Israel: The chief task facing the newly appointed Head of the IDF’s Planning Branch, Major General Nimrod Shefer, is to restart the debates in the General Staff for consolidating the IDF’s new multi-year plan, codenamed “Halamish.”
The plan was supposed to enter effect at the start of 2012 and be implemented at least by the end of 2016. However, its implementation was postponed by a year due to the arguments over the defense budget and the upheavals in the Middle East.
The arguments began as a result of the summer protests and the need to allocate budgets for implementing the recommendations of the Trachtenberg committee.
As with all the IDF’s previous multi-year plans (the last one, Tefen, which was intended for 2007-2011, was the first in decades to be materialized in its entirety, without being cut in the middle), the Halamish plan is based on “reference scenarios.” This essentially refers to the worst scenario, to which the IDF builds its forces accordingly. However, this doesn’t necessarily mean that the IDF is preparing for the worst-case scenario.
When Halamish was launched, back when Amir Eshel was still the Head of the Planning Branch (Eshel will soon be appointed the Air Force Commander), the Middle East truly seemed different. The peace agreements with Egypt were stable, even if the risk of war with Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas was already discernible over the horizon.
The strengthening of the threat posed by the “Iranian Axis,” in parallel to the strategic change in the southern arena, demanded that the assumptions of the Halamish plan be examined from the ground up. However, the suitable conditions for that don’t exist now. Due to a gap of at least six billion NIS between the defense establishment’s budgetary demands and the budget as it exists on paper (at least for the time being), the defense establishment is largely managing from hand to mouth at the moment, like a family going through hardships, or a business with financial problems maneuvering payments to its suppliers.
Merkava, with No End
Take the affair of the Merkava project as an example. The project was worthy of an in-depth examination concerning the question of whether the IDF should invest most of its allocated ground resources in a heavy armored vehicle, or in lighter vehicles with active protection. An examination is actually being done by a special committee, which includes the economist Liora Meridor and the former commander of the Combat Corps Headquarters, Major General (Res.) Emanuel Sakal.
According to the decisions made in the framework of the previous plan, Tefen, the IDF invests approximately two billion NIS annually over a ten-year period for construction of tanks and APCs. Nearly half of the sum is funded by the US taxpayer, in the framework of the Namer production efforts being done in the US. The other half is in NIS, providing a livelihood to approximately 200 factories involved with the Merkava tank, and a much smaller number of factories providing Namer components.
Several weeks ago, the Ministry of Defense completely halted new orders in the framework of the Merkava tank and APC project. In the past few days, it seems that the most predictable thing happened: small factories, most of them in the periphery, reached the brink of collapse. An uproar came from the heads of the periphery municipalities, including Kiryat Shmona, Nahariya, Sderot, and Netivot.
On Wednesday, the Director General of the Ministry of Defense, Udi Shani, approved the freeing of 50 million NIS for orders from 15 factories facing the most distress. The rest of the factories are still crying out for orders (primarily those that don’t have orders many years in advance). An essential debate concerning the fate of the project is sluggishly taking place (due to previous commitments, its closure could end up costing even more money in the coming years than its continuation).
There are no differences of opinion in the defense establishment concerning the necessity of the new tanks and APCs. The chief question is whether or not the ordered amount is excessive, and if the budgets can’t be utilized in a more efficient manner.
The political echelon is urging that the number of APCs intended for production in the coming years be cut by half. The Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz (who didn’t hesitate when it came to slashing the armored ORBAT while he was Ground Force Commander, prior to the Second Lebanon War) would apparently be happy to make the significant cut to the project. The problem is that the Ministry of Defense committed to GDLS – which constructed a Namer assembly line in the US city of Lima. In the contract, it stipulated that a minimal number of APCs be produced in two stages. The IDF is considering canceling the second stage, but it’s doubtful that they could do it, from a legal perspective.
The Southern Danger
Despite the cuts, the IDF is very much operating these days in an eve of war atmosphere. Even if there won’t eventually be a war with Iran in the summer, there’s a possibility that a significant front will erupt in 2012 against the Gaza Strip or in the north against Hezbollah. A conflict with Syria is neither fictitious.
The solemn atmosphere was also sensed at the forum of hundreds of operational commanders that gathered this week at the IDF’s Glilot base. In contrast to the mood in the IDF, the public finds it preferable to repress things. Even during tension-filled times, it is the nature of the media to deal with short, specific events more than with fateful processes that occur over time.
One example of this is the rocket fired at Eilat this week – an episode that will soon be forgotten. The rocket was a result of the Egyptian military’s difficulty in controlling events in Sinai, and the presence of numerous terrorist groups throughout the vast peninsula.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s decision last weekend to run for elections for the presidency of Egypt is an example of a far more significant event. However, it’s doubtful that even a small percentage of the Israeli public noticed it. This is a surprising decision, from many aspects, as the previous assessment was that the Brotherhood would avoid a direct conflict over the regime in the coming years. The movement’s very decision to run for office has a considerable significance. Have you considered a scenario in which the Muslim Brotherhood wins the elections, selects a religious president in Egypt, and de-facto cancels the peace agreement with Israel? This is not farfetched. The IDF, which decreased its forces in the south during the stable period during the Egyptian peace process, must prepare for that scenario as well.
The SIBAT Convention: No Party
The eve of Passover is a period for meetings and proposing toasts. Such was the atmosphere at the conference held on Thursday morning by SIBAT, the Ministry of Defense’s defense export and cooperation division, which saw the participation of senior officials from the Israeli defense industries.
SIBAT is the branch tasked with promoting Israel’s defense exports. The more that the Israeli defense industries sell overseas, the more they can afford to develop additional developments for the IDF at a lower cost.
However, there is no festive mood in the defense export arena. The cuts to the defense budgets in Western countries, primarily in the US, are leaving their mark. Data for 2011 has yet to be completely compiled, but it is likely that defense exports saw a specific decline compared to 2010 (although it is still high – nearly $7 billion).
The combination of global budgetary cuts (the US companies, now hungrier than ever, have increased the competition against Israeli companies in East-Asian markets) and the frugality of the Ministry of Defense is no simple matter. Elbit has already started cutting hundreds of employees from its manpower quotas (a process expected to continue after the holiday). Rafael and IAI have stopped recruiting new employees. Plasan Sasa is suffering from the decline in vehicle protection orders for the US Army. Moreover, the situation is even more complicated in small and medium-sized companies, which have fewer layers of fat to trim.
Eyes Towards the Comptroller
After the holdiday, Lt. General (Res.) Gabi Ashkenazi, Minister of Defense Ehud Barak, and the other heroes of the Galant document affair will submit their references to the State Comptroller’s draft report on the affair.
In addition, a full report will be published after the holiday on another issue: the conduct of the political echelons and the defense establishment concerning the flotilla of the Turkish ship Marmara in May 2010. An interesting topic will be addressed in the report – should the Head of the National Security Council take an active part in the sensitive deliberations of the security cabinet, as stated in the NSC law? Or should he be compartmentalized out of some of these debates, as is actually taking place?
Bernd Pulch 