as well as the text snipping included as text in this message. It is wise for a TSCM, CyberSecurity, CyberOperations, TEMPEST, or related counter-intelligence, IC specialists to study this report, because it will allow them to spot other spies in thier workplace, and to detect behaviors and equipment usage patterns that will result in the capture of the spy.<\/p>\n
I took the PDF document, and performed a text recognition on it, and then copy and pasted that text into this document (the document actually is unclassifed and redacted, to please see the originl attached PDF file).<\/p>\n
-jma<\/p>\n
TOP SECRET\/\/HCS O P\/81 0\/TK\/\/ORCON\/NOFORN t Greenwald articles were published, Snowden revealed
\n(U) Review of the Unauthorized Disclosures of
\nFormer National Security Agency Contractor
\nEdward Snowden
\nSeptember 15, 2016
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\n(U) Executive Summary
\n(U) In June 2013, former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden
\nperpetrated the largest and most damaging public release of classified information in U.S.
\nintelligence history. In August 2014, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House
\nPermanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) directed Committee staff to carry out a
\ncomprehensive review of the unauthorized disclosures. The aim of the review was to allow the
\nCommittee to explain to other Members of Congress-and, where possible, the American
\npeople-how this breach occurred, what the U.S. Government knows about the man who
\ncommitted it, and whether the security shortfalls it highlighted had been remedied.
\n(U) Over the next two years, Committee staff requested hundreds of documents from the
\nIntelligence Community (IC), participated in dozens of briefings and meetings with IC
\npersonnel, conducted several interviews with key individuals with knowledge of Snowden’s
\nbackground and actions, and traveled to NSA Hawaii to visit Snowden’s last two work locations.
\nThe review focused on Snowden’s background, how he was able to remove more than 1.5
\nmillion classified documents from secure NSA networks, what the 1.5 million documents
\ncontained, and the damage their removal caused to national security.
\n(U) The Committee’s review was careful not to disturb any criminal investigation or
\nfuture prosecution of Snowden, who has remained in Russia since he fled there on June 23, 2013.
\nAccordingly, the Committee did not interview individuals whom the Department of Justice
\nidentified as possible witnesses at Snowden’s trial, including Snowden himself, nor did the
\nCommittee request any matters that may have occurred before a grand jury. Instead, the IC
\nprovided the Committee with access to other individuals who possessed substantively similar
\nknowledge as the possible witnesses. Similarly, rather than interview Snowden’s NSA coworkers
\nand supervisors directly, Committee staff interviewed IC personnel who had reviewed
\nreports of interviews with Snowden’s co-workers and supervisors. The Committee remains
\nhopeful that Snowden will return to the United States to face justice.
\n(U) The bulk of the Committee’s 37-page review, which includes 237 footnotes, must
\nremain classified to avoid causing further harm to national security; however, the Committee has
\nmade a number of unclassified findings. These findings demonstrate that the public narrative
\npopularized by Snowden and his allies is rife with falsehoods, exaggerations, and crucial
\nomissions, a pattern that began before he stole 1.5 million sensitive documents.
\n(U) First, Snowden caused tremendous damage to national security, and the vast
\nmajority of the documents he stole have nothing to do with programs impacting individual
\nprivacy interests-they instead pertain to military, defense, and intelligence programs of
\ngreat interest to America’s adversaries. A review of the materials Snowden compromised
\nmakes clear that he handed over secrets that protect American troops overseas and secrets that
\nprovide vital defenses against terrorists and nation-states. Some of Snowden’s disclosures
\nexacerbated and accelerated existing trends that diminished the IC’s capabilities to collect
\nagainst legitimate foreign intelligence targets, while others resulted in the loss of intelligence
\nstreams that had saved American lives. Snowden insists he has not shared the full cache of 1.5
\nmillion classified documents with anyone; however, in June 2016, the deputy chairman of the
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\nRussian parliament’s defense and security committee publicly conceded that “Snowden did share
\nintelligence” with his government. Additionally, although Snowden’s professed objective may
\nhave been to inform the general public, the information he released is also available to Russian,
\nChinese, Iranian, and North Korean government intelligence services; any terrorist with Internet
\naccess; and many others who wish to do harm to the United States.
\n(U) The full scope of the damage inflicted by Snowden remains unknown. Over the past
\nthree years, the IC and the Department of Defense (DOD) have carried out separate reviewswith
\ndiffering methodologies-of the damage Snowden caused. Out of an abundance of caution,
\nDOD reviewed all 1.5 million documents Snowden removed. The IC, by contrast, has carried
\nout a damage assessment for only a small subset of the documents. The Committee is concerned
\nthat the IC does not plan to assess the damage of the vast majority of documents Snowden
\nremoved. Nevertheless, even by a conservative estimate, the U.S. Government has spent
\nhundreds of millions of dollars, and will eventually spend billions, to attempt to mitigate the
\ndamage Snowden caused. These dollars would have been better spent on combating America’s
\nadversaries in an increasingly dangerous world.
\n(U) Second, Snowden was not a whistleblower. Under the law, publicly revealing
\nclassified information does not qualify someone as a whistleblower. However, disclosing
\nclassified information that shows fraud, waste, abuse, or other illegal activity to the appropriate
\nlaw enforcement or oversight personnel-including to Congress–does make someone a
\nwhistleblower and affords them with critical protections. Contrary to his public claims that he
\nnotified numerous NSA officials about what he believed to be illegal intelligence collection, the
\nCommittee found no evidence that Snowden took any official effort to express concerns about
\nU.S. intelligence activities-legal, moral, or otherwise-to any oversight officials within the
\nU.S. Government, despite numerous avenues for him to do so. Snowden was aware of these
\navenues. His only attempt to contact an NSA attorney revolved around a question about the
\nlegal precedence of executive orders, and his only contact to the Central Intelligence Agency
\n(CIA) Inspector General (IO) revolved around his disagreements with his managers about
\ntraining and retention of information technology specialists.
\n(U) Despite Snowden’s later public claim that he would have faced retribution for
\nvoicing concerns about intelligence activities, the Committee found that laws and regulations in
\neffect at the time of Snowden’s actions afforded him protection. The Committee routinely
\nreceives disclosures from IC contractors pursuant to the Intelligence Community Whistleblower
\nProtection Act of 1998 (IC WP A). If Snowden had been worried about possible retaliation for
\nvoicing concerns about NSA activities, he could have made a disclosure to the Committee. He
\ndid not. Nor did Snowden remain in the United States to face the legal consequences of his
\nactions, contrary to the tradition of civil disobedience he professes to embrace. Instead, he fled to
\nChina and Russia, two countries whose governments place scant value on their citizens’ privacy
\nor civil liberties-and whose intelligence services aggressively collect information on both the
\nUnited States and their own citizens.
\n(U) To gather the files he took with him when he left the country for Hong Kong,
\nSnowden infringed on the privacy of thousands of government employees and contractors. He
\nobtained his colleagues’ security credentials through misleading means, abused his access as a
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\nII
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\nsystems administrator to search his co-workers’ personal drives, and removed the personally
\nidentifiable information of thousands ofIC employees and contractors. From Hong Kong he
\nwent to Russia, where he remains a guest of the Kremlin to this day.
\n(U) It is also not clear Snowden understood the numerous privacy protections that govern
\nthe activities of the IC. He failed basic annual training for NSA employees on Section 702 of the
\nForeign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and complained the training was rigged to be
\noverly difficult. This training included explanations of the privacy protections related to the
\nPRISM program that Snowden would later disclose.
\n(U) Third, two weeks before Snowden began mass downloads of classified
\ndocuments, he was reprimanded after engaging in a workplace spat with NSA managers.
\nSnowden was repeatedly counseled by his managers regarding his behavior at work. For
\nexample, in June 2012, Snowden became involved in a fiery e-mail argument with a supervisor
\nabout how computer updates should be managed. Snowden added an NSA senior executive
\nseveral levels above the supervisor to the e-mail thread, an action that earned him a swift
\nreprimand from his contracting officer for failing to follow the proper protocol for raising
\ngrievances through the chain of command. Two weeks later, Snowden began his mass
\ndownloads of classified information from NSA networks. Despite Snowden’s later claim that the
\nMarch 2013 congressional testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper was a
\n“breaking point” for him, these mass downloads predated Director Clapper’s testimony by eight
\nmonths.
\n(U) Fourth, Snowden was, and remains, a serial exaggerator and fabricator. A close
\nreview of Snowden’s official employment records and submissions reveals a pattern of
\nintentional lying. He claimed to have left Army basic training because of broken legs when in
\nfact he washed out because of shin splints. He claimed to have obtained a high school degree
\nequivalent when in fact he never did. He claimed to have worked for the CIA as a “senior
\nadvisor,” which was a gross exaggeration of his entry-level duties as a computer technician. He
\nalso doctored his performance evaluations and obtained new positions at NSA by exaggerating
\nhis resume and stealing the answers to an employment test. In May 2013, Snowden informed his
\nsupervisor that he would be out of the office to receive treatment for worsening epilepsy. In
\nreality, he was on his way to Hong Kong with stolen secrets.
\n(U) Finally, the Committee remains concerned that more than three years after the
\nstart of the unauthorized disclosures, NSA, and the IC as a whole, have not done enough to
\nminimize the risk of another massive unauthorized disclosure. Although it is impossible to
\nreduce the chance of another Snowden to zero, more work can and should be done to improve
\nthe security of the people and computer networks that keep America’s most closely held secrets.
\nFor instance, a recent DOD Inspector General report directed by the Committee found that NSA
\nhas yet to effectively implement its post-Snowden security improvements. The Committee has
\ntaken actions to improve IC information security in the Intelligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal
\nYears 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, and looks forward to working with the IC to continue to
\nimprove security.
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\nTable of Contents
\nExecuti.v e su mmary …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1.
\nScope and Methodology ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1
\nEarly Life ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
\nCIA Employment ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3
\nTransition to NSA Contractor …………………………………………………………………………………………… 6
\nNSA Hawaii – Contract Systems Administrator …………………………………………………………………. 8
\nSnowden’ s Downloading and Removal Process ……………………………………………………………….. 10
\nNSA Hawaii – Gaining More Access and Departing for China and Russia …………………………… 14
\nCommunications with Intelligence Oversight Personnel.. …………………………………………………… 16
\nWas Snowden a Whistleblower? …………………………………………………………………………………….. 18
\nForeign Influence ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 19
\nWhat Did Snowden Take? ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 20
\nWhat Damage Did Snowden Cause? ……………………………………………………………………………….. 22
\nHow Has the IC Recovered from Snowden? …………………………………………………………………….. 28
\nConclusion – Efforts to Improve Security ………………………………………………………………………… 30
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\n(U) Scope and Methodology
\n(U) Since June 2013, the unauthorized disclosures of former NSA contractor Edward
\nSnowden and the impact of these disclosures on the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) have been
\na subject of continual Committee oversight. The Committee held an open hearing on the
\ndisclosures on June 18, 2013, and, over the next year, held eight additional hearings and
\nbriefings, followed by numerous staff-level briefings on Snowden’s disclosures.
\n(U) In August 2014, then-Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger
\ndirected Committee staff to begin a review of the actions and motivations of Edward Snowden
\nrelated to his removal of more than 1.5 million classified documents from secure NSA networks.
\nThe intent was not to duplicate the damage assessments already under way in the executive
\nbranch; rather, the report would help explain to other Members of Congress-and, where
\npossible, the American people-how the “most massive and damaging theft of intelligence
\ninformation in our history” occurred, 1 what the U.S. Government knows about the man who
\nperpetrated it, and what damage his actions caused.
\n(U) Over the next two years, Committee staff requested hundreds of documents from the
\nIC, participated in dozens of briefings and meetings with IC personnel, and conducted several
\ninterviews with key individuals with knowledge of Snowden’s background and actions, and
\ntraveled to NSA Hawaii to visit Snowden’s last two work locations.
\n(U) The Committee’s product is a review, not an investigation, largely in deference to
\nany criminal investigation or future prosecution. Since he arrived in Russia on June 23, 2013,
\nSnowden has not returned to the United States to face the criminal charges against him.
\nAccordingly, the Committee did not interview or seek documents from individuals whom the
\nDepartment of Justice identified as possible witnesses at Snowden’s trial, including Snowden
\nhimself, nor did the Committee request any matters that may have occurred before a grand jury.
\nInstead, the IC provided the Committee with access to other individuals who possessed
\nsubstantively similar knowledge. Similarly, rather than interview Snowden’s NSA co-workers
\nand supervisors directly, Committee staff interviewed IC personnel who had reviewed reports of
\ninterviews with Snowden’s co-workers and supervisors.
\n(U) The Committee’s review has informed numerous congressionally directed actions
\nand resource allocation decisions in the enacted Intelligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years
\n2014, 2015, and 2016, and in the House-passed Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
\n2017.
\n(U) Early Life
\n(U) Edward Joseph Snowden was born on June 21, 1983, in Elizabeth City, North
\nCarolina. His parents, Lon Snowde~, a Coast Guard chief petty officer, and Elizabeth Snowden,
\n1 Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, HPSCI Worldwide Threats Hearing (Open
\nSession, Feb. 4, 2014).
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\na federal court clerk, moved the family to Annapolis, Maryland, when Edward was a child.2 In
\n2001, his parents divorced. 3
\n(U) By his own account, Snowden was a poor student.4 He dropped out of high school in
\nhis sophomore year and began taking classes at the local community college. 5 Snowden hoped
\nthat the classes would allow him to earn a General Education Diploma (GED), but nothing the
\nCommittee found indicates that he did so. To the contrary, on an applicant resume submitted to
\nNSA in 2012, Snowden indicated that he graduated from “Maryland High School” in 2001;6
\nearlier, in 2006, Snowden had posted on a public web forum that he did not “have a degree of
\nANY type. I don’t even have a high school diploma.” 7
\n(U) After leaving community college, Snowden eventually enlisted in the Army Reserve
\nas a special forces recruit. He left after five months, receiving a discharge in September 2004
\nwithout finishing training courses. 8 Snowden would later claim he had to leave basic training
\nbecause “he broke both his legs in a training accident.” 9 An NSA security official the
\nCommittee interviewed took a different view, telling Committee staff that Snowden was
\ndischarged after suffering from “shin splints,” a common overuse injury. 10
\n(U) Unable to pursue his preferred military career, Snowden turned to security guard
\nwork. In February 2005, the University of Maryland’s Center for the Advanced Study of
\n2 “NSA Leaker Edward Snowden Has Ties to North Carolina,” Raleigh News & Observer (Aug. 1, 2013).
\n3 John M. Broder & Scott Shane, “For Snowden, A Life of Ambition, Despite the Drifting,” New York Times (June
\n15, 2013).
\n4 Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill, and Laura Poitras, “Edward Snowden: the Whistleblower Behind the NSA
\nSurveillance Revelations,” The Guardian (June 11, 2013), available at
\nhttps:\/ \/www .theguardian.com\/world\/2013\/j un\/09\/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance ( accessed June
\n28, 2016).
\n5 Matthew Mosk, et al., “TIMELINE: Edward Snowden’s Life As We Know It,” ABC News, (June 13, 2013).
\n6 See, e.g., Edward Snowden Resume. Regarding “High School Education,” the resume Snowden submitted to
\nNSA’s Tailored Access Operations unit says as follows: For “Grad\/Exit dt,” Snowden wrote “2001-06-21 ;” For his
\n“School,” Snowden wrote “Maryland High School”; and for “Level Achieved”, Snowden wrote “High School
\nGraduate.”
\n7 See supra, note 3. One of Snowden’ s associates claims to have reviewed official educational records that
\ndemonstrate Snowden’s passage ofa high school equivalency test and receipt of high school equivalency diploma in
\nJune 2004. Any receipt of such a diploma in 2004 stands in tension with Snowden’s 2006 claim to not have a
\n“degree of any type [or] … even a high school diploma”; and with his 2012 resume, which stated that he either left or
\ngraduated from “Maryland High School” in 2001.
\n8 “What We Know About NSA Leaker Edward Snowden,” NBC News (June 10, 2013), available at
\nhttp:\/\/usnews.nbcnews.com\/<\/a> _ news\/2013\/06\/10\/18882615-what-we-know-about-nsa-Jeaker-snowden?lite (accessed
\nJune 28, 2016); see also “Edward Snowden Did Enlist For Special Forces, US Army Confirms,” The Guardian
\n(June 10, 2013), available at http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2013\/jun\/10\/edward-snowden-army-special<\/a> forces
\n(accessed September 15, 2016).
\n9 “Edward Snowden Did Enlist For Special Forces, US Army Confirms,” The Guardian (June 10, 2013), available
\nat http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2013\/jun\/l<\/a> 0\/edward-snowden-army-special forces (accessed September 15,
\n2016).
\n10 See supra, note 6. If untreated, shin splints can progress into stress fractures, but the Committee found no
\nevidence that Snowden was involved in a training accident.
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\nLanguage (CASL) sponsored Snowden for a Top Secret security clearance. 11 The investigation
\nfor that clearance turned up only one piece of derogatory information: ~ of
\nSnowden’s said she did not recommend him for access to classified information. Snowden
\nsought counseling ~’ and the counselor recommended him for a position
\nof trust with no reservations. The favorable investigation, combined with a successful
\npolygraph test, enabled Snowden to work at CASL’s lobby reception desk as a “security
\nspecialist.” He worked there for four months, until he was hired by BAE Systems to work on a
\nCIA Global Communications Services Contract.
\n(S\/\/NF) Snowden’s stint as a BAE Systems contractor was similarly short-lived. For less
\nthan a year, he worked as a systems administrator who “managed installations and application
\nrollouts” in the Washington, DC, area.14 In August 2006, he converted from a contractor to a
\nCIA employee. As part of that conversion, Snowden went through an “entrance on duty”
\ns chological evaluation.
\n(U) CIA Employment
\n(U) Snowden was not, as he would later claim, a “senior advisor” at CIA. 16 Rather, his
\nonly position as a CIA employee was as a Telecommunications Information Systems Officer, or
\nTISO. The job description for a TISO makes clear that the position is an entry-level IT support
\nfunction, not a senior executive. TISOs “operate, maintain, install, and manage
\ntelecommunications systems,” and “provide project management and systems integration for
\nvoice and data communications systems,” including “support to customers after installation.” 17
\nEven so, the position may have appealed to Snowden because TISOs “typically spend 60-70% of
\ntheir career abroad.” 18
\n(U) In November 2006–less than three months after starting with CIA-Snowden
\ncontacted the Agency’s Inspector General (IG) seeking “guidance” because he felt he was “being
\n11 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014). Overall document classified Cl\/NF; cited portion classified
\nU\/\/FOUO.
\n12 NSA, FBI, and NCSC, “‘Negative Information’ Found in Edward Snowden’s Personnel Security File,” (Sept. 30,
\n2014). Overall document classified U\/\/FOUO.
\n13 Id.
\n14 CIA Office of Security, “Response to HPSCI Staffer Meeting,” (Nov. 18, 2014). Overall document classified
\nS\/\/NF; cited portion classified S\/\/NF.
\nis Id.
\n16 Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald, “NSA Whistleblower Edward Snowden: ‘I Don’t Want To Live in a Society
\nthat Does These Sorts of Things,” The Guardian (Jun. 9, 2013), available at
\nhttp:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/video\/2013\/jun\/09\/nsa-whistleblower-edward-snowden-interview-video<\/a>
\n(accessed May 2, 2016).
\n17 CIA, Careers and Internships, “Telecommunications Information Systems Officer – Entry\/Developmental,”
\nwww.cia.gov<\/a> (Oct. 2, 2015).
\nis Id.
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\nunfairly targeted” by his supervisor. 19 After entering on duty, Snowden believed there were
\n“morale and retention issues” among his fellow TISOs.20 He raised those concerns with his
\ntraining supervisor, the chief of the communications training unit, but “felt they were left
\nunaddressed.” 21 He next tried the chief and deputy chief of his operational group, but was
\nsimilarly dissatisfied with their response. 22
\n(U) Undeterred, Snowden spent the next week surveying the other TISOs who entered on
\nduty at the same time as him.23 He wrote up his findings and sent them to the CIA’s Strategic
\nHuman Capital Office. Then, instead of attempting to raise his concerns again with his
\nsupervisor or work collaboratively with other TISOs to resolve the concerns, Snowden sent his
\nconcerns to the Deputy Director of CIA for Support-the head of the entire Directorate of
\nSupport and one of the ten most senior executives of CIA.24
\n(U) In his e-mail, Snowden complained about the process of assigning new TISOs to
\noverseas locations, the pay of TIS Os compared to contractors who performed similar work, and
\nthe difficulty for TISOs to transfer laterally to other jobs. 25
\n~ Despite his lack of experience, the 23-year-old Snowden told the Deputy Director he
\nfelt “pretty disenfranchised” because his immediate supervisors did not take his unsolicited
\nrecommendations to heart. 26
\n(U) Snowden told the IG that, after he contacted the Deputy Director for Support, his
\nsupervisors pulled him in to their offices for unscheduled counseling. In his view, they were
\n“extremely hostile” and “seem[ ed] to believe I have trouble bonding with my classmates.” 27
\nThose counseling sessions prompted Snowden to contact the IG to help protect him from
\n“reprisal for speaking truth to power.”
\n(U) One day after receiving his complaint, an IG employee responded to Snowden and
\n,recommended he contact the CIA’s Ombudsman, an official who could help Snowden sort
\nthrough the options available to him and mediate disputes between managers and employees. 28
\nThe IG employee also directed Snowden to the relevant Agency regulation regarding the factors
\nmanagers could consider when deciding to retain an employee beyond the initial three-year trial
\nperiod.29 Whether that response satisfied Snowden is unclear; shortly after receiving it, Snowden
\nsent another message to the IG employee instructing him to disregard the initial request because
\n19 E-mail from Snowden to CIA Office of Inspector General (Nov. 2, 2006), Overall document classified S; cited
\nportion marked U\/\/AIUO.
\n20 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked.
\n21 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked.
\n22 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked.
\n23 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked.
\n24 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked.
\n25 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked.
\n26 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion classified C.
\n27 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked
\n28 E-mail from CIA Office oflnspector General to Edward Snowden (Nov. 3, 2006). Overall document classified S;
\ncited portion classified U\/\/AIUO.
\n29 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion classified U\/\/AIUO.
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\nthe issue had been “addressed.” 30 During the rest of his time at CIA, Snowden did not contact
\nthe IG.
\nf8) After the completion of his training, Snowden was assigned to – in March 2007
\nfor his first TISO assignment. 31 Snowden was, in the words of his supervisor, “an energetic
\nofficer” with a “plethora” of experience on Microsoft operating systems, but he “often does not
\npositively respond to advice from more senior officers, … does not recognize the chain of
\ncommand, often demonstrates a lack of maturity, and does not appear to be embracing the CIA
\nculture. “32
\nf8) A few months after starting in_, Snowden asked to apply for a more senior
\nposition in – as a regional communications officer. His supervisor did not endorse his
\napplication. When he was not selected for the position, Snowden responded by starting “a
\ncontroversial e-mail exchange with very senior officers” in which he questioned the selection
\nboard’s professionaljudgment. 33 Years later, when characterizing his experience as a CIA TISO,
\nSnowden would write that he was “specially selected by [CIA’s] Executive Leadership Team for
\n[a] high-visibility assignment” that “required exceptionally wide responsibility.” 34 The
\ndescription is in tension with his supervisor’s account of a junior officer who “needed more
\nexperience before transitioning to such a demanding position. “35
\nf8) Snowden also modified CIA’s performance review software in connection with his
\nannual performance review, by manipulating the font. 36 This behavior led to Snowden’s recall
\nfor “professional consultations” with the head of all CIA technical officers in Europe. 37 This was
\nthe first but not the only time more senior CIA officers attempted to correct Snowden’s behavior.
\nHis supervisor in – cataloged six counseling sessions between October 2007 and April
\n2008, nearly one per month, regarding his behavior at work. 38 In September 2008, Snowden
\nrequested to leave – “short of tour,” that is, before his scheduled rotation date to a new
\nassignment. 39 The request was denied. Disobeying orders, Snowden traveled back to the
\nWashington, D.C., area for his and his fiancee’s medical appointments. Because of his
\ndisobedience, Snowden’s supervisors recommended he not return to __ 40
\n30 E-mail from Snowden to CIA Office oflnspector General (Nov. 3, 2006). Overall document classified S; cited
\nportion classified U\/\/AIUO.
\n31 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014); overall document classified C\/\/NF; cited portion classified
\nCl\/NF.
\n32 Memorandum for the Record by Senior Telecommunications Officer – Europe, “TISO –Edward
\nSnowden” (Sept. 4, 2008).
\n33 CIA Office of Security, “Response to HP SCI Staffer Meeting,” (Nov. 18, 2014).
\n34 Edward Snowden Resume.
\n35 Memorandum for the Record by Senior Telecommunications Officer – Europe, “TISO –Edward
\nSnowden” (Sept. 4, 2008). Overall document classified S\/\/NF; cited portion classified S.
\n36 Id. Overall document classified S\/\/NF; cited portion classified S.
\n37 Id. Overall document classified S\/\/NF; cited portion classified S.
\n38 Memorandum for the Record by Office in Charge, -\u00b7 “TISO –Edward Snowden” (Dec. 18, 2008).
\nOverall document classified S\/\/NF; cited portion classified S.
\n39 Id. Overall document classified S\/\/NF; cited portion classified S.
\n40 Id. Overall document classified S\/\/NF; cited portion classified S.
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\n5
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\n(8\/\/NF) In January 2009, CIA submitted a “fitness for duty” report for Snowden, an
\nadministrative tool to determine whether Snowden had any work-related medical issues.41 The
\nAgency also assigned him to a ~osition in the Washington, D.C., area so he could be available
\nfor any medical appointments. 4
\n(8\/\/NF) Several years later, Snowden claimed that, while in_, he had ethical
\nqualms about working for CIA.43 None of the memoranda for the record detailing his numerous
\ncounseling sessions mention Snowden expressing any concerns about
\n-\u00b7 Neither the CIA IG nor any other CIA intelligence oversight official or manager
\nhas a record of Snowden expressing any concerns about the legality or morality of CIA activities.
\n(U) Transition to NSA Contractor
\n(C,l\/NF) Around the same time that Snowden returned to the D.C. area, he applied for a
\nposition with an NSA contractor, Perot Systems, as a systems administrator. He was still a CIA
\nemployee at the time and his clearance remained in good standing with no derogatory
\ninformation.44 On March 25, 2009, Perot Systems sponsored Snowden for employment; six days
\nlater, on March 31, NSA Security checked the Intelligence Community-wide security database,
\n“Scattered Castles,” to verify Snowden’s clearance.45
\n(U) Seeing no derogatory information in Scattered Castles, NSA Security approved
\nSnowden for access eight days later, on April 7.46
\n(8\/\/NF) On April 16, Snowden formally resigned as a CIA employee. 47 CIA’s Security
\nOffice u dated his Scattered Castles record on April 20,
\n. Because NSA had checked the
\ndatabase three weeks earlier, NSA Security did not learn of the – in his record at that
\ntime.49 It is unclear ifNSA Security would have treated Snowden’s onboarding any differently
\nhad NSA been aware of
\n41 CIA Office of Security, “Response to HPSCI Staffer Meeting,” (Nov. 18, 2014). Overall document classified
\nSI\/NF; cited portion classified SI\/NF.
\n42 Id. Overall document classified SI\/NF; cited
\n43
\nNSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014). Overall document classified Cl\/NF; cited portion classified
\nCl\/NF.
\n45 Id. Overall document classified Cl\/NF; cited portion classified UI\/FOUO.
\n46 Id. Overall document classified Cl\/NF; cited portion classified UI\/FOUO.
\n47 Id. Overall document classified Cl\/NF; cited portion classified Cl\/NF.
\n48 CIA Office of Security, “Response to HPSCI Staffer Meeting,” (Nov. 18, 2014). Overall document classified
\nSI\/NF.
\n49 NSA, Edward Snowden Time Ii~ 30, 2014 ). Overall document classified Cl INF; cited portion classified
\nCl\/NF. The alerting function for – in Scattered Castles has since been fixed.
\nTOP 8ECRET\/\/HC8 0 P\/8I G,qK,l\/ORCffi>UNOFORN
\n6
\nTOP 8ECRET\/\/HC8 0 P\/8I G\/TK\/\/ORCON\/l’JOFORN
\n(U) From May 2009 to February 2012, Snowden worked in a variety of roles supporting
\nIC contracts for Dell, which had purchased Perot Systems in 2009. He worked as an IT systems
\nadministrator at NSA sites in .. for a little more than a year, where he supported NSA’s
\nAgency Extended Information Systems Services (AXISS) contracts. 50
\n(U) One co-worker recalled that while he was working in .. , Snowden traveled to
\nThailand to learn how to be a ship’s captain, but never finished the training course. According to
\nanother co-worker, at some point before he was stationed in .. , Snowden took a trip to China
\nand spoke about his admiration for the Chinese people and Chinese martial arts. 51 The same coworker
\nremembered Snowden expressing his view that the U.S. government had overreached on
\nsurveillance and that it was illegitimate for the government to obtain data on individuals’
\npersonal computers. 52 There are no indications of how Snowden attempted to square this belief
\nwith his continued employment in support of the foreign signals intelligence mission ofNSA.
\n(U) Other co-workers from Snowden’s time in 1111rec alled him as someone frustrated
\nwith his lack of access to information. One remembered Snowden complaining how he lacked
\naccess at CIA;53 another recalled him attemptin~ to gain access to information about the war in
\nIraq that was outside of his job responsibilities. 4 Although Snowden did not obtain the
\ninformation he was looking for, he later claimed it was “typical” of the U.S. government to cover
\nup embarrassing information. 55
\n(C\/\/NF) In September 2010, Snowden returned to the United States and Dell attempted to
\nmove him to a position where he would support IT systems at CIA. Because of the ~ in
\nScattered Castles, however, CIA refused to grant Snowden access to its information. Dell put
\nSnowden on leave for three months while waiting for a position that did not require a security
\nclearance to open up. Eventually, one did: In December 2010, Snowden started work in an
\nuncleared “systems engineer\/pre-sales technical role” for Dell supporting a CIA contract. 57
\n(U) Snowden was also due for a periodic background reinvestigation in the fall of 2010.
\nOPM contractor U.S. Information Services completed that review in May 2011, finding no
\nderogatory information. According to an after-the-fact review by the National
\nCounterintelligence Executive, the reinvestigation was “incomplete” and “did not present a
\ncomplete picture of Mr. Snowden.” 58 Among its other flaws, the investigation never attempted
\nto verify Snowden’s CIA employment or speak to his CIA supervisors, nor did it attempt to
\nindependently verify Snowden’s self-report of a past security violation-areas where further
\nso Id. Overall document classified C\/\/NF; cited portion classified U\/\/FOUO.
\n51 Interview with NSA Atto~(Feb. 8, 2016) (report of interview with-\u00b7
\n52 Id. The same co-worker, -\u00b7 also mentioned that Snowden considered himself a privacy advocate.
\n” Interview with NSA Attom,b. 8, 2016) (report of interview with -\u00b7
\n54 Id. (report of interview with .
\n55 Id. (report of interview with .
\n56 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014). Overall document classified C\/\/NF; cited portion classified
\nCl\/NF.
\n57 Id. Overall document classified C\/\/NF; cited portion classified C\/\/NF.
\n58 National Counterintelligence Executive, Technical and quality review of the April 2011 Single Scope Background
\nInvestigation- Periodic Reinvestigation on Mr. Snowden,” (Aug. 23, 2013); overall document classified U\/\/FOUO.
\nTOP 8ECRET\/\/HC8 0 P\/8I G\/TK\/\/ORCON!l’tOFORN
\n7
\nTOP 8ECRETh’HC8 0 P\/8I G\/TK\/\/ORCON\/NOFORN
\ninformation could have alerted NSA to CIA’s concerns. 59 Contrary to best practices, the
\ninvestigation also failed to develop any character references beyond the two people Snowden
\nhimself listed, his mother and his girlfriend. 60
\n(8) From August 31, 2011, to January 11, 2012, Snowden took a leave of absence from
\nHis Dell co-workers offered conflicting accounts of how he spent his leave, 61
\n(U) NSA Hawaii – Contract Systems Administrator
\n(U) Snowden returned from leave in early 2012 and took a position as a general systems
\nadministrator supporting Dell’s AXISS work at NSA’s Hawaii Cryptologic .Center.62 As part of
\nthe change in station, he took a counterintelligence polygraph examination. The first exam was
\n“inconclusive,” but did not lead to NSA Security developing any further information; the second
\nwas successful. 63 At the end of March 2012, Snowden moved to Hawaii.
\n(U) The job Snowden performed in Hawaii was similar to his duties during the previous
\nthree years with Dell. He was a field systems administrator, working in technical support office
\nofNSA Hawaii. Some of his work involved moving large numbers of files between different
\ninternal Microsoft SharePoint servers for use by other NSA Hawaii employees. Although most
\nNSA Hawaii staff had moved to a new building at the start of 2012, Snowden and other technical
\nsupport workers remained in the Kunia “tunnel,” an underground facility originally built for
\naircraft assembly during World War Two.
\n(U) Snowden had few friends among his co-workers at NSA Hawaii. 64 Those co-workers
\ndescribed him as “smart” and “nerdy,” but also someone who was “arrogant,” “introverted,” and
\n“squirrelly”; an “introvert” who frequently ‘jumped to conclusions. “65 His supervisors found his
\nwork product to be “adequate,” but he was chronically late for work, frequently not showing up
\nuntil the afternoon. 66 Snowden claimed he had trouble waking up on time because he stayed up
\nlate playing video games. 67
\n(U) Few of Snowden’s Hawaii co-workers recall him expressing political opinions. One
\nremembered a conversation in which Snowden claimed the Stop Online Piracy Act and the
\n59 Id.
\n60 Id.
\n61 Interview with NSA Attorney (Feb. 8, 2016).
\n62 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014). Dell Federal was a subcontractor to CACI International for
\nNSA’s AXISS Field IT support contracts. E-mail from NSA Legislative Affairs to HPSCI Staff, “Responses to
\nYour Questions on Read and Return Documents for HPSCI Media Leaks Review,” (Dec. 2, 2014, at 3:47 PM).
\nOverall document cited U\/\/FOUO; cited portion classified U\/\/FOUO. \u00b7
\n63 Id.
\n64 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
\n65 Interview with NSA Attorney (Jan. 28, 2016).
\n66 Id.
\n61 Id.
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\n8
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\nProtect Intellectual Property Act would lead to online censorship. 68 In the same conversation,
\nSnowden told his colleague that he had not read either bill.69 The same co-worker recalled
\nSnowden once claiming that, based on his meetings with Chinese hackers at a conference, the
\nUnited States caused problems for China but China never caused problems for the United
\nStates.70 Although no other co-worker in Hawaii recalled Snowden expressing any sympathy for
\nforeign governments, a different co-worker from the Kunia tunnel remembered that Snowden
\ndefended the actions of Private Bradley Manning. 71
\n(U) One incident early in Snowden’s time at NSA Hawaii merits further description. In
\nJune 2012, Snowden installed a patch to a group of servers on classified networks that supported
\nNSA field sites, including NSA Hawaii. Although the patch was intended to fix a vulnerability
\nto the classified servers, the patch caused the servers to crash, resulting in a loss of network
\naccess for several NSA sites.72 One ofNSA’s senior technical support managers, a government
\nemployee, fired off an e-mail to a number of systems administrators, asking who had installed
\nthe troublesome patch and sarcastically chiding that individual for failing to test the patch before
\nloading it. 73
\n(U) Snowden replied to all the recipients and added the deputy head ofNSA’s technical
\nservices directorate to the e-mail thread. This individual was several levels above the immediate
\ngovernment supervisors whom Snowden could have contacted first. Calling the initial e-mail
\n“not appropriate and … not helpful,” Snowden accused the middle manager of focusing on
\n“evasion and finger-pointing rather than problem resolution.” 74
\n(U) Snowden received a quick rebuke. The NSA civilian employee in Washington
\nresponsible for managing field AXISS contracts sent Snowden an e-mail telling him his response
\nwas “totally UNACCEPTABLE” because “[u]nder no circumstances will any contractor call out
\nor point fingers at any government manager whether you agree with their handling of an issue or
\nnot.”75 She further instructed Snowden that ifhe “felt the need to discuss with any management
\nit should have been done with the site management you are working with and no one else.” 76
\n~ That weekend, Snowden came in to work
\n77
\n68 Interview with NSA Attorney (Jan. 28, 2016) (citing co-worker 111111).
\n69 Id. (citing co-worker
\n70 Id. (citing co-worker
\n71 Id.; Interview with N ttomey (Feb. 8, 2016) ( citing co-worker.).
\n72 Interview with (Oct. 28, 2015).
\n73 E-mail from , “RE: (U) ICA-tcp issues with KB2653956,” (Jun. 21, 2012, at 1:20AM). Overall
\ndocument classified U\/\/FOUO.
\n74 E-mail from Edward Snowden, “RE: (U) ICA-tcp issues with KB2653956,” (Jun. 21, 2012, at 1 :OOPM). Overall
\ndocument classified U\/\/FOUO.
\n75 E-mail from_, “(U) E-mail you sent in response to ICA-tcp issues with a patch,” (Jun. 22, 2012, at
\n3:26AM). Overall document classified U\/\/FOUO.
\n76 Id.
\n77 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
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\n9
\nTOP 8ECRET\/\/HC8 0 P\/8I G\/TK\/\/ORCON\/NOFORN
\n(U) The following Monday, he sent an e-mail to the NSA middle manager saying he
\n“understood how bad this e-mail looked for what was intended to be a relatively benign
\nmessage” and acknowledging that the e-mail “never should have happened in the first place.” 78
\nThe manager accepted the apology, explaining that his problem with the message “had nothing
\nto do with the content but with distribution” because he did not understand “the elevation of the
\nissue to such a high management level”; that is, to the deputy head ofNSA’s technical services
\ndirectorate. 79
\n(U) Snowden would later publicly claim that his “breaking point”-the final impetus for
\nhis unauthorized downloads and disclosures of troves of classified material-was March 2013
\ncongressional testimony by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. 80
\n(SI\/REL TO USA, FVEY) But only a few weeks after his conflict with NSA managers,
\non July 12, 2012-eight months before Director Clapper’s testimony-Snowden began the
\nunauthorized, mass downloading of information from NSA networks. 81
\n(U) Snowden ‘s Downloading and Removal Process
\n(U) Snowden used several methods to gather information on NSA networks, none of
\nwhich required advanced computer skills.
\n(U) At first, Snowden used blunt tools to download files en masse from NSA networks.
\nTwo non-interactive downloading tools, commonly known as “scraping” tools, called “wget”
\nand DownThemAll! were available on NSA classified networks for legitimate system
\nadministrator purposes. 84 Both tools were designed to allow users to download large numbers of
\nfiles over slow or unstable network connections. 85 Snowden used the two tools with a list of
\nwebsite addresses, sometimes writing simple programming scripts to generate the lists. For
\n78 E-mail from Edward Snowden, “RE: (U) ICA-tcp issues with KB2653956” (Jun. 25, 2012, at 2:31AM). Overall
\ndocument classified U\/\/FOUO.
\n79 E-mail from_, “RE: (U) ICA-tcp issues with KB2653956” (Jun. 25, 2012, at 1:51AM). Overall
\ndocument classified U\/\/FOUO.
\n80 “Transcript: ARD Interview with Edward Snowden,” (Jan. 26, 2014), available at
\nhttps:\/\/edwardsnowden.com\/20<\/a> 14\/01\/27 \/video-and-interview-with-edward-snowden.
\n81 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014). Overall document classified C\/\/NF; cited portion classified
\nC\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY.
\n82 NSA, “Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA Networks,” (Oct. 29, 2014).
\nOverall document classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY; cited ortion classified S\/\/REL.
\n83
\nNSA, “Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA Networks,” (Oct. 29, 2014).
\nOverall document classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion classified U\/\/FOUO
\n85 Id. Overall document classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion classified U\/\/FOUO
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\n10
\nTOP 8ECRET\/\/HC8 0 P\/81 GffK\/\/ORCOl’UNOFORN
\ninstance, ifNSA webpages were set up in numerical order (i.e., page 1, page 2, page 3, and so
\non), Snowden programmed a script to automatically collect the pages. 86 Neither scraping tool
\ntargeted areas of potential privacy or civil liberties concerns; rather, Snowden downloaded all
\ninformation from internal NSA networks and classified webpages of other IC elements. 87
\n(U) Exceeding the access required to do his job, Snowden next began using his systems
\nadministrator privileges to search across other NSA employees’ personal network drives and
\ncopy what he found on their drives.91 Snowden also enlisted his unwitting colleagues to help
\nhim, asking several of his co-workers for their securit1 credentials so he could obtain
\ninformation that they could access, but he could not.9 One of these co-workers subsequently
\nlost his security clearance and resigned from NSA employment. 93
\n(8\/\/REL) Snowden infringed the privacy of at least \u2022 NSA personnel by searching
\ntheir network drives without their permission, removing a co y of any documents he found to be
\nof interest. 94 5 \u2022
\n86 Id. Overall document classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion classified U\/\/FOUO
\n87 Id. Overall document classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion classified U\/\/FOUO
\n88 NSA, “HPSCI Recollection Summary Paper,” (Jan. 26, 2015). Overall document classified S\/\/NF; cited portion
\nclassified S\/\/NF. See infra for a more detailed description of the files Snowden removed.
\n89 NSA, “Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA Networks,” (Oct. 29, 2014).
\nOverall document classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY; cited ortion classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY.
\n90 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
\n91 NSA, “Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA Networks,” (Oct. 29, 2014).
\nOverall document classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion classified U\/\/FOUO.
\n92 HPSCI Memorandum for the Record, NSA Briefing to HPSCI Staff(July 22, 2013).
\n93 NSA Legislative Affairs Memorandum to Staff Director and Minority Staff Director (Feb. 10, 2014). Overall
\ndocument classified U; document not portion-marked.
\n94 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016); NSA, “Number of Personal Network Drives Searched,”
\n(Mar. 14, 2016). Overall document classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion classified S\/\/REL TO USA,
\nFVEY.
\n95 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
\n96 Id.
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\n11
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\n(U) Snowden’s searches quickly expanded beyond surveillance programs. Some of the
\npersonal network drives Snowden searched belonged to individuals involved in the hiring
\ndecision for a job for which Snowden had applied. On these individuals’ network drives,
\nSnowden searched for human resources files and files related to the promotion and hiring
\ndecisions.97
\n(S\/\/REL) Snowden first saved the information he gathered on his personal network
\ndrive.98 At some point in 2012, a fellow systems administrator noticed that Snowden’s personal
\ndrive used a significantly larger amount of memory than most other employees and asked him
\nwhat he was doing. 99 Snowden responded that he was downloading system atches for NSA
\nnetworks, a task that was consistent with his job responsibilities. 100
\n(U) In late August 2012, Snowden requested a ”thin-on-thick” machine for his desk. 102
\nAt the time, NSA Hawaii was in the middle of a transition from “thick clients,”-physical
\ndesktop computers at each worker’s desk, to “thin clients,”-virtual desktops hosted on servers.
\nOn a ”thin client,” there is no traditional desktop computer at workers’ desks, rather, each user
\nhas a client that provides a display and input, with computing processors, memory, and storage
\non network servers. Snowden’s “thin-on-thick” setup meant that he had a physical desktop
\ncomputer at his desk, but he only used its computing power and hard drive to operate a virtual
\ncomputer. This “thin-on-thick” setup allowed NSA Hawaii to reap some of the benefits of thin
\nclients, such as uniform security policies and improved information sharing, without the cost of
\nbuying new thin client devices. NSA Hawaii could also make use of a large quantity of “thick
\nclient” desktop computers it had recently purchased. 103 Yet the thin-on-thick setup opened up a
\nloophole for Snowden to exploit.
\n(S\/\/NF) Snowden knew NSA’s networks recorded and logged every action by users on
\nthick client workstations while connected to the network. 104 He also knew that auditing controls
\n97 NSA, “Number of Personal Network Drives Searched,” (Mar. 14, 2016). Overall document classified S\/\/REL TO
\nUSA, FVEY; cited portion classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY.
\n98 NSA, “Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA Networks,” (Oct. 29, 2014).
\nOverall document classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY.
\n99 Interview with NSA Attorney (Jan. 28, 2016).
\n100 Id.
\n101 NSA, “Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA Networks,” (Oct. 29, 2014).
\nOverall document classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY.
\n102 NSA Response to HPSCI Question on Thin-on-Thick Computer at Snowden’s Workstation (Mar. 2, 2016).
\nOverall document classified S\/\/NF; cited portion classified S\/\/NF. Because thin-on-thick workstations were
\nprevalent at NSA Hawaii at the time, Snowden did not have to go through any special approval process to obtain a
\nthin-on-thick workstation.
\n103 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
\n104 NSA, “Response to HPSCI Document Re uest – Question # IO” (Ma
\nS\/\/NF; cited ortion classified S\/\/NF.
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\n12
\nTOP SECRET\/\/HCS O P\/81 GITKJ\/ORCON\/NOFORN
\nwould send an alert to network security ersonnel if he tried to remove data from the network.
\n106
\n(SI\/REL) There is no evidence that NSA was aware of this specific vulnerability to its
\nnetworks. Because Snowden’s legitimate work responsibilities involved transferring large
\namounts of data between different SharePoint servers, the large quantities of data he copied as
\nStep I of the exfiltration process did not trigger any NSA alerts for abnormal network traffic. 109
\n105 NSA, “Purpose of Functioning CD-ROM and USB Drive,” (Mar. 14, 2016). Overall document classified S\/\/REL
\nUSA, FVEY; cited portion classified S\/\/REL USA, FVEY.
\n106 NSA, “Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA Networks,” (Oct. 29, 2014).
\nOverall document classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY. See also id
\nfor additional details on the NSA forensics rocess that allowed for the reconstruction of Snowden’ s methods.
\n107
\nInterview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
\n109 NSA, “Response to HPSCI Document Request – Question# 1 O” (May 1, 2015). Overall document classified
\nS\/\/REL USA, FVEY; cited portion classified S\/\/REL USA, FVEY. Although Snowden, as a systems administrator,
\nwas authorized to transfer large quantities of data on the NSA network, he was not authorized to remove data from
\nthe network for his intended purpose of later transferring it to removable media so he could disclose it.
\nTOP SECRET\/\/HCS O P\/81 G-\/TK\/\/ORCON\/NOFORN:
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\n(U) NSA Hawaii – Gaining More Access and Departing for China and Russia
\n(U) After he began removing documents in the summer of 2012, Snowden spent several
\nmonths applying for employment as a NSA civilian. In September 2012, he took a test to obtain
\na position in the Tailored Access Operations office, or TAO, the group within NSA responsible
\nfor computer network exploitation operations. After finding the test and its answers among the
\ndocuments he had taken off of NSA networks, he passed the test. 111 Based on the test result and
\nhis exaggerated resume, 112 TAO offered him a position. The pay grade TAO offered, howevera
\nGS-12 position that would have paid around $70,000 per year-was not sufficient for
\nSnowden. He instead believed he should have been offered a GS-15 position that would have
\npaid nearly $120,000 per year. 113
\n(U) In early December 2012, Snowden attempted to contact journalist Glenn Greenwald.
\nTo hide his identity, Snowden used the pseudonym “Cincinnatus” and asked Greenwald for his
\npublic encryption key so Snowden could send him documents securely. 115 In January 2013, he
\ncontacted filmmaker Laura Poitras. 116
\n(U) In late March 2013, Snowden finally obtained a new position, not with NSA as a
\ncivilian but with Booz Allen Hamilton as a contractor. 117 He would be a SIGINT Development
\nAnalyst, meaning he analyzed foreign networks and cyber operators to help NSA’s National
\nThreat Operation Center (NTOC) in its cyber defense efforts. NTOC’s operations helped defend
\nU.S. military networks from attacks by foreign cyber actors, including Russia and China.
\n110 NSA, “Purpose of Functioning CD-ROM and USB Drive,” (Mar. 14, 2016).
\n111 Bryan Burrough, Sarah Ellison, and Suzanna Andrews, “The Snowden Saga: A Shadow land of Secrets and
\nLight,” Vanity Fair (May 2014), available at www.vanityfair.com\/news\/politics\/2014\/05\/edward-snowden-politicsinterview<\/a>
\n(quoting NSA Deputy Director Rick Ledgett).
\n112 Edward Snowden Resume (June 28, 2012). Snowden described himself as a “Senior Advisor” at
\n“Dell\/NSNCIA\/DIA” rather than as a systems administrator. Resume inflation was a habit for Snowden-in the
\nfiles he sent to Glenn Oreenwald, he described himself as an NSA Special Advisor “under corporate cover” and as a
\nformer CIA “field officer.” See Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide at 32.
\n113 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
\n114 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014).
\n115 Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide at 7 (2014).
\n116 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014).
\n117 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014).
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\n(C\/\/NF) In his new position, Snowden had access to more documents on NSA networks,
\nmany of which he later removed. 118 Because there was not a thin-on-thick workstation at
\nSnowden’s new desk, he had to return after hours to his old desk-located at a different NSA
\nfacility a twenty-minute drive away-to exfiltrate documents 119
\nHis NTOC job did not require him to visit his old building, so he had no reason other than
\ndocument removal to return. 120
\n(U) On May 15, 2013, Snowden told his Booz Allen Hamilton supervisor that he needed
\nto take two weeks of leave without pay to return to the continental United States for medical
\nreasons. 121 According to his supervisor, Snowden had previously claimed he suffered from
\nepilepsy, 122 although he never presented evidence of a diagnosis from any doctor. 123 Four days
\nlater, Snowden flew to Hong Kong without telling either his girlfriend or his mother (who was in
\nHawaii at the time visiting him) where he was going. 124 The Committee found no conclusive
\nevidence indicating why Snowden chose Hong Kong as his destination, but, according to later
\naccounts, Snowden believed he would be safe in the city based on its tradition of free speech. 125
\n(U) On Friday May 31, Snowden’s leave without pay ended. The following Monday,
\nJune 3, Booz Allen Hamilton started looking for him. 126 Two days later, on June 5, Booz Allen
\nreported Snowden to NSA’s Office of Security and Greenwald published the first ofSnowden’s
\ndisclosures. 127
\n(U) Four days after the fir<\/p>\n
\nhimself as the source of the disclosures. 128 According to press reports, between June 10 and June
\n23, Snowden hid in the apartments of refugees in Hong Kong while his lawyer worked to arrange
\ntransit for him out of the city. 129 On June 23, 2013, he flew from Hong Konf< to Moscow’s
\nSheremetyvevo airport, accompanied by Wikileaks activist Sarah Harrison. 1 0 The next day, he
\nfailed to appear on a flight to Havana and disappeared from public view until August 1, 2013,
\nwhen Russia granted him asylum and he left the airport. 131 As of September 15, 2016, Snowden
\nremains in Russia.
\n118 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
\n119 NSA, “Response to HPSCI Document Request – Question #2” (June 24, 2015). Overall document classified
\nS\/\/NF; cited portion classified C\/\/REL.
\n120 Id. Cited portion classified C\/\/REL.
\n121 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014).
\n122 Interview with NSA Attorney (Jan. 28, 2016) (citing BAH supervisor).
\n123 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
\n124 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014); Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
\n125 See Luke Harding, The Snowden Files (2014) at 108.
\n126 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014).
\n127 Glenn Greenwald, “Verizon Order: NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Americans Daily,” The
\nGuardian (June 5, 2013).
\n128 See Luke Harding, The Snowden Files (2014) at 146-52.
\n129 Theresa Tedesco, “How Snowden Escaped,” National Post (Sept. 6, 2016), available at
\nhttp:\/\/news.nationalpost.com\/features\/how-edward-snowden-escaped-hong-kong\/<\/a>
\n130 Luke Harding, The Snowden Files (2014) at 224.
\n131 Id. at 229-30, 250.
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\nAdditionally, although
\nSnowden’s objective may have been to inform the public, the information he released is also
\navailable to Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean intelligence services; any terrorist with
\nInternet access; and many others who wish to do harm to the United States.
\n(S\/\/NF) When he fled Hong Kong, Snowden left a number of encrypted com uter hard
\ndrives behind.
\n-133
\n(U) Communications with Intelligence Oversight Personnel
\n(U) In March 2014 public testimony to the European Parliament, Snowden claimed that
\nhe reported his concerns about “clearly problematic programs to more than ten distinct officials”
\nat NSA. 134 Snowden also publicly stated that he “specifically expressed concern about [NSA’ s]
\nsuspect interpretation of the law,” inviting “members of Congress to request a written answer to
\nthis question [from the NSA].” 135 The Committee requested such an answer from NSA, 136 and
\nfound no evidence to support these claims. The Committee further found no evidence that
\nSnowden attempted to communicate concerns about the legality or morality of intelligence
\nactivities to any officials, senior or otherwise, during his time at either CIA or NSA.
\n(U) As already described, one of Snowden’s Hawaii co-workers recalls him defending
\nBradley Manning’s actions, 137 another remembered him criticizing bills under consideration in
\nCongress that he regarded as harmful to online privacy 138 and criticizing U.S. foreign policy
\ntoward China. 139 None of his co-workers or his supervisors, however, recall Snowden raising
\nconcerns about the legality or morality of U.S. intelligence activities. 140
\n132 DIA, Information Review Task Force-2, “Initial Assessment” (Dec. 26, 2013), at 3. Overall document classified
\nTS\/\/Sl\/\/RSEN\/OC\/NF; cited portion classified S\/\/NF.
\n133 HPSCI Memorandum for the Record, Insider Threat\/Counterintelligence Monthly Briefing (Feb. 4, 2014).
\n134 Edward Snowden, Testimony to the European Parliament (Mar. 7, 2014) at 6.
\n135 Bryan Burrough, Sarah Ellison, and Suzanna Andrews, “The Snowden Saga: A Shadowland of Secrets and
\nLight,” Vanity Fair (May 2014), available at www.vanityfair.com\/news\/politics\/20l4\/05\/edward-snowden-politicsinterview<\/a>.
\n136 Letter from HPSCI Chairman Mike Rogers to Director James Clapper (Aug. 5, 2014) (requesting, among other
\nthings, “[a]ll communications between Edward Snowden and any IC or Department of Defense compliance, legal, or
\nInspector General personnel”).
\n137 See supra, note 71.
\n138 See supra, note 68.
\n139 See supra, note 70.
\n140 Interview with NSA Attorney (Jan. 28, 2016) (citing supervisors, co-workers). The co-worker who recalled
\nSnowden defending Manning expressly mentioned that Snowden did not believe Americans’ privacy rights were
\nbeing violated and that Snowden had no qualms about the legality of the NSA mission. See Interview with NSA
\nAttorney (Feb. 8, 2016) ( citing co-worker \u2022.
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\n(U) Neither did Snowden raise any concerns with IC oversight personnel. As previously
\ndiscussed, Snowden contacted the CIA IG within a few months of his start at the Agency to
\ncomplain about training issues and management style, but he later dropped the complaint. 141 He
\ndid not contact the NSA IG, the Department of Defense (DOD) IG, or the Intelligence
\nCommunity (IC) IG, all of whom could have responded to a complaint regarding unlawful
\nintelligence activities. Nor did Snowden attempt to contact the Committee or the Senate Select
\nCommittee on Intelligence through the procedures available to him under the Intelligence
\nCommunity Whistleblower Protection Act (IC WP A). He could have done this anonymously if
\nhe feared retribution.
\n(U) Snowden did, however, contact NSA personnel who worked in an internal oversight
\noffice about his personal difficulty understanding the safeguards against unlawful intelligence
\nactivities. While on a trip to NSA headquarters at Ft. Meade in June 2012, Snowden visited a
\ntraining officer in the internal oversight and compliance office of the Signals Intelligence
\nDirectorate. The training officer remembered that Snowden was upset because he had failed
\nNSA’s internal training course on how to handle information collected under FISA Section 702,
\nthe legal authority by which the government can target the communications of non-U.S. persons
\noutside the United States. 142
\n(U) The internal training is a rigorous computer-based course that walks NSA employees
\nand contractors through the laws and regulations that govern the proper handling of information
\ncollected under the authority of FISA Section 702, including information collected under the
\nprograms Snowden would later disclose, PRISM and “upstream” collection. At the end of the
\ncourse, NSA personnel take a scenario-based test to gauge their comprehension of the material;
\nif they do not receive a minimum score on the test, they must retake the computer-based training
\ncourse. All of the answers to the test questions can be found within the training material. After
\nthree failures of the computer-based course, the individual must attend an in-person training
\ncourse to ensure they are able to understand the rules governing Section 702, including privacy
\nprotections.
\n(U) According to the training officer, Snowden had failed the computer-based training
\ncourse and was afraid of the consequences. 143 He was also upset because he believed the course
\nwas rigged. 144 After the training officer explained to Snowden that he could take the course
\nagain-and that careful reading would allow him to find all of the answers to the test-Snowden
\nbecame calm and left the oversight and compliance office. 145 At no point during his visit to the
\ncompliance office did Snowden raise any concerns about how NSA used Section 702, PRISM, or
\n“upstream” collection. 146
\n141 See supra, notes 19 through 30.
\n142 NSA, “OVSC1203 Issue Regarding Course Content and Trick Questions,” overall document classified TS\/INF;
\ncited portion classified U\/\/FOUO.
\n143 Interview with – (Oct. 28, 2015).
\n144 Id
\n14s Id.
\n146 Id.
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\n(U) In April 2013-after he had removed documents multiple times from NSA systemsSnowden
\ncontacted the NSA Office of General Counsel with a question about a different training
\ncourse. 147 He was curious about the mandatory training on United States Signals Intelligence
\nDirective 18, which is the foundational authority for NSA’s collection activities overseas
\ntargeting foreigners. 148 Specifically, he believed the training erroneously accorded the same
\nprecedence to statutes and executive orders. A few days later, an NSA attorney clarified that
\nwhile executive orders have the force of law, they cannot trump a statute. 149 Snowden did not
\nrespond to that e-mail; he also did not raise any concerns about the legality or morality of U.S.
\nintelligence activities. 150
\n(U) Was Snowden a Whistlehlower?
\n(U) As a legal matter, during his time with NSA, Edward Snowden did not use
\nwhistleblower procedures under either law or regulation to raise his objections to U.S.
\nintelligence activities, and thus, is not considered a whistleblower under current law. He did not
\nfile a complaint with the DOD or IC IG’s office, for example, or contact the intelligence
\ncommittees with concerns about fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, or violations of law.
\nInstead, Snowden disclosed classified information to the press.
\n(U) Snowden, however, has argued that even a lawful disclosure would have resulted in
\nretaliation against him.
\n(U) Among other things, Snowden has argued that he was unable to raise concerns about
\nNSA programs because he was not entitled to protection as an IC whistleblower given his status
\nas a contractor. (He was with Booz Allen at the time of his leaks to the press.) But the 1998 IC
\nWP A applies to IC employees as well as contractors. Although the statute does not explicitly
\nprohibit reprisals, the IC WPA channel nevertheless enables confidential, classified disclosures
\nand oversight, as well as a measure of informal source protection by Congress. The statute
\nspecifically authorizes IC contractors to inform the intelligence committees of adverse actions
\ntaken as a consequence of IC WPA-covered disclosures.
\n(U) Moreover, explicit protection against such actions was conferred on Snowden by
\nDoD regulation 5240 1-R. Snowden’s unauthorized disclosures involved Executive Order (EO)
\n12333 activities as well as activities conducted under FISA. At least with respect to intelligence
\nactivities authorized under E.O. 12333-and, according to the DoD Senior Intelligence
\nOversight Official, activities conducted under other authorities-5240 1-R requires employees
\nand contractors of a DoD intelligence element to report “questionable activities,” or “conduct
\nthat constitutes, or is related to, [an] intelligence activity that may violate the law, any Executive
\n147 E-mail from Edward Snowden to NSA Office of General Counsel (Apr. 5, 2013, at 4:11PM), overall document
\nclassified U\/\/FOUO; cited portion classified U\/\/FOUO.
\n148 Id., cited portion classified U\/\/FOUO.
\n149 E-mail from NSA Office of General Counsel Attorney to Edward Snowden (Apr. 8, 2013, at 1 :37PM), overall
\ndocument classified U\/\/FOUO; cited portion classified U\/\/FOUO.
\n150 IC on the Record, “Edward J. Snowden email inquiry to the NSA Office of General Counsel,” (May 29, 2014)
\n(“There was not additional follow-up noted.”).
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\nOrder or Presidential directive … or applicable DoD policy[.]” 151 5240 1-R also says that DoD
\nsenior leaders shall “ensure that no adverse action is taken against any employee [ or contractor]
\nbecause the employee reports [questionable activities]” pursuant to the regulation. 152 The IC
\nIG’s Executive Director for Intelligence Community Whistleblowing & Source Protection
\n(ICW&SP), a former employee of the DoD IG’s staff, has advised HPSCI staff that these
\nprocedures applied to Snowden during his employment as an NSA contractor and would have
\nhelped to shield him from retaliation for voicing his objections internally.
\n(U) Finally, Snowden also likely was covered by 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 2409 (Section 2409). As
\nwritten at the time of Snowden’s leaks, 153 Section 2409 was primarily focused on protecting
\nDoD contractors from reprisals if they properly disclosed a “violation of law related” to a DoD
\ncontract. However, Snowden has not advanced any contract-related claims about NSA
\nsurveillance. Rather, he generally disagreed with NSA surveillance programs on policy and
\nconstitutional grounds.
\n(U) If Snowden did have concerns with programs related to a DoD contract, then the
\nprior version of Section 2409 authorized him to raise those concerns without fear of retaliation
\nwith a “Member of Congress, a representative of a Committee of Congress, an Inspector
\nGeneral, the Government Accountability Office, a Department of Defense employee responsible
\nfor contract oversight or management, or an authorized official of an agency or the Department
\nof Justice[.]”
\n(U) Foreign Influence
\n151 Department of Defense Regulation 5240 1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence
\nComponents that Affect U.S. Persons, C.15.2.1, 3.1.1 (Dec. 7, 1982) (emphasis added).
\n152 Id at C.14.2.3.2.
\n153 Important amendments to Section 2409, which took effect in July 2013, substantially altered the statute. Among
\nother things, the updates extended reprisal protections to DoD subcontractors as well as contractors, and widened the
\nlist of persons to whom contractors and subcontractors could make disclosures. At the same time, the amendments
\nalso narrowed Section 2409’s coverage by explicitly excluding employees and contractors ofIC elements. However,
\nthat limitation, like other alterations to Section 2409, did not take effect until July 2013-after Snowden had
\nunlawfully disclosed NSA material to journalists.
\n154 See, e.g., Testimony of Gen. Keith Alexander at 30, HPSCI Hearing (Jun. 13, 2013) (“It is not clear to us if there
\nis a foreign nexus. There [are] some things; it does look odd that someone would go to Hon Kong to do this.”)
\n155
\n15
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\n(TS\/\/HCS\/OC\/NF) Since Snowden’s arrival in Moscow, he has had, and continues to
\nhave, contact with Russian intelligence services.
\nand in June 2016,
\nthe deputy chairman of the Russian parliament’s defense and security committee asserted that
\n“Snowden did share intelligence” with his government. 161
\n(U) What Did Snowden Take?
\nIn light of the volume at stake, it is likely that even
\nSnowden does not know the full contents of all 1.5 million documents he removed.
\n(U) One thing that is clear, however, is that the IC documents disclosed in public are
\nmerely the tip of the iceberg.
\n(S\/\/NF) As of August 19, 2016, press outlets had published or referenced_
\ntaken by Snowden. 164 This represents less than one-tenth of one percent of the nearly 1.5 million
\ndocuments the IC assesses Snowden removed. 165
\n160 Id. Cited material classified S\/\/OC\/\/NF.
\n161 Mary Louise Kelly, “During Tenure in Russia, Edward Snowden Has Kept A Low Profile,” National Public
\nRadio (June 29, 2016), available at http:\/\/www.npr.org\/2016\/06\/29\/483890378\/during-tenure-in-russia-edwardsnowden-<\/a>
\nhas-ke t-a-low- rofile.
\n16
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\n(U) The 1.5 million documents came from two classified networks, an internal NSA
\nnetwork called NSANet and an IC-wide Top Secret\/Sensitive Compartmented Information
\nnetwork called the Joint Warfighter Information Computer System (JWICS). If printed out and
\nstacked, these documents would create a pile more than three miles high. 166
\n165 NSA, “HPSCI Recollection Summary Paper,” (Jan. 26, 2015) Overall document classified S\/\/NF; cited portion
\nclassified S\/\/NF.
\n166 Testimony of Mr. Scott Liard, Deputy Director for Counterintelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, HPSCI
\nHearing (Jan. 27, 2014), at 7-8. The 1.5 million document count does not include 374,000 blank documents
\nSnowden downloaded from the Department of the Army Intelligence Information Service (DAIIS) Message
\nProcessing System. See DIA, Information Review Task Force-2, “Fourth Quarter Report, 2014” (Dec. 31, 2014), at
\nxvii.
\n167 NSA, “HPSCI Recollection Summary Paper,” (Jan. 26, 2015). Overall document classified S\/\/NF; cited portion
\nclassified S\/\/NF.
\n168 NSA, “Timing of Recollection and Security Flags,” (Mar. 14, 2016). Overall document classified S\/\/REL TO
\nUSA, FVEY; cited portion classified S\/\/REL.
\n169 Id.
\n110 Id.
\n171 NSA, “HPSCI Recollection Summary Paper,” (Jan. 26, 2015).
\n172 Id.; see also DIA, Information Review Task Force-2, “Fourth Quarter Report, 2014” (Dec. 31, 2014), at xvii.
\n173 Id; see also DIA, Information Review Task Force-2, “Fourth Quarter Report, 2014” (Dec. 31, 2014), at xvii.
\n174 Id; see also DIA, Information Review Task Force-2, “Fourth Quarter Report, 2014” (Dec. 31, 2014), at xvii.
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\n(8) The vast majority of the documents Snowden removed were unrelated to electronic
\nsurveillance or any issues associated with privacy and civil liberties.
\n(U) What Damage Did Snowden Cause?
\n(S\/INF) Over the past three years, the Intelligence Community and the Department of
\nDefense (DoD) have carried out separate reviews-with differing methodologies-of the
\ncontents of all 1.5 million documents Snowden removed. It is not clear which of the documents
\nSnowden removed are in the hands of a foreign government. All of the documents that have
\nbeen publicly disclosed 176–can be accessed b foreign militaries
\nand intelligence services as well as the public.
\n(U) Out of an abundance of caution, DoD therefore reviewed all 1.5 million documents to
\ndetermine the maximum extent of the possible damage.
\n(TS\/INF) As of June 2016, the most recent DoD review identified 13 high-risk issues,
\nwhich are identified in the following table. 179 Eight of the 13 relate to
\ncapabilities ofDoD; if the Russian or Chinese
\ngovernments have access to this information, American troops will be at greater risk in any
\nfuture conflict. 180
\nE-mail from NSA Legislative Affairs (Aug. 22, 2016, at 4:48PM). Overall document classified S\/\/REL TO
\nUSA, FVY; cited portion classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY.
\n177 DIA, Information Review Task Force-2, “Initial Assessment” (Dec. 26, 2013), at 3. Overall document classified
\nTS\/\/SV\/RSEN\/OC\/NF; cited portion classified S\/\/NF.
\n178 Mary Louise Kelly, “During Tenure in Russia, Edward Snowden Has Kept A Low Profile,” National Public
\nRadio (June 29, 2016), available at http:\/\/www.npr.org\/2016\/06\/29\/483890378\/during-tenure-in-russia-edwardsnowden-<\/a>
\nhas-kept-a-low-profile.
\n179 DoD, Mitigation Oversight Task Force, “Quarterly Report” (Oct. 2015), at 8. Overall document classified
\nTS\/\/Sl\/TK\/\/ORCON\/NF; cited portion classified TS\/INF
\n180 Id.
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\nTOP 8ECRET\/\/HC8 0 P\/8I G\/TK\/\/ORCON\/l’l”OFORN –
\n–
\n–
\n(U) The Intelligence Community, by contrast, has carried out a damage assessment for
\nonly a small subset of the documents Snowden removed. And unlike IC damage assessments for
\nprevious unauthorized disclosures , 181 the IC assessment on Snowden does not contain an
\nassessment of Snowden ‘s background and motive, an assessment of whether he was the agent of
\na foreign intelligence service, or recommendations for how to improve security in the IC. In its
\nreview, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) , a component of the Office
\nof the Director of National Intelligence, divided the documents Snowden removed into three
\n“tiers.” 182
\n181 See, e.g., Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “Ana Belen Montes : A Damage Assessment ,”
\n(July ! , 2004) . Overall document classified S\/\/NF.
\n182 NCSC, “Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
\nAttributed to Edward Snowden , 1 January 20 I 5 through 31 August 20 I 5,” (Apr. 8, 2016) , at 5. Overall document
\nclassified TS\/\/HCS-P\/Sl-G \/TK\/\/OC\/NF; cited portion classified U\/\/FOUO.
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\n(8\/\/REL) Tier One: Documents that have been disclosed in the media, either in whole
\nor in part. As of August 19, 2016, press outlets had published or referenced 1111fil es taken by
\nSnowden.183
\n(TS\/181\/lOC\/NF) Tier Two: Documents that, based on forensic analysis, Snowden
\nwould have collected in the course of collecting Tier One, but have not yet been disclosed to the
\nublic. The IC assesses these documents are likel in the hands of the media.
\n(8\/\/NF) The IC damage assessment of Tier One documents is still ongoing, but, as oflate
\nMay 2016, the IC had no plans to c out a damage assessment of the documents in Tier Two
\nor Tier Three. 186
\nAs a result, the IC’s
\ndamage assessment cannot be considered a complete accounting of the damage Snowden caused
\nto U.S. intelligence.
\n(U) However, even the IC’s limited damage assessment of documents in Tier One
\nindicates that Snowden’s disclosures caused massive damage to national security. A few
\nexamples, listed below, illustrate the scale of the damage .
\n\u2022
\n183 E-mail from NSA Legislative Affairs (Aug. 22, 2016, at 4:48PM). Overall document classified S\/\/REL TO
\nUSA, FVEY; cited portion classified S\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY.
\n184 NCSC, “Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
\nAttributed to Edward Snowden, I January 2015 through 31 August 2015,” (Apr. 8, 2016), at 5. Overall document
\nclassified TS\/\/HCS-P\/SI-G\/TK\/\/OC\/NF, cited portion classified TS\/\/SI\/OC\/NF.
\n185 Id., cited portion classified TS\/\/SI\/OC\/NF.
\n186 HPSCI Staff Briefing with NCSC (May 25, 2016).
\n187 NCSC, “Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
\nAttributed to Edward Snowden, I January 2015 through 31 August 2015,” (Apr. 8, 2016), at I. Overall document
\nclassified TS\/\/HCS-P\/SI-G\/TK\/\/OC\/NF; cited portion classified S\/\/NF.
\n188 HPSCI Staff Memorandum for the Record, “NSA Notification of Resulting
\nfrom Recent Media Disclosures,” (July 8, 2014). Overall document classified TS\/\/SI\/\/NF.
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\n24
\n1s9 Id.
\n190 Id.
\n\u2022
\n\u2022
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\n0
\n0
\n0
\n191 NCSC, “Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Inform ation
\nAttributed to Edward Snowden , I August 2014 through 31 December 2014,” (Dec . 22, 2015) , at 25. Overall
\ndocument classified TS\/\/HCS-P\/SI-G\/TK\/\/OC\/NF; cited portion classified S\/\/Sl\/\/NF .
\n192 Presidential Policy Directive 28, “Signals Intelligence Activities” (Jan . 17, 20 I 4) .
\n193 Letter from Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper to Chairman Devin Nunes and Ranking Member
\nAdam Schiff (Jun. 23, 2015). Overall document classified TS\/\/SI\/\/NF, cited portion classified TS\/\/SI\/\/NF .
\n194 NSA, “Response to Congressionally Directed Action:
\n_ ,” (Nov . 17, 2014), at 2-4. Overall document classified TS\/\/Sl\/\/NF ; cited portion classified
\nTS\/\/Sl\/\/NF .
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\n25
\nTOP 8ECRET\/\/HC8 0 P\/81 GITK\/\/ORCOW\/NOFORN
\n\u2022
\n0
\n\u2022
\n\u2022
\n195 HPSCI Staff Briefing with ODNI (Sept. 6, 2016).
\n196 HPSCI Staff Briefing with NCSC, NSA, CIA, and FBI (Jun. 17, 2016).
\n197 NCSC, “Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
\nAttributed to Edward Snowden, 1 August 2014 through 31 December 2014 – HCS-0 Annex” (Dec. 22, 2015), .
\nOverall document classified TS\/\/HCS-0\/SI\/\/OC\/\/NF; cited portion classified S\/\/HCS-0\/\/0C\/NF.
\n198 NCSC, “Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
\nAttributed to Edward Snowden, 1 January 2015 through 31 August 2015,” (Apr. 8, 2016), at 11. Overall document
\nclassified TS\/\/HCS-P\/SI-G\/TK\/\/OC\/NF; cited portion classified TS\/\/SI\/\/NF.
\n199 HPSCI Staff Briefing with NCSC, NSA, CIA, and FBI (Jun. 17, 2016).
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\n26
\nTOP SECRET\/\/HCS O P-\/SI Q,qKJ\/OR:CON\/NOFORN
\n0
\n0
\n\u2022
\n\u2022
\n200 NCSC, “Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
\nAttributed to Edward Snowden, I January 2015 through 31 August 2015,” (Apr. 8, 2016), at 11. Overall document
\nclassified TS\/\/HCS-P\/SI-G\/TK\/\/OC\/NF; cited portion classified S\/\/HCS-P\/SI\/\/OC\/NF.
\n201 Id., cited portion classified S\/\/HCS-P\/SI\/\/OC\/NF.
\n202 NSA, “Response to Request for Information Re: ,” (Dec. 16, 2014).
\nOverall document classified TS\/\/SI\/\/NF; cited portion classified TS\/\/SI\/\/NF.
\n203 CIA, Memorandum for Congress, “In Response to Questions on Decreased Collection Possibly Caused by
\nUnauthorized Disclosures since June 2013,” (July 20, 2016), at 2. Overall document classified TS\/\/HCS-0-P
\nCRD\/SI\/\/OC\/NF; cited portion classified TS\/\/SI\/REL TO USA, FVEY).
\n204 ODNI, Recouping Intelligence Capabilities Brief (Jun. 7, 2016), at 8. Overall document classified TS\/\/SI\/\/NF;
\ncited portion classified TS\/\/SI\/\/NF; ODNI Briefing to HPSCI Staff on Recouping Intelligence Capabilities Brief
\n(July 13, 2016).
\n20S Id.
\n206 ODNI, “Remediation of Unauthorized Disclosures” (June 2015), at 3. Overall document classified
\nTS\/\/SI\/\/OC\/NF; cited portion classified TS\/\/SI\/OC\/NF.
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\n\u2022
\n\u2022
\n(U) How Has the IC Recovered from Snowden?
\n(TS\/\/SI\/\/NF) There is no IC-wide estimate for the total cost to the government of
\nremediating Snowden’s disclosures. However, a mid-2015 study by ODNI’s Systems and
\nResources Analysis Group estimated that NSA and CIA will spend over Fiscal
\nYears 2016 and 2017 to recover from the damage Snowden’s disclosures caused to SIGINT
\ncapabilities. 211
\n(TS\/1-SI\/\/NFA) s a whole, the IC will undoubtedly spend even more. The
\nestimate represents a conservative assessment of the amount CIA and NSA will spend to rebuild
\nSIGINT capabilities that were damaged by Snowden’s disclosures. The estimate captures only
\ntwo years of spending and does not reflect investments made before Fiscal Year 2016 or planned
\ninvestments for Fiscal Year 2018 and beyond. Moreover, it does not capture the costs associated
\nHPSCI Staff Memorandum for the Record, “Upcoming Unauthorized Disclosures of
\n~ Overall document classified TS\/\/SI\/\/NF. \u00b7
\nODNI SRA, “FYl7 Major Issue Studies- Recouping Intelligence Capabilities,” (June 7, 2016), at 9. Overall
\ndocument classified TS\/\/SI\/\/NF; cited portion classified TS\/\/SI\/\/NF.
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\nwith the IC’s damaged relationships with foreign and corporate partners, the opportunity cost of
\nthe time and resources the IC and DOD have spent mitigating the damage of the disclosures, or
\nthe costs of improved security measures across the federal government.
\n(U) Snowden’s actions also exposed significant vulnerabilities in the IC’s information
\nsecurity. Although it is impossible to reduce the risk of an insider threat like Snowden to zero,
\nrelatively simple changes such as automatically detecting the malicious use of scraping tools like
\n“wget,” physically disabling removable media from the workstations ofNSA personnel who lack
\na work reason to use removable media, and implementing two-person controls to transfer data by
\nremovable media would have dramatically reduced the quantity of files Snowden could have
\nremoved or stopped him altoge~er.
\n(U) The Committee remains concerned that NSA, and the IC as a whole, have not done
\nenough to reduce the chances of future insider threats like Snowden.
\n(Cl\/REL TO USA, FVEY) In the aftermath ofSnowden’s disclosures, NSA compiled a
\nlist ofllll security improvements for its networks. These improvements, called the “Secure the
\nNet” initiatives, contained many steps that would have stopped Snowden, such as two-person
\ncontrol for transfer of data by removable media, and many broader security improvements, such
\nas reducing the number of privileged users and authorized data transfer agents, and moving
\ntoward a continuous evaluation model for background investigations. 212 In July 2014, more than
\na year after Snowden’s first disclosures, many of these “Secure the Net” initiatives-including
\nsome relatively simple initiatives, such as two-stage controls for systems administrators-had
\nnot been completed. 213 In August 2016, more than three years after Snowden’s first disclosures,
\nfour of the 111i1ni1tia tives remained outstanding. 214
\n(U) In the House-passed Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, the
\nCommittee directed the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IO) to carry out an
\nassessment of information security at NSA, including whether NSA had successfully remediated
\nthe vulnerabilities exposed by Snowden.
\n(U) In August 2016, DOD IO issued its report, finding that NSA needed to take
\nadditional steps to effectively implement the privileged access-related “Secure the Net”
\ninitiatives.215
\n\u00b7 (U) In particular, DOD IO found that NSA had not: fully implemented technology to
\noversee privileged user activities; effectively reduced the number of privileged access users; or
\neffectively reduced the number of authorized data transfer agents. In addition, contrary to the
\n212 NSA, “Secure the Net Initiatives,” (Aug. 22, 2016). Overall document classified C\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY.
\n213 NSA, “Secure the Net Initiatives,” (July 2014). Overall document classified C\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY.
\n214 NSA, “Secure the Net Initiatives,” (Aug. 22, 2016). Overall document classified C\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY.
\n215 Department of Defense Inspector General, Report 2016-129, “The National Security Agency Should Take
\nAdditional Steps in Its Privileged Access-Related Secure the Net Initiatives” (Aug. 29, 2016). Overall document
\nclassified S\/\/NF, cited portion classified U\/\/FOUO.
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\n“Secure the Net” initiatives, NSA did not consistently secure server racks and other sensitive
\nequipment in data centers, and did not extend two-stage authentication controls to all high-risk
\nusers.216 Recent security breaches at NSA underscore the necessity for the agency to improve its
\nsecurity posture.
\n(U) And even though NSA has been the victim ofrecent breaches, it is not the only IC
\nagency where information security needs to be improved. For instance, a recent CIA Inspector
\nGeneral report found that CIA has not yet implemented multi-factor authentication controls such
\nas a physical token for general or privileged users of the Agency’s enterprise or mission
\nsystems.217
\n(U) As a recent Committee report concluded, the introduction of the Intelligence
\nCommunity Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE) should produce an improved security
\nenvironment in the IC.218 And as that report noted, although IC data will be more secure and
\nbetter protected under IC ITE than it is today, from both internal and external threats, IC ITE will
\nalso increase risks in different areas.219 These risks will require dedicated attention to ensure IC
\nITE reaches its full potential for an improved security environment.
\n(U) Conclusion – Efforts to Improve Security
\n(U) Although it is impossible to reduce the chance of another Snowden to zero, more
\nwork can and should be done to improve the security of the people and computer networks that
\nkeep America’s most closely held secrets.
\n(U) Since the beginning of Snowden’s disclosures, the Committee has directed the IC to
\ncarry out a number of studies and security improvements to reduce the risk of another insider
\nthreat. Among its other oversight efforts, the Committee has:
\n\u2022 (U) Authorized an additional for insider threat detection efforts in Fiscal
\nYear 2014. Consistent with a spend plan and updated insider threat strategy provided to
\nCongress, 60 percent of these funds were to be used for insider threat detection and the
\nremaining 40 percent toward continuous evaluation; 220 .
\n\u2022 (U) Directed the DNI to ensure that the President’s National Insider Threat Policy and
\nMinimum Standards were fully implemented on TS\/SCI networks and all NIP-funded
\n216 Id., cited portion classified C\/\/REL TO USA, FVEY.
\n217 CIA Office oflnspector General, “Review of National Security Systems Required by the Cybersecurity Act of
\n2015,” Report No. 2016-0022-AS (Aug. 2016). Overall report classified S\/\/NF, cited portion classified S\/\/NF.
\n218 HPSCI Report, “Assessing IC ITE’s Security Posture,” (Feb. 4, 2016). Overall report classified S\/\/NF, cited
\nportion classified U.
\n219 Id. at 25, cited portion classified U\/\/FOUO.
\n22\u00b0 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. 113-
\n126, pp. 15-16.
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\nnetworks at CIA, DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, FBI, and DOE by October 1, 2014; 221
\n\u2022 (U) Directed the DNI, as the Security Executive Agent, to establish a structure for a
\ncomprehensive continuous evaluation system for holders of TS\/SCI within 270 days of
\nthe enactment; 222
\n\u2022 (U) Directed the DNI, in coordination with the USD(I) to review whether the continuous
\nevaluation process, insider threat auditing tools, and background investigation processes
\nshould consider different kinds of information to detect potential leakers than the current
\nprocess collects to detect traditional security threats; 223
\n\u2022 (U) Directed the DNI to review the management controls on privileged access, to include
\nSystems Administrators; 224
\n\u2022 (U) Directed the NSA to implement a “two person rule” for Tier 3 Systems
\nAdministrators and select Tier 2 Systems Administrators and directed the DNI to report
\nto the Intelligence Committees on actions he is undertaking to lead the other IC elements
\nin enacting a similar two person rule, or similar safeguards; 225
\n\u2022 (U) Directed the DNI to attempt to reduce the number of Tier 3 System Administrators
\nand ensure consistency in tier ratings across the IC;226
\n\u2022 (U) Directed the DNI to expand Scattered Castles to contain all TS\/SCI clearance holders
\nand list any pertinent exceptions or “flags” as close to real-time as possible; 227
\n\u2022 (U) Directed the DNI to ensure that insider threat security measures were fully applied to
\ncontractors and contractor facilities; 228
\n221 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. I 13-
\n126, p. 16; Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the House-passed Intelligence Authorization Act for
\nFiscal Year 2014 pp. 32.
\n222 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. I 13-
\n126, p. 16; Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the House-passed Intelligence Authorization Act for
\nFiscal Year 2014 pp. 32-33.
\n223 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. I 13-
\n126, p. 16; Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the House-passed Intelligence Authorization Act for
\nFiscal Year 2014 p. 33.
\n224 Id.
\n22s Id.
\n226 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. I 13-
\n126, p. 16; Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the House-passed Intelligence Authorization Act for
\nFiscal Year 2014 p. 34.
\n221 Id.
\n22s Id.
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\n\u2022 (U) Required the IC to continuously evaluate the eligibility of personnel to access
\nclassified information, to develop procedures for automatically sharing derogatory
\ninformation between agencies, and other improvements to the reinvestigation process; 229
\n\u2022 (U) Encouraged the DNI to make a determination of how periodic reinvestigations will
\nbe handled in concert with a continuous evaluation program; 230
\n\u2022 (U) Directed an IC analysis of private sector policies to reduce insider threats; 231
\n\u2022 (U) Directed a DNI-led review once every three years of all U.S. government positions
\nwith access to classified information; 232
\n\u2022 (U) Directed the DNI, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of
\nDefense, and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, to develop and
\nimplement procedures that govern whether and how publicly available information may
\nbe used in the security clearance process; 233
\n\u2022 (U) Required each IC element to implement a program to enhance security reviews of
\nindividuals applying for access to classified information; 234
\n\u2022 (U) Required the Inspector General of each federal agency that operates national security
\nsystems to report on, among other things, information security practices to detect data
\nexfiltration and other threats; 235
\n\u2022 (U) Directed NSA to produce a plan for completing security improvements to its
\nnetworks by the end of Calendar Year 2018, including enclaves and systems used outside
\nofNSA-controlled facilities; and236
\n229 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. 113-126, Title V.
\n23\u00b0 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. 113-
\n126, p. 16
\n231 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, P.L. 113-293, \u00a7 308.
\n232 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, P.L. 113-
\n293, p.11.
\n233 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, P.L. 113-
\n293, pp. 11-12.
\n234 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Division M, Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal
\nYear 2016, P.L. 114-113, \u00a7 306.
\n235 Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Division N, Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2016, P.L. 114-113,
\n\u00a7 406
\n236 Classified Annex to Accompany the Joint Explanatory Statement to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
\nYear 2016, Division M, Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2016, P.L. 114-113, p. 19.
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\n\u2022 (U) Directed the Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) to carry out an
\nassessment of post-Snowden information security improvements at CIA, DIA, FBI,
\nNGA, NRO, and ODNI.237
\n(U) As the Fiscal Year 2017 Intelligence Authorization Act moves toward enactment and
\nCongress begins its consideration of the President’s Fiscal Year 2018 budget request, the
\nCommittee looks forward to working with the IC to ensure our nation’s secrets receive the
\nsecurity they deserve.
\n237 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, H.R.
\n5077, p. 93.
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