkler, Georg; 07.08.30; Dresden XVIII; 121800; 8250; XII/1347/87,
Winkler, Günter; 30.04.45; HVA; 961500; 1142; 1996/73, A
Winter, Marina; 26.11.60; HVA; 961500; 1130; 4293/84, J
Witte, Dieter; 23.11.37; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 5039/76,
Wittstock, Manfred; 31.03.32; Rostock VII; 010700; 2500; 936/64,
Witzel, Rainer; 19.04.64; HVA; 961500; 1090; 3581/88, M
Witzmann, Helmar; 06.08.54; Abt. XI; 941100; 1142; 3959/83,
Wokurka, Ulf; 31.10.62; HVA; 961500; 1055; 4228/83, F
Wolfsteller, Roland; 11.11.59; Abt. N; 906540; 2080; 1598/81,
Wolf, Barbara; 11.02.45; HVA; 961500; 1595; 804/83/1, F
Wolf, Jürgen; 15.10.51; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; 2741/77,
Wolf, Klaus; 30.03.55; Abt. N; 906540; 1095; 2012/78,
Wolf, Matthias; 24.11.60; HVA; 961500; 1090; 3051/89, E
Wolf, Rainer; 22.02.59; Abt. N; 906540; 1130; 1548/80,
Wolf, Ulrich; 13.03.43; HVA; 961500; 1595; 804/83, F
Wolkenstein, Dietrich; 09.03.35; HVA; 961500; 1281; 962/64, M
Wolkenstein, Hubertus; 25.12.63; HVA; 961500; 1142; 6480/82, M
Wolkenstein, Renate; 23.08.33; HVA; 961500; 1281; 962/64/1, M
Worsch, Jürgen; 28.09.48; Abt. XI; 941100; 1140; 339/73,
Worsch, Ursula; 04.02.49; HVA; 961500; 1140; 339/73/2, E
Wotzka, Jörg-Michael; 27.07.47; KD Rostock; 010040; 2520; 3391/89,
Wöller, Klaus; 31.12.30; HVA; 961500; 1020; 2953/77, J
Wunderlich, Uwe; 06.05.60; Abt. N; 906540; 1140; 4037/79,
Würzburg, Gerd; 10.06.57; HVA; 961500; 1157; 421/79, F
Zapke, Helge-Jens; 01.10.67; Abt. N; 906540; 1156; 953/87,
Zech, Jürgen; 16.07.51; HVA; 961500; 1055; 4598/87, F
Zehl, Klaus; 07.01.38; Rostock VI; 010600; 2510; 553/75,
Zeiseweis, Ralf; 11.11.62; BV Berlin XX; 152000; 1140; 3299/88,
Zeiske, Tino; 27.07.61; HVA; 961500; 1143; 2614/84, F
Zellmer, Bernd; 04.12.55; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 3620/77,
Zentsch, Peter; 28.08.41; Rostock, BKG; 012900; 2500; 2254/84,
Zetzsche, Jürgen; 16.10.52; Abt. N; 906540; 1144; 1753/80,
Ziegler, Frank; 15.11.63; HVA; 961500; 7010; 3341/86, S
Ziesche, Hans-Dieter; 16.01.60; HVA; 961500; 1017; 205/84, F
Ziese, Elvira; 09.10.54; Frankfurt/O. VI; 050600; 1200; V/441/88,
Zilm, Klaus; 03.03.51; HVA; 961500; 1601; 422/87, F
Zimmermann, Bernd; 07.08.39; HVA; 961500; 1080; 458/63, A
Zimmermann, Peter; 09.11.38; Frankfurt/O. XVIII; 051800; 1203; V/445/88,
Zimmermann, Werner; 05.03.46; Dresden VI; 120600; 8080; XII/1165/88,
Zobel, Frank; 03.04.67; HVA; 961500; 2003; 2842/89, J
Zobler, Günter; 06.09.36; HVA; 961500; 1120; 1826/88, A
Zurflüh, Joachim; 24.12.35; Abt. XI; 941100; 1150; 237/70,
Zwetz, Axel; 13.05.38; Abt. N; 906540; 1136; 958/65,
STALINISTISCHE FÄLSCHUNGEN DER NEO-STASI “GoMoPa” – BEISPIEL MERIDIAN CAPITAL
TOP-SECRET – CHE GUEVARA’S HAIR AUCTIONED OFF
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TOP-SECRET – Fujimori on Trial
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SPIEGEL -“GELIEBTER GENOSSE”-WIE STASI-OBERST STELZER BND-CHEF HELLENBROICH FÜR “GoMoPa” ANWARB
FAZ ÜBER DIE NEO-STASI “GoMoPa” UND DEREN EINSCHLÄGIG BEKANNTE “PARTNER” “GERD BENNEWIRTZ” UND “PETER EHLERS”
FOR YOUR EYES ONLY – FBI’s Top Ten News Stories for the Week Ending September 30, 2011
| Washington, D.C. September 30, 2011 |
- Newark: International Fugitive Captured After More than 40 YearsGeorge Wright, a fugitive for over 41 years, was arrested by Portuguese authorities, pursuant to a provisional arrest request from the United States. The United States is seeking his extradition from Portugal to serve the remainder of a 15- to 30-year sentence for a New Jersey state murder conviction. Full Story
- Boston: Man Charged with Plotting Attack on Pentagon and U.S. Capitol and Attempting to Provide Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist OrganizationRezwan Ferdaus was arrested and charged in connection with his plot to damage or destroy the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol using large remote controlled aircraft filled with C-4 plastic explosives. Ferdaus, a U.S. citizen, was also charged with attempting to provide material support and resources to al Qaeda in order to carry out attacks on U.S. soldiers stationed overseas. Full Story
- Washington Field: Former Guard Charged with Attempting to Communicate National Defense Information to People’s Republic of ChinaBryan Underwood, a former contract guard working at a U.S. Consulate in China, was charged in a superseding indictment with one count of attempting to communicate national defense information to a foreign government. Full Story
- Philadelphia: More than Two Dozen Boeing Employees Arrested in Prescription Drug StingAgents from the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration arrested employees and former employees of Boeing’s Ridley Park, Pennsylvania plant and one non-employee in an effort aimed at prescription drug abuse at the manufacturing plant. Full Story
- San Diego: Thirty-Six Defendants with Ties to Hells Angels Motorcycle Club Charged in Federal Drug Conspiracy InvestigationTwenty-six individuals with ties to the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club were arrested this week. Six defendants were already in custody and four are considered fugitives at this time. Full Story
- San Juan: Twenty-Seven Individuals Indicted for Drug TraffickingTwenty-seven individuals were indicted on drug-related charges as a result of a joint investigation into a drug distribution conspiracy at the Brisas del Mar Public Housing Project and other areas located in the Municipality of Salinas, Puerto Rico. Full Story
- Seattle: Public Awareness Campaign Launched to Seek New Information in the Murder of Assistant U.S. Attorney
Attorney General Eric Holder joined the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington, the Wales family, and the FBI in Seattle to announce a new media and social media effort to seek information related to the 2001 slaying of Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas C. Wales. Full Story - Detroit: Furukawa, Three Execs Guilty in Price-Fixing and Bid-Rigging ConspiracyFurukawa Electric Co. Ltd., headquartered in Tokyo, agreed to plead guilty and pay a $200 million fine for its role in a criminal price-fixing and bid-rigging conspiracy involving the sale of parts to automobile manufacturers. Three executives, who are Japanese nationals, have also agreed to plead guilty and to serve prison time in the United States ranging from a year and a day to 18 months. Full Story
- El Paso: New Mexico Man Sentenced to Federal Prison for Murder of a ChildThelton Andres Riley was sentenced to 30 years in federal prison for the death of a 7-month-old child on August 10, 2009, on Fort Bliss. Full Story
- Springfield: Man Sentenced for Making False Threat to Detonate ExplosivesA Fairview Heights man was sentenced for making a false threat to detonate an explosive device and for influencing a federal officer by threat. Full Story
TOP-SECRET – Trial by Jury: Judging the NYPD Ring of Steel
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After 9/11, the NYPD surrounded Lower Manhattan’s civic center with enhanced security architecture commonly referred to as the ‘Ring of Steel’.With its local and global reach, the zone is a signature public space of our time: encrypted, hardened.Our exposition subjects the Ring of Steel to its own trial by jury. We propose new pathways to interrogate the bias against civic-mindedness revealed by command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance procedures and technologies.This is critical for those called to the civic center for jury duty — especially from communities underrepresented in the jury pool, who might be intimidated by security theater even before they face examination about their impartiality during a jury trial. |
TOP-SECRET – Net Worth by John Galt OWS
ia: http://twitter.com/#!/WeRallJohnGalt John Galt (“John Galt” is an Ayn Rand fictional hero.)
These appeared as Occupy Wall Street dissent, most at Twitter #ows. Repetition of entries deliberate.
Cryptome Occupy Wall Street photo and video series: http://cryptome.org/ows-series.htm
Cryptome Protest Photos Series: http://cryptome.org/protest-series.htm
Bill Maher, defender of poor, atheist, net worth $23M #p2
5 hours ago
Mark Ruffalo, avenger to poor, speaker at #OWS today, net worth $10M #p2 #ows
6 hours ago
Tim Robbins, boy toy to Susan Sarandon, net worth $45M. #p2 #ows
6 hours ago
Susan Sarandon, warrior against Rich, friend to #OWS, net worth $50M #p2 #ows
6 hours ago
John Goodman, Roseannes’s TV hubby, portraying a “normal guy”, built a net worth of $65M. He owns four homes over 5,000 SF each. #p2 #ows
7 hours ago
CNN’s Anderson Cooper. 360. Investigating corruption & greed. Net worth $110M. Makes $11M per year. #p2 #ows
7 hours ago
Harry “jobs” Reid, union friend, defender of poor, net worth $5M #p2 #ows
7 hours ago
Nancy Pelosi, Joan D’Arc of working class, net worth $36M #p2 #ows
7 hours ago
Jimmy Carter, friend to Castro, champion of global poor, net worth $5M #p2 #ows
7 hours ago
Etta James net worth $16M #p2 #ows
7 hours ago
Lady Gaga, champion of the oppressed, net worth $110M. In process of buying castle in Scotland. Born that way. #p2 #ows
7 hours ago
Jane Fonda, left heroine, net worth $120M. Owns 5 homes over 4,000 square feet each. How big’s your house? #p2 #ows
7 hours ago
Linda Rondstat, main squeeze of Gov Brown, net worth $115M. #p2 #ows
7 hours ago
CA Gov Jerry Brown net worth $4M #p2 #ows
7 hours ago
Jimmy Buffet, palm tree sage of working class, net worth $400M. Are we seeing a trend here progs? Good 4 Jimmy. #p2 #ows
8 hours ago
Bob Marley net worth $130M. Good for him. Love Marley. #p21 #ows
8 hours ago
Chelsea Clinton net worth $5M #p2 #ows
8 hours ago
Hillary Clinton net worth $22M #p2 #ows
8 hours ago
Bill Clinton net worth $80M #p2 #ows
8 hours ago
Alec Baldwin net worth $65M. Gets $300K per episode. Learning yet progs? #p2 #ows #tcot
8 hours ago
Al Gore net worth $100M. No carbon offset profits included. #p2 #owl
8 hours ago
Michael Moore net worth $80M. Hero of the poor. #OWS #p2
8 hours ago
Ron Paul net worth $5M #OWS
8 hours ago
John Lennon net worth $800M. Getting the picture progs? You’re pawns. GOP wants YOU to succeed. #OWS #p2 #tcot
9 hours ago
George W Bush, greatest American President, scourge of poor, worth $54M LESS than Roseanne, 3M less than Maher #p2 #ows #tcot
9 hours ago
Warren Buffet, Prog darling, worth $39 Billion. #p2 #ows
9 hours ago
Maxine Waters. Lotta Wall Street dividends. #ows #p2 pfds.opensecrets.org/N00006690_2010…
9 hours ago
Arrianna Hufington (Huffington Post) net worth is $35M. And she was born in Greece LOL. #p2 #ows #tcot
9 hours ago
Figured out why @billmaher is so angry. He’s only worth $23M. Roseanne’s worth $80M. Even I think THAT’s unfair #ows #p2 #tcot
9 hours ago
Fidel Castro, socialist hero, net worth $900M. Good money in being King. Understand Obama’s motives now. #OWS #p2
10 hours ago
Hugo Chavez net worth is $1Billion #p2 #ows
10 hours ago
Finally figured out why Maher is angry all the time. He’s only worth $23M while Roseanne’s worth $80M. Even I think that’s unfair #ows
10 hours ago
Jesse Jackson net worth is $10M #p2 #ows
10 hours ago
Al Sharpton is only worth $5M #p2 #ows
10 hours ago
Morgan Freeman has a net worth of $90M #p2 #ows
10 hours ago
Richard Trumka made $265K in 2010, 3 times the median wage of rank & file. His net worth is not available (shock). #OWS #p2
10 hours ago
Democrat Senator Herb Kohl from Wisconsin net worth $243M #OWS #p2
10 hours ago
Champions of the Poor: Stewart, Maher, Barr, Olbermann, Maddow, Sanders, Schultz, Penn. Combined net worth: $1.2 Billion. #ows #p2
10 hours ago
Bill Maher’s net worth is $23M. #p2 #ows
10 hours ago
Jon Stewart’s net worth is also $80M. Yearly salary is $15M #p2 #ows
10 hours ago
Roseanne Barr’s net worth is $80M. #p2 #ows
10 hours ago
Alan Colmes net worth is only $12M. Salary just $2M per year. #p2 #ows
10 hours ago
Barack Obama’s net worth is $10.5M. He makes $400K per year. #p2 #ows
10 hours ago
Keith Olbermann net worth is $35M. Yearly salary was $10M. Now probably $50K. #p2 #ows
10 hours ago
Senator Bernie Sanders net worth $750M. One of richest in Congress. #ows #p2
10 hours ago
Rachel Maddow’s net worth is $12.5M #p2 #ows
10 hours ago
Michael Moore net worth is $50M #OWS #p2 Moore personally reaped $80M from Fahrenheit 911
10 hours ago
MSNBC’s Ed Schultz net worth is $11.5M. #p2 #ows
10 hours ago
Howard Schultz (CEO Starbucks) net worth $1.3 Billion (no typo). Enjoy your coffee #ows #p2
10 hours ago
Domino’s pizza CEO Patrick Doyle made $5.5M in 2010. 164 times the median salary of his workers. Enjoy your pizza #p2 #ows
10 hours ago
Bob Marley. Worth $137M. Sweet fruit indeed #ows
14 hours ago
Sean Penn net worth is $150M. Now I know why he loves Chavez. Envy. #p2 #ows
15 hours ago
Finally figured out why Maher is angry all the time. He’s only worth $23M while Roseanne’s worth $80M. Even I think that’s unfair #OWS
15 hours ago
Fidel Castro net worth $900M #OWS #p2
15 hours ago
Hugo Chavez net worth is $1Billion #p2 #OWS
15 hours ago
Roseanne, $80M superwoman, condemns the rich at #OWS #p2
15 hours ago
Keith Olbermann, $35M man, protests the rich on #OWS #p2
15 hours ago
Richard Trumka made $265K in 2010, 3 times the median wage of rank & file. His net worth is not available (shock). #OWS #p2
15 hours ago
Democrat Senator Herb Kohl from Wisconsin net worth $243M #OWS #p2
16 hours ago
Senator Bernie Sanders net worth $750M. One of richest in Congress. #ows p2
16 hours ago
Matt Damon net worth is $65M. Earns about $24M per year now. #p2 #ows
16 hours ago
Domino’s pizza CEO Patrick Doyle made $5.5M in 2010. 164 times the median salary of his workers. Enjoy your pizza #p2 #ows
16 hours ago
Howard Schultz (CEO Starbucks) net worth $1.3 Billion (no typo). Enjoy your coffee #ows #p2
16 hours ago
MSNBC’s Ed Schultz net worth is $11.5M. #p2 #ows
16 hours ago
Obama rails against millionaires (defined as $250K) while holding $15M in worth. Shouldn’t he be giving up $14.1M to keep face? #p2
16 hours ago
Nelson Mandela net worth is $15M #p2 #ows
16 hours ago
Bob Marley estate estimated net worth is $130M #p2 #ows
16 hours ago
Jimi Hendrix estate net worth of $175M #p2 #ows
16 hours ago
Morgan Freeman has a net worth of $90M #p2 #ows
16 hours ago
Michael Moore net worth is $50M #OWS #p2 Moore personally reaped #80M from Fahrenheit 911
16 hours ago
Louis Farrakhan net worth is $3M #OWS #p2
16 hours ago
Joe Biden net worth is $500K. Really? sad. I’m worth more than Joe, in many ways. #p2 #ows
17 hours ago
Keith Olbermann net worth is $35M. Yearly salary was $10M. Now probably $50K. #p2 #ows
17 hours ago
Al Sharpton is only worth $5M #p2 #ows
17 hours ago
Jesse Jackson net worth is $10M #p2 #ows
17 hours ago
Rachel Maddow’s net worth is $12.5M #p2 #ows
17 hours ago
Barack Obama’s net worth is $10.5M. He makes $400K per year. #p2 #ows
17 hours ago
Alan Colmes net worth is only $12M. Salary just $2M per year. #p2 #ows
17 hours ago
Jon Stewart’s net worth is also $80M. Yearly salary is $15M #p2 #ows
17 hours ago
Roseanne Barr’s net worth is $80M. #p2 #ows
17 hours ago
Bill Maher’s net worth is $23M. #p2 #ows
17 hours ago
“@iowahawkblog: Hey #OccupyWallStreet: Michael Moore’s net worth is $50 million. And it was taken directly from people like you.” #p2
17 hours ago
Süddeutsche Zeitung über die kriminellen Machenschaften der “GoMoPa”
SZ_03.09.2010_Am_virtuellen_Pranger
zu “GoMoPa” gehören weitere “Websites” wie z.B.
– die Bewertung
– Extremnews
– Schei**hausfliegenblog
die regelmässig für ihre “Freunde und Kollegen der “GoMoPa” Partei ergreifen, weil es sonst niemand tut…
STALKING STUDIE DES WEISSEN RING
Opfer fordern Entzug der Anwaltszulassung für mutmassliche “GoMoPa”-Paten
TOP-SECRET – Hitachi-LG Data Storage Inc. Agrees to Plead Guilty
Hitachi-LG Data Storage Inc. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Participating in Bid-Rigging and Price-Fixing Conspiracies Involving Optical Disk Drives
Company Agrees to Pay $21.1 Million Criminal Fine
| U.S. Department of Justice September 30, 2011 |
WASHINGTON—Hitachi-LG Data Storage Inc. has agreed to plead guilty and to pay a $21.1 million criminal fine for its participation in a series of conspiracies to rig bids and fix prices for the sale of optical disk drives, the Department of Justice announced today. This is the department’s first charge resulting from its ongoing investigation into the optical disk drive industry.
A 15-count felony charge was filed today in U.S. District Court in San Francisco against Hitachi-LG Data Storage, a joint venture between Hitachi Ltd., a Japanese corporation, and LG Electronics Inc., a Republic of Korea corporation. Of the 14 counts, seven charge Hitachi-LG Data Storage with conspiring with others to suppress and eliminate competition by rigging bids on optical disk drives sold to Dell Inc.; six counts charge Hitachi-LG Data Storage with rigging bids on optical disk drives sold to Hewlett-Packard Company (HP); and one count charges Hitachi-LG Data Storage with conspiring with others to fix the prices of optical disk drives sold to Microsoft Corporation. The final count charges Hitachi-LG Data Storage for its participation in a scheme to defraud HP in an April 2009 optical disk drive procurement event.
“The bid-rigging and price-fixing conspiracies involving optical disk drives undermined competition and innovation in the high tech industry,” said Sharis A. Pozen, Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. “The Antitrust Division is committed to prosecuting those who harm competition in the optical disk drive industry.”
Under the plea agreement, which is subject to court approval, Hitachi-LG Data Storage has agreed to assist the department in its ongoing investigation into the optical disk drive industry.
Optical disk drives are devices such as CD-ROM, CD-RW (ReWritable), DVD-ROM and DVD-RW (ReWritable) that use laser light or electromagnetic waves to read and/or write data and are often incorporated into personal computers and gaming consoles.
According to the court document, Dell hosted optical disk drive procurement events in which bidders would be awarded varying amounts of optical disk drive supply depending on where their pricing ranked. From approximately June 2004 to approximately September 2009, Hitachi-LG Data Storage and co-conspirators participated in a series of conspiracies involving meetings and conversations to discuss bidding strategies and the prices of optical disk drives. As part of the conspiracies, Hitachi-LG Data Storage and co-conspirators bid on optical disk drives at collusive and noncompetitive prices and exchanged information on sales, market share and the pricing of optical disk drives to monitor and enforce adherence to the agreements.
The department said that from approximately June 2007 to approximately March 2008, Hitachi-LG Data Storage and co-conspirators participated in meetings and conversations in Taiwan and the Republic of Korea to discuss and fix the prices of optical disk drives sold to Microsoft. As part of the conspiracy, Hitachi-LG Data Storage and co-conspirators issued price quotations in accordance with the agreements reached and exchanged information on the sales of optical disk drives to monitor and enforce adherence to the agreed-upon prices.
According to the court document, HP also hosted optical disk drive procurement events in which participants would be awarded varying amounts of optical disk drive supply depending on where their pricing ranked. The department said that from approximately November 2005 to approximately March 2009, Hitachi-LG Data Storage and co-conspirators participated in a series of conspiracies involving meetings and discussions to predetermine pricing and rank order, and submitted collusive and noncompetitive bids for the procurement event.
Hitachi-LG Data Storage is also charged with one count of wire fraud for devising a scheme to subvert HP’s competitive bidding process for an April 2009 procurement event. According to the charge, Hitachi-LG Data Storage executed the scheme through interstate communications, including an email sent by one of its employees to co-conspirators in San Jose, Calif., and the Republic of Korea, that contained first round bidding results and non-public, competitively sensitive information relating to the April 2009 event.
Hitachi-LG Data Storage is charged with multiple violations of the Sherman Act and one violation of the wire fraud statute. Sherman Act violations carry a maximum penalty of a $100 million criminal fine. The maximum fine may be increased to twice the gain derived from the crime or twice the loss suffered by the victims, if either of those amounts is greater than the statutory maximum fine. The wire fraud violation carries a maximum penalty of the greatest of a $500,000 fine, twice the gain a person derived from the offense or twice the loss suffered by the victims.
The ongoing joint investigation is being conducted by the Antitrust Division’s San Francisco Office and the FBI in San Francisco and Houston. Anyone with information concerning illegal or anticompetitive conduct in the optical disk drive industry is urged to call the Antitrust Division’s San Francisco Field Office at 415-436-6660 or visit http://www.justice.gov/atr/contact/newcase.htm.
BREAKING NEWS – CIA drone kills U.S.-born al Qaeda cleric in Yemen
1 of 2. Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-born cleric linked to al Qaeda’s Yemen-based wing, gives a religious lecture in an unknown location in this still image taken from video released by Intelwire.com on September 30, 2011. Anwar al-Awlaki has been killed, Yemen’s Defence Ministry said on Friday. A Yemeni security official said Awlaki, who is of Yemeni descent, was hit in a Friday morning air raid in the northern al-Jawf province that borders oil giant Saudi Arabia.
Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-born cleric linked to al Qaeda, was killed in a CIA drone strike in Yemen on Friday, U.S. officials said, removing a “global terrorist” high on a U.S. wanted list.
Awlaki’s killing deprives the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) of an eloquent propagandist in English and Arabic who was implicated in attacks on the United States.
“He planned and directed attacks against the United States,” one U.S. official said. “In addition, Awlaki publicly urged attacks against U.S. persons and interests worldwide and called for violence against Arab governments he judged to be working against al Qaeda.”
Earlier in his career, Awlaki preached at mosques in the United States attended by some of the hijackers in the September 11, 2001 attacks by al Qaeda, whose leader, Osama bin Laden, was killed in a U.S. raid on his hideout in Pakistan in May.
Awlaki’s death could be a boon for U.S. President Barack Obama and for his Yemeni counterpart, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who is clinging to power despite months of popular protests, factional violence and international pressure.
A Yemeni government statement said Samir Khan, an American of Pakistani origin, and two others were killed with Awlaki. Khan, from North Carolina, was an editor of AQAP’s English-language online magazine Inspire, which often published Awlaki’s writings.
A Yemeni official said Awlaki had been located based on information obtained from a detained AQAP militant.
U.S. drone aircraft targeted but missed Awlaki in May. The United States has stepped up drone strikes in Yemen to try and keep al Qaeda off balance and prevent it from capitalizing on the strife and chaos gripping the nation that borders oil giant Saudi Arabia and lies near vital shipping routes.
“CHIEF OF EXTERNAL OPERATIONS”
A senior U.S. official said Awlaki had orchestrated attacks on U.S. interests as “chief of external operations” for AQAP.
“Awlaki played a significant operational role in the attempted attack on a U.S. airliner in December 2009 (and) helped oversee the October 2010 plot to detonate explosive devices aboard U.S. cargo aircraft,” the official said.
Washington also learned that Awlaki sought to use poisons including cyanide and ricin to attack Westerners and exchanged e-mails with a U.S. military psychiatrist later accused of killing 13 people at Fort Hood army base in Texas in 2009.
AQAP, which established itself in Yemen after Saudi Arabia defeated a violent al Qaeda campaign from 2003-6, has emerged as one of the network’s most ambitious wings, attempting daring, if unsuccessful, attacks on U.S. and Saudi targets.
Bin Laden’s al Qaeda made its first mark in Yemen with an attack that killed 17 U.S. sailors on the warship Cole in Aden harbor in 2000.
The Yemen embassy in Washington said Awlaki had been killed 8 km (five miles) from the town of Khashef in the northern province of Jawf, adjacent to Saudi Arabia, about 140 km east of Sanaa, at about 9:55 a.m. (0655 GMT).
AQAP has not acknowledged Awlaki’s death. It usually takes a few days to post an Internet response to such killings.
A tribal sheikh in Jawf said Awlaki and three other people had been killed. “We have retrieved their bodies. There was another car that had al Qaeda members inside it, but they were able to escape,” he said, asking not to be named.
A Yemeni official said more details would be announced once the surviving al Qaeda group had been tracked down.
HARD TO REPLACE
“If he is dead, Awlaki will be difficult to replace,” said Jeremy Binnie, a terrorism and insurgency analyst at IHS Jane’s in London. “It’s a blow for AQAP’s international operations. Awlaki has helped the group build its international profile.”
U.S. authorities have branded Awlaki a “global terrorist” and last year authorized his capture or killing, but Sanaa had previously appeared reluctant to act against him.
Awlaki was not a senior Islamic cleric, nor a commander of AQAP, which is led by a Yemeni named Nasser al-Wuhayshi, but he played a key role in the group’s global outreach.
“Awlaki’s death won’t hurt al Qaeda’s operations because he didn’t have a leadership role. But the organization has lost an important figure for recruiting people from afar,” said Said Obeid, a Yemeni analyst on al Qaeda.
Henry Wilkinson, head analyst at risk consultancy Janusian in London, said Awlaki’s demise would have little impact on AQAP’s local operations, but added: “He was a rare talent who could reach out and recruit and mobilize. If the U.S. have killed Awlaki, then they have achieved a major target.”
Yemen has been mired in turmoil after eight months of mass protests demanding that Saleh step down, something he has reiterated he will do only if his main rivals do not take over.
“Because if we transfer power and they are there, this will mean that we have given into a coup,” Saleh told The Washington Post and Time magazine in an interview published on Friday, a week after he made a surprise return from Saudi Arabia.
He had been recuperating in Riyadh from a June bomb attack on his Sanaa compound that badly burned and wounded him.
STALLED TALKS
His return halted talks over a Gulf-brokered transition plan that had been revived despite violence that has killed more than 100 people in Sanaa in the past two weeks.
Saleh’s troops have been fighting the forces of rebel General Ali Mohsen and those of tribal leader Sadeq al-Ahmar.
Saleh who has repeatedly shied away from signing a Gulf-brokered transition plan at the last minute, urged outside powers to have more patience in concluding the deal, saying:
“We are pressed by America and the international community to speed up the process of handing over power. And we know where power is going to go. It is going to al Qaeda, which is directly and completely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.”
Opposition groups accuse Saleh of giving militants more leeway in a ploy to frighten Western powers and convince them that he is the best defense against al Qaeda.
“Awlaki serves the government as a way to scare the West,” said protest organizer Manea al-Mattari. “They want to improve their image in the West after all the killing they have done.”
Thousands of pro- and anti-Saleh demonstrators took to the streets of Sanaa again on Friday, the Muslim day of prayer.
Protesters carried 13 bodies, wrapped in Yemeni flags, of people killed in fighting in the capital this week. Asked about Awlaki’s death, one demonstrator said it was irrelevant.
“Nobody cared about his death today and we wonder why the government announced it now. We have much bigger problems than Anwar al-Awlaki,” said Fayza al-Suleimani, 29.
Gefälschter Lebenslauf von Klaus Maurischat-Pseudoym Siegfried Siewert – Partner von “Bennewirtz und Ehlers” – “CEO” DER STASI-“GoMoPa”
DIE WAHRHEIT – DAS SIND DIE ERPRESSER : “GoMoPa”-ERPRESST MERIDIAN CAPITAL “GoMoPa”-CEO MAURISCHAT WIRD VOM BKA VERHAFTET
DER BEWEIS: “GoMoPa”-ERPRESST MERIDIAN CAPITAL “GoMoPa”-CEO MAURISCHAT WIRD VOM BKA VERHAFTET
Millionen Finanzierungen mit Widersprüchen / Die Werbemethoden der Meridian Capital Enterprises
ZUM DOWNLOAD OBEN CLICKEN
Berlin (ots) – Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. bietet auf ihren Webseiten weltweite Finanzierungen an. GoMoPa hat die dort gemachten Angaben analysiert und starke Widersprüche entdeckt.
Die Unternehmensstruktur
Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. behauptet “ein Finanzinstitut” zu sein, “das zu einer internationalen Finanzgruppe gehört.” Diese Gruppe setze sich aus 11 verschiedenen Mitgliedern zusammen. GoMoPa fragte alle zuständigen Handelsregister ab. Ergebnis: 5 der 11 angegebenen Finanzinstitute sind nicht eingetragen.
Mitarbeiter der KLP Group Emirates, GoMoPa-Partner und Management-Gruppe in Dubai, machten sich die Mühe, drei weitere Geschäftsadressen der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. zu überprüfen. Martin Kraeter, Prinzipal der KLP Group: “Alle 3 genannten Firmen existieren hier nicht, auch nicht in abgewandelter Form.”
Das Unternehmen will weltweit über zahlreiche Standorte verfügen. Bei denen handelt es sich allerdings lediglich um “Virtual Offices” eines Büroservice-Anbieters.
Laut Firmenhomepage hat das Unternehmen seinen “rechtlichen Geschäftssitz” in Dubai. In einem GoMoPa vorliegenden Schreiben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. heißt es jedoch, der Firmensitz sei in London. Auf der Homepage selbst tauchen zwei Londoner Adressen auf, die das Unternehmen als “Kundenabteilung für deutschsprachige Kunden” und “Abteilung der Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren” bezeichnet.
Die Meridian Capital Enterprises ist tatsächlich als “Limited” (Ltd.) mit Sitz in England und Wales eingetragen. Eine Abfrage beim Gewerbeamt Dubais (DED) zur Firmierung jedoch bleibt ergebnislos. Bemerkenswert ist auch der vermeintliche Sitz in Israel. Auf der Webseite von Meridian Capital Enterprises heißt es: “Die Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist im Register des israelischen Justizministeriums unter der Nummer 514108471 (…) angemeldet.” Martin Kraeter hierzu: ” Ein ‘britisch-arabisch-israelisches bankfremdes Finanzinstitut sein zu wollen, wie die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. es darstellt, ist mehr als zweifelhaft. Es würde keinem einzigen Emirati, geschweige denn einem ‘Scheich’, auch nur im Traum einfallen Geschäfte mit Personen oder Firmen aus Israel zu machen. “
Eigenartig ist auch: Zwei angebliche Großinvestitionen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in Dubai sind Investmentruinen bzw. erst gar nicht realisierte Projekte.
Der Aktivitätsstatus der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist laut englischem Handelsregister als “dormant” gemeldet. Auf der Grundlage des britischen Gesellschaftsrechts können sich eingetragene Unternehmen selbst “dormant” (schlafend) melden, wenn sie keine oder nur unwesentliche buchhalterisch zu erfassende Transaktionen vorgenommen haben. Angesichts der angeblichen globalen Investitionstätigkeit der Meridian Capital Ltd. ist dieses jedoch sehr erstaunlich.
Auf ihrer Webseite gibt die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. einen Überblick über ihre größten Investitionen in Deutschland: “Dithmarschen Wind Powerplant, Waldpolenz Solar Park, AIDAdiva, Berlin Hauptbahnhof, Sony Center”. Die Eigentümer des Sony Centers am Potsdamer Platz teilten GoMoPA mit, dass ihnen sei ein solcher Investor unbekannt sei. Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. will übrigens angeblich auch in die Erweiterung des Panama-Kanals sowie in das Olympiastadion in Peking investiert haben.
Der Webauftritt
Die Internetseite der MCE ist aufwendig gestaltet. Bei näherer Betrachtung fällt jedoch auf, dass es sich bei zahlreichen Fotos der Veranstaltungen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in den meisten Fällen um Bildmaterial von Online-Zeitungen oder frei zugänglichen Medienfotos einzelner Institutionen handelt.
Auf der Homepage befinden sich Videofilme, die eine verblüffende Ähnlichkeit mit dem Werbematerial von NAKHEEL aufweisen, dem größten Bauträger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. Den schillernden Videos über die berühmten drei Dubai Palmen wurden offensichtlich selbstproduzierte Trailersequenzen der Meridian Capital Enterprises vorangestellt.
Ab einem Volumen von 10 Millionen Euro oder höher präsentiert sich so die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. als der passende Investitionspartner. Auf der Internetseite sind diverse Fotos mit Scheichs an Konferenztischen zu sehen. Doch diese großen Tagungen und großen Kongresse der Meridian Capital Enterprises werden in den Pressearchiven der lokalen Presse Dubais mit keinem Wort erwähnt.
Vertiefende Information unter:
http://www.presseportal.de/go2/mehr_zu_MCE_ltd
Originaltext: GoMoPa GmbH Digitale Pressemappe: http://www.presseportal.de/pm/72697 Pressemappe via RSS : http://www.presseportal.de/rss/pm_72697.rss2
Pressekontakt: Herr Friedrich Wasserburg Telefon: +49 (30) 51060992 Fax: +49 (30) 51060994 Zuständigkeitsbereich: Presse
Firmeninfo Goldman Morgenstern & Partners LLC 575 Madison Avenue USA-10022 – 2511 New York http://www.gomopa.net
Über Goldman Morgenstern & Partners LLC: Ein Zusammenschluss aus Unternehmens-, Steuer-, Anlageberatern und Rechtsanwälten.
© 2008 news aktuell
DANN GING DIe ERPRESSUNG LOS UND MERIDIAN CAPITAL REAGIERTE – STATT DIES ABER ZUZUGEBEN SETZEN DIE STASI-VERBRECHER EINE GEFÄLSCHTE PRESSE-MITTEILUNG IN NETZ, DIE MICH BELASTEN SOLL
BITTE KONTAKTIEREN SIE AUCH MERIDIAN CAPITAL
sales@meridiancapital.com
1 Battery Park Plaza
New York, NY 10004
TEL: 212-972-3600
FAX: 212-612-0100
Hierzu weitere Infos unter
Original Stellungnahme Meridian Capital gegen “GoMoPa” auf http://meridiancapital.wordpress.com/
Original Stellungnahme Meridian Capital gegen “GoMoPa” auf http://meridiancapital.wordpress.com
Meridian Capital about GoMoPa
STASI-FÄLSCHUNGEN DER “GoMoPa”
- June 12, 2011 – 10:44 am
- Posted in Uncategorized
- Comments Off
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,
die Betrüger und durch uns inhaftierten Erpresser der GoMoPa versuchen mit einer gefälschten Presse-Mitteilung von usich abzulenken und einen investigativen Journalisten, Bernd Pulch, zu belasten.
Die Presse-Mitteilung auf pressreleaser.org ist eine Fälschung und die gesamte webseite ist der GoMoPa zu zuordnen.
Hier noch einmal die tatäschlichen Geschehnisse:
Hier der Artikel von “GoMoPa” über Meridian Capital.
„GoMopa“ schreibt:08.09.2008Weltweite Finanzierungen mit WidersprüchenDie Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt an, weltweite Finanzierungen anbieten zu können und präsentiert sich hierbei auf aufwendig kreierten Webseiten. GOMOPA hat die dort gemachten Angaben analysiert und Widersprüche entdeckt.Der FirmensitzDer Firmensitz befindet sich laut eigener Aussage in Dubai, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate. In einem GOMOPA vorliegenden Schreiben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. heißt es jedoch, der Firmensitz sei in London. Auf der Homepage des Unternehmens taucht die Geschäftsadresse in der Londoner Old Broad Street nur als „Kundenabteilung für deutschsprachige Kunden“ auf. Eine weitere Adresse in der englischen Hauptstadt, diesmal in der Windsor Avenue, sei die „Abteilung der Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren“.Die Meridian Capital Enterprises ist tatsächlich als „Limited“ (Ltd.) mit Sitz in England und Wales eingetragen. Aber laut Firmenhomepage hat das Unternehmen seinen „rechtlichen Geschäftssitz“ in Dubai. Eine Abfrage beim Gewerbeamt Dubais (DED) zu dieser Firmierung bleibt ergebnislos. Bemerkenswert ist auch der vermeintliche Sitz in Israel. Auf der Webseite von Meridian Capital Enterprises heißt es: „Die Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist im Register des israelischen Justizministeriums unter der Nummer 514108471, gemäß dem Gesellschaftsrecht von 1999, angemeldet.“ Hierzu Martin Kraeter, Gomopa-Partner und Prinzipal der KLP Group Emirates in Dubai: „Es würde keinem einzigen Emirati – geschweige denn einem Scheich auch nur im Traum einfallen, direkte Geschäfte mit Personen oder Firmen aus Israel zu tätigen. Und schon gar nicht würde er zustimmen, dass sein Konterfei auch noch mit vollem Namen auf der Webseite eines Israelischen Unternehmens prangt.“ Auf der Internetseite sind diverse Fotos mit Scheichs an Konferenztischen zu sehen. Doch diese großen Tagungen und großen Kongresse der Meridian Capital Enterprises werden in den Pressearchiven der lokalen Presse Dubais mit keinem Wort erwähnt. Zwei angebliche Großinvestitionen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in Dubai sind Investmentruinen bzw. erst gar nicht realisierte Projekte. Das Unternehmen wirbt mit ihrer finanziellen Beteiligung an dem Dubai Hydropolis Hotel und dem Dubai Snowdome. Der Aktivitätsstatus der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist laut englischen Handelsregister (UK Companies House) „dormant“ gemeldet. Auf der Grundlage des englischen Gesellschaftsrechts können sich eingetragene Unternehmen selbst „dormant“ (schlafend) melden, wenn sie keine oder nur unwesentliche buchhalterisch zu erfassende Transaktionen vorgenommen haben. Dies ist angesichts der angeblichen globalen Investitionstätigkeit der Meridian Capital Ltd. sehr erstaunlich. Der Webauftritt Die Internetseite der MCE ist sehr aufwendig gestaltet, die Investitionen angeblich in Millionen- und Milliardenhöhe. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Präsentationselemente fällt jedoch auf, dass es sich bei zahlreichen veröffentlichen Fotos, die Veranstaltungen der Meridian Capital Enterprises dokumentieren sollen, meist um Fotos von Online-Zeitungen oder frei zugänglichen Medienfotos einzelner Institutionen handelt wie z.B. der Börse Dubai. Auf der Internetpräsenz befinden sich Videofilmchen, die eine frappierende Ähnlichkeit mit dem Werbematerial von NAKHEEL aufweisen, dem größten Bauträger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. Doch den schillernden Videos über die berühmten drei Dubai Palmen „Jumeirah, Jebel Ali und Deira“ oder das Archipel „The World“ wurden offensichtlich selbstproduzierte Trailersequenzen der Meridian Capital Enterprises vorangestellt. Doch könnte es sich bei den Werbevideos um Fremdmaterial handeln. Auch die auf der Webseite wahllos platzierten Fotos von bekannten Sehenswürdigkeiten Dubais fungieren als Augenfang für den interessierten Surfer mit eigenem Finanzierungswunsch. Bei einem Volumen von 10 Millionen Euro oder höher präsentiert sich die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. als der passende Investitionspartner. Das Unternehmen verfügt weltweit über zahlreiche Standorte: Berlin, London, Barcelona, Warschau, Moskau, Dubai, Riad, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong und New York. Aber nahezu alle Standorte sind lediglich Virtual Offices eines global arbeitenden Büroservice-Anbieters. „Virtual Office“ heißt im Deutschen schlicht „Briefkastenfirma“. Unter solchen Büroadressen sollen laut Meridian Capital Enterprises ganze Kommissionen ansässig sein, alles zum Wohle des Kunden.“ Zitatende |
Hier die Hintergründe der Erpressung:
Hier unsere Original-Stellungnahme:
Anfang Oktober 2008 erhielt einer der Arbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. eine Meldung von einem anonymen Sender, dass in naher Zukunft – zuerst im Internet, dann im Fernsehen, im Radio und in der deutschen Presse – Informationen erscheinen, die die Funktionsweise und Tätigkeiten der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in einem äußerst negativen Licht darstellen. Der Mitarbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. wurde also informiert, dass diese Meldungen/Nachrichten zweifelsohne deutlich das Aussehen und den guten Ruf der Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. beeinträchtigen.
Der an dieser Stelle erwähnte „Gesprächspartner” hat den Arbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. informiert, dass die Möglichkeit besteht die peinliche Situation zu vermeiden, indem die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. auf das von der Person gezeigte Konto die Summe von 100.000,00 EUR überweist. Wie sich aber später zeigte, war der Herr Klaus Maurischat – dieser anonyme Gesprächspartner – „Gehirn“ und „Lider des GOMOPA“. Die Ermittlungen wurden angestellt durch die Bundeskriminalpolizei (Verfolgungs- und Ermittlungsorgan auf der Bundesebene) während des Ermittlungsverfahrens wegen einer finanziellen Erpressung, Betrügereien auch wegen der Bedrohungen, welche von Herrn Maurischat und seine Mitarbeiter praktiziert wurden sowie wegen Teilnahme anderer (Leiter der Internetservices und Moderatoren der Blogs) an diesem Prozedere. Diese Straftaten wurden begangen zu Schaden vieler Berufs- und Justizpersonen, darunter auch der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Die Opfer dieses Verbrechens sind in Deutschland, Österreich, der Schweiz, Spanien, Portugal, Großbritannien, den USA und Kanada sichtbar.
In diesem Moment taucht folgende Frage auf: Wie war die Reaktion der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. auf die Forderungen seitens GOMOPA? Entsprach die Reaktion den Erwartungen von GOMOPA? Hat die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. die geforderte Summe 100.000,00 EUR überwiesen?
Seites der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gab es überhaupt keine Reaktion auf den Erpressungsversuch von GOMOPA. Ende August 2008 auf dem Service http://www.gompa.net sind zahlreiche Artikel/Meldungen erscheinen, welche die Tätigkeit der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in einem sehr negativen Licht dargestellt haben. Nachdem die auf http://www.gomopa.net enthaltenen Informationen ausführlich und vollständig analysiert worden waren, ergab es sich, dass sie der Wahrheit nicht einmal in einem Punkt entsprechen und potenzielle und bereits bestehende Kunden der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in Bezug auf die von diesem Finanzinstitut geführten Geschäftstätigkeit irreführen. Infolge der kriminellen Handlugen von GOMOPA und der mit ihm kooperierenden Services und Blogs im Netz hat die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. beachtliche und messbare geschäftliche Verluste erlitten. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. hat nämlich in erster Linie eine wichtige Gruppe von potenziellen Kund verloren. Was sich aber als wichtiger ergab, haben sich die bisherigen Kunden von der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. kaum abgewandt. Diejenigen Kunden haben unsere Dienstleitungen weiterhin genutzt und nutzen die immer noch. In Hinblick auf die bisherige Zusammenarbeit mit der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd., werden ihrerseits dem entsprechend keine Einwände erhoben .
GOMOPA hat so einen Verlauf der Ereignisse genau prognostiziert, dessen Ziel beachtliche und messbare geschäftliche durch die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. erlittene Verluste waren. Der Verlauf der Ereignisse hat das Service GOMOPA mit Sicherheit gefreut. GOMOPA hat nämlich darauf gerechnet, dass die Stellung der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. nachlässt und das Finanzinstitut die geforderte Summe (100.000,00 EUR) bereitstellt. Im Laufe der Zeit, als das ganze Prozedere im Netz immer populärer war, versuchte GOMOPA noch vier mal zu der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Kontakte aufzunehmen, indem es jedes mal das Einstellen dieser kriminellen „Kompanie” versprochen hat, wobei es jedes mal seine finanziellen Forderungen heraufsetzte. Die letzte für das Einstellen der „Kompanie“ gegen die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. vorgesehene Quote betrug sogar 5.000.000,00 EUR (in Worten: fünfmilionen EURO). Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. konnte sich aber vor den ständig erhöhenden Forderungen seitens des Services GOMOPA behaupten.
Im Oktober 2008 traf die Leitung der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Entscheidung über die Benachrichtigung der Internationalen Polizei INTERPOL sowie entsprechender Strafverfolgungsorgane der BRD (die Polizei und die Staatsanwaltschaft) über den bestehenden Sachverhalt. In der Zwischenzeit meldeten sich bei der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. zahlreiche Firmen und Korporationen, sogar Berufsperson wie Ärzte, Richter, Priester, Schauspieler und anderen Personen aus unterschiedlichen Ländern der Welt, die der Erpressung von GOMOPA nachgegeben und die geforderten Geldsummen überwiesen haben. Diese Personen gaben bereits Erklärungen ab, dass sie dies getan haben, damit man sie bloß endlich „in Ruhe lässt” und um unnötige Probleme, Schwierigkeiten und einen kaum begründbaren Ausklang vermeiden zu können. Die Opfer dieses kriminellen Vorgehens haben die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. über unterschiedliche Geldsummen, welche verlangt wurden, informiert.
In einem Fall gab es verhältnismäßig kleine (um ein paar tausend EURO), in einem anderen Fall handelte es schon um beachtliche Summen (rund um paar Millionen EURO).
Zusätzlich wendeten sich an die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Firmen, welche dem GOMOPA noch keine „Gebühr” überweisen haben und bereits überlegen, ob sie dies tun sollen, oder nicht. Diese Firmen erwarteten von der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. eine klare Stellungnahme sowie eine professionelle praktische Beratung, wie man sich in solch einer Lage verhalten soll und wie man diese Geldforderungen umgehen kann. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. hat ausnahmslos allen Verbrechensopfern, welche sich bei unserer Firma gemeldet haben, eine Zusammenarbeit vorgeschlagen. Als oberste Aufgabe stellt sich diese Kooperation, gemeinsam entschlossene und wirksame Maßnahmen gegen GOMOPA, gegen andere Services im Netz sowie gegen alle Bloggers zu treffen, die an dem hier beschriebenen internationalen kriminellen Vorgehen mit GOMOPA-Führung teilnehmen.Auf unsere Bitte benachrichtigten alle mitbeteiligten Firmen die Internationale Polizei INTERPOL sowie ihre heimischen Verfolgungsorgane, u. a. die zuständige Staatsanwaltschaft und die Polizeibehörden über den bestehenden Sachverhalt.
In Hinblick auf die Tatsache, dass das verbrecherische Handeln von GOMOPA sich über viele Staaten erstreckte und dass die Anzahl der in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland erstatteten Anzeigen wegen der durch GOMOPA, Internetservices und Bloggers begangenen Straftaten, rasant wuchs – was zweifelsohne von einer weit gehenden kriminellen Wirkungskraft des GOMOPA zeugt – schlug die Internationale Wirtschaftspolizei INTERPOL der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. vor, dass sich ihr Vertreter in Berlin mit dem Vertreter von GOMOPA trifft, um die „Zahlungsmodalitäten“ und Überweisung der Summe von 5.000.000,00 EUR zu besprechen. Dieser Schritt meinte, eine gut durchdachte und durch die Bundeskriminalpolizei organisierte Falle durchzuführen, deren Ziel die Festnahme der unter GOMOPA wirkenden internationalen Straftäter war.
Die koordinierten Schritte und Maßnahmen der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. und anderer Beschädigter, geleitet von der Internationalen Wirtschaftspolizei INTERPOL, dem Bundeskriminalamt und der Staatsanwaltschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland haben zur Aus-, Einarbeitung und Durchführung der oben beschriebenen Falle beigetragen. Im November 2008 führte die in Berlin vorbereitete Falle zur Festnahme und Verhaftung des Vertreters des GOMOPA, der nach der Festnahme auf Herrn Klaus Maurichat – als den Hauptverantwortlichen und Anführer der internationalen kriminellen Gruppe GOMOPA verwies. Der Festgenommene benannte und zeigte der Bundeskriminalpolizei zugleich den aktuellen Aufenthaltsort des Herrn Klaus Maurischat. „Gehirn“ und Gründer dieser internationalen kriminellen Gruppe GOMOPA, Herr Klaus Maurischat wurde am selben Tag auch festgenommen und auf Frist verhaftet, wird bald in Anklagezustand gestellt, wird die Verantwortung für eigene Straftaten und die des Forums GOMOPA vor einem zuständigen Bundesgericht tragen. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. unternahm bereits alle möglichen Schritte, damit Herr Klaus Maurischat auch auf der Anklagebank des zuständigen Gerichts des Vereinigten Königsreiches Großbritannien erscheint. Unter den beschädigten Berufs- und Justizpersonen aus Großbritannien, neben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt es noch viele Opfer von GOMOPA…
Die dreisten Verbrecher wagen es unter http://www.pressreleaser.org, einer eigenen “GoMoPa”-Seite unsere Pressemitteilung oben zu verfälschen und unschuldige Personen zu belasten.
“GoMoPa” Boss is Jochen Resch
- May 15, 2011 – 1:15 pm
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Dear Readers,
after a thorough research we are sure that the real “GoMoPa” boss is Jochen Resch, lawyer in Berlin, Germany. He is the brain behind “GoMoPa” and responsable for blackmailing, extortion, racketeering, cybermurder and murder – in the tradition of the East German “Inteeligence” STASI that is why he called “GoMoPa” – Financial “Intelligence” Service .
Webmaster
Meridian Capital about GoMoPa
“GoMoPa” in detention
- May 13, 2011 – 1:02 pm
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Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. unveils new criminal phenomena in network. In recently appeared on the net more often at the same time a new a very worrying phenomenon of criminal nature. Professional criminals groups in the network are taking part, to extortion, fraud, Erschwindeln relating to certain specifically selected companies and businesses are capable of. These criminals developed new methods and means, simply and in a short time to bereichern.Strategien and manifestations, which underlie this process are fairly simple. A criminal is looking to “carefully” on the Internet specific companies and corporations (victims of crime) and informed them in the next step, that of the business activities of such companies and corporations in the near future – first on the Internet then in other available mass media – numerous and very unfavorable information appears. At the same time, the criminals beat their future victims an effective means of reducing unnecessary difficulties and problems to escape the loss of good name and image of the company and corporate sector. These offenders are aware of that reputation, name and appearance of each company is a value in itself. It was therefore a value of what each company is prepared to pay any price. But the reason for difficulties and problems arising from the loss of good name and reputation result. The criminals and their victims are already aware that this loss is devastating consequences might have been the closing down of a particular business can enforce. It takes both to No as well as at large companies regard. The company is concerned that in virtually every industry in each country and cross-border activities sind.Das criminal procedure in the form of a blackmail on money, a fraud is becoming rapidly and globally, ie led cross-border and internationally. Among the victims of extortion, fraud is now looking both at home (domestic) and international corporations, the major emphasis on conservation, keeping and maintaining their reputation in the business according to their credibility lay. The criminals in the network have understood that maintaining an unassailable reputation and name of a company the unique ability to provide fast and easy enrichment forms. The above-mentioned criminal procedure is difficult to track because it is international in nature, and by overlapping or even nonexistent (fictional) professional and judicial persons in various countries and operated company wird.Diese offenders in the network publish it and disseminate false information about your victims on remote servers, which are not uncommon in many exotic countries. There are those countries in which serious gaps in the legal system, investigative and prosecution procedures are visible. As an example, at this point mention India werden. Mit criminals working in the network grid portals known leader of blogs with your seat-consciously or unconsciously, even in highly developed countries. For example, at this point, countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, Spain or Portugal are mentioned. The below listed criminals were able to act unpunished today. As a symptom of such action appears here the activity and “effectiveness” of the company GOMOPA, which is on countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the United States, Britain, Spain and India. A good example of such an action is Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat – the leader and “brain” of the company GOMOPA with many already in force and criminal judgments “on his account”, which in this way for years and funded its maintenance in the industry almost unlimited activity. This status will change dramatically, however, including far and wide thanks to discontinued operations of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. who would oppose such offenses addressed in the network. Other companies and corporations, in which the crime network and outside of this medium have fallen victim to contribute to combating such crimes bei.Die situation is changing, thanks to effective steps and the successful cooperation of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. with the international police Interpol, with the federal agency (FBI) in the U.S., the Federal Criminal Police in Germany, with Scotland Yard in Britain, as well as with the Russian secret service FSB.Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. – Together with other companies and cooperations, the victim of criminal activities of the network of crime have fallen – has undeniably already started to yield results. The fact that in recent weeks (November 2008) on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of the above-mentioned leaders and “brain” of the company GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Maurishat was arrested should not be ignored. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. information available results clearly show that the next arrests of persons participating in this process in such countries as: Austria, Switzerland, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Spain, Mexico, Portugal, Brazil, the USA, Canada, UK, Ireland , Australia, New Zealand and made in a.. The ultimate goal of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. and the other victims of crime in the network is to provide all participants in this criminal procedure before the competent court to lead. All professional and judicial persons, regardless of the seat and out of the business, which the above-described criminal action (fraud, extortion) to have fallen victim can of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. led company to join the goal set at all at this point the procedure described those associated in the public and the economic life out. II blacklist blackmail and with international fraudsters and their methods (opus operandi) in the following countries: 1 The Federal Republic Deutschland2. Dubai 3rd Russia 1st The Federal Republic of Germany GmbH GOMOPA, Goldman Morgenstern & Partners LLC., Goldman Morgenstern & Partners Consulting LLC, Wottle collection. In these firms are quite active following persons: – Klaus Mauri Chat ( “Father” and “brain” of the criminal organization responsible for countless final judgments have been achieved (arrested in Germany in November 2008) – Josef Rudolf Heckel ( “right hand “when Mr Klaus Mauri chat, denounced former banker who is excessive in many Bankschmuggeleien was involved.
The study of 900 pages named Toxdat by Ehrenfried Stelzer is the “Stasi Killer Bible”. It lists all kind of murder methods and concentrates on the most effective and untraceable.
“The toxdat study was ordered by Stasi Vice-President Gerhard Neiber, the second man in rank after boss Erich Mielke. The toxdat study was also the theoretical “story book” for the murder of the famous German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach by former Stasi member under the guidance of “GoMoPa”,” an informer stated. “Ehrenfried stelzer” was nicknamed “Professor Murder” by his victims. Even close co-worker now compare him with the German SS”doctor” Mengele, “Dr. Death” from Auschwitz.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution.
For more Information the victims have launched a new site: http://www.victims-opfer.com
The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.
Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment.
German authorities are under growing pressure to reopen investigations into at least a dozen suspicious deaths after the arrest of an alleged East German assassin cast new light on the communist regime. Stasi victims quoted a source saying “isolated units” had conducted operations that were “extremely well organised” and had “100 per cent logistical support” from the East German state.
A statement from prosecutors read: “The accused [Jurgen G] is suspected, as a member of a commando of the former DDR, of killing a number of people between 1976 and 1987 who from the point of view of the DDR regime had committed treason or were threatening to do so.”
Details of his Jurgen G’s arrest have been described in suitably florid terms, with the mass circulation tabloid Bild saying he was working at the Wolfsbruch marina near Rheinsberg in north-eastern Germany when a woman approached him. “Excuse me, is that your yellow Trabant in the car park? I just ran into it with my car,” she is said to have asked.
When he followed her to the car park, masked officers jumped out of vans and bushes and overpowered him in an operation worthy of the Stasi itself.
An eyewitness told Bild: “They blindfolded him and raced off in an unmarked car.”
Police across Germany are reported to be sifting through files to see who the victims may have been, and some intelligence officers are greeting the arrest of Jurgen G as a breakthrough.
Thomas Auerbach, who works for the Stasi file authority in Berlin and has written a book based on the death squad files, said: “These people were trained to make such murders look like accidents or suicides, even as ‘ordinary’ crimes such as robberies. They were real terror experts.”
The cases said to be linked to Jurgen G or his unit include many people involved with the commercial arm of the East German ruling socialist party, the SED (Socialist Unity Party).
Uwe Harms, the head of a Hamburg-based haulage firm which was part of a network of companies secretly owned by the SED, disappeared in March 1987 after conversations with various DDR functionaries. Six weeks later, his body was found in a plastic bag.
Weeks before his death he told friends that he felt he was being followed. After reunification, one of the other SED company heads said Mr Harms had been liquidated for refusing to allow his firm to be used to transport arms into East Germany.
Dieter Vogel, a businessman who had been jailed for life for spying for the CIA, was found suffocated in his cell in the East German prison Bautzen on March 9, 1982. The fact that he was due to be taken to the West in a spy swap arrangement just a few weeks later cast doubt on the suicide theory.
He had passed the names of several Stasi moles to the BND, West Germany’s heavily penetrated counter-intelligence service.
The Christian Democrat Union politician Uwe Barschel, 43, was found dead by magazine reporters in his bathtub in a hotel room in Geneva in October, 1987. He died of poisoning, but rumours that he was involved somehow in arms deals and the Stasi have clung to the case.
One of the more high-profile and enduring mysteries is that of Lutz Eigendorf, an East German footballer from the Stasi-backed Dynamo Berlin.
He fled to the West in 1979 amid great publicity. Four years later, he died after crashing his car into a tree on a straight stretch of road with blood alcohol levels way over the limit. Witnesses who had seen him earlier in the evening said he had not been drinking.
Most controversial though is the suggestion that the assassination squad was linked to the murder of a Swedish television reporter and her friend in 1984.
Cats Falk and her friend Lena Graens went missing on Nov 19, 1984. Their bodies were fished out of a Stockholm canal six months later.
Reports suggested a three-man assassination squad killed them, spiking their drinks with drugs, putting them into their car and pushing it into the Hammarby canal.
Shortly before her death, Cats Falk had reportedly uncovered a deal between an arms dealer and an East German firm.
Germany has recently undergone a wave of nostalgia for all things East German, dubbed Ostalgie, with colourful television shows featuring former DDR stars such as the ice skater Katerina Witt talking wistfully about socialist pop music.
A reassessment may be coming in the wake of the revelations.
Victims: The DDR-STASI MURDER GANG “GoMOPa” in murderoplot against Joerg Berger
The Stasi Murder Gang of „GoMoPa“ was involved in many trials to kill the popular East German soccer trainer Joerg Berger, Stasi victims tell in postings on their hompage http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com. Berger stated before his early death in his biography that they tried to pollute him with arsenic.
Arsenic and many of its compounds are especially potent poisons. Many water supplies close to mines are contaminated by these poisons. Arsenic disrupts ATP production through several mechanisms. At the level of the citric acid cycle, arsenic inhibits lipoic acid which is a cofactor for pyruvate dehydrogenase; and by competing with phosphate it uncouples oxidative phosphorylation, thus inhibiting energy-linked reduction of NAD+, mitochondrial respiration and ATP synthesis. Hydrogen peroxide production is also increased, which might form reactive oxygen species and oxidative stress. These metabolic interferences lead to death from multi-system organ failure, probably from necrotic cell death, not apoptosis. A post mortem reveals brick red coloured mucosa, owing to severe haemorrhage. Although arsenic causes toxicity, it can also play a protective role.[
Elemental arsenic and arsenic compounds are classified as “toxic” and “dangerous for the environment” in the European Union under directive 67/548/EEC. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) recognizes arsenic and arsenic compounds as group 1 carcinogens, and the EU lists arsenic trioxide, arsenic pentoxide and arsenate salts as category 1 carcinogens.
Arsenic is known to cause arsenicosis owing to its manifestation in drinking water, “the most common species being arsenate [HAsO42- ; As(V)] and arsenite [H3AsO3 ; As(III)]”. The ability of arsenic to undergo redox conversion between As(III) and As(V) makes its availability in the environment more abundant. According to Croal, Gralnick, Malasarn and Newman, “[the] understanding [of] what stimulates As(III) oxidation and/or limits As(V) reduction is relevant for bioremediation of contaminated sites (Croal). The study of chemolithoautotrophic As(III) oxidizers and the heterotrophic As(V) reducers can help the understanding of the oxidation and/or reduction of arsenic.
Treatment of chronic arsenic poisoning is easily accomplished. British anti-lewisite (dimercaprol) is prescribed in dosages of 5 mg/kg up to 300 mg each 4 hours for the first day. Then administer the same dosage each 6 hours for the second day. Then prescribe this dosage each 8 hours for eight additional days. However the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) states that the long term effects of arsenic exposure cannot be predicted. Blood, urine, hair and nails may be tested for arsenic, however these tests cannot foresee possible health outcomes due to the exposure. Excretion occurs in the urine and long term exposure to arsenic has been linked to bladder and kidney cancer in addition to cancer of the liver, prostate, skin, lungs and nasal cavity.[
Occupational exposure and arsenic poisoning may occur in persons working in industries involving the use of inorganic arsenic and its compounds, such as wood preservation, glass production, nonferrous metal alloys and electronic semiconductor manufacturing. Inorganic arsenic is also found in coke oven emissions associated with the smelter industry.
THE DDR GESTAPO-STASI MURDER GANG responsable for the murder of Lutz Eigendorf
The talented Eigendorf played for East German side Dynamo Berlin.
He made his debut for the GDR in an August 1978 match against Bulgaria, immediately scoring his first two goals in a 2–2 draw. He went on to collect six caps, scoring three goals.[1] His final international was a February 1979 friendly match against Iraq.
On 20 March 1979, after a friendship match between Dynamo and West German club 1. FC Kaiserslautern in Gießen he fled to the west hoping to play for that team. But because of his defection he was banned from play for one year by UEFA and instead spent that time as a youth coach with the club.
This was not the first time an East German athlete had fled to the west, but it was a particularly embarrassing defection. Eigendorf’s club Dynamo was under the patronage of the Stasi, East Germany’s secretive state police, and subject to the personal attentions of the organisation’s head, Erich Mielke. He ensured that the club’s roster was made up of the country’s best players, as well as arranging for the manipulation of matches in Dynamo’s favour. After his defection Eigendorf openly criticised the DDR in the western media.
His wife Gabriele remained behind in Berlin with their daughter and was placed under constant police surveillance. Lawyers working for the Stasi quickly arranged a divorce and the former Frau Eigendorf re-married. Her new husband was eventually revealed as a Lothario – an agent of the state police whose role it was to spy on a suspect while romancing them.
In 1983 Eigendorf moved from Kaiserslautern to join Eintracht Braunschweig, all the while under the scrutiny of the Stasi who employed a number of West Germans as informants. On 5 March that year he was badly injured in a suspicious traffic accident and died within two days. An autopsy indicated a high blood alcohol level despite the testimony of people he had met with that evening indicating that Eigendorf had only a small amount of beer to drink.
After German re-unification and the subsequent opening of the files of the former East Germany’s state security service it was revealed that the traffic accident had been an assassination attempt orchestrated by the Stasi, confirming the longtime suspicions held by many. A summary report of the events surrounding Eigendorf’s death was made on German television on 22 March 2000 which detailed an investigation by Heribert Schwan in the documentary “Tod dem Verräter” (“Death to the Traitor”).
On 10 February 2010, a former East German spy revealed the Stasi ordered him to kill Eigendorf, which he claimed not to have done
MfS has been accused of a number of assassinations against political dissidents and other people both inside and outside the country. Examples include the East German football player Lutz Eigendorf and the Swedish journalist Cats Falck.
The terrorists who killed Alfred Herrhausen were professionals. They dressed as construction workers to lay a wire under the pavement of the road along Mr. Herrhausen’s usual route to work. They planted a sack of armor-piercing explosives on a parked bicycle by the roadside. An infrared beam shining across the road triggered the explosion just when the limousine, one of three cars in a convoy, sped by.
The operation, from the terrorists’ point of view, was flawless: Mr. Herrhausen, the chairman of one of Europe’s most powerful companies, Deutsche Bank, was killed in the explosion along that suburban Frankfurt road on Nov. 30, 1989.
But was everything what it seemed?
Within days, the Red Army Faction — a leftist terrorist group that had traumatized West Germany since 1970 with a series of high-profile crimes and brazen killings of bankers and industrialists — claimed responsibility for the assassination. An intense manhunt followed. In June 1990, police arrested 10 Red Army Faction members who had fled to East Germany to avoid arrest for other crimes. To the police’s surprise, they were willing to talk. Equally confounding to authorities: All had solid alibis. None was charged in the Herrhausen attack.
Now, almost two decades later, German police, prosecutors and other security officials have focused on a new suspect: the East German secret police, known as the Stasi. Long fodder for spy novelists like John le Carré, the shadowy Stasi controlled every aspect of East German life through imprisonment, intimidation and the use of informants — even placing a spy at one point in the office of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.
According to documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, the murders of Mr. Herrhausen and others attributed to the Red Army Faction bear striking resemblance to methods and tactics pioneered by a special unit of the Stasi. The unit reported to Stasi boss Erich Mielke and actively sought in the waning years of the communist regime to imitate the Red Army Faction to mask their own attacks against prominent people in Western Germany and destabilize the country.
“The investigation has intensified in recent months,” said Frank Wallenta, a spokesman for the Federal Prosecutor. “And we are investigating everything, including leads to the Stasi.”
If those leads turn out to be true, it would mean not only rewriting some of the most dramatic episodes of the Cold War, but would likely accelerate a broader soul-searching now under way in Germany about the communist past.
In building a reunified country, many Germans have ignored discussion of the brutal realities of its former communist half. When the former East Germany is discussed, it’s often with nostalgia or empathy for brothers hostage to Soviet influence.
Stasi boss Erich Mielke, middle, with unnamed associates
That taboo is slowly being broken. Last year’s Oscar-winning movie, “The Lives of Others,” chronicled in dark detail a Stasi agent’s efforts to subvert the lives of ordinary people. Material in the Stasi archives shows that senior leaders had a shoot-to-kill order against those fleeing from East to West — a controversial order that contradicts East German leaders’ claims that they never ordered any shootings.
This story is based on more than a dozen interviews with police, prosecutors and other security officials. Several policemen and prosecutors confirmed that the allegation of extensive Stasi involvement with the Red Army Faction is a key part of the current investigation.
Court cases in West Germany in the 1990s established that members of the Red Army Faction were granted free passage to other countries in the 1970s and refuge in East Germany in the 1980s. But the current investigation and documents from Stasi archives suggest far deeper involvement — that members of the Red Army Faction were not only harbored by the Stasi but methodically trained in sophisticated techniques of bombing and murder.
Traudl Herrhausen, Mr. Herrhausen’s widow, is one of those pushing for further investigation. She says she long suspected involvement by the Stasi or other intelligence service such as the KGB, but never spoke publicly because she didn’t have evidence and didn’t want to interfere in the investigation. She says she is now breaking an 18-year silence in her desire to see justice done. “Now I want to look my husband’s killers in the eye,” she said in an interview.
The Red Army Faction was founded about 1970 by a band of leftists who justified their terrorism based on opposition to West Germany’s ruling elite. Killing members of this elite would provoke the West German state to take repressive measures that would show its true fascist face, Red Army Faction leaders believed.
In its early years, the group, also known as the Baader-Meinhof band, made headlines with prison breaks, bank robberies, bomb attacks and deadly shootouts. Four gang members led by Ulrike Meinhof freed Red Army Faction leader Andreas Baader from a Berlin jail a month after his arrest.
Red Army Faction violence in West Germany intensified in 1977 when Jürgen Ponto, then head of Dresdner Bank, was shot and killed at his home. Five weeks later, the group killed four people and abducted the chairman of the German employer association, Hans-Martin Schleyer, one of West Germany’s most prominent businessmen. It was the start of a six-week ordeal in which neither government nor terrorists would compromise. To support the Red Army Faction cause, Palestinian terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa jet in Spain, forcing it to land in Mogadishu, Somalia. After the plane was rushed by West German commandos, top Red Army Faction leaders in West Germany committed suicide and Mr. Schleyer was executed by his captors.
Red Army Faction violence began to abate in the late 1970s after the Lufthansa incident. Many in Germany thought the group — whose attacks were often crude — lost its will to kill after the arrest of its senior leaders in 1982. So when the group appeared to renew its terror campaign with a series of high-profile attacks in 1985, police were stunned by the level of their sophistication and determination.
This time, the group dazzled police with its ability to hit targets and leave little substantial evidence behind. They used high-tech devices no one thought they possessed. Their marksmen killed with military precision.
Weapons used by terrorists during the 1977 kidnapping of German industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer.
Surprisingly, members of the Red Army Faction so-called third generation had a policeman’s understanding of forensic science. From 1985 onward, the Red Army Faction rarely left a fingerprint or other useful piece of evidence at a crime scene, according to court records. The murder cases from this era are still open. Some suspected Stasi involvement, but no one could ever prove it, according to a senior police official.
The 1989 car-bomb murder of Mr. Herrhausen particularly stunned police with its audacity and sophistication. Mr. Herrhausen was the head of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest bank. He was part of the political-business elite that helped turn West Germany from a war-ravaged rump state into an economic powerhouse — all while East Germany languished in frustration. Mr. Herrhausen was a vocal proponent of a united Germany.
In November 1989, Mr. Herrhausen was following the fall of the Berlin wall and events in the Soviet Union closely, conferring frequently with Mikhail Gorbachev, according to his wife and friends. Then on Nov. 27, Mr. Herrhausen announced a plan to acquire the investment banking firm Morgan Grenfell — at the time a record-breaking bank acquisition.
Also during November, a spot along Mr. Herrhausen’s usual route to work was closed because of construction. Terrorists, dressed as construction workers, laid an electric wire under the road’s pavement. On Nov. 29, the stretch reopened.
On the morning of Nov. 30, like every workday morning, Mr. Herrhausen stepped into his limousine at about 8:30. Mr. Herrhausen’s driver waited about one minute to allow the first of the three-car entourage to drive ahead and survey the road.
“It was the route they hadn’t used in weeks,” Mrs. Herrhausen said.
As Mr. Herrhausen sped down the road, a team of terrorists waited. Beside the road, a parked bicycle held a sack of armor-piercing explosives. The detonator was connected by the electric wire under the road to a trigger activated by an interruption in an infrared beam shining across the road.
A terrorist activated the detonator after the first car of bodyguards drove past the bomb. Mr. Herrhausen died at the scene.
As they had during previous attacks, police set up dragnets to round up Red Army Faction cadre. But the June 1990 arrests of 10 members of the group who had earlier been granted political asylum in East Germany produced no leads. All the seized Red Army Faction members had solid alibis.
In July 1991, prosecutors believed they had a breakthrough when an informant claimed he had allowed two members of the Red Army Faction to stay at his home near the Herrhausen residence. Prosecutors followed that trail 13 years before dropping charges in 2004.
Frustrated with the inability of prosecutors to solve the Herrhausen case and believing that prosecutors were ignoring other leads including possible Stasi involvement, German officials replaced the prosecutor overseeing the case.
Police acknowledge that part of the reason for their focus on possible Stasi involvement was that all other leads had dried up. But they say they also knew that over the years the Stasi had worked with and given explosives to other terrorists, including “Carlos the Jackal” and the Basque group ETA in Spain. And in 2001 to 2003, an undercover police officer met with a man who claimed he had been a killer for the Stasi operating in Western Germany, although police were never able to tie him to specific murders.
German investigators turned their attention to Wartin, a small eastern German village nestled in yellow-brown fields of grain near the Polish border. Today, sheep graze in a field spotted with wooden posts.
In the 1980s, however, Wartin was home to the Stasi’s AGM/S — “Minister Working Group/Special Operations.” It got its name because it reported to Mr. Mielke, the minister who headed the Stasi for almost all of East Germany’s 40-year history.
The Wartin unit’s peacetime duties included the kidnapping and murder of influential people in the West, according to Stasi records reviewed by The Wall Street Journal in the Stasi archives in Berlin.
The documents say the unit’s activities included “intimidating anti-communist opinion leaders” by “liquidation,” and “kidnapping or hostage taking, connected with the demand that political messages be read,” according to a description of the unit’s activities written by a senior Wartin official in 1982.
Based on these documents, German investigators increasingly believe that the Stasi played a more active role than previously believed in Red Army Faction terrorism. After years of not being able to draw parallels between the Stasi unit in Wartin and the Red Army Faction killings, police are now focusing closely on such a link. Joachim Lampe, who assisted the successful prosecution of the first wave of Red Army Faction terrorists up until 1982 and was then assigned to prosecute Stasi-related crimes in West Germany, says it’s time to compare the activities of Wartin with the activities of the Red Army Faction to see where they overlap. “It is an important line of investigation,” he said.
A year after the Red Army Faction’s first generation collapsed in 1972, an internal Wartin report said cooperation with terrorists is possible if the individuals could be trusted to maintain secrecy and obey orders. Initial contacts, however, may not have taken place until later in the decade. Disillusionment gripped many of the terrorists living on the lam, according to court records citing witness statements by accused terrorists. Beginning about 1980, the Stasi granted refuge to 10 members of the Red Army Faction in East Germany and gave them assumed identities.
The Stasi sympathized with the anti-capitalist ideals of the Red Army Faction, but Stasi leaders were concerned about placing their trust in a group of uncontrollable leftist militants, a review of Stasi records shows. Stasi officials did not want to tarnish East Germany’s international reputation, so they toyed with different concepts for cooperation with terrorist groups, according to a prosecutor who has investigated Stasi involvement with terrorism.
One suggestion, contained in a document prepared for new officers assigned to the unit, was to emulate Romanian intelligence, which successfully worked with the terrorist “Carlos” to bomb the Radio Free Europe office in Munich, Germany, in 1981. To assist in such operations, the Wartin unit developed highly specialized explosives, poisons and miniature firearms.
About 1980 the Stasi also proposed a second strategy: instead of using a terrorist group directly — such cooperation always contained risk of discovery — they could simply execute attacks so similar to those of known terrorists that police would never look for a second set of suspects, according to Wartin records. The Wartin leadership called this strategy the “perpetrator principle,” according to Stasi records. The unit’s progress in implementing the steps to imitate terrorist attacks is described in a series of progress reports by Wartin officials between 1980 and 1987.
In September 1981, Red Army Faction terrorists attempted to kill U.S. Gen. James Kroesen in Heidelberg, Germany, shooting a bazooka at his car. About the same time, members of the same Red Army Faction team visited East Germany, where they were asked by the Stasi to shoot a bazooka at a car containing a dog. The dog died, according to court records.
In Wartin, officials wrote up a detailed description of the Red Army Faction members’ re-enactment of the Kroesen attack. “It is important to collect all accessible information about the terrorist scene in imperialist countries, to study and analyze their equipment, methods and tactics, so we can do it ourselves,” a senior Wartin official wrote in February 1982, according to the report.
In 1982, West German police discovered two troves of Red Army Faction weapons and documents buried in German forests. Three terrorists, including Red Army Faction leader Christian Klar, were arrested when they approached the sites. The troves were buried in locations easy to find at night, a tactic used by Wartin’s own agents to store operational equipment in West Germany, according to an investigator who viewed the troves and Stasi records.
That same year, a Wartin official described the staged bombing of a moving vehicle. According to the report, several Stasi officers shed “tears of joy” when electronic sensors detected the approaching car and ignited the detonator.
A spokesman at Germany’s federal police investigative agency, the equivalent of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, declined to comment on the close similarity between the detonator used in the demonstration and the device that killed Mr. Herrhausen, saying this is part of their investigation.
Wartin officers continued their preparations for imitating terrorist attacks in West Germany, according to a 1985 internal Wartin report. They created a special archive profiling the characteristics of known terrorists and terrorist groups, and taught staff members to execute nearly identical attacks, according to Stasi records. Each year, the unit’s officers detailed the unit’s success in teaching these techniques in their annual reports, according to the reports.
Then, in 1987, the AGM/S stopped offensive operations. The unit was disbanded.
Werner Grossmann, a former three-star Stasi General and former head of foreign intelligence operations, says the AGM/S was responsible for planning attacks in West Germany, but was dissolved “because it didn’t produce results.” Mr. Grossmann assumed control of part of the AGM/S after most of the unit was dissolved.
Mr. Grossmann says he took control of part of the AGM/S because he wanted to run intelligence operations against West Germany’s civil defense infrastructure.
“I refused to have anything to do with terrorism and terrorists,” Mr. Grossmann said in an interview. He said he didn’t have any influence over the AGM/S activities before 1987 and wasn’t informed about the unit’s activities before it came under his control.
Olaf Barnickel, a career Stasi officer who served at Wartin, says his unit planned murders in West Germany, but never committed one. “It was all theory and no practice,” Mr. Barnickel said in an interview.
But some German police are unpersuaded. They believe the seeds may have been planted for future violent attacks.
In November 1989, as East Germany disintegrated, groups of citizens forced their way into Stasi installations, seizing control. In Wartin, a local church minister led a group of demonstrators to the main entrance of the Stasi base. The base closed.
Within the Stasi as a whole, the chain of command began to disintegrate. Links to organizations in West Germany, including the Red Army Faction, were broken.
Sixteen months after Mr. Herrhausen’s murder, the Red Army Faction claimed its last victim, killing Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, the head of the Treuhandanstalt, the powerful trust that controlled most state-owned assets in the former East Germany and was overseeing their privatization. Mr. Rohwedder was killed while he was standing by the window of his house in Düsseldorf.
The murder was performed by a trained sharpshooter, according to a police official familiar with the investigation. The Stasi trained members of the Red Army Faction in sharpshooting skills and had its own teams of sharpshooters, according to witness statements by Stasi officials to a Berlin prosecutor and Stasi records.
In 1998, the Red Army Faction issued the last of its communiques, announcing it was disbanding. German police attribute the group’s disappearance to changing times, which made the group seem a relic of the past. Indeed, the Red Army Faction today is largely seen by the German public as part of the social upheaval that plagued West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. More than one in four Germans consider former Red Army Faction members to have been misguided idealists. More than half now think the investigations should be closed for good in the coming decade when the current group of Red Army Faction prisoners finish serving their prison sentences.
German prosecutors say their investigation of the Stasi’s role is continuing.
Since last month, Mrs. Herrhausen has been in contact with the next of kin of victims in the other unsolved Red Army Faction murder cases, looking for support to push the investigation. The bomb that killed her husband nearly 18 years ago exploded soon after he left for work, within earshot of their home in suburban Frankfurt.
“I still hear that bomb every day,” she says.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution.
The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.
Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment.
The name of Benno Ohnesorg became a rallying cry for the West German left after he was shot dead by police in 1967. Newly discovered documents indicate that the cop who shot him may have been a spy for the East German secret police.
It was one of the most important events leading up to the wave of radical left-wing violence which washed over West Germany in the 1970s. On the evening of June 2, 1967, the literature student Benno Ohnesorg took part in a demonstration at West Berlin’s opera house. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the shah of Iran, was to attend and the gathered students wanted to call attention to his brutal regime.
The protests, though, got out of hand. Pro-shah demonstrators, some of them flown in from Iran for the occasion, battled with the student protestors. West Berlin police also did their part, brutally beating back the crowd. At 8:30 p.m., a shot was fired, and a short time later the 26-year-old Ohnesorg, having been hit in the back of the head, became the left wing’s first martyr.
Now, though, the history of the event may have to be re-written. New documents discovered in the Stasi archive — the vast collection of files left behind by the East German secret police — reveal that the policeman who shot Ohnesorg, Karl-Heinz Kurras, could in fact have been a spy for East Germany’s communist regime.
In an article that will appear in late May in Deutschlandarchiv, a periodical dedicated to the ongoing project of German reunification, Helmut Müller-Enbergs and Cornelia Jabs reveal that documents they found in the Stasi papers show that Kurras began working together with the Stasi in 1955. He had wanted to move to East Berlin to work for the East German police. Instead, he signed an agreement with the Stasi to remain with the West Berlin police force and spy for the communist state.
As a result of the new information, criminal charges have once again been filed against Kurras, who was acquitted twice, once in 1967 and again in 1970, of negligent homicide charges related to Ohnesorg’s death. Kurras told the Berlin paper Tagesspiegel on Friday that he had never worked together with the Stasi.
But in addition to finding the agreement between Kurras and the Stasi, the two researchers also discovered numerous documents indicating that the East Germans were pleased with the information Kurras passed along — particularly given that he was posted to a division responsible for rooting out moles within the West German police force.
Immediately after Ohnesorg’s death, Kurras received a Stasi communication ordering him to destroy his records and to “cease activities for the moment.” Kurras responded with his acquiescence and wrote “I need money for an attorney.”
The exact circumstances surrounding the death of Ohnesorg have never been completely clarified. Kurras himself, now 81, gave conflicting versions of the story during the investigation but the official version has long been that Kurras fired in self defense. Many others point to witness accounts whereby the police were beating Ohnesorg when the shot was fired.
It is still unclear how the new evidence might play into history’s understanding of the tragic event. The day was one full of violence, with demonstrators and police battling each other with pipes, wooden clubs and stones. Police were further incited by rumors that an officer had been stabbed earlier in the evening. Ohnesorg himself, however, was not directly involved in the violence.
West Berlin in the 1960s and 70s became a focal point of German left wing radicalism. The city had long been left-leaning, and the fact that Berliners were exempt from military service meant that it became a magnate for pacifists and anti-state activists.
Ohnesorg’s death gave them an immediate rallying cry. As the left-wing movement became more radical, many justified their violent activities by pointing to the police brutality that led to the student’s death. A letter written by Ulrike Meinhof announcing the founding of the Red Army Faction, which appeared in SPIEGEL in the fall of 1967, explicitly mentioned the Ohnesorg incident. The RAF went on to terrorize Germany for decades, ultimately killing over 30 people across the country. The radical “June 2 Movement” used the date of the incident in its name.
Kurras, for his part, seems to have been a highly valued Stasi agent. In his files, it is noted that “he is prepared to complete any task assigned to him.” It also mentions that he is notable for having the “courage and temerity necessary to accomplish difficult missions.”
Now it seems the STASI is back again in business after transforming it in to the CYBER-STASI of the 21st Century.
The serial betrayer and cyberstalker Klaus Maurischat is on the run again. The latest action against him (see below) cause him to react in a series of fake statements and “press releases” – one more absurd than the other. Insider analyze that his criminal organisation “GoMoPa” is about to fade away.
On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders say they have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the Encyclopedia – Britannica
The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention ofGoogle Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.
Besides that many legal institutions, individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.
The case number is ST/0148943/2011
In a series of interviews beginning 11 months before the sudden death of German watchdog Heinz Gerlach Berlin lawyer Joschen Resch unveilved secrets of Gerlach, insiders say. Secret documents from Mr Gerlachs computer were published on two dubious hostile German websites. Both have a lot of similarities in their internet registration. One the notorious “GoMoPa” website belongs to a n Eastern German organization which calls itself “
Numerous attempts have been made to stop our research and the publication of the stories by “GoMoPa” members in camouflage thus confirming the truth and the substance of it in a superior way.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution. The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelznr, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror
The Stasi murder:
„GoMoPa“ & Backers: Blackmailing, Extortion, Racketeering, Internet Murder and Murder. These are the weapons of the East-German “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”, a renegate confesses.
Deep Throat, Berlin; confesses: „Since months the „GoMoPa“ keyfigures like Klaus-Dieter Maurischat< are in hide-aways because the German police is hunting them for the wirecard fraud and a lot of other criminal actions. I left the group when I noticed that. The found and former Stasi-Colonel Ehrenfried Stelzer died under strange circumstances in Berlin. This has been told to us. But it is also possible that his death was staged. In any case the criminal organization of “GoMoPa” is responsible for the murder of Heinz Gerlach by dioxin. Now my life is also in danger that is why I hide myself.”
According to Deep Throat, Hans J. the murder was done with the help of the old Stasi-connections of the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”.
The renegate says that computer hacker Thomas Promny and Sven Schmidt are responsible for the computer crimes and he states that the crime organization of “GoMoPa” has also helpers inside internet companies like Go-Daddy, Media-on and even in Google, Hamburg..
THE “NACHRICHTENDIENST”:New criminal police action against “GoMoPa”:
German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground.
On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders say they have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the
Encyclopedia – Britannica
The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention of Google Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.
Besides that many legal institutions, individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.
The case number is
ST/0148943/2011
Stasi-Dioxin: The “NACHRICHTENDIENST” searching for the perfect murder:
Viktor Yushchenko was running against Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. Yanukovych was a political ally of outgoing president Leonid Kuchma. Kuchma’s administration depended upon corruption and dishonesty for its power. Government officials ruled with a sense of terror rather than justice. For the powerful and wealthy few, having Yanukovych elected president was important. Should Yushchenko win, Ukraine’s government was sure to topple. Yushchenko’s campaign promises included a better quality of life for Ukrainians through democracy. His wife, Katherine, told CBS in a 2005 interview, “He was a great threat to the old system, where there was a great deal of corruption, where people were making millions, if not billions.”
On September 6, 2004, Yushchenko became ill after dining with leaders of the Ukrainian secret police. Unlike other social or political engagements, this dinner did not include anyone else on Yushchenko’s team. No precautions were taken regarding the food. Within hours after the dinner, Yushchenko began vomiting violently. His face became paralyzed; he could not speak or read. He developed a severe stomachache and backache as well as gastrointestinal pain. Outwardly, Yushchenko developed what is known as chloracne, a serious skin condition that leaves the face scarred and disfigured.
By December 2004, doctors had determined that Yushchenko had been the victim of dioxin poisoning. Dioxin is a name given to a group of related toxins that can cause cancer and even death. Dioxin was used in the biochemical weapon called Agent Orange during the Vietnam War controversial war in which the United States aidedSouth Vietnam in its fight against a takeover by Communist North Vietnam). Yushchenko had a dioxin level six thousand times greater than that normally found in the bloodstream. His is the second-highest level ever recorded.
Yushchenko immediately suspected he had been poisoned, though Kuchma’s camp passionately denied such allegations. Instead, when Yushchenko showed up at a parliamentary meeting shortly after the poisoning incident, Kuchma’s men teased him, saying he must have had too much to drink or was out too late the night before.
Dioxin can stay in the body for up to thirty-five years. Experts predict that his swelling and scars will fade but never completely disappear. John Henry, a toxicologist at London’s Imperial Hospital, told RedNova.com, “It’ll be a couple of years, and he will always be a bit pockmarked. After damage as heavy as that, I think he will not return to his film star looks.” And Yushchenko will live with the constant threat of cancer.
At first it was believed the poison must have come from a Russian laboratory. Russia was a strong supporter of Kuchma and lobbied against Yushchenko in the 2004 election. But by July 2005, Yushchenko’s security forces were able to trace the poison to a lab in Ukraine. Though not entirely ruling out Russia’s involvement, Yushchenko is quoted on his Web site as saying “I’m sure that even though some people are running from the investigation, we will get them. I am not afraid of anything or anybody.”
Evidence shows that such a perfect murder plotted by former Stasi agents is the cause of the death of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
The Ministry for State Security (German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), commonly known as the Stasi (IPA: [‘?tazi?]) (abbreviation German: Staatssicherheit, literally State Security), was the official state security service of East Germany. The MfS was headquartered in East Berlin, with an extensive complex in Berlin-Lichtenberg and several smaller facilities throughout the city. It was widely regarded as one of the most effective and repressive intelligence and secret police agencies in the world. The MfS motto was “Schild und Schwert der Partei” (Shield and Sword of the Party), that is the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED).
According to the confessions of an informer, Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch writes most of the “articles” of the communist “STASI” agency “GoMoPa” himself or it is done by lawyers of his firm. The whistleblower states that lawyer Resch is the mastermind behind the “CYBER-STASI” called “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”. Bizarre enough they use Jewish names of non-existing Jewish lawyers by the name of “Goldman, Morgenstern and Partner” to stage their bogus “firm”. Further involved in their complots are a “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber and “STASI”-Colonel Ehrenfried Stelzer, “the first crime expert” in the former communist East-Germany.
According to London based Meridian Capital hundreds and thousands of wealthy people and companies have paid to the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” to avoid their cyberstalking (see article below).
Finally the German criminal police started their investigations (case number ST/0148943/2011).
The “NACHRICHTENDIENST” is also involved in the death of the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach who died under strange circumstances in July 2010.
Only hours after his death the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” was spreading the news that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution and set the stage for a fairy tale. Months before his death the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” started a campaign to ruin his reputation and presumably was also responsable for cyberattacks to bring his website down. In fact they presumably used the same tactics also against our servers. Therefore we investigated all internet details of them and handed the facts to the FBI and international authorities.
Story background:
Now it seems the STASI is back again in business after transforming it in to the CYBER-STASI of the 21st Century.
The serial betrayer and cyberstalker Klaus Maurischat is on the run again. The latest action against him (see below) cause him to react in a series of fake statements and “press releases” – one more absurd than the other. Insider analyze that his criminal organisation “GoMoPa” is about to fade away.
On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders say they have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the Encyclopedia – Britannica
The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention of Google Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.
Besides that many legal institutions, individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.
The case number is ST/0148943/2011
In a series of interviews beginning 11 months before the sudden death of German watchdog Heinz Gerlach Berlin lawyer Joschen Resch unveilved secrets of Gerlach, insiders say. Secret documents from Mr Gerlachs computer were published on two dubious hostile German websites. Both have a lot of similarities in their internet registration. One the notorious “GoMoPa” website belongs to a n Eastern German organization which calls itself “
Numerous attempts have been made to stop our research and the publication of the stories by “GoMoPa” members in camouflage thus confirming the truth and the substance of it in a superior way.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution. The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.
Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment section.
-”Worse than the Gestapo.” —Simon Wiesenthal, Nazi hunter said about the notorious “Stasi”.
Less than a month after German demonstrators began to tear down the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, irate East German citizens stormed the Leipzig district office of the Ministry for State Security (MfS)—the Stasi, as it was more commonly called. Not a shot was fired, and there was no evidence of “street justice” as Stasi officers surrendered meekly and were peacefully led away. The following month, on January 15, hundreds of citizens sacked Stasi headquarters in Berlin. Again there was no bloodshed. The last bit of unfinished business was accomplished on May 31 when the Stasi radioed its agents in West Germany to fold their tents and come home.
The intelligence department of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), the People’s Army, had done the same almost a week earlier, but with what its members thought was better style. Instead of sending the five-digit code groups that it had used for decades to message its spies in West Germany, the army group broadcast a male choir singing a children’s ditty about a duck swimming on a lake. There was no doubt that the singing spymasters had been drowning their sorrow over losing the Cold War in schnapps. The giggling, word-slurring songsters repeated the refrain three times: “Dunk your little head in the water and lift your little tail.” This was the signal to agents under deep cover that it was time to come home.
With extraordinary speed and political resolve, the divided nation was reunified a year later. The collapse of the despotic regime was total. It was a euphoric time for Germans, but reunification also produced a new national dilemma. Nazi war crimes were still being tried in West Germany, forty-six years after World War II. Suddenly the German government was faced with demands that the communist officials who had ordered, executed, and abetted crimes against their own people—crimes that were as brutal as those perpetrated by their Nazi predecessors—also be prosecuted.
The people of the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR), the German Democratic Republic, as the state had called itself for forty years, were clamoring for instant revenge. Their wrath was directed primarily against the country’s communist rulers—the upper echelon of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei (SED), the Socialist Unity Party. The tens of thousands of second-echelon party functionaries who had enriched themselves at the expense of their cocitizens were also prime targets for retribution.
Particularly singled out were the former members of the Stasi, the East German secret police, who previously had considered themselves the “shield and sword” of the party. When the regime collapsed, the Stasi had 102,000 full-time officers and noncommissioned personnel on its rolls, including 11,000 members of the ministry’s own special guards regiment. Between 1950 and 1989, a total of 274,000 persons served in the Stasi.
The people’s ire was running equally strong against the regular Stasi informers, the inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IMs). By 1995, 174,000 had been identified as IMs, or 2.5 percent of the total population between the ages of 18 and 60. Researchers were aghast when they found that about 10,000 IMs, or roughly 6 percent of the total, had not yet reached the age of 18. Since many records were destroyed, the exact number of IMs probably will never be determined; but 500,000 was cited as a realistic figure. Former Colonel Rainer Wiegand, who served in the Stasi counterintelligence directorate, estimated that the figure could go as high as 2 million, if occasional stool pigeons were included.
“The Stasi was much, much worse than the Gestapo, if you consider only the oppression of its own people,” according to Simon Wiesenthal of Vienna, Austria, who has been hunting Nazi criminals for half a century. “The Gestapo had 40,000 officials watching a country of 80 million, while the Stasi employed 102,000 to control only 17 million.” One might add that the Nazi terror lasted only twelve years, whereas the Stasi had four decades in which to perfect its machinery of oppression, espionage, and international terrorism and subversion.
To ensure that the people would become and remain submissive, East German communist leaders saturated their realm with more spies than had any other totalitarian government in recent history. The Soviet Union’s KGB employed about 480,000 full-time agents to oversee a nation of 280 million, which means there was one agent per 5,830 citizens. Using Wiesenthal’s figures for the Nazi Gestapo, there was one officer for 2,000 people. The ratio for the Stasi was one secret policeman per 166 East Germans. When the regular informers are added, these ratios become much higher: In the Stasi’s case, there would have been at least one spy watching every 66 citizens! When one adds in the estimated numbers of part-time snoops, the result is nothing short of monstrous: one informer per 6.5 citizens. It would not have been unreasonable to assume that at least one Stasi informer was present in any party of ten or twelve dinner guests.
THE STASI OCTOPUS
Like a giant octopus, the Stasi’s tentacles probed every aspect of life. Full-time officers were posted to all major industrial plants. Without exception, one tenant in every apartment building was designated as a watchdog reporting to an area representative of the Volkspolizei (Vopo), the People’s Police. In turn, the police officer was the Stasi’s man. If a relative or friend came to stay overnight, it was reported. Schools, universities, and hospitals were infiltrated from top to bottom. German academe was shocked to learn that Heinrich Fink, professor of theology and vice chancellor at East Berlin’s Humboldt University, had been a Stasi informer since 1968. After Fink’s Stasi connections came to light, he was summarily fired. Doctors, lawyers, journalists, writers, actors, and sports figures were co-opted by Stasi officers, as were waiters and hotel personnel. Tapping about 100,000 telephone lines in West Germany and West Berlin around the clock was the job of 2,000 officers.
Stasi officers knew no limits and had no shame when it came to “protecting the party and the state.” Churchmen, including high officials of both Protestant and Catholic denominations, were recruited en masse as secret informers. Their offices and confessionals were infested with eavesdropping devices. Even the director of Leipzig’s famous Thomas Church choir, Hans-Joachim Rotch, was forced to resign when he was unmasked as a Spitzel, the people’s pejorative for a Stasi informant.
Absolutely nothing was sacred to the secret police. Tiny holes were bored in apartment and hotel room walls through which Stasi agents filmed their “suspects” with special video cameras. Even bathrooms were penetrated by the communist voyeurs.8 Like the Nazi Gestapo, the Stasi was the sinister side of deutsche Gründlichkeit (German thoroughness).
After the Berlin wall came down, the victims of the DDR regime demanded immediate retribution. Ironically, their demands were countered by their fellow Germans in the West who, living in freedom, had diligently built einen demokratischen Rechtsstaat, a democratic state governed by the rule of law. The challenge of protecting the rights of both the victims and the accused was immense, given the emotions surrounding the issue. Government leaders and democratic politicians recognized that there could be no “quick fix” of communist injustices without jeopardizing the entire system of democratic jurisprudence. Moving too rapidly merely to satisfy the popular thirst for revenge might well have resulted in acquittals or mistrials. Intricate jurisdictional questions needed to be resolved with both alacrity and meticulousness. No German government could afford to allow a perpetrator to go free because of a judicial error. The political fallout from any such occurrence, especially in the East, could prove fatal to whatever political party occupied the chancellor’s office in Bonn at the time.
Politicians and legal scholars of the “old federal states,” or West Germany, counseled patience, pointing out that even the prosecution of Nazi criminals had not yet been completed. Before unification, Germans would speak of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“coming to grips with the past”) when they discussed dealing with Nazi crimes. In the reunited Germany, this word came to imply the communist past as well. The two were considered comparable especially in the area of human rights violations. Dealing with major Nazi crimes, however, was far less complicated for the Germans: Adolf Hitler and his Gestapo and Schutzstaffel (SS) chief, Heinrich Himmler, killed themselves, as did Luftwaffe chief and Vice Chancellor Hermann Göring, who also had been the first chief of the Gestapo. The victorious Allies prosecuted the rest of the top leadership at the International War Crimes Tribunal in Nürnberg. Twelve were hanged, three received life terms, four were sentenced to lesser terms of imprisonment (up to twenty years), and three were acquitted.
The cases of communist judges and prosecutors accused of Rechtsbeugung (perversion of justice) are more problematic. According to Franco Werkenthin, a Berlin legal expert charged with analyzing communist crimes for the German parliament, those sitting in judgment of many of the accused face a difficult task because of the general failure of German justice after World War II. Not a single judge or prosecutor who served the Nazi regime was brought to account for having perverted justice—even those who had handed down death sentences for infringements that in a democracy would have been considered relatively minor offenses. Werkenthin called this phenomenon die Jauche der Justiz, the cesspool of justice.
Of course, the crimes committed by the communists were not nearly as heinous as the Nazis’ extermination of the Jews, or the mass murders in Nazi-occupied territories. However, the communists’ brutal oppression of the nation by means including murder alongside legal execution put the SED leadership on a par with Hitler’s gang. In that sense, Walter Ulbricht or Erich Honecker (Ulbricht’s successor as the party’s secretary-general and head of state) and secret police chief Erich Mielke can justifiably be compared to Hitler and Himmler, respectively.
Arrest warrants were issued for Honecker and Mielke. The Soviet government engineered Honecker’s escape to Moscow, where he became the ward of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. When the Soviet Union crumbled, the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin expelled Honecker. He was arrested on his return to Germany, but a court decided against a trial when he was diagnosed with liver cancer. Honecker flew to Chile with his wife Margot to live with their daughter, a Chilean citizen by marriage. His exile was short, and he died in 1994. Mielke was not so fortunate: His KGB friends turned their backs on him. He was tried in Germany for the 1931 murder of two police officers, found guilty, and sentenced to six years in prison. Other charges, including manslaughter, were dismissed because of his advanced age and poor health.
Three other members of the twenty-one-member ruling Politburo also have been tried. Former Defense Minister Heinz Kessler was convicted of manslaughter in connection with the order to kill people who were trying to escape to the West. He received a seven-and-a-half-year term. Two others, members of the Central Committee and the National Defense Council, were tried with Kessler and sentenced to seven and a half years and five years, respectively. Politburo member Harry Tisch, who was also head of the communist trade union, was found guilty of embezzlement and served eighteen months. Six others, including Egon Krenz (Honecker’s successor as party chief), were charged with manslaughter. Krenz was found guilty, and on August 25, 1997, was sentenced to six and a half years in prison.
However, eight years after reunification, many of the 165 members of the Central Committee have not yet been put under investigation. In 1945, Nazis holding comparable or lesser positions were subject to automatic arrest by the Allies. They spent months or even years in camps while their cases were adjudicated. Moreover, the Nürnberg Tribunal branded the Reich and its Corps of Political Leaders, SS, Security Service (SD), Secret State Police (Gestapo), SA (Storm Troopers), and Armed Forces High Command criminal organizations. Similarly sweeping actions against communist leaders and functionaries such as Stasi officers were never contemplated, even though tens of thousands of political trials and human rights abuses have been documented. After the East German regime fell, German judicial authorities scrupulously avoided the appearance of waging witch-hunts or using the law as a weapon of vengeance. Prosecutors and judges made great efforts to be fair, often suspending legal action while requesting rulings from the supreme court on possible constitutional conflicts.
The victims of oppression clamored for revenge and demanded speedy prosecution of the erstwhile tyrants. They had little patience for a judicial system that was handicapped by a lack of unblemished and experienced criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges. Despite these handicaps, the Berlin Central Police Investigations Group for Government Criminality, mindful that the statute of limitations for most communist crimes would expire at the end of 1999, made significant progress under its director Manfred Kittlaus, the able former director of the West Berlin state police. Kittlaus’s major task in 1998 was to investigate wrongful deaths, including 73 murders, 30 attempted murders, 583 cases of manslaughter, 2,938 instances of attempted manslaughter, and 425 other suspicious deaths. Of the 73 murders, 22 were classified as contract murders.
One of those tried and convicted for attempted contract murder was former Stasi collaborator Peter Haak, who was sentenced to six and a half years in prison. The fifty-two-year-old Haak took part in the Stasi’s 1981 Operation Scorpion, which was designed to pursue people who helped East Germans escape to the West. Proceedings against former General Gerhard Neiber, whose Stasi directorate was responsible for preventing escapes and for wreaking vengeance, were still pending in 1998.
Peter Haak’s murder plot was hatched after he befriended Wolfgang Welsch and his family. Welsch was a thorn in the side of the Stasi because of his success in smuggling people out of the DDR. Haak joined Welsch and the latter’s wife and seven-year-old daughter on a vacation in Israel, where he mixed a gram of thallium, a highly poisonous metallic chemical element used in rat poison, into the hamburgers he was preparing for a meal. Welsch’s wife and daughter vomited immediately after ingesting the poison and recovered quickly. Welsch suffered severe aftereffects, but eventually recovered: He had consumed a large amount of beer with the meal, and an expert testified that the alcohol had probably flushed the poison from his system.
Berlin Prosecutor General Christoph Schäfgen revealed that after the DDR’s demise 15,200 investigations had been launched, of which more than 9,000 were still active at the beginning of 1995. Indictments were handed down in 153 cases, and 73 perpetrators were convicted. Among those convicted were the aforementioned Politburo members as well as a number of border guards who had killed people who were trying to escape to the West.
Despite widespread misgivings about the judicial failures in connection with some Nazi crimes, a number of judges and prosecutors were convicted and jailed for up to three years for perversion of justice. In collusion with the Stasi, they had requested or handed down more severe sentences in political cases so that the state could collect greater amounts when the “convicts” were ransomed by the West German government. {The amount of ransom paid was governed by the time a prisoner had been sentenced to serve.)
The enormity of the task facing judicial authorities in reunified Germany becomes starkly evident when one examines the actions they have taken in all five former East German provinces and in East Berlin. From the end of 1990 to July 1996, 52,050 probes were launched into charges of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, election fraud, and perversion of justice. A total of 29,557 investigations were halted for various reasons including death, severe illness, old age, or insufficient evidence. In those five and a half years, there were only 139 convictions.
The problem is even more staggering when cases of espionage are included. Between 1990 and 1996, the office of the federal prosecutor general launched 6,641 probes, of which 2,431 were terminated before trial—most due to the statute of limitations. Of 175 indictments on charges of espionage, 95 resulted in convictions. In addition to the cases handled at the federal level, the prosecutor general referred 3,926 investigations to state authorities, who terminated 3,344 without trial. State courts conducted 356 trials, resulting in 248 convictions. Because the statute of limitations for espionage is five years, the prosecutor general’s office told me in 1997 it was unlikely that more espionage trials would be conducted.
It is important to emphasize the difference between the statute’s application to so-called government crimes committed in East Germany before the collapse and to crimes, such as espionage, committed in West Germany. The Unification Treaty specifically permits the belated prosecution of individuals who committed acts that were punishable under the East German criminal code and who due to official connivance were not prosecuted earlier. There is no statute of limitations for murder. For most other crimes the limit is five years; however, due to the obstacles created by previous government connivance, the German parliament in 1993 doubled this time limit for prosecution of the more serious crimes. At the same time, the parliament decreed that all cases must be adjudicated by the end of 2002. For less serious offenses, the statute would have run out on December 31, 1997, but the parliament extended it to 2000.
A number of politicians, jurists, and liberal journalists pleaded for a general amnesty for crimes committed by former DDR leaders and Communist Party functionaries. A former West German supreme court judge, Ernst Mahrenholz, said the “sharp sword of justice prevents reconciliation.” Schäfgen, the Berlin prosecutor general, had this answer for the former high court judge and other amnesty advocates:
I cannot agree. We are raising no special, sharp sword against East Germans. We must pursue state-sponsored injustice in exactly the same manner as we do when a thief steals or when one human being kills another. If one wants to change that, then we would have to do away with the entire criminal justice system, because punishment always hurts. We are not criminalizing an entire people but only an ever shrinking, small portion.
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who was West Germany’s minister of justice when the nation was unified, said this at a session of parliament in September 1991: “We must punish the perpetrators. This is not a matter of a victor’s justice. We owe it to the ideal of justice and to the victims. All of those who ordered injustices and those who executed the orders must be punished; the top men of the SED as well as the ones who shot [people] at the wall.” Aware that the feelings against communists were running high among their victims, Kinkel pointed to past revolutions after which the representatives of the old system were collectively liquidated. In the same speech before parliament, he said:
Such methods are alien to a state ruled by law. Violence and vengeance are incompatible with the law in any case. At the same time, we cannot tolerate that the problems are swept under the rug as a way of dealing with a horrible past, because the results will later be disastrous for society. We Germans know from our own experience where this leads. Jewish philosophy formulates it in this way: “The secret of redemption is called remembering.”
Defense attorneys for communist officials have maintained that the difficulty lies in the fact that hundreds of thousands of political opponents were tried under laws of the DDR. Although these laws were designed to smother political dissent and grossly violated basic human rights and democratic norms, they were nonetheless laws promulgated by a sovereign state. How could one justly try individual Stasi officers, prosecutors, and judges who had simply been fulfilling their legal responsibility to pursue and punish violators of the law?
Opinions varied widely on whether and how the Stasi and other perpetrators of state-sponsored crimes should be tried. Did the laws of the DDR, as they existed before reunification, still apply in the east? Or was the criminal code of the western part of the country the proper instrument of justice in reunified Germany? However, these questions were moot: As Rupert Scholz, professor of law at the University of Munich and a Christian Democratic member of parliament, pointed out, the Unification Treaty specifies that the penal code of the DDR and not that of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) shall be applied to offenses committed in East Germany. Scholz’s view was upheld by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the supreme court. Most offenses committed by party functionaries and Stasi officers—murder, kidnapping, torture, illegal wiretapping, mail robbery, and fraud—were subject to prosecution in reunified Germany under the DDR’s penal code. But this would not satisfy the tens of thousands of citizens who had been sent to prison under East German laws covering purely political offenses for which there was no West German equivalent.
Nevertheless, said Scholz, judicial authorities were by no means hamstrung, because West Germany had never recognized the East German state according to international law. “We have always said that we are one nation; that the division of Germany led neither to full recognition under international law nor, concomitantly, to a recognition of the legal system of the DDR,” Scholz said. Accordingly, West German courts have consistently maintained that West German law protects all Germans equally, including those living in the East. Therefore, no matter where the crimes were committed, whether in the East or the West, all Germans have always been subject to West German laws. Applying this logic, East German border guards who had either killed or wounded persons trying to escape to the West could be tried under the jurisdiction of West Germany.
The “one nation” principle was not upheld by the German supreme court. Prior to the court’s decision, however, Colonel General Markus Wolf, chief of the Stasi’s foreign espionage directorate, and some of his officers who personally controlled agents from East Berlin had been tried for treason and convicted. Wolf had been sentenced to six years in prison. The supreme court ruling overturned that verdict and those imposed on Wolf’s cohorts, even though they had obtained the most closely held West German secrets and handed them over to the KGB. The maximum penalty for Landesverrat, or treason, is life imprisonment. In vacating Wolf’s sentence, the court said he could not be convicted because he operated only from East German territory and under East German law.
However, Wolf was reindicted on charges of kidnapping and causing bodily harm, crimes also punishable under East German law. The former Stasi three-star general, on March 24, 1955, had approved in writing a plan to kidnap a woman who worked for the U.S. mission in West Berlin. The woman and her mother were tricked by a Stasi agent whom the woman had been teaching English, and voluntarily got into his car. He drove them into the Soviet sector of the divided city, where they were seized by Stasi officers. The woman was subjected to psychological torture and threatened with imprisonment unless she signed an agreement to spy for the Stasi. She agreed. On her return to the American sector, however, the woman reported the incident to security officials. Wolf had committed a felony punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment in West Germany. He was found guilty in March 1977 and sentenced to two years’ probation.
Those who have challenged the application of the statute of limitations to communist crimes, especially to the executions of citizens fleeing to the West, have drawn parallels to the notorious executive orders of Adolf Hitler. Hitler issued orders mandating the summary execution of Soviet Army political commissars upon their capture and initiating the extermination of Jews. An early postwar judicial decision held that these orders were equivalent to law. When that law was declared illegal and retroactively repealed by the West German Bundestag, the statute of limitations was suspended—that is, it never took effect. Many of those convicted in subsequent trials of carrying out the Führer’s orders were executed by the Allies. The German supreme court has ruled the same way as the Bundestag on the order to shoot people trying to escape to West Germany, making the statute of limitations inapplicable to such cases. The ruling made possible the trial of members of the National Defense Council who took part in formulating or promulgating the order. A number of border guards who had shot would-be escapees also have been tried and convicted.
Chief Prosecutor Heiner Sauer, former head of the West German Central Registration Office for Political Crimes, was particularly concerned with the border shootings. His office, located in Salzgitter, West Germany, was established in 1961 as a direct consequence of the Berlin Wall, which was erected on August 13 of that year. Willy Brandt, at the time the city’s mayor (later federal chancellor) had decided that crimes committed by East German border guards should be recorded. At his behest, a central registry of all shootings and other serious border incidents was instituted. Between August 13, 1961 and the opening of the borders on November 9, 1989, 186 border killings were registered. But when the Stasi archives were opened, investigators found that at least 825 people had paid with their lives for trying to escape to the West. This figure was reported to the court that was trying former members of the National Defense Council. In addition to these border incidents, the registry also had recorded a number of similar political offenses committed in the interior of the DDR: By fall 1991, Sauer’s office had registered 4,444 cases of actual or attempted killings and about 40,000 sentences handed down by DDR courts for “political offenses.”
During the early years of Sauer’s operation, the details of political prosecutions became known only when victims were ransomed by West Germany or were expelled. Between 1963 and 1989, West Germany paid DM5 billion (nearly US$3 billion) to the communist regime for the release of 34,000 political prisoners. The price per head varied according to the importance of the person or the length of the sentence. In some cases the ransom amounted to more than US$56,000. The highest sum ever paid to the East Germans appears to have been DM450,000 (US$264,705 using an exchange rate of US$1.70 to the mark). The ransom “object” in this case was Count Benedikt von Hoensbroech. A student in his early twenties, von Hoensbroech was attending a West Berlin university when the wall went up. He was caught by the Stasi while trying to help people escape and was sentenced to ten years at hard labor. The case attracted international attention because his family was related to Queen Fabiola of Belgium, who interceded with the East Germans. Smelling money, the East German government first demanded the equivalent of more than US$1 million from the young man’s father as ransom. In the end, the parties settled on the figure of DM450,000, of which the West German government paid DM40,000 (about $23,529). Such ransom operations were fully controlled by the Stasi.
Political prisoners released in the DDR could not be registered by the West Germans because their cases remained secret. The victims were admonished to keep quiet or face another prison term. Nonetheless, in the first year after reunification, Sauer’s office added another 20,000 documented cases, for a total of 60,000. Sauer said he believed the final figure of all political prosecutions would be somewhere around 300,000. In every case, the Stasi was involved either in the initial arrest or in pretrial interrogations during which “confessions” were usually extracted by physical or psychological torture, particularly between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s.
Until 1987, the DDR imposed the death penalty for a number of capital crimes, including murder, espionage, and economic offenses. But after the mid-1950s, nearly all death sentences were kept quiet and executions were carried out in the strictest secrecy, initially by guillotine and in later years by a single pistol shot to the neck. In most instances, the relatives of those killed were not informed either of the sentence or of the execution. The corpses were cremated and the ashes buried secretly, sometimes at construction sites. In reporting about one executioner who shot more than twenty persons to death, the Berlin newspaper Bildzeitung said that a total of 170 civilians had been executed in East Germany. However, Franco Werkenthin, the Berlin official investigating DDR crimes, said he had documented at least three hundred executions. He declined to say how many were for political offenses, because he had not yet submitted his report to parliament. “But it was substantial,” he told me. The true number of executions may never be known because no complete record of death sentences meted out by civil courts could be found. Other death sentences were handed down by military courts, and many records of those are also missing. In addition, German historian Günther Buch believes that about two hundred members of the Stasi itself were executed for various crimes, including attempts to escape to the West.
SAFEGUARDING HUMAN DIGNITY?
The preamble to the East German criminal code stated that the purpose of the code was to “safeguard the dignity of humankind, its freedom and rights under the aegis of the criminal code of the socialist state,” and that “a person can be prosecuted under the criminal code only in strictest concurrence with the law.” However, many of the codified offenses for which East German citizens were prosecuted and imprisoned were unique to totalitarian regimes, both fascist and communist.
Moreover, certain sections of the code, such as those on “Treasonable Relaying of Information” and “Treasonable Agent Activity,” were perversely applied, landing countless East Germans in maximum security penitentiaries. The victims of this perversion of justice usually were persons who had requested legal exit permits from the DDR authorities and had been turned down. In many cases, their “crime” was having contacted a Western consulate to inquire about immigration procedures. Sentences of up to two and a half years’ hard labor were not unusual as punishment for such inquiries.
Engaging in “propaganda hostile to the state” was another punishable offense. In one such case, a young man was arrested and prosecuted for saying that it was not necessary to station tanks at the border and for referring to border fortifications as “nonsense.” During his trial, he “admitted” to owning a television set on which he watched West German programs and later told friends what he saw. One of those “friends” had denounced him to the Stasi. The judge considered the accused’s actions especially egregious and sentenced him to a year and a half at hard labor.
Ironically, another part of this section of the criminal code decreed that “glorifying militarism” also was a punishable offense, although the DDR itself “glorified” its People’s Army beyond any Western norm. That army was clad in uniforms and insignia identical to those of the Nazi Wehrmacht, albeit without eagles and swastikas. The helmets, too, were differently shaped, but the Prussian goose step was regulation during parades.
A nineteen-year-old who had placed a sign in an apartment window reading “When justice is turned into injustice, resistance becomes an obligation!” was rewarded with twenty-two months in the penitentiary. Earlier, the youth had applied for an exit visa and had been turned down. A thirty-four-year-old father of two who also had been denied permission to leave the “workers’ and peasants’ state” with his family similarly advertised that fact with a poster reading “We want to leave, but they won’t let us.” The man went to prison for sixteen months. The “crimes” of both men were covered by a law on “Interference in Activities of the State or Society.”
Two letters—one to a friend in West Germany, seeking assistance to legally emigrate to the West, and another containing a similar appeal to Chief of State Honecker—brought a four-year sentence to their writer, who was convicted under two laws: those on “establishing illegal contacts” (writing to his friend) and on “public denigration” (writing to Honecker). The Stasi had illegally intercepted both letters.
The East German party chiefs were not content to rely only on the Stasi’s millions of informers to ferret out antistate sentiments. Leaving nothing to chance, they created a law that made the failure to denounce fellow citizens a crime punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. One man was sentenced to twenty-three months for failing to report that a friend of his was preparing to escape to the West. The mandatory denunciation law had its roots in the statutes of the Socialist Unity Party, which were published in the form of a little red booklet. I picked up a copy of this booklet that had been discarded by its previous owner, a Stasi chauffeur, who had written “Ha, Ha” next to the mandate to “report any misdeeds, regardless of the person responsible, to leading party organs, all the way up to the Central Committee.”
Rupert Scholz, member of parliament and professor of law at the University of Munich, said many East Germans feel there is little determination among their Western brethren to bring the Stasi criminals to trial. “In fact, we already have heard many of them say that the peaceful revolution should have been a bloody one instead so they could have done away with their tormentors by hanging them posthaste,” Scholz told me.
The Reverend Joachim Gauck, minister to a Lutheran parish in East Germany, shared the people’s pessimism that justice would be done. Following reunification, Gauck was appointed by the Bonn government as its special representative for safeguarding and maintaining the Stasi archives. “We must at least establish a legal basis for finding the culprits in our files,” Gauck told me. “But it will not be easy. If you stood the millions of files upright in one line, they would stretch for 202 kilometers [about 121 miles]. In those files you can find an unbelievable number of Stasi victims and their tormentors.”
Gauck was given the mandate he needed in November 1991, when the German parliament passed a law authorizing file searches to uncover Stasi perpetrators and their informants. He viewed this legislation as first step in the right direction. With the evidence from Stasi files, the perpetrators could be removed from their public service jobs without any formal legal proceedings. Said Gauck: “We needed this law badly. It is not reasonable that persons who served this apparatus of oppression remain in positions of trust.
DAS BETRUGSURTEIL GEGEN “BENNEWIRTZ” UND “PETER EHLERS” “GoMoPa”-PARTNER “MAURISCHAT” UND “VORNKAHL” WG BETRUGES AM EIGEN ANLEGER
TOP-SECRET – FBI UNVEILS THE FACTS ABOUT THE PENTAGON ATTACK
Massachusetts Man Charged with Plotting Attack on Pentagon and U.S. Capitol and Attempting to Provide Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization
BOSTON—A 26-year-old Ashland man was arrested and charged today in connection with his plot to damage or destroy the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol, using large remote controlled aircraft filled with C-4 plastic explosives. Rezwan Ferdaus, a U.S. citizen, was also charged with attempting to provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization, specifically to al Qaeda, in order to carry out attacks on U.S. soldiers stationed overseas.
“Our top priority is to protect our nation from terrorism and national security threats. The conduct alleged today shows that Mr. Ferdaus had long planned to commit violent acts against our country, including attacks on the Pentagon and our nation’s Capitol. Thanks to the diligence of the FBI and our many other law enforcement partners, that plan was thwarted,” said U.S. Attorney Carmen M. Ortiz. “I want the public to understand that Mr. Ferdaus’ conduct, as alleged in the complaint, is not reflective of a particular culture, community, or religion,” she added. “In addition to protecting our citizens from the threats and violence alleged today, we also have an obligation to protect members of every community, race, and religion against violence and other unlawful conduct.”
The public was never in danger from the explosive devices, which were controlled by undercover FBI employees (UCs). The defendant was closely monitored as his alleged plot developed and the UCs were in frequent contact with him.
Richard DesLauriers, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Boston Division said, “Today’s arrest was the culmination of an investigation forged through strong relationships among various Massachusetts law enforcement agencies to detect, deter, and prevent terrorism. Each of the more than 30 federal, state, and local agencies on the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) worked together to protect the community from this threat. In this particular investigation, the Worcester, Ashland, and Framingham Police Departments and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, played particularly critical roles. The communities of Worcester, Ashland, and Framingham should be proud of the unwavering commitment and professionalism the agencies demonstrated in ensuring that their towns and region were safe from harm. The Massachusetts State Police and the Commonwealth Fusion Center also contributed significantly to this investigation.”
“The FBI used an undercover operation to conduct this investigation. Undercover operations are used to combat all types of crimes and criminals, including in the counterterrorism arena.”
“The JTTF initiated this investigation because we have an obligation to take action to protect the public whenever an individual expresses a desire to commit violence. A committed individual, even one with no direct connections to, or formal training from, an international terrorist organization, can pose a serious danger to the community,” added DesLauriers. “It is important to remember that our system of justice is based on the notion of individual responsibility. Therefore, no one should cite Mr. Ferdaus’ actions as an excuse or reason to engage in any unlawful behavior against others in the community. We will work diligently to protect the civil rights of all Americans.”
The affidavit alleges the following: Ferdaus, a Northeastern University graduate with a degree in physics, began planning to commit a violent “jihad” against the U.S. in early 2010. He obtained mobile phones, each of which he modified to act as an electrical switch for an IED. He then supplied the phones to FBI UCs, who he believed to be members of, or recruiters for, al Qaeda. According to the affidavit, Ferdaus believed that the devices would be used to kill American soldiers overseas. During a June 2011 meeting, he appeared gratified when he was told that his first phone detonation device had killed three U.S. soldiers and injured four or five others in Iraq. Ferdaus responded, “That was exactly what I wanted.”
According to the affidavit, after each subsequent delivery, Ferdaus was anxious to know how well each of his detonation devices had worked and how many Americans they had killed. During recorded conversations, Ferdaus stated that he devised the idea of attacking the Pentagon long before he met with the government’s cooperating witness (CW) and UC, and that his jihad had, “started last year.”
In recorded conversations with the CW that began in January 2011, Ferdaus stated that he planned to attack the Pentagon using aircraft similar to “small drone airplanes” filled with explosives and guided by GPS equipment. According to the affidavit, in April 2011, Ferdaus expanded his plan to include an attack on the U.S. Capitol. In May and June 2011, Ferdaus delivered two thumb drives to the UCs, which contained detailed attack plans with step-by-step instructions as to how he planned to attack the Pentagon and Capitol. The plans included using three remote controlled aircraft and six people, including himself, whom he described as an “amir,” i.e., an Arabic term meaning leader.
During various recorded meetings, Ferdaus envisioned causing a large “psychological” impact by killing Americans, including women and children, who he referred to as “enemies of Allah.” According to the affidavit, Ferdaus’ desire to attack the United States is so strong that he confided, “I just can’t stop; there is no other choice for me.”
In May 2011, Ferdaus traveled from Boston to Washington, D.C., conducted surveillance and took photographs of his targets (Pentagon and Capitol), and identified and photographed sites at the East Potomac Park from which he planned to launch his aircraft filled with explosives. Upon his return, Ferdaus told the UC that “more stuff ha[d] to be done,” that his plan needed to be expanded, and that he had decided to couple his “aerial assault” plan with a “ground directive.” Ferdaus indicated that his ground assault plan would involve the use of six people, armed with automatic firearms and divided into two teams. Ferdaus described his expanded attack as follows:
…with this aerial assault, we can effectively eliminate key locations of the P-building then we can add to it in order to take out everything else and leave one area only as a squeeze where the individuals will be isolated, they’ll be vulnerable and we can dominate.
Once isolated, Ferdaus planned to “open up on them” and “keep firing” to create “chaos” and “take out” everyone. He also provided the expanded plan to the UC on a thumb drive.
Between May and September 2011, Ferdaus researched, ordered and acquired the necessary components for his attack plans, including one remote controlled aircraft (F-86 Sabre). This morning prior to his arrest, Ferdaus received from the UCs 25 pounds of (what he believed to be) C-4 explosives, six fully-automatic AK-47 assault rifles (machine guns) and grenades. In June 2011, Ferdaus rented a storage facility in Framingham, Mass., under a false name, to use to build his attack planes and maintain all his equipment.
According to the affidavit, in August 2011, the F-86 remote controlled aircraft was delivered to the Framingham storage facility. Ferdaus delivered a total of eight detonation devices to the UCs over the course of the investigation, which he built with the intention that they be used by al Qaeda operatives overseas to kill U.S. soldiers. On September 20, 2011 Ferdaus made a training video, which he provided to the UCs, demonstrating how to make “cell phone detonators.”
According to the affidavit, at today’s meeting the UCs allowed Ferdaus to inspect the explosives and firearms (a quantity of C-4 explosives, three grenades, and six fully-automatic AK-47 assault rifles) that the UCs delivered, and that Ferdaus had requested for his attack plan. After inspecting the components, Ferdaus brought them to his storage unit, took possession of the explosives and firearms, and locked them in his storage unit. Ferdaus was then immediately arrested.
Although Ferdaus was presented with multiple opportunities to back out of his plan, including, being told that his attack would likely kill women and children, the affidavit alleges that Ferdaus never wavered in his desire to carry out the attacks.
If convicted, Ferdaus faces up to 15 years in prison on the material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization charge; up to 20 years in prison on the charge of attempting to destroy national defense premises; and a five-year minimum mandatory in prison and up to 20 years on the charge of attempting to damage and destroy buildings that are owned by the United States, by using an explosive. On each charge Ferdaus also faces up to three years of supervised release and a $250,000 fine.
The case was investigated by the FBI, with assistance from the Worcester, Ashland and Framingham Police Departments and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms ,and Explosives.
The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys B. Stephanie Siegmann and Donald L. Cabell of Ortiz’s Anti-Terrorism and National Security Unit.
The details contained in the complaint are allegations. The defendant is presumed to be innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
Neo Stalin Show Case – Tymoshenko denounces court case ‘lynching’
Yulia Tymoshenko, the former Ukrainian prime minister, has denounced as a “lynching” and a “show” the trial that could see her jailed as early as Friday.
Making her closing statement on Thursday with hundreds of her supporters outside the Kiev courtroom, she accused Viktor Yanukovich, Ukraine’s president, of orchestrating the case to crush someone he saw as a “dangerous political rival”.
“This has been a classic lynching trial,” said the 50-year-old political firebrand, seemingly energised despite already spending 57 days in detention on contempt of court charges.
“You should have already brought in an acquittal and ended this humiliation of Ukraine. But the show goes on,” she told the judge.
In an unexpected twist, the verdict could now come during a summit of European Union leaders and former Soviet republics in Warsaw on Friday meant to celebrate Kiev’s progress towards a crucial political and trade deal with the EU.
EU leaders have warned that a guilty verdict and jail term for Ukraine’s leading opposition politician could be a major setback for hopes professed by Mr Yanukovich’s administration for closer integration with Europe.
Ms Tymoshenko faces up to 10 years in prison if found guilty of exceeding her authority when brokering a 2009 natural gas agreement with Russia while prime minister.
Prosecutors say the deal damaged Ukraine’s economy and have called for a seven-year sentence.
“Today I understand well what it felt like to be crushed during the Soviet regime, thrown into Soviet jails without proper courts and due process,” she told the courtroom as she read from a 60-page statement.
Mr Yanukovich, who narrowly beat his arch-rival in elections last year, has come under intensifying pressure from EU states and the US in recent weeks to drop the case, widely seen in Ukraine and beyond as politically motivated.
He has denied being behind the case, saying it was instigated by his predecessor and Ms Tymoshenko’s one-time Orange Revolution ally, Viktor Yushchenko.
Stefan Füle, EU enlargement commissioner, told a conference in Warsaw on Thursday that talks would continue aimed at concluding a political “association” and wide-ranging free trade deal with Kiev by the end of the year.
But he said a guilty court verdict could jeopardise chances of winning the necessary ratification by the EU’s 27 states and the European parliament.
“There is no doubt that if the former prime minister was put in prison, the relationship between Ukraine and the EU should not be the same,” he warned.
As well as bringing rival camps of pro- and anti-Tymoshenko demonstrators to Khreshchatyk, Kiev’s main street, the case is being closely watched in neighbouring countries. It featured prominently on Thursday in newspapers in Poland, which is keen to see its eastern neighbour more closely integrated with the EU and wrested out of Moscow’s orbit.
Civic groups in Ukraine warn the Tymoshenko case is symbolic of a broader rollback of democratic gains achieved after the Orange Revolution.
But they urged the EU to continue talks with Kiev as the best way of securing future reforms and avoiding the country again falling under Russian influence.
Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin – now almost certain to return as president next year – has repeatedly tried to pull Ukraine into a customs union he has formed with other ex-Soviet republics.
Mr Yanukovich had hinted in recent weeks that Kiev might seek a face-saving exit from the Tymoshenko trial by “decriminalising” the article under which she was charged.
But motions to do so now seem unlikely to pass through parliament in time, although the judge could still adjourn the case.
Ms Tymoshenko warned she would “under no circumstances” seek amnesty from Mr Yanukovich if the law changed after her trial ended. Doing so would be “recognition of a dictatorship”, she said.
Jose Manuel Pinto Teixeira, head of the EU delegation to Ukraine talks, warned this week: “It seems our messages were not heard well by the Ukrainian side.”
TOP-SECRET – Costly Database of Terrorism Racket Porn Video

IntelCenter Database (ICD)Comprehensive Online Database Covering
Terrorist/Rebel Incidents, Threats & Videos
A sends:
—–Original Message—–
From: BenV <benv[at]intelcenter.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2011 18:57:27
To: <DailyBrief[at]yahoogroups.com>
Subject: [DailyBrief] IntelCenter Dubbed Netflix of Terrorism – Feedback on Searching Terrorist Video
We just rolled out a new terrorist/rebel online database that allows full searching and streaming of up to HD quality video and full screen viewing. It’s part of our existing IntelCenter Database (ICD) and is called the Video Component. The database is accessible from anywhere with a Net connection and will support optimized versions for phone and tablet devices. The library goes back 20 years and once fully migrated will be in excess of 15,000 videos. You can see more details at
http://www.intelcenter.com/icd/
Fast Company just released an article on the database dubbing us the NetFlix of terrorism. You can see the piece here: http://www.fastcompany.com/1783435/netflix-for-terrorists and I put the full text below.
Here’s my question. How would you like to search for terrorist/rebel video that you need to review?
As it stands now the database allows search by group, video production group, speaker, release date, runtime, video type (i.e. hostage, statement, documentary style), language, primary country, main themes, contains (i.e. vehicular bombing, IED construction, shooting, statement), addressed to, transcript and many more technical metadata areas to support exploitation that cannot be posted here. All the group and individual names are on standardized lists so you don’t have to go guessing as to how we spelled it. You just review the list and pick the match.
Is there something else that you’ve wanted or found incredibly helpful in the past?
If anyone here wants the dog and pony show over WebEx or otherwise, just shoot me a note directly at
benv[at]intelcenter.com.
Thanks in advance for any feedback. We can have the greatest resource in the world but if we don’t understand how each different community needs to find and work with the video then it does nothing to forward the mission and at the end of the day that’s what our singular goal is, impact.
– Ben
Fast Company – 28 Sep. 2011
The Netflix Of Terrorism
http://www.fastcompany.com/1783435/netflix-for-terrorists
BY Neal Ungerleider
Terrorist organizations are nothing if not telegenic. Web video tends to be the preferred way they get messages across and recruit sympathizers. Now private company IntelCenter, has assembled one of the world’s largest collections of streaming terrorist videos for viewing on demand.
Terrorist organizations love making videos and uploading them to the internet. It’s a quick and effective way of getting their message across–and not just for potential recruits and sympathizers. A private company, IntelCenter, has assembled one of the world’s largest collections of streaming terrorist videos for viewing by the military, intelligence and academic communities.
The video archive, called IntelCenter Database: Video Component, contains approximately 15,000 terrorist and rebel-produced propaganda videos. According to IntelCenter’s Ben Venzke, the archive mainly contains video from “non-nation state actors, be they small or large, that are actively involved in bombings, kidnappings, shootings, insurgencies, and the like.” In other words: More FARC and al-Qaeda and fewer creepy, angry teenagers in their bedrooms. Users who subscribe to the service can instantly watch the videos and search by keywords and (terrorist) content creators, just as they could on Netflix or YouTube.
Homeland Security–the sprawling conglomeration of counter-terrorism, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and fearmongering that arose after the September 11 attacks–is big business. According to the left-leaning National Priorities Project, a staggering $69 billion dollars was allocated by the federal government for homeland security during fiscal year 2011. This is a massive source of revenue for the many private firms creating services and products used by federal and local governments. Access to IntelCenter’s video archive doesn’t come cheap; individual accounts for government users go for $9,995/year a piece or $65,000 for group licenses of 6-10 users. Substantially more affordable packages are available for private security and academic subscribers that begin at $2,320 annually. The cheaper levels give the user access to the same content but limit the number of search fields that can be used.
Subscribers to IntelCenter’s services are not limited to the United States; according to the company, their products are also designed to servvice intelligence analysts and military in Canada, Australia, Europe and other regions worldwide.
IntelCenter’s Venzke tells Fast Company that his company offers intelligence service-level video archives to researchers, private security professionals, corporate securities, universities, and the media. The archive grew out of the previously existing IntelCenter Database, which offers text-based background information and reference materials on militant groups.
Users can search terrorist videos on the site by release date, the militant organization that created it, video producer (ironically enough, jihadists have formed their own media organizations such as as-Sahab Media), speaker, language, main themes, and regional focus. Although thousands of terrorist and militant-produced videos are currently available on the internet–ironically mainly through mainstream content archivers such as YouTube–the considerable time spent searching video archives in both English and foreign languages for a particular video does present a difficulty. One of IntelCenter’s strongest selling points is that they reduce the manpower hours needed to retrieve older propaganda videos.
Videos viewed through the site stream up to HD quality and can be watched either in a window or full-screen. Users can also view videos on their smartphones or tablets; the service is compatible with Android devices as well as the iPhone or iPad and offers both HTML5 and Flash video. According to Venzke, the archive “grows at a rate of about 3-20 new videos a day.”
Thankfully for intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism investigators, militant organizations love producing video clips and internet propaganda. Hezbollah has their own satellite television network with a huge internet presence and terrorist groups worldwide use YouTube to reach sympathizers before their videos are (sometimes) pulled down. Just this week, al-Qaeda in Yemen released the latest issue of their English-language propaganda magazine online–the PDF-format magazine encouraged readers to target “the populations of countries that are at war with the Muslims.”
The growth market in Homeland Security means that a streaming video site aimed at intelligence and corporate security is smart business. Police departments and regional law enforcement around the country generally have generous funds to spend on Homeland Security; the New York Police Department’s counter-terrorism unit is currently dealing with fallout from an Associated Press expose. Those big budgets translate into money to spend on all sorts of tools developed by private firms. More importantly, there are relatively few public-access databases archiving videos from militant organizations that can be easily searched without bouncing between English, Arabic, Spanish, Urdu and other foreign-language queries. Promoting that capability, for IntelCenter and the many other small companies serving the Homeland Security industry, can be very profitable.
[Story images: IntelCenter]
For more stories like this, follow [at]fastcompany on Twitter. Email Neal Ungerleider, the author of this article, here or find him on Twitter and Google+.
SPIEGEL -“GELIEBTER GENOSSE”-WIE STASI-OBERST STELZER BND-CHEF HELLENBROICH FÜR “GoMoPa” ANWARBT
TOP-SECRET – Megadeath Weapons Tritium Production to Increase
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 188 (Wednesday, September 28, 2011)] [Notices] [Pages 60017-60020] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2011-24947] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY National Nuclear Security Administration Notice of Intent To Prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). ACTION: Notice of intent to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement and conduct public scoping meetings. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The Council on Environmental Quality's implementing regulations for the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and DOE's NEPA implementing regulations require the preparation of a supplement to an environmental impact statement (EIS) when there are substantial changes to a proposal or when there are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns. DOE may also prepare a SEIS at any time to further the purposes of NEPA. Pursuant to these provisions, the NNSA, a semi-autonomous agency within DOE, intends to prepare a SEIS to update the environmental analyses in DOE's 1999 EIS for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor (CLWR EIS; DOE/EIS-0288). The CLWR EIS addressed the production of tritium in Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reactors using tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs). In the Record of Decision (ROD) for the CLWR EIS, NNSA selected TVA's Watts Bar Unit 1 and Sequoyah Units 1 and 2, located in Spring City and Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee, respectively, for tritium production. TVA has been producing tritium for NNSA at Watts Bar Unit 1 since 2004. After several years of tritium production experience at TVA's Watts Bar Unit 1, NNSA has determined that tritium permeation through TPBAR cladding into the reactor cooling water occurs at a higher rate than previously projected. The proposed SEIS will analyze the potential environmental impacts associated with increased tritium permeation levels observed since 2004; DOE's revised estimate of the maximum number of TPBARs required to support the current Nuclear Posture Review tritium supply requirements; and proposed changes to TVA facilities that may be used for future tritium production. TVA will be participating as a cooperating agency in the preparation of the SEIS. Any other agency that would like to be a cooperating agency in the preparation of the SEIS is requested to contact the SEIS Document Manager as noted in this Notice under ADDRESSES. DATES: NNSA invites comments on the scope of the SEIS. The public scoping period starts with the publication of this Notice in the Federal Register and will continue until November 14, 2011. NNSA will consider all comments received or postmarked by that date in defining the scope of the SEIS. Comments received or postmarked after that date will be considered to the extent practicable. A public scoping meeting is scheduled to be held on October 20, 2011, from 6:30 p.m. to 10 p.m. [[Page 60018]] ADDRESSES: The public scoping meeting will be held at the Southeast Tennessee Trade and Conference Center, Athens, TN. NNSA will publish additional notices on the date, time, and location of the scoping meeting in local newspapers in advance of the scheduled meeting. Any necessary changes will be announced in the local media. The scoping meeting will provide the public with an opportunity to present comments, ask questions, and discuss issues with NNSA officials regarding the SEIS. Written comments or suggestions concerning the scope of the SEIS or requests for more information on the SEIS and public scoping process should be directed to: Mr. Curtis Chambellan, Document Manager for the SEIS, U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Box 5400, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185-5400; facsimile at 505-845-5754; or e-mail at: tritium.readiness.seis@doeal.gov. Mr. Chambellan may also be reached by telephone at 505-845-5073. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the NNSA NEPA process, please contact: Ms. Mary Martin, NNSA NEPA Compliance Officer, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, or telephone 202-586-9438. For general information about the DOE NEPA process, please contact: Ms. Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (GC-54), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, or telephone 202-586-4600, or leave a message at 1-800-472-2756. Additional information about the DOE NEPA process, an electronic archive of DOE NEPA documents, and other NEPA resources are provided at http://energy.gov/nepa. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: NNSA is responsible for supplying nuclear materials for national security needs and ensuring that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe and reliable. Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is an essential component of every weapon in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Unlike other nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, tritium decays at a rate of 5.5 percent per year. Accordingly, as long as the Nation relies on a nuclear deterrent, the tritium in each nuclear weapon must be replenished periodically. The last reactor used for tritium production during the Cold War was shut down in 1988. Since then, tritium requirements for the stockpile have largely been met from the existing original inventory through the harvest and recycle of tritium gas during the dismantlement of weapon systems, and the replacement of tritium-containing weapons components as part of Limited Life Component Exchange programs. In December 1999, a new tritium production capability was established through an Interagency Agreement with TVA in which TPBARs are irradiated in the Watts Bar Unit 1 commercial nuclear power reactor and undergo extraction at the Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) located at DOE's Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. In order to continue to provide the required supply, irradiation will increase from today's 544 TPBARs per fuel cycle to a projected steady state rate of approximately 1,700 TPBARs per fuel cycle, i.e., approximately every 18 months. To provide sufficient capacity to ensure the ability to meet projected future stockpile requirements, NNSA and TVA anticipate requesting authorization for TPBAR irradiation to be increased in fiscal year 2016 to a level that is beyond currently licensed rates for one reactor. Meeting the increased demand will require a license amendment from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to permit the irradiation of a greater number of TPBARs per reactor than can currently be irradiated at either the Watts Bar or Sequoyah site. License amendments are reactor specific. NNSA and TVA will supplement the 1999 CLWR EIS with analyses supporting the anticipated license amendment requests that also evaluate a higher level of tritium permeation through TPBAR cladding into the reactor cooling water than was previously analyzed. The tritium releases associated with the proposed increase in the number of TPBARs that could be irradiated at Watts Bar, Sequoyah, or both sites (compared to the number currently authorized by the NRC) would remain below Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and NRC regulatory limits. Subsequently, TVA plans to adopt the SEIS for use in obtaining the necessary NRC license amendment(s). The production of tritium in a CLWR is technically straightforward. All of the Nation's supply of tritium has been produced in reactors. Most commercial pressurized water reactors were designed to utilize 12- foot-long rods containing an isotope of boron (boron-10) in ceramic form. These rods are sometimes called burnable absorber rods. The rods are inserted in the reactor fuel assemblies to absorb excess neutrons produced by the uranium fuel in the fission process for the purpose of controlling power in the core at the beginning of an operating cycle. DOE's tritium program developed TPBARs in which neutrons are absorbed by a lithium aluminate ceramic rather than boron ceramic. While the two types of rods function in a very similar manner to absorb excess neutrons in the reactor core, there is one notable difference: When neutrons strike the lithium aluminate ceramic material in a TPBAR, tritium is produced inside the TPBAR. These TPBARs are placed in the same locations in the reactor core as the standard boron burnable absorber rods. There is no fissile material (uranium or plutonium) in the TPBARs. Tritium produced in TPBARs is captured almost instantaneously in a solid zirconium material in the rod, called a ``getter.'' The getter material that captures the tritium is very effective. During each reactor refueling cycle, the TPBARs are removed from the reactor and transported to SRS. At SRS, the TPBARs are heated in a vacuum at the TEF to extract the tritium from the getter material. DOE's May 1999 Consolidated Record of Decision for Tritium Supply and Recycling (64 FR 26369) announced the selection of TVA's Watts Bar Unit 1, Sequoyah Unit 1 and Sequoyah Unit 2 for use in irradiating TPBARs and stated that a maximum of approximately 3,400 TPBARs would be irradiated per reactor during each 18-month fuel cycle. Since then, the projected need for tritium has decreased significantly. NNSA has determined that tritium demand to supply the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile could be satisfied using a maximum of approximately 2,500 TPBARs per fuel cycle, with a projected steady state number of approximately 1,700 TPBARs per fuel cycle. Purpose and Need Although NNSA's projected need for tritium to support the nuclear weapons stockpile today is less than originally planned, a higher than expected rate of permeation of tritium from TPBARs into reactor coolant water and subsequent release to the environment has restricted the number of TPBARs irradiated at TVA's Watts Bar Unit 1. Before TVA increases tritium production rates to meet expected national security requirements, the environmental analyses in the CLWR EIS are being updated to analyze and evaluate the effects of the higher tritium permeation, as well as any potential effects related to other changes in the regulatory and operating environment since publication of the original CLWR EIS. As a cooperating agency in the preparation of the SEIS, TVA plans to use the SEIS in pursuing NRC licensing amendments to increase TPBAR [[Page 60019]] irradiation at TVA's Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) at Spring City, Tennessee, and/or the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant at Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee, beyond levels set in 2002. Four alternatives are expected to be analyzed in the SEIS: The No Action Alternative and three action alternatives, one using only the Watts Bar site, one using only the Sequoyah site, and one using both the Watts Bar and Sequoyah sites. As a matter of note, in a separate proceeding, DOE and TVA are also analyzing the potential use of mixed oxide fuel during some fuel cycles at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant as part of the U.S. program for surplus plutonium disposition (75 FR 41850. July 19, 2010). Proposed Action and Alternatives The CLWR EIS assessed the potential impacts of irradiating up to 3,400 TPBARs per reactor unit operating on 18 month fuel cycles. It included TPBAR irradiation scenarios using multiple reactor units to achieve a maximum level of 6,000 TPBARs every 18 months. Subsequently, tritium production requirements have been reduced such that irradiation of approximately 1,700 TPBARs every reactor fuel cycle is expected to be sufficient to fulfill current requirements, consistent with the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. To provide flexibility in future tritium supply decisions, the revised environmental analysis is expected to consider irradiation of up to a total of 2,500 TPBARs every 18 months. This approach would provide sufficient reserve capacity to accommodate potential future changes in requirements and to allow for production above currently expected annual requirement levels for short durations (i.e., several years) to recover from potential future shortfalls should that become necessary. In the CLWR EIS, the permeation of tritium through the TPBAR cladding into the reactor coolant systems of potential tritium production reactors was estimated to be less than or equal to one tritium curie/TPBAR/year. After several years of tritium production experience at Watts Bar Unit 1, NNSA has determined that tritium permeation through TPBAR cladding is approximately three to four times higher than this estimate; nevertheless, tritium releases have been below regulatory limits. To conservatively bound the potential environmental impacts, the SEIS will assess the impacts associated with tritium production in CLWRs based on a permeation rate of approximately five tritium curies/TPBAR/year. An assessment of tritium mitigation and management measures will be included as part of the environmental analyses in the SEIS. Mitigation and management measures include an assessment of technologies commercially available to treat tritiated effluents, transportation of tritiated effluents and/or low level radioactive waste streams, and other applicable effluent management actions. The SEIS, which will supplement the 1999 CLWR EIS, will support agency deliberations regarding potential changes in the tritium production at NRC licensed TVA facilities in order to meet the requirements of TVA's agreement with NNSA. These changes also require TVA to pursue an NRC license amendment request for these facilities. Accordingly, the SEIS is expected to substantially meet NRC requirements for an environmental report necessary to support TVA's license amendment request(s) for tritium production at the Watts Bar and/or Sequoyah Nuclear Plants. No Action Alternative: Produce tritium at currently approved TVA facilities (Watts Bar Unit 1 and Sequoyah Units 1 and 2) at appropriate levels to keep permeation levels within currently approved NRC license and regulatory limits. Alternative 1: Utilize TVA's Watts Bar site only to a maximum level of 2,500 TPBARs every reactor fuel cycle (18 months). Alternative 2: Utilize TVA's Sequoyah site only to a maximum level of 2,500 TPBARs every 18 months. Alternative 3: Utilize both the Watts Bar and Sequoyah sites to a maximum total level of 2,500 TPBARS every 18 months. The level of production per site would be determined by TVA. This alternative would provide the ability to supply stockpile requirements at either site independently, or using both sites with each supplying a portion of the supply. Preliminary Identification of Environmental Issues NNSA has tentatively identified the issues for analysis in the SEIS. Additional issues may be identified as a result of the scoping comment process. The SEIS will analyze the potential impacts on: 1. Air, water, soil, and visual resources. 2. Plants and animals, and their habitats, including state and Federally-listed threatened or endangered species and their critical habitats. 3. Irretrievable and irreversible consumption of natural resources and energy, including transportation issues. 4. Cultural resources, including historical and pre-historical resources and traditional cultural properties. 5. Infrastructure and utilities. 6. Socioeconomic conditions. 7. Human health under routine operations and accident conditions, including potential impacts from seismic events. 8. Minority and low-income populations (Environmental Justice). 9. Intentional Destructive Acts, including terrorist acts. 10. Other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions (cumulative impacts). SEIS Process and Invitation to Comment. The SEIS scoping process provides an opportunity for the public to assist the NNSA in determining issues and alternatives to be addressed in the SEIS. One public scoping meeting will be held as noted under DATES in this Notice. The purpose of the scoping meeting is to provide attendees with an opportunity to present comments, ask questions, and discuss issues regarding the SEIS with NNSA officials. Comments can also be mailed to Mr. Chambellan as noted in this Notice under ADDRESSES. The SEIS scoping meeting will include an informal open house from 6:30-7 p.m. to facilitate dialogue between NNSA and the public. Once the formal scoping meeting begins at 7:00 pm, NNSA will present a brief overview of the SEIS process and provide individuals the opportunity to give written or oral statements. NNSA welcomes specific scoping comments or suggestions on the SEIS. Copies of written comments and transcripts of oral comments provided to NNSA during the scoping period will be available on the Internet at http://nnsa.energy.gov/nepa/clwrseis. After the close of the public scoping period, NNSA will begin preparing the Draft SEIS. NNSA expects to issue the Draft SEIS for public review in 2012. A Federal Register Notice of Availability, along with notices placed in local newspapers, will provide dates and locations for public hearings on the Draft SEIS and the deadline for comments on the draft document. Persons who submit comments with a mailing address during the scoping process will receive a copy of or link to the Draft SEIS. Other persons who would like to receive a copy of or link to the Draft SEIS for review should notify Mr. Chambellan at the address noted under ADDRESSES. NNSA will include all comments received on the Draft SEIS, and responses to those comments in the Final SEIS. Issuance of the Final SEIS is currently anticipated to take place in 2013. NNSA [[Page 60020]] will issue a ROD no sooner than 30 days after publication of EPA's Notice of Availability of the Final SEIS. Issued in Washington, DC, this 23rd day of September 2011. Thomas P. D'Agostino, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration. [FR Doc. 2011-24947 Filed 9-27-11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
“DUBIOSE DOPPELROLLE” – SPIEGEL ÜBER “GoMoPa”-Gründer STASI-Oberst Stelzer und mutmasslichen “GoMoPa”-Boss Resch
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-65717414.html
DUBIOS ! DUBIOS ! DUBIOS !
Anscheinend inspiriert das Wort “Dubios” die fingierte “GoMoPa”…
DIE WELT ÜBER DIE ZUSAMMENARBEIT ZWISCHEN STASI UND RAF BEI DEN RAF-MORDEN
State Department’s search for a WikiLeaks scapegoat
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- Peter Van Buren for TomDispatch, part of the Guardian Comment Network
- guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 27 September 2011 18.11 BST
On the same day that more than 250,000 unredacted State Department cables hemorrhaged out onto the internet, I was interrogated for the first time in my 23-year State Department career by State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and told I was under investigation for allegedly disclosing classified information. The evidence of my crime? A posting on my blog from the previous month that included a link to a WikiLeaks document already available elsewhere on the web.
As we sat in a small, gray, windowless room, resplendent with a two-way mirror, multiple ceiling-mounted cameras, and iron rungs on the table to which handcuffs could be attached, the two DS agents stated that the inclusion of that link amounted to disclosing classified material. In other words, a link to a document posted by who-knows-who on a public website available at this moment to anyone in the world was the legal equivalent of me stealing a top secret report, hiding it under my coat and passing it to a Chinese spy in a dark alley.
The agents demanded to know who might be helping me with my blog (“Name names!”), if I had donated any money from my upcoming book on my wacky, year-long State Department assignment to a forward military base in Iraq, and if so, to which charities, the details of my contract with my publisher, how much money (if any) I had been paid, and – by the way – whether I had otherwise “transferred” classified information.
Had I, they asked, looked at the WikiLeaks site at home on my own time on my own computer? Every blog post, every Facebook post and every tweet by every State Department employee, they told me, must be pre-cleared by the department prior to “publication”. Then they called me back for a second 90-minute interview, stating that my refusal to answer questions would lead to my being fired, never mind the fifth (or the first) amendments.
Why me? It’s not like the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has the staff or the interest to monitor the hundreds of blogs, thousands of posts and millions of tweets by Foreign Service personnel. The answer, undoubtedly, is my new book, We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People. Its unvarnished portrait of State’s efforts and the US at work in Iraq has clearly angered someone, even though one part of State signed off on the book under internal clearance procedures some 13 months ago. I spent a year in Iraq leading a State Department Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and, sadly, know exactly what I am talking about. DS monitoring my blog is like a small-town cop pulling over every African American driver: vindictive, selective prosecution. “Ya’ll be careful in these parts, ‘hear, ’cause we’re gonna set an example for your kind of people.”
Silly as it seems, such accusations carry a lot of weight if you work for the government. DS can unilaterally, and without any right of appeal or oversight, suspend your security clearance and for all intents and purposes end your career. The agents questioning me reminded me of just that, as well as of the potential for criminal prosecution – and all because of a link to a website, nothing more.
It was implied as well that even writing about the interrogation I underwent, as I am doing now, might morph into charges of “interfering with a government investigation”. They labelled routine documents in use in my interrogation as “law enforcement sensitive” to penalise me should I post them online. Who knew such small things actually threatened the security of the United States? Are these words so dangerous, or is our nation so fragile that legitimate criticism becomes a firing offense?
Let’s think through this disclosure of classified info thing, even if State won’t. Every website on the internet includes links to other websites. It’s how the web works. If you include a link to say, a CNN article about Libya, you are not “disclosing” that information – it’s already there. You’re just saying: “Have a look at this.” It’s like pointing out a newspaper article of interest to a guy next to you on the bus. (Careful, though, if it’s an article from the New York Times or the Washington Post: it might quote stuff from WikiLeaks and then you could be endangering national security.)
Security at State: hamburgers and mud
Security and the State Department go together like hamburgers and mud. Over the years, State has leaked like an old boot. One of its most hilarious security breaches took place when an unknown person walked into the secretary of State’s outer office and grabbed a pile of classified documents. From the vast trove of missing classified laptops to bugging devices found in its secure conference rooms, from high-ranking officials trading secrets in Vienna to top diplomats dallying with spies in Taiwan, even the publicly available list is long and ugly.
Of course, nothing compares to what history will, no doubt, record as the most significant outpouring of classified material ever: the dump of hundreds of thousands of cables that are now on display on WikiLeaks and its mushroom-like mirror sites. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (an oxymoron if ever there was one) is supposed to protect our American diplomats by securing State’s secrets, and over time, they just haven’t done very well at that.
US soldier Bradley Manning, left, who is accused of stealing the huge database of classified files released by the WikiLeaks website of Julian Assange, right. Photograph: Associated Press/AFP/Getty ImagesThe State Department and its Bureau of Diplomatic Security never took responsibility for their part in the loss of all those cables, never acknowledged their own mistakes or porous security measures. No one will ever be fired at State because of WikiLeaks – except, at some point, possibly me. Instead, State joined in the federal mugging of army Private Bradley Manning, the person alleged to have copied the cables onto a Lady Gaga CD while sitting in the Iraqi desert.
That all those cables were available electronically to everyone from the secretary of State to a lowly army private was the result of a clumsy post-9/11 decision at the highest levels of the State Department to quickly make up for information-sharing shortcomings. Trying to please an angry Bush White House, State went from sharing almost nothing to sharing almost everything overnight. They flung their whole library onto the government’s classified intranet, SIPRnet, making it available to hundreds of thousands of federal employees worldwide. It is usually not a good idea to make classified information that broadly available when you cannot control who gets access to it outside your own organisation. The intelligence agencies and the military certainly did no such thing on SIPRnet, before or after 9/11.
State did not restrict access. If you were in, you could see it all. There was no safeguard to ask why someone in the army in Iraq in 2010 needed to see reporting from 1980s Iceland. Even inside their own organisation, State requires its employees to “subscribe” to classified cables by topic, creating a record of what you see and limiting access by justifiable need. A guy who works on trade issues for Morocco might need to explain why he asked for political-military reports from Chile.
Most for-pay porn sites limit the amount of data that can be downloaded. Not State. Once those cables were available on SIPRnet, no alarms or restrictions were implemented so that low-level users couldn’t just download terabytes of classified data. If any activity logs were kept, it does not look like anyone checked them.
A few classified State Department cables will include sourcing, details on from whom or how information was collected. This source data allows an informed reader to judge the veracity of the information – was the source on a country’s nuclear plans a street vendor or a high military officer? Despite the sometimes life-or-death nature of protecting sources (though some argue this is overstated), State simply dumped its hundreds of thousands of cables online unredacted, leaving source names there, all pink and naked in the sun.
Then again, history shows that technical security is just not State’s game, which means the WikiLeaks uproar is less of a surprise in context. For example, in 2006, news reports indicated that State’s computer systems were massively hacked by Chinese computer geeks. In 2008, State data disclosures led to an identity theft scheme only uncovered through a fluke arrest by the Washington, DC cops. Before it was closed down in 2009, snooping on private passport records was a popular intramural activity at the State Department, widely known and casually accepted. In 2011, contractors using fake identities appear to have downloaded 250,000 internal medical of State Department employees, including mine.
Wishing isn’t a strategy, hope isn’t a plan
Despite their own shortcomings, State and its Bureau of Diplomatic Security take this position: if we shut our eyes tightly enough, there is no WikiLeaks. (The morning news summary at State includes this message: “Due to the security classification of many documents, the daily addendum will not include news clips that are generated by leaked cables by the website WikiLeaks.”) The corollary to such a position evidently goes something like this: since we won’t punish our own technical security people or the big shots who approved the whole flawed scheme in the first place, and the damned first amendment doesn’t allow us to punish the New York Times, let’s just punish one of our own employees for looking at, creating links to and discussing stuff on the web – and while he was at it, writing an accurate, first-hand and critical account of the disastrous, if often farcical, American project in Iraq.
That’s what frustrated bullies do – they pick on the ones they think they can get away with beating up. The advantage of all this? It gets rid of a “troublemaker”, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security people can claim that they are “doing something” about the WikiLeaks drip that continues even while they fiddle. Of course, it also chills free speech, sending a message to other employees about the price of speaking plainly.
Now does that make sense? Only inside the world of Diplomatic Security, where historically, it always has.
For example, Diplomatic Security famously took into custody the color slides reproduced in the Foreign Service Journal showing an open copy of one of the government’s most sensitive intelligence documents, albeit only after the photos were published and distributed in the thousands. Similarly, DS made it a crime to take photos of the giant US Embassy compound in Baghdad, but only after the architecture firm building it posted sketches of the embassy online; a Google search will still reveal many of those images; others who served in Iraq have posted them on their unsecured Facebook pages.
Imagine this: State’s employees are still blocked by a firewall from looking at websites that carry, or simply write about and refer to, WikiLeaks documents, including TomDispatch.com, which is publishing this piece. (That, in turn, means my colleagues at State won’t be able to read this – except on the sly.)
In the belly of the beast
Back in that windowless room for a second time, I faced the two DS agents clumsily trying to play semi-bad cop and altogether-bad cop. They once again reminded me of my obligation to protect classified information, and studiously ignored my response – that I indeed do take that obligation seriously; enough, in fact, to distinguish between actual disclosure and a witch-hunt.
As they raised their voices and made uncomfortable eye contact just like it says to do in any Interrogation 101 manual, you could almost imagine the hundreds of thousands of unredacted cables physically spinning through the air around us, heading – splat, splot, splat – for the web. Despite the Hollywood-style theatrics and the grim surroundings, the interrogation was less police state or 1984-style nightmare than a Brazil-like dark comedy.
In the end, though, it’s no joke. I’ve been a blogger since April, but my meeting with the DS agents somehow took place only a week before the publication date of my book. Days after my second interrogation, the principal deputy secretary of State wrote my publisher demanding small redactions in my book – already shipped to the bookstores – to avoid “harm to US security”. One demand: to cut a vignette based on a scene from the movie version of Black Hawk Down.
The link to WikiLeaks is still on my blog. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security declined my written offer to remove it, certainly an indication that however much my punishment mattered to them, the actual link mattered little. I may lose my job in State’s attempt to turn us all into mini-Bradley Mannings and so make America safe.
These are not people steeped in, or particularly appreciative of, the finer points of irony. Still, would anyone claim that there isn’t irony in the way the State Department regularly crusades for the rights of bloggers abroad in the face of all kinds of government oppression, crediting their voices for the Arab Spring, while going after one of its own bloggers at home for saying nothing that wasn’t truthful?
Here’s the best advice my friends in Diplomatic Security have to offer, as far as I can tell: slam the door after the cow has left the barn, then beat your wife as punishment. She didn’t do anything wrong, but she deserved it, and don’t you feel better now?
Süddeutsche Zeitung über die kriminellen Machenschaften der “GoMoPa”
SPIEGEL über die Giftstudie des “GoMoPa”-Masterminds und Resch-Protege´s STASI-Oberst Ehrenfried Stelzer
DIE GIFTSTUDIE “TOXDAT” DES RESCH-PROTEGE´S STASI-OBERST EHRENFRIED STELZER
SPIEGEL über die STASI-Connection des mutmasslichen “GoMoPa”-Chefs Jochen Resch
Julian Assange: The Unauthorised Autobiography – review
Marsupials are pouched animals, mostly from Australia, that give birth to their young in an unfinished state. What we have here is a weird marsupial hybrid. It’s part Australian WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, and part Scottish novelist and ghostwriter Andrew O’Hagan. This mixed-up creature has given birth to an unfinished draft, dragged out of its pouch and published before its maturity under the wacky title The Unauthorised Autobiography. Assange hasn’t really been well-served by his publisher’s behaviour. It’s the result of what seems to be a characteristic Assange imbroglio in which he will neither give back his £412,000 publisher’s advance, nor deliver a finally approved manuscript. But the decision by Canongate’s Jamie Byng to publish regardless, although understandable, has produced an unsatisfactory book.
The ghostwriter and his subject hadn’t yet really gelled by the time of this draft. It’s easy to see the fictionalising hand of O’Hagan in an early chapter about Assange’s hippy boyhood in northern Queensland. It begins, soulfully: “For most people, childhood is a climate. In my case, it is perfectly hot and humid with nothing above us but blue sky …” But a later section on the Aussie hacker’s souring partnership with the journalists who were to print his leaked US secrets is much more raw. The opening reads like Assange sounding off verbatim on a bad day, in a sentence full of bile and misogyny: “Vanity in a newspaper man is like perfume on a whore: they use it to fend off a dark whiff of themselves.” For by the time we reach this second half of the book, O’Hagan’s mediating intelligence seems to have retreated, and the digital recorder is doing much of the work. Perhaps the ghost got weary, locked up in a chilly East Anglian winter with his monologuing subject, who is currently confined there on bail, fighting extradition on Swedish sex allegations.
The lack of a final edit does other disservices to Assange’s story. The narrative stops too abruptly, before publication in the Guardian and the New York Times of the third and most important set of leaks he had acquired (the state department cables), and the subsequent legal pursuit of Assange on the sex complaints. It’s padded out instead with unnecessary chunks of the cables themselves, which can be read elsewhere. The unresolved criminal allegations, inevitably, make him censor a defensive account of sex with two Swedish fans. It’s all very well calling a woman “neurotic”, but did he deliberately tear a condom as she alleged?
Furthermore, a nervous Canongate libel lawyer, no longer able presumably to rely on Assange as a future witness, appears to have simply chopped out chunks of detail when Assange abuses those he doesn’t like. This censorship muddies what could have been a lively, if defamatory, narrative, and pointlessly withholds many of the names. I myself, for example, who clashed with Assange during the Guardian saga, and co-authored a book he didn’t care for, am anonymised throughout, transparently enough, as “the news reporter”. Yet Bill Keller, then editor of the New York Times and considered presumably to be libel-proof under US free-speech laws, remains relentlessly vituperated against under his own name.
A final fact-check would have removed a crop of stupid errors. It must have been a transcription mistake that turned Heather Brooke into “the ‘Independent’ journalist” rather than the independent journalist she is. And Oscar Wilde with his rent-boys was not “sleeping with panthers”, he was feasting with panthers.
For all its drawbacks, the memoir does add some good detail to the increasingly well-trodden field of Assange studies (it’s the fifth book so far). The passage in which he meets his biological father, a bohemian Sydney actor, for the first time in his 20s, is genuinely poignant: “I found myself getting sort of angry … There on shelf after shelf were the exact same books as those I had bought and read myself … If I had only known him, I might just have picked his books down from the shelf … I was forced to make myself up as I went along.”
And there’s a telling section in which Assange, perhaps unwittingly, reveals why he seeks out unquestioning disciples, and quarrels with so many others: “Opponents past and present have the same essential weakness about them – first they want to use you, then they want to be you, then they want to snuff you out. It’s a pattern that stretches in my life from toytown feds to hacks at the Guardian … Usually it ends with these people enumerating one’s personal faults, a shocking, ungrateful, unmanly effort, to be filed under despicable in my book … I’ve been meeting [these people] all my life.”
This seems to be a cry coming from a truly threatened personality, in fear of being overwhelmed and extinguished. People have criticised Assange for being preposterously grandiose and lashing out at imagined “enemies”. Perhaps they should have been kinder, for there is clearly something else at work here.
It’s a shame Assange couldn’t get on with the Guardian. As he has the grace occasionally to recognise in this book, people there share some of his beliefs – free speech, investigative journalism, standing up to big corporations and murderous governments, the potentially liberating quality of the internet. And his idea for WikiLeaks provided an exhilarating addition to the world’s journalistic possibilities. It was a neat tool – as an uncensorable global publisher of last resort, and as an electronic outlet for leaking the new kinds of huge database the computer age is bringing into existence. But unmediated leaking on a random basis, even of gigabits of purloined documents, cannot ever revolutionise all the world’s power relationships. There Assange shows, regrettably, that he is living in a fantasy world.
Behind his high-sounding talk of quantum mechanics and global conspiracies, there lies a more familiar and heartfelt cry: “If only people knew what was really going on, they’d do something about it!” One sympathises. But these very memoirs demonstrate the opposite. Nothing much happened after Assange threw back the curtain to reveal his sensationally leaked Baghdad helicopter gunship video, with US pilots mowing down Reuters employees and young children in a burst of incompetent cannon-fire. As Assange (or O’Hagan) concedes: “It vexes me when the world won’t listen.”
That was what forced him to accept an offer from some of the world’s major newspapers to make sense of the rest of his material, publish it under the authority of their own names and grant him a share of the credibility slowly built up over 190 years of reputable reporting. Thanks to that imaginative transaction, he rocketed briefly to worldwide fame. These marsupial memoirs of his seem unlikely to increase his prospects of becoming the messiah of the information age. Maybe, sadly, even the reverse.
David Leigh is the co-author of WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy (Guardian Books).
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TOP-SECRET – CIA Alec Station Memo of 9/11 Commission 02
TOP-SECRET – CIA Alec Station Memo of 9/11 Commission 01
TOP-SECRET – Localizar y detener al Dr. Goiburú
| Documentos del Archivo del Terror de Paraguay implican a Fuerzas de Seguridad paraguayas y argentinas en el secuestro
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 239 – Part III Editado por Carlos Osorio y Marianna Enamoneta Publicado – Diciembre 21, 2007 Para más información contactar a: Peter Kornbluh: (202) 994-7116
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Lazos Relacionados En el 15 Aniversario del Archive del Terror Operación Cóndor en el Archivo del Terror Centro de Documentación y Archivo para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (CDyA) CDyA [Sitio espejo] 60,000 registros del Archivo del Terror CDyA [Sitio UNESCO] Memoria Abierta Archivo del Terror en YouTube |
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TOP-SECRET – EN EL 15 ANIVERSARIO DEL ARCHIVO DEL TERROR
COOPERACIÓN En apoyo al Archivo del Terror
2000 Primer convenio de cooperación El 17 de Febrero 2000 el National Security Archive y la Corte Suprema de Justicia lanzaron una iniciativa de cooperación a fin de recaudar fondos y recursos para digitalizar el acervo del CDyA, adquirir el hardware y software necesarios para hacer accesible el acervo a través del internet y capacitar al personal del CDyA. En esa ocasión se adquirió un nuevo equipo de computación y se estableció el acceso a internet del CDyA 2001 – 2002 Memoria Histórica, Democracia y Derechos Humanos (MHDDH) En 2001, La Corte Suprema de Justicia y la Universidad Católica de Asunción, con el apoyo del National Security Archive en Washington DC, lanzaron un proyecto de dos años diseñado para atender a los desafíos de responder al incremento de peticiones de habeas data y del público en general y el acelerado desarrollo la tecnología digital y el internet. El proyecto “Memoria Histórica, Democracia y Derechos Humanos (MHDDH)”. El proyecto fue financiado por el Fondo para la Democracia y los Derechos Humanos del Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos y fue administrado por la US AID. Un equipo asesor de la Corte Suprema de Justicia coordino el proyecto y sus miembros fueron Rosa Palau, Co-Directora del CDyA, el Embajador Jorge Lara Castro, catedrático de la UCA, y Carlos Osorio, Director del Proyecto de Documentación del Cono Sur del National Security Archive. Entre Septiembre 2001 y Diciembre 2002, el proyecto logro: 1) Microfilmar 200,000 páginas del Acervo del CDyA. El apoyo inicial proveído por US AID y la Corte Suprema de Justicia en 1993 permitió microfilmar el 60% del acervo del Archivo. El proyecto MHDDH proveyó los recursos financieros que permitieron al personal cualificado de la Corte Suprema de Justicia llevar a cabo el resto de la microfilmación. El proyecto ayudo a pagar salarios de operadores y técnicos, adquirir rollos y materiales para reencuadernar los libros microfilmados. 2) Catalogación de Sesenta Mil Documentos para responder a Habeas Data
Un equipo supervisado por la Universidad Católica y dirigido por un archivista profesional, catálogo 60,000 documentos considerados los más pertinentes para responder a los centenares de peticiones de Habeas Data que recibe el CDyA anualmente. El catálogo montado en una base de datos WinIsis, permite realizar búsquedas en los campos básicos siguientes: Fecha, Nombres, Organizaciones, Términos Geográficos, Tipo de Documento, Fondo, Ubicación Física y Rollo y Número de Fotograma. 3) Acceso público al catálogo de 60,000 documentos El proyecto diseñó el sistema para publicar este catálogo en el internet como una manera de facilitar el acceso del público al acervo del CDyA. 4) Digitalización de 300,000 documentos El proyecto MHDDH financio la producción de más de 500,000 imágenes digitales de los documentos del acervo del CDyA, estableciendo así las bases para una futura instalación de un sistema de administración y búsqueda de un archivo digital. 5) Re equipamiento del CDyA Se instalaron estanterías metálicas deslizantes y se adquirió material de computación 6) Gira por Washington DC En diciembre 2002, el National Security Archive organizó una gira de capacitación para el personal del CDyA que incluyo visitas y talleres en la Universidad George Washington, el Instituto por una Sociedad Abierta, el Archivo Nacional, la Biblioteca del Congreso y la Biblioteca de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de los Estados Unidos.
2003 – 2007 Convenio de Archivo Digital Se firma convenio de Cooperación entre la Corte Suprema de Justicia y el National Security Archive que busca construir el Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD) a fin de disminuir o eliminar la manipulación y así preservar los textos del acervo del CDyA: procesar las imágenes de los 300,000 documentos del acervo del CDyA por OCR, montar un sistema de administración y búsqueda sobre las imágenes, e instalar equipo de computación e impresoras. El convenio establece las pautas para la publicación de análisis de documentación del CDyA en gacetillas electrónicas en la página web del National Security Archive. Se instaló el sistema ATD y se obtuvo impresora laser. 2007 Catálogo en Línea y Sitio Espejo
Se firma convenio de Cooperación entre la Corte Suprema de Justicia y el National Security Archive a fin de poner en línea el catálogo de 60,000 documentos con el apoyo de la Gelman Library de la George Washington University. El convenio incluye la puesta en línea de una imagen espejo del sitio web del CDyA |
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Published – Abbas, Netanyahu & Obama at the U.N. : responses from a Palestinian and a Jew
From: Tikkun <magazine[at]tikkun.org>
Subject: Abbas, Netanyahu & Obama at the U.N. : responses from a Palestinian and a Jew
Editor’s Note: As we often do in the magazine, the website, and these emails, here are responses you are unlikely to read or hear or see in the mass media to the President of Palestine Abbas and the Prime Minister of Israel Netanyahu in relationship to what they have been doing at the U.N. Our first respondent is a Palestinian activist in Ramallah, the second a Jewish columnist in NYC.
Kudos Mr. Abbas
Reply
Mazin Qumsiyeh mazin[at]qumsiyeh.org to rabbilerner, Human show details 11:18 AM (1 hour ago)
http://popular-resistance.blogspot.com/2011/09/kudos-mr-abbas.html
Mahmoud Abbas gave a brilliant speech at the United Nations, getting rounds of applause from most of the representatives. I think it demonstrated clearly and unambiguously that the Palestinian leadership has been “unreasonably reasonable” and has instead seen the hopes of peace and of millions of Palestinians suffering for 63 years dashed on the rock of Israeli expansionist, colonial, and apartheid policies. He explained that Israel has been taking one unilateral action after another each resulting in more pain and suffering for our people. Going to the UN, he explained is putting things back where the problems started (he did not use the last two words but I do). He said a word that I think he should defend strongly that no person or country with an iota of logic or conscience should reject the Palestinian state membership in the UN or its formation in the 22% of historic Palestine that is the West Bank and Gaza. I think he took a courageous step and gave a good performance. Now we here on the ground in Palestine hope and will push for additional follow-up steps. From our own perspective, three things are critical:
1) That he and his administration now implement quickly the reconciliation agreement signed by all Palestinian factions most notably the one about creating a representative Palestinian National Council. In his speech he said he hopes this will be done in a few weeks. We hope this will be done quickly and not any longer than four weeks.
2) That he and his administration act quickly and decisively to really promote popular unarmed resistance throughout Palestine and among Palestinians in exile. In forming a new government, the ministry that is now in charge of walls and settlements should be either a) dismantled or b) reconfigured. A new strategy to encourage real nonviolent resistance must be adopted. We must end the practice of holding a few demonstrative actions that do not disturb the occupation and that are used to enrich a few people. We must instead allow the kind of popular resistance that have been effective from our history (see my book that details challenges and opportunities learned from this history and available in Arabic and English). He also said he will pursue this.
3) The Palestinian people are waiting to see clear evidence of change; a new Palestinian Spring as Mr. Abbas called it. This requires seeing visibly what Mr. Abbas talked about: transparency, accountability, democracy, and freedom.
There were those who worried that going to the UN will raise the expectations of the Palestinian people who then may turn to despair and more if they do not see a change on the ground. I say a) it is great to raise the expectations, and b) we, the Palestinian people will never turn to despair but we will revolt if we do not see real changes and stronger steps. I share Abu Mazen’s hope that the international community steps up to the plate. But I also hope that we all go back to our people and take those steps that will ensure our freedom.
I also listened to Netanyahu’s speech and was just amazed at how many lies can be packed in one speech. It is not even worth detailing except to refer you to this link: http://www.qumsiyeh.org/liesandtruths/
In this occasion, it might be worth comparing Israel and the Palestinians.
Israel Palestinians Population----------------5.5 million Jewish---------11 million (7 million refugees or displaced) Land controlled ----------91.7%----------------------8.3% of historic Palestine Nature--------------------Occupier/colonizer---------Occupied people Military Personnel--------Regular 175,000------------None --------------------------Reserves, 500,000 Irregulars----------------10-50,000------------------3-5,000 --------------------------Armed settlers-------------Armed underground forces Police/other security-----30,000---------------------50,000 Tanks----------------------3,800---------------------0 Artillery------------------1500 large----------------0 Submarines-----------------6 ------------------------0 Warships-------------------20-30---------------------0 Combat airplanes-----------2000----------------------0 Nuclear Weapons----------->300-----------------------0 GDP-----------------------$195 billion--------------$4 billion Military expenditure------$10 billion----------------Negligible (security services) Casuaties (63 years)-------6,000 killed--------------75,000 killed ---------------------------20,000 injured------------300,000 injured Abducted/jailed------------30------------------------400,000 Homes demolished-----------0-------------------------50,000 Refugees created-----------0------------------------>6 million people
Mr. President, we don’t want a shortcut, we want our freedom by Abir Kopty
http://mondoweiss.net/2011/09/mr-president-we-dont-want-a-shortcut-we-want-our-freedom.html
Palestinians on statehood: ‘We want action, not votes at the UN’ Villagers who have often been at the sharp end of Palestinian-Israeli relations are skeptical about the UN route
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/14/palestinian-statehood-action-un
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On Israel And Palestine, Obama Is Rick Perry
President Barack Obama’s speech to the U.N. General Assembly succeeded in making clear why the Palestinians had no other choice but to take their statehood bid to the U.N. and why the United States can no longer pretend to be an “honest broker” in the conflict.
For the first time since the U.N. conferred statehood on Israel 63 years ago, the sitting U.S president told the world body that the United States will back Israel, right or wrong. The president’s speech was so one-sided, in fact, that he sounded a lot like Texas Gov. Rick Perry, who gave a similar speech to a group of “pro-Israel” right-wingers one day earlier. Perry is not the president, so his speech was different, except for the motivation, which was same.
Both speeches were standard “pro-Israel” bloviating, but Perry gave his on the campaign trail and not in front of the entire world. (I hesitate to call a speech opposing Palestinian statehood “pro-Israel” when the latest comprehensive poll on the subject says that 70 percent of Israelis say Israel should support the U.N.’s decision if statehood is granted.)
The very best explanation of what Obama did at the United Nations came from Daniel Levy, a Brit who moved to Israel right out of college 18 years ago. Levy’s quote appeared on page one of the Washington Post.
“There is virtually no thread of reason running between the way he [Obama] related to the rest of the world and its developments, particularly in the Middle East, and the positions he espoused on Israel-Palestine a conflict apparently occurring on another planet,” said Daniel Levy, co-director of the Middle East Task Force at the New America Foundation. “Palestinian freedoms, rights and self-determination are somehow supposed to be attained without the recourse to leverage, international law or meaningful international support, considered to be necessary and legitimate virtually everywhere else.”
Of course, there is one “thread,” although it is not of “reason.” Every word in Obama’s speech was designed not to advance a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but to keep single-issue donors and, to a lesser extent, single-issue voters in his camp for the 2012 election. Not a week goes by without the Obama team sending emails out to people it deems Israel voters to remind them of all the wonderful things this president has done for Israel. One recently was dedicated to citing quotes from Prime Minister Netanyahu praising Obama, the first time I can remember that a president sought to validate himself by citing the praise of a foreign leader.
Obama isn’t lying about his “pro-Israel” record, however. This administration has been the most one-sided supporter of everything Israel asks for since 1948. There is no competition. Not even George W. Bush comes close.
When the Israelis, following Obama’s election, asked Bush to give Israel permission to bomb Iran, he said no, despite his vice president and neoconservative aides pushing the Israeli position hard. Bush also did more than Obama to advance the peace process that the Israeli right hates so much, convening an international summit at Aqaba and being the first president to say, in unambiguous terms, that the United States supports “two states, living side by side in peace and security.”
On Israel, Obama is to the right of Bush, to the right of Reagan, and certainly to the right of Clinton. On Israel and Palestine, Barack Obama is Rick Perry.
Of course, Obama’s outrageous surrender to Netanyahu still won’t impress the Israel-Firsters. They have despised him from day one, for all kinds of reasons, and predictably condemned the speech. Meanwhile, Israel’s thuggish far-right foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, told reporters that “I am ready to sign on this speech with both hands.”
Lieberman is telling the truth he could have written Obama’s speech and the neocons are lying. But neocons are adherents of the Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) school: They have only one goal, which is to defeat this president. And although privately they celebrate their amazing success at intimidating Obama into submission, publicly they denounce him and send scary emails to senior citizens in Florida and New Jersey warning them that Obama wants to destroy Israel.
But these speeches and love-ins with Netanyahu accomplish nothing for Obama. The single-issue Israel voters and donors (3 percent of the Jewish community) will take their money and votes elsewhere.
And Netanyahu will, working from Jerusalem, do everything he can to help the Republicans win the next election. It’s almost funny how these people would exchange the person who is the most “pro-Israel” president ever (looking at it from their “maintain-the-occupation-at-all-costs” vantage point) for an unknown quantity like Perry or Romney. After all, a Republican whose main constituency is Wall Street would likely turn out to approach Israel with more skepticism than Obama does.
But it’s a game. Netanyahu and the lobby want to defeat Obama to demonstrate, yet again, who calls the shots on U.S. Middle East policy.
But forget the campaign for a moment which is what Obama should have done when addressing the U.N. The president’s speech was an embarrassing disaster. Since 2009, 1,600 Palestinians (overwhelmingly civilians and over 400 children) have been killed by the Israeli army. Thirteen Israelis have been killed over the same period. Despite that, Obama devoted 120 words of his speech to Israeli suffering (even going so far as to cite the Holocaust) and not one word to Palestinian suffering.
Example: An Australian newspaper reports on a new film about the tragedy of Palestinian women in Gaza (under full Israeli blockade) who are suffering with breast cancer but are not permitted by Israel to leave Gaza for treatment. (They used to go to Israeli hospitals or hospitals in the Arab states and Europe.) Nor does Israel permit the import of the radioactive isotopes used to treat breast cancers. So they die.
One could go on and on about the horrors of the occupation but it won’t matter to the politicians who determine U.S. foreign policy. They know which side their bread is buttered on, as Obama demonstrated at the U.N. this week.
But, I’m surprised to say, Obama did Palestinians and the 70 percent of Israelis who support statehood a big favor. By demonstrating that the United States refuses to play the role of “honest broker” and by telling the U.N. that we are Israel and Israel is us, the United States is yielding the role of Middle East peacemaker to others. The French, Turks, Indians, Brazilians, Chinese, South Africans, and Russians don’t agree on much. But they do agree on the urgency of the creation of a Palestinian state in the areas occupied in 1967. And they agree that the United States, no longer the superpower it once was, should move over and let countries not fully invested in one side play a more constructive role.
Those who wonder how these “other countries” could exert the leadership the U.S. has abdicated might consider the issue of economics, trade, etc. Israel does not live on an island with the United States. It is part of the world and not even the United States and the $3.5 billion it hands over to Israel each year (no strings attached) can save Israel if the rest of the world says “enough.”
Obama has chosen to abdicate. The rest of the world is eager to step up.
And that is why I have no doubt that the state of Palestine was created this week at the United Nations. By opting out, Obama did a tremendous favor to Palestinians and Israelis both. Palestinians will have their fully sovereign, contiguous state. And the Jewish state of Israel will finally be secure. As Israelis like to say, “yhiyeh tov.” Or as Arabs say, “insha’Allah khair.” Everything will be fine.
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TOP-SECRET – FCC Preserving Open Internet
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 185 (Friday, September 23, 2011)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 59192-59235] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2011-24259] [[Page 59191]] Vol. 76 Friday, No. 185 September 23, 2011 Part II Federal Communications Commission ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 47 CFR Parts 0 and 8 Preserving the Open Internet; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 185 / Friday, September 23, 2011 / Rules and Regulations [[Page 59192]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 47 CFR Parts 0 and 8 [GN Docket No. 09-191; WC Docket No. 07-52; FCC 10-201] Preserving the Open Internet AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: This Report and Order establishes protections for broadband service to preserve and reinforce Internet freedom and openness. The Commission adopts three basic protections that are grounded in broadly accepted Internet norms, as well as our own prior decisions. First, transparency: fixed and mobile broadband providers must disclose the network management practices, performance characteristics, and commercial terms of their broadband services. Second, no blocking: fixed broadband providers may not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; mobile broadband providers may not block lawful Web sites, or block applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services. Third, no unreasonable discrimination: fixed broadband providers may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic. These rules, applied with the complementary principle of reasonable network management, ensure that the freedom and openness that have enabled the Internet to flourish as an engine for creativity and commerce will continue. This framework thus provides greater certainty and predictability to consumers, innovators, investors, and broadband providers, as well as the flexibility providers need to effectively manage their networks. The framework promotes a virtuous circle of innovation and investment in which new uses of the network--including new content, applications, services, and devices--lead to increased end-user demand for broadband, which drives network improvements that in turn lead to further innovative network uses. DATES: Effective Date: These rules are effective November 20, 2011. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matt Warner, (202) 418-2419 or e-mail, matthew.warner@fcc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report and Order (Order) in GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, FCC 10- 201, adopted December 21, 2010 and released December 23, 2010. The complete text of this document is available on the Commission's Web site at http://www.fcc.gov. It is also available for inspection and copying during normal business hours in the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. This document may also be purchased from the Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc., 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone (800) 378-3160 or (202) 863-2893, facsimile (202) 863-2898, or via e-mail at http://www.bcpiweb.com. Synopsis of the Order I. Preserving the Free and Open Internet In this Order the Commission takes an important step to preserve the Internet as an open platform for innovation, investment, job creation, economic growth, competition, and free expression. To provide greater clarity and certainty regarding the continued freedom and openness of the Internet, we adopt three basic rules that are grounded in broadly accepted Internet norms, as well as our own prior decisions: i. Transparency. Fixed and mobile broadband providers must disclose the network management practices, performance characteristics, and terms and conditions of their broadband services; ii. No blocking. Fixed broadband providers may not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; mobile broadband providers may not block lawful Web sites, or block applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services; and iii. No unreasonable discrimination. Fixed broadband providers may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic. We believe these rules, applied with the complementary principle of reasonable network management, will empower and protect consumers and innovators while helping ensure that the Internet continues to flourish, with robust private investment and rapid innovation at both the core and the edge of the network. This is consistent with the National Broadband Plan goal of broadband access that is ubiquitous and fast, promoting the global competitiveness of the United States. In late 2009, we launched a public process to determine whether and what actions might be necessary to preserve the characteristics that have allowed the Internet to grow into an indispensable platform supporting our nation's economy and civic life, and to foster continued investment in the physical networks that enable the Internet. Since then, more than 100,000 commenters have provided written input. Commission staff held several public workshops and convened a Technological Advisory Process with experts from industry, academia, and consumer advocacy groups to collect their views regarding key technical issues related to Internet openness. This process has made clear that the Internet has thrived because of its freedom and openness--the absence of any gatekeeper blocking lawful uses of the network or picking winners and losers online. Consumers and innovators do not have to seek permission before they use the Internet to launch new technologies, start businesses, connect with friends, or share their views. The Internet is a level playing field. Consumers can make their own choices about what applications and services to use and are free to decide what content they want to access, create, or share with others. This openness promotes competition. It also enables a self-reinforcing cycle of investment and innovation in which new uses of the network lead to increased adoption of broadband, which drives investment and improvements in the network itself, which in turn lead to further innovative uses of the network and further investment in content, applications, services, and devices. A core goal of this Order is to foster and accelerate this cycle of investment and innovation. The record and our economic analysis demonstrate, however, that the openness of the Internet cannot be taken for granted, and that it faces real threats. Indeed, we have seen broadband providers endanger the Internet's openness by blocking or degrading content and applications without disclosing their practices to end users and edge providers, notwithstanding the Commission's adoption of open Internet principles in 2005.\1\ In light of these considerations, as well as the limited choices most consumers have for broadband service, broadband [[Page 59193]] providers' financial interests in telephony and pay television services that may compete with online content and services, and the economic and civic benefits of maintaining an open and competitive platform for innovation and communication, the Commission has long recognized that certain basic standards for broadband provider conduct are necessary to ensure the Internet's continued openness. The record also establishes the widespread benefits of providing greater clarity in this area-- clarity that the Internet's openness will continue, that there is a forum and procedure for resolving alleged open Internet violations, and that broadband providers may reasonably manage their networks and innovate with respect to network technologies and business models. We expect the costs of compliance with our prophylactic rules to be small, as they incorporate longstanding openness principles that are generally in line with current practices and with norms endorsed by many broadband providers. Conversely, the harms of open Internet violations may be substantial, costly, and in some cases potentially irreversible. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ In this Order we use ``broadband'' and ``broadband Internet access service'' interchangeably, and ``broadband provider'' and ``broadband Internet access provider'' interchangeably. ``End user'' refers to any individual or entity that uses a broadband Internet access service; we sometimes use ``subscriber'' or ``consumer'' to refer to those end users that subscribe to a particular broadband Internet access service. We use ``edge provider'' to refer to content, application, service, and device providers, because they generally operate at the edge rather than the core of the network. These terms are not mutually exclusive. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The rules we proposed in the Open Internet NPRM and those we adopt in this Order follow directly from the Commission's bipartisan Internet Policy Statement, adopted unanimously in 2005 and made temporarily enforceable for certain broadband providers in 2005 and 2007; openness protections the Commission established in 2007 for users of certain wireless spectrum; and a notice of inquiry in 2007 that asked, among other things, whether the Commission should add a principle of nondiscrimination to the Internet Policy Statement. Our rules build upon these actions, first and foremost by requiring broadband providers to be transparent in their network management practices, so that end users can make informed choices and innovators can develop, market, and maintain Internet-based offerings. The rules also prevent certain forms of blocking and discrimination with respect to content, applications, services, and devices that depend on or connect to the Internet. An open, robust, and well-functioning Internet requires that broadband providers have the flexibility to reasonably manage their networks. Network management practices are reasonable if they are appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose. Transparency and end-user control are touchstones of reasonableness. We recognize that broadband providers may offer other services over the same last-mile connections used to provide broadband service. These ``specialized services'' can benefit end users and spur investment, but they may also present risks to the open Internet. We will closely monitor specialized services and their effects on broadband service to ensure, through all available mechanisms, that they supplement but do not supplant the open Internet. Mobile broadband is at an earlier stage in its development than fixed broadband and is evolving rapidly. For that and other reasons discussed below, we conclude that it is appropriate at this time to take measured steps in this area. Accordingly, we require mobile broadband providers to comply with the transparency rule, which includes enforceable disclosure obligations regarding device and application certification and approval processes; we prohibit providers from blocking lawful Web sites; and we prohibit providers from blocking applications that compete with providers' voice and video telephony services. We will closely monitor the development of the mobile broadband market and will adjust the framework we adopt in this Order as appropriate. These rules are within our jurisdiction over interstate and foreign communications by wire and radio. Further, they implement specific statutory mandates in the Communications Act (``Act'') and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (``1996 Act''), including provisions that direct the Commission to promote Internet investment and to protect and promote voice, video, and audio communications services. The framework we adopt aims to ensure the Internet remains an open platform--one characterized by free markets and free speech--that enables consumer choice, end-user control, competition through low barriers to entry, and the freedom to innovate without permission. The framework does so by protecting openness through high-level rules, while maintaining broadband providers' and the Commission's flexibility to adapt to changes in the market and in technology as the Internet continues to evolve. II. The Need for Open Internet Protections In the Open Internet NPRM (FCC 09-93 published at 74 FR 62638, November 30, 2009), we sought comment on the best means for preserving and promoting a free and open Internet. We noted the near-unanimous view that the Internet's openness and the transparency of its protocols have been critical to its unparalleled success. Citing evidence of broadband providers covertly blocking or degrading Internet traffic, and concern that broadband providers have the incentive and ability to expand those practices in the near future, we sought comment on prophylactic rules designed to preserve the Internet's prevailing norms of openness. Specifically, we sought comment on whether the Commission should codify the four principles stated in the Internet Policy Statement, plus proposed nondiscrimination and transparency rules, all subject to reasonable network management.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ The Open Internet NPRM recast the Internet Policy Statement principles as rules rather than consumer entitlements, but did not change the fact that protecting and empowering end users is a central purpose of open Internet protections. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Commenters agree that the open Internet is an important platform for innovation, investment, competition, and free expression, but disagree about whether there is a need for the Commission to take action to preserve its openness. Commenters who favor Commission action emphasize the risk of harmful conduct by broadband providers, and stress that failing to act could result in irreversible damage to the Internet. Those who favor inaction contend that the Internet generally is open today and is likely to remain so, and express concern that rules aimed at preventing harms may themselves impose significant costs. In this part, we assess these conflicting views. We conclude that the benefits of ensuring Internet openness through enforceable, high-level, prophylactic rules outweigh the costs. The harms that could result from threats to openness are significant and likely irreversible, while the costs of compliance with our rules should be small, in large part because the rules appear to be consistent with current industry practices. The rules are carefully calibrated to preserve the benefits of the open Internet and increase certainty for all Internet stakeholders, with minimal burden on broadband providers. A. The Internet's Openness Promotes Innovation, Investment, Competition, Free Expression, and Other National Broadband Goals Like electricity and the computer, the Internet is a ``general purpose technology'' that enables new methods of production that have a major impact on the entire economy. The Internet's founders intentionally built a network that is open, in the sense that it has no gatekeepers limiting innovation and [[Page 59194]] communication through the network.\3\ Accordingly, the Internet enables an end user to access the content and applications of her choice, without requiring permission from broadband providers. This architecture enables innovators to create and offer new applications and services without needing approval from any controlling entity, be it a network provider, equipment manufacturer, industry body, or government agency. End users benefit because the Internet's openness allows new technologies to be developed and distributed by a broad range of sources, not just by the companies that operate the network. For example, Sir Tim Berners-Lee was able to invent the World Wide Web nearly two decades after engineers developed the Internet's original protocols, without needing changes to those protocols or any approval from network operators. Startups and small businesses benefit because the Internet's openness enables anyone connected to the network to reach and do business with anyone else, allowing even the smallest and most remotely located businesses to access national and global markets, and contribute to the economy through e-commerce \4\ and online advertising.\5\ Because Internet openness enables widespread innovation and allows all end users and edge providers (rather than just the significantly smaller number of broadband providers) to create and determine the success or failure of content, applications, services, and devices, it maximizes commercial and non-commercial innovations that address key national challenges--including improvements in health care, education, and energy efficiency that benefit our economy and civic life. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ The Internet's openness is supported by an ``end-to-end'' network architecture that was formulated and debated in standard- setting organizations and foundational documents. See, e.g., WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 17-29, Vinton G. Cerf & Robert E. Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network Interconnection, COM-22 IEEE Transactions of Commc'ns Tech. 637-48 (1974); WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 30-39, J.H. Saltzer et al., End to End Arguments in System Design, Second Int'l Conf. on Distributed Computing Systems, 509-12 (1981); WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 49-55, B. Carpenter, Internet Engineering Task Force (``IETF''), Architectural Principles of the Internet, RFC 1958, 1-8 (June 1996), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1958.txt; Lawrence Roberts, Multiple Computer Networks and Intercomputer Communication, ACM Symposium on Operation System Principles (1967). Under the end-to-end principle, devices in the middle of the network are not optimized for the handling of any particular application, while devices at network endpoints perform the functions necessary to support networked applications and services. See generally WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 40-48, J. Kempf & R. Austein, IETF, The Rise of the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on the Evolution of the Internet Architecture, RFC 3724, 1-14 (March 2004), ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3724.txt. \4\ Business-to-consumer e-commerce was estimated to total $135 billion in 2009. See WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 81-180, Robert D. Atkinson et al., The Internet Economy 25 Years After.com, Info. Tech. & Innovation Found., at 24 (March 2010), available at http://www.itif.org/files/2010-25-years.pdf. \5\ The advertising-supported Internet sustains about $300 billion of U.S. GDP. See Google Comments at 7. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Internet's openness is critical to these outcomes, because it enables a virtuous circle of innovation in which new uses of the network--including new content, applications, services, and devices-- lead to increased end-user demand for broadband, which drives network improvements, which in turn lead to further innovative network uses. Novel, improved, or lower-cost offerings introduced by content, application, service, and device providers spur end-user demand and encourage broadband providers to expand their networks and invest in new broadband technologies.\6\ Streaming video and e-commerce applications, for instance, have led to major network improvements such as fiber to the premises, VDSL, and DOCSIS 3.0. These network improvements generate new opportunities for edge providers, spurring them to innovate further.\7\ Each round of innovation increases the value of the Internet for broadband providers, edge providers, online businesses, and consumers. Continued operation of this virtuous circle, however, depends upon low barriers to innovation and entry by edge providers, which drive end-user demand. Restricting edge providers' ability to reach end users, and limiting end users' ability to choose which edge providers to patronize, would reduce the rate of innovation at the edge and, in turn, the likely rate of improvements to network infrastructure. Similarly, restricting the ability of broadband providers to put the network to innovative uses may reduce the rate of improvements to network infrastructure. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ We note that broadband providers can also be edge providers. \7\ For example, the increasing availability of multimedia applications on the World Wide Web during the 1990s was one factor that helped create demand for residential broadband services. Internet service providers responded by adopting new network infrastructure, modem technologies, and network protocols, and marketed broadband to residential customers. See, e.g., WCB Letter 12/13/10, Attach. at 250-72, Chetan Sharma, Managing Growth and Profits in the Yottabyte Era (2009), http://www.chetansharma.com/yottabyteera.htm (Yottabyte). By the late 1990s, a residential end user could download content at speeds not achievable even on the Internet backbone during the 1980s. See, e.g., WCB Letter 12/13/10, Attach. at 226-32, Susan Harris & Elise Gerich, The NSFNET Backbone Service: Chronicling the End of an Era, 10 ConneXions (April 1996), available at http://www.merit.edu/networkresearch/projecthistory/nsfnet/nsfnet_article.php. Higher speeds and broadband's ``always on'' capability, in turn, stimulated more innovation in applications, from gaming to video streaming, which in turn encouraged broadband providers to increase network speeds. WCB Letter 12/13/10, Attach. at 233-34, Link Hoewing, Twitter, Broadband and Innovation, PolicyBlog, Dec. 4, 2010, policyblog.verizon.com/BlogPost/626/TwitterBroadbandandInnovation.aspx. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Openness also is essential to the Internet's role as a platform for speech and civic engagement. An informed electorate is critical to the health of a functioning democracy, and Congress has recognized that the Internet ``offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.'' Due to the lack of gatekeeper control, the Internet has become a major source of news and information, which forms the basis for informed civic discourse. Many Americans now turn to the Internet to obtain news,\8\ and its openness makes it an unrivaled forum for free expression. Furthermore, local, State, and Federal government agencies are increasingly using the Internet to communicate with the public, including to provide information about and deliver essential services. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ See WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 133-41, Pew Research Ctr. for People and the Press, Americans Spend More Time Following the News; Ideological News Sources: Who Watches and Why 17, 22 (Sept. 12, 2010), people-press.org/report/652/ (stating that ``44% of Americans say they got news through one or more Internet or mobile digital source yesterday''); WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 131-32, TVB Local Media Marketing Solutions, Local News: Local TV Stations are the Top Daily News Source, http://www.tvb.org/planning_buying/120562 (estimating that 61% of Americans get news from the Internet) (``TVB''). However, according to the Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism, the majority of news that people access online originates from legacy media. See Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism, The State of the News Media: An Annual Report on American Journalism (2010), http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/overview_key_findings.php (``Of news sites with half a million visitors a month (or the top 199 news sites once consulting, government and information data bases are removed), 67% are from legacy media, most of them (48%) newspapers.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Television and radio broadcasters now provide news and other information online via their own Web sites, online aggregation Web sites such as Hulu, and social networking platforms. Local broadcasters are experimenting with new approaches to delivering original content, for example by creating neighborhood-focused Web sites; delivering news clips via online video programming aggregators, including AOL and Google's YouTube; and offering news from citizen journalists. In addition, broadcast networks license their full-length entertainment programs for downloading or streaming to edge providers such as Netflix and Apple. [[Page 59195]] Because these sites are becoming increasingly popular with the public, online distribution has a strategic value for broadcasters, and is likely to provide an increasingly important source of funding for broadcast news and entertainment programming. Unimpeded access to Internet distribution likewise has allowed new video content creators to create and disseminate programs without first securing distribution from broadcasters and multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) such as cable and satellite television companies. Online viewing of video programming content is growing rapidly.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ See Google Comments at 28; Motorola Comments at 5; MPAA Comments at 5-6; DISH Reply at 4-5; WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 22-23, Online Video Goes Mainstream, eMarketer, Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?R=1007664 (estimating that 29% of Internet users younger than 25 say they watch all or most of their TV online, that as of April 2010 67% of U.S. Internet users watch online video each month, and that this figure will increase to 77% by 2014); WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 20-21, Chris Nuttall, Web TVs bigger for manufacturers than 3D, Financial Times, Aug. 29, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/0b34043a-9fe3-11df-8cc5-00144feabdc0.html (stating that 28 million Internet-enabled TV sets are expected to be sold in 2010, an increase of 125% from 2009); WCB Letter 12/13/10, Attach. at 291-92, Sandvine, News and Events: Press Releases, http://www.sandvine.com/news/pr_detail.asp?ID=288 (estimating that Netflix represents more than 20% of peak downstream Internet traffic). Cisco expects online viewing to exert significant influence on future demand for broadband capacity, ranking as the top source of Internet traffic by the end of 2010 and accounting for 91% of global Internet traffic by 2014. WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 40-42, Press Release, Cisco, Annual Cisco Visual Networking Index Forecast Projects Global IP Traffic To Increase More than Fourfold by 2014 (June 10, 2010), http://www.cisco.com/web/MT/news/10/news_100610.html. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the Open Internet NPRM, the Commission sought comment on possible implications that the proposed rules might have ``on efforts to close the digital divide and encourage robust broadband adoption and participation in the Internet community by minorities and other socially and economically disadvantaged groups.'' As we noted in the Open Internet NPRM, according to a 2009 study, broadband adoption varies significantly across demographic groups.\10\ We expect that open Internet protections will help close the digital divide by maintaining relatively low barriers to entry for underrepresented groups and allowing for the development of diverse content, applications, and services.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ See Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, Home Broadband Adoption (June 2009). Approximately 14 to 24 million Americans remain without broadband access capable of meeting the requirements set forth in Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as amended. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act et al., Sixth Broadband Deployment Report, 25 FCC Rcd 9556, 9557, para. 1 (2010) (Sixth Broadband Deployment Report). \11\ For example, Jonathan Moore founded Rowdy Orbit IPTV, an online platform featuring original programming for minority audiences, because he was frustrated by the lack of representation of people of color in traditional media. Dec. 15, 2009 Workshop Tr. at 39-40, video available at http://www.openinternet.gov/workshops/speech-democratic-engagement-and-the-open-internet.html. The Internet's openness--and the low costs of online entry--enables businesses like Rowdy Orbit to launch without having to gain approval from traditional media gatekeepers. Id. We will closely monitor the effects of the open Internet rules we adopt in this Order on the digital divide and on minority and disadvantaged consumers. See generally ColorOfChange Comments; Dec. 15, 2009 Workshop Tr. at 52-60 (remarks of Ruth Livier, YLSE); 100 Black Men of America et al. Comments at 1-2; Free Press Comments at 134-36; Center for Media Justice et al. Comments at 7-9. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For all of these reasons, there is little dispute in this proceeding that the Internet should continue as an open platform. Accordingly, we consider below whether we can be confident that the openness of the Internet will be self-perpetuating, or whether there are threats to openness that the Commission can effectively mitigate. B. Broadband Providers Have the Incentive and Ability to Limit Internet Openness For purposes of our analysis, we consider three types of Internet activities: providing broadband Internet access service; providing content, applications, services, and devices accessed over or connected to broadband Internet access service (``edge'' products and services); and subscribing to a broadband Internet access service that allows access to edge products and services. These activities are not mutually exclusive. For example, individuals who generate and share content such as personal blogs or Facebook pages are both end users and edge providers, and a single firm could both provide broadband Internet access service and be an edge provider, as with a broadband provider that offers online video content. Nevertheless, this basic taxonomy provides a useful model for evaluating the risk and magnitude of harms from loss of openness. The record in this proceeding reveals that broadband providers potentially face at least three types of incentives to reduce the current openness of the Internet. First, broadband providers may have economic incentives to block or otherwise disadvantage specific edge providers or classes of edge providers, for example by controlling the transmission of network traffic over a broadband connection, including the price and quality of access to end users. A broadband provider might use this power to benefit its own or affiliated offerings at the expense of unaffiliated offerings. Today, broadband providers have incentives to interfere with the operation of third-party Internet-based services that compete with the providers' revenue-generating telephony and/or pay-television services. This situation contrasts with the first decade of the public Internet, when dial-up was the primary form of consumer Internet access. Independent companies such as America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy provided access to the Internet over telephone companies' phone lines. As broadband has replaced dial-up, however, telephone and cable companies have become the major providers of Internet access service. Online content, applications, and services available from edge providers over broadband increasingly offer actual or potential competitive alternatives to broadband providers' own voice and video services, which generate substantial profits. Interconnected Voice- over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) services, which include some over-the-top VoIP services,\12\ ``are increasingly being used as a substitute for traditional telephone service,'' \13\ and over-the-top [[Page 59196]] VoIP services represent a significant share of voice-calling minutes, especially for international calls. Online video is rapidly growing in popularity, and MVPDs have responded to this trend by enabling their video subscribers to use the Internet to view their programming on personal computers and other Internet-enabled devices. Online video aggregators such as Netflix, Hulu, YouTube, and iTunes that are unaffiliated with traditional MVPDs continue to proliferate and innovate, offering movies and television programs (including broadcast programming) on demand, and earning revenues from advertising and/or subscriptions. Several MVPDs have stated publicly that they view these services as a potential competitive threat to their core video subscription service. Thus, online edge services appear likely to continue gaining subscribers and market significance,\14\ which will put additional competitive pressure on broadband providers' own services. By interfering with the transmission of third parties' Internet-based services or raising the cost of online delivery for particular edge providers, telephone and cable companies can make those services less attractive to subscribers in comparison to their own offerings. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ The Commission's rules define interconnected VoIP as ``a service that: (1) Enables real-time, two-way voice communications; (2) requires a broadband connection from the user's location; (3) requires Internet protocol-compatible customer premises equipment (CPE); and (4) permits users generally to receive calls that originate on the public switched telephone network and to terminate calls to the public switched telephone network.'' 47 CFR 9.3. Over- the-top VoIP services require the end user to obtain broadband transmission from a third-party provider, and providers of over-the- top VoIP can vary in terms of the extent to which they rely on their own facilities. See SBC Commc'ns Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, WC Docket No, 05-65, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 18290, 18337-38, para. 86 (2005). \13\ Tel. Number Requirements for IP-Enabled Servs. Providers, Report and Order, Declaratory Ruling, Order on Remand, and NPRM, 22 FCC Rcd 19531, 19547, para. 28 (2007); see also Vonage Comments at 3-4. In merger reviews and forbearance petitions, the Commission has found the record ``inconclusive regarding the extent to which various over-the-top VoIP services should be included in the relevant product market for [mass market] local services.'' See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. and MCI, Inc. Application for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 18433, 18480, para. 89 (2005); see also Petition of Qwest Corp. for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. sec. 160(c) in the Phoenix, Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622, 8650, para. 54 (2010) (Qwest Phoenix Order). In contrast to those proceedings, we are not performing a market power analysis in this proceeding, so we need not and do not here determine with specificity whether, and to what extent, particular over-the-top VoIP services constrain particular practices and/or rates of services governed by Section 201. Cf. Qwest Phoenix Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 8647-48, paras. 46-47 (discussing the general approach to product market definition); id. at 8651-52, paras. 55-56 (discussing the need for evidence that one service constrains the price of another service to include them in the same product market for purposes of a market power analysis). \14\ See, e.g., WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 5763, Ryan Fleming, New Report Shows More People Dropping Cable TV for Web Broadcasts, Digital Trends, Apr. 16, 2010, available at http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/new-report-shows-that-more-and-more-people-are-dropping-cable-tv-in-favor-of-web-broadcasts. Congress recently recognized these developments by expanding disabilities access requirements to include advanced communications services. See Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act, Public Law 111-260; see also 156 CONG. REC. 6005 (daily ed. July 26, 2010) (remarks of Rep. Waxman) (this legislation before us * * * ensur[es] that Americans with disabilities can access the latest communications technology.); id. at 6004 (remarks of Rep. Markey) (``[T]he bill we are considering today significantly increases accessibility for Americans with disabilities to the indispensable telecommunications * * * tools of the 21st century.''); Letter from Rick Chessen, NCTA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191 at 2 n.6 (filed Dec. 10, 2010). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition, a broadband provider may act to benefit edge providers that have paid it to exclude rivals (for example, if one online video site were to contract with a broadband provider to deny a rival video site access to the broadband provider's subscribers). End users would be harmed by the inability to access desired content, and this conduct could lead to reduced innovation and fewer new services.\15\ Consistent with these concerns, delivery networks that are vertically integrated with content providers, including some MVPDs, have incentives to favor their own affiliated content.\16\ If broadband providers had historically favored their own affiliated businesses or those incumbent firms that paid for advantageous access to end users, some innovative edge providers that have today become major Internet businesses might not have been able to survive. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ See generally WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 23-27, Steven C. Salop & David Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Cost, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 267-71 (1983); WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 1-23, Steven C. Salop & Thomas Krattenmaker, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 214 (1986). See also Andrew I. Gavil et al., Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy 1153-92 (2d ed. 2008) (describing how policies fostering competition spur innovation). To similar effect, a broadband provider may raise access fees to disfavored edge providers, reducing their ability to profit by raising their costs and limiting their ability to compete with favored edge providers. \16\ See Google Comments at 30-31; Netflix Comments at 7 n.10; Vonage Reply at 4; WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 28-78, Austan Goolsbee, Vertical Integration and the Market for Broadcast and Cable Television Programming, Paper for the Federal Communications Commission 31-32 (Sept. 5, 2007) (Goolsbee Study) (finding that MVPDs excluded networks that were rivals of affiliated channels for anticompetitive reasons). Cf. WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 85-87, David Waterman & Andrew Weiss, Vertical Integration in Cable Television 142-143 (1997) (MVPD exclusion of unaffiliated content during an earlier time period); see also H.R. Rep. 102-628 (2d Sess.) at 41 (1992) (``The Committee received testimony that vertically integrated companies reduce diversity in programming by threatening the viability of rival cable programming services.''). In addition to the examples of actual misconduct that we provide, the Goolsbee Study provides empirical evidence that cable providers have acted in the past on anticompetitive incentives to foreclose rivals, supporting our concern that these and other broadband providers would act on analogous incentives in the future. We thus disagree that we rely on ``speculative harms alone'' or have failed to adduce ``empirical evidence.'' Baker Statement at * 1, * 4 (citing AT&T Reply Exh. 2 at 45 (J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Innovation Spillovers and the ``Dirt Road'' Fallacy: The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Banning Optional Transactions for Enhanced Delivery over the Internet, 6 J. Competition L. & Econ. 521, 571-72 (2010)). To the contrary, the empirical evidence and the misconduct that we describe below validate the economic theories that inform our decision in this Order. Moreover, as we explain below, by comparison to the benefits of the prophylactic measures we adopt, the costs associated with these open Internet rules are likely small. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Second, broadband providers may have incentives to increase revenues by charging edge providers, who already pay for their own connections to the Internet, for access or prioritized access to end users. Although broadband providers have not historically imposed such fees, they have argued they should be permitted to do so. A broadband provider could force edge providers to pay inefficiently high fees because that broadband provider is typically an edge provider's only option for reaching a particular end user.\17\ Thus broadband providers have the ability to act as gatekeepers.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ Some end users can be reached through more than one broadband connection, sometimes via the same device (e.g., a smartphone that has Wi-Fi and cellular connectivity). Even so, the end user, not the edge provider, chooses which broadband provider the edge provider must rely on to reach the end user. \18\ Also known as a ``terminating monopolist.'' See, e.g., CCIA Comments at 7; Skype Comments at 10-11; Vonage Comments at 9-10; Google Reply at 8-14. A broadband provider can act as a gatekeeper even if some edge providers would have bargaining power in negotiations with broadband providers over access or prioritization fees. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Broadband providers would be expected to set inefficiently high fees to edge providers because they receive the benefits of those fees but are unlikely to fully account for the detrimental impact on edge providers' ability and incentive to innovate and invest, including the possibility that some edge providers might exit or decline to enter the market. The unaccounted-for harms to innovation are negative externalities,\19\ and are likely to be particularly large because of the rapid pace of Internet innovation, and wide-ranging because of the role of the Internet as a general purpose technology. Moreover, fees for access or prioritized access could trigger an ``arms race'' within a given edge market segment. If one edge provider pays for access or prioritized access to end users, subscribers may tend to favor that provider's services, and competing edge providers may feel that they must respond by paying, too. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ A broadband provider may hesitate to impose costs on its own subscribers, but it will typically not take into account the effect that reduced edge provider investment and innovation has on the attractiveness of the Internet to end users that rely on other broadband providers--and will therefore ignore a significant fraction of the cost of foregone innovation. See, e.g., OIC Comments at 20-24. If the total number of broadband subscribers shrinks, moreover, the social costs unaccounted for by the broadband provider could also include the lost ability of the remaining end users to connect with the subscribers that departed (foregone direct network effects) and a smaller potential audience for edge providers. See, e.g., id. at 23. Broadband providers are also unlikely to fully account for the open Internet's power to enhance civic discourse through news and information, or for its ability to enable innovations that help address key national challenges such as education, public safety, energy efficiency, and health care. See ARL et al. Comments at 3; Google Reply at 39; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Public Law 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fees for access or prioritization to end users could reduce the potential profit [[Page 59197]] that an edge provider would expect to earn from developing new offerings, and thereby reduce edge providers' incentives to invest and innovate.\20\ In the rapidly innovating edge sector, moreover, many new entrants are new or small ``garage entrepreneurs,'' not large and established firms. These emerging providers are particularly sensitive to barriers to innovation and entry, and may have difficulty obtaining financing if their offerings are subject to being blocked or disadvantaged by one or more of the major broadband providers. In addition, if edge providers need to negotiate access or prioritized access fees with broadband providers,\21\ the resulting transaction costs could further raise the costs of introducing new products and might chill entry and expansion.\22\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\ See, e.g., ALA Comments at 3-4; ColorOfChange Comments at 3; Free Press Comments at 69; Google Comments at 34; Netflix Comments at 4; OIC Comments at 29-30; DISH Reply at 10. Such fees could also reduce an edge provider's incentive to invest in existing offerings, assuming the fees would be expected to increase to the extent improvements increased usage of the edge provider's offerings. \21\ Negotiations impose direct expenses and delay. See Google Comments at 34. There may also be significant costs associated with the possibility that the negotiating parties would reach an impasse. See ALA Comments at 2 (``The cable TV industry offers a telling example of the `pay to play' environment where some cable companies do not offer their customers access to certain content because the company has not successfully negotiated financial compensation with the content provider.''). Edge providers may also bear costs arising from their need to monitor the extent to which they actually receive prioritized delivery. \22\ See, e.g., Google Comments at 34-35; Shane Greenstein Notice of Ex Parte, GN Docket No. 09-191, Transaction Cost, Transparency, and Innovation for the Internet at 19, available at http://www.openinternet.gov/workshops/innovation-investment-and-the-open-internet.html; van Schewick Jan. 19, 2010 Ex Parte Letter, Opening Statement at 7 (arguing that the low costs of innovation not only make many more applications worth pursuing, but also allow a large and diverse group of people to become innovators, which in turn increases the overall amount and quality of innovation). There are approximately 1,500 broadband providers in the United States. See Wireline Competition Bureau, FCC, Internet Access Services: Status as of December 31, 2009 at 7, tbl. 13 (Dec. 2010) (FCC Internet Status Report), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1208/DOC-303405A1.pdf. The innovative process frequently generates a large number of attempts, only a few of which turn out to be highly successful. Given the likelihood of failure, and that financing is not always readily available to support research and development, the innovation process in many sectors of the Internet's edge is likely to be highly sensitive to the upfront costs of developing and introducing new products. PIC Comments at 50 (``[I]t is unlikely that new entrants will have the ability (both financially and with regard to information) to negotiate with every ISP that serves the markets that they are interested in.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Some commenters argue that an end user's ability to switch broadband providers eliminates these problems. But many end users may have limited choice among broadband providers, as discussed below. Moreover, those that can switch broadband providers may not benefit from switching if rival broadband providers charge edge providers similarly for access and priority transmission and prioritize each edge provider's service similarly. Further, end users may not know whether charges or service levels their broadband provider is imposing on edge providers vary from those of alternative broadband providers, and even if they do have this information may find it costly to switch. For these reasons, a dissatisfied end user, observing that some edge provider services are subject to low transmission quality, might not switch broadband providers (though they may switch to a rival edge provider in the hope of improving quality). Some commenters contend that, in the absence of open Internet rules, broadband providers that earn substantial additional revenue by assessing access or prioritization charges on edge providers could avoid increasing or could reduce the rates they charge broadband subscribers, which might increase the number of subscribers to the broadband network. Although this scenario is possible,\23\ no broadband provider has stated in this proceeding that it actually would use any revenue from edge provider charges to offset subscriber charges. In addition, these commenters fail to account for the likely detrimental effects of access and prioritization charges on the virtuous circle of innovation described above. Less content and fewer innovative offerings make the Internet less attractive for end users than would otherwise be the case. Consequently, we are unable to conclude that the possibility of reduced subscriber charges outweighs the risks of harm described herein.\24\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\ Economics literature recognizes that access charges could be harmful under some circumstances and beneficial under others. See, e.g., WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 1-62, E. Glen Weyl, A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 1642, 1642-72 (2010) (the effects of allowing broadband providers to charge terminating rates to content providers are ambiguous); see also WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 180-215, John Musacchio et al., A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Provider Investment Incentives with an Application to the Net-Neutrality Issue, 8 Rev. of Network Econ. 22, 22-39 (2009) (noting that there are conditions under which ``a zero termination price is socially beneficial''). Moreover, the economic literature on two-sided markets is at an early stage of development. AT&T Comments, Exh. 3, Schwartz Decl. at 16; Jeffrey A. Eisenach (Eisenach) Reply at 11-12; cf., e.g., WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 156-79, Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 Rand J. of Econ. 668 (2006); WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 216- 302, Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two- Sided Markets, 1 J. Eur. Econ. Ass'n 990 (2003). \24\ Indeed, demand for broadband Internet access service might decline even if subscriber fees fell, if the conduct of broadband providers discouraged demand by blocking end user access to preferred edge providers, slowing non-prioritized transmission, and breaking the virtuous circle of innovation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Third, if broadband providers can profitably charge edge providers for prioritized access to end users, they will have an incentive to degrade or decline to increase the quality of the service they provide to non-prioritized traffic. This would increase the gap in quality (such as latency in transmission) between prioritized access and non- prioritized access, induce more edge providers to pay for prioritized access, and allow broadband providers to charge higher prices for prioritized access. Even more damaging, broadband providers might withhold or decline to expand capacity in order to ``squeeze'' non- prioritized traffic, a strategy that would increase the likelihood of network congestion and confront edge providers with a choice between accepting low-quality transmission or paying fees for prioritized access to end users. Moreover, if broadband providers could block specific content, applications, services, or devices, end users and edge providers would lose the control they currently have over whether other end users and edge providers can communicate with them through the Internet. Content, application, service, and device providers (and their investors) could no longer assume that the market for their offerings included all U.S. end users. And broadband providers might choose to implement undocumented practices for traffic differentiation that undermine the ability of developers to create generally usable applications without having to design to particular broadband providers' unique practices or business arrangements.\25\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\ See OIC Comments at 24; Free Press Comments at 45. The transparency and reasonable network management guidelines we adopt in this Order, in particular, should reduce the likelihood of such fragmentation of the Internet. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- All of the above concerns are exacerbated by broadband providers' ability to make fine-grained distinctions in their handling of network traffic as a result of increasingly sophisticated network management tools. Such tools may be used for beneficial purposes, but they also increase broadband providers' ability to act on incentives to engage in [[Page 59198]] network practices that would erode Internet openness.\26\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\ See CCIA/CEA Comments at 4; Free Press Comments at 29-30, 143-46; Google Comments at 32-34; Netflix Comments at 3; OIC Comments at 14, 79-82; DISH Reply at 8-9; IPI Reply at 9; Vonage Reply at 5. For examples of network management tools, see, for example, WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 1-8, Allot Service Gateway, Pushing the DPI Envelope: An Introduction, at 2 (June 2007), available at http://www.sysob.com/download/AllotServiceGateway.pdf (``Reduce the performance of applications with negative influence on revenues (e.g. competitive VoIP services).''); WCB Letter 12/13/10, Attach. at 289-90, Procera Networks, PLR, http://www.proceranetworks.com/customproperties/tag/Products-PLR.html; WCB Letter 12/13/10, Attach. at 283-88, Cisco, http//:www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/ps7045/ps6129/ps6133/ps6150/prod_brochure0900aecd8025258e.pdf (marketing the ability of equipment to identify VoIP, video, and other traffic types). Vendors market their offerings as enabling broadband providers to ``make only modest incremental infrastructure investments and to control operating costs.'' WCB Letter 12/13/10, Attach. at 283, Cisco. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Although these threats to Internet-enabled innovation, growth, and competition do not depend upon broadband providers having market power with respect to end users,\27\ most would be exacerbated by such market power. A broadband provider's incentive to favor affiliated content or the content of unaffiliated firms that pay for it to do so, its incentive to block or degrade traffic or charge edge providers for access to end users, and its incentive to squeeze non-prioritized transmission will all be greater if end users are less able to respond by switching to rival broadband providers. The risk of market power is highest in markets with few competitors, and most residential end users today have only one or two choices for wireline broadband Internet access service. As of December 2009, nearly 70 percent of households lived in census tracts where only one or two wireline or fixed wireless firms provided advertised download speeds of at least 3 Mbps and upload speeds of at least 768 Kbps \28\--the closest observable benchmark to the minimum download speed of 4 Mbps and upload speed of 1 Mbps that the Commission has used to assess broadband deployment. About 20 percent of households are in census tracts with only one provider advertising at least 3 Mbps down and 768 Kbps up. For Internet service with advertised download speeds of at least 10 Mbps down and upload speeds of at least 1.5 Mbps up, nearly 60 percent of households lived in census tracts served by only one wireline or fixed wireless broadband provider, while nearly 80 percent lived in census tracts served by no more than two wireline or fixed wireless broadband providers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\ Because broadband providers have the ability to act as gatekeepers even in the absence of market power with respect to end users, we need not conduct a market power analysis. \28\ See FCC Internet Status Report at 7, fig. 3(a). A broadband provider's presence in a census tract does not mean it offers service to all potential customers within that tract. And the data reflect subscriptions, not network capability. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Including mobile broadband providers does not appreciably change these numbers.\29\ The roll-out of next generation mobile services is at an early stage, and the future of competition in residential broadband is unclear.\30\ The record does not enable us to make a predictive judgment that the future will be more competitive than the past. Although wireless providers are increasingly offering faster broadband services, we do not know, for example, how end users will value the trade-offs between the benefits of wireless service (e.g., mobility) and the benefits of fixed wireline service (e.g., higher download and upload speeds).\31\ We note that the two largest mobile broadband providers also offer wireline or fixed service; \32\ this could dampen their incentive to compete aggressively with wireline (or fixed) services.\33\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\ In December 2009, nearly 60% of households lived in census tracts where no more than two broadband providers offered service with 3 Mbps down and 768 Kbps up, while no mobile broadband providers offered service with 10 Mbps down and 1.5 Mbps up. Id. at 8, fig. 3(b). Mobile broadband providers generally have offered bandwidths lower than those available from fixed providers. See Yottabyte at 13-14. \30\ See National Broadband Plan at 40-42. A number of commenters discuss impediments to increased competition. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Comments at 9; Google Comments, at 18-22; IFTA Comments at 10-11; see also WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 9-16, Thomas Monath et al., Economics of Fixed Broadband Network Strategies, 41 IEEE Comm. Mag. 132, 132-39 (Sept. 2003). \31\ See Ad Hoc Comments at 9; Google Comments at 21; Vonage Comments at 8; IPI Reply at 14; WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 56- 65, Vikram Chandrasekhar & Jeffrey G. Andrews, Femtocell Networks: A Survey, 46 IEEE Comm. Mag., Sept. 2008, 59, at 59-60 (explaining mobile spectrum alone cannot compete with wireless connections to fixed networks). We also do not know how offers by a single wireless broadband provider for both fixed and mobile broadband services will perform in the marketplace. \32\ See OIC Comments at 71-72. Large cable companies that provide fixed broadband also have substantial ownership interests in Clear, the 4G wireless venture in which Sprint has a majority ownership interest. \33\ OIC Comments at 71-72; Skype Comments at 10. In cellular telephony, multimarket conduct has been found to dampen competition. See WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 1-24, P.M. Parker and L.H. R[ouml]ller, Collusive conduct in duopolies: Multimarket contact and cross ownership in the mobile telephone industry, 28 Rand J. Of Econ. 304, 304-322 (Summer 1997); WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 25-58, Meghan R. Busse, Multimarket contact and price coordination in the cellular telephone industry, 9 J. of Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 287, 287-320 (Fall 2000). Moreover, some fixed broadband providers also provide necessary inputs to some mobile providers' offerings, such as backhaul transport to wireline facilities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition, customers may incur significant costs in switching broadband providers \34\ because of early termination fees; \35\ the inconvenience of ordering, installation, and set-up, and associated deposits or fees; possible difficulty returning the earlier broadband provider's equipment and the cost of replacing incompatible customer- owned equipment; the risk of temporarily losing service; the risk of problems learning how to use the new service; and the possible loss of a provider-specific e-mail address or Web site. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \34\ ARL et al. Comments at 5; Google Comments at 21-22; Netflix Comments at 5; New Jersey Rate Counsel (NJRC) Comments at 17; OIC Comments at 40, 73; PIC Comments at 23; Skype Comments at 12; OIC Reply at 20-21; Paul Misener (Amazon.com) Comments at 2; see also WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 59-76, Patrick Xavier & Dimitri Ypsilanti, Switching Costs and Consumer Behavior: Implications for Telecommunications Regulation, 10(4) Info 2008, 13, 13-29 (2008). Churn is a function of many factors. See, e.g., WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 1-53, 97-153, AT&T Comments, WT Docket No. 10-133, at 51 (Aug. 2, 2010). The evidence in the record, e.g., AT&T Comments at 83, is not probative as to the extent of competition among broadband providers because it does not appropriately isolate a connection between churn levels and the extent of competition. \35\ Google Comments at 21-22. Of broadband end users with a choice of broadband providers, 32% said paying termination fees to their current provider was a major reason why they have not switched service. FCC, Broadband Decision: What Drives Consumers to Switch-- Or Stick With--Their Broadband Internet Provider 8 (Dec. 2010) (FCC Internet Survey), available at hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-303264A1.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. Broadband Providers Have Acted To Limit Openness These dangers to Internet openness are not speculative or merely theoretical. Conduct of this type has already come before the Commission in enforcement proceedings. As early as 2005, a broadband provider that was a subsidiary of a telephone company paid $15,000 to settle a Commission investigation into whether it had blocked Internet ports used for competitive VoIP applications. In 2008, the Commission found that Comcast disrupted certain peer-to-peer (P2P) uploads of its subscribers, without a reasonable network management justification and without disclosing its actions. Comparable practices have been observed in the provision of mobile broadband services. After entering into a contract with a company to handle online payment services, a mobile wireless provider allegedly blocked customers' attempts to use competing services to make purchases using their mobile phones. A nationwide mobile provider restricted the types of lawful applications that could be accessed over its 3G mobile wireless network. [[Page 59199]] There have been additional allegations of blocking, slowing, or degrading P2P traffic. We do not determine in this Order whether any of these practices violated open Internet principles, but we note that they have raised concerns among edge providers and end users, particularly regarding lack of transparency. For example, in May 2008 a major cable broadband provider acknowledged that it had managed the traffic of P2P services. In July 2009, another cable broadband provider entered into a class action settlement agreement stating that it had ``ceased P2P Network Management Practices,'' but allowing the provider to resume throttling P2P traffic.\36\ There is evidence that other broadband providers have engaged in similar degradation.\37\ In addition, broadband providers' terms of service commonly reserve to the provider sweeping rights to block, degrade, or favor traffic. For example, one major cable provider reserves the right to engage, ``without limitation,'' in ``port blocking, * * * traffic prioritization and protocol filtering.'' Further, a major mobile broadband provider prohibits use of its wireless service for ``downloading movies using peer-to-peer file sharing services'' and VoIP applications. And a cable modem manufacturer recently filed a formal complaint with the Commission alleging that a major broadband Internet access service provider has violated open Internet principles through overly restrictive device approval procedures. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \36\ See RCN Settlement Agreement sec. 3.2. RCN denied any wrongdoing, but it acknowledges that in order to ease network congestion, it targeted specific P2P applications. See Letter from Jean L. Kiddo, RCN, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 2-5 (filed May 7, 2010). \37\ A 2008 study by the Max Planck Institute revealed significant blocking of BitTorrent applications in the United States. Comcast and Cox were both cited as examples of providers blocking traffic. See generally WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 75- 80, Marcel Dischinger et al., Max Planck Institute, Detecting BitTorrent Blocking (2008), available at broadband.mpi-sws.org/transparency/results/08_imc_blocking.pdf; see also WCB Letter 12/ 13/10, Attach. at 235-39, Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Glasnost: Results from Tests for BitTorrent Traffic Blocking, broadband.mpi-sws.org/transparency/results; WCB Letter 12/13/10, Attach. at 298-315, Christian Kreibich et al., Netalyzr: Illuminating Edge Network Neutrality, Security, and Performance 15 (2010), available at http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/pubs/techreports/TR-10-006.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These practices have occurred notwithstanding the Commission's adoption of open Internet principles in the Internet Policy Statement; enforcement proceedings against Madison River Communications and Comcast for their interference with VoIP and P2P traffic, respectively; Commission orders that required certain broadband providers to adhere to open Internet obligations; longstanding norms of Internet openness; and statements by major broadband providers that they support and are abiding by open Internet principles. D. The Benefits of Protecting the Internet's Openness Exceed the Costs Widespread interference with the Internet's openness would likely slow or even break the virtuous cycle of innovation that the Internet enables, and would likely cause harms that may be irreversible or very costly to undo. For example, edge providers could make investments in reliance upon exclusive preferential arrangements with broadband providers, and network management technologies may not be easy to change.\38\ If the next revolutionary technology or business is not developed because broadband provider practices chill entry and innovation by edge providers, the missed opportunity may be significant, and lost innovation, investment, and competition may be impossible to restore after the fact. Moreover, because of the Internet's role as a general purpose technology, erosion of Internet openness threatens to harm innovation, investment in the core and at the edge of the network, and competition in many sectors, with a disproportionate effect on small, entering, and non-commercial edge providers that drive much of the innovation on the Internet.\39\ Although harmful practices are not certain to become widespread, there are powerful reasons for immediate concern, as broadband providers have interfered with the open Internet in the past and have incentives and an increasing ability to do so in the future. Effective open Internet rules can prevent or reduce the risk of these harms, while helping to assure Americans unfettered access to diverse sources of news, information, and entertainment, as well as an array of technologies and devices that enhance health, education, and the environment. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \38\ As one example, Comcast's transition to a protocol-agnostic network management practice took almost nine months to complete. See Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, V.P., Regulatory Affairs, Comcast Corp., to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 07-52 at 2 (filed July 10, 2008); Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, V.P., Regulatory Affairs, Comcast Corp., to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 07-52 at Attach. B at 3, 9 (filed Sept. 19, 2008) (noting that the transition required ``lab tests, technical trials, customer feedback, vendor evaluations, and a third-party consulting analysis,'' as well as trials in five markets). \39\ See, e.g., ALA Comments at 2; IFTA Comments at 14. Even some who generally oppose open Internet rules agree that extracting access fees from entities that produce content or services without the anticipation of financial reward would have significant adverse effects. See WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 35-80, C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation, 25 Yale J. on Reg. 135, 161-62 (2008) (``[S]ocial production has distinctive features that make it unusually valuable, but also unusually vulnerable, to a particular form of exclusion. That mechanism of exclusion is not subject to the prohibitions of antitrust law, moreover, presenting a relatively stronger argument for regulation.''), cited in Prof. Tim Wu Comments at 9 n.22. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- By comparison to the benefits of these prophylactic measures, the costs associated with the open Internet rules adopted here are likely small. Broadband providers generally endorse openness norms--including the transparency and no blocking principles--as beneficial and in line with current and planned business practices (though they do not uniformly support rules making them enforceable).\40\ Even to the extent rules require some additional disclosure of broadband providers' practices, the costs of compliance should be modest. In addition, the high-level rules we adopt carefully balance preserving the open Internet against avoiding unduly burdensome regulation. Our rules against blocking and unreasonable discrimination are subject to reasonable network management, and our rules do not prevent broadband providers from offering specialized services such as facilities-based VoIP. In short, rules that reinforce the openness that has supported the growth of the Internet, and do not substantially change this highly successful status quo, should not entail significant compliance costs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \40\ We note that many broadband providers are, or soon will be, subject to open Internet requirements in connection with grants under the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 required that nondiscrimination and network interconnection obligations be ``contractual conditions'' of all BTOP grants. Public Law 111-5, sec. 6001(j), 123 Stat. 115 (codified at 47 U.S.C. sec. 1305). These nondiscrimination and interconnection conditions require BTOP grantees, among other things, to adhere to the principles in the Internet Policy Statement; to display any network management policies in a prominent location on the service provider's Web site; and to offer interconnection where technically feasible. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Some commenters contend that open Internet rules are likely to reduce investment in broadband deployment. We disagree. There is no evidence that prior open Internet obligations have discouraged investment; \41\ and [[Page 59200]] numerous commenters explain that, by preserving the virtuous circle of innovation, open Internet rules will increase incentives to invest in broadband infrastructure. Moreover, if permitted to deny access, or charge edge providers for prioritized access to end users, broadband providers may have incentives to allow congestion rather than invest in expanding network capacity. And as described in Part III, below, our rules allow broadband providers sufficient flexibility to address legitimate congestion concerns and other network management considerations. Nor is there any persuasive reason to believe that in the absence of open Internet rules broadband providers would lower charges to broadband end users, or otherwise change their practices in ways that benefit innovation, investment, competition, or end users. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \41\ See, e.g., Free Press Comments at 4, 23-25; Google Comments at 38-39; XO Comments at 12. In making prior investment decisions, broadband providers could not have reasonably assumed that the Commission would abstain from regulating in this area, as the Commission's decisions classifying cable modem service and wireline broadband Internet access service as information services included notices of proposed rulemaking seeking comment on whether the Commission should adopt rules to protect consumers. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities et al., Report and Order and NPRM, 20 FCC Rcd 14853, 14929-35, paras. 146-59 (2005); Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable & Other Facilities et al., Declaratory Ruling and NPRM, 17 FCC-- Rcd 4798, 4839-48, paras. 72-95 (2002) (seeking comment on whether the Commission should require cable operators to give unaffiliated ISPs access to broadband cable networks); see also AT&T Comments at 8 (``[T]he existing principles already address any blocking or degradation of traffic and thus eliminate any theoretical leverage providers may have to impose [unilateral `tolls'].''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The magnitude and character of the risks we identify make it appropriate to adopt prophylactic rules now to preserve the openness of the Internet, rather than waiting for substantial, pervasive, and potentially irreversible harms to occur before taking any action. The Supreme Court has recognized that even if the Commission cannot ``predict with certainty'' the future course of a regulated market, it may ``plan in advance of foreseeable events, instead of waiting to react to them.'' Moreover, as the Commission found in another context, ``[e]xclusive reliance on a series of individual complaints,'' without underlying rules, ``would prevent the Commission from obtaining a clear picture of the evolving structure of the entire market, and addressing competitive concerns as they arise. * * * Therefore, if the Commission exclusively relied on individual complaints, it would only become aware of specific * * * problems if and when the individual complainant's interests coincided with those of the interest of the overall `public.' '' Finally, we note that there is currently significant uncertainty regarding the future enforcement of open Internet principles and what constitutes appropriate network management, particularly in the wake of the court of appeals' vacatur of the Comcast Network Management Practices Order. A number of commenters, including leading broadband providers, recognize the benefits of greater predictability regarding open Internet protections.\42\ Broadband providers benefit from increased certainty that they can reasonably manage their networks and innovate with respect to network technologies and business models. For those who communicate and innovate on the Internet, and for investors in edge technologies, there is great value in having confidence that the Internet will remain open, and that there will be a forum available to bring complaints about violations of open Internet standards.\43\ End users also stand to benefit from assurances that services on which they depend ``won't suddenly be pulled out from under them, held ransom to extra payments either from the sites or from them.'' Providing clear yet flexible rules of the road that enable the Internet to continue to flourish is the central goal of the action we take in this Order.\44\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \42\ For example, AT&T has recognized that open Internet rules ``would reduce regulatory uncertainty, and should encourage investment and innovation in next generation broadband services and technologies.'' See WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 94, AT&T Statement on Proposed FCC Rules to Preserve an Open Internet, AT&T Public Policy Blog, Dec. 1, 2010, attpublicpolicy.com/government-policy/att-statement-on-proposed-fcc-rules-to-preserve-an-open-internet. Similarly, Comcast acknowledged that our proposed rules would strike ``a workable balance between the needs of the marketplace and the certainty that carefully-crafted and limited rules can provide to ensure that Internet freedom and openness are preserved.'' See David L. Cohen, FCC Proposes Rules to Preserve an Open Internet, comcastvoices, Dec. 1, 2010, blog.comcast.com/2010/12/fcc-proposes-rules-to-preserve-an-open-internet.html; see also, e.g., Final Brief for Intervenors NCTA and NBC Universal, Inc. at 11-13; 19-22, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (DC Cir. 2010) (No. 08-1291). In addition to broadband providers, an array of industry leaders, venture capitalists, and public interest groups have concluded that our rules will promote investment in the Internet ecosystem by removing regulatory uncertainty. See Free Press Comments at 10; Google Comments at 40; PIC Comments at 28; WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 91 (statement of CALinnovates.org), 96 (statement of Larry Cohen, president of the Communications Workers of America), 98 (statement of Ron Conway, founder of SV Angel), 99 (statement of Craig Newmark, founder of craigslist), 105 (statement of Dean Garfield, president and CEO of the Information Technology Industry Council), 111 (Dec. 8, 2010 letter from Jeremy Liew, Managing Director, Lightspeed Venture Partners to Julius Genachowski, FCC Chairman), 112 (Dec. 1, 2010 letter from Jed Katz, Managing Director, Javelin Venture Partners to Julius Genachowski, FCC Chairman), 127 (statement of Gary Shapiro, president and CEO of the Consumer Electronics Association), 128 (statement of Ram Shriram, founder of Sherpalo Ventures), 132 (statements of Rey Ramsey, President and CEO of TechNet, and John Chambers, Chairman and CEO of Cisco), 133 (statement of John Doerr, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers); XO Reply at 6. \43\ For this reason, we are not persuaded that alternative approaches, such as rules that lack a formal enforcement mechanism, a transparency rule alone, or reliance entirely on technical advisory groups to resolve disputes, would adequately address the potential harms and be less burdensome than the rules we adopt here. See, e.g., Verizon Comments at 130-34. In particular, we reject the notion that Commission action is unnecessary because the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ``are well equipped to cure any market ills.'' Id. at 9. Our statutory responsibilities are broader than preventing antitrust violations or unfair competition. See, e.g., News Corp. and DIRECTV Group, Inc., 23 FCC Rcd 3265, 3277-78, paras. 23-25 (2008). We must, for example, promote deployment of advanced telecommunications capability, ensure that charges in connection with telecommunications services are just and reasonable, ensure the orderly development of local television broadcasting, and promote the public interest through spectrum licensing. See CDT Comments at 8-9; Comm'r Jon Liebowitz, FTC, Concurring Statement of Commissioner Jon Leibowitz Regarding the Staff Report: ``Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy'' (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/V070000statement.pdf (``[T]here is little agreement over whether antitrust, with its requirements for ex post case by case analysis, is capable of fully and in a timely fashion resolving many of the concerns that have animated the net neutrality debate.''). \44\ Contrary to the suggestion of some, neither the Department of Justice nor the FTC has concluded that the broadband market is competitive or that open Internet rules are unnecessary. See McDowell Statement at *4; Baker Statement at *3. In the submission in question, the Department observed that: (1) The wireline broadband market is highly concentrated, with most consumers served by at most two providers; (2) the prospects for additional wireline competition are dim due to the high fixed and sunk costs required to provide wireline broadband service; and (3) the extent to which mobile wireless offerings will compete with wireline offerings is unknown. See DOJ Ex Parte Jan. 4, 2010, GN Dkt. No. 09-51, at 8, 10, 13-14. The Department specifically endorsed requiring greater transparency by broadband providers, id. at 25-27, and recognized that in concentrated markets, like the broadband market, it is appropriate for policymakers to limit ``business practices that thwart innovation.'' Id. at 11. Finally, although the Department cautioned that care must be taken to avoid stifling infrastructure investment, it expressed particular concern about price regulation, which we are not adopting. Id. at 28. In 2007, the FTC issued a staff report on broadband competition policy. See FTC, Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy (June 2007). Like the Department, the FTC staff did not conclude that the broadband market is competitive. To the contrary, the FTC staff made clear that it had not studied the state of competition in any specific markets. Id. at 8, 105, 156. With regard to the merits of open Internet rules, the FTC staff report recited arguments pro and con, see, e.g., id. at 82, 105, 147-54, and called for additional study, id. at 7, 9-10, 157. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- III. Open Internet Rules To preserve the Internet's openness and broadband providers' ability to manage and expand their networks, we adopt high-level rules embodying four core principles: transparency, no blocking, no unreasonable discrimination, and reasonable network management. These rules are generally consistent with, and should not require [[Page 59201]] significant changes to, broadband providers' current practices, and are also consistent with the common understanding of broadband Internet access service as a service that enables one to go where one wants on the Internet and communicate with anyone else online.\45\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \45\ The definition of ``broadband Internet access service'' proposed in the Open Internet NPRM encompassed any ``Internet Protocol data transmission between an end user and the Internet.'' Open Internet NPRM, 24 FCC Rcd at 13128, App. A. Some commenters argued that this definition would cover a variety of services that do not constitute broadband Internet access service as end users and broadband providers generally understand that term, but that merely offer data transmission between a discrete set of Internet endpoints (for example, virtual private networks, or videoconferencing services). See, e.g., AT&T Comments at 96-100; Communications Workers of America (CWA) Comments at 10-12; Sprint Reply at 16-17; see also CDT Comments at 49-50 (distinguishing managed (or specialized) services from broadband Internet access service by defining the former, in part, as data transmission ``between an end user and a limited group of parties or endpoints'') (emphasis added). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A. Scope of the Rules We find that open Internet rules should apply to ``broadband Internet access service,'' which we define as: A mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints, including any capabilities that are incidental to and enable the operation of the communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet access service. This term also encompasses any service that the Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the service described in the previous sentence, or that is used to evade the protections set forth in this Part. The term ``broadband Internet access service'' includes services provided over any technology platform, including but not limited to wire, terrestrial wireless (including fixed and mobile wireless services using licensed or unlicensed spectrum), and satellite.\46\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \46\ In the Open Internet NPRM, we proposed separate definitions of the terms ``broadband Internet access,'' and ``broadband Internet access service.'' Open Internet NPRM, 24 FCC Rcd at 13128, App. A sec. 8.3. For purposes of these rules, we find it simpler to define just the service. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``Mass market'' means a service marketed and sold on a standardized basis to residential customers, small businesses, and other end-user customers such as schools and libraries. For purposes of this definition, ``mass market'' also includes broadband Internet access services purchased with the support of the E-rate program that may be customized or individually negotiated. The term does not include enterprise service offerings, which are typically offered to larger organizations through customized or individually negotiated arrangements. ``Broadband Internet access service'' encompasses services that ``provide the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints.'' To ensure the efficacy of our rules in this dynamic market, we also treat as a ``broadband Internet access service'' any service the Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the service described in the previous sentence, or that is used to evade the protections set forth in these rules. A key factor in determining whether a service is used to evade the scope of the rules is whether the service is used as a substitute for broadband Internet access service. For example, an Internet access service that provides access to a substantial subset of Internet endpoints based on end users preference to avoid certain content, applications, or services; Internet access services that allow some uses of the Internet (such as access to the World Wide Web) but not others (such as e-mail); or a ``Best of the Web'' Internet access service that provides access to 100 top Web sites could not be used to evade the open Internet rules applicable to ``broadband Internet access service.'' Moreover, a broadband provider may not evade these rules simply by blocking end users' access to some Internet endpoints. Broadband Internet access service likely does not include services offering connectivity to one or a small number of Internet endpoints for a particular device, e.g., connectivity bundled with e-readers, heart monitors, or energy consumption sensors, to the extent the service relates to the functionality of the device.\47\ Nor does broadband Internet access service include virtual private network services, content delivery network services, multichannel video programming services, hosting or data storage services, or Internet backbone services (if those services are separate from broadband Internet access service). These services typically are not mass market services and/or do not provide the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints.\48\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \47\ To the extent these services are provided by broadband providers over last-mile capacity shared with broadband Internet access service, they would be specialized services. \48\ We also note that our rules apply only as far as the limits of a broadband provider's control over the transmission of data to or from its broadband customers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Although one purpose of our open Internet rules is to prevent blocking or unreasonable discrimination in transmitting online traffic for applications and services that compete with traditional voice and video services, we determine that open Internet rules applicable to fixed broadband providers should protect all types of Internet traffic, not just voice or video Internet traffic. This reflects, among other things, our view that it is generally preferable to neither require nor encourage broadband providers to examine Internet traffic in order to discern which traffic is subject to the rules. Even if we were to limit our rules to voice or video traffic, moreover, it is unlikely that broadband providers could reliably identify such traffic in all circumstances, particularly if the voice or video traffic originated from new services using uncommon protocols.\49\ Indeed, limiting our rules to voice and video traffic alone could spark a costly and wasteful cat-and-mouse game in which edge providers and end users seeking to obtain the protection of our rules could disguise their traffic as protected communications.\50\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \49\ This is true notwithstanding the increasing sophistication of network management tools, described above in Part II.B. See Arthur Callado et al., A Survey on Internet Traffic Identification, 11 IEEE Commnc'ns Surveys & Tutorials 37, 49 (2009). \50\ See IETF, Reflections on Internet Transparency, RFC 4924 at 5 (Jul. 2007) (RFC 4924) (``In practice, filtering intended to block or restrict application usage is difficult to successfully implement without customer consent, since over time developers will tend to re-engineer filtered protocols so as to avoid the filters. Thus over time, filtering is likely to result in interoperability issues or unnecessary complexity. These costs come without the benefit of effective filtering. * * *''); IETF, Considerations on the Use of a Service Identifier in Packet Headers, RFC 3639 at 3 (Oct. 2003) (RFC 3639) (``Attempts by intermediate systems to impose service-based controls on communications against the perceived interests of the end parties to the communication are often circumvented. Services may be tunneled within other services, proxied by a collaborating external host (e.g., an anonymous redirector), or simply run over an alternate port (e.g., port 8080 vs port 80 for HTTP).''). Cf. RFC 3639 at 4 (``From this perspective of network and application utility, it is preferable that no action or activity be undertaken by any agency, carrier, service provider, or organization which would cause end-users and protocol designers to generally obscure service identification information from the IP packet header.''). Our rules are nationwide and do not vary by geographic area, notwithstanding potential variations across local markets for broadband Internet access service. Uniform national rules create a more predictable policy environment for broadband providers, many of which offer services in multiple geographic areas. See, e.g., Level 3 Comments at 13; Charter Comments at iv. Edge providers will benefit from uniform treatment of their traffic in different localities and by different broadband providers. Broadband end users will also benefit from uniform rules, which protect them regardless of where they are located or which broadband provider they obtain service from. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We recognize that there is one Internet (although it is comprised of a multitude of different networks), and that it should remain open and [[Page 59202]] interconnected regardless of the technologies and services end users rely on to access it. However, for reasons discussed in Part III.E below related to mobile broadband--including the fact that it is at an earlier stage and more rapidly evolving--we apply open Internet rules somewhat differently to mobile broadband than to fixed broadband at this time. We define ``fixed broadband Internet access service'' as a broadband Internet access service that serves end users primarily at fixed endpoints using stationary equipment, such as the modem that connects an end user's home router, computer, or other Internet access device to the network. This term encompasses fixed wireless broadband services (including services using unlicensed spectrum) and fixed satellite broadband services. We define ``mobile broadband Internet access service'' as a broadband Internet access service that serves end users primarily using mobile stations. Mobile broadband Internet access includes services that use smartphones as the primary endpoints for connection to the Internet.\51\ The discussion in this Part applies to both fixed and mobile broadband, unless specifically noted. Part III.E further discusses application of open Internet rules to mobile broadband. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \51\ We note that Section 337(f)(1) of the Act excludes public safety services from the definition of mobile broadband Internet access service. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For a number of reasons, these rules apply only to the provision of broadband Internet access service and not to edge provider activities, such as the provision of content or applications over the Internet. First, the Communications Act particularly directs us to prevent harms related to the utilization of networks and spectrum to provide communication by wire and radio. Second, these rules are an outgrowth of the Commission's Internet Policy Statement.\52\ The Statement was issued in 2005 when the Commission removed key regulatory protections from DSL service, and was intended to protect against the harms to the open Internet that might result from broadband providers' subsequent conduct. The Commission has always understood those principles to apply to broadband Internet access service only, as have most private-sector stakeholders.\53\ Thus, insofar as these rules translate existing Commission principles into codified rules, it is appropriate to limit the application of the rules to broadband Internet access service. Third, broadband providers control access to the Internet for their subscribers and for anyone wishing to reach those subscribers.\54\ They are therefore capable of blocking, degrading, or favoring any Internet traffic that flows to or from a particular subscriber. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \52\ When the Commission adopted the Internet Policy Statement, it promised to incorporate the principles into ``ongoing policymaking activities.'' Internet Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd at 14988, para. 5. \53\ See, e.g., Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 14853, 14976 (2005) (Wireline Broadband Order) (separate statement of Chairman Martin); id. at 14980 (Statement of Commissioner Copps, concurring); id. at 14983 (Statement of Commissioner Adelstein, concurring); Verizon June 8, 2009 Comments, GN Docket No. 09-51, at 86 (``These principles have helped to guide wireline providers' practices and to ensure that consumers' expectations for their public Internet access services are met.''). The Commission has conditioned wireline broadband provider merger approvals on the merged entity's compliance with these obligations. See, e.g., SBC Commc'ns Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 18290, 18392, para. 211 (2005). \54\ We thus find broadband providers distinguishable from other participants in the Internet marketplace. See, e.g., Verizon Comments at 36-39 (discussing a variety of other participants in the Internet ecosystem); Verizon Reply at 36-37 (same); NCTA Comments at 47-49 (same); NCTA Reply at 22 (same). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We also do not apply these rules to dial-up Internet access service because telephone service has historically provided the easy ability to switch among competing dial-up Internet access services. Moreover, the underlying dial-up Internet access service is subject to protections under Title II of the Communications Act. The Commission's interpretation of those protections has resulted in a market for dial- up Internet access that does not present the same concerns as the market for broadband Internet access. No commenters suggested extending open Internet rules to dial-up Internet access service. Finally, we decline to apply our rules directly to coffee shops, bookstores, airlines, and other entities when they acquire Internet service from a broadband provider to enable their patrons to access the Internet from their establishments (we refer to these entities as ``premise operators'').\55\ These services are typically offered by the premise operator as an ancillary benefit to patrons. However, to protect end users, we include within our rules broadband Internet access services provided to premise operators for purposes of making service available to their patrons.\56\ Although broadband providers that offer such services are subject to open Internet rules, we note that addressing traffic unwanted by a premise operator is a legitimate network management purpose.\57\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \55\ See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 14989, 15006-07, para. 36, n.99 (2005) (CALEA Order). Consistent with the Commission's approach in the CALEA Order, ``[w]e note * * * that the provider of underlying [broadband service] facilities to such an establishment would be subject to [the rules].'' Id. at 15007, para. 36. \56\ We note that the premise operator that purchases the Internet service remains the end user for purposes of our rules, however. Moreover, although not bound by our rules, we encourage premise operators to disclose relevant restrictions on broadband service they make available to their patrons. \57\ We also do not include within the rules free access to individuals' wireless networks, even if those networks are intentionally made available to others. See Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) Comments at 25-28. No commenter argued that open Internet rules should apply to individual operators of wireless networks in these circumstances. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Transparency Promoting competition throughout the Internet ecosystem is a central purpose of these rules. Effective disclosure of broadband providers' network management practices and the performance and commercial terms of their services promotes competition--as well as innovation, investment, end-user choice, and broadband adoption--in at least five ways. First, disclosure ensures that end users can make informed choices regarding the purchase and use of broadband service, which promotes a more competitive market for broadband services and can thereby reduce broadband providers' incentives and ability to violate open Internet principles.\58\ Second, and relatedly, as end users' confidence in broadband providers' practices increases, so too should end users' adoption of broadband services--leading in turn to additional investment in Internet infrastructure as contemplated by Section 706 of the 1996 Act and other provisions of the communications laws.\59\ Third, [[Page 59203]] disclosure supports innovation, investment, and competition by ensuring that startups and other edge providers have the technical information necessary to create and maintain online content, applications, services, and devices, and to assess the risks and benefits of embarking on new projects. Fourth, disclosure increases the likelihood that broadband providers will abide by open Internet principles, and that the Internet community will identify problematic conduct and suggest fixes.\60\ Transparency thereby increases the chances that harmful practices will not occur in the first place and that, if they do, they will be quickly remedied, whether privately or through Commission oversight. Fifth, disclosure will enable the Commission to collect information necessary to assess, report on, and enforce the other open Internet rules. For all of these reasons, most commenters agree that informing end users, edge providers, and the Commission about the network management practices, performance, and commercial terms of broadband Internet access service is a necessary and appropriate step to help preserve an open Internet. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \58\ Broadband providers may have an incentive not to provide such information to end users, as doing so can lessen switching costs for end users. Third-party information sources such as Consumer Reports and the trade press do not routinely provide such information. See CDT Comments at 31; CWA Comments at 21; DISH Comments at 2; Google Comments at ii, 64-66; Level 3 Comments at 13; Sandoval Reply at 60. Economic literature in this area also confirms that policies requiring firms to disclose information generally benefit competition and consumers. See, e.g., Mark Armstrong, Interactions Between Competition and Consumer Policy, 4 Competition Policy Int'l 97 113-16 (Spring 2008), eprints.ucl.ac.uk/7634/1/7634.pdf. \59\ See PIC Reply at 16-18; Free Press Comments at 43-45; Ad Hoc Comments at ii; CDT Comments at 5-7; ALA Comments at 3; National Hispanic Media Coalition (NHMC) Comments at 8; National Broadband Plan at 168, 174 (lack of trust in Internet is significant factor preventing non-adopters from subscribing to broadband services); 47 U.S.C. secs. 151, 230, 254, 1302. A recent FCC survey found that among non-broadband end users, 46% believed that the Internet is dangerous for kids, and 57% believed that it was too easy for personal information to be stolen online. John B. Horrigan, FCC Survey: Broadband Adoption & Use in America 17 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.fcc.gov/DiversityFAC/032410/consumer-survey-horrigan.pdf. \60\ On a number of occasions, broadband providers have blocked lawful traffic without informing end users or edge providers. In addition to the Madison River and Comcast-BitTorrent incidents described above, broadband providers appear to have covertly blocked thousands of BitTorrent uploads in the United States throughout early 2008. See Marcel Dischinger et al.; Catherine Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 641, 666-84 (2009). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Open Internet NPRM sought comment on what end users and edge providers need to know about broadband service, how this information should be disclosed, when disclosure should occur, and where information should be available. The resulting record supports adoption of the following rule: A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network management practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access services sufficient for consumers to make informed choices regarding use of such services and for content, application, service, and device providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.\61\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \61\ For purposes of these rules, ``consumer'' includes any subscriber to the broadband provider's broadband Internet access service, and ``person'' includes any ``individual, group of individuals, corporation, partnership, association, unit of government or legal entity, however organized,'' cf. 47 CFR 54.8(a)(6). We also expect broadband providers to disclose information about the impact of ``specialized services,'' if any, on last-mile capacity available for, and the performance of, broadband Internet access service. The rule does not require public disclosure of competitively sensitive information or information that would compromise network security or undermine the efficacy of reasonable network management practices.\62\ For example, a broadband provider need not publicly disclose information regarding measures it employs to prevent spam practices at a level of detail that would enable a spammer to defeat those measures. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \62\ Commenters disagree on the risks of requiring disclosure of information regarding technical, proprietary, and security-related management practices. Compare, e.g., American Cable Association (ACA) Comments at 17; AFTRA et al. Comments at ii, 16; Cox Comments at 11; Fiber-to-the-Home Council (FTTH) Comments at 3, 27; Libove Comments at 4; Sprint Comments at 16; T-Mobile Comments at 39, with, e.g., Free Press Comments at 117-18; Free Press Reply at 17-19; Digital Education Coalition (DEC) Comments at 14; NJRC Comments at 20-21. We may subsequently require disclosure of such information to the Commission; to the extent we do, we will ensure that such information is protected consistent with existing Commission procedures for treatment of confidential information. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Despite broad agreement that broadband providers should disclose information sufficient to enable end users and edge providers to understand the capabilities of broadband services, commenters disagree about the appropriate level of detail required to achieve this goal. We believe that at this time the best approach is to allow flexibility in implementation of the transparency rule, while providing guidance regarding effective disclosure models. We expect that effective disclosures will likely include some or all of the following types of information, timely and prominently disclosed in plain language accessible to current and prospective end users and edge providers, the Commission, and third parties who wish to monitor network management practices for potential violations of open Internet principles: \63\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \63\ In setting forth the following categories of information subject to the transparency principle, we assume that the broadband provider has chosen to offer its services on standardized terms, although providers of ``information services'' are not obligated to do so. If the provider tailors its terms of service to meet the requirements of an individual end user, those terms must at a minimum be disclosed to the end user in accordance with the transparency principle. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Network Practices Congestion Management: If applicable, descriptions of congestion management practices; types of traffic subject to practices; purposes served by practices; practices' effects on end users' experience; criteria used in practices, such as indicators of congestion that trigger a practice, and the typical frequency of congestion; usage limits and the consequences of exceeding them; and references to engineering standards, where appropriate.\64\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \64\ We note that the description of congestion management practices provided by Comcast in the wake of the Comcast-BitTorrent incident likely satisfies the transparency rule with respect to congestion management practices. See Comcast, Network Management Update, http://www.comcast.net/terms/network/update; Comcast, Comcast Corporation Description of Planned Network Management Practices to be Deployed Following the Termination of Current Practices, downloads.comcast.net/docs/Attachment_B_Future_Practices.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Application-Specific Behavior: If applicable, whether and why the provider blocks or rate-controls specific protocols or protocol ports, modifies protocol fields in ways not prescribed by the protocol standard, or otherwise inhibits or favors certain applications or classes of applications. Device Attachment Rules: If applicable, any restrictions on the types of devices and any approval procedures for devices to connect to the network. (For further discussion of required disclosures regarding device and application approval procedures for mobile broadband providers, see infra.) Security: If applicable, practices used to ensure end-user security or security of the network, including types of triggering conditions that cause a mechanism to be invoked (but excluding information that could reasonably be used to circumvent network security). Performance Characteristics Service Description: A general description of the service, including the service technology, expected and actual access speed and latency, and the suitability of the service for real-time applications. Impact of Specialized Services: If applicable, what specialized services, if any, are offered to end users, and whether and how any specialized services may affect the last-mile capacity available for, and the performance of, broadband Internet access service. Commercial Terms Pricing: For example, monthly prices, usage-based fees, and fees for early termination or additional network services. Privacy Policies: For example, whether network management practices entail inspection of network traffic, and [[Page 59204]] whether traffic information is stored, provided to third parties, or used by the carrier for non-network management purposes. Redress Options: Practices for resolving end-user and edge provider complaints and questions. We emphasize that this list is not necessarily exhaustive, nor is it a safe harbor--there may be additional information, not included above, that should be disclosed for a particular broadband service to comply with the rule in light of relevant circumstances. Broadband providers should examine their network management practices and current disclosures to determine what additional information, if any, should be disclosed to comply with the rule. In the Open Internet NPRM, we proposed that broadband providers publicly disclose their practices on their Web sites and in promotional materials. Most commenters agree that a provider's Web site is a natural place for end users and edge providers to find disclosures, and several contend that a broadband provider's only obligation should be to post its practices on its Web site. Others assert that disclosures should also be displayed prominently at the point-of-sale, in bill inserts, and in the service contract. We agree that broadband providers must, at a minimum, prominently display or provide links to disclosures on a publicly available, easily accessible Web site that is available to current and prospective end users and edge providers as well as to the Commission, and must disclose relevant information at the point of sale. Current end users must be able to easily identify which disclosures apply to their service offering. Broadband providers' online disclosures shall be considered disclosed to the Commission for purposes of monitoring and enforcement. We may require additional disclosures directly to the Commission. We anticipate that broadband providers may be able to satisfy the transparency rule through a single disclosure, and therefore do not at this time require multiple disclosures targeted at different audiences.\65\ We also decline to adopt a specific format for disclosures, and instead require that disclosure be sufficiently clear and accessible to meet the requirements of the rule.\66\ We will, however, continue to monitor compliance with this rule, and may require adherence to a particular set of best practices in the future.\67\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \65\ But we expect that broadband providers will make disclosures in a manner accessible by people with disabilities. \66\ Some commenters advocate for a standard disclosure format. See, e.g., Adam Candeub et al. Reply at 7; Level 3 Comments at 13; Sprint Comments at 17. Others support a plain language requirement. See, e.g., NATOA Comments at 7; NJRC Comments at 19; IFTA Comments at 16. Other commenters, however, argue against the imposition of a standard format as inflexible and difficult to implement. See, e.g., Cox Comments at 10; National Telecommunications Cooperative Association (NTCA) Comments at 9; Qwest Comments at 11. The approach we adopt is similar to the approach adopted in the Commission's Truth-in-Billing Proceeding, where we set out basic guidelines. Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format, First Report and Order and Further NPRM, 14 FCC Rcd 7492, 7495-96, paras. 3-5 (1999). \67\ We may address this issue as part of a separate, ongoing proceeding regarding transparency for communications services more generally. Consumer Information and Disclosure, Notice of Inquiry, FCC 09-68 (rel. Aug. 28, 2010). Relatedly, the Commission has begun an effort, in partnership with broadband providers, to measure the actual speed and performance of broadband service, and we expect that the data generated by this effort will inform Commission efforts regarding disclosure. See Comment Sought on Residential Fixed Broadband Services Testing and Measurement Solution, Pleading Cycle Established, Public Notice, 25 FCC Rcd 3836 (2010) (SamKnows project); Comment Sought on Measurement of Mobile Broadband Network Performance and Coverage, Public Notice, 25 FCC Rcd 7069 (2010) (same). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Although some commenters assert that a disclosure rule will impose significant burdens on broadband providers, no commenter cites any particular source of increased costs, or attempts to estimate costs of compliance. For a number of reasons, we believe that the costs of the disclosure rule we adopt in this Order are outweighed by the benefits of empowering end users and edge providers to make informed choices and of facilitating the enforcement of the other open Internet rules. First, we require only that providers post disclosures on their Web sites and provide disclosure at the point of sale, not that they bear the cost of printing and distributing bill inserts or other paper documents to all existing customers.\68\ Second, although we may subsequently determine that it is appropriate to require that specific information be disclosed in particular ways, the transparency rule we adopt in this Order gives broadband providers some flexibility to determine what information to disclose and how to disclose it. We also expressly exclude from the rule competitively sensitive information, information that would compromise network security, and information that would undermine the efficacy of reasonable network management practices. Third, as discussed below, by setting the effective date of these rules as November 20, 2011, we give broadband providers adequate time to develop cost effective methods of compliance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \68\ In a separate proceeding, the Commission has determined that the costs of making disclosure materials available on a service provider's Web site are outweighed by the public benefits where the disclosure requirement applies only to entities already using the Internet for other purposes. See Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure Requirements for Television Broadcast Licensee Public Interest Obligations, Report and Order, 23 FCC Rcd 1274, 1277-78, paras. 7-10 (2008). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A key purpose of the transparency rule is to enable third-party experts such as independent engineers and consumer watchdogs to monitor and evaluate network management practices, in order to surface concerns regarding potential open Internet violations. We also note the existence of free software tools that enable Internet end users and edge providers to monitor and detect blocking and discrimination by broadband providers.\69\ Although current tools cannot detect all instances of blocking or discrimination and cannot substitute for disclosure of network management policies, such tools may help supplement the transparency rule we adopt in this Order.\70\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \69\ See Sandoval Comments at 4-5. For example, the Max Planck Institute analyzed data collected by the Glasnost tool from thousands of end user, and found that broadband providers were discriminating against application-specific traffic. See WCB Letter 12/13/10, Attach. at 235-39, Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Glasnost: Results from Tests for BitTorrent Traffic Blocking, broadband.mpi-sws.org/transparency/results. Netalyzr is a National Science Foundation-funded project that tests a wide range of network characteristics. See International Computer Science Institute, Netalyzer, netalyzr.icsi.berkeley.edu. Similar tools are being developed for mobile broadband services. See, e.g., WindRider, Mobile Network Neutrality Monitoring System, http:// www.cs.northwestern.edu/~ict992/mobile.htm. \70\ For an example of a public-private partnership that could encourage the development of new tools to assess network management practices, see FCC Open Internet Apps Challenge, http://www.openinternet.gov/challenge. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Although transparency is essential for preserving Internet openness, we disagree with commenters that suggest it is alone sufficient to prevent open Internet violations. The record does not convince us that a transparency requirement by itself will adequately constrain problematic conduct, and we therefore adopt two additional rules, as discussed below. C. No Blocking and No Unreasonable Discrimination 1. No Blocking The freedom to send and receive lawful content and to use and provide applications and services without fear of blocking is essential to the Internet's openness and to competition in adjacent markets such as voice communications and video and audio programming. Similarly, the ability to connect and use [[Page 59205]] any lawful devices that do not harm the network helps ensure that end users can enjoy the competition and innovation that result when device manufacturers can depend on networks' openness.\71\ Moreover, the no- blocking principle has been broadly accepted since its inclusion in the Commission's Internet Policy Statement. Major broadband providers represent that they currently operate consistent with this principle and are committed to continuing to do so.\72\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \71\ The Commission has long protected end users' rights to attach lawful devices that do not harm communications networks. See, e.g., Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 FCC 2d 420, 424 (1968); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d 384, 388 (1980); see also Michael T. Hoeker, From Carterfone to the iPhone: Consumer Choice in the Wireless Telecommunications Marketplace, 17 CommLaw Conspectus 187, 192 (2008); Kevin Werbach, The Federal Computer Commission, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 21 (2005). \72\ As Qwest states, ``Qwest and virtually all major broadband providers have supported the FCC Internet Policy Principles and voluntarily abide by those principles as good policy.'' Qwest PN Comments at 2-3, 5; see also, e.g., Comcast Comments at 27; Clearwire Comments at 1; Margaret Boles, AT&T on Comcast v. FCC Decision, AT&T Pub. Pol'y Blog (Apr. 6, 2010), attpublicpolicy.com/broadband-policy/att-statement-on-comcast-v-fcc-decision. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the Open Internet NPRM, the Commission proposed codifying the original three Internet Policy Statement principles that addressed blocking of content, applications and services, and devices. After consideration of the record, we consolidate the proposed rules into a single rule for fixed broadband providers: \73\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \73\ As described below, we adopt a tailored version of this rule for mobile broadband providers. A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful --------------------------------------------------------------------------- devices, subject to reasonable network management. The phrase ``content, applications, services'' refers to all traffic transmitted to or from end users of a broadband Internet access service, including traffic that may not fit cleanly into any of these categories.\74\ The rule protects only transmissions of lawful content, and does not prevent or restrict a broadband provider from refusing to transmit unlawful material such as child pornography.\75\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \74\ See William Lehr et al. Comments at 27 (``While the proposed rules of the FCC appear to make a clear distinction between applications and services on the one hand (rule 3) and content (rule 1), we believe that there will be some activities that do not fit cleanly into these two categories''); PIC Comments at 39; RFC 4924 at 5. For this reason the rule may prohibit the blocking of a port or particular protocol used by an application, without blocking the application completely, unless such practice is reasonable network management. See Distributed Computing Industry Ass'n (DCIA) Comments at 7 (discussing work-arounds by P2P companies facing port blocking or other practices); Sandvine Reply at 3; RFC 4924. The rule also is neutral with respect to where in the protocol stack or in the network blocking could occur. \75\ The ``no blocking'' rule does not impose any independent legal obligation on broadband Internet access service providers to be the arbiter of what is lawful. See, e.g., WISPA Comments at 12- 13. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We also note that the rule entitles end users to both connect and use any lawful device of their choice, provided such device does not harm the network.\76\ A broadband provider may require that devices conform to widely accepted and publicly-available standards applicable to its services.\77\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \76\ We note that MVPDs, pursuant to Section 629 and the Commission's implementing regulations, are already subject to similar requirements that give end users the right to attach devices to an MVPD system provided that the attached equipment does not cause electronic or physical harm or assist in the unauthorized receipt of service. See Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 14775 (1998); 47 U.S.C.. 549; 47 CFR 76.1201-03. Nothing in this Order is intended to alter those existing rules. \77\ For example, a DOCSIS-based broadband provider is not required to support a DSL modem. See ACA Comments at 13-14; see also Satellite Broadband Commenters Comments at 8-9 (noting that an antenna and associated modem must comply with equipment and protocol standards set by satellite companies, but that ``consumers can [then] attach * * * any personal computer or wireless router they wish''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We make clear that the no-blocking rule bars broadband providers from impairing or degrading particular content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices so as to render them effectively unusable (subject to reasonable network management).\78\ Such a prohibition is consistent with the observation of a number of commenters that degrading traffic can have the same effects as outright blocking, and that such an approach is consistent with the traditional interpretation of the Internet Policy Statement. The Commission has recognized that in some circumstances the distinction between blocking and degrading (such as by delaying) traffic is merely ``semantic.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \78\ We do not find it appropriate to interpret our rule to impose a blanket prohibition on degradation of traffic more generally. Congestion ordinarily results in degradation of traffic, and such an interpretation could effectively prohibit broadband providers from permitting congestion to occur on their networks. Although we expect broadband providers to continue to expand the capacity of their networks--and we believe our rules help ensure that they continue to have incentives to do so--we recognize that some network congestion may be unavoidable. See, e.g., AT&T Comments at 65; TWC Comments at 16-18; Internet Freedom Coalition Reply at 5. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Some concerns have been expressed that broadband providers may seek to charge edge providers simply for delivering traffic to or carrying traffic from the broadband provider's end-user customers. To the extent that a content, application, or service provider could avoid being blocked only by paying a fee, charging such a fee would not be permissible under these rules.\79\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \79\ We do not intend our rules to affect existing arrangements for network interconnection, including existing paid peering arrangements. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. No Unreasonable Discrimination Based on our findings that fixed broadband providers have incentives and the ability to discriminate in their handling of network traffic in ways that can harm innovation, investment, competition, end users, and free expression, we adopt the following rule: A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic over a consumer's broadband Internet access service. Reasonable network management shall not constitute unreasonable discrimination. The rule strikes an appropriate balance between restricting harmful conduct and permitting beneficial forms of differential treatment. As the rule specifically provides, and as discussed below, discrimination by a broadband provider that constitutes ``reasonable network management'' is ``reasonable'' discrimination.\80\ We provide further guidance regarding distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable discrimination: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \80\ We also make clear that open Internet protections coexist with other legal and regulatory frameworks. Except as otherwise described in this Order, we do not address the possible application of the no unreasonable discrimination rule to particular circumstances, despite the requests of certain commenters. See, e.g., AT&T Comments at 64-77, 108-12; PAETEC Comments at 13; see also AT&T Comments at 56 (arguing that some existing agreements could be at odds with limitations on pay for priority arrangements). Rather, we find it more appropriate to address the application of our rule in the context of an appropriate Commission proceeding with the benefit of a more comprehensive record. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Transparency. Differential treatment of traffic is more likely to be reasonable the more transparent to the end user that treatment is. The Commission has previously found broadband provider practices to violate open Internet principles in part because they were not disclosed to end users. Transparency is particularly important with respect to the discriminatory treatment of traffic as it is often difficult for end users to determine the causes of slow or poor performance of content, applications, services, or devices. End-User Control. Maximizing end-user control is a policy goal Congress [[Page 59206]] recognized in Section 230(b) of the Communications Act, and end-user choice and control are touchstones in evaluating the reasonableness of discrimination.\81\ As one commenter observes, ``letting users choose how they want to use the network enables them to use the Internet in a way that creates more value for them (and for society) than if network providers made this choice,'' and ``is an important part of the mechanism that produces innovation under uncertainty.'' Thus, enabling end users to choose among different broadband offerings based on such factors as assured data rates and reliability, or to select quality-of- service enhancements on their own connections for traffic of their choosing, would be unlikely to violate the no unreasonable discrimination rule, provided the broadband provider's offerings were fully disclosed and were not harmful to competition or end users.\82\ We recognize that there is not a binary distinction between end-user controlled and broadband-provider controlled practices, but rather a spectrum of practices ranging from more end-user controlled to more broadband provider-controlled.\83\ And we do not suggest that practices controlled entirely by broadband providers are by definition unreasonable. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \81\ ``The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services * * * offer[ ] users a great degree of control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology develops.'' 47 U.S.C. 230(a)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). \82\ In these types of arrangements ``[t]he broadband provider does not get any particular leverage, because the ability to select which traffic gets priority lies with individual subscribers. Meanwhile, an entity providing content, applications, or services does not need to worry about striking up relationships with various broadband providers to obtain top treatment. All it needs to worry about is building relationships with users and explaining to those users whether and how they may want to select the particular content, application, or service for priority treatment.'' CDT Comments at 27; see also Amazon Comments at 2-3; SureWest Comments at 32-33. \83\ We note that default settings set by broadband providers would likely be considered more broadband provider-controlled than end-user controlled. See generally Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale L.J. 615 (1990); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 193, 197-99 (1991). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Some commenters suggest that open Internet protections would prohibit broadband providers from offering their subscribers different tiers of service or from charging their subscribers based on bandwidth consumed. We are, of course, always concerned about anti-consumer or anticompetitive practices, and we remain so here. However, prohibiting tiered or usage-based pricing and requiring all subscribers to pay the same amount for broadband service, regardless of the performance or usage of the service, would force lighter end users of the network to subsidize heavier end users. It would also foreclose practices that may appropriately align incentives to encourage efficient use of networks. The framework we adopt in this Order does not prevent broadband providers from asking subscribers who use the network less to pay less, and subscribers who use the network more to pay more. Use-Agnostic Discrimination. Differential treatment of traffic that does not discriminate among specific uses of the network or classes of uses is likely reasonable. For example, during periods of congestion a broadband provider could provide more bandwidth to subscribers that have used the network less over some preceding period of time than to heavier users. Use-agnostic discrimination (sometimes referred to as application-agnostic discrimination) is consistent with Internet openness because it does not interfere with end users' choices about which content, applications, services, or devices to use. Nor does it distort competition among edge providers. Standard Practices. The conformity or lack of conformity of a practice with best practices and technical standards adopted by open, broadly representative, and independent Internet engineering, governance initiatives, or standards-setting organizations is another factor to be considered in evaluating reasonableness. Recognizing the important role of such groups is consistent with Congress's intent that our rules in the Internet area should not ``fetter[ ]'' the free market with unnecessary regulation,\84\ and is consistent with broadband providers' historic reliance on such groups.\85\ We make clear, however, that we are not delegating authority to interpret or implement our rules to outside bodies. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \84\ 47 U.S.C. 230(b)(2). \85\ Broadband providers' practices historically have relied on the efforts of such groups, which follow open processes conducive to broad participation. See, e.g., William Lehr et al. Comments at 24; Comcast Comments at 53-59; FTTH Comments at 12; Internet Society (ISOC) Comments at 1-2; OIC Comments at 50-52; Comcast Reply at 5-7. Moreover, Internet community governance groups develop and encourage widespread implementation of best practices, supporting an environment that facilitates innovation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In evaluating unreasonable discrimination, the types of practices we would be concerned about include, but are not limited to, discrimination that harms an actual or potential competitor to the broadband provider (such as by degrading VoIP applications or services when the broadband provider offers telephone service), that harms end users (such as by inhibiting end users from accessing the content, applications, services, or devices of their choice), or that impairs free expression (such as by slowing traffic from a particular blog because the broadband provider disagrees with the blogger's message). For a number of reasons, including those discussed above in Part II.B, a commercial arrangement between a broadband provider and a third party to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic in the broadband Internet access service connection to a subscriber of the broadband provider (i.e., ``pay for priority'') would raise significant cause for concern.\86\ First, pay for priority would represent a significant departure from historical and current practice. Since the beginning of the Internet, Internet access providers have typically not charged particular content or application providers fees to reach the providers' retail service end users or struck pay-for- priority deals, and the record does not contain evidence that U.S. broadband providers currently engage in such arrangements. Second this departure from longstanding norms could cause great harm to innovation and investment in and on the Internet. As discussed above, pay-for- priority arrangements could raise barriers to entry on the Internet by requiring fees from edge providers, as well as transaction costs arising from the need to reach agreements with one or more broadband providers to access a critical mass of potential end users. Fees imposed on edge providers may be excessive because few edge providers have the ability to bargain for lesser fees, and because no broadband provider internalizes the full costs of reduced innovation and the exit of edge providers from the market. Third, pay-for-priority arrangements may particularly harm non-commercial end users, including individual bloggers, libraries, schools, advocacy organizations, and other speakers, especially those who communicate through video or other content sensitive [[Page 59207]] to network congestion. Even open Internet skeptics acknowledge that pay for priority may disadvantage non-commercial uses of the network, which are typically less able to pay for priority, and for which the Internet is a uniquely important platform. Fourth, broadband providers that sought to offer pay-for-priority services would have an incentive to limit the quality of service provided to non-prioritized traffic. In light of each of these concerns, as a general matter, it is unlikely that pay for priority would satisfy the ``no unreasonable discrimination'' standard. The practice of a broadband Internet access service provider prioritizing its own content, applications, or services, or those of its affiliates, would raise the same significant concerns and would be subject to the same standards and considerations in evaluating reasonableness as third-party pay-for-priority arrangements.\87\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \86\ The Open Internet NPRM proposed a flat ban on discrimination and interpreted that requirement to prohibit broadband providers from ``charg[ing] a content, application, or service provider for enhanced or prioritized access to the subscribers of the broadband Internet access service provider.'' Open Internet NPRM, 24 FCC Rcd at 13104-05, paras. 104, 106. In the context of a ``no unreasonable discrimination'' rule that leaves interpretation to a case-by-case process, we instead adopt the approach to pay for priority described in this paragraph. \87\ We reject arguments that our approach to pay-for-priority arrangements is inconsistent with allowing content-delivery networks (CDNs). See, e.g., Cisco Comments at 11-12; TWC Comments at 21-22, 65, 89-90; AT&T Reply at 49-53; Bright House Reply at 9. CDN services are designed to reduce the capacity requirements and costs of the CDN's edge provider clients by hosting the content for those clients closer to end users. Unlike broadband providers, third-party CDN providers do not control the last-mile connection to the end user. And CDNs that do not deploy within an edge provider's network may still reach an end user via the user's broadband connection. See CDT Comments at 25 n.84; George Ou Comments (Preserving the Open and Competitive Bandwidth Market) at 3; see also Cisco Comments at 11; FTTH Comments at 23-24. Moreover, CDNs typically provide a benefit to the sender and recipient of traffic without causing harm to third-party traffic. Though we note disagreement regarding the impact of CDNs on other traffic, the record does not demonstrate that the use of CDNs has any material adverse effect on broadband end users' experience of traffic that is not delivered via a CDN. Compare Letter from S. Derek Turner, Free Press, to Chairman Genachowski et al., FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 1-2 (filed July 29, 2010) with Letter from Richard Bennett, ITIF, to Chairman Genachowski et al., FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, Attach. at 12 (filed Aug. 9, 2010). Indeed, the same benefits derived from using CDNs can be achieved if an edge provider's own servers happen to be located in close proximity to end users. Everything on the Internet that is accessible to an end user is not, and cannot be, in equal proximity from that end user. See John Staurulakis Inc. Comments at 5; Bret T. Swanson Reply at 4. Finally, CDN providers unaffiliated with broadband providers generally do not compete with edge providers and thus generally lack economic incentives (or the ability) to discriminate against edge providers. See Akamai Comments at 12; NASUCA Reply at 7; NCTA Reply at 25. We likewise reject proposals to limit our rules to actions taken at or below the ``network layer.'' See, e.g., Google Comments at 24-26; Vonage Reply at 2; CDT Reply at 18; Prof. Scott Jordan (Jordan) Comments at 3; see also Scott Jordan, A Layered Network Approach to Net Neutrality, Int'l J. of Commc'n 427, 432-33 (2007) (describing the OSI layers model and the actions of routers at and below the network layer) attached to Letter from Scott Jordan, Professor, University of California-Irvine, to Office of the Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 (filed Mar. 22, 2010). We are not persuaded that the proposed limitation is necessary or appropriate in this context. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Because we agree with the diverse group of commenters who argue that any nondiscrimination rule should prohibit only unreasonable discrimination, we decline to adopt the more rigid nondiscrimination rule proposed in the Open Internet NPRM. A strict nondiscrimination rule would be in tension with our recognition that some forms of discrimination, including end-user controlled discrimination, can be beneficial. The rule we adopt provides broadband providers' sufficient flexibility to develop service offerings and pricing plans, and to effectively and reasonably manage their networks. We disagree with commenters who argue that a standard based on ``reasonableness'' or ``unreasonableness'' is too vague to give broadband providers fair notice of what is expected of them. This is not so. ``Reasonableness'' is a well-established standard for regulatee conduct.\88\ As other commenters have pointed out, the term ``reasonable'' is ``both administrable and indispensable to the sound administration of the nation's telecommunications laws.''\89\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \88\ As recently as 1995, Congress adopted the venerable ``reasonableness'' standard when it recodified provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Public Law 104-88, sec. 106(a) (now codified at 49 U.S.C. 15501). \89\ AT&T Reply at 33-34 (``And no one has seriously suggested that Section 202 should itself be amended to remove the `unreasonable' qualifier on the ground that the qualifier is too `murky' or `complex.' Seventy-five years of experience have shown that qualifier to be both administrable and indispensable to the sound administration of the nation's telecommunications laws.''); see also Comcast Reply at 26 (``[T]he Commission should embrace the strong guidance against an overbroad rule and, instead, develop a standard based on `unreasonable and anticompetitive discrimination.' ''); Sprint Reply at 23 (``The unreasonable discrimination standard contained in Section 202(a) of the Act contains the very flexibility the Commission needs to distinguish desirable from improper discrimination.''); Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002) (holding that denial of a permit ``when the intended use would present an unreasonable danger to the health and safety of park users or Park District employees'' is a standard that is ``reasonably specific and objective, and do[es] not leave the decision `to the whim of the administrator' '') (citation omitted); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1968) (stating that ``unreasonably'' ``is a widely used and well understood word, and clearly so when juxtaposed with `obstruct' and `interfere' ''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We also reject the argument that only ``anticompetitive'' discrimination yielding ``substantial consumer harm'' should be prohibited by our rules. We are persuaded those proposed limiting terms are unduly narrow and could allow discriminatory conduct that is contrary to the public interest. The broad purposes of this rule--to encourage competition and remove impediments to infrastructure investment while protecting consumer choice, free expression, end-user control, and the ability to innovate without permission--cannot be achieved by preventing only those practices that are demonstrably anticompetitive or harmful to consumers. Rather, the rule rests on the general proposition that broadband providers should not pick winners and losers on the Internet--even for reasons that may be independent of providers' competitive interests or that may not immediately or demonstrably cause substantial consumer harm.\90\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \90\ For example, slowing BitTorrent packets might only affect a few end users, but it would harm BitTorrent. More significantly, it would raise concerns among other end users and edge providers that their traffic could be slowed for any reason--or no reason at all-- which could in turn reduce incentives to innovate and invest, and change the fundamental nature of the Internet as an open platform. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We disagree with commenters who argue that a rule against unreasonable discrimination violates Section 3(51) of the Communications Act for those broadband providers that are telecommunications carriers but do not provide their broadband Internet access service as a telecommunications service.\91\ Section 3(51) provides that a ``telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this Act only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services.'' \92\ This limitation is not relevant to the Commission's actions here.\93\ The hallmark of common [[Page 59208]] carriage is an ``undertak[ing] to carry for all people indifferently.'' \94\ An entity ``will not be a common carrier where its practice is to make individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal'' with potential customers.\95\ The customers at issue here are the end users who subscribe to broadband Internet access services.\96\ With respect to those customers, a broadband provider may make individualized decisions. A broadband provider that chooses not to offer its broadband Internet access service on a common carriage basis can, for instance, decide on a case-by-case basis whether to serve a particular end user, what connection speed(s) to offer, and at what price. The open Internet rules become effective only after such a provider has voluntarily entered into a mutually satisfactory arrangement with the end user, which may be tailored to that user. Even then, as discussed above, the allowance for reasonable disparities permits customized service features such as those that enhance end user control over what Internet content is received. This flexibility to customize service arrangements for a particular customer is the hallmark of private carriage, which is the antithesis of common carriage.\97\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \91\ See, e.g., AT&T Comments at 209-11; Verizon Comments at 93- 95; CTIA PN Reply at 20-21. We do not read the Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. as addressing rules like the rules we adopt in this Order. 440 U.S. 689 (1979). There, the Court held that obligations on cable providers to ``hold out dedicated channels on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis * * * relegated cable systems, pro tanto, to common-carrier status.'' Id. at 700-01. None of the rules adopted in this Order requires a broadband provider to ``hold out'' any capacity for the exclusive use of third parties or make a public offering of its service. \92\ 47 U.S.C. 153(51). Section 332(c)(2) contains a restriction similar to that of sec. 3(51): ``A person engaged in the provision of a service that is a private mobile service shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be treated as a common carrier for any purpose under this Act.'' Id. sec. 332(c)(2). Because we are not imposing any common carrier obligations on any broadband provider, including providers of ``private mobile service'' as defined in Section 332(d)(3), our requirements do not violate the limitation in Section 332(c)(2). \93\ Courts have acknowledged that the Commission is entitled to deference in interpreting the definition of ``common carrier.'' See AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)). In adopting the rule against unreasonable discrimination, we rely, in part, on our authority under section 706, which is not part of the Communications Act. Congress enacted section 706 as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and more recently codified the provision in Chapter 12 of Title 47, at 47 U.S.C. 1302. The seven titles that comprise the Communications Act appear in Chapter 5 of Title 47. Consequently, even if the rule against unreasonable discrimination were interpreted to require common carriage in a particular case, that result would not run afoul of Section 3(51) because a network operator would be treated as a common carrier pursuant to Section 706, not ``under'' the Communications Act. \94\ Nat'l Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (DC Cir. 1976) (NARUC I) (quoting Semon v. Royal Indemnity Co., 279 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1960) and other cases); see also Verizon Comments at 93 (`` `[T]he primary sine qua non of common carrier status is a quasi-public character, which arises out of the undertaking `to carry for all people indifferently * * *.' '' (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (DC Cir. 1976) (NARUC II)). But see CTIA Reply at 57 (suggesting that nondiscrimination is the sine qua non of common carrier regulation referred to in NARUC II). \95\ NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 641 (citing Semon, 279 F.2d at 739- 40). Commenters assert that any obligation that is similar to an obligation that appears in Title II of the Act is a ``common carrier'' obligation. See, e.g., AT&T Comments at 210-11. We disagree. Just because an obligation appears within Title II does not mean that the imposition of that obligation or a similar one results in ``treating'' an entity as a common carrier. For the meaning of common carriage treatment, which is not defined in the Act, we look to caselaw as discussed in the text. \96\ Even if edge providers were considered ``customers'' of the broadband provider, the broadband provider would not be a common carrier with regard to the role it plays in transmitting edge providers' traffic. Our rules permit broadband providers to engage in reasonable network management and, under certain circumstances, block traffic and devices, engage in reasonable discrimination, and prioritize traffic at subscribers' request. Blocking or deprioritizing certain traffic is far from ``undertak[ing] to carry for all [edge providers] indifferently.'' See NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 641. \97\ See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1481 (DC Cir. 1994) (``If the carrier chooses its clients on an individual basis and determines in each particular case whether and on what terms to serve and there is no specific regulatory compulsion to serve all indifferently, the entity is a private carrier for that particular service and the Commission is not at liberty to subject the entity to regulation as a common carrier.'') (internal quotation marks omitted). Although promoting competition throughout the Internet ecosystem is a central purpose of these rules, we decline to adopt as a rule the Internet Policy Statement principle regarding consumers' entitlement to competition. We agree with those commenters that argue that the principle is too vague to be reduced to a rule and that the proposed rule as stated failed to provide any meaningful guidance regarding what conduct is and is not permissible. See, e.g., Verizon Comments at 4, 53; TPPF Comments at 7. A rule barring broadband providers from depriving end users of their entitlement to competition does not appear to be a viable method of promoting competition. We also do not wish to duplicate competitive analyses carried out by the Department of Justice, the FTC, or the Commission's merger review process. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. Reasonable Network Management Since at least 2005, when the Commission adopted the Internet Policy Statement, we have recognized that a flourishing and open Internet requires robust, well-functioning broadband networks, and accordingly that open Internet protections require broadband providers to be able to reasonably manage their networks. The open Internet rules we adopt in this Order expressly provide for and define ``reasonable network management'' in order to provide greater clarity to broadband providers, network equipment providers, and Internet end users and edge providers regarding the types of network management practices that are consistent with open Internet protections. In the Open Internet NPRM, the Commission proposed that open Internet rules be subject to reasonable network management, consisting of ``reasonable practices employed by a provider of broadband Internet access service to: (1) Reduce or mitigate the effects of congestion on its network or to address quality-of-service concerns; (2) address traffic that is unwanted by users or harmful; (3) prevent the transfer of unlawful content; or (4) prevent the unlawful transfer of content.'' The proposed definition also stated that reasonable network management consists of ``other reasonable network management practices.'' Upon reviewing the record, we conclude that the definition of reasonable network management should provide greater clarity regarding the standard used to gauge reasonableness, expressly account for technological differences among networks that may affect reasonable network management, and omit elements that do not relate directly to network management functions and are therefore better handled elsewhere in the rules--for example, measures to prevent the transfer of unlawful content. We therefore adopt the following definition of reasonable network management: A network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access service. Legitimate network management purposes include: ensuring network security and integrity, including by addressing traffic that is harmful to the network; addressing traffic that is unwanted by end users (including by premise operators), such as by providing services or capabilities consistent with an end user's choices regarding parental controls or security capabilities; and reducing or mitigating the effects of congestion on the network. The term ``particular network architecture and technology'' refers to the differences across access platforms such as cable, DSL, satellite, and fixed wireless. As proposed in the Open Internet NPRM, we will further develop the scope of reasonable network management on a case-by-case basis, as complaints about broadband providers' actual practices arise. The novelty of Internet access and traffic management questions, the complex nature of the Internet, and a general policy of restraint in setting policy for Internet access service providers weigh in favor of a case-by-case approach. In taking this approach, we recognize the need to balance clarity with flexibility.\98\ We discuss below certain [[Page 59209]] principles and considerations that will inform the Commission's case- by-case analysis. Further, although broadband providers are not required to seek permission from the Commission before deploying a network management practice, they or others are free to do so, for example by seeking a declaratory ruling.\99\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \98\ Some parties contend that there will be uncertainty associated with open Internet rules, subject to reasonable network management, which will limit provider flexibility, stifle innovation, and slow providers' response time in managing their networks. See, e.g., ADTRAN Comments at 11-13; Barbara Esbin (Esbin) Comments at 7. For example, some parties express concern that that the definition proposed in the Open Internet NPRM provided insufficient guidance regarding what standard will be used to determine whether a given practice is ``reasonable.'' See, e.g., ADTRAN Comments at 13; AT&T Comments at 13; CDT Comments at 38; PIC Comments at 35-36, 39; Texas PUC Comments at 6-7; Verizon Reply at 8, 75, 78. Others contend that although clarity is needed, the Commission should not list categories of activities considered reasonable. See, e.g., Free Press Comments at 82, 85-86. We seek to balance these interests through general rules designed to give providers sufficient flexibility to implement necessary network management practices, coupled with guidance regarding certain principles and considerations that will inform the Commission's case-by-case analysis. \99\ See 47 CFR 1.2 (providing for ``a declaratory ruling terminating a controversy or removing uncertainty''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We reject proposals to define reasonable network management practices more expansively or more narrowly than stated above. We agree with commenters that the Commission should not adopt the ``narrowly or carefully tailored'' standard discussed in the Comcast Network Management Practices Order.\100\ We find that this standard is unnecessarily restrictive and may overly constrain network engineering decisions. Moreover, the ``narrowly tailored'' language could be read to import strict scrutiny doctrine from constitutional law, which we are not persuaded would be helpful here. Broadband providers may employ network management practices that are appropriate and tailored to the network management purpose they seek to achieve, but they need not necessarily employ the most narrowly tailored practice theoretically available to them. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \100\ See Comcast Network Management Practices Order, 23 FCC Rcd at 13055-56, para. 47 (stating that, to be considered ``reasonable'' a network management practice ``should further a critically important interest and be narrowly or carefully tailored to serve that interest''); see also AT&T Comments at 186-87 (arguing that the Comcast standard is too narrow); Level 3 Comments at 14; PAETEC Comments at 17-18. But see Free Press Comments at 91-92 (stating that the Commission should not retreat from the fundamental framework of the Comcast standard). A ``reasonableness'' standard also has the advantage of being administrable and familiar. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We also acknowledge that reasonable network management practices may differ across platforms. For example, practices needed to manage congestion on a fixed satellite network may be inappropriate for a fiber-to-the-home network. We also recognize the unique network management challenges facing broadband providers that use unlicensed spectrum to deliver service to end users. Unlicensed spectrum is shared among multiple users and technologies and no single user can control or assure access to the spectrum. We believe the concept of reasonable network management is sufficiently flexible to afford such providers the latitude they need to effectively manage their networks.\101\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \101\ See Appendix A, sec. 8.11. We recognize that the standards for fourth-generation (4G) wireless networks include the capability to prioritize particular types of traffic, and that other broadband Internet access services may incorporate similar features. Whether particular uses of these technologies constitute reasonable network management will depend on whether they are appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The principles guiding case-by-case evaluations of network management practices are much the same as those that guide assessments of ``no unreasonable discrimination,'' and include transparency, end- user control, and use- (or application-) agnostic treatment. We also offer guidance in the specific context of the legitimate network management purposes listed above. Network Security or Integrity and Traffic Unwanted by End Users. Broadband providers may implement reasonable practices to ensure network security and integrity, including by addressing traffic that is harmful to the network.\102\ Many commenters strongly support allowing broadband providers to implement such network management practices. Some commenters, however, express concern that providers might implement anticompetitive or otherwise problematic practices in the name of protecting network security. We make clear that, for the singling out of any specific application for blocking or degradation based on harm to the network to be a reasonable network management practice, a broadband provider should be prepared to provide a substantive explanation for concluding that the particular traffic is harmful to the network, such as traffic that constitutes a denial-of- service attack on specific network infrastructure elements or exploits a particular security vulnerability. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \102\ In the context of broadband Internet access service, techniques to ensure network security and integrity are designed to protect the access network and the Internet against actions by malicious or compromised end systems. Examples include spam, botnets, and distributed denial of service attacks. Unwanted traffic includes worms, malware, and viruses that exploit end-user system vulnerabilities; denial of service attacks; and spam. See IETF, Report from the IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006, RFC 4948, at 31 (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4948.txt. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Broadband providers also may implement reasonable practices to address traffic that a particular end user chooses not to receive. Thus, for example, a broadband provider could provide services or capabilities consistent with an end user's choices regarding parental controls, or allow end users to choose a service that provides access to the Internet but not to pornographic Web sites. Likewise, a broadband provider serving a premise operator could restrict traffic unwanted by that entity, though such restrictions should be disclosed. Our rule will not impose liability on a broadband provider where such liability is prohibited by Section 230(c)(2) of the Act.\103\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \103\ See 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(2) (no provider of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of ``(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in [subparagraph (A)]''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We note that, in some cases, mechanisms that reduce or eliminate some forms of harmful or unwanted traffic may also interfere with legitimate network traffic. Such mechanisms must be appropriate and tailored to the threat; should be evaluated periodically as to their continued necessity; and should allow end users to opt-in or opt-out if possible.\104\ Disclosures of network management practices used to address network security or traffic a particular end user does not want to receive should clearly state the objective of the mechanism and, if applicable, how an end user can opt in or out of the practice. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \104\ For example, a network provider might be able to assess a network endpoint's posture--see IETF, Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and Requirements, RFC 5209 (Jun. 2008); Internet Engineering Task Force, PA-TNC: A Posture Attribute (PA) Protocol Compatible with Trusted Network Connect (TNC), RFC 5792 (Mar. 2010)--and tailor port blocking accordingly. With the posture assessment, an end user might then opt out of the network management mechanism by upgrading the operating system or installing a suitable firewall. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Network Congestion. Numerous commenters support permitting the use of reasonable network management practices to address the effects of congestion, and we agree that congestion management may be a legitimate network management purpose. For example, broadband providers may need to take reasonable steps to ensure that heavy users do not crowd out others. What constitutes congestion and what measures are reasonable to address it may vary depending on the technology platform for a particular broadband Internet access service. For example, if cable modem subscribers in a particular neighborhood are experiencing congestion, it may be reasonable for a broadband provider to temporarily limit [[Page 59210]] the bandwidth available to individual end users in that neighborhood who are using a substantially disproportionate amount of bandwidth. We emphasize that reasonable network management practices are not limited to the categories described here, and that broadband providers may take other reasonable steps to maintain the proper functioning of their networks, consistent with the definition of reasonable network management we adopt. As we stated in the Open Internet NPRM, ``we do not presume to know now everything that providers may need to do to provide robust, safe, and secure Internet access to their subscribers, much less everything they may need to do as technologies and usage patterns change in the future.'' Broadband providers should have flexibility to experiment, innovate, and reasonably manage their networks. E. Mobile Broadband There is one Internet, which should remain open for consumers and innovators alike, although it may be accessed through different technologies and services. The record demonstrates the importance of freedom and openness for mobile broadband networks, and the rationales for adopting high-level open Internet rules, discussed above, are for the most part as applicable to mobile broadband as they are to fixed broadband. Consumer choice, freedom of expression, end-user control, competition, and the freedom to innovate without permission are as important when end users are accessing the Internet via mobile broadband as via fixed. And there have been instances of mobile providers blocking certain third-party applications, particularly applications that compete with the provider's own offerings; relatedly, concerns have been raised about inadequate transparency regarding network management practices. We also note that some mobile broadband providers affirmatively state they do not oppose the application of openness rules to mobile broadband. However, as explained in the Open Internet NPRM and subsequent Public Notice, mobile broadband presents special considerations that suggest differences in how and when open Internet protections should apply. Mobile broadband is an earlier-stage platform than fixed broadband, and it is rapidly evolving. For most of the history of the Internet, access has been predominantly through fixed platforms--first dial-up, then cable modem and DSL services. As of a few years ago, most consumers used their mobile phones primarily to make phone calls and send text messages, and most mobile providers offered Internet access only via ``walled gardens'' or stripped down Web sites. Today, however, mobile broadband is an important Internet access platform that is helping drive broadband adoption, and data usage is growing rapidly. The mobile ecosystem is experiencing very rapid innovation and change, including an expanding array of smartphones, aircard modems, and other devices that enable Internet access; the emergence and rapid growth of dedicated-purpose mobile devices like e-readers; the development of mobile application (``app'') stores and hundreds of thousands of mobile apps; and the evolution of new business models for mobile broadband providers, including usage-based pricing. Moreover, most consumers have more choices for mobile broadband than for fixed (particularly fixed wireline) broadband.\105\ Mobile broadband speeds, capacity, and penetration are typically much lower than for fixed broadband, though some providers have begun offering 4G service that will enable offerings with higher speeds and capacity and lower latency than previous generations of mobile service.\106\ In addition, existing mobile networks present operational constraints that fixed broadband networks do not typically encounter. This puts greater pressure on the concept of ``reasonable network management'' for mobile providers, and creates additional challenges in applying a broader set of rules to mobile at this time. Further, we recognize that there have been meaningful recent moves toward openness in and on mobile broadband networks, including the introduction of third-party devices and applications on a number of mobile broadband networks, and more open mobile devices. In addition, we anticipate soon seeing the effects on the market of the openness conditions we imposed on mobile providers that operate on upper 700 MHz C Block (``C Block'') spectrum,\107\ which includes Verizon Wireless, one of the largest mobile wireless carriers in the U.S. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \105\ Compare National Broadband Plan at 37 (Exh. 4-A) with 39- 40 (Exh. 4-E). However, in many areas of the country, particularly in rural areas, there are fewer options for mobile broadband. See Fourteenth Wireless Competition Report at para. 355, tbl. 39 & chart 48. This may result in some consumers having fewer options for mobile broadband than for fixed. \106\ Some fixed broadband providers contend that current mobile broadband offerings directly compete with their offerings. See Letter from Michael D. Saperstein, Jr., Director of Regulatory Affairs, Frontier Communications, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191 (filed Dec. 15, 2010) (discussing entry of wireless service into the broadband market and its effect on wireline broadband subscribership) and Attach. at 1 (citing reports that LTE is ``a very practical and encouraging substitution for DSL, particularly when you look at rural markets''); Letter from Malena F. Barzilai, Federal Government Affairs, Windstream Communications, Inc., to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191 (filed Dec. 15, 2010). As part of our ongoing monitoring, we will track such competition and any impact these rules may have on it. \107\ The first network using spectrum subject to these rules has recently started offering service. See Press Release, Verizon Wireless, Blazingly Fast: Verizon Wireless Launches The World's Largest 4G LTE Wireless Network On Sunday, Dec. 5 (Dec. 5, 2010), available at news.vzw.com/news/2010/12/pr2010-12-03.html. Specifically, licensees subject to the rule must provide an open platform for third-party applications and devices. See 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 15289; 47 CFR 27.16. The rules we adopt in this Order are independent of those open platform requirements. We expect our observations of how the 700 MHz open platform rules affect the mobile broadband sector to inform our ongoing analysis of the application of openness rules to mobile broadband generally. 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 15364-65, 15374, paras. 205, 229. A number of commenters support the Commission's waiting to determine whether to apply openness rules to mobile wireless until the effects of the C Block openness requirement can be observed. See, e.g., AT&T PN Reply, at 32-37; Cricket PN Reply at 11. We also note that some providers tout openness as a competitive advantage. See, e.g., Clearwire Comments at 7; Verizon Reply at 47-52. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In light of these considerations, we conclude it is appropriate to take measured steps at this time to protect the openness of the Internet when accessed through mobile broadband. We apply certain of the open Internet rules, requiring compliance with the transparency rule and a basic no-blocking rule.\108\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \108\ We note that section 332(a) requires us, ``[i]n taking actions to manage the spectrum to be made available for use by the private mobile service,'' to consider various factors, including whether our actions will ``improve the efficiency of spectrum use and reduce the regulatory burden,'' and ``encourage competition.'' 47 U.S.C. 332(a)(2), (3). To the extent section 332(a) applies to our actions in this Order, we note that we have considered these factors. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Application of Openness Principles to Mobile Broadband a. Transparency The wide array of commenters who support a disclosure requirement generally agree that all broadband providers, including mobile broadband providers, should be required to disclose their network management practices. Although some mobile broadband providers argue that the dynamic nature of mobile network management makes meaningful disclosure difficult, we conclude that end users need a clear understanding of network management practices, performance, and commercial terms, regardless of the broadband platform they use to access the Internet. Although a number of mobile broadband [[Page 59211]] providers have adopted voluntary codes of conduct regarding disclosure, we believe that a uniform rule applicable to all mobile broadband providers will best preserve Internet openness by ensuring that end users have sufficient information to make informed choices regarding use of the network; and that content, application, service, and device providers have the information needed to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings. The transparency rule will also aid the Commission in monitoring the evolution of mobile broadband and adjusting, as appropriate, the framework adopted in this Order. Therefore, as stated above, we require mobile broadband providers to follow the same transparency rule applicable to fixed broadband providers. Further, although we do not require mobile broadband providers to allow third-party devices or all third-party applications on their networks, we nonetheless require mobile broadband providers to disclose their third-party device and application certification procedures, if any; to clearly explain their criteria for any restrictions on use of their network; and to expeditiously inform device and application providers of any decisions to deny access to the network or of a failure to approve their particular devices or applications. With respect to the types of disclosures required to satisfy the rule, we direct mobile broadband providers to the discussion in Part III.B, above. Additionally, mobile broadband providers should follow the guidance the Commission provided to licensees of the upper 700 MHz C Block spectrum regarding compliance with their disclosure obligations, particularly regarding disclosure to third-party application developers and device manufacturers of criteria and approval procedures (to the extent applicable).\109\ For example, these disclosures include, to the extent applicable, establishing a transparent and efficient approval process for third parties, as set forth in Section 27.16(d).\110\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \109\ 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 15371-72, para. 224 (``[A] C Block licensee must publish [for example, by posting on the provider's Web site] standards no later than the time at which it makes such standards available to any preferred vendors (i.e., vendors with whom the provider has a relationship to design products for the provider's network). We also require the C Block licensee to provide to potential customers notice of the customers' rights to request the attachment of a device or application to the licensee's network, and notice of the licensee's process for customers to make such requests, including the relevant network criteria.''). \110\ See 47 CFR 27.16(d) (``Access requests. (1) Licensees shall establish and publish clear and reasonable procedures for parties to seek approval to use devices or applications on the licensees' networks. A licensee must also provide to potential customers notice of the customers' rights to request the attachment of a device or application to the licensee's network, and notice of the licensee's process for customers to make such requests, including the relevant network criteria. (2) If a licensee determines that a request for access would violate its technical standards or regulatory requirements, the licensee shall expeditiously provide a written response to the requester specifying the basis for denying access and providing an opportunity for the requester to modify its request to satisfy the licensee's concerns.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. No Blocking We adopt a no blocking rule that guarantees end users' access to the Web and protects against mobile broadband providers' blocking applications that compete with their other primary service offering-- voice and video telephony--while ensuring that mobile broadband providers can engage in reasonable network management: A person engaged in the provision of mobile broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block consumers from accessing lawful Web sites, subject to reasonable network management; nor shall such person block applications that compete with the provider's voice or video telephony services, subject to reasonable network management. We understand a ``provider's voice or video telephony services'' to include a voice or video telephony service provided by any entity in which the provider has an attributable interest.\111\ We emphasize that the rule protects any and all applications that compete with a mobile broadband provider's voice or video telephony services. Further, degrading a particular Web site or an application that competes with the provider's voice or video telephony services so as to render the Web site or application effectively unusable would be considered tantamount to blocking (subject to reasonable network management). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \111\ For the purposes of these rules, an attributable interest includes equity ownership interest in or de facto control of, or by, the entity that provides the voice or video telephony service. An attributable interest also includes any exclusive arrangement for such voice or video telephony service, including de facto exclusive arrangements. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- End users expect to be able to access any lawful Web site through their broadband service, whether fixed or mobile. Web browsing continues to generate the largest amount of mobile data traffic, and applications and services are increasingly being provisioned and used entirely through the Web, without requiring a standalone application to be downloaded to a device. Given that the mobile Web is well-developed relative to other mobile applications and services, and enjoys similar expectations of openness that characterize Web use through fixed broadband, we find it appropriate to act here. We also recognize that accessing a Web site typically does not present the same network management issues that downloading and running an app on a device may present. At this time, a prohibition on blocking access to lawful Web sites (including any related traffic transmitted or received by any plug-in, scripting language, or other browser extension) appropriately balances protection for the ability of end users to access content, applications, and services through the Web and assurance that mobile broadband providers can effectively manage their mobile broadband networks. Situations have arisen in which mobile wireless providers have blocked third-party applications that arguably compete with their telephony offerings.\112\ This type of blocking confirms that mobile broadband providers may have strong incentives to limit Internet openness when confronted with third-party applications that compete with their telephony services. Some commenters express concern that wireless providers could favor their own applications over the applications of unaffiliated developers, under the guise of reasonable network management. A number of commenters assert that blocking or hindering the delivery of services that compete with those offered by the mobile broadband provider, such as over-the-top VoIP, should be prohibited. According to Skype, for example, there is ``a consensus that at a minimum, a `no blocking' rule should apply to voice and video applications that compete with broadband network operators' own service offerings.'' Clearwire argues that the Commission should restrict only practices that appear to have an element of anticompetitive intent. Although some commenters support a broader no-blocking rule, we believe that a targeted prophylactic rule is appropriate at this [[Page 59212]] time,\113\ and necessary to deter this type of behavior in the future. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \112\ See, e.g., Letter from James W. Cicconi, AT&T Services, Inc., to Ruth Milkman, Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, FCC, RM-11361, RM-11497 at 6-8 (filed Aug. 21, 2009); DISH PN Reply at 7 (``VoIP operators such as Skype have faced significant difficulty in gaining access across wireless Internet connections.''). Mobile providers blocking VoIP services is an issue not only in the United States, but worldwide. In Europe, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications reported, among other issues, a number of cases of blocking or charging extra for VoIP services by certain European mobile operators. See European Commission, Information Society and Media Directorate-General Report on the Public Consultation on ``The Open Internet and Net Neutrality in Europe'' 2, (Nov. 9, 2010), ec.europa.eu/information--society/ policy/ecomm/library/public--consult/net--neutrality/index--en.htm. \113\ See Letter from Jonathan Spalter, Chairman, Mobile Future, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket Nos. 09-191 & 10- 127, at 3 n.16 (filed Dec. 13, 2010) (supporting tailored prohibition on blocking applications), citing AT&T Comments at 65; T-Mobile Comments, Declaration of Grant Castle at 4. The no blocking rule that we adopt for mobile broadband involves distinct treatment of applications that compete with the provider's voice and video telephony services, whereas we have adopted a broader traffic-based approach for fixed broadband. We acknowledge that this rule for mobile broadband may lead in some limited measure to the traffic- identification difficulties discussed with respect to fixed broadband. We find, however, that the reasons for taking our cautious approach to mobile broadband outweigh this concern, particularly in light of our intent to monitor developments involving mobile broadband, including this and other aspects of the practical implementation of our rules. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The prohibition on blocking applications that compete with a broadband provider's voice or video telephony services does not apply to a broadband provider's operation of application stores or their functional equivalent. In operating app stores, broadband providers compete directly with other types of entities, including device manufacturers and operating system developers,\114\ and we do not intend to limit mobile broadband providers' flexibility to curate their app stores similar to app store operators that are not subject to these rules. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \114\ For example, app stores are operated by manufacturers and operating system developers such as Nokia, Apple, RIM, Google, Microsoft, and third parties such as GetJar. See also AT&T PN Comments at 63-66 (emphasizing the competitiveness of the market for mobile apps, including the variety of sources from which consumers may obtain applications); T-Mobile PN Comments at 21 (``The competitive wireless marketplace will continue to discipline app store owners * * * that exclude third-party apps from their app stores entirely, eliminating the need for Commission action.''). We note, however, that for a few devices, such as Apple's iPhone, there may be fewer options for accessing and distributing apps. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As indicated in Part III.D above, the reasonable network management definition takes into account the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access service. Thus, in determining whether a network management practice is reasonable, the Commission will consider technical, operational, and other differences between wireless and other broadband Internet access platforms, including differences relating to efficient use of spectrum. We anticipate that conditions in mobile broadband networks may necessitate network management practices that would not be necessary in most fixed networks, but conclude that our definition of reasonable network management is flexible enough to accommodate such differences. 2. Ongoing Monitoring Although some commenters support applying the no unreasonable discrimination rule to mobile broadband,\115\ for the reasons discussed above, we decline to do so, preferring at this time to put in place basic openness protections and monitor the development of the mobile broadband marketplace. We emphasize that our decision to proceed incrementally with respect to mobile broadband at this time should not suggest that we implicitly approve of any provider behavior that runs counter to general open Internet principles. Beyond those practices expressly prohibited by our rules, other conduct by mobile broadband providers, particularly conduct that would violate our rules for fixed broadband, may not necessarily be consistent with Internet openness and the public interest. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \115\ See, e.g, Free Press Comments at 125-26; OIC Comments at 36-39. See also, e.g., Leap Comments at 17-22; Sprint Reply at 24- 26. A number of commenters suggest that openness rules should be applied identically to all broadband platforms. See, e.g., CenturyLink Comments at 22-23; Comcast Comments at 32; DISH Network PN Comments at 17; NCTA PN Comments at 11; Qwest PN Comments at 12- 19; SureWest PN Comments at 18-20; TWC PN Comments at 33-35; Vonage PN Comments at 10-18; Windstream PN Comments at 6-19. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We are taking measured steps to protect openness for mobile broadband at this time in part because we want to better understand how the mobile broadband market is developing before determining whether adjustments to this framework are necessary. To that end, we will closely monitor developments in the mobile broadband market, with a particular focus on the following issues: (1) The effects of these rules, the C Block conditions, and market developments related to the openness of the Internet as accessed through mobile broadband; (2) any conduct by mobile broadband providers that harms innovation, investment, competition, end users, free expression or the achievement of national broadband goals; (3) the extent to which differences between fixed and mobile rules affect fixed and mobile broadband markets, including competition among fixed and mobile broadband providers; and (4) the extent to which differences between fixed and mobile rules affect end users for whom mobile broadband is their only or primary Internet access platform.\116\ We will investigate and evaluate concerns as they arise. We also will adjust our rules as appropriate. To aid the Commission in these tasks, we will create an Open Internet Advisory Committee, as discussed below, with a mandate that includes monitoring and regularly reporting on the state of Internet openness for mobile broadband. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \116\ We note that mobile broadband is the only or primary broadband Internet access platform used by many Americans. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Further, we reaffirm our commitment to enforcing the open platform requirements applicable to upper 700 MHz C Block licensees. The first networks using this spectrum are now becoming operational. F. Other Laws and Considerations Open Internet rules are not intended to expand or contract broadband providers' rights or obligations with respect to other laws or safety and security considerations, including the needs of emergency communications and law enforcement, public safety, and national security authorities. Similarly, open Internet rules protect only lawful content, and are not intended to inhibit efforts by broadband providers to address unlawful transfers of content. For example, there should be no doubt that broadband providers can prioritize communications from emergency responders, or block transfers of child pornography. To make clear that open Internet protections can and must coexist with these other legal frameworks, we adopt the following clarifying provisions: Nothing in this part supersedes any obligation or authorization a provider of broadband Internet access service may have to address the needs of emergency communications or law enforcement, public safety, or national security authorities, consistent with or as permitted by applicable law, or limits the provider's ability to do so. Nothing in this part prohibits reasonable efforts by a provider of broadband Internet access service to address copyright infringement or other unlawful activity. 1. Emergency Communications and Safety and Security Authorities Commenters are broadly supportive of our proposal to state that open Internet rules do not supersede any obligation a broadband provider may have--or limit its ability--to address the needs of emergency communications or law enforcement, public safety, or homeland or national security authorities (together, ``safety and security authorities''). Broadband providers have obligations under statutes such as the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act that could in some circumstances intersect with open Internet protections, and most commenters recognize the benefits of clarifying that these obligations are not inconsistent with open Internet rules. Likewise, in connection with an emergency, there [[Page 59213]] may be Federal, state, Tribal, and local public safety entities; homeland security personnel; and other authorities that need guaranteed or prioritized access to the Internet in order to coordinate disaster relief and other emergency response efforts, or for other emergency communications. In the Open Internet NPRM we proposed to address the needs of law enforcement in one rule and the needs of emergency communications and public safety, national, and homeland security authorities in a separate rule. We are persuaded by the record that these rules should be combined, as the interests at issue are substantially similar.\117\ We also agree that the rule should focus on the needs of ``law enforcement * * * authorities'' rather than the needs of ``law enforcement.'' The purpose of the safety and security provision is first to ensure that open Internet rules do not restrict broadband providers in addressing the needs of law enforcement authorities, and second to ensure that broadband providers do not use the safety and security provision without the imprimatur of a law enforcement authority, as a loophole to the rules. As such, application of the safety and security rule should be tied to invocation by relevant authorities rather than to a broadband provider's independent notion of law enforcement. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \117\ See PIC Comments at 42-44. We intend the term ``national security authorities'' to include homeland security authorities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Some commenters urge us to limit the scope of the safety and security rule, or argue that it is unnecessary because other statutes give broadband providers the ability and responsibility to assist law enforcement. Several commenters urge the Commission to revise its proposal to clarify that broadband providers may not take any voluntary steps that would be inconsistent with open Internet principles, beyond those steps required by law. They argue, for example, that a broad exception for voluntary efforts could swallow open Internet rules by allowing broadband providers to cloak discriminatory practices under the guise of protecting safety and security.\118\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \118\ See EFF Comments at 20-22. EFF would require a pre- deployment waiver from the Commission if the needs of law enforcement would require broadband providers to act inconsistently with open Internet rules. Id. at 22. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We agree with commenters that the safety and security rule should be tailored to avoid the possibility of broadband providers using their discretion to mask improper practices. But it would be a mistake to limit the rule to situations in which broadband providers have an obligation to assist safety and security personnel. For example, such a limitation would prevent broadband providers from implementing the Cellular Priority Access Service (also known as the Wireless Priority Service (WPS)), which allows for but does not legally require the prioritization of public safety communications on wireless networks. We do not think it necessary or advisable to provide for pre-deployment review by the Commission, particularly because time may be of the essence in meeting safety and security needs.\119\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \119\ The National Emergency Number Association (NENA) would encourage or require network managers to provide public safety users with advance notice of changes in network management that could affect emergency services. See NENA Comments at 5-6. Although we do not adopt such a requirement, we encourage broadband providers to be mindful of the potential impact on emergency services when implementing network management policies, and to coordinate major changes with providers of emergency services when appropriate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Transfers of Unlawful Content and Unlawful Transfers of Content In the NPRM, we proposed to treat as reasonable network management ``reasonable practices to * * * prevent the transfer of unlawful content; or * * * prevent the unlawful transfer of content.'' For reasons explained above we decline to include these practices within the scope of ``reasonable network management.'' However, we conclude that a clear statement that open Internet rules do not prohibit broadband providers from making reasonable efforts to address the transfer of unlawful content or unlawful transfers of content is helpful to ensure that open Internet rules are not used as a shield to enable unlawful activity or to deter prompt action against such activity. For example, open Internet rules should not be invoked to protect copyright infringement, which has adverse consequences for the economy, nor should they protect child pornography. We emphasize that open Internet rules do not alter copyright laws and are not intended to prohibit or discourage voluntary practices undertaken to address or mitigate the occurrence of copyright infringement.\120\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \120\ See, e.g., Stanford University--DMCA Complaint Resolution Center; User Generated Content Principles, http://www.ugcprinciples.com (cited in Letter from Linda Kinney, MPAA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket Nos. 09-191, 10-137, WC Docket No. 07-52 at 1 (filed Nov. 29, 2010)). Open Internet rules are not intended to affect the legal status of cooperative efforts by broadband Internet access service providers and other service providers that are designed to curtail infringement in response to information provided by rights holders in a manner that is timely, effective, and accommodates the legitimate interests of providers, rights holders, and end users. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- G. Specialized Services In the Open Internet NPRM, the Commission recognized that broadband providers offer services that share capacity with broadband Internet access service over providers' last-mile facilities, and may develop and offer other such services in the future. These ``specialized services,'' such as some broadband providers' existing facilities-based VoIP and Internet Protocol-video offerings, differ from broadband Internet access service and may drive additional private investment in broadband networks and provide end users valued services, supplementing the benefits of the open Internet. At the same time, specialized services may raise concerns regarding bypassing open Internet protections, supplanting the open Internet, and enabling anticompetitive conduct. For example, open Internet protections may be weakened if broadband providers offer specialized services that are substantially similar to, but do not meet the definition of, broadband Internet access service, and if consumer protections do not apply to such services. In addition, broadband providers may constrict or fail to continue expanding network capacity allocated to broadband Internet access service to provide more capacity for specialized services. If this occurs, and particularly to the extent specialized services grow as substitutes for the delivery of content, applications, and services over broadband Internet access service, the Internet may wither as an open platform for competition, innovation, and free expression. These concerns may be exacerbated by consumers' limited choices for broadband providers, which may leave some end users unable to effectively exercise their preferences for broadband Internet access service (or content, applications, or services available through broadband Internet access service) over specialized services. We agree with the many commenters who advocate that the Commission exercise its authority to closely monitor and proceed incrementally with respect to specialized services, rather than adopting policies specific to such services at this time. We will carefully observe market developments to verify that specialized services promote investment, innovation, competition, and end-user benefits without undermining or threatening the open Internet.\121\ We note also that our rules [[Page 59214]] define broadband Internet access service to encompass ``any service that the Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of [broadband Internet access service], or that is used to evade the protections set forth in these rules.'' \122\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \121\ Our decision not to adopt rules regarding specialized services at this time involves an issue distinct from the regulatory classification of services such as VoIP and IPTV under the Communications Act, a subject we do not address in this Order. Likewise, the Commission's actions here do not affect any existing obligation to provide interconnection, unbundled network elements, or special access or other wholesale access under Sections 201, 251, 256, and 271 of the Act. 47 U.S.C. 201, 251, 256, 271. \122\ Some commenters, including Internet engineering experts and analysts, emphasize the importance of distinguishing between the open Internet and specialized services and state that ``this distinction must continue as a most appropriate and constructive basis for pursuing your policy goals.'' Various Advocates for the Open Internet PN Reply at 3; see also id. at 2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We will closely monitor the robustness and affordability of broadband Internet access services, with a particular focus on any signs that specialized services are in any way retarding the growth of or constricting capacity available for broadband Internet access service. We fully expect that broadband providers will increase capacity offered for broadband Internet access service if they expand network capacity to accommodate specialized services. We would be concerned if capacity for broadband Internet access service did not keep pace. We also expect broadband providers to disclose information about specialized services' impact, if any, on last-mile capacity available for, and the performance of, broadband Internet access service. We may consider additional disclosure requirements in this area in our related proceeding regarding consumer transparency and disclosure. We would also be concerned by any marketing, advertising, or other messaging by broadband providers suggesting that one or more specialized services, taken alone or together, and not provided in accordance with our open Internet rules, is ``Internet'' service or a substitute for broadband Internet access service. Finally, we will monitor the potential for anticompetitive or otherwise harmful effects from specialized services, including from any arrangements a broadband provider may seek to enter into with third parties to offer such services. The Open Internet Advisory Committee will aid us in monitoring these issues. IV. The Commission's Authority To Adopt Open Internet Rules Congress created the Commission ``[f]or the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all people of the United States * * * a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national defense, [and] for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio communication.'' Section 2 of the Communications Act grants the Commission jurisdiction over ``all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio.'' As the Supreme Court explained in the radio context, Congress charged the Commission with ``regulating a field of enterprise the dominant characteristic of which was the rapid pace of its unfolding'' and therefore intended to give the Commission sufficiently ``broad'' authority to address new issues that arise with respect to ``fluid and dynamic'' communications technologies.\123\ Broadband Internet access services are clearly within the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction and historically have been supervised by the Commission. Furthermore, as explained below, our adoption of basic rules of the road for broadband providers implements specific statutory mandates in the Communications Act and the Telecommunications Act of 1996. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \123\ Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219-20 (1943) (Congress did not ``attempt[] an itemized catalogue of the specific manifestations of the general problems'' that it entrusted to the Commission); see also FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137, 138 (1940) (the Commission's statutory responsibilities and authority amount to ``a unified and comprehensive regulatory system'' for the communications industry that allows a single agency to ``maintain, through appropriate administrative control, a grip on the dynamic aspects'' of that ever-changing industry). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Congress has demonstrated its awareness of the importance of the Internet and advanced services to modern interstate communications. In Section 230 of the Act, for example, Congress announced ``the policy of the United States'' concerning the Internet, which includes ``promot[ing] the continued development of the Internet'' and ``encourag[ing] the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet,'' while also ``preserv[ing] the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services'' and avoiding unnecessary regulation. Other statements of congressional policy further confirm the Commission's statutory authority. In Section 254 of the Act, for example, Congress charged the Commission with designing a Federal universal program that has as one of several objectives making ``[a]ccess to advanced telecommunications and information services'' available ``in all regions of the Nation,'' and particularly to schools, libraries, and health care providers. To the same end, in Section 706 of the 1996 Act, Congress instructed the Commission to ``encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans (including, in particular, elementary and secondary schools and classrooms)'' and, if it finds that advanced telecommunications capability is not being deployed to all Americans ``on a reasonable and timely basis,'' to ``take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability.'' This mandate provides the Commission both ``authority'' and ``discretion'' ``to settle on the best regulatory or deregulatory approach to broadband.'' As the legislative history of the 1996 Act confirms, Congress believed that the laws it drafted would compel the Commission to protect and promote the Internet, while allowing the agency sufficient flexibility to decide how to do so.\124\ As explained in detail below, Congress did not limit its instructions to the Commission to one Section of the communications laws. Rather, it expressed its instructions in multiple Sections which, viewed as a whole, provide broad authority to promote competition, investment, transparency, and an open Internet through the rules we adopt in this Order. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \124\ S. Rep. No. 104-23, at 51 (1995) (``The goal is to accelerate deployment of an advanced capability that will enable subscribers in all parts of the United States to send and receive information in all its forms--voice, data, graphics, and video--over a high-speed switched, interactive, broadband, transmission capability.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A. Section 706 of the 1996 Act Provides Authority for the Open Internet Rules As noted, Section 706 of the 1996 Act directs the Commission (along with state commissions) to take actions that encourage the deployment of ``advanced telecommunications capability.'' ``[A]dvanced telecommunications capability,'' as defined in the statute, includes broadband Internet access.\125\ [[Page 59215]] Under Section 706(a), the Commission must encourage the deployment of such capability by ``utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity,'' various tools including ``measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.'' For the reasons stated in Parts II.A, II.D and III.B, above, our open Internet rules will have precisely that effect. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \125\ 47 U.S.C. 1302(d)(1) (defining ``advanced telecommunications capability'' as ``high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology''). See National Broadband Plan for our Future, Notice of Inquiry, 24 FCC Rcd 4342, 4309, App. para. 13 (2009) (``advanced telecommunications capability'' includes broadband Internet access); Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 14 FCC Rcd 2398, 2400, para. 1 (Section 706 addresses ``the deployment of broadband capability''), 2406 para. 20 (same). Even when broadband Internet access is provided as an ``information service'' rather than a ``telecommunications service,'' see Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977-78 (2005), it involves ``telecommunications.'' 47 U.S.C. 153(24). Given Section 706's explicit focus on deployment of broadband access to voice, data, and video communications, it is not important that the statute does not use the exact phrase ``Internet network management.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In Comcast, the DC Circuit identified Section 706(a) as a provision that ``at least arguably * * * delegate[s] regulatory authority to the Commission,'' and in fact ``contain[s] a direct mandate--the Commission `shall encourage.' '' \126\ The court, however, regarded the Commission as ``bound by'' a prior order that, in the court of appeals' understanding, had held that Section 706(a) is not a grant of authority. In the Advanced Services Order, to which the court referred, the Commission held that Section 706(a) did not permit it to encourage advanced services deployment through the mechanism of forbearance without complying with the specific requirements for forbearance set forth in Section 10 of the Communications Act. The issue presented in the 1998 proceeding was whether the Commission could rely on the broad terms of Section 706(a) to trump those specific requirements. In the Advanced Services Order, the Commission ruled that it could not do so, noting that it would be ``unreasonable'' to conclude that Congress intended Section 706(a) to ``allow the Commission to eviscerate [specified] forbearance exclusions after having expressly singled out [those exclusions] for different treatment in Section 10.'' The Commission accordingly concluded that Section 706(a) did not give it independent authority--in other words, authority over and above what it otherwise possessed \127\--to forbear from applying other provisions of the Act. The Commission's holding thus honored the interpretive canon that ``[a] specific provision * * * controls one[ ] of more general application.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \126\ See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658; see also 47 U.S.C. 1302(a) (``The Commission * * * shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans * * * by utilizing * * * price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.''). Because Section 706 contains a ``direct mandate,'' we reject the argument pressed by some commenters (see, e.g., AT&T Comments at 217-18; Verizon Comments at 100-01; Qwest Comments at 58-59; Letter from Rick Chessen, Senior Vice President, Law and Regulatory Policy, NCTA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket Nos. 09-191 & 10-127, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 7 (filed Dec. 10, 2010) (NCTA Dec. 10, 2010 Ex Parte Letter)) that Section 706 confers no substantive authority. \127\ Consistent with longstanding Supreme Court precedent, we have understood this authority to include our ancillary jurisdiction to further congressional policy. See, e.g., Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d 384, 474 (1980), aff'd, Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 211-14 (DC Cir. 1982) (CCIA). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While disavowing a reading of Section 706(a) that would allow the agency to trump specific mandates of the Communications Act, the Commission nonetheless affirmed in the Advanced Services Order that Section 706(a) ``gives this Commission an affirmative obligation to encourage the deployment of advanced services'' using its existing rulemaking, forbearance and adjudicatory powers, and stressed that ``this obligation has substance.'' The Advanced Services Order is, therefore, consistent with our present understanding that Section 706(a) authorizes the Commission (along with state commissions) to take actions, within their subject matter jurisdiction and not inconsistent with other provisions of law, that encourage the deployment of advanced telecommunications capability by any of the means listed in the provision.\128\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \128\ To the extent the Advanced Services Order can be construed as having read Section 706(a) differently, we reject that reading of the statute for the reasons discussed in the text. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In directing the Commission to ``encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans * * * by utilizing * * * price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment,'' Congress necessarily invested the Commission with the statutory authority to carry out those acts. Indeed, the relevant Senate Report explained that the provisions of Section 706 are ``intended to ensure that one of the primary objectives of the [1996 Act]--to accelerate deployment of advanced telecommunications capability--is achieved,'' and stressed that these provisions are ``a necessary fail-safe'' to guarantee that Congress's objective is reached. It would be odd indeed to characterize Section 706(a) as a ``fail-safe'' that ``ensures'' the Commission's ability to promote advanced services if it conferred no actual authority. Here, under our reading, Section 706(a) authorizes the Commission to address practices, such as blocking VoIP communications, degrading or raising the cost of online video, or denying end users material information about their broadband service, that have the potential to stifle overall investment in Internet infrastructure and limit competition in telecommunications markets. This reading of Section 706(a) obviates the concern of some commenters that our jurisdiction under the provision could be ``limitless'' or ``unbounded.'' To the contrary, our Section 706(a) authority is limited in three critical respects. First, our mandate under Section 706(a) must be read consistently with Sections 1 and 2 of the Act, which define the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction over ``interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio.'' \129\ As a result, our authority under Section 706(a) does not, in our view, extend beyond our subject matter jurisdiction under the Communications Act. Second, the Commission's actions [[Page 59216]] under Section 706(a) must ``encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.'' Third, the activity undertaken to encourage such deployment must ``utilize[e], in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity,'' one (or more) of various specified methods. These include: ``price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.'' Actions that do not fall within those categories are not authorized by Section 706(a). Thus, as the DC Circuit has noted, while the statutory authority granted by Section 706(a) is broad, it is ``not unfettered.'' \130\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \129\ 47 U.S.C. 151, 152. The Commission historically has recognized that services carrying Internet traffic are jurisdictionally mixed, but generally subject to Federal regulation. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs Petition for Clarification or Declaratory Ruling that No FCC Order or Rule Limits State Authority to Collect Broadband Data, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25 FCC Rcd 5051, 5054, paras. 8-9 & n. 24 (2010). Where, as here, ``it is not possible to separate the interstate and intrastate aspects of the service,'' the Commission may preempt state regulation where ``Federal regulation is necessary to further a valid Federal regulatory objective, i.e., state regulation would conflict with Federal regulatory policies.'' Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570, 578 (8th Cir. 2007); see also La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375 n. 4 (1986). Except to the extent a state requirement conflicts on its face with a Commission decision herein, the Commission will evaluate preemption in light of the fact-specific nature of the relevant inquiry, on a case-by-case basis. We recognize, for example, that states play a vital role in protecting end users from fraud, enforcing fair business practices, and responding to consumer inquiries and complaints. See, e.g., Vonage Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 22404-05, para. 1. We have no intention of impairing states' or local governments' ability to carry out these duties unless we find that specific measures conflict with Federal law or policy. In determining whether state or local regulations frustrate Federal policies, we will, among other things, be guided by the overarching congressional policies described in Section 230 of the Act and Section 706 of the 1996 Act. 47 U.S.C. 230, 1302. \130\ Ad Hoc Telecomms. Users Comm., 572 F.3d at 906-07 (``The general and generous phrasing of sec. 706 means that the FCC possesses significant albeit not unfettered, authority and discretion to settle on the best regulatory or deregulatory approach to broadband.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 706(a) accordingly provides the Commission a specific delegation of legislative authority to promote the deployment of advanced services, including by means of the open Internet rules adopted in this Order. Our understanding of Section 706(a) is, moreover, harmonious with other statutory provisions that confer a broad mandate on the Commission. Section 706(a)'s directive to ``encourage the deployment [of advanced telecommunications capability] on a reasonable and timely basis'' using the methods specified in the statute is, for example, no broader than other provisions of the Commission's authorizing statutes that command the agency to ensure ``just'' and ``reasonable'' rates and practices, or to regulate services in the ``public interest.'' Indeed, our authority under Section 706(a) is generally consistent with--albeit narrower than--the understanding of ancillary jurisdiction under which this Commission operated for decades before the Comcast decision.\131\ The similarities between the two in fact explain why the Commission has not heretofore had occasion to describe Section 706(a) in this way: In the particular proceedings prior to Comcast, setting out the understanding of Section 706(a) that we articulate in this Order would not meaningfully have increased the authority that we understood the Commission already to possess.\132\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \131\ In Comcast, the court stated that `` `[t]he Commission * * * may exercise ancillary jurisdiction only when two conditions are satisfied: (1) The Commission's general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission's effective performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.' '' 600 F.3d at 646 (quoting Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691-92 (DC Cir. 2005)) (alterations in original). The court further ruled that the second prong of this test requires the Commission to rely on specific delegations of statutory authority. 600 F.3d at 644, 654. \132\ Ignoring that Section 706(a) expressly contemplates the use of ``regulating methods'' such as price regulation, some commenters read prior Commission orders as suggesting that Section 706 authorizes only deregulatory actions. See AT&T Comments at 216 (citing Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com's Free World Dialup is Neither Telecomm. Nor A Telecomms. Serv., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 3307, 3319, para. 19 n. 69 (2004) (Pulver Order)); Esbin Comments at 52 (citing Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities et al., Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd 4798, 4801, 4826, 4840, paras. 4, 47, 73, (2002) (Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling) and Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities et al., Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 14853, 14894 para. 77 (2005) (Wireline Broadband Report and Order)). They are mistaken. The Pulver Order stated only that Section 706 did not contemplate the application of ``economic and entry/exit regulation inherent in Title II'' to information service Internet applications. Pulver Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 3379, para. 19 n. 69 (emphasis added). The open Internet rules that we adopt in this Order do not regulate Internet applications, much less impose Title II (i.e., common carrier) regulation on such applications. Moreover, at the same time the Commission determined in the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and the Wireline Broadband Report and Order that cable modem service and wireline broadband services (such as DSL) could be provided as information services not subject to Title II, it proposed new regulations under other sources of authority including Section 706. See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, 17 FCC Rcd at 4840, para. 73; Wireline Broadband Report and Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 14929-30, 14987, para. 146. On the same day the Commission adopted the Wireline Broadband Report and Order, it also adopted the Internet Policy Statement, which rested in part on Section 706. 20 FCC Rcd 14986, para. 2 (2005). Our prior orders therefore do not construe Section 706 as exclusively deregulatory. And to the extent that any prior order does suggest such a construction, we now reject it. See Ad Hoc Telecomms. Users Comm., 572 F.3d at 908 (Section 706 ``direct[s] the FCC to make the major policy decisions and to select the mix of regulatory and deregulatory tools the Commission deems most appropriate in the public interest to facilitate broadband deployment and competition'') (emphasis added). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 706(b) of the 1996 Act provides additional authority to take actions such as enforcing open Internet principles. It directs the Commission to undertake annual inquiries concerning the availability of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans and requires that, if the Commission finds that such capability is not being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion, it ``shall take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market.'' In July 2010, the Commission ``conclude[d] that broadband deployment to all Americans is not reasonable and timely'' and noted that ``[a]s a consequence of that conclusion,'' Section 706(b) was triggered. Section 706(b) therefore provides express authority for the pro-investment, pro-competition rules we adopt in this Order. B. Authority To Promote Competition and Investment in, and Protect End Users of, Voice, Video, and Audio Services The Commission also has authority under the Communications Act to adopt the open Internet rules in order to promote competition and investment in voice, video, and audio services. Furthermore, for the reasons stated in Part II, above, even if statutory provisions related to voice, video, and audio communications were the only sources of authority for the open Internet rules (which is not the case), it would not be sound policy to attempt to implement rules concerning only voice, video, or audio transmissions over the Internet.\133\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \133\ Many broadband providers offer their service on a common carriage basis under Title II of the Act. See Framework for Broadband Internet Serv., Notice of Inquiry, 25 FCC Rcd 7866, 7875, para. 21 (2010). With respect to these providers, the rules we adopt in this Order are additionally supported on that basis. With the possible exception of transparency requirements, however, the open Internet rules are unlikely to create substantial new duties for these providers in practice. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. The Commission Has Authority To Adopt Open Internet Rules To Further Its Responsibilities Under Title II of the Act Section 201 of the Act delegates to the Commission ``express and expansive authority'' to ensure that the ``charges [and] practices * * * in connection with'' telecommunications services are ``just and reasonable.'' As described in Part II.B, interconnected VoIP services, which include some over-the-top VoIP services, ``are increasingly being used as a substitute for traditional telephone service.''\134\ Over- the-top services therefore do, or will, contribute to the marketplace discipline of voice telecommunications services regulated under Section 201.\135\ Furthermore, [[Page 59217]] companies that provide both voice communications and broadband Internet access services (for example, telephone companies that are broadband providers) have the incentive and ability to block, degrade, or otherwise disadvantage the services of their online voice competitors. Because the Commission may enlist market forces to fulfill its Section 201 responsibilities, we possess authority to prevent these anticompetitive practices through open Internet rules.\136\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \134\ Tel. No. Requirements for IP-Enabled Servs. Providers, Report and Order, Declaratory Ruling, Order on Remand, and NPRM, 22 FCC Rcd 19531, 19547, para. 28 (2007). By definition, interconnected VoIP services allow calls to and from traditional phone networks. \135\ See NCTA Dec. 10, 2010 Ex Parte Letter (arguing that the Commission could exercise authority ancillary to several provisions of Title II of the Act, including Sections 201 and 202, ``to ensure that common carrier services continue to be offered on just and reasonable terms and conditions'' and to ``facilitate consumer access to broadband-based alternatives to common carrier services such as Voice over Internet Protocol''); Vonage Comments at 11-12 (``The Commission's proposed regulations would help preserve the competitive balance between providers electing to operate under Title II and those operating under Title I.''); Google Comments at 45-46 (``The widespread use of VoIP and related services as cheaper and more feature-rich alternatives to Title II services has significant effects on traditional telephone providers' practices and pricing, as well [as] on network interconnection between Title II and IP networks that consumers use to reach each other, going to the heart of the Commission's Title II responsibilities.'') (footnotes and citations omitted); Letter from Devendra T. Kumar, Counsel to Skype Communications S.A.R.L., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 (filed Nov. 30, 2010) (arguing that the Commission has authority ancillary to Section 201 to protect international VoIP calling); XO Comments at 20 (noting the impact of, inter alia, VoIP on the Commission's ``traditional framework'' for regulating voice services under Title II); Letter from Alan Inouye et al., on behalf of ALA, ARL and EDUCAUSE, to Chairman Julius Genachowski et al., GN Docket No. 09- 191, WC Docket No. 07-52 at 4-5 (filed Dec. 13, 2010) (citing examples of how libraries and higher education institutions are using broadband services, including VoIP, to replace traditional common carrier services). In previous orders, the Commission has embraced the use of VoIP to avoid or constrain high international calling rates. See Universal Serv. Contribution Methodology et al., Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 FCC Rcd 7518, 7546, para. 55 & n.187 (2006) (``[I]nterconnected VoIP service is often marketed as an economical way to make interstate and international calls, as a lower-cost substitute for wireline toll service.''), rev'd in part sub nom. Vonage Holdings Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232 (DC Cir. 2007); Reporting Requirements for U.S. Providers of Int'l Telecomms. Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd 6460, 6470, para. 22 (2004) (``Improvements in the packet-switched transmission technology underlying the Internet now allow providers of VoIP to offer international voice transmission of reasonable quality at a price lower than current IMTS rates.'') (footnote omitted); Int'l Settlements Policy Reform, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd 19954, 19964, para. 13 (2002) (``This ability to engage in least-cost routing, as well as alternative, non-traditional services such as IP Telephony or Voice- Over-IP, in conjunction with the benchmarks policy have created a market dynamic that is pressuring international settlement rates downward.''). In addition, NCTA has explained that, ``[b]y enabling consumers to make informed choices regarding broadband Internet access service,'' the Commission could conclude that transparency requirements ``would help promote the competitiveness of VoIP and other broadband-based communications services'' and ``thereby facilitate the operation of market forces to discipline the charges and other practices of common carriers, in fulfillment of the Commission's obligations under Sections 201 and 202'' of the Act. NCTA Dec. 10, 2010 Ex Parte Letter at 2-3. \136\ We reject the argument asserted by some commenters (see, e.g., AT&T Comments at 218-19; Verizon Comments at 98-99) that the various grants of rulemaking authority in the Act, including the express grant of rulemaking authority in Section 201(b) itself, do not authorize the promulgation of rules pursuant to Section 201(b). See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 (1999) (``We think that the grant in sec. 201(b) means what it says: The FCC has rulemaking authority to carry out the `provisions of this Act.' ''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 251(a)(1) of the Act imposes a duty on all telecommunications carriers ``to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities of other telecommunications carriers.'' Many over- the-top VoIP services allow end users to receive calls from and/or place calls to traditional phone networks operated by telecommunications carriers. The Commission has not determined whether any such VoIP providers are telecommunications carriers. To the extent that VoIP services are information services (rather than telecommunications services), any blocking or degrading of a call from a traditional telephone customer to a customer of a VoIP provider, or vice-versa, would deny the traditional telephone customer the intended benefits of telecommunications interconnection under Section 251(a)(1). Over-the-top VoIP customers account for a growing share of telephone usage. If calls to and from these VoIP customers were not delivered efficiently and reliably by broadband providers, all users of the public switched telephone network would be limited in their ability to communicate, and Congress's goal of ``efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide'' communications across interconnected networks would be frustrated. To the extent that VoIP services are telecommunications services, a broadband provider's interference with traffic exchanged between a provider of VoIP telecommunications services and another telecommunications carrier would interfere with interconnection between two telecommunications carriers under Section 251(a)(1).\137\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \137\ See also 47 U.S.C. 256(b)(1) (directing the Commission to ``establish procedures for * * * oversight of coordinated network planning by telecommunications carriers and other providers of telecommunications service for the effective and efficient interconnection of public telecommunications networks used to provide telecommunications service''); Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659 (acknowledging Section 256's objective, while adding that Section 256 does not `` `expand[ ] * * * any authority that the Commission' otherwise has under law'') (quoting 47 U.S.C. 256(c)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. The Commission Has Authority To Adopt Open Internet Rules To Further Its Responsibilities Under Titles III and VI of the Act ``The Commission has been charged with broad responsibilities for the orderly development of an appropriate system of local television broadcasting,'' \138\ which arise from the Commission's more general public interest obligation to ``ensure the larger and more effective use of radio.'' \139\ Similarly, the Commission has broad jurisdiction to oversee MVPD services, including direct-broadcast satellite (DBS).\140\ Consistent with these mandates, our jurisdiction over video and audio services under Titles III and VI of the Communications Act provides additional authority for open Internet rules. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \138\ See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968); see also id. at 174 (``[T]hese obligations require for their satisfaction the creation of a system of local broadcasting stations, such that `all communities of appreciable size (will) have at least one television station as an outlet for local self- expression.' ''); 47 U.S.C. 307(b) (Commission shall ``make such distribution of licenses, * * * among the several States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each of the same''), 303(f) & (h) (authorizing the Commission to allocate broadcasting zones or areas and to promulgate regulations ``as it may deem necessary'' to prevent interference among stations) (cited in Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 173-74). \139\ Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 216 (public interest to be served is the ``larger and more effective use of radio'') (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). \140\ See 47 U.S.C. 303(v); see also N.Y. State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804, 807-12 (DC Cir. 1984) (upholding the Commission's exercise of ancillary authority over satellite master antenna television service); 47 U.S.C. 548 (discussed below). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- First, such rules are necessary to the effective performance of our Title III responsibilities to ensure the ``orderly development * * * of local television broadcasting'' \141\ and the ``more effective use of radio.'' \142\ As discussed in Parts II.A and II.B, Internet video distribution is increasingly important to all video programming services, including local television broadcast service. Radio stations also are providing audio and video content on the Internet. At the same time, [[Page 59218]] broadband providers--many of which are also MVPDs--have the incentive and ability to engage in self-interested practices that may include blocking or degrading the quality of online programming content, including broadcast content, or charging unreasonable additional fees for faster delivery of such content. Absent the rules we adopt in this Order, such practices jeopardize broadcasters' ability to offer news (including local news) and other programming over the Internet, and, in turn, threaten to impair their ability to offer high-quality broadcast content.\143\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \141\ Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 177; see 47 U.S.C. 303(f) & (h) (establishing Commission's authority to allocate broadcasting zones or areas and to promulgate regulations ``as it may deem necessary'' to prevent interference among stations) (cited in Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 173-74). \142\ Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 216; see also 47 U.S.C. 303(g) (establishing Commission's duty to ``generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest''), 307(b) (``[T]he Commission shall make such distribution of licenses * * * among the several States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each of the same.''). \143\ NCTA has noted that ``[t]he Commission could decide that, based on the growing importance of broadcast programming distributed over broadband networks to both television viewers and the business of broadcasting itself, ensuring that broadcast video content made available over broadband networks is not subject to unreasonable discrimination or anticompetitive treatment is necessary to preserve and strengthen the system of local broadcasting.'' NCTA Dec. 10, 2010 Ex Parte Letter at 3; see also id. (``Facilitating the availability of broadcast content on the Internet may also help to foster more efficient and intensive use of spectrum, thereby supporting the Commission's duty in Section 303(g) to `generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.' '') (quoting 47 U.S.C. 303(g)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Commission likewise has authority under Title VI of the Act to adopt open Internet rules that protect competition in the provision of MVPD services. A cable or telephone company's interference with the online transmission of programming by DBS operators or stand-alone online video programming aggregators that may function as competitive alternatives to traditional MVPDs \144\ would frustrate Congress's stated goals in enacting Section 628 of the Act, which include promoting ``competition and diversity in the multichannel video programming market''; ``increase[ing] the availability of satellite cable programming and satellite broadcast programming to persons in rural and other areas not currently able to receive such programming''; and ``spur[ring] the development of communications technologies.'' \145\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \144\ The issue whether online-only video programming aggregators are themselves MVPDs under the Communications Act and our regulations has been raised in pending program access complaint proceedings. See, e.g., VDC Corp. v. Turner Network Sales, Inc., Program Access Complaint (Jan. 18, 2007); Sky Angel U.S., LLC v. Discovery Commc'ns LLC, Program Access Complaint (Mar. 24, 2010). Nothing in this Order should be read to state or imply any determination on this issue. \145\ 47 U.S.C. sec. 548(a). The Act defines ``video programming'' as ``programming provided by, or generally considered comparable to programming provided by, a television broadcast station.'' 47 U.S.C. sec. 522(20). Although the Commission stated nearly a decade ago that video `` `streamed' over the Internet'' had ``not yet achieved television quality'' and therefore did not constitute ``video programming'' at that time, see Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, 17 FCC Rcd at 4834, para. 63 n.236, intervening improvements in streaming technology and broadband availability enable such programming to be ``comparable to programming provided by * * * a television broadcast station,'' 47 U.S.C. sec. 522(20). This finding is consistent with our prediction more than five years ago that ``[a]s video compression technology improves, data transfer rates increase, and media adapters that link TV to a broadband connection become more widely used, * * * video over the Internet will proliferate and improve in quality.'' Ann. Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery of Video Programming, Notice of Inquiry, 19 FCC Rcd 10909, 10932, para. 74 (2004) (citation omitted). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When Congress enacted Section 628 in 1992, it was specifically concerned about the incentive and ability of cable operators to use their control of video programming to impede competition from the then- nascent DBS industry.\146\ Since that time, the Internet has opened a new competitive arena in which MVPDs that offer broadband service have the opportunity and incentive to impede DBS providers and other competing MVPDs--and the statute reaches this analogous arena as well. Section 628(b) prohibits cable operators from engaging in ``unfair or deceptive acts or practices the purpose or effect of which is to prevent or hinder significantly the ability of an MVPD to deliver satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to consumers.'' An ``unfair method of competition or unfair act or practice'' under Section 628(b) includes acts that can be anticompetitive.\147\ Thus, Section 628(b) proscribes practices by cable operators that (i) can impede competition, and (ii) have the purpose or effect of preventing or significantly hindering other MVPDs from providing consumers their satellite-delivered programming (i.e., programming transmitted to MVPDs via satellite for retransmission to subscribers).\148\ Section 628(c)(1), in turn, directs the Commission to adopt rules proscribing unfair practices by cable operators and their affiliated satellite cable programming vendors. Section 628(j) provides that telephone companies offering video programming services are subject to the same rules as cable operators. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \146\ See Cable Act of 1992, Public Law 102-385, sec. 2(a)(5), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (``Vertically integrated program suppliers * * * have the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated cable operators over nonaffiliated cable operators and programming distributors using other technologies.''); H.R. Rep. No. 102-862, at 93 (1992) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1231, 1275 (``In adopting rules under this section, the conferees expect the Commission to address and resolve the problems of unreasonable cable industry practices, including restricting the availability of programming and charging discriminatory prices to non-cable technologies.''); S. Rep. No. 102-92, at 26 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1159 (``[C]able programmers may simply refuse to sell to potential competitors. Small cable operators, satellite dish owners, and wireless cable operators complain that they are denied access to, or charged more for, programming than large, vertically integrated cable operators.''). \147\ Review of the Commission's Program Access Rules and Examination of Programming Tying Arrangements, First Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd 746, 779, para. 48 & n. 190 (2010) (citing Exclusive Contracts for Provision of Video Serv. in Multiple Dwelling Units and Other Real Estate Devs., Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd 20235, 20255, para. 43, aff'd, NCTA, 567 F.3d 659); see also NTCA, 567 F.3d at 664-65 (referring to ``unfair dealing'' and ``anticompetitive practices''). \148\ See 47 U.S.C. 548(b); NCTA, 567 F.3d at 664. In NCTA, the court held that the Commission reasonably concluded that the ``broad and sweeping terms'' of Section 628(b) authorized it to ban exclusive agreements between cable operators and building owners that prevented other MVPDs from providing their programming to residents of those buildings. The court observed that ``the words Congress chose [in Section 628(b)] focus not on practices that prevent MVPDs from obtaining satellite cable or satellite broadcast programming, but on practices that prevent them from `providing' that programming `to subscribers or consumers.' '' NCTA, 567 F.3d at 664 (emphasis in original). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The open Internet rules directly further our mandate under Section 628. Cable operators, telephone companies, and DBS operators alike are seeking to keep and win customers by expanding their MVPD offerings to include online access to their programming.\149\ For example, in providing its MVPD service, DISH (one of the nation's two DBS providers) relies significantly on online dissemination of programming, including video-on-demand and other programming, that competes with similar offerings by cable operators.\150\ [[Page 59219]] As DISH explains, ``[a]s more and more video consumption moves online, the competitive viability of stand-alone MVPDs depends on their ability to offer an online video experience of the same quality as the online video offerings of integrated broadband providers.'' The open Internet rules will prevent practices by cable operators and telephone companies, in their role as broadband providers, that have the purpose or effect of significantly hindering (or altogether preventing) delivery of video programming protected under Section 628(b).\151\ The Commission therefore is authorized to adopt open Internet rules under Section 628(b), (c)(1), and (j).\152\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \149\ DISH Reply at 4-5 (``Pay-TV services continue to evolve at a rapid pace and providers increasingly are integrating their vast offerings of linear channels with online content,'' while ``consumers are adopting online video services as a complement to traditional, linear pay-TV services'' and ``specifically desire Internet video as a complement to * * * [MVPDs'] traditional TV offerings.'') (footnotes and citations omitted). We find unpersuasive the contention that this Order fails to ``grapple with the implications of the market forces that are driving MVPDs * * * to add Internet connectivity to their multichannel video offerings.'' McDowell Statement at *24 (footnote omitted). Our analysis takes account of these developments, which are discussed at length in Part II.A, above. \150\ Id. at 5-8 & n. 20 (discussing ``DishOnline service,'' which ``allows DISH to offer over 3,000 movies and TV shows through its `DishOnline' Internet video service,'' and noting that ``the success of DishOnline is critically dependent on broadband access provided and controlled by DISH's competitors in the MVPD market''); DISH PN Comments at 2-3; DISH Network, Watch Live TV Online OR Recorded Programs with DishOnline, http://www.dish-systems.com/products/dish_online.php (`` `DISHOnline.com integrates DISH Network's expansive TV programming lineup with the vast amount of online video content, adding another dimension to our `pay once, take your TV everywhere' product platform.' ''). Much of the regular subscription programming that DISH offers online is satellite- delivered programming. See DISH Network, Watch Live TV Online OR Recorded Programs with DishOnline, http://www.dish-systems.com/products/dish_online.php (noting that customers can watch content from cable programmers such as the Discovery Channel and MTV). Thus, we reject NCTA's argument that ``[t]here is no basis for asserting that any cable operator or common carrier's practices with respect to Internet-delivered video could * * * `prevent or significantly hinder' an MVPD from providing satellite cable programming.'' NCTA Dec. 10, 2010 Ex Parte Letter at 5. \151\ Notwithstanding suggestions to the contrary, the Commission is not required to wait until anticompetitive harms are realized before acting. Rather, the Commission may exercise its ancillary jurisdiction to ``plan in advance of foreseeable events, instead of waiting to react to them.'' Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 176-77 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Star Wireless, LLC v. FCC, 522 F.3d at 475. \152\ See Open Internet NRPM, 24 FCC Rcd at 13099, para. 85 (discussing role of the Internet in fostering video programming competition and the Commission's authority to regulate video services). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Similarly, open Internet rules enable us to carry out our responsibilities under Section 616(a) of the Act, which confers additional express statutory authority to combat discriminatory network management practices by broadband providers. Section 616(a) directs the Commission to adopt regulations governing program carriage agreements ``and related practices'' between cable operators or other MVPDs and video programming vendors.\153\ The program carriage regulations must include provisions that prevent MVPDs from ``unreasonably restrain[ing] the ability of an unaffiliated video programming vendor to compete fairly by discriminating in video programming distribution,'' on the basis of a vendor's affiliation or lack of affiliation with the MVPD, in the selection, terms, or conditions of carriage of the vendor's programming.\154\ MVPD practices that discriminatorily impede competing video programming vendors' online delivery of programming to consumers affect the vendors' ability to ``compete fairly'' for viewers, just as surely as MVPDs' discriminatory selection of video programming for carriage on cable systems has this effect. We find that discriminatory practices by MVPDs in their capacity as broadband providers, such as blocking or charging fees for termination of online video programming to end users, are ``related'' to program carriage agreements and within our mandate to adopt regulations under Section 616(a).\155\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \153\ An MVPD is ``a person such as, but not limited to, a cable operator, a multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct broadcast satellite service, or a television receive-only satellite program distributor, who makes available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video programming.'' 47 U.S.C. 522(13). A ``video programming vendor'' is any ``person engaged in the production, creation, or wholesale distribution of video programming for sale.'' 47 U.S.C. 536(b). A number of video programming vendors make their programming available online. See, e.g., Hulu.com, http://www.hulu.com/about; Biography Channel, http://www.biography.com; Hallmark Channel, http://www.hallmarkchannel.com. \154\ 47 U.S.C. 536(a)(1)-(3); see also 47 CFR 76.1301 (implementing regulations to address practices specified in Section 616(a)(1)-(3)). \155\ The Act does not define ``related practices'' as that phrase is used in Section 616(a). Because the term is neither explicitly defined in the statute nor susceptible of only one meaning, we construe it, consistent with dictionary definitions, to cover practices that are ``akin'' or ``connected'' to those specifically identified in Section 616(a)(1)-(3). See Black's Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979); Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1916 (1993). The argument that Section 616(a) has no application to Internet access service overlooks that the statute expressly covers these ``related practices.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. Authority To Protect the Public Interest Through Spectrum Licensing Open Internet rules for wireless services are further supported by our authority, under Title III of the Communications Act, to protect the public interest through spectrum licensing. Congress has entrusted the Commission with ``maintain[ing] the control of the United States over all the channels of radio transmission.'' Licensees hold Commission-granted authorizations to use that spectrum subject to conditions the Commission imposes on that use.\156\ In considering whether to grant a license to use spectrum, therefore, the Commission must ``determine * * * whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the granting of such application.'' \157\ Likewise, when identifying classes of licenses to be awarded by auction and the characteristics of those licenses, the Commission ``shall include safeguards to protect the public interest'' and must seek to promote a number of goals, including ``the development and rapid deployment of new technologies, products, and services.'' Even after licenses are awarded, the Commission may change the license terms ``if in the judgment of the Commission such action will promote the public interest, convenience, and necessity.'' The Commission may exercise this authority on a license-by-license basis or through a rulemaking, even if the affected licenses were awarded at auction. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \156\ 47 U.S.C. 304, 316(a)(1). We thus disagree with commenters who suggest in general that there is nothing in Title III to support the imposition of open Internet rules. See, e.g., EFF Comments at 6 n. 13. \157\ 47 U.S.C. 309(a); see also 47 U.S.C. 307(a) (``The Commission, if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby, subject to the limitations of this [Act], shall grant to any applicant therefor a station license provided for by this [Act].''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Commission previously has required wireless licensees to comply with open Internet principles, as appropriate in the particular situation before it. In 2007, when it modified the service rules for the 700 MHz band, the Commission took ``a measured step to encourage additional innovation and consumer choice at this critical stage in the evolution of wireless broadband services.'' Specifically, the Commission required C block licensees ``to allow customers, device manufacturers, third-party application developers, and others to use or develop the devices and applications of their choosing in C Block networks, so long as they meet all applicable regulatory requirements and comply with reasonable conditions related to management of the wireless network (i.e., do not cause harm to the network).'' The open Internet conditions we adopt in this Order likewise are necessary to advance the public interest in innovation and investment.\158\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \158\ In addition, the use of mobile VoIP applications is likely to constrain prices for CMRS voice services, similar to what we described earlier with regard to VoIP and traditional phone services. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- AT&T contends that the Commission cannot apply ``neutrality'' regulations to wireless broadband services outside the upper 700 MHz C Block spectrum because any such regulations ``would unlawfully rescind critical rulings in the Commission's 700 MHz Second Report and Order on which providers relied in making multi-billion dollar investments,'' \159\ and that adopting these regulations more broadly to all mobile providers would violate the Administrative Procedure Act. We disagree. As explained above, the Commission retains the statutory authority to impose new requirements on existing licenses beyond those that were in place at the time of grant, whether the licenses were assigned by [[Page 59220]] auction or by other means.\160\ In this case, parties were made well aware that the agency might extend openness requirements beyond the C Block, diminishing any reliance interest they might assert.\161\ To the extent that AT&T argues that application of openness principles reduced auction bids on the C Block spectrum, we find that the reasons for the price differences between the C Block and other 700 MHz spectrum blocks are far more complex. A number of factors, including unique auction dynamics and significant differences between the C Block spectrum and other blocks of 700 MHz spectrum contributed to these price differences. In balancing the public interest factors we are required to consider, we have determined that adopting a targeted set of rules that apply to all mobile broadband providers is necessary at this time. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \159\ AT&T PN Reply at 32. AT&T asserts that winners of non-C- Block licenses paid a premium for licenses not subject to the open platform requirements that applied to the upper 700 MHz C Block licenses. Id. at 33-34. \160\ The Commission may act by rulemaking to modify or impose rules applicable to all licensees or licensees in a particular class; in order to modify specific licenses held by particular licensees, however, the Commission generally is required to follow the modification procedure set forth in 47 U.S.C. 316. See Comm. for Effective Cellular Rules v. FCC, 53 F.3d 1309, 1319-20 (DC Cir. 1995). \161\ See generally 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 15358-65. In the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, the Commission stated that its decision to limit open-platform requirements to the C Block was based on the record before it ``at this time,'' id. at 15361, and noted that openness issues in the wireless industry were being considered more broadly in other proceedings. Id. at 15363. The public notice setting procedures for the 2008 auction advised bidders that the rules governing auctioned licenses would be subject to ``pending and future proceedings'' before the Commission. See Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for January 24, 2008, Public Notice, 22 FCC Rcd 18141, 18156, para. 42 (2007). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. Authority To Collect Information To Enable the Commission To Perform Its Reporting Obligations to Congress Additional sections of the Communications Act provide authority for our transparency requirement in particular. Section 4(k) provides for an annual report to Congress that ``shall contain * * * such information and data collected by the Commission as may be considered of value in the determination of questions connected with the regulation of interstate * * * wire and radio communication'' and provide ``recommendations to Congress as to additional legislation which the Commission deems necessary or desirable.'' \162\ The Commission has previously relied on Section 4(k), among other provisions, as a basis for its authority to gather information.\163\ The Comcast court, moreover, ``readily accept[ed]'' that ``certain assertions of Commission authority could be `reasonably ancillary' to the Commission's statutory responsibility to issue a report to Congress. For example, the Commission might impose disclosure requirements on regulated entities in order to gather data needed for such a report.'' \164\ We adopt such disclosure requirements here. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \162\ 47 U.S.C. 154(k). In a similar vein, Section 257 of the Act directs the Commission to report to Congress every three years on ``market entry barriers'' that the Commission recommends be eliminated, including ``barriers for entrepreneurs and other small businesses in the provision and ownership of telecommunications services and information services.'' 47 U.S.C. 257(a) & (c); see also Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659; NCTA Dec. 10, 2010 Ex Parte Letter at 3 (``[S]ection 257's reporting mandate provides a basis for the Commission to require providers of broadband Internet access service to disclose the terms and conditions of service in order to assess whether such terms hamper small business entry and, if so, whether any legislation may be required to address the problem.'') (footnote omitted). \163\ See, e.g., New Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to Commc'ns, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd 16830, 16837, paras. 1, 12 (2004) (extending Commission's reporting requirements for communications disruptions to certain providers of non-wireline communications, in part based on Section 4(k)); DTV Consumer Educ. Initiative, Report & Order, 23 FCC Rcd 4134, 4147, paras. 1, 2, 28 (2008) (requiring various entities, including broadcasters, to submit quarterly reports to the Commission detailing their consumer education efforts related to the DTV transition, in part based on section 4(k)); Review of the Commission's Broad. Cable and Equal Emp't Opportunity Rules and Policies, Second Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd 24018, 24077, paras. 5, 195 (2002) (promulgating recordkeeping and reporting requirements for broadcast licensees and other regulated entities to show compliance with equal opportunities hiring rules, in part based on section 4(k)). \164\ 600 F.3d at 659. All, or nearly all, providers of broadband Internet access service are regulated by the Commission insofar as they operate under certificates to provide common carriage service, or under licenses to use radio spectrum. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, the Commission has broad authority under Section 218 of the Act to obtain ``full and complete information'' from common carriers and their affiliates. To the extent broadband providers are affiliated with communications common carriers, Section 218 allows the Commission to require the provision of information such as that covered by the transparency rule we adopt in this Order.\165\ We believe that these disclosure requirements will assist us in carrying out our reporting obligations to Congress. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \165\ Cf. US West, Inc. v. FCC, 778 F.2d 23, 26-27 (DC Cir. 1985) (acknowledging Commission's authority under Section 218 to impose reporting requirements on holding companies that owned local telephone companies). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- E. Constitutional Issues Some commenters contend that open Internet rules violate the First Amendment and amount to an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. We examine these constitutional arguments below, and find them unfounded. 1. First Amendment Several broadband providers argue that open Internet rules are inconsistent with the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment. These commenters generally contend that because broadband providers distribute their own and third-party content to customers, they are speakers entitled to First Amendment protections. Therefore, they argue, rules that prevent broadband providers from favoring the transmission of some content over other content violate their free speech rights. Other commenters contend that none of the proposed rules implicate the First Amendment, because providing broadband service is conduct that is not correctly understood as speech. In arguing that broadband service is protected by the First Amendment, AT&T compares its provision of broadband service to the operation of a cable television system, and points out that the Supreme Court has determined that cable programmers and cable operators engage in speech protected by the First Amendment. The analogy is inapt. When the Supreme Court held in Turner I that cable operators were protected by the First Amendment, the critical factor that made cable operators ``speakers'' was their production of programming and their exercise of ``editorial discretion over which programs and stations to include'' (and thus which to exclude). Unlike cable television operators, broadband providers typically are best described not as ``speakers,'' but rather as conduits for speech. The broadband Internet access service at issue here does not involve an exercise of editorial discretion that is comparable to cable companies' choice of which stations or programs to include in their service. In this proceeding broadband providers have not, for instance, shown that they market their services as benefiting from an editorial presence.\166\ To the contrary, Internet end users expect that they can obtain access to all or substantially all content that is available on the Internet, without the editorial [[Page 59221]] intervention of their broadband provider.\167\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \166\ See, e.g., AT&T, AT&T U-verse, http://www.att-services.net/att-u-verse.html (AT&T U-verse: ``Customers can get the information they want, when they want it''); Verizon, FiOS Internet, http://www22.verizon.com/Residential/FiOSInternet/Overview.htm and Verizon, High Speed Internet, http://www22.verizon.com/Residential/HighSpeedInternet (Verizon FiOS and High Speed Internet: ``Internet, plus all the free extras''). \167\ See Verizon Comments at 117 (``[B]roadband providers today provide traditional Internet access services that offer subscribers access to all lawful content and have strong economic incentives to continue to do so.'') (emphasis added). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Consistent with that understanding, broadband providers maintain that they qualify for statutory immunity from liability for copyright violations or the distribution of offensive material precisely because they lack control over what end users transmit and receive.\168\ In addition, when defending themselves against subpoenas in litigation involving alleged copyright violations, broadband providers typically take the position that they are simply conduits of information provided by others.\169\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \168\ See 17 U.S.C. 512(a) (a ``service provider shall not be liable * * * for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider's transmitting, routing, or providing connections for'' material distributed by others on its network); 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1) (``[N]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider''); see also Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1234 (DC Cir. 2003) (discussing in context of subpoena issued to Verizon under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 512(a)'s ``four safe harbors, each of which immunizes ISPs from liability from copyright infringement''), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 924 (2004). For example ``Verizon.net, the home page for Verizon Internet customers, contains a notice explicitly claiming copyright over the contents of the page. In contrast, the terms of service of Verizon Internet access explicitly disclaim any affiliation with content transmitted over the network.'' PK Reply at 22. \169\ See, e.g., Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2005) (subpoenas served on Charter were not authorized because ``Charter's function'' as a broadband provider ``was limited to acting as a conduit for the allegedly copyright protected material'' at issue); Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d at 1237 (accepting Verizon's argument that Federal copyright law ``does not authorize the issuance of a subpoena to an ISP acting as a mere conduit for the transmission of information sent by others''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- To be sure, broadband providers engage in network management practices designed to protect their Internet services against spam and malicious content, but that practice bears little resemblance to an editor's choosing which programs, among a range of programs, to carry.\170\ Furthermore, this Order does not limit broadband providers' ability to modify their own Web pages, or transmit any lawful message that they wish, just like any other speaker. Broadband providers are also free under this Order to offer a wide range of ``edited'' services. If, for example, a broadband provider wanted to offer a service limited to ``family friendly'' materials to end users who desire only such content, it could do so under the rules we promulgate in this Order. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \170\ We recognize that in two cases, Federal district courts have concluded that the provision of broadband service is ``speech'' protected by the First Amendment. In Itasca, the district court reasoned that broadband providers were analogous to cable and satellite television companies, which are protected by the First Amendment. Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Vill. of Itasca, 503 F. Supp. 2d 928, 947-49 (N.D. Ill. 2007). And in Broward County, the district court determined that the transmission function provided by broadband service could not be separated from the content of the speech being transmitted. Comcast Cablevision of Broward Cnty., Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 691-92 (S.D. Fla. 2000). For the reasons stated, we disagree with the reasoning of those decisions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- AT&T and NCTA argue that open Internet rules interfere with the speech rights of content and application providers to the extent they are prevented from paying broadband providers for higher quality service. Purchasing a higher quality of termination service for one's own Internet traffic, though, is not speech--just as providing the underlying transmission service is not. Telephone common carriers, for instance, transmit users' speech for hire, but no court has ever suggested that regulation of common carriage arrangements triggers First Amendment scrutiny. Even if open Internet rules did implicate expressive activity, they would not violate the First Amendment. Because the rules are based on the characteristics of broadband Internet access service, independent of content or viewpoint, they would be subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny.\171\ The regulations in this Order are triggered by a broadband provider offering broadband Internet access, not by the message of any provider. Indeed, the point of open Internet rules is to protect traffic regardless of its content. Verizon's argument that such regulation is presumptively suspect because it makes speaker-based distinctions likewise lacks merit: Our action is based on the transmission service provided by broadband providers rather than on what providers have to say. In any event, speaker-based distinctions are permissible so long as they are ```justified by some special characteristic of' the particular medium being regulated''--here the ability of broadband providers to favor or disfavor Internet traffic to the detriment of innovation, investment, competition, public discourse, and end users. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \171\ See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 642. Regulations generally are content neutral if justified without reference to content or viewpoint. Id. at 643; BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 69 (DC Cir. 1998); Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 966-67 (DC Cir. 1996). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Under intermediate scrutiny, a content-neutral regulation will be sustained if ``it furthers an important or substantial government interest * * * unrelated to the suppression of free expression,'' and if ``the means chosen'' to achieve that interest ``do not burden substantially more speech than is necessary.'' The government interests underlying this Order--preserving an open Internet to encourage competition and remove impediments to infrastructure investment while enabling consumer choice, end-user control, free expression, and the freedom to innovate without permission--ensure the public's access to a multiplicity of information sources and maximize the Internet's potential to further the public interest. As a result, these interests satisfy the intermediate-scrutiny standard.\172\ Indeed, the interest in keeping the Internet open to a wide range of information sources is an important free speech interest in its own right. As Turner I affirmed, ``assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.'' \173\ This Order protects the speech interests of all Internet speakers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \172\ These interests are consistent with the Communications Act's charge to the Commission to make available a ``rapid and efficient'' national communications infrastructure, 47 U.S.C. 151; to promote, consistent with a ``vibrant and competitive free market,'' ``the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services''; and to ``encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received,'' 47 U.S.C. 230(b)(1)-(3). Indeed, AT&T concedes that ``[t]here is little doubt that preservation of an open and free Internet is an `important or substantial government interest.' '' AT&T Comments at 237 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662). \173\ 512 U.S. at 663. The Turner I Court continued: ``Indeed, it has long been a basic tenet of national communications policy that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.'' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (NCCB) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Time Warner and Verizon contend that the government lacks important or substantial interests because the harms from prohibited practices supposedly are speculative. This ignores actual instances of harmful practices by broadband providers, as discussed in Part II.B. In any event, the Commission is not required to stay its hand until substantial harms already have occurred. On the contrary, the Commission's predictive judgments as to the development of a problem and likely injury to the public interest are entitled to great deference. In sum, the rules we adopt are narrowly tailored to advance the important government interests at stake. [[Page 59222]] The rules apply only to that portion of the end user's link to the Internet over which the end user's broadband provider has control. They forbid only those actions that could unfairly impede the public's use of this important resource. Broadband providers are left with ample opportunities to transmit their own content, to maintain their own Web sites, and to engage in reasonable network management. In addition, they can offer edited services to their end users. The rules are narrowly tailored because they address the problem at hand, and go no farther.\174\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \174\ AT&T contends (AT&T Comments at 219-20) that our rules would conflict with prohibitions contained in Section 326 of the Act against ``censorship'' of ``radio communications'' or interference with ``the right of free speech by means of radio communication.'' 47 U.S.C. 326. For the same reasons that our rules do not violate the First Amendment, they do not violate Section 326's statutory prohibition. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Fifth Amendment Takings Contrary to the claims of some broadband providers, open Internet rules pose no issue under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Our rules do not compel new services or limit broadband providers' flexibility in setting prices for their broadband Internet access services, but simply require transparency and prevent broadband providers--when they voluntarily carry Internet traffic--from blocking or unreasonably discriminating in their treatment of that traffic. Moreover, this Order involves setting policies for communications networks, an activity that has been one of this Commission's central duties since it was established in 1934. Absent compelled permanent physical occupations of property,\175\ takings analysis involves ``essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries'' regarding such factors as the degree of interference with ``investment- backed expectations,'' the ``economic impact of the regulation'' and ``the character of the government action.'' In this regard, takings law makes clear that property owners cannot, as a general matter, expect that existing legal requirements regarding their property will remain entirely unchanged. As discussed in Part II, the history of broadband Internet access services offers no basis for reasonable reliance on a policy regime in which providers are free to conceal or discriminate without limit, and the rules we adopt in this Order should not impose substantial new costs on broadband providers.\176\ Accordingly, our Order does not raise constitutional concerns under regulatory takings analysis. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \175\ Verizon contends that ``[t]o the extent the proposed rules would prohibit the owner of a broadband network from setting the terms on which other providers can occupy its property, the rule would give those providers the equivalent of a permanent easement on the network--a form of physical occupation.'' Verizon Comments at 119 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430 (1982)). Not so. Such transmissions are neither ``occupations'' nor ``permanent.'' See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12; see also Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 570 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding Commission's finding that a must-carry obligation did not constitute a physical occupation because ``the transmission of WRNN's signal does not involve a physical occupation of Cablevision's equipment or property''). In addition, to the extent broadband providers voluntarily allow any customer to transmit or receive information, the imposition of reasonable non- discrimination requirements would not be a taking under Loretto. See Hilton Washington Corp. v. District of Columbia, 777 F.2d 47 (DC Cir. 1985); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 531 (1992). \176\ This history likewise refutes the assertion that prior Commission decisions ``engendered serious reliance interests'' that would be unsettled by our adoption of open Internet rules. Baker Statement at *11 n.41 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- V. Enforcement Prompt and effective enforcement of the rules adopted in this Order is crucial to preserving an open Internet and providing clear guidance to stakeholders. We anticipate that many of the disputes that will arise regarding alleged open Internet violations--particularly those centered on engineering-focused questions--will be resolvable by the parties without Commission involvement. We thus encourage parties to endeavor to resolve disputes through direct negotiation focused on relevant technical issues, and to consult with independent technical bodies. Many commenters endorse this approach.\177\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \177\ See, e.g., Bright House Networks Comments at 10; CCIA Comments at 2, 34; Google-Verizon Joint Comments at 4 (``A robust role for technical and industry groups should be encouraged to address any challenges or problems that may arise and to help guide the practices of all players. * * *''); WISPA Comments at 14-16; DISH Network Reply at 24-26; Qwest Reply at 32. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Should issues develop that are not resolved through private processes, the Commission will provide backstop mechanisms to address such disputes.\178\ In the Open Internet NPRM, the Commission proposed to enforce open Internet rules through case-by-case adjudication, a proposal that met with almost universal support among commenters. The Commission also sought comment on whether it should adopt complaint procedures specifically governing alleged violations of open Internet rules, and whether any of the Commission's existing rules provide a suitable model. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \178\ Providers and other parties may also seek guidance from the Commission on questions about the application of the open Internet rules in particular contexts, for instance by requesting a declaratory ruling. See 47 CFR 1.2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A. Informal Complaints Many commenters urge the Commission to adopt informal complaint procedures that equip end users and edge providers with a simple and cost-effective option for calling attention to open Internet rule violations. We agree that end users, edge providers, and others should have an efficient vehicle to bring potential open Internet violations to the Commission, and indeed, such a vehicle is already available. Parties may submit complaints to the Commission pursuant to Section 1.41 of the Commission's rules. Unlike formal complaints, no filing fee is required. We recommend that end users and edge providers submit any complaints through the Commission's Web site, at http://esupport.fcc.gov/complaints.htm. The Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau will also make available resources explaining these rules and facilitating the filing of informal complaints. Although individual informal complaints will not typically result in written Commission orders, the Enforcement Bureau will examine trends or patterns in complaints to identify potential targets for investigation and enforcement action.\179\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \179\ As with our other complaint rules, the availability of complaint procedures does not bar the Commission from initiating separate and independent enforcement proceedings for potential violations. See 47 CFR 0.111(a)(16). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Formal Complaints Many commenters propose that the Commission adopt formal complaint procedures to address open Internet disputes. We agree that such procedures should be available in the event an open Internet dispute cannot be resolved through other means. Formal complaint processes permit anyone--including individual end users and edge providers--to file a claim alleging that another party has violated a statute or rule, and asking the Commission to rule on the dispute. A number of commenters suggest that existing Commission procedural rules could readily be utilized to govern open Internet complaints. We conclude that adopting a set of procedures based on our Part 76 cable access complaint rules will best suit the needs of open Internet disputes that may arise.\180\ Although similar to the [[Page 59223]] complaint rules under Section 208, we find that the part 76 rules are more streamlined and thus preferable.\181\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \180\ The Commission is authorized to resolve formal complaints--and adopt procedural rules governing the process-- pursuant to Sections 4(i) and 4(j) of the Act. 47 U.S.C.. 154(i), 154(j). In addition, Section 403 of the Act enables the Commission to initiate inquiries and enforce orders on its own motion. 47 U.S.C. 403. Inherent in such authority is the ability to resolve disputes concerning violations of the open Internet rules. \181\ The Part 76 rules were promulgated to address complaints against cable systems. See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review--Part 76--Cable Television Service Pleading and Complaint Rules, Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 418, 420, para. 6 (1999) (``1998 Biennial Review''). For example, a local television station may bring a complaint, pursuant to the Part 76 rules, claiming that it was wrongfully denied carriage on a cable system. See 47 CFR 76.61. Some complaints alleging open Internet violations may be analogous, such as those brought by a content or application provider claiming that broadband providers--many of which are cable companies--are unlawfully blocking or degrading access to end users. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Under the rules we adopt in this Order, any person may file a formal complaint. Before filing a complaint, a complainant must first notify the defendant in writing that it intends to file a complaint with the Commission for violation of rules adopted in this Order.\182\ After the complaint has been filed, the defendant must submit an answer, and the complainant may submit a reply. In some cases, the facts might be uncontested, and the proceeding can be completed based on the pleadings. In other cases, a thorough analysis of the challenged conduct might require further factual development and briefing.\183\ Based on the record developed, Commission staff (or the Commission itself) will issue an order determining the lawfulness of the challenged practice. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \182\ As with other formal complaint procedures, a filing fee will be required. See 47 CFR 1.1106. \183\ The rules give the Commission discretion to order other procedures as appropriate, including briefing, status conferences, oral argument, evidentiary hearings, discovery, or referral to an administrative law judge. See 47 CFR 8.14(e) through (g). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As in other contexts, complainants in open Internet proceedings will ultimately bear the burden of proof to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that an alleged violation of the rules has occurred. A number of commenters propose, however, that once a complainant makes a prima facie showing that an open Internet rule has been violated, the burden should shift to the broadband provider to demonstrate that the challenged practice is reasonable. This approach is appropriate in the context of certain open Internet complaints, when the evidence necessary to apply the open Internet rules is predominantly in the possession of the broadband provider. Accordingly, we require a complainant alleging a violation of the open Internet rules to plead fully and with specificity the basis of its claims and to provide facts, supported when possible by documentation or affidavit, sufficient to establish a prima facie case of an open Internet violation. In turn, the broadband provider must answer each claim with particularity and furnish facts, supported by documentation or affidavit, demonstrating the reasonableness of the challenged practice. At that point, the complainant will have the opportunity to demonstrate that the practice is not reasonable. Should experience reveal the need to adjust the burden of proof in open Internet disputes, we will do so as appropriate. Several commenters urge the Commission to adopt timelines for the complaint process. We recognize the need to resolve alleged violations swiftly, and accordingly will allow requests for expedited treatment of open Internet complaints under the Enforcement Bureau's Accelerated Docket procedures.\184\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \184\ See 47 CFR 1.730. Furthermore, for good cause, pursuant to 47 CFR 1.3, the Commission may shorten the deadlines or otherwise revise the procedures herein to expedite the adjudication of complaints. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In resolving formal complaints, the Commission will draw on resources from across the agency--including engineering, economic, and legal experts--to resolve open Internet complaints in a timely manner. In addition, we will take into account standards and best practices adopted by relevant standard-setting organizations, and such organizations and outside advisory groups also may provide valuable technical assistance in resolving disputes. Further, in order to facilitate prompt decision-making, when possible we will resolve open Internet formal complaints at the bureau level, rather than the Commission level.\185\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \185\ The rules adopted in this Order explicitly authorize the Enforcement Bureau to resolve complaints alleging open Internet violations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. FCC Initiated Actions As noted above, in addition to ruling on complaints, the Commission has the authority to initiate enforcement actions on its own motion. For instance, Section 403 of the Act permits the Commission to initiate an inquiry concerning any question arising under the Act, and Section 503(b) authorizes us to issue citations and impose forfeiture penalties for violations of our rules. Should the Commission find that a broadband Internet provider is engaging in activity that violates the open Internet rules, we will take appropriate enforcement action, including the issuance of forfeitures. VI. Effective Date, Open Internet Advisory Committee, and Commission Review Some of the rules adopted in this Order contain new information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). Our rules addressing transparency are among those requiring PRA approval. The disclosure rule is essential to the proper functioning of our open Internet framework, and we therefore make all the rules we adopt in this Order effective November 20, 2011. To assist the Commission in monitoring the state of Internet openness and the effects of our rules, we intend to create an Open Internet Advisory Committee. The Committee, to be created in consultation with the General Services Administration pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, will be an inclusive and transparent body that will hold public meetings. It will be comprised of a balanced group including consumer advocates; Internet engineering experts; content, application, and service providers; network equipment and end- user-device manufacturers and suppliers; investors; broadband service providers; and other parties the Commission may deem appropriate. The Committee will aid the Commission in tracking developments with respect to the freedom and openness of the Internet, in particular with respect to issues discussed in this Order, including technical standards and issues relating to mobile broadband and specialized services. The Committee will report to the Commission and make recommendations it deems appropriate concerning our open Internet framework. In light of the pace of change of technologies and the market for broadband Internet access service, and to evaluate the efficacy of the framework adopted in this Order for preserving Internet openness, the Commission will review all of the rules in this Order no later than two years from their effective date, and will adjust its open Internet framework as appropriate. VII. Procedural Matters A. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was included in the Open Internet NPRM in GN Docket No. 09-191 and WC Docket No. 07- 52. The Commission sought written public [[Page 59224]] comment on the proposals in these dockets, including comment on the IRFA. This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the RFA. Need for, and Objectives of, the Rules In this Order the Commission takes an important step to preserve the Internet as an open platform for innovation, investment, job creation, economic growth, competition, and free expression. To provide greater clarity and certainty regarding the continued freedom and openness of the Internet, we adopt three basic rules that are grounded in broadly accepted Internet norms, as well as our own prior decisions: i. Transparency. Fixed and mobile broadband providers must disclose the network management practices, performance characteristics, and terms and conditions of their broadband services; ii. No blocking. Fixed broadband providers may not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; mobile broadband providers may not block lawful Web sites, or block applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services; and iii. No unreasonable discrimination. Fixed broadband providers may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic. We believe these rules, applied with the complementary principle of reasonable network management, will empower and protect consumers and innovators while helping ensure that the Internet continues to flourish, with robust private investment and rapid innovation at both the core and the edge of the network. This is consistent with the National Broadband Plan goal of broadband access that is ubiquitous and fast, promoting the global competitiveness of the United States. In late 2009, we launched a public process to determine whether and what actions might be necessary to preserve the characteristics that have allowed the Internet to grow into an indispensable platform supporting our nation's economy and civic life, and to foster continued investment in the physical networks that enable the Internet. Since then, more than 100,000 commenters have provided written input. Commission staff held several public workshops and convened a Technological Advisory Process with experts from industry, academia, and consumer advocacy groups to collect their views regarding key technical issues related to Internet openness. This process has made clear that the Internet has thrived because of its freedom and openness--the absence of any gatekeeper blocking lawful uses of the network or picking winners and losers online. Consumers and innovators do not have to seek permission before they use the Internet to launch new technologies, start businesses, connect with friends, or share their views. The Internet is a level playing field. Consumers can make their own choices about what applications and services to use and are free to decide what content they want to access, create, or share with others. This openness promotes competition. It also enables a self-reinforcing cycle of investment and innovation in which new uses of the network lead to increased adoption of broadband, which drives investment and improvements in the network itself, which in turn lead to further innovative uses of the network and further investment in content, applications, services, and devices. A core goal of this Order is to foster and accelerate this cycle of investment and innovation. The record and our economic analysis demonstrate, however, that the openness of the Internet cannot be taken for granted, and that it faces real threats. Indeed, we have seen broadband providers endanger the Internet's openness by blocking or degrading content and applications without disclosing their practices to end users and edge providers, notwithstanding the Commission's adoption of open Internet principles in 2005. In light of these considerations, as well as the limited choices most consumers have for broadband service, broadband providers' financial interests in telephony and pay television services that may compete with online content and services, and the economic and civic benefits of maintaining an open and competitive platform for innovation and communication, the Commission has long recognized that certain basic standards for broadband provider conduct are necessary to ensure the Internet's continued openness. The record also establishes the widespread benefits of providing greater clarity in this area--clarity that the Internet's openness will continue; that there is a forum and procedure for resolving alleged open Internet violations; and that broadband providers may reasonably manage their networks and innovate with respect to network technologies and business models. We expect the costs of compliance with our prophylactic rules to be small, as they incorporate longstanding openness principles that are generally in line with current practices and with norms endorsed by many broadband providers. Conversely, the harms of open Internet violations may be substantial, costly, and in some cases potentially irreversible. The rules we proposed in the Open Internet NPRM and those we adopt in this Order follow directly from the Commission's bipartisan Internet Policy Statement, adopted unanimously in 2005 and made temporarily enforceable for certain providers in 2005 and 2006; openness protections the Commission established in 2007 for users of certain wireless spectrum; and a notice of inquiry in 2007 that asked, among other things, whether the Commission should add a principle of nondiscrimination to the Internet Policy Statement. Our rules build upon these actions, first and foremost by requiring broadband providers to be transparent in their network management practices, so that end users can make informed choices and innovators can develop, market, and maintain Internet-based offerings. The rules also prevent certain forms of blocking and discrimination with respect to content, applications, services, and devices that depend on or connect to the Internet. An open, robust, and well-functioning Internet requires that broadband providers have the flexibility to reasonably manage their networks. Network management practices are reasonable if they are appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose. Transparency and end-user control are touchstones of reasonableness. We recognize that broadband providers may offer other services over the same last-mile connections used to provide broadband service. These ``specialized services'' can benefit end users and spur investment, but they may also present risks to the open Internet. We will closely monitor specialized services and their effects on broadband service to ensure, through all available mechanisms, that they supplement but do not supplant the open Internet. Mobile broadband is at an earlier stage in its development than fixed broadband and is evolving rapidly. For that and other reasons discussed below, we conclude that it is appropriate at this time to take measured steps in this area. Accordingly, we require mobile providers to comply with the transparency rule, which includes enforceable disclosure obligations regarding device and application certification and approval processes; we prohibit providers from blocking lawful Web sites; and we prohibit providers from blocking applications that compete with providers' voice and video telephony services. We will closely [[Page 59225]] monitor the development of the mobile broadband market and will adjust the framework we adopt in this Order as appropriate. These rules are within our jurisdiction over interstate and foreign communications by wire and radio. Further, they implement specific statutory mandates in the Communications Act (``Act'') and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (``1996 Act''), including provisions that direct the Commission to promote Internet investment and to protect and promote voice, video, and audio communications services. The framework we adopt in this Order aims to ensure the Internet remains an open platform--one characterized by free markets and free speech--that enables consumer choice, end-user control, competition through low barriers to entry, and the freedom to innovate without permission. The framework does so by protecting openness through high- level rules, while maintaining broadband providers' and the Commission's flexibility to adapt to changes in the market and in technology as the Internet continues to evolve. Summary of the Significant Issues Raised by the Public Comments in Response to the IRFA and Summary of the Assessment of the Agency of Such Issues A few commenters discussed the IRFA from the Open Internet NPRM. The Center for Regulatory Effectiveness (CRE) argued that the Open Internet NPRM's IRFA was defective because it ineffectively followed 5 U.S.C. secs. 603(a) (``Such analysis shall describe the impact of the proposed rule on small entities.'') and 603(c) (``Each initial regulatory flexibility analysis shall also contain a description of any significant alternatives to the proposed rule which accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes and which minimize any significant economic impact of the proposed rule on small entities.''). CRE does not provide any case law to support its interpretation that the Commission is in violation of these aspects of the statute, nor does CRE attempt to argue that SBEs have actually or theoretically been harmed. Rather, CRE is concerned that by not following its reading of these parts of the law, the Commission is being hypocritical by not being transparent enough. CRE recommends that the Commission publish a revised IRFA for public comment. We disagree: we believe that the IRFA was adequate and that the opportunity for SBEs to comment in a publicly accessible docket should remove any potential harm to openness that CRE is concerned with, as well as any harms to SBEs that could occur by not following CRE's interpretation of the law. The Smithville Telephone Company (Smithville) notes that many ILECs have vastly fewer employees than the 1500 or less that is required to be recognized as a small business under the SBA. For instance, Smithville states that it has seven employees. Smithville also observes that some other small ILECs in Mississippi have staffs of 8, 4, 2, 3, and 21. Smithville argues that companies of this size do not have the resources to fully analyze issues and participate in Commission proceedings. Smithville would like the Commission to use the data that it regularly receives from carriers to set a carrier size where exemptions from proposed rules and less complex reporting requirements can be set. In the present case, however, we determine that this is not necessary. We expect the costs of compliance with these rules to be small, as the high-level rules incorporate longstanding openness principles that appear to be generally in line with most broadband providers' current practices. We note that Smithville does not cite any particular source of increased costs, or attempt to estimate costs of compliance. Nonetheless, the Commission attempts to ease any burden that the transparency rule may cause by only requiring disclosure on a Web site and at the point of sale, making the transparency rule flexible. In addition, by setting the effective date of these rules as November 20, 2011, the Order gives broadband providers adequate time to develop cost-effective methods of compliance. Finally, to the extent that the transparency rule imposes a new obligation on small businesses, we find that the flexibility built into the rule addresses any compliance concerns. The American Cable Association (ACA) notes that the Commission has an obligation to ``include in the FRFA a comprehensive discussion of the economic impact its actions will have on small cable operators.'' The ACA cites its other comments, which ask the Commission to clarify that the codified principles would not obligate broadband service providers to (1) ``employ specific network management practices,'' (2) ``impose affirmative obligations dealing with unlawful content or the unlawful transfer of content,'' (3) ``accommodate lawful devices that are not supported by a broadband provider's network,'' and (4) ``provide information regarding a company's network management practices through any reporting, recordkeeping, or means other than through a company's Web site or Web page.'' Addressing ACA's arguments with regard to cable operators, and fixed broadband providers in particular, (1), the Commission is not requiring specific network management practices. The Commission only requires that any network management be reasonable; the Commission does not require that any specific practice be employed. Regarding (2), the rules do not impose affirmative obligations dealing with unlawful content or the unlawful transfer of content. We state that the ``no blocking'' rule does not prevent or restrict a broadband provider from refusing to transmit material such as child pornography. In response to (3), the Order clarifies that the ``no blocking'' rule protects only devices that do not harm the network and only requires fixed broadband service providers to allow devices that conform to publicly available industry standards applicable to the providers' services. Directly addressing ACA's concern, the Order notes that a DOCSIS-based provider is not required to support a DSL modem. In response to (4), the disclosure requirement in this Order does not require additional forms of disclosure, other than, at a minimum, requiring broadband providers to prominently display or provide links to disclosures on a publicly available, easily accessible Web site that is available to current and prospective end users and edge providers as well as to the Commission, and disclosing relevant information at the point of sale. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the Rules Apply The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, where feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may be affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business Act. A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) Is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business Administration (SBA). 1. Total Small Entities Our action may, over time, affect small entities that are not easily categorized at present. We therefore [[Page 59226]] describe here, at the outset, three comprehensive, statutory small entity size standards. First, nationwide, there are a total of approximately 27.2 million small businesses, according to the SBA. In addition, a ``small organization'' is generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.'' Nationwide, as of 2002, there were approximately 1.6 million small organizations. Finally, the term ``small governmental jurisdiction'' is defined generally as ``governments of cities, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.'' Census Bureau data for 2002 indicate that there were 87,525 local governmental jurisdictions in the United States. We estimate that, of this total, 84,377 entities were ``small governmental jurisdictions.'' Thus, we estimate that most governmental jurisdictions are small. 2. Internet Access Service Providers Internet Service Providers. The 2007 Economic Census places these firms, whose services might include voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), in either of two categories, depending on whether the service is provided over the provider's own telecommunications facilities (e.g., cable and DSL ISPs), or over client-supplied telecommunications connections (e.g., dial-up ISPs). The former are within the category of Wired Telecommunications Carriers, which has an SBA small business size standard of 1,500 or fewer employees. These are also labeled ``broadband.'' The latter are within the category of All Other Telecommunications, which has a size standard of annual receipts of $25 million or less. These are labeled non-broadband. The most current Economic Census data for all such firms are 2007 data, which are detailed specifically for ISPs within the categories above. For the first category, the data show that 396 firms operated for the entire year, of which 159 had nine or fewer employees. For the second category, the data show that 1,682 firms operated for the entire year. Of those, 1,675 had annual receipts below $25 million per year, and an additional two had receipts of between $25 million and $ 49,999,999. Consequently, we estimate that the majority of ISP firms are small entities. The ISP industry has changed since 2007. The 2007 data cited above may therefore include entities that no longer provide Internet access service and may exclude entities that now provide such service. To ensure that this FRFA describes the universe of small entities that our action might affect, we discuss in turn several different types of entities that might be providing Internet access service. 3. Wireline Providers Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically for incumbent local exchange services. The appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. According to Commission data, 1,311 carriers have reported that they are engaged in the provision of incumbent local exchange services. Of these 1,311 carriers, an estimated 1,024 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 287 have more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates that most providers of incumbent local exchange service are small businesses that may be affected by our proposed action. Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (Competitive LECs), Competitive Access Providers (CAPs), Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and Other Local Service Providers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically for these service providers. The appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. According to Commission data, 1005 carriers have reported that they are engaged in the provision of either competitive access provider services or competitive local exchange carrier services. Of these 1005 carriers, an estimated 918 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 87 have more than 1,500 employees. In addition, 16 carriers have reported that they are ``Shared-Tenant Service Providers,'' and all 16 are estimated to have 1,500 or fewer employees. In addition, 89 carriers have reported that they are ``Other Local Service Providers.'' Of the 89, all have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates that most providers of competitive local exchange service, competitive access providers, Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and other local service providers are small entities that may be affected by our action. We have included small incumbent LECs in this present RFA analysis. As noted above, a ``small business'' under the RFA is one that, inter alia, meets the pertinent small business size standard (e.g., a telephone communications business having 1,500 or fewer employees), and ``is not dominant in its field of operation.'' The SBA's Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small incumbent LECs are not dominant in their field of operation because any such dominance is not ``national'' in scope. We have therefore included small incumbent LECs in this RFA analysis, although we emphasize that this RFA action has no effect on Commission analyses and determinations in other, non-RFA contexts. Interexchange Carriers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically for providers of interexchange services. The appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. According to Commission data, 300 carriers have reported that they are engaged in the provision of interexchange service. Of these, an estimated 268 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 32 have more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates that the majority of IXCs are small entities that may be affected by our action. Operator Service Providers (OSPs). Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically for operator service providers. The appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. According to Commission data, 33 carriers have reported that they are engaged in the provision of operator services. Of these, an estimated 31 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 2 has more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates that the majority of OSPs are small entities that may be affected by our proposed action. 4. Wireless Providers--Fixed and Mobile For reasons discussed above in the text of the Order, the Commission has distinguished wireless fixed broadband Internet access service from wireless mobile broadband Internet access service. Specifically, the Commission decided that fixed broadband Internet access service providers, whether wireline or wireless, must disclose their network management practices and the performance characteristics and commercial terms of their broadband services; may not block lawful content, applications, services or non-harmful [[Page 59227]] devices; and may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic. Also for the reasons discussed above, the Commission decided that wireless mobile broadband Internet access service providers must disclose their network management practices and performance characteristics and commercial terms of their broadband service and may not block lawful Web sites or block applications that compete with their voice or video telephony service. Thus, to the extent the wireless services listed below are used by wireless firms for fixed and mobile broadband Internet access services, the actions in this Order may have an impact on those small businesses as set forth above and further below. In addition, for those services subject to auctions, we note that, as a general matter, the number of winning bidders that claim to qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses currently in service. Also, the Commission does not generally track subsequent business size unless, in the context of assignments and transfers or reportable eligibility events, unjust enrichment issues are implicated. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). Since 2007, the Census Bureau has placed wireless firms within this new, broad, economic census category. Prior to that time, such firms were within the now-superseded categories of ``Paging'' and ``Cellular and Other Wireless Telecommunications.'' Under the present and prior categories, the SBA has deemed a wireless business to be small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. For the category of Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite), preliminary data for 2007 show that there were 11,927 firms operating that year. While the Census Bureau has not released data on the establishments broken down by number of employees, we note that the Census Bureau lists total employment for all firms in that sector at 281,262. Since all firms with fewer than 1,500 employees are considered small, given the total employment in the sector, we estimate that the vast majority of wireless firms are small. Wireless Communications Services. This service can be used for fixed, mobile, radiolocation, and digital audio broadcasting satellite uses. The Commission defined ``small business'' for the wireless communications services (WCS) auction as an entity with average gross revenues of $40 million for each of the three preceding years, and a ``very small business'' as an entity with average gross revenues of $15 million for each of the three preceding years. The SBA has approved these definitions. The Commission auctioned geographic area licenses in the WCS service. In the auction, which commenced on April 15, 1997 and closed on April 25, 1997, seven bidders won 31 licenses that qualified as very small business entities, and one bidder won one license that qualified as a small business entity. 1670-1675 MHz Services. This service can be used for fixed and mobile uses, except aeronautical mobile. An auction for one license in the 1670-1675 MHz band commenced on April 30, 2003 and closed the same day. One license was awarded. The winning bidder was not a small entity. Wireless Telephony. Wireless telephony includes cellular, personal communications services, and specialized mobile radio telephony carriers. As noted, the SBA has developed a small business size standard for Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). Under the SBA small business size standard, a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. According to Trends in Telephone Service data, 413 carriers reported that they were engaged in wireless telephony. Of these, an estimated 261 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 152 have more than 1,500 employees. Therefore, more than half of these entities can be considered small. Broadband Personal Communications Service. The broadband personal communications services (PCS) spectrum is divided into six frequency blocks designated A through F, and the Commission has held auctions for each block. The Commission initially defined a ``small business'' for C- and F-Block licenses as an entity that has average gross revenues of $40 million or less in the three previous calendar years. For F-Block licenses, an additional small business size standard for ``very small business'' was added and is defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates, has average gross revenues of not more than $15 million for the preceding three calendar years. These small business size standards, in the context of broadband PCS auctions, have been approved by the SBA. No small businesses within the SBA-approved small business size standards bid successfully for licenses in Blocks A and B. There were 90 winning bidders that claimed small business status in the first two C-Block auctions. A total of 93 bidders that claimed small business status won approximately 40 percent of the 1,479 licenses in the first auction for the D, E, and F Blocks. On April 15, 1999, the Commission completed the reauction of 347 C-, D-, E-, and F-Block licenses in Auction No. 22. Of the 57 winning bidders in that auction, 48 claimed small business status and won 277 licenses. On January 26, 2001, the Commission completed the auction of 422 C and F Block Broadband PCS licenses in Auction No. 35. Of the 35 winning bidders in that auction, 29 claimed small business status. Subsequent events concerning Auction 35, including judicial and agency determinations, resulted in a total of 163 C and F Block licenses being available for grant. On February 15, 2005, the Commission completed an auction of 242 C-, D-, E-, and F-Block licenses in Auction No. 58. Of the 24 winning bidders in that auction, 16 claimed small business status and won 156 licenses. On May 21, 2007, the Commission completed an auction of 33 licenses in the A, C, and F Blocks in Auction No. 71. Of the 12 winning bidders in that auction, five claimed small business status and won 18 licenses. On August 20, 2008, the Commission completed the auction of 20 C-, D-, E-, and F-Block Broadband PCS licenses in Auction No. 78. Of the eight winning bidders for Broadband PCS licenses in that auction, six claimed small business status and won 14 licenses. Specialized Mobile Radio Licenses. The Commission awards ``small entity'' bidding credits in auctions for Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) geographic area licenses in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands to firms that had revenues of no more than $15 million in each of the three previous calendar years. The Commission awards ``very small entity'' bidding credits to firms that had revenues of no more than $3 million in each of the three previous calendar years. The SBA has approved these small business size standards for the 900 MHz Service. The Commission has held auctions for geographic area licenses in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands. The 900 MHz SMR auction began on December 5, 1995, and closed on April 15, 1996. Sixty bidders claiming that they qualified as small businesses under the $15 million size standard won 263 geographic area licenses in the 900 MHz SMR band. The 800 MHz SMR auction for the upper 200 channels began on October 28, 1997, and was completed on December 8, 1997. Ten bidders claiming that they qualified as small businesses under the $15 million size standard won 38 geographic area licenses for the upper 200 channels in the 800 MHz SMR band. A second auction for the 800 MHz band was held [[Page 59228]] on January 10, 2002 and closed on January 17, 2002 and included 23 BEA licenses. One bidder claiming small business status won five licenses. The auction of the 1,053 800 MHz SMR geographic area licenses for the General Category channels began on August 16, 2000, and was completed on September 1, 2000. Eleven bidders won 108 geographic area licenses for the General Category channels in the 800 MHz SMR band and qualified as small businesses under the $15 million size standard. In an auction completed on December 5, 2000, a total of 2,800 Economic Area licenses in the lower 80 channels of the 800 MHz SMR service were awarded. Of the 22 winning bidders, 19 claimed small business status and won 129 licenses. Thus, combining all four auctions, 41 winning bidders for geographic licenses in the 800 MHz SMR band claimed status as small businesses. In addition, there are numerous incumbent site-by-site SMR licenses and licensees with extended implementation authorizations in the 800 and 900 MHz bands. We do not know how many firms provide 800 MHz or 900 MHz geographic area SMR service pursuant to extended implementation authorizations, nor how many of these providers have annual revenues of no more than $15 million. In addition, we do not know how many of these firms have 1,500 or fewer employees, which is the SBA-determined size standard. We assume, for purposes of this analysis, that all of the remaining extended implementation authorizations are held by small entities, as defined by the SBA. Lower 700 MHz Band Licenses. The Commission previously adopted criteria for defining three groups of small businesses for purposes of determining their eligibility for special provisions such as bidding credits. The Commission defined a ``small business'' as an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues not exceeding $40 million for the preceding three years. A ``very small business'' is defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues that are not more than $15 million for the preceding three years. Additionally, the lower 700 MHz Service had a third category of small business status for Metropolitan/Rural Service Area (MSA/RSA) licenses--``entrepreneur''--which is defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues that are not more than $3 million for the preceding three years. The SBA approved these small size standards. An auction of 740 licenses (one license in each of the 734 MSAs/RSAs and one license in each of the six Economic Area Groupings (EAGs)) commenced on August 27, 2002, and closed on September 18, 2002. Of the 740 licenses available for auction, 484 licenses were won by 102 winning bidders. Seventy-two of the winning bidders claimed small business, very small business or entrepreneur status and won a total of 329 licenses. A second auction commenced on May 28, 2003, closed on June 13, 2003, and included 256 licenses: 5 EAG licenses and 476 Cellular Market Area licenses. Seventeen winning bidders claimed small or very small business status and won 60 licenses, and nine winning bidders claimed entrepreneur status and won 154 licenses. On July 26, 2005, the Commission completed an auction of 5 licenses in the Lower 700 MHz band (Auction No. 60). There were three winning bidders for five licenses. All three winning bidders claimed small business status. In 2007, the Commission reexamined its rules governing the 700 MHz band in the 700 MHz Second Report and Order. An auction of 700 MHz licenses commenced January 24, 2008 and closed on March 18, 2008, which included, 176 Economic Area licenses in the A Block, 734 Cellular Market Area licenses in the B Block, and 176 EA licenses in the E Block. Twenty winning bidders, claiming small business status (those with attributable average annual gross revenues that exceed $15 million and do not exceed $40 million for the preceding three years) won 49 licenses. Thirty three winning bidders claiming very small business status (those with attributable average annual gross revenues that do not exceed $15 million for the preceding three years) won 325 licenses. Upper 700 MHz Band Licenses. In the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, the Commission revised its rules regarding Upper 700 MHz licenses. On January 24, 2008, the Commission commenced Auction 73 in which several licenses in the Upper 700 MHz band were available for licensing: 12 Regional Economic Area Grouping licenses in the C Block, and one nationwide license in the D Block. The auction concluded on March 18, 2008, with 3 winning bidders claiming very small business status (those with attributable average annual gross revenues that do not exceed $15 million for the preceding three years) and winning five licenses. 700 MHz Guard Band Licensees. In 2000, in the 700 MHz Guard Band Order, the Commission adopted size standards for ``small businesses'' and ``very small businesses'' for purposes of determining their eligibility for special provisions such as bidding credits and installment payments. A small business in this service is an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues not exceeding $40 million for the preceding three years. Additionally, a very small business is an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues that are not more than $15 million for the preceding three years. SBA approval of these definitions is not required. An auction of 52 Major Economic Area licenses commenced on September 6, 2000, and closed on September 21, 2000. Of the 104 licenses auctioned, 96 licenses were sold to nine bidders. Five of these bidders were small businesses that won a total of 26 licenses. A second auction of 700 MHz Guard Band licenses commenced on February 13, 2001, and closed on February 21, 2001. All eight of the licenses auctioned were sold to three bidders. One of these bidders was a small business that won a total of two licenses. Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service. The Commission has previously used the SBA's small business size standard applicable to Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite), i.e., an entity employing no more than 1,500 persons. There are fewer than 10 licensees in the Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service, and under that definition, we estimate that almost all of them qualify as small entities under the SBA definition. For purposes of assigning Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service licenses through competitive bidding, the Commission has defined ``small business'' as an entity that, together with controlling interests and affiliates, has average annual gross revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $40 million. A ``very small business'' is defined as an entity that, together with controlling interests and affiliates, has average annual gross revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $15 million. These definitions were approved by the SBA. In May 2006, the Commission completed an auction of nationwide commercial Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service licenses in the 800 MHz band (Auction No. 65). On June 2, 2006, the auction closed with two winning bidders winning two Air-Ground Radiotelephone Services licenses. Neither of the winning bidders claimed small business status. AWS Services (1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 MHz bands (AWS-1); 1915- [[Page 59229]] 1920 MHz, 1995-2000 MHz, 2020-2025 MHz and 2175-2180 MHz bands (AWS-2); 2155-2175 MHz band (AWS-3)). For the AWS-1 bands, the Commission has defined a ``small business'' as an entity with average annual gross revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $40 million, and a ``very small business'' as an entity with average annual gross revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $15 million. For AWS-2 and AWS-3, although we do not know for certain which entities are likely to apply for these frequencies, we note that the AWS-1 bands are comparable to those used for cellular service and personal communications service. The Commission has not yet adopted size standards for the AWS-2 or AWS-3 bands but proposes to treat both AWS-2 and AWS-3 similarly to broadband PCS service and AWS-1 service due to the comparable capital requirements and other factors, such as issues involved in relocating incumbents and developing markets, technologies, and services. 3650-3700 MHz band. In March 2005, the Commission released a Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order that provides for nationwide, non-exclusive licensing of terrestrial operations, utilizing contention-based technologies, in the 3650 MHz band (i.e., 3650-3700 MHz). As of April 2010, more than 1270 licenses have been granted and more than 7433 sites have been registered. The Commission has not developed a definition of small entities applicable to 3650- 3700 MHz band nationwide, non-exclusive licensees. However, we estimate that the majority of these licensees are Internet Access Service Providers (ISPs) and that most of those licensees are small businesses. Fixed Microwave Services. Microwave services include common carrier, private-operational fixed, and broadcast auxiliary radio services. They also include the Local Multipoint Distribution Service (LMDS), the Digital Electronic Message Service (DEMS), and the 24 GHz Service, where licensees can choose between common carrier and non- common carrier status. At present, there are approximately 31,428 common carrier fixed licensees and 79,732 private operational-fixed licensees and broadcast auxiliary radio licensees in the microwave services. There are approximately 120 LMDS licensees, three DEMS licensees, and three 24 GHz licensees. The Commission has not yet defined a small business with respect to microwave services. For purposes of the IRFA, we will use the SBA's definition applicable to Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except satellite)--i.e., an entity with no more than 1,500 persons. Under the present and prior categories, the SBA has deemed a wireless business to be small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. For the category of Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite), preliminary data for 2007 show that there were 11,927 firms operating that year. While the Census Bureau has not released data on the establishments broken down by number of employees, we note that the Census Bureau lists total employment for all firms in that sector at 281,262. Since all firms with fewer than 1,500 employees are considered small, given the total employment in the sector, we estimate that the vast majority of firms using microwave services are small. We note that the number of firms does not necessarily track the number of licensees. We estimate that virtually all of the Fixed Microwave licensees (excluding broadcast auxiliary licensees) would qualify as small entities under the SBA definition. Broadband Radio Service and Educational Broadband Service. Broadband Radio Service systems, previously referred to as Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS) and Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service (MMDS) systems, and ``wireless cable,'' transmit video programming to subscribers and provide two-way high speed data operations using the microwave frequencies of the Broadband Radio Service (BRS) and Educational Broadband Service (EBS) (previously referred to as the Instructional Television Fixed Service (ITFS)). In connection with the 1996 BRS auction, the Commission established a small business size standard as an entity that had annual average gross revenues of no more than $40 million in the previous three calendar years. The BRS auctions resulted in 67 successful bidders obtaining licensing opportunities for 493 Basic Trading Areas (BTAs). Of the 67 auction winners, 61 met the definition of a small business. BRS also includes licensees of stations authorized prior to the auction. At this time, we estimate that of the 61 small business BRS auction winners, 48 remain small business licensees. In addition to the 48 small businesses that hold BTA authorizations, there are approximately 392 incumbent BRS licensees that are considered small entities. After adding the number of small business auction licensees to the number of incumbent licensees not already counted, we find that there are currently approximately 440 BRS licensees that are defined as small businesses under either the SBA or the Commission's rules. In 2009, the Commission conducted Auction 86, the sale of 78 licenses in the BRS areas. The Commission offered three levels of bidding credits: (i) A bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that exceed $15 million and do not exceed $40 million for the preceding three years (small business) will receive a 15 percent discount on its winning bid; (ii) a bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that exceed $3 million and do not exceed $15 million for the preceding three years (very small business) will receive a 25 percent discount on its winning bid; and (iii) a bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that do not exceed $3 million for the preceding three years (entrepreneur) will receive a 35 percent discount on its winning bid. Auction 86 concluded in 2009 with the sale of 61 licenses. Of the ten winning bidders, two bidders that claimed small business status won 4 licenses; one bidder that claimed very small business status won three licenses; and two bidders that claimed entrepreneur status won six licenses. In addition, the SBA's Cable Television Distribution Services small business size standard is applicable to EBS. There are presently 2,032 EBS licensees. All but 100 of these licenses are held by educational institutions. Educational institutions are included in this analysis as small entities. Thus, we estimate that at least 1,932 licensees are small businesses. Since 2007, Cable Television Distribution Services have been defined within the broad economic census category of Wired Telecommunications Carriers; that category is defined as follows: ``This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in operating and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure that they own and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text, sound, and video using wired telecommunications networks. Transmission facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of technologies.'' The SBA has developed a small business size standard for this category, which is: all such firms having 1,500 or fewer employees. To gauge small business prevalence for these cable services we must, however, use the most current census data that are based on the previous category of Cable and Other Program Distribution and its associated size standard; that size standard was: all such firms having $13.5 million or less in annual receipts. According to Census Bureau data for 2002, there were a total of 1,191 firms [[Page 59230]] in this previous category that operated for the entire year. Of this total, 1,087 firms had annual receipts of under $10 million, and 43 firms had receipts of $10 million or more but less than $25 million. Thus, the majority of these firms can be considered small. 5. Satellite Service Providers Satellite Telecommunications Providers. Two economic census categories address the satellite industry. The first category has a small business size standard of $15 million or less in average annual receipts, under SBA rules. The second has a size standard of $25 million or less in annual receipts. The most current Census Bureau data in this context, however, are from the (last) economic census of 2002, and we will use those figures to gauge the prevalence of small businesses in these categories. The category of Satellite Telecommunications ``comprises establishments primarily engaged in providing telecommunications services to other establishments in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries by forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of satellites or reselling satellite telecommunications.'' For this category, Census Bureau data for 2002 show that there were a total of 371 firms that operated for the entire year. Of this total, 307 firms had annual receipts of under $10 million, and 26 firms had receipts of $10 million to $24,999,999. Consequently, we estimate that the majority of Satellite Telecommunications firms are small entities that might be affected by our action. The second category of All Other Telecommunications comprises, inter alia, ``establishments primarily engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking, communications telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry also includes establishments primarily engaged in providing satellite terminal stations and associated facilities connected with one or more terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to, and receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems.'' For this category, Census Bureau data for 2002 show that there were a total of 332 firms that operated for the entire year. Of this total, 303 firms had annual receipts of under $10 million and 15 firms had annual receipts of $10 million to $24,999,999. Consequently, we estimate that the majority of All Other Telecommunications firms are small entities that might be affected by our action. 6. Cable Service Providers Because Section 706 requires us to monitor the deployment of broadband regardless of technology or transmission media employed, we anticipate that some broadband service providers may not provide telephone service. Accordingly, we describe below other types of firms that may provide broadband services, including cable companies, MDS providers, and utilities, among others. Cable and Other Program Distributors. Since 2007, these services have been defined within the broad economic census category of Wired Telecommunications Carriers; that category is defined as follows: ``This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in operating and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure that they own and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text, sound, and video using wired telecommunications networks. Transmission facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of technologies.'' The SBA has developed a small business size standard for this category, which is: all such firms having 1,500 or fewer employees. To gauge small business prevalence for these cable services we must, however, use current census data that are based on the previous category of Cable and Other Program Distribution and its associated size standard; that size standard was: all such firms having $13.5 million or less in annual receipts. According to Census Bureau data for 2002, there were a total of 1,191 firms in this previous category that operated for the entire year. Of this total, 1,087 firms had annual receipts of under $10 million, and 43 firms had receipts of $10 million or more but less than $25 million. Thus, the majority of these firms can be considered small. Cable Companies and Systems. The Commission has also developed its own small business size standards, for the purpose of cable rate regulation. Under the Commission's rules, a ``small cable company'' is one serving 400,000 or fewer subscribers, nationwide. Industry data indicate that, of 1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but eleven are small under this size standard. In addition, under the Commission's rules, a ``small system'' is a cable system serving 15,000 or fewer subscribers. Industry data indicate that, of 7,208 systems nationwide, 6,139 systems have under 10,000 subscribers, and an additional 379 systems have 10,000-19,999 subscribers. Thus, under this second size standard, most cable systems are small. Cable System Operators. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, also contains a size standard for small cable system operators, which is ``a cable operator that, directly or through an affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than 1 percent of all subscribers in the United States and is not affiliated with any entity or entities whose gross annual revenues in the aggregate exceed $250,000,000.'' The Commission has determined that an operator serving fewer than 677,000 subscribers shall be deemed a small operator, if its annual revenues, when combined with the total annual revenues of all its affiliates, do not exceed $250 million in the aggregate. Industry data indicate that, of 1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but ten are small under this size standard. We note that the Commission neither requests nor collects information on whether cable system operators are affiliated with entities whose gross annual revenues exceed $250 million, and therefore we are unable to estimate more accurately the number of cable system operators that would qualify as small under this size standard. 7. Electric Power Generators, Transmitters, and Distributors Electric Power Generators, Transmitters, and Distributors. The Census Bureau defines an industry group comprised of ``establishments, primarily engaged in generating, transmitting, and/or distributing electric power. Establishments in this industry group may perform one or more of the following activities: (1) Operate generation facilities that produce electric energy; (2) operate transmission systems that convey the electricity from the generation facility to the distribution system; and (3) operate distribution systems that convey electric power received from the generation facility or the transmission system to the final consumer.'' The SBA has developed a small business size standard for firms in this category: ``A firm is small if, including its affiliates, it is primarily engaged in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy for sale and its total electric output for the preceding fiscal year did not exceed 4 million megawatt hours.'' According to Census Bureau data for 2002, there were 1,644 firms in this category that operated for the entire year. Census data do not track electric output and we have not determined how many of these firms fit the SBA size standard for small, with no more than 4 million megawatt hours of electric output. Consequently, we [[Page 59231]] estimate that 1,644 or fewer firms may be considered small under the SBA small business size standard. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements for Small Entities As indicated above, the Internet's legacy of openness and transparency has been critical to its success as an engine for creativity, innovation, and economic development. To help preserve this fundamental character of the Internet, the Order requires that broadband providers must, at a minimum, prominently display or provide links to disclosures on a publicly available, easily accessible Web site that is available to current and prospective end users and edge providers as well as to the Commission, and at the point of sale. Providers should ensure that all Web site disclosures are accessible by persons with disabilities. We do not require additional forms of disclosure. Broadband providers' disclosures to the public include disclosure to the Commission; that is, the Commission will monitor public disclosures and may require additional disclosures directly to the Commission. We anticipate that broadband providers may be able to satisfy the transparency rule through a single disclosure, and therefore do not require multiple disclosures targeted at different audiences. This affects all classes of small entities mentioned in Appendix B, part C, and requires professional skills of entering information onto a Web page and an understanding of the entities' network practices, both of which are easily managed by staff of these types of small entities. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant alternatives that it has considered in reaching its proposed approach, which may include (among others) the following four alternatives: (1) The establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; (3) the use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small entities. The rules adopted in this Order are generally consistent with current industry practices, so the costs of compliance should be small. Although some commenters assert that a disclosure rule will impose significant burdens on broadband providers, no commenter cites any particular source of increased costs, or attempts to estimate costs of compliance. For a number of reasons, we believe that the costs of the disclosure rule we adopt in this Order are outweighed by the benefits of empowering end users to make informed choices and of facilitating the enforcement of the other open Internet rules. First, we require only that providers post disclosures on their Web sites and at the point of sale, not that they bear the cost of printing and distributing bill inserts or other paper documents to all existing customers. Second, although we may subsequently determine that it is appropriate to require that specific information be disclosed in particular ways, the transparency rule we adopt in this Order gives broadband providers flexibility to determine what information to disclose and how to disclose it. We also expressly exclude from the rule competitively sensitive information, information that would compromise network security, and information that would undermine the efficacy of reasonable network management practices. Third, by setting the effective date of these rules as November 20, 2011, we give broadband providers adequate time to develop cost effective methods of compliance. Thus, the rule gives broadband providers--including small entities--sufficient time and flexibility to implement the rules in a cost-effective manner. Finally, these rules provide certainty and clarity that are beneficial both to broadband providers and to their customers. Report to Congress The Commission has sent a copy of the Order, including this FRFA, in a report to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act. In addition, the Commission will send a copy of the Order, including this FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA. B. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis This document contains new information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104- 13. C. Congressional Review Act The Commission has sent a copy of this Report and Order to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A). D. Data Quality Act The Commission certifies that it has complied with the Office of Management and Budget Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 FR 2664, January 14 (2005), and the Data Quality Act, Public Law 106-554 (2001), codified at 44 U.S.C. 3516 note, with regard to its reliance on influential scientific information in the Report and Order in GN Docket No. 09-191 and WC Docket No. 07-52. E. Accessible Formats To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (tty). Contact the FCC to request reasonable accommodations for filing comments (accessible format documents, sign language interpreters, CARTS, etc.) by e-mail: FCC504@fcc.gov; phone: (202) 418-0530 (voice), (202) 418- 0432 (TTY). VIII. Ordering Clauses Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 201, 218, 230, 251, 254, 256, 257, 301, 303, 304, 307, 309, 316, 332, 403, 503, 602, 616, and 628, of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as amended, 47 U.S.C. secs. 151, 152, 153, 154, 201, 218, 230, 251, 254, 256, 257, 301, 303, 304, 307, 309, 316, 332, 403, 503, 522, 536, 548, 1302, this Report and Order is adopted. It is further ordered that Part 0 of the Commission's rules is amended as set forth in Appendix B. It is further ordered that Part 8 of the Commission's Rules, 47 CFR Part 8, is added as set forth in Appendix A and B. It is further ordered that this Report and Order shall become effective November 20, 2011. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a copy of this Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration. List of Subjects 47 CFR Part 0 Cable television, Communications, Common carriers, Communications common carriers, Radio, Satellites, Telecommunications, Telephone. [[Page 59232]] 47 CFR Part 8 Cable television, Communications, Common carriers, Communications common carriers, Radio, Satellites, Telecommunications, Telephone. Federal Communications Commission. Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary. For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 0 to read as follows: PART 0--COMMISSION ORGANIZATION 0 1. The authority citation for part 0 continues to read as follows: Authority: Sec. 5, 48 Stat. 1068, as amended; 47 U.S.C. 155, 225, unless otherwise noted. 0 2. Section 0.111 is amended by adding paragraph (a)(24) to read as follows: Sec. 0.111 Functions of the Bureau. (a) * * * (24) Resolve complaints alleging violations of the open Internet rules. * * * * * 0 3. Add part 8 to read as follows: PART 8--PRESERVING THE OPEN INTERNET Sec. 8.1 Purpose. 8.3 Transparency. 8.5 No Blocking. 8.7 No Unreasonable Discrimination. 8.9 Other Laws and Considerations. 8.11 Definitions. 8.12 Formal Complaints. 8.13 General pleading requirements. 8.14 General formal complaint procedures. 8.15 Status conference. 8.16 Confidentiality of proprietary information. 8.17 Review. Authority: 47 U.S.C. secs. 151, 152, 153, 154, 201, 218, 230, 251, 254, 256, 257, 301, 303, 304, 307, 309, 316, 332, 403, 503, 522, 536, 548, 1302. Sec. 8.1 Purpose. The purpose of this part is to preserve the Internet as an open platform enabling consumer choice, freedom of expression, end-user control, competition, and the freedom to innovate without permission. Sec. 8.3 Transparency. A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network management practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access services sufficient for consumers to make informed choices regarding use of such services and for content, application, service, and device providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings. Sec. 8.5 No Blocking. (a) A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network management. (b) A person engaged in the provision of mobile broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block consumers from accessing lawful Web sites, subject to reasonable network management; nor shall such person block applications that compete with the provider's voice or video telephony services, subject to reasonable network management. Sec. 8.7 No Unreasonable Discrimination. A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic over a consumer's broadband Internet access service. Reasonable network management shall not constitute unreasonable discrimination. Sec. 8.9 Other Laws and Considerations. (a) Nothing in this part supersedes any obligation or authorization a provider of broadband Internet access service may have to address the needs of emergency communications or law enforcement, public safety, or national security authorities, consistent with or as permitted by applicable law, or limits the provider's ability to do so. (b) Nothing in this part prohibits reasonable efforts by a provider of broadband Internet access service to address copyright infringement or other unlawful activity. Sec. 8.11 Definitions. (a) Broadband Internet access service. A mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints, including any capabilities that are incidental to and enable the operation of the communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet access service. This term also encompasses any service that the Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the service described in the previous sentence, or that is used to evade the protections set forth in this part. (b) Fixed broadband Internet access service. A broadband Internet access service that serves end users primarily at fixed endpoints using stationary equipment. Fixed broadband Internet access service includes fixed wireless services (including fixed unlicensed wireless services), and fixed satellite services. (c) Mobile broadband Internet access service. A broadband Internet access service that serves end users primarily using mobile stations. (d) Reasonable network management. A network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access service. Sec. 8.12 Formal Complaints. Any person may file a formal complaint alleging a violation of the rules in this part. Sec. 8.13 General pleading requirements. (a) General pleading requirements. All written submissions, both substantive and procedural, must conform to the following standards: (1) A pleading must be clear, concise, and explicit. All matters concerning a claim, defense or requested remedy should be pleaded fully and with specificity. (2) Pleadings must contain facts that, if true, are sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief requested. (3) Facts must be supported by relevant documentation or affidavit. (4) The original of all pleadings and submissions by any party shall be signed by that party, or by the party's attorney. Complaints must be signed by the complainant. The signing party shall state his or her address and telephone number and the date on which the document was signed. Copies should be conformed to the original. Each submission must contain a written verification that the signatory has read the submission and to the best of his or her knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose. If any pleading or other submission is signed in violation of this provision, the Commission shall upon motion or upon its own initiative impose appropriate sanctions. (5) Legal arguments must be supported by appropriate judicial, Commission, or statutory authority. [[Page 59233]] Opposing authorities must be distinguished. Copies must be provided of all non-Commission authorities relied upon which are not routinely available in national reporting systems, such as unpublished decisions or slip opinions of courts or administrative agencies. (6) Parties are responsible for the continuing accuracy and completeness of all information and supporting authority furnished in a pending complaint proceeding. Information submitted, as well as relevant legal authorities, must be current and updated as necessary and in a timely manner at any time before a decision is rendered on the merits of the complaint. (7) Parties seeking expedited resolution of their complaint may request acceptance on the Enforcement Bureau's Accelerated Docket pursuant to the procedures at Sec. 1.730 of this chapter. (b) Copies to be Filed. The complainant shall file an original copy of the complaint, accompanied by the correct fee, in accordance with part 1, subpart G (see Sec. 1.1106 of this chapter) and, on the same day: (1) File three copies of the complaint with the Office of the Commission Secretary; (2) Serve two copies on the Market Disputes Resolution Division, Enforcement Bureau; (3) Serve the complaint by hand delivery on either the named defendant or one of the named defendant's registered agents for service of process, if available, on the same date that the complaint is filed with the Commission. (c) Prefiling notice required. Any person intending to file a complaint under this section must first notify the potential defendant in writing that it intends to file a complaint with the Commission based on actions alleged to violate one or more of the provisions contained in this part. The notice must be sufficiently detailed so that its recipient(s) can determine the specific nature of the potential complaint. The potential complainant must allow a minimum of ten (10) days for the potential defendant(s) to respond before filing a complaint with the Commission. (d) Frivolous pleadings. It shall be unlawful for any party to file a frivolous pleading with the Commission. Any violation of this paragraph shall constitute an abuse of process subject to appropriate sanctions. Sec. 8.14 General formal complaint procedures. (a) Complaints. In addition to the general pleading requirements, complaints must adhere to the following requirements: (1) Certificate of service. Complaints shall be accompanied by a certificate of service on any defendant. (2) Statement of relief requested--(i) The complaint shall state the relief requested. It shall state fully and precisely all pertinent facts and considerations relied on to demonstrate the need for the relief requested and to support a determination that a grant of such relief would serve the public interest. (ii) The complaint shall set forth all steps taken by the parties to resolve the problem. (iii) A complaint may, on request of the filing party, be dismissed without prejudice as a matter of right prior to the adoption date of any final action taken by the Commission with respect to the petition or complaint. A request for the return of an initiating document will be regarded as a request for dismissal. (3) Failure to prosecute. Failure to prosecute a complaint, or failure to respond to official correspondence or request for additional information, will be cause for dismissal. Such dismissal will be without prejudice if it occurs prior to the adoption date of any final action taken by the Commission with respect to the initiating pleading. (b) Answers to complaints. Unless otherwise directed by the Commission, any party who is served with a complaint shall file an answer in accordance with the following requirements: (1) The answer shall be filed within 20 days of service of the complaint. (2) The answer shall advise the parties and the Commission fully and completely of the nature of any and all defenses, and shall respond specifically to all material allegations of the complaint. Collateral or immaterial issues shall be avoided in answers and every effort should be made to narrow the issues. Any party against whom a complaint is filed failing to file and serve an answer within the time and in the manner prescribed by these rules may be deemed in default and an order may be entered against defendant in accordance with the allegations contained in the complaint. (3) Facts must be supported by relevant documentation or affidavit. (4) The answer shall admit or deny the averments on which the adverse party relies. If the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, the defendant shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. When a defendant intends in good faith to deny only part of an averment, the answer shall specify so much of it as is true and shall deny only the remainder, and state in detail the basis of that denial. (5) Averments in a complaint are deemed to be admitted when not denied in the answer. (c) Reply. In addition to the general pleading requirements, replies must adhere to the following requirements: (1) The complainant may file a reply to a responsive pleading that shall be served on the defendant and shall also contain a detailed full showing, supported by affidavit, of any additional facts or considerations relied on. Unless expressly permitted by the Commission, replies shall not contain new matters. (2) Failure to reply will not be deemed an admission of any allegations contained in the responsive pleading, except with respect to any affirmative defense set forth therein. (3) Unless otherwise directed by the Commission, replies must be filed within ten (10) days after submission of the responsive pleading. (d) Motions. Except as provided in this section, or upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances, additional motions or pleadings by any party will not be accepted. (e) Additional procedures and written submissions. (1) The Commission may specify other procedures, such as oral argument or evidentiary hearing directed to particular aspects, as it deems appropriate. In the event that an evidentiary hearing is required, the Commission will determine, on the basis of the pleadings and such other procedures as it may specify, whether temporary relief should be afforded any party pending the hearing and the nature of any such temporary relief. (2) The Commission may require the parties to submit any additional information it deems appropriate for a full, fair, and expeditious resolution of the proceeding, including copies of all contracts and documents reflecting arrangements and understandings alleged to violate the requirements set forth in the Communications Act and in this part, as well as affidavits and exhibits. (3) The Commission may, in its discretion, require the parties to file briefs summarizing the facts and issues presented in the pleadings and other record evidence. (i) These briefs shall contain the findings of fact and conclusions of law which that party is urging the Commission to adopt, with specific citations to the record, and supported by relevant authority and analysis. (ii) The schedule for filing any briefs shall be at the discretion of the Commission. Unless ordered otherwise [[Page 59234]] by the Commission, such briefs shall not exceed fifty (50) pages. (iii) Reply briefs may be submitted at the discretion of the Commission. Unless ordered otherwise by the Commission, reply briefs shall not exceed thirty (30) pages. (f) Discovery. (1) The Commission may in its discretion order discovery limited to the issues specified by the Commission. Such discovery may include answers to written interrogatories, depositions, document production, or requests for admissions. (2) The Commission may in its discretion direct the parties to submit discovery proposals, together with a memorandum in support of the discovery requested. Such discovery requests may include answers to written interrogatories, admissions, document production, or depositions. The Commission may hold a status conference with the parties, pursuant to Sec. 8.15, to determine the scope of discovery, or direct the parties regarding the scope of discovery. If the Commission determines that extensive discovery is required or that depositions are warranted, the Commission may advise the parties that the proceeding will be referred to an administrative law judge in accordance with paragraph (g) of this section. (g) Referral to administrative law judge. (1) After reviewing the pleadings, and at any stage of the proceeding thereafter, the Commission may, in its discretion, designate any proceeding or discrete issues arising out of any proceeding for an adjudicatory hearing before an administrative law judge. (2) Before designation for hearing, the Commission shall notify, either orally or in writing, the parties to the proceeding of its intent to so designate, and the parties shall be given a period of ten (10) days to elect to resolve the dispute through alternative dispute resolution procedures, or to proceed with an adjudicatory hearing. Such election shall be submitted in writing to the Commission. (3) Unless otherwise directed by the Commission, or upon motion by the Enforcement Bureau Chief, the Enforcement Bureau Chief shall not be deemed to be a party to a proceeding designated for a hearing before an administrative law judge pursuant to this paragraph (g). (h) Commission ruling. The Commission (or the Enforcement Bureau on delegated authority), after consideration of the pleadings, shall issue an order ruling on the complaint. Sec. 8.15 Status conference. (a) In any proceeding subject to the part 8 rules, the Commission may in its discretion direct the attorneys and/or the parties to appear for a conference to consider: (1) Simplification or narrowing of the issues; (2) The necessity for or desirability of amendments to the pleadings, additional pleadings, or other evidentiary submissions; (3) Obtaining admissions of fact or stipulations between the parties as to any or all of the matters in controversy; (4) Settlement of the matters in controversy by agreement of the parties; (5) The necessity for and extent of discovery, including objections to interrogatories or requests for written documents; (6) The need and schedule for filing briefs, and the date for any further conferences; and (7) Such other matters that may aid in the disposition of the proceeding. (b) Any party may request that a conference be held at any time after an initiating document has been filed. (c) Conferences will be scheduled by the Commission at such time and place as it may designate, to be conducted in person or by telephone conference call. (d) The failure of any attorney or party, following advance notice with an opportunity to be present, to appear at a scheduled conference will be deemed a waiver and will not preclude the Commission from conferring with those parties or counsel present. (e) During a status conference, the Commission may issue oral rulings pertaining to a variety of matters relevant to the conduct of the proceeding including, inter alia, procedural matters, discovery, and the submission of briefs or other evidentiary materials. These rulings will be promptly memorialized in writing and served on the parties. When such rulings require a party to take affirmative action, such action will be required within ten (10) days from the date of the written memorialization unless otherwise directed by the Commission. Sec. 8.16 Confidentiality of proprietary information. (a) Any materials filed in the course of a proceeding under this part may be designated as proprietary by that party if the party believes in good faith that the materials fall within an exemption to disclosure contained in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(b). Any party asserting confidentiality for such materials shall so indicate by clearly marking each page, or portion thereof, for which a proprietary designation is claimed. If a proprietary designation is challenged, the party claiming confidentiality will have the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the material designated as proprietary falls under the standards for nondisclosure enunciated in FOIA. (b) Submissions containing information claimed to be proprietary under this section shall be submitted to the Commission in confidence pursuant to the requirements of Sec. 0.459 of this chapter and clearly marked ``Not for Public Inspection.'' An edited version removing all proprietary data shall be filed with the Commission for inclusion in the public file within five (5) days from the date the unedited reply is submitted, and shall be served on the opposing parties. (c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, materials marked as proprietary may be disclosed solely to the following persons, only for use in the proceeding, and only to the extent necessary to assist in the prosecution or defense of the case: (1) Counsel of record representing the parties in the proceeding and any support personnel employed by such attorneys; (2) Officers or employees of the parties in the proceeding who are named by another party as being directly involved in the proceeding; (3) Consultants or expert witnesses retained by the parties; (4) The Commission and its staff; and (5) Court reporters and stenographers in accordance with the terms and conditions of this section. (d) The Commission will entertain, subject to a proper showing, a party's request to further restrict access to proprietary information as specified by the party. The other parties will have an opportunity to respond to such requests. (e) The persons designated in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section shall not disclose information designated as proprietary to any person who is not authorized under this section to receive such information, and shall not use the information in any activity or function other than the prosecution or defense of the case before the Commission. Each individual who is provided access to the information by the opposing party shall sign a notarized statement affirmatively stating, or shall certify under penalty of perjury, that the individual has personally reviewed the Commission's rules and understands the limitations they impose on the signing party. (f) No copies of materials marked proprietary may be made except copies [[Page 59235]] to be used by persons designated in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section. Each party shall maintain a log recording the number of copies made of all proprietary material and the persons to whom the copies have been provided. (g) Upon termination of the complaint proceeding, including all appeals and petitions, all originals and reproductions of any proprietary materials, along with the log recording persons who received copies of such materials, shall be provided to the producing party. In addition, upon final termination of the proceeding, any notes or other work product derived in whole or in part from the proprietary materials of an opposing or third party shall be destroyed. Sec. 8.17 Review. (a) Interlocutory review. (1) Except as provided below, no party may seek review of interlocutory rulings until a decision on the merits has been issued by the Commission's staff, including an administrative law judge. (2) Rulings listed in this paragraph are reviewable as a matter of right. An application for review of such ruling may not be deferred and raised as an exception to a decision on the merits. (i) If the staff's ruling denies or terminates the right of any person to participate as a party to the proceeding, such person, as a matter of right, may file an application for review of that ruling. (ii) If the staff's ruling requires production of documents or other written evidence, over objection based on a claim of privilege, the ruling on the claim of privilege is reviewable as a matter of right. (iii) If the staff's ruling denies a motion to disqualify a staff person from participating in the proceeding, the ruling is reviewable as a matter of right. (b) Petitions for reconsideration. Petitions for reconsideration of interlocutory actions by the Commission's staff or by an administrative law judge will not be entertained. Petitions for reconsideration of a decision on the merits made by the Commission's staff should be filed in accordance with Sec. Sec. 1.104 through 1.106 of this chapter. (c) Application for review. (1) Any party to a part 8 proceeding aggrieved by any decision on the merits issued by the staff pursuant to delegated authority may file an application for review by the Commission in accordance with Sec. 1.115 of this chapter. (2) Any party to a part 8 proceeding aggrieved by any decision on the merits by an administrative law judge may file an appeal of the decision directly with the Commission, in accordance with Sec. Sec. 1.276(a) and 1.277(a) through (c) of this chapter. [FR Doc. 2011-24259 Filed 9-22-11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
TOP-SECRET – Operación Clandestina de la Inteligencia Militar Argentina en México

Una escuadra del Área de Inteligencia 121 dirigido por el General Galtieri intentó matar a la dirigencia Montonera radicada en la capital azteca
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 241
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Gastbeitrag: WIE AUCH SIE “GoMoPa”-Rufmordopfer werden können
Liebe Leserin, lieber Leser!
Stellen Sie sich bitte kurz vor, dass Sie mit einer tollen Geschäftsidee oder einer Geschäftserweiterung zu mehr Geld kommen möchten. Beispielsweise auch Ihr Unternehmen vergrössern oder gar Ihre Waren exportieren wollen.
Sie werben damit natürlich über die Medien….
Da meldet sich bei Ihnen möglicherweise ein Beauftragter des Finanz-Nachrichtendienstes GoMoPamit der Mitteilung, dass im GoMoPa-Forum sehr negative Forenbeiträge über Ihre Person oder Ihr Vorhaben stünden. Äusserst Schlimmes wir über Sie berichtet. Zum Beispiel, dass Sie bisher schonIhr Geld mit betrügerischen Machenschaften verdient hätten oder Ihr Sohn als erfolgreicher Sportler nach neuesten Ermittlungen in einem Kokain-Dealer-Ring verwickelt sei.
Ein anonymer User ( Schreiberling) habe dies geschrieben, wird vom GoMoPa-Beauftragten berichtet. Man könne jetzt noch nicht feststellen, ob dies so wahr sei. Man könne aber auch nicht den Beitrag einfach rausnehmen, denn es könne ja auch was Wahres daran sein!
Falls Sie selbst an der Wahrheitsfindung interessiert seien, könnten Sie auch beim ´seriösen Nachrichtendienst` GoMoPa als Gesellschafter oder als Premium-Mitglied einsteigen, dann könne man ja…..usf. …ganz einfach den Beitrag herausnehmen!
So ähnlich könnte es geschehen und glauben Sie mir: ´Dies ist kein böser Traum,-keine Fata Morgana`, sondern schon Zigtausendmal in der fast 10-Jährigen GoMoPa- Geschichte so abgelaufen.
Wir, von der CSA-Agency, wurden selbst aus Wettbewerbsgründen seit 2002 von GoMoPa auf primitivste Weise im Forum diffamiert oder die von uns als seriöse Dienstleister empfohlenen Unternehmungen wurden per Rufmord mit schmutzigsten, unwahren Verleumdungs-Attacken vonanonymen Bloggern ( bezahlte Helfershelfer vom GoMoPa) nahezu ruiniert. Nicht nur finanziell , sondern auch gesundheitlich nieder gemacht! Nicht umsonst heisst es RUFMORD.
Der Begriff ´Stalking` ist da noch eine vornehme Bezeichnung.
Auf gut deutsch passt Rufmord besser.
Geschäftlicher und gesundheitlicher RUFMORD gehört auch entsprechend bestraft.
Die Justiz tut sich sehr schwer damit. Vor allem, wenn die Rufmörder mit Ihren Machenschaften mit Gesellschaften wie z.B. ´GoMoPa` als Briefkastenfirma aus dem Ausland agieren. UND zum anderen, weil sich die Stalking-Terror-Experten von GoMoPa sich mit ihren Methoden auch der Justiz und der Medien bedienen.
TOP-SECRET – Confirmed Identity of the CIA Official behind 9/11, Rendition & Torture Cases is Revealed
BFP Breaking News: Confirmed Identity of the CIA Official behind 9/11, Rendition & Torture Cases is Revealed
Wednesday, 21. September 2011 by Sibel Edmonds
Alfreda Frances Bikowsky: The Current Director of the CIA Global Jihad Unit
BNBoiling Frogs Post has now confirmed the identity of the CIA analyst at the heart of a notorious failure in the run-up to the September 11th tragedy. Her name is Alfreda Frances Bikowsky and she is the current director of the CIA Jihad Unit. Through three credible sources and documents we have confirmed Ms. Bikowsky’s former titles and positions, including her start at the CIA as an analyst for the Soviet Desk, her position as one of the case officers at the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit-Alec Station, her central role and direct participation in the CIA’s rendition-torture and black sites operations, and her current position as director of the CIA’s Global Jihad Unit.
The producers Nowosielski and Duffy have now made both names available at their website. They also identify the second CIA culprit as Michael Anne Casey. We have not been able to obtain confirmation by other sources on this person yet, but we are still working on it.
Alfreda Frances Bikowsky is the person described in New Yorker journalist Jane Mayer’s book The Dark Side as having flown in to watch the waterboarding of terrorist Khalid Sheikh Mohammad without being assigned to do so. “Its not supposed to be entertainment,” superiors were said to have told her. She was also at the center of “the el-Masri incident,” in which an innocent German citizen was kidnapped by the CIA in 2003 and held under terrible conditions without charges for five months in a secret Afghan prison. The AP characterized it as “one of the biggest diplomatic embarrassments of the U.S. war on terrorism.”
Both the previous and current administrations appear to have deemed Alfreda Frances Bikowsky’s direct involvement in intentional obstruction of justice, intentional cover up, lying to Congress, and overseeing rendition-kidnapping-torture practices as qualifying factors to have kept promoting her. She now leads the CIA’s Global Jihad Unit and is a close advisor to the President.
TOP-SECRET – State Dept Background Briefing on Nuclear Safety
Background Briefing: Preview of High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety
Special Briefing
Via Teleconference
Washington, DC
September 21, 2011
MODERATOR: Thank you callers for joining us today for this background briefing on tomorrow’s High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety at the United Nations. We are delighted to have as our briefer today [Senior State Department Official], hereafter known as Senior State Department Official.
Go ahead and start, [Senior State Department Official].
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you very much, [Moderator]. Thanks for being on the call, everyone. The United States welcomed UN Secretary General Ban’s call for the High-Level Meeting, that will be conducted tomorrow, on Nuclear Security and Safety. This meeting is intended to build political support and momentum at the highest levels for international efforts to strengthen nuclear safety and security.
As you know, the international community has a lot of lessons to learn from the recent Fukushima accident in Japan, which resulted from the tragic earthquake and tsunami that devastated Japan. Indeed, we’re still learning lessons from the Chernobyl disaster, which took place over 25 years ago. The most fundamental lesson for our countries is that nuclear accidents can transcend national borders and have international consequences. A nuclear accident anywhere affects all of us, and it is also important that all states do everything they can to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism because of the global implications and consequences.
Another critical lesson is the necessity of being prepared for the unexpected, especially when it comes to nuclear matters. The double disaster of an earthquake and a tsunami was hard for many to imagine. All states with nuclear power must apply the highest standards for nuclear safety. And the United States wants to set the gold standard for nuclear safety and, frankly, that should be the goal of every state. It’s everyone’s responsibility to own– of each country’s own regulatory body to ensure that its nuclear facilities meet the highest standards of safety.
The United States remains committed to nuclear power as an important component of our energy (inaudible) as well as the world’s. We cannot take nuclear energy off the table, but it must be safe and secure, which is why the United States continues to reaffirm the importance of strengthening the IAEA.
This meeting will welcome the IAEA action on nuclear safety, which calls for states to request voluntary peer reviews on a regular basis to facilitate transparency and improve standards of nuclear safety. The meeting also highlights the importance of nuclear safety and compliments the Nuclear Security Summit that will be hosted next year by South Korea. The South Korea summit is a follow-on to the Nuclear Security Summit that President Obama hosted in April 2010.
I’m happy to answer any questions you might have about the High-Level Meeting tomorrow.
MODERATOR: Great. Before we jump into the questions, just to tell callers that [Senior State Department Official] is on a train, so we are hoping that the line holds. And if you hear funky noise in the background, that’s what it’s about.
Tanya, why don’t you go ahead.
OPERATOR: Thank you. We will now begin the question and answer session. If you would like to ask a question, please press * then 1. To withdraw your question, press * then 2. Once again, to ask a question, please press * then 1. One moment, please, for the first question.
Once again, to ask a question, please press * than 1. One moment please. We do have a question from Bill Freebairn. Your line is open.
QUESTION: Good afternoon. Thanks for holding the call. I was wondering whether the U.S. is going to push or press for additional measures that go, perhaps, beyond what the IAEA is saying about sort of voluntary peer reviews and suggest something a little more mandatory and/or support strengthening of a emergency response capacity, which IAEA has also talked about.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Right. The United States has always been a strong supporter of the IAEA’s peer review programs, both in conducting regular missions in the United States and also urging other countries to do the same. And we always send our senior experts, many of them in leadership capacities, to represent the United States on missions in other countries.
Establishing a mandatory requirement for member-states to submit to regular IAEA peer reviews would require the negotiation of a binding international agreement among member-states that most likely would take several years to come to fruition and no guarantee that all member-states would join in. And that’s why we settled on the voluntary peer review part of this. We are very much open to exploring longer term approaches that could including legally binding requirements, but in the meantime, we believe that these are important voluntary peer reviews that can happen and that will add to the data and the knowledge that we have and the kind of cooperation that we think we need to have.
Bill, your second question was?
QUESTION: It was on the emergency response capacity. IAEA is talking about regional centers, possibly for emergency response. So how does the U.S. support that, and do they see the IAEA as the right organization to coordinate this?
MODERATOR: [Senior State Department Official], are you still on the line? I wonder if we have lost her.
OPERATOR: I show her line as still connected.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Hello?
MODERATOR: Hi. Did you hear the question, [Senior State Department Official]? Do you need it again?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes. No. I just —
MODERATOR: Okay. Go ahead.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I dropped off, I’m now back.
MODERATOR: Okay. Good.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The – after Fukushima, President Obama ordered a comprehensive safety review of all 104 active power plants in the United States – almost a quarter of all nuclear reactors operating around the world. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has already completed its near term inspections, and we believe that it’s important that because you cannot take nuclear energy off the table, we must be able to assert that these plants are safe and secure, which is why the United States continues to reaffirm the importance of strengthening the IAEA. And we also are looking forward to welcoming the IAEA action plan on nuclear safety in this meeting tomorrow, which calls for states to request voluntary peer reviews on a regular basis to facilitate transparency and improve standards of nuclear safety.
QUESTION: Yeah. But on the emergency response capability, there’s been talk about IAEA taking a strong role in putting together regional centers that could respond quickly–
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes.
QUESTION: — to an emergency.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes. And we are looking for the opportunity to support these efforts. We think that the regional approach is a smart one because it provides for the fastest response and gives regions a sense of empowerment, and we look forward to making sure that we can support these issues and hearing more about them tomorrow.
QUESTION: Thank you.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: You’re welcome.
OPERATOR: Once again, if you would like to ask a question, please press * then 1. At this time we have no further questions.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much, and thank you, [Senior State Department Official].
PRN: 2011/1557
TOP-SECRET – Protection of Critical Cyber Assets
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 184 (Thursday, September 22, 2011)] [Proposed Rules] [Pages 58730-58741] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2011-24102] [[Page 58730]] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 18 CFR Part 40 [Docket No. RM11-11-000] Version 4 Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. ACTION: -----------------------------------------------------------------------N otice of proposed rulemaking. SUMMARY: Under section 215 of the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) proposes to approve eight modified Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards, CIP- 002-4 through CIP-009-4, developed and submitted to the Commission for approval by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Electric Reliability Organization certified by the Commission. In general, the CIP Reliability Standards provide a cybersecurity framework for the identification and protection of ``Critical Cyber Assets'' to support the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 requires the identification and documentation of Critical Cyber Assets associated with Critical Assets that support the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. The ``Version 4'' CIP Reliability Standards propose to modify CIP-002-4 to include ``bright line'' criteria for the identification of Critical Assets. The proposed Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards would replace the currently effective Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards. The Commission also proposes to approve the related Violation Risk Factors and Violation Severity Levels with modifications, the implementation plan, and effective date proposed by NERC. DATES: Comments are due November 21, 2011. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number and in accordance with the requirements posted on the Commission's Web site http://www.ferc.gov. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods: Agency Web Site: Documents created electronically using word processing software should be filed in native applications or print-to-PDF format and not in a scanned format, at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp. Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters unable to file comments electronically must mail or hand deliver an original copy of their comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. These requirements can be found on the Commission's Web site, see, e.g., the ``Quick Reference Guide for Paper Submissions,'' available at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp or via phone from FERC Online Support at 202-502-6652 or toll-free at 1-866-208-3676. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jan Bargen (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability, Division of Logistics and Security, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502- 6333. Edward Franks (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability, Division of Logistics and Security, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502- 6311. Kevin Ryan (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6840. Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8408. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: September 15, 2011. 1. Under section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),\1\ the Commission proposes to approve eight modified Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards, CIP-002-4 through CIP-009-4. The proposed ``Version 4'' CIP Standards were developed and submitted for approval to the Commission by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), which the Commission certified as the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) responsible for developing and enforcing mandatory Reliability Standards.\2\ In general, the CIP Reliability Standards provide a cybersecurity framework for the identification and protection of ``Critical Cyber Assets'' to support the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System.\3\ In particular, the Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards propose to modify CIP-002-4 to include ``bright line'' criteria for the identification of Critical Assets, in lieu of the currently-required risk-based assessment methodology that is developed and applied by applicable entities. In addition, NERC developed proposed conforming modifications to the remaining cybersecurity Reliability Standards, CIP-003-4 through CIP- 009-4. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o (2006). \2\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ] 61,062, order on reh'g & compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006), aff'd sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009). \3\ The NERC Glossary of Terms defines Critical Assets to mean ``Facilities, systems, and equipment which, if destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable, would affect the reliability or operability of the Bulk Electric System.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. The Commission proposes to approve Version 4, the Violation Risk Factors (VRFs),the Violation Severity Levels (VSLs) with modifications, the implementation plan, and effective date proposed by NERC. The Commission also proposes to approve the retirement of the currently effective Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards, CIP-002-3 to CIP-009-3. The Commission seeks comments on these proposals to approve. 3. While we propose to approve the Version 4 CIP Standards, like NERC, we recognize that the Version 4 CIP Standards represent an ``interim step'' \4\ to addressing all of the outstanding directives set forth in Order No. 706.\5\ We believe that the electric industry, through the NERC standards development process, should continue to develop an approach to cybersecurity that is meaningful and comprehensive to assure that the nation's electric grid is capable of withstanding a Cybersecurity Incident.\6\ Below, we reiterate several topics set forth in Order No. 706 that pertain to a tiered approach to identifying Cyber Assets, protection from misuse, and a regional perspective. We expect NERC will continue to improve the CIP Standards to address these and other outstanding matters addressed in Order No. 706. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ NERC Petition at 6. \5\ Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure Protection, Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040, order on reh'g, Order No. 706-A, 123 FERC ] 61,174 (2008), order on clarification, Order No. 706-B, 126 FERC ] 61,229 (2009). \6\ Section 215(a) of the FPA defines Cybersecurity Incident as ``a malicious act or suspicious event that disrupts, or was an attempt to disrupt, the operation of those programmable electronic devices and communication networks including hardware, software and data that are essential to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. Moreover, as discussed below, the Commission seeks comments from NERC and other interested persons on establishing a reasonable deadline for NERC to satisfy the outstanding directives in Order No. 706 pertaining to the CIP Standards, using NERC's development timeline. [[Page 58731]] I. Background A. Mandatory Reliability Standards 5. Section 215 of the FPA requires a Commission-certified ERO to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, which are subject to Commission review and approval. Once approved, the Reliability Standards may be enforced by the ERO, subject to Commission oversight, or by the Commission independently.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ See 16 U.S.C. 824o(e). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, the Commission established a process to select and certify an ERO \8\ and, subsequently, certified NERC as the ERO.\9\ On January 18, 2008, the Commission issued Order No. 706 approving eight CIP Reliability Standards proposed by NERC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval and Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,212 (2006). \9\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ] 61,062, order on reh'g & compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006), aff'd sub nom., Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (DC Cir. 2009). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7. In addition, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA,\10\ the Commission directed NERC to develop modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards to address various concerns discussed in the Final Rule. In relevant part, the Commission directed the ERO to address the following issues regarding CIP-002-1: (1) Need for ERO guidance regarding the risk-based assessment methodology for identifying Critical Assets; (2) scope of Critical Assets and Critical Cyber Assets; (3) internal, management, approval of the risk-based assessment; (4) external review of Critical Assets identification; and (5) interdependency between Critical Assets of the Bulk-Power System and other critical infrastructures. Subsequently, the Commission approved Version 2 and Version 3 of the CIP Reliability Standards, each version including changes responsive to some but not all of the directives in Order No. 706.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5). \11\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 128 FERC ] 61,291 (2009), order denying reh'g and granting clarification, 129 FERC ] 61,236 (2009) (approving Version 2 of the CIP Reliability Standards); North American Electric Reliability Corp., 130 FERC ] 61,271 (2010) (approving Version 3 of the CIP Reliability Standards). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Current Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards 8. Reliability Standard CIP-002-3 addresses the identification of Critical Assets and associated Critical Cyber Assets. Pursuant to CIP- 002-3, a responsible entity must develop a risk-based assessment methodology to identify its Critical Assets. Requirement R1 specifies certain types of assets that an assessment must consider for Critical Asset status and also allows the consideration of additional assets that the responsible entity deems appropriate. Requirement R2 requires the responsible entity to develop a list of Critical Assets based on an annual application of the risk-based assessment methodology developed pursuant to Requirement R1. Requirement R3 provides that the responsible entity must use the list of Critical Assets to develop a list of associated Critical Cyber Assets that are essential to the operation of the Critical Assets. 9. In addition, the Commission approved the following ``Version 3'' CIP Standards: CIP-003-3 (Security Management Controls); CIP-004-3 (Personnel & Training); CIP-005-3 (Electronic Security Perimeter(s)); CIP-006-3 (Physical Security of Critical Cyber Assets); CIP-007-3 (Systems Security Management); CIP-008-3 (Incident Reporting and Response Planning); CIP-009-3 (Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets). II. Proposed Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards A. NERC Petition 10. On February 10, 2011, NERC filed a petition seeking Commission approval of proposed Reliability Standards CIP-002-4 to CIP-009-4 and requesting the concurrent retirement of the currently effective Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards, CIP-002-3 to CIP-009-3.\12\ The principal differences are found in CIP-002, where NERC replaced the risk-based assessment methodology for identifying Critical Assets with 17 uniform bright line criteria for identifying Critical Assets. NERC does not propose any changes to the process of identifying the associated Critical Cyber Assets that are then subject to the cyber security protections required by CIP-003 through CIP-009. NERC also submitted proposed VRFs and VSLs and an implementation plan governing the transition to Version 4. NERC proposed that the Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards become effective the first day of the eighth calendar quarter after applicable regulatory approvals have been received. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ NERC Petition at 1. The proposed Reliability Standards are not attached to the NOPR. They are, however, available on the Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. RM11- 11-000 and are available on the ERO's Web site, http://www.nerc.com. Reliability Standards approved by the Commission are not codified in the CFR. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11. On April 12, 2011, NERC made an errata filing correcting certain errors in the petition and furnishing corrected exhibits and the standard drafting team minutes. In the errata, NERC also replaced the VRFs and VSLs in the February 10 petition with new proposed VRFs and VSLs.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ NERC states that the Version 4 VRFs and VSLs are carried over in part from the VRFs and VSLs in the Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards. NERC Petition at 46. The Commission approved the Version 2 and 3 VRFs and VSLs in Docket Nos. RD10-6-001 and RD09-7-003 on January 20, 2011 but required NERC to make modifications in a compliance filing due by March 21, 2011. North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 134 FERC ] 61,045 (2011). The February 10 petition did not carry over the modified Version 3 VRFs and VSLs since it was filed before the March 21 compliance filing. NERC submitted new Version 4 VRFs and VSLs that carried over the modified Version 3 VRFs and VSLs in the April 12 errata. On June 6, 2011, NERC filed the March 21, 2011 compliance filing in the present docket, Docket No. RM11-11-000. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12. In its Petition, NERC states that the Version 4 CIP Standards satisfy the Commission's criteria, set forth in Order No. 672, for determining whether a proposed Reliability Standard is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential and in the public interest.\14\ According to NERC, CIP-002-4 achieves a specified reliability goal by requiring the identification and documentation of Critical Cyber Assets associated with Critical Assets that support the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. NERC opines that the Reliability Standard ``improves reliability by establishing uniform criteria across all Responsible Entities for the identification of Critical Assets.'' \15\ Further, NERC states that CIP-002-4 contains a technically sound method to achieve its reliability goal by requiring the identification and documentation of Critical Assets through the application of the criteria set forth in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-4. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ Order No. 672, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204 at P 323-337. \15\ NERC Petition at 4. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13. NERC states that CIP-002-4 establishes clear and uniform criteria for identifying Critical Assets on the Bulk-Power System.\16\ NERC also states that CIP-002-4 does not reflect any differentiation in requirements based on size of the responsible entity. NERC asserts that CIP-002-4 will not have negative effects on competition or restriction of the grid. NERC also contends that the two-year implementation period for CIP-002-4 is reasonable given the time it will take responsible entities to determine [[Page 58732]] whether assets meet the criteria included in Attachment 1 and to implement the controls required in CIP-003-4 through CIP-009-4 for the newly identified assets. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ Id. at 38. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14. Finally, NERC acknowledges that CIP-002-4 addresses some, but not all, of the Commission's directives in Order No. 706. NERC explains that the standard drafting team limited the scope of requirements in the development of CIP Version 4 ``as an interim step'' limited to the concerns raised by the Commission regarding CIP-002.\17\ NERC states that it has taken a ``phased'' approach to meeting the Commission's directives from Order No. 706 and, according to NERC, the standard drafting team continues to address the remaining Commission directives. According to NERC, the team will build on the bright line approach of CIP Version 4.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ NERC Petition at 6 (citing Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 236). \18\ NERC Petition at 6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 15. Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 contains 3 requirements. Requirement R1, which pertains to the identification of Critical Assets, provides: The Responsible Entity shall develop a list of its identified Critical Assets determined through an annual application of the criteria contained in CIP-002-4 Attachment 1--Critical Asset Criteria. The Responsible Entity shall update this list as necessary, and review it at least annually. Attachment 1 provides seventeen criteria to be used by all responsible entities for the identification of Critical Assets pursuant to Requirement R1. The thresholds pertain to specific types of facilities such as generating units, transmission lines and control centers. For example, Criterion 1.1 provides ``[e]ach group of generating units (including nuclear generation) at a single plant location with an aggregate highest rated net Real Power capability of the preceding 12 months equal to or exceeding 1500 MW in a single Interconnection.'' With regard to transmission, Criterion 1.6 provides ``Transmission Facilities operated at 500 kV or higher,'' and Criterion 1.7 provides ``Transmission Facilities operated at 300 kV or higher at stations or substations interconnected at 300 kV or higher with three or more other transmission stations or substations.'' 16. Reliability Standard CIP-002-4, Requirement R2 requires responsible entities to develop a list of Critical Cyber Assets associated with the Critical Assets identified pursuant to Requirement R1. As in previous versions, the Requirement further states that to qualify as a Critical Cyber Asset, the Cyber Asset must: (1) Use a routable protocol to communicate outside the Electronic Security Perimeter; (2) use a routable protocol within a control center; or (3) be dial-up accessible. In the proposed version, in the context of generating units at a single plant location, the Requirement limits the designation of Critical Cyber Assets only to Cyber Assets shared by a combination of generating units whose compromise could within 15 minutes result in the loss of generation capability equal to or higher than 1500 MW. 17. Requirement R3 requires that a senior manager or delegate for each responsible entity approve annually the list of Critical Assets and the list of Critical Cyber Assets, even if the lists contain no elements. As mentioned above, proposed Reliability Standards CIP-003-4 to CIP-009-4 only reflect conforming changes to accord with the CIP- 002-4 Reliability Standard. C. Additional Information Regarding Attachment 1 Criteria 18. In response to a Commission data request, NERC provided additional information regarding the bright line criteria for identifying Critical Assets.\19\ NERC provided some information regarding the development of the criteria. Further, based on an industry survey, NERC provided information regarding the estimated number of Critical Assets and the number of Critical Assets that have associated Critical Cyber Assets located in the United States that would be identified pursuant to CIP-002-4. For example, NERC indicates that the Version 4 CIP Standards would result in the identification of 532 control centers as Critical Assets with Critical Cyber Assets, and another 21 control centers as Critical Assets without any associated Critical Cyber Assets.\20\ Further, 201 control centers would not be identified as Critical Assets. With regard to Blackstart Resources, NERC's survey results indicate that CIP-002-4 would result in the identification of approximately 234 Blackstart Resources as Critical Assets with associated Critical Cyber Assets, 273 identified as Critical Assets without Critical Cyber Assets, and 35 Blackstart Resources not classified as Critical Assets.\21\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ See April 17, 2011 Commission staff data request issued in Docket No. RM11-11-000. NERC responded to the data request in staggered filings, on May 27, 2011 and June 30, 2011. \20\ NERC June 30, 2011 Data Response at 2-3. \21\ Id. at 3-4. In the June 30, 2011 Data Response, NERC stated that with respect to Blackstart Resources some responsible entities indicated that they had not performed a complete analysis of their systems based on CIP-002-4 and are unsure whether some units may be classified as Critical Assets. Id. at 4. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- III. Discussion 19. Pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(2), the Commission proposes to approve CIP-002-4 to CIP-009-4 as just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. The Commission proposes to approve the VRFs and VSLs, implementation plan, and effective date proposed by NERC. The Commission also proposes to approve the retirement of the currently effective Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards CIP-002-3 to CIP-009-3 upon the effective date of CIP-002-4 to CIP-009-4. The Commission seeks comments on these proposals. 20. Further, as discussed below, the Commission seeks comments from NERC and other interested persons on the proposal to establish a reasonable deadline for NERC to satisfy the outstanding directives in Order No. 706. Specifically, as explained in detail later, the Commission requests comments on: (1) The proposal to establish a deadline using NERC's development timeline for the next version of the CIP Reliability Standards; (2) how much time NERC needs to develop and file the next version of the CIP Reliability Standards; (3) other potential approaches to Critical Cyber Asset identification; and (4) whether the next version is anticipated to satisfy all of the directives in Order No. 706. A. The Commission Proposes To Approve the Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards 21. The Commission, in giving due weight to NERC's Filing, proposes to approve the Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards. The Commission also proposes to approve the implementation plan and effective date proposed by NERC. Version 4 provides a change in three respects: (1) Version 4 will result in the identification of certain types of Critical Assets that may not be identified under the current approach; (2) Version 4 uses bright line criteria to identify Critical Assets, eliminating the use of existing entity-defined risk-based assessment methodologies that generally do not adequately identify Critical Assets; and (3) Version 4 provides a level of consistency and clarity regarding the identification of Critical Assets lacking under Version 3. We [[Page 58733]] separately address each of these reasons for proposing to approve Version 4 below. 1. Critical Asset Identification 22. In its Petition, NERC indicates that, after conducting reviews of CIP-002 compliance, NERC ``determined that the existing methodologies generally do not adequately identify all Critical Assets.'' \22\ While recognizing that CIP version 4 is intended as an ``interim step,'' it appears that the proposed bright line criteria will result in the identification of certain types of Critical Assets (e.g. 500 kV substations) that may not be identified by the approach that is currently in effect. This is reflected in NERC's June 30, 2011 data response, in which NERC presented industry survey data reflecting the application of the bright line criteria in Version 4. To facilitate an analysis of the data, NERC also provided observations and data from several of its earlier industry surveys, including the 2009 ``CIP Self- Certification Survey'' and 2010 ``CIP-002 Critical Asset Methodology Data Request.''. For example, NERC states in the June 30, 2011 data response that in the 2009 survey only 50 percent of substations rated 300 kV and above are classified as Critical Assets while that figure would increase to 70 percent under Version 4.\23\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\ NERC Petition at 11. \23\ Id. at 4. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23. The NERC petition indicates that 270 transmission substations rated 500 kV and above are classified as Critical Assets under Version 3 while, according to the data response, the figure would rise to 437 under Version 4.\24\ This increase is consistent with Criterion 1.6 of Attachment 1 to CIP-002-4, which identifies all transmission substations rated 500 kV as Critical Assets. According to the data response, the 25 percent of generation units rated 300 MVA and above would be identified as Critical Assets under Version 4. Moreover, the proportion of total Blackstart Resources classified as Critical Assets increases due to the required 100 percent coverage of these under Version 4.\25\ Further, the number of control centers identified as Critical Assets increases from 425 under Version 3 to 553 under Version 4, the latter figure representing 74 percent of all control centers. These figures represent increases in certain categories in Critical Asset identification among generation, transmission, and control centers. We also note that NERC's industry survey data indicates decreases in the number of generation and blackstart resources identified as Critical Assets with Critical Cyber Assets. While the bright line thresholds result in the identification of a significant number of additional generation plants rated above 1500 MVA as Critical Assets, the thresholds also result in the identification of less generation below 300 MVA. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\ Id. at 5. \25\ NERC Petition at 17 (explaining that each Blackstart Resource identified in a Transmission Operator's restoration plan is a Critical Asset). In the June 30, 2011 Data Response, NERC's survey found that responsible entities identified 93 percent of Blackstart Resources as Critical Assets. NERC stated that confusion over the term Blackstart Resource may have contributed to the lower percentage, and that responsible entities will be educated on the definition of Blackstart Resource prior to the effective date of CIP-002-4. NERC June 30, 2011 Data Response at 4. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24. As NERC recognizes in its filing, the improvements in Critical Asset identification under Version 4 represent an interim step in complying with the directives in Order No. 706.\26\ As we discuss below, Version 4 should not be viewed as an endpoint but as a step towards eventual full compliance with Order No. 706. 2. Version 4 Removes Discretion in Identifying Critical Assets 25. The proposed Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards discards the current risk-based methodology for identifying Critical Assets. Under the current CIP-002-3, responsible entities are tasked with identifying Critical Assets based on their own risk-based methodology. In the Petition NERC points out that in Order No. 706 the Commission directed NERC to ``provide reasonable technical support to assist entities in determining whether their assets are critical to the Bulk-Power System.'' \27\ NERC explains that it responded to the Commission's direction by developing guidance documents to assist entities in developing their risk-based methodologies and Critical Asset identification.\28\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\ Id. at 10-11 (citing Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 255). \28\ Id. at 11. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26. In its Petition, NERC states that it ``conducted various reviews of risk-based methodologies developed by many entities of varying sizes * * * and determined that the existing methodologies generally do not adequately identify all Critical Assets.'' \29\ To address this, NERC proposes to replace the current risk-based methodology with uniform, bright line criteria, which will be used by all responsible entities to identify Critical Assets. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27. While risk-based assessment methodologies have merit, we share NERC's concerns about the existing application of the currently effective CIP-002-3, Requirement 1. Thus, in this context, we believe that a shift away from responsible entity-designed risk-based methodologies for identifying Critical Assets, which NERC has found to be inadequate, to the use of NERC-developed criteria is an improvement. 3. Version 4 Provides Consistency and Clarity in the Identification of Critical Assets 28. In its June 30, 2011 data response, NERC states that the survey results from 2009 generated concern ``about the apparent inconsistency in the application of the standards across the system, as evidenced by the apparent variation from region to region.'' \30\ NERC states that it subsequently engaged with the Regional Entities and stakeholders to better understand the data, with these efforts resulting in the development of Version 4. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \30\ NERC June 30, 2011 Data Response at 3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29. We believe that the application of uniform criteria is an improvement over the current approach because they add greater consistency and clarity in identifying Critical Assets. The risks posed by cyber threats suggest a different approach than the possibly inconsistent, inadequate methodologies for identifying Critical Assets, as evidenced by NERC's conclusion that insufficient numbers of Critical Assets were identified using the risk-based assessment methodology. As an integrated system, the protection afforded for Critical Assets and their Critical Cyber Assets is only as strong as its weakest link. In this respect, allowing responsible entities to devise their own methodologies for identifying Critical Assets, especially if these methodologies prove to be weak, may compromise the Critical Assets and Critical Cyber Assets of other responsible entities even if they have adopted a more stringent methodology. The uniform system of Critical Asset identification proposed by NERC in Version 4 helps to address this weakness and places all responsible entities on an equal footing with respect to Critical Asset identification. 30. In addition, clear, bright line criteria should make it easier for Regional Entities, NERC and the Commission to monitor responsible entities and evaluate how they are identifying Critical Assets. A single set of bright line criteria, as opposed to [[Page 58734]] myriad entity-designed risk-based methodologies, should improve the CIP compliance process. 31. However, under the currently-effective CIP-002-3, an entity that applies its risk-based assessment methodology considers specific types of assets identified in Requirement R1, as well as ``any additional assets that support the operation of the Bulk Electric System that the Responsible Entity deems appropriate to include in its assessment.'' Thus, currently, a responsible entity has the flexibility to consider any assets it deems appropriate. The Commission also notes that there are assets currently identified as Critical Assets which would no longer be identified as Critical Assets under the Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 bright line criteria for Critical Asset identification. The Commission seeks comment whether, under CIP Version 4, a responsible entity retains the flexibility to identify assets that, although outside of the bright line criteria, are essential to Bulk-Power System reliability. Further, we seek comment whether the ERO and/or Regional Entities would have the ability, either in an event- driven investigation or compliance audit, to identify specific assets that fall outside the bright-line criteria yet are still essential to Bulk-Power System reliability and should be subject prospectively to compliance with the CIP Reliability. If so, on what basis should that decision be made? 32. In addition, the Commission is cognizant of one caution that remains concerning a binary bright line criteria protection philosophy, i.e., either an asset satisfies the threshold and is subject to compliance or is below the threshold and not subject to compliance (as opposed to a tiered approach to compliance as discussed below), in terms of applying cybersecurity protections to Cyber Assets. Specifically, bright line criteria that limit legally-mandated cybersecurity protections to certain classes of Bulk-Power System assets may indicate to an adversary the types of assets that fail to meet the threshold and, therefore, are not subject to mandatory CIP compliance. Therefore, the Commission encourages NERC to accelerate development of the next version of the CIP Reliability Standards and to address the concerns discussed herein in Section B. 4. Violation Risk Factors/Violation Severity Levels 33. NERC states that the proposed VRFs and VSLs are consistent with those approved for the Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards.\31\ NERC explains that each requirement in Version 4 is assigned a VRF and a set of VSLs and that these elements support the determination of an initial value range for the base penalty amount regarding violations of requirements in Commission-approved Reliability Standards, as defined in the ERO Sanction Guidelines.\32\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \31\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 134 FERC ] 61,045 (2011) (approving Version 2 and 3 CIP Reliability Standards VRFs and VSLs but requiring modifications in a compliance filing). \32\ NERC Petition at 37. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 34. The principal changes in the proposed Version 4 VRFs and VSLs relate to CIP-002-4. NERC proposes to carry forward the Version 3 VRFs and VSLs for all other Requirements (in CIP-003-4 through CIP-009-4), for which no substantive revisions are proposed. CIP-002-4 no longer contains sub-Requirements and, instead, each of three main Requirements has a single VRF and set of VSLs, consistent with the methodology proposed by NERC and approved by the Commission.\33\ The VRF designations for the three Requirements in CIP-002-4 are consistent with those assigned to similar Requirements in previous versions of the CIP Reliability Standards and satisfy our established guidelines. Therefore, the Commission proposes to approve the Version 4 VRFs proposed by NERC and incorporate appropriately the modifications directed to prior versions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \33\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 135 FERC ] 61,166, at 8 (2011). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35. With regard to the proposed Version 4 VSLs for CIP-002-4, we are concerned that the VSLs for Requirement R1 and Requirement R2, while carrying forward the wording from corresponding Version 3 VSLs, do not adequately address the purpose of NERC's proposed bright line criteria: To ensure accurate and complete identification of all Critical Assets, so that all associated Critical Cyber Assets become subject to the protections required by the CIP Standards. 36. More importantly, neither set of VSLs address the failure to properly identify either Critical Assets or Critical Cyber Assets in the first place. The failure to identify a Critical Asset, whether inadvertently or through misapplication of the bright line criteria, is paramount because if an Asset is not identified and included on the Critical Asset list, its associated Cyber Assets will not be considered under Requirement R2. Failure to identify those Cyber Assets as Critical Cyber Assets under Requirement R2 then creates the ``weakest link'' circumstance discussed in the Commission's order establishing two CIP VSL Guidelines for analyzing the validity of VSLs pertaining to cyber security.\34\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \34\ CIP VSL Guideline 1 states, ``Requirements where a single lapse in protection can compromise computer network security, i.e., the ``weakest link'' characteristic, should apply binary rather than gradated VSLs.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37. Therefore, the Commission proposes to direct the ERO to modify the VSLs for CIP-002-4, Requirements R1 and R2, to address a failure to identify either Critical Assets or Critical Cyber Assets, as shown in Appendix 1.\35\ The Commission proposes to approve the Version 4 VSLs proposed by NERC, as modified, because they would then satisfy our established guidelines, fully address the purpose of NERC's bright line criteria, and incorporate appropriately the modifications directed to prior versions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \35\ NERC proposes to assign a Severe VSL for a violation of Requirement R1 if a responsible entity does not develop a list of its identified Critical Assets ``even if such list is null.'' NERC does not propose to assign a VSL for a violation of Requirement R1 when a responsible entity fails to identify a Critical Asset that falls within any of the Critical Asset Criteria in Attachment 1, or fails to include an identified Critical Asset in its Critical Asset list. NERC further proposes to assign a Severe VSL to a responsible entity's violation of Requirement R2 only when it fails to include in its list of Critical Cyber Assets a Critical Cyber Asset it has identified. NERC does not propose to assign a VSL for a violation of Requirement R2 resulting from a responsible entity's failure to identify as a Critical Cyber Asset a Cyber Asset that qualifies as a Critical Cyber Asset. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. Implementation Plan and Effective Date 38. NERC proposes an effective date for full compliance with the Version 4 CIP Standards of the first day of the eighth calendar quarter after applicable regulatory approvals have been received. In addition, NERC provides a detailed implementation plan for newly identified Critical Assets and newly registered entities. NERC also presents a number of scenarios intended to explain how CIP-002-4 will be implemented. Depending on the situation, the implementation plan establishes timelines and milestones for entities to reach full compliance with CIP-002-4. 39. The Commission proposes to approve the effective date and implementation plan for CIP-002-4. Under the scenarios presented by NERC, we understand that entities with existing CIP compliance implementation programs will effectively no longer use CIP-002-3 to identify Critical Assets after approval of CIP-002-4 but rather will apply the criteria in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-4. While some responsible entities have already installed the necessary equipment and software to address [[Page 58735]] cybersecurity, we recognize that other responsible entities may need to purchase and install new equipment and software to achieve compliance for assets that are brought within the scope of the protections under the CIP-002-4 bright line criteria. Based on these considerations, the Commission believes that the implementation plan proposed by NERC sets reasonable deadlines for industry compliance. B. Ongoing Development Efforts To Satisfy Directives Set Forth in Order No. 706 40. As acknowledged by NERC, the proposed Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards do not address all of the directives set forth in Order No. 706. Although the Commission proposes to approve CIP-002-4, we highlight the need for NERC, working through the Reliability Standards development process, to address all outstanding Order No. 706 directives as soon as possible. 41. Below, we discuss several directives in Order No. 706 that have yet to be satisfied and propose to give guidance regarding the next version of the CIP Reliability Standards, such as the need to address the NIST framework, data network connectivity, and the potential misuse of control centers or control systems and the adoption of a regional perspective and oversight. Our guidance is intended to more fully ensure that all Cyber Assets serving reliability functions of the Bulk- Power System are within scope of the CIP Reliability Standards. In addition, as discussed below, we seek comments from NERC and other interested persons on a proposal to establish a deadline for NERC to submit modified CIP Reliability Standards that address the outstanding directives set forth in Order No. 706, using NERC's development timeline. 42. The stated purpose of Reliability Standard CIP-002 is the accurate identification of Critical Cyber Assets. Both the currently- effective and proposed CIP-002 Reliability Standards, along with guidance NERC provided to industry,\36\ are structured in a staged approach. First, an entity must identify Critical Assets. NERC defines Critical Assets as ``facilities, systems, and equipment which, if destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable, would affect the reliability or operability of the Bulk Electric System.'' \37\ Second, based on the Critical Assets identified in the first step, an entity must identify Cyber Assets supporting the Critical Assets. The NERC Glossary defines Cyber Assets as ``programmable electronic devices and communication networks including hardware, software, and data.'' \38\ Third, an entity should identify the Critical Cyber Assets by determining, in accordance with the NERC Glossary, the ``Cyber Assets essential to the reliable operation of the Critical Assets.'' \39\ In Order No. 706, the Commission did not address whether or not the staged approach outlined above was the only method for identifying Critical Cyber Assets. Rather at that time, focus was placed on addressing specific concerns with the first step--the identification of Critical Assets. Recognizing CIP-002 as the cornerstone of the CIP Reliability Standards,\40\ a failure to accurately identify Critical Assets could greatly impact accurate Critical Cyber Asset identification and the overall applicability of the protection measures afforded in CIP-003 through CIP-009. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \36\ North American Reliability Corporation Security Guideline for the Electric Sector: ``Identifying Critical Cyber Assets'' Version 1.0, Effective June 17, 2010, at 4-5, and North American Reliability Corporation Security Guideline for the Electric Sector: ``Identifying Critical Assets'' Version 1.0, Effective September 17, 2009. \37\ NERC Glossary of Terms at 11. \38\ Id. \39\ Id. \40\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 234. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 43. In light of recent cybersecurity vulnerabilities, threats and attacks that have exploited the interconnectivity of cyber systems,\41\ the Commission seeks comments regarding the method of identification of Critical Cyber Assets \42\ to ensure sufficiency and accuracy. The Commission recognizes that control systems that support Bulk-Power System reliability are ``only as secure as their weakest links,'' and that a single vulnerability opens the computer network and all other networks with which it is interconnected to potential malicious activity.\43\ Accordingly, the Commission believes that any criteria adopted for the purposes of identifying a Critical Cyber Asset under CIP-002 should be based upon a Cyber Asset's connectivity and its potential to compromise the reliable operation \44\ of the Bulk-Power System, rather than focusing on the operation of any specific Critical Asset(s). The Commission seeks comments on this approach. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \41\ These include the discovery of Stuxnet, Night Dragon and RSA breaches from advanced persistent threats in July 2010, February 2011 and March 2011 respectively, where systems were compromised. \42\ In Order No. 706, the Commission declined to direct a method for identifying Critical Cyber Assets, but stated that it may revisit this circumstance in a future proceeding. See Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 284. \43\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 130 FERC ] 61,211, at P 15 (2010). \44\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(a)(4). The term ``reliable operation'' means ``operating the elements of the bulk-power system within equipment and electric system thermal, voltage, and stability limits so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of such system will not occur as a result of a sudden disturbance, including a cybersecurity incident, or unanticipated failure of system elements.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 44. Further, the Commission seeks comments on how to ensure that the directives of Order No. 706 relative to CIP-002 with respect to the concerns discussed below are addressed, resulting in a method that will lead to sufficient and accurate Critical Cyber Asset identification. 45. The Commission believes that NERC should consider the following three strategies to meet the outstanding directives and seeks comments on these strategies. First, NERC should consider applicable features of the NIST Risk Management Framework to ensure protection of all cyber systems connected to the Bulk-Power System, including establishing CIP requirements based on entity functional characteristics rather than focusing on Critical Asset size. Second, such as in the consideration of misuse, NERC should consider mechanisms for identifying Critical Cyber Assets by examining all possible communication paths between a given cyber resource and any asset supporting a reliability function. Third, NERC should provide a method for review and approval of Critical Cyber Asset lists from external sources such as the Regional Entities or NERC. Each of these strategies is discussed below. 1. NIST Framework 46. In Order No. 706, the Commission directed NERC to ``monitor the development and implementation'' of cybersecurity standards then being developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).\45\ The Commission also directed NERC to consider the effectiveness of the NIST standards.\46\ At that time, the Commission directed NERC to address any NIST provisions that will better protect the Bulk-Power System in the Reliability Standards development process.\47\ While the Commission determined not to require NERC to adopt or incorporate elements of the NIST standards, Order No. 706 left open the option of revisiting the NIST standards at a later time.\48\ The Commission is not here proposing to direct that NERC use elements of the NIST standards. However, we continue [[Page 58736]] to believe that the NIST framework could provide beneficial input into the NERC CIP Reliability Standards and we urge NERC to consider any such provisions that will better protect the Bulk-Power System. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \45\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 233. \46\ Id. \47\ Id. \48\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 47. The NIST Risk Management Framework was developed to manage the risks associated with all information systems, and offers a structured yet flexible approach that can now be applied to the electric industry. The NIST Risk Management Framework guides selection and specification of cybersecurity controls and measures necessary to protect individuals and the operations and assets of the organization, while considering effectiveness, efficiency, and constraints due to applicable laws, directives, policies, standards, or regulations. Each of the activities in the Risk Management Framework has an associated NIST security standard and/or guidance document that can be used by organizations implementing the framework. The management of risk is a key element. 48. Two primary features of the NIST Framework are: (1) Customizing protection to the mission of the cyber systems subject to protection (similar to the role identified by the NERC Functional Model); and (2) ensuring that all connected cyber systems associated with the Bulk- Power System, based on their function, receive some level of protection.\49\ The Bulk-Power System could benefit from each of these tested approaches. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \49\ NIST SP800-53, Section 1.4, Organizational Responsibilities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- a. NIST Approach and the NERC Functional Model 49. The purpose of the NERC CIP Reliability Standards is to specify mandatory Requirements for responsible entities to establish, maintain, and preserve the cybersecurity of key information technology systems' assets, the use of which is essential to reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. The CIP Reliability Standards include Requirements which are based upon the functional roles of the responsible entities as specified in the NERC Functional Model.\50\ The identification of cyber systems and assets used to execute these functional roles should be the first step in identifying the systems for coverage under the CIP Reliability Standards for protection. The Functional Model should be used as a starting point when considering the applicability of the NIST Framework for securing the operation of cyber assets to provide for the Reliable Operation of the Bulk-Power System. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \50\ Reliability Functional Model, Function Definitions and Functional Entities, Version 5, approved by NERC Board of Trustees May 2010; and, Reliability Functional Model Technical Document Version 5, approved by NERC Board of Trustees May 2010. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. NIST Tiered Approach 50. If applied to the Bulk-Power System, the NIST Framework would specify the level of protection appropriate for systems based upon their importance to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. Cyber systems connected to the Bulk-Power System require availability, integrity, and confidentiality to effectively ensure the reliability of the Bulk-Power System. 51. The NIST Framework provides for a tiered approach to cybersecurity protection where protection of some type would be applied to all cyber assets connected to the Bulk-Power System. Under the NIST Framework, cyber assets whose compromise or loss of operability could result in a greater risk to Bulk-Power System reliability would be subject to more rigorous cybersecurity protections compared to a less important asset. The NIST Framework recognizes that all connected assets require a baseline level of protection to prevent attackers from gaining a foothold to launch further, even more devastating attacks on other critical systems. 52. Using the NIST framework, all cyber assets would also be reviewed to determine the appropriate level of cyber protection. The level of protection required for a given cyber asset is based upon its mission criticality and its innate technological risks. 2. Misuse of Control Systems 53. In Order No. 706, the Commission directed NERC to consider the misuse of control centers and control systems in the determination of Critical Assets.\51\ If a perpetrator is able to misuse an asset, the attacker may navigate across and between control system data networks in order to gain access to multiple sites, which could enable a coordinated multi-site attack. Recent cybersecurity incidents \52\ illustrate the importance of restricting connectivity between control systems and external networks, emphasizing the inherent risk exposure created by networking critical cyber control systems. Future mechanisms for identifying when cyber assets require protection will have to examine all possible paths between a given cyber resource and any asset supporting a reliability function. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \51\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 282. \52\ These include the discovery of Stuxnet, Night Dragon and RSA breaches from advanced persistent threats in July 2010, February 2011 and March 2011 respectively, where systems were compromised. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 54. In Order No. 706, the Commission expressed concerns regarding the classification of control centers and the potential misuse of control systems.\53\ With regard to control centers, the Commission noted that responsible entities should be required to ``examine the impact on reliability if the control centers are unavailable, due for example to power or communications failures, or denial of service attacks.'' \54\ In addition, the Commission stated that ``[r]esponsible entities should also examine the impact that misuse of those control centers could have on the electric facilities they control and what the combined impact of those electric facilities could be on the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.'' \55\ The Commission stated that ``when these matters are taken into account, it is difficult to envision a scenario in which a reliability coordinator, transmission operator or transmission owner control center or backup control center would not properly be identified as a critical asset.'' \56\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \53\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 280-281. \54\ Id. P 280. \55\ Id. \56\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 55. In addition, the Commission raised concerns about the misuse of a control system that controls more than one asset.\57\ Specifically, the Commission noted that multiple assets, whether multiple generating units, multiple transmission breakers, or perhaps even multiple substations, could be taken out of service simultaneously due to a failure or misuse of the control system. The Commission stated that even if one or all of the assets would not be considered as a Critical Asset on a stand alone basis, a simultaneous outage resulting from the single point of control might affect the reliability or operability of the Bulk-Power System. The Commission stated ``[i]n that case, the common control system should be considered a Critical Cyber Asset.'' \58\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \57\ Id. P 281. \58\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 56. The Commission is concerned that the proposed CIP-002-4 bright line criteria do not adequately address the Commission's prior directive regarding the classification of control centers or take the potential misuse of control systems into account in the identification of Critical Assets. For example, the proposed bright line criteria leave a number of Critical Assets [[Page 58737]] with potentially unprotected cyber assets, including a total of 222 \59\ control centers with no legal obligation to apply cybersecurity measures. These potentially unprotected control centers involve an unknown number of associated control systems. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \59\ NERC June 30, 2011 Data Response at 3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 57. Consider the following example: Electric grid control system operation in part consists of the collection of raw data needed to run the grid, collected by a SCADA system from intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) (e.g., RTUs and synchrophasors). The SCADA data is typically aggregated by an energy management system (EMS). The EMS may, in some cases, calculate area control error (ACE) and transmit it to a balancing authority, which in turn makes computer based decisions about balancing load and generation. Those decisions are then used by the balancing authority or generation operator as part of an automated generation control (AGC) process. At each of these one or more sites, there are many data network interconnection points with other entities, (e.g., neighboring transmission operators, generation operators, and reliability coordinators) and additional connectivity to corporate data networks and elsewhere, employing several communications technologies. This results in a complex interconnection of cyber assets (including the data of those cyber assets) demanding vigilant protection.\60\ These cyber systems require comprehensive protection because the interconnected system is only as strong as its weakest link. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \60\ See generally, Ron Ross, Managing Enterprise Risk in Today's World of Sophisticated Threats, National Institute of Standards and Technology (2007). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 58. Any failure to take into account the interconnectivity of control systems represents a significant reliability gap. Where modern data networking technology is used for operation of the Bulk-Power System (e.g., control systems, synchrophasors, smart grid), a network- based cyber attack could result in multiple simultaneous outages of grid equipment and cyber systems alike through misuse of a single point of control (e.g., a SCADA control host system). Such an attack could take place by way of a cyber system associated with an asset that falls outside the CIP-002-4 bright line criteria yet is connected in common with other cyber systems on the Bulk-Power System. The risk of a cyber attack is greater now than when Order No. 706 was issued, as borne out by the recent increased frequency and sophistication of cyber attacks. It is critical, therefore, that the Commission's concerns regarding the potential misuse of control centers and associated control systems be addressed in the CIP Reliability Standards. 3. Regional Perspective 59. In Order No. 706, the Commission directed NERC to ``develop a process of external review and approval of critical asset lists based on a regional perspective.'' \61\ The Commission found that ``Regional Entities must have a role in the external review to assure that there is sufficient accountability in the process [and] * * * because the Regional Entities and ERO are ultimately responsible for ensuring compliance with Reliability Standards.'' \62\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \61\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 329. \62\ Id. P 327. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 60. The Commission is concerned that the lack of a regional review in the identification of cyber assets might result in a reliability gap. In Order No. 706, the Commission expressed concerns regarding the need for developing a process of external review and approval of Critical Asset lists based on a regional perspective, and that such lists are considered from a wide-area view. This process would help to identify trends in Critical Asset identification. Further, while we recognize that individual circumstances may likely vary, an external review will provide an appropriate level of consistency.\63\ For example, reliability coordinators may communicate through a common system and compromise of that system could propagate across multiple regions. A cyber compromise can easily propagate across these data and control networks with potential adverse consequences to the Bulk-Power System on multi-region basis. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \63\ Id. P 322. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 61. This problem may become exacerbated by any future revisions to the CIP Reliability Standards that opt to reserve a high level of independent authority to the registered entity to categorize and prioritize its cyber assets. Looking forward, it will be essential for NERC and the Regional Entities to actively review the designation of cyber assets that are subject to the CIP Reliability Standards, including those which span regions, in order to determine whether additional cyber assets should be protected. 4. Summary 62. In summary, the Commission proposes to approve NERC's proposed Version 4 CIP Standards pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA. As discussed above, it appears that the Version 4 CIP Standards represent an improvement in three respects in that they: (1) Will result in the identification of certain types of Critical Assets that may not be identified under the current approach; (2) use bright line criteria to identify Critical Assets, thus limiting the discretion of responsible entities when identifying Critical Assets; and (3) provide a level of consistency and clarity regarding the identification of Critical Assets. 63. While we believe that the Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards satisfy the statutory standard for approval, we also believe that more improvement is needed. As NERC explains in its Petition, the Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards are intended as ``interim'' and future versions will build on Version 4. We believe that the electric industry, through the NERC standards development process, should continue to develop an approach to cybersecurity that is meaningful and comprehensive to assure that the nation's electric grid is capable of withstanding a Cybersecurity Incident.\64\ As discussed above, we believe that some of the essential components of such a meaningful and comprehensive approach to cybersecurity are set forth in Order No. 706. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \64\ Section 215(a) of the FPA defines Cybersecurity Incident as ``a malicious act or suspicious event that disrupts, or was an attempt to disrupt, the operation of those programmable electronic devices and communication networks including hardware, software and data that are essential to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 58738]] 5. Reasonable Deadline for Full Compliance With Order No. 706 64. The Commission issued Order No. 706 on January 18, 2008. In Order No. 706, the Commission approved Version 1 of the CIP Reliability Standards while also directing modifications pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, some of which are described above. Later approved versions of the CIP Reliability Standards, and now the proposed Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards, addressed some of the directives in Order No. 706, but other directives remain unsatisfied. 65. Over three years have elapsed since the Commission issued the Final Rule in January 2008. As discussed above, we believe that it is important for the successful implementation of a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity that NERC timely addresses the modifications directed by the Commission in Order No. 706. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to set a deadline for NERC to file the next version of the CIP Reliability Standards, which NERC indicates will address all outstanding Order No. 706 directives.\65\ This proposal is consistent with the views expressed in the January 2011 Audit Report of the Department of Energy's Inspector General, who found ``that the Commission could have, but did not impose specific deadlines for the ERO to incorporate changes to the CIP standards.'' \66\ Similarly, our proposal is responsive to the Audit Report finding that ``the CIP standards implementation approach and schedule approved by the Commission were not adequate to ensure that systems-related risks to the Nation's power grid were mitigated or addressed in a timely manner.'' \67\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \65\ See NERC's May 27, 2011 Responses to Data Requests, Response 1 (``[t]he standard drafting team expects that the filing for the next version of the CIP Reliability Standards will address the remaining FERC Order No. 706 directives''). \66\ Department of Energy Inspector General Audit Report, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Monitoring of Power Grid Cybersecurity at 6 (January 2011). \67\ Id. at 2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 66. The Commission understands that, under NERC's timeline for the ongoing effort to address all outstanding Order No. 706 directives, it anticipates submitting the next version of the CIP Reliability Standards to the NERC Board of Trustees by the second quarter of 2012, and filing that version the Commission by the end of the third quarter of 2012.\68\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \68\ See NERC's May 27, 2011 Responses to Data Requests, Response 1. See also North American Electric Reliability Corporation Reliability Standards Development Plan 2011-2013 Informational Filing Pursuant to Section 310 of the NERC Rules of Procedure, Docket Nos. RM05-17-000, RM05-25-000, RM06-16-000 at 14 (filed April 5, 2011). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 67. The Commission proposes to establish NERC's current development timeline above as a deadline for compliance with the outstanding Order No. 706 CIP Standard directives. The Commission seeks comments from NERC and other parties concerning this proposal. Further, NERC and other parties may propose and support an alternative compliance deadline. IV. Information Collection Statement 68. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations require that OMB approve certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements (collections of information) imposed by an agency.\69\ The information contained here is also subject to review under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.\70\ We will submit this proposed rule to OMB for review. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \69\ 5 CFR 1320.11. \70\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 69. As stated above, the Commission previously approved Reliability Standards similar to the proposed Reliability Standards that are the subject of the current rulemaking.\71\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \71\ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 130 FERC ] 61,271 (2010). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 70. The principal differences in the information collection requirements and resulting burden imposed by the proposed Reliability Standards in this rule are triggered by the proposed changes in Reliability Standard CIP-002-4. The previous risk-based assessment methodology for identifying Critical Assets will be replaced by 17 uniform ``bright line'' criteria for identifying Critical Assets (in CIP-002-4, Attachment 1, ``Critical Asset Criteria''). Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 would require each responsible entity to use the bright line criteria as a ``checklist'' to identify Critical Assets, initially and in an annual review, instead of performing the more technical and individualized risk analysis involved in complying with the currently-effective CIP Reliability Standards. As in past versions, each Responsible Entity will then identify the Critical Cyber Assets associated with its updated list of Critical Assets. If application of the bright line criteria result in the identification of new Critical Cyber Assets, such assets become subject to the remaining standards (proposed CIP-003-4, CIP-004-4, CIP-005-4a, CIP-006-4c, CIP- 007-4, CIP-008-4, and CIP-009-4), and the information collection requirements contained therein. 71. We estimate that the burden associated with the annual review of the assets (by the estimated 1,501 entities) will be simplified by the ``Critical Asset Criteria'' in proposed Reliability Standard CIP- 002-4. Rather than each entity annually reviewing and updating a Risk- Based Assessment Methodology that frequently required technical analysis and judgment decisions, the proposed bright line criteria will provide a straight forward checklist for all entities to use. Thus, we estimate that the proposal will reduce the burden associated with the annual review, as well as provide a consistent and clear set of criteria for all entities to follow. 72. The estimated changes to burden as contained in the proposed rule in RM11-11 follow. [[Page 58739]] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Annual burden FERC-725B Data collection (per Number of respondents Average number of Average number of Effect of NOPR in RM11- hours upon proposed Version 4) \72\ annual responses burden hours per 11, on total annual implementation of per respondent response \73\ hours RM11-11 (1).................... (2) (3).................... (1) x (2) x (3)........ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Entities that (previously and now) 345 [no change]........ 1 1,880 [reduction of 40 reduction of 13,800 648,600 will identify at least one Critical hours from 1,920 to hours. Cyber Asset [category a]. 1,880 hours]. Entities that (previously and now) 1,144 [reduction of 12 1 120 [no change]........ Reduction of 1,440 137,280 will not identify any Critical Cyber entities from 1156 to hours [for the 12 Assets [category b]. 1,144]. entities]. Entities that will newly identify a increase of 12 1 3,840 \75\............. increase of 46,080..... 46,080 Critical Asset/Critical Cyber Asset [formerly 0]. due to the requirements in RM11-11 \74\ [category c]. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Net Total........................ 1,501 \72\............. .................. ....................... +30,840................ 831,960 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The revisions to the cost estimates based on requirements of this proposed rule are: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \72\ The NERC Compliance Registry as of 9/28/2010 indicated that 2,079 entities were registered for NERC's compliance program. Of these, 2,057 were identified as being U.S. entities. Staff concluded that of the 2,057 U.S. entities, approximately 1,501 were registered for at least one CIP related function. According to an April 7, 2009 memo to industry, NERC noted that only 31% of entities responding to an earlier survey reported that they had at least one Critical Asset, and only 23% reported having a Critical Cyber Asset. Staff applied the 23% (an estimate unchanged for Version 4 standards) to the 1,501 figure to estimate the number of entities that identified Critical Assets under Version 3 CIP Standards. \73\ Calculations for figures prior to applying reductions: Respondent category b: 3 employees x (working 50%) x (40 hrs/week) x (2 weeks) = 120 hours. Respondent category c: 20 employees x (working 50%) x (40 hrs/week) x (8 weeks) = 3200 hours. 20 employees x (working 20%) x (3200 hrs) = 640 hours. Total = 3840. Respondent category a: 50% of 3840 hours (category d) = 1920. \74\ We estimate 12 (or 1%) of the existing entities that formerly had no identified Critical Cyber Assets will have them under the proposed Reliability Standards. This proposed rule does not affect the burden for the 6 new U.S. Entities that were estimated to newly register or otherwise become subject to the CIP Standards each year in FERC-725B, and therefore are not included in this chart. \75\ This estimated burden estimate applies only to the first three year audit cycle. In subsequent audit cycles these entities will move into category a, or be removed from the burden as an entity that no longer is registered for a CIP related function. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Each entity that has identified Critical Cyber Assets has a reduction of 40 hours (345 entities x 40 hrs. x @$96/hour = $1,324,800 reduction). 12 Entities that formerly had not identified Critical Cyber Assets, but now will have them, has [cir] A reduction of 120 hours and an increase of 3,840 hours (for a net increase of 3,720 annual hours), giving 12 entities x 3,720 hrs.@$96/hour = $4,285,440. [cir] Storage costs = 12 entities@$15.25/entity = $183. Total Net Annual Cost for the FERC-725B requirements contained in the NOPR in RM11-11 = $2,960,823 ($4,285,440 + $183 -$1,324,800). The estimated hourly rate of $96 is the average cost of legal services ($230 per hour), technical employees ($40 per hour) and administrative support ($18 per hour), based on hourly rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the 2009 Billing Rates and Practices Survey Report.\76\ The $15.25 per entity for storage costs is an estimate based on the average costs to service and store 1 GB of data to demonstrate compliance with the CIP Standards.\77\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \76\ Bureau of Labor Statistics figures were obtained from http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm, and 2009 Billing Rates figure were obtained from http://www.marylandlawyerblog.com/2009/07 /average_hourly_rate_for_lawyer.html. Legal services were based on the national average billing rate (contracting out) from the above report and BLS hourly earnings (in-house personnel). It is assumed that 25% of respondents have in-house legal personnel. \77\ Based on the aggregate cost of an advanced data protection server. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Title: Mandatory Reliability Standards, Version 4 Critical Infrastructure Protection Standards. Action: Proposed Collection FERC-725B. OMB Control No.: 1902-0248. Respondents: Businesses or other for-profit institutions; not-for- profit institutions. Frequency of Responses: On Occasion. Necessity of the Information: This proposed rule proposes to approve the requested modifications to Reliability Standards pertaining to critical infrastructure protection. The proposed Reliability Standards help ensure the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System by providing a cybersecurity framework for the identification and protection of Critical Assets and associated Critical Cyber Assets. As discussed above, the Commission proposes to approve NERC's proposed Version 4 CIP Standards pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA because they represent an improvement to the currently-effective CIP Reliability Standards. Internal Review: The Commission has reviewed the proposed Reliability Standards and made a determination that its action is necessary to implement section 215 of the FPA. 73. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting requirements by contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive Director, e-mail: DataClearance@ferc.gov, phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873]. 74. For submitting comments concerning the collection(s) of information and the associated burden estimate(s), please send your comments to the Commission, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, [[Page 58740]] Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, phone: (202) 395-4638, fax: (202) 395-7285]. For security reasons, comments to OMB should be submitted by e-mail to: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Comments submitted to OMB should include Docket Number RM11-11 and OMB Control Number 1902-0248. V. Environmental Analysis 75. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\78\ The Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this requirement as not having a significant effect on the human environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying, corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the effect of the regulations being amended.\79\ The actions proposed here fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's regulations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \78\ Order No. 486, Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, FERC Stats. & Regs., Regulations Preambles 1986-1990 ] 30,783 (1987). \79\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification 76. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \80\ generally requires a description and analysis of final rules that will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The RFA mandates consideration of regulatory alternatives that accomplish the stated objectives of a proposed rule and that minimize any significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The Small Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Size Standards develops the numerical definition of a small business.\81\ The SBA has established a size standard for electric utilities, stating that a firm is small if, including its affiliates, it is primarily engaged in the transmission, generation and/or distribution of electric energy for sale and its total electric output for the preceding twelve months did not exceed four million megawatt hours.\82\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \80\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612. \81\ 13 CFR 121.101. \82\ 13 CFR 121.201, Sector 22, Utilities & n.1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 77. The Commission analyzed the affect of the proposed rule on small entities. The Commission's analysis found that the DOE's Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that there were 3,276 electric utility companies in the United States in 2009,\83\ and 3,015 of these electric utilities qualify as small entities under the Small Business Administration (SBA) definition. Of these 3,276 electric utility companies, the EIA subdivides them as follows: (1) 875 Cooperatives of which 843 are small entity cooperatives; (2) 1,841 municipal utilities, of which 1,826 are small entity municipal utilities; (3) 128 political subdivisions, of which 115 are small entity political subdivisions; (4) 171 power marketers, of which 113 individually could be considered small entity power marketers; \84\ (5) 200 privately owned utilities, of which 93 could be considered small entity private utilities; (6) 24 state organizations, of which 14 are small entity state organizations; and (7) 9 federal organizations of which 4 are small entity federal organizations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \83\ See Energy Information Administration Database, Form EIA- 861, Dept. of Energy (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia861.html. \84\ Most of these small entity power marketers and private utilities are affiliated with others and, therefore, do not qualify as small entities under the SBA definition. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 78. Many of the entities that have not previously identified Critical Assets and Critical Cyber Assets are considered small entities. The new CIP version 4 bright line criteria generally result in the identification of relatively larger Bulk-Power System equipment as Critical Assets. For the most part, the small entities do not own or operate these larger facilities. There is a limited possibility that these entities would have facilities that meet the bright line criteria and therefore be subject to the full CIP standards (CIP-002 through CIP-009). The Commission expects only a marginal increase in the number of small entities that will identify at least one Critical Asset under the Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards that have not done so previously. 79. The Commission estimates that only one percent (12) of the small and medium-sized entities that have not previously identified Critical Assets and Critical Cyber Assets will have an increased cost due to the proposed Reliability Standards and their identification of new Critical Cyber Assets. For each of those 12 entities, we anticipate a cost increase associated with creating a cyber security program along with the actual cyber security protections associated with the identified Critical Cyber Assets. The Commission requests comment on the potential implementation cost and subsequent cost increases that could be experienced by such small entities. Small and medium-sized entities that continue to have no Critical Assets will not see any change in their burden. 80. In general, the majority of small entities are not required to comply with mandatory Reliability Standards because they are not regulated by NERC pursuant to the NERC Registry Criteria. Moreover, a small entity that is registered but does not identify critical cyber assets pursuant to CIP-002-4 will not have compliance obligations pursuant to CIP-003-4 through CIP-009-4. 81. The Commission also investigated possible alternatives. These included the Commission's adoption in Order No. 693 of the NERC definition of bulk electric system, which reduces significantly the number of small entities responsible for compliance with mandatory Reliability Standards. The Commission also noted that small entities could join a joint action agency or similar organization, which could accept responsibility for compliance with mandatory Reliability Standards on behalf of its members and also may divide the responsibility for compliance with its members. 82. Based on the foregoing, the Commission certifies that the proposed Reliability Standards will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, no regulatory flexibility analysis is required. VII. Comment Procedures 83. The Commission invites interested persons to submit comments on the matters and issues proposed in this notice to be adopted, including any related matters or alternative proposals that commenters may wish to discuss. Comments are due November 21, 2011. Comments must refer to Docket No. RM11-11-000, and must include the commenter's name, the organization they represent, if applicable, and their address in their comments. 84. The Commission encourages comments to be filed electronically via the eFiling link on the Commission's Web site at http://www.ferc.gov. The Commission accepts most standard word processing formats. Documents created electronically using word processing software should be filed in native applications or print-to-PDF format and not in a scanned format. Commenters filing electronically do not need to make a paper filing. 85. Commenters unable to file comments electronically must mail or hand deliver an original copy of their comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. [[Page 58741]] 86. All comments will be placed in the Commission's public files and may be viewed, printed, or downloaded remotely as described in the Document Availability section below. Commenters on this proposal are not required to serve copies of their comments on other commenters. VIII. Document Availability 87. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the Internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426. 88. From the Commission's Home Page on the Internet, this information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket number field. 89. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's Web site during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at 202- 502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or e-mail at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502- 8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference Room at public.referenceroom@ferc.gov. List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 40 Electric power, Electric utilities, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. By direction of the Commission. Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr., Deputy Secretary. [FR Doc. 2011-24102 Filed 9-21-11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) über die Wirtschaftskriminellen der “GoMoPa” und Ihre “Partner”
Occupy Wall Street Photos 21 September 2011, Day 5
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Wall and Broad Streets at the New York Stock Exchange Closed![]() ![]() |
Liberty Square Camp, 7:20 AM, Mostly Asleep![]() |
Preliminary Schedule for 21 September 2011![]() |
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TOP-SECRET – Colombian Paramilitaries and the United States: “Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web”

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TOP-SECRET – SOUTHERN CONE RENDITION PROGRAM: PERU’S PARTICIPATION
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Contents of this website Copyright 1995-2008 National Security Archive. All rights reser
DIE FINANCIAL TIMES und die seriöse Presse über die erfundenen “Goldman, Morgenstern und Partner” alias “GoMoPa”
TOP-SECRET – Spy Jules Kroll Bond Gets Favor
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 182 (Tuesday, September 20, 2011)] [Notices] [Pages 58319-58321] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2011-24028] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION [Release No. 34-65339] Order Granting Temporary Exemption of Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. From the Conflict of Interest Prohibition in Rule 17g-5(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 September 14, 2011. I. Introduction Rule 17g-5(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange Act'') prohibits a nationally recognized statistical rating organization (``NRSRO'') from issuing or maintaining a credit rating solicited by a person that, in the most recently ended fiscal year, provided the NRSRO with net revenue equaling or exceeding 10% of the total net revenue of the NRSRO for the fiscal year. In adopting this rule, the Commission stated that such a person would be in a position to exercise substantial influence on the NRSRO, which in turn would make it difficult for the NRSRO to remain impartial.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Release No. 34-55857 (June 5, 2007), 72 FR 33564, 33598 (June 18, 2007). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- II. Application and Exemption Request of Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. (``Kroll''), f/k/a LACE Financial Corp. (``LACE''), is a credit rating agency registered with the Commission as an NRSRO under Section 15E of the Exchange Act for the classes of credit ratings described in clauses (i) through (v) of Section 3(a)(62)(B) of the Exchange Act. Kroll traditionally has operated mainly under the ``subscriber-paid'' business model, in which the NRSRO derives its revenue from restricting access to its ratings to paid [[Page 58320]] subscribers. Kroll has informed the Commission that it intends to expand its existing NRSRO business by establishing a new ``issuer- paid'' rating service under which it will issue ratings paid for by the issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of the security being rated. In connection with this planned expansion, Kroll has requested a temporary and limited exemption from Rule 17g-5(c)(1) on the grounds that the restrictions imposed by Rule 17g-5(c)(1) would pose a substantial constraint on the firm's ability to compete effectively with large rating agencies offering comparable ratings services. Specifically, Kroll argues that given that the fees typically associated with issuer- paid engagements tend to be relatively high when compared to the fees associated with its existing subscriber-based business, it is possible that in the early stages of its expansion the fees associated with a single issuer-paid engagement could exceed ten percent of its total net revenue for the fiscal year. Accordingly, Kroll has requested that the Commission grant it an exemption from Rule 17g-5(c)(1) for any revenues derived from non-subscription based business during the remainder of calendar years 2011 and 2012, which are also the end of Kroll's 2011 and 2012 fiscal years, respectively. III. Discussion The Commission, when adopting Rule 17g-5(c)(1), noted that it intended to monitor how the prohibition operates in practice, particularly with respect to asset-backed securities, and whether exemptions may be appropriate.\2\ The Commission has previously granted two temporary exemptions from Rule 17g-5(c)(1), including one on February 11, 2008 to LACE, as Kroll was formerly known, in connection with its initial registration as an NRSRO (``LACE Exemptive Order'').\3\ The Commission noted several factors in granting that exemption, including the fact that the revenue in question was earned prior to the adoption of the rule, the likelihood of smaller firms such as LACE being more likely to be affected by the rule, LACE's expectation that the percentage of total revenue provided by the relevant client would decrease, and the increased competition in the asset-backed securities class that could result from LACE's registration. In granting the LACE Exemptive Order, the Commission also noted that an exemption would further the primary purpose of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (``Rating Agency Act'') as set forth in the Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs accompanying the Rating Agency Act: To ``improve ratings quality for the protection of investors and in the public interest by fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating industry.'' \4\ On June 23, 2008, the Commission, citing the same factors set forth in the LACE Exemptive Order, issued a similar order granting Realpoint LLC a temporary exemption from the requirements of Rule 17g-5(c)(1) in connection with Realpoint LLC's registration as an NRSRO.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Release No. 34-55857 (June 5, 2007), 72 FR 33564, 33598 (June 18, 2007). \3\ Release No. 34-57301 (February 11, 2008), 73 FR 8720 (February 14, 2008). \4\ See Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to Accompany S. 3850, Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, S. Report No. 109-326, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 6, 2006). \5\ Release No. 34-58001 (June 23, 2008), 73 FR 36362 (June 26, 2008). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On September 2, 2010, the Commission issued an Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings (``LACE/Putnam Order'') against LACE and Barron Putnam, LACE's founder as well as its majority owner during the relevant time period. The LACE/Putnam Order found, among other things, that the firm made misrepresentations in its application to become registered as an NRSRO and its accompanying request for an exemption from Rule 17g-5(c)(1). Specifically, the Commission found that the firm materially misstated the amount of revenue it received from its largest customer during 2007.\6\ On November 9, 2010, the Commission issued an Order Making Findings and Imposing A Cease-and-Desist Order (the ``Mouzon Order'') against LACE's former president, Damyon Mouzon. The Mouzon Order found, among other things, that as LACE's president, Mouzon was responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the information provided to the Commission in connection with the firm's NRSRO application and its request for an exemption, and that he knew or should have known that the financial information that LACE provided to the Commission in connection with its NRSRO application and its request for an exemption from Rule 17g- 5(c)(1) was inaccurate.\7\ LACE, Putnam and Mouzon each consented to the entry of those orders on a neither admit nor deny basis. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ In the Matter of LACE Financial Corp. and Barron Putnam, Respondents: Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Pursuant to Sections 15E(d) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and Cease-and-Desist Orders, Release No. 62834 (September 2, 2010). \7\ In the Matter of Damyon Mouzon, Respondent: Order Making Findings and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 63280 (November 9, 2010). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the request that is subject to this Order, Kroll acknowledged the recent orders against LACE and its former owner and president and stated that it has taken significant steps to enhance the compliance and other functions associated with the traditional subscriber-based business, including replacing senior management, retaining new compliance and financial personnel, and adding new independent directors comprising a majority of the board. Kroll has informed Commission staff that LACE's former ownership and management personnel no longer have any ownership or other relationship, financial or otherwise, with Kroll. Kroll has further informed Commission staff that LACE ceased performing any work or analysis in connection with the issuer-paid ratings that were the subject of the LACE Exemptive Order in December 2008. The Commission believes that a temporary, limited and conditional exemption allowing Kroll to enter the market for rating structured finance products is consistent with the Commission's goal of improving ratings quality for the protection of investors and in the public interest by fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating industry. In order to maintain this exemption, Kroll will be required to publicly disclose in Exhibit 6 to Form NRSRO, as applicable, that the firm received more than 10% of its net revenue in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 from a client or clients that paid it to rate asset-backed securities. This disclosure is designed to alert users of credit ratings to the existence of this specific conflict and is consistent with exemptive relief the Commission has previously granted to LACE and Realpoint LLC. Furthermore, in addition to Kroll's existing obligations as an NRSRO to maintain policies, procedures, and internal controls, by the terms of this order, Kroll will also be required to maintain policies, procedures, and internal controls specifically designed to address the conflict created by exceeding the 10% threshold. Finally, the Commission notes that Kroll is subject to the September 2, 2010 Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and- Desist Proceedings against LACE Financial Corp. Section 15E(p) of the Exchange Act, as added by Section 932(a)(8) of the Dodd- [[Page 58321]] Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, requires Commission staff to conduct an examination of each NRSRO at least annually. As part of this annual examination regimen for NRSROs, Commission staff will closely review Kroll's activities with respect to managing this conflict and meeting the conditions set forth below and will consider whether to recommend that the Commission take additional action, including administrative or other action. The Commission therefore finds that a temporary, limited and conditional exemption allowing Kroll to enter the market for rating structured finance products is consistent with the Commission's goal, as established by the Rating Agency Act, of improving ratings quality by fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating industry, subject to Kroll's making public disclosure of the conflict created by exceeding the 10% threshold and maintaining policies, procedures and internal controls to address that conflict, is necessary and appropriate in the public interest and is consistent with the protection of investors. IV. Conclusion Accordingly, pursuant to Section 36 of the Exchange Act, It is hereby ordered that Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc., formerly known as LACE Financial Corp., is exempt from the conflict of interest prohibition in Exchange Act Rule 17g-5(c)(1) until January 1, 2013, with respect to any revenue derived from issuer-paid ratings, provided that: (1) Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. publicly discloses in Exhibit 6 to Form NRSRO, as applicable, that the firm received more than 10% of its total net revenue in fiscal year 2011 or 2012 from a client or clients; and (2) in addition to fulfilling its existing obligations as an NRSRO to maintain policies, procedures, and internal controls, Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. also maintains policies, procedures, and internal controls specifically designed to address the conflict created by exceeding the 10% threshold. By the Commission. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary. [FR Doc. 2011-24028 Filed 9-19-11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
Die “GoMoPa” – Wirecard Lüge
Unveiled – Occupy Wall Street Photos 19 September 2011
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Wall Street at the New York Stock Exchange Closed![]() |
Wall Street Pedestrian Traffic Corraled by Barriers![]() ![]() |
Wall Street Area Financial Buildings Looming over Liberty Camp (aka Zuccotti Park)![]() |
Camp Speakers Corner![]() |
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Bystanders Observing the Speakers![]() |
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Main Camp Pizza Supplier![]() |
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York Ostensible Regulator of Wall Street Banks, One Block From Liberty Camp![]() |
TOP-SECRET – NEW KISSINGER ‘TELCONS’ REVEAL CHILE PLOTTING AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT
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NEW KISSINGER ‘TELCONS’ REVEAL CHILE PLOTTING Nixon Vetoed Proposed Coexistence with an Allende Government National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 255
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Washington D.C., September 19, 2011 – On the eve of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the military coup in Chile, the National Security Archive today published for the first time formerly secret transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s telephone conversations that set in motion a massive U.S. effort to overthrow the newly-elected socialist government of Salvador Allende. “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger told CIA director Richard Helms in one phone call. “I am with you,” the September 12, 1970 transcript records Helms responding. The telephone call transcripts—known as ‘telcons’—include previously-unreported conversations between Kissinger and President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers. Just eight days after Allende’s election, Kissinger informed the president that the State Department had recommended an approach to “see what we can work out [with Allende].” Nixon responded by instructing Kissinger: “Don’t let them do it.” After Nixon spoke directly to Rogers, Kissinger recorded a conversation in which the Secretary of State agreed that “we ought, as you say, to cold-bloodedly decide what to do and then do it,” but warned it should be done “discreetly so that it doesn’t backfire.” Secretary Rogers predicted that “after all we have said about elections, if the first time a Communist wins the U.S. tries to prevent the constitutional process from coming into play we will look very bad.” The telcons also reveal that just nine weeks before the Chilean military, led by Gen. Augusto Pinochet and supported by the CIA, overthrew the Allende government on September 11, 1973, Nixon called Kissinger on July 4 to say “I think that Chilean guy might have some problems.” “Yes, I think he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responded. Nixon then blamed CIA director Helms and former U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry for failing to block Allende’s inauguration three years earlier. “They screwed it up,” the President declared. Although Kissinger never intended the public to know about these conversations, observed Peter Kornbluh, who directs the National Security Archive’s Chile Documentation Project, he “bestowed on history a gift that keeps on giving by secretly taping and transcribing his phone calls.” The transcripts, Kornbluh noted, provide historians with the ability to “eavesdrop on the most candid conversations of the highest and most powerful U.S. officials as they plotted covert intervention against a democratically-elected government.” Kissinger began secretly taping all his incoming and outgoing phone conversations when he became national security advisor in 1969; his secretaries transcribed the calls from audio tapes that were later destroyed. When Kissinger left office in January 1977, he took more than 30,000 pages of the transcripts, claiming they were “personal papers,” and used them, selectively, to write his memoirs. In 1999, the National Security Archive initiated legal proceedings to force Kissinger to return these records to the U.S. government so they could be subject to the freedom of information act and declassification. At the request of Archive senior analyst William Burr, telcons on foreign policy crises from the early 1970s, including these four previously-unknown conversations on Chile, were recently declassified by the Nixon Presidential library. On November 30, 2008 the National Security Archive will publish a comprehensive collection of Kissinger telcons in the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA). Comprising 15,502 telcons, this collection documents Kissinger’s conversations with top officials in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including President Richard Nixon; Defense Secretaries Melvin Laird, Elliot Richardson, and James Schlesinger; Secretary of State William P. Rogers; Ambassador to the U.N. George H.W. Bush; and White House Counselor Donald Rumsfeld; along with noted journalists, ambassadors, and business leaders with close White House ties. Wide-ranging topics discussed in the telcons include détente with Moscow, military actions during the Vietnam War and the negotiations that led to its end, Middle East peace talks, the 1970 crisis in Jordan, U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, and Chile, rapprochement with China, the Cyprus crisis (1974- ), and the unfolding Watergate affair. When combined with the Archive’s previous electronic publication of Kissinger’s memoranda of conversation — The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977 — users of the DNSA will have access to comprehensive records of Kissinger’s talks with myriad U.S. officials and world leaders. Like the Archive’s earlier publication, the Kissinger telcons will be comprehensively and expertly indexed, providing users with have easy access to the information they seek. The collection also includes 158 White House tapes, some of which dovetail with transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations with Nixon and others. Users of the set will thus be able to read the “telcon” and listen to the tape simultaneously. READ THE DOCUMENTS l. Helms/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:00 noon. Eight days after Salvador Allende’s narrow election, Kissinger tells CIA director Richard Helms that he is calling a meeting of the 40 committee—the committee that determines covert operations abroad. “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger declares. Helms reports he has sent a CIA emissary to Chile to obtain a first-hand assessment of the situation. 2. President/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:32 p.m. In the middle of a Kissinger report to Nixon on the status of a terrorist hostage crisis in Amman, Jordan, he tells the president that “the big problem today is Chile.” Former CIA director and ITT board member John McCone has called to press for action against Allende; Nixon’s friend Pepsi CEO Donald Kendall has brought Chilean media mogul Augustine Edwards to Washington. Nixon blasts a State Department proposal to “see what we can work out [with Allende], and orders Kissinger “don’t let them do that.” The president demands to see all State Department cable traffic on Chile and to get an appraisal of “what the options are.” 3. Secretary Rogers, September 14, 1970, 12:15pm (page 2) After Nixon speaks to Secretary of State William Rogers about Chile, Kissinger speaks to him on September 14. Rogers reluctantly agrees that the CIA should “encourage a different result” in Chile, but warns it should be done discreetly lest U.S. intervention against a democratically-elected government be exposed. Kissinger firmly tells Secretary Rogers that “the president’s view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an Allende takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture.” 4) President/Kissinger, July 4, 1973, 11:00 a.m. Vacationing in San Clemente, Nixon calls Kissinger and discusses the deteriorating situation in Chile. Two weeks earlier, a coup attempt against Allende failed, but Nixon and Kissinger predict further turmoil. “I think that Chilean guy may have some problems,” Nixon states. “Oh, he has massive problems. He has massive problems…he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responds. The two share recollections of three years earlier when they had covertly attempted to block Allende’s inauguration. Nixon blames CIA director Richard Helms and former U.S. ambassador Edward Korry for failing to stop Allende; “they screwed it up,” he states. The conversation then turns to Kissinger’s evaluation of the Los Angeles premiere of the play “Gigi.” 5) President/Kissinger, September 16, 1973, 11:50 a.m. (previously posted May 26, 2004) In their first substantive conversation following the military coup in Chile, Kissinger and Nixon discuss the U.S. role in the overthrow of Allende, and the adverse reaction in the new media. When Nixon asks if the U.S. “hand” will show in the coup, Kissinger admits “we helped them” and that “[deleted reference] created conditions as great as possible.” The two commiserate over what Kissinger calls the “bleating” liberal press. In the Eisenhower period, he states, “we would be heroes.” Nixon assures him that the people will appreciate what they did: “let me say they aren’t going to buy this crap from the liberals on this one.” |
TOP-SECRET – Deep Packet Spying Breaches Gmail and All Security
Date: Sat, 17 Sep 2011 20:37:56 -0500
From: Marsh Ray <marsh[at]extendedsubset.com>
To: Discussion of cryptography and related <cryptography[at]randombit.net>
Subject: [cryptography] Another data point on SSL “trusted” root CA reliability (S Korea)
Been seeing Twitter from [at]ralphholz, [at]KevinSMcArthur, and [at]eddy_nigg about some goofy certs surfacing in S Korea with CA=true. via Reddit http://www.reddit.com/tb/kj25j
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/496473.html [below]
It’s not entirely clear that a trusted CA cert is being used in this attack, however the article comes to the conclusion that HTTPS application data is being decrypted so it’s the most plausible assumption. Quoting extensively here because I don’t have a sense of how long “The Hankyoreh” keeps their English language text around. – Marsh
_______________________________________________
cryptography mailing list cryptography[at]randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2011 12:11:59 +0200
From: Ralph Holz <holz[at]net.in.tum.de>
To: cryptography[at]randombit.net
Subject: Re: [cryptography] Another data point on SSL “trusted” root CA reliability (S Korea)
True, we found about 80 distinct certificates that had subject “Government of Korea” and CA:TRUE [1].
In our full dataset from April 2011, however, we found about 30k certificates with this property. None of them had valid chains to the NSS root store. The numbers do not seem to change over time: in Nov 2009, it was about 30k, and about the same in Sep 2010. In the EFF dataset of the full IPv4 space, I find 773,512 such certificates. *Distinct* ones – and the EFF dataset has 5.5m distinct certs. It is a wide-spread problem.
For the case of Korea, [at]KevinSMcArthur found that the issuing certificates have a pathlen of 0, which makes it impossible for the end-host cert to operate as a CA *as long as the client actually checks that extension*. I don’t know which ones do, but it would be a question to ask the NSS developers.
As of now, I don’t think these are really attacker certs, also because the overall numbers seem to point more at some CA software that creates certs with the CA flag on by default.
Although your article seems to indicate something bad is going on over there…
[1] If you want to check, CSVs at:
www.meleeisland.de/korean_hosts_CA_on.csv
www.meleeisland.de/korean_hosts_CA_on_fullchains.csv
www.meleeisland.de/scan_apr2011_ca_on_issuers_not_selfsigned.csv
Ralph
NIS admits to packet tapping Gmail
If proven, international fallout could occur over insecurity of the HTTP Secure system
By Noh Hyung-woong
It has come to light that the National Intelligence Service has been using a technique known as “packet tapping” to spy on emails sent and received using Gmail, Google’s email service. This is expected to have a significant impact, as it proves that not even Gmail, previously a popular “cyber safe haven” because of its reputation for high levels of security, is safe from tapping.
The NIS itself disclosed that Gmail tapping was taking place in the process of responding to a constitutional appeal filed by 52-year-old former teacher Kim Hyeong-geun, who was the object of packet tapping, in March this year.
As part of written responses submitted recently to the Constitutional Court, the NIS stated, “Mr. Kim was taking measures to avoid detection by investigation agencies, such as using a foreign mail service [Gmail] and mail accounts in his parents’ names, and deleting emails immediately after receiving or sending them. We therefore made the judgment that gathering evidence through a conventional search and seizure would be difficult, and conducted packet tapping.”
The NIS went on to explain, “[Some Korean citizens] systematically attempt so-called ‘cyber asylum,’ in ways such as using foreign mail services (Gmail, Hotmail) that lie beyond the boundaries of Korea‘s investigative authority, making packet tapping an inevitable measure for dealing with this.”
The NIS asserted the need to tap Gmail when applying to a court of law for permission to also use communication restriction measures [packet tapping]. The court, too, accepted the NIS’s request at the time and granted permission for packet tapping.
Unlike normal communication tapping methods, packet tapping is a technology that allows a real-time view of all content coming and going via the Internet. It opens all packets of a designated user that are transmitted via the Internet. This was impossible in the early days of the Internet, but monitoring and vetting of desired information only from among huge amounts of packet information became possible with the development of “deep packet inspection” technology. Deep packet inspection technology is used not only for censorship, but also in marketing such as custom advertising on Gmail and Facebook.
The fact that the NIS taps Gmail, which uses HTTP Secure, a communication protocol with reinforced security, means that it possesses the technology to decrypt data packets transmitted via Internet lines after intercepting them.
“Gmail has been using an encrypted protocol since 2009, when it was revealed that Chinese security services had been tapping it,” said one official from a software security company. “Technologically, decrypting it is known to be almost impossible. If it turns out to be true [that the NIS has been packet tapping], this could turn into an international controversy.”
“The revelation of the possibility that Gmail may have been tapped is truly shocking,” said Jang Yeo-gyeong, an activist at Jinbo.net. “It has shown once again that the secrets of people’s private lives can be totally violated.” Lawyer Lee Gwang-cheol of MINBYUN-Lawyers for a Democratic Society, who has taken on Kim’s case, said, “I think it is surprising, and perhaps even good, that the NIS itself has revealed that it uses packet tapping on Gmail. I hope the Constitutional Court will use this appeal hearing to decide upon legitimate boundaries for investigations, given that the actual circumstances of the NIS’s packet tapping have not been clearly revealed.”
Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani[at]hani.co.kr]
How 250,000 US embassy cables were leaked
An innocuous-looking memory stick, no longer than a couple of fingernails, came into the hands of a Guardian reporter earlier this year. The device is so small it will hang easily on a keyring. But its contents will send shockwaves through the world’s chancelleries and deliver what one official described as “an epic blow” to US diplomacy.
The 1.6 gigabytes of text files on the memory stick ran to millions of words: the contents of more than 250,000 leaked state department cables, sent from, or to, US embassies around the world.
What will emerge in the days and weeks ahead is an unprecedented picture of secret diplomacy as conducted by the planet’s sole superpower. There are 251,287 dispatches in all, from more than 250 US embassies and consulates. They reveal how the US deals with both its allies and its enemies – negotiating, pressuring and sometimes brusquely denigrating foreign leaders, all behind the firewalls of ciphers and secrecy classifications that diplomats assume to be secure. The leaked cables range up to the “SECRET NOFORN” level, which means they are meant never to be shown to non-US citizens.
As well as conventional political analyses, some of the cables contain detailed accounts of corruption by foreign regimes, as well as intelligence on undercover arms shipments, human trafficking and sanction-busting efforts by would-be nuclear states such as Iran and Libya. Some are based on interviews with local sources while others are general impressions and briefings written for top state department visitors who may be unfamiliar with local nuances.
Intended to be read by officials in Washington up to the level of the secretary of state, the cables are generally drafted by the ambassador or subordinates. Although their contents are often startling and troubling, the cables are unlikely to gratify conspiracy theorists. They do not contain evidence of assassination plots, CIA bribery or such criminal enterprises as the Iran-Contra scandal in the Reagan years, when anti-Nicaraguan guerrillas were covertly financed.
One reason may be that America’s most sensitive “top secret” and above foreign intelligence files cannot be accessed from Siprnet, the defence department network involved.
The US military believes it knows where the leak originated. A soldier, Bradley Manning, 22, has been held in solitary confinement for the last seven months and is facing a court martial in the new year. The former intelligence analyst is charged with unauthorised downloads of classified material while serving on an army base outside Baghdad. He is suspected of taking copies not only of the state department archive, but also of video of an Apache helicopter crew gunning down civilians in Baghdad, and hundreds of thousands of daily war logs from military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
It was childishly easy, according to the published chatlog of a conversation Manning had with a fellow-hacker. “I would come in with music on a CD-RW labelled with something like ‘Lady Gaga’ … erase the music … then write a compressed split file. No one suspected a thing … [I] listened and lip-synched to Lady Gaga’s Telephone while exfiltrating possibly the largest data spillage in American history.” He said that he “had unprecedented access to classified networks 14 hours a day 7 days a week for 8+ months”.
Manning told his correspondent Adrian Lamo, who subsequently denounced him to the authorities: “Hillary Clinton and several thousand diplomats around the world are going to have a heart attack when they wake up one morning and find an entire repository of classified foreign policy is available, in searchable format, to the public … Everywhere there’s a US post, there’s a diplomatic scandal that will be revealed. Worldwide anarchy in CSV format … It’s beautiful, and horrifying.”
He added: “Information should be free. It belongs in the public domain.”
Manning, according to the chatlogs, says he uploaded the copies to WikiLeaks, the “freedom of information activists” as he called them, led by Australian former hacker Julian Assange.
Assange and his circle apparently decided against immediately making the cables public. Instead they embarked on staged disclosure of the other material – aimed, as they put it on their website, at “maximising political impact”.
In April at a Washington press conference the group released the Apache helicopter video, titling it Collateral Murder.
The Guardian’s Nick Davies brokered an agreement with Assange to hand over in advance two further sets of military field reports on Iraq and Afghanistan so professional journalists could analyse them. Published earlier this year simultaneously with the New York Times and Der Spiegel in Germany, the analyses revealed that coalition forces killed civilians in previously unreported shootings and handed over prisoners to be tortured.
The revelations shot Assange and WikiLeaks to global prominence but led to angry denunciations from the Pentagon and calls from extreme rightwingers in the US that Assange be arrested or even assassinated. This month Sweden issued an international warrant for Assange, for questioning about alleged sexual assaults. His lawyer says the allegations spring from unprotected but otherwise consensual sex with two women.
WikiLeaks says it is now planning to post a selection of the cables. Meanwhile, a Guardian team of expert writers has been spending months combing through the data. Freedom of information campaigner Heather Brooke obtained a copy of the database through her own contacts and joined the Guardian team. The paper is to publish independently, but simultaneously with the New York Times and Der Spiegel, along with Le Monde in Paris and El País in Madrid. As on previous occasions the Guardian is redacting information likely to cause reprisals against vulnerable individuals.
WikiLeaks-named Ethiopian reporter in unredacted cable flees country in fear
An Ethiopian reporter has fled the country after being named in a WikiLeaks cable, in what a media rights group said was the first instance of one of the leaks causing direct repercussions for a journalist.
Wikileaks recently published all its cables unredacted, naming sources that were removed by partner media organisations, including the Guardian.
The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) said reporter Argaw Ashine fled at the weekend after being interrogated over the identity of a government source mentioned in a leaked 2009 US cable. Argaw was the local correspondent for Kenya’s Nation Media Group.
The cable said Argaw was told by an unnamed source that the government would target six journalists from a newspaper seen as critical of the government. That paper closed later that year after citing harassment and intimidation.
Joel Simon, the New York-based CPJ’s executive director, said: “The threat we sought to avert through redactions of initial WikiLeaks cables has now become real. A citation in one of these cables can easily provide repressive governments with the perfect opportunity to persecute or punish journalists and activists.
“WikiLeaks must take responsibility for its actions and do whatever it can to reduce the risk to journalists named in its cables. It must put in place systems to ensure that such disclosures do not reoccur.”
Ethiopian officials on Thursday denied Argaw’s account to the CPJ that he had been harassed and intimidated because of the cable.
A government spokesman said officials had separately arrested five opposition figures on Wednesday, including a journalist, on allegations of terrorism. They follow dozens of other terrorism-related arrests and detentions in recent weeks, including those of two Swedish journalists.
The main opposition coalition said recent events illustrate a pattern of oppression as citizens tire of the longtime leadership and seek change. Human rights groups have long accused Ethiopia of cracking down on political dissent.
Shimeles Kemal, the government spokesman, said Argaw was not pressured to name a source and that Ethiopian law allows journalists to protect their sources.
“This is a very absurd and ridiculous accusation, the allegation that he was threatened by security to leave the country or disclose a source,” Shimeles said.
Argaw has asked the CPJ to not reveal his location.
Eskinder Nega, a journalist and publisher whose newspaper was shut down over allegations that the paper incited violence during disputed elections in 2005, was among the five opposition figures arrested on Wednesday, Shimeles said. After the newspaper was shut down, Eskinder continued to speak critically of the government in public forums, and articles under his byline appeared on opposition-aligned websites.
“According to the police statement, these people have been involved in activities, they have plotted, planned and carefully laid out contrived plans that are likely to wreak havoc in the country through launching terrorist attacks and throwing the country into utter chaos,” Shimeles said.
Opposition party official Negasso Gidada said another person arrested, Andualem Arage, served on the editorial board of an opposition-party newspaper. He denied the charges that the five were involved in terrorist activities.
Negasso said the party newspaper had been advocating for “the right to struggle in a peaceful, democratic, constitutional and legal way.
“The people are fed up because of the social, economic and political situation and the people follow also what is happening in North Africa and Arab countries … and people are saying, ‘When is our turn? When shall we go to the streets?'” he said.
“The attitude is so strong in the country, in the people, soon it will explode, and the government is afraid of that, and by arresting political party members and leaders, the government thinks it will take precautionary measures against that.”
OP-SECRET – CIA Domestic Spying Authorized T
TOP-SECRET – Fukushima Daiichi NPS 15-16 September 2011
17 September 2011
Fukushima Daiichi NPS 15-16 September 2011
Photos released by Tokyo Electric Power Co. 17 September 2011
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Unit 1, Reactor building cover from northern side, Sep 15, 2011.High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_01.jpg |
Unit 1, Reactor building cover from northern side, Sep 15, 2011.High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_02.jpg |
Unit 1, View from large crane around a reactor building, Sep 15, 2011.High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_03.jpg |
Unit 1, Southern direction (Unit 3 & 4) from Unit 1, Sep 15, 2011.High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_04.jpg |
Unit 2, Overview of a reactor building from western hilltop, Sep 15, 2011.High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_05.jpg |
Unit 3, Overview of a reactor building from western hilltop, Sep 15, 2011.High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_06.jpg |
Unit 3, Rubble collection around southwest of a reactor building, Sep 16, 2011.High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_07.jpg |
Unit 3, Rubble collection preparation of a reactor building, Sep 15, 2011.High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_08.jpg |
Unit 4, Overview of a reactor building from western hilltop, Sep 15, 2011.High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_09.jpg |
Unit 4, Rubble collection preparation of a reactor building, Sep 15, 2011.High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_10.jpg |
Unit 5,6, Overview of a reactor building from southwest side, Sep 15, 2011.High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_11.jpg |
Unit 5,6, Maintenance work at port and harbors from Unit 6 seaside yard, Sep 15, 2011.High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_12.jpg |
Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility, overview, Sep 16, 2011.High-resolution: http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-091711/110917_15.jpg |
Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility, overview, Sep 16, 2011. |
TOP-SECRET – ARCHIVE EXPERT TESTIFIES IN FUJIMORI TRIAL

Senior Analyst Kate Doyle providing testimony in the trial against former-president Alberto Fujimori (center)
ARCHIVE EXPERT TESTIFIES IN FUJIMORI TRIAL
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 256
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TOP-SECRET – 2 DE OCTUBRE DE 1968 – Verdad Bajo Resguardo
Mexican President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (right) and Government Minister Luis Echeverría Alvarez
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TOP-SECRET – Bureau of Public Debt Records Eyeball
Bureau of Public Debt Records Eyeball
Federal Register, August 17, 2011
Systems Covered by this Notice
This notice covers all systems of records adopted by the Bureau of
the Public Debt up to April 1, 2011. The systems notices are reprinted
in their entirety following the Table of Contents.
Dated: August 11, 2011.
Veronica Marco,
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Privacy, Transparency, and
Records.
Table of Contents
Bureau of the Public Debt
BPD.001--Human Resources and Administrative Records
BPD.002--United States Savings-Type Securities
BPD.003--United States Securities (Other than Savings-Type
Securities)
BPD.004--Controlled Access Security System
BPD.005--Employee Assistance Records
BPD.006--Health Service Program Records
BPD.007--Gifts to Reduce the Public Debt
BPD.008--Retail Treasury Securities Access Application
BPD.009--U.S. Treasury Securities Fraud Information System
TREASURY/BPD.001
System Name:
Human Resources and Administrative Records--Treasury/BPD.
System Location(s):
Records are maintained at the following Bureau of the Public Debt
locations: 200 Third Street, Parkersburg, WV; 320 Avery Street,
Parkersburg, WV; Second and Avery Streets, Parkersburg, WV; and 799 9th
Street, NW., Washington, DC.
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200 Third Street, Parkersburg, WV![]() |
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TOP-SECRET – TEMPEST and Countermeasures Cables
A sends:
The following 5 cables contain both the word “TEMPEST” and “countermeasures”, all are SECRET//NOFORN:
– 09STATE29527 (Appears to be duplicate of 09STATE29526)
Also:
– 09STATE23578 (Appears to be duplicate of 09STATE29526)
Source: http://laurelai.info/mirrors/cablegate/
The State Department section 12 FAH (Foreign Affairs Handbook) is classified.
VZCZCXYZ0001 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHEK #0293/01 0870902 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 270902Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0846 S E C R E T BISHKEK 000293 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR ACTION OF OIG DEPT FOR NEA/SCA/EX BILL HAUGH DEPT FOR SCA/CEN DAVID GEHRENBECK E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2033 TAGS: AMGT ASEC ASIG AISG SUBJECT: EMBASSY BISHKEK RESPONSES TO RECOMMENDATIONS LISTED IN OIG REPORT NUMBER ISP-S-08-14A, FEBRUARY 2008 REF: A. MCCORMICK/AMBASSADOR YOVANOVITCH E-MAIL DATED FEBRUARY 29 2008 B. OIG REPORT NUMBER ISP-S-08-14A FEBRUARY 2008 Classified By: DCM Lee Litzenberger for Reasons 1.4(g) Here follows Embassy Bishkek responses to the formal and informal recommendations listed in OIG report number ISP-S-08-14A. 1. (C/NF) Recommendation 1: Embassy Bishkek should continue to coordinate with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations to ensure near term installation of locally fabricated mantraps for the vehicle entrances to the embassy compound. (Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with OBO) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post has contracted via RPSO Frankfurt with a German Architectural and Engineering firm to provide 100% design and construction documents for the Mantrap project. To date, Post and OBO have received the 35% design submittal for review and have returned comments. Although most recently some contractual problems have slowed the design effort, Post is confident these issues will be resolved quickly and 100% design documents can be delivered by 30 April. After receiving the final construction documents and OBO Building Permit, Post will proceed to the contracting and construction phase. 2. (C/NF) Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should replace the damaged forced-entry/ballistic-resistant window on the compound access control guard booth servicing the employee parking lot. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post identified the proper replacement glass and ordered the glass directly from Norshield in coordination with OBO/PE/CC/SPE via purchases order SKG-100-08-M-0057. The order for the replacement glass was placed on 01/17/08. On 03/05/08, Post learned that the window reached our dispatch agent in New Jersey. Post anticipates the window will arrive 06/08. Once the replacement glass is received, Post will coordinate with Larry Best and Koburn Stoll from OBO/PE/CC/SPE to request an FE/BR door and window team for installation. 3. (SBU) Recommendation 3: Embassy Bishkek should implement flexible work hours for embassy personnel and encourage employees to vary their arrival and departure times. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs in part. Response: Post is not prepared to implement flexible working hours Embassy wide, but prefers a stepped approach to arrival times by section to help alleviate vehicles waiting outside of the compound to be screened, which is a the security concern that prompted this recommendation. Post has analyzed the congestion problems and contends that the congestion is primarily focused at Post 26 (vehicle CAC) from between 0800 to 0830 while vehicles are waiting for security screening. Post Management has instructed the Facilities Maintenance Section to alter their working hours so that this section would start work at 0800 vice 0830. The Facilities Maintenance Section is by far the largest section that reports directly to the Embassy every morning and modifying their arrival time by 30 minutes should eliminate waiting lines for security screening while still maintaining positive management controls over staff. In addition, the RSO regularly advises all American Staff to vary their routes and times to and from work. 4. (C/NF) Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations should assess the integrity of all affected chancery windows and advise the embassy of any needed work to bring the windows into compliance with security standards. (Action: OBO) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Yvonne Manderville from OBO/PE/DE/SEB visited Post in March 2008. Manderville stated that adhesive properties of the gasket material have failed and caused the gasket to separate from the window pane which has resulted in the degradation of the ballistic properties of the window assemblies. Manderville recommended that Post petition for inclusion in the FEBR window and door replacement program. Post is drafting a cable to OBO and DS requesting a formal condition survey of all FE/BR windows and doors. In this cable Post will also petition for inclusion in the Life Cycle Replacement program. Request will be submitted by May 1, 2008. 5. (S/NF) Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should conduct a complete TEMPEST review of all permanent and temporary classified processing areas at post and provide detailed instructions regarding countermeasures that should be employed to mitigate any proven TEMPEST noncompliance or threat. (Action: DS in coordination with Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post will review and implement the recommendations from the May 2007 Technical Security Assessment. Post has contacted Lee Mason and Mark Steakley from DS/ST/CMP/ECB to request and schedule a TEMPEST review. Mason and Steakley were contacted in mid March and Post is waiting follow-up and confirmation. 6. (SBU) Recommendation 6: Embassy Bishkek should establish a viable alternate command center. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post does not concur. Response: The current alternate command center represents the best option presently available to Embassy Bishkek. The alternate command center is located south of Bishkek not far from the Kyrgyz Presidential mansion and the Diplomatic village. While the road infrastructure could be improved, the location is not remote. In addition, the location is well suited for a helicopter landing zone. There is a large field approximately 600 meters wide and 2 kilometers in length that could accommodate several transport helicopters in the event of an evacuation. The alternate command center has a HF radio base station that when last tested in December 2007 had excellent link quality between Embassy Dushanbe (82%) and Embassy Tashkent (91%). The alternate command center has two computer workstations with dial-up internet access, a photocopier, and a fax. There are two landlines, one IVG line and two satellite phones. The alternate command center can be placed into operation within 30 minutes as demonstrated in a test in December 2007. Furthermore, the location has been fully stocked with medical supplies, emergency rations and water. Embassy Bishkek could not find any blast protection requirements in the applicable Alternate Command Center references in 12 FAH-1 H-261c and 12 FAH 1, Appendix 3. As the Post housing pool evolves, Post will continue to seek a better Alternate Command Center, but the current location is the best option at the present time. 7. (SBU) Recommendation 7: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should evaluate post's current safe haven and initiate a physical security upgrade project to bring the safe haven into conformance with current requirements. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post's safe haven area is too small to protect all employees assigned to Embassy Bishkek. Until the annex is built, Post initiated coordination with Yvonne Manderville OBO/PE/DE/SEB and Dale Amdahl DS/PCB/PSD to identify and implement viable alternatives such as constructing safe areas in the warehouse, facilities maintenance building and health unit/caf. Post's floor warden training addresses refuge locations within the Chancery. 8. (SBU) Recommendation 8: Embassy Bishkek should develop and implement a formal agreement with Manas Air Base for the evacuation of Americans and qualifying locally employed staff members. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: The Embassy has explored the recommendation. In doing so we have learned that a formal agreement between Embassy Bishkek and Manas Coalition Airbase for the evacuation of Americans and qualifying locally employed staff members and selected foreign nationals, is not necessary to ensure Noncombatant Evacuation Operations are accomplished, and the base is not authorized by USCENTCOM to conclude such an agreement. There are mechanisms in place for the efficient and proper coordination and planning for this contingency which should be followed to ensure forces and assets are available during emergency situations. Embassy Bishkek has therefore coordinated with USCENTCOM to ensure contingency planning options are in-place, to include evacuation of Embassy personnel, and fully coordinated with other affected agencies (USTRANSCOM, DOS, and JCS) IAW applicable directives. 9. (SBU) Recommendation 9: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should conduct a security assessment to determine whether static residential guards are required in addition to the centralized alarm monitoring system and mobile patrol. (Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with DS) Management decision: Post concurs, with comment. Response: Post will conduct, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic security an assessment outlined in 12 FAH-6 H-521.1. Post is confident the assessment will reaffirm that the residential security program is necessary for the safety and security of personnel assigned to Embassy Bishkek. Targeted date for completion is 30 June 2008. The greatest threat against Americans in Bishkek is crime. In February 1994 Embassy Bishkek instructed the Local Guard Commander to implement a night residential security program. In October 2002, the RSO identified a local alarm company that had the technical capability to install and monitor alarms and panic buttons at Embassy residences. However, in January 2008 the new Minister of Internal Affairs announced that MVD would no longer provide a quick reaction force to respond to alarms. In addition, RSO Bishkek is only authorized one, 24 hour mobile patrol. This means that response time to residences in the event of an emergency is too slow. Although the distance between the southernmost and northernmost residence is only 8 miles, the infrastructure and traffic can delay response time by more than 30 minutes. In addition, Mobile Patrol can only check each residence two or three times in a 12 hour shift. This situation is untenable. Since 2006, residential LGF have detected and deterred 4 instances of attempted vandalism to Embassy employee vehicles at their residences. LGF residential guards have deterred assault and when tasked provided temporary 24 hour residential security for American Officers who the RSO had reason to believe were being threatened by host nation intelligence and or organized crime. Finally, residential security guards were able to monitor and report regarding an incident in which a vehicle belonging to the son-in-law of the former deputy chief of the Kyrgyz Intelligence service was deliberately torched within 30 feet of an apartment building which, at the time, housed four Embassy employees and their families. Since the Embassy began using the alarm company, the Police have not had to respond to incidents at residences during the night when the guards were present. The alarms have only been needed during the day when the guards are not present. The statistic speaks for itself. The residential guards are a definite deterrent against acts of violence and vandalism against American Officers. Embassy Bishkek, if required to choose between residential alarms and residential guards, would choose to maintain the residential guards, as a more viable means of protecting the lives of the American officers and their dependents. 10. (C/NF) Recommendation 10: Embassy Bishkek should install shatter-resistant window film on all windows that the regional security officer considers vulnerable at the chief of mission residence. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post's Facilities Maintenance Section has scheduled a survey of the CMR to identify all windows that are not currently protected by shatter-resistant window film. Post currently has film on hand and will contract with a local contractor for installation. Targeted date of completion is May 31, 2008. 11. (SBU) Recommendation 11: Embassy Bishkek should install grilles on all accessible windows in the chief of mission residence safe area and fit one window grille with an interior emergency release device for emergency egress. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: RSO in conjunction with the FM at Post has scheduled a review and update of the existing physical security assessment of the CMR in accordance with residential security standards 12 FAH-6 H-400, 12 FAH-6 H-113.10 and 12 FAH-8 H-520. Any deficiencies discovered during this review will be corrected to conform to the standards. Targeted date of completion is July 31, 2008. 12. (U) Recommendation 12: Embassy Bishkek should pursue and secure a formal agreement with Manas Air force Base, including reimbursement, for investigative support provided by the regional security office. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post FMO has contacted Manas Air Base Chief Financial Officer regarding this recomendation and has requested a meeting to explore the concept of reimbursement for investigative services provided by the Embassy on behalf of Manas Air Base. Post RSO and FMO are working closley to accurately identify and quantify associated cost related to investigations. Once Post's analysis is complete the FMO will coordinate with Manas Air Base Chief Finance Officer to establish a formal agreement that outlines workload counts and a reimbursement plan for investigations completed by RSO Foreign Service National Investigators on behalf of Manas Air Base. 13. (C/NF) Recommendation 13: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with the Bureaus of Overseas Buildings Operations and Diplomatic Security, should modify the facility manager's existing office space to bring it into compliance with current physical security protection standards. (Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with OBO and DS) Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Although Post concurs with this recommendation, a short term solution is unlikely. The existing Facilities Managers Office is a loft in the Maintenance Shop Building. This building is a pre-engineered building (Butler Building) and is physically unable to handle the load that would be applied to the structure by the addition of making this area compliant with current physical security protection standards. Post has been actively pursuing with OBO a new office annex (NOX), which is a long term solution to holistically address all of our space and space related security concerns. Post is currently on the "Top 80 List" for 2011 and a back-up for 2010. However, Embassy Bishkek Facilities Maintenance Officer and the Regional Security Officer will prepare a waiver and exception package for DS/PSD/PCB review and approval. Targeted date for submission of the waiver and exception request to DS/PSD/PCB is June 2008. 14. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 1: The inner CAC building (post two) lacks any form of protective window treatment on its windows. Occupants are susceptible to flying glass if a bomb attack occurred on the east side of the compound. Embassy Bishkek should install shatter-resistant window film on all post two windows that the regional security officer deems vulnerable to blast. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: Post's Facilities Maintenance Section will conduct a survey of Post 2 and identify all windows that are not currently protected by shatter-resistant window film. Post currently has film on hand and will contract with a local contractor for installation. Targeted date of completion is May 31, 2008. 15. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 2: The presence of a concrete barrier adjacent to the east side vehicular CAC, a large boulder adjacent to the northwest corner of the compound wall, and a stoplight fixture adjacent to the service CAC provide footholds that an intruder could use to scale the compound wall. Embassy Bishkek should remove or relocate the concrete barrier, boulder, and stoplight that are adjacent to the embassy compound fence. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: In March Post relocated the concrete barriers and large boulders so that they are at least 2.75 meters from the compound wall and can no longer be used as a foothold. The location of the stoplight fixture will be relocated during the construction of the mantrap for that CAC later this year. 16. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 3: The rear hardline door leading to the temporary trailers is not covered by an exterior camera. The Marine at Post One cannot positively determine who he is letting into the chancery. Without a camera, he could either allow an intruder to enter or deny entry to a trusted employee in an emergency. Embassy Bishkek should install a camera to cover this area. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: The regional ESO from Astana concurs with this recommendation; ESO will relocate camera #28 so that it provides video coverage of this entrance to the Chancery. Additional materials required for this project are on-hand and this project has been added to the active work list as a priority. Targeted completion date is June 30th 17. (SBU) Informal Recommendation 4: The emergency plan for Embassy Bishkek has not been entered into the crisis and emergency planning application. Embassy Bishkek should direct section heads to input the missing data before February 2008. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: In February Post completed the unclassified portion of the EAP and entered it into the crisis and emergency planning application. Post is waiting for DS/IP/SPC/EP to advise that the software glitch has been fixed to allow Post to publish the classified sections as well. 18. (SBU) Informal Recommendation 5: The emergency notification system does not cover the embassy's built-in conference room or the workspace just outside the two CAA temporary office trailers. Embassy Bishkek should install speaker systems at these two locations. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: The regional ESO from Astana concurs with this recommendation; additional speakers and other materials required for this project are on-hand and this project has been added to the active work list as a priority. Targeted completion date is June 30th. 19. (SBU) Informal Recommendation 6: The physical security exceptions for three locations within the compound are not valid. Embassy Bishkek should update the existing physical security exceptions for the medical unit, cafeteria, and CAA office trailers. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: The waiver for exceptions to physical security standards for the CAA office trailer is valid. However, the Health Unit/Caf waiver is no longer valid. As a result of post growth, the Health Unit and Cafeteria are now staffed by employees more than 4 hours per day. Embassy Bishkek will resubmit a waiver and exception packet for the health unit/cafeteria. Targeted submission date is 30 June. 20. (U) Informal Recommendation 7: Several apartment stairwells do not have lighting at night. Embassy Bishkek should explore gaining landlord agreement to install motion activated lights in stairwells and issue flashlights to employees in the interim. Management decision: Post does not concur. Response: Post has conducted an informal survey of all direct hire American staff who receive Embassy provide housing and other than individual incidents of actual light bulbs being burned out, all stairwells have adequate lighting installed. In addition to this, every Friday, the Facilities Maintenance Section Electricians in conjunction with the Local Guard Force make inspections of existing security lighting. Lights are tested in guard booths and stairwells and any maintenance work orders that have been submitted citing security lighting issues are repaired at this time. 21. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 8: The grilles on the CMR rear doors do not have latches and cannot be secured from inside the residence. Embassy Bishkek should secure these grilles. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: RSO in conjunction with the FM at Post will review and update the existing physical security assessment of the CMR in accordance with residential security standards 12 FAH-6 H-400, 12 FAH-6 H-113.10 and 12 FAH-8 H-520. Any deficiencies discovered during this review will be corrected to conform to the standards. Expected completion date is 1 May 2008. 22. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 9: The passive infrared sensor in the living room of the CMR on the rear of the building is inoperative. Embassy Bishkek should repair this infrared sensor. Management decision: Post concurs. Response: The local security company that installs and maintains all of our residential alarm systems visited the CMR on March 19, 2008. The entire alarm system was inspected and tested. It was found that some faulty wiring was causing the infrared sensor from operating properly, wiring was repaired and a complete operational test was conducted with satisfactory results. YOVANOVITCH
R 061518Z JAN 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMCONSUL ISTANBUL INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA CIA WASHINGTON DC/DO/MSP-MCGSOC/ 2364 DIA WASHINGTON DC/ JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3SOD// HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL/ HQ EUCOM VAIHINGEN GE/ COMSOCEUR/ USASOC FT BRAGG NC/ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL S E C R E T STATE 000869 DDSO FOR CAPT. SONG USSOCOM FOR MR. BRIAN MILLER POST FOR RSO POST FOR IMO POST FOR ADANA PRETORIA FOR RIMC E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018 TAGS: ACOA AEMR AMGT ASEC SUBJECT: EUCOM(AF) REGIONAL SURVEY TEAM PCC ACCESS - AMEMBASSY ANKARA REF: A. USSOCOM SCSO J2 MACDILL AFB B. FL 111131Z DEC 08 C. 08 ANKARA 2153 Classified By: JAMES MCDERMOTT, DIRECTOR, DS/IP/SPC, REASON 1.4(G) 1. (U) ACTION POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS TELEGRAM VIA CABLE TO INFO DS/IP/SPC AND IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/CSB STATING CONCURRENCE AND/OR NONCONCURRENCE. 2. (U) FOR ATO AF: PLEASE FORWARD YOUR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION REQUEST TO IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/CSB AND INFO DS/IP/SPC. ANY FURTHER INQUIRIES CAN BE DIRECTED TO YOUR OC/COMSEC. 3. (U) IRM/BPC/CST/LD/OB AND IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/CSB HAVE CLEARED THIS TELEGRAM. 4. (S) THE FOLLOWING RST MEMBERS WILL VISIT AMEMBASSY ANKARA AS WELL AS CONSULATE GENERAL ISTANBUL AND US CONSULATE ADANA ON JANUARY 14, 2009 TO FEBRUARY 14, 2009 TO CONDUCT A SECURITY PROGRAM SURVEY OF THE FACILITY. THE FOLLOWING TEAM MEMBERS WHO POSSESS TOP SECRET (TS) CLEARANCES ARE AUTHORIZED ESCORTED ACCESS TO THE PCC IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5FAH-6 H124.4 E, G, H: NAME SSN CLEARANCE MANN, JAMES R. XXX-XX-XXXX TS/SCI MCKINNON, ISAIAH XXX-XX-XXXX TS/SCI DRAPER, DONALD W. XXX-XX-XXXX TS/SCI 5. (S) PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE PCC IS AUTHORIZED UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: (A) THE SHIELDED ENCLOSURE, MG SET, AC POWER FILTERS, AND ISOLATION TRANSFORMER ARE NOT TO BE FILMED OR PHOTOGRAPHED; THEREFORE, ARRANGE TO HAVE THIS EQUIPMENT COVERED DURING FILMING/PHOTOGRAPHY OF AREA. (B) ALL ELECTRONIC PROCESSING OF CLASSIFIED DATA MUST HALT DURING THE USE OF ANY ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT UTILIZED BY THE TEAM. (C) ANY VIDEO TAPE OR PHOTOS TAKEN WITHIN THE PCC SHALL BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL AND MARKED AND HANDLED AS SUCH. (D) PLAY BACK OF CLASSIFIED VIDEO/AUDIO TAPE MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A TEMPEST APPROVED MANNER. (E) CLASSIFIED PLAIN TEXT MUST BE SECURED AND THE SURVEY TEAM MUST REMAIN UNDER ESCORT BY PCC PERSONNEL. 6. (U) POC: DS/IP/SPC/SO: JAMES SPOO, BRANCH CHIEF, STE (571) 345-2532. RICE
VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #3578 0711843 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 121826Z MAR 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0000 INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0000 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0000 RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0000 S E C R E T STATE 023578 NOFORN SEOUL FOR RSO IMO AND ESO BEIJING FOR ESC MANILA FOR RDSE (ACTING) BANGKOK FOR RIMC SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON CLOSURE OF U.S. EMBASSY SEOUL TAGS: AADP ABLD ACOA AMGT ASEC KSEO KRIM KGIT KNET KCIP SUBJECT: TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES REQUIREMENTS - SEOUL REF: 00 STATE 126075 Classified By: M.J. STEAKLEY, DS/ST/CMP, REASON: 1.4 (C) AND (G) 1. (S/NF) These revised TEMPEST countermeasures requirements are effective immediately. Requirements apply to the Chancery at Seoul, located at 82 Sejong-ro. Post's relevant threat levels at the time of this telegram are High for Technical and High for Human Intelligence. 2. (S) TEMPEST requirements are determined by the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) and approved by the Countermeasures Division Director. These requirements apply to all information processing systems for this facility. A. (S) TOP SECRET and SCI CLASSIFIED Automated Information System (AIS): Post is authorized to use TEMPEST Level 1 AIS equipment for processing classified national security information (NSI) at the TOP SECRET or SCI level within the Embassy core area of the CAA. Post is authorized to use Commercial-off- the-Shelf (COTS) AIS equipment within a CSE or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. Use of higher level equipment is approved. B. (S) SECRET (COLLATERAL) CLASSIFIED (AIS): Seoul is authorized to use TEMPEST Level 1 AIS equipment for processing classified NSI at the SECRET level within restricted and core areas of the CAA. Post was previously authorized Zone A equipment, but that equipment category is being phased out and is no longer being procured. By October 1, 2013, Seoul must have replaced all Zone A classified processing equipment with TEMPEST Level 1 equipment. Post is authorized to use COTS AIS equipment within a certified shielded enclosure (CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. C. (S) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AIS: Use of COTS AIS for processing unclassified and sensitive but unclassified (SBU) within the Embassy restricted area and core area of the CAA is approved. Unclassified and multimedia equipped unclassified processing equipment to be used within a CAA must be purchased, shipped, stored, installed, maintained and repaired in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-542, and may not be located inside a CSE. 3. (S) Secure video teleconferencing (SVDC), if requested, will be addressed in a SEPTEL following completion of coordination with VCI/VO. 4. (S) All Classified Automated Information System (CAIS) equipment, components and peripherals must be secured in accordance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) requirements for classified discussion, processing and/or storage overseas. Thin Clients with embedded flash memory, at facilities with 24-hour cleared American presence, are permitted to remain unsecured within the Controlled Access Areas (CAA) as long as the equipment is rebooted prior to vacating the premises. 5. (S) Fiber optic cabling is required for classified connectivity. Fiber optic cabling is also required for unclassified (SBU) connectivity for any IT equipment located within a CSE. Equipment used to process classified information outside a CSE must be installed, to the maximum extent possible, in accordance with Recommendation A of NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95 with the following additional requirements: - Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical) from other computer and electronic equipment used for unclassified information processing. - Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical) from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded telephone or signal lines that do not leave USG-controlled property (for example, phone lines that go to the post phone switch). - Be located a minimum of two meters (six feet spherical) from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded telephone or signal lines that transit USG-controlled property (for example, direct phone lines that do not go through the post telephone switch, telephone switch lines going out, any wire going to antennas on the roof, etc). - Be located a minimum of 3 meters (ten feet spherical) from active radio transmitters (two-way radios, high frequency transceivers, satellite transceivers, cellular devices, Wi-Fi devices, Bluetooth, etc.) and must not use the same AC power circuit as active radio transmitters (to include cell phone chargers). - Be located a minimum of three meters (ten feet spherical) from cable television antenna feeds and any Warren switch with the switch on. This distance can be reduced to one meter if the Warren switch is off when processing classified. - Be located to have no physical contact with any other office equipment or cabling. 6. (S) Classified conversations up to SECRET may be conducted in the CAA offices or vaults in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-313.10-4. Classified discussions shall be conducted in CAA spaces with DS-approved acoustic countermeasures or in secure conference rooms (SCRs) or equivalent according to the OSPB Conduct of Classified Conversations standard. Classified conversations above the SECRET level are restricted to relevant core areas. 7. (U) All requirements apply to all agencies under Chief of Mission authority and pertain to the Chancery building only. Tenant agencies may employ additional TEMPEST countermeasures within their respective offices. 8. (U) For further information or clarification regarding 12 FAH-6 H-540 Automated Information Systems Standards, please contact DS/CS/ETPA. For other, TEMPEST related issues, please contact the Department CTTA at DSCTTA@state.sgov.gov. 9. (U) Post must verify that these TEMPEST countermeasures have been implemented and report so in an updated Technical Security Assessment (TSA). All proposed change requests to a CAA countermeasures environment must be sent to the Department, identified for DS/ST/CMP action. 10. (U) This telegram should be retained by Post until superseding requirements are received. CLINTON
VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #9526 0861053 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 271035Z MAR 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0000 INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0000 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0000 RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 0000 RUEHNW/DIR DTSPO WASHINGTON DC S E C R E T STATE 029526 NOFORN AMMAN FOR RSO IMO AND ESO ABU DHABI FOR ESC CAIRO FOR RDSE FRANKFURT FOR RIMC DTSPO FOR BRS/CMD/TCSC SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON CLOSURE OF U.S. EMBASSY AMMAN TAGS: AADP ABLD ACOA AMGT ASEC KSEO KRIM KGIT KNET KCIP SUBJECT: TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES REQUIREMENTS - AMMAN REF: A. 95 STATE 230596 B. 06 STATE 13022 Classified By: M.J. STEAKLEY, DS/ST/CMP, REASON: 1.4 (C) AND (G) 1. (S/NF) These revised TEMPEST countermeasures requirements are effective immediately. Requirements apply to the Chancery at Amman, Jordan, located at Abdoun, Al-Umawyeen Street, Amman, Jordan. Amman,s threat levels at the time of this telegram are MEDIUM for Technical and MEDIUM for Human Intelligence. 2. (S) TEMPEST requirements are determined by the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) and approved by the Countermeasures Division Director. These requirements apply to all information processing systems for this facility. A. (S) TOP SECRET and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) CLASSIFIED Automated Information System (AIS): Post is authorized to use TEMPEST Level 2 AIS equipment for processing classified national security information (NSI) at the TOP SECRET or SCI level within the Embassy core area of the controlled access area (CAA). Within a certified shielded enclosure (CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications, post is authorized to use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) AIS equipment. B. (S) SECRET (COLLATERAL) CLASSIFIED (AIS): Post is authorized to use TEMPEST Level 2 AIS equipment for processing classified NSI at the SECRET level within restricted and core areas of the CAA. Post is authorized to use COTS AIS equipment within a certified shielded enclosure (CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. NOTE: Post currently has COTS equipment installed for classified processing at the SECRET level outside of a CSE. This equipment must be replaced with TEMPEST Level 2 or TEMPEST Level 1 compliant AIS within 24 months of the date of this telegram. Effective immediately, all new procurements must be for TEMPEST Level 2 or TEMPEST Level 1 compliant equipment. C. (S) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AIS: Use of COTS AIS for processing unclassified and sensitive but unclassified (SBU) within the Embassy restricted and core area of the CAA is approved. Unclassified and multimedia-equipped unclassified processing equipment to be used within a CAA must be purchased, shipped, stored, installed, maintained and repaired in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-542, and may not be located inside a CSE. 3. (S) Secure video-teleconferencing and data collaboration (SVDC) system installation and operation was previously authorized in REFTEL (B). As a result of the TEMPEST requirements change announced in this telegram, the current SVDC equipment must either be replaced with TEMPEST Level 1 compliant equipment or the existing SVDC COTS equipment must be relocated and installed inside a CSE. Request that Post,s RSO notify DS/CMP/ECB within 60 days of this telegram whether SVDC equipment will remain in its current location and be upgraded to TEMPEST Level 1 or if the existing SVDC COTS equipment will be moved inside a CSE. Should Post decide to move the existing SVDC COTS equipment to a different location inside a CSE, a new SVDC check list must be prepared and submitted, and a new authorization telegram will be issued by DS/ST/CMP to formalize the decision. 4. (S) All Classified Automated Information System (CAIS) equipment, components and peripherals must be secured in accordance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) requirements for classified discussion, processing and/or storage overseas. Thin clients with embedded flash memory, at facilities with 24-hour cleared American presence, are permitted to remain unsecured within the CAA as long as the equipment is rebooted prior to vacating the premises. 5. (S) Fiber optic cabling is required for classified connectivity. Fiber optic cabling is also required for unclassified (SBU) connectivity for any information technology equipment located within a CSE. Equipment used to process classified information outside a CSE must be installed, to the maximum extent possible, in accordance with Recommendation E of NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95A with the following additional requirements: - Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical) from other computer and electronic equipment used for unclassified information processing. - Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical) from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded telephone or signal lines that do not leave USG-controlled property (for example, phone lines that go to the post phone switch). - Be located a minimum of two meters (six feet spherical) from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded telephone or signal lines that transit USG-controlled property (for example, direct phone lines that do not go through the post telephone switch, telephone switch lines going out, any wire going to antennas on the roof, etc). - Be located a minimum of 3 meters (ten feet spherical) from active radio transmitters (two-way radios, high frequency transceivers, satellite transceivers, cellular devices, Wi-Fi devices, Bluetooth, etc.) and must not use the same AC power circuit as active radio transmitters (to include cell phone chargers). - Be located a minimum of three meters (ten feet spherical) from cable television antenna feeds and any Warren switch with the switch on. This distance can be reduced to one meter if the Warren switch is off when processing classified. - Be located to have no physical contact with any other office equipment or cabling. 6. (S) Classified conversations up to SECRET may be conducted in the CAA offices or vaults in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-311.10-4. Classified conversations above the SECRET level are restricted to relevant core areas. 7. (U) All requirements apply to all agencies under Chief of Mission authority, and pertain to the Chancery building only. Tenant agencies may employ additional TEMPEST countermeasures within their respective offices. 8. (U) For further information or clarification regarding 12 FAH-6 H-540 Automated Information Systems Standards, please contact DS/CS/ETPA. For other TEMPEST-related issues, please contact Department CTTA at DSCTTA@state.sgov.gov. 9. (U) In accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-533.2, Post must verify that these TEMPEST countermeasures have been implemented; DS/ST/CMP requests Post report so in an updated Technical Security Assessment (TSA). All proposed change requests to a CAA countermeasures environment must be sent to the Department, identified for DS/ST/CMP action. 10. (U) This telegram should be retained by Post until superseding requirements are received. CLINTON
VZCZCXRO1998 RR RUEHCI DE RUEHC #9527/01 0861055 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 271037Z MAR 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 3202 INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 9276 RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0314 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3759 RUEHNW/DIR DTSPO WASHINGTON DC S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 029527 NOFORN KOLKATA FOR RSO AND IMO NEW DELHI FOR ESC AND RIMC MANILA FOR RDSE (ACTING) BANGKOK FOR RIMC DTSPO FOR BRS/CMD/TCSC SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON CLOSURE OF U.S. CONSULATE KOLKATA TAGS: AADP ABLD AMGT ACOA ASEC KSEO KRIM KGIT KNET KCIP SUBJECT: TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES REQUIREMENTS - KOLKATA REF: 94 STATE 261557 Classified By: M.J. STEAKLEY, DS/ST/CMP, REASON: 1.4 (C) AND (G) 1. (S/NF) These revised TEMPEST countermeasures requirements are effective immediately. Requirements apply to the Chancery at Kolkata, located at 5/1 Ho Chi Minh Sarani, Kolkata West Bengal, India. Kolkata,s relevant threat levels at the time of this telegram are Medium for Technical and Medium for Human Intelligence. 2. (S) TEMPEST requirements are determined by the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) and approved by the Countermeasures Division Director. These requirements apply to all information processing systems for this facility. A. (S) TOP SECRET and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) CLASSIFIED Automated Information System (AIS): Post is not currently authorized for processing classified national security information (NSI) at the TOP SECRET or SCI level. TEMPEST requirements will be provided for processing at this level once authorized. B. (S) SECRET (COLLATERAL) CLASSIFIED AIS: Post is authorized to use TEMPEST Zone B or TEMPEST Level 2 AIS equipment for processing classified NSI at the SECRET level within restricted and core areas of the controlled access area (CAA). Use of higher level equipment is approved. Post is authorized to use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) AIS equipment within a certified shielded enclosure (CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. NOTE: Post currently has Zone B compliant equipment installed for classified processing, and this equipment may continue to be used for processing at the SECRET level until September, 2011. All new procurements must be for TEMPEST Level 2 compliant equipment. By October 2011, all classified processing at Post must be on TEMPEST Level 2 equipment. Use of higher level equipment is approved. C. (S) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED (SBU) AIS: Use of COTS AIS for processing SBU information within the restricted and core area of the Embassy CAA is approved. 3. (S) Secret-High Video-teleconferencing and Data Collaboration (SVDC), if requested, will be addressed in a SEPTEL following completion of coordination with VCI/VO. 4. (S) All Classified Automated Information System (CAIS) equipment, components and peripherals must be secured in accordance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) requirements for classified discussion, processing and/or storage overseas. Thin clients with embedded flash memory, at facilities with a 24-hour cleared American presence, are permitted to remain unsecured within the CAA as long as the equipment is rebooted prior to vacating the premises. 5. (S) Fiber optic cabling is required for classified connectivity. Fiber optic cabling is also required for SBU connectivity for any information technology equipment located within a CSE. Equipment used to process classified information outside a CSE must be installed, to the maximum extent possible, in accordance with Recommendation E of NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95 with the following additional requirements: - Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical) from other computer and electronic equipment used for unclassified information processing. - Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical) from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded telephone or signal lines that do not leave USG-controlled property (for example, phone lines that go to the post phone switch). - Be located a minimum of two meters (six feet spherical) STATE 00029527 002 OF 002 from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded telephone or signal lines that transit USG-controlled property (for example, direct phone lines that do not go through the post telephone switch, telephone switch lines going out, any wire going to antennas on the roof, etc). - Be located a minimum of 3 meters (ten feet spherical) from active radio transmitters (two-way radios, high frequency transceivers, satellite transceivers, cellular devices, Wi-Fi devices, Bluetooth, etc.) and must not use the same AC power circuit as active radio transmitters (to include cell phone chargers). - Be located a minimum of three meters (ten feet spherical) from cable television antenna feeds and any Warren switch with the switch on. This distance can be reduced to one meter if the Warren switch is off when processing classified. - Be located to have no physical contact with any other office equipment or cabling. 6. (S) Classified conversations up to SECRET may be conducted in the CAA offices or vaults in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-312.10-4. Classified conversations above the SECRET level are restricted to relevant core areas. 7. (U) All requirements apply to all agencies under Chief of Mission authority and pertain to the Chancery building only. Tenant agencies may employ additional TEMPEST countermeasures within their respective offices. 8. (U) For further information or clarification regarding 12 FAH-6 H-540 Automated Information Systems Standards, please contact DS/CS/ETPA. For other TEMPEST-related issues, please contact the Department CTTA at DSCTTA@state.sgov.gov. 9. (U) In accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-533.2, Post must verify that these TEMPEST countermeasures have been implemented; DS/ST/CMP requests Post report so in an updated Technical Security Assessment (TSA). All proposed change requests to a CAA countermeasures environment must be sent to the Department, identified for DS/ST/CMP action. 10. (U) This telegram should be retained by Post until superseding requirements are received. CLINTON
TOP-SECRET – Electronic Filing of Bank Secrecy Act Reports
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 180 (Friday, September 16, 2011)] [Notices] [Pages 57799-57801] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2011-23841] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposal That Electronic Filing of Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) Reports Be Required; Comment Request AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Treasury. ACTION: Notice and request for comments. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: FinCEN is proposing to require electronic filing of certain Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) reports not later than June 30, 2012. This requirement will significantly enhance the quality of our electronic data, improve our analytic capabilities in supporting law enforcement requirements and result in significant reduction in real costs to the United States Government and ultimately to U.S. taxpayers. Specifically, we propose mandatory electronic submission of all BSA reports excluding the Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIR).\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ All CMIRs are filed with the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at the port of entry/ exit or mailed to the Commissioner of Customs in Washington, DC. There are no electronic filing capabilities at the ports. A CBP contractor keys the data on the completed form into a data tape that is electronically uploaded to the BSA database. FinCEN receives no paper filed CMIRs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- DATES: Comments should be submitted on or before November 15, 2011. ADDRESSES: Written comments should be submitted to: Regulatory Policy and Programs Division, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Department of the Treasury, P.O. Box 39, Vienna, Virginia 22183, Attention: PRA Comments--BSA Required Electronic Filing. BSA Required Electronic Filing comments also may be submitted by electronic mail to the following Internet address: regcomments@fincen.gov, with the caption, ``Attention: BSA Required Electronic Filing,'' in the body of the text. Inspection of comments. Comments may be inspected, between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m., in the FinCEN reading room in Vienna, VA. Persons wishing to inspect the comments submitted must request an appointment with the Disclosure Officer by telephoning (703) 905-5034 (not a toll free call). FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The FinCEN Regulatory Helpline at 800- 949-2732, select option 7. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Title: Bank Secrecy Act, Reporting Forms, (31 CFR chapter X). Abstract: The statute generally referred to as the ``Bank Secrecy Act,'' Titles I and II of Public Law 91-508, as amended, codified at 12 U.S.C. 1829b, 12 U.S.C. 1951-1959, and 31 U.S.C. 5311-5332, authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary), inter alia, to require financial institutions to file reports that are determined to have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory matters, or in the conduct of intelligence or counter-intelligence activities to protect against international terrorism, and to implement counter-money laundering programs and compliance procedures.\2\ Regulations implementing Title II of the BSA appear at 31 CFR Chapter X. The authority of the Secretary to administer the BSA has been delegated to the Director of FinCEN. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Language expanding the scope of the BSA to intelligence or counter-intelligence activities to protect against international terrorism was added by Section 358 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the USA PATRIOT Act), Public Law 107-56. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Secretary was granted authority with the enactment of Title 31 U.S.C., to require financial institutions and other persons to file various BSA reports. The information collected on the reports is required to be provided pursuant to Title 31 U.S.C., as implemented by FinCEN regulations found throughout 31 CFR chapter X. The information collected pursuant to this authority is made available to appropriate agencies and organizations as disclosed in FinCEN's Privacy Act System of Records Notice.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ Treasury Department bureaus such as FinCEN renew their System of Records Notices every three years unless there is cause to amend them more frequently. FinCEN's System of Records Notice was most recently published at 73 FR 42405, 42407-9 (July 21, 2008). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Current Action: In support of Treasury's paperless initiative and efforts to make the government operations more efficient, FinCEN has chosen to mandate electronic filing of certain BSA reports effective June 30, 2012. This requirement will significantly enhance the quality of our electronic data, improve our analytic capabilities in supporting law enforcement requirements, and result in a significant reduction in real costs to the U.S. government and ultimately to U.S. taxpayers. Specifically, we propose to make mandatory the electronic submission of all BSA reports excluding the CMIR.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ See supra note 1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Background: Since October 2002, FinCEN has provided financial institutions with the capability of electronically filing BSA reports through its system called BSA E-Filing. Effective August 2011, the system was expanded to support individuals filing the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) report. BSA E-Filing is a secure, Web-based electronic filing system. It is a flexible solution for financial institutions or individuals, whether they file one BSA report or thousands. BSA E-Filing is an accessible service that filers can access by using their existing internet connections regardless of connection speed. In addition, it is designed to minimize filing errors and provide enhanced feedback to filing institutions or individuals, thereby providing a significant improvement in data quality. BSA E-Filing, which is provided free of charge, features streamlined BSA information submission; faster routing of information to law enforcement; greater data security and privacy compared with paper forms; long-term [[Page 57800]] cost savings to institutions, individuals, and the government; and insures compatibility with future versions of BSA reports. In addition, BSA E-Filing offers the following features not available on paper: Electronic notification of submissions, receipt of submission, and errors, warnings, and alerts; Batch validation; Acknowledgement that a currency transaction report (CTR) and or suspicious activity report (SAR) was filed; Feedback reports to filers; Faster receipt for money services businesses of registration acknowledgement letter; Ability to send and receive secure messages; Use of Adobe forms that allows users to create templates, reducing data entry but still providing for printing paper copies if the filer wants to use a paper copy for its internal review and approval processes; Ability for supervisory users to assign system roles to their staff; and Availability of helpful training materials. In 2010, we initiated a complete redesign and rebuilding of a new system-of-record that significantly enhances FinCEN's current technical capabilities to receive, process, share, and store BSA data. A significant part of this upgrade was the implementation of state-of- the-art electronic reporting or information collection tools. As of July 1, 2011, over 84% of BSA reports are filed electronically with FinCEN.\5\ FinCEN annually measures customer satisfaction with BSA E- Filing and has a performance goal of at least 90% satisfaction; in Fiscal Year 2010, 96% of customers were satisfied with BSA E-Filing.\6\ To enroll with BSA E-Filing financial institutions or individuals go to http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/main.html and follow four easy steps. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ As of July 2011, there are over 12,000 registered e-filers. Of the 1250 major filers, 659 are currently e-filing. FinCEN anticipates that many current paper filers will convert to e-file when the new BSA E-Filing system becomes available. \6\ See FinCEN's 2010 Annual Report, available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/annual_report_fy2010.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As a result of the 2010 initiative, FinCEN is in the process of fielding a new BSA Collection, Processing, and Analytic system. The new system, which includes significant e-filing improvements, is designed to support the most efficient state-of-the-art electronic filing. The database will accept XML-based dynamic reports as well as certain other file formats. The various file formats \7\ will be provided to permit integration into in-house systems or for use by service providers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ The XML Schema, ACSII, and the electronic file specifications will be provided at no cost to filers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- All filings (batch, computer-to-computer, and discrete) will be initiated through the BSA E-Filing system \8\ using current registration and log-in procedures. Although batch and computer-to- computer filing processes will remain unchanged, the file format will change to match the database. Batch and computer-to-computer filers will file reports, which are based on an electronic file specification that will be provided free of charge. Discrete filings (the replacement for submitting a single paper report) will be based on Adobe LiveCycle Designer ES dynamic forms. The discrete function is available for all small business report filers (as well as individuals). The discrete filing function will be accessed by logging into the BSA E-Filing System and entering a pre-approved user ID and password. During log-in to the discrete filing option, filers will be prompted through a series of questions.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ BSA E-Filing is a free Web-based service provided by FinCEN. More information on the filing methods may be accessed at http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/main.html. \9\ A series of predetermined questions designed to establish the type of institution and filing in much the same manner as used in widely accepted income tax filing software. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After log-in, a financial institution filing a report through the discrete function will answer another set of questions that will establish a subset of the data fields appropriate to the filer's specific type of filing institution. Today's proposal requiring filers to submit certain BSA reports electronically using the free FinCEN BSA E-Filing system will provide a range of benefits. Electronic filing will also facilitate the rapid dissemination of financial and suspicious activity information in connection with BSA filings, making information contained in these filings more readily available to--and more easily searchable by--law enforcement, the financial regulatory community, and other users of BSA data. Additionally, the proposal to require certain BSA reports to be filed electronically will result in a significant reduction in the use of paper, producing a positive environmental impact. Further, the implementation of the proposal has the potential to save the government a few million dollars per year through the reduction of expenditures associated with current paper processing, in particular the physical intake and sorting of incoming reports, and the electronic keying of reported information into the database. Security: Mandatory electronic filing will provide increased security not available with paper filings. At the present time, all paper reports are mailed to the IRS Enterprise Computing Center-- Detroit (ECC-D) as unclassified mail with no special handling via the U.S. Postal Service system. On occasion, mailed paper reports have been delayed, and in some cases damaged beyond readability. A financial institution may not discover that a report was not received by ECC-D until many months after the report was due.\10\ For example, problems with delivery of reports may not be discovered until the financial institution is examined by its regulator, and the regulator compares a list of the reports that are posted to the database against the institution's official files. The BSA E-Filing System is a secure 128- bit single socket layer protected Web-based filing system. Reports received are acknowledged and any noted errors are reported back to the filer. This process provides the filer with a record that the required filing was received, as well as suggestions on how to improve the accuracy of their future reports. Reports originated by the filer are posted securely directly to the database, thereby significantly reducing or eliminating possibility of data compromise. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ The missing report becomes more critical if it was reporting suspicious activity--especially when relating to terrorist financing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Filer Impact Assessment a. Depository institutions: Based on information available we believe this change in filing procedures will have minimal impact on depository institutions. All depository institutions are currently required to file quarterly call or thrift financial reports with their regulator electronically through a Web-based portal provided by the appropriate federal regulator. This same electronic connectivity may be used to file BSA reports with FinCEN by logging in to the BSA E-Filing System Web-based portal. b. Broker-Dealers, Future-Commission Merchants (FCMs), Introducing Brokers in Commodities (IB-Cs), and Mutual Funds: \11\ Based on information available we believe this change in filing procedures will have minimal impact on these filing institutions. This group is highly automated and enjoys robust electronic buying and selling systems with sophisticated processing [[Page 57801]] and reporting systems.\12\ Currently the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandates electronic filing,\13\ as does the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ FinCEN is considering adding a SAR reporting requirement to Investment Adviser's (IA's) registered with the SEC. Mandatory e- filing will have minimum impact on this group. \12\ Currently both the SEC and the CFTC require electronic reporting, The SEC through the EDGAR system and the CFTC through the NFC Windjammer and Easy File systems. \13\ See http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/regoverview.htm. \14\ For financial institutions subject to CFTC oversight See NFA Electronic Filings at http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-electronic-filings/index.HTML. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- c. Insurance companies: Based on information available we believe this change in filing procedures will have minimal impact on these institutions. This group is highly automated.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ See the National Insurance Producer Registry (NIPR) at http://www.nipr.com/. NIPR is a unique public-private partnership that supports the work of the states and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in making the producer-licensing process more cost-effective, streamlined and uniform for the benefit of regulators, the insurance industry and the consumers they protect and serve. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- d. Casinos and Card Clubs: \16\ Based on information available we believe this change in filing procedures will have minimal impact on these institutions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ Casinos and Card Clubs with gross annual gaming revenues in excess of $1 million (see 31 CFR1010.100 (t)(5)(ii) and (6)(ii)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- e. Money Services Businesses (MSBs): Information gained from a review of the MSB filings of the currency transaction report (CTR), SAR, and Registration of Money Services Business (RMSB) forms indicates that some impact to this group can be expected. Information in trade journals and other publications, along with informal comments from the Internal Revenue Service Small Business/Self Employed, indicate that most filers have Internet connectivity. MSBs routinely accept and process credit card transactions requiring automated communications with the approving card center. They also routinely place orders for goods and services through the Internet and electronically access bill paying services. Additionally, basic Internet access can be obtained through a simple inexpensive dial-up connection or at professional external Internet facilities such as service providers for those MSBs without Internet connectivity. Lastly, FinCEN has included provisions for requesting a hardship exception in this notice in case unforeseen situations arise.\17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ See Filer impact paragraph ``g.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- f. Service Providers: There is a network of third-party service providers with which financial institutions may contract to provide electronic filing services to the BSA E-Filing System. FinCEN believes this group to be highly automated and many are already using the BSA E- Filing System. We do not anticipate that this proposal will have an impact on this group. g. Small businesses: \18\ In support of small businesses, FinCEN's Office of Compliance will provide a temporary hardship exemption capability. A small business may request, and may be granted, an emergency extension of up to one year if it can document a sufficiently serious problem that prevents compliance with the new filing requirements. The approved extension will be effective for one year from the effective date of this notice.\19\ A hardship request based solely on a lack of Internet connectivity or a business decision to restrict Internet connectivity will not be considered adequate justification for an extension. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\ See the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Web site http://www.sba.gov/content/what-sbas-definition-small-business-concern for SBA's definition of a small business concern. \19\ Request for emergency extension will be mailed to: Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Attention RPP-CP, PO Box 39, Vienna, VA 22183 or may be e-mailed to: regcomments@fincen.gov. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- h. Individual filers: Effective August 2011, FinCEN expanded its support of electronic filing to individuals.\20\ The capability to file the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR Form TD F 90- 22.1) became available and individuals worldwide can sign up to file their individual FBAR's by accessing the FinCEN E-Filing Web site. Based on new applications to date, there is no indication of any issues with individuals using this new capability. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\ See page 3 Background. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) Type of Review: Review of a new proposal to mandate the electronic filing of BSA reports. Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit and non-profit institutions. Frequency: As required. Estimated Burden: Effective with the FinCEN IT Modernization, BSA reporting will be supported by seven BSA reports.\21\ The burden for electronic filing and recordkeeping of each BSA report is reflected in the OMB approved burden \22\ for each of these reports. The non- reporting recordkeeping burden is reflected separately.\23\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\ BSA-SAR, BSA-CTR, Designation Of Exempt Person, CMIR, RMSB, Foreign Bank Account Report, and the Report of Cash Over $10,000 Received in a Trade or Business (Form 8300). \22\ See OMB Control Numbers 1506-0065, 1506-0064, 1506-0009, 1506-0013, 1506-0014, 1506-0018. \23\ See OMB Control Numbers 1506-0051 through 1506-0059. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Estimated number of respondents for all reports = 74,900.\24\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\ All filers subject to BSA reporting requirements excluding CMIR. See supra note 1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Estimated Total Annual Responses for all reports = 16,172,770. Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours = 20,874,761.\25\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\ Includes all reporting and recordkeeping burden associated with filing BSA reports. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB control number. Records required to be retained pursuant to the BSA must be retained for five years. Request for Comments Comments submitted in response to this notice will be summarized and/or included in the request for OMB approval. All comments will become a matter of public record. Comments are invited on: (a) Whether the collection of information only by electronic means is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of the collection of information; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on respondents (filers), including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology; (e) the practicality of utilizing external Internet facilities or service providers to occasionally file BSA reports, (f) estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation, maintenance, or purchase of services to provide information by filers that currently do not have Internet access, and (g) the enhanced security of sensitive information and significant cost savings of electronic filing. Dated: September 13, 2011. James H. Freis, Jr., Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. [FR Doc. 2011-23841 Filed 9-15-11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4810-02-P
TOP-SECRET – EIS of Huge Security Complex Along US-Canadian Border
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 180 (Friday, September 16, 2011)] [Notices] [Pages 57751-57754] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2011-23993] ———————————————————————– DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Customs and Border Protection Notice of Availability of a Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Northern Border Activities AGENCY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, DHS. ACTION: Notice of availability; Request for comments; Notice of public meetings. ———————————————————————– SUMMARY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) announces that a Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) is now available and open for public comment. The Draft PEIS analyzes the potential environmental and socioeconomic effects associated with its ongoing and potential future activities along the Northern Border between the United States and Canada. The overall area of study analyzed in the document extends approximately 4,000 miles from Maine to Washington and 100 miles south of the U.S.-Canada Border. CBP also announces that it will be holding a series of public meetings in October to obtain comments regarding the Draft PEIS. DATES: CBP invites comments on the Draft PEIS during the 45 day comment period, which begins on September 16, 2011. To ensure consideration, comments must be received by October 31, 2011. Comments may be submitted as set forth in the ADDRESSES section of this document. CBP will hold public meetings on the Draft PEIS. The locations, dates, and times are listed in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments related to the Draft PEIS by any of the following methods. Please include your name and address and the state or region to which the comment applies, as appropriate. To avoid duplication, please use only one of the following methods for providing comments: Project Web site: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com/public-
involvement/comments.html; E-mail: Comments@NorthernBorderPEIS.com; Mail: CBP Northern Border PEIS, P.O. Box 3625, McLean, Virginia 22102; Phone voicemail box: (866) 760-1421 (comments recorded in the voicemail box will be transcribed). You may download the Draft PEIS from the project Web site: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com. It will also be made available on the Department of Homeland Security Web site (http://www.dhs.gov). Copies of the Draft PEIS may also be obtained by submitting a request through one of the methods listed below. Please include your name and mailing address in your request. E-mail: Comments@NorthernBorderPEIS.com and write “Draft PEIS” in the subject line; Mail: CBP Northern Border PEIS, (Draft PEIS Request), P.O. Box 3625, McLean, VA 22102; Phone: (866) 760-1421. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jennifer Hass, CBP, Office of Administration, telephone (202) 344-1929. You may also visit the project’s Web site at: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Public Meetings and Invitation To Comment CBP invites comments on all aspects of the Draft PEIS. Comments that will provide the most assistance to CBP will reference a specific section of the Draft PEIS, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include data, information, or authority that support such recommended change. Substantive comments received during the comment period will be addressed in, and included as an appendix to, the Final PEIS. The Final PEIS will be made available to the public through a Notice of Availability in the Federal Register. Comments may be submitted as described in the ADDRESSES section of this document. Respondents may request to withhold names or street addresses, except for city or town, from public view or from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. Such a request must be stated prominently at the beginning of the comment. Such requests will be honored to the extent allowed by law. This request to withhold personal information does not apply to submissions from organizations or businesses, or from individuals identifying themselves as representatives or officials of organizations or businesses. CBP will hold public meetings to inform the public and solicit comments about the Draft PEIS. Meetings will be held from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. at each of the locations and dates provided below. The meeting in the Washington, DC area is for interested parties located outside of the project’s areas of interest. Meetings will include displays, handouts, and a presentation by CBP, and will provide an opportunity for the public to record their comments on the Draft PEIS. Changes in meeting plans, due to inclement weather or other causes, will be announced on the project’s Web site at: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com, and on a telephone message at: (866) 760-1421. —————————————————————————————— Date City, state Location —————————————————————————————— October 3…. Duluth, MN…………. Holiday Inn, 200 West First Street, Duluth, MN 55802. October 4…. Massena, NY………… VFW, 101 W Hatfield St., Massena, NY 13662. October 4…. Caribou, ME………… Caribou Inn and Convention Center, 19 Main Street, Caribou, ME 04736. October 5…. Augusta, ME………… The Senator Inn & Spa, 284 Western Ave., Augusta, ME 04330. October 5…. Bottineau, ND………. Twin Oaks Resort & Convention Center, 10723 Lake Loop Road, Bottineau, ND 58318. October 6…. St. Albans, VT……… The Senator Historical Museum, 9 Church Street, St. Albans, VT 05478. October 6…. Detroit, MI………… Holiday Inn Express, 1020 Washington Boulevard, Detroit, MI 48226. October 6…. Havre, MT………….. The Town House Inn, 627 1st Street West, Havre, MT 59501. October 11… Bellingham, WA……… Hampton Inn, 3958 Bennett Drive, Bellingham, WA 98225. October 11… Rochester, NY………. Holiday Inn–Rochester Airport, 911 Brooks Avenue, Rochester, NY 14624. October 12… Erie, PA…………… Ambassador Banquet Center, 7794 Peach Street, Erie, PA 16509. October 13… Naples, ID…………. The Great Northwest Territories Event Center, 336 County Road 8, Naples, ID 83847. October 17… Washington, DC……… Crystal City Marriott at Regan National Airport, 1999 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA 22201. —————————————————————————————— [[Page 57752]] The public may obtain information concerning the status and progress of the PEIS, as well as view and download the document, via the project’s Web site at: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com. Background U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is charged with the mission of enforcing customs, immigration, agriculture, and numerous other laws and regulations at the Nation’s borders and facilitating legitimate trade and travel through legal ports of entry. As the guardian of the United States’ borders, CBP protects the roughly 4,000 miles of Northern Border between United States and Canada, from Maine to Washington. The terrain ranges from densely forested lands on the west and east coasts to open plains in the middle of the country. CBP has completed a Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for its ongoing and potential future activities along the Northern Border. The Draft PEIS is now available for public review and comment. (For instructions on obtaining a copy of the PEIS or on submitting comments, please see the ADDRESSES section of this document.) An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is a study of the potential effects on the environment from a specific Federal action. A Programmatic EIS (PEIS) is an EIS that looks at the general types of effects of a whole broad program of actions. It often forms the foundation for a “regular” or site-specific EIS, which looks in general detail at the effects of a specific project slated for a particular place. Because this effort is programmatic in nature, the Draft PEIS does not define effects for a specific or planned action. Instead, it analyzes the overall environmental and socioeconomic effects of activities supporting the homeland security mission of CBP focused on applying alternative approaches to better secure the border. On July 6, 2010, CBP published in the Federal Register (75 FR 38822) a notice announcing that CBP intended to prepare four PEISs to analyze the environmental effects of current and potential future CBP border security activities along the Northern Border. Each PEIS was to cover one region of the Northern Border: the New England region, the Great Lakes region, the region east of the Rocky Mountains, and the region west of the Rocky Mountains. The notice also announced and initiated the public scoping process to gather information from the public in preparation for drafting the PEISs. As indicated in the notice, the scoping period concluded on August 5, 2010. However, CBP continued to take comments past the initial scoping period. For more information on this process, please see the section of this document entitled Public Scoping Process. Subsequently, and in part due to comments received during public scoping, CBP decided to refocus its approach and develop one PEIS covering the entire Northern Border, rather than four separate, regional PEISs. This new approach was designed to ensure that CBP could effectively analyze and convey impacts that occur across regions of the Northern Border. CBP published a notice in the Federal Register announcing this intention on November 9, 2010 (75 FR 68810). While this makes for a somewhat larger single document, it offers the advantage of less duplication and greater usefulness as a CBP planning tool. Aided by the information gained during the public scoping process, CBP has prepared the Draft PEIS to analyze the environmental and socioeconomic effects of current and potential future CBP border security activities along the Northern Border between the United States and Canada, including an area extending approximately 100 miles south of the Northern Border. For the purposes of the PEIS, the Northern Border is defined as the area between the United States and Canada extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean encompassing all the States between Maine and Washington, inclusively. (The Alaska- Canada border is not included in this effort.) CBP is evaluating the environmental and socioeconomic impacts of routine aspects of its operations along the Northern Border and considering enhancements to its infrastructure, technologies, and application of manpower to continue to deter existing and evolving threats to the Nation’s physical and economic security. Due to the diverse and natural environments along the Northern Border, the Draft PEIS analyzes four Northern Border regions, referred to above: the New England region, the Great Lakes region, the region east of the Rocky Mountains, and the region west of the Rocky Mountains. CBP plans to use the information derived from the analysis in the PEIS in management, planning, and decision-making for its mission and its environmental stewardship responsibilities. It will also be used to establish a foundation for future impact analyses. More specifically, CBP plans to use the PEIS analysis over the next five to seven years as CBP works to improve security along the Northern Border. To protect the Northern Border against evolving terrorist and criminal threats, CBP plans to implement a diversified approach to border security over the next five to seven years that responds most effectively to those threats. This will involve some combination of facilities, security infrastructure, technologies, and operational activities, although the specific combination of elements that will be used over this period cannot be determined at this time. CBP will use this PEIS as a foundation for future environmental analyses of specific programs or locations as CBP’s plans for particular Northern Border security activities develop. Alternatives Considered The Draft PEIS considers the environmental impacts of several alternative approaches CBP may use to protect the Northern Border against evolving threats. These alternatives would all support continued deployment of existing CBP personnel in the most effective manner while maintaining officer safety and continued use of partnerships with other Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the United States and Canada. CBP needs to maintain effective control of the Northern Border via all air, land, and maritime pathways for cross-border movement. The No Action Alternative (or “status quo”) would be to continue with the same facilities, technology, infrastructure, and approximate level of personnel currently in use, deployed, or currently planned by CBP. Normal maintenance of existing facilities is included in this alternative. This alternative would not meet CBP’s goals as it would not allow CBP to improve its capability to interdict cross-border violators or to identify and resolve threats at the ports of entry in a manner that avoids adverse effects on legal trade and travel. However, it is evaluated in this Draft PEIS because it provides a baseline against which the impacts of the other reasonable alternatives can be compared. The Facilities Development and Improvement Alternative would focus on providing new permanent facilities or improvements to existing facilities such as Border Patrol stations, ports of entry, and other facilities to allow CBP agents to operate more efficiently and respond to situations more quickly. This alternative would help meet CBP’s goals because the new and improved facilities would make it more difficult for cross-border violators to cross the border. It [[Page 57753]] would also divert traffic from or increase the capacity of the more heavily used ports of entry, decreasing waiting times. The applicability of this alternative would be limited, as most roads crossing the Northern Border already have a crossing facility. The Detection, Inspection, Surveillance and Communications Technology Expansion Alternative would focus on deploying more effective detection, inspection surveillance and communication technologies in support of CBP activities. This alternative would involve utilizing upgraded systems that would enable CBP to focus efforts on identifying threat areas, improving agent and officer communication systems, and deploying personnel to resolve incidents with maximum efficiency. This alternative would help meet CBP’s goals by improving CBP’s situational awareness and allowing CBP to more efficiently and effectively direct its resources for interdicting cross-border violators. The Tactical Security Infrastructure Deployment Alternative would focus on constructing additional barriers, access roads, and related facilities. The barriers would include selective fencing and vehicle barriers at selected points along the border and would deter and delay cross-border violators. The access roads and related facilities would increase the mobility of agents, and enhance their capabilities for surveillance and for responding to various international border violations. This alternative would help meet CBP’s goals by discouraging cross-border violators and improving CBP’s capacity to respond. The Flexible Direction Alternative (the Preferred Alternative) would allow CBP to follow any of the above directions in order to employ the most effective response to the changing threat environment along the Northern Border. This approach would allow CBP to respond more appropriately to a constantly changing threat environment. Public Scoping Process CBP developed and executed a public scoping program for the PEIS to identify public concerns to be examined in the PEIS. “Scoping” of an EIS is a process of informing diverse stakeholders about an action that an agency is planning and seeking those stakeholders’ feedback on the environmental concerns that the action could generate. The intent of the scoping effort is to adopt the scope of the planned environmental document to ensure that it addresses relevant concerns identified by interested members of the public as well as organizations, Native American Tribes, and other government agencies and officials. CBP’s public scoping period for the Northern Border PEIS commenced on July 6, 2010 and concluded on August 5, 2010. See 75 FR 38822. The public scoping process was initiated with the publishing of a notice of intent (NOI) notifying the public of CBP’s decision to prepare the PEISs. In coordination with the publication of the NOI, display advertisements were published in various newspapers serving local communities, public service announcements were broadcasted on local radio stations, scoping letters were mailed to potentially interested stakeholders consisting of agencies, organizations, and individuals, and a project Web site was developed. Following the publication of the NOI, a series of public scoping meetings were held in July 2010. CBP encouraged the public to submit comments concerning the scope of the PEIS during the public meetings, or via Web site, e-mail, or letter. The comments CBP received during the public scoping process were used to adapt the scope of the Draft PEIS and to ensure that it addressed relevant concerns identified by interested members of the public as well as organizations, Native American Tribes, and other government agencies and officials. CBP has compiled a list of comments received in a scoping report. This report is available on the project’s Web site at: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com. NEPA This environmental analysis is being conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508), and Department of Homeland Security Directive 023-01 (renumbered from 5100.1), Environmental Planning Program of April 19, 2006. NEPA addresses concerns about environmental quality and the government’s role in protecting it. The essence of NEPA is the requirement that every Federal agency examine the environmental effects of any proposed action before deciding to proceed with it or with some alternative. NEPA and the implementing regulations issued by the President’s Council on Environmental Quality call for agencies to document the potential environmental effects of actions they are proposing. Generally, agencies must make those documents public, and seek public feedback on them. In accordance with NEPA, the PEIS analyzes the effects on the environment of the Northern Border Security Program. CBP will seek public input on these studies and will use them in agency planning and decision making. Because NEPA is a uniquely broad environmental law and covers the full spectrum of the natural and human environment, the PEIS will also address environmental considerations governed by other environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). NHPA Programmatic Agreement CBP is developing a Programmatic Agreement (PA) for operations along the Northern Border in accordance with Section 106 of NHPA, 16 U.S.C. 470f, and its implementing regulations (36 CFR part 800). While the PA is being pursued as an independent action from the PEIS, it will be applied to future activities occurring within the Northern Border study area and therefore is relevant to the Northern Border PEIS project. The Northern Border is defined for purposes of the PA as extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean encompassing all the States between Maine to Washington, including an area extending approximately 100 miles south of the U.S.-Canada border. This area is identical to the area of study of the PEIS. CBP is currently consulting and coordinating with the Historic Preservation Officers of the states of Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Vermont, and Washington, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) to finalize an agreed upon framework for future Section 106 reviews for CBP actions. The PA will be signed by CBP, the ACHP, State Historic Preservation Officers, and other consulting parties. The signed PA will identify (1) activities and projects carried out by CBP that are agreed do not have the potential to affect properties either listed or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places, and (2) activities that are considered undertakings that do not require consultation under Section 106. Additionally, the PA identifies actions that may have an effect but that will not require Section 106 review by CBP, State or Tribal Historic Preservation Officers, Tribes and other consulting parties, so long as all terms and conditions as described in the PA are satisfactorily met. The signed PA will be valid for five years from the date of [[Page 57754]] execution, as verified with CBP filing the PA with the ACHP. Next Steps After the public comment period on the draft PEIS, CBP will complete a Final PEIS. The Final PEIS will be made available to the public through a Notice of Availability in the Federal Register. CBP will then select a programmatic course of action to guide CBP’s activities along the Northern Border for the next five to seven years. That decision will be published in the Federal Register in a Record of Decision. Dated: September 14, 2011. Trent Frazier, Acting Executive Director, Facilities Management and Engineering, Office of Administration. [FR Doc. 2011-23993 Filed 9-15-11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 9111-14-P
TOP-SECRET – Trujillo Declassified
Citizens of Trujillo gather at a memorial for the victims (Semana.com)
Trujillo Declassified
Documenting Colombia’s ‘tragedy without end’Documents Detail U.S. Concerns about Impunity in Major Human Rights Case
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 259
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TOP-SECRET – “Body count mentalities” Colombia’s “False Positives” Scandal, Declassified
Gen. Mario Montoya Uribe announces his resigation as Colombian Army Commander in November 2008. (Photo credit: Semana.com)
Body count mentalities”
Colombia’s “False Positives” Scandal, Declassified
Documents Describe History of Abuses by Colombian Army
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 266
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TOP-SECRET – The August 1991 Coup in Moscow, 20 Years Later
Documents Show Hardliners Tried to Topple Gorbachev but Brought Down the Soviet Union
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 357
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Boris Yeltsin in front of the Parliament 08.19.1991
911 x 10 Photos
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In this Monday, July 25, 2011 photo, Vladimir Gavriushin sits at the grave he built for his daughter Yelena in a cemetery outside Vilnius, Lithuania. Yelena was one of the nearly 3,000 people killed on Sept. 11, 2001. Gavriushin has buried rocks from ground zero under these tombstone towers, far from the place Yelena died _ a place he can no longer afford to visit. And so, as the 10-year anniversary of the terrorist attacks approaches, he mourns for her here, at his own ground zero. |
Andrew Kinard, a Marine lieutenant, lost both legs in an I.E.D. attack two months into his first tour in Iraq, in 2006. Now he’s at Harvard, pursuing a joint law and business degree. He was photographed at his summer internship, at the Fortress Investment Group. (Christopher Anderson) |
In a May 23, 2011 photo, Sukhwinder Singh sits next to the memorial for his father, Balbir Singh Sodhi, in Mesa, Arizona. Singh’s father was shot and killed in front of the family owned gas station as he was placing flowers at a makeshift memorial the family set up shortly after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The Sikh was killed during the anti-muslim backlash after the 9/11 attacks. Some have objected to including Balbair Singh Sodhi’s name on a Phoenix Sept. 11 memorial, saying he was not a victim of the attack. |
A police officer stands guard in New York’s Times Square as the ABC news ticker displays news of an al-Qaida terror threat, Friday, Sept. 9, 2011. Just days before the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, U.S. counterterrorism officials are chasing a credible but unconfirmed al-Qaida threat to use a car bomb on bridges or tunnels in New York City or Washington. It is the first “active plot” timed to coincide with the somber commemoration. |
(L-R) New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Janice Fedarcyk, assistant director in charge New York Field Office for the FBI, and New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly speak to media about a threat in New York September 8, 2011. President Barack Obama on Thursday ordered a redoubling of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in the face of a “credible but unconfirmed” threat ahead of the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. Reuters |
New York City police officers stop a commercial truck at a checkpoint in New York’s financial district, Friday, Sept. 9, 2011. U.S. officials said Thursday that they were chasing a credible but unconfirmed al-Qaida threat to use a car bomb on bridges or tunnels in New York or Washington. Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly said that police are beefing up security at bridges and tunnels, setting up vehicle checkpoints and doing bomb sweeps of parking garages. (Mark Lennihan) |
The U.S. embassy in Paris during a ceremony to pay tribute to the victims of the 9/11 attacks, Friday, Sept. 9, 2011, ahead of the 10-year anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks on Sunday. (Charles Platiau) |
Construction workers install model twin towers representing the towers of the World Trade Center in preparation to commemorate the 10 anniversary of the Sept. 11 this Sunday, at Trocadero plazamin Paris Friday Sept. 9, 2011. The Eiffel tower is seen in the background. The towers will be finished on Saturday in advance of the commemoration on upcoming Sunday. (Michel Euler) |
Workers at the new Flight 93 National Memorial work on final preparations for Saturday’s dedication ceremony Sept. 8. 2011 in Shanksville, Pa.. The boulder in the background marks the location of the crash crater. Sunday will mark the tenth anniversary of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. (Gene J. Puskar) |
Family members of police officers killed during or as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks stand to be recognized during a ceremony in New York, Thursday, Sept. 8, 2011. (Seth Wenig) |
Developer Larry Silverstein, left, and Joe Daniels, President of the September 11 Memorial, attend a news conference Wednesday, Aug. 24, 2011 in New York where they discussed Silverstein’s buildings at the World Trade Center and the plans for the opening of the memorial. (Mark Lennihan) |
This Tuesday, Aug 16, 2011 photo shows Michael Lewin in his office in the town of Lod, central Israel. His brother, Daniel Lewin, was killed during the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Daniel’s family honors his memory with a traditional Jewish yahrzeit, an annual memorial observance of a loved one’s death. They talk about his life and study the Torah, the Hebrew Bible, in his name. Over the years, Michael has visited ground zero several times on business trips to New York. |
ADVANCE FOR USE LABOR DAY WEEKEND, SEPT. 3-5, 2011 AND THEREAFTER – This Wednesday, Aug. 10 2011 photo shows a tent which houses a chapel and a storage of the remains of victims of the attacks on the World Trade Center near Chief Medical Examiner Office Forensic Biology Lab in New York. (Mary Altaffer) |
ADVANCE FOR USE LABOR DAY WEEKEND, SEPT. 3-5, 2011 AND THEREAFTER – This Wednesday, Aug. 10 2011 photo shows posters on a wall of the garden behind a tent which houses a chapel and a storage of the remains of victims of the attacks on the World Trade Center near Chief Medical Examiner Office Forensic Biology Lab in New York. (Mary Altaffer) |
FILE – In this Sept. 2001 file photo, dust still covers the streets near ground zero as Associated Press photographer Amy Sancetta pushes her bike on the streets a few days after the terrorist attacks in New York. On Sept. 11, 2001, the Ohio-based national photographer was in New York City to cover her tenth the U.S. Open Tennis tournament. The desk had a report that a plane might have hit one of the World Trade Center towers, so she caught a cab downtown. |
FILE – In this Tuesday, Sept. 11, 2001 file photo, pedestrians in lower Manhattan watch smoke rise from the World Trade Tower after an early morning terrorist attack on the New York landmark. Television brought the 2001 attacks to the world in real time, and forever linked the thousands who lived through it and the millions who watched. It became a collective experience, and, from every angle, one of the most digitally documented events ever. And so it remains. (Amy Sancetta, file) |
Börse Online über “GoMoPa”-Betrüger und RA Jochen Resch
“SPIEGEL” über die STASI-Connection des mutmasslichen “GoMoPa”-Chefs Jochen Resch
TOP-SECRET-Getting Access to the Secrets of the Osama Bin Laden Kill
Getting Access to the Secrets of the Osama Bin Laden Kill
![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/0005/schmidle/pict25.jpg)
Nicholas Schmidle has written Getting Bin Laden, a dramatic and detailed account of the raid to kill Osama bin Laden, in The New Yorker, August 1, 2011. The story shows that Schmidle had extraordinary access to participants in the operation, in the White House, the DoD, the CIA, and Special Operations — members of the latter two providing details of personnel, training, location, scheduling and travel well beyond what is usually revealed about covert actions. The persuasive spin of the account parallels that of Associated Press covering the bin Laden hunter “CIA John” which was also based on privileged access to official informants.
Highly secret meeting details and quotes by President Obama, Vice President Biden, Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, Admiral Mullen, Admiral McRaven, John Brennan, Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes and a number of special operations members are used to produce a dramatic narrative in which there are no failures, no journalistic counterbalance to a complex and risky operation. Even the unexpected helicopter crash is transformed into a success:
“I’m glad no one was hurt in the crash, but, on the other hand, I’m sort of glad we left the helicopter there,” the special-operations officer said. “It quiets the conspiracy mongers out there and instantly lends credibility. You believe everything else instantly, because there’s a helicopter sitting there.”
While Schmidle is an experienced journalist with service in Pakistan and elsewhere, his access to those involved in the kill’s top secret planning and operation, and his unrelenting positive spin of the story (in accord with Obama’s campaign to valorize the singular accomplishment), could be explained by his access to his father, Richard Schmidle, a general in Special Operations and now deputy commander for U.S. Cyber Command.
![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/0005/schmidle/pict27.jpg)
USMC BGEN Rorbert E. Schmidle Jr., The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) War Fighter Conference held at the Officer’s Club aboard Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (NC). Photographer’s Name: LCPL NATHAN L. BARNES, USMC. Location: MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP LEJEUNE. Date Shot: 3/4/2004. Date Posted: unknown. VIRIN: 040304-M-RT524-001 [Clipped and enlarged from original photo (2.4MB).]
https://slsp.manpower.usmc.mil/gosa/biographies/rptBiography.asp?PERSON_ID=5&PERSON_TYPE=General
Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle, Jr.
Deputy Commander, U. S. Cyber Command
Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle, Jr., USMC, serves as the Deputy Commander for U.S. Cyber Command, Ft. George G. Meade, MD. As the Deputy Commander, he directs the forces and daily activities of U.S. Cyber Command. In this capacity, he also coordinates the Department of Defense computer network attack and computer network defense missions.
Lieutenant General Schmidle is a native of Newtown, Connecticut.
His command assignments include: Commanding General of First Marine Aircraft Wing, Commanding Officer of Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (Experimental), and Commanding Officer of Marine Fighter/Attack Squadrons 251 and 115.
Previous operational assignments include multiple tours flying the F-4 and F/A-18 aircraft as well as serving as the operations officer and air officer of an Infantry Battalion, First Battalion 9th Marines.
Additionally, Lieutenant General Schmidle has served in the following key staff assignments: Assistant Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Programs and Resources (Programs), Deputy Chief of Staff for Integrated Product Team 1 for the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and USMC lead for the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Deputy Director for Resources and Acquisition in the Joint Staff J-8, Director of the USMC Expeditionary Force Development Center and the Military Secretary for the 32nd and 33rd Commandants of the Marine Corps.
Lieutenant General Schmidle graduated from Drew University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in History. He also holds a Master of Arts in Philosophy from American University and is currently working on his doctorate at Georgetown University He is a distinguished graduate and prior faculty member of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College as well as a distinguished graduate of the Marine Corps War College. Additionally, he has been published on a range of topics from military history to social psychology and philosophy.
![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/0005/schmidle/pict30.jpg)
![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/0005/schmidle/pict31.jpg)
![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/0005/schmidle/pict29.jpg)
Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle, the deputy commander for U.S. Cyber Command during the Evening Parade reception at Marine Barracks Washington in Washington, D.C., May 27, 2011. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Tia Dufour/Released) Date Posted: 6/3/2011. VIRIN: 110527-M-KS211-009
![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/0005/schmidle/pict32.jpg)
http://newamerica.net/user/122
Nicholas Schmidle, Bernard L. Schwartz Fellow, schmidle[at]newamerica.net
![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/0005/schmidle/pict26.jpg)
Nicholas Schmidle, May 12, 2009. Source
![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/0005/schmidle/pict28.jpg)
Major General Robert E. “Rooster” Schmidle Jr., P. W. Singer, New America Foundation, Uploaded to Flickr on May 26, 2010 Source
TOP-SECRET – Meyer Lansky – THE FBI FILES PART 2
Meyer Lansky (1902-1983) was involved in a wide-range of organized criminal activity and was associated with many other well known criminal figures from the 1920s to the 1970s. Lansky was especially active in gambling ventures, including the rise of Las Vegas and efforts to build casinos in Cuba before the communist revolution there. In 1972, he was indicted on charges that he and others had skimmed millions of dollars from a Vegas casino that they owned; the indictment on Lansky was later dismissed since he was considered too ill to face trial. The files in this release range from 1950 to 1978.
By clicking on the links below you can download the files a pdf documents
| Meyer Lansky | |
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Meyer Lansky in 1958 |
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| Born | Meyer Suchowljansky July 4, 1902(1902-07-04) Grodno, Russian Empire |
| Died | January 15, 1983(1983-01-15) (aged 80) Miami Beach, Florida |
| Cause of death | lung cancer |
| Nationality | United States |
| Known for | Mob activity |
Meyer Lansky (born Meyer Suchowljansky[1]; July 4, 1902 – January 15, 1983), known as the “Mob’s Accountant”, was a Russian Empire-born American organized crime figure who, along with his associate Charles “Lucky” Luciano, was instrumental in the development of the “National Crime Syndicate” in the United States. For decades he was thought to be one of the most powerful people in the country.
Lansky developed a gambling empire which stretched from Saratoga, New York to Miami to Council Bluffs and Las Vegas; it is also said that he oversaw gambling concessions in Cuba. Although a member of the Jewish Mafia, Lansky undoubtedly had strong influence with the Italian Mafia and played a large role in the consolidation of the criminal underworld (although the full extent of this role has been the subject of some debate).
Lansky was born Meyer Suchowljansky in Grodno (then in the Russian Empire, now in Belarus), to a Jewish family who experienced pogroms at the hands of the local Christian Polish and Russian population.[2] In 1911, he emigrated to the United States through the port of Odessa[3] with his mother and brother and joined his father, who had previously emigrated to the United States in 1909, and settled on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, New York.[4]
Lansky met Bugsy Siegel when he was a teenager. They became lifelong friends, as well as partners in the bootlegging trade, and together with Lucky Luciano, formed a lasting partnership. Lansky was instrumental in Luciano’s rise to power by organizing the 1931 murder of Mafia powerhouse Salvatore Maranzano. As a youngster, Siegel saved Lansky’s life several times, a fact which Lansky always appreciated. The two adroitly managed the Bug and Meyer Mob despite its reputation as one of the most violent Prohibition gangs.
Lansky was the brother of Jacob “Jake” Lansky, who in 1959 was the manager of the Nacional Hotel in Havana, Cuba.
Gambling operations
By 1936, Lansky had established gambling operations in Florida, New Orleans, and Cuba. These gambling operations were very successful as they were founded upon two innovations. First, in Lansky and his connections there existed the technical expertise to effectively manage them based upon Lansky’s knowledge of the true mathematical odds of most popular wagering games. Second, mob connections were used to ensure legal and physical security of their establishments from other crime figures, and law enforcement (through payoffs).
But there was also an absolute rule of integrity concerning the games and wagers made within their establishments. Lansky’s “carpet joints” in Florida and elsewhere were never “clip-joints”; where gamblers were unsure of whether or not the games were rigged against them. Lansky ensured that the staff (the croupiers and their management) actually consisted of men of high integrity. And it was widely known what would happen to a croupier or a table manager who attempted to cheat or steal from a customer or the house.[clarification needed]
In 1936, Lansky’s partner Luciano was sent to prison. As Alfred McCoy records:
“During the 1930s, Meyer Lansky ‘discovered’ the Caribbean for Northeastern United States syndicate bosses and invested their illegal profits in an assortment of lucrative gambling ventures…. He was also reportedly responsible for organized crime’s decision to declare Miami a ‘free city’ (i.e., not subject to the usual rules of territorial monopoly).”
Lansky later convinced the Mafia to place Bugsy Siegel in charge of Las Vegas, and became a major investor in Siegel’s Flamingo Hotel.
After Al Capone‘s 1931 conviction for tax evasion and prostitution, Lansky saw that he too was vulnerable to a similar prosecution. To protect himself, he transferred the illegal earnings from his growing casino empire to a Swiss numbered bank account, whose anonymity was assured by the 1934 Swiss Banking Act. Lansky eventually even bought an offshore bank in Switzerland, which he used to launder money through a network of shell and holding companies.[5]
War work
In the 1930s, Meyer Lansky and his gang claimed to have stepped outside their usual criminal activities to break up rallies held by Nazi sympathizers. Lansky recalled a particular rally in Yorkville, a German neighborhood in Manhattan, that he claimed he and 14 other associates disrupted:
- The stage was decorated with a swastika and a picture of Adolf Hitler. The speakers started ranting. There were only fifteen of us, but we went into action. We threw some of them out the windows. Most of the Nazis panicked and ran out. We chased them and beat them up. We wanted to show them that Jews would not always sit back and accept insults.[6]
During World War II, Lansky was also instrumental in helping the Office of Naval Intelligence‘s Operation Underworld, in which the US government recruited criminals to watch out for German infiltrators and submarine-borne saboteurs.
According to Lucky Luciano’s authorized biography, during this time, Lansky helped arrange a deal with the US Government via a high-ranking U.S. Navy official. This deal would secure the release of Lucky Luciano from prison; in exchange the Italian Mafia would provide security for the war ships that were being built along the docks in New York Harbor. German submarines were sinking allied shipping outside the coast on a daily basis and there was great fear of attack or sabotage by Nazi sympathizers.
The Flamingo
During the 1940s, Lansky’s associate Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel persuaded the crime bosses to invest in a lavish new casino hotel project in Las Vegas, the Flamingo. After long delays and large cost overruns, the Flamingo Hotel was still not open for business. To discuss the Flamingo problem, the Mafia investors attended a secret meeting in Havana, Cuba in 1946. While the other bosses wanted to kill Siegel, Lansky begged them to give his friend a second chance. Despite this reprieve, Siegel continued to lose Mafia money on the Flamingo Hotel. A second family meeting was then called. However, by the time this meeting took place, the casino turned a small profit. Lansky again, with Luciano’s support, convinced the family to give Siegel some more time.
The Flamingo was soon losing money again. At a third meeting, the family decided that Siegel was finished. He had humiliated the organized crime bosses and never had a chance. It is widely believed that Lansky himself was compelled to give the final okay on eliminating Siegel due to his long relationship with Siegel and his stature in the family.
On June 20, 1947, Siegel was shot and killed in Beverly Hills, California. Twenty minutes after the Siegel hit, Lansky’s associates, including Gus Greenbaum and Moe Sedway, walked into the Flamingo Hotel and took control of the property. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lansky retained a substantial financial interest in the Flamingo for the next twenty years. Lansky said in several interviews later in his life that if it had been up to him, Ben Siegel would be alive today.
This also marked a power transfer in Vegas from the New York crime families to the Chicago Outfit. Although his role was considerably more restrained than in previous years, Lansky is believed to have both advised and aided Chicago boss Tony Accardo in initially establishing his hold.
Lansky in Cuba
After World War II, Lansky associate Lucky Luciano was paroled from prison on the condition that he permanently return to Sicily. However, Luciano secretly moved to Cuba, where he worked to resume control over American Mafia operations. Luciano also ran a number of casinos in Cuba with the sanction of Cuban president General Fulgencio Batista, though the American government succeeded in pressuring the Batista regime to deport Luciano.
Batista’s closest friend in the Mafia was Lansky. They formed a renowned friendship and business relationship that lasted for three decades. During a stay at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York in the late 1940s, it was mutually agreed upon that, in exchange for kickbacks, Batista would offer Lansky and the Mafia control of Havana’s racetracks and casinos. Batista would open Havana to large scale gambling, and his government would match, dollar for dollar, any hotel investment over $1 million, which would include a casino license. Lansky, of course, would place himself at the center of Cuba’s gambling operations. He immediately called on his “associates” to hold a summit in Havana.
The Havana Conference was held on December 22, 1946 at the Hotel Nacional. This was the first full-scale meeting of American underworld leaders since the Chicago meeting in 1932. Present were such notable figures as Joe Adonis and Albert “The Mad Hatter” Anastasia, Frank Costello, Joseph “Joe Bananas” Bonanno, Vito Genovese, Moe Dalitz, Thomas Luchese, from New York, Santo Trafficante Jr. from Tampa, Carlos “The Little Man” Marcello from New Orleans, and Stefano Magaddino, Joe Bonanno’s cousin from Buffalo. From Chicago there was Anthony Accardo and the Fischetti brothers, “Trigger-Happy” Charlie and his brother Rocco, and, representing the Jewish interest, Lansky and “Dandy” Phil Kastel from Florida. The first to arrive was Salvatore Charles Lucky Luciano, who had been deported to Italy, and had to travel to Havana with a false passport. Lansky shared with them his vision of a new Havana, profitable for those willing to invest the right sum of money. A city that could be their “Latin Las Vegas,” where they would feel right at home since it was a place where drugs, prostitution, labor racketeering, and extortion were already commonplace. According to Luciano’s evidence, and he is the only one who ever recounted details of the events in any detail, he confirmed that he was appointed as kingpin for the mob, to rule from Cuba until such time as he could find a legitimate way back into the U.S. Entertainment at the conference was provided by, among others, Frank Sinatra who flew down to Cuba with their friends, the Fischetti brothers.
In 1952, Lansky even offered then President Carlos Prío Socarrás a bribe of U.S. $250,000 to step down so Batista could return to power. Once Batista retook control of the government he quickly put gambling back on track. The dictator contacted Lansky and offered him an annual salary of U.S. $25,000 to serve as an unofficial gambling minister. By 1955, Batista had changed the gambling laws once again, granting a gaming license to anyone who invested $1 million in a hotel or U.S. $200,000 in a new nightclub. Unlike the procedure for acquiring gaming licenses in Vegas, this provision exempted venture capitalists from background checks. As long as they made the required investment, they were provided with public matching funds for construction, a 10-year tax exemption and duty-free importation of equipment and furnishings. The government would get U.S. $250,000 for the license plus a percentage of the profits from each casino. Cuba’s 10,000 slot machines, even the ones which dispensed small prizes for children at country fairs, were to be the province of Batista’s brother-in-law, Roberto Fernandez y Miranda. An Army general and government sports director, Fernandez was also given the parking meters in Havana as a little something extra. Import duties were waived on materials for hotel construction and Cuban contractors with the right “in” made windfalls by importing much more than was needed and selling the surplus to others for hefty profits. It was rumored that besides the U.S. $250,000 to get a license, sometimes more was required under the table. Periodic payoffs were requested and received by corrupt politicians.
Lansky set about reforming the Montmartre Club, which soon became the in place in Havana. He also long expressed an interest in putting a casino in the elegant Hotel Nacional, which overlooked El Morro, the ancient fortress guarding Havana harbor. Lansky planned to take a wing of the 10-storey hotel and create luxury suites for high stakes players. Batista endorsed Lansky’s idea over the objections of American expatriates such as Ernest Hemingway and the elegant hotel opened for business in 1955 with a show by Eartha Kitt. The casino was an immediate success.[7]
Once all the new hotels, nightclubs and casinos had been built Batista wasted no time collecting his share of the profits. Nightly, the “bagman” for his wife collected 10 percent of the profits at Trafficante’s interests; the Sans Souci cabaret, and the casinos in the hotels Sevilla-Biltmore, Commodoro, Deauville and Capri (part-owned by the actor George Raft). His take from the Lansky casinos, his prized Habana Riviera, the Nacional, the Montmartre Club and others, was said to be 30 percent. What exactly Batista and his cronies actually received in total in the way of bribes, payoffs and profiteering has never been certified. The slot machines alone contributed approximately U.S. $1 million to the regime’s bank account.
Revolution
The fast times soon rolled to a stop. The 1959 Cuban revolution and the rise of Fidel Castro changed the climate for mob investment in Cuba. On that New Year’s Eve of 1958, while Batista was preparing to flee to the Dominican Republic and then on to Spain (where he died in exile in 1973), Lansky was celebrating the $3 million he made in the first year of operations at his 440-room, $18 million palace, the Habana Riviera. Many of the casinos, including several of Lansky’s, were looted and destroyed that night.
On January 8, 1959, Castro marched into Havana and took over, setting up shop in the Hilton. Lansky had fled the day before for the Bahamas and other Caribbean destinations. The new Cuban president, Manuel Urrutia Lleó, took steps to close the casinos.
In October 1960, Castro nationalized the island’s hotel-casinos and outlawed gambling. This action essentially wiped out Lansky’s asset base and revenue streams. He lost an estimated $7 million. With the additional crackdown on casinos in Miami, Lansky was forced to depend on his Las Vegas revenues.
Later years
In his later years, Lansky lived a low-profile, routine existence in Miami Beach, making life difficult for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He dressed like the average grandfather, walked his dog every morning, and portrayed himself as a harmless retiree. Lansky’s associates usually met him in malls and other crowded locations. Lansky would change drivers, who chauffeured him around town to look for new pay phones almost every day. Lansky was so elusive that the FBI essentially gave up monitoring him by the mid-1970s.
Attempted escape to Israel and trial
In 1970, Lansky fled to Herzliya Pituah, Israel, to escape federal tax evasion charges. Although the Israeli Law of Return allows any Jew to settle in the State of Israel, it excludes those with criminal pasts. Two years after Lansky fled to Israel, Israeli authorities deported him back to the U.S. However, the government’s best shot at convicting Lansky was with the testimony of loan shark Vincent “Fat Vinnie” Teresa, an informant with little or no credibility. The jury was unreceptive and Lansky was acquitted in 1974.
Death
Lansky’s last years were spent quietly at his home in Miami Beach. He died of lung cancer on January 15, 1983, age 80, leaving behind a widow and three children.[8] On paper, Lansky was worth almost nothing. At the time, the FBI believed he left behind over $300 million in hidden bank accounts, but they never found any money.
However, his biographer Robert Lacey describes Lansky’s financially strained circumstances in the last two decades of his life and his inability to pay for health care for his relatives. For Lacey, there was no evidence “to sustain the notion of Lansky as king of all evil, the brains, the secret mover, the inspirer and controller of American organized crime.”[9] He concludes from evidence including interviews with the surviving members of the family that Lansky’s wealth and influence had been grossly exaggerated, and that it would be more accurate to think of him as an accountant for gangsters rather than a gangster himself. His granddaughter told author T.J. English that at his death in 1983, Lansky left only $37,000 in cash.[10] When asked in his later years what went wrong in Cuba, the gangster offered no excuses. “I crapped out,” he said. He would also tell people he had lost every single penny in Cuba. In all likelihood, it was only an excuse to keep the IRS off his back. According to Lansky’s daughter Sandra, he had transferred at least $15 million to his brother Jake due to his problems with the IRS. Lansky was known to keep money in other people’s names, but how much will likely never be known. Meyer Lansky was and continues to be a mystery.
In September 1982, Forbes listed him as one of the 400 wealthiest people in America. His net worth was estimated at $100 million.
In popular culture
In film
- The character Hyman Roth, portrayed by Lee Strasberg, and certain aspects of the main character Michael Corleone from the film The Godfather Part II (1974), are based on Lansky. In fact, shortly after the premiere in 1974, Lansky phoned Strasberg and congratulated him on a good performance (Strasberg was nominated for an Oscar for his role), but added “You could’ve made me more sympathetic.” Roth’s statement to Michael Corleone that “We’re bigger than U.S. Steel” was actually a direct quote from Lansky, who said the same thing to his wife while watching a news story on the Cosa Nostra. The character Johnny Ola is similar to Lansky’s associate Vincent Alo. Additionally, the character Moe Greene, who was a friend of Roth’s, is modeled upon Bugsy Siegel.[11][12] The film reflects real life in that Lansky was denied the Right of Return to Israel and returned to the U.S. to face criminal charges, but fabricated details regarding Roth’s attempts to bribe Latin American dictators for entry to their countries, as well as Roth’s ultimate fate.
- Maximilian “Max” Bercovicz, the gangster played by James Woods in Sergio Leone‘s opus Once Upon A Time In America was inspired by Meyer Lansky.[13]
- Mark Rydell plays Lansky in the 1990 Sydney Pollack film Havana, starring Robert Redford.
- The film Bugsy (1991), a biography of Bugsy Siegel, included Lansky as a major character, played by Ben Kingsley.
- In the 1991 film Mobsters, he is played by the actor Patrick Dempsey.
- In a 1999 movie biopic entitled Lansky, the dramatized role of Lansky is portrayed by Richard Dreyfuss.
- Meyer Lansky is portrayed by Dustin Hoffman in the 2005 film The Lost City.
In television
- In the current (2010) series on HBO, Boardwalk Empire, Meyer Lansky is played by Anatol Yusef.
- The 1981 NBC mini series, The Gangster Chronicles, the character of Michael Lasker, played by Brian Benben, was based on Lansky. Because Lansky was still living at the time, the producers derived the “Michael Lasker” name for the character to avoid legal complications.
- A 1999 made-for-TV movie called Lansky was released starring Richard Dreyfuss as Lansky, Eric Roberts as Bugsy Siegel, and Anthony LaPaglia as Lucky Luciano.
- Manny Wiesbord, the mob chieftain played by Joseph Wiseman on Crime Story, was based on Lansky.
- Lansky’s grandson, Meyer Lansky II, appeared in the “Jesse James vs. Al Capone” episode of Spike‘s Deadliest Warrior as a Capone expert, credited as “Mafioso Descendant.” The senior Lansky was briefly referenced during the episode.
In literature
- In the 2010 book of photographs “New York City Gangland”,[14] Meyer Lansky is seen “loitering” on Little Italy’s famed “Whiskey Curb” with partners Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel, Vincent “Jimmy Blue Eyes” Alo, and waterfront racketeer Eddie McGrath.
- In the 1996 novel The Plan, by Stephen J. Cannell, Lansky and fellow mobster Joseph Alo are involved in putting an anti-Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act presidential candidate into office.
- In the 2009 theatrical adaption by Joseph Bologna “Lansky” is portrayed by Mike Burstyn in a one act play.
- In the book Havana by Stephen Hunter, Lansky and Fidel Castro are both included as main characters.
- In the 2009 novel If The Dead Rise Not by Philip Kerr the hero, Bernie Gunther, meets Lansky in Havana.
- In the 2009 novel Ride of the Valkyries by Stuart Slade, Meyer Lansky is the President of Mafia run Cuba.
- In the 2011 historical novel, “The Devil Himself” by Eric Dezenhall, Meyer Lansky coordinates counterespionage operations with the U.S. Navy to prevent Nazi sabotage in New York and help plan the invasion of Sicily.
- He portrays himself in Harold Robbins 1995 follow-up to The Carpetbaggers, The Raiders.
In music
- In his 2007 song “Party Life,” Jay-Z raps, “So tall and Lanky / My suit, it should thank me / I make it look good to be this hood Meyer Lansky.”
- Raekwon, a member of the Wu-tang Clan referred to himself as “rap’s Meyer Lansky” in his song “Glaciers of Ice,” a single on his classic 1995 release “Only Built 4 Cuban Linx…“
- A member of the rap group Wu-Syndicate uses Myalansky as his stage name, referring to Meyer Lansky.
- In the 2010 mixtape “Albert Anastasia” by Rick Ross refers to Meyer Lansky in his song White Sand Pt.II: “I put the team together like I’m Meyer Lansky.”
- On Obie Trice’s “Outro” off the Cheers album Proof raps, ” Know much about Meyer Lansky? / Don’t tustle with my hand speed / Clutch your burner, bust it and watch your man bleed.”
- In 2011 50 Cent’s Run Up On Me Freestyle raps, “Got a fetish for the guns Calico drums / Rap Meyer Lansky steady counting my ones”
TOP-SECRET- Presidential Documents – Strategic Counterterrorism Commuications Initiative
Federal Register Volume 76, Number 179 (Thursday, September 15, 2011)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 56945-56947]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-23891]
Presidential Documents
Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 179 / Thursday, September 15, 2011 /
Presidential Documents
___________________________________________________________________
Title 3–
The President
[[Page 56945]]
Executive Order 13584 of September 9, 2011
Developing an Integrated Strategic
Counterterrorism Communications Initiative and
Establishing a Temporary Organization to Support
Certain Government-wide Communications Activities
Directed Abroad
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, including section 2656 of title 22, United
States Code, and section 3161 of title 5, United States
Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy. The United States is committed to
actively countering the actions and ideologies of al-
Qa’ida, its affiliates and adherents, other terrorist
organizations, and violent extremists overseas that
threaten the interests and national security of the
United States. These efforts take many forms, but all
contain a communications element and some use of
communications strategies directed to audiences outside
the United States to counter the ideology and
activities of such organizations. These communications
strategies focus not only on the violent actions and
human costs of terrorism, but also on narratives that
can positively influence those who may be susceptible
to radicalization and recruitment by terrorist
organizations.
The purpose of this Executive Order is to reinforce,
integrate, and complement public communications efforts
across the executive branch that are (1) focused on
countering the actions and ideology of al-Qa’ida, its
affiliates and adherents, and other international
terrorist organizations and violent extremists
overseas, and (2) directed to audiences outside the
United States. This collaborative work among executive
departments and agencies (agencies) brings together
expertise, capabilities, and resources to realize
efficiencies and better coordination of U.S. Government
communications investments to combat terrorism and
extremism.
Sec. 2. Assigned Responsibilities to the Center for
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications.
(a) Under the direction of the Secretary of State
(Secretary), the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications (Center) that has been established in
the Department of State by the Secretary shall
coordinate, orient, and inform Government-wide public
communications activities directed at audiences abroad
and targeted against violent extremists and terrorist
organizations, especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates
and adherents, with the goal of using communication
tools to reduce radicalization by terrorists and
extremist violence and terrorism that threaten the
interests and national security of the United States.
Consistent with section 404o of title 50, United States
Code, the Center shall coordinate its analysis,
evaluation, and planning functions with the National
Counterterrorism Center. The Center shall also
coordinate these functions with other agencies, as
appropriate.
Executive branch efforts undertaken through the Center
shall draw on all agencies with relevant information or
capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct these
communications efforts.
(b) To achieve these objectives, the Center’s
functions shall include:
(i) monitoring and evaluating narratives (overarching communication themes
that reflect a community’s identity, experiences, aspirations, and
concerns) and events abroad that are relevant to the development of a
[[Page 56946]]
U.S. strategic counterterrorism narrative designed to counter violent
extremism and terrorism that threaten the interests and national security
of the United States;
(ii) developing and promulgating for use throughout the executive branch
the U.S. strategic counterterrorism narratives and public communications
strategies to counter the messaging of violent extremists and terrorist
organizations, especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents;
(iii) identifying current and emerging trends in extremist communications
and communications by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents in order
to coordinate and provide thematic guidance to U.S. Government
communicators on how best to proactively promote the U.S. strategic
counterterrorism narrative and policies and to respond to and rebut
extremist messaging and narratives when communicating to audiences outside
the United States, as informed by a wide variety of Government and non-
government sources, including nongovernmental organizations, academic
sources, and finished intelligence created by the intelligence community;
(iv) facilitating the use of a wide range of communications technologies,
including digital tools, by sharing expertise among agencies, seeking
expertise from external sources, and extending best practices;
(v) identifying and requesting relevant information from agencies,
including intelligence reporting, data, and analysis; and
(vi) identifying shortfalls in U.S. capabilities in any areas relevant to
the Center’s mission and recommending necessary enhancements or changes.
(c) The Secretary shall establish a Steering
Committee composed of senior representatives of
agencies relevant to the Center’s mission to provide
advice to the Secretary on the operations and strategic
orientation of the Center and to ensure adequate
support for the Center. The Steering Committee shall
meet not less than every 6 months. The Steering
Committee shall be chaired by the Under Secretary of
State for Public Diplomacy. The Coordinator for
Counterterrorism of the Department of State shall serve
as Vice Chair. The Coordinator of the Center shall
serve as Executive Secretary. The Steering Committee
shall include one senior representative designated by
the head of each of the following agencies: the
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the
Treasury, the National Counterterrorism Center, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Counterterrorism Center of
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Broadcast Board of
Governors, and the Agency for International
Development. Other agencies may be invited to
participate in the Steering Committee at the discretion
of the Chair.
Sec. 3. Establishment of a Temporary Organization.
(a) There is established within the Department of
State, in accordance with section 3161 of title 5,
United States Code, a temporary organization to be
known as the Counterterrorism Communications Support
Office (CCSO).
(b) The purpose of the CCSO shall be to perform the
specific project of supporting agencies in Government-
wide public communications activities targeted against
violent extremism and terrorist organizations,
especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents,
to audiences abroad by using communication tools
designed to counter violent extremism and terrorism
that threaten the interests and national security of
the United States.
(c) In carrying out its purpose set forth in
subsection (b) of this section, the CCSO shall:
(i) support agencies in their implementation of whole-of-government public
communications activities directed at audiences abroad, including by
providing baseline research on characteristics of these audiences, by
developing expertise and studies on aspirations, narratives, information
strategies and tactics of violent extremists and terrorist organizations
overseas, by designing and developing sustained campaigns on specific areas
of
[[Page 56947]]
interest to audiences abroad, and by developing expertise on implementing
highly focused social media campaigns; and
(ii) perform such other functions related to the specific project set forth
in subsection (b) of this section as the Secretary may assign.
(d) The CCSO shall be headed by a Director selected
by the Secretary, with the advice of the Steering
Committee. Its staff may include, as determined by the
Secretary: (1) personnel with relevant expertise
detailed on a non-reimbursable basis from other
agencies; (2) senior and other technical advisers; and
(3) such other personnel as the Secretary may direct to
support the CCSO. To accomplish this mission, the heads
of agencies participating on the Steering Committee
shall provide to the CCSO, on a non-reimbursable basis,
assistance, services, and other support including but
not limited to logistical and administrative support
and details of personnel. Non-reimbursable details
shall be based on reasonable requests from the
Secretary in light of the need for specific expertise,
and after consultation with the relevant agency, to the
extent permitted by law.
(e) The CCSO shall terminate at the end of the
maximum period permitted by section 3161(a)(1) of title
5, United States Code, unless sooner terminated by the
Secretary consistent with section 3161(a)(2) of such
title.
Sec. 4. General Provisions.
(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to
impair or otherwise affect:
(i) authority granted by law to an agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with
applicable law and subject to the availability of
appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not,
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or in equity by any party against
the United States, its departments, agencies, or
entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any
other person.
(Presidential Sig.)
THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 9, 2011.
[FR Doc. 2011-23891
Filed 9-14-11; 8:45 am]
Billing code 3195-W1-P
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TOP-SECRET-Secret U.S. Message to Mullah Omar: “Every Pillar of the Taliban Regime Will Be Destroyed”
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (center) and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert Finn are given a tour of the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul, Afghanistan on April 27, 2002. OSD Package No. A07D-00238 (DOD Photo by Robert D. Ward)
Washington, DC, September 14, 2011 – In October 2001 the U.S. sent a private message to Taliban leader Mullah Omar warning that “every pillar of the Taliban regime will be destroyed,” [Document 16] according to previously secret U.S. documents posted today by the National Security Archive at www.nsarchive.org. The document collection includes high-level strategic planning memos that shed light on the U.S. response to the attacks and the Bush administration’s reluctance to become involved in post-Taliban reconstruction in Afghanistan. As an October 2001 National Security Council strategy paper noted, “The U.S. should not commit to any post-Taliban military involvement since the U.S. will be heavily engaged in the anti-terrorism effort worldwide.” [Document 18]
|
Materials posted today also include memos from officials lamenting the American strategy of destroying al-Qaeda and the Taliban without substantially investing in Afghan infrastructure and economic well-being. In 2006, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald R. Neumann asserted that recommendations to “minimize economic assistance and leave out infrastructure plays into the Taliban strategy, not to ours.” [Document 25] The Ambassador was concerned that U.S. inattention to Afghan reconstruction was causing the U.S. and its Afghan allies to lose support. The Taliban believed they were winning, he said, a perception that “scares the hell out of Afghans.” [Document 26] Taliban leaders were capitalizing on America’s commitment, he said, and had sent a concise, but ominous, message to U.S. forces: “You have all the clocks but we have all the time.” [Document 25]
The documents published here describe multiple important post-9/11 strategic decisions. One relates to the dominant operational role played by the CIA in U.S. activities in Afghanistan. [Document 19] Another is the Bush administration’s expansive post-9/11 strategic focus, as expressed in Donald Rumsfeld’s remark to the president: “If the war does not significantly change the world’s political map, the U.S. will not achieve its aim/ There is value in being clear on the order of magnitude of the necessary change.” [Document 13] Yet another takes the form of U.S. communications with Pakistani intelligence officials insisting that Islamabad choose between the United States or the Taliban: “this was a black-and-white choice, with no grey.” [Document 3 (Version 1)]
Highlights include:
- A memo from Secretary Rumsfeld to General Franks expressing the Secretary’s frustration that the CIA had become the lead government agency for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, “Given the nature of our world, isn’t it conceivable that the Department [of Defense] ought not to be in a position of near total dependence on CIA in situations such as this?” [Document 19]
- A detailed timeline of the activities of Vice President Richard Cheney and his family from September 11-27, 2001 [Document 22]
- The National Security Council’s October 16, 2001 strategic outline of White House objectives to destroy the Taliban and al-Qaeda while avoiding excessive nation-building or reconstruction efforts. “The U.S. should not commit to any post-Taliban military involvement since the U.S. will be heavily engaged in the anti-terrorism effort worldwide.” The document also notes the importance of “CIA teams and special forces in country operational detachments (A teams)” for anti-Taliban operations. [Document 18]
- U.S. Ambassador Neumann expresses concern in 2006 that the American failure to fully embrace reconstruction activities has harmed the American mission. “The supplemental decision recommendation to minimize economic assistance and leave out infrastructure plays into the Taliban strategy, not to ours.” A resurgent Taliban leadership summarized the emerging strategic match-up by saying, “You have all the clocks but we have all the time.” [Document 25]
- A memo on U.S. strategy from Donald Rumsfeld to President Bush dated September 30, 2001, saying, “If the war does not significantly change the world’s political map, the U.S. will not achieve its aim/ There is value in being clear on the order of magnitude of the necessary change. The USG [U.S. Government] should envision a goal along these lines: New regimes in Afghanistan and another key State (or two) that supports terrorism.” [Document 13]
- A transcript of Washington’s October 7, 2001 direct message to the Taliban: “Every pillar of the Taliban regime will be destroyed.” [Document 16]
- The day after 9/11, Deputy Secretary Armitage presents a “stark choice” to Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud Ahmed, “Pakistan must either stand with the United States in its fight against terrorism or stand against us. There was no maneuvering room.” [Document 3 (Version 1)]
- In talking points prepared for a September 14, 2001 National Security Council meeting. Secretary of State Colin Powell notes, “My sense is that moderate Arabs are starting to see terrorism in a whole new light. This is the key to the coalition, we are working them hard.” [Document 7]
Read the Documents
Document 1 – Action Plan
U.S. Department of State, Memorandum,” Action Plan as of 9/13/2001 7:55:51am,” September 13, 2001, Secret, 3 pp. [Excised]
Two days after the 9/11 attacks, the Department of State creates an action plan to document U.S. government activities taken so far and to create an immediate list of things to do. Included in the list are high-level meetings with Pakistani officials, including ISI intelligence Director Mahmoud Ahmed. [Note that Ahmed’s September 13 meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage is detailed in Document 3 and Document 5.] The action plan details efforts to get international support, including specific U.S. diplomatic approaches to Russia, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Sudan, China and Indonesia.
Document 2 – Islamabad 05087
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Musharraf: We Are With You in Your Action Plan in Afghanistan” September 13, 2001, Secret – Noforn, 7 pp. [Excised]
Newly appointed U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin “bluntly” tells Pakistani President Musharraf “that the September 11 attacks had changed the fundamentals of the [Afghanistan – Pakistan] debate. There was absolutely no inclination in Washington to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban. The time for dialog was finished as of September 11.” Effectively declaring the Taliban a U.S. enemy (along with al-Qaeda), Ambassador Chamberlin informs President Musharraf “that the Taliban are harboring the terrorists responsible for the September 11 attacks. President Bush was, in fact, referring to the Taliban in his speech promising to go after those who harbored terrorists.” [Note: A less complete version of this document was previously released and posted on September 13, 2010. This copy has less information withheld.]
Document 3 – State 157813 [Version 1]
Document 3 – State 157813 [Version 2]
U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Deputy Secretary Armitage’s Meeting with Pakistan Intel Chief Mahmud: You’re Either With Us or You’re Not,” September 13, 2001, Secret, 9 pp. [Excised]
The day after the 9/11 attacks, Deputy Secretary Armitage meets with Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud Ahmed (which can also be spelled Mehmood Ahmad, Mahmud or Mahmoud). Armitage presents a “stark choice” in the 15-minute meeting. “Pakistan must either stand with the United States in its fight against terrorism or stand against us. There was no maneuvering room.” Mahmud assures Armitage that the U.S. “could count on Pakistan’s ‘unqualified support,’ that Islamabad would do whatever was required of it by the U.S.” Deputy Secretary Armitage adamantly denies Pakistan has the option of a middle road between supporting the Taliban and the U.S., “this was a black-and-white choice, with no grey.” Mahmoud responds by commenting “that Pakistan has always seen such matters in black-and-white. It has in the past been accused of ‘being-in-bed’ with those threatening U.S. interests. He wanted to dispel that misconception.” Mahmoud’s denial of longstanding historical Pakistani support for extremists in Afghanistan directly conflicts with U.S. intelligence on the issue, which has documented extensive Pakistani support for the Taliban and multiple other militant organizations.
Two versions of this document have been reviewed with different sections released. Version 1 in general contains more information; however Version 2 contains a few small sections not available in Version 1. These sections include paragraph 10, “Mr. Armitage indicated it was still not clear what might be asked of Pakistan by the U.S. but he suspected it would cause ‘deep introspection.’ Mahmud’s colleagues in the CIA would likely be talking more with him in the near future on this. Mahmud confirmed that he had been in touch with Langley after yesterday’s attacks and expected to continue these contacts.” It is unclear why this was withheld in Version 1. It is not surprising that Mahmoud, Chief of Pakistani intelligence, would be in regular contact with equally high-level intelligence officials from the CIA.
It is interesting to read this document ten years after it was initially written, as it is largely assumed that Islamabad over the past decade has taken the “grey” approach Armitage steadfastly denies as a potential position. Pakistan has served as a safe haven for the Taliban insurgency, while Islamabad simultaneously assists the U.S. in its war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Document 4 – Talking Points
U.S. Department of State, “Talking Points,” September 13, 2001, Secret, 4 pp. [Excised]
Talking points for Secretary Colin Powell drafted two days after the 9/11 attacks. Objectives of the U.S. response to the attack include, “eliminating Usama bin-Laden’s al-Qaida.” The Secretary focuses on regional support from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, as well as cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Interestingly the Secretary notes that the U.S. “will also probe Iranian ability to work with us against the Taliban and Usama bin-Laden, and we’ll look for Arafat’s support.”
Document 5 – State 159711
U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Deputy Secretary Armitage’s Meeting with General Mahmud: Actions and Support Expected of Pakistan in Fight Against Terrorism,” September 14, 2001, Secret, 5 pp. [Excised]
On September 13, 2001 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage again meets with Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud Ahmed in one of a series of well-known communications between Armitage and the ISI Chief in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Secretary Armitage tells General Mahmoud the U.S. is looking for full cooperation and partnership from Pakistan, understanding that the decision whether or not to fully comply with U.S. demands would be “a difficult choice for Pakistan.” Armitage carefully presents General Mahmoud with the following specific requests for immediate action and asks that he present them to President Musharraf for approval:
- “Stop al-Qaida operatives at your border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and end all logistical support for bin Ladin;”
- “Provide the U.S. with blanket overflight and landing rights to conduct all necessary military and intelligence operations;”
- “Provide as needed territorial access to U.S. and allied military intelligence, and other personnel to conduct all necessary operations against the perpetrators of terrorism or those that harbor them, including use of Pakistan’s naval ports, airbases and strategic locations on borders;”
- “Provide the U.S. immediately with intelligence, [EXCISED] information, to help prevent and respond to terrorist acts perpetuated against the U.S., its friends and allies;”
- “Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts of September11 and any other terrorist acts against the U.S. or its friends and allies [EXCISED]”
- “Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and any other items and recruits, including volunteers en route to Afghanistan that can be used in a military offensive capacity or to abet the terrorist threat;”
- “Should the evidence strongly implicate Usama bin Ladin and the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan and should Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to harbor him and this network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, end support for the Taliban and assist us in the formentioned ways to destroy Usama bin Ladin.”
[Note: A less complete version of this document was previously released and posted on September 13, 2010. This copy has less information withheld. ]
Document 6 – Memo
U.S. Department of State, Gameplan for Polmil Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan,” September 14, 2001, Secret/NODIS, 4 pp. [Excised]
Since “Tuesday’s attacks clearly demonstrate that UBL [Usama bin Ladin] is capable of conducting terrorism while under Taliban control,” U.S. officials are faced with the question of what to do with the Taliban. The Department of State issues a set of demands to the Taliban including: surrendering all known al-Qaeda associates in Afghanistan, providing intelligence on bin Laden and affiliates, and expelling all terrorists from Afghanistan. Reflecting U.S. policies in the years to come, the memo notes that the U.S. “should also find subtle ways to encourage splits within the [Taliban] leadership if that could facilitate changes in their policy toward terrorism.” The memo concludes that if “the Taliban fail to meet our deadline, within three days we begin planning for Option three, the use of force. The Department of State notes the importance of coordination with Pakistan, the Central Asian states, Russia, and “possibly Iran.” “Pakistan is unwilling to send its troops into Afghanistan, but will provide all other operational and logistical support we ask of her.”
Document 7 – Talking Points
U.S. Department of State, “Talking Points for PC 0930 on 14 September 2001,” September 14, 2001, [Unspecified Classification], 3 pp. [Excised]
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s September 14, 2001 talking points for a National Security Council Principal’s Committee meeting discuss the administration’s immediate response to the 9/11 attacks and future plans for retaliation. Objectives include, “setting the stage for a forceful response,” “eradicating Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaida” and “eliminating safehaven and support for terrorisms whether from states or other actors.” Secretary Powell notes, “My sense is that moderate Arabs are starting to see terrorism in a whole new light. This is the key to the coalition, we are working them hard.”
Document 8 – Islamabad 05123
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Musharraf Accepts The Seven Points” September 14, 2001, Secret, 4 pp. [Excised]
After extensive meetings with ranking Pakistani military commanders, on September 14, 2001 President Pervez Musharraf accepts the seven actions requested by the U.S. for immediate action in response to 9/11. President Musharraf “said he accepted the points without conditions and that his military leadership concurred,” but there would be “a variety of security and technical issues that need to be addressed.” He emphasized that “these were not conditions … but points that required clarification.” Musharraf also asks the U.S. to clarify if its mission is to “strike UBL and his supporters or the Taliban as well,” and advises that the U.S. should be prepared for what comes next. “Following any military action, there should be a prompt economic recovery effort. “You are there to kill terrorists, not make enemies” he said. “Islamabad wants a friendly government in Kabul.”
[Note: A copy of this document was previously released and posted on September 13, 2010.]
Document 9 – State 161279
U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Deputy Secretary Armitage-Mamoud Phone Call – September 18, 2001,” September 18, 2001, Confidential, 2 pp.
Traveling aboard a U.S. government aircraft, Pakistani Intelligence ISI Director Mahmoud Ahmed arrives in Afghanistan on September 17, 2001 to meet Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and discuss 9/11, U.S. demands and the future of al-Qaeda. Mahmoud informs Mullah Omar and other Taliban officials that the U.S. has three conditions:
- “They must hand over UBL [Usama bin Ladin] to the International Court of Justice, or extradite him,”
- “They must hand over or extradite the 13 top lieutenants/associates of UBL…”
- “They must close all terrorist training camps.”
According to Mahmoud, the Taliban’s response “was not negative on all these points.” “The Islamic leaders of Afghanistan are now engaged in ‘deep Introspection’ about their decisions.”
[Note: A copy of this document was previously released and posted on September 13, 2010.]
Document 10 – State 161371
U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Secretary’s 13 September 2001 Conversation with Pakistani President Musharraf,” September 19, 2001, Secret, 3 pp.
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf have a telephone conversation on September 13, to discuss U.S.-Pakistan relations and U.S. retaliation for the events of 9/11. The Secretary informs President Musharraf that “because Pakistan has a unique relationship with the Taliban, Pakistan has a vital role to play.” The Secretary tells Musharraf, “‘as one general to another, we need someone on our flank fighting with us. And speaking candidly, the American people would not understand if Pakistan was not in the fight with the U.S.'”
Document 11 – Islamabad 05337
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Mahmud Plans 2nd Mission to Afghanistan” September 24, 2001, Secret, 3 pp.
ISI Director Mahmoud Ahmed returns to Afghanistan to make a last-minute plea to the Taliban. General Mahmoud tells U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin “his mission was taking place in parallel with U.S. Pakistani military planning” and that in his estimation, “a negotiated solution would be preferable to military action.” “‘I implore you,’ Mahmud told the Ambassador, ‘not to act in anger. Real victory will come in negotiations.’ ‘Omar himself,’ he said, ‘is frightened. That much was clear in his last meeting.'” The ISI Director tells the Ambassador America’s strategic objectives of getting Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda would best be accomplished by coercing the Taliban to do it themselves. “It is better for the Afghans to do it. We could avoid the fallout. If the Taliban are eliminated … Afghanistan will revert to warlordism.” Nevertheless General Mahmoud promises full Pakistani support for U.S. activities, including military action. “We will not flinch from a military effort.” “Pakistan,” he said, “stands behind you.” Ambassador Chamberlin insists that while Washington “appreciated his objectives,” to negotiate to get bin Laden, Mullah Omar “had so far refused to meet even one U.S. demand.” She tells Mahmoud his trip “could not delay military planning.”
[Note: A copy of this document was previously released and posted on September 13, 2010.]
Document 12 – Islamabad 05452
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Mahmud on Failed Kandahar Trip” September 29, 2001, Confidential, 3 pp.
An additional trip by ISI Director Mahmoud Ahmed to Afghanistan to negotiate with the Taliban is unsuccessful. Mahmoud’s September 28, 2001 “two-hour meeting with Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Jalil concluded with no progress.” Mahmoud is ostensibly seeking to get the Taliban to cooperate “so that ‘the barrel of the gun would shift away from Afghanistan,’ only in this way would Pakistan avoid ‘the fall out’ from a military attack on its neighbor.”Yet despite Mahmoud’s efforts the Taliban remained uncooperative. “The mission failed as Mullah Omar agreed only to ‘think about’ proposals.” U.S. officials are similarly unenthusiastic about the idea of compromise. “Ambassador confirmed that the United States would not negotiate with the Taliban and that we were on a ‘fast track to bringing terrorists to justice.'” Mahmoud acknowledged that “President [Bush] had been quite clear in asserting there would be no negotiations.”
Document 13 – Memorandum for the President
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the President, “Strategic Thoughts,” September 30, 2001, Top Secret/Close Hold, 2 pp. [Excised]
Instead of focusing exclusively on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld advises President Bush that the U.S. should think more broadly. “It would instead be surprising and impressive if we built our forces up patiently, took some early action outside of Afghanistan, perhaps in multiple locations, and began not exclusively or primarily with military strikes but with equip-and-train activities with local opposition forces coupled with humanitarian aid and intense information operations.”
With a strategic vision emphasizing support for local opposition groups rather than direct U.S. strikes, the Secretary is wary of excessive or imprecise U.S. aerial attacks which risk “creating images of Americans killing Moslems.” The memo argues that the U.S. should “capitalize on our strong suit, which is not finding a few hundred terrorists in the caves of Afghanistan,” and instead using “the vastness of our military and humanitarian resources, which can strengthen enormously the opposition forces in terrorist-supporting states.” The approach to the war should not focus “too heavily on direct, aerial attacks on things and people.”
“If the war does not significantly change the world’s political map, the U.S. will not achieve its aim/ There is value in being clear on the order of magnitude of the necessary change. The USG [U.S. Government] should envision a goal along these lines: New regimes in Afghanistan and another key State (or two) that supports terrorism (To strengthen political and military efforts to change policies elsewhere).”
Document 14 – Working Paper
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Working Paper, “Thoughts on the ‘Campaign’ Against Terrorism” October 2, 2001, Secret, 1 p.
Arguing that Afghanistan is “part of the much broader problem of terrorist networks and nations that harbor terrorists across the globe,” this paper discusses multiple aspects of emerging U.S. operations in the war on terror, including developing greater intelligence capabilities, the use of direct action, military capabilities, humanitarian aid and “working with Muslims worldwide to demonstrate the truth that the problem is terrorism – not a religion or group of people.”
Document 15 – Memorandum
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, “Strategic Guidance for the Campaign Against Terrorism, October 3, 2001, Top Secret, 16 pp.
A expansive document designed to “provide strategic guidance to the Department of Defense for the development of campaign plans,” this memo specifies the perceived threats, objectives, means, strategic concepts and campaign elements guiding the nascent war on terror. Threats identified include terrorist organizations, states harboring such organizations (including the “Taliban [and] Iraq Baathist Party”), non-state actors that support terrorist organizations and the capacity of “terrorist organizations or their state supporters to acquire, manufacture or use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons or the means to deliver them.”
Strategic objectives include preventing further attacks against the U.S. and deterring aggression, as well as the somewhat contradictory goals of “encouraging populations dominated by terrorist organizations or their supporters to overthrow that domination,” and “prevent[ing] or control[ing] the spreading or escalation of conflict.”
Document 16 – State 175415
U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Message to Taliban,” October 7, 2001, Secret/Nodis/Eyes Only, 2 pp.
The U.S. requests that either Pakistani Intelligence ISI Chief Mahmoud Ahmed or Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf deliver a message to Taliban leaders directly from Washington informing the Taliban that “if any person or group connected in any way to Afghanistan conducts a terrorist attack against our country, our forces or those of our friends or allies, our response will be devastating. It is in your interest and in the interest of your survival to hand over all al-Qaida leaders.” The U.S. warns that it will hold leaders of the Taliban “personally responsible” for terrorist activities directed against U.S. interests, and that American intelligence has “information that al-Qaida is planning additional attacks.” The short message concludes by informing Mullah Omar that “every pillar of the Taliban regime will be destroyed.”
Document 17 – Information Paper
Defense Intelligence Agency, Information Paper, “Prospects for Northern Alliance Forces to Seize Kabul,” October 15, 2001, Secret/Norforn/X1, 2 pp. [Excised]
Comparing the current military strength of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, this paper concludes that a difficult battle for Kabul may lay ahead for the Northern Alliance. “Taliban strength in the Kabul Central Corps is approximately 130 tanks, 85 armored personnel carriers, 85 pieces of artillery and approximately 7,000 soldiers. Northern Alliance forces, under the command of General Fahim Khan, number about 10,000 troops, with approximately 40 tanks and a roughly equal number of APCs [armored personnel carriers], and a few artillery pieces.” “If the Northern Alliance’s present combat power relative to defending Taliban forces in and around Kabul remains unchanged, the Northern Alliance will not be in a position to successfully conduct a large scale offensive to seize and hold Kabul. The Northern Alliance is more likely to occupy key terrain around the city and use allied air strikes/artillery to strengthen its position and encourage defections of Taliban leaders in the city. Only under these favorable circumstances would Northern Alliance forces then be able to take control of Kabul.”
However the document asserts that this military balance may change rapidly due to the provision of assistance to the Northern Alliance and the isolation of the Taliban. “Russia is reportedly delivering approximately forty to fifty T-55 tanks, sixty APCs, plus additional artillery, rocket systems, attack helicopters and a large quantity of ammunition to the Northern Alliance via the Parkhar supply base in southern Tajikistan.”
On November 13, 2001 the Northern Alliance took control of Kabul as the Taliban rapidly retreated to Kandahar.
Document 18 – Memorandum and Attached Paper
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld to Douglas Feith, “Strategy,” Attachment, “U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan,” National Security Council, October 16, 2001, 7:42am, Secret/Close Hold/ Draft for Discussion, 7 pp. [Excised]
Five weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the National Security Council outlines the U.S. retaliatory strategy. Emphasizing the destruction of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, it is careful not to commit the U.S. to extensive rebuilding activities in post-Taliban Afghanistan. “The USG [U.S. Government] should not agonize over post-Taliban arrangements to the point that it delays success over Al Qaida and the Taliban.” “The U.S. should not commit to any post-Taliban military involvement since the U.S. will be heavily engaged in the anti-terrorism effort worldwide.” There is a handwritten note from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld adding “The U.S. needs to be involved in this effort to assure that our coalition partners are not disaffected.”
Operationally the U.S. will “use any and all Afghan tribes and factions to eliminate Al-Qaida and Taliban personnel,” while inserting “CIA teams and special forces in country operational detachments (A teams) by any means, both in the North and the South.” Secretary Rumsfeld further notes: “Third country special forces UK [excised] Australia, New Zealand, etc) should be inserted as soon as possible.”
Diplomacy is important “bilaterally, particularly with Pakistan, but also with Iran and Russia,” however “engaging UN diplomacy… beyond intent and general outline could interfere with U.S. military operations and inhibit coalition freedom of action.”
Document 19 – Working Paper
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld to General Myers, Working Paper, “Afghanistan,” October 17, 2001, 11:25am, Secret, 1 p.
A memo from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Myers reflects the critical role played by the Central Intelligence Agency in initial U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Secretary Rumsfeld expresses his frustration that U.S. intelligence officials, instead of military personnel, are the dominant actors on the ground in Afghanistan. “Given the nature of our world, isn’t it conceivable that the Department ought not to be in a position of near total dependence on CIA in situations such as this?” “Does the fact that the Defense Department can’t do anything on the ground in Afghanistan until CIA people go in first to prepare the way suggest that the Defense Department is lacking a capability we need?”
Document 20 – Working Paper
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Working Paper, “Discussions w/CENTCOM re: Sy Hersh Article,” October 22, 2001, 1:19pm, Secret, 2 pp.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is concerned about information reported by Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker that U.S. Central Command failed to fire on a convoy thought to contain Taliban personnel including Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. Rumsfeld informs Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command Thomas “Tommy” Franks that he had been instructed “immediately to hit [this target] if anyone wiggled and that [the Secretary] was going to call the President. But in the meantime, he had [the Secretary’s] authority to hit it.” Secretary Rumsfeld discussed the failure to fire with General Myers, writing that he has “the feeling he [Franks] may not have given me the full story.”
The paper also contradicts previous instructions that aerial attacks should be precise and limited in Afghanistan. Instead, Secretary Rumsfeld states, “I have a high tolerance level for possible error. That is to say, if he [Franks] thinks he has a valid target and he can’t get me or he can’t get Wolfowitz in time, he should hit it. I added that there will not be any time where he cannot reach me or, if not me, Wolfowitz. I expect him to be leaning far forward on this.”
Document 21 – Memorandum for the President
U.S. Department of State, Memorandum, From Secretary of State Colin Powell to U.S. President George W. Bush, “Your Meeting with Pakistani President Musharraf,” November 5, 2001, Secret, 2 pp. [Excised]
Signed by Secretary of State Colin Powell to President Bush, this memo highlights critical changes in U.S.-Pakistan relations since 9/11, including higher levels of cooperation not only on counterterrorism policy, but also on nuclear non-proliferation, the protection of Pakistani nuclear assets, and economic development. Powell notes that President Musharraf’s decision to ally with the U.S. comes “at considerable political risk,” as he has “abandoned the Taliban, frozen terrorist assets [and] quelled anti-Western protests without unwarranted force, [Excised].” Regarding Afghanistan, the Secretary tells the President that Pakistan will want to protect its interests and maintain influence in Kabul. “Musharraf is pressing for a future government supportive of its interests and is concerned that the Northern Alliance will occupy Kabul.”
[Note: A copy of this document was previously released and posted on September 13, 2010.]
Document 22 – Timeline
U.S. Secret Service, Paper, “9/11/01 Timeline,” November 17, 2001, Secret, 32 pp. [Excised]
A detailed timeline of the activities of Vice President Richard Cheney and his family from September 11-27, 2001, this document was compiled at the request of the Vice President, whose well-known Secret Service codename is “Angler.” The document extensively uses other Secret Service code words, such as “Crown” (White House), “Author” (Lynne Cheney, the Vice President’s wife), “Advocate” (Elizabeth Cheney, the Vice President’s daughter) and “Ace” (Philip J. Perry, the Vice President’s son-in-law).
Document 23 – Snowflake
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Snowflake Memorandum, From Donald Rumsfeld to Doug Feith, “Afghanistan,” April 17, 2002, 9:15AM, Secret, 1 p. [Excised]
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is concerned the U.S. does not yet have comprehensive plans for U.S. activities in Afghanistan. “I may be impatient. In fact I know I’m a bit impatient. But the fact that Iran and Russia have plans for Afghanistan and we don’t concerns me.” The Secretary laments the state of interagency coordination and is alarmed that bureaucratic delay may harm the war effort. “We are never going to get the U.S. military out of Afghanistan unless we take care to see that there is something going on that will provide the stability that will be necessary for us to leave.”
Document 24 – Memorandum
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, From Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “Al Qaeda Ops Sec,” July 19, 2002, Secret, 1 p. [Excised]
U.S. officials are unsure whether or not Osama bin Laden is alive, with the intelligence community assessing that he must be because “his death would be too important a fact for [members of al-Qaeda] to be able to keep it a secret.” Paul Wolfowitz rejects this assertion, arguing that bin Laden’s survival is equally important news for al-Qaeda to communicate, leading him to conclude that the terrorists are “able to communicate quite effectively on important subjects without our detecting anything.” Although specifics remain classified, the memo expresses concern over America’s overreliance on a specific capability allowing the U.S. to track terrorist organizations. Wolfowitz questions whether or not this technique is providing a false sense of security to intelligence officials and that the U.S. may even be being manipulated by terrorists who may know about U.S. capabilities. “We are a bit like the drunk looking for our keys under the lamppost because that is the only place where there is light.” Critical information may be in places the U.S. is not looking.
Document 25 – Kabul 000509
U.S. Embassy (Kabul), Cable, “Afghan Supplemental” February 6, 2006, Secret, 3 pp. [Excised]
In a message to the Secretary of State, U.S. Ambassador Ronald R. Neumann expresses his concern that the American failure to fully fund and support activities designed to bolster the Afghan economy, infrastructure and reconstruction effort is harming the American mission. His letter is a plea for additional money and a shift in priorities. “We have dared so greatly, and spent so much in blood and money that to try to skimp on what is needed for victory seems to me too risky.”
The Ambassador notes, “the supplemental decision recommendation to minimize economic assistance and leave out infrastructure plays into the Taliban strategy, not to ours.” Taliban leaders were issuing statements that the U.S. would grow increasingly weary, while they gained momentum. A resurgent Taliban leadership ominously summarizes the emerging strategic match-up with the United States by saying, “You have all the clocks but we have all the time.”
Document 26 – Kabul 003863
U.S. Embassy (Kabul), Cable, “Afghanistan: Where We Stand and What We Need” August 29, 2006, Secret, 8 pp. [Excised]
According to U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald R. Neumann “we are not winning in Afghanistan; although we are far from losing.” The primary problem is a lack of political will to provide additional resources to bolster current strategy and to match increasing Taliban offensives. “At the present level of resources we can make incremental progress in some parts of the country, cannot be certain of victory, and could face serious slippage if the desperate popular quest for security continues to generate Afghan support for the Taliban…. Our margin for victory in a complex environment is shrinking, and we need to act now.” The Taliban believe they are winning. That perception “scares the hell out of Afghans.” “We are too slow.”
Rapidly increasing certain strategic initiatives such as equipping Afghan forces, taking out the Taliban leadership in Pakistan and investing heavily in infrastructure can help the Americans regain the upper hand, Neumann declares. “We can still win. We are pursuing the right general policies on governance, security and development. But because we have not adjusted resources to the pace of the increased Taliban offensive and loss of internal Afghan support we face escalating risks today.”
SCHEI**HAUS-FLIEGEN “GoMOPA”-Peter Ehlers und Gerd Bennewirtz- SCHEI**-HAUS-Nomen est STASI-Omen !
Der Beweis: Organisierte Verbrecher der GoMoPa:”Lug, Trug; Betrug, Cybermord, Rufmord, Mord”
Liebe Leser,
trotz serienmässiger Vorstrafen wegen Betruges und der zahlreicher anderer Kripo-,FBI-Ermiottlungen werden die organisierten GoMoPa-STASI-Gangster Ihre unwahren Lügen gegen mich nicht löschen und stellen diese immer wieder neu ins Netz: Kein Wunder, denn ich habe die Verbrechen dieser organisierten Kriminellen aufgedeckt und werde dies weiter tun – im Interesse aller anständigen Mitglieder der menschlichen Gesellschaft !
Wie dumm diese STASI-Verbrecher zeigt sich in deren eigenen Texten: “Wie kann ein Magister eine Diplomarbeit schreiben” ? – wie in deren “Shithouse Fly Blog auf mich falsch dargelegt und natürlich haben die STASI-Kriminellen nicht den Hauch eines Beweises für irgendeine Behauptung – wir dagegen jede Menge und auch jede Menge Aktenzeichen gegen sie:
Zum Beispiel:
Klaus Maurischat ( Aktenzeichen Krefeld vom 24. April 2006; AZ: 28 Ls 85/05 – Am 24. April 2006 war die Verhandlung am Amtsgericht Krefeld in der Betrugssache: Mark Vornkahl / Klaus Maurischat ./. Dehnfeld. Aktenzeichen: 28 Ls 85/05, Klaus Maurischat, Lange Straße 38, 27313 Dörverden)
FAKT IST: Klaus Maurischat ist vorbestraft
Aktenzeichen Krefeld vom 24. April 2006; AZ: 28 Ls 85/05 – Am 24. April 2006 war die Verhandlung am Amtsgericht Krefeld in der Betrugssache: Mark Vornkahl / Klaus Maurischat ./. Dehnfeld. Aktenzeichen: 28 Ls 85/05, Klaus Maurischat, Lange Straße 38, 27313 Dörverden)
Sie wollen mich zwingen, mit ihren Lügen meine Berichterstattung gegen sie einzustellen – wie hier ersichtlich:
So wollte der Serienbetrüger Klaus Maurischat uns zwingen, die Berichterstattung über “GoMoPa” zu stoppen
Unser Bildtext: Klaus Maurischat: There is no Place like home
So wollte der Serienbetrüger Klaus Maurischat uns zwingen die Berichterstattung über den “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa” einzustellen
Meine Anmerkung: Sie lesen
den Original-Text mit den Original-Rechtschreibfehlern von Maurischat in chronologischer Reihenfolge von unten nach oben. “Unter den Linden” ist die Regus-Tarnadresse für den untergetauchten Serienbetrüger und Stasi-Ganoven. “SUMA” steht im Sprach-Jargon des “GoMoPa”-”NACHRICHTENDIENSTLERS” für Suchmaschine.
Zitat:
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA (MEINE ANTWORT)
> Was anderes fällt einem Hilfsschüler auch nicht ein! Wenn ich dich
> schnappe, dann haue ich dir die Fresse ein – mein Lieber! Merk dir
> das gut, du Kinderficker!
>
> Was sagt denn dein Freund Dr. XXX zu deinem handeln, Schwuchtel?
>
> > HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA (MEINE ANTWORT)
> >
> > > Geiles Google Suchergebniss hast du mittlerweile. Das ist sowas von
> > > geil. Am besten ist dieser Beitrag zu Deiner Magisterarbeit, du
> > > Spinner:
> > >
> > > http://scheisshausfliege.wordpress.com/2011/01/29/die-diplomarbeit-des-magisters-bernd-pulch-ein-haufen-scheisse/
> > >
> > > Wenn du nicht aufhörst, wird niemand mehr ein Stück Brot von dir
> > > nehmen. Dein Name ist dan absolut durch. Glaub mir, wir verstehen da
> > > mehr von als du Schwachkopf!
> > >
> > > Im Übrigen kannst du mich stets gern persönlich treffen. Unter den
> > > Linden 21, Berlin – habe immer für dich Feigling Zeit! (TARN-ADRESSE)
> > >
> > > So – und nun überle wann du die Artikel über uns löschen willst,
> > > sonst mache ich die erste Seite der SUMA Ergebnisse mit deinen
> > > Einträgen voll.
Weitere Info zu den Verbrechen der organisierten Kriminellen der STASI “GoMoPa” auf http://www.victims-opfer.com
TOP-SECRET-NEW KISSINGER ‘TELCONS’ REVEAL CHILE PLOTTING AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT
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NEW KISSINGER ‘TELCONS’ REVEAL CHILE PLOTTING Nixon Vetoed Proposed Coexistence with an Allende Government National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 255 m
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Washington D.C., September 13, 2001- On the eve of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the military coup in Chile, the National Security Archive today published for the first time formerly secret transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s telephone conversations that set in motion a massive U.S. effort to overthrow the newly-elected socialist government of Salvador Allende. “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger told CIA director Richard Helms in one phone call. “I am with you,” the September 12, 1970 transcript records Helms responding.
The telephone call transcripts—known as ‘telcons’—include previously-unreported conversations between Kissinger and President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers. Just eight days after Allende’s election, Kissinger informed the president that the State Department had recommended an approach to “see what we can work out [with Allende].” Nixon responded by instructing Kissinger: “Don’t let them do it.”
After Nixon spoke directly to Rogers, Kissinger recorded a conversation in which the Secretary of State agreed that “we ought, as you say, to cold-bloodedly decide what to do and then do it,” but warned it should be done “discreetly so that it doesn’t backfire.” Secretary Rogers predicted that “after all we have said about elections, if the first time a Communist wins the U.S. tries to prevent the constitutional process from coming into play we will look very bad.”
The telcons also reveal that just nine weeks before the Chilean military, led by Gen. Augusto Pinochet and supported by the CIA, overthrew the Allende government on September 11, 1973, Nixon called Kissinger on July 4 to say “I think that Chilean guy might have some problems.” “Yes, I think he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responded. Nixon then blamed CIA director Helms and former U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry for failing to block Allende’s inauguration three years earlier. “They screwed it up,” the President declared.
Although Kissinger never intended the public to know about these conversations, observed Peter Kornbluh, who directs the National Security Archive’s Chile Documentation Project, he “bestowed on history a gift that keeps on giving by secretly taping and transcribing his phone calls.” The transcripts, Kornbluh noted, provide historians with the ability to “eavesdrop on the most candid conversations of the highest and most powerful U.S. officials as they plotted covert intervention against a democratically-elected government.”
Kissinger began secretly taping all his incoming and outgoing phone conversations when he became national security advisor in 1969; his secretaries transcribed the calls from audio tapes that were later destroyed. When Kissinger left office in January 1977, he took more than 30,000 pages of the transcripts, claiming they were “personal papers,” and used them, selectively, to write his memoirs. In 1999, the National Security Archive initiated legal proceedings to force Kissinger to return these records to the U.S. government so they could be subject to the freedom of information act and declassification. At the request of Archive senior analyst William Burr, telcons on foreign policy crises from the early 1970s, including these four previously-unknown conversations on Chile, were recently declassified by the Nixon Presidential library.
On November 30, 2008 the National Security Archive will publish a comprehensive collection of Kissinger telcons in the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA). Comprising 15,502 telcons, this collection documents Kissinger’s conversations with top officials in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including President Richard Nixon; Defense Secretaries Melvin Laird, Elliot Richardson, and James Schlesinger; Secretary of State William P. Rogers; Ambassador to the U.N. George H.W. Bush; and White House Counselor Donald Rumsfeld; along with noted journalists, ambassadors, and business leaders with close White House ties. Wide-ranging topics discussed in the telcons include détente with Moscow, military actions during the Vietnam War and the negotiations that led to its end, Middle East peace talks, the 1970 crisis in Jordan, U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, and Chile, rapprochement with China, the Cyprus crisis (1974- ), and the unfolding Watergate affair. When combined with the Archive’s previous electronic publication of Kissinger’s memoranda of conversation — The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977 — users of the DNSA will have access to comprehensive records of Kissinger’s talks with myriad U.S. officials and world leaders. Like the Archive’s earlier publication, the Kissinger telcons will be comprehensively and expertly indexed, providing users with have easy access to the information they seek. The collection also includes 158 White House tapes, some of which dovetail with transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations with Nixon and others. Users of the set will thus be able to read the “telcon” and listen to the tape simultaneously.
READ THE DOCUMENTS
l. Helms/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:00 noon.
Eight days after Salvador Allende’s narrow election, Kissinger tells CIA director Richard Helms that he is calling a meeting of the 40 committee—the committee that determines covert operations abroad. “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger declares. Helms reports he has sent a CIA emissary to Chile to obtain a first-hand assessment of the situation.
2. President/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:32 p.m.
In the middle of a Kissinger report to Nixon on the status of a terrorist hostage crisis in Amman, Jordan, he tells the president that “the big problem today is Chile.” Former CIA director and ITT board member John McCone has called to press for action against Allende; Nixon’s friend Pepsi CEO Donald Kendall has brought Chilean media mogul Augustine Edwards to Washington. Nixon blasts a State Department proposal to “see what we can work out [with Allende], and orders Kissinger “don’t let them do that.” The president demands to see all State Department cable traffic on Chile and to get an appraisal of “what the options are.”
3. Secretary Rogers, September 14, 1970, 12:15pm (page 2)
After Nixon speaks to Secretary of State William Rogers about Chile, Kissinger speaks to him on September 14. Rogers reluctantly agrees that the CIA should “encourage a different result” in Chile, but warns it should be done discreetly lest U.S. intervention against a democratically-elected government be exposed. Kissinger firmly tells Secretary Rogers that “the president’s view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an Allende takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture.”
4) President/Kissinger, July 4, 1973, 11:00 a.m.
Vacationing in San Clemente, Nixon calls Kissinger and discusses the deteriorating situation in Chile. Two weeks earlier, a coup attempt against Allende failed, but Nixon and Kissinger predict further turmoil. “I think that Chilean guy may have some problems,” Nixon states. “Oh, he has massive problems. He has massive problems…he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responds. The two share recollections of three years earlier when they had covertly attempted to block Allende’s inauguration. Nixon blames CIA director Richard Helms and former U.S. ambassador Edward Korry for failing to stop Allende; “they screwed it up,” he states. The conversation then turns to Kissinger’s evaluation of the Los Angeles premiere of the play “Gigi.”
5) President/Kissinger, September 16, 1973, 11:50 a.m. (previously posted May 26, 2004)
In their first substantive conversation following the military coup in Chile, Kissinger and Nixon discuss the U.S. role in the overthrow of Allende, and the adverse reaction in the new media. When Nixon asks if the U.S. “hand” will show in the coup, Kissinger admits “we helped them” and that “[deleted reference] created conditions as great as possible.” The two commiserate over what Kissinger calls the “bleating” liberal press. In the Eisenhower period, he states, “we would be heroes.” Nixon assures him that the people will appreciate what they did: “let me say they aren’t going to buy this crap from the liberals on this one.”
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TOP-SECRET – Meyer Lansky – THE FBI FILES PART 1
Meyer Lansky (1902-1983) was involved in a wide-range of organized criminal activity and was associated with many other well known criminal figures from the 1920s to the 1970s. Lansky was especially active in gambling ventures, including the rise of Las Vegas and efforts to build casinos in Cuba before the communist revolution there. In 1972, he was indicted on charges that he and others had skimmed millions of dollars from a Vegas casino that they owned; the indictment on Lansky was later dismissed since he was considered too ill to face trial. The files in this release range from 1950 to 1978.
By clicking on the links below you can download the files a pdf documents
92-2831 section 4 -266- pages 1-249
92-2831 section 4 -266- pages 250-304
| Meyer Lansky | |
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Meyer Lansky in 1958 |
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| Born | Meyer Suchowljansky July 4, 1902(1902-07-04) Grodno, Russian Empire |
| Died | January 15, 1983(1983-01-15) (aged 80) Miami Beach, Florida |
| Cause of death | lung cancer |
| Nationality | United States |
| Known for | Mob activity |
Meyer Lansky (born Meyer Suchowljansky[1]; July 4, 1902 – January 15, 1983), known as the “Mob’s Accountant”, was a Russian Empire-born American organized crime figure who, along with his associate Charles “Lucky” Luciano, was instrumental in the development of the “National Crime Syndicate” in the United States. For decades he was thought to be one of the most powerful people in the country.
Lansky developed a gambling empire which stretched from Saratoga, New York to Miami to Council Bluffs and Las Vegas; it is also said that he oversaw gambling concessions in Cuba. Although a member of the Jewish Mafia, Lansky undoubtedly had strong influence with the Italian Mafia and played a large role in the consolidation of the criminal underworld (although the full extent of this role has been the subject of some debate).
Lansky was born Meyer Suchowljansky in Grodno (then in the Russian Empire, now in Belarus), to a Jewish family who experienced pogroms at the hands of the local Christian Polish and Russian population.[2] In 1911, he emigrated to the United States through the port of Odessa[3] with his mother and brother and joined his father, who had previously emigrated to the United States in 1909, and settled on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, New York.[4]
Lansky met Bugsy Siegel when he was a teenager. They became lifelong friends, as well as partners in the bootlegging trade, and together with Lucky Luciano, formed a lasting partnership. Lansky was instrumental in Luciano’s rise to power by organizing the 1931 murder of Mafia powerhouse Salvatore Maranzano. As a youngster, Siegel saved Lansky’s life several times, a fact which Lansky always appreciated. The two adroitly managed the Bug and Meyer Mob despite its reputation as one of the most violent Prohibition gangs.
Lansky was the brother of Jacob “Jake” Lansky, who in 1959 was the manager of the Nacional Hotel in Havana, Cuba.
Gambling operations
By 1936, Lansky had established gambling operations in Florida, New Orleans, and Cuba. These gambling operations were very successful as they were founded upon two innovations. First, in Lansky and his connections there existed the technical expertise to effectively manage them based upon Lansky’s knowledge of the true mathematical odds of most popular wagering games. Second, mob connections were used to ensure legal and physical security of their establishments from other crime figures, and law enforcement (through payoffs).
But there was also an absolute rule of integrity concerning the games and wagers made within their establishments. Lansky’s “carpet joints” in Florida and elsewhere were never “clip-joints”; where gamblers were unsure of whether or not the games were rigged against them. Lansky ensured that the staff (the croupiers and their management) actually consisted of men of high integrity. And it was widely known what would happen to a croupier or a table manager who attempted to cheat or steal from a customer or the house.[clarification needed]
In 1936, Lansky’s partner Luciano was sent to prison. As Alfred McCoy records:
“During the 1930s, Meyer Lansky ‘discovered’ the Caribbean for Northeastern United States syndicate bosses and invested their illegal profits in an assortment of lucrative gambling ventures…. He was also reportedly responsible for organized crime’s decision to declare Miami a ‘free city’ (i.e., not subject to the usual rules of territorial monopoly).”
Lansky later convinced the Mafia to place Bugsy Siegel in charge of Las Vegas, and became a major investor in Siegel’s Flamingo Hotel.
After Al Capone‘s 1931 conviction for tax evasion and prostitution, Lansky saw that he too was vulnerable to a similar prosecution. To protect himself, he transferred the illegal earnings from his growing casino empire to a Swiss numbered bank account, whose anonymity was assured by the 1934 Swiss Banking Act. Lansky eventually even bought an offshore bank in Switzerland, which he used to launder money through a network of shell and holding companies.[5]
War work
In the 1930s, Meyer Lansky and his gang claimed to have stepped outside their usual criminal activities to break up rallies held by Nazi sympathizers. Lansky recalled a particular rally in Yorkville, a German neighborhood in Manhattan, that he claimed he and 14 other associates disrupted:
- The stage was decorated with a swastika and a picture of Adolf Hitler. The speakers started ranting. There were only fifteen of us, but we went into action. We threw some of them out the windows. Most of the Nazis panicked and ran out. We chased them and beat them up. We wanted to show them that Jews would not always sit back and accept insults.[6]
During World War II, Lansky was also instrumental in helping the Office of Naval Intelligence‘s Operation Underworld, in which the US government recruited criminals to watch out for German infiltrators and submarine-borne saboteurs.
According to Lucky Luciano’s authorized biography, during this time, Lansky helped arrange a deal with the US Government via a high-ranking U.S. Navy official. This deal would secure the release of Lucky Luciano from prison; in exchange the Italian Mafia would provide security for the war ships that were being built along the docks in New York Harbor. German submarines were sinking allied shipping outside the coast on a daily basis and there was great fear of attack or sabotage by Nazi sympathizers.
The Flamingo
During the 1940s, Lansky’s associate Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel persuaded the crime bosses to invest in a lavish new casino hotel project in Las Vegas, the Flamingo. After long delays and large cost overruns, the Flamingo Hotel was still not open for business. To discuss the Flamingo problem, the Mafia investors attended a secret meeting in Havana, Cuba in 1946. While the other bosses wanted to kill Siegel, Lansky begged them to give his friend a second chance. Despite this reprieve, Siegel continued to lose Mafia money on the Flamingo Hotel. A second family meeting was then called. However, by the time this meeting took place, the casino turned a small profit. Lansky again, with Luciano’s support, convinced the family to give Siegel some more time.
The Flamingo was soon losing money again. At a third meeting, the family decided that Siegel was finished. He had humiliated the organized crime bosses and never had a chance. It is widely believed that Lansky himself was compelled to give the final okay on eliminating Siegel due to his long relationship with Siegel and his stature in the family.
On June 20, 1947, Siegel was shot and killed in Beverly Hills, California. Twenty minutes after the Siegel hit, Lansky’s associates, including Gus Greenbaum and Moe Sedway, walked into the Flamingo Hotel and took control of the property. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lansky retained a substantial financial interest in the Flamingo for the next twenty years. Lansky said in several interviews later in his life that if it had been up to him, Ben Siegel would be alive today.
This also marked a power transfer in Vegas from the New York crime families to the Chicago Outfit. Although his role was considerably more restrained than in previous years, Lansky is believed to have both advised and aided Chicago boss Tony Accardo in initially establishing his hold.
Lansky in Cuba
After World War II, Lansky associate Lucky Luciano was paroled from prison on the condition that he permanently return to Sicily. However, Luciano secretly moved to Cuba, where he worked to resume control over American Mafia operations. Luciano also ran a number of casinos in Cuba with the sanction of Cuban president General Fulgencio Batista, though the American government succeeded in pressuring the Batista regime to deport Luciano.
Batista’s closest friend in the Mafia was Lansky. They formed a renowned friendship and business relationship that lasted for three decades. During a stay at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York in the late 1940s, it was mutually agreed upon that, in exchange for kickbacks, Batista would offer Lansky and the Mafia control of Havana’s racetracks and casinos. Batista would open Havana to large scale gambling, and his government would match, dollar for dollar, any hotel investment over $1 million, which would include a casino license. Lansky, of course, would place himself at the center of Cuba’s gambling operations. He immediately called on his “associates” to hold a summit in Havana.
The Havana Conference was held on December 22, 1946 at the Hotel Nacional. This was the first full-scale meeting of American underworld leaders since the Chicago meeting in 1932. Present were such notable figures as Joe Adonis and Albert “The Mad Hatter” Anastasia, Frank Costello, Joseph “Joe Bananas” Bonanno, Vito Genovese, Moe Dalitz, Thomas Luchese, from New York, Santo Trafficante Jr. from Tampa, Carlos “The Little Man” Marcello from New Orleans, and Stefano Magaddino, Joe Bonanno’s cousin from Buffalo. From Chicago there was Anthony Accardo and the Fischetti brothers, “Trigger-Happy” Charlie and his brother Rocco, and, representing the Jewish interest, Lansky and “Dandy” Phil Kastel from Florida. The first to arrive was Salvatore Charles Lucky Luciano, who had been deported to Italy, and had to travel to Havana with a false passport. Lansky shared with them his vision of a new Havana, profitable for those willing to invest the right sum of money. A city that could be their “Latin Las Vegas,” where they would feel right at home since it was a place where drugs, prostitution, labor racketeering, and extortion were already commonplace. According to Luciano’s evidence, and he is the only one who ever recounted details of the events in any detail, he confirmed that he was appointed as kingpin for the mob, to rule from Cuba until such time as he could find a legitimate way back into the U.S. Entertainment at the conference was provided by, among others, Frank Sinatra who flew down to Cuba with their friends, the Fischetti brothers.
In 1952, Lansky even offered then President Carlos Prío Socarrás a bribe of U.S. $250,000 to step down so Batista could return to power. Once Batista retook control of the government he quickly put gambling back on track. The dictator contacted Lansky and offered him an annual salary of U.S. $25,000 to serve as an unofficial gambling minister. By 1955, Batista had changed the gambling laws once again, granting a gaming license to anyone who invested $1 million in a hotel or U.S. $200,000 in a new nightclub. Unlike the procedure for acquiring gaming licenses in Vegas, this provision exempted venture capitalists from background checks. As long as they made the required investment, they were provided with public matching funds for construction, a 10-year tax exemption and duty-free importation of equipment and furnishings. The government would get U.S. $250,000 for the license plus a percentage of the profits from each casino. Cuba’s 10,000 slot machines, even the ones which dispensed small prizes for children at country fairs, were to be the province of Batista’s brother-in-law, Roberto Fernandez y Miranda. An Army general and government sports director, Fernandez was also given the parking meters in Havana as a little something extra. Import duties were waived on materials for hotel construction and Cuban contractors with the right “in” made windfalls by importing much more than was needed and selling the surplus to others for hefty profits. It was rumored that besides the U.S. $250,000 to get a license, sometimes more was required under the table. Periodic payoffs were requested and received by corrupt politicians.
Lansky set about reforming the Montmartre Club, which soon became the in place in Havana. He also long expressed an interest in putting a casino in the elegant Hotel Nacional, which overlooked El Morro, the ancient fortress guarding Havana harbor. Lansky planned to take a wing of the 10-storey hotel and create luxury suites for high stakes players. Batista endorsed Lansky’s idea over the objections of American expatriates such as Ernest Hemingway and the elegant hotel opened for business in 1955 with a show by Eartha Kitt. The casino was an immediate success.[7]
Once all the new hotels, nightclubs and casinos had been built Batista wasted no time collecting his share of the profits. Nightly, the “bagman” for his wife collected 10 percent of the profits at Trafficante’s interests; the Sans Souci cabaret, and the casinos in the hotels Sevilla-Biltmore, Commodoro, Deauville and Capri (part-owned by the actor George Raft). His take from the Lansky casinos, his prized Habana Riviera, the Nacional, the Montmartre Club and others, was said to be 30 percent. What exactly Batista and his cronies actually received in total in the way of bribes, payoffs and profiteering has never been certified. The slot machines alone contributed approximately U.S. $1 million to the regime’s bank account.
Revolution
The fast times soon rolled to a stop. The 1959 Cuban revolution and the rise of Fidel Castro changed the climate for mob investment in Cuba. On that New Year’s Eve of 1958, while Batista was preparing to flee to the Dominican Republic and then on to Spain (where he died in exile in 1973), Lansky was celebrating the $3 million he made in the first year of operations at his 440-room, $18 million palace, the Habana Riviera. Many of the casinos, including several of Lansky’s, were looted and destroyed that night.
On January 8, 1959, Castro marched into Havana and took over, setting up shop in the Hilton. Lansky had fled the day before for the Bahamas and other Caribbean destinations. The new Cuban president, Manuel Urrutia Lleó, took steps to close the casinos.
In October 1960, Castro nationalized the island’s hotel-casinos and outlawed gambling. This action essentially wiped out Lansky’s asset base and revenue streams. He lost an estimated $7 million. With the additional crackdown on casinos in Miami, Lansky was forced to depend on his Las Vegas revenues.
Later years
In his later years, Lansky lived a low-profile, routine existence in Miami Beach, making life difficult for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He dressed like the average grandfather, walked his dog every morning, and portrayed himself as a harmless retiree. Lansky’s associates usually met him in malls and other crowded locations. Lansky would change drivers, who chauffeured him around town to look for new pay phones almost every day. Lansky was so elusive that the FBI essentially gave up monitoring him by the mid-1970s.
Attempted escape to Israel and trial
In 1970, Lansky fled to Herzliya Pituah, Israel, to escape federal tax evasion charges. Although the Israeli Law of Return allows any Jew to settle in the State of Israel, it excludes those with criminal pasts. Two years after Lansky fled to Israel, Israeli authorities deported him back to the U.S. However, the government’s best shot at convicting Lansky was with the testimony of loan shark Vincent “Fat Vinnie” Teresa, an informant with little or no credibility. The jury was unreceptive and Lansky was acquitted in 1974.
Death
Lansky’s last years were spent quietly at his home in Miami Beach. He died of lung cancer on January 15, 1983, age 80, leaving behind a widow and three children.[8] On paper, Lansky was worth almost nothing. At the time, the FBI believed he left behind over $300 million in hidden bank accounts, but they never found any money.
However, his biographer Robert Lacey describes Lansky’s financially strained circumstances in the last two decades of his life and his inability to pay for health care for his relatives. For Lacey, there was no evidence “to sustain the notion of Lansky as king of all evil, the brains, the secret mover, the inspirer and controller of American organized crime.”[9] He concludes from evidence including interviews with the surviving members of the family that Lansky’s wealth and influence had been grossly exaggerated, and that it would be more accurate to think of him as an accountant for gangsters rather than a gangster himself. His granddaughter told author T.J. English that at his death in 1983, Lansky left only $37,000 in cash.[10] When asked in his later years what went wrong in Cuba, the gangster offered no excuses. “I crapped out,” he said. He would also tell people he had lost every single penny in Cuba. In all likelihood, it was only an excuse to keep the IRS off his back. According to Lansky’s daughter Sandra, he had transferred at least $15 million to his brother Jake due to his problems with the IRS. Lansky was known to keep money in other people’s names, but how much will likely never be known. Meyer Lansky was and continues to be a mystery.
In September 1982, Forbes listed him as one of the 400 wealthiest people in America. His net worth was estimated at $100 million.
In popular culture
In film
- The character Hyman Roth, portrayed by Lee Strasberg, and certain aspects of the main character Michael Corleone from the film The Godfather Part II (1974), are based on Lansky. In fact, shortly after the premiere in 1974, Lansky phoned Strasberg and congratulated him on a good performance (Strasberg was nominated for an Oscar for his role), but added “You could’ve made me more sympathetic.” Roth’s statement to Michael Corleone that “We’re bigger than U.S. Steel” was actually a direct quote from Lansky, who said the same thing to his wife while watching a news story on the Cosa Nostra. The character Johnny Ola is similar to Lansky’s associate Vincent Alo. Additionally, the character Moe Greene, who was a friend of Roth’s, is modeled upon Bugsy Siegel.[11][12] The film reflects real life in that Lansky was denied the Right of Return to Israel and returned to the U.S. to face criminal charges, but fabricated details regarding Roth’s attempts to bribe Latin American dictators for entry to their countries, as well as Roth’s ultimate fate.
- Maximilian “Max” Bercovicz, the gangster played by James Woods in Sergio Leone‘s opus Once Upon A Time In America was inspired by Meyer Lansky.[13]
- Mark Rydell plays Lansky in the 1990 Sydney Pollack film Havana, starring Robert Redford.
- The film Bugsy (1991), a biography of Bugsy Siegel, included Lansky as a major character, played by Ben Kingsley.
- In the 1991 film Mobsters, he is played by the actor Patrick Dempsey.
- In a 1999 movie biopic entitled Lansky, the dramatized role of Lansky is portrayed by Richard Dreyfuss.
- Meyer Lansky is portrayed by Dustin Hoffman in the 2005 film The Lost City.
In television
- In the current (2010) series on HBO, Boardwalk Empire, Meyer Lansky is played by Anatol Yusef.
- The 1981 NBC mini series, The Gangster Chronicles, the character of Michael Lasker, played by Brian Benben, was based on Lansky. Because Lansky was still living at the time, the producers derived the “Michael Lasker” name for the character to avoid legal complications.
- A 1999 made-for-TV movie called Lansky was released starring Richard Dreyfuss as Lansky, Eric Roberts as Bugsy Siegel, and Anthony LaPaglia as Lucky Luciano.
- Manny Wiesbord, the mob chieftain played by Joseph Wiseman on Crime Story, was based on Lansky.
- Lansky’s grandson, Meyer Lansky II, appeared in the “Jesse James vs. Al Capone” episode of Spike‘s Deadliest Warrior as a Capone expert, credited as “Mafioso Descendant.” The senior Lansky was briefly referenced during the episode.
In literature
- In the 2010 book of photographs “New York City Gangland”,[14] Meyer Lansky is seen “loitering” on Little Italy’s famed “Whiskey Curb” with partners Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel, Vincent “Jimmy Blue Eyes” Alo, and waterfront racketeer Eddie McGrath.
- In the 1996 novel The Plan, by Stephen J. Cannell, Lansky and fellow mobster Joseph Alo are involved in putting an anti-Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act presidential candidate into office.
- In the 2009 theatrical adaption by Joseph Bologna “Lansky” is portrayed by Mike Burstyn in a one act play.
- In the book Havana by Stephen Hunter, Lansky and Fidel Castro are both included as main characters.
- In the 2009 novel If The Dead Rise Not by Philip Kerr the hero, Bernie Gunther, meets Lansky in Havana.
- In the 2009 novel Ride of the Valkyries by Stuart Slade, Meyer Lansky is the President of Mafia run Cuba.
- In the 2011 historical novel, “The Devil Himself” by Eric Dezenhall, Meyer Lansky coordinates counterespionage operations with the U.S. Navy to prevent Nazi sabotage in New York and help plan the invasion of Sicily.
- He portrays himself in Harold Robbins 1995 follow-up to The Carpetbaggers, The Raiders.
In music
- In his 2007 song “Party Life,” Jay-Z raps, “So tall and Lanky / My suit, it should thank me / I make it look good to be this hood Meyer Lansky.”
- Raekwon, a member of the Wu-tang Clan referred to himself as “rap’s Meyer Lansky” in his song “Glaciers of Ice,” a single on his classic 1995 release “Only Built 4 Cuban Linx…“
- A member of the rap group Wu-Syndicate uses Myalansky as his stage name, referring to Meyer Lansky.
- In the 2010 mixtape “Albert Anastasia” by Rick Ross refers to Meyer Lansky in his song White Sand Pt.II: “I put the team together like I’m Meyer Lansky.”
- On Obie Trice’s “Outro” off the Cheers album Proof raps, ” Know much about Meyer Lansky? / Don’t tustle with my hand speed / Clutch your burner, bust it and watch your man bleed.”
- In 2011 50 Cent’s Run Up On Me Freestyle raps, “Got a fetish for the guns Calico drums / Rap Meyer Lansky steady counting my ones”
TOP-SECRET-CUBA and the U.S ROAD MAP
| Washington, D.C., September, 2011– In March 1975, a top aide to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger drafted a secret/nodis report titled “Normalizing Relations with Cuba” that recommended moving quickly to restore diplomatic ties with Havana. “Our interest is in getting the Cuba issue behind us, not in prolonging it indefinitely,” states the memorandum, which was written as the Ford administration engaged in secret diplomacy with Castro officials to lessen hostilities. “If there is a benefit to us in an end to the state of ‘perpetual antagonism,'” the report to Kissinger noted, “it lies in getting Cuba off the domestic and inter-American agendas—in extracting the symbolism from an intrinsically trivial issue.”The Kissinger document is one of several declassified records posted today and cited in a new article, “Talking to Fidel,” published in the February issue of Cigar Aficionado now available in newsstands. Written by Archive Cuba analyst Peter Kornbluh and William LeoGrande, Dean of the School of Public Affairs at American University, the article traces the secret, back-channel efforts by Kennedy, Kissinger, Carter and Clinton to improve and even attempt to normalize relations with the Castro regime. “The historical record,” the authors write, “contains important lessons [for President Obama] on how an effective effort at direct diplomacy might end, once and for all, the perpetual hostility in U.S.-Cuban relations.”
The article also quotes former President Jimmy Carter as stating that he should have followed through on his initial efforts to normalize relations with Cuba. “I think in retrospect, knowing what I know since I left the White House,” Carter told the authors in an interview, “I should have gone ahead and been more flexible in dealing with Cuba and establishing full diplomatic relations.” The Kissinger documents, posted for the first time on the Web, along with other documentation from the Kennedy and Carter administrations, were obtained by the Archive’s Cuba documentation project as part of a major research project on secret dialogue and negotiations between Havana and Washington over the past fifty years. The article in Cigar Aficionado is adapted from a forthcoming book by Kornbluh and LeoGrande, Talking with Fidel: The Untold History of Dialogue between the United States and Cuba. “History shows that presidents from Kennedy to Clinton considered dialogue both possible and preferable to continued hostility and aggression in U.S. policy toward Cuba,” Kornbluh noted. “This rich declassified record of the past provides a road map for the new administration to follow in the future.” Read the Dialogue Documents Document l: White House memorandum, Secret, “Conversation with Commandante Ernesto Guevara of Cuba”, August 22, 1961. In a secret memo to President Kennedy, Richard Goodwin recounts his impromptu meeting with Ernesto “Che” Guevara that took place on August 17, 1961 in Montevideo, Uruguay. Their conversation covered several key points: First, Guevara expressed Cuba’s hope to establish a “modus vivendi” with the United States. Second, although Castro was willing\ to make a number of concessions toward that goal, the nature of Cuba’s political system was nonnegotiable. “He said they could discuss no formula that would mean giving up the type of society to which they were dedicated,” Goodwin reported. Finally Guevara raised the issue of how the two countries would find “a practical formula” to advance toward accommodation. He made a pragmatic suggestion, according to Goodwin: “He knew it was difficult to negotiate these things but we could open up some of these issues by beginning to discuss secondary issues … as a cover for more serious conversation.” The meeting marked the first high-level talks between officials from the United States and Cuba since the break in diplomatic relations on January 3, 1961. Document 2: White House memorandum, Top Secret, “Mr. Donovan’s Trip to Cuba,” March 4, 1963. This document records President Kennedy’s interest in negotiations with Castro and his instructions to his staff to “start thinking along more flexible lines” about negotiations with Cuba toward better relations. At issue were talks between James Donovan, who had negotiated the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, and Fidel Castro, who had expressed an interest in using the prisoner negotiations as a springboard to discuss more normal relations. The memo recording Kennedy’s views makes clear he expressed a concrete interest in exploring and pursuing an effective dialogue with Castro. Document 3: Central Intelligence Agency memorandum, Secret, “Interview of the U.S. Newswoman with Fidel Castro Indicating Possible Interest in Rapprochement with the United States”, May 1, 1963. After ABC News correspondent Lisa Howard returned from interviewing Castro in April 1963, she provided a debriefing to CIA deputy director Richard Helms. Helms’s memorandum of conversation notes her opinion that Castro is “ready to discuss rapprochement.” Howard also offered to become an intermediary between Havana and Washington. The document contains a notation, “Psaw,” meaning President Kennedy read the report on Howard and Castro. Document 4: Oval Office audio tape, Kennedy and Bundy, November 5, 1963. (.mp3 audio clip – 6 MB) This audio document, recorded by a secret taping system in President Kennedy’s office, records a discussion between the President and his National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, regarding Castro’s invitation to William Attwood, a deputy to U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, to come to Cuba for secret talks. “How can Attwood get in and out of there very privately,” Kennedy is heard to ask. The President suggests that Attwood should be taken off the U.S. payroll prior to such a meeting so that the White House could plausibly deny that any official talks had taken place if the meeting leaks to the press. Document 5: National Security Council, memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, Confidential, “Cuba Policy,” August 30, 1974. This memorandum for Kissinger lays out the growing multinational pressures on the U.S. to change its sanctions policy toward Cuba. A number of Latin countries are pushing for licenses for U.S. subsidiaries to export goods to Cuba, and the OAS nations are threatening to lift the ban on trade and diplomatic ties with Havana that the U.S. imposed in 1964. Stephen Low, an NSC staffer on Latin America, recommends an options paper for changing U.S. policy and negotiating with the Cubans that “should be held very closely.” Kissinger authorizes the project. Unbeknownst to all but his two top aides, he also initiates contact with the Cubans through intermediaries to begin exploring talks. (Newly posted) Document 6: Kissinger Aide-Memoire to Cuba, January 11, 1975 In an effort to renew a dialogue between Cuba and the United States, Kissinger’s aides and Cuban representatives meet for the first time in a public cafeteria in La Guardia airport in New York on January 11, 1975. During this secret meeting, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, William Rogers, provides an aide-mémoire, approved by Kissinger, to Castro’s representative, Ramon Sanchez-Parodi. “We are meeting here to explore the possibilities for a more normal relationship between our two countries,” the untitled and unsigned U.S. document reads. The message takes a very positive tone in suggesting that the “U.S. is able and willing to make progress on such issues even with socialist nations with whom we are in fundamental ideological disagreement.” (Newly posted) Document 7: Department of State, Secret, “Normalizing relations with Cuba”, March 27, 1975. As the OAS prepared to lift multilateral sanctions against Cuba, and the U.S. Congress pushed for lifting the embargo, deputy assistant secretary for Latin America Harry Shlaudeman drafted a secret/nodis memo for Kissinger on “Normalizing Relations with Cuba.” His report suggests that the U.S. should move quickly to negotiate with Cuba through a scenario that will result in normal diplomatic relations. “Our interest is in getting the Cuba issue behind us, not in prolonging it indefinitely,” the memo states. Shlaudeman warns that the conventional scenario of talks will become mired in disagreements over compensation for expropriated property and suggests setting that issue aside. The document lays out a series of steps that would be taken to normalize relations and finally get the “intrinsically trivial issue” of Cuba “off the domestic and inter-American agendas.” (Newly posted) Document 8: Presidential Directive / NSC-6, Secret, “Cuba”, March 15, 1977. This directive, issued shortly after Carter took office, represents the only time a President has ordered normalization of U.S. relations with Castro’s Cuba. “I have concluded that we should attempt to achieve normalization of our relations with Cuba,” the directive states. Carter instructed his foreign policy team to “set in motion a process which will lead to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba.” Although negotiations led quickly to re-opening diplomatic ties through the establishment of interest sections in Havana and Washington, secret talks, including with Fidel Castro, broke down over the U.S. insistence that Cuba withdraw its troops from Africa before the Carter Administration would consider lifting the embargo. |
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TOP-SECRET-Historical Archives Lead to Arrest of Police Officers in Guatemalan Disappearance
Demonstration by the GAM on April 13, 1985 following the deaths of GAM leaders, Héctor Gómez and Rosario Godoy de Cuevas. Photo from; “Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyrany.” [Courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon]
Historical Archives Lead to Arrest of Police
Officers in Guatemalan Disappearance
Declassified documents show U.S. Embassy knew
that Guatemalan security forces were behind
wave of abductions of students and labor leaders
National Security Archive calls for release of military files
and investigation into intellectual authors of the 1984
abduction of Fernando García and other disappearances
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 273
By Kate Doyle and Jesse Franzblau
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TOP-SECRET – MCI Lawful Spying Guide
TOP-SECRET – INSA Nest of Official and Corporate Spies
TOP-SECRET – FUJIMORI FOUND GUILTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES
|
UJIMORI FOUND GUILTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES
National Security Archive Posts Declassified Evidence Used in Trial
U.S. Documents Implicated Fujimori in Repression, Cover-up
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 274
|
TOP-SECRET – ROBERT F. KENNEDY URGED LIFTING TRAVEL BAN TO CUBA IN ’63
Source: Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
ROBERT F. KENNEDY URGED LIFTING
TRAVEL BAN TO CUBA IN ’63
Attorney General cited inconsistency with “our views as a free society”
State Department overruled RFK proposal to withdraw prohibitions on travel
Documents Record First Internal Debate to Lift Ban
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 158
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TOP-SECRET: Fukushima Daiichi NPP 12 September 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Dust Sampling at the Opening of Reactor Building of Unit 3, September 12, 2011. Released by Tokyo Electric Power Company 13 September 2011.![]() |
TOP-SECRET – Khodorkovsky ‘will not be free while Putin is in power’
Wednesday, 18 April 2007, 07:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001770
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DOJ OF OPDAT/ALEXANDRE, LEHMANN AND NEWCOMBE, OCRS/OHR AND
SHASKY, OIA/BURKE AND DITTOE
STATE FOR EUR/RUS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/17/2017
TAGS ECON, KCRM, KJUS, PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: MEETING WITH XXXXXXXXXXXX
REF: A. MOSCOW 774 B. MOSCOW 697
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.5 (b, d)
1. (C) Summary: Emboffs met with XXXXXXXXXXXX. He described the new embezzlement and money laundering charges — that Khodorkovskiy engaged in transfer pricing that harmed unwitting minority shareholders in Yukos’ three production subsidiaries — as a re-packaging of the charges in the first case. He claimed the defense has substantial evidence these shareholders were fully informed of these activities. Further, XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that the charges are without legal or factual support and questioned the prosecution’s claim that the loss to the subsidiaries was USD 30 billion, a figure he said was about equal to the value of the oil produced by the three units during the period in question. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he was surprised that a Moscow court had agreed to change the venue of the trial from Chita to Moscow. He described two cases pending before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The first case claims that Khodorkovskiy was arrested and held in pre-trial detention in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention), while the second alleges violations of Khodorkovskiy’s right to a fair trial. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that the case against XXXXXXXXXXXX is politically motivated and being run out of the Kremlin, and does not foresee any change of status for Khodorkovskiy while the Putin Administration remains in office. End Summary.
The New Charges
—————
2. (C) On February 16, the General Procuracy charged Khodorkovskiy and Platon Lebedev with embezzlement and money laundering (Ref B). According to the indictment, Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev acquired controlling interests in three oil companies (Samaraneftegaz, Yuganskneftegaz, and Tomskneftegaz) and then caused these companies to sell oil at below-market prices to other companies that they controlled without disclosing to other shareholders their role in these transactions. They then allegedly re-sold the oil at market prices, which were approximately 3-4 times greater than the original purchase price. The alleged victims were the other shareholders of Samaraneftegaz, Yuganskneftegaz, and Tomskneftegaz, who were entitled to the benefit of an arms-length sale at market prices, but instead received only the artificially deflated prices allegedly set by Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev (Ref B).
3. (C) As an initial matter, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the new charges are simply a re-packaging of the charges in the first case. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX in the first case, prosecutors relied on the very same transactions to charge Khodorkovskiy with tax evasion. However, he said, they were unsatisfied with Khodorkovskiy’s eight-year sentence and decided to bring new charges carrying potentially heavier sentences. The money laundering charges carry a maximum sentence of 15 years and the embezzlement charges carry a maximum sentence of 10 years. He said the defense will challenge them on the grounds that they violate Russian and international norms prohibiting double jeopardy. XXXXXXXXXXXX also suggested that the new charges may have been brought to prevent Khodorkovskiy from being released on parole before upcoming Duma and Presidential elections. (Note: Russian law provides that a prisoner is eligible for early release after he has served half of his sentence. Because Khodorkovskiy was arrested in October 2003 and was sentenced to eight years, he might have been eligible for early release in October 2007. However, his prison violations, which XXXXXXXXXXXX claims were provoked by authorities, would likely have prevented his early release in any event. End Note.)
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that the new charges are without merit since this transfer pricing technique was not only legal but engaged in by “thousands of firms.” He noted that the business groups and industrial firms emerging from privatization during the 1990s were generally organized to take maximum advantage of benefits the GOR provided via “internal offshore” zones. The headquarters and some operating units of a group or firm were typically located in identified havens and conducted most of the transactions, thus allowing for tax optimization. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX this structure facilitated and encouraged the widespread practice of transfer pricing, whereby one part of a company
MOSCOW 00001770 002 OF 003
purchased the output made by another part of the company at below-market prices before selling the same output at a market price.
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX defense would present substantial documentary evidence, including records of corporate meetings, proving that the minority shareholders of Samaraneftegaz, Yuganskneftegaz, and Tomskneftegaz were fully informed of all relevant aspects of the subject transactions. XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed that if the minority shareholders had actually been defrauded, as prosecutors claim, they would have filed civil suits, which they did not do. Finally, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the prosecution’s claim of a USD 30 billion loss to the shareholders is &absurd8 because the sum would represent the total value of all the oil produced by the subject companies during the relevant time period rather than the difference between what the minority shareholders actually received and what they would have received in arms-length transactions, which, he said, would have been much a more sensible way to measure the alleged loss.
The Trial: Where and When?
————————–
6. (C) The Procuracy filed the new charges in Chita, where Khodorkovskiy is presently incarcerated, and sought to conduct the preliminary investigation and trial there (Ref B). Shortly after the new charges were filed, the defense filed a motion seeking a change of venue to Moscow, claiming that the majority of witnesses and evidence are located there. On March 20, the Basmanny Court in Moscow granted the defense motion. The Procuracy appealed this decision and the appeal was heard on April 16 in the Moscow City Court. This Court upheld the Basmanny Court’s decision transferring the case to Moscow. XXXXXXXXXXXX Russian law provides that the preliminary investigation should be conducted in the place where the crime was allegedly committed, but may be conducted in the place where the defendant is located to ensure &completeness, objectivity and compliance with procedural norms.”
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the Procuracy chose Chita to make it difficult for the defense team to meet with their clients and prepare their defense. Specifically, he said, Chita is difficult to reach and lacks the copying machines and other office equipment the defense needs to prepare its case. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that although the Procuracy’s decision was clearly wrong as a matter of law, he was surprised by the Basmanny Court’s decision because the same court had consistently ruled against Khodorkovskiy in the first case. He claimed that the ruling was an indication of a general recognition that the Procuracy had “gone too far.”
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that he did not know when the trial on the new charges would take place. He said that the prosecution had sought to start the trial in June so that it would be completed before the elections, but noted that the case materials consist of 127 volumes and said that the XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the prosecutors will likely move to cut off the defense’s review of the case file in May, but said that the defense would challenge such a motion. Under Russian law, the prosecution can seek to limit the time that the defense has to review the case file if there are grounds to believe that the defense is engaging in unreasonable delay. XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that a trial date could not be set until the location of the trial had been determined. Therefore, because of ongoing litigation regarding the venue of the trial and the voluminous nature of the case file, it is not clear when the case will proceed to trial.
The European Court of Human Rights
———————————-
9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that Khodorkovskiy has filed two complaints to the ECHR in Strasbourg alleging violations of his rights under the Convention in the first case. The ECHR in Strasbourg adjudicates claims brought under the Convention. As a result of Russia’s ratification of the Convention in 1998, Russia is bound by the Convention and any ECHR decisions interpreting it. The first complaint, he said,
MOSCOW 00001770 003 OF 003
alleges that Khodorkovskiy was arrested and held in pre-trial detention in violation of the Convention. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the ECHR had agreed to hear this case on an accelerated timetable, but had not yet set a date.
10. (C) The second complaint, he said, alleges violations of Khodorkovskiy’s right to a fair trial. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that before adjudicating a case, the ECHR typically sends a list of specific questions about the movant’s claims to the respondent government. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX the Russian government has not yet responded to the ECHR’s questions regarding the second complaint and it is therefore not clear when this case will be considered. XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that the second complaint is “more interesting” than the first because, if successful, it could result in a reversal of Khodorkovskiy’s conviction. By contrast, the first claim could only result in an award of monetary damages. XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that the French Embassy in Moscow and German Bundestag have shown interest in this case.
No Changes Expected
——————-
11. (C) In his final remarks, XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the new charges against Khodorkovskiy are politically motivated and said that the case is being orchestrated entirely by the Kremlin. Although he stated confidently that the charges are without legal or evidentiary support, he concluded by saying that Khodorkovskiy would likely remain in prison as long as the Putin Administration is in power. BURNS
TOP-SECRET – China ‘would accept’ Korean reunification
Monday, 22 February 2010, 09:32
S E C R E T SEOUL 000272
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, <abbr title=”JA“><abbr title=”JA“>JA, CH
SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS
Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
- South Korea’s vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo tells the Americans that senior Chinese officials have told him that China is fed up with the North Korean regime’s behaviour and would not oppose Korean reunification. Chun says North Korea has already collapsed economically and will collapse politically when Kim Jong-il dies. Key passage highlighted in yellow.
- Read related article
Summary
——-
1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Ambassador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Korea‘s collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North’s economy. Beijing had “no will” to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies — and the DPRK characterized as “the most incompetent official in China” — had retained his position as chief of the PRC’s 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.
VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations…
——————————————
2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Ambassador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Korea’s collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in “two to three years.” Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North’s economy; there was “no substance” to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministry’s “briefing” to the ROK embassy in Beijing on Wang Jiarui’s visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had “basically read a Xinhua press release,” Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether Wang had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.
3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea “than most people believe.” Beijing had “no will” to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies and the DPRK leadership “knows it.” Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the “brink of collapse,” the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
—————————————–
4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was “a very bad thing” that Wu Dawei had retained his position as chief of the PRC’s delegation. XXXXXXXXXXXX said it appeared that the DPRK “must have lobbied extremely hard” for the now-retired Wu to stay on as China’s 6PT chief. [NAME REMOVED] complained that Wu is the PRC’s XXXXXXXXXXXX an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who “knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesn’t speak English.” Wu was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming — to anyone willing to listen — that the PRC’s economic rise represented a “return to normalcy” with China as a great world power.
…China’s “New Generation” of Korea-Hands…
———————————————
5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials XXXXXXXXXXXX stood in sharp contrast to Wu, according to VFM Chun.XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control.XXXXXXXXXXXX, Chun said, were ready to “face the new reality” that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state — a view that since North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders.
…PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario…
———————————————
6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly “not welcome” any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun XXXXXXXXXXXX said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the United States in a “benign alliance” — as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chundismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China’s strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan, and South Korea — not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could “strengthen the centrifugal forces in China’s minority areas.”
…and Japan
————
7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s control. Chun asserted that, even though “Japan’s preference” was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses. STEPHENS
TOP-SECRET – Sixteen Individuals Arrested in the United States for Alleged Roles in Cyber Attacks
WASHINGTON—Fourteen individuals were arrested today by FBI agents on charges related to their alleged involvement in a cyber attack on PayPal’s website as part of an action claimed by the group “Anonymous,” announced the Department of Justice and the FBI. Two additional defendants were arrested today on cyber-related charges.
The 14 individuals were arrested in Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, and Ohio on charges contained in an indictment unsealed today in the Northern District of California in San Jose. In addition, two individuals were arrested on similar charges in two separate complaints filed in the Middle District of Florida and the District of New Jersey. Also today, FBI agents executed more than 35 search warrants throughout the United States as part of an ongoing investigation into coordinated cyber attacks against major companies and organizations. Finally, the United Kingdom’s Metropolitan Police Service arrested one person and the Dutch National Police Agency arrested four individuals today for alleged related cyber crimes.
According to the San Jose indictment, in late November 2010, WikiLeaks released a large amount of classified U.S. State Department cables on its website. Citing violations of the PayPal terms of service, and in response to WikiLeaks’ release of the classified cables, PayPal suspended WikiLeaks’ accounts so that WikiLeaks could no longer receive donations via PayPal. WikiLeaks’ website declared that PayPal’s action “tried to economically strangle WikiLeaks.”
The San Jose indictment alleges that in retribution for PayPal’s termination of WikiLeaks’ donation account, a group calling itself Anonymous coordinated and executed distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against PayPal’s computer servers using an open source computer program the group makes available for free download on the Internet. DDoS attacks are attempts to render computers unavailable to users through a variety of means, including saturating the target computers or networks with external communications requests, thereby denying service to legitimate users. According to the indictment, Anonymous referred to the DDoS attacks on PayPal as “Operation Avenge Assange.”
The defendants charged in the San Jose indictment allegedly conspired with others to intentionally damage protected computers at PayPal from Dec. 6, 2010, to Dec. 10, 2010.
The individuals named in the San Jose indictment are: Christopher Wayne Cooper, 23, aka “Anthrophobic;” Joshua John Covelli, 26, aka “Absolem” and “Toxic;” Keith Wilson Downey, 26; Mercedes Renee Haefer, 20, aka “No” and “MMMM;” Donald Husband, 29, aka “Ananon;” Vincent Charles Kershaw, 27, aka “Trivette,” “Triv” and “Reaper;” Ethan Miles, 33; James C. Murphy, 36; Drew Alan Phillips, 26, aka “Drew010;” Jeffrey Puglisi, 28, aka “Jeffer,” “Jefferp” and “Ji;” Daniel Sullivan, 22; Tracy Ann Valenzuela, 42; and Christopher Quang Vo, 22. One individual’s name has been withheld by the court.
The defendants are charged with various counts of conspiracy and intentional damage to a protected computer. They will make initial appearances throughout the day in the districts in which they were arrested.
In addition to the activities in San Jose, Scott Matthew Arciszewski, 21, was arrested today by FBI agents on charges of intentional damage to a protected computer. Arciszewski is charged in a complaint filed in the Middle District of Florida and made his initial appearance this afternoon in federal court in Orlando, Fla.
According to the complaint, on June 21, 2011, Arciszewski allegedly accessed without authorization the Tampa Bay InfraGard website and uploaded three files. The complaint alleges that Arciszewski then tweeted about the intrusion and directed visitors to a separate website containing links with instructions on how to exploit the Tampa InfraGard website. InfraGard is a public-private partnership for critical infrastructure protection sponsored by the FBI with chapters in all 50 states.
Also today, a related complaint unsealed in the District of New Jersey charges Lance Moore, 21, of Las Cruces, N.M., with allegedly stealing confidential business information stored on AT&T’s servers and posting it on a public file sharing site. Moore was arrested this morning at his residence by FBI agents and is expected to make an initial appearance this afternoon in Las Cruces federal court. Moore is charged in with one count of accessing a protected computer without authorization.
According to the New Jersey complaint, Moore, a customer support contractor, exceeded his authorized access to AT&T’s servers and downloaded thousands of documents, applications and other files that, on the same day, he allegedly posted on a public file-hosting site that promises user anonymity. According to the complaint, on June 25, 2011, the computer hacking group LulzSec publicized that they had obtained confidential AT&T documents and made them publicly available on the Internet. The documents were the ones Moore had previously uploaded.
The charge of intentional damage to a protected computer carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. Each count of conspiracy carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine.
An indictment and a complaint merely contain allegations. Defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
To date, more than 75 searches have taken place in the United States as part of the ongoing investigations into these attacks.
These cases are being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for the Northern District of California, Middle District of Florida, and the District of New Jersey. The Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section also has provided assistance.
Today’s operational activities were done in coordination with the Metropolitan Police Service in the United Kingdom and the Dutch National Police Agency. The FBI thanks the multiple international, federal, and domestic law enforcement agencies who continue to support these operations.
TOP-SECRET- How The FBI fights Cybercrime – Statement before the House Judiciary Subcommittee
- Gordon M. Snow
- Assistant Director
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Statement before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
- Washington, D.C.
Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today regarding the FBI’s efforts to combat cyber crime as it relates to social networking sites.
Let me begin by acknowledging that the rapid expansion of the Internet has allowed us to learn, to communicate, and to conduct business in ways that were unimaginable 20 years ago. Still, the same technology, to include the surge in the use of social networking sites over the past two years, has given cyber thieves and child predators new, highly effective avenues to take advantage of unsuspecting users. These cyber criminals are using a variety of schemes to defraud or victimize innocent social networking site users, some of which I would like to highlight today.
Social Engineering
Regardless of the social networking site, users continue to be fooled online by persons claiming to be somebody else. Unlike the physical world, individuals can misrepresent everything about themselves while they communicate online, ranging not only from their names and business affiliations (something that is fairly easy to do in-person as well), but extending as well to their gender, age, and location (identifiers that are far more difficult to fake in-person). Years ago, we called these types of people confidence or “con” men. Perhaps as a result of today’s high-tech times, con artists are now referred to as being engaged in social engineering. It should come as no surprise to learn that the FBI is investigating classic investment fraud schemes, such as Ponzi schemes, that are now being carried out in virtual worlds. Other con artists are able to conduct identity theft crimes by misidentifying themselves on social networking sites and then tricking their victims into giving them their account names and passwords as well as other personally identifiable information.
In addition to identity theft crimes, child predators routinely use social networking sites to locate and communicate with future victims and other pedophiles. In at least one publicized case from last year, an individual attempted to extort nude photos of teenage girls after he gained control of their e-mail and social networking accounts. That particular FBI investigation led to an 18-year federal sentence for the offender, reflecting that these crimes are serious and will not be tolerated.
Fraud Schemes
There are a variety of Internet fraud schemes being used by cyber criminals at any given time. By way of example, a recent fraud scheme involves a cyber criminal gaining access to an unsuspecting user’s e-mail account or social networking site. The fraudster, who claims to be the account holder, then sends messages to the user’s friends. In the message, the fraudster states that he is on travel and has been robbed of his credit cards, passport, money, and cell phone; and is in need of money immediately. Without realizing that the message is from a criminal, the friends wire money to an overseas account without validating the claim.
Phishing Scams
Phishing schemes attempt to make Internet users believe that they are receiving e-mail from a trusted source when that is not the case. Phishing attacks on social networking site users come in various formats, including: messages within the social networking site either from strangers or compromised friend accounts; links or videos within a social networking site profile claiming to lead to something harmless that turns out to be harmful; or e-mails sent to users claiming to be from the social networking site itself. Social networking site users fall victim to the schemes due to the higher level of trust typically displayed while using social networking sites. Users often accept into their private sites people that they do not actually know, or sometimes fail altogether to pproperly set privacy settings on their profile. This gives cyber thieves an advantage when trying to trick their victims through various phishing schemes.
Social networking sites, as well as corporate websites in general, provide criminals with enormous amounts of information to send official looking documents and send them to individual targets who have shown interest in specific subjects. The personal and detailed nature of the information erodes the victim’s sense of caution, leading them to open the malicious e-mail. Such e-mail contains an attachment that contains malicious software designed to provide the e-mail’s sender with control over the victim’s entire computer. Once the malware infection is discovered, it is often too late to protect the data from compromise.
Cyber criminals design advanced malware to act with precision to infect, conceal access, steal or modify data without detection. Coders of advanced malware are patient and have been known to test a network and its users to evaluate defensive responses. Advanced malware may use a “layered” approach to infect and gain elevated privileges on a system. Usually, these types of attacks are bundled with an additional cyber crime tactic, such as social engineering or zero day exploits. In the first phase of a malware infection, a user might receive a spear phishing e-mail that obtains access to the user’s information or gains entry into the system under the user’s credentials. Once the cyber criminal initiates a connection to the user or system, they can further exploit it using other vectors that may give them deeper access to system resources. In the second phase, the hacker might install a backdoor to establish a persistent presence on the network that can no longer be discovered through the use of anti-virus software or firewalls.
Data Mining
Cyber thieves use data mining on social networking sites as a way to extract sensitive information about their victims. This can be done by criminal actors on either a large or small scale. For example, in a large-scale data mining scheme, a cyber criminal may send out a “getting to know you quiz” to a large list of social networking site users. While the answers to these questions do not appear to be malicious on the surface, they often mimic the same questions that are asked by financial institutions or e-mail account providers when an individual has forgotten their password. Thus, an e-mail address and the answers to the quiz questions can provide the cyber criminal with the tools to enter your bank account, e-mail account, or credit card in order to transfer money or siphon your account. Small-scale data mining may also be easy for cyber criminals if social networking site users have not properly guarded their profile or access to sensitive information. Indeed, some networking applications encourage users to post whether or not they are on vacation, simultaneously letting burglars know when nobody is home.
The Cyber Underground
The impact of cyber crime on individuals and commerce can be substantial, with the consequences ranging from a mere inconvenience to financial ruin. The potential for considerable profits is enticing to young criminals, and has resulted in the creation of a large underground economy known as the cyber underground. The cyber underground is a pervasive market governed by rules and logic that closely mimic those of the legitimate business world, including a unique language, a set of expectations about its members’ conduct, and a system of stratification based on knowledge and skill, activities, and reputation.
One of the ways that cyber criminals communicate within the cyber underground is on website forums. It is on these forums that cyber criminals buy and sell login credentials (such as those for e-mail, social networking sites, or financial accounts); where they buy and sell phishing kits, malicious software, access to botnets; and victim social security numbers, credit cards, and other sensitive information. These criminals are increasingly professionalized, organized, and have unique or specialized skills.
In addition, cyber crime is increasingly transnational in nature, with individuals living in different countries around the world working together on the same schemes. In late 2008, an international hacking ring carried out one of the most complicated and organized computer fraud attacks ever conducted. The crime group used sophisticated hacking techniques to compromise the encryption used to protect data on 44 payroll debit cards, and then provided a network of “cashers” to withdraw more than $9 million from over 2,100 ATMs in at least 280 cities worldwide, including cities in the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Italy, Hong Kong, Japan and Canada. The $9 million loss occurred within a span of less than 12 hours. The cyber underground facilitates the exchange of cyber crime services, tools, expertise, and resources, which enables this sort of transnational criminal operation to take place across multiple countries.
Beyond Cyber Crime
Apart from the cyber crime consequences associated with social networking sites, valuable information can be inadvertently exposed by military or government personnel via their social networking site profile. In a recently publicized case, an individual created a fake profile on multiple social networking sites posing as an attractive female intelligence analyst and extended friend requests to government contractors, military, and other government personnel. Many of the friend requests were accepted, even though the profile was of a fictitious person. According to press accounts, the deception provided its creator with access to a fair amount of sensitive data, including a picture from a soldier taken on patrol in Afghanistan that contained embedded data identifying his exact location. The person who created the fake social networking sites, when asked what he was trying to prove, responded: “The first thing was the issue of trust and how easily it is given. The second thing was to show how much different information gets leaked out through various networks.” He also noted that although some individuals recognized the sites as fake, they had no central place to warn others about the perceived fraud, helping to ensure 300 connections in a month.
This last point is worth expanding upon. Some social networking sites have taken it upon themselves to be model corporate citizens by voluntarily providing functions for users to report acts of abuse. A number of sites have easy to use buttons or links that, with a single click, will send a message to the system administrator alerting them of potentially illegal or abusive content. Unfortunately though, many sites have not followed the lead. Some sites provide users with no ability to report abuse, while others either intentionally or unintentionally discourage reporting by requiring users to complete a series of onerous steps every time they want to report abuse.
FBI Cyber Mission and Strategic Partnerships
The Department of Justice leads the national effort to prosecute cyber crime, and the FBI, in collaboration with other federal law enforcement agencies, investigates cyber crime. The FBI’s cyber crime mission is four-fold: first and foremost, to stop those behind the most serious computer intrusions and the spread of malicious code; second, to identify and thwart online sexual predators who use the Internet to meet and exploit children and to produce, possess, or share child pornography; third, to counteract operations that target U.S. intellectual property, endangering our national security and competitiveness; and fourth, to dismantle national and transnational organized criminal enterprises engaging in Internet fraud. To this end, we have established cyber squads in each of our 56 field offices around the country, with more than 1,000 specially trained agents, analysts, and digital forensic examiners. Still, we can not combat this threat alone.
Some of the best tools in the FBI’s arsenal for combating any crime problem are its long-standing partnerships with federal, state, local, and international law enforcement agencies, as well as with the private sector and academia. At the federal level, and by presidential mandate, the FBI leads the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) as a multi-agency national focal point for coordinating, integrating, and sharing pertinent information related to cyber threat investigations in order to determine the identity, location, intent, motivation, capabilities, alliances, funding, and methodologies of cyber threat groups and individuals. In doing so, the partners of the NCIJTF support the U.S. government’s full range of options across all elements of national power.
The FBI also partners closely with not-for-profit organizations, including extensive partnerships with the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C), in establishing the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), the National Cyber-Forensic and Training Alliance (NCFTA), the InfraGard National Members Alliance in establishing InfraGard, the Financial Services Information Sharing & Analysis Center (FS-ISAC), and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).
Just one recent example of coordination highlights how effective we are when working within these closely established partnerships. Earlier this year, Romanian police and prosecutors conducted one of Romania’s largest police actions ever—an investigation of an organized crime group engaged in Internet fraud. The investigation deployed over 700 law enforcement officers who conducted searches at 103 locations, which led to the arrest of 34 people. Over 600 victims of this Romanian crime ring were U.S. citizens. The success in bringing down this group was based in large part on the strength of our partnership with Romanian law enforcement and our domestic federal, state and local partners. Through extensive coordination by the FBI’s legal attaché (legat) in Bucharest, the Internet Crime Complaint Center provided the Romanians with over 600 complaints it had compiled from submissions to the http://www.IC3.gov reporting portal. In addition, and again in close coordination with the FBI’s legat, over 45 FBI field offices assisted in the investigation by conducting interviews to obtain victim statements on Romanian complaint forms, and by obtaining police reports and covering other investigative leads within their divisions.
Working closely with others, sharing information, and leveraging all available resources and expertise, the FBI and its partners have made significant strides in combating cyber crime. Clearly, there is more work to be done, but through a coordinated approach we have become more nimble and responsive in our efforts to bring justice to the most egregious offenders.
Conclusion
Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to come before you today and share the work that the FBI is doing to address the threat posed by cyber criminals in this country and around the globe. I am happy to answer any questions.
TOP-SECRET – Biological Weapons Export Controls Revised
Biological Weapons Export Controls Revised
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 176 (Monday, September 12, 2011)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 56099-56103] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2011-22677] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security 15 CFR Parts 740, 742 and 774 [Docket No. 110222155-1110-01] RIN 0694-AF14 Implementation of a Decision Adopted Under the Australia Group (AG) Intersessional Silent Approval Procedures in 2010 and Related Editorial Amendments AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce. ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) publishes this final rule to amend the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement a decision based on a proposal that was discussed at the 2010 Australia Group (AG) Plenary and adopted under the AG intersessional silent approval procedures in November 2010. Specifically, this rule amends the Commerce Control List (CCL) entry in the EAR that controls human and zoonotic pathogens and ``toxins,'' consistent with the intersessional changes to the AG's ``List of Biological Agents for Export Control.'' First, this rule clarifies the scope of the AG- related controls in the EAR that apply to ``South American haemorrhagic fever (Sabia, Flexal, Guanarito)'' and ``Pulmonary and renal syndrome- haemorrhagic fever viruses (Seoul, Dobrava, Puumala, Sin Nombre)'' by revising the list of viruses in this CCL entry to remove these two fevers and replace them with ten viral causative agents for the fevers. These changes are intended to more clearly identify the causative agents that are of concern for purposes of the controls maintained by the AG. Second, this rule alphabetizes and renumbers the list of viruses in this CCL entry, consistent with the 2010 intersessional changes to the AG control list. Finally, this rule makes an editorial change to the CCL entry that controls human and zoonotic pathogens and ``toxins.'' To assist exporters to more easily identify the bacteria and ``toxins'' that are controlled under this CCL entry, this rule alphabetizes and renumbers the lists of bacteria and ``toxins'' in the entry. DATES: This rule is effective September 12, 2011. ADDRESSES: Send comments regarding this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Jasmeet Seehra, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), by e-mail to Jasmeet_K._ Seehra@omb.eop.gov, or by fax to (202) 395-7285; and to the Regulatory Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, 14th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Room 2705, Washington, DC 20230. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elizabeth Sangine, Director, Chemical and Biological Controls Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, Telephone: (202) 482-3343. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement a decision that was adopted under the Australia Group (AG) intersessional silent approval procedures in November 2010. The AG is a multilateral forum consisting of 40 participating countries that maintain [[Page 56100]] export controls on a list of chemicals, biological agents, and related equipment and technology that could be used in a chemical or biological weapons program. The AG periodically reviews items on its control list to enhance the effectiveness of participating governments' national controls and to achieve greater harmonization among these controls. The November 2010 intersessional decision revised the AG ``List of Biological Agents for Export Control'' to clarify the scope of the AG controls that apply to certain viruses connected with the phenotypes or medical conditions known as ``South American haemorrhagic fever'' and ``Pulmonary and renal syndrome-haemorrhagic fever viruses.'' The purpose of these changes was to address a concern by the AG that the listings for ``South American haemorrhagic fever (Sabia, Flexal, Guanarito)'' and ``Pulmonary and renal syndrome-haemorrhagic fever viruses (Seoul, Dobrova, Puumala, Sin Nombre)'' could be misinterpreted (e.g., by assuming that the causative agents identified in the parentheses represented an exhaustive listing of such viruses). In addition, both of these AG listings referred to phenotypes or medical conditions known to be caused by several distinct species of viruses, some (but not all) of which were identified in parentheses for each listing. To address this concern, the November 2010 AG intersessional decision removed ``South American haemorrhagic fever'' and ``Pulmonary and renal syndrome-haemorrhagic fever viruses'' from the List of Biological Agents and replaced them with ten viral causative agents for the fevers. Five of these causative agents (i.e., ``Dobrava-Belgrade virus,'' ``Guanarito virus,'' ``Sabia virus,'' ``Seoul virus,'' and ``Sin nombre virus'') were previously identified in parentheses under the listings for the two fevers, while the other five causative agents (i.e., ``Andes virus,'' ``Chapare virus,'' ``Choclo virus,'' ``Laguna Negra virus,'' and ``Lujo virus'') were not previously identified on the AG List. Two other causative agents (i.e., ``Flexal virus'' and ``Puumala virus'') that were previously identified in parentheses under the listings for the two fevers were removed from the AG List. This rule amends Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 1C351 on the Commerce Control List (CCL) (Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the EAR) by revising the list of viruses contained in 1C351.a to reflect these changes to the AG List of Biological Agents. Consistent with the changes to ECCN 1C351 described above, this rule alphabetizes and renumbers the list of viruses in ECCN 1C351.a to conform with the format in the AG List of Biological Agents. In addition, for the convenience of exporters attempting to determine the control status of certain pathogens and toxins, this rule alphabetizes and renumbers the lists of bacteria and toxins contained in ECCN 1C351.c and .d, respectively. Consistent with this reordering, this rule revises references to certain agents identified in the ``CW Controls'' paragraph of this ECCN, in the ``License Requirements Notes'' under the License Requirements section of this ECCN, and/or in the ``Related Controls'' paragraph under the List of Items Controlled section of this ECCN. Although this rule removes ``Flexal virus'' from ECCN 1C351, consistent with the AG intersessional changes to the AG List of Biological Agents as described above, this virus continues to be listed on the CCL. Specifically, this rule adds ``Flexal virus'' to ECCN 1C360 (Select agents not controlled under ECCN 1C351, 1C352, or 1C354), because the virus is included in the list of select agents and toxins maintained by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in 42 CFR 73.3(b). This rule also amends ECCNs 1C351 and 1C352 by revising the ``Related Controls'' paragraph under the List of Items Controlled for each ECCN to correct the references to the regulations maintained by CDC and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Department of Agriculture, that apply to certain select agents and toxins. Finally, this rule amends Section 740.20 (License Exception STA), Section 742.18 (license requirements and policies related to the Chemical Weapons Convention), and the List of Items Controlled section in ECCN 1C991 (Vaccines, immunotoxins, medical products, and diagnostic and food testing kits) to update the references to certain items controlled under ECCN 1C351 that were alphabetized and renumbered, as described above. Section 740.20 also is amended to include in paragraph (b)(2)(vi) certain toxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d that were inadvertently omitted by the License Exception STA rule that BIS published on June 16, 2011 (76 FR 35276). The toxins identified in Section 740.20(b)(2)(vi) may be exported under License Exception STA to countries listed in Section 740.20(c)(1), provided that such exports conform with the limits specified in Section 740.20(b)(2)(vi)(A) and (b)(2)(vi)(B). None of the changes made by this rule increase the scope of the controls in ECCNs 1C351 and 1C991 (i.e., the items that are controlled under these ECCNs remain the same, although certain items are now specifically identified under separate listings in 1C351.a). As noted above, ``Flexal virus,'' which was previously controlled under ECCN 1C351.a, is now controlled as a ``select agent'' under ECCN 1C360.a; however, the license requirements for this virus remain unchanged. Although the Export Administration Act expired on August 20, 2001, the President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783 (2002), as extended by the Notice of August 12, 2010, 75 FR 50681 (August 16, 2010), has continued the EAR in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Saving Clause Shipments of items removed from eligibility for export or reexport under a license exception or without a license (i.e., under the designator ``NLR'') as a result of this regulatory action that were on dock for loading, on lighter, laden aboard an exporting carrier, or en route aboard a carrier to a port of export, on October 12, 2011, pursuant to actual orders for export or reexport to a foreign destination, may proceed to that destination under the previously applicable license exception or without a license (NLR) so long as they are exported or reexported before October 27, 2011. Any such items not actually exported or reexported before midnight, on October 27, 2011, require a license in accordance with this regulation. ``Deemed'' exports of ``technology'' and ``source code'' removed from eligibility for export under a license exception or without a license (under the designator ``NLR'') as a result of this regulatory action may continue to be made under the previously available license exception or without a license (NLR) before October 27, 2011. Beginning at midnight on October 27, 2011, such ``technology'' and ``source code'' may no longer be released, without a license, to a foreign national subject to the ``deemed'' export controls in the EAR when a license would be required to the home country of the foreign national in accordance with this regulation. Rulemaking Requirements 1. Executive Orders 13563 and 12866 direct agencies to assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is [[Page 56101]] necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety effects, distributive impacts, and equity). Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting flexibility. This rule has been determined to be not significant for purposes of Executive Order 12866. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person is required to respond to, nor shall any person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with, a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) (PRA), unless that collection of information displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Control Number. This rule contains a collection of information subject to the requirements of the PRA. This collection has been approved by OMB under Control Number 0694-0088 (Multi-Purpose Application), which carries a burden hour estimate of 58 minutes to prepare and submit form BIS-748. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Jasmeet Seehra, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and to the Regulatory Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, as indicated in the ADDRESSES section of this rule. 3. This rule does not contain policies with Federalism implications as that term is defined in Executive Order 13132. 4. The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553) requiring notice of proposed rulemaking, the opportunity for public participation, and a delay in effective date, are inapplicable because this regulation involves a military and foreign affairs function of the United States (See 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1)). Immediate implementation of these amendments is non-discretionary and fulfills the United States' international obligation to the Australia Group (AG). The AG contributes to international security and regional stability through the harmonization of export controls and seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical and biological weapons. The AG consists of 40 member countries that act on a consensus basis and the amendments set forth in this rule implement a decision adopted under the AG intersessional silent approval procedures in November 2010 and other changes that are necessary to ensure consistency with the controls maintained by the AG. Since the United States is a significant exporter of the items in this rule, immediate implementation of this provision is necessary for the AG to achieve its purpose. Any delay in implementation will create a disruption in the movement of affected items globally because of disharmony between export control measures implemented by AG members, resulting in tension between member countries. Export controls work best when all countries implement the same export controls in a timely and coordinated manner. Further, no other law requires that a notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for public comment be given for this final rule. Because a notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for public comment are not required to be given for this rule under the Administrative Procedure Act or by any other law, the analytical requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) are not applicable. Therefore, this regulation is issued in final form. List of Subjects 15 CFR Part 740 Administrative practice and procedure, Exports, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 15 CFR Part 742 Exports, Foreign trade. 15 CFR Part 774 Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. Accordingly, parts 740, 742 and 774 of the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR parts 730-774) are amended as follows: PART 740--[AMENDED] 0 1. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 740 continues to read as follows: Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of August 12, 2010, 75 FR 50681 (August 16, 2010). 0 2. Section 740.20 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(v) and paragraph (b)(2)(vi) introductory text, as follows: Sec. 740.20 License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA). * * * * * (b) * * * (2) * * * (v) License Exception STA may not be used for any item controlled by ECCN 1C351.a, .b, .c, d.11, .d.12 or .e, ECCNs 1C352, 1C353, 1C354, 1C360, 1E001 (i.e., for technology, as specified in ECCN 1E001, for items controlled by ECCN 1C351.a, .b, .c, .d.11, .d.12 or .e or ECCNs 1C352, 1C353, 1C354 or 1C360) or ECCN 1E351. (vi) Toxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.1 through 1C351.d.10 and 1C351.d.13 through 1C351.d.19 are authorized under License Exception STA to destinations indicated in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, subject to the following limits. For purposes of this paragraph, all such toxins that are sent from one exporter, reexporter or transferor to a single end-user, on the same day, constitute one shipment. * * * * * PART 742--[AMENDED] 0 3. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 742 continues to read as follows: Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2139a; 22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 7210; Sec 1503, Pub. L. 108-11, 117 Stat. 559; E.O. 12058, 43 FR 20947, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 179; E.O. 12851, 58 FR 33181, 3 CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 608; E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 950; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Presidential Determination 2003-23 of May 7, 2003, 68 FR 26459, May 16, 2003; Notice of August 12, 2010, 75 FR 50681 (August 16, 2010); Notice of November 4, 2010, 75 FR 68673 (November 8, 2010). 0 4. Section 742.18 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(1), paragraph (b)(1)(i) introductory text, and paragraphs (b)(1)(ii) and (b)(1)(iii), as follows: Sec. 742.18 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention). * * * * * (a) * * * (1) Schedule 1 chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C351. A license is required for CW reasons to export or reexport Schedule 1 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.11 or d.12 to all destinations including Canada. CW applies to 1C351.d.11 for ricin in the form of Ricinus Communis AgglutininII (RCAII), which is also known as ricin D or Ricinus Communis LectinIII (RCLIII), and Ricinus Communis LectinIV (RCLIV), which is also known as ricin E. CW applies to 1C351.d.12 for saxitoxin identified by C.A.S. 35523-89-8. (Note that the advance notification procedures and annual reporting requirements described in [[Page 56102]] Sec. 745.1 of the EAR also apply to exports of Schedule 1 chemicals.) * * * * * (b) * * * (1) * * * (i) Exports to States Parties to the CWC. Applications to export Schedule 1 Chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.11 or .d.12 to States Parties to the CWC (destinations listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR) generally will be denied, unless all of the following conditions are met: * * * * * (ii) Exports to States not party to the CWC. Applications to export Schedule 1 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.11 or .d.12 to States not Party to the CWC (destinations not listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR) generally will be denied, consistent with U.S. obligations under the CWC to prohibit exports of these chemicals to States not Party to the CWC. (iii) Reexports. Applications to reexport Schedule 1 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.11 or .d.12 generally will be denied to all destinations (including both States Parties to the CWC and States not Party to the CWC). * * * * * PART 774--[AMENDED] 0 5. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 774 continues to read as follows: Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 10 U.S.C. 7420; 10 U.S.C. 7430(e); 22 U.S.C. 287c, 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq., 22 U.S.C. 6004; 30 U.S.C. 185(s), 185(u); 42 U.S.C. 2139a; 42 U.S.C. 6212; 43 U.S.C. 1354; 15 U.S.C. 1824a; 50 U.S.C. app. 5; 22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 7210; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of August 12, 2010, 75 FR 50681 (August 16, 2010). 0 6. In Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List), Category 1--Special Materials and Related Equipment, Chemicals, ``Microorganisms'' and ``Toxins,'' ECCN 1C351 is amended by revising the License Requirements section and the ``Related Controls'' and ``Items'' paragraphs in the List of Items Controlled section, to read as follows: Supplement No. 1 to Part 774--The Commerce Control List * * * * * 1C351 Human and zoonotic pathogens and ``toxins'', as follows (see List of Items Controlled). License Requirements Reason for Control: CB, CW, AT Control(s) Country chart CB applies to entire entry............. CB Column 1. CW applies to 1C351.d.11 and d.12 and a license is required for CW reasons for all destinations, including Canada, as follows: CW applies to 1C351.d.11 for ricin in the form of (1) Ricinus Communis AgglutininII (RCAII), also known as ricin D or Ricinus Communis LectinIII (RCLIII) and (2) Ricinus Communis LectinIV (RCLIV), also known as ricin E. CW applies to 1C351.d.12 for saxitoxin identified by C.A.S. 35523-89-8. See Sec. 742.18 of the EAR for licensing information pertaining to chemicals subject to restriction pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine licensing requirements for items controlled for CW reasons. Control(s) Country chart AT applies to entire entry............. AT Column 1. License Requirement Notes 1. All vaccines and ``immunotoxins'' are excluded from the scope of this entry. Certain medical products and diagnostic and food testing kits that contain biological toxins controlled under paragraph (d) of this entry, with the exception of toxins controlled for CW reasons under d.11 and d.12, are excluded from the scope of this entry. Vaccines, ``immunotoxins'', certain medical products, and diagnostic and food testing kits excluded from the scope of this entry are controlled under ECCN 1C991. 2. For the purposes of this entry, only saxitoxin is controlled under paragraph d.12; other members of the paralytic shellfish poison family (e.g. neosaxitoxin) are designated EAR99. 3. Clostridium perfringens strains, other than the epsilon toxin-producing strains of Clostridium perfringens described in c.9, are excluded from the scope of this entry, since they may be used as positive control cultures for food testing and quality control. License Exceptions * * * * * List of Items Controlled Unit: * * * Related Controls: (1) Certain forms of ricin and saxitoxin in 1C351.d.11. and d.12 are CWC Schedule 1 chemicals (see Sec. 742.18 of the EAR). The U.S. Government must provide advance notification and annual reports to the OPCW of all exports of Schedule 1 chemicals. See Sec. 745.1 of the EAR for notification procedures. See 22 CFR part 121, Category XIV and Sec. 121.7 for additional CWC Schedule 1 chemicals controlled by the Department of State. (2) The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, maintain controls on the possession, use, and transfer within the United States of certain items controlled by this ECCN (for APHIS, see 7 CFR 331.3(b), 9 CFR 121.3(b), and 9 CFR 121.4(b); for CDC, see 42 CFR 73.3(b) and 42 CFR 73.4(b)). Related Definitions: * * * Items: a. Viruses, as follows: a.1. Andes virus; a.2. Chapare virus; a.3. Chikungunya virus; a.4. Choclo virus; a.5. Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus (a.k.a. Crimean- Congo haemorrhagic fever virus); a.6. Dengue fever virus; a.7. Dobrava-Belgrade virus; a.8. Eastern equine encephalitis virus; a.9. Ebola virus; a.10. Guanarito virus; a.11. Hantaan virus; a.12. Hendra virus (Equine morbillivirus); a.13. Japanese encephalitis virus; a.14. Junin virus; a.15. Kyasanur Forest virus; a.16. Laguna Negra virus; a.17. Lassa fever virus; a.18. Louping ill virus; a.19. Lujo virus; a.20. Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus; a.21. Machupo virus; a.22. Marburg virus; a.23. Monkey pox virus; a.24. Murray Valley encephalitis virus; a.25. Nipah virus; a.26. Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus; a.27. Oropouche virus; a.28. Powassan virus; a.29. Rift Valley fever virus; a.30. Rocio virus; a.31. Sabia virus; a.32. Seoul virus; a.33. Sin nombre virus; a.34. St. Louis encephalitis virus; a.35. Tick-borne encephalitis virus (Russian Spring-Summer encephalitis virus); a.36. Variola virus; a.37. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus; a.38. Western equine encephalitis virus; or a.39. Yellow fever virus. b. Rickettsiae, as follows: b.1. Bartonella quintana (Rochalimea quintana, Rickettsia quintana); b.2. Coxiella burnetii; b.3. Rickettsia prowasecki (a.k.a. Rickettsia prowazekii); or b.4. Rickettsia rickettsii. c. Bacteria, as follows: c.1. Bacillus anthracis; c.2. Brucella abortus; c.3. Brucella melitensis; c.4. Brucella suis; c.5. Burkholderia mallei (Pseudomonas mallei); c.6. Burkholderia pseudomallei (Pseudomonas pseudomallei); c.7. Chlamydophila psittaci (formerly known as Chlamydia psittaci); c.8. Clostridium botulinum; c.9. Clostridium perfringens, epsilon toxin producing types; c.10. Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli, serotype O157 and other verotoxin producing serotypes; c.11. Francisella tularensis; c.12. Salmonella typhi; c.13. Shigella dysenteriae; c.14. Vibrio cholerae; or c.15. Yersinia pestis. d. ``Toxins'', as follows, and ``subunits'' thereof: [[Page 56103]] d.1. Abrin; d.2. Aflatoxins; d.3. Botulinum toxins; d.4. Cholera toxin; d.5. Clostridium perfringens toxins; d.6. Conotoxin; d.7. Diacetoxyscirpenol toxin; d.8. HT-2 toxin; d.9. Microcystin (Cyanginosin); d.10. Modeccin toxin; d.11. Ricin; d.12. Saxitoxin; d.13. Shiga toxin; d.14. Staphylococcus aureus toxins; d.15. T-2 toxin; d.16. Tetrodotoxin; d.17. Verotoxin and other Shiga-like ribosome inactivating proteins; d.18. Viscum Album Lectin 1 (Viscumin); or d.19. Volkensin toxin. e. ``Fungi'', as follows: e.1. Coccidioides immitis; or e.2. Coccidioides posadasii. 0 7. In Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List), Category 1-- Special Materials and Related Equipment, Chemicals, ``Microorganisms'' and ``Toxins,'' ECCN 1C352 is amended by revising the ``Related Controls'' paragraph in the List of Items Controlled section, to read as follows: 1C352 Animal pathogens, as follows (see List of Items Controlled). * * * * * List of Items Controlled Unit: * * * Related Controls: The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, maintain controls on the possession, use, and transfer within the United States of certain items controlled by this ECCN (for APHIS, see 7 CFR 331.3(b), 9 CFR 121.3(b), and 9 CFR 121.4(b); for CDC, see 42 CFR 73.3(b) and 42 CFR 73.4(b)). Related Definitions: * * * Items: * * * * * 0 8. In Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List), Category 1--Special Materials and Related Equipment, Chemicals, ``Microorganisms'' and ``Toxins,'' ECCN 1C360 is amended by revising paragraph (a) in the ``Items'' paragraph in the List of Items Controlled to read as follows: 1C360 Select agents not controlled under ECCN 1C351, 1C352, or 1C354. * * * * * List of Items Controlled Unit: * * * Related Controls: * * * Related Definitions: * * * Items: Note: * * * a. Human and zoonotic pathogens, as follows: a.1. Viruses, as follows: a.1.a. Central European tick-borne encephalitis viruses, as follows: a.1.a.1. Absettarov; a.1.a.2. Hanzalova; a.1.a.3. Hypr; a.1.a.4. Kumlinge; a.1.b. Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 (Herpes B virus); a.1.c. Flexal virus; a.1.d. Reconstructed replication competent forms of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus containing any portion of the coding regions of all eight gene segments; a.2. [RESERVED]; * * * * * 0 9. In Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List), Category 1--Special Materials and Related Equipment, Chemicals, ``Microorganisms'' and ``Toxins,'' ECCN 1C991 is amended by revising the ``Items'' paragraph in the List of Items Controlled to read as follows: 1C991 Vaccines, immunotoxins, medical products, diagnostic and food testing kits, as follows (see List of Items controlled). * * * * * List of Items Controlled Unit: * * * Related Controls: * * * Related Definitions: * * * Items: a. Vaccines against items controlled by ECCN 1C351, 1C352, 1C353, 1C354, or 1C360; b. Immunotoxins containing items controlled by 1C351.d; c. Medical products containing botulinum toxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.3 or conotoxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.6; d. Medical products containing items controlled by ECCN 1C351.d (except botulinum toxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.3, conotoxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.6, and items controlled for CW reasons under 1C351.d.11 or .d.12); e. Diagnostic and food testing kits containing items controlled by ECCN 1C351.d (except items controlled for CW reasons under ECCN 1C351.d.11 or .d.12). Dated: August 26, 2011. Kevin J. Wolf, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. [FR Doc. 2011-22677 Filed 9-9-11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3510-33-P
TOP-SECRET – FBI Notice of Potential al-Qa’ida NYC DC Threat
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(U//FOUO) Potential Al-Qa’ida Threat to New York City and Washington, DC During 9/11 Anniversary Period
8 September 2011
(U) Scope
(U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to provide warning and perspective regarding potential attack plotting by al-Qa?ida against US interests. This product is intended to support the activities of FBI and DHS and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and the private sector in effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist attacks against the United States.
IA-0???-11
(U) Warning: This joint FBI/DHS document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It is subject to release restrictions as detailed in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 482) and the Freedom of Information Acts (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS and FBI policy for FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, media, or other personnel who do not have an authorized need-to-know without appropriate prior authorization.
(U) Warning: This product may contain US person information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided. US person information is highlighted with the label USPER and should be protected in accordance with constitutional requirements and all federal and state privacy and civil liberties laws.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(U) Key Findings
(U//FOUO) According to recently obtained information, al-Qa’ida may be planning attacks inside the United States, targeting either New York City or Washington, DC around the time of the 9/11 anniversary.
(U//FOUO) We remain concerned that terrorists and violent extremists may view the symbolism of the 10th anniversary of 9/11 as a potentially attractive date to conduct an attack—particularly in major US cities.
(U//FOUO) Al-Qa’ida Possibly Planning Homeland Attack around 9/11 Anniversary Timeframe
(U//FOUO) As of early September 2011, al-Qa’ida possibly planned to carry out attacks in either New York City or Washington, DC—including a possible car bomb attack— around the timeframe of the 9/11 anniversary; such attacks may involve operatives carrying US documentation.
- (U//FOUO) The attacks would be intended to cause panic within the public and disarray among first responders.
- (U//FOUO) We have no further information on the specific timing, targets, locations, or methods of any of the potential attacks.
(U//FOUO) We assess that al-Qa’ida has likely maintained an interest since at least February 2010 in conducting large attacks in the Homeland timed to coincide with symbolic dates, to include the 10-year anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We also remain concerned that the May 2011 death of Usama bin Ladin (UBL), coupled with the subsequent removal of several key al-Qa’ida figures, could further contribute to al-Qa’ida’s desire to stage an attack on a symbolic date—such as the 10-year anniversary of 9/11—as a way to avenge UBL’s death and reassert the group’s relevance, although operational readiness likely remains the primary driving factor behind the timing of al-Qa’ida attacks.
(U) Possible Attack Methods and Targets
(U//FOUO) While this specific threat reporting indicates al-Qa’ida may be considering an attack using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)—likely similar to the tactic used by Faisal Shahzad USPER in his attempted attack on Times Square on 1 May 2010—we assess that al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have also considered attacks with small-arms, homemade explosive devices, and poisons, and probably provide their operatives with enough autonomy to select the particular target and method of attack.
(U//FOUO) Although we have no specific information on targets other than these two cities for this particular threat stream, we assess that al-Qa’ida in general has traditionally viewed aviation, mass transit systems, and US Government and military sites as particularly attractive. We further assess that targets with large gatherings of people and that are of economic, symbolic, or political significance offer the opportunity for al-Qa’ida and its adherents to inflict mass casualties, with the added objectives of causing economic and psychological damage on the United States.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Page 2 of 5
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(U) Indicators of Pre-Operational Surveillance and Preparations for an Attack
(U//FOUO) We strongly encourage federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism officials and the private sector to remain alert and immediately report potential indicators of preoperational surveillance and planning activities at any commercial retail establishment, transportation venue, national monument or icon, or other public gathering place. Although a single indicator may constitute constitutionally protected activity, one or more might indicate pre-operational surveillance or preparation for an attack. Possible indicators include:
- (U//FOUO) Unusual or prolonged interest in or attempts to gain sensitive information about security measures of personnel, entry points, peak days and hours of operation, and access controls such as alarms or locks;
- (U//FOUO) Observation of security reaction drills or procedures; multiple false alarms or fictitious emergency calls to the same locations or similar venues;
- (U//FOUO) Use of cameras or video recorders, sketching, or note-taking in a manner that would arouse suspicion;
- (U//FOUO) Unusual interest in speaking with building maintenance personnel;
- (U//FOUO) Observation of or questions about facility security measures, to include barriers, restricted areas, cameras, and intrusion detection systems;
- (U//FOUO) Observations of or questions about facility air conditioning, heating, and ventilation systems;
- (U//FOUO) Suspicious purchases of items that could be used to construct an explosive device, including hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer;
- (U//FOUO) Suspicious activities in storage facilities or other areas that could be used to construct an explosive device;
- (U//FOUO) Attempted or unauthorized access to rooftops or other potentially sensitive areas.
(U) Recommended Protective Measures for VBIED Attacks
- (U//FOUO) Update personnel on escalating threat;
- (U//FOUO) Review and verify IED and VBIED tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and reporting procedures;
- (U//FOUO) Frequently test communications and notification procedures;
- (U//FOUO) Be aware of and report unattended vehicles;
- (U//FOUO) Identify security zones and establish standoff distances;
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- (U//FOUO) Conduct refresher training for employees to understand basic procedures and associated hazards from blast and fragmentation;
- (U//FOUO) Educate facility personnel on indicators of a VBIED attack TTPs and to be on the lookout for suspicious behavior;
- (U//FOUO) Review and identify local use-of-force policies to challenge a potential vehicle suicide attack should it be encountered;
- (U//FOUO) Review evacuation protocols for VBIED threats, and conduct evacuation drills establishing primary and secondary evacuation routes and assembly areas;
- (U//FOUO) Establish security presence at strategic locations within at-risk venues, specifically at all entrances or vehicular choke points;
- (U//FOUO) Establish vehicle search protocols and identify vehicle screening points or marshalling areas to check identification and manifests of approaching service vehicles;
- (U//FOUO) Prohibit unauthorized vehicle access;
- (U//FOUO) Record tag numbers for all vehicles entering site;
- (U//FOUO) Establish protocols for executing serpentine vehicle access and choke points to impede approach of a VBIED toward a possible target. Conduct random vehicle explosive detection and canine searches;
- (U//FOUO) Stagger search times and patterns to impede potential surveillance.
(U) Outlook
(U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS continue to work with our federal and non-federal partners to investigate this threat stream and will provide updates as appropriate. We continue to operate under the assumption that terrorists not yet identified by the Intelligence Community and law enforcement could seek to advance or execute attacks with little or no warning and urge federal, state, and local law enforcement and the private sector to maintain increased vigilance for indications of pre-operational and suspicious activity.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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(U) Reporting Notice
(U) The FBI and DHS encourage recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and the State and Major Urban Area Fusion Center. The FBI’s 24/7 Strategic Information and Operations Center can be reached by telephone number 202-323-3300 or by email at SIOC[at]ic.fbi.gov. The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at (202) 282-9685 or by email at NOC.Fusion[at]dhs.gov. FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm and Fusion Center information may be obtained at http://www.dhs.gov/files/resources/editorial_0306.shtm. For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC. The NICC can be reached by telephone at (202) 282-9201 or by email at NICC[at]dhs.gov. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.
(U) Administrative Note: Law Enforcement Response
(U//FOUO) Information contained in this intelligence bulletin is for official use only. No portion of this bulletin should be released to the media, the general public, or over nonsecure Internet servers. Release of this material could adversely affect or jeopardize investigative activities.
(U) For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document, please contact the FBI Counterterrorism Analysis Section at (202) 324-3000 or FBI_CTAS[at]ic.fbi.gov, or DHS/I&A Production Branch staff at IA.PM[at]hq.dhs.gov.
(U) I&A would like to invite you to participate in a brief customer feedback survey regarding this product. Your feedback is extremely important to our efforts to improve the quality and impact of our products on your mission. Please click below to access the form and then follow a few simple steps to complete and submit your response. Thank you.
(U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3.4
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Page 5 of 5
TOP-SECRET -“FBI agents, fire fighters, rescue workers and engineers work at the Pentagon crash site,” 9/11/2001

“FBI agents, fire fighters, rescue workers and engineers work at the Pentagon crash site,” 9/11/2001; Photo number: 010914-F8006R-002; Photo Courtesy of the Department of Defense
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four passenger airliners, crashing them into the World Trade Center in New York City, and into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, while the fourth plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. Shown here is the crash scene at the Pentagon following the attack.
TOP-SECRET – Nazi & Japanese War Crimes Final Report to the United States Congress
TOP-SECRET – Brazil Conspired with U.S. to Overthrow Allende
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Declassified U.S. Documents Show Richard Nixon and Brazilian President Emilio Médici Discussed Coordinated Intervention in Chile, Cuba, and other Latin American nations “to prevent new Allendes and Castros”
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TOP-SECRET-Breaking the Silence The Mexican Army and the 1997 Acteal Massacre

Mexican troops training at a Military Camp in Chiapas.
(Photo courtesy of Adolfo Gutiérrez)
Breaking the Silence
The Mexican Army and the 1997 Acteal Massacre
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 283
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TOP-SECRET – May 02 – U-2 Cover Plan
Memo, cover plan to be used for downed U-2 flight; White House Office, Office of the Staff Seretary: Records, 1952-61 (Subject Series; Alphabetical Subseries), Box 15, Folder: Intelligence Matters (14); Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library; National Archives
On May 1, 1960, an American U-2 spy plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet air space. Dated May 2, this document details a cover story to be released regarding the flight.
TOP-SECRET-The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States – 9/11 Commission
FBI Report Chronology Part 01 of 02
FBI Report Chronology Part 02 of 02
Click on te links above to get the Original Documents of the 9/11 Commisssion
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, was set up on November 27, 2002, “to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks“, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks.
The commission was also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks.
Chaired by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, the commission consisted of five Democrats and five Republicans. The commission was created by Congressional legislation, with the bill signed into law by President George W. Bush.
The commission’s final report was lengthy and based on extensive interviews and testimony. Its primary conclusion was that the failures of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation permitted the terrorist attacks to occur and that had these agencies acted more wisely and more aggressively, the attacks could potentially have been prevented.
After the publication of its final report, the commission closed on August 21, 2004.[1] The commission was the last investigation by the federal government into the events of 9/11, with the exception of the NIST report on the collapse of Building 7.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was established on November 27, 2002, by President George W. Bush and the United States Congress, with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger initially appointed to head the commission.[2] However, Kissinger resigned only weeks after being appointed, because he would have been obliged to disclose the clients of his private consulting business.[3] Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell was originally appointed as the vice-chairman, but he stepped down on December 10, 2002, not wanting to sever ties to his law firm.[4] On December 15, 2002, Bush appointed former New Jersey governor Tom Kean to head the commission.[5]
By the spring of 2003, the commission was off to a slow start, needing additional funding to help it meet its target day for the final report, of May 27, 2004.[6] In late March, the Bush administration agreed to provide an additional $9 million for the commission, though this was $2 million short of what the commission requested.[7] The first hearings were held from March 31 to April 1, 2003, in New York City.[8]
Members
- Thomas Kean (Chairman) – Republican, former Governor of New Jersey
- Lee H. Hamilton (Vice Chairman) – Democrat, former U.S. Representative from the 9th District of Indiana
- Richard Ben-Veniste – Democrat, attorney, former chief of the Watergate Task Force of the Watergate Special Prosecutor’s Office
- Max Cleland – Democrat, former U.S. Senator from Georgia. Resigned December 2003, stating that “the White House has played cover-up”[9]
- Fred F. Fielding – Republican, attorney and former White House Counsel
- Jamie Gorelick – Democrat, former Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton Administration
- Slade Gorton – Republican, former U.S. Senator from Washington
- Bob Kerrey – Democrat, President of the New School University and former U.S. Senator from Nebraska. Replaced Max Cleland as a Democratic Commissioner, after Cleland’s resignation.
- John F. Lehman – Republican, former Secretary of the Navy
- Timothy J. Roemer – Democrat, former U.S. Representative from the 3rd District of Indiana
- James R. Thompson – Republican, former Governor of Illinois
The members of the commission’s staff included:
- Philip D. Zelikow, Executive Director/Chair
- Christopher Kojm, Deputy Executive Director
- Daniel Marcus, General Counsel
- John J. Farmer, Senior Counsel
- Janice Kephart, Counsel
- Alvin S. Felzenberg, Spokesman[10]
Then government officials who were called to testify before the commission included:
- George W. Bush – President; testimony not under oath. The session was not officially transcribed because the White House considered it a “private meeting” in which highly classified information would be discussed. Asked to limit the length of testimony to one hour (However, the meeting lasted for three hours and ten minutes). Testimony took place in the Oval Office. Initially, Bush insisted that he testify only to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the commission, but later agreed to testify before the full panel.[11]
- Dick Cheney – Vice President; testimony not under oath. The session was not officially transcribed because the White House considered it a “private meeting” in which highly classified information would be discussed. Testimony took place in the Oval Office. [11]
- George John Tenet – Director of Central Intelligence Agency
- Colin Powell – Secretary of State
- Donald H. Rumsfeld – Secretary of Defense
- Condoleezza Rice – National Security Advisor
- Richard Armitage – Deputy Secretary of State
- Paul Wolfowitz – Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Tom Ridge – Secretary of Homeland Security and former Governor of Pennsylvania
- John Ashcroft – Attorney General
Past government officials who were called to testify before the commission included:
- Bill Clinton – former President; testified in private separately from Al Gore. Testimony was recorded and not limited in time.[11]
- Al Gore – former Vice President; testified in private separately from Bill Clinton. Testimony was recorded and not limited in time.[11]
- Madeleine Albright – former Secretary of State
- William Cohen – former Secretary of Defense
- Sandy Berger – former National Security Advisor
- Richard A. Clarke – former chief counter-terrorism adviser on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations
- Janet Reno – former Attorney General
President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, former President Bill Clinton, and former Vice President Al Gore all gave private testimony. President Bush and Vice President Cheney insisted on testifying together and not under oath, while Clinton and Gore met with the panel separately. As National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice claimed that she was not required to testify under oath because the position of NSA is an advisory role, independent of authority over a bureaucracy and does not require confirmation by the Senate. Legal scholars disagree on the legitimacy of her claim. Eventually, Condoleezza Rice testified publicly and under oath.[12]
The commission issued its final report on July 22, 2004. After releasing the report, Commission Chair Thomas Kean declared that both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had been “not well served” by the FBI and CIA.[13] The commission interviewed over 1,200 people in 10 countries and reviewed over two and a half million pages of documents, including some closely-guarded classified national security documents. Before it was released by the commission, the final public report was screened for any potentially classified information and edited as necessary.
Additionally, the commission has released several supplemental reports on the terrorists’ financing, travel, and other matters.
Parenthetic numbers refer to page numbers in the Commission Report
- The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power. (367)
- United States should support Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own. (369)
- United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan, in order to give the government a reasonable opportunity to improve the life of the Afghan people. Afghanistan must not again become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism. The United States and the international community should help the Afghan government extend its authority over the country, with a strategy and nation-by-nation commitments to achieve their objectives. (370)
- The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted, openly. The United States and Saudi Arabia must determine if they can build a relationship that political leaders on both sides are prepared to publicly defend—a relationship about more than oil. It should include a shared commitment to political and economic reform, as Saudis make common cause with the outside world. It should include a shared interest in greater tolerance and cultural respect, translating into a commitment to fight the violent extremists who foment hatred. (374)
- The U.S. government must define what the message is, what it stands for. We should offer an example of moral leadership in the world, committed to treat people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to our neighbors. America and Muslim friends can agree on respect for human dignity and opportunity. (376)
- Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not respect these principles, the United States must stand for a better future. One of the lessons of the long Cold War was that short-term gains in cooperating with the most repressive and brutal governments were too often outweighed by long-term setbacks for America’s stature and interests. (376)
- We need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously. America does stand up for its values. The United States defended, and still defends, Muslims against tyrants and criminals in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
- Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for much larger resources. It should get them.
- The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope. Where such assistance is provided, it should be identified as coming from the citizens of the United States. (377)
- The U.S. government should offer to join with other nations in generously supporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund. Funds will be spent directly for building and operating primary and secondary schools in those Muslim states that commit to sensibly investing their own money in public education. (378)
- A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terror-ism should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children’s future. (379)
- The United States should engage other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terror-ism. (379)
- The United States should engage its friends to develop a common coalition approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists. (380)
- Pre-venting the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction] warrants a maximum effort—by strengthening counterproliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. (381)
- Vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain front and center in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The government has recognized that information about terrorist money helps us to understand their networks, search them out, and disrupt their operations. Intelligence and law enforcement have targeted the relatively small number of financial facilitators—individuals al Qaeda relied on for their ability to raise and deliver money—at the core of al Qaeda’s revenue stream. (382)
- The United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility. (385)
- The U.S. border security system should be integrated into a larger network of screening points that includes our transportation system and access to vital facilities, such as nuclear reactors. The President should direct the Department of Homeland Security to lead the effort to design a comprehensive screening system, addressing common problems and setting common standards with systemwide goals in mind. (387)
- The Department of Homeland Security, properly supported by the Congress, should complete, as quickly as possible, a biometric entry-exit screening system, including a single system for speeding qualified travelers. It should be integrated with the system that provides benefits to foreigners seeking to stay in the United States. (389)
- We should do more to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies, and raise U.S. and global border security standards for travel and border crossing over the medium and long term through extensive inter-national cooperation. (390)
- Secure identification should begin in the United States. The federal government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses. (390)
- The U.S. government should identify and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be protected, set risk-based priorities for defending them, select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, and funding to implement the effort. The plan should assign roles and missions to the relevant authorities (federal, state, regional, and local) and to private stakeholders. In measuring effectiveness, perfection is unattainable. But terrorists should perceive that potential targets are defended. They may be deterred by a significant chance of failure. (391)
- Improved use of “no-fly” and “automatic selectee” lists should not be delayed while the argument about a successor to CAPPS continues. (393)
- The TSA and the Congress must give priority attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. (393)
- As the President determines the guidelines for information sharing among government agencies and by those agencies with the private sector, he should safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom information is shared. (394)
- The burden of proof for retaining a particular governmental power should be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power actually materially enhances security and (b) that there is adequate supervision of the executive’s use of the powers to ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use. (394-5)
- There should be a board within the executive branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we recommend and the commitment the government makes to defend our civil liberties. (395)
- Homeland security assistance should be based strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities. Now, in 2004, Washington, D.C.,and New York City are certainly at the top of any such list. We understand the contention that every state and city needs to have some minimum infrastructure for emergency response. But federal homeland security assistance should not remain a program for general revenue sharing. It should supplement state and local resources based on the risks or vulnerabilities that merit additional support. Congress should not use this money as a pork barrel. (396)
- Emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System (ICS). When multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a unified command. (397)
- Congress should support pending legislation which provides for the expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum for public safety purposes. (397)
- We endorse the American National Standards Institute’s recommended standard for private preparedness…. We also encourage the insurance and credit-rating industries to look closely at a company’s compliance with the ANSI standard in assessing its insurability and creditworthiness. We believe that compliance with the standard should define the standard of care owed by a company to its employees and the public for legal purposes. (398)
- We recommend the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), built on the foundation of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Breaking the older mold of national government organization, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies. (403)
- The current position of Director of Central Intelligence should be replaced by a National Intelligence Director with two main areas of responsibility: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government and (2) to manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it. (411)
- The CIA Director should emphasize (a) rebuilding the CIA’s analytic capabilities; (b) transforming the clandestine service by building its human intelligence capabilities; (c) developing a stronger language program, with high standards and sufficient financial incentives; (d) renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity among operations officers so they can blend more easily in foreign cities;(e) ensuring a seamless relationship between human source collection and signals collection at the operational level; and (f) stressing a better balance between unilateral and liaison operations. (415)
- Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Operations Command. (415)
- Overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer be kept secret. Congress should pass a separate appropriations act for intelligence, defending the broad allocation of how these tens of billions of dollars have been assigned among the varieties of intelligence work. (416)
- Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge. (417)
- The president should lead the government-wide effort to bring the major national security institutions into the information revolution. (418)
- Congress should address [the dysfunction system of intelligence oversight].We have considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one. A single committee in each house of Congress. (420)
- Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this department and its duties. But we believe that Congress does have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent standing committee with a nonpartisan staff. (421)
- We should minimize as much as possible the disruption of national security policymaking during the change of administrations by accelerating the process for national security appointments. (422)
- A specialized and integrated national security workforce should be established at the FBI consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security. (425-6)
- The Department of Defense and its oversight committees should regularly assess the adequacy of Northern Command’s strategies and planning to defend the United States against military threats to the homeland. (428)
- The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight committees should regularly assess the types of threats the country faces to determine (a) the adequacy of the government’s plans—and the progress against those plans—to protect America’s critical infrastructure and (b) the readiness of the government to respond to the threats that the United States might face. (428)
- ^ “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States”. 9-11commission.gov. September 20, 2004. http://www.9-11commission.gov/. Retrieved 2010-02-17.
- ^ “Investigating Sept. 11”. NewsHour (PBS). November 27, 2002. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july-dec02/investigation_11-27.html. Retrieved January 21, 2009.
- ^ Cable News Network (December 13, 2002). “Kissinger resigns as head of 9/11 commission”. CNN Inside Politics (Time Warner). http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/12/13/kissinger.resigns/. Retrieved August 7, 2006.
- ^ “Mitchell quits 9/11 probe”. CNN. December 10, 2002. http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/12/11/mitchell.resigns/. Retrieved January 21, 2009.
- ^ “Bush taps ex-New Jersey governor for 9/11 panel”. CNN. December 16, 2002. http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/12/16/commission.kean/. Retrieved January 21, 2009.
- ^ Burger, Timothy J. (March 26, 2003). “Commission Funding Woes”. Time Magazine. http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,437267,00.html. Retrieved January 21, 2009.
- ^ “Probe Wins Boost in Aid”. New York Daily News. March 30, 2003. https://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/2003/03/30/2003-03-30_9-11_probe_wins_boost_in_aid.html. Retrieved January 21, 2009.
- ^ Chen, David W. (April 1, 2003). “Beyond Numbers, 9/11 Panel Hears Families’ Anguish”. The New York Times. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980CEFDC1039F932A35757C0A9659C8B63. Retrieved January 21, 2009.
- ^ ““The White House Has Played Cover-Up”–Former 9/11 Commission Member Max Cleland Blasts Bush”. Democracy Now!. March 23, 2004. http://www.democracynow.org/2004/3/23/the_white_house_has_played_cover. Retrieved July 7, 2009.
- ^ Jehl, Douglas (August 8, 2005, corrected August 9). “Four in 9/11 Plot Are Called Tied to Qaeda in ’00”. New York Times (Arthur Ochs Sulzberger Jr.). http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/09/politics/09intel.html?ex=1281240000&en=bc4d02afa0a46012&ei=5090. Retrieved August 7, 2006.
- ^ a b c d “9/11 commission finishes Bush, Cheney session”. 4/29/2004 7:27:56 PM ET. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4862296/ns/us_news-security. Retrieved November 24, 2010
- ^ Burger, Timothy J. (Dec. 20, 2003). “Condi and the 9/11 Commission”. Time. http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,565974,00.html. Retrieved November 24, 2010
- ^ Shovelan, John (July 23, 2004). “9/11 Commission finds ‘deep institutional failings'”. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2004/s1160100.htm. Retrieved February 2, 2007.
- ^ Zelikow, Philip D.; Condoleezza Rice (1995). “Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft”. Harvard University Press. http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/ZELGER.html?show=reviews.
- ^ Associated Press, Feb. 3, 2008, “Ties between White House, Sept 11 Chief”, http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/S/SEPT_11_COMMISSION?SITE=CAVEN&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT , archived at: http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/02/04/6826/
- ^ “9/11: Truth, Lies and Conspiracy Interview: Lee Hamilton”. CBC News, Canada. August 21, 2006. Archived from the original on 2008-06-23. http://web.archive.org/web/20080623194035/http://www.cbc.ca/sunday/911hamilton.html. Retrieved 2010-10-16.
- ^ Eggen, Dan (August 2, 2006). “9/11 Panel Suspected Deception by Pentagon”. The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/01/AR2006080101300.html. Retrieved May 31, 2009.
- ^ Yen, Hope (August 4, 2006). “Book: Sept. 11 Panel Doubted Officials”. Associated Press (Washington Post). http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/04/AR2006080401026.html. Retrieved October 16, 2010.
- ^ http://newsmine.org/content.php?ol=9-11/inquiry/tenet-lies-about-not-seeing-bush-in-august-2001.txt, retrieved February 5, 2010
- ^ Tenet, George; Bill Harlow (2007). “At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA.” HarperCollins. ISBN 0-06-114778-8.
- ^ Levins, Harry (September 6, 2009). “The Ground Truth”. St. Louis Post-Dispatch. http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/entertainment/reviews.nsf/book/story/AB0778AD6967637F86257627007F18E5?OpenDocument. Retrieved September 12, 2009.
- ^ Farmer, John (2009). The Ground Truth: The Untold Story of America Under Attack on 9/11. Riverhead Books. ISBN 1-59448-894-0.
TOP-SECRET-Conspiracy of Silence? Colombia, the United States and the Massacre at El Salado

Conspiracy of Silence?
Colombia, the United States and the Massacre at El Salado
Declassified Documents Highlight U.S. Concerns Over Role of Colombian Security Forces in February 2000 Paramilitary Killings
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 287
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TOP-SECRET-POSADA CARRILES BUILT BOMBS FOR, AND INFORMED ON, JORGE MAS CANOSA, CIA RECORDS REVEAL
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 288
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TOP-SECRET-Backgrounder: US Smart Power Counterterrorism
Background Briefing on Secretary Clinton’s Speech “A Smart Power Approach to Counterterrorism”
Special Briefing
Senior Administration Official
Conference Call
September 9, 2011
MR. TONER: Good morning, everyone, and thanks to all for joining us at such short notice. As you know, the Secretary is giving remarks this morning very shortly from now on smart power approach to counterterrorism. We thought it would be useful to have someone walk you through some of the highlights of that speech before she actually gives it. So without further ado, I d like to introduce [Senior Administration Official One], who will be known as Senior Administration Official Number One. And just a reminder, this is on background.
So without further ado, handing it over to [Senior Administration Official One].
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Good morning, everybody. Thank you for joining us. As you know, this speech was designed to be part of the commemoration of the 10-year anniversary since the September 11 attack. The Secretary thought it would be appropriate to stand back and talk about the Administration s approach to counterterrorism, but it obviously takes on new relevance given what we have heard about a heightened alert status.
Fundamentally, this speech, if you ve had a chance to look at it you should all have embargoed copies is designed to talk about using all the tools of American power, including our values and our strong democratic leadership around the world to fight counterterrorism and embedding the fight against terrorism in our larger approach to values-based global leadership.
So just walking you through it and you ll see that throughout this speech, she emphasizes that the fight against counter against terrorism has to be not just a fight about what we are against, but we have to fight for what we are for, namely our values of tolerance, equality, and opportunity for universal rights and the rule of law.
So, at the top of the speech, she makes clear that the military fight continues. We have unfinished business and we will do what we need to do to confront terrorists militarily where they live, but we will do so within international law standards and in keeping with our highest values. But we also have to work to cut the roots out from under terrorists, and that means attacking finances, attacking their ability to recruit, and attacking their ability to have safe havens.
So, in the section Taking the Fight to al-Qaida, she talks about the force piece here, but she also talks about the justice piece. Draw your attention to page five, where she makes clear that in doing we will we maintain the right to use force against groups such as al-Qaida that have attacked us and still threaten us with imminent violence, but in doing so we will stay true to our values and respect the rule of law, including international law principles. And then further down, she makes clear our intention to make full use of civilian courts and reformed military commissions, because this sends a message to the world about the importance of rule of law in confronting terrorism.
Further on, she talks about how the threat has changed. After the loss of [sic] the death of bin Ladin, the threat from the Afghan-Pakistan border remains, but the al-Qaida threat has become more diffuse.
On page six, you see that she talks about al-Qaida now as a syndicate of terror. It is not a monolith. It s becoming more geographically diverse and she specifically talks about al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, with bases in Yemen trying to do attacks beyond its bases, and about al-Shabaab in Somalia, as two examples there.
Further on, she talks about how our larger goals, globally, of supporting democratic change, supporting prosperity, fighting poverty, fighting repression, supporting rule of law are also counterterrorism objectives. And in this regard, the work that we do to try to resolve conflicts, reduce poverty, improve governance also drain the swamp that terrorists try to live in and exploit.
Some specific areas of innovation noted on page seven, I would call your attention to new biometric screening tools to improve border security and visa processes electronic fingerprinting, facial recognition, iris scans. And then also in the category of making it harder for terrorists to operate, our work to combat terror finance, working with countries around the world to put new tough legislation in place, to disrupt illicit financial networks, but as a result of it becoming harder for terrorists to use official networks, having now to confront their alternative strategies where they fund their operation through criminal activity and kidnapping. So we also have to work with governments to ensure that we have a no-concessions policy, no paying ransom to kidnappers, et cetera.
In the category of trying to drain the swamp of new recruits, trying to slow recruitment, you see starting on page eight and nine she talks about a number of initiatives. First of all, trying to counter the extremist narrative, this speaks to the establishment at the State Department of the special representative to Muslim communities, to step up in our engagement in the most crucial spaces, putting our own people, speaking Arabic, Urdu, and Dari, on key television stations to counteract misinformation, and the development and launching now of a new center for strategic counterterrorism communications, which is focused on undermining terrorist propaganda, dissuading potential recruits. This is housed in the State Department, but it s a whole-of-government approach that includes Urdu and Arabic speakers who make up a special digital outreach team and are getting up online, contesting the narrative in terror on terrorist websites and forums, and getting in it and arguing their points with young people.
She also talks, starting on page nine, about what we ve learned about key recruiting hotspots, that terrorists have been more successful in hotspots where economic opportunity is in short supply, where education is biased in favor of an extremist narrative, and the importance of using a scalpel, not a sledgehammer, working with local leaders in particular places where recruiting has been most successful to try to empower a more progressive, democratic narrative and to provide alternative opportunities for young people, to deny recruiters the opportunity to turn kids extreme and there are some examples here working with the Kenyan Muslim Youth Association, working with the Sisters Against Violence, particularly focusing our efforts in Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Yemen, and obviously Afghanistan.
And then the last piece here is the importance of strengthening the diplomatic offensive to build both to build partner capacity and to maintain a strong global community, a global coalition against terrorism. So here on page 10 and 11, talking about first elevating our own counterterrorism effort to the level of assistant secretary, then our efforts to expand our training programs to some 60 countries we ve now trained some 7,000 law enforcement and counterterrorism officials around the world strengthening capacity, building in frontline states Yemen and Pakistan.
Also, we discovered that in fact, there is no dedicated international venue to regularly convene counterterrorism policymakers and practitioners from around the world. So at the UNGA, working with Turkey, the United States will serve as a founding co-chair, along with 30 other nations, of a new global counterterrorism forum. This forum is designed to assist countries that are transitioning from authoritarian rule to democracy and rule of law. It s going to provide support, particularly in the civilian sector, best practices, writing of new legislation, training police, prosecutors, judges, but all within the context of upholding the strongest standards of universal human rights.
Finally, at the end of the speech, she talks about the essential element of defeating an extremist ideology with an ideology of hope, democracy, prosperity, universal values, tapping into the aspirations for change that we ve seen across North Africa and the broader Middle East, and rooted very much in American leadership, American confidence in our own values, in our own open democratic system which must not only be maintained, it has to be strengthened as a key element of serving as a beacon for others around the world and for defeating terror.
So with that, let me pause and take any questions.
MR. TONER: We can go ahead and take some questions now.
OPERATOR: Thank you. At this time, we re ready to begin the question-and-answer session. If you would like to ask a question, please press *1 and record your name and news organization clearly so I may introduce you into the call. Again, press *1 to ask a question. And one moment for our first question.
One moment, please. We do have a question from Kirit Radia with ABC News. You may ask your question.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Hi, Kirit.
QUESTION: Hi, [Senior Administration Official One]. It s Kirit. Thanks for doing this. I do have a quick question about the terror plot that came out last night. I know it s not exactly about the speech, but there was some reporting that this was the result of a tip from a walk-in into a U.S. Embassy. I m curious if you could tell us anything about that, since we re on background.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: I cannot, Kirit. We are not prepared to talk at all about the intelligence surrounding this issue.
MR. TONER: Next question.
OPERATOR: At this time, I m showing no further questions. Again, if you d like to ask a question, please press *1. Again, press *1 to ask a question.
And one moment for our next question.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Okay, good. Well, if we have no questions, we will look forward to the speech in about half an hour.
OPERATOR: We did have one question, if you d like to take it yet.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Sure.
OPERATOR: And that s from Chris Hawley with Associated Press. You may ask your question.
QUESTION: Hi, there. Last week, we had a very large story kind of looking at terrorism arrests around the world, and we found that something like 35,000 people have been convicted of terrorism in the last 10 years and a lot of this stems from sort of U.S. pressure and aid toward other countries. But at the same time, a lot of groups are saying that many countries are using this as an excuse to crack down on political dissidents. Are there any protections or guidelines you guys are adopting as you go into this quote/unquote smart approach to protect political dissent?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you for that.
First and foremost, I think when you hear the speech, when you see the speech, you ll see that the Secretary makes clear that one of our strongest and most important U.S. weapons in the fight against terror is our own adherence to the highest standards of international law. So in the training programs that we are doing for other countries, in the best practices that we are trying to share, and in the example that we set and particularly, as I said, she cites the importance of being able to use both civilian courts and reformed military courts to try terrorists in a transparent manner which protects their rights we are trying to set an example for countries around the world in the way this has to be handled, and that this is about trying terrorists, this is not about using terrorism as an excuse to settle scores or handle other issues.
QUESTION: Got it. All right. Many thanks.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you.
OPERATOR: Thank you. At this time, I m showing no further questions.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you very much, everybody.
PRN: 2011/1450
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9/11-How can we survive ? – Black Humor for War Time Debt Profligacy and Panic
Black Humor for War Time Debt Profligacy and Panic
Images by Cryptome.
We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People, Peter Van Buren, 2011. Peter Van Buren was a State Department officer in Iraq working with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). He was based primarily at Forward Operating Base Hammer
Van Buren provides an informative, gorge-raising, black humorous, literal boots-on-the-ground, apology for “we have a war to fight, damn the cost, others will pay the bill” instigator of the current global panic about national debt ever bleaker humor. Rue with him being taken in by the natsec scam, laugh at each other and weep over your unpaid bills, service cutbacks, and tax duns for the cost of guiltless official malfeasance.
DoJ-celebrated task force prosecutions for terrorism, financial crime, health care fraud and child pornography are easy, small-time stuff compared to the great crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan forgiven by war-time exemptions, with very few cases for US official financial profligacy, negligence and wastage.
Excerpts:
Page 11:
My side of State was removed from the high-level Wikileaky things ambassadors did and changed very little between administrations.
[Van Buren was based primarily at FOB Hammer (as was Bradley Manning), a huge base 12 miles in circumference which was heavily compartmentalized to separate types of personnel: military, USG, OG (CIA), contractors, guards, servants.]
U.S. Army 210th Brigade Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division Soldiers compete in remote car derby in Forward Operating Base Hammer, Iraq, July 4, 2010. U.S. Soldiers celebrated Independence Day with a series of tournaments, a cookout, and an array of games.(U.S. Army photo by Spc. Frank Smith/Released) |
Pages 46-49:
Money and Our Meth Habit
We lacked a lot of things in Iraq: flush toilets, fresh vegetables, the comfort of family members nearby, and of course adult supervision, strategic guidance, and common sense. Like Guns N’ Roses’ budget for meth after a new hit, the one thing we did not lack was money. There was money everywhere. A soldier recalled unloading pallets of new US hundred-dollar bills, millions of dollars flushing out of the belly of a C-130 cargo aircraft to be picked up off the runway by forklifts (operated by soldiers who would make less in their lifetimes than what was on their skids at that moment). You couldn’t walk around a corner without stumbling over bales of money; the place was lousy with it. In my twenty-three years working for the State Department, we never had enough money. We were always being told to “do more with less,” as if slogans were cash. Now there was literally more money than we could spend. It was weird.
We’d be watching the news from home about foreclosures, and I’d be reading e-mails from my sister about school cutbacks, while signing off on tens of thousands of dollars for stuff in Iraq. At one point we were tasked to give out microgrants, $5,000 in actual cash handed to an Iraqi to “open a business,” no strings attached. If he took the money and in front of us spent it on dope and pinball, it was no matter. We wondered among ourselves whether we shouldn’t be running a PRT in Detroit or New Orleans instead of Baghdad. In addition to the $63 billion Congress had handed us for Iraq’s reconstruction, we also had some $91 billion of captured Iraqi funds (that were mostly misplaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority), plus another $18 billion donated by countries such as Japan and South Korea. In 2009, we had another $387 million for aid to internal refugees that paid for many reconstruction-like projects. If that was not enough, over a billion additional US dollars were spent on operating costs for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. By comparison, the reconstruction of Germany and Japan cost, in 2010 dollars, only $32 billion and $17 billion, respectively.
While a lot of the money was spent in big bites at high levels through the Embassy, or possibly just thrown into the river when no one could find a match to set it on fire, at the local level money was spent via two programs: CERP and QRF. CERP was Army money, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. Though originally provided to address emergency humanitarian needs and short-term counterinsurgency costs, this nearly unlimited pool of cash came to be spent on reconstruction. The local US Army Commander could himself approve projects up to $200,000, with almost no technical or policy oversight. Accounting was fast and loose; a 2009 audit, for example, found the Army could not account for $8.7 billion in funds. It might have been stolen or just lost; no one will ever know. The Army shared its money with us at the ePRTs, partly out of generosity, partly out of pity, and partly because individual military units were graded on how much cash they spent — more money spent meant more reconstruction kudos in evaluation reports.
Pages 56-57:
Garbage
In our air-conditioned isolation, it took years to realize we needed to think about things like garbage and potable water. What had happened all around Iraq since the chaos of 2003 was a process of devolution, where populated areas lost their ability to sustain the facilities that had constituted civilization since the Romans — water, sewage, trash removal — things that made it possible for large numbers of people to live in close proximity to one another. Shock and awe had disrupted the networked infrastructure that allowed cities to function. What had been slow degradation through neglect under Saddam became irreversible decline by force under the United States.
The collapse of civil society left a void that the bad guys had rushed to fill. Stories circulated of neighborhood militiamen commandeering shuttered power plants and private generators for the public’s use, turning the militants into local heroes. In some poor areas, especially in the south, Iranian charities were a primary source of propane, food, and other services that people expected the government to provide, as Saddam had more or less done. It had finally dawned on us that providing reliable basic utilities was critical to a successful counterinsurgency. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were put on the case after earlier efforts by megacontractors like Bechtel and then the Army Corps of Engineers had failed.
Almost daily my team and I would go out into the field. We’d strap on body armor and helmets and load into armored vehicles for the soldiers to drive us out of the FOB. We rode in either armored Humvees or large monster trucks called MRAPs, mine-resistant, ambush-protected carriers. These sat high off the ground and were covered with antennas and crazy electronics designed to thwart the battery-powered triggers that set off IEDs and mines along our route. The best thing about the MRAPs was that they were hermetically sealed against nonexistent chemical weapons and thus possessed near-nuclear-powered air-conditioning. You could crank that stuff and form frost. The MRAPs were so high off the ground that the turret often tore down the spaghetti web of pirated electric lines strung over most streets, lessening our popularity every time we drove in. Our parade of four or five vehicles, armed with nasty-looking machine guns and tough-looking soldiers, would nonetheless roll through small towns and slums to arrive at whatever dilapidated building served as the center of US-appointed local government. (By common consent no one was allowed to comment on the paradox of creating a democracy by appointing local leaders. It just wasn’t done.) As we drove, trash was a fact anywhere we looked, like the sun and the dust. The MRAPs specifically equipped to look for roadside bombs even had giant blowers welded to their front bumpers to whip garbage aside and expose the IEDs. For a poor country, everybody seemed to have a lot of things to throw away. Even though the trash was rarely collected, there were huge dumps filled with acres of it. You couldn’t help but be reminded that for all the counterinsurgency ideals about living among the people, we still lived near Iraq but not in it; on the FOB you couldn’t drop a Snickers wrapper without two people telling you to pick that shit up.
![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/0005/debt-humor-16.jpg)
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles secure a local village while members of Provincial Reconstruction Team Zabul conduct a key leader engagement with village elders in Arghandab, Afghanistan, July 30, 2011. PRT Zabul’s mission is to conduct civil-military operations in Zabul Province to extend the reach and legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force photo/Senior Airman Grovert Fuentes-Contreras)(Released)
TOP-SECRET-State Department Cable says Colombian Army Responsible for Palace of Justice Deaths, Disappearances

Document Introduced as Evidence in Trial of Col. Alfonso Plazas Vega
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 289
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TOP-SECRET-Operation Sofia: Documenting Genocide in Guatemala
Operation Sofia: Documenting Genocide in Guatemala
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 297
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TOP-SECRET-FBI FILES ABOUT 9-11-NINE-ELEVEN
Meridian Capital about GoMoPa STASI-FÄLSCHUNGEN DER “GoMoPa” Fingierter “Press Releaser”
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,
die Betrüger und durch uns inhaftierten Erpresser der GoMoPa versuchen mit einer gefälschten Presse-Mitteilung von sich abzulenken und einen investigativen Journalisten, Bernd Pulch, zu belasten.
Die Presse-Mitteilung auf pressreleaser.org ist eine Fälschung und die gesamte Webseite ist der GoMoPa zu zuordnen.
Hier noch einmal die tatäschlichen Geschehnisse:
Hier der Artikel von “GoMoPa” über Meridian Capital.
„GoMopa“ schreibt:08.09.2008Weltweite Finanzierungen mit WidersprüchenDie Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt an, weltweite Finanzierungen anbieten zu können und präsentiert sich hierbei auf aufwendig kreierten Webseiten. GOMOPA hat die dort gemachten Angaben analysiert und Widersprüche entdeckt.Der FirmensitzDer Firmensitz befindet sich laut eigener Aussage in Dubai, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate. In einem GOMOPA vorliegenden Schreiben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. heißt es jedoch, der Firmensitz sei in London. Auf der Homepage des Unternehmens taucht die Geschäftsadresse in der Londoner Old Broad Street nur als „Kundenabteilung für deutschsprachige Kunden“ auf. Eine weitere Adresse in der englischen Hauptstadt, diesmal in der Windsor Avenue, sei die „Abteilung der Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren“.Die Meridian Capital Enterprises ist tatsächlich als „Limited“ (Ltd.) mit Sitz in England und Wales eingetragen. Aber laut Firmenhomepage hat das Unternehmen seinen „rechtlichen Geschäftssitz“ in Dubai. Eine Abfrage beim Gewerbeamt Dubais (DED) zu dieser Firmierung bleibt ergebnislos.Bemerkenswert ist auch der vermeintliche Sitz in Israel. Auf der Webseite von Meridian Capital Enterprises heißt es: „Die Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist im Register des israelischen Justizministeriums unter der Nummer 514108471, gemäß dem Gesellschaftsrecht von 1999, angemeldet.“ Hierzu Martin Kraeter, Gomopa-Partner und Prinzipal der KLP Group Emirates in Dubai: „Es würde keinem einzigen Emirati – geschweige denn einem Scheich auch nur im Traum einfallen, direkte Geschäfte mit Personen oder Firmen aus Israel zu tätigen. Und schon gar nicht würde er zustimmen, dass sein Konterfei auch noch mit vollem Namen auf der Webseite eines Israelischen Unternehmens prangt.“Auf der Internetseite sind diverse Fotos mit Scheichs an Konferenztischen zu sehen. Doch diese großen Tagungen und großen Kongresse der Meridian Capital Enterprises werden in den Pressearchiven der lokalen Presse Dubais mit keinem Wort erwähnt. Martin Kraeter: „ Ein ‚britisch-arabisch-israelisches bankfremdes Finanzinstitut sein zu wollen, wie die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. es darstellt, ist mehr als zweifelhaft. So etwas gibt es schlicht und ergreifend nicht! Der Nahostkonflikt schwelt schon seit mehr als 50 Jahren. Hier in den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) werden Israelis erst gar nicht ins Land gelassen. Israelische Produkte sind gebannt. Es gibt nicht einmal direkte Telefonverbindungen. Die VAE haben fast 70% der Wiederaufbaukosten des Libanon geschultert, nachdem Israel dort einmarschiert ist.“ Zwei angebliche Großinvestitionen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in Dubai sind Investmentruinen bzw. erst gar nicht realisierte Projekte. Das Unternehmen wirbt mit ihrer finanziellen Beteiligung an dem Dubai Hydropolis Hotel und dem Dubai Snowdome. Der Aktivitätsstatus der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist laut englischen Handelsregister (UK Companies House) „dormant“ gemeldet. Auf der Grundlage des englischen Gesellschaftsrechts können sich eingetragene Unternehmen selbst „dormant“ (schlafend) melden, wenn sie keine oder nur unwesentliche buchhalterisch zu erfassende Transaktionen vorgenommen haben. Dies ist angesichts der angeblichen globalen Investitionstätigkeit der Meridian Capital Ltd. sehr erstaunlich. Der Webauftritt Die Internetseite der MCE ist sehr aufwendig gestaltet, die Investitionen angeblich in Millionen- und Milliardenhöhe. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Präsentationselemente fällt jedoch auf, dass es sich bei zahlreichen veröffentlichen Fotos, die Veranstaltungen der Meridian Capital Enterprises dokumentieren sollen, meist um Fotos von Online-Zeitungen oder frei zugänglichen Medienfotos einzelner Institutionen handelt wie z.B. der Börse Dubai. Auf der Internetpräsenz befinden sich Videofilmchen, die eine frappierende Ähnlichkeit mit dem Werbematerial von NAKHEEL aufweisen, dem größten Bauträger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. Doch den schillernden Videos über die berühmten drei Dubai Palmen „Jumeirah, Jebel Ali und Deira“ oder das Archipel „The World“ wurden offensichtlich selbstproduzierte Trailersequenzen der Meridian Capital Enterprises vorangestellt. Doch könnte es sich bei den Werbevideos um Fremdmaterial handeln. Auch die auf der Webseite wahllos platzierten Fotos von bekannten Sehenswürdigkeiten Dubais fungieren als Augenfang für den interessierten Surfer mit eigenem Finanzierungswunsch. Bei einem Volumen von 10 Millionen Euro oder höher präsentiert sich die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. als der passende Investitionspartner. Das Unternehmen verfügt weltweit über zahlreiche Standorte: Berlin, London, Barcelona, Warschau, Moskau, Dubai, Riad, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong und New York. Aber nahezu alle Standorte sind lediglich Virtual Offices eines global arbeitenden Büroservice-Anbieters. „Virtual Office“ heißt im Deutschen schlicht „Briefkastenfirma“. Unter solchen Büroadressen sollen laut Meridian Capital Enterprises ganze Kommissionen ansässig sein, alles zum Wohle des Kunden.“ Zitatende |
Hier die Hintergründe der Erpressung:
Hier unsere Original-Stellungnahme:
Anfang Oktober 2008 erhielt einer der Arbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. eine Meldung von einem anonymen Sender, dass in naher Zukunft – zuerst im Internet, dann im Fernsehen, im Radio und in der deutschen Presse – Informationen erscheinen, die die Funktionsweise und Tätigkeiten der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in einem äußerst negativen Licht darstellen. Der Mitarbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. wurde also informiert, dass diese Meldungen/Nachrichten zweifelsohne deutlich das Aussehen und den guten Ruf der Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. beeinträchtigen.
Der an dieser Stelle erwähnte „Gesprächspartner” hat den Arbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. informiert, dass die Möglichkeit besteht die peinliche Situation zu vermeiden, indem die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. auf das von der Person gezeigte Konto die Summe von 100.000,00 EUR überweist. Wie sich aber später zeigte, war der Herr Klaus Maurischat – dieser anonyme Gesprächspartner – „Gehirn“ und „Lider des GOMOPA“. Die Ermittlungen wurden angestellt durch die Bundeskriminalpolizei (Verfolgungs- und Ermittlungsorgan auf der Bundesebene) während des Ermittlungsverfahrens wegen einer finanziellen Erpressung, Betrügereien auch wegen der Bedrohungen, welche von Herrn Maurischat und seine Mitarbeiter praktiziert wurden sowie wegen Teilnahme anderer (Leiter der Internetservices und Moderatoren der Blogs) an diesem Prozedere. Diese Straftaten wurden begangen zu Schaden vieler Berufs- und Justizpersonen, darunter auch der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Die Opfer dieses Verbrechens sind in Deutschland, Österreich, der Schweiz, Spanien, Portugal, Großbritannien, den USA und Kanada sichtbar.
In diesem Moment taucht folgende Frage auf: Wie war die Reaktion der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. auf die Forderungen seitens GOMOPA? Entsprach die Reaktion den Erwartungen von GOMOPA? Hat die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. die geforderte Summe 100.000,00 EUR überwiesen?
Seites der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gab es überhaupt keine Reaktion auf den Erpressungsversuch von GOMOPA. Ende August 2008 auf dem Service http://www.gompa.net sind zahlreiche Artikel/Meldungen erscheinen, welche die Tätigkeit der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in einem sehr negativen Licht dargestellt haben. Nachdem die auf http://www.gomopa.net enthaltenen Informationen ausführlich und vollständig analysiert worden waren, ergab es sich, dass sie der Wahrheit nicht einmal in einem Punkt entsprechen und potenzielle und bereits bestehende Kunden der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in Bezug auf die von diesem Finanzinstitut geführten Geschäftstätigkeit irreführen. Infolge der kriminellen Handlugen von GOMOPA und der mit ihm kooperierenden Services und Blogs im Netz hat die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. beachtliche und messbare geschäftliche Verluste erlitten. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. hat nämlich in erster Linie eine wichtige Gruppe von potenziellen Kund verloren. Was sich aber als wichtiger ergab, haben sich die bisherigen Kunden von der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. kaum abgewandt. Diejenigen Kunden haben unsere Dienstleitungen weiterhin genutzt und nutzen die immer noch. In Hinblick auf die bisherige Zusammenarbeit mit der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd., werden ihrerseits dem entsprechend keine Einwände erhoben .
GOMOPA hat so einen Verlauf der Ereignisse genau prognostiziert, dessen Ziel beachtliche und messbare geschäftliche durch die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. erlittene Verluste waren. Der Verlauf der Ereignisse hat das Service GOMOPA mit Sicherheit gefreut. GOMOPA hat nämlich darauf gerechnet, dass die Stellung der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. nachlässt und das Finanzinstitut die geforderte Summe (100.000,00 EUR) bereitstellt. Im Laufe der Zeit, als das ganze Prozedere im Netz immer populärer war, versuchte GOMOPA noch vier mal zu der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Kontakte aufzunehmen, indem es jedes mal das Einstellen dieser kriminellen „Kompanie” versprochen hat, wobei es jedes mal seine finanziellen Forderungen heraufsetzte. Die letzte für das Einstellen der „Kompanie“ gegen die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. vorgesehene Quote betrug sogar 5.000.000,00 EUR (in Worten: fünfmilionen EURO). Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. konnte sich aber vor den ständig erhöhenden Forderungen seitens des Services GOMOPA behaupten.
Im Oktober 2008 traf die Leitung der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Entscheidung über die Benachrichtigung der Internationalen Polizei INTERPOL sowie entsprechender Strafverfolgungsorgane der BRD (die Polizei und die Staatsanwaltschaft) über den bestehenden Sachverhalt. In der Zwischenzeit meldeten sich bei der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. zahlreiche Firmen und Korporationen, sogar Berufsperson wie Ärzte, Richter, Priester, Schauspieler und anderen Personen aus unterschiedlichen Ländern der Welt, die der Erpressung von GOMOPA nachgegeben und die geforderten Geldsummen überwiesen haben. Diese Personen gaben bereits Erklärungen ab, dass sie dies getan haben, damit man sie bloß endlich „in Ruhe lässt” und um unnötige Probleme, Schwierigkeiten und einen kaum begründbaren Ausklang vermeiden zu können. Die Opfer dieses kriminellen Vorgehens haben die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. über unterschiedliche Geldsummen, welche verlangt wurden, informiert.
In einem Fall gab es verhältnismäßig kleine (um ein paar tausend EURO), in einem anderen Fall handelte es schon um beachtliche Summen (rund um paar Millionen EURO).
Zusätzlich wendeten sich an die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Firmen, welche dem GOMOPA noch keine „Gebühr” überweisen haben und bereits überlegen, ob sie dies tun sollen, oder nicht. Diese Firmen erwarteten von der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. eine klare Stellungnahme sowie eine professionelle praktische Beratung, wie man sich in solch einer Lage verhalten soll und wie man diese Geldforderungen umgehen kann. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. hat ausnahmslos allen Verbrechensopfern, welche sich bei unserer Firma gemeldet haben, eine Zusammenarbeit vorgeschlagen. Als oberste Aufgabe stellt sich diese Kooperation, gemeinsam entschlossene und wirksame Maßnahmen gegen GOMOPA, gegen andere Services im Netz sowie gegen alle Bloggers zu treffen, die an dem hier beschriebenen internationalen kriminellen Vorgehen mit GOMOPA-Führung teilnehmen.Auf unsere Bitte benachrichtigten alle mitbeteiligten Firmen die Internationale Polizei INTERPOL sowie ihre heimischen Verfolgungsorgane, u. a. die zuständige Staatsanwaltschaft und die Polizeibehörden über den bestehenden Sachverhalt.
In Hinblick auf die Tatsache, dass das verbrecherische Handeln von GOMOPA sich über viele Staaten erstreckte und dass die Anzahl der in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland erstatteten Anzeigen wegen der durch GOMOPA, Internetservices und Bloggers begangenen Straftaten, rasant wuchs – was zweifelsohne von einer weit gehenden kriminellen Wirkungskraft des GOMOPA zeugt – schlug die Internationale Wirtschaftspolizei INTERPOL der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. vor, dass sich ihr Vertreter in Berlin mit dem Vertreter von GOMOPA trifft, um die „Zahlungsmodalitäten“ und Überweisung der Summe von 5.000.000,00 EUR zu besprechen. Dieser Schritt meinte, eine gut durchdachte und durch die Bundeskriminalpolizei organisierte Falle durchzuführen, deren Ziel die Festnahme der unter GOMOPA wirkenden internationalen Straftäter war.
Die koordinierten Schritte und Maßnahmen der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. und anderer Beschädigter, geleitet von der Internationalen Wirtschaftspolizei INTERPOL, dem Bundeskriminalamt und der Staatsanwaltschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland haben zur Aus-, Einarbeitung und Durchführung der oben beschriebenen Falle beigetragen. Im November 2008 führte die in Berlin vorbereitete Falle zur Festnahme und Verhaftung des Vertreters des GOMOPA, der nach der Festnahme auf Herrn Klaus Maurichat – als den Hauptverantwortlichen und Anführer der internationalen kriminellen Gruppe GOMOPA verwies. Der Festgenommene benannte und zeigte der Bundeskriminalpolizei zugleich den aktuellen Aufenthaltsort des Herrn Klaus Maurischat. „Gehirn“ und Gründer dieser internationalen kriminellen Gruppe GOMOPA, Herr Klaus Maurischat wurde am selben Tag auch festgenommen und auf Frist verhaftet, wird bald in Anklagezustand gestellt, wird die Verantwortung für eigene Straftaten und die des Forums GOMOPA vor einem zuständigen Bundesgericht tragen. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. unternahm bereits alle möglichen Schritte, damit Herr Klaus Maurischat auch auf der Anklagebank des zuständigen Gerichts des Vereinigten Königsreiches Großbritannien erscheint. Unter den beschädigten Berufs- und Justizpersonen aus Großbritannien, neben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt es noch viele Opfer von GOMOPA…
Die dreisten Verbrecher wagen es unter http://www.pressreleaser.org, einer eigenen “GoMoPa”-Seite unsere Pressemitteilung oben zu verfälschen und unschuldige Personen zu belasten.
“GoMoPa” Boss is Jochen Resch
- May 15, 2011 – 1:15 pm
- Posted in Uncategorized
- Comments Off
Dear Readers,
after a thorough research we are sure that the real “GoMoPa” boss is Jochen Resch, lawyer in Berlin, Germany. He is the brain behind “GoMoPa” and responsable for blackmailing, extortion, racketeering, cybermurder and murder – in the tradition of the East German “Inteeligence” STASI that is why he called “GoMoPa” – Financial “Intelligence” Service .
Webmaster
Meridian Capital about GoMoPa
“GoMoPa” in detention
- May 13, 2011 – 1:02 pm
- Posted in Uncategorized
- Comments Off
Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. unveils new criminal phenomena in network. In recently appeared on the net more often at the same time a new a very worrying phenomenon of criminal nature. Professional criminals groups in the network are taking part, to extortion, fraud, Erschwindeln relating to certain specifically selected companies and businesses are capable of. These criminals developed new methods and means, simply and in a short time to bereichern.Strategien and manifestations, which underlie this process are fairly simple. A criminal is looking to “carefully” on the Internet specific companies and corporations (victims of crime) and informed them in the next step, that of the business activities of such companies and corporations in the near future – first on the Internet then in other available mass media – numerous and very unfavorable information appears. At the same time, the criminals beat their future victims an effective means of reducing unnecessary difficulties and problems to escape the loss of good name and image of the company and corporate sector. These offenders are aware of that reputation, name and appearance of each company is a value in itself. It was therefore a value of what each company is prepared to pay any price. But the reason for difficulties and problems arising from the loss of good name and reputation result. The criminals and their victims are already aware that this loss is devastating consequences might have been the closing down of a particular business can enforce. It takes both to No as well as at large companies regard. The company is concerned that in virtually every industry in each country and cross-border activities sind.Das criminal procedure in the form of a blackmail on money, a fraud is becoming rapidly and globally, ie led cross-border and internationally. Among the victims of extortion, fraud is now looking both at home (domestic) and international corporations, the major emphasis on conservation, keeping and maintaining their reputation in the business according to their credibility lay. The criminals in the network have understood that maintaining an unassailable reputation and name of a company the unique ability to provide fast and easy enrichment forms. The above-mentioned criminal procedure is difficult to track because it is international in nature, and by overlapping or even nonexistent (fictional) professional and judicial persons in various countries and operated company wird.Diese offenders in the network publish it and disseminate false information about your victims on remote servers, which are not uncommon in many exotic countries. There are those countries in which serious gaps in the legal system, investigative and prosecution procedures are visible. As an example, at this point mention India werden. Mit criminals working in the network grid portals known leader of blogs with your seat-consciously or unconsciously, even in highly developed countries. For example, at this point, countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, Spain or Portugal are mentioned. The below listed criminals were able to act unpunished today. As a symptom of such action appears here the activity and “effectiveness” of the company GOMOPA, which is on countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the United States, Britain, Spain and India. A good example of such an action is Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat – the leader and “brain” of the company GOMOPA with many already in force and criminal judgments “on his account”, which in this way for years and funded its maintenance in the industry almost unlimited activity. This status will change dramatically, however, including far and wide thanks to discontinued operations of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. who would oppose such offenses addressed in the network. Other companies and corporations, in which the crime network and outside of this medium have fallen victim to contribute to combating such crimes bei.Die situation is changing, thanks to effective steps and the successful cooperation of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. with the international police Interpol, with the federal agency (FBI) in the U.S., the Federal Criminal Police in Germany, with Scotland Yard in Britain, as well as with the Russian secret service FSB.Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. – Together with other companies and cooperations, the victim of criminal activities of the network of crime have fallen – has undeniably already started to yield results. The fact that in recent weeks (November 2008) on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of the above-mentioned leaders and “brain” of the company GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Maurishat was arrested should not be ignored. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. information available results clearly show that the next arrests of persons participating in this process in such countries as: Austria, Switzerland, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Spain, Mexico, Portugal, Brazil, the USA, Canada, UK, Ireland , Australia, New Zealand and made in a.. The ultimate goal of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. and the other victims of crime in the network is to provide all participants in this criminal procedure before the competent court to lead. All professional and judicial persons, regardless of the seat and out of the business, which the above-described criminal action (fraud, extortion) to have fallen victim can of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. led company to join the goal set at all at this point the procedure described those associated in the public and the economic life out. II blacklist blackmail and with international fraudsters and their methods (opus operandi) in the following countries: 1 The Federal Republic Deutschland2. Dubai 3rd Russia 1st The Federal Republic of Germany GmbH GOMOPA, Goldman Morgenstern & Partners LLC., Goldman Morgenstern & Partners Consulting LLC, Wottle collection. In these firms are quite active following persons: – Klaus Mauri Chat ( “Father” and “brain” of the criminal organization responsible for countless final judgments have been achieved (arrested in Germany in November 2008) – Josef Rudolf Heckel ( “right hand “when Mr Klaus Mauri chat, denounced former banker who is excessive in many Bankschmuggeleien was involved.
The study of 900 pages named Toxdat by Ehrenfried Stelzer is the “Stasi Killer Bible”. It lists all kind of murder methods and concentrates on the most effective and untraceable.
“The toxdat study was ordered by Stasi Vice-President Gerhard Neiber, the second man in rank after boss Erich Mielke. The toxdat study was also the theoretical “story book” for the murder of the famous German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach by former Stasi member under the guidance of “GoMoPa”,” an informer stated. “Ehrenfried stelzer” was nicknamed “Professor Murder” by his victims. Even close co-worker now compare him with the German SS”doctor” Mengele, “Dr. Death” from Auschwitz.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution.
For more Information the victims have launched a new site: http://www.victims-opfer.com
The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.
Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment.
German authorities are under growing pressure to reopen investigations into at least a dozen suspicious deaths after the arrest of an alleged East German assassin cast new light on the communist regime. Stasi victims quoted a source saying “isolated units” had conducted operations that were “extremely well organised” and had “100 per cent logistical support” from the East German state.
A statement from prosecutors read: “The accused [Jurgen G] is suspected, as a member of a commando of the former DDR, of killing a number of people between 1976 and 1987 who from the point of view of the DDR regime had committed treason or were threatening to do so.”
Details of his Jurgen G’s arrest have been described in suitably florid terms, with the mass circulation tabloid Bild saying he was working at the Wolfsbruch marina near Rheinsberg in north-eastern Germany when a woman approached him. “Excuse me, is that your yellow Trabant in the car park? I just ran into it with my car,” she is said to have asked.
When he followed her to the car park, masked officers jumped out of vans and bushes and overpowered him in an operation worthy of the Stasi itself.
An eyewitness told Bild: “They blindfolded him and raced off in an unmarked car.”
Police across Germany are reported to be sifting through files to see who the victims may have been, and some intelligence officers are greeting the arrest of Jurgen G as a breakthrough.
Thomas Auerbach, who works for the Stasi file authority in Berlin and has written a book based on the death squad files, said: “These people were trained to make such murders look like accidents or suicides, even as ‘ordinary’ crimes such as robberies. They were real terror experts.”
The cases said to be linked to Jurgen G or his unit include many people involved with the commercial arm of the East German ruling socialist party, the SED (Socialist Unity Party).
Uwe Harms, the head of a Hamburg-based haulage firm which was part of a network of companies secretly owned by the SED, disappeared in March 1987 after conversations with various DDR functionaries. Six weeks later, his body was found in a plastic bag.
Weeks before his death he told friends that he felt he was being followed. After reunification, one of the other SED company heads said Mr Harms had been liquidated for refusing to allow his firm to be used to transport arms into East Germany.
Dieter Vogel, a businessman who had been jailed for life for spying for the CIA, was found suffocated in his cell in the East German prison Bautzen on March 9, 1982. The fact that he was due to be taken to the West in a spy swap arrangement just a few weeks later cast doubt on the suicide theory.
He had passed the names of several Stasi moles to the BND, West Germany’s heavily penetrated counter-intelligence service.
The Christian Democrat Union politician Uwe Barschel, 43, was found dead by magazine reporters in his bathtub in a hotel room in Geneva in October, 1987. He died of poisoning, but rumours that he was involved somehow in arms deals and the Stasi have clung to the case.
One of the more high-profile and enduring mysteries is that of Lutz Eigendorf, an East German footballer from the Stasi-backed Dynamo Berlin.
He fled to the West in 1979 amid great publicity. Four years later, he died after crashing his car into a tree on a straight stretch of road with blood alcohol levels way over the limit. Witnesses who had seen him earlier in the evening said he had not been drinking.
Most controversial though is the suggestion that the assassination squad was linked to the murder of a Swedish television reporter and her friend in 1984.
Cats Falk and her friend Lena Graens went missing on Nov 19, 1984. Their bodies were fished out of a Stockholm canal six months later.
Reports suggested a three-man assassination squad killed them, spiking their drinks with drugs, putting them into their car and pushing it into the Hammarby canal.
Shortly before her death, Cats Falk had reportedly uncovered a deal between an arms dealer and an East German firm.
Germany has recently undergone a wave of nostalgia for all things East German, dubbed Ostalgie, with colourful television shows featuring former DDR stars such as the ice skater Katerina Witt talking wistfully about socialist pop music.
A reassessment may be coming in the wake of the revelations.
Victims: The DDR-STASI MURDER GANG “GoMOPa” in murderoplot against Joerg Berger
The Stasi Murder Gang of „GoMoPa“ was involved in many trials to kill the popular East German soccer trainer Joerg Berger, Stasi victims tell in postings on their hompage http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com. Berger stated before his early death in his biography that they tried to pollute him with arsenic.
Arsenic and many of its compounds are especially potent poisons. Many water supplies close to mines are contaminated by these poisons. Arsenic disrupts ATP production through several mechanisms. At the level of the citric acid cycle, arsenic inhibits lipoic acid which is a cofactor for pyruvate dehydrogenase; and by competing with phosphate it uncouples oxidative phosphorylation, thus inhibiting energy-linked reduction of NAD+, mitochondrial respiration and ATP synthesis. Hydrogen peroxide production is also increased, which might form reactive oxygen species and oxidative stress. These metabolic interferences lead to death from multi-system organ failure, probably from necrotic cell death, not apoptosis. A post mortem reveals brick red coloured mucosa, owing to severe haemorrhage. Although arsenic causes toxicity, it can also play a protective role.[
Elemental arsenic and arsenic compounds are classified as “toxic” and “dangerous for the environment” in the European Union under directive 67/548/EEC. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) recognizes arsenic and arsenic compounds as group 1 carcinogens, and the EU lists arsenic trioxide, arsenic pentoxide and arsenate salts as category 1 carcinogens.
Arsenic is known to cause arsenicosis owing to its manifestation in drinking water, “the most common species being arsenate [HAsO42- ; As(V)] and arsenite [H3AsO3 ; As(III)]”. The ability of arsenic to undergo redox conversion between As(III) and As(V) makes its availability in the environment more abundant. According to Croal, Gralnick, Malasarn and Newman, “[the] understanding [of] what stimulates As(III) oxidation and/or limits As(V) reduction is relevant for bioremediation of contaminated sites (Croal). The study of chemolithoautotrophic As(III) oxidizers and the heterotrophic As(V) reducers can help the understanding of the oxidation and/or reduction of arsenic.
Treatment of chronic arsenic poisoning is easily accomplished. British anti-lewisite (dimercaprol) is prescribed in dosages of 5 mg/kg up to 300 mg each 4 hours for the first day. Then administer the same dosage each 6 hours for the second day. Then prescribe this dosage each 8 hours for eight additional days. However the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) states that the long term effects of arsenic exposure cannot be predicted. Blood, urine, hair and nails may be tested for arsenic, however these tests cannot foresee possible health outcomes due to the exposure. Excretion occurs in the urine and long term exposure to arsenic has been linked to bladder and kidney cancer in addition to cancer of the liver, prostate, skin, lungs and nasal cavity.[
Occupational exposure and arsenic poisoning may occur in persons working in industries involving the use of inorganic arsenic and its compounds, such as wood preservation, glass production, nonferrous metal alloys and electronic semiconductor manufacturing. Inorganic arsenic is also found in coke oven emissions associated with the smelter industry.
THE DDR GESTAPO-STASI MURDER GANG responsable for the murder of Lutz Eigendorf
The talented Eigendorf played for East German side Dynamo Berlin.
He made his debut for the GDR in an August 1978 match against Bulgaria, immediately scoring his first two goals in a 2–2 draw. He went on to collect six caps, scoring three goals.[1] His final international was a February 1979 friendly match against Iraq.
On 20 March 1979, after a friendship match between Dynamo and West German club 1. FC Kaiserslautern in Gießen he fled to the west hoping to play for that team. But because of his defection he was banned from play for one year by UEFA and instead spent that time as a youth coach with the club.
This was not the first time an East German athlete had fled to the west, but it was a particularly embarrassing defection. Eigendorf’s club Dynamo was under the patronage of the Stasi, East Germany’s secretive state police, and subject to the personal attentions of the organisation’s head, Erich Mielke. He ensured that the club’s roster was made up of the country’s best players, as well as arranging for the manipulation of matches in Dynamo’s favour. After his defection Eigendorf openly criticised the DDR in the western media.
His wife Gabriele remained behind in Berlin with their daughter and was placed under constant police surveillance. Lawyers working for the Stasi quickly arranged a divorce and the former Frau Eigendorf re-married. Her new husband was eventually revealed as a Lothario – an agent of the state police whose role it was to spy on a suspect while romancing them.
In 1983 Eigendorf moved from Kaiserslautern to join Eintracht Braunschweig, all the while under the scrutiny of the Stasi who employed a number of West Germans as informants. On 5 March that year he was badly injured in a suspicious traffic accident and died within two days. An autopsy indicated a high blood alcohol level despite the testimony of people he had met with that evening indicating that Eigendorf had only a small amount of beer to drink.
After German re-unification and the subsequent opening of the files of the former East Germany’s state security service it was revealed that the traffic accident had been an assassination attempt orchestrated by the Stasi, confirming the longtime suspicions held by many. A summary report of the events surrounding Eigendorf’s death was made on German television on 22 March 2000 which detailed an investigation by Heribert Schwan in the documentary “Tod dem Verräter” (“Death to the Traitor”).
On 10 February 2010, a former East German spy revealed the Stasi ordered him to kill Eigendorf, which he claimed not to have done
MfS has been accused of a number of assassinations against political dissidents and other people both inside and outside the country. Examples include the East German football player Lutz Eigendorf and the Swedish journalist Cats Falck.
The terrorists who killed Alfred Herrhausen were professionals. They dressed as construction workers to lay a wire under the pavement of the road along Mr. Herrhausen’s usual route to work. They planted a sack of armor-piercing explosives on a parked bicycle by the roadside. An infrared beam shining across the road triggered the explosion just when the limousine, one of three cars in a convoy, sped by.
The operation, from the terrorists’ point of view, was flawless: Mr. Herrhausen, the chairman of one of Europe’s most powerful companies, Deutsche Bank, was killed in the explosion along that suburban Frankfurt road on Nov. 30, 1989.
But was everything what it seemed?
Within days, the Red Army Faction — a leftist terrorist group that had traumatized West Germany since 1970 with a series of high-profile crimes and brazen killings of bankers and industrialists — claimed responsibility for the assassination. An intense manhunt followed. In June 1990, police arrested 10 Red Army Faction members who had fled to East Germany to avoid arrest for other crimes. To the police’s surprise, they were willing to talk. Equally confounding to authorities: All had solid alibis. None was charged in the Herrhausen attack.
Now, almost two decades later, German police, prosecutors and other security officials have focused on a new suspect: the East German secret police, known as the Stasi. Long fodder for spy novelists like John le Carré, the shadowy Stasi controlled every aspect of East German life through imprisonment, intimidation and the use of informants — even placing a spy at one point in the office of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.
According to documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, the murders of Mr. Herrhausen and others attributed to the Red Army Faction bear striking resemblance to methods and tactics pioneered by a special unit of the Stasi. The unit reported to Stasi boss Erich Mielke and actively sought in the waning years of the communist regime to imitate the Red Army Faction to mask their own attacks against prominent people in Western Germany and destabilize the country.
“The investigation has intensified in recent months,” said Frank Wallenta, a spokesman for the Federal Prosecutor. “And we are investigating everything, including leads to the Stasi.”
If those leads turn out to be true, it would mean not only rewriting some of the most dramatic episodes of the Cold War, but would likely accelerate a broader soul-searching now under way in Germany about the communist past.
In building a reunified country, many Germans have ignored discussion of the brutal realities of its former communist half. When the former East Germany is discussed, it’s often with nostalgia or empathy for brothers hostage to Soviet influence.
Stasi boss Erich Mielke, middle, with unnamed associates
That taboo is slowly being broken. Last year’s Oscar-winning movie, “The Lives of Others,” chronicled in dark detail a Stasi agent’s efforts to subvert the lives of ordinary people. Material in the Stasi archives shows that senior leaders had a shoot-to-kill order against those fleeing from East to West — a controversial order that contradicts East German leaders’ claims that they never ordered any shootings.
This story is based on more than a dozen interviews with police, prosecutors and other security officials. Several policemen and prosecutors confirmed that the allegation of extensive Stasi involvement with the Red Army Faction is a key part of the current investigation.
Court cases in West Germany in the 1990s established that members of the Red Army Faction were granted free passage to other countries in the 1970s and refuge in East Germany in the 1980s. But the current investigation and documents from Stasi archives suggest far deeper involvement — that members of the Red Army Faction were not only harbored by the Stasi but methodically trained in sophisticated techniques of bombing and murder.
Traudl Herrhausen, Mr. Herrhausen’s widow, is one of those pushing for further investigation. She says she long suspected involvement by the Stasi or other intelligence service such as the KGB, but never spoke publicly because she didn’t have evidence and didn’t want to interfere in the investigation. She says she is now breaking an 18-year silence in her desire to see justice done. “Now I want to look my husband’s killers in the eye,” she said in an interview.
The Red Army Faction was founded about 1970 by a band of leftists who justified their terrorism based on opposition to West Germany’s ruling elite. Killing members of this elite would provoke the West German state to take repressive measures that would show its true fascist face, Red Army Faction leaders believed.
In its early years, the group, also known as the Baader-Meinhof band, made headlines with prison breaks, bank robberies, bomb attacks and deadly shootouts. Four gang members led by Ulrike Meinhof freed Red Army Faction leader Andreas Baader from a Berlin jail a month after his arrest.
Red Army Faction violence in West Germany intensified in 1977 when Jürgen Ponto, then head of Dresdner Bank, was shot and killed at his home. Five weeks later, the group killed four people and abducted the chairman of the German employer association, Hans-Martin Schleyer, one of West Germany’s most prominent businessmen. It was the start of a six-week ordeal in which neither government nor terrorists would compromise. To support the Red Army Faction cause, Palestinian terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa jet in Spain, forcing it to land in Mogadishu, Somalia. After the plane was rushed by West German commandos, top Red Army Faction leaders in West Germany committed suicide and Mr. Schleyer was executed by his captors.
Red Army Faction violence began to abate in the late 1970s after the Lufthansa incident. Many in Germany thought the group — whose attacks were often crude — lost its will to kill after the arrest of its senior leaders in 1982. So when the group appeared to renew its terror campaign with a series of high-profile attacks in 1985, police were stunned by the level of their sophistication and determination.
This time, the group dazzled police with its ability to hit targets and leave little substantial evidence behind. They used high-tech devices no one thought they possessed. Their marksmen killed with military precision.
Weapons used by terrorists during the 1977 kidnapping of German industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer.
Surprisingly, members of the Red Army Faction so-called third generation had a policeman’s understanding of forensic science. From 1985 onward, the Red Army Faction rarely left a fingerprint or other useful piece of evidence at a crime scene, according to court records. The murder cases from this era are still open. Some suspected Stasi involvement, but no one could ever prove it, according to a senior police official.
The 1989 car-bomb murder of Mr. Herrhausen particularly stunned police with its audacity and sophistication. Mr. Herrhausen was the head of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest bank. He was part of the political-business elite that helped turn West Germany from a war-ravaged rump state into an economic powerhouse — all while East Germany languished in frustration. Mr. Herrhausen was a vocal proponent of a united Germany.
In November 1989, Mr. Herrhausen was following the fall of the Berlin wall and events in the Soviet Union closely, conferring frequently with Mikhail Gorbachev, according to his wife and friends. Then on Nov. 27, Mr. Herrhausen announced a plan to acquire the investment banking firm Morgan Grenfell — at the time a record-breaking bank acquisition.
Also during November, a spot along Mr. Herrhausen’s usual route to work was closed because of construction. Terrorists, dressed as construction workers, laid an electric wire under the road’s pavement. On Nov. 29, the stretch reopened.
On the morning of Nov. 30, like every workday morning, Mr. Herrhausen stepped into his limousine at about 8:30. Mr. Herrhausen’s driver waited about one minute to allow the first of the three-car entourage to drive ahead and survey the road.
“It was the route they hadn’t used in weeks,” Mrs. Herrhausen said.
As Mr. Herrhausen sped down the road, a team of terrorists waited. Beside the road, a parked bicycle held a sack of armor-piercing explosives. The detonator was connected by the electric wire under the road to a trigger activated by an interruption in an infrared beam shining across the road.
A terrorist activated the detonator after the first car of bodyguards drove past the bomb. Mr. Herrhausen died at the scene.
As they had during previous attacks, police set up dragnets to round up Red Army Faction cadre. But the June 1990 arrests of 10 members of the group who had earlier been granted political asylum in East Germany produced no leads. All the seized Red Army Faction members had solid alibis.
In July 1991, prosecutors believed they had a breakthrough when an informant claimed he had allowed two members of the Red Army Faction to stay at his home near the Herrhausen residence. Prosecutors followed that trail 13 years before dropping charges in 2004.
Frustrated with the inability of prosecutors to solve the Herrhausen case and believing that prosecutors were ignoring other leads including possible Stasi involvement, German officials replaced the prosecutor overseeing the case.
Police acknowledge that part of the reason for their focus on possible Stasi involvement was that all other leads had dried up. But they say they also knew that over the years the Stasi had worked with and given explosives to other terrorists, including “Carlos the Jackal” and the Basque group ETA in Spain. And in 2001 to 2003, an undercover police officer met with a man who claimed he had been a killer for the Stasi operating in Western Germany, although police were never able to tie him to specific murders.
German investigators turned their attention to Wartin, a small eastern German village nestled in yellow-brown fields of grain near the Polish border. Today, sheep graze in a field spotted with wooden posts.
In the 1980s, however, Wartin was home to the Stasi’s AGM/S — “Minister Working Group/Special Operations.” It got its name because it reported to Mr. Mielke, the minister who headed the Stasi for almost all of East Germany’s 40-year history.
The Wartin unit’s peacetime duties included the kidnapping and murder of influential people in the West, according to Stasi records reviewed by The Wall Street Journal in the Stasi archives in Berlin.
The documents say the unit’s activities included “intimidating anti-communist opinion leaders” by “liquidation,” and “kidnapping or hostage taking, connected with the demand that political messages be read,” according to a description of the unit’s activities written by a senior Wartin official in 1982.
Based on these documents, German investigators increasingly believe that the Stasi played a more active role than previously believed in Red Army Faction terrorism. After years of not being able to draw parallels between the Stasi unit in Wartin and the Red Army Faction killings, police are now focusing closely on such a link. Joachim Lampe, who assisted the successful prosecution of the first wave of Red Army Faction terrorists up until 1982 and was then assigned to prosecute Stasi-related crimes in West Germany, says it’s time to compare the activities of Wartin with the activities of the Red Army Faction to see where they overlap. “It is an important line of investigation,” he said.
A year after the Red Army Faction’s first generation collapsed in 1972, an internal Wartin report said cooperation with terrorists is possible if the individuals could be trusted to maintain secrecy and obey orders. Initial contacts, however, may not have taken place until later in the decade. Disillusionment gripped many of the terrorists living on the lam, according to court records citing witness statements by accused terrorists. Beginning about 1980, the Stasi granted refuge to 10 members of the Red Army Faction in East Germany and gave them assumed identities.
The Stasi sympathized with the anti-capitalist ideals of the Red Army Faction, but Stasi leaders were concerned about placing their trust in a group of uncontrollable leftist militants, a review of Stasi records shows. Stasi officials did not want to tarnish East Germany’s international reputation, so they toyed with different concepts for cooperation with terrorist groups, according to a prosecutor who has investigated Stasi involvement with terrorism.
One suggestion, contained in a document prepared for new officers assigned to the unit, was to emulate Romanian intelligence, which successfully worked with the terrorist “Carlos” to bomb the Radio Free Europe office in Munich, Germany, in 1981. To assist in such operations, the Wartin unit developed highly specialized explosives, poisons and miniature firearms.
About 1980 the Stasi also proposed a second strategy: instead of using a terrorist group directly — such cooperation always contained risk of discovery — they could simply execute attacks so similar to those of known terrorists that police would never look for a second set of suspects, according to Wartin records. The Wartin leadership called this strategy the “perpetrator principle,” according to Stasi records. The unit’s progress in implementing the steps to imitate terrorist attacks is described in a series of progress reports by Wartin officials between 1980 and 1987.
In September 1981, Red Army Faction terrorists attempted to kill U.S. Gen. James Kroesen in Heidelberg, Germany, shooting a bazooka at his car. About the same time, members of the same Red Army Faction team visited East Germany, where they were asked by the Stasi to shoot a bazooka at a car containing a dog. The dog died, according to court records.
In Wartin, officials wrote up a detailed description of the Red Army Faction members’ re-enactment of the Kroesen attack. “It is important to collect all accessible information about the terrorist scene in imperialist countries, to study and analyze their equipment, methods and tactics, so we can do it ourselves,” a senior Wartin official wrote in February 1982, according to the report.
In 1982, West German police discovered two troves of Red Army Faction weapons and documents buried in German forests. Three terrorists, including Red Army Faction leader Christian Klar, were arrested when they approached the sites. The troves were buried in locations easy to find at night, a tactic used by Wartin’s own agents to store operational equipment in West Germany, according to an investigator who viewed the troves and Stasi records.
That same year, a Wartin official described the staged bombing of a moving vehicle. According to the report, several Stasi officers shed “tears of joy” when electronic sensors detected the approaching car and ignited the detonator.
A spokesman at Germany’s federal police investigative agency, the equivalent of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, declined to comment on the close similarity between the detonator used in the demonstration and the device that killed Mr. Herrhausen, saying this is part of their investigation.
Wartin officers continued their preparations for imitating terrorist attacks in West Germany, according to a 1985 internal Wartin report. They created a special archive profiling the characteristics of known terrorists and terrorist groups, and taught staff members to execute nearly identical attacks, according to Stasi records. Each year, the unit’s officers detailed the unit’s success in teaching these techniques in their annual reports, according to the reports.
Then, in 1987, the AGM/S stopped offensive operations. The unit was disbanded.
Werner Grossmann, a former three-star Stasi General and former head of foreign intelligence operations, says the AGM/S was responsible for planning attacks in West Germany, but was dissolved “because it didn’t produce results.” Mr. Grossmann assumed control of part of the AGM/S after most of the unit was dissolved.
Mr. Grossmann says he took control of part of the AGM/S because he wanted to run intelligence operations against West Germany’s civil defense infrastructure.
“I refused to have anything to do with terrorism and terrorists,” Mr. Grossmann said in an interview. He said he didn’t have any influence over the AGM/S activities before 1987 and wasn’t informed about the unit’s activities before it came under his control.
Olaf Barnickel, a career Stasi officer who served at Wartin, says his unit planned murders in West Germany, but never committed one. “It was all theory and no practice,” Mr. Barnickel said in an interview.
But some German police are unpersuaded. They believe the seeds may have been planted for future violent attacks.
In November 1989, as East Germany disintegrated, groups of citizens forced their way into Stasi installations, seizing control. In Wartin, a local church minister led a group of demonstrators to the main entrance of the Stasi base. The base closed.
Within the Stasi as a whole, the chain of command began to disintegrate. Links to organizations in West Germany, including the Red Army Faction, were broken.
Sixteen months after Mr. Herrhausen’s murder, the Red Army Faction claimed its last victim, killing Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, the head of the Treuhandanstalt, the powerful trust that controlled most state-owned assets in the former East Germany and was overseeing their privatization. Mr. Rohwedder was killed while he was standing by the window of his house in Düsseldorf.
The murder was performed by a trained sharpshooter, according to a police official familiar with the investigation. The Stasi trained members of the Red Army Faction in sharpshooting skills and had its own teams of sharpshooters, according to witness statements by Stasi officials to a Berlin prosecutor and Stasi records.
In 1998, the Red Army Faction issued the last of its communiques, announcing it was disbanding. German police attribute the group’s disappearance to changing times, which made the group seem a relic of the past. Indeed, the Red Army Faction today is largely seen by the German public as part of the social upheaval that plagued West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. More than one in four Germans consider former Red Army Faction members to have been misguided idealists. More than half now think the investigations should be closed for good in the coming decade when the current group of Red Army Faction prisoners finish serving their prison sentences.
German prosecutors say their investigation of the Stasi’s role is continuing.
Since last month, Mrs. Herrhausen has been in contact with the next of kin of victims in the other unsolved Red Army Faction murder cases, looking for support to push the investigation. The bomb that killed her husband nearly 18 years ago exploded soon after he left for work, within earshot of their home in suburban Frankfurt.
“I still hear that bomb every day,” she says.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution.
The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.
Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment.
The name of Benno Ohnesorg became a rallying cry for the West German left after he was shot dead by police in 1967. Newly discovered documents indicate that the cop who shot him may have been a spy for the East German secret police.
It was one of the most important events leading up to the wave of radical left-wing violence which washed over West Germany in the 1970s. On the evening of June 2, 1967, the literature student Benno Ohnesorg took part in a demonstration at West Berlin’s opera house. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the shah of Iran, was to attend and the gathered students wanted to call attention to his brutal regime.
The protests, though, got out of hand. Pro-shah demonstrators, some of them flown in from Iran for the occasion, battled with the student protestors. West Berlin police also did their part, brutally beating back the crowd. At 8:30 p.m., a shot was fired, and a short time later the 26-year-old Ohnesorg, having been hit in the back of the head, became the left wing’s first martyr.
Now, though, the history of the event may have to be re-written. New documents discovered in the Stasi archive — the vast collection of files left behind by the East German secret police — reveal that the policeman who shot Ohnesorg, Karl-Heinz Kurras, could in fact have been a spy for East Germany’s communist regime.
In an article that will appear in late May in Deutschlandarchiv, a periodical dedicated to the ongoing project of German reunification, Helmut Müller-Enbergs and Cornelia Jabs reveal that documents they found in the Stasi papers show that Kurras began working together with the Stasi in 1955. He had wanted to move to East Berlin to work for the East German police. Instead, he signed an agreement with the Stasi to remain with the West Berlin police force and spy for the communist state.
As a result of the new information, criminal charges have once again been filed against Kurras, who was acquitted twice, once in 1967 and again in 1970, of negligent homicide charges related to Ohnesorg’s death. Kurras told the Berlin paper Tagesspiegel on Friday that he had never worked together with the Stasi.
But in addition to finding the agreement between Kurras and the Stasi, the two researchers also discovered numerous documents indicating that the East Germans were pleased with the information Kurras passed along — particularly given that he was posted to a division responsible for rooting out moles within the West German police force.
Immediately after Ohnesorg’s death, Kurras received a Stasi communication ordering him to destroy his records and to “cease activities for the moment.” Kurras responded with his acquiescence and wrote “I need money for an attorney.”
The exact circumstances surrounding the death of Ohnesorg have never been completely clarified. Kurras himself, now 81, gave conflicting versions of the story during the investigation but the official version has long been that Kurras fired in self defense. Many others point to witness accounts whereby the police were beating Ohnesorg when the shot was fired.
It is still unclear how the new evidence might play into history’s understanding of the tragic event. The day was one full of violence, with demonstrators and police battling each other with pipes, wooden clubs and stones. Police were further incited by rumors that an officer had been stabbed earlier in the evening. Ohnesorg himself, however, was not directly involved in the violence.
West Berlin in the 1960s and 70s became a focal point of German left wing radicalism. The city had long been left-leaning, and the fact that Berliners were exempt from military service meant that it became a magnate for pacifists and anti-state activists.
Ohnesorg’s death gave them an immediate rallying cry. As the left-wing movement became more radical, many justified their violent activities by pointing to the police brutality that led to the student’s death. A letter written by Ulrike Meinhof announcing the founding of the Red Army Faction, which appeared in SPIEGEL in the fall of 1967, explicitly mentioned the Ohnesorg incident. The RAF went on to terrorize Germany for decades, ultimately killing over 30 people across the country. The radical “June 2 Movement” used the date of the incident in its name.
Kurras, for his part, seems to have been a highly valued Stasi agent. In his files, it is noted that “he is prepared to complete any task assigned to him.” It also mentions that he is notable for having the “courage and temerity necessary to accomplish difficult missions.”
Now it seems the STASI is back again in business after transforming it in to the CYBER-STASI of the 21st Century.
The serial betrayer and cyberstalker Klaus Maurischat is on the run again. The latest action against him (see below) cause him to react in a series of fake statements and “press releases” – one more absurd than the other. Insider analyze that his criminal organisation “GoMoPa” is about to fade away.
On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders say they have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the Encyclopedia – Britannica
The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention ofGoogle Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.
Besides that many legal institutions, individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.
The case number is ST/0148943/2011
In a series of interviews beginning 11 months before the sudden death of German watchdog Heinz Gerlach Berlin lawyer Joschen Resch unveilved secrets of Gerlach, insiders say. Secret documents from Mr Gerlachs computer were published on two dubious hostile German websites. Both have a lot of similarities in their internet registration. One the notorious “GoMoPa” website belongs to a n Eastern German organization which calls itself “
Numerous attempts have been made to stop our research and the publication of the stories by “GoMoPa” members in camouflage thus confirming the truth and the substance of it in a superior way.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution. The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelznr, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror
The Stasi murder:
„GoMoPa“ & Backers: Blackmailing, Extortion, Racketeering, Internet Murder and Murder. These are the weapons of the East-German “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”, a renegate confesses.
Deep Throat, Berlin; confesses: „Since months the „GoMoPa“ keyfigures like Klaus-Dieter Maurischat< are in hide-aways because the German police is hunting them for the wirecard fraud and a lot of other criminal actions. I left the group when I noticed that. The found and former Stasi-Colonel Ehrenfried Stelzer died under strange circumstances in Berlin. This has been told to us. But it is also possible that his death was staged. In any case the criminal organization of “GoMoPa” is responsible for the murder of Heinz Gerlach by dioxin. Now my life is also in danger that is why I hide myself.”
According to Deep Throat, Hans J. the murder was done with the help of the old Stasi-connections of the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”.
The renegate says that computer hacker Thomas Promny and Sven Schmidt are responsible for the computer crimes and he states that the crime organization of “GoMoPa” has also helpers inside internet companies like Go-Daddy, Media-on and even in Google, Hamburg..
THE “NACHRICHTENDIENST”:New criminal police action against “GoMoPa”:
German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground.
On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders say they have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the
Encyclopedia – Britannica
The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention of Google Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.
Besides that many legal institutions, individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.
The case number is
ST/0148943/2011
Stasi-Dioxin: The “NACHRICHTENDIENST” searching for the perfect murder:
Viktor Yushchenko was running against Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. Yanukovych was a political ally of outgoing president Leonid Kuchma. Kuchma’s administration depended upon corruption and dishonesty for its power. Government officials ruled with a sense of terror rather than justice. For the powerful and wealthy few, having Yanukovych elected president was important. Should Yushchenko win, Ukraine’s government was sure to topple. Yushchenko’s campaign promises included a better quality of life for Ukrainians through democracy. His wife, Katherine, told CBS in a 2005 interview, “He was a great threat to the old system, where there was a great deal of corruption, where people were making millions, if not billions.”
On September 6, 2004, Yushchenko became ill after dining with leaders of the Ukrainian secret police. Unlike other social or political engagements, this dinner did not include anyone else on Yushchenko’s team. No precautions were taken regarding the food. Within hours after the dinner, Yushchenko began vomiting violently. His face became paralyzed; he could not speak or read. He developed a severe stomachache and backache as well as gastrointestinal pain. Outwardly, Yushchenko developed what is known as chloracne, a serious skin condition that leaves the face scarred and disfigured.
By December 2004, doctors had determined that Yushchenko had been the victim of dioxin poisoning. Dioxin is a name given to a group of related toxins that can cause cancer and even death. Dioxin was used in the biochemical weapon called Agent Orange during the Vietnam War controversial war in which the United States aidedSouth Vietnam in its fight against a takeover by Communist North Vietnam). Yushchenko had a dioxin level six thousand times greater than that normally found in the bloodstream. His is the second-highest level ever recorded.
Yushchenko immediately suspected he had been poisoned, though Kuchma’s camp passionately denied such allegations. Instead, when Yushchenko showed up at a parliamentary meeting shortly after the poisoning incident, Kuchma’s men teased him, saying he must have had too much to drink or was out too late the night before.
Dioxin can stay in the body for up to thirty-five years. Experts predict that his swelling and scars will fade but never completely disappear. John Henry, a toxicologist at London’s Imperial Hospital, told RedNova.com, “It’ll be a couple of years, and he will always be a bit pockmarked. After damage as heavy as that, I think he will not return to his film star looks.” And Yushchenko will live with the constant threat of cancer.
At first it was believed the poison must have come from a Russian laboratory. Russia was a strong supporter of Kuchma and lobbied against Yushchenko in the 2004 election. But by July 2005, Yushchenko’s security forces were able to trace the poison to a lab in Ukraine. Though not entirely ruling out Russia’s involvement, Yushchenko is quoted on his Web site as saying “I’m sure that even though some people are running from the investigation, we will get them. I am not afraid of anything or anybody.”
Evidence shows that such a perfect murder plotted by former Stasi agents is the cause of the death of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
The Ministry for State Security (German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), commonly known as the Stasi (IPA: [‘?tazi?]) (abbreviation German: Staatssicherheit, literally State Security), was the official state security service of East Germany. The MfS was headquartered in East Berlin, with an extensive complex in Berlin-Lichtenberg and several smaller facilities throughout the city. It was widely regarded as one of the most effective and repressive intelligence and secret police agencies in the world. The MfS motto was “Schild und Schwert der Partei” (Shield and Sword of the Party), that is the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED).
According to the confessions of an informer, Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch writes most of the “articles” of the communist “STASI” agency “GoMoPa” himself or it is done by lawyers of his firm. The whistleblower states that lawyer Resch is the mastermind behind the “CYBER-STASI” called “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”. Bizarre enough they use Jewish names of non-existing Jewish lawyers by the name of “Goldman, Morgenstern and Partner” to stage their bogus “firm”. Further involved in their complots are a “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber and “STASI”-Colonel Ehrenfried Stelzer, “the first crime expert” in the former communist East-Germany.
According to London based Meridian Capital hundreds and thousands of wealthy people and companies have paid to the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” to avoid their cyberstalking (see article below).
Finally the German criminal police started their investigations (case number ST/0148943/2011).
The “NACHRICHTENDIENST” is also involved in the death of the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach who died under strange circumstances in July 2010.
Only hours after his death the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” was spreading the news that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution and set the stage for a fairy tale. Months before his death the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” started a campaign to ruin his reputation and presumably was also responsable for cyberattacks to bring his website down. In fact they presumably used the same tactics also against our servers. Therefore we investigated all internet details of them and handed the facts to the FBI and international authorities.
Story background:
Now it seems the STASI is back again in business after transforming it in to the CYBER-STASI of the 21st Century.
The serial betrayer and cyberstalker Klaus Maurischat is on the run again. The latest action against him (see below) cause him to react in a series of fake statements and “press releases” – one more absurd than the other. Insider analyze that his criminal organisation “GoMoPa” is about to fade away.
On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders say they have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the Encyclopedia – Britannica
The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention of Google Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.
Besides that many legal institutions, individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.
The case number is ST/0148943/2011
In a series of interviews beginning 11 months before the sudden death of German watchdog Heinz Gerlach Berlin lawyer Joschen Resch unveilved secrets of Gerlach, insiders say. Secret documents from Mr Gerlachs computer were published on two dubious hostile German websites. Both have a lot of similarities in their internet registration. One the notorious “GoMoPa” website belongs to a n Eastern German organization which calls itself “
Numerous attempts have been made to stop our research and the publication of the stories by “GoMoPa” members in camouflage thus confirming the truth and the substance of it in a superior way.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution. The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.
Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment section.
-”Worse than the Gestapo.” —Simon Wiesenthal, Nazi hunter said about the notorious “Stasi”.
Less than a month after German demonstrators began to tear down the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, irate East German citizens stormed the Leipzig district office of the Ministry for State Security (MfS)—the Stasi, as it was more commonly called. Not a shot was fired, and there was no evidence of “street justice” as Stasi officers surrendered meekly and were peacefully led away. The following month, on January 15, hundreds of citizens sacked Stasi headquarters in Berlin. Again there was no bloodshed. The last bit of unfinished business was accomplished on May 31 when the Stasi radioed its agents in West Germany to fold their tents and come home.
The intelligence department of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), the People’s Army, had done the same almost a week earlier, but with what its members thought was better style. Instead of sending the five-digit code groups that it had used for decades to message its spies in West Germany, the army group broadcast a male choir singing a children’s ditty about a duck swimming on a lake. There was no doubt that the singing spymasters had been drowning their sorrow over losing the Cold War in schnapps. The giggling, word-slurring songsters repeated the refrain three times: “Dunk your little head in the water and lift your little tail.” This was the signal to agents under deep cover that it was time to come home.
With extraordinary speed and political resolve, the divided nation was reunified a year later. The collapse of the despotic regime was total. It was a euphoric time for Germans, but reunification also produced a new national dilemma. Nazi war crimes were still being tried in West Germany, forty-six years after World War II. Suddenly the German government was faced with demands that the communist officials who had ordered, executed, and abetted crimes against their own people—crimes that were as brutal as those perpetrated by their Nazi predecessors—also be prosecuted.
The people of the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR), the German Democratic Republic, as the state had called itself for forty years, were clamoring for instant revenge. Their wrath was directed primarily against the country’s communist rulers—the upper echelon of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei (SED), the Socialist Unity Party. The tens of thousands of second-echelon party functionaries who had enriched themselves at the expense of their cocitizens were also prime targets for retribution.
Particularly singled out were the former members of the Stasi, the East German secret police, who previously had considered themselves the “shield and sword” of the party. When the regime collapsed, the Stasi had 102,000 full-time officers and noncommissioned personnel on its rolls, including 11,000 members of the ministry’s own special guards regiment. Between 1950 and 1989, a total of 274,000 persons served in the Stasi.
The people’s ire was running equally strong against the regular Stasi informers, the inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IMs). By 1995, 174,000 had been identified as IMs, or 2.5 percent of the total population between the ages of 18 and 60. Researchers were aghast when they found that about 10,000 IMs, or roughly 6 percent of the total, had not yet reached the age of 18. Since many records were destroyed, the exact number of IMs probably will never be determined; but 500,000 was cited as a realistic figure. Former Colonel Rainer Wiegand, who served in the Stasi counterintelligence directorate, estimated that the figure could go as high as 2 million, if occasional stool pigeons were included.
“The Stasi was much, much worse than the Gestapo, if you consider only the oppression of its own people,” according to Simon Wiesenthal of Vienna, Austria, who has been hunting Nazi criminals for half a century. “The Gestapo had 40,000 officials watching a country of 80 million, while the Stasi employed 102,000 to control only 17 million.” One might add that the Nazi terror lasted only twelve years, whereas the Stasi had four decades in which to perfect its machinery of oppression, espionage, and international terrorism and subversion.
To ensure that the people would become and remain submissive, East German communist leaders saturated their realm with more spies than had any other totalitarian government in recent history. The Soviet Union’s KGB employed about 480,000 full-time agents to oversee a nation of 280 million, which means there was one agent per 5,830 citizens. Using Wiesenthal’s figures for the Nazi Gestapo, there was one officer for 2,000 people. The ratio for the Stasi was one secret policeman per 166 East Germans. When the regular informers are added, these ratios become much higher: In the Stasi’s case, there would have been at least one spy watching every 66 citizens! When one adds in the estimated numbers of part-time snoops, the result is nothing short of monstrous: one informer per 6.5 citizens. It would not have been unreasonable to assume that at least one Stasi informer was present in any party of ten or twelve dinner guests.
THE STASI OCTOPUS
Like a giant octopus, the Stasi’s tentacles probed every aspect of life. Full-time officers were posted to all major industrial plants. Without exception, one tenant in every apartment building was designated as a watchdog reporting to an area representative of the Volkspolizei (Vopo), the People’s Police. In turn, the police officer was the Stasi’s man. If a relative or friend came to stay overnight, it was reported. Schools, universities, and hospitals were infiltrated from top to bottom. German academe was shocked to learn that Heinrich Fink, professor of theology and vice chancellor at East Berlin’s Humboldt University, had been a Stasi informer since 1968. After Fink’s Stasi connections came to light, he was summarily fired. Doctors, lawyers, journalists, writers, actors, and sports figures were co-opted by Stasi officers, as were waiters and hotel personnel. Tapping about 100,000 telephone lines in West Germany and West Berlin around the clock was the job of 2,000 officers.
Stasi officers knew no limits and had no shame when it came to “protecting the party and the state.” Churchmen, including high officials of both Protestant and Catholic denominations, were recruited en masse as secret informers. Their offices and confessionals were infested with eavesdropping devices. Even the director of Leipzig’s famous Thomas Church choir, Hans-Joachim Rotch, was forced to resign when he was unmasked as a Spitzel, the people’s pejorative for a Stasi informant.
Absolutely nothing was sacred to the secret police. Tiny holes were bored in apartment and hotel room walls through which Stasi agents filmed their “suspects” with special video cameras. Even bathrooms were penetrated by the communist voyeurs.8 Like the Nazi Gestapo, the Stasi was the sinister side of deutsche Gründlichkeit (German thoroughness).
After the Berlin wall came down, the victims of the DDR regime demanded immediate retribution. Ironically, their demands were countered by their fellow Germans in the West who, living in freedom, had diligently built einen demokratischen Rechtsstaat, a democratic state governed by the rule of law. The challenge of protecting the rights of both the victims and the accused was immense, given the emotions surrounding the issue. Government leaders and democratic politicians recognized that there could be no “quick fix” of communist injustices without jeopardizing the entire system of democratic jurisprudence. Moving too rapidly merely to satisfy the popular thirst for revenge might well have resulted in acquittals or mistrials. Intricate jurisdictional questions needed to be resolved with both alacrity and meticulousness. No German government could afford to allow a perpetrator to go free because of a judicial error. The political fallout from any such occurrence, especially in the East, could prove fatal to whatever political party occupied the chancellor’s office in Bonn at the time.
Politicians and legal scholars of the “old federal states,” or West Germany, counseled patience, pointing out that even the prosecution of Nazi criminals had not yet been completed. Before unification, Germans would speak of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“coming to grips with the past”) when they discussed dealing with Nazi crimes. In the reunited Germany, this word came to imply the communist past as well. The two were considered comparable especially in the area of human rights violations. Dealing with major Nazi crimes, however, was far less complicated for the Germans: Adolf Hitler and his Gestapo and Schutzstaffel (SS) chief, Heinrich Himmler, killed themselves, as did Luftwaffe chief and Vice Chancellor Hermann Göring, who also had been the first chief of the Gestapo. The victorious Allies prosecuted the rest of the top leadership at the International War Crimes Tribunal in Nürnberg. Twelve were hanged, three received life terms, four were sentenced to lesser terms of imprisonment (up to twenty years), and three were acquitted.
The cases of communist judges and prosecutors accused of Rechtsbeugung (perversion of justice) are more problematic. According to Franco Werkenthin, a Berlin legal expert charged with analyzing communist crimes for the German parliament, those sitting in judgment of many of the accused face a difficult task because of the general failure of German justice after World War II. Not a single judge or prosecutor who served the Nazi regime was brought to account for having perverted justice—even those who had handed down death sentences for infringements that in a democracy would have been considered relatively minor offenses. Werkenthin called this phenomenon die Jauche der Justiz, the cesspool of justice.
Of course, the crimes committed by the communists were not nearly as heinous as the Nazis’ extermination of the Jews, or the mass murders in Nazi-occupied territories. However, the communists’ brutal oppression of the nation by means including murder alongside legal execution put the SED leadership on a par with Hitler’s gang. In that sense, Walter Ulbricht or Erich Honecker (Ulbricht’s successor as the party’s secretary-general and head of state) and secret police chief Erich Mielke can justifiably be compared to Hitler and Himmler, respectively.
Arrest warrants were issued for Honecker and Mielke. The Soviet government engineered Honecker’s escape to Moscow, where he became the ward of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. When the Soviet Union crumbled, the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin expelled Honecker. He was arrested on his return to Germany, but a court decided against a trial when he was diagnosed with liver cancer. Honecker flew to Chile with his wife Margot to live with their daughter, a Chilean citizen by marriage. His exile was short, and he died in 1994. Mielke was not so fortunate: His KGB friends turned their backs on him. He was tried in Germany for the 1931 murder of two police officers, found guilty, and sentenced to six years in prison. Other charges, including manslaughter, were dismissed because of his advanced age and poor health.
Three other members of the twenty-one-member ruling Politburo also have been tried. Former Defense Minister Heinz Kessler was convicted of manslaughter in connection with the order to kill people who were trying to escape to the West. He received a seven-and-a-half-year term. Two others, members of the Central Committee and the National Defense Council, were tried with Kessler and sentenced to seven and a half years and five years, respectively. Politburo member Harry Tisch, who was also head of the communist trade union, was found guilty of embezzlement and served eighteen months. Six others, including Egon Krenz (Honecker’s successor as party chief), were charged with manslaughter. Krenz was found guilty, and on August 25, 1997, was sentenced to six and a half years in prison.
However, eight years after reunification, many of the 165 members of the Central Committee have not yet been put under investigation. In 1945, Nazis holding comparable or lesser positions were subject to automatic arrest by the Allies. They spent months or even years in camps while their cases were adjudicated. Moreover, the Nürnberg Tribunal branded the Reich and its Corps of Political Leaders, SS, Security Service (SD), Secret State Police (Gestapo), SA (Storm Troopers), and Armed Forces High Command criminal organizations. Similarly sweeping actions against communist leaders and functionaries such as Stasi officers were never contemplated, even though tens of thousands of political trials and human rights abuses have been documented. After the East German regime fell, German judicial authorities scrupulously avoided the appearance of waging witch-hunts or using the law as a weapon of vengeance. Prosecutors and judges made great efforts to be fair, often suspending legal action while requesting rulings from the supreme court on possible constitutional conflicts.
The victims of oppression clamored for revenge and demanded speedy prosecution of the erstwhile tyrants. They had little patience for a judicial system that was handicapped by a lack of unblemished and experienced criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges. Despite these handicaps, the Berlin Central Police Investigations Group for Government Criminality, mindful that the statute of limitations for most communist crimes would expire at the end of 1999, made significant progress under its director Manfred Kittlaus, the able former director of the West Berlin state police. Kittlaus’s major task in 1998 was to investigate wrongful deaths, including 73 murders, 30 attempted murders, 583 cases of manslaughter, 2,938 instances of attempted manslaughter, and 425 other suspicious deaths. Of the 73 murders, 22 were classified as contract murders.
One of those tried and convicted for attempted contract murder was former Stasi collaborator Peter Haak, who was sentenced to six and a half years in prison. The fifty-two-year-old Haak took part in the Stasi’s 1981 Operation Scorpion, which was designed to pursue people who helped East Germans escape to the West. Proceedings against former General Gerhard Neiber, whose Stasi directorate was responsible for preventing escapes and for wreaking vengeance, were still pending in 1998.
Peter Haak’s murder plot was hatched after he befriended Wolfgang Welsch and his family. Welsch was a thorn in the side of the Stasi because of his success in smuggling people out of the DDR. Haak joined Welsch and the latter’s wife and seven-year-old daughter on a vacation in Israel, where he mixed a gram of thallium, a highly poisonous metallic chemical element used in rat poison, into the hamburgers he was preparing for a meal. Welsch’s wife and daughter vomited immediately after ingesting the poison and recovered quickly. Welsch suffered severe aftereffects, but eventually recovered: He had consumed a large amount of beer with the meal, and an expert testified that the alcohol had probably flushed the poison from his system.
Berlin Prosecutor General Christoph Schäfgen revealed that after the DDR’s demise 15,200 investigations had been launched, of which more than 9,000 were still active at the beginning of 1995. Indictments were handed down in 153 cases, and 73 perpetrators were convicted. Among those convicted were the aforementioned Politburo members as well as a number of border guards who had killed people who were trying to escape to the West.
Despite widespread misgivings about the judicial failures in connection with some Nazi crimes, a number of judges and prosecutors were convicted and jailed for up to three years for perversion of justice. In collusion with the Stasi, they had requested or handed down more severe sentences in political cases so that the state could collect greater amounts when the “convicts” were ransomed by the West German government. {The amount of ransom paid was governed by the time a prisoner had been sentenced to serve.)
The enormity of the task facing judicial authorities in reunified Germany becomes starkly evident when one examines the actions they have taken in all five former East German provinces and in East Berlin. From the end of 1990 to July 1996, 52,050 probes were launched into charges of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, election fraud, and perversion of justice. A total of 29,557 investigations were halted for various reasons including death, severe illness, old age, or insufficient evidence. In those five and a half years, there were only 139 convictions.
The problem is even more staggering when cases of espionage are included. Between 1990 and 1996, the office of the federal prosecutor general launched 6,641 probes, of which 2,431 were terminated before trial—most due to the statute of limitations. Of 175 indictments on charges of espionage, 95 resulted in convictions. In addition to the cases handled at the federal level, the prosecutor general referred 3,926 investigations to state authorities, who terminated 3,344 without trial. State courts conducted 356 trials, resulting in 248 convictions. Because the statute of limitations for espionage is five years, the prosecutor general’s office told me in 1997 it was unlikely that more espionage trials would be conducted.
It is important to emphasize the difference between the statute’s application to so-called government crimes committed in East Germany before the collapse and to crimes, such as espionage, committed in West Germany. The Unification Treaty specifically permits the belated prosecution of individuals who committed acts that were punishable under the East German criminal code and who due to official connivance were not prosecuted earlier. There is no statute of limitations for murder. For most other crimes the limit is five years; however, due to the obstacles created by previous government connivance, the German parliament in 1993 doubled this time limit for prosecution of the more serious crimes. At the same time, the parliament decreed that all cases must be adjudicated by the end of 2002. For less serious offenses, the statute would have run out on December 31, 1997, but the parliament extended it to 2000.
A number of politicians, jurists, and liberal journalists pleaded for a general amnesty for crimes committed by former DDR leaders and Communist Party functionaries. A former West German supreme court judge, Ernst Mahrenholz, said the “sharp sword of justice prevents reconciliation.” Schäfgen, the Berlin prosecutor general, had this answer for the former high court judge and other amnesty advocates:
I cannot agree. We are raising no special, sharp sword against East Germans. We must pursue state-sponsored injustice in exactly the same manner as we do when a thief steals or when one human being kills another. If one wants to change that, then we would have to do away with the entire criminal justice system, because punishment always hurts. We are not criminalizing an entire people but only an ever shrinking, small portion.
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who was West Germany’s minister of justice when the nation was unified, said this at a session of parliament in September 1991: “We must punish the perpetrators. This is not a matter of a victor’s justice. We owe it to the ideal of justice and to the victims. All of those who ordered injustices and those who executed the orders must be punished; the top men of the SED as well as the ones who shot [people] at the wall.” Aware that the feelings against communists were running high among their victims, Kinkel pointed to past revolutions after which the representatives of the old system were collectively liquidated. In the same speech before parliament, he said:
Such methods are alien to a state ruled by law. Violence and vengeance are incompatible with the law in any case. At the same time, we cannot tolerate that the problems are swept under the rug as a way of dealing with a horrible past, because the results will later be disastrous for society. We Germans know from our own experience where this leads. Jewish philosophy formulates it in this way: “The secret of redemption is called remembering.”
Defense attorneys for communist officials have maintained that the difficulty lies in the fact that hundreds of thousands of political opponents were tried under laws of the DDR. Although these laws were designed to smother political dissent and grossly violated basic human rights and democratic norms, they were nonetheless laws promulgated by a sovereign state. How could one justly try individual Stasi officers, prosecutors, and judges who had simply been fulfilling their legal responsibility to pursue and punish violators of the law?
Opinions varied widely on whether and how the Stasi and other perpetrators of state-sponsored crimes should be tried. Did the laws of the DDR, as they existed before reunification, still apply in the east? Or was the criminal code of the western part of the country the proper instrument of justice in reunified Germany? However, these questions were moot: As Rupert Scholz, professor of law at the University of Munich and a Christian Democratic member of parliament, pointed out, the Unification Treaty specifies that the penal code of the DDR and not that of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) shall be applied to offenses committed in East Germany. Scholz’s view was upheld by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the supreme court. Most offenses committed by party functionaries and Stasi officers—murder, kidnapping, torture, illegal wiretapping, mail robbery, and fraud—were subject to prosecution in reunified Germany under the DDR’s penal code. But this would not satisfy the tens of thousands of citizens who had been sent to prison under East German laws covering purely political offenses for which there was no West German equivalent.
Nevertheless, said Scholz, judicial authorities were by no means hamstrung, because West Germany had never recognized the East German state according to international law. “We have always said that we are one nation; that the division of Germany led neither to full recognition under international law nor, concomitantly, to a recognition of the legal system of the DDR,” Scholz said. Accordingly, West German courts have consistently maintained that West German law protects all Germans equally, including those living in the East. Therefore, no matter where the crimes were committed, whether in the East or the West, all Germans have always been subject to West German laws. Applying this logic, East German border guards who had either killed or wounded persons trying to escape to the West could be tried under the jurisdiction of West Germany.
The “one nation” principle was not upheld by the German supreme court. Prior to the court’s decision, however, Colonel General Markus Wolf, chief of the Stasi’s foreign espionage directorate, and some of his officers who personally controlled agents from East Berlin had been tried for treason and convicted. Wolf had been sentenced to six years in prison. The supreme court ruling overturned that verdict and those imposed on Wolf’s cohorts, even though they had obtained the most closely held West German secrets and handed them over to the KGB. The maximum penalty for Landesverrat, or treason, is life imprisonment. In vacating Wolf’s sentence, the court said he could not be convicted because he operated only from East German territory and under East German law.
However, Wolf was reindicted on charges of kidnapping and causing bodily harm, crimes also punishable under East German law. The former Stasi three-star general, on March 24, 1955, had approved in writing a plan to kidnap a woman who worked for the U.S. mission in West Berlin. The woman and her mother were tricked by a Stasi agent whom the woman had been teaching English, and voluntarily got into his car. He drove them into the Soviet sector of the divided city, where they were seized by Stasi officers. The woman was subjected to psychological torture and threatened with imprisonment unless she signed an agreement to spy for the Stasi. She agreed. On her return to the American sector, however, the woman reported the incident to security officials. Wolf had committed a felony punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment in West Germany. He was found guilty in March 1977 and sentenced to two years’ probation.
Those who have challenged the application of the statute of limitations to communist crimes, especially to the executions of citizens fleeing to the West, have drawn parallels to the notorious executive orders of Adolf Hitler. Hitler issued orders mandating the summary execution of Soviet Army political commissars upon their capture and initiating the extermination of Jews. An early postwar judicial decision held that these orders were equivalent to law. When that law was declared illegal and retroactively repealed by the West German Bundestag, the statute of limitations was suspended—that is, it never took effect. Many of those convicted in subsequent trials of carrying out the Führer’s orders were executed by the Allies. The German supreme court has ruled the same way as the Bundestag on the order to shoot people trying to escape to West Germany, making the statute of limitations inapplicable to such cases. The ruling made possible the trial of members of the National Defense Council who took part in formulating or promulgating the order. A number of border guards who had shot would-be escapees also have been tried and convicted.
Chief Prosecutor Heiner Sauer, former head of the West German Central Registration Office for Political Crimes, was particularly concerned with the border shootings. His office, located in Salzgitter, West Germany, was established in 1961 as a direct consequence of the Berlin Wall, which was erected on August 13 of that year. Willy Brandt, at the time the city’s mayor (later federal chancellor) had decided that crimes committed by East German border guards should be recorded. At his behest, a central registry of all shootings and other serious border incidents was instituted. Between August 13, 1961 and the opening of the borders on November 9, 1989, 186 border killings were registered. But when the Stasi archives were opened, investigators found that at least 825 people had paid with their lives for trying to escape to the West. This figure was reported to the court that was trying former members of the National Defense Council. In addition to these border incidents, the registry also had recorded a number of similar political offenses committed in the interior of the DDR: By fall 1991, Sauer’s office had registered 4,444 cases of actual or attempted killings and about 40,000 sentences handed down by DDR courts for “political offenses.”
During the early years of Sauer’s operation, the details of political prosecutions became known only when victims were ransomed by West Germany or were expelled. Between 1963 and 1989, West Germany paid DM5 billion (nearly US$3 billion) to the communist regime for the release of 34,000 political prisoners. The price per head varied according to the importance of the person or the length of the sentence. In some cases the ransom amounted to more than US$56,000. The highest sum ever paid to the East Germans appears to have been DM450,000 (US$264,705 using an exchange rate of US$1.70 to the mark). The ransom “object” in this case was Count Benedikt von Hoensbroech. A student in his early twenties, von Hoensbroech was attending a West Berlin university when the wall went up. He was caught by the Stasi while trying to help people escape and was sentenced to ten years at hard labor. The case attracted international attention because his family was related to Queen Fabiola of Belgium, who interceded with the East Germans. Smelling money, the East German government first demanded the equivalent of more than US$1 million from the young man’s father as ransom. In the end, the parties settled on the figure of DM450,000, of which the West German government paid DM40,000 (about $23,529). Such ransom operations were fully controlled by the Stasi.
Political prisoners released in the DDR could not be registered by the West Germans because their cases remained secret. The victims were admonished to keep quiet or face another prison term. Nonetheless, in the first year after reunification, Sauer’s office added another 20,000 documented cases, for a total of 60,000. Sauer said he believed the final figure of all political prosecutions would be somewhere around 300,000. In every case, the Stasi was involved either in the initial arrest or in pretrial interrogations during which “confessions” were usually extracted by physical or psychological torture, particularly between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s.
Until 1987, the DDR imposed the death penalty for a number of capital crimes, including murder, espionage, and economic offenses. But after the mid-1950s, nearly all death sentences were kept quiet and executions were carried out in the strictest secrecy, initially by guillotine and in later years by a single pistol shot to the neck. In most instances, the relatives of those killed were not informed either of the sentence or of the execution. The corpses were cremated and the ashes buried secretly, sometimes at construction sites. In reporting about one executioner who shot more than twenty persons to death, the Berlin newspaper Bildzeitung said that a total of 170 civilians had been executed in East Germany. However, Franco Werkenthin, the Berlin official investigating DDR crimes, said he had documented at least three hundred executions. He declined to say how many were for political offenses, because he had not yet submitted his report to parliament. “But it was substantial,” he told me. The true number of executions may never be known because no complete record of death sentences meted out by civil courts could be found. Other death sentences were handed down by military courts, and many records of those are also missing. In addition, German historian Günther Buch believes that about two hundred members of the Stasi itself were executed for various crimes, including attempts to escape to the West.
SAFEGUARDING HUMAN DIGNITY?
The preamble to the East German criminal code stated that the purpose of the code was to “safeguard the dignity of humankind, its freedom and rights under the aegis of the criminal code of the socialist state,” and that “a person can be prosecuted under the criminal code only in strictest concurrence with the law.” However, many of the codified offenses for which East German citizens were prosecuted and imprisoned were unique to totalitarian regimes, both fascist and communist.
Moreover, certain sections of the code, such as those on “Treasonable Relaying of Information” and “Treasonable Agent Activity,” were perversely applied, landing countless East Germans in maximum security penitentiaries. The victims of this perversion of justice usually were persons who had requested legal exit permits from the DDR authorities and had been turned down. In many cases, their “crime” was having contacted a Western consulate to inquire about immigration procedures. Sentences of up to two and a half years’ hard labor were not unusual as punishment for such inquiries.
Engaging in “propaganda hostile to the state” was another punishable offense. In one such case, a young man was arrested and prosecuted for saying that it was not necessary to station tanks at the border and for referring to border fortifications as “nonsense.” During his trial, he “admitted” to owning a television set on which he watched West German programs and later told friends what he saw. One of those “friends” had denounced him to the Stasi. The judge considered the accused’s actions especially egregious and sentenced him to a year and a half at hard labor.
Ironically, another part of this section of the criminal code decreed that “glorifying militarism” also was a punishable offense, although the DDR itself “glorified” its People’s Army beyond any Western norm. That army was clad in uniforms and insignia identical to those of the Nazi Wehrmacht, albeit without eagles and swastikas. The helmets, too, were differently shaped, but the Prussian goose step was regulation during parades.
A nineteen-year-old who had placed a sign in an apartment window reading “When justice is turned into injustice, resistance becomes an obligation!” was rewarded with twenty-two months in the penitentiary. Earlier, the youth had applied for an exit visa and had been turned down. A thirty-four-year-old father of two who also had been denied permission to leave the “workers’ and peasants’ state” with his family similarly advertised that fact with a poster reading “We want to leave, but they won’t let us.” The man went to prison for sixteen months. The “crimes” of both men were covered by a law on “Interference in Activities of the State or Society.”
Two letters—one to a friend in West Germany, seeking assistance to legally emigrate to the West, and another containing a similar appeal to Chief of State Honecker—brought a four-year sentence to their writer, who was convicted under two laws: those on “establishing illegal contacts” (writing to his friend) and on “public denigration” (writing to Honecker). The Stasi had illegally intercepted both letters.
The East German party chiefs were not content to rely only on the Stasi’s millions of informers to ferret out antistate sentiments. Leaving nothing to chance, they created a law that made the failure to denounce fellow citizens a crime punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. One man was sentenced to twenty-three months for failing to report that a friend of his was preparing to escape to the West. The mandatory denunciation law had its roots in the statutes of the Socialist Unity Party, which were published in the form of a little red booklet. I picked up a copy of this booklet that had been discarded by its previous owner, a Stasi chauffeur, who had written “Ha, Ha” next to the mandate to “report any misdeeds, regardless of the person responsible, to leading party organs, all the way up to the Central Committee.”
Rupert Scholz, member of parliament and professor of law at the University of Munich, said many East Germans feel there is little determination among their Western brethren to bring the Stasi criminals to trial. “In fact, we already have heard many of them say that the peaceful revolution should have been a bloody one instead so they could have done away with their tormentors by hanging them posthaste,” Scholz told me.
The Reverend Joachim Gauck, minister to a Lutheran parish in East Germany, shared the people’s pessimism that justice would be done. Following reunification, Gauck was appointed by the Bonn government as its special representative for safeguarding and maintaining the Stasi archives. “We must at least establish a legal basis for finding the culprits in our files,” Gauck told me. “But it will not be easy. If you stood the millions of files upright in one line, they would stretch for 202 kilometers [about 121 miles]. In those files you can find an unbelievable number of Stasi victims and their tormentors.”
Gauck was given the mandate he needed in November 1991, when the German parliament passed a law authorizing file searches to uncover Stasi perpetrators and their informants. He viewed this legislation as first step in the right direction. With the evidence from Stasi files, the perpetrators could be removed from their public service jobs without any formal legal proceedings. Said Gauck: “We needed this law badly. It is not reasonable that persons who served this apparatus of oppression remain in positions of trust.”
See more at the journalist Bernd Pulch website http://www.berndpulch.org
Opfer: VON RUFMÖRDERN u. Serienbetrügern erfundene “GoMoPa-SJB”: “Wer stoppt Rufmorde ?”
TOP-SECRET – Operación México: Programa argentino de rendición extraordinaria revelado por documentos desclasificados

Operación México: Programa argentino de rendición extraordinaria revelado por documentos desclasificados
Analista del National Security Archive presenta nueva evidencia ante un tribunal argentino
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TOP-SECRET – Archival Evidence of Mexico’s Human Rights Crimes: The Case of Aleida Gallangos

Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, following his detention on July 26, 1968, in the midst of the student protests. The photograph was part of the Mexican intelligence files compiled by DFS agents, and made available in the AGN years later.
[Source: AGN, DFS files, 11-235, Legajo 30, Folio 17]
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TOP-SECRET – Arms smuggling into Lebanon and the Gaza Strip
Cable dated:2009-11-18T14:32:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002501
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, KWBG, EG, IR, LE, IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JPMG: COUNTERSMUGGLING TECHNICAL DISCUSSION (PART 2 OF 4)
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (S) Summary: Concurrent to the Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) Executive Session, IDF J5 and Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) officers briefed U.S. JPMG delegation members on current arms transfers and weapons smuggling into Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. IDF J5 and IDI officers first focused on arms transfers to Hizballah in Lebanon via Iran and Syria, and provided current estimates of Hizballah arms. IDF J5 and IDI officers argued that Hizballah’s ultimate goal during any future conflict is to launch a massive number of missiles and rockets daily into Israeli territory, including those that can reach the Tel Aviv area. J5 and IDI also described the sophisticated smuggling routes from Iran into the Gaza Strip, arguing that Hamas is now more powerful than prior to Operation Cast Lead. IDF J5 and IDI officers noted improved countersmuggling efforts by Egypt, but stressed more must be done to curb smuggling into Gaza. This is the second of four cables (septel) reporting on the 40th Joint Political Military Group. End summary.
2. (SBU) Israeli attendees included representatives from the IDF J5, IDI, Shin Bet, and Mossad. The U.S. delegation was led by PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy Robert Maggi, and included PM/RSAT John Schwenk, OSD Israel Desk Officer Eric Lynn, J5 Israel Desk Officer LTC Alan Simms, U.S. DAO Tel Aviv Assistant Air Attache Matt Yocum, EUCOM LCDR Molly McCabe, and U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv political-military officer Jason Grubb.
3. (S) Maggi stressed the importance of and noted progress with counter-smuggling efforts into Gaza — but also acknowledged the GOI desire to see even further progress. He said the USG was looking for practical ideas to improve counter-smuggling efforts. IDF J5 officers argued that smuggling represents a strategic challenge for the GOI, which is facing a proliferation of knowledge and capabilities that are severely limiting Israel’s diplomatic options for peace. IDF J5 made the case that weapons and knowledge proliferate from state actors, which disrupts diplomatic regional efforts. IDF J5 highlighted “regional faultlines,” with the United States and Iran leading two opposing camps — and countries such as China, Russia, and Qatar remaining on the sidelines with unclear intentions.
4. (S) IDI officers briefed on arms “deliveries” to the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, making the case with the latter that these arms transfers were done openly and should not be considered smuggling. IDI noted that since 2006, Hizballah has increased its quantity of sophisticated arms with improved range and accuracy — these arms were acquired via Syria and Iran despite the presence of UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). IDI highlighted the continued desire by Hizballah to avenge the assassination of its former military commander Imad Mughniyah, and pointed to failed attempts to do so in Azerbaijan and Egypt. Finally, IDI reviewed the arms delivery route from Syria to Lebanon via the Beqa’a Valley, and then to points south through Beirut.
5. (S) IDI presented estimates of Hizballah arms in Lebanon, including a breakdown of arms south of the Litani River. According to the IDI, Hizballah possesses over 20,000 rockets, hundreds of 220 mm and 302 mm rockets, several hundred “Fajr” rockets, hundreds of simple anti-tank (AT) launchers with rockets and missiles, and hundreds of advanced anti-tank wire guided missiles (ATGM), dozens of SA-14, SA-7, and QW-1 anti-aircraft guns, several Ababil unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), an unknown quantity of C-802 coastal missiles and up to thousands of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
6. (S) Given this arsenal, Maggi asked what the IDF thought Hizballah’s intentions were. IDI officers opined that Hizballah was preparing for a long conflict with Israel in which it hopes to launch a massive number of rockets at Israel per day. IDI officers noted in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Tel Aviv was left untouched — Hizballah will try to change the equation during the next round and disrupt everyday life in Tel Aviv. A Mossad official noted that Hizballah will want to ensure it can launch rockets and missiles to the very last day of the conflict, i.e., avoid running out of munitions. He estimated that Hizballah will try to launch 400-600 rockets and missiles at Israel per day — 100 of which will be aimed at Tel Aviv. He noted that Hizballah is looking to sustain such launches for at least two months.
7. (S) IDI then shifted focus to the Gaza Strip, describing three circles of arms smuggling: 1. arms sources and
TEL AVIV 00002501 002 OF 002
financing, such as Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and unfettered arms markets such as Eritrea and Yemen, and possibly China; 2. transit areas and states such as the Red Sea, Yemen, Sudan, Syrian, Lebanon, and Libya; and finally, 3. the “close circle” along the Sinai-Egyptian border and Philadelphi route. Maggi asked what percentage of arms transfers occurred via land, sea and air. IDI noted that it was difficult to determine: smugglers tend to prefer the naval route — as there are fewer obstacles — but the last segment almost always occurred overland. IDF J5 added that land smugglers are learning from past experience and building new overland “bypasses.” When asked about air routes from Iran over Turkey, IDI officials indicated that Turkey has been made aware of such activity, although a Mossad representative suggested Turkey may not be entirely aware of the extent of such activity, given the IRGC’s smuggling expertise. The GOI highlighted that focusing solely on the last phase of smuggling (e.g. along the Philadelphi route) would only lead to limited success, and that wider efforts were key.
8. (S) IDI also provided an analysis of weapons entering Gaza following Operation Cast Lead. IDI noted that one of the goals of Cast Lead was to damage Hamas’ ability to produce its own weapons. In this regard, the IDF was successful, but Hamas is reconstituting its capabilities. According to the IDI, Hamas possibly possesses a few rockets with ranges over 40 km — perhaps as far as 60-70 km, or within range of Tel Aviv. In addition, the IDI believes Hamas possesses quality AT systems such as the Kornet PG-29 and quality anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). These weapons join an already potent arsenal including Grad rockets with ranges up to 40 km, ammonium perchlorate (APC) oxidizer for indigenous rocket production, hundreds of 120, 80 and 60 mm MBs, dozens of mortars, C5 K air-to-surface rockets, PG-7 AT rockets and launchers, SA-7 MANPADS, PKS AAA MGs and thousands of rounds of ammunition, and quality AT, such as Sagger missiles and launchers, and light anti-tank weapon (LAW) rockets.
9. (S) IDF J5 presented some basic benchmarks for possible countersmuggling solutions for Gaza. First, Egyptian national commitment is required. Other benchmarks outlined by the IDF included a clear chain of command, control of the Sinai and its inhabitants, systematic treatment of tunnel infrastructure, trial and imprisonment of smugglers, and overcoming traditional failures such as bribery and lack of coordination. IDF J5 noted that Egyptian Intelligence Minister Soliman has been supportive, while there is growing awareness on the part of Egyptian Defense Minister Tantawi — who the IDF views as an obstacle to counter-smuggling efforts. However, IDF J5 said there is a lack of coordination between the Egyptian Army and intelligence service on counter-smuggling efforts.
10. (S) The IDF has observed a more systematic response by Egypt in recent months, including assigning guards to newly discovered tunnel entries, or even blowing up tunnels — by IDF estimates, the Egyptian Army has collapsed 20-40 tunnels in the last 4-5 months. Nevertheless, the IDF continues to see a lack of urgency on the part of Egypt regarding smuggling into the Sinai; little attention has been paid to improving the socio-economic conditions of Bedouins primarily responsible for Sinai smuggling. While Egypt has made several key arrests — including prominent smuggler Muhammad Sha’er — others are still at large. Finally, the IDF noted the construction of an underground barrier and sensors’ network — but in many cases, the smugglers have dug deeper tunnels to avoid the network.
11. (S) The IDF J5 outlined consultations with geology and tunnel experts, whom suggested several possible solutions to the Sinai-Gaza tunneling network: constant and specific mine activity in the vicinity of the border to a depth of 20-30 meters; the use of a shock device or stun charge, or smoke at a tunnel entrance for deterrence purposes; constructing underground obstacles 90 meters deep to destabilize current tunnel infrastructure; close supervision and inspection of buildings in urban areas, in which there is a high concentration of trucks and newly built rooftops and roads; and the arrest of major smugglers — such as Darwish Madi — and utilization of interrogation to discover major tunnels and dismantle smuggling networks.
12. (U) PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy Maggi has cleared this cable. CUNNINGHAM
TOP-SECRET – Yemeni insiders losing patience with Saleh
Cable dated:2005-05-23T14:26:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001352
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2015
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, KMCA, KMPI, DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: ROYG INSIDERS INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED WITH SALEH CLAN
REF: SANAA 966
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (S/NF) Ambassador met informally with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that President Saleh is more interested in enriching his family than in making the strategic choices necessary to lead Yemen into the future. XXXXXXXXXXXX was gloomy about President Saleh’s ability to understand the importance of the issues of controlling SA/LW and intelligence sharing to U.S.-ROYG cooperation, and said Saleh did not comprehend what was necessary to maintain a close relationship with the USG in the long term. End Summary.
2. (S/NF) Echoing what we are increasingly hearing from those ROYG interlocutors closest to the Embassy, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Saleh is more and more isolated, and less and less responsive to advice from those practical, progressive ROYG insiders XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX moaned that Saleh “listens to no one,” and is “unrealistically and stupidly confident” that he will always make the right decisions. Saleh, he said, does not think strategically and cares only about enriching his own family, particularly: XXXXXXXXXXXX Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar Commander of Northern Army (considered the second most powerful man in Yemen); XXXXXXXXXXXX
3. (S/NF) Together with Sheikh Abdullah al Ahmar’s clan (speaker of the Parliament and supreme chief the Hashid tribal confederation which includes Saleh’s tribe), all of Yemen’s wealth is being squandered and stolen by Saleh who is increasingly “greedy and paranoid,” especially regarding American intentions, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX are making millions working the diesel smuggling and black market along with Ali Mohsen, using military vehicles and NSB and CSF staff to move the fuel to markets in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. XXXXXXXXXXXX
4. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that his contacts in Saada, including a leading sheikh (he would not give his name), are all furious with Saleh over the amount of indiscriminate killing and destruction perpetrated by the regular army in the north during last month’s suppression of the al-Houthi rebellion. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the “Believing Youth” were by far the minority of the fighters in Saada, rather he said, most fighters came from tribes allied together against Saleh and the central government. He said Saleh is “extremely concerned” that he could lose control of the tribes in Saada and that this will spread to the al-Jawf and Ma’rib tribes.
5. (S/NF) “Everyone”, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, has had it with the corruption of Saleh and his family. As an example, XXXXXXXXXXXX cited the outrageous costs of this Sunday’s May 22 celebration of the fifteenth Unity Day being held in Mukalla at a cost, claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX, of more than 300 million USD, most of which will go into the pockets of those government officials arranging the show. (Note: The price tag XXXXXXXXXXXX gave likely includes some of the massive development projects in Mukalla and elsewhere that the government is rushing to complete before May 22. End Note.)
6. (S/NF) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX is only one source, and this is not the first time he has given a pessimistic assessment of Saleh and his cronies. XXXXXXXXXXXX. But we are increasingly hearing hints and murmurs from others, including XXXXXXXXXXXX and SXXXXXXXXXXXX (who told Ambassador recently that he “wants out” of politics because the President no longer listens to his advice). Even XXXXXXXXXXXX, who, while most certainly profiting from the corrupt business dealings of XXXXXXXXXXXX and Saleh, claimed that he and a group of young GPC and Islah MP‘s intend to band together to force the government to control corruption and enact reforms.
7. (S/NF) Comment Continued. We have heard rumors backing up XXXXXXXXXXXX’s claim of an opposition candidate in 2006. Saleh is worried about a possible political challenge next year from Islah and the new opposition coalition JMP, or even from within the GPC. We may well see another clamp-down on the press and political parties “for security reasons” that will roll back some or much of the progress made in democratic reforms and human rights just in time for this year’s MCC reports. End Comment. Krajeski
TOP-SECRET: US Navy Undersea Surveillance Processing Facilities Eyeball
| Naval Ocean Processing Facility (NOPF), 352 Bullpup Street, Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, VA36.764744 -75.958012
Note high-security double-fencing customarily used at top secret facilities.
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Naval Ocean Processing Facility (NOPF), 352 Bullpup Street, Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, VA![]() |
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| Naval Ocean Processing Facility, Whidbey Island NAS, WAhttp://maps.google.com/maps?q=Whidbey+Island+NAS,+WA&hl=en&ll=48.341457,-122.68394 &spn=0.001583,0.004292&sll=37.0625,-95.677068&sspn=62.484575,104.589844&vpsrc=6&t=h&z=19
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TOP-SECRET – FBI Mossad Sting Bags Big-Headed Egghead
Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, September 7, 2011
Noted Scientist Pleads Guilty to Attempted Espionage
Scientist Arrested in 2009 Following Undercover Operation
WASHINGTON – Stewart David Nozette, a scientist who once worked for the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the White House’s National Space Council, pleaded guilty today to attempted espionage for providing classified information to a person he believed to be an Israeli intelligence officer.
The guilty plea, which took place this morning in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, was announced by Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia; and James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.
Nozette, 54, of Chevy Chase, Md., pleaded guilty to one count of attempted espionage. Senior Judge Paul L. Friedman, who presided at the plea hearing, scheduled a status hearing for Nov. 15, 2011. No sentencing date was set. The plea agreement, which is subject to the judge’s approval, calls for an agreed-upon prison term of 13 years.
Nozette has been in custody since his arrest on Oct. 19, 2009. FBI agents arrested him following an undercover operation in which he provided classified materials on three occasions, including one occasion that forms the basis for today’s guilty plea. He was subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury. The indictment does not allege that the government of Israel or anyone acting on its behalf committed any offense under U.S. laws in this case.
“ Stewart Nozette betrayed America’s trust by attempting to sell some of the nation’s most closely-guarded secrets for profit. Today, he is being held accountable for his actions. As this case demonstrates, we remain vigilant in protecting America’s secrets and in bringing to justice those who compromise them,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco.
“Stewart Nozette was once a trusted scientist who maintained high-level government security clearances and was frequently granted access to classified information relating to our national defense. Today he is a disgraced criminal who was caught red-handed attempting to trade American secrets for personal profit. He will now have the next 13 years behind bars to contemplate his betrayal,” said U.S. Attorney Machen. “The FBI and its partners deserve tremendous credit for their outstanding work on this case. This investigation and prosecution demonstrate our commitment to identifying and punishing those who would put our national security at risk.”
“Preventing the loss or compromise of high-technology and vital national security information is a top priority of the FBI,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “This case is a prime example of what happens when a person decides to sell our nation’s most valuable secrets for individual gain.”
Background
Nozette received a Ph.D. in Planetary Sciences from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1983. He has worked in various capacities on behalf of the U.S. government in the development of state-of-the-art programs in defense and space. For example, Nozette worked at the White House on the National Space Council, Executive Office of the President, from approximately 1989 through 1990. He also worked as a physicist for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory from approximately 1990 to 1999, where he designed highly advanced technology.
Among other things, Nozette assisted in the development of the Clementine bi-static radar experiment which purportedly discovered water ice on the south pole of the moon. A version of the Clementine satellite currently hangs on display at the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., and was later hailed as the vanguard of the new “faster, cheaper, better” revolution in space exploration.
Nozette was also the president, treasurer and director of the Alliance for Competitive Technology (ACT), a non-profit organization that he organized in March 1990. Between January 2000 and February 2006, Nozette, through his company, ACT, entered into agreements with several government agencies to develop highly advanced technology. Nozette performed some of this research and development at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C., the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in Arlington, Va., and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Md.
According to a factual proffer in support of the guilty plea, from 1989 through 2006, Nozette held security clearances as high as TOP SECRET and had regular, frequent access to classified information and documents related to the national defense of the United States. The factual proffer also provides details about the undercover operation that led to Nozette’s arrest.
The Investigation
According to the factual proffer, on Feb. 16, 2007, law enforcement agents executed a search warrant at Nozette’s home in Maryland as part of a fraud investigation and found classified documents. Further investigation into the classified documents revealed that in 2002, Nozette sent an e-mail threatening to take a classified program he was working on, “to [foreign country] or Israel and do it there selling internationally…” As a result of this and other information giving rise to suspicion of espionage, the FBI decided to conduct an undercover operation.
On Sept. 3, 2009, Nozette was contacted via telephone by an individual purporting to be an Israeli intelligence officer from the Mossad, but who was, in fact, an undercover employee of the FBI. During that call, the defendant agreed to meet with the undercover employee that day on Connecticut Avenue N.W., in front of the Mayflower Hotel in downtown Washington, D.C.
Later that day, Nozette met with the undercover employee and had lunch in the restaurant of the Mayflower Hotel. After the undercover employee made it clear that he was a “Mossad” agent, Nozette stated, “Good. Happy to be of assistance.”
After lunch in the hotel restaurant, Nozette and the undercover employee retired to a hotel suite to continue their discussion. During the conversation, the defendant informed the undercover employee that he had clearances “all the way to Top Secret SCI, I had nuclear…,” that “anything that the U.S. has done in space I’ve seen,” and that he would provide classified information for money and a foreign passport to a country without extradition to the United States.
The defendant and the undercover employee met again on Sept. 4, 2009, at the Mayflower Hotel. During this encounter, Nozette assured the undercover employee that, although he no longer had legal access to any classified information at a U.S. government facility, he could, nonetheless, recall the classified information to which he had been granted access. The defendant said, “It’s in my” head, and pointed to his head.
Undercover Operation Continues
On Sept. 10, 2009, FBI agents left a letter in the prearranged “dead drop” facility for the defendant. In the letter, the FBI asked Nozette to answer a list of questions concerning classified U.S. satellite information. FBI agents also provided signature cards, in the defendant’s true name and an alias, for Nozette to sign and asked the defendant to provide four passport sized photographs for the Israeli passport the defendant requested. The FBI agents also left $2,000 cash for the defendant in the “dead drop” facility, which Nozette retrieved the same day, along with the questions and signature cards.
On Sept. 16, 2009, Nozette left a manila envelope in the “dead drop” facility in the District of Columbia. One of the “answers” provided by the defendant contained information classified as SECRET/SCI which related to the national defense, in that it directly concerned classified aspects and mission capabilities of a prototype overhead collection system and which disclosure would negate the ability to support military and intelligence operations. In addition to disclosing SECRET/SCI information, Nozette offered to reveal additional classified information that directly concerned nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft or satellites, and other major weapons systems.
On Sept. 17, 2009, FBI agents left a second communication in the “dead drop” facility for the defendant. In the letter, the FBI asked Nozette to answer another list of questions concerning classified U.S. satellite information. Nozette retrieved the questions from the “dead drop” facility later that same day.
On Oct. 1, 2009, Nozette left a manila envelope in the “dead drop” facility in the District of Columbia. The FBI also left a cash payment of $9,000 in the “dead drop” facility. Later that day, the FBI agents retrieved the sealed manila envelope left by the defendant. Inside the envelope, FBI agents discovered the encrypted thumb drive that was provided to Nozette on Sept. 17, 2009, which included another set of “answers” from the defendant. The “answers” contained information classified as TOP SECRET/SCI and other information classified as SECRET/SCI. This classified information related to the national defense, in that it directly concerned satellites, early warning systems, means of defense or retaliation against large-scale attack, communications intelligence information, and major elements of defense strategy. (This information is what formed the basis for the charge in today’s guilty plea.)
On Oct. 5, 2009, Nozette left a manila envelope in the “dead drop” facility in the District of Columbia. Later that day, the FBI agents retrieved the sealed manila envelope left by the defendant. Inside the envelope, FBI agents discovered the encrypted thumb drive that was provided to Nozette on Oct. 1, 2009, which included another set of “answers” from the defendant. The “answers” contained information classified as TOP SECRET/SAR. This classified information related to the national defense, in that it directly concerned capabilities of a U.S. military weapon system research and development effort.
Nozette and the undercover employee met again on Oct. 19, 2009, at the Mayflower Hotel. During that meeting, the following exchanges took place:
NOZETTE: “So, uh, I gave you even in this first run, some of the most classified information that there is. . . . I’ve sort of crossed the Rubicon. . . . Now the, uh, so I think when I said like fifty K, I think that was probably too low. . . .The cost to the U.S. Government was two hundred million. . . . to develop it all. Uh, and then that’s not including the launching of it. . .Uh, integrating the satellites. . . . So if you say okay that probably brings it to almost a billion dollars. . . So I tell ya at least two hundred million so I would say, you know, theoretically I should charge you certainly, you know, at most a one percent.”
Nozette was arrested soon after he made these statements. He was subsequently indicted on four charges of attempted espionage. Under the plea agreement, Nozette pleaded guilty to the third count of the indictment, arising out of his passing of TOP SECRET/SCI information on Oct. 1, 2009.
At the time of his arrest, Nozette was awaiting sentencing in another federal case. On Jan. 30, 2009, he pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to charges of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government with respect to false claims and tax evasion in an amount up to $399,999. In that case, Nozette agreed to pay restitution of $265,205 to the U.S. government. Nozette is awaiting sentencing in the case. Under terms of today’s plea, the sentence in the fraud case is to run concurrently with the sentence for attempted espionage.
This investigation was conducted by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, with assistance from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Naval Audit Service, National Reconnaissance Office, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Defense Contract Audit Agency, U.S. Army 902nd Military Intelligence Group, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Office of Counterintelligence, NASA Office of Inspector General, Department of Energy , Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Criminal Investigation Division, IRS Tax Exempt & Government Entities group, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Postal Inspection Service, as well as other partners in the U.S. intelligence community.
The prosecution is being handled by Trial Attorneys Deborah A. Curtis and Heather M. Schmidt, from the Counterespionage Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Anthony Asuncion, from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia.
11-1142
National Security Division
WIKIPEDIA ÜBER CYBERSTALKER wie die fingierten “GoMoPa”
Vorsicht: Cyber-Stalker im Netz
STALKING STUDIE DES WEISSEN RING
Süddeutsche Zeitung über die kriminellen Machenschaften der “GoMoPa”
Opfer fordern Entzug der Anwaltszulassung für mutmassliche “GoMoPa”-Paten
Meridian Capital: Klaus Dieter Maurischat „GoMoPa“ in Detention
Meridian Capital über die Verhaftung von GoMoPa-Chef Klaus Maurischat durch das BKA in Berlin wg. Erpressung, Betruges & Cyberstalking
Magisterarbeit Bernd Pulch an der Universität Mainz
Handelsblatt über die kriminellen “GoMoPa”-Betrüger
Neo-STASI-WARNUNG Wie auch Sie GoMoPa-Rufmordopfer werden können-
Stellen Sie sich bitte kurz vor, dass Sie mit einer tollen Geschäftsidee oder einer Geschäftserweiterung zu mehr Geld kommen möchten. Beispielsweise auch Ihr Unternehmen vergrössern oder gar Ihre Waren exportieren wollen.
Sie werben damit natürlich über die Medien….
Da meldet sich bei Ihnen möglicherweise ein Beauftragter des Finanz-Nachrichtendienstes GoMoPa mit der Mitteilung, dass im GoMoPa-Forum sehr negative Forenbeiträge über Ihre Person oder Ihr Vorhaben stünden. Äusserst Schlimmes wird über Sie berichtet. Zum Beispiel, dass Sie bisher schon Ihr Geld mit betrügerischen Machenschaften verdient hätten oder Ihr Sohn als erfolgreicher Sportler nach neuesten Ermittlungen in einem Kokain-Dealer-Ring verwickelt sei.
Ein anonymer User ( Schreiberling) habe dies geschrieben, wird vom GoMoPa-Beauftragten berichtet. Man könne jetzt noch nicht feststellen, ob dies so wahr sei. Man könne aber auch nicht den Beitrag einfach rausnehmen, denn es könne ja auch was Wahres daran sein!
Falls Sie selbst an der Wahrheitsfindung interessiert seien, könnten Sie auch beim ´seriösen Nachrichtendienst` GoMoPa als Gesellschafter oder als Premium-Mitglied einsteigen, dann könne man ja…..usf. …ganz einfach den Beitrag herausnehmen!
So ähnlich könnte es geschehen und glauben Sie mir: ´Dies ist kein böser Traum,-keine Fata Morgana`, sondern schon Zigtausendmal in der fast 10-Jährigen GoMoPa- Geschichte so abgelaufen.
Wir, von der CSA-Agency, wurden selbst aus Wettbewerbsgründen seit 2002 von GoMoPa auf primitivste Weise im Forum diffamiert oder die von uns als seriöse Dienstleister empfohlenen Unternehmungen wurden per Rufmord mit schmutzigsten, unwahren Verleumdungs-Attacken von anonymen Bloggern ( bezahlte Helfershelfer vom GoMoPa) nahezu ruiniert. Nicht nur finanziell , sondern auch gesundheitlich nieder gemacht! Nicht umsonst heisst es RUFMORD.
Der Begriff ´Stalking` ist da noch eine vornehme Bezeichnung.
Auf gut deutsch passt Rufmord besser.
Geschäftlicher und gesundheitlicher RUFMORD gehört auch entsprechend bestraft.
Die Justiz tut sich sehr schwer damit. Vor allem, wenn die Rufmörder mit Ihren Machenschaften mit Gesellschaften wie z.B. ´GoMoPa` als Briefkastenfirma aus dem Ausland agieren. UND zum anderen, weil sich die Stalking-Terror-Experten von GoMoPa sich mit ihren Methoden auch der Justiz und der Medien bedienen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) über die Wirtschaftskriminellen der “GoMoPa”
Die Liste der “GoMoPa”- Opfer
DIE FINANCIAL TIMES über die erfundenen “Goldman, Morgenstern und Partner” alias “GoMoPa”
TOP-SECRET – US talks to Israeli security chief about Arabs and Gaza
Cable dated:2008-05-22T07:57:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 001080
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2018
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINR, KPAL, KWBG, EG, IS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S MEETING WITH SHIN BET CHIEF FOCUSES ON ISRAEL‘S ARABS, THE GAZA STRIP, AND OMAR SOLIMAN’S VISIT
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).
——- SUMMARY ——-
1. (S) In a May 13 meeting covering a range of subjects, Israeli Security Agency (ISA, or Shin Bet) Chief Yuval Diskin told Ambassador Jones the following:
— Israel’s Arabs are materially better off than many Arabs in neighboring countries, but increasingly feel disconnected from the State, and tend to identify themselves first as Arabs, and sometimes Muslims, rather than as Israelis. Arab-Israeli Knesset Members are not helping by flirting with enemy regimes in Syria and elsewhere, exploiting their parliamentary immunity. Diskin and the ISA have been advocates within the GOI for doing more to reconnect Israeli-Arabs with Israel. The many ideas Diskin and others have come up with to do this cost money, which the GOI does not have.
— The ISA understands the USG rationale for providing certain types of equipment to the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF), but will approve transfer requests on a case-by-case basis, depending on the capabilities of the equipment, and how the PASF intend to use them. The ISA cannot approve direct transfers of equipment to the PA Presidential Guard (PG) as the PG is XXXXXXXXXXXX as a result of activities by many of its officers during the Second Intifada. If necessary, equipment could be transferred to the PG via a third party.
— Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman’s visit opened up a very sensitive period. Israel presented its conditions for a “cooling down”, or cease-fire/tahdiya with Hamas, and now it is Hamas’ turn to respond once Soliman conveys those conditions. They include a complete cessation of terrorist activity in the Gaza Strip. In addition, Israel will not tolerate any direction from the Gaza Strip of terrorist activities in the West Bank. Passages between Israel and the Gaza Strip will be opened gradually as Hamas and the other terrorist groups cease their attacks. Rafah Crossing can be opened, but PA President Abu Mazen must get credit for the opening. Diskin and many in the GOI are skeptical that Hamas will agree to the tahdiya, or that it would last long. Many in the GOI and IDF, including Diskin, believe Israel must re-enter Gaza in force sooner rather than later, to cut back the terrorists’ growing capabilities there.
2. (S) The Ambassador asked Diskin’s assistance in ensuring the ISA’s prompt approval of hundreds of entry permits for participants in the upcoming Bethlehem Conference. Diskin promised ISA would work as quickly as possible and approve as many permits as possible. At the Ambassador’s request, Diskin also promised to help a Palestinian student in the Gaza Strip receive an entry permit so that he could attend his visa interview for college study in the U.S. Diskin also said ISA would issue Palestinian Sheikh Tamimi entry permits for Jerusalem events one day at a time, “as long as he behaves himself.” END SUMMARY.
——————————————— ———–
DISKIN ON ISRAEL’S ARABS — COMPLICATED, GROWING PROBLEM ——————————————— ———–
3. (S) Responding to the Ambassador’s question about Diskin’s current assessment of the Arab-Israeli population — especially in light of an incident May 8 during which an Arab-Israeli MK claimed he had been attacked by an undercover police officer — Diskin initially expressed reluctance and discomfort in answering the question, explaining that how Israel treats its Arab citizens is its own internal affair. Then, opening up, Diskin proceeded to spend the next ten minutes describing his concerns about Israel’s Arab-Israeli population. According to the ISA chief, many of them “take their rights too far,” and the community itself is suffering from an identity crisis. Most, he claimed, want to live in Israel. At the same time, they see themselves first as Arabs, and then as Muslims. (He acknowledged that a small percentage are Christians.) He assessed that the Israeli-Arab political leadership is trying to take the Israel-Palestinian conflict in a new direction and give it a new “national color.” Thankfully, he observed, they are not succeeding, and their efforts are not filtering down to the general public, which is more concerned with daily life. Still, the ISA Chief said his agency is rightly concerned with this. He added that the ISA is also monitoring other
TEL AVIV 00001080 002 OF 005
forms of extremism within Israel’s population, including Jewish extremists. He added that the ISA is also aware that there are problems among Israel’s Bedouin and Druze.
4. (S) Diskin said that the main challenge for the GOI is to figure out how to “connect” these people with the State of Israel. It is complex as it requires them to live their daily lives in contradiction. Most of the time, he allowed, they have been loyal to the State over the previous sixty years — even during the 1967 and 1973 wars and “waves of terror” that followed. The percentage of families that have connections with “bad people on the other side doing bad things” is very low, he said. He claimed that most of the Israeli-Arabs who have caused problems were refugees who were given permits to re-enter Israel in order to reunify with family members already living in Israel. “In these cases,” he said, “they brought their bad ideas with them, and then acted on them.” He continued: “Allowing Palestinians to return over the past few years was foolish. The Bedouin have brought women with them from the Gaza Strip and Jenin and now have many children. We need to manage this immigration in a controlled way. It is hard for us to absorb large quantities of people the way we have been doing these last few years.”
5. (S) Diskin noted that one of the main problems the GOI is facing now is that Arab-Israeli Knesset members are visiting enemy states, exploiting their parliamentary immunity in order to visit countries like Syria and mix with groups like Hizballah. “These people,” he said, “are not spreading the democratic values of Israel. Instead, they are being co-opted by people like Bashar Assad.” Diskin lamented that the ISA has to “deal with them now,” as — in his words — the Israeli National Police have failed to do what they were supposed to do. Pointing to the high-profile case of MK Azmi Bishara, Diskin said, tongue in cheek, that Israel would “welcome his return” from Syria, and that he would likely spend many years in an Israeli prison if he returns.
6. (S) Diskin suggested that the ISA has been a voice for assisting Arab-Israelis constructively over the last several years. He claimed that the ISA has been “constantly pushing and prodding” the GOI to “prevent their issues from falling through the cracks.” While the GOI has come up with many good ideas, Diskin observed, it nevertheless lacks funding to follow through on them. He claimed he and President Peres had recently discussed the need for more high-tech employment opportunities for Arab-Israelis, as well as colleges and training centers. He added that Prime Minister Olmert is “deeply involved,” and noted that Olmert will chair a government-run conference in June on the situation of the Arab-Israeli population. “It will,” he said, “be a good start to making better policy on this issue.”
7. (S) The Ambassador replied that the USG offers a small number of scholarships every year for Arab-Israelis to help them with graduate-level studies in the U.S. He indicated that the embassy would be willing to consider candidates that the ISA brought to its attention. The Ambassador observed that Israel’s Arab and Druze minorities should be viewed as potential “bridges” to Israel’s neighbors. In the future, they could help to change thinking and promote reform in the Arab world.
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ISA CONSIDERING EQUIPMENT APPROVALS FOR PASF ——————————————–
8. (S) The Ambassador raised the issue of GOI approvals for equipment the USG is providing to the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) for their training and use. He noted that to date, the GOI has approved some of the equipment, and denied the provision of other pieces of equipment, including protective equipment like kevlar helmets, and vests. The Ambassador observed that it is likely the USG will be submitting more equipment requests to the GOI in the future. He noted that many equipment requests form packages that are designed to provide specific capabilities that cannot be achieved if the equipment packages are only partially approved. This was also the case with investment proposals. He urged Diskin to look at any investment proposals stemming from the Bethlehem Investment Conference sympathetically, and to take the benefits they would provide into account when deciding whether to approve them.
9. (S) Diskin replied that the ISA also hopes that the Bethlehem Conference will succeed, and that the PA will progress on the economic front, as it would help to secure progress on the political front. Diskin said he is worried
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that we may be asking for too much too quickly on the political front, and that it may lead to disaster in the West Bank. While he agreed that creating better living conditions in the West Bank is a good idea, he stressed that we have to be very careful. He pointed to incidents in the past to explain that arms, ammunition and vests given to the PASF can eventually make their way into Hamas’ hands. In the past, such equipment has included rifles and heavy machines guns that he claimed have been used against IDF helicopters and soldiers. “I do not think that we need more arms in the West Bank,” he stressed, adding, “We have given them too much ammunition already.” As for vests, Diskin said that whether the GOI approves them depends on how the PASF will use them, and the capabilities of the vests themselves. Admitting he did not know the MOD’s position on the vests, Diskin said that the ISA did not object to their provision to the PASF. He noted, however, that the ISA strongly opposes bringing armored vehicles into the West Bank.
10. (S) Diskin stressed that the ISA opposes providing equipment to the Presidential Guard (PG), XXXXXXXXXXXX as a result of its officers’ activities during the Second Intifada. Diskin recounted that he told PM Olmert that “it would not be good” for Israel to transfer arms and weapons to the PG directly. He said he told PM Olmert that such items could be given to a third party, and that they could then turn the items over to the PG. Diskin added, “We can find ways to give it to a third party.”
11. (S) Reiterating the importance of equipping the PASF, the Ambassador stressed that the USG is requesting permission to turn over almost 3,000 vests and helmets for the graduates of U.S. training programs. Diskin responded that the final answer is with the MOD: “ISA has no veto on this. Sometimes the MOD opposes us.” Reviewing USSC Dayton’s request, Diskin said that the ISA agreed with the USSC, although it pointed out the problem of directly transferring equipment to the PG. Diskin said that other pieces of equipment, including water trucks and ladders, are still being reviewed by the ISA, but indicated that he would approve most of them. He added that he will oppose the provision of AK-47 rifles and ammunition to the PASF: “There are too many guns and ammunition in the West Bank already.”
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DISKIN ON GAZA AND OMAR SOLIMAN’S VISIT —————————————-
12. (S) Asked about Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman’s visit, Diskin noted that he had met with Soliman the day before (May 12). Diskin characterized it as an “interesting meeting — a good atmosphere swirling with many lies — exactly what is to be expected in the Middle East.” The situation now, in the wake of Soliman’s visit, is a sensitive one. Soliman was surprised to hear that Israel was ready for a tahdiya, but only under certain conditions. According to Diskin, ISA played a key role in formulating the conditions. Israel cannot accept a tahdiya without a commitment to stop weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip. This requires Egypt’s commitment, as it is a sovereign state. While weapons entering the Gaza Strip are coming from Sudan, Eritrea, Yemen and other countries, Egypt is the last place they pass through before they enter the Strip. Diskin cautioned: “We have been too patient about this. We cannot tolerate this anymore.”
13. (S) Diskin added that terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank must stop. This includes, he stressed, the directing of terror attacks within the West Bank from the Gaza Strip. Diskin said that the ISA knows that terrorist organizations in the West Bank have contacts with organizations in the Gaza Strip including Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committees, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and especially the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. He claimed that Israeli security services have often found that terrorist infrastructure in the Gaza Strip provides funding and direction to operatives in the West Bank. Diskin said that he told Soliman that if, under a tahdiya, there is an attack in the West Bank and Israel determines that there was no connection with the Gaza Strip, then Israel will not retaliate against targets in the Gaza Strip. If, however, Israel determines that there is a Gaza Strip connection, then attacks will be carried out against Gaza Strip targets. Without elaborating, Diskin pointed out that, if the tahdiya is to start, Hamas will have to make commitments to Egypt. He said that Soliman seemed to understand the Israeli position. He added that PM Olmert and DefMin Barak also made
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the same points to the Egyptian intelligence chief.
14. (S) Diskin explained how observation of the tahdiya would correlate with opening of the Rafah crossing and passages between the Gaza Strip and Israel. As smuggling and terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip decline, then the passages can be gradually opened. As for the Rafah crossing, in Israel’s view, it is essential that PA President Abbas be involved in its opening, so that he receives credit for it.
15. (S) Diskin said that Israel does not like the tahdiya — seeing it as a means whereby Hamas and other groups can regroup and re-arm — but also dislikes the current situation. The ISA, he said, believes that the best option now is a large-scale ground incursion into the Gaza Strip that allows the IDF to take over the southern part of the Gaza Strip and to stop smuggling and increase pressure on Hamas. “If you do this, it will cause big problems for Hamas’ survival in the Gaza Strip,” he said. “We can do it,” he added. He continued: “None of us like the idea of a military operation in the Gaza Strip, but we also believe we cannot avoid it. I do not believe in this ‘cooling down’ that the tahdiya would afford. Even if it starts, it will not last long. The way we are now treating the current situation is not effective. It is a waste of time, money and life. A ground invasion may lead to loss of life, but would be more effective. We need to be ready to take over the southern Gaza Strip and hold on to it for as long as necessary. Months and years if need be. Strategically, all of us understand that we cannot avoid the Gaza Strip if there is to be a roadmap and a peace process.” Diskin added, “My job is to tell the inconvenient truth. I am glad that others are finally realizing that the situation in the Gaza Strip is intolerable and getting worse every day. The situation in Lebanon makes it easier for us to make our case. We need to be very tough in dealing with the problem of the Gaza Strip. Egypt will not resolve the problem for us, and Abu Mazen will not and cannot.”
16. (S) Diskin observed that Soliman looks at the Gaza Strip the way any Arab and Egyptian would — with an eye towards kicking it down the road: “I believe his policy is to try to buy more time. It is not to solve a problem, but to see what will happen down the road.” Diskin lamented that there are so many problems in the Middle East that it prevents pursuing and implementing a long-term policy. He concluded, “It is hard to anticipate all the factors when formulating a course of action. Events in other states — things like the price of oil — surprise you. Everyone is surprised all the time. To survive in the Middle East, you have to be like a shark in the water. You have to keep moving forward or you will die.”
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DISKIN PROMISES TO ASSIST WITH ENTRY PERMITS ——————————————–
17. (C) The Ambassador requested Diskin’s assistance in ensuring that entry permits for Bethlehem Conference invitees are issued as quickly as possible. While noting our appreciation that more than 200 had been approved, the Ambassador pointed out that over 400 had been requested. He stressed that invitees are anxious and may start canceling participation if they do not receive their permits by the end of the week. Diskin said the ISA would do its best, and that he had told his staff two months ago to treat each request positively, unless an invitee posed a clear threat. Diskin said he would work closely with the MOD on the permits, and asked to be informed if any problems emerged. Diskin reiterated that he had given clear instructions to his staff to approve as many permits as possible.
18. (C) The Ambassador also requested Diskin’s assistance in obtaining an entry permit for Palestinian Sheikh Tamimi so that he could attend a May 27 interfaith meeting in Jerusalem. The Ambassador noted that FM Livni is also invited to attend the meeting. Diskin said Tamimi will receive a permit, but for that day only. The Ambassador undertook to have a U.S. security officer accompany Tamimi while he is in Jerusalem, as had been done during his previous interfaith meeting in Jerusalem.
19. (C) The Ambassador also requested Diskin’s assistance in obtaining an entry permit for a Palestinian student in the Gaza Strip who needs to travel to Jerusalem in order to undergo a May 22 visa interview in connection with his acceptance to MIT. Diskin promised to assist and requested all the information on the student. JONES
TOP-SECRET -Israel – calm before the storm?
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 002473
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, KWBG, IS, IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY JAMES STEINBERG
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) ( d)
1. (S) Summary. Israel is deceptively calm and prosperous. The security situation inside Israel is the best since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the economy has weathered the storms of the international economic crisis, and Netanyahu’s governing coalition is stable, for the time being at least. Yet outside the storm is gathering and Israelis of many different political outlooks agree on the need to seize the initiative, even while they disagree about what exactly should be done. Israelis see Iran as the primary regional threat, both due to its nuclear program and its projection of power directly into Gaza and southern Lebanon. The Israeli navy’s seizure of a ship loaded with a huge shipment of Iranian arms November 3 has provided tangible proof of Iran’s involvement in arming Hamas and Hizballah. Syrian intentions are also a source of concern, as Israeli analysts see Asad moving closer to Iran and Hizballah even as Syria improves its relations with the West. The sharp decline in Israel’s long- standing strategic relationship with Turkey is adding a new element of instability into the picture. Prime Minister Erdogan’s rhetorical support for Ahmedinejad and his dismissal of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program is feeding the sense here of impending crisis, although the robust U.S.-Israeli security relationship is profoundly reassuring to Israeli security officials and the general public alike. Finally, the failure to re-launch Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the political crisis in the Palestinian Authority is deeply disturbing to Israelis who still believe in a two-state solution. Even GOI skeptics are worried that the lack of a political dialogue and talk of a collapse of the PA are undermining the bottom-up approach they advocate as the alternative to a final-status agreement. Netanyahu insists that he is ready to start negotiations immediately without preconditions, but he will not negotiate on the basis of former PM Olmert’s offer of a year ago. The opposition Kadima Party’s number two, former IDF Chief of Staff and former Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz, has generated considerable attention with a new peace plan that is based on offering the Palestinians a state with temporary borders in the next year or two, to be followed by intensive final status negotiations. Few here believe the Palestinians will accept this idea, but it may serve to push Netanyahu toward offering a peace initiative of his own. End Summary.
Calm Before the Storm?
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2. (S) Israel in the fall of 2009 is deceptively calm on the surface. Israelis are enjoying the best security situation since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the result of Israeli intelligence successes in destroying the suicide bombing network in the West Bank as well as good security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority’s security forces. The Israeli economy has successfully weathered the world economic crisis, with only a slight uptick in unemployment and no major impact on the financial system. PM Netanyahu’s center-right coalition is stable, and faces no significant challenge from the opposition Kadima Party. Netanyahu personally enjoys approval ratings over sixty percent, and appears to have benefited politically from the media obsession with reports of frictions with the U.S. Administration. Netanyahu so far has managed the more right wing elements of Likud and other rightist elements in the coalition, although tensions with the far right are likely to reemerge over peace process issues, including a temporary settlement freeze or a decision to make good on Barak’s pledges to evacuate illegal outposts. There are signs of a growing split within the Labor Party, and Foreign Minister Lieberman continues to face the strong possibility of several criminal indictments for money laundering and obstruction of justice, but none of this threatens the stability of the coalition, at least not yet. The latest polls indicate that Likud would gain three seats if elections were held now.
And Looming Threats
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3. (S) Despite this good news for the government, Israelis are even more anxious than normal these days. Sixty-one years after the establishment of the State of Israel, Israelis sense a growing tide in the world challenging not just the occupation of territory seized in 1967, but even against the existence of the Jewish state within any borders. The GOI‘s alarm and outrage over the Goldstone Report was based on their view that the report represented an attempt to deny Israel the right to react military to terrorist threats.
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Security is indeed good and Israel’s borders are generally the quietest they have been in years, but it is common knowledge that Hamas in Gaza and Hizballah in Lebanon both now possess rockets capable of hitting the greater Tel Aviv area, Israel’s main population and economic center. When discussing Iran’s nuclear program, sophisticated Israeli interlocutors note that the issue is not just whether a nuclear-armed Iran would launch nuclear-tipped missiles at Israel – although that possibility cannot be dismissed – but rather the regional nuclear arms race that would ensue and the impact of the resulting uncertainty on Israeli elites and foreign investors alike. Israel’s remarkable high-tech economy is a great achievement, but it also makes Israel exceptionally vulnerable to a host of private decisions to live and invest elsewhere. Growing alienation among Israel’s twenty-percent Arab minority and the increasing domination of Israeli Arab politics by an elite that identifies with Palestinian nationalism further complicates Israel’s internal scene.
4. (S) Painstakingly constructed relations with Israel’s neighbors are also fraying. Even optimists about relations with Egypt and Jordan admit that Israel enjoys peace with both regimes, but not with their people. The transformation of Michel Aoun into Hizballah’s primary Lebanese ally may be the final nail in the coffin of Israel’s decades-old relations with Lebanon’s Maronite Christians. Finally, Israelis are deeply alarmed by the direction of Turkish foreign policy, and see Erdogan and Davutoglu as punishing Israel for the EU’s rejection of Turkey while driving Israel’s erstwhile strategic ally into an alternative strategic partnership with Syria and Iran.
Gaza Dilemmas
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5. (S) Gaza poses its own set of dilemmas. The IDF general responsible for Gaza and southern Israel, Major General Yoav Galant, recently commented to us that Israel’s political leadership has not yet made the necessary policy choices among competing priorities: a short-term priority of wanting Hamas to be strong enough to enforce the de facto ceasefire and prevent the firing of rockets and mortars into Israel; a medium-priority of preventing Hamas from consolidating its hold on Gaza; and a longer-term priority of avoiding a return of Israeli control of Gaza and full responsibility for the well-being of Gaza’s civilian population. Israel appears determined to maintain its current policy of allowing only humanitarian supplies and limited commercial goods into Gaza, while sealing the borders into Israel. There are indications of progress in the indirect negotiations with Hamas over the release of Gilad Shalit in return for the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, many of them hardened terrorists,but it is difficult to predict the timing of such a deal. Shalit’s release would likely result in a more lenient Israeli policy toward the Gaza crossings, but a large prisoner exchange would be played by Hamas as a major political achievement and thus further damage the standing of Abu Mazen among Palestinians.
Security Cooperation with the U.S. Reassuring ———————————————
6. (S) Especially given the sense of growing threats from all directions, Israelis from the Prime Minister on down to the average citizen are deeply appreciative of the strong security and mil-mil cooperation with the U.S. The U.S.-Israeli security relationship remains strong, as indicated by the joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense exercise Juniper Cobra 10 in which over 1,400 American personnel tested Israel’s defense – and U.S. support thereof – against ballistic missile threats in the region . The United States remains committed to Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), and has taken a number of steps to alleviate Israeli concerns over some potential U.S arms sales to the region, including the creation of four new QME working groups to further discuss these arms transfers. These working groups will soon begin deliberations, focusing on previous arms transfer agreements, mitigation measures for the planned U.S. F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, technical mitigation issues, and intelligence policy.
7. (S) While the United States and Israel may not agree on some U.S. arms transfers to the region, these QME working groups will ensure a transparent process so that Israel is not surprised by any U.S. potential transfer. As it does in assessing all threats, Israel approaches potential U.S. arms sales from a “worst case scenario” perspective in which current moderate Arab nations (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
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Jordan) in the region could potentially fall victim to regime change and resume hostilities against Israel. It is primarily for this reason that Israel continues to raise concerns regarding the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, especially if the aircraft are based at Tabuk airfield near the Israeli border. We have deflected Israeli requests for additional information regarding the F-15 sale until we receive an official Letter of Request (LOR) from Saudi Arabia.
8. (S) Finally, an argument can be made that Israel has continued to raise concerns over the F-15 sale as leverage in its attempts to modify its purchase of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Israel remains highly committed to the JSF as a successor to its aging F-16 fleet, although budgetary considerations have raised some doubts how Israel will be able to afford it. Nevertheless, Israel continues to press for the inclusion of an Israeli-made electronic warfare (EW) suite, indigenous maintenance capacity, and a lower cost per aircraft into its JSF purchase plans, and has repeatedly raised these issues with SecDef.
Impasse with the Palestinians
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9. (C) Polls show that close to seventy percent of Israeli Jews support a two-state solution, but a similar percentage do not believe that a final status agreement can be reached with the Palestinian leadership. Expressed another way, Israelis of varying political views tell us that after Abu Mazen spurned Ehud Olmert’s peace offer one year ago, it became clearer than ever that there is too wide a gap between the maximum offer any Israeli prime minister could make and the minimum terms any Palestinian leader could accept and survive. Sixteen years after Oslo and the Declaration of Principles, there is a widespread conviction here that neither final status negotiations nor unilateral disengagements have worked. While some on the left conclude that the only hope is a U.S.-imposed settlement, a more widely held narrative holds that the Oslo arrangements collapsed in the violence of the Second Intifada after Arafat rejected Barak’s offer at Camp David, while Sharon’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza resulted in the Hamas takeover and a rain of rockets on southern Israel. Netanyahu effectively captured the public mood with his Bar Ilan University speech last June, in which he expressed support for a two-state solution, but only if the Plestinian leadership would accept Israel as the ation-state of the Jewish people and the Palestiian state would be demilitarized (and subject toa number of other security-related restrictions o its sovereignty that he did not spell out in deail in the speech but which are well known in Wahington). Palestinian PM Fayyad has recently temed Netanyahu’s goal a “Mickey Mouse state” due to all the limitations on Palestinian sovereignty that it would appear to entail.
10. (S) Abu Mazen’s stated intent not to seek another term is widely seen here as an effort to put pressure on Washington to put pressure on Israel to meet Palestinian terms for starting negotiations. Abu Mazen’s statements have likely reinforced his image among Israelis as a decent man, and certainly a different breed from Arafat, but a weak and unreliable leader. Yet even some of the Israeli officials, including Avigdor Lieberman and Sylvan Shalom, who have been most skeptical about the prospects for a final status agreement in the near term, are now expressing concern at the lack of engagement with the PA and the prospects of the PA collapsing. Advocates of a bottom-up approach are finally realizing that without a political process, the security cooperation and economic development approach will become unsustainable. Netanyahu has told us that he considers Abu Mazen to be his negotiating partner, and in his latest public statements has stressed that he is not interested in negotiations for their own sake, but rather seeks a far-reaching agreement with the Palestinians, but it remains unclear to us how far Netanyahu is prepared to go. Netanyahu is interested in taking steps to strengthen Abu Mazen, but he will not agree to the total freeze on Israeli construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that Abu Mazen insists is a requirement for engaging with Netanyahu.
Israeli Choices —————
11. (C) Former Defense Minister and former IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz generated a lot of media attention this week when he announced a peace plan that calls for establishing a Palestinian state with temporary borders on sixty percent of the West Bank, then entering final status negotiations.
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Mofaz’ approach is similar to ideas that have been floated quietly over the past few months by Defense Minister Barak and President Peres, and Mofaz claims that both Barak and Peres support his plan. Mofaz’ plan is in part an effort to undermine the political position of his rival for Kadima party leadership, former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. Livni, presumably drawing on her experience negotiating with the Palestinians during the Olmert government, says she opposes the idea of an interim solution, but instead supports intensive final status negotiations, perhaps this time with direct U.S. involvement. Livni and Mofaz both stress that they are motivated by a sense of urgency and that time is not on Israel’s side.
12. (C) Netanyahu still holds the political cards here, however, and we see no scenarios in which Livni or Mofaz become prime minister in the near future. As Mofaz told the Ambassador earlier this week, Netanyahu may wait until the Palestinian elections, if they are in fact held in January, but the initiative is in his hands. If the Palestinians continue to refuse to engage on terms that Netanyahu can accept, it is possible that Netanyahu could turn his attention to Syria. Media reports that Netanyahu asked President Sarkozy to deliver a message to Asad may turn out to be accurate, but as with the Palestinians, Netanyahu will not resume talks with Syria where they left off under Olmert, but will insist on negotiations without preconditions. CUNNINGHAM
Die “GoMoPa” – Wirecard Lüge
Börse-Online berichtet über die Organisierten Kriminellen der “GoMoPa” und wie sie die Finanzbranche bedrohen
TOP-SECRET – THE TRUE PICS FROM THE PROTEST-REVOLT IN CHILE
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Riot police hit students with their batons during a 48-hour national strike at Santiago August 25, 2011. Protesters battled police in Chile’s capital on Thursday, the second day of a two-day strike against unpopular President Sebastian Pinera that was marked by sporadic looting but had no impact on the vital mining sector. Reuters |
Workers, students and citizens attend a 48-hour national strike at Santiago August 25, 2011. Protesters scuffled with police in the Chilean capital on Thursday, the second of a two-day strike against unpopular President Sebastian Pinera marked by sporadic looting, though the linchpin mining sector was not affected. Reuters |
A demonstrator is detained by riot policemen during a 48-hour national strike at Santiago August 25, 2011. Protesters scuffled with police in the Chilean capital on Thursday, the second of a two-day strike against unpopular President Sebastian Pinera marked by sporadic looting, though the linchpin mining sector was not affected. Reuters |
Carlos Burgos, who says he was shot at by the Chilean police, shows his wound in the Penalolen neighbourhood in Santiago August 26, 2011, where 16-year-old Manuel Gutierrez was shot dead during a 48-hour national strike against President Sebastian Pinera. Gutierrez died early on Friday after he was shot a day earlier in massive protests in the capital against the unpopular Pinera, the first fatality in months of social unrest. Police said he was shot in the chest as protesters battled them overnight in Santiago, in the aftermath of a 48-hour national strike against Pinera marked by violent clashes and sporadic looting. Reuters |
Students march toward the Chilean consulate in Buenos Aires on August 25, 2011, supporting the Chilean students in their claim for free education and against Chile’s President Sebastian Pinera. Getty |
A demonstrator stands next to a burning barricade on the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Roberto Candia) |
Riot police detain a woman during a protest of public workers and students for the massive layoffs of government employees in Santiago, Chile, Thursday, Aug. 26, 2010. (Aliosha Marquez) |
Police and protesters clash in front of the Gratitud Nacional Church during the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Sebastian Silva) |
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Riot police detain a protester near La Moneda presidential palace during the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans are demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Victor R. Caivano) |
Protesters throw stones at an armored police vehicle spraying tear gas during the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Sebastian Silva) |
A police officer on horseback rides past a bus stop set on fire by demonstrators on the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Luis Hidalgo) |
A protester kicks a tear gas canister during clashes with police in the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Jose Miguel Rojas) |
A protester throws stones at an armored police vehicle after clashes broke out during a march on the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Victor R. Caivano) |
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Nearly one million people, including whole families, gathered at the Parque O’Higgins in a demonstration called “Family Sunday for Education”, organised by University students, high schools and the College of Teachers. Chile. 21st August 2011 Demotix |
TOP-SECRET-Voice of America Antennas Eyeball
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Börse Online über “GoMoPa”-Betrüger und RA Jochen Resch
Crpytome – Financial Crisis Luxury Architecture
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Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. is interviewed on Capitol Hill in Washington, Tuesday, Aug. 2, 2011, after the Senate voted to pass debt legislation. (Jacquelyn Martin) |
Madrid’s Stock Exchange is seen on Wednesday Aug. 10, 2011. A risky European Central Bank decision to fight the continent’s debt crisis by buying Spanish and Italian bonds on Monday started pushing down the soaring interest rates threatening those countries with financial disaster.(Daniel Ochoa de Olza) |
In this Feb. 1, 2011 file photo, people queue outside an unemployment office in Madrid. Spain’s Labor Ministry says the number of people filing claims for unemployment benefits fell by 42,059 in July as the summer tourism season provided new jobs. The ministry said Tuesday, Aug. 2, 2011 that July’s fall was the fourth straight monthly decline. It left the number receiving benefits at 4.08 million, down from 4.12 million the previous month. (Arturo Rodriguez, File) |
Lawmakers crowd the Parliament as Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi addresses the lower chamber on the state of the economy in Rome, Wednesday, Aug. 3, 2011. Berlusconi said economic growth is his government’s key policy aim. After a volatile day on markets, in which Italian borrowing rates touched a record high, Berlusconi told parliament that Italy “has not done little” in response to the crisis, but that it needs to do more. He says Italy needs to promote competitiveness and growth. |
A beggar, his body covered with white paint, walks along a street in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Saturday, March 5, 2011. (Ramon Espinosa) |
A nearly deserted atrium of the European Council is pictured in Brussels, Monday, Aug. 8, 2011. European have always valued their vacations, and their leaders are no exception. With modern communications, the leaders say they remain constantly in touch. So do their vacations matter? One financial analyst says yes: “It sends a terrible message to the markets … in the middle of a crisis.” (Yves Logghe) |
Pensioners gather in a protest against the government’s austerity measures, Thursday, Aug. 25 2011, outside the prime minister’s official residence in Lisbon. Portugal’s European partners and the International Monetary Fund lent it the money to prevent the country going bankrupt but in return demanded a long list of spending cuts and economic reforms. Poster hanging from the umbrella reads “The government lied to the pensioners”. (Armando Franca) |
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, left, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, right, attend a meeting at the Elysee Palace, Paris, Tuesday, Aug. 16, 2011. The leaders of Germany and France are meeting Tuesday to discuss Europe’s debt crisis as new figures show their economies stalled even before the latest bout of turmoil struck financial markets. (Patrick Kovarik, Pool) |
A traveller smokes next to a beggar outside a public office in central Athens on Thursday, Aug. 11, 2011. Greece’s Statistical Authority says unemployment in the debt-ridden country jumped to 16.6 percent in May.The number of jobless stands at 822,719 in the country of about 11 million people. The graffiti reads “pigs, murderes” and “burn the parliament”. (Dimitri Messinis) |
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, left, speaks during a special meeting on the financial crisis with head of the French Central Bank Christian Noyer, right, Finance Minister Francois Baroin, second from right, and Prime Minister Francois Fillon, third from right, at the Elysee Palace in Paris, Wednesday Aug. 10, 2011. Sarkozy is interrupted his vacation to hold an emergency government meeting about the uncertainty on world financial markets. (Denis/Pool) |
![]() A view of Milan’s stock exchange headquarters is seen, Monday, July 11, 2011. Finance ministers gathered in Brussels are debating how to secure a private-sector contribution to a new Greek package and how to prevent the debt crisis spreading to bigger countries, including Italy. (Antonio Calanni) |
E.U. and Stock Exchange’s flags fly outside the building of the Greek Stock Exchange in Athens, Friday, Aug. 5, 2011. The eurozone’s debt crisis battered markets once again Friday, challenging vacationing European leaders to find a way to keep the turmoil from pushing Spain and Italy to a financial collapse that would hit an already-waning global recovery. (Thanassis Stavrakis) |
A woman holding a handkerchief to her face to protect herself from lingering tear gas passes by an elderly beggar while, in the background, two workers replace broken hotel windows in central Athens on Thursday, June 30, 2011. Rioters caused extensive property damage during anti-government protests Wednesday while police riposted with heavy use of chemicals. (Dimitri Messinis) |
A tourist with her luggage enters a luxury hotel in central Athens as protesters demonstrate on Tuesday, Aug. 23, 2011. Dozens of protesters have been picketing the entrance to three luxury hotels on Athens’ main Syntagma Square as part of a 24-hour strike by hotel employees objecting to plans to cut their entitlement to early retirement. The banner on the left reads in Greek “Hands off” the ‘arduous and unhealthy’ classification of professions. (Petros Giannakouris) |
Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DCSource |
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where high level meetings were held in a last attempt to save Lehman Brothers, is photographed August 25, 2009. A failed plan to rescue Lehman Brothers was followed Sunday by more seismic shocks from Wall Street, including an apparent government-brokered takeover of Merrill Lynch by the Bank of America. (Cryptome) Below, Board Room of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
|
Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, left, talks with Greek President Karolos Papoulias during their meeting in Athens, on Friday, July 22, 2011. Eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund pledged Thursday to give Greece a euro 109 billion ($155 billion) worth of rescue funds, on top of the euro 110 billion granted more than a year ago. (Petros Giannakouris) |
People walk past a prostrate beggar at the entrance to the Syntagma Square metro station in central Athens, Thursday, Aug. 11, 2011. Greece’s Statistical Authority says unemployment in the debt-ridden country jumped to 16.6 percent in May.The number of jobless stands at 822,719 in the country of about 11 million people. (Dimitri Messinis) |
Pedestrians walk past the New York Stock Exchange on Friday, Aug. 5, 2011 in New York. Fears that the economy might dip back into recession helped send the Dow Jones industrial average down 513 points on Thursday. European leaders are struggling to contain that region’s debt problems, prompting comparisons to the 2008 financial crisis. Markets tumbled from Tokyo to London Friday as overseas traders reacted to the selloff. (Jin Lee) |
Political protest at the New York Stock Exchange, August 20, 2007. (Cryptome) |
Rep. Jason Chaffetz, R-Utah, sponsor of the “Cut, Cap and Balance” deficit reduction plan that was passed in the GOP-controlled House, walks through the Capitol to get an update from the Senate on debt negotiations, in Washington, Sunday, July 31, 2011. (J. Scott Applewhite) |
A beggar boy and a beggar rest near an entrance of a pedestrian underpass near Beijing’s Central Business District, China, Thursday, April 28, 2011. (Alexander F. Yuan) |
A launching ceremony of the Severodvinsk nuclear-powered submarine is held at a defense shipyard in the Arctic port of Severodvinsk, Russia, Tuesday, June 15, 2010. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev attended the ceremony in Severodvinsk. (RIA-Novosti, Vladimir Rodionov, Presidential Press Service) |
A beggar asks for donations in front of the synagogue in Novi Sad, some 80 kilometers (50 miles) north of Belgrade, Serbia, Tuesday, May 18, 2011. (Darko Vojinovic) |
Citigroup Center, New York, NY. (Cryptome)![]() |
“SPIEGEL” über die STASI-Connection des mutmasslichen “GoMoPa”-Chefs Jochen Resch
“DIE WELT” ÜBER DIE DIFFAMIERUNGSMETHODEN DER STASI – VORBILD FÜR “GoMoPa”
EHRE WEM EHRE GEBUEHRT: “DIE PISSNELKEN DES JAHRZEHNTS – GoMoPa UND PARTNER”
VORSICHT SATIRE –
Liebe Leser,
normalerweise bin ich kein Freund von “starken Worten und Auszeichnungen”.
Doch diesmal muss es sein.
Eindeutig zu den “Pisssnelken des Jahrzehnts” haben sich die selbsternannten “Scheisshausfliegen” von dem selbsternannten “Nachrichtendienst” “GoMoPa” und deren mutmassliche Auftraggeber “RA Resch, RA SchulteSchulte, Gerd Bennewirtz und Peter Ehlers” durchgekämpft.
Der “Pissnelken – Jahrzehnt-Preis” vorher ging an Erich Mielke und Erich Honecker.
Im Jahrzehnt davor an “Mao”.
Meine herzliche Gratulation an die aktuellen “Pissnelken des Jahrzehnts”
Die Preise werden übrigens in SAN QUENTIN verliehen – in Form eines “Goldenen Strahls auf die Preisträger ”
Herzlichst Ihr
Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium
VORSICHT SATIRE –
TOP-SECRET – Saudi defence minister explains targeting of Yemeni rebels with air strikes
247619
S E C R E T RIYADH 000159
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP: JHARRIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2025 U
TAGS: PREL, PINR, SA, YM
SUBJECT: (S) SAUDI ARABIA: RENEWED ASSURANCES ON SATELLITE
IMAGERY
REF: SECSTATE 8892
Classified By: Amb. James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b, c and d)
SUMMARY
——–
1. (S/NF) Ambassador met with Assistant Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince Khaled bin Sultan to relay U.S. concerns about sharing USG imagery with Saudi Arabia in light of evidence that Saudi aircraft may have struck civilian targets during its fighting with the Houthis in northern Yemen.
Prince Khaled described the targeting decision-making process and while not denying that civilian targets might have been hit, gave unequivocal assurances that Saudi Arabia considered it a priority to avoid strikes against civilian targets. Based on the assurances received from Prince Khaled, the Ambassador has approved, as authorized in reftel, the provision of USG imagery of the Yemeni border area to the Saudi Government. End summary.
USG CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE STRIKES ON CIVILIAN TARGETS
——————————————— ———-
2. (S/NF) Ambassador Smith delivered points in reftel to Prince Khaled on February 6, 2010. The Ambassador highlighted USG concerns about providing Saudi Arabia with satellite imagery of the Yemen border area absent greater certainty that Saudi Arabia was and would remain fully in compliance with the laws of armed conflict during the conduct of military operations, particularly regarding attacks on civilian targets. The Ambassador noted the USG’s specific concern about an apparent Saudi air strike on a building that the U.S. believed to be a Yemeni medical clinic. The Ambassador showed Prince Khaled a satellite image of the bomb-damaged building in question.
IF WE HAD THE PREDATOR, THIS MIGHT NOT HAVE HAPPENED
——————————————— ——-
3. (S/NF) Upon seeing the photograph, Prince Khalid remarked, “This looks familiar,” and added, “if we had the Predator, maybe we would not have this problem.” He noted that Saudi Air Force operations were necessarily being conducted without the desired degree of precision, and recalled that a clinic had been struck, based on information received from Yemen that it was being used as an operational base by the Houthis. Prince Khalid explained the Saudi approach to its fight with the Houthis, emphasizing that the Saudis had to hit the Houthis very hard in order to “bring them to their knees” and compel them to come to terms with the Yemeni government. “However,” he said, “we tried very hard not to hit civilian targets.” The Saudis had 130 deaths and the Yemenis lost as many as one thousand. “Obviously,” Prince Khaled observed, “some civilians died, though we wish that this did not happen.”
HOW THE TARGETS WERE SELECTED
—————————–
4. (S/NF) Prince Khaled gave the Ambassador further background, explaining that the targets given to the Saudi Air Force were studied and recommended by a Saudi-Yemeni joint committee headed by Saudi and Yemeni general officers. That joint committee reported to him, and no targets were struck unless they had clearance from this joint committee. “Did they make mistakes? Possibly.” Prince Khaled also reported that the Saudis had problems with some of the targeting recommendations received from the Yemeni side. For instance, there was one occasion when Saudi pilots aborted a strike, when they sensed something was wrong about the information they received from the Yemenis. It turned out that the site recommended to be hit was the headquarters of General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, the Yemeni northern area military commander, who is regarded as a political opponent to President Saleh. This incident prompted the Saudis to be more cautious about targeting recommendations from the Yemeni government.
CEASEFIRE COMING SOON
———————
5. (S/NF) The Ambassador told Prince Khaled that the USG is looking to Saudi Arabia to help bring an end to the Houthi fighting soon. Prince Khaled responded that Saudi Arabia is “looking for ways to end this conflict in a way that fosters good relations.” He said that he met with President Saleh last Wednesday to discuss Houthi ceasefire terms, and they agreed that, so long as the Houthis deliver on the terms they offered, there should be news about a ceasefire “within a week.” As part of the ceasefire arrangements the Yemeni military will be deployed on the Yemeni side of the border to prevent future Houthi incursions into Saudi Arabia. “Then,” Prince Khaled noted, “we can concentrate on Al-Qaida.”
COMMENT
——
6. (S/NF) Prince Khaled, in addressing the Ambassador’s concerns about possible targeting of civilian sites appeared neither defensive nor evasive. He was unequivocal in his assurance that Saudi military operations had been and would continue to be conducted with priority to avoiding civilian casualties. The Ambassador found this assurance credible, all the more so in light of Prince Khaled’s acknowledgment that mistakes likely happened during the strikes against Houthi targets, of the inability of the Saudi Air Force to operate with adequate precision, and the unreliability of Yemeni targeting recommendations. Based on these assurances, the Ambassador has approved, as authorized in reftel, the provision of USG imagery of the Yemeni border area to the Saudi Government. While the fighting with the Houthis appears to be drawing to a close, the imagery will be of continuing value to the Saudi military to monitor and prevent Houthi incursions across the border as well as enhancing Saudi capabilities against Al-Qaeda activities in this area.
SMITH
TOP-SECRET – US government outlines ‘dilemma’ in event of Iraqi crackdown on Iranian dissidents
195061
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000553
NOFORN SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019 TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PINR, PREF, PREL, IZ, IR, US SUBJECT: MEK/CAMP ASHRAF – THE WAY AHEAD
REF: A. BAGHDAD 442 B. BAGHDAD 420 C. BAGHDAD 405 D. BAGHDAD 287 E. BRUSSELS 101 F. BAGHDAD 113 G. 08 BAGHDAD 2658
Classified By: Political Military Minister Counselor Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S/NF) Summary: The Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK) faces a difficult position in Iraq as the GOI has made clear it considers the group a terrorist organization and seeks the closure of the Camp Ashraf facility and the departure of all the residents from Iraq. It plans to prosecute some members of the group for crimes it believes the MEK conducted on behalf of Saddam Hussein’s regime against both Shi’a and Kurds. The GOI is pressing other countries to take the rest of the residents. Camp Ashraf is now under the security responsibility of the GOI, with a small U.S. force in a monitoring role. The GOI has provided written assurances of humane treatment for the residents of Camp Ashraf and has said it will not forcibly deport any member to a country where he or she might face persecution. While the GOI is impatient on this issue and faces considerable pressure from Iran, it is learning that there is no easy or quick solution.
In order to break-up the cult-like nature of the organization, the GOI is threatening to separate the leaders of the organization from the rank and file. Unless done over time and according to careful preparation and planning, this act (or the decision to seek to arrest the leaders) will cause a humanitarian crisis. If the GOI acts harshly against the MEK and provokes a reaction (or the MEK provokes the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)), the USG faces a challenging dilemma: we either protect members of a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) against actions of the ISF and risk violating the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, or we decline to protect the MEK in the face of a humanitarian crisis, thus leading to international condemnation of both the USG and the GOI. In consultation with the Commanding General (CG), Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), our selected course of action is to encourage the GOI to negotiate directly with the MEK, press both sides to exercise restraint, monitor the situation at Camp Ashraf, and further involve international organizations and third country diplomats. End Summary.
———- Background ———-
2. (S/NF) There are currently 3400 individuals, most of them members of the MEK, residing at Camp Ashraf, approximately 90 km Northeast of Baghdad. After being expelled from France, the organization relocated to Iraq in 1986, at the invitation of Saddam Hussein. They established the National Liberation Army (NLA), an approximately 7,000-member force (some estimates suggest it may have been as much as three times larger) who pursued conventional combat against the Iranian regime, sometimes unilaterally, other times in concert with the Iraqi forces, utilizing Iraqi territory as their base. From 1986 until the signing of the Iran-Iraq ceasefire in 1988, the NLA suffered significant casualties, particularly in their last offensive. From that time until 2001, the NLA continued periodic small-scale cross border raids and have defended themselves against corresponding Iranian attacks in Iraqi territory. There are conflicting reports of MEK QIraqi territory. There are conflicting reports of MEK operations conducted against Kurdish factions in the North and Shi’a in the South in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM.
3. (SBU) During the invasion of Iraq by Coalition Forces (CF) in Operation Iraqi Freedom, MEK bases in Iraq were bombed. Several MEK members were killed or wounded during the attacks, but the MEK members were ordered not to return fire, and they did not. The MEK/NLA subsequently signed a cease fire letter on April 15, 2003. Heavy weapons and all light arms were confiscated from the MEK, and the membership of the MEK in Iraq was consolidated from several MEK camps to the main camp at Ashraf. Joint Task Force-134 (TF-134) began to provide security protection for Camp Ashraf and its residents upon the construction of the adjoining Forward Operating Base (FOB) Grizzly.
BAGHDAD 00000553 002 OF 004
4. (S/NF) Because of reports that the MEK had participated in putting down the Kurdish and Shi’a uprisings and have had relations with terrorist organizations, they do not enjoy a large following in Iraq. Likewise, because they had fought alongside Iraqi forces against Iranians, their popular support in Iran is low. They have, however, succeeded (sometimes with monetary incentives) in endearing themselves to the surrounding villages in Diyala Province, providing jobs, water, medical services, and other support.
5. (S/NF) Although the GOI had several times since 2003 called for the expulsion of the Camp Ashraf residents (CAR), the situation came to a head in June 2008. After a large-scale anti-Iranian (and some say anti-Iraqi) political rally was held at Camp Ashraf, the GOI struck back. The Council of Ministers issued a decree that labeled the MEK as an FTO and made it illegal for anyone to do business with the camp. It officially called for expulsion of the group from Iraq.
6. (S/NF) Anticipating the expiration of the UN mandate allowing unilateral action by CF in Iraq, and that protected persons status could no longer be offered to the CAR after December 31, 2008, the USG (Embassy/MNF-I) began preparing for and coordinating with the GOI for the transfer of security responsibility for the camp and its residents. The Embassy asked for and received written assurances of humane treatment for the residents (REF G). In summary, the assurances provide that the residents will be treated humanely in accordance with Iraq’s Constitution, laws and international obligations. They also provide that the Government will not transfer residents to any where they may have reason to fear persecution for their political opinions or religious beliefs or where they may be subject to torture.
7. (S/NF) The GOI has presented its official position on the MEK: they are a terrorist organization, but the members will be treated as individuals. They have been given only two options: repatriate willingly to Iran or to a third country of their choosing.
———– The New Era ———–
8. (S) As of January 1, 2009, the USG no longer accords CAR protected persons status under the Fourth Geneva Convention – a policy position reached by OSD in 2004. Currently, however, 200 U.S. soldiers remain posted near Camp Ashraf (at FOB Grizzly) to monitor and report on the situation at the camp. These forces operate at the invitation of the GOI in accordance with the Security Agreement.
9. (S/NF) On January 1, the USG began a coordinated process of turning security of the camp fully over to the GOI. This process, which included training of the Iraqi Army (IA) battalion (BN) stationed at Camp Ashraf and joint manning of the checkpoints leading into the camp, was completed on February 20.
—————————– GOI Plans with Regard to Camp —————————–
10. (S) An inter-ministerial committee was established by the GOI under the direction of National Security Advisor (NSA) Dr. Mowaffaq al-Rubaie. This committee is studying various options for the CAR (REF B), including:
— Arresting leaders. We know there are currently three active GOI arrest warrants for MEK leaders. There are Qactive GOI arrest warrants for MEK leaders. There are reports of up to 54 MEK members wanted by the Iranian Government (it is unclear how many of these 54 are actually at Camp Ashraf).
— Separating leaders from the rank and file. Rubaie noted that one option being considered was to physically separate the “top 50-100” leaders from the rest of the camp, either within the camp or otherwise.
— Relocating residents to diverse locations far from Iran. Rubaie is studying a proposal to relocate CAR to “two or three” other locations in the Western part of Iraq, “away from the possibility of Iranian attack.”
BAGHDAD 00000553 003 OF 004
11. (S/NF) While the third option is least likely, execution of any of the three is likely to cause a humanitarian crisis. A recent defector revealed plans for limited to large-scale immolations, at Camp Ashraf and abroad, and acts of suicide by at least female leaders should GOI enter the camp to arrest leaders. There are also plans for large demonstrations by CAR to protest any extended GOI presence in the camp. These demonstrations, while intended to be peaceful, could easily grow into a violent confrontation with ISF (REF F). MNF-I rules of engagement (ROE) permit forces to respond to situations in which deadly force is used against unarmed persons.
————————– International Resettlement ————————–
12. (S/NF) More than 1000 of the CAR allege ties to third countries other than Iran. France, Germany, Canada, Australia and the UK make up a majority of the claims. The EU recently de-listed the MEK as an FTO (REF E). As such, we have requested that the Department demarche European capitals (REF D) to urge them to repatriate their nationals; to consider, for humanitarian reasons, renewing refugee status claims; and to allow those with family ties to enter their countries for family reunification purposes.
13. (S/NF) The Iranian Embassy in Baghdad has told the Iraqi Minister of Human Rights that it intends to issue valid passports to all 3400 CAR and send them to Turkey (REF C). Contrary to public statements (REF D), the Iranian Ambassador told the Minister that Iran does not want to repatriate any of the MEK defectors to Iran. ICRC officials told us February 5 that they believed Iran would repatriate former MEK members, but noted there have not been any repatriations since April 2008. The ICRC has noted that they have no reports of persecution of the former MEK members who have returned to Iran, but also admits that its capability to monitor in Iran is extremely limited. Without strict international monitoring, it is likely that few of the 3400 CAR would chose to return to Iran.
———————- Way Ahead Here in Iraq ———————-
14. (S) In conjunction with the MNF-I, our plan is to press the GOI to honor its humanitarian assurances (most recently reaffirmed by PM Maliki on Feb 19 (REF A)). PM Maliki responded he would scrupulously respect the assurances. TF-134 will monitor the camp and continue to facilitate coordination between the CAR and the GOI.
15. (S) The 200 U.S. soldiers at FOB Grizzly will continue to observe and record GOI conduct toward the MEK, as will an Embassy team and international organizations, such as ICRC and UNAMI. The CDA and CG MNF-I will personally protest any violations of humanitarian assurances directly to PM Maliki. Our military forces will not interfere with GOI efforts to arrest leaders, but will seek to prevent mistreatment of civilians, in accordance with CENTCOM ROE. Because U.S. military intervention has the potential to precipitate a crisis in our relationship with the GOI, Embassy and MNF-I will coordinate with the highest levels of the GOI in an effort to prevent such a crisis from developing or escalating. Embassy will also immediately consult with the Department in the event of any confrontation between U.S. and QDepartment in the event of any confrontation between U.S. and Iraqi forces.
16. (S) We will continue to encourage international organizations to remain involved in the MEK situation. The ICRC, admitting to a lack of resources, visited the camp once again February 25. Although the ICRC will not establish a permanent presence at Camp Ashraf, officials say they will continue to monitor the humanitarian situation. The UNHCR has noted its intention to interview the two recent MEK defectors in Baghdad regarding their refugee claims. Representatives of the CAR recently traveled to Baghdad, escorted by IA forces, to meet with UNAMI representatives. It is extremely important for these organizations to assist in finding solutions to the MEK situation.
17. (S/NF) As our role in negotiations between the MEK and
BAGHDAD 00000553 004 OF 004
the GOI has diminished, direct interaction between the GOI and the MEK has increased. Upon our recommendation, MEK leaders have begun to address their concerns directly with GOI authorities rather than to us. Tactical coordination between MEK security forces and the IA BN has produced positive results and has increased the confidence of the MEK on the IA providing security for Camp Ashraf.
18. (S/NF) Since Rubaie’s meeting with Western diplomats January 27 (Ref D), we have engaged the French, British, Canadian, Swedish and Australian Embassies regarding CAR who claim to have ties to their countries. While the French Government has noted its intention not to accept any of the CAR, others are consulting with their governments on the prospect. We will provide support to those embassies that wish to visit their nationals and those who claim former refugee status or to have family ties.
19. (S) We believe this measured and evenhanded approach, coupled with extensive senior leader engagement, will defuse a volatile situation. Nevertheless, we cannot be certain of success. It is impossible to entirely eliminate the possibility that (elements of) the GOI, or the MEK, will instigate a confrontation in spite of our efforts. BUTENIS
“BILD”: Studie zum Tatort Internet :Jeder Dritte wurde schon gemobbt
DIE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG ÜBER DIE “GoMoPA”-KRIMINELLEN – MUTMASSLICHE PARTNER VON “GERD BENNEWIRTZ UND PETER EHLERS”
NYT: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels
TOP-SECRET – US embassy cables: Saudi defence minister explains targeting of Yemeni rebels with air strikes
247619
S E C R E T RIYADH 000159
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP: JHARRIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2025 U
TAGS: PREL, PINR, SA, YM
SUBJECT: (S) SAUDI ARABIA: RENEWED ASSURANCES ON SATELLITE
IMAGERY
REF: SECSTATE 8892
Classified By: Amb. James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b, c and d)
SUMMARY
——–
1. (S/NF) Ambassador met with Assistant Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince Khaled bin Sultan to relay U.S. concerns about sharing USG imagery with Saudi Arabia in light of evidence that Saudi aircraft may have struck civilian targets during its fighting with the Houthis in northern Yemen.
Prince Khaled described the targeting decision-making process and while not denying that civilian targets might have been hit, gave unequivocal assurances that Saudi Arabia considered it a priority to avoid strikes against civilian targets. Based on the assurances received from Prince Khaled, the Ambassador has approved, as authorized in reftel, the provision of USG imagery of the Yemeni border area to the Saudi Government. End summary.
USG CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE STRIKES ON CIVILIAN TARGETS
——————————————— ———-
2. (S/NF) Ambassador Smith delivered points in reftel to Prince Khaled on February 6, 2010. The Ambassador highlighted USG concerns about providing Saudi Arabia with satellite imagery of the Yemen border area absent greater certainty that Saudi Arabia was and would remain fully in compliance with the laws of armed conflict during the conduct of military operations, particularly regarding attacks on civilian targets. The Ambassador noted the USG’s specific concern about an apparent Saudi air strike on a building that the U.S. believed to be a Yemeni medical clinic. The Ambassador showed Prince Khaled a satellite image of the bomb-damaged building in question.
IF WE HAD THE PREDATOR, THIS MIGHT NOT HAVE HAPPENED
——————————————— ——-
3. (S/NF) Upon seeing the photograph, Prince Khalid remarked, “This looks familiar,” and added, “if we had the Predator, maybe we would not have this problem.” He noted that Saudi Air Force operations were necessarily being conducted without the desired degree of precision, and recalled that a clinic had been struck, based on information received from Yemen that it was being used as an operational base by the Houthis. Prince Khalid explained the Saudi approach to its fight with the Houthis, emphasizing that the Saudis had to hit the Houthis very hard in order to “bring them to their knees” and compel them to come to terms with the Yemeni government. “However,” he said, “we tried very hard not to hit civilian targets.” The Saudis had 130 deaths and the Yemenis lost as many as one thousand. “Obviously,” Prince Khaled observed, “some civilians died, though we wish that this did not happen.”
HOW THE TARGETS WERE SELECTED
—————————–
4. (S/NF) Prince Khaled gave the Ambassador further background, explaining that the targets given to the Saudi Air Force were studied and recommended by a Saudi-Yemeni joint committee headed by Saudi and Yemeni general officers. That joint committee reported to him, and no targets were struck unless they had clearance from this joint committee. “Did they make mistakes? Possibly.” Prince Khaled also reported that the Saudis had problems with some of the targeting recommendations received from the Yemeni side. For instance, there was one occasion when Saudi pilots aborted a strike, when they sensed something was wrong about the information they received from the Yemenis. It turned out that the site recommended to be hit was the headquarters of General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, the Yemeni northern area military commander, who is regarded as a political opponent to President Saleh. This incident prompted the Saudis to be more cautious about targeting recommendations from the Yemeni government.
CEASEFIRE COMING SOON
———————
5. (S/NF) The Ambassador told Prince Khaled that the USG is looking to Saudi Arabia to help bring an end to the Houthi fighting soon. Prince Khaled responded that Saudi Arabia is “looking for ways to end this conflict in a way that fosters good relations.” He said that he met with President Saleh last Wednesday to discuss Houthi ceasefire terms, and they agreed that, so long as the Houthis deliver on the terms they offered, there should be news about a ceasefire “within a week.” As part of the ceasefire arrangements the Yemeni military will be deployed on the Yemeni side of the border to prevent future Houthi incursions into Saudi Arabia. “Then,” Prince Khaled noted, “we can concentrate on Al-Qaida.”
COMMENT
——
6. (S/NF) Prince Khaled, in addressing the Ambassador’s concerns about possible targeting of civilian sites appeared neither defensive nor evasive. He was unequivocal in his assurance that Saudi military operations had been and would continue to be conducted with priority to avoiding civilian casualties. The Ambassador found this assurance credible, all the more so in light of Prince Khaled’s acknowledgment that mistakes likely happened during the strikes against Houthi targets, of the inability of the Saudi Air Force to operate with adequate precision, and the unreliability of Yemeni targeting recommendations. Based on these assurances, the Ambassador has approved, as authorized in reftel, the provision of USG imagery of the Yemeni border area to the Saudi Government. While the fighting with the Houthis appears to be drawing to a close, the imagery will be of continuing value to the Saudi military to monitor and prevent Houthi incursions across the border as well as enhancing Saudi capabilities against Al-Qaeda activities in this area.
SMITH
TOP-SECRET: KEYWORD – WIKILEAKS -INSURANCE – HERE IS THE KEYWORD
BÖRSE ONLINE ÜBER DIE FINGIERTE “GoMoPa” – DIE MUTMASSLICHEN “PARTNER VON GERD BENNEWIRTZ UND PETER EHLERS”
TOP-SECRET: America Eyeballs 3
TSA, Post: To get another view of how sprawling Top Secret America has become, just head west on the toll road toward Dulles International Airport.
As a Michaels craft store and a Books-A-Million give way to the military intelligence giants Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin, find the off-ramp and turn left. Those two shimmering-blue five-story ice cubes belong to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which analyzes images and mapping data of the Earth’s geography. A small sign obscured by a boxwood hedge says so.
Cryptome:
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, 2207 Rockhill Road, Herndon, VA
If NGA is a tenant in the building there is no perimeter security customary for spy agency.
A sign at the entrance, cited by Priest above, is obscured in Google Street view, below, on Innovation Drive.
However, a rental advertisement states there is a SCIF in the facility.
![]() Google Street View ![]() Source ![]() Source
http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ll=38.964022,-77.419882&spn=0.008017,0.013078&t=h&z=17&vpsrc=0 This is misnamed on Google as the George Mason University Executive Programs.
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| TSA, Post: Across the street, in the chocolate-brown blocks, is Carahsoft, an intelligence agency contractor specializing in mapping, speech analysis and data harvesting. Nearby is the government’s Underground Facility Analysis Center. It identifies overseas underground command centers associated with weapons of mass destruction and terrorist groups, and advises the military on how to destroy them. |
Cryptome:http://www.bing.com/maps/?v=2&cp=38.95837031099434~-77.42316203297403&lvl=18&dir=0&sty=h&where1=Dulles%20International%20Airport%2C%20VA&form=LMLTCC
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TOP-SECRET: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 29 August 2011 Inside
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Dust-sampling Opening of Reactor Building of Unit 1, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station pictured on August 28, 2011. Released August 30, 2011 by TEPCO. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) |
Dust-sampling Opening of Reactor Building of Unit 2, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station pictured on August 29, 2011. Released August 30, 2011 by TEPCO. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) |
Checking inside of the reactor containment vessel of Unit 4, Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station. Opening an airlock door for workers. Pictured on August 29, 2011. Released August 30, 2011 by TEPCO. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) |
TOP-SECRET: THE WIKILEAKS “INSURANCE” FILES UNVEILED HERE
| Step right up, step right up and grab your WikiLeaks insurance file! #wikileaks #cablegate | http://insurance.aes256.orgOnly some people know what this mysterious file is, because it’s been encoded with the AES256 Top Secret encryption software, but they know its name, “INSURANCE”.IT’S ONE POINT FOUR GIGABYTES OF INFORMATION, and the mystery and intrigue deepens with theorist and hacker alike having a stab at guessing the content or slow munching the code breaking chores, respectively.
Several hours since the revelation, and the internet’s sorta lit up just now like a big gormless-looking energy-saving light bulb. The implication is, the key has not been released but you can rest asssured that the people who this is directed at have already applied their Top Secret key to it. They already know what it contains. And that’s the bit I don’t like, where TRUTH & JUSTICE become yet another bargaining chip in a complex game of cat and mouse between poker players, excuse that all sortsa mixed metaphoria. I’ll obsessively update this post with any findings, or news of any released ENCRYPTION key. Or word from Assange or his team. This, for me, could mean that Assange is in ‘deep negotiation’ with the government somewhere, right now, maybe even under arrest; maybe undergoing rendition.
WikiLeaks has lost control of its full, unredacted cache of a quarter-million US State Dept cables, and this time the leaked files are apparently online. The uncensored cables are contained in a 1.73-GB password-protected file named “cables.csv,” which is reportedly circulating somewhere on the internet, according to Steffen Kraft, editor of Der Freitag. Kraft announced last week that his paper had found the file, and easily obtained the password to unlock it. Unlike the cables that WikiLeaks has been publishing piecemeal since last fall, these cables are raw and unredacted, and contain the names of informants and suspected intelligence agents that were blacked out of the official releases. Der Freitag said the documents include the names of suspected agents in Israel, Jordan, Iran and Afghanistan, and noted that interested parties could have already discovered and decrypted the file to uncover the names of informants. Former WikiLeaks staffer Herbert Snorrason of Iceland, who left the organization as part of a staff revolt last year and is now part of the competing site OpenLeaks, confirmed:
Information about the exposed file and password was also confirmed by Der Spiegel. According to that publication, the cables were contained in an encrypted file that Julian Assange had stored on a subdirectory of the organization’s server last year, which wasn’t searchable from the internet by anyone who didn’t already know its location. Assange had reportedly given the password for the file to an “external contact” to access the file’s contents. With both the file and the password now online, the leak is complete. Snorrason said on Monday:
The password leak was done “completely inadvertently,” Snorrason added. He declined to identify the leaker, or the circumstances of the leak, but said it was someone who was with neither WikiLeaks nor OpenLeaks. When Daniel Domscheit-Berg left WikiLeaks, he took the contents of the WikiLeaks server with him, which included the encrypted file. Last December, Domscheit-Berg returned most of what he had taken, including the file containing the cables. Wikileaks subsequently released an archive of the data that Domscheit-Berg had returned. Among the documents was the encrypted file containing the cables. Several months later, the person to whom Assange had provided the password somehow made it public online. Der Spiegel doesn’t elaborate on precisely why or how that person published the password, and Snorrason declined to say more, for fear of guiding people to the password. Snorrason said:
Both the encrypted file and password went unnoticed until recently. Der Spiegel implies that Domscheit-Berg was responsible for calling Der Freitag’s attention to the file and password. Domscheit-Berg did not respond to an e-mail query on Monday. WikiLeaks abruptly opened the spigot last week on its cable publications, spewing out over 130,000 by Monday afternoon, more than half the total database. WikiLeaks responded to the leak on Twitter on Monday by writing:
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TOP-SECRET: US embassy cables: Mashaei groomed as possible successor to Ahmadinejad in Iran
Cable dated:2010-01-28T14:32:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000023
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/28
TAGS: PGOV, IR, PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN: Ahmadinejad Ally Mashaei Lightning Rod for Criticism
CLASSIFIED BY: Charles Pennypacker, Consular Officer, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: President Ahmadinejad’s relationship with his Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei has become a source of aggravation for Ahmadinejad’s hardline supporters and an easy target for his political opponents. Mashaei has a long history of missteps and provocative comments, most recently a January 10 speech that critics blasted for contravening Islamic principles. In response to this latest affront, critics from across the political spectrum have derided Mashaei’s intrusion into religious matters, and hardliners in particular beseeched the president to dump his oft-beleaguered sidekick – to no avail. Ahmadinejad has defended Mashaei through several contentious episodes dating to his first term, and his refusal to remove Mashaei has inspired confusion and derision. As an IRPO contact recently observed, Ahmadinejad’s attachment to Mashaei may reflect that the president has a very limited number of trusted lieutenants, Mashaei among them. END SUMMARY.
Background
2. (SBU) Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei first became embroiled in controversy during Ahmadinejad’s first term, when he served as Vice President for Cultural Heritage and Tourism and also headed Iran’s Tourism Organization. As part of a 2005 economic conference in Turkey he attended a cultural ceremony featuring female dancers. A video of Mashaei at the ceremony surfaced a year later and was broadcast on state media, sparking criticism that Mashaei violated Islamic principles by watching women dance. Subsequently, in July 2008 Mashaei elicited broad criticism by deeming Iran a friend of the Israeli people. In the face of fierce criticism, Mashaei reiterated his remarks, prompting a campaign to remove him. Ahmadinejad, however, publically backed Mashaei.
3. (SBU) Instead, after his 2009 reelection, Ahmadinejad elevated Mashaei to First Vice President. A mix of Ahmadinejad’s conservative detractors and supporters collectively denounced the promotion, citing Mashaei’s abovementioned transgressions as well as concerns about his unorthodox religious beliefs. Many in Ahmadinejad’s base of support demanded that he retract the order. The opposition to Mashaei, and Ahmadinejad’s refusal to acquiesce, eventually compelled Supreme Leader Khamenei to send a letter to Ahmadinejad demanding Mashaei’s removal. Incredibly, Ahmadinejad relented only after state media publicized the letter several days later amid warnings that Ahmadinejad must heed Khamenei’s wishes. In the face of the Supreme Leader’s opposition to Mashaei, Ahmadinejad made Mashaei his Chief of Staff, prompting official IRGC media organs to castiage Ahmadinejad for ignoring the spirit if not the letter of Khamenei’s guidance.
Biography
4. (SBU) Mashaei was born in 1960 in Ramsar and attended Esfahan Industrial University, where he studied electrical engineering. The origins of his relationship with Ahmadinejad are unclear, though a Fars News Agency account says they met when Ahmadinejad was governor of the city of Khoi in the late 1980s and Mashaei was serving in the Intelligence Ministry. (NOTE: Mashaei’s daughter married Ahmadinejad’s son in 2008. END NOTE.) In addition to his past work in the Intelligence Ministry, Mashaei’s website lists several other official jobs:
– General Manager for Social Affairs, Interior Ministry
– Manager, Payam Radio Station
– Manager, Tehran Radio Station
– Deputy for Social Affairs and Culture, Tehran Municipality
DUBAI 00000023 002 OF 003
– Director, Iran Tourism Organization
5. (SBU) Mashaei’s website also lists the various posts he currently holds in the Ahmadinejad government beyond his role as chief of staff:
– Director, Center for Study of Globalization
– President’s Deputy, Supreme Council for Iranians Abroad
– Member, Government Cultural Committee
– President’s Representative, Council Overseeing IRIB
– Member, Government Economic and Cultural Committee
6. (SBU) Ahmadinejad’s stubborn defense of Mashaei bespeaks his importance as a key advisor for the increasingly isolated president; he also has emerged as a spokesman for the Ahmadinejad administration. Ahmadinejad has even told press that he would gladly serve as Vice-President in a Mashaei administration, prompting many to speculate that Ahmadinejad seeks to have Mashaei replace him in 2013.
A Political Punching Bag
7. (C) Since his installation as Chief of Staff, Mashaei has attracted far more attention for his ‘unofficial’ comments about religion, bearing out the earlier whispers that the opposition to Mashaei stemmed from his unorthodox religious views. An IRPO contact last summer said many clerics were concerned by Mashaei’s belief in the imminent return of the Twelfth Imam and by the intrusion of a layman into religious matters. During Ahmadinejad’s second term Mashaei has repeatedly stoked withering criticism by airing his religious views – and, in doing so, provided great fodder too for the president’s political foes.
8. (C) The criticism of Mashaei, and Ahmadinejad by association, is both real and opportunistic. Ahmadinejad’s hardline backers bristle at Mashaei’s presence in his government and time again beseech him to dump him. Kayhan Newspaper in November responded to a Mashaei assertion that ‘God is not the axis of unity among men’ by arguing that his comments contravene Islam and other religions and suggesting to Ahmadinejad that the government, the people of Iran, and the president himself would all be better off without Mashaie. The IRGC newspaper Sobh-e Sadegh a week later sent Ahmadinejad the same message-that he should abandon Mashaei.
9. (C) On January 10 during a university speech Mashaei invited derision by denigrating past prophets’ management ability. According to BBC Farsi, Mashaei pointed out that the prophet Noah (there are many prophets in Islam) lived for 950 years and even in that time was not able to establish ‘justice,’ thus creating the need for more prophets. A clerical supporter responded by complaining that Mashaei’s presence on the Ahmadinejad government causes much pain for the president’s supporters. Kayhan followed suit and carried an article mocking Mashaei and asking that he stay out of such matters. Ahmadinejad’s brother Davud, the former head of the president’s office of inspection, accused Mashaei of saying “absurd” things to keep the system busy and to prevent progress towards Khomeini’s goals. He mockingly implied that Mashaei’s only ‘accomplishment’ is his friendship with Hooshang Amir Ahmadi. (COMMENT: Davud Ahmadinejad, who resigned his position as in August 2008, reportedly did so due to disagreements with his brother regarding Mashaei. END COMMENT.)
DUBAI 00000023 003 OF 003
10. (SBU) Ahmadinejad’s opponents use the president’s relationship with Mashaei for mockery and to score political points. Numerous IRPO contacts have related well known anecdotes about Mashaei’s religious views and firm belief in the imminent return of the Twelfth Imam. Among them is the political ‘urban myth’ in Tehran that Ahmadinejad’s devotion to Mashaei is said to stem from his belief that Mashaei is in fact in direct contact with the Twelfth Imam. According to these rumors, Mashaei allegedly occasionally enters a trance-like state to communicate with the Twelfth Imam or will sometimes randomly say ‘hello’ to no one at all and then explain that the Twelfth Imam just passed by.
11. (SBU) On January 17 the moderate website ‘Ayande News’ carried an article about a meeting between Ahmadinejad and his supporters in which he defended Mashaei and referred to him as ‘Ohleeah ollah’, a title reserved for Islam’s most revered. Afterwards, the meeting’s organizer compared the relationship of Ahmadinejad and Mashaei to that of a ‘disciple and a mystic master.’ The oppositionist website ‘Rah-e Sabz’ has carried innumerable derogatory stories about Mashaei, among them allegations that Mashaei has assisted in the sale of Iranian antiquities outside of the country and that Mashaei’s family members have received jobs at the state-owned carmaker Saipa.
12. (SBU) The recent attacks on Mashaei seemingly culminated with reports of Mashaei’s resignation. On January 20, for example, the website ‘Khabar Online’ (affiliated with Majlis Speaker Larijani) published rumors that Mashaei would soon resign his position. The report cited a Majlis member who said that he regarded Mashaei as a “spent force.” However, Mashaei that day denied the reports of his resignation and the protests continued. BBC Farsi on January 27 reported that a Majlis faction aligned with traditional conservatives, the ‘Front of the Followers of the Line of the Imam and the Supreme Leader,’ sent Ahmadinejad a letter asking him to remove Mashaei.
13. (C) COMMENT: Mashaei’s presence in the Ahmadinejad government and the criticism he elicits illustrates some of the ongoing factional divisions in Tehran. That Larijani and other more moderate principlists use Mashaei to badger Ahmadinejad is not surpising; these camps have been jockeying for position since the 2005 presidential election campaign. More interesting is the criticism from Ahmadinejad’s hardline supporters. These hardliners still rely on the traditional clergy for a patina of Islamic legitimacy, and the clerical class’ near universal distaste for Mashaei’s version of Islam contributes to the hardline animosity to Ahmadinejad. To date, the criticism of Mashaei has stopped short of attacking Ahmadinejad directly, but his backers seem increasingly weary of Mashaei’s antics and Ahmadinejad’s patience for them. Ahmadinejad, who reportedly believes Mashaei is merely misunderstood, seems doggedly determined to retain his chief of staff even in the face of protests from his base. It was only with Khamenei’s direct intervention that Ahmadinejad grudgingly retracted Mashaei’s elevation to first vice president; it seems that to depose Mashaei, his critics may need to enlist the Supreme Leader once again. END COMMMENT. EYRE
TOP-SECRET: Israel sees Iran’s uranium enrichment as ‘point of no return’
Thursday, 17 March 2005, 14:58
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001593
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/14/2015
TAGS PARM, PREL, MNUC, KNNP, EU, IR, IS, GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
REF: STATE 26053
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D).
Summary
- Israel urges international pressure on Tehran but worries US may move towards a less tough EU position. Israel is aware that it will be harder to destroy Iranian nuclear sites than it was Iraq’s reactor in 1981. Expects Iran to hit back at coalition forces in Iraq and the Gulf and launch terrorist attacks. Key passage highlighted in yellow.
- Read related article
1. (S) SUMMARY: Israel sees Iran as the primary threat to its security and sees the enrichment cycle as the “point of no return” for Tehran’s nuclear weapons program. The GOI believes that diplomatic pressure with teeth, such as sanctions, can affect Iranian behavior, and is lobbying the EU-3 and IAEA on details of a permanent suspension agreement. The Israelis support a unified international front but are concerned that the USG may move toward the EU position. Despite the GOI‘s focus on the diplomatic track, public and private speculation about possible Israeli air strikes continues. In weighing the military options, the GOI is aware of significant differences from its successful strike against Iraq’s nuclear program in 1981, including an uncertain and dispersed target set, the presence of coalition forces in Iraq and the Gulf, Iranian capabilities to retaliate through Hizballah and terrorism, and the changed strategic environment. END SUMMARY.
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The Iranian Threat, “Point of No Return,” and Timelines
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2. (S) PM Sharon calls Iran “the main threat to Israel” and has recently expressed concern that some states are “getting used to” the idea of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. Other senior Israeli officials echo this, cautioning that Tehran’s nuclear weapons program poses what Mossad Chief Meir Dagan calls an “existential threat” that alters the strategic balance in the region.
3. (C) In a meeting with congressional visitors in December, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz described operation of the enrichment cycle as the “point of no return” for the Iranian program, a view shared by many senior GOI officials. Mossad Chief Dagan went a step further, saying that the Iranian program will be unstoppable once it no longer requires outside assistance to complete the enrichment process. At the technical level, the director for external affairs at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) told poloff that the critical step would be Iran’s operation of a centrifuge enrichment cascade.
4. (S) GOI officials have given different timelines for when they believe Iran will have full enrichment capability. In February, PM Sharon told the Secretary that he believes there is still time remaining to pressure Iran, but that the window of opportunity is closing quickly. DefMin Mofaz cautioned that Iran is “less than one year away,” while the head of research in military intelligence estimated that Iran would reach this point by early 2007. Technical experts at the IAEC predicted that Iran would have enrichment capability within six months of the end of the suspension agreement. A few GOI officials admitted informally that these estimates need to be taken with caution. The head of the MFA’s strategic affairs division recalled that GOI assessments from 1993 predicted that Iran would possess an atomic bomb by 1998 at the latest.
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Focus on Diplomacy and Concern with the EU-3
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5. (S) In the near term, Israel is focused on maintaining diplomatic pressure on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and EU-3. Sharon defines diplomatic pressure to include UNSC sanctions, e.g. on Iran’s airlines and trade, as noted below. President Katsav has said that Tehran is “very conscious of international opinion.” Other MFA and NSC officials point to the current suspension and to Iranian reaction to the Mykonos case as proof that diplomatic pressure can affect decision-making in Tehran.
6. (S) The Israelis often express disappointment with EU-3 efforts, but see no real alternative at this time. PM Sharon told reporters on March 10 that Iran uses the negotiations to “play for time.” In private, Sharon, his Cabinet, and military leaders have all complained that the Europeans are “too soft.” Similarly, President Katsav has cautioned that Iran will “cheat” on any commitments it makes. MFA staff told poloff that they do not believe that the EU-3 effort will be successful in obtaining a permanent suspension or that the Europeans will support effective sanctions against Iran.
7. (C) GOI technical experts said they have been lobbying the Europeans and IAEA on several issues. First, the GOI would like a clearer and more detailed listing of all activities covered by the suspension, along with timelines for each step. Second, they want more robust verification measures and greater focus on Iran’s denial of access to IAEA inspectors. Third, the Israelis insist that any final agreement must be endorsed by the UNSC to ensure that noncompliance will be dealt with at an appropriate level. Fourth, Israel is pushing the EU-3 to define benchmarks that would signal a failure of the process, and to identify the concrete consequences of such failure.
8. (C) According to the IAEC, the GOI has urged the Europeans to examine bilateral or EU sanctions with small, but noticeable, economic impacts. After telling the press on March 10 that “it would probably not be advisable to impose an oil embargo on Iran,” PM Sharon advocated trade and flight restrictions. Lower-level GOI officials said these steps could include restrictions on Iranians studying in Europe, limitations on travel by Iranian scientific personnel, and suspension of landing privileges for Iranian airlines within the EU. The goal, according to the deputy NSA for foreign affairs, is unified pressure from the EU, Russia, and U.S. for a “complete, full, verifiable cessation of the fuel cycle program.” In the short term, this means a full suspension of all enrichment, reprocessing, heavy-water-reactor construction, and related R&D activities.
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Israeli Preference for USG and UNSC Involvement
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9. (C) In light of their uneasiness with EU-3 efforts, the Israelis are hoping for robust U.S. involvement and action by the UNSC. PM Sharon has urged the EU-3 to continue its efforts, but also stressed the importance of preparing to take Iran to the UNSC. In a meeting with a CoDel on December 12, DefMin Mofaz pushed for the U.S. to take the lead with the Europeans and pursue all diplomatic solutions, including sanctions. President Katsav asked the Secretary not to “wait for the Europeans.”
10. (C) This desire for U.S. activity is amplified by the extremely limited options open to Israel on the diplomatic front. The IAEC’s director for non-proliferation admitted that the GOI sees “little we can do” to increase pressure on Iran as long as Tehran abides by the suspension agreement. The MFA’s office director for the Gulf states said that Israel would maintain its low-profile diplomatic activities, such as supplying IAEA members with intelligence material related to the Iranian program. She said the MFA believes that any overt Israeli pressure would backfire, leading to a surge of Arab support for Iran and focusing attention on Israel’s own nuclear activities.
11. (C) Following the recent announcements on Iran by the President and the Secretary, several Israeli officials asked if the USG is shifting its policy on Iran. The deputy NSA for foreign affairs acknowledged that the U.S. move is probably necessary to build international consensus for taking Iran to the UNSC. At the same time, he expressed concern that the USG would be influenced by what he called the EU’s habit of granting concessions to Iran prior to full compliance. Mid-level staffers at the NSC and IAEC were also disquieted by U.S. press reports claiming that the USG is re-examining its position on Hizballah.
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The Military Option: Bushehr is not Osirak
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12. (S) Despite frustrations with diplomatic efforts, Israeli officials are understandably reluctant to discuss possible military options. In public, PM Sharon has stressed the importance of the “political and economic” track. During a recent discussion with a visiting USG official, IDF Deputy Chief of Staff (and CoS-designate) Major General Dani Haloutz similarly said “we don’t want to go there.” In February, President Katsav told the Secretary that “the military option is not necessary — bring the issue to the Security Council.”
13. (S) Public speculation about possible military strikes usually focuses on the differences from the Israeli Air Force’s attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981. In private, GOI officials have acknowledged that several factors would make any attack against Iran a much more difficult mission. A senior military intelligence official told the Embassy that the GOI does not know where all of the targets are located and said that any attack would only delay, not end, the Iranian program. The MFA’s office director for the Gulf states noted that potential target sites are well dispersed throughout the country, with several located in built-up civilian areas. The IAEC stressed the importance of Russian assistance in restraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions and said that any attack on Bushehr would likely result in Russian casualties and endanger Moscow’s cooperation.
14. (C) MFA contacts said that the distance to the targets and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and the Gulf raise additional complications. An Israeli assault would necessitate prior coordination with coalition forces in Iraq, they maintained, leaving the USG open to retaliation throughout the Islamic world, especially in Iraq. MFA and NSC officials acknowledged that any attack would also elicit a strong response from Arab states and the Palestinians, effectively freezing the peace process.
15. (C) The Israelis realize that Iran would use any military strike as an excuse to cease cooperation with the EU-3 and the IAEA. In addition, the GOI is acutely aware of Iran’s ability to retaliate, both militarily and through attacks by its regional surrogates. PM Sharon has claimed that Hizballah has 11,000 rockets (and possibly UAVs) capable of reaching Israel from launching sites in Lebanon. The MFA’s office director for the Gulf states said that she believed that Iran would retaliate by inciting terrorist groups in Israel and the Occupied Territories.
16. (C) Current USG, EU-3, and IAEA focus on Iran also creates a situation that differs from 1981, when the Israelis felt that the international community was ignoring the Iraqi threat. Israelis hope that the others will solve the Iranian problem for them, or as Vice PM Shimon Peres has said, “I do not think that the matter of Iran needs to be turned into an Israeli problem — it is a matter of concern for the whole world.”
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Comment: Diplomatic Solution Preferred, but …
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17. (S) COMMENT: The Israelis are focusing on diplomatic channels in the IAEA and EU-3, and appear to have very real concerns about the feasibility of military strikes against the Iranian nuclear program. Nevertheless, the GOI has shown time and again that it will act militarily if it believes that its security is threatened, and the IDF is most certainly keeping contingency plans up to date. The Israeli press reported that in February PM Sharon’s Security Cabinet had given “initial authorization” for an attack on Iran. The press reports cited an unnamed “Israeli security source,” who claimed that the USG would “authorize” an Israeli attack. Post notes that it may not be possible to detect preparations for any military strike. Air defense operations would pose nearly perfect cover for civil defense and Air Force activities preceding any attack. Due to both the extreme sensitivity of the issue and the GOI‘s near inability to prevent leaks, any attack order would be closely held, probably even from many members of PM Sharon’s Cabinet.
18. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The GOI knows that we share its interest in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we should expect continued Israeli lobbying at the highest levels urging the USG to ensure that the EU-3 effort is on track and backed by a solid international front. We will also hear Israeli concerns that the U.S. position may move toward the EU stance. At the same time, we should recognize that Israeli intelligence briefings will understandably focus on worst-case scenarios and may not match current USG assessments.
********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv’s Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department’s Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER
East German Communist Intelligence, STASI…Sponsored the Baader-Meinhof Gang
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East German Communist Intelligence, Stasi…Sponsored the Baader-Meinhof Gang
East German (communist) Intelligence Stasi….Sponsored the Baader-Meinhof Gang…(AKA Red Army Faction, RAF)…Except for all-out-war, the greates… (More) East German (communist) Intelligence Stasi….Sponsored the Baader-Meinhof Gang…(AKA Red Army Faction, RAF)…Except for all-out-war, the greatest threats against US Army Europe (USAREUR) were deadly terrorist’s attacks and spies.
The major terrorist group we faced was the Red Army Faction (RAF). They were violent, lethal and used bombings to try to intimidate us and our government. The Red Army Faction, also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang was one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in the Co
TOP-SECRET – OIG Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was asked to prepare a report of the accountability of CIA officers for performance failures in countering the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, as revealed by earlier congressional hearings. The report was prepared in 2005, but kept secret until August 21 2007.
Responding to congressional pressure, the CIA released a bowdlerized executive summary only, which does not name responsible persons. CIA Director General Hayden and others objected to the release of the report, and Hayden also objects to the report’s recommendation that an Accountability Review Board should be set up to judge the persons responsible for the failures.
A report in searchable text form is here: OIG Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks. Actually the report itself, or what we can see of it, is pretty mild, considering the magnitude and inexplicability of many of the failures. While the report focuses on “little issues” like poor CIA-FBI cooperation and various tactical failures, it doesn’t consider the larger question of why radical Islamist terrorism in general, and Al-Qaeda in particular, was not ringing alarm bells everywhere. The report does ask why CIA Director Tenet didn’t formulate a plan to eliminate Al-Qaeda. A better question is why neither Tenet or nor anyone in the executive office of two administrations was not treating the threat as a war. After all, Bin-Laden had threatened to destroy the United States in his Fatwas, and Al-Qaeda had already carried out attacks in the SS Cole and on US embassies. Here was a clearly hostile enemy who was not making empty threats. The problem could be seen by anyone who looked, without the need for special intelligence information. Yet the issue was shunted aside.
The great failure perhaps was not the failure of George Tenet. A CIA director is not supposed to formulate policy. The great failure was the failure of the executive branch, which failed to identify a clear and present danger, and to put into operation an emergency plan to deal with it.
Read the full report and draw your own conclusions:
This document describing the unreadiness of the CIA for the attacks of 9-11 was prepared in June of 2005 by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the CIA . The CIA decided to keep the document secret. At length in August of 2007, the executive report portion of the document was released.
An article by Mark Mazetti in the The New York Times of August 21, summarized some of the findings:
A report released Tuesday by the Central Intelligence Agency includes new details of the agency’s missteps before the Sept. 11 attacks, outlining what the report says were failures to grasp the role being played by the terror mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and to assess fully the threats streaming into the C.I.A. in the summer of 2001.
The 19-page report, prepared by the agency’s inspector general, also says 50 to 60 C.I.A. officers knew of intelligence reports in 2000 that two of the Sept. 11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hamzi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, may have been in the United States. But none of those officers thought to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation about the potential domestic threat, the report says, evidence of what it calls a systemic failure.
The inspector general recommended that several top agency officials, including former director George J. Tenet, be held accountable for their failure to put in place a strategy to dismantle Al Qaeda in the years before Sept. 11, 2001. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, the current C.I.A. director, and his predecessor, Porter J. Goss, have declined to seek disciplinary action against Mr. Tenet and others named in the report.
The report was not a spontaneous review initiated by the CIA. It begins “
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requested that the CIA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) review the findings of their Joint Inquiry (JI) Report and undertake whatever additional investigations were necessary to determine whether any Agency employees were deserving of awards for outstanding service provided before the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), or should be held accountable for failure to perform their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner.
In other words, the legislative bodies had found problems in the functioning of the CIA, and requested the CIA to take appropriate corrective measures. The refusal to seek disciplinary action against CIA officers by the head of the CIA is therefore significant.
The summary also notes that “
(U) The Accountability Review Team assembled by the Inspector General (IG) focused exclusively on the issues identified by the JI. The IG was not asked by the Congress to conduct a comprehensive review of the capabilities and functioning of the Agency’s many components involved with counterterrorism programs, and the Team did not do so. As a result, this account does not document the many successes of the Agency and its officers at all levels (including many whose actions are discussed in this report) in the war on terrorism, both before and after 9/11.
(U) Similarly, because this report was designed to address accountability issues, it does not include recommendations relating to the systemic problems that were identified. Such systemic recommendations as were appropriate to draw from this review of the events of the pre-9/11 period have been forwarded separately to senior Agency managers. In its regular program of audits, investigations, and inspections, the OIG continues to review the counterterrorism programs and operations of the Agency, identifying processes that work well and those that might be improved.
The team notes that it used a “reasonable person” approach, that is, to determine if actions taken were responsible or negligent based on what a reasonable person would do. The results of this approach are sometimes peculiar. For example, the Team decided, in contradiction to congress, that the use of foreign liaison and walk-in (volunteer) “assets” by the CIA was not excessive. But then they decide that the CIA officials were not to blame for failures, because the failures were due to the lack of cooperation or limited operation provided by such assets and liaisons.
The problems that allowed 9-11 to happen would seem to be much deeper than personal failures, or even “systemic failures” related to CIA-FBI cooperation. The FBI and the CIA had been tracking Al-Qaeda for years. Inexplicably, they failed to do so at the crucial time. They are also indicative of a larger conceptual failure in understanding the Middle East, and in allocating the necessary intelligence and diplomatic resources. (See comment on the role of the CIA and FBI in the 9-11 failure).
An important recommendation of the report:
Concerning certain issues, the Team concluded that the Agency and its officers did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. As a result, the Inspector General recommends that the Director, Central Intelligence Agency establish an Accountability Board made up of individuals who are not employees of the Agency to review the performance of some individuals and assess their potential accountability.
General Hayden objects to creation of such a board. No agency likes to have external oversight.
The first page of the released report is numbered Roman Numeral v. We have tried to keep the formatting as close to the original as reasonably possible. The report has numerous areas that were whited out by the censor. These are indicated herein by XXXXXXXXXX. They include names of operatives, foreign liaisons, amounts of money and other information.
Ami Isseroff
9-11 Project at MidEastWeb: 9-11 Commission Report: Whitewash as a public service 9-11 commission report OIG Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attack Osama Bin Laden Fatwa of 1998 Osama Bin Laden Statement on Afghanistan War Inside Al-Qaeda Who is Osama Bin Laden? – Fatwa of 1996 (Declaration of war) Terrorist threat greater than before 9-11
Notice – Copyright
This introduction is copyright 2007 by MidEastWeb Middle East http://www.mideastweb.org and the author. Please tell your friends about MidEastWeb and link to this page. Please do not copy this page to your Web site. You may print this page out for classroom use provided that this notice is appended, and you may cite this material in the usual way. Other uses by permission only. The source material below is placed in the public domain and is free of copy restrictions. Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/Executive%20Summary_OIG%20Report.pdf
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(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requested that the CIA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) review the findings of their Joint Inquiry (JI) Report and undertake whatever additional investigations were necessary to determine whether any Agency employees were deserving of awards for outstanding service provided before the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), or should be held accountable for failure to perform their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner.
(U) The Accountability Review Team assembled by the Inspector General (IG) focused exclusively on the issues identified by the JI. The IG was not asked by the Congress to conduct a comprehensive review of the capabilities and functioning of the Agency’s many components involved with counterterrorism programs, and the Team did not do so. As a result, this account does not document the many successes of the Agency and its officers at all levels
(including many whose actions are discussed in this report) in the war on terrorism, both before and after 9/11.
(U) Similarly, because this report was designed to address accountability issues, it does not include recommendations relating to the systemic problems that were identified. Such systemic recommendations as were appropriate to draw from this review of the events of the pre-9/11 period have been forwarded separately to senior Agency managers. In its regular program of audits, investigations, and inspections, the OIG continues to review the counterterrorism programs and operations of the Agency, identifying processes that work well and those that might be improved.
(U) After conducting its review, the Inspector General Team reports that, while its findings differ from those of the JI on a number of matters, it reaches the same overall conclusions on most of the important issues.
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Concerning certain issues, the Team concluded that the Agency and its officers did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. As a result, the Inspector General recommends that the Director, Central Intelligence Agency establish an Accountability Board made up of individuals who are not employees of the Agency to review the performance of some individuals and assess their potential accountability.
(U) In its deliberations, the Team used a “reasonable person” approach and relied on Agency regulations-which are subjective-concerning standards of accountability. A discussion of those regulations is included in the Foreword. While the Team found that many officers performed their responsibilities in an exemplary fashion, it did not recommend individuals for additional recognition because these officers already have been rewarded.
(U) The Team found no instance in which an employee violated the law, and none of the errors discussed herein involves misconduct. Rather, the review focuses on areas where individuals did not perform their duties in a satisfactory manner; that is, they did not-with regard to the specific issue or issues discussed-act “in accordance with a reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence,” as required by Agency regulation. On occasion, the Team has found that a specific officer was responsible for a particular action or lack of action, but has not recommended that an Accountability Board review the officer’s performance. Such a conclusion reflects the Team’s view that extenuating circumstances mitigate the case.
(U) The findings of greatest concern are those that identify systemic problems where the Agency’s programs or processes did not work as they should have, and concerning which a number of persons were involved or aware, or should have been. Where the Team found systemic failures, it has recommended that an Accountability Board assess the performance and accountability of those managers who, by virtue of their position and authorities, might reasonably have been expected to oversee and correct the process. In general, the fact that failures were systemic should not absolve responsible officials from accountability.
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(U) The Review Team found that Agency officers from the top down worked hard against the al-Qa’ida and Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) targets. They did not always work effectively and cooperatively, however. The Team found neither a “single point of failure” nor a “silver bullet” that would have enabled the Intelligence Community (IC) to predict or prevent the 9/11 attacks. The Team did find, however, failures to implement and manage important processes, to follow through with operations, and to properly share and analyze critical data. If IC officers had been able to view and analyze the full range of information available before 11 September 2001, they could have developed a more informed context in which to assess the threat reporting of the spring and summer that year.
(U) This review focuses only on those findings of the Joint Inquiry that relate to the Central Intelligence Agency. The Team cooperated with the Department of Justice Inspector General and the Kean Commission as they pursued their separate inquiries. For this report, the Team interviewed officers from other agencies who had been detailed to the CIA in the period before 9/11, but did not undertake to interview systematically other officers outside CIA and the IC Management Staff. This report reaches no conclusions about the performance of other agencies or their personnel.
(U) Senior Leadership and Management of the Counterterrorism Effort
(U) The JI concluded that, before 9/11, neither the US Government nor the IC had a comprehensive strategy for combating al-Qa’ida. It charged that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was either unwilling or unable to marshal the full range of IC resources necessary to combat the growing threat to the United States. The OIG Team also found that the IC did not have a documented, comprehensive approach to al-Qa’ida and that the DCI did not use all of his authorities in leading the IC’s strategic effort against UBL.
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(C) The Team found that the DCI was actively and forcefully engaged in the counterterrorism efforts of the CIA. Beginning in 1999, he received regular updates, often daily, on efforts to track and disrupt UBL. He was personally engaged in sounding the alarm about the threat to many different audiences in the policy community, military, Congress, and public, and he worked directly and personally with foreign counterparts to encourage their cooperation.
(S//NF) In December 1998, the DCI signed a memorandum in which he declared: “We are at war.” In addition to directives related to collection programs and other matters, this memorandum stated that the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence (DDCI) would chair an interagency group to formulate an integrated, interagency plan to counter the terrorist challenge posed by Usama Bin Ladin. The DCI wrote that he wanted “…no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community.”
(S//NF) The Team found that neither the DCI nor the DDCI followed up these warnings and admonitions by creating a documented, comprehensive plan to guide the counterterrorism effort at the Intelligence Community level. The DDCI chaired at least one meeting in response to the DCI directive, but the forum soon devolved into one of tactical and operational, rather than strategic, discussions. These subsequent meetings were chaired by the Executive Director of the CIA and included few if any officers from other IC agencies. While CIA and other agencies had individual plans and important initiatives underway, senior officers in the Agency and Community told the Team that no comprehensive strategic plan for the IC to counter UBL was created in response to the DCI’s memorandum, or at any time prior to 9/11.
(S//NF) The DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) was not used effectively as a strategic coordinator of the IC’s counterterrorism efforts. CTC’s stated mission includes the production of all-source intelligence and the coordination of the IC’s counterterrorism efforts. Before 9/11, however, the Center’s focus was primarily operational and tactical. While
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focusing on operations is critically important and does not necessarily mean that other elements of mission will be ignored, the Team found that this nearly exclusive focus-which resulted in many operational successes-had a negative impact on CTC’s effectiveness as a coordinator of IC counterterrorism strategy. The Team found that the most effective interagency effort against UBL was that of the Assistant DCI for Collection, who, from the early months of 1998 to 9/11, worked with representatives of several intelligence agencies to stimulate collection.
(S//NF) In the years leading up to 9/11, the DCI worked hard and with some success, at the most senior levels of government, to secure additional budgetary resources to rebuild the CIA and the IC. At the same time, the Team found that he did not use his senior position and unique authorities to work with the National Security Council to elevate the relative standing of counterterrorism in the formal ranking of intelligence priorities, or to alter the deployment of human and financial resources across agencies in a coordinated approach to the terrorism target. While the nature of the IC makes the mission of managing it problematic and difficult, the DCI at the time had some authority to move manpower and funds among agencies. The Team found that, in the five years prior to 9/11, the DCI on six occasions used these authorities to move almost XXXXXX
in funds from other agencies to the CIA for a number of important purposes XXXXXX
XXXXXX One of these transfers helped fund a middle East program that was terrorism-related, but none supported programs designed to counter UBL or al-Qa’ida. Nor were DCI authorities used to transfer any personnel into these programs in the five years prior to 9/11.
The Team notes that the former DCI recognized the need for an integrated, interagency plan, and believes that such a plan was needed to mobilize all of the operational, analytic, and resource capabilities of the IC to enable the several agencies of the Community to work cooperatively and with maximum effectiveness against al-Qa’ida. At the same time, the Team concludes that the former DCI, by virtue of his position, bears ultimate responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was
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ever created, despite his specific direction that this should be done.
(S//NF) The JI report discussed a persistent strain in relations between CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) that impeded collaboration between the two agencies in dealing with the terrorist challenge from al-Qa’ida. The Team, likewise, found that significant differences existed between CIA and NSA over their respective authorities. The Team did not document in detail or take a position on the merits of this disagreement, but notes that the differences remained unresolved well into 2001 in spite of the fact that considerable management attention was devoted to the issue, including at the level of the Agency’s Deputy Executive Director. Senior officers of the CIA and the IC Management Staff stated that these interagency differences had a negative impact on the IC’s ability to perform its mission and that only the DCI’s vigorous personal involvement could have led to a timely resolution of the matter.
(C)The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the former DCI for failing to act personally to resolve the differences between CIA and NSA in an effective and timely manner.
(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings 2 (The DCI’s Role); 4 (Application of Technology); and 7 (Computer Exploitation) for discussion of these issues.
(U) Management of CIA’s Resources for Counterterrorism
(C) Funding for the Agency’s counterterrorism programs increased significantly from Fiscal Year (FY)1998 to FY 2001 as a result of supplemental appropriations. These funds were appropriated, in part, because of the efforts of the CIA’s Director and senior leaders to convince the Administration and Congress that the Agency was short of resources for counterterrorism and other key programs. The Team preparing this report did not attempt to reach a
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counterterrorism programs.
(S) The Team did find, however, that during the same period they were appealing the shortage of resources, senior officials were not effectively managing the Agency’s counterterrorism funds. In particular, Agency managers moved funds from the base budgets of the Counterterrorist Center and other counterterrorism programs to meet other corporate and Directorate of Operations (DO) needs. The Team found that from FY 1997 to FY 2001 (as of 9/11),XXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
was redistributed from counterterrorism programs to other Agency priorities. Some of these funds were used to strengthen the infrastructure of the DO and, thus, indirectly supported counterterrorism efforts; other funds were used to cover nonspecific corporate “taxes” and for a variety of purposes that, based on the Agency’s budgetary definitions, were unrelated to terrorism. Conversely, no resources were reprogrammed from other Agency programs to counterterrorism, even after the DCI’s statement in December 1998 that he wanted no resources spared in the effort. The Team found that the Agency made little use of the Reserve for Contingencies to support its counterterrorism effort. Finally, CTC managers did not spend all of the funds in their base budget, even after it had been reduced by diversions of funds to other programs.
(C) The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the Executive Director, the Deputy Director for Operations, and the Chief of CTC during the years prior to 9/11 regarding their management of the Agency’s counterterrorism financial resources, including specifically their redirection of funds from counterterrorism programs to other priorities.
(C) Concerning human resources, the Team found that the unit within CTC responsible for Usama Bin Ladin, UBL Station, by the accounts of all who worked there, had an excessive workload. Most of its officers did not have the operational experience, expertise, and training necessary to accomplish their mission in an effective manner. Taken together, these weaknesses contributed to performance lapses related to the handling of materials concerning
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individuals who were to become the 9/11 hijackers. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the Chiefs of CTC during the period 1997-2001 regarding the manner in which they staffed the UBL component.
(C) The Team found that certain units within CTC did not work effectively together to understand the structure and operations of al-Qa’ida. This situation had a particularly negative impact on performance with respect to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. The Team, like the Joint Inquiry, found that CTC’s assigning principal responsibility for KSM to the Renditions Branch had the consequence that the resources of the Sunni Extremist Group, UBL Station, and CTC analysts were not effectively brought to bear on the problem. CTC considered KSM to be a high-priority target for apprehension and rendition, but did not recognize the significance of reporting from credible sources in 2000 and 2001 that portrayed him as a senior al-Qa’ida lieutenant and thus missed important indicators of terrorist planning. This intelligence reporting was not voluminous and its significance is obviously easier to determine in hindsight, but it was noteworthy even in the pre-9/11 period because it included the allegation that KSM was sending terrorists to the United States to engage in activities on behalf of Bin Ladin.
(C) The evidence indicates that the management approach employed in CTC had the effect of actively reinforcing the separation of responsibilities among the key CTC units working on KSM. The Team recommends that an
Accountability Board review the performance of the XXX
XXXX and XXXXX
for failure to provide proper oversight and guidance to their officers; to coordinate effectively with other units; and to allocate the workload to ensure that KSM was being covered appropriately. The Team also recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the Chief of CTC for failure to ensure that CTC units worked in a coordinated, effective manner against KSM. Finally, the Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the XXXXXX for
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failure to produce any XXXXXX coverage of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad from 1997 to 20011
- (U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Finding 3 (Counterterrorism Resources) and Factual Finding 5i (Khalid Shaykh Muhammad) for further information on these issues.
(U) Information Sharing
The Team’s findings related to the issue of information sharing are in general accord with the JI’s overall assessment of CIA’s performance. Like the JI, the Team found problems in the functioning of two separate but related processes in the specific case of the Malaysia operation of early 2000: entering the names of suspected al-Qa’ida terrorists on the “watchlist” of the Department of State and providing information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in proper channels. The Team also found that CTC did not forward relevant information to XXXXXX
In regard to broader issues of information sharing, the Team found basic problems with processes designed to facilitate such sharing. In particular, CTC managers did not clarify the roles and responsibilities of officers detailed to CTC by other agencies.
(S//NF) The Malaysia Operation. Agency officers did not, on a timely basis, recommend to the Department of State the watchlisting of two suspected al-Qa’ida terrorists, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. These individuals, who later were among the hijackers of 9/11, were known by the Agency in early January 2000 to have traveled to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to participate in a meeting of suspected terrorists. From Kuala Lumpur, they traveled to Bangkok. In January 2000, CTC officers received information that one of these suspected terrorists had a US visa; in March 2000,
‘ (U) As a result of a conflict of interest, the Inspector General recused himself from deliberations on the performance of Agency components and individuals relating to the KSM issue and to the strategic analysis issues discussed below. The two successive Deputy Inspectors General did participate in accountability discussions regarding analysis and all other issues.
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these officers had information that the other had flown from Bangkok to Los Angeles.
(S//NF) In the period January through March 2000, some 50 to 60 individuals read one or more of six Agency cables containing travel information related to these terrorists. These cables originated in four field locations and Headquarters. They were read by overseas officers and Headquarters personnel, operations officers and analysts, managers and junior employees, and CIA staff personnel as well as officers on rotation from NSA and FBI. Over an 18-month period, some of these officers had opportunities to review the information on multiple occasions, when they might have recognized its significance and shared it appropriately with other components and agencies. Ultimately, the two terrorists were watchlisted in late August 2001 as a result of questions raised in May 2001 by a CIA officer on assignment at the FBI.
(S//NF) In 1998, CTC assumed responsibility for communicating watchlisting guidance in the Agency. As recently as December 1999, less than a month before the events of early January 2000, CTC had sent to all field offices of the CIA a cable reminding them of their obligation to watchlist suspected terrorists and the procedures for doing so. Field components and Headquarters units had obligations related to watchlisting, but they varied widely in their performance. That so many individuals failed to act in this case reflects a systemic breakdown-a breakdown caused by excessive workload, ambiguities about responsibilities, and mismanagement of the program. Basically, there was no coherent, functioning watchlisting program.
(S//NF) The Review Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the two Chiefs of CTC in the years between 1998 and 2001 concerning their leadership and management oversight of the watchlisting program.
(S//NF) Agency officers also failed to pass the travel information about the two terrorists to the FBI in the prescribed channels. The Team found that an FBI officer
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assigned to CTC on 5 January 2000 drafted a message about the terrorists’ travel that was to be sent from CIA to the FBI in the proper channels. Apparently because it was in the wrong format or needed editing, the message was never sent. On the same date, another CTC officer sent a cable to several Agency addressees reporting that the information and al-Mihdhar’s travel documents had been passed to the FBI. The officer who drafted this cable does not recall how this information was passed. The Team has not been able to confirm that the information was passed, or that it was not passed. Whatever the case, the Team found no indication that anyone in CTC checked to ensure FBI receipt of the information, which, a few UBL Station officers said, should have been routine practice.
(S//NF) addressees cables reporting that al-Hazmi and another al-Qa’ida associate had traveled to the United States. They were clearly identified in the cables as “UBL associates.” The Team has found no evidence, and heard no claim from any party, that this information was shared in any manner with the FBI or that anyone in UBL . Station took other appropriate operational action at that time.
(S//NF) In the months following the Malaysia operation, the CIA missed several additional opportunities to nominate al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar for watchlisting; to inform the FBI about their intended or actual travel to the United States; and to take appropriate operational action. These included a few occasions identified by the Joint Inquiry as well as several others.
(S//NF) The consequences of the failures to share information and perform proper operational followthrough on these terrorists were potentially significant. Earlier watchlisting of al-Mihdhar could have prevented his re-entry into the United States in July 2001. Informing the FBI and good operational followthrough by CIA and FBI might have resulted in surveillance of both al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. Surveillance, in turn, would have had the potential to yield information on flight training, financing, and links to others who were complicit in the 9/11 attacks.
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The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance ofXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
for failing
to ensure that someone in the Station informed the FBI and took appropriate operational action regarding al-Hazmi in March 2000. In addition, the Team recommends that the Accountability Board assess the performance of the latter three managers for failing to ensure prompt action relevant to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar during several later opportunities between March 2000 and August 2001.
(U) Broader Information Sharing Issues. The Joint Inquiry charged that CIA’s information-sharing problems derived from differences among agencies with respect to missions, legal authorities, and cultures. It argued that CIA efforts to protect sources and methods fostered a reluctance to share information and limited disclosures to criminal investigators. The report also alleged that most Agency officers did not focus sufficiently on the domestic terrorism front, viewing this as an FBI mission. The 9/11 Review Team’s findings are similar in many respects, but the Team believes the systemic failures in this case do not lie in reluctance to share. Rather, the basic problems were poor implementation, guidance, and oversight of processes established to foster the exchange of information, including the detailee program.
CTC and UBL Station had on their rosters detailees from many different agencies, including the FBI, NSA, Federal Aviation Administration , and State Department. The manner in which these detailees were managed left many of them unclear about the nature of their responsibilities. Many CIA managers and officers believed the detailees were responsible for conveying information to their home agencies, while most of the detailees maintained that they were working as CTC officers and had neither the time nor the responsibility to serve as links to their home agencies. The Team found, at a minimum, that there were fundamental ambiguities about the responsibilities of the detailees as they related to information sharing, and that these responsibilities were never delineated explicitly or in
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writing. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the two Chiefs of CTC during the years before 9/11 concerning their oversight of the Center’s practices in management of the detailee program.
(U) See the Team’s discussions of Factual Finding 5b (The Watchlisting Failure) and Systemic Findings 9 (Information Sharing Within the IC) and 10 (Information Sharing with Non-IC Members) for elaboration on these issues.
(U) Strategic Analysis
The Team, like the JI , found that the IC’s understanding of al-Qa’ida was hampered by insufficient analytic focus, particularly regarding strategic analysis. The Team asked three individuals who had served as senior intelligence analysts and managers to conduct an independent review of the Agency’s analytic products dealing with UBL and al-Qa’ida for the period from 1998 to 2001 and assess their quality. They found that, while CTC’s tradecraft was generally good, important elements were missing. Discussion of implications was generally weak, for example. Most important, a number of important issues were covered insufficiently or not at all. The Team found:
- No comprehensive strategic assessment of al-Qa’ida by CTC or any other component.
- No comprehensive report focusing on UBL since 1993.
- No examination of the potential for terrorists to use aircraft as weapons, as distinguished from traditional hijackings.
- Limited analytic focus on the United States as a potential target.
- No comprehensive analysis that put into context the threats received in the spring and summer of 2001.
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That said, CTC’s analytic component, the Assessments and Information Group (AIG), addressed aspects of these issues in several more narrowly focused strategic papers and other analyticproducts.
J,S‘f The personnel resources of AIG were heavily dedicated to policy-support and operational-support activities. Analysts focused primarily on current and tactical issues rather than on strategic analysis. In the two years prior to 9/11, the Directorate of Intelligence’s
raised with CTC managers the need to dedicate some proportion of the analytic work force to strategic analysis, as was the practice in many DI offices. In early 2001, the DCI specifically directed CTC to establish a strategic analysis unit within AIG. The Chief of AIG had for some time been aware of the need to strengthen the analytic work force and was working to do so. The strategic analysis unit was formed in July 2001; as of late July, it was manned by XXXXXX analysts.
(S/NF) he Team found that the National Intelligence Council (NIC) addressed the al-Qa’ida threat to only a limited extent. The NIC produced a National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat to the United States in 1995 and an update in 1997. It did not produce a similar, comprehensive assessment from that point until after 9/11, although preparation of such a product was underway, with a CTC drafter, in the early months of 2001 and was being edited as of 9/11.
(U) See Team discussions of Factual Findings 2 (Signs of an Impending Attack), 3 (The Threat to the United States), and 4 (Aircraft as Weapons) and Systemic Finding 5 (Strategic Analysis) for further information on these topics.
(U) Operations (Unilateral and Liaison)
(S/NF) The Joint Inquiry charges that CIA did not effectively develop and use human resources to penetrate al-Qa’ida’s inner circle, thus significantly limiting the IC’s
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ability to acquire actionable intelligence before 9/11. The report argues that this lack of sources resulted from an excessive reliance on foreign liaison services and walk-ins (sources who volunteer); a focus on disruption and capture rather than collection; and adherence to the dirty asset rules (guidelines that restricted the recruitment of sources who had committed certain proscribed acts).
The Review Team did not find that CIA’s reliance on liaison for collection was excessive but did find thatXXXXXX this reliance was not balanced with a strong focus on developing unilateral assets. The Team did not find that CIA reliance on walk-ins was misguided XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
‘Although the CIA focused its al-Qa’ida operations on Afghanistan, possibly limiting its ability to focus elsewhere, the Team believes that this approach was reasonable and that its purpose was collection on al-Qa’ida as well as disruption of al-Qa’ida’s activities. While
agreeing that the dirty asset rules may have created a climate that had the effect of inhibiting certain recruitment operations, the Team is unable to confirm or determine the extent of the impact. Finally, the Team found that several operational platforms XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
were not effectively engaged in the battle against al-Qa’ida. In the case of XXXX this reflected the weakness of the program itself. In the case XXXXX it reflected CTC’s focus on Afghanistan and the priority o its attempts to penetrate al-Qa’ida’s inner circle.
(S//NF) The Team found that the CIA’s relations with foreign liaison services were critical to its ability to disrupt al-Qa’ida and thwart some terrorist attacks on the United States. While the capabilities and cooperation of liaison services were uneven, the program itself did not detract from CIA’s efforts to mount its own unilateral operations. The Team did raise serious questions about whether CTC prior to 9/11 had made the most effective use of XXXXXXXXX liaison services in its operations against al-Qa’ida. XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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Nevertheless, the Team observes that the complicated dynamics of liaison relationships, including lack of common goals and counterintelligence problems, suggest that CTC managers made reasonable judgmentsXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
The Joint Inquiry particularly criticized CIA for the conduct of its operational relationship XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
It noted that CIA had unsuccessfully pressed XXXXXX
authorities for additional information on individuals later identified as associates of some of the hijackers. It placed some of the blame for this on CIA’s decisions. XXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The Team also found that CIA was unable to acquire the information cited by the JI but found that it made repeated efforts to do so and that its lack of success was the result of a difficult operating environment and limited cooperation on the part of’ XXXXXX. The Team concluded that the decisions made with respect to XXXXXXXX were reasonable.
(S//NF) The Joint Inquiry also argued that both the FBI and CIA had failed to identify the extent of support from Saudi nationals or groups for terrorist activities globally or within the United States and the extent to which such support, to the extent it existed, was knowing or inadvertent. While most of the JI discussion on the Saudi issue dealt with issues involving the FBI and its domestic operations, the report also XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX The Team found that a significant gap existed in the CIA’s understanding of Saudi extremists’ involvement in plotting terrorist attacks. The primary reasons for this gap were the difficulty of the task, the hostile operational environment, and’XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
(S//NF) The Team also found, however, that UBL Station and XXXXX were hostile to each other and working at cross purposes over a period of years before 9/11. The Team cannot measure the specific impact of this counterproductive behavior. At a minimum, however, the Team found that organizational tensions clearly complicated
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and delayed the preparation of Agency approaches XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(thus negatively affecting the timely and effective functioning of the exchange with XXXXXXX on terrorism issues.
(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings 11 (HUMINT Operations Against Al-Qa’ida) and 15 (Reliance on Foreign Liaison), Factual Finding 5h (The Hijackers’ Associates in Germany), and Related Finding 20 (Issues Relating to Saudi Arabia) for additional information.
(U) Covert Action
(91 The Joint Inquiry charged that US policymakers had wanted Usama Bin Ladin killed as early as August 1998 and believed CIA personnel understood that. However, the government had not removed the ban on assassination and did not provide clear direction or authorization for CIA to kill Bin Ladin or make covert attacks against al-Qa’ida0
The JI said that the CIA was reluctant to Iseek authority to assassinate Bin Ladin and averse to taking advantage of ambiguities in the authorities it did receive that might have allowed it more flexibility. The JI argued that these factors shaped the type of covert action the CIA undertook against Bin Ladin and that, before September 11, covert action had little impact on al-Qa’ida or Bin Ladin.
The findings and conclusions of the Review Team correspond with most but not all of the JI conclusions. The Team believes that the restrictions in the authorities given the CIA with respect to Bin Ladin, while arguably, although ambiguously, relaxed for a period of time in late 1998 and early 1999, limited the range of permissible operations. Given the law, executive order, and past problems with covert action programs, CIA managers refused to take advantage of the ambiguities that did exist. The Team believes this position was reasonable and correct. Ultimately, the Team concludes the failure of the Agency’s covert action against Bin Ladin lay not in the language and interpretation of its authorities, but in the limitations of its covert action capabilities: CIA’s heavy reliance on a single
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group of assets, who were of questionable reliability and had limited capabilities, proved insufficient to mount a credible operation against Bin Ladin. Efforts to develop other options had limited potential prior to 9/11.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The Joint Inquiry states that US military officials were reluctant to use military assets to conduct operations in Afghanistan or to support or participate in CIA operations against al-Qa’ida prior to 9/11. At least in part, this was a result of the IC’s inability to provide the necessary intelligence to support military operations. The findings of the Team match those of the JI as they relate to the CIA. The Agency was unable to satisfy the demands of the US military for the precise, actionable intelligence that the military leadership required in order to deploy US troops on the ground in Afghanistan or launch cruise missile attacks against UBL-related sites beyond the August 1998 retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan. Differences between CIA and the Department of Defense over the cost of replacing lost Predators also hampered collaboration over the use of that platform in Afghanistan. The Team concludes, however, that other impediments, including the slow-moving policy process, reduced the importance of these CIA-military differences. The Team believes CIA handled its relationship with the US military responsibly and within the bounds of what was reasonable and possible.
XXXXXXXX The Joint Inquiry charges that the CIA failed to attack UBL’s finances and failed to work cooperatively with the Department of the Treasury to develop leads and establish links to other terrorist funding sources. The Team, likewise, found that CIA failed to attack Bin Ladin’s moneysuccessfully but finds that this was not for lack of effort. XXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXX The Team also agrees that bureaucratic obstacles and legal restrictions inhibited CIA’s partnership with the Department of the Treasury.
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U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings 13 (Covert Action), 14 (Collaboration with the Military), and 16 (Strategy to Disrupt Terrorist Funding) for more information on these issues.
(U) Technology
XXXXXXXXXXThe Joint Inquiry charged that
technology had not been fully and effectively applied in support of US counterterrorism efforts. The Team found that significant differences existed between CIA and NSA over several critical issues. One of these involved a dispute over which agency had authorityXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXX
This dispute had not yet been resolved in September 2001. The second issue involved NSA’s unwillingness to share raw SIGINT transcripts with CIA; this made it more difficult for CTC to perform its mission against al-Qa’ida. In the late 1990s, however, NSA managers offered to allow a CTC officer to be detailed to NSA to cull the transcripts for useful information. CTC sent one officer to NSA for a brief period of time in 2000, but failed to send others, citing resource constraints. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the Chiefs of CTC for their failure to detail officers to NSA on a consistent, full-time basis to exploit this material in the years before 9/11.
(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings 4 (Application of Technology) and 7 (Computer Exploitation) for discussion of the technology issue.
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TOP-SECRET – BORDABERRY CONDEMNED FOR 1973 COUP
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Washington, DC, September 1, 2011 – For the first time in Latin America, a judge has sent a former head of state to prison for the crime of an “Attack against the Constitution.” In an unprecedented ruling last month in Montevideo, former Uruguayan President Juan María Bordaberry was sentenced to serve 30 years for undermining Uruguay’s constitution through an auto-coup in June 1973, and for his responsibility in nine disappearances and two political assassinations committed by the security forces while he was president between 1972 and 1976.
Hebe Martínez Burlé (reproducida por gentileza de La República)Walter de León Declassified U.S. documents provided as evidence in the case by the National Security Archive show that Bordaberry justified his seizure of extra-constitutional powers on June 27, 1973 by telling the U.S. Ambassador that “Uruguay’s democratic traditions and institutions…were themselves the real threat to democracy.” Another U.S. document used in the trial shows that within days after the coup, the police were ordered to launch, in coordination with the military, “intelligence gathering and operations of a ‘special’ nature”—references to death squad actions that ensued.
“These declassified U.S. documents,” said Carlos Osorio, who heads the National Security Archive’s Southern Cone project, “helped the Court open the curtain of secrecy on human rights crimes committed during Bordaberry’s reign of power.”
The ruling by Judge Mariana Motta on February 9, 2010, was based on a case presented by two lawyers, Walter de León and Hebe Martínez Burlé. “No one thought we had a chance to convict Bordaberry,” Ms. Martínez Burlé said. “Even among human rights advocates, some said we were crazy.”
Oscar Destouet, head of the Human Rights Directorate in the Ministry of Education which supported the prosecution, noted that “[t]his is the first time that a head of state is brought to justice for a coup d’état.” Certainly, the case is unprecedented in the Uruguayan judicial system. “The sentence points to a new dawn in Uruguayan jurisprudence,” says Jorge Pan, head of the Institute for Legal Studies of Uruguay [IELSUR].
Bordaberry was elected to the presidency in 1971 amidst social turmoil and the Tupamaro insurgency, which was the most active guerrilla movement in Latin America at the time. In order to crush the militants and quell unrest, he engineered a self coup d’état in June 1973, dissolving Congress and suspending the constitution, and then launched a ruthless counterinsurgency drive during which thousands were imprisoned and tortured and hundreds killed or disappeared. The Uruguayan security forces also coordinated their repressive actions with other Southern Cone countries –in what is known as “Operation Condor”– by tracking down and killing Uruguayan citizens who had taken refuge in other nations, such as Senator Zelmar Michelini and legislator Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz who were assassinated in Buenos Aires.
The quest for justice for human rights violations committed under the military regime has been blocked by an amnesty ratified in a referendum by 54% of the voters in 1989. In October 2009, another plebiscite to rescind the amnesty fell short with only 48% of support. Nevertheless, in August 2003, the Supreme Court removed Bordaberry’s immunity from prosecution as a former president and ruled that he must stand trial for “Atentado a la Constitución.”
According to Osorio, “U.S. documentation is helping judges to overcome the hurdles of impunity in Uruguay.” In December 2006, Osorio presented his testimony with more than 70 declassified U.S. documents before an investigative magistrate in charge of this historical case.
This briefing book presents eight declassified U.S. documents introduced in the case which identified Bordaberry’s role in the military putsch, his disdain for democratic institutions, and the role of security forces in crimes under his regime. It also includes:
The sentence of Judge Mariana Motta
A summary containing highlights of the case written by lawyer Walter de León
A chronology around the putsch headed by Juan María Bordaberry
A chronology of the trial for “Attack against the Constitution”
Documents
July 1, 1973 – Possible Effects of Uruguayan Tortures Charges on the AID Public Safety Program
In a memo to the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission in Uruguay Frank Ortiz, a representative from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) expresses his fear that the latest charges of torture against Uruguayan police, as well as the military coup led by President Bordaberry, could endanger U.S. Congressional support for USAID’s police assistance program to Uruguay. The memo discusses allegations of torture by police in the city of Paysandu in addition to numerous allegations in other places across the country that are being investigated by Uruguayan legislators. All of this has contributed to conflict between the Uruguayan Congress and the military and Bordaberry.
Ortiz reports that “[t]he very final act of the Senate in the early hours of June 27 was to vote 16 to 1, an investigation of the Paysandu torture charges. Immediately afterwards the Senate was closed and dissolved by President Bordaberry… to an outside observer… the motivations for closing Congress would be both anger at the failure to prosecute Senator Erro for his Tupamaro ties, and desire by the President and the Armed Forces to prevent Congressional investigation of the tortures in Paysandu and elsewhere.”
July 2, 1973 – The United States and Events in Uruguay
Deputy Chief of Mission Frank Ortiz sends an update to the Department of State regarding the situation in Montevideo after the coup. “A decisive stage has been reached in Uruguay… The executive acting with and at the b[ehest of the armed forces] has now taken steps such as the dissolution of the congress and of the powerful communist-dominated labor confederation (CNT)…” The cable suggests that “there is a disposition to accept the assurances of the president that the illegal measures taken were necessary and temporary and that there will be a return to the traditional democratic forms.”
At the same time, Ortiz reports that “the opposition groups, the leaders of which are in hiding, are in a state of shock over the suddenness and the sweeping nature of the Government’s moves.” According to Amnesty International and many other human rights organizations, between 1973 and 1976, Uruguay became the country with the highest number of jailed and of tortured dissidents in Latin America.
July 25, 1973 – Public Safety Division: Police Report
The Chief USAID Public Safety Advisor in Montevideo presents a report of “activities since the recent changes in the Uruguayan Government took place.” The report states that “[a]s of July 10, orders were received at the office of the Chief of Police to reintegrate military operations… coordinated operations have been ordered as of noon on this date… As of 1300 hours July 10 the Montevideo police received new orders which called for increased coordination between the military and the police operations… indications are that this will mostly be intelligence gathering and operations of ‘special’ nature.” The “special” operations highlighted in the document itself meant death squad activities in the counterinsurgency jargon of the security forces in the 1960’s and 1970’s.
November 12, 1973 – Uruguay Four Months After Closing Congress
U.S. Ambassador Ernest Siracusa sends a report to the Department of State four months after the coup stating that “[s]ince June 27 the Bordaberry government has closed the Congress, proscribed political activity, imposed censorship to stifle criticism, outlawed the dominant communist controlled labor confederation, temporarily suspended activities of the national university and has plans to outlaw the federation of university students and its affiliated groups. The government’s power base has shifted to the Armed Forces…”
Regarding Bordaberry’s relationship with the military, Siracusa observes that “his characteristics make him comfortable with the military, and the interminable debates as to whether Bordaberry or the military is behind any given move usually miss the key point — that Bordaberry and the military generally are now thinking along the same lines… We believe that Bordaberry initiated the move to close the Congress. In like manner, it was Bordaberry, not the military, who drafted a decree expected to be issued soon outlawing or dissolving the Communist Party (PCU). These steps and others, conceived in terms of patriotism, morality, or more practical considerations, have allied the president frequently with the so-called hard-liners such as first division commander General Esteban Cristi.”
December 26, 1973 – Conversation with President Bordaberry
U.S. Ambassador Siracusa reports on a meeting with Bordaberry where they cover political economic and bilateral affairs. In one section, after expressing his feelings that Uruguayans are happy about the stability reached by the regime following the putsch in June, Siracusa says “I had detected also a certain sadness that Uruguay’s cherished democratic institutions had been to some extent sacrificed or limited as a price.” Bordaberry responds to the Ambassador by explaining that “the situation had truly arrived at the border of chaos and that had drastic action not been taken the country would eventually have been faced with acceptance of chronic anarchy or a truly military takeover as alternative.” Siracusa ends by stating that Bordaberry said “everything they have done has really been an effort to end the stagnation of more than two decades and to save Uruguay’s democratic traditions and institutions rather than do violence to them. In a sense… these institutions, as they operated, were themselves the real threat to democracy in Uruguay.”
August 14, 1975 – Deaths and Disappearances of Chilean Extremists: GOA Involvement
Amidst a flurry of suspicious deaths of Chilean guerrillas in Argentina, the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires reports to the Department of State that the U.S. “Legatt [Legal Attaché] advises that police and especially the military establishments of Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile are well inter-connected… Also, assassination operations are known to be carried out by these governments’ security agencies for one another, though never provable.” The reports by FBI liaison in Argentina, Legal Attaché Robert Scherrer, on the collaboration of the Southern Cone security agencies, will eventually disclose the existence of Operation Condor in 1976.
June 18, 1976 – Further Information on Zelmar Michelini and Luis Héctor Gutiérrez
A few weeks after exiled Uruguayan legislators Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz are killed by unknown men in Buenos Aires, the U.S. Ambassador in Montevideo, Ernest Siracusa, reports that “according to [a secret source] Michelini was considered by Argentine authorities to be working with the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) in Argentina in orchestrating the propaganda campaign against Uruguay. The JCR is the coordinating [sic] up for the terrorist/subversive groups of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia.”
August 3, 1976 – ARA Monthly Report (July) The ‘Third World War’ and South America
Since the beginning of the year, numerous leftist guerrillas and opposition leaders of bordering Southern Cone countries have been killed in Buenos Aires. Among those killed were two Uruguayan legislators, a former Bolivian President, numerous other Chileans, Uruguayans, Bolivians, Brazilians and Paraguayans.
In this finalized analysis for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman states that “the military regimes of the southern cone… are joining forces to eradicate ‘subversion’, which increasingly translates into non-violent dissent from the left and the center left. The security forces of the Southern Cone: now coordinate intelligence activities closely; operate in the territory of one another in pursuit of subversives; have established Operation Condor to find and kill terrorists of the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee [JCR] in their own countries and in Europe… Security cooperation is a fact: There is extensive cooperation between the security/intelligence operations of six governments: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Their intelligence services hold formal meetings to plan ‘Operation Condor’…”
Shlaudeman concludes that “the problem begins with the definition of ‘subversion’… [it] has grown to include nearly anyone who opposes government policy… Uruguayan Foreign Minister Blanco… was the first to describe the campaign against terrorists as a ‘Third World War’. The description is interesting for two reasons: it justifies harsh and sweeping ‘wartime’ measures; it emphasizes the international and institutional aspect, thereby justifying the exercise of power beyond national borders.”
TOP-SECRET: KISSINGER BLOCKED DEMARCHE ON INTERNATIONAL ASSASSINATIONS TO CONDOR STATES
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Washington, DC, September 1, 2011 – Only five days before a car bomb planted by agents of the Pinochet regime rocked downtown Washington D.C. on September 21, 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger rescinded instructions sent to, but never implemented by, U.S. ambassadors in the Southern Cone to warn military leaders there against orchestrating “a series of international murders,” declassified documents obtained and posted by the National Security Archive revealed today.
The Secretary “has instructed that no further action be taken on this matter,” stated a September 16, 1976, cable sent from Lusaka (where Kissinger was traveling) to his assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs, Harry Shlaudeman. The instructions effectively ended efforts by senior State Department officials to deliver a diplomatic demarche, approved by Kissinger only three weeks earlier, to express “our deep concern” over “plans for the assassination of subversives, politicians, and prominent figures both within the national borders of certain Southern Cone countries and abroad.” Aimed at the heads of state of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, the demarche was never delivered.
“The September 16th cable is the missing piece of the historical puzzle on Kissinger’s role in the action, and inaction, of the U.S. government after learning of Condor assassination plots,” according to Peter Kornbluh, the Archive’s senior analyst on Chile and author of the book, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. “We know now what happened: The State Department initiated a timely effort to thwart a ‘Murder Inc’ in the Southern Cone, and Kissinger, without explanation, aborted it,” Kornbluh said. “The Kissinger cancellation on warning the Condor nations prevented the delivery of a diplomatic protest that conceivably could have deterred an act of terrorism in Washington D.C.”
Kissinger’s September 16 instructions responded to an August 30, 1976 secret memorandum from Shlaudeman, titled “Operation Condor,” that advised him: “what we are trying to head off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage to the international status and reputation of the countries involved.” After receiving Kissinger’s orders, on September 20, Shlaudeman directed his deputy, William Luers, to “instruct the [U.S.] ambassadors to take no further action noting that there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme.”
The next day, a massive car bomb claimed the life of former Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier and his 26-year old American colleague, Ronni Karpen Moffitt, as they drove down Massachusetts Avenue in Washington, D.C. The bombing remains the most infamous attack of “Condor”—a collaboration between the secret police services in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil and several other Latin American military dictatorships, to track down and kill opponents of their regimes. Until 9/11, the Letelier-Moffitt assassination was known as the most significant act of international terrorism ever committed in the capital city of the United States.
In the August 30th memorandum Shlaudeman informed Kissinger that the U.S. ambassador to Montevideo, Ernest Siracusa, had resisted delivering the demarche against Condor assassinations to the Uruguayan generals for fear that his life would be endangered, and wanted further instructions. Shlaudeman recommended that Kissinger authorize a telegram to Siracusa “to talk to both [Foreign Minister Juan Carlos] Blanco and [military commander-in-chief] General [Julio César] Vadora” and a “parallel approach” in which Shlaudeman would meet with the Uruguayan ambassador in Washington. He also offered an alternative of having a CIA official meet with his counterpart in Montevideo. (This memo was obtained under the FOIA by Kornbluh.)
Several days earlier, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, David Popper, had also protested the order to present the demarche to General Augusto Pinochet. “[G]iven Pinochet’s sensitivities,” Popper cabled, “he might well take as an insult any inference that he was connected with such assassination plots.” Like Siracusa, Popper requested further instructions.
Kissinger did not respond to the Shlaudeman memo for more than two weeks. In his September 16th cable, Kissinger “declined to approve message to Montevideo” and effectively reversed instructions to the U.S. ambassadors in Chile and Argentina to deliver the demarche to General Augusto Pinochet and General Jorge Videla.
The cable was discovered by Archive Southern Cone analyst Carlos Osorio among tens of thousands of routinely declassified State Department cables from 1976.
“We now know that it was Kissinger himself who was responsible,” stated John Dinges, author of The Condor Years, and a National Security Archive associate fellow. “He cancelled his own order; and Chile went ahead with the assassination in Washington.”
Only after the Letelier-Moffitt assassination did a member of the CIA station in Santiago meet with the head of the Chilean secret police, Col. Manuel Contreras, to discuss the demarche. The meeting took place the first week of October. In a secret memorandum from Shlaudeman to Kissinger—also obtained by Kornbluh under the FOIA—he reported that passing U.S. concerns to Contreras “seems to me sufficient action for the time being. The Chileans are the prime movers in Operation Condor.”
The memorandum makes no mention of the CIA pressing Contreras on the issue of the Letelier-Moffitt assassination. Several years later, the FBI identified him as responsible for that atrocity, and the U.S. demanded his extradition, which the Pinochet regime refused. In November 1993, after Pinochet left power, a Chilean court found Contreras guilty for the Condor murders and sentenced him to seven years in a specially-constructed prison.
Henry Kissinger’s role in rescinding the Condor demarche was at the center of a contentious controversy at the prestigious journal, Foreign Affairs (FA), in 2004. In a FA review of Kornbluh’s book, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow Kenneth Maxwell referred to the undelivered demarche, and Shlaudeman’s September 20th instructions to the ambassadors to “take no further action.” In a response, the late William D. Rogers, Kissinger’s close associate, lawyer, and a former assistant secretary of State, stated—incorrectly it is now clear—that “Kissinger had nothing to do with the cable.” When Maxwell responded to the Rogers letter, he reiterated that the demarche was never made in Chile, and that the Letelier-Moffitt assassination “was a tragedy that might have been prevented” if it had.
In response, Kissinger enlisted two wealthy members of the Council to pressure the editor of FA, James Hoge, to allow Rogers to have the last word. In a second letter-to-the-editor, Rogers accused Maxwell of “bias,” and of challenging Shlaudeman’s integrity by suggesting that he had countermanded “a direct, personal instruction from Kissinger” to issue the demarche, “and to do it behind his back” while Kissinger was on a diplomatic mission in Africa. When Hoge refused to publish Maxwell’s response, Maxwell resigned from his positions at FA and the Council.
In the letter that his own employer refused to publish, Maxwell wrote that, to the contrary, “it is hard to believe that Shlaudeman would have sent a cable rescinding the [demarche] without the approval of the Secretary of State who had authorized [it] in the first place.” He called on Kissinger to step forward and clarify the progression of policy decisions leading up to the Letelier-Moffitt assassination, and for the full record to be declassified.
The declassification of Kissinger’s September 16th cable demonstrates that Maxwell was correct. It was Kissinger who ordered an end to diplomatic attempts to deliver the demarche and call a halt to Condor murder operations.
Documents
This action cable signed by Secretary of State Kissinger reflects a decision by the Latin American bureau in the State Department to try to stop the Condor plans known to be underway, especially those outside of Latin America. Kissinger instructs the ambassadors of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay to meet as soon as possible with the chief of state or the highest appropriate official of their respective countries and to convey a direct message, known in diplomatic language as a “demarche.” The ambassadors are instructed to tell the officials the U.S. government has received information that Operation Condor goes beyond information exchange and may “include plans for the assassination of subversives, politicians and prominent figures both within the national borders of certain Southern Cone countries and abroad.” Further, the ambassadors are to express the U.S. government’s “deep concern,” about the reports and to warn that, if true, they would “create a most serious moral and political problem.”
In his memo to Kissinger dated August 30, 1976, Schlaudeman spelled out the U.S. position on Condor assassination plots: “What we are trying to head off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage to the international status and reputation of the countries involved.” Shlaudeman’s memo requests approval from Kissinger to direct U.S. ambassador to Uruguay, Ernest Siracusa, to proceed to meet with high officials in Montevideo and present the Condor demarche.
Document 3 – Department of State, Cable, “Actions Taken,” September 16, 1976
In this cable, sent from Lusaka where Kissinger is traveling, the Secretary of State refuses to authorize sending a telegram to U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay, Ernest Siracusa, instructing him to proceed with the Condor demarche. Kissinger than broadens his instructions to cover the delivery of the demarche in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay: “The Secretary has instructed that no further action be taken on this matter.” These instructions effectively end the State Department initiative to warn the Condor military regimes not to proceed with international assassination operations, since the demarche has not been delivered in Chile or Argentina.
Document 4 – Department of State, Cable, “Operation Condor,” Septmber 20, 1976
Kissinger’s Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs received his instructions on turning off the Condor demarche on September 16th. Three days later, while in Costa Rica, Shlaudeman receives another cable, which remains secret, from his deputy, William Luers, regarding how to proceed on the demarche. At this point, on September 20, Shlaudeman directs Luers, to “instruct the [U.S.] ambassadors to take no further action noting that there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme.”
Condor’s most infamous “scheme” comes to fruition the very next day when a car-bomb planted by agents of the Chilean secret police takes the life of former Chilean diplomat, and leading Pinochet opponent, Orlando Letelier, and his 26-year old American colleague, Ronni Karpen Moffitt, in downtown Washington D.C.
In his October 8 memo to Kissinger transmitting a CIA memorandum of conversation with Col. Contreras, Schlaudeman argued that “the approach to Contreras seems to me to be sufficient action for the time being” because “the Chileans are the prime movers in Operation Condor.”
STASI-WARNUNG – VORBESTRAFTE RUFMÖRDER, SERIENBETRÜGER UND MUTMASSLICHE MÖRDER DER GoMoPa
Liebe Leser,
mit weiteren Lügen, Fälschungen und Rufmorden im Internet sollen wir dazu gebracht werden unsere Aufklärungsarbeit in Sachen STASI und “GoMoPa” und deren mutmassliche Auftraggeber/Partner Gerd Bennewirtz und Peter Ehlers einzustellen und zu löschen.
DAS WIRD NICHT PASSIEREN !
Herzlichst Ihr
Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium
SZ: John le Carré: “Marionetten” Ihre eigenen Geschöpfe
Terror-Paranoia und eine Politik, die mit der Angst spielt: John le Carré beweist in seinem neuen Roman, dass kaum einer so viel über Deutschland weiß, wie er.
Während des Kalten Kriegs war Deutschland geteilt und nicht im Besitz seiner vollen Souveränitätsrechte. Das Land war einerseits machtlos, andererseits lag es in der Mitte der Weltpolitik, gewissermaßen im Auge des Orkans. Diese eigentümliche Mixtur aus Provinz und Weltbühne, aus Abseitigkeit und Zentralität hat kein Schriftsteller so prägnant erfasst wie der englische Thriller-Autor John le Carré. Der Titel eines seiner frühen Romane bringt es mit schlafwandlerischer Treffsicherheit auf den Begriff: “Eine kleine Stadt in Deutschland”. Wie viel altfränkische Verschlafenheit klingt da mit – und doch ist dieses Deutschland Hauptschauplatz des Kalten Kriegs, auch wenn andere dabei die Fäden in der Hand halten.
Bild vergrößern Arbeitete vor seiner Schriftstellerkarriere für den britischen Geheimdienst: John le Carré. (© Foto: dpa)//
Damals, in den sechziger Jahren, waren die Zeiten der Großmachtsphantasien schon lange vorbei. Die Bundesrepublik war ein politischer Zwerg, der daran arbeitete, unter dem Sicherheitsschirm der USA zum wirtschaftlichen Riesen zu werden. Und doch war es dieses beschauliche Ländchen, das ganz kleine Brötchen buk, in dem die beiden Supermächte das Weiße im Auge ihres Feindes sehen konnten.
Vielleicht hat es ja sogar eine tiefere Bedeutung, wenn George Smiley, John le Carrés unvergesslicher Secret-Service-Mann, während seines Studiums der Literaturwissenschaft sich besonders passioniert der deutschen Literatur des Barock widmet – mithin jener Epoche, in der Deutschland in Folge des Dreißigjährigen Krieges in die Kleinstaaterei zerfiel.
Der Fremde
Dass der Fremde das Eigene schärfer zu erfassen vermag, als man selbst, ist ein Gemeinplatz – aber man muss ihn im Falle John le Carrés erneut bemühen: Er hat das Deutschland des Kalten Krieges erzählerisch ins Bild gesetzt. Er hat in seinem berühmtesten Roman, “Der Spion, der aus der Kälte kam”, die Glienicker Brücke zwischen Berlin und Potsdam zum geographischen Sinnbild der Block-Konfrontation werden lassen, wo die Geheimdienste aus West und Ost sich zum Agenten-Austausch trafen – noch heute ein Ort, an dem einen das Glück der Wiedervereinigung geradezu körperlich anspringt.
Für das Pathos wie für die Beschaulichkeit der politischen Situation der beiden Deutschlands hatte John le Carré ein Gespür wie kein zweiter. Als Mitarbeiter sowohl des British Foreign Office wie des britischen Geheimdienstes lebte le Carré, der nahezu akzentfrei Deutsch spricht, Anfang der sechziger Jahre in Bonn und in Hamburg.
In diesen Tagen hat “Arte” einen Film über den großen Spionage-Autor gezeigt. Da sah man John le Carré, mit seinen 77 Jahren noch immer ein blendend aussehender Gentleman, im Garten seines hinreißend zum Meer hin exponierten Hauses in Cornwall. Zu seiner Linken, die Steilküste hinunter, erstreckte sich eine große Bucht, an deren anderer Seite ein Städtchen zu sehen war: “Wie sagte Theodor Storm über Husum? ,Die graue Stadt am Meer’. Das dort ist meine graue Stadt am Meer.”
“Marionetten” heißt sein 21. Roman, und er spielt in Hamburg. Auf Englisch heißt das Buch “A Most Wanted man”. Aber der deutsche Titel ist gar nicht schlecht. Im Grunde greift er ein altes Motiv auf. Zwar ist Deutschland mittlerweile ein souveränes Land. Wenn es aber um den Krieg gegen den Terror geht, wird es zum Vasallen Amerikas, und seinen Geheimdiensten bleibt auf ihrem eigenen Territorium nichts anderes übrig, als die transatlantischen Kollegen walten und schalten zu lassen.
Keine der “Marionetten”-Figuren vermag souverän zu handeln, immer ziehen andere an den Strippen. Im Kleist’schen Sinne anmutig sind diese Marionetten nicht. Vielmehr werden sie ohne Rücksicht auf Verluste durch die Machtkämpfe der Weltpolitik geschleift, an ihren Fäden, mit polternden Körpern.
Issa, ein junger Moslem, gelangt illegal nach Deutschland. Annabel Richter, Tochter aus bester deutscher Juristen-Familie, arbeitet für die Organisation Fluchthafen, die politischen Flüchtlingen dabei hilft, ihren Aufenthalt in Deutschland zu legalisieren. Mit Issa hat sie einen schwierigen Fall. Er gibt sich als Tschetschene aus, spricht aber nur russisch. Seine Frömmigkeit stellt er umständlich zur Schau, aber manchmal wirkt sie gerade deshalb wie zwielichtiges Kasperltheater. Er hat geradezu heiligenmäßige Züge kindlicher Unschuld. Dann wieder wirkt er mit seiner gestelzten Ausdrucksweise wie von allen guten Geistern verlassen. Sein Körper jedenfalls weist Spuren von Folter auf.
Die Geschichte, die Issa seiner Anwältin Annabel auftischt, ist haarsträubend: Sein Vater sei ein russischer Oberst der Roten Armee gewesen, der wie nur je ein grausiger Warlord in Tschetschenien gewütet habe. Er habe seine tschetschenische Mutter vergewaltigt, sich dabei aber in sie und damit auch in seinen Bastard-Sohn verliebt. Seine Mutter sei wegen der Schande von ihrer eigenen Familie getötet worden, während sein Vater ihn auf einem russischen Internat habe großziehen lassen.
Nervös
Issa hasst seinen Vater und verehrt seine tote Mutter. Seine Loyalität gehört dem geschundenen tschetschenischen Volk. Der russische Geheimdienst hält ihn für einen gefährlichen Islamisten und hatte ihn hinter Gitter gebracht. Aber Issa gelang die Flucht. Und jetzt steht er nicht mit leeren Händen da. Von seinem Vater soll er ein gewaltiges Vermögen geerbt haben. Es ist schmutziges Geld, das weiß Issa, er möchte es deshalb islamischen Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen vermachen. Aber Hamburg ist auch die Stadt von Mohammed Atta, einem der 9/11-Attentäter. Da hatte der Verfassungsschutz des Stadtstaats auf ganzer Linie versagt. Entsprechend nervös sind jetzt alle. Der Erfolgsdruck bei den Geheimdiensten ist hoch. Die Briten, die Amerikaner sind anwesend und pfuschen den deutschen Diensten ins Spiel.
“Marionetten” erzählt davon, wie eine Politik, die mit der Angst spielt, ihre rechtsstaatliche Balance verliert. John le Carré hat während der Recherchen Murat Kurnaz interviewt, der nach Guantanamo verschleppt wurde. Die Terror-Paranoia schafft sich unter Umständen ihre eigenen Geschöpfe. Wenn die Agenten in “Marionetten” die Lage beschreiben, dann reden sie von den “verschlungenen Pfaden des Dschihadismus”. Dieser Roman führt meisterhaft vor, wie sich um ein Schlagwort eine ganze Sicherheits-Bürokratie bildet, ja, sich aus dem Begriff heraus eine eigene Handlungslogik entfaltet. In dieser Logik hat ein gläubiger Tschetschene, der uns wie Murat Kurnaz fremd und deshalb fanatisch vorkommt, keine Chance auf eine faire Beweisaufnahme. Im Zweifel für den Angeklagten – dieser Rechtsgrundsatz ist im Bann der Terrorangst aufgehoben.
Aber die Wege des Dschihadismus sind ja tatsächlich verschlungen; und le Carré ist niemand, der die Gefahr des Terrorismus unterschätzt. Was es mit Issa wirklich auf sich hat, das weiß auch sein Erfinder nicht. Klar ist nur, dass die Logik der Geheimdienste keine Rücksicht auf Verluste nimmt. Man klappt dies Buch stöhnend zu und möchte eine Welt, unsere Welt weit von sich weisen, in der es keine Möglichkeit gibt, sauber durchzukommen.
JOHN LE CARRÉ: Marionetten. Aus dem Englischen von Sabine Roth und Regina Rawlinson. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin 2008. 368 S., 22,90 Euro.
John le Carré findet STASI-Operationen teilweise “vorzüglich” – STASI-MORALISCH EKELHAFT
Der Schriftsteller und ehemalige Geheimdienst-Mitarbeiter John le Carré hat sich in einem Interview der “Süddeutschen Zeitung” (Montagausgabe) teilweise positiv über den DDR-Staatssicherheitsdienst geäußert. “Moralisch gesehen war die Stasi einfach nur ekelhaft”, sagte der 79-jährige Brite, der mit bürgerlichem Namen David Cornwell heißt. “Aber ihre grenzüberschreitenden Operationen waren vorzüglich”, fügte er hinzu. “Dies übrigens nicht nur in Westdeutschland, sondern auch in Kuba, in Afrika. Die Staatssicherheit wurde vom sowjetischen KGB gelenkt, aber der KGB hat sie gehasst.” Le Carré kritisierte heutige fragwürdige Methoden von Geheimdiensten: “Heutzutage ist der widerwärtige Ausdruck ‘verschärfte Befragung’ in Gebrauch gekommen”, sagte er. Unlängst habe die Zeitung “Guardian” aufgedeckt, dass es eine Geheimdienststudie gebe zum Thema “In welchem Verhältnis steht der Schmerz, der Menschen zugefügt wird, zum Wahrheitsgehalt der Aufgaben, die solche Leute dann machen”. Der Autor sagte: “Ich finde das entsetzlich.” Zu seiner Zeit – er war bis 1964 im diplomatischen Dienst – wäre es ihm nicht in den Sinn gekommen, dass informelle Befragungen unter Folter durchgeführt werden könnten, sagte le Carré. “In meiner Welt war das so: Wir hielten uns für Superjournalisten, der Wahrhaftigkeit verpflichtet. Es war ein Schock für mich, als ich erfuhr, dass John Scarlett vom britischen Auslandsdienst MI6 sich dazu hergegeben hat, eine Krisensituation herbeizureden, dass er Tony Blair dabei geholfen hat, Großbritannien unter verlogenen Vorwänden in den Irak-Krieg zu treiben.”
TOP-SECRET: TRIALS/EXECUTIONS OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS
R 090540Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7682 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY BONN AMCOMSUL DHAHRAN AMEMBASSY JIDDA AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 1381 E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006 TAGS: PREL PGOV IR SUBJECT: TRIALS/EXECUTIONS OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS: STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE AND SHAH LASHES OUT AT FOREIGN CRITICS ¶1. IN PROTEST AGAINST RECENT TRIALS/PUNISHMENT (PARTICULARLY EXECUTIONS, WHICH NOW TOTAL 10) OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT-ELEMENTS, TEHRAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS -- LEAD BY FACULTY OF ENGINEERING STUDENTS-- MOUNTED ON-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATION AFTERNOON OF MARCH 7 AND EVEN LARGE ONE (CIRC 600) MORNING OF MARCH 8. WHILE UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION FELT CAPABLE OF HANDLING MARCH 7 DEMONSTRATION WITHOUT HELP OF OUTSIDE POLICE, THEY APPARENTLY FELT UNABLE DO SO MARCH 8 AND CALLED NATIONAL POLICE ONTO CAMPUS FOR BRIEF PERIOD. RESULT WAS MUCH MANHANDLING OF STUDENTS BUT THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF ANY SERIOUS CASUALTIES/CLASHES, AND UNIVERSITY WAS QUIET BY EARLY AFTERNOON. ¶2. SOME FACULTIES AT OTHER TEHRAN UNIVERSITIES (E.G. ARYAMEHR, NATIONAL AND POLYTECHNIC) ARE REPORTED TO HAVE ENGAGED IN SYMPATHY STRIKES" MARCH 8 BUT SO FAR NO DEMONSTRATIONS REPORTED* THERE IS RELIABLE REPORT THAT DEMONSTRATIONS BY STUDENTS AT UNIVERSITY OF MESHED (SIX OF 10 EXECUTED CAME FROM MESHED AREA) BECAME SERIOUS ENOUGH THAT UNIVERSITY WAS CLOSED THREE DAYS AGO AND STILL REMAINS CLOSED. (COMMENT: WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF GOI ORDERS TEHRAN UNIVERSITIES CLOSED UNTIL AFTER NO RUZ HOLIDAY.) ¶3. FROM COMMENTS OF STUDENTS AND OBSERVERS CLOSE TO ACADEMIC CIRCLES, IT SEEMS CLEAR LARGE PART OF MOTIVATION FOR DEMONSTRATION AND SYMPATHY STRIKES IS STUDENT ANGER OVER GOI'S CONTINUED DETENTION OF SEVERAL STUDENTS AS "ANTI-STATE" SUBVERSIVES AND, EVEN MORE, ANGER OVER RECENT TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS OF THOSE CONVICTED OF ANTI-STATE ACTIVITIES. THERE ARE ALREADY INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT GOI CONSIDERS TIMING OF DEMONSTRATIONS (PERHAPS DEMONSTRATIONS THEMSELVES) PROMOTED BY ANTI-STATE ELEMENTS TO EMBARRASS GOI DURING VISIT OF CHANCELLOR BRANDT AND HIS CONSIDERABLE PRESS RETINUE. ¶4. IN RELATED DEVELOPMENT, WHICH MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN INTENDED FOR EARS OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS AND THEIR SYMPATHIZERS SHAH LASHED OUT STRONGLY IN MARCH 7 PRESS CONFERENCE (WITH GERMAN PRESSMEN) AT WHAT HE LABELLED DISTORTED FOREIGN REPORTING ABOUT TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS. HIM HIT AT LE MONDE VIGOROUSLY AND REPEATEDLY, AND TOOK PARTICULAR EXCEPTION TO LE MONDE'S APPEAL FOR CLEMENCY FOR THOSE CONVICTED IN RECENT TRIALS. AFTER ASKING TWO RHETORICAL QUESTIONS "HAS LE MONDE EVER ASKED WHETHER THESE MURDERERS HAVE RIGHT TO TAKE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE? HAS LE MONDE EVER WRITTEN ONE WORD OF CONDEMNATION AGAINST TERRORISTS AND ASSASSINS SENT BY IRA TO EXTERMINATE PEOPLE?"), SHAH SAID FOREIGN PRESS HAS NO RIGHT GIVE ADVICE ON MATTERS THEY KNOW NOTHING ABOUT. HE RECALLED HIS "CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY" NOT TO PERMIT "TERROR OR ATTEMPTS AGAINST MY COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY BY AGENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES." EXEMPT HECK
TOP-SECRET: CONTINUING TERRORIST VIOLENCE
UNCLASSIFIED TEHRAN 5055 E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006 TAGS: IR PTER SUBJECT: CONTINUING TERRORIST VIOLENCE REF: TEHRAN 4887 SUMMARY: FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL SAID TAHERI, BOMBING AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE CONTINUED TO INCREASE. SAVAK MAINTAINING ITS POLICY OF WIDESPREAD PREVENTIVE ARRESTS AND, WHILE THIS RUNS RISK OF HEIGHTENING RESENTMENT AMONG POPULACE, OFFICIALS SEEM CONFIDENT THAT GUERRILLAS ARE ON THE RUN. WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE OFFICIAL OPTIMISM AND FEEL THAT SANGUINE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THE GUERRILLA REACTION THEY USUALLY PROVOKE MAY FURTHER ERODE CREDIBILITY OF SECURITY ORGANS IN MIND OF PUBLIC. END SUMMARY ¶1. IN WAKE OF SMOOTHLY HANDLED ASSASSINATION AUGUST 13 OF HEAD OF PRISONS BRIGADIER GENERAL SAID TAHERI (REFTEL) WHO WAS ALSO CHIEF OF AN ANTI-GUERRILLA SUBCOMMITTEE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, FREQUENCY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAS INCREASED. RECENT CONFIRMED INCIDENTS HAVE INCLUDED A BOMB IN A TEHRAN DEPARTMENT STORE WHICH INJURED THE TERRORIST PLANTING IT, BOMB IN TEHRAN NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY BUILDING WHICH KILLED WATCHMAN, APPREHENSION OF A TERRORIST IN SOUTH TEHRAN WHICH RESULTED IN ONE KILLED AND FIVE WOUNDED, AND SHOOTING TO DEATH OF THREE POLICEMEN IN A SMALL BAZAAR IN SOUTH TEHRAN. NUMEROUS OTHER BOMBINGS AND SHOOTINGS RUMORED BUT NOT VERIFIED BY EMBASSY OR CONFIRMED BY GOI. ¶2. SAVAK AND OTHER SECURITY ORGANS ARE PROCEEDING WITH A WIDESPREAD AND, WE HEAR, NOT VERY WELL TARGETED ROUND-UP OF SUSPECTS, AIDED BY LISTS OF NAMES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS FOUND IN DWELLING OF A RECENTLY SLAIN TERRORIST LEADER. POLICE NETS, WHICH ARE REPORTEDLY HAULING IN THE INNOCENT WITH THE GUILTY, HAVE EXTENDED AS FAR AFIELD AS ISFAHAN WHERE A NUMBER OF SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED TWO WEEKS AGO. ¶3. DESPITE INCREASING LEVEL OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, POLICE OFFICIALS REMAIN OPTIMISTIC. CHIEF OF NATIONAL POLICE LTG JAFFARQOLI SADRI ASSURED EMBOFF AUG. 17 THAT CURRENT FLURRY OF INCIDENTS CONSTITUTES DYING GASP OF GUERRILLAS WHO, HE CLAIMS, HAVE BEEN REDUCED BY TWO THIRDS IN PAST YEAR AND ARE FORCED TO ACT NOW TO SHOW THEY STILL EXIST. IN A MEDIA INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN LOCAL PRESS AUG. 19, SADRI UPPED FIGURE FOR REDUCTION OF GUERRILLA FORCES TO THREE FOURTHS, PREDICTED THAT REMAINING TERRORISTS WOULD SOON BE WIPED OUT AND REITERATED STANDARD GOVERNMENT LINE THAT GUERRILLAS ARE CONFUSED MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS OF MARXIST-LENINIST BENT BUT WITHOUT GOALS OR PROGRAM. IN DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFF SADRI ATTACHED NO PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO MURDER OF GENERAL TAHERI, ASSERTING THAT TERRORISTS WOULD HAVE BEEN SATISIFED WITH ANY HIGH-RANKING OFFICER AND CHOSE TAWERI ONLY BECUASE OF IOSLATED LOCATION OF HIS HOUSE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR LONG WALKS ALONE. SADRI ALSO DISCOUNTED POSSIBILITY THAT ASSASSINS WERE OF HIGHER CALIBER THAN RUN-OF-THE-MILL GUERRILLAS, POINTING OUT THAT SHOTS WHICH KILLED TAHERI HAD BEEN FIRED FROM 50 CENTIMETERS AND THAT "A CHILD COULD HIT A MAN FROM THAT DISTANCE." COMMENT: WE CONSIDER IT MORE LIKELY THAT TAHERI WAS PERSONALLY TARGETED DUE TO HIS DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. MOREOVER, SKILLFUL MANNER IN WHICH ASSASSINATION CARRIED OUT, REQUIRING CAREFUL PLANNING AND RECONNAISSANCE AS WELL AS DEFT EXECUTION, APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THOSE INVOLVED WERE MUCH BETTER TRAINED THAN AVERAGE TERRORISTS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN BLOWN UP BY THEIR OWN BOMBS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT NUMBER OF GUERRILLA INCIDENTS WILL BEGIN TO TAPER OFF, BUT WE DO NOT SHARE SADRI'S CONFIDENCE THAT HIS TACTICS AND THOSE OF SAVAK CAN COMPLETELY HALT TERRORIST ACTIVITY. IN FACT OVER REACTION AND TOO ZEALOUS A REPRESSION BY SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS SEEM AT LEAST AS LIKELY TO RECRUIT NEW GUERRILLAS AS TO STAMP OUT OLD ONES. IN ADDITION WISDOM SEEMS QUESTIONABLE OF SECURITY OFFICIALS MAKING PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT BREAKUP OF GUERRILLA GROUPS AND PREDICTIONS OF THEIR DEMISE. WE RECALL THAT THE LAST SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT LAST JANUARY WAS FOLLOWED BY SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS ON US-PROPERTIES AND OTHER SITES IN TEHRAN. IN OUR VIEW SUCH PUBLIC DECLARATIONS RUN RISK OF INCREASING CREDIBILITY GAP AND RESENTMENT ON PART OF PUBLIC WHO LIKELY BE INCREASINGLY APPREHENSIVE OF INDISCRIMINATE ARRESTS THAT DO NOT SEEM TO BE STAMPING OUT TERRORISTS. THE PROGNOSTICATION THEREFORE IS FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE TERRORISM BUT, DESPITE SUCCESSFUL MURDER OF TAHERI, WE DO NOT CONCLUDE THAT GUERRILLAS WILL NOW PLACE GREATER RELIANCE ON ASSASSINATION AS A TOOL. REASON IS THAT TERRORISTS STILL LACK ENOUGH TRAINED PERSONNEL TO PULL OFF ASSASSINATIONS ON REGULAR BASIS. FARLAND
TOP-SECRET: The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río
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The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río
Ambassador Cited Accused Colombian General’s Reliance on Death Squads
“Systematic” Support of Paramilitaries “Pivotal to his Military Success”
Infamous General a “Not-So-Success” Story of U.S. Military Training
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 327
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TOP-SECRET: THE CIA FILE ON LUIS POSADA CARRILES
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THE CIA FILE
ON LUIS POSADA CARRILESA FORMER AGENCY ASSET GOES ON TRIAL IN THE U.S
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 334
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TOP-SECRET: Ex-Kaibil Officer Connected to Dos Erres Massacre Arrested in Alberta, Canada

Ex-Kaibil Officer Connected to Dos Erres Massacre Arrested in Alberta, Canada
Declassified documents show that U.S. officials knew the Guatemalan Army was responsible for the 1982 mass murder
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TOP-SECRET – THE FBI FILEAS ABOUT THE AMERICAN NAZI PARTY
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american_nazi_party_monograph_pt02
DOWNLOAD THE FBI FILEY BY MOUSECLICK ABOVE
American Nazi Party
| American Nazi Party | |
|---|---|
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| Founder | George Lincoln Rockwell |
| Founded | 1959 |
| Headquarters | Arlington, Virginia |
| Ideology | Neo-Nazism White Separatism White Nationalism Antisemitism National Socialism |
| Political position | Far-Right |
| Website | |
| http://www.americannaziparty.com/ | |
The American Nazi Party (ANP) was an American political party founded by discharged U.S. Navy Commander George Lincoln Rockwell. Headquartered in Arlington,Virginia, Rockwell initially called it the World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists (WUFENS), but later renamed it the American Nazi Party in 1960 to attract maximum media attention.[1] The party was based largely upon the ideals and policies of Adolf Hitler‘s NSDAP in Germany during the Third Reich but also expressed allegiance to the Constitutional principles of the U.S.’s Founding Fathers[citation needed]. It also added a platform of Holocaust denial.
Headquarters
The WUFENS headquarters was first located in a residence on Williamsburg Road in Arlington, but was later moved as the ANP headquarters to a house at 928 North Randolph Street (now a hotel and office building site). Rockwell and some party members also established a “Stormtrooper Barracks” in a farmhouse in the Dominion Hills section of Arlington at what is now the Upton Hill Regional Park, the tallest hill in the county. After Rockwell’s death, the headquarters was moved again to one side of a duplex brick and concrete storefront at 2507 North Franklin Road which featured a swastika prominently mounted above the front door. This site was visible from busy Wilson Boulevard. Today the Franklin Road address is often misidentified as Rockwell’s headquarters when in fact it was the successor organization’s last physical address in Arlington (now a coffeehouse).[2] [3]
Name change and party reform
After several years of living in impoverished conditions, Rockwell began to experience some financial success with paid speaking engagements at universities where he was invited to express his controversial views as exercises in free speech. This inspired him to end the rancorous “Phase One” party tactics and begin “Phase Two”, a plan to recast the group as a legitimate political party by toning down the verbal and written attacks against non-whites, replacing the party rallying cry of “Sieg Heil!” with “White Power!”, limiting public display of the swastika, and entering candidates in local elections. On January 1, 1967 Rockwell renamed the ANP to the National Socialist White People’s Party (NSWPP), a move that alienated some hard-line members. Before he could fully implement party reforms, Rockwell was assassinated on August 25, 1967 by disgruntled follower, John Patler.
Assassination of George Lincoln Rockwell
An assassination attempt was made on Rockwell on June 28, 1967. As Rockwell returned from shopping, he drove into the party headquarters driveway on Wilson Boulevard and found it blocked by a felled tree and brush. Rockwell assumed that it was another prank by local teens. As a young boy cleared the obstruction, two shots were fired at Rockwell from behind one of the swastika-embossed brick driveway pillars. One of the shots ricocheted off the car, right next to his head. Leaping from the car, Rockwell pursued the would-be assassin. On June 30, Rockwell petitioned the Arlington County Circuit Court for a gun permit; no action was ever taken on his request.
On August 25, 1967, Rockwell was killed by John Patler, a former party member whom Rockwell had ejected from the party for allegedly trying to introduce Marxist doctrine into the party’s platforms. While leaving the Econowash laundromat at the Dominion Hills Shopping Center in Arlington, Virginia, two bullets entered his car through his windshield, striking Rockwell in the head and chest. His car slowly rolled backwards to a stop and Rockwell staggered out of the front passenger side door of the car, and then collapsed on the pavement.[4]
Koehl succession and ideological divisions
Rockwell’s deputy commander, Matt Koehl, a staunch Hitlerist, assumed the leadership role after a party council agreed that he should retain command. Koehl continued some of Rockwell’s reforms such as emphasizing the glories of a future all-white society but retained the pseudo-Nazi uniforms of the party’s “Storm Troopers” who had been modeled on the NSDAP‘s Sturmabteilung, and the swastika-festooned party literature. In 1968 Koehl moved the party to a new headquarters at 2507 North Franklin Road, clearly visible from Arlington‘s main thoroughfare, Wilson Boulevard. He also established a printing press, a “George Lincoln Rockwell Memorial Book Store”, and member living quarters on property nearby.
The party began to experience ideological division among its followers as it entered the 1970s. In 1970, member Frank Collin, who was secretly an ethnic Jew, broke away from the group and founded the National Socialist Party of America, which became famous due to an attempt to march through Skokie, Illinois, which led to anUnited States Supreme Court Case.[5]
Other dissatisfied members of the NSWPP chose to support William Luther Pierce, eventually forming the National Alliance in 1974.
Further membership erosion occurred as Koehl, drawing heavily upon the teachings of Hitlerian mystic Savitri Devi, began to suggest that National Socialism was more akin to a religious movement than a political one. He espoused the belief that Hitler was the gift of an inscrutable divine providence sent to rescue the white race from decadence and gradual extinction caused by a declining birth rate and miscegenation. Hitler’s death in 1945 was viewed as a type of martyrdom; a voluntary, Christ-like self-sacrifice, that looked forward to a spiritual resurrection of National Socialism at a later date when the Aryan race would need it the most. These esoteric beliefs led to disputes with the World Union of National Socialists, which Rockwell had founded and whose leader, Danish neo-Nazi Povl Riis-Knudsen, had been appointed by Koehl. Undaunted, Koehl continued to recast the party as a new religion in formation. Public rallies were gradually phased out in favor of low-key gatherings in private venues. On Labor Day 1979, in a highly unpopular move for some members, Koehl disbanded the party’s paramilitary “Storm Troopers”. The Koehl organization is now known as the New Order and operates so far from the public spotlight that few of today’s neo-Nazis are aware of its existence or know that it is the linear descendant of Rockwell’s original ANP. On November 3, 1979, members of the American Nazi Party and the Ku Klux Klan attacked a Communist Workers’ Party protest march. The alliance of Nazis and Klansmen shot and killed five marchers. Forty Klansmen and Nazis, and several Communist marchers were involved in the shootings; sixteen Klansmen and Nazis were arrested and the six best cases were brought to trial first. Two criminal trials resulted in the acquittal of the defendants by all-white juries. However, in a 1985 civil lawsuit the survivors won a $350,000 judgment against the city, the Klan and the Nazi Party for violating the civil rights of the demonstrators. The shootings became known as the “Greensboro Massacre“.
Namesake organization
Today, the name “American Nazi Party” has been adopted by an organization headed by Rocky J. Suhayda. Headquartered in Westland, Michigan, this group claims George Lincoln Rockwell as their founder, but there is no actual connection to the original ANP or its successor organizations, apart from the fact that their website sells nostalgic reprints of Rockwell’s 1960s-era magazine “The Stormtrooper”.
Notable former members
- Frank Collin, founder of the National Socialist Party of America
- William Luther Pierce (founder of the National Alliance)
- Kurt Saxon (author of The Poor Man’s James Bond)
TOP-SECRET – THE FBI FILES ABOUT WERNHER VON BRAUN – THE SS-LEADER AND THE NASA-BRAIN
DOWNLOAD THE FBI FILES ABOVE BY MOUSECLICK
Wernher von Braun
| Wernher von Braun | |
|---|---|
Von Braun at his desk at Marshall Space Flight Center in May 1964, with models of the Saturn rocket family |
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| Born | March 23, 1912 Wirsitz, German Empire |
| Died | June 16, 1977 (aged 65) Alexandria, Virginia, United States |
| Cause of death | Pancreatic cancer |
| Resting place | Alexandria, Virginia, United States |
| Nationality | German, American |
| Alma mater | Technical University of Berlin |
| Occupation | Rocket engineer and designer |
| Spouse | Maria Luise von Quistorp(m. 1947–1977) |
| Children | Iris Careen von Braun Margrit Cecile von Braun Peter Constantine von Braun |
| Parents | Magnus von Braun (senior) (1877-1972) Emmy von Quistorp (1886-1959) |
| Military career | |
| Allegiance | Nazi Germany |
| Service/branch | SS |
| Years of service | 1937–1945 |
| Rank | Sturmbannführer, SS |
| Battles/wars | World War II |
| Awards | Knights Cross of the War Merit Cross (1944) War Merit Cross, First Class with Swords (1943) |
| Other work | Rocket engineer, NASA, Built the Saturn V rocket of the Apollo manned moon missions |
Wernher Magnus Maximilian, Freiherr[1] von Braun (March 23, 1912 – June 16, 1977) was a German rocket scientist, aerospace engineer, space architect, and one of the leading figures in the development of rocket technology in Nazi Germany during World War II and in the United States after that.
A former member of the Nazi party, commissioned Sturmbannführer of the paramilitary SS and decorated Nazi war hero, von Braun would later be regarded as the preeminent rocket engineer of the 20th century in his role with the United States civilian space agency NASA.[2] In his 20s and early 30s, von Braun was the central figure in Germany’s rocket development program, responsible for the design and realization of the deadly V-2 combat rocket during World War II. After the war, he and some of his rocket team were taken to the U.S. as part of the then-secret Operation Paperclip. Von Braun worked on the US Army intermediate range ballistic missile(IRBM) program before his group was assimilated by NASA, under which he served as director of the newly-formed Marshall Space Flight Center and as the chief architect of the Saturn V launch vehicle, the superbooster that propelled the Apollo spacecraft to the Moon.[3] According to one NASA source, he is “without doubt, the greatest rocket scientist in history. His crowning achievement was to lead the development of the Saturn V booster rocket that helped land the first men on the Moon in July 1969.”[4] In 1975 he received the National Medal of Science.
Early life
Wernher von Braun was born in Wirsitz (Wyrzysk), Province of Posen, then a part of the German Empire, and was the second of three sons. He belonged to anaristocratic family, inheriting the German title of Freiherr (equivalent to Baron). His father, conservative civil servant Magnus Freiherr von Braun (1878–1972), served as a Minister of Agriculture in the Federal Cabinet during the Weimar Republic. His mother, Emmy von Quistorp (1886–1959), could trace her ancestry through both parents to medieval European royalty, a descendant of Philip III of France, Valdemar I of Denmark, Robert III of Scotland, and Edward III of England.[5][6] Von Braun had a younger brother, also named Magnus Freiherr von Braun.[7] After Wernher von Braun’s Lutheran confirmation, his mother gave him a telescope, and he developed a passion for astronomy. When Wyrzysk was transferred to Poland at the end of World War I, his family, like many other German families, moved to Germany. They settled in Berlin, where 12-year-old von Braun, inspired by speed records established by Max Valier and Fritz von Opel in rocket-propelled cars,[8] caused a major disruption in a crowded street by detonating a toy wagon to which he had attached a number of fireworks. He was taken into custody by the local police until his father came to collect him.
Von Braun was an accomplished amateur musician who could play Beethoven and Bach from memory. Von Braun learned to play the cello and the piano at an early age and originally wanted to become a composer. He took lessons from Paul Hindemith, the famous composer. The few pieces of von Braun’s youthful compositions that exist are reminiscent of Hindemith’s style.[9]
Beginning in 1925, von Braun attended a boarding school at Ettersburg Castle near Weimar where he did not do well in physics and mathematics. In 1928 his parents moved him to the Hermann-Lietz-Internat (also a residential school) on the East Frisian North Sea island of Spiekeroog. There he acquired a copy of Die Rakete zu den Planetenräumen (1929) (By Rocket into Interplanetary Space) (in German)[10] by rocket pioneer Hermann Oberth. Space travel had always fascinated von Braun, and from then on he applied himself to physics and mathematics to pursue his interest in rocket engineering.
In 1930 he attended the Technical University of Berlin, where he joined the Verein für Raumschiffahrt (VfR, the “Spaceflight Society”) and assisted Willy Ley in his liquid-fueled rocket motor tests in conjunction withHermann Oberth.[11] He also studied at ETH Zurich. Although he worked mainly on military rockets in his later years there, space travel remained his primary interest.
The following episode from the early 1930s is telling in this respect. At this time von Braun attended a presentation given by Auguste Piccard. After the talk the young student approached the famous pioneer of high-altitude balloon flight, and stated to him: “You know, I plan on travelling to the Moon at some time.” Piccard is said to have responded with encouraging words.[12]
He was greatly influenced by Oberth, and he said of him:
Hermann Oberth was the first, who when thinking about the possibility of spaceships grabbed a slide-rule and presented mathematically analyzed concepts and designs…. I, myself, owe to him not only the guiding-star of my life, but also my first contact with the theoretical and practical aspects of rocketry and space travel. A place of honor should be reserved in the history of science and technology for his ground-breaking contributions in the field of astronautics.[13]
German career
]The Prussian rocketeer and working under the Nazis
Walter Dornberger, Friedrich Olbricht, Wilhelm von Leeb, and von Braun at Peenemünde, 1941
Von Braun was working on his creative doctorate when the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP, or Nazi party) came to power in a coalition government in Germany; rocketry almost immediately became part of the national agenda. An artillery captain, Walter Dornberger, arranged an OrdnanceDepartment research grant for Von Braun, who then worked next to Dornberger’s existing solid-fuel rocket test site at Kummersdorf. He was awarded a doctorate in physics[14] (aerospace engineering) on July 27, 1934 from the University of Berlin for a thesis titled About Combustion Tests; his doctoral advisor was Erich Schumann.[15] However, this thesis was only the public part of von Braun’s work. His actual full thesis, Construction, Theoretical, and Experimental Solution to the Problem of the Liquid Propellant Rocket (dated April 16, 1934) was kept classified by the army, and was not published until 1960.[16] By the end of 1934, his group had successfully launched two rockets that rose to heights of 2.2 and 3.5 kilometers.
At the time, Germany was highly interested in American physicist Robert H. Goddard‘s research. Before 1939, German scientists occasionally contacted Goddard directly with technical questions. Wernher von Braun used Goddard’s plans from various journals and incorporated them into the building of the Aggregat(A) series of rockets. The A-4 rocket is the well known V-2.[17] In 1963, von Braun reflected on the history of rocketry, and said of Goddard’s work: “His rockets … may have been rather crude by present-day standards, but they blazed the trail and incorporated many features used in our most modern rockets and space vehicles.”[8] Goddard confirmed his work was used by von Braun in 1944, shortly before the Nazis began firing V-2s at England. A V2 crashed in Sweden and some parts were sent to an Annapolis lab where Goddard was doing research for the Navy. If this was the so-called Bäckebo Bomb, it had been procured by the British in exchange for Spitfires; Annapolis would have received some parts from them. Goddard is reported to have recognized components he had invented, and inferred that his brainchild had been turned into a weapon.[18]
There were no German rocket societies after the collapse of the VFR, and civilian rocket tests were forbidden by the new Nazi regime. Only military development was allowed and to this end, a larger facility was erected at the village of Peenemünde in northern Germany on the Baltic Sea. This location was chosen partly on the recommendation of von Braun’s mother, who recalled her father’s duck-hunting expeditions there. Dornberger became the military commander at Peenemünde, with von Braun as technical director. In collaboration with the Luftwaffe, the Peenemünde group developed liquid-fuel rocket engines for aircraft and jet-assisted takeoffs. They also developed the long-range A-4 ballistic missile and the supersonic Wasserfall anti-aircraft missile.
In November 1937 (other sources: December 1, 1932), von Braun joined the National Socialist German Workers Party. An Office of Military Government, United States document dated April 23, 1947, states that von Braun joined the Waffen-SS (Schutzstaffel) horseback riding school in 1933, then the National Socialist Party on May 1, 1937, and became an officer in the Waffen-SS from May 1940 until the end of the war.
Amongst his comments about his NSDAP membership von Braun has said:
I was officially demanded to join the National Socialist Party. At this time (1937) I was already technical director of the Army Rocket Center at Peenemünde … My refusal to join the party would have meant that I would have to abandon the work of my life. Therefore, I decided to join. My membership in the party did not involve any political activities … in Spring 1940, one SS-Standartenführer (SS Colonel) Müller … looked me up in my office at Peenemünde and told me that Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler had sent him with the order to urge me to join the SS. I called immediately on my military superior … Major-General W. Dornberger. He informed me that … if I wanted to continue our mutual work, I had no alternative but to join.[19]
That claim has been often disputed because in 1940, the Waffen-SS had shown no interest in Peenemünde yet.[20] Also, the assertion that persons in von Braun’s position were pressured to join the Nazi party, let alone the SS, has been disputed.[21] When shown a picture of him behind Himmler, Braun claimed to have worn the SS uniform only that one time,[citation needed] but in 2002 a former SS officer at Peenemünde told the BBC that von Braun had regularly worn the SS uniform to official meetings; it should be noted that this was mandatory.[22] He began as an Untersturmführer (Second Lieutenant) and was promoted three times by Himmler, the last time in June 1943 to SS-Sturmbannführer (Wehrmacht Major). Von Braun claimed this was a technical promotion received each year regularly by mail.[22]
On December 22, 1942, Adolf Hitler signed the order approving the production of the A-4 as a “vengeance weapon” and the group developed it to target London. Following von Braun’s July 7, 1943 presentation of a color movie showing an A-4 taking off, Hitler was so enthusiastic that he personally made von Braun a professor shortly thereafter.[23] In Germany at this time, this was an exceptional promotion for an engineer who was only 31 years old.
By that time the British and Soviet intelligence agencies were aware of the rocket program and von Braun’s team at Peenemünde. Over the nights of 17 and 18 August 1943RAF Bomber Command‘s Operation Hydra dispatched raids on the Peenemünde camp consisting of 596 aircraft and dropping 1,800 tons of explosives.[24] The facility was salvaged and most of the science team remained unharmed; however, the raids killed von Braun’s engine designer Walter Thiel and Chief Engineer Walther, and the rocket program was delayed.[25][26]
The first combat A-4, renamed the V-2 (Vergeltungswaffe 2 “Retaliation/Vengeance Weapon 2”) for propaganda purposes, was launched toward England on September 7, 1944, only 21 months after the project had been officially commissioned. Von Braun’s interest in rockets was specifically for the application of space travel, which led him to say on hearing the news from London: “The rocket worked perfectly except for landing on the wrong planet.” He described it as his “darkest day”.[citation needed] However, satirist Mort Sahl is often credited with mocking von Braun with the paraphrase “I aim at the stars, but sometimes I hit London“.[27] In fact that line appears in the film I Aim at the Stars, a 1960 biopic on von Braun.
Experiments with rocket aircraft
During 1936 von Braun’s rocketry team working at Kummersdorf investigated installing liquid-fuelled rockets in aircraft. Ernst Heinkel enthusiastically supported their efforts, supplying a He 72 and later two He 112sfor the experiments. Late in 1936 Erich Warsitz was seconded by the RLM to Wernher von Braun and Ernst Heinkel, because he had been recognized as one of the most experienced test-pilots of the time, and because he also had an extraordinary fund of technical knowledge.[28] After von Braun familiarized Warsitz with a test-stand run, showing him the corresponding apparatus in the aircraft, he asked:
“Are you with us and will you test the rocket in the air? Then, Warsitz, you will be a famous man. And later we will fly to the moon – with you at the helm!”[29]
In June 1937, at Neuhardenberg (a large field about 70 kilometres east of Berlin, listed as a reserve airfield in the event of war), one of these latter aircraft was flown with itspiston engine shut down during flight by test pilot Erich Warsitz, at which time it was propelled by von Braun’s rocket power alone. Despite the wheels-up landing and having the fuselage on fire, it proved to official circles that an aircraft could be flown satisfactorily with a back-thrust system through the rear.[30]
At the same time, Hellmuth Walter‘s experiments into Hydrogen peroxide-based rockets were leading towards light and simple rockets that appeared well-suited for aircraft installation. Also the firm of Hellmuth Walter at Kiel had been commissioned by the RLM to build a rocket engine for the He 112, so there were two different new rocket motor designs at Neuhardenberg: whereas von Braun’s engines were powered by alcohol and liquid oxygen, Walter engines had hydrogen peroxide and calcium permanganate as acatalyst. Von Braun’s engines used direct combustion and created fire, the Walter devices used hot vapours from a chemical reaction, but both created thrust and provided high speed.[31] The subsequent flights with the He 112 used the Walter-rocket instead of von Braun’s; it was more reliable, simpler to operate and the dangers to test-pilot Erich Warsitz and machine were less.[32]
Slave labor
SS General Hans Kammler, who as an engineer had constructed several concentration camps including Auschwitz, had a reputation for brutality and had originated the idea of using concentration camp prisoners as slave laborers in the rocket program. Arthur Rudolph, chief engineer of the V-2 rocket factory at Peenemünde, endorsed this idea in April 1943 when a labor shortage developed. More people died building the V-2 rockets than were killed by it as a weapon.[33] Von Braun admitted visiting the plant at Mittelwerk on many occasions, and called conditions at the plant “repulsive”, but claimed never to have witnessed any deaths or beatings, although it had become clear to him by 1944 that deaths had occurred.[34] He denied ever having visited the Mittelbau-Dora concentration camp itself, where 20,000 died from illness, beatings, hangings and intolerable working conditions.[35]
On August 15, 1944, von Braun wrote a letter to Albin Sawatzki, manager of the V-2 production, admitting that he personally picked labor slaves from the Buchenwald concentration camp, who, he admitted 25 years later in an interview, had been in a “pitiful shape”.[not in citation given][3]
In Wernher von Braun: Crusader for Space, numerous statements by von Braun show he was aware of the conditions but felt completely unable to change them. A friend quotes von Braun speaking of a visit to Mittelwerk:
It is hellish. My spontaneous reaction was to talk to one of the SS guards, only to be told with unmistakable harshness that I should mind my own business, or find myself in the same striped fatigues!… I realized that any attempt of reasoning on humane grounds would be utterly futile. (Page 44)
When asked if von Braun could have protested against the brutal treatment of the slave laborers, von Braun team member Konrad Dannenberg told The Huntsville Times, “If he had done it, in my opinion, he would have been shot on the spot.”[36]
Others claim von Braun engaged in brutal treatment or approved of it. Guy Morand, a French resistance fighter who was a prisoner in Dora, testified in 1995 that after an apparent sabotage attempt:
Without even listening to my explanations, [von Braun] ordered the Meister to have me given 25 strokes…Then, judging that the strokes weren’t sufficiently hard, he ordered I be flogged more vigorously…von Braun made me translate that I deserved much more, that in fact I deserved to be hanged…I would say his cruelty, of which I was personally a victim, are, I would say, an eloquent testimony to his Nazi fanaticism.[37]
Robert Cazabonne, another French prisoner, testified that von Braun stood by and watched as prisoners were hung by chains from hoists.[38] Von Braun claimed he “never saw any kind of abuse or killing” and only “heard rumors…that some prisoners had been hanged in the underground galleries”.[39]
Arrest and release by the Nazi regime
According to André Sellier, a French historian and survivor of the Mittelbau-Dora concentration camp, Himmler had von Braun come to his Hochwald HQ in East Prussia in February 1944. To increase his power-base within the Nazi régime, Heinrich Himmler was conspiring to use Kammler to gain control of all German armament programs, including the V-2 program at Peenemünde.[40] He therefore recommended that von Braun work more closely with Kammler to solve the problems of the V-2, but von Braun claimed to have replied that the problems were merely technical and he was confident that they would be solved with Dornberger’s assistance.
Apparently von Braun had been under SD surveillance since October 1943. A report stated that he and his colleagues Riedel and Gröttrup were said to have expressed regret at an engineer’s house one evening that they were not working on a spaceship and that they felt the war was not going well; this was considered a “defeatist” attitude. A young female dentist who was an SS spy reported their comments.[40] Combined with Himmler’s false charges that von Braun was a communist sympathizer and had attempted to sabotage the V-2 program, and considering that von Braun was a qualified pilot who regularly piloted his government-provided airplane that might allow him to escape to England, this led to his arrest by the Gestapo.[40]
The unsuspecting von Braun was detained on March 14 (or March 15),[41] 1944 and was taken to a Gestapo cell in Stettin (now Szczecin, Poland),[40] where he was imprisoned for two weeks without even knowing the charges against him. It was only through the Abwehr in Berlin that Dornberger was able to obtain von Braun’s conditional release and Albert Speer, Reichsminister for Munitions and War Production, convinced Hitler to reinstate von Braun so that the V-2 program could continue.[40] Quoting from the “Führerprotokoll” (the minutes of Hitler’s meetings) dated May 13, 1944 in his memoirs, Speer later relayed what Hitler had finally conceded: “In the matter concerning B. I will guarantee you that he will be exempt from persecution as long as he is indispensable for you, in spite of the difficult general consequences this will have.”
Von Braun (with arm cast) immediately after his surrender
Surrender to the Americans
The Soviet Army was about 160 km from Peenemünde in the spring of 1945 when von Braun assembled his planning staff and asked them to decide how and to whom they should surrender. Afraid of the well known Soviet cruelty to prisoners of war, von Braun and his staff decided to try to surrender to the Americans. Kammler had ordered relocation of von Braun’s team to central Germany; however, a conflicting order from an army chief ordered them to join the army and fight. Deciding that Kammler’s order was their best bet to defect to the Americans, von Braun fabricated documents and transported 500 of his affiliates to the area around Mittelwerk, where they resumed their work. For fear of their documents being destroyed by the SS, von Braun ordered the blueprints to be hidden in an abandoned mine shaft in the Harzmountain range.[42]
While on an official trip in March, von Braun suffered a complicated fracture of his left arm and shoulder after his driver fell asleep at the wheel. His injuries were serious, but he insisted that his arm be set in a cast so he could leave the hospital. Due to this neglect of the injury he had to be hospitalized again a month later where his bones had to be re-broken and re-aligned.[42]
In April, as the Allied forces advanced deeper into Germany, Kammler ordered the science team to be moved by train into the town of Oberammergau in the Bavarian Alpswhere they were closely guarded by the SS with orders to execute the team if they were about to fall into enemy hands. However, von Braun managed to convince SS Major Kummer to order the dispersion of the group into nearby villages so that they would not be an easy target for U.S. bombers.[42]
On May 2, 1945, upon finding an American private from the U.S. 44th Infantry Division, von Braun’s brother and fellow rocket engineer, Magnus, approached the soldier on a bicycle, calling out in broken English: “My name is Magnus von Braun. My brother invented the V-2. We want to surrender.”[7][43] After the surrender, von Braun spoke to the press:
“We knew that we had created a new means of warfare, and the question as to what nation, to what victorious nation we were willing to entrust this brainchild of ours was a moral decision more than anything else. We wanted to see the world spared another conflict such as Germany had just been through, and we felt that only by surrendering such a weapon to people who are guided by the Bible could such an assurance to the world be best secured.”[44]
The American high command was well aware of how important their catch was: von Braun had been at the top of the Black List, the code name for the list of German scientists and engineers targeted for immediate interrogation by U.S. military experts. On June 19, 1945, two days before the scheduled handover of the area to the Soviets, US Army Major Robert B. Staver, Chief of the Jet Propulsion Section of the Research and Intelligence Branch of the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps in London, and Lt Col R. L. Williams took von Braun and his department chiefs by jeep from Garmisch to Munich. The group was flown to Nordhausen, and was evacuated 40 miles (64 km) southwest to Witzenhausen, a small town in the American Zone, the next day.[45] Von Braun was briefly detained at the “Dustbin” interrogation center at Kransberg Castle where the elite of the Third Reich’s economy, science and technology were debriefed by U.S. and British intelligence officials.[46] Initially he was recruited to the U.S. under a program called “Operation Overcast,” subsequently known as Operation Paperclip.
American career
U.S. Army career
On June 20, 1945, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull[dubious – discuss] approved the transfer of von Braun and his specialists to America; however this was not announced to the public until October 1, 1945.[47]Von Braun was among those scientists for whom the U.S. Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency created false employment histories and expunged Nazi Party memberships and regime affiliations from the public record. Once “bleached” of their Nazism, the US Government granted the scientists security clearance to work in the United States. “Paperclip,” the project’s operational name, derived from the paperclips used to attach the scientists’ new political personæ to their “US Government Scientist” personnel files.[48]
The first seven technicians arrived in the United States at New Castle Army Air Field, just south of Wilmington, Delaware, on September 20, 1945. They were then flown to Boston and taken by boat to the Army Intelligence Service post at Fort Strong in Boston Harbor. Later, with the exception of von Braun, the men were transferred to Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland to sort out the Peenemünde documents, enabling the scientists to continue their rocketry experiments.
Finally, von Braun and his remaining Peenemünde staff (see List of German rocket scientists in the United States) were transferred to their new home at Fort Bliss, Texas, a large Army installation just north of El Paso. Von Braun would later write he found it hard to develop a “genuine emotional attachment” to his new surroundings.[49] His chief design engineer Walther Reidel became the subject of a December 1946 article “German Scientist Says American Cooking Tasteless; Dislikes Rubberized Chicken,’ exposing the presence of von Braun’s team in the country and drawing criticism from Albert Einstein and John Dingell.[49]Requests to improve their living conditions such as laying linoleum over their cracked wood flooring were rejected.[49] Von Braun remarked that “…at Peenemünde we had been coddled, here you were counting pennies…”[49] At the age of 26, von Braun had thousands of engineers who answered to him, but was now answering to “pimply” 26 year-old Major Jim Hamill who possessed an undergraduate degree in engineering.[49] His loyal Germans still addressed him as Herr Professor, but Hamill addressed him as Wernher and never bothered to respond to von Braun’s request for more materials, and every proposal for new rocket ideas were dismissed.[49]
While there, they trained military, industrial and university personnel in the intricacies of rockets and guided missiles. As part of the Hermes project they helped to refurbish, assemble and launch a number of V-2s that had been shipped from Germany to the White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico. They also continued to study the future potential of rockets for military and research applications. Since they were not permitted to leave Fort Bliss without military escort, von Braun and his colleagues began to refer to themselves only half-jokingly as “PoPs,” “Prisoners of Peace.”
In 1950, at the start of the Korean War, von Braun and his team were transferred to Huntsville, Alabama, his home for the next 20 years. Between 1950 and 1956, von Braun led the Army’s rocket development team at Redstone Arsenal, resulting in the Redstone rocket, which was used for the first live nuclear ballistic missile tests conducted by the United States.
As director of the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), von Braun, with his team, then developed the Jupiter-C, a modified Redstone rocket.[50] The Jupiter-C successfully launched the West’s first satellite, Explorer 1, on January 31, 1958. This event signaled the birth of America’s space program.
Despite the work on the Redstone rocket, the twelve years from 1945 to 1957 were probably some of the most frustrating for von Braun and his colleagues. In the Soviet Union, Sergei Korolev and his team of scientists and engineers plowed ahead with several new rocket designs and the Sputnik program, while the American government was not very interested in von Braun’s work or views and only embarked on a very modest rocket-building program. In the meantime, the press tended to dwell on von Braun’s past as a member of the SS and the slave labor used to build his V-2 rockets.
Popular concepts for a human presence in space
Repeating the pattern he had established during his earlier career in Germany, von Braun – while directing military rocket development in the real world – continued to entertain his engineer-scientist’s dream of a future world in which rockets would be used for space exploration. However, instead of risking being sacked, he now was increasingly in a position to popularize these ideas. The May 14, 1950 headline of The Huntsville Times (“Dr. von Braun Says Rocket Flights Possible to Moon”) might have marked the beginning of these efforts. These disclosures rode a moonflight publicity wave that was created by the two 1950 U.S. science fiction films, Destination Moon and Rocketship X-M.
In 1952, von Braun first published his concept of a manned space station in a Collier’s Weekly magazine series of articles entitled “Man Will Conquer Space Soon!“. These articles were illustrated by the space artist Chesley Bonestell and were influential in spreading his ideas. Frequently von Braun worked with fellow German-born space advocate and science writer Willy Ley to publish his concepts, which, unsurprisingly, were heavy on the engineering side and anticipated many technical aspects of space flight that later became reality.
The space station (to be constructed using rockets with recoverable and reusable ascent stages) would be a toroid structure, with a diameter of 250 feet (76 m). The space station would spin around a central docking nave to provide artificial gravity, and would be assembled in a 1,075 mile (1,730 km) two-hour, high-inclination Earth orbit allowing observation of essentially every point on earth on at least a daily basis. The ultimate purpose of the space station would be to provide an assembly platform for manned lunar expeditions. The notion of a rotating wheel-shaped station was introduced in 1929 by Herman Potočnik in his bookThe Problem of Space Travel – The Rocket Motor. More than a decade later, the movie version of 2001: A Space Odyssey would draw heavily on the design concept in its visualization of an orbital space station.
Von Braun envisaged these expeditions as very large-scale undertakings, with a total of 50 astronauts travelling in three huge spacecraft (two for crew, one primarily for cargo), each 49 m (160.76 ft) long and 33 m (108.27 ft) in diameter and driven by a rectangular array of 30 rocket propulsion engines.[51] Upon arrival, astronauts would establish a permanent lunar base in the Sinus Roris region by using the emptied cargo holds of their craft as shelters, and would explore their surroundings for eight weeks. This would include a 400 km expedition in pressurized rovers to the crater Harpalus and the Mare Imbrium foothills.
Walt Disney and von Braun, seen in 1954 holding a model of his passenger ship, collaborated on a series of three educational films.
At this time von Braun also worked out preliminary concepts for a manned Mars mission that used the space station as a staging point. His initial plans, published in The Mars Project (1952), had envisaged a fleet of ten spacecraft (each with a mass of 3,720 metric tons), three of them unmanned and each carrying one 200-ton winged lander[52] in addition to cargo, and nine crew vehicles transporting a total of 70 astronauts. Gigantic as this mission plan was, its engineering and astronautical parameters were thoroughly calculated. A later project was much more modest, using only one purely orbital cargo ship and one crewed craft. In each case, the expedition would use minimum-energy Hohmann transfer orbits for its trips to Mars and back to Earth.
Before technically formalizing his thoughts on human spaceflight to Mars, von Braun had written a science fiction novel, set in 1980, on the subject. According to his biographer, Erik Bergaust, the manuscript was rejected by no less than 18 publishers. Von Braun later published small portions of this opus in magazines, to illustrate selected aspects of his Mars project popularizations. The complete manuscript, titled Project MARS: A Technical Tale, did not appear as a printed book until December 2006.[53]
In the hope that its involvement would bring about greater public interest in the future of the space program, von Braun also began working with Walt Disney and the Disney studios as a technical director, initially for three television films about space exploration. The initial broadcast devoted to space exploration was Man in Space, which first went on air on March 9, 1955, drawing 42 million viewers and unofficially the second-highest rated television show in American history.[49][54]
Later (in 1959) von Braun published a short booklet[55] — condensed from episodes that had appeared in This Week Magazine before—describing his updated concept of the first manned lunar landing. The scenario included only a single and relatively small spacecraft—a winged lander with a crew of only two experienced pilots who had already circumnavigated the moon on an earlier mission. The brute-force direct ascent flight schedule used a rocket design with five sequential stages, loosely based on the Novadesigns that were under discussion at this time. After a night launch from a Pacific island the first three stages would bring the spacecraft (with the two remaining upper stages attached) to terrestrial escape velocity, with each burn creating an acceleration of 8-9 times standard gravity. Residual propellant in the third stage would be used for the deceleration intended to commence only a few hundred kilometers above the landing site in a crater near the lunar north pole. The fourth stage provided acceleration to lunar escape velocity while the fifth stage would be responsible for a deceleration during return to the Earth to a residual speed that allows aerocapture of the spacecraft ending in a runway landing, much in the way of the Space Shuttle. One remarkable feature of this technical tale is that the engineer Wernher von Braun anticipated a medical phenomenon that would become apparent only years later: being a veteran astronaut with no history of serious adverse reactions to weightlessness offers no protection against becoming unexpectedly and violently spacesick.
Von Braun with President Kennedy at Redstone Arsenal in 1963
Von Braun with the F-1 engines of the Saturn V first stage at the US Space and Rocket Center
Concepts for orbital warfare
Von Braun developed and published his space station concept during the very “coldest” time of the Cold War, when the U.S. government for which he worked put the containment of the Soviet Union above everything else. The fact that his space station – if armed with missiles that could be easily adapted from those already available at this time – would give the United States space superiority in both orbital and orbit-to-ground warfare did not escape him. Although von Braun took care to qualify such military applications as “particularly dreadful” in his popular writings, he elaborated on them in several of his books and articles. This much less peaceful aspect of von Braun’s “drive for space” has recently been reviewed by Michael J. Neufeld from the Space History Division of the National Air and Space Museum in Washington.[56]
]NASA career
The U.S. Navy had been tasked with building a rocket to lift satellites into orbit, but the resulting Vanguard rocket launch system was unreliable. In 1957, with the launch of Sputnik 1, there was a growing belief within the United States that America lagged behind the Soviet Union in the emerging Space Race. American authorities then chose to utilize von Braun and his German team’s experience with missiles to create an orbital launch vehicle, something von Braun had originally proposed in 1954 but had been denied.[49]
NASA was established by law on July 29, 1958. One day later, the 50th Redstone rocket was successfully launched from Johnston Atoll in the south Pacific as part ofOperation Hardtack I. Two years later, NASA opened the Marshall Space Flight Center at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, and the ABMA development team led by von Braun was transferred to NASA. In a face-to-face meeting with Herb York at the Pentagon, von Braun made it clear he would go to NASA only if development of the Saturn was allowed to continue.[57] Presiding from July 1960 to February 1970, von Braun became the center’s first Director.
Charles W. Mathews, von Braun, George Mueller, and Lt. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips in the Launch Control Center following the successful Apollo 11 liftoff on July 16, 1969
The Marshall Center’s first major program was the development of Saturn rockets to carry heavy payloads into and beyond Earth orbit. From this, the Apollo program for manned moon flights was developed. Wernher von Braun initially pushed for a flight engineering concept that called for an Earth orbit rendezvous technique (the approach he had argued for building his space station), but in 1962 he converted to the more risky lunar orbit rendezvous concept that was subsequently realized.[58] During Apollo, he worked closely with former Peenemünde teammate, Kurt H. Debus, the first director of the Kennedy Space Center. His dream to help mankind set foot on the Moonbecame a reality on July 16, 1969 when a Marshall-developed Saturn V rocket launched the crew of Apollo 11 on its historic eight-day mission. Over the course of the program, Saturn V rockets enabled six teams of astronauts to reach the surface of the Moon.
During the late 1960s, von Braun was instrumental in the development of the U.S. Space & Rocket Center in Huntsville. The desk from which he guided America’s entry in the Space Race remains on display there.
During the local summer of 1966–67, von Braun participated in a field trip to Antarctica, organized for him and several other members of top NASA management.[59] The goal of the field trip was to determine whether the experience gained by US scientific and technological community during the exploration of Antarctic wastelands would be useful for the manned exploration of space. Von Braun was mainly interested in management of the scientific effort on Antarctic research stations, logistics, habitation and life support, and in using the barren Antarctic terrain like the glacial dry valleys to test the equipment that one day would be used to look for signs of life on Mars and other worlds.
In an internal memo dated January 16, 1969,[60] von Braun had confirmed to his staff that he would stay on as a center director at Huntsville to head the Apollo Applications Program. A few months later, on occasion of the first moon-landing, he publicly expressed his optimism that the Saturn V carrier system would continue to be developed, advocating manned missions to Mars in the 1980s.[61]
However, on March 1, 1970, von Braun and his family relocated to Washington, D.C., when he was assigned the post of NASA’s Deputy Associate Administrator for Planning at NASA Headquarters. After a series of conflicts associated with the truncation of the Apollo program, and facing severe budget constraints, von Braun retired from NASA on May 26, 1972. Not only had it become evident by this time that his and NASA’s visions for future U.S. space flight projects were incompatible; it was perhaps even more frustrating for him to see popular support for a continued presence of man in space wane dramatically once the goal to reach the moon had been accomplished.
Von Braun and William R. Lucas, the first and third Marshall Space Flight Center directors, viewing a Spacelabmodel in 1974
Dr. von Braun also developed the idea of a Space Camp that would train children in fields of science and space technologies as well as help their mental development much the same way sports camps aim at improving physical development.
Career after NASA
After leaving NASA, von Braun became Vice President for Engineering and Development at the aerospace company, Fairchild Industries in Germantown, Maryland on July 1, 1972.
In 1973 a routine health check revealed kidney cancer, which during the following years could not be controlled by surgery.[62]Von Braun continued his work to the extent possible, which included accepting invitations to speak at colleges and universities as he was eager to cultivate interest in human spaceflight and rocketry, particularly with students and a new generation of engineers. On one such visit in the spring of 1974 to Allegheny College, von Braun revealed a more personal side, including an allergy to feather pillows and a disdain for some rock music of the era.[citation needed]
Von Braun helped establish and promote the National Space Institute, a precursor of the present-day National Space Society, in 1975, and became its first president and chairman. In 1976, he became scientific consultant to Lutz Kayser, the CEO ofOTRAG, and a member of the Daimler-Benz board of directors. However, his deteriorating health forced him to retire from Fairchild on December 31, 1976. When the 1975 National Medal of Science was awarded to him in early 1977 he was hospitalized, and unable to attend the White House ceremony.
Personal life
Maria von Braun, wife of Wernher von Braun
During his stay at Fort Bliss, von Braun mailed a marriage proposal to 18-year-old Maria Luise von Quistorp (born June 10, 1928), his cousin on his mother’s side. On March 1, 1947, having received permission to go back to Germany and return with his bride, he married her in a Lutheran church in Landshut, Germany. He and his bride, as well as his father and mother, returned to New York on March 26, 1947.
On 9 December 1948, the von Brauns’ first daughter, Iris Careen, was born at Fort Bliss Army Hospital.[50] The von Brauns eventually had two more children, Margrit Cécile on May 8, 1952 and Peter Constantine on June 2, 1960.
On April 15, 1955, von Braun became a naturalized citizen of the United States.
Death
On June 16, 1977, Wernher von Braun died of pancreatic cancer in Alexandria, Virginia, at the age of 65.[63][64] He was buried at the Ivy Hill Cemetery in Alexandria, Virginia.[65]
Grave of Wernher von Braun in Ivy Hill Cemetery (Alexandria, Virginia)
Published works
- Proposal for a Workable Fighter with Rocket Drive. July 6, 1939.
- The proposed vertical take-off interceptor[66] for climbing to 35,000 ft in 60 seconds was rejected by the Luftwaffe in the autumn of 1941[26]:258 for the Me 163 Komet[67] and never produced. (The differingBachem Ba 349 was produced during the 1944 Emergency Fighter Program.)
- ‘Survey’ of Previous Liquid Rocket Development in Germany and Future Prospects. May 1945.[68]
- A Minimum Satellite Vehicle Based on Components Available from Developments of the Army Ordnance Corps. September 15, 1954. “It would be a blow to U.S. prestige if we did not [launch a satellite] first.”[68]
- The Mars Project, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, (1953). With Henry J. White, translator.
- German Rocketry, The Coming of the Space Age. New York: Meredith Press. 1967.
- First Men to the Moon, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York (1958). Portions of work first appeared in This Week Magazine.
- Daily Journals of Werner von Braun, May 1958-March 1970. March 1970.[68]
- History of Rocketry & Space Travel, New York, Crowell (1975). With Frederick I. Ordway III.
- 2nd Edition:, Estate of Wernher von Braun; Ordway III, Frederick I & Dooling, David Jr. (1985) [1975]. Space Travel: A History. New York: Harper & Row. ISBN 0-06-181898-4.
- The Rocket’s Red Glare, Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, (1976). With Frederick I. Ordway III.
- Project Mars: A Technical Tale, Apogee Books, Toronto (2006). A previously unpublished science fiction story by von Braun. Accompanied by paintings from Chesley Bonestell and von Braun’s own technical papers on the proposed project.
- The Voice of Dr. Wernher von Braun, Apogee Books, Toronto (2007). A collection of speeches delivered by von Braun over the course of his career.
- Wernher von Braun, Crusader for Space, A Biographical Memoir, Ernst Stuhlinger and Fredrick I. Ordway III, Krieger ISBN 0-89464-842-X. Two volumes on the life of von Braun,
Recognition and critique
In 1970, Huntsville, Alabama honored von Braun’s years of service with a series of events including the unveiling of a plaque in his honor. Pictured (l–r), his daughter Iris, wife Maria, U.S. Sen. John Sparkman, Alabama Gov. Albert Brewer, von Braun, son Peter, and daughter Margrit.
- Apollo space program director Sam Phillips was quoted as saying that he did not think that America would have reached the moon as quickly as it did without von Braun’s help. Later, after discussing it with colleagues, he amended this to say that he did not believe America would have reached the moon at all.[citation needed]
- The crater von Braun on the Moon is named after him.
- Von Braun received a total of 12 honorary doctorates, among them, on January 8, 1963, one from the Technical University of Berlin from which he had graduated.
- Von Braun was responsible for the creation of the Research Institute at the University of Alabama in Huntsville. As a result of his vision, the university is one of the leading universities in the nation for NASA-sponsored research. The building housing the university’s Research Institute was named in his honor, Von Braun Research Hall, in 2000.
- Several German cities (Bonn, Neu-Isenburg, Mannheim, Mainz), and dozens of smaller towns have named streets after Wernher von Braun.
- The Von Braun Center (built 1975) in Huntsville is named in von Braun’s honor.
- Scrutiny of von Braun’s use of forced labor at the Mittelwerk intensified again in 1984 when Arthur Rudolph, one of his top affiliates from the A-4/V2 through to the Apollo projects, left the United States and was forced to renounce his citizenship in place of the alternative of being tried for war crimes.[69]
- A science- and engineering-oriented Gymnasium in Friedberg, Bavaria was named after Wernher von Braun in 1979. In response to rising criticism, a school committee decided in 1995, after lengthy deliberations, to keep the name but “to address von Braun’s ambiguity in the advanced history classes.”
- An avenue in the Annadale section of Staten Island, New York was named for him in 1977.
- Von Braun’s engineering approach was very conservative, building in additional strength to structure designs, a point of contention with other engineers who struggled to keep vehicle weight down. Von Braun’s insistence on further tests after Mercury-Redstone 2 flew higher than planned, has been identified as contributing to the Soviet Union’s success in launching the first human in space.[70]
Summary of SS career
- SS number: 185,068
- Nazi Party number: 5,738,692
Dates of rank
(left SS after graduation from the school; commissioned in 1940 with date of entry backdated to 1934)
- SS-Untersturmführer: May 1, 1940
- SS-Obersturmführer: November 9, 1941
- SS-Hauptsturmführer: November 9, 1942
- SS-Sturmbannführer: June 28, 1943
Honors
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Quotations
On surrendering with his rocket team to the Americans in 1945: “We knew that we had created a new means of warfare, and the question as to what nation, to what victorious nation we were willing to entrust this brainchild of ours was a moral decision more than anything else. We wanted to see the world spared another conflict such as Germany had just been through, and we felt that only by surrendering such a weapon to people who are guided by the Bible could such an assurance to the world be best secured.”[75]
“All of man’s scientific and engineering efforts will be in vain unless they are performed and utilized within a framework of ethical standards commensurate with the magnitude of the scope of the technological revolution. The more technology advances, the more fateful will be its impact on humanity.”
“You must accept one of two basic premises: Either we are alone in the universe, or we are not alone in the universe. And either way, the implications are staggering”.
“If the world’s ethical standards fail to rise with the advances of our technological revolution, the world will go to hell. Let us remember that in the horse-and-buggy days nobody got hurt if the coachman had a drink too many. In our times of high-powered automobiles, however, that same drink may be fatal….”
On Adolf Hitler: “I began to see the shape of the man – his brilliance, the tremendous force of personality. It gripped you somehow. But also you could see his flaw — he was wholly without scruples, a godless man who thought himself the only god, the only authority he needed.”[77]
“Science and religion are not antagonists. On the contrary, they are sisters. While science tries to learn more about the creation, religion tries to better understand the Creator. While through science man tries to harness the forces of nature around him, through religion he tries to harness the force of nature within him.”
“My experiences with science led me to God. They challenge science to prove the existence of God. But must we really light a candle to see the sun?”
“Late to bed, early to rise, work like hell and advertise.”
TOP-SECRET: PKK TERRORISM – SYRIAN CONNECTION
R 141518Z MAY 90 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5425 INFO AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMCONSUL ADANA C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 02993 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER PREL SW SY SUBJECT: PKK TERRORISM - SYRIAN CONNECTION ¶1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. ¶2. ROLF GAUFFIN, SWEDEN'S AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS, TOLD DCM RECENTLY THAT AN ARAB NATIVE WITH A CLAIM TO SWEDISH PERMANENT RESIDENCY HAD WALKED INTO THE SWEDISH EMBASSY IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS TO SEEK REPATRI- ATION. THE PERSON SAID HE HAD BEEN IN TRAINING AT THE PKK CAMP IN THE BIQA BUT HAD BECOME DISAFFECTED AND WANTED TO RETURN TO SWEDEN. GAUFFIN IS ARRANGING FOR HIS DEPARTURE. ¶3. GAUFFIN SAID HE WAS APPREHENSIVE OF THE SYRIAN REACTION TO HIS HANDLING SUCH A CASE, ESPECIALLY WITH THE PKK CONNECTION. HE, THEREFORE, ALERTED THE POLITICAL SECURITY DIVISION TO ASSURE THEY KNEW THE WHOLE STORY. THE PSD REPLY LED GAUFFIN TO BELIEVE THEY WERE WELL AWARE OF HIS "WALK-IN" AND HAD NO INTENTION OF INTERFERING. THIS EPISODE ALSO CONFIRMED FOR GAUFFIN THAT THE SYRIANS DO KEEP TABS ON COMINGS AND GOINGS IN THE BIQA. ¶4. IN VIEW OF HIS RECENT EXPOSURE TO THE PKK AND SYRIAN COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, THE DEPARTMENT MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN CONTACTING THE GOS TO SEE IF A DEBRIEF- ING WITH THE EX PKK TRAINEE MIGHT BE ARRANGED. DJEREJIAN
DIE WELT: Wie in Brandenburg die Stasi wieder mitregiert
In Brandenburgs SPD machen Stasi-Spitzel Karriere – und das ausgerechnet im Wahlkreis von Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Viele Genossen sind entsetzt.
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Es ist der Wahlkreis des prominentesten Brandenburger SPD-Genossen: Frank-Walter Steinmeier, einst Außenminister und heute SPD-Bundestagsfraktionschef, errang 2009 in Brandenburg an der Havel erstmals ein eigenes Bundestagsmandat.

- Foto: dpa/DPA Regale mit Akten des einstigen Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit der DDR (Stasi) im Archiv der Jahn-Behörde
Dafür genügten ihm 32,8 Prozent der Wählerstimmen. Ausgerechnet hier, in der drittgrößten Stadt Brandenburgs, ist der SPD-Unterbezirk von Stasi-Spitzeln durchsetzt. Weder das politische Schwergewicht Steinmeier noch Brandenburgs Ministerpräsident und SPD-Landeschef Matthias Platzeck konnten bislang den Wiederaufstieg der alten Seilschaften stoppen.
Bereits im März mussten die beiden Vorzeige-Sozialdemokraten hilflos zusehen, wie mit Dirk Stieger (IM „Bergmann“) und Thomas Reichelt (IM „Wolfgang“) gleich zwei ehemalige Spitzel der SED-Geheimpolizei in den Parteivorstand des SPD-Unterbezirks gewählt wurden.
Brisante Papiere für die Presse
Doch das war erst die Ouvertüre. Jetzt hat die Stasi-Unterlagen-Behörde von Roland Jahn brisante Papiere für die Presse freigegeben. Es sind nur 51 Seiten, doch die haben es in sich. Denn sie beleuchten die Vergangenheit des SPD-Kandidaten für das Amt des Oberbürgermeisters in der kreisfreien Stadt – genau vier Monate vor dem Urnengang ein Debakel sondergleichen.
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Ohnehin steht die rot-rote Regierungskoalition in Potsdam unter keinem guten Stern. Als sie im Herbst 2009 ihre Arbeit aufnahm, wurden reihenweise Mandatsträger der Linkspartei, darunter eine stattliche Zahl von Landtagsabgeordneten, als ehemalige Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit (MfS) enttarnt.
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- Foto: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft/ Manfred Hildebrand/Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft/Manfred Hildebrand … protestierte er mit einer Postkarte, die ihn mit überklebtem Mund zeigte. Als er auch noch die unabhängige polnische Gewerkschaft Solidarnosc in der DDR unterstützte, platzte der SED der Kragen: Am 1. September 1982 wurde er festgenommen …
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- Foto: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft Für die SED waren Jahns öffentliche Aktionen zu viel: Im Juni 1983 wurde er abgeschoben. Die bundesdeutschen Grenzer begrüßte er mit den Worten “Ich bin immer noch Bürger der DDR”. Doch auch von Westdeutschland aus (hier auf der West-Seite der Berliner Mauer) arbeitete Roland Jahn weiter für die Bürgerrechte in der DDR.
Die SPD war geschockt. Jetzt zeigen die Vorgänge in Brandenburg an der Havel, dass die Sozialdemokraten sich auch ernsthafte Sorgen über die Vorgänge in den eigenen Reihen machen müssen. Offenbar wurde es versäumt, genauer hinzuschauen – zumindest in jener Stadt, die wegen ihres markanten Doms und einer mehr als 1000-jährigen Geschichte weit über die Landesgrenzen hinaus bekannt ist.
Dilemma für die SPD
Das Dilemma, in dem die SPD dort steckt, war vorhersehbar. Denn die Partei nominierte im März den umstrittenen Kommunalpolitiker Norbert Langerwisch zum Spitzenkandidaten für das höchste Amt im Rathaus. Ausgerechnet Langerwisch – der frühere Polizeichef und Bürgermeister hatte schon in der Vergangenheit mit einer Affäre bundesweit für Schlagzeilen gesorgt.
Kurz nachdem er 2003 bei der damaligen Oberbürgermeisterwahl gegen die CDU-Bewerberin Dietlind Tiemann unterlegen war, fanden sich bei einem Drogendealer Hunderte Blanko-Wahlzettel, die den Verdacht einer Manipulation des Wählervotums nahelegten. Langerwisch bestritt Kontakte zu der Unterweltsgröße – später musste er sie jedoch einräumen. Die Stadtverordneten wählten ihn daraufhin ab.
Vergeblich hat Platzeck jetzt versucht, eine neuerliche Kandidatur von Langerwisch zu verhindern. Doch eine Alternative fand sich nicht. Daraufhin schwenkte der Ministerpräsident und SPD-Landeschef um, nun lobte er den Parteifreund in höchsten Tönen.
Platzeck lobte Langerwisch
In einer am 28. April veröffentlichten Erklärung schrieb Platzeck: „Norbert Langerwisch ist eine gute Wahl für Brandenburg. Als Bürgermeister und als Polizist hat er seine Heimatstadt mitgestaltet und viel bewegt.“ Gut möglich, dass der Brandenburger Regierungschef diese Worte inzwischen bedauert. Denn Langerwisch hatte mit der DDR-Staatssicherheit offenbar engere Kontakte als bisher eingeräumt.
Die Jahn-Behörde jedenfalls hat den Sozialdemokraten, der zu DDR-Zeiten treu der SED diente, als Inoffiziellen MfS-Mitarbeiter eingestuft. Das Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz, auf dem die Arbeit der Jahn-Behörde beruht, ließ da keine andere Wahl. Denn laut seiner Akte hat Langerwisch noch kurz vor dem Fall der Mauer brisante Informationen an die SED-Geheimpolizei geliefert. Ausweislich der Stasi-Dokumente denunzierte er einen Kollegen der Volkspolizei, der „sehr dem Alkohol“ zuspreche, und berichtete über Familienangehörige mit West-Kontakten.
MfS spendierte Weinbrand
Das MfS war angetan: Laut einer überlieferten Quittung spendierte es dem Zuträger eine Flasche Weinbrand im Wert von 48 DDR-Mark. Langerwisch will nicht völlig ausschließen, dass er das Geschenk angenommen hat: „Das kann sein, die Stasi kam immer zum Geburtstag.“ Doch die Einstufung als Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter des MfS empört den SPD-Politiker, der nie eine Verpflichtungserklärung unterschrieben hat. „Ich habe keine inoffiziellen Informationen übermittelt“, sagte der Polizist dieser Zeitung. Er könne nichts dafür, was ein Stasi-Offizier über ihn aufgeschrieben habe. Dessen Darstellung entspringe „lebhafter Fantasie“.
Mehrere Überprüfungen auf eine Stasi-Tätigkeit seien ergebnislos verlaufen. Doch laut Stasi-Unterlagengesetz kommt es bei der Einstufung als IM allein darauf an, ob jemand bereit war, Informationen zu liefern.
Aus Langerwischs Sicht hat es sich um offizielle Kontakte in seiner Funktion bei der Volkspolizei gehandelt. In der Akte liest sich das anders. Dort heißt es, Langerwisch sei „aufgeschlossen“ und habe „keine Vorbehalte, sich zu Interna zu äußern“ – und zwar hinter dem Rücken seines Chefs, jedenfalls wenn stimmt, was in den Papieren steht.
Stasi-Mitarbeiter in der Justiz
Während Platzeck mit einer Wirtschaftsdelegation die USA bereist, gibt es weitere Hiobsbotschaften aus der Heimat. In Brandenburgs Justiz sind deutlich mehr Stasi-belastete Mitarbeiter tätig als bislang bekannt. Justizminister Volkmar Schöneburg (Linke) korrigierte am Mittwoch frühere Angaben nach oben: Demnach haben 152 Beschäftigte eine Stasi-Vergangenheit. Davon sind 13 Richter, einer ist Staatsanwalt.
Damit sind nun fast doppelt so viele Fälle bekannt wie noch vor knapp zwei Monaten. Juristen zeigten sich erstaunt über die neuen Angaben. „Mit dieser Zahl hätte ich nicht gerechnet“, sagte der Brandenburger Generalstaatsanwalt Erardo Rautenberg. „Die Zahl ist erstaunlich“, so Matthias Deller, Chef des Deutschen Richterbundes in Brandenburg.
Landesregierung muss politische Hygiene herstellen
Die Vereinigung der Opfer der Stalinismus (VOS) pocht auf Konsequenzen. Offensichtlich hätten in Brandenburg „Erich Mielkes Enkel in Scharen Karriere machen dürfen“, kritisierte der stellvertretende VOS-Bundeschef Hugo Diederich. Die Landesregierung in Potsdam sei gefordert, endlich die politische Hygiene in Brandenburg herzustellen. Er forderte eine Regelüberprüfung für den öffentlichen Dienst. Justizminister Schöneburg lehnt selbst eine Überprüfung der etwa 800 Richter im Lande ab.
Die SPD wiederum tut sich im Umgang mit ihrem Parteifreund Langerwisch schwer. Dessen Glaubwürdigkeit ist schwer erschüttert. Die CDU-Landeschefin Saskia Ludwig wirft Platzeck schon mangelnde Durchsetzungskraft in der eigenen Partei vor. „Dieser Mann hätte niemals aufgestellt werden dürfen.“ Der laxe Umgang der SPD mit ihrem politischen Personal „schadet dem Ansehen des Landes Brandenburg in Deutschland“.
Auch im Bundestag sind der Aktenfund und der Zustand der SPD im Unterbezirk Brandenburg an der Havel ein Thema. „Die Kandidatur einer Person wie Langerwisch beschädigt die Demokratie“, sagte der stellvertretende Vorsitzende der CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Arnold Vaatz, dieser Zeitung.
Platzeck muss Angelegenheit zur Chefsache machen
Der ehemalige Bürgerrechtler ist erstaunt, dass sich Platzeck noch jüngst hinter den Parteifreund gestellt hatte. „Er muss die Angelegenheit jetzt zur Chefsache machen und dafür sorgen, dass die Kandidatur zurückgezogen wird“, forderte Vaatz. Geschehe dies nicht, könne „aus der Personalie des OB-Kandidaten schnell eine Personalie Platzeck werden“.
In der Verantwortung sieht Vaatz aber auch Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Der gilt zwar nicht gerade als ein Freund des rot-roten Modells in Potsdam, hat aber bislang keinen Anlass gesehen, sich von den Stasi-Seilschaften in seinem Wahlkreis zu distanzieren. Ob er diese Linie bis zur Oberbürgermeisterwahl im September durchhält, wird sich zeigen.
TOP-SECRET: DOCUMENTS ON SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM
O 190550Z DEC 86 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE UNCLAS STATE 391887 FOR POLITICAL OFFICERS, INFO PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER SY SUBJECT: DOCUMENTS ON SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM ¶1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FACT PAPER ON SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND A CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS. EARLIER VERSIONS OF BOTH DOCUMENTS WERE RELEASED TO THE PRESS ON NOVEMBER 14 AND APPEARED IN THE USIA WIRELESS FILE ON THAT DATE. BOTH DOCUMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN REVISED TO REFLECT THE HASI CONVICTION IN WEST BERLIN ON NOVEMBER ¶26. WE ASSUME USIS MADE APPROPRIATE USE OF THE MATERIAL APPEARING IN THE WIRELESS FILE. WE ARE SENDING THE REVISED VERSIONS SO THAT POLOFFS MAY SHARE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THESE DOCUMENTS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS. ¶2. (BEGIN TEXT OF FACT PAPER) DECEMBER 5, 1986 SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 1983-1986 NEW EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR AND DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO LIGHT IN TWO RECENT TRIALS INCLUDING THE CONVICTION IN GREAT BRITAIN OF NIZAR HINDAWI FOR THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF AN EL AL CIVILIAN AIRPLANE WITH 375 PASSENGERS ABOARD. SYRIA CLEARLY HAS A LONG RECORD OF INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM. SYRIA IS ONE OF THE "CHARTER MEMBERS" OF COUNTRIES ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S TERRORISM LIST, WHICH WAS FIRST COMPILED IN 1979. (COUNTRIES CURRENTLY ON THE LIST ARE SYRIA, LIBYA, IRAN, SOUTH YEMEN, AND CUBA.) THE PATTERN OF SYRIAN ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM HAS VARIED. FROM THE MID-1970'S THROUGH 1983, SYRIAN PERSONNEL ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN TERRORIST OPERATIONS. THESE OPERATIONS WERE PRIMARILY DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER ARABS, SUCH AS SYRIAN DISSIDENTS, MODERATE ARAB STATES SUCH AS JORDAN, AND PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS, AS WELL AS ISRAELI AND JEWISH TARGETS. IN 1982, FOR EXAMPLE, A CAR BOMB EXPLODED IN FRONT OF THE OFFICES OF A LEBANESE-OWNED PRO-IRAQI NEWSPAPER IN DOWNTOWN PARIS, KILLING ONE PERSON AND INJURING SCORES OF OTHERS. FRANCE LATER EXPELLED TWO SYRIAN DIPLOMATS AND ORDERED ITS AMBASSADOR HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS. BY LATE 1983 DAMASCUS HAD CURTAILED USE OF ITS OWN PERSONNEL. INSTEAD, IT BEGAN TO RELY MORE HEAVILY ON TERRORIST GROUPS MADE UP OF NON-SYRIANS WHO HAVE BASES AND TRAINING FACILITIES IN SYRIA AND SYRIAN-OCCUPIED AREAS OF LEBANON. THE MOST NOTORIOUS OF THESE IS THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION. AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT SYRIA PREFERS TO SUPPORT GROUPS WHOSE ACTIVITIES ARE GENERALLY IN LINE WITH SYRIAN OBJECTIVES, RATHER THAN TO SELECT TARGETS OR CONTROL OPERATIONS ITSELF. DAMASCUS UTILIZES THESE GROUPS TO ATTACK OR INTIMIDATE ENEMIES AND OPPONENTS AND TO EXERT ITS INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. YET AT THE SAME TIME IT CAN DISAVOW KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR OPERATIONS. SUCH SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS HAVE CARRIED OUT SCORES OF ATTACKS AGAINST PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB, TURKISH, ISRAELI AND WESTERN TARGETS DURING THE PAST THREE YEARS. THIS YEAR, INVESTIGATIONS INTO MAJOR INCIDENTS HAVE REVEALED ANOTHER CHANGE IN SYRIAN ACTIVITIES: THAT SYRIA HAS NOT ABANDONED ITS WILLINGNESS TO BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ATTACKS. THE BRITISH TRIAL AND INVESTIGATION OF THE ABORTIVE EL AL BOMBING EXPOSED THE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF PRESIDENT ASSAD'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. AND THE WEST BERLIN TRIAL INTO THE BOMBING OF THE GERMAN-ARAB FRIENDSHIP UNION IN WEST BERLIN REVEAED THE INVOLVEMENT OF SYRIAN OFFICIALS. TO A LARGE DEGREE, SYRIA HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN COVERING ITS TRACKS. NOW, HOWEVER, IN BRITAIN AND BERLIN, EVIDENCE OF MORE DIRECT SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT HAS EMERGED. LONDON AND BERLIN INVESTIGATIONS IN THE BRITISH INVESTIGATION OF THE ABORTED EL AL ATTACK, HINDAWI TOLD BRITISH POLICE HE WAS RECRUITED BY HAITHAM SAID, AN AIDE TO MAJOR GENERAL AL-KHULI, CHIEF OF SYRIAN AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE. ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL, AL-KHULI'S OPERATIVES: (1) SUPPLIED HINDAWI, A JORDANIAN, WITH A SYRIAN PASSPORT; (2) GAVE HIM DOLLARS 12,000 AND PROMISED HIM MORE MONEY WHEN HE COMPLETED HIS MISSION TO PLANT A BOMB ABOARD AN EL AL CIVILIAN AIRLINER; (3) PROVIDED HIM WITH THE BOMB WHICH WAS CARRIED INTO LONDON ABOARD THE SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES, WHICH ALSO GAVE HIM SAA CREW MEMBER HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS; AND (4) TRAINED HIM IN THE BOMB'S USE. HINDAWI TRIED TO USE HIS PREGNANT GIRL FRIEND AS THE UNWITTING CARRIER OF THE SOPHISTICATED BOMB WHICH WAS BUILT INTO HER CARRY-ON BAG. IF AN ALERT SECURITY OFFICIAL HAD NOT SPOTTED THE DEVICE AFTER HER BAG CLEARED AN EARLIER CHECK, 375 INNOCENT PERSONS, INCLUDING SOME 230 AMERICANS, WOULD HAVE PERISHED. AFTER THE APRIL 17 PLAN FAILED, ACCORDING TO EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL, HINDAWI FOLLOWED INSTRUCTIONS TO GO TO THE SYRIAN EMBASSY, WHERE HE WAS GREETED BY THE AMBASSADOR AND HIDDEN IN A SYRIAN SAFEHOUSE IN LONDON. BRITISH PRESS REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION SAY BRITAIN ALSO HAS EVIDENCE THAT THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON WAS PERSONALLY INVOLVED SEVERAL MONTHS BEFORE THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING IN RECRUITING HINDAWI FOR SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE. IN WEST BERLIN, HINDAWI'S BROTHER, AHMAD HASI, AND ANOTHER ARAB, FAROUK SALAMEH, WERE CONVICTED FOR THE MARCH 29 BOMBING OF THE GERMAN-ARAB FRIENDSHIP UNION IN WEST BERLIN IN WHICH ELEVEN PERSONS WERE INJURED. IN A SWORN STATEMENT, HASI SAID HE PICKED UP THIS BOMB AT THE SYRIAN EMBASSY IN EAST BERLIN FROM A SENIOR SYRIAN AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, HAITHEM SAEED, AND A SYRIAN EXPLOSIVES EXPERT WAS SENT FROM DAMASCUS TO REPAIR THE DEVICE AFTER IT TWICE FAILED TO EXPLODE. ABU NIDAL SYRIA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE MOST ACTIVE AND BRUTAL INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUP OPERATING TODAY, ABU NIDAL. (SEE NOTE BELOW) ALTHOUGH ABU NIDAL NOW ALSO RECEIVES BACKING AND SUPPORT FROM LIBYA, AND SANCTUARY IN EASTERN EUROPE, DAMASCUS HAS PROVIDED ABU NIDAL WITH IMPORTANT LOGISTICAL SUPPORT EVER SINCE THE GROUP MOVED FROM IRAQ IN 1983. SYRIA ALLOWS ABU NIDAL'S GROUP TO MAINTAIN TRAINING CAMPS IN THE LEBANESE BIQA' VALLEY, AN AREA UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE SYRIAN ARMED FORCES. SYRIA PROVIDES THE GROUP WITH TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND PERMITS ITS OPERATIVES TO TRANSIT FREELY THROUGH DAMASCUS WHEN DEPARTING ON MISSIONS. SYRIA CONTINUES TO PERMIT OPERATION OF ABU NIDAL FACILITIES IN DAMASCUS. (THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT ASSERTS THAT THE SOLE FUNCTION OF THESE FACILITIES IS LIMITED TO CULTURAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS.) ALTHOUGH LAST DECEMBER'S ROME AIRPORT ATTACK WAS COMMITTED UNDER LIBYAN SPONSORSHIP, THE SURVIVING MEMBER OF THE FOUR-MAN TERRORIST TEAM, ACCORDING TO REPORTS ON THE ITALIAN INVESTIGATION, TOLD INVESTIGATORS THE TEAM WAS TRAINED IN SYRIAN-OCCUPIED AREAS OF LEBANON BY SYRIANS. THE TEAM THEN TRAVELED TO DAMASCUS, WHERE IT REMAINED WHILE FINAL PREPARATIONS WERE MADE FOR THE ATTACK IN WHICH 16 CIVILIANS AND 3 TERRORISTS WERE KILLED. IN ANKARA ON NOVEMBER 6, TURKISH PROSECUTERS ISSUED AN INDICTMENT ACCUSING SIX PALESTINIANS WORKING FOR THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION OF KILLING A JORDANIAN DIPLOMAT IN JULY, 1985. THE INDICTMENT ALSO LINKED THE MEN WITH FOUR OTHER ACTIONS, INCLUDING THE SEPTEMBER 6, 1986 ATTACK ON AN ISTANBUL SYNAGOGUE, KILLING 21 PERSONS AND A 1983 ATTEMPT TO PLACE A BOMB ON AN ALITALIA FLIGHT, AND THE ATTEMPTED CAR BOMBING OF A U.S. OFFICERS CLUB IN IZMIR IN ¶1983. (BEGIN NOTE) THE OFFICIAL NAME OF THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION IS "FATAH - REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL." IT IS HEADED BY SABRI AL-BANNA, A PALESTINIAN WHO USES THE NOM DE GUERRE ABU NIDAL. THE GROUP'S ORIGINAL NAME WAS THE BLACK JUNE ORGANIZATION WHEN IT WAS FORMED IN 1976. IRONICALLY, THIS GROUP FIRST CONCENTRATED ON SYRIAN TARGETS, INCLUDING AN ATTACK ON SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM, NOW VICE PRESIDENT, IN 1977. (END NOTE) THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION'S MOVE TO SYRIA IN 1983 WAS FOLLOWED BY A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN THE GROUP'S TERRORIST ATTACKS: MORE THAN A DOZEN ATTACKS IN 1984 AND TWICE THAT NUMBER IN 1985. MORE THAN HALF OF THE 1985 ATTACKS OCCURRED IN WESTERN EUROPE, INCLUDING ATTACKS ON BRITISH TOURISTS AT HOTELS IN ATHENS. WHEN KING HUSSEIN LAUNCHED HIS FEBRUARY 1985 PEACE INITIATIVE, JORDAN BECAME A MAJOR TARGET. BUT WHEN JORDANIAN-SYRIAN RELATIONS BEGAN TO WARM IN MID-1985, ATTACKS ON JORDANIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD DIMINISHED. IN ITS DEALINGS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES, SYRIA HAS CONSISTENTLY TRIED TO PLAY DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS CONNECTION WITH ABU NIDAL AND HAS DENIED PERMITTING HIS GROUP TO ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT DAMASCUS HAS ACTUALLY RESTRAINED ABU NIDAL'S ACTIVITIES (ABU NIDAL TRAINING CAMPS IN THE SYRIAN-CONTROLLED BIQA' VALLEY CONTINUE TO OPERATE FOR EXAMPLE) OR CUT BACK ON OTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT KNOW ABOUT EVERY OPERATION, GIVEN THE AMOUNT AND NATURE OF SYRIAN SUPPORT, DAMASCUS COULD INFLUENCE AND CONSTRAIN THE ABU NIDAL GROUP'S ACTIVITIES IN SYRIA AND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS OF LEBANON IF IT CHOSE TO DO SO. OTHER SYRIAN-SUPPORTED PALESTINIAN GROUPS SYRIA ALSO PROVIDES VARYING AMOUNTS OF SUPPORT TO OTHER RADICAL PALESTINIAN GROUPS. THESE INCLUDE: SAIQA, WHICH IS UNDER TOTAL SYRIAN CONTROL; THE ABU MUSA GROUP, NOW ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON DAMASCUS; THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE--GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC); AND THE MARXIST POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), WHICH NOW MAINTAINS ITS PRINCIPAL BASE IN DAMASCUS. IN ALL, SYRIAN-SPONSORED GROUPS, INCLUDING THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION, WERE LINKED TO ABOUT 30 TERRORIST ATTACKS DURING 1985, A QUARTER OF THEM IN GREECE ALONE. THE ABU MUSA GROUP ANNOUNCED FROM DAMASCUS ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO BOMB AN EL AL AIRLINER, IN MADRID ON JUNE 26 OF THIS YEAR. THE SUSPECT IN THAT ATTEMPT HAS ADMITTED BEING A MEMBER OF THE GROUP. TWO WEEKS LATER, OTHER GROUPS SUPPORTED BY SYRIA, THE PFLP AND THE LEBANESE SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY, ATTEMPTED AN ATTACK ON AN ISRAELI RESORT TOWN ON JULY 10, 1986. SUPPORT FOR NON-PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS IN ADDITION TO THE RADICAL PALESTINIAN GROUPS, A VARIETY OF OTHER TERRORISTS HAVE FACILITIES AND RECEIVED TERRORIST TRAINING IN SYRIA OR SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS OF LEBANON: THE JAPANESE RED ARMY, THE KURDISH LABOR PARTY, THE ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA (ASALA), AND THE PAKISTANI AL ZULFIKAR. IN ADDITION, THE LEBANESE ARMED REVOLUTIONARY FACTION (LARF) IS BASED IN THE LEBANESE VILLAGE OF QUBAYAT, WITHIN THE AREA OF SYRIAN CONTROL IN LEBANON. TO THESE GROUPS MUST BE ADDED THE INDIVIDUAL INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS WHO FREQUENT DAMASCUS. BRUNO BREGUET, AN ASSOCIATE OF CARLOS, THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST, WAS ARRESTED IN PARIS IN FEBRUARY 1982 FOR TRANSPORTING ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES. LATER RELEASED, HE WAS RECENTLY SIGHTED ON A FLIGHT TO DAMASCUS, MET ON ARRIVAL BY SYRIAN AUTHORITIES, AND ESCORTED THROUGH THE AIRPORT WITHOUT HAVING TO PASS THROUGH THE NORMAL CONTROLS. EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT FREDERIC ORIACH, A MILITANT MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACTION DIRECT, SPENT JULY AND AUGUST 1986 IN DAMASCUS PURSUING IDEOLOGICAL AND MILITARY STUDIES. CASUALTIES AND CONTROL ATTACKS BY SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS SINCE 1983 HAVE KILLED OR WOUNDED NEARLY 500 PEOPLE. SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS HAVE ATTACKED U.S. FACILITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST OVER 10 TIMES SINCE 1983. IN JORDAN LAST YEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SYRIAN-SPONSORED JORDANIAN PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY PARTY ATTEMPTED TWO ANTI-U.S. ATTACKS. BOMBS WERE FOUND AT A USAID EMPLOYEE'S HOME AND AT THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR ORIENTAL STUDIES. THESE OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS OTHERS AIMED AGAINST JORDANIAN TARGETS, HAVE HALTED SINCE THE SYRIAN-JORDANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT LATE LAST YEAR--UNDERSCORING SYRIA'S ABILITY, IF IT WISHES, TO CONTROL ITS SURROGATES' ACTIVITIES AND TO SEVERELY CURB THE CAPABILITY OF THOSE TO WHOM IT PROVIDED SAFE HAVEN AND SUPPORT. THIS HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY A TOP SYRIAN OFFICIAL WHO TRIED TO DISMISS, IN A WASHINGTON POST PRESS INTERV1EW THIS SEPTEMBER, EVIDENCE THAT ABU NIDAL'S GROUP WAS INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ATTACKS. SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER FAROUK CHARAA SAID IN DISCUSSING THE ACTIONS OF THE ABU NIDAL GROUP: "WHOEVER KNOWS MY GOVERNMENT MUST REALIZE THAT SUCH ATTACKS COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ITS AWARENESS." (END TEXT OF FACT PAPER.) ¶3. (BEGIN TEXT OF CHRONOLOGY) CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS: 1983-1986 THE FOLLOWING LIST OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IS NOT INTENDED TO BE ALL-INCLUSIVE BUT IS ILLUSTRATIVE OF SYRIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN AND SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND TERRORIST GROUPS. THE GROUPS CITED HERE HAVE LINKS WITH SYRIA. 1986 26 NOVEMBER WEST BERLIN. A COURT CONVICTED TWO ARABS FOR THE MARCH 29 BOMBING OF THE GERMAN-ARAB FRIENDSHIP UNION WHICH INJURED 11 PERSONS. IN A SWORN STATEMENT ONE OF THE DEFENDENTS, AHMAD HASI, SAID HE PICKED UP THE BOMB AT THE SYRIAN EMBASSY IN EAST BERLIN FROM A SYRIAN AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. HASI IS A BROTHER OF NIZAR HINDAWI, WHO WAS CONVICTED IN A BRITISH COURT FOR THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF AN EL AL AIRLINER. 6 NOVEMBER TURKEY. TURKISH PROSECUTORS ISSUED AN INDICTMENT ACCUSING SIX PALESTINIANS WORKING FOR THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION OF KILLING A JORDANIAN DIPLOMAT IN JULY 1985. AN ARREST WARRANT ALSO WAS ISSUED FOR THE SYRIAN EMBASSY SECOND SECRETARY, MOHAMMED DARWICHI, WHO WAS ONE OF THE ORIGINAL DEFENDENTS AND LEFT TURKEY. THE INDICTMENT ALSO LINKED MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WITH FOUR OTHER ACTIONS: THE SEPTEMBER 6, 1986 ATTACK ON AN ISTANBUL SYNAGOGUE, WHICH KILLED 22 PERSONS; AN ATTEMPT TO PLACE A BOMB ON AN ALITALIA FLIGHT IN 1983; THE ATTEMPTED CAR BOMBING OF A U.S. OFFICERS' CLUB IN IZMIR IN 1983, AND THE KILLING OF A PALESTINIAN STUDENT IN ANKARA IN 1982. 26 JUNE MADRID. A SPANIARD ATTEMPTED TO BOARD AN EL AL FLIGHT WITH A SUITCASE BOMB, APPARENTLY WITHOUT KNOWING IT. THE SUSPECT ARRESTED BY SPANISH POLICE CARRIED A SYRIAN PASSPORT. A SPOKESMAN FOR THE ABU MUSA GROUP, WHICH IS ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON DAMASCUS, CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANTING THE BOMB, ALTHOUGH THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT DENIED INVOLVEMENT. 17 APRIL LONDON. EL AL SECURITY DISCOVERED A SYRIAN-MADE BOMB IN THE LUGGAGE OF AN IRISH WOMAN AS SHE ATTEMPTED TO BOARD A PLANE FOR TEL AVIV. A BRITISH COURT FOUND HER BOYFRIEND, NIZAR HINDAWI, GUILTY OF THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING, AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN OFFICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE TERRORIST ACT. 2 MARCH WEST BANK. TWO GUNMEN ASSASSINATED THE MAYOR OF NABLUS, ZAFER AL-MASRI, A PALESTINIAN APPOINTED BY ISRAEL. BOTH THE ABU NIDAL GROUP AND THE POPULAR FRONT FOR LIBERATION OF PALESTINE CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 1985 27 DEC. ROME AND VIENNA. ABU NIDAL TERRORISTS SIMULTANEOUSLY ATTACKED EL AL TICKET COUNTERS IN THE ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORTS, KILLING MORE THAN 20 PEOPLE, INCLUDING FIVE AMERICANS, AND WOUNDING SOME 120 OTHERS. (ALTHOUGH THESE ATTACKS WERE COMMITTED UNDER LIBYAN SPONSORSHIP, REPORTS ON THE ITALIAN INVESTIGATION INDICATE THAT THE ROME TERRORIST TEAM RECEIVED TRAINING IN SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS OF LEBANON AND PASSED THROUGH DAMASCUS.) 30 SEPT. NETHERLANDS. A SMALL BOMB DAMAGED THE EL AL OFFICE OF AMSTERDAM. FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL--THE ABU NIDAL GROUP'S OFFICIAL NAME--CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 25 SEPT. ITALY. A BOMB EXPLODED IN A BRITISH AIRWAYS OFFICE IN ROME, INJURING 15 PEOPLE. POLICE ARRESTED HASSAN ITAB FLEEING THE SCENE. ITAB CLAIMED HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS, AN ABU NIDAL "COVER" NAME, AND WAS LATER IDENTIFIED BY WITNESSES AS THE SAME MAN WHO THREW A GRENADE AT THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN ATHENS IN MARCH. 18 SEPT. GREECE. MICHEL NIMRI, A JORDANIAN MAGAZINE PUBLISHER AND REPORTEDLY A PERSONAL FRIEND OF YASSIR ARAFAT, WAS ASSASSINATED IN ATHENS. BLACK SEPTEMBER, A NAME USED BY THE ABU NIDAL GROUP, CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY THE NEXT DAY. 16 SEPT. ITALY. A GRENADE ATTACK ON A ROME SIDEWALK CAFE INJURED 38 TOURISTS, INCLUDING NINE AMERICANS. POLICE ARRESTED A PALESTINIAN IN CONNECTION WITH THE ATTACK. THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS, ANOTHER SYRIAN-LINKED GROUP, CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY ON 19 SEPTEMBER. 3 SEPT. GREECE. TERRORISTS THREW HAND GRENADES THAT WOUNDED 19 BRITISH TOURISTS AT THE GLYFADA HOTEL IN ATHENS. BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED THE ATTACK WAS TO PRESSURE THE GREEK AUTHORITIES TO RELEASE A MAN ARRESTED NEAR THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY ON 31 AUGUST. 31 AUGUST GREECE. POLICE ARRESTED A HEAVILY ARMED MAN NEAR THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY IN ATHENS. SAMIR SALAMEH ACKNOWLEDGED MEMBERSHIP IN BLACK SEPTEMBER AND CLAIMED HE PLANNED TO ASSASSINATE THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR. 8 AUGUST GREECE. A BOMB EXPLODED IN THE KITCHEN OF THE LONDON HOTEL IN ATHENS, INJURING 13 PEOPLE--NINE OF THEM BRITISH SUBJECTS. THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY, CONTENDING THE HOTEL WAS A "HIDEOUT" FOR BRITISH SPIES. 24 JULY TURKEY. THE FIRST SECRETARY AT THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY IN ANKARA WAS ASSASSINATED BY A LONE GUNMAN. THE INCIDENT WAS CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 11 JULY KUWAIT. TWO BOMBS EXPLODED WITHIN MINUTES OF EACH OTHER KILLING EIGHT PEOPLE AND INJURING 89 IN TWO CAFES ABOUT TEN KILOMETERS APART. THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 1 JULY SPAIN. A BOMB EXPLODED AT THE BRITISH AIRWAYS TICKET OFFICE IN MADRID, ALSO DAMAGING THE TWA OFFICE UPSTAIRS. THE ALIA ROYAL JORDANIAN AIRLINES TICKET OFFICE NEARBY WAS HIT BY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE AND TWO GRENADES THAT FAILED TO EXPLODE. ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND 27 WERE WOUNDED. CLAIMED BY ORGANIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED, REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS, AND BLACK SEPTEMBER. 4 APRIL GREECE. A ROCKET WAS FIRED AT A JORDANIAN AIRLINER AS IT WAS TAKING OFF FROM ATHENS AIRPORT. THE PROJECTILE HIT THE PLAN BUT DID NOT EXPLODE. BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 3 APRIL ITALY. A ROCKET NARROWLY MISSED THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY ON THE FIFTH FLOOR OF AN OFFICE BUILDING IN ROME. NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED. BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 21 MARCH ITALY. THREE UNIDENTIFIED MEN THREW HAND GRENADES INTO A JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN ROME, INJURING TWO PEOPLE. BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 21 MARCH GREECE. AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN THREW A HAND GRENADE INTO THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN ATHENS, INJURING THREE PEOPLE. CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. (SEE SEPTEMBER 25, 1985 INCIDENT.) 21 MARCH CYPRUS. AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN THREW TWO HAND GRENADES INTO THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN NICOSIA. CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 9 MARCH UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. A BOMB WAS FOUND ON A JORDANIAN AIRLINER. THE YOUNG PALESTINIAN WHO CARRIED THE BOMB ONTO THE KARACHI-TO-AMMAN FLIGHT SAID HE THOUGHT HE WAS TRANSPORTING DRUGS TO SUPPORT ABU NIDAL TERRORIST OPERATIONS. 22 FEB. JORDAN. THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY PLACED A BOMB AT THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR ORIENTAL RESEARCH IN AMMAN. THE BOMB WAS FOUND AND DEFUSED. 10 JAN. JORDAN. A BOMB PLANTED BY THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY WAS DEFUSED NEAR A USAID EMPLOYEE'S HOME. THE EXPLOSIVES HAD NEITHER A POWER SOURCE NOR A TIMING DEVICE. 1984 29 DEC. JORDAN. TWO UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN ASSASSINATED FAH AL-QAWASMEH, A MEMBER OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND FORMER MAYOR OF HEBRON, OUTSIDE HIS HOME IN AMMAN. TWO WITNESSES TO THE SHOOTING WERE INJURED BY GUNFIRE AS THEY TRIED TO BLOCK THE ASSASSINS' FLEEING VEHICLE. BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 14 DEC. ITALY. ISMAIL DARWISH, A LEADING MILITARY FIGURE IN THE FATAH MOVEMENT, WAS GUNNED DOWN ON A ROME STREET BY AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN WHO FLED ON A WAITING MOTOR SCOOTER. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 4 DEC. ROMANIA. THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION OF THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY WAS SHOT AND KILLED AS HE WAS GETTING INTO HIS CAR IN BUCHAREST. BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 2 DEC. JORDAN. A GUARD DISCOVERED A BOMB CONCEALED IN AN ATTACHE CASE INSIDE THE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE AND CITIBANK BUILDING IN AMMAN. BOMB TECHNICIANS DEFUSED THE DEVICE, WHICH CONTAINED 18 BLOCKS OF TNT AND A TIMER. THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY WAS LATER DETERMINED TO BE RESPONSIBLE. 4 OCT. CYPRUS. A CAR BOMB EXPLODED BEHIND THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN NICOSIA, SLIGHTLY INJURING ONE PERSON. CLAIMED BY ABU MUSA'S FATAH DISSIDENT ORGANIZATION. 13 AUGUST JORDAN. JORDANIAN POLICE DEFUSED A BOMB CONSISTING OF SEVERAL HUNDRED GRAMS OF SOVIET-MADE EXPLOSIVES NEAR THE RESIDENCE OF A US EMBASSY OFFICIAL. THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY WAS LATER DETERMINED TO BE RESPONSIBLE. 11 AUGUST JORDAN. MEMBERS OF THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY TRIED TO SET OFF A BOMB OUTSIDE THE JORDAN RADIO AND TELEVISION STATION. THE BOMB WAS DISCOVERED AND DEFUSED. 3 AUGUST JORDAN. A BOMB EXPLODED UNDER A WATER TRUCK PARKED NEAR THE U.S. EMBASSY WAREHOUSE IN AMMAN. THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES AND ONLY MINOR DAMAGE. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 29 MAY CYPRUS. A FORMER SAIQA OFFICER WHO HAD SWITCHED HIS ALLEGIANCE TO ARAFAT, ABDULLAH AHMAD SULEIMAN EL SAADI, WAS MURDERED IN LIMASSOL. FOUR SYRIAN MEN AND TWO WOMEN WERE ARRESTED FOR THE MURDER AND SUBSEQUENTLY DEPORTED FROM CYPRUS. 3 MAY CYPRUS. AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN SHOT AND KILLED PALESTINIAN PUBLISHER HANNA MUQBIL AND WOUNDED HIS SECRETARY IN NICOSIA. MUQBIL WAS REPORTEDLY A FORMER MEMBER OF ABU NIDAL WHO HAD DEFECTED TO ARAFAT'S CAMP. 24 MARCH JORDAN. A BOMB WAS DEFUSED OUTSIDE THE BRITISH CONSULATE IN AMMAN. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 24 MARCH JORDAN. A BOMB WAS DISCOVERED AND DEFUSED OUTSIDE THE BRITISH CULTURAL CENTER. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 24 MARCH JORDAN. A BOMB EXPLODED IN THE PARKING LOT OF THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL, WHICH IS ACROSS THE STREET FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY, DAMAGING TWO VEHICLES AND SLIGHTLY INJURING A USAID EMPLOYEE AND HIS DAUGHTER. A SECOND BOMB WAS DISCOVERED IN THE PARKING LOT AND DEFUSED. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 1983 29 DEC. SPAIN. TWO JORDANIAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEES WERE ATTACKED BY A LONE GUNMAN AS THEY WERE LEAVING THE EMBASSY. WALID JAMAL BALKIS WAS KILLED INSTANTLY, AND IBRAHIM SAMI MOHAMMED WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED. THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 19 DEC. TURKEY. A CAR BOMB WAS DISCOVERED IN AN ABANDONED RENTAL CAR MIDWAY BETWEEN THE FRENCH CULTURAL HOUSE AND THE CORDON HOTEL USED BY AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN IZMIR. THE BOMB'S TIMER APPARENTLY MALFUNCTIONED. TURKISH POLICE LINKED THE ABU NIDAL GROUP AND SYRIAN AGENTS TO THE INCIDENT. 7 NOV. GREECE. TWO SECURITY GUARDS OF THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY WERE WOUNDED ON A CROWDED STREET IN ATHENS. ONE OF THE TWO VICTIMS DIED FROM HIS WOUNDS. THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 26 OCT. ITALY. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE VATICAN AND HIS DRIVER WERE WOUNDED IN AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN ROME. THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 25 OCT. INDIA. JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR WOUNDED BY AN UNKNOWN ASSAILANT IN NEW DELHI. CLAIMED BY THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES. 13 OCT. JORDAN. TWO HAND GRENADES WERE THROWN INTO A POLICE BARRACKS IN AMMAN. A MEMBER OF THE POLICE RECRUITED BY SAIQA CONFESSED TO THE ATTACK. LOCAL AUTHORITIES SUSPECTED THAT ABU NIDAL ELEMENTS MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED. 21 AUGUST GREECE. A HIGH-LEVEL PLO OFFICIAL, MA'MUM MURAYSH, WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY TWO UNIDENTIFIED MEN ON A MOTORCYCLE. THE VICTIM'S SON AND HIS DRIVER WERE WOUNDED. THE MOVEMENT FOR REBUILDING FATAH CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 10 APRIL PORTUGAL. THE PLO OBSERVER TO AN INTERNATIOAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIALISTS, ISAM AL-SARTAWI, WAS SHOT TO DEATH IN A HOTEL LOBBY. SARTAWI'S SECRETARY WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED IN THE ATTACK. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 1 JANUARY ISRAEL. A GRENADE ATTACK ON A CIVILIAN BUS IN TEL AVIV INJURED 12. BOTH SAIQA AND ABU NIDAL CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. (END TEXT OF CHRONOLOGY.) ¶4. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT, KABUL, MOSCOW, AND LENINGRAD. SHULTZ
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI: THE ADOLF HITLER PARTY FILES
TOP-SECRET: THE GERMAN ORGANIZED CRIME FAMILY “GoMoPa” AND THEIR FOUNDERS THE STASI
The German Organized Crime Family known by the name of “GoMoPa” is in association with the SJB, Neuss Rhineland, “GoMoPa” is as shortened version of their bogus name “Goldman, Morgenstern and Partner”
They are the heirs of the former Organized Crime Familiy in Germany – the STASI.
Here are the most important facts;
The Ministry for State Security (German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), commonly known as the Stasi (IPA: [ˈʃtaziː]) (abbreviation German: Staatssicherheit, literally State Security), was the official state security service of East Germany. The MfS was headquartered in East Berlin, with an extensive complex in Berlin-Lichtenberg and several smaller facilities throughout the city. It was widely regarded as one of the most effective and repressive intelligence and secret police agencies in the world. The MfS motto was “Schild und Schwert der Partei” (Shield and Sword of the Party), that is the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED).
| Ministerium für Staatssicherheit | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Seal of the Ministry of State Security of the GDR | |||
| Agency overview | |||
| Formed | February 9, 1950[1] | ||
| Dissolved | October 4, 1990 (End of GDR) | ||
| Headquarters | East Berlin, GDR | ||
| Employees | 68,000 | ||
Creation of the StasiThe MfS was founded on 8 February 1950[citation needed]. It was modeled on the Soviet MGB[citation needed], and was regarded by the Soviet Union as an extremely loyal and effective partner[citation needed]. Wilhelm Zaisser was the first Minister of State Security of the GDR, and Erich Mielke his deputy. Zaisser, who tried to depose SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht after the June 1953 uprising[2] was after this removed by Ulbricht and replaced by Ernst Wollweber. Wollweber resigned in 1957 after clashes with Ulbricht and Erich Honecker, and was succeeded by his deputy, Erich Mielke. Early on the Stasi waged a campaign against Jews, who were already subject to widespread discrimination and violence in the Soviet Union. The Stasi censored the fact that Jews had been victims during the previous regime and in one instance, took gold from the bodies of Jews. The Stasi labeled Jews as capitalists and criminals.[3][4] Gypsies were also blamed in the Stasi propaganda.[5] In 1957, Markus Wolf became head of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) (General Reconnaissance Administration), its foreign intelligence section. As intelligence chief, Wolf achieved great success in penetrating the government, political and business circles of West Germany with spies. The most influential case was that of Günter Guillaume which led to the downfall of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt in May 1974. In 1986, Wolf retired and was succeeded by Werner Grossmann. [edit]Relationship with the KGBAlthough Mielke’s Stasi was superficially granted independence in 1957, until 1990 the KGB continued to maintain liaison officers in all eight main Stasi directorates, each with his own office inside the Stasi’s Berlin compound, and in each of the fifteen Stasi district headquarters around East Germany.[6] Collaboration was so close that the KGB invited the Stasi to establish operational bases in Moscow and Leningrad to monitor visiting East German tourists and Mielke referred to the Stasi officers as “Chekists of the Soviet Union.”[6] In 1978, Mielke formally granted KGB officers in East Germany the same rights and powers they enjoyed in the Soviet Union.[6] OrganizationThe Ministry for State Security also included the following entities:
Stasi operationsFurther information: Eastern Bloc politics
See also: Censorship in East Germany
PersonnelBetween 1950 and 1989, the Stasi employed a total of 274,000 people in an effort to root out the class enemy.[8][9] In 1989, the Stasi employed 91,015 persons full time, including 2,000 fully employed unofficial collaborators, 13,073 soldiers and 2,232 officers of GDR army,[10] along with 173,081 unofficial informants inside GDR[11] and 1,553 informants in West Germany.[12] In terms of the identity of inoffizielle Mitarbeiter(IMs) Stasi informants, by 1995, 174,000 had been identified, which approximated 2.5% of East Germany’s population between the ages of 18 and 60.[8] 10,000 IMs were under 18 years of age.[8] While these calculations were from official records, according to the federal commissioner in charge of the Stasi archives in Berlin, because many such records were destroyed, there were likely closer to 500,000 Stasi informers.[8] A former Stasi colonel who served in the counterintelligence directorate estimated that the figure could be as high as 2 million if occasional informants were included.[8] InfiltrationFull-time officers were posted to all major industrial plants (the extensiveness of any surveillance largely depended on how valuable a product was to the economy)[9] and one tenant in every apartment building was designated as a watchdog reporting to an area representative of the Volkspolizei (Vopo).[13] Spies reported every relative or friend who stayed the night at another’s apartment.[13] Tiny holes were drilled in apartment and hotel room walls through which Stasi agents filmed citizens with special video cameras.[13] Schools, universities, and hospitals were extensively infiltrated.[13] The Stasi had formal categorizations of each type of informant, and had official guidelines on how to extract information from, and control, those who they came into contact with.[14] The roles of informants ranged from those already in some way involved in state security (such as the police and the armed services) to those in the dissident movements (such as in the arts and the Protestant Church).[15] Information gathered about the latter groups was frequently used to divide or discredit members.[16] Informants were made to feel important, given material or social incentives, and were imbued with a sense of adventure, and only around 7.7%, according to official figures, were coerced into cooperating. A significant proportion of those informing were members of the SED; to employ some form of blackmail, however, was not uncommon.[15] A large number of Stasi informants were trolley conductors, janitors, doctors, nurses and teachers; Mielke believed the best informants were those whose jobs entailed frequent contact with the public.[17] The Stasi’s ranks swelled considerably after Eastern Bloc countries signed the 1975 Helsinki accords, which Erich Honecker viewed as a grave threat to his regime because they contained language binding signatories to respect “human and basic rights, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and conviction.”[18] The number of IMs peaked at around 180,000 in this year, having slowly risen from 20,000–30,000 in the early 1950s, and reaching 100,000 for the first time in 1968, in response to Ostpolitik and protests worldwide.[19] The Stasi also acted as a proxy for KGB to conduct activities in other Eastern Bloc countries, such as Poland, where the Soviets were despised.[20] The MfS infiltrated almost every aspect of GDR life. In the mid-1980s, a network of IMs began growing in both German states; by the time East Germany collapsed in 1989, the MfS employed 91,015 employees and 173,081 informants.[21] About one of every 63 East Germans collaborated with the MfS—one of the most extensive police infiltrations of a society in history. In 2007 an article in BBC stated that “Some calculations have concluded that in East Germany there was one informer to every seven citizens.”[22] Additionally, MfS agents infiltrated and undermined West Germany’s government and spy agencies. In an extreme case, Stasi informant Knud Wollenberger (code name Daniel) married civil rights and peace activist Vera Lengsfeld specifically to keep a watch on her.[17] Executions of dissidentsPeople were imprisoned for such reasons as trying to leave the country, or telling political jokes. Prisoners were kept, isolated and disoriented, knowing nothing of what was going on in the outside world.[23] After the mid-1950s, Stasi executions were carried out in strict secrecy, and were usually accomplished with a guillotine and, in later years, by a single pistol shot to the neck.[24] In most instances, the relatives of the executed were not informed of either the sentence or the execution.[24] After the Berlin Wall fell, X-ray machines were found in the prisons. Indeed, three of the best-known dissidents died within a few months of each other, of similar rare forms of leukaemia. Survivors state that the MfS intentionally irradiated political prisoners with high-dose radiation, possibly to provoke cancer in them.[23]International operations International operationsSee also: Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung
Other files (the Rosenholz Files), which contained the names of East German spies abroad, led American spy agencies to capture them. After German reunification, it was revealed that the MfS had secretly aided left-wing terrorists such as the Red Army Faction, even though no part of the RAF had ever been ideologically aligned with the GDR. Directorate X was responsible for disinformation. Rolf Wagenbreth, director of disinformation operations, stated “Our friends in Moscow call it ‘dezinformatsiya’. Our enemies in America call it ‘active measures,’ and I, dear friends, call it ‘my favorite pastime'”. Examples
Fall of CommunismRecruitment of informants became increasingly difficult towards the end of the GDR’s existence, and after 1986, there was a negative turnover rate of IMs. This had a significant impact on the Stasi’s ability to survey the population, in a period of growing unrest, and knowledge of the MfS’s activities became more widespread.[53] The Stasi had been tasked during this period with preventing the country’s economic difficulties becoming a political problem, through suppression of the very worst problems the state faced, but it failed to do so.[9] Stasi officers reportedly had discussed rebranding East Germany as a democratic capitalist country to the West, but which would be in practice taken over by Stasi officers. The plan specified 2,587 OibE officers who would take over power (Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz, “officers on special assignment”) and it was registered as Top Secret Document 0008-6/86 of March 17, 1986.[54][55] According to Ion Mihai Pacepa, the chief intelligence officer in communist Romania, other communist intelligence services had similar plans.[55] On 12 March 1990 Der Spiegel reported that the Stasi was indeed attempting to implement 0008-6/86.[54]Pacepa has noted that what happened in Russia and how KGB Colonel Vladimir Putin took over Russia resembles these plans.[55] See Putinism. On 7 November 1989, in response to the rapidly changing political and social situation in the GDR in late 1989, Erich Mielke resigned. On 17 November 1989, the Council of Ministers (Ministerrat der DDR) renamed the MfS as the “Office for National Security” (Amt für Nationale Sicherheit – AfNS), which was headed by Generalleutnant Wolfgang Schwanitz. On 8 December 1989, GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow directed the dissolution of the AfNS, which was confirmed by a decision of the Ministerrat on 14 December 1989. As part of this decision, the Ministerrat originally called for the evolution of the AfNS into two separate organizations: a new foreign intelligence service (Nachrichtendienst der DDR) and an “Office for the Protection of the Constitution of the GDR” (Verfassungsschutz der DDR), along the lines of the West German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, however, the public reaction was extremely negative, and under pressure from the “Round Table” (Runder Tisch), the government dropped the creation of the Verfassungsschutz der DDR and directed the immediate dissolution of the AfNS on 13 January 1990. Certain functions of the AfNS reasonably related to law enforcement were handed over to the GDR Ministry of Internal Affairs. The same ministry also took guardianship of remaining AfNS facilities. When the parliament of Germany investigated public funds that disappeared after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, it found out that East Germany had transferred large amounts of money to Martin Schlaff through accounts in Vaduz, the capital of Liechtenstein, in return for goods “under Western embargo”. Moreover, high-ranking Stasi officers continued their post-DDR careers in management positions in Schlaff’s group of companies. For example, in 1990 Herbert Kohler, Stasi commander in Dresden, transferred 170 million marks to Schlaff for “harddisks” and months later went to work for him.[34][56] The investigations concluded that “Schlaff’s empire of companies played a crucial role” in the Stasi attempts to secure the financial future of Stasi agents and keep the intelligence network alive.[34] The Stern magazine noted that KGB officerVladimir Putin worked with his Stasi colleagues in Dresden in 1989.[56] In the Soviet Union, about 50 billion U.S. dollars was transferred out of the country (see FIMACO). Recovery of the Stasi filesDuring the Peaceful Revolution of 1989, MfS offices were overrun by enraged citizens, but not before the MfS destroyed a number of documents (approximately 5%).[57] Storming the Stasi headquartersAs the GDR began to fall, the Stasi did as well. They began to destroy the extensive files that they had kept, both by hand and with the use of shredders. Citizens protesting and entering the Stasi building in Berlin; the sign accuses the Stasi and SED of being Nazistic dictators. When these activities became known, protest erupted in front of the Stasi headquarters.[58] In the evening of 15 January 1990, a large crowd of people formed outside the gates in order to stop the destruction of personal files. In their minds, this information should have been available to them and also have been used to punish those who had taken part in Stasi actions. The large group of protesters grew and grew until they were able to overcome the police and gain entry into the complex. The protestors became violent and destructive as they smashed doors and windows, threw furniture, and trampled portraits of Erich Honecker, leader of the GDR. Among the destructive public were officers working for the West German government, as well as former MfS collaborators seeking to destroy documents. One explanation postulated as to why the Stasi did not open fire was for fear of hitting their own colleagues. As the people continued their violence, these undercover men proceeded into the file room and acquired many files that would become of great importance to catching ex-Stasi members. Controversy of the Stasi filesWith the German Reunification on 3 October 1990 a new government agency was founded called the Office of the Federal Commissioner Preserving the Records of the Ministry for State Security of the GDR (BStU).[59] There was a debate about what should happen to the files, whether they should be opened to the people or kept closed. Those who opposed opening the files cited privacy as a reason. They felt that the information in the files would lead to negative feelings about former Stasi members, and, in turn, cause violence. Pastor Rainer Eppelmann, who became Minister of Defense and Disarmament after March 1990, felt that new political freedoms for former Stasi members would be jeopardized by acts of revenge. Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere even went so far as to predict murder. They also argued against the use of the files to capture former Stasi members and prosecute them, arguing that not all former members were criminals and should not be punished solely for being a member. There were also some who believed that everyone was guilty of something. Peter Michael Diestel, the Minister of Interior, opined that these files could not be used to determine innocence and guilt, claiming that “there were only two types of individuals who were truly innocent in this system, the newborn and the alcoholic.” Other opinions, such as the one of West German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, believed in putting the Stasi behind them and working on German reunification. Others argued that everyone should have the right to see their own file, and that the files should be opened to investigate former Stasi members and prosecute them, as well as not allow them to hold office. Opening the files would also help clear up some of the rumors that were floating around. Some also believed that politicians involved with the Stasi should be investigated. The fate of the files was finally decided under the Unification Treaty between the GDR and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). This treaty took the Volkskammer law further and allowed more access and use of the files. Along with the decision to keep the files in a central location in the East, they also decided who could see and use the files, allowing people to see their own files. In 1992, following a declassification ruling by the German government, the MfS files were opened, leading people to look for their files. Timothy Garton Ash, an English historian, after reading his file, wrote The File: A Personal History while completing his dissertation research in East Berlin.[60] Between 1991 and 2011, around 2.75 million individuals, mostly GDR citizens, requested to see their own files.[61] The ruling also gave people the ability to make duplicates of their documents. Another big issue was how the media could use and benefit from the documents. It was decided that the media could obtain files as long as they were depersonalized and not regarding an individual under the age of 18 or a former Stasi member. This ruling not only gave the media access to the files, but also gave schools access. Tracking down former Stasi informers with the filesEven though groups of this sort were active in the community, those who were tracking down ex-members were, as well. Many of these hunters succeeded in catching ex-Stasi; however, charges could not be made for merely being a member. The person in question would have had to participate in an illegal act, not just be a registered Stasi member. Among the high-profile individuals who were arrested and tried were Erich Mielke, Third Minister of State Security of the GDR, and Erich Honecker, head of state for the GDR. Mielke was given six years for the murder of two policemen in 1931. Honecker was charged with authorizing the killing of would-be escapees on the East-West frontier and the Berlin Wall. During his trial, he went through cancer treatment. Due to the fact that he was nearing death, Honecker was allowed to spend his final time in Chile. He died in May 1994.]Reassembling the destroyed files Document shredding is described in Stasiland. Some of it is very easy due to the amount of archives and the failure of shredding machines (in some cases “shredding” meant tearing paper in two by hand and documents could be recovered easily). In 1995, the BStU began reassembling the shredded documents; 13 years later the three dozen archivists commissioned to the projects had only reassembled 327 bags; they are now using computer-assisted data recovery to reassemble the remaining 16,000 bags – estimated at 45 million pages. It is estimated that this task may be completed at a cost of 30 million dollars.[62] The CIA acquired some MfS records during the looting of the MfS archives. The Federal Republic of Germany has asked for their return and received some in April 2000.[63] See also Rosenholz files. Museum in the old headquartersThe Anti-Stalinist Action Normannenstraße (ASTAK), an association founded by former GDR Citizens’ Committees, has transformed the former headquarters of the MfS into a museum. It is divided into three floors:
The ground floor has been kept as it used to be. The decor is original, with many statues and flags.
Photo gallery: Stasi officers after the reunificationRecruitment by Russian state-owned companiesFormer Stasi agent Matthias Warnig (codename “Arthur”) is currently the CEO of Nord Stream.[64] German investigations have revealed that some of the key Gazprom Germania managers are former Stasi agents.[65][66] LobbyingEx-MfS officers continue to be politically active via the Gesellschaft zur Rechtlichen und Humanitären Unterstützung e. V. (Society for Legal and Humanitarian Support) (GRH). Former high-ranking officers and employees of the MfS, including the last MfS director, Wolfgang Schwanitz, make up the majority of the organization’s members, and it receives support from the German Communist Party, among others. Impetus for the establishment of the GRH was provided by the criminal charges filed against the Stasi in the early 1990s. The GRH, decrying the charges as “victor’s justice”, called for them to be dropped. Today the group provides an alternative if somewhat utopian voice in the public debate on the GDR legacy. It calls for the closure of the museum in Hohenschönhausen and can be a vocal presence at memorial services and public events. In March 2006 in Berlin, GRH members disrupted a museum event; a political scandal ensued when the Berlin Senator (Minister) of Culture refused to confront them.[67] Behind the scenes, the GRH also lobbies people and institutions promoting opposing viewpoints. For example, in March 2006, the Berlin Senator for Education received a letter from a GRH member and former Stasi officer attacking the Museum for promoting “falsehoods, anticommunist agitation and psychological terror against minors.”[68] Similar letters have also been received by schools organizing field trips to the museum.[69] Alleged informants
In the arts
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TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI – THE MAFIA MONOGRAPH FILES
Download the Files above
Italian Organized Crime
Since their appearance in the 1800s, the Italian criminal societies known as the Mafia have infiltrated the social and economic fabric of Italy and now impact the world. They are some of the most notorious and widespread of all criminal societies.
There are several groups currently active in the U.S.: theSicilian Mafia; the Camorra or Neapolitan Mafia; the’Ndrangheta or Calabrian Mafia; and the Sacra Corona Unita or United Sacred Crown.
We estimate the four groups have approximately 25,000 members total, with 250,000 affiliates worldwide. There are more than 3,000 members and affiliates in the U.S., scattered mostly throughoutthe major cities in the Northeast, the Midwest, California, and the South. Their largest presence centers around New York, southern New Jersey, and Philadelphia.
Their criminal activities are international with members and affiliates in Canada, South America, Australia, and parts of Europe. They are also known to collaborate with other international organized crime groups from all over the world, especially in drug trafficking.
The major threats to American society posed by these groups are drug trafficking and money laundering.They have been involved in heroin trafficking for decades. Two major investigations that targeted Italian organized crime drug trafficking in the 1980s are known as the “French Connection” and the “Pizza Connection.”
These groups don’t limit themselves to drug running, though. They’re also involved in illegal gambling, political corruption, extortion, kidnapping, fraud, counterfeiting, infiltration of legitimate businesses, murders, bombings, and weapons trafficking. Industry experts in Italy estimate that their worldwide criminal activity is worth more than $100 billion annually.
A Long History
These enterprises evolved over the course of 3,000 years during numerous periods of invasion and exploitation by numerous conquering armies in Italy. Over the millennia, Sicilians became more clannish and began to rely on familial ties for safety, protection, justice, and survival.
An underground secret society formed initially as resistance fighters against the invaders and to exact frontier vigilante justice against oppression. A member was known as a “Man Of Honor,” respected and admired because he protected his family and friends and kept silent even unto death.
Sicilians weren’t concerned if the group profited from its actions because it came at the expense of theoppressive authorities. These secret societies eventually grew into the Mafia.
Since the 1900s, thousands of Italian organized crime figures—mostly Sicilian Mafiosi—have come illegally to this country. Many who fled here in the early 1920s helped establish what is known today as La Cosa Nostra or the American Mafia.
Charles “Lucky” Luciano, a Mafioso from Sicily, came to the U.S. during this era and is credited for making the American La Cosa Nostra what it is today. Luciano structured the La Cosa Nostra after theSicilian Mafia. When Luciano was deported back to Italy in 1946 for operating a prostitution ring, he became a liaison between the Sicilian Mafia and La Cosa Nostra.
Sicilian Mafia (based in Sicily)
The Sicilian Mafia formed in the mid-1800s to unify the Sicilian peasants against their enemies. In Sicily,the word Mafia tends to mean “manly.” The Sicilian Mafia changed from a group of honorable Sicilian men to an organized criminal group in the 1920s.
In the 1950s, Sicily enjoyed a massive building boom. Taking advantage of the opportunity, the SicilianMafia gained control of the building contracts and made millions of dollars. Today, the Sicilian Mafia has evolved into an international organized crime group. Some experts estimate it is the second largest organization in Italy.
The Sicilian Mafia specializes in heroin trafficking, political corruption, and military arms trafficking—and is also known to engage in arson, frauds, counterfeiting, and other racketeering crimes. With an estimated 2,500 Sicilian Mafia affiliates it is the most powerful and most active Italian organized crime group in the U.S.
The Sicilian Mafia is infamous for its aggressive assaults on Italian law enforcement officials. In Sicily theterm “Excellent Cadaver” is used to distinguish the assassination of prominent government officials fromthe common criminals and ordinary citizens killed by the Mafia. High-ranking victims include police commissioners, mayors, judges, police colonels and generals, and Parliament members.
On May 23, 1992, the Sicilian Mafia struck Italian law enforcement with a vengeance. At approximately 6 p.m., Italian Magistrate Giovanni Falcone, his wife, and three police body guards were killed by a massive bomb. Falcone was the director of Criminal Affairs in Rome. The bomb made a crater 30 feet in diameter in the road. The murders became known as the Capaci Massacre.
Less than two months later, on July 19, the Mafia struck Falcone’s newly named replacement, Judge Paolo Borsellino in Palermo, Sicily. Borsellino and five bodyguards were killed outside the apartment of Borsellino’s mother when a car packed with explosives was detonated by remote control.
Under Judge Falcone’s tenure the FBI and Italian law enforcement established a close working relationship aimed at dismantling Italian organized crime groups operating in both countries. That relationship has intensified since then.
Camorra or Neapolitan Mafia (based in Naples)
The word “Camorra” means gang. The Camorra first appeared in the mid-1800s in Naples, Italy, as a prison gang. Once released, members formed clans in the cities and continued to grow in power. TheCamorra has more than 100 clans and approximately 7,000 members, making it the largest of the Italian organized crime groups.
In the 1970s, the Sicilian Mafia convinced the Camorra to convert their cigarette smuggling routes into drug smuggling routes with the Sicilian Mafia’s assistance. Not all Camorra leaders agreed, leading tothe Camorra Wars that cost 400 lives. Opponents of drug trafficking lost the war.
The Camorra made a fortune in reconstruction after an earthquake ravaged the Campania region in 1980. Now it specializes in cigarette smuggling and receives payoffs from other criminal groups for any cigarette traffic through Italy. The Camorra is also involved in money laundering, extortion, alien smuggling, robbery, blackmail, kidnapping, political corruption, and counterfeiting.
It is believed that nearly 200 Camorra affiliates reside in this country, many of whom arrived during theCamorra Wars.
’Ndrangheta or Calabrian Mafia (based in Calabria)
The word “’Ndrangheta” comes from the Greek meaning courage or loyalty. The ’Ndrangheta formed inthe 1860s when a group of Sicilians was banished from the island by the Italian government. They settled in Calabria and formed small criminal groups.
There are about 160 ’Ndrangheta cells with roughly 6,000 members. They specialize in kidnapping and political corruption, but also engage in drug trafficking, murder, bombings, counterfeiting, gambling, frauds, thefts, labor racketeering, loansharking, and alien smuggling.
Cells are loosely connected family groups based on blood relationships and marriages. In the U.S.,there are an estimated 100-200 members and associates, primarily in New York and Florida.
Sacra Corona Unita or United Sacred Crown (based in the Puglia region)
Law enforcement became aware of the Sacra Corona Unita in the late 1980s. Like other groups, it started as a prison gang. As its members were released, they settled in the Puglia region in Italy and continued to grow and form links with other Mafia groups. The Sacra Corona Unita is headquartered in Brindisi, located in the southeastern region of Puglia.
The Sacra Corona Unita consists of about 50 clans with approximately 2,000 members and specializes in smuggling cigarettes, drugs, arms, and people. It is also involved in money laundering, extortion, and political corruption. The organization collects payoffs from other criminal groups for landing rights on thesoutheast coast of Italy, a natural gateway for smuggling to and from post-Communist countries like Croatia, Yugoslavia, and Albania.
Very few Sacra Corona Unita members have been identified in the U.S., although some individuals in Illinois, Florida, and New York have links to the organization.
La Cosa Nostra is the foremost organized criminal threat to American society. Literally translated into English it means “this thing of ours.” It is a nationwide alliance of criminals—linked by blood ties or through conspiracy—dedicated to pursuing crime and protecting its members.
La Cosa Nostra, or the LCN as it is known by the FBI, consists of different “families” or groups that are generally arranged geographically and engaged in significant and organized racketeering activity. It is also known as the Mafia, a term used to describe other organized crime groups.
The LCN is most active in the New York metropolitan area, parts of New Jersey, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, and New England. It has members in other major cities and is involved in international crimes.
History of La Cosa Nostra
Although La Cosa Nostra has its roots in Italian organized crime, it has been a separate organization for many years. Today, La Cosa Nostra cooperates in various criminal activities with different criminal groups that are headquartered in Italy.
Giuseppe Esposito was the first known Sicilian Mafia member to emigrate to the U.S. He and six other Sicilians fled to New York after murdering the chancellor and a vice chancellor of a Sicilian province and 11 wealthy landowners. He was arrested in New Orleans in 1881 and extradited to Italy.
New Orleans was also the site of the first major Mafia incident in this country. On October 15, 1890, New Orleans Police Superintendent David Hennessey was murdered execution-style. Hundreds of Sicilians were arrested, and 19 were eventually indicted for the murder. An acquittal generated rumors of widespread bribery and intimidated witnesses. Outraged citizens of New Orleans organized a lynch mob and killed 11 of the 19 defendants. Two were hanged, nine were shot, and the remaining eight escaped.
The American Mafia has evolved over the years as various gangs assumed—and lost—dominance overthe years: the Black Hand gangs around 1900; the Five Points Gang in the 1910s and ‘20s in New York City; Al Capone’s Syndicate in Chicago in the 1920s. By the end of the ‘20s, two primary factions had emerged, leading to a war for control of organized crime in New York City.
The murder of faction leader Joseph Masseria brought an end to the gang warfare, and the two groups united to form the organization now dubbed La Cosa Nostra. It was not a peaceful beginning: Salvatore Maranzano, the first leader of La Cosa Nostra, was murdered within six months.
Charles “Lucky” Luciano became the new leader. Maranzano had established the La Cosa Nostra code of conduct, set up the “family” divisions and structure, and established procedures for resolving disputes. Luciano set up the “Commission” to rule all La Cosa Nostra activities. The Commission included bosses from six or seven families.
Luciano was deported back to Italy in 1946 based on his conviction for operating a prostitution ring.There, he became a liaison between the Sicilian Mafia and La Cosa Nostra.
Other Historical Highlights:
1951: A U.S. Senate committee led by Democrat Estes Kefauver of Tennessee determined that a “sinister criminal organization” known as the Mafia operated in this nation.
1957: The New York State Police uncovered a meeting of major LCN figures from around the country inthe small upstate New York town of Apalachin. Many of the attendees were arrested. The event was thecatalyst that changed the way law enforcement battles organized crime.
1963: Joseph Valachi became the first La Cosa Nostra member to provide a detailed looked inside theorganization. Recruited by FBI agents, Valachi revealed to a U.S. Senate committee numerous secrets ofthe organization, including its name, structure, power bases, codes, swearing-in ceremony, and members of the organization.
Today, La Cosa Nostra is involved in a broad spectrum of illegal activities: murder, extortion, drug trafficking, corruption of public officials, gambling, infiltration of legitimate businesses, labor racketeering, loan sharking, prostitution, pornography, tax-fraud schemes, and stock manipulation schemes.
Named after legendary boss Vito Genovese, the Genovese crime family was once considered the most powerful organized crime family in the nation. Members and their numerous associates engaged in drug trafficking, murder, assault, gambling, extortion, loansharking, labor racketeering, money laundering, arson, gasoline bootlegging, and infiltration of legitimate businesses.
Genovese family members are also involved in stock market manipulation and other illegal frauds and schemes as evidenced by the recent FBI investigation code named “Mobstocks.”
The Genovese crime family has its roots in the Italian criminal groups in New York controlled by Joseph Masseria in the 1920s. The family history is rife with murder, violence, and greed.
Early History—Masseria and Maranzano
Masseria sparked the so-called “Castellammarese War” in 1928 when he tried to gain control of organized crime across the country. The war ended in 1931 when Salvatore Maranzano conspired with Masseria’s top soldier, Charles “Lucky” Luciano, to have Masseria killed. Maranzano emerged as themost powerful Mafia boss in the nation, setting up five separate criminal groups in New York and calling himself “Boss of Bosses.”
Two of the most powerful La Cosa Nostra families—known today as the Genovese and Gambino families—emerged from Maranzano’s restructuring efforts. Maranzano named Luciano the first boss of what would later be known as the Genovese family. Luciano showed his appreciation less than five months later by sending five men dressed as police officers to Maranzano’s office to murder him.
Luciano, Costello, and Genovese
With Maranzano out of the way, Luciano become the most powerful Mafia boss in America and used his position to run La Cosa Nostra like a major corporation. He set up the LCN Commission, or ruling body, composed of seven bosses, and divided the different rackets among the families.
In 1936, Luciano was sentenced to 30 to 50 years in prison. Ten years later, he was released from prison and deported to Italy, never to return. When he was convicted, Frank Costello became acting boss because Genovese—then just an underboss—had fled to Italy to avoid a murder charge. His return to thestates was cleared when a key witness against him was poisoned and the charges were dropped.
Costello led the family for approximately 20 years until May of 1957 when Genovese took control by sending soldier Vincent “the Chin” Gigante to murder him. Costello survived the attack but relinquished control of the family to Genovese. Attempted murder charges against Gigante were dismissed when Costello refused to identify him as the shooter.
In 1959, it was Genovese’s turn to go to prison following a conviction of conspiracy to violate narcotics laws. He received a 15-year sentence but continued to run the family through his underlings from his prison cell in Atlanta, Georgia.
Valachi Sings—and Lombardo Leads
About this time, Joseph Valachi, a “made man,” was sent to the same prison as Genovese on a narcotics conviction. Labeled an informer, Valachi survived three attempts on his life behind bars. Still in prison in 1962, he killed a man he thought Genovese had sent to kill him. He was sentenced to life forthe murder.
The sentencing was a turning point for Valachi, who decided to cooperate with the U.S. government. On September 27, 1963, he appeared before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and testified that he was a member of a secret criminal society in the U.S. known as La Cosa Nostra.
In 1969, several years after Valachi began cooperating with the FBI, Vito Genovese died in his prison cell. By then the Genovese family was under the control of Philip “Benny Squint” Lombardo. Unlike the bosses before him, Lombardo preferred to rule behind his underboss. His first, Thomas Eboli, was murdered in 1972. Lombardo promoted Frank “Funzi” Tieri, and later Anthony “Fat Tony” Salerno as his front men.
Throughout the 1980s, the Genovese family hierarchy went through several changes. Tieri, recognized onthe street as the Genovese family boss in the late 1970s, was convicted for operating a criminal organization through a pattern of racketeering that included murder and extortion.
Salerno then fronted as boss until he had stroke in 1981. In 1985, Salerno and the bosses of the other four New York families were convicted for operating a criminal enterprise—the LCN Commission. Lombardo, his two captains in prison and his health failing, turned full control of the Genovese family over to Gigante—the man who tried to kill Costello 30 years earlier.
Fish on the Hook
In 1986, a second member turned against the Genovese family when Vincent “Fish” Cafaro, a soldier and right-hand-man to Anthony Salerno, decided to cooperate with the FBI and testify. According to Cafaro’s sworn statement, Gigante ran the family from behind the scenes while pretending to be mentally ill. Cafaro said this behavior helped further insulate Gigante from authorities while he ran theGenovese family’s criminal activities.
Gigante’s odd behavior and mumbling while he walked around New York’s East Village in a bathrobe earned him the nickname “the Odd Father.” After an FBI investigation, Gigante was convicted of racketeering and murder conspiracy in December 1997 and sentenced to 12 years. Another FBIinvestigation led to his indictment on January 17, 2002, accusing him of continuing to run the Genovese family from prison. He pled guilty to obstruction of justice in 2003.
Gigante died in prison in December 2005 in the same federal hospital where Gambino family leader John Gotti had died in 2002.
The Italian American Working Group
Over the years, FBI investigations have revealed how organized criminal groups have proliferated and impacted much of the world. Partnerships with foreign law enforcement agencies are essential to combat global organized crime groups.
Among the partnerships the FBI is involved with is the Italian American Working Group, which meets every year. The group addresses organized crime, cyber crime, money laundering, international terrorism, illegal immigration, cooperating witnesses, drug smuggling, art theft, extradition matters, and cigarette smuggling. The U.S. and Italy take turns hosting the meetings.
Labor racketeering is the domination, manipulation, and control of a labor movement in order to affect related businesses and industries. It can lead to the denial of workers’ rights and inflicts an economic loss on the workers, business, industry, insurer, or consumer.
The historical involvement of La Cosa Nostra in labor racketeering has been thoroughly documented:
- More than one-third of the 58 members arrested in 1957 at the Apalachin conference in New York listed their employment as “labor” or “labor-management relations.”
- Three major U.S. Senate investigations have documented La Cosa Nostra’s involvement in labor racketeering. One of these, the McClellan Committee, in the late-1950s, found systemic racketeering in both the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union.
- In 1986, the President’s Council on Organized Crime reported that five major unions—includingthe Teamsters and the Laborers International Union of North America—were dominated by organized crime.
- In the early 1980s, former Gambino Family Boss Paul Castellano was overheard saying, “Our job is to run the unions.”
Labor racketeering has become one of La Cosa Nostra’s fundamental sources of profit, national power, and influence.
FBI investigations over the years have clearly demonstrated that labor racketeering costs the American public millions of dollars each year through increased labor costs that are eventually passed on to consumers.
Labor unions provide a rich source for organized criminal groups to exploit: their pension, welfare, and health funds. There are approximately 75,000 union locals in the U.S., and many of them maintain their own benefit funds. In the mid-1980s, the Teamsters controlled more than 1,000 funds with total assets of more than $9 billion.
Labor racketeers attempt to control health, welfare, and pension plans by offering “sweetheart” contracts, peaceful labor relations, and relaxed work rules to companies, or by rigging union elections.
Labor law violations occur primarily in large cities with both a strong industrial base and strong labor unions, like New York, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, and Philadelphia. These cities also have a large presence of organized crime figures.
We have several investigative techniques to root out labor law violations: electronic surveillance, undercover operations, confidential sources, and victim interviews. We also have numerous criminal and civil statutes to use at our disposal, primarily through the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Statute.
The civil provisions of the RICO statute have proven to be very powerful weapons, especially the consent decrees. They are often more productive because they attack the entire corrupt entity instead of imprisoning individuals, who can easily be replaced with other organized crime members or associates.
Consent decrees are most effective when there is long-term, systemic corruption at virtually every level of a labor union by criminal organizations. A civil RICO complaint and subsequent consent decree can restore democracy to a corrupt union by imposing civil remedies designed to eliminate such corruption and deter its re-emergence.
The Teamsters are the best example of how efficiently the civil RICO process can be used. For decades,the Teamsters has been substantially controlled by La Cosa Nostra. In recent years, four of eight Teamster presidents were indicted, yet the union continued to be controlled by organized crime elements. The government has been fairly successful at removing the extensive criminal influence from this 1.4 million-member union by using the civil process.
We work closely with the Office of Labor Racketeering in the Department of Labor and with the U.S. Attorneys’ offices in investigating violations of labor law.
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI – The Marilyn Monroe Files
Marilyn Monroe
| Marilyn Monroe | |
|---|---|
Monroe in the trailer for Some Like It Hot(1959) |
|
| Born | Norma Jeane Mortenson June 1, 1926 Los Angeles |
| Died | August 5, 1962 (aged 36) Brentwood, Los Angeles |
| Cause of death | Barbiturate overdose |
| Resting place | Westwood Village Memorial Park Cemetery, Westwood, Los Angeles |
| Other names | Norma Jeane Baker Norma Jeane Dougherty Norma Jeane DiMaggio |
| Occupation | Actress, model, film producer, singer |
| Years active | 1947–1962 |
| Religion | Christian (1926-1956), Jewish (1956-1962) |
| Spouse | James Dougherty (m. 1942–1946) (divorced) Joe DiMaggio (m. 1954–1954)(divorced) Arthur Miller (m. 1956–1961)(divorced) |
| Signature | |
Marilyn Monroe (pronounced /mɒnˈroʊ/ or /mənˈroʊ/, born Norma Jeane Mortenson but baptized and raised as Norma Jeane Baker; June 1, 1926 – August 5, 1962[1]) was an American actress, singer and model.[2] After spending much of her childhood in foster homes, Monroe began a career as a model, which led to a film contract in 1946. Her early film appearances were minor, but her performances in The Asphalt Jungle and All About Eve (both 1950) were well received. By 1953, Monroe had progressed to leading roles. Her “dumb blonde” persona was used to comedic effect in such films as Gentlemen Prefer Blondes (1953), How to Marry a Millionaire (1953) and The Seven Year Itch (1955). Limited by typecasting, Monroe studied at the Actors Studio to broaden her range, and her dramatic performance inBus Stop (1956) was hailed by critics, and she received a Golden Globe nomination. Her production company, Marilyn Monroe Productions, released The Prince and the Showgirl (1957), for which she received a BAFTA Award nomination and won a David di Donatello award. She received a Golden Globe Award for her performance inSome Like It Hot (1959).
The final years of Monroe’s life were marked by illness, personal problems, and a reputation for being unreliable and difficult to work with. The circumstances of her death, from an overdose of barbiturates, have been the subject of conjecture. Though officially classified as a “probable suicide”, the possibility of an accidental overdose, as well as the possibility of homicide, have not been ruled out. In 1999, Monroe was ranked as the sixth greatest female star of all time by the American Film Institute. In the years and decades following her death, Monroe has often been cited as a pop and cultural icon as well as an eminent American sex symbol
Family and early life
Marilyn Monroe was born on June 1, 1926 in the Los Angeles County Hospital[6] as Norma Jeane Mortenson (soon after changed to Baker), the third child born to Gladys Pearl Baker (née Monroe) (May 27, 1902 – March 11, 1984).[7] Monroe’s birth certificate names the father as Martin Edward Mortensen with his residence stated as “unknown”.[8] The name Mortenson is listed as her surname on the birth certificate, although Gladys immediately had it changed to Baker, the surname of her first husband and which she still used. Martin’s surname was misspelled on the birth certificate leading to more confusion on who her actual father was. Gladys Baker had married a Martin E. Mortensen in 1924, but they had separated before Gladys’ pregnancy.[9] Several of Monroe’s biographers suggest that Gladys Baker used his name to avoid the stigma of illegitimacy.[10]Mortensen died at the age of 85, and Monroe’s birth certificate, together with her parents’ marriage and divorce documents, were discovered. The documents showed that Mortensen filed for divorce from Gladys on March 5, 1927, and it was finalized on October 15, 1928.[11][12] Throughout her life, Marilyn Monroe denied that Mortensen was her father.[9] She said that, when she was a child, she had been shown a photograph of a man that Gladys identified as her father, Charles Stanley Gifford. She remembered that he had a thin mustache and somewhat resembled Clark Gable, and that she had amused herself by pretending that Gable was her father.[9][13]
Gladys was mentally unstable and financially unable to care for the young Norma Jeane, so she placed her with foster parents Albert and Ida Bolender of Hawthorne, California, where she lived until she was seven. One day, Gladys visited and demanded that the Bolenders return Norma Jeane to her. Ida refused, she knew Gladys was unstable and the situation would not benefit her young daughter. Gladys pulled Ida into the yard, then quickly ran back to the house and locked herself in. Several minutes later, she walked out with one of Albert Bolender’s military duffel bags. To Ida’s horror, Gladys had stuffed a screaming Norma Jeane into the bag, zipped it up, and was carrying it right out with her. Ida charged toward her, and their struggle split the bag apart, dumping out Norma Jeane, who wept loudly as Ida grabbed her and pulled her back inside the house, away from Gladys.[14] In 1933, Gladys bought a house and brought Norma Jeane to live with her. A few months later, Gladys began a series of mental episodes that would plague her for the rest of her life. In My Story, Monroe recalls her mother “screaming and laughing” as she was forcibly removed to the State Hospital in Norwalk.
Norma Jeane was declared a ward of the state. Gladys’ best friend, Grace McKee, became her guardian. It was Grace who told Monroe that someday she would become a movie star. Grace was captivated by Jean Harlow, and would let Norma Jeane wear makeup and take her out to get her hair curled. They would go to the movies together, forming the basis for Norma Jeane’s fascination with the cinema and the stars on screen. When she was 9, McKee married Ervin Silliman “Doc” Goddard in 1935, and subsequently sent Monroe to the Los Angeles Orphans Home (later renamed Hollygrove), followed by a succession of foster homes.[15] While at Hollygrove, several families were interested in adopting her; however, reluctance on Gladys’ part to sign adoption papers thwarted those attempts. In 1937, Monroe moved back into Grace and Doc Goddard’s house, joining Doc’s daughter from a previous marriage. Due to Doc’s frequent attempts to sexually assault Norma Jeane, this arrangement did not last long.
Grace sent Monroe to live with her great-aunt, Olive Brunings in Compton, California; this was also a brief stint ended by an assault (some reports say it was sexual)–one of Olive’s sons had attacked the now middle-school-aged girl. Biographers and psychologists have questioned whether at least some of Norma Jeane’s later behavior (i.e. hypersexuality, sleep disturbances, substance abuse, disturbed interpersonal relationships), was a manifestation of the effects of childhood sexual abuse in the context of her already problematic relationships with her psychiatrically ill mother and subsequent caregivers.[16][17] In early 1938, Grace sent her to live with yet another one of her aunts, Ana Lower, who lived in Van Nuys, another city in Los Angeles County. Years later, she would reflect fondly about the time that she spent with Lower, whom she affectionately called “Aunt Ana.” She would explain that it was one of the only times in her life when she felt truly stable. As she aged, however, Lower developed serious health problems.
In 1942, Monroe moved back to Grace and Doc Goddard’s house. While attending Van Nuys High School, she met a neighbor’s son, James Dougherty (more commonly referred to as simply “Jim”), and began a relationship with him.[18][19][20] Several months later, Grace and Doc Goddard decided to relocate to Virginia, where Doc had received a lucrative job offer. Although it was never explained why, they decided not to take Monroe with them. An offer from a neighborhood family to adopt her was proposed, but Gladys rejected the offer. With few options left, Grace approached Dougherty’s mother and suggested that Jim marry her so that she would not have to return to an orphanage or foster care, as she was two years below the California legal age. Jim was initially reluctant, but he finally relented and married her in a ceremony arranged by Ana Lower. During this period, Monroe briefly supported her family as a homemaker.[18][21] In 1943, during World War II, Dougherty enlisted in the Merchant Marine. He was initially stationed on Santa Catalina Island off California’s west coast, and Monroe lived with him there in the town of Avalon for several months before he was shipped out to the Pacific. Frightened that he might not come back alive, Monroe begged him to try and get her pregnant before he left. Dougherty disagreed, feeling that she was too young to have a baby, but he promised that they would revisit the subject when he returned home. Subsequently, Monroe moved in with Dougherty’s mother.
Career
Early work: 1945–47
Mrs. Norma Jeane Dougherty,Yank Magazine, 1945
While Dougherty served in the Merchant Marine, Monroe began working in the Radioplane Munitions Factory, mainly spraying airplane parts with fire retardant and inspectingparachutes. During that time, Army photographer David Conover noticed her and snapped a photograph of her for a Yank magazine article. He encouraged her to apply to The Blue Book Modeling Agency. She signed with the agency and began researching the work of Jean Harlow and Lana Turner. She was told that they were looking for models with lighter hair, so Norma Jeane bleached her brunette hair to a golden blonde.
Monroe became one of Blue Book’s most successful models; she appeared on dozens of magazine covers. Her successful modeling career brought her to the attention of Ben Lyon, a 20th Century Fox executive, who arranged a screen test for her. Lyon was impressed and commented, “It’s Jean Harlow all over again.”[22] She was offered a standard six-month contract with a starting salary of $125 per week. Lyon did not like the name Norma Jeane and chose “Carole Lind” as a stagename, after Carole Lombard and Jenny Lind, but he soon decided it was not an appropriate choice. Monroe was invited to spend the weekend with Lyon and his wife Bebe Daniels at their home. It was there that they decided to find her a new name. Following her idol Jean Harlow, she decided to choose her mother’s maiden name of Monroe. Several variations such as Norma Jeane Monroe and Norma Monroe were tried and initially “Jeane Monroe” was chosen. Eventually, Lyon decided Jeane and variants were too common, and he decided on a more alliterative sounding name. He suggested “Marilyn”, commenting that she reminded him of Marilyn Miller. Monroe was initially hesitant because Marilyn was the contraction of the name Mary Lynn, a name she did not like.[citation needed] Lyon, however, felt that the name “Marilyn Monroe” was sexy, had a “nice flow”, and would be “lucky” due to the double “M”[23] and thus Norma Jeane Baker took the name Marilyn Monroe.
Marilyn Monroe’s first movie role was an uncredited role as a telephone operator in The Shocking Miss Pilgrim in 1947.[24] She won a brief role that same year in Dangerous Yearsand extra appearances in Green Grass of Wyoming and You Were Meant for Me, she also won a three scene role as Betty in Scudda Hoo! Scudda Hay!. Monroe’s part in Scudda Hoo! Scudda Hay! was to be three scenes long, but before the release of the film her part was cut down to a brief one-line scene.[citation needed] Green Grass of Wyoming, You Were Meant For Me, and Scudda Hoo! Scudda Hay!, wouldn’t be released until 1948, which was months after Monroe’s contract had ended in late 1947. She attempted to find opportunities for film work, and while unemployed, she posed for nude photographs. She was paid $50 and signed the model release form as “Mona Monroe”.[citation needed] It would be the only time she would get paid for the nude photos. That year, she was also crowned the first “Miss California Artichoke Queen” at the annual artichoke festival in Castroville.[25]
Breakthrough: 1948–51
In 1948, Monroe signed a six-month contract with Columbia Pictures and was introduced to the studio’s head drama coach Natasha Lytess, who became her acting coach for several years.[26] She starred in the low-budget musical Ladies of the Chorus (1948). Monroe was capitalized as one of the film’s bright spots, but the movie didn’t bring any success for Monroe nor Columbia.[27] During her short stint at Columbia, studio head Harry Cohn softened her appearance somewhat by correcting a slight overbite she had.
in The Asphalt Jungle (1950)
She had a small role in the Marx Brothers film Love Happy (1949). Monroe impressed the producers, who sent her to New York to feature in the film’s promotional campaign.[28] Love Happy brought Monroe to the attention of the talent agent, Johnny Hyde, who agreed to represent her. He arranged for her to audition for John Huston, who cast her in the drama The Asphalt Jungle as the young mistress of an aging criminal. Her performance brought strong reviews,[28] and was seen by the writer and director, Joseph Mankiewicz. He accepted Hyde’s suggestion of Monroe for a small comedic role in All About Eve as Miss Caswell, an aspiring actress, described by another character as a student of “The Copacabana School of Dramatic Art”. Mankiewicz later commented that he had seen an innocence in her that he found appealing, and that this had confirmed his belief in her suitability for the role.[29] Following Monroe’s success in these roles, Hyde negotiated a seven-year contract for her with 20th Century Fox, shortly before his death in December 1950.[30] It was at some time during this 1949–50 period that Hyde arranged for her to have a slight bump of cartilage removed from her somewhat bulbous nose which further softened her appearance and accounts for the slight variation in look she had in films after 1950.
In 1951, Monroe enrolled at University of California, Los Angeles, where she studied literature and art appreciation,[31] and appeared in several minor films playing opposite such long-established performers as Mickey Rooney, Constance Bennett, June Allyson, Dick Powell and Claudette Colbert.[32] In March 1951, she appeared as a presenter at the 23rd Academy Awards ceremony.[33] In 1952, Monroe appeared on the cover of Look magazine wearing a Georgia Tech sweater as part of an article celebrating female enrollment to the school’s main campus. In the early 1950s, Monroe and Gregg Palmer both unsuccessfully auditioned for roles as Daisy Mae and Abner in a proposed Li’l Abner television series based on the Al Capp comic strip, but the effort never materialized.[34]
[edit]Leading films: 1952–55
First issue of Playboy, December 1953
In March 1952, Monroe faced a possible scandal when one of her nude photos from a 1949 session with photographer Tom Kelley was featured in a calendar. The press speculated about the identity of the anonymous model and commented that she closely resembled Monroe. As the studio discussed how to deal with the problem, Monroe suggested that she should simply admit that she had posed for the photograph but emphasize that she had done so only because she had no money to pay her rent.[35] She gave an interview in which she discussed the circumstances that led to her posing for the photographs, and the resulting publicity elicited a degree of sympathy for her plight as a struggling actress.[35]
She made her first appearance on the cover of Life magazine in April 1952, where she was described as “The Talk of Hollywood”.[36] Stories of her childhood and upbringing portrayed her in a sympathetic light: a cover story for the May 1952 edition of True Experiences magazine showed a smiling and wholesome Monroe beside a caption that read, “Do I look happy? I should — for I was a child nobody wanted. A lonely girl with a dream — who awakened to find that dream come true. I am Marilyn Monroe. Read my Cinderella story.”[37] It was also during this time that she began dating baseball player Joe DiMaggio. A photograph of DiMaggio visiting Monroe at the 20th Century Fox studio was printed in newspapers throughout the United States, and reports of a developing romance between them generated further interest in Monroe.[38]
Four films in which Monroe featured were released beginning in 1952. She had been lent to RKO Studios to appear in a supporting role in Clash by Night, a Barbara Stanwyckdrama, directed by Fritz Lang.[39] Released in June 1952, the film was popular with audiences, with much of its success credited to curiosity about Monroe, who received generally favorable reviews from critics.[40]
With Keith Andes in Clash by Night(1952)
This was followed by two films released in July, the comedy We’re Not Married!, and the drama Don’t Bother to Knock. We’re Not Married! featured Monroe as a beauty pageant contestant. Variety described the film as “lightweight”. Its reviewer commented that Monroe was featured to full advantage in a bathing suit, and that some of her scenes suggested a degree of exploitation.[41] In Don’t Bother to Knock she played the starring role[42] of a babysitter who threatens to attack the child in her care. The downbeat melodrama was poorly reviewed, although Monroe commented that it contained some of her strongest dramatic acting.[42] Monkey Business, a successful comedy directed byHoward Hawks starring Cary Grant and Ginger Rogers, was released in September and was the first movie in which Monroe appeared in with platinum blonde hair.[43] In O. Henry’s Full House for 20th Century Fox, released in August 1952, Monroe had a single one-minute scene with Charles Laughton, yet she received top billing alongside him and the film’s other stars, including Anne Baxter, Farley Granger, Jean Peters and Richard Widmark.
Darryl F. Zanuck considered that Monroe’s film potential was worth developing and cast her in Niagara, as a femme fatale scheming to murder her husband, played byJoseph Cotten.[44] During filming, Monroe’s make-up artist Whitey Snyder noticed her stage fright (that would ultimately mark her behavior on film sets throughout her career); the director assigned him to spend hours gently coaxing and comforting Monroe as she prepared to film her scenes.[45]
As Rose in Niagara
Much of the critical commentary following the release of the film focused on Monroe’s overtly sexual performance,[44] and a scene which shows Monroe (from the back) making a long walk toward Niagara Falls received frequent note in reviews.[46] After seeing the film, Constance Bennett reportedly quipped, “There’s a broad with her future behind her.”[47] Whitey Snyder also commented that it was during preparation for this film, after much experimentation, that Monroe achieved “the look, and we used that look for several pictures in a row … the look was established.”[46] While the film was a success, and Monroe’s performance had positive reviews, her conduct at promotional events sometimes drew negative comments. Her appearance at the Photoplay awards dinner in a skin-tight gold lamé dress was criticized. Louella Parsons‘ newspaper column quoted Joan Crawford discussing Monroe’s “vulgarity” and describing her behavior as “unbecoming an actress and a lady”.[48] Monroe had previously received criticism for wearing a dress with a neckline cut almost to her navel when she acted as Grand Marshall at the Miss America Parade in September 1952.[49] A photograph from this event was used on the cover of the first issue of Playboy in December 1953, with a nude photograph of Monroe, taken in 1949, inside the magazine.[50]
Performing “Diamonds Are a Girl’s Best Friend” in Gentlemen Prefer Blondes (1953)
Her next film was Gentlemen Prefer Blondes (1953) co-starring Jane Russell and directed by Howard Hawks. Her role as Lorelei Lee, a gold-digging showgirl, required her to act, sing, and dance. The two stars became friends, with Russell describing Monroe as “very shy and very sweet and far more intelligent than people gave her credit for”.[51] She later recalled that Monroe showed her dedication by rehearsing her dance routines each evening after most of the crew had left, but she arrived habitually late on set for filming. Realizing that Monroe remained in her dressing room due to stage fright, and that Hawks was growing impatient with her tardiness, Russell started escorting her to the set.[52]
At the Los Angeles premiere of the film, Monroe and Russell pressed their hand- and footprints in the cement in the forecourt of Grauman’s Chinese Theatre. Monroe received positive reviews and the film grossed more than double its production costs.[53] Her rendition of “Diamonds Are a Girl’s Best Friend” became associated with her.Gentlemen Prefer Blondes also marked one of the earliest films in which William Travilla dressed Monroe. Travilla dressed Monroe in eight of her films including Bus Stop,Don’t Bother to Knock, How to Marry a Millionaire, River of No Return, There’s No Business Like Show Business, Monkey Business, and The Seven Year Itch.[54] How to Marry a Millionaire was a comedy about three models scheming to attract wealthy husbands. The film teamed Monroe with Betty Grable and Lauren Bacall, and was directed by Jean Negulesco.[55] The producer and scriptwriter, Nunnally Johnson, said that it was the first film in which audiences “liked Marilyn for herself [and that] she diagnosed the reason very shrewdly. She said that it was the only picture she’d been in, in which she had a measure of modesty… about her own attractiveness.”[56]
Monroe’s films of this period established her “dumb blonde” persona and contributed to her popularity. In 1953 and 1954, she was listed in the annual “Quigley Poll of the Top Ten Money Making Stars”, which was compiled from the votes of movie exhibitors throughout the United States for the stars that had generated the most revenue in their theaters over the previous year.[57] “I want to grow and develop and play serious dramatic parts. My dramatic coach, Natasha Lytess, tells everybody that I have a great soul, but so far nobody’s interested in it.” Monroe told the New York Times.[58] She saw a possibility in 20th Century Fox’s upcoming film, The Egyptian, but was rebuffed by Darryl F. Zanuck who refused to screen test her.[59]
Marilyn Monroe and Jane Russell putting signatures, hand and foot prints in cement atGrauman’s Chinese Theatre on June 26, 1953
Instead, she was assigned to the western River of No Return, opposite Robert Mitchum. Director Otto Preminger resented Monroe’s reliance on Natasha Lytess, who coached Monroe and announced her verdict at the end of each scene. Eventually Monroe refused to speak to Preminger, and Mitchum had to mediate.[60] Of the finished product, she commented, “I think I deserve a better deal than a grade Z cowboy movie in which the acting finished second to the scenery and the CinemaScopeprocess.”[61] In late 1953 Monroe was scheduled to begin filming The Girl in Pink Tights with Frank Sinatra. When she failed to appear for work, 20th Century Fox suspended her.[62]
International success: 1954–57
Monroe and Joe DiMaggio were married in San Francisco on January 14, 1954. They traveled to Japan soon after, combining a honeymoon with a business trip previously arranged by DiMaggio. For two weeks she took a secondary role to DiMaggio as he conducted his business, having told a reporter, “Marriage is my main career from now on.”[63] Monroe then traveled alone to Korea where she performed for 13,000 American Marines over a three-day period. She later commented that the experience had helped her overcome a fear of performing in front of large crowds.[64] Edward H. Comins (1932–2011) of Las Vegas, Nevada, the winner of a Bronze Star medal in the Korean War, reported having cooked for Monroe during one of her engagements abroad.[65]
Returning to Hollywood in March 1954, Monroe settled her disagreement with 20th Century Fox and appeared in the musical There’s No Business Like Show Business. The film failed to recover its production costs[61] and was poorly received. Ed Sullivan described Monroe’s performance of the song “Heat Wave” as “one of the most flagrant violations of good taste” he had witnessed.[66] Time magazine compared her unfavorably to co-star Ethel Merman, while Bosley Crowther for The New York Timessaid that Mitzi Gaynor had surpassed Monroe’s “embarrassing to behold” performance.[67] The reviews echoed Monroe’s opinion of the film. She had made it reluctantly, on the assurance that she would be given the starring role in the film adaptation of the Broadway hit The Seven Year Itch.[68]
An iconic image entered popular culture.[69]
One of Monroe’s most notable film roles was shot in September 1954, a skirt-blowing key scene for The Seven Year Itch in New York City. In it, she stands with her co-star, Tom Ewell, while the air from a subway grating blows her skirt up. A large crowd watched as director Billy Wilder ordered the scene to be refilmed many times. Joe DiMaggio was reported to have been present and infuriated by the spectacle.[70] After a quarrel, witnessed by journalist Walter Winchell, the couple returned to California where they avoided the press for two weeks, until Monroe announced that they had separated.[71] Their divorce was granted in November 1954.[72] The filming was completed in early 1955, and after refusing what she considered to be inferior parts in The Girl in the Red Velvet Swing and How to Be Very, Very Popular, Monroe decided to leave Hollywood on the advice of Milton Greene. The role of Curly Flagg in How to Be Very, Very Popular went to Sheree North, and Girl in the Red Velvet Swing went to Joan Collins. The Seven Year Itch was released and became a success, earning an estimated $8 million.[73] Monroe received positive reviews for her performance and was in a strong position to negotiate with 20th Century Fox.[73] On New Year’s Eve 1955, they signed a new contract which required Monroe to make four films over a seven-year period. The newly formed Marilyn Monroe Productions would be paid $100,000 plus a share of profits for each film. In addition to being able to work for other studios, Monroe had the right to reject any script, director or cinematographer she did not approve of.[74][75] In June 2011, the dress was sold for $4.6 million to an undisclosed buyer.[76]
Milton Greene had first met Monroe in 1953 when he was assigned to photograph her for Look magazine. While many photographers tried to emphasize her sexy image, Greene presented her in more modest poses, and she was pleased with his work. As a friendship developed between them, she confided in him her frustration with her 20th Century Fox contract and the roles she was offered. Her salary for Gentlemen Prefer Blondes amounted to $18,000, while freelancer Jane Russell was paid more than $100,000.[77] Greene agreed that she could earn more by breaking away from 20th Century Fox. He gave up his job in 1954, mortgaged his home to finance Monroe, and allowed her to live with his family as they determined the future course of her career.[78]
On April 8, 1955, veteran journalist Edward R. Murrow interviewed Greene and his wife Amy, as well as Monroe, at the Greenes’ home in Connecticut on a live telecast of the CBS program Person to Person. The kinescope of the telecast has been released on home video.[79]
Truman Capote introduced Monroe to Constance Collier, who gave her acting lessons. She felt that Monroe was not suited to stage acting, but possessed a “lovely talent” that was “so fragile and subtle, it can only be caught by the camera”. After only a few weeks of lessons, Collier died.[80] Monroe had met Paula Strasberg and her daughter Susan on the set of There’s No Business Like Show Business,[81] and had previously said that she would like to study with Lee Strasberg at the Actors Studio. In March 1955, Monroe met with Cheryl Crawford, one of the founders of the Actors Studio, and convinced her to introduce her to Lee Strasberg, who interviewed her the following day and agreed to accept her as a student.[82]
In May 1955, Monroe started dating playwright Arthur Miller; they had met in Hollywood in 1950 and when Miller discovered she was in New York, he arranged for a mutual friend to reintroduce them.[83] On June 1, 1955, Monroe’s birthday, Joe DiMaggio accompanied Monroe to the premiere of The Seven Year Itch in New York City. He later hosted a birthday party for her, but the evening ended with a public quarrel, and Monroe left the party without him. A lengthy period of estrangement followed.[84][85] Throughout that year, Monroe studied with the Actors Studio, and found that one of her biggest obstacles was her severe stage fright. She was befriended by the actors Kevin McCarthy and Eli Wallach who each recalled her as studious and sincere in her approach to her studies, and noted that she tried to avoid attention by sitting quietly in the back of the class.[86] When Strasberg felt Monroe was ready to give a performance in front of her peers, Monroe and Maureen Stapleton chose the opening scene from Eugene O’Neill‘s Anna Christie, and although she had faltered during each rehearsal, she was able to complete the performance without forgetting her lines.[87] Kim Stanley later recalled that students were discouraged from applauding, but that Monroe’s performance had resulted in spontaneous applause from the audience.[87] While Monroe was a student, Lee Strasberg commented, “I have worked with hundreds and hundreds of actors and actresses, and there are only two that stand out way above the rest. Number one is Marlon Brando, and the second is Marilyn Monroe.”[87]
The first film to be made under the contract and production company was Bus Stop directed by Joshua Logan. Logan had studied under Constantin Stanislavski, approved of method acting, and was supportive of Monroe.[88] Monroe severed contact with her drama coach, Natasha Lytess, replacing her with Paula Strasberg, who became a constant presence during the filming of Monroe’s subsequent films.[89]
Monroe’s dramatic performance as Chérie in Bus Stop(1956), a saloon singer with little talent, marked a departure from her earlier comedies.
In Bus Stop, Monroe played Chérie, a saloon singer with little talent who falls in love with a cowboy, Beauregard “Bo” Decker, played by Don Murray. Her costumes, make-up and hair reflected a character who lacked sophistication, and Monroe provided deliberately mediocre singing and dancing. Bosley Crowther of The New York Times proclaimed: “Hold on to your chairs, everybody, and get set for a rattling surprise. Marilyn Monroe has finally proved herself an actress.” In his autobiography, Movie Stars, Real People and Me, director Logan wrote: “I found Marilyn to be one of the great talents of all time… she struck me as being a much brighter person than I had ever imagined, and I think that was the first time I learned that intelligence and, yes, brilliance have nothing to do with education.” Logan championed Monroe for an Academy Award nomination and complimented her professionalism until the end of his life.[90] Though not nominated for an Academy Award,[91] she received a Golden Globe nomination.
In The Prince and the Showgirl (1957), Monroe co-starred with Laurence Olivier, who also directed the film.
Bus Stop was followed by The Prince and the Showgirl directed by Laurence Olivier, who also co-starred. Prior to filming, Olivier praised Monroe as “a brilliant comedienne, which to me means she is also an extremely skilled actress”. During filming in England he resented Monroe’s dependence on her drama coach, Paula Strasberg, regarding Strasberg as a fraud whose only talent was the ability to “butter Marilyn up”. He recalled his attempts at explaining a scene to Monroe, only to hear Strasberg interject, “Honey — just think of Coca-Cola and Frank Sinatra.”[92] Olivier later commented that in the film “Marilyn was quite wonderful, the best of all.”[93] Monroe’s performance was hailed by critics, especially in Europe, where she won the David di Donatello, the Italian equivalent of the Academy Awards, as well as the French Crystal Star Award. She was also nominated for a BAFTA. It was more than a year before Monroe began her next film. During her hiatus, she summered with Miller in Amagansett, New York. She suffered a miscarriage on August 1, 1957.[94][95]
Last films: 1958–62
With Miller’s encouragement she returned to Hollywood in August 1958 to star in Some Like It Hot. The film was directed by Billy Wilder and co-starred Jack Lemmon andTony Curtis. Wilder had experienced Monroe’s tardiness, stage fright, and inability to remember lines during production of The Seven Year Itch. However her behavior was now more hostile, and was marked by refusals to participate in filming and occasional outbursts of profanity.[96] Monroe consistently refused to take direction from Wilder, or insisted on numerous retakes of simple scenes until she was satisfied.[97] She developed a rapport with Lemmon, but she disliked Curtis after hearing that he had described their love scenes as “like kissing Hitler”.[98] Curtis later stated that the comment was intended as a joke.[99] During filming, Monroe discovered that she was pregnant. She suffered another miscarriage in December 1958, as filming was completed.[100]
Some Like it Hot became a resounding success, and was nominated for six Academy Awards. Monroe was acclaimed for her performance and won the Golden Globe Award for Best Actress – Motion Picture Musical or Comedy. Wilder commented that the film was the biggest success he had ever been associated with.[101] He discussed the problems he encountered during filming, saying “Marilyn was so difficult because she was totally unpredictable. I never knew what kind of day we were going to have… would she be cooperative or obstructive?”[102] He had little patience with her method-acting technique and said that instead of going to the Actors Studio “she should have gone to a train-engineer’s school … to learn something about arriving on schedule.”[103] Wilder had become ill during filming, and explained, “We were in mid-flight – and there was a nut on the plane.”[104] In hindsight, he discussed Monroe’s “certain indefinable magic” and “absolute genius as a comic actress.”[102]
By this time, Monroe had only completed one film, Bus Stop, under her four-picture contract with 20th Century Fox. She agreed to appear in Let’s Make Love, which was to be directed by George Cukor, but she was not satisfied with the script, and Arthur Miller rewrote it.[105] Gregory Peck was originally cast in the male lead role, but he refused the role after Miller’s rewrite; Cary Grant, Charlton Heston, Yul Brynner andRock Hudson also refused the role before it was offered to Yves Montand.[106] Monroe and Miller befriended Montand and his wife, actress Simone Signoret, and filming progressed well until Miller was required to travel to Europe on business. Monroe began to leave the film set early and on several occasions failed to attend, but her attitude improved after Montand confronted her. Signoret returned to Europe to make a film, and Monroe and Montand began a brief affair that ended when Montand refused to leave Signoret.[107] The film was not a critical or commercial success.[108]
Monroe’s health deteriorated during this period, and she began to see a Los Angeles psychiatrist, Dr. Ralph Greenson. He later recalled that during this time she frequently complained of insomnia, and told Greenson that she visited several medical doctors to obtain what Greenson considered an excessive variety of drugs. He concluded that she was progressing to the point of addiction, but also noted that she could give up the drugs for extended periods without suffering any withdrawal symptoms.[109] According to Greenson, the marriage between Miller and Monroe was strained; he said that Miller appeared to genuinely care for Monroe and was willing to help her, but that Monroe rebuffed while also expressing resentment towards him for not doing more to help her.[110] Greenson stated that his main objective at the time was to enforce a drastic reduction in Monroe’s drug intake.[111]
Monroe in her final completed film, The Misfits (1961)
In 1956, Arthur Miller had briefly resided in Nevada and wrote a short story about some of the local people he had become acquainted with, a divorced woman and some aging cowboys. By 1960 he had developed the short story into a screenplay, and envisaged it as containing a suitable role for Monroe. It became her last completed film.The Misfits, directed by John Huston and costarring Clark Gable, Montgomery Clift, Eli Wallach and Thelma Ritter. Shooting commenced in July 1960, with most taking place in the hot Northern Nevada desert.[112] Monroe was frequently ill and unable to perform, and away from the influence of Dr. Greenson, she had resumed her consumption of sleeping pills and alcohol.[111] A visitor to the set, Susan Strasberg, later described Monroe as “mortally injured in some way,”[113] and in August, Monroe was rushed to Los Angeles where she was hospitalized for ten days. Newspapers reported that she had been near death, although the nature of her illness was not disclosed.[114] Louella Parsons wrote in her newspaper column that Monroe was “a very sick girl, much sicker than at first believed”, and disclosed that she was being treated by a psychiatrist.[114] Monroe returned to Nevada and completed the film, but she became hostile towards Arthur Miller, and public arguments were reported by the press.[115] Making the film had proved to be an arduous experience for the actors; in addition to Monroe’s distress, Montgomery Clift had frequently been unable to perform due to illness, and by the final day of shooting, Thelma Ritter was in hospital suffering from exhaustion. Gable, commenting that he felt unwell, left the set without attending the wrap party.[116] Monroe and Miller returned to New York on separate flights.[117]
Within ten days Monroe had announced her separation from Miller, and Gable had died from a heart attack.[118] Gable’s widow, Kay, commented to Louella Parsons that it had been the “eternal waiting” on the set of The Misfits that had contributed to his death, though she did not name Monroe. When reporters asked Monroe if she felt guilty about Gable’s death, she refused to answer,[119] but the journalist Sidney Skolsky recalled that privately she expressed regret for her poor treatment of Gable during filming and described her as being in “a dark pit of despair”.[120] Monroe later attended the christening of the Gables’ son, at the invitation of Kay Gable.[120] The Misfits received mediocre reviews, and was not a commercial success, though some praised the performances of Monroe and Gable.[120] Huston later commented that Monroe’s performance was not acting in the true sense, and that she had drawn from her own experiences to show herself, rather than a character. “She had no techniques. It was all the truth. It was only Marilyn.”[120]
During the following months, Monroe’s dependence on alcohol and prescription medications began to take a toll on her health, and friends such as Susan Strasberg later spoke of her illness.[121] Her divorce from Arthur Miller was finalized in January 1961, with Monroe citing “incompatibility of character”,[121] and in February she voluntarily entered the Payne Whitney Psychiatric Clinic. Monroe later described the experience as a “nightmare”.[122] She was able to phone Joe DiMaggio from the clinic, and he immediately traveled from Florida to New York to facilitate her transfer to the Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center. She remained there for three weeks. Illness prevented her from working for the remainder of the year; she underwent surgery to correct a blockage in her Fallopian tubes in May, and the following month underwent gallbladdersurgery.[123] She returned to California and lived in a rented apartment as she convalesced.
In 1962, Monroe began filming Something’s Got to Give, which was to be the third film of her four-film contract with 20th Century Fox. It was to be directed by George Cukor, and co-starred Dean Martin and Cyd Charisse. She was ill with a virus as filming commenced, and suffered from high temperatures and recurrent sinusitis. On one occasion she refused to perform with Martin as he had a cold, and the producer Henry Weinstein recalled seeing her on several occasions being physically ill as she prepared to film her scenes, and attributed it to her dread of performing. He commented, “Very few people experience terror. We all experience anxiety, unhappiness, heartbreaks, but that was sheer primal terror.”[124]
On May 19, 1962, she attended the early birthday celebration of President John F. Kennedy at Madison Square Garden, at the suggestion of Kennedy’s brother-in-law, actor Peter Lawford. Monroe performed “Happy Birthday” along with a specially written verse based on Bob Hope‘s “Thanks for the Memory“. Kennedy responded to her performance with the remark, “Thank you. I can now retire from politics after having had ‘Happy Birthday’ sung to me in such a sweet, wholesome way.”[125] (also see entry Happy Birthday, Mr. President)
Monroe returned to the set of Something’s Got to Give and filmed a sequence in which she appeared nude in a swimming pool. Commenting that she wanted to “push Liz Taylor off the magazine covers”, she gave permission for several partially nude photographs to be published by Life. Having only reported for work on twelve occasions out of a total of 35 days of production,[124] Monroe was dismissed. The studio 20th Century Fox filed a lawsuit against her for half a million dollars,[126] and the studio’s vice president, Peter Levathes, issued a statement saying “The star system has gotten way out of hand. We’ve let the inmates run the asylum, and they’ve practically destroyed it.”[126] Monroe was replaced by Lee Remick, and when Dean Martin refused to work with any other actress, he was also threatened with a lawsuit.[126] Following her dismissal, Monroe engaged in several high-profile publicity ventures. She gave an interview to Cosmopolitan and was photographed at Peter Lawford’s beach house sipping champagne and walking on the beach.[127] She next posed for Bert Stern for Vogue in a series of photographs that included several nudes.[127] Published after her death, they became known as ‘The Last Sitting‘. Richard Meryman interviewed her for Life, in which Monroe reflected upon her relationship with her fans and her uncertainties in identifying herself as a “star” and a “sex symbol”. She referred to the events surrounding Arthur Miller’s appearance before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1956, and her studio’s warning that she would be “finished” if she showed public support for him, and commented, “You have to start all over again. But I believe you’re always as good as your potential. I now live in my work and in a few relationships with the few people I can really count on. Fame will go by, and, so long, I’ve had you fame. If it goes by, I’ve always known it was fickle. So at least it’s something I experienced, but that’s not where I live.”[128]
In the final weeks of her life, Monroe engaged in discussions about future film projects, and firm arrangements were made to continue negotiations on Something’s Got to Give.[129] Among the projects was a biography of Jean Harlow filmed two years later unsuccessfully with Carroll Baker. Starring roles in Billy Wilder‘s Irma la Douce[130] and What a Way to Go! were also discussed; Shirley MacLaine eventually played the roles in both films. Kim Novak replaced her in Kiss Me, Stupid, a comedy in which she was to star opposite Dean Martin. A film version of the Broadway musical, A Tree Grows In Brooklyn, and an unnamed World War I–themed musical co-starring Gene Kelly were also discussed, but the projects never materialized due to her death.[129] Her dispute with 20th Century Fox was resolved, and her contract renewed into a $1 million two-picture deal, and filming of Something’s Got to Give was scheduled to resume in early fall 1962. Marilyn, having fired her own agent and MCA in 1961 managed her own negoiations as President of Marilyn Monroe Productions. Also on the table was an Italian four film deal worth 10 million giving her script, director, and co-star approval.[131] Allan “Whitey” Snyder who saw her during the last week of her life, said Monroe was pleased by the opportunities available to her, and that she “never looked better [and] was in great spirits”.[129]Death and aftermath
The crypt of Marilyn Monroe (2005)
On August 5, 1962, LAPD police sergeant Jack Clemmons received a call at 4:25 am from Dr Ralph Greenson, Monroe’s psychiatrist, proclaiming that Monroe was found dead at her home in Brentwood, Los Angeles, California.[132] She was 36 years old. At the subsequent autopsy, eight milligram per cent of Chloral hydrate and 4.5 milligram percent of Nembutal were found in her system,[133] and Dr. Thomas Noguchi of the Los Angeles County Coroners office recorded cause of death as “acutebarbiturate poisoning,” resulting from a “probable suicide.”[134] Many theories, including murder, circulated about the circumstances of her death and the timeline after the body was found. Some conspiracy theories involved John and Robert Kennedy, while other theories suggested CIA or Mafia complicity. It was reported that the last person Monroe called was the President.[135][136]
On August 8, 1962, Monroe was interred in a crypt at Corridor of Memories #24, at the Westwood Village Memorial Park Cemetery in Los Angeles. Lee Strasbergdelivered the eulogy. The crypt space immediately to the left of Monroe’s was bought and reserved by Hugh Hefner in 1992.[137] DiMaggio took control of the funeral arrangements which consisted of only 31 close family and friends. Police were also present to keep the press away.[138] Her casket was solid bronze and was lined with champagne colored silk.[139] Allan “Whitey” Snyder did her make-up which was supposedly a promise made in earlier years if she were to die before him.[139] She was wearing her favorite green Emilio Pucci dress.[139] In her hands was a small bouquet of pink teacup roses.[139] For the next 20 years, red roses were placed in a vase attached to the crypt, courtesy of Joe DiMaggio.[138]
In August 2009, the crypt space directly above that of Monroe was placed for auction[140] on eBay. Elsie Poncher plans to exhume her husband and move him to an adjacent plot. She advertised the crypt, hoping “to make enough money to pay off the $1.6 million mortgage” on her Beverly Hills mansion.[137] The winning bid was placed by an anonymous Japanese man for $4.6 million,[141] but the winning bidder later backed out “because of the paying problem”. Playboy magazine founder Hugh Hefner, who never met Monroe, bought the crypt next to hers at the Westwood Village Memorial Park Cemetery. He affirmed that the initial success of his magazine directly correlated with Monroe.[citation needed]
Administration of estate
Monroe’s Brentwood home (1992)
In her will, Monroe stated she would leave Lee Strasberg her personal effects, which amounted to just over half of her residuary estate, expressing her desire that he “distribute [the effects] among my friends, colleagues and those to whom I am devoted”.[142] Instead, Strasberg stored them in a warehouse, and willed them to his widow, Anna, who successfully sued Los Angeles-based Odyssey Auctions in 1994 to prevent the sale of items consigned by the nephew of Monroe’s business manager, Inez Melson. In October 1999, Christie’s auctioned the bulk of Monroe’s effects, including those recovered from Melson’s nephew, netting an amount of $13,405,785. Subsequently, Strasberg sued the children of four photographers to determine rights of publicity, which permits the licensing of images of deceased personages for commercial purposes. The decision as to whether Monroe was a resident of California, where she died and where her will was probated,[143] or New York, which she considered her primary residence, was worth millions.[144]
On May 4, 2007, a New York judge ruled that Monroe’s rights of publicity ended at her death.[145][146][147] In October 2007, California Governor Arnold Schwarzeneggersigned Senate Bill 771.[148] The legislation was supported by Anna Strasberg and the Screen Actors Guild.[149] Senate Bill 771 established that non-family members may inherit rights of publicity through the residuary clause of the deceased’s will, provided that the person was a resident of California at the time of death.[150] In March 2008, the United States District Court in Los Angeles ruled that Monroe was a resident of New York at the time of her death, citing the statement of the executor of her estate to California tax authorities, and a 1966 sworn affidavit by her housekeeper.[151] The decision was reaffirmed by the United States District Court of New York in September 2008.[152]
In July 2010, Monroe’s Brentwood home was put up for sale by Prudential California Realty. The house was sold for $3.6 million.[153] Monroe left to Lee Strasberg an archive of her own writing – diaries, poems, and letters, which Anna discovered in October 1999. In October 2010, the documents were published as a book, Fragments.[154][155]
Personal life
Relationships
Monroe had three marriages, all of which ended in divorce. The first was to James Dougherty, the second to Joe DiMaggio, and lastly to Arthur Miller. Allegedly, she was briefly married to writer Robert “Bob” Slatzer. She is alleged to have had affairs with both John and Robert Kennedy. Marlon Brando, in his autobiography Songs My Mother Taught Me, claimed that he had had a relationship with her, and enduring friendship lasting until her death. She also suffered two miscarriages and an ectopic pregnancy during her three marriages.[156][157]
Monroe married James Dougherty on June 19, 1942, at the home of Chester Howell in Los Angeles. As a result of her modeling career, he began to lose interest in her and stated that he did not approve of her new job. Monroe then decided to divorce Dougherty. The marriage ended when he returned from overseas in 1946. In The Secret Happiness of Marilyn Monroe and To Norma Jeane with Love, Jimmie, he claimed they were in love, but dreams of stardom lured her away. In 1953, he wrote a piece called “Marilyn Monroe Was My Wife” for Photoplay, in which he claimed that she threatened to jump off the Santa Monica Pier if he left her. She was reported to have been furious and explained in 1956 interview that she confessed to having attempted suicide during the marriage and stated that she felt trapped and bored by Dougherty, even blaming their marriage on her foster mother.[158] In her autobiography, explaining the sudden dissolution of their marriage, Monroe stated, “My marriage didn’t make me sad, but it didn’t make me happy either. My husband and I hardly spoke to each other. This wasn’t because we were angry. We had nothing to say. I was dying of boredom.”[159]
Doc Goddard had plans to publish extra details about the marriage, citing that he hoped to clear up rumors about an arranged marriage, but decided against the publication at the last minute.[160] In the 2004 documentary Marilyn’s Man, Dougherty made three new claims: that he invented the “Marilyn Monroe” persona; studio executives forced her to divorce him; and that he was her true love and her “dedicated friend for life”.
Monroe eloped with Joe DiMaggio at San Francisco City Hall on January 14, 1954. In 1951, DiMaggio saw a photograph of Monroe alongside Chicago White Sox players Joe Dobson and Gus Zernial, prompting him to request a date with her in 1952. Of their initial meeting, Monroe wrote in My Story that she did not have a desire to know him, as she had feared a stereotypical jock. During their honeymoon in Japan, she was asked to visit Korea as part of the USO. She performed ten shows in four days for over 100,000 servicemen.
Joe DiMaggio and Marilyn Monroe staying at Imperial Hotel in Tokyo on their honeymoon (1954)
Maury Allen quoted New York Yankees PR man Arthur Richman that Joe told him that the marriage went wrong from then. On September 14, 1954, Monroe filmed the famed skirt-blowing scene for The Seven Year Itch in front of New York’s Trans-Lux Theater. Bill Kobrin, then Fox’s east coast correspondent, told the Palm SpringsDesert Sun in 1956 that it was Billy Wilder‘s idea to turn the shoot into a media circus, and that the couple had a “yelling battle” in the theater lobby.[161] She filed for divorce on grounds of mental cruelty nine months after the wedding. In February 1961, Monroe was admitted to the Payne Whitney Psychiatric Clinic. She contacted DiMaggio, who secured her release. She later joined him in Florida, where he was serving as a batting coach at the New York Yankees‘ training camp. Bob Hope jokingly dedicated Best Song nominee The Second Time Around to them at the 1961 Academy Awards. According to Allen, on August 1, 1962, DiMaggio – alarmed by how Monroe had fallen in with people he considered detrimental to her well-being – quit his job with a PX supplier to ask her to remarry him. After Monroe’s death, DiMaggio claimed her body and arranged her funeral. For 20 years, he had a half-dozen red roses delivered to her crypt three times a week. In 2006, DiMaggio’s adopted granddaughters auctioned the bulk of his estate, which featured two letters Monroe penned to him and a photograph signed “I love you, Joe, Marilyn.”[162]
On June 29, 1956, Monroe married playwright Arthur Miller, in a civil ceremony in White Plains, New York. Monroe met Miller in 1950. During this filming of Bus Stop, the relationship between Monroe and Miller had developed, and although the couple were able to maintain their privacy for almost a year, the press began to write about them as a couple,[163] often referred to as “The Egghead and The Hourglass”.[164] The reports of their romance were soon overtaken by news that Miller had been called to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee to explain his supposed communist affiliations. Called upon to identify communists he was acquainted with, Miller refused and was charged with contempt of Congress. He was acquitted on appeal.[165] During the investigation, Monroe was urged by film executives to abandon Miller, rather than risk her career but she refused, later branding them as “born cowards”.[165] The press began to discuss an impending marriage, but Monroe and Miller refused to confirm the rumor. In June 1956, a reporter was following them by car, and as they attempted to elude him, the reporter’s car crashed, killing a female passenger. Monroe became hysterical upon hearing the news, and their engagement was announced, partly in the expectation that it would reduce the excessive media interest they were being subjected to.[164] City Court Judge Seymour D. Robinowitz presided over the hushed ceremony in the law office of Sam Slavitt (the wedding had been kept secret from both the press and the public). Monroe and Miller wed again two days later in a Jewish ceremony before a small group of guests. Rabbi Robert E. Goldburg, a Reform rabbi at Congregation Mishkan Israel, presided over the ceremony.[166] Their nuptials were celebrated at the home of Miller’s literary agent, Kay Brown, in Westchester County, New York. Some 30 friends and relatives attended the hastily arranged party. Less than two weeks after the wedding, the Millers flew to London, where they were greeted at Parkside House by Laurence Olivier and wife Vivien Leigh. Monroe created chaos among the normally staid British press. In reflecting on his courtship of Monroe, Miller wrote, “She was a whirling light to me then, all paradox and enticing mystery, street-tough one moment, then lifted by a lyrical and poetic sensitivity that few retain past early adolescence.”[167] Nominally raised as a Christian but before her 1956 conversion (to Judaism),[168] Monroe laughingly rejected Jane Russell‘s conversion attempts during the 1953 filming of “Gentlemen Prefer Blondes” saying “Jane tried to convert me (to religion) and I tried to introduce her to Freud”.[169] She did convert to Judaism before marrying Miller.[170][171][172][173] After she finished shooting The Prince and the Showgirl with Laurence Olivier, the couple returned to the United States from England and discovered she was pregnant. Tony Curtis, her co-star from Some Like It Hot, claims he got Monroe pregnant during their on-off affair that was rekindled during the filming of Some Like It Hot in 1959, while she was still married to Arthur Miller.[174][175][176][177]
Miller’s screenplay for The Misfits, a story about a despairing divorcée, was meant to be a Valentine gift for his wife, but by the time filming started in 1960 their marriage was beyond repair. A Mexican divorce was granted on January 24, 1961 in Ciudad Juarez by Francisco José Gómez Fraire. On February 17, 1962, Miller married Inge Morath, one of the Magnum photographers recording the making of The Misfits. In January 1964, Miller’s play After The Fall opened, featuring a beautiful and devouring shrew named Maggie. Simone Signoret noted in her autobiography the morbidity of Miller and Elia Kazan resuming their professional association “over a casket”. In interviews and in his autobiography, Miller insisted that Maggie was not based on Monroe. However, he never pretended that his last Broadway-bound work, Finishing the Picture, was not based on the making of The Misfits. He appeared in the documentary The Century of the Self, lamenting the psychological work being done on her before her death.
From President Kennedy’s birthday gala where Monroe sang “Happy Birthday, Mr. President“, May 19, 1962.
On May 19, 1962, Monroe made her last significant public appearance, singing “Happy Birthday, Mr. President” at a birthday party for President John F. Kennedy at Madison Square Garden. The dress that she wore to the event, specially designed and made for her by Jean Louis, sold at an auction in 1999 for $1.26 million.[178] Monroe reportedly had an affair with President John F. Kennedy. JFK’s reputed mistress Judith Exner, in her 1977 autobiography, also wrote about an affair that she said the president and Monroe had.[179] Journalist Anthony Summers examines the issue of Monroe’s relationships with the Kennedy brothers at length in two books: his 1993 biography of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, entitled Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar Hoover, and his 1985 biography of Monroe, entitled Goddess. In the Hoover book, Summers concludes that Monroe was in love with President Kennedy and wanted to marry him in the early 1960s; that she called the White House frequently; and that, when the married President had to break off their affair, Monroe became even more depressed, and then turned to Robert Kennedy, who visited Monroe in Los Angeles the day that she died.[180] Patricia Seaton Lawford, the fourth wife of actor Peter Lawford, also deals with the Monroe-Kennedy matters in her 1988 biography of Peter Lawford, entitled The Peter Lawford Story. Lawford’s first wife was Patricia Kennedy Lawford, a sister of John and Robert; Lawford was very close to the Kennedy family for over a decade, including the time of Monroe’s death. In 1997, documents purporting to prove a coverup of a relationship between JFK and Monroe were discovered to be fraudulent.[181]
Psychoanalysis
Monroe had a long experience with psychoanalysis. She was in analysis with Margaret Herz Hohenberg, Anna Freud, Marianne Rie Kris, Ralph S. Greenson (who found Monroe dead), and Milton Wexler.[182]
Politics
In Monroe’s last interview she pleaded with a reporter to end the article with the folllowing quote: “What I really want to say: That what the world really needs is a real feeling of kinship. Everybody: stars, laborers, Negroes, Jews, Arabs. We are all brothers. Please don’t make me a joke. End the interview with what I believe.”[183]
Monroe was friends with Ella Fitzgerald and helped Ella in her career. Ella Fitzgerald later recounted, “I owe Marilyn Monroe a real debt…it was because of her that I played the Mocambo, a very popular nightclub in the ’50s. She personally called the owner of the club, and told him she wanted me booked immediately, and if he would do it, she would take a front table every night. She told him – and it was true, due to Marilyn’s superstar status – that the press would go wild. The owner said yes, and Marilyn was there, front table, every night. The press went overboard. After that, I never had to play a small jazz club again. She was an unusual woman – a little ahead of her times. And she didn’t know it.”[184]
Political discussions were recounted with Robert Kennedy as to policy towards Cuba, and President Kennedy. The latter said to have taken place at had luncheon with the Peter Lawfords. She was very pleased, as she had asked the President a lot of socially significant questions concerning the morality of atomic testing.[185] Monroe supported Peace Action, which was created from a merge of Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy and the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign.[186]
While in Mexico in 1962, she openly associated with Americans who were identified by the FBI as communists, such as Frederick Vanderbilt Field. The daughter of Monroe’s last psychiatrist, Joan Greenson, said that Monroe was “passionate about equal rights, rights for blacks, rights for the poor. She identified strongly with the workers.”[187]
TOP-SECRET: THE CIA FILE ON LUIS POSADA CARRILES
Washington, D.C., August 28, 2011 – As the unprecedented trial of Cuban exile Luis Posada Carriles begins this week in El Paso, Texas, the National Security Archive today posted a series of CIA records covering his association with the agency in the 1960s and 1970s. CIA personnel records described Posada, using his codename, “AMCLEVE/15,” as “a paid agent” at $300 a month, being utilized as a training instructor for other exile operatives, as well as an informant. “Subject is of good character, very reliable and security conscious,” the CIA reported in 1965. Posada, another CIA document observed, incorrectly, was “not a typical ‘boom and bang’ type of individual.”
Today’s posting includes key items from Posada’s CIA file, including several previously published by the Archive, and for the first time online, the indictment from Posada’s previous prosecution–in Panama–on charges of trying to assassinate Fidel Castro with 200 pounds of dynamite and C-4 explosives (in Spanish).
“This explosive has the capacity to destroy any armored vehicle, buildings, steel doors, and the effects can extend for 200 meters…if a person were in the center of the explosion, even if they were in an armored car, they would not survive,” as the indictment described the destructive capacity of the explosives found in Posada’s possession in Panama City, where Fidel Castro was attending an Ibero-American summit in November 2000.
The judge presiding over the perjury trial of Posada has ruled that the prosecution can introduce unclassified evidence of his CIA background which might be relevant to his “state of mind” when he allegedly lied to immigration officials about his role in a series of hotel bombings in Havana in 1997. In pre-trial motions, the prosecution has introduced a short unclassified “summary” of Posada’s CIA career, which is included below. Among other things, the summary (first cited last year in Tracey Eaton’s informative blog, “Along the Malecon”) reveals that in 1993, only four years before he instigated the hotel bombings in Havana, the CIA anonymously warned former agent and accused terrorist Luis Posada of an assassination threat on his life.
A number of the Archive’s CIA documents were cited in articles in the Washington Post, and CNN coverage today on the start of the Posada trial. “The C.I.A. trained and unleashed a Frankenstein,” the New York Times quoted Archive Cuba Documentation Project director Peter Kornbluh as stating. “It is long past time he be identified as a terrorist and be held accountable as a terrorist.”
Posada was convicted in Panama in 2001, along with three accomplices, of endangering public safety; he was sentenced to eight years in prison. After lobbying by prominent Cuban-American politicians from Miami, Panamanian president Mireya Moscoso pardoned all four in August 2004. A fugitive from justice in Venezuela where he escaped from prison while being tried for the October 6, 1976, mid air bombing of a Cuban jetliner which killed all 73 people on board, Posada showed up in Miami in March 2005. He was arrested on May 17 of that year by the Department of Homeland Security and held in an immigration detention center in El Paso for two years, charged with immigration fraud during the Bush administration. Since mid 2007, he has been living on bail in Miami. In April 2009, the Obama Justice Department added several counts of perjury relating to Posada denials about his role in organizing a series of hotel, restaurant and discotheque bombings in 1997. Since mid 2007, he has been living on bail in Miami
According to Kornbluh, “it is poetic justice that the same U.S. Government whose secret agencies created, trained, paid and deployed Posada is finally taking steps to hold him accountable in a court of law for his terrorist crimes.”
Read the Documents
Document 1: CIA, Unclassified, “Unclassified Summary of the CIA’s Relationship With Luis Clemente Posada Carriles,” Undated.
This unclassified summary of the relationship between Luis Posada Carriles and the CIA, which was provided to the court by the US Justice Department, says the CIA first had contact with Posada in connection with planning the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. He remained a paid agent of the CIA from 1965-1967 and again from 1968-1974. From 1974-76, Posada provided unsolicited threat reporting. (Additional documents introduced in court show that he officially severed ties with the CIA in February 1976.) According to this document, the CIA last had contact with Posada in 1993 when they anonymously contacted him in Honduras by telephone to warn him of a threat to his life. (This document was first cited last year in Tracey Eaton’s informative blog, “Along the Malecon.”)
Document 2: CIA, “PRQ Part II for AMCLEVE/15,” September 22, 1965.
“PRQ Part II,” or the second part of Posada’s Personal Record Questionnaire, provides operational information. Within the text of the document, Posada is described as “strongly anti-Communist” as well as a sincere believer in democracy. The document describes Posada having a “good character,” not to mention the fact that he is “very reliable, and security conscious.” The CIA recommends that he be considered for a civil position in a post-Castro government in Cuba (codenamed PBRUMEN).
Document 3: CIA, Cable, “Plan of the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) to Blow Up a Cuban or Soviet Vessel in Veracruz, Mexico,” July 1, 1965.
This CIA cable summarizes intelligence on a demolition project proposed by Jorge Mas Canosa, then the head of RECE. On the third page, a source is quoted as having informed the CIA of a payment that Mas Canosa has made to Luis Posada in order to finance a sabotage operation against ships in Mexico. Posada reportedly has “100 pounds of C-4 explosives and some detonators” and limpet mines to use in the operation.
Document 4: CIA, Memorandum, “AMCLEVE /15,” July 21, 1966.
This document includes two parts-a cover letter written by Grover T. Lythcott, Posada’s CIA handler, and an attached request written by Posada to accept a position on new coordinating Junta composed of several anti-Castro organizations. In the cover letter, Lythcbtt refers to Posada by his codename, AMCLEVE/I5, and discusses his previous involvement withthe Agency. He lionizes Posada, writing that his ”performance in all assigned tasks has been excellent,” and urges that he be permitted to work with the combined anti-Castro exile groups. According to the document, Lythcott suggests that Posada be taken off the CIA payroll to facilitate his joining the anti-Castro militant junta, which will be led by RECE. Lythcott insists that Posada will function as an effective moderating force considering he is “acutely aware of the international implications of ill planned or over enthusiastic activities against Cuba.” In an attached memo, Posada, using the name “Pete,” writes that if he is on the Junta, “they will never do anything to endanger the security of this Country (like blow up Russian ships)” and volunteers to “give the Company all the intelligence that I can collect.”
Document 5: CIA, Personal Record Questionnaire on Posada, April 17, 1972.
This “PRQ” was compiled in 1972 at a time Posada was a high level official at the Venezuelan intelligence service, DISIP, in charge of demolitions. The CIA was beginning to have some concerns about him, based on reports that he had taken CIA explosives equipment to Venezuela, and that he had ties to a Miami mafia figure named Lefty Rosenthal. The PRQ spells out Posada’s personal background and includes his travel to various countries between 1956 and 1971. It also confirms that one of his many aliases was “Bambi Carriles.”
Document 6: CIA, Report, “Traces on Persons Involved in 6 Oct 1976 Cubana Crash,” October 13, 1976.
In the aftermath of the bombing of Cubana flight 455, the CIA ran a file check on all names associated with the terror attack. In a report to the FBI the Agency stated that it had no association with the two Venezuelans who were arrested. A section on Luis Posada Carriles was heavily redacted when the document was declassified. But the FBI retransmitted the report three days later and that version was released uncensored revealing Posada’s relations with the CIA.
Document 7: CIA, Secret Intelligence Report, “Activities of Cuban Exile Leader Orlando Bosch During his Stay in Venezuela,” October 14, 1976.
A source in Venezuela supplied the CIA with detailed intelligence on a fund raiser held for Orlando Bosch and his organization CORU after he arrived in Caracas in September 1976. The source described the dinner at the house of a Cuban exile doctor, Hildo Folgar, which included Venezuelan government officials. Bosch was said to have essentially asked for a bribe in order to refrain from acts of violence during the United Nations meeting in November 1976, which would be attended by Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez. He was also quoted as saying that his group had done a “great job” in assassinating former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier in Washington D.C. on September 21, and now was going to “try something else.” A few days later, according to this intelligence report, Luis Posada Carriles was overheard to say that “we are going to hit a Cuban airplane” and “Orlando has the details.”
Document 8: First Circuit Court of Panama, “Fiscalia Primera Del Primer Circuito Judicial De Panama: Vista Fiscal No. 200”, September 28, 2001.
This lengthy document is the official indictment in Panama of Luis Posada Carriles and 4 others for the attempted assassination of Fidel Castro at the 10th Ibero-American Summit in November 2000. In this indictment, Posada Carriles is accused of possession of explosives, endangerment of public safety, illicit association, and falsification of documents. After traveling to Panama, according to the evidence gathered, “Luis Posada Carriles and Raul Rodriguez Hamouzova rented a red Mitsubishi Lancer at the International Airport of Tocumen, in which they transported the explosives and other devices necessary to create a bomb.” (Original Spanish: “Luis Posada Carriles y Raul Rodriguez Hamouzova rentaron en el Aeropuerto Internacional de Tocumen de la referida empresa el vehículo marca Mitsubishi Lancer, color rojo, dentro del cual se transportaron los explosives y artefactos indicados para elaborar una bomba.”) This bomb was intended to take the life of Fidel Castro; Castro was to present at the Summit on November 17th, and what Carriles had proposed to do “wasn’t easy, because it occurred at the Summit, and security measures would be extreme.” (Original Spanish: “lo que se proponía hacer no era fácil, porque ocurría en plena Cumbre, y las medidas de seguridad serían extremas.”)
After being discovered by agents of the Explosives Division of the National Police, they ascertained that “this explosive has the capacity to destroy an armored vehicle, buildings, steel doors, and the effects of an explosive of this class and quality can extend for 200 meters.” Additionally, “to a human, from a distance of 200 meters it would affect the senses, internal hemorrhages, and if the person were in the center of the explosion, even if they were in an armored car, they would not survive…the destructive capacity of this material is complete.” (Original Spanish: “Este explosivo tiene la capacidad de destruir cualquier carro blindado, puede destruir edificios, puertas de acero, y que la onda expansiva de esta calidad y clase de explosive puede alcanzar hasta 200 metros…Al ser humano, sostienen, a la distancia de 200 metros le afectaría los sentidos, hemorragios internos, y si la persona estuviese en el centro de la explosion, aunque estuviese dentro de un carro blindado no sobreviviría…la capacidad destructive de este material es total.”)
The indictment states that when Posada was “asked about the charges against him, including possession of explosives, possession of explosives that endanger public safety, illicit association, and falsification of documents…he expresses having fought subversion against democratic regimes along several fronts, specifically Castro-sponsored subversion.” (Original Spanish: “Preguntado sobre los cargos formulados, es decir Posesión de Explosivos, Posesión de Explosivos que implica Peligro Común, Asociación Ilicita, y Falsedad de Documentos…Expresa haber combatido en distintos frentes la subversión contra regimens democráticos, ‘quiero decir la subversión castrista.’”)
Posada and his accomplices were eventually convicted of endangering public safety and sentenced to 8 years in prison. He was pardoned by Panamanian president, Mireya Moscosa, after only four years in August 2004 and lived as a fugitive in Honduras until March 2005 when he illegally entered the United States and applied for political asylum.
TOP-SECRET: Ex-Kaibil Officer Connected to Dos Erres Massacre Arrested in Alberta, Canada

Washington, D.C. – January 20, 2011 – Jorge Vinicio Sosa Orantes was arrested in Alberta, Canada on January 18, 2011 on charges of naturalization fraud in the United States. Sosa Orantes, 52, is a former commanding officer of the Guatemalan Special Forces, or Kaibil unit, which brutally murdered more than 250 men, women and children during the 1982 massacre in Dos Erres, Guatemala. Sosa Orantes, a resident of Riverside County, California where he was a well known martial arts instructor, was arrested near the home of a relative in Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada. The charges for which he was arrested stem from an indictment by the United States District Court, Central District of California on charges of making false statements under oath on his citizenship application. Sosa Orantes will come before the Canadian court in Calgary to face possible extradition to the United States.
In an interview with the Calgary Sun, U.S. Justice Department prosecutor David Gates said that the extradition request was not a result of the allegations against Sosa Orantes for his involvement in the massacre; his extradition is being requested for alleged naturalization fraud. However, considering the similar case against Gilberto Jordan, it is possible that the precedence set with the ruling on that case may affect the outcome of Sosa Orantes’s case.
On September 16, 2010 in a historic ruling, former Guatemalan special forces soldier Gilberto Jordán, who confessed to having participated in the 1982 massacre of hundreds of men, women and children in Dos Erres, Guatemala, was sentenced today by a judge in a south Florida courtroom to serve ten years in federal prison for lying on his citizenship application about his role in the crime. Calling the massacre, “reprehensible,” U.S. District Judge William Zloch handed down the maximum sentence allowed for naturalization fraud, stating he wanted the ruling to be a message to “those who commit egregious human rights violations abroad” that they will not find “safe haven from prosecution” in the United States.
On May 5, 2010, agents from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Gilberto Jordan, 54, in Palm Beach County, Florida, based on a criminal complaint charging Jordán with lying to U.S. authorities about his service in the Guatemalan Army and his role in the 1982 Dos Erres massacre. The complaint alleged that Jordán, a naturalized American citizen, was part of the special counterinsurgency Kaibiles unit that carried out the massacre of hundreds of residents of the Dos Erres village located in the northwest Petén region. Jordán allegedly helped kill unarmed villagers with his own hands, including a baby he allegedly threw into the village well.
The massacre was part of the Guatemalan military’s “scorched earth campaign” and was carried out by the Kaibiles ranger unit. The Kaibiles were specially trained soldiers who became notorious for their use of torture and brutal killing tactics. According to witness testimony, and corroborated through U.S. declassified archives, the Kaibiles entered the town of Dos Erres on the morning of December 6, 1982, and separated the men from women and children. They started torturing the men and raping the women and by the afternoon they had killed almost the entire community, including the children. Nearly the entire town was murdered, their bodies thrown into a well and left in nearby fields. The U.S. documents reveal that American officials deliberated over theories of how an entire town could just “disappear,” and concluded that the Army was the only force capable of such an organized atrocity. More than 250 people are believed to have died in the massacre.
The Global Post news organization conducted an investigative report into the investigation of the Guatemalan soldiers living in the United States and cited declassified documents released to the National Security Archive’s Guatemala Documentation Project under the Freedom of Information Act. These documents are part of a collection of files assembled by the Archive and turned over to Guatemala’s truth commission investigators, who used the files in the writing of their ground-breaking report, “Guatemala: Memory of Silence.” [see CEH section on Dos Erres]
The documents include U.S. Embassy cables that describe first-hand accounts by U.S. officials who traveled to the area of Dos Erres and witnessed the devastation left behind by the Kaibiles. Based on their observations and information obtained from sources during their trip, the American officials concluded “that the party most likely responsible for this incident is the Guatemalan Army.”
Declassified U.S. Documents on Kaibiles and the Dos Erres Massacre
December 1980
Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), Volume VIII–Latin America
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Secret, Intelligence Summary, 12 pages
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The Defense Intelligence Agency periodically produces intelligence summary reports with information on the structure and capabilities of foreign military forces. On page six of this 1980 summary on the Guatemalan military, the DIA provides information on the Kaibil (ranger) counterinsurgency training center, which is located in La Pólvora, in the Péten. The report describes how each of Guatemala’s infantry battalions has a Kaibil platoon, “which may be deployed as a separate small unit. These platoons are used as cadre for training other conscripts in insurgency and counterinsurgency techniques and tactics. The Air Force sends personnel to the Kaibil School for survival training.”
November 19, 1982
Army Establishes a Strategic Reaction Force
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Confidential, Cable, 2 pages
Less than a month before the Dos Erres killings, the DIA reports on the creation of a “strategic reaction force” made up of 20 Kaibil ranger instructors based out of Guatemala City’s Mariscal Zavala Brigade. The special unit was assembled in order to carry out the mission “of quickly deploying to locations throughout the country to seek and destroy guerrilla elements.” The document indicates that the Kaibil unit was placed under direct control of Guatemala’s central military command. It states; “the unit’s huge success in previous engagement with the enemy have prompted the Guatemalan Army General Staff (AGS) to assume direct command and control of this unit.”
December 10, 1982
Guatemalan Counter Terrorism Capabilities
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Secret Cable, 3 pages
Days after the Dos Erres massacre the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala sends a secret cable back to Washington with information on the counter-terrorist tactical capability of the Guatemalan police and military forces. The cable reports that a Kaibil unit, based in the Mariscal Zavala Brigade headquarters, “has recently been deployed to the Petén, and is now operationally under the Poptún Military Bridage.”
This reporting coincides with the CEH and OAS summary of the events leading up to the Dos Erres massacre.
December 28, 1982
Alleged Massacre of 200 at Village of Dos R’s, Petén
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Secret Cable, 3 pages
As information begins to surface about the Dos Erres massacre U.S. officials look into the matter and report on information obtained through a “reliable embassy source” who tells U.S. officials that the Guatemalan Government Army may have massacred the 200 villagers of Dos Erres. According to the source, an Army unit disguised as guerrillas entered the Dos Erres village gathered the people together and demanded their support. The source tells officials that the villagers knew they were not with the guerrilla, and did not comply with their demands. One villager who managed to escape later recounts the story to people in Las Cruces, 12 kilometers from Dos Erres, and to the Embassy source who relays the information to American officials. Another witness tells the source that the village was completely deserted, and claimed to have found burnt identification cards in the nearby Church. They also claim that the Army came back to the village a few days later and took roofing and furniture to the Army Base in Las Cruces.
The U.S. officials offer possible theories on why no bodies were found, and on how the entire Dos Erres population could have just “disappeared.” One theory was that the Army killed everyone in the village, dumped the bodies into the well, and covered the well over. This was based on the local testimonies of those who had gone into the village and saw that the well was covered over, but they were afraid to look inside.
The cable goes on to say that because of the reliability of the source, and the seriousness of the allegations, that an embassy office will go to investigate on Dec. 30th, 1982.
December 31, 1982
Possible Massacre in “Dos R’s”, El Petén
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Secret Cable, 4 pages
On December 30th three mission members from the U.S. Embassy and a Canadian diplomat visit Las Cruces in Poptún to investigate the allegations of the Dos R’s massacre. The document verifies the existence of the Dos Erres village, noting that the settlement was deserted and many of the houses burnt to the ground.
The Mission Team visit the Army Base in Poptún, El Petén, where they speak with the operations officer (S3), who tells the mission members that the area near Las Cruces was exceptionally dangerous because of recent guerrilla activity. Army officials explain how Dos Erres “had suffered from a guerrilla attack in early December,” and that it would pose a considerable risk for them to visit the town. From Poptún, the mission Members fly directly to the town of Las Cruces (using the directions provided by their source) and then to the village of Las Dos Erres. When they reach Dos Erres, however, the helicopter pilot refuses to touch down, but agrees to sweep low over the area. From this view the Embassy officials could see that houses had been “razed or destroyed by fire.” They then fly back to Las Cruces to speak with locals, including a member of the local civil defense patrol (PAC) and a “confidant of the Army in the area.” He tells officials that the Army was responsible for the disappearance of the people in Dos Erres and that he had been told to keep out of the area in early December, because the army was going to “sweep through.” He also confirms the prior reports that the Army officials wore civilian dress during the sweep, but had identifiable Army combat boots and Galil rifles. The cable notes that this information matches that of previous reftel source.
Based on the information obtained during their trip, the cable reports that “Embassy must conclude that the party most likely responsible for this incident is the Guatemalan Army.”
SECRET: URGENT DEMARCHE TO GOA
VZCZCXYZ0003 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #8040 3392140 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O P 042134Z DEC 08 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0000 INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0000 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 0000 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000 RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 0000 RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 0000 S E C R E T STATE 128040 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ ES RO AS EN SUBJECT: URGENT DEMARCHE TO GOA REF: BAGHDAD 03794 Classified By: DAS G Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary ------- ¶1. (S) Department requests that Embassy Canberra demarche the Australian Government on the way forward in the GOA's negotiations with the Government of Iraq on an agreement to permit Australian forces to remain in Iraq after the expiration of the UNSCR 1790 mandate for the multinational force. Please report GOA response, in particular any indication that the GOA will communicate with its mission in Baghdad. Info addressee posts should feel free to use points below as the basis of their own approaches to host government on this issue. Please slug replies for EAP/ANP, NEA/I, and S/I. End Summary. Background ---------- ¶2. (S) As the GOI moves beyond the process of gaining agreement for the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, it is focusing on the terms for the continued presence of four Coalition partners (Australia, Romania, El Salvador and Estonia) beyond December 31. (The British are engaging with the GOI at the highest level and have made significant progress on a mechanism to permit them to stay in Iraq.) Regarding the other four, the GOI made clear its conditions for agreement: 1) that the Government will not present any more security agreements to the Council of Representatives (COR) and 2) that the forces of the four must conduct non-combat missions. The GOI is pressing for the simplest exchange of letters or diplomatic notes or signed MOUs to permit continued operations. ¶3. (S) The Australians have a high-level team in Baghdad and are working with the GOI but to date remain convinced that they need an agreement that would require COR approval. Given the importance of the Australian staff officers to MNF-I operations in Iraq, it would be most helpful for Embassy Canberra to press the GOA to look for a mechanism short of COR ratification to allow the continued presence of its military officers. Points -------- ¶4. (S/REL AS EN ES RO UK) Department suggests that the demarche be based on the following points: --Now that the U.S. has concluded its complex negotiations with the GOI for a bilateral security agreement, the GOI is focused on negotiating terms to allow Coalition partners to remain in Iraq. --The U.S. strongly supports the presence of Australian staff officers in MNF-I beyond January 1, 2009 and Australia's other significant contributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom. --The GOI has made it clear that Australia's continued presence will be in a non-combat assistance capacity. --PM al-Maliki has stated that he will not present any other bilateral security agreements to the COR. --Canberra should explore whether there are other mechanisms that would allow Iraq to conclude a legally binding agreement without the approval of the COR. Such arrangements or agreement could be in the form of an exchange of diplomatic notes or a MOU, and draw upon relevant provisions in the U.S. Security Agreement with Iraq in order to establish a basis for the continued presence of Australian officers in Iraq. Additional Point As Appropriate ------------------------------- ¶5. If this remains an issue: We understand that the GOA wishes to include its combat forces in TF158 in its bilateral agreement. We recommend that this be addressed separately given the GOI's position against combat missions for coalition forces and that the GOA focus on a security agreement covering the Australian staff officers embedded with MNF-I only. Reporting Deadline ------------------ ¶6. Embassy should report results of efforts by cable to the Department before December 12. ¶7. Please contact EAP/ANP's Aleisha Woodward or NEA/I's Shaun Mandelkorn for any necessary further background information or argumentation to meet our objectives. RICE
27 Years Later, Justice for Fernando García

responsible for Fernando García’s “forced disappearance”
Washington, D.C., February 18, 2011 – Twenty-seven years ago today, Guatemalan labor activist Edgar Fernando García was shot and kidnapped by government security forces off a street in downtown Guatemala City. He was never seen again. In recognition of the anniversary of his disappearance, the National Security Archive today posts the complete text of the historic ruling issued last October by a Guatemalan court that convicted two former policemen to 40 years in prison for the crime, as well as key documents from the Guatemalan National Police Archive that were used in the prosecution.
Fernando García’s family continues to fight for justice inside Guatemala and internationally. The groundbreaking trial that found Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos and Abraham Lancerio Gómez – both low-ranking police agents at the time of the abduction – guilty of García’s “forced disappearance” ended with the court’s unprecedented order that the government investigate their superior officers. Meanwhile in Washington, where the García case has been pending before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission for over a decade, the commission announced on February 9 its decision to send the case to the Inter-American Court in Costa Rica due to Guatemala’s failure to act on commission findings.
The Fernando García trial took place over several days last October in a crowded courtroom in the “Tribunals Tower” in downtown Guatemala City, and brought together an extraordinary array of experts and witnesses testifying on behalf of the prosecution. (To see a more complete description of the first days of the trial, see Kate Doyle’s blog posting.) Congresswomen Nineth Montenegro, García’s wife and mother of their infant daughter, Alejandra, at the time of his abduction, told the court about her anguished search for her husband in the months following his disappearance, leading to the creation of one of Guatemala’s first human rights organizations, the Mutual Support Group (GAM). Alejandra García Montenegro, now a lawyer who served as the querellante adhesivo or “private prosecutor” in the case, spoke movingly at the trial’s end about the impact of his disappearance on her family and her own childhood. García’s elderly mother also testified, expressing the pain she has endured for almost three decades in losing her son without knowing his ultimate fate.
At the heart of the prosecution’s case were the official records of the former National Police of Guatemala, recovered by the Office of the Human Rights Prosecutor in 2005 and now being examined for evidence of human right crimes. Velia Muralles Bautista, an investigator with the Historic Archives of the National Police (AHPN), gave expert testimony on hundreds of police records connected to the February 1984 counterinsurgency operation that resulted in Fernando García’s abduction. Muralles drew particular attention to a handful of key documents that contained powerful evidence of the Guatemalan government’s role in planning and carrying out García’s capture. They included records of the police Joint Operations Center (Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas, or COC), which controlled and commanded the police units involved in the operation [documents 3, 4, 5, and 6]; a hand-drawn map of Guatemala City, assigning Zone 11— where García and his companion, Danilo Chinchilla, were captured — to the Fourth Corps of the National Police [document 7]; and the recommendation from the National Police hierarchy that the defendants be considered for medals for their heroic actions in the counterinsurgency operation on that day, at the time, and in the place of the capture of Edgar [document 2].
On the last days of the trial, Marco Tulio Alvarez, head of Guatemala’s Archivos de la Paz (Archives of Peace), testified on the political and historical context of Fernando García’s disappearance. His testimony addressed the coordination between government agencies in “cleansing operations”, specifically between the military and the National Police. In his testimony, Tulio Alvarez referred to documents from the AHPN, the Death Squad Diary, and declassified U.S. documents obtained by the National Security Archive, among other Guatemalan government documents. Tulio Alvarez used this documentary evidence to paint a picture for the court of government repression of those who spoke against the government, groups the Guatemalan government considered “internal enemies.” His testimony touched on the regime’s desire to “annihilate local secret communities, and military units…” which was described in a military document, Plan Victoria 82.
For a more detailed account of the last days of the trial and other witnesses, see the report written by C. Carolina López, our associate in Guatemala.
Now, the pressure is on the Guatemalan government, not only from the ruling of the three judges in Guatemala who heard this case, but also the pending hearing before the Inter-American Court in Costa Rica. An indictment and trial of superior officers allegedly responsible for ordering the cleansing operations would truly be a landmark development for human rights justice in Guatemala.
Read the Documents
Document 1
October 28, 2010
Organismo Judicial, Guatemala. C-01069-1997-00001 Oficial Tercero. Tribunal Octavo de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos Contra el Ambiente, Guatemala.(Judicial Body of Guatemala, Third Official, Eighth Criminal Court Convcition, Drug-trafficking and Environmental Crimes, Guatemala)
93 pages
This document is the official ruling of the Guatemalan court, which convicted former National Police officers Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos and Abraham Lancerio Gómez of forced disappearance in the case of Edgar Fernando García. The two men received the maximum sentence of 40 years in prison. The ruling, written by three Guatemala judges, acknowledges that Edgar Fernando García was illegally detained; the disappearance was committed by state security agents within national security policy; and the crime was against the individual liberties and freedoms of Fernando García.
The official ruling also includes parts of the testimony from eye witnesses, as well as expert witness testimony on the documents from the Historical Archive of the National Police (AHPN) and the declassified U.S. government documents from the National Security Archive collections.
Document 2
Undated
Cuarto Cuerpo Guatemala, Nomina del Personal del Cuarto Cuerpo de la Policia Nacional que se hace a distinciones, según el reclamento de condecoraciones. (Fourth Corps Guatemala, Nomination of Personnel of the Fourth Corps of the National Police for distinction, according to regulations for awards)
Souce: Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
3 pages
This documents records the nomination of four police officers, Hector Roderico Ramírez Ríos, Alfonso Guillermo de Leon, Hugo Rolando Gomez Osorio, and Abraham Lancerio Gómez to receive awards for their actions on February 18, 1984 at 11:00 in the morning with their encounter with “two subversives” who had subversive propaganda and fire arms at the “Mercado de Guarda” in zone 11. This was the exact date, time, and place that Fernando García and his companion Danilo Chinchilla were abducted. In her testimony, expert witness Velia Muralles used this document to demonstrate that these four former National Police officers took part in the crime of the forced disappearance of Fernando García because of the awards they received for participating in the cleansing operation the morning he was shot and disappeared.
Document 3
February 10, 1984
Oficio COC – 165 – WA, Guatemala.
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Souce: Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1 page
Document 4
February 11, 1984
Oficio COC – 173 – WA, Guatemala.
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Source: Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1 page
Document 5
February 12, 1984
Oficio COC/185-opp, Guatemala.
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1 page
Document 6
February 17, 1984
Oficio COC/207-laov, Guatemala
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1 page
These four documents (three through six) are from the “Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas” or COC, which was the “Center of Cooperative Operations” between the military and the police. These documents are from February 1984, days before Fernando García was disappeared. Expert witness Muralles explained that this document showed the coordination between the military and police in the overall national strategy of “cleansing operations” or “operación limpieza.”
Document 6, from February 17, 1984 shows detailed instructions from COC Chief, Monico Antonio Cano Perez for a member of the National Police to carry out an operation on the morning of February 18, between 9:00am and 12:00pm, the exact window during which Fernando García was abducted.
Document 7
February 17, 1984
Oficio COC/201/WA, Guatemala
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
4 pages
This is another document from Joint Operations Center giving instructions to the National Police regarding cleansing operations. This documents contains two pages that show which sectors of the city were assigned to specific corps of the National Police. The second to last page, titled “Sectores de la Ciudad Capital para Operaciones Limpieza de los Cuerpos P.N.” shows that the Fourth Corps was in charge of Zone 11 for the patrol for “operacion limpieza”. The defendents, Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos and Abraham Lancerio Gómez, were members of the fourth corps. The last page, titled “Croquis Demostrativo Sectores Ciudad Capital Para Operacion Limpeza de los Cuerpos P.N.” is a hand-drawn map shows a yellow-gold outline for Zone 11, where Fernando García was captured.
Document 8
February 18, 1984
Cuadro para control de operaciones, de los cuerpos, escuela y narcoticos, de la policia nacional en diferentes zonas de la ciudad capital. (Chart for orders of operations, of the corps, school and narcotics, and of the National Police in different zones of the capital city.)
Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1page
This document is a logbook list of which units were assigned to patrol which areas on certain days. We see that the Fourth Corps of the National Police was assigned to patrol Zones 11 and 12 during the hours of 9:00am and 12:00pm on Feburary 18, 1984. The defendents, Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos and Abraham Lancerio Gómez, were members of the fourth corps.
TOP-SECRET:Los documentos de Chiquita
Este es un fragmento de una nota manuscrita de 2000 en la que se describe que Chiquita pagó a grupos armados por seguridad y no como una extorsión. National Security Archive.Haga clic en la foto para ampliar.
Cientos de memorandos internos de la multinacional bananera Chiquita Brands, desclasificados por el National Security Archive, muestran que la empresa hizo pagos a guerrilleros, paramilitares y miembros del Ejército a cambio de seguridad.
Por Michael Evans especial para VerdadAbierta.com*
Memorandos confidenciales internos de Chiquita Brands International revelan que el gigante del banano se benefició de sus pagos a grupos paramilitares colombianos y la guerrilla, contradiciendo el acuerdo de culpabilidad (plea agreement) que firmó con fiscales de Estados Unidos de 2007, en el que alegó que nunca había recibido “ningún servicio de seguridad o equipos de seguridad a cambio de los pagos”. Chiquita había tildado estos pagos como una “extorsión”.
Chiquita entregó miles de documentos al Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos como parte de un acuerdo de sentencia, en el que admitió años de pagos ilegales a las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, Auc, grupo que el Departamento de Estado había señalado como “organización terrorista extranjera” y con el que acordó pagar una multa de 25 millones de dólares.
El National Security Archive obtuvo más de 5.500 páginas de documentos internos de Chiquita del Departamento de Justicia bajo un derecho de petición en EE.UU (Freedom of Information Act) y publica en línea varios de estos documentos que están incluídos en la colección: Colombia y los Estados Unidos: Violencia Política, Narcotráfico y Derechos Humanos, 1948-2010.
Los papeles proporcionan evidencia de “transacciones” de beneficio mutuo entre las filiales colombianas de Chiquita y varios grupos armados ilegales en Colombia y arroja claridad sobre más de una década de pagos relacionados con la seguridad a la guerrilla, los paramilitares, las fuerzas colombianas de seguridad y las cooperativas privadas Convivir, grupos armados auspiciados por el gobierno.
La colección de documentos también detalla los esfuerzos de la compañía por ocultar lo que denominaron pagos “delicados” en las cuentas de gastos de los directivos de la empresa y a través de diferentes trucos contables (Ver documento).
La investigación del Departamento de Justicia concluyó que muchos de los pagos de Chiquita a las Auc (también llamadas como “Autodefensas” en muchos de los documentos) se realizaron a través de organizaciones legales Convivir supervisadas por el ejército colombiano.
Estas nuevas pruebas de que Chiquita se benefició de los pagos ilícitos pueden aumentar su exposición a demandas de las víctimas de grupos armados ilegales de Colombia. La colección es el resultado de una colaboración National Security Archive con la Universidad de Georgetown, su Escuela de Leyes y Derechos Humanos y la Clínica de Abogados y Justicia Pública, y se ha utilizado en apoyo de una demanda civil contra Chiquita encabezado por Earth Rights International a nombre de cientos de víctimas colombianas de los paramilitares.
“Estos registros extraordinarios son las pruebas más detalladas hasta la fecha del verdadero costo de hacer negocios en Colombia”, dijo Michael Evans, director del proyecto de documentación de Colombia del National Security Archive. “El aparente acuerdo de Chiquita con las guerrillas y paramilitares es responsable de los incontables asesinatos, desmiente el acuerdo de culpabilidad firmado por la empresa con el Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos”.
El esfuerzo de la compañía para ocultar los indicios de sus nexos con grupos armados ilegales en Colombia es evidente en un par de memorandos legales de enero de 1994. El primero de ellos indica que las guerrillas le prestaban seguridad en algunas de las plantaciones de Chiquita.
El director general de operaciones de Chiquita en Turbo dijo a abogados de la compañía que los guerrilleros fueron “utilizados para suministrar el personal de seguridad en diferentes granjas”.
Una anotación manuscrita en un documento membreteado de la compañía, clasificado como confidencial, se pregunta: “¿Por qué es relevante?” y, “¿Por qué está siendo escrito?”. En el documento los abogados han tachado la palabra “transacciones” – lo que sugiere un acuerdo de canje- y lo sustituyeron por el término más neutro de “pagos”. Los contables de la empresa incluyeron los gastos como “pagos de extorsión de guerrillas”, pero los registraron en los libros como “seguridad ciudadana”, de acuerdo con estas notas.
Otro documento muestra que Chiquita también pagó a paramilitares por servicios de seguridad -incluyendo información de inteligencia sobre las operaciones de la guerrilla- después de que las Auc arrebataron el control de la región a la guerrilla, a mediados de la década de 1990.
En marzo de 2000, el abogado senior de Chiquita, Robert Thomas, escribió un memo (ver) de una conversación con los directores de la filial en Colombia de Chiquita, Banadex, en la que indican que los paramilitares de Santa Marta crearon una empresa ficticia, Inversiones Manglar, para ocultar “el verdadero propósito de garantizar la seguridad”.
Inversiones Manglar se presentaba como una empresa de exportación agrícola, pero producía “información sobre los movimientos guerrilleros”, según la nota. Según Thomas, funcionarios de Banadex le dijeron que “todas las compañías bananeras están contribuyendo en Santa Marta” y que Chiquita “debe continuar haciendo los pagos”, ya que “no se puede obtener el mismo nivel de apoyo (seguridad) de los militares”.
Los papeles de Chiquita también destacan el papel de los militares colombianos para presionar a la empresa a financiar a las Auc a través de las Convivir y para facilitar los pagos ilegales.
Un indicio de esto se encuentra en otro documento escrito por Thomas, en septiembre de 2000, que describe una reunión en 1997, con el líder de las Auc, Carlos Castaño, quien sugirió por primera vez a los directores de Banadex apoyar la creación de la Convivir llamada La Tagua del Darién.
Según la nota, los funcionarios de Banadex adujeron que “no tenían más remedio que asistir a la reunión” porque no hacerlo sería “antagonizar con los militares de Colombia, funcionarios locales y estatales, y las Autodefensas”.
Entre los funcionarios que más apoyaron las Convivir durante este tiempo se encontraba Álvaro Uribe, entonces gobernador de Antioquia, en el que tenía su centro de operaciones Chiquita en Colombia. En el memo de septiembre de 2000, Thomas señala: “Es bien conocido en el momento en que oficiales de alto rango del ejército colombiano y el Gobernador del Departamento de Antioquia estaban haciendo campaña para el establecimiento de una organización Convivir de Urabá”.
Un memorando de 1995 indica que, tanto Uribe como otro político de la región, Alfonso Núñez, recibieron donaciones de otra de las filiales en Colombia de Chiquita, la Compañía Frutera de Sevilla. Uribe fue presidente de Colombia desde 2002 hasta 2010.
Más tarde, un memo legal de agosto de 1997 escrito en papel membretado de Chiquita, dice que la empresa era “miembro de una Convivir llamada Puntepiedra, SA”, que el autor clasifica como “una persona jurídica en la que participamos con otros exportadores de banano en la región de Turbo”. La nota dice que la “única función” de las Convivir era “proporcionar información sobre los movimientos guerrilleros.”
La compañía había estado haciendo pagos sensibles de seguridad durante años – primero en forma directa a militares y grupos guerrilleros, y luego, a través de organizaciones comerciales locales y Convivir-. Para 1991, unos 15 mil dólares de “pagos delicados” para las diversas unidades del ejército colombiano se muestran junto a un desembolso de más de 31 dólares a “guerrilla” (Ver documento).
Una versión diferente del mismo documento no solo omite los nombres de los beneficiarios de pagos, sino que incluye una anotación manuscrita junto a la “guerrilla”. Una entrada dice: “Pago extorsión.” Otra anotación dice: “Sobre todo no son pagos ilegales – estos son legales – gasolina, el ejército, la policía, los políticos . El pago no ofrece nada, ni beneficios”.
Registros contables de 1997-1998 también señalan el papel de las fuerzas de seguridad colombianas en el fomento de pagos de la empresa a paramilitares.
A partir del segundo trimestre de 1997 y hasta el segundo trimestre de 1998, Banamex realizó pagos a cooperativas “Convivir”, que registraron como “donación al grupo de ciudadanos de reconocimiento a petición del Ejército.” En 2002(ver documento) y 2003(ver documento), la empresa realizó pagos similares a cooperativas Convivir junto con desembolsos a “funcionarios militares y de Policía” para “pagos de servicios de seguridad.”
Otro documento escrito a mano de 1999 revela un aparente esfuerzo por un general del Ejército de Colombia para establecerse como un intermediario en los pagos de los paramilitares. El documento describe a un “general que ha estado en la zona desde hace varios años” que había sido acusado por el alcalde de San José de Apartadó de ser parte de “[un] escuadrón de la muerte” y que había sido “suspendido del Ejército”.
El documento señala que el general “nos ha ayudado personalmente” con “seguridad” y con “información que impidió secuestros”. Las notas hacen referencia indirecta a un pago de 9 mil dólares, agregando que “otras compañías están poniendo en sus…”
“Los papeles de Chiquita refuerzan la idea de que, en 1997, las Auc crecieron en las regiones bananeras del norte de Colombia, y que los funcionarios del gobierno local, oficiales militares y líderes empresariales apoyaron a sus operaciones paramilitares”, dijo Evans.
“Estas revelaciones son más que académicas”, dijo el profesor Arturo Carrillo, Director de la Clínica Internacional de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Georgetown. “Los documentos refuerzan la media docena de demandas federales pendientes en contra de Chiquita, que la empresa fue cómplice, y por lo tanto responsable de las atrocidades cometidas por las Auc en Urabá. Uno sólo puede esperar que revelando la información obtenida y publicada por el National Security Archive se dará lugar a una mayor responsabilidad por las acciones criminales de Chiquita en Colombia, ya que con el acuerdo de la empresa con el Departamento de Justicia, este se ha negado a procesar a los ejecutivos de Chiquita por su mal accionar”.
“La publicación de estos documentos es sólo el comienzo”, agregó Evans. “Las miles de páginas de registros financieros y jurídicos incluidos en esta colección son las semillas de futuros proyectos de investigación para los que estén dispuestos a reconstruir la compleja red de legales, pseudo-legales, y las entidades ilegales que participaron en operaciones de seguridad de Chiquita, incluyendo oficiales militares, la guerrilla, los paramilitares, empresarios prominentes, las asociaciones comerciales y las milicias Convivir”.
* Michael Evans es director del Proyecto Documental de Colombia del National Security Archive.
Última actualización el Viernes, 08 de Abril de 2011 06:00
TOP-SECRET: The Chiquita Papers-Banana Giant’s Paramilitary Payoffs Detailed in Trove of Declassified Legal, Financial Documents

Banana Giant’s Paramilitary Payoffs Detailed in Trove of Declassified Legal, Financial Documents
Evidence of Quid Pro Quo with Guerrilla, Paramilitary Groups Contradicts 2007 Plea Deal
Colombian Military Officials Encouraged, Facilitated Company’s Payments to Death Squads
More than 5,500 Pages of Chiquita Records Published Online by National Security Archive
Bogotá, Colombia, April 7, 2011 – Confidential internal memos from Chiquita Brands International reveal that the banana giant benefited from its payments to Colombian paramilitary and guerrilla groups, contradicting the company’s 2007 plea agreement with U.S. prosecutors, which claimed that the company had never received “any actual security services or actual security equipment in exchange for the payments.” Chiquita had characterized the payments as “extortion.”
These documents are among thousands that Chiquita turned over to the U.S. Justice Department as part of a sentencing deal in which the company admitted to years of illegal payments to the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)–a State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization–and agreed to pay a $25 million fine. The Archive has obtained more than 5,500 pages of Chiquita’s internal documents from the Justice Department under the Freedom of Information Act and is publishing the entire set online today. Key documents from the Chiquita Papers are included in the recently-published document collection, Colombia and the United States: Political Violence, Narcotics, and Human Rights, 1948-2010, now available as part of the Digital National Security Archive from ProQuest.
The documents provide evidence of mutually-beneficial “transactions” between Chiquita’s Colombian subsidiaries and several illegal armed groups in Colombia and shed light on more than a decade of security-related payments to guerrillas, paramilitaries, Colombian security forces, and government-sponsored Convivir militia groups. The collection also details the company’s efforts to conceal the so-called “sensitive payments” in the expense accounts of company managers and through other accounting tricks. The Justice Department investigation concluded that many of Chiquita’s payments to the AUC (also referred to as “Autodefensas” in many of the documents) were made through legal Convivir organizations ostensibly overseen by the Colombian army.
New evidence indicating that Chiquita benefited from the illicit payments may increase the company’s exposure to lawsuits representing victims of Colombia’s illegal armed groups. The collection is the result of an Archive collaboration with George Washington University Law School’s International Human Rights and Public Justice Advocacy Clinics and has been used in support of a civil suit brought against Chiquita led by Earth Rights International on behalf of hundreds of Colombian victims of paramilitary violence.
“These extraordinary records are the most detailed account to date of the true cost of doing business in Colombia,” said Michael Evans, director of the National Security Archive’s Colombia documentation project. “Chiquita’s apparent quid pro quo with guerrillas and paramilitaries responsible for countless killings belies the company’s 2007 plea deal with the Justice Department. What we still don’t know is why U.S. prosecutors overlooked what appears to be clear evidence that Chiquita benefited from these transactions.”
The company’s effort to conceal indications that it benefited from the payments is evident in a pair of legal memos from January 1994. The first of these indicates that leftist guerrillas provided security at some of Chiquita’s plantations. The general manager of Chiquita operations in Turbó told company attorneys that guerrillas were “used to supply security personnel at the various farms.” A handwritten annotation on a subsequent draft of the document asks, “Why is this relevant?” and, “Why is this being written?” Throughout the document, lawyers have crossed out the word “transactions”–suggestive of a quid pro quo arrangement–and replaced it with the more neutral term “payments.” Company accountants characterized the expenditures as “guerrilla extortion payments” but recorded them in the books as “citizen security,” according to these memos. (Note 1)
Another document shows that Chiquita also paid right-wing paramilitary forces for security services–including intelligence on guerrilla operations–after the AUC wrested control of the region from guerrillas in the mid-1990s. The March 2000 memo, written by Chiquita Senior Counsel Robert Thomas and based on a convesation with managers from Chiquita’s wholly-owned subsidiary, Banadex, indicate that Santa Marta-based paramilitaries formed a front company, Inversiones Manglar, to disguise “the real purpose of providing security.” (Note 2)
Ostensibly an agricultural export business, Inversiones Manglar actually produced “info on guerrilla movements,” according to the memo. Banadex officials told Thomas that “all other banana companies are contributing in Santa Marta” and that Chiquita “should continue making the payments” as they “can’t get the same level of support from the military.”
The Chiquita Papers also highlight the role of the Colombian military in pressuring the company to finance the AUC through the Convivir groups and in facilitating the illegal payments.
One indication of this is found in another document written by Thomas in September 2000 describing the 1997 meeting where notorious AUC leader Carlos Castaño first suggested to Banadex managers that they support a newly-established Convivir called La Tagua del Darien. According to the memo, the Banadex officials said that they had “no choice but to attend the meeting” as “refusing to meet would antagonize the Colombia military, local and state govenment officials, and Autodefensas.” (Note 3)
Among the officials most supportive of the Convivir groups during this time was Álvaro Uribe, then the governor of Antioquia, the hub of Chiquita’s operations in Colombia. Thomas’ September 2000 memo notes that, “It was well-known at the time that senior officers of the Colombian military and the Governor of the Department of Antioquia were campaigning for the establishment of a Convivir organization in Uraba.” A 1995 memo indicates that both Uribe and another politician, Alfonso Nuñez, received substantial donations from another of Chiquita’s Colombian subsidiaries, Compañía Frutera de Sevilla. Uribe was president of Colombia from 2002-2010.
Later that year, an August 1997 legal memo written on Chiquita letterhead says that the company was “member[s] of an organization called CONVIVIR Puntepiedra, S.A.,” which the author characterizes as “a legal entity in which we participate with other banana exporting companies in the Turbó region.” The memo says that the “sole function” of the the Convivir was “to provide information on guerrilla movements.”
The company had been making sensitive security payments for years–first in the form of direct payoffs to military officers and guerrilla groups, then through local trade organizations and the Convivir militias. For 1991, some $15,000 worth of “sensitive payments” to various units of the Colombian military are listed alongside a more than $31,000 disbursement to “Guerrilla.” A different version of the same document omits the names of the payment recipients but includes a handwritten annotation next to the “Guerrilla” entry that says, “Extortion Payment.” Another annotation reads, “Mainly not illegal payments — these are legal — pay gasoline, army, police, politicians — payment doesn’t provide anything or benefits.” [Emphasis added.]
Accounting records from 1997-1998 also point to the role of Colombian security forces in encouraging the company’s illegal paramilitary payments. Beginning in the second quarter of 1997 and continuing through the second quarter of 1998, sensitive payment schedules for Banadex record large payments to “Convivir” as “Donation to citizen reconaissance group made at request of Army.” Similar records from 2002 and 2003 list Convivir payments alongside disbursements to “Military and Police Officials” for “Facilitating payments for security services.”
Another handwritten document from 1999 reveals an apparent effort by a Colombian Army general to establish himself as an intermediary for the paramilitary payments. The document (transcribed here) describes a “General in the zone for several years” who had been accused of being “with [a] death squad” by the mayor of San José de Apartadó (Note 4) and had been “suspended from the Army.” The document notes that the general had “helped us personally” with “Security” and “information that prevented kidnaps.” The notes make oblique reference to a $9,000 payment, adding that “Other companies are putting in their…”
“The Chiquita Papers reinforce the idea that, by 1997, the AUC ran the show in the banana-growing regions of northern Colombia, and that local government officials, military officers, and business leaders supported their paramilitary operations,” said Evans.
“These troublesome revelations are more than academic,” said Professor Arturo Carrillo, Director of GW’s International Human Rights Clinic. “They reinforce the claim, advanced in half a dozen federal lawsuits currently pending against Chiquita, that the company was knowingly complicit in, and thus liable for, the atrocities committed by the AUC in Urabá while on the Chiquita payroll. One can only hope that the revealing information obtained and published by the National Security Archive will lead to greater accountability for Chiquita’s criminal actions in Colombia, since the company’s plea agreement with the Justice Department, which has refused to prosecute Chiquita executives for wrongdoing, amounts to little more than a slap on the corporate wrist.”
“The publication of these documents is just the beginning,” added Evans. “The thousands of pages of financial and legal records included in this collection are the seeds of future research projects for investigators prepared to deconstruct the complex web of legal, psuedo-legal, and illegal entities involved in Chiquita’s security operations, including military officers, guerrillas, paramilitary thugs, prominent businessmen, trade associations, and Convivir militias.”
The Chiquita Papers – A Selected Chronology
The following is a chronological list of some of the most interesting documents in the Chiquita Papers as selected by the National Security Archive.
1990 April 19 – First of many Chiquita memos on the subject of “Accounting for Sensitive Payments.”
1992 February 21 – Lists “Sensitive Payments” for Chiquita subsidiary Compañía Frutera de Sevilla in 1991, including disbursements to the Naval Station, Operative Command, the Army in Turbó, and the Guerrilla. Purpose for all: “Expedite Turbo operation.” [See annotated version.]
1992 May 8 – Chiquita legal memo on whether support for Colombian military counterinsurgency operations through a “trade association of banana exporters” known as Fundiban is a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
1992 February 21 – Some $15,000 worth of “sensitive payments” to various units of the Colombian military are listed alongside a more than $31,000 disbursement to “Guerrilla.” A different version of the same document omits the names of the payment recipients but includes a handwritten annotation next to the “Guerrilla” entry that says, “Extortion Payment.” Another annotation reads, “Mainly not illegal payments — these are legal — pay gasoline, army, police, politicians — payment doesn’t provide anything or benefits.” [Emphasis added.]
1992 September 20 – Transcription of voicemail left for Chiquita’s general counsel from contact in Medellín, Colombia.
1993 August 10 – A handwritten note based on discussion with Chiquita in-house counsel notes indicates that company has begun to channel its security payments to the Colombian Army through a “banana association” in Turbó known as “Agura” at a price of three cents per box of bananas shipped.
1994 January 4 – Draft legal memo describes reporting of transactions in Turbó and Santa Marta for “security purposes and payments to the respective trade association.” The outlays are described as “guerrilla extortion payments” made through “our intermediary or Security Consultant, Rene Osorio,” who is said to be the company’s “contact with the various guerrilla groups in both Divisions.” The guerrilla payments are called “citizen security” and are “expensed via the Manager’s Expense Account.” The author of the memo was told by the General Manager in Turbó “that the Guerrilla Groups are used to supply security personnel at the various farms.”
1994 January 5 – Second draft of January 4, 1994, memo includes annotations asking, “Why is this relevant?” and, “Why is this being written?”
1994 June 10 – Memo from Chiquita counsel (Medellín) to Chiquita in-house counsel discusses Colombian legal standards in cases of kidnapping and exotortion; notes that Constitutional Court decision that “when a person acts under one of the justified circumstances” they act in a “State of Necessity” and “cannot be penalized.”
1995 February 20 – Chiquita memo describes payments to Álvaro Uribe ($5935 on Oct. 24, 1994) and Alfonso Nuñez ($2000 on Oct. 30, 1994), both candidates for governor of Antioquia.
1997 February 3 – Memo from local outside counsel (Medellín) to Chiquita in-house counsel discusses application of Colombian law in cases of extortion and finds that “when one acts in a state of necessity, no punishment will be applied.” … “In other words, a person who pays for extortion is a victim, not an accomplice to the crime, and therefore cannot be punished.”
1997 May 7 – Handwritten notes: “Spent approx $575,000 over last 4 years on security payments = Guerrilla payments”; “$222,000 in 1996 — $21,763 Convivir – Rest guerrillas”; “Budget for 1997 — $80,000 Guerrillas — $120,000 Convivir”; “[Deleted] indicates Convivirs legal”; “Not FCPA issue”
…
“Cost of doing business in Colombia – Maybe the question is not why are we doing this but rather we are in Colombia and do we want to ship bananas from Colombia.”
“Need to keep this very confidential – People can get killed.”1997-1998 – Sensitive payment schedules for Banadex record large payments to “Convivir” as “Donation to citizen reconaissance group made at request of Army.”
1997 August ca. – In-house attorney handwritten notes regarding “Convivir”:
“CONVIVIR PUNTE PIEDRA, S.A.”
“(We have our own)”
“Organismo Juridico … Participamos con las otras bananeras. (We were last to participate)”
“We pay [cents]0.03/box. Wk 18/1997 – Wk 17/199[8?]”
“Under military supervision. Proporcionan información and some are armed (but they’re not paramilitary groups?). Radios, motorcycles”
“Legalmente operan en Colombia”
“Negotiate through a lawyer. We are not shareholders. We don’t know who the owners are. Pushed by the gov’t locally and the military.”1997 August 29 – Memo written Chiquita in-house counsel says, “we currently are members of an organization called CONVIVIR Puntepiedra, S.A., a legal entity in which we participate with other banana exporting companies in the Turbo region. Banadex currently pays $0.03 per box to this CONVIVIR.” Memo also says that the Convivir “operate under military supervision (and have offices at the military bases)” and that “their sole function is to provide information on guerrilla movements.”
1997 September 9 – Memo from local outside counsel (Baker & McKenzie) regarding “Payments to guerrilla groups” in response to Chiquita query regarding legal consequences of such payments “in case of extortion or kidnapping.” Baker memo highlights Colombian Constitutional Court challenge to 1993 law that made it a crime for foreign companies to pay extortion/ransom and that “necessity” is a condition under which such payments are permitted. However, the memo also says that “he who obtains personal benefit from a state of necessity … incurs in a criminal action.”
1999 July 6 – In-house counsel notes discuss former Colombian “general” forced out of military for supposed association with “death squads.” Notes indicate that the officer “helped us personally” with “security” and “information that prevented kidnaps.” Notes also say that “Turbo improved while he was there.” Note also refers obliquely to $9,000 payment.
2000 March 6 – Chiquita in-house counsel handwritten notes about front company set up by paramilitaries in Santa Marta to collect security payments from Banadex.
“disguised the real purpose of providing security”
“don’t know who the shareholders are”
“Same people who formed Convivir formed this new company; govt won’t permit another Convivir; too much political pressure re: para-military”
“Don’t know whether the gov’t is aware what this organization does.”
“Military in Santa Marta may know what this company does. Military won’t acknowledge formally that they know what the corporation does.”
“Note: In Turbo we issue a check to Convivir [or/of] another code name and deliver it to a variety of intermediaries for transfer to Convivir.”
“Tagua del Darien is name of cooperative formed as part of Convivir movement.”
“Santa Marta 3[cents]/box; first payment in October 1999. Money for info on guerrilla movements; info not given to gov’t military.”
“Checks made out to Inversiones Manglar SA à Asociacion Para la Paz Del Magdalena.”
“Natural persons w/ no affiliation to military formed Inversions Manglar S.A.”
“[Deleted] says we should continue making the payments; can’t get the same level of support from the military.”2000 September ca. – Draft memo details initial meetings between paramilitaries and Banadex officials.
2001 May 7 – Outside local counsel (Posse, Herrera & Ruiz) provides legal analysis of Convivir organizations: “We should underline that the legality of payments, is subject to the due observance of the requisites described above. In addition the actual use … of contributed funds should be borne in mind. If funds are used for the conduction of activities that comply with legal requirements, legality of such payments will be preserved. However, if funds are used in connection of activities beyond the scope authorized … including the conductions of activities that are contrary to law, the actual (or even constructive) knowledge of such activities by the contributing party may taint such payments as illegal and even result in criminal prosecution.”
2003 ca. – PowerPoint presentation on options for how to conceal improper payments.
2004 January 28 – Chiquita turns over attorney-client privileged documents to Dept. of Justice. Memo from counsel Kirkland & Ellis describes scope and limitations of the documents provided.
2007 March 13 – The U.S. Department of Justice reaches a plea deal with Chiquita for making payments to the AUC, a designated foreign terrorist organization.
Notes
1. A 1997 legal memo drawn up by Chiquita’s U.S. counsel specifically warned that an extortion defense would not apply in situations where the company actually benefited from the payments. Another legal memo from the company’s attorneys in Colombia cautioned that payments to ostensibly legal Convivir militias could be considered illegal if there were actual or constructive knowledge that they were connected to illegal activities.
2. Although Thomas’ name does not appear in any of these records, his authorship has been confirmend by comparing the documents to the report of the Special Litigation Committee (SLC) established by Chiquita’s Board of Directors that issued its final report in 2009.
3. Although the identity of the paramilitary leader who first approached the Banadex officials is not revealed in the redacted document, both the SLC report and the sentencing agreement confirm that it was Castaño who was at the meeting and who personally requested that the company support the La Tagua group.
4. The “Peace Community” of San José de Apartadó is one of several Colombia towns that during this time had taken a neutral position in the country’s civil conflict.
TOP-SECRERT: 1989 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT FOR THE UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 03111 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER UK SUBJECT: 1989 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT FOR THE UK REF: STATE 363024 MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 1989 --------------------------------------------- ---- ¶1. THROUGHOUT 1989, AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREAT TO THE UK AND UK INTERESTS WERE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OUTLAWED PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, THE ACTIVITIES OF OUTLAWED PROTESTANT TERRORIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND CAUSED THE DEATHS OF 62 PEOPLE IN 1989, INCLUDING 14 MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY FORCES AND 9 POLICEMEN KILLED IN TERRORIST ATTACKS. PIRA TERRORIST ATTACKS ON TARGETS IN BRITAIN AND IN MAINLAND EUROPE RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF AN ADDITIONAL FIFTEEN UK ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL OR THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS IN 1989. ¶2. HMG CONTINUED IN 1989 TO DEMAND INFORMATION FROM LIBYA ABOUT ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PIRA, INCLUDING DELIVERIES OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL YEARS OF EXPLOSIVES, ARMAMENTS, AND AMMUNITION IN LARGE QUANTITIES. DESPITE CONTINUING OCCASIONAL CAPTURES OF PIRA ARMS AND SUPPLIES IN 1989, THE PIRA WAS BELIEVED STILL TO HAVE ENOUGH LIBYAN-SUPPLIED ARMS TO SUSTAIN ITS DESTRUCTIVE TERRORIST CAMPAIGN FOR AT LEAST A DECADE. ¶3. THE FATWA -- OR DEATH EDICT -- OF IRAN'S AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AGAINST THE BRITISH AUTHOR SALMAN RUSHDIE ON 14 FEBRUARY 1989 LED TO WIDESPREAD PUBLIC DISTURBANCES AMONG ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES IN BRITAIN AND ABROAD. THERE WERE SEVERAL INSTANCES OF BOMBINGS OF BOOKSTORES SELLING RUSHDIE'S BOOK "SATANIC VERSES." THREATS AGAINST PUBLISHERS AND MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES REQUIRED POLICE PROTECTION. UK AUTHORITIES ARRESTED AND DEPORTED 23 IRANIANS ON NATIONAL SECURITY GROUNDS IN 1989. ¶4. BRITISH POLICE PROVIDED ROUND-THE-CLOCK PROTECTION FOR SALMAN RUSHDIE THROUGHOUT THE REST OF 1989 TO PREVENT HIS MURDER BY MUSLIM FANATICS WHO MIGHT SEEK TO CARRY OUT THE "SENTENCE OF DEATH" AGAINST THE AUTHOR. HMG OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO IRANIAN AUTHORITIES THAT THE UK HELD IRAN DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ACTION TAKEN AGAINST BRITISH OR OTHER NATIONALS AS A RESULT OF THE FATWA. ¶5. UK AUTHORITIES CONTINUED IN 1989 TO INVESTIGATE THE BOMBING OF PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT 103 OVER LOCKERBIE, SCOTLAND IN DECEMBER 1988. THE INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN EXTREMELY FAR-REACHING AND COSTLY BUT HAS RESULTED IN CONSIDERABLE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT THE NATURE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS ON COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT AND IN SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES. UK INVESTIGATORS HAVE WORKED CLOSELY ON THE CASE WITH CRIMINAL SPECIALISTS AND FORENSIC SCIENTISTS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE FRG, AND OTHER CONCERNED COUNTRIES. BRITAIN SHARES A POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE WORLD-WIDE EFFORT TO CONCLUDE NEW INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON AVIATION SECURITY, CONTROL OF EXPLOSIVES, AND THE SHARING OF INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY TO COMBAT TERRORIST THREATS TO CIVIL AVIATION. ¶6. THE UK PROVIDES TRAINING, ADVICE, AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES TO ASSIST THEIR OWN EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORIST THREATS. ¶7. THE UK IS ACTIVE IN THE UN, THE EC, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORA IN EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN EFFORTS TO ISOLATE AND PENALIZE COUNTRIES WHICH SUPPORT TERRORISM. RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM ------------------------------- ¶8. UK COURTS IN BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND CONTINUED IN 1989 TO PROSECUTE CASES AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE PIRA AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN THE DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. ¶9. BECAUSE OF THE SIGNIFICANT THREAT OF PIRA TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE UK, BRITAIN CONTINUED IN 1989 TO EXERCISE THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF LAW CONTAINED IN THE 1984 PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT. THE ACT, AMONG ITS OTHER ELEMENTS, ENABLES SPECIAL COURTS TO OPERATE IN NORTHERN IRELAND DESPITE THE PERSISTENT THREAT OF PIRA TERRORISM AGAINST JUDGES AND JURIES. ¶10. THERE ARE OUTSTANDING UK ARREST WARRANTS AGAINST PIRA TERRORISTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND SEVERAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. UK AUTHORITIES CONTINUED IN 1989 TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH OFFICIALS IN IRELAND, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, THE FRG, FRANCE, AND OTHER COUNTRIES DEALING WITH INCIDENTS OF PIRA TERRORISM AND ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE EXTRADITION OF PIRA MEMBERS WANTED FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS. CATTO
Den dunklen Machenschaften der STASI ist am besten mit dem Licht der Öffentlichkeit zu begegnen.“
Liebe Leser,
nachstehend publiziere ich Material, das unserer Redaktion in Bezug auf die STASI-Mörder-Bande von STASI-Opfern zugespielt wurde.
Herzlichst Ihr
Magister Bernd Pulch
Den dunklen Machenschaften der
ist am besten mit dem Licht der
Öffentlichkeit zu begegnen.“


. . . . noch mehr Link’s zu diesem Thema
“Mord – eine Arbeitsmethode des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit”
von Prof. Dr. Dieter Voigt
“Anleitung zu Entführung, Mord und Totschlag”
PLAN “Operativen Maßnahmen zur Liquidierung”
“Operativen Maßnahme zur Liquidierung von Michael Gartenschläger”
“Der Giftschrank der Staatssicherheit”
Viele Unfälle und Erkrankungen von ehemaligen
DDR-Systemkritikern sind noch lange nicht geklärt.
. . Vielen Dank an ! Dr. B******** Dr. S****** Dr. R******
INSIDER: STASI-MORD AN HEINZ GERLACH MIT DIOXIN-GoMoPa “weiss” sofort die Todesursache
Heinz Gerlach
Wir in den Medien:
(Investment Magazin, Investment, Das Investment) DAS ORIGINAL – „Neue Erkenntnisse in der Affäre Resch/GoMoPa-Stasi haben wir recherchiert“, erläutert SJB.-GoMoPa-Sprecher Heinz Friedrich. „Neben dem Stasi-Top-Agenten und früheren Leiter der Kriminologie an der Ost-Berliner Humboldt-Universität, Ehrenfried Stelzer, hat Rechtsanwalt Jochen Resch den sogenannten „Wirtschaftsdetektiv“ Medard Fuchsgruber als Protege´ gefördert.
Fuchsgruber spielte eine besonders dubiose Rolle in den letzten Tagen und Wochen vor dem Tode von Heinz Gerlach. Er sollte im Auftrag der von „GoMoPa“ erpressten Kasseler Firma Immovation AG Erkennntnisse über „GoMoPa“ sammeln und diese auch dem „GoMoPa“-Kritiker Heinz Gerlach zur Verfügung stellen. Er hatte jederzeit freien Zugang zu Heinz Gerlach und dessen Privaträumen.
8. Juli 2009 … Der Wirtschaftsdetektiv Medard Fuchsgruber soll zum neuen Geschäftsführer des Deutschen Instituts für Anlegerschutz (DIAS) gewählt werden“, meldete http://www.anlegerschutz.tv/
Zwei Tage später starb Heinz Gerlach.
Am 10. Juli 2010 starb Heinz Gerlach angeblich an „Blutvergiftung“. GoMoPa brachte die Meldung nur wenige Stunden nach dem Ableben – mit der Todesursache „Blutvergiftung“ – diese Todesursache kann sehr leicht und sher schnell durch Dioxinvergiftung herbeigeführt werden. Diese „Pressemeldung“ ist inzwischen von der Webseite der „GoMoPa“ verwschwunden.
Aber auch andere Insider, ausser uns haben sie gesehen:
Siehe hier in der Akte Heinz Gerlach::
„Zum Tode von Heinz Gerlach »
11.07.10 Sondermeldung
HEINZ GERLACH VERSTORBEN
(Eigener Bericht)
Heinz Gerlach ist tot. Am Sonnabend Abend ist der äußerst umstrittene “Anlegerschützer” in Oberursel verstorben. Das vermeldet der Finanzmarketingberater Michael Oehme in einem Rundbrief. Heinz Gerlach wäre am 9. August 65 Jahre alt geworden.
Auf den Internetseiten der Heinz Gerlach Medien eK ist bislang keine Bestätigung für diese Nachricht zu erhalten.
Die Todesumstände sind völlig unklar. Der Finanznachrichtendienst Gomopa spekuliert, Gerlach sei einer Blutvergiftung erlegen.
Bei allen kritikwürdigen Geschäftsmethoden war Heinz Gerlach ein Mensch, der eine Familie hinterlässt. Unser Mitgefühl gilt seinen Angehörigen.
Wie und ob unsere Berichterstattung weitergeht, hängt davon ab, auf welche Weise die Geschäfte des Unternehmens nach Heinz Gerlachs Tod geführt werden.
Bereits vorbereitete Artikel und Enthüllungen werden wir aus Pietät zunächst nicht veröffentlichen.“
http://www.akte-heinz-gerlach.info/11-07-10-sondermeldung-heinz-gerlach-verstorben/ (noch ist der Link verfügbar)
Während selbst die Gerlach-kritische Akte schreibt „die Todeusursache sind noch völlig unklar“, WEISS „GoMoPa“ BEREITS ZU DIESEM ZEITPUNKT; dss die ANGEBLICHE TODESURSACHE EINE BLUTVERGIFTUNG WAR.
“GoMoPa”-”Aushängeschild” Klaus Maurischat alias Siefried Siewert
Von da an nahm die Legende ihren Lauf – über hessische Provinzzeitungen, die keine Quelle angaben.
Wir erinnern uns, das Pseudonym von Klaus Maurischat (dessen Lebenslauf und Identität wohl gefälscht sein dürften), ist Siegfried Siewert. Siegfried Sievert ist ein ehemaliger Stasi-Agent und nunmehr für den DIOXIN-Skandal verantwortlich.
Er gab zu im Auftrag der Stasi, BLUTFETT-VERSUCHE vorgenommen zu haben.
“Dieser Kerl panschte Gift-Fett in unser Essen”, titelt die Bild-Zeitung über den Chef des Futtermittelherstellers Harles & Jentzsch aus Uetersen (Kreis Pinneberg). Gemeint ist Siegfried Sievert, 58 Jahre alt. Wer ist der Mann, der für einen der größten Lebensmittelskandale Deutschlands verantwortlich sein könnte?
Der Unternehmer lebt in einer Villa in Kiebitzreihe (Kreis Steinburg) und ist seit 16 Jahren bei Harles & Jentzsch in leitender Position tätig. Seit 2005 ist er alleinvertretungsberechtigter Geschäftsführer. Als nach dem Dioxinfund klar wurde, dass die verseuchte Mischfettsäure nur für technische Zwecke verwendet werden darf, erklärte Sievert: “Wir waren leichtfertig der irrigen Annahme, dass die Mischfettsäure, die bei der Herstellung von Biodiesel aus Palm-, Soja- und Rapsöl anfällt, für die Futtermittelherstellung geeignet ist.”
Sievert hat sich für Qualitätsstandards stark gemacht
Diese Aussage erstaunt Branchenexperten, die mit Sievert gearbeitet haben. Christof Buchholz ist Geschäftsführer des Deutschen Verbands des Großhandels mit Ölen, Fetten und Ölrohstoffen (Grofor), in dem 120 Unternehmen organisiert sind, darunter auch Harles & Jentzsch. Buchholz sagt: “Ich kenne Herrn Sievert gut. Er hat sich seit Jahren für hohe Qualitätsstandards stark gemacht, insbesondere für das holländische System.” Dabei würden akribisch all jene Gefahren aufgelistet, die eine mechanische oder chemische Verunreinigung verursachen könnten – und Standards für die sichere Produktion von Futtermitteln definiert.
Sievert dürfte demnach ein Experte für eine saubere Futtermittelproduktion sein. Er besuchte auch die jährlichen Grofor-Treffen, bei denen sich Experten aus ganz Europa austauschen. Wie glaubwürdig ist dann seine Aussage, er habe angenommen, die Mischfettsäure verwenden zu dürfen – zumal der niederländische Lieferant Petrotec AG in Verträgen, Lieferscheinen und Rechnungen darauf hingewiesen haben will, dass diese billigere Fettsäure ausschließlich zur technischen Verwendung bestimmt sei?
“Wir können das nicht nachvollziehen”
Christof Buchholz: “Bei uns war die Überraschung groß. Es ist ein No-go für Futtermittelhersteller, technische Mischfettsäuren zu verwenden. Wir können das nicht nachvollziehen.” Er habe deshalb Siegfried Sievert angerufen. “Wir haben ein kurzes Gespräch geführt. Herr Sievert war verzweifelt und erklärte auch mir, dass er dachte, das sei in Ordnung.” Während des Telefonats sei zudem besprochen worden, woher die Dioxine gekommen sein könnten. Christof Buchholz: “Herr Sievert wusste darauf keine Antwort und klagte, dass es so viele Fragezeichen gebe.”
Seine erste Aussage hat er mittlerweile revidiert. Dem niedersächsischen Agrar ministerium teilte Harles & Jentzsch jetzt mit, das dioxinverseuchte Industriefett sei versehentlich in die Produktion gelangt. Ministeriumssprecher Gert Hahne: “Die Darstellung, da hat einer den falschen Hahn aufgedreht, erscheint uns sehr unglaubwürdig.”
Sievert drohen drei Jahre Gefängnis
Die Staatsanwaltschaft Itzehoe ermittelt wegen des Verdachts einer vorsätzlichen Straftat gegen Siegfried Sievert. Ihm drohen wegen Verunreinigung von Lebens- und Futtermitteln bis zu drei Jahren Gefängnis oder eine Geldstrafe. Außerdem droht eine Prozess-Lawine. Auf was dürfen Landwirte hoffen, die auf Schadensersatz klagen?
Die Harles & Jentzsch GmbH ist im Mai 1980 in Pinneberg gegründet worden, zog 1994 nach Uetersen. Im Handelsregister gibt das Unternehmen als Geschäftszweck an: Handel und Veredelung, Im- und Export von Ölen, Fetten, Fettsäuren und deren Derivaten. Unter dem Markennamen “Hajenol” verkauft Harles & Jentzsch Futterfett für Rinder, Schweine, Geflügel und Legehennen, produziert aber auch Industriefette für die Papierverarbeitung. Das Stammkapital der GmbH betrug 1994 genau 537 800 Mark. Diese Summe scheint zwischenzeitlich nicht erhöht worden zu sein, obwohl der Jahresumsatz des Zwölf-Mann-Betriebs zuletzt 20 Millionen Euro betrug.
Sollte Harles & Jentzsch vorsätzlich gehandelt haben, wird die Betriebshaftpflichtversicherung nicht einspringen. Der Bauernverband geht von einem Millionenschaden aus. Es geht um mehr als 1000 Landwirte, die ihre Höfe schließen mussten und deren Tiere teilweise verbrannt werden. Als Entschädigung wird das Stammkapital und selbst das Gesellschaftsvermögen nicht reichen. Dem Vertriebschef der Firma zufolge soll am Donnerstag eine Bestandsaufnahme erfolgen. Danach werde entschieden, ob Insolvenz angemeldet werde. Gegen Sievert und seine Mitarbeiter hat es derweil Morddrohungen gegeben. Am Telefon seien Mitarbeiter mit den Worten “Wir machen euch fertig” bedroht worden, so Sievert.
Bild schreibt: –„ Die Akte trägt die Registriernummer II 153/71, ist mehrere Hundert Seiten dick. Auf dem Deckel – in feiner Schreibschrift – ein Name: „Pluto“. Unter diesem Decknamen spionierte Siegfried Sievert (58) 18 Jahre lang für die Staatssicherheit der DDR – der Futtermittelpanscher, der mutmaßlich für den deutschen Dioxin-Skandal verantwortlich ist!
Siegfried Sievers
Auf Antrag von BILD gab die zuständige Birthler-Behörde die Unterlagen jetzt heraus. Die Dokumente zeichnen das Bild eines Mannes, der rücksichtslos ist, skrupellos und vor allem auf eigenen Profit bedacht.
Rückblick. 1971 wird die Stasi auf den 18-jährigen Sievert aufmerksam. Sie beobachtet sein „dekadentes Aussehen“, seine hohe Intelligenz und seine „guten Verbindungen zu anderen jugendlichen Personenkreisen“. Sievert wird angeworben. Aus einem Bericht vom 16. März 1971: „Der Kandidat kann zur Absicherung der Jugend (…) eingesetzt werden.“
Sievert wählt seinen Decknamen selbst, kassiert fortan Prämien für seine „inoffizielle Mitarbeit“. In den Unterlagen finden sich zahlreiche Quittungen, eine vom 6. November 1987: „Hiermit bescheinige ich den Erhalt von 100 Mark für geleistete Arbeit.“
Nach dem Abitur studiert Sievert in Greifswald Physik. Er macht Karriere, wird Geschäftsführer für „Absatz und Beschaffung“ in der „Märkischen Ölmühle“ in Wittenberge (Brandenburg).
Eifrig spitzelt Sievert weiter, berichtet über intime Verhältnisse seiner Kollegen.
So notiert „IM-Pluto“ am 25. September 1986: „Die beiden beabsichtigen, gemeinsam die BRD zu besuchen.“ Zwei Kollegen hätten angegeben, von einem Freund eingeladen worden zu sein. „Fakt ist jedoch, daß zwischen dem Kollegen und der Kollegin seit langer Zeit Intimbeziehungen bestehen. (…) Aus dieser Tatsache ist abzuleiten, daß eine gemeinsame Reise in die BRD mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit für eine Flucht benutzt wird.“
Skrupel zeigte Sievert laut Stasi-Akte keine. Ein Führungsoffizier notiert: „Der IM hatte keinerlei Vorbehalte bei der Belastung von Personen aus seinem Umgangskreis.“
Nach dem Mauerfall verlässt Sievert die Ölmühle. Ehemalige Kollegen wundern sich über seinen Wohlstand, werfen ihm vor, er habe Lieferungen der Ölmühle unterschlagen, dafür unter der Hand kassiert. Ein Vorwurf, für den es derzeit keine Belege gibt.
1993 steigt Sievert beim Futtermittelhersteller „Harles & Jentzsch“ ein. 2005 wird er alleiniger Geschäftsführer, steigert in nur fünf Jahren den Umsatz von 4,3 auf rund 20 Millionen Euro, vervierfacht den Gewinn. Ein Futtermittelmischer aus Niedersachsen zu BILD: „Solch ein Wachstum ist mit normalen Methoden unmöglich.“
Mit Panscherei möglicherweise schon: Das dioxinverseuchte Tierfutter von „Harles & Jentzsch“ war durch das Einmischen von Industriefetten entstanden. Die sind deutlich billiger als Futterfette.
Allein im November und Dezember 2010 soll Sieverts Firma mindestens 3000 Tonnen verseuchtes Futterfett verarbeitet haben. Etwa 150 000 Tonnen belastetes Futter könnten so in die Nahrungskette gelangt sein.
Martin Hofstetter, Agrarexperte von Greenpeace zu BILD: „Wenn man sich die Zahlen von ,Harles & Jentzsch‘ anschaut und die bisherigen Erkenntnisse und Veröffentlichungen berücksichtigt, kann man eigentlich nur zu einem Schluss kommen: Hier wurde systematisch betrogen und gepanscht.“
UND: Stasi-Top-Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer war auch Professor für Kriminologie an der Berliner Humboldt-Universität zu SED-Zeiten. Von Stelzer gibt es bislang kein offizielelsBild…
SJB-GoMoPa-Sprecher heinz Friedrich kommentiert: „Der verdacht liegt nahe, dass hier eine Verschwörung zum Tode von Heinz Gerlach geführt hat, der dieser Gruppierung im Wege stand. Auch wir und unsere Angehörigen wuurden mit Stas-Methoden bedroht und eingeschüchtert.“ Und fügt er hinzu: „Wie das Dioxin in die Blutbahn von heinz Gerlach kam, werden diese Stas-Agenten und ihre Mitverschwörer wohl wissen.“
Nach dem Tode von Gerlach wechelte Fuchsgruber endgültig und offen die Seiten in das „GoMoPa“-Team und hat sollte auch als DIAS-Geschäftsführer den Stasi-Agenten Ehrenfried Stelzer abgelöst – auf Betreiben des „Anlegerschutz“-Anwaltes RA Jochen Resch (siehe unten).
Nachstehende Erklärung publizierte dann Immovation AG:
„Nach den höchsterfreulichen gerichtlichen Erfolgen gegen den u. a. von rechtskräftig verurteilten Betrügern betriebenen, im Ausland domizilierten “Informationsdienst” Gomopa geht die Kasseler IMMOVATION Immobilien Handels AG auch straf- und zivilrechtlich gegen den Wirtschaftsdetektiv Medard Fuchsgruber vor.
Dieser hatte den IMMOVATION-Vorständen Lars Bergmann und Matthias Adamietz im Frühjahr 2010 angeboten, unwahre, diffamierende Veröffentlichungen auf der Website der gomopa.net beseitigen zu lassen und weitere rechtswidrige Veröffentlichungen dieser Art zu verhindern. Diese beauftragten Medard Fuchsgruber entsprechend und entrichteten ein Honorar von insgesamt EUR 67.500,00. Entgegen allen Zusagen von Fuchsgruber erfolgen über Gomopa jedoch – insbesondere seit Juli diesen Jahres – weiterhin schwer diffamierende Veröffentlichungen, gegen deren wesentlichste das traditionsreiche Kasseler Unternehmen in der Zwischenzeit bereits vor Gericht eine einstweilige Verfügung durchsetzen konnte (LG Berlin; Az.: 27 O 658/10).
Fuchsgruber ist – nach Entgegennahme des Vorabhonorars – offenbar seit Juni selbst “Kooperationspartner” bei Gomopa und wirbt sogar mit dieser Funktion, auch bei Gomopa wird das Engagement Fuchsgrubers besonders willkommen geheißen. Nach Auffassung der IMMOVATION hat Fuchsgruber damit von Beginn an über sein beabsichtigtes Engagement für die IMMOVATION getäuscht, was das Unternehmen im Rahmen einer Strafanzeige und eines Strafantrags inzwischen von der zuständigen Staatsanwaltschaft überprüfen lässt. Zudem hat die IMMOVATION das vorab bezahlte Honorar zurückgefordert und wird erforderlichenfalls den zivilrechtlichen Klageweg beschreiten.
Absurde Erklärungsversuche
Die von Fuchsgruber offenkundig in Journalisten- und Branchenkreisen zirkulierte Einschätzung, er hätte auftragsgemäß für IMMOVATION gehandelt, zielt völlig ins Leere: Denn nach seinem Einstieg bei Gomopa haben die über einen Serverstandort im Ausland verbreiteten Schmähungen nachweislich sogar zugenommen. Und schließlich: Selbst wenn dem so wäre, wie ließe sich dann der Umstand erklären, dass Fuchsgruber weiterhin als “Kooperationsparter” bei Gomopa fungiert, wenn doch nun für Gomopa öffentlich bekannt ist, dass Fuchsgruber im Auftrag der diffamierten IMMOVATION aktiv werden sollte?
Eine unmittelbare Beendigung der Zusammenarbeit Fuchsgruber und Gomopa wäre daher die logische Konsequenz, die jedoch bezeichnenderweise bis heute offenkundig ausgeblieben ist, was den von der IMMOVATION erhobenen Vorwurf weiter untermauert. Bemerkenswert ist darüber hinaus, dass sich der Einstieg Fuchsgrubers beim “Informationsdienst” Gomopa laut Medienberichten in enger zeitlicher Nähe zum Scheitern Fuchsgrubers beim Deutschen Institut für Anlegerschutz (DIAS) vollzog.“
Und im November 2010 durfte Fuchgruber dann auf der „GoMoPa“-Webseite für sich werben:
http://www.gomopa.net/Pressemitteilungen.html?id=603&meldung=Wucherbeitraege-Medard-Fuchsgruber-gruendete-Aktionsgemeinschaft-fuer-Versicherte#thumb (Noch ist der Link da)
Hintergrund:
Der Beleg, wie eng „GoMoPa“ und der laut den SJB-GoMoPa-Opfern hinter „GoMoPa“ stehende Rechtsanwalt Resch stehen, lesen Sie nachfolgend. Und: RA Resch fördert einen Ex-STASI-Hauptmann:
Zitat:
„GoMoPa: Warum haben Sie ausgerechnet einen Stasi-Oberst und zudem noch hochbetagt, nämlich Ehrenfried Stelzer (78), als Nachfolger von Pietsch bei DIAS eingesetzt?
Resch: “Der Verein stand ohne Geschäftsführer da. Stelzer war der einzige, der Zeit hatte. Alle im Verein haben gesagt, 20 Jahre nach der Wende ist die Stasizeit nicht mehr so wichtig. Schließlich war Stelzer Professor für Kriminalistik an der Humboldt-Uni. Aber im Nachhinein war das kein so kluger Zug.”
GoMoPa: Stelzer wurde inzwischen von Wirtschaftsdetektiv Medard Fuchsgruber abgelöst, der nach eigenen Worten die aggressive Verfolgung von Kapitalmarktverbrechen fortsetzen will. Der Verein soll künftig von mehreren Rechtsanwälten bezahlt werden.“
Zitatende
Mehr unter http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com
Ausgrechnet der dubiose Detektiv Fuchsgruber, der die Seiten von Immovation AG hin zu „GoMoPa“ wechelt ist also ein Resch-Protege´.
Und: Fuchsgruber bemühte sich nachweislich um Gerlachs Archiv in der Insolvenzmasse. Und: er hatte freien Zugang zu Heinz Gerlachs Privaträumen.
Und: Fuchsgruber wechselte erst OFFIZIELL nach Heinz Gerlachs für alle überraschenden Tod zu „GoMoPa“ und wurde ein Protege´von Resch.
Und: Das Pseudonym von Klaus Maurischat „Siegfried Siewert“ ist ein Anagramm des Namen des früheren Stasi-Agenten und Dioxin Panschers Siegfried Sievers.
Und: Die Stasi führte Menschenversuche mit Dioxin durch.
Alles Zufälle ? Rein statistisch gesehen wohl kaum.
Dazu passt, dass diese Gruppierung die Publikation dieser Fakten mit allen Umständen verhindern will. Sie werden wissen weshalb…
Beispiel GMAC:
Laut den SJB-GoMoPa-Opfern versuchte GoMoPa wohl im Auftrag von Resch die General Motors-Tochter GMAC zu erpressen.
Zitata aus „GoMoPa“: Der Berliner Anlegerschutzanwalt Jochen Resch, der zahlreiche Käufer von GMAC-RFC-finanzierten Wohnungen vertritt, sagte dem Finanznachrichtendienst GoMoPa.net: “Anfangs wurde das Fünffache, später sogar das Siebenfache des Nettoverdienstes eines Kreditnehmers als Kredit vergeben. Wer also 40.000 Euro netto im Jahr verdiente, bekam einen Kredit bis zu 280.000 Euro, obwohl, wie sich nach Überprüfung herausstellt, die Immobilie nur 140.000 Euro wert war.
Dazu genügte eine Anmeldung beim Internet-Vermittler Creditweb, und die Kredite wurden bei entsprechender Verdienstbescheinigung im Eiltempo durchgewunken.
Was die Wohnung wirklich wert war, war nicht mehr das Problem von GMAC-RFC . Denn sie verschnürte die Wohnungen zu Paketen von 500 Millionen Euro und verkaufte die Pakete zur Refinanzierung nach Holland.
Nutzniesser der Baufilligenz der GMAC-RFC waren aber nicht die Käufer, die mit dem Kredit über dreißig Jahre eine überteuerte Wohnung abzahlen. Nutzniesser waren die Verkäufer und Vermittler, die 50 Prozent auf den wahren Verkehrswert der Wohnung draufgeschlagen hatten.
Für die Vermittler von Wohnungsfinanzierungen begann ein wahres Schlaraffenland
Anlegerschutzanwalt Resch beschreibt den Aufstieg der Ami-Bank so: “Vertriebsorganisationen sahen die große Chance, ihren bei anderen Banken nur schwer finanzierbaren Kunden einen Kredit zu vermitteln. Für den Vertrieb der entscheidende Vorteil. Nur wenn Geld fließt, fließen auch die Provisionen. Bis zu 35 Prozent des Kaufpreises.
Dieses attraktive Angebot ließ die GMAC-RFC Bank innerhalb kurzer Zeit zu einem ernsthaften Konkurrenten für die übrigen finanzierenden Banken auf dem Schrottimmobilienmarkt aufsteigen. Innerhalb kurzer Zeit erreichte die GMAC-RFC Bank deshalb ein Gesamtkreditvolumen von mehr als zwei Milliarden Euro.
Der Grund für die großzügige Kreditgewährung dürfte gewesen sein, dass die GMAC-RFC Bank das Risiko verkaufte. Sie wollte von vornherein die Kredite nicht behalten. Sie schnürte große Kreditpakete und verkaufte diese an holländische Zweckgesellschaften.
Die GMAC-RFC wurde schnell zum heißen Tipp auf dem Immobilienmarkt. Denn Verkäufer und Vermittler bekamen sogar Antragsteller ohne Eigenkapital durch, die bei jeder anderen Bank durchgefallen wären.”
Die GMAC-RFC Bank feierte sich in einer Pressemitteilung vom Januar 2007 wie folgt: „Mit Einführung der neuen Baufilligenz® – einer Produktinnovation, mit der erstmals in Deutschland standardisierte Vollfinanzierungen für Eigennutzer und Kapitalanleger bis zu 110 Prozent des Kaufpreises angeboten werden – haben wir nicht nur innerhalb kurzer Zeit die Produktführerschaft erreicht, sie zeichnet auch als Wachstumstreiber für die Verdoppelung des Neugeschäftes gegenüber 2005 verantwortlich.“
Im September 2008 war das Innovations-Konzept der GMAC sowohl in den USA als auch in Deutschland gescheitert. Die GMAC-RFC vergibt seitdem keine Hypothekendarlehen mehr.
Anlegerschutzanwalt Resch: “Zum 30. September 2008 gab die GMAC-RFC Bank ihre Lizenz zurück. Es wurde den Kunden mitgeteilt, dass alles beim Alten bleibe. Die GMAC-RFC Servicing GmbH werde jetzt die Kunden weiter betreuen.
Schon damals entstanden jedoch Zweifel, ob dieses Angebot ernst gemeint war. Wir hatten befürchtet, dass sich die Konditionen bei der Prolongation des Darlehens verschlechtern würden.”
Die Befürchtungen bestätigt die GMAC-RFC indirekt in ihrem Rundbrief vom 23. September 2010. Der Vorteil einer Umschuldung auf eine andere Bank sei die Möglichkeit einer „besseren Zinskondition“.
Theoretisch dürfte die GMAC-RFC damit recht haben. Praktisch wird es allerdings dazu führen, dass die GMAC-RFC Darlehensnehmer bei dem Versuch einer Umschuldung bemerken werden, dass sie wohl keine einzige Bank finden werden, die in das Risiko einsteigt.
Es wird offenbar werden, dass viele Anleger nur durch das institutionelle Zusammenwirken zwischen Vertrieb, Verkäufer und GMAC-RFC Bank einen Kredit bekommen hatten.
Es wird offenbar werden, dass die Hausbank des Kunden die Umschuldung nur bei Stellung weiterer Sicherheiten vornehmen wird.
Es wird offenbar werden, dass vielfach die Wohnung sittenwidrig überteuert ist. Sie bringt beim Weiterverkauf nicht einmal die Hälfte dessen, was die GMAC-RFC Bank finanziert hat.
Das einzig Gute ist, dass viele ahnungslose Anleger beim Versuch einer Umschuldung bemerken, was ihnen seinerzeit angetan wurde.”
GoMoPa.net schickte der GMAC-RFC Servicing GmbH folgende Fragen:
1) Ist es richtig, dass dieses Angebot zur Umschuldung damit zusammenhängt, dass die zur Refinanzierung an holländische Zweckgesellschaften verkauften Kredite nur unzureichend bedient werden und durch die Umschuldung die Rückzahlung und die Zinszahlungen für die Anleihen der Zweckgesellschaften gesichert werden müssen?
2) Ist es richtig, dass die GMAC-RFC Bank seit ihrem Auftreten auf dem deutschen Immobilienmarkt im Jahr 2004 ein Gesamtvolumen von über zwei Milliarden Euro an Krediten ausgereicht hat, die in fünf „Paketen“ an holländische Zweckgesellschaften verkauft wurden?
3) Ist es richtig, dass ausschließlich über das Internetportal Creditweb Darlehensanträge bei der GMAC eingereicht werden konnten? Wenn nein, welche weiteren Internetportale waren dazu berechtigt?
4.) Ist es richtig, dass die mit der Creditweb kooperierenden Vertriebe keine Originalunterlagen der Kreditsuchenden, sondern lediglich Kopien eingereicht haben? Hat sich die GMAC-RFC Bank seinerzeit Originale der Lohn- und Gehaltsunterlagen der Kreditnehmer vorlegen lassen?
5.) Ist es richtig, dass in dem Baufilligenzprogramm es lediglich auf die finanzielle Situation des Darlehensnehmers ankam und dass Kredite bis zur Höhe des siebenfachen Jahresnettoeinkommens finanziert wurden?
6.) Ist es richtig, dass die Gewährung der Kredite auf der Grundlage des Pfandbriefgesetzes erfolgte?
7.) Wie erfolgt der Nachweis der Aktivlegitimation der GMAC Servicing GmbH in Fällen, in denen die Vollstreckung bei notleidenden oder gekündigten Darlehen erforderlich wird?
GoMoPa.net ersuchte die GMAC-RFC Servicing GmbH in Wiesbaden mehrmals, zu dem Rundbrief an die deutschen Kreditnehmer Stellung zu beziehen. Die Geschäftsführerin Jennifer Anderson sei in den USA, eine Telefonnummer sei nicht bekannt. Die Pressesprecherin Katharina Dahms sei in Urlaub und hätte keine Vertretung. Und der Prokurist Sven Klärner, der noch Auskunft geben könnte, rief trotz mehrfacher Bitten von GoMoPa.net nicht zurück – er wird wissen warum. „
Zitatende
Hintergrund:
Die SJB-GoMoPa-Opfer behaupten: „Der abgetauchte Berliner Zweig der GoMoPa-Gangster will nun zusammen mit ihrem Hausanwalt RA Jochen Resch, Berlin, die DKB erpressen – so wie sie dies vorher mit Immovation versucht haben.
Estavis hat bezahlt, damit ein Grundsatzurteil gegen sie nicht unter den Käufer ihrer Immobilien verbreitet wird. Dasselbe Spiel versuchen der Knacki Maurischat und sein Kumpan Resch nun auch bei der DKB durchzuziehen.
Eigengartig, da schliesst ein Finanzforum aus Deutschland mit Briefkasten in New York einen Vertrag ab mit einem börsenkotierten Immobilien-Unternehmen aus Berlin, derESTAVIS AG. Dieser Vertrag umfasst Dienstleistungen im Marketingbereich für den Abverkauf Denkmalgeschützter Eigentumswohnungen. Kontraktwert: € 100’000 ! Eine sehr eigenartige Vereinbarung.“
Börse Online: „Der Anlegeranwalt Jochen Resch kommt neuerdings oft in den Pressemitteilungen vor, die der Finanzdienst Gomopa ungefragt an Redaktionen verschickt. Als „Deutschlands bekannteste Anlegerschutzkanzlei“ wird Resch Rechtsanwälte in einem Bericht über das Ende der Noa Bankvorgestellt. Zu Schrottimmobilien äußert sich Resch, zu einem Skandal um den Immobilienfondsanbieter Volkssolidarität. Die Offenheit ist neu. Früher ging Gomopa Resch hart an und konfrontierte ihn mit Vorwürfen. Doch einige Formulierungen in einer Teilhaberinformation zur finanziellen Situation Gomopas vom Juli 2010 legen nahe, dass der Sinneswandel vielleicht nicht nur Zufall ist.
Gomopa, eigentlich Goldman Morgenstern & Partners Consulting LLC mit Sitz in New York, ist seit mehr als zehn Jahren aktiv. Auf der Website ist unter den Fachautoren der bekannte Bestsellerautor Jürgen Roth aufgelistet. Im Handelsregister der deutschen Zweigniederlassung ist als Geschäftszweck an erster Stelle „wirtschaftliche Beratung, insbesondere des Mittelstandes“ aufgelistet. Dazu gehöre „die Präsentation von Firmen im Internet und anderen Medien“. Die Verbindung des Dienstes mit einem Nachrichtenportal im Internet sieht Gomopa-Gründer Mark Vornkahl nicht als Problem: „Ein Interessenkonflikt zwischen kostenpflichtiger Beratung, Informationsabonnement und öffentlicher Aufklärung ist uns seit Bestehen nicht untergekommen.“
Doch die Nutzer des Portals erfuhren bislang nicht, ob mit Personen oder Organisationen, über die berichtet wurde, vertragliche Beziehungen bestehen. Reschs Kanzlei war laut Teilhaberinformation zeitweise eine wichtige Finanzierungsquelle von Gomopa. Darin berichtet Gomopa-Mitgründer Klaus Maurischat, dass eine Vereinbarung mit der Kanzlei „momentan 7500,- Euro im Monat einbringt – rund 25 Prozent unserer monatlichen Kosten!“. Für „individuelle Mandantenanwerbung“ stehe die Gesellschaft mit mehreren Anwaltskanzleien in Verhandlungen.
Anwalt Resch stellt zum Inhalt der Vereinbarung klar: „Wir haben einen einmaligen Rechercheauftrag erteilt, der im üblichen Rahmen honoriert wird.“ Mit Mandantenbeschaffung habe das nichts zu tun. Was Gomopa von einer Mandantenanwerbung hätte, ist auch unklar. Denn Anwälte dürfen dafür nicht bezahlen. Auf unsere Anfrage zu dieser und weiteren Fragen gab Vornkahl keine inhaltliche Antwort beziehungsweise verwahrte sich gegen Zitate aus den entsprechenden Passagen seiner E-Mail, weil er einem Mitbewerber „keine Auskünfte zur Ausgestaltung unseres Geschäftsbetriebes gebe.“
Hier eine vorläufige Liste der von RA Resch bearbeiteten Fälle:
Liste der bearbeiteten Fälle:
ALLWO (Badenia Heinen & Biege)
B & V
BADENIA (Allwo, Heinen&Biege)
BAG, Hamm
BBI Beteiligungsgesellschaft Bayrische Immobilien
Beißer Gruppe
BEMA / OSPA
Betreutes Wohnen
BHW Bank, Hameln
Brentana Wohnbau
C & C CyberCooperation AG
dieser Eintrag wurde gelöscht
CFG Grundbesitz GmbH
Contest (heute CFG Grundbesitz GmbH)
Conzeptbau Bagge
DBVI Privatbank Reithinger
Dedimax (S&C Grund & Kapital)
DEGEWO
Deutscher Informationsdienst, Hannover
DM Beteiligungen AG
Dubai Invest Immobilienfonds GmbH & Co. KG / First Real Estate
Eagle Immobilien
EECH Gruppe
EURO Convent AG
EURO-Gruppe
Falk-Fonds
Finanz Concept GmbH
First Real Estate Grundbesitz GmbH
Fondax Beteiligungsfonds 1
Fondax Beteiligungsfonds 2
Fondax Capital – Select GmbH & Co.KG
Fortissimo
Forum IV GbR
Frankonia Sachwert AG (jetzt Deltoton)
FUNDUS – Gruppe
GABAU GmbH & Co.KG
Gallinat Bank, Essen
Global Real Estate
Göttinger Gruppe
Grüezi GmbH, Berlin
Grund & Boden
Hansa Grundinvest OHG
Hauser Wohnbau GmbH
HCC Fonds
Heberle & Kollegen, Rostock
Horst Bogatz
IBH – Immobilienfonds
ISP Internationaler Sachwert Plan
KK Royal Basement
Köllner
Madrixx AG, Berlin
Morena GmbH, Berlin
Papenburg Carré
Plan-Immofonds
Prime Estate GmbH, Berlin
Private Commercial Office – US Land Banking
Prokon
PS Haus – & Grundbesitzmarketing GmbH, Berlin
Quadro – Bau GmbH & Co. KG
R & R First Concept, Berlin
RB Real Estate
RCM Royal Capital Management, Berlin
Rentadomo
RJS Grundstück-u. Immobiliengesellschaft mbH
Rolf Albern Vermögensverwaltungs GmbH
S & C/ PK Multifonds
Securenta / Göttinger Gruppe / Langenbahn AG
Südwestrentaplus
Treuconcept
TREUCONSULT
UVBD
VEAG Immobilienfonds Nr. 298 KG
VermögensGarant AG
W K West Finanz Kapital Beteiligungs AG
WBG Leipzig-West
WHe Kommunalfonds Fürstenwalde KG
WI – RN GmbH
Wirtschaftskontor Berlin Kusch & Co. GmbH
WKVI, Düsseldorf
Wollenberg & Branke GmbH & Co KG
Ein Insider: „Was glauben Sie, wer auf die Idee kam, die ominöse Briefkastenfirm Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner LLC, „GoMoPa“, einen angeblichen Zusammenschluss jüdischer Anwälte in den USA zu gründen und wer die vielen Anwälte wie RA Albrecht Saß, Hamburg, OLG Richter a.D. Matthias Schillo, Potsdam, und RA Thomas Schulte, Berlin, zur Reputationsaufbesserung aufbot ?
a) RA Jochen Resch oder b) Ex-Gefängnisinsasse Klaus Maurischat, der kaum Englisch spricht ? Und: Heinz Gerlach war dicht dran, diese Zusammenhänge aufzuklären über den „Estavis“-“Beratungsvertrag“. Seine Tochter, eine Rechtsanwältin in New York, hatte bereits eine eidesstattliche Versicherung über die Brifekasetn Firma „Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner LLC“ und deren Briefkastenadresse in New York abgegeben und er hatte Strafanzeige wegen der „Estavis“Beratungs-Affäre“ abgegeben. Dann wechselt auf einmal der von Immovation zur Aufklärung von „GoMoPa“ beauftrage „Detektiv“ Meinhard Fuchs trotz eines bereits bezahlten Honorares von über € 60.000,- die Seiten hin zu „GoMoPa“ und Heinz Gerlach stirbt plötzlich und für alle unerwartet angeblich an Blutvergiftung, seltsam…“
ENDE DES ARTIKELS
SECRET: FULL TEXT OF ISLAMIC JIHAD 17 MARCH STATEMENT
R 201307Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2276 INFO AMEMBASSY BERN UNCLAS BEIRUT 01725 E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR TAGS: PTER PREL LE SUBJECT: FULL TEXT OF ISLAMIC JIHAD 17 MARCH STATEMENT ¶1. AP PROVIDED EMBASSY WITH FULL TEXT OF ISLAMIC JIHAD STATEMENT AS TELEPHONED MARCH 17 TO REUTERS AND AFP. ¶2. BEGIN TEXT: "THE ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION IN THE NAME OF GOD THE ALL MERCIFUL. THE PUNISHMENT OF THOSE IS THE CURSE OF GOD, THE ANGELS AND ALL PEOPLE. THE DETENTION OF TERRY ANDERSON, BRIAN LEVICK AND JERRY (GEOFFRY?) NASH COMES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST AMERICA AND ITS AGENTS. WE ARE DEFINITE THAT ISLAMIC BEIRUT IS FULL OF AGENTS FROM ALL SIDES AND ACCORDINGLY WE ARE WORKING DAY AND NIGHT TO PURGE OUR REGION OF ANY SUBVERSIVE ELEMENT OF THE MOSSAD, CIA OR ALLIED INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. WE ADDRESS A FINAL WARNING TO FOREIGN NATIONALS RESIDING IN OUR ISLAMIC REGIONS TO RESPECT OUR HOSPITALITY AND NOT TO EXPLOIT THEIR PRESENCE AMONG US TO UNDERTAKE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST US. ASSUMING THE PROFESSION OF A JOURNALIST, MERCHANT, INDUSTRIALIST, SCIENTIST AND RELIGIOUS MAN WILL FROM NOW ON BE OF NO AVAIL TO SPIES STAYING AMONG US. THEY HAVE BEEN EXPOSED, AND THEIR PUNISHMENT IS WELL KNOWN. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE LEARNED THAT SWITZERLAND IS PLANNING TO BUY WEAPONS AND PILOTLESS RECONNAISSANCE PLANES FROM THE ZIONIST STATE. WE WARN BERNE AGAINST MAKING SUCH A STEP AS IT WILL REMOVE FROM IT ITS NEUTRAL CHARACTER AND THREATEN ITS INTERESTS, ESTABLISHMENTS AND NATIONALS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAMIC AND WESTERN WORLD." "WE HAVE DELAYED RELEASING THIS STATEMENT UNTIL THE THREE WERE TAKEN OUTSIDE BEIRUT." END TEXT. ¶3. INDIVIDUAL TAKING CALL SAID IT WAS FROM THE "USUAL" MAN WHO CALLED, SPEAKING LEBANESE ACCENTED ARABIC, ABOUT 1900 ON MARCH 17. BARTHOLOMEW
SECRET: FURTHER ON HIZBALLAH “MANIFESTO”
O 191237Z FEB 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1805 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY UNCLAS BEIRUT 01013 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E.O. 12356: NA TAGS: PGOV PINT PTER LE IR SUBJECT: FURTHER ON HIZBALLAH "MANIFESTO" REF: BEIRUT 992 ¶1. AS REPORTED REFTEL, HIZBALLAH PUBLISHED ON FEBRUARY 16 FOR THE FIRST TIME IN LEBANON A POLITICAL "MANIFESTO." HIZBALLAH'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, AS CITED FROM THE MANIFESTO BY THE LOCAL FRENCH-LANGUAGE PRESS, FOLLOW. BEGIN TEXT. -- THE DEPARTURE OF THE ISRAELIS, PRELUDE TO THE ANNIHILATION OF ISRAEL AND THE LIBERATION OF THE HOLY CITY OF JERUSALEM. -- THE DEFINITIVE DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON OF THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND THEIR ALLIES AND THE END OF THE INFLUENCE OF ANY COLONIALIST STATE OVER THE COUNTRY. -- THE JUDGMENT OF PHALANGE PARTY MEMBERS FOR ALL THE CRIMES THEY HAVE COMMITTED AGAINST MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS, WITH THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL. -- THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL THE SONS OF OU PEOPLE, AND FREEDOM OF CHOICE OF THE POLITICAL REGIME WHICH THEY DESIRE. WE DO NOT HIDE, HOWEVER, OUR PREFERENCE FOR AN ISLAMIC REGIME AND CALL ON EVERYONE TO CHOOSE IT, BECAUSE IT ALONE GUARANTEES JUSTICE AND DIGNITY FOR ALL AND PREVENTS ANY ATTEMPTS AT NEOCOLONIALIST INFILTRATION INTO OUR COUNTRIES END TEXT. ¶2. ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL PRESS, THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES WERE CONTAINED IN A FIFTY-PAGE MANIFESTO ENTITLED "OPEN LETTER TO THE OPPRESSED OF LEBANON AND THE WORLD." THE MANIFESTO WAS PRESENTED BY SHEIKH HASSAN GHIBRISS, SPOKESMAN OF THE "HIZBALLAH NATION," TO A GATHERING OF ABOUT 1000 SUPPORTERS ON FEBRUARY 16 IN THE SOUTHERN BEIRUT SUBURB OF SHIYAH. ¶3. SEVERAL SHIITE AND SUNNI RELIGIOUS LEADERS REPORTEDLY ATTENDED THE GATHERING, MOST NOTABLY SHEIKHS SOBHI TUFAYLI HASSAN NASRALLAH, AND JALAL EDDIN ARKANDAN. HOWEVER, BOTH HIZBALLAH "SPIRITUAL GUIDE" SHEIKH FADLALLAH AND TAWHIID MOVEMENT LEADER SHEIKH SHA'BAN WERE ABSENT DUE TO THEIR CURRENT VISIT TO IRAN WHERE, ACCORDING TO LEBANESE TELEVISION, THEY WERE RECEIVED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI ON FEBRUARY 15. ¶4. WE WOULD ALSO DRAW ADDRESSEES' ATTENTION TO FBIS GF190720 AND GF190722 IN WHICH TEHRAN RADIO REPORTS A MEETING ON FEBRUARY 16 BETWEEN SHEIKH FADLALLAH AND GRAND AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI FOLLOWING WHICH THE TWO RELIGIOUS LEADERS CALLED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON. BARTHOLOMEW
TOP-SECRET: THE HIZBALLAH “MANIFESTO”
P 050846Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2022 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMCONSUL JERUSALEM UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 01351 E.O. 12356: NA TAGS: PINT PTER LE SUBJECT: HIZBALLAH "MANIFESTO" REF: BEIRUT 1013 FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN FEBRUARY 23 "MIDDLE EAST REPORTER." IT SUMMARIZES 48-PAGE HIZBALLAH TRACT ISSUED ON FEBRUARY 16 (REFTEL). EMBASSY HAS REQUIRED ORIGINAL ARABIC-LANGUAGE TEXT OF FULL MANIFIESTO, WHICH WE WILL POUCH TO INR AND NEA/ARN. BEGIN TEXT. "HIZBULLAH" DEFINES ITS MILITANT POLICY --------------------------------------- "HIZBULLAH" (PARTY OF GOD) HAS NOW PUBLICLY DEFINED ITS POLICY, GOALS AND IDEOLOGY. AS A GROUP OF FUNDAMENTALIST SHIITES, THEY ARE DEDICATED TO PROMOT ISLAM ON THE PATTERN OF KHOMEINI'S REVOLUTION IN IRAN. THEY DERIVE THEIR APPELATION FROM TWO KORANIC VERSES WHICH READ: (1) "AND WHO SO TAKETH ALLAH AND HIS MESSANGER AND THOSE WHO BELIEVE FOR FRIEND (WILL KNOW THAT), LO* THE PARTY OF ALLAH THEY ARE THE VICTORIOUS." (SURAH 5/56); (2) "THOU WILT NOT FIND FOLK WHO BELIEVE IN ALLAH AND HIS MESSENGER, EVEN THOUGH THEY BE THEIR FATHERS OR THEIR SONS OR THEIR BRETHREN OR THEIR CLAN. AS FOR SUCH, HE HATH WRITTEN FAITH UPON THEIR HEARTS AND HATH STRENGTHENED THEM WITH A SPIRIT FROM HIM, AND HE WILL BRING THEM INTO GARDENS UNDERNEATH WHICH RIVERS FLOW, WHEREIN THEY WILL ABIDE. ALLAH IS WELL PLEASED WITH THEM, AND THEY ARE WELL PLEASED WITH HIM. THEY ARE ALLAH'S PARTY, LO* IS IT NOT ALLAH'S PARTY WHO ARE THE SUCCESSFUL. (SURAH 58/22-23). ANNIVERSARY: MARKING THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIOLENT DEATH OF THE MOSLEM CLERIC SHEIKH RAGHEB HARB, THE IMAM OF THE VILLAGE OF JABSHIT IN SOUTH LEBANON, "HIZBULLAH" STAGED A MASS RALLY AT THE CHIYAH SUBURB SATURDAY, FEB. 16, 1985. SHEIKH HARB WAS A STAUNCH OPPONENT OF ISRAEL OCCUPATION, AND AN ADVOCATE OF "HIZBULLAH" AND THE RISE OF A PAN-ISLAMIC "NATION OF THE PARTY OF GOD." HE WAS ASSASSINATED REPORTEDLY BY ISRAEL'S AGENTS IN HIS NATIVE VILLAGE ON FEB. 16, 1984. THE ORGANIZATION SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE THE ACCUSATION THAT IT WAS A HAND OF TERRORISTS. IT UNDER- LINED ITS ALLEGIANCE TO "WELAYAT AL FAQIH" (RULE OF THE THEOLOGIAN) UNDER IRAN'S AYATULLAH RUHALLAH KHOMEINI. AMERICA, FRANCE, ISRAEL AND THE PHALANGE PARTY WERE DECLARED AS ITS PRIME ENEMIES. IT DESCRIBED THE PRESENT LEBANESE SYSTEM AS "DESPOTIC" AND RENOUNCED THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL. OPENING THE MEETING, SHEIKH GHABRIS SAID THAT "HIZBULLAH" WAS "MISLEADINGLY DESCRIBED AS A HANDFUL OF FANATICS BENT ON KILLING, PLUNDER AND ROBBERY;" AND THAT THEY WERE "BLAMED FOR EVERY UNPLEASANT INCIDENT." "BUT," HE EMPHASIZED, "IT WAS "HIZBULLAH" WHICH ACTIVATED THE (FREEDOM) FIGHTERS AND EXPELLED THE ENEMY." MANIFESTO: LATER SHEIKH IBRAHIM AL AMIN READ OUT AT THE RALLY A 48-PAGE "MESSAGE" DEDICATED TO THE "MARTYR SHEIKH RAGHEB HARB" WHICH WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A MANIFESTO OF THE PARTY. (SEE MER OF FEB. 19, PAGE '). THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME "HIZBULLAH" DEFINED ITS MILITANT POSITION AND IDEOLOGY SINCE IT MADE ITS IMPACT ON LEBANESE POLITICS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. THE MESSAGE IDENTIFIED THE MOSLEM FUNDAMENTALIST MEMBERS OF "HIZBALLAH" AS "THE CHILDREN OF THE NATION WHOSE VANGUARD IN IRAN WAS BESTOWED WITH VICTORY." "THIS VANGUARD," THE MESSAGE WENT ON, "HAS LAID THE FOUNDATION OF A PAN-ISLAMIC STATE UNDER THE WISE GUIDANCE OF THE FULLY QUALIFIED FAQIH AYATULLAH RUHALLAH KHOMEINI. "HIZBULLAH" MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT HAD NO CARD-CARRYING MEMBERS, "BUT IT IS LINKED TO ALL MOSLEMS IN THE WORLD BY THE STRONG IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL BOND OF ISLAM." EAST AND WEST: THE STATEMENT ATTACKED THE "HAUTY" POWERS OF THE EAST AND WEST ALIKE. IT SAID: "AMERICA HAS TRIED, THROUGH ITS LOCAL AGENTS, TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT THOSE WHO DESTROYED ITS ARROGANCE IN LEBANON AND FOILED ITS CONSPIRACIES WERE BUT A HANDFUL OF FANATIC TERRORISTS WHO HAVE NO MISSION BUT TO BLOW UP LIQUOR STORES, GAMBLING CASINOS AND AMUSEMENT MACHINES." THE STATEMENT POINTED OUT THAT SUCH PRACTICES WERE ONLY MARGINAL DEALING WITH THE TAIL INSTEAD OF THE HEAD. "WE ARE HEADED FOR DEALING WITH EVIL AT THE ROOTS, AND THE ROOTS ARE AMERICA," IT SAID, AND STRESSED THAT NOTHING WILL TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER FIGHTING THE U.S. "HIZBULLAH" BELIEVES THAT BOTH WESTERN CAPITALISM AND EASTERN COMMUNISM HAVE FAILED TO PROVIDE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MASSES. "THE ANSWER LIES IN THE MISSION OF ISLAM," IT SAID. DEMANDS: THE DECLARATION DEMANDED: 1. COMPLETE EVACUATION OF ISRAEL ARMY FROM LEBANON "AS A PRELUDE FOR THE REMOVAL OF ISRAEL FROM EXISTENCE AND LIBERATING JERUSALEM FROM CLAWS OF OCCUPATION." 2. "AMERICA, FRANCE AND THEIR ALLIES MUST LEAVE LEBANON ONCE AND FOR ALL, AND ANY IMPERIAL INFLUENCE IN THE COUNTRY MUST BE TERMINATED." ¶3. "THE PHALANGISTS MUST BE SUBJECTED TO JUSTICE AND BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL FOR ALL THE CRIMES THEY HAVE COMMITTED AGAINST THE MOSLEMS AND THE CHRISTIANS WITH ENCOURAGEMENT FROM AMERICAN AND ISRAEL." 4. "ALL OUR LEBANESE PEOPLE MUST BE GIVEN THE CHANCE OF DETERMINING THEIR FUTURE AND CHOOSES THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THEY WANT, BEARING IN MIND THAT WE WILL NOT GIVE UP OUR COMMITMENT TO THE RULE OF ISLAM." POLITICAL "MARONISM": THE POLICY OF THE LEADERS OF "POLITICAL MARONISM" AS IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE "LEBANESE FRONT" AND THE "LEBANESE FORCES" MILITIA CAN NEVER ACHIEVE PEACE OR STABILITY FOR THE CHRISTIANS, SAID "HIZBULLAH". "IT IS A POLICY BASED ON FANATICISM, SECTARIAN PRIVILEGES AND ALLIANCE WITH IMPERIALISM AND ISRAEL," IT ADDED. UNIFIL: THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE (UNIFIL) OPERATING IN SOUTH LEBANON, IS ACCUSED BY "HIZBULLAH" OF STANDING AS A "BUFFER" IMPEDING THEIR RESISTANCE AND "MAINTAINING ISRAELI'S SECURITY AND INVADING FORCES." "HIZBULLAH" DOES NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHOWDOWN WITH UNIFIL "IF IT CONTINUED TO CONNIVE WITH THE ENEMY." OTHER ARAB STATES "ANXIOUSLY SEEKING PEACE WITH ISRAEL" ALSO CAME UNDER FIRE FROM "HIZBULLAH". THEY WERE URGED INSTEAD TO CLOSE THEIR RANKS, DEFINE THEIR AIMS PRECISELY AND BREAK THE FETTERS RESTRICTING THEIR WILL. MARCH: ARMED MEMBERS OF "HIZBULLAH WERE REPORTED TO HAVE MARCHED INTO SIDON MONDAY, FEB. 18, AND TORE LEBANESE FLAGS AND PICTURES OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. (SEE MER OF FEB. 19, PAGE 2). THEY SMASHED A NUMBER OF STORES AND SUPER MARKETS SELLING LIQUOR, AND RAISED IRANIAN FLAGS AND PORTRAITS OF THE IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADER AYATULLAH KHOMEINI. THE ACTION WAS SEEN AS A BACKLASH TO THE VISIT TO THE CITY THE DAY BEFORE BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL JEERED BY THE ARMED DEM- ONSTRATORS "THE SHAH OF LEBANON". THE GEMAYELS: IN ITS STATEMENT, "HIZBULLAH" LASHED OUT AGAINST PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL AND HIS BROTHER THE LATE BASHIR. IT SAID: "THE BUTCHER BASHIR HAD REACHED THE PRESIDENCY WITH THE HELP OF ISRAEL, THE ARAB OIL PRINCES AND SYCOPHANT MOSLEM MPS FLATTERING THE PHALANGISTS." "THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY AN ATTEMPT TO RECTIFY HIS REPUGNANT IMAGE BY AN EXERCISE CALLED THE "SALVATION COMMITTEE," WHICH WAS BUT AN AMERICAN-ISRAELI BRIDGE USED BY THE PHALANGISTS TO ACHIEVE CONTROL OVER THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE. HOWEVER, OUR PEOPLE COULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH HUMILIATION. THEY DASHED THE DREAMS OF THE ZIONISTS AND THEIR ALLIES. AMERICA NEVERTHELESS, PERSISTED IN ITS FOLLIES AND BROUGHT (PRESIDENT) AMIN GEMAYEL TO SUCCEED HIS BROTHER. THE FIRST THING HE DID WAS TO DESTROY THE HOUSES OF THE DISPLACED PEOPLE FROM THE SOUTH, DEFILE THE ISLAMIC MOSQUES, ORDER THE ARMY TO BOMBARD THE DOWN-TRODDAN SUBURB AND DESTRUCT THE HOUSES ON THEIR OCCUPANTS, AND TO CALL IN NATO FORCES TO HELP HIM AGAINST US, CONCLUDE THE NOTORIOUS 17 MAY ACCORD WITH ISRAEL WHICH WOULD HAVE TRANSFORMED LEBANON INTO AN ISRAELI PROTECTORATE OR AN AMERICAN COLONY." U.S. AND NATO: "HIZBULLAH" DECLARED "CLEARLY AND FRANKLY" THAT "WE FEAR NO ONE BUT GOD, AND WE CANNOT TOLERATE INJUSTICE, AGGRESSION AND HUMILIATION." IT WENT ON TO ANNOUNCE: "THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO PARTNERS AND THE ZIONIST STATE WHICH HAS USURPED THE HOLY ISLAM LAND OF PALESTINE, HAVE EXERCISED, AND ARE STILL EXERCISING AGGRESSION ON US WITH A VIEW TO HUMILIATING US. WE, THEREFORE, ARE ALWAYS ON THE ALERT AND CONSTANTLY GIRDING OURSELVES TO REPEL THE AGGRESSION AND DEFEND OUR RELIGION, EXISTENCE AND DIGNITY." END TEXT. LYNE
CONFIDENTIAL: HIZBALLAH CALLS FOR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IN LEBANON
P 181159Z FEB 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1795 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV UNCLAS BEIRUT 00992 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PINT PTER LE SUBJECT: HIZBALLAH CALLS FOR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IN LEBANON ¶1. IN A STATEMENT PUBLISHED IN BEIRUT NEWSPAPERS ON FEBRUARY 18, HIZBALLAH DECLARED ITS ALLEGIANCE TO AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND PLEDGED TO ESTABLISH "REVOLUTION- ARY ISLAMIC RULE" IN LEBANON. STATEMENT DENIED THAT HIZBALLAH WOULD ESTABLISH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST RULE BY FORCE, BUT "WE DO NOT HIDE OUR COMMITMENT TO ISLAMIC RULE, AND WE CALL ON ALL PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THIS REGIME. WE WILL FIGHT ABSOLUTISM TO ITS ROOTS." ¶2. STATEMENT IS REPORTED BY LOCAL PRESS TO BE HIZBALLAH'S FIRST PUBLIC MANIFESTO. BARTHOLOMEW
TOP SECRET CIA ‘OFFICIAL HISTORY’ OF THE BAY OF PIGS: REVELATIONS
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Washington, D.C., August 24, 2011 – In the heat of the battle at the Bay of Pigs, the lead CIA field operative aboard one of the transport boats fired 75mm recoilless rifles and .50-caliber machine guns on aircraft his own agency had supplied to the exile invasion force, striking some of them. With the CIA-provided B-26 aircraft configured to match those in the Cuban air force, “we couldn’t tell them from the Castro planes,” according to the operative, Grayston Lynch. “We ended up shooting at two or three of them. We hit some of them there because when they came at us…it was a silhouette, that was all you could see.”
This episode of ‘friendly fire’ is one of many revelations contained in the Top Secret multi-volume, internal CIA report, “The Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation.” Pursuant to a Freedom of Information lawsuit (FOIA) filed by the National Security Archive on the 50th anniversary of the invasion last April, the CIA has now declassified four volumes of the massive, detailed, study–over 1200 pages of comprehensive narrative and documentary appendices.
Archive Cuba specialist Peter Kornbluh, who filed the lawsuit, hailed the release as “a major advance in obtaining the fullest possible record of the most infamous debacle in the history of the CIA’s covert operations.” The Bay of Pigs, he noted, “remains fundamentally relevant to the history of the CIA, of U.S. foreign policy, and of U.S. intervention in Cuba and Latin America. It is a clandestine history that must be understood in all its inglorious detail.”
In an article published today in the “Daily Beast,” Kornbluh described the ongoing “FOIA wars” with the CIA to obtain the declassification of historical documents the CIA continues to keep secret. He characterized the process of pressing the CIA to release the Official History and other historically significant documents as “the bureaucratic equivalent of passing a kidney stone.”
The “Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations” was written between 1974 and 1984 by Jack Pfeiffer, a member of the Agency’s staff who rose to become the CIA’s Chief Historian. After he retired in the mid 1980s, Pfeiffer attempted to obtain the declassification of Volumes 4 and 5 of his study, which contained his lengthy and harsh critiques of two previous official investigations of the Bay of Pigs: the report of the Presidential Commission led by Gen. Maxwell Taylor; and the CIA’s own Inspector General’s report written in the aftermath of the failed assault. Both the Taylor Commission and the IG report held the CIA primarily responsible for the failure of the invasion—a position Pfeiffer rejected. The CIA released only the Taylor critique, but Pfeiffer never circulated it.
According to Kornbluh, Pfeiffer saw as his mission to spread the blame for the debacle of “JMATE”—the codename for the operation—beyond the CIA headquarters at Langley, VA. Kornbluh characterized the study as “not only the official history, but the official defense of the CIA’s legacy that was so badly damaged on the shores of Cuba;” and he predicted its declassification “would revive the ‘who-lost-Cuba’ blame game” that has accompanied the historical debate over the failed invasion for fifty years.
The Archive is posting all four volumes today. They are described below:
Volume 1: Air Operations, March 1960 to April 1961 (Part 1| Part 2 | Part 3)
The opening volume examines the critical component of the invasion—the CIA-created air force, the preliminary airstrikes, and the air battle over Cuba during the three day attack. The study forcefully addresses the central “who-lost-Cuba” debate that broke out in the aftermath of the failed invasion. It absolves the CIA of blame, and places it on the Kennedy White House and other agencies for decisions relating to the preliminary airstrikes and overt air cover that, according to the Official History, critically compromised the success of the operation. “[I]in its attempts to meet its official obligations in support of the official, authorized policy of the U.S. government—to bring about the ouster of Fidel Castro—the agency was not well served by the Kennedy White House, Secretary of State Rusk, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the U.S. Navy,” the CIA historian concludes. “The changes, modifications, distortions, and lack of firm, positive guidance related to air operations—the key to the success or failure of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Castro—make clear that the collapse of the beachhead at Playa Giron was a shared responsibility. When President Kennedy [during his post-invasion press conference] proclaimed his sole responsibility for the operation there was more truth to his statement than he really believed or than his apologists will accept.”
Besides the ‘friendly fire” episode, Volume 1 contains a number of colorful revelations. Among them:
- Only days before the invasion, the CIA tried to entice Cuba’s top diplomat, foreign minister Raul Roa, to defect. “Our contact with Raul Roa reports that this defection attempt is still alive although Roa would make no firm commitment or promise on whether he would defect in the U.N.,” operations manager, Jacob Esterline, noted in a secret April 11, 1961 progress report on invasion planning. “Roa has requested that no further contact be made at this time.” Like the invasion itself, the Agency’s effort for a dramatic propaganda victory over Cuba was unsuccessful. “The planned defection did not come off,” concedes the Official History.
- In coordination with the preliminary airstrike on April 14, the CIA, with the support of the Pentagon, requested permission for a series of “large-scale sonic booms” over Havana—a psychological operations tactic the Agency had successfully employed in the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. “We were trying to create confusion, and so on,” a top-level CIA invasion planner stated. “I thought a sonic boom would be a helluva swell thing, you know. Break all the windows in downtown Havana…distract Castro.” Trying to maintain “plausible denial” of Washington’s role, the State Department rejected the request as “too obviously U.S.” The Official History records General Curtis Lemay demanding on the telephone to know “who was the sonofabitch who didn’t approve” the request.
- Several damaged invasion airplanes made emergency landings on the Grand Cayman Islands, and were seized by local authorities. The situation created an awkward diplomatic situation with Great Britain; details of the negotiations between the U.S. and England are redacted but the CIA did suggest making the argument that if the planes were not released, Castro would think the Caymans were being used as a launch site for the invasion and respond aggressively.
- As Castro’s forces gained the upper hand against the invasion, Agency planners reversed a decision against widespread use of napalm bombs “in favor of anything that might reverse the situation in Cuba in favor of the Brigade forces.”
- Although the CIA had been admonished by both the Eisenhower and Kennedy White House to make sure that the U.S. hand did not show in the invasion, during the fighting headquarters authorized American pilots to fly planes over Cuba. Secret instructions quoted in the Official History state that Americans could pilot planes but only over the beachhead and not inland. “American crews must not fall into hands enemy,” warned the instructions. If they did “[the] U.S. will deny any knowledge.” Four American pilots and crew died when their planes were shot down over Cuba. The Official History contains private correspondence with family members of some of the pilots.
Volume II: “Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy” (Part 1 | Part 2)
Volume 2 provides new details on the negotiations and tensions with other countries which the CIA needed to provide logistical and infrastructure support for the invasion preparations. The volume describes Kennedy Administration efforts to sustain the cooperation of Guatemala, where the main CIA-led exile brigade force was trained, as well as the deals made with Gen. Anastacio Somoza and his brother Luis, then the President of Nicaragua. The Official History points out that CIA personnel simply took over diplomatic functions from the State Department in both countries. “In the instance of Guatemala, the U.S. Ambassador for all practical purposes became ‘inoperative’; and in Nicaragua the opposite condition prevailed—anything that the Agency suggested received ambassadorial blessing.” Among the revelations:
- While attending John F. Kennedy’s inauguration in Washington in January 1961, General Anastacio Somoza met secretly with CIA director Allen Dulles to discuss the creation of JMTIDE, the cryptonym for the airbase the CIA wanted to use in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua to launch the attack on Cuba. Somoza explicitly raised Nicaragua’s need for two development loans totaling $10 million. The CIA subsequently pressed the State Department to support the loans, one of which was from the World Bank.
- President Luis Somoza demanded assurances that the U.S. would stand behind Nicaragua once it became known that the Somozas had supported the invasion. Somoza told the CIA representative that “there are some long-haired Department of State liberals who are not in favor of Somoza and they would welcome this as a source of embarrassment for his government.”
- Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes repeatedly told CIA officials that he wanted to “see Guatemalan Army and Air Force personnel participate in the air operations against Castro’s Cuba.”
- The dictator of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo, offered his country’s territory in support of the invasion. His quid pro quo was a U.S. assurance to let Trujillo “live out the rest of his days in peace.” The State Department rejected the offer; Trujillo, whose repression and corruption was radicalizing the left in the Dominican Republic, was later assassinated by CIA-backed groups.
Volume III: “Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies, 1951- January 1961”
This volume provides the most detailed available account of the decision making process in the White House, CIA and State Department during the Eisenhower administration that led to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The CIA previously declassified this 300-page report in 1998, pursuant to the Kennedy Assassination Records Act; but it was not made public until 2005 when Villanova professor of political science David Barrett found it in an obscure file at the National Archives, and first posted it on his university’s website.
This volume contains significant new information, and a number of major revelations, particularly regarding Vice-President Richard Nixon’s role and the CIA’s own expectations for the invasion, and on CIA assassination attempts against Fidel Castro.
- A small group of high-level CIA officials sought to use part of the budget of the invasion to finance a collaboration with the Mafia to assassinate Castro. In an interview with the CIA historian, former chief of the invasion task force, Jacob Esterline, said that he had been asked to provide money from the invasion budget by J.C. King, the head of the Western Hemisphere. “Esterline claimed that on one occasion as chief/w4, he refused to grant Col J.C. King, chief WH Division, a blank check when King refused to tell Jake the purpose for which the check was intended. Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN number from the Office of Finance and that the money was used to pay the Mafia-types.” The Official History also notes that invasion planners discussed pursuing “Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination”—although few details were provided. In November 1960, Edward Lansdale, a counterinsurgency specialist in the U.S. military who later conceived of Operation Mongoose, sent the invasion task force a “MUST GO LIST” of 11 top Cuban officials, including Che Guevera, Raul Castro, Blas Roca and Carlos Raphael Rodriguez.
- Vice-President Nixon, who portrayed himself in his memoirs as one of the original architects of the plan to overthrow Castro, proposed to the CIA that they support “goon squads and other direct action groups” inside and outside of Cuba. The Vice President repeatedly sought to interfere in the invasion planning. Through his national security aide, Nixon demanded that William Pawley, “a big fat political cat,” as Nixon’s aide described him to the CIA, be given briefings and access to CIA officers to share ideas. Pawley pushed the CIA to support untrustworthy exiles as part of the effort to overthrow Castro. “Security already has been damaged severely,” the head of the invasion planning reported, about the communications made with one, Rubio Padilla, one of Pawley’s favorite militants.
- In perhaps the most important revelation of the entire official history, the CIA task force in charge of the paramilitary assault did not believe it could succeed without becoming an open invasion supported by the U.S. military. On page 149 of Volume III, Pfeiffer quotes still-secret minutes of the Task Force meeting held on November 15, 1960, to prepare a briefing for the new President-elect, John F. Kennedy: “Our original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted,” the document states. “Our second concept (1,500-3000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.”
This candid assessment was not shared with the President-elect then, nor later after the inauguration. As Pfeiffer points out, “what was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 became the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs Operation in March 1961”—run only by the CIA, and with a force of 1,200 men.
Volume IV: The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs
This volume, which Pfeiffer wrote in an “unclassified” form with the intention of publishing it after he left the CIA, represents his forceful rebuttal to the findings of the Presidential Commission that Kennedy appointed after the failed invasion, headed by General Maxwell Taylor. In the introduction to the 300 pages volume, Pfeiffer noted that the CIA had been given a historical “bum rap” for “a political decision that insured the military defeat of the anti-Castro forces”—a reference to President Kennedy’s decision not to provide overt air cover and invade Cuba after Castro’s forces overwhelmed the CIA-trained exile Brigade. The Taylor Commission, which included Attorney General Robert Kennedy, he implied, was biased to defend the President at the expense of the CIA. General Taylor’s “strongest tilts were toward deflecting criticism of the White House,” according to the CIA historian.
According to Pfeiffer, this volume would present “the first and only detailed examination of the work of, and findings of, the Taylor Commission to be based on the complete record.” His objective was to offer “a better understanding of where the responsibility for the fiasco truly lies.” To make sure the reader fully understood his point, Pfeiffer ended the study with an “epilogue” consisting of a one paragraph quote from an interview that Raul Castro gave to a Mexican journalist in 1975. “Kennedy vacillated,” Castro stated. “If at that moment he had decided to invade us, he could have suffocated the island in a sea of blood, but he would have destroyed the revolution. Lucky for us, he vacillated.”
After leaving the CIA in the mid 1980s, Pfeiffer filed a freedom of information act suit to obtain the declassification of this volume, and volume V, of his study, which he intended to publish as a book, defending the CIA. The CIA did eventually declassify volume IV, but withheld volume V in its entirety. Pfeiffer never published the book and this volume never really circulated publicly.
Volume V: The Internal Investigation Report [Still Classified]
Like his forceful critique of the Taylor Commission, Pfeiffer also wrote a critique of the CIA’s own Inspector General’s report on the Bay of Pigs—“Inspector General’s Survey of Cuban Operation”–written by a top CIA officer, Lyman Kirkpatrick in 1961. Much to the surprise and chagrin of top CIA officers at the time, Kirkpatrick laid the blame for the failure squarely at the feet of his own agency, and particularly the chief architect of the operation, Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell. The operation was characterized by “bad planning,” “poor” staffing, faulty intelligence and assumptions, and “a failure to advise the President that success had become dubious.” Moreover, “plausible denial was a pathetic illusion,” the report concluded. “The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.” In his cover letter to the new CIA director, John McCone, Kirkpatrick identified what he called “a tendency in the Agency to gloss over CIA inadequacies and to attempt to fix all of the blame for the failure of the invasion upon other elements of the Government, rather than to recognize the Agency’s weaknesses.”
Pfeiffer’s final volume contains a forceful rebuttal of Kirkpatrick’s focus on the CIA’s own culpability for the events at the Bay of Pigs. Like the rest of the Official History, the CIA historian defends the CIA against criticism from its own Inspector General and seeks to spread the “Who Lost Cuba” blame to other agencies and authorities of the U.S. government, most notably the Kennedy White House.
When Pfeiffer first sought to obtain declassification of his critique, the Kirkpatrick report was still secret. The CIA was able to convince a judge that national security would be compromised by the declassification of Pfeiffer’s critique which called attention to this extremely sensitive Top Secret report. But in 1998, Peter Kornbluh and the National Security Archive used the FOIA to force the CIA to declassify the Inspector General’s report. (Kornbluh subsequently published it as a book: Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.) Since the Kirkpatrick report has been declassified for over 13 years, it is unclear why the CIA continues to refuse to declassify a single word of Pfeiffer’s final volume.
The National Security Archive remains committed to using all means of legal persuasion to obtain the complete declassification of the final volume of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation.
TOP-SECRET FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVES: Did NATO Win the Cold War?
Documentary supplement to the article “Did NATO Win the Cold War? Looking over the Wall,” by Vojtech Mastny, Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3 (May-June 1999): 176-89
April 23, 1999
This documentary supplement to the article, “Did NATO Win the Cold War? Looking over the Wall,” has been prepared on the occasion of the Washington summit marking the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is intended to provide the reader with the most important sources referred to in the text of the article that are relevant to the view of NATO “from the other side.”
Some of the sources have been obtained as a result of the project on the “Parallel History of the Cold War Alliances,” conducted by the National Security Archive in cooperation with the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. More information about the project can be found on the websites of the two institutions.
Other sources were made available through the National Security Archive’s partner organization, the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, and have been published in its Bulletin. More information about the Project can be found on its website.
The documents refer to the text of the article according to the numbers that appear on its margins. They are published in full or in part, as indicated, and are preceded by brief introductions explaining their origins. In some cases, reproductions of the original documents are included as samples.
Catherine Nielsen and John Martinez, both of the National Security Archive, assisted in the preparation of the texts for online publication.
Vojtech Mastny
George F. Kennan, the architect of America’s policy of containment and a frequent critic of its execution, was U.S. ambassador to Moscow in one of the darkest years of the Cold War, 1952. On September 8, 1952, shortly before he was expelled from the Soviet Union as a persona non grata, he sent a dispatch to Washington in which he tried to assess NATO from the Soviet point of view. In retrospect, he regarded this assessment so important that he included it as the only appendix to his volume of memoirs published in 1971. While some of Kennan’s conclusions may not have withstood the test of time, his warning against being “fascinated and enmeshed by the relentless and deceptive logic of the military equation” remained topical throughout the Cold War.
[George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1950-1963 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, pp. 327-51]
Document 2.
A confidential information bulletin provided by Soviet intelligence to top eastern European party leaders has been preserved in the files of the Czechoslovak communist party central committee in Prague. As shown on the sample, the reports sometimes quoted verbatim statements made by high Western officials at top secret meetings.
The bulletin included the following passage referring to the alleged American disclosure at a secret NATO meeting in December 1950:
“In connection with their failures in Korea the Americans apparently intend to provoke in the summer of 1951 a military conflict in eastern Europe with the goal of seizing the eastern zone of Austria. To realize this goal, the Americans intend to utilize Yugoslavia.”
[“O deiatelnosti organov Severo-atlanticheskogo Soiuza v sviazi s sozdaniem atlanticheskoi armii i remilitarizatsiei zapadnoi Germanii,” February 1951, 92/1093, 100/24, Central State Archives, Prague; translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, National Security Archive]
Document 3.
Karel Kaplan, an official researcher who had enjoyed unlimited access to the Czechoslovak communist party archives prior to his defection to the West, learned about a meeting with Stalin on January 9-12, 1951, from one of its participants, the country’s minister of defense Alexej Cepicka. In 1978, Kaplan created a stir by publishing his findings, suggesting that Stalin had told his eastern European followers to prepare for an offensive war against Western Europe: “After a report by representatives of the bloc about the condition of their respective armies, Stalin took the floor to elaborate on the idea of the military occupation of the whole of Wurope, insisting on the necessity of preparing it very well.
Since the Korean War had demonstrated the military weakness of the United States, despite its use of highly advanced technology, it seemed appropriate to Stalin to take advantage of this in Europe. He developed arguments in support of the following thesis: `No European army is in a position to seriously oppose the Soviet army and it can even be anticipated that there will be no resistance at all. The current military power of the United States is not very great. For the time being, the Soviet camp therefore enjoys a distinct superiority. But this is merely temporary, for some three or four years. Afterward, the United States will have at its disposal means for transporting reinforcements to Europe and will also be able to take advantage of its atomic superiority. Consequently, it will be necessary to make use of this brief interval to systematically prepare our armies by mobilizing all our economic, political, and human resources. During the forthcoming three or four years, all of our domestic and international policies will be subordinated to this goal. Only the total mobilization of our resources will allow us to grasp this unique opportunity to extend socialism throughout the whole of Europe.'”
[Karel Kaplan, Dans les Archives du comité central: Trente ans de secrets du bloc soviétique, Paris: Michel, 1978, pp. 165-66; translated by Vojtech Mastny]
Another record of the Moscow meeting, written shortly afterward by its Romanian participant, Minister of the Armed Forces Emil Bodnaras, has been preserved in Bucharest and was published there in 1995. According to this document, Stalin urged a buildup of the eastern European armies to deter an American attack rather than to prepare them for an attack on western Europe. But his insistence on exploiting what he regarded as current American weakness to achieve combat readiness within three years could be interpreted as a call for offensive action at the right time. The three-year framework he mentioned corresponded to the period of “maximum danger” that also underlay NATO’s contemporary plans for the development of its armed forces –another indication that those secret plans were no secret to Stalin.
[C. Cristescu, “Ianuarie 1951: Stalin decide înarmarea Romanei,” Magazin Istoric, 1995, no. 10, pp. 15-23; translated by Vladimir Socor]
Document 4.
This description of presumed Soviet military capabilities is from one of the annual estimates compiled by NATO from 1950 onward and is preserved in its archives in Brussels.
The excerpt from the record of the 99th meeting of NATO’s Military Representatives Committee shows some of the doubts that spread by 1955 about the accuracy of the alliance’s estimates of Soviet capabilities:
The conclusive answer to the question of who started the Korean War and why could finally be given in 1995, following the release of the Soviet documents proving Kim Il Sung’s initiative and Stalin’s indispensable support. Some of the relevant documents were given by Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin to South Korean President Kim Young-Sam during his state visit to Moscow, others were subsequently made available from Russian archives. They were translated into English and published with commentaries for the first time by American historian Kathryn Weathersby in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 5 and 6-7.
TOP-SECRET: CIA Declassifies Oldest Documents in U.S. Government Collection
The Central Intelligence Agency today declassified the United States Government’s six oldest classified documents, dating from 1917 and 1918. These documents, which describe secret writing techniques and are housed at the National Archives, are believed to be the only remaining classified documents from the World War I era. Documents describing secret writing fall under the CIA’s purview to declassify.
“These documents remained classified for nearly a century until recent advancements in technology made it possible to release them,” CIA Director Leon E. Panetta said. “When historical information is no longer sensitive, we take seriously our responsibility to share it with the American people.”
One document outlines the chemicals and techniques necessary for developing certain types of secret writing ink and a method for opening sealed letters without detection. Another memorandum dated June 14, 1918 – written in French – reveals the formula used for German secret ink.
“The CIA recognizes the importance of opening these historical documents to the public,” said Joseph Lambert, the Agency’s Director of Information Management Services. “In fiscal year 2010 alone, the Agency declassified and released over 1.1 million pages of documents.”
The documents will be available on CIA.gov and in the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. CREST currently houses over 10 million pages of declassified Agency documents. Since 1995, the Agency has released over 30 million pages as a result of Executive Orders, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Privacy Act, and mandatory declassification reviews.
SECRET: PEACE COMMISSIONER TELLS AMBASSADOR ABOUT PENDING PROBLEMS WITH DEMOBILIZED PARAMILITARIES
VZCZCXYZ0014 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHBO #4988/01 1561613 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 051613Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5636 INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6861 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7791 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN LIMA 3853 RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9207 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4491 RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3588 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004988 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2015 TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER TELLS AMBASSADOR ABOUT PENDING PROBLEMS WITH DEMOBILIZED PARAMILITARIES Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) ------- SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo said in a May 26 meeting with Ambassador Wood that he expects dissident factions of the paramilitary groups to demobilize soon. The GOC expects to confront the few remaining paramilitary groups who refused to lay down their arms. Restrepo said the GOC is concerned about the emergence of a new generation of criminal organizations, and called on the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) to begin Justice and Peace legal processing as soon possible. End summary. --------------------------------- LAST TWO DEMOBILIZATIONS EXPECTED --------------------------------- ¶2. (C) Restrepo noted that the last two groups to demobilize are the final faction of the Elmer Cardenas Bloc and the Cacique Pipinta. The Constitutional Court's press release on the Justice and Peace (J&P) Law on May 18, however, had persuaded them to postpone their demobilization until after the presidential election. This 800-strong faction of the Elmer Cardenas Bloc, which was a dissident AUC bloc in Choco and Antioquia departments, is led by one of the founders of the AUC and a loyal friend of former AUC leader Carlos Castano, AKA "El Aleman."Restrepo explained that the reason behind the delay in demobilizing is that the GOC has not been able to supply the necessary security in this crucial corridor that leads to Panama. The fear by the locals is that the FARC, which is currently located in the south of Choco Department, would take over once the bloc demobilizes. ¶3. (C) The CaciquiPipinta Bloc, which is a dissident faction of the Central Bolivar Bloc, is made up of some 300 men that operate in the north of Caldas Department. Even though this group is linked with AUC political leader Ernesto Baez, Restrepo explained that it really does not belong to anyone, and the group members do not accept orders from Baez. The faction's leaders have told Restrepo they have not wanted to associate themselves with Baez and other more recognized AUC leaders like "Macaco" because they did not want to link themselves with narcotrafficking. Restrepo noted that this group is mainly known to be involved in extortion. --------------------------------------------- -------- REMAINING AND RE-EMERGING GROUPS, A MAJOR GOC CONCERN --------------------------------------------- -------- ¶4. (C) Restrepo warned that the GOC was not going to accept the demobilizations of any additional groups besides Elmer Cardenas and Cacique Pipinta.Restrepo had already instructed the Operational Community for Laying Down Arms (CODA), which certifies the demobilization of the individual deserters, not to accept anymore AUC members. He thought it was important that the GOC demonstrate its willingness to confront these groups. ¶5. (C) One group that has chosen not to demobilize, the Martin Llanos Bloc, located in Casanare Department, has been in inconclusive talks with the GOC for sometime now. Restrepo described his talks with this group among the most difficult and complicated. Restrepo said he gets the "chills" every time he talks to them. Their philosophy is very similar to the FARC; they want the GOC to offer them territory to control. According to Colombian intelligence reports, some factions of this bloc are being regrouped into new criminal organizations led by Hector Buitrago, who is the father of Martin Llanos. ¶6. (C) Restrepo explained that the GOC is calling this phenomenon the "new emerging anti-communist criminal groups," of which there are between 10 to 30 (reftel). One of the most prominent is the New Generation Group (ONG) located in the Pacific Coast of Narino Department and led by former paramilitary leader "Varela," who has been associated with the North Valle drug cartel. Other groups that are becoming well-known around the country are the "Aguilas" (Eagles) and "Halcones" (Falcons). ¶7. (C) In a conversation Restrepo had with former AUC founder Carlos Castano in 2003, Castano warned he was fearful of the possibility of new groups forming whose membership included former members of the mafia, AUC, and FARC. This combination would be very dangerous and hard to detect since they would have the know-how and experience of the three groups and they would operate in small groups of 8 to 10 men. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador related his most recent trip to Tumaco on the Pacific Coast and how concerned he was with the vulnerability of this region where problems of overpopulation, poverty, drugs, lack of infrastructure, and ELN and FARC pressure converged. In conversations with locals, he heard of the growing presence of the ELN and their gradual involvement in the drug trade. ELN fronts in Narino appear to be independent from the ELN's Central Command (COCE). --------------------------------------------- ---- JUSTICE AND PEACE LISTS ON HOLD: FISCALIA FEARFUL --------------------------------------------- ---- ¶9. (C) Restrepo warned the Fiscalia must start processing those on the Justice and Peace list soon to avoid the risk of "a return to the mountains". Restrepo expressed frustration with the Ministry of Interior and Justice (MoIJ) and the Fiscalia for sitting on the lists that he turned in over a month ago. He said it took him three months to convince over 2,284 paramilitaries to sign up for J&P and now this effort might be in vain. Of the 2,284, only 200 to 250 had open cases, which meant that over 2,000 were willing to testify to things the State was not aware of or did not have sufficient information about. Moreover, there were 2,400 individuals in prisons who have included their names on the lists. This was a historic opportunity that could go to waste if the Fiscalia did not act quickly. According to Restrepo, the Fiscalia should at least focus on the 200 paramilitary leaders who have open cases. ¶10. (C) Restrepo understood that the Fiscalia has been unable to process all these cases at once, but should try to focus its resources on this endeavor. Instead, between the MoIJ and the Fiscalia, they have been sending messages back and forth to his office, in his view, to obstruct movement on the lists. Restrepo noted that his relationship with Minister of Interior and Justice SabasPretelt was worsening. Pretelt was constantly meeting with paramilitary leaders and "speaking badly about him behind his back." Restrepo said Pretelt and Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran are fearful of what is to come: Pretelt, because he will have a hard time fulfilling the behind-the-scenes promises he made to these individuals, and Iguaran, because he is primarily responsible for the success of this process. Restrepo criticized Pretelt for having a poor understanding of the reality of the former combatants. For example, in a Cabinet meeting, Pretelt reported that over 70 percent of demobilized paramilitaries are currently employed and the true figure is close to 7 percent. (In a May 29 meeting with the Ambassador, Pretelt said 11,675 former paramilitaries are employed in one form or another, or about 35 percent of the total.) -------------------------------------- ARMS BEING TURNED OVER TO THE FISCALIA -------------------------------------- ¶11. (C) Restrepo told the Ambassador the GOC was in the process of handing over to the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) 128 tons of arms turned in by the demobilized paramilitaries. The GOC would like to consolidate these arms in one location as soon as possible since they are located in 23 different cites around the country. The GOC's Antiterrorist Analysis Interinstitutional Group (GIAT)--responsible for registering the trafficking of weapons--has already recorded and identified the origin of the arms (septel). The Fiscalia is supposed to use GIAT records in its investigations and help determine which are to be deposited or destroyed. Restrepo said, for security reasons, all explosive material that was turned over by the demobilized blocs had already been destroyed. Anecdotally, Restrepo commented that in just one of the demobilizations, 1,500 grenades were handed over in a truck as if they had been potatoes. ------------------------------ AMBASSADOR WILL VOICE CONCERNS ------------------------------ ¶12. (C) The Ambassador said the GOC needs to do a better job at monitoring the demobilized paramilitaries and cracking down on these newly formed criminal groups (septel). This process cannot be voluntary; the State needs to go after those unwilling to cooperate. If there are insufficient resources, the GOC needs to refocus its efforts. The USG has authorized aid to the GOC, but the monies cannot be delivered if the GOC does not show strong commitment to the process. WOOD
SECRET: ITALY: PM BERLUSCONI IN BROAD AGREEMENT
VZCZCXRO4386 PP RUEHFL RUEHNP DE RUEHRO #0726 1611152 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 091152Z JUN 08 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0438 INFO RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 3074 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 9416 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 3223 S E C R E T ROME 000726 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2023 TAGS: PREL NATO ETRD IT SUBJECT: ITALY: PM BERLUSCONI IN BROAD AGREEMENT ON KEY FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) a... E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2023 TAGS: PREL NATO ETRD IT ¶1. (C/NF) The Ambassador met June 6 with PM Silvio Berlusconi and U/S Gianni Letta to frame issues President Bush may discuss with Berlusconi during their June 12 bilateral meeting in Rome. Berlusconi said he saw no problematic issues in the U.S.-Italian relationship. In office for less than one month, Berlusconi indicated his government's thinking on several matters was still evolving. ¶2. (C/NF) The Ambassador said the President may discuss lifting caveats in Afghanistan, increasing pressure on Iran, Italian energy security, and Lebanon. Independently, Berlusconi raised GMOs, which he described as "the only way to feed the world," noting that the current situation had reinforced his support for GMOs. ¶3. (S/NF) Afghanistan: The Ambassador thanked Berlusconi for Italy's commitments in Afghanistan and urged Berlusconi to lift caveats, especially geographic ones limiting freedom of movement. The Ambassador noted these prevented Italian Carabinieri from providing on-site training and mentoring to Afghan police. Letta said the GOI was committed to increasing operational flexibility for Italian soldiers deployed to Afghanistan and was working on how it would do that. The Ambassador also told Berlusconi that we continue to receive disturbing reports of Italians paying-off local warlords and other combatants. Berlusconi agreed this should stop. ¶4. (C/NF) Iran: The Ambassador complimented Berlusconi for the recent tough tone his government has taken on Iran and said the President would want to discuss how to increase pressure on the Iranian regime. Berlusconi called Ahmadinejad a "crazy nut" who must be isolated and asked how his government should respond to Italian companies asking about doing business in Iran. The Ambassador replied firmly, no new investments. ¶5. (C/NF) Energy Security: The Ambassador told Berlusconi the President was keenly interested in energy security and praised favorably recent positions taken by government figures in support of nuclear power generation. He added that while we are not anti-Russia, Europe's (including Italy's) over-reliance on Russia for its energy needs was a serious concern. Berlusconi agreed, saying his government will pursue several avenues toward energy diversification while noting that Italy's energy dependence required strong relations with Russia. ¶6. (C/NF) Lebanon: The Ambassador told Berlusconi the President would likely be interested in his views on Lebanon and UNIFIL. Letta responded that the government was still reviewing its thinking on Lebanon. ¶7. (C/NF) COMMENT: Berlusconi is very much looking forward to the President's visit, sees himself and Italy as being on the same page as the U.S., virtually across the board, and will be ready to discuss all of the above issues with POTUS on June 12. SPOGLI
SECRET: ITALY: FM D’ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE,
VZCZCXRO7040 OO RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHNP DE RUEHRO #0710/01 0961009 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 061009Z APR 07 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7637 INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0550 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0310 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0369 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0651 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0359 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0464 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0939 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 4301 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0219 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2310 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0430 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8544 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2462 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0733 RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0393 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000710 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT. FOR EUR E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 TAGS: PREL NATO UNSC EUN IT SUBJECT: ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE, MEPP, LEBANON, IRAN SANCTIONS, GUANTANAMO AND ABU OMAR REF: A. STATE 36991 ¶B. STATE 37005 ¶C. STATE 41871 ¶D. STATE 42573 ¶E. ROME 625 ¶F. ROME 702 Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SPOGLI, REASONS 1.4 B AND D. SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (C/NF) Amb. Spogli got FM D'Alema's agreement to make a clear statement in support of the Athisaari plan for Kosovo and was told that the FM did not think he could or should control an Italian NGO threatening to close its hospitals in Afghanistan unless one of its employees was released by the Afghan Government. During an April 5 tour d'horizon, the Ambassador and FM also discussed Iran sanctions (D'Alema said Italy was applying the rules thoroughly), the Middle East peace process (D'Alema worried the Israelis and Palestinians would miss an opportunity for progress), Lebanon (where everything but UNIFIL is at an impasse, according to the FM), and the Abu Omar case. The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the request that Italy consider taking some Guantanamo detainees to help speed the closure of the facility. D'Alema said trying to close Guantanamo was a noble step and that if Italy could help, it would try to do so (see also septel on Guantanamo). End Summary. Afghanistan and Emergency Now ----------------------------- ¶2. (C/NF) On April 5, Ambassador Spogli and Foreign Minister D'Alema discussed key issues on the foreign policy agenda. The Ambassador raised concerns about the statements of Gino Strada, head of the Italian NGO Emergency Now, who was threatening to close his hospitals in Afghanistan unless the Afghan Government released one of his staff being held for possible terrorist affiliations. The Amb. said such an unwelcome step would be punishing the Afghan people and asked if D'Alema could help get Strada to stop making threats. D'Alema replied that he had spoken with Strada, who told him that if his employees are going to be arrested in Afghanistan, he would move his operations to a country that doesn't arrest his staff. D'Alema told the Amb. that all sides needed to show flexibility and that if the Afghan Government had evidence against the individual being held, it should be shared. D'Alema noted that Italy was grateful to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul for helping secure Red Cross access to the detained individual. Then, somewhat exasperated, he said, "Strada is who he is. He runs an NGO. He is not part of the Italian Government. He says they cannot work in Helmand without having contact with the Taliban. He thinks the Taliban have the legitimate support of the people there. We have urged him to be prudent. But we do not control him and he feels threatened." D'Alema then said that during the Mastrogiacomo kidnapping the Taliban cell phones that were traced all had Pakistani numbers, and that if terror bosses could live carefree in a Pakistan that could not be reproached because of its alliance with the U.S., we would not win this war. Kosovo - Firm Support for Status -------------------------------- ¶3. (C/NF) The Ambassador noted that the Italian position on the Athisaari plan for Kosovo had generated some confusion and that a clear statement of support would be very helpful. D'Alema emphatically insisted that Italy supported the Athisaari plan's core status provisions ("they should not be touched"). Italy continued to believe that some non-status issues, like protection of religious sites and minority rights, however, could still be improved. He said there were two unacceptable outcomes: continuing the status quo and a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The latter would tear Europe apart and pull the legal legs out from under the European mission to Kosovo. He argued that a UNSCR was needed that would help soften the Russian position, and a proposal needed to be crafted for Serbia - something conditional with flexible rewards - that could be offered to Belgrade when Serbia inevitably rejects Kosovar independence. Without these elements, the region could be destabilized, he said. He added that Italy had been clear in its talks with Russia and everywhere else that it would absolutely support Athisaari's core status proposal without prolonging talks and without new negotiations. The Ambassador asked if D'Alema could make a public statement to that effect. D'Alema agreed to do so. Iran Sanctions - Italy in Compliance ------------------------------------ ¶4. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked how Iran sanctions were proceeding for Italy, and noted our disappointment that when action was taken against Bank Sepah in Italy all funds had already been moved. D'Alema said the Iranians knew it was coming and were a step ahead, as they had been elsewhere. He added that when he had spoken with Larijani early in the week to urge the release of the UK sailors, Larijani had protested vigorously about the action against Bank Sepah. D'Alema asserted "we are applying the sanctions rules. We are in compliance. But Italy is also the victim of the sanctions and is excluded from negotiations with Iran and from the group with primary responsibility for decisions on Iran, despite being a UNSC member." Israel-Palestine: About to Miss an Opportunity? --------------------------------------------- -- ¶5. (C/NF) The Ambassador thanked D'Alema for his recent helpful comments insisting that Palestinian leaders accept the three Quartet conditions before Italian officials would meet with them. The FM said he feared a moment of opportunity was being lost. Abu Mazen was stronger than before but needed to find a way to get results out of his dialogue with Olmert. Both sides, he said, need to be pushed and encouraged. Without progress the risk of violence would increase. He suggested what was needed now was a confidence building phase with limited ambition focusing on releasing prisoners, improving Palestinian quality of life, granting more freedom of access/movement and getting credible security assurances for Israel. The Palestinians, he said, would never accept an independent state within provisional borders, because they believe this means they will never get final status issues resolved. He envisions an eventual regional final status conference, but not until the open final status questions have been resolved by the two sides. He said with both sides weak and lacking strategies to reach solutions, the international community needed to step in and offer hope for positive movement. Europe should press the Palestinians and the U.S. should press the Israelis in a coordinated division of labor, he suggested, adding that the Palestinians needed to hear the message that when the time comes, the U.S. would be willing to push Israel to resolve the final status issues. He informed the Amb. that Abu Mazen would be in Rome in the coming weeks. Lebanon - D'Alema Concerned --------------------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Turning to Lebanon, D'Alema said he was very concerned because the only thing working there was UNIFIL. Everything else was totally blocked. Parliament was not meeting. Reconstruction was at a standstill. The economy was in danger. There was no progress on the arms embargo or Sheba Farms. He said the Lebanon Contact Group meeting in London had been a good step and hoped that the group would meet at the political level to help bolster UN action. He also said some way had to be found to get Syrian buy-in or the embargo would never work. Guantanamo Detainees - Closure a Noble Idea ------------------------------------------- ¶7. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the request for Italy to consider taking some of the 25 releasable Guantanamo detainees who could not be returned to their countries of origin. D'Alema said it was a delicate issue, but the idea of trying to close Guantanamo was noble, and if Italy could find a way to help, it would. The devil would be in practicalities of whether Italy could take any of the detainees. (See septel for PM and Min. of Interior views on taking Guantanamo detainees.) Abu Omar - Pre-emptive Letters ------------------------------ ¶8. (S/NF) D'Alema closed the hour-long meeting by noting that he had asked the Secretary if the Department could send something in writing to him explaining that the U.S. would not act on extradition requests in the Abu Omar case if tendered. This, he explained, could be used pre-emptively by the GOI to fend off action by Italian magistrates to seek the extradition of the implicated Americans. D'Alema said he understood that L had discussed this with the Italian Ambassador in Washington.Amb. Spogli explained that we were waiting for the constitutional court to decide on the merits of the case before deciding on our next steps, because Min. of Justice Mastella had suspended action until that court rendered a decision. The FM noted that there was still the risk of action by the magistrates at any time. The Ambassador agreed that we should work to avoid having extradition requests forwarded. SPOGLI
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NSA: THE CUBA CRISIS 1963 UNVEILLED
Der Beweis: Magisterarbeit Bernd Pulch – http://www.kepplinger.de/node/50 – HOMEPAGE DES DOZENTEN
Liebe Leser,
hier der Beweis für meine Magisterarbeit auf der Webseite meines betreuenden Dozenten, Noelle-Neumann-Nachfolgers und LeiterS des
Institutes für Publizistik an der Universität Mainz, Dr. Hans Mathias Kepplinger:
Webseite:
http://www.kepplinger.de/node/50
am Institut für Publizistik der Universität Mainz
Magisterarbeiten N-Z
Neubauer, Frank Richard
Die Presse- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Bereichs Lobbying
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Nickels, Margret
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Die Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Fernsehen (FSF)
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Expertenurteile über ausgewählte Print- und TV-Medien
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Die aktuelle Berichterstattung über die Friedensbewegung. Eine Untersuchung der Tagespresse und des Hörfunks zur Validierung eines inhaltsanalytischen Verfahrens
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Dolf Zillmanns Studien zur ‘Emotional-Arousal-Theory’
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Die Leser des Spiegel 1949-1994
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Lifestyle als Mittel der Zielgruppensegmentierung in der Werbung
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Rethelford, Peter
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Riedl, Peter
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Der Journalist Werner Holzer
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Schaus, Anabel
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Scheufele, Bertram
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Schilling, Rainer
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Schindler, Winfried
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Schlarb, Armin
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Schlüter, Elmar
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Schmitt, Christiane
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Schmitt, Iris
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Schmitt-Egenolf, Andreas
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Schmitz, Lothar
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Februar 1993
Schneider, Hans-Jürgen
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Schraewer, Claudia
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Schreck, Jutta
Einzelfallstudien zur Pressekonzentration
August 1986
Schriefers, Annette
Ansichten der Bevölkerung zur Rolle und zur Arbeitsweise von Journalisten
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Schröter, Frauke
Die Nachrüstungsdebatte in der Prawda
Oktober 1985
Schuck, Petra
Mißbrauch von Pressefotos – Literaturbericht
Oktober 1985
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Die Darstellung von Medizin im Fernsehen
Mai 1995
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Vergleichende Untersuchung der Lokalberichterstattung der beiden Mainzer Tageszeitungen
Juni 1993
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Kultursponsoring in Deutschland
Februar 1995
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Das Fernsehen in Jamaica
August 1990
Schweizer, Marie-Theres
Die Jugendfilmarbeit im Dritten Reich
Juli 1982
Selbka, Iwona
Beiträge polnischer Wissenschaftler zur Kommunikationsforschung
August 1984
Semela, Eva
Welche ökonomischen Auswirkungen auf die öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten besitzt die Einführung privaten Fernsehens?
September 1991
Sempert, Petra
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Mai 1986
Severin, Petra
Geschlechterrollen und Lebensstile in der Werbung in Stern und Bunte von 1965 bis 1990. Eine Inhaltsanalyse der Werbeanzeigen in den beiden Zeitschriften Stern und Bunte
März 1991
Sidenstein, Ute
Gottfried Sello als Kunstkritiker in ‘Die Zeit’ von 1958 bis 1985
Oktober 1989
Siehl, Carsten
Virtuelle Realität. Grundlagen, Anwendungsbereiche und Kommunikationsaspekte einer neuen Medientechnologie
Juni 1995
Simons, Christian
Profil und Funktion der On-Air-Promotion. Eine Strukturanalyse der Programmwerbungen im deutschen Fernsehen
Juni 1996
Sinning, Hilka
Nachrichtenwerte – Die historische Entwicklung eines Forschungskonzeptes
Juli 1980
Spanier, Julia
Ausstrahlungseffekte von emotionalisierenden Werbespots
September 1993
Spiel, Ralph
Die Entwicklung der Filmtheater in der BRD seit 1970
Februar 1993
Staab, Christina
Der Bildungskandidat. Eine Analyse der Bewerbungsunterlagen zur Sendung ‘Der große Preis’
Dezember 1994
Staab, Joachim Friedrich
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März 1985
Stein, Dorothee
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Januar 1981
Stein, Simone
Horst Keller – Europa als Auftrag für einen Journalisten
Oktober 1994
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Präsentationselemente und Nachrichtenrezeption – Framing von Medieninhalten
September 1998
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August 1986
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November 1991
Stolz, Hans-Georg
Die redaktionelle Linie ausgewählter Publikationsorgane
August 1987
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Februar 1992
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April 1980
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Der Stern und sein Gründer
März 1986
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November 1986
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Einfluß von Krisen-Typen auf Publikationsweisen. Eine Input-Output-Analyse anhand von zwei Beispielen
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Swoboda, Thilo
Der Einfluß von Medien auf politische Entscheidungen. Eine Befragung ehemaliger Bundestagsabgeordneter
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Szadzik, Carmen
Der Computer als Befragungsinstrument im persönlichen Interview und bei Selbstausfüllersystemen
Oktober 1993
Tesch, Roland
Die Wahrnehmung von Vergewaltigungsszenen im Fernsehen
Mai 1994
Topp, Elisabeth
Schemageleitete Rezeption von Hörfunk- und Zeitungsnachrichten
November 1991
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Das “Luder” – eine Charaterfiktion der Boulevardpresse
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April 2003
Tscherner, Christine
Bedingungen von Thematisierungseffekten
September 1998
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November 1989
Volb, Andrea
Journalisten-Preise in Deutschland
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Vollbracht, Matthias
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Vondano, Ursula
Die kommunikationspolitischen Konzepte von CDU/CSU, SPD und FDP
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Die Veränderungen der Themenschwerpunkte in den Hörfunk-Nachrichten des HR von 1955 bis 1985
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Die wissenschaftliche Begleitforschung zu den Kabelpilotprojekten in Ludwigshafen, München, Dortmund und Berlin
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November 1990
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Mai 1991
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1997
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NSA: THE CUBA CRISIS 1962 UNVEILLED PART 2
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NSA: THE CUBA CRISIS 1962 UNVEILLED PART 1
DER BEWEIS: DIE FREI ERFUNDENEN LÜGENMÄRCHEN VON STASI-“GoMoPA” UND IHREN BLOGS WIE SCHE*SSHAUSFLIEGENBLOG-EXTREMNEWS UND DIE BEWERTUNG
DIE FREI ERFUNDENEN “GoMoPa”-LÜGEN: FALL PROFESSOR MINISTER STELTER
IMMOVATION AG: Frei erfundene Behauptungen des “Informationsdienstes” GoMoPa im Zusammenhang mit angeblichem Sturz des früheren brandenburgischen Ministers Prof. Schelter – Einstweilige Verfügung beantragt
Zum sechsten Mal in Folge schüttete die Kasseler IMMOVATION AG die Rendite aus den Genussrechten an ihre rund 1.500 Anleger in Deutschland und Österreich aus. Über 1,91 Mio. Euro wurden für das Jahr 2009 an die Anleger pünktlich per 31.07.2010 ausbezahlt. Informationen zu weiteren aktuellen Themen finden Sie auf der Homepage der IMMOVATION AG: http://www.immovation-ag.de
TOP-SECRET:Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the US Intelligence Community-CIA Archives
SECRET: REQUEST FOR 212(F) VISA REVOCATION FOR CORRUPT DOMINICAN CONSUL IN HONG KONG
VZCZCXYZ0014 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHDG #1692/01 1941101 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 131101Z JUL 07 FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8758 INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0094 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 0131 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0079 S E C R E T SANTO DOMINGO 001692 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR P, WHA, WHA/CAR, CA/VO/L/C ANDREW KOTUAL, ALSO FOR CA/VO/L/A BRIAN HUNT E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2027 TAGS: CVIS OPRC PHUM KCRM KCOR CH DR SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR 212(F) VISA REVOCATION FOR CORRUPT DOMINICAN CONSUL IN HONG KONG REF: A. TD-314/30639-06 ¶B. SANTO DOMINGO 0733 Classified By: ECOPOL COUNSELOR MICHAEL MEIGS. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) This is an advisory opinion requesting the revocation of the B1/B2 nonimmigrant visas issued to Casilda Teonilde CASADO DE CHEUNG; her husband, Pak Shing CHEUNG; her brother, Roger CASADO ALCANTARA; and her children, Yin Mey, Yin Ney, Sheung Leung, and Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO, under the Presidential Proclamation under section 212(f) of the INA suspending "the entry into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, of certain persons who have committed, participated in, or are the beneficiaries of corruption in the performance of public functions where that corruption has serious adverse effects on" (...) "U.S. foreign assistance goals (or) the security of the United States against transnational crime and terrorism." ¶2. (SBU) Casilda Teonilde CASADO DE CHEUNG is the Director of the Dominican Trade and Development Office in Hong Kong, which is the Dominican Republic's diplomatic mission to the People's Republic of China (PRC) (the Dominican government recognizes Taiwan, rather than the PRC). Cheung was appointed to this position by the Fernandez administration. Her brother, Roger CASADO ALCANTARA, serves as the mission's deputy director, and her daughter, Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO, is the assistant director, according to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) sources. Cheung is married to a Chinese national by the name of Pak Shing CHEUNG. ¶3. (S//NF) According to SAA sources, prior to traveling to Hong Kong to take up her new position, Cheung commented that she intended to become extremely wealthy in her new job. As noted in Ref B, she has followed through on this pledge primarily through the corrupt sale of visas to intending migrants. According to sources in the local Chinese community who have given reliable information on this issue in the past, Cheung's husband works directly with Chinese human smuggling organizations to identify potential migrants. In many cases these migrants seek to use the Dominican Republic as a stepping stone in efforts to reach U.S. territory (refs A and B). ¶4. (S//NF) Once the migrants are identified, Cheung works to issue them with valid Dominican visas. The going rate for these visas is reported by various sources in the Foreign Ministry (Dominican Embassy to France), Chinese community and SAA to be approximately USD 10,000. The visa recipients almost never qualify for these visas; they lack the skills and/or resources that are prerequisites for investor classification, for example, or they have no family members in the Dominican Republic to justify classification under "family reunification." This means that those visas are issued in violation of Dominican law. Payments for this service are made in cash either directly at the Trade and Development Office in Hong Kong or at a nail salon in Santo Domingo that is owned by the brother of Cheung's husband, according to sources in the local Chinese community. ¶5. (S//NF) SAA has estimated the number of Chinese nationals smuggled through this arrangement at "roughly 4-20 (...) almost every week (since at least 2004)" (Ref A). As of early 2006 most all of these individuals traveled using visas that had been personally signed by Mrs. Cheung (Ref A). According to media reports and SAA contacts, these Chinese migrants are able to bypass regular processing at the airport and the scrutiny it entails because they travel with both their valid visas and with letters personally signed by Migration Director Amarante Baret. These letters are not issued to travelers from other countries, according to investigative reporting by independent newspaper Clave Digital. SAA is in possession of scores of such letters signed by Amarante Baret confirming the issuance of valid Dominican visas to hundreds (if not thousands) of Chinese nationals. In addition, Dominican authorities determined that the addresses declared by some of the arriving Chinese were incorrect and were not the actual destinations of those individuals. ¶6. (S//NF) Few of these travelers ever return to their country of origin. As noted in Ref B, investigative reporting by Clave Digital asserted that of 2,948 Chinese nationals who had entered the Dominican Republic over the last two years using temporary business visas, only 432 had returned to China. The Foreign Ministry has gone on record disputing these numbers. ¶7. (C) Embassy requests a finding of ineligibility under section 212(f) in order revoke the nonimmigrant visas issued to Casilda Teonilde CASADO DE CHEUNG; her husband, Pak Shing CHEUNG; her brother, Roger CASADO ALCANTARA; and their daughter, Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO as individuals who have "committed or participated in" (...) "corruption in the performance of public functions." Casilda CASADO DE CHEUNG manages the mission and is in charge of the issuance of Dominican visas to intending migrants in violation of Dominican law. Her husband, Pak Shing CHEUNG, works directly with the smuggling organizations to identify migrants, and works with his brother in Santo Domingo to arrange for the transfer of funds supporting this scheme. Roger CASADO ALCANTARA and Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO both work in upper management positions at the mission in Hong Kong, and are involved or, at the least, are the "beneficiaries of" the corruption that goes on at the mission. Embassy requests the revocation of the visas issued to the minor children of Cheung -- Yin Mey, Yin Ney, and Sheung Leung CHEUNG CASADO -- because they are "beneficiaries of corruption in the performance of public functions." ¶8. (C) Cheung's corruption has "serious adverse effects on" (...) "U.S. foreign assistance goals." Many of the Chinese nationals smuggled under this scheme appear to be victims of trafficking in persons, the eradication of which is a major U.S. foreign policy objective. For example, upon arrival in the Dominican Republic, many of these migrants are forced to work in conditions of involuntary servitude (ref A). It is possible that others are trafficked to work as "mistresses for some men from the Dominican elite" (ref B). These credible allegations of high-level official complicity in trafficking were a major factor in the Department's decision to return the Dominican Republic to the Tier 2 Watch List this year, as noted in the 2006 trafficking report's text. Revoking Cheung and her family's visas would send a powerful message to Dominican authorities that the U.S. Government takes these allegations seriously. It could encourage Dominican authorities to investigate and prosecute these and other corrupt officials who have conspired in trafficking, something authorities have declined to do thus far despite specific accusations in the trafficking report. ¶9. (C) Cheung's corruption also has "serious adverse effects on" (...) "the security of the United States against transnational crime and terrorism." The Caribbean is often referred to as the "third border" of the United States. Ref B outlines credible allegations that significant numbers of Chinese migrants smuggled under this system are using the Dominican Republic as a stepping stone in efforts to migrate illegally to the United States. This network could conceivably be exploited by organized criminals and terrorists, who would threaten the security of the United States if they were allowed to reach U.S. territory. BULLEN
TOP-SECRET:The Revolutions of 1989: New Documents from Soviet/East Europe Archives Reveal Why There Was No Crackdown
WASHINGTON, D.C. — Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the National Security Archive and its research partners in East and Central Europe today released previously secret documents from behind the Iron Curtain detailing the ultimately futile scramble by the Communist parties of the region to stay in power in 1989 — evidence which explains in the actual words of Communist leaders now for the first time in English how the system imposed by Stalin’s armies gave way in the face of popular protest, largely without violent repression.
The documents include verbatim transcripts of such historic meetings as the Polish Communist party’s leadership on the day after Solidarity swept the June 1989 elections, Solidarity leader Walesa’s talk in Warsaw with German chancellor Kohl on the day the Berlin Wall was to fall, Soviet leader Gorbachev’s meetings with Hungarian communist reformers, and the Czechoslovak Communist Party’s central committee’s rationale for not calling in the troops in the face of mass protests in November 1989.
The documents are the product of a five-year multinational research project organized by George Washington University’s National Security Archive, in collaboration with scholars, journalists and activists in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Russia, Germany, Romania and Bulgaria, focused on the collapse of Communism in 1989. The project organized four landmark “critical oral history” conferences in which former adversaries, divided by ideology and the struggle for power, sat at the same tables and discussed the end of the Cold War, face to face with each other and their own documents. (Similar gatherings co-organized by the Archive in recent years focused on the crisis years of 1953, 1956, 1968, and 1980-81 in Eastern Europe.) The 1989 conferences began last year with a May 1998 meeting on St. Simons Island, Georgia, and continued this year in Budapest on June 9-11, in Prague on October 14-16, and in Warsaw on October 21-23. Participants included Czech president Vaclav Havel, former Polish prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, current Polish foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek, Gorbachev aide Gyorgy Shakhnazarov, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock, and top communist party officials and dissidents.
Research partners of the National Security Archive include:
Cold War History Research Center, BudapestInstitute for the Study of the 1956 Revolution
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Cold War International History Project, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.
The Czechoslovak Documentation Center, Prague (Dobrichovice)
The Institute of Contemporary History, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic
Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences
Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow
Institute of Universal History, Moscow
Memorial, Moscow
Cold War Research Group, Sofia
Civic Academy Foundation, Bucharest
DOCUMENTS
Click on a document number to view the transcription.Document 1. Memorandum of Conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and Karoly Grosz, General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Moscow, March 23-24, 1989. This document from Hungarian Archives reveals Gorbachev’s contradictions, as the Soviet leader proclaims again that the Brezhnev doctrine is dead and military interventions should be “precluded in the future, yet at the same time, tries to set “boundaries” for the changes in Eastern Europe as “the safekeeping of socialism and assurance of stability.” As it turned out, the boundaries crumbled along with the Wall.
Document 2. Transcript of the Central Committee secretariat meeting of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR), Warsaw, June 5, 1989. On the day after Solidarity had swept Poland’s first open elections, ultimately winning 99 of 100 Senate seats, the Polish Communists vent their shock and dismay (“a bitter lesson,” “the party are not connected with the masses,” “We trusted the Church and they turned out to be Jesuits” were typical comments). Comrade Kwasniewski (who now serves as the elected President of Poland) remarks that “It’s well known that also party members were crossing out our candidates” (only two out of 35 Party candidates survived the epidemic of X’s). But they see no choice but to negotiate a coalition government, and specifically “[w]arn against attempts at destabilization, pointing at the situation in China” — since the Tienanmien massacre occurred the same day as the Polish elections, the road not taken.
Document 3. Transcript of the Opening Full Session of the National Roundtable Negotiations, June 13, 1989. This remarkable document (transcribed from previously unpublished video recordings) points to the unwritten “rules” of mutual civility that arose in the nonviolent dissident movements and found an echo among the Communist reformers during the negotiated revolutions of 1989. For example, Dr. Istvan Kukorelli from the Patriotic People’s Front proposes to “refrain from questioning the legitimacy of each other, since the legitimacy of all of us is debatable. It is a question which belongs to the future – who will be given credit by history and who will be forgotten.”
Document 4. Report of the President of People’s Republic of Hungary Rezso Nyers and Karoly Grosz, General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party on their talks with Gorbachev in Moscow, 24-25 July, 1989. The excerpt translated into English contains economic reformer Nyers’ assessment of the political situation in Hungary, and first among the factors that “can defeat the party,” he lists “the past, if we let ourselves [be] smeared with it.” The memory of the revolution of 1956 and its bloody repression by the Soviets was Banquo’s ghost, destroying the legitimacy of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, just as 1968 in Prague and 1981’s martial law in Poland and all the other Communist “blank spots” of history came back in 1989 to crumble Communist ideology. For their part, the Communist reformers (including Gorbachev) did not quite know how to respond as events accelerated in 1989, except not to repeat 1956.
Document 5. Record of conversation between West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the leader of Polish Solidarity Lech Walesa, Warsaw, November 9, 1989. In this extraordinary conversation (available previously only in German), Solidarity’s leader fears the collapse of the Wall would distract West Germany’s attention – and money – to the GDR, at the time when Poland, the trail-blazer to the post-communist era in Eastern Europe, desperately needed both. “Events are moving too fast,” Walesa said, and only hours later, the Wall fell, and Kohl had to cut his Poland visit short to scramble back to Berlin, thus proving Walesa’s fear correct.
Document 6. Entry from the Diary of Gorbachev’s Foreign Policy Assistant Anatoly Chernyaev, 10 November 1989. This extraordinary diary entry from inside the Kremlin, the day after the Wall fell, documents in the form of a “snapshot” reaction the revolutionary mood of one of the closest and most loyal of Gorbachev’s assistants. Chernyaev realized that this event meant “the end of Yalta” and of “the Stalinist legacy” in Europe, and in a striking statement, he welcomed this change, saying the key was Gorbachev’s decision not to stand in the way.
Document 7. Speech by Premier Ladislav Adamec at the extraordinary session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, 24 November 1989. This remarkable previously secret transcript shows the party elites choosing against violent repression of the mass protests in Wenceslas Square. More clearly than in almost any other Party document, the reasons for nonviolence are spelled out: such a solution would only temporarily “return calm,” it would radicalize the youth, “the international support of the socialist countries can no longer be counted on,” and “the capitalist states” might react with a “political and economic boycott.”
TOP-SECRET: U.S. Planning for War in Europe, 1963-64
Location of original: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Records of Policy Planning Council, 1963-64, box 280, file “War Aims”
This 79-page document is divided into sections below for easier navigation:
Location of original: Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Records of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Subject Files, 1961-63, box 3, Johnson-European Trip May 1964 (also available as document 992 in National Security Archive published microfiche collection, U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68, Washington, D.C., 1998)
This document records a briefing at headquarters United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) directed by CINCUSAFE General Gabriel P. Disosway to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson who was completing a tour of U.S. bases and embassies in Western Europe. The briefing disclosed the Air Force’s assumptions that the United States could only win a nuclear war in Europe because the “side that hits first will win”; moreover, the Soviets were “not thinking in terms of conventional war.” Significantly, Johnson raised a central problem: “the understandable reluctance of responsible officials to agree to a general release of nuclear weapons.” This is a reference to what became known as the “nuclear taboo”–the idea that because of their disproportionate effects nuclear weapons were virtually unusable.[5]
Document Three: Memorandum for the Secretary from Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, “Meetings in Paris with Bohlen, Finletter, Lemnitzer, and McConnell,” 27 May 1964, with cover memo and detailed report attached
Location of original: Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Records of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Subject Files, 1961-63, box 1, Memoranda (file 1 of 5) (also available as document 993 in National Security Archive published microfiche collection, U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68, Washington, D.C., 1998)
Also prepared by Seymour Weiss, this document records discussions during April 1964 between Deputy Under Secretary Johnson and key U.S. officials based in, or then visiting, Paris, including Ambassador to France Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. ambassador to the NATO Council Thomas Finletter, Commander-in-Chief Europe (CINCEUR)/Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Lyman Lemnitzer, and Deputy Commander-in-Chief USAFE John P. McConnell. Their conversations focused on a variety of problems, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, command-and-control of nuclear weapons, threat assessments, and proposed force withdrawals from Europe.
The discussions on tactical nuclear weapons and threat assessment raised important questions. While Lemnitzer assumed early use for nuclear weapons, especially anti-demolition weapons (ADMs), his State Department interlocutors questioned that assumption in part because a decision to use nuclear weapons “would be the most crucial one any president could make” and might not be made “quickly or easily.” The discussion of threats revealed interesting differences between Lemnitzer and McConnell over whether Warsaw pact forces could “easily overrun” NATO forces, as the latter believed. Johnson, however, argued that the probability of a large Communist invasion” was a “rapidly diminishing” one, arguing that it was more important to plan for more likely contingencies such as an East German revolt or Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus.
Document Four: Department of State Airgram enclosing “Secretary McNamara’s Remarks to NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 15-17, 1964,” 23 December 1964
Location of original: Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Formerly Top Secret Foreign Policy Files, 1964-66, box 22, NATO
Beginning with his famous May 1962 “Athens Speech”, Secretary of Defense McNamara began an effort to “educate” European NATO leaders on the realities of nuclear warfare and the necessity for a flexible response military strategy. This speech, delivered at one of the semi-annual NATO defense and foreign ministers meeting, represented another step in that effort. As in other speeches, he emphasized the high costs of nuclear war, the problem of escalation control, and the need to plan for contingencies other than a massive invasion. What is especially striking about this speech, however, is McNamara’s confidence that NATO nuclear and conventional forces had deterred the Soviets from strategic and theater nuclear attacks as well as from massive conventional attack. Interestingly, McNamara treats the latter as a “substantial” threat although he may have privately agreed with State Department officials that the risk was diminishing.
Document Five: Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn Thompson to Seymour Weiss, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, “Implications of a Major Soviet Conventional Attack in Central Europe,” 29 December 1964
Location of original: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Records of Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn Thompson, 1961-70, box 21, Chron-July 1964
The State Department’s most influential Soviet expert of the 1960s, Llewellyn Thompson was then chairing a special State-Defense committee on politico-military planning (the “Thompson Committee”). In this paper, Thompson joins U.A. Johnson in agreement that the chances of a Soviet conventional attack in Central Europe were “remote.” If, however, the Soviets did make a “grab for Europe,” Thompson argued that Washington should reply with a strategic first strike against the Soviet Union. Admitting that the United States “might also lose”, Thompson argued that a first strike, including immediate use of tactical nukes, would be necessary because the Soviets would otherwise take the same course.
Many historians have described Thompson as a voice of sanity on U.S.-Soviet relations during the 1960s; for example, he played a key role in encouraging President Kennedy to take a moderate course during the Cuban missile crisis. His willingness, at least on paper, to support first strikes and first nuclear use suggests that a nuclear taboo was then far from pervasive. If Thompson had the responsibility, however, one wonders if he would have readily ordered a first strike in an “ambiguous situation”?
Glossary
ACE – Allied Command Europe
ADM – atomic demolition munitions
ASW – antisubmariine weapons
ECM – electronic countermeasures
LOC – lines of communications
MAAG – military assistance advisory group
MLF – multilateral force
MRBM – medium range ballistic missile
PAL – permissive action links (safety locks on nuclear weapons)
POLAD – political advisers
special ammunition – possibly a reference to depleted uranium ammunition
Notes
1. See, for example, Robert A. Wampler, NATO Strategic Planning and Nuclear Weapons 1950-57, Nuclear History Program Occasional Paper 6 (College Park, Center for International Security Studies, 1990).
2. A history of the NESC would be most useful but difficult to write until its major studies have been declassified. Some materials on NESC, including its charter, and summaries of some of its reports can be found in the volumes on national security in the State Department’s Foreign Relations series. Some writes have argued that the NESC had war planning responsibilities but its role was strictly analytical, although no doubt war planners studied its reports closely.
3. Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York, 1990), 247.
4. For a discussion of SIOP-63, see Desmond Ball, “Development of the SIOP, 1960-1983,” Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986), 62-70.
5. For thoughtful explorations of the notion of “nuclear taboo” see Thomas Schelling, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons,” in L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazar, Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy (Boulder, Westview Press,1994), 105-115; Peter Gizewski, “From Winning Weapon to Destroyer of Worlds: The Nuclear Taboo in International Politics,” International Journal LI (Summer 1996):397-418; and Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), 116-152.
SECRET: ANWAR IBRAHIM’S SODOMY TRIAL II – A PRIMER
VZCZCXRO3046 PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH DE RUEHKL #0529/01 1820541 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 010541Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2918 INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2796 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0639 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0001 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2610 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2652 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0227 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0904 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KUALA LUMPUR 000529 SIPDIS FOR EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS MY SUBJECT: ANWAR IBRAHIM'S SODOMY TRIAL II - A PRIMER Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D). Summary and Comment ------------------- ¶1. (C) Malaysian Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim will go on trial beginning July 8 on charges of sodomy -- a criminal offense in Malaysia -- with a former aide. Anwar was previously tried and convicted of sodomy in 2000 in a heavily manipulated trial that the U.S. concluded "was marred by deep flaws in the judicial process." The verdict was overturned on appeal in 2004. Senior Malaysian authorities were very aggressive in handling the present case during the initial period of June-September 2008, but, coinciding with the passing of Anwar's deadline to bring down the government through Parliamentary cross-overs, have since taken a more measured "rule-of-law" approach in public. Authorities have not taken all the legal and extra-legal measures available to them, for example, to challenge Anwar's bail provisions or resolve an earlier impasse regarding the court venue. Anwar's conviction in this trial, which may last many months, could end his political career; the judge would decide whether Anwar would remain free pending an appeal. This cable provides a primer for the Department's reference, including background on the 2000 conviction and the present case, a synopsis of the specific legal charges and penalties, a summary of likely evidence to be presented in court, and three possible scenarios for the trial. ¶2. (C) Comment: The issue of the specific actions between Anwar and his aide will play out in court and, we suspect, in a very sensationalistic fashion. The facts surrounding the case, however, make a compelling argument that the government's prosecution of the case is foremost a political act against the Opposition leader. Whether the incident in question was wholly concocted or has some basis in fact, the case is not part of a morals campaign or a normal criminal matter and has been the subject of extensive political interference and manipulation. As one consequence, much of the Malaysian public remains deeply sceptical about the government's prosecution of Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar's flawed trials in 1998-2000 produced a public uproar and attracted international condemnation; in today's information-intensive environment, such effects may be exacerbated depending on events in court. Embassy will provide draft press guidance for the Department's consideration prior to the July 8 trial date. End Summary and Comment. Sodomy Case I, 1998-2000 ------------------------ ¶3. (SBU) Under the government of former Prime Minister Mahathir, Anwar Ibrahim was charged and convicted of sodomy (and abuse of power) in a sensationalistic trials in 1998-2000, directed and heavily manipulated by Mahathir against his former deputy. Anwar was charged with sodomizing his wife's driver. During his pre-trial detention, Anwar was beaten by the then Inspector General of Police. The High Court convicted Anwar of sodomy in August 2000 and sentenced him to nine years imprisonment. The U.S. expressed deep concern with the first sodomy trial, noting "that the trial and (Anwar's) resulting conviction and nine-year jail sentence were marred by deep flaws in the judicial process." After Mahathir stepped down in favor of Abdullah Badawi, the Federal Court overturned the conviction in September 2004 and released Anwar from prison (Anwar's separate conviction for abuse of power remained in place). The Federal Court found there were "many unusual things that happened regarding the arrest and confession" of certain prosecution witnesses, including the fact that Anwar's driver stated that he was paid to make the allegations against Anwar. In an unusual move and possible political compromise, the Federal Court judges included in their judgment the conclusion that there was evidence to confirm "the appellants were involved in homosexual activities," but added that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged offenses beyond reasonable doubt. Because Anwar's conviction on the separate charge of abuse of power was not overturned, he was barred from political office until April 2008. Sodomy Case II, 2008 -------------------- ¶4. (SBU) Less than four months after Anwar Ibrahim's People's Justice Party (PKR) and its opposition partners made significant advances in the March 2008 national elections, and three months after Anwar became eligible for political office, an aide to Anwar, Mohd Saiful Bukhari Azlan, filed a police report on June 28, 2008, alleging that he had been forcibly sodomized by Anwar on several occasions. The following day, Anwar took refuge in the Turkish ambassador's residence, claiming that he feared a repetition of his 1998 arrest and for his personal safety. He remained with the Turkish ambassador for only one day, departing after public assurances of his safety from the Foreign Minister and Home Minister. In the midst of a highly charged political atmosphere, which included Anwar's claims that he could bring down the government through Parliamentary defections by September 16, 2008, and new allegations linking then DPM Najib with the Altantuya murder case, the police investigation proceeded. It came to light that Saiful had had contact with the office of then DPM Najib prior to working with Anwar, and more significantly Saiful had met with Najib (and allegedly his wife Rosmah) at Najib's home just prior to filing his police complaint. Najib first denied publicly he had any connection with the case, and then acknowledged meeting Saiful, an admission that preempted internet reports about to be released by blogger Raja Petra (who is now a fugitive from sedition charges). ¶5. (SBU) As authorities made known their intention to arrest and charge Anwar for sodomy, Anwar's lawyers arranged for his voluntary appearance before police for questioning and charging. Contrary to the agreement, on July 16, police in commando-style outfits waylaid Anwar's convoy en route to the police station and arrested him on the street. Police questioned Anwar, took him to a hospital to provide a DNA sample (which Anwar refused, citing lawyers' advice and fear of "manipulation"), and held him overnight. Anwar was released on police bail by a magistrate on July 17. The Charges ----------- ¶6. (SBU) On August 7, 2008, prosecutors charged Anwar Ibrahim before a Sessions Court under Section 377B of the Penal Code, which reads: "Whoever voluntarily commits carnal intercourse against the order of nature shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years and shall be liable to whipping." Section 377A of the Penal Code defines "carnal intercourse against the order of nature" as including sodomy. Prosecutors specifically charged Anwar with the sodomizing of Saiful Bukhari Azlan at a Kuala Lumpur condominium (owned by Anwar's friend) on June 26, 2008. Although Saiful originally claimed he was forcibly sodomized on several occasions, the prosecutors chose not to pursue charges against Anwar under a separate Penal Code section (377C), which pertains to non-consensual sodomy (with a higher burden of proof), and also to focus on only one alleged incident. It is important to note that under Malaysia's legal system, prosecutors may amend the charges during the course of the trial. Saiful himself does not face charges for the alleged acts. The Court ordered Anwar to remain free on a personal bond of US $5,700 RM 20,000 and did not impose other restrictions (for example, Anwar has been free to travel abroad and has done so on many occasions since August 2008). The government did not attempt to dispute or revoke the bail provisions. Wrangle and Delay over Court Venue ---------------------------------- ¶7. (SBU) Following Anwar's formal charging, and with Anwar's 9/16 deadline looming in the background, prosecutors quickly moved to transfer the case from the Sessions Court to the High Court. The prosecution argued on September 10, 2008, that such an important case with possibly complicated legal issues should be dealt with at the High Court and produced a certificate signed by the Attorney General to move the case, which under normal circumstances automatically results in a transfer. However, Anwar's lawyers objected to the transfer out of concern that the more politicized High Court level would result in a pro-prosecution judge hearing the case, as happened during the first sodomy trial in 1999-2000. In November 2008, independent-minded Sessions Court judge Komathy Suppiah rejected the certificate of transfer, noting that Attorney General Gani Patail faced allegations of evidence tampering in Anwar's 1998 case and the transfer order signed by the AG would "undermine the public perception of the judiciary." ¶8. (C) Judge Komathy was overruled in March 2009 by High Court judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah who decided the Sessions Court has no authority to refuse the Attorney General's transfer order; Zabidin himself was then assigned to preside over the sodomy trial. Anwar's lawyers filed an appeal against the transfer; the Court of Appeals only began to hear the appeal on June 30; based on precedent, Anwar's camp admits the appeal has little chance of success. Zabidin initially attempted to schedule the trial to begin in May 2009; defense lawyers argued they needed more time and hoped their appeal would be heard prior to the trial. (Note: The High Court often takes one to two years before setting trial dates in normal criminal cases. End Note.) Zabidin subsequently set the trial to begin on July 1. Anwar's lawyers filed an application to compel the prosecution to provide them with full documentation and evidence that will be introduced at the trial, which the prosecution has thus far failed to do in apparent violation of the Criminal Procedure Code. With the hearing on the disclosure of evidence set for July 1 (now pushed back to July 3), Judge Zabidin postponed the trial start to July 8. The judge originally specified a three-week duration for the trial, but lawyers assume that the trial will take many months to conclude. The High Court Judge -------------------- ¶9. (C) High Court Judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah is a lawyer by training. After private law practice, he joined the judicial service as a Sessions Court judge and was elevated to judicial commissioner in 2004. After two years on contract, Zabidin was promoted to become a permanent High Court judge in 2006. Zabidin is not a well-known judge and is not associated with high profile or controversial judgments, according to our senior legal contacts. Anwar's lawyers allege that Zabidin is beholden to the government and will favor the prosecution; the judge's unusual rush to bring the case to trial is viewed by the defense as an early indication of his bias. Government Switches Gears ------------------------- ¶10. (C) Senior government and UMNO party officials adopted a very aggressive public and private approach to the Anwar case during the June-September 2008 period. This included frequent, prejudicial statements in public, and strong claims in private to other politicians and diplomats regarding Anwar's guilt. This intensive phase encompassed the initial news of the allegations and Anwar's formal charging, but also Anwar's own aggressive political posturing and claims that he could bring down the government by September 2008 through Parliamentary crossovers. After Anwar's deadline passed in September, and after resolution of the UMNO leadership battle in favor of Najib's succession in October 2008, we observed a definite toning down of the Government's approach, and a shifting to a lower gear. For example, we did not hear reports of government intervention to quickly resolve the matter of the court venue, which effectively delayed the prosecution by some seven months. Anwar's bail provisions remained in place and unchallenged. Public statements by senior government officials, outside of by-election campaigns, became infrequent. This toned down approach has continued through the present; it would fit within a hypothetical decision to demonstrate that the trial is a law enforcement matter, rather than a political battle. Regardless, it is clear that the government has not taken all the legal and extra-legal steps against Anwar that it could have since September 2008. GOM Confidence: Waning or Recalculating? ----------------------------------------- ¶11. (C) Many of our government and UMNO contacts have insisted to us, emphatically so in the early months of the case, that the evidence against Anwar is very conclusive, often hinting at video footage and physical evidence like DNA (see below). Recently, some contacts sympathetic to Anwar but not part of his team claimed the government over time had become less certain it had sufficient evidence to convict Anwar. According to one unconfirmed account, in June several key aides to PM Najib advised him to drop the case against Anwar because the evidence was not strong enough for an easy conviction and the political cost of forcing through a guilty verdict would be too high. It is also possible that the toned down rhetoric from the government has been misinterpreted as uncertainty on the authorities' part. Evidence at the Trial --------------------- ¶12. (C) Based on available information, we believe the following evidentiary aspects will feature in Anwar's trial: Saiful's complaint: The testimony of Saiful is central to the government's case, and he is expected to take the stand. Saiful has continued to assert that he was forcibly sodomized, although the charges under Section 377B do not require proof of a non-consensual act; given his youth (age 23) and physical size, Saiful will need to explain specific circumstances of the incident to support his assertion of rape. Medical reports: As publicly revealed by defense lawyers, Saiful underwent two medical examinations on June 28, 2008, just prior to lodging a police report. The first examination by a Burmese doctor at a local hospital concluded there was "no conclusive clinical findings" suggestive of sodomy, and the doctor recommended he be examined at a government hospital in line with police procedures in such cases. (Note: The Burmese doctor briefly left Malaysia after being held for questioning by police. End Note.) The second examination at the police-approved government hospital also failed to uncover medical evidence of sodomy, according to copies of hospital reports released by the defense. DNA: The defense team believes prosecutors will introduce DNA evidence, based on DNA samples held by the police since 1998, and are preparing expert witnesses. The government's hurried passage in Parliament of a DNA bill, approved by the lower house on June 23, is widely seen as tied to the Anwar trial and will permit the government to utilize the 11-year old samples. The defense could claim the samples were planted, as is widely believed to be the case in Anwar's earlier prosecution. Anwar's alibi: Anwar's lawyers claim that five persons will testify that Anwar was with them at the time of the alleged incident. They also claim that police attempted but failed to intimidate some of these defense witnesses to change their accounts. CCTV: The prosecution may use CCTV footage from the condominium where the alleged incident took place to confirm Anwar's presence at a specific date and time. Character witnesses: As happened in the 1999 case, it is very possible that prosecutors introduce witnesses to attack Anwar's character and actions aside from the alleged 2008 sodomy incident. There are unconfirmed reports that the prosecution will call 30 witnesses to the stand. Defense witnesses (PM Najib and wife Rosmah?): In an effort to demonstrate the political motivation in the government's case, defense lawyers could call PM Najib, his wife Rosmah, and other senior officials such as Najib's aide Khairil Anas Yusof who appear connected to the case (Najib and Rosmah because they met Saiful and discussed his reporting to the police). While this will make for momentary drama, we expect the judge to disallow such moves. Bail and other Conditions during the Trial ------------------------------------------ ¶13. (C) Anwar's legal team has expressed concern that the prosecution may apply to revoke the personal bond that allows Anwar to be free pending the trial or seek to impose other conditions, such as impounding his passport or restricting his movement to within Kuala Lumpur. The lawyers acknowledge that there is not a strong precedent for overturning the existing bail decision. In several recent politically-charged court cases, however, Malaysian judges have ignored precedent decisions. (Note: We have no information on the prosecution's intentions in this matter. End Note.) What if Anwar is Convicted? --------------------------- ¶14. (C) Most observers conclude that a conviction in Anwar's case, one upheld on appeal, would essentially end Anwar's political career given the legal penalties and Anwar's age (62). According to the Federal Constitution, a member of Parliament will be disqualified from holding his seat if he is convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year or to a fine of not less than US $570 RM 2,000 and has not received a free pardon. This stipulation comes into effect after all appeals are exhausted (at the Court of Appeals and Federal Court). The constitution also provides that a convicted person can only be active in politics after five years from the date of his release from prison. At age 62, a second conviction could effectively bar Anwar permanently from political life. In the event of a conviction, Anwar will certainly appeal. The judge will decide whether Anwar remains free pending appeal or immediately goes to jail. While officially remaining a Member of Parliament pending the final outcome, he would be unable to operate from prison as the Opposition leader. Political Interference and Manipulation --------------------------------------- ¶15. (C) The issue of the alleged actions between Anwar and Saiful will play out in court, and sodomy, even a consensual act, is a crime under Malaysian law. The facts surrounding the case, however, make it clear that the government's prosecution of the case is foremost a political act against the Opposition leader. The Malaysian government does not aggressively prosecute cases of sodomy; we find record of some 55 cases since 1991, or an average of 3 per year. The vast majority of such cases involve adults assaulting minors. Anwar's prosecution is not part of a morals campaign. The GOM does not aggressively target non-heterosexual behavior; if it did so, a recent cabinet minister, senior staff associated with PM Najib and other prominent citizens linked to the government also would find themselves under investigation. ¶16. (C) Aside from the immediate comparison with Anwar's previous prosecution for sodomy, which was grossly manipulated by former Prime Minister Mahathir, the indications of political interference and manipulation in the present case are compelling; much of the information is in the public realm. Collateral reporting, not addressed here, provides further substantiation. Najib connection: Keeping in mind that Najib and Anwar remain bitter enemies, it is striking that Najib met personally with the complainant Saiful prior to the police report, and allegedly arranged for Saiful to have intensive contact with senior police officials in the days before he filed the complaint. Senior officials' involvement: From the very early stages, the senior-most officials in the government, including then PM Abdullah, current PM Najib, cabinet ministers, the AGO and national police chief (the latter two having played important roles in Anwar's 1998-1999 flawed trials) and officials of the ruling UMNO party have been intimately involved in decisions regarding the case, according to Embassy contacts and publicly available sources. Despite the current toned-down government approach, and emphasis that the Anwar trial is a normal law enforcement matter, senior-most executive and UMNO party officials continue such a directing role. Leakage of information: Senior government leaders provided law enforcement information on the case to leaders of Anwar's coalition partner, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), in an unsuccessful attempt to split PAS from the opposition. A recent internet report claims that the government has provided some government-directed press editors with a "sneak preview" of evidence against Anwar. Public statements: From the initial public reports of the complaint against Anwar in June 2008 to Anwar's election to Parliament in August 2008, PM Abdullah and other senior leaders spoke publicly and frequently about Anwar's alleged crime and the need for justice, and the case featured prominently in the parliamentary campaign against Anwar. There have been far fewer statements since September 2008, except during by-election campaigns. Press: The Government-directed mainstream press, which includes all major dailies and all TV stations, provided extensive coverage of Saiful's allegations while severely limiting reporting on Anwar's response during the heated period of June-August 2008. Alleged intimidation: The police detained for questioning the doctor who first examined Saiful, causing him to leave Malaysia temporarily out of concern for his safety. Police also pressured the hospital in question to hold a press conference to state that the doctor was not qualified to conduct such an examination, according to our sources. According to defence lawyers, several of their witnesses have been threatened by police in an effort to change their testimony. The Imam for the Federal Territories (including Kuala Lumpur and the administrative capital Putra Jaya) claimed publicly that he was forced to witness an "improper" Islamic oath taken by Saiful; he was subsequently sacked by the Prime Minister's Department. Customized Legislation, the DNA bill: The government hurriedly prepared a bill on DNA evidence, following shortly after Anwar's refusal to provide a DNA sample at the time of his arrest, which compels suspects to provide samples and allows authorities to utilize previously stored samples in new criminal cases. The government originally introduced the bill in August 2008 and voted it through the lower house only on June 23, 2009; several steps remain before it becomes law. Public Scepticism ----------------- ¶17. (C) In the run-up to Anwar's August 2008 arraignment, public opinion polling conducted by the Merdeka Center, Malaysia's most respected opinion survey group, revealed that a preponderance of Malaysians believed the charges against Anwar were unjust, indicating a deep public scepticism regarding the government's case. We understand that new polling on this question will be released before the July 8 trial date. Pollsters have informed us that the new data continues to reflect widespread public suspicions. Reportedly, only 15 percent of ethnic Malays and 10 percent of Malaysians overall believe Anwar's prosecution to be justified. Outside of government circles, many Embassy contacts, including those who give credence to rumors of Anwar's personal life, take it as a matter of fact that the government is prosecuting Anwar for political reasons. In a public statement made on June 24, former Bar Council president (and U.S. Woman of Courage awardee in 2009) Ambiga Sreenvasan urged the government to drop the charges against Anwar in order to restore credibility to PM Najib's ruling coalition. Scenarios --------- ¶18. (C) When viewed as a political matter, a number of potential scenarios for the Anwar prosecution present themselves; below we review three that are most apparent. In these scenarios we assume that Najib will exercise the deciding voice on how and whether to proceed, though he also will need to weigh the opinions of other UMNO ruling party elites. -- Conviction at all costs: Based on an assessment that Anwar is a threat to UMNO's continued rule at least at the time of the next national elections, Najib and UMNO elites decide that the political costs of prosecuting Anwar are acceptable and pursue the matter aggressively inside and outside the courtroom with the overriding goal of convicting Anwar and removing him permanently from politics. While asserting that this is purely a law enforcement matter, the government exerts political pressure as necessary, accepting reputational risks in the process, and achieves a conviction after months of high-profile drama in the courtroom. The courts hear and reject Anwar's appeals in an expedited manner, well ahead of the next national elections in 2012 or ¶2013. This scenario appeared to be in play during the initial months of the case and in the lead up to Anwar's September 2008 deadline to overturn the ruling coalition's majority; it has been less apparent since then. Recalling the deep personal animosity between Najib and Anwar, and the singular importance of Anwar to the opposition coalition, this scenario remains plausible, even though Anwar's immediate threat to UMNO's rule has passed. -- Merits of the case, reputational damage: In a second scenario, the government proceeds with the prosecution but refrains from exerting undue pressure to achieve conviction, believing that the evidence presented and/or the court proceedings themselves will sufficiently damage Anwar's reputation and this will outweigh harm to the Najib administration's credibility. Conviction remains the desired outcome, supported by sufficient evidence, but the government accepts some risk of a final verdict of innocence after all appeals are heard. This scenario rests on the assumption of sufficiently clear evidence against Anwar that will swing public opinion in favor of the government even in the event of an eventual acquittal. Absent greater information on the government's evidence against Anwar, it is difficult to judge the prospects for this scenario. -- Withdrawal: In a third scenario, Najib and UMNO elites decide that the government's case is not strong enough to pursue, entails unacceptable political costs, or is no longer necessary because of the diminished threat from Anwar. The government withdraws the charges prior to the trial start of July 8, or shortly after the trial begins, possibly under conditions of "discharge not amounting to acquittal." (Lawyers tell us that such a discharge in theory would allow the government to reactivate the case at a future time, thus maintaining this as a lever over Anwar.) Najib, confident that he can beat back an opposition challenge in the next election, attributes the original decision to prosecute to the previous administration of Abdullah Badawi and takes credit for respecting the rule of law in this high profile case involving his determined political nemesis. In contrast to 2008, Najib's currently secure position as UMNO leader and Prime Minister, along with Anwar's diminished threat, make this scenario a political possibility, though some UMNO elites and perhaps Najib himself may not want to give up the opportunity to remove Anwar Ibrahim from politics once and for all. KEITH
ELECTION UPDATE: CAMPAIGNS HOLD FINAL RALLIES; NOW IT IS UP TO THE VOTERS
VZCZCXYZ0026 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHPE #1346/01 0971857 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 071857Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9651 INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3227 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9295 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ APR QUITO 0223 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0397 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6655 RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4198 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL UNCLAS LIMA 001346 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINR PE SUBJECT: ELECTION UPDATE: CAMPAIGNS HOLD FINAL RALLIES; NOW IT IS UP TO THE VOTERS REF: A. LIMA 1277 B. LIMA 1199 ---------- SUMMARY ---------- ¶1. (U) Presidential hopefuls ended their campaigns with a flourish, holding massive closing rallies on 4/6, the final day for campaigning before the 4/9 general elections. Two of the three leading candidates, Unidad Nacional's Lourdes Flores and APRA's Alan Garcia, addressed their supporters in Lima, while ultra-nationalist "outsider" Union por el Peru's (UPP) Ollanta Humala stayed true to his southern power base by staging his extravaganza in Arequipa. The final two weeks of the campaign saw the mud start to fly, albeit in moderate quantities, with most of the dirt aimed at Humala. Two "private" polls leaked to international news organizatins had contradictory results, raising uncertainty over the electorate's volatility as it heads for the ballot boxes. END SUMMARY. -------------- LOURDES FLORES -------------- ¶2. (U) Flores' raly attracted what the National Police estimated as 19,000 followers to the Campo de Marte park just off central Lima. Her speech concentrated on the positive message that her campaign focused on for the last two weeks: that Unidad Nacional stands for a change with "serenity," offering a "certain path and a sure destination," vowing to combat the marginalization of a large part of the population, provide honest and efficient government, and promote growth through enhancement of opportunities for small businesses. Flores also took swipes at her principle opponents, warning voters not to "hand over the country to adventurers and improvisers" (an allusion to Humala), nor "to repeat the old political, economic and social failures that only brought more hunger and desperation and fewer illusions" (a reference to Garcia's disastrous 1985-90 Government). ----------- ALAN GARCIA ----------- ¶3. (U) Garcia's rally attracted what the National Police estimated as 15,000 supporters to the Naval Heroes Plaza that fronts the Sheraton Hotel and Palace of Justice in downtown Lima. He sought to position APRA as the principle political force representing the center, between "the right wing of the great capitalists, although it is dressing itself up differently and assuming phrases at the last minute" (Flores) and "a mendacious agitator and demagogue who recently, at age 45, discovered nationalism" (Humala). He also sought to reassure non-Apristas that his government would be an inclusive one, open to working with other parties and staffing the bureaucracy with qualified technocrats. At previous stops in Puno, Tumbes and Trujillo during the last week of campaigning, Garcia delivered much the same message, but added local riffs. In Trujillo, an APRA stronghold, he paid homage to the party's martyrs. In Puno and Tumbes he promised to create free trade zones and expand agricultural credits. -------------- OLLANTA HUMALA -------------- ¶4. (U) Humala closed out his campaign in the central plaza in Arequipa before a crowd estimated by the National Police at 4,500. The day before he held a rally at the Naval Heroes Plaza in Lima, drawing an audience similar to Garcia's. The UPP candidate was clearly on the defensive, dedicating a major portion of his speech to address the numerous questions and accusations raised against him and his followers over the past two weeks, damning his accusers and claiming that the mass media is engaged in an anti-Humala campaign on behalf of the traditional parties and great business interests. ¶5. (U) Humala, his family and his entourage were the main focus of attention over the past two weeks of the campaign, with his political opponents and the media making hay over: -- UPP spokesman Daniel Abugattas calling First Lady Eliane Karp a "daughter of a whore," and accusing her of intervening with the Israeli Embassy to prevent Peruvians of Palestinian descent (Abugattas is one) from traveling to the West Bank and Gaza. Humala removed Abugattas as his spokesman, but rejected calls to kick him off the UPP's congressional list for Lima. -- Television commentator, renowned novelist, and self-professed bi-sexual Jaime Bayly's claim that when one of his staff asked Humala's father Isaac to appear on his TV program, the latter responded, "Tell that faggot that we are not going to go on his program and that when we are in the government we will have him shot." This followed on Humala's mother's comments in March that homosexuals should be executed (Ref B). -- Humala's claims that electoral authorities are conspiring to commit fraud to prevent his election, pointing to the latters' failure to provide a mechanism that would enable on-duty military and police personnel to vote, and his threat to have his supporters take to the street if this occurs. Election authorities and OAS Observer Mission head Lloyd Axworthy responded by dismissing the possibility of fraud. Axworthy also minimized the importance of the affected personnel not being able to cast ballots, noting that they represent less than one percent of the national vote, and that their dedication to security duties will enable the rest of the Peruvian population to vote in safety. -- Media reports published on 3/31 that at least three retired military officers serving important functions in Humala's campaign (Colonels Adrian Villafuerte, Estuardo Loyola, and Luis Pinto) served in positions of confidence for generals linked closely to imprisoned former National Security Advisor Vladimiro Montesinos. -- Humala's Second Vice President running mate Carlos Torres having lunch on 4/2 with TV magnate (Channel 5) Genaro Delgado Parker only a few hours after Humala vowed that "shameless" media owners who owe the government millions of dollars (Delgado Parker reportedly has debts to the GOP of some USD 10 million) will be called on to pay up under his administration. Humala claimed that Torres met with Delgado Parker without his knowledge, and subsequently issued instructions that UPP candidates and officials may not/not meet with media owners or business tycoons without his prior approval. -- Humala's interview with Argentine daily "Pagina 12," which the Lima media picked up on 4/5, that if Lourdes Flores wins, "What would happen is what happened to presidents of other Latin American countries who were removed by the people. I think that it will be very difficult for Lourdes Flores to manage to complete one year of government." Flores, Garcia and media commentators leapt on this quote as signifying that Humala was prepared employ non-democratic means to obtain power should he be defeated at the ballot box. His critics generally ignored his qualification later in the interview that any candidate "who represents continuity" would last a year in office if they did not address social demands. -- Humala's involvement in criminal investigations. He has been summoned to testify on 4/24 in the criminal trial of his brother Antauro for the latter's leadership of the 1/1/05 Andahuaylas uprising. In addition, Tocache prosecutor Arturo Campos has said he intends to call Humala to testify in mid-April in connection with the allegations that he committed human rights violations when commanding an Army base in the Huallaga Valley in 1992. -- Humala's admission that he was planning to visit a factory belonging to Samuel and Mendel Winter, two media owners who were convicted and sentenced to jail terms for accepting bribes from Montesinos, and whose parole status is being reviewed by a criminal court over their failure to pay a multi-million dollar fine. -- News that Salomon Lerner Ghitis, Humala's liaison to the business community, recently met with the newly appointed Chilean Ambassador to Peru, Christian Barros, in Santiago raised speculation as to possible dealings between the ultra-nationalist Humala and the country's southern neighbor. Humala dismissed the importance of these reports, stating that Lerner's trip and meetings were related to the latter's business and had nothing to do with the UPP campaign. -- Allegations that first surfaced on 4/5, charging that retired Major Italo Ponce, a senior Humala campaign advisor, visited imprisoned Montesinos crony Oscar Lopez Meneses in jail to negotiate the conformation of UPP's congressional list. The weekly "Caretas" published an expose on 4/7, in which a witness, businessman Augusto Vega, claimed to have participated in these discussions. Vega had been involved in the UPP campaign until January of this year when he left, he says, because of the Montesinos connection (NOTE: We have also heard that Vega broke with Humala after being passed over as a congressional candidate. END NOTE). -- A 4/6 report by the news magazine "La Ventana Indiscreta" in which retired National Police Colonel Cesar Mojorovich, who was in charge of the local police station when Humala staged his 10/27/2000 "uprising" in Locumba, claimed that Humala's action was a sham designed to distract the government's and public's attention from Montesinos, who chose that same day to make his escape from Peru on a boat. Mojorovich's account does not/not appear to add anything new to these allegations, which have been aired ever since Humala's "uprising" took place, but it does have the effect of bringing this issue to the fore again at a critical moment of the campaign. Perhaps not coincidentally, Mojorovich is being accompanied by leading members of the Independent Moralizing Front (FIM) party, which has been an outspoken critic of Humala. ----------------- THE PRIVATE POLLS ----------------- ¶6. (U) The Organic Election Law prohibits the public diffusion of poll results for a week before the election. This prevents the local media from publishing polls during this period, but it does not/not prevent the polling organizations or their private clients from leaking the results to the international press so that the news gets back to a Peruvian audience. Such has occurred with respect to two polls carried out by the Apoyo and CPI consultancies. The Apoyo poll was based on interviews in Lima and urban areas taken on 4/3 and combined with rural results from the poll published on 4/2 (Ref A), has Humala at 31 percent with Flores and Garcia tied at 23 percent. The CPI poll, taken nationally on 4/4, found a technical tie, with the top three candidates within a range of less than three percent: Flores 27.6 percent, Humala 25.9 percent and Garcia 24.9 percent. ---------- COMMENT ---------- ¶7. (SBU) With active campaigning at an end, it now is up to the electorate to judge the candidates at the ballot box. One unanswered question is whether the constant political and media assaults on Humala will penetrate his Teflon shield and wear away at his support (as the CPI poll reports and as the previous Apoyo poll hinted was starting to occur - Ref A), or whether his base of committed followers will remain unchanged (as the latest Apoyo poll suggests). The other major issues in play are whether Flores has managed to arrest or reverse her steady decline, and whether Garcia can maintain his final sprint for the finish line and make it into the second round. The answers will come on 4/9. END COMMENT. STRUBLE
CONFIDENTIAL: PROMINENT BLOGGER FLEES SEDITION TRIAL
VZCZCXRO3036 PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH DE RUEHKL #0323 1200954 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 300954Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2661 INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0613 RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L KUALA LUMPUR 000323 SIPDIS FOR EAP/MTS AND DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019 TAGS: PHUM PINS PGOV KJUS KDEM UK MY SUBJECT: PROMINENT BLOGGER FLEES SEDITION TRIAL REF: A. 08 KL 990 - RAJA PETRA RELEASED FROM ISA ¶B. 08 KL 846 - UPDATE ON RAJA PETRA DETENTION ¶C. 08 KL 806 - JOURNALIST DETAINED UNDER ISA Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d). Summary and Comment ------------------- ¶1. (C) Prominent blogger and government critic Raja Petra Kamarudin, who was jailed for two months in 2008 under the Internal Security Act (ISA), failed to appear for his sedition trail on April 23, and the court subsequently issued a warrant for his arrest. A member of his defense team informed poloff that Raja Petra, along with his wife, fled to the United Kingdom about two months ago on the belief that he would face eventual imprisonment for sedition. ¶2. (SBU) Comment: Raja Petra, Malaysia's most controversial on-line voice, will continue to be a nuisance to Prime Minister Najib's administration. Not expecting to return to Malaysia anytime soon, we can expect Raja Petra to ratchet up his criticism and purported exposes during his self-imposed exile. End Summary and Comment. Where is Raja Petra? -------------------- ¶3. (SBU) Raja Petra Kamarudin, an outspoken blogger and member of the Selangor state royal family failed to appear at Sessions Court for the continuation of his sedition trial on April 23. The court subsequently issued a warrant for his arrest. Raja Petra faced charges under the Sedition Act for articles he posted on his website, Malaysia Today, regarding the high-profile Altantuya murder case and the victim's alleged ties to Prime Minister Najib and his wife. If convicted of sedition, he faces a maximum sentence of three years in jail. ¶4. (U) On April 23, Raja Petra posted on his website his reasons for not appearing in court. He claimed Malaysian authorities intended to detain him under the ISA, as the Government had done in September 2008 (ref A-C). He also stated the courts were unable to provide him with a fair trial and noted the government was using sedition charges and criminal defamation charges, in addition to detaining him under ISA, for linking the Prime Minister to the murdered Mongolian national Altantuya. Raja Petra also mentioned that he had angered the Selangor royal family with his criticism of the Sultan of Perak related to the ruling coalition's takeover of Perak state government from the opposition, and therefore could not return to Selangor. Lawyer Confirms Departure for UK -------------------------------- ¶5. (C) Poloff met with one of Raja Petra's lead lawyers on April 23. The lawyer disclosed that following Raja Petra's last appearance in court in February Raja Petra's legal team concluded their client would be found guilty and imprisoned under the sedition charges, and informed Raja Petra accordingly. The lawyer claimed that the ruling coalition's political influence over the court proceedings precluded a fair trail. He said that Raja Petra, who holds both Malaysian and British passports, along with his wife had left for the UK some two months ago and remained there. His departure was kept closely guarded with Raja Petra's closest friends remaining in the dark. The lawyer said it was unclear if the Attorney General's Office realized Raja Petra had left Malaysia, as the prosecutor's public statements indicated he was still in the country. After the court's issuance of an arrest warrant for Raja Petra, and a "show cause notice" for his wife as bail guarantor, some on-line articles suggested Raja Petra was in the UK. KEITH
TOP-SECRET FROM THE NATION SECURITY ARCHIVES: UPRISING IN EASTERN GERMANY
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TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI – THE FBI HISTORY
fbi_history_part01
Click on FBI files above
Federal Bureau of Investigation
| Federal Bureau of Investigation | |||
| Common name | Federal Bureau of Investigation | ||
| Abbreviation | FBI | ||
| Seal of the Federal Bureau of Investigation | |||
| Motto | Fidelity, Bravery, Integrity | ||
| Agency overview | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Formed | 1908 | ||
| Employees | 35,437[1] (May 31, 2011) | ||
| Annual budget | 7.9 billion USD (2010)[1] | ||
| Legal personality | Governmental: Government agency | ||
| Jurisdictional structure | |||
| Federal agency (Operations jurisdiction) |
United States | ||
| Legal jurisdiction | As per operations jurisdiction. | ||
| Governing body | United States Congress | ||
| Constituting instrument | United States Code Title 28 Part II Chapter 33 | ||
| General nature |
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| Operational structure | |||
| Headquarters | J. Edgar Hoover Building,Washington, D.C. | ||
| Sworn members | 13,963 (May 31, 2011)[1] | ||
| Unsworn members | 21,474 (May 31, 2011)[1] | ||
| Agency executives |
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| Child agencies | |||
| Major units | |||
| Field offices | 56 (List of FBI Field Offices) | ||
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| Website | |||
| fbi.gov | |||
| view · talk · edit this information |
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is an agency of the United States Department of Justice that serves as both a federal criminal investigative body and an internal intelligence agency (counterintelligence). The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over violations of more than 200 categories of federal crime.[2] Its mottois a backronym of FBI, “Fidelity, Bravery, Integrity”.
The FBI’s headquarters, the J. Edgar Hoover Building, is located in Washington, D.C. Fifty-six field offices are located in major cities throughout the United States as well as over 400 resident agencies in smaller cities and towns across the country. More than 50 international offices called “legal attachés” are in U.S. embassies worldwide.
Contents[hide] |
Mission and priorities
In the fiscal year 2010, the FBI’s minimum budget was approximately $7.9 billion, including $618 million in program increases to counter-terrorism andsurveillance, fighting cyber crime, white-collar crime, and training programs.[3]
The FBI was established in 1908 as the Bureau of Investigation (BOI). Its name was changed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1935.
The FBI’s main goal is to protect and defend the United States, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners.[2]
Currently, the FBI’s top investigative priorities are:[4]
- Protect the United States from terrorist attacks (see counter-terrorism);
- Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage (see counter-intelligence);
- Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes (see cyber-warfare);
- Combat public corruption at all levels;
- Protect civil rights;
- Combat transnational/national criminal organizations and enterprises (see organized crime);
- Combat major white-collar crime;
- Combat significant violent crime;
- Support federal, state, local and international partners;
- Upgrade technology for successful performance of the FBI’s mission.
In August 2007, the top categories of lead criminal charges resulting from FBI investigations were:[5]
- Bank robbery and incidental crimes (107 charges)
- Drugs (104 charges)
- Attempt and conspiracy (81 charges)
- Material involving sexual exploitation of minors (53 charges)
- Mail fraud – frauds and swindles (51 charges)
- Bank fraud (31 charges)
- Prohibition of illegal gambling businesses (22 charges)
- Fraud by wire, radio, or television (20 charges)
- Hobbs Act (Robbery and extortion affecting interstate commerce) (17 charges)
- Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)-prohibited activities (17 charges)
Indian reservations
The federal government has the primary responsibility for investigating[6] and prosecuting serious crime on Indian reservations.[7]
The FBI has criminal jurisdiction in “Indian Country” (the official name for the program) for major crimes under the “Indian Country” Crimes Act (Title 18, United States Code, Section 1152), the Indian Country Major Crimes Act (Title 18, United States Code, Section 1153), and the Assimilative Crimes Act (Title 18, United States Code, Section 13). The 1994 Crime Act expanded federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country in such areas as guns, violent juveniles, drugs, and domestic violence. Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the FBI has jurisdiction over any criminal act directly related to casino gaming. The FBI also investigates civil rights violations, environmental crimes, public corruption, and government fraud occurring in “Indian Country.”[8]
The FBI does not specifically list crimes in Native American land as one of its priorities.[9] Often serious crimes have been either poorly investigated or prosecution has been declined. Tribal courts can only impose sentences of up to three years, and even then under certain restrictions.[10][11]
Indian reservations often use their own investigative agency for crimes within its reservations, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which is an agency of the U.S. Department of the Interior.
Legal authority
The FBI’s mandate is established in Title 28 of the United States Code (U.S. Code), Section 533, which authorizes the Attorney General to “appoint officials to detect… crimes against the United States.”[12] Other federal statutes give the FBI the authority and responsibility to investigate specific crimes.
J. Edgar Hoover began using wiretapping in the 1920s during Prohibition to arrest bootleggers.[13] A 1927 case in which a bootlegger was caught through telephone tapping went to the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that the FBI could use wiretaps in its investigations and did not violate the Fourth Amendment as unlawful search and seizure as long as the FBI did not break in to a person’s home to complete the tapping.[13] After Prohibition’s repeal,Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934, which outlawed non-consensual phone tapping, but allowed bugging.[13] In another Supreme Court case, the court ruled in 1939 that due to the 1934 law, evidence the FBI obtained by phone tapping was inadmissible in court.[13] A 1967 Supreme Court decision overturned the 1927 case allowing bugging, after which Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, allowing public authorities to tap telephones during investigations, as long as they obtain a warrant beforehand.[13]
The FBI’s chief tool against organized crime is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. The FBI is also charged with the responsibility of enforcing compliance of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 and investigating violations of the act in addition to prosecuting such violations with the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). The FBI also shares concurrent jurisdiction with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970.
The USA PATRIOT Act increased the powers allotted to the FBI, especially in wiretapping and monitoring of Internet activity. One of the most controversial provisions of the act is the so-called sneak and peekprovision, granting the FBI powers to search a house while the residents are away, and not requiring them to notify the residents for several weeks afterwards. Under the PATRIOT Act’s provisions the FBI also resumed inquiring into the library records[14] of those who are suspected of terrorism (something it had supposedly not done since the 1970s).
In the early 1980s, Senate hearings were held to examine FBI undercover operations in the wake of the Abscam controversy, which had allegations of entrapment of elected officials. As a result in following years a number of guidelines were issued to constrain FBI activities.
A March 2007 report by the inspector general of the Justice Department described the FBI’s “widespread and serious misuse” of national security letters, a form of administrative subpoena used to demand records and data pertaining to individuals. The report said that between 2003 and 2005 the FBI had issued more than 140,000 national security letters, many involving people with no obvious connections to terrorism.[15]
Information obtained through an FBI investigation is presented to the appropriate U.S. Attorney or Department of Justice official, who decides if prosecution or other action is warranted.
The FBI often works in conjunction with other Federal agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in seaport and airport security,[16] and the National Transportation Safety Board in investigating airplane crashes and other critical incidents. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the only other agency with the closest amount of investigative power. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the FBI maintains a role in most federal criminal investigations.
History
Beginnings: The Bureau of Investigation
In 1886, the Supreme Court, in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois, found that the states had no power to regulate interstate commerce. The resulting Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 created a Federal responsibility for interstate law enforcement. The Justice Department made little effort to relieve its staff shortage until the turn of the century, when Attorney General Charles Joseph Bonaparte reached out to other agencies, including the Secret Service, for investigators. But the Congress forbade this use of Treasury employees by Justice, passing a law to that effect in 1908. So the Attorney General moved to organize a formal Bureau of Investigation (BOI or BI), complete with its own staff of special agents. The Secret Service provided the Department of Justice 12 Special Agents and these agents became the first Agents in the new BOI. Thus, the first FBI agents were actually Secret Service agents. Its jurisdiction derived from the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.[17][18] The FBI grew out of this force of special agents created on July 26, 1908 during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. Its first official task was visiting and making surveys of the houses of prostitution in preparation for enforcing the “White Slave Traffic Act,” orMann Act, passed on June 25, 1910. In 1932, it was renamed the United States Bureau of Investigation. The following year it was linked to the Bureau of Prohibition and rechristened the Division of Investigation (DOI) before finally becoming an independent service within the Department of Justice in 1935.[17] In the same year, its name was officially changed from the Division of Investigation to the present-day Federal Bureau of Investigation, or FBI.
The J. Edgar Hoover Directorship
J. Edgar Hoover, FBI Director from 1924 to 1972.
Lester J. Gillis, also known as “Baby Face” Nelson.
The Director of the BOI, J. Edgar Hoover, became the first FBI Director and served for 48 years combined with the BOI, DOI, and FBI. After Hoover’s death, legislation was passed limiting the tenure of future FBI Directors to a maximum of ten years. The Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, or the FBI Laboratory, officially opened in 1932, largely as a result of Hoover’s efforts. Hoover had substantial involvement in most cases and projects the FBI handled during his tenure.
During the “War on Crime” of the 1930s, FBI agents apprehended or killed a number of notorious criminals who carried out kidnappings, robberies, and murders throughout the nation, including John Dillinger, “Baby Face” Nelson, Kate “Ma” Barker, Alvin “Creepy” Karpis, and George “Machine Gun” Kelly.
Other activities of its early decades included a decisive role in reducing the scope and influence of the Ku Klux Klan. Additionally, through the work of Edwin Atherton, the FBI claimed success in apprehending an entire army of Mexican neo-revolutionaries along the California border in the 1920s.
The FBI and national security
Beginning in the 1940s and continuing into the 1970s, the Bureau investigated cases of espionage against the United States and its allies. Eight Nazi agents who had planned sabotage operations against American targets were arrested, six of whom were executed (Ex parte Quirin). Also during this time, a joint US/UK code breaking effort (Venona)—with which the FBI was heavily involved—broke Soviet diplomatic and intelligence communications codes, allowing the US and British governments to read Soviet communications. This effort confirmed the existence of Americans working in the United States for Soviet intelligence.[19] Hoover was administering this project but failed to notify the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) until 1952. Another notable case is the arrest of Soviet spy Rudolf Abel in 1957.[20] The discovery of Soviet spies operating in the US allowed Hoover to pursue his longstanding obsession with the threat he perceived from the American Left, ranging from Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) union organizers to American liberals with no revolutionary aspirations whatsoever.
The FBI and the civil-rights movement
During the 1950s and 1960s, FBI officials became increasingly concerned about the influence of civil rights leaders. In 1956, for example, Hoover took the rare step of sending an open letter denouncing Dr. T.R.M. Howard, a civil rights leader, surgeon, and wealthy entrepreneur in Mississippi who had criticized FBI inaction in solving recent murders of George W. Lee, Emmett Till, and other blacks in the South.[21] The FBI carried out controversial domestic surveillance in an operation it called theCOINTELPRO, which was short for “COunter-INTELligence PROgram.”[22] It aimed at investigating and disrupting dissident political organizations within the United States, including both militant and non-violent organizations, including the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, a leading civil rights organization.[23]
Martin Luther King, Jr. was a frequent target of investigation. In his 1991 memoirs, Washington Post journalist Carl Rowan asserted that the FBI had sent at least one anonymous letter to King encouraging him to commit suicide.[24]
In March 1971, a Media, Pennsylvania FBI resident office was robbed; the thieves took secret files and distributed them to a range of newspapers including the Harvard Crimson.[25] The files detailed the FBI’s extensive COINTELPRO program, which included investigations into lives of ordinary citizens—including a black student group at a Pennsylvania military college and the daughter of Congressman Henry Reuss of Wisconsin.[25] The country was “jolted” by the revelations, and the actions were denounced by members of Congress including House Majority Leader Hale Boggs.[25] The phones of some members of Congress, including Boggs, had allegedly been tapped.[25]
The FBI and Kennedy’s assassination
When President John F. Kennedy was shot and killed, the jurisdiction fell to the local police departments until President Lyndon B. Johnson directed the FBI to take over the investigation.[26] To ensure that there would never be any more confusion over who would handle homicides at the federal level, Congress passed a law that put investigations of deaths of federal officials within FBI jurisdiction.
The FBI and organized crime
In response to organized crime, on August 25, 1953, the Top Hoodlum Program was created. It asked all field offices to gather information on mobsters in their territories and to report it regularly to Washington for a centralized collection of intelligence on racketeers.[27] After the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO Act, took effect, the FBI began investigating the former Prohibition-organized groups, which had become fronts for crime in major cities and even small towns. All of the FBI work was done undercover and from within these organizations using the provisions provided in the RICO Act and these groups were dismantled. Although Hoover initially denied the existence of a National Crime Syndicate in the United States, the Bureau later conducted operations against known organized crime syndicates and families, including those headed by Sam Giancana and John Gotti. The RICO Act is still used today for all organized crime and any individuals that might fall under the Act.
However, in 2003 a congressional committee called the FBI’s organized crime informant program “one of the greatest failures in the history of federal law enforcement.” The FBI allowed four innocent men to be convicted of murder while protecting an informant in March 1965. Three of the men were sentenced to death (which was later reduced to life in prison). The fourth defendant was sentenced to life in prison, where he spent three decades.[28] In July 2007, U.S. District Judge Nancy Gertner in Boston found the bureau helped convict the four men of the March 1965 gangland murder of Edward “Teddy” Deegan. The U.S. Government was ordered to pay $100 million in damages to the four defendants.[29]
Notable post-Hoover reorganizations
Special FBI teams
In 1984, the FBI formed an elite unit[30] to help with problems that might arise at the 1984 Summer Olympics, particularly terrorism and major-crime. The formation of the team arose from the 1972 Summer Olympics at Munich, Germany when terrorists murdered Israeli Athletes. The team was named Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and acts as the FBI lead for a national SWAT team in related procedures and all counter terrorism cases. Also formed in 1984 was the Computer Analysis and Response Team (CART).[31] The end of the 1980s and the early part of the 1990s saw the reassignment of over 300 agents from foreign counter intelligence duties to violent crime, and the designation of violent crime as the sixth national priority. But with reduced cuts to other well-established departments, and because terrorism was no longer considered a threat after the end of the Cold War,[31] the FBI became a tool of local police forces for tracking fugitives who had crossed state lines, a felony. The FBI Laboratory also helped develop DNA testing, continuing the pioneering role in identification that began with its fingerprinting system in 1924.
Notable efforts in the 1990s
An FBI Agent tags the cockpit voice recorder from EgyptAir Flight 990 on the deck of the USS Grapple (ARS 53) at the crash site on November 13, 1999.
Between 1993 and 1996, the FBI increased its counter-terrorism role in the wake of the first 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York, New York and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and the arrest of the Unabomber in 1996. Technological innovation and the skills of FBI Laboratory analysts helped ensure that all three of these cases were successfully prosecuted, but the FBI was also confronted by a public outcry in this period, which still haunts it today.[32] In the early and late 1990s, the FBI role in the Ruby Ridge and Waco incidents caused an uproar over the killings. During the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia, the FBI was also criticized for its investigation on the Centennial Olympic Park bombing. It has settled a dispute with Richard Jewell, who was a private security guard at the venue, along with some media organizations,[33] in regards to the leaking of his name during the investigation. After Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA, 1994), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, 1996), and the Economic Espionage Act (EEA, 1996), the FBI followed suit and underwent a technological upgrade in 1998, just as it did with its CART team in 1991. Computer Investigations and Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center (CITAC) and the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) were created to deal with the increase in Internet-related problems, such as computer viruses, worms, and other malicious programs that might unleash havoc in the US. With these developments, the FBI increased its electronic surveillance in public safety and national security investigations, adapting to how telecommunications advancements changed the nature of such problems.
September 11th attacks
Within months of the September 11 attacks in 2001, FBI Director Robert Mueller, who had only been sworn in one week before the attacks, called for a re-engineering of FBI structure and operations. In turn, he made countering every federal crime a top priority, including the prevention of terrorism, countering foreign intelligence operations, addressing cyber security threats, other high-tech crimes, protecting civil rights, combating public corruption, organized crime, white-collar crime, and major acts of violent crime.[34]
In February 2001, Robert Hanssen was caught selling information to the Russian government. It was later learned that Hanssen, who had reached a high position within the FBI, had been selling intelligence since as early as 1979. He pleaded guilty to treason and received a life sentence in 2002, but the incident led many to question the security practices employed by the FBI. There was also a claim that Robert Hanssen might have contributed information that led to the September 11, 2001 attacks.[35]
The 9/11 Commission‘s final report on July 22, 2004 stated that the FBI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were both partially to blame for not pursuing intelligence reports which could have prevented the September 11, 2001 attacks. In its most damning assessment, the report concluded that the country had “not been well served” by either agency and listed numerous recommendations for changes within the FBI.[36] While the FBI has acceded to most of the recommendations, including oversight by the new Director of National Intelligence, some former members of the 9/11 Commission publicly criticized the FBI in October 2005, claiming it was resisting any meaningful changes.[37]
On July 8, 2007 the Washington Post published excerpts from UCLA Professor Amy Zegart’s book Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11.[38] The article reported that government documents show the CIA and FBI missed 23 potential chances to disrupt the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The primary reasons for these failures included: agency cultures resistant to change and new ideas; inappropriate incentives for promotion; and a lack of cooperation between the FBI, CIA and the rest of the United States Intelligence Community. The article went on to also blame the FBI’s decentralized structure which prevented effective communication and cooperation between different FBI offices. The article also claimed that the FBI has still not evolved into an effective counterterrorism or counterintelligence agency, due in large part to deeply ingrained cultural resistance to change within the FBI. For example, FBI personnel practices continue to treat all staff other than Special Agents as support staff, categorizing Intelligence Analysts alongside the FBI’s auto mechanics and janitors.[39]Organization and Rank structure
The FBI is organized into five functional branches and the Office of the Director, which contains most administrative offices. Each branch is managed by an Executive Assistant Director. Each office and division within the branch is managed by an Assistant Director.
- Office of the Director
- Office of Congressional Affairs
- Office of Equal Employment Opportunity Affairs
- Office of the General Counsel
- Office of Integrity and Compliance
- Office of the Ombudsman
- Office of Professional Responsibility
- Office of Public Affairs
- Inspection Division
- Facilities and Logistics Services Division
- Finance Division
- Records Management Division
- Resource Planning Office
- Security Division
- National Security Branch
- Counterintelligence Division
- Counterterrorism Division
- Directorate of Intelligence
- Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate
- Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch
- Criminal Investigative Division
- Cyber Division (Director: Gordon M Snow)
- Critical Incident Response Group
- Office of International Operations (Director: Joseph M. Demarest)
- Office of Law Enforcement Coordination
- Human Resources Branch
- Training Division
- Human Resources Division
- Science and Technology Branch
- Criminal Justice Information Services Division
- Laboratory Division
- Operational Technology Division
- Special Technologies and Applications Office
- Information and Technology Branch
- Information Technology Operations Division
- Office of IT Policy & Planning
- Office of IT Program Management
- Office of IT Systems Development
- Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer
The following is a complete listing of the rank structure found within the FBI;[40]
- Probationary Agent
- Special Agent
- Senior Special Agent
- Supervisory Special Agent
- Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAC)
- Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC)
- Assistant Director
- Associate Executive Assistant Director
- Executive Assistant Director
- Deputy Chief of Staff
- Chief of Staff & Senior Counsel to the Director
- Associate Deputy Director
- Deputy Director
- Director
Infrastructure
J. Edgar Hoover Building, FBI Headquarters
FBI Mobile Command Center, Washington Field Office
The FBI is headquartered at the J. Edgar Hoover Building in Washington, D.C., with 56 field offices[41] in major cities across the United States. The FBI also maintains over 400 resident agencies across the United States, as well as over 50 legal attachés at United States embassies and consulates. Many specialized FBI functions are located at facilities in Quantico, Virginia, as well as a “data campus” in Clarksburg, West Virginia, where 96 million sets of fingerprints “from across the United States are stored, along with others collected by American authorities from prisoners in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan.”[42] The FBI is in process of moving its Records Management Division, which processes Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, to Winchester, Virginia.[43]
According to the Washington Post, the FBI “is building a vast repository controlled by people who work in a top-secret vault on the fourth floor of the J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building in Washington. This one stores the profiles of tens of thousands of Americans and legal residents who are not accused of any crime. What they have done is appear to be acting suspiciously to a town sheriff, a traffic cop or even a neighbor.”[42]
The FBI Laboratory, established with the formation of the BOI,[44] did not appear in the J. Edgar Hoover Building until its completion in 1974. The lab serves as the primary lab for most DNA, biological, and physical work. Public tours of FBI headquarters ran through the FBI laboratory workspace before the move to the J. Edgar Hoover Building. The services the lab conducts include Chemistry, Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), Computer Analysis and Response, DNA Analysis, Evidence Response, Explosives, Firearms and Tool marks, Forensic Audio, Forensic Video, Image Analysis, Forensic Science Research, Forensic Science Training, Hazardous Materials Response, Investigative and Prospective Graphics, Latent Prints, Materials Analysis, Questioned Documents, Racketeering Records, Special Photographic Analysis, Structural Design, and Trace Evidence.[45] The services of the FBI Laboratory are used by many state, local, and international agencies free of charge. The lab also maintains a second lab at the FBI Academy.
The FBI Academy, located in Quantico, Virginia, is home to the communications and computer laboratory the FBI utilizes. It is also where new agents are sent for training to become FBI Special Agents. Going through the twenty-one week course is required for every Special Agent.[46] It was first opened for use in 1972 on 385 acres (1.6 km2) of woodland. The Academy also serves as a classroom for state and local law enforcement agencies who are invited onto the premiere law enforcement training center. The FBI units that reside at Quantico are the Field and Police Training Unit, Firearms Training Unit, Forensic Science Research and Training Center, Technology Services Unit (TSU), Investigative Training Unit, Law Enforcement Communication Unit, Leadership and Management Science Units (LSMU), Physical Training Unit, New Agents’ Training Unit (NATU), Practical Applications Unit (PAU), the Investigative Computer Training Unit and the “College of Analytical Studies.”
In 2000, the FBI began the Trilogy project to upgrade its outdated information technology (IT) infrastructure. This project, originally scheduled to take three years and cost around $380 million, ended up going far over budget and behind schedule.[47] Efforts to deploy modern computers and networking equipment were generally successful, but attempts to develop new investigation software, outsourced to Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), were a disaster. Virtual Case File, or VCF, as the software was known, was plagued by poorly defined goals, and repeated changes in management.[48] In January 2005, more than two years after the software was originally planned for completion, the FBI officially abandoned the project. At least $100 million (and much more by some estimates) was spent on the project, which was never operational. The FBI has been forced to continue using its decade-old Automated Case Support system, which is considered woefully inadequate by IT experts. In March 2005, the FBI announced it is beginning a new, more ambitious software project code-named Sentinel expected for completion by 2009.[49]
Carnivore was an electronic eavesdropping software system implemented by the Federal Bureau of Investigation during the Clinton administration that was designed to monitor email and electronic communications. After prolonged negative coverage in the press, the FBI changed the name of its system from “Carnivore” to the more benign-sounding “DCS1000.” DCS is reported to stand for “Digital Collection System”; the system has the same functions as before. The Associated Press reported in mid-January 2005 that the FBI essentially abandoned the use of Carnivore in 2001, in favor of commercially available software, such as NarusInsight.
The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division,[50] located in Clarksburg, West Virginia. It is the youngest division of the FBI only being formed in 1991 and opening in 1995. The complex itself is the length of three football fields. Its purpose is to provide a main repository for information. Under the roof of the CJIS are the programs for the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR),Fingerprint Identification, Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), NCIC 2000, and the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). Many state and local agencies use these systems as a source for their own investigations and contribute to the database using secure communications. FBI provides these tools of sophisticated identification and information services to local, state, federal, and international law enforcement agencies.
FBI is in charge of National Virtual Translation Center which provides “timely and accurate translations of foreign intelligence for all elements of the Intelligence Community.”
FBI agents from the Washington Field Office with a tactical vehicle standing by for the 2009 Presidential Inauguration
Faulty bullet lead analysis testimony
For over 40 years, the FBI crime lab in Quantico believed lead in bullets had unique chemical signatures, and that by breaking them down and analyzing them, it was possible to match bullets, not only to a single batch of ammunition coming out of a factory, but to a single box of bullets. The National Academy of Sciences conducted an 18-month independent review of comparative bullet-lead analysis. In 2003, its National Research Council published a report calling into question 30 years of FBI testimony. It found the model the FBI used for interpreting results was deeply flawed and that the conclusion that bullet fragments could be matched to a box of ammunition so overstated, that it was misleading under the rules of evidence. One year later, the FBI decided to stop doing bullet lead analysis.
After a 60 Minutes/Washington Post investigation in November 2007, (two years later) the bureau agreed to identify, review, and release all of the pertinent cases, and notify prosecutors about cases in which faulty testimony was given.[51]
Personnel
As of December 31, 2009, the FBI had a total of 33,852 employees. That includes 13,412 special agents and 20,420 support professionals, such as intelligence analysts, language specialists, scientists, information technology specialists, and other professionals.[52]
The Officer Down Memorial Page provides the biographies of 58 FBI officers killed in the line of duty from 1925 to 2011.[53]
Hiring process
Agents in training on the FBI Academyfiring range
In order to apply to become an FBI agent, an applicant must be between the ages of 23 and 37. However, due to the decision in Robert P. Isabella v. Department of State and Office of Personnel Management, 2008 M.S.P.B. 146, preference eligible veterans may apply after age 37. In 2009, the Office of Personnel Management issued implementation guidance on the Isabella decision: OPM Letter The applicant must also hold American citizenship, have a clean record, and hold a four-year bachelors degree. All FBI employees require a Top Secret (TS) security clearance, and in many instances, employees need a higher level, TS/SCI(Top Secret/SensitiveCompartmented Information) clearance.[54] In order to get a security clearance, all potential FBI personnel must pass a series of Single Scope Background Investigations(SSBI), which are conducted by the Office of Personnel Management.[55] Special Agents candidates also have to pass a Physical Fitness Test (PFT) that includes a 300-meter run, one-minute sit-ups, maximum push-ups, and a 1.5-mile (2.4 km) run. There is also a polygraph test personnel have to pass, with questions including possible drug use.
After potential special agent candidates are cleared with TS clearance and the Form SF-312 non-disclosure agreement is signed, they attend the FBI training facility located on Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia. Candidates spend approximately 21 weeks at the FBI Academy, where they receive over 500 classroom hours and over 1,000 simulated law enforcement hours to train. Upon graduation, new FBI Special Agents are placed all around the country and the world, depending on their areas of expertise. Professional support staff works out of one of the many support buildings the FBI maintains. However, any Agent or Support staff member can be transferred to any location for any length of time if their skills are deemed necessary at one of the FBI field offices or one of the 400 resident agencies the FBI maintains.
BOI and FBI directors
FBI Directors are appointed by the President of the United States. They must be confirmed by the United States Senate and serve ten-year terms unless they resign or are fired by the President before their term is up. J. Edgar Hoover, appointed by Calvin Coolidge in 1924, was by far the longest-serving FBI Director, serving until his death in 1972. In 1968, Congress passed legislation as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act Pub.L. 90-351, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 197 that specified a 10-year term limit for future FBI Directors, as well as requiring Senate confirmation of appointees. As the incumbent, this legislation did not apply to Hoover, only to his successors. The current FBI Director is Robert Mueller, who was appointed in 2001 by George W. Bush.
The FBI director is responsible for the day-to-day operations at the FBI. Along with his deputies, the director makes sure cases and operations are handled correctly. The director also is in charge of making sure the leadership in any one of the FBI field offices are manned with qualified agents. Before the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was passed in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the FBI director would brief the President of the United States on any issues that arise from within the FBI. Since then, the director now reports to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who in turn reports to the President.
Weapons
An FBI Special Agent is issued a Glock Model 22 pistol in .40 S&W caliber upon successful completion of their training at the FBI Academy. Glock Models 17, 19 and 26 in 9mm Luger, Models 23, and 27 in .40 S&W caliber are authorized as a secondary weapon. Special Agents are authorized to purchase and qualify with the Glock Model 21 in .45 ACP for duty carry. Special Agents of the FBI HRT (Hostage Rescue Team), and regional SWAT teams are issued the Springfield Model 1911A1 .45 ACP Pistol. (See article FBI Special Weapons and Tactics Teams)
Publications
The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin is published monthly by the FBI Law Enforcement Communication Unit,[56] with articles of interest to state and local law enforcement personnel. First published in 1932 asFugitives Wanted by Police,[57] the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin covers topics including law enforcement technology and issues, such as crime mapping and use of force, as well as recent criminal justiceresearch, and Vi-CAP alerts, on wanted suspects and key cases.
The FBI also publishes some reports for both law enforcement personnel as well as regular citizens covering topics including law enforcement, terrorism, cybercrime, white-collar crime, violent crime, and statistics.[58] However, the vast majority of Federal government publications covering these topics are published by the Office of Justice Programs agencies of the United States Department of Justice, and disseminated through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service.
Crime statistics
In the 1920s, the FBI began issuing crime reports by gathering numbers from local police departments.[59] Due to limitations of this system found during the 1960s and 1970s—victims often simply did not report crimes to the police in the first place—the Department of Justice developed an alternate method of tallying crime, the victimization survey.[59]
Uniform Crime Reports
The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) compile data from over 17,000 law enforcement agencies across the country. They provide detailed data regarding the volume of crimes to include arrest, clearance (or closing a case), and law enforcement officer information. The UCR focuses its data collection on violent crimes, hate crimes, and property crimes.[58] Created in the 1920s, the UCR system has not proven to be as uniformas its name implies. The UCR data only reflect the most serious offense in the case of connected crimes and has a very restrictive definition of rape. Since about 93% of the data submitted to the FBI is in this format, the UCR stands out as the publication of choice as most states require law enforcement agencies to submit this data.
Preliminary Annual Uniform Crime Report for 2006 was released on June 4, 2006. The report shows violent crime offenses rose 1.3%, but the number of property crime offenses decreased 2.9% compared to 2005.[60]
National Incident Based Reporting System
The National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) crime statistics system aims to address limitations inherent in UCR data. The system used by law enforcement agencies in the United States for collecting and reporting data on crimes. Local, state, and federal agencies generate NIBRS data from their records management systems. Data is collected on every incident and arrest in the Group A offense category. The Group A offenses are 46 specific crimes grouped in 22 offense categories. Specific facts about these offenses are gathered and reported in the NIBRS system. In addition to the Group A offenses, eleven Group B offenses are reported with only the arrest information. The NIBRS system is in greater detail than the summary-based UCR system. As of 2004, 5,271 law enforcement agencies submitted NIBRS data. That amount represents 20% of the United States population and 16% of the crime statistics data collected by the FBI.
FBI files on specific persons
It is possible to obtain a copy of an FBI file on oneself, on a living person who gives you permission to do so, or on a deceased individual, through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act. The FBI has generated files on numerous celebrities including Elvis Presley, Frank Sinatra, John Denver, John Lennon, Jane Fonda, Groucho Marx, Charlie Chaplin, MC5, Lou Costello, Sonny Bono, Bob Dylan, Michael Jackson, Mickey Mantle, and Gene Autry.[61] The FBI also profiled Jack the Ripper in 1988 but his identity still remains unproven today.[62] To quote Howard Zinn, “if I found that the FBI did not have any dossier on me, it would have been tremendously embarrassing and I wouldn’t have been able to face my friends.”[63]
[edit]
TOP-SECRET: The Velvet Revolution Declassified
Washington, D.C., August 20, 2011 – Fifteen years ago today, a modest, officially sanctioned student demonstration in Prague spontaneously grew into a major outburst of popular revulsion toward the ruling Communist regime. At that point the largest protest in 20 years, the demonstrations helped to spark the Velvet Revolution that brought down communism in Czechoslovakia and put dissident playwright Václav Havel in the Presidential Palace.
The November 17, 1989 march commemorated a student leader, Jan Opletal, who was killed by Nazi occupiers 50 years before, but quickly took on a starkly anti-regime character with calls of “Jakeš into the wastebasket,” referring to the communist party general secretary, and demands for free elections. The authorities used blunt force to disperse the students, injuring scores of people including several foreign journalists. Hundreds were arrested.
The result was more demonstrations over the next three days that completely exposed the bankruptcy of the regime. Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution soon joined the historic chain of events begun with Poland’s roundtable talks and elections, Hungary’s reintroduction of a multi-party system, and just a week before the Prague protests, the collapse of the Berlin Wall.
Now a new joint English-Czech edition volume has been published in Prague which tells the extraordinary tale of the revolution. The volume is entitled Prague-Washington-Prague: Reports from the United States Embassy in Czechoslovakia, November-December 1989. What sets this volume apart from other accounts is that it is a compilation of recently declassified U.S. State Department cable traffic from the period. Released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the non-governmental National Security Archive, the cables not only provide quite accurate reporting of the unfolding events but offer insights into U.S. thinking at the time, including how the first demonstrations on this date in 1989 completely surprised American officials and forced them to dramatically revise their estimates on the survivability of the Communist regime in Prague.
Of particular note, this new volume is the first publication of the Václav Havel Library, which is still in the process of being formed. (Its website, currently being developed, offers further information about the book.)
The book’s editor, Vilém Precan, is a long-time partner of the National Security Archive who has been instrumental in bringing new documentation to light and organizing international conferences on the hidden history of Czechoslovakia and the Cold War. As indicated by Radio Prague, the international service of Czech Radio, Dr. Precan “worked untiringly with the National Security Archive … to have the documents released.”
From the book’s Introduction: “It is unusual for documents related to diplomacy to be published so soon after their having been written … That the set of documents published in this volume got into the hands of independent historians so soon after their having originated is thanks to an American nongovernmental institution with a name that will probably mean little to the layman and might even be confusing. That institution is the National Security Archive. It was established to gather and publish documents that have been declassified on the basis of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) …. The [Archive] has been more than successful in achieving this aim.”
From Vilém Precan’s Acknowledgements: “This volume is the result of the work of many people, whom I as Editor now wish to thank. First and foremost I express my gratitude to my friends and colleagues at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C.: Tom Blanton, Catherine Nielsen, Svetlana Savranskaya, and Sue Bechtel, owing to whose efforts the telegrams were made available to independent researchers and were passed on to Prague, and who were of great assistance to me while I was working in Washington. ”
Note about the book cover: Václav Bartuska, the director of the Havel Library, made the following comment: The photograph “is from the meeting where the transition of power from commies to Civic Forum was discussed … The back of the man you see at the bottom of the picture belongs to … guess whom … I liked this idea of having Václav Havel there right at the centre of all things, yet not visible at first. I think this had been his place for a long time.”
Why was the revolution non-violent? One of the many subplots of the new compilation is the fact that, despite the authorities’ initial use of force to break up the November demonstrations, the Velvet Revolution and similar events in other East European states (with the notable exception of Romania) were allowed to take place without Moscow resorting to bloody repression to keep its clients in power. An earlier National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book from 1999 also explores this topic in some detail, drawing on declassified records from a range of Russian and East European archives.
The spontaneous eruption of student protests in Prague instantly recalled to the minds of U.S. embassy staff (as indicated in cables included in this briefing book) earlier demonstrations in Eastern Europe, such as in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia on the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion of 1968. In that context, readers should note that some of the materials in the new Havel Library volume are also to become part of an acclaimed book series published by Central European University Press under the rubric, The National Security Archive Cold War Reader Series. This series comprises volumes of once-secret documentation from the former Soviet bloc and the West on each of the major upheavals in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. The series will feature a special emphasis on the revolutions of 1989 with separate volumes on Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Titles already in print or at the publishers include:
The Prague Spring 1968, edited by Járomír Navrátil et al (1998)
“I am happy that the cooperation between the National Security Archive in Washington and the Czech foundation, Prague Spring 1968, has resulted in this voluminous collection of documents.” – Václav HavelUprising in East Germany, 1953, edited by Christian Ostermann (2001)
“This excellent collection of documents pulls together what’s been learned about [the uprising] since the Cold War … It is an indispensable new source for the study of Cold War history.” – John Lewis GaddisThe Hungarian Revolution of 1956, edited by Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne and János Rainer (2002)
“There is no publication, in any language, that would even approach the thoroughness, reliability, and novelty of this monumental work.” – István DeákA Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, edited by Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (Forthcoming, 2005)
Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.Document No. 1: Confidential Cable #08082 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Brutal Suppression of Czech Students’ Demonstration,” November 18, 1989, 14:18Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 2: Unclassified Cable #08087 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Embassy Protest of Attack on American Journalists during November 17-19 Demonstrations in Prague,” November 20, 1989, 12:20Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 3: Confidential Cable #08097 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Demonstrations Continue Over Weekend in Prague,” November 20, 1989, 12:42Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 4: Unclassified Cable #08106 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Czechoslovak Press Coverage of Demonstration Aftermath Shows Contradictory Lines,” November 20, 1989, 16:48Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 5: Limited Official Use Cable from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Czechoslovak Independents Establish New Organization and List Agenda of Demands,” November 20, 1989, 16:52Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 6: Confidential Cable #08109 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “American Woman’s Account of November 17 Demonstration and the Death of a Czech Student,” November 20, 1989, 16:54Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 7: Confidential Cable #08110 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Popular and Soviet Pressure for Reform Converge on the Jakes Leadership,” November 20, 1989, 16:57Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 8: Confidential Cable #08144 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Demonstrations in Prague and Other Czechoslovak Cities November 20,” November 21, 1989, 15:20Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 9: Confidential Cable #08153 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Student Strike Situation Report,” November 21, 1989, 18:59Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 10: Confidential Cable #08155 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Morning Demonstration at Wenceslas Square: Overheard Conversations,” November 21, 1989, 19:01Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
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TOP-SECRET: Soviets Planned Nuclear First Strike to Preempt West, Documents Show
Washington D.C. August 20, 2011 – The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact had a long-standing strategy to attack Western Europe that included being the first to use nuclear weapons, according to a new book of previously Secret Warsaw Pact documents published tomorrow. Although the aim was apparently to preempt NATO “aggression,” the Soviets clearly expected that nuclear war was likely and planned specifically to fight and win such a conflict.
The documents show that Moscow’s allies went along with these plans but the alliance was weakened by resentment over Soviet domination and the belief that nuclear planning was sometimes highly unrealistic. Just the opposite of Western views at the time, Pact members saw themselves increasingly at a disadvantage compared to the West in the military balance, especially with NATO’s ability to incorporate high-technology weaponry and organize more effectively, beginning in the late 1970s.
These and other findings appear in a new volume published tomorrow on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Warsaw Pact. Consisting of 193 documents originating from all eight original member-states, the volume, A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, provides significant new evidence of the intentions and capabilities of one of the most feared military machines in history.
Highlights of the 726-page volume include highly confidential internal reports, military assessments, minutes of Warsaw Pact leadership meetings, and Politburo discussions on topics such as:
- The shift beginning in the 1960s from defensive operations to plans to launch attacks deep into Western Europe. (Documents Nos. 16, 20a-b, 21)
- Plans to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, ostensibly to preempt Western first-use. (Documents Nos. 81, 83)
- Soviet expectations that conventional conflicts would go nuclear, and plans to fight and win such conflicts. (Documents Nos. 81, 83)
- The deep resentment of alliance members, behind the façade of solidarity, of Soviet dominance and the unequal share of the military burden that was imposed on them. (Documents Nos. 4-6, 33-37, 47, 52)
- East European views on the futility of plans for nuclear war and the realization that their countries, far more than the Soviet Union, would suffer the most devastating consequences of such a conflict. (Documents Nos. 22b, 38, 50, 52)
- The “nuclear romanticism,” primarily of Soviet planners, concerning the viability of unconventional warfare, including a memorable retort by the Polish leader that “no one should have the idea that in a nuclear war one could enjoy a cup of coffee in Paris in five or six days.” (Documents Nos. 31, 115)
- Ideologically warped notions of Warsaw Pact planners about the West’s presumed propensity to initiate hostilities and the prospects for defeating it. (Documents Nos. 50, 73, 79, 81)
- The impact of Chernobyl as a reality check for Soviet officials on the effects of nuclear weapons. (Document No. 115)
- The pervasiveness and efficacy of East bloc spying on NATO, mainly by East Germans (Documents Nos. 11, 28, 80, 97, 109, 112)
- Warsaw Pact shortcomings in resisting hostile military action, including difficulties in firing nuclear weapons. (Documents Nos. 44, 143)
- Data on the often disputed East-West military balance, seen from the Soviet bloc side as much more favorable to the West than the West itself saw it, with the technological edge increasingly in Western favor since the time of the Carter administration (Documents Nos. 47, 79, 81, 82, 130, 131, 135, 136)
The motives accounting for the Warsaw Pact’s offensive military culture included not only the obsessive Soviet memory of having been taken by surprise by the nearly fatal Nazi attack in June 1941 but primarily the ideological militancy of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that posited irreconcilable hostility of the capitalist adversaries. The influence of the doctrine explains, for example, the distorted interpretation of secret Western planning documents that were unequivocally defensive documents to which Warsaw Pact spies had extensive access. So integral was the offensive strategy to the Soviet system that its replacement by a defensive strategy under Gorbachev proved impossible to implement before the system itself disintegrated.
The Soviet military, as the ideologically most devoted and disciplined part of the Soviet establishment, were given extensive leeway by the political leadership in designing the Warsaw Pact’s plans for war and preparing for their implementation. Although the leadership reserved the authority to decide under what circumstances they would be implemented and never actually tried to act on them, the chances of a crisis spiraling out of control may have been greater than imagined at the time. The plans had dynamics of their own and the grip of the aging leadership continued to diminish with the passage of time.
The new collection of documents published today is the first of its kind in examining the Warsaw Pact from the inside, with the benefit of materials once thought to be sealed from public scrutiny in perpetuity. It was prepared by the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), an international scholarly network formed to explore and disseminate documentation on the military and security aspects of contemporary history. The book appears as part of the “National Security Archive Cold War Reader Series” through Central European University Press.
The PHP’s founders and partners are the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research organization based at The George Washington University; the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich; the Institute for Strategy and Security Policy at the Austrian Defense Academy in Vienna; the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies in Florence; and the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo.
In addition to documents, the volume features a major original essay by Vojtech Mastny, a leading historian of the Warsaw Pact, and contextual headnotes for each document by co-editor Malcolm Byrne. A detailed chronology, glossaries and bibliography are also included.
The documents in the collection were obtained by numerous scholars and archivists, many of them associated with PHP and its partners, including the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C.
The vast majority of the documents were translated especially for this volume and have never previously appeared in English.
Attached to this notice are ten representative documents taken from the list above. They appear as they do in the volume, i.e. with explanatory headnotes at the top of each item.
The documents in their original languages can be found in their entirety on the Center for Security Studies website.
On Saturday, May 14, a book launch for A Cardboard Castle? will take place in Warsaw at the Military Office of Historical Research. The address is: 2, ul. Stefana Banacha, Room 218. It will begin at 11:30 a.m. Speakers include:
- Gen. William E. Odom, former Director, U.S. National Security Agency
- Gen. Tadeusz Pioro, senior Polish representative to the Warsaw Pact
- Brig. Gen. Leslaw Dudek, Polish representative to the alliance
- Prof. dr. hab. Andrzej Paczkowski, Polish Academy of Sciences
- Dr hab. Krzysztof Komorowski, Military Office of Historical Research
- Prof. dr hab. Wojciech Materski, Polish Academy of Sciences
Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.Below are ten representative documents from A Cardboard Castle?. They are numbered as they are in the volume and include explanatory headnotes at the top of each item. Links to the original documents — in their orginal languages — appear at the end of each entry.Document No. 16: Speech by Marshal Malinovskii Describing the Need for Warsaw Pact Offensive Operations, May 1961 – original language
Document No. 21: Organizational Principles of the Czechoslovak Army, November 22, 1962 – original language
Document No. 50: Memorandum of the Academic Staff of the Czechoslovak Military Academies on Czechoslovakia’s Defense Doctrine, June 4, 1968 – original language
Document No. 64: Report by Ceaus,escu to the Romanian Politburo on the PCC Meeting in Budapest, March 18, 1969 – original language
Document No. 81: Marshal Ogarkov Analysis of the ?Zapad? Exercise, May 30-June 9, 1977 – original language
Document No. 83: Soviet Statement at the Chiefs of General Staff Meeting in Sofia,
June 12-14, 1978 – original languageDocument No. 109: East German Intelligence Assessment of NATO?s Intelligence on the Warsaw Pact, December 16, 1985 – original language
Document No. 115: Minutes of the Political Consultative Committee Party Secretaries? Meeting in Budapest, June 11, 1986 – original language (part 1 – part 2 – part 3)
Document No. 136: Summary of Discussion among Defense Ministers at the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Warsaw, July 15, 1988 – original language (part 1 – part 2)
Document No. 143: Czechoslovak Description of ?Vltava-89? Exercise, May 23, 1989 – original language
TOP-SECRET: Alexander Yakovlev and the Roots of the Soviet Reforms
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Alexander Yakovlev and the |
Washington D.C. August 20, 2011 – Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev, who died in Moscow last week at the age of 81, was probably the best known “architect of perestroika.” Soviet ambassador to Canada, then member of the Politburo and Mikhail Gorbachev’s closest adviser, he could rightfully be called the “Father of Glasnost.”
Alexander Yakovlev rose through the Communist Party ranks to become one of the most vocal critics of the Stalinist past and a passionate advocate of democratization in the second half of the 1980s. He was one of the people history will credit for his role in helping to end the Cold War.
Yakovlev was born in a peasant family in the Yaroslavl oblast, fought in World War II, and was badly wounded in 1943. In the same year he joined the Communist Party and became a professional “apparatchik.” In 1972, during the Brezhnev years, after publishing an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta (on a dispute within the Writers’ Union) that was considered “unpatriotic,” he was sent to Canada as ambassador. In 1983, he was allowed to return to Moscow to assume the position of director of the prestigious Institute of World Economy and International Relations, which soon became a bastion of reformist intellectuals and one of the springboards of perestroika.
Soon after becoming general secretary in 1985, Gorbachev quickly recognized Yakovlev’s potential and promoted him to head the Central Committee’s Propaganda Department. In 1986, Yakovlev became secretary of the Central Committee in charge of ideology and in 1987 a full member of the Politburo. His role in promoting freedom of the press, political openness and democratization has been widely noted by observers of the Soviet political process of the late 1980s.
Recently released documents from the Yakovlev Collection of the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) show the unprecedented scope of issues on which Alexander Yakovlev exerted influence within Soviet decision-making circles under Gorbachev. Although we usually associate Yakovlev with glasnost and democratization, it becomes clear from the record that he was also a key reformer when it came to arms control (“untying” the Soviet “package” position on nuclear arms control negotiations), and the Soviet economy. The documents also show that Yakovlev’s position was quite developed and consistent very early on, when the rest of the Soviet reformers, including Gorbachev himself, were not yet willing to look beyond the existing one-party system.
The following selection of materials are part of a much larger collection of documents from the former Soviet bloc available for research at the National Security Archive.
Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.Document 1: Alexander Yakovlev. On Reagan. Memorandum prepared on request from M.S. Gorbachev and handed to him on March 12, 1985In this memorandum, which Gorbachev requested and Yakovlev prepared the day after Gorbachev’s election as general secretary, Yakovlev analyzed President Ronald Reagan’s positions on a variety of issues. The analysis is notable for its non-ideological tone, suggesting that meeting with the U.S. president was in the Soviet Union’s national interest, and that Reagan’s positions were far from clear-cut, indicating some potential for improving U.S.-Soviet relations.
Document 2: Memorandum to Mikhail Gorbachev, “The Imperative of Political Development,” December 25, 1985
In this memorandum to Gorbachev, Yakovlev outlines his view of the needed transformation of the political system of the Soviet Union. Yakovlev writes in his memoir that he prepared this document in several drafts earlier in the year but hesitated to present it to Gorbachev because he believed his own official standing at the time was still too junior. Yakovlev’s approach here is thoroughly based on a perceived need for democratization, starting with intra-party democratization. The memo suggests introducing several truly ground-breaking reforms, including genuine multi-candidate elections, free discussion of political positions, a division of power between the legislative and executive branches, independence of the judicial branch, and real guarantees of human rights and freedoms.
Document 3: Memorandum for Gorbachev, “To the Analysis of the Fact of the Visit of Prominent American Political Leaders to the USSR (Kissinger, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Brown, and others), circa December 1986
In this memorandum, devoted to U.S.-Soviet relations and the issues of arms control, Yakovlev proposes a radical breakthrough in Soviet foreign policy. Until now, the Soviet negotiating position on nuclear arms control was based on a ” package ” approach-tying together progress on strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range weapons and forward-based systems in Europe, and the issue of anti-ballistic missile defense. Gorbachev’s insistence on the package approach and Reagan’s commitment to SDI made a breakthrough at the U.S.-Soviet summit in Reykjavik impossible. Here, Yakovlev proposes ” untying ” the package and signing separate agreements on each of its elements, arguing that this would be in the Soviet interest. Gorbachev agreed to ” untie the package ” as early as March 1987.
Document 4: Text of Presentation at the CC CPSU Politburo Session, September 28, 1987
This presentation to the Politburo comes after the January and June Plenums of the Central Committee, which outlined comprehensive programs of reform of the political (January) and economic (June) system, and after Yakovlev himself was promoted to the full Politburo membership (in charge of ideology). This is the first time he unveils his views on democratization–which he considered at the time to be the most important task of perestroika–to the Politburo.
Document 5: Notes for Presentation at the Politburo session, December 27, 1988
These notes represent a summary of Yakovlev’s thinking about the most important developments of 1988. His presentation follows Gorbachev’s seminal speech at the United Nations on December 7. The notes reflect his first disappointments with the slow pace of perestroika, bureacratic intertia, and the general apathy of the population. Yakovlev argues for more systematic implementation of the principles and reforms of the ” new thinking ” and gives special emphasis to the U.N. speech, which he calls a ” watershed .”
Document 6: Anatoly Chernyaev, Personal Memorandum to Mikhail Gorbachev, November 11, 1989
In this personal handwritten memorandum, Gorbachev’s foreign policy adviser, Anatoly Chernyaev, expresses his discomfort with the way Gorbachev treated Yakovlev at a recent party Plenum. The memo reflects a recent rift between Gorbachev and Yakovlev, which was precipitated by a disinformation campaign initiated by KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov. Chernayev defends Yakovlev, emphasizing his intellectual potential and his importance for continuing perestroika’s reforms.
From the National Security Archive: The Secret History of Dayton
Map depicting post-Dayton political alignment of the Balkans
The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft
by Derek Chollet
Washington, D.C., August 20, 2011 – Every work of history is not just a statement about the past, but a reflection of the era — if not the precise year — during which it was written. This is certainly the case with the now-declassified 1997 U.S. State Department studyof the American effort to end the Bosnian war, the original version of which is now available.
On November 21, 1995, the world witnessed an event that for years many believed impossible: on a secluded, wind-swept U.S. Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia agreed to end a war. The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords concluded one of the most challenging diplomatic undertakings the United States had pursued since the end of the Cold War — eighteen weeks of whirlwind shuttle diplomacy, followed by twenty-one intensive days of negotiations in Dayton. The agreement brought peace to a troubled corner of Europe, and established an ambitious blueprint to build a new Bosnia — an effort that the international community remains deeply engaged in today.
Dayton also capped a dramatic reversal not only of U.S. policy, but of the credibility of American leadership of the Atlantic Alliance in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. For three years, the American approach toward the Bosnia problem had been one of disengagement, hoping that the Europeans — who had high hopes for their fledgling political union — would take the lead to solve the problem. Yet Europe’s response proved feckless, and the United States proved no better. More than any other foreign policy issue, the problem of Bosnia’s defined — and plagued — the early years of Bill Clinton’s presidency. Despite some significant successes during his first term — such as the Middle East peace process, the 1994 Framework Agreement with North Korea, the passage of NAFTA — Clinton’s early years were in many ways defined by the inability to bring peace to Bosnia.
Dayton’s core accomplishment is that it ended a war and gave hope to millions who have suffered immense hardship. But it did more than that. Dayton brought to an end one of the most difficult periods in the history of U.S.-European relations, helping to define a new role for NATO and restore confidence in American leadership after a period during which it been cast into doubt.
This achievement mattered for America’s global standing; it mattered for President Bill Clinton’s Administration and the President’s leadership. John Harris, a leading historian of the Clinton presidency and author of the recent book The Survivor: Bill Clinton in the White House, explains that Clinton “emerged from the fall of 1995 as a vastly more self-confident and commanding leader.” In less than six months during 1995, he had taken charge of the Transatlantic Alliance, pushed NATO to use overwhelming military force, risked America’s prestige on a bold diplomatic gamble, and placed 20,000 American military men and women on the ground in a dangerous environment. That the President and his Administration ran such risks successfully gave them confidence going forward. Richard Holbrooke, Dayton’s architect, recalls that after Dayton, “American foreign policy seemed more assertive, more muscular… Washington was now praised for its firm leadership — or even chided by some Europeans for too much leadership.”
It was in this context that in early 1996 the U.S. State Department launched a unique historical effort to capture the record of this achievement. In conversations with Thomas Donilon (then Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s Chief of Staff and Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs) and William J. Burns (then the Executive Secretary of the Department), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Bennett Freeman began to put together the initiative. In his capacity overseeing the State Department’s Office of the Historian as well as serving as Chief Speechwriter for Secretary Christopher, Freeman worked with that office and the Bureau of European Affairs to assemble a team to begin collecting documents and conduct interviews with all the key American participants in the Dayton process. The interviews were no less important than the documents themselves, in order to capture the fresh recollections of those participants in an unusual almost “real-time” historical exercise. They worked with the full cooperation and authority of the Secretary of State. After the initial research effort was underway and an archive of these materials had been created, Freeman then asked Derek Chollet to draft the study based on this research, which he completed in the spring of 1997.
There were two core goals of the creation of this archive and the writing of the study: first, to collect the documents and create an oral history of this fast-moving negotiating process for the benefit of future historians and to supplement the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States series; and second, to use the study to outline the bureaucratic and diplomatic mechanics of this complex negotiation, so that the lessons of the “Dayton model” could be studied and applied by future diplomats and policymakers as they worked to tackle similar problems (a fuller explanation can be found in the foreword to the original study). It has also proved invaluable to the many American diplomats who have been responsible for implementing the Dayton Accords or shaping U.S. policy toward Balkans generally.
Declassified in 2003, the original study is now available to scholars. And it is our hope that in the near future, as many of the documents on which much of this study is based — which are contained and organized in the special archive — are released as possible. Their release will prove valuable to other scholars of this period as well as those interested in the making of American foreign policy — especially when it concerns the process behind difficult diplomatic negotiations.
It is important to point out that at the time this historical initiative began, no one knew whether the Dayton peace plan would succeed. Twenty-thousand American troops were on the ground in Bosnia as part of a 60,000-strong NATO force. At the time, American diplomats were hopeful — and proud that they had achieved a diplomatic success — but few dared imagine that their efforts would prove to be as successful as they have been ten years later. Despite the fears by many that implementing Dayton would be a quagmire, not a single American soldier has been killed by hostile fire. And while Bosnia still has a way to go to fulfill Dayton’s vision of a single, multi-ethic, tolerant state with a functional government, the war is over.
The Road to Dayton
U.S. Diplomacy and the Bosnia Peace Process, May-December 1995
U.S. Department of State, Dayton History Project, May 1997
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Cover page, Foreward, Table of Contents, Acknowledgements and Maps
Chapter 1 – The Summer Crisis: June-July 1995
Chapter 2 – Through the Window of Opportunity: The Endgame Strategy
Chapter 3 – Tragedy as Turning Point: The First Shuttle, Mt. Igman, and Operation Deliberate Force
Chapter 4 – The Road to Geneva: The Patriarch Letter and NATO Bombing
Chapter 5 – Force and Diplomacy: NATO Bombing Ends, The Western Offensive Heats Up
Chapter 6 – The New York Agreement, Negotiating a Cease-fire, and Approaching a Settlement
Chapter 7 – Preparing for Proximity Talks
Chapter 8 – Opening Talks and Clearing Away the Underbrush: Dayton, November 1-10
Chapter 9 – Endgame: Dayton, November 11-21
Epilogue – Implementation Begins
CONFIDENTIAL: PLD LEADER MEDINA KEEPS DISTANCE FROM FERNANDEZ
VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHDG #1340/01 2381957 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 251957Z AUG 08 FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1330 INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PRIORITY 2182 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0920 RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN PRIORITY 1094 RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON PRIORITY 2885 RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO PRIORITY 1219 RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 4848 RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY 1920 RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0199 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUMISTA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTO DOMINGO 001340 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CAR E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2028 TAGS: PGOV PBIO SNAR ECON DR SUBJECT: PLD LEADER MEDINA KEEPS DISTANCE FROM FERNANDEZ REF: A. SANTO DOMINGO 01327 ¶B. SANTO DOMINGO 01167 ¶C. SANTO DOMINGO 01296 Classified By: P. Robert Fannin, Ambassador, Reasons 1.4(b), (d) ¶1. (C) BACKGROUND: Danilo Medina is the second-most powerful leader in the PLD party, after President Fernandez himself, and is seen as the strategic brains behind the organization's rise from third-party status in the 1980s to control of the presidency and both houses of congress by 2006. Medina served as Fernandez's Minister of the Presidency until late-2006. He then left the administration to challenge the President for the PLD's 2008 nomination after Fernandez, according to Medina, broke a pledge to support his candidacy and instead ran for re-election. Medina lost the 2008 PLD primary by a large margin, but later allowed his supporters to join the Fernandez campaign. On August 11, he attended his first party meeting since the break with the President. ¶2. (C) POLCHIEF met with Danilo Medina on August 20 and inquired about the prospects for constitutional reform. Medina said that Fernandez called a meeting of the PLD's Political Committee on August 11 and that the President pressed for his proposed constitutional amendments to be endorsed quickly, citing a need for an agreement prior to his August 16 inauguration speech. A key proposed amendment would maintain the two-term limit on the presidency, but would permit the head of state to run again four years after leaving office. Medina said that he voted against the amendment, even though it would allow him to run in 2012, because he is against re-election in any form; however, the proposed constitutional change was approved by the party. Medina was critical of the fact that Fernandez -- after calling the meeting on the 11th knowing the party would want to please him before cabinet appointments were made on August 16 -- did not introduce the proposed amendments during his inauguration speech. ¶3. (C) Medina was critical of Fernandez's inauguration speech, sharing the view of other commentators that the address proposed more public works projects than the Government can afford (Ref A). Medina argued that the Government will simply go into more debt to finance the President's projects. He was also critical of what he considers the excessive defense of the peso, which has caused interests rates to rise, as well as of Finance Minister Bengoa, who he described as a "yes man." ¶4. (C) POLCHIEF praised the recent success of the Dominican justice system in achieving convictions in the Baninter bank fraud (Ref B) and inquired about the prospects for prosecution of public-sector corruption. Medina replied that the fight against corruption should start within political parties, where the problem is serious. He said that many politicians accept campaign contributions from narcotics traffickers. These types of contributions range, according to Medina, from officials who do not know (or fail to investigate whether) they are receiving narco money, to those who proactively approach narcos in their districts to essentially shake them down. Regarding the recent drug-related multiple murder case in Bani, Medina praised Sen. Wilton Guerrero (PLD-Peravia), who has made allegations of official complicity in the drug trade in that area (Ref C). ¶5. (C) In a review of opposition parties, Medina contradicted prevailing wisdom by saying that the PRD party is doing well. He argued that the PRD lost the presidential election not because of the party's reputation, but because their candidate, Miguel Vargas Maldonado, was widely seen as having been deeply corrupt during his prior government service. Medina noted that, if the votes of allied parties are not counted, the PRD beat the PLD in a majority of the country's provinces. Regarding the PRSC, which received less than five percent of the vote, Medina said that the party does not have a clear future. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Medina has always kept his criticism of Fernandez out of the press; however, this meeting showed that behind closed doors he has the dagger out for the President. At times, Medina sounded more like a member of the opposition than a fellow PLD leader. He is very powerful within the party, particularly in the congress, where the vote on constitutional reform will be an opportunity for him to flex his muscles. With Fernandez likely to be barred from running again in 2012, all indications are that Medina will be the front-runner for the PLD nomination. (U) Please visit us at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/santodomingo/ FANNIN
UNTOUCHABLE ! TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI – THE ELLIOT NESS FILES
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Eliot Ness
| Eliot Ness | |
|---|---|
| Bureau of Prohibition Cleveland Division of Police |
|
| April 19, 1903 – May 16, 1957 | |
| Place of birth | Chicago, Illinois |
| Rank | Chief Investigator of the Prohibition Bureau for Chicago in 1934 Director for Public Safety for Cleveland, Ohio |
Eliot Ness (April 19, 1903 – May 16, 1957) was an American Prohibition agent, famous for his efforts to enforce Prohibition in Chicago, Illinois, and the leader of a legendary team of law enforcement agents nicknamed The Untouchables.[1]
Early life
Eliot Ness was born April 19, 1903 in Chicago, Illinois. He was the youngest of five siblings born to Norwegian immigrants, Peter and Emma Ness. Ness attended Christian Fenger High School in Chicago. He was educated at the University of Chicago, where he was a member of the Sigma Alpha Epsilonfraternity, graduating in 1925 with a degree in economics. He began his career as an investigator for the Retail Credit Company of Atlanta. He was assigned to the Chicago territory, where he conducted background investigations for the purpose of credit information. He returned to the University to take a course incriminology, eventually earning a Master’s Degree in the field.[2][3]
Capone’s conviction
In 1926, Ness’s brother-in-law, Alexander Jamie, a Bureau of Investigation agent (this became the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or FBI, in 1935), influenced Ness to enter law enforcement. He joined the U.S. Treasury Department in 1927, working with the 300-strong Bureau of Prohibition, in Chicago.[4]
Following the election of President Herbert Hoover, U.S. Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon was specifically charged with bringing down gangster Al Capone. The federal government approached the problem from two directions: income tax evasion and the Volstead Act. Ness was chosen to head the operations under the Volstead Act, targeting the illegal breweries and supply routes of Capone.
With Chicago’s corrupted law-enforcement agents endemic, Ness went through the records of all Prohibition agents to create a reliable team, initially of 50, later reduced to 15 and finally to just eleven men called, “The Untouchables“. Raids against illegal stills and breweries began immediately; within six months Ness claimed to have seized breweries worth over one million dollars. The main source of information for the raids was an extensive wire-tapping operation. An attempt by Capone to bribe Ness’s agents was seized on by Ness for publicity, leading to the media nickname, “The Untouchables.” There were a number of assassination attempts on Ness, and one close friend of his was killed.
The efforts of Ness and his team had a serious impact on Capone’s operations, but it was the income tax evasion which was the key weapon. In a number of federal grand jury cases in 1931, Capone was charged with 22 counts of tax evasion and also 5,000 violations of the Volstead Act.[5] On October 17, 1931, Capone was sentenced to 11 years in prison, and following a failed appeal, he began his sentence in 1932.[6][7]
Career
Marker at Lake View Cemetery
Ness was promoted to Chief Investigator of the Prohibition Bureau for Chicago and in 1934 for Ohio. Following the end of Prohibition in 1933, he was assigned as an alcohol tax agent in the “Moonshine Mountains” of southern Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee; and, in 1934, he was transferred to Cleveland, Ohio. In December 1935, Cleveland mayor Harold Burton hired him as the city’s Safety Director, which put him in charge of both the police and fire departments. He headed a campaign to clean out police corruption and to modernize the fire department.[8]
By 1938, Ness’s personal life was completely transformed, while his career began to have some ups and downs. Ness concentrated heavily on his work, which may have been a contributing factor in his divorce from his first wife, Edna. He declared war on the mob, and his primary targets included “Big” Angelo Lonardo, “Little” Angelo Scirrca, Moe Dalitz, John Angerola and George Angersola and Charles Pollizi. Ness was also Safety Director at the time of several grisly murders that occurred in the Cleveland area from 1935 to 1938. Unfortunately, what was otherwise a remarkably successful career in Cleveland, withered gradually. Ness’s critics at the time pointed to his divorces, his high-profile social drinking and his conduct in a 1942 car accident.[9]
Ness moved to Washington, D.C., in 1942, and worked for the federal government in directing the battle against prostitution in communities surrounding military bases, where venereal disease was a serious problem. In 1944, he left to become chairman of the Diebold Corporation, a security safe company based in Ohio. He ran unsuccessfully for mayor of Cleveland, in 1947. He later came to work for North Ridge Industrial Corporation, in Coudersport, Pennsylvania. Collaborating with Oscar Fraleyin his last years, he co-wrote the book, The Untouchables, which was published in 1957, a month after his death at age 54, following a heart attack.[10]
Personal life
Ness was married to Edna Staley from 1929 to 1938, illustrator Evaline Ness from 1939 to 1945, and artist Elisabeth Andersen Seaver from 1946 until his death by heart attack. He had one son, Robert, adopted in 1947.[9] Ness’ ashes were scattered in one of the small ponds on the grounds of Lake View Cemetery, in Cleveland.[11][12]
Legacy
A number of television programs and feature films have been made (loosely) based on his life. Some of the best-known of these include the 1950s/1960s TV series titled The Untouchables, which starred Robert Stack as Ness and which Walter Winchell narrated, and Brian De Palma‘s Oscar-winning film of the same title, The Untouchables, which starred Kevin Costner as Ness. Tom Amandes portrayed Ness in the short-lived TV remake of The Untouchables, which ran from 1993 to 1994.[13][14]
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI: THE ST. VALENTINES MASSACRE
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Saint Valentine’s Day massacre
Victims
- Peter Gusenberg, a frontline enforcer for the Moran organization.
- Frank Gusenberg, the brother of Peter Gusenberg and also an enforcer. Frank was still alive when police first arrived on the scene, despite reportedly having fourteen bullets in his body. When questioned by the police about the shooting his only response was “nobody shot me”. He died three hours later.
- Albert Kachellek (alias “James Clark”), Moran’s second-in-command, a retired man at the time, he was not a member of the gang himself but happened to be there at the time the killing happened.
- Adam Heyer, the bookkeeper and business manager of the Moran gang.
- Reinhart Schwimmer, an optician who had abandoned his practice to gamble on horse racing (unsuccessfully) and associate with the Moran gang. Though Schwimmer called himself an “optometrist” he was actually an optician (an eyeglass fitter) and he had no medical training.
- Albert Weinshank, who managed several cleaning and dyeing operations for Moran. His resemblance to Moran, including the clothes he was wearing, is what allegedly set the massacre in motion before Moran actually arrived.
- John May, an occasional car mechanic for the Moran gang, though not a gang member himself. May had had two earlier arrests (no convictions) but was attempting to work legally. However, his desperate need of cash, with a wife and seven children, caused him to accept jobs with the Moran gang as a mechanic.
Events
On the morning of Thursday, February 14, 1929, St. Valentine’s Day, five members of the North Side Gang, plus gang collaborators Reinhardt H. Schwimmer and John May, were lined up against the rear inside wall of the garage at 2122 North Clark Street, in the Lincoln Park neighborhood of Chicago’s North Side, and executed. The murders were committed by gangsters allegedly hired from outside the city by the Al Capone mob so they would not be recognized by their victims.
Two of the shooters were dressed as uniformed police officers, while the others wore suits, ties, overcoats and hats, according to witnesses who saw the “police” leading the other men at gunpoint out of the garage after the shooting. John May’s German Shepherd, Highball, who was leashed to a truck, began howling and barking, attracting the attention of two women who operated boarding houses across the street. One of them, Mrs. Landesman, sensed that something was dreadfully wrong and sent one of her roomers to the garage to see what was upsetting the dog. The man ran out, sickened at the sight. Frank Gusenberg was still alive after the killers left the scene and was rushed to the hospital shortly after police arrived at the scene. When the doctors had Gusenberg stabilized, police tried to question him but when asked who shot him, he replied “Nobody shot me”, despite having sustained 14 bullet wounds. It is believed that the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre resulted from a plan devised by members of the Capone gang to eliminate George ‘Bugs’ Moran due to the rivalry between the two gangs. However, years later, Deidre Capone, the only living blood relative to Capone, wrote the novel Uncle Al Capone, in an effort to deny her uncle’s involvement in the massacre. One chapter outlines a conversation her grandfather shared with Al Capone via telephone, shortly after the execution. Deidre Capone claimed this telephone conversation to be proof of Al Capone’s innocence; apparently, she was the only one who believed this.
George Moran was the boss of the long-established North Side Gang, formerly headed up by Dion O’Banion, who was murdered by four gunmen five years earlier in his flower shop on North State Street. Everyone who had taken command of the North Siders since O’Banion’s rule had been murdered, supposedly by various members or associates of the Capone organization. This massacre was allegedly planned by the Capone mob for a number of reasons: in retaliation for an unsuccessful attempt by Frank Gusenberg and his brother, Peter, to murder Jack McGurn earlier in the year; the North Side Gang’s complicity in the murders of Pasqualino “Patsy” Lolordo and Antonio “The Scourge” Lombardo – both had been presidents of the Unione Siciliane, the local Mafia, and close associates of Capone. Bugs Moran’s muscling in on a Capone-run dog track in the Chicago suburbs, his takeover of several Capone-owned saloons that he insisted were in his territory, and the general rivalry between Moran and Capone for complete control of the lucrative Chicago bootlegging business were probable contributing factors to this incident.
The plan was to lure Bugs Moran to the SMC Cartage warehouse on North Clark Street. Contrary to common belief, this plan did not intend to eliminate the entire North Side gang – just Moran, and perhaps two or three of his lieutenants. It is usually assumed that they were lured to the garage with the promise of a stolen, cut-rate shipment of whiskey, supplied by Detroit’s Purple Gang, also associates of Capone’s. However, some recent studies dispute this, although there seems to have been hardly any other good reason for so many of the North Siders to be there. One of these theories states that all of the victims (with the exception of John May) were dressed in their best clothes, which would not have been suitable for unloading a large shipment of whiskey crates and driving it away – even though this is how they, and other gangsters, were usually dressed at the time. The Gusenberg brothers were also supposed to drive two empty trucks to Detroit that day to pick up two loads of stolen Canadian whiskey.
On St. Valentine’s Day, most of the Moran gang had already arrived at the warehouse by approximately 10:30 AM. However, Moran himself was not there, having left his Parkway Hotel apartment late. As Moran and one of his men, Ted Newberry, approached the rear of the warehouse from a side street they saw the police car pull up. They immediately turned and retraced their steps, going to a nearby coffee shop. On the way, they ran into another gang member, Henry Gusenberg, and warned him away from the place. A fourth gang member, Willie Marks, was also on his way to the garage when he spotted the police car. Ducking into a doorway, he jotted down the license number before leaving the neighborhood.
Capone’s lookouts likely mistook one of Moran’s men for Moran himself – probably Albert Weinshank, who was the same height and build. That morning the physical similarity between the two men was enhanced by their dress: both happened to be wearing the same color overcoats and hats. Witnesses outside the garage saw a Cadillac sedan pull to a stop in front of the garage. Four men, two dressed in police uniform, emerged and walked inside. The two fake police officers, carrying shotguns, entered the rear portion of the garage and found members of Moran’s gang and two gang collaborators, Reinhart Schwimmer and John May, who was fixing one of the trucks.
The two “police officers” then signaled to the pair in civilian clothes who had accompanied them. Two of the killers opened fire with Thompson sub-machine guns, one containing a 20-round box magazine and the other a 50-round drum. They were efficient, spraying their victims left and right, even continuing to fire after all seven had hit the floor. The seven men were ripped apart in the volley, and two shotgun blasts afterward all but obliterated the faces of John May and James Clark, according to the coroner’s report.
To give the appearance that everything was under control, the men in street clothes came out with their hands up, prodded by the two uniformed police officers. Inside the garage, the only survivors in the warehouse were Highball, May’s German Shepherd, and Frank Gusenberg. Despite fourteen bullet wounds, he was still conscious, but died three hours later, refusing to utter a word about the identities of the killers.
Investigation
Since it was common knowledge that Moran was hijacking Capone’s Detroit-based liquor shipments, police focused their attention on the Purple Gang. Mug shots of Purple members George Lewis, Eddie Fletcher, Phil Keywell and his younger brother Harry, were picked out by landladies Mrs. Doody and Mrs. Orvidson, who had taken in three men as roomers ten days before the massacre; their rooming houses were directly across the street from the Clark Street garage. Later, these women wavered in their identification, and Fletcher, Lewis, and Harry Keywell were all questioned and cleared by Chicago Police. Nevertheless, the Keywell brothers (and by extension the Purple Gang) would remain ensnared in the massacre case for all time. Many also believed what the killers wanted them to believe – that the police had done it.
On 22 February, police were called to the scene of a garage fire on Wood Street where a 1927 Cadillac Sedan was found disassembled and partially burned. It was determined that the car had been used by the killers. The engine number was traced to a Michigan Avenue dealer, who had sold the car to a James Morton of Los Angeles, California. The garage had been rented by a man calling himself Frank Rogers, who gave his address as 1859 West North Avenue – which happened to be the address of the Circus Café, operated by Claude Maddox, a former St. Louis gangster with ties to the Capone organization, the Purple Gang, and a St. Louis gang called Egan’s Rats. Police could turn up no information about anyone named James Morton or Frank Rogers. But they had a definite lead on one of the killers.
Just minutes before the killings, a truck driver named Elmer Lewis had turned a corner only a block away from 2122 North Clark and sideswiped what he took to be a police car. He told police later that he stopped immediately but was waved away by the uniformed driver, whom he noticed was missing a front tooth. The same description of the car’s driver was also given by the president of the Board of Education, H. Wallace Caldwell, who had also witnessed the accident. Police knew that this description could be none other than a former member of Egan’s Rats, Fred ‘Killer’ Burke; Burke and a close companion, James Ray, were well known to wear police uniforms whenever on a robbery spree. Burke was also a fugitive, under indictment for robbery and murder in Ohio. Police also suggested that Joseph Lolordo could have been one of the killers, because of his brother, Pasqualino’s, recent murder by the North Side Gang.
Police then announced that they suspected Capone gunmen John Scalise and Albert Anselmi, as well as Jack McGurn himself, and Frank Rio, a Capone bodyguard. Police eventually charged McGurn and Scalise with the massacre. John Scalise, along with Anselmi and Joseph ‘Hop Toad’ Giunta, were murdered by Al Capone in May, 1929, after Capone learned about their plan to kill him, and before he went to trial. The murder charges against Jack McGurn were finally dropped because of a lack of evidence and he was just charged with a violation of the Mann Act: he took his girlfriend, Louise Rolfe, who was also the main witness against him and became known as the “Blonde Alibi”, across state lines to marry.
The case stagnated until December 14, 1929, when the Berrien County, Michigan Sheriff’s Department raided the St. Joseph, Michigan bungalow of “Frederick Dane”. Dane had been the registered owner of a vehicle driven by Fred “Killer” Burke. Burke had been drinking that night, rear-ended another vehicle and drove off. Patrolman Charles Skelly pursued, finally forcing Burke off the road. As Skelly hopped on the running board he was shot three times and died of his wounds later that night. The car was found wrecked and abandoned just outside of St. Joseph and traced to Fred Dane. By this time police photos confirmed that Dane was in fact Fred Burke, wanted by the Chicago Police for his participation in the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre.
When police raided Burke’s bungalow, they found a large trunk containing a bulletproof vest, almost $320,000 in bonds recently stolen from a Wisconsin bank, two Thompson submachine guns, pistols, two shotguns, and thousands of rounds of ammunition. St. Joseph authorities immediately notified the Chicago police, who requested that both machine guns be brought there at once. Through the then relatively new science of forensic ballistics, both weapons were determined to have been used in the massacre – and that one of Burke’s Tommy guns had also been used to murder New York mobster Frankie Yale a year and a half earlier. Unfortunately, no further concrete evidence would surface in the massacre case. Burke would be captured over a year later on a Missouri farm. As the case against him in the murder of Officer Skelly was strongest, he was tried in Michigan and subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. Fred Burke died in prison in 1940.
Aftermath
Public outrage over The St. Valentine’s Day Massacre marked the beginning of the end to Capone’s influence in Chicago. Although Moran suffered a heavy blow, he still managed to keep control of his territory until the early 1930s, when control passed to the Chicago Outfit under Frank Nitti, who had taken control of the Capone organization after Capone’s conviction of income tax evasion. The massacre also brought the belated attention of the federal government to bear on Capone and his criminal activities.
In 1931, Capone was convicted of income tax evasion and was sentenced to ten years in a Federal institution, plus one year in the Cook County Jail for attempted jury tampering. The massacre ultimately affected both Moran and Capone and left the war they had with each other at a stalemate. It was a blow from which the North Side Gang never fully recovered. But the most serious blows to both gangs, as well as most others around the country, was the Stock Market Crash in October, 1929, which heralded the Great Depression, and the repeal of the 18th Amendment (Prohibition) in 1933, which had given rise to most of the lawlessness in the first place.
Though Jack McGurn would beat the massacre charges, he would be murdered in a Chicago bowling alley on February 15, 1936. The two most widely accepted theories blame either Bugs Moran or the Chicago Outfit itself under Frank Nitti with the killing, as McGurn had become a public relations liability to the Outfit.
Bolton revelations
On January 8, 1935, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents surrounded a Chicago apartment building at 3920 North Pine Grove, looking for the remaining members of the Barker Gang. A brief shootout erupted, resulting in the death of bank robber Russell Gibson. Also taken into custody were Doc Barker, Byron Bolton, and two women. While interrogating agents got nothing out of Barker, Bolton (a hitherto obscure criminal) proved to be a “geyser of information”, as one crime historian called him. Bolton, a former Navy machine-gunner and associate of Egan’s Rats, had been the valet and sidekick of a slick Chicago hit man named Fred Goetz aka Shotgun George Ziegler. Bolton was privy to many of the Barker Gang’s crimes and even pinpointed the Florida hideout of Ma and Freddie Barker (both of whom were killed in a shootout with the FBI a week later.) To the agents’ surprise, Bolton kept on talking and claimed to have taken part in the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre with Goetz, Fred Burke, and several others.
Because the FBI had no jurisdiction in a state murder case, they attempted to keep Bolton’s revelations confidential, until the Chicago American newspaper somehow got their hands on a second-hand version of the bank robber’s confession. The newspaper declared that the crime had been “solved”, despite being stonewalled by J. Edgar Hoover and the Bureau, who did not want any part of the massacre case. Garbled versions of Bolton’s story went out in the national media. Pieced together, his tale went like this: Bolton claimed that the murder of Bugs Moran had been plotted in “October or November” 1928 at a Couderay, Wisconsin resort owned by Fred Goetz. Present at this meet were Goetz, Al Capone, Frank Nitti, Fred Burke, Gus Winkeler, Louis Campagna, Daniel Serritella, William Pacelli, and Bolton himself. The men stayed two or three weeks, hunting and fishing when they were not planning the murder of their enemies.
Byron Bolton claimed he and Jimmy Moran (or Morand) were charged with watching the S.M.C. Cartage garage and phoning the signal to the killers at the Circus Café when Bugs Moran arrived at the meeting. Police had indeed found a letter addressed to Bolton in the lookout nest (and possibly a vial of prescription medicine). Bolton guessed that the actual killers had been Burke, Winkeler, Goetz, Bob Carey, Raymond “Crane Neck” Nugent,[1] and Claude Maddox (four shooters and two getaway drivers). Bolton gave an account of the massacre different from the one generally told by historians. He claimed that he saw only “plainclothes” men exit the Cadillac and go into the garage. This indicates that a second car was used by the killers. One witness, George Brichet, claimed to have seen at least two uniformed men exiting a car in the alley and entering the garage through its rear doors. A Peerless sedan had been found near a Maywood house owned by Claude Maddox in the days after the massacre, and in one of the pockets was an address book belonging to victim Albert Weinshank.
Bolton further indicated he had mistaken one of Moran’s men to be Moran, after which he telephoned the signal to the Circus Café. When the killers (who had expected to kill Moran and maybe two or three of his men) were unexpectedly confronted with seven men, they simply decided to kill them all and get out fast. Bolton claimed that Capone was furious with him for his mistake (and the resulting police pressure) and threatened to kill him, only to be dissuaded by Fred Goetz.
His claims were corroborated by Gus Winkeler’s widow Georgette, in both an official FBI statement and her memoirs, which were published in a four-part series in a true detective magazine during the winter of 1935-36. Mrs. Winkeler revealed that her husband and his friends had formed a special crew used by Capone for high-risk jobs. The mob boss was said to have trusted them implicitly and nicknamed them the “American Boys”. Byron Bolton’s statements were also backed up by William Drury, a maverick Chicago detective who had stayed on the massacre case long after everyone else had given up. Bank robber Alvin Karpis later claimed to have heard secondhand from Ray Nugent about the massacre and that the “American Boys” were paid a collective salary of $2,000 a week plus bonuses. Karpis also claimed that Capone himself had told him while they were in Alcatraz together that Goetz had been the actual planner of the massacre.
Despite Byron Bolton’s statements, no action was taken by the FBI. All the men he named, with the exceptions of Burke and Maddox, were all dead by 1935. Bank robber Harvey Bailey would later complain in his 1973 autobiography that he and Fred Burke had been drinking beer in Calumet City at the time of the massacre, and the resulting heat forced them to abandon their bank robbing ventures. Claude Maddox was questioned fruitlessly by Chicago Police, and there the matter lay. Crime historians are still divided on whether or not the “American Boys” committed the St. Valentine’s Day Massacree.
Other suspects
Over the years, many mobsters, in and out of Chicago, would be named as part of the Valentine’s Day hit team. Two prime suspects are Cosa Nostra hit men John Scalise and Albert Anselmi; both men were effective killers and are frequently mentioned as possibilities for two of the shooters. In the days after the massacre, Scalise was heard to brag, “I am the most powerful man in Chicago.” He had recently been elevated to the position of vice-president in the Unione Siciliana by its president, Joseph Guinta. Nevertheless, Scalise, Anselmi, and Guinta would be found dead on a lonely road near Hammond, Indiana on May 8, 1929. Gangland lore has it that Al Capone had discovered that the pair was planning to betray him. At the climax of a dinner party thrown in their honor, Capone produced a baseball bat and beat the trio to death.
Murder weapons
The two Thompson submachine guns (serial numbers 2347 and 7580) found in Fred Dane’s (an alias for Fred Burke) Michigan bungalow were personally driven to the Chicago coroner’s office by the Berrien County District Attorney. Ballistic expert Calvin Goddard tested the weapons and determined that both had been used in the massacre. One of them had also been used in the murder of Brooklyn mob boss Frankie Yale, which confirmed the New York Police Department’s long-held theory that Burke, and by extension Al Capone, had been responsible for Yale’s death.
Gun No. 2347 had been originally purchased on November 12, 1924 by Les Farmer, a deputy sheriff in Marion, Illinois, which happened to be the seat of Williamson County. Marion and the surrounding area were then overrun by the warring bootleg factions of the Shelton Brothers and Charlie Birger. Deputy Farmer was documented as having ties with Egan’s Rats, based 100 miles (160 km) away in St. Louis. By the beginning of 1927 at the very latest, the weapon had wound up in Fred Burke’s possession. It is possible he had used this same Tommygun in Detroit’s Milaflores Massacre on March 28, 1927.
Gun No. 7580 had been sold by Chicago sporting goods owner Peter von Frantzius to a Victor Thompson (also known as Frank V. Thompson) in the care of the Fox Hotel of Elgin, Illinois. Some time after the purchase the machine gun wound up with James “Bozo” Shupe, a small-time hood from Chicago’s West Side who had ties to various members of Capone’s Outfit.
Both submachine guns are still in the possession of the Berrien County Sheriff’s Department in St. Joseph, Michigan.
Crime scene and bricks from the murder wall
The garage, which stood at 2122 N. Clark Street, was demolished in 1967; the site is now a landscaped parking lot for a nursing home . There is still controversy over the actual bricks used to build the north inside wall of the building where the mobsters were lined up and shot. They were claimed to be responsible, according to stories, for bringing financial ruin, illness, bad luck and death to anyone who bought them.[2]
The bricks from the bullet-marked inside North wall were purchased and saved by Canadian businessman George Patey in 1967.[citation needed] His original intention was to use them in a restaurant that he represented, but the restaurant’s owner did not like the idea. Patey ended up buying the bricks himself, outbidding three or four others. Patey had the wall painstakingly taken apart and had each of the 414 bricks numbered, then shipped them back to Canada.
There are different reports about what George Patey did with the bricks after he got them. In 1978, Time Magazine reported that Patey reassembled the wall and put it on display in a wax museum with gun-wielding gangsters shooting each other in front of it to the accompaniment of recorded bangs. The wax museum later went bankrupt. Another source, an independent newspaper in the United Kingdom, reported in February 2000 that the wall toured shopping malls and exhibitions in the United States for a couple of decades. In 1968 Patey stopped exhibiting the bricks and put them into retirement.
Patey opened a nightclub called the Banjo Palace in 1971. It had a Roaring Twenties theme. The famous bricks were installed inside the men’s washroom with Plexiglasplaced right in front of them to shield them, so that patrons could urinate and try to hit the targets painted on the Plexiglas. In a 2001 interview with an Argentinian journalist, Patey said, “I had the most popular club in the city. People came from high society and entertainment, Jimmy Stewart, Robert Mitchum.”
The bricks were placed in storage until 1997 when Patey tried to auction them off on a website called Jet Set On The Net. The deal fell through after a hard time with the auction company. The last known substantial offer for the entire wall was made by a Las Vegas casino but Patey refused the $175,000 offer.[citation needed] In 1999, Patey tried to sell them brick by brick on his own website and sold about a hundred to gangsterbuffs. These came with signed certificates by Patey. Patey died on December 26, 2004, having never revealed how much he paid to buy the bricks at auction. The remaining bricks of his massacre wall was given as an inheritance to his niece. She ended up selling it to the soon to open Las Vegas mob museum. While the wall is no longer complete because of Patey selling a few dozen from it, it still remains the original massacre wall in which the seven men were lined up against and killed by Capone hired killers. The trail of the authentic St.Valentine’s day massacre bricks
TOP-SECRET: THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION UNVEILED
Forty-six years ago, at 4:15 a.m. on November 4, 1956, Soviet forces launched a major attack on Hungary aimed at crushing, once and for all, the spontaneous national uprising that had begun 12 days earlier. At 5:20 a.m., Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy announced the invasion to the nation in a grim, 35-second broadcast, declaring: “Our troops are fighting. The Government is in its place.” However, within hours Nagy himself would seek asylum at the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest while his former colleague and imminent replacement, János Kádár, who had been flown secretly from Moscow to the city of Szolnok, 60 miles southeast of the capital, prepared to take power with Moscow’s backing. On November 22, after receiving assurances of safe passage from Kádár and the Soviets, Nagy finally agreed to leave the Yugoslav Embassy. But he was immediately arrested by Soviet security officers and flown to a secret location in Romania. By then, the fighting had mostly ended, the Hungarian resistance had essentially been destroyed, and Kádár was entering the next phase of his strategy to neutralize dissent for the long term.The defeat of the Hungarian revolution was one of the darkest moments of the Cold War. At certain points since its outbreak on October 23 the revolt looked like it was on the verge of an amazing triumph. The entire nation appeared to have taken up arms against the regime. Rebels, often armed with nothing more than kitchen implements and gasoline, were disabling Soviet tanks and achieving other — sometimes small but meaningful — victories throughout the country. On October 31, the tide seemed to turn overwhelmingly in the revolution’s favor when Pravda published a declaration promising greater equality in relations between the USSR and its East European satellites. One sentence was of particular interest. It read: “[T]he Soviet Government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People’s Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary.” To outside observers, the Kremlin statement came as a total surprise. CIA Director Allen Dulles called it a “miracle.” The crisis seemed on the verge of being resolved in a way no-one in Hungary or the West had dared to hope.
But tragically, and unbeknownst to anyone outside the Kremlin, the very day the declaration appeared in Pravda the Soviet leadership completely reversed itself and decided to put a final, violent end to the rebellion. From declassified documents, it is now clear that several factors influenced their decision, including: the belief that the rebellion directly threatened Communist rule in Hungary (unlike the challenge posed by Wladyslaw Gomulka and the Polish Communists just days before, which had targeted Kremlin rule but not the Communist system); that the West would see a lack of response by Moscow as a sign of weakness, especially after the British, French and Israeli strike against Suez that had begun on October 29; that the spread of anti-Communist feelings in Hungary threatened the rule of neighboring satellite leaders; and that members of the Soviet party would not understand a failure to respond with force in Hungary.
Developments within the Hungarian leadership also undoubtedly played a part in Moscow’s decision. Imre Nagy, who had suddently been thrust into the leadership role after it became clear that the old Stalinist leaders had been completely discredited, had stumbled at first. He failed to connect with the crowds that had massed in front of the Parliament building beginning on October 23 and seemed himself to be on the verge of being swept aside by popular currents that were entirely beyond the authorities’ control. But over the course of the next week, Nagy apparently underwent a remarkable transformation, from a more or less dutiful pro-Moscow Communist to a politician willing to sanction unprecedented political, economic and social reform, including the establishment of a multi-party state in Hungary, and insistent on the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from the country. By November 1, Nagy took the dramatic step of declaring Hungary’s rejection of the Warsaw Pact and appealing to the United Nations for help in establishing the country’s neutrality.
Meanwhile, in Washington, U.S. officials observed the tidal wave of events with shock and no small degree of ambivalence as to how to respond. The main line of President Eisenhower’s policy was to promote the independence of the so-called captive nations, but only over the longer-term. There is little doubt that he was deeply upset by the crushing of the revolt, and he was not deaf to public pressure or the emotional lobbying of activists within his own administration. But he had also determined, and internal studies backed him up, that there was little the United States could do short of risking global war to help the rebels. And he was not prepared to go that far, nor even, for that matter, to jeopardize the atmosphere of improving relations with Moscow that had characterized the previous period.
Yet Washington’s role in the Hungarian revolution soon became mired in controversy. One of the most successful weapons in the East-West battle for the hearts and minds of Eastern Europe was the CIA-administered Radio Free Europe. But in the wake of the uprising, RFE’s broadcasts into Hungary sometimes took on a much more aggressive tone, encouraging the rebels to believe that Western support was imminent, and even giving tactical advice on how to fight the Soviets. The hopes that were raised, then dashed, by these broadcasts cast an even darker shadow over the Hungarian tragedy that leaves many Hungarians embittered to this day.
Once the Soviets made up their minds to eliminate the revolution, it took only a few days to complete the main military phase of the operation. By November 7 — coincidentally, the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution — Soviet forces were firmly enough in control of the country that Kádár could take the oath of office in the Parliament building (even though the Nagy government had never formally resigned). Pockets of resistance remained, but Kádár was able to begin the long process of “normalization” that featured suppressing dissent of any meaningful kind and otherwise coopting Hungarian society into going along with the new regime.
For the next three decades, as a consequence of the crushing of the revolution, the history of the events of 1956 was effectively sealed to Hungarians. Even to mention the name of Imre Nagy in public was to risk punishment. Only after the collapse of the Communist regimes in Hungary and the region in 1989 did it become possible to begin to excavate the archival records and bring out the facts. Since then, previously inaccessible records of the Soviet leadership as well as of other Warsaw Pact member states has beome available that give a much clearer picture than was ever imagined possible of what happened in the corridors of power in Moscow, Budapest and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Even in the United States, government records have recently been re-reviewed and released in more complete form, and personal archives have produced documentation on RFE and other topics that help throw light on the U.S. response and the role of Hungary in the superpower conflict.
Now, through the collaboration of scholars and archivists operating under the umbrella of the Openness in Russia and Eastern Europe Project, many of the most important of these new records have been collected for the first time into one, English-language publication. Some of these materials were introduced by scholars at the 40th anniversary conference “Hungary and the World 1956: The New Archival Evidence,” organized in Budapest by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (Budapest), the National Security Archive and others. Other materials were published in their original languages in various Hungarian, Russian and other scholarly volumes and journals. In the United States, The Cold War International History Project Bulletin has reproduced a substantial number of items for a specialized English-language audience.
But The 1956 Hungarian Revolution is the first attempt to put together a major collection of these new materials, in addition to the significant number of items that appear here for the first time in any language, in a single volume. In all, the book consists of 120 documents and totals 598 pages. Each item is introduced by a brief “headnote” that describes its context and significance. In addition, the editors have written introductory essays for each of the three main chapters that give readers a narrative account of the events leading up to, during and after the uprising. A detailed chronology, glossaries, a bibliography and hundreds of footnotes flesh out the materials even further.
The 1956 Hungarian Revolution is the third in the “National Security Archive Cold War Reader” series published by Central European University Press. The first two titles were Prague Spring ’68, edited by Jaromír Navrátil et al (1998), and Uprising in East Germany, 1953, edited by Christian Ostermann (2001). Future volumes will focus on the Solidarity crisis in Poland in 1980-1981, and the collapse of Communism in 1989, with separate volumes on the U.S. and Soviet response and the specific experiences of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Those collections are expected in 2003-2004.
Generous funding for the Openness Project, of which this publication is one outcome, has come from the Open Society Institute, the John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the German Marshal Fund of the United States.
Readers are encouraged to visit the National Security Archive’s reading room at George Washington University’s Gelman Library (Suite 701) to view the original versions of these documents, and the many related materials that are also available. Questions about the series or any of the materials included in the volumes may be addressed to Malcolm Byrne. Publication or sales inquiries may be made directly to CEU Press.
Documents in the Briefing Book[Note: these documents were transcribed for the book for space reasons. Although they are numbered here from 1 – 12, the headnotes often refer to other documents by number. Those numbers are the ones used in the book, not in this selection.]
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
If you have trouble downloading the files directly, right click on your mouse and select “Save Target As…”2) Minutes of 290th NSC meeting, July 12, 1956 (5 pages)
3) Report from Anastas Mikoyan on the Situation in the Hungarian Workers’ Party, July 14, 1956 (6 pages)
5) Jan Svoboda’s Notes on the CPSU CC Presidium Meeting with Satellite Leaders, October 24, 1956 (6 pages)
7) Minutes of the Nagy Government’s Fourth Cabinet Meeting, November 1, 1956 (2 pages)
9) Situation Report from Malenkov-Suslov-Aristov, November 22, 1956 (8 pages)
TOP-SECRET: The Velvet Revolution Declassified
Washington, D.C., August 18, 2011 – Fifteen years ago today, a modest, officially sanctioned student demonstration in Prague spontaneously grew into a major outburst of popular revulsion toward the ruling Communist regime. At that point the largest protest in 20 years, the demonstrations helped to spark the Velvet Revolution that brought down communism in Czechoslovakia and put dissident playwright Václav Havel in the Presidential Palace.
The November 17, 1989 march commemorated a student leader, Jan Opletal, who was killed by Nazi occupiers 50 years before, but quickly took on a starkly anti-regime character with calls of “Jakeš into the wastebasket,” referring to the communist party general secretary, and demands for free elections. The authorities used blunt force to disperse the students, injuring scores of people including several foreign journalists. Hundreds were arrested.
The result was more demonstrations over the next three days that completely exposed the bankruptcy of the regime. Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution soon joined the historic chain of events begun with Poland’s roundtable talks and elections, Hungary’s reintroduction of a multi-party system, and just a week before the Prague protests, the collapse of the Berlin Wall.
Now a new joint English-Czech edition volume has been published in Prague which tells the extraordinary tale of the revolution. The volume is entitled Prague-Washington-Prague: Reports from the United States Embassy in Czechoslovakia, November-December 1989. What sets this volume apart from other accounts is that it is a compilation of recently declassified U.S. State Department cable traffic from the period. Released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the non-governmental National Security Archive, the cables not only provide quite accurate reporting of the unfolding events but offer insights into U.S. thinking at the time, including how the first demonstrations on this date in 1989 completely surprised American officials and forced them to dramatically revise their estimates on the survivability of the Communist regime in Prague.
Of particular note, this new volume is the first publication of the Václav Havel Library, which is still in the process of being formed. (Its website, currently being developed, offers further information about the book.)
The book’s editor, Vilém Precan, is a long-time partner of the National Security Archive who has been instrumental in bringing new documentation to light and organizing international conferences on the hidden history of Czechoslovakia and the Cold War. As indicated by Radio Prague, the international service of Czech Radio, Dr. Precan “worked untiringly with the National Security Archive … to have the documents released.”
From the book’s Introduction: “It is unusual for documents related to diplomacy to be published so soon after their having been written … That the set of documents published in this volume got into the hands of independent historians so soon after their having originated is thanks to an American nongovernmental institution with a name that will probably mean little to the layman and might even be confusing. That institution is the National Security Archive. It was established to gather and publish documents that have been declassified on the basis of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) …. The [Archive] has been more than successful in achieving this aim.”
From Vilém Precan’s Acknowledgements: “This volume is the result of the work of many people, whom I as Editor now wish to thank. First and foremost I express my gratitude to my friends and colleagues at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C.: Tom Blanton, Catherine Nielsen, Svetlana Savranskaya, and Sue Bechtel, owing to whose efforts the telegrams were made available to independent researchers and were passed on to Prague, and who were of great assistance to me while I was working in Washington. ”
Note about the book cover: Václav Bartuska, the director of the Havel Library, made the following comment: The photograph “is from the meeting where the transition of power from commies to Civic Forum was discussed … The back of the man you see at the bottom of the picture belongs to … guess whom … I liked this idea of having Václav Havel there right at the centre of all things, yet not visible at first. I think this had been his place for a long time.”
Why was the revolution non-violent? One of the many subplots of the new compilation is the fact that, despite the authorities’ initial use of force to break up the November demonstrations, the Velvet Revolution and similar events in other East European states (with the notable exception of Romania) were allowed to take place without Moscow resorting to bloody repression to keep its clients in power. An earlier National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book from 1999 also explores this topic in some detail, drawing on declassified records from a range of Russian and East European archives.
The spontaneous eruption of student protests in Prague instantly recalled to the minds of U.S. embassy staff (as indicated in cables included in this briefing book) earlier demonstrations in Eastern Europe, such as in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia on the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion of 1968. In that context, readers should note that some of the materials in the new Havel Library volume are also to become part of an acclaimed book series published by Central European University Press under the rubric, The National Security Archive Cold War Reader Series. This series comprises volumes of once-secret documentation from the former Soviet bloc and the West on each of the major upheavals in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. The series will feature a special emphasis on the revolutions of 1989 with separate volumes on Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Titles already in print or at the publishers include:
The Prague Spring 1968, edited by Járomír Navrátil et al (1998)
“I am happy that the cooperation between the National Security Archive in Washington and the Czech foundation, Prague Spring 1968, has resulted in this voluminous collection of documents.” – Václav HavelUprising in East Germany, 1953, edited by Christian Ostermann (2001)
“This excellent collection of documents pulls together what’s been learned about [the uprising] since the Cold War … It is an indispensable new source for the study of Cold War history.” – John Lewis GaddisThe Hungarian Revolution of 1956, edited by Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne and János Rainer (2002)
“There is no publication, in any language, that would even approach the thoroughness, reliability, and novelty of this monumental work.” – István DeákA Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, edited by Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (Forthcoming, 2005)
Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.Document No. 1: Confidential Cable #08082 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Brutal Suppression of Czech Students’ Demonstration,” November 18, 1989, 14:18Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 2: Unclassified Cable #08087 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Embassy Protest of Attack on American Journalists during November 17-19 Demonstrations in Prague,” November 20, 1989, 12:20Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 3: Confidential Cable #08097 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Demonstrations Continue Over Weekend in Prague,” November 20, 1989, 12:42Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 4: Unclassified Cable #08106 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Czechoslovak Press Coverage of Demonstration Aftermath Shows Contradictory Lines,” November 20, 1989, 16:48Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 5: Limited Official Use Cable from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Czechoslovak Independents Establish New Organization and List Agenda of Demands,” November 20, 1989, 16:52Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 6: Confidential Cable #08109 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “American Woman’s Account of November 17 Demonstration and the Death of a Czech Student,” November 20, 1989, 16:54Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 7: Confidential Cable #08110 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Popular and Soviet Pressure for Reform Converge on the Jakes Leadership,” November 20, 1989, 16:57Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 8: Confidential Cable #08144 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Demonstrations in Prague and Other Czechoslovak Cities November 20,” November 21, 1989, 15:20Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 9: Confidential Cable #08153 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Student Strike Situation Report,” November 21, 1989, 18:59Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document No. 10: Confidential Cable #08155 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Morning Demonstration at Wenceslas Square: Overheard Conversations,” November 21, 1989, 19:01Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act
CONFIDENTIAL: LIKELIHOOD OF A CUBAN MASS MIGRATION
VZCZCXYZ0012 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHUB #0781/01 2702018 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 262018Z SEP 08 FM USINT HAVANA TO RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3761 RUCOWCX/CCGDEIGHT NEW ORLEANS LA PRIORITY INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0547 RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU 0034 RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE 0009 RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 0027 RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM CMD CTR MACDILL AFB FL RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU RUESDM/JTLO MIAMI FL RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUCOWCA/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA 0125 RUCOWCV/COMCOGARD SECTOR KEY WEST FL RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000781 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2018 TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL SMIG PHUM CU SUBJECT: LIKELIHOOD OF A CUBAN MASS MIGRATION FOLLOWING HURRICANE DESTRUCTION Classified By: COM JONATHAN D. FARRAR, REASONS 1.4 B & D ¶1. (C) Summary: Hurricane season 2008 has been especially unkind to the island of Cuba. Four consecutive storms, concluding with the most recent, Hurricane IKE, left much of the island in shambles. Buildings and homes, tobacco and sugar crops, and island-wide infrastructure have all been affected, including 444,000 damaged houses, and 63,000 houses destroyed. The level of destruction has led many Cuba watchers to ask whether a Cuban mass migration is likely in the near future. While the aforementioned events have indeed been historic in proportion, from our vantage point we see no indication that a mass migration from Cuba is pending. However, U.S. Interests Section (USINT) believes this is an issue that must be given due deference as the outcome of post-hurricane recovery efforts will play a large role in determining whether Cubans take to the sea or remain on the island. End Summary. ¶2. (C) During post-hurricane interactions with a variety of sources in Cuba, USINT personnel have not detected any indication a mass migration from Cuba is pending. Further, Cubans who have regular contact with USINT (mainly dissidents, refugees, and religious groups), including those from Pinar del Rio, one of the worst hit and affected Cuban provinces, have not reported the existence of rumors or preparations by Cubans to depart the island in increased numbers or larger go-fast or rustica loads. ¶3. (C) In conversation with Cuban Ministry of Interior (MININT) personnel, specifically the Cuban Border Guard (CBG), the USINT Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) learned that some CBG coastal outpost units in Ciego de Avila, Camaguey, and Las Tunas provinces were damaged during the wave of hurricanes, and that CBG troops are busy making repairs to infrastructure there. However, as expected, a CBG Colonel informed the DIS that CBG patrols have not been scaled back. It should be noted that during a separate meeting with MININT/CBG personnel immediately following the passing of IKE, the same Colonel asked the DIS whether the US Coast Guard was planning "an operation" following that most recent hurricane; DIS believes the Colonel's question, in the context of the meeting and conversation, was an attempt to gauge whether the US government was concerned about an increase in Cuban migrant departures or mass migration, and inadvertently suggested himself that there was a fear on the part of the CBG that at least an increase in Cuban migration numbers was possible. ¶4. (C) Cubans we speak with are increasingly frustrated with the difficulties caused by the hurricanes and the GOC's refusal to accept some foreign assistance offers. However, the Cuban people possess a rather high boiling point: Cubans have adopted a wait-and-see posture, also doing the best they can in the interim to reinstall some sense of Cuban-style "normalcy." Via Cuban state broadcast television and radio, the GOC has urged Cubans to fight, be disciplined, and exhibit solidarity following each hurricane's destructive path, and encouraged Cubans to work harder to overcome current conditions. ¶5. (C) While there have been no suggestions of a mass migration event from Cuba, the ingredients necessary for the Cuban people and/or government to cook-up such a scenario have manifested in Cuba over the past two months- they include: multiple natural disasters, damaged or destroyed infrastructure, an apparent shortage of food on the island, significantly increased fuel prices, and a Cuban government whose post-hurricane response and recovery "expertise" are in demand and are apparently spread dangerously thin from the Province of Pinar del Rio in the west to Guantanamo Province in the east, and in every province in between. Further, as the rise and fall of Cuban migrant flow relies heavily on weather conditions and sea state, the chances for an increased egress of Cuban migrants prior to the winter cold fronts and subsequent heavy seas would be more likely. Many Cubans may attempt to depart the island hoping to beat the heavy seas or reunite with family in south Florida prior to the holiday season; this hurricane season may exacerbate that trend. ¶6. (C) Comment: While the international community has its eyes fixed on Cuba's pending response to the offers of financial and resource assistance from the US government to the GOC, it is possible that Cuban authorities will attempt to mitigate the departure of Cuban migrants from the island towards the United States to avoid negative press and embarrassment. However, as international interest wanes, Cuban authorities may also lose interest in curtailing the flow of Cubans towards the United States. End Comment. FARRAR
SECRET: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA)
VZCZCXRO3142 OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH DE RUEHKL #1114/01 3580721 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 230721Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2163 INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0552 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2711 RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 001114 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2028 TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM KJUS KDEM SUBJECT: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA) REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1026 - DPM NAJIB DISCUSSES ISA ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 990 - RAJA PETRA RELEASED ¶C. KUALA LUMPUR 944 - MCA AND GERAKAN CRITICIZE UMNO ¶D. KUALA LUMPUR 846 - UPDATE ON RAJA PETRA ¶E. KUALA LUMPUR 834 - KOK RELEASED FROM ISA ¶F. KUALA LUMPUR 810 - UPROAR OVER ISA ¶G. KUALA LUMPUR 806 - JOURNALIST DETAINED UNDER ISA ¶H. 07 KUALA LUMPUR 902 - BEYOND ISA Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b, c and d). NOTE: THIS CABLE TRANSMITS AN EDITED VERSION OF KUALA LUMPUR 1102 SENT ON 12/18/08 IN MORE RESTRICTED CHANNELS. END NOTE. ¶1. (S) Summary: The Malaysian government's use of the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention without trial and is central to the GOM's intelligence-driven CT effort, has come under increasing political pressure over the past three months. The GOM's employment of the ISA in September to carry out three politically-motivated ISA detentions unrelated to terrorism sparked unprecedented public criticism. At least eight component parties from the governing National Front (BN) coalition have since broken ranks with the leading United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and called for amending or abolishing the ISA. The opposition party alliance led by Anwar Ibrahim has made the revocation of ISA one of its highest profile policy goals. In November, a High Court judge delivered a legal blow to the GOM's wide discretion in using the ISA in a ruling that freed blogger Raja Petra, and the GOM is appealing the decision. Prime Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib and Home Minister Syed Hamid have defended the ISA as essential to national security, while Najib told the Ambassador privately ISA should be retained but used more judiciously. The GOM released 17 ISA detainees, among them 10 previously linked to terrorist groups, including Yazid Sufaat, from November 5 to December 4. ¶2. (S) Comment: The ISA is the cornerstone of Malaysia's CT effort and has allowed Special Branch to take successful preemptive action against suspected terrorists and their supporters. Given the GOM's exclusive reliance on the ISA "crutch" and on Special Branch's role, police and prosecutors remain ill-prepared to investigate and bring to trial terrorist suspects (or prosecute other complex criminal conspiracies). The ISA also is subject to misuse for political ends and is an important insurance policy for maintaining UMNO in power. For both CT and political reasons, the GOM will not readily give up the ISA. We doubt that the increased political pressure and seeming swing in public opinion against the ISA, due in part to its misuse in September, will result in the ISA's amendment or revocation in the near future, absent the Opposition coming to power. These developments, however, reinforce the conclusion (ref H) that Malaysia cannot take for granted the availability of the ISA as a CT tool in the long run. It remains in the U.S. interest to encourage and assist Malaysia to develop an approach centered on prosecutions and convictions before an independent judiciary to combat terrorism. ¶3. (C) Comment continued: It is unclear to what extent outside political pressures played a direct role in the GOM's latest release of ISA detainees. The decisions may have more to do with Syed Hamid's personal exercise of authority as Home Minister. Syed Hamid has taken a more proactive role as Home Minister, compared to PM Abdullah who held the position through March 2008 and tended not to become involved in details. End Summary and Comment. ¶4. (C) The Malaysian government's use of the Internal Security Act (ISA), central to the GOM's intelligence-driven counterterrorism efforts, has come under increasing political pressure since the September ISA arrests of three persons based on political rather security considerations. The September 12 ISA detentions of an ethnic Chinese journalist, an ethnic Chinese Opposition MP (Teresa Kok), and a prominent blogger (Raja Petra Kamaruddin) served the ruling UMNO party's immediate political purpose of sending a warning to opposition politicians and those considering defecting from BN, as some UMNO politicians have told us. This came at a time when Anwar Ibrahim was publicly threatening to bring down the BN government via parliamentary crossovers by September 16. The arrests, however, also sparked unprecedented public criticism of the ISA, including from UMNO's ethnic minority partners within BN. The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the key ethnic Chinese BN component party, reportedly threatened to leave BN unless the GOM released the Chinese journalist; the GOM complied within less than 24 hours (ref F). Authorities freed MP Teresa Kok after seven days. Home Minister Syed Hamid ordered a two-year ISA detention period for Raja Petra, who was freed on appeal in November in a surprise court ruling (see below). ¶5. (C) Comment: Unlike his predecessor Mahathir, PM Abdullah refrained from using the ISA for political purposes until December 2007 when police detained five leaders of the ethnic Indian activist group HINDRAF that organized large street protests. The public viewed the GOM's September 2008 ISA arrests as more transparently political, in part because of the lack of public order concerns. End Comment. ¶6. (C) Political pressure against the ISA did not dissipate following the release of the first two of the three recent ISA detainees. At least eight component parties from the governing BN coalition of 14 parties have since broken ranks with UMNO and called for amending or reviewing the grounds for the ISA, while several have supported the law's abolition. In late September MCA, BN's second largest party, called for "a comprehensive review of the ISA so that it will apply strictly to cases relating to terrorism and subversive elements," and also argued for the introduction of "checks and balances in the use of ISA." The leader of the Gerakan party, Koh Tsu Koon, called on the GOM to "abolish the ISA once and for all," and rely on the judicial system instead. The leader of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) also initially called for ISA to be abolished, and on December 1 said PPP would withdraw from BN unless if the ISA were not amended before the next election. In response, Prime Minister Abdullah called PPP's bluff and said the small party, which holds no seats in Parliament, could leave BN if it wished. BN MPs so far have not backed up their criticism of ISA with action. In response to a petition circulated in Parliament for the review or repeal of ISA, only one BN MP signed his name. ¶7. (C) The opposition party alliance (Pakatan Rakyat, or Pakatan) led by Anwar Ibrahim has vocally condemned ISA as undemocratic and unjust, and made the abolishment of ISA one of its highest profile policy goals. A number of senior officials from Pakatan's three parties, Anwar's Peoples Justice Party (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) were detained under ISA during the era of former Prime Minister Mahathir. Not surprisingly, the three parties have vowed to revoke ISA if they come to power. "Abolish ISA" was the most prominent theme at PKR's annual party conference on November 29, which Polcouns observed. The keynote event concluded with a focus on ISA and featured large screens that scrolled through the list of all 60-plus ISA detainees with the several thousand attendees reciting the detainees' names as they appeared. Well-known blogger Raja Petra, released from ISA detention only days before, mounted the stage as the surprise guest of the grand finale. ¶8. (SBU) On November 7, a High Court judge delivered an unanticipated legal blow to the GOM's wide discretion in using the ISA in a habeas corpus ruling that freed blogger Raja Petra. The Embassy obtained the full text of the judge's 22-page ruling. ISA Section 8.B states "there shall be no judicial review in any court" of the Home Minister's exercise of "discretionary powers in accordance with this Act," except for compliance with procedural requirements. The judge ruled, however, that the Home Minister decisions could not be "unfettered and arbitrary," allowing for the court to consider whether the Minister's ISA detention order was "in accordance with the Act," and its focus on threats to national security, including the national economy; threats to maintenance of essential services; and threats to the public emanating from a "substantial body of persons" who intend to change the government through unlawful means. In the case of Raja Petra, the judge concluded that the grounds for his detention did not fall within the purview of the ISA. The government has appealed the ruling and as of mid-December the appeal remains pending. ¶9. (C) Many civil society groups took the opportunity over the past three months to highlight their standing opposition to the ISA, as well as other emergency ordinances that allow for detention without trial. Both conservative and liberal Muslim NGOs called on the GOM to abolish the ISA, as did the inter-faith Consultative Forum that groups the leaders of all major religions except Islam. The National Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) chairman Abu Talib restated the commission's existing position, namely "detention without trial is against human rights principles; that's why we advised the Government years ago to repeal the ISA." ¶10. (C) As questions over the ISA have mounted, Prime Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib, and other senior UMNO leaders defended the ISA as essential to national security. In the wake of public criticism over the September ISA arrests, Home Minister Syed Hamid, who has authority under the ISA to approve detention orders, defended the Act as essential and stated clearly that "we have no plans to do away with ISA." In early December, Syed Hamid waved off criticisms, arguing that the ISA "has never been abused or used for politics." He also commented that, "Malaysians sometimes don't know how lucky we are in that we have not experienced what is happening in Mumbai (the terrorist attack) and Bangkok (political unrest) now." He said the fact that there have been no post 9/11 terrors attacks in Malaysia was in part due to the ISA. On December 15, Syed Hamid again publicly defended use of the ISA, stating, "More apt, faster and better to use the ISA... detention under the act is early action to prevent the security of the country from being adversely affected." ¶11. (C) DPM Najib, who is anticipated to become Prime Minister in late March 2009, told the Ambassador privately on November 11 that the government continued to need the ISA, "even though there are civil liberty concerns," but should reserve ISA only for those who pose "serious threats, like terrorists" (ref A). On December 8, PM Abdullah publicly rejected calls for amendments to the ISA. ¶12. (SBU) In early December, local and international press reported that the GOM had released 17 ISA detainees from November 5 through December 4. Of those released, 10 had been held for suspected links to Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, and/or the Darul Islam terrorist groups. The released terrorist suspects included Yazid Sufaat, who played an important role in Al Qaeda's anthrax development program, according to the 9/11 Commission. The remaining seven persons released consisted of suspected foreign agents (2 persons), southern Thailand separatists (2), document forgers (2), and prominent blogger Raja Petra, according to an NGO that consistently and accurately monitors ISA detentions. In his public remarks, Syed Hamid said those recently released ISA detainees had been rehabilitated and no longer posed a security threat to Malaysia. ¶13. (S) Note: Authorities had detained the terrorist suspects for periods between two and (in the case of Yazid Sufaat) seven years, for an average detention period of four years for the ten individuals. Special Branch relies on a process for rehabilitating ISA detainees, and eventually releasing them under restricted and monitored conditions when judged necessary. The GOM has never attempted to prosecute any terrorist suspects, including those held under the ISA. This is due in large part to the fact that the GOM pursues almost exclusively an intelligence approach to CT, as opposed to a law enforcement approach that would involve criminal investigations, collection of legally admissible evidence, and development of cases for prosecution in the courts. In 2007, Malaysia amended anti-terrorism provisions in its penal code and criminal procedures code, but authorities have not yet utilized these provisions. Malaysia also has a poor track record of prosecuting other complex criminal conspiracies, including drug trafficking cases, preferring instead to utilize the ISA and other emergency ordinances to detain suspects without trial. End Note. ¶14. (S) A well-known journalist contacted us in early December and said that officers of the Police Special Branch had complained to him that Home Minister Syed Hamid had ordered the recent releases of terrorist suspects without adequate consultation and in some cases against the recommendation of Special Branch. Australian and British diplomats, speaking with Polcouns December 16, stated that Syed Hamid, who is a lawyer by training, personally reviewed the dossiers of ISA detainees and was inclined to approve releases absent compelling justification from the Special Branch. ¶15. (C) The Thai embassy contacted Poloff on December 15 to express concern over the release of two ISA detainees (Abdul Rahman bin Ahmad and Mat Tarmizi bin Shamsudin, who apparently are dual-citizens of Malaysia and Thailand) who had been held for their connection to the insurgency in southern Thailand. The Thai diplomat said Bangkok considered Abdul Rahman in particular to be a major player in the insurgency. He noted that those released are required to remain in Malaysia and check in periodically with the police. The Thai diplomat said he believed the GOM released the detainees in order to diffuse criticism of the ISA. We learned that the Thai embassy also has contacted other Western embassies (UK, France, Australia) to express concern over the recent ISA releases. KEITH
TOP-SECRET: KISSINGER CONSPIRED WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO KEEP SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE DARK

Henry Kissinger and Anatoly Dobrynin in the Map Room at the White House, March 17, 1972 (Source: Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972

The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow
Edited by William Burr
Washington, DC, August 17, 2011 – Then-national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger colluded with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to keep the U.S. Secretary of State in the dark about ongoing secret discussions between the Soviets and the Nixon White House, according to newly released Soviet-era documents, released last week by the Department of State.
In February 1972, with the Moscow summit approaching, Kissinger met with Soviet ambassador Dobrynin, who was scheduled to meet with Secretary of State William Rogers, to talk about what the Secretary knew and did not know about “the state of U.S.-Soviet relations.” Commenting on the meeting in his memorandum of conversation forwarded to Moscow, Dobrynin observed that it was a “unique situation when the Special Assistant to the President secretly informs a foreign ambassador about what the Secretary of State knows and does not know.” This memorandum appears for the first time in an extraordinary State Department collection of U.S. and Soviet documents on the Dobrynin-Kissinger meetings, produced through a U.S.-Russian cooperative effort, with selections posted on-line today by the National Security Archive.
On October 22, 2007, the State Department’s Office of the Historian released Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972, edited by David C. Geyer and Douglas E. Selvage. Over a thousand pages long with 380 documents and introductions by Dobrynin and Kissinger, this volume (initially released in CD form by the office of the historian) includes the most secret and sensitive U.S.-Soviet exchanges of the superpower détente, the so-called “back channel” or “confidential channel” Dobrynin-Kissinger meetings. (Note 1) Besides Kissinger’s records of his meetings with Dobrynin, which had already been declassified, this extraordinary volume includes translations of previously secret cables and memoranda of conversations reporting on Dobrynin’s meetings with Kissinger as well as President Richard Nixon. Simultaneously, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s History and Records Department is publishing a Russian language edition of the documents under the title, Sovetsko-Amerikanskie Otnosheniia: Gody Razriadki, 1969-1976, Tom I, 1969-Mai 1972. The Foreign Ministry will release this volume in a few weeks, during a conference in Moscow. (Note 2) A successor U.S.-Russian volume, covering 1972-1976, is now in the planning stages.
What made this remarkable publication possible is the superb cooperation of the Russian Republic’s Foreign Ministry, which provided unmatched access to its formerly classified files. This cooperative effort began with a letter, shepherded by Douglas E. Selvage through the State Department bureaucracy, from former Secretary of State Colin Powell to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov suggesting a joint historical volume on the U.S.-Soviet détente. Frustrated by the problem of access to détente-era Soviet diplomatic records, interested diplomatic historians, in particular National Security Archive fellows James Hershberg of George Washington University and Vladislav Zubok of Temple University, played a significant role in encouraging this high-level approach to the Foreign Ministry (Zubok also reviewed the translations). The volume’s detailed introduction explains how the project unfolded under the general direction of Marc J. Susser, the Historian, U.S. Department of State, and Piotr V. Stegny, Aleksandr A. Churillin, and Konstantin A. Provalov, successive directors of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs History and Records Department.
The Russian Foreign Ministry provided more documents than could be used, but the volume includes detailed annotations, completed by lead editor David C. Geyer, based on many of the unpublished documents. Scholars with Russian language skills will be interested to know that copies of all of the documents declassified by the Foreign Ministry will become available for research at the U.S. National Archives (a parallel collection will be available at the Archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry).
During a State Department conference held on October 22-23 to announce the publication of the volume, a number of the participants emphasized that what made it especially significant was 1) that is now possible to make side-by-side comparisons of records of the same Dobrynin-Kissinger meeting, and 2) that Dobrynin often prepared the only records of a number of his talks with Kissinger. Indeed, Dobrynin’s high-quality accounts of the meetings are often far more detailed, not only providing more on the context and atmosphere (which Kissinger sometimes did), but also recounting statements not mentioned in Kissinger’s versions, for example, on sensitive domestic political matters. What explains this difference is that participating in and documenting his meetings with Kissinger and Nixon was Dobrynin’s full-time responsibility; the Foreign Ministry and the Politburo wanted the most comprehensive reports possible. By contrast, Kissinger met with Nixon almost every weekday and could brief him personally about the meetings, without providing highly-detailed reports; moreover, as he became responsible for more and more problems, Kissinger had less time to sit down and dictate his account of the meetings. (Note 3) For example, during the crucial April-May 1972 period, when North Vietnam launched a major offensive and the U.S.-Soviet summit was impending, Dobrynin prepared the only record of some of the discussions. That Dobrynin’s reports are now available makes it possible to look at the back channel meetings and superpower détente generally from an entirely fresh perspective.
Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972 is not yet available in print form yet or on-line, but the Office of the Historian released a special CD with the volume on it. To give interested readers a flavor of the material, the National Security Archive is publishing on its Web site some illuminating examples of the new documents. This sampling includes:
- a unique record of Dobrynin’s first “one-on-one” back-channel meeting with Kissinger,
- accounts of Kissinger’s September 1970 demarche to Kissinger on the Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba,
- Nixon’s unsuccessful attempt to discourage the Soviet leadership from meeting with Democratic presidential aspirant Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Me) to preserve the White House’s political advantages,
- Dobrynin’s initial reactions—from the notion that Beijing and Washington would exploit the “factor of U.S.-Chinese relations in order to exert pressure on us,” to the disclosure of Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to China in July 1971,
- Kissinger’s briefing to Dobrynin on what he should and should not tell Secretary of State Rogers about more sensitive issues that only Nixon and Kissinger had discussed with the Soviets
- initial White House and Soviet reactions to the North Vietnamese 1972 Spring Offensive,
- and Dobrynin’s mistaken estimate that the pressures for a successful summit would hold Nixon back from approving major military action against Hanoi during the spring of 1972.
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Selected Documents from Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972
In an earlier meeting with Dobrynin, Nixon established arrangements for the Ambassador and Kissinger to hold private meetings, without the knowledge of the State Department (which Nixon despised) to discuss matters of mutual concern. Flowing from Nixon’s publicly declared emphasis on the need for an “era of negotiations”, the new president wanted to find ways to mitigate, if not prevent, clashes between the nuclear-armed superpowers. This conversation, for which Dobrynin prepared the sole record, covered a wide range of issues: Middle East, European security, Berlin, Vietnam, China, arms control, signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations (including possible summit meeting). Of special interest are Kissinger’s general assurances concerning the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. He said that Nixon “would like to assure the Soviet Government that … he does not have the slightest intention of intervening in the affairs of Eastern Europe.” Moreover, Dobrynin reported that Kissinger “intimated–although he did not say outright–that they favor maintaining the postwar borders in Europe.” Certainly, the Nixon administration never made an iron-clad pledge as to the inviolability of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, but Kissinger’s first assurance suggests that his statement in the introduction to the volume, that the White House never made assurances “with respect to the internal conditions in Eastern Europe,” needs some qualification. On possible U.S. relations with China, Kissinger mentioned that attempts to hold talks with Chinese diplomats in Warsaw had failed, but that Washington remained interested in holding talks in the future. The United States wanted to have talks with Beijing, Moscow’s major enemy, not from an “unfriendly designs” against the Soviet Union but from a “natural desire” for better relations with China.
In another unique record, Dobrynin reported on a meeting with Kissinger and Nixon in the latter’s White House living quarters. After some brief discussion of the Middle East, the aftermath of the North Korean shoot-down of the U.S. EC-121, and arms control, Nixon turned to Vietnam, which was the subject of a TV address he was going to make that evening. During Nixon’s briefing on his speech, he argued that North Vietnamese diplomats refused to negotiate seriously because they believed that “time will work against” Nixon and “that he will ultimately have to give in, mainly owing to pressure from public opinion.” Nixon, however, believed that if the North Vietnamese did not change their tack and become more responsive to U.S. negotiating positions, he could convince the American public on the “need for ‘other measures’”, implicitly massive bombing strikes to coerce North Vietnam. Nixon’s veiled threats provide an example of the “madman theory”–the threat of disproportionate force–at work. While Nixon and Kissinger would not accept North Vietnam’s proposal for a coalition government, during the conversation before the meeting with Nixon, Kissinger showed considerable flexibility about the ultimate outcome of the war. He told Dobrynin that he was “prepared to accept any political system in South Vietnam, ‘provided there is a fairly reasonable interval between conclusion of an agreement and [the establishment of] such a system.” Implicitly, even if South Vietnam became a Communist regime, that would be acceptable as long as there was a “reasonable interval” after the U.S. military withdrawal.
During the summer and fall of 1969, frustrated with the slowness of the Paris talks and convinced that Moscow was not doing enough to get Hanoi to settle, the Nixon administration continued to follow the madman approach by carrying out a campaign of threats to escalate the Vietnam War by striking North Vietnam. Not long after warning Dobrynin in late September that the “train was leaving the station,” Nixon and Kissinger ordered a low-level secret alert of strategic and conventional forces, not to “alarm” the Soviets but to “jar” them into a more cooperative frame of mind. While the Soviets never mentioned the alert to the Nixon administration, they were also unhappy with the way that the U.S.-Soviet relationship was developing and the leadership tasked Dobrynin to convey those misgivings directly to President Nixon. Both Dobrynin and Kissinger created records of this key meeting, although the farmer’s account is substantially more detailed on Vietnam and the Middle East, but also on the atmospherics.
During the meeting, Dobrynin read a statement from the Soviet leadership, which maintained that U.S. positions on European security, the Middle East, China, and Vietnam “ran counter to [its] declarations in favor of improving relations.” According to Dobrynin, the leadership’s critique made Nixon nervous, but he “pulled himself together” and gave a calm and clear response, outlining his thinking on a number of issues.
While the Soviets had objected to U.S. implied threats against Hanoi, Nixon declared that the Soviets would not “break him” and that “if the Soviet Union does not want to provide any assistance now in settling the Vietnam conflict, the United States will go its own way, using its own methods and taking the appropriate steps.” One of Dobrynin’s conclusions was that “the fate of his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, is beginning to really worry [Nixon].”
During late September 1970, the Jordan crisis, the Soviet construction of a naval base in Cienfuegos, Cuba, and elections in Chile preoccupied the Nixon Administration. These documents begin with discussion of a summit meeting as well as problems raised by the Syrian invasion of Jordan, with Kissinger concerned about Moscow’s relations with Damascus and Dobrynin worried about U.S. military preparations. Later in the day, after a Pentagon press officer had mistakenly disclosed Soviet activities at Cienfuegos, the talks became more difficult when Kissinger, according to his record, declared that “we would view it with utmost gravity if construction [of the submarine base] continued” and that the “installation [had been] completed with maximum deception.” He also reportedly told Dobrynin that Moscow and Washington had “reached a turning point in their relationship” and that “it is now up to the Soviets whether to go the hard route—whether it wanted to go the route of conciliation or the route of confrontation.” Interestingly, Dobrynin’s version does not cite Kissinger’s language about “turning point” or “hard route” (or “deception”). It is difficult to believe (although not inconceivable) that Dobrynin, who appears to have been most careful about sending detailed accounts of his meetings, would not have mentioned this. Kissinger, however, may have wanted to include some tough language in the record to satisfy the more confrontational Nixon.
During what Kissinger called a “cordial” luncheon, Dobrynin and Kissinger discussed the recent publication of Khrushchev’s memoirs and Soviet naval activities in Cuba, and the general problem of “worsening U.S.-Soviet relations,” including continued disagreements over the Middle East and Vietnam, and what could be done to improve the situation. Both agreed that the impasse had to be broken and that a meeting in early January could be used to advance positions on SALT, the Middle East, and Vietnam. While Kissinger’s version is fuller than Dobrynin (probably one of the few instances where this is so), the latter’s account provides interesting detail on Kissinger’s mood, e.g., that he “was on the defensive during the conversation.” Thus, Kissinger became “noticeably agitated” after Dobyrnin told him that both he and the Soviet leadership believed that despite their many talks we’re not getting anywhere.” Also unmentioned in Kissinger’s account is his apparent irritation over the fact that the head of the Soviet SALT Delegation had leaked to his U.S. counterpart information on the highly secret back channel U.S.-Soviet discussions of a summit, information which Kissinger had thought was held by only a handful of people.
A few days later, during a phone conversation Kissinger obliquely raised a very delicate matter on Nixon’s behalf: the possibility that Democratic Party aspirants for the presidency would visit the Soviet Union to advance their causes. This was a reference to Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Me), who was planning to visit the Soviet Union. Nixon did not want Muskie or other Democrats to get any advantages from such trips and Kissinger suggested that the Soviets do what they had done with Nixon in 1967, not schedule meetings with senior officials. After Dobrynin observed that Nixon had not asked to meet with Soviet leaders during his visit as a “tourist” and “went on to ask what Nixon’s reaction would have been if the President at that time had advised us not to meet with him in Moscow,” Kissinger soon changed the subject. This intervention backfired. In his reporting message, Dobrynin advised Moscow that, given Nixon’s concerns, “it would be all the more fitting to receive Senator Muskie in Moscow,” and that Moscow should not discourage such visits because they could “be a fairly important instrument for pressuring” Nixon.
During a meeting on 9 January 1971, Dobrynin and Kissinger began breaking the ice by taking new positions on issues that had troubled U.S-Soviet relations. Kissinger took an important initiative by suggesting compromise proposals on Berlin and SALT; the latter would include a separate ABM agreement as well as a “freeze” of ICBM deployments. Kissinger also proposed new efforts to work with the Soviets in laying the “ground-work for a settlement” in the Middle East as well as new approaches to the Vietnam problem, for example, the U.S. would no longer insist on the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam. Dobrynin’s version includes highly significant detail not covered in Kissinger’s account, such as the latter’s presentation of Nixon’s view on the interrelationship between the election cycle and U.S.-Soviet negotiations. According to Kissinger, because of electoral preoccupations during 1972, “all that realistically remains is just 1971, which essentially will be decisive in regard to whether the two countries will manage to [resolve] major international issues.”
On Vietnam, Kissinger expressed renewed interest in the possibility of a “decent interval” solution (although he did not use the term); once Washington reached a military agreement with Hanoi, the Vietnamese would have to make their own political settlement. Then “it will no longer be [the Americans’] concern, but that of the Vietnamese themselves if some time after the U.S. troop withdrawal they start fighting with each other again.” “If a war does break out again between North and South Vietnam, it will be a lengthy affair, and … will obviously ‘spill over’ into the period after the Nixon administration has left office.”
This fascinating cable gives Dobrynin’s appraisal of the significance of the back channel, the interrelationships of the various pending negotiations, White House strategy, and ways and means for Moscow to exert pressure on the White House to realize Soviet diplomatic objectives. Dobrynin believed that Nixon’s chief goal was a summit meeting and SALT agreement that would be “in hand” when a summit took place, but that the White House was less interested in a Berlin agreement. Because that was a greater priority for Moscow, Nixon could not be too negative on the Berlin talks without making “it more difficult to secure our final consent to a summit meeting,” but couldn’t be too positive either because the prospect of a Berlin agreement served for the U.S. as a “kind of guarantee of a summit.” Dobrynin thought that Nixon and Kissinger wanted to use the back-channel to reach “agreement in principle” before use diplomatic channel for more detailed agreements, but until that happened they wanted to keep the talks secret before the “outcome of the dialogue is itself clear.” This meant that the State Department was “sidelined” but it also meant that the Dobrynin-Kissinger talks unfolded on a high level of generality. According to Dobrynin, Kissinger “is noticeably apprehensive about getting into a discussion of details … lest he be ‘caught flat-footed’ without professional expertise on these matters.” Over the years, historians and critics have argued that this was one of the flaws of Kissinger’s conduct of the back-channel. While Dobrynin could rely on Foreign Ministry experts, who were aware of the secret talks, Kissinger would not discuss them with State Department officials, who could have helped him avoid some pitfalls during the SALT talks (e.g., Kissinger’s initial commitment to exclude SLBMs from the strategic forces “freeze”, which caused great complications later on).
One of the stunning events in Cold War history, Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 had the impact on the Soviet Union that Nixon and Kissinger, and no doubt Mao Zedong, had sought: it made the Soviets more worried than ever about the prospect and possibility that Beijing and Washington would exaggerate and exploit the “factor of U.S.-Chinese relations in order to exert pressure on us.” Soon after Nixon’s announcement of his forthcoming trip to China, Dobrynin sent the Foreign Ministry an analysis of the new U.S.-China relationship, the strategic and political considerations that underlay the new U.S. policy, and the possible Soviet response. While Dobrynin thought it important that Moscow continue its “current policy” toward the United States, he believed it “important that we give Washington no reason to believe that … we might make concessions under the influence of the ‘Chinese’ factor.” Two days after he sent the cable, Dobrynin met with Kissinger, at the suggestion of the latter so that he could “get a feeling for Dobrynin’s attitude.”
Dobrynin’s record of the meeting is typically more detailed and at one interesting point it contradicts Kissinger’s account: according to the latter, Dobrynin “asked” for a briefing, but according to Dobrynin, Kissinger brought up China himself because he was “impatiently waiting for me to ask many questions.” Whatever Dobrynin actually said, his version shows Kissinger providing more information and observations on the substance of the discussions in Beijing. For example, Kissinger could not resist discussing Zhou En-lai who, Dobrynin observed, had “made quite a strong impression on him.” Kissinger also discussed the difficulties raised by the U.S. relationship with Taiwan and gave his assessment of Beijing’s thinking about nuclear strategy. Kissinger believed that Chinese “backwardness” on nuclear issues was “due to the still very great shortcomings in China’s own nuclear missile capabilities.” He also suggested that Beijing was more worried about Japan than it was about the Soviet Union; Chinese leaders “are convinced there are strong undercurrents of revanchist sentiment among the Japanese and are clearly afraid Japan might decide to become a nuclear power.” To calm the Soviets about the possibility of U.S.-China collusion, Kissinger assured a skeptical Dobynin that he “had had no conversations, and was having none, with the Chinese that affected the Soviet Union’s interests in any way.”
The South Asian Crisis of 1971—the break-up of East and West Pakistan, Pakistan’s brutal repression about the people of East Pakistan, the creation of Bangladesh, the conflict between Indian and West Pakistan, and then war–involved complex machinations by the Nixon administration, which “tilted” toward Pakistan, in part because of the latter’s crucial role in expediting rapprochement with Beijing. While India and the Soviet Union had signed a friendship treaty a few months earlier (partly to offset the U.S.-China rapprochement), local and regional concerns fueled the South Asian conflict, but Nixon and Kissinger were quick to assume that Moscow had a hidden hand in the conflict. These records of Kissinger’s conversation with Soviet diplomat Yuli Vorontsov, who filled in during Dobrynin’s absence, on 5 December 1971, illustrate the problem. To Kissinger’s claim that the Soviets encouraged the Indian “military aggression” against Pakistan,” Vorontsov reported that he “expressed surprise on a purely personal level and questioned why events between India and Pakistan are so insistently and obviously being extended to relations between our two countries.”
Kissinger’s account does not include this language or Vorontsov’s observations that Moscow also wanted to end the fighting and had called for a “political solution to the crisis.” “So what does this have to do with U.S.-Soviet relations … or even more with predictions about a ‘critical juncture.’?” In any event, Nixon quickly sent an accusatory letter condemning Moscow for “supporting [India’s] open use of force against the independence and integrity of Pakistan.”
The tensions over the South Asian crisis notwithstanding, the plans for a U.S.-Soviet summit, announced in the fall of 1971 and scheduled for late May 1972, remained on track. While Secretary of State Rogers and the Department of State were becoming more involved in the summit planning process, Nixon and Kissinger strictly circumscribed their role. This became a problem in early February 1972 when Dobrynin accepted Rogers’ invitation to a meeting to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. Not wanting Rogers to know any more than was necessary, Kissinger arranged to meet with Dobrynin to update him “about what specifically the Secretary of State knows concerning the state of Soviet-U.S. relations.” Dobrynin produced the only record of this meeting, which shows Kissinger telling him that Rogers did not know about “confidential conversations on the Middle East” or Nixon’s proposal about limitations on numbers of missile-carrying nuclear submarines. Kissinger also asked Dobrynin not to discuss the summit agenda with Rogers. As Dobrynin observed, it was a “unique situation when the Special Assistant to the President secretly informs a foreign ambassador about what the Secretary of State knows and does not know.”
In another unique document, Dobrynin recorded a difficult talk with Kissinger on the North Vietnamese Spring Offensive and its implications for Moscow-Washington relations. Arguing that the offensive amounted to a “large-scale armed invasion of South Vietnam” and a “flagrant violation” of the 1968 bombing-halt agreement, Kissinger suggested that Hanoi’s actions were aimed at humiliating President Nixon and “from an objective standpoint [were] unquestionably aimed at complicating the situation on the eve of the Soviet-U.S. summit. That is the only possible conclusion.” Mentioning that the North Vietnamese troops were armed with Soviet weapons, Kissinger told Dobryin that he believed that Hanoi was acting on its own and that the Soviet Union had not encouraged the offensive. Nevertheless, because North Vietnam and the Soviet Union were allies he did not want Moscow to believe that any U.S. military response to North Vietnam was “deliberately directed against the interests of the Soviet Union.” Dobrynin could only repeat what Brezhnev had already written: that the “bombing of the DRV can only complicate the situation, and consequently, the atmosphere leading up to and during the Soviet-U.S. talks in Moscow.” During the discussion that followed, Kissinger observed that “Apparently we will have to go through yet another crisis that neither of us precipitated.”
While Nixon and Kissinger escalated attacks on North Vietnamese forces, they held back from major air strikes on the Hanoi area or from long-standing contingency plans to mine Haiphong Harbor. By early May, however, Nixon was making decisions to move in that direction and on 8 May he gave a TV speech announcing the U.S. escalation. Dobrynin, however, misjudged Nixon’s course of action. In another unique memcon with Kissinger, he recorded Kissinger’s assertion that the Nixon wanted the Moscow Summit to take place although he recognized that the Vietnam situation “will probably have an unfavorable impact on the meeting in some respects.” Dobrynin’s conclusion that Nixon had made a “firm decision” to go to Moscow led him to believe that the White House desire for “productive talks [was] having a restraining influence on Nixon in terms of taking any particularly serious military measures against the DRV.” That would remain the case, Dobrynin thought, until the summit, unless the Vietnam situation turned disastrous. The possibility that Nixon would escalate the war, taking the chance that the Soviets would not cancel the summit (which Nixon believed was unlikely), apparently did not occur to the ambassador. Nixon’s gamble paid off and the summit was highly successful, despite the Vietnam War escalation.
Notes
1. The Kissinger-Dobrynin talks during 1969-1973 have been characterized as “back channel” because State Department contacts with embassies and foreign offices are understood as the regular “front channel” for diplomatic communications.
2. A selection of Russian documents from the first several months of 1969 was initially published in a leading Russian journal on postwar history. See Vladimir O. Pechatnov, ed., “Sekretnyi Kanal A.F. Dobrynin-G. Kissindzher: Dokumenty Arkhiva Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia, No. 5 (September-October 2006): 108-38. Pechatnov, a professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), played a key role as adviser and compiler on the Russian side of the joint project.
3. This is not to say that no Kissinger records of those meetings exist; he may have recounted them in personal diaries or in hand-written records of the discussions.
TOP-SECRET: The INF Treaty and the Washington Summit
Washington D.C., August, 2011 – Previously secret Soviet Politburo records and declassified American transcripts of the Washington summit 20 years ago between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev show that Gorbachev was willing to go much further than the Americans expected or were able to reciprocate on arms cuts and resolving regional conflicts, according to documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.
Today’s posting includes the internal Soviet deliberations leading up to the summit, full transcripts of the two leaders’ discussions, the Soviet record of negotiations with top American diplomats, and other historic records being published for the first time.
The documents show that the Soviet Union made significant changes to its initial position to accommodate the U.S. demands, beginning with “untying the package” of strategic arms, missile defense, and INF in February 1987 and then agreeing to eliminate its newly deployed OKA/SS-23 missiles, while pressing the U.S. leadership to agree on substantial reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. Gorbachev’s goal was to prepare and sign the START Treaty on the basis of 50 percent reductions of strategic offensive weapons in 1988 before the Reagan administration left office. In the course of negotiations, the Soviet Union also proposed cutting conventional forces in Europe by 25% and starting negotiations to eliminate chemical weapons.
The documents also detail Gorbachev’s desire for genuine collaboration with the U.S. in resolving regional conflicts, especially the Iran-Iraq War, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Nicaragua. However, the documents show that the U.S. side was unwilling and unable to pursue many of the Soviet initiatives at the time due to political struggles within the Reagan administration. Reading these documents one gets a visceral sense of missed opportunities for achieving even deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals, resolving regional conflicts, and ending the Cold War even earlier.
The documents paint the fullest declassified portrait yet available of the Washington summit which ended 20 years ago today and centered on the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty – the only treaty of its kind in actually eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons. By eliminating mainly the missiles based in Europe, the treaty lowered the threat of nuclear war in Europe substantially and cleared the way for negotiations on tactical nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as negotiations on conventional forces in Europe.
Under the Treaty, the Soviet Union destroyed 889 of its intermediate-range missiles and 957 shorter-range missiles, and the U.S. destroyed 677 and 169 respectively. These were the missiles with very short flight time to targets in the Soviet Union, which made them “most likely to spur escalation to general nuclear war from any local hostilities that might erupt.” (Note 1) These weapons were perceived as most threatening by the Soviet leadership, which is why the Soviet military supported the Treaty, even though there was a significant opposition among them to including the shorter-range weapons.
The Treaty included remarkably extensive and intrusive verification inspection and monitoring arrangements, based on the “any time and place” proposal of March 1987, which was accepted by the Soviets to the Americans’ surprise; and the documents show that the Soviets were willing to go beyond the American position in the depth of verification regime. The new Soviet position on verification not only removed the hurdle that seemed insurmountable, but according to then-U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock, became a symbol of the new trust developing in U.S.-Soviet relations, which made the treaty and further progress on arms control possible.
The documents published here for the first time give the reader a unique and never-previously-available opportunity to look into the process of internal deliberations on both sides and the negotiations both before and during the summit in December 1987.
Read the Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.February 4, 1987
Record of Conversation of Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeev and H. Brown, C. Vance, H. Kissinger, and D. Jones.This meeting takes place during the visit of the Council on Foreign Relations Group, to Moscow on February 2-6. In addition to meeting with Marshal Akhromeev, the members of the group also met with Mikhail Gorbachev and Alexander Yakovlev. Marshal Akhromeev discusses problems of U.S.-Soviet arms control process, which has slowed down considerably after the Reykjavik summit and criticizes the U.S. side for backtracking after the summit, especially on the issue of deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons. He expresses doubts that any progress could be achieved in the last two years of the Reagan administration in Geneva, but also emphasized the Soviet willingness to move ahead, however on the basis of “package,” i.e. linkage between INF, strategic offensive weapons and the ABM systems. Members of the Council on Foreign Relations Group express their disagreement with the idea of elimination of offensive ballistic missiles and total elimination of nuclear weapons proposed by Reagan in Reykjavik on the grounds of security, citing Soviet superiority in conventional weapons in Europe (Kissinger and Jones) and also arguing that if the agreement was reached, the U.S. Congress would have never ratified that agreement. The U.S. representatives suggest that further progress would be impossible on the basis of the Soviet “package” approach, and that to make it possible, negotiations should proceed on separate issues without linking them with each other. The conversation also involves detailed discussion of Soviet objections to SDI and the balance of conventional weapons in Europe, on which Akhromeev reminds the Americans of the Soviet proposal of June 1986 to reduce conventional weapons in Europe by 25%, to which they received no response.
February 25, 1987
Alexander Yakovlev, Memorandum for Gorbachev
“Toward an Analysis of the Fact of the Visit of Prominent American Political Leaders to the USSR (Kissinger, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Brown, and others)This long memorandum analyzes the statements and impressions of members of the group of the Council on Foreign Relations, which visited the Soviet Union earlier in the month, and provides recommendations for Gorbachev on next Soviet moves in arms control and Soviet-American relations. The document contains the single most powerful argument for “untying the package” of INF strategic offensive weapons and ABM systems, which was the basis of the Soviet arms control position in Reykjavik. Surprisingly, Yakovlev does not argue from positions of Soviet security or linkage to the SDI. His argument concerns mainly the domestic political situation in the United States, with right-wing forces running the show in the administration and the fact that the Irangate scandal has weakened President Reagan significantly. If the Soviet Union is to have any chance to achieve any arms control agreements in the next two years, before the end of the Reagan term, it needs major new initiatives, which would persuade the U.S. administration to engage in serious arms control. Therefore, the timing is ripe for untying the package to show the seriousness of Soviet intentions. He implies that the Soviet side must be ready to make concessions, but that they would not affect Soviet security. The second argument, which makes the timing even more important is that the resumption of Soviet nuclear testing (with the first test coming on February 26, 1987) would damage the image of Soviet perestroika in Europe. An announcement of a major new initiative such as untying the package would counteract the damage produced by the resumption of testing. This memorandum shows the impact of the visit of the representatives of the Council on Foreign relations on policymakers in the Soviet Union, and the attentiveness of the Soviet leaders to the perceptions of perestroika abroad.
February 26, 1987
Politburo Session [Excerpt]At this Politburo session the historic decision to “untie the package” is made ostensibly following the proposal by Gromyko (most likely the preliminary decision had already been made in the Walnut Room before the session started). Gorbachev argued strongly for this decision as the only way to jumpstart the negotiations that had been “stuck” in Geneva. Here he also proposes to invite George Shultz to Moscow, and to proceed to a quick conclusion of the agreement on INF and then on strategic offensive weapons. He shows his frustration with U.S. backtracking on arms control after Reykjavik. All present Politburo members speak in favor “untying the package,” including Yegor Ligachev and Defense Minister Yuri Sokolov, who later criticized the treaty and concessionary. Shevardnadze makes an argument about timing linking the decision to the need to restore trust in European public opinion after the resumption of Soviet nuclear tests. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze’s arguments follow very closely the argument presented in the Yakovlev memo of the day before (see Document 2).
April 14, 1987
Memorandum of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. Excerpt.During this meeting with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze (joined by Marshal Akhromeev after the break), Shultz presses Gorbachev for inclusion of shorter-range nuclear missiles into the treaty, and specifically for inclusion of the new Soviet OKA/SS-23 missile, which according to the Soviet side had a range of only 400 km (as a result of the INF agreement, the USSR had to destroy 239 of these modern, newly deployed and highly mobile missiles, which allowed for the breakthrough in the negotiations but resulted in heavy criticism among the military). Shultz also insists on the principle of “equality,” which would allow the United States to match the number of Soviet SRINF even though the U.S. did not have those at the time. Gorbachev tries very hard to counteract this argument and persuade Shultz that since the Soviet Union was willing to eliminate all weapons of that class, the U.S. should reserve for itself the right to develop those. Gorbachev also expresses Soviet agreement with the U.S. idea of global double zero on INF and SRINF for the first time, but Shultz does not seem to grasp it most likely because his instructions did not give him a mandate to pursue that proposal. To Shultz’s expressed concern about issues of verification, Gorbachev offers the deepest and most comprehensive verification regime going beyond what the U.S. was prepared to. In discussion of strategic offensive weapons, Shultz raises the issue of sub-ceiling for elements of the strategic triad, and Gorbachev emotionally accuses him of backtracking on the Reykjavik understandings—to cut the strategic triad by half. Gorbachev raises the linkage between SDI and strategic offensive weapons but offers a new Soviet understanding of laboratory testing, which would be permitted in the treaty. This meeting signified a real breakthrough in INF negotiations due to three major new Soviet initiatives: agreement to include SRINF, comprehensive verification regime, and willingness to accept the U.S. principle of “equality.”
April 10, 1987
Letter from President Reagan to General Secretary GorbachevApril 9, 1987
Rejected Draft of Letter from President Reagan to General Secretary GorbachevPresident Reagan’s deputy national security adviser Colin Powell forwarded a 10-page draft to Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger on April 9, but the actual 2-page letter signed by President Reagan and carried by Shultz to Moscow, dated April 10, contained only a few phrases carried over from the draft. Especially notable is the muted language in the final letter about the then-raging espionage controversy over the U.S. Embassy’s Marine guards – which led to a U.S. Senate resolution urging Shultz not to go to Moscow, but ultimately proved to be based on coerced false confessions by the guards. The President downplayed the problems in his Los Angeles speech of April 10, when he said “If I had to characterize U.S.-Soviet relations in one word, it would be this: proceeding. No great cause for excitement; no great cause for alarm.” The same day, Gorbachev proposed to deal with the shorter-range INF issue by freezing and then cutting these systems.
April 16, 1987
Politburo session.Gorbachev informs the Politburo about his conversation with Shultz. The surprising assessment is that “conversation was good but empty—we did not move anywhere.” He accuses Shultz as being focused on extracting concessions from the Soviet Union. Nothing is said of specific Soviet concessions on shorter-range nuclear missiles. Shevardnadze shares Gorbachev’s frustration with American abandonment of the Reykjavik position saying “the general tendency is hardening on all directions after Reykjavik—they want to keep 100 units and are against the global zero. However, Gorbachev makes it very clear that the treaty and more radical progress on arms control are in Soviet interests and that he would continue to press the American leaders in this direction.
May 1987
Plan of Conversation
Between M.S. Gorbachev and the President of the United States R. Reagan before the first trip to Washington. May 1987.
(A draft dictated by Gorbachev to his adviser Anatoly Chernyaev)In this draft Gorbachev outlines his ideas for the first one-on-one conversation he will have with Reagan. He is coming with a very ambitious agenda—not limited to the INF treaty but in fact looking far beyond it. In the very first conversation, he is prepared to engage Reagan on START, chemical weapons, conventional weapons and regional problems. The scope of issues mentioned in this draft and the solutions proposed on each of them show what a monumental opportunity the summit could be with the Soviet leadership willing to be flexible on practically all the issues that before represented stumbling blocks not only in U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations but in resolving regional conflicts such as the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq war and the situation in Central America. Gorbachev shows unbendable optimism in his and Reagan’s ability to deal with all these issues decisively and successfully.
May 7, 1987
National Security Decision Directive Number 271: Instructions for the Eighth NST Negotiating RoundThis directive signed by President Reagan two days after the beginning of the eighth round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva provided specific instructions for each of the three U.S. negotiating teams. The INF instructions in particular represented a holding pattern (“Washington is currently examining the Soviet proposal”) on the issue of shorter-range missiles (SRINF), even though both Gorbachev and Shultz at different points in the April discussions had embraced the idea of a “double zero” for these missiles. In other respects, the instructions moved backward from the Reykjavik summit positions, with a seven-year as opposed to a ten-year period for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and resurrection of the “sublimits” approach to counting nuclear weapons.
June 13, 1987
National Security Decision Directive Number 278: Establishing a U.S. Negotiating Position on SRINF MissilesThis directive essentially codified the “double zero” agreement announced formally the previous day at the semiannual NATO ministerial meeting, after a period of heated debate among NATO leaders, with West Germany’s Kohl most in favor of the approach and Britain’s Thatcher most dubious. But the document’s second paragraph ends with what would become the sticking point to the negotiations – the status of the Pershing missiles belonging to West Germany. Ultimately, after what President Reagan described in his memoirs as his own private plea to Kohl, the West German leader would announce on August 26 that the German Pershings would be eliminated once the U.S. and Soviet missiles were.
July 9, 1987
Politburo Session.Gorbachev formally announces to the Politburo that the Soviet Union adopts the double global zero platform agreeing to destroy its intermediate-range missiles in Asia (formal announcement would be made on July 23). He also formally announces the decision to add tactical missiles (like SS-23/OKA) to be covered in the INF Treaty justifying that step by saying that it would “deliver a blow” to “Pershings IB” stationed in the FRG. He calls for a third zero—eliminating tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. What is striking here is that he already made the exact same proposals to Shultz in April, but Shultz was not able at the time to respond to them, and only after NATO formally adopted the global double zero position on June 12, Gorbachev announces it as his new position at the Politburo. Gorbachev is sensitive to the criticism of his own military about the Soviet disproportionate cuts under the INF treaty—therefore he raises the issue of the imbalance, but noting that even disproportionate cuts would be justified since the intention is to “clear Europe from nuclear weapons.”
August 11, 1987
Department of State Briefing Papers: Nuclear and Space Talks, START, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, Defense and Space, Nuclear Testing, Compliance Issues, ABM Treaty Interpretation, Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Documents 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d and 4e)These State Department briefing papers provide a snapshot of U.S. negotiating positions across the range of U.S.-Soviet issues going into the fall discussions that would produce the INF Treaty and the Washington summit. From internal evidence (repeated references to “as of August 11”), the typed text appears to date from August 11, but the handwritten notes and editing comments were added subsequent to Chancellor Kohl’s August 26 offer to eliminate the German Pershings.
September 5, 1987
GRIP 27D [“Should the U.S. change its current stance on U.S. warheads on FRG Pershing IA missiles?”]Written by National Security Council staff, this memorandum bears the codeword GRIP signifying the particular secrecy compartment used for NSC documents on U.S.-Soviet arms discussions in 1987 and 1988 (there would ultimately be at least 96 separate GRIP items, according to the finding aide to the Robert Linhard Papers at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library). The issue of U.S. warheads on the German Pershings came up in June 1987 when the U.S. Defense Department responded to the “double zero” consensus by proposing the conversion of Pershing IIs into shorter range Pe-1Bs for turnover to the West Germans, much to the Soviets’ dismay. Even after Kohl’s August 26 announcement on elimination of the German Pershings, the Soviets suspected backsliding when the U.S. would not commit in writing to destroy the Pershing warheads; but this memo outlined the position that the U.S. would take: sticking to the principle of not negotiating about an ally’s weapons, while reassuring the Soviets that the warheads would not be used in some other configuration.
September 8, 1987
Meeting with the National Security Planning Group [Briefing Memorandum for President Reagan from National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci]This briefing memo and attached talking points were drafted by NSC staffers Linton Brooks and Will Tobey and forwarded by the national security adviser, Frank Carlucci, to President Reagan to prepare him for a key NSPG meeting on the upcoming visit by Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze to Washington. Although the memo suggests there would be a debate over how flexible the U.S. negotiating positions should be on START and SDI, the outcome of the NSPG meeting was that President Reagan sided with defense secretary Weinberger against any change in those positions (Weinberger had separately argued for keeping some non-nuclear-tipped INF missiles, but Reagan overruled him).
September 10, 1987
Letter from General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan, Russian and English versions [Documents 7a and 7b]Foreign minister Shevardnadze arrives in Washington on September 15 bearing this five-page letter from Gorbachev to Reagan (8 pages in the unofficial translation given to the President). Together with a plea for progress on INF and arms reductions generally, the letter contains an interesting distinction related to the issue that had derailed the Reykjavik summit, the Strategic Defense Initiative. Gorbachev refers to “strategic offensive weapons in space” as the problem for the Soviets – the fear that U.S. development of the SDI would create the capacity for a Hitler-style blitzkrieg from space. Reagan had always insisted the U.S. was not seeking this capacity, but as Raymond Garthoff has noted, the President missed the opening to combine constraints on such weapons with the cooperative SDI program he always envisioned with the Soviets. The Shultz-Shevardnadze talks during this visit ultimately produce only an agreement in principle on the INF Treaty and on a subsequent summit in Washington with a date to be determined later.
October 23, 1987
Memorandum of conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. Excerpt.In this long and fascinating conversation Gorbachev was trying to show the new Soviet flexibility to move closer to the U.S. position on the issues of sub-ceilings on elements of the strategic triad, including willingness to have a lower level of Soviet heavy ICBMs, laboratory testing of SDI elements, and verification. At the same time, he notes that the U.S. side tries to “squeeze as much as possible out of us.” Gorbachev’s main objective for the meeting is to get Shultz to agree to draft key provisions for the START treaty that could be discussed in Washington during his visit. However, Shultz’s response to this proposal is inconclusive—he would prefer delegations in Geneva to work more on clarifying the issues under dispute and leave the “key provisions” for the principals to discuss at the summit. Gorbachev vents his frustration calling Shultz’ position “foggy, “ complains about U.S. lack of willingness to move on arms control, and doubts U.S. support for Soviet domestic changes. No decisions on “key provisions” were achieved and even dates of the summit were left undecided. The document also contains a fascinating discussion of U.S.-Soviet collaboration in trying to resolve the Iran-Iraq conflict.
October 28, 1987
Gorbachev Letter to Reagan.This letter is Gorbachev’s final call for progress in discussions of the key provisions of START treaty so that the principals could agree on those in Washington. The last obstacle to such agreement is the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which the Soviet Union proposed to be ten years and to which Shultz did not agree in Moscow. Gorbachev proposes to open a direct channel through the Ambassadors to discuss this issue before the summit to find a speedy solution. Gorbachev believes that it is realistic to achieve an agreement on strategic weapons and to start discussion on banning chemical weapons. He suggests that “we want to crown your visit to the Soviet Union with concluding an agreement on strategic offensive weapons” referring to the planned Reagan visit to Moscow in May-June 1988. In the letter, Gorbachev also gives final dates of his visit to Washington—during the first ten days of December 1987.
October 30, 1987
Memorandum For: The President From: George P. Shultz [Secretary of State] Subject: Gorbachev’s LetterThe Secretary of State summarizes for the President the contents of Gorbachev’s “fairly positive” letter, which would be hand delivered to Reagan by Shevardnadze later that day. Shultz remarks on the Soviet agreement for an early December summit in Washington, and notes the flexibility in various of Gorbachev’s proposals. After formally receiving the letter from Shevardnadze, Reagan would announce the summit agreement in the White House press room, with Shultz and Shevardnadze at his side.
The top U.S. public relations official proposes in this memo that Reagan fly to Europe and attend a NATO summit immediately after the one with Gorbachev in Washington – a suggestion that would not be accepted. But the memo provides interesting inside detail about the President’s standing in European public opinion: “Our own polling of European publics continues to show by overwhelming margins that Gorbachev is viewed more favorably than President Reagan (e.g. Britain (83%), Germany (80%), Italy (76%) and France (51%), and more the advocate of peace and arms control.”
November 10, 1987
National Security Decision Directive Number 288: My Objectives at the SummitThis directive written in the first person summarizes President Reagan’s expectations for the Washington summit, and perhaps most strikingly asserts that the summit “must in no way complicate our efforts to maintain a strong defense budget and key programs like SDI” and the Reagan doctrine support to anticommunist armed forces abroad. Frances Fitzgerald commented in her book Way Out There in the Blue (p. 434) that “Both of these policies were history in the Hollywood sense of the word, yet administration officials followed the guidance quite faithfully” to the point of missing Gorbachev’s offer on Central America for both the U.S. and the USSR to stop shipping arms there if the peace plan proposed by Costa Rica’s Oscar Arias was accepted. Since the U.S. Congress was not going to approve more arms anyway, given the Iran-contra scandal, Gorbachev’s offer amounted to exactly the cessation of Soviet arms that the U.S. claimed it sought.
November 24, 1987
Memorandum Subject: Gorbachev’s Gameplan: The Long View [By Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency]On the eve of the Washington summit, the top U.S. intelligence analyst on the Soviet Union – Robert M. Gates, then the deputy director of CIA – gets Gorbachev almost completely wrong. In this memo (forwarded by the CIA director William Webster to Vice President Bush and other top officials), Gates predicts that the Soviet reforms are merely a “breathing space” before the resumption of the “further increase in Soviet military power and political influence.” Gates misses the Soviet recognition that the Stalinist economic system had failed; he incorrectly predicts that Gorbachev will only agree to arms reductions that “protect existing Soviet advantages”; he claims the Soviets are still committed to the protection of their Third World clients – only three months later, Gorbachev would announce the pullout from Afghanistan; and Gates sees any Gorbachev force reductions as a threat to “Alliance cohesion” rather than a gain for security in Europe. This hard-line assessment of Gorbachev is not shared by President Reagan, who would rescind his “evil empire” rhetoric while standing in Red Square in May 1988.
November 28, 1987
Information Memorandum TO: The Secretary, From: INR- Morton I. Abramowitz, Subject: Gorbachev’s Private Summit AgendaThis two-page cover memo from the head of the State Department’s intelligence and research bureau to Secretary Shultz summarizes a seven-page INR study looking at “what might be some of the ‘wild cards’ on the summit agenda.” While generally accurate in its assessment of Gorbachev’s intentions, even the State Department analysts closest to the Shultz view of Soviet behavior do not predict several of the Gorbachev surprises during the summit such as the offer on Central America and on conventional forces in Europe. The prediction of “something splashy on Afghanistan” would be off by a few months, but the memo’s anticipation of a possible SDI compromise would be only slightly behind Gorbachev’s own thinking.
December 7, 1987
Memo: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-290) on Arms Control Position for the US-USSR SummitOn the Friday before the Washington summit, President Reagan signs this directive setting out what journalist Don Oberdorfer later described as “seemingly impossible” negotiating goals on SDI with Gorbachev, including explicit Soviet approval of tests in space, and Soviet approval of US deployment of strategic defenses after the end of an agreed period of non-withdrawal from ABM Treaty. Gorbachev had rejected both of these ideas repeatedly in earlier meetings, but would surprise the Americans at the Washington summit with his tactics if not his underlying posture on SDI.
December 8, 1987
Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 10:45 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.December 8, 1987
Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 2:30 p.m. – 3:15 p.m.December 8, 1987
Record of Conversation
Between S.F. Akhromeev and P. Nitze at the U.S. State DepartmentIn the first conversations of military experts Marshal Akhromeev outlines the Soviet position on the strategic nuclear weapons negotiations. The main point remained the linkage between ABM compliance and START issues. The other remaining issue is verification, on which now Soviets were prepared to go further than the Americans in reversal of the traditional positions. When Akhromeev offers on-site inspections to count the number of bombs deployed on each bomber, Nitze responds: “We cannot agree to that.” The discussion also covers issues of counting Soviet “Backfire” bomber and U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles.
December 9, 1987
Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 10:35 a.m. – 10:45 a.m.December 9, 1987
Draft Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 10:55 a.m. – 12:35 p.m.December 9, 1987
Record of Conversations between Sergey Fyodorovich Akhromeev and Paul Nitze at the U.S. State Department. Excerpt.In this excerpt of a very long conversation of military experts Akhromeev shows his frustration with the Americans’ unwillingness to meet the Soviet delegation halfway even after all the flexibility shown by the Soviet side on reducing heavy ICBMs and counting heavy bombers. When he suggests that the draft of key provisions should contain a commitment of both sides to reduce the total throw-weight of the sides’ ICBMs and SLBMs by 50%, Nitze replies that this paragraph should be recorded only as a “unilateral statement.”
December 9, 1987
Record of Conversation
Between S.F. Akhromeev and F. Carlucci at the PentagonAkhromeev and Carlucci discuss issues of possible cooperation on SDI research during the period of non-withdrawal and non-deployment of SDI systems. Carlucci makes a very strong argument in defense of the SDI saying that it is widely supported in the country and that there was no chance for a strategic offensive weapons treaty to be ratified by the U.S. Congress “regardless of how great it was if only it was said that it undermined the concept of SDI.” Akhromeev counters with questioning the SDI feasibility and suggesting that the Soviet Union was capable of producing an asymmetrical response to the program.
December 10, 1987
Draft Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 10 a.m. – 12 p.m.December 10, 1987
Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at a Working Luncheon, 12:40 p.m. – 2:10 p.mAkhromeev and members of U.S. JCS discuss measures of cooperation between representatives of U.S. and Soviet armed forces as means of building trust between the two militaries. Akhromeev proposes more human contacts between the officers, visits to bases, exchanges of basketball teams or military bands. The conversation also involves the issues of reductions of conventional weapons in Europe, including dual-use weapons. During the discussion of conventional weapons Akhromeev for the first time admits that there are “imbalances” in the European theater, including the Soviet advantage in tanks and U.S. advantage in combat aircraft. Verification and nuclear safety centers are also discussed.
December 12, 1987
Telegram: Secretary’s 12/11 NAC Briefing on Washington SummitThis telegram summarizes Secretary of State Shultz’s briefing to the North Atlantic Council immediately after the Washington summit, and provides talking points for U.S. diplomats around the world to use when briefing their host governments on the summit. Sent by the deputy secretary of state (acting secretary in Shultz’s absence) John Whitehead, the cable says the Washington summit “has taken us a gigantic step forward” on strategic arms, and hails the INF Treaty as a “bipartisan achievement for the U.S.”
December 16, 1987
Anatoly Chernyaev Memorandum to Gorbachev.In this memorandum prepared for Gorbachev’s report to the Politburo on the results of the Washington summit Chernyaev lists all the accomplishments of the summit—primarily in dealing with negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons. According to Chernyaev, there was a real danger that the summit results would have been limited to the INF treaty without progress on START issues. He notes progress in finding solutions to the following difficult issues: provision on compliance with the AMB treaty, limits for warheads on strategic missiles and for warheads on sea-launched cruise missiles. Chernyaev also discusses Reagan’s negotiating style “his incompetence,” pointing that the real power “rests with the group of Bush, Carlucci and others around him”—but Gorbachev decides not to use this part of memo in his actual Politburo presentation and spoke about Reagan very favorably in his report on December 17.
December 17, 1987
Politburo Session.At this Politburo session devoted to the results of Gorbachev’s visit to Washington, Gorbachev gives a very high assessment of the summit and the INF treaty. He considers the Washington summit as “bigger than Geneva or Reykjavik” in terms of building mutual understanding with the U.S. leadership. He notes the change in Reagan’s behavior and emphasizes that the principals were speaking “as equals and seriously each keeping his ideology to himself.” Gorbachev stresses the historic nature of the INF treaty and the full Politburo support for it, because “the entire development of Soviet-American relations and the normalization of international situation in general” depended on the outcome of this issue. He also informs members of the Politburo about his and the delegation’s meetings with Americans of all ways of life and describes strong support for perestroika in the United States.
December 29, 1987
National Security Decision Directive Number 292: Organizing for the INF Ratification Effort [Document 23]This directive signed by President Reagan sets up the White House teams working for Senate ratification of the INF Treaty. This was not a hard sell politically: On December 15th the Washington Post published the first post-summit poll, showing Reagan’s approval ratings at their highest since the Iran-contra scandal broke in November 1986, up from 50 to 58%, with 61% having a “favorable impression” of Reagan. Remarkably, 65% had a “favorable impression” of Gorbachev! Yet a chorus of critics (including former President Nixon, former secretary of state Kissinger, and former – and future – national security adviser Scowcroft) were attacking the INF treaty for removing nuclear weapons from Europe while leaving a large Soviet conventional arms advantage. Unbeknownst to the critics, in part because Reagan was unprepared to take up the conventional forces issue when Gorbachev raised it during the summit, the Soviets were ready to move on major cuts in non-nuclear forces as well, and Gorbachev would announce such cuts in his United Nations speech less than a year later.
Note
1. Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. (The Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C. 1994), p. 327.
TOP-SECRET: Characterization of Darfur violence as “genocide” had no “legal consequences” for U.S., according to 2004 State Department Memo
Washington, DC, August 17, 2011 – A secret June 25, 2004 Department of State memo entitled “Genocide and Darfur” written by William Taft IV, the legal advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell, stated that “a determination that genocide has occurred in Darfur would have no immediate legal–as opposed to moral, political or policy–consequences for the United States.”
Writing for The Atlantic, National Security Archive Fellow Rebecca Hamilton argues that the memo’s determination that calling the conflict in Darfur genocide would yield no “legal consequences” influenced Secretary of State Colin Powell’s “judgment call” to become the first member of any US administration to apply the label genocide to an ongoing conflict.
The June 25, 2004 memo stands in stark contrast to a secret May 1994 State Department discussion paper on Rwanda–also declassified in response to a National Security Archive request–which warned that a finding of genocide in Rwanda might obligate the Clinton administration “to actually ‘do something.’” The briefing paper helps explain why, with clear evidence to the contrary, U.S. officials refused to label the massacres of over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in Rwanda as genocide.
In her book, Fighting for Darfur, Hamilton interviewed Assistant Secretary of State Lorne Craner, who crafted the State Department’s investigation into whether genocide was occurring in Darfur. He recounted that the Department of State was heavily influenced by massacres in Rwanda a decade earlier. He remembers Powell instructing him, “There is not going to be another Rwanda.”
In addition to advising Powell that terming the events in Darfur genocide had no “legal consequences,” the 2004 memo also stated that “a finding of genocide can act as a spur to the international community to take more forceful and immediate actions to respond to ongoing atrocities.”
On September 9, 2004, free from the “legal implications” of the term and hoping to “spur” the international community into action, Secretary of State Colin Powell sat before Senate Foreign Relations Committee and testified that the Department of State had “concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the jinjaweid bear responsibility —and that genocide may still be occurring.”
Read Rebecca Hamilton’s article at The Atlantic.
TOP SECRET CIA ‘OFFICIAL HISTORY’ OF THE BAY OF PIGS: REVELATIONS
Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba
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Washington, D.C., August 17, 2011 – In the heat of the battle at the Bay of Pigs, the lead CIA field operative aboard one of the transport boats fired 75mm recoilless rifles and .50-caliber machine guns on aircraft his own agency had supplied to the exile invasion force, striking some of them. With the CIA-provided B-26 aircraft configured to match those in the Cuban air force, “we couldn’t tell them from the Castro planes,” according to the operative, Grayston Lynch. “We ended up shooting at two or three of them. We hit some of them there because when they came at us…it was a silhouette, that was all you could see.”
This episode of ‘friendly fire’ is one of many revelations contained in the Top Secret multi-volume, internal CIA report, “The Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation.” Pursuant to a Freedom of Information lawsuit (FOIA) filed by the National Security Archive on the 50th anniversary of the invasion last April, the CIA has now declassified four volumes of the massive, detailed, study–over 1200 pages of comprehensive narrative and documentary appendices.
Archive Cuba specialist Peter Kornbluh, who filed the lawsuit, hailed the release as “a major advance in obtaining the fullest possible record of the most infamous debacle in the history of the CIA’s covert operations.” The Bay of Pigs, he noted, “remains fundamentally relevant to the history of the CIA, of U.S. foreign policy, and of U.S. intervention in Cuba and Latin America. It is a clandestine history that must be understood in all its inglorious detail.”
In an article published today in the “Daily Beast,” Kornbluh described the ongoing “FOIA wars” with the CIA to obtain the declassification of historical documents the CIA continues to keep secret. He characterized the process of pressing the CIA to release the Official History and other historically significant documents as “the bureaucratic equivalent of passing a kidney stone.”
The “Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations” was written between 1974 and 1984 by Jack Pfeiffer, a member of the Agency’s staff who rose to become the CIA’s Chief Historian. After he retired in the mid 1980s, Pfeiffer attempted to obtain the declassification of Volumes 4 and 5 of his study, which contained his lengthy and harsh critiques of two previous official investigations of the Bay of Pigs: the report of the Presidential Commission led by Gen. Maxwell Taylor; and the CIA’s own Inspector General’s report written in the aftermath of the failed assault. Both the Taylor Commission and the IG report held the CIA primarily responsible for the failure of the invasion—a position Pfeiffer rejected. The CIA released only the Taylor critique, but Pfeiffer never circulated it.
According to Kornbluh, Pfeiffer saw as his mission to spread the blame for the debacle of “JMATE”—the codename for the operation—beyond the CIA headquarters at Langley, VA. Kornbluh characterized the study as “not only the official history, but the official defense of the CIA’s legacy that was so badly damaged on the shores of Cuba;” and he predicted its declassification “would revive the ‘who-lost-Cuba’ blame game” that has accompanied the historical debate over the failed invasion for fifty years.
The Archive is posting all four volumes today. They are described below:
Volume 1: Air Operations, March 1960 to April 1961 (Part 1| Part 2 | Part 3)
The opening volume examines the critical component of the invasion—the CIA-created air force, the preliminary airstrikes, and the air battle over Cuba during the three day attack. The study forcefully addresses the central “who-lost-Cuba” debate that broke out in the aftermath of the failed invasion. It absolves the CIA of blame, and places it on the Kennedy White House and other agencies for decisions relating to the preliminary airstrikes and overt air cover that, according to the Official History, critically compromised the success of the operation. “[I]in its attempts to meet its official obligations in support of the official, authorized policy of the U.S. government—to bring about the ouster of Fidel Castro—the agency was not well served by the Kennedy White House, Secretary of State Rusk, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the U.S. Navy,” the CIA historian concludes. “The changes, modifications, distortions, and lack of firm, positive guidance related to air operations—the key to the success or failure of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Castro—make clear that the collapse of the beachhead at Playa Giron was a shared responsibility. When President Kennedy [during his post-invasion press conference] proclaimed his sole responsibility for the operation there was more truth to his statement than he really believed or than his apologists will accept.”
Besides the ‘friendly fire” episode, Volume 1 contains a number of colorful revelations. Among them:
- Only days before the invasion, the CIA tried to entice Cuba’s top diplomat, foreign minister Raul Roa, to defect. “Our contact with Raul Roa reports that this defection attempt is still alive although Roa would make no firm commitment or promise on whether he would defect in the U.N.,” operations manager, Jacob Esterline, noted in a secret April 11, 1961 progress report on invasion planning. “Roa has requested that no further contact be made at this time.” Like the invasion itself, the Agency’s effort for a dramatic propaganda victory over Cuba was unsuccessful. “The planned defection did not come off,” concedes the Official History.
- In coordination with the preliminary airstrike on April 14, the CIA, with the support of the Pentagon, requested permission for a series of “large-scale sonic booms” over Havana—a psychological operations tactic the Agency had successfully employed in the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. “We were trying to create confusion, and so on,” a top-level CIA invasion planner stated. “I thought a sonic boom would be a helluva swell thing, you know. Break all the windows in downtown Havana…distract Castro.” Trying to maintain “plausible denial” of Washington’s role, the State Department rejected the request as “too obviously U.S.” The Official History records General Curtis Lemay demanding on the telephone to know “who was the sonofabitch who didn’t approve” the request.
- Several damaged invasion airplanes made emergency landings on the Grand Cayman Islands, and were seized by local authorities. The situation created an awkward diplomatic situation with Great Britain; details of the negotiations between the U.S. and England are redacted but the CIA did suggest making the argument that if the planes were not released, Castro would think the Caymans were being used as a launch site for the invasion and respond aggressively.
- As Castro’s forces gained the upper hand against the invasion, Agency planners reversed a decision against widespread use of napalm bombs “in favor of anything that might reverse the situation in Cuba in favor of the Brigade forces.”
- Although the CIA had been admonished by both the Eisenhower and Kennedy White House to make sure that the U.S. hand did not show in the invasion, during the fighting headquarters authorized American pilots to fly planes over Cuba. Secret instructions quoted in the Official History state that Americans could pilot planes but only over the beachhead and not inland. “American crews must not fall into hands enemy,” warned the instructions. If they did “[the] U.S. will deny any knowledge.” Four American pilots and crew died when their planes were shot down over Cuba. The Official History contains private correspondence with family members of some of the pilots.
Volume II: “Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy” (Part 1 | Part 2)
Volume 2 provides new details on the negotiations and tensions with other countries which the CIA needed to provide logistical and infrastructure support for the invasion preparations. The volume describes Kennedy Administration efforts to sustain the cooperation of Guatemala, where the main CIA-led exile brigade force was trained, as well as the deals made with Gen. Anastacio Somoza and his brother Luis, then the President of Nicaragua. The Official History points out that CIA personnel simply took over diplomatic functions from the State Department in both countries. “In the instance of Guatemala, the U.S. Ambassador for all practical purposes became ‘inoperative’; and in Nicaragua the opposite condition prevailed—anything that the Agency suggested received ambassadorial blessing.” Among the revelations:
- While attending John F. Kennedy’s inauguration in Washington in January 1961, General Anastacio Somoza met secretly with CIA director Allen Dulles to discuss the creation of JMTIDE, the cryptonym for the airbase the CIA wanted to use in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua to launch the attack on Cuba. Somoza explicitly raised Nicaragua’s need for two development loans totaling $10 million. The CIA subsequently pressed the State Department to support the loans, one of which was from the World Bank.
- President Luis Somoza demanded assurances that the U.S. would stand behind Nicaragua once it became known that the Somozas had supported the invasion. Somoza told the CIA representative that “there are some long-haired Department of State liberals who are not in favor of Somoza and they would welcome this as a source of embarrassment for his government.”
- Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes repeatedly told CIA officials that he wanted to “see Guatemalan Army and Air Force personnel participate in the air operations against Castro’s Cuba.”
- The dictator of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo, offered his country’s territory in support of the invasion. His quid pro quo was a U.S. assurance to let Trujillo “live out the rest of his days in peace.” The State Department rejected the offer; Trujillo, whose repression and corruption was radicalizing the left in the Dominican Republic, was later assassinated by CIA-backed groups.
Volume III: “Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies, 1951- January 1961”
This volume provides the most detailed available account of the decision making process in the White House, CIA and State Department during the Eisenhower administration that led to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The CIA previously declassified this 300-page report in 1998, pursuant to the Kennedy Assassination Records Act; but it was not made public until 2005 when Villanova professor of political science David Barrett found it in an obscure file at the National Archives, and first posted it on his university’s website.
This volume contains significant new information, and a number of major revelations, particularly regarding Vice-President Richard Nixon’s role and the CIA’s own expectations for the invasion, and on CIA assassination attempts against Fidel Castro.
- A small group of high-level CIA officials sought to use part of the budget of the invasion to finance a collaboration with the Mafia to assassinate Castro. In an interview with the CIA historian, former chief of the invasion task force, Jacob Esterline, said that he had been asked to provide money from the invasion budget by J.C. King, the head of the Western Hemisphere. “Esterline claimed that on one occasion as chief/w4, he refused to grant Col J.C. King, chief WH Division, a blank check when King refused to tell Jake the purpose for which the check was intended. Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN number from the Office of Finance and that the money was used to pay the Mafia-types.” The Official History also notes that invasion planners discussed pursuing “Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination”—although few details were provided. In November 1960, Edward Lansdale, a counterinsurgency specialist in the U.S. military who later conceived of Operation Mongoose, sent the invasion task force a “MUST GO LIST” of 11 top Cuban officials, including Che Guevera, Raul Castro, Blas Roca and Carlos Raphael Rodriguez.
- Vice-President Nixon, who portrayed himself in his memoirs as one of the original architects of the plan to overthrow Castro, proposed to the CIA that they support “goon squads and other direct action groups” inside and outside of Cuba. The Vice President repeatedly sought to interfere in the invasion planning. Through his national security aide, Nixon demanded that William Pawley, “a big fat political cat,” as Nixon’s aide described him to the CIA, be given briefings and access to CIA officers to share ideas. Pawley pushed the CIA to support untrustworthy exiles as part of the effort to overthrow Castro. “Security already has been damaged severely,” the head of the invasion planning reported, about the communications made with one, Rubio Padilla, one of Pawley’s favorite militants.
- In perhaps the most important revelation of the entire official history, the CIA task force in charge of the paramilitary assault did not believe it could succeed without becoming an open invasion supported by the U.S. military. On page 149 of Volume III, Pfeiffer quotes still-secret minutes of the Task Force meeting held on November 15, 1960, to prepare a briefing for the new President-elect, John F. Kennedy: “Our original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted,” the document states. “Our second concept (1,500-3000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.”
This candid assessment was not shared with the President-elect then, nor later after the inauguration. As Pfeiffer points out, “what was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 became the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs Operation in March 1961”—run only by the CIA, and with a force of 1,200 men.
Volume IV: The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs
This volume, which Pfeiffer wrote in an “unclassified” form with the intention of publishing it after he left the CIA, represents his forceful rebuttal to the findings of the Presidential Commission that Kennedy appointed after the failed invasion, headed by General Maxwell Taylor. In the introduction to the 300 pages volume, Pfeiffer noted that the CIA had been given a historical “bum rap” for “a political decision that insured the military defeat of the anti-Castro forces”—a reference to President Kennedy’s decision not to provide overt air cover and invade Cuba after Castro’s forces overwhelmed the CIA-trained exile Brigade. The Taylor Commission, which included Attorney General Robert Kennedy, he implied, was biased to defend the President at the expense of the CIA. General Taylor’s “strongest tilts were toward deflecting criticism of the White House,” according to the CIA historian.
According to Pfeiffer, this volume would present “the first and only detailed examination of the work of, and findings of, the Taylor Commission to be based on the complete record.” His objective was to offer “a better understanding of where the responsibility for the fiasco truly lies.” To make sure the reader fully understood his point, Pfeiffer ended the study with an “epilogue” consisting of a one paragraph quote from an interview that Raul Castro gave to a Mexican journalist in 1975. “Kennedy vacillated,” Castro stated. “If at that moment he had decided to invade us, he could have suffocated the island in a sea of blood, but he would have destroyed the revolution. Lucky for us, he vacillated.”
After leaving the CIA in the mid 1980s, Pfeiffer filed a freedom of information act suit to obtain the declassification of this volume, and volume V, of his study, which he intended to publish as a book, defending the CIA. The CIA did eventually declassify volume IV, but withheld volume V in its entirety. Pfeiffer never published the book and this volume never really circulated publicly.
Volume V: The Internal Investigation Report [Still Classified]
Like his forceful critique of the Taylor Commission, Pfeiffer also wrote a critique of the CIA’s own Inspector General’s report on the Bay of Pigs—“Inspector General’s Survey of Cuban Operation”–written by a top CIA officer, Lyman Kirkpatrick in 1961. Much to the surprise and chagrin of top CIA officers at the time, Kirkpatrick laid the blame for the failure squarely at the feet of his own agency, and particularly the chief architect of the operation, Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell. The operation was characterized by “bad planning,” “poor” staffing, faulty intelligence and assumptions, and “a failure to advise the President that success had become dubious.” Moreover, “plausible denial was a pathetic illusion,” the report concluded. “The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.” In his cover letter to the new CIA director, John McCone, Kirkpatrick identified what he called “a tendency in the Agency to gloss over CIA inadequacies and to attempt to fix all of the blame for the failure of the invasion upon other elements of the Government, rather than to recognize the Agency’s weaknesses.”
Pfeiffer’s final volume contains a forceful rebuttal of Kirkpatrick’s focus on the CIA’s own culpability for the events at the Bay of Pigs. Like the rest of the Official History, the CIA historian defends the CIA against criticism from its own Inspector General and seeks to spread the “Who Lost Cuba” blame to other agencies and authorities of the U.S. government, most notably the Kennedy White House.
When Pfeiffer first sought to obtain declassification of his critique, the Kirkpatrick report was still secret. The CIA was able to convince a judge that national security would be compromised by the declassification of Pfeiffer’s critique which called attention to this extremely sensitive Top Secret report. But in 1998, Peter Kornbluh and the National Security Archive used the FOIA to force the CIA to declassify the Inspector General’s report. (Kornbluh subsequently published it as a book: Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.) Since the Kirkpatrick report has been declassified for over 13 years, it is unclear why the CIA continues to refuse to declassify a single word of Pfeiffer’s final volume.
The National Security Archive remains committed to using all means of legal persuasion to obtain the complete declassification of the final volume of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation.
CONFIDENTIAL: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004746 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013 TAGS: ECPS ETRD IT TSPA TSPL PREL EUN SUBJECT: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN ATTENTION -- BUT NO ANSWERS CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D) ¶1. (C) AT THE END OF AN OCTOBER 9 MEETING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT WITH PM BERLUSCONI'S CLOSEST ADVISOR, PRIME MINISTRY UNDERSECRETARY GIANNI LETTA, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE USG'S CONTINUED GREAT CONCERN OVER LACK OF PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE GALILEO/M-CODE OVERLAY DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EU. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD LETTA BLUNTLY THAT THE DISPUTE RISKS BECOMING A TRAIN WRECK ON ITALY'S EU WATCH UNLESS MORE CONCERTED POLITICAL-LEVEL ATTENTION IS GIVEN TO THE ISSUE. THE USG FELT THAT THAT AMERICAN TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAD PROVIDED COMMISSION EXPERTS WITH EXHAUSTIVE CLASSIFIED TECHNICAL BRIEFINGS, WHICH HAD DEMONSTRATED PERSUASIVELY THAT NON-OVERLAY SPECTRAL OPTIONS EXIST, WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE GALILEO CAPABILITIES. NEVERTHELESS, THE COMMISSION AND EU GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN UNWILLING TO TAKE THE POLITICAL STEP TO DRAW THE OBVIOUS CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS. ¶2. (C) LETTA RESPONDED THAT SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO GALILEO. IN THE PRIME MINISTRY, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR GIOVANNI CASTELANETTA HAD BEEN BRIEFING PM BERLUSCONI REGULARLY. LETTA ALSO NOTED THAT DURING CABINET MEETINGS DEFENSE MINISTER MARTINO HAD SPOKEN OPENLY IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, LETTA OFFERED NO CLEAR INDICATION OF WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS, IF ANY, THE GOI PLANNED TO TAKE WITHIN THE EU. ¶3. (C) IN A SEPARATE MEETING OCTOBER 14 WITH ECMIN, AGAIN ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, GENERAL LEONARDO TRICARICO (THE PRIME MINISTER'S MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISOR) TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO RAISE THE MATTER OF GALILEO. ECMIN REVIEWED USG CONCERNS FOR TRICARICO, AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH LETTA. ALTHOUGH HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RECENT MEETINGS IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON, AND WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS ABOUT THE LACK OF FORWARD MOVEMENT IN U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS, TRICARICO WAS AT A LOSS TO SUGGEST WHAT ACTIONS ITALY SHOULD OR COULD TAKE. ¶4. (C) COMMENT: LETTA'S ACCOUNT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION ITALIAN MINISTERS -- INCLUDING THE PM -- ARE GIVING THE GALILEO/M-CODE DISPUTE IS WELCOME NEWS. REPORTS OF DEFMIN MARTINO'S UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION IS WELCOME, AND CONFIRMS WHAT HE HAS TOLD US. (BUT MARTINO HAS ALSO BEEN QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT HE NEEDS KEY ALLIES, SUCH AS LETTA, IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THE INTERMINISTERIAL PROCESS.) NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT THE GOI HAS ANY GAME PLAN ON HOW TO PREVENT THE WRONG OUTCOME AT THE IMPORTANT DECEMBER MEETING OF EU TRANSPORT MINISTERS. EMBASSY STANDS READY TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE GOI AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS ON GALILEO AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES WORK OUT THE NEXT STEPS IN OUR STRATEGY. END COMMENT. SEMBLER NNNN 2003ROME04746 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE CIA: TERRORISM REVIEW – ANTI-US TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE CIA: US INTELLIGENCE AND VIETNAM
CONFIDENTIAL: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004746 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013 TAGS: ECPS ETRD IT TSPA TSPL PREL EUN SUBJECT: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN ATTENTION -- BUT NO ANSWERS CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D) ¶1. (C) AT THE END OF AN OCTOBER 9 MEETING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT WITH PM BERLUSCONI'S CLOSEST ADVISOR, PRIME MINISTRY UNDERSECRETARY GIANNI LETTA, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE USG'S CONTINUED GREAT CONCERN OVER LACK OF PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE GALILEO/M-CODE OVERLAY DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EU. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD LETTA BLUNTLY THAT THE DISPUTE RISKS BECOMING A TRAIN WRECK ON ITALY'S EU WATCH UNLESS MORE CONCERTED POLITICAL-LEVEL ATTENTION IS GIVEN TO THE ISSUE. THE USG FELT THAT THAT AMERICAN TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAD PROVIDED COMMISSION EXPERTS WITH EXHAUSTIVE CLASSIFIED TECHNICAL BRIEFINGS, WHICH HAD DEMONSTRATED PERSUASIVELY THAT NON-OVERLAY SPECTRAL OPTIONS EXIST, WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE GALILEO CAPABILITIES. NEVERTHELESS, THE COMMISSION AND EU GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN UNWILLING TO TAKE THE POLITICAL STEP TO DRAW THE OBVIOUS CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS. ¶2. (C) LETTA RESPONDED THAT SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO GALILEO. IN THE PRIME MINISTRY, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR GIOVANNI CASTELANETTA HAD BEEN BRIEFING PM BERLUSCONI REGULARLY. LETTA ALSO NOTED THAT DURING CABINET MEETINGS DEFENSE MINISTER MARTINO HAD SPOKEN OPENLY IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, LETTA OFFERED NO CLEAR INDICATION OF WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS, IF ANY, THE GOI PLANNED TO TAKE WITHIN THE EU. ¶3. (C) IN A SEPARATE MEETING OCTOBER 14 WITH ECMIN, AGAIN ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, GENERAL LEONARDO TRICARICO (THE PRIME MINISTER'S MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISOR) TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO RAISE THE MATTER OF GALILEO. ECMIN REVIEWED USG CONCERNS FOR TRICARICO, AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH LETTA. ALTHOUGH HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RECENT MEETINGS IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON, AND WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS ABOUT THE LACK OF FORWARD MOVEMENT IN U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS, TRICARICO WAS AT A LOSS TO SUGGEST WHAT ACTIONS ITALY SHOULD OR COULD TAKE. ¶4. (C) COMMENT: LETTA'S ACCOUNT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION ITALIAN MINISTERS -- INCLUDING THE PM -- ARE GIVING THE GALILEO/M-CODE DISPUTE IS WELCOME NEWS. REPORTS OF DEFMIN MARTINO'S UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION IS WELCOME, AND CONFIRMS WHAT HE HAS TOLD US. (BUT MARTINO HAS ALSO BEEN QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT HE NEEDS KEY ALLIES, SUCH AS LETTA, IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THE INTERMINISTERIAL PROCESS.) NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT THE GOI HAS ANY GAME PLAN ON HOW TO PREVENT THE WRONG OUTCOME AT THE IMPORTANT DECEMBER MEETING OF EU TRANSPORT MINISTERS. EMBASSY STANDS READY TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE GOI AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS ON GALILEO AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES WORK OUT THE NEXT STEPS IN OUR STRATEGY. END COMMENT. SEMBLER NNNN 2003ROME04746 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL "
CONFIDENTIAL: GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003567 SIPDIS STATE FOR OES/SAT (BRAIBANTI, KARNER) DEFENSE FOR OASD/NII (STENBIT MANNO WORMSER SWIDER CHESKY) DEFENSE ALSO FOR OSD/P (TOWNSEND, NOVAK) JOINT STAFF FOR J5/J6 E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2013 T... SUBJECT: GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL TALKS TO RESOLVE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE REF: USNATO 00777 Classified By: A/ECMIN David W. Mulenex; reasons 1.5 B and D. ¶1. (C) Summary: Italian MFA Political Director Gianfranco Aragona informed a U.S. delegation on July 16 that he still believes technical solutions exist to the U.S.-EU dispute over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal overlay of the M-code. Aragona recognized US security concerns regarding the overlay, but repeatedly insisted the EU must safeguard the "Integrity and operability" of Galileo. The U.S. delegation insisted that an overlay would harm U.S. and NATO NAVWAR capabilities and put lives at risk in the event of warfare. Aragona did not completely reject the delegation's point that a political solution was necessary to avoid this outcome but made it clear he does not believe the dispute is ripe for high level political intervention. Aragona did agree that the delegation's suggestion to merge unclassified technical talks and plenary negotiations was a good idea and promised to convey the idea to the Commission. Aragona stated firmly that NATO would not be an acceptable venue for classified discussions. He suggested they could take place at the US Mission to NATO, but insisted that he participants must be limited to the U.S. and the EC. See Embassy comment para 16. End Summary. ¶2. (U) On July 16 a U.S. delegation met with Italian MFA Political Director Gianfranco Aragona to discuss the US-EC dispute over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal overlay of the GPS M-code. The U.S. delegation was led by Ralph Braibanti, Director, Space and Advanced Technology, State Department Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Technical Affairs and included Mel Flack, Director, Communications Electronic Division, US Mission to NATO; Richard McKinney, Deputy Director Space Acquisition, US Air Force; Todd Wilson, EST Officer, US Mission to the EU; Marja Verloop EUR/ERA; and representatives from the political and science sections of Embassy Rome. Those joining Aragona included Giovanni Brauzzi, Director, Office of NATO Affairs, MFA; Sandro Bernardin, European Correspondent, MFA; Mario Caporale, Navigation Office, Italian Space Agency; and Umberto Cantielli, Chief, Navigation Identification Office, Defense General Staff, Ministry of Defense. U.S. Delegation Insists Political Solution is needed ¶3. (C) Braibanti told Aragona that the U.S. believes it is important to hold informal consultations with key EU member States to advance U.S.-EC differences over Galileo towards a decision. He recalled that the President raised M-Code overlay at the last U.S.- EU Summit. In reviewing the USG position on Galileo, Braibanti explained that the U.S. accepts the EU satellite system as a reality, but the security implications of having the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) overlay the GPS M-Code are unacceptable to both the U.S. and NATO. so far, the U.S. has fought a defensive battle with the European Commission (EC). Braibanti allowed that some progress has been made in convincing European officials that direct overlay of M-Code by the PRS is a bad idea. However, consideration being given by the EC to use BOC 2.2 for Open Service (OS) also involves a partial overlay of M-Code, and damages navigational warfare capabilities. The U.S. will be unable to accept this outcome. ¶4. (C) Braibanti assured Aragona that the USG is committed to finding a solution, but cautioned that without some flexibility and compromise from the EC, progress will be difficult. The U.S. has proposed several technical options for Galileo PRS and OS that our experts believe meet all stated technical and performance requirements for Galileo services. Braibanti underscored that, given the EC's timetable for making design decisions on Galileo, member states may find that the Commission has locked in technical solutions that threaten U.S. and NATO capabilities to conduct navigational warfare. To avoid this eventuality, which could put allied lives at risk, member states need to give clear political guidance now to the EC that the Galileo signal structure cannot undermine NAVWAR operations. But Aragona Puts Faith in Further Technical Talks ¶5. (C) Aragona, signaling his reluctance to take on U.S. concerns vis-a-vis Italy's EU partners, underscored that Galileo negotiations had been entrusted to the EC. He assured the U.S. team that Italy recognized the security issues at stake. "Given our NATO membership it would be crazy for us not to be sensitive to U.S. arguments," Aragona declared. These concerns are shared by the EC, he claimed, but any solution must also safeguard the "integrity and operability of Galileo for it to be a commercially viable and reliable system (Note: Aragona came back repeatedly throughout the course of the consultations to this theme. End Note). ¶6. (C) Aragona pressed claims by EC experts that technical negotiations could lead to a solution to both protect the integrity and operability of Galileo and address US security concerns. Referencing the U.S.-EU Summit, Aragona asserted that, as an "agreement" had been reached to proceed with technical talks, the pace of negotiations to try to reach a "technical solution" to the overlay conundrum should be intensified. Italy and the EC are ready to take into account U.S. and NATO security concerns and believe that technical solutions, which protect them, are available. ¶7. (C) Aragona wanted to know when the U.S. would be ready to discuss the most recent EC proposals, which he understood included a certain "inventiveness" and were "not so stuck in the prejudices of the past." The EC was ready to sit and discuss a mutually agreeable technical solution. As for political input, Aragona said once more that the Commission is well aware that U.S. security concerns must be addressed while taking into account the "integrity" of the Galileo system. ¶8. (C) Braibanti countered that, with regard to EC technical proposals, he was aware of only two to which a formal reply had not been given: using filtering to mitigate the navigation warfare problems posed by overlaying BOC 2.2, and having the U.S. change the frequency for its military GPS signals. In the spirit of cooperation, the U.S. had not rejected these ideas out of hand, but instead asked its technical experts to analyze them carefully. Now that he had seen the results of this analysis, Braibanti could say with some certainty that it is highly unlikely that either of these options will work. Summing up this portion of the discussion, Braibanti framed the state of play for Aragona: We may well reach a situation in September where we will have analyzed the EC's proposals and decided they can not provide a solution which protects U.S. and NATO capabilities to conduct NAVWAR. Our concern is that if EC technical experts continue to operate within their current frame of reference, we will arrive at a technical impasse. To avoid this impasse, the EC team needs clear political direction from member States that they should focus on options that do not negatively impact NAVWAR. (Note: on the margins of the meeting, Braibanti told Aragona that the USG worries the EC negotiators may be positioning themselves to argue to the EU member states that they had made a good faith effort to reach a compromise, but the U.S. would not meet them halfway, so Galileo must move ahead without an agreement to cooperate with the U.S. Aragona discounted this possibility, suggesting that the EC recognizes the need for Galileo-GPS interoperability. (End Note) NATO a Non-Starter for Classified Talks ¶9. (C) Aragona said the U.S. and EU face a practical problem over where to hold classified discussions and that this problem should be easily resolvable. Italy expects the U.S. to provide a formal answer to the letter EC negotiator Heinz Hillbrecht sent to Braibanti on July 2 (reftel). Aragona maintained that the EC wants further discussions in a classified setting, but that setting can not be NATO. He underscored this point in uncharacteristically blunt language. Aragona said holding the talks at the US Mission to NATO was perfectly acceptable as long as they were U.S.-EC rather than NATO-EC discussions. The issue under discussion is between the U.S. and the EC, Aragona argued, and, moreover, there are several non-EU members of NATO. Braibanti took Aragona's points and assured him that the USG was considering the issue of additional classified discussions, including the modalities for such meetings. Some Agreement on Procedure, but.... ¶10. (C) Braibanti, moving the discussion to how and when to hold the next plenary negotiating session, said the U.S. will work with the Commission on dates for a September meeting to review technical and trade issues He suggested folding the technical discussions into the plenary negotiating session. This could help to ensure transparency and avoid misunderstanding among the political negotiators about the available technical options. Aragona acknowledged that Braibanti's idea had merit and committed to "see what could be done" to make a political recommendation to the EC to proceed along these lines. Still Talking Past Each Other on substance ¶11. (C) The U.S. delegation raised concerns that France might be driving the EC toward a decision counter to the interests of other EU member states, the U.S. and NATO. Mel Flack said it was difficult not to arrive at the conclusion that France was interested in an M-Code overlay so it could guarantee reliability for precision guided weaponry it might seek to sell to third countries. ¶12. (C) "I have objected to Europeans who say that U.S. actions demonstrate an intent to undermine Galileo," Aragona told the delegation. "Likewise," he said, "I do not believe that there is any maliciousness on the part of a particular country or the EC." Above all, he maintained, Galileo is a commercial undertaking; the system's signal structure was selected according to well established criteria based on the belief that it provided the most robust, reliable service. "I accept your arguments about the need to jam adversaries in a NAVWAR context," he said, but the U.S. "needs to keep in mind that Galileo service must be sold. The problem of selective jamming is not just political; commercial aspects are also involved." When Aragona stated it would not be acceptable to expect the EU to settle for alternate, less robust, signals, Braibanti countered it would be unacceptable for the U.S. and its allies to risk the lives of soldiers in order to allow the EU to have more robust signals for Galileo. ¶13. (C) Aragona acknowledged the point in passing, but moved quickly to close and summarize the conversation. He suggested the next step would be to find a suitable venue to hold classified discussions. He claimed there is flexibility and that the EU is aware of the need for a solution amenable to both sides. Braibanti emphasized that after the September discussions the USG would like to hold another set of bilateral consultations with Italy. Aragona was noncommittal, offering to share thoughts after the September plenary session and then decide on a way forward. In terms of U.S.-Italian engagement, he said he hoped that discussions would not lead to the "extreme" situation in which the U.S. and EU would be negotiating on exclusively U.S. terms, by which he meant asking the EU to accept moving PRS to another frequency band and to only then negotiate a solution. He noted in closing that Italy had its own technological and industrial interests to defend. Better Signals, Less Political Clout from Other GOI Ministries ¶14. (C) Braibanti, Flack and EST Couns met with Vice Minister for Research Guido Possa on July 15. Possa is responsible for the Italian Space Agency and through it for Italian participation in ESA. After a brief explanation of the overlay problem and its implications for NAVWAR, Possa immediately understood that a political, and not a technical approach was needed to resolve outstanding problems. Possa suggested that the U.S. should work closely with the Germans, and in Italy with Minister of Defense Martino, whose commitment to NATO and to close cooperation with the U.S. were well known. On the margins of a July 28 representational event, ESTCOUNS and A/POLMINCOUNS raised briefly the overlay problem with MINDEF Martino. Martino said that, from his point of view, Galileo was unnecessary and a huge waste of money -- one GPS system was enough. He was unaware that the USG now supported Galileo in principle. Martino was sensitive to our arguments on the security implications of the overlay, but observed that he was perceived within the GOI as too pro-American to be of much assistance. He suggested that the Embassy's best bet for moving the GOI closer to the USG position would be to approach U/S to the PM Gianni Letta, who, we note, is PM Berlusconi's closest political advisor. ¶15. (C) ESTCOUNS, ECONCOUNS, AND USEU ECONCOUNS met July 18 with Ministry of Transport Diplomatic Advisor Maraini to discuss the Aragona meetings and to seek the perspective of the Ministry on the decisions to be taken concerning Galileo at the December Transport Council. Maraini told us that he believed that Galileo was now principally a political problem, and a problem beyond the competency of the Transport Ministry and Transport Council. In a candid appraisal of Hillbrecht-whom Maraini admitted he did not know well--the Diplomatic Advisor said that the decision to be taken was beyond the competency of Hillbrecht's technical committee. Maraini understood and agreed with our assessment that very little time and scope remained for technical solutions, and that an impasse requiring a major political decision by the EU was likely. Maraini is worried about the outcome. He undertook to prepare a note for Minister Lunardi to be sent to the Prive Minister before the PM's departure for Crawford. ¶16. (C) Embassy Comment: The U.S. delegation made the trip to Rome to follow up on indications from Aragona, made during his recent trip to Washington, that he may have been willing to carry some water for us with the EC and member states. We were left with the impression that Italy's PolDir had instead decided to keep his EU hat firmly in place and stick to the script of the EC briefing book on Galileo. Despite understanding within the functional ministries of the GOI, peeling Aragona, the MFA, and Italy away from the EC position will be difficult, judging from Aragona's assessment that "technical solutions" still offer a way forward. He threw us a quarter of a bone by offering to help give political top cover to the expert level technical discussions. However, Aragona's implicit insistence that Galileo's commercial viability may depend on at least a partial M-Code overlay to "guarantee" service is troubling for its resemblance to French arguments. ¶17. (U) This message has been cleared by OES/SAT Braibanti. Sembler
TOP SECRET: THE CIA’S INTERNAL PROBE OF THE CUBABAY OF PIGS AFFAIR
TOP SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI: INVESTIGATION OF ADOLF HITLER AND HIS POSSIBLE ESCAPE
BETREFF: STASI-“GoMoPA”: DIE CODE-LISTE DER GETARNTEN STASI-MITARBEITER VON A-Z
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CONFIDENTIAL: ANWAR SHIFTS GEARS, NOT GOALS, SAY AIDES
VZCZCXRO6876 PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH DE RUEHKL #0991/01 3142324 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 092324Z NOV 08 FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1936 INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2678 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0516 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 000991 SIPDIS FOR EAP AND INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM MY SUBJECT: ANWAR SHIFTS GEARS, NOT GOALS, SAY AIDES REF: KUALA LUMPUR 979 - INITIAL REACTION TO U.S. ELECTION Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d). Summary and Comment ------------------- ¶1. (C) Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim has shifted to a less aggressive posture for now, but his goal remains bringing down the UMNO-led government through parliamentary crossovers prior to Deputy Prime Minister Najib becoming the next UMNO party president and Prime Minister, according to top officials in Anwar's Peoples Justice Party (PKR). Part of Anwar's strategy entails reaching out to the "losers" in the transition from Prime Minister Abdullah to Najib, including UMNO veteran Tengku Razaleigh. The PKR officials acknowledged that the government's September arrests of three persons under the Internal Security Act (ISA) had sent an effective warning to those considering switching their support to Anwar. PKR officials and Anwar's lawyers assumed the sodomy prosecution against Anwar would move forward, with a trial phase likely beginning by January. The Opposition was unlikely to support "superficial" reforms that UMNO would try to rush through parliament as part of outgoing PM Abdullah's legacy. The Ambassador met on October 30 with Tengku Razaleigh, who complained about his inability to compete in the UMNO nomination process due to money politics and contended that the next UMNO president (Najib) would not necessarily become the next Prime Minister. ¶2. (C) Comment: We currently are witnessing a different tone and pace in the struggle between the Opposition and UMNO following Anwar's unrealized September deadline and the rapid consolidation of UMNO support behind Najib as the next Prime Minister. While PKR's rationale for wanting to head-off Najib remains in place, Anwar has lost political momentum for the moment and seems to face increasingly long odds in securing future crossovers. Anwar's ability to attract the "losers" from the Abdullah-Najib transition remains theoretical. End Summary and Comment. Anwar's Less Aggressive Posture ------------------------------- ¶3. (C) Polcouns met separately with PKR Information Chief Tian Chua and PKR Vice President Sivarasa Rasiah on November 3 and 5, respectively. Both PKR officials acknowledged that Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim has shifted to a lower key approach since the passage of Anwar's public September 16 deadline to bring down PM Abdullah's government through the crossover of 30 or more government MPs. Compared with September, Anwar is now more focused on consolidating the Opposition People's Alliance (Pakatan Rakyat), which encompasses three parties with often disparate political views: PKR, the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). As the formal Opposition leader in Parliament, Anwar is devoting attention to Pakatan's actions in parliament and guiding Opposition MPs, most of whom are sitting in the body for the first time. Crossover Goal Unchanged ------------------------ ¶4. (C) Despite his less aggressive public posture, Anwar's goal remains bringing down the UMNO-led government through parliamentary crossovers prior to Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak becoming the next UMNO party president and Prime Minister, Tian Chua and Sivarasa stated. The time horizon has shifted from December to March 2009, in line with the shift in the UMNO party elections, at which time Najib is set to become UMNO president uncontested. PKR officials reiterated that Anwar and PKR remain focused on preempting Najib's takeover if possible, because they believe Najib would invoke authoritarian measures to scuttle the Opposition before the next national elections. In the months ahead, PKR would look for opportunities to weaken support for Najib and the government, for example by criticizing GOM measures in the face of a possible dramatic downturn in the economy following the global financial crisis, or by using new information linking Najib to scandals, like the Altantuya case and the Eurocopter purchase. (Comment: Anwar and other Opposition leaders have taken up such issues in Parliament over the past few weeks. On November 4, Anwar led a walk-out of Opposition MPs to protest Najib's refusal to allow questions during his presentation of revised budget figures. End Comment.) Attracting the "Losers" ----------------------- ¶5. (C) Anwar does not have enough ethnic Malay MPs ready to join the Opposition, according to both Tian Chua and Sivarasa, without which the Opposition faces unacceptable risks of a harsh government backlash justified on the basis of Malay nationalism. Anwar reportedly hopes to attract disaffected UMNO leaders and MPs who are "losers" in the current transition from Abdullah to Najib; most prominent among these is veteran UMNO leader Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. Talks with Razaleigh remain inconclusive because Razaleigh continues to insist on the prospective position of Prime Minister, while PKR estimates that Razaleigh could secure the crossover of only four or five UMNO MPs (see notes below from the Ambassador's recent meeting with Razaleigh). Anwar is also maintaining contact with PM Abdullah at this stage, primarily through son-in-law Khairy Jamaluddin, Tian Chua said. Whether members of Abdullah's circle would consider crossing over to Anwar remained an open question. ISA as Warning to MPs --------------------- ¶6. (C) The two PKR officials acknowledged that the government's September arrests of three persons -- a journalist, an Opposition MP and blogger Raja Petra -- under the Internal Security Act (ISA) had sent an effective warning to those MPs considering switching support to Anwar. (let's mention Petra's release today) (Comment: In early October, UMNO MP Nur Jazlan told Polcouns that the ISA arrests had been "very successful" in achieving UMNO's objective of intimidating MPs who had considered joining with Anwar. End Comment.) Sodomy Trial Will Remain a Factor --------------------------------- ¶7. (C) Sankara Nair, a prominent attorney for Anwar, told us on November 5 that, regardless of maneuvers in the current Sessions Court, it only a matter of time before the government shifted Anwar's sodomy case to the High Court, a more favorable venue for the prosecution. Sivarasa, who also serves as one of Anwar's lawyers, believed that the trial phase of the sodomy case would begin in earnest by January. Neither Sankara nor Sivarasa believed the government would drop the case. Opposition Unlikely to Support Abdullah's Reforms --------------------------------------------- ---- ¶8. (C) The Prime Minister's circle -- through Khairy -- has approached Anwar regarding support for judicial reform measures that would be presented in Parliament soon as part of Abdullah's parting legacy, according to Sivarasa and Tian Chua. The Opposition, however, was unlikely to support these measures because they did not represent meaningful changes. The Opposition believed, for example, the proposed changes to the Anti-Corruption Commission would leave the body under firm executive control. Following the resignation of legal reform Minister Zaid Ibrahim, Nazri Aziz, de facto Minister for parliamentary affairs, led the judicial reform discussions in Parliament, but he lacked credibility. Anwar and the U.S. Presidential Election ---------------------------------------- ¶9. (U) Following his initial remarks of November 5 (reftel), Anwar has continued to comment generally positively on Senator Obama's victory in the U.S. presidential election. Time Magazine highlighted Anwar's remarks on President-elect Obama as the first among those of only 11 prominent world personalities. Anwar wrote that, "In Obama's victory are sown the seeds of great expectations that a truly new chapter will be written in the history of the world." Anwar publicly claimed he had been in contact with Senator Obama. Ambassador Calls on Razaleigh ----------------------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador met on October 30 with Tengku Razaleigh, who, as the only challenger to DPM Najib for the UMNO presidency, had yet to garner a single UMNO division nomination (he now has one). Casting himself as a reformer, Razaleigh said that he wished to bring greater democracy and transparency to UMNO, but that he could not compete in the current nomination race in the face of engrained corruption and money-politics. Razaleigh said that Najib's coming to power would allow former Prime Minister Mahathir to regain substantial influence within the government. Razaleigh indicated his relations with Mahathir, his former political rival, remained strained. ¶11. (C) While Razaleigh conceded that Najib would win the UMNO contest, he stressed several times to the Ambassador that the next UMNO president would not necessarily become the next Prime Minister, but did not further explain this remark. Razaleigh speculated that there now existed grounds for PM Abdullah and Anwar Ibrahim to work together, for example on reform measures. Razaleigh thought that Khairy Jamaluddin currently acted as the go-between for Abdullah and Anwar. Razaleigh acknowledged, as he has publicly, that he continues contact with opposition politicians, but he did not otherwise signal he planned to leave UMNO. KEITH
SECRET//NOFORN: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY
VZCZCXRO9472 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #0384/01 1541323 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 031323Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6431 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000384 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018 TAGS: PREL SY SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: As the U.S. continues its re-engagement with Syria, it may help us achieve our goals if we understand how SARG officials pursue diplomatic goals. Syrian President Bashar al-Asad is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his father but he, too, prefers to engage diplomatically on a level of abstraction that seems designed to frustrate any direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by extension, his judgment. Bashar's vanity represents another Achilles heel: the degree to which USG visitors add to his consequence to some degree affects the prospects for a successful meeting. The SARG foreign policy apparatus suffers from apparent dysfunctionality and weaknesses in terms of depth and resources but the SARG punches above its weight because of the talents of key individuals. SARG officials generally have clear, if tactical, guidance from Bashar and they are sufficiently professional to translate those instructions into recognizable diplomatic practice. But in a diplomatic world that is generally oiled by courtesy and euphemism, the Syrians don't hesitate to be nasty in order to achieve their objectives. The behaviors they employ as diplomatic "force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal. End Summary. ------------------- Gaming Out the SARG ------------------- ¶2. (S/NF) As the U.S. moves forward to re-engage Syria, we are well aware that Syrian officials have long been famous for their abilities as tough negotiators. The late President Hafiz al-Asad could wear down his interlocutors through sheer staying power in 10-hour meetings without breaks; the wealth of detail and historical perspective he brought to those discussions also tested the mettle of those who were attempting to persuade him to a course of action he questioned. His son Bashar is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his father but he, too, prefers to engage diplomatically on a level of abstraction that seems designed to frustrate any direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by extension, his judgment. Bashar's presentations on world affairs suggest that he would prefer to see himself as a sort of philosopher-king, the Pericles of Damascus. Playing to Bashar's intellectual pretentions is one stratagem for gaining his confidence and acquiescence; it may be time-consuming but could well produce results. Bashar's vanity represents another Achilles heel: the degree to which USG visitors add to his consequence to some degree affects the prospects for achieving our goals. Every interaction we have with the SARG is, in fact, a transaction and the better equipped we are to understand the dynamics of our negotiations the better able we will be to achieve our objectives. Post has assembled the compendium below in an attempt to reflect our experience in dealing with the SARG in the hope that Washington-based interlocutors will find it useful. ------------------------------------ A Compendium of Diplomatic Behaviors ------------------------------------ ¶3. (S/NF) Capacity: SARG scope of action is limited the President's span of control. He is generally able to monitor the activities of his foreign minister, political/media advisor, intelligence chiefs, and brother Maher. At various times, his vice president and national security advisor are also active and therefore under his direct supervision. While communication flows between him and his subordinates, it appears not to be formalized and information is highly compartmented. Subordinates' portfolios are not clearly delineated; overlapping areas create tension and competition. There is no "interagency" policy development process that lays out advantages and disadvantages of policy choices. There are, as far as we know, no briefing or decision memos. The bench is not deep; beyond the principals lie only a few trusted staffers. Bashar and his team also find it difficult to juggle more than one major foreign policy issue at a time. ¶4. (S/NF) Protocol: SARG officials are sticklers for diplomatic protocol, although they are not experts on the international conventions from which it is derived. The SARG places a high value on protocolary forms that ensure respectful treatment of state officials (despite bilateral differences) because such forms guarantee that the President and his representatives are shown proper courtesies by a world that is often at odds with Syria. (This focus on protocol underlies the continuing Syrian unhappiness over the absence of a U.S. ambassador.) Protocol conventions also reinforce the notion of equal relations between sovereign states and the SARG insists that communications between it and foreign embassies comply with traditional diplomatic practice. The MFA receives a flood of diplomatic notes from Damascus-based foreign missions daily which are apportioned out to various offices for action. The diplomatic notes, translated into Arabic by the senders, become the paper trail for SARG decisions. The MFA bureaucracy does not appear to generate cover memoranda that provide background to requests or recommendations for decisions. Many such notes, possibly all notes from the U.S. Embassy, are sent to the Minister himself for review. The MFA does not have internal email, only fax and phone. Instructions to Syrian missions abroad are often sent by fax; sometimes the MFA fails to provide instructions at all. ¶5. (S/NF) The Suq: In dealing with the U.S., the Syrians see every encounter as a transaction. The level and composition of the Syrian side of any meeting is carefully calculated in terms of protocol and the political message being sent; a lunch invitation must be interpreted as more than just the Arab compulsion to hospitality ) who hosts the lunch is as important as who attends the meetings. When it comes to content, the Syrians seek to gain the highest value deliverable for the lowest price or no price at all. During the re-engagement process, the SARG has attempted to extract high profile USG gestures in exchange for relief of operational constraints on the Embassy. The SARG has been uncharacteristically forward-leaning in allowing discussions on a New Embassy Compound site to develop as far as they have; actual closure on a land deal, however, is probably contingent on U.S. delivery of a SARG desirable, e.g., the announcement that a U.S. ambassador will be sent to Damascus. The SARG's focus on embassy operations is in part rooted in their paranoia over USG intelligence collection and penetration of Syrian society but the imposition of constraints on mission activities has also conveniently created an embassy list of desiderata that the SARG seeks to use as cost-free concessions. FM Muallim candidly acknowledged this approach when he commented in February to Charge that he had not yet decided what he needed in exchange for permission to reopen the American School in Damascus. ¶6. (S/NF) Vanity and Self-preservation: The President's self-image plays a disproportionate role in policy formulation and diplomatic activity. Meetings, visits, trips abroad that enhance his respectability and prestige are pursued; encounters that may involve negotiations or difficult debate are declined or delegated to subordinates. The President responds with anger if he finds himself challenged by visitors, but not until after the meeting. He seems to avoid direct confrontation. When engaged in summit diplomacy, he often seeks to include allies to bolster his confidence (e.g., Quadripartite Summit in September 2008, Riyadh Summit in April 2009). His foreign policy subordinates are all "employees" without constituencies or influence independent of the President's favor. Their overriding concern when engaging foreigners is to avoid the appearance of overstepping or violating their instructions. They are particularly cautious in the presence of other Syrians; requests to meet one-on-one often yield more expansive and candid responses. ¶7. (S/NF) Deceit: SARG officials at every level lie. They persist in a lie even in the face of evidence to the contrary. They are not embarrassed to be caught in a lie. While lower level officials often lie to avoid potential punitive action from their own government, senior level officials generally lie when they deem a topic too "dangerous" to discuss (e.g., Al-Kibar, IAEA) or when they have not yet determined whether or how to respond (FFN, Hezbollah arms supplies, etc). When a senior SARG official is lying, the key challenge is not demonstrating the lack of veracity but discovering the true reasons for it. ¶8. (S/NF) Passivity: SARG foreign policy is formulated in response to external developments (changes in regional leadership, initiatives from the West, etc). The SARG does not launch initiatives and generally seeks cover from allies when exploring new courses of action. The SARG is much more confident on the Arab level than on the international level. SARG policy responses are generally tactical and operational, exploratory rather than decisive, oblique instead of direct. Strategy, to the extent it exists, emerges from a series of tactical choices. The lack of initiative appears rooted in an underlying sense of diplomatic powerlessness. Every foreign policy embarrassment in Syria's history lies under the surface of a generally false projection of assertiveness. That assertiveness is sometimes read as arrogance. ¶9. (S/NF) Antagonism: Every Syrian diplomatic relationship contains an element of friction. There is some current friction, for example, in the Syrians' relations with the Turks and the French. The Syrians are not troubled by discord; they seek an upper hand in any relationship by relying on foreign diplomats' instinctive desire to resolve problems. By withholding a solution, the SARG seeks to control the pace and temperature of the relationship. SARG officials artificially restrict their availability and can engage in harsh verbal attacks to intimidate and rattle foreign diplomats. SARG officials delight in disparaging their interlocutors behind their backs for allowing themselves to be cowed. On the international level, the President has indulged in personal criticisms of foreign leaders; unlike his father, he deliberately makes enemies when he doesn't necessarily have to. FM Muallim can behave similarly but he probably does so on the President's instructions. ¶10. (S/NF) Complacency: SARG leadership genuinely believes that SARG foreign policy has been, is being, and will be vindicated by events. They also genuinely believe their foreign policy is based on morally defensible and intellectually solid principles, although it is usually reactive and opportunistic. Existing policy choices are immutable unless the President decides to change them, in which case, his new policies, despite any appearances to the contrary, are consistent with "traditional" principles. Baathism infuses foreign policy principles (Pan-Arabism) but pragmatism is more important. More recently, Bashar's like or dislike of other leaders plays a role in policy formulation. ¶11. (S/NF) The Non Sequitur: When Syrian officials don't like a point that has been made to them, they frequently resort to an awkward changes in subject to deflect perceived criticism. Syrian officials seem to think they've scored a verbal hit by employing a facile non sequitur, usually in the form of a counter-accusation. When the SARG's human rights record is raised with Muallim, for example, he often raises Israel's December-January Gaza operation or, more recently, asks if the U.S. will accept the 1300 Al Qaeda sympathizers in Syrian jails. The non sequitur is intended to stop discussion of the unwelcome topic while subtly intimidating the interlocutor with the threat of raising a subject that is putatively embarrassing to him or her. When the non sequitur is deployed, it is clear that the SARG official is on the defensive. ¶12. (S/NF) Comment: Given the apparent dysfunctionality of the SARG foreign policy apparatus and its weaknesses in terms of depth and resources, the SARG's ability to punch above its weight internationally is noteworthy. Much of its strength appears to lie in the talents of key individuals and their ability to collaborate with each other, despite tensions and rivalries. SARG officials generally have clear, if tactical, guidance from Bashar and they are sufficiently professional to translate those instructions into recognizable diplomatic practice. But the behaviors they employ as diplomatic "force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal. At the end of the day, there are few who really like to deal with the Syrians. The SARG, well aware of its reputation, however, spends much of its energy ensuring that we have to. CONNELLY
SECRET: FRENCH BELIEVE THAT ASSASSINATION OF SYRIAN GENERAL WAS AN INSIDE JOB
VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHFR #1717 2561757 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 121757Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4295 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE S E C R E T PARIS 001717 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PINR FR SY LE SUBJECT: FRENCH BELIEVE THAT ASSASSINATION OF SYRIAN GENERAL SLEIMAN WAS AN INSIDE JOB REF: PARIS 1703 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kathy Allegrone for reasons 1.4. (b), (d). ¶1. (S/NF) As Washington readers and others ponder French policy toward Syria, and as an expansion of para 3 in reftel, we pass along the previously unreported views of two of our GOF interlocutors from meetings in late August on the mysterious assassination earlier in the month of Syrian brigadier general Muhammad Sleiman and its potential significance for the regime of Syrian President Asad. NEA adviser at the French presidency Boris Boillon, on August 20, asserted that the killing seemed to be some sort of inside job. He flatly rejected the notion that the Israelis had taken out Sleiman, particularly the theory that a sniper had shot him on a boat situated somewhere off the coast of the Syrian coastal city of Tartus. Boillon claimed that French information was that the hit was more "classic" and "mafia-like" with police stopping traffic in the immediate vicinity, bodyguards looking the other way, and the assailant pumping a slug into Sleiman's head. ¶2. (S/NF) When asked how he interpreted the killing, Boillon said that several theories presented themselves, the only common denominator of which was internecine rivalry in the entourage close to Bashar al-Asad. Although Bashar's disgruntled brother-in-law and sidelined head of Syrian Military Intelligence 'Asif Shawkat seems to have the most compelling motive for knocking off someone he might have regarded as a rival and source of his reputed downfall in recent months, Boillon thought Bashar's brother Mahir was a more likely suspect. Boillon described Mahir as ambitious, a bit of a wild man, and determined to increase his power and influence within the inner circle. Inasmuch as Mahir might have contrived to bring down Shawkat, he might also have decided to take out his next key rival, Sleiman, in a more permanent way. ¶3. (S/NF) Boillon further referred the related possibility that Mahir had rubbed out Sleiman in the same way he might have rubbed out Hizballah leader 'Imad Mughniyah ) possibly even on Bashar's orders. The latter explanation would tie in with the notion of cleaning house as Syria needed to present a more respectable image while it pursued its rapprochement with France and/or needed to remove those who "knew too much" (in the case of Sleiman, about the clandestine nuclear program). Of course, Boillon added, one could never rule out the notion that Sleiman's death was related to a bloody struggle over control of lucrative criminal activities. ¶4. (S/NF) Pouille on August 28, meanwhile, was less forthcoming than Boillon in terms of offering interpretations of Sleiman's death, but he was equally categorical in disputing the theory that the Israelis were responsible. He cited the French ambassador in Damascus as his source for the contention that the killing was an inside job to "settle old scores" as well as conveniently get rid of someone who might have information of value to the UNIIIC on Lebanon or to the IAEA on Syria's nuclear program. ¶5. (S/NF) Comment: We offer these insights, some of which have appeared in abridged form in the French press, less for the light they may shed on Sleiman's assassination than they do about the French perception of the Asad regime. Indeed, Boillon's rundown of the various theories sounded like he had recently read a finished French intelligence assessment of the situation. Both Boillon and Pouille sought, in these conversations, to stress that France does not judge the Asad regime dangerously unstable or Asad's grip on power slipping. Nonetheless, they believe that the internal situation is fragile enough to warrant concern and a nuanced approach. We believe this could partly account for Sarkozy's decision to move so quickly to cultivate his personal relationship with Bashar and to "gamble" (as the French media have put it) on Bashar's willingness to change course on Lebanon, peace with Israel, and even Syria's relationship with Iran. For what it may be worth, former Lebanese military intelligence chief Johnny Abdo recently contended the assassination was an inside job and pointed to the absence of the sort of mass arrests inside Syria that would normally accompany this type of killing by criminal or non-regime elements. End comment Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce STAPLETON
SECRET: PREMATURE RUMORS OF ASIF SHAWKAT’S DEMISE
VZCZCXRO7077 PP RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #0251/01 1051417 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 141417Z APR 08 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4849 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5535 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0846 RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0378 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000251 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR JORDAN; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV SY IZ SUBJECT: PREMATURE RUMORS OF ASIF SHAWKAT'S DEMISE REF: DAMASCUS 142 Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (S) Summary: Widespread reports that Syrian Military Intelligence Chief Asif Shawkat is under house arrest and that Shawkat's wife (and Bashar Asad's sister) Bushra al-Asad is trying to flee the country likely reflect Bashar's successful moves to limit Shawkat's influence. While our sources suspect both stories are untrue and blame the external opposition for stirring the rumor mill to weaken Bashar, Shawkat's star definitely appears to be on the wane. End Summary ------------------------------- The Rumor Mill Working Overtime ------------------------------- ¶2. (SBU) Many Embassy contacts point to a report published by opposition website "Free Syria" as the original source of a number of news stories reporting Shawkat's house arrest. Sources here also contend that former Syrian VP (and now leader of the expat opposition group National Salvation Front) Abdel Halim Khaddam has attempted to weaken Bashar by repeating this rumor during recent anti-SARG interviews on SkyTV and Lebanese TV station al Moustaqbal in which he alleged Shawkat's house arrest and predicted Shawkat would suffer the same fate as now deceased head of Syrian intelligence operations in Lebanon, Ghazi Kanaan. ¶3. (SBU) Opposition website "al Haqiqa" published an April 6 story reporting that President Asad would replace Shawkat with SMI deputy Ali Yunis, a story similar to a "Debka" website report on Bashar's decision to fire Shawkat. Saudi daily "Sharq al Awsaat" reported Shawkat's house arrest; according to this version, Shawkat overstepped his authority in negotiating (via the Turks) with the USG about withdrawing Syria's support for Hizballah in exchange for agreement that the International Tribunal would not indict senior Syrian officials. Another version reported by the French-based opposition website "Ihraar Suriya" (the Free People of Syria) alleged that Shawkat had been implicated in the assassination plot against Hizballah leader Imad Mugniyah and that Hizballah and Iran were demanding his prosecution. ¶4. (C) Another rumor circulating in diplomatic circles (perhaps reflecting wishful thinking) is that Bashar has decided to turn Shawkat over to the International Tribunal for the murder for former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri in exchange for immunity. ----------------------------------- Bushra al-Asad to Flee the Country? ----------------------------------- ¶5. (C) Different stories regarding Shawkat's arrest also allege that his wife (and Bashar older sister) has or is attempting to leave the country and seek political asylum in possibly France or a Gulf country such as the UAE. The Kuwaiti daily "al-Siyasiya," for example, reported that Shawkat allegedly told his wife, Busra, to leave Syria with the couple's children, and she had applied for asylum in France (later denied by the French government, according to an April 13 story in "al Hayat.") According to a few contacts here, however, Bushra remains in Syria and her children are still attending school. A French Embassy contact told us that Bushra had been to Paris earlier in the year on a routine shopping excursion but there was no truth to stories that she had sought political asylum. ---------------------- Rumors Discounted Here ---------------------- ¶6. (SBU) In what many are viewing as a SARG response to the growing wave of rumors, an April 10 Syrian TV evening newscast showed footage of Shawkat attending a military academy graduation ceremony. The footage highlighted Shawkat wearing his military uniform and appearing with Minister of Defense Hasan Turkumani, who delivered the key note address. Meanwhile, pro-government Syrian website "Shafaf al-Sham" ran a story describing Shawkat as the "most powerful man in Syria" and reporting government plans to appoint Shawkat as Vice President for National Security Affairs. (Note: This position was a job briefly held by Bashar's paternal uncle Rifa't al-Asad before being exiled by the late Hafez al Asad.) ¶7. (S) Most of our contacts heavily discount reports of Shawkat's dismissal and house arrest. Well connected As-Safir correspondent Ziad Haydar called the reports "rubbish." Ihsan Sanker, a longtime Embassy contact who claims occassional access to Asad family members, reported April 10 seeing Shawkat at the funeral of a mutual friend a week earlier. According to Sanker, mutual acquaintances say they have seen Shawkat "regularly" over the last month. ----------------------------- Shawkat's Star on the Decline? ----------------------------- ¶8. (S) Describing Shawkat as "dejected and withdrawn," Sanker said Shawkat was "not even trying to hide" his unhappiness over his continuing loss of influence. The assassination of Hizballah luminary Imad Mugniyeh led to a series of accusations between SMI and GID, with the outcome coming out in GID's favor, Sanker reported. Additionally, Sanker said he had heard Shawkat's portfolio had been pared down to military issues, while Bashar's cousin Hafez Makhluf had all but taken over the national security portfolio. As-Safir correspondent Haydar reported he had heard the same thing, saying Bashar had recently further marginalized Shawkat's national security role. ¶9. (S) Orient Center Director and MFA Advisor Samir al-Taki told us recently that Shawkat and GID chief Ali Mamluk had exchanged mutual recriminations of blame and negligence in the wake of the Mugniyeh assassination (reftel). In an attempt to discredit GID, Shawkat ordered SMI to question a number of Syrians with ties to France and the U.S. (including al-Taki) under possible suspicion of involvement in the Mugniyeh affair. In the meantime, al-Taqi added, the GID had assumed primary responsibility for investigating the Mugniyeh killing, under the overall direction of Bashar's cousin, Hafez Makhluf, a prominent GID officer. Against the backdrop of these recent events, an ongoing reorganization of security organizations has made it difficult to determine who was up and who was down, al-Taqi explained. Separate reporting and diplomatic circles point to Mamluk's rise and Shawkat's relative retreat. But Al-Taqi cast doubt on reports of Shawkat's removal, saying "we've heard such reports before," only to see Shawkat maintain his position as a key insider. ------------------------- Shawkat in the Dog House? ------------------------- ¶10. (S) A UK-Syrian business contact with low level regime ties told us April 13 that Shawkat's problems with Bashar had come to head before the Arab League Summit. According to this source, SMI arrested a Saudi national suspected of involvement in the Mugniyeh assassination. This Saudi died in SMI custody, complicating Bashar's already strained relations with the Saudi royal family. A variant of this rumor which has appeared in the press was that the deceased Saudi was a diplomat working in the Saudi Embassy. Our contact discounted this rumor because "not even Shawkat would be stupid enough" to apprehend someone with diplomatic immunity. ¶11. (S) Comment: It seems highly unlikely that Bashar would arrest Shawkat unless he perceived a direct challenge to his authority, especially at a time when Syrians are openly talking about the possibility of war with Israel and worsening economic conditions that require greater regime cohesion. Moreover, we strongly doubt Bashar feels pressured enough on Lebanon to be preparing to turn over Shawkat to the Tribunal. Rather, we believe Bashar's continuing efforts to erode Shawkat's influence reflect his perception of Shawkat as a potential threat that must be managed. Separately, we assess that Bashar is most comfortable with Bushra here in Syria under his thumb and that he would not cause her to flee. We also believe that unless family matters worsen, Bushra prefers to reside in Syria, particularly given her desire to stay close to her elderly mother. CORBIN
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE CIA: MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1958-63 (NIE 11-4-58)
TOP-SECRET: ORIGINAL DOCUMENT OF PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN: U.S. Recognition of the State of Israel
| The choice for our people, Mr. President, is between statehood and extermination.” |
| Chaim Weizmann president of Jewish Agency for Palestine to President Harry S. Truman, April 9, 1948 |
The creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was one of the most divisive issues of the Truman administration. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations agreed that Palestine, which had been a British mandate since 1922, would be divided into two new states: one Jewish, one Arab. The British would withdraw on May 14, 1948, when this partition plan would take effect.
As the deadline approached, U.S. policy on this question appeared to be in disarray. President Truman secretly assured the Jewish Agency for Palestine of U.S. support for the plan, while the State Department announced support of an alternative plan. As the violence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine escalated and as the British prepared to withdraw, President Truman, subjected to intense pressures, made his choice. On May 14, 1948, just 11 minutes after the State of Israel was proclaimed in Tel Aviv, President Truman released a statement recognizing the new Jewish state.
The statement recognizing the State of Israel is at the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri.
The U.S. announces recognition of the State of Israel in a statement released, May 14, 1948.
TOP-SECRET: ORGINAL DOCUMENTS FROM PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY “ICH BIN EIN BERLINER” SPEECH
“There are some who say that Communism is the wave of the future.
Let them come to Berlin.”
–President John F. Kennedy, Berlin, Germany, June 26, 1963
The cold war is the term for the rivalry between the two blocs of contending states that emerged following World War II. It was a series of confrontations and tests of wills between the non-Communist states, led by the United States and Great Britain, and the Communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, that lasted 45 years and, at one point, drew the world to the brink of nuclear war.
In August 1961 the Soviets erected the Berlin Wall to stop the mass exodus of people fleeing Soviet East Berlin for West Berlin and the non-Communist world. The wall was a mass of concrete, barbed wire, and stone that cut into the heart of the city, separating families and friends. For 28 years, it stood as a grim symbol of the gulf between the Communist East and the non-Communist West. In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, signalling the end of the cold war.
National Archives,
John F. Kennedy Library
(NLK-29248)
On June 26, 1963, President John F. Kennedy delivered a speech that electrified an adoring crowd gathered in the shadow of the Berlin Wall. As he paid tribute to the spirit of Berliners and to their quest for freedom, the crowd roared with approval upon hearing the the President’s dramatic pronouncement, “Ich bin ein Berliner” (I am a Berliner).
AU Format (297K)

One of President Kennedy’s speech card from his remarks in Berlin
The speech was peppered with German and one sentence in Latin, written phonetically on one of the speech cards here.
National Archives, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts
Twenty-four years after President John F. Kennedy’s visit to Berlin, as tensions between the two superpowers eased, President Ronald Reagan made a historic appearance at the Berlin Wall. He spoke passionately about the advance of human liberty and challenged Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to “tear down this wall” the ultimate symbol of Communist suppression and thus demonstrate a commitment to profound change.
SECRET: MAXIMIZING THE IMPACT OF RAMI’S DESIGNATION
VZCZCXRO5973 OO RUEHDE DE RUEHDM #0070/01 0311027 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 311027Z JAN 08 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4583 INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 1372 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 7207 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 5447 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0324 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0758 RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 4839 RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 1295 RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 7624 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 7932 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 2081 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0147 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE 0161 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC IMMEDIATE S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000070 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ELA, EEB/TFS; TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY; NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018 TAGS: ECON EINV EPET ETTC PGOV PINR KCOR SY SUBJECT: MAXIMIZING THE IMPACT OF RAMI'S DESIGNATION REF: A. DAMASCUS 54 ¶B. 05 DAMASCUS 2364 ¶C. 06 DAMASCUS 03 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4(b,d) ------- SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (S/NF) As Washington moves towards designating Rami Makhlouf, Embassy Damascus recommends that the Department's roll-out strategy focus on linking his corrupt activities to consequences suffered by the Syrian people (see para 11). In some of the largest economic sectors -- electricity, petroleum, and telecommunications -- Makhlouf has used government instruments to squeeze out legitimate businessmen, receive lucrative public contracts, establish cash cows and then milk them with impunity from oversight or competition. Significantly, several of his ventures exploit weaknesses in the Syrian economy and undermine reform efforts while increasing the burden on Syria's lower classes. Embassy contacts report that Makhlouf is anticipating his eventual designation, and that he has taken steps to lower his profile and mitigate risk to his personal fortune. End summary. ------------------ MAKING THE CASE... ------------------ ¶2. (C) In one well-known example, Makhlouf used his regime ties to muscle-out the local agent for Iberdrola, just before the Spanish company was awarded a 430 million-euro contract to build a new power plant. Having previously obtained exclusive rights to represent Siemens, Rami profited again when additional power infrastructure projects were awarded to the German company. Currently, both the Iberdrola (Iberinco) and Siemens projects are behind schedule and over-budget. Over the same period, the Syrian public suffered from rolling blackouts and increased electrical bills. During last summer's August heatwave, poorer neighborhoods went without power up to ten hours per day while Prime Minister Utri blamed Syria's electrical woes on "international pressure" rather than insufficient SARG investment in infrastructure. Blackouts have recently returned to Syria and Rami's avarice (reportedly demanding a USD 30 million "commission" in Iberdrola's case) is a key contributing factor. ¶3. (U) Rami is suspected of delaying the SARG's anticipated licensing of a third GSM service provider in Syria until he closes a deal to sell SyriaTel, which reportedly earned USD 692 million in 2007 alone. Since GSM service was first introduced in 2000, Syrians have been forced to choose between two providers, Makhlouf's SyriaTel and Areeba (now MTN), which was reportedly owned by First Lady Asma al-Akhras' family. Syrians widely resent the duopoly's ability to set prices for the entire country. With market forces unable to compete, regime corruption elevated the price of basic GSM service on which the average Syrian relies as his primary means of communication. (There are six million mobile subscribers to roughly three million land-line connections.) ¶4. (C) At a time when Syria's petroleum exports are contracting and the Syrian people are increasingly suffering from fuel shortages, Rami's presence in the petroleum sector is exacerbating the problem. The French company Total proposed a venture that would have brought additional Syrian gas reserves on-line in time to avert recent shortages, but the deal has inexplicably floundered facing SARG bureaucratic inaction. Similarly, a Shell offer to upgrade and increase capacity of Syrian refineries remains mired in SARG bureaucracy at a time of acute shortages in refined product. Interestingly, the only petroleum project currently proceeding at full-speed in Syria is the Gulfsands (35 percent) "strategic partnership" with the Rami-led Cham Holding Company (65 percent) to develop the recent oil and gas discovery in the Khurbet East region (Northeastern Syria). According to a Gulfsands' statement, the joint venture soon expects to bring 10,000 bpd of new oil production on-line. ¶5. (U) In a particularly brazen venture, Makhlouf also seems intent on profiting from the impact of US sanctions on Syrian Arab Airlines. Rami's Cham Holding Company (40 percent) has joined with Syrian Air (25 percent) and the Kuwaiti company Al Aqeelah (35 percent) to create the first "private airline" in Syria, dubbed the Cham Pearl. The Kuwaiti company's subsidiary, Aqeeq Aviation Holding, is apparently exploring ways to circumvent US sanctions and provide commercial aircraft. Once operational, Cham Pearl intends to take over Syrian Air's most profitable routes of three hours or less -- 75 percent of Syrian Air's business -- from Damascus to major regional airports, leaving Syrian Air with the less profitable long-haul routes. (See "Syria: Opening Skies," Oxford Business Group, January 29, 2008) ¶6. (U) Makhlouf remains unabashed about employing SARG muscle when necessary. In one oft-repeated example on the Damascus street in 2007, a Syrian businessman purchased a prime piece of real estate along the Mezzeh autostrade and received a permit from the city to construct a large apartment building. As the project progressed, the SARG security services informed the building's owner that he could not complete his project as it would allow future occupants to have direct line-of-sight to the Damascus airport. Rami's agents then visited the distraught owner and offered to buy the unfinished building for a fraction of the property's actual value. Rebuffing Makhlouf's initial offer, the owner sought recourse in the local courts for weeks to no avail. In late 2007, Cham Holding announced that it had acquired the property and would be developing a five-star Marriott hotel on the site at a cost of USD 70 million. ¶7. (C) Note: A hospitality-industry contact told Econoff that Rami and Nabil Kuzbari (ref A) had traveled to the US and met with senior Marriott executives in December to present a potential business proposal and discuss design options for the site. According to the contact, the Syrians left the US believing they had closed the deal and upon returning, prematurely leaked their success to the local media. In late December, Marriott reportedly informed Cham Holding that it was no longer interested in the proposal due to "political reasons." End note. ¶8. (U) Although difficult to prove, various internet-based newsletters claim that Makhlouf is the political patron of many high-ranking public SARG officials, including Minister of Construction Hamud al-Hussein, Minister of Petroleum Sufian Allaw, Minister of Electricity Ahmad Khalid al-Ali, Central Bank Governor Adib Mayaleh and former Minister of Telecommunications Amro Salem. As officials with these portfolios would be in position to wield substantial influence over industry regulation and lucrative tenders, it is doubtful that Rami would have enjoyed such uncanny business successes without government collusion. ------------------------ DIFFUSING RESPONSIBILITY ------------------------ ¶9. (U) Since returning from his brief exile in Dubai (ref B), Rami has taken several measures to try to both lower his profile and insulate his personal fortune. In 2006, Makhlouf founded the Al Mashrek Fund, a holding company with a reported capitalization of SYP 4 billion (USD 80 million), including SYP 1 billion (USD 20 million) in cash deposited with Banque Bemo Saudi Fransi. Later that year, Makhlouf and 69 prominent Syrian businessmen formed the Cham Holding Company with an initial capitalization of USD 200 million, now estimated to be worth USD 350 million. Representing Makhlouf, the Al Mashrek Fund is the majority shareholder in Cham Holding, which currently has 65 partners and a ten-member board of directors. By mid-2007, Cham Holding was pursuing six "landmark" development projects valued at USD 1.3 billion, primarily in energy, transportation and real estate. (See The Syria Report, April 30 and Sept 12, 2007) ----------------------------------------- USING CUT-OUTS AND PRIVATE BANKING SECTOR ----------------------------------------- ¶10. (S/NF) In addition to his public financial activities, Makhlouf has undertaken several behind-the-scenes machinations to mitigate his financial risk. Possibly concerned by the vulnerability of UAE banks to US pressure -- or frustrated by Emirati laws limiting foreign investment to real estate and the stock market -- Rami reportedly brought a part of his fortune back into Syria in 2006. According to a well-informed contact, Rami befriended then-expatriate Syrian Morthada al-Dandashi in Dubai and hired him to manage many of Makhlouf's "parallel" financial activities in Syria. The contact said that Rami paid Dandashi's USD 2 million "ante" to become a partner in Cham Holding, and deposited significant sums under Dandashi's name in the Damascus branch of the Lebanese Byblos Bank -- where Dandashi subsequently became a partner. Syrian-Austrian citizen and Cham Holding director Nabil Kuzbari is also reported to have deposited money for Rami in Austrian banks. Finally, contacts say Makhlouf has also opened accounts under different names in Lebanon, Greece, Turkey, and possibly Cyprus -- where Post has learned that Rami once explored obtaining citizenship. ------------------------- SUGGESTED ROLL-OUT THEMES ------------------------- ¶11. (U) Post recommends the following themes for public statements regarding the designation of Rami Makhlouf: -- Electricity: Rami Makhlouf used his influence with the regime to gain lucrative contracts in the power sector. Yet, as the Syrian people continue to suffer from chronic power outages and higher electrical bills, Rami has already been paid for projects that are behind schedule and well over-budget. -- Petroleum: Although several Western petroleum companies are interested in helping Syria develop its gas and oil sector, the only new project to be proceeding without SARG impediment is Rami's. As a result, Syria has become a net importer of petroleum products. In the midst of an unusually severe winter, severe fuel shortages are forcing the Syrian public to wait in long lines for, and frequently go without, heating fuel for their homes. -- GSM service: Rami Makhlouf has made millions of dollars from his ownership of SyriaTel, one of only two GSM service providers in Syria. Currently, Rami is said to be blocking the licensing of a third GSM provider until he completes a deal to sell SyriaTel. Until free market forces are allowed to compete, Makhlouf will continue to subject the Syrian public to artificially elevated prices for basic telecommunications services. -- Aviation: The Syrian national air carrier, Syrian Arab Airlines (Syrian Air), has an aging fleet that is in need of replacement. Rather than addressing any of Syrian Air's needs, the Assad regime instead awarded Rami Makhlouf a license to operate a private airline that intends to assume the most profitable of Syrian Air's routes. -- Tourism/Hospitality: The Syrian people are known for their hospitality and entrepreneurial expertise. Unfortunately, legitimate Syrian businessmen hoping to invest in the emerging tourism sector have again been muscled-out by Rami Makhlouf and regime thugs who wish to monopolize every opening in the Syrian economy for their own profit, rather than share the country's potential with the hard-working Syrian people. ------- COMMENT ------- ¶12. (S/NF) Makhlouf's efforts to divest and diversify suggest that he is expecting eventual USG action against him, particularly since the November 2007 designation of his brother, Hafiz. Although his countermeasures will likely mitigate the impact of his designation, we believe that it will still send a strong signal to the regime and to his current and potential future business partners. Corruption is a theme that resonates here, as every Syrian has been a victim of it. Rami has long been Syria's poster-boy for corruption, so making the charge stick is not difficult. Citing examples that impact the daily lives of Syrians should help to amplify the designation's roll-out and ensure that it receives the widest possible coverage. HOLMSTROM
SECRET: TREASURY TEAM’S DAMASCUS CONSULTATIONS ON
VZCZCXRO6583 PP RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #0269/01 0741541 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 151541Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3157 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000269 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA/ELA;TREASURY FOR LEBENSON/GLASER/SZUBIN; NSC FOR MARCHESE EO 12958 DECL: 03/06/2017 TAGS EFIN, ECON, ETTC, SY, SANC SUBJECT: TREASURY TEAM’S DAMASCUS CONSULTATIONS ON FINANCIAL SANCTIONS REF: A. DAMASCUS 0108 B. 05 DAMASCUS 6224 Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Michael Corbin, reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Treasury representatives recently visited Post to discuss options for using financial sanctions to apply pressure to the Syrian regime. We discussed: -- Treasury’s requirements for finalizing the pending designations of Mohammad Sulayman and Ali Mamluk, and Treasury’s information requirements for a public statement; -- Treasury’s need to maintain the legal thread between the classified designation packet and the public statement announcing the designation; -- Post’s support for designating Mohammad Nassif Kheirbek, SARG pointman for its relationship with Iran; -- How designating regime financiers like Rami and Mohammad Mahlouf could be problematic without a new Executive Order on corruption. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) PENDING DESIGNATIONS: Post understands the designations for Mohammad Sulieman, Syrian Special Presidential Advisor for Arms Procurement and Strategic Weapons and Ali Mamluk, Chief of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, are pending due to a lack of unclassified material necessary for Treasury’s public SIPDIS designation statement. In post’s estimate, Mohammad Sulayman is a relatively low-payoff target. His activities are not widely known, which will make it difficult to obtain unclassified information for a public statement and, SIPDIS likewise, make it unlikely that his designation would resonate inside Syria. Ali Mamluk, on the other hand, is more well-known within Syria, especially for involvement in his objectionable activities regarding Lebanon, and his suppressing Syrian civil society and the internal opposition. Therefore, Mamluk’s designation will likely have a larger impact with local and regional audiences if the public statement announcing his designation also discusses his oppression of Syrian society. ¶3. (S/NF) We understood from our visit with Treasury representatives that although we are limited to designating regime members under the existing Executive Orders, there is some flexibility in Treasury,s public statement announcing the designation. Post has advocated that no matter the legal basis of the designation, any public designation should focus on themes that resonate inside Syria: corruption, suppression of civil society, and denial of basic human rights (ref A). The need to maintain the “legal thread” between the designation packet and the public announcement could be challenging on cases like Mohamad Sulieman whose links to corruption are less clear. In cases like Ali Mamluk, however, the role of the organization he heads in suppressing internal dissent is publicly known in Syria and stating as much in our statement would resonate well here. ¶4. (S/NF) Post also supports moving forward with the designation packet on Mohammad Nasif Kheirbek, Syrian Deputy Vice-President for Security and lead Syrian liaison to Iran. Keirbek’s designation could play to a SARG vulnerability, in this case, the SARG’s relationship with Iran, which worries the Sunni majority. Designation of regime pillars involved with the SARG’s partnership with Iran could heighten Syrian and regional concerns about the SARG’s willingness to accomodate an expansionary Iranian agenda. ¶5. (S/NF) REGIEME FINANCIERS: We also discussed the possibility of targeting high-profile inner circle members and regime financiers like Rami Mahklouf (Asad’s first cousin) and Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami’s father) in the next phase of targeted financial sanctions. Based on our consultation with the Treasury representatives, it seemed apparent that without an Executive Order on corruption it would be difficult to compile enough information to designate this group under the current executive orders. The other option for pursuing this group would be to show how these individuals provided financial support to previously designated individuals such as Asif Shawkat. This course of action could prove highly problematic given the regime’s proficiency at obfuscating its financial transactions (ref B). DAMASCUS 00000269 002 OF 002 ¶6. (S) Comment. Post thanks Treasury for its team’s February 25-27 visit and welcomes any additional feedback that Washington agencies may have on our recommendations covered in ref A. Post continues to believe targeted financial sanctions are a tool appropriate for the Syrian setting but this tool requires further work to fully develop. ROEBUCK
Meridian Capital about GoMoPa
STASI-FÄLSCHUNGEN DER “GoMoPa”
- June 12, 2011 – 10:44 am
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Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,
die Betrüger und durch uns inhaftierten Erpresser der GoMoPa versuchen mit einer gefälschten Presse-Mitteilung von usich abzulenken und einen investigativen Journalisten, Bernd Pulch, zu belasten.
Die Presse-Mitteilung auf pressreleaser.org ist eine Fälschung und die gesamte webseite ist der GoMoPa zu zuordnen.
Hier noch einmal die tatäschlichen Geschehnisse:
Hier der Artikel von “GoMoPa” über Meridian Capital.
„GoMopa“ schreibt:08.09.2008Weltweite Finanzierungen mit WidersprüchenDie Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt an, weltweite Finanzierungen anbieten zu können und präsentiert sich hierbei auf aufwendig kreierten Webseiten. GOMOPA hat die dort gemachten Angaben analysiert und Widersprüche entdeckt.Der Firmensitz Der Firmensitz befindet sich laut eigener Aussage in Dubai, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate. In einem GOMOPA vorliegenden Schreiben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. heißt es jedoch, der Firmensitz sei in London. Auf der Homepage des Unternehmens taucht die Geschäftsadresse in der Londoner Old Broad Street nur als „Kundenabteilung für deutschsprachige Kunden“ auf. Eine weitere Adresse in der englischen Hauptstadt, diesmal in der Windsor Avenue, sei die „Abteilung der Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren“. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises ist tatsächlich als „Limited“ (Ltd.) mit Sitz in England und Wales eingetragen. Aber laut Firmenhomepage hat das Unternehmen seinen „rechtlichen Geschäftssitz“ in Dubai. Eine Abfrage beim Gewerbeamt Dubais (DED) zu dieser Firmierung bleibt ergebnislos. Bemerkenswert ist auch der vermeintliche Sitz in Israel. Auf der Webseite von Meridian Capital Enterprises heißt es: „Die Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist im Register des israelischen Justizministeriums unter der Nummer 514108471, gemäß dem Gesellschaftsrecht von 1999, angemeldet.“ Hierzu Martin Kraeter, Gomopa-Partner und Prinzipal der KLP Group Emirates in Dubai: „Es würde keinem einzigen Emirati – geschweige denn einem Scheich auch nur im Traum einfallen, direkte Geschäfte mit Personen oder Firmen aus Israel zu tätigen. Und schon gar nicht würde er zustimmen, dass sein Konterfei auch noch mit vollem Namen auf der Webseite eines Israelischen Unternehmens prangt.“ Auf der Internetseite sind diverse Fotos mit Scheichs an Konferenztischen zu sehen. Doch diese großen Tagungen und großen Kongresse der Meridian Capital Enterprises werden in den Pressearchiven der lokalen Presse Dubais mit keinem Wort erwähnt. Zwei angebliche Großinvestitionen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in Dubai sind Investmentruinen bzw. erst gar nicht realisierte Projekte. Das Unternehmen wirbt mit ihrer finanziellen Beteiligung an dem Dubai Hydropolis Hotel und dem Dubai Snowdome. Der Aktivitätsstatus der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist laut englischen Handelsregister (UK Companies House) „dormant“ gemeldet. Auf der Grundlage des englischen Gesellschaftsrechts können sich eingetragene Unternehmen selbst „dormant“ (schlafend) melden, wenn sie keine oder nur unwesentliche buchhalterisch zu erfassende Transaktionen vorgenommen haben. Dies ist angesichts der angeblichen globalen Investitionstätigkeit der Meridian Capital Ltd. sehr erstaunlich. Der Webauftritt Die Internetseite der MCE ist sehr aufwendig gestaltet, die Investitionen angeblich in Millionen- und Milliardenhöhe. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Präsentationselemente fällt jedoch auf, dass es sich bei zahlreichen veröffentlichen Fotos, die Veranstaltungen der Meridian Capital Enterprises dokumentieren sollen, meist um Fotos von Online-Zeitungen oder frei zugänglichen Medienfotos einzelner Institutionen handelt wie z.B. der Börse Dubai. Auf der Internetpräsenz befinden sich Videofilmchen, die eine frappierende Ähnlichkeit mit dem Werbematerial von NAKHEEL aufweisen, dem größten Bauträger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. Doch den schillernden Videos über die berühmten drei Dubai Palmen „Jumeirah, Jebel Ali und Deira“ oder das Archipel „The World“ wurden offensichtlich selbstproduzierte Trailersequenzen der Meridian Capital Enterprises vorangestellt. Doch könnte es sich bei den Werbevideos um Fremdmaterial handeln. Auch die auf der Webseite wahllos platzierten Fotos von bekannten Sehenswürdigkeiten Dubais fungieren als Augenfang für den interessierten Surfer mit eigenem Finanzierungswunsch. Bei einem Volumen von 10 Millionen Euro oder höher präsentiert sich die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. als der passende Investitionspartner. Das Unternehmen verfügt weltweit über zahlreiche Standorte: Berlin, London, Barcelona, Warschau, Moskau, Dubai, Riad, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong und New York. Aber nahezu alle Standorte sind lediglich Virtual Offices eines global arbeitenden Büroservice-Anbieters. „Virtual Office“ heißt im Deutschen schlicht „Briefkastenfirma“. Unter solchen Büroadressen sollen laut Meridian Capital Enterprises ganze Kommissionen ansässig sein, alles zum Wohle des Kunden.“ Zitatende |
Hier die Hintergründe der Erpressung:
Hier unsere Original-Stellungnahme:
Anfang Oktober 2008 erhielt einer der Arbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. eine Meldung von einem anonymen Sender, dass in naher Zukunft – zuerst im Internet, dann im Fernsehen, im Radio und in der deutschen Presse – Informationen erscheinen, die die Funktionsweise und Tätigkeiten der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in einem äußerst negativen Licht darstellen. Der Mitarbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. wurde also informiert, dass diese Meldungen/Nachrichten zweifelsohne deutlich das Aussehen und den guten Ruf der Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. beeinträchtigen.
Der an dieser Stelle erwähnte „Gesprächspartner” hat den Arbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. informiert, dass die Möglichkeit besteht die peinliche Situation zu vermeiden, indem die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. auf das von der Person gezeigte Konto die Summe von 100.000,00 EUR überweist. Wie sich aber später zeigte, war der Herr Klaus Maurischat – dieser anonyme Gesprächspartner – „Gehirn“ und „Lider des GOMOPA“. Die Ermittlungen wurden angestellt durch die Bundeskriminalpolizei (Verfolgungs- und Ermittlungsorgan auf der Bundesebene) während des Ermittlungsverfahrens wegen einer finanziellen Erpressung, Betrügereien auch wegen der Bedrohungen, welche von Herrn Maurischat und seine Mitarbeiter praktiziert wurden sowie wegen Teilnahme anderer (Leiter der Internetservices und Moderatoren der Blogs) an diesem Prozedere. Diese Straftaten wurden begangen zu Schaden vieler Berufs- und Justizpersonen, darunter auch der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Die Opfer dieses Verbrechens sind in Deutschland, Österreich, der Schweiz, Spanien, Portugal, Großbritannien, den USA und Kanada sichtbar.
In diesem Moment taucht folgende Frage auf: Wie war die Reaktion der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. auf die Forderungen seitens GOMOPA? Entsprach die Reaktion den Erwartungen von GOMOPA? Hat die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. die geforderte Summe 100.000,00 EUR überwiesen?
Seites der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gab es überhaupt keine Reaktion auf den Erpressungsversuch von GOMOPA. Ende August 2008 auf dem Service http://www.gompa.net sind zahlreiche Artikel/Meldungen erscheinen, welche die Tätigkeit der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in einem sehr negativen Licht dargestellt haben. Nachdem die auf http://www.gomopa.net enthaltenen Informationen ausführlich und vollständig analysiert worden waren, ergab es sich, dass sie der Wahrheit nicht einmal in einem Punkt entsprechen und potenzielle und bereits bestehende Kunden der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in Bezug auf die von diesem Finanzinstitut geführten Geschäftstätigkeit irreführen. Infolge der kriminellen Handlugen von GOMOPA und der mit ihm kooperierenden Services und Blogs im Netz hat die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. beachtliche und messbare geschäftliche Verluste erlitten. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. hat nämlich in erster Linie eine wichtige Gruppe von potenziellen Kund verloren. Was sich aber als wichtiger ergab, haben sich die bisherigen Kunden von der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. kaum abgewandt. Diejenigen Kunden haben unsere Dienstleitungen weiterhin genutzt und nutzen die immer noch. In Hinblick auf die bisherige Zusammenarbeit mit der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd., werden ihrerseits dem entsprechend keine Einwände erhoben .
GOMOPA hat so einen Verlauf der Ereignisse genau prognostiziert, dessen Ziel beachtliche und messbare geschäftliche durch die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. erlittene Verluste waren. Der Verlauf der Ereignisse hat das Service GOMOPA mit Sicherheit gefreut. GOMOPA hat nämlich darauf gerechnet, dass die Stellung der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. nachlässt und das Finanzinstitut die geforderte Summe (100.000,00 EUR) bereitstellt. Im Laufe der Zeit, als das ganze Prozedere im Netz immer populärer war, versuchte GOMOPA noch vier mal zu der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Kontakte aufzunehmen, indem es jedes mal das Einstellen dieser kriminellen „Kompanie” versprochen hat, wobei es jedes mal seine finanziellen Forderungen heraufsetzte. Die letzte für das Einstellen der „Kompanie“ gegen die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. vorgesehene Quote betrug sogar 5.000.000,00 EUR (in Worten: fünfmilionen EURO). Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. konnte sich aber vor den ständig erhöhenden Forderungen seitens des Services GOMOPA behaupten.
Im Oktober 2008 traf die Leitung der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Entscheidung über die Benachrichtigung der Internationalen Polizei INTERPOL sowie entsprechender Strafverfolgungsorgane der BRD (die Polizei und die Staatsanwaltschaft) über den bestehenden Sachverhalt. In der Zwischenzeit meldeten sich bei der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. zahlreiche Firmen und Korporationen, sogar Berufsperson wie Ärzte, Richter, Priester, Schauspieler und anderen Personen aus unterschiedlichen Ländern der Welt, die der Erpressung von GOMOPA nachgegeben und die geforderten Geldsummen überwiesen haben. Diese Personen gaben bereits Erklärungen ab, dass sie dies getan haben, damit man sie bloß endlich „in Ruhe lässt” und um unnötige Probleme, Schwierigkeiten und einen kaum begründbaren Ausklang vermeiden zu können. Die Opfer dieses kriminellen Vorgehens haben die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. über unterschiedliche Geldsummen, welche verlangt wurden, informiert.
In einem Fall gab es verhältnismäßig kleine (um ein paar tausend EURO), in einem anderen Fall handelte es schon um beachtliche Summen (rund um paar Millionen EURO).
Zusätzlich wendeten sich an die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Firmen, welche dem GOMOPA noch keine „Gebühr” überweisen haben und bereits überlegen, ob sie dies tun sollen, oder nicht. Diese Firmen erwarteten von der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. eine klare Stellungnahme sowie eine professionelle praktische Beratung, wie man sich in solch einer Lage verhalten soll und wie man diese Geldforderungen umgehen kann. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. hat ausnahmslos allen Verbrechensopfern, welche sich bei unserer Firma gemeldet haben, eine Zusammenarbeit vorgeschlagen. Als oberste Aufgabe stellt sich diese Kooperation, gemeinsam entschlossene und wirksame Maßnahmen gegen GOMOPA, gegen andere Services im Netz sowie gegen alle Bloggers zu treffen, die an dem hier beschriebenen internationalen kriminellen Vorgehen mit GOMOPA-Führung teilnehmen.Auf unsere Bitte benachrichtigten alle mitbeteiligten Firmen die Internationale Polizei INTERPOL sowie ihre heimischen Verfolgungsorgane, u. a. die zuständige Staatsanwaltschaft und die Polizeibehörden über den bestehenden Sachverhalt.
In Hinblick auf die Tatsache, dass das verbrecherische Handeln von GOMOPA sich über viele Staaten erstreckte und dass die Anzahl der in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland erstatteten Anzeigen wegen der durch GOMOPA, Internetservices und Bloggers begangenen Straftaten, rasant wuchs – was zweifelsohne von einer weit gehenden kriminellen Wirkungskraft des GOMOPA zeugt – schlug die Internationale Wirtschaftspolizei INTERPOL der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. vor, dass sich ihr Vertreter in Berlin mit dem Vertreter von GOMOPA trifft, um die „Zahlungsmodalitäten“ und Überweisung der Summe von 5.000.000,00 EUR zu besprechen. Dieser Schritt meinte, eine gut durchdachte und durch die Bundeskriminalpolizei organisierte Falle durchzuführen, deren Ziel die Festnahme der unter GOMOPA wirkenden internationalen Straftäter war.
Die koordinierten Schritte und Maßnahmen der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. und anderer Beschädigter, geleitet von der Internationalen Wirtschaftspolizei INTERPOL, dem Bundeskriminalamt und der Staatsanwaltschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland haben zur Aus-, Einarbeitung und Durchführung der oben beschriebenen Falle beigetragen. Im November 2008 führte die in Berlin vorbereitete Falle zur Festnahme und Verhaftung des Vertreters des GOMOPA, der nach der Festnahme auf Herrn Klaus Maurichat – als den Hauptverantwortlichen und Anführer der internationalen kriminellen Gruppe GOMOPA verwies. Der Festgenommene benannte und zeigte der Bundeskriminalpolizei zugleich den aktuellen Aufenthaltsort des Herrn Klaus Maurischat. „Gehirn“ und Gründer dieser internationalen kriminellen Gruppe GOMOPA, Herr Klaus Maurischat wurde am selben Tag auch festgenommen und auf Frist verhaftet, wird bald in Anklagezustand gestellt, wird die Verantwortung für eigene Straftaten und die des Forums GOMOPA vor einem zuständigen Bundesgericht tragen. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. unternahm bereits alle möglichen Schritte, damit Herr Klaus Maurischat auch auf der Anklagebank des zuständigen Gerichts des Vereinigten Königsreiches Großbritannien erscheint. Unter den beschädigten Berufs- und Justizpersonen aus Großbritannien, neben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt es noch viele Opfer von GOMOPA…
Die dreisten Verbrecher wagen es unter http://www.pressreleaser.org, einer eigenen “GoMoPa”-Seite unsere Pressemitteilung oben zu verfälschen und unschuldige Personen zu belasten.
“GoMoPa” Boss is Jochen Resch
- May 15, 2011 – 1:15 pm
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Dear Readers,
after a thorough research we are sure that the real “GoMoPa” boss is Jochen Resch, lawyer in Berlin, Germany. He is the brain behind “GoMoPa” and responsable for blackmailing, extortion, racketeering, cybermurder and murder – in the tradition of the East German “Inteeligence” STASI that is why he called “GoMoPa” – Financial “Intelligence” Service .
Webmaster
Meridian Capital about GoMoPa
“GoMoPa” in detention
- May 13, 2011 – 1:02 pm
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Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. unveils new criminal phenomena in network. In recently appeared on the net more often at the same time a new a very worrying phenomenon of criminal nature. Professional criminals groups in the network are taking part, to extortion, fraud, Erschwindeln relating to certain specifically selected companies and businesses are capable of. These criminals developed new methods and means, simply and in a short time to bereichern.Strategien and manifestations, which underlie this process are fairly simple. A criminal is looking to “carefully” on the Internet specific companies and corporations (victims of crime) and informed them in the next step, that of the business activities of such companies and corporations in the near future – first on the Internet then in other available mass media – numerous and very unfavorable information appears. At the same time, the criminals beat their future victims an effective means of reducing unnecessary difficulties and problems to escape the loss of good name and image of the company and corporate sector. These offenders are aware of that reputation, name and appearance of each company is a value in itself. It was therefore a value of what each company is prepared to pay any price. But the reason for difficulties and problems arising from the loss of good name and reputation result. The criminals and their victims are already aware that this loss is devastating consequences might have been the closing down of a particular business can enforce. It takes both to No as well as at large companies regard. The company is concerned that in virtually every industry in each country and cross-border activities sind.Das criminal procedure in the form of a blackmail on money, a fraud is becoming rapidly and globally, ie led cross-border and internationally. Among the victims of extortion, fraud is now looking both at home (domestic) and international corporations, the major emphasis on conservation, keeping and maintaining their reputation in the business according to their credibility lay. The criminals in the network have understood that maintaining an unassailable reputation and name of a company the unique ability to provide fast and easy enrichment forms. The above-mentioned criminal procedure is difficult to track because it is international in nature, and by overlapping or even nonexistent (fictional) professional and judicial persons in various countries and operated company wird.Diese offenders in the network publish it and disseminate false information about your victims on remote servers, which are not uncommon in many exotic countries. There are those countries in which serious gaps in the legal system, investigative and prosecution procedures are visible. As an example, at this point mention India werden. Mit criminals working in the network grid portals known leader of blogs with your seat-consciously or unconsciously, even in highly developed countries. For example, at this point, countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, Spain or Portugal are mentioned. The below listed criminals were able to act unpunished today. As a symptom of such action appears here the activity and “effectiveness” of the company GOMOPA, which is on countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the United States, Britain, Spain and India. A good example of such an action is Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat – the leader and “brain” of the company GOMOPA with many already in force and criminal judgments “on his account”, which in this way for years and funded its maintenance in the industry almost unlimited activity. This status will change dramatically, however, including far and wide thanks to discontinued operations of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. who would oppose such offenses addressed in the network. Other companies and corporations, in which the crime network and outside of this medium have fallen victim to contribute to combating such crimes bei.Die situation is changing, thanks to effective steps and the successful cooperation of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. with the international police Interpol, with the federal agency (FBI) in the U.S., the Federal Criminal Police in Germany, with Scotland Yard in Britain, as well as with the Russian secret service FSB.Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. – Together with other companies and cooperations, the victim of criminal activities of the network of crime have fallen – has undeniably already started to yield results. The fact that in recent weeks (November 2008) on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of the above-mentioned leaders and “brain” of the company GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Maurishat was arrested should not be ignored. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. information available results clearly show that the next arrests of persons participating in this process in such countries as: Austria, Switzerland, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Spain, Mexico, Portugal, Brazil, the USA, Canada, UK, Ireland , Australia, New Zealand and made in a.. The ultimate goal of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. and the other victims of crime in the network is to provide all participants in this criminal procedure before the competent court to lead. All professional and judicial persons, regardless of the seat and out of the business, which the above-described criminal action (fraud, extortion) to have fallen victim can of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. led company to join the goal set at all at this point the procedure described those associated in the public and the economic life out. II blacklist blackmail and with international fraudsters and their methods (opus operandi) in the following countries: 1 The Federal Republic Deutschland2. Dubai 3rd Russia 1st The Federal Republic of Germany GmbH GOMOPA, Goldman Morgenstern & Partners LLC., Goldman Morgenstern & Partners Consulting LLC, Wottle collection. In these firms are quite active following persons: – Klaus Mauri Chat ( “Father” and “brain” of the criminal organization responsible for countless final judgments have been achieved (arrested in Germany in November 2008) – Josef Rudolf Heckel ( “right hand “when Mr Klaus Mauri chat, denounced former banker who is excessive in many Bankschmuggeleien was involved.
The study of 900 pages named Toxdat by Ehrenfried Stelzer is the “Stasi Killer Bible”. It lists all kind of murder methods and concentrates on the most effective and untraceable.
“The toxdat study was ordered by Stasi Vice-President Gerhard Neiber, the second man in rank after boss Erich Mielke. The toxdat study was also the theoretical “story book” for the murder of the famous German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach by former Stasi member under the guidance of “GoMoPa”,” an informer stated. “Ehrenfried stelzer” was nicknamed “Professor Murder” by his victims. Even close co-worker now compare him with the German SS”doctor” Mengele, “Dr. Death” from Auschwitz.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution.
For more Information the victims have launched a new site: http://www.victims-opfer.com
The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.
Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment.
German authorities are under growing pressure to reopen investigations into at least a dozen suspicious deaths after the arrest of an alleged East German assassin cast new light on the communist regime. Stasi victims quoted a source saying “isolated units” had conducted operations that were “extremely well organised” and had “100 per cent logistical support” from the East German state.
A statement from prosecutors read: “The accused [Jurgen G] is suspected, as a member of a commando of the former DDR, of killing a number of people between 1976 and 1987 who from the point of view of the DDR regime had committed treason or were threatening to do so.”
Details of his Jurgen G’s arrest have been described in suitably florid terms, with the mass circulation tabloid Bild saying he was working at the Wolfsbruch marina near Rheinsberg in north-eastern Germany when a woman approached him. “Excuse me, is that your yellow Trabant in the car park? I just ran into it with my car,” she is said to have asked.
When he followed her to the car park, masked officers jumped out of vans and bushes and overpowered him in an operation worthy of the Stasi itself.
An eyewitness told Bild: “They blindfolded him and raced off in an unmarked car.”
Police across Germany are reported to be sifting through files to see who the victims may have been, and some intelligence officers are greeting the arrest of Jurgen G as a breakthrough.
Thomas Auerbach, who works for the Stasi file authority in Berlin and has written a book based on the death squad files, said: “These people were trained to make such murders look like accidents or suicides, even as ‘ordinary’ crimes such as robberies. They were real terror experts.”
The cases said to be linked to Jurgen G or his unit include many people involved with the commercial arm of the East German ruling socialist party, the SED (Socialist Unity Party).
Uwe Harms, the head of a Hamburg-based haulage firm which was part of a network of companies secretly owned by the SED, disappeared in March 1987 after conversations with various DDR functionaries. Six weeks later, his body was found in a plastic bag.
Weeks before his death he told friends that he felt he was being followed. After reunification, one of the other SED company heads said Mr Harms had been liquidated for refusing to allow his firm to be used to transport arms into East Germany.
Dieter Vogel, a businessman who had been jailed for life for spying for the CIA, was found suffocated in his cell in the East German prison Bautzen on March 9, 1982. The fact that he was due to be taken to the West in a spy swap arrangement just a few weeks later cast doubt on the suicide theory.
He had passed the names of several Stasi moles to the BND, West Germany’s heavily penetrated counter-intelligence service.
The Christian Democrat Union politician Uwe Barschel, 43, was found dead by magazine reporters in his bathtub in a hotel room in Geneva in October, 1987. He died of poisoning, but rumours that he was involved somehow in arms deals and the Stasi have clung to the case.
One of the more high-profile and enduring mysteries is that of Lutz Eigendorf, an East German footballer from the Stasi-backed Dynamo Berlin.
He fled to the West in 1979 amid great publicity. Four years later, he died after crashing his car into a tree on a straight stretch of road with blood alcohol levels way over the limit. Witnesses who had seen him earlier in the evening said he had not been drinking.
Most controversial though is the suggestion that the assassination squad was linked to the murder of a Swedish television reporter and her friend in 1984.
Cats Falk and her friend Lena Graens went missing on Nov 19, 1984. Their bodies were fished out of a Stockholm canal six months later.
Reports suggested a three-man assassination squad killed them, spiking their drinks with drugs, putting them into their car and pushing it into the Hammarby canal.
Shortly before her death, Cats Falk had reportedly uncovered a deal between an arms dealer and an East German firm.
Germany has recently undergone a wave of nostalgia for all things East German, dubbed Ostalgie, with colourful television shows featuring former DDR stars such as the ice skater Katerina Witt talking wistfully about socialist pop music.
A reassessment may be coming in the wake of the revelations.
Victims: The DDR-STASI MURDER GANG “GoMOPa” in murderoplot against Joerg Berger
The Stasi Murder Gang of „GoMoPa“ was involved in many trials to kill the popular East German soccer trainer Joerg Berger, Stasi victims tell in postings on their hompage http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com. Berger stated before his early death in his biography that they tried to pollute him with arsenic.
Arsenic and many of its compounds are especially potent poisons. Many water supplies close to mines are contaminated by these poisons. Arsenic disrupts ATP production through several mechanisms. At the level of the citric acid cycle, arsenic inhibits lipoic acid which is a cofactor for pyruvate dehydrogenase; and by competing with phosphate it uncouples oxidative phosphorylation, thus inhibiting energy-linked reduction of NAD+, mitochondrial respiration and ATP synthesis. Hydrogen peroxide production is also increased, which might form reactive oxygen species and oxidative stress. These metabolic interferences lead to death from multi-system organ failure, probably from necrotic cell death, not apoptosis. A post mortem reveals brick red coloured mucosa, owing to severe haemorrhage. Although arsenic causes toxicity, it can also play a protective role.[
Elemental arsenic and arsenic compounds are classified as “toxic” and “dangerous for the environment” in the European Union under directive 67/548/EEC. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) recognizes arsenic and arsenic compounds as group 1 carcinogens, and the EU lists arsenic trioxide, arsenic pentoxide and arsenate salts as category 1 carcinogens.
Arsenic is known to cause arsenicosis owing to its manifestation in drinking water, “the most common species being arsenate [HAsO42- ; As(V)] and arsenite [H3AsO3 ; As(III)]”. The ability of arsenic to undergo redox conversion between As(III) and As(V) makes its availability in the environment more abundant. According to Croal, Gralnick, Malasarn and Newman, “[the] understanding [of] what stimulates As(III) oxidation and/or limits As(V) reduction is relevant for bioremediation of contaminated sites (Croal). The study of chemolithoautotrophic As(III) oxidizers and the heterotrophic As(V) reducers can help the understanding of the oxidation and/or reduction of arsenic.
Treatment of chronic arsenic poisoning is easily accomplished. British anti-lewisite (dimercaprol) is prescribed in dosages of 5 mg/kg up to 300 mg each 4 hours for the first day. Then administer the same dosage each 6 hours for the second day. Then prescribe this dosage each 8 hours for eight additional days. However the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) states that the long term effects of arsenic exposure cannot be predicted. Blood, urine, hair and nails may be tested for arsenic, however these tests cannot foresee possible health outcomes due to the exposure. Excretion occurs in the urine and long term exposure to arsenic has been linked to bladder and kidney cancer in addition to cancer of the liver, prostate, skin, lungs and nasal cavity.[
Occupational exposure and arsenic poisoning may occur in persons working in industries involving the use of inorganic arsenic and its compounds, such as wood preservation, glass production, nonferrous metal alloys and electronic semiconductor manufacturing. Inorganic arsenic is also found in coke oven emissions associated with the smelter industry.
THE DDR GESTAPO-STASI MURDER GANG responsable for the murder of Lutz Eigendorf
The talented Eigendorf played for East German side Dynamo Berlin.
He made his debut for the GDR in an August 1978 match against Bulgaria, immediately scoring his first two goals in a 2–2 draw. He went on to collect six caps, scoring three goals.[1] His final international was a February 1979 friendly match against Iraq.
On 20 March 1979, after a friendship match between Dynamo and West German club 1. FC Kaiserslautern in Gießen he fled to the west hoping to play for that team. But because of his defection he was banned from play for one year by UEFA and instead spent that time as a youth coach with the club.
This was not the first time an East German athlete had fled to the west, but it was a particularly embarrassing defection. Eigendorf’s club Dynamo was under the patronage of the Stasi, East Germany’s secretive state police, and subject to the personal attentions of the organisation’s head, Erich Mielke. He ensured that the club’s roster was made up of the country’s best players, as well as arranging for the manipulation of matches in Dynamo’s favour. After his defection Eigendorf openly criticised the DDR in the western media.
His wife Gabriele remained behind in Berlin with their daughter and was placed under constant police surveillance. Lawyers working for the Stasi quickly arranged a divorce and the former Frau Eigendorf re-married. Her new husband was eventually revealed as a Lothario – an agent of the state police whose role it was to spy on a suspect while romancing them.
In 1983 Eigendorf moved from Kaiserslautern to join Eintracht Braunschweig, all the while under the scrutiny of the Stasi who employed a number of West Germans as informants. On 5 March that year he was badly injured in a suspicious traffic accident and died within two days. An autopsy indicated a high blood alcohol level despite the testimony of people he had met with that evening indicating that Eigendorf had only a small amount of beer to drink.
After German re-unification and the subsequent opening of the files of the former East Germany’s state security service it was revealed that the traffic accident had been an assassination attempt orchestrated by the Stasi, confirming the longtime suspicions held by many. A summary report of the events surrounding Eigendorf’s death was made on German television on 22 March 2000 which detailed an investigation by Heribert Schwan in the documentary “Tod dem Verräter” (“Death to the Traitor”).
On 10 February 2010, a former East German spy revealed the Stasi ordered him to kill Eigendorf, which he claimed not to have done
MfS has been accused of a number of assassinations against political dissidents and other people both inside and outside the country. Examples include the East German football player Lutz Eigendorf and the Swedish journalist Cats Falck.
The terrorists who killed Alfred Herrhausen were professionals. They dressed as construction workers to lay a wire under the pavement of the road along Mr. Herrhausen’s usual route to work. They planted a sack of armor-piercing explosives on a parked bicycle by the roadside. An infrared beam shining across the road triggered the explosion just when the limousine, one of three cars in a convoy, sped by.
The operation, from the terrorists’ point of view, was flawless: Mr. Herrhausen, the chairman of one of Europe’s most powerful companies, Deutsche Bank, was killed in the explosion along that suburban Frankfurt road on Nov. 30, 1989.
But was everything what it seemed?
Within days, the Red Army Faction — a leftist terrorist group that had traumatized West Germany since 1970 with a series of high-profile crimes and brazen killings of bankers and industrialists — claimed responsibility for the assassination. An intense manhunt followed. In June 1990, police arrested 10 Red Army Faction members who had fled to East Germany to avoid arrest for other crimes. To the police’s surprise, they were willing to talk. Equally confounding to authorities: All had solid alibis. None was charged in the Herrhausen attack.
Now, almost two decades later, German police, prosecutors and other security officials have focused on a new suspect: the East German secret police, known as the Stasi. Long fodder for spy novelists like John le Carré, the shadowy Stasi controlled every aspect of East German life through imprisonment, intimidation and the use of informants — even placing a spy at one point in the office of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.
According to documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, the murders of Mr. Herrhausen and others attributed to the Red Army Faction bear striking resemblance to methods and tactics pioneered by a special unit of the Stasi. The unit reported to Stasi boss Erich Mielke and actively sought in the waning years of the communist regime to imitate the Red Army Faction to mask their own attacks against prominent people in Western Germany and destabilize the country.
“The investigation has intensified in recent months,” said Frank Wallenta, a spokesman for the Federal Prosecutor. “And we are investigating everything, including leads to the Stasi.”
If those leads turn out to be true, it would mean not only rewriting some of the most dramatic episodes of the Cold War, but would likely accelerate a broader soul-searching now under way in Germany about the communist past.
In building a reunified country, many Germans have ignored discussion of the brutal realities of its former communist half. When the former East Germany is discussed, it’s often with nostalgia or empathy for brothers hostage to Soviet influence.
Stasi boss Erich Mielke, middle, with unnamed associates
That taboo is slowly being broken. Last year’s Oscar-winning movie, “The Lives of Others,” chronicled in dark detail a Stasi agent’s efforts to subvert the lives of ordinary people. Material in the Stasi archives shows that senior leaders had a shoot-to-kill order against those fleeing from East to West — a controversial order that contradicts East German leaders’ claims that they never ordered any shootings.
This story is based on more than a dozen interviews with police, prosecutors and other security officials. Several policemen and prosecutors confirmed that the allegation of extensive Stasi involvement with the Red Army Faction is a key part of the current investigation.
Court cases in West Germany in the 1990s established that members of the Red Army Faction were granted free passage to other countries in the 1970s and refuge in East Germany in the 1980s. But the current investigation and documents from Stasi archives suggest far deeper involvement — that members of the Red Army Faction were not only harbored by the Stasi but methodically trained in sophisticated techniques of bombing and murder.
Traudl Herrhausen, Mr. Herrhausen’s widow, is one of those pushing for further investigation. She says she long suspected involvement by the Stasi or other intelligence service such as the KGB, but never spoke publicly because she didn’t have evidence and didn’t want to interfere in the investigation. She says she is now breaking an 18-year silence in her desire to see justice done. “Now I want to look my husband’s killers in the eye,” she said in an interview.
The Red Army Faction was founded about 1970 by a band of leftists who justified their terrorism based on opposition to West Germany’s ruling elite. Killing members of this elite would provoke the West German state to take repressive measures that would show its true fascist face, Red Army Faction leaders believed.
In its early years, the group, also known as the Baader-Meinhof band, made headlines with prison breaks, bank robberies, bomb attacks and deadly shootouts. Four gang members led by Ulrike Meinhof freed Red Army Faction leader Andreas Baader from a Berlin jail a month after his arrest.
Red Army Faction violence in West Germany intensified in 1977 when Jürgen Ponto, then head of Dresdner Bank, was shot and killed at his home. Five weeks later, the group killed four people and abducted the chairman of the German employer association, Hans-Martin Schleyer, one of West Germany’s most prominent businessmen. It was the start of a six-week ordeal in which neither government nor terrorists would compromise. To support the Red Army Faction cause, Palestinian terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa jet in Spain, forcing it to land in Mogadishu, Somalia. After the plane was rushed by West German commandos, top Red Army Faction leaders in West Germany committed suicide and Mr. Schleyer was executed by his captors.
Red Army Faction violence began to abate in the late 1970s after the Lufthansa incident. Many in Germany thought the group — whose attacks were often crude — lost its will to kill after the arrest of its senior leaders in 1982. So when the group appeared to renew its terror campaign with a series of high-profile attacks in 1985, police were stunned by the level of their sophistication and determination.
This time, the group dazzled police with its ability to hit targets and leave little substantial evidence behind. They used high-tech devices no one thought they possessed. Their marksmen killed with military precision.
Weapons used by terrorists during the 1977 kidnapping of German industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer.
Surprisingly, members of the Red Army Faction so-called third generation had a policeman’s understanding of forensic science. From 1985 onward, the Red Army Faction rarely left a fingerprint or other useful piece of evidence at a crime scene, according to court records. The murder cases from this era are still open. Some suspected Stasi involvement, but no one could ever prove it, according to a senior police official.
The 1989 car-bomb murder of Mr. Herrhausen particularly stunned police with its audacity and sophistication. Mr. Herrhausen was the head of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest bank. He was part of the political-business elite that helped turn West Germany from a war-ravaged rump state into an economic powerhouse — all while East Germany languished in frustration. Mr. Herrhausen was a vocal proponent of a united Germany.
In November 1989, Mr. Herrhausen was following the fall of the Berlin wall and events in the Soviet Union closely, conferring frequently with Mikhail Gorbachev, according to his wife and friends. Then on Nov. 27, Mr. Herrhausen announced a plan to acquire the investment banking firm Morgan Grenfell — at the time a record-breaking bank acquisition.
Also during November, a spot along Mr. Herrhausen’s usual route to work was closed because of construction. Terrorists, dressed as construction workers, laid an electric wire under the road’s pavement. On Nov. 29, the stretch reopened.
On the morning of Nov. 30, like every workday morning, Mr. Herrhausen stepped into his limousine at about 8:30. Mr. Herrhausen’s driver waited about one minute to allow the first of the three-car entourage to drive ahead and survey the road.
“It was the route they hadn’t used in weeks,” Mrs. Herrhausen said.
As Mr. Herrhausen sped down the road, a team of terrorists waited. Beside the road, a parked bicycle held a sack of armor-piercing explosives. The detonator was connected by the electric wire under the road to a trigger activated by an interruption in an infrared beam shining across the road.
A terrorist activated the detonator after the first car of bodyguards drove past the bomb. Mr. Herrhausen died at the scene.
As they had during previous attacks, police set up dragnets to round up Red Army Faction cadre. But the June 1990 arrests of 10 members of the group who had earlier been granted political asylum in East Germany produced no leads. All the seized Red Army Faction members had solid alibis.
In July 1991, prosecutors believed they had a breakthrough when an informant claimed he had allowed two members of the Red Army Faction to stay at his home near the Herrhausen residence. Prosecutors followed that trail 13 years before dropping charges in 2004.
Frustrated with the inability of prosecutors to solve the Herrhausen case and believing that prosecutors were ignoring other leads including possible Stasi involvement, German officials replaced the prosecutor overseeing the case.
Police acknowledge that part of the reason for their focus on possible Stasi involvement was that all other leads had dried up. But they say they also knew that over the years the Stasi had worked with and given explosives to other terrorists, including “Carlos the Jackal” and the Basque group ETA in Spain. And in 2001 to 2003, an undercover police officer met with a man who claimed he had been a killer for the Stasi operating in Western Germany, although police were never able to tie him to specific murders.
German investigators turned their attention to Wartin, a small eastern German village nestled in yellow-brown fields of grain near the Polish border. Today, sheep graze in a field spotted with wooden posts.
In the 1980s, however, Wartin was home to the Stasi’s AGM/S — “Minister Working Group/Special Operations.” It got its name because it reported to Mr. Mielke, the minister who headed the Stasi for almost all of East Germany’s 40-year history.
The Wartin unit’s peacetime duties included the kidnapping and murder of influential people in the West, according to Stasi records reviewed by The Wall Street Journal in the Stasi archives in Berlin.
The documents say the unit’s activities included “intimidating anti-communist opinion leaders” by “liquidation,” and “kidnapping or hostage taking, connected with the demand that political messages be read,” according to a description of the unit’s activities written by a senior Wartin official in 1982.
Based on these documents, German investigators increasingly believe that the Stasi played a more active role than previously believed in Red Army Faction terrorism. After years of not being able to draw parallels between the Stasi unit in Wartin and the Red Army Faction killings, police are now focusing closely on such a link. Joachim Lampe, who assisted the successful prosecution of the first wave of Red Army Faction terrorists up until 1982 and was then assigned to prosecute Stasi-related crimes in West Germany, says it’s time to compare the activities of Wartin with the activities of the Red Army Faction to see where they overlap. “It is an important line of investigation,” he said.
A year after the Red Army Faction’s first generation collapsed in 1972, an internal Wartin report said cooperation with terrorists is possible if the individuals could be trusted to maintain secrecy and obey orders. Initial contacts, however, may not have taken place until later in the decade. Disillusionment gripped many of the terrorists living on the lam, according to court records citing witness statements by accused terrorists. Beginning about 1980, the Stasi granted refuge to 10 members of the Red Army Faction in East Germany and gave them assumed identities.
The Stasi sympathized with the anti-capitalist ideals of the Red Army Faction, but Stasi leaders were concerned about placing their trust in a group of uncontrollable leftist militants, a review of Stasi records shows. Stasi officials did not want to tarnish East Germany’s international reputation, so they toyed with different concepts for cooperation with terrorist groups, according to a prosecutor who has investigated Stasi involvement with terrorism.
One suggestion, contained in a document prepared for new officers assigned to the unit, was to emulate Romanian intelligence, which successfully worked with the terrorist “Carlos” to bomb the Radio Free Europe office in Munich, Germany, in 1981. To assist in such operations, the Wartin unit developed highly specialized explosives, poisons and miniature firearms.
About 1980 the Stasi also proposed a second strategy: instead of using a terrorist group directly — such cooperation always contained risk of discovery — they could simply execute attacks so similar to those of known terrorists that police would never look for a second set of suspects, according to Wartin records. The Wartin leadership called this strategy the “perpetrator principle,” according to Stasi records. The unit’s progress in implementing the steps to imitate terrorist attacks is described in a series of progress reports by Wartin officials between 1980 and 1987.
In September 1981, Red Army Faction terrorists attempted to kill U.S. Gen. James Kroesen in Heidelberg, Germany, shooting a bazooka at his car. About the same time, members of the same Red Army Faction team visited East Germany, where they were asked by the Stasi to shoot a bazooka at a car containing a dog. The dog died, according to court records.
In Wartin, officials wrote up a detailed description of the Red Army Faction members’ re-enactment of the Kroesen attack. “It is important to collect all accessible information about the terrorist scene in imperialist countries, to study and analyze their equipment, methods and tactics, so we can do it ourselves,” a senior Wartin official wrote in February 1982, according to the report.
In 1982, West German police discovered two troves of Red Army Faction weapons and documents buried in German forests. Three terrorists, including Red Army Faction leader Christian Klar, were arrested when they approached the sites. The troves were buried in locations easy to find at night, a tactic used by Wartin’s own agents to store operational equipment in West Germany, according to an investigator who viewed the troves and Stasi records.
That same year, a Wartin official described the staged bombing of a moving vehicle. According to the report, several Stasi officers shed “tears of joy” when electronic sensors detected the approaching car and ignited the detonator.
A spokesman at Germany’s federal police investigative agency, the equivalent of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, declined to comment on the close similarity between the detonator used in the demonstration and the device that killed Mr. Herrhausen, saying this is part of their investigation.
Wartin officers continued their preparations for imitating terrorist attacks in West Germany, according to a 1985 internal Wartin report. They created a special archive profiling the characteristics of known terrorists and terrorist groups, and taught staff members to execute nearly identical attacks, according to Stasi records. Each year, the unit’s officers detailed the unit’s success in teaching these techniques in their annual reports, according to the reports.
Then, in 1987, the AGM/S stopped offensive operations. The unit was disbanded.
Werner Grossmann, a former three-star Stasi General and former head of foreign intelligence operations, says the AGM/S was responsible for planning attacks in West Germany, but was dissolved “because it didn’t produce results.” Mr. Grossmann assumed control of part of the AGM/S after most of the unit was dissolved.
Mr. Grossmann says he took control of part of the AGM/S because he wanted to run intelligence operations against West Germany’s civil defense infrastructure.
“I refused to have anything to do with terrorism and terrorists,” Mr. Grossmann said in an interview. He said he didn’t have any influence over the AGM/S activities before 1987 and wasn’t informed about the unit’s activities before it came under his control.
Olaf Barnickel, a career Stasi officer who served at Wartin, says his unit planned murders in West Germany, but never committed one. “It was all theory and no practice,” Mr. Barnickel said in an interview.
But some German police are unpersuaded. They believe the seeds may have been planted for future violent attacks.
In November 1989, as East Germany disintegrated, groups of citizens forced their way into Stasi installations, seizing control. In Wartin, a local church minister led a group of demonstrators to the main entrance of the Stasi base. The base closed.
Within the Stasi as a whole, the chain of command began to disintegrate. Links to organizations in West Germany, including the Red Army Faction, were broken.
Sixteen months after Mr. Herrhausen’s murder, the Red Army Faction claimed its last victim, killing Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, the head of the Treuhandanstalt, the powerful trust that controlled most state-owned assets in the former East Germany and was overseeing their privatization. Mr. Rohwedder was killed while he was standing by the window of his house in Düsseldorf.
The murder was performed by a trained sharpshooter, according to a police official familiar with the investigation. The Stasi trained members of the Red Army Faction in sharpshooting skills and had its own teams of sharpshooters, according to witness statements by Stasi officials to a Berlin prosecutor and Stasi records.
In 1998, the Red Army Faction issued the last of its communiques, announcing it was disbanding. German police attribute the group’s disappearance to changing times, which made the group seem a relic of the past. Indeed, the Red Army Faction today is largely seen by the German public as part of the social upheaval that plagued West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. More than one in four Germans consider former Red Army Faction members to have been misguided idealists. More than half now think the investigations should be closed for good in the coming decade when the current group of Red Army Faction prisoners finish serving their prison sentences.
German prosecutors say their investigation of the Stasi’s role is continuing.
Since last month, Mrs. Herrhausen has been in contact with the next of kin of victims in the other unsolved Red Army Faction murder cases, looking for support to push the investigation. The bomb that killed her husband nearly 18 years ago exploded soon after he left for work, within earshot of their home in suburban Frankfurt.
“I still hear that bomb every day,” she says.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution.
The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.
Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment.
The name of Benno Ohnesorg became a rallying cry for the West German left after he was shot dead by police in 1967. Newly discovered documents indicate that the cop who shot him may have been a spy for the East German secret police.
It was one of the most important events leading up to the wave of radical left-wing violence which washed over West Germany in the 1970s. On the evening of June 2, 1967, the literature student Benno Ohnesorg took part in a demonstration at West Berlin’s opera house. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the shah of Iran, was to attend and the gathered students wanted to call attention to his brutal regime.
The protests, though, got out of hand. Pro-shah demonstrators, some of them flown in from Iran for the occasion, battled with the student protestors. West Berlin police also did their part, brutally beating back the crowd. At 8:30 p.m., a shot was fired, and a short time later the 26-year-old Ohnesorg, having been hit in the back of the head, became the left wing’s first martyr.
Now, though, the history of the event may have to be re-written. New documents discovered in the Stasi archive — the vast collection of files left behind by the East German secret police — reveal that the policeman who shot Ohnesorg, Karl-Heinz Kurras, could in fact have been a spy for East Germany’s communist regime.
In an article that will appear in late May in Deutschlandarchiv, a periodical dedicated to the ongoing project of German reunification, Helmut Müller-Enbergs and Cornelia Jabs reveal that documents they found in the Stasi papers show that Kurras began working together with the Stasi in 1955. He had wanted to move to East Berlin to work for the East German police. Instead, he signed an agreement with the Stasi to remain with the West Berlin police force and spy for the communist state.
As a result of the new information, criminal charges have once again been filed against Kurras, who was acquitted twice, once in 1967 and again in 1970, of negligent homicide charges related to Ohnesorg’s death. Kurras told the Berlin paper Tagesspiegel on Friday that he had never worked together with the Stasi.
But in addition to finding the agreement between Kurras and the Stasi, the two researchers also discovered numerous documents indicating that the East Germans were pleased with the information Kurras passed along — particularly given that he was posted to a division responsible for rooting out moles within the West German police force.
Immediately after Ohnesorg’s death, Kurras received a Stasi communication ordering him to destroy his records and to “cease activities for the moment.” Kurras responded with his acquiescence and wrote “I need money for an attorney.”
The exact circumstances surrounding the death of Ohnesorg have never been completely clarified. Kurras himself, now 81, gave conflicting versions of the story during the investigation but the official version has long been that Kurras fired in self defense. Many others point to witness accounts whereby the police were beating Ohnesorg when the shot was fired.
It is still unclear how the new evidence might play into history’s understanding of the tragic event. The day was one full of violence, with demonstrators and police battling each other with pipes, wooden clubs and stones. Police were further incited by rumors that an officer had been stabbed earlier in the evening. Ohnesorg himself, however, was not directly involved in the violence.
West Berlin in the 1960s and 70s became a focal point of German left wing radicalism. The city had long been left-leaning, and the fact that Berliners were exempt from military service meant that it became a magnate for pacifists and anti-state activists.
Ohnesorg’s death gave them an immediate rallying cry. As the left-wing movement became more radical, many justified their violent activities by pointing to the police brutality that led to the student’s death. A letter written by Ulrike Meinhof announcing the founding of the Red Army Faction, which appeared in SPIEGEL in the fall of 1967, explicitly mentioned the Ohnesorg incident. The RAF went on to terrorize Germany for decades, ultimately killing over 30 people across the country. The radical “June 2 Movement” used the date of the incident in its name.
Kurras, for his part, seems to have been a highly valued Stasi agent. In his files, it is noted that “he is prepared to complete any task assigned to him.” It also mentions that he is notable for having the “courage and temerity necessary to accomplish difficult missions.”
Now it seems the STASI is back again in business after transforming it in to the CYBER-STASI of the 21st Century.
The serial betrayer and cyberstalker Klaus Maurischat is on the run again. The latest action against him (see below) cause him to react in a series of fake statements and “press releases” – one more absurd than the other. Insider analyze that his criminal organisation “GoMoPa” is about to fade away.
On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders say they have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the Encyclopedia – Britannica
The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention ofGoogle Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.
Besides that many legal institutions, individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.
The case number is ST/0148943/2011
In a series of interviews beginning 11 months before the sudden death of German watchdog Heinz Gerlach Berlin lawyer Joschen Resch unveilved secrets of Gerlach, insiders say. Secret documents from Mr Gerlachs computer were published on two dubious hostile German websites. Both have a lot of similarities in their internet registration. One the notorious “GoMoPa” website belongs to a n Eastern German organization which calls itself “
Numerous attempts have been made to stop our research and the publication of the stories by “GoMoPa” members in camouflage thus confirming the truth and the substance of it in a superior way.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution. The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelznr, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror
The Stasi murder:
„GoMoPa“ & Backers: Blackmailing, Extortion, Racketeering, Internet Murder and Murder. These are the weapons of the East-German “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”, a renegate confesses.
Deep Throat, Berlin; confesses: „Since months the „GoMoPa“ keyfigures like Klaus-Dieter Maurischat< are in hide-aways because the German police is hunting them for the wirecard fraud and a lot of other criminal actions. I left the group when I noticed that. The found and former Stasi-Colonel Ehrenfried Stelzer died under strange circumstances in Berlin. This has been told to us. But it is also possible that his death was staged. In any case the criminal organization of “GoMoPa” is responsible for the murder of Heinz Gerlach by dioxin. Now my life is also in danger that is why I hide myself.”
According to Deep Throat, Hans J. the murder was done with the help of the old Stasi-connections of the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”.
The renegate says that computer hacker Thomas Promny and Sven Schmidt are responsible for the computer crimes and he states that the crime organization of “GoMoPa” has also helpers inside internet companies like Go-Daddy, Media-on and even in Google, Hamburg..
THE “NACHRICHTENDIENST”:New criminal police action against “GoMoPa”:
German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground.
On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders say they have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the
Encyclopedia – Britannica
The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention of Google Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.
Besides that many legal institutions, individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.
The case number is
ST/0148943/2011
Stasi-Dioxin: The “NACHRICHTENDIENST” searching for the perfect murder:
Viktor Yushchenko was running against Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. Yanukovych was a political ally of outgoing president Leonid Kuchma. Kuchma’s administration depended upon corruption and dishonesty for its power. Government officials ruled with a sense of terror rather than justice. For the powerful and wealthy few, having Yanukovych elected president was important. Should Yushchenko win, Ukraine’s government was sure to topple. Yushchenko’s campaign promises included a better quality of life for Ukrainians through democracy. His wife, Katherine, told CBS in a 2005 interview, “He was a great threat to the old system, where there was a great deal of corruption, where people were making millions, if not billions.”
On September 6, 2004, Yushchenko became ill after dining with leaders of the Ukrainian secret police. Unlike other social or political engagements, this dinner did not include anyone else on Yushchenko’s team. No precautions were taken regarding the food. Within hours after the dinner, Yushchenko began vomiting violently. His face became paralyzed; he could not speak or read. He developed a severe stomachache and backache as well as gastrointestinal pain. Outwardly, Yushchenko developed what is known as chloracne, a serious skin condition that leaves the face scarred and disfigured.
By December 2004, doctors had determined that Yushchenko had been the victim of dioxin poisoning. Dioxin is a name given to a group of related toxins that can cause cancer and even death. Dioxin was used in the biochemical weapon called Agent Orange during the Vietnam War controversial war in which the United States aidedSouth Vietnam in its fight against a takeover by Communist North Vietnam). Yushchenko had a dioxin level six thousand times greater than that normally found in the bloodstream. His is the second-highest level ever recorded.
Yushchenko immediately suspected he had been poisoned, though Kuchma’s camp passionately denied such allegations. Instead, when Yushchenko showed up at a parliamentary meeting shortly after the poisoning incident, Kuchma’s men teased him, saying he must have had too much to drink or was out too late the night before.
Dioxin can stay in the body for up to thirty-five years. Experts predict that his swelling and scars will fade but never completely disappear. John Henry, a toxicologist at London’s Imperial Hospital, told RedNova.com, “It’ll be a couple of years, and he will always be a bit pockmarked. After damage as heavy as that, I think he will not return to his film star looks.” And Yushchenko will live with the constant threat of cancer.
At first it was believed the poison must have come from a Russian laboratory. Russia was a strong supporter of Kuchma and lobbied against Yushchenko in the 2004 election. But by July 2005, Yushchenko’s security forces were able to trace the poison to a lab in Ukraine. Though not entirely ruling out Russia’s involvement, Yushchenko is quoted on his Web site as saying “I’m sure that even though some people are running from the investigation, we will get them. I am not afraid of anything or anybody.”
Evidence shows that such a perfect murder plotted by former Stasi agents is the cause of the death of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
The Ministry for State Security (German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), commonly known as the Stasi (IPA: [‘?tazi?]) (abbreviation German: Staatssicherheit, literally State Security), was the official state security service of East Germany. The MfS was headquartered in East Berlin, with an extensive complex in Berlin-Lichtenberg and several smaller facilities throughout the city. It was widely regarded as one of the most effective and repressive intelligence and secret police agencies in the world. The MfS motto was “Schild und Schwert der Partei” (Shield and Sword of the Party), that is the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED).
According to the confessions of an informer, Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch writes most of the “articles” of the communist “STASI” agency “GoMoPa” himself or it is done by lawyers of his firm. The whistleblower states that lawyer Resch is the mastermind behind the “CYBER-STASI” called “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”. Bizarre enough they use Jewish names of non-existing Jewish lawyers by the name of “Goldman, Morgenstern and Partner” to stage their bogus “firm”. Further involved in their complots are a “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber and “STASI”-Colonel Ehrenfried Stelzer, “the first crime expert” in the former communist East-Germany.
According to London based Meridian Capital hundreds and thousands of wealthy people and companies have paid to the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” to avoid their cyberstalking (see article below).
Finally the German criminal police started their investigations (case number ST/0148943/2011).
The “NACHRICHTENDIENST” is also involved in the death of the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach who died under strange circumstances in July 2010.
Only hours after his death the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” was spreading the news that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution and set the stage for a fairy tale. Months before his death the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” started a campaign to ruin his reputation and presumably was also responsable for cyberattacks to bring his website down. In fact they presumably used the same tactics also against our servers. Therefore we investigated all internet details of them and handed the facts to the FBI and international authorities.
Story background:
Now it seems the STASI is back again in business after transforming it in to the CYBER-STASI of the 21st Century.
The serial betrayer and cyberstalker Klaus Maurischat is on the run again. The latest action against him (see below) cause him to react in a series of fake statements and “press releases” – one more absurd than the other. Insider analyze that his criminal organisation “GoMoPa” is about to fade away.
On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders say they have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the Encyclopedia – Britannica
The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention of Google Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.
Besides that many legal institutions, individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.
The case number is ST/0148943/2011
In a series of interviews beginning 11 months before the sudden death of German watchdog Heinz Gerlach Berlin lawyer Joschen Resch unveilved secrets of Gerlach, insiders say. Secret documents from Mr Gerlachs computer were published on two dubious hostile German websites. Both have a lot of similarities in their internet registration. One the notorious “GoMoPa” website belongs to a n Eastern German organization which calls itself “
Numerous attempts have been made to stop our research and the publication of the stories by “GoMoPa” members in camouflage thus confirming the truth and the substance of it in a superior way.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution. The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.
Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment section.
-”Worse than the Gestapo.” —Simon Wiesenthal, Nazi hunter said about the notorious “Stasi”.
Less than a month after German demonstrators began to tear down the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, irate East German citizens stormed the Leipzig district office of the Ministry for State Security (MfS)—the Stasi, as it was more commonly called. Not a shot was fired, and there was no evidence of “street justice” as Stasi officers surrendered meekly and were peacefully led away. The following month, on January 15, hundreds of citizens sacked Stasi headquarters in Berlin. Again there was no bloodshed. The last bit of unfinished business was accomplished on May 31 when the Stasi radioed its agents in West Germany to fold their tents and come home.
The intelligence department of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), the People’s Army, had done the same almost a week earlier, but with what its members thought was better style. Instead of sending the five-digit code groups that it had used for decades to message its spies in West Germany, the army group broadcast a male choir singing a children’s ditty about a duck swimming on a lake. There was no doubt that the singing spymasters had been drowning their sorrow over losing the Cold War in schnapps. The giggling, word-slurring songsters repeated the refrain three times: “Dunk your little head in the water and lift your little tail.” This was the signal to agents under deep cover that it was time to come home.
With extraordinary speed and political resolve, the divided nation was reunified a year later. The collapse of the despotic regime was total. It was a euphoric time for Germans, but reunification also produced a new national dilemma. Nazi war crimes were still being tried in West Germany, forty-six years after World War II. Suddenly the German government was faced with demands that the communist officials who had ordered, executed, and abetted crimes against their own people—crimes that were as brutal as those perpetrated by their Nazi predecessors—also be prosecuted.
The people of the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR), the German Democratic Republic, as the state had called itself for forty years, were clamoring for instant revenge. Their wrath was directed primarily against the country’s communist rulers—the upper echelon of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei (SED), the Socialist Unity Party. The tens of thousands of second-echelon party functionaries who had enriched themselves at the expense of their cocitizens were also prime targets for retribution.
Particularly singled out were the former members of the Stasi, the East German secret police, who previously had considered themselves the “shield and sword” of the party. When the regime collapsed, the Stasi had 102,000 full-time officers and noncommissioned personnel on its rolls, including 11,000 members of the ministry’s own special guards regiment. Between 1950 and 1989, a total of 274,000 persons served in the Stasi.
The people’s ire was running equally strong against the regular Stasi informers, the inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IMs). By 1995, 174,000 had been identified as IMs, or 2.5 percent of the total population between the ages of 18 and 60. Researchers were aghast when they found that about 10,000 IMs, or roughly 6 percent of the total, had not yet reached the age of 18. Since many records were destroyed, the exact number of IMs probably will never be determined; but 500,000 was cited as a realistic figure. Former Colonel Rainer Wiegand, who served in the Stasi counterintelligence directorate, estimated that the figure could go as high as 2 million, if occasional stool pigeons were included.
“The Stasi was much, much worse than the Gestapo, if you consider only the oppression of its own people,” according to Simon Wiesenthal of Vienna, Austria, who has been hunting Nazi criminals for half a century. “The Gestapo had 40,000 officials watching a country of 80 million, while the Stasi employed 102,000 to control only 17 million.” One might add that the Nazi terror lasted only twelve years, whereas the Stasi had four decades in which to perfect its machinery of oppression, espionage, and international terrorism and subversion.
To ensure that the people would become and remain submissive, East German communist leaders saturated their realm with more spies than had any other totalitarian government in recent history. The Soviet Union’s KGB employed about 480,000 full-time agents to oversee a nation of 280 million, which means there was one agent per 5,830 citizens. Using Wiesenthal’s figures for the Nazi Gestapo, there was one officer for 2,000 people. The ratio for the Stasi was one secret policeman per 166 East Germans. When the regular informers are added, these ratios become much higher: In the Stasi’s case, there would have been at least one spy watching every 66 citizens! When one adds in the estimated numbers of part-time snoops, the result is nothing short of monstrous: one informer per 6.5 citizens. It would not have been unreasonable to assume that at least one Stasi informer was present in any party of ten or twelve dinner guests.
THE STASI OCTOPUS
Like a giant octopus, the Stasi’s tentacles probed every aspect of life. Full-time officers were posted to all major industrial plants. Without exception, one tenant in every apartment building was designated as a watchdog reporting to an area representative of the Volkspolizei (Vopo), the People’s Police. In turn, the police officer was the Stasi’s man. If a relative or friend came to stay overnight, it was reported. Schools, universities, and hospitals were infiltrated from top to bottom. German academe was shocked to learn that Heinrich Fink, professor of theology and vice chancellor at East Berlin’s Humboldt University, had been a Stasi informer since 1968. After Fink’s Stasi connections came to light, he was summarily fired. Doctors, lawyers, journalists, writers, actors, and sports figures were co-opted by Stasi officers, as were waiters and hotel personnel. Tapping about 100,000 telephone lines in West Germany and West Berlin around the clock was the job of 2,000 officers.
Stasi officers knew no limits and had no shame when it came to “protecting the party and the state.” Churchmen, including high officials of both Protestant and Catholic denominations, were recruited en masse as secret informers. Their offices and confessionals were infested with eavesdropping devices. Even the director of Leipzig’s famous Thomas Church choir, Hans-Joachim Rotch, was forced to resign when he was unmasked as a Spitzel, the people’s pejorative for a Stasi informant.
Absolutely nothing was sacred to the secret police. Tiny holes were bored in apartment and hotel room walls through which Stasi agents filmed their “suspects” with special video cameras. Even bathrooms were penetrated by the communist voyeurs.8 Like the Nazi Gestapo, the Stasi was the sinister side of deutsche Gründlichkeit (German thoroughness).
After the Berlin wall came down, the victims of the DDR regime demanded immediate retribution. Ironically, their demands were countered by their fellow Germans in the West who, living in freedom, had diligently built einen demokratischen Rechtsstaat, a democratic state governed by the rule of law. The challenge of protecting the rights of both the victims and the accused was immense, given the emotions surrounding the issue. Government leaders and democratic politicians recognized that there could be no “quick fix” of communist injustices without jeopardizing the entire system of democratic jurisprudence. Moving too rapidly merely to satisfy the popular thirst for revenge might well have resulted in acquittals or mistrials. Intricate jurisdictional questions needed to be resolved with both alacrity and meticulousness. No German government could afford to allow a perpetrator to go free because of a judicial error. The political fallout from any such occurrence, especially in the East, could prove fatal to whatever political party occupied the chancellor’s office in Bonn at the time.
Politicians and legal scholars of the “old federal states,” or West Germany, counseled patience, pointing out that even the prosecution of Nazi criminals had not yet been completed. Before unification, Germans would speak of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“coming to grips with the past”) when they discussed dealing with Nazi crimes. In the reunited Germany, this word came to imply the communist past as well. The two were considered comparable especially in the area of human rights violations. Dealing with major Nazi crimes, however, was far less complicated for the Germans: Adolf Hitler and his Gestapo and Schutzstaffel (SS) chief, Heinrich Himmler, killed themselves, as did Luftwaffe chief and Vice Chancellor Hermann Göring, who also had been the first chief of the Gestapo. The victorious Allies prosecuted the rest of the top leadership at the International War Crimes Tribunal in Nürnberg. Twelve were hanged, three received life terms, four were sentenced to lesser terms of imprisonment (up to twenty years), and three were acquitted.
The cases of communist judges and prosecutors accused of Rechtsbeugung (perversion of justice) are more problematic. According to Franco Werkenthin, a Berlin legal expert charged with analyzing communist crimes for the German parliament, those sitting in judgment of many of the accused face a difficult task because of the general failure of German justice after World War II. Not a single judge or prosecutor who served the Nazi regime was brought to account for having perverted justice—even those who had handed down death sentences for infringements that in a democracy would have been considered relatively minor offenses. Werkenthin called this phenomenon die Jauche der Justiz, the cesspool of justice.
Of course, the crimes committed by the communists were not nearly as heinous as the Nazis’ extermination of the Jews, or the mass murders in Nazi-occupied territories. However, the communists’ brutal oppression of the nation by means including murder alongside legal execution put the SED leadership on a par with Hitler’s gang. In that sense, Walter Ulbricht or Erich Honecker (Ulbricht’s successor as the party’s secretary-general and head of state) and secret police chief Erich Mielke can justifiably be compared to Hitler and Himmler, respectively.
Arrest warrants were issued for Honecker and Mielke. The Soviet government engineered Honecker’s escape to Moscow, where he became the ward of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. When the Soviet Union crumbled, the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin expelled Honecker. He was arrested on his return to Germany, but a court decided against a trial when he was diagnosed with liver cancer. Honecker flew to Chile with his wife Margot to live with their daughter, a Chilean citizen by marriage. His exile was short, and he died in 1994. Mielke was not so fortunate: His KGB friends turned their backs on him. He was tried in Germany for the 1931 murder of two police officers, found guilty, and sentenced to six years in prison. Other charges, including manslaughter, were dismissed because of his advanced age and poor health.
Three other members of the twenty-one-member ruling Politburo also have been tried. Former Defense Minister Heinz Kessler was convicted of manslaughter in connection with the order to kill people who were trying to escape to the West. He received a seven-and-a-half-year term. Two others, members of the Central Committee and the National Defense Council, were tried with Kessler and sentenced to seven and a half years and five years, respectively. Politburo member Harry Tisch, who was also head of the communist trade union, was found guilty of embezzlement and served eighteen months. Six others, including Egon Krenz (Honecker’s successor as party chief), were charged with manslaughter. Krenz was found guilty, and on August 25, 1997, was sentenced to six and a half years in prison.
However, eight years after reunification, many of the 165 members of the Central Committee have not yet been put under investigation. In 1945, Nazis holding comparable or lesser positions were subject to automatic arrest by the Allies. They spent months or even years in camps while their cases were adjudicated. Moreover, the Nürnberg Tribunal branded the Reich and its Corps of Political Leaders, SS, Security Service (SD), Secret State Police (Gestapo), SA (Storm Troopers), and Armed Forces High Command criminal organizations. Similarly sweeping actions against communist leaders and functionaries such as Stasi officers were never contemplated, even though tens of thousands of political trials and human rights abuses have been documented. After the East German regime fell, German judicial authorities scrupulously avoided the appearance of waging witch-hunts or using the law as a weapon of vengeance. Prosecutors and judges made great efforts to be fair, often suspending legal action while requesting rulings from the supreme court on possible constitutional conflicts.
The victims of oppression clamored for revenge and demanded speedy prosecution of the erstwhile tyrants. They had little patience for a judicial system that was handicapped by a lack of unblemished and experienced criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges. Despite these handicaps, the Berlin Central Police Investigations Group for Government Criminality, mindful that the statute of limitations for most communist crimes would expire at the end of 1999, made significant progress under its director Manfred Kittlaus, the able former director of the West Berlin state police. Kittlaus’s major task in 1998 was to investigate wrongful deaths, including 73 murders, 30 attempted murders, 583 cases of manslaughter, 2,938 instances of attempted manslaughter, and 425 other suspicious deaths. Of the 73 murders, 22 were classified as contract murders.
One of those tried and convicted for attempted contract murder was former Stasi collaborator Peter Haak, who was sentenced to six and a half years in prison. The fifty-two-year-old Haak took part in the Stasi’s 1981 Operation Scorpion, which was designed to pursue people who helped East Germans escape to the West. Proceedings against former General Gerhard Neiber, whose Stasi directorate was responsible for preventing escapes and for wreaking vengeance, were still pending in 1998.
Peter Haak’s murder plot was hatched after he befriended Wolfgang Welsch and his family. Welsch was a thorn in the side of the Stasi because of his success in smuggling people out of the DDR. Haak joined Welsch and the latter’s wife and seven-year-old daughter on a vacation in Israel, where he mixed a gram of thallium, a highly poisonous metallic chemical element used in rat poison, into the hamburgers he was preparing for a meal. Welsch’s wife and daughter vomited immediately after ingesting the poison and recovered quickly. Welsch suffered severe aftereffects, but eventually recovered: He had consumed a large amount of beer with the meal, and an expert testified that the alcohol had probably flushed the poison from his system.
Berlin Prosecutor General Christoph Schäfgen revealed that after the DDR’s demise 15,200 investigations had been launched, of which more than 9,000 were still active at the beginning of 1995. Indictments were handed down in 153 cases, and 73 perpetrators were convicted. Among those convicted were the aforementioned Politburo members as well as a number of border guards who had killed people who were trying to escape to the West.
Despite widespread misgivings about the judicial failures in connection with some Nazi crimes, a number of judges and prosecutors were convicted and jailed for up to three years for perversion of justice. In collusion with the Stasi, they had requested or handed down more severe sentences in political cases so that the state could collect greater amounts when the “convicts” were ransomed by the West German government. {The amount of ransom paid was governed by the time a prisoner had been sentenced to serve.)
The enormity of the task facing judicial authorities in reunified Germany becomes starkly evident when one examines the actions they have taken in all five former East German provinces and in East Berlin. From the end of 1990 to July 1996, 52,050 probes were launched into charges of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, election fraud, and perversion of justice. A total of 29,557 investigations were halted for various reasons including death, severe illness, old age, or insufficient evidence. In those five and a half years, there were only 139 convictions.
The problem is even more staggering when cases of espionage are included. Between 1990 and 1996, the office of the federal prosecutor general launched 6,641 probes, of which 2,431 were terminated before trial—most due to the statute of limitations. Of 175 indictments on charges of espionage, 95 resulted in convictions. In addition to the cases handled at the federal level, the prosecutor general referred 3,926 investigations to state authorities, who terminated 3,344 without trial. State courts conducted 356 trials, resulting in 248 convictions. Because the statute of limitations for espionage is five years, the prosecutor general’s office told me in 1997 it was unlikely that more espionage trials would be conducted.
It is important to emphasize the difference between the statute’s application to so-called government crimes committed in East Germany before the collapse and to crimes, such as espionage, committed in West Germany. The Unification Treaty specifically permits the belated prosecution of individuals who committed acts that were punishable under the East German criminal code and who due to official connivance were not prosecuted earlier. There is no statute of limitations for murder. For most other crimes the limit is five years; however, due to the obstacles created by previous government connivance, the German parliament in 1993 doubled this time limit for prosecution of the more serious crimes. At the same time, the parliament decreed that all cases must be adjudicated by the end of 2002. For less serious offenses, the statute would have run out on December 31, 1997, but the parliament extended it to 2000.
A number of politicians, jurists, and liberal journalists pleaded for a general amnesty for crimes committed by former DDR leaders and Communist Party functionaries. A former West German supreme court judge, Ernst Mahrenholz, said the “sharp sword of justice prevents reconciliation.” Schäfgen, the Berlin prosecutor general, had this answer for the former high court judge and other amnesty advocates:
I cannot agree. We are raising no special, sharp sword against East Germans. We must pursue state-sponsored injustice in exactly the same manner as we do when a thief steals or when one human being kills another. If one wants to change that, then we would have to do away with the entire criminal justice system, because punishment always hurts. We are not criminalizing an entire people but only an ever shrinking, small portion.
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who was West Germany’s minister of justice when the nation was unified, said this at a session of parliament in September 1991: “We must punish the perpetrators. This is not a matter of a victor’s justice. We owe it to the ideal of justice and to the victims. All of those who ordered injustices and those who executed the orders must be punished; the top men of the SED as well as the ones who shot [people] at the wall.” Aware that the feelings against communists were running high among their victims, Kinkel pointed to past revolutions after which the representatives of the old system were collectively liquidated. In the same speech before parliament, he said:
Such methods are alien to a state ruled by law. Violence and vengeance are incompatible with the law in any case. At the same time, we cannot tolerate that the problems are swept under the rug as a way of dealing with a horrible past, because the results will later be disastrous for society. We Germans know from our own experience where this leads. Jewish philosophy formulates it in this way: “The secret of redemption is called remembering.”
Defense attorneys for communist officials have maintained that the difficulty lies in the fact that hundreds of thousands of political opponents were tried under laws of the DDR. Although these laws were designed to smother political dissent and grossly violated basic human rights and democratic norms, they were nonetheless laws promulgated by a sovereign state. How could one justly try individual Stasi officers, prosecutors, and judges who had simply been fulfilling their legal responsibility to pursue and punish violators of the law?
Opinions varied widely on whether and how the Stasi and other perpetrators of state-sponsored crimes should be tried. Did the laws of the DDR, as they existed before reunification, still apply in the east? Or was the criminal code of the western part of the country the proper instrument of justice in reunified Germany? However, these questions were moot: As Rupert Scholz, professor of law at the University of Munich and a Christian Democratic member of parliament, pointed out, the Unification Treaty specifies that the penal code of the DDR and not that of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) shall be applied to offenses committed in East Germany. Scholz’s view was upheld by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the supreme court. Most offenses committed by party functionaries and Stasi officers—murder, kidnapping, torture, illegal wiretapping, mail robbery, and fraud—were subject to prosecution in reunified Germany under the DDR’s penal code. But this would not satisfy the tens of thousands of citizens who had been sent to prison under East German laws covering purely political offenses for which there was no West German equivalent.
Nevertheless, said Scholz, judicial authorities were by no means hamstrung, because West Germany had never recognized the East German state according to international law. “We have always said that we are one nation; that the division of Germany led neither to full recognition under international law nor, concomitantly, to a recognition of the legal system of the DDR,” Scholz said. Accordingly, West German courts have consistently maintained that West German law protects all Germans equally, including those living in the East. Therefore, no matter where the crimes were committed, whether in the East or the West, all Germans have always been subject to West German laws. Applying this logic, East German border guards who had either killed or wounded persons trying to escape to the West could be tried under the jurisdiction of West Germany.
The “one nation” principle was not upheld by the German supreme court. Prior to the court’s decision, however, Colonel General Markus Wolf, chief of the Stasi’s foreign espionage directorate, and some of his officers who personally controlled agents from East Berlin had been tried for treason and convicted. Wolf had been sentenced to six years in prison. The supreme court ruling overturned that verdict and those imposed on Wolf’s cohorts, even though they had obtained the most closely held West German secrets and handed them over to the KGB. The maximum penalty for Landesverrat, or treason, is life imprisonment. In vacating Wolf’s sentence, the court said he could not be convicted because he operated only from East German territory and under East German law.
However, Wolf was reindicted on charges of kidnapping and causing bodily harm, crimes also punishable under East German law. The former Stasi three-star general, on March 24, 1955, had approved in writing a plan to kidnap a woman who worked for the U.S. mission in West Berlin. The woman and her mother were tricked by a Stasi agent whom the woman had been teaching English, and voluntarily got into his car. He drove them into the Soviet sector of the divided city, where they were seized by Stasi officers. The woman was subjected to psychological torture and threatened with imprisonment unless she signed an agreement to spy for the Stasi. She agreed. On her return to the American sector, however, the woman reported the incident to security officials. Wolf had committed a felony punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment in West Germany. He was found guilty in March 1977 and sentenced to two years’ probation.
Those who have challenged the application of the statute of limitations to communist crimes, especially to the executions of citizens fleeing to the West, have drawn parallels to the notorious executive orders of Adolf Hitler. Hitler issued orders mandating the summary execution of Soviet Army political commissars upon their capture and initiating the extermination of Jews. An early postwar judicial decision held that these orders were equivalent to law. When that law was declared illegal and retroactively repealed by the West German Bundestag, the statute of limitations was suspended—that is, it never took effect. Many of those convicted in subsequent trials of carrying out the Führer’s orders were executed by the Allies. The German supreme court has ruled the same way as the Bundestag on the order to shoot people trying to escape to West Germany, making the statute of limitations inapplicable to such cases. The ruling made possible the trial of members of the National Defense Council who took part in formulating or promulgating the order. A number of border guards who had shot would-be escapees also have been tried and convicted.
Chief Prosecutor Heiner Sauer, former head of the West German Central Registration Office for Political Crimes, was particularly concerned with the border shootings. His office, located in Salzgitter, West Germany, was established in 1961 as a direct consequence of the Berlin Wall, which was erected on August 13 of that year. Willy Brandt, at the time the city’s mayor (later federal chancellor) had decided that crimes committed by East German border guards should be recorded. At his behest, a central registry of all shootings and other serious border incidents was instituted. Between August 13, 1961 and the opening of the borders on November 9, 1989, 186 border killings were registered. But when the Stasi archives were opened, investigators found that at least 825 people had paid with their lives for trying to escape to the West. This figure was reported to the court that was trying former members of the National Defense Council. In addition to these border incidents, the registry also had recorded a number of similar political offenses committed in the interior of the DDR: By fall 1991, Sauer’s office had registered 4,444 cases of actual or attempted killings and about 40,000 sentences handed down by DDR courts for “political offenses.”
During the early years of Sauer’s operation, the details of political prosecutions became known only when victims were ransomed by West Germany or were expelled. Between 1963 and 1989, West Germany paid DM5 billion (nearly US$3 billion) to the communist regime for the release of 34,000 political prisoners. The price per head varied according to the importance of the person or the length of the sentence. In some cases the ransom amounted to more than US$56,000. The highest sum ever paid to the East Germans appears to have been DM450,000 (US$264,705 using an exchange rate of US$1.70 to the mark). The ransom “object” in this case was Count Benedikt von Hoensbroech. A student in his early twenties, von Hoensbroech was attending a West Berlin university when the wall went up. He was caught by the Stasi while trying to help people escape and was sentenced to ten years at hard labor. The case attracted international attention because his family was related to Queen Fabiola of Belgium, who interceded with the East Germans. Smelling money, the East German government first demanded the equivalent of more than US$1 million from the young man’s father as ransom. In the end, the parties settled on the figure of DM450,000, of which the West German government paid DM40,000 (about $23,529). Such ransom operations were fully controlled by the Stasi.
Political prisoners released in the DDR could not be registered by the West Germans because their cases remained secret. The victims were admonished to keep quiet or face another prison term. Nonetheless, in the first year after reunification, Sauer’s office added another 20,000 documented cases, for a total of 60,000. Sauer said he believed the final figure of all political prosecutions would be somewhere around 300,000. In every case, the Stasi was involved either in the initial arrest or in pretrial interrogations during which “confessions” were usually extracted by physical or psychological torture, particularly between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s.
Until 1987, the DDR imposed the death penalty for a number of capital crimes, including murder, espionage, and economic offenses. But after the mid-1950s, nearly all death sentences were kept quiet and executions were carried out in the strictest secrecy, initially by guillotine and in later years by a single pistol shot to the neck. In most instances, the relatives of those killed were not informed either of the sentence or of the execution. The corpses were cremated and the ashes buried secretly, sometimes at construction sites. In reporting about one executioner who shot more than twenty persons to death, the Berlin newspaper Bildzeitung said that a total of 170 civilians had been executed in East Germany. However, Franco Werkenthin, the Berlin official investigating DDR crimes, said he had documented at least three hundred executions. He declined to say how many were for political offenses, because he had not yet submitted his report to parliament. “But it was substantial,” he told me. The true number of executions may never be known because no complete record of death sentences meted out by civil courts could be found. Other death sentences were handed down by military courts, and many records of those are also missing. In addition, German historian Günther Buch believes that about two hundred members of the Stasi itself were executed for various crimes, including attempts to escape to the West.
SAFEGUARDING HUMAN DIGNITY?
The preamble to the East German criminal code stated that the purpose of the code was to “safeguard the dignity of humankind, its freedom and rights under the aegis of the criminal code of the socialist state,” and that “a person can be prosecuted under the criminal code only in strictest concurrence with the law.” However, many of the codified offenses for which East German citizens were prosecuted and imprisoned were unique to totalitarian regimes, both fascist and communist.
Moreover, certain sections of the code, such as those on “Treasonable Relaying of Information” and “Treasonable Agent Activity,” were perversely applied, landing countless East Germans in maximum security penitentiaries. The victims of this perversion of justice usually were persons who had requested legal exit permits from the DDR authorities and had been turned down. In many cases, their “crime” was having contacted a Western consulate to inquire about immigration procedures. Sentences of up to two and a half years’ hard labor were not unusual as punishment for such inquiries.
Engaging in “propaganda hostile to the state” was another punishable offense. In one such case, a young man was arrested and prosecuted for saying that it was not necessary to station tanks at the border and for referring to border fortifications as “nonsense.” During his trial, he “admitted” to owning a television set on which he watched West German programs and later told friends what he saw. One of those “friends” had denounced him to the Stasi. The judge considered the accused’s actions especially egregious and sentenced him to a year and a half at hard labor.
Ironically, another part of this section of the criminal code decreed that “glorifying militarism” also was a punishable offense, although the DDR itself “glorified” its People’s Army beyond any Western norm. That army was clad in uniforms and insignia identical to those of the Nazi Wehrmacht, albeit without eagles and swastikas. The helmets, too, were differently shaped, but the Prussian goose step was regulation during parades.
A nineteen-year-old who had placed a sign in an apartment window reading “When justice is turned into injustice, resistance becomes an obligation!” was rewarded with twenty-two months in the penitentiary. Earlier, the youth had applied for an exit visa and had been turned down. A thirty-four-year-old father of two who also had been denied permission to leave the “workers’ and peasants’ state” with his family similarly advertised that fact with a poster reading “We want to leave, but they won’t let us.” The man went to prison for sixteen months. The “crimes” of both men were covered by a law on “Interference in Activities of the State or Society.”
Two letters—one to a friend in West Germany, seeking assistance to legally emigrate to the West, and another containing a similar appeal to Chief of State Honecker—brought a four-year sentence to their writer, who was convicted under two laws: those on “establishing illegal contacts” (writing to his friend) and on “public denigration” (writing to Honecker). The Stasi had illegally intercepted both letters.
The East German party chiefs were not content to rely only on the Stasi’s millions of informers to ferret out antistate sentiments. Leaving nothing to chance, they created a law that made the failure to denounce fellow citizens a crime punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. One man was sentenced to twenty-three months for failing to report that a friend of his was preparing to escape to the West. The mandatory denunciation law had its roots in the statutes of the Socialist Unity Party, which were published in the form of a little red booklet. I picked up a copy of this booklet that had been discarded by its previous owner, a Stasi chauffeur, who had written “Ha, Ha” next to the mandate to “report any misdeeds, regardless of the person responsible, to leading party organs, all the way up to the Central Committee.”
Rupert Scholz, member of parliament and professor of law at the University of Munich, said many East Germans feel there is little determination among their Western brethren to bring the Stasi criminals to trial. “In fact, we already have heard many of them say that the peaceful revolution should have been a bloody one instead so they could have done away with their tormentors by hanging them posthaste,” Scholz told me.
The Reverend Joachim Gauck, minister to a Lutheran parish in East Germany, shared the people’s pessimism that justice would be done. Following reunification, Gauck was appointed by the Bonn government as its special representative for safeguarding and maintaining the Stasi archives. “We must at least establish a legal basis for finding the culprits in our files,” Gauck told me. “But it will not be easy. If you stood the millions of files upright in one line, they would stretch for 202 kilometers [about 121 miles]. In those files you can find an unbelievable number of Stasi victims and their tormentors.”
Gauck was given the mandate he needed in November 1991, when the German parliament passed a law authorizing file searches to uncover Stasi perpetrators and their informants. He viewed this legislation as first step in the right direction. With the evidence from Stasi files, the perpetrators could be removed from their public service jobs without any formal legal proceedings. Said Gauck: “We needed this law badly. It is not reasonable that persons who served this apparatus of oppression remain in positions of trust. We need to win our people over to accepting that they are now free and governed by the rule of law. To achieve that, we must build up their confidence and trust in the public service.”
Searching the roughly six million files will take years. A significant number of the dossiers are located in repositories of the Stasi regional offices, sprinkled throughout eastern Germany. To put the files at the Berlin central repository in archival order would take one person 128 years. The job might have been made easier had the last DDR government not ordered the burning of thousands of Stasi computer tapes, ostensibly to forestall a witch-hunt. Thousands of files dealing with espionage were shredded and packed into 17,200 paper sacks. These were discovered when the Stasi headquarters was stormed on January 15, 1990. The contents of all of these bags now have been inspected. It took two workers between six and eight weeks to go through one bag. Then began the work of the puzzlers, putting the shredded pieces together. By the middle of 1997, fewer than 500 bags of shredded papers had been reconstructed—into about 200,000 pages. Further complicating matters was the lack of trained archivists and experts capable of organizing these files—to say nothing of the 37.5 million index cards bearing the names of informers as well as persons under Stasi surveillance—and interpreting their contents. Initially, funding for a staff of about 550 individuals was planned, at a total of about DM24.5 million annually (about US$15 million using an exchange rate of US$1.60). By 1997, the budget had grown to US$137 million and the staff to 3,100.
Stasi victims and citizens who had been under surveillance were allowed to examine their Stasi files. Within four years of reunification, about 860,000 persons had asked to inspect their case files, with 17,626 of those requests being received in December 1994 alone. By 1997, 3.4 million people had asked to see their files. Countless civil suits were launched when victims found the names of those who had denounced and betrayed them, and many family relationships and friendships were destroyed.
The rehabilitation of Stasi victims and financial restitution to them was well under way; but Gauck believed that criminal prosecution of the perpetrators would continue to be extremely difficult. “We can already see that leading SED functionaries who bear responsibility for the inhumane policies, for which they should be tried, are instead accused of lesser offenses such as corruption. It is actually an insult to democracy that a man like Harry Tisch is tried for embezzlement and not for being a member of the Politburo, where the criminal policies originated.”
The “Stasi files law,” as it is popularly known, also made it possible to vet parliamentarians for Stasi connections. Hundreds were fired or resigned—and a few committed suicide—when it was discovered that they had been Stasi informants. Among those who resigned was Lothar de Maiziere, the last premier of the DDR, who signed the unification agreement with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. He was a member of the East German version of the Christian Democratic Union, which like all noncommunist parties in the Eastern bloc had been totally co-opted by the regime. After reunification, he moved into parliament and was awarded the vice chairmanship of Kohl’s Christian Democratic Union. A lawyer, De Maiziere had functioned for years as an IM, an informer, under the cover name Cerny. De Maiziere at first denied he was Cerny, but the evidence was overwhelming. It was De Maiziere’s government that had ordered the destruction of the Stasi computer tapes.
THE COMMUNISTS’ POLITICAL SURVIVAL
De Maiziere, who had been a driving force behind prompt reunification, soon passed into oblivion; but twenty members of the old Communist Party, the SED, are still members of parliament. The SED changed its name in late 1989, when the DDR was collapsing, to the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). Its new leadership arrogantly dismissed their bloody past as irrelevant now that the word democratic had been adopted as part of their party’s name. If the elections of summer 1990 had taken place just a few months later and thus had been conducted under the law of reunified Germany, these individuals would not have won parliamentary seats. The West German electoral rules governing the proportional representation system require that a party garner at least 5 percent of the vote before it may enter parliament. In addition to choosing a party, voters cast a second ballot for a specific person. This is called a direct mandate. If any party falls below 5 percent but gets at least three direct mandates, that party is seated in parliament. As a one-time compromise in consideration of East Germany’s smaller population, the Bonn government accepted a 3-percent margin of party votes. Even so, the PDS barely made it into parliament.
In the 1994 general election, the first after reunification, the party polled 4.4 percent. Had it not been for the votes electing four persons by direct mandate, the PDS would have been excluded. The direct mandates all came from East Berlin districts heavily populated by unemployed, former Communist Party and government officials. One of the men elected directly was Gregor Gysi, a communist lawyer who had been accused of informing on his clients to the Stasi. Gysi denied the allegations and had obtained a temporary injunction barring a former East German dissident from making the assertion. However, a Hamburg court lifted the injunction in December 1994 on the basis of Stasi documents that indicated Gysi had no case.
Another candidate directly elected to parliament was Stefan Heym, a German-born writer who had emigrated to the United States after Hitler came to power, had changed his name from Helmut Flieg, and had become a U.S. citizen. He served in the U.S. Army as an officer during World War II, but switched sides in 1952 to live in East Germany, forfeiting his U.S. citizenship in order to become an East German citizen and a member of the Communist Party. A year later, on June 17, 1953, the East German people rose up in a revolt that was crushed by the Red Army. Had it not been for the intervention of the Soviets, Heym wrote afterward in the communist daily newspaper Berliner Zeitung, “the American bombing would have already begun. The shots against the rebels were fired to prevent war, rather than to begin one.” And when Stalin died, just four months earlier, Heym used the same newspaper to mourn the butcher of an estimated twenty million people as the “most loved man of our times.” Finally, in a speech on January 31, 1995, at a demonstration marking the 62nd anniversary of the Nazi takeover, the unrepentant Heym, now eighty-two years old, had the gall to say that the present climate in Germany was “very similar to that in 1933, and this frightens me.” It was a grotesque spectacle when Heym was accorded the “honor” of delivering the opening address of the 1965 parliamentary session traditionally reserved for the body’s oldest member. Despite vehement protests, parliamentary president Rita Süssmuth ruled to uphold the tradition.
One of the PDS members also retaining his seat was Hans Modrow. Modrow, a veteran communist, was SED district secretary in Dresden. It was a most powerful communal political position. Modrow was a vital cog in the apparatus of state repression. The local Stasi chief, Major General Horst Böhm, reported directly to him. Modrow was the one who ordered the Vopo, the People’s Police, to resort to violence in putting down massive protests during the turbulent days in fall 1989, just before the Berlin Wall fell. Hundreds of protesters were severely beaten and jailed. Böhm, the Dresden Stasi boss, was found shot dead in his office in early 1990, just before he was to appear before a commission that had been convened to settle the future of the communist state. His death was listed as a suicide. However, an unsubstantiated rumor has it that he was murdered to prevent him from testifying about Modrow’s despotic rule. Modrow was found guilty of election fraud in May 1993. The DDR hierarchy, according to the evidence, had ordered that the number of votes opposing the official slate in the 1989 election had to be fewer than in 1985. Modrow reported that only 2.5 percent of the ballots in his district were cast in opposition; but the true number was at least four times higher. The judge issued him a mere rebuke, refusing to imprison or fine him. The federal high court, which reviews sentences, ordered in November 1994 that Modrow stand trial again because the sentence “was too mild.” After a new trial in 1996 on charges of perjury, Modrow was sentenced to six months’ probation. A year later, parliament was still considering whether he should be deprived of his seat.
Unlike the Nazi Party’s finances and property, which were confiscated by the victorious Allies and turned over to the first West German government in 1949, the SED’s millions were inherited by the PDS, which spirited part of those funds out of the country when the East German government collapsed. The PDS also became custodian of the archives of the SED and refused anyone outside the party access to them. Shortly after reunification, in 1990, the courts ruled that the archives were state property. Judicial authorities as well as scholars were permitted to research them. Nevertheless, the SED archives were almost lost. In 1994, the German news magazine Focus discovered a letter dated March 1991, sent by Gregor Gysi in the capacity of PDS party chief to Vladimir A. Ivashko, assistant secretary-general of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party. In this letter, Gysi pleaded with Soviet leaders either to put pressure on German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to return the archive to the PDS, or if Kohl felt this was politically impossible, to destroy it. The opening of the archive, Gysi wrote, was a “genuine catastrophe,” because it contained many secret documents. Publication of the documents would have “extremely unpleasant results not only for the PDS but for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well,” Gysi wrote. But his Soviet friends were no longer able to help him. The archive holds documents on Politburo decisions and directives that might prove crucial in prosecuting the former East German party hierarchy. In the end, the PDS offered to settle for 20 percent of the SED’s ill-gotten funds, forfeiting the rest as a gesture of goodwill toward the new state.
Not all observers were impressed by this compromise. Peter Gauweiler, Bavaria’s minister for development and ecological affairs at the time of reunification, and a member of the Christian Democratic Party, demanded that the PDS and the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, the West German Communist Party), be outlawed: “Every month we learn of new crimes committed by the SED—terrible things, gruesome things,” Gauweiler said. “We cannot tolerate a successor organization to such an extremely criminal gang.”
For more Information the victims have launched a new site: http://www.victims-opfer.com
Reporting by Anthony Solomon, Bridget Gallagher; Editing by Magister Bernd Pulch* and Kim Halburton
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The INVESTMENT – MAGAZINE – THE ORIGINAL- was founded in 1995. We publish three editions, one global, one for Asia and one germany, Austria and Szwiterland.
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A high net worth individual (HNWI) is a person with a high net worth. In the private banking business, these individuals typically are defined as having investable assets (financial assets not including primary residence) in excess of US$1 million.[1][2] As explained below, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated a different definition of “high net worth individual” for regulatory purposes.
The Merrill Lynch – Capgemini World’s Wealth Report 2009 defines HNWIs as those who hold at least US$1 million in financial assets and Ultra-HNWIs as those who hold at least US$30 million in financial assets, with both excluding collectibles, consumables, consumer durables and primary residences. The report states that in 2008 there were 8.6 million HNWIs worldwide, a decline of 14.9% from 2007. The total HNWI wealth worldwide totaled US$32.8 trillion, a 19.5% decrease from 2007. The Ultra-HNWIs experienced the greater loss, losing 24.6% in population size and 23.9% in accumulated wealth. The report revised its 2007 projections that HNWI financial wealth would reach US$59.1 trillion by 2012 and revised this downward to a 2013 HNWI wealth valued at $48.5 trillion advancing at an annual rate of 8.1%.
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*Magister Bernd M. Pulch (MA – Magister Artium)
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Published his Magister-Thesis for Professor Hans-Mathias Kepplinger
about Dolf Zillmans “Emotional Arousal Theory” January 1987
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(Today, persona non grata in the German banking industry); – Peter Reski (responsible for Finance, known for fraud, tax fraud and embezzlement, which is already behind the judgments are final) – Mark Vornkahl (responsible for organizational and administrative tasks in GOMOPA, a former police officer dismissed because of numerous expectations in the service, already has a few final judgments “on his account”); – Claus i Ulrike Wottle (married couple, for the so-called “unconventional” enforcement of the debt for the benefit GOMOPA. This execution was imposing, with extortion violence based on both real and fictitious debts references? How does the system of GOMOPADie above-mentioned persons in Brief, as well as with the service GOMOPA cooperating, so-called “experts GOMOPA” Bloggers and all other professional and legal persons choose from all possible sources of information about large, rich companies and corporations coming in various domestic and international sectors of the economy. GOMOPA The service is particularly keen that those aussucht, the “in itself visible.” Those companies corporations and, therefore, against the relatively easy and without much effort himself, inconsistencies, etc. can be done in terms of the even crimes such as cheating and Erschwindeln Others can easily perform. It is well known that every company especially good at their presence and her name is inviolable. Each company will do everything according to their good presence also retain its credibility to be. But if the victim of GOMOPA and his “partner” and a large range of businesses, so it is possible to call such companies a quick, easy, and even considerably enriched. It appears at this point the question: Which clever criminals in the network and outside the network to me is success, it does not wish to benefit? The criminals in the network know that without business credibility there is no confidence that any business is essential. GOMOPA and all are cooperating with the security of all possible methods and measures mastered how to credibility and confidence of a company, a company, corporation (crime victims) in question. This moves just the attention of the user, so that the homepage of the GOMOPA http://www.gomopa.net in search engines like Google, Yahoo is easy to find. This, in turn, means nothing other than additional profits for the service GOMOPA because of its activity around a media discourse created wird.Ein at first glance commonplace and easy victims of extortion, for example, can a public governmental body, which, based on the credibility of public works, such as a bank or a foreign bank financial institution. So it was with the foreign banks, international financial institution Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. the case. A simple and easy victims of illicit profits and material may include insurance companies, where – as it is from our search results, much to the criminal activities of the GOMOPA especially in the area of the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and Austria was due. Among the known and identifiable victims is certainly German, Austrian and Swiss banks, insurance companies such as Allianz of Germany, German and Austrian companies such as HDI and DKV visible. This is what the service GOMOPA trust and what with the cooperating services, blogs nowadays practice is the so-called cyber-stalking, which rapidly spread in the network. The method is criminal at this point and others in the threat that the business of an enterprise (Ofer blackmail, threats and forcible ) fictitious, even non-existent information (lies, rumors, stories, statements, insults) on the net first then in other mass media. This is only used to a potential victim to move a considerable sum of money for the so-called “peace “the blackmailer available. The” quiet “here means the promise of access lock with respect to the fictitious publication of any information on the net and in all other mass media, the victims of extortion in extremely negative light showing. Such threats are, as already above the goal of companies – potential victims of cyber-stalking to do likewise, that they themselves “buy.” In short, GOMOPA and his peers, and cooperating with those services, and blogs, create a “virtual reality”, or otherwise said publishing fictitious information on potential victims of a crime. firms and corporations, against which threats and extortion by GOMOPA are not due, ie those who for so-called “peace” does not want to pay, to be victims of serious lies, insults, and Insinuationen other criminal misappropriations, the appearance and presence of a firm with certainty. One is a target of GOMOPA, namely as fast and as easy as it goes, money abzukassieren, and if a company refuses, and the “peace” do not buy wishes, it is unexpectedly and quickly become an object of extortion and defamation on the net. At this point the following question arises: How is it possible that the leader of the firm GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Mauri chat, only in the Federal Republic of Germany on his account “23 court rulings, has for many years as an honest citizen to create, while other persons, firms, corporations criminal acts, offenses memorize, in addition to substantial sums of money could earn? This complex process can only be explained as follows: GOMOPA creates his appearance, his presence in the eyes of public opinion as an honest subject, against which pathological phenomena in the public and economic life einschreitet. GOMOPA and his partner (services, blogs) present themselves as followers of any Verbrechensart that promise so the fight against criminals in each virtual network ( especially against any cheaters, blackmailers). GOMOPA used in this respect a kind of “Merketingsvorhang” as a method of seduction, a result which is his true “face” and his true intentions than that of a fraudster and blackmail on money can hide. The true intentions of the GOMOPA, of working together GOMOPA Services and blogs were until today no doubt with success before the public opinion will remain hidden, especially thanks to the so-called “smoke curtain”, which reflects the fact that man himself as a “winner” of any abuse and any pathological appearance of the public and economic life in Aland German, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, Russia, Spain created. Next appears the GOMOPA forward by the person on which companies and corporations – the future victims of the crime that is – against the possibility of the release of extremely poor and the company concerned in a negative light visual information on the Internet and other mass media warns. The person from whom the speech is also informed that they are successful against such a procedure for a “fee” can be used. The GOMOPA is at this point up to the extortion of money for so-called “peace” to the company and corporation (the victim of a crime) around. Most of the companies concerned to such threats did not respond, because it’s everyday life and their agenda. It finally barely missing on the web of blackmail and outside of the medium. Normally so seldom so-called “understanding”, while on the one hand, the crime victim, on the other hand, the GOMOPA occurs. It is understandable that the price for such an “understanding” means the provision of the requested funds would GOMOPA. The financial blackmail in this stage is rarely enforced. The situation changes little, however, if the firms and corporations (crime victims) find that the threat was fulfilled. In Brief will appear on the homepage http://www.gomopa.net numerous newspaper articles, reports and bogus pseudo market analysis, both by GOMOPA as well as so-called “independent experts” and the company will be represented, with formal or fictitious GOMOPA together. Information published here, correspond to the contents of a threat and make the operations of firms and corporations in an extremely negative light dar. There is no doubt that such actions and methods only to harm the good name and good presence of these firms and corporations prerogatives. The activity of GOMOPA is certainly not exhausted. GOMOPA disseminated (published accommodates) the above information in the network by the credible, and popular opinion-operated services. Moreover, GOMOPA threatens the companies and corporations (its victims), that “from the finger-drawn” information not only on the network, but also on television and on radio and in the press landscape erscheinen.Wie the experience and expertise of the former Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. show that the services are usually not aware that they are for the purpose of a criminal action by the GOMOPA used. They agree with the corresponding fictitious publications, reports and analysis on what specifically GOMOPA through and through “independent” experts are prepared. It also states that the services, and blogs such cooperation with the GOMOPA approval, although they know that the information transmitted by GOMOPA are fictitious and the credibility of companies and corporations affect. They take so aware of the criminal procedure part. The explanation of this situation is quite simple. GOMOPA pays namely the services, and blogs related remuneration that the publication of false information on the companies and corporations (crime victims) agree. Some services, and blogs seem to know nothing about it to have that on their pages available information “fictitious” and “pulled out of the fingers are. Are you looking for in this way their conduct to justify, because they want the legal consequences of participating in the abuse of the good name and appearance of a company or corporation to escape. The activity system of GOMOPA of collaborating services and blogs was also the example of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. tested. Beginning in October 2008 was one of the workers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. a message from an anonymous sender, in the near future – first on the Internet, then on television, radio and in the German press – information published by the functioning and activities of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in an extremely negative light show. The employee of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. was then informed that these reports / news undoubtedly significantly the appearance and the reputation of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. affect. The place mentioned in this “conversation partner” has the workers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. informed that the possibility of the embarrassing situation to be avoided by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. to the person shown by the account the sum of 100,000.00 EUR transfers. As later revealed, however, was Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat – this anonymous interlocutor – “brain” and “Leader of the GOMOPA”. The investigations have been employed by the Federal Judicial Police (tracking and identifying the body at the federal level) during the investigation for the payment of blackmail, fraud and threats because of what Mr Mauri chatting and his staff were practiced, and for participation by other (head of Internet services and moderators of blogs) on this process. These crimes have been committed to loss of many professional and judicial persons, including the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. The victims of this crime in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, the USA and Canada visible. At this moment appeared the following question: What was the reaction of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. to the demands from GOMOPA? Corresponded to the response to the expectations of GOMOPA? Has the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. the required sum of EUR 100,000.00 paid? Side of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. There was absolutely no reaction to the extortion attempt by GOMOPA. At the end of August 2008 on the Service http://www.gompa.net numerous articles / reports published by the activities of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in a very negative light have represented. Once the information contained on http://www.gomopa.net detail and were fully analyzed, it is that they are not even the truth at one point and potential and existing customers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in relation to the financial institution from this discontinued business activities is misleading. Following the criminal Handlugen of GOMOPA and its cooperating services, and blogs on the network, the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. measurable and significant business losses. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. has primarily an important group of potential customers lost. But what it showed as important, the existing customers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. little away. Those customers have used our services and continue to use the still. In view of the existing collaboration with the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.., Which will in turn be no objections. GOMOPA has such a course of events accurately predicted, which aims significant and measurable business by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. losses were suffered. The course of events, the service GOMOPA certainly pleased. GOMOPA has to expect that the position of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. declines and the financial institution, the required sum (100.000,00 EUR) provides. Over time, as the whole procedure in the network was becoming more popular, tried GOMOPA still four times to the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Contacts, each time by adjusting these criminal “Kompanie” has promised, although it every time his financial demands heraufsetzte. The last of the set of “company” against Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. ratio was even planned EUR 5,000,000.00 (in words: EURO fünfmilionen). The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. could but before the ever-increasing demands from the Service GOMOPA claim. In October 2008 met the management of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Decision on the notification of the INTERPOL International Police and the appropriate law enforcement institutions of the FRG (the police and the prosecutor) about the existing situation. In the meantime, reported at the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. numerous companies and corporations, and even professional person such as doctors, judges, priests, actors and other people from different countries of the world, the extortion of GOMOPA relented and the required amounts of money it had. These people already gave statements that they have done so, so they finally just “be in peace” and unnecessary problems, difficulties, and a reasonable conclusion hardly avoid them. The victims of this criminal action, the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. using different amounts of money which were requested, informed. In one case, there were relatively small (a few thousand EURO), in another case it has to deliver significant amounts (around few million EURO). Additionally turned to Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Companies which have not yet GOMOPA the “fee” on out and have already considered whether they should do or not. These firms anticipated by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. a clear opinion as well as a practical professional advice on how to be in such a situation should behave and how they can avoid debt. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. has invariably victims of all crimes, which are at our company have made a cooperation proposed. The top task is to this cooperation, jointly determined and effective measures against GOMOPA against other services in the network, and against all Bloggers to meet in the here described with international criminal procedure GOMOPA leaders to participate. All these companies were known as the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. proposed “crusade” against GOMOPA, his partner. At our request to notify all participating companies the INTERPOL International Police and their pursuit of domestic institutions, including the competent public prosecutor and the police authorities about the existing situation. In view of the fact that the criminal act of GOMOPA be extended over many states and that the number of the Federal Republic of Germany because the ads reimbursed by GOMOPA, Internet Services and Bloggers crimes, grew up fast – which no doubt influenced by a far-reaching impact of criminal of GOMOPA testifies – International Business, the Police INTERPOL Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. before that its representatives in Berlin with representatives from GOMOPA true to the “payment arrangements and transfer the sum of EUR 5,000,000.00 to discuss. This step meant a well thought-out and by the Federal Criminal Police organized the event to carry out aimed at the arrest of international criminals GOMOPA acting was. The coordinated steps and measures of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Damaged and others, led by the International Economic Police INTERPOL, the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Prosecutor of the Federal Republic of Germany for education, training and implementation of the above-described case contributed. In November 2008, the event in Berlin prepared for the apprehension and arrest of the representative of the GOMOPA, after the arrest of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat – as the main leaders and leaders of international criminal group GOMOPA recalled. The arrest and notified the Federal Criminal Police showed both the current whereabouts of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat. “Brain” and the founder of this international criminal group GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Mauri chat on the same day was also arrested and imprisoned on time, will soon put in charge state, the responsibility for their own crimes and those of the forum, before a competent GOMOPA Federal wear. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. undertook all possible steps to ensure that Mr. Klaus Mauri chatting on the dock of the competent court of the United Kingdom of Great Britain appears. Among the damaged work and justice people from United Kingdom, along with the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. There are many victims of GOMOPA: The beginning of the arrests with such a scale means for the German judiciary and a major breakthrough point. It is worth noting that the prosecution bodies of the Federal Republic, up to this stage of the long-standing criminal activity of Mr. Klaus Mauri chatting and his staff were powerless. Prolonged impunity of the criminal actions of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat, for years the “first violin” in GOMOPA played, is to end gegangen.An this point another question arises: how is it so go on? The arrest of Mr. Klaus chat Mauri is a critical moment, in other words a “turn around 180 degrees” for him personally. But it also means the beginning of the end “for its employees, for Internet Services, Bloggers, with GOMOPA so happy and had worked together without contradiction. There is no doubt that the cause of Mr Klaus Mauri chat at the top of the “iceberg” is. The above-mentioned turning point on this issue will be further arrests and detentions of members GOMOPA bring with them, and all persons from all areas involved in this transnational criminal actions have taken part. For information (reports by the end of December 2008), which of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. available, the result that the next arrests currently prepared to be associated with the Services GOMOPA cooperating persons. This is to people outside Germany – from where Mr Klaus Mauri chat coming – refer. The details may be at this point in terms of legal and course of the prosecution bodies of the BRG and the Interpol-led investigation can not be betrayed. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. currently can only illustrate information from the investigation led the public to the criminal liability not to have this moment wird.In so intense preparations for the arrest of a number of persons outside the Federal Republic of Germany. This applies particularly to countries such as the following: – Russia-Ukraine – Poland – Spain – Mexico – Portugal – Brazil – the United States of America – Canada – UK – Ireland – Australia – New Zealand – India. All professional and judicial persons, regardless of the country in which they accompany the Office, or its citizens, and until now, consciously or unconsciously with the Forum GOMOPA together, or continue to work together to arouse the suspicion of the INTERPOL International Police. This works with the police criminal investigation department in each country, to the above persons first identify and then to legally pursue them. Information about this topic, as well as on the beginning and end of the activity of the GOMOPA can be at the following addresses on the Web at: http://gomopaabzocker.wordpress.com/ – http://www.nepper-schlepper-bauernfaenger.com – http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNpzAu-QMuE – http://www.korte.de/alexander/2006/01/gomopa-finanforum-kritik.html- http://evelux.de/gomopa-sam-240/- http://blog.deobald.org/archive/2007/07/01/betrugsvorwurf-gomopa-spam/ 2. Dubai KLP Group Emirates – United Arab Emirates. As head of the company is Mr Martin Kraeter, not only as the “brain” of the whole company, but also as a longstanding friend of Mr Klaus Mauri Chat (GOMOPA-wire) acts. This company wants to hide and not even officially exist, that they as a strategic partner of the GOMOPA in the area of the Middle East, according to the territory of the Persian coast operates. Official activities of the company KLP Group Emirates includes among others the following areas: financial advisory services from the offshore area (Management Services – Facilitators – OffshoreConsultants, International Tax & Legal Consultants – Fiduciaries). In the sphere of activities of the Company will include the creation of companies and enterprises in the so-called “tax havens” to the tax liability to the company activity entfliehen.Inoffizielle KLP Group Emirates includes cooperation with the Service GOMOPA in the field of “Gelwäsche”. The monies are a result of criminal activity by GOMOPA generated by advanced professional and judicial persons soon throughout the world and legalized. The illegality based on the activity of the company KLP Group Emirates, as well as the cooperation with the Services GOMOPA attracted attention even when the prosecution organs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, especially in Scotland Yard, which on this issue an intensive investigation has begun, which is in the ” development phase is located. It must be noted that all professional and judicial persons, but especially the clients of the company KLP Group Emirates, with the company KLP Group Emirates have cooperated in the past and still do, under the “Lupp” of Scotland Yard to be .3. Russlanda) The Company E-XECUTIVE by the Lord led Novosartow Vilen. On the homepage of the Company contained information comes directly from the company GOMOPA. The company e XECUTIVE leads the close cooperation not only with GOMOPA, but also with another on the Russian territory under the name of OOO UK broker functioning company. The company e XECUTIVE in connection with the company OOO UK broker is a member of a criminal group led by GOMOPA. The company e XECUTIVE GOMOPA representing interests in Russia and Central-Eastern Europe. Unofficially, the company employs E XECUTIVE-especially with the search for potential “victims” of the Erschwindelns, blackmail and forcing the funds for GOMOPA companies and corporations from the territory of Russia, Ukraine, and from all countries in Central Eastern Europe. Officially, the company e XECUTIVE one to the forum GOMOPA similar industrial activity. b) OOO “UK broker.” Head of the firm is Mr. Pavel Kokarev. This company is not concealed, that they are consistent with the Forum GOMOPA cooperates. The company OOO UK broker represents GOMOPA in Central Eastern Europe, including Russia. You shall be officially transferred to this area the GOMOPA similar activity, but unofficially it is to search for potential “victims” of racketeering, fraud and Erschwindelns for GOMOPA employed. The company has remained until now spared from any punishment, it could with “eternal impunity” because of a poorly developed, corrupt legal system in Russia expected. The situation may change after Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat arrested in Berlin and was arrested. This constant offenders, the “on his account” a set of legally enforceable judgments has, until now his freedom has unlimited recover, the do not know quite what it means to be arrested, begins gradually, according to our available information to finally “to bear witness.” This is understandable when one considers the threat of a penalty he considered. This delinquent shows growing interest in cooperation with the German tracking and identifying bodies. So there is a chance that other people he unveiled to the public by providing for reduction of prison sentence counts. It is also the only question of time INTERPOL, in cooperation with the Russian Service (FSB) of the Company OOO UK broker “at the door knocking”, which by Mr. Pavle Kokarev and represented. The company OOO UK broker has a virtual office in REGUS building in Moscow, is not even a person, forming a typical one-person company, which all business “crimes” may be the name of it, with no civil liability to pay. The Lord Pavel Kokarev seems to have forgotten or do not have sufficient knowledge about its possible responsibility fier to participate in the international crimes under the direction of Gomopa.
For more Information the victims have launched a new site: http://www.victims-opfer.com
Drahtzieher Jochen Resch und Strohmann Klaus Maurischat
- May 4, 2011 – 6:54 pm
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- Tagged GoMoPa, gomopa drahtzieher, jochen resch, Meridian Capital: Klaus Dieter Maurischat „GoMoPa“ in Detention
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Sehr geehrte Leser,
auch wir gehen von dem Drahtzieher Jochen Resch aus, da Klaus Maurischat nicht in der Lage ist englisch zu sprechen und ihm auch sonst alle Fähigkeiten fehlen das Verbrecher-Netzwerk “GoMoPa” zu leiten
Mit freundlichen Grüssen
Administrator
Meridian Capital about GoMoPa
Der “Ausgangspunkt der “GoMoPa”-Erpressungen an Meridian Capital
- April 26, 2011 – 10:48 am
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Nachfolgend bringen wir einen Artikel von „GoMoPa“, der der Ausgangspunkt der “GoMoPa” Erpressungen war und zur Verhaftung von “GoMoPa”-”CEO” Klaus Dieter Maurischat in Berlin durch das BKA und Interpol war.„GoMopa“ schreibt:08.09.2008 Weltweite Finanzierungen mit WidersprüchenDie Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt an, weltweite Finanzierungen anbieten zu können und präsentiert sich hierbei auf aufwendig kreierten Webseiten. GOMOPA hat die dort gemachten Angaben analysiert und Widersprüche entdeckt. Der Firmensitz Der Firmensitz befindet sich laut eigener Aussage in Dubai, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate. In einem GOMOPA vorliegenden Schreiben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. heißt es jedoch, der Firmensitz sei in London. Auf der Homepage des Unternehmens taucht die Geschäftsadresse in der Londoner Old Broad Street nur als „Kundenabteilung für deutschsprachige Kunden“ auf. Eine weitere Adresse in der englischen Hauptstadt, diesmal in der Windsor Avenue, sei die „Abteilung der Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren“. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises ist tatsächlich als „Limited“ (Ltd.) mit Sitz in England und Wales eingetragen. Aber laut Firmenhomepage hat das Unternehmen seinen „rechtlichen Geschäftssitz“ in Dubai. Eine Abfrage beim Gewerbeamt Dubais (DED) zu dieser Firmierung bleibt ergebnislos. Bemerkenswert ist auch der vermeintliche Sitz in Israel. Auf der Webseite von Meridian Capital Enterprises heißt es: „Die Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist im Register des israelischen Justizministeriums unter der Nummer 514108471, gemäß dem Gesellschaftsrecht von 1999, angemeldet.“ Hierzu Martin Kraeter, Gomopa-Partner und Prinzipal der KLP Group Emirates in Dubai: „Es würde keinem einzigen Emirati – geschweige denn einem Scheich auch nur im Traum einfallen, direkte Geschäfte mit Personen oder Firmen aus Israel zu tätigen. Und schon gar nicht würde er zustimmen, dass sein Konterfei auch noch mit vollem Namen auf der Webseite eines Israelischen Unternehmens prangt.“ Auf der Internetseite sind diverse Fotos mit Scheichs an Konferenztischen zu sehen. Doch diese großen Tagungen und großen Kongresse der Meridian Capital Enterprises werden in den Pressearchiven der lokalen Presse Dubais mit keinem Wort erwähnt. Zwei angebliche Großinvestitionen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in Dubai sind Investmentruinen bzw. erst gar nicht realisierte Projekte. Das Unternehmen wirbt mit ihrer finanziellen Beteiligung an dem Dubai Hydropolis Hotel und dem Dubai Snowdome. Der Aktivitätsstatus der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist laut englischen Handelsregister (UK Companies House) „dormant“ gemeldet. Auf der Grundlage des englischen Gesellschaftsrechts können sich eingetragene Unternehmen selbst „dormant“ (schlafend) melden, wenn sie keine oder nur unwesentliche buchhalterisch zu erfassende Transaktionen vorgenommen haben. Dies ist angesichts der angeblichen globalen Investitionstätigkeit der Meridian Capital Ltd. sehr erstaunlich. Der Webauftritt Die Internetseite der MCE ist sehr aufwendig gestaltet, die Investitionen angeblich in Millionen- und Milliardenhöhe. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Präsentationselemente fällt jedoch auf, dass es sich bei zahlreichen veröffentlichen Fotos, die Veranstaltungen der Meridian Capital Enterprises dokumentieren sollen, meist um Fotos von Online-Zeitungen oder frei zugänglichen Medienfotos einzelner Institutionen handelt wie z.B. der Börse Dubai. Auf der Internetpräsenz befinden sich Videofilmchen, die eine frappierende Ähnlichkeit mit dem Werbematerial von NAKHEEL aufweisen, dem größten Bauträger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. Doch den schillernden Videos über die berühmten drei Dubai Palmen „Jumeirah, Jebel Ali und Deira“ oder das Archipel „The World“ wurden offensichtlich selbstproduzierte Trailersequenzen der Meridian Capital Enterprises vorangestellt. Doch könnte es sich bei den Werbevideos um Fremdmaterial handeln. Auch die auf der Webseite wahllos platzierten Fotos von bekannten Sehenswürdigkeiten Dubais fungieren als Augenfang für den interessierten Surfer mit eigenem Finanzierungswunsch. Bei einem Volumen von 10 Millionen Euro oder höher präsentiert sich die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. als der passende Investitionspartner. Das Unternehmen verfügt weltweit über zahlreiche Standorte: Berlin, London, Barcelona, Warschau, Moskau, Dubai, Riad, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong und New York. Aber nahezu alle Standorte sind lediglich Virtual Offices eines global arbeitenden Büroservice-Anbieters. „Virtual Office“ heißt im Deutschen schlicht „Briefkastenfirma“. Unter solchen Büroadressen sollen laut Meridian Capital Enterprises ganze Kommissionen ansässig sein, alles zum Wohle des Kunden.“ Zitatende |
Gegen “GoMoPa”: Cyberstalking: Wer verfolgt wird, muss sich wehren
- April 22, 2011 – 4:11 pm
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- Tagged Meridian Capital, Meridian Capital: Klaus Dieter Maurischat „GoMoPa“ in Detention
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Cyberstalking: Wer verfolgt wird, muss sich wehren
Wer Glück hat, muss nur seine E-Mail-Adresse wechseln oder unbestellte Waren zurücksenden. Schlimmstenfalls aber ist der Ruf ruiniert oder das Konto geplündert: Cyberstalking hat viele Formen. Wer von Unbekannten im Web terrorisiert wird, muss sich wehren. Die Polizei gibt Tipps.
Immer häufiger werden persönliche Daten laut Experten dazu verwandt, um anderen mit den Mitteln des Internets einen Streich zu spielen oder sie massiv unter Druck zu setzen. Imagepflege im Netz und ein sensibler Umgang mit Daten können helfen.
Anzeige
Cyberstalking ist ein Sammelbegriff von Anwälten und Polizei für Straftaten im Internet. Dabei stand das eingedeutschte Synonym für Internet (“Cyber(-space)”) genauso Pate wie das englische Verb “to stalk” (für anpirschen, anschleichen). “Cyberstalking ist ein Kunstbegriff”, sagt Ulrich Schulte am Hülse, Rechtsanwalt in Berlin. Eine genaue Definition liege bislang nicht vor. Unter dem Strich werden damit verschiedene Wege bezeichnet, auf denen Personen per Internet belästigt und verfolgt werden. Das Risiko, einmal betroffen zu sein, steigt mit der Häufigkeit der Nutzung, sagen die Experten.
Keine validen Zahlen
Denn Statistiken beispielsweise der Polizei liegen zu Cyberstalking nicht vor: “Es wird wohl immer mehr. Wir führen die Straftaten nicht unter diesem Begriff”, sagt Frank Scheulen, Sprecher des Landeskriminalamtes Nordrhein-Westfalen in Düsseldorf. “Mit der Zunahme und Verbreitung der Neuen Medien liegt es aber auf der Hand, dass auch Cyberstalking zunimmt”, sagt Professor Harald Dreßing vom Institut für Seelische Gesundheit in Mannheim.
Die Folgen sind Beleidigungen, aber auch ganz praktischer Ärger: “Unter fremden Namen kaufen und verkaufen Cyberstalker Waren im Online- und Versandhandel. Sie veröffentlichen Homepages, Blogs oder begehen Straftaten”, zählt Scheulen auf. Gängig sei auch das unerwünschte Senden und Versenden von E-Mails, das unbefugte Veröffentlichen oder Verfremden von Fotos oder von vermeintlichen Aussagen des Opfers mit anzüglichem Inhalt.
Unbedingt Anzeige erstatten
Meist führt ein allzu sorgloser Umgang mit den persönlichen Daten im Internet dazu. Wer Opfer von Cyberstalkern geworden ist, sollte unverzüglich Anzeige erstatten, rät Scheulen: “Dann kann die Polizei über den Provider und die IP-Adresse die Täter aufspüren.” Abmahnung, Unterlassungsverfügung und Schadensersatzforderungen hätten dann gute Erfolgsaussichten, sagt Schulte am Hülse. Zur Vorbereitung rechtlicher Schritte empfehle sich die Dokumentation des Cyberstalkings vom ersten Moment an.
Ein sensibler Umgang mit Internet und Daten hilft vorzubeugen. “Geben Sie keine persönlichen Informationen wie Hobbys oder Vorlieben preis”, rät Scheulen. Vor allem sollten keine Telefonnummern, Adressen oder Namen in Chatrooms veröffentlicht werden: “Man weiß nicht, wer sich im Netz verbirgt oder wie die Daten weiter genutzt werden.” Dreßing rät dazu, bei der Nutzung von SchülerVZ, Xing und Co. den Zugang zum privaten Profil auf Bekannte und Freunde zu limitieren. Es hänge sich schließlich auch niemand ein Schild mit persönlichen Daten um und renne damit durch die Innenstadt.
Warnung vor “GoMoPa”-Fälschung www.pressreleaser.org
- April 19, 2011 – 12:11 am
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- Tagged GoMoPa, Meridian Capital, Meridian Capital: Klaus Dieter Maurischat „GoMoPa“ in Detention, pressreleaser.org
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Liebe Leser,
aus gegebenem Anlass warnen wir vor den Fälschungen der “GoMoPa”-Betrüger auf
http://www.pressreleaser.org sowie vor deren Erpresser-Blogs wie z.B. der berüchtige “Scheisshausfliegen-Blog.”
Das ist die Fälschung:
Ihr Antiy-Cyberstalker-Crusade – Team
Anfang Oktober 2008 erhielt einer der Arbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. eine Meldung von einem anonymen Sender, dass in naher Zukunft – zuerst im Internet, dann im Fernsehen, im Radio und in der deutschen Presse – Informationen erscheinen, die die Funktionsweise und Tätigkeiten der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in einem äußerst negativen Licht darstellen. Der Mitarbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. wurde also informiert, dass diese Meldungen/Nachrichten zweifelsohne deutlich das Aussehen und den guten Ruf der Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. beeinträchtigen.
Der an dieser Stelle erwähnte „Gesprächspartner” hat den Arbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. informiert, dass die Möglichkeit besteht die peinliche Situation zu vermeiden, indem die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. auf das von der Person gezeigte Konto die Summe von 100.000,00 EUR überweist. Wie sich aber später zeigte, war der Herr Klaus Maurischat – dieser anonyme Gesprächspartner – „Gehirn“ und „Lider des GOMOPA“. Die Ermittlungen wurden angestellt durch die Bundeskriminalpolizei (Verfolgungs- und Ermittlungsorgan auf der Bundesebene) während des Ermittlungsverfahrens wegen einer finanziellen Erpressung, Betrügereien auch wegen der Bedrohungen, welche von Herrn Maurischat und seine Mitarbeiter praktiziert wurden sowie wegen Teilnahme anderer (Leiter der Internetservices und Moderatoren der Blogs) an diesem Prozedere. Diese Straftaten wurden begangen zu Schaden vieler Berufs- und Justizpersonen, darunter auch der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Die Opfer dieses Verbrechens sind in Deutschland, Österreich, der Schweiz, Spanien, Portugal, Großbritannien, den USA und Kanada sichtbar.
In diesem Moment taucht folgende Frage auf: Wie war die Reaktion der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. auf die Forderungen seitens GOMOPA? Entsprach die Reaktion den Erwartungen von GOMOPA? Hat die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. die geforderte Summe 100.000,00 EUR überwiesen?
Seites der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gab es überhaupt keine Reaktion auf den Erpressungsversuch von GOMOPA. Ende August 2008 auf dem Service http://www.gompa.net sind zahlreiche Artikel/Meldungen erscheinen, welche die Tätigkeit der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in einem sehr negativen Licht dargestellt haben. Nachdem die auf http://www.gomopa.net enthaltenen Informationen ausführlich und vollständig analysiert worden waren, ergab es sich, dass sie der Wahrheit nicht einmal in einem Punkt entsprechen und potenzielle und bereits bestehende Kunden der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in Bezug auf die von diesem Finanzinstitut geführten Geschäftstätigkeit irreführen. Infolge der kriminellen Handlugen von GOMOPA und der mit ihm kooperierenden Services und Blogs im Netz hat die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. beachtliche und messbare geschäftliche Verluste erlitten. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. hat nämlich in erster Linie eine wichtige Gruppe von potenziellen Kund verloren. Was sich aber als wichtiger ergab, haben sich die bisherigen Kunden von der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. kaum abgewandt. Diejenigen Kunden haben unsere Dienstleitungen weiterhin genutzt und nutzen die immer noch. In Hinblick auf die bisherige Zusammenarbeit mit der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd., werden ihrerseits dem entsprechend keine Einwände erhoben .
GOMOPA hat so einen Verlauf der Ereignisse genau prognostiziert, dessen Ziel beachtliche und messbare geschäftliche durch die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. erlittene Verluste waren. Der Verlauf der Ereignisse hat das Service GOMOPA mit Sicherheit gefreut. GOMOPA hat nämlich darauf gerechnet, dass die Stellung der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. nachlässt und das Finanzinstitut die geforderte Summe (100.000,00 EUR) bereitstellt. Im Laufe der Zeit, als das ganze Prozedere im Netz immer populärer war, versuchte GOMOPA noch vier mal zu der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Kontakte aufzunehmen, indem es jedes mal das Einstellen dieser kriminellen „Kompanie” versprochen hat, wobei es jedes mal seine finanziellen Forderungen heraufsetzte. Die letzte für das Einstellen der „Kompanie“ gegen die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. vorgesehene Quote betrug sogar 5.000.000,00 EUR (in Worten: fünfmilionen EURO). Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. konnte sich aber vor den ständig erhöhenden Forderungen seitens des Services GOMOPA behaupten.
Im Oktober 2008 traf die Leitung der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Entscheidung über die Benachrichtigung der Internationalen Polizei INTERPOL sowie entsprechender Strafverfolgungsorgane der BRD (die Polizei und die Staatsanwaltschaft) über den bestehenden Sachverhalt. In der Zwischenzeit meldeten sich bei der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. zahlreiche Firmen und Korporationen, sogar Berufsperson wie Ärzte, Richter, Priester, Schauspieler und anderen Personen aus unterschiedlichen Ländern der Welt, die der Erpressung von GOMOPA nachgegeben und die geforderten Geldsummen überwiesen haben. Diese Personen gaben bereits Erklärungen ab, dass sie dies getan haben, damit man sie bloß endlich „in Ruhe lässt” und um unnötige Probleme, Schwierigkeiten und einen kaum begründbaren Ausklang vermeiden zu können. Die Opfer dieses kriminellen Vorgehens haben die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. über unterschiedliche Geldsummen, welche verlangt wurden, informiert.
In einem Fall gab es verhältnismäßig kleine (um ein paar tausend EURO), in einem anderen Fall handelte es schon um beachtliche Summen (rund um paar Millionen EURO).
Zusätzlich wendeten sich an die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Firmen, welche dem GOMOPA noch keine „Gebühr” überweisen haben und bereits überlegen, ob sie dies tun sollen, oder nicht. Diese Firmen erwarteten von der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. eine klare Stellungnahme sowie eine professionelle praktische Beratung, wie man sich in solch einer Lage verhalten soll und wie man diese Geldforderungen umgehen kann. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. hat ausnahmslos allen Verbrechensopfern, welche sich bei unserer Firma gemeldet haben, eine Zusammenarbeit vorgeschlagen. Als oberste Aufgabe stellt sich diese Kooperation, gemeinsam entschlossene und wirksame Maßnahmen gegen GOMOPA, gegen andere Services im Netz sowie gegen alle Bloggers zu treffen, die an dem hier beschriebenen internationalen kriminellen Vorgehen mit GOMOPA-Führung teilnehmen.Auf unsere Bitte benachrichtigten alle mitbeteiligten Firmen die Internationale Polizei INTERPOL sowie ihre heimischen Verfolgungsorgane, u. a. die zuständige Staatsanwaltschaft und die Polizeibehörden über den bestehenden Sachverhalt.
In Hinblick auf die Tatsache, dass das verbrecherische Handeln von GOMOPA sich über viele Staaten erstreckte und dass die Anzahl der in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland erstatteten Anzeigen wegen der durch GOMOPA, Internetservices und Bloggers begangenen Straftaten, rasant wuchs – was zweifelsohne von einer weit gehenden kriminellen Wirkungskraft des GOMOPA zeugt – schlug die Internationale Wirtschaftspolizei INTERPOL der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. vor, dass sich ihr Vertreter in Berlin mit dem Vertreter von GOMOPA trifft, um die „Zahlungsmodalitäten“ und Überweisung der Summe von 5.000.000,00 EUR zu besprechen. Dieser Schritt meinte, eine gut durchdachte und durch die Bundeskriminalpolizei organisierte Falle durchzuführen, deren Ziel die Festnahme der unter GOMOPA wirkenden internationalen Straftäter war.
Die koordinierten Schritte und Maßnahmen der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. und anderer Beschädigter, geleitet von der Internationalen Wirtschaftspolizei INTERPOL, dem Bundeskriminalamt und der Staatsanwaltschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland haben zur Aus-, Einarbeitung und Durchführung der oben beschriebenen Falle beigetragen. Im November 2008 führte die in Berlin vorbereitete Falle zur Festnahme und Verhaftung des Vertreters des GOMOPA, der nach der Festnahme auf Herrn Klaus Maurichat – als den Hauptverantwortlichen und Anführer der internationalen kriminellen Gruppe GOMOPA verwies. Der Festgenommene benannte und zeigte der Bundeskriminalpolizei zugleich den aktuellen Aufenthaltsort des Herrn Klaus Maurischat. „Gehirn“ und Gründer dieser internationalen kriminellen Gruppe GOMOPA, Herr Klaus Maurischat wurde am selben Tag auch festgenommen und auf Frist verhaftet, wird bald in Anklagezustand gestellt, wird die Verantwortung für eigene Straftaten und die des Forums GOMOPA vor einem zuständigen Bundesgericht tragen. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. unternahm bereits alle möglichen Schritte, damit Herr Klaus Maurischat auch auf der Anklagebank des zuständigen Gerichts des Vereinigten Königsreiches Großbritannien erscheint. Unter den beschädigten Berufs- und Justizpersonen aus Großbritannien, neben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt es noch viele Opfer von GOMOPA…
Die dreisten Verbrecher wagen es unter http://www.pressreleaser.org, einer eigenen “GoMoPa”-Seite unsere Pressemitteilung oben zu verfälschen und unschuldige Personen zu belasten.
Meridian Capital: Klaus Dieter Maurischat „GoMoPa“ in Detention
- – 11:32 am
- Posted in Uncategorized
- Tagged GoMoPa, Meridian Capital, Meridian Capital: Klaus Dieter Maurischat „GoMoPa“ in Detention
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Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. unveils new criminal phenomena in network I. In recently appeared on the net more often at the same time a new a very worrying phenomenon of criminal nature. Professional criminals groups in the network are taking part, to extortion, fraud, Erschwindeln relating to certain specifically selected companies and businesses are capable of. These criminals developed new methods and means, simply and in a short time to bereichern.Strategien and manifestations, which underlie this process are fairly simple. A criminal is looking to “carefully” on the Internet specific companies and corporations (victims of crime) and informed them in the next step, that of the business activities of such companies and corporations in the near future – first on the Internet then in other available mass media – numerous and very unfavorable information appears. At the same time, the criminals beat their future victims an effective means of reducing unnecessary difficulties and problems to escape the loss of good name and image of the company and corporate sector. These offenders are aware of that reputation, name and appearance of each company is a value in itself. It was therefore a value of what each company is prepared to pay any price. But the reason for difficulties and problems arising from the loss of good name and reputation result. The criminals and their victims are already aware that this loss is devastating consequences might have been the closing down of a particular business can enforce. It takes both to No as well as at large companies regard. The company is concerned that in virtually every industry in each country and cross-border activities sind.Das criminal procedure in the form of a blackmail on money, a fraud is becoming rapidly and globally, ie led cross-border and internationally. Among the victims of extortion, fraud is now looking both at home (domestic) and international corporations, the major emphasis on conservation, keeping and maintaining their reputation in the business according to their credibility lay. The criminals in the network have understood that maintaining an unassailable reputation and name of a company the unique ability to provide fast and easy enrichment forms. The above-mentioned criminal procedure is difficult to track because it is international in nature, and by overlapping or even nonexistent (fictional) professional and judicial persons in various countries and operated company wird.Diese offenders in the network publish it and disseminate false information about your victims on remote servers, which are not uncommon in many exotic countries. There are those countries in which serious gaps in the legal system, investigative and prosecution procedures are visible. As an example, at this point mention India werden. Mit criminals working in the network grid portals known leader of blogs with your seat-consciously or unconsciously, even in highly developed countries. For example, at this point, countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, Spain or Portugal are mentioned. The below listed criminals were able to act unpunished today. As a symptom of such action appears here the activity and “effectiveness” of the company GOMOPA, which is on countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the United States, Britain, Spain and India. A good example of such an action is Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat – the leader and “brain” of the company GOMOPA with many already in force and criminal judgments “on his account”, which in this way for years and funded its maintenance in the industry almost unlimited activity. This status will change dramatically, however, including far and wide thanks to discontinued operations of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. who would oppose such offenses addressed in the network. Other companies and corporations, in which the crime network and outside of this medium have fallen victim to contribute to combating such crimes bei.Die situation is changing, thanks to effective steps and the successful cooperation of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. with the international police Interpol, with the federal agency (FBI) in the U.S., the Federal Criminal Police in Germany, with Scotland Yard in Britain, as well as with the Russian secret service FSB.Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. – Together with other companies and cooperations, the victim of criminal activities of the network of crime have fallen – has undeniably already started to yield results. The fact that in recent weeks (November 2008) on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of the above-mentioned leaders and “brain” of the company GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Maurishat was arrested should not be ignored. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. information available results clearly show that the next arrests of persons participating in this process in such countries as: Austria, Switzerland, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Spain, Mexico, Portugal, Brazil, the USA, Canada, UK, Ireland , Australia, New Zealand and made in a.. The ultimate goal of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. and the other victims of crime in the network is to provide all participants in this criminal procedure before the competent court to lead. All professional and judicial persons, regardless of the seat and out of the business, which the above-described criminal action (fraud, extortion) to have fallen victim can of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. led company to join the goal set at all at this point the procedure described those associated in the public and the economic life out. II blacklist blackmail and with international fraudsters and their methods (opus operandi) in the following countries: 1 The Federal Republic Deutschland2. Dubai 3rd Russia 1st The Federal Republic of Germany GmbH GOMOPA, Goldman Morgenstern & Partners LLC., Goldman Morgenstern & Partners Consulting LLC, Wottle collection. In these firms are quite active following persons: – Klaus Mauri Chat ( “Father” and “brain” of the criminal organization responsible for countless final judgments have been achieved (arrested in Germany in November 2008) – Josef Rudolf Heckel ( “right hand “when Mr Klaus Mauri chat, denounced former banker who is excessive in many Bankschmuggeleien was involved.
(Today, persona non grata in the German banking industry); – Peter Reski (responsible for Finance, known for fraud, tax fraud and embezzlement, which is already behind the judgments are final) – Mark Vornkahl (responsible for organizational and administrative tasks in GOMOPA, a former police officer dismissed because of numerous expectations in the service, already has a few final judgments “on his account”); – Claus i Ulrike Wottle (married couple, for the so-called “unconventional” enforcement of the debt for the benefit GOMOPA. This execution was imposing, with extortion violence based on both real and fictitious debts references? How does the system of GOMOPADie above-mentioned persons in Brief, as well as with the service GOMOPA cooperating, so-called “experts GOMOPA” Bloggers and all other professional and legal persons choose from all possible sources of information about large, rich companies and corporations coming in various domestic and international sectors of the economy. GOMOPA The service is particularly keen that those aussucht, the “in itself visible.” Those companies corporations and, therefore, against the relatively easy and without much effort himself, inconsistencies, etc. can be done in terms of the even crimes such as cheating and Erschwindeln Others can easily perform. It is well known that every company especially good at their presence and her name is inviolable. Each company will do everything according to their good presence also retain its credibility to be. But if the victim of GOMOPA and his “partner” and a large range of businesses, so it is possible to call such companies a quick, easy, and even considerably enriched. It appears at this point the question: Which clever criminals in the network and outside the network to me is success, it does not wish to benefit? The criminals in the network know that without business credibility there is no confidence that any business is essential. GOMOPA and all are cooperating with the security of all possible methods and measures mastered how to credibility and confidence of a company, a company, corporation (crime victims) in question. This moves just the attention of the user, so that the homepage of the GOMOPA http://www.gomopa.net in search engines like Google, Yahoo is easy to find. This, in turn, means nothing other than additional profits for the service GOMOPA because of its activity around a media discourse created wird.Ein at first glance commonplace and easy victims of extortion, for example, can a public governmental body, which, based on the credibility of public works, such as a bank or a foreign bank financial institution. So it was with the foreign banks, international financial institution Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. the case. A simple and easy victims of illicit profits and material may include insurance companies, where – as it is from our search results, much to the criminal activities of the GOMOPA especially in the area of the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and Austria was due. Among the known and identifiable victims is certainly German, Austrian and Swiss banks, insurance companies such as Allianz of Germany, German and Austrian companies such as HDI and DKV visible. This is what the service GOMOPA trust and what with the cooperating services, blogs nowadays practice is the so-called cyber-stalking, which rapidly spread in the network. The method is criminal at this point and others in the threat that the business of an enterprise (Ofer blackmail, threats and forcible ) fictitious, even non-existent information (lies, rumors, stories, statements, insults) on the net first then in other mass media. This is only used to a potential victim to move a considerable sum of money for the so-called “peace “the blackmailer available. The” quiet “here means the promise of access lock with respect to the fictitious publication of any information on the net and in all other mass media, the victims of extortion in extremely negative light showing. Such threats are, as already above the goal of companies – potential victims of cyber-stalking to do likewise, that they themselves “buy.” In short, GOMOPA and his peers, and cooperating with those services, and blogs, create a “virtual reality”, or otherwise said publishing fictitious information on potential victims of a crime. firms and corporations, against which threats and extortion by GOMOPA are not due, ie those who for so-called “peace” does not want to pay, to be victims of serious lies, insults, and Insinuationen other criminal misappropriations, the appearance and presence of a firm with certainty. One is a target of GOMOPA, namely as fast and as easy as it goes, money abzukassieren, and if a company refuses, and the “peace” do not buy wishes, it is unexpectedly and quickly become an object of extortion and defamation on the net. At this point the following question arises: How is it possible that the leader of the firm GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Mauri chat, only in the Federal Republic of Germany on his account “23 court rulings, has for many years as an honest citizen to create, while other persons, firms, corporations criminal acts, offenses memorize, in addition to substantial sums of money could earn? This complex process can only be explained as follows: GOMOPA creates his appearance, his presence in the eyes of public opinion as an honest subject, against which pathological phenomena in the public and economic life einschreitet. GOMOPA and his partner (services, blogs) present themselves as followers of any Verbrechensart that promise so the fight against criminals in each virtual network ( especially against any cheaters, blackmailers). GOMOPA used in this respect a kind of “Merketingsvorhang” as a method of seduction, a result which is his true “face” and his true intentions than that of a fraudster and blackmail on money can hide. The true intentions of the GOMOPA, of working together GOMOPA Services and blogs were until today no doubt with success before the public opinion will remain hidden, especially thanks to the so-called “smoke curtain”, which reflects the fact that man himself as a “winner” of any abuse and any pathological appearance of the public and economic life in Aland German, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, Russia, Spain created. Next appears the GOMOPA forward by the person on which companies and corporations – the future victims of the crime that is – against the possibility of the release of extremely poor and the company concerned in a negative light visual information on the Internet and other mass media warns. The person from whom the speech is also informed that they are successful against such a procedure for a “fee” can be used. The GOMOPA is at this point up to the extortion of money for so-called “peace” to the company and corporation (the victim of a crime) around. Most of the companies concerned to such threats did not respond, because it’s everyday life and their agenda. It finally barely missing on the web of blackmail and outside of the medium. Normally so seldom so-called “understanding”, while on the one hand, the crime victim, on the other hand, the GOMOPA occurs. It is understandable that the price for such an “understanding” means the provision of the requested funds would GOMOPA. The financial blackmail in this stage is rarely enforced. The situation changes little, however, if the firms and corporations (crime victims) find that the threat was fulfilled. In Brief will appear on the homepage http://www.gomopa.net numerous newspaper articles, reports and bogus pseudo market analysis, both by GOMOPA as well as so-called “independent experts” and the company will be represented, with formal or fictitious GOMOPA together. Information published here, correspond to the contents of a threat and make the operations of firms and corporations in an extremely negative light dar. There is no doubt that such actions and methods only to harm the good name and good presence of these firms and corporations prerogatives. The activity of GOMOPA is certainly not exhausted. GOMOPA disseminated (published accommodates) the above information in the network by the credible, and popular opinion-operated services. Moreover, GOMOPA threatens the companies and corporations (its victims), that “from the finger-drawn” information not only on the network, but also on television and on radio and in the press landscape erscheinen.Wie the experience and expertise of the former Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. show that the services are usually not aware that they are for the purpose of a criminal action by the GOMOPA used. They agree with the corresponding fictitious publications, reports and analysis on what specifically GOMOPA through and through “independent” experts are prepared. It also states that the services, and blogs such cooperation with the GOMOPA approval, although they know that the information transmitted by GOMOPA are fictitious and the credibility of companies and corporations affect. They take so aware of the criminal procedure part. The explanation of this situation is quite simple. GOMOPA pays namely the services, and blogs related remuneration that the publication of false information on the companies and corporations (crime victims) agree. Some services, and blogs seem to know nothing about it to have that on their pages available information “fictitious” and “pulled out of the fingers are. Are you looking for in this way their conduct to justify, because they want the legal consequences of participating in the abuse of the good name and appearance of a company or corporation to escape. The activity system of GOMOPA of collaborating services and blogs was also the example of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. tested. Beginning in October 2008 was one of the workers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. a message from an anonymous sender, in the near future – first on the Internet, then on television, radio and in the German press – information published by the functioning and activities of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in an extremely negative light show. The employee of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. was then informed that these reports / news undoubtedly significantly the appearance and the reputation of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. affect. The place mentioned in this “conversation partner” has the workers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. informed that the possibility of the embarrassing situation to be avoided by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. to the person shown by the account the sum of 100,000.00 EUR transfers. As later revealed, however, was Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat – this anonymous interlocutor – “brain” and “Leader of the GOMOPA”. The investigations have been employed by the Federal Judicial Police (tracking and identifying the body at the federal level) during the investigation for the payment of blackmail, fraud and threats because of what Mr Mauri chatting and his staff were practiced, and for participation by other (head of Internet services and moderators of blogs) on this process. These crimes have been committed to loss of many professional and judicial persons, including the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. The victims of this crime in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, the USA and Canada visible. At this moment appeared the following question: What was the reaction of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. to the demands from GOMOPA? Corresponded to the response to the expectations of GOMOPA? Has the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. the required sum of EUR 100,000.00 paid? Side of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. There was absolutely no reaction to the extortion attempt by GOMOPA. At the end of August 2008 on the Service http://www.gompa.net numerous articles / reports published by the activities of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in a very negative light have represented. Once the information contained on http://www.gomopa.net detail and were fully analyzed, it is that they are not even the truth at one point and potential and existing customers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in relation to the financial institution from this discontinued business activities is misleading. Following the criminal Handlugen of GOMOPA and its cooperating services, and blogs on the network, the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. measurable and significant business losses. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. has primarily an important group of potential customers lost. But what it showed as important, the existing customers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. little away. Those customers have used our services and continue to use the still. In view of the existing collaboration with the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.., Which will in turn be no objections. GOMOPA has such a course of events accurately predicted, which aims significant and measurable business by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. losses were suffered. The course of events, the service GOMOPA certainly pleased. GOMOPA has to expect that the position of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. declines and the financial institution, the required sum (100.000,00 EUR) provides. Over time, as the whole procedure in the network was becoming more popular, tried GOMOPA still four times to the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Contacts, each time by adjusting these criminal “Kompanie” has promised, although it every time his financial demands heraufsetzte. The last of the set of “company” against Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. ratio was even planned EUR 5,000,000.00 (in words: EURO fünfmilionen). The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. could but before the ever-increasing demands from the Service GOMOPA claim. In October 2008 met the management of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Decision on the notification of the INTERPOL International Police and the appropriate law enforcement institutions of the FRG (the police and the prosecutor) about the existing situation. In the meantime, reported at the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. numerous companies and corporations, and even professional person such as doctors, judges, priests, actors and other people from different countries of the world, the extortion of GOMOPA relented and the required amounts of money it had. These people already gave statements that they have done so, so they finally just “be in peace” and unnecessary problems, difficulties, and a reasonable conclusion hardly avoid them. The victims of this criminal action, the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. using different amounts of money which were requested, informed. In one case, there were relatively small (a few thousand EURO), in another case it has to deliver significant amounts (around few million EURO). Additionally turned to Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Companies which have not yet GOMOPA the “fee” on out and have already considered whether they should do or not. These firms anticipated by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. a clear opinion as well as a practical professional advice on how to be in such a situation should behave and how they can avoid debt. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. has invariably victims of all crimes, which are at our company have made a cooperation proposed. The top task is to this cooperation, jointly determined and effective measures against GOMOPA against other services in the network, and against all Bloggers to meet in the here described with international criminal procedure GOMOPA leaders to participate. All these companies were known as the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. proposed “crusade” against GOMOPA, his partner. At our request to notify all participating companies the INTERPOL International Police and their pursuit of domestic institutions, including the competent public prosecutor and the police authorities about the existing situation. In view of the fact that the criminal act of GOMOPA be extended over many states and that the number of the Federal Republic of Germany because the ads reimbursed by GOMOPA, Internet Services and Bloggers crimes, grew up fast – which no doubt influenced by a far-reaching impact of criminal of GOMOPA testifies – International Business, the Police INTERPOL Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. before that its representatives in Berlin with representatives from GOMOPA true to the “payment arrangements and transfer the sum of EUR 5,000,000.00 to discuss. This step meant a well thought-out and by the Federal Criminal Police organized the event to carry out aimed at the arrest of international criminals GOMOPA acting was. The coordinated steps and measures of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Damaged and others, led by the International Economic Police INTERPOL, the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Prosecutor of the Federal Republic of Germany for education, training and implementation of the above-described case contributed. In November 2008, the event in Berlin prepared for the apprehension and arrest of the representative of the GOMOPA, after the arrest of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat – as the main leaders and leaders of international criminal group GOMOPA recalled. The arrest and notified the Federal Criminal Police showed both the current whereabouts of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat. “Brain” and the founder of this international criminal group GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Mauri chat on the same day was also arrested and imprisoned on time, will soon put in charge state, the responsibility for their own crimes and those of the forum, before a competent GOMOPA Federal wear. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. undertook all possible steps to ensure that Mr. Klaus Mauri chatting on the dock of the competent court of the United Kingdom of Great Britain appears. Among the damaged work and justice people from United Kingdom, along with the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. There are many victims of GOMOPA: The beginning of the arrests with such a scale means for the German judiciary and a major breakthrough point. It is worth noting that the prosecution bodies of the Federal Republic, up to this stage of the long-standing criminal activity of Mr. Klaus Mauri chatting and his staff were powerless. Prolonged impunity of the criminal actions of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat, for years the “first violin” in GOMOPA played, is to end gegangen.An this point another question arises: how is it so go on? The arrest of Mr. Klaus chat Mauri is a critical moment, in other words a “turn around 180 degrees” for him personally. But it also means the beginning of the end “for its employees, for Internet Services, Bloggers, with GOMOPA so happy and had worked together without contradiction. There is no doubt that the cause of Mr Klaus Mauri chat at the top of the “iceberg” is. The above-mentioned turning point on this issue will be further arrests and detentions of members GOMOPA bring with them, and all persons from all areas involved in this transnational criminal actions have taken part. For information (reports by the end of December 2008), which of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. available, the result that the next arrests currently prepared to be associated with the Services GOMOPA cooperating persons. This is to people outside Germany – from where Mr Klaus Mauri chat coming – refer. The details may be at this point in terms of legal and course of the prosecution bodies of the BRG and the Interpol-led investigation can not be betrayed. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. currently can only illustrate information from the investigation led the public to the criminal liability not to have this moment wird.In so intense preparations for the arrest of a number of persons outside the Federal Republic of Germany. This applies particularly to countries such as the following: – Russia-Ukraine – Poland – Spain – Mexico – Portugal – Brazil – the United States of America – Canada – UK – Ireland – Australia – New Zealand – India. All professional and judicial persons, regardless of the country in which they accompany the Office, or its citizens, and until now, consciously or unconsciously with the Forum GOMOPA together, or continue to work together to arouse the suspicion of the INTERPOL International Police. This works with the police criminal investigation department in each country, to the above persons first identify and then to legally pursue them. Information about this topic, as well as on the beginning and end of the activity of the GOMOPA can be at the following addresses on the Web at: http://gomopaabzocker.wordpress.com/ – http://www.nepper-schlepper-bauernfaenger.com – http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNpzAu-QMuE – http://www.korte.de/alexander/2006/01/gomopa-finanforum-kritik.html- http://evelux.de/gomopa-sam-240/- http://blog.deobald.org/archive/2007/07/01/betrugsvorwurf-gomopa-spam/ 2. Dubai KLP Group Emirates – United Arab Emirates. As head of the company is Mr Martin Kraeter, not only as the “brain” of the whole company, but also as a longstanding friend of Mr Klaus Mauri Chat (GOMOPA-wire) acts. This company wants to hide and not even officially exist, that they as a strategic partner of the GOMOPA in the area of the Middle East, according to the territory of the Persian coast operates. Official activities of the company KLP Group Emirates includes among others the following areas: financial advisory services from the offshore area (Management Services – Facilitators – OffshoreConsultants, International Tax & Legal Consultants – Fiduciaries). In the sphere of activities of the Company will include the creation of companies and enterprises in the so-called “tax havens” to the tax liability to the company activity entfliehen.Inoffizielle KLP Group Emirates includes cooperation with the Service GOMOPA in the field of “Gelwäsche”. The monies are a result of criminal activity by GOMOPA generated by advanced professional and judicial persons soon throughout the world and legalized. The illegality based on the activity of the company KLP Group Emirates, as well as the cooperation with the Services GOMOPA attracted attention even when the prosecution organs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, especially in Scotland Yard, which on this issue an intensive investigation has begun, which is in the ” development phase is located. It must be noted that all professional and judicial persons, but especially the clients of the company KLP Group Emirates, with the company KLP Group Emirates have cooperated in the past and still do, under the “Lupp” of Scotland Yard to be .3. Russlanda) The Company E-XECUTIVE by the Lord led Novosartow Vilen. On the homepage of the Company contained information comes directly from the company GOMOPA. The company e XECUTIVE leads the close cooperation not only with GOMOPA, but also with another on the Russian territory under the name of OOO UK broker functioning company. The company e XECUTIVE in connection with the company OOO UK broker is a member of a criminal group led by GOMOPA. The company e XECUTIVE GOMOPA representing interests in Russia and Central-Eastern Europe. Unofficially, the company employs E XECUTIVE-especially with the search for potential “victims” of the Erschwindelns, blackmail and forcing the funds for GOMOPA companies and corporations from the territory of Russia, Ukraine, and from all countries in Central Eastern Europe. Officially, the company e XECUTIVE one to the forum GOMOPA similar industrial activity. b) OOO “UK broker.” Head of the firm is Mr. Pavel Kokarev. This company is not concealed, that they are consistent with the Forum GOMOPA cooperates. The company OOO UK broker represents GOMOPA in Central Eastern Europe, including Russia. You shall be officially transferred to this area the GOMOPA similar activity, but unofficially it is to search for potential “victims” of racketeering, fraud and Erschwindelns for GOMOPA employed. The company has remained until now spared from any punishment, it could with “eternal impunity” because of a poorly developed, corrupt legal system in Russia expected. The situation may change after Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat arrested in Berlin and was arrested. This constant offenders, the “on his account” a set of legally enforceable judgments has, until now his freedom has unlimited recover, the do not know quite what it means to be arrested, begins gradually, according to our available information to finally “to bear witness.” This is understandable when one considers the threat of a penalty he considered. This delinquent shows growing interest in cooperation with the German tracking and identifying bodies. So there is a chance that other people he unveiled to the public by providing for reduction of prison sentence counts. It is also the only question of time INTERPOL, in cooperation with the Russian Service (FSB) of the Company OOO UK broker “at the door knocking”, which by Mr. Pavle Kokarev and represented. The company OOO UK broker has a virtual office in REGUS building in Moscow, is not even a person, forming a typical one-person company, which all business “crimes” may be the name of it, with no civil liability to pay. The Lord Pavel Kokarev seems to have forgotten or do not have sufficient knowledge about its possible responsibility fier to participate in the international crimes under the direction of Gomopa.
“The Other GoMoPa” – The Original Meridian Capital Press Release
Dear Readers,
here is on your request the Original Meridian Capital Document:
http://othergomopa.blogspot.com/
Other Gomopa
Saturday, July 11, 2009
KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN DETENTION
KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN HAFT — DownloadGerman VersionHere is a Google Translation (German -> English)Sunday 18 Januar 2009 January 2009
TOP-SECRET: Soviets Planned Nuclear First Strike to Preempt West, Documents Show
Soviets Planned Nuclear First Strike to
Preempt West, Documents Show
Warsaw Pact Allies Resented Soviet Dominance and “Nuclear Romanticism”
Bloc Saw Military Balance in West’s Favor from 1970s On, Especially in Technology
New Volume of Formerly Secret Records Published on 50th Anniversary of Warsaw Pact
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 154
For more information contact
Vojtech Mastny 202/415-6707
Malcolm Byrne – 202/994-7043
May 13, 2005
Read “The Warsaw Pact, gone with a whimper”
by Malcolm Byrne and Vojtech Mastny
The International Herald Tribune
May 14, 2005
“The Warsaw Pact, gone with a whimper”
by Malcolm Byrne and Vojtech Mastny, International Herald Tribune, May 14, 2005
Advance praise for new volume:
A “remarkable book … not just a story for experts or historians – it is a chronology of significance and an era we must never forget.”
The Rt. Hon. Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, NATO Secretary General ’99-’03
“A remarkable achievement … [T]his pioneer effort will be an indispensable resource for Cold War scholars.”
Lawrence S. Kaplan, Georgetown U., author of NATO Divided, NATO United
“[T]his invaluable volume illuminates not only the ‘inside history’ of the Warsaw Pact, but, as reflected in that story, the history of Soviet-East European relations.”
William Taubman, Amherst College, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of Khrushchev: The Man and His Era
“[Mastny] and Byrne are to be congratulated for producing this monumental volume, with a trove of translated documents that is a major boon to both scholars and teachers.”
William E. Odom (Lt. Gen., Ret.), former Director, U.S. National Security Agency, author of The Collapse of the Soviet Military
Washington D.C. August 13 th, 2011 – The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact had a long-standing strategy to attack Western Europe that included being the first to use nuclear weapons, according to a new book of previously Secret Warsaw Pact documents published tomorrow. Although the aim was apparently to preempt NATO “aggression,” the Soviets clearly expected that nuclear war was likely and planned specifically to fight and win such a conflict.
The documents show that Moscow’s allies went along with these plans but the alliance was weakened by resentment over Soviet domination and the belief that nuclear planning was sometimes highly unrealistic. Just the opposite of Western views at the time, Pact members saw themselves increasingly at a disadvantage compared to the West in the military balance, especially with NATO’s ability to incorporate high-technology weaponry and organize more effectively, beginning in the late 1970s.
These and other findings appear in a new volume published tomorrow on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Warsaw Pact. Consisting of 193 documents originating from all eight original member-states, the volume, A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, provides significant new evidence of the intentions and capabilities of one of the most feared military machines in history.
Highlights of the 726-page volume include highly confidential internal reports, military assessments, minutes of Warsaw Pact leadership meetings, and Politburo discussions on topics such as:
* The shift beginning in the 1960s from defensive operations to plans to launch attacks deep into Western Europe. (Documents Nos. 16, 20a-b, 21)
* Plans to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, ostensibly to preempt Western first-use. (Documents Nos. 81, 83)
* Soviet expectations that conventional conflicts would go nuclear, and plans to fight and win such conflicts. (Documents Nos. 81, 83)
* The deep resentment of alliance members, behind the façade of solidarity, of Soviet dominance and the unequal share of the military burden that was imposed on them. (Documents Nos. 4-6, 33-37, 47, 52)
* East European views on the futility of plans for nuclear war and the realization that their countries, far more than the Soviet Union, would suffer the most devastating consequences of such a conflict. (Documents Nos. 22b, 38, 50, 52)
* The “nuclear romanticism,” primarily of Soviet planners, concerning the viability of unconventional warfare, including a memorable retort by the Polish leader that “no one should have the idea that in a nuclear war one could enjoy a cup of coffee in Paris in five or six days.” (Documents Nos. 31, 115)
* Ideologically warped notions of Warsaw Pact planners about the West’s presumed propensity to initiate hostilities and the prospects for defeating it. (Documents Nos. 50, 73, 79, 81)
* The impact of Chernobyl as a reality check for Soviet officials on the effects of nuclear weapons. (Document No. 115)
* The pervasiveness and efficacy of East bloc spying on NATO, mainly by East Germans (Documents Nos. 11, 28, 80, 97, 109, 112)
* Warsaw Pact shortcomings in resisting hostile military action, including difficulties in firing nuclear weapons. (Documents Nos. 44, 143)
* Data on the often disputed East-West military balance, seen from the Soviet bloc side as much more favorable to the West than the West itself saw it, with the technological edge increasingly in Western favor since the time of the Carter administration (Documents Nos. 47, 79, 81, 82, 130, 131, 135, 136)
The motives accounting for the Warsaw Pact’s offensive military culture included not only the obsessive Soviet memory of having been taken by surprise by the nearly fatal Nazi attack in June 1941 but primarily the ideological militancy of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that posited irreconcilable hostility of the capitalist adversaries. The influence of the doctrine explains, for example, the distorted interpretation of secret Western planning documents that were unequivocally defensive documents to which Warsaw Pact spies had extensive access. So integral was the offensive strategy to the Soviet system that its replacement by a defensive strategy under Gorbachev proved impossible to implement before the system itself disintegrated.
The Soviet military, as the ideologically most devoted and disciplined part of the Soviet establishment, were given extensive leeway by the political leadership in designing the Warsaw Pact’s plans for war and preparing for their implementation. Although the leadership reserved the authority to decide under what circumstances they would be implemented and never actually tried to act on them, the chances of a crisis spiraling out of control may have been greater than imagined at the time. The plans had dynamics of their own and the grip of the aging leadership continued to diminish with the passage of time.
The new collection of documents published today is the first of its kind in examining the Warsaw Pact from the inside, with the benefit of materials once thought to be sealed from public scrutiny in perpetuity. It was prepared by the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), an international scholarly network formed to explore and disseminate documentation on the military and security aspects of contemporary history. The book appears as part of the “National Security Archive Cold War Reader Series” through Central European University Press.
The PHP’s founders and partners are the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research organization based at The George Washington University; the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich; the Institute for Strategy and Security Policy at the Austrian Defense Academy in Vienna; the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies in Florence; and the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo.
In addition to documents, the volume features a major original essay by Vojtech Mastny, a leading historian of the Warsaw Pact, and contextual headnotes for each document by co-editor Malcolm Byrne. A detailed chronology, glossaries and bibliography are also included.
The documents in the collection were obtained by numerous scholars and archivists, many of them associated with PHP and its partners, including the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C.
The vast majority of the documents were translated especially for this volume and have never previously appeared in English.
Attached to this notice are ten representative documents taken from the list above. They appear as they do in the volume, i.e. with explanatory headnotes at the top of each item.
The documents in their original languages can be found in their entirety on the Center for Security Studies website.
On Saturday, May 14, a book launch for A Cardboard Castle? will take place in Warsaw at the Military Office of Historical Research. The address is: 2, ul. Stefana Banacha, Room 218. It will begin at 11:30 a.m. Speakers include:
* Gen. William E. Odom, former Director, U.S. National Security Agency
* Gen. Tadeusz Pioro, senior Polish representative to the Warsaw Pact
* Brig. Gen. Leslaw Dudek, Polish representative to the alliance
* Prof. dr. hab. Andrzej Paczkowski, Polish Academy of Sciences
* Dr hab. Krzysztof Komorowski, Military Office of Historical Research
* Prof. dr hab. Wojciech Materski, Polish Academy of Sciences
Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Below are ten representative documents from A Cardboard Castle?. They are numbered as they are in the volume and include explanatory headnotes at the top of each item. Links to the original documents — in their orginal languages — appear at the end of each entry.
Document No. 16: Speech by Marshal Malinovskii Describing the Need for Warsaw Pact Offensive Operations, May 1961 – original language
Document No. 21: Organizational Principles of the Czechoslovak Army, November 22, 1962 – original language
Document No. 50: Memorandum of the Academic Staff of the Czechoslovak Military Academies on Czechoslovakia’s Defense Doctrine, June 4, 1968 – original language
Document No. 64: Report by Ceaus,escu to the Romanian Politburo on the PCC Meeting in Budapest, March 18, 1969 – original language
Document No. 81: Marshal Ogarkov Analysis of the ?Zapad? Exercise, May 30-June 9, 1977 – original language
Document No. 83: Soviet Statement at the Chiefs of General Staff Meeting in Sofia,
June 12-14, 1978 – original language
Document No. 109: East German Intelligence Assessment of NATO?s Intelligence on the Warsaw Pact, December 16, 1985 – original language
Document No. 115: Minutes of the Political Consultative Committee Party Secretaries? Meeting in Budapest, June 11, 1986 – original language (part 1 – part 2 – part 3)
Document No. 136: Summary of Discussion among Defense Ministers at the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Warsaw, July 15, 1988 – original language (part 1 – part 2)
Document No. 143: Czechoslovak Description of ?Vltava-89? Exercise, May 23, 1989 – original language


TOP-SECRET: The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev Former Top Soviet Adviser’s Journal Chronicles Final Years of the Cold War
Washington, DC, August 13th, 2011 – Today the National Security Archive is publishing the first installment of the diary of one of the key behind-the-scenes figures of the Gorbachev era – Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev. This document is being published in English here for the first time.
It is hard to overestimate the uniqueness and importance of this diary for our understanding of the end of the Cold War – and specifically for the peaceful withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The document allows the reader a rare opportunity to become a fly on the wall during the heady discussions of early perestroika, and to witness such fascinating phenomena as how the dying ideology of Soviet-style communism held sway over the hearts and minds of Soviet society.
In 2004, Anatoly Chernyaev donated the originals of his diaries from 1972 to 1991 to the National Security Archive in order to ensure full and permanent public access to his notes – beyond the reach of the political uncertainties of contemporary Russia. The Archive is planning to publish the complete English translation of the diaries in regular installments.
This first installment covers the year 1985, which saw the election of Mikhail Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the beginning of the changes that were evident first in the “style,” and then in the practice of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. The diary gives a detailed account of Gorbachev’s election and of the political struggle associated with it. The author is observing the changes in 1985 from his position as a senior analyst in the International Department of the Central Committee (CC), where Chernyaev was in charge of relations with West European Communist parties.
The author documents all the major developments of 1985 – beginning from the first revelations about the sad state of the Soviet economy and the extent of such societal problems as alcoholism, to anguished discussions about the war in Afghanistan, to the first summit with President Ronald Reagan in Geneva. Throughout the year, the most noticeable change is the process of radical “cleansing” of the party – the great turnover of personnel designed to replace the old dogmatic Brezhnevite elite. The diary sheds light on how, gradually but persistently, Gorbachev built his reform coalition, making such fateful decisions as appointing Eduard Shevardnadze to the post of Foreign Minister, and bringing Boris Yeltsin to Moscow.
The pages of the diary provide a gallery of living portraits of all the influential figures in the highest echelons of the Soviet elite who in 1985 were engaged in a struggle for political survival under the new leadership. Chernyaev observes his colleagues in the Central Committee trying to reconcile their ingrained ideology with the new “Gorbachev style,” or “Gorbachev thinking.” He himself, as is clear from his notes, remained committed to the Leninist romanticism of communist ideology and argued for going back to Lenin in an effort to purify and reform the Soviet society.
One line of Chernyaev’s narrative follows developments in the influential International Department of the CC CPSU as its staff tried to find answers about the future of the international communist movement as the Soviet Union itself began to change. Gorbachev at that time chose to renounce Moscow’s Big Brother role with regard to socialist countries and non-ruling Communist parties, both in terms of dictating to them but also bankrolling them. Chernyaev presents us with an intimate portrait of one of the most influential figures in the Soviet leadership – the head of the International Department, Boris N. Ponomarev.
The diary gives a detailed account about one of the most important (and long poorly-understood) dynamics of foreign policy making in the Soviet Union – the interaction between the Central Committee and the Foreign Ministry in every step of the preparation of major events and decisions. From its pages, one can see the tremendous role of experts and consultants – the free-thinking intellectuals of the Soviet elite – in forming policy priorities for the leadership. The International Department was a major oasis of enlightened thinking in the Soviet nomenklatura; it provided Gorbachev with people on whom he could rely for new ideas and honest estimates of the situation after coming to power – beginning with Anatoly Chernyaev, whom Gorbachev chose as his foreign policy adviser in March 1986. One can confidently say that every bold foreign policy initiative advanced by Gorbachev in the years 1986-1991 bears Chernyaev’s mark on it. Thus, the diary gives insights into the thought processes of one of most influential new thinkers in Moscow.
Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev was born on May 25, 1921 in Moscow. He fought in World War II beginning in 1941. After the war, he returned to his studies at Moscow State University in the Department of History, which he completed in 1948. From 1950-1958, he taught contemporary history at Moscow State University. From 1958-1961, Chernyaev worked in Prague on the editorial board of the theoretical journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, joining the International Department in 1961. In 1986, he became foreign policy adviser to the General Secretary, and later to the first and the last President of the USSR. A prolific writer, Chernyaev has published five monographs in addition to numerous articles in Soviet, Russian, European and U.S. journals.
The National Security Archive takes great pleasure in wishing a happy birthday to Anatoly Sergeevich, who for years has been our partner in the mission to fight government secrecy through glasnost. Anatoly Sergeevich turns 85 today.
The Chernyaev Diary was translated by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.
Wer erschoss den Treuhandchef Rohwedder? 2/5
Wer erschoss den Treuhandchef Rohwedder? 3/5
Wer erschoss den Treuhandchef Rohwedder? 4/5
Wer erschoss den Treuhandchef Rohwedder? 5/5
SECRET: ATTACKING BASHAR’S MONEY
VZCZCXRO0088 PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #0054/01 0241517 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 241517Z JAN 08 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4564 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0339 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000054 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA/ELA NSC FOR SINGH TREASURY FOR GLASER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2027 TAGS: EFIN ETTC PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: ATTACKING BASHAR'S MONEY REF: A. 07 DAMASCUS 2066 ¶B. 07 DAMASCUS 1926 ¶C. 07 DAMASCUS 68 Classified By: CDA Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.5 b/d ¶1. (S) Summary. As Washington policy makers consider ways to pressure the regime, one possibility would be to go after President Asad's money-men. Four individuals Asad uses to make and move money are Zuhair Sahloul, Nabil Kuzbari, Asad's uncle Mohammad Makhlouf, and his father-in-law, Fawas Akhras. Each is important to Asad and each plays a somewhat different role in facilitating regime graft. End summary. ¶2. (S) Sahloul (AKA Abu Shafic) is the most important black-market money changer in Syria. When the Syrian Pound (SYP) devalued precipitously in the fall of 2005, the SARG gave Sahloul an office in the Central Bank and access to its hard currency reserves so he could intervene in the black market to stabilize the currency. (Note. Sahloul was surprisingly effective and within weeks the SYP appreciated 20 percent, allowing Sahloul in the process a handsome profit for both himself and a handful of regime-insiders. End note.) Sahloul moves Asad's money using his own network and his access to Hawalis worldwide. A Sahloul intimate bragged to us recently that Sahloul could move ten million dollars anywhere in the world in 24-hours. ¶3. (S) In addition to being the father of Syria's poster-boy for corruption, Rami Makhlouf, Mohammad Makhlouf has long served as a financial advisor to the Asad family. If Rami is the face of corruption, Mohammad is the brain. When Asad agreed to open the telecom sector to cellphone providers, it was Mohammad that some credit with conceptualizing the deal whereby Rami took over the first provider, SyriaTel, (long Rami's biggest cash-cow), and the second license (originally to SpaceTel, then Areeba 94, and now MTN) went to the first-lady's family (see para five below). Long held in check by his brother-in-law, the late president Hafiz Asad, under Bashar Asad, Mohammad's avarice reportedly has no bounds. As a result, the Makhloufs have had an at-times problematic relationship with Bashar and were forced to leave the country for a number of months in 2005 following one particularly heated exchange. ¶4. (S) Because of the Makhlouf's excesses and Asad's inherited propensity to limit the power and influence of his family members, Nabil Kuzbari has played an increasingly important role for the first-family. Known locally as "the Paper King," Kuzbari's base of operations has long been in Vienna. In the last two years, however, he has developed an increasingly collaborative relationship with Rami and Mohammed Makhlouf. Last year he served as Rami's frontman in establishing his holding company, Sham Holding, which brought together 70 of Syria's most-important business families to fund a number of Rami's most ambitious entrepreneurial projects. In addition to lobbying European politicians to engage the Asad regime, Kuzbari reportedly uses his contacts in the Austrian business and banking circles to move regime assets abroad. ¶5. (S) In addition to being Asad's father-in-law, Fawas Akhras has been increasingly active in business here in Syria. Akhras is the force behind the Syrian-British Business Council and recently put together a visit to London by a large group of Syrian businessmen. Coming only lately to business, Akhras has stepped on a number of established business families who increasingly resent his assertiveness and willingness to use his son-in-law's position to advance his nascent Syria-based businesses. Contacts in the banking sector have commented on the large amount of funds that have begun to move recently through his accounts. A long-time resident of London, he is suspected of being another avenue used by Asad to stash funds abroad. ¶6. (S) Comment. Post has long advocated moving against individuals, like those listed above, who are intregal to allowing the regime to profit from its corruption. Taking action against those linked to corruption is a win-win proposition: not only does it bring pressure on the regime where it hurts most - its pocketbook, but such a move would also be popular with the average Syrian who is the most common victim of the regime's avarice. CORBIN
SECRET: TREASURY TEAM’S DAMASCUS CONSULTATIONS ON
VZCZCXRO6583 PP RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #0269/01 0741541 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 151541Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3157 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000269 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA/ELA;TREASURY FOR LEBENSON/GLASER/SZUBIN; NSC FOR MARCHESE EO 12958 DECL: 03/06/2017 TAGS EFIN, ECON, ETTC, SY, SANC SUBJECT: TREASURY TEAM’S DAMASCUS CONSULTATIONS ON FINANCIAL SANCTIONS REF: A. DAMASCUS 0108 B. 05 DAMASCUS 6224 Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Michael Corbin, reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Treasury representatives recently visited Post to discuss options for using financial sanctions to apply pressure to the Syrian regime. We discussed: -- Treasury’s requirements for finalizing the pending designations of Mohammad Sulayman and Ali Mamluk, and Treasury’s information requirements for a public statement; -- Treasury’s need to maintain the legal thread between the classified designation packet and the public statement announcing the designation; -- Post’s support for designating Mohammad Nassif Kheirbek, SARG pointman for its relationship with Iran; -- How designating regime financiers like Rami and Mohammad Mahlouf could be problematic without a new Executive Order on corruption. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) PENDING DESIGNATIONS: Post understands the designations for Mohammad Sulieman, Syrian Special Presidential Advisor for Arms Procurement and Strategic Weapons and Ali Mamluk, Chief of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, are pending due to a lack of unclassified material necessary for Treasury’s public SIPDIS designation statement. In post’s estimate, Mohammad Sulayman is a relatively low-payoff target. His activities are not widely known, which will make it difficult to obtain unclassified information for a public statement and, SIPDIS likewise, make it unlikely that his designation would resonate inside Syria. Ali Mamluk, on the other hand, is more well-known within Syria, especially for involvement in his objectionable activities regarding Lebanon, and his suppressing Syrian civil society and the internal opposition. Therefore, Mamluk’s designation will likely have a larger impact with local and regional audiences if the public statement announcing his designation also discusses his oppression of Syrian society. ¶3. (S/NF) We understood from our visit with Treasury representatives that although we are limited to designating regime members under the existing Executive Orders, there is some flexibility in Treasury,s public statement announcing the designation. Post has advocated that no matter the legal basis of the designation, any public designation should focus on themes that resonate inside Syria: corruption, suppression of civil society, and denial of basic human rights (ref A). The need to maintain the “legal thread” between the designation packet and the public announcement could be challenging on cases like Mohamad Sulieman whose links to corruption are less clear. In cases like Ali Mamluk, however, the role of the organization he heads in suppressing internal dissent is publicly known in Syria and stating as much in our statement would resonate well here. ¶4. (S/NF) Post also supports moving forward with the designation packet on Mohammad Nasif Kheirbek, Syrian Deputy Vice-President for Security and lead Syrian liaison to Iran. Keirbek’s designation could play to a SARG vulnerability, in this case, the SARG’s relationship with Iran, which worries the Sunni majority. Designation of regime pillars involved with the SARG’s partnership with Iran could heighten Syrian and regional concerns about the SARG’s willingness to accomodate an expansionary Iranian agenda. ¶5. (S/NF) REGIEME FINANCIERS: We also discussed the possibility of targeting high-profile inner circle members and regime financiers like Rami Mahklouf (Asad’s first cousin) and Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami’s father) in the next phase of targeted financial sanctions. Based on our consultation with the Treasury representatives, it seemed apparent that without an Executive Order on corruption it would be difficult to compile enough information to designate this group under the current executive orders. The other option for pursuing this group would be to show how these individuals provided financial support to previously designated individuals such as Asif Shawkat. This course of action could prove highly problematic given the regime’s proficiency at obfuscating its financial transactions (ref B). DAMASCUS 00000269 002 OF 002 ¶6. (S) Comment. Post thanks Treasury for its team’s February 25-27 visit and welcomes any additional feedback that Washington agencies may have on our recommendations covered in ref A. Post continues to believe targeted financial sanctions are a tool appropriate for the Syrian setting but this tool requires further work to fully develop. ROEBUCK
TOP-SECRET: FBI FILES ABOUT THE MURDER OF MARTIN LUTHER KING
Martin Luther King, Jr., a prominent American leader of the African-American civil rights movement and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, was assassinated at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis, Tennessee, on April 4, 1968, at the age of 39. On June 10, 1968, James Earl Ray, a fugitive from the Missouri State Penitentiary, was arrested in London at Heathrow Airport, extradited to the United States, and charged with the crime. On March 10, 1969, Ray entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to 99 years in the Tennessee state penitentiary.[1] Ray later made many attempts to withdraw his guilty plea and be tried by a jury, but was unsuccessful; he died in prison on April 23, 1998, at the age of 70.
Click for download the file below
Der Fall Rohwedder
IMMOVATION AG WEHRT SICH GEGEN DIE KRIMINELLEN DER STASI-“GoMoPa”
Liebe Leser,
nachfolgender Link verweist auf den Blog der Kasseler Immobilienfirma Immovation, die sich in 2010 erfolgreich gegen die STASI-Kriminellen des frei erfundenen, selbst ernannten, “Finanznachrichtendienstes “GoMoPa” durchsetzten – vor deutschen Gerichten.
Dies wird aber nach der Wirecard-Affäre, die von “GoMoPa” mitverantwortet wird und in deren Zuge über 200 Millionen Euro Anlegergelder über Nacht vernichtet wurden und die Enttarnung der “GoMoPa” als kriminelle STASI-Nachfolgeorganisation immer schwerer, da es sie “offiziell” in Deutschland nicht gibt und in der Berlin- Brandenburger Justiz und Exekutive über 20% ehemalige STASI- und DDR-Mitarbeiter sitzen.
Entscheidend ist, das das Landeskriminalamt Bayern wegen der Wirecard-Affäre weiter gegen “GoMoPa” und deren kriminelle Hintermänner ermittelt sowie weitere Dinge in Bewegung sind, über die ich hier und jetzt nichts verlauten lassen kann.
Link
Herzlichst Ihr
Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium der Publizistik, Germanistik und Komparatistik.
Dear Readers,
following link points to the blog of Kassel Immovation real estate company, who in 2010 successfully against the Secret Police of the criminals freely invented, self-proclaimed, “Finanznachrichtendienstes” GoMoPa “permeated – in German courts.
However, this is for the Wire Card affair that cas co-created by “GoMoPa” and in the course of this affair than 200 million euros of investors’ money vanished over night and the unmasking of the “GoMoPa” as a criminal STASI successor makes it now more difficult, because there they are not “officially” located in Germany and by also by the fact that the Berlin-Brandenburg judiciary and the executive has over 20% former Stasi and GDR-employees.
Therefore it is crucial that the Bavarian State Criminal Police Office continues to investigate against “GoMoPa” and their criminal backers, as well as other things are determined on the move, about which can not be announced here today
link
Sincerely,
Bernd Pulch, Master of Arts in journalism, comparative literature and Germanic.
CONFIDENTIAL: INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END
VZCZCXRO4219 OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #5399/01 3471603 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 131603Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1450 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0200 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 005399 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA/ELA NSC FOR MARCHESE TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END OF 2006 Classified By: CDA William Roebuck, for reasons 1.5 b/d ¶1. (S) Summary. The SARG ends 2006 in a much stronger position domestically and internationally than it did 2005. While there may be additional bilateral or multilateral pressure that can impact Syria, the regime is based on a small clique that is largely immune to such pressure. However, Bashar Asad's growing self-confidence )- and reliance on this small clique -- could lead him to make mistakes and ill-judged policy decisions through trademark emotional reactions to challenges, providing us with new opportunities. For example, Bashar,s reaction to the prospect of Hariri tribunal and to publicity for Khaddam and the National Salvation Front borders on the irrational. Additionally, Bashar,s reported preoccupation with his image and how he is perceived internationally is a potential liability in his decision making process. We believe Bashar,s weaknesses are in how he chooses to react to looming issues, both perceived and real, such as a the conflict between economic reform steps (however limited) and entrenched, corrupt forces, the Kurdish question, and the potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence of transiting Islamist extremists. This cable summarizes our assessment of these vulnerabilities and suggests that there may be actions, statements, and signals that the USG can send that will improve the likelihood of such opportunities arising. These proposals will need to be fleshed out and converted into real actions and we need to be ready to move quickly to take advantage of such opportunities. Many of our suggestions underline using Public Diplomacy and more indirect means to send messages that influence the inner circle. End Summary. ¶2. (S) As the end of 2006 approaches, Bashar appears in some ways stronger than he has in two years. The country is economically stable (at least for the short term), internal opposition the regime faces is weak and intimidated, and regional issues seem to be going Syria,s way, from Damascus, perspective. Nonetheless, there are some long-standing vulnerabilities and looming issues that may provide opportunities to up the pressure on Bashar and his inner circle. Regime decision-making is limited to Bashar and an inner circle that often produces poorly thought-out tactical decisions and sometimes emotional approaches, such as Bashar,s universally derided August 15 speech. Some of these vulnerabilities, such as the regime,s near-irrational views on Lebanon, can be exploited to put pressure on the regime. Actions that cause Bashar to lose balance and increase his insecurity are in our interest because his inexperience and his regime,s extremely small decision-making circle make him prone to diplomatic stumbles that can weaken him domestically and regionally. While the consequences of his mistakes are hard to predict and the benefits may vary, if we are prepared to move quickly to take advantage of the opportunities that may open up, we may directly impact regime behavior where it matters--Bashar and his inner circle. ¶3. (S) The following provides our summary of potential vulnerabilities and possible means to exploit them: -- Vulnerability: -- THE HARIRI INVESTIGATION AND THE TRIBUNAL: The Hariri investigation ) and the prospect of a Lebanon Tribunal -- has provoked powerful SARG reactions, primarily because of the embarrassment the investigation causes. Rationally, the regime should calculate that it can deal with any summons of Syrian officials by refusing to turn any suspects over, or, in extreme cases by engineering "suicides.8 But it seems the real issue for Bashar is that Syria,s dignity and its international reputation are put in question. Fiercely-held sentiments that Syria should continue to exercise dominant control in Lebanon play into these sensitivities. We should seek to exploit this raw nerve, without waiting for formation of the tribunal. -- Possible action: -- PUBLICITY: Publicly highlighting the consequences of the ongoing investigation a la Mehlis causes Bashar personal angst and may lead him to act irrationally. The regime has deep-seated fears about the international scrutiny that a tribunal -- or Brammertz accusations even against lower-echelon figures -- would prompt. The Mehlis accusations of October 2005 caused the most serious strains in Bashar's inner circle. While the family got back together, these splits may lie just below the surface. -- Vulnerability: -- THE ALLIANCE WITH TEHRAN: Bashar is walking a fine line in his increasingly strong relations with Iran, seeking necessary support while not completely alienating Syria,s moderate Sunni Arab neighbors by being perceived as aiding Persian and fundamentalist Shia interests. Bashar's decision to not attend the Talabani ) Ahmadinejad summit in Tehran following FM Moallem,s trip to Iraq can be seen as a manifestation of Bashar's sensitivity to the Arab optic on his Iranian alliance. -- Possible action: -- PLAY ON SUNNI FEARS OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE: There are fears in Syria that the Iranians are active in both Shia proselytizing and conversion of, mostly poor, Sunnis. Though often exaggerated, such fears reflect an element of the Sunni community in Syria that is increasingly upset by and focused on the spread of Iranian influence in their country through activities ranging from mosque construction to business. Both the local Egyptian and Saudi missions here, (as well as prominent Syrian Sunni religious leaders), are giving increasing attention to the matter and we should coordinate more closely with their governments on ways to better publicize and focus regional attention on the issue. -- Vulnerability: -- THE INNER CIRCLE: At the end of the day, the regime is dominated by the Asad family and to a lesser degree by Bashar Asad,s maternal family, the Makhlufs, with many family members believe to be increasingly corrupt. The family, and hangers on, as well as the larger Alawite sect, are not immune to feuds and anti-regime conspiracies, as was evident last year when intimates of various regime pillars (including the Makhloufs) approached us about post-Bashar possibilities. Corruption is a great divider and Bashar's inner circle is subject to the usual feuds and squabbles related to graft and corruption. For example, it is generally known that Maher Asad is particularly corrupt and incorrigible. He has no scruples in his feuds with family members or others. There is also tremendous fear in the Alawite community about retribution if the Sunni majority ever regains power. -- Possible Action: -- ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS: Targeted sanctions against regime members and their intimates are generally welcomed by most elements of Syrian society. But the way designations are applied must exploit fissures and render the inner circle weaker rather than drive its members closer together. The designation of Shawkat caused him some personal irritation and was the subject of considerable discussion in the business community here. While the public reaction to corruption tends to be muted, continued reminders of corruption in the inner circle have resonance. We should look for ways to remind the public of our previous designations. -- Vulnerability: -- THE KHADDAM FACTOR: Khaddam knows where the regime skeletons are hidden, which provokes enormous irritation from Bashar, vastly disproportionate to any support Khaddam has within Syria. Bashar Asad personally, and his regime in general, follow every news item involving Khaddam with tremendous emotional interest. The regime reacts with self-defeating anger whenever another Arab country hosts Khaddam or allows him to make a public statement through any of its media outlets. -- Possible Action: -- We should continue to encourage the Saudis and others to allow Khaddam access to their media outlets, providing him with venues for airing the SARG,s dirty laundry. We should anticipate an overreaction by the regime that will add to its isolation and alienation from its Arab neighbors. Vulnerability: -- DIVISIONS IN THE MILITARY-SECURITY SERVICES: Bashar constantly guards against challenges from those with ties inside the military and security services. He is also nervous about any loyalties senior officers (or former senior officers) feel toward disaffected former regime elements like Rif,at Asad and Khaddam. The inner circle focuses continuously on who gets what piece of the corruption action. Some moves by Bashar in narrowing the circle of those who benefit from high-level graft has increased those with ties to the security services who have axes to grind. -- Possible Action: -- ENCOURAGE RUMORS AND SIGNALS OF EXTERNAL PLOTTING: The regime is intensely sensitive to rumors about coup-plotting and restlessness in the security services and military. Regional allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia should be encouraged to meet with figures like Khaddam and Rif,at Asad as a way of sending such signals, with appropriate leaking of the meetings afterwards. This again touches on this insular regime,s paranoia and increases the possibility of a self-defeating over-reaction. Vulnerability: -- REFORM FORCES VERSUS BAATHISTS-OTHER CORRUPT ELITES: Bashar keeps unveiling a steady stream of initiatives on economic reform and it is certainly possible he believes this issue is his legacy to Syria. While limited and ineffectual, these steps have brought back Syrian expats to invest and have created at least the illusion of increasing openness. Finding ways to publicly call into question Bashar,s reform efforts )- pointing, for example to the use of reform to disguise cronyism -- would embarrass Bashar and undercut these efforts to shore up his legitimacy. Revealing Asad family/inner circle corruption would have a similar effect. -- Possible Action: -- HIGHLIGHTING FAILURES OF REFORM: Highlighting failures of reform, especially in the run-up to the 2007 Presidential elections, is a move that Bashar would find highly embarrassing and de-legitimizing. Comparing and contrasting puny Syrian reform efforts with the rest of the Middle East would also embarrass and irritate Bashar. -- Vulnerability: -- THE ECONOMY: Perpetually under-performing, the Syrian economy creates jobs for less than 50 percent of the country,s university graduates. Oil accounts for 70 percent of exports and 30 percent of government revenue, but production is in steady decline. By 2010 Syria is expected to become a net importer of oil. Few experts believe the SARG is capable of managing successfully the expected economic dislocations. -- DISCOURAGE FDI, ESPECIALLY FROM THE GULF: Syria has enjoyed a considerable up-tick in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the last two years that appears to be picking up steam. The most important new FDI is undoubtedly from the Gulf. -- Vulnerability: -- THE KURDS: The most organized and daring political opposition and civil society groups are among the ethnic minority Kurds, concentrated in Syria,s northeast, as well as in communities in Damascus and Aleppo. This group has been willing to protest violently in its home territory when others would dare not. There are few threats that loom larger in Bashar,s mind than unrest with the Kurds. In what is a rare occurrence, our DATT was convoked by Syrian Military Intelligence in May of 2006 to protest what the Syrians believed were US efforts to provide military training and equipment to the Kurds in Syria. -- Possible Action: -- HIGHLIGHT KURDISH COMPLAINTS: Highlighting Kurdish complaints in public statements, including publicizing human rights abuses will exacerbate regime,s concerns about the Kurdish population. Focus on economic hardship in Kurdish areas and the SARG,s long-standing refusal to offer citizenship to some 200,000 stateless Kurds. This issue would need to be handled carefully, since giving the wrong kind of prominence to Kurdish issues in Syria could be a liability for our efforts at uniting the opposition, given Syrian (mostly Arab) civil society,s skepticism of Kurdish objectives. -- Vulnerability: -- Extremist elements increasingly use Syria as a base, while the SARG has taken some actions against groups stating links to Al-Qaeda. With the killing of the al-Qaida leader on the border with Lebanon in early December and the increasing terrorist attacks inside Syria culminating in the September 12 attack against the US embassy, the SARG,s policies in Iraq and support for terrorists elsewhere as well can be seen to be coming home to roost. -- Possible Actions: -- Publicize presence of transiting (or externally focused) extremist groups in Syria, not limited to mention of Hamas and PIJ. Publicize Syrian efforts against extremist groups in a way that suggests weakness, signs of instability, and uncontrolled blowback. The SARG,s argument (usually used after terror attacks in Syria) that it too is a victim of terrorism should be used against it to give greater prominence to increasing signs of instability within Syria. ¶4. (S) CONCLUSION: This analysis leaves out the anti-regime Syrian Islamists because it is difficult to get an accurate picture of the threat within Syria that such groups pose. They are certainly a long-term threat. While it alludes to the vulnerabilities that Syria faces because of its alliance with Iran, it does not elaborate fully on this topic. The bottom line is that Bashar is entering the new year in a stronger position than he has been in several years, but those strengths also carry with them -- or sometimes mask ) vulnerabilities. If we are ready to capitalize, they will offer us opportunities to disrupt his decision-making, keep him off-balance, and make him pay a premium for his mistakes. ROEBUCK
CONFIDENTIAL: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA
VZCZCXRO2381 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHDM #0068/01 0041408 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 041408Z JAN 06 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6460 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0694 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0055 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000068 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS NEA/ELA NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2015 TAGS: EAIR ECON ETTC SY SANC SUBJECT: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA REF: A. A: DAMASCUS 5567 ¶B. REF B: DAMASCUS 6224 Classified By: CDA: Stephen Seche for Reasons 1.5 ¶1. (C) Summary. As post has reported previously, the average Syrian would welcome targeted sanctions that focus on regressive elements within the Asad regime. The best mix in our judgement would be sanctions that are phased, multi-lateral, and widely publicized. Most of our Syrian interlocutors concur that if done correctly, these sanctions would delegitimize those elements within the SARG perceived to be obstacles to change, strengthen progressive elements both within the regime and the wider society, and increase pressure on the SARG to substantively change its destabilizing behavior. End summary. ¶2. (C) Financial and travel sanctions that target individuals remain popular with the majority of our Syrian interlocutors (ref A, B). They argue that targeting individuals would make clear for the average Syrian that the international community opposes the regime and its policies, but does not wish to punish the Syrian people. At the same time, targeted sanctions would also help delegitimize those individuals who pose the greatest internal and external threat to progress. Additionally, if designated individuals could neither travel nor conduct legitimate business, they would become an increasing liability for President Bashar al-Asad,s regime. Popular resentment against the sanctioned individuals would add to the pressure to change. ¶3. (C) Syrians we speak with argue that future designations should be multi-lateral. Some tools for doing so already exist. UNSCR 1636 makes provision for designation of individuals named under the Hariri investigation. A case should be made for additional designations under existing or new UNSC resolutions. The USG designated Dhu al Himma as-Shaleesh and Asif Issa as-Shalesh, cousins of President Asad, under E.O. 13315 ) a derivative of UNSCR 1483 - for their role in procuring defense-related items for Saddam Hussein. We should lobby our allies to pursue similar designations, under the umbrella of new or existing UNSC resolutions of both the Shaleeshes and any new Syrians we designate concerning Lebanon, Iraq, WMD, and the peace process. Though it is unlikely that any significant financial resources would be frozen by these designations (ref B), the naming and shaming of the most recalcitrant elements within the regime would delegitimize them internationally, which in turn, would work to undermine the hardliners domestically. ¶4. (C) Pursuing multilateral designations would greatly multiply the effectiveness of targeted sanctions, but a carefully timed campaign to widely publicize the designations is equally important. Without media coverage and publicity to raise the profile of designations, the effort would lose its most effective element - &name and shame.8 The Shaleesh case mentioned above is a case in point. Despite the Shaleesh family having a high profile within Syria, very few Syrians at any level are aware the USG imposed financial sanctions on them. The head of one of the leading Sunni business families in Damascus approached us recently to ask why the USG did not aggressively pursue sanctioning criminal elements within the regime. When asked for examples of who should be sanctioned, our contact pointed to Dhu al Himma as-Shaleesh who, he asserted, took much of the 580 million USD in Iraqi funds the Commercial Bank of Syria illegally paid out in 2003 and has yet to reconcile with the Iraqis. Needless to say, our contact was surprised to find out Dhu al Himma as well as his nephew, Asif Issa Shaleesh, were already sanctioned. ¶5. (C) Phasing in future targeted sanctions can maximize their impact. The first phase could start with those most clearly the architects of objectionable SARG policies relating to Iraq, Lebanon, WMD, and support for the Palestinian rejectionist groups, and then extend to those continuing to support the original group in an ever widening circle. In addition to all of the Mehlis suspects, the first batch of new designees might include a core group of eight to ten, such as Asif Shawkat (Asad,s brother-in-law and head of Syrian Military Intelligence), Maher Asad (President Asad,s brother and commander of the Republican Guard), Rami Makhlouf (Asad,s first cousin and Syria,s poster boy for corruption), Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami,s father), Riyad Issa Shaleesh (principal director of SES International ) an entity already designated under E.O. 13315; in addition, we should push our allies to sanction the other two Shaleeshes mentioned above), Hisham Ikhtiyar (chairman of the Regional Command's National Security Bureau), Abdel Fatah Qudsia (Presidential advisor on Palestinian issues), and Mohammad Suleiman (Presidential advisor responsible for procurement). A second tranch of designations could then move on to this group's lieutenants and business partners. ¶6. (C) Most Syrians we talk to believe that President Asad still represents their best hope for change without instability. It is their fear of instability that stops the majority of Syrians from pushing harder for internal change. For this reason, they argue that sanctions focusing on individuals would help empower Asad to scuttle the regime,s pariahs. According to this school of thought, Bashar himself should not be designated at this point as it would limit our options and signal that the USG is intent on regime change, greatly limiting the number of Syrians willing to join us in pressuring the SARG for change. ¶7. (C) Comment. Pursuing targeted sanctions would send a powerful message to the regime and those associated with it: "if you are perceived to be proponents of the policies causing regional instability, you will be designated. If you provide aid and assistance to those designated, you risk designation yourself." Both internal and external pressure on the regime to change would likewise increase incrementally as the number of designations increased. If conventional Syrian wisdom is correct, the obstacles stopping Bashar from doing the right thing would proportionally decrease as targeted sanctions progressed. Even if that view is wrong, the same result will occur, as the supports of Bashar,s failed policies are eroded. In the end, the USG will advance its policy objectives by undermining the regime,s ability to pursue policies at odds with regional stability. SECHE
SECRET: CJCS ADMIRAL MULLEN’S JANUARY 17 MEETING
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Brownfield Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) ------- Summary ------- ¶1. (S) President Uribe's overwhelming concern during a January 17 meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Admiral Michael Mullen, was Hugo Chavez' aggressive remarks and proposal to grant belligerent status to the FARC. Uribe insisted the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) must keep their terrorist designation, and the USG and GOC should work together to convince Latin American countries that Chavez' approach would harm Colombia and regional democracy. Uribe said Chavez has committed to bring down Uribe and his government by using the FARC as his militia inside Colombia. The GOC's current plan of action on hostages consists of locating them, securing areas near the hostage groups, and calling on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to negotiate their release. Uribe would authorize Colombian forces to cross into Venezuela to arrest FARC leaders and bring them to justice in Colombia. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Participants UNITED STATES CJCS Admiral Michael Mullen Ambassador William Brownfield CJCS/EA CAPT James Foggo Defense Attach COL Mark Wilkins (notetaker) COLOMBIA President Alvaro Uribe Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos Armed Forces Commander General Freddy Padilla MFA U.S. and Canada Desk Officer Patricia Cortes ------------------------------- Uribe Obsessed By Chavez Blasts ------------------------------- ¶3. (C) President Alvaro Uribe arrived late to the meeting, directly from a discussion with his cabinet on how to respond to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' latest inflammatory remarks, and the show of solidarity by the Venezuelan Congress on granting "belligerent" status to the FARC. It was clear that he was still focused on Chavez and the GOC response. ------------------------- GOC Progress, USG Support ------------------------- ¶4. (C) Uribe thanked the United States for its continued support, stressing its decisiveness in helping Colombia pull back from the brink of becoming a failed state. While much work remains, Colombia has made great progress against terrorists and the GOC feels certain they can win this battle. Uribe attributed a great portion of the credit for Colombia's success to the permanent assistance of the USG and its armed forces. Chairman Mullen reaffirmed the strength of the bilateral relationship and assured Uribe of continuing USG commitment to defeating our common adversaries. He admired Colombians' determination and leadership. The Colombian military had transformed itself remarkably and performed the highest calling possible -- returning Colombia to its citizens. --------------------------- Chavez' Endorsement of FARC --------------------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to Venezuela, Uribe said his neighbor's actions cause Colombia great difficulty. The FARC and ELN must keep their terrorist designation, Uribe insisted, and there should be negative consequences for any country granting them belligerent status. It was important to counter and challenge Chavez' rhetoric, especially on this point. When France and Mexico granted that status to the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels in El Salvador in 1981, Uribe commented, they fought an unelected and brutal dictatorship. By contrast, the FARC waged war on a duly elected democracy, they had no public support, and they financed themselves through narcotrafficking and extortion. ¶6. (S) Asked by the Chairman how much help Chavez gave the FARC, Uribe replied that Chavez has a five to seven year plan to advance his Bolivarian agenda in Colombia. He has created popular militias inside Venezuela (apart from the Armed Forces) to sustain his revolution. The GOC believes Chavez thinks he could use the FARC as his militia inside Colombia to combat its democratic government. Chavez remains committed to bring down both Uribe and his government, as the primary obstacles to his Bolivarian expansionist dreams. With no clear Colombian presidential successor, a well financed candidate favoring Chavez might find space in 2010. The best counter to Chavez, in Uribe's view, remains action -- including use of the military. ---------------- Regional Support ---------------- ¶7. (S) Uribe urged the GOC and USG to work together to convince Latin American countries that Chavez' approach to the FARC was wrong and would harm Colombia and regional democracy. The USG, he said, ought to lead a public campaign against Venezuela and counter Chavez' progress through preferential oil offers. The U.S. and Mexico, supported by Honduras, Panama, Belize, and Costa Rica (especially Oscar Arias in the latter) were natural leaders to counter Chavez. Even Cuba, which felt Chavez had crossed into dangerous territory, has exercised a restraining influence. When the GOC asked the Cuban government their views on Chavez' call to roll back the FARC's terrorist designation, the Cubans stated that it was "a difficult proposal." ¶8. (S) Uribe saw mixed loyalties among other Latin American countries. Only Nicaragua had supported Chavez' FARC proposal. Argentina remains difficult, since Venezuela bought Argentine bonds and Chavez made campaign contributions to the new President. Paraguay, in the midst of an election cycle, is uncertain though the front-runner supports Chavez. Uruguay, a possible ally, is sitting on the fence. Brazil remains friendly with Colombia, but prefers neutrality lest it offend anyone. In Peru, President Alan Garcia concurs with the United States and would follow its lead. Chile remains a good friend to Colombia and its cause. ----------------- Hostages and HVTs ----------------- ¶9. (S) Uribe listed rescue of hostages held by the FARC as one of his main goals for 2008. He outlined a plan whereby the military would establish a "cordon sanitaire" around areas where hostages were held. Then the GOC would temporarily open the area to outside interlocutors such as the ICRC to offer an international medical mission and conduct negotiations. Under this umbrella, the GOC would focus on the 44 hostages the FARC had identified as "exchangeable." Chairman Mullen assured USG support for GOC's efforts, but he cautioned that the USG wanted the hostages returned alive. Uribe responded with his conviction that the FARC would not kill hostages at this stage. The best course of action, he advocated, remains to locate the hostages, secure the positions, and then call in the ICRC to negotiate their release. ¶10. (S) Uribe said the GOC also placed a priority on high value targets and that they had achieved great results in late 2007. Finally, he said he was prepared to authorize Colombian forces to cross into Venezuela, arrest FARC leaders, and bring them to justice in Colombia. ¶11. (U) CJCS Admiral Mullen cleared this cable. Brownfield
TOP SECRET: The Reykjavik File
Previously Secret Documents from U.S. and Soviet Archives on the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit
Washington, D.C. and Reykjavik, Iceland – President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev almost achieved a deal 20 years ago at the 1986 Reykjavik summit to abolish nuclear weapons, but the agreement would have required “an exceptional level of trust” that neither side had yet developed, according to previously secret U.S. and Soviet documents posted today on the Web by the National Security Archive of George Washington University and presented on October 12 in Reykjavik directly to Gorbachev and the president of Iceland.
The two leaders in conversation at Hofdi House, 11 October 1986 (Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library) [Click image for larger version.] The documents include Gorbachev’s initial letter to Reagan from 15 September 1986 asking for “a quick one-on-one meeting, let us say in Iceland or in London,” newly translated Gorbachev discussions with his aides and with the Politburo preparing for the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz’s briefing book for the summit, the complete U.S. and Soviet transcripts of the Reykjavik summit, and the internal recriminations and reflections by both sides after the meeting failed to reach agreement.
Archive director Thomas Blanton, Archive director of Russia programs Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya, and Pulitzer-Prize-winning biographer Dr. William Taubman presented the documents to Gorbachev at a state dinner in the residence of President Olafur Ragnar Grimsson of Iceland on October 12 marking the 20th anniversary of the summit, which Grimsson commented had put Iceland on the map as a meeting place for international dialogue.
The documents show that U.S. analysis of Gorbachev’s goals for the summit completely missed the Soviet leader’s emphasis on “liquidation” of nuclear weapons, a dream Gorbachev shared with Reagan and which the two leaders turned to repeatedly during the intense discussions at Reykjavik in October 1986. But the epitaph for the summit came from Soviet aide Gyorgy Arbatov, who at one point during staff discussions told U.S. official Paul Nitze that the U.S. proposals (continued testing of missile defenses in the Strategic Defense Initiative or SDI while proceeding over 10 years to eliminate all ballistic missiles, leading to the ultimate abolition of all offensive nuclear weapons) would require “an exceptional level of trust” and therefore “we cannot accept your position.”
Politburo notes from October 30, two weeks after the summit, show that Gorbachev by then had largely accepted Reagan’s formulation for further SDI research, but by that point it was too late for a deal. The Iran-Contra scandal was about to break, causing Reagan’s approval ratings to plummet and removing key Reagan aides like national security adviser John Poindexter, whose replacement was not interested in the ambitious nuclear abolition dreams the two leaders shared at Reykjavik. The documents show that even the more limited notion of abolishing ballistic missiles foundered on opposition from the U.S. military which presented huge estimates of needed additional conventional spending to make up for not having the missiles.
The U.S. documents were obtained by the Archive through Freedom of Information Act requests to the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and the U.S. Department of State. The Soviet documents came to the Archive courtesy of top Gorbachev aide Anatoly Sergeyevich Chernyaev, who has donated his diary and notes of Politburo and other Gorbachev discussions to the Archive, and from the Volkogonov collection of the U.S. Library of Congress.
Reagan and Gorbachev following a final, unscheduled session held in hopes of reaching agreement, 12 October 1986. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin (center) and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze (far right) look on. (Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library) [Click image for larger version.] The Reykjavik File: Previously Secret U.S. and Soviet Documents on the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev SummitFrom the Collections of the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., October 2006
[The U.S. documents were obtained by the Archive through Freedom of Information Act requests and Mandatory Declassification Review Requests to the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and the U.S. Department of State. The Soviet documents came to the Archive courtesy of top Gorbachev aide Anatoly Sergeyevich Chernyaev, who has donated his diary and notes of Politburo and other Gorbachev discussions to the Archive, and from the Volkogonov collection of the U.S. Library of Congress.]
Note: The documents cited in this Electronic Briefing Book are in PDF format. You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Document 1: “Dear Mr. President,” Mikhail Gorbachev letter to Ronald Reagan, 15 September 1986 (unofficial translation with signed Russian original, proposing “a quick one-on-one meeting, let us say in Iceland or in London”), 6 pp. with 4 pp. Russian original
This letter, carried by Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze to Washington, initiated the Reykjavik summit meeting when Gorbachev proposed “a quick one-on-one meeting, let us say in Iceland or in London,” in order to break out of the cycle of spy-versus-spy posturing and inconclusive diplomatic negotiations after the 1985 Geneva summit. The English translation includes underlining by Reagan himself, who marked the sentence accusing the U.S. of deliberately finding a “pretext” to “aggravate” relations, and the two sentences about making “no start” on implementing the Geneva agreements and not “an inch closer to an agreement on arms reduction.”
Document 2: USSR CC CPSU Politburo discussion of Reagan’s response to Gorbachev’s initiative to meet in Reykjavik and strategic disarmament proposals, 22 September 1986, 2 pp.
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze reports to the Politburo on his talks in Washington and informs the Soviet leadership about Reagan’s decision to accept Gorbachev’s invitation to meet in Reykjavik on the condition that 25 Soviet dissidents including Yury Orlov and Nicholas Daniloff, accused of spying, are released. Gorbachev accepts the conditions and sets forth his main ideas for the summit. The Soviet position, according to him, should be based on acceptance of U.S. security interests, otherwise negotiations would be unproductive. Gorbachev is aiming at a serious improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations.
Document 3: Gorbachev discussion with assistants on preparations for Reykjavik, 29 September 1986, 1p.
At this Politburo meeting Gorbachev stresses once again the importance of taking U.S. interests into account and the fact that his new policy is creating a positive dynamic for disarmament in Europe. He emphasizes the need for an “offensive” and the active nature of new Soviet initiatives for Reykjavik.
Document 4: Memorandum to the President, Secretary of State George Shultz, “Subject: Reykjavik,” 2 October 1986, 4 pp.
This briefing memo from Shultz to Reagan, labeled “Super Sensitive” as well as formally classified as “Secret/Sensitive,” shows that the U.S. did not expect any actual agreement at Reykjavik, but rather, mere preparations for a future summit in the U.S. Shultz talks here about ceilings on ballistic missiles but fails to predict Gorbachev’s dramatic agreements to 50% cuts and a process leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Ironically, Shultz says one of the U.S. goals is to emphasize progress “without permitting the impression that Reykjavik itself was a Summit,” when history now sees Reykjavik as in many ways the most dramatic summit meeting of the Cold War.
Document 5: Gorbachev’s instructions for the group preparing for Reykjavik, 4 October 1986, 5 pp.
Gorbachev explains his top priorities and specific proposals to the group charged with preparing for Reykjavik. He calls for preparing a position with a “breakthrough potential,” which would take into account U.S. interests and put strategic weapons, not issues of nuclear testing, at the forefront. Gorbachev’s ultimate goal for Reykjavik-he reiterates it several times during the meeting-is total liquidation of nuclear weapons based on the Soviet 15 January 1986 Program of Liquidation of Nuclear Weapons by the Year 2000. Whereas Gorbachev sees the value in making concessions in hopes of achieving a breakthrough, his Politburo colleagues (including Chebrikov) warn him against using this word in the negotiations. In the evening Gorbachev gives additional instructions to Chernyaev on human rights and on the matter of Gorbachev’s wife, Raisa Maksimovna, accompanying him to Iceland.
Document 6: “Gorbachev’s Goals and Tactics at Reykjavik,” National Security Council (Stephen Sestanovich), 4 October 1986, 2 pp. (plus cover page from John M. Poindexter [National Security Adviser to the President] to Shultz)
This briefing memo prepared (on the same day as Gorbachev’s Politburo discussion above) by one of the National Security Council’s senior Soviet experts, completely mis-predicts Gorbachev’s behavior at the Reykjavik summit. Far from being “coy” or “undecided” about a future U.S. summit, Gorbachev was already planning major concessions and breakthroughs. Far from having to “smoke” Gorbachev out during the talks, Reagan would be faced with an extraordinarily ambitious set of possible agreements.
Document 7: “The President’s Trip to Reykjavik, Iceland, October 9-12, 1986 – Issues Checklist for the Secretary,” U.S. Department of State, 7 October 1986, 23 pp. (first 2 sections only, Checklist and Walk-through)
This detailed briefing book for Secretary Shultz provides a one-stop-shopping portrait of the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and negotiations on the eve of the Reykjavik summit. The complete table of contents gives the list of briefing papers and backgrounders that are also available in the collections of the National Security Archive (from FOIA requests to the State Department), but posted here are only the first two sections of the briefing book: the “Checklist” of U.S.-Soviet issues, and the “Walk-Through” of subjects for the Reykjavik agenda. Notable is the very first item on the latter, which presupposes that the best they will achieve is some agreement on a number of ballistic missile warheads between the U.S. proposal of 5500 and the Soviet proposal of 6400, rather than the radical cuts that wound up on the table at Reykjavik.
Document 8: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session on preparations for Reykjavik, 8 October 1986, 6 pp.
In this last Politburo session before the delegation departed for Reykjavik, Gorbachev goes over the final details of the Soviet proposals. He allows for the possibility that the meeting could be a failure, and suggests making “concessions on intermediate range missiles,” and French and British nuclear weapons. Gorbachev believes there should be no “intermediate” positions or agreements, driving for his maximum program even if concessions would have to be made. Shevardnadze sounds most optimistic predicting that the U.S. side could agree with the Soviet non-withdrawal period on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and on 50% cuts of the nuclear triad (missiles, bombers, submarines) and intermediate-range missiles.
Reagan and Gorbachev depart Hofdi House after the conclusion of the summit, 12 October 1986. (Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library) [Click image for larger version.]
Document 9: U.S. Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan-Gorbachev, First Meeting, 11 October 1986, 10:40 a.m. – 12:30 p.m., 8 pp.
Document 10: Russian transcript of Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, 11 October 1986 (morning), published in FBIS-USR-93-061, 17 May 1993, 5 pp.
Document 11: U.S. Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan-Gorbachev, Second Meeting, 11 October 1986, 3:30 p.m. – 5:40 p.m., 15 pp.
Document 12: Russian transcript of Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, 11 October 1986 (afternoon), published in FBIS-USR-93-087, 12 July 1993, 6 pp.
Document 13: U.S. Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan-Gorbachev, Third Meeting, 12 October 1986, 10:00 a.m. – 1:35 p.m., 21 pp.
Document 14: Russian transcript of Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, 12 October 1986 (morning), published in FBIS-USR-93-113, 30 August 1993, 11 pp.
Document 15: U.S. Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan-Gorbachev, Final Meeting, 12 October 1986, 3:25 p.m. – 4:30 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. – 6:50 p.m., 16 pp.
Document 16: Russian transcript of Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, 12 October 1986 (afternoon), published in FBIS-USR-93-121, 20 September 1993, 7 pp.
This side-by-side presentation of the official U.S. transcripts of the Reykjavik summit meetings and the Soviet transcripts as published in Moscow in 1993 and translated by the U.S. government’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service puts the reader inside the bullet-proof glass over the windows of Hofdi House as Reagan, Gorbachev, their translators, and their foreign ministers discuss radical changes in both U.S. and Soviet national security thinking.
The two sets of transcripts are remarkably congruent, with each version providing slightly different wording and detail but no direct contradictions. Reagan and Gorbachev eloquently express their shared vision of nuclear abolition, and heatedly debate their widely divergent views of missile defenses. For Reagan, SDI was the ultimate insurance policy against a madman blackmailing the world with nuclear-tipped missiles in a future where all the superpowers’ missiles and nuclear weapons had been destroyed. Reagan comes back again and again to the metaphor of keeping your gas masks even after banning chemical weapons, but Gorbachev feels as if Reagan is lecturing him, and says “that’s the 10th time you talked about gas masks.”
For Gorbachev, SDI was a U.S. attempt to take the arms race into space and potentially launch a first-strike attack on the Soviet Union – the ultimate nightmare for Soviet leaders seared into their consciousnesses by Hitler’s blitzkrieg. But Gorbachev’s scientists had already told him that missile defenses could be easily and cheaply countered with multiple warheads and decoys even if the defenses ever worked (which was unlikely).
The great “what if” question suggested by the Reykjavik transcripts is what would have happened if Gorbachev had simply accepted Reagan’s apparently sincere offer to share SDI technology rather than dismissing this as ridiculous when the U.S. would not even share “milking machines.” If Gorbachev had “pocketed” Reagan’s offer, then the pressure would have been on the U.S. to deliver, in the face of a probable firestorm of opposition from the U.S. military and foreign policy establishment. Working in the opposite direction in favor of the deal would have been overwhelming public support for these dramatic changes, both in the U.S. and in the Soviet Union, and especially in Europe.
Perhaps most evocative is the Russian version’s closing words, which are not included in the U.S. transcript. This exchange comes after Reagan asks for a personal “favor” from Gorbachev of accepting the offer on SDI and ABM, and Gorbachev replies by saying this is not a favor but a matter of principle. The U.S. version has Reagan standing at that point to leave the room and a brief polite exchange about regards to Nancy Reagan. But the Russian version has Reagan saying, “I think you didn’t want to achieve an agreement anyway” and “I don’t know when we’ll ever have another chance like this and whether we will meet soon.”
Document 17: Russian transcript of Negotiations in the Working Group on Military Issues, headed by Nitze and Akhromeev, 11-12 October 1986, 52 pp.
In the all-night negotiations of Soviet and U.S. military experts during the middle of the Reykjavik summit, the Soviet delegation led by Marshal Sergei Akhromeev starts from the new Soviet program, just outlined by Gorbachev in his meeting with Reagan earlier in the day-proposing 50% cuts of strategic weapons across the board, a zero option on intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and a 10-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty. At the same time, the U.S. delegation led by Paul Nitze conducts the discussion practically disregarding the new Soviet proposals and negotiating on the basis of U.S. proposals of 18 January 1986, which by now are overtaken by the latest developments in the Reagan-Gorbachev talks. Responding to U.S. proposals on allowing development of SDI while proceeding with deep cuts in strategic weapons, member of the Soviet delegation Georgy Arbatov comments “what you are offering requires an exceptional level of trust. We cannot accept your position,” directly implying that the necessary level of trust was not there. This document, prepared as a result of the all-night discussion, outlined the disagreements but failed to integrate the understandings achieved by the two leaders on October 11 or approached again on October 12.
Document 18: “Lessons of Reykjavik,” U.S. Department of State, c. 12 October 1986, 1 p. (plus cover sheet from Shultz briefing book for media events October 17, but text seems to have been written on last day of summit, October 12)
This remarkable one-page summary of the summit’s lessons seems to have been written on the last day of Reykjavik, given the mention of “today’s” discussions, but leaves a dramatically positive view of the summit in contrast to the leaders’ faces as they left Hofdi House, as well as to Shultz’s downbeat presentation at the press briefing immediately following the summit. It is unclear who authored this document, although the text says that “I have been pointing out these advantages [of thinking big] in a theoretical sense for some time.” This document plus Gorbachev’s own very positive press briefing commentary immediately following the summit were included in Secretary Shultz’s briefing book for his subsequent media appearances.
Document 19: Gorbachev’s reflections on Reykjavik on the flight to Moscow, 12 October 1986, 2 pp.
In his remarks on the way back from Reykjavik, written down by Chernyaev, Gorbachev gives a very positive assessment of the summit. He proclaims that he is now “even more of an optimist after Reykjavik,” that he understood Reagan’s domestic problems and that the U.S. President was not completely free in making his decisions. He understands Reykjavik as signifying a new stage in the process of disarmament-from limitations to total abolition.
Document 20: “Iceland Chronology,” U.S. Department of State, 14 October 1986, 11 pp.
This blow-by-blow, minute-by-minute chronology sums up not only the discussions given in detail in the transcripts above, but also all the preparatory meetings and discussions and logistics on the U.S. side.
Document 21: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session on results of the Reykjavik Summit, 14 October 1986, 12 pp.
In the first Politburo meeting after Reykjavik, Gorbachev reports on the results, starting with a standard ideological criticism of Reagan as a class enemy who showed “extreme primitivism, a caveman outlook and intellectual impotence.” He goes on, however, to describe the summit as a breakthrough, and the attainment of a new “higher level from which now we have to begin a struggle for liquidation and complete ban on nuclear armaments.” The Politburo agrees with the assessment and approves the General Secretary’s tough posturing.
Document 22: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session on measures in connection with the expulsion of Soviet diplomats from the USA, 22 October 1986, 2 pp.
Reacting to the U.S. decision to expel Soviet diplomats, the Politburo discusses the perceived American retreat from the understandings reached at Reykjavik and decides to press Reagan to follow through with the disarmament agenda on the basis of the summit.
Document 23: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session. Reykjavik assessment and instructions for Soviet delegation for negotiations in Geneva, 30 October 1986, 5 pp.
At this Politburo session Gorbachev and Shevardnadze discuss whether and when to reveal the new Soviet position on SDI testing, which would allow “testing in the air, on the test sites on the ground, but not in space.” This is a significant step in the direction of the U.S. position and is seen as a serious concession on the Soviet part by Foreign Minister Gromyko. Gorbachev is very concerned that the U.S. administration is “perverting and revising Reykjavik, retreating from it.” He places a great deal of hope in Shevardnadze-Shultz talks in terms of returning to and expanding the Reykjavik agenda.
Document 24: Memorandum for the President, John M. Poindexter, “Subject: Guidance for Post-Reykjavik Follow-up Activities,” 1 November 1986, 1 p.
This cover memo describes the process of developing National Security Decision Directive 250 (next document) on Post-Reykjavik follow-up, led by National Security Adviser John Poindexter. The most striking aspect of this memo is Poindexter’s own claim that he has incorporated as much as he can (accounting for the President’s expressed bottom lines) of the Pentagon’s and other objections, and that he needs to brief Reagan about remaining objections on matters that simply would not fit with the President’s program.
Document 25: National Security Decision Directive Number 250, “Post-Reykjavik Follow-Up,” 3 November 1986 (signed by Ronald Reagan), 14 pp.
Largely the work of NSC staffer Robert Linhard, who participated at Reykjavik, NSDD 250 attempts to keep the U.S. national security bureaucracy focused on President Reagan’s goal of eliminating ballistic missiles while walking back from Reagan’s expressed intent at Reykjavik to eliminate all offensive nuclear weapons. In fact, the NSDD’s version of Reykjavik completely leaves out the Reagan and Shultz statements to Gorbachev about welcoming the abolition of nuclear weapons. Yet even this limited effort did not succeed in moving the U.S. bureaucracy towards realistic planning, and in fact the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly weighed in with National Security Adviser Poindexter to the effect that eliminating missiles would require large increases in conventional military spending.
Document 26: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session. About discussions between Shevardnadze and Shultz in Vienna, 13 November 1986, 3 pp.
Here the Politburo discusses the results of the Shevardnadze-Shultz talks in Geneva, where Shultz refused to discuss new Shevardnadze’s proposals concerning what is allowed and not allowed under the ABM treaty. Shultz’s position notwithstanding, Gorbachev emphasizes the need to press the U.S. to move forward on the basis of Reykjavik. Gorbachev stresses that “we have not yet truly understood what Reykjavik means,” referring to its significance as a new level of disarmament dialogue.
Document 27: Gorbachev Conversation with Chernyaev about Reykjavik, 17 November 1986, 1 p.
In a conversation with Chernyaev, Gorbachev talks about Soviet next steps in countering the U.S. attempts to circumvent Reykjavik. He stresses that “we cannot go below Reykjavik,” and is concerned that “the Americans will not go above Reykjavik.”
Document 28: Gorbachev Conference with Politburo Members and Secretaries of the Central Committee, 1 December 1986, 4 pp.
In a Politburo discussion of the Reagan decision to abandon the SALT II treaty, Gorbachev angrily states that the Americans are not doing anything in the spirit of Reykjavik and that the recent position of the Reagan administration was related to the domestic political crisis over Iran-Contra. Yegor Ligachev agrees with Gorbachev that after Reykjavik the Soviet positions only became stronger. Gorbachev speaks about his awareness of growing opposition to his disarmament proposals among the generals, who are “hissing among themselves.”
Document 29: Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Alton G. Keel [Executive Secretary of the National Security Council], 18 December 1986 [for meeting on 19 December to discuss NSDD 250 and other topics], 7 pp. with staff attachments and talking points
This set of documents demonstrates how the proposals on the table at Reykjavik had fallen off the table in Washington after the Iran-Contra scandal and Poindexter’s departure, and as the result of the U.S. military’s opposition. NSC senior staffer Alton Keel sets up an agenda for President Reagan’s meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that includes the elimination of ballistic missiles together with routine briefings about military exercises and anti-drug efforts in Bolivia, and alerts the President to the military’s insistence on large spending increases. But he does not forward the striking talking points prepared by the NSC staff (under Poindexter) that would have expressed to the top U.S. military what Reagan had said at Reykjavik to Gorbachev.
SECRET: GERMANY WARNS THE USG ABOUT A BRAZILIAN PROCUREMENT ATTEMPT OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN
VZCZCXRO1391 PP RUEHSL DE RUEHRL #0921/01 2121541 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 311541Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4817 INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP RUCNWSN/THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0315 RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000921 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER STATE FOR ISN STATE FOR EUR/PRM E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2034 TAGS: MTCRE PREL PINR MNUC ETTC KSCA KNNP IR BR GM SUBJECT: (S) GERMANY WARNS THE USG ABOUT A BRAZILIAN PROCUREMENT ATTEMPT OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN Classified By: Acting Global Affairs Unit Chief David L. Fisher for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) On July 31, MFA Export Control Division Desk Officer Nancy Reck provided EconOff with a German-language non-paper warning US export control authorities about a potential Brazilian procurement attempt of proliferation concern for "Automatic High-Precision Heavy-Duty Necking-In-Machines with CNC Control" from a US vendor. German authorities received an application from a German firm for the export of four Necking-In-Machines to Brazil, which they plan on rejecting for fears that these machines would be diverted to the Middle East -- probably Iran. (COMMENT: The German producer of these machines was not mentioned or listed in the non-paper. END COMMENT) The Germans based their conclusions on their own research and information from an unnamed "reliable source" (NFI). Reck shared that Germany is confident in the strength of their legal position should the German producer challenge the rejection in court. ¶2. (S) Begin text of informal Embassy translation of German-language non-paper: In regards to our partnership in the area of non-proliferation and our excellent partnership in export control affairs, we would like to bring the following information to the attention of your government: A German firm placed an export application for four "Automatic High-Precision Heavy-Duty Necking-In-Machines with CNC Control" (Einziehmaschinen) with a total value of 7,700,000 euro. The machines are controlled by both the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The stated recipient is the firm Export Business & Consult located in Brazil. This firm's address is as follows: Export Business & Consult Av. Osmar Cunha 183-712A Florianopolis, Santa Catarina, 88015-100 Brazil The end-user is listed as Export Business & Consult, Rua Ivo Luchi s/n Bairro Industrial, Palhoca, Santa Catarina, Brazil. (COMMENT: Reck said the term "s/n" in this sentence refers to "street name." END COMMENT) The stated end-use description is for the production of gas cylinders, pressure containers, and CNG-cylinders for automobiles. From a reliable "source", we have obtained the following information: -- The Brazilian authorities are investigating the receiver because of suspicion connecting the firm with procurement of dual-use goods, listed under the Wassenaar Arrangement, for diversion to the Middle-East. -- The firm has already tried to procure machine tools in numerous European countries -- The existence of a declared end-user could not be proven -- The declared receiver has neither the physical facilities nor the financial means or the technical possibilities to use the Necking-In-Machines for themselves. -- The previous activities of both firms give cause for the presumption, that it has to do with a front company without financial movement or registered business capital. -- According to the source's assessment, this case could be connected with the proliferation of critical goods to the Middle East (presumably Iran). We will reject this application. Due to the long investigation time, the export applicant's legal representative shared that the Brazilian end-user could possibly make an effort to procure the machines from the USA. We look forward to the continuation of our excellent cooperation in the affairs of non-proliferation and export control. BERLIN 00000921 002 OF 002 End text of informal Embassy translation. Bradtke
CONFIDENTIAL: GERMAN SATELLITE START-UP RAPIDEYE GATHERING
VZCZCXRO3104 PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDF RUEHDH RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHMA RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHSL RUEHTM RUEHTRO DE RUEHRL #0788/01 1820725 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 010725Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4489 INFO RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1032 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0310 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0531 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0238 RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC 0127 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCUSTR/USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000788 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER STATE FOR ISN/MDSP DICK BUENNEKE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: TSPA EINV ETRD PGOV PREL PINR CH BR FR LH GM SUBJECT: GERMAN SATELLITE START-UP RAPIDEYE GATHERING CUSTOMERS; EMPHASIS ON CHINESE AND USG MARKETS REF: 08 BERLIN 1537 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: German satellite imagery provider RapidEye AG, which began selling its imagery products in January of this year (see ref A), has established its first contracts with France and Lithuania. In the next few years, RapidEye is confident that its customer base will expand by ten, with an eye toward markets in China, the US, and Brazil. Although the firm originally sought to become a niche provider of value-added imagery products and analysis, it is finding that its customers are only interested in raw imagery data. This has caused RapidEye to re-focus its business model to be a provider of data that offers direct satellite downlink services. Please see ref A for previous reporting on RapidEye AG. END SUMMARY FRANCE AND LITHUANIA ARE RAPIDEYE'S FIRST CUSTOMERS --------------------------------------------- ------ ¶2. (SBU) On June 15, 2009, Econoff and NGAoff met with RapidEye CEO Wolfgang Biedermann and discussed RapidEye's current and future business developments. Biedermann said that RapidEye had contracts with its first customers, France and Lithuania, totaling one million euros. Biedermann boasted that RapidEye had beat the competing French commercial satellite imagery system, SPOT, on a crop monitoring project in France. (COMMENT: SPOT is a high-resolution, optical imaging satellite system run by Spot Image in Toulouse, France. The SPOT system has been operational since 1986 with its most recent launch in 2002. END COMMENT) Biedermann explained that the main reason why RapidEye won over SPOT was that RapidEye has a superior imagery revisit rate, a feature valued by the French customer. CUSTOMERS IN THE FOLD: CHINA, BRAZIL AND THE US LEAD THE PACK --------------------------------------------- ---------------- ¶3. (SBU) Biedermann said RapidEye has 10 more customers in its sights, led by China, Brazil, and the United States. He estimated these would bring RapidEye's revenue up to around 10 million euro. He emphasized that the customers would be "operational" and not simply "pilot users." RapidEye views the sale of land cover data (including purchases by NGA) to US defense and intelligence agencies to be a key component of business success in the US market. To support this goal, RapidEye plans to set up a small office in Northern Virginia to serve as a liaison to USG customers. RapidEye views Brazil as a large scale potential customer due to its size, rapid development, and well-organized national use of remote sensing data. CHINA MAY HAVE THE MOST POTENTIAL FOR RAPIDEYE --------------------------------------------- - ¶4. (SBU) China appears to be the focal point of RapidEye's current marketing strategy, with principal target areas identified as the Chinese Ministry of Land Management (MLM) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). Biedermann said "other" Chinese ministries might require similar coverage, but that RapidEye will approach each sale independently. Noting that some Chinese ministries do not coordinate well with each other, RapidEye envisions selling change-detection data products to MLM on a nation-wide basis. Biedermann said China has three tiered priority areas related to acquiring remote sensing data for land management: 1) China's rapidly developing coastal region, 2) Central China, and 3) the desert and semi-desert terrain of Western China. For these areas, Biedermann estimated the average cost per square kilometer would be between 0.70 and 0.90 euro. ¶5. (SBU) RapidEye's primary competition in the Chinese market is the French SPOT satellite system. Biedermann is eager to demonstrate the superiority of RapidEye's products and services to the Chinese customer. Simply put, RapidEye's BERLIN 00000788 002 OF 002 goal is to supplant SPOT as the vendor of choice in the Chinese market. RAPID EYE PLUGGED INTO WORLD MARKETS; WAITING FOR CUSTOMERS --------------------------------------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) As RapidEye strives to expand its worldwide customer base, it has already established distribution contracts covering the US, China, Russia/Eastern Europe, and Mexico/Central America. In January 2009, RapidEye announced an agreement with China's Beijing Earth Observation, Inc. (BEO) (a subsidiary of Eastdawn Group Inc.) as its Chinese distributor. Eastdawn Group CEO, Mr. Bing Sun said RapidEye has great potential in the Chinese market, especially in the agricultural, environmental, insurance, and government sectors. In February 2009, RapidEye announced an agreement with the Mexican company Bufete de Ingenieria en Telecomunicaciones y Sistemas (B.I.T.S.) to be RapidEye's sole distributor in Mexico and Central America. In April 2009, RapidEye announced an agreement with the Moscow-based company Sovzond as its sole distributor for markets in Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Krygystan, and Turkmenistan. ¶7. (SBU) Also in April, RapidEye announced an agreement with the US company MakaLani LLC of Honolulu, Hawaii as its sole distributor to the US market. MakaLani LLC, a Native Hawaiian Organization (NHO), will focus on distribution to the US Government market, particularly defense, the intelligence community, and homeland security. (COMMENT: RapidEye may have chosen MakaLani LLC based on an earlier USG recommendation to establish US distribution ties with a minority-owned or disadvantaged US company in order to be better positioned to compete for US Government contracts. END COMMENT) RAPID EYE TO OFFER DIRECT DOWNLINK SERVICES ------------------------------------------- ¶8. (SBU) RapidEye signed a contract with the Canadian firm, MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA), in April 2009, designating MDA as the sole supplier of direct downlink solutions for RapidEye's international customers seeking ground segments. The contract allows international ground station customers the ability to task, acquire, and process RapidEye imagery in near real-time. Koenig
CONFIDENTIAL: THE U.S.-CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE, WORKING
VZCZCXRO6907 OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC DE RUEHBJ #2104/01 1511040 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 301040Z MAY 08 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7651 INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002104 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2033 TAGS: PHUM PREL KOLY NK BR CH SUBJECT: THE U.S.-CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE, WORKING LUNCH, MAY 26, 2008: UNHRC, ICCPR, NORTH KOREA, BURMA Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR AUBREY CARLSON. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (U) May 26, 2008; 1:30 p.m.; Beijing, Diaoyutai State Guesthouse ¶2. (U) Participants: U.S. David J. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Rights, and Labor John V. Hanford, Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Thomas Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Dan Picutta, Charge d'Affairs, a.i., Embassy Beijing Robert K. Harris, Assistant Legal Advisor, Department of State Richard W. Behrend, PRM Advisor, Department of State Susan O'Sullivan, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Democracy, Rights, and Labor, Department of State Dan Kritenbrink, Internal Unit Chief, Political Section, Embassy Beijing Emilie L. Kao, Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of Democracy Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom, Department of State Jeannette M. Windon, Special Assistant, Office of Democracy and Global Affairs, Department of State Andrea Goodman, Political Officer, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State Steve Goldrup, Second Secretary, Embassy Beijing Gregory May, Second Secretary, Embassy Beijing (notetaker) James Brown, Interpreter PRC Wu Hailong, Director General, International Organizations and Conferences Department, MFA Shen Yongxiang, Deputy Director General, International Organizations and Conferences Department, MFA Yao Maochen, Deputy Inspector of United Front Work Department, CPC Central Committee Teng Wei, Deputy Director General, Criminal Division, Legislative Affairs Commission of the National People's Congress Standing Committee Wan Yonghai, Presiding Judge, Second Criminal Division, Supreme People's Court Sun Maoli, Deputy Director General, Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of Public Security Liu Guoyu, Deputy Director General, Prison Administration Department, Ministry of Justice Guo Wei, Director General, Foreign Affairs Department, State Administration for Religious Affairs Liu Zhengrong, Director General (acting), Internet Department, State Council Information Office Suolang Renzeng, Deputy Chief, Administration for Ethnic and Religious Affairs, Tibetan Autonomous Region Zhao Yubin, Director, North American and Oceanian Affairs Department, MFA Yan Jiarong, Director, International Organizations and Conferences Department, MFA Yao Shaojun, Deputy Director, International Organizations and Conferences Department, MFA Xu Jing, Deputy Director, International Organizations and Conferences Department, MFA Zheng Zeguang, Director General, North American and Oceanian Affairs Zu Yanwei, Attache, International Organizations and Conferences Department, MFA Liu Lingxiao, Attache, International Organizations and Conferences Department, MFA Fang Qiang, Interpreter, MFA Summary ------- ¶3. (C) China and the United States should cooperate more on human rights issues in the United Nations, Shen Yongxiang, Deputy Director General of the MFA's Department of International Organizations, said during a May 26 working lunch. DDG Shen said the United States should reengage with the Council in order to improve it. DDG Shen said China intends to invite the new UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit, saying there was not enough time left in current Commissioner Louise Arbour's term for this. DRL Assistant Secretary Kramer countered that Arbour would welcome a chance to visit China. DDG Shen said China will continue to host visits by UN Special Rapporteurs at a rate of one per year. China is working toward ratification of the BEIJING 00002104 002 OF 004 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) but must still accomplish further legal reforms, including a review of China's Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) system, in order to comply with the Covenant. On North Korean refugees, Director General Wu Hailong repeated standard points that North Koreans in China are "economic migrants." However, China has been cooperative with the UNHCR and will allow the remaining five North Koreans under UNHCR care to depart for third countries by the end of June. EAP DAS Christensen urged China to press Burma to grant access to foreign disaster relief experts. DG Wu said Burma continues to be suspicious of the United States, yet the Burmese regime is taking positive steps, including accepting U.S. material assistance. End Summary. UN Human Rights Council ----------------------- ¶4. (C) DDG Shen Yongxiang began the May 26 working lunch with an appeal that the United States and China work more closely in the UN Human Rights Council. Shen argued that more cooperation in the UN between the United States and China in the area of human rights would improve the international image of both countries. China is ready to work with the United States to promote a UN body that is "fair, objective and non-selective." DDG Shen complained that, following the "serious crimes" carried out by rioters in Lhasa March 14, the United States "violated the proceedings" of the UN Human Rights Council by unfairly accusing China of rights violations in Tibet. China hopes the United States will participate in a "more productive way" in the Human Rights Council. China supports the current process of universal periodic review in the Human Rights Council, and the United States should take the review process seriously. DDG Shen encouraged the United States to participate in the upcoming Durban UN World Conference Against Racism. ¶5. (C) A/S Kramer responded that the United States is extremely disappointed in the UN Human Rights Council. The periodic review process is a possible positive mechanism, but it is too early to tell how successful that mechanism will be. On Durban, A/S Kramer said that while it will ultimately be up to the next administration to decide whether the United States participates, this would be "extremely difficult" unless there is a major overhaul of the approaches to be taken at the conference. A/S Kramer noted that Canada has already announced it will skip the Durban conference and Israel has serious reservations. DDG Shen said that while China "respects" the views of the United States and its disappointment with the Human Rights Council, some current deficiencies could have been avoided had the United States been more engaged at the start of the reform process. DDG Shen said the United States and other Western countries backed the idea that the support of one-third of Human Rights Council members is enough to hold a special session, whereas China believes a 50-percent threshold would have been fairer. Assistant Legal Advisor Harris said that the United States agreed that the Council should not have double standards or be politicized. The Council should be willing to address fairly the most serious human rights abuses wherever they occur. However, the United States believes it is a double standard for the Council to hold many special sessions and adopt one-sided resolutions concerning Israel while failing to hold special sessions on the most serious human rights problems (for example Zimbabwe). Meanwhile, the Council in its first year issued only two special mechanisms mandates, which involved Cuba and Belarus. As a practical matter, China's earlier proposal to require a 50-percent majority for calling special sessions would not prevent special sessions involving Israel. However, a 50-percent threshold might have proven to be a barrier to convening special sessions regarding other countries with profound human rights problems. Visits by UN Commissioners, Special Rapporteurs --------------------------------------------- -- ¶6. (C) A/S Kramer urged China to host more Special Rapporteurs and to invite UN Human Rights Commissioner Louise Arbour to visit Tibet. DDG Shen said China is "open and positive" about receiving a visit by the Commissioner. However, her term will expire this year. China thus will extend an invitation to the new Commissioner. Kramer replied that Arbour would welcome the chance to visit China before her term expires and could easily find time on her schedule. Harris added that the possibility of visiting Tibet is the reason Arbour wants to make a visit during the last months of BEIJING 00002104 003 OF 004 her tenure. China, DDG Shen said, also welcomes visits by various UN Special Rapporteurs and already has extended invitations to the Rapporteurs on religious freedom and education, among others. China's goal is to host a visit by one Special Rapporteur per year. However, China has not hosted such visits in the last two years while the UN Human Rights Council structure has been under review. Once the review is complete, China will resume issuing invitations. However, DDG Shen added, China must balance the timing and sequencing of Special Rapporteur visits between the political, cultural and social realms. Harris commented that the United States hosts on average three Special Rapporteurs per year and has had several visits in the past two years. ICCPR ----- ¶7. (C) China is "positive" about the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), DDG Shen asserted, and since signing the Covenant has been making efforts to prepare for ratification. Since 2003, China has engaged in a series of judicial reforms that will help smooth eventual ratification. However, China still must make additional reforms to its criminal justice system in order to comply with the ICCPR, and is currently reviewing its Reform Through Labor (RTL) system. All of these changes will create favorable conditions for ratification of the ICCPR. Finally, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working with the United Nations to resolve "inconsistencies" that have been identified in the Chinese translation of the ICCPR. China, DDG Shen averred, is even more "eager" to ratify the ICCPR than the United States is to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Harris noted that the United States has not yet announced an intention to ratify the ICESCR because, like China, the United States wants to be absolutely sure that it can implement all the Covenant's provisions. North Korea ----------- ¶8. (C) PRM Advisor Behrend urged China to stop repatriating North Korean refugees against their will, particularly those seeking protection from the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) office i China. China should improve access for Nort Korean refugees to UNHCR and grant Chinese iizenship to children of mixed Chinese-North Korean parentage, which would allow them access to schools and other social services. Director General Wu Hailong responded that North Koreans in China are not "refugees" but rather economic migrants who have entered the country illegally. Nevertheless, China has cooperated in the cases of 30 North Koreans under UNHCR care. By June, China will approve the departure to third countries of the remaining five North Koreans still under UNHCR care in China. DG Wu urged the United States not to allow U.S. nationals to break Chinese law by becoming involved with North Korean illegal migrants. DG Wu noted that illegal migrants from North Korea had in the past violated Chinese law by storming diplomatic compounds and international schools. The ultimate solution to the North Korean problem is to work toward peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Once the DPRK economy develops, DG Wu predicted, the number of illegal border crossers from North Korea will decline. Burma Humanitarian Relief ------------------------- ¶9. (C) EAP DAS Christensen expressed appreciation for China's help in convincing Burma to accept U.S. cyclone relief assistance. Christensen urged China to push Burma to allow foreign relief workers into the country. Though Burma has accepted supplies from the United States, the Burmese regime should also agree to accept technical experts from around the world. Such experts are needed on the ground to ensure an effective aid operation. DG Wu said China appreciates the help the USG has given to Burma. Any international assistance effort, however, must respect the needs and wishes of Burma. The United States has been hostile to Burma's development, and this, DG Wu said, has led to suspicion on the Burmese side. Despite this, DG Wu continued, Burma is now accepting U.S. aid and recently allowed a visit by U.S. Pacific Command's Admiral Keating. DG Wu observed that Burma remains hesitant to admit aid workers and has not granted entry to a team of Chinese rescue workers. After the devastating earthquake in Sichuan, China has been very open BEIJING 00002104 004 OF 004 to offers of international assistance, DG Wu said, and China's attitude has affected Burma. A/S Kramer praised China's response to the earthquake and openness to outside help. DG Wu said China's openness shows the progress China has made in many areas. PICCUTA
SECRET: TIBET: MFA ORGANIZES TIGHTLY CONTROLLED TRIP
VZCZCXRO8966 OO RUEHAG RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHROV RUEHVC DE RUEHBJ #1210/01 0911303 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 311303Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6186 INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0368 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8974 RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 9347 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 BEIJING 001210 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2028 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KIRF NP IN JA BR GM CA IT SP, SI, SL, TZ, UK, AU, FR, RS, CH SUBJECT: TIBET: MFA ORGANIZES TIGHTLY CONTROLLED TRIP TO LHASA FOR DIPLOMATS, MARCH 28-29 REF: BEIJING 975 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary ------- ¶1. (C) With less than 24-hours notice to participating Embassies, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) Government, organized an overnight trip to Lhasa March 28 to 29. Fifteen Beijing-based diplomats, including PolOff, participated. Diplomats were shown destroyed shops, a burnt school building and two hospitals treating wounded security officers and civilians. The trip was tightly controlled and Chinese journalists were present at nearly all meetings. PolOff observed extensive damage to shops starting two to three blocks east of the Potala Palace and increasing in areas closer to the Tibetan quarter. TAR officials sought to demonstrate that both Han and Tibetans had suffered as a result of the violence and rioting. While PolOff saw a significant presence of regular police, there was a noticeable absence of military vehicles or anti- riot equipment. The delegation met with TAR Chairman Qiangba Puncog. At the meeting with Qiangba Puncog, diplomats pressed for details about the number of dead and the charges against those currently under detention. PolOff urged China to exercise restraint and engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama's representatives. PolOff also repeated to the TAR Chairman the USG's request for unfettered access for diplomats to all Tibetan areas. ¶2. (C) Summary continued. In response to the diplomatic delegation's collective request to visit the Jokhang Temple and speak with monks involved in a March 27 demonstration in front of an MFA-led group of foreign journalists, MFA and TAR officials arranged a hasty visit to Barkhor Square and the Jokhang on the morning of March 29. Diplomats met with a single monk, who said all of his colleagues were "sleeping" and thus "unavailable" to meet with the delegation. The Barkhor area was almost devoid of people, save for security attached to the delegation. Organizers denied PolOff's requests to venture into the city to meet with Amcits, but PolOff was given the opportunity to meet with one Amcit at the delegation's hotel. Government organizers also arranged for foreign residents of Lhasa, including two American NGO workers, to attend a briefing with Tibetan scholars and Buddhist figures, where PolOff was able to speak with them. The foreign residents were mainly chosen by the TAR Government, however, not the participating diplomats. Comment: Although some of the events on this trip were crudely stage-managed, it is clear that Lhasa has suffered widespread ethnic-based violence and rioting. A large percentage of the population, Han and Tibetan, have suffered great economic loss, both from the rioting itself and the cancellation of tour groups. Interlocutors' complete lack of candor about the underlying social factors contributing to the riots, while not unexpected, was disturbing nonetheless. End Summary. "We Leave For Lhasa Tomorrow" ----------------------------- ¶3. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs U.S. Affairs Division Director An Gang told PolOff March 27 that the MFA's Department of External Security Affairs, in cooperation with the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Foreign Affairs Office (FAO), was organizing a trip for foreign diplomats to Lhasa, leaving the next morning, March 28. Embassy Beijing was given one hour by the MFA to register a participant for the trip, which would involve a total of 25 hours on the ground in Lhasa. In addition to U.S. Embassy Beijing, the Beijing Embassies/Missions of Brazil, Japan, Germany, Canada, the European Commission, Italy, Spain, Slovenia (as EU President), Singapore, Tanzania (as Africa Union President), the United Kingdom, Australia, France and Russia also sent BEIJING 00001210 002 OF 008 representatives. At 17:00 on March 27, participating diplomats were called to a briefing presided over by Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) Wu Dawei. VFM Wu told the group that the MFA was organizing the trip so that diplomats could provide "more correct reports" on the situation in Lhasa and Tibet to their respective capitals. VFM Wu offered no details about the itinerary, other than the TAR FAO would provide the schedule to the delegation upon arrival in Lhasa. VFM Wu also said that, although the situation in Lhasa was "generally stable," for safety reasons everyone must abide by the "arrangements" set by the MFA and the TAR Government. PolOff told VFM Wu that AmEmbassy Beijing viewed the trip, and a similar trip organized the same week for foreign journalists, as a "first step" but reiterated the USG's request that diplomats and journalists have free and unfettered access to all Tibetan areas affected by recent unrest. Chinese Media Presence ---------------------- ¶4. (C) In addition to numerous minders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, plain-clothes security personnel and the TAR FAO, at least two Xinhua print journalists and a China Central Television (CCTV) journalist and cameraman accompanied the delegation. CCTV crews filmed most events on the trip, including the arrival and departure at Lhasa airport. Xinhua News Agency quoted accurately, though selectively, some delegation member's positive comments about the trip, particularly a statement by Tanzanian Minister George Manongi (representing the African Union) that "no government would tolerate" violent protests. Security Presence Observed in Lhasa ----------------------------------- ¶5. (C) The delegation's motorcade included both police and People's Armed Police (PAP) escorts. (Plate numbers for PAP vehicles seen by PolOff, including those attached to the motorcade, all started with WJ 23.) The airport road appeared to be open to other traffic during the delegation's arrival and departure from Lhasa. PolOff saw at least two groups of Tibetans picnicking very close to the road. As the motorcade neared Lhasa proper, PolOff saw numerous PRC flags flying over Tibetan-style homes. At nearly every intersection where village roads met the main airport road, a single officer was stationed with his or her back to the motorcade, looking down the approaching roadway. PolOff observed no checkpoints at any point on the trip except for one on the airport road that appeared little different from a normal traffic police checkpoint. ¶6. (C) The security presence in Lhasa was noticeable and significantly larger than that observed by PolOff during a visit to Lhasa with ConGen Chengdu officers February 26-29, 2008. At least one police vehicle (mainly sedans and SUVs) and one to three officers were seen at most intersections. Police officers were mainly sitting in, or standing next to, their vehicles rather than walking the streets. At one point, PolOff saw several police poke their heads out of a police station doorway to watch the motorcade pass by. PolOff saw only scattered PAP vehicles other than those attached to the delegation. PolOff observed no officers in riot gear, nor did he see any heavier police vehicles such as water cannon trucks. During a visit to the Jokhang Temple March 29, some diplomats reported seeing a few helmeted police in side streets leading off Barkhor Square. Over the course of the trip, PolOff saw three canvas-covered military transport trucks; one had its plates covered, the other two were without plates entirely. (Note: An Amcit resident (protect) told PolOff that a large number of security forces remained in Lhasa but they had been confined to compounds during the Government- organized visits that week by foreign journalists and diplomats. A TAR FAO minder told delegation members that no PLA assets were used to suppress the March 14 riots.) BEIJING 00001210 003 OF 008 Fewer People onStreets ----------------------- ¶7. (C) At est, PolOff observed pedestrian traffic at a tir of the level it was in late February, thoug in some areas it was much less. During te late afternoon of March 28, PolOff observedfewer than ten Tibetan pilgrims with prayer weels walking in front of the Potala Palace. Te next day, March 29, PolOff observed well over a hundred pilgrims walking on the Potala circumambulation route. During this second drive-by, a TAR FAO minder highlighted the presence of the pilgrims to PolOff. In contrast to February, when pilgrims of various ages and dress could be seen in Lhasa, the pilgrims observed during this visit, in addition to being fewer in number, also appeared to be primarily elderly Tibetans. Also, areas in the Tibetan quarter that were packed with pilgrims in February looked nearly abandoned. One street near the Ramoche Temple was blocked by a police cordon, and behind this barrier, PolOff could see few, if any, people. From the motorcade on Beijing East Road looking into the Barkhor area, PolOff also saw streets that were nearly devoid of people. Diplomats who participated in a March 29 stop at the Jokhang Temple reported that the streets in the Barkhor district were practically abandoned. Arrival and Visit to Affected Areas ----------------------------------- ¶8. (C) Immediately upon arrival in Lhasa on March 28, organizers took the delegation to a clothing store on Beijing Middle Road where four Han and one Tibetan shopkeeper had been killed. As the delegation pulled up to the store, the Han Chinese owner and a surviving Tibetan shop assistant were kneeling before a memorial altar set up in the burnt-out shop. Shortly after the delegation's arrival, they emerged to speak with diplomats as television cameras rolled. Next, the delegation was led on a driving tour of Beijing Road, Qingnian Road, and North and East Linkuo Road to view damaged businesses and homes. TAR FAO interpreters pointed out damage to Xinhua News Agency offices, the Tibet Daily and a Bank of China branch. An FAO minder also pointed out that a local television station and stores carrying mobile phones, foreign-branded goods and precious gems had been specifically target by rioters/looters. Visit to Damaged School ----------------------- ¶9. (C) The delegation was then taken to Lhasa Second Middle School where an entire classroom building had been gutted by fire. The Tibetan principal of the school described the efforts of staff to protect the children on March 14 and how rioters had allegedly set fire to the building and then blocked fire trucks from arriving on the scene. The fire also consumed many of the schools' textbooks, she said. According to the principal, 80 percent of the school's 839 students are ethnic Tibetan, in keeping with the population of the surrounding neighborhood. The teaching staff was 90 percent Tibetan. In addition to standard Mandarin Chinese curriculum taught in China, students at Lhasa Second Middle School receive 280 minutes of Tibetan and 200 minutes of English instruction per week. Diplomats then observed primary school students taking a history lesson in a science lab that had been converted into an ordinary classroom since the March 14 fire. At the back of the classroom was a display condemning the March 14 riots. An FAO handler remarked to a delegation member that the "lawbreakers do not want to see good schools and the development of society." Extent of Damage ---------------- ¶10. (C) Judging by the very limited tour given to the diplomats, the area of Lhasa west of the Potala Palace seemed unaffected by the rioting. Individual burned out stores could be seen starting two to three blocks BEIJING 00001210 004 OF 008 east of the Potala, with the ratio of damaged to undamaged shops increasing as one neared the Ramoche Temple/Barkhor area. At some points along Beijing East and Lingkhor North and East Roads, entire rows of shops had been burned or damaged. On Beijing East Road, PolOff saw that the (Nepali/Tibetan operated) Kyichu Hotel had only a single broken window while the neighboring six shops, by contrast, including a Han- run sunglass store visited by PolOff in February, had been completely burned out. Despite extensive damage to stores, all roads were clean, and PolOff saw little debris on sidewalks. In the areas east of the Potala Palace, about a third of stores remained shuttered, making it difficult to assess whether shops were damaged or just closed. For every store that was burned out, at least ten others showed signs of damage to the metal rolling shutter or broken windows. All over Lhasa, PolOff saw white katas (Tibetan greeting scarves) affixed to storefronts, an indication that the store is Tibetan-owned (reftel). Meeting with TAR Chairman ------------------------- ¶11. (SBU) Following the tour and check-in at the Lhasa Hotel (in a largely unaffected area of west Lhasa) on the evening of March 28, the delegation arrived at the TAR Government compound for a meeting with TAR Chairman Qiangba Puncog and a large contingent of high-level TAR officials, including the Mayor of Lhasa Doje Cezhug. (Note: As TAR Chairman, Qiangba Puncog is equivalent to a provincial governor and is ranked behind the top PRC official in Tibet, TAR Party Chairman Zhang Qingli.) After introductions and before Qiangba Puncog could read his prepared report, the Slovenian Counselor, Bernard Srajner asked the TAR Chairman a series of questions prepared in advance by the EU participants. A summary of the EU questions and Qiangba Puncog's answers (both in his prepared remarks and response to follow up questions) follows: --What is the fate of 13 people arrested in a demonstration on March 10? The TAR Chairman said 15 people (13 monks and 2 lay people) had participated in the March 10 demonstration in Lhasa, which included raising the "snow mountain flag." The thirteen monks are among 303 total people detained, but Qiangba Puncog gave no additional information on what the 13 monks were charged with. (Note: The figure of 303 detained appeared to be a figure for detainees related to demonstrations prior to March 14.) --What happened in the first 24 hours of March 14? Why did security forces "hold back" at first? Qiangba Puncog repeated a standard Government version of events, saying the March 14 "beating, smashing, looting, and burning" incident had been "masterminded" by the Dalai Lama clique in an attempt to sabotage the Olypics. Police and PAP officers had exercised estraint. Government forces had not used fireams, though authorities confiscated some "lead bullet" guns from some rioters. (Comment: The term "lead bullet" guns seemed to indicate non-police, makeshift firearms.) The TAR Chairman said the TAR Government had failed to protect civilians, and he apologized to victims in the hospitals. --How many people were killed and injured? The TAR Chairman repeated published casualty figures. He said 382 innocent civilians had been injured, 58 seriously. Eighteen "innocent civilians" had been killed, including an infant below the age of one. In addition, one police officer and three rioters were killed. Seven schools, 5 hospitals, 908 shops and 120 private residences had been damaged with total losses amounting to RMB 250 million ($36 million). --What is the nature of charges against detainees? Will independent observers be allowed at trials? As a result of the March 14 riot, 414 people had been detained. An additional 289 had turned themselves in, although 111 of these people had already been released because their crimes were "minor." Qiangba Puncog said PRC law prohibits splittism. Defendants will be BEIJING 00001210 005 OF 008 charged not for their views, but for their "public actions." All cases will be dealt with according to law. Some who committed "small crimes" will be released but the more "serious" cases will go to trial. All defendants will have access to legal counsel, including legal aid for those who have no money to afford a defense attorney. (Note: While Qiangba Puncog did not directly answer the question about outside observers, the Canadian participant said the head of the TAR Justice Department (si fa ting) later told her at a banquet immediately afterward that outside observers would not be possible.) --What has happened to monks who demonstrated at the Jokhang Temple in front of visiting journalists? Qiangba Puncog characterized the incident as an example of "Government tolerance." It was "natural" for some people to have different views, and the monks will not be punished, he said. The Australian participant, in a follow-up question, asked for a visit to the Jokhang Temple to speak with the monks involved in the incident. The Chairman said TAR authorities would consider adding a Jokhang visit to the schedule. (Note: A hastily arranged visit to the Jokhang was arranged the next morning, as reported below.) "We Are Already Restrained and Non-Violent" ------------------------------------------- ¶12. (C) During the meeting with the TAR Chairman, PolOff stated USG points regarding the need for China to exercise restraint and for all sides to refrain from violence. China should respect the legal rights of peaceful protestors and enter substantive dialogue with representatives of the Dalai Lama. PolOff ended by saying, while the current trip was a positive step in the right direction, the USG still seeks unfettered access for diplomats to all Tibetan areas, inside and outside the TAR. More and better access was in the interests of all sides, PolOff said. Qiangba Puncog responded that he already understood the U.S. position and that Chinese President Hu Jintao had already discussed the Tibet situation directly with President Bush. China is "already exercising restraint and refraining from violence," so such calls are unnecessary. It was because of this restraint, including no use of lethal weapons by security forces, that the riot took so long to get under control. The TAR Government places great importance on the visit by diplomats, Qiangba Puncog said, urging delegation members to report the "real situation" to their respective "highest leaders." ¶13. (SBU) Qiangba Puncog also defended China's economic and religious policies in Tibet. The TAR Governor highlighted a string of new measures, announced the following day in TAR newspapers, designed to provide economic relief to victims of the rioting. He noted that Tibet was experiencing high growth rates and rising income, thanks in no small part to Central Government support. Prices were stable in the TAR following the unrest, he asserted. There was no need to adjust Government policies regarding religion, he said. After the meeting, Qiangba Puncog hosted a banquet for the delegation, followed by the screening of a documentary film on the March 14 riots. Meeting with U.S. Citizens -------------------------- ¶14. (C) PolOff requested that, instead of watching the documentary on March 28, he be allowed to go out on his own to visit with American citizens in Lhasa. Several other diplomats also requested time to meet with their citizens in lieu of the film. The TAR FAO agreed to excuse PolOff and other diplomats from the film, but only on condition that meetings with citizens take place at the Lhasa Hotel. PolOff was told he could not venture outside of the hotel "for safety reasons." PolOff contacted three Amcits. Two noted that foreigners were still instructed to stay indoors at night, making a 21:00 meeting at the hotel impractical. One Amcit, a long-term Lhasa resident who lives close to the hotel, agreed to visit with BEIJING 00001210 006 OF 008 PolOff in the hotel lobby. (Note: The Amcit reported that he was fine, though some money had been looted from one of his downtown Lhasa shops, which had also been sprayed by gunfire. The Amcit also noted that tension in the city between ethnic Tibetans and Han remains.) ¶15. (C) Delegation members were given a second chance to meet with their respective citizens, though trip organizers, not the diplomats, controlled who was invited. During the pre-trip briefing with VFM Wu Dawei, several diplomats requested that they be given a chance to meet with their respective citizens in Lhasa. VFM Wu said such meetings would likely be possible but had to take place at the delegation's hotel. Some Embassies, but not the United States, provided contact information for their citizens in Lhasa to the MFA to facilitate meetings. The TAR FAO, in response to this request, then apparently invited about ten foreign residents to attend the final meeting of the trip March 29, a briefing by TAR scholars and official religious figures. The delegation was not provided with any name list prior to the meeting. Upon arrival, PolOff learned that two Amcit NGO workers, one of whom had declined an invitation to meet PolOff at the hotel the previous evening, were present. The foreign residents mainly sat and listened as the Tibetan scholars denounced the Dalai Lama. PolOff asked that the meeting be cut short to allow time for individual discussions with citizens. One of the Amcits told PolOff his organization's "local partner" had encouraged him to attend the meeting, which he did for the sake of maintaining cooperative relations. The other, the Tibet director for a multi-national environmental NGO, indicated that his boss at the NGO had requested that he attend. PolOff told both that they were under no obligation to meet with USG officials. However, both voluntarily met with PolOff for about 15 minutes each. (Note: Both Amcits reported that they were fine and that, after being unable to venture outside for four days following the March 14 riots, things in Lhasa were now beginning to return to normal.) Other diplomats later complained that citizens whom they had requested that the MFA/TAR FAO invite were not contacted. Visit to Jokhang Temple, "Monks are Sleeping" --------------------------------------------- ¶16. (C) Around 01:00 March 29, all delegation members, except PolOff, received calls in their hotel rooms that the start time for the next morning had been moved up from 08:30 to 08:00. According to the Australian participant, when delegation members boarded the vans just before 08:00, organizers told them there had been a "change in the schedule" but offered no details. As the motorcade departed just prior to 08:00, several delegation members noted the absence of some of the diplomats and requested that the motorcade wait. MFA/TAR FAO handlers refused. (Note: Three other diplomats who, unlike PolOff, knew about the time change but arrived at the motorcade just at 08:00, were left behind and also missed the trip to the Jokhang.) PolOff's request that he be allowed to catch up to the motorcade by taxi was refused. The Government minders, according to those who made it on the bus, were extremely nervous and appeared desperate to complete the visit to Jokhang as rapidly as possible. The diplomats only realized that they were being taken to the Jokhang Temple as they pulled into Barkhor Square. ¶17. (C) Upon arrival, the diplomats noticed a much larger security contingent than at other events on the trip. Officials were "extremely nervous" during the visit, several diplomats later told PolOff. Other than the delegation and the escorts/security, Barkhor Square and the surrounding streets were abandoned. Little, if any, damage to shops in the Barkhor was noticeable, according to U.K. Political Counselor Peter Wilson. The MFA/TAR FAO officials escorted the group into the temple where they met with a single monk who is a member of the Jokhang's Democratic BEIJING 00001210 007 OF 008 Management Committee. When the group asked to see the monks involved in the March 27 demonstration in front of foreign journalists, the monk said they and the other monks were all in their dorm "sleeping." The monk said that his colleagues who had participated in the incident were "young and lacked understanding," but they would not be punished. Wilson noted that the Jokhang is usually packed with pilgrims. The monk said that the temple was closed for the day but would reopen tomorrow. Several diplomats left the Temple early in disgust and then staged a mini-protest, refusing to get back on the bus while they debated whether to continue with the visit. They eventually decided to proceed with the schedule. Australian Political Officer Eleanor Lawson, who had requested to TAR Chairman Qiangba Puncog that the Jokhang be added to the schedule and later was outspokenly critical of the poor handling of the Temple visit, told PolOff that MFA Director General for External Security Affairs Wang Min later pulled her aside and demanded that she "stop causing trouble." (Comment: PolOff's requests on March 28 to venture out alone, as well as his delivery of USG points on Tibet to both TAR Chairman Qiangba and MFA VFM Wu, may have prompted organizers to exclude PolOff from the sensitive Jokhang trip. While a simple administrative oversight cannot be ruled out, when PolOff complained about being excluded, TAR FAO officials merely insisted that "everyone was called.") More Visits with Victims, Hospitals ----------------------------------- ¶18. (C) Following the Jokhang Temple stop (after which PolOff and others who had missed the Jokhang visit rejoined the main group), the diplomats visited the offices of the Chengguan District Government. While there, four Tibetans and one Han resident described the events of March 14. Several told of having their stores and homes destroyed, saying they were living on Government assistance. Chen Xiaoxiong (a Han Chinese) told of how her shop was destroyed, causing RMB 2.6 million ($370,000) in damage, and how ethnic Tibetans had protected her and provided her with shelter. "With the support of the Party and my friends, I am confident I can start my life again," Chen said. ¶19. (C) This meeting produced the most unscripted moment of the entire trip: In response to a question regarding the composition of the rioters, a Tibetan resident offered that most were "unemployed." A Chengguan District Government official then chimed in saying that, actually, the rioters were "lazy" people who refused to work despite abundant opportunities to participate in Government job-training programs. The same official, in contradiction to the TAR Chairman's comments that prices are stable, said inflation is a problem and that the Government is providing extra support for victims to cope with rising costs. The group then visited a People's Armed Police hospital and saw injured PAP officers (both Han and Tibetan), including some in intensive care beds. The delegation then proceeded to Lhasa's Regional People's Hospital. Outside the second hospital, ambulances with smashed windows were on display. Hospital officials relayed a story that a mob had attacked one ambulance, which was carrying a small child at the time. Diplomats later met with a (Tibetan) doctor injured during the attack on the ambulance. Living Buddhas Denounce "Splittist" Dalai Lama --------------------------------------------- -- ¶20. (C) At the final meeting of the trip (the one mentioned above that included foreign residents), diplomats heard a briefing by Tibetan scholars and religious figures. The briefing was heavy on propaganda with an emphasis on Tibet's social and economic progress since the "peaceful liberation" of ¶1951. The primary speaker was Drubkang, the Chairman of the Tibetan Buddhist Association. Drupkang, in response to a question on whether he considered the Dalai Lama a real living Buddha, gave a lengthy denunciation of the "unpatriotic" 14th Dalai Lama but BEIJING 00001210 008 OF 008 fell short of denouncing the Dalai Lama's legitimacy as a reincarnate. The Dalai Lama's use of violence runs counter to the key tenets of Buddhism, he said. Drubkang added that the participation of monks in the unrest shows that monasteries need to increase their legal education of young monks. Another living Buddha asserted that Western countries should do more to educate their young people about the "real" situation in Tibet and counter widespread "prejudice" against Tibet outside China. The Government has spent huge sums rebuilding monasteries and providing medical care and other benefits to monks, he said, adding that the only "conflict" in Tibet was the long-standing struggle between separatists and anti-separatists. Following this meeting, the delegation departed for the airport and returned to Beijing. Comment ------- ¶21. (C) Although some of the events on this trip were crudely stage managed, it is clear that Lhasa has suffered widespread ethnic-based violence and rioting. A large percentage of the population, Han and Tibetan, have suffered great economic loss, both from the rioting itself and the cancellation of tour groups. Despite our hosts' efforts to portray Lhasa as a city quickly bouncing back, the frantic visit to the Barkhor/Jokhang Temple, with its heavy security presence, appeared to indicate that tensions remain high in the Tibetan quarter of the city. ¶22. (C) Comment continued: Interlocutors' complete lack of candor regarding the underlying social factors contributing to the riots, while not unexpected, was disturbing nonetheless. Even the "average people" diplomats met with resorted to stock propaganda phrases (e.g., "Dalai Lama clique" and "beating, smashing, looting, burning") while denying Tibetan society had any problems other than the lingering presence of a few "separatists." One Amcit resident of Lhasa (protect), however, told PolOff during the trip that he believes the city's Tibetan youths are becoming "radicalized." An increasing number of young Tibetans in Lhasa, he said, become angry when they are addressed in Mandarin Chinese and refuse to speak China's official language. Nevertheless, he and the other long-term foreign residents PolOff spoke with appeared to believe that, even if ethnic tensions remain, tourists will return, NGO projects will go forward and Lhasa will continue its current path of rapid, albeit increasingly Han-dominated, development. RANDIT
TOP-SECRET FROM THE CIA: US INTELLIGENCE AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR CONFERENCE
TOP-SECRET: CIA HAD SINGLE OFFICER IN HUNGARY 1956
Washington D.C., August 9th, 2011 – Fifty years ago today the Soviet Presidium overturned its earlier decision to pull its troops out of Hungary in the face of a popular uprising, yet the CIA–with only one Hungarian-speaking officer stationed in Budapest at the time–failed to foresee either the uprising or the Soviet invasion to come, according to declassified CIA histories posted on the Web by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org).
Describing the several days in early November 1956 when it seemed the Hungarian Revolution had succeeded (before the Soviet tanks rolled in on November 4), a CIA Clandestine Service History written in 1958 commented: “This breath-taking and undreamed-of state of affairs not only caught many Hungarians off-guard, it also caught us off-guard, for which we can hardly be blamed since we had no inside information, little outside information, and could not read the Russians’ minds.”
Through a Freedom of Information Act request and appeal, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS) professor Charles Gati obtained the heavily-censored extracts from two previously secret CIA histories in the Clandestine Service History series for his critically-praised new book Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Stanford University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006).
The extracts come from a two-volume history of CIA operations in Hungary (dated May 1972 and only 2 copies made) and from a two-volume history titled “The Hungarian Revolution and Planning for the Future” (dated January 1958). Because of the extensive security deletions, it is impossible to determine the length of each document, but judging by the page numbers, the first pair of volumes totals at least 99 and 71 pages, and the second at least 106 pages.
The CIA histories show that the Agency had essentially only one Hungarian-speaking officer based in Hungary during the 1950-1957 period, and for several years that person spent “95 percent” of his time on “cover duties.” “He mailed letters, purchased stamps and stationery …,” among other “support tasks,” the history noted. At the time of the Revolution in fall 1956, he was preoccupied with official contacts and doing interviews with Hungarian visitors.
The name of the sole CIA officer in Budapest in 1956, Geza Katona, is censored from the CIA histories but included in Professor Gati’s book with Katona’s permission. Katona is also the subject of an extensive oral history interview in the Summer 2006 issue of Hungarian Quarterly (pp. 109-131), which repeats his cover story as a State Department official. According to the CIA histories, Katona took part in no operational activities because he had no time and was “constrained from so doing by the US policy of nonintervention.” In fact, the histories say, “At no time in the period 23 October – 4 November, if one looks at the situation realistically, did we have anything that could or should have been mistaken for an intelligence operation.”
The CIA documents admit that the bulk of the reports CIA received were from the border areas near Austria. The Agency had no steady information from Budapest (“the storm center”) or on a country-wide basis. The histories acknowledge this meant intelligence was “one-sided” and that therefore planning based on that intelligence was also “one-sided.”
On the issue of whether support from outside the country would have been useful or welcome (which may seem an obvious point, but until now the evidence has consisted only of memoir accounts and second-hand literature citing unnamed intelligence sources), the CIA histories reflect this lingering controversy, reporting with some feeling that, based on “the whole picture we now have of the mentality of the revolutionaries … almost anyone from the West, of whatever nationality, color or purpose would have been received with open arms by any of the revolutionary councils in the cities of Hungary during the period in question.”
Two related issues have remained open to debate since the revolution–whether the United States sent weapons or ammunition to the rebels or deployed specially trained émigré forces into Hungary. The CIA records appear to put both questions to rest.
A few days after the revolt broke out, Katona queried the agency on official policy regarding arms and ammunition. On October 28, Headquarters responded, “we must restrict ourselves to information collection only [and] not get involved in anything that would reveal U.S. interest or give cause to claim intervention.” The next day, Washington replied more specifically “that it was not permitted to send U.S. weapons in.” In fact, the implication in the histories is that transferring arms was never seriously contemplated: “At this date no one had checked precisely on the exact location and nature of U.S. or other weapons available to CIA. This was done finally in early December” of 1956.
Numerous published accounts have indicated the existence of secret U.S.-trained émigré groups in the 1950s identified under such rubrics as Red Sox/Red Cap or the Volunteer Freedom Corps. But it has never been officially confirmed whether any groups of this kind played a part in Hungary in 1956. From the Clandestine Service Histories, it seems clear they did not. Although the new documents confirm that small psychological warfare and paramilitary units came into being in the early 1950s, (including the Hungarian National Council headed by Bela Varga), and occasional reconnaissance missions took place at that time, the prospects for penetrating into Hungary deteriorated by 1953 when stepped up controls by Hungarian security forces and “the meager talent available” among potential agents made cross-border operations essentially untenable.
Thus, far from revealing the deployment of any organized contingents that may have existed, the new documents imply that something much more spur-of-the-moment took place: on October 31, “Headquarters seconded a scheme which had shortly before come out of [deleted] and which proposed that certain defectors [deleted] who had volunteered to go back into Hungary be allowed to go.”
The histories contain other interesting insights into CIA operations, including the complaint that another obstacle to their activities was the involvement of the U.S. military (presaging current conflicts between the two bureaucracies in Iraq). The authors sarcastically write that “If we [the CIA] were in no position to act efficiently … the military is, was, and always will be even worse off.” They recommend that in the future the CIA keep the military “at arm’s length” and only do what’s necessary “to keep them happy.”
Of course, according to Soviet documents previously published by the National Security Archive (click here for more selections from The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents, edited by Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, and Janos M. Rainer, from Central European University Press), the availability of an abundance of intelligence assets does not necessarily provide all the answers. Moscow was also taken by surprise by the Revolution despite the thousands of Soviet soldiers, KGB officers, and Party informants present in Hungary. Rather than understanding the sources of the discontent, it was easier for Soviet operatives and even the leadership to cast woefully misdirected blame on the CIA for the unrest. Klement Voroshilov remarked at the October 28 Presidium session: “The American Secret Services are more active in Hungary than Comrades Suslov and Mikoyan are,” referring to the two Party leaders sent to Budapest to negotiate a modus vivendi with the new Nagy government. At that moment, of course, the Soviet Presidium had more active members (2) in Budapest than the CIA had case officers (1).
Documents
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CIA Histories
Document 1: CIA Clandestine Services History, The Hungarian Revolution and Planning for the Future, 23 October – 4 November 1956, Volume I of II, January 1958
Document 2: CIA Historical Staff, The Clandestine Service Historical Series, Hungary, Volume I, [Deleted], May 1972
Document 3: CIA Historical Staff, The Clandestine Service Historical Series, Hungary, Volume II, External Operations, 1946 – 1965, May 1972
Soviet Documents
Document 4: Working Notes from the CPSU CC Presidium Session, October 28, 1956
Document 5: Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on October 30, 1956 (Re: Point 1 of Protocol No. 49)
Document 6: Working Notes and Attached Extract from the Minutes of the CPSU CC Presidium Meeting, October 31, 1956
CONFIDENTIAL: CHANCELLOR ANGELA “TEFLON” MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT
VZCZCXRO1733 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHRL #1106/01 2521657 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 091657Z SEP 09 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5130 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001106 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019 TAGS: GM PREL PGOV SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR ANGELA "TEFLON" MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT AS FDP WAITS IN THE WINGS Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE GLASS FO R REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (C) Less than two weeks after her party suffered losses in two state elections, CDU Chancellor Angela Merkel found her fighting spirit before 8,000 party faithful at a September 6 election rally in Duesseldorf launching the "hot phase" of the CDU/CSU electoral campaign. The CDU has been shifting party tactics after its losses in the August 30 elections in Saarland and Thuringia, where the Social Democratic Party (SPD) may now be in a position to form coalitions with the Left Party. Merkel -- to great applause -- focused in on the specter of a so-called red-red government composed of the SPD and The Left Party. She described the SPD as suffering from an "identity crisis," and needing a vacation from political decision-making and time in opposition. Along with the entire CDU leadership and incumbent CDU/CSU Ministers-president, Merkel made her case for a CDU/CSU coalition with the pro-business but socially liberal FDP. She repeated the CDU/CSU's election mantra: "we have the strength" throughout her speech, aiming to convince the German electorate that a strong CDU/CSU is required for Germany to emerge from its worst economic recession in post-war history. CDU views on whether the issue of Germany's role in Afghanistan would become a more prominent campaign theme were mixed. ¶2. (C) With three weeks to go before the parliamentary elections, all signs point to Chancellor Merkel returning to office, although she and her party recognize that they face a difficult campaign. It remains uncertain whether the CDU and the FDP will gain enough support to form a majority coalition. If not, another Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) is very likely; other options require a three-party constellation that would force the ill-suited Greens and FDP to work together. But, there seems to be an almost one hundred percent certainty -- given the SPD's chronic slump in the polls and limited coalition options -- that SPD Foreign Minister and Chancellor-candidate Frank Walter Steinmeier will not become Chancellor. End summary. MERKEL CASTS ASIDE SPD, EMBRACES FDP ------------------------------------ ¶3. (C) Chancellor Merkel -- to rapturous cries of "Angie, Angie" and a standing ovation -- took to the floor at her party's September 6 rally before some 8,000 supporters affirming that the CDU/CSU "have the best chance to win the parliamentary elections" but also cautioning that "the election's outcome has not yet been decided." On the one hand, she praised her Grand Coalition government's record, noting its success in countering Germany's economic and financial crisis. On the other hand, she called for a new CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP after the upcoming elections-- casting aside the SPD. She asserted that such a coalition would anchor Germany in the "middle" of the political spectrum and take the country out of its current economic crisis faster. Merkel said: "Our country needs a government that will support growth, security and work for everyone." In a swipe at the SPD (COMMENT: Merkel never mentioned Steinmeier by name. END COMMENT.), she said the party is currently plagued by an "identity crisis," adding that, "The SPD is devoid of any reality and is distraught." She asked, "How can a party that achieved 10, 18, and 24 percent at the recent state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Saarland be taken seriously?" Dismissing SPD warnings against a so-called "black-yellow" (CDU/CSU-FDP) coalition, Merkel said that the country should be more worried about the SPD's plans to form coalitions with The Left Party on the state and federal levels. (Note: The SPD has warned that a black-yellow coalition would represent wealthy Germany and business interest at the expense of the middle and lower classes.) ¶4. (U) CDU leaders also tried to cast the CDU at the state level in a positive light after its poor showing in the Saarland and Thuringia state elections on August, causing the Minister President of the latter state to resign. Lower Saxony's CDU Minister President Christian Wulff asserted that the most prosperous and successful "Laender" (states) in Germany are those ruled by the CDU/CSU and FDP. He cited Berlin, governed by SPD Mayor Klaus Wowereit's Berlin (NOTE: in Berlin the SPD rules with The Left Party. END NOTE), as being the worst case. Hesse's Minister President Roland Koch -- to great applause -- noted that he could not understand how the SPD could possibly cooperate on a state or national level with a Left Party that is "anti-American and anti-European." (Note: In Saarland and Thuringia the option BERLIN 00001106 002 OF 003 exists for the SPD to form a governing coalition with the Left Party. END NOTE.) CSU Truce with FDP? ------------------- ¶5. (C) CSU Bavarian Minister-President Horst Seehofer threw his party's support behind a CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP, despite his well-publicized doubts about the FDP's real coalition intentions after the parliamentary elections. Even as Seehofer pronounced his support for the FDP in Duesseldorf, however, media reports from Munich confirmed that the CSU had decided to continue attacking the FDP. The CSU has been buffing its economic bona fides by attacking the FDP on its own themes while basking in the reflected glory from popular Economics Minister zu Guttenberg, the new CSU champion. Seehofer has publicly suspected that FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle -- in an attempt to enter government at all costs -- might support a "traffic light" coalition with the SPD and the Greens, although this political constellation appears unlikely at present. In addition, Bavarian politics trump national politics, especially during a time when the CSU longs for the days when their party alone wielded political power in Munich, rather than as it does today, in a coalition with the FDP. Seehofer is also aware that the CSU needs to be strong and the FDP proportionally more weak for the CSU to win more and better ministerial posts in a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. He did not use his appearance in Duesseldorf to chide the FDP, to the great delight of those pleading that recent CDU/CSU-FDP bickering had been harmful and counter-productive during the campaign. AFGHANISTAN - A DOMESTIC CAMPAIGN ISSUE? ---------------------------------------- ¶6. (C) The September 4 air strike against two fuel tankers near Kunduz, Afghanistan hit the press right before the CDU/CSU rally. In light of the German media's frenzy, PolOff asked the CDU's Head of International Relations Klemens Moemkes whether Germany's ISAF commitment might emerge as a potential domestic campaign issue. Moemkes noted that the SPD could make Afghanistan an issue but this would be very odd given Foreign Minister Steinmeier's support for Germany's military role in ISAF. However, the prospect of Afghanistan becoming a major theme clearly had the CDU's xxxxx spooked. He told PolOff that it would be very difficult for the Chancellor not to address Germany's role in Afghanistan in the coming weeks. Given the German public's overwhelming support for a withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan, this was not an issue the Chancellor wanted to address in the run-up to the parliamentary elections. COMMENT ------- ¶7. (C) While it is all but certain that Chancellor Merkel will return to office as Chancellor after the next parliamentary elections on September 27, it is too close to call whether she will achieve a coalition with the FDP. Bavarian MP Seehofer's attacks on the FDP in Bavaria could weaken that party there and further undermine the chances of a coalition. The FDP wants the same but political bickering over future ministerial positions and CSU attacks on the FDP in Bavaria and on FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle suggest that a possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition will not be a marriage made in heaven. Some FDP contacts admit that they harbor doubts about the Chancellor's promise to form a coalition with the FDP. They insinuate that in reality she may prefer another Grand Coalition with the SPD, although Chancellor Merkel has used every public opportunity to advertise for a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. Backing down on this pledge would call into question her reputation. ¶8. (C) Paradoxically, however, it is the CDU/CSU's relative weakness in the polls (35-36 percent) that threatens a possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. The FDP is clearly riding on a high with double-digit successes in the state elections of Saarland, Saxony, and Thuringia, but this may not be enough. The CDU refuses to engage in any self-introspection after its defeats in Saarland and Thuringia and the party can really only take comfort from the SPD's perennial weakness. The fear in the CDU is acute that the Chancellor's high popularity ratings may not be enough to ensure a comfortable win for the CDU/CSU at the parliamentary elections. ¶9. (C) Merkel, once again, vehemently denies any intention to form a Grand Coalition with the SPD but the electoral math on September 27 may force her -- despite intense CDU/CSU reservations, not to mention those of the German public -- to look at the SPD as a partner. As for the SPD, Steinmeier is BERLIN 00001106 003 OF 003 looking desperate. The SPD has failed to reach over 25 percent in the last six elections and Steinmeier's unlikely path to the chancellorship is only possible if he reneges on a campaign promise not to form a coalition with The Left Party. This will not happen in 2009 but the CDU/CSU will not tire of raising the fear of a red-red coalition in 2009 or in ¶2013. The Chancellor appears to be in a win-win situation but three weeks on the campaign trail can be an eternity. End comment. Murphy
TOP-SECRET: German Response U.S. National Intelligence
VZCZCXYZ0005 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #2157/01 3371918 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 031918Z DEC 07 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9945 INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0314 S e c r e t <> 002157 Sipdis Noforn Sipdis, state for p,t, nea/ir, isn, eur/ags E.o. 12958: decl: 12/03/2017 Tags: knnp, mnuc, parm, gm, ir Subject: german response u.s. National intelligence estimate on iran's nuclear program Ref: secstate 162558 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Jeff Rathke for reasons 1.4 (b)/(d) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Post delivered demarches to senior Chancellery and MFA officials on December 3. Both National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen and MFA State Secretary Reinhard Silberberg considered the assessment to be potentially "good news." Heusgen added that the Chancellery will seek additional assessments from its intelligence agency, and noted that the international community still had reason for concern about Iranian intentions, its unwillingness to disclose details of its nuclear programs and its continued enrichment. Heusgen also noted some concern about potential domestic political backlash, given the Chancellor's recent work to persuade German companies to withdraw from their Iran business dealings. Silberberg detailed German agreement to EU <> against Bank Melli, to be implemented by late January, calling the "new" policy a signal of German willingness to go beyond proliferation-related issues in application of <>, coupled with continued reticence at more wide-reaching measures for fear of harming the Iranian people. END SUMMARY. ----------------------------- chancellery response ----------------------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Ambassador delivered reftel points and nonpapers to National Security Advisor-equivalent Christoph Heusgen on December 3. Also present was Chancellery Senior Director-equivalent for Security Policy and Disarmament Geza von Geyr. Heusgen noted that he had just completed a telcon on the same subject with APNSA Hadley. (NOTE: Heusgen appeared still to be digesting his conversation with Hadley. He was initially negative, but his thinking became more positive and operationally focused during the conversation. END NOTE) Heusgen noted that German intelligence he had seen indicated a continued weaponization program; he has asked the BND chief for a new assessment. The BND will also conduct its weekly briefing on December 4 and will present their latest assessment. He added that Germany will not publicly react to the NIE. ¶3. (S/NF) Heusgen expressed concern about the timing of the information and potential political fallout, particularly in light of Chancellor Merkel's efforts to use moral suasion to convince German companies to end investment in Iran. In this regard, he noted that Chancellery Chief of Staff Thomas de Maziere is scheduled to meet on Wednesday with German Federation of Industry (BDI) chief Juergen Thumann and leaders of German energy giant E.ON regarding their interest in LNG in Iran. He added that DNI McConnell's scheduled visit to <> on December 4 is timely. ¶4. (S/NF) Heusgen noted that we still need to be alarmed about the Iranian intent and unwillingness to disclose their program, particularly given their continued enrichment and ballistic missile programs, evidenced by Iran's unveiling of the Ashura ballistic missile last week. He noted that the Chancellery will have to see to it that the public reaction to the NIE is a moderate one and to ensure that the focus is not only on the information on the Iranian nuclear weapons program, but also emphasizes that the IAEA sees many open points and that Iran has not abided by IAEA requests on enrichment and coming clean on its activities thus far. ¶5. (S/NF) In terms of further UNSCR <>, von Geyr added that in light of this information it will be harder to get Russia and China on board; Heusgen indicated that Kislyak's absence from the P5 1 Political Directors meeting on December 1 meant that Russia's intentions regarding a new UNSCR remain unclear. He once again repeated that he would be seeking assessments from other foreign intelligence agencies (naming the French) in addition to the NIE. It is necessary to remain vigilant on Iran because of Iran's continued failure to meet IAEA requirements, he said, as well as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad's public threats against Israel. In terms of <>, Heusgen added that with this acknowledgment from the U.S., perhaps Iran would be willing to suspend briefly. If this information is verified, why don't the Iranians suspend enrichment as they do not need it, he posited, having neither a weapons program nor power plants that could use enriched uranium. ¶6. (S/NF) Heusgen noted that the Chancellery would work with the MFA to develop a joint press line. Heusgen noted that President Bush and Chancellor Merkel are scheduled to discuss the topic tomorrow following Merkel's return from the CDU Party Convention being held in Hannover. Heusgen continued by repeating the German view on potential public statements: The Chancellery does not comment publicly on intelligence matters. If the news is confirmed it is good news about this aspect of the Iranian program, but it is also another reason to urge Iran to stop enrichment. Von Geyr added that much must still be clarified by the Iranians; the IAEA report shows many open points. ---------------------------- foreign ministry response ---------------------------- ¶7. (S/NF) DCM conveyed reftel points to MFA State Secretary Silberberg, and left them as non-papers. Silberberg said it was "good news" the US intelligence community had concluded that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program due to international scrutiny and <> as of fall 2003 and had not resumed the program as of mid-2007. ¶8. (S/NF) With regard to further steps against Tehran's defiance of the Security Council, Silberberg went on, the German government has agreed to move ahead with designation of Bank Melli, though not immediately. Germany, France, and the UK, he said, have agreed to work now toward a quick resolution in the Security Council, and detect some positive signs from the Russian side. If the UNSCR effort succeeds, the <> it contains will nonetheless be weak, and the EU-3 will seek to supplement them with EU measures by the end of December, including the designation of Bank Melli. Asked about the timeline for EU autonomous <>, including designation of Bank Melli, should the Security Council fail to pass a third <> resolution, Silberberg said this could come at the end of January. He described his own role, and that of the MFA, as "active" in securing agreement to this approach from the ministries of finance and economy and the Chancellery. Key elements of this "new" German policy were (1) willingness to go beyond proliferation-related issues in application of <> and (2) judgment that it is "not yet" time for total economic and financial isolation of Iran, as this would harm the Iranian people disproportionately. Silberberg noted that debate continued in the EU on possible designation of Bank Saderat, but Germany believed that to do so now, in conjunction with designating Bank Melli, would move too far in the direction of a total embargo. Timken jr
SECRET: GERMAN RESPONSE CONCERNING EXPORT OF WELDING
VZCZCXYZ0012 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #1784 2631530 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 201530Z SEP 07 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9336 INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0198 RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0078 S E C R E T BERLIN 001784 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/MTR AND EUR E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017 TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MTCRE KSCA GM IR EI SUBJECT: (S) GERMAN RESPONSE CONCERNING EXPORT OF WELDING MACHINE TO IRANIAN MISSILE PROCUREMENT AGENT REF: A. BERLIN 1468 ¶B. STATE 99879 Classified By: Global Affairs Counselor Donald R. Shemanski for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) German MFA Export Control Division Desk Officer Wiebke Wacker delivered a German-language nonpaper to Global Affairs officer September 19. The nonpaper responds to ref B demarche informing German authorities that the German firm Trumpf GmbH & Co., working with Ireland's Mac Aviation Group, offered a model TLC-1005 five-axis laser cutting and welding machine to Iran's Ariasa AG. Wacker said officials from the German Federal Office of Economics and Export Controls (BAFA) had sensitized Trumpf representatives to the case. She stated the firm subsequently stopped processing the order. ¶2. (S) Begin text of informal Embassy translation of German nonpaper: With reference to your nonpaper of July 19, 2007 concerning the export of a five-axis laser cutting and welding machine by the German firm Trumpf from Germany via Ireland and Malaysia to Iran, we take this opportunity to bring the following information to the attention of the U.S. authorities: -- We thank you for the information in connection with the proposed delivery of a welding machine by the German firm Trumpf via Ireland and Malaysia to the Iranian firm Ariasa AG. -- The Trumpf firm was sensitized by BAFA officials. The firm confirmed the existence of a related inquiry, which came from the firm IIT Trading Group, probably acting on behalf of Mac Aviation Group. The inquiry was presented to TGB, an Irish subsidiary of Trumpf. According to information provided to Trumpf, the machine was intended for use by Mac Aviation in Malaysia. -- German authorities' communication and contact records indicate that the Trumpf firm has not to date communicated with Iranian entities. -- Trumpf has stopped processing the order and assured BAFA it will apply for an export license in the event the firm pursues the matter further. We look forward to continuing our excellent cooperation in the field of export controls. End text of informal Embassy translation of German nonpaper. TIMKEN JR
TOP-SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY OF BILL CLINTON: DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL BOXES
TOP-SECRET: U.S. ESPIONAGE AND INTELLIGENCE
U.S. ESPIONAGE AND INTELLIGENCE

Organization, Operations, and Management, 1947-1996
In the aftermath of World War II, with the Cold War looming on the horizon, the United States began the process of developing an elaborate peacetime intelligence structure that would extend across a number of government departments. The operations of the U.S. intelligence community during the Cold War would range from running single agents, to marshaling the talents of thousands to build and deploy elaborate spy satellites.
The end of the Cold War brought major changes, but not the end of the U.S. government’s requirement for an elaborate intelligence structure. A number of intelligence organizations have been consolidated or altogether eliminated. New organizations have been established to provide more coherent management of activities ranging from military espionage, to imagery collection, to the procurement of airborne intelligence systems. The end of the Cold War has brought about the declassification of much information about intelligence organization and espionage activities that took place prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Focus of the Collection
U.S. Espionage and Intelligence: Organization, Operations, and Management, 1947-1996 publishes together for the first time recent unclassified and newly declassified documents pertaining to the organizational structure, operations, and management of the U.S. intelligence community over the last fifty years, cross-indexed for maximum accessibility. This set reproduces on microfiche 1,174 organizational histories, memoranda, manuals, regulations, directives, reports, and studies, representing over 36,102 pages of documents from the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, military service intelligence organizations, National Security Council and other organizations.
U.S. Espionage and Intelligence presents a unique look into the internal workings of America’s intelligence community. The documents gathered here shed further light on U.S. intelligence organization and activities during the Cold War, and describe the consolidation and reevaluation of the intelligence community in the post-Cold War era. They are drawn from diverse sources, including the National Archives, manuscript collections in the Library of Congress, court files of major espionage prosecutions, presidential libraries, and most importantly, Freedom of Information Act requests. The result of this effort is an authoritative documents publication which, together with the National Security Archive’s previous collection on the structure and operations of the U.S. intelligence community, The U.S. Intelligence Community: 1947-1989, published in early 1990, provides a comprehensive record of U.S. espionage and intelligence activities since World War II.
U.S. Espionage and Intelligence provides a wealth of information and documentation on key aspects of intelligence organization and operations during and after the Cold War, including such extraordinary topics as:
- the evolution of the CIA
- the development and operation of key reconnaissance systems (SR-71, CORONA)
- the consolidation of Defense Department intelligence
- intelligence performance during the Persian Gulf War
- damage assessments of Aldrich Ames’ espionage activities
Significance of the Collection
The U.S. intelligence community has played a key role in advising presidents from Harry Truman to Bill Clinton on the intentions and activities of the Soviet Union, as well as of other nations. It also came to absorb a significant portion of the federal budget, reaching an approximate high of $30 billion in the late 1980s.
U.S. Espionage and Intelligence allows scholars direct access to the newly declassified, detailed primary documents that contain the history of the military, diplomatic, and intelligence components of the Cold War, and which go far beyond what is available in secondary sources. This new information is essential for reaching an accurate understanding of what was happening behind the scenes and how it related to the more public aspects of Cold War policy and operations.
The material contained in this set concerning the post-Cold War era is crucial in assessing the intelligence community’s performance in critical areas such as the Persian Gulf War and the Aldrich Ames case. The material is also vital in understanding the evolution of the intelligence community since the end of the Cold War and its possible future–for that evolution may significantly influence the ability of the intelligence community to deal with critical threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.
One-Stop Access to Critical Documents
It would take a monumental effort, as well as many thousands of dollars, to duplicate the information contained in this collection. U.S. Espionage and Intelligenceallows a researcher– whether interested in the CIA, military intelligence, intelligence performance in the Persian Gulf War, or post-Cold War intelligence reform–to use one source at one location to access the thousands of pages of declassified material on the U.S. intelligence community available in this set.
Through U.S. Espionage and Intelligence the researcher gains access to a wide variety of documents: internal histories of the CIA and a variety of military intelligence organizations; program histories of the SR-71 and CORONA; director of central intelligence and Department of Defense directives establishing organizations such as the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency; plans for the consolidation and reform of Defense intelligence organizations after the Cold War and memoranda implementing the reforms; and assessments of intelligence community performance in a number of areas.
In-depth Indexing Makes Every Document Accessible
The National Security Archive prepares extensive printed finding aids for its collections. In- depth indexing offers users remarkable ease and precision of access to every document in the set. The printed Index provides document-level access to subjects, individuals, and organizations, and represents a major research contribution in itself. Important transactions within each document are indexed individually using a controlled subjects vocabulary.
The Guide includes an essay, events chronology, glossaries of key individuals, organizations, and terms, document catalog, and a bibliography of secondary sources.
Research Vistas
With its depth of documentary detail, the collection enables researchers to explore
- U.S. intelligence performance
- Cold War history
- evolution of the U.S. intelligence community and its components
- U.S. intelligence collection activities
The Collection is a Necessity For:
- Scholars and students of
- intelligence
- national security organization and operations
- Cold War history
- Journalists
- Librarians and bibliographers
- Concerned citizens
Sample Document Titles
01/15/62 Legal Basis for Cold-War Activities, Lawrence Houston, [Classification Excised] Memorandum
03/27/64 Directive 5105.23, National Reconnaissance Office, Department of Defense, Top Secret Directive 05/23/67 Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro, Central Intelligence Agency, Secret Memorandum
07/00/73 Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, 26 February 1953-29 November 1961, Central Intelligence Agency, Top Secret Biographic Sketch
00/00/82 History of the Navy HUMINT Program, United States Navy, Top Secret History
03/15/91 Plan for Restructuring Defense Intelligence, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, and Communication Intelligence, Secret Report
01/06/92 Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness, Director of Central Intelligence, [Classification Excised] Memorandum
06/01/92 DCID 2/9, Management of National Imagery Intelligence, Director of Central Intelligence, Secret Intelligence Directive
09/00/92 Appendixes A, B, and C to the Final Report: National Reconnaissance Program Task Force for the Director of Central Intelligence, National Reconnaissance Program Task Force, Secret Report
12/18/92 Directive 5200.37, Centralized Management of Department of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Operations, Department of Defense, [Classification Unknown] Directive
08/00/93 Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm, House Committee on Armed Services, [Classification Unknown] Report
01/21/94 A Description of Procedures and Findings Related to the Report of the U.S. Environmental Task Force, King Publishing, Paper
12/07/95 Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence on the Clandestine Services and the Damage Caused by Aldrich Ames, Director of Central Intelligence, Statement
03/01/96 Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence, Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Report
12/19/96 United States of America v. Harold J. Nicholson, Superseding Indictment, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Indictment
Overview
Title
U.S. Espionage and Intelligence: Organization, Operations, and Management, 1947-1996
Content
Reproduces on microfiche 1,174 U.S. government records totaling 36,102 pages of documentation concerning the organizational structure, operations, and management of the intelligence community from World War II to the present.
Materials were identified, obtained, assembled, and indexed by the National Security Archive.
Series
The Special Collections
Arrangement
Microfiche are arranged chronologically. For ease of use, each document bears a unique accession number to which all indexing is keyed.
Standards
The documents are reproduced on 35mm silver halide archivally permanent positive microfiche conforming to NMA and BSI standards. Any microfiche found to be physically substandard in any way will be replaced free of charge.
Indexing
A printed Guide and Index accompanies the microfiche collection. The Guide contains an events chronology, glossaries, chronological document catalog and a bibliography of secondary sources. The Index provides in-depth, document level access to subjects and individuals.
Date of Publication
April 1997
U.S. Espionage and Intelligence Project Staff
Project Director
Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson, project director, is a senior fellow at the National Security Archive and coordinates the Archive’s projects on U.S. policy toward China and ongoing documentation on U.S. intelligence issues. He previously edited the Archive’s collections on presidential national security documents, the history of the U.S. intelligence community, and the military uses of space. A former associate professor at American University, he received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Rochester. Among his many books are Sword and Shield: Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus (1986), American Espionage and the Soviet Target (1988), America’s Secret Eyes in Space (1990), and A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (1995). His articles have appeared in a wide variety of professional journals and in publications ranging from Scientific American to the Washington Post. He is a regular commentator on intelligence and military issues for national television and radio.
Project Staff
Michael Evans, Research Assistant
Jane Gefter, Research Assistant
Michael Watters, Research Assistant
U.S. Espionage and Intelligence Advisory Board
Christopher Andrew, Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge author, For the President’s Eyes Only
Loch Johnson, Department of Political Science, University of Georgia author, Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World
David Wise, author, Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for $4.6 Million
Praise for U.S. Espionage and Intelligence, 1947-1996
“Serious students of the structure and operations of American intelligence rely on the work of the National Security Archive. The new collection of intelligence documents, compiled for the Archive by Jeffrey T. Richelson, helps to pierce the labyrinth.”
David Wise
Author of Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for $4.6 Million
“An invaluable supplement to the National Security Archive’s previous collection, The U.S. Intelligence Community 1947-1989, this brings the most recently declassified documents to the reader. Jeffrey Richelson’s useful introduction also serves to detail changes that have occurred in the structure of the U.S. espionage establishment.”
John Prados
Author of Presidents’ Secret Wars
JURICON ÜBER DIE VERBRECHERLAUFBAHNEN UND STASI-VERGANGENHEIT DER “GoMoPa”
DIE ALTEN STASI-TRICK VON “GoMoPa” – FÄLSCHEN, BETRÜGEN, VERTUSCHEN UND RUFMORDEN
Beweis: Wie “GoMoPa” Meridian Capital erpresst hat und Maurischat von Interpol und BKA festgenommen wurde – Verwirrspiele nach STASI-Muster
Nachfolgend bringen wir eine Original-Pressemeldung von „GoMoPa“, dem „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ mit dem Meridian Capital, London, erpresst werden sollte. Der Artikel strotzt nur von Fehlern. Damit ist deutlich, dass „GoMoPa“ tatsäch Meridian Capital erpresst hat und die Aktionen von Meridian Capital sich gegen „GoMoPa“ gerichtet haben.
Die gefälschte Pressemitteilung von Meridian Capital in Bezug auf unser Haus soll von dem „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ „GoMoPa“ ablenken.
„GoMopa“ schreibt:
08.09.2008
Weltweite Finanzierungen mit Widersprüchen
Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt an, weltweite Finanzierungen anbieten zu können und präsentiert sich hierbei auf aufwendig kreierten Webseiten. GOMOPA hat die dort gemachten Angaben analysiert und Widersprüche entdeckt.
Der Firmensitz
Der Firmensitz befindet sich laut eigener Aussage in Dubai, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate. In einem GOMOPA vorliegenden Schreiben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. heißt es jedoch, der Firmensitz sei in London. Auf der Homepage des Unternehmens taucht die Geschäftsadresse in der Londoner Old Broad Street nur als „Kundenabteilung für deutschsprachige Kunden“ auf. Eine weitere Adresse in der englischen Hauptstadt, diesmal in der Windsor Avenue, sei die „Abteilung der Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren“.
Die Meridian Capital Enterprises ist tatsächlich als „Limited“ (Ltd.) mit Sitz in England und Wales eingetragen. Aber laut Firmenhomepage hat das Unternehmen seinen „rechtlichen Geschäftssitz“ in Dubai. Eine Abfrage beim Gewerbeamt Dubais (DED) zu dieser Firmierung bleibt ergebnislos.
Bemerkenswert ist auch der vermeintliche Sitz in Israel. Auf der Webseite von Meridian Capital Enterprises heißt es: „Die Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist im Register des israelischen Justizministeriums unter der Nummer 514108471, gemäß dem Gesellschaftsrecht von 1999, angemeldet.“ Hierzu Martin Kraeter, Gomopa-Partner und Prinzipal der KLP Group Emirates in Dubai: „Es würde keinem einzigen Emirati – geschweige denn einem Scheich auch nur im Traum einfallen, direkte Geschäfte mit Personen oder Firmen aus Israel zu tätigen. Und schon gar nicht würde er zustimmen, dass sein Konterfei auch noch mit vollem Namen auf der Webseite eines Israelischen Unternehmens prangt.“
Auf der Internetseite sind diverse Fotos mit Scheichs an Konferenztischen zu sehen. Doch diese großen Tagungen und großen Kongresse der Meridian Capital Enterprises werden in den Pressearchiven der lokalen Presse Dubais mit keinem Wort erwähnt.
Martin Kraeter: „ Ein ‚britisch-arabisch-israelisches bankfremdes Finanzinstitut sein zu wollen, wie die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. es darstellt, ist mehr als zweifelhaft. So etwas gibt es schlicht und ergreifend nicht! Der Nahostkonflikt schwelt schon seit mehr als 50 Jahren. Hier in den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) werden Israelis erst gar nicht ins Land gelassen. Israelische Produkte sind gebannt. Es gibt nicht einmal direkte Telefonverbindungen. Die VAE haben fast 70% der Wiederaufbaukosten des Libanon geschultert, nachdem Israel dort einmarschiert ist.“
Zwei angebliche Großinvestitionen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in Dubai sind Investmentruinen bzw. erst gar nicht realisierte Projekte. Das Unternehmen wirbt mit ihrer finanziellen Beteiligung an dem Dubai Hydropolis Hotel und dem Dubai Snowdome.
Der Aktivitätsstatus der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist laut englischen Handelsregister (UK Companies House) „dormant“ gemeldet. Auf der Grundlage des englischen Gesellschaftsrechts können sich eingetragene Unternehmen selbst „dormant“ (schlafend) melden, wenn sie keine oder nur unwesentliche buchhalterisch zu erfassende Transaktionen vorgenommen haben. Dies ist angesichts der angeblichen globalen Investitionstätigkeit der Meridian Capital Ltd. sehr erstaunlich.
Der Webauftritt
Die Internetseite der MCE ist sehr aufwendig gestaltet, die Investitionen angeblich in Millionen- und Milliardenhöhe. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Präsentationselemente fällt jedoch auf, dass es sich bei zahlreichen veröffentlichen Fotos, die Veranstaltungen der Meridian Capital Enterprises dokumentieren sollen, meist um Fotos von Online-Zeitungen oder frei zugänglichen Medienfotos einzelner Institutionen handelt wie z.B. der Börse Dubai.
Auf der Internetpräsenz befinden sich Videofilmchen, die eine frappierende Ähnlichkeit mit dem Werbematerial von NAKHEEL aufweisen, dem größten Bauträger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. Doch den schillernden Videos über die berühmten drei Dubai Palmen „Jumeirah, Jebel Ali und Deira“ oder das Archipel „The World“ wurden offensichtlich selbstproduzierte Trailersequenzen der Meridian Capital Enterprises vorangestellt. Doch könnte es sich bei den Werbevideos um Fremdmaterial handeln.
Auch die auf der Webseite wahllos platzierten Fotos von bekannten Sehenswürdigkeiten Dubais fungieren als Augenfang für den interessierten Surfer mit eigenem Finanzierungswunsch. Bei einem Volumen von 10 Millionen Euro oder höher präsentiert sich die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. als der passende Investitionspartner. Das Unternehmen verfügt weltweit über zahlreiche Standorte: Berlin, London, Barcelona, Warschau, Moskau, Dubai, Riad, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong und New York. Aber nahezu alle Standorte sind lediglich Virtual Offices eines global arbeitenden Büroservice-Anbieters. „Virtual Office“ heißt im Deutschen schlicht „Briefkastenfirma“. Unter solchen Büroadressen sollen laut Meridian Capital Enterprises ganze Kommissionen ansässig sein, alles zum Wohle des Kunden.“
Zitatende
Dies ist das altbekannte Muster des „NACHRCHTENDIENSTES“ „GoMoPa“ und seiner Berliner und Hamburger Komplizen Falschmeldungen zu verbreiten, um Firmen und Personen erpressen oder ausschalten zu können.
OTHER GOMOPA
SATURDAY, JULY 11, 2009
KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN DETENTION
KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN HAFT – DownloadGerman VersionHere is a Google Translation (German -> English)
Sunday 18 Januar 2009 January 2009
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI: Original Knights of the KKK – Ku-Klux-Klan
CONFIDENTIAL: VZCZCXYZ0005 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #1542/01 3191825 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 141825Z NOV 08 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2636 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001542 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV AF RS GG UP GM SUBJECT: GERMANY REMAINS STUBBORN ON MAP AND ADDITIONAL TROOPS FOR AFGHANISTAN Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 ( B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Top German government officials emphasized to visiting USNATO Ambassador Kurt Volker November 10-11 that Germany remains strongly opposed to granting Ukraine and Georgia member action plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. While open to giving the applicant countries a “navigation aid” or action plan to help guide their reforms, Germany is not ready at this point to substitute this “navigation aid” for MAP — it wants to keep open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership. Volker warned that adding an additional hurdle to the accession process would give the impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest commitment and capitulating to Russian pressure. German officials also stressed that over the next year, they had little political flexibility for increasing the number of German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF parliamentary mandate approved last month. In response to MFAs view that the April 2009 NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit should be primarily an anniversary meeting and avoid “confrontational issues,” Volker emphasized the need to address key questions like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the east. The Germans are disdainful of Medvedevs European security proposal, but they believe they have to “deal with it” and are hopeful that discussing it can “improve the atmosphere” with Russia. While warning against “cornering” Russia in regards to MAP and the conflict with Georgia, Germans have been very critical of Medvedevs announcement about stationing short-range missiles in Kaliningrad. END SUMMARY. INTERLOCUTORS ¶2. (U) During his November 10-11 visit to Berlin, USNATO Ambassador Volker met separately with National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen, MFA State Secretary Reinhard Silberberg and MOD Parliamentary Secretary Christian Schmidt. He also met with a number of key parliamentarians, including Christian Democratic Union (CDU) foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von Klaeden, Christian Social Union (CSU) Secretary General Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, Social Democratic Party (SPD) defense policy spokesman Rainer Arnold, Greens defense policy spokesman Winfried Nachtwei, Free Democratic Party (FDP) foreign policy spokesman Werner Hoyer and Deputy Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD). MAP FOR GEORGIA/UKRAINE ¶3. (C) Both Heusgen and Silberberg reiterated Germanys strong opposition to granting Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. Silberberg said flatly that “no decision can be taken” in December, making reference to the Bucharest Summit declaration that this should be only a “first review.” Noting that both countries have “lots of deficits,” Heusgen said that Ukraine was “a nightmare” because of ongoing political turmoil and that Georgia lacked a multiparty system and was not truly a pluralistic society. Silberberg said that because of its role in the August conflict with Russia, Germany considered Georgia to be “further from MAP” than it was before. However, both agreed with Volker that the Alliance could not be seen backing away from its Bucharest commitment that both countries would one day become members of NATO. They also conceded that NATO had to avoid giving the perception that Russia, in using force against Georgia, had successfully drawn a new line across Europe and had achieved an unchallenged sphere of influence. They proposed repeating the Bucharest language at the December ministerial and “coming back to this later.” ¶4. (C) Heusgen also favored giving the two applicant countries a “clear idea” of what they needed to do. Heusgen said that when Chancellor Merkel visited Kyiv in July, she had proposed setting up a “navigation aid” or action plan to help guide Ukraine in making the necessary reforms, but had never received a response. Heusgen emphasized, however, that Germany was not ready at this point to substitute this “navigation aid” for MAP — it wanted to keep open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership. He expressed concern that the applicant countries, especially Ukraine, could start clamoring immediately for membership after satisfying the technical requirements in an action plan. Along the same lines, Silberberg said the Alliance had to make clear to the applicants that the final decision on membership was political, not technical, and not automatic based on fulfilling a checklist. Volker welcomed creative thinking on the way forward, but said that adding an additional hurdle to the accession process would give the impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest commitment and could allow Russia to claim “victory.” ¶5. (C) In separate meetings with leading parliamentarians from all the major parties, no one expressed support for moving forward with MAP for Georgia and Ukraine. Most had extremely negative opinions of Georgian President Saakashvili, variously describing him as “crazy,” “a hot head,” and “dangerous.” The general opinion was that Saakashvili was as much at fault for the outbreak of the August war as Russia. Volker challenged this view and reminded them that Russias provocative acts and pressure had set the stage for the conflict. The parliamentarians also worried that pursuing MAP would “corner the Russians” and make them less cooperative on important questions like Afghanistan, Iran, energy, etc. AFGHANISTAN ¶6. (C) Every government interlocutor, including Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt, emphasized that over the next year, through the Bundestag election in September 2009, Germany had little political flexibility for increasing the number of German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF parliamentary mandate approved last month. Silberberg said flatly: “Were in the north and were staying there.” With regard to getting Germany to send combat troops to the south, he advised: “Dont try it. It wont happen.” Heusgen was relaxed about possible U.S. requests to do more, asserting that when Obama visited Berlin in July, he had indicated that he was “perfectly happy” with the German contribution. Silberberg claimed that the SPD-controlled MFA was more receptive than the CDU-controlled MOD about deploying German forces outside the north. He said, for example, that the MFA had pushed for embedded German trainers (OMLTs) to be allowed to deploy outside the north with their assigned Afghan National Army (ANA) units, but that MOD had refused. ¶7. (C) While generally ruling out new military contributions to Afghanistan, Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt confirmed that Germany planned to support and participate in the proposed deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft to Afghanistan, which will require the government to seek a stand-alone mandate from the Bundestag. In separate meetings, parliamentarians confirmed that there was broad support for the AWACS mission. Silberberg warned, however, that any connection made between the AWACS and the controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan could be a “problem” in obtaining Bundestag approval. He indicated that he had already passed this concern on to SACEUR GEN Craddock. ¶8. (C) Volker noted that new CENTCOM Commander GEN Patreus was currently conducting a strategic review of the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. It was possible the review might recommend to the incoming Administration the deployment of significantly more troops and other resources to meet the current challenges. In that event, the U.S. would almost certainly turn to its European Allies to help shoulder the burden and to get behind a single, unified effort. If additional combat troops were out of the question, Volker encouraged German officials to think creatively about what other military contributions Germany could make, such as deploying additional helicopters and MEDEVAC assets on a country-wide basis, or widening its deployment area by erasing the dividing line between regional commands north and west. ¶9. (C) SPD Defense Policy Spokesman Rainer Arnold gave the standard line that Germany had no more armored helicopters to deploy and probably would not have any until the next generation of NH-90 and Tiger helicopters was delivered. Schmidt revealed, however, that Germany had recently launched a program to armor eight additional C-53 helicopters. (Comment: Germany has some 80 CH-53 helicopters, but only 20 of them are armored and suitable for operating in a combat environment. Germany currently has six armored C-53s in Afghanistan and claims that it cannot afford to deploy additional ones until the inventory of armored helicopters is increased. End Comment.) Schmidt also noted that he planned to talk to the Bavarian interior minister about sending Bavarian policemen to Afghanistan to serve as trainers for the Afghan National Police. (Comment: Up to now, Bavaria has been one of the few German states that has declined to let its police officers serve in Afghanistan. End Comment.) ¶10. (C) Parliamentarians generally welcomed the prospect of greater U.S. attention and commitment to Afghanistan and agreed that Germany should increase its own efforts, especially in reconstruction and development and in the training of the Afghan national security forces. However, they echoed the view that there was little political maneuver room for Germany to increase its military contributions to Afghanistan over the next year, given the electoral season and low popular support for the mission. FDP foreign policy spokesman Hoyer pointed out that mistrust between the two Grand Coalition parties complicated matters. He thought Chancellor Merkel (CDU) would be very wary about taking an initiative to increase Germanys military contribution to Afghanistan before the Bundestag election, for fear of playing into the hands of her electoral rival, FM Steinmeier (SPD). SPD defense policy spokesman Arnold argued that deployment of German soldiers to the south and the likely resulting increase in German soldiers “killing and being killed” could put the whole deployment at risk. NATO SUMMIT ¶11. (C) Silberberg said Germany viewed next years Strasbourg/Kehl Summit as primarily a “family” anniversary meeting, largely without partners. There were no plans to invite Russian president Medvedev or to deal with “confrontational issues.” While Volker agreed that the summit offered an excellent opportunity to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Alliance and to recognize its role in Franco-German reconciliation, it could not just be a celebration. There had to be real substance. Key issues like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the east had to be addressed. Silberberg expressed some surprise that Russia would be on the agenda, but took the point. ¶12. (C) Volker also noted that some in Washington remained to be convinced about the wisdom of launching work on a new strategic concept at the summit, believing the exercise could prove divisive and distract the Alliance from more practical cooperation. Silberberg responded that there was too much momentum behind the idea of a new strategic concept to stop it now. He said Germany favored releasing a “short, political” Declaration on Alliance Security at the Summit to launch the strategic concept review. MEDVEDEVS PROPOSAL ON A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ¶13. (C) While acknowledging that Medvedevs proposal for a new European security architecture was hypocritical and did nothing to address current problems (like CFE and Georgia), Silberberg said that “we have to deal with it.” He noted that the proposal had come as a surprise to the Russian MFA, which had to scramble after the fact to propose some ideas for fleshing out the concept. He was disdainful of the content, but hopeful that discussing the proposal would “improve the atmosphere” with Russia. He complained that the current EU troika dialogue with Russia, where each side reads prepared statements, was not very useful. He also pressed for resumption of meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and for the NRC to be improved as a political forum. He suggested that the Alliance pre-coordinate in advance of NRC meetings and not hold internal political debates in front of the Russians. ¶14. (C) On Medvedevs proposal, Volker said there was already a pan-European security organization (the OSCE), so the Russians had to answer the question: where was the value-added? From the U.S. point of view, the Medvedev proposal appeared to be nothing more than the OSCE minus the Helsinki Accords, the Paris Charter, and the United States. The Russians should be forced to be specific on the substance of their proposal, and the forum for discussing this should be the OSCE in Vienna. Regarding the NRC, Volker noted the original intention had been to treat Russia as an equal partner. Given its aggression against Georgia, the U.S. would have trouble going back to that format for now, but agreed that dialogue with Russia should continue in some form. MISSILE DEFENSE ¶15. (C) Silberberg called Medvedevs November 5 announcement about deploying short-range rockets in Kaliningrad in response to U.S. MD plans as “simply stupid.” He noted that FM Steinmeier had immediately issued a public statement criticizing the announcement. It was clear that the timing, coming right after the U.S. presidential election, was deliberate and not a mistake. Silberberg noted that while his counterparts at the Russian MFA “seem very reasonable” on this issue, they are obviously “very far” from the locus of Russian decision-making. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ¶16. (U) Volker also participated in several public diplomacy events during his November 10-11 visit. On November 10, on the margins of the opening ceremony of the annual conference of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), he did separate interviews with Germanys two main public broadcasters, ARD and ZDF, responding to questions on NATO enlargement and the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Also on November 10, he participated in an hour-long panel discussion hosted by Deutschland Radio Kultur on the future of U.S. foreign policy following the U.S. elections. The roundtable, which included Luxembourg FM Jean Asselborn and German Deputy Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD), was broadcast live over radio and was recorded for broadcast by Phoenix television on November 15. ¶17. (U) On November 11, Volker participated in a panel discussion on NATO and the challenges of the eastern dimension, hosted by the U.S. Embassy before a audience of ¶180. The panel was one of six held simultaneously in various embassies in Berlin as part of the ATA annual conference. The other panelists included former Polish NATO Ambassador Jerzy Nowak and German foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von Klaeden (CDU). In a press conference in the U.S. Embassy at the conclusion of his visit, Volker took questions from six print journalists on Afghanistan, NATO enlargement, Georgia, and the NATO C-17 strategic airlift consortium. ¶18. (U) Ambassador Volker has reviewed and cleared this cable. TIMKEN JRGERMANY REMAINS STUBBORN ON MAP AND ADDITIONAL
VZCZCXYZ0005 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #1542/01 3191825 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 141825Z NOV 08 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2636 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001542 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV AF RS GG UP GM SUBJECT: GERMANY REMAINS STUBBORN ON MAP AND ADDITIONAL TROOPS FOR AFGHANISTAN Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 ( B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Top German government officials emphasized to visiting USNATO Ambassador Kurt Volker November 10-11 that Germany remains strongly opposed to granting Ukraine and Georgia member action plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. While open to giving the applicant countries a "navigation aid" or action plan to help guide their reforms, Germany is not ready at this point to substitute this "navigation aid" for MAP -- it wants to keep open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership. Volker warned that adding an additional hurdle to the accession process would give the impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest commitment and capitulating to Russian pressure. German officials also stressed that over the next year, they had little political flexibility for increasing the number of German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF parliamentary mandate approved last month. In response to MFAs view that the April 2009 NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit should be primarily an anniversary meeting and avoid "confrontational issues," Volker emphasized the need to address key questions like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the east. The Germans are disdainful of Medvedevs European security proposal, but they believe they have to "deal with it" and are hopeful that discussing it can "improve the atmosphere" with Russia. While warning against "cornering" Russia in regards to MAP and the conflict with Georgia, Germans have been very critical of Medvedevs announcement about stationing short-range missiles in Kaliningrad. END SUMMARY. INTERLOCUTORS ¶2. (U) During his November 10-11 visit to Berlin, USNATO Ambassador Volker met separately with National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen, MFA State Secretary Reinhard Silberberg and MOD Parliamentary Secretary Christian Schmidt. He also met with a number of key parliamentarians, including Christian Democratic Union (CDU) foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von Klaeden, Christian Social Union (CSU) Secretary General Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, Social Democratic Party (SPD) defense policy spokesman Rainer Arnold, Greens defense policy spokesman Winfried Nachtwei, Free Democratic Party (FDP) foreign policy spokesman Werner Hoyer and Deputy Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD). MAP FOR GEORGIA/UKRAINE ¶3. (C) Both Heusgen and Silberberg reiterated Germanys strong opposition to granting Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. Silberberg said flatly that "no decision can be taken" in December, making reference to the Bucharest Summit declaration that this should be only a "first review." Noting that both countries have "lots of deficits," Heusgen said that Ukraine was "a nightmare" because of ongoing political turmoil and that Georgia lacked a multiparty system and was not truly a pluralistic society. Silberberg said that because of its role in the August conflict with Russia, Germany considered Georgia to be "further from MAP" than it was before. However, both agreed with Volker that the Alliance could not be seen backing away from its Bucharest commitment that both countries would one day become members of NATO. They also conceded that NATO had to avoid giving the perception that Russia, in using force against Georgia, had successfully drawn a new line across Europe and had achieved an unchallenged sphere of influence. They proposed repeating the Bucharest language at the December ministerial and "coming back to this later." ¶4. (C) Heusgen also favored giving the two applicant countries a "clear idea" of what they needed to do. Heusgen said that when Chancellor Merkel visited Kyiv in July, she had proposed setting up a "navigation aid" or action plan to help guide Ukraine in making the necessary reforms, but had never received a response. Heusgen emphasized, however, that Germany was not ready at this point to substitute this "navigation aid" for MAP -- it wanted to keep open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership. He expressed concern that the applicant countries, especially Ukraine, could start clamoring immediately for membership after satisfying the technical requirements in an action plan. Along the same lines, Silberberg said the Alliance had to make clear to the applicants that the final decision on membership was political, not technical, and not automatic based on fulfilling a checklist. Volker welcomed creative thinking on the way forward, but said that adding an additional hurdle to the accession process would give the impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest commitment and could allow Russia to claim "victory." ¶5. (C) In separate meetings with leading parliamentarians from all the major parties, no one expressed support for moving forward with MAP for Georgia and Ukraine. Most had extremely negative opinions of Georgian President Saakashvili, variously describing him as "crazy," "a hot head," and "dangerous." The general opinion was that Saakashvili was as much at fault for the outbreak of the August war as Russia. Volker challenged this view and reminded them that Russias provocative acts and pressure had set the stage for the conflict. The parliamentarians also worried that pursuing MAP would "corner the Russians" and make them less cooperative on important questions like Afghanistan, Iran, energy, etc. AFGHANISTAN ¶6. (C) Every government interlocutor, including Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt, emphasized that over the next year, through the Bundestag election in September 2009, Germany had little political flexibility for increasing the number of German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF parliamentary mandate approved last month. Silberberg said flatly: "Were in the north and were staying there." With regard to getting Germany to send combat troops to the south, he advised: "Dont try it. It wont happen." Heusgen was relaxed about possible U.S. requests to do more, asserting that when Obama visited Berlin in July, he had indicated that he was "perfectly happy" with the German contribution. Silberberg claimed that the SPD-controlled MFA was more receptive than the CDU-controlled MOD about deploying German forces outside the north. He said, for example, that the MFA had pushed for embedded German trainers (OMLTs) to be allowed to deploy outside the north with their assigned Afghan National Army (ANA) units, but that MOD had refused. ¶7. (C) While generally ruling out new military contributions to Afghanistan, Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt confirmed that Germany planned to support and participate in the proposed deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft to Afghanistan, which will require the government to seek a stand-alone mandate from the Bundestag. In separate meetings, parliamentarians confirmed that there was broad support for the AWACS mission. Silberberg warned, however, that any connection made between the AWACS and the controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan could be a "problem" in obtaining Bundestag approval. He indicated that he had already passed this concern on to SACEUR GEN Craddock. ¶8. (C) Volker noted that new CENTCOM Commander GEN Patreus was currently conducting a strategic review of the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. It was possible the review might recommend to the incoming Administration the deployment of significantly more troops and other resources to meet the current challenges. In that event, the U.S. would almost certainly turn to its European Allies to help shoulder the burden and to get behind a single, unified effort. If additional combat troops were out of the question, Volker encouraged German officials to think creatively about what other military contributions Germany could make, such as deploying additional helicopters and MEDEVAC assets on a country-wide basis, or widening its deployment area by erasing the dividing line between regional commands north and west. ¶9. (C) SPD Defense Policy Spokesman Rainer Arnold gave the standard line that Germany had no more armored helicopters to deploy and probably would not have any until the next generation of NH-90 and Tiger helicopters was delivered. Schmidt revealed, however, that Germany had recently launched a program to armor eight additional C-53 helicopters. (Comment: Germany has some 80 CH-53 helicopters, but only 20 of them are armored and suitable for operating in a combat environment. Germany currently has six armored C-53s in Afghanistan and claims that it cannot afford to deploy additional ones until the inventory of armored helicopters is increased. End Comment.) Schmidt also noted that he planned to talk to the Bavarian interior minister about sending Bavarian policemen to Afghanistan to serve as trainers for the Afghan National Police. (Comment: Up to now, Bavaria has been one of the few German states that has declined to let its police officers serve in Afghanistan. End Comment.) ¶10. (C) Parliamentarians generally welcomed the prospect of greater U.S. attention and commitment to Afghanistan and agreed that Germany should increase its own efforts, especially in reconstruction and development and in the training of the Afghan national security forces. However, they echoed the view that there was little political maneuver room for Germany to increase its military contributions to Afghanistan over the next year, given the electoral season and low popular support for the mission. FDP foreign policy spokesman Hoyer pointed out that mistrust between the two Grand Coalition parties complicated matters. He thought Chancellor Merkel (CDU) would be very wary about taking an initiative to increase Germanys military contribution to Afghanistan before the Bundestag election, for fear of playing into the hands of her electoral rival, FM Steinmeier (SPD). SPD defense policy spokesman Arnold argued that deployment of German soldiers to the south and the likely resulting increase in German soldiers "killing and being killed" could put the whole deployment at risk. NATO SUMMIT ¶11. (C) Silberberg said Germany viewed next years Strasbourg/Kehl Summit as primarily a "family" anniversary meeting, largely without partners. There were no plans to invite Russian president Medvedev or to deal with "confrontational issues." While Volker agreed that the summit offered an excellent opportunity to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Alliance and to recognize its role in Franco-German reconciliation, it could not just be a celebration. There had to be real substance. Key issues like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the east had to be addressed. Silberberg expressed some surprise that Russia would be on the agenda, but took the point. ¶12. (C) Volker also noted that some in Washington remained to be convinced about the wisdom of launching work on a new strategic concept at the summit, believing the exercise could prove divisive and distract the Alliance from more practical cooperation. Silberberg responded that there was too much momentum behind the idea of a new strategic concept to stop it now. He said Germany favored releasing a "short, political" Declaration on Alliance Security at the Summit to launch the strategic concept review. MEDVEDEVS PROPOSAL ON A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ¶13. (C) While acknowledging that Medvedevs proposal for a new European security architecture was hypocritical and did nothing to address current problems (like CFE and Georgia), Silberberg said that "we have to deal with it." He noted that the proposal had come as a surprise to the Russian MFA, which had to scramble after the fact to propose some ideas for fleshing out the concept. He was disdainful of the content, but hopeful that discussing the proposal would "improve the atmosphere" with Russia. He complained that the current EU troika dialogue with Russia, where each side reads prepared statements, was not very useful. He also pressed for resumption of meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and for the NRC to be improved as a political forum. He suggested that the Alliance pre-coordinate in advance of NRC meetings and not hold internal political debates in front of the Russians. ¶14. (C) On Medvedevs proposal, Volker said there was already a pan-European security organization (the OSCE), so the Russians had to answer the question: where was the value-added? From the U.S. point of view, the Medvedev proposal appeared to be nothing more than the OSCE minus the Helsinki Accords, the Paris Charter, and the United States. The Russians should be forced to be specific on the substance of their proposal, and the forum for discussing this should be the OSCE in Vienna. Regarding the NRC, Volker noted the original intention had been to treat Russia as an equal partner. Given its aggression against Georgia, the U.S. would have trouble going back to that format for now, but agreed that dialogue with Russia should continue in some form. MISSILE DEFENSE ¶15. (C) Silberberg called Medvedevs November 5 announcement about deploying short-range rockets in Kaliningrad in response to U.S. MD plans as "simply stupid." He noted that FM Steinmeier had immediately issued a public statement criticizing the announcement. It was clear that the timing, coming right after the U.S. presidential election, was deliberate and not a mistake. Silberberg noted that while his counterparts at the Russian MFA "seem very reasonable" on this issue, they are obviously "very far" from the locus of Russian decision-making. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ¶16. (U) Volker also participated in several public diplomacy events during his November 10-11 visit. On November 10, on the margins of the opening ceremony of the annual conference of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), he did separate interviews with Germanys two main public broadcasters, ARD and ZDF, responding to questions on NATO enlargement and the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Also on November 10, he participated in an hour-long panel discussion hosted by Deutschland Radio Kultur on the future of U.S. foreign policy following the U.S. elections. The roundtable, which included Luxembourg FM Jean Asselborn and German Deputy Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD), was broadcast live over radio and was recorded for broadcast by Phoenix television on November 15. ¶17. (U) On November 11, Volker participated in a panel discussion on NATO and the challenges of the eastern dimension, hosted by the U.S. Embassy before a audience of ¶180. The panel was one of six held simultaneously in various embassies in Berlin as part of the ATA annual conference. The other panelists included former Polish NATO Ambassador Jerzy Nowak and German foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von Klaeden (CDU). In a press conference in the U.S. Embassy at the conclusion of his visit, Volker took questions from six print journalists on Afghanistan, NATO enlargement, Georgia, and the NATO C-17 strategic airlift consortium. ¶18. (U) Ambassador Volker has reviewed and cleared this cable. TIMKEN JR
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI: THE JOHN GOTTI FILES
John Joseph Gotti, Jr (October 27, 1940 – June 10, 2002) was an American mobster who became the Boss of the Gambino crime family in New York City. Gotti grew up in poverty. He and his brothers turned to a life of crime at an early age. Operating out of the Ozone Park neighborhood of Queens, Gotti quickly rose in prominence, becoming one of the crime family’s biggest earners and a protege of Gambino family underboss Aniello Dellacroce.
After the FBI indicted members of Gotti’s crew for selling narcotics, Gotti took advantage of growing dissent over the leadership of the crime family. Fearing that his men and himself would be killed by Gambino crime family Boss Paul Castellano for selling drugs, Gotti organized the murder of Castellano in December 1985 and took over the family shortly thereafter. This left Gotti as the boss of the most powerful crime family in America, which made hundreds of millions of dollars a year from construction, hijacking, loan sharking, gambling, extortion and other criminal activities. Gotti was the most powerful crime boss during his era and became widely known for his outspoken personality and flamboyant style, which eventually helped lead to his downfall. While his peers would go out of their way to shun attention, especially from the media, Gotti was known as the “The Dapper Don” for his expensive clothes and personality in front of news cameras. He was later given the nickname “The Teflon Don” because several attempts to convict him of crimes in the 1980s resulted in either a hung jury or an acquittal (i.e. the charges wouldn’t “stick”).
Gotti’s underboss Salvatore “Sammy the Bull” Gravano is credited with the FBI’s success in finally convicting Gotti. In 1991, Gravano agreed to turn state’s evidence and testify for the prosecution against Gotti after hearing Gotti on wiretap make several disparaging remarks about Gravano and questioning his loyalty. In 1992, Gotti was convicted of five murders, conspiracy to commit murder, racketeering, obstruction of justice, illegal gambling, extortion, tax evasion, and loansharking. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole and was transferred to United States Penitentiary, Marion. Gotti died of throat cancer on June 10, 2002 at the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri.
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI: THE WATERGATE FILES
TOP-SECRET FROM THE FBI-ARCHIVES:Senator Edward Moore “Ted” Kennedy
1136317-002 – 175A-WF-389 – Section 1 -942748
1136317-002 – 9-HQ-51213 – Section 1 -942755
1136317-002 – 9-HQ-51213 – Section 2 -942756
1136317-002 – 9-HQ-51213 EBF 2 – Section 1 -942759
1136317-002 – 9-HQ-51213 EBF 10 – Section 1 -942758
1136317-002 – 62-BS-4994 – Section 1 -942749
1136317-002 – 62-BS-5078 – Section 1 -942750
1136317-002 – 62-HQ-112941 – Section 1 -942752
1136317-002 – 62-HQ-112941 – Section 2 -942753
1136317-002 – 62-HQ-112941 – Section 3 -942754
1136317-002 – 62-HQ-112941 – Section 4 -942751
1136317-002 – 89-PX-250 – Section 1 -942746
1136317-002 – 94-HQ-55752 – Section 1 -942760
1136317-002 – 94-HQ-55752 – Section 2 -942761
1136317-002 – 94-HQ-55752 – Section 3 -942762
1136317-002 – 94-HQ-55752 – Section 4 -942763
1136317-002 – 94-HQ-55752 EBF 25 – Section 1 -942766
1136317-002 – 94-HQ-55752 EBF 95 – Section 1 -942767
1136317-003 – 197-BS-71824 -HQ- – Section 1 -967633- pages 250-290
1136317-003 – 197-BS-71824 -HQ- – Section 2 -967634
1136317-003 – 197-SL-178651 – Section 1 -967623- pages 1-249
1136317-003 – 197-BS-71824 -HQ- – Section 2 -967634
1136317-003 – 197-SL-178651 – Section 1 -967623- pages 1-249
1136317-003 – 197-SL-178651 – Section 2 -967624
Edward Moore “Ted” Kennedy (1932-2009) served as a U.S. senator from 1962 to 2009. The files below range from 1961 to 2001. The bulk of this material concerns FBI investigations into threats of violence and extortion claims against Senator Kennedy and other public officials. Parts 1 to 18 were previously released in 2010.
TOP-SECRET FROM THE CIA-ARCHIVES: Wartime Statutes – Instruments of Soviet Control- PART 2
TOP-SECRET FROM THE CIA-ARCHIVES: Wartime Statutes – Instruments of Soviet Control
1983_10_01_THE_SOVIET_UNIONS_CONTROL_OF_THE_WARSAW_PACT_FORCES
1979_07_18_LETTER_FROM_WARSAW_PACT
1979_07_18_LETTER_FROM_WARSAW_PACT
1978_03_21_STATUTE_ON_THE_COMBINED _ARMED_FORCES
1978_06_27_STATUTE_ON_THE_COMBINED_FLEET
1978_09_06_DRAFT_STATUTE_ON_THE_WARSAW_PACT
1979_05_11_REPORT_ON_THE_WARSAW_PACT_COOPERATION
PART TWO SOON
STRENG GEHEIM: DIREKTIVE DES INNENMINISTERIUMS ZUM SPERREN KINDERPORNOGRAPHISCHER SEITEN WIE “GoMoPa4KIDS”
TOP-SECRET: NEW WAZIRISTAN TERRORIST ALLIANCE
P 041421Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1740 INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY CIA WASHDC PRIORITY JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 000478 NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2034 TAGS: PREL PTER PK SUBJECT: NEW WAZIRISTAN TERRORIST ALLIANCE Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Rival Pakistani Taliban leaders Baitullah Mehsud, Maulvi Nazir, and Hafiz Gul Bahadur formed a new militant alliance on February 23. The new alliance recognizes Taliban leader Mullah Omar as its leader, and its goal is to fight the planned U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan. The Pakistani militant leaders will maintain their independent militants groups but will now facilitate cooperation in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan. It is too early to say how effective this new alliance will be in launching cross-border attacks against U.S./NATO forces in Afghanistan, but it does give the largest and most powerful Pakistani Taliban leaders unfettered access across North and South Waziristan. Formation of the alliance demonstrates that the GOP's tribal "divide and conquer" strategy is not working, at least not to our advantage. Civilian leaders are concerned about the continuing loss of government writ in the Waziristans after this agreement, but Pakistan's security forces may see few downsides to an alliance that focuses its attacks outside of Pakistan. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) On February 23, Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) leader Baitullah Mehsud signed a deal with two powerful rival Taliban commanders Maulvi Nazir of South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan. The three, according to press reports, have formed a new group called Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Unity Council), that they claim will unite them against external forces trying to divide the multiple Taliban groups based in Pakistan. They have formed a 13-member shura to run the affairs of the new alliance. The militants named Mullah Omar as their supreme leader, but the group did not choose a leader of its operational shura. According to a joint public statement, the militant leaders praised Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar as defenders of Islam and Muslims. The spokesman for Baitullah Mehsud, Mufti Waliullah, said that the three Taliban commanders would now operate from a single platform under the new alliance. Currently Baitullah Mehsud controls the eastern portion of South Waziristan, which is populated largely by Mehsud tribesmen. Maulvi Nazir is based out of the Ahmedzai Wazir area of South Waziristan on the agency's western border with Afghanistan. Hafiz Gul Bahadur leads his Utmanzai Wazir militants from Miram Shah, North Waziristan. ¶3. (C) The formation of the new alliance follows Baitullah Mehsud's December 2007 formation of TTP as an umbrella group to better coordinate pro-Taliban activities. The creation of the TTP was the merger of various Pakistani militant groups operating under disparate commands in different tribal agencies. The TTP alliance runs as a loose federation rather than a strictly controlled organization. Each of the militant leaders maintains a degree of autonomy and Baitullah Mehsud, as the strongest leader of Pakistani Taliban, lends his support and coordination to the various TTP subcommanders in places such as Bajaur and Swat. Nazir, who broke openly with Mehsud in the spring of 2007 (see para 6), was not a part of TTP. Bahadur, who had jockeyed with Mehsud for the title of pre-eminent local militant leader in the Waziristans, had maintained some distance from the TTP label before now. ¶4. (C) The new Mujahideen Unity Council will likely be another loose federation with each Taliban commander maintaining his own authority. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Secretariat Additional Chief Secretary Habibullah Khan expressed concern to Peshawar Principal Officer in a February 24 meeting that this new body provides all three militant leaders with unfettered access to all of South and North Waziristan. Baitullah Mehsud will be a main beneficiary of this new access, giving his fighters easier entry to the Afghanistan border through Maulvi Nazir's Wazir-held territory. Before the deal, Mehsud had limited access to the border from his portion of South Waziristan because he was blocked either by Maulvi Nazir or Gul Bahadur. While the alliance will not work as a tight top-down militant organization, it will facilitate access and coordination of various Pakistani Taliban as they cross into Afghanistan. ¶5. (C) While Khan had no hard facts, he detected the hand of the Haqqani network in bringing these rival commanders together. The new coordination, he feared, will allow the Taliban to focus on sending militants across the border into Afghanistan. Sirajuddin Haqqani also claimed in the press that he had convinced the three rival Taliban leaders to meet. Sirajuddin and his father Jalaluddin Haqqani lead much of the Taliban militancy in eastern Afghanistan. Sirajuddin often travels to the tribal areas of Pakistan, North Waziristan in particular, and has served as a mediator between these rival Taliban leaders. ¶6. (S/NF) In the past, the Pakistani government has supported Maulvi Nazir in an attempt to counter Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan. In the spring of 2007, an open break between Nazir and Mehsud took place over the presence of "Uzbek" fighters in South Waziristan. The disagreement culminated in an operation in which Pakistani security forces fought alongside Nazir's followers to oust Uzbeks from the area. While Nazir appeared to draw on genuine local anger and desire to remove "Uzbeks," his activities as an al-Qaida facilitator and promoter of cross-border attacks have always complicated Pakistani efforts to sell this episode as a "success" story. A South Waziristan-based contact told Principal Officer Peshawar on February 24 that Mehsud and Nazir are showing signs of getting past old disagreements and that "Uzbeks" are re-appearing in growing numbers in the area. ¶7. (SBU) According to Pakistani newspapers, Ahmedzai Wazir elders of South Waziristan, who are concerned about the new alliance and the possibility of "Uzbeks" coming back into their territory, questioned Maulvi Nazir about the deal with rival Mehsud. At a meeting in Wana, South Waziristan Maulvi Nazir assured the elders that each militant group will continue to have its own independent status and remain sovereign in their own territory. Nazir explained that the alliance was formed "only to act together against the United States" because the Taliban was concerned about the troop surge in Afghanistan, according to Pakistan press reports. The elders publicly cautioned Nazir that they would turn against him if this new deal brought any harm to their areas. ¶8. (C) While he did not touch on a possible ISI role in brokering this new alliance, Habibullah Khan noted that pressure has been building on the Pakistani military in the Waziristans. The Pakistani military and then Northwest Frontier Province Governor Orakzai quietly entered peace deals with North Waziristan commanders in December 2007 and with Baitullah Mehsud in February 2008 in order to achieve relative peace. Those agreements came after a series of high profile attacks on the military in the Waziristans, including the kidnapping of over 250 security forces by Baitullah Mehsud and Jan 2008 fighting at Ladha Fort in South Waziristan. While violence directed at the military in the Waziristans has been minor in the last few months, Peshawar observers regularly note that the military remains concerned with its ability to keep a lid on trouble in these two agencies. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani believes the respite offered by this latest agreement is necessary for his stretched forces to continue fighting in Bajaur and Mohmand agencies. However, the relative quiet in South and North Waziristan has allowed Baitullah Mehsud to increasingly send his fighters in other parts of the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province, including Swat. ¶9. (C) Khan also noted with deep dismay that this announcement demonstrates that these militant commanders see themselves in a strong enough position to form an alliance that takes them one step closer to a formal territorial takeover of the Waziristan as an "Islamic Emirate." South Waziristan contacts also commented that there is an increasing presence of Punjabi militants from Jaish-e Muhammad in the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan. (Comment: A development if accurate that is almost certainly of concern to the Pakistani military. It is significant that Baitullah Mehsud's strength and open militancy are drawing fighters from places such as southern Punjab.) ¶10. (C) As this new alliance formed, Mullah Omar ordered militants in North and South Waziristan to immediately stop their attacks on Pakistani security forces, according to press reports. Omar said in a letter to the militants, "If anybody really wants to wage jihad, they must fight the U.S. and NATO troops inside Afghanistan." The letter also stated that Omar was responsible for the agreement between Mehsud, Nazir, and Bahadur, and that after this agreement "the attacks on Pakistani security forces by the local Taliban will decrease if not end completely." Mullah Omar continues to exert considerable influence on the militants in South and North Waziristan. Halting attacks against Pakistani forces may increase the militants' safe haven space in Pakistan, allowing the militants to cross the border to attack NATO forces in Afghanistan. ¶11. (C) Comment: It is too early to predict how effective this new alliance will be in launching cross-border attacks on U.S./NATO forces, but its formation will provide the group with unfettered access to Afghanistan across North and South Waziristan. It is another indication that the GOP's tribal divide and conquer strategy against militants is not working, at least not to our advantage. Pakistan's security forces, however, may see limited downsides to an arrangement that focuses militant attacks outside of Pakistan.
SECRET: GERMANY’S NEW INTERIOR MINISTER FACES STEEP
VZCZCXYZ0005 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #1393/01 3081215 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 041215Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5677 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/HQ USEUCOM LO WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC RUKAAKA/USAREUR ACE DARMSTADT GE RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC S E C R E T BERLIN 001393 NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR, S/CT, L DHS FOR OIA SCARDAVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019 TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KHLS KJUS GM SUBJECT: GERMANY'S NEW INTERIOR MINISTER FACES STEEP LEARNING CURVE REF: A. BERLIN 1377 ¶B. BERLIN 1167 ¶C. BERLIN 988 ¶D. 2008 BERLIN 1455 ¶E. 2008 BERLIN 504 Classified By: Robert A. Pollard, Minister-Counselor for Economic Affai rs for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Germany's new federal interior minister, Thomas de Maiziere, is known for being a competent administrator who performed effectively over the past four years as the Chancellery Chief of Staff. De Maiziere is a close confidant of Chancellor Merkel, their professional relationship dates back to 1990, and he developed a reputation as a reliable crisis manager and interagency master over the past four years. Although de Maiziere previously served as a state interior minister in Saxony, he has less direct experience dealing with the international security issues - most prominently counterterrorism - that he will face as federal interior minister. Furthermore, de Maiziere is not known for being ideological or outspoken. In this respect, de Maiziere represents a marked change from his predecessor, powerhouse Wolfgang Schaeuble, who had strong views on security policy and was willing to endure considerable criticism to achieve his policy goals. We do not expect de Maiziere to push for further expanding law enforcement powers of police and/or security services. De Maiziere indicates that he intends to focus on integration of foreigners into German society and will continue the Ministry's Islam Conference, a controversial Schaeuble initiative that had advanced the country's discussion on immigration and discrimination issues. He also intends to promote the further integration of former east and west Germany. END SUMMARY An Aristocratic Westerner Makes His Name in the East --------------------------------------------- ------- ¶2. (U) De Maiziere, 55, is a lawyer by training who was born and raised in Bonn, but has spent nearly the last two decades in the eastern states of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony. He is a descendent of the noble Maiziere-les-Metz family who, as Huguenots, fled France for asylum in Prussia in the late seventeenth century. De Maiziere's father, Ulrich, was Inspector General of the German Armed Forces. His cousin, Lothar, was the last, and only democratically elected, Premier of the German Democratic Republic, who later served as a minister in the Kohl government. As a staffer in the offices of Berlin Governing Mayor Richard von Weizsacker, and later Eberhard Diepgen, de Maiziere participated in the negotiations on German reunification. After 1990, de Maiziere worked to re-establish democratic structures in eastern states starting first in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. From 1998 through 2005, de Maiziere served in Saxony as head of the State Chancery, and as Finance, Justice and Interior Minister. De Maiziere joined the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) as a student in 1972. De Maiziere won a direct mandate in the September 27 national parliamentary election and is now a member of the Bundestag representing the district of Meissen in Saxony. ¶3. (C) De Maiziere first met Angela Merkel in 1990 and his recommendation of her to his cousin Lothar de Maiziere is said to have facilitated her entry into CDU politics. Chancellor Merkel and de Maiziere are known to have a very close professional relationship and to share a similar sober and analytical approach to governing. De Maiziere is reported to have performed well throughout his tenure as Merkel's Chancellery Chief and Minister for Special Duties. As Chancellery Chief of Staff, de Maiziere was known as a consensus builder who understands and effectively works the interagency process, sometimes requiring competing ministers to resolve disputes among themselves. The Chancellor no doubt appreciated de Maiziere's efforts to shield her from these policy battles given her general propensity to stay above the fray and to express an opinion on an issue only when consensus has been reached at the cabinet level. De Maiziere Faces a Steep Learning Curve ---------------------------------------- ¶4. (C) De Maiziere's experience in eastern Germany helped him gain new responsibilities for the Federal Interior Ministry: the entire Department of Eastern German affairs has been moved from the Transportation and Urban Affairs Ministry to the Interior Ministry. In his remarks to ministry employees on his first day in office, de Maiziere said that with this move the interior ministry is now responsible for not only immigrant integration, but also the integration of Eastern and Western Germany and the cohesion of German society. De Maiziere will continue the German Islam Conference, an initiative started by his predecessor, which seeks to improve the integration of Germany's Muslim population and open a dialogue between the government and Germany's Muslim community. The Islam Conference has met with some controversy and came under scrutiny earlier this year when it was discovered that some Muslim representatives were alleged to have links with extremist groups. ¶5. (S/NF) De Maiziere has some familiarity with security issues given that his duties in the Chancellery included overall coordination of Germany's intelligence services. De Maiziere was helpful in promoting cooperation between German ministries and security services with USG counterparts both during the 2007 Sauerland Islamic Jihad Union terrorist cell case and following extremist threats surrounding the recent national elections. De Maiziere's predecessor Wolfgang Schaeuble spent considerable time dealing with the issue of terrorism and working to update Germany's legal frameworks and expand the mandates of law enforcement agencies to ensure they had the capabilities to address the phenomena. In contrast, de Maiziere said virtually nothing in public on the issue of terrorism during his time in the Chancellery, and he has not emphasized the topic since moving to Interior. Therefore, there is some question concerning the depth of his knowledge of the transnational character of terrorism, radicalization pathways, and terrorists' increasing use of the Internet and related technology to recruit, train and organize, aspects of the issue that most affect Germany today. ¶6. (C) During his first day remarks to employees, de Maiziere made the peculiar statement that "the Interior Ministry is responsible for internal matters, and the Foreign Ministry is responsible for issues external to Germany." This characterization of the MoI's tasks contrasts sharply with EU law enforcement integration initiatives under Schaeuble such as the Pruem data sharing agreement. Observers are concerned that de Maiziere's limited perspective could result in diminished bilateral cooperation and mark a significant departure from former minister Schaeuble, who placed a heavy emphasis throughout his tenure on increasing security cooperation with European and other international partners. De Maiziere would benefit from learning about the benefits of international cooperation first hand from his counterparts at the G6 meeting in London this week, which DHS Secretary Napolitano and senior DoJ representatives will attend. (Note: The G6 is an informal grouping of the interior ministers of Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the UK. Schaeuble made a point of inviting the USG to G6 meetings that he hosted, a custom that UK Minister Jacqui Smith is following for this week's London meeting. Ref D.) Will de Maiziere be a Strong Security Partner? --------------------------------------------- - ¶7. (C) We do not expect de Maiziere to be aggressive in pushing for expanded security powers. However, there is less need for this as two recent legislative packages have already strengthened Germany's counterterrorism legal framework (Refs C and E). More relevant is whether de Maiziere will build on Schaeuble's record of deepening U.S.-German security cooperation, such as the successful negotiations of a bilateral "Pruem-like" agreement to exchange information on terrorism and serious crime suspects, as well as establish an automated fingerprint checking system. Final implementation of our agreement is awaiting resolution of some concerns raised by a Green Party Justice Senator from Hamburg. We will likely need support from de Maiziere to break this impasse, but it is unclear whether de Maiziere is willing to make the effort on an initiative that his predecessor initiated and for which he received heavy criticism due to data privacy concerns. On the issue of resettlement of Guantanamo detainees, de Maiziere has yet to express a viewpoint one way or the other. ¶8. (C) We anticipate that data protection and domestic security issues will be a continuing theme that the new coalition government of the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU) and Free Democrats (FDP) will struggle with. During the previous administration, the FDP regularly criticized former interior minister Schaeuble for policies which the FDP believed trampled on citizens' privacy rights (Ref B). Germany's new Justice Minister Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (FDP) believes that Schaeuble went too far in giving police new powers of investigation, and she was successful in committing the new government to modify a number of these powers and introducing added data protection measures in the recently completed coalition agreement (Ref A). The FDP has found it politically expedient to cast personal freedoms and security policy as mutually exclusive. In this debate, de Maiziere's greatest advantage is that he is not Schaeuble. As Interior Minister, de Maiziere is expected to support existing laws and practices initiated by his predecessor, and his reputation for reasonableness and consensus-building should serve him well in these discussions. MURPHY
TAGESSPIEGEL: Die STASI kannte viele Polizei-Geheimnisse
Einen Einfluss auf die West-Berliner Polizei hatte das MfS nicht, das haben Forscher der FU aufgedeckt. Nach dem Fall des Stasi-Agenten und Polizisten Kurras hatte Polizeipräsident Glietsch eine Untersuchung in Auftrag gegeben.
Er war einer von wenigen, dafür aber der Wichtigste. Der West-Berliner Polizist Karl-Heinz Kurras hatte als Zuträger des Ost-Berliner Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit nicht seinesgleichen. Das ist eins der Ergebnisse der Studie „Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der DDR und die West-Berliner Polizei“. Der zur Freien Universität gehörende Forschungsverbund SED-Staat hat sie im Auftrag des Polizeipräsidenten Dieter Glietsch erstellt.
Ein weiteres Ergebnis: Kein Stasi-Mann hat es bis in die höheren Ränge der West-Berliner Polizei geschafft. Das MfS kannte viele Einzelheiten, hatte aber keine manipulative Kraft. Vor allem dieses Ergebnis nahm Glietsch mit einer Zufriedenheit hin: Die Studie habe „Sicherheit schaffen“ sollen, dass es keinen nennenswerten Einfluss der Stasi auf die Führung der Polizei im Westen gegeben hat.
Das Ergebnis habe ihn „nicht überrascht“, so der Polizeipräsident – schließlich würden Polizisten in ihrer Karriere bei vielen Gelegenheiten überprüft.
Um so eifriger versorgten Polizeibeamte der unteren Dienstgrade die Stasi – auch wenn es nie besonders viele waren. Durchschnittlich zehn bis zwanzig Polizisten standen in den untersuchten Jahren 1950 bis 1972 im Dienst und im Sold des MfS, so die Studie. Laut Jochen Staadt vom Forschungsverbund war die Stasi an allem interessiert, was sie bekommen konnte: Fotos von Polizeiwachen, Namenslisten von Polizisten, biografische Einzelheiten, etwa zu finanziellen Verhältnissen, Ausstattung der Polizei, Waffendepots. Man habe so viel wie möglich für den Fall eines militärischen Angriffs auf West-Berlin wissen wollen – das sei die Strategie hinter der Informationsbeschaffung gewesen, so Staadt. Wäre es zu einem solchen Angriff gekommen, so der Historiker, hätte Kurras wohl mit seinem Führungsoffizier direkt zusammengearbeitet: Major Werner Eiserbeck, Kurras’ Mann beim MfS, sollte Dienststellenleiter in Schöneberg werden, wenn es die Stasi bis in den Westen geschafft hätte.
180 Aktenbände gehören zu dem ausgewerteten „Objektvorgang West-Berliner Polizei“. Dass es den Vorgang bei der Stasi-Unterlagenbehörde gab, wussten bis 2009 sogar in dieser Behörde nicht viele. Eine Historikerin stieß auf Berichte eines „Otto Bohl“ – und der erwies sich bei der Durchsicht der Akten als der Polizist Karl-Heinz Kurras, bis dahin bekannt als der Mann, der am 2. Juni 1967 bei einer Demonstration den Studenten Benno Ohnesorg erschoss.
In der Debatte über Kurras und das MfS kam die Frage auf, ob die Stasi den Auftrag für die tödlichen Schüsse auf den Studenten Benno Ohnesorg gegeben hatte – nichts spricht dafür. Außerdem kam die Praxis der Stasi-Überprüfung früherer Volkspolizisten zur Sprache.
Polizeipräsident Glietsch erinnerte am Mittwoch daran: 9000 ehemalige Volkspolizisten waren 1990 in die Berliner Polizei übernommen worden. 7600 wurden damals auf eine Stasi-Belastung untersucht, mehr als 1100 deshalb entlassen. In einer weiteren Überprüfung wurden fast 3000 höhere West-Berliner Polizisten auf eine Zusammenarbeit mit der Stasi überprüft – das schien es nicht gegeben zu haben. Kurras konnte damals nicht mehr auffallen – er war bereits entlassen.
Noch immer sind nicht alle Stasi-Zuträger namentlich bekannt. Die jetzt veröffentlichte Studie enthält keine Klarnamen – die werden nur intern genannt. Glietsch zufolge soll nun die Staatsanwaltschaft prüfen, ob ehemalige West-Berliner Polizisten noch wegen Geheimnisverrat zu belangen sind.
In einer weiteren Studie solle der Forschungsverbund nun die Zeit von 1972 bis 1989 untersuchen, sagte Glietsch. Klaus Schroeder, Leiter des Forschungsverbunds, machte dem Polizeipräsidenten ein Kompliment : Die Polizei sei die erste staatliche Institution, die sich derart erforschen lasse. Und das Ergebnis der nächsten Studie sei „offen“.
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/die-stasi-kannte-viele-kleine-polizei-geheimnisse/3981752.html
TOP-SECRET: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD’S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD?
VZCZCXRO3166 RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHTRO DE RUEHDIR #0316/01 2151125 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 031125Z AUG 09 FM RPO DUBAI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0474 INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0475 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000316 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/3/2019 TAGS: PREL PROP PGOV PINR IR SUBJECT: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD? DUBAI 00000316 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) ¶1. (U) This is a joint cable by the Iran Regional Presence Office and the Dubai Regional Media Hub. ¶2. (S/NF) Summary: Since Iran's June 12 presidential elections, Arab media have intensely focused their coverage on the demonstrations in Iran and the international community's response to the government crackdown. Whereas in recent years the Arab media have limited their commentary to Iran's external relations -- particularly its regional ambitions and the international implications of its nuclear program -- during the post-election crisis Arab commentators have, for the first time, poked a hole in the veneer of the Islamic Republic's internal political system and explored its underpinnings more closely, often challenging the system's very legitimacy in on-air commentary. A number of these commentators have opined that Ahmadinejad has, at least in the near term, lost standing among some moderate Arabs, who have come to view Ahmadinejad's administration as oppressive, unpopular, and undemocratic, much as they criticize many Arab governments. However, all of the Arab media figures we spoke to emphasized that Arab criticism of Ahmadinejad has not necessarily led to increased support for U.S. policy in the region. On the contrary, closer analysis suggests that Ahmadinejad's eroding popularity in the Arab world has created a scenario in which any U.S. effort to engage the current Iranian government will be perceived by a wide spectrum of Arabs as accommodation with Ahmadinejad. ALL EYES ON IRAN ---------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Iran's post-election crisis has dominated the Arab media's news coverage for the past seven weeks. The demonstrations have garnered special coverage on Al-Arabiya and have consistently been among the top headlines on Al-Jazeera. The marketing director of the Middle East Broadcasting Company (MBC), parent company of Al-Arabiya, told IRPO/DRMH that Al-Arabiya's viewership has skyrocketed since the June 12 election. Al-Arabiya's news website has also experienced a dramatic increase in visits from users living in the region between Tripoli and Amman, which the marketing director, a native of Lebanon, attributed to the tremendous interest Sunni Arabs have in watching the drama in Iran unfold. Coverage of Iran's election aftermath is not limited to straightforward news reporting; editorial pages, media commentaries, and the Arab blogosphere have also been abuzz with debate over the demonstrations, the international community's response, and the implications of these events for the Arab world. While Iran's elections may no longer command daily headlines in the Western media, nearly all the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke recognized that the Arab street remains firmly focused on the recent unrest and continuing political drama playing out in Iran. THE BENEVOLENT DICTATOR'S FALL FROM GRACE? ------------------------------------------ ¶4. (S/NF) A Syrian journalist and blogger, who owns a media consultancy firm in Dubai, believes that many in the Arab street initially viewed Ahmadinejad when he came to power in 2005 as a "benevolent dictator." Citing the tradition of the Mahdi, the media consultant argued that both Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are taught from early childhood to await the arrival of a strong and unimpeachable figure who will lead the Muslim world. The media consultant maintained that even secular Arabs view the world, albeit unintentionally, with this ingrained mindset. Our contact argued that Ahmadinejad played in to this narrative, and when Ahmadinejad arrived on the international stage many Arabs saw him, in contrast to their own flawed leaders, as a humble and pious man who was brave enough to stand up for his people and the greater Muslim world by confronting Israel and the West head on. However, both the intensely competitive campaign period and the forceful reaction by the Iranian people to the official election results have led some moderate Arabs to rethink Ahmadinejad's true disposition. The election, the media consultant said, led some Arabs to understand that despite his astutely crafted and well-marketed image in the Arab world, DUBAI 00000316 002.2 OF 003 Ahmadinejad is resented by many Iranians for domestic mismanagement, incompetence, and corruption. Because of this public fall from grace, so the media consultant told us, Ahmadinejad is no longer the "untouchable, holy figure" in the Arab world he once was -- his flaws have brought him down to the level of the Arab world's own imperfect leaders. An Al-Arabiya executive, speaking at a recent conference, said that the election aftermath had destroyed the image many Arabs had of the Islamic Revolution, and Ahmadinejad's legitimacy as a leader was now open to question. [NOTE: The media consultant attributed Iran's perceived "victories" over the U.S. and the West to Ahmadinejad, as opposed to Supreme Leader Khamenei. While conventional wisdom in the West is that Khamenei has the final say over Iran's most vital interests, including the nuclear program, the consultant's comments suggest that the Arab street views Ahmadinejad as much more influential in the Islamic Republic's decision-making system.] POST-ELECTION CRISIS NOT A SILVER BULLET FOR ARAB REGIMES --------------------------------------------- ------------ ¶5. (S/NF) Ahmadinejad's fall from grace notwithstanding, most of the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke agreed that Arab governments have a limited ability to capitalize on Ahmadinejad's missteps because of the skeletons in their own closets. Al-Arabiya's former Tehran bureau chief observed that Arab regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who no doubt would like to exploit Ahmadinejad's current vulnerabilities, have remained noticeably silent. In his view, they realize that any statement condemning Tehran's crackdown on peaceful dissidents would appear untenably hypocritical in the eyes of their own citizens. He considers this public silence yet another "missed opportunity" for Arab leaders to take a stand to counter Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and further detract from his popularity with the Arab street. NEW SPACE TO DISAGREE WITH AHMADINEJAD AND THE U.S. --------------------------------------------- ------ ¶6. (S/NF) All of the Arab commentators and news media figures we spoke to agreed that the U.S. "played it right" throughout the post-election crisis by staying away from detailed public comments that could be perceived as interventionist. However, the Arab commentators were quick to distinguish between criticism of Ahmadinejad in the Arab street and support for U.S. policies. The Syrian media consultant said that the heated debates before the election, in which the three challengers -- Mousavi, Karroubi, and Reza'i -- publicly criticized Ahmadinejad for corruption and economic mismanagement, made it clear to Arabs that this election was about Iran, not the U.S. This distinction, coupled with the U.S.' restraint in commenting on the election, provided an unprecedented window for Arab commentators to criticize Ahmadinejad without appearing to side with the U.S. ¶7. (S/NF) Examples of this played out during two separate appearances by the Dubai Regional Media Hub Acting Director on live panel discussions on Abu Dhabi TV and Lebanese New TV regarding regional issues, including events in Iran. Whereas fellow Arab panelist resolutely disagreed with her comments in support of U.S. policy in the region, in particular the peace process, they felt free to openly criticize Ahmadinejad's government, which they refrained from doing in the past, for its internal crackdown and regional ambitions. One Saudi commentator contrasted Turkish regional mediation, which he described as a positive force in the region, with Iranian regional intervention, which he called pernicious and destabilizing. A Lebanese commentator noted the irony of Iran accusing outsiders of interfering in its internal affairs when there is not "one corner of the Arab world" where Iran does not intervene behind the scenes. AHMADINEJAD DOWN BUT NOT OUT DUBAI 00000316 003.2 OF 003 ---------------------------- ¶8. (S/NF) As Al-Arabiya's Tehran bureau chief noted, while Ahmadinejad's image may have taken a hit in the Arab street as a result of the government's handling of domestic dissent, the damage is not necessarily permanent. In his view, the Arab street is notoriously emotional and "could easily be turned to support Ahmadinejad once again" with some trumped up slogans and public bravado. The bureau chief believed that, in the perceived leadership void left by Arab leaders on regional issues, Ahmadinejad could rally public opinion by capitalizing on any number of sensitive issues for the Arab street, most prominent among them Israel, at upcoming international fora. The Syrian media consultant, too, cautioned the U.S. not to overestimate any erosion in Ahmadinejad's popularity with Arabs. In his opinion, Ahmadinejad has only lost standing with a segment of moderates in the Arab street; he believes that most Arabs are so polarized, either for or against Ahmadinejad, that the allegations of voter fraud and the violent post-election crackdown on protesters will not permanently sway their positions one way or the other. ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN: NO PLEASING THE ARAB STREET --------------------------------------------- ---- ¶9. (S/NF) Comment: Once the dust settles on Iran's post-election crisis, Arabs will look to see if the U.S. deals with Ahmadinejad as it pursues its nuclear nonproliferation agenda despite the lingering questions over the legitimacy of his election. If the U.S. enters negotiations with Ahmadinejad's government, moderate Arab observers may argue that the U.S., for the sake of its own national interest, has cut a deal at the expense of pro-democracy advocates -- just as many in the Arab street believe the U.S. has done with a number of Arab regimes. Those Arabs who continue to support Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, may perceive negotiations as a personal victory for a humble leader who brought the U.S. to its knees through steadfast resistance. Thus, Ahmadinejad's "fall from grace" in the Arab world may have created yet another obstacle to improved Arab perceptions of the U.S. -- in which engagement with an Ahmadinejad-led government is now a potentially lose-lose scenario in which Arabs at both ends of the pro- and anti-Ahmadinejad spectrum will consider negotiations with Teheran an accommodation with the Iranian president. RICHARDSON
Solidarity and Martial Law in Poland: 25 Years Later
With a foreword by
Lech Walesa
Washington D.C., August 5th, 2011 – Twenty-five years ago this week, at 6:00 a.m. on December 13, 1981, Polish Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski appeared on national TV to declare that a state of martial law existed in the country. Earlier in the night, military and police forces had begun securing strategic facilities while ZOMO special police rounded up thousands of members of the Solidarity trade union, including its celebrated leader, Lech Walesa.
A quarter-century later, the George Washington University-based National Security Archive is publishing, through Central European University Press a collection of previously secret documentation entitled From Solidarity to Martial Law, edited by Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne (Walesa provided the volume’s foreword). The documents, many of which have never been published in English, are from inside Solidarity, the Polish communist party leadership, the Kremlin as well as the White House and CIA. They provide a vivid history of the Solidarity period, one of the most dramatic episodes in the Cold War.
While martial law was highly effective in suppressing the union and restoring communist party control in Poland, the authorities could not eradicate the political movement that had been awakened, and that Solidarity both led and symbolized. In 1983, Walesa would win the Nobel Peace Prize and before the end of the decade, Poles would elect Eastern Europe’s first non-communist government since World War II.
Although a crackdown of some kind against the union had long been feared and anticipated (ever since Solidarity’s founding in August 1980), when it came it nonetheless took most observers outside of Poland by surprise. For over a year, Jaruzelski’s patrons in the Kremlin had been applying extraordinary political pressure on Warsaw to crush the opposition, but Jaruzelski did not inform them that he was finally ready to act until approximately two days before.
In the United States, observers and policy-makers were also caught off-guard despite having had a highly-placed spy in the Polish Defense Ministry until just weeks before the crackdown. Part of the explanation was that senior officials focused on the possibility of a Soviet invasion, not an internal “solution.” An invasion, especially after the Red Army’s move into Afghanistan two years earlier, would have created a major international crisis.
But U.S. officials also misread the Polish leadership, including Jaruzelski, documents show. In evaluating the possibility of an outside invasion earlier in 1981, State Department and CIA analyses concluded that even the Polish communist party would resist a Soviet move, along with the rest of the population, and would use martial law as a way to “maximize deterrence” against Moscow. In fact, internal Polish and Soviet records make clear that Jaruzelski and his colleagues were intent on imposing military rule for purposes of reasserting control over society, a goal they fully shared with the Kremlin.
The documents include:
- Internal Solidarity union records of leadership meetings and strategy sessions
- Transcripts of Polish Politburo and Secretariat meetings
- Transcripts of Soviet leadership discussions
- Detailed accounts of one-on-one meetings and telephone conversations between Leonid Brezhnev and Polish leaders Stanislaw Kania and Jaruzelski
- White House discussions of the unfolding crisis and a possible Soviet invasion
- CIA analyses
- Communications from CIA agent Col. Ryszard Kuklinski who fed the U.S. highly classified information on Poland’s plans for martial law
- Materials from the Catholic Church including Pope John Paul II
- A page from the notebook of key Soviet adjutant Gen. Viktor Anoshkin showing that Jaruzelski pleaded with Moscow to be prepared to send in troops just before martial law — shedding rare light on the unresolved historical and political question of Jaruzelski’s motives regarding a possible Soviet intervention
The new book contains 95 documents in translation, representing sources from the archives of eight countries, and thus providing a multi-dimensional, multi-national perspective on the key aspects of the Solidarity crisis. The documents are accompanied by descriptive “headnotes” explaining the significance of each item, along with a lengthy chronology of events and other research aids. A major overview by the editors describes and locates the events in their historical context.
Document samples in From Solidarity to Martial Law
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.[Note: document descriptions appear at the top of each document]Document 1: Message from Ryszard Kuklinski on Impending Warsaw Pact Invasion, December 4, 1980
Document 2: Memorandum from Ronald I. Spiers to the Secretary of State, “Polish Resistance to Soviet Intervention,” June 15, 1981
Document 3: CIA National Intelligence Daily, “USSR-Poland: Polish Military Attitudes,” June 20, 1981
Document 4: Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, “Supplement No. 2: Planned Activity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,” November 25, 1981
Document 5: Solidarity NCC Presidium, “Position Taken by the Presidium of the National Coordinating Commission and Leaders of the NSZZ,” December 3, 1981
Document 6: Protocol No. 18 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 5, 1981
Document 7: Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, December 10, 1981
Document 8: Notebook Entries of Lt. Gen. Viktor Anoshkin, December 11, 1981
CONFIDENTIAL: LEBANON: BELLEMARE ANXIOUS FOR MORE USG ASSISTANCE
VZCZCXRO3042 PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHLB #1348/01 2591418 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 151418Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3034 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2905 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001348 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, IO/FO-HOOK, WARLICK, IO/UNP-AMORRISON, L/FO-JBELLINGER, JTHESSIN, L/AN-LJACOBSON, L/UNA-TBUCHWALD, INR/GGI-MARGULIES, CIA/CNC-JFINKEL, JBRODERERICK, CIA/CTC-JBEAN, DOJ-JEVY, USUN-KHALILZAD, WOLFF, SCHEDLBAUER, NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PINR UNSC LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: BELLEMARE ANXIOUS FOR MORE USG ASSISTANCE THAN HE HAS SEEN REF: THE HAGUE 744 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (S/NF) In a September 12 meeting with the Ambassador, Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC) made three specific requests for USG assistance and additional requests for USG action. First, he asked that the USG provide intelligence information that UNIIIC has formally requested. Second, that the USG loan UNIIIC two criminal investigators TDY. UNIIIC needs "investigators who can question a witness" to interview some 200 persons currently in prison who may have some relevant information. Third, that the USG urge the UK to do more to help UNIIIC, particularly with intelligence information (the UK has provided loaned personnel). ¶2. (S/NF) In addition, Bellemare asked for USG support when the Management Committee considers the Tribunal operating budget on September 25 -- the same day that Lebanese President Sleiman will meet President Bush in Washington. He also raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a new resolution to clarify some legal issues. Finally he repeated earlier requests for a USG reaction to 26 sketches of possible suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG and asked about getting access to alleged Hizballah defectors reportedly in the U.S. ¶3. (S/NF) On other matters, Bellemare said that the GOL has not asked that UNIIIC investigate the latest political assassination (the September 10 attack on opposition Druze member Saleh Aridi). He is concerned about a new Telecommunication Ministry directive that may impede his plans for using wiretaps. End Summary. GOL HAS NOT ASKED THAT UNIIIC INVESTIGATE LATEST ASSASSINATION -------------------------------- ¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador and DCM met on September 12 with Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC), in his office in Monteverde. The Ambassador asked if UNIIIC would investigate the case of Saleh Aridi, a Druze political official assassinated in a car bomb attack near Beirut on September 10. Bellemare explained that for UNIIIC to take on a case, first the GOL must ask the UN SYG, then the SYG and Security Council must approve. He said that the GOL had shown no indication that it would request that UNIIIC investigate the Aridi killing. UNIIIC is interested in finding out more about the Aridi attack, since details are similar to other cases it is investigating. If it is not invited to investigate but wants information about a case, UNIIIC must submit a request to the Lebanese chief prosecutor. The criteria the GOL uses to decide on requesting UNIIIC assistance is "a mystery to me" Bellemare said. (NOTE: The Aridi assassination is the first of a pro-Syrian politician. END NOTE.) WIRETAPPING ----------- ¶5. (S/NF) Bellemare was concerned about something he had learned the day before that might affect wiretapping. The Telecommunications Ministry had directed two private telecom companies in Lebanon to inform the Ministry about any requests for wiretapping. He noted that it is well known that the Internal Security Forces (ISF), the national police, conduct wiretapping even though the legal basis for their authority to do so is weak. The Telecom Ministry's move may have been directed against the ISF. The order, however, also could limit the ability of UNIIIC to conduct wiretaps if the phone companies fear that they will have to report those efforts to the Telecommunications Ministry. ¶6. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked if Bellemare believed the action was targeted at UNIIIC, noting that the new Telecommunications Minister is from the opposition. Bellemare replied that he was not in a position to say. At his meeting with PM Fouad Siniora earlier in the week, on September 8, Siniora told Bellemare to inform him if he runs into any problems with cooperation from government officials. He said he might discuss this with the PM if it looks as if this new telecom directive will be a problem, but first he will meet with officials of the two telecom companies next week. The Ambassador offered to support his efforts at resolving this issue. ¶7. (S/NF) Bellemare noted that at his August 14 meeting in The Hague with the USG Interagency Working Group (IWG), he had asked for USG help with wiretapping capability. He said that trying to work wiretapping through the Lebanese ISF or military intelligence would be like "putting the names (of targets) in the paper". He explained that UN legal experts were currently looking into the possibility that UNIIIC has legal authority to carry out wiretaps. Beyond legal authority for wiretapping, though, Bellemare said he needs technical capability. ASSISTANCE FROM THE USG ----------------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Bellemare expressed frustration that USG has not provided more in response to his requests for assistance, and noted that he has discussed this with State Department officials. He outlined three requests for USG assistance for his investigation. -- One, provide intelligence information that UNIIIC has formally requested, or inform him that it cannot be provided, so that he knows not to pursue the requests. -- Two, provide two loaned criminal analysts on TDY. UNIIIC needs "investigators who can question a witness" to interview some 200 persons currently in prison who may have some relevant informtion. -- Three, using USG influence, urge the U government to provide more to UNIIIC, particulaly regarding intelligence information. Bellemare said he has requests in to MI-6, but has not received much. On personnel, Scotland Yard has provided a loaned investigator. ¶9. (S/NF) Bellemare showed a good understanding of the problems associated with complying with the first two requests from his several meetings with USG officials, but his frustration was nonetheless evident. "You are the key player. If the U.S. doesn't help me, who will?" The USG has "a big investment in the Tribunal" and being more forthcoming on UNIIIC's requests is a way of making that investment pay off, he said. ¶10. (S/NF) During the meeting, Bellemare made several other requests for USG action: -- USG support when the Committee considers the Tribunal operating budget, scheduled for September 25, the same day that Lebanese President Sleiman will meet President Bush in Washington. He warned that the budget includes high travel costs, but that these are necessary because of the need for frequent travel between the Hague and Lebanon. Bellemare thanked the USG for what he said was a much improved attitude on the part of the Tribunal Management Committee. His requests have been more favorably received than was the case previously. -- He raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a new resolution to clarify some legal issues. He mused about the possibility of getting Chapter VII authority for the Tribunal via such a new resolution, but seemed to think that was not doable in the Council. -- He asked for a reaction to the 26 sketches of possible suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG. -- Finally, he asked about getting access to alleged Hizballah defectors reportedly in the U.S., or a definitive negative response to the request. The answers the USG has given him so far on this subject, he said, have been not sufficiently definitive. INTERVIEWS IN SYRIA ------------------- ¶11. (S/NF) On this issue, Bellemare repeated what he said in the IWG meeting (reftel): that he did not want to go to Syria until the USG or other sources had provided names of leads he should ask to interview and other information. If Syria denied his request to interview these people, then he would have evidence of Syrian non-cooperation. Just asking would give some indication to others in Syria where his investigation might be headed, which could provoke more cooperation "if I hit the right person." ¶12. (S/NF) Bellemare emphasized the urgency for responding to his request related to Syria, first, because UNIIIC's mandate and with it Chapter VII authority expires at the end of the year, and second, the importance of conducting the interviews before the interviewees disappear by being killed or other means. OTHER ISSUES: NEW MINISTER OF JUSTICE, UNIIIC PRESS SPOKESPERSON ------------------------------ ¶13. (C ) Bellemare said he had a very positive impression of new GOL Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar, who had told Bellemare he wanted to be helpful. Najjar's predecessor, Charles Rizk, was a vocal supporter of the Tribunal but also known for public criticisms of Bellemare and the previous Commissioner, Serge Brammertz. Bellemare, a Canadian, noted that Najjar had taught at McGill University in Montreal and they had some mutual acquaintances. ¶14. (SBU) UNIIIC now has a press spokesperson who started work the week before, Bellemare reported. The official had good relevant experience as the spokesperson for the Yugoslavia Tribunal and most recently for the UN Legal Affairs office. The new spokesperson is currently working up a strategy for UNIIIC's press interaction. ¶15. (C) Bellemare said he had been advised by several persons to not make statements in public that might be seen as disrupting the current relative calm in Lebanon. He planned to follow that advice, (NOTE: Bellemare traveled to Saudi Arabia September 15, we understand. We will seek further information from UNIIIC contacts. END NOTE.) SISON
SECRET: CHINA ARMS EMBARGO
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001510 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014 TAGS: PARM PHUM PREL PINR EUN USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: APRIL 2 PSC DEBATE AND NEXT STEPS FOR U.S. REF: A. USEU TODAY 04/06/04 ¶B. BRUSSELS 1464 ¶C. STATE 68263 ¶D. PRAGUE 390 Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ------- SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (S/NF) The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) discussed the EU arms embargo on China during a heated 90 minute exchange on April 2. PSC Ambassadors generally agreed that the issue -- of whether, when and how to lift the embargo -- should be sent back down to working groups for further study before being presented to political groups for a decision. France objected, however, and succeeded in getting agreement to discuss the issue at the April 26 FMs meeting (GAERC) -- but failed in its campaign to secure an early decision. The debate will likely continue well into the Dutch EU Presidency. This cable draws on a detailed readout and a sensitive internal report provided to Poloff by UK and Hungarian contacts (please protect accordingly), as well as background provided in recent days by other interlocutors. It also offers a strategy for continuing US engagement. -------------------------------------- PSC Reacts Badly to Latest US Demarche -------------------------------------- ¶2. (S/NF) PSC Ambassadors reportedly arrived at the April 2 meeting to find copies of ref C demarche sitting on their otherwise empty desks. The demarche was received badly because it gave the impression that "big brother was watching," and because it appeared timed as a heavyhanded and hubristic attempt to influence the PSC, according to our UK contact. Some reps, led by Greek Ambassador Paraskevoupoulos, objected to the Council Secretariat's distribution of the demarche under Council Secretariat cover and with a Secretariat identifying number. He argued that the document had no business being circulated by the Secretariat, and insisted that it be stricken from EU SIPDIS records. Ambassadors also reacted against what they perceived as the threatening tone of our demarche. ¶3. (S/NF) The Financial Times' front page article on April 2 about the US demarche campaign also enflamed the Ambassadors because it appeared directly aimed at Friday's PSC discussion. Irish Ambassador Kelleher reportedly opened the meeting by waving the article in the air and imploring his colleagues to protect the confidentiality of internal EU deliberations. Poloff pointed out that the timing of the latest US demarche was a coincidence, as we were previously unaware that the PSC was scheduled to discuss the issue on that day. (COMMENT: Our demarche was received badly not so much because of its substance, but because of the way it was presented. Our UK contact faulted the Irish and the Council Secretariat for the way the demarche was handled in the PSC, SIPDIS and also the awkward timing that made it seem, along with the FT article, tailor-made to influence the April 2 discussion. END COMMENT). ----------------------------------------- National Positions: France versus Denmark ----------------------------------------- ¶4. (S/NF) According to our UK contact, France staked out a "zero flexibility" position on lifting the embargo, and is opposed to any talk of applying conditionality (i.e. by insisting on further human rights progress by China and/or strengthening the Code of Conduct prior to lifting the embargo). The Danes are reportedly still leading the opposition, and have circulated to EU partners a list of ten human rights conditions that they believe China should meet before the embargo is lifted (we have not yet obtained a copy of this list). Other EU Member States are lining up somewhere in between, although "all agree in principle" that the embargo should be lifted if certain conditions are met. The debate from now on will focus on defining conditions and timing. ¶5. (S/NF) Following is a summary of national interventions made at the April 2 PSC: -- France: The embargo is anachronistic and must go; willing to discuss timing but not conditionality because China would not accept human rights conditionality; likewise would be contradictory to enhance the Code of Conduct specifically for China while also lifting the embargo; opposed also to making Code of Conduct legally binding; wants issue to remain political; opposed to sending it down to working groups. -- Denmark: Any decision to lift the embargo must be linked to specific Chinese steps on human rights; EU also needs to review Code of Conduct to ensure that lifting the embargo does not result in increased arms sales to China. -- Germany: EU must consider regional impact of lifting the embargo; now is not a good time to lift embargo (COMMENT: The Germans appear to have moved closer to the Danes in recent weeks, and are now the largest EU member state with serious reservations about lifting the embargo. One report of the discussion suggests that "the tough German position, coupled with the strength of US views, might be tempering French enthusiasm." END COMMENT). -- UK: Should be further study by working groups to identify implications for human rights and regional stability, and to examine options for strengthening Code of Conduct (COMMENT: Our Hungarian contact reports that the UK is fundamentally closer to the French end of the spectrum than the Danish. The UK, like France, does not favor making the Code of Conduct legally binding. END COMMENT). -- Greece: Should explore gestures China could make on human rights without explicitly linking them to lifting the embargo; should not link regional stability to lifting embargo; "provocatively" proposed that the Code of Conduct be made legally binding. (COMMENT: Our contacts report that the Greek position on lifting the embargo is closer to France than any other Member State. END COMMENT). -- Ireland: Supports sending the issue back to working groups (in part to keep the EU from making any decision during its Presidency). -- Netherlands: Central consideration should be possible release of political prisoners from the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. -- Czech Republic: Supports French position that issue should remain political; silent on other points (COMMENT: Our UK contact said that the Czech position is generally understood to be informed by that country's interest in selling radar equipment to China, as described ref D. END COMMENT). -- Sweden: Working groups should further study issues of human rights, regional stability, and enhancing the Code of Conduct. -- Austria: Should explore gestures on human rights that China could make but avoid linkage to lifting the embargo; should conduct a general (i.e. non China-specific) review of Code of Conduct. -- Italy: Intervened with same points as Austria. -- Belgium: More discussion needed of implications, including on human rights, of any decision to lift embargo. -- Commission: Took no position on lifting embargo but said EU should remain focused on human rights. Other member states did not intervene in the PSC discussion. ------------------------------------- Timeline: Back to the Working Groups? ------------------------------------- ¶6. (S/NF) The PSC will meet again on this issue on April 7, when it is expected to approve an "issues paper" which will then be sent through COREPER to FMs for discussion at the April 26 GAERC. According to our UK and Hungarian contacts, the paper is intended as a tour d'horizon for the GAERC discussion. It will not contain recommendations, and FMs are not expected to take a decision. Instead, they will likely send the paper back down to the PSC for re-examination. Most PSC Ambassadors, having satisfied the French desire for a ministerial discussion in April, will then press France to accept the majority preference for sending the issue back to the working groups. The working groups would need two to three months, minimum, to complete their assessments and submit their papers to the PSC (EU working groups are comprised of capital-based experts who rarely meet more than once per month). The relevant working groups are COHUM (human rights), COASI (Asia Directors), and COARM (conventional arms exports). ¶7. (S/NF) What all this means is that the debate will likely continue well into the Dutch Presidency. Already, Member States are beginning to look toward the December EU-China Summit as a possible timeframe for any decision to lift the embargo. We have heard they are also looking at the US electoral calendar and quietly wondering whether it would be worth holding off their decision until November or December in the hopes of sneaking it past the US radar. They have not and will not discuss such issues openly, even amongst each other in the PSC, but our UK contact confirms that quiet conversations and suggestive comments are going on in the wings. --------------------- Next Steps for the US --------------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Our efforts have managed to slow down the momentum in favor of removing the arms embargo, but have not killed this idea outright. In addition to the ongoing diplomatic dialogue on this issue, we recommend the following steps to help us keep the pressure on European governments: -- We should coordinate closely with Japan, and perhaps also the ROK. According to numerous EU interlocutors, the Japanese have become increasingly active on this issue, but their efforts appear so far uncoordinated with our own. While this may have served our interests in the sense that it gave the Europeans the impression that Japan's concerns were genuine and not dictated by Washington, it is now time to begin coordinating our efforts, so that Europeans recognize that other key players in the region share our regional stability concerns. -- We should engage the European Parliament, and particularly members of its Human Rights Committee. The EP is already on record opposing an end to the embargo. By calling attention to EU deliberations and ongoing Chinese human rights abuses, the EP could increase the political heat on member state governments against any decision to lift the embargo. -- We should consider increasing our public statements and press briefings for European audiences, on the assumption that more scrutiny by European publics would help our views on this issue, especially as regards human rights. -- We should increase our engagement with institutional and member state representatives to the COHUM, COASI and COARM working groups. In this way we could ensure that our views on human rights, regional stability and the Code of Conduct are fully understood by those experts who will be supplying recommendations to the political groups for discussion. -- Additionally, as suggested ref B, we recommend the USG begin considering options for how the EU might strengthen controls on arms exports to China in a post-embargo scenario. The worst case for us would be for the EU to lift its embargo without having in place some sort of new mechanism for controlling the transfer of arms and sensitive technologies to China. Schnabel
SECRET: VLADIVOSTOK11, RUSSKIY ISLAND — THEY WILL BUILD IT, THEY WILL COME, THEN
INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CA-00 CIAE-00 COME-00
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P 160724Z FEB 10
FM AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1260
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
UNCLAS VLADIVOSTOK 000011
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV ECON SENV RS
SUBJECT: RUSSKIY ISLAND -- THEY WILL BUILD IT, THEY WILL COME, THEN WHAT?
REF: 2009 Vladivostok 0087
¶1. Summary: Many were surprised when in 2007, then President Vladimir Putin announced that the 2012 APEC summit would be held on Russkiy Island, an empty, undeveloped island just South of Vladivostok. On February 5, 2010, Consular Officer and USAID Representative visited the island, taking the ferry from Vladivostok. Construction has commenced, and due to the work we saw, and the construction standards they are building to, we believe that the construction on the island will be completed in time for the APEC summit in autumn 2012 (Note that there is discussion about moving up the date of the summit two months from November to September due to the harsh winter weather).
They Will Build It and They Will Come
¶2. Russkiy Island was a closed, military island, little more than a place for camping or a good picnic in summer or ice fishing in winter. When it was announced that the 2012 APEC summit would be held on Russkiy Island, there was a lot of concern about the cost of the project, especially since Russkiy Island had no infrastructure. Everything for APEC would have had to have been built from scratch. The island lacked water and power, and the roads were only gravel. Actually, the roads were so treacherous and impassable at places that we were forced to turn around at one point and even assisted another car stuck in the snow.
¶3. On our drive around the island we were struck by the enduring aesthetic beauty of the well constructed brick and stone buildings dating from the czarist times. The island is also home to several distinctly unattractive Soviet era officers' residential apartment buildings that are the common concrete panel construction. There are two old forts and large artillery batteries that attest to the significant defensive role the island played in protecting Vladivostok during WWII. Governor Darkin maintains an impressive dacha on the island as does the President of Russia. There are no stores, gas stations, restaurants, or other amenities on the island. The few year-round residents rely on the ferry to the mainland for all their shopping needs.
¶4. Even though the weather was below freezing (-20 C), the construction was ongoing and a great deal of progress has already been made. The site preparations are being accomplished quickly as hundreds of hectares of forests are being or have already been clear-cut. The felled trees are being pushed aside into enormous piles by bulldozers. As there are no remaining obstacles to land leveling for foundation slabs, massive earth moving equipment is able to rapidly carve and reshape the natural rolling hills to accelerate construction. We did not see any evidence of erosion mitigation barriers in place, raising doubts about how well protected the marine environment will be around the island. Roads to and from the work sites from the dock yards have been constructed and several have already been paved with asphalt. The road substrates are typical for Russia - a mixture of course, ungraded, slate, rock, and dirt. No compression is applied to the substrates and only a thin layer of gravel is spread prior to paving.
¶5. The contractor is using relatively simple construction techniques for the buildings. The superstructure of all the buildings is steel I-beams with floors being poured in place on galvanized steel. Exterior walls are concrete blocks and mortar. The use of drop ceilings will permit the quick interior fit outs with ventilation and electrical wiring. This is essentially the construction form used for parking garages and shopping centers and is typical of the Tvoi Dom and Crokus City, and the Crocus-Expo International Exposition Center; Moscow facilities built, owned and operated by the billionaire Aras Agalarov, President of the Crokus Group and the general contractor for the Russkiy Island development project. This construction facades will be formed from glass, tile, metal or glass panels providing architectural detail and variety to the otherwise uninspired uniform rectangular blocks.
¶6. The water and sewage infrastructure seems to be being built to a higher standard than many other facets of the project. The contractor is using advanced double walled PVC pipes (not steel) and poured-in-place juncture housing for manhole access. Vladivostok itself has no sewage treatment facilities. We noticed that of the several manufacturers of excavation and land moving equipment are represented at the site; the vast majority of the equipment was Hitachi. We saw only one Caterpillar bulldozer and no Liebherr equipment so common on Sakhalin. A very large and elaborate "oceanarium" (ocean aquarium) is also under construction and should become an attractive tourist destination. Unfortunately, access to the aquarium construction site is restricted so we were unable to inspect it or get a close-up view.
¶7. Most of the thousands of construction workers appeared to be from Central Asia, although we heard that many nationalities are represented, including laborers from Mexico. There are several large camps for the laborers who are bussed to and from the construction sites on busses with Moscow license plates series `199 RUS', presumably because they are registered to Crocus, the Moscow based general contractor.
¶8. While we took a ferry, construction on the two large bridges that will connect the island to the mainland appears to be proceeding apace. Since the bridge is the most important part of the project (and at US$1.5 billion, the most expensive), the public believes that it is being constructed to international standards. As safety and quality are being taken into consideration for the bridge, this part of the project will likely pose the greatest challenge in meeting the deadline for the APEC summit. The general contractor for the bridge construction is a local company from Ussurisk that has no previous experience building bridges. We learned that the sand for the bridge's massive concrete trusses is being shipped by barges from North Korea.
¶9. While impressive progress is being made on the island's construction projects, it is apparent that speed is the top priority and environmental concerns, aesthetics, and perhaps quality are all to be sacrificed in order to ensure that the ambitious deadline is met.
Then What?
¶10. The 2012 APEC summit is meant to be the core of the greater Far East Development Program that will help develop the Russian Far East (RFE). Federal funding for numerous projects associated with APEC preparations is estimated to be $10 billion. One optimistic economist, specializing in municipal and regional strategic planning, expressed the opinion that that figure will be matched by private investment. However, a random survey of Vladivostok's taxi drivers reflected a more pessimistic belief that the project will attract no private investment and that at least half of the $10 billion from the GOR will be stolen. It is said that seven percent of all contracts will be given to the President's Office and the consensus seems to be that the entire project was conceived to facilitate the misappropriation of "budget" funds.
¶11. The plan is to locate a new Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU), a combination of all universities in the Vladivostok area, at the APEC site on Russkiy Island. The inconvenient location is creating a lot of concern among university students. FEFU will create a strong knowledge base and there is talk about creating an investment zone on Russkiy Island complete with business incubators for high-tech start-ups. However, while the recently adopted federal strategic plan for the development of the RFE through the year 2025 emphasizes the need to diversify the region's economy through the commercialization of innovative technologies, doubts remain about the ability of the region to compete in the technology sphere with its Asian neighbors.
¶12. If all goes well, preparations for the 2012 APEC summit will leave the Vladivostok area with a developed island, new bridges, an updated transportation system, renovated airport, opera house, "oceanarium", sports stadium, and many improvements to the city itself. There will be a residual effect for the citizens of Vladivostok as the city is expected to receive a new sewage treatment facility, installation of natural gas connections to residents throughout the city, and moving oil tanks from the downtown area. But the real test is whether Russia decides, and makes clear to its neighbors, that it is indeed open for business and welcomes new investment and joint ventures. That "improvement" could account for more foreign investment than all the shiny new projects combined.
ARMBRUSTER
CONFIDENTIAL: COMBATING ORGANIZED CRIME: ROUND ONE
VZCZCXRO0687 RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHSF #0103/01 0411705 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 101705Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6700 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000103 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019 TAGS: PGOV KCRM KCOR BU SUBJECT: COMBATING ORGANIZED CRIME: ROUND ONE GOES TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT REF: A. 09 SOFIA 508 ¶B. 09 SOFIA 548 ¶C. 09 SOFIA 642 Classified By: AMB JAMES WARLICK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Elected on an anti-corruption and organized crime platform, the GERB government has made good on its campaign promises and taken some positive steps. Important reforms, bolstered by political will from the top, have ratcheted up the pressure against previously untouchable organized crime figures and enabled marquee busts of a few large well-equipped organized crime groups. At the same time, these arrests have highlighted weaknesses in the judicial system as judges allow members of these groups to make bail and delay proceedings despite prosecutors' assurances of airtight evidence against them. In private meetings with the Ambassador, the government has confirmed its commitment to fight organized crime, but this may be a losing battle if it is unable to convince the judiciary to make the reforms necessary to allow prosecutors to do their jobs and keep dangerous criminals in prison. End Summary. PROGRESS ON ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION ----------------------------------------- ¶2. (C) In its short time in office, the government has completed difficult reforms and personnel changes necessary to make law enforcement more effective. It has revamped law enforcement by removing 26 of the 28 regional police chiefs, many of whom were corrupt or incompetent, established embassy-recommended interagency counter organized crime task forces, and passed new laws to resolve jurisdictional conflicts between the State Agency for National Security (DANS) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI). As a result, coordination between law enforcement and the prosecutor's office has dramatically improved. Chief Prosecutor Boris Velchev, a Socialist appointee, confided to the Ambassador during a February 1 meeting that he has the complete support of the PM and the government to "declare war" on the 200 to 300 most dangerous organized crime figures, including the 20 to 50 bosses who are household names (ref A). ¶3. (C) Structural reforms and clear political will have brought some quick and convincing results, including impressive operations in December against two notorious organized crime gangs known as "the Impudents" and "the Crocodiles." The government arrested 30 members of the Impudent gang believed to have carried out 19 high profile ransom kidnappings over the past several years. Breaking up this group was a priority from day one for the new government due to this group's use of sophisticated technology and techniques along with the psychological effect the kidnappings had on the population. Similarly, the Crocodile gang, composed mainly of car thieves and highway robbers, terrorized mostly Turkish citizens driving through Bulgaria to Germany. ¶4. (C) Most recently, the police launched operation "Octopus" in which they arrested 12 people on February 10 believed to be involved in a powerful organized crime group that has operated for the last 10 years. These busts were a public relations coup for the government in that they targeted well-known groups that previous governments had been powerless to stop. The government has had even more success arresting former government officials for corruption. To date, two former ministers have been indicted and five other ministers from the previous two governments will likely face corruption-related charges. This is on top of at least 10 high-level arrests of mayors, judges, agency heads, and MPs for corruption since last summer. JUDICIAL REFORM LAGS BEHIND --------------------------- ¶5. (C) Despite successes on the organized crime and corruption front, the powerful "big fish" mostly remain at large due to the serious flaws in the overly formalistic judicial system (ref B). No case illustrates this better than the Marinov brothers and the January 5 assassination of Boris "Bobby" Tsankov. Tsankov, a self-styled journalist and entertainment figure with extensive underworld ties, was gunned down in typical gangland fashion in downtown Sofia. This unsolved murder is reminiscent of the approximately 140 other Mafia hits that have taken place in Bulgaria from 1993 to 2010. It is widely believed that Krassimir "Big Margin" Marinov and his brother Nikolay "Small Margin" Marinov ordered the hit to prevent Tsankov from providing evidence to the chief prosecutor's office. The Marinovs have been embroiled in serious organized crime and murder cases dating back to 2005 (ref A), but were free on bail at the time of the shooting thanks to legal loopholes that allow the perpetual postponement of serious cases. After the Tsankov killing, Little Margin's whereabouts are unknown and Big Margin was briefly detained for the killing before being released due to a lack of evidence (he was later arrested again on drug-related charges). ¶6. (C) Even the successful operation against the Impudent gang has not been brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Of the 30 members initially arrested, 21 have been released from jail, including one of the ringleaders, Anton "the Hamster" Petrov. Petrov was released on BGN 20,000 (USD 15,000) bail after the Appeals Court determined that the MOI and prosecutors had failed to provide new and convincing evidence against him. Since Petrov's release, two witnesses who were cooperating with the police have reneged on promises to testify against the kidnapping group. This is a familiar pattern that has repeated itself in many other important organized crime cases. REFORM EFFORTS FACE DIFFICULT HURDLES ------------------------------------- ¶7. (C) Chief Prosecutor Velchev and Minister of Justice Popova told the Ambassador in separate meetings that reform of the criminal procedure code had run into fierce opposition from the "old guard" (politicians and judges) allied with defense lawyers and NGOs using the language of human rights to sink necessary reform. Changes to the criminal procedure code would close legal loopholes and likely speed up organized crime and corruption cases, which drag on for years in the current system (ref A). Reforming the code is widely viewed as essential to shift the balance from a system overly favorable to defendants to a more just and effective system. Among other things, the proposed changes to the criminal procedure code would allow police to testify in court, provide a back-up defense lawyer and increase fines if the defendant's attorney fails to show up at court (a common tactic for postponements), and simplify evidence collection procedures. Without radical reform, Minister Popova told the Ambassador that Bulgaria's judiciary could not cope with its entrenched organized crime problem. Radical reforms such as significantly changing how judges and prosecutors are appointed, disciplined, and promoted (ref C) would require constitutional amendments that need 161 of the 240 votes in parliament to pass. GERB is a minority government with 114 MPs, making constitutional reform difficult. ¶8. (C) Comment: The GERB government has set ambitious goals in combating organized crime and has shown it has the political will to fight established criminal enterprises and entrenched interests. Still, this will not be an easy fight, and it will be difficult to achieve convictions and reasonable sentencing of "big fish" if the judicial system is not recalibrated to confront Bulgaria's organized crime problem. Radical judicial reform advocated by the Minister of Justice will not happen overnight given the highly independent and conservative judicial system and the daunting constitutional barriers preventing rapid reform. Despite these challenges, incremental reform is possible with the government's strong support. In the end, the government will be judged not on high profile arrests, but on its ability to speed up corruption cases, close legal loop holes, and successfully lock up previously untouchable organized crime figures. End Comment. WARLICK
Charter 77 After 30 Years-Original Signature Cards, Secret Police Files, U.S. Intelligence Reports Published for First Time

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 213
Edited by Prof. Vilém Prečan (Czechoslovak Documentation Centre),
Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton (National Security Archive)
Translations and editorial assistance by Derek Paton
Scanning and other research assistance by Catherine Nielsen, Maria Lorena Martinez, Dr. Mary E. Curry, and Petr Blažek
Washington D.C., January 6, 2007 – The Czechoslovak human rights activists who launched the landmark Charter 77 movement secretly gathered their first 240 signatures on handwritten cards without leaving copies with the signatories, but were arrested 30 years ago today by the secret police on charges of “subversion” and “hostility to the socialist state and social system” before they could deliver the original Charter to the Federal Assembly, according to Charter 77 and Czechoslovak secret police documents published in English for the first time on the National Security Archive Web site (www.nsarchive.org).
But the Chartists had already arranged for publication of their manifesto in the Western press, where the Charter was featured in major articles on January 7, 1977 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Corriere della Sera, The Times of London, and Le Monde. The latter featured a cartoon of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev holding up a sign labeled “Helsinki,” in which a tiny citizen is holding up his own “Helsinki” sign – neatly encapsulating the contrast between the Soviet view of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act as ratifying the boundaries of Europe as imposed by Josef Stalin and World War II, versus the civil society focus on Helsinki’s human rights commitments (that even U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had dismissed as empty rhetoric at the time).
Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas subsequently called Charter 77 “the most mature and accomplished program produced by Eastern Europe from the war up to today” (New York Times, April 14, 1977).
Charter 77 co-spokesperson Václav Havel, one of those arrested on January 6, 1977 and subsequently president of Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic from 1989 to 2003, told reporters this week that Charter 77 could serve as a model for constructive political culture, because it brought together “people of diverse opinions, but unlike present-day Czech politicians they were not always searching for what they could harm the others with, but they cooperated and pulled all together” (CTK Czech news agency, January 1, 2007). In Havel’s reminiscences about Charter 77 (prior to the 1989 “velvet revolution”) he prophetically commented that “something had taken shape here that was historically quite new: the embryo of a genuine social tolerance” that “would be impossible to wipe out of the national memory.”
“Charter 77 was a bolt from the blue in the otherwise stagnant political atmosphere of Czechoslovakia,” remarked Professor Vilém Prečan, one of the editors of today’s Web posting and head of the Czechoslovak Documentation Centre in Prague. “Together with movements for human and civil rights in other countries of the Soviet bloc, Charter 77 became a vital factor working from below in the Helsinki process and towards the democratic revolutions of 1989.”
The Web posting includes:
- original drafts of the Charter with handwritten edits by Václav Havel and Pavel Kohout (who originally proposed the name “Charter 77”);
- typed and handwritten agendas for the conspiratorial meetings of the nascent Chartists in December 1976 and January 1977 to organize the gathering of the first signatures;
- the original signature cards of Václav Havel and other leading Chartists;
- the January 5, 1977 letter to the Federal Assembly signed by Charter’s three spokespersons that was confiscated by the secret police from Havel and his companions January 6 on their way to present the Charter to the authorities;
- the first secret police report from January 6, 1977 calling the Charter a “crude attack” by “hostile elements” who “have been winning over other anti-socialist elements”;
- the January 14, 1977 legal opinion by the Czechoslovak Communist authorities finding Charter 77 to be “untrue and grossly slanderous… clearly pursuing the aim of evoking hatred and hostility towards, or at least distrust of, the socialist social and state system of the republic”;
- the secret police report from April 1977 recording the decision of the Communist Party Presidium not to prosecute anyone solely on the basis of signing the Charter, but on other grounds;
- contemporary reporting on Charter 77 in previously secret documents by the CIA, the U.S. State Department;
- Professor Prečan’s 1978 commentary on the impact of Charter 77;
- contemporary U.S. official statements about Charter 77 from the Congressional Record and presidential documents;
- Václav Havel’s own reminiscences about Charter 77, courtesy of Paul Wilson, who translated (from the Czech) Havel’s answers to questions from Karel Hvíždala for the 1990 book Disturbing the Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf).
Electronic Briefing Book
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
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Section I: Charter 77 – The First Publication
January 6, 1977: “The Charter 77 Declaration” was unsuccessfully presented to the Czechoslovak authorities, and the would-be presenters were detained by the secret police.
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January 7, 1977: “The Charter 77 Declaration” (dated 1 January 1977) reached the public in four daily newspapers abroad – the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, The Times, Le Monde, and Corriere della Sera. (Le Monde had, as usual, already gone to press the afternoon before the date written on the newspaper, but the organizer of the simultaneous publishing of the Declaration, Hans-Peter Riese, a German journalist and friend of Pavel Kohout’s, had failed to note this. The oversight turned out, however, to be very useful, keeping publication all on the same day.)
January 8, 1977: The New York Times and The Washington Post published their first stories on Charter 77, focusing on the detention of the Chartists. The Times included the quotation from the Communist Party newspaper Rudé právo warning dissidents that “those who lie on the rails to stop the train of history” must expect to get their legs cut off.
January 27, 1977: The full text of “The Charter 77 Declaration” was published in The New York Times as well as the U.S. Congressional Record.
Vilém Prečan’s introduction to Charter 77 from The Right to Know the Right to Act: Documents of Helsinki Dissent from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Compiled and edited by the staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, D.C., May 1978.
Václav Havel’s reminiscences about Charter 77, reproduced with the kind permission of Paul Wilson, who translated (from the Czech) Havel’s answers to questions from Karel Hvížďala for the 1990 book Disturbing the Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf). This excerpt is from pages 125-145.
Section II: The Czechoslovak Documents
A. The Charter 77 Founding Documents
[Source: The Czechoslovak Documentation Centre, Prague – Note: The originals of most of the Czechoslovak documents published here are deposited in the Security Services Archive (archiv bezpečnostních složek), at the Ministry of the Interior, Prague]
Document 1. “Pavel Kohout Card.” Circa December 20, 1976
[Translation by Derek Paton]This notecard typed by Václav Havel summarized the plan for how the organizers would proceed to organize the collection of signatures for the Charter 77 Manifesto. This “Pavel Kohout card” was prepared not later than on December 20 together with the final version of the Charter 77 Declaration. Every collector had an envelope with instructions on how to sign a signature card, and their own signed card as an example. The group of collectors was about ten people, who were instructed not to leave the statement with anybody until after the publication. After the publication the text of the Charter with all the signatures would be distributed to every person who signed it. Another provision defined how signatures would be checked at the meeting scheduled for December 29, 1976 (the deadline for collecting signatures) at 4 p.m. In the interview/memoirs Disturbing the Peace, Havel mentions how surprised he was when Mlynář came in with more than 100 signatures from former Communists.
Document 2. Original drafts of Charter 77 text
These early drafts of the Charter 77 manifesto include handwritten edits by Havel and Kohout. All the drafts were dated ten days after the actual document date—a decision made by the organizers to mislead the police. For example, the date proposed for the publication was noted as January 17, 1977, whereas it was actually set to be January 7. The draft dated December 27 was actually written on December 17. The handwritten page is by Kohout. The two drafts were discussed at meetings on December 16 and 17, and the final draft was agreed on December 18. The first draft was proposed by Havel. Kohout proposed the name Charter 77, which was adopted on December 18, 1976. Petr Uhl proposed to have three spokespersons instead of one.
Document 3. Draft agenda for January 3, 1977 meeting in Václav Havel’s apartment
[Translation by Derek Paton]Václav Havel wrote and presented this draft agenda at the January 3, 1977 meeting at his apartment, and the document was later confiscated by the police during the house search on January 6, 1977. Fifteen people participated in the meeting (the room was overcrowded): all three spokespeople (Jan Patočka, Jiří Hájek, Václav Havel), Zdeněk Mlynář, Václav Černý, Ludvík Vaculík, Pavel Landovský, Jaroslav Šabata, Jan Tesař, Jiří Němec, and some other organizers. This was for a very long time the last quiet gathering of the Chartists undisturbed by the police.
Document 4. Original signature cards: Václav Havel, Jiří Hájek, Pavel Kohout, Zdeněk Mlynář, Jan Patočka, Rudolf Slánský, Ludvík Vaculík, and Prokop Drtina
Document 5. Charter 77 Letter to the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly signed by the three spokespersons (Jan Patočka, Jiří Hájek, Václav Havel), January 5, 1977
[Translation by Derek Paton]This letter was meant to transmit the formal Charter 77 Declaration to the authorities, but on the morning of January 6, Czechoslovak State Security forces surrounded the car carrying Havel, Ludvík Vaculík, and Pavel Landovský, who were on their way to present the signed text to the Assembly and to the CTK news agency, as well as mail the Charter to all the signers. The police seized all the documentation, detained and interrogated not only the three but other co-signers, and searched their houses. But the process of releasing the Charter publicly, coordinated by Kohout’s friend Hans-Peter Riese with help from Czechoslovak émigrés who visited Prague for Christmas, had already put the text in the hands of journalists in Munich and elsewhere over the holidays, so the January 7 publication target was achieved despite the efforts of the state security forces.
B. The Authorities Respond to Charter 77
Document 6. Department of the National Security Corps, City of Prague. “Decision,” January 6, 1977
[Translation by Derek Paton]This order from the Czechoslovak Secret Police (StB) began criminal proceedings of Charter 77 activists, accused of the crime of “subversion” (section 98 of the penal code) for their “hostility towards the socialist social and state system of the republic” in sending out “a crude attack” on the system. Remarkably, the document notes that these “hostile elements” actually “have been winning over other anti-socialist elements.”
Document 7. Department of Investigation, State Security Forces (StB). “Decision,” January 11, 1977
[Translation by Derek Paton]This StB order adds yet more charges against the Chartists, now accused of damaging the interests and reputation of Czechoslovakia abroad (section 112 of the penal code) by disseminating abroad “untrue reports on conditions in the republic.”
Document 8. Statement on “The Charter 77 Declaration.” January 14, 1977
[Translation by Derek Paton]This legal opinion by the Prosecutor General and the head of the Supreme Court of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, with their colleagues the Czech Minister of Justice and the chief prosecutor, concludes that the Charter 77 movement not only violates sections 98 and 112 of the penal code, as the StB already alleged, but also section 100 on “sedition.” These top legal authorities call Charter 77 “untrue and grossly slanderous… clearly pursuing the aim of evoking hatred and hostility towards, or at least distrust of, the socialist social and state system of the republic.”
Document 9. Information on the current results of the investigation into the case of “Charter 77,” about April 1, 1977
[Translation by Derek Paton]This StB document notes that the criminal proceedings against the Chartists started on January 6, and by April 1, 1977, 251 persons had been interrogated. Most interestingly, the report refers to a decision made by the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Presidium that nobody should be charged specifically on the grounds of signing the Charter, but only on other grounds. This is the only known documentary reference to that Presidium decision.
Section III: U.S. Documents
Document 1. CIA National Intelligence Daily. January 28, 1977
[Source: Carter Presidential Library, CIA CREST database]
This CIA summary of current intelligence, circulated daily to top U.S. policymakers, reports speculation that the Czechoslovak regime might try to deport dissidents who signed Charter 77, especially Václav Havel, Pavel Kohout, Jiří Hájek, Jiří Lederer, Ludvík Vaculík. The item notes that out of nearly 300 signatories, 200 were harassed by the police but it is unlikely that they would agree to leave the country voluntarily.
Document 2. CIA National Intelligence Daily. February 8, 1977
[Source: Carter Presidential Library, CIA CREST database]
The daily CIA summary mentions that the Czechoslovak authorities are reluctant to issue indictments against dissidents directly linked to Charter 77, but at the same time are maintaining pressure on the supporters and trying to downplay its significance. The CIA also notes the Charter’s potential to create serious problems for the USSR with the approach of the Belgrade Conference.
Document 3. CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Memorandum. “Dissident Activity in East Europe: An Overview.” April 1, 1977
[Source: Carter Presidential Library NLC-7-17-5-4-7]
This CIA overview notes the effects of the Soviet détente policy and the Helsinki accords as new factors in Eastern Europe. It emphasizes that “the Czechoslovaks have taken center stage among East European dissident intellectuals by their direct challenge to regime practices regarding civil rights, as outlined in ‘Charter 77,’” and the surprisingly large number of the “Chartists.”
Document 4. CIA National Intelligence Daily. July 14, 1977
[Source: Carter Presidential Library, CIA CREST database]
The CIA daily notes a new release of Charter 77 documents on cultural and literary censorship in Czechoslovakia, and reports that since the original manifesto was published, many dissidents have been silenced by official harassment, but that Zdeněk Mlynář, who took asylum in Austria, continues to work on behalf of Charter 77 by helping to organize Western pressure on the Czechoslovak authorities.
Document 5. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Weekly Highlights of Developments in Human Rights. “Hajek to give up leading Charter 77 role.” April 12, 1978
[Source: FOIA release to National Security Archive]
The State Department’s intelligence bureau reports that Jiří Hájek is considering resigning from his post as spokesman for Charter 77 as a result of internal factional disagreements in the movement and because of the growing strength of the more militant wing of the movement.
Document 6. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Weekly Highlights of Developments in Human Rights. “Dissidents draft statement.” August 16, 1978
[Source: FOIA release to National Security Archive]
The report mentions the first instance of cooperation between the Czechoslovak and Polish dissidents in issuing a joint statement of Charter 77 and the Polish Workers Defense Committee (KOR) on the anniversary of the Soviet-led military intervention of 1968.
Document 7. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Weekly Highlights of Developments in Human Rights. “Polish-Czechoslovak dissident cooperation.” September 13, 1978
[Source: FOIA release to National Security Archive]
The INR weekly reports another case of cooperation between the Charter 77 and KOR, when Czechoslovak dissidents asked the Polish Committee to publish a statement on the harassment of Chartists by Prague authorities. According to information from the U.S. Embassy in Prague, as many as 50 Chartists might be considering emigrating as a result of constant police surveillance and harassment.
Document 8. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Weekly Highlights of Developments in Human Rights. “Police move to prevent contacts with Polish dissidents.” October 12, 1978
[Source: FOIA release to National Security Archive]
INR reports that Charter 77 spokesman Jaroslav Šabata was arrested in connection with his efforts to organize cooperation between the Czechoslovak and Polish dissidents. The report mentions that the Czechoslovak police might have penetrated the Charter 77 movement and decided to move against the Charter activists to prevent wider contacts between dissidents of the two countries.
Document 9. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. “The Human Rights Movement in Czechoslovakia.” October 11, 1979
[Source: FOIA release to National Security Archive]
This detailed eight-page report traces the accomplishments of Charter 77 movement and the obstacles it had to face on the eve of its third anniversary. Charter activities are said to have focused Western attention on the repressive character of the Czechoslovak regime. The latter’s crackdown on the dissidents has opened a new breach between Communist parties in the East and West, set back the regime’s attempts to gain international acceptability, and caused some embarrassment to Moscow in its attempts to pursue détente policy with the West. However, the report describes the Charter’s prospects in accomplishing its goals as “bleak,” because “the regime has all the necessary levers of power and coercion at its disposal and will not hesitate to use them if threatened,” and due to a lack of popular support outside the intelligentsia circles. “Despite these bleak prospects, the movement deserves respect, admiration, and sympathy for its ability to survive thus far and for its willingness to confront the regime in the face of overwhelming odds.”
Document 10. Office of Public Liaison Submission from the Czechoslovak National Council of America. “Czechoslovakia since Belgrade: Compliance with the Provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.” April 17, 1980
[Source: Carter Presidential Library, Office of Public Liaison Files]
The Czechoslovak émigré organization provided the Carter White House with this report documenting recent police harassment of the Charter 77 movement activists and their family members. The report describes the trial of six signatories of the Charter in October 1979 as “only a small sample of the violations by the Czechoslovak authorities of their international obligations and accepted standards of justice.” All six were found guilty of the crime of subversion of the republic and were sentenced to prison terms ranging from two to five years. The report also deals with police actions against young people, discrimination in education, and severe limitations on freedom of information.
Section IV. U.S. Official Statements on Charter 77
Document 1. Department of State Comments on Subject of Human Rights in Czechoslovakia. Department of State Bulletin, January 26, 1977
In this first official U.S. statement on Charter 77, Fredrick Brown, Director of the Office of Press Relations, reads a statement to the press noting the signing of Charter 77 – “some 300 individuals [in Czechoslovakia] have petitioned the government to guarantee the rights accorded them by the Czechoslovak Constitution, the international covenants on civil and political and on economic, social and cultural rights, and by the Helsinki Final Act.” He called on all the signatories of the Final Act to “strongly deplore the violations of such rights and freedoms wherever they occur.” The diplomatic cables from the U.S. Embassy in Prague that provided the basis for this statement are the subject of current Freedom of Information Act requests by the National Security Archive but are not yet declassified.
Document 2. The Helsinki Spark. Remarks by Hon. Dante Fascell, House of Representatives, January 26, 1977
Congressman Fascell talks about the wave of dissent in the countries of Eastern Europe and calls it “the thirst for liberty.” He notes the repressive response of the Communist authorities throughout the region and the resolve of Charter 77 signatories in Czechoslovakia. “In the context of the Helsinki agreements—whose implementation the Congress formed the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to evaluate—the campaign against freedom and human rights amounts to a breach of a crucial promise.” He asks for the full translation of the Charter 77 Manifesto to be reprinted in the Congressional Record.
Document 3. Czechoslovakia and Charter 77. Remarks by Hon. James Blanchard, House of Representatives, February 2, 1977
Congressman Blanchard informs the House about his protest to the Czechoslovak ambassador against the harassment of the dissidents by the authorities. A full translation of the Charter 77 Manifesto is included in the remarks.
Document 4. Statement by the President of the United States Ronald Reagan. Czechoslovak Human Rights Initiative. December 31, 1986. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 22, no. 53 p. 1681
Ronald Reagan gives high praise to the accomplishments of Charter 77 movement on the eve of its tenth anniversary. He emphasizes that “Charter 77, Eastern Europe’s longest lasting human rights initiative, served for ten years as a champion of civil and human rights, a repository for national values, and a cultural and publishing network at home and abroad…. By their activities, Charter 77 signers have in countless small and large ways pushed back the gloom over Czechoslovakia’s barren political landscape.”
Document 5. The 10th Anniversary of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. Remarks by Hon. Steny Hoyer, House of Representatives, January 7, 1987
Congressman Hoyer introduced a resolution to commend the Charter 77 human rights organization on the tenth anniversary of its establishment, and emphasized its contribution to the achievements of the Helsinki Act: “Ten years after the birth of Charter 77, the quiet, relentless push for dialog has found partners—in likeminded movements throughout Eastern Europe.”
Document 6. Human Rights and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. Remarks by Hon. Dante Fascell, House of Representatives, January 29, 1987
Congressman Fascell commends highly the achievements of Charter 77 as “the beacon of hope and light, not just for the people of that unfortunate country, but throughout Eastern Europe.” He informs the House that the members of the U.S. Helsinki Commission had nominated Charter 77 as a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987.
Document 7. Helsinki Commission Chairman Nominates Czechoslovak Human Rights Activist for Nobel Peace Prize. Remarks by Hon. Dennis DeConcini, U.S. Senate, February 7, 1989
Senator DeConcini notes that the whole world is watching Czechoslovakia, where Václav Havel remains in prison. “In spite of relentless harassment by the authorities, including imprisonment, repeated detentions, house searches and confiscations of property, Havel has remained active in the struggle for human rights.” Senator DeConcini and Representative Hoyer have nominated Václav Havel for the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize.
DUBIOS- STALKER UND ERPRESSER LAUT SPIEGEL, SZ, FAZ, HANDELSBLATT, BÖRSE ONLINE: “GoMoPa” UND DEREN HINTERMÄNNER – MUTMASSLICH RESCH, EHLERS UND BENNEWIRTZ
Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium
siehe
Presse-Links hier
Opfer wehren sich: “DUBIOS IST JOCHEN RESCH LAUT “SPIEGEL” WEGEN SEINER STASI-KONTAKTE
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-65717414.html
VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ
Dubiose Doppelrolle
Eine merkwürdige Personalentscheidung des Deutschen Instituts für Anlegerschutz (DIAS) sorgt für Aufsehen: Als neuen geschäftsführenden Vorstand beriefen die Mitglieder des auf die Untersuchung unlauterer Finanzgeschäfte spezialisierten Instituts Ehrenfried Stelzer. Bis zur Wende war Stelzer Leiter der Sektion Kriminalistik an der Ost-Berliner Humboldt-Universität. Die Sektion galt als Stasi-Hochburg, Stelzer selbst diente der Stasi Jahrzehnte als “Offizier im besonderen Einsatz”. Im April war Stelzers Vorgänger Volker Pietsch, der als Finanzspezialist von der Verbraucherzentrale Berlin gekommen war, zurückgetreten. Die Hintergründe von Pietschs Abgang sind unklar, hängen aber möglicherweise mit der unsoliden Finanzsituation des DIAS zusammen. Seit der Gründung vor fünf Jahren ist der Verein wesentlich von Zuwendungen der Berliner Anlegerschutz-Kanzlei Resch abhängig. Deren geschäftsführender Gesellschafter Jochen Resch ist nicht nur DIAS-Mitglied, sondern auch Vorstand der Verbraucherzentrale Brandenburg – eine Doppelfunktion, die Resch dem Vorwurf aussetzt, sich über das DIAS Mandanten zu beschaffen. Resch bestreitet das. Das DIAS sei unabhängig konzipiert “und nie eine Mandantenschaufel” gewesen. Auch der neue DIAS-Vorstand Stelzer gilt als Resch-Mann. Man kenne sich “lange Jahre”, so Resch. Eine von Stelzers ersten Amtshandlungen war es, den gesamten zehnköpfigen Beirat, die meisten darin Juristen, abzuberufen.
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SZ_03.09.2010_Am_virtuellen_Pranger
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http://www.faz.net/artikel/C30857/cyberstalking-im-netz-30321544.html
und
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http://www.victims-opfer.com/?page_id=11764
ÜBER DIE ZUSAMMENHÄNGE ZWISCHEN “GoMoPa” UND GOOGLE:
ETHIKBANK: “GoMoPa” IST TABU
SECRET: THE BRAZILIAN CONNECTION WITH IRAN AND
R 121450Z DEC 86 FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1591 INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO AMCONSUL SAO PAULO AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE POUCH AMCONSUL RECIFE POUCH AMCONSUL SALVADOR DA BAHIA POUCH BELO HORIZONTE POUCH AMEMBASSY COLOMBO AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA AMEMBASSY MANAGUA UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 13835 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E.O.12356: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL BR IR HO NU CE SUBJECT: THE BRAZILIAN CONNECTION WITH IRAN AND THE CONTRAS REFS: (A)BRASILIA 13511, (B)BRASILIA 4799 ¶1. (U) WITH THE UNRAVELING OF THE IRANIAN ARMS/CONTRA AID SCANDAL, THE BRAZILIAN PRESS CONTINUES TO POINT TO A SO-CALLED "BRAZILIAN CONNECTION". WEEKLY NEWS MAGAZINE "VEJA" AND CONSERVATIVE "O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO" RAN STORIES IN THE LAST FEW DAYS ON THE SUPPOSED BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT. ¶2. "ESTADO'S" DEFENSE EDITOR ROBERTO GODOY WROTE ABOUT ALLEGED U.S. ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN HAWK MISSILES FROM BRAZIL IN 1986, AN UNUSUAL REQUEST, ACCORDING TO GODOY, FOR BRAZIL DOES NOT HAVE SUCH SYSTEM IN ITS INVENTORY. THE FIRST CONTACT, GODOY SAID, WAS MADE IN EARLY 1986 BY AN "ADVISOR" TO H. ROSS PEROT TO A LOCAL ARMS PRODUCER, AND THE SECOND IN MAY, TO A FORMER MEMBER OF THE BRAZILIAN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INVOLVED WITH THE ARMS INDUSTRY. GODOY EXPLAINED THAT THE AMERICAN PROPOSED TO TRADE HAWKS FOR THE MORE ADVANCED SPARROW, NOT SPECIFYING WHERE THE WEAPONS WOULD GO. IN BOTH INSTANCES, HE CONTINUED, THE AMERICAN WAS TURNED DOWN BECAUSE THE BRAZILIANS SUSPECTED THE CONTRAS OR IRAN AS RECIPIENTS AND SAID GOVERNMENT RULES WOULD NOT ALLOW SUCH "NEBULOUS" TRANSFERS OR SALES TO A NATION AT WAR. GODOY ALSO REFERRED TO JAIRO IWAMASSA GUINOZA'S CONNECTION (SEE REFTEL A) RESTATING THAT GUINOZA WAS NEVER ABLE TO PURCHASE ANY ARMS FROM BRAZILIAN MANUFACTURERS. ¶3. "VEJA'S" STORY CLAIMS TO PRESENT "PROOF" OF BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CONTRAS AND IRAN, BUT IT IS SHORT ON EVIDENCE AND SOURCES. ONE OF THE "PROOFS" IS A RECENT PHOTOGRAPH OF FIVE BOXES OF HAND GRENADES MADE BY COMPANHIA DE EXPLOSIVOS VALPARAIBA IN SAO PAULO. ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE, THE GRENADES WERE SHIPPED TO SRI LANKA IN 1984 AND IT SPECULATES THAT SOME OF THEM WERE DIVERTED TO HONDURAS FROM SOUTH AFRICA, A PORT STOP ALONG THE WAY. "VEJA" DOES NOT KNOW HOW MANY CONTRABAND WEAPONS ENDED UP IN THE CONTRA'S TRAINING CAMP, NOR THE SIZE OF THE ORIGINAL SHIPMENT TO COLOMBO, BUT SUGGESTS THAT THE TRANSFER WAS MADE WITH THE CONSENT OF THE BUYER, FOR SRI LANKA DID NOT PROTEST THE INCOMPLETE SHIPMENT. ANOTHER "PROOF" WAS FINDING TWO HONDURAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS TRAINING AT EMBRAER ALSO IN 1984. HONDURAS HAD SIGNED A US DOLS 10 MILLION CONTRACT "FINANCED BY RONALD REAGAN'S GOVERNMENT" FOR THE PURCHASE OF TUCANOS. IN "VEJA'S" OPINION, NICARAGUA NOW HAS EVIDENCE TO MAKE A CLAIM FROM ITAMARATY ON BRAZIL'S SUPPORT TO NICARAGUA'S FOES. ¶4. (U) "VEJA" ALSO REHASHES THE STORY OF U.S. CITIZEN GEORGE PERRY'S DEATH IN 1983 IN NEW YORK. SUPPOSEDLY PERRY WAS KILLED BECAUSE HE DIDN'T FULFILL HIS PART ON A US DOLS 20 MILLION DEAL TO DELIVER ARMS TO IRAN, AND THE GOB'S VISA REFUSAL FOR THE U.S. INVESTIGATOR OF THE CRIME. IN ADDITION, VARIOUS ATTEMPTS AT SHADY SALES TO AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE EARLY 80'S ARE DESCRIBED. THE STORY ENDS WITH THE UNDOCUMENTED ASSERTION THAT IRAN PURCHASED IN 1983 US DOLS 500 MILLION WORTH OF "EXPLOSIVES" AND THAT SINCE THEN THE GOB HAS "TENDED TO IRAN'S REQUESTS" INCLUDING SENDING A "PLANE LOAD OF ARMS" LAST WEEK. ¶5. (LOU) COMMENT: THE BRAZILIAN PRESS IS SEARCHING FOR BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE US/IRAN/CONTRA ARMS TRAFFIC BUT SO FAR THE EVIDENCE IS NOT CONVINCING. MOST OF THE INSTANCES CITED BY THE PRESS OCCURRED A FEW YEARS BEFORE THE U.S. BEGAN ITS SECRET CONTACTS. ATTEMPTS AT SALES MUST HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN MADE INDEPENDENT OF U.S. EFFORTS. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, "JORNAL DO BRASIL" REPORTED IN JUNE 1984 NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SALE OF ONE MILLION GRENADES TO A SUBSIDIARY OF THE VALPARAIBA COMPANY MENTIONED ABOVE. ENOUGH TALES OF INTRIGUE AND POTENTIALLY EMBARRASSING SHADY ARMS DEALS MIGHT MAKE THE GOB CONSIDER THE ADVANTAGES OF REQUIRING A NON-TRANSFER TO THIRD PARTIES CLAUSE IN THEIR ARMS SALES CONTRACTS, A REQUIREMENT NOT INCLUDED IN THEIR CURRENT ARMS SALES POLICY GUIDELINES (SEE REFTEL B). SHLAUDEMAN
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE CIA: COLOMBIA’S GROWING UNDERGROUND ECONOMY
The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev: 1987-1988
Washington D.C., August 3rd 2011 – Today, the National Security Archive publishes its third installment of the diary of one of the main supporters of Mikhail Gorbachev and strongest proponents of glasnost during the perestroika period in the Soviet Union — Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev. This section of the diary, covering two key years of history, is being published in English here for the first time.
By 1987 Chernyaev has become a member of Gorbachev’s inner circle, a close adviser the General Secretary relies on for drafting his speeches, writing his book on perestroika, and often for baring his soul and sharing doubts and concerns about the speed and the direction that the reform is taking. Even though Chernyaev’s position focuses his responsibilities on foreign policy, the diary shows how deeply involved he was in developing the ideas of perestroika in philosophical terms, and in applying them to Soviet domestic political structures and ideology. He is especially vocal in his encouragement of openness and freedom of the press.
At the start of the year, Chernyaev gives a brief overview of how the policy of glasnost has been changing the Soviet press, which becomes truly free and vibrant in this period, with many previously banned manuscripts finding their way into scholarly and literary journals. The speed of the reform process picks up with the January 1987 Central Committee Plenum focusing on “cadres” — the Communist Party’s personnel policy. In spring 1987, Chernyaev is very busy preparing materials for U.S.-Soviet negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces, (resulting in the landmark treaty signed in December 1987), as well as Geneva and Reykjavik which leads to his “neglecting” his diary for a time.
The summer entries give a glimpse of Gorbachev’s uneasy reaction to the flight of Mathias Rust, the young West German pilot who landed his small plane near the Red Square after evading the vaunted Soviet air defense systems. Eventually, Gorbachev uses the Rust incident to conduct a profound purge of the military leadership, removing those who are known for their opposition to the reform, including Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov.
In fall 1987, virtually all of Chernyaev’s attention is given over to preparations for a seminal event — the Central Committee Plenum commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. These preparations involve addressing some of the most painful spots in Soviet history — Stalin’s purges beginning in the 1930s.
The year 1988 begins with another important Plenum — this time focusing on school reform. The February party gathering addresses fundamental ideological issues head-on within the framework of discussions on the teaching of history in secondary schools and in institutions of higher education. Chernyaev notes attacks on glasnost at the Plenum, which later culminate in a famous letter by Nina Andreeva, a teacher from Leningrad, published in the conservative newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya in March, which in turn provokes an intense discussion and a drawing of lines of disagreement within the Central Committee. Gorbachev openly challenges those in the leadership who side with Andreeva’s Stalinist version of Soviet history, and he later gradually removes practically all of these individuals from the Central Committee — including Vitalii Vorotnikov, Yegor Ligachev, Andrei Gromyko, Mikhail Solomentsev, Viktor Nikonov and Viktor Chebrikov.
The first half of 1988, as reflected in the diary, is devoted to preparations for the 19th Party Conference of June 28-July 1, which becomes the main turning point toward political reform and democratization in Soviet society. Chernyaev’s diary perceptively captures all the difficult debates over these issues within the leadership and among the drafters of the theses for the conference. Assessing Gorbachev’s performance there, Chernyaev notes his bold and consistent speeches, but also his inability to deal effectively with voices of the opposition, including Ligachev on the right and Boris Yeltsin on the left. Afterwards, during a trip with Gorbachev to the Black Sea, Chernyaev works on implementing the decisions of the conference — primarily drafting proposals for a radical reform of the central party apparatus, which is eventually carried out at the September 1988 Plenum of the Central Committee.
Chernyaev is also involved in drafting arguably the most important Gorbachev speech of 1988 — the U.N. General Assembly address announcing drastic cuts in Soviet conventional forces in Europe, which makes it clear to the East Europeans that the new Soviet leadership is serious about not resorting to force to maintain Communist political control in the region. In preparing the speech, Soviet reformers must overcome emerging opposition among the military brass, who make every effort to prevent deep unilateral cuts in Soviet armaments, and are especially adamant in resisting the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe. Specific figures and other content from the speech have to be kept secret, even from other members of the Central Committee, practically until Gorbachev’s departure for the United States.
These diary entries cover the two most successful years of Soviet perestroika — the years when Gorbachev enjoyed immense popularity both at home and especially in the West, and before the conservative opposition to reform began to coalesce, leading eventually to the coup of August 1991. Beneath the surface, however, these processes were already beginning to rock the reformers’ boat, and Chernyaev, subtly but precisely, notes the first signs of this agitation in these pages.
The Chernyaev Diary was translated by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.
TOP-SECRET FROM THE CIA-ARCHIVES: INTERNATIONAL CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT
STRENG VERTRAULICH: GEHEIMREPORT DES BUNDESTAGES ZU GEHEIMGEFÄNGNISSEN IN DEUTSCHLAND
CONFIDENTIAL: DEFLATED EXPECTATIONS FOR MERKEL’S DREAM COALITION
VZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #0153/01 0341656 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 031656Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6467 INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000153 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL EFIN ECON GM SUBJECT: DEFLATED EXPECTATIONS FOR MERKEL'S DREAM COALITION AFTER FIRST 100 DAYS REF: 2009 BERLIN 1528 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Greg Delawie for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: One hundred days after Germany's black-yellow coalition took office, a strong, unified government led by Chancellor Merkel has yet to materialize. The much anticipated “dream coalition” comprised of Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister the Christian Social Union (CSU), and Free Democratic Party (FDP) which promised a unified conservative approach to the economy and “like minded” thinking on social welfare, the environment, and foreign policy has become bogged down in party politics with no end in sight. Recent polls show that the bickering may be at least partly to blame for the FDP's 5.6 percent fall in the polls, with it now down to 9 percent from its historic 14.6 percent election results (see septel) and the CSU plummet to an historic low of 41 percent. Indeed one minister is now threatening resignation. Sources from the three coalition parties have admitted to problems, blaming the other coalition parties, and downplaying their significance. Merkel has come under criticism within her own party for not taking strong public stands and reining in her coalition partners, instead staying above the political fray. The opposition, particularly the Social Democratic Party (SPD), is trying to capitalize on this “divided we rule” coalition with an eye toward unseating a teetering CDU-FDP coalition in North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) in May elections, thereby tipping the CDU-FDP Bundesrat majority in its favor. Merkel is counting on better economic and political indicators after the NRW election followed by the release of the annual tax forecasts to congeal the coalition. If the CDU/FDP coalition fails in NRW, coalition divisions are likely to become more pronounced. End Summary. Off to a Rocky Start --------------------- ¶2. (C) Concluding a coalition agreement in only three weeks, prior to her November 2 departure for Washington to address Congress and in time for the 9 November 20 year anniversary of German unity may have been Chancellor Merkel's first and only major success to date in marshaling coalition unity. But the feat may have had consequences. The haste to sign has left half-resolved differences on tax cuts, economic policy, Afghanistan, Turkey, health care, data protection (see reftel) and other issues that continue to gurgle to the surface. Important to recognize is that each party is operating under its own political pressures from different voting constituencies. The FDP's main goal is to deliver on campaign promises – particularly tax relief – and shore up its base, the CSU is desperate to regain its dominance in Bavaria, and the CDU is seeking to rebuild its eroded voter base. All three parties and the opposition are now gearing up for May 9 elections in NRW. This election in Germany's most populous state, referred to as a “small national election,” is regarded as a partial vote of confidence on the national coalition, and will determine the Bundesrat majority. If the NRW CDU-FDP coalition fails to return to government, the national CDU-FDP coalition will fall by six seats in the Bundesrat – from 37 to 31 seats – it will lose its majority. Such a loss could well hamper the government's ability to pass major financial or economic legislation. ¶3. (C) Each of the three coalition parties have pointed to the others for instigating tension. CDU party contact xxxxx accused the FDP of functioning as if it were still in the opposition. Senior SPD parliamentarian Hans-Ulrich Klose attributed the coalition strains to the FDP adjusting to being in government after 11 years in the opposition. FDP contact xxxxx accused the CDU/CSU of reacting to their own internal problems: for the CDU, its controversy over the Kunduz airstrike, and for the CSU, its involvement in a major bank scandal. The FDP also points to the CSU's strong rivalry with the FDP, with which it now governs in Bavaria. The CSU is still trying to recover from its historic low voting results in the September 2008 state elections, which forced it for the first time in 46 years to govern within a coalition. All parties, however, have downplayed the significance of the feuds, with senior CDU party operative xxxxx explaining in January that the party leaderships are just now settling in after an exhausting election campaign and intense coalition negotiations. He hoped (more than predicted) that the parties would soon settle into a more cooperative relationship. In January, Merkel called a small summit for coalition leadership with Westerwelle and Seehofer to smooth things over and commit to a new beginning. While the coalition's political edginess receded for a time, policy divisions continue to surface. CDU/CSU vs FDP – the Economy ----------------------------- ¶4. (C) While CDU/CSU and FDP voters may be the most likely to cross over to the other party, their mainstay voter bases are different, with the CDU/CSU appealing to economically conservative voters who also support the social market economy, but are socially conservative. The FDP base is composed of free-market advocates, who are socially liberal and strong advocates of civil liberties. The FDP's campaign and continuing mantra has been for much larger tax cuts in 2011, worth 20-24 billion euros, apparently at the expense of both coalition unity and the better judgment of economic experts. The cuts would make getting the deficit back under the EU ceiling of 3 percent of GDP by 2013 nearly impossible. National debt will rise from 66 percent of GDP to 80 percent. There are growing public concerns over rising debt, but also about perceived disarray in the coalition's tax and budget policies. Merkel insists that a decision regarding the tax reduction plans will not be taken before May, when the overall tax revenue forecast is due. Waiting until May also means the coalition will not have to go public with unpopular consolidation measures until after the NRW elections. Finance Minister Schaeuble (CDU) appears unenthusiastic at best about further tax cuts. He has already said deficit reduction measures would have to start in 2011. The CSU has also called the FDP's call for speedy tax relief measures “unrealistic” despite the fact that it had included such a demand during its election campaign. The most recent squabble between the FDP and CSU is over FDP Health Minister Roesler's plans for health care reform which foresees more care options and the introduction of competition. Seehofer has rejected the proposal, holding fast against radical changes to the system. Roesler has indicated he might resign over this issue. Foreign Policy -------------- ¶5. (C) Coalition feuding over economic and tax policy has trumped coalition divisions over foreign policy, although FM Westerwelle has managed a few disruptions in the latter. As a harbinger of hard times to come, as one of his first actions, Westerwelle opposed the naming of CDU Bundestag member Erika Steinbach to the foundation “Flight Expulsion and Reconciliation” citing possible damage to relations with Poland. As President of Germany's Federation of Expellees, Steinbach is disliked in Poland. While the numbers are disputed, the expellee community, which mainly votes CSU or CDU, has exerted influence on the issue. National and State CDU and CSU politicians came out in support of Steinbach with only Merkel keeping mum. The controversy continues, despite ongoing attempts to reach a compromise, threatening to drain coalition attention and good-will. ¶6. (C) Coalition strains have also surfaced on the issue of overseas deployments. Regarding a troop increase in Afghanistan, Westerwelle's position was at first muddled, as he tried to reflect his party's general negativity toward overseas military deployments while at the same time tending to his role as Germany's chief diplomat in the run-up to the London Conference. In the end, he (together with the opposition) likely played a role in achieving a lower-than-expected troop increase. Westerwelle also convinced the CDU to agree on gradually reducing German participation in UNIFIL. The CSU also rocked the coalition boat on Afghanistan, with Seehofer expressing general skepticism on a troop increase, although he later came around. In addition, CSU Secretary General Dobrindt has ridiculed the federal government's reconciliation concept in Afghanistan as a “cash for clunkers version for the Taliban.” Comment --------- ¶7. (C) Chancellor Merkel may have ironically cast off the yoke of the Grand Coalition only now to be encumbered with a new FDP-CSU double yoke, restrained by an FDP bent on delivering on campaign promises and a CSU distracted over its rivalry with the FDP and internal problems. High expectations for the “dream coalition” are certainly in part to blame for the current polls, with popularity numbers for Merkel and Westerwelle both having suffered. Worried most, however, are the CDU and FDP politicians in NRW, who fear that the national coalition's squabbling could negatively impact their own chances in the May 9 elections. The leadership threesome – Merkel, Westerwelle, and Seehofer – may make an extra effort to get along, or at least appear to get along, as the NRW elections near. It is not clear that Westerwelle and the FDP, however, believe that it is the squabbling that is unhelpful, or rather its own inability to deliver as yet on certain campaign promises. If it is the latter, more coalition tensions could ensue as Westerwelle begins to expend more energy as FDP Chairman and less as Foreign Minister, gearing up his party for its NRW campaign. Berlin is once again becoming bogged down in political squabbles as the NRW elections near. ¶8. (U) Consulate Munich contributed to this cable. Murphy
CONFIDENTIAL: FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS STRUGGLE
VZCZCXRO6323 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHRL #0157/01 0351607 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 041607Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6478 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000157 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS STRUGGLE WITH FM WESTERWELLE ON TROOP INCREASE FOR AFGHANISTAN REF: A. BERLIN 138 ¶B. BERLIN 112 Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Defense Minister zu Guttenberg revealed in a February 3 meeting with Ambassador Murphy that coalition partner FM Westerwelle -- not the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) -- had been the single biggest obstacle to the government seeking a bigger increase in German troops for Afghanistan. But even with the modest planned troop increase of 500 (with 350 more in reserve), zu Guttenberg said a restructuring of the current Bundeswehr presence would allow Germany to increase the number of soldiers involved in the training of Afghan National Army (ANA) by more than 1,000. While Westerwelle has portrayed his skepticism about additional troops as principled, it was also motivated by a desire to put zu Guttenberg "in his place." While the size of the troop increase is settled, the length of the new ISAF mandate remains open. The government is hoping to have the new mandate approved by the Bundestag before the end of February, with significant (if not majority) support from the opposition SPD and Greens. END SUMMARY. WESTERWELLE: BIGGEST OBSTACLE ¶2. (C) In explaining the lower-than-expected planned increase in the number of German troops for Afghanistan, zu Guttenberg told the Ambassador that Westerwelle's opening position in the coalition negotiations on the new mandate had been "not one additional soldier." In that context, it had been difficult to get agreement on any increase at all. (Comment: Zu Guttenberg proposed 1,500 additional troops at the initial January 4 mini-cabinet meeting on this issue. End Comment.) DOING A LOT MORE WITH A LITTLE MORE ¶3. (C) To help justify the need for more troops, zu Guttenberg said he had forced the Bundeswehr to do a complete review of all the existing positions in Afghanistan, which had confirmed that some could be eliminated in light of the new ISAF counterinsurgency strategy. He said a restructuring of the current Bundeswehr presence, combined with the troop increase, would boost the number of soldiers involved in the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) from 280 to 1,400. The restructuring includes turning the battalion-size quick reaction force based in Mazar into a "protection and training" battalion. A second such battalion will be created in Kunduz by augmenting the existing infantry company there with new troops. Zu Guttenberg reiterated that Germany strongly supports COMISAF's focus on protection of the population and partnering with the Afghan national security forces (ANSF), and that the German "trainers" (i.e., the two new maneuver battalions) will operate in the field with the ANSF. PUTTING ZU GUTTENBERG IN HIS PLACE ¶4. (C) While zu Guttenberg said he is avoiding public comment on whether the outcome of the coalition talks on the new mandate is a "victory" for him or Westerwelle, FDP Defense Policy Spokesman Elke Hoff told poloff separately that Westerwelle's hard line against additional troops had been motivated in part to "teach zu Guttenberg a lesson." She claimed that zu Guttenberg had been too presumptuous last fall in making speeches in Canada and the U.S. about how Germany would significantly increase its troop contribution to ISAF. He might have been able to get agreement on a higher ceiling had he engaged parliamentarians first and showed "greater respect for the political process." OPEN QUESTION: LENGTH OF THE MANDATE ¶5. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that the cabinet would formally agree on the proposed new ISAF mandate February 9 and that the first reading in the Bundestag would be February 10. FM Westerwelle is scheduled to speak on behalf of the government in introducing the proposed mandate. The government is aiming to hold the final Bundestag vote on the mandate -- following two weeks of committee hearings -- on February 26. Zu Guttenberg was BERLIN 00000157 002 OF 002 confident that a large number (if not a majority) of opposition politicians from the SPD and Greens would vote in favor of the new mandate. ¶6. (C) A February 2 meeting of state secretaries tentatively agreed that the new mandate should run, as is the custom, for one year, expiring in February 2011. Zu Guttenberg indicated, however, that it might be preferable to stick to the length of the current mandate, which expires in December 2010. He expressed concern that having the mandate lap over into early 2011 could lead to a premature debate on withdrawal, before the new strategy really had a chance to work. (Comment: Another option under consideration -- and favored by some in the Chancellery -- is a 18-month mandate, so that any debate on the future of the troop presence would be put off until the fall of ¶2011. But the MFA objects that this would only raise the ire of the opposition and give them an excuse to oppose the mandate. End Comment.) REASSURING THE GERMANS ON COMMAND OF THE NORTH ¶7. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that Germany very much welcomed the planned inflow of U.S. forces into the north, especially the helicopter assets, which filled a long-standing shortfall. He noted, however, that many in Germany question whether the U.S. will be willing to accept continued German leadership of RC-North in view of the increased U.S. presence. Ambassador Murphy assured him that the U.S. had no issues working for the German command in the North. Murphy
CONFIDENTIAL: WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000164 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020 TAGS: OTRA MARR NATO PARM PINS PREL PGOV GM AF IR SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES Classified By: Classified by Political M-C George Glass for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) German FM Westerwelle told Amb February 5 that it was important to refocus Afghanistan efforts on civilian reconstruction; that we needed to avoid suggesting German troops engaged in less risk than other countries; that he did not invite Iranian FM Mottaki to Germany or seek a meeting with him; that any discussion of non-strategic nuclear weapons needed to be conducted at 28 at NATO; and that he could not influence any decision by the European Parliament on the SWIFT agreement. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador asked about Westerwelle's first 100 days in office. Though in an ebullient mood, Westerwelle said things were very difficult (FDP slipped another percentage point in the polls hours before the meeting). He said he had been in France February 4 for a joint cabinet meeting, but that nothing substantive came of it. He observed that one never really knew what was going to happen with Sarkozy involved. -------------- AFGHANISTAN ------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador reviewed his own recent trip to Afghanistan. He shared his impression that the Germans were doing a superb job at all levels from the RC-North commander on down. He learned how critical mentoring and partnering with Afghan security forces had become. He noted that the U.S. was sending substantial forces to RC-North, where they would conduct training and be under German command. Westerwelle responded that this was important for Germany and for international cooperation. The Ambassador added that the U.S. was sending substantial helicopter support as well. He said that Germans could be proud of their troops in Afghanistan. Westerwelle responded that this was good news. He said that the London Conference bore an excellent conclusion, and was particularly useful for its focus on civilian progress. He emphasized the importance of underscoring civilian reconstruction. ¶4. (C) With a request for confidentiality, Westerwelle referred to the January 20 "Bild Zeitung" interview with General McChrystal, in which the general is quoted as urging the Germans to take more risks. Westerwelle recounted that he himself had had to answer questions about this article for ten days, explaining that the Germans were not "peace soldiers" while other countries provided the combat troops. He said it was important that German troops not be "relativized" and cast as second-class troops. He observed that Germany had originally deployed 3,500 troops, increased that mandate to 4,500, and was now planning an increase of another 500 plus a reserve. He emphasized that this was a major contribution compared with other European countries. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador noted that he had gained the impression in Afghanistan that police training was more challenging than he had originally understood. Troops were usually required to provide force protection. But German police training was the best. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked how the prospective February 26 Bundestag debate to extend the Bundeswehr mandate in Afghanistan would play out. Westerwelle said the question was how large a majority would approve the new mandate. He said that SPD caucus chief Steinmeier displayed good will on this issue. However, SPD chairman Gabriel wanted to politicize the issue for domestic political gain. Nevertheless, he thought some in the SPD would support the new mandate. However, Westerwelle expected no support from the Greens. Westerwelle noted that the May NRW state elections were also affecting the issue in a negative way. That said, he said he could not see Steinmeier opposing the larger mandate. He hoped the Ambassador would speak with Steinmeier. ------ IRAN ------ ¶7. (C) Asked about the February 5 visit of Iranian FM Mottaki to the Munich Security Conference, Westerwelle emphasized that he (Westerwelle) had not invited Mottaki to come to Germany, and Westerwelle had also not requested a meeting with Mottaki. Rather, it was Mottaki who was asking to see Westerwelle. Westerwelle said he had still not decided whether he would talk to Mottaki or not. He reflected concern that Tehran might try to exploit Mottaki's visit to Germany as a distraction, and continue executing people during the visit. In any case, Westerwelle said his position was exactly the same as the U.S. on Iran, and he would share the results of any meeting with Mottaki, if it took place. BERLIN 00000164 002 OF 002 ¶8. (C) Westerwelle said he would meet Russian FM Lavrov and (separately) Chinese FM Yang February 5. He suggested that Moscow had been changing course on Iran sanctions since the Qom revelations. The Russians now saw Iran as playing games on the nuclear issue. However, he observed that China was "hesitant," or even in opposition to sanctions. Reflecting on his recent visit to China, Westerwelle said he had not perceived any "good will" there at present. He said he would ask Yang again about Iran and then share the results with the U.S. Westerwelle opined that it was important also to focus on Brazil as an opinion leader in the Third World. He noted that President Lula had received Ahmadinejad warmly several months ago. He added that he was uncertain what the Saudis thought, but that the other Persian Gulf countries seemed to be in an existential panic about the Iranian nuclear program. ----------- TAC NUKES ----------- ¶9. (C) Touching briefly on arms control, Westerwelle stated unequivocally that tactical nuclear weapons was an issue for NATO. He said that when he had received Kissinger, Schulz, Perry and Nunn on February 3 to talk about their global zero proposal, tactical nuclear weapons was not discussed. He said that the four statesmen were very supportive of President Obama. ---------- TFTP --------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador raised the challenge of getting the European Parliament to approve an agreement to share data with the U.S. on tracking terrorist finance. The Ambassador noted the extensive efforts of the Treasury Department and other U.S. agencies to explain the importance of the program to our common security. He asked how one could get better support for the program. Westerwelle replied that the German government had been able to come up with a solution for itself a few months ago when the issue first surfaced. (Comment: In fact, German Interior Minister de Maziere's vote to abstain in the EU Council vote on TFTP on November 30 reflected the complete deadlock within the Coalition Government between TFTP advocates in the CDU-controlled Interior Ministry and TFTP opponents in the FDP-controlled Justice Ministery. End Comment.) However, Westerwelle said that now that the issue was in the European Parliament, he had no ability to influence it. He said that he was very, very aware of the Secretary's interest in this issue. Nevertheless, he had a sense that almost all groups in the European Parliament had concerns with the proposed agreement. He emphasized that this was not an issue that only concerned his party, the FDP, but rather many others as well. ¶11. (C) Westerwelle shared that he had not yet appointed a new Coordinator for German-American cooperation. ---------- COMMENT --------- ¶12. (C) Westerwelle (who spoke with ease in English) was in a buoyant mood and more confident on his issues than we have seen him so far. He seemed ready to defend any intimation that he was less than supportive of a troop surge (Defense Minister zu Guttenberg told the Ambassador two days ago that Westerwelle had worked for no increase of German troops for Afghanistan, see Berlin 157) with invocations of the importance of civilian reconstruction. On Iran, he leapt at the chance to tell us he had not invited Mottaki. His dodges on both tactical nuclear weapons and terrorist finance were all but practiced. His comment that he was unable to affect the vote in the EU Parliament on TFTP was a bit disingenuous; on February 4, an MFA official acknowledged to visiting Treasury officials in Berlin that German MEPs were in fact leading the charge against TFTP in the EU Parliament with the tacit support of the FDP, if not of specialists in the Justice Ministry and MFA themselves. Westerwelle still cuts a good image in meetings and in the press here, even though his party continues a bout of free fall in the polls. His ministry, though, still wonders (privately to us) where he gets his policy direction from. END COMMENT. ¶13. (U) The Ambassador did not have the chance to clear this cable before departing Berlin. Murphy
TOP-SECRET CIA-REPORT: NORTH KOREA’S ENGAGEMENT: PERSPECTIVES, OUTLOOK, AND IMPLICATION
TOP-SECRET: SARAH PALINS TELEPHONE HACK REVEALED
TOP-SECRET:FUKUSHIMA PLANT DIA
TOP-SECRET: CHINESE RESEARCH ON HIGH MICROWAVE AND EMP-WEAPONS
TOP-SECRET FROM THE CIA ARCHIVES: BIN LADIN PREPARING TO HIJACK US AIRCRAFT AND OTHER ATTACKS
STRENG VERTRAULICH: DAS SCHILY-EL-MASRI-DOSSIER
TOP-SECRET: CIA ARCHIVES DOCUMENT-WARNING OF WAR IN EUROPE
SECRET: THE SAUDI SHI’A: WHERE DO THEIR LOYALTIES LIE?
VZCZCXRO1004 PP RUEHDE DE RUEHRH #3312/01 1221455 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 021455Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6969 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2585 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0526 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 RIYADH 003312 SIPDIS SIPDIS DHAHRAN SENDS PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS SA SUBJECT: THE SAUDI SHI'A: WHERE DO THEIR LOYALTIES LIE? REF: A. RIYADH 3301 ¶B. RIYADH 1196 ¶C. RIYADH 888 Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ------- Summary ------- ¶1. (S) Some Sunni Arab leaders, including Egypt's President Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah, have recently publicly questioned the loyalties of Arab Shi'a populations in the Middle East. Privately, senior Saudi officials raise similar concerns. Given the ongoing sectarian conflict in Iraq, increasing regional tensions vis-a-vis Shi'a Iran, and the tenuous status of Saudi Shi'a within their own country, the question of whether Saudi Shi'a loyalties belong primarily with Saudi Arabia - or, alternatively, to their coreligionists elsewhere in the Gulf - is a timely one. It is also of central concern to U.S. strategic interests in the region, given the concentration of Saudi Arabia's Shi'a population in its oil producing areas. ¶2. (S) Our conclusion, based on discussions with a broad spectrum of Saudi Shi'a contacts over the past eight months, is that most Saudi Shi'a remain committed to the agreement reached between the Saudi Shi'a leadership and King Fahd in 1993-4, whereby Shi'a leaders agreed to pursue their goals within the Kingdom's political system in return for the King's promise to improve their situation. Saudi Shi'a have deep religious ties to Iraq and Iran and are inspired by the newfound religious freedom and political power of the Iraqi Shi'a; they also have a lengthy history of persecution by the Al-Saud and face continuing discrimination (ref B). Nonetheless, their leaders still appear committed to working for reform from within, a strategy that, thanks to King Abdullah, is slowly bearing fruit. In our view, it would require a major internal or external stimulus to move the Saudi Shi'a toward confrontation with Riyadh. Such stimuli could include a major shift in SAG policy or leadership, the spread of uncontained sectarian violence to the Kingdom, or a major change in regional security arrangements, especially escalating regional conflict involving Shi'a (ref C). Absent these circumstances, the vast majority of Saudi Shi'a are not likely to demonstrate significant external political loyalties, either to Iran or to any inchoate notion of a "Shi'a crescent." End summary. --------------------------------------------- -------- A Tactical Choice: Advocating for Rights from Within --------------------------------------------- -------- ¶3. (SBU) At 1.5 to 2 million strong, the Shi'a comprise 10 to 15 percent of Saudi citizens. They are concentrated in the Eastern Province (EP), particularly the oasis areas of Qatif (where the population is overwhelmingly Shi'a) and Al-Ahsa (a mixed Sunni-Shi'a area). Saudi Shi'a do not have the breadth of tribal and clan ties to Iraq and Iran as do the Shi'a of Kuwait and Bahrain, though at least one major Shi'a tribal confederation, the Al-Tamim, are present in Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. ¶4. (SBU) The Wahhabi Saudi state has a long record of brutal persecution of both Saudi Shi'a and Shi'a living elsewhere in the region. During the military raids of the first and second Saudi states in the 18th and 19th centuries, Shi'a were a frequent target of Wahhabi Saudi violence, including an all-out attack on major Shi'a cities in southern Iraq and the desecration of holy sites there. When the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz, conquered what is now the EP, his fanatical Ikhwan army went on a murderous anti-Shi'a rampage. A watershed moment in this troubled history came in 1979 when thousands of Shi'a, angry at the state, inspired by the Iranian revolution, and organized by a young group of leaders, most notably Hassan Al-Saffar, took to the streets of Qatif in protest. The SAG cracked down, killing a number of the protesters and arresting many activists. Hundreds of Shi'a, including Al-Saffar, went into exile, initially to Iran but later leaving Iran for Syria, Lebanon, the UK, the U.S., and other western countries. Al-Saffar and many of his political allies returned to Saudi Arabia in the mid 1990s after reaching a deal with King Fahd in 1993-4. The King agreed to allow the exiles to return, to release Shi'a detained in the Kingdom, and to take steps to improve the situation of the Shi'a; for their part, the returning Shi'a agreed to cease their opposition activities and pursue their goals within the Saudi system. ¶5. (C) Why did the exiled Shi'a return? According to Mohammed Al-Mahfooth, one of their number and now editor-in-chief of a journal on contemporary Islamic issues, "There were two main reasons. First, we realized that, as a minority in Saudi Arabia, we could never hope to change the regime by revolution, as we might have thought in 1979. Second, we felt we were losing touch with our communities here, and we were not effective at helping them to develop from abroad. So we decided to come back and work for our own rights from within." We have heard similar explanations from other Shi'a who were part of the exile movement. As a group, exiled and indigenous leaders made an important tactical decision in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Realizing that they could not wrest control over their destiny from the SAG by opposition and confrontation, they changed their goal to realizing their civil rights as Saudi citizens and their tactics to pushing for reform from within. The same tactical calculus remains relevant today. ¶6. (C) Shi'a activists have consistently emphasized to us their continued commitment to pushing for civil rights and reform within the system; in the words of one of their leaders, "Any place there is room, we are trying to use it." We see considerable evidence that the Shi'a are indeed taking full advantage of every opportunity, especially with the ascension of King Abdullah, whom the Shi'a view as friendly to their aspirations. They were active participants in the petition movement in the last years of King Fahd's reign, signing petitions calling for reform both as a community and, as individuals, in conjunction with other (Sunni) reformers. The Shi'a successfully organized to win all the municipal council seats in EP areas where they enjoyed demographic predominance. The Qatif municipal council, with Jafar Al-Shayeb as its president, will likely prove to be the most organized and active of any in the EP. ¶7. (C) The Shi'a are also pushing the boundaries of what the SAG allows in terms of civil society (ref A), organizing unregistered but tolerated activities ranging from regular cultural and political forums to computer and astronomy clubs to underground film showings. Of the five people appointed to the Dammam branch of the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), at least four are Shi'a activists, including Al-Shayeb. The Shi'a are pushing for greater religious freedom and a reduction in discrimination through the NSHR and via direct appeal to senior SAG leaders, albeit with limited success. Pointing to these activities and to their vision of a Saudi Arabia where all citizens enjoy civil rights, some of our contacts argue that the Shi'a are the true Saudi nationalists and reformers. ¶8. (C) Another indication that the Shi'a are, at least for now, committed to working within the system is that Shi'a leaders and activists from a variety of backgrounds are gravitating toward this tactic and that they are actively building bridges with other reform elements in Saudi society. The returned exiles are the most politically active Saudi Shi'a, were the major force in brokering the 1993-4 deal with King Fahd, and are in the forefront of most of the initiatives mentioned above. (Note: While they do not form a single political block, they are sometimes referred to as "Shirazis" because at the time of their exile many of them followed the late Ayatollah Mohammed Al-Shirazi, who advocated that clerics should play a greater political role in demanding Shi'a rights, although Shirazi opposed the concept of wilayat al-faqih. End note.) Other Shi'a activists, both secular and religious, have also adopted the tactic of pushing for reform from within, although they do not have the same broad organizational networks of the Shirazis. These activists include former leftists like Najib Al-Khunaizi, who hosts one of the regular cultural forums in Qatif, and purported Saudi Hezbollah leader Hassan Al-Nimr, who participated in the most recent National Dialogue in Abha. The Shirazis, Al-Khunaizi, Al-Nimr, and other Shi'a leaders are also making efforts to reach out to secular and religious reformers from Sunni society, trading visits to each other's forums and majlises and seeking other means for dialogue. --------------------------------------------- ---- Iran: Religious Ties but Few Political Loyalties --------------------------------------------- ---- ¶9. (S) While there are strong religious ties between the Saudi Shi'a and Iran and the potential for Iranian influence in the EP is a legitimate concern, especially given the increasing bellicosity of Iranian rhetoric and policy, our best assessment is that, under prevailing conditions, the Shi'a are not looking to Tehran for political guidance. ¶10. (S) As argued in ref C, given the importance of the EP to Saudi Arabia's oil industry, Iran has a strategic rationale for laying the groundwork to exert its influence. It also has a history of doing so. The Iranian revolution inspired the Saudi Shi'a to rise up in opposition in 1979, and the Iranians played a role in organizing Saudi Hezbollah in the 1980s. Most Saudi Shi'a clerics have studied extensively in Iran, especially Qom, and many politically active Shi'a spent time in Iran in the early and mid 1980s. A militant Saudi Shi'a group, at least inspired if not directed by Iran, carried out the attack on the Al-Khobar military barracks in the summer of 1996. More recently, a few of our Shi'a contacts have claimed that there are active pro-Iranian networks in the Qatif area and alleged other signs of Iranian activity, although a much larger number of others discount these claims. (Note: Recent sensitive reports from other channels also suggest possible Shi'a links with militant Shi'a in Iran, Iraq, and/or Lebanon. One report suggests that Iranian-affliated Iraqi militias may have begun low-key efforts to establish contacts in the EP, and another report suggests that one Saudi Shi'a may have visited a Lebanese Shi'a leader to seek financial support. End note.) ¶11. (S) The vast majority of our Shi'a contacts, however, have told ConOffs that they see no evidence of current Iranian efforts to exert political influence in the EP. Our contacts, who include community activists, political leaders, journalists, businessmen, cultural figures, academics, and sheikhs, many of whom studied in Iran, are also generally skeptical of Iranian motives as they pertain to Saudi Arabia. We heard over and over variants of the following statement: "We were used by Iran before, and we won't let it happen again. Their interests are completely different than ours." Indeed, the exiled Shirazis appear to have left Iran in the mid 1980s because it became clear they were being used: several contacts independently told us that the group left because they refused Iranian pressure to organize or take credit for sabotage operations against Saudi oil installations. ¶12. (C) Time and time again, Shi'a sheikhs have explained that the Saudi Shi'a prefer to study in Najaf or Karbala (where Arabic is spoken everywhere, including outside the religious community), have much stronger historical ties to religious institutions in Iraq, and studied in Qom only because Saddam Hussein's regime made it impossible for them to study in Iraq. They also caution that a Shi'a who has studied at a hawza in Qom would not necessarily share a pro-Iranian religious or political perspective and note that all the important ayatollahs, including those from Najaf, have hawzas in Qom. All of our contacts concur that among Saudi Shi'a who emulate a marja' or mujtahid, the large majority of Saudi Shi'a follow Iranian-born but Iraq-based Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, with the rest divided among a number of other ayatollahs. ¶13. (S) The current role and activity of Saudi Hezbollah remains a question mark about which we have been able to develop only limited information. Some contacts claims the group no longer exists, but prevailing evidence suggests that it encompasses a small group of religious figures who believe in the concept of wilayat al-faqih, emulate Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i as their marja', but have few current followers. Our contacts report that its leaders are not very active politically, do not take their cue from the Iranian regime, and do not espouse violence (at least not currently, in all three cases). While we continue to seek additional information on Saudi Hezbollah, what limited knowledge we have supports the views espoused by our contacts. We do not know of any anti-SAG or anti-American violence ascribed to any Saudi Shi'a group since the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996; at least one of Saudi Hezbollah's purported leaders has participated in the National Dialogue (suggesting that the SAG does not consider the movement or the individual as much of a threat and that he supports the Dialogue's concept); and we have heard that other Shi'a leaders have, over time, convinced Saudi Hezbollah's leaders that violence would not help the Shi'a cause. We cannot rule out the possibility that Iran or its proxies could recruit and train small Saudi Shi'a cells to carry out disruptive or terrorist activities. However, we cannot see such cells developing a broad following given the present Shi'a leadership and their strategy unless there are major changes in the regional political landscape. ------------------ The Impact of Iraq ------------------ ¶14. (C) The Saudi Shi'a follow events in Iraq with intense interest. In stark contrast to non-Shi'a Saudis, most Shi'a express support for the U.S. intervention in Iraq despite the current strife and violence. Many Shi'a contacts have explicitly thanked ConOffs for the U.S. role in freeing their coreligionists in Iraq from Saddam Hussein's oppressive regime and helping them obtain political power commensurate with their numbers. Saudi Shi'a feel deep emotional and religious ties to Iraq and look forward to visiting Shi'a holy sites and participating in religious festivals there as soon as the security situation permits. The expanded political and religious freedoms for Shi'a in Iraq have empowered Saudi Shi'a to push further than they previously dared against SAG restrictions on religious freedom and civil society. For example, contacts have linked expanded Ashura celebrations in Qatif, as well as more cautious expressions of Shi'a identity elsewhere in the Kingdom, directly to the new situation in Iraq. ¶15. (S) However, although Saudi Shi'a are certainly aware that Shi'a form a significant part of the population on the Arab side of the gulf, to date we have seen no indication that the Saudi Shi'a have any realistic vision of a pan-Arab Shi'a political block. Any such realization of an Arab "Shi'a crescent" would have to be led by Iraqi Shi'a, and at this point, as several contacts have noted to us, domestic challenges occupy their full attention. Saudi Shi'a are not currently traveling to Iraq in significant numbers, and political and religious contacts between Saudi and Iraqi Shi'a post-Iraqi liberation, while they have occurred, appear to have been limited to date. --------------------------------------------- --- The Future of the Shi'a Strategy and U.S. Policy --------------------------------------------- --- ¶16. (S) Will the Shi'a strategy of seeking to realize their rights as Saudi citizens by engaging the SAG hold firm over the next several years? We believe that it will, as long as the SAG does not backtrack on reform through a change in policy or leadership and/or as long as there are not compelling external pressures or influences that change their calculus of interests. Although Shi'a leaders have frequently expressed to us their frustration with the slow pace of reform and with the continued discrimination against the Shi'a community, they have invested a great deal in the strategy of engagement and it is slowly bearing fruit in the form of some advances in religious freedom (in Qatif at least) and civil society. If the SAG does backtrack, e.g. by clamping down harshly on unlicensed civil society organizations or undoing the limited measure of religious freedom recently gained by the Shi'a, or if other elements of the current equilibrium change, the strategic calculations of the Shi'a leadership could change as well. While we have not seen any signs of radical young Shi'a leaders who disagree with the goals or tactics of the current leadership, such leaders could emerge if sectarian violence initiated by Sunni extremists spreads uncontained to Saudi Arabia, if the employment situation for young Shi'a worsens, if Ayatollah Sistani is succeeded by a more radical cleric as marja' to most Saudi Shi'a, or if conflict breaks out with Iran. ¶17. (S) The argument outlined above, that the Saudi Shi'a remain committed to a strategic choice to push for realization of their rights as citizens from within the Saudi system and, under current conditions, do not entertain any serious external political loyalties, has several important implications for U.S. policymakers. Most Saudi Shi'a currently see their interests as directly aligned with U.S. interests in key respects, particularly with the U.S. interest in promoting participatory governance and human rights in the Middle East as an antidote to extremism. They appreciate any pressure the U.S. puts on the Saudi government to reform, although they wish the U.S. would increase this pressure and worry that other interests, such as regional stability and security of the oil supply, cause the U.S. to draw back from urging greater steps toward political reform. ¶18. (S) The most important implication of this argument is therefore that it is unlikely that the vast majority of Saudi Shi'a would support Iranian or Iranian-proxy interference in Saudi Arabia as long as the current equilibrium holds, particularly the promise for gradual reform. King Abdullah embodies this promise of reform, particularly for the Shi'a, and with good cause: no less a figure than Prince Talal bin Abdulaziz told the Ambassador that King Abdullah has decided to give Saudi more religious freedom as part of an effort to better incorporate them into Saudi national life. By supporting the reform process, the U.S. is also playing a role, an important one in Shi'a eyes, in maintaining the current equilibrium. (Comment: As suggested in ref C, the USG can certainly use SAG concern about potential Iranian influence as one means of urging the SAG to grant fuller rights to its Shi'a citizens. End comment.) A secondary, more tactical implication is that the Saudi Shi'a currently make natural allies in U.S. efforts to promote political reform and human rights in Saudi Arabia. Post is already directing some programmatic resources in this direction and will explore this potential further in a later cable. ------- Sources ------- ¶19. (SBU) This cable draws on hundreds of conversations over the past eight months between CG, PolOff, and PAO and a diverse group of Saudi Shi'a contacts, as well as on related observations and on publicly available sources such as Saudi Shi'a websites and other reports. We have reported many of these conversations and observations in previous cables (NOTAL), including RIYADH 964, RIYADH 179, RIYADH 42, 2005 RIYADH 9142 (reform, Iran, Iraq); RIYADH 3306, RIYADH 1741, RIYADH 1380, 2005 RIYADH 7589, 2003 RIYADH 2698 (reform); RIYADH 1706, RIYADH 1377, RIYADH 1252 (civil society); RIYADH 1461, RIYADH 280, RIYADH 275 (Shi'a leadership); 2005 RIYADH 9048, 2005 RIYADH 8565 (Iraq, Iran); RIYADH 1053 (Iraq); 2005 RIYADH 8741 (Iran); RIYADH 2840 (reactions to Mubarak); and 2005 RIYADH 8323 (EP governance). (APPROVED: KINCANNON) GFOELLER
CONFIDENTIAL: OKINAWAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE CHINA THREAT OR LACK THEREOF
VZCZCXRO4578 PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHPB DE RUEHNH #0103/01 1160120 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 260120Z APR 06 FM AMCONSUL NAHA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0472 INFO RHMFISS/18WG CP KADENA AB JA RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE RUSFNSG/CDR10THASG TORII STATION JA RHMFISS/CDR1STBN1STSFGA TORII STATION JA RHMFISS/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI RHMFISS/CG FIRST MAW RHMFISS/CG II MEF RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA RHMFISS/CG III MEF RUHBANB/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER JA RUHBBEA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV CAMP COURTNEY JA RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/COMFLEACT OKINAWA JA RHMFISS/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA RHMFISS/COMMARFORPAC RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT RHHMDBA/COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA RUHBVMA/CTF 76 RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 0137 RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI RHHMBRA/JICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0517 RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVFO FAREAST YOKOSUKA JA RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA RUHBANB/OKINAWA AREA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0209 RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0174 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0472 RHMFISS/USARPAC G5 FT SHAFTER HI RHMFISS/USPACOM REP GUAM ISLAND GU RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 NAHA 000103 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/26/2031 TAGS: MARR PINS JA CH TW SUBJECT: OKINAWAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE CHINA THREAT OR LACK THEREOF REF: A. A. TOKYO 1301 ¶B. B. TOKYO 1153 ¶C. C. EMBASSY TOKYO TRANSLATION OF FEBRUARY 24 SANKEI SHIMBUN ARTICLE. ¶D. D. FUKUOKA 17 ¶E. E. NAGOYA 11 ¶F. F. TOKYO 822 NAHA 00000103 001.2 OF 008 CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas G. Reich, Consul General, Consulate General Naha, State. REASON: 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Despite China's rapidly expanding economic and military activities, including in waters near Okinawa, Okinawans claim they do not share America's or Japan's sense of threat from China. While many mainland Japanese officials and influentials say they recognize China as a potential threat to regional security and stability, even most conservative Okinawans do not believe a Chinese threat to Japan (or elsewhere) necessarily means a threat to Okinawa. Many Okinawans identify with China culturally and believe China sees them as a separate people from the Japanese. Some also say Okinawa, over the centuries, has received better treatment from China than from Japan or the United States. These attitudes combine to produce an Okinawan perspective that is markedly different from that of mainland Japan, and which is a factor in local attitudes toward U.S. military bases in Okinawa. End summary. ------------------ China Rising ------------------ ¶2. (SBU) In recent years, China's economic expansion and growing military capabilities have attracted a great deal of attention in Japan, although somewhat less in Okinawa. The two leading Okinawan newspapers generally appear reluctant to feature articles about the potential negative impacts on regional security associated with China's rise, mostly because the newspapers fear this line of thought will serve as an implicit justification for the continued existence of U.S. military bases on the island. ¶3. (SBU) Nevertheless, Okinawans who make the effort to read mainland Japanese newspapers can find ample coverage of Japan's concerns. Some widely reported Chinese activities have a very direct connection to Okinawa. For example, Japan, China and Taiwan have competing claims to an island chain 250 miles west of Okinawa, known as the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyu in China. The governments of Japan and China have disputed the islands' sovereignty for years and more recently have both made moves to develop undersea resources near them (see, e.g., refs. A, B). The media have reported China has erected drilling platforms in the disputed territory. ¶4. (SBU) China has also stepped up military air and sea activities in the area, prompting Japanese Self Defense Forces to respond. According to national broadcaster NHK, Japan Air Self Defense Forces scrambled to intercept Chinese military aircraft above or near the East China Sea 30 times between April and September 2005, more than twice as often as they did in all of 2004. Chinese maritime activity also occasionally makes the news. The November 2004 Chinese submarine incursion into Japanese waters within Okinawa Prefecture drew a rare Chinese apology for a ""technical error."" The mainland Japanese media have suggested this was not the only Chinese submarine intrusion near Okinawa. --------------------------------------------- -------------- ------------------------------ Different Perspectives of ""Mainland"" Japanese and Okinawans --------------------------------------------- -------------- ------------------------------ ¶5. (C) In mainland Japan, concern over China's military buildup is frequently aired. For example, in January the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) General Affairs Chairman Akio Kuma noted that if China chose to swallow up Taiwan, it would be easy enough for it to swallow up Okinawa, too, in the absence of U.S. forces. In February the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) issued a statement that it was ""inevitable that China's military buildup and its moves to line up marine interests from the viewpoint of the Japanese people are recognized as an actual threat to Japan"" (ref. C). ¶6. (U) Typical of many Japanese academics' views was a February 9 article by (Japan's) National Defense University Professor Tomohide Murai stating that the most efficient way for the United States to project power throughout the world was to link with regional partners, and that Japan, by its very location, was a key partner in the Pacific. Murai noted the Chinese recognized the strategic importance of Okinawa, calling it (as does the United States) the ""keystone of the Pacific."" ¶7. (SBU) In Okinawa, however, many - probably most -residents have a substantially different assessment of China. In general, Okinawans perceive little potential threat from China; many people here note China and the Ryukyu Kingdom had peaceful relations for centuries prior to the 19th Century Meiji Restoration in Japan. To be sure, there are Okinawans who are as concerned about China's destabilizing possibilities as are many mainlanders, but this is not the prevailing view on the island. ¶8. (C) As vignettes of Okinawa's relaxed attitude toward China, we note the following conversations. During a September 2005 office call, reformist Ginowan City Mayor Yoichi Iha told us he believed China posed no threat to Okinawa. In October 2005 Kin Town Mayor Gibu underscored his support for the U.S.-Japan alliance but complained the GOJ had never explained what threat, exactly, the alliance deterred. In March, former Socialist Party Diet Member and candidate for Okinawa City mayor Mitsuko Tomon made the same complaint. ¶9. (C) We asked why a look at a map of the region surrounding Okinawa and current stories regarding China's expansion didn't provide Okinawans enough information for them to judge for themselves. Tomon replied the GOJ and USG were like the boy who cried wolf, pointing to China and claiming that something awful might happen, but nothing ever did. Okinawans were undisturbed, Tomon claimed, by Chinese incursions. Chinese fishing boats crossing the sea boundary did not affect Okinawan fisheries as Okinawans worked only in its inner seas. In a separate conversation, he Okinawan Federation of Fisheries echoed Tomon's claim, but added that their members avoided the Senkakus because they were ""politically difficult."" The Chinese might be drilling near the Senkakus, and claim the Senkakus for themselves, Tomon noted, but these were essentially peaceful activities for the GOJ to settle. Because of Okinawa's history as the Ryukyu Kingdom, it had a very different view of China than did the Japanese mainland. Historically speaking, Tomon commented, Japan and the United States had been more harmful to Okinawa than China had ever been. ---------------------------------------- A Ryukyuan History Primer ---------------------------------------- ¶10. (U) By entering into close trading relationships with both China and Japan in the 14th and 15th centuries, the Ryukyu Kingdom enjoyed a lengthy period of prosperity in the years before 1609. As George Kerr notes in his book Okinawa: The History of an Island People, ""the islands were independent. They were in constant communication and at peace with neighboring states. Okinawans were in the happy position of freedom to adopt what they wanted, and to remain indifferent - or at best mildly curious - about foreign artifacts and institutions for which they felt no pressing need. China loomed as the neighbor of unquestioned superiority, and Okinawans were in close and constant communication with Japan, but were overwhelmed by neither."" Many Okinawans today regard this period as the Golden Age of their history, and view it as a basis for their belief that China sees Okinawa a place entirely separate from Japan. ¶11. (U) The Golden Age ended in 1609, when the southernmost clan in mainland Japan (the Satsumas of southern Kyushu) sent an army to assert control over Okinawa and extracted increasingly burdensome tributes. The Satsumas then took over the lucrative trade with China through Okinawa, continuing it despite the Tokugawa Shogunate's closed country (sakoku) policy. ¶12. (U) After Commodore Perry and his black ships helped trigger the Meiji Restoration, Japan began vigorously securing and expanding its borders. In 1872 Japan formally abolished the Ryukyu Kingdom and annexed Okinawa, over Chinese protests. Okinawa pleaded with China and the United States to intervene. Four-party discussions dragged on for decades until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, which settled the issue in Japan's favor as far as the western powers were concerned. ¶13. (U) Japan instituted a top-down assimilation program for Okinawa that gained momentum when met by a bottom-up assimilation movement following Japan's success in the Sino-Japanese War. Practical-minded Okinawans became convinced they would benefit from closer identification with Japan. Early editorials of the Ryukyu Shimpo, dating as far back as 1893, asserted that Okinawa could develop only by fully assimilating with Japan. ¶14. (U) Over the following 50 years, many Okinawans saw military service, including during the battle for Okinawa, as a chance to prove they were true Japanese. However, the battle, which killed perhaps a third of the Okinawan population, came as a shock to most of the survivors, who experienced or heard stories of atrocities against Okinawans by Japanese troops. In the years after the war, a home-grown historical interpretation of the battle took solid root in Okinawa, which holds that Tokyo had always intended to sacrifice Okinawa in a battle designed to consume as many U.S. forces as possible, to stall and weaken an eventual attack on the mainland. ¶15. (U) The United States directly governed Okinawa through a military high commissioner from 1945 to 1972, 20 years longer than the rest of Japan. During this period, U.S. forces forcibly seized land for bases. By the early 1960s, a movement advocating reversion to Japan began among Okinawans, leading to large-scale demonstrations against the U.S. administration in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Okinawa reverted to Japan May 15, 1972. ¶16. (SBU) The reunion was a victory for all Okinawans (though many were dismayed at the remaining numbers of U.S. facilities and forces), and anti-U.S. protests were dramatically reduced following reversion. With reversion, the GOJ sharply increased infrastructure development, and the general standard of living greatly improved. However, in the years since 1972, many Okinawans have called for lessening the island's economic dependence on GOJ transfer payments. Okinawa remains the poorest prefecture in Japan, with the highest unemployment rate in Japan, and many argue that Okinawa needs to become more economically independent. --------------------------------------------- -------------- ----------------- Okinawan Analysis: Split Identity, Affinity with China --------------------------------------------- -------------- ----------------- ¶17. (SBU) The above history still shapes Okinawans' world views, including their sense of identity. In December 2005 the University of the Ryukyus announced the results of a telephone survey of Okinawans, in which 40% of respondents, when asked how they identified themselves, said they were Okinawan. A smaller percentage said they were both Okinawan and Japanese (36%), and just over one in five identified themselves as Japanese (21%). ¶18. (SBU) This history also shapes how Okinawans view the GOJ and actions that are presented in the world press as provocations to China, most notably visits by the Prime Minister to Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine. While many mainland Japanese are reportedly uncomfortable with the visits, if push comes to shove between China and Japan, opinion polls show that most side with Japan's right to do as it pleases. We believe most Okinawans side with China. Typical of this attitude is Masaru Yamada, treasurer of Okinawa City, who recently criticized Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. He told us he doubted China would ever accept Koizumi's explanations of the visits, any more than he himself did. Okinawans and Chinese held similar views of the visits, he explained, because they shared the experience of having been ""prisoners of war"" of the Japanese. ¶19. (U) Local newspaper editorials have also pointed to the Yasukuni visits as unnecessary barriers to bilateral and regional cooperation that the GOJ could, and should, remove. Although an exaggeration, a recent Ryukyu Shimpo article reporting on the study of Okinawan identity concluded with a warning that GOJ policies, particularly as they related to bases and transformation, could influence Okinawans' opinions on whether to remain part of Japan. ¶20. (SBU) Many Okinawans believe that China sees them differently, and more warmly, than it sees the rest of Japan. They point out that Taipei International Airport, when posting place names in Chinese characters, lists flights to/from ""Ryukyu,"" not Okinawa. A May 2005 Ryukyu Shimpo report claimed that, because of Okinawa's history, it could become an intermediary peacefully linking China and Taiwan. By offering an independent, international contribution, Okinawa could renounce its title of ""(strategic) keystone of the Pacific"" and become a ""keystone of goodwill."" A June 2005 Ryukyu Shimpo opinion piece contrasted the hospitality the Chinese granted Okinawa Governor Inamine and his party when they visited Beijing with Beijing's snubbing of PM Koizumi. ""The extreme attention provided Okinawa, with its deep historical connection to China, was conspicuous in its contrast. To look at it the other way around, it was an intense dig at the GOJ,"" commented the Shimpo. ¶21. (SBU) Chinese Ambassador to Japan Ki Ou (phonetic from Japanese pronunciation) visited Okinawa April 24, on a trip sponsored by the OPG, Okinawa Economic Association, and Okinawa Visitors and Convention Bureau. Ou masterfully played to Okinawans' sense of exceptionalism and desire for a new golden era of lucrative Sino-Okinawan relations. Ou cited the historical and cultural links between China and the Ryukyus and said he immediately felt comfortable on this first visit to Okinawa. Over the past 25 years China's economic expansion had far outpaced its military expansion, Ou claimed, and its defense capabilities were reasonable for a country of China's area and population. China alone, of the five original nuclear powers, had offered to eliminate all nuclear weapons if the others would only agree to do the same. Okinawa and China should again travel together the path of peaceful development, Ou stressed, and tens of thousands of Chinese tourists annually were sure to follow. ----------- Caveats ----------- ¶22. (SBU) Okinawa's exceptionalism is not based entirely on history and feeling; it is used to practical effect. Okinawans claiming to feel no threat from China often use this to bolster arguments that bases should be eliminated from Okinawa. For example, when asked specifically about Chinese military activities near Okinawa, such as the November 2004 submarine incursion, former Diet member Tomon grudgingly admitted that the incident was regrettable. She hastened to add, however, that it alone did not justify the concentration of U.S. forces and facilities in Okinawa. ¶23. (SBU) The claim of exceptionalism is useful even for conservatives who support the alliance and those who profit from our base presence. Conservative Okinawans could be seen as playing good cop to reformists' bad cop, in order to squeeze the maximum concessions from the GOJ and USG. A number of Okinawan leaders probably assert this exceptionalism because they believe it useful in leveraging concessions from the USG and GOJ in return for Okinawan shouldering the burden of U.S. military bases. ¶24. (SBU) Economic self-interest also helps explain Okinawa's keenness to engage China. In this, Okinawan governments and businesses have motives similar to those of other provinces now scrambling to find new sources of income as Koizumi's reforms reduce the outward flow of GOJ largess. The former Secretary General of the LDP in Okinawa, Kenjiro Nishida, told us his main motivation for founding the Okinawa-China Friendship Exchange Association was to boost the number of Chinese tourists to Okinawa. He noted his Chinese counterparts met him more than halfway, being well funded by their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ConGen Fukuoka and Consulate Nagoya have identified identical local motives to engage China, as well as signs of China's welcoming this engagement (Refs. F, G). The Chinese leadership may remember Sun Tzu's maxim, ""when he is united, divide him."" Regardless of how cool relations are between Tokyo and Beijing, there is no evidence this has had an effect on Okinawa's ties with China. ¶25. (SBU) That being said, Okinawan businesspeople whose interests directly conflict with China are not as relaxed about Chinese expansion. Local developer Tadashi Zayasu told us he owned part of an interest in a drilling application in the East China Sea near the Senkaku Islands. Zayasu said the GOJ had approved a drilling application filed by the partnership, d.b.a. Teikoku Oil. The application was filed in 1970, but the GOJ did not approve it until July 2005. Zayasu mused that the GOJ seemed bent on helping the Chinese at the expense of Okinawans. Why else, he asked, would the GOJ have funded a Chinese pipeline to support their exploitation of the fields while sitting on a Japanese company's application for over thirty years? ------------------------------- Comment/Conclusion ------------------------------- ¶26. (SBU) The above caveats notwithstanding, Okinawa's sense of affinity with China and feeling of distance from Japanese interests give this place a unique perspective on Sino-Japanese relations, and it shapes the local environment for U.S. military bases. Due in part to this, many Okinawans are unconvinced that our bases in Okinawa are needed to defend Japan -- or at least not to defend Okinawa. Some in the GOJ leadership may value the domestic political benefits of appealing to Japanese nationalism over the benefits of improved Sino-Japanese relations (ref. F). The Yasukuni visits, and Chinese reactions to them, are having the opposite effect on attitudes in Okinawa. Such acts strengthen the sense in Okinawa that the LDP leadership, and the GOJ more broadly, ignore the victims of militarism. Okinawans' cultural identification with China, combined with a sense of serial betrayal by the GOJ, fuels local suspicion of GOJ motives on current political-military issues. REICH
CONFIDENTIAL: CUBA: NUN COMMENTS ON FIDEL’S HEALTH
VZCZCXRO6508 PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHSR RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHROV #0262 3491610 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 151610Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0591 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0619 C O N F I D E N T I A L VATICAN 000262 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2016 TAGS: PREL CU VT SUBJECT: CUBA: NUN COMMENTS ON FIDEL'S HEALTH REF: 04 Vatican 1401 CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Sandrolini, Deputy Chief of Mission, EXEC, State. REASON: 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. A prominent abbess in Rome described her recent visit to Havana and commented on the state of Castro's health in a December 12 meeting with Ambassador; she also suggested some possible contacts for the USG. The abbess has been controversial in the past. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Rooney called on Mother Tekla Famiglietti, Abbess General of the Brigittine Order of the Most Holy Savior, on December 12. Mother Tekla -- in charge of the Brigittines for some 25 years and sometimes called ""the most powerful woman in Rome"" -- had just returned from a visit to Cuba. She had hoped to meet Fidel Castro, whom she had befriended some years earlier (reftel) at the inauguration of Mexican President Vicente Fox. ¶3. (C) Mother Tekla said that during this trip she found a different attitude among priests, nuns, and government contacts; there is a feeling of impending change resulting from the coming end of the Fidel era. People want change, though some of those close to Fidel are threatened by it. Mother Tekla commented that Cubans would be less agitated in Cuba itself than in Miami when the changes begin. She hoped the USG would not wait for Castro's death to begin opening up, but would instead act now to relax the embargo and help people; this would also steal a march on others, such as China, who are already on the ground. ¶4. (C) Mother Tekla said she had been to Fidel's house many times before, typically meeting first with his private secretary Carlos Valenciaga Diaz. She had intended to do so this time, but then felt that Castro was now too weak and ill. Diaz told her that Fidel has lost 20 kilos and is a shadow of his former self; he does not have cancer but is bleeding from the stomach. A room in Castro's house has been converted into a hospital room. ¶5. (C) Mother Tekla said she works with Licencia Caridad, head of the ministry for religious affairs, and Eusebio Leal Spencer, whom Castro put in charge of getting a new facility built for Mother Tekla. She thinks Spencer may know some people who might be of interest to the USG as potential leaders once a government change has occurred. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Mother Tekla is well known in Rome (if sometimes controversial), and we have reported on meeting her in the past. Reftel describes a flap over her 2004 visit to Havana with Cardinal Sepe for the opening of the Brigittines' house there, which Castro used as a propaganda opportunity to the embarrassment of the Holy See. We report this conversation for its possible interest in terms of news about Fidel's health, and the suggested contacts. ROONEY
CONFIDENTIAL: COURT ACQUITS NAJIB’S EX-ADVISOR IN MURDER TRIAL
VZCZCXRO9992 PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH DE RUEHKL #0959/01 3051103 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 311103Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1839 INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2672 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0510 RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 0082 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000959 SIPDIS FOR EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2028 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KJUS KDEM MY SUBJECT: COURT ACQUITS NAJIB'S EX-ADVISOR IN MURDER TRIAL Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d). Summary and Comment ------------------- ¶1. (SBU) High Court Justice Mohamad Zaki on October 31 acquitted Political Analyst Abdul Razak Baginda, former advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, of the charge of abetting the murder of Mongolian national Altantuya Shaariibuu in October 2006, but ordered the continuation of the murder trial for two policemen. Defense lawyers announced they sought to call to the stand two men who have linked DPM Najib to the case: Razak's former private investigator Balasubramaniam, who has disappeared from public, and controversial blogger Raja Petra who is detained under the Internal Security Act. The trial of the two police defendants is set to continue November 10. In immediate commentary, political opposition leaders, including Anwar Ibrahim, did not focus on Razak's guilt or innocence, but called into question the conduct of the proceedings and suggested a cover-up to protect DPM Najib. ¶2. (C) Comment: Many observers anticipated Razak's acquittal given the prosecution's poor performance, Razak's connections to DPM Najib, and the alleged and widely-perceived political manipulation in the case. The Razak verdict momentarily attracts more attention to the allegations of Najib's linkages to the case; so too would the testimony of either Balasubramaniam or Raja Petra, though it is not clear either man will be able to take the stand. Allegations stemming from the Altantuya case, however, have not prevented Najib from securing all the nominations so far for the UMNO party elections. Absent dramatic and compelling new evidence prejudicial to the DPM, the Altantuya case will not slow down Najib's drive to become Malaysia's next Prime Minister. End Summary and Comment. Razak Acquitted, Trial for Policemen Continues --------------------------------------------- - ¶3. (U) High Court Justice Mohamad Zaki on October 31 acquitted Political Analyst Abdul Razak Baginda, former advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, of charges of abetting the murder of Mongolian national Altantuya Shaariibuu in October 2006, but ordered the continuation of the murder trial for two policemen. Embassy FSN Political Assistant attended the judgment hearing. The ruling came roughly two years after Razak's arrest, and followed a lengthy 17-month trial involving the presentation of 84 witnesses. The prosecution had argued that Razak had asked the policemen to murder Altantuya, Razak's former lover who had harassed Razak for money. The judge ruled that the prosecution team failed to prove a prima facie case against Razak, and ordered his release. The judge found a sufficiently strong prosecution case against the two police defendants, Chief Inspector Azilah Hadri and Corporal Sirul Azha Umar, charged with carrying out Altantuya's murder. At the time of the crime, Azilah and Azha were members of the protection detail for DPM Najib. Defense to Call Controversial Witnesses --------------------------------------- ¶4. (U) The Justice requested the defense to begin their arguments later on the afternoon of October 31, but the defense requested and was granted a continuance as their witnesses were not available. In the day's most surprising turn, Kamarul Hisham, lead defense counsel for one of the accused police officers, stated he wished to place on the witness chair Razak's private investigator P. Balasubramaniam and Malaysia Today editor Raja Petra Kamaruddin. Both witnesses have previously made sworn statements linking DPM Najib to the murdered Altantuya, and in the case of Raja Petra, implicating Najib's wife in the murder. Balasubramaniam, who was an early witness for the prosecution, has not been seen publicly since he issued a sworn statement in July on DPM Najib's links to the Altantuya case, and then retracted the statement the next day, allegedly under duress according to some accounts. Raja Petra is currently detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA). (Note: Although the court may order Raja Petra's presence as a witness, Section 18 of the ISA gives the Home Minister discretion to ignore the court order. End note.) The Judge set November 10 for the defense to begin its presentation. ¶5. (SBU) For the October 31 judgment hearing, a crowd of approximately 200 waited outside the courthouse while some 100 (primarily family members of the defendants and journalists) filled the packed courtroom. Razak's family appeared confident and remained calm throughout the whole hearing and showed no sign of surprise in Razak's acquittal. The verdict also appeared to come as no surprise to the attending crowd. The victim's father, Setev Shaariibuu, attended the judgment and afterward through an interpreter expressed his disappointment to reporters: "I am not satisfied. My daughter (knew) only one Malaysian and that is Razak Baginda. Now my daughter is dead and Baginda is freed. The country (Malaysia) has lost credibility..." Opposition Suggests Cover-Up ---------------------------- ¶6. (U) In immediate comments, political opposition figures, who have suggested repeatedly that the government had engaged in a cover-up to protect DPM Najib, did not focus on Razak's guilt or innocence, but called into question the conduct of the proceedings. Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim noted, "On a personal level, I wish Razak Baginda well, but the issue here resolves around the court procedure and investigations. There is a general and growing perception that the investigation was not done professionally, that there is a clear motive to cover up." Anwar also drew attention to recent Internet revelations of an SMS exchange between Najib and Razak Baginda's former lawyer in which Najib reportedly wrote that Razak "will face a tentative charge but all is not lost." KEITH
AMBASSADOR ADVOCATES FOR BOEING AND CBP WITH AER
VZCZCXRO4216 RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ DE RUEHDL #0493/01 1241516 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 041516Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6872 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES RUEHBL/AMCONSUL BELFAST 0373 RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000493 SIPDIS SIPDIS COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/ROBERT MCLAUGHLIN COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/ADVOCACY CENTER OR PAT NUGENT DHS FOR CBP/JENNIFER SAVA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAIR ECON ETRD EI SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ADVOCATES FOR BOEING AND CBP WITH AER LINGUS CEO REF: DUBLIN 361 AND PREVIOUS DUBLIN 00000493 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. Summary: In a May 2 meeting with Aer Lingus CEO Dermot Mannion, the Ambassador advocated Boeing aircraft for the carrier's long-haul needs and sought Mannion's help in pushing the Dublin Airport Authority (DAA) to upgrade U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operations in Ireland. Mannion said that the Boeing offer was attractive, and he noted that Aer Lingus would decide between Boeing and Airbus at roughly the same time as the carrier's likely stock flotation in September. He also observed that Aer Lingus could enjoy the full benefits of trans-Atlantic Open Skies only if Dublin's new terminal were sized to accommodate rising passenger volume and to enable CBP to conduct full pre-clearance (adding agricultural and customs checks to passport screening.) Mannion added that Aer Lingus needed clarity on the prospects for the U.S.-EU aviation agreement, including the phase-out of the Shannon Stop requirement, in order to start planning for the 2007-2008 winter travel season. Post will continue efforts to press the case for both Boeing and CBP in our regular discussions with industry, the Irish parliament, and the GOI. End summary. Advocacy for Boeing ------------------- ¶2. In a May 2 meeting with Aer Lingus CEO Dermot Mannion, the Ambassador strongly advocated Boeing's 787 Dreamliner for the carrier's long-haul needs. Mannion replied that Aer Lingus would probably decide between Boeing and Airbus at roughly the same time as the carrier's stock flotation, expected in September. He added, however, that aircraft orders might also have to await the Dublin Airport Authority's decision on the size of Dublin's planned second terminal, which would determine the number of gates available to Aer Lingus planes (see para 4). He noted that "the door remains very open to Boeing," and he observed that Aer Lingus would take advantage of Ex-Im Bank financing options if Boeing were to win the aircraft bid. Mannion also recounted his efforts to quash press reports that Airbus had secured Aer Lingus' long-haul aircraft orders, following on the carrier's deal to acquire four Airbus A-330s in 2006-2007 for intra-European service. Noting recent reports on the Airbus A-350's design flaws, the Ambassador stressed Post's intention to continue advocacy for Boeing. Mannion recommended that emboffs speak with members of the airline's newly formed aircraft purchases evaluation team. Needed Clarity on U.S.-EU Open Skies ------------------------------------ ¶3. Aer Lingus needs clarity on prospects for the U.S.-EU aviation agreement, including the U.S.-Ireland annex, to plan future trans-Atlantic service, said Mannion. He explained that Aer Lingus sold seats 300 days in advance and was already preparing its tentative schedule for the 2007 summer season. A delay until October 2006 in the signing of the U.S.-EU agreement would only give Aer Lingus enough time to plan for the 2007-2008 winter season. Mannion expected, however, that Aer Lingus would launch service to San Francisco in 2007 as the first of the three additional U.S. points that Aer Lingus would be permitted to serve under the U.S.-Ireland annex to the U.S.-EU agreement. He also remarked that, due to the uncertain timing of the U.S.-EU agreement, the Irish Department of Transport intended to re-engage with USG negotiators on the U.S.-Ireland annex during U.S.-EU aviation discussions the week of May 8. (Under the annex, October 29, 2006, is the start date for the phase-out of the current "Shannon Stop" requirement, by which U.S. and Irish carriers may operate one non-stop flight to/from Dublin for each non-stop flight to/from Shannon.) Right-sizing Dublin Airport for Aer Lingus and CBP --------------------------------------------- ----- ¶4. With the April 5 Irish Cabinet decision to privatize Aer Lingus through a stock flotation, the carrier's next goal was to ensure that Dublin Airport's planned second terminal would meet the carrier's needs, observed Mannion. He noted that the Dublin Airport Authority (DAA) had aimed to submit the planning application for the new terminal this month, a target that now would not be met. Mannion cautioned that further delay with the planning application would seriously jeopardize the terminal's scheduled opening in 2009. On the DUBLIN 00000493 002.2 OF 002 upside, the delay had allowed Aer Lingus more time to consult with the DAA on the terminal size required to accommodate the carrier's rising passenger volume projections. The Ambassador cited an April 28 Irish Times report that Aer Lingus and Ryanair had convinced the DAA on the need to expand the planned terminal, at a possible extra cost of euro 100 million. Mannion responded that whereas Aer Lingus had had regular contact with working-level DAA officials on the terminal, the DAA Board of Directors had refused to consider expansion until this past week. ¶5. Aer Lingus could enjoy the full benefits of trans-Atlantic Open Skies only if the new terminal were also configured to enable U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to conduct full pre-clearance, adding agricultural and customs checks to passport screening, remarked Mannion. The Ambassador said that he was focused not only on the DAA's plans to accommodate CBP in the new terminal, but also on dealing with mounting passenger congestion in CBP's current facilities over the next two summers, especially with the likely onset of bilateral Open Skies. Mannion pointed out that a delay in the terminal's opening till 2010 would exacerbate pressures on CBP staff. He added that CBP would be key to Aer Lingus' plans to link its new Dublin-Dubai service with established Dublin-U.S. flights in 2007, since Middle Eastern passengers would prefer to be pre-cleared outside the United States. Mannion and the Ambassador agreed to continue coordinated approaches to the DAA on CBP's needs, with emboffs noting the possibility of moving sooner to full pre-clearance in the more spacious Shannon Airport. Comment: Pressing the cases for Boeing and CBP --------------------------------------------- - ¶6. This was the Ambassador's third meeting with Mannion since he assumed his Aer Lingus post last summer, and in each discussion the Ambassador has urged Aer Lingus to choose Boeing and to choose quickly, with orders for the 787 Dreamliner now backed up to roughly 2011. In previous discussions, Mannion noted difficulties in placing orders during ongoing negotiations with labor about the stock flotation, lest he create doubts about his commitment to reduce the carrier's reported euro 340 million pension deficit with the flotation proceeds. The Irish Cabinet's April 5 decision to proceed with the stock flotation has lent certainty to Aer Lingus' ability to raise equity for the aircraft orders. We are concerned, however, that the Dublin Airport sizing issue might become another reason for delay in Aer Lingus' aircraft purchase decisions. ¶7. Post will continue to press the case for upgrading CBP operations at Dublin and Shannon Airports. In a recent dinner with Irish Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, the Ambassador described the potential advantages of full pre-clearance for Dublin as a trans-Atlantic hub, leading one committee member to raise the issue in Parliament the next day. Shannon Airport has also hired a U.S. consultant to do a feasibility study on Shannon's ability to move to full pre-clearance. We look forward to receiving from CBP headquarters an updated standards document that outlines for airports the logistical requirements for CBP to provide full pre-clearance. BENTON
CIA Archive: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NSA: American Cryptology during the Cold War; 1945-1989
CONFIDENTIAL: OECD: REPORT OF MEETING
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 003181 SIPDIS STATE FOR EB/IFD/OMA, EUR/ERA, INL/C, L/LEI AND L/EB DOC FOR ITA/MAC/MTA/KOZLOWICKI, OGC/NICKERSON/MANSEAU DOJ FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION/FRAUD SECTION/MMENDELSOHN/JACOBSON USEU FOR MRICHARDS PASS TO US SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISION/ENFORCEMENT/RGRIME, INTL.AFFAIRS/TBEATTY FROM USOECD SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2012 TAGS: KCOR ECON EINV ETRD PREL OECD SUBJECT: OECD: REPORT OF MARCH 12-14, 2007 MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY Classified By: A/DCM CURTIS STONE FOR REASONS 1.5 (B AND D) ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At its March 12-14 meeting, the OECD Working Group on Bribery (WGB) conducted Phase 2 peer-review evaluations of Portugal and Ireland's implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention ("Convention"). The WGB called on Portugal to raise awareness of foreign bribery in both the public and private sector, to be more proactive in detecting, investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery offenses, and to take measures to disallow undocumented, confidential expenses. Lead examiners advised that the GOI's poor participation in the original on-site visit left them with little basis to assess Ireland's implementation and enforcement efforts. Ireland acknowledged this problem and agreed to an additional on-site visit within one year. The WGB assessed UK efforts to implement the Convention in context of a Phase 2 written follow-up review, continued discussions on the UK's discontinuation of the BAE/Saudi Arabia investigation, and released a public statement expressing serious concerns. The WGB also announced its decision to conduct a supplemental, Phase 2 bis examination of the UK. Japan reported on results of its self-assessment of obstacles to effective enforcement. The WGB completed Phase 2 follow-up reviews of Japan and Switzerland and established mandates for two sub-groups to review anti-bribery instruments as part of the possible revision of the 1997 Revised Recommendation, which outlined best practices in areas such as accounting, auditing and public procurement, non-tax deductibility of bribes and other measures to combat foreign bribery. END SUMMARY. TABLE OF CONTENTS Portugal Phase 2 Evaluation - paras 2-3 Ireland Phase 2 Evaluation - paras 4-6 Japan Self-Assessment - paras 7-10 Phase 2 Follow-up Reports - para 11 -- Japan Written Follow-up - paras 12-13 -- UK Written Follow-up - paras 14-19 -- UK: BAE/Saudi Arabia - paras 20-24 -- Switzerland Written Follow-up - paras 25-26 -- Revision of Anti-Bribery Instruments- para 27 -- Deferral of Tour de Table - para 28 -- Outreach Activities - para 29 -- 2006 Annual Report- para 30 -- Other Items - paras 31-34 PORTUGAL PHASE 2 EXAMINATION ¶2. (U) Lead examiners Brazil and the Netherlands briefed on results of the Phase 2 on-site visit to Portugal, identifying key deficiencies in Portuguese enforcement efforts. Although Portugal had made significant legislative efforts to implement the Convention, it has had no foreign bribery prosecutions or serious investigations. While many government actors are involved in anti-corruption efforts, they are not active. More vigorous action by the private sector is also required. The Portugal delegation reported that the on-visit had made a very positive contribution to Portugal's revision of its criminal code. Since the visit, the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Economy and the Export Promotion Agency had carried out a major dissemination campaign to inform all Portuguese missions abroad, major business associations and the largest Portuguese companies about foreign bribery obligations. ¶3. (U) WGB members called on Portugal to take measures to disallow undocumented, confidential expenses; establish an autonomous definition of foreign public officials; clarify reporting obligations and procedures within the public service and accounting and auditing professions; provide additional resources and training to law enforcement authorities to proactively detect, investigate and prosecute foreign bribery; E raise awareness among public officials on preventing, detecting, reporting and investigating foreign bribery, including raising awareness among law enforcement authorities about special rules to establish nationality and extra-territorial jurisdiction in foreign bribery cases, specifically the absence of a dual criminality requirement; and to work more closely with the private sector and civil society to raise awareness and to develop effective prevention strategies. IRELAND PHASE 2 EXAMINATION ¶4. (SBU) Lead examiners New Zealand and Estonia reported on a wholly unsatisfactory on-site visit to Ireland in October. Inadequate preparation and participation by the GOI left them with little basis to assess Ireland's implementation and enforcement efforts. They advised that the total absence of awareness raising activities on foreign bribery in Ireland had demonstrated the low priority given to Ireland's application of the Convention. There have been no prosecutions of foreign bribery in Ireland. No law required public officials to report foreign bribery allegations, no whistle-blowing legislation was in place for the private sector, and overlapping statutes prohibiting foreign bribery contained differing elements which could impede enforcement efforts. ¶5. (U) Lead examiners reported that since the visit, Ireland had recognized the serious problems with the evaluation and demonstrated that it intended to give higher priority to implementing the Convention. Senior Irish officials announced that a Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) bill had been approved by the government, which intended to move quickly to introduce it to Parliament. The Irish delegation advised that the bill will broaden the definitions for bribery and foreign public officials and introduce extraterritorial jurisdiction. They also reported that Ireland would consider including whistle-blower protection in the new bill. The Irish del said the peer-review examination had been valuable and Ireland wanted to adopt best anti-bribery practices. A group of senior Irish officials would be convened to review and implement WGB recommendations. ¶6. (U) The WGB concluded that Ireland had not fully met its Phase 2 monitoring obligations, but accepted Ireland's invitation to carry out a Phase 2 bis examination with another on-site visit within one year. The WGB recommended that Ireland strengthen its foreign bribery legislation; consolidate or harmonize the foreign bribery offense under the two overlapping statutes to remove inconsistencies; expand corporate liability for foreign bribery; clarify the scope of the relevant legislation for companies; amend its laws to confirm that bribe payments are not tax deductible; and ensure that Irish citizens and corporations can always be effectively prosecuted for foreign bribery offenses committed outside Ireland by promptly establishing nationality jurisdiction under the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001. JAPAN SELF-ASSESSMENT ¶7. (SBU) The Chairman noted that the main difficulty with Japan's Phase 2 examination was whether the system was geared to generate cases and whether one could effectively initiate an investigation. Japan conducted a self-assessment to determine legal and procedural impediments to the effective investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery. Japan had established an inter-agency task force, which met 12 times, and held consultations with experts, prosecutors and police. The GOJ concluded the greatest obstacles were inadequate investigative leads, the lack of reliable whistle-blowing information, insufficient responses from Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) requests, limited information on investigative methods used by other countries and insufficient foreign language abilities. The Japanese del noted authorities needed to disseminate information about the foreign bribery offense more widely, more fully grasp the state of internal auditing and internal control systems, and raise awareness regarding the Japanese whistle-blower law that went into effect in June 2005. ¶8. (SBU) The Japanese delegation committed to raise awareness of whistle-blower protection, utilize MLA requests early and actively, conclude bilateral MLA agreements, actively use voluntary investigative measures at the earliest possible stage and exchange information among police, prosecutors, experts and civil society. The Japanese del suggested greater focus on the prevention of foreign bribery is appropriate, commenting that cases and convictions were not the only criteria of success. The Japanese del noted that a potential foreign bribery case involving Japanese firm Kyudenko's activities in the Philippines was under investigation. ¶9. (SBU) Lead examiners United States and Italy applauded Japan for completing the self-assessment. The US noted that Japan's passive approach to investigation and emphasis on maintaining secrecy at the sacrifice of advancing cases needed to be addressed. Not only did the placement of the foreign bribery offense in the Unfair Competition Prevention Law (UCPL) rather than in the Criminal Code appear to reduce awareness, but the entities responsible for pursuing investigations (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Ministry of Justice (MOJ)) provided conflicting guidance. The U.S. also highlighted that the whistle-blower law did not apply to employees of Japanese companies based overseas. The principal recommendation of lead examiners was on-going consultation and monitoring of Japan's enforcement efforts. The Italian lead examiner echoed US comments, and urged Japan to bring a case and build experience in how to start prosecutions. He also noted that the GOJ had shared no information about the Kyudenko case until reports had appeared in the press. ¶10. (SBU) The Japanese del responded that the GOJ has been proactive in ordering Japanese representations abroad to report foreign bribery allegations, that prosecutors are trying to identify evidence and have added enhanced MLA efforts, and defended the Japanese emphasis on secrecy to avoid destruction of evidence by suspects. In the 6 months since the whistle-blowing law had been enacted, 2,000 reports had been made, but the Japanese del conceded it needed to raise awareness about the protection offered. The Chairman commented that the key issue appeared to be how Japan can develop an allegation into a filed case. PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP REPORTS ¶11. (U) Within one year of the WGB's approval of the Report of Phase 2 Examination, countries must, at a minimum, provide an oral report on steps they have taken or plan to take to implement the WGB's priority recommendations. A detailed written follow-up report must be provided within two years. JAPAN WRITTEN FOLLOW-UP ¶12. (SBU) Lead examiners U.S. and Italy reported that Japan had complied with many Phase 2 recommendations. Japan reported it had reformed the UCPL to extend statutes of limitation, requested MLA on two occasions, raised awareness of foreign bribery, including of amendments to the corporate tax law and income tax law expressly denying tax deductibility of bribes to foreign public officials, and distributed amended 2007 Guidelines to prevent foreign bribery. The WGB found that Japan had not implemented: - Rec. 1(iv) to raise awareness of foreign bribery among the legal profession; and - Rec. 5(c) to clarify that UCPL prohibits all cases where a foreign public official directs transmission of benefit to a third party. The WGB found that Japan had partially implemented a number of recommendations, including: - recommendation in preamble to Phase 2 recommendations re: assessing impediments to effective investigation and prosecution, make use of MLA at non-"filed" investigative stage, increase law enforcement coordination and address difficulties encountered in establishing and enforcing territorial jurisdiction; - Rec. 2(b) for METI to establish a formal system to effectively process allegations of foreign bribery - Rec. 2(d) on improving whistle-blower protection for those reporting directly to law enforcement authorities; - Rec. 3(a) to ensure all activities under article 8.1 of the Convention are prohibited, including off-the-books accounts. - Rec. 5(b) to ensure METI guidelines on facilitation payments conform to the Convention and Commentaries. The WGB found that Japan had satisfactorily implemented other specific recommendations, but some follow-up recommendations had not been the subject of sufficient practice and required continued follow-up. ¶13. (SBU) The WGB agreed that, in order to continue moving this positive process forward, Japan should provide a Phase 2 bis follow-up report in one year. This will allow Japan and lead examiners to consult and exchange views on progress being made and for a brief report to the WGB. The WGB agreed that both the written follow-up and the self-assessment would be published, along with a summary of the discussion. U.K. WRITTEN FOLLOW-UP ¶14. (SBU) The WGB found that the UK had implemented a number of the WGB Phase 2 recommendations, but failed to enact comprehensive foreign bribery legislation. The U.K. had no foreign bribery prosecutions and its decision to drop the BAE Systems plc investigation relating to Saudi Arabia highlighted WGB concerns. The WGB found that the UK had made progress since its March 2005 Phase 2 examination in raising awareness (e.g. appointment of a UK anti-corruption coordinator); in continuing to encourage Overseas Territories to adopt anti-bribery legislation (UK verified compliance of Guernsey's legislation with the Convention and Jersey's enactment of a foreign bribery statute, but not yet extended the Convention to either island); in providing additional resources to facilitate MLA and in increasing capacity to investigate allegations of foreign bribery (e.g. new Metropolitan Police/City of London Police unit investigating foreign corruption allegations). Since March 2005, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) had launched 6 new investigations and had worked on 23 vetting files in an attempt to develop enough information to open a case file. The UK del expressed its optimism that its first foreign bribery prosecution could be launched in 2007. ¶15. (C) The UK del claimed its existing law implemented the obligations of the Convention, but noted the UK remains committed to fundamental reform of its bribery laws. A Home Office consultation report had concluded that no consensus existed for moving forward a draft 2003 bill to enact comprehensive corruption legislation. The issue has been referred to the Law Commission, which was expected to prepare a new draft bill within 18 months. WGB lead examiners France and Canada underscored that 6 years had passed since the Phase 1 examination recommended the UK enact comprehensive foreign bribery legislation. France noted this delay sent a negative message regarding the UK's commitment to implement the Convention as a whole. ¶16. (C) US del said the UK position that current legislation is adequate to effectively implement the Convention was rebutted by concrete evidence that it was not. US del also noted that the WGB should ask the UK to do what it had asked Japan to do: identify the structural problems that have prevented cases from moving to indictment. The Chairman commented that the WGB had long been doubtful regarding the UK's reliance on its principal-agent element of bribery. The UK del noted that evidentiary problems raised by some UK officials regarding the BAE/Saudi investigation gave a distorted view of the deficiencies of UK law, calling the Saudi case "wholly unusual, if not exceptional" given the involvement of an absolute monarchy. ¶17. (U) The WGB found that the UK had failed to implement: - the recommendation in the preamble to the Phase 2 to enact at the earliest possible date comprehensive foreign bribery legislation; - Rec. 3(a) to proceed with adoption of reforms clarifying and unifying UK accounting legislation with IAS to ensure fraudulent accounting offense is in full conformity with Article 8 of the Convention; - Rec. 5(a) to amend where appropriate the Code for Crown Prosecutors, the Crown Prosecution Manual and other documents to ensure investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery is not influenced by considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect upon relations with another state or the identity of the natural or legal persons involved (Article 5 of Convention); and - Rec. 5(c) to broaden the level of persons engaging the criminal liability of legal persons for foreign bribery. The WGB also concluded that the UK had partially implemented 9 recommendations and satisfactorily implemented 8 recommendations. ¶18. (U) Following a further discussion of the BAE/Saudi investigation (see below), the WGB agreed that it would conduct a Phase 2 bis review of the UK focused on progress in enacting a new foreign bribery law and in broadening liability of legal persons for foreign bribery, examining whether systemic problems explain the lack of foreign bribery cases brought to prosecution and addressing other issues raised by the discontinuance of the BAE/Saudi Arabia investigation. The review will include an on-site visit to be conducted by March 2008. ¶19. (C) An extensive discussion of how the WGB would make public this decision followed. The UK stridently objected to any engagement with the media by the Chair regarding the review and asked that only a WGB press release be issued. The Secretariat argued that OECD practice is to be as open as possible with the media, while respecting the confidential nature of the discussions. After many delegations expressed confidence in the Chair, the WGB agreed to allow the Chair to brief the press, accompanied by OECD Legal staff and the director of the Financial and Enterprise Affairs Directorate. Bilateral interview requests made in the following several days would be referred to the Secretariat. TERMINATION OF BAE/SAUDI ARABIA INVESTIGATION ¶20. (C) Lead examiner France noted a number of issues were still outstanding regarding the BAE/Saudi Arabia investigation, including the materiality of the UK's national security rationale. Lead examiner Canada said it accepted the explanations given by the UK for reasons for discontinuing the investigation, but had serious concerns about the UK's legal framework and adequacy of its corporate criminal liability legislation. US del asked whether the UK could provide any assurances that BAE was not continuing to make corrupt payments to Saudi officials and that MOD officials were not continuing to participate in the alleged corrupt payments. The U.S. also asked about evidence preservation and whether UK national security concerns would pose an impediment to providing MLA to other states. ¶21. (C) The UK del, which included Foreign and Commonwealth Office, SFO, Ministry of Defense Police, Department for International Development, Metropolitan Police and office of the Attorney General (AG) officials, reported that the SFO was reviewing the aftermath of the decision to discontinue in light of its duty to ensure that the MOD Police, Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) and other bodies received all relevant information to help them carry out their public duties. The UK del advised that since no one has been charged and found guilty, there are limitations on actions the UK government can take and other fora must accept their responsibilities in considering the case. The UK del advised that no evidentiary material would be returned until the judicial review has run its course. The SFO did not see a reason why national or international security would prevent the UK from responding to a request for MLA. ¶22. (C) The Chairman inquired further into the reasons for discontinuance and asked whether the WGB should not deplore a threat by a sovereign state to stop fundamental cooperation, if Saudi threats to stop counter-terrorism cooperation were the basis of the national security interests involved. He inquired about how precise Parties must be in identifying risks and the immediacy of danger posed before invoking national security. The UK del advised that the SFO Director had considered only national and international security grounds in reaching his decision to discontinue the investigation. The judicial review would address whether the decision-making process was valid and whether the decision was in conformity with Article 5 of the Convention. The Swiss del noted that it continued to be very concerned about the effect of the UK decision, that it implied that the UK would not prosecute allegations of foreign bribery by its firms in Saudi Arabia, depriving other parties of a level playing field there and possibly in other countries. ¶23. (C) In response to an OECD legal advisor's inquiries whether the UK recognized international public policy and public interest factors in favor of prosecution, the UK del (AG rep) confirmed that the UK recognized that bribery was contrary to international public policy and that the nature of bribery as an offense was a powerful factor for prosecuting the act. In the BAE/Saudi matter, however, he advised that the SFO Director had considered protecting national security an even more important factor. The UK AG shared this view, and also considered that the case was unlikely to lead to successful prosecution. Regarding the basis for identifying the national security risk, the UK del said the UK ambassador to Saudi Arabia had considered the risk that Saudi Arabia would withdraw counter-terrorism cooperation to be real and that all who expressed views had shared that assessment, including the UK's security services. In response to an OECD legal advisor's query about whether the ECGD had the right to refuse to provide official support to BAE Systems in the future in light of the allegations in this case, the UK del said it could not speak for the ECGD, which had its own duties to implement anti-corruption policies and the right to insist that BAE Systems provide due diligence information. ¶24. (C) US del stressed the difficulty in assessing from the outside the factors taken into account in the UK's decision. While concerns remained about the particular case, more critical was what the case had revealed regarding the UK's legal framework for preventing foreign bribery. As the Convention approaches its tenth anniversary, the WGB must demand that all parties meet their obligations and maintain high standards. The French del spoke of the need to convey a clear message to the business community and civil society that payment of bribes to foreign public officials was no longer an acceptable competitive advantage. The Canadian del agreed that abandonment of the investigation created a problem for the Convention. Following a discussion which frequently underscored the need to defend the Convention, and which weighed the merits of various next steps, France, Italy, New Zealand Greece, Chile, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, and the US del all expressed continuing serious concerns about the UK's decision and spoke in favor of the WGB (1) issuing a strong statement to the public relaying those concerns and (2) conducting a Phase 2 bis review of the UK focused on Convention implementation. Although Germany and Canada expressed a preference for waiting until the results of the UK domestic judicial review, a position strongly favored by the UK, WGB consensus ultimately opposed such a delay. SWITZERLAND WRITTEN FOLLOW-UP ¶25. (SBU) Switzerland reported that its Phase 2 examination had contributed to greater awareness of its obligations under the Convention and had spurred long-term cooperation among federal and cantonal-level authorities, the Swiss business community and civil society. Switzerland reported that 23 foreign bribery cases were initiated in 2005 and 2006, of which 17 were in connection with the UN Oil for Food program. A total of 19 cases were still in the investigative stage and four were closed. No charges were pressed nor rulings handed down during the period. Informed by comments from lead examiners Hungary and Belgium, the WGB found that Switzerland had taken efforts to raise awareness, but further measures targeted at small and medium-sized enterprises and cantonal-level authorities were required to fully implement WGB recommendations. Switzerland had fully implemented: - Rec. 3(a) to consider establishing a formal obligation for any federal authority, civil servant or public official to report indications of possible bribery to authorities and - Rec. 3(d) to consider extending mandatory reporting obligations for auditors to report to prosecutorial authorities evidence of possible corrupt practices by those whose accounts they audit if executive bodies refrain from taking action. ¶26. (U) Discussion of Switzerland's follow-up report revealed certain difficulties encountered by the WGB in distinguishing between full and partial implementation of recommendations and highlighted the need for precision in recommendation text. In several instances Switzerland had taken action in response to recommendations, but measures had not yet been finalized. Switzerland contended it had nonetheless fully implemented the recommendations. The WGB ultimately found that Switzerland had only partially implemented the remaining 8 recommendations. REVISION OF ANTI-BRIBERY INSTRUMENTS: DRAFT MANDATE FOR SUB-GROUPS ¶27. (U) The WGB agreed that Chairman Pieth and Vice-Chair Gavouneli would serve as chairs of two ad hoc sub-groups on (1) criminalization and (2) prevention issues, involving areas such as export credit, official development assistance, public procurement, auditing and non-tax deductibility. The sub-groups are to be open and informal and their task will be to assist the WGB in completing proposed revisions to anti-bribery instruments by December 2007. This would include likely revision of the 1997 Revised Recommendation (requiring approval by the OECD Council) and possible clarification in Commentaries regarding interpretations of the Convention. TOUR DE TABLE DEFERRED ¶28. (U) The WGB deferred reviewing country enforcement actions on foreign bribery and UN Oil-for-Food cases to June, given the press of other agenda items. OUTREACH ACTIVITIES ¶29. (U) The Secretariat briefed on outreach activities, including the anticipated signature in April of a Memorandum of Understanding with the Organization of American States to strengthen the fight against corruption in the Americas. The Secretariat also agreed to provide suggestions on next steps for SIPDIS WGB outreach to China. ANNUAL REPORT ¶30. (U) The WGB approved the 2006 draft annual report, after agreeing to a UK request to delete a reference to the BAE/Saudi investigation. US del noted that there was nothing inappropriate with the proposed reference, but did not object to its deletion. The French del noted that reference should be included in the 2007 Annual Report. OTHER ITEMS ¶31. (U) The Italian delegation briefed on the invitation by the Government of Italy to hold a Prosecutors' Meeting in Rome in November as part of an event marking the 10th anniversary of the Convention in November or December 2007, which may involve ministerial participation. ¶32. (U) The Netherlands del noted that differences in WGB Parties' positions regarding UNCAC issues have complicated UNCAC implementation. They proposed including an agenda item for the October WGB plenary meeting to exchange ideas about how to organize in preparation for the second UNCAC Conference of State Parties. ¶33. (U) The US del suggested, with support of Dutch and Swiss colleagues, that prosecutors plan to meet on the margins of the June plenary for a brainstorming session to discuss the usefulness of a prosecutors' forum. The UK requested that this be scheduled for the same day as the Tour de Table to facilitate attendance. The Chair suggested that the prosecutors also provide guidance to the Italian delegation regarding the agenda for the 10th anniversary event. ¶34. (U) The June WGB plenary meeting will take place June 19-21, ¶2007. (Ad hoc sub-groups were subsequently scheduled to meet on June 18.) MORELLA
CONFIDENTIAL: TERRORIST FINANCE: IARA AND FIVE OFFICIALS, JTJ
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUBLIN 001598 SIPDIS STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS (BSTEPHENSON), S/CT (TKUSHNER), EUR/UBI, IO/PHO (APEREZ), NSC FOR MRUPPERT, TREASURY FOR JZARATE, AND OFAC DIRECTOR (RWERNER) E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2014 TAGS: ETTC KTFN EFIN PTER PREL CVIS ECON LVPR SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: IARA AND FIVE OFFICIALS, JTJ DESIGNATION (LISTS 62 & 63) REF: A. STATE 222164 ¶B. STATE 222244 ¶C. STATE 219924 Classified By: POL/ECON COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR REASONS 1.4.(B) AND (D) 1.(C) Summary. Emboff, drawing on reftel points, spoke on October 19 to Maurice Biggar, Deputy Director for International Terrorism & Illicit Drugs and his colleague, Eoin Duggan, at the DFA. According to Biggar and Duggan the USG domestic designation of IARA is an issue of concern as it targets an Irish citizen, Ibrahim Buisir. The GOI has no information on JTJ operations within Ireland. The IARA designation came as a surprise, but not an unwelcome one. Ireland does not currently have legal recourse to freeze assets of suspected terrorism financiers. The GOI also does not have far-reaching intelligence capabilities, so greatly appreciates information-sharing and cooperation with the USG. If both such designations are approved through the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee, the EU will follow suit, thereby requiring legal action in Ireland and allowing Irish authorities to freeze assets of Buisir. The Irish are likely to welcome such action. End Summary. --------------------------------------------- ------------- List 62: The Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), Ibrahim Buisir --------------------------------------------- ------------- 2.(C) Biggar had no new information to report regarding the IARA; however, Ibrahim Buisir, who was named last week as having ties to Al-Qaeda, is certainly of interest as a dual Irish-Libyan with links to terrorist financing. Buisir's designation on the US domestic list came as a surprise to the Irish, and the Irish government would have appreciated a heads up. That said, the Irish also consider Buisir to be a problem. Recently, they tried to prosecute him for credit card fraud but he was released on a technicality. He is now living on welfare. 3.(C) The USG domestic designation of Buisir does not change his status. As an Irish citizen, he is free to move his assets and to travel, both within country and abroad. Current Irish law does not allow for the arrest of an individual suspected of terrorism financing unless the EU has designated the person. (Note: A criminal and terrorism law is pending ratification this fall.) If the USG designation is pursued and approved by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee, the EU will automatically adopt it, allowing Ireland's Central Bank legal means to freeze his assets. The process from the EU approval to Irish application usually takes a matter of days. The Irish are likely to welcome this designation. 4.(C) Buisir has successfully used the press to gain sympathy in the past. The DFA has concerns that he may do so again, claiming persecution by the USG. To date, though, only one article has made it in the press regarding the designation and Buisir has refrained from public comments. -------------------------------------------- List 63: Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad (JTJ) -------------------------------------------- 5.(U) The GOI has no information on current activities of Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad (JTJ) in Ireland. The DFA welcomes this designation and information sharing on terrorism financing. Biggar emphasized that, as with Buisir, the Irish government cannot act until the UN and EU have acted. ---------------- Working Together ---------------- ¶6. For the purposes of better understanding the GOI, it is important to highlight the eagerness and willingness the DFA expressed regarding the fight against terrorism. Biggar mentioned that the DFA and the Gardai (Irish national police) do not have as close a working relationship as they would like. As a result, information sharing is limited and rare. Thus, the USG briefings with the DFA are well received and appreciated. The free flow of information is always welcome. KENNY
CONFIDENTIAL: NORTHERN IRELAND – CONTROLLING THE VIOLENCE
R 091735Z AUG 88 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8426 INFO AMEMBASSY DUBLIN NATO COLLECTIVE SECDEF WASHDC JCS WASHDC DIRFBI WASHDC USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAFF/SPACOS// USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD/J5// CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD// CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD// USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAFF// USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//POLAD// CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD// AMCONSUL BELFAST POUCH) AMCONSUL EDINBURGH POUCH) C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 16998 TERREP E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: KPRP PTER PGOV MARR MCAP UK EI SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND - CONTROLLING THE VIOLENCE REF: A) LONDON 16351 B) LONDON 5653 ¶1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. ¶2. SUMMARY: THE RECENT ESCALATION OF IRA ATTACKS, WHICH HAVE INCLUDED NOT ONLY MORE KILLINGS IN NORTHERN IRELAND BUT ALSO BOMBINGS AT UK MILITARY BASES IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND THE FIRST BOMBING IN BRITAIN ITSELF SINCE 1984, HAVE CAUSED HMG TO REEXAMINE ITS EFFORTS TO CONTROL IRA TERRORISM. THE INITIAL PROGNOSIS BY OFFICIALS IN LONDON IS THAT THERE IS NOT A GREAT DEAL MORE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE SHORT TERM OTHER THAN TO INCREASE ALERT LEVELS AND OTHER PRECAUTIONS AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICES, AND OTHER LIKELY IRA TARGETS. THE IRA MIGHT BE PLANNING ATTACKS DIRECTLY AGAINST OR TO COINCIDE WITH CERTAIN UPCOMING EVENTS, INCLUDING THE BEGINNING OF THE CORONER'S INQUEST IN GIBRLATAR INTO THE KILLING THERE OF THREE IRA TERRORISTS LAST JANUARY, AND THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE AT BRIGHTON IN OCTOBER. THE ATTACKS HAVE NOT WEAKENED THE GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE TO CONTINUE WITH ITS CURRENT POLICIES, WHICH INCLUDE TRYING TO RECTIFY CATHOLIC GRIEVANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THERE HAVE BEEN NEW DEMANDS TO INCREASE UK MILITARY FORCES IN ULSTER AND TO REINTRODUCE THE PREVENTIVE INTERNMENT OF KNOWN IRA ACTIVISTS; THE GOVERNMENT HOPES THESE STEPS WILL NOT BE NECESSARY AND FOR NOW HAS NO SUCH PLANS. UK OFFICIALS ARE PLEASED WITH PROGRESS IN GAINING THE COOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE IRA, BUT ALSO ARE CONVINCED THAT THE IRISH REPUBLIC COULD DO MORE TO HELP. PERHAPS THE SHOCK OF THE CURRENT WAVE OF ATTACKS, SAYS HMG, WILL ACCELERATE THE IMPROVEMENT IN SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. LONDON HOPES THAT IMPROVED INTRA-EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN COMBATTING TERRORISM WILL HELP TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IRA ATTACKS ON BRITISH MILITARY FORCES STATIONED IN EUROPE. END SUMMARY. THE IRA PLAYS TO THE NEWS AND CHALLENGES LONDON TO REACT --------------------------------------------- ----------- ¶3. THE RECENT ESCALATION OF TERRORIST ATTACKS BY THE IRA, INCLUDING BOMBINGS OF UK MILITARY TARGETS IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND THE FIRST IRA BOMBING IN BRITAIN ITSELF IN FOUR YEARS, HAS REFOCUSED ATTENTIONS IN WHITEHALL ON THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING IRA TERRORISM. WHAT THE KILLINGS BY THE IRA HAVE NOT DONE IS UNDERMINE EITHER THE THATCHER GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE TO STICK TO ITS POLICIES ON NORTHERN IRELAND OR THE CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL CONSENSUS BEHIND THOSE POLICIES. ¶4. THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE AND HMG POLICE OFFICIALS CALCULATE THAT THE IRA PLANS ITS ATTACKS MAINLY FOR NEWS VALUE. SPOKESMEN FOR THE IRA AND ITS POLITICAL WING, SINN FEIN, HAVE CONFIRMED THIS IN RECENT INTERVIEWS WITH JOURNALISTS. THE IRA WANTS ITS ATTACKS TO SHOCK THE PUBLIC IN BRITAIN AND WEAR DOWN BRITISH DETERMINATION TO STAY IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE UK SUNDAY NEWSPAPER "THE OBSERVER" REPORTED ON AUGUST 7 THAT IRA SOURCES TOLD ITS REPORTERS THE AUGUST 1 BOMBING OF AN ARMY DEPOT IN LONDON (REFTEL A) WAS UNDERTAKEN ON THE BORDER OF PRIME MINISTER THATCHER'S OWN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCY WITH THE HOPES THAT IT WOULD KILL MANY SOLDIERS (ONE DIED IN THE BLAST) AND FORCE MRS. THATCHER TO RETURN EARLY FROM HER AUSTRALIA VISIT. ¶5. THE BOMBINGS HAVE EMBARASSED THE GOVERNMENT BUT NOT NEARLY SO MUCH AS THE IRA APPARENTLY WOULD LIKE. SO FAR, IT HAS STIFFENED RATHER THAN WEAKENED LONDON'S RESOLVE. AND, WHILE THE KILLINGS HAVE SCORED INTENSIVE NEWS COVERAGE, THEY PROBABLY HAVE NOT INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY THE NUMBERS OF BRITONS WHO AGREE WITH THE "TIME TO GO" MOVEMENT FOR A BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM ULSTER. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT MANY ORDINARY CITIZENS DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND OTHER POTENTIAL TERRORIST TARGETS CANNOT BE PROTECTED BETTER. IN UK TELEVISION INTERVIEWS, SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO LIVE NEAR THE NORTH LONDON ARMY BASE ATTACKED ON AUGUST 1 SAID THEY HAD ALWAYS BEEN AMAZED THAT SECURITY WAS SO LAX AT THE BASE. BUT MANY OTHER BRITONS, EVEN WHILE THEY WINCE AT EACH DAY'S TALLY OF BOMBING VICTIMS, DO NOT EXPECT THEIR GOVERNMENT TO BE ABLE TO FEND OFF TERRORISTS EVERY TIME. THEY APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND, AS EX-PRIME MINISTER STANLEY BALDWIN TOLD THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN 1932, THAT DESPITE ANY PRECAUTIONS "THE BOMBER WILL ALWAYS GET THROUGH." THE ESCALATION WAS EXPECTED --------------------------- ¶6. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND TOM KING DECLARED IN LATE JULY THAT THE IRA WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY "INCOMPETENT," AS EVIDENCED BY A SERIES OF BUNGLED ATTACKS IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN WHICH INNOCENT BYSTANDERS WERE KILLED OR INJURED INSTEAD OF MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES. THE RECENT ESCALATION OF KILLINGS CAME SO FAST AFTER KING'S STATEMENT AS TO SEEM PROMPTED BY IT. THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) TOLD US THAT KING'S PRONOUNCEMENT WAS OVERLY OPTIMISTIC AND WAS NOT REFLECTED IN ANY RELAXATION OF VIGILANCE BY THE POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES. SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE KNOWN THE IRA WAS MERELY PAUSING AND WAS OVERDUE FOR A COME-BACK. ¶7. NIO OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT EVER SINCE UK SECURITY FORCES REVEALED THEIR PENETRATION OF IRA COMMUNICATIONS WHEN THEY KILLED EIGHT IRA TERRORISTS IN MAY 1987 AT LOUGHGALL, NORTHERN IRELAND, THE IRA HAS BEEN HOLDING BACK WHILE IT CHANGED ITS METHODS. THE TERRORISTS HAVE AMASSED TONS OF ARMAMENTS, CHIEFLY FROM LIBYA, BUT HAVE BEEN FEELING THEIR WAY WITH NEW PROCEDURES FOR MAKING AND COMMUNICATING DECISIONS. THE KILLING OF CIVILIAN BYSTANDERS AT ENNISKILLEN IN DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR AND IN SEVERAL OTHER APPARENTLY BUNGLED IRA ATTACKS SINCE THEN PROBABLY WAS DUE IN PART TO A DECENTRALIZATION OF IRA DECISION-MAKING. TO AVOID LEAKS AND INTERCEPTS, LOCAL IRA UNITS WERE TOLD TO OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY. SAS AND POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH UNITS HAVE EXCELLENT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES WHICH THE IRA CORRECTLY ASSUMES INCLUDE "MOLES" IN ITS OWN RANKS. THE SAFETY WARNING FOR THE IRA, AND THE BOAST OF UK AUTHORITIES, IS THAT IN NORTHERN IRELAND "EVERY TREE HAS ITS SPECIAL BRANCH." ¶8. AFTER MORE THAN HALF A YEAR OF PREPARATIONS, UK OFFICIALS TOLD US, THE IRA PLANNED A SERIES OF ATTACKS WHICH WAS TO INCLUDE THE GIBRALTAR BOMBING IN JANUARY. THE FAILURE OF THAT ATTACK (REFTEL B) AND THE REVELATION THAT ONCE AGAIN UK SECURITY OFFICIALS WERE AWARE OF ITS PLANS PROBABLY CAUSED THE IRA TO DELAY OR DEFER OTHER ATTACKS. IT WENT AHEAD WITH BOMBINGS DIRECTED AGAINST UK MILITARY PERSONNEL IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF EUROPE, APPARENTLY SECURE IN THE BELIEF THAT AT LEAST ONE "ACTIVE SERVICE UNIT" EMPLACED TO OPERATE IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS HAD NOT BEEN DETECTED BY EITHER UK OR LOCAL SECURITY OFFICIALS. WHATEVER ATTACKS HAD BEEN PLANNED IN BRITAIN ITSELF PROBABLY WERE JUDGED TO BE MORE RISKY AND WERE DELAYED AGAIN, BUT UK AUTHORITIES WERE CONVINCED THEY WOULD OCCUR EVENTUALLY. ¶9. UK SECURITY OFFICIALS KNEW OF MANY IRA MEMBERS AND SYMPATHIZERS IN BRITAIN AND WATCHED THEM AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE. BUT WHEN THE ATTACK CAME IN NORTH LONDON ON AUGUST 1 IT WAS BY A "SLEEPER," AN INDIVIDUAL OR A UNIT OF THE IRA NOT KNOWN BY SPECIAL BRANCH TO BE IN ENGLAND AND READY FOR AN ATTACK HERE. THERE MIGHT BE, OF COURSE, OTHER TERRORISTS IN BRITAIN PREPARING FOR ADDITIONAL ATTACKS. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CONTACTS TOLD US THAT A GREAT MANY DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS HERE ARE "SOFT TARGETS" SUCH AS RECRUITING OFFICES AND URBAN DEPOTS WHERE IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO INCREASE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS SIGNIFICANTLY. IF A WELL-TRAINED IRA UNIT IS POISED AND EQUIPPED FOR ANOTHER ATTACK, SAID THE MOD, IT COULD WELL FIND ITS MARK. INTERNMENT FOR THE IRA IN ULSTER? --------------------------------- ¶10. WHILE THERE MAY NOT BE MUCH MORE BY WAY OF PRECAUTIONS THAT CAN BE TAKEN IN BRITAIN, THE SITUATION IS DIFFERENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND. SOME BACKBENCH CONSERVATIVE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT HAVE REACTED TO THE RECENT ATTACKS HERE AND IN ULSTER BY DEMANDING THE REINTRODUCTION OF INTERNMENT, THE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT TRIAL OR FORMAL CHARGES IN COURT OF KNOWN MEMBERS OF THE IRA AND OTHER VIOLENT GROUPS, BOTH CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT. ¶11. INTERNMENT WAS ADOPTED IN AUGUST 1971 WHEN 450 MEMBERS OF THE IRA WERE ROUNDED UP BY THE ARMY AND POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN "OPERATION DEMETRIUS." 100 OF THOSE ARRESTED HAD TO BE RELEASED BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE TO BE CERTAIN OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM, SO THAT THE COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE IRA APPARENTLY WAS LEFT INTACT. OPPONENTS OF INTERNMENT NOW CONCEDE THAT CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS SO MUCH BETTER THAT A NEW ROUND-UP PROBABLY WOULD SUCCEED IN GREATLY DISRUPTING IRA PLANS. TOM KING SAID RECENTLY THAT THE OPTION OF INTERNMENT REMAINS "UNDER REVIEW," BUT OUR CONTACTS IN GOVERNMENT TOLD US THAT IRA ATTACKS WOULD HAVE TO BE FAR MORE SERIOUS FOR THE OPTION TO BE CHOSEN. HMG KNOWS THAT ADOPTING INTERNMENT WOULD BE A PROPAGANDA VICTORY AND A RECRUITMENT BOON FOR THE IRA. ALSO, INTERNMENT VERY LIKELY WOULD NOT WORK UNLESS IT WAS ADOPTED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND, WHICH UK OFFICIALS REGARD AS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. THE UK WANTS MORE HELP FROM IRELAND ----------------------------------- ¶12. UK OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT ONE KEY TO SUCCESS IN THE WAR AGAINST IRA TERRORISM IS IMPROVED SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. THEY THINK THAT DUBLIN HAS NOT YET FELT COMPELLED TO PUT ITS WEIGHT FULLY AGAINST THE TERRORISTS IN PART BECAUSE THE IRA, EVEN THOUGH IT DECLARES THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT IS "ILLEGAL" AND THAT THE IRISH POLICE AND MILITARY ARE LEGITIMATE TARGETS FOR ATTACK, HAS WISELY REFRAINED FROM ENDANGERING ITS SANCTUARY ON THE IRISH SIDE OF THE BORDER BY ATTACKING THE REPUBLIC'S OFFICIALS AND ARMED FORCES THERE. ¶13. THERE WERE EVENTS IN 1987 WHICH EMBARRASSED THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT INTO GREATER ACTION, SAY UK OFFICIALS, SUCH AS THE CAPTURE OF THE ARMS SHIP EKSUND AND THE REVELATION THEREFROM THAT THE IRA HAD BEEN IMPORTING LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS FROM LIBYA INTO IRELAND TO BE USED AGAINST FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE INTENSIVE EFFORT OF IRISH FORCES IN "OPERATION MALLARD" TO FIND MANY OF THOSE ARMAMENTS, AND THE PROLONGED INABILITY OF THE IRISH POLICE IN LATE 1987 TO CAPTURE THE RENEGADE EX-IRA MEMBER AND RAMPANT CRIMINAL DESI O'HARE, THE POPULARLY STYLED "BORDER FOX," EMBARRASSED IRELAND AND ITS SECURITY FORCES STILL MORE. NIO OFFICIALS TOLD US THEY BELIEVE IT IS MORE USEFUL NOW TO USE EACH ADDITIONAL IRA ATTACK, AND THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE IRA TRAVELS RELATIVELY FREELY IN THE REPUBLIC AND HAS MUNITIONS STORED THERE, AS ARGUMENTS TO PROD DUBLIN INTO MORE COOPERATION. ¶14. AT A RECENT EC MEETING IN HANOVER MRS. THATCHER ONCE AGAIN CONFRONTED IRISH PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY OVER THE NEED FOR DUBLIN TO BE MORE HELPFUL. ACCORDING TO CABINET SOURCES HERE, HAUGHEY CONCEDED THAT IRELAND'S POLICE AND MILITARY DO NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH BRITISH FORCES IN STOPPING THE IRA. IN RESPONSE TO THATCHER'S OFFER TO EITHER EXTEND BRITISH ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT OR TO ARRANGE SUCH ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IF NECESSARY, HAUGHEY PROMISED HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD REASSESS THE NEED FOR TRAINING AND OTHER SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS. NO END IN SIGHT --------------- ¶15. HMG OFFICIALS REGARD THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM AS A PERENNIAL IRRITANT WHICH WILL NOT GO AWAY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. NO ONE WILL FIND A SOLOMONIC WAY TO SATISFY THE CONTRADICTORY DEMANDS OF UNIONISTS AND REPUBLICANS. THE PERCEIVED GRIEVANCES OF BOTH SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO GENERATE CONFLICT. WITH NO NEAR-TERM SOLUTION IN SIGHT, THE PRINCIPAL GOALS OF GOVERNMENT ARE TO KEEP VIOLENCE DOWN TO TOLERABLE LEVELS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, STOP THE SPREAD OF IRA ATTACKS TO BRITAIN AND ELSEWHERE, AND RECTIFY THOSE OF THE GRIEVANCES UNDERLYING THE CONFLICT WHICH ARE LEGITIMATE. ¶16. THE GOVERNMENT IN LONDON BELIEVES THAT CONTINUED IRA TERRORISM IS INEVITABLE. THEY LIKE TO POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, EVEN WITH THE RECENT ESCALATION, IS VERY MUCH LESS THAN IN THE PEAK YEAR 1972 AND IN MOST INTERVENING YEARS. UK OFFICIALS ARE CONFIDENT THEY CAN KEEP THE KILLINGS IN ULSTER TO NOT MUCH MORE THAN CURRENT LEVELS WITHOUT ANY INCREASE IN SECURITY FORCES THERE. IRA ATTACKS IN BRITAIN ITSELF AND IN EUROPE ARE A DIFFERENT MATTER. COUNTER-TERRORISM TIES AND COOPERATION AMONG EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAS IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY IN RECENT YEARS, AND THE UK IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE IRA CAN BE HELD IN CHECK OUTSIDE OF NORTHERN IRELAND EVEN THOUGH ATTACKS WILL CONTINUE TO OCCUR. ¶17. THERE ARE MANY EVENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH MIGHT BRING IRA ATTACKS, SUCH AS THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MAZE PRISON ESCAPES ON SEPTEMBER 25 AND SEVERAL DIFFERENT DAYS WHEN CATHOLIC OR PROTESTANT ORGANIZATIONS WILL BE HAVING PUBLIC MARCHES. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE SEVERAL UPCOMING EVENTS AND ANNIVERSARIES WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED AS POSSIBLE PERIODS OF INCREASED THREAT OF IRA TERRORIST ATTACK IN BRITAIN AND EUROPE. PROMINENT AMONG THEM ARE: -- THE BEGINNING, NOW SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 6, OF THE INQUEST BY THE GIBRALTAR CORONER INTO THE KILLING OF THREE IRA TERRORISTS THERE LAST JANUARY. -- THE ANNUAL CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 11-14. THE CONFERENCE WILL BE AT BRIGHTON THIS YEAR, THE SAME PLACE WHERE AN IRA BOMB CAME CLOSE TO KILLING MARGARET THATCHER AND A MAJOR PART OF HER CABINET DURING THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN 1984. -- 1989 WILL MARK THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF BOTH THE INTRODUCTION OF BRITISH TROOPS INTO NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE CREATION OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA. 1989 COULD BE A BAD YEAR FOR COMMEMORATIVE TERRORISM. PRICE
SECRET//NOFORN: CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: APRIL 2 PSC DEBATE AND NEXT
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001510 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014 TAGS: PARM PHUM PREL PINR EUN USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: APRIL 2 PSC DEBATE AND NEXT STEPS FOR U.S. REF: A. USEU TODAY 04/06/04 ¶B. BRUSSELS 1464 ¶C. STATE 68263 ¶D. PRAGUE 390 Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ------- SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (S/NF) The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) discussed the EU arms embargo on China during a heated 90 minute exchange on April 2. PSC Ambassadors generally agreed that the issue -- of whether, when and how to lift the embargo -- should be sent back down to working groups for further study before being presented to political groups for a decision. France objected, however, and succeeded in getting agreement to discuss the issue at the April 26 FMs meeting (GAERC) -- but failed in its campaign to secure an early decision. The debate will likely continue well into the Dutch EU Presidency. This cable draws on a detailed readout and a sensitive internal report provided to Poloff by UK and Hungarian contacts (please protect accordingly), as well as background provided in recent days by other interlocutors. It also offers a strategy for continuing US engagement. -------------------------------------- PSC Reacts Badly to Latest US Demarche -------------------------------------- ¶2. (S/NF) PSC Ambassadors reportedly arrived at the April 2 meeting to find copies of ref C demarche sitting on their otherwise empty desks. The demarche was received badly because it gave the impression that "big brother was watching," and because it appeared timed as a heavyhanded and hubristic attempt to influence the PSC, according to our UK contact. Some reps, led by Greek Ambassador Paraskevoupoulos, objected to the Council Secretariat's distribution of the demarche under Council Secretariat cover and with a Secretariat identifying number. He argued that the document had no business being circulated by the Secretariat, and insisted that it be stricken from EU SIPDIS records. Ambassadors also reacted against what they perceived as the threatening tone of our demarche. ¶3. (S/NF) The Financial Times' front page article on April 2 about the US demarche campaign also enflamed the Ambassadors because it appeared directly aimed at Friday's PSC discussion. Irish Ambassador Kelleher reportedly opened the meeting by waving the article in the air and imploring his colleagues to protect the confidentiality of internal EU deliberations. Poloff pointed out that the timing of the latest US demarche was a coincidence, as we were previously unaware that the PSC was scheduled to discuss the issue on that day. (COMMENT: Our demarche was received badly not so much because of its substance, but because of the way it was presented. Our UK contact faulted the Irish and the Council Secretariat for the way the demarche was handled in the PSC, SIPDIS and also the awkward timing that made it seem, along with the FT article, tailor-made to influence the April 2 discussion. END COMMENT). ----------------------------------------- National Positions: France versus Denmark ----------------------------------------- ¶4. (S/NF) According to our UK contact, France staked out a "zero flexibility" position on lifting the embargo, and is opposed to any talk of applying conditionality (i.e. by insisting on further human rights progress by China and/or strengthening the Code of Conduct prior to lifting the embargo). The Danes are reportedly still leading the opposition, and have circulated to EU partners a list of ten human rights conditions that they believe China should meet before the embargo is lifted (we have not yet obtained a copy of this list). Other EU Member States are lining up somewhere in between, although "all agree in principle" that the embargo should be lifted if certain conditions are met. The debate from now on will focus on defining conditions and timing. ¶5. (S/NF) Following is a summary of national interventions made at the April 2 PSC: -- France: The embargo is anachronistic and must go; willing to discuss timing but not conditionality because China would not accept human rights conditionality; likewise would be contradictory to enhance the Code of Conduct specifically for China while also lifting the embargo; opposed also to making Code of Conduct legally binding; wants issue to remain political; opposed to sending it down to working groups. -- Denmark: Any decision to lift the embargo must be linked to specific Chinese steps on human rights; EU also needs to review Code of Conduct to ensure that lifting the embargo does not result in increased arms sales to China. -- Germany: EU must consider regional impact of lifting the embargo; now is not a good time to lift embargo (COMMENT: The Germans appear to have moved closer to the Danes in recent weeks, and are now the largest EU member state with serious reservations about lifting the embargo. One report of the discussion suggests that "the tough German position, coupled with the strength of US views, might be tempering French enthusiasm." END COMMENT). -- UK: Should be further study by working groups to identify implications for human rights and regional stability, and to examine options for strengthening Code of Conduct (COMMENT: Our Hungarian contact reports that the UK is fundamentally closer to the French end of the spectrum than the Danish. The UK, like France, does not favor making the Code of Conduct legally binding. END COMMENT). -- Greece: Should explore gestures China could make on human rights without explicitly linking them to lifting the embargo; should not link regional stability to lifting embargo; "provocatively" proposed that the Code of Conduct be made legally binding. (COMMENT: Our contacts report that the Greek position on lifting the embargo is closer to France than any other Member State. END COMMENT). -- Ireland: Supports sending the issue back to working groups (in part to keep the EU from making any decision during its Presidency). -- Netherlands: Central consideration should be possible release of political prisoners from the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. -- Czech Republic: Supports French position that issue should remain political; silent on other points (COMMENT: Our UK contact said that the Czech position is generally understood to be informed by that country's interest in selling radar equipment to China, as described ref D. END COMMENT). -- Sweden: Working groups should further study issues of human rights, regional stability, and enhancing the Code of Conduct. -- Austria: Should explore gestures on human rights that China could make but avoid linkage to lifting the embargo; should conduct a general (i.e. non China-specific) review of Code of Conduct. -- Italy: Intervened with same points as Austria. -- Belgium: More discussion needed of implications, including on human rights, of any decision to lift embargo. -- Commission: Took no position on lifting embargo but said EU should remain focused on human rights. Other member states did not intervene in the PSC discussion. ------------------------------------- Timeline: Back to the Working Groups? ------------------------------------- ¶6. (S/NF) The PSC will meet again on this issue on April 7, when it is expected to approve an "issues paper" which will then be sent through COREPER to FMs for discussion at the April 26 GAERC. According to our UK and Hungarian contacts, the paper is intended as a tour d'horizon for the GAERC discussion. It will not contain recommendations, and FMs are not expected to take a decision. Instead, they will likely send the paper back down to the PSC for re-examination. Most PSC Ambassadors, having satisfied the French desire for a ministerial discussion in April, will then press France to accept the majority preference for sending the issue back to the working groups. The working groups would need two to three months, minimum, to complete their assessments and submit their papers to the PSC (EU working groups are comprised of capital-based experts who rarely meet more than once per month). The relevant working groups are COHUM (human rights), COASI (Asia Directors), and COARM (conventional arms exports). ¶7. (S/NF) What all this means is that the debate will likely continue well into the Dutch Presidency. Already, Member States are beginning to look toward the December EU-China Summit as a possible timeframe for any decision to lift the embargo. We have heard they are also looking at the US electoral calendar and quietly wondering whether it would be worth holding off their decision until November or December in the hopes of sneaking it past the US radar. They have not and will not discuss such issues openly, even amongst each other in the PSC, but our UK contact confirms that quiet conversations and suggestive comments are going on in the wings. --------------------- Next Steps for the US --------------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Our efforts have managed to slow down the momentum in favor of removing the arms embargo, but have not killed this idea outright. In addition to the ongoing diplomatic dialogue on this issue, we recommend the following steps to help us keep the pressure on European governments: -- We should coordinate closely with Japan, and perhaps also the ROK. According to numerous EU interlocutors, the Japanese have become increasingly active on this issue, but their efforts appear so far uncoordinated with our own. While this may have served our interests in the sense that it gave the Europeans the impression that Japan's concerns were genuine and not dictated by Washington, it is now time to begin coordinating our efforts, so that Europeans recognize that other key players in the region share our regional stability concerns. -- We should engage the European Parliament, and particularly members of its Human Rights Committee. The EP is already on record opposing an end to the embargo. By calling attention to EU deliberations and ongoing Chinese human rights abuses, the EP could increase the political heat on member state governments against any decision to lift the embargo. -- We should consider increasing our public statements and press briefings for European audiences, on the assumption that more scrutiny by European publics would help our views on this issue, especially as regards human rights. -- We should increase our engagement with institutional and member state representatives to the COHUM, COASI and COARM working groups. In this way we could ensure that our views on human rights, regional stability and the Code of Conduct are fully understood by those experts who will be supplying recommendations to the political groups for discussion. -- Additionally, as suggested ref B, we recommend the USG begin considering options for how the EU might strengthen controls on arms exports to China in a post-embargo scenario. The worst case for us would be for the EU to lift its embargo without having in place some sort of new mechanism for controlling the transfer of arms and sensitive technologies to China. Schnabel
TOP-SECRET: CUBAN CRISIS 1961- ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NATIONAL SECURIYT AGENCY (NSA)
Afghanistan and the Soviet Withdrawal 1989 20 Years Later
Washington D.C., July 31st 2011 – Twenty years ago today, the commander of the Soviet Limited Contingent in Afghanistan Boris Gromov crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, thus marking the end of the Soviet war which lasted almost ten years and cost tens of thousands of Soviet and Afghan lives.
As a tribute and memorial to the late Russian historian, General Alexander Antonovich Lyakhovsky, the National Security Archive today posted on the Web (www.nsarchive.org) a series of previously secret Soviet documents including Politburo and diary notes published here in English for the first time. The documents suggest that the Soviet decision to withdraw occurred as early as 1985, but the process of implementing that decision was excruciatingly slow, in part because the Soviet-backed Afghan regime was never able to achieve the necessary domestic support and legitimacy – a key problem even today for the current U.S. and NATO-supported government in Kabul.
The Soviet documents show that ending the war in Afghanistan, which Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev called “the bleeding wound,” was among his highest priorities from the moment he assumed power in 1985 – a point he made clear to then-Afghan Communist leader Babrak Karmal in their first conversation on March 14, 1985. Already in 1985, according to the documents, the Soviet Politburo was discussing ways of disengaging from Afghanistan, and actually reached the decision in principle on October 17, 1985.
But the road from Gorbachev’s decision to the actual withdrawal was long and painful. The documents show the Soviet leaders did not come up with an actual timetable until the fall of 1987. Gorbachev made the public announcement on February 8, 1988, and the first troops started coming out in May 1988, with complete withdrawal on February 15, 1989. Gorbachev himself, in his recent book (Mikhail Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroiku … Pochemu eto vazhno seichas. (Moscow: Alpina Books 2006)), cites at least two factors to explain why it took the reformers so long to withdraw the troops. According to Gorbachev, the Cold War frame held back the Soviet leaders from making more timely and rational moves, because of fear of the international perception that any such withdrawal would be a humiliating retreat. In addition to saving face, the Soviet leaders kept trying against all odds to ensure the existence of a stable and friendly Afghanistan with some semblance of a national reconciliation process in place before they left.
The documents detail the Soviet leadership’s preoccupation that, before withdrawal of troops could be carried out, the Afghan internal situation had to be stabilized and a new government should be able to rely on its domestic power base and a trained and equipped army able to deal with the mujahadeen opposition. The Soviets sought to secure the Afghan borders through some kind of compromise with the two other most important outside players—Pakistan, through which weapons and aid reached the opposition, and the United States, provider of the bulk of that aid. In the process of Geneva negotiations on Afghanistan, which were initiated by the United Nations in 1982, the United States, in the view of the Soviet reformers, was dragging its feet, unwilling to stop arms supplies to the rebels and hoping and planning for the fall of the pro-Soviet Najibullah regime after the Soviet withdrawal.
Internally, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan did everything possible to prevent or slow down the Soviet withdrawal, putting pressure on the Soviet military and government representatives to expand military operations against the rebels.
Persistent pleading on the part of Najibullah government as late as January 1989 created an uncharacteristic split in the Soviet leadership, with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze suggesting that the withdrawal should be slowed down or some forces should remain to help protect the regime, while the military leadership argued strongly in favor of a complete and decisive withdrawal.
According to the American record, Shevardnadze had already informed Secretary of State George Shultz as early as September 1987 of the specific timetable for withdrawal. But many senior officials did not believe the Soviet assurances; in fact, deputy CIA director Robert Gates famously bet a State Department diplomat on New Year’s Eve 1987 that Gorbachev would make no withdrawal announcement until after the end of the Reagan administration. Gates believed the Chinese saying about the Soviet appetite for territory: “What the bear has eaten, he never spits out” – and only in his memoirs did he admit he was making “an intelligence forecast based on fortune cookie wisdom.” (Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon&Shuster, 1996, pp. 430-431). Of course, Gates’ hardline views on Gorbachev would take over U.S. policy as the George H.W. Bush administration came into office in January 1989.
By this time, however, the Soviet leaders well realized that the goal of building socialism in Afghanistan was illusory; and at the same time the goal of securing the southern borders of the Soviet Union seemed to be still within reach with the policy of national reconciliation of the Najibullah government. So the troops came out completely by February 15, 1989. Soon after the Soviet withdrawal, however, both superpowers seemed to lose interest in what had been so recently the hottest spot of the Cold War.
Najibullah would outlast Gorbachev’s tenure in the Kremlin, but not by much: Within three years Najibullah would be removed from power and brutally murdered, and Afghanistan would plunge into the darkness of civil war and the coming to power of the Taliban. Twenty years later, the other superpower and its Cold War alliance are fighting a war in Afghanistan against forces of darkness that were born among the fundamentalist parts of mujahadeen resistance to the Soviet occupation. In such a context, the language and the dilemmas in these 20-year-old documents still provide some resonance today.
This posting is also a tribute to and a commemoration of one of our long-standing partners in the pursuit of opening secrets and writing the new truly international history of the Cold War. General Alexander Lyakhovsky passed away from a heart attack while standing on a Moscow Metro platform on February 3, 2009, less than two weeks before the 20th anniversary of the end of the war in which he served as an officer, and which he studied for many years as a scholar. He is survived by his wife Tatyana and their children Vladimir and Galina.
The National Security Archive mourns the passing of our dear friend and partner, Alexander Antonovich. It is fitting and proper that here we express our deepest appreciation for his remarkable knowledge, his scholarly and personal integrity, and his generosity both in expertise and the documents that he always shared with us, while he educated us and the world. His memory lives on in all of us who ever read his work, heard him speak, or best of all, listened to him sing the sad songs of the Afghan war.
— Svetlana Savranskaya, director of Russia programs, Thomas Blanton, executive director, National Security Archive, and Malcolm Byrne, Deputy Director, National Security Archive.
Documents:
Document 1. Memorandum of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Conversation with Babrak Karmal, March 14, 1985
In his first conversation with the leader of Afghanistan, who was installed by the Soviet troops in December of 1979, Gorbachev underscored two main points: first that “the Soviet troops cannot stay in Afghanistan forever,” and second, that the Afghan revolution was presently in its “national-democratic” stage, whereas its socialist stage was only “a course of the future.” He also encouraged the Afghan leader to expand the base of the regime to unite all the “progressive forces.” In no uncertain terms, Karmal was told that the Soviet troops would be leaving soon and that his government would have to rely on its own forces.
Document 2. Anatoly Chernyaev Diary, April 4, 1985
Chernyaev reflects on the “torrent of letters” about Afghanistan received recently by the Central Committee and the Pravda newspaper. They reflect the growing dissatisfaction of the population with the drawn-out war and the consensus that the troops should be withdrawn.
Document 3 Anatoly Chernyaev Diary, October 17, 1985.
At the Politburo session of October 17, 1985, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed to make a final decision on Afghanistan and quoted from citizens’ letters regarding the dissatisfaction in the country with the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. He also described his meeting with Babrak Karmal during which Gorbachev told the Afghan leader: “we will help you, but with arms only, not troops.”Chernyaev noted Gorbachev’s negative reaction to the assessment of the situation given by Defense Minister Marshal Sergey Sokolov.
Document 4. Politburo Session, June 26, 1986.
The Politburo discusses the first results of Najibullah’s policy of national reconciliation. Gorbachev emphasizes that the decision to withdraw the troops is firm, but that the United States seems to be a problem as far as the national reconciliation is concerned. He proposes early withdrawals of portions of troops to give the process a boost, and proposes to “pull the USA and Pakistan by their tail” to encourage them to participate in it more actively.
Document 5 Politburo Session, November 13, 1986.
The first detailed Politburo discussion of the process and difficulties of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which included the testimony of Marshal Sergei Akhromeev.
Document 6 Politburo Session, January 21, 1987
The Politburo discusses the results of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Head of the Central Committee International Department Anatoly Dobrynin’s trip to Afghanistan. Shevardnadze’s report is very blunt and pessimistic about the war and the internal situation. The main concern of the Politburo is how to end the war but save face and ensure a friendly and neutral Afghanistan.
Document 7 Politburo Session, February 23, 1987
Gorbachev talks about the need to withdraw while engaging the United States and Pakistan in negotiations on the final settlement. He is willing to meet with the Pakistani leader Zia ul Khaq, and maybe even offer him some payoff. The Soviet leader also shows concern about the Soviet reputation among non-aligned countries and national liberation movements.
Document 8 Politburo Session, February 26, 1987
In his remarks to the Politburo, General Secretary returns to the issue of the need to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan several times. He emphasizes the need to withdraw the troops, and at the same time struggles with the explanation for the withdrawal, noting that “we not going to open up the discussion about who is to blame now.” Gromyko admits that it was a mistake to introduce the troops, but notes that it was done after 11 requests from the Afghan government.
Document 9 Colonel Tsagolov Letter to USSR Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov on the Situation in Afghanistan, August 13, 1987
Criticism of the Soviet policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan and analysis of general failures of the Soviet military mission there are presented in Colonel Tsagolov’s letter to USSR Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov of August 13, 1987. This letter represents the first open criticism of the Afghan war from within the military establishment. Colonel Tsagolov paid for his attempt to make his criticism public in his interview with Soviet influential progressive magazine “Ogonek” by his career—he was expelled from the Army in 1988.
Document 10 CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan, May 10, 1988
On May 10, 1988, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR issued a “closed” (internal use) letter to all Communist Party members of the Soviet Union on the issue of withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. The letter presents the Central Committee analysis of events in Afghanistan and Soviet actions in that country, the problems and the difficulties the Soviet troops had to face in carrying out their mission. In particular, the letter stated that important historic and ethnic factors were overlooked when the decisions on Afghanistan were made in the Soviet Union. The letter analyzes Soviet interests in Afghanistan and the reasons for the withdrawal of troops.
Document 11 Politburo Session January 24, 1989
This Politburo session deals with the issue of the completion of the withdrawal and the post-war Soviet role in Afghanistan, as well as possible future development of the situation there. The discussion shows the split among the Soviet leadership with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arguing for leaving some personnel behind to help protect the Najibullah regime or delaying the full withdrawal.
Document 12 Excerpt from Alexander Lyakhovsky and Vyacheslav Nekrasov, Grazhdanin, Politik, Voin: Pamyati Shakha Masuda (Citizen, Politician, Fighter: In Memory of Shah Masoud), (Moscow, 2007), pp. 202-205
Document 13 Excerpt from Statement of the Soviet Military Command in Afghanistan on the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops, February 14, 1989
On April 7, 1988, USSR Defense Minister signed an order on withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. In February 1989, the Defense Ministry prepared a statement of the Soviet Military Command in Afghanistan on the issue of withdrawal of troops, which was delivered to the Head of the UN Mission in Afghanistan on February 14, 1989—the day when the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan. The statement gave an overview of Soviet-Afghan relations before 1979, Soviet interpretation of the reasons for providing internationalist assistance to Afghanistan, and sending troops there after the repeated requests of the Afghan government. It criticized the U.S. role in arming the opposition in disregard of the Geneva agreements, and thus destabilizing the situation in the country. In an important acknowledgement that the Vietnam metaphor was used to analyze Soviet actions in Afghanistan, they military explicitly referred to “unfair and absurd” comparisons between the American actions in Vietnam and the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
Document 14. Official Chronology of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan with quotes from documents from the Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow.
Books By Alexander Lyakhovsky
Grazhdanin,Politik,Voin, Plamya Afgana and Zacharovannye svobodoj
CONFIDENTIAL: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part II – Community Reaction
VZCZCXRO2713 RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHMU #0013/01 0071743 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 071743Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0368 INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC RUEHC/USAID WASHDC 0004 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000013 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/07 TAGS: SNAR SOCI ASEC PGOV PHUM PREL KCOR NU SUBJECT: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part II - Community Reaction Divided, FSLN Blames U.S. for Crisis REF: A) 2009 MANAGUA 1149 (LORDS OF NARCO-COAST PART I) B) 2009 MANAGUA 1051 (PRIMER ON MISKITO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT) C) 2009 MANAGUA 1047 (MISKITO INDEPENDENCE RALLY TURNS DEADLY) D) 2008 MANAGUA 1517 AND PREVIOUS (FRAUD IN RAAN ELECTIONS) E) 2008 MANAGUA 419 AND PREVIOUS (GON SUSPENDS RAAN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS) CLASSIFIED BY: Robert J. Callahan, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D) SUMMARY ¶1. (C): On December 8, after a plane laden with cocaine and cash crash-landed in the remote, small village of Walpa Siksa in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN), a deadly confrontation took place between Nicaraguan anti-drug units and drug smugglers allied with some number of local residents. This message is the second in a series that reports on the Walpa Siksa incident and its immediate aftermath, and explores what these events have revealed about the actual state of organized trafficking operations in Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. ¶2. (C) In the aftermath of the incident, public reactions have been divided. Some regional politicians and leaders of the indigenous Yatama political party have called the incident and subsequent government operations in the region a new "Red Christmas Massacre" - a reference to the Sandinistas' deadly attacks on indigenous Miskitos in the 1980s, assertions the military contests are false. Religious leaders have denounced these same political leaders for turning a blind eye to the increased drug activity. Former Vice President (and ex-Sandinista), Sergio Ramirez, has decried the presence of trafficking organizations as a national security threat, while a senior current FSLN official accused the United States, specifically the CIA, of "promoting" the drug trade to destabilize the country. Underneath all lies a subtext of the perennial rivalry and racial conflict between Nicaragua's Pacific (Hispanic) and Atlantic (Afro-Caribbean and Amerindian) cultures. Yet, also through the dissonance, the Walpa Siksa incident and its aftermath seem to indicate stronger linkages between drug smugglers and local communities in Nicaragua's Atlantic region than previously believed. END SUMMARY REGIONAL POLITICIANS BLAME THE MILITARY - SEEK A NEW CRISIS ¶3. (C) The Walpa Siksa village, where the December 8 incident occurred, is in a region historically controlled by Yatama; the regional, indigenous Miskito political party. Much of Yatama's leadership itself has been co-opted by the ruling Sandinista Party (REF D) over the last few years. Even so, regional politicians and several Yatama leaders have taken to the airwaves, primarily on their new Yatama radio station (reportedly funded by the government), to condemn the Nicaraguan military for its continuing operations in the vicinity of Walpa Siksa and Prinzapolka. These leaders, including Brooklyn Rivera, a Yatama National Assembly Deputy; Reynoldo Francis, Governor of the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN); Roberto Wilson, the RAAN Vice Governor; and Elizabeth Enriquez Francis, former mayor of RAAN capital Bilwi (and ex-wife of Governor Francis), have used Miskito-language radio broadcasts from the new station to claim that the Nicaraguan anti-drug unit had violated human rights in pursuing its investigation and by detaining suspects from Walpa Siksa. These leaders vehemently denied that these coastal communities support, house and abet drug smugglers, as had been charged by some critics. Rivera told national media that "the soldiers are all from the Pacific coast. There has been racism, robberies and looting of indigenous people's homes." Other Miskito leaders claim that the soldiers have killed livestock and stolen food donated to the community by the World Food Program. ¶4. (C) Rivera, Francis, Wilson, and Enriquez have all called for and even led several protests against police and navy forces stationed in Bilwi, creating a new crisis in the region. They have denounced the "human rights violations" by the anti-drug unit against the "innocent" indigenous people and claim that the military "occupation" of Walpa Siksa is rife with abuses. This racially-charged agitation led some in the Miskito community to set up illegal road blocks at the town of Sinsin, preventing traffic on the only road between Bilwi and Managua. There were also attempts to take over the Bilwi International Airport and the capital's main wharf. These Yatama leaders and radicalized supporters have demanded that the Navy cease all operations on the Atlantic Coast, withdraw from the region, and immediately release the roughly two dozen suspects detained in Walpa Siksa and Prinzapolka. (see SEPTEL). Rivera also told reporters that the Walpa Siksa community elders had decided to abandon their community if the military did not depart or carried out its plan to establish a permanent presence in the area. MORAVIAN CHURCH LEADER CONDEMNS GOVERNMENT COLLUSION ¶5. (U) The Moravian Church is the largest denomination on the Atlantic Coast and a large majority of indigenous Miskitos belong to it, making the church the moral authority in the region; even more so than the Catholic Church. On Friday, December 13, Moravian Church Superintendant Cora Antonio issued a grave statement against the local Walpa Siksa community leaders, police officials and military officials in the Atlantic, whom she claimed knew about the narco-trafficking base in Walpa Siksa, but took no action until the recent plane crash. Antonio, who will finish her two-year term in January 2010, complained that drug smugglers had established their networks unchallenged by the GON and exploited the extreme poverty on the Coast. She also claimed that elected officials, including Francis, Wilson, and Lidia Coleman, the mayor of nearby Prinzapolka, as well as police and military authorities, "knew from the beginning of the installation of this narco-traffickers' base, but never did anything about it." She also stated that in certain Caribbean communities the narco-traffickers exercised the highest authority, above that of the community judge, the village elders, even the pastor or "sindico," and that they frequently commanded the "last word" on community decisions. Antonio also said the Moravian Church had recently removed a reverend from the Walpa Siksa village out of fear that he would be physically attacked for preaching against drugs from the pulpit. WIHTA TARA ALSO SAYS MILITARY SHOULD LEAVE ¶6. (U) Other non-FSLN-aligned indigenous leaders took aim at the President Ortega and at the military's recent actions. The Wihta Tara of the Miskito Nation, aka the Rev. Hector Williams, who denounced the Managua government and called for Miskito independence, told the media that Columbian drug traffickers had already left, so the military should leave as well. NOTE: The Wihta Tara (Miskito for "great judge"), was elected by the Council of Elders of the Miskito Nation and leads Miskito separatist movement that mounted protests which were violently suppressed this past October (REF E) END NOTE. Williams stated that "the army is after the money that they think is hidden in the community." Building on the racial inequality theme, another separatist leader, Steady Alvarado, publicly questioned why the military felt it could take actions in the indigenous communities that it would never attempt on the Pacific Coast. The Miskito Council of Elders itself issued a statement on December 12 blaming President Ortega directly for the "tortures, persecutions and death of our community members in Walpa Siksa." It also accused Ortega of being "incapable of neutralizing" drug trafficking activity on the Atlantic Coast, and for again "bearing a grudge" against the Coastal peoples, "like he did during the Navidad Roja (Red Christmas Massacre)." NOTE: The Red Christmas Massacre occurred in 1981, when Sandinista military operations in the Atlantic Coast killed dozens and forcibly relocated hundreds of Miskitos thought to be collaborating with the Contras. END NOTE. ARMY CHIEF DENIES RIGHTS VIOLATIONS - YIELD "NOT ONE INCH TO NARCOS" ¶7. (U) General Omar Halleslevens, Commander of the Nicaraguan military, told reporters that the Army would not leave Walpa Siksa, nor would it stop searching neighboring communities for drug traffickers. He insisted that the Army would remain and would take appropriate measures to protect the area from again becoming a haven for drug trafficking. Halleslevens denied accusations that the military had violated human rights, saying "our line has been from the very beginning to respect life, human rights, private property and the law ... as we are completing our duty to support the police in applying the law." He further declared that the military would "not give a rock, nor even an inch of the national territory, to narco-traffickers" and called on government institutions and the population to support law enforcement in its fight. NOTE: Thus far, Post has no/no credible evidence of human rights violations by law enforcement related to this operation. We continue to monitor the situation closely and will report relevant developments if they occur. END NOTE. FORMER FSLN VICE PRESIDENT CONDEMNS NARCOS, BLAMES GOVERNMENT ¶8. (U) Adding to the chorus of concern about the absentee national government was author and former Nicaraguan/FSLN vice president, Sergio Ramirez, who said in an op-ed that the strong narco-traffickers presence on the Caribbean Coast threatened Nicaragua's sovereignty and territorial integrity. He believed that the "narco-traffickers will promote the separation of the Caribbean Coast (REF E) and already have the social base to do it" because of the significant resources drug smugglers enjoy and the rampant political corruption in the region. Ramirez also said the confrontation between the anti-drug units and the Walpa Siksa community demonstrated that criminal organizations had achieved enormous influence on the Atlantic Coast while the "government does not do anything to stop the problem." FSLN LEADER BLAMES THE U.S., CIA FOR THE CRISIS, MAY CANCEL ELECTIONS ¶9. (U) In contrast, during December 16 interviews, Steadman Fagoth, a Miskito indigenous leader, former Contra commander, and now ardent Ortega supporter, told FSLN-controlled media that United States had created the Walpa Siksa crisis. Fagoth, who is also president of the Government's Fishing Authority (INPESCA), spoke to Multinoticias Channel 4, owned and operated by the Ortega-Murillo family, and to "El 19," the official on-line newspaper of the Sandinista Government. He claimed that the United States, through the CIA, was trying to provoke an uprising in the Atlantic Coast against the government by supporting narco-criminals. He added that Alberto Luis Cano, the fugitive Colombian drug leader and passenger of the crashed drug airplane (see SEPTEL-Part I) had been hired by the CIA to promote an uprising among the native population, by playing on the racial animosity between Nicaragua's Pacific and Atlantic populations. Perhaps Fagoth's most troubling comment was that because of the current unrest, the government might delay regional elections scheduled for March 2010. COMMENT ¶10. (C) In the cacophony following the Walpa Siksa incident, statements of FSLN official Steadman Fagoth are perhaps the most politically ominous. Fagoth is a regular proxy for Ortega's Atlantic policy. His remarks frequently represent test balloons for how Ortega perceives the situation and how the President seeks to position himself against any fallout. Fagoth's anti-U.S. accusations are outrageous, but not unexpected -- that the United States and CIA employed a drug trafficker to created this crisis, destabilize the region and overthrow the government. He made similar accusations about the United States and CIA when the Wihta Tara announced the separatist movement several months ago. In 2008, the GON delayed RAAN municipal elections (REF E) on dubious grounds. Thus Fagoth's comment about delaying the March 2010 regional elections may indicate Ortega's true intent: freeze everyone in place. ¶11. (C) The Walpa Siksa incident and its aftermath aggravated underlying tensions and divisions that persist in the Atlantic, and may have exposed new evidence about the nature and extend of narco-trafficking activity. Serious concerns about threats to national security and sovereignty have been raised by critics of the government. Some community leaders, such as Moravian Superintendent Cora Antonio, have spoken out about what they see as rampant drug corruption and political collusion by RAAN political leaders. We find it odd that these same political leaders, such as Rivera, Francis, Wilson and Enriquez agitated against military counter-drug operations, and virtually denied the existence of any narco-trafficking activity. At a minimum, their efforts to fan latent racial resentments seem self-serving re-election efforts in the run-up to regional elections. For its part, the military denies any human rights abuses in this, its largest anti-drug land operation in the Caribbean in years. In a subsequent message we will provide more detail about the figures caught up in the Walpa Siksa incident and outline some of the networks and relationships that we believe traffickers may have been able to establish. CALLAHAN
CONFIDENTIAL: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part I – Deadly Confrontation
VZCZCXRO2201 RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHMU #1149/01 3552241 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 212241Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0312 INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC RUEHC/USAID WASHDC 0001 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 001149 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/21 TAGS: SNAR SOCI PGOV PHUM PREL KCOR ASEC NU SUBJECT: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part I - Deadly Confrontation at Walpa Siksa REF: MANAGUA 1051 (MOSQUITO COAST INDEPENDENCE) CLASSIFIED BY: Robert J. Callahan, Ambassador, State, Embassy Managua; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 8, after a plane laden with cocaine and cash crash landed in the remote, small village of Walpa Siksa in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN), a deadly confrontation took place between Nicaraguan anti-drug units and drug smugglers allied with a some number of local residents. Stories of how the clash came to pass on December 8 are divergent, but the Walpa Siksa incident, the ensuing actions of regional leaders and local residents, as well as the enhanced posture of security forces seems to indicate there are stronger linkages between drug smugglers and local communities than previously believed. This message is the first in a series that reports on the Walpa Siksa incident and its immediate aftermath, and explores what these events have revealed about the actual state of organized trafficking operations in Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. END SUMMARY WALPA SIKA: THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT ¶2. (C) On Tuesday, December 8, a Nicaraguan anti-drug unit clashed with suspected drug traffickers, leaving two sailors dead and five other government security forces wounded. The following account of events is based on Government of Nicaragua (GON) official briefings and conversations between senior GON law enforcement/military officials and Embassy personnel. On Tuesday, December 8, a Nicaraguan anti-drug unit combined force of navy and national police traveled to the remote, small village of Walpa Siksa in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) to investigate reports of a plane crash linked to drug smugglers. The joint patrol arrived in the evening and was ambushed by civilians from the remote village, who were allegedly defending the drug traffickers. In the melee, two sailors were killed, and three other military personnel and one police officer were severely wounded. One villager from Walpa Siksa was also killed. On Wednesday, December 9, a joint Nicaraguan navy-army patrol returned to Walpa Siksa to detain those suspected of involvement in the ambush, only to find the community abandoned of all males. On Thursday, December 10, anti-drug forces from the Navy confronted an additional group of drug smugglers near the community of Prinzapolka, in which one suspect was killed and another wounded. Two more were detained, and the fifth suspect escaped. Subsequent missions by the anti-drug unit over several days resulted in 20 suspects arrested (18 in connection with the first clash), and confiscation of a powerboat, several guns, ammunition, small quantities of drugs and $177,960 in cash. Nicaraguan security forces have seized and are now operating out of several homes in the Walpa Siksa community that are believed to have housed drug smugglers. The military has announced plans to establish a permanent presence in the area to discourage drug traffickers from using it as a base of operations any longer. ¶3. (U) Capt. Roger Gonzalez, newly-installed chief of the Nicaraguan naval forces, told the press that "we understand there is a Colombian criminal, suspected drug trafficker, [Alberto Ruiz Cano] who has $500,000 and has armed certain area individuals, and we are searching for him." Police investigators revealed that Ruiz Cano, whose real name is Amauri Pau, was illegally issued a Nicaraguan national identity card (cedula) and owns several properties and businesses in Managua believed to be involved in money laundering (see SEPTEL). Ruiz Cano is also believed to have been on the crashed plane and is suspected of leading the December 8 attack against the anti-drug unit. Officials detained two Colombians -- Ruiz Cano's father [Fernando Melendez Paudd known as "el Patron"] and his cousin [Catalina del Carmen Ruiz] -- but neither has been willing to talk to police about Ruiz Cano or his whereabouts. Ruiz Cano's associates have hired attorney Julian Holmes Arguello to defend them. The presence of Holmes Arguello, a well-known and expensive attorney, has reinforced official suspicions about Holmes own possible drug connections. WALPA SIKSA: EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNTS -- EARLY "WHITE" CHRISTMAS OR FAILED DRUG RESCUE? ¶4. (U) The national daily newspaper El Nuevo Diario "END" (left-of-center) has provided continuous coverage of the Walpa Siksa incident, since it came to light on the evening of December 8th. According to the paper's accounts, events leading up to the deadly December 8 firefight differ somewhat from the official account. The paper's sources, who requested anonymity for fear of possible reprisals from traffickers, other residents and the government, stated that the plane crash-landed in the Walpa Siksa cemetery on Sunday, December 6 at 11 a.m. The impact killed the pilot and co-pilot instantly, and broke the plane into several pieces scattering packets of cocaine and bundles of dollars in the debris. Walpa Siksa residents quickly discovered the dead pilots and one crash survivor, to whom they gave medical attention. They were also surprised at the large quantity of cocaine the plane was carrying. According to the paper's sources, some community elders wanted to immediately contact the police and navy about the plane crash and drugs, but others argued that it would be better to divide the cash and drugs within the community and then burn the plane to hide the evidence. According to the media reports, the latter group prevailed and armed themselves with weapons (pistols, AK-47 rifles) that had been stored since the 1980's. According to the eye-witness accounts, on December 7 at 2 p.m. two boats with approximately 40 Colombian narco-traffickers, who were "armed to the teeth," arrived in Walpa Siksa to rescue the pilots and the third passenger (known as "el Jefe" or "the boss," believed to be Alberto Ruiz Cano), and to recover the plane's lost "merchandise." The Colombians spent the night of December 7 and all day December 8 trying to convince the community to return the missing drugs and cash. According to END reports, when the narco-traffickers learned that a government anti-drug unit was coming from Bilwi to investigate the plane crash, they armed the community in order to repel the Navy. As soon as the two Navy boats arrived, the narco-traffickers opened fire on the sailors, who also shot back, killing four community members [NOTE: only one death in the community has been confirmed. END NOTE]. The navy boats returned to Bilwi at 7 p.m. with their dead and wounded. On December 9, the wounded civilians from Walpa Siksa were taken to a nearby village and, by the afternoon, the Walpa Siksa village was evacuated because villagers feared reprisals by the Government. ¶5. (C) Our Embassy contacts on the ground in the RAAN have relayed an account similar to that reported in the newspaper, but that differs on some important details. According to our sources, on Friday, December 4, an airplane carrying hundreds of pounds of cocaine and sacks of cash ran out of fuel on its way to a clandestine runway in the RAAN and was forced to make an emergency landing on the beach near Walpa Siksa. The plane's pilot and two passengers, allegedly Colombians, suffered minor injuries and were sheltered by the local community. Members of the community quickly emptied the airplane of its cargo, estimated to be approximately a half-ton of cocaine separated into individual one kilo packets. Our contacts told us that word of the plane crash quickly spread throughout the coastal communities and on Saturday morning, December 5, several local merchants left Bilwi with their boats full of commercial goods and food to sell to the community with its sudden new windfall. By Saturday evening narco-trafficker "rescue boats" carrying approximately 40 Colombians and Hondurans (reportedly from Honduras and San Andres) arrived in the community to save the pilot/passengers and recover the drugs and cash. Over the ensuing three days, village elders urged by the narco "recovery team" tried to persuade the community to sell the cocaine packets back at a price of $3,000 a kilo. According to our contacts, the major sticking point was that the $3,000 price was only half the $6,000 per kilo price that locals knew they could get by taking their windfall slightly up the coast to Honduras. When one group of Walpa Siksa residents ultimately refused to sell back their stash to the narco-traffickers, they were attacked and robbed of their "windfall." This group subsequently traveled to Bilwi on the morning of Tuesday, December 8, and filed a formal complaint with the police there, which confirmed rumors of a drug-plane crash. Our contacts told us that it was this formal complaint that lead to the government dispatching the counter-drug unit to investigate at Walpa Siksa. The anti-drug unit arrived in two boats to Walpa Siksa at approximately 6 p.m. Our contacts told us that there had been no ambush when they arrived, but rather an "amicable" meeting between law enforcement and village elders. However, things turned sour after one of the Colombians from the "rescue team," who was drunk and under the impression they were under attack, shot his automatic weapon into the group of uniformed sailors, killing one and seriously wounding several other counter-drug unit members. Our contacts told us that the "ambush" story was fabricated later by authorities to account for their dead and wounded. COMMENT ¶6. (C) Walpa Siksa has obliged us to revise our views about the nature and extent of trafficking activity on the Atlantic. Previously, our assessment had been that the majority of the local indigenous Miskito villages were too xenophobic to actively support outsiders (even Nicaraguans from the Pacific side of Hispanic descent) in transporting drugs (or, frankly, any other activity) for extended periods. We had also believed that local interaction with traffickers had been intermittent, and normally took place upon the instruction or advice of a small number of corrupt political and indigenous leaders in the region. We maintain our basic assessment is still valid; however, all three versions of the Walpa Siksa incident reveal evidence that there is likely a much higher degree of cooperation and support than we previously believed between foreign drug trafficking organization and, at least, the more remote local communities of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. In some cases there may be persistent and pervasive relationships within an entire community. We fear that it now appears that organized criminal elements may have made major inroads within some remote coastal communities, convincing them to join forces by offering perhaps the only secure and steady employment opportunity on the Coast - maintaining drug trafficking supply routes. Nicaragua's Atlantic is a key mid-point for an increasingly busy transit corridor of South American drug shipments bound for the United States. It is also the most underdeveloped and economically backward region of the country and has been generally ignored by the current and previous central governments in Managua. This combination of political neglect, limited economic opportunity and daily shipments of drugs creates conditions for a possible "perfect storm" where Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast could degenerate into an ungoverned "Narco-Coast," with serious repercussions for Nicaragua's political stability and U.S. counternarcotics cooperation. In subsequent messages we will address reaction to Walpa Siksa by local, regional and national figures. We will also provide more detailed reporting about the key figures caught up in the Walpa Siksa incident and outline some of the networks and relationships that we believe traffickers have been able to establish. CALLAHAN
CONFIDENTIAL: BULGARIA AND THE ENERGY KNOT: SCENESETTER FOR OCT
VZCZCXRO6805 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHSF #0641/01 2761002 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 021002Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5430 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000641 SIPDIS FOR SPECIAL ENVOY BOYDEN GRAY E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018 TAGS: ECON ENRG PGOV BU SUBJECT: BULGARIA AND THE ENERGY KNOT: SCENESETTER FOR OCT 7 VISIT OF SPE GRAY Classified By: Ambassador Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) Summary: The quandary over energy facing all our European partners is particularly acute here in Bulgaria. With few hydrocarbons of its own, Bulgaria relies on Russia for seventy percent of its total energy needs and over ninety percent of its gas. Though previously a net exporter of electricity, the EU's decision to force closure of blocks 3 and 4 of the communist-era nuclear plant Kozluduy cost the Bulgarian economy over USD 1.4 billion and put a squeeze on Serbia, Macedonia and Greece, who had purchased the bulk of the exports. The hard reality of today's energy picture is that Russia is not only the dominant supplier, it is also the dominant player -- your visit here is the first by a senior U.S. energy official in a year, whereas Putin has personally engaged both the President and Prime Minister on energy issues in multiple sessions over the past ten months. But the cartoon strip portraying a passionately eager Bulgaria in bed with the muscle bound duo of Gazprom and Lukoil is only partially true -- it is a tryst driven less by passion and more by a perceived lack of options. Prime Minister Stanishev recently described Russian tactics on South Stream as blackmail and Energy Minister Dimitrov complains openly of psychological warfare. At the same time, the Bulgarians are deeply worried about the prospects for Nabucco and are convinced that Azeri gas supplies will be held up by Turkey. Their bid to hold an energy summit in the spring, the ostensible focus of your visit, is designed to catalyze greater coordination -- and negotiating leverage -- amongst transit countries while also getting the United States more actively engaged. Background on specific issues likely to arise in your discussions with President Parvanov, Prime Minister Stanishev, Foreign Minister Kalfin and Energy Minister Dimitrov follows below. End Summary. TIMING ------ ¶2. (C) Your visit to Sofia comes when Bulgaria is striving to sell itself as a European energy center. With six active or potential pipelines transiting the country, the creation of a new energy mega-holding company, and the construction of a new nuclear plant, Bulgaria is setting itself up to be an important regional energy player, despite being overly dependent on Russian energy sources. The proposal to host a major gas summit in April 2009 -- which Putin has already promised to attend -- is the latest attempt to put Bulgaria on the energy map. Your visit will guide the Bulgarians as they formulate an agenda and goals for this summit. It will also focus Bulgarian policy makers on U.S. views on Russian energy strategy and South Stream, answer growing skepticism about Nabucco's prospects, and give solid counter-arguments to those who say there is no real alternative to dependence on Russian energy. THE SUMMIT ---------- ¶3. (C) At the January 19 signing of the South Stream Intergovernmental Agreement, President Parvanov, with Putin at his side, announced Bulgaria would host an energy summit intended as a follow-on to the June 2007 Zagreb energy conference. Upon Putin's departure, Sofia fell under heavy criticism both at home and abroad for hastily joining South Stream, and the energy summit idea lost steam. Ambassador for Energy Security Peter Poptchev told us the Bulgarians resented perceived Russian pressure to hold such a summit. In July the Bulgarians independently resurrected the summit idea as a way to show Bulgarian support for Nabucco and diversification, as well to balance European, U.S. and Russian interests in the Caspian and Black Sea regions. With the potential for six pipelines passing through its territory, the Bulgarians also have high hopes to become a regional energy hub. The summit, they believe, will help put Sofia on the map not only as an energy center, but as a place that brokers discussions between the West, Russia and Eurasia. ¶4. (C) The Bulgarians requested your visit to advise on the summit. They envision a spring conference (tentatively April 24-25) that would bring together heads of state from Eurasian and European producer, transit and consumer countries. PM Stanishev told Ambassador September 19 that Putin has agreed to attend. The summit will be gas-focused and will attempt to put "real solutions" on sources, routes and quantities on the table. Well-aware of the potential for East European energy conference fatigue in the first half of 2009, the Bulgarians are proposing that all key participants, including the EU, the United States and Russia, view the proposed Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czech conferences as a linked continuum. The April Sofia conference would take care of any unfinished business left from the January Hungary Conference and the proposed Czech conference would take up where the Sofia conference leaves off. To distinguish the Bulgarian summit, Sofia is considering including an as-yet undeveloped "industry component." ¶5. (C) The Bulgarians will seek U.S. views and your advice on the proposed agenda of the summit and whether it will advance U.S. goals in the region. They want recommendations on how to coordinate the Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czech conferences and may seek advice on the proposed industry component of the Sofia summit. They are interested in, but may not ask directly about, U.S. views on whether Sofia has a future as an intermediary between Europe, the United States and Russia on energy and other issues affecting the Black Sea region. They are interested in your analysis of recent Azeri and Turkish energy moves. They will also request high level U.S. attendance at the summit. BULGARIAN ENERGY PROJECTS -------------------------- ¶6. (C) SOUTH STREAM: The Bulgarians signed the South Stream intergovernmental agreement in January and Parliament ratified the agreement in July. Negotiations between Bulgargaz and Gazprom resumed in September to work out a pre-shareholders agreement. At our recommendation, and at the direction of the Government, state-owned Bulgargaz reluctantly hired outside legal counsel (the U.S. law firm Paul Hastings) to represent it in South Stream negotiations. With the creation of a new, state-owned energy mega-holding in September, Bulgargaz has lost much of its previously-considerable independence. The acting head of the Bulgarian Energy Holding is Deputy Energy Minister Galina Tosheva, previously lead South Stream negotiator for the Bulgarian Government. Tosheva has a healthy suspicion of Russia's intentions in Bulgaria and has directed Bulgargaz to rely on its legal counsel for expert advice. Tosheva told us that Gazprom negotiators are taking a hard line now that negotiations have resumed. They are proposing to re-route gas currently transiting Bulgaria (for which Bulgartransgas makes a healthy profit) to South Stream, meaning South Stream would not represent 31 bcm of new gas for Europe, but something significantly lower. The Bulgarians state that this is contrary to the spirit of the IGA and are preparing to fight the Russian proposal. ¶7. (C) NABUCCO: Despite the strong public support they have shown Nabucco this year, the Bulgarians are turning into Nabucco-skeptics. In March, Sofia signed what it thought was an agreement for Azerbaijan to supply 1 bcm of gas that Bulgaria would eventually take as its Nabucco quota. In advance of Nabucco, Bulgaria planned to access the gas via a potential hook-up to the Turkey-Greece-Italy interconnector. Realizing now that the agreement was not, in fact, a commitment on Azerbaijan's part, the Bulgarians feel burned. The government is now in dire need of a pep talk on the Nabucco. They state firmly that both South Stream and Nabucco are critical and that one cannot be allowed to preclude the other. At the same time, they are nervous about both Azerbaijani willingness to supply Nabucco and Turkish willingness to support the project. They will be interested in your view of Nabucco's prospects. ¶8. (C) TGI HOOK-UP: The Bulgarians are in negotiations with Greece about this possible interconnector. Energy Holding CEO Tosheva said this is Bulgaria's most immediate source of diversification and energy security. The Greeks apparently are cool to the idea, saying there is insufficient gas. In response, the Bulgarians have proposed the purchase of LNG to be delivered to Greece in exchange for either TGI access or gas currently going through the export pipeline from Russia and transiting Bulgarian territory. Your Bulgarian interlocutors may ask for U.S. support for these schemes in our discussions with the Greeks and Turks. ¶9. (C) BURGAS-ALEXANDROUPOLIS (BAP) and AMBO: The Bulgarians, Russians and Greeks signed a shareholders agreement for the BAP oil pipeline in January during the Putin visit. Since then, the project company has been registered, but little more progress has been made. The Bulgarians are still confident the pipeline will be built, and seem surprisingly uninterested in the dynamics surrounding CPC expansion. With BAP's relative progress, the AMBO (Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria) oil pipeline project has lost momentum. Still, Bulgaria remains committed to AMBO and is ready to move forward if and when AMBO attracts supply and financing. ¶10. (C) BELENE: In 2006 the GOB selected Russian AtomstroyExport as the contractor for the new Belene nuclear plant. Bulgaria is keeping majority ownership of the plant, but is in the process of selecting a strategic investor for the other 49 percent. RWE and the Belgian Electrabel are in the running. We have stated repeatedly that the choice of a Russian contractor for Belene decreased Bulgaria's bid for greater independence from Russian energy sources. The lack of transparency surrounding the tender has led to the inescapable conclusion that the decision to choose Russia as the Belene contractor was linked to the re-negotiation of Bulgaria's long-term gas transit contract with Gazprom in December 2006. YOUR MEETINGS ------------- ¶11. (C) President Parvanov began his second five-year term in 2007. Parvanov's desire to exercise behind-the-scenes influence over the government has led to tensions with his former protege, Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev. Parvanov has close ties to Russian politicians and held no less than eight meetings with Vladimir Putin in the last seven years. The energy summit will be under his aegis. --Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev is a 42-year-old progressive Socialist. He is pro-west and eager to have Bulgaria viewed as a good friend and partner of the United States. He returned September 30 from a week-long visit to the United States where he met with U/S Burns, spoke at the Harvard Business School and held an investment forum. He understands that Bulgaria is overly dependent on Russian energy sources, but sees Bulgaria as having few options for greater energy independence. --Foreign Minister Kalfin is close to both Stanishev and Parvanov and as Deputy Prime Minister oversees the Economy and Energy Ministry. He is a strong supporter of close Bulgarian-U.S. relations and is highly conversant on energy issues. --Economy and Energy Minister Petar Dimitrov is a relative new-comer to energy issues. He is largely seen as taking direction on energy matters from former Energy Minister Rumen Ovcharov, who is linked with Russian energy interests and left office in June 2007 after a corruption scandal. ¶12. (C) Your visit will also highlight, though meetings and press outreach, the need for Bulgaria to focus on a long-term energy strategy not solely based on the transit of hydrocarbons or the production of Russian-based nuclear energy, but on the development of renewables, clean coal and greater energy efficiency. Bulgaria will always be dependent on Russian energy to one extent or another. But as the most energy inefficient economy in Europe, it can make meaningful strides toward greater diversity away from Russian energy sources. With the price of energy at near record highs, Russia's hydrocarbon-generated wealth is increasingly circulating through the Bulgarian economy, making Bulgaria all the more susceptible to Russian leverage. An energy strategy that focuses on renewables and efficiency is one tool Bulgaria can use to put a noticeable dent in negative Russian influence. The other tool is transparency. Hub status in any industry is bestowed only on places which offer transparent, efficient service. To achieve its goal of becoming a true energy center, we should recommend that Bulgaria present itself not as the place with closest ties to Russia, but as the most transparent place to do energy deals. McEldowney
STRENG VERTRAULICHES DOKUMENT DER DEUTSCHEN BAHN ZUR NEUPOSITIONIERUNG
VERTRAULICHES ABLAUFKONZEPT DER LOVEPARADE 15.1.2010S
CONFIDENTIAL: VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT IGNORES USG OVERTURES ON AVIATION
VZCZCXRO8319 PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHCV #0269/01 0621545 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 031545Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2674 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS RUEAHLC/DHS WASHDC RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHINGTON DC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL C O N F 1 D E N TIA L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000269 SIPDIS HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD TREASURY FOR MMALLOY COMMERCE FOR 4431/MAC/WH/JLAO E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2019 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ETRD EINV EAIR VE SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT IGNORES USG OVERTURES ON AVIATION REF: 2008 CARACAS 647 CARACAS 00000269 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Economic Counselor Damall Steuart for reasons 1.4 (b)and(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A Venezuelan private sector organization advocated strongly for the Venezuelan civil aviation authority (INAC) to support the issuance of visas for F AA inspectors and to meet with the Embassy to discuss visa matters. The Venezuelan govemment (GBRV) has not acceded to either request. While five intemational airlines recent1y received a disbursement of dollars from Venezuelan exchange control agency (CADIVI), no US carriers were inc1uded. Charge Caulfield's request to meet with CAD IVI to discuss US company requests for dollars has also gone unanswered. END SUMMARY. LOCAL SUPPORT FOR THE USG HAS NOT BUDGED THE GBRV ¶2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Econoffs in January that INAC wanted a solution to its US visa issues with an emphasis on obtaining visas for Venezuelan military pilots. On February 11, the AlDCM called INAC and offered to discuss visa matters with INAC President Jose Martinez. Although XXXXXXXXXXXX met with Martinez and encouraged him to meet with the AlDCM, INAC has yet to respond to the Embassy's offer. ¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was also a strong proponent of an FAA visit. Two of Venezuela's three FAA-certified aircraft maintenance facilities have lost their certifications as F AA inspectors have been unable to obtain visas. The third facility will lose its certification in June 2009. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that this situation is extremely detrimental for Venezuelan businesses in the aviation sector, but that he and his association members have been unsuccessful in convincing the Venezuelan govemment to issue FAA visas. (Note: After failing in their second attempt to obtain visas, F AA inspectors withdrew their passports from the Venezuelan Embassy in early February.) FOREIGN EXCHANGE PAIN ¶4. (C) On February 10, the Charge requested a meeting with CADIVI to discuss the outstanding dollar requests by US businesses in all sectors. CAD IVI has not responded to the Charge's request to date. All three US carriers with operations in Venezuela strongly support a meeting between the Embassy and CAD IVI and would be willing to provide whatever documentation Post might need for their sector. (Note: CADIVI is the agency that administers the GBRV's currency controls. To receive US dollars at the official exchange rate for transactions such as dividend repatriation and operating costs, a company must obtain CAD IVI approval. There are no reliable figures for how much money US companies as a whole have requested from CADIVI, but most believe the number is in the billions. See reftel for more information on CADIVI.) ¶5. (C) On February 17, Econoffs met with XXXXXXXXXXXX And XXXXXXXXXXXX. Both said they would encourage CAD IVI President Manuel Barroso to respond to the Embassy's request. However, neither was optimistic. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that the Vice President ofIATA had come to Venezuela twice for appointments with CADIVI but Barroso "stood him up" both times. ¶6. (C) Three months ago when it became c1ear that Venezuela's supply of dollars would dwindle, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, Barroso started approving all dollar authorizations personally. The approvals are "completely arbitrary" according to XXXXXXXXXXXX who argued that Barroso is a military man and a "mini Chavez" who "wants all the power in his own hands." XXXXXXXXXXXX said Barroso recent1y asked Chavez for another year as the head of CADIVI and Chavez agreed as Barroso used to be a member of Chavez' personal security detachment and remains his "good friend." Nevertheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that CADIVI was not discriminating against US airlines when it recent1y disbursed dollars to five non-U S carriers. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that there are simply not enough dollars to go around. American Airlines, the largest operator in the Venezuelan market, is awaiting the most substantial dollar disbursement of any airline. COMMENT ¶7. (C) While there is strong private sector support for increased bilateral cooperation on aviation issues, the GBRV chooses not to respond to USG overtures. Sources in the sector report that sorne in INAC want to accept the Embassy's repeated offers to begin a dialogue on technical issues. However, INAC officials current1y answer direct1y to the Venezuelan Vice President who does not seem disposed to increasing cooperation with the USG. (A more detailed discussion of intemal INAC operations will follow septel.) US airlines, and indeed the intemational business community, are increasingly concemed with the difficulty in obtaining dollars from CAD IVI in part due to the rumored possibility that the GBRV may devalue in the near future. The GBRV unfortunately seems uninterested in their concems. GENNA TIEMPO
SECRET: ITALY REQUESTS ASSISTANCE FOR ANTI-PIRACY
VZCZCXYZ0001 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRO #0433/01 1061348 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 161348Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1935 INFO RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0273 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY S E C R E T ROME 000433 SIPDIS OSD FOR MAGGIE SADOWSKA EUR/RPM FOR CHRIS DAVY AND PETER CHISHOLM EUR/WE FOR CHRIS JESTER AND PAMELA SPRATLEN AF/RSA FOR MIKE BITTRICK AND JUN BANDO E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2019 TAGS: MASS MARR EWWT KCRM PBTS PGOV PHSA PREL AORC SUBJECT: PIRACY: ITALY REQUESTS ASSISTANCE FOR ANTI-PIRACY OPERATION REF: WASLEY-JESTER-SADOWSKA EMAILS 4-15-09 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Elizabeth Dibble for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (S) The Government of Italy sent U.S. Embassy Rome an unclassified Note Verbale on April 16 thanking the USG for assistance provided thus far in the deployment of Italian Special Forces to Djibouti for possible use in an anti-piracy mission and requesting continuing assistance as needed. The note, sent in unclassified channels to speed up the process, was generated in response to our requirement that any further USG assistance in support of the Italian anti-piracy mission be requested via Diplomatic Note. ¶2. (S) Background: The Italian-owned and flagged tugboat Buccaneer was taken by pirates in the Gulf of Aden on April ¶11. The ship has 16 crew members on board: 10 Italian, 5 Romanian, and 1 Croatian, and is currently about one nautical mile from the coast of Somalia. The Italian military has requested permission from the Government of Djibouti and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) to use Camp Lemonier in Djibouti as a logistical staging area in preparation for a possible rescue mission. The GOI assures us that it has obtained all the necessary landing permits from the Government of Djibouti. It has already landed one aircraft in Djibouti with approximately 29 logistical support staff, currently housed at Camp Lemonier, to prepare for the staging. The mission, if it happens, will not/not be launched from Djiboutian soil, and the GOI is currently considering other options that do not entail a rescue mission. Italy may use its Frigate MAESTRALE, currently deployed to the region as part of EU operation ATALANTA, and which is currently shadowing the pirates, to launch the operation, or may make use of other vessels. Italy may request helicopter, intel, and other logistical support from the U.S. as the need arises, but currently its request is limited to logistical support to house units at Camp Lemonier. ¶3. (S) Post has stressed to the GOI the need to provide as many details as possible about the potential operation in a timely manner, as well as the need to coordinate fully with the Government of Djibouti. The Defense Attache is in contact with the Italian Military and Poloffs are in contact with the MFA Operations Center as the situation evolves, and will provide additional operational details as they become available. ¶4. (SBU) The translated text of the Note is as follows (Italian original will be emailed to EUR/WE): BEGIN TEXT "Ministry of Foreign Affairs Rome, 4/16/2009 Prot. 0129432 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Italy presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and, in consideration of our shared efforts in the fight against terrorism and piracy, has the honor to express its full appreciation for the assistance provided to the "Training Mission" sent to Djibouti. The sending of the mission, as well as the deployment of the Italian Frigate "MAESTRALE," forms part of the efforts undertaken by the Government of Italy in the struggle against piracy. While noting that the Authorities of Djibouti have provided the necessary visas and aircraft landing authorizations, the Italian Government is particularly grateful to the Government of the United States of America for having hosted this mission at Camp Lemonier. The Italian Government, in addition, is grateful to the Government of the United States of America henceforth for any further assistance that it might provide in the future. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in expressing its full gratitude for the collaboration, takes the opportunity to extend to the Embassy of the United States of America reassurances of its highest consideration." END TEXT DIBBLE
TOP-SECRET: The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev 1989
Washington, DC, July 31st – The National Security Archive publishes its fourth installment of the diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, the man who was behind some of the most momentous transformations in Soviet foreign policy at the end of the 1980s in his role as Mikhail Gorbachev’s main foreign policy aide. In addition to his contributions to perestroika and new thinking, Anatoly Sergeevich was and remains a paragon of openness and transparency, providing his diaries and notes to historians who are trying to understand the end of the Cold War. This section of the diary, covering 1989—the year of miracles—is published here in English for the first time.
After the “turning point year,” 1988, the Soviet reformers around Gorbachev expected fast progress on all fronts—domestically in implementation of the results of the XIX party conference and further democratization of the Soviet system, and internationally following the groundbreaking UN speech of December 1988, especially in the sphere of nuclear arms control and in integrating the Soviet Union into Europe. However, those hopes were not realized, and the year brought quite unexpected challenges and outcomes. By the end of the year, no new arms control agreements would be signed, but the Berlin Wall would fall, nationalist movements would start threatening the unity of the Soviet Union, and popular revolutions would sweepEastern Europewhile the Soviets stuck to their pledge not to use force. By the end of 1989,Europewas transformed and the Cold War had ended. Anatoly Chernyaev documented all those changes meticulously and reflected on their meaning in real time.
For Chernyaev, the year began with an argument over the final withdrawal of Soviet forces fromAfghanistan. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze tried to delay the full withdrawal of troops and to send an additional brigade to help the Afghan leader Najibullah repel attacks of Pakistani-supported mujahaddin and stabilize his government. Chernyaev and Alexander Yakovlev actively opposed that course of action on the grounds that it would cost hundreds of lives of Soviet soldiers and undermine Soviet trustworthiness in the eyes of international partners. The troops were withdrawn on schedule by February 15, 1989.
Domestically, the most important event was the first contested election to the Congress of People’s Deputies on March 26, 1989. Chernyaev himself was elected as a Deputy, but expressed unease about being among the 100 candidates on the “guaranteed” party list. His reflections on the electoral campaign and the results of the elections show his sincere belief that the Soviet system could be transformed by deepening the democratization and his concerns over the limitations and resistance by the conservative elements within the party. The electoral campaign takes place at the time when the economic situation deteriorates quite significantly, leading to unprecedented discontent of the population and ultimately miners’ strikes in the summer.
An important theme of 1989 is the growing nationalism and the threat of possible breakup of theSoviet Union—“the nationalities bomb.” On this issue, Chernyaev seems to understand the situation much better than Gorbachev, who until very late does not comprehend the fact that the Baltic states genuinely want to leave the Soviet Union, maybe up until the human chain of protesters forms on August 23, 1989. Gorbachev believes that they could be kept in by negotiations and economic pressure. The events inTbilision April 9, 1989, where the police killed 20 civilians trying to disperse nationalist rallies, should have been a wake-up call. Chernyaev wonders if Gorbachev understands all the depth of the nationalities issue or if he is still under the influence of the Soviet official narrative of harmonious relations between ethnic groups under socialism.
The summer of 1989 brings the Solidarity victory in the Polish elections and the start of the Hungarian roundtable negotiations culminating in the first non-communist government in Eastern Europe inPolandand the Soviet acceptance of those events. On the heels of the Polish and Hungarian breakthroughs comes the change of leadership inEast Germanyand the almost accidental yet fateful fall of the Berlin Wall. In this case, just as on the issue of nationalism, Chernyaev shows a much better understanding of its true meaning than most other Soviet leaders. In the fall of the Wall, he sees an end of an era, the true transformation of the international system, and a beginning of a new chapter in the European history. The start of the process of German reunification and theMaltasummit signified the end of the Cold War.
However, for Chernyaev, his position notwithstanding, the year’s main concern was the domestic developments in theSoviet Union, and specifically the insufficient progress in radical economic and political reform. A lot of entries deal with his disappointment in Gorbachev’s slow or ambivalent actions where he seems to be siding with conservatives, his inability to move more decisively even on the issues that he himself proclaimed, such as land reform. Chernyaev’s main lament is that Gorbachev is losing time and political power as a result of his indecisiveness while the opposition is growing strong using “the Russian factor” and becoming more anti-Gorbachev and siding with Yeltsin more and more often in the Congress of People’s Deputies.
All through the tumultuous events of 1989, Anatoly Chernyaev remains at Gorbachev’s side, faithful to the ideas and the promise of the reform, but at the same time more and more critical at the weaknesses and inconsistencies of his boss and growing more dissatisfied by the emerging distance in their personal relationship. The last entry of the year, for December 31, is written in the form of a letter to Gorbachev, expressing all his disappointments and worries about the fate of the reform. The diary entries allow historians an opportunity to see the days of 1989 as they unfolded, through the eyes of a most perceptive and involved participant.
The Chernyaev Diary was translated by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Overview of reactor building of Unit 3 from western hilltop between Unit 2 and 3, Sep 29, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
Overview of reactor building of Unit 3 from a crane above Unit 3, Sep 24, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
Overview of a reactor building of Unit 4 from western hilltop between Unit 2 and 3. Sep 29, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
Overview of reactor building of Unit 2 from western hilltop between Unit 2 and 3, Sep 29, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
Installation Work of Roof Panels for Reactor Building Covers at Unit 1 of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, October 8, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
Overview of reactor building of Unit 1 -From south direction of Main Anti-Earthquake Building, Oct 8, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
Overview of reactor building of Unit 1 -From a crane above Unit 1, Sep 9, 2011. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
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„GoMopa“ schreibt:08.09.2008

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The new collection also sheds light on the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Colombia’s conflict—both the close cooperation with Colombian security forces evident in the Task Force as well as the highly-sensitive U.S. intelligence operations that targeted the Colombian government itself. Key information about links between the Task Force and the Pepes was derived from U.S. intelligence sources that closely monitored meetings between the Colombian president and his top security officials.

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Unit 1, Reactor building cover from northern side, Sep 15, 2011.
Unit 1, Reactor building cover from northern side, Sep 15, 2011.
Unit 1, View from large crane around a reactor building, Sep 15, 2011.
Unit 1, Southern direction (Unit 3 & 4) from Unit 1, Sep 15, 2011.
Unit 2, Overview of a reactor building from western hilltop, Sep 15, 2011.
Unit 3, Overview of a reactor building from western hilltop, Sep 15, 2011.
Unit 3, Rubble collection around southwest of a reactor building, Sep 16, 2011.
Unit 3, Rubble collection preparation of a reactor building, Sep 15, 2011.
Unit 4, Overview of a reactor building from western hilltop, Sep 15, 2011.
Unit 4, Rubble collection preparation of a reactor building, Sep 15, 2011.
Unit 5,6, Overview of a reactor building from southwest side, Sep 15, 2011.
Unit 5,6, Maintenance work at port and harbors from Unit 6 seaside yard, Sep 15, 2011.
Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility, overview, Sep 16, 2011.
Centralized Radiation Waste Treatment Facility, overview, Sep 16, 2011.

2 DE OCTUBRE DE 1968 – Verdad Bajo Resguardo
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In this Monday, July 25, 2011 photo, Vladimir Gavriushin sits at the grave he built for his daughter Yelena in a cemetery outside Vilnius, Lithuania. Yelena was one of the nearly 3,000 people killed on Sept. 11, 2001. Gavriushin has buried rocks from ground zero under these tombstone towers, far from the place Yelena died _ a place he can no longer afford to visit. And so, as the 10-year anniversary of the terrorist attacks approaches, he mourns for her here, at his own ground zero.
Andrew Kinard, a Marine lieutenant, lost both legs in an I.E.D. attack two months into his first tour in Iraq, in 2006. Now he’s at Harvard, pursuing a joint law and business degree. He was photographed at his summer internship, at the Fortress Investment Group. (Christopher Anderson)
In a May 23, 2011 photo, Sukhwinder Singh sits next to the memorial for his father, Balbir Singh Sodhi, in Mesa, Arizona. Singh’s father was shot and killed in front of the family owned gas station as he was placing flowers at a makeshift memorial the family set up shortly after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The Sikh was killed during the anti-muslim backlash after the 9/11 attacks. Some have objected to including Balbair Singh Sodhi’s name on a Phoenix Sept. 11 memorial, saying he was not a victim of the attack.
A police officer stands guard in New York’s Times Square as the ABC news ticker displays news of an al-Qaida terror threat, Friday, Sept. 9, 2011. Just days before the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, U.S. counterterrorism officials are chasing a credible but unconfirmed al-Qaida threat to use a car bomb on bridges or tunnels in New York City or Washington. It is the first “active plot” timed to coincide with the somber commemoration.
(L-R) New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Janice Fedarcyk, assistant director in charge New York Field Office for the FBI, and New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly speak to media about a threat in New York September 8, 2011. President Barack Obama on Thursday ordered a redoubling of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in the face of a “credible but unconfirmed” threat ahead of the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. Reuters
New York City police officers stop a commercial truck at a checkpoint in New York’s financial district, Friday, Sept. 9, 2011. U.S. officials said Thursday that they were chasing a credible but unconfirmed al-Qaida threat to use a car bomb on bridges or tunnels in New York or Washington. Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly said that police are beefing up security at bridges and tunnels, setting up vehicle checkpoints and doing bomb sweeps of parking garages. (Mark Lennihan)
The U.S. embassy in Paris during a ceremony to pay tribute to the victims of the 9/11 attacks, Friday, Sept. 9, 2011, ahead of the 10-year anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks on Sunday. (Charles Platiau)
Construction workers install model twin towers representing the towers of the World Trade Center in preparation to commemorate the 10 anniversary of the Sept. 11 this Sunday, at Trocadero plazamin Paris Friday Sept. 9, 2011. The Eiffel tower is seen in the background. The towers will be finished on Saturday in advance of the commemoration on upcoming Sunday. (Michel Euler)
Workers at the new Flight 93 National Memorial work on final preparations for Saturday’s dedication ceremony Sept. 8. 2011 in Shanksville, Pa.. The boulder in the background marks the location of the crash crater. Sunday will mark the tenth anniversary of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. (Gene J. Puskar)
Family members of police officers killed during or as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks stand to be recognized during a ceremony in New York, Thursday, Sept. 8, 2011. (Seth Wenig)
Developer Larry Silverstein, left, and Joe Daniels, President of the September 11 Memorial, attend a news conference Wednesday, Aug. 24, 2011 in New York where they discussed Silverstein’s buildings at the World Trade Center and the plans for the opening of the memorial. (Mark Lennihan)
This Tuesday, Aug 16, 2011 photo shows Michael Lewin in his office in the town of Lod, central Israel. His brother, Daniel Lewin, was killed during the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Daniel’s family honors his memory with a traditional Jewish yahrzeit, an annual memorial observance of a loved one’s death. They talk about his life and study the Torah, the Hebrew Bible, in his name. Over the years, Michael has visited ground zero several times on business trips to New York.
ADVANCE FOR USE LABOR DAY WEEKEND, SEPT. 3-5, 2011 AND THEREAFTER – This Wednesday, Aug. 10 2011 photo shows a tent which houses a chapel and a storage of the remains of victims of the attacks on the World Trade Center near Chief Medical Examiner Office Forensic Biology Lab in New York. (Mary Altaffer)
ADVANCE FOR USE LABOR DAY WEEKEND, SEPT. 3-5, 2011 AND THEREAFTER – This Wednesday, Aug. 10 2011 photo shows posters on a wall of the garden behind a tent which houses a chapel and a storage of the remains of victims of the attacks on the World Trade Center near Chief Medical Examiner Office Forensic Biology Lab in New York. (Mary Altaffer)
FILE – In this Sept. 2001 file photo, dust still covers the streets near ground zero as Associated Press photographer Amy Sancetta pushes her bike on the streets a few days after the terrorist attacks in New York. On Sept. 11, 2001, the Ohio-based national photographer was in New York City to cover her tenth the U.S. Open Tennis tournament. The desk had a report that a plane might have hit one of the World Trade Center towers, so she caught a cab downtown.
FILE – In this Tuesday, Sept. 11, 2001 file photo, pedestrians in lower Manhattan watch smoke rise from the World Trade Tower after an early morning terrorist attack on the New York landmark. Television brought the 2001 attacks to the world in real time, and forever linked the thousands who lived through it and the millions who watched. It became a collective experience, and, from every angle, one of the most digitally documented events ever. And so it remains. (Amy Sancetta, file)














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U.S. Army 210th Brigade Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division Soldiers compete in remote car derby in Forward Operating Base Hammer, Iraq, July 4, 2010. U.S. Soldiers celebrated Independence Day with a series of tournaments, a cookout, and an array of games.(U.S. Army photo by Spc. Frank Smith/Released)













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Riot police hit students with their batons during a 48-hour national strike at Santiago August 25, 2011. Protesters battled police in Chile’s capital on Thursday, the second day of a two-day strike against unpopular President Sebastian Pinera that was marked by sporadic looting but had no impact on the vital mining sector. Reuters
Workers, students and citizens attend a 48-hour national strike at Santiago August 25, 2011. Protesters scuffled with police in the Chilean capital on Thursday, the second of a two-day strike against unpopular President Sebastian Pinera marked by sporadic looting, though the linchpin mining sector was not affected. Reuters
A demonstrator is detained by riot policemen during a 48-hour national strike at Santiago August 25, 2011. Protesters scuffled with police in the Chilean capital on Thursday, the second of a two-day strike against unpopular President Sebastian Pinera marked by sporadic looting, though the linchpin mining sector was not affected. Reuters
Carlos Burgos, who says he was shot at by the Chilean police, shows his wound in the Penalolen neighbourhood in Santiago August 26, 2011, where 16-year-old Manuel Gutierrez was shot dead during a 48-hour national strike against President Sebastian Pinera. Gutierrez died early on Friday after he was shot a day earlier in massive protests in the capital against the unpopular Pinera, the first fatality in months of social unrest. Police said he was shot in the chest as protesters battled them overnight in Santiago, in the aftermath of a 48-hour national strike against Pinera marked by violent clashes and sporadic looting. Reuters
Students march toward the Chilean consulate in Buenos Aires on August 25, 2011, supporting the Chilean students in their claim for free education and against Chile’s President Sebastian Pinera. Getty
A demonstrator stands next to a burning barricade on the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Roberto Candia)
Riot police detain a woman during a protest of public workers and students for the massive layoffs of government employees in Santiago, Chile, Thursday, Aug. 26, 2010. (Aliosha Marquez)
Police and protesters clash in front of the Gratitud Nacional Church during the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Sebastian Silva)![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/info/chile-protest4/pict38.jpg)
Riot police detain a protester near La Moneda presidential palace during the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans are demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Victor R. Caivano)
Protesters throw stones at an armored police vehicle spraying tear gas during the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Sebastian Silva)
A police officer on horseback rides past a bus stop set on fire by demonstrators on the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Luis Hidalgo)
A protester kicks a tear gas canister during clashes with police in the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Jose Miguel Rojas)
A protester throws stones at an armored police vehicle after clashes broke out during a march on the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Victor R. Caivano)![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/info/chile-protest4/pict37.jpg)
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Nearly one million people, including whole families, gathered at the Parque O’Higgins in a demonstration called “Family Sunday for Education”, organised by University students, high schools and the College of Teachers. Chile. 21st August 2011 Demotix![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/eyeball/voa/pict38.jpg)
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Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. is interviewed on Capitol Hill in Washington, Tuesday, Aug. 2, 2011, after the Senate voted to pass debt legislation. (Jacquelyn Martin)
Madrid’s Stock Exchange is seen on Wednesday Aug. 10, 2011. A risky European Central Bank decision to fight the continent’s debt crisis by buying Spanish and Italian bonds on Monday started pushing down the soaring interest rates threatening those countries with financial disaster.(Daniel Ochoa de Olza)
In this Feb. 1, 2011 file photo, people queue outside an unemployment office in Madrid. Spain’s Labor Ministry says the number of people filing claims for unemployment benefits fell by 42,059 in July as the summer tourism season provided new jobs. The ministry said Tuesday, Aug. 2, 2011 that July’s fall was the fourth straight monthly decline. It left the number receiving benefits at 4.08 million, down from 4.12 million the previous month. (Arturo Rodriguez, File)
Lawmakers crowd the Parliament as Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi addresses the lower chamber on the state of the economy in Rome, Wednesday, Aug. 3, 2011. Berlusconi said economic growth is his government’s key policy aim. After a volatile day on markets, in which Italian borrowing rates touched a record high, Berlusconi told parliament that Italy “has not done little” in response to the crisis, but that it needs to do more. He says Italy needs to promote competitiveness and growth.
A beggar, his body covered with white paint, walks along a street in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Saturday, March 5, 2011. (Ramon Espinosa)
A nearly deserted atrium of the European Council is pictured in Brussels, Monday, Aug. 8, 2011. European have always valued their vacations, and their leaders are no exception. With modern communications, the leaders say they remain constantly in touch. So do their vacations matter? One financial analyst says yes: “It sends a terrible message to the markets … in the middle of a crisis.” (Yves Logghe)
Pensioners gather in a protest against the government’s austerity measures, Thursday, Aug. 25 2011, outside the prime minister’s official residence in Lisbon. Portugal’s European partners and the International Monetary Fund lent it the money to prevent the country going bankrupt but in return demanded a long list of spending cuts and economic reforms. Poster hanging from the umbrella reads “The government lied to the pensioners”. (Armando Franca)
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, left, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, right, attend a meeting at the Elysee Palace, Paris, Tuesday, Aug. 16, 2011. The leaders of Germany and France are meeting Tuesday to discuss Europe’s debt crisis as new figures show their economies stalled even before the latest bout of turmoil struck financial markets. (Patrick Kovarik, Pool)
A traveller smokes next to a beggar outside a public office in central Athens on Thursday, Aug. 11, 2011. Greece’s Statistical Authority says unemployment in the debt-ridden country jumped to 16.6 percent in May.The number of jobless stands at 822,719 in the country of about 11 million people. The graffiti reads “pigs, murderes” and “burn the parliament”. (Dimitri Messinis)
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, left, speaks during a special meeting on the financial crisis with head of the French Central Bank Christian Noyer, right, Finance Minister Francois Baroin, second from right, and Prime Minister Francois Fillon, third from right, at the Elysee Palace in Paris, Wednesday Aug. 10, 2011. Sarkozy is interrupted his vacation to hold an emergency government meeting about the uncertainty on world financial markets. (Denis/Pool)![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/info/finance-luxury/pict5.jpg)
A view of Milan’s stock exchange headquarters is seen, Monday, July 11, 2011. Finance ministers gathered in Brussels are debating how to secure a private-sector contribution to a new Greek package and how to prevent the debt crisis spreading to bigger countries, including Italy. (Antonio Calanni)
E.U. and Stock Exchange’s flags fly outside the building of the Greek Stock Exchange in Athens, Friday, Aug. 5, 2011. The eurozone’s debt crisis battered markets once again Friday, challenging vacationing European leaders to find a way to keep the turmoil from pushing Spain and Italy to a financial collapse that would hit an already-waning global recovery. (Thanassis Stavrakis)
A woman holding a handkerchief to her face to protect herself from lingering tear gas passes by an elderly beggar while, in the background, two workers replace broken hotel windows in central Athens on Thursday, June 30, 2011. Rioters caused extensive property damage during anti-government protests Wednesday while police riposted with heavy use of chemicals. (Dimitri Messinis)
A tourist with her luggage enters a luxury hotel in central Athens as protesters demonstrate on Tuesday, Aug. 23, 2011. Dozens of protesters have been picketing the entrance to three luxury hotels on Athens’ main Syntagma Square as part of a 24-hour strike by hotel employees objecting to plans to cut their entitlement to early retirement. The banner on the left reads in Greek “Hands off” the ‘arduous and unhealthy’ classification of professions. (Petros Giannakouris)
Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where high level meetings were held in a last attempt to save Lehman Brothers, is photographed August 25, 2009. A failed plan to rescue Lehman Brothers was followed Sunday by more seismic shocks from Wall Street, including an apparent government-brokered takeover of Merrill Lynch by the Bank of America. (Cryptome) Below, Board Room of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, left, talks with Greek President Karolos Papoulias during their meeting in Athens, on Friday, July 22, 2011. Eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund pledged Thursday to give Greece a euro 109 billion ($155 billion) worth of rescue funds, on top of the euro 110 billion granted more than a year ago. (Petros Giannakouris)
People walk past a prostrate beggar at the entrance to the Syntagma Square metro station in central Athens, Thursday, Aug. 11, 2011. Greece’s Statistical Authority says unemployment in the debt-ridden country jumped to 16.6 percent in May.The number of jobless stands at 822,719 in the country of about 11 million people. (Dimitri Messinis)
Pedestrians walk past the New York Stock Exchange on Friday, Aug. 5, 2011 in New York. Fears that the economy might dip back into recession helped send the Dow Jones industrial average down 513 points on Thursday. European leaders are struggling to contain that region’s debt problems, prompting comparisons to the 2008 financial crisis. Markets tumbled from Tokyo to London Friday as overseas traders reacted to the selloff. (Jin Lee)
Political protest at the New York Stock Exchange, August 20, 2007. (Cryptome)
Rep. Jason Chaffetz, R-Utah, sponsor of the “Cut, Cap and Balance” deficit reduction plan that was passed in the GOP-controlled House, walks through the Capitol to get an update from the Senate on debt negotiations, in Washington, Sunday, July 31, 2011. (J. Scott Applewhite)
A beggar boy and a beggar rest near an entrance of a pedestrian underpass near Beijing’s Central Business District, China, Thursday, April 28, 2011. (Alexander F. Yuan)
A launching ceremony of the Severodvinsk nuclear-powered submarine is held at a defense shipyard in the Arctic port of Severodvinsk, Russia, Tuesday, June 15, 2010. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev attended the ceremony in Severodvinsk. (RIA-Novosti, Vladimir Rodionov, Presidential Press Service)
A beggar asks for donations in front of the synagogue in Novi Sad, some 80 kilometers (50 miles) north of Belgrade, Serbia, Tuesday, May 18, 2011. (Darko Vojinovic)
Citigroup Center, New York, NY. (Cryptome)![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/info/finance-luxury/pict26.jpg)


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Dust-sampling Opening of Reactor Building of Unit 1, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station pictured on August 28, 2011. Released August 30, 2011 by TEPCO. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
Dust-sampling Opening of Reactor Building of Unit 2, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station pictured on August 29, 2011. Released August 30, 2011 by TEPCO. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
Checking inside of the reactor containment vessel of Unit 4, Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station. Opening an airlock door for workers. Pictured on August 29, 2011. Released August 30, 2011 by TEPCO. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)

























Today’s posting includes the internal Soviet deliberations leading up to the summit, full transcripts of the two leaders’ discussions, the Soviet record of negotiations with top American diplomats, and other historic records being published for the first time.
Under the Treaty, the Soviet Union destroyed 889 of its intermediate-range missiles and 957 shorter-range missiles, and the U.S. destroyed 677 and 169 respectively. These were the missiles with very short flight time to targets in the Soviet Union, which made them “most likely to spur escalation to general nuclear war from any local hostilities that might erupt.” (




AU Format (297K)
Nachfolgend bringen wir einen Artikel von „GoMoPa“, der der Ausgangspunkt der “GoMoPa” Erpressungen war und zur Verhaftung von “GoMoPa”-”CEO” Klaus Dieter Maurischat in Berlin durch das BKA und Interpol war.

















At the start of the year, Chernyaev gives a brief overview of how the policy of glasnost has been changing the Soviet press, which becomes truly free and vibrant in this period, with many previously banned manuscripts finding their way into scholarly and literary journals. The speed of the reform process picks up with the January 1987 Central Committee Plenum focusing on “cadres” — the Communist Party’s personnel policy. In spring 1987, Chernyaev is very busy preparing materials for U.S.-Soviet 










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