Confidential – Obama – Implementing National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats

This Presidential Policy Directive is one of a number that have not previously been released. It was publicly posted to a collaboration server for U.S. military personnel complete with its National Security Council coversheet intact, providing a rare look at dissemination guidelines utilized in high-level documentation.

TOP-SECRET-Post-Saddam Iraq: The War Game

“There was consensus that the United States would not intervene without coalition support except under the most dire circumstances such as WMD use or catastrophic humanitarian disaster.”
– Desert Crossing After Action Report, 1999.

“When it looked like we were going in, I called back down to CENTCOM and said, ‘You need to dust off Desert Crossing.’ They said, ‘What’s that? Never heard of it.'”
– General Anthony Zinni (ret.), 2004.

Washington D.C., November 6, 20011 – In late April 1999, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), led by Marine General Anthony Zinni (ret.), conducted a series of war games known as Desert Crossing in order to assess potential outcomes of an invasion of Iraq aimed at unseating Saddam Hussein. The documents posted here today covered the initial pre-war game planning phase from April-May 1999 through the detailed after-action reporting of June and July 1999.

The Desert Crossing war games, which amounted to a feasibility study for part of the main war plan for Iraq — OPLAN 1003-98 — tested “worst case” and “most likely” scenarios of a post-war, post-Saddam, Iraq. The After Action Report presented its recommendations for further planning regarding regime change in Iraq and was an interagency production assisted by the departments of defense and state, as well as the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency, among others.

The results of Desert Crossing, however, drew pessimistic conclusions regarding the immediate possible outcomes of such action. Some of these conclusions are interestingly similar to the events which actually occurred after Saddam was overthrown. (Note 1) The report forewarned that regime change may cause regional instability by opening the doors to “rival forces bidding for power” which, in turn, could cause societal “fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines” and antagonize “aggressive neighbors.” Further, the report illuminated worries that secure borders and a restoration of civil order may not be enough to stabilize Iraq if the replacement government were perceived as weak, subservient to outside powers, or out of touch with other regional governments. An exit strategy, the report said, would also be complicated by differing visions for a post-Saddam Iraq among those involved in the conflict.

The Desert Crossing report was similarly pessimistic when discussing the nature of a new Iraqi government. If the U.S. were to establish a transitional government, it would likely encounter difficulty, some groups discussed, from a “period of widespread bloodshed in which various factions seek to eliminate their enemies.” The report stressed that the creation of a democratic government in Iraq was not feasible, but a new pluralistic Iraqi government which included nationalist leaders might be possible, suggesting that nationalist leaders were a stabilizing force. Moreover, the report suggested that the U.S. role be one in which it would assist Middle Eastern governments in creating the transitional government for Iraq.

General Zinni, who retired in 2000 shortly after the completion of Desert Crossing, brought the report to the attention of the public after the war. Even before the invasion, he had made his opposition to an imminent war widely known. In a major address at the Middle East Institute in October 2002, he disputed the view that war was either inevitable or desirable. On the question of establishing a new government to replace Saddam Hussein, he said, “God help us if we think this transition will occur easily.” (Note 2)

Zinni disparaged the views of pro-war advocates who minimized the significance of Arab opinion: “I’m not sure which planet they live on, because it isn’t the one I travel.” In a Q&A after the speech, he declared that while it was necessary to deal with Saddam Hussein “eventually,” “[t]hat could happen in many ways” short of war. “The question becomes how to sort out your priorities …. My personal view, and this is just personal, is that I think this isn’t No. 1. It’s maybe six or seven, and the affordability line may be drawn around five.” (Note 3)

Zinni commented in depth publicly about Desert Crossing at UCLA in 2004 where he discussed the origins of the plan in the wake of the Desert Fox bombing campaign in 1998:

And it struck me then that we had a plan to defeat Saddam’s army, but we didn’t have a plan to rebuild Iraq. And so I asked the different agencies of government to come together to talk about reconstruction planning for Iraq. . . . I thought we ought to look at political reconstruction, economic reconstruction, security reconstruction, humanitarian need, services, and infrastructure development. We met in Washington, DC. We called the plan, and we gamed it out in the scenario, Desert Crossing. (Note 4)

Zinni noted the parallels to what eventually happened after the invasion as well as to the lack of interest elsewhere in the U.S. government for tackling the problems of reconstruction:

The first meeting surfaced all the problems that have exactly happened now. This was 1999. And when I took it back and looked at it, I said, we need a plan. Not all of this is a military responsibility. I went back to State Department, to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Department of Commerce and others and said, all right, how about you guys taking part of the plan. We need a plan in addition to the war plan for the reconstruction. Not interested. Would not look at it. (Note 5)

So the General decided to take action himself — “because I was convinced nobody in Washington was going to plan for it, and we, the military, would get stuck with it.”

Zinni claimed that his report had been forgotten only a few years later, stating: “When it looked like we were going in [to Iraq], I called back down to CENTCOM and said, ‘You need to dust off Desert Crossing.’ They said, ‘What’s that? Never heard of it.’ So in a matter of just a few years it was gone. The corporate memory. And in addition I was told, ‘We’ve been told not to do any of the planning. It would all be done in the Pentagon.'” (Note 6)

The planning done at the Defense Department changed Zinni’s original conception in some fundamental ways. For example, Zinni proposed a civilian occupation authority with offices in all eighteen Iraqi provinces, whereas the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was actually established only in Baghdad.

Even more significantly, the former CENTCOM commander noted that his plan had called for a force of 400,000 for the invasion — 240,000 more than what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved. “We were concerned about the ability to get in there right away, to flood the towns and villages,” USA Today quoted Zinni as saying in July 2003. “We knew the initial problem would be security.” (Note 7)

Army General Thomas “Tommy” Franks adjusted the concept when he assumed command of CENTCOM upon Zinni’s retirement. Yet even his initial version of OPLAN 1003-98 envisioned a need for 385,000 troops, according to the book, COBRA II, (Note 8) — before Rumsfeld insisted that the number be sharply reduced.

DOWNLAOD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS HERE

Desert Crossing After Action Report Briefing_1999-07-22

Desert Crossing After Action Report_1999-06-28

Desert Crossing Joint Intelligence Center Central doc_1998-11-14

Desert Crossing Misc emails_May-Aug 1999

Desert Crossing Pre-Wargame Intellgence Conference_1999-04-29

TOP-SECRET: WHITE HOUSE HIDES HUNDREDS OF OSAMA BIN LADEN KILLING PHOTOS

wh-hides-obl

Download White House Original Letter by Mouseclick on the Link above

Press Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Killing of Osama bin Laden

Via Conference Call
12:03 A.M. EDT

MR. VIETOR: Thank you, everyone, for joining us, especially so late. We wanted to get you on the line quickly with some senior administration officials to talk about the operation today regarding Osama bin Laden. And with that I’ll turn it over to our first senior administration official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks for joining us, everybody, at this late hour. It’s much appreciated. From the outset of the administration, the President has placed the highest priority in protecting the nation from the threat of terrorism. In line with this, we have pursued an intensified, targeted, and global effort to degrade and defeat al Qaeda. Included in this effort has been a relentless set of steps that we’ve taken to locate and bring Osama bin Laden to justice. Indeed, in the earliest days of the administration, the President formally instructed the intelligence community and his counterterrorism advisors to make the pursuit of Osama bin Laden, as the leader of al Qaeda, as a top priority.

In the beginning of September of last year, the CIA began to work with the President on a set of assessments that led it to believe that in fact it was possible that Osama bin Laden may be located at a compound in Pakistan. By mid-February, through a series of intensive meetings at the White House and with the President, we had determined there was a sound intelligence basis for pursuing this in an aggressive way and developing courses of action to pursue Osama bin Laden at this location.

In the middle of March, the President began a series of National Security Council meetings that he chaired to pursue again the intelligence basis and to develop courses of action to bring justice to Osama bin Laden. Indeed, by my count, the President chaired no fewer than five National Security Council meetings on the topic from the middle of March — March 14th, March 29th, April 12th, April 19th, and April 28th. And the President gave the final order to pursue the operation that he announced to the nation tonight on the morning — Friday morning of April 29th.

The President mentioned tonight that the pursuit of Osama bin Laden and the defeat of al Qaeda has been a bipartisan exercise in this nation since September 11, 2001, and indeed, this evening before he spoke to the nation, President Obama did speak to President Bush 43 and President Clinton this evening to review with them the events of today and to preview his statement to the nation tonight.

And with that, I’ll turn it over to my colleague to go through some of the details. Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As you heard, the President ordered a raid earlier today against an al Qaeda compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Based on intelligence collection analysis, a small U.S. team found Osama bin Laden living in a large home on a secured compound in an affluent suburb of Islamabad. The raid occurred in the early morning hours in Pakistan and accomplished its objective. Osama bin Laden is now no longer a threat to America.

This remarkable achievement could not have happened without persistent effort and careful planning over many years. Our national security professionals did a superb job. They deserve tremendous credit for serving justice to Osama bin Laden.

Bin Laden was a sworn enemy of the United States and a danger to all humanity; a man who called for the murder of any American anywhere on Earth. His death is central to the President’s goal of disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al Qaeda and its violent allies. He was responsible for killing thousands of innocent men and women not only on 9/11, but in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombing, the attack of the USS Cole, and many other acts of brutality.

He was the leader of a violent extremist movement with affiliates across the globe that had taken up arms against the United States and its allies. Bin Laden’s most influential role has been to designate the United States as al Qaeda’s primary target and to maintain organizational focus on that objective. This strategic objective, which was first made in a 1996 declaration of jihad against Americans, was the cornerstone of bin Laden’s message.

Since 9/11, multiple agencies within our intelligence community have worked tirelessly to track down bin Laden, knowing that his removal from al Qaeda would strike a crippling blow to the organization and its militant allies. And last September the President was made aware of a compound in Abbottabad, where a key al Qaeda facilitator appeared to be harboring a high-value target. He received regular intelligence updates, as was just mentioned, on the compound in September, and he directed that action be taken as soon as he concluded that the intelligence case was sufficiently strong. A range of options for achieving the mission were developed, and on Friday he authorized the operation.

Now I’ll turn it to my colleagues to go through the intelligence.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. First I want to point out that today’s success was a team effort. It was a model of really seamless collaboration across our government. Since 9/11, this is what the American people have expected of us, and today, in this critical operation, we were able to finally deliver.

The operation itself was the culmination of years of careful and highly advanced intelligence work. Officers from the CIA, the NGA, the NSA all worked very hard as a team to analyze and pinpoint this compound. Together they applied their very unique expertise and capabilities to America’s most vexing intelligence problem, where to find bin Laden.

When the case had been made that this was a critical target, we began to prepare this mission in conjunction with the U.S. military. In the end, it was the matchless skill and courage of these Americans that secured this triumph for our country and the world. I’m very proud of the entire team that worked on this operation, and am very thankful to the President for the courage that he displayed in making the decision to proceed with this operation.

With that, let me turn to my colleague to give you details on the intelligence background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. The bottom line of our collection and our analysis was that we had high confidence that the compound harbored a high-value terrorist target. The experts who worked this issue for years assessed that there was a strong probability that the terrorist that was hiding there was Osama bin Laden.

What I’d like to do is walk you through the key points in that intelligence trail that led us to that conclusion. From the time that we first recognized bin Laden as a threat, the CIA gathered leads on individuals in bin Laden’s inner circle, including his personal couriers. Detainees in the post-9/11 period flagged for us individuals who may have been providing direct support to bin Laden and his deputy, Zawahiri, after their escape from Afghanistan.

One courier in particular had our constant attention. Detainees gave us his nom de guerre or his nickname and identified him as both a protégé of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of September 11th, and a trusted assistant of Abu Faraj al-Libbi, the former number three of al Qaeda who was captured in 2005.

Detainees also identified this man as one of the few al Qaeda couriers trusted by bin Laden. They indicated he might be living with and protecting bin Laden. But for years, we were unable to identify his true name or his location.

Four years ago, we uncovered his identity, and for operational reasons, I can’t go into details about his name or how we identified him, but about two years ago, after months of persistent effort, we identified areas in Pakistan where the courier and his brother operated. Still we were unable to pinpoint exactly where they lived, due to extensive operational security on their part. The fact that they were being so careful reinforced our belief that we were on the right track.

Then in August 2010, we found their residence, a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, a town about 35 miles north of Islamabad. The area is relatively affluent, with lots of retired military. It’s also insolated from the natural disasters and terrorist attacks that have afflicted other parts of Pakistan. When we saw the compound where the brothers lived, we were shocked by what we saw — an extraordinarily unique compound. The compound sits on a large plot of land in an area that was relatively secluded when it was built. It is roughly eight times larger than the other homes in the area.

When the compound was built in 2005, it was on the outskirts of the town center, at the end of a narrow dirt road. In the last six years, some residential homes have been built nearby. The physical security measures of the compound are extraordinary. It has 12- to 18-foot walls topped with barbed wire. Internal wall sections — internal walls sectioned off different portions of the compound to provide extra privacy. Access to the compound is restricted by two security gates, and the residents of the compound burn their trash, unlike their neighbors, who put the trash out for collection.

The main structure, a three-story building, has few windows facing the outside of the compound. A terrace on the third floor has a seven-foot wall privacy — has a seven-foot privacy wall.

It’s also noteworthy that the property is valued at approximately $1 million but has no telephone or Internet service connected to it. The brothers had no explainable source of wealth.

Intelligence analysts concluded that this compound was custom built to hide someone of significance. We soon learned that more people were living at the compound than the two brothers and their families. A third family lived there — one whose size and whose makeup matched the bin Laden family members that we believed most likely to be with Osama bin Laden. Our best assessment, based on a large body of reporting from multiple sources, was that bin Laden was living there with several family members, including his youngest wife.

Everything we saw — the extremely elaborate operational security, the brothers’ background and their behavior, and the location and the design of the compound itself was perfectly consistent with what our experts expected bin Laden’s hideout to look like. Keep in mind that two of bin Laden’s gatekeepers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Faraj al-Libbi, were arrested in the settled areas of Pakistan.

Our analysts looked at this from every angle, considering carefully who other than bin Laden could be at the compound. We conducted red team exercises and other forms of alternative analysis to check our work. No other candidate fit the bill as well as bin Laden did.

So the final conclusion, from an intelligence standpoint, was twofold. We had high confidence that a high-value target was being harbored by the brothers on the compound, and we assessed that there was a strong probability that that person was Osama bin Laden.

Now let me turn it over to my colleague.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. Earlier this afternoon, a small U.S. team conducted a helicopter raid on the compound. Considerable planning helped prepare our operators for this very complex mission. Senior officials have been involved in the decision-making and planning for this operation for months, and briefed the President regularly. My colleague has already mentioned the unusual characteristics of this compound. Each of these, including the high walls, security features, suburban location, and proximity to Islamabad made this an especially dangerous operation.

The men who executed this mission accepted this risk, practiced to minimize those risks, and understood the importance of the target to the national security of the United States.

I know you understand that I can’t and won’t get into many details of this mission, but I’ll share what I can. This operation was a surgical raid by a small team designed to minimize collateral damage and to pose as little risk as possible to non-combatants on the compound or to Pakistani civilians in the neighborhood.

Our team was on the compound for under 40 minutes and did not encounter any local authorities while performing the raid. In addition to Osama bin Laden, three adult males were killed in the raid. We believe two were the couriers and the third was bin Laden’s adult son.

There were several women and children at the compound. One woman was killed when she was used as a shield by a male combatant. Two other women were injured.

During the raid, we lost one helicopter due to mechanical failure. The aircraft was destroyed by the crew and the assault force and crew members boarded the remaining aircraft to exit the compound. All non-combatants were moved safely away from the compound before the detonation.

That’s all I have at this time. I’ll turn it back to my colleague.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We shared our intelligence on this bin Laden compound with no other country, including Pakistan. That was for one reason and one reason alone: We believed it was essential to the security of the operation and our personnel. In fact, only a very small group of people inside our own government knew of this operation in advance.

Shortly after the raid, U.S. officials contacted senior Pakistani leaders to brief them on the intent and the results of the raid. We have also contacted a number of our close allies and partners throughout the world.

Sine 9/11, the United States has made it clear to Pakistan that we would pursue bin Laden wherever he might be. Pakistan has long understood that we are at war with al Qaeda. The United States had a legal and moral obligation to act on the information it had.

And let me emphasize that great care was taken to ensure operational success, minimize the possibility of non-combatant casualties, and to adhere to American and international law in carrying out the mission.

I should note that in the wake of this operation, there may be a heightened threat to the homeland and to U.S. citizens and facilities abroad. Al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers may try to respond violently to avenge bin Laden’s death, and other terrorist leaders may try to accelerate their efforts to strike the United States. But the United States is taking every possible precaution to protect Americans here at home and overseas. The State Department has sent guidance to embassies worldwide and a travel advisory has been issued for Pakistan.

And without a doubt, the United States will continue to face terrorist threats. The United States will continue to fight those threats. We have always understood that this fight would be a marathon and not a sprint.

There’s also no doubt that the death of Osama bin Laden marks the single greatest victory in the U.S.-led campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda. It is a major and essential step in bringing about al Qaeda’s eventual destruction.

Bin Laden was al Qaeda’s only (inaudible) commander in its 22-year history, and was largely responsible for the organization’s mystique, its attraction among violent jihadists, and its focus on America as a terrorist target. As the only al Qaeda leader whose authority was universally respected, he also maintained his cohesion, and his likely successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is far less charismatic and not as well respected within the organization, according to comments from several captured al Qaeda leaders. He probably will have difficulty maintaining the loyalty of bin Laden’s largely Gulf Arab followers.

Although al Qaeda may not fragment immediately, the loss of bin Laden puts the group on a path of decline that will be difficult to reverse.

And finally, it’s important to note that it is most fitting that bin Laden’s death comes at a time of great movement towards freedom and democracy that is sweeping the Arab world. He stood in direct opposition to what the greatest men and women throughout the Middle East and North Africa are risking their lives for: individual rights and human dignity.

MR. VIETOR: With that we’re ready to take a couple questions.

Q One question. You said “a small U.S. team.” Were these military personnel, can you say, or non-military?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can’t go into further details at this time; just a small U.S. team.

Q Good morning. Can you tell us specifically what contact there was with bin Laden at the compound? You referred to someone using a woman as a shield that was not bin Laden. But how was he killed? Where? What occurred at the compound?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As the President said this evening, bin Laden was killed in a firefight as our operators came onto the compound.

Q Thank you. Just to go back to what you were talking about with the attacks in response to this operation, are you hearing any specific threats against specific targets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. But any type of event like this, it is very prudent for us to take measures so that we can ensure that the security measures that we need to institute here and throughout the world are in place. This is just something that we normally would do. We don’t have any specific threats at this time related to this. But we are ensuring that every possible precaution is taken in advance.

Q Yes, hey, how are you doing? My question would be, what was the type of the helicopter that failed? And what was the nature of that mechanical failure?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can’t go into details at this time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We didn’t say it was mechanical.

Q Was bin Laden involved in firing himself or defending himself? And then any chronology of the raid itself?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did resist the assault force. And he was killed in a firefight.

Q Thank you. Thank you for taking this call. Can you give me a comment on the very fact that Osama bin Laden was just in Islamabad — and has long been (inaudible) Afghanistan (inaudible) also from India, that Osama bin Laden is hiding somewhere near Islamabad? What does it signify, that? Does it signify any cooperation or any kind of link that he had with establishments in Pakistan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As the President said, Pakistani cooperation had assisted in this lead, as we pursued it. So we’re continuing to work this issue right now. We are very concerned about — that he was inside of Pakistan, but this is something that we’re going to continue to work with the Pakistani government on.

Q But the very fact you didn’t inform the Pakistani authorities — did you have any suspicion that if you informed them, the information might lead somewhere?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: An operation like this that is conducted has the utmost operational security attached to it. I said that we had shared this information with no other country, and that a very, very small group of individuals within the United States government was aware of this. That is for operational security purposes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would also just add to that that President Obama, over a period of several years now, has repeatedly made it clear that if we had actionable intelligence about Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts, we would act. So President Obama has been very clear in delivering that message publicly over a period of years. And that’s what led President Obama to order this operation. When he determined that the intelligence was actionable and the intelligence case was sufficient, he gave us high confidence that bin Laden indeed was at the compound.

Q Thank you. What is going to happen next? And what is the U.S. going to do with bin Laden’s body?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are ensuring that it is handled in accordance with Islamic practice and tradition. This is something that we take very seriously. And so therefore this is being handled in an appropriate manner.

MR. VIETOR: Great, thanks. Just to remind everyone, this call is on background, as senior administration officials. We have time for one more question, and we’re going to go to bed.

Q Do you have a sense of the vintage of the compound and how long bin Laden had been there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The compound has been in existence for roughly five years, but we don’t know how long bin Laden lived there. We assess that the compound was built for the purpose of harboring him. But again, don’t know how long he’s been there.

MR. VIETOR: Great, thank you all. We’ll talk more tomorrow.

END 12:24 A.M. EDT

SECRET: CHECK PLEASE! GOVERNMENT OF CUBA MAY ACCEPT U.S. OFFER

VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0559/01 2571036
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 141036Z SEP 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4755
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/COMCOGARD SECTOR KEY WEST FL PRIORITY
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCA/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA PRIORITY 0142
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUEHKG/USDAO KINGSTON JM PRIORITY
S E C R E T HAVANA 000559 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2029
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: CHECK PLEASE! GOVERNMENT OF CUBA MAY ACCEPT U.S.
OFFER OF POST-HURRICANE ASSISTANCE 

REF: HAVANA 500 & 511 

Classified By: CDA JAMES WILLIAMS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: On 3 September 2009, the U.S. Coast Guard
Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the U.S.
Interests Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba, engaged in a
candid conversation with a Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MINREX) official who provided insight into the possible
Government of Cuba (GOC) response to any USG offers of
post-hurricane assistance to the GOC. End Summary. 

¶2. (S/NF) A MINREX officer ("officer") in the Ministry's
North American Division, Rodney, who attends repatriations
somewhat infrequently (DIS has had contact with this official
on approximately 5 occasions- USINT consular officers have
also met this officer on other occasions while attending
repatriations), exchanged pleasantries with the DIS at the
outset of the repatriation. During the boat ride to the
receiving pier, the officer almost immediately directed the
conversation towards what seemed to be a pre-planned
discussion. Offering up the usual &in my personal opinion8
while placing a firm hand on his chest and gesturing towards
himself, the officer stated: "I have been reading a lot of
U.S. press reports about possible U.S. hurricane assistance
and I think the GOC would be willing to accept that
assistance." DIS stated to the officer that that approach
would be different than last year's GOC response to the
multiple USG offers of post-hurricane assistance. The
officer went on to say that "(political) conditions this year
are very different than they were last year this time," an
apparent reference to the recent re-establishment of USINT
access to MINREX (reftels). 

¶3. (S/NF) DIS stated to the officer that it was common and
prudent practice to offer a disaster assistance response team
(DART) to locations following natural disasters to assess the
damage and the necessary level and type of assistance. The
officer responded by saying that: "the level of damage to
Cuba during last year's hurricane season was evident and the
team was a precondition to providing post-hurricane
assistance to Cuba; the U.S. should not impose preconditions
and should allow the GOC to determine how assistance is
used." In turn, the DIS responded that the USG is not in the
business of writing blank checks to foreign governments to
which the officer seemed to be at a loss for words. The
officer and the DIS cordially agreed that this was an
ideological difference between both nations, and agreed that
while neither of us wanted to see any hurricane affect Cuba,
should the opportunity arise for the USG to offer hurricane
assistance to the GOC, it would be interesting to see how the
scenario unfolds. 

¶4. (S/NF) This officer is a young (29 years old), cordial,
well-spoken MINREX officer who utilizes repatriations as an
opportunity to practice what might already be considered
polished English. He studied economics, is well versed in
international political ideology, and appears to be a
voracious reader. Like his more senior MINREX counterparts,
he makes a point during each repatriation to discuss recent
U.S. press reporting relative to U.S.-Cuba relations, and
uses each repatriation as an opportunity to elicit a response
from the DIS on a wide scope of U.S.-Cuban matters, always
under the guise of being a personal opinion or interest. He
does not balk when given the chance to prop-up and support
the tenets of the Cuban revolution, and especially, in his
government's opinion, the harsh treatment the USG has
afforded the Cuban people throughout the course of the
revolution. He is able to support and speak to the major GOC
talking points (i.e. the embargo, Cuban-Americans, etc.), and
is likely to rise in the GOC. 

¶5. (S/NF) Comment: Yet again, MINREX has utilized the DIS and
the repatriation process as a forum to air out a current GOC 

focus, and float the idea by a U.S. officer who the GOC is
aware works in the political-economic section at USINT. The
typical "this is my opinion" approach from this MINREX
officer is an opening gesture, whereafter he and each MINREX
officer then communicates a willingness, need, or current
focus of the GOC that they have decided to communicate to the
Mission and USG at large. This may well be a concerted
effort on the part of MINREX to engage in one-on-one
communication, at a relatively low-level, as a circuitous
approach to GOC-U.S. communications in lieu of direct or
over-publicized talks. By communicating in this manner, the
GOC can communicate with the USG, in this case over the issue
of hurricane assistance, and still maintain its public image
and propaganda campaign that lambaste the USG for its
approach towards Cuba. Interestingly, DIS cannot recall any
recent press reporting having to do with possible
post-hurricane assistance to Cuba. 

(S/NF) Further Comment: DIS was extremely surprised by the
hurricane assistance-related comments made by the MINREX
officer. Having spent a significant amount of time working
and traveling with Cuban MININT and MINREX officers over the
past year, Cubans are extremely proud people, and almost
never admit that there is a flaw in their system, even when
the flaw is a glaring one. For a MINREX officer to admit
that his country may be willing to accept assistance from the
U.S. should a hurricane ravage this island again, ventures
well beyond the perceived pride level of GOC officials. More
than anything, the GOC does not like to be embarrassed, and
taking handouts from the USG may well be a point of
embarrassment for the GOC should they choose to accept. As
such, any genuine post-hurricane assistance offer should be
extended quietly; however, the USG should be wary that the
GOC may be expecting a blank check, not a calculated offer of
pragmatic post-hurricane assistance. End Comment.
WILLIAMS

CONFIDENTIAL: COMBATING ORGANIZED CRIME: ROUND ONE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000103 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV KCRM KCOR BU
SUBJECT: COMBATING ORGANIZED CRIME: ROUND ONE GOES TO THE
NEW GOVERNMENT 

REF: A. 09 SOFIA 508
     ¶B. 09 SOFIA 548
     ¶C. 09 SOFIA 642 

Classified By: AMB JAMES WARLICK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 

¶1.  (C) Summary: Elected on an anti-corruption and organized
crime platform, the GERB government has made good on its
campaign promises and taken some positive steps.  Important
reforms, bolstered by political will from the top, have
ratcheted up the pressure against previously untouchable
organized crime figures and enabled marquee busts of a few
large well-equipped organized crime groups.  At the same
time, these arrests have highlighted weaknesses in the
judicial system as judges allow members of these groups to
make bail and delay proceedings despite prosecutors'
assurances of airtight evidence against them.  In private
meetings with the Ambassador, the government has confirmed
its commitment to fight organized crime, but this may be a
losing battle if it is unable to convince the judiciary to
make the reforms necessary to allow prosecutors to do their
jobs and keep dangerous criminals in prison.  End Summary. 

PROGRESS ON ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION
----------------------------------------- 

¶2.  (C) In its short time in office, the government has
completed difficult reforms and personnel changes necessary
to make law enforcement more effective.   It has revamped law
enforcement by removing 26 of the 28  regional police chiefs,
many of whom were corrupt or incompetent, established
embassy-recommended interagency counter organized crime task
forces, and passed new laws to resolve jurisdictional
conflicts between the State Agency for National Security
(DANS) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI).  As a result,
coordination between law enforcement and the prosecutor's
office has dramatically improved.  Chief Prosecutor Boris
Velchev, a Socialist appointee, confided to the Ambassador
during a February 1 meeting that he has the complete support
of the PM and the government to "declare war" on the 200 to
300 most dangerous organized crime figures, including the 20
to 50 bosses who are household names (ref A). 

¶3.  (C) Structural reforms and clear political will have
brought some quick and convincing results, including
impressive operations in December against two notorious
organized crime gangs known as "the Impudents" and "the
Crocodiles."  The government arrested 30 members of the
Impudent gang believed to have carried out 19 high profile
ransom kidnappings over the past several years.  Breaking up
this group was a priority from day one for the new government
due to this group's use of sophisticated technology and
techniques along with the psychological effect the
kidnappings had on the population.  Similarly, the Crocodile
gang, composed mainly of car thieves and highway robbers,
terrorized mostly Turkish citizens driving through Bulgaria
to Germany. 

¶4.  (C) Most recently, the police launched operation
"Octopus" in which they arrested 12 people on February 10
believed to be involved in a powerful organized crime group
that has operated for the last 10 years.  These busts were a
public relations coup for the government in that they
targeted well-known groups that previous governments had been
powerless to stop.  The government has had even more success
arresting former government officials for corruption.  To
date, two former ministers have been indicted and five other
ministers from the previous two governments will likely face
corruption-related charges.  This is on top of at least 10
high-level arrests of mayors, judges, agency heads, and MPs
for corruption since last summer. 

JUDICIAL REFORM LAGS BEHIND
--------------------------- 

¶5.  (C) Despite successes on the organized crime and
corruption front, the powerful "big fish" mostly remain at
large due to the serious flaws in the overly formalistic
judicial system (ref B).  No case illustrates this better
than the Marinov brothers and the January 5 assassination of
Boris "Bobby" Tsankov.  Tsankov, a self-styled journalist and
entertainment figure with extensive underworld ties, was
gunned down in typical gangland fashion in downtown Sofia.
This unsolved murder is reminiscent of the approximately 140
other Mafia hits that have taken place in Bulgaria from 1993
to 2010.  It is widely believed that Krassimir "Big Margin"
Marinov and his brother Nikolay "Small Margin" Marinov
ordered the hit to prevent Tsankov from providing evidence to
the chief prosecutor's office.  The Marinovs have been
embroiled in serious organized crime and murder cases dating
back to 2005 (ref A), but were free on bail at the time of
the shooting thanks to legal loopholes that allow the
perpetual postponement of serious cases.  After the Tsankov
killing, Little Margin's whereabouts are unknown and Big
Margin was briefly detained for the killing before being
released due to a lack of evidence (he was later arrested
again on drug-related charges). 

¶6.  (C) Even the successful operation against the Impudent
gang has not been brought to a satisfactory conclusion.  Of
the 30 members initially arrested, 21 have been released from
jail, including one of the ringleaders, Anton "the Hamster"
Petrov.  Petrov was released on BGN 20,000 (USD 15,000) bail
after the Appeals Court determined that the MOI and
prosecutors had failed to provide new and convincing evidence
against him.  Since Petrov's release, two witnesses who were
cooperating with the police have reneged on promises to
testify against the kidnapping group. This is a familiar
pattern that has repeated itself in many other important
organized crime cases. 

REFORM EFFORTS FACE DIFFICULT HURDLES
------------------------------------- 

¶7.  (C) Chief Prosecutor Velchev and Minister of Justice
Popova told the Ambassador in separate meetings that reform
of the criminal procedure code had run into fierce opposition
from the "old guard" (politicians and judges) allied with
defense lawyers and NGOs using the language of human rights
to sink necessary reform.  Changes to the criminal procedure
code would close legal loopholes and likely speed up
organized crime and corruption cases, which drag on for years
in the current system (ref A).  Reforming the code is widely
viewed as essential to shift the balance from a system overly
favorable to defendants to a more just and effective system.
Among other things, the proposed changes to the criminal
procedure code would allow police to testify in court,
provide a back-up defense lawyer and increase fines if the
defendant's attorney fails to show up at court (a common
tactic for postponements), and simplify evidence collection
procedures.  Without radical reform, Minister Popova told the
Ambassador that Bulgaria's judiciary could not cope with its
entrenched organized crime problem.  Radical reforms such as
significantly changing how judges and prosecutors are
appointed, disciplined, and promoted (ref C) would require
constitutional amendments that need 161 of the 240 votes in
parliament to pass.  GERB is a minority government with 114
MPs, making constitutional reform difficult. 

¶8.  (C) Comment: The GERB government has set ambitious goals
in combating organized crime and has shown it has the
political will to fight established criminal enterprises and
entrenched interests.  Still, this will not be an easy fight,
and it will be difficult to achieve convictions and
reasonable sentencing of "big fish" if the judicial system is
not recalibrated to confront Bulgaria's organized crime
problem.  Radical judicial reform advocated by the Minister
of Justice will not happen overnight given the highly
independent and conservative judicial system and the daunting
constitutional barriers preventing rapid reform.  Despite
these challenges, incremental reform is possible with the
government's strong support.  In the end, the government will
be judged not on high profile arrests, but on its ability to
speed up corruption cases, close legal loop holes, and
successfully lock up previously untouchable organized crime
figures.  End Comment. 

WARLICK

CONFIDENTIAL: BULGARIA AND THE ENERGY KNOT: SCENESETTER FOR OCT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000641 

SIPDIS 

FOR SPECIAL ENVOY BOYDEN GRAY 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018
TAGS: ECON ENRG PGOV BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA AND THE ENERGY KNOT: SCENESETTER FOR OCT
7 VISIT OF SPE GRAY 

Classified By: Ambassador Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d)
. 

¶1.  (C)  Summary:  The quandary over energy facing all our
European partners is particularly acute here in Bulgaria.
With few hydrocarbons of its own, Bulgaria relies on Russia
for seventy percent of its total energy needs and over ninety
percent of its gas.  Though previously a net exporter of
electricity, the EU's decision to force closure of blocks 3
and 4 of the communist-era nuclear plant Kozluduy cost the
Bulgarian economy over USD 1.4 billion and put a squeeze on
Serbia, Macedonia and Greece, who had purchased the bulk of
the exports.  The hard reality of today's energy picture is
that Russia is not only the dominant supplier, it is also the
dominant player -- your visit here is the first by a senior
U.S. energy official in a year, whereas Putin has personally
engaged both the President and Prime Minister on energy
issues in multiple sessions over the past ten months.  But
the cartoon strip portraying a passionately eager Bulgaria in
bed with the muscle bound duo of Gazprom and Lukoil is only
partially true -- it is a tryst driven less by passion and
more by a perceived lack of options.  Prime Minister
Stanishev recently described Russian tactics on South Stream
as blackmail and Energy Minister Dimitrov complains openly of
psychological warfare.  At the same time, the Bulgarians are
deeply worried about the prospects for Nabucco and are
convinced that Azeri gas supplies will be held up by Turkey.
Their bid to hold an energy summit in the spring, the
ostensible focus of your visit, is designed to catalyze
greater coordination -- and negotiating leverage -- amongst
transit countries while also getting the United States more
actively engaged.  Background on specific issues likely to
arise in your discussions with President Parvanov, Prime
Minister Stanishev, Foreign Minister Kalfin and Energy
Minister Dimitrov follows below.  End Summary. 

TIMING
------ 

¶2.  (C)  Your visit to Sofia comes when Bulgaria is striving
to sell itself as a European energy center.  With six active
or potential pipelines transiting the country, the creation
of a new energy mega-holding company, and the construction of
a new nuclear plant, Bulgaria is setting itself up to be an
important regional energy player, despite being overly
dependent on Russian energy sources.  The proposal to host a
major gas summit in April 2009 -- which Putin has already
promised to attend -- is the latest attempt to put Bulgaria
on the energy map.  Your visit will guide the Bulgarians as
they formulate an agenda and goals for this summit.  It will
also focus Bulgarian policy makers on U.S. views on Russian
energy strategy and South Stream, answer growing skepticism
about Nabucco's prospects, and give solid counter-arguments
to those who say there is no real alternative to dependence
on Russian energy. 

THE SUMMIT
---------- 

¶3.  (C)  At the January 19 signing of the South Stream
Intergovernmental Agreement, President Parvanov, with Putin
at his side, announced Bulgaria would host an energy summit
intended as a follow-on to the June 2007 Zagreb energy
conference.  Upon Putin's departure, Sofia fell under heavy
criticism both at home and abroad for hastily joining South
Stream, and the energy summit idea lost steam.  Ambassador
for Energy Security Peter Poptchev told us the Bulgarians
resented perceived Russian pressure to hold such a summit.
In July the Bulgarians independently resurrected the summit
idea as a way to show Bulgarian support for Nabucco and
diversification, as well to balance European, U.S. and
Russian interests in the Caspian and Black Sea regions.  With
the potential for six pipelines passing through its
territory, the Bulgarians also have high hopes to become a
regional energy hub.  The summit, they believe, will help put
Sofia on the map not only as an energy center, but as a place
that brokers discussions between the West, Russia and
Eurasia. 

¶4.  (C)  The Bulgarians requested your visit to advise on the
summit.  They envision a spring conference (tentatively April
24-25) that would bring together heads of state from Eurasian
and European producer, transit and consumer countries.  PM
Stanishev told Ambassador September 19 that Putin has agreed
to attend.  The summit will be gas-focused and will attempt
to put "real solutions" on sources, routes and quantities on
the table.  Well-aware of the potential for East European
energy conference fatigue in the first half of 2009, the
Bulgarians are proposing that all key participants, including
the EU, the United States and Russia, view the proposed
Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czech conferences as a linked
continuum.  The April Sofia conference would take care of any
unfinished business left from the January Hungary Conference
and the proposed Czech conference would take up where the
Sofia conference leaves off.  To distinguish the Bulgarian
summit, Sofia is considering including an as-yet undeveloped
"industry component." 

¶5.  (C)  The Bulgarians will seek U.S. views and your advice
on the proposed agenda of the summit and whether it will
advance U.S. goals in the region.  They want recommendations
on how to coordinate the Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czech
conferences and may seek advice on the proposed industry
component of the Sofia summit.  They are interested in, but
may not ask directly about, U.S. views on whether Sofia has a
future as an intermediary between Europe, the United States
and Russia on energy and other issues affecting the Black Sea
region.  They are interested in your analysis of recent Azeri
and Turkish energy moves.  They will also request high level
U.S. attendance at the summit. 

BULGARIAN ENERGY PROJECTS
-------------------------- 

¶6.  (C)  SOUTH STREAM:  The Bulgarians signed the South
Stream intergovernmental agreement in January and Parliament
ratified the agreement in July.  Negotiations between
Bulgargaz and Gazprom resumed in September to work out a
pre-shareholders agreement.  At our recommendation, and at
the direction of the Government, state-owned Bulgargaz
reluctantly hired outside legal counsel (the U.S. law firm
Paul Hastings) to represent it in South Stream negotiations.
With the creation of a new, state-owned energy mega-holding
in September, Bulgargaz has lost much of its
previously-considerable independence.  The acting head of the
Bulgarian Energy Holding is Deputy Energy Minister Galina
Tosheva, previously lead South Stream negotiator for the
Bulgarian Government.  Tosheva has a healthy suspicion of
Russia's intentions in Bulgaria and has directed Bulgargaz to
rely on its legal counsel for expert advice.  Tosheva told us
that Gazprom negotiators are taking a hard line now that
negotiations have resumed.  They are proposing to re-route
gas currently transiting Bulgaria (for which Bulgartransgas
makes a healthy profit) to South Stream, meaning South Stream
would not represent 31 bcm of new gas for Europe, but
something significantly lower.  The Bulgarians state that
this is contrary to the spirit of the IGA and are preparing
to fight the Russian proposal. 

¶7.  (C)  NABUCCO:  Despite the strong public support they
have shown Nabucco this year, the Bulgarians are turning into
Nabucco-skeptics.  In March, Sofia signed what it thought was
an agreement for Azerbaijan to supply 1 bcm of gas that
Bulgaria would eventually take as its Nabucco quota.  In
advance of Nabucco, Bulgaria planned to access the gas via a
potential hook-up to the Turkey-Greece-Italy interconnector.
Realizing now that the agreement was not, in fact, a
commitment on Azerbaijan's part, the Bulgarians feel burned.
The government is now in dire need of a pep talk on the
Nabucco.  They state firmly that both South Stream and
Nabucco are critical and that one cannot be allowed to
preclude the other.  At the same time, they are nervous about
both Azerbaijani willingness to supply Nabucco and Turkish
willingness to support the project.  They will be interested
in your view of Nabucco's prospects. 

¶8.  (C)  TGI HOOK-UP:  The Bulgarians are in negotiations
with Greece about this possible interconnector.  Energy
Holding CEO Tosheva said this is Bulgaria's most immediate
source of diversification and energy security.  The Greeks
apparently are cool to the idea, saying there is insufficient
gas.  In response, the Bulgarians have proposed the purchase
of LNG to be delivered to Greece in exchange for either TGI
access or gas currently going through the export pipeline
from Russia and transiting Bulgarian territory.  Your
Bulgarian interlocutors may ask for U.S. support for these
schemes in our discussions with the Greeks and Turks. 

¶9.  (C)  BURGAS-ALEXANDROUPOLIS (BAP) and AMBO:  The
Bulgarians, Russians and Greeks signed a shareholders
agreement for the BAP oil pipeline in January during the
Putin visit.  Since then, the project company has been
registered, but little more progress has been made.  The
Bulgarians are still confident the pipeline will be built,
and seem surprisingly uninterested in the dynamics
surrounding CPC expansion.  With BAP's relative progress, the
AMBO (Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria) oil pipeline project has
lost momentum.  Still, Bulgaria remains committed to AMBO and
is ready to move forward if and when AMBO attracts supply and
financing. 

¶10.  (C)  BELENE:  In 2006 the GOB selected Russian
AtomstroyExport as the contractor for the new Belene nuclear
plant.  Bulgaria is keeping majority ownership of the plant,
but is in the process of selecting a strategic investor for
the other 49 percent.  RWE and the Belgian Electrabel are in
the running.  We have stated repeatedly that the choice of a
Russian contractor for Belene decreased Bulgaria's bid for
greater independence from Russian energy sources.  The lack
of transparency surrounding the tender has led to the
inescapable conclusion that the decision to choose Russia as
the Belene contractor was linked to the re-negotiation of
Bulgaria's long-term gas transit contract with Gazprom in
December 2006. 

YOUR MEETINGS
------------- 

¶11.  (C)  President Parvanov began his second five-year term
in 2007.  Parvanov's desire to exercise behind-the-scenes
influence over the government has led to tensions with his
former protege, Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev.  Parvanov
has close ties to Russian politicians and held no less than
eight meetings with Vladimir Putin in the last seven years.
The energy summit will be under his aegis. 

--Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev is a 42-year-old
progressive Socialist.  He is pro-west and eager to have
Bulgaria viewed as a good friend and partner of the United
States.  He returned September 30 from a week-long visit to
the United States where he met with U/S Burns, spoke at the
Harvard Business School and held an investment forum.  He
understands that Bulgaria is overly dependent on Russian
energy sources, but sees Bulgaria as having few options for
greater energy independence. 

--Foreign Minister Kalfin is close to both Stanishev and
Parvanov and as Deputy Prime Minister oversees the Economy
and Energy Ministry.  He is a strong supporter of close
Bulgarian-U.S. relations and is highly conversant on energy
issues. 

--Economy and Energy Minister Petar Dimitrov is a relative
new-comer to energy issues.  He is largely seen as taking
direction on energy matters from former Energy Minister Rumen
Ovcharov, who is linked with Russian energy interests and
left office in June 2007 after a corruption scandal. 

¶12.  (C)  Your visit will also highlight, though meetings and
press outreach, the need for Bulgaria to focus on a long-term
energy strategy not solely based on the transit of
hydrocarbons or the production of Russian-based nuclear
energy, but on the development of renewables, clean coal and
greater energy efficiency.  Bulgaria will always be dependent
on Russian energy to one extent or another. But as the most
energy inefficient economy in Europe, it can make meaningful
strides toward greater diversity away from Russian energy
sources.  With the price of energy at near record highs,
Russia's hydrocarbon-generated wealth is increasingly
circulating through the Bulgarian economy, making Bulgaria
all the more susceptible to Russian leverage.  An energy
strategy that focuses on renewables and efficiency is one
tool Bulgaria can use to put a noticeable dent in negative
Russian influence.  The other tool is transparency.  Hub
status in any industry is bestowed only on places which offer
transparent, efficient service.  To achieve its goal of
becoming a true energy center, we should recommend that
Bulgaria present itself not as the place with closest ties to
Russia, but as the most transparent place to do energy deals. 

McEldowney

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Press Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Killing of Osama bin Laden

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