Mutmaßlicher Geheimer Beutevertrag zwischen “GoMoPa” und IM

 

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

 

es liegen uns nunmehr Belege über einen mutmaßlichen geheimen Beutevertrag zwischen “GoMoPa” und deren IM wie z.B. “die bewertung” sowie die einschlägig bekannten Herrschaften vor.

Hiernach erhalten die IM für Tips, die zu Einnahmen bei “GoMoPa” führen, einen Anteil zwischen 20 bis 50%.

 

Stay tuned…

 

TOP-SECRET – DHS Report: Assessing ISIL’s lnfluence and Perceived Legitimacy in the Homeland

DHS-AssessingLegitimacyISIL

 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis Field Analysis Report

  • 9 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • May 5, 2015

Download

(U//FOUO) Scope: This Field Analysis Report (FAR) is designed to support awareness and inform enforcement and collection operations of federal, state, and local partners involved in homeland security and counterterrorism efforts. Some of the activities described in the FAR may be constitutionally protected activities and should be supported by additional facts to justify increased suspicion. The totality of relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any law enforcement response or action. Our assessment of the level of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) name recognition since its declaration of a caliphate in June 2014 is based on a review of suspicious activity reporting (SAR) across the United States between 1 January and 30 December 2014, criminal complaints of US persons charged with supporting or seeking to support ISIL, Bureau of Prisons (BOP) intelligence reporting, and DHS I&A open source reporting to assess the influence of ISIL’s messaging campaign within the United States and ISIL’s perceived legitimacy among homegrown violent extremists (HVEs).

(U) Key Findings

(U//LES) We assess an increased volume of ISIL-related SARs between June 2014 and January 2015 signifies the penetration and recognition of its brand because much of this reporting centered on ISIL symbols, imagery, and support for the group voiced on social media.

(U//FOUO) We judge––based on the body of SAR, criminal complaints, BOP reports, and open source reporting consulted throughout this FAR (see Scope and Source Summary Statements)––that ISIL’s messaging is resonating with US-based violent extremists due to its championing of a multifaceted vision of a caliphate that prioritizes a wide array of justifications and obligations for support, especially compared to other terrorist groups with whom it competes for support, like al-Qa‘ida (AQ) and its affiliates. ISIL’s messaging is amplified through a sophisticated use of social media tailored to a global audience.

(U//LES) A high volume of SAR reporting—of varying degrees of potential threats—associated with ISIL will likely persist as long as ISIL sustains its messaging campaign and perceived military and governance successes, specifically so long as it is perceived to successfully defend its self-declared caliphate.

(U//FOUO) ISIL’s Narratives Promote Caliphate and Lone Offender Attacks

(U//FOUO) We assess ISIL’s name recognition is built in large measure on its military successes and rapid territorial gains in Syria and Iraq in 2014. The allure for potential HVEs also rests with ISIL’s carefully constructed image, based on the perceived legitimacy of its self-proclaimed re-establishment of the caliphate, governance efforts according to their interpretation of Islamic law, and ability to project power through continued expansion—all conveyed via a highly organized messaging effort. The prevalence of media coverage surrounding ISIL’s exploits challenges our ability to isolate and assess how central a role ISIL-directed messaging, amplified by individuals who share that messaging online though their individual social media platforms, plays in influencing demonstrations of ISIL support in the United States.

(U//FOUO) ISIL espouses a violent extremist counterculture and vision focused on the expansion of its self-proclaimed caliphate. This approach is at odds with the model traditionally espoused by AQ, which focuses on driving perceived Western aggressors from Muslim-majority countries through terrorist attacks in the West, before conquest of a state or establishment of a caliphate. The ISIL narrative includes a positive vision—in the eyes of its members—of an alternative political system that is to be established now, as opposed to at some point in the distant future.

(U//FOUO) As a consequence, a broader and more diverse pool of individuals in the United States, including females, may identify strongly with aspects of ISIL’s narrative—including governance under a particular vision of Islamic law, the re-establishment of the caliphate, the purported obligation upon Muslims to emigrate once it is formed, and the defense of Sunni Muslims against the Syrian regime’s persecution. These elements of ISIL’s narrative do not resemble goals long prioritized by AQ via its English-language messaging. We judge ISIL’s self-purported success as a functioning and viable state responding to US-led coalition attacks helps legitimize—to some individuals—its use of terrorist tactics to defend itself against perceived Western aggression.

(U//FOUO) Uptick in ISIL-Related Suspicious Incidents since June 2014 May Signify Group’s Increased Influence

(U//LES) The volume of ISIL-related SARs increased sharply in the second half of 2014, according to queries of state, local, and federal holdings nationally. Chronologically, this uptick corresponds with ISIL’s military successes, self-declared re-establishment of a caliphate, and increased English-language messaging—along with increased media coverage of these exploits. Any single incident of suspicious activity, in isolation, may constitute constitutionally protected activity and does not necessarily indicate an intent to mobilize to violence or provide material support to ISIL. Nevertheless, as a body of reporting showing a trend, we judge the increase in SARs signifies a penetration of ISIL’s messaging into the Homeland.

(U//LES) Several incidents related to ISIL graffiti, symbols, or ISIL-related paraphernalia—including clothing, patches, and flags––were reported to law enforcement agencies. Additional examples of graffiti, in Arabic and English, stickers with ISIL emblems, and similar imagery have been reported in the United States. A group was arrested in France in November 2014 for selling ISIL paraphernalia to US-based individuals and other customers, according to open source reporting.

Unveiled – 14,000 files of Venezuela corruption involving Derwick Associates and ProEnergy

Total about 10GB.

Password: ve-corrupt90

Expires 7/24/15

Folders with multiple files:

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/jbcz2suj4nmflsk/AABtgyoQcSE6eE10Or8lfM7Ja?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/caova21yzm9e0tr/AACbus2G-XdbcyIhA9w6xj9ga?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/caiunzt3wf4ahwm/AACYWnUUQRmrYvqvDSdhM6yna?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/1ys6fyh3ze7ehs6/AAD0b4z196wloBmmidTqSIhZa?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/8rrmjs1zafyh49p/AAC2F7YW23YTCFV5TJqX3657a?dl=0

Single files:

https://www.dropbox.com/s/2ruxym66r88eppd/Investigation%20on%20the%20continued%20Electrical%20Crisis%20of%20Venezuela%20D%20and%20A%20role%20August%2022%2C%202014.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/kq01uh2d9l94yba/Termozulia%20I.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/chrjzwvdeqggic5/Termozulia%20II.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/mk7jysd3etx3uyr/Timeline.xlsx?dl=0



Korrupter STASI-Capo Schalck legt Geldscheine für immer aus der Hand

The man who persuaded a Cold War conservative leader in West Germany to save Communist East Germany from insolvency has died in Bavaria, where he fled just after the Berlin Wall came down. In 1983, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski convinced Bavarian state premier Franz Josef Strauss, an ardent anti-communist and former Defense Minister, to lend his nearly bankrupt country a billion of West Germany’s marks,

Exposed – CIA Torturer Alfreda Bikowsky Pseudonym Redacted

The New Yorker, June 22, 2015

The Inside War

To expose torture, Dianne Feinstein fought the C.I.A.—and the White House.

By Connie Bruck

[Excerpts]

After Feinstein’s floor speech in mid-March, 2014, the Intelligence Committee voted to send the [CIA torture] report’s executive summary to the White House for a declassification review, anticipating public release. The White House instead said that the C.I.A. would take the lead in redacting information. Feinstein argued that the agency had a conflict of interest—redacting the charges of its own violations—and she appealed to Obama to reconsider. She got no response.

In the six million documents that the C.I.A. had turned over, undercover agents were referred to by their official aliases, and the agency suggested pseudonyms for them that Senate staffers could use. In drafting the report, the staffers used several hundred of those pseudonyms, along with the real names of publicly identified senior C.I.A. officials. Their goal was to create a narrative in which major characters appeared repeatedly, many in various contexts, lending coherence to a complex chain of events and revealing the multifaceted roles that some individuals played. This was not without precedent: previous reports of intelligence failures, including the Church committee report, in 1975, had used pseudonyms for central characters.

But on August 1st, when the C.I.A. delivered the redacted report—a few days before its expected release—Feinstein saw that the agency had redacted all the pseudonyms, arguing that readers might be able to combine them with other details and identify the agency personnel. The report, shot through with black lines, resembled a play where the pivotal actors were unrecognizable from scene to scene, making the action almost impossible to follow. The C.I.A. made one concession. The report had used the real names of the two contract psychologists—already identified in the press—who were paid eighty million dollars to develop the interrogation program. The C.I.A. said that the psychologists could be identified by pseudonyms that the agency had provided.

Feinstein rejected the redacted version, and began negotiating, mainly with Denis McDonough. Since the issue of pseudonyms was the most difficult one, they agreed to leave it for last, and discussed other redactions through the fall. Over Columbus Day weekend, McDonough flew to San Francisco to meet with Feinstein. “This has been a very difficult process,” Feinstein told me, not long afterward. She said that she and McDonough had “settled a lot of problems,” but that some remained, and she was determined not to have the report “decimated.”

Feinstein offered to reduce the number of pseudonyms from several hundred to forty or fifty, but McDonough refused. By mid-November, she was fighting for just fourteen. Many of these people had played major roles in the program and currently occupy high-level positions at the C.I.A. One was Alfreda Bikowsky, an agent who had been named in journalistic accounts as early as 2011. As deputy chief of the unit dedicated to finding Osama bin Laden, Bikowsky had participated in brutal interrogations. She was convinced of the program’s virtues. Its strength, she once wrote, was that potential terrorists expected nothing worse than a “show trial” in America. They “never counted on being detained by us outside the U.S., and being subjected to methods they never dreamed of.”

The former intelligence officer told me, “There was this group of four or five women, at the core of hunting Al Qaeda.” Bikowsky was at the center of it. “They all had this burden of guilt, that they were there and didn’t stop 9/11. They saw their jobs as making America safer—and were willing to go to great lengths.” In statements to the committee in 2006, Porter Goss, the C.I.A. director who preceded Michael Hayden, described the interrogations as “not a brutality. It’s more of an art or a science.” The key, he said, was “knowing what makes someone tick.” He added, “Just the simplest thing will work, a family photograph or something.” In fact, as the report describes, C.I.A. officers threatened at least three detainees with harm to their family members. Other techniques included menacing a subject with a pistol and a cordless drill, and employing “rectal hydration,” which the chief of interrogations later characterized as a marker of “total control over a detainee.” Before one session with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the lead planner of the 9/11 attacks, who was subjected to waterboarding a hundred and eighty-three times, Bikowsky sent an e-mail that referred to him by a nickname: “Mukie is gonna be hatin’ life on this one.”

According to the report, Bikowsky was the chief architect of the C.I.A.’s effort to justify its use of enhanced techniques. In February, 2007, she accompanied Hayden to testify before the Intelligence Committee. The former intelligence officer said that Bikowsky had come because “Hayden was new and didn’t know all the details. She had all the facts stuffed into her head. Unless you knew what questions to ask, she’d run circles around you.” Citing information that she said was obtained from the interrogation program, Bikowsky testified, “There’s no question, in my mind, that having that detainee information has saved hundreds, conservatively speaking, of American lives.” The report lists four major claims she made in the hearing, and provides evidence that all are inaccurate. It also asserts that Bikowsky misled the C.I.A. inspector general and other senior officials about the efficacy of the enhanced techniques. (The C.I.A. stands by all but one of Bikowsky’s claims, and says that her assertions about the techniques reflected a widespread understanding. A spokesman said, “The representations as to the value of the information derived from detainees subject to E.I.T.s”—enhanced interrogation techniques—“were representations made by the agency, not one individual. Suggestions to the contrary only serve to distort the record.”)

The argument over how Bikowsky should be identified in the report was particularly freighted. The main character in the movie “Zero Dark Thirty” was based partly on her, and she was the subject of a Wikipedia page. Still, the C.I.A. and the White House refused to allow a pseudonym for her. She has been promoted to a senior position in the global-jihad unit. “The C.I.A. does not hold people accountable the way I think it should,” Feinstein told me. “You want to support them if the wrong thing happens.” But, she added, that is different from supporting them “for doing wrong.”

On November 20th, McDonough went to a Senate Democratic Caucus meeting, in the Mansfield Room of the Capitol. He was there to brief senators on the President’s immigration policy, but he knew that Feinstein and her colleagues on the Intelligence Committee would want to discuss the torture report. Feinstein delivered a prepared speech, about ten minutes long. “She flat-out called out the White House and the C.I.A.,” the senior Senate staffer recalled. “Then Rockefeller, Wyden, Heinrich, and Udall spoke, and they really went after McDonough.” McDonough, according to the staffer, argued that the report would risk lives, pointing out that, while he had Secret Service protection, C.I.A. families did not. The Senate aide recalled that McDonough defended his impartiality. “He said, ‘Every time I go over to the C.I.A., they tell me I’m doing the Senate’s bidding, and I come over here and you guys tell me I’m doing the C.I.A.’s bidding,’ and neither is true. I’m trying to be an arbitrator.” For many, his protest rang hollow. “Denis and Brennan are very tight, and Denis thinks very highly of Brennan,” someone who knows McDonough well said. “I think whatever Brennan told him, Denis had reason, based on the personal relationship, to trust.” At the close of the meeting, McDonough made it clear that the White House would not allow the remaining, contested pseudonyms to be used, and, if the committee did not agree, the report would not come out.

The pseudonyms for the fourteen key people were deleted. Although Bikowsky was referred to in some places as the “deputy chief of Alec station,” in dozens of other spots any title for her was redacted. Robert Eatinger, the acting general counsel Feinstein mentioned in her floor speech, had all sixteen hundred mentions of his name redacted. It was a bitter defeat, but Feinstein feared that if the report was not released before the Republicans took control of the Senate, in January, 2015, it never would be. Some of her colleagues believed that the White House was deliberately running out the clock. “Obama participated in the slowdown process, and that’s a hard thing to forgive,” Rockefeller said.

Doppelleben zwischen STASI und BND – Film

Enttarnt – FCM-Präsident war STASI-Informant

Ulrich Kammrad

 

Der frühere Präsident des 1. FC Magdeburg und langjährige Sportrichter, Ulrich Kammrad, war in der DDR inoffizieller Mitarbeiter der Staatssicherheit. Das berichtet am Freitag das Magazin “Focus”. Kammrad räumte laut “Focus” seine IM-Vergangenheit ein. Sein Amt als Sportrichter beim Fußballverband Sachsen-Anhalt (FSA) legte er inzwischen nieder.

1976 hatte Kammrad das Präsidentenamt beim DDR-Oberligisten 1. FC Magdeburg übernommen. Im selben Jahr verpflichtete er sich laut “Focus” als IM. Präsident des Clubs blieb er bis 1981. Als IM hat er dem Magazin zufolge über Spieler und Trainer berichtet, die aus Sicht der Stasi als unzuverlässig galten. Kammrad sagte dem “Focus”, er bereue seine Vergangenheit nicht. Er habe eine Aufgabe gehabt und die habe er erfüllt. Ihm sei es darum gegangen, seinen Club vor dem “Klassenfeind” zu schützen.

Der Landesfußballverband zeigte sich überrascht. FSA-Sprecher Volkmar Volkmar Laube sagte MDR SACHSEN-ANHALT, Kammrad habe ehrenamtlich als Sportrichter für den Verband gearbeitet. Der 76-Jährige hat aber bei der planmäßigen Tagung der Sportrichter in Bülstringen vergangene Woche seinen Rücktritt aus dem Sportgericht bekanntgegeben und scheidet zum Monatsende aus. Laube weiter: “Durch den Fokus sind wir erst mit der Stasi-Vergangenheit konfrontiert worden. Im Moment steht der Verdacht im Raum. Daher können wir keine abschließend Aussage tätigen.”