The procedures for establishing, managing and overseeing special access
programs (SAPs) in the Department of Defense are spelled out in an updated
DoD Instruction that was issued yesterday. See "Management,
Administration, and Oversight of DoD Special Access Programs," DoD
Instruction 5205.11, February 6, 2013.
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/i5205_11.pdf
A special access program is a classified program that employs security
measures above and beyond those that would normally be used to protect
ordinary (or "collateral") classified information. Such measures may
include special eligibility reviews, polygraph testing, cover, and other
controls on information. Within DoD, SAPs fall into three broad topical
categories: intelligence, acquisition, and operations and support.
DoD SAPs have been a focus of controversy in the past, because their
intensive secrecy seemed to foster mismanagement. There were massive,
multi-billion dollar failures (e.g., the aborted A-12 naval aircraft
program) as well as the occasional eccentricity (e.g., the Timber Wind
nuclear powered rocket for anti-ballistic missile missions), both of which
triggered Inspector General audits.
http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/Audit2/91-059.pdf
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/tw.pdf
Because of those kinds of missteps, "The special access classification
system... is now adversely affecting the national security it is intended
to support," the House Armed Services Committee concluded in 1991 (H.Rept.
102-60, p. 101).
But such concerns are expressed less frequently today. This is partly
because of changes in Congress, but also because the administration of
special access programs at the Pentagon has become less improvisational and
freewheeling, and more standardized. (Whether they are also more successful
is impossible to say.)
The newly updated DoD Instruction defines the SAP "governance structure,"
which consists of a multi-level SAP Oversight Committee (SAPOC), the Senior
Review Group (SRG), and the SAP Senior Working Group (SSWG).
The Instruction also sheds light on the hierarchical structure of some
SAPs, which are in effect SAPs within SAPs: "DoD SAPs may include
subordinate activities identified as, in descending order, compartments,
sub-compartments, and projects."
There is also another SAP hierarchy along an axis of sensitivity.
"Acknowledged SAPs," whose existence may be admitted and made known to
others, are the least sensitive. "Unacknowledged SAPs" (such as Timber
Wind once was) are more sensitive and cannot be referenced. Their very
existence is a classified fact. But both of those categories must be
reported to Congress. "Waived SAPs" are the most sensitive of special
access programs, and they are exempted by statute (10 USC 119e) from normal
congressional notification requirements. In such cases, only eight senior
members of the congressional defense committees may be advised of the
program.
DoD's SAPs are not to be confused with the intelligence community's
Controlled Access Programs (CAPs), which serve a similar function. An
official within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
is responsible for "deconflict[ing] the names and abbreviations for DoD's
SAPs and DNI's CAPs."
It is noteworthy that the new DoD Instruction on SAP management is a
public document. It rescinds and replaces a 1997 Instruction that was
considered too sensitive for public release.
BRENNAN: "PERHAPS" CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IS OUTDATED
Among the questions submitted to DCIA-nominee John Brennan by the Senate
Intelligence Committee in advance of his much-anticipated confirmation
hearing this afternoon was one about classification policy.
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/
A recent report to the President from the Public Interest Declassification
Board termed the national security classification system "outdated," the
Committee noted. Does Mr. Brennan agree?
"I would say that the classification system is perhaps outdated in some
respects and the recommendations from the PIDB report warrant further
consideration," he replied (Question 30). "If confirmed as Director, I
would review the PIDB's conclusions and would be glad to get back to the
Committee with my views."
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2013_hr/brennan-preh.pdf
In other words, he seemed to say, one of the cornerstones of intelligence
as practiced today may be obsolete, at least "in some respects." But I have
nothing to say about that right now. Let's talk about it after I am
confirmed.
VETERANS AND HOMELESSNESS, AND MORE FROM CRS
Newly updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that have
not been made readily available to the public include the following.
Argentina's Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the "Holdouts",
February 6, 2013:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41029.pdf
Honduras-U.S. Relations, February 5, 2013:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf
Veterans and Homelessness, February 4, 2013:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34024.pdf
VA Housing: Guaranteed Loans, Direct Loans, and Specially Adapted Housing
Grants, February 4, 2013:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42504.pdf
Agricultural Conservation: A Guide to Programs, February 5, 2013:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40763.pdf
The National Flood Insurance Program: Status and Remaining Issues for
Congress, February 6, 2013:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42850.pdf
Appropriations Subcommittee Structure: History of Changes from 1920 to
2013, February 5, 2013:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31572.pdf
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress,
February 6, 2013:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf
_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
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Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
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