Category Archives: SECRECY NEWS

SECRET – U.S. Army Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) Manual

The following manual was released by the U.S. Army on February 12, 2014.  The manual was first reported by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists.

FM 3-38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities

  • 96 pages
  • February 12, 2014


FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, provides overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA). This manual describes the importance of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to Army forces and provides the tactics and procedures commanders and staffs use in planning, integrating, and synchronizing CEMA.

This manual provides the information necessary for Army forces to conduct CEMA that enable them to shape their operational environment and conduct unified land operations. It provides enough guidance for commanders and their staffs to develop innovative approaches to seize, retain, and exploit advantages throughout an operational environment. CEMA enable the Army to achieve desired effects in support of the commander’s objectives and intent.

The principal audience for FM 3-38 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should see applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning cyberspace operations, electronic warfare (EW), and spectrum management operations (SMO). Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual.

1-1. Cyber electromagnetic activities are activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system (ADRP 3-0). CEMA consist of cyberspace operations (CO), electronic warfare (EW), and spectrum management operations (SMO) (see figure 1-1 on page 1-2).

1-2. Army forces conduct CEMA as a unified effort. Integration is the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole (JP 1-02). Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 1-02). CEMA integrates and synchronizes the functions and capabilities of CO, EW, and SMO to produce complementary and reinforcing effects. Conducting these activities independently may detract from their efficient employment. If uncoordinated, these activities may result in conflicts and mutual interference between them and with other entities that use the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). CO, EW, and SMO are synchronized to cause specific effects at decisive points to support the overall operation.

1-3. The CEMA element is responsible for planning, integrating, and synchronizing CO, EW, and SMO to support the commander’s mission and desired end state within cyberspace and the EMS. During execution the CEMA element is responsible for synchronizing CEMA to best facilitate mission accomplishment. (See chapter 2 for more information on the CEMA element.)

1-4. Cyberspace operations, EW, and SMO are essential to the conduct of unified land operations. While these activities differ in their employment and tactics, their functions and capabilities must be integrated and synchronized to maximize their support to unified land operations. The integration of these activities requires an understanding of the functions and capabilities being employed.


1-5. Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). Cyberspace operations consist of three functions: offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and Department of Defense information network operations (see chapter 3).


1-6. Electronic warfare is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-13.1). EW consists of three functions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. These functions are referred to as divisions in joint doctrine (see chapter 4).


1-7. SMO are the interrelated functions of spectrum management, frequency assignment, host-nation coordination, and policy that enable the planning, management, and execution of operations within the electromagnetic operational environment during all phases of military operations. SMO are the management portions of electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO). EMSO also include electronic warfare (see chapter 5)


3-1. Army forces coordinate and integrate CO through CEMA. They do this to gain and maintain freedom of action in cyberspace and as required to achieve periods of cyberspace superiority.

3-2. Cyberspace superiority is the degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary (JP 1-02). Such interference is possible because large portions of cyberspace are not under the control of friendly forces. Cyberspace superiority establishes conditions describing friendly force freedom of action while denying this same freedom of action to enemy and adversary actors. Ultimately, Army forces conduct CO to create and achieve effects in support of the commander’s objectives and desired end state.

3-3. CO are categorized into three functions including offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and Department of Defense information network operations. These functions are described in joint doctrine as missions in cyberspace that require specific actions in cyberspace (see joint doctrine for CO). Figure 3-1 on page 3-2 depicts the three interdependent functions of CO.


3-4. Offensive cyberspace operations are cyberspace operations intended to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace (JP 1-02). Army forces conduct OCO across the range of military operations by targeting enemy and hostile adversary activity and related capabilities in and through cyberspace. OCO are designed to support the commander’s objectives and intent consistent with applicable authorities and legal frameworks. (See paragraph 3-38 for additional information on authorities and other legal considerations.)

3-5. OCO are conducted in and through cyberspace where information technology infrastructures, along with the people and systems that use them, exist in an area of operations and pervade an operational environment. To varying degrees, host-nation populations, governments, security forces, businesses and other actors rely upon these infrastructures and supporting networks or systems. Given these conditions, OCO require deliberate coordination and integration to ensure desired effects (changes in behavior which do not suggest the ways or means those changes were created) are created and focused at the right place and time in support of the commander’s objectives.

3-6. Using OCO, commanders can mass effects through the employment of lethal and nonlethal actions leveraging all capabilities available to gain advantages in cyberspace that support objectives on land. For example, cyberspace capabilities and other information-related capabilities may be directed at an enemy weapons system consisting of the targeted platform and its operators. The cyberspace capability could create degrading effects on the platform while an information-related capability influences, disrupts, corrupts, or usurps the decisionmaking of the operator. (See FM 3-13 for additional information on inform and influence activities (IIA) and information-related capabilities.)


3-7. A cyberspace attack consists of actions that create various direct denial effects in cyberspace (for example, degradation, disruption, or destruction) and manipulation that leads to denial that is hidden or that manifests in the physical domains. For the Army, cyberspace attacks are a type of cyberspace operation employed primarily in support of OCO. Cyberspace attacks are primarily employed outside of LandWarNet, but they are coordinated and deconflicted inside of the Department of Defense information networks (DODIN). (See paragraph 3-24 for additional information on the DODIN.)

3-8. Army forces conduct or facilitate cyberspace attacks in support of OCO within designated areas of operation. For example, when employed as part of an offensive cyberspace operation, a cyberspace attack may be directed at information resident in, or in transit between, computers (including mobile phones and personal digital assistants) and computer networks used by an enemy or adversary. Enemy or adversary actors may be denied the ability to use resources or have their information resources used for friendly proposes as a result of a cyberspace attack. In every instance, commanders and staffs follow appropriate authorities and legal guidance. (See paragraph 3-38 for additional information on authorities and other legal considerations.)

3-9. Using specific portions of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) as primary pathways or avenues of approach, cyberspace attacks may employ capabilities such as tailored computer code in and through various network nodes such as servers, bridges, firewalls, sensors, protocols, operating systems, and hardware associated with computers or processors. Tailored computer code is only one example of a cyberspace capability (a device, computer program, or technique, including any combination of software, firmware, or hardware) designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace. The development and employment of tailored computer code represents the core and unique technical nature of CO capabilities. Computer code is designed to create specific effects, and when employed this code moves in the form of data packets in and through cyberspace across wired and wireless driven communication technology and systems. Cyberspace attacks must therefore be coordinated and integrated in support of the commander’s objectives and consistent with applicable assessment measures and indicators.

3-10. Cyberspace attack capabilities are employed to support maneuver operations by creating simultaneous and complementary effects. For example, a cyberspace attack capability may be employed in conjunction with electronic attack, offensive space control, fires, and information related capabilities to deceive, degrade, destroy, and disrupt a specific enemy integrated air defense system or enemy safe haven (see table 3-1 on page 3-4).


The government seizure of Associated Press telephone records in the course
of a leak investigation undermined freedom of the press in the United
States, congressional critics said yesterday.

"It seems to me the damage done to a free press is substantial," said Rep.
Zoe Lofgren at a hearing of the House Judiciary Committee.

Pursuant to subpoena, the government captured call records for 20
telephone lines of Associated Press reporters and editors over a two month
period last year.  The records are logs of calls made and received, but do
not include their contents.  It was a "massive and unprecedented intrusion"
into newsgathering activities, wrote the AP's president Gary Pruitt in a
May 13 letter.

The Justice Department denied that the action deviated from established

"We understand your position that these subpoenas should have been more
narrowly drawn, but in fact, consistent with Department policy, the
subpoenas were limited in both time and scope," wrote Deputy Attorney
General James M. Cole in a May 14 reply.

The  move arose from an AP story about a disrupted bomb plot originating
in Yemen that led to the revelation of a classified counterterrorism
operation and the existence of a valued agent. "This is among the top two
or three serious leaks that I've ever seen" said Attorney General Eric
Holder. He did not elaborate.

Meanwhile, the upshot is that any presumption of confidentiality in the
source-reporter relationship has been compromised across the board,
especially but not only in national security reporting.

"Reporters who might have previously believed that a confidential source
would speak to them would no longer have that level of confidence, because
those confidential sources are now going to be chilled in their
relationship with the press," Rep. Lofgren said yesterday.

Last year, congressional leaders harshly criticized the Obama
Administration for supposedly failing to aggressively combat leaks of
classified information, including in the present case.

"The Administration's disregard for the Constitution and rule of law not
only undermines our democracy, it threatens our national security," said
Rep. Lamar Smith, at a hearing of the House Judiciary Committee on June 7
of last year. "The Justice Department has not taken the initiative to
prosecute leaks of national security secrets. Recent leaks about a foiled
bomb plot out of Yemen and a cyberattack against Iran are, in the words of
Senate Intelligence Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein, quote, 'very detrimental,
very concerning, and hurt our country,' end quote."

The irony was not lost on Rep. Jerrold Nadler.

"I think we should put this in context, and remember that less than a year
ago this committee's Republican leadership demanded aggressive
investigation of press leaks, accusing the administration itself of
orchestrating those leaks," he noted. "Then, members of this committee
wanted the reporters subpoenaed, put in front of grand juries and
potentially jailed for contempt. Now, of course, it is convenient to attack
the attorney general for being too aggressive or the Justice Department for
being too aggressive."

"But this inconsistency on the part of my Republican colleagues should not
distract us from legitimate questions worthy of congressional oversight,
including whether the Espionage Act has been inappropriately used looking
at leakers, whether there is a need for a greater press shield,... and
Congress' broad grants of surveillance authority and immunity," Rep. Nadler

Rep. Lofgren said that the damage done to freedom of the press by the
clandestine seizure of AP phone records "will continue until corrective
action is taken."


The Government Printing Office is blocking public access to some
previously released records of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, while the records are reviewed to see if they contain
export-controlled information.  The move follows the controversial
disabling and partial restoration of the NASA Technical Reports Server
(NTRS) ("NASA Technical Report Database Partly Back Online," Secrecy News,
May 9.)

"GPO has been asked to suspend any activity related to making these
documents available if they have not been reviewed," GPO said in a notice

"During this time, PURLs that GPO has created for the electronic versions
of NASA Technical Reports found in cataloging records accessed through the
Catalog of U.S. Government Publications (CGP) may not link to the documents
that the catalog record describes."


"In 2009, China overtook the United States to become both the world's
largest producer of and market for motor vehicles," a new report from the
Congressional Research Service notes.

That is not altogether bad news. "Every year since 2010, General Motors
has sold more cars in China (through exports and its joint ventures there)
than in the United States," CRS said. "On the other hand, China maintains a
number of trade and investment barriers that affect trade flows in autos
and auto parts."

See U.S.-Chinese Motor Vehicle Trade: Overview and Issues, May 13, 2013:

Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that
Congress has declined to make publicly available include the following.

Regulation of Fertilizers: Ammonium Nitrate and Anhydrous Ammonia, May 9,

Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional
Concerns, May 10, 2013:

Women in Combat: Issues for Congress, May 9, 2013:

The Peace Corps: Current Issues, May 10, 2013:

Proposals to Eliminate Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns, May 10,

The Federal Budget: Issues for FY2014 and Beyond, May 9, 2013:

Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:

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OR email your request to

Secrecy News is archived at:

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:

Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood


Almost a year and a half after he was nominated by President Obama in December 2011, the Senate yesterday confirmed David Medine to be the chairman of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board by a vote of 53-45. Republicans, led by Sen. Charles Grassley, opposed the nominee and voted against him. “I was disappointed that he failed to answer a basic yes-or-no question about national security law: ‘Do you believe that we are engaged in a war on terrorism?’,” Sen. Grassley said. “Instead of a simple yes or no, he opted for a more limited answer that military power is permissible in appropriate cases.” Democrats, led by Sen. Patrick Leahy, praised Mr. Medine and the Board that he will now lead. “The confirmation of this nominee is a significant victory for all Americans who care about safeguarding our privacy rights and civil liberties,” Sen. Leahy said. “The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is a guardian of Americans’ privacy rights and civil liberties as well as an essential part of our national security strategy,” he said. But this seems like an overstatement. The size of the five-member Board and the resources available to it are not commensurate with the responsibilities it has nominally been assigned. It cannot possibly perform comprehensive oversight of the broad range of privacy or civil liberties concerns that arise in the national security domain. Expectations to the contrary are bound to be disappointed. At best, the Board may serve as a boutique oversight shop that tackles a couple of discrete policy issues each year. For background on the origins and development of the Board, see Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: New Independent Agency Status, Congressional Research Service, August 27, 2012: INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS, AND OTHER DOD DIRECTIVES The procedures by which the U.S. Air Force establishes international agreements for the exchange of intelligence information with foreign military services were described in a new Air Force Instruction. “Foreign military organizations being considered for inclusion in an IIA (international intelligence agreement) must clearly support U.S. security and foreign policy objectives. The foreign government must have favorable relations with the United States; a well-developed, secure intelligence service; and a stable domestic environment and military unity. Known national characteristics of the foreign government in question must fall within the guidelines of the United States national disclosure and security policy, and be reasonably expected to have adequate fiscal means, and conform to legal guidelines,” the Instruction states. Such agreements must “Provide for mutual support (quid pro quo)” and must “Provide intelligence that would otherwise be denied to the United States.” See Air Force Instruction 14-102, International Intelligence Agreements, April 29, 2013: Another new Department of Defense Instruction governs records management within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “It is DoD policy,” it states, “to limit the creation of records to those essential for the efficient conduct of official business and to preserve those of continuing value while systematically eliminating all others.” See OSD Records and Information Management Program, Administrative Instruction 15, May 3, 2013: Other noteworthy new military publications include the following. Information Operations (IO), DoD Directive 3600.01, May 2, 2013: DODD 5134.10 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), DoD Directive 5134.10, May 7, 2013: THE U.S. SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING WORKFORCE, AND MORE FROM CRS New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has not made available to the public include the following. The U.S. Science and Engineering Workforce: Recent, Current, and Projected Employment, Wages, and Unemployment, May 6, 2013: Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues, May 7, 2013: Tax Reform in the 113th Congress: An Overview of Proposals, May 6, 2013: Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, May 3, 2013: Terrorist Watch List Screening and Background Checks for Firearms, May 1, 2013: Missing Adults: Background, Federal Programs, and Issues for Congress, May 7, 2013: Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, May 7, 2013: Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, May 7, 2013: Expulsion, Censure, Reprimand, and Fine: Legislative Discipline in the House of Representatives, May 2, 2013: No-Fly Zones: Strategic, Operational, and Legal Considerations for Congress, May 3, 2013: Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2013, May 3, 2013: _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to OR email your request to Secrecy News is archived at: Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: email: voice: (202) 454-4691


“During calendar year 2012, the Government made 1,856 applications to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for authority to conduct electronic
surveillance and/or physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes.”

That somewhat opaque statistic was disclosed in the Justice Department’s
latest annual report to Congress on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, filed on Tuesday. As is usually the case, none of the requests for
electronic surveillance were denied by the Court.

No matter how it is sliced and diced, the newly disclosed number of
applications does not yield much substance. It means that the government
submitted an average of 5 requests per day last year for intelligence
surveillance or physical search. It is about 5% higher than the number of
applications the year before (1,745), but quite a bit lower than the figure
from 2007 (2,371).

The number of applications does not correspond directly to the number of
targets, since multiple applications may be submitted in the course of an
individual investigation. Nor is the outcome of the surveillance or search
activity indicated in a way that would tend to validate or invalidate the
authorization after the fact.

In any case, the FIS Court did not deny any of the government’s requests
for authority to conduct electronic surveillance in whole or in part, the
report said, although unspecified modifications were made to 40 proposed
orders. The report does not say whether or not any requests for physical
search were disapproved or modified.

The government also made 212 applications for access to business records
and “tangible things” for foreign intelligence purposes, almost the same as
the 205 the year before.

And also in 2012, the FBI submitted 15,229 National Security Letter
requests for information concerning 6,223 different U.S. persons
(“excluding requests for subscriber information only”), down somewhat from
the 16,511 requests (concerning 7,201 different persons) the year before.

As an instrument of public oversight, the annual reports on FISA are only
minimally informative. They register gross levels of activity, but they
provide no measures of quality, performance or significance. Neither
counterintelligence successes nor failures can be discerned from the
reports. Nor can one conclude from the data presented that the FISA
process is functioning as intended, or that it needs to be curbed or

Congressional leaders blocked efforts to impose new or stronger public
reporting requirements when the FISA Amendments Act was reauthorized late
last year. However, Sen. Jeff Merkley and several Senate colleagues asked
the FIS Court to summarize its opinions in such a way as to facilitate
their eventual declassification and disclosure. This request has produced
no known results to date.

The FISA itself is a product of a rich period of political ferment in the
1970s when public and private institutions converged to promote increased
transparency, improved oversight and meaningful new constraints on
government authority. Investigative journalists wrote groundbreaking
stories, Congressional committees held historic hearings, political
activists and ordinary citizens mobilized to defend their interests,
leading to real and lasting changes. On the legislative front, these
included passage of an invigorated Freedom of Information Act, along with
the Privacy Act, the Government in the Sunshine Act, and the FISA, which
subjected intelligence surveillance activities to at least a degree of
independent judicial review.

An interesting account of that momentous period can be found in the new
book “Reining in the State: Civil Society and Congress in the Vietnam and
Watergate Eras” by Katherine A. Scott, University Press of Kansas, March

Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:


OR email your request to

Secrecy News is archived at:

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:

Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
voice: (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood


The process of declassifying national security records, which is hardly
expeditious under the best of circumstances, will become slower as a result
of the mandatory budget cuts known as sequestration.

Due to sequestration, “NARA has reduced funding dedicated to the
declassification of Presidential records,” the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA) said in a report last week.

“Instead, NARA staff will prepare documents for declassification, in
addition to their existing duties. This will slow declassification
processes and delay other work, including FOIA responses and special access
requests,” said the new report, which also identified several other adverse
effects of the across-the-board cuts.

Meanwhile, because of the basic asymmetry between classification and
declassification, there is no particular reason to expect a corresponding
reduction in the rate at which new records are classified.

Classification is an integral part of the production of new national
security information that cannot be deferred, while declassification is a
distinct process that can easily be put on hold. Likewise, there is no
dedicated budget for “classification” to cut in the way that NARA has cut
declassification spending. And while Congress has erected barriers to
declassification (such as the Kyl-Lott Amendment to prohibit automatic
declassification of records without review), it has simultaneously allowed
declassification requirements to go overlooked and unenforced.

Some declassification is actually mandated by law. A 1991 statute on the
Foreign Relations of the United States series requires the Department of
State to publish a “thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of
major United States foreign policy decisions” no later than 30 years after
the fact, necessitating the timely declassification of the underlying
records. But law or no law, the government has not complied with this
publication schedule.


A new report from the Congressional Research Service assesses the economic
state of post-revolution Egypt and finds it fairly grim.

“After more than two years of social unrest and economic stagnation
following the 2011 popular uprising, the government of Egypt is facing
serious economic pressures that, if not remedied, could lead to economic
collapse and possibly new levels of violence,” the report says.

“Egyptian authorities and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been
in negotiations for more than two years over an IMF loan to Egypt in
exchange for policy reforms that, if successful, could stave off economic
collapse and create more ‘inclusive’ growth…. [but] No agreement has been
finalized or implemented to date. Egyptian authorities have been reluctant
to commit to economic reforms that may be politically unpopular and
increase the country’s debt.”

Background on the negotiations and on U.S. aid to Egypt are presented in
Egypt and the IMF: Overview and Issues for Congress, April 29, 2013:

Some other CRS reports on Middle Eastern countries that have been recently
updated include the following.

Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, April 26, 2013:

Iran Sanctions, April 24, 2013:

U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, April 11, 2013:

Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, April 4, 2013:

Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, April 1, 2013:


The international agreements that constitute the infrastructure of
international trade and investment are spotlighted in an informative new
report from the Congressional Research Service.

“In the absence of an overarching multilateral framework on investment,
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investment chapters in free trade
agreements (FTAs), collectively referred to as ‘international investment
agreements,’ have emerged as the primary mechanism for promoting a
rules-based system for international investment,” the new report explains.

“Presently, there are over 3,000 BITs globally. The United States has
concluded 47 BITs, 41 of which have entered into force.” These treaties
were tabulated by CRS and presented along with other little-known data on
the subject in U.S. International Investment Agreements: Issues for
Congress, April 29, 2013:

Other new or newly updated CRS reports obtained by Secrecy News include
the following.

Mountaintop Mining: Background on Current Controversies, April 29, 2013:

National Park System: Establishing New Units, April 25, 2013:

The Administrative Process by Which Groups May Be Acknowledged as Indian
Tribes by the Department of the Interior, April 26, 2013:

Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Reform: An Overview of
Proposals to Reduce the Growth in SSDI Rolls, April 29, 2013:

Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues, April 26, 2013:

Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:


OR email your request to

Secrecy News is archived at:

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:

Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
voice: (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood


“Intelligence activity in the past decades has, all too often, exceeded
the restraints on the exercise of governmental power that are imposed by
our country’s Constitution, laws, and traditions,” according to the
Congressional Research Service.

The CRS, which shuns polemical claims, presents that assertion as a simple
statement of fact (although cautiously sourced to the 1976 Church Committee
report) in a newly updated report on FBI terrorism investigations.

The report reviews the FBI investigative process, the statutory framework
within which it operates, and the tools at its disposal, along with
oversight considerations for Congress. See The Federal Bureau of
Investigation and Terrorism Investigations, April 24, 2013:

Other new or newly updated CRS reports include the following.

Terrorism, Miranda, and Related Matters, April 24, 2013:

Terrorism Risk Insurance: Issue Analysis and Overview of Current Program,
April 26, 2013:

U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Background and Issues
for Congress, April 23, 2013:

Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense
Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, April 25, 2013:

U.S.-South Korea Relations, April 26, 2013:

Iran Sanctions, April 24, 2013:

Intelligence Issues for Congress, April 23, 2013:

Inflation-Indexing Elements in Federal Entitlement Programs, April 24,

Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, April 25, 2013:

Prevalence of Mental Illness in the United States: Data Sources and
Estimates, April 24, 2013:


The Department of Defense has revised its 1996 directive on non-lethal
weapons (NLW) to guide future development and procurement of this category
of weaponry.

“Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets principally
through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, NLW employ means other than
gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning. NLW are
intended to have relatively reversible effects on personnel or materiel,”
the revised directive explains.

“It is DoD policy that NLW doctrine and concepts of operation will be
developed to reinforce deterrence and expand the range of options available
to commanders.”

The directive does not apply to information operations, cyber operations
or electronic warfare capabilities. See DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal
Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy, DoD Directive 3000.03E, April 25, 2013:

Other noteworthy new or updated DoD issuances include the following.

DoD Nuclear Weapons Surety Program, DoD Directive 3150.02, April 24, 2013:

DoD Counterfeit Prevention Policy, DoD Instruction 4140.67, April 26,

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
(ATSD(IO)), DoD Directive 5148.11, April 24, 2013:

Use of Excess Ballistic Missiles for Space Launch, Directive-Type
Memorandum (DTM) 11-008, July 5, 2011, Incorporating Change 3, April 25,

Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:


OR email your request to

Secrecy News is archived at:

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:

Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
voice: (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood