Unveiled by Cryptome and the Media – Free Syrian Army Photos 5

Free Syrian Army Photos 5

[Image]

This citizen journalism image provided by Shaam News Network (SNN), taken on Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012, purports to show children killed by shabiha, pro-government militiamen, being prepared for burial in a mass grave in Daraya, Syria. According to activists’ accounts, government forces retook the Damascus suburb of Daraya from rebel control three days earlier and have since gone on a killing spree. Reports of the death toll range widely from more than 300 to as many as 600. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS IS UNABLE TO INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY THE AUTHENTICITY, CONTENT, LOCATION OR DATE OF THIS CITIZEN JOURNALIST IMAGE. AP

[Image]

This citizen journalism image provided by Shaam News Network SNN, taken on Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012, purports to show people killed by shabiha pro-government militiamen being prepared for a mass burial in Daraya, Syria. According to activists’ accounts, government forces retook the Damascus suburb of Daraya from rebel control three days ago and have since gone on a killing spree. Reports of the death toll range widely from more than 300 to as many as 600. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS IS UNABLE TO INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY THE AUTHENTICITY, CONTENT, LOCATION OR DATE OF THIS CITIZEN JOURNALIST IMAGE. AP

[Image]

This citizen journalism image provided by Shaam News Network SNN, taken on Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012, purports to show people killed by shabiha, pro-government militiamen, being buried in a mass grave in Daraya, Syria. According to activists’ accounts, government forces retook the Damascus suburb of Daraya from rebel control three days ago and have since gone on a killing spree. Reports of the death toll range widely from more than 300 to as many as 600. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS IS UNABLE TO INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY THE AUTHENTICITY, CONTENT, LOCATION OR DATE OF THIS CITIZEN JOURNALIST IMAGE. AP

[Image]

This citizen journalism image provided by Shaam News Network SNN, taken on Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012, purports to show people who were killed by shabiha, pro-government militiamen in Daraya, Syria. According to activists’ accounts, government forces retook the Damascus suburb of Daraya from rebel control three days ago and have since gone on a killing spree. Reports of the death toll range widely from more than 300 to as many as 600. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS IS UNABLE TO INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY THE AUTHENTICITY, CONTENT, LOCATION OR DATE OF THIS CITIZEN JOURNALIST IMAGE. AP

[Image]

Syrian rebel fighter, Tawfiq Hassan, 23, a former butcher, poses for a picture, after returning from fighting against Syrian army forces in Aleppo, at a rebel headquarters in Marea on the outskirts of Aleppo city, Syria, Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012. In their previous lives, they were butchers, barbers, construction workers and university students. Now they are rebels fighting a civil war they hope will end the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. AP

 

[Image]

Syrian rebel fighter, who goes by the name Saqir Abu Zahid, 22, a former University student, poses for a picture after returning from fighting Syrian forces in Aleppo at a rebel headquarters in Marea on the outskirts of Aleppo city, Syria, Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012. AP

[Image]

Syrian rebel fighter, Abu Hammam, 23, a former member of the Syrian security forces, poses for a picture, after returning from fighting against Syrian army forces in Aleppo, at a rebel headquarters in Marea on the outskirts of Aleppo city, Syria, Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012. AP

[Image]

Syrian rebel fighter, Wisam Al-Saleh, 21, poses for a picture, after returning back from fighting against Syrian army forces in Aleppo, at a rebel headquarters in Marea on the outskirts of Aleppo city, Syria, Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012. AP

[Image]

Syrian rebel fighter, Mohammed Yaseen, 24, a former construction worker, poses for a picture, after returning from fighting against Syrian army forces in Aleppo, at a rebel headquarters in Marea on the outskirts of Aleppo city, Syria, Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012. AP

[Image]

Syrian rebel fighter, Ali Alnajjr, 20, a former school student, poses for a picture, after returning from fighting against Syrian army forces in Aleppo, at a rebel headquarters in Marea on the outskirts of Aleppo city, Syria, Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012. AP

[Image]

Syrian rebel fighter, Ahmed Al-Saleh, 22, a former policeman, poses for a picture after returning from fighting against Syrian army forces in Aleppo, at a rebel headquarters in Marea on the outskirts of Aleppo city, Syria, Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012. AP

[Image]

Syrian rebel fighter, Badir Farouh, 17, poses for a picture after returning from fighting against Syrian forces in Aleppo at a rebel headquarters in Marea on the outskirts of Aleppo city, Syria, Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012. AP

[Image]

Syrian rebel fighter, Mohammed Sami, 22, a barber, poses for a picture after returning from fighting against Syrian army forces in Aleppo, at a rebel headquarters in Marea on the outskirts of Aleppo city, Syria, Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012. AP

[Image]

Syrian rebel fighter, Amir Hajji, 20, poses for a picture, after returning back from fighting against Syrian army forces in Aleppo, at a rebel headquarters in Marea on the outskirts of Aleppo city, Syria, Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012.  AP

[Image]

Syrian rebel fighter, Mohammed Abu Razouk, 27, poses for a picture, after returning back from fighting against Syrian army forces in Aleppo, at a rebel headquarters in Marea on the outskirts of Aleppo city, Syria, Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012. AP

[Image]

Syrian rebel fighter, Mustafa Abu Shaheen, 19, a former construction worker, poses for a picture after returning from fighting against Syrian army forces in Aleppo, at a rebel headquarters in Marea on the outskirts of Aleppo city, Syria, Sunday, Aug. 26, 2012. AP

[Image]

An injured Free Syrian Army group leader discusses the plan with his fighters, in Aleppo’s district of Al-Zebdieh August 26, 2012. Reuters

[Image]

Members of the Free Syrian Army discuss strategies in Aleppo’s district of Al-Zebdieh August 26, 2012. Reuters

[Image]

Free Syrian Army fighters drive through the area after missiles fired from a fighter jet hit a petrol tanker in the Bab al-Nayrab district in Aleppo August 26, 2012. Reuters

[Image]

A Free Syrian Army fighter runs away to take cover from a sniper shooting near the Salah El Dine neighbourhood of Syria’s southwest city of Aleppo August 26, 2012. Reuters

[Image]

A Free Syrian Army sniper takes his position in the Salah El Dine neighbourhood of Syria’s southwest city of Aleppo August 26, 2012. Reuters

[Image]

A Free Syrian Army sniper takes his position in the Salah El Dine neighbourhood of Syria’s southwest city of Aleppo August 26, 2012. Reuters

[Image]

[Image]

Free Syrian Army fighters walk in the Salah El Dine neighbourhood of Syria’s southwest city of Aleppo August 26, 2012. Reuters

[Image]

A Free Syrian Army fighter walks by a power pack detonator for an explosive in the Salah El Dine neighbourhood of Syria’s southwest city of Aleppo August 26, 2012. Reuters

[Image]

Free Syrian Army fighters walk in the Salah El Dine neighbourhood of Syria’s southwest city of Aleppo August 26, 2012. Reuters

[Image]

Ruins line a street in the middle of the Salah El Dine neighbourhood of Syria’s southwest city of Aleppo August 26, 2012. Reuter

[Image]

Rebel fighters fire against pro- Syrian government forces at the al-Mashad neighbourhood in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo on August 25, 2012. Syrian rebels say they are digging in for a war of attrition in Aleppo, where what was being billed as the ‘mother of all battles’ is now dragging on into a second month of bloody stalemate. Getty

[Image]

A woman walks with her children as a blue sheet provides cover from snipers during sectarian clashes between Sunni Muslims and Alawites in the Sunni area of Tripoli August 25, 2012. At least three people including an Sunni Islamist commander were killed on Friday in a fifth day of sporadic sectarian fighting in Lebanon’s northern city of Tripoli triggered by the conflict in neighbouring Syria. Reuters

[Image]

Young Syrian boys search through the ruins of destroyed houses following an airstrike by regime forces in Syria’s northern city of Aleppo on August 24, 2012. Syrian forces blitzed areas in and around the Aleppo, activists said, as Western powers sought to tighten the screws on embattled President Bashar al-Assad. Getty

[Image]

A Syrian man reacts outside an operation room at a hospital in Syria’s northern city of Aleppo as doctors give treatment to his grandchildren following an air strike by regime forces on the city on August 24, 2012. Syrian forces blitzed areas in and around the Aleppo , activists said, as Western powers sought to tighten the screws on embattled President Bashar al-Assad. Getty

[Image]

Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad (R) shakes hands with Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of the Iranian parliamentary committee for national security and foreign policy, before a meeting in Damascus August 26, 2012, in this handout photograph released by Syria’s national news agency SANA. Reuters

[Image]

[Image]

Syrian Vice President Faruq al-Sharaa (R) is pictured with the chairman of the Iranian Shura Council’s Committee for Foreign Policy and National Security Alaeddin Boroujerd who is on an official visit to Damascus on August 26, 2012. Al-Sharaa made his first public appearance in over a month following rumors that he had tried to defect. Getty

TOP-SECRET – Developing Self-Sustaining Security Force Capabilities

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/CALL-Partnership.png

 

The Multi-National Corps–Iraq logistics staff and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) support operations cell, an element of the Iraqi Assistance Group, merged at the operational level to publish plans, policies, and procedures that met the strategic aims of the coalition forces, the national goals of the government of Iraq, and the joint campaign plan published by Multi-National Force–Iraq. Corps sustainment planners published operational objectives for execution at the operational and tactical levels in an effort to develop a sustainment-based system for the ISF. Based on experiences and observations over the past 18 months, the partners, advisors, and planners gathered the best practices for advising and assisting security forces at all levels of the sustainment system. This handbook presents partnering considerations in developing a fundamental base for a self-sustaining, host nation security force.

Although based largely on the experiences of units deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2007–2009, the sustainment development ideas and concepts presented in this book are worthy of consideration by any leader assigned the challenging task of developing host nation logistics. This publication is not just for logisticians. All leaders are charged to sustain the force, and many of the lessons learned over the past two years highlight gaps at the collective task/green-tab leader level. Many of the leaders in the Iraqi Army; Iraqi Police; National Police; Department of Border Security; Ministers of Defense, Interior, Transportation, Health, Oil; and many others, including coalition partners were themselves challenged by force sustainment and are critical elements to the solution.

Key Concepts

• Commanders must avoid providing direct support to host nation security forces—if a system exists—and instead provide recommendations supporting the development of a host nation sustainment culture.
• Host nation logistics development requires organizations to assess processes outside their level of war to determine friction points.
• Leaders must recognize the importance of moving from initial assessment and continuing the planning process and plan implementation.
• Development of a process to synchronize efforts across all headquarters to gain unity of effort without unity of command is key to developing host nation systems.
• Systematic problems should be solved rather than symptomatic problems.
• Development of sustainment capabilities for local security forces is essential to establishing a viable local security structure.

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

CALL-Partnership

Autor – So laufen die “GoMoPa”-Machenschaften ab

Wir haben uns malein bisschen schlau gemacht. Es war auch nicht wirklich schwer,hinter die Taktik und Geschäftspraktiken von Gomopa und KlausMaurischat zu kommen. Denn wer schon einmal (oder wie im Falle vonKlaus Maurischat auch mehrfach!) vorbestraft ist, der hinterlässteine dicke fette Spur im Internet…

Eine Hypothese

Nehmen wir einhypothetisches Beispiel: Mal angenommen, Sie sind ein Unternehmer miteiner gut gehenden Firma, die einen exzellenten Ruf genießt, wiewäre es da, wenn Ihnen jemand einfach so androht, er veröffentliche„schlimme Dinge“ über Sie und Ihr Unternehmen. Sie wärengeschockt, richtig?! Vor allem, weil Sie ein sauberer Geschäftsmannsind. Ihrem Erpresser ist das aber völlig egal, der nur eines will:Mit wenig Arbeit an viel Geld kommen. Da aber auf legalem Wege mitihm niemand mehr etwas zu tun haben möchte (immerhin ist er mehrfachvorbestraft – und nicht nur wegen eines einfachenKaufhausdiebstahls als 15-jähriger), sucht sich der „kleine Klaus“eine neue Geldquelle. Er nimmt sich das Geld von ehrbarenGeschäftsleuten.

Weiter in unseremBeispiel: Sie bekommen also Post und sollen zahlen. Wie aber kanneine solche Zahlung abgewickelt werden? Haben Sie schon einmal eine„Rechnung über Erpressungsleistungen“ in den Händen gehalten?Wohl kaum. Man muss also etwas findiger sein: Sie bekommen einen„Beratungsvertrag“ angeboten. Der „kleine Klaus“ wird nun –in einem Markt, von dem er null Ahnung hat! – Ihr Berater. Sie, derSie das Geschäft von der Pike auf gelernt haben und sowohl den Marktals auch Ihre Kunden kennen, brauchen also ab sofort einen Berater.Aha! Das Interessante dabei: Ihr Berater braucht gar keine Ahnung vomGeschäft zu haben. Er hat vorsorglich ein paar gar nicht netteUnwahrheiten über Sie im Internet publiziert. Versuchen Sie mal, dieeinfach zu löschen: Sie werden sich die Zähne ausbeißen! Außerdemoperieren sie offiziell nicht von Deutschland aus. Obwohl sievielleicht in Vörden oder Krefeld wohnen. Sie als Geschädigter, alshinterhältig Erpresster, haben jedenfalls keine Chance, etwas gegendiese Machenschaften zu unternehmen. Deswegen sind Sie vielleichtgeneigt, dennoch einem „Beratungsvertrag“ zuzustimmen.

DerBeratungsvertrag. Ein branchenübliches Instrument. Nur verlangt manein etwas branchenunübliches Honorar von Ihnen. Es liegt vielleichtim unangenehmen sechsstelligen Bereich. Sie schlucken. Aber wassollen Sie machen? Die Veröffentlichungen können Sie Ihre kompletteExistenz kosten. Also entschließen Sie sich erst einmal zu bezahlen.Doch hört der Spuk dann auf? – nein! Die Dateien werden nur ineinen gesicherten internen Bereich verschoben – sie sind jederzeitwieder abrufbar! Und damit landen Sie in der Spirale der Erpressung.Denn was einmal funktioniert hat, kann immer wieder funktionieren.Solange, bis Ihnen und Ihrer Firma endgültig die Luft wegbleibt.

TOP-SECRET – Restricted U.S. Army Special Forces Tactical Facilities Manual

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/USArmy-SF-TacticalFacilities.png

 

Field Manual (FM) 3-05.230, Special Forces Tactical Facilities, supports key United States (U.S.) Army Special Forces (SF) doctrine. An SF tactical facility (TACFAC) is defined as any secure urban or rural facility that enables Army special operations forces (ARSOF) to extend command and control (C2), provides support for operations, and allows operational elements to influence a specified area. SF TACFACs include a variety of secure locations for SF operations, including (but not limited to) firebases, camps, and team houses.

PURPOSE

As with all doctrinal manuals, FM 3-05.230 is authoritative but not directive. It serves as a guide but does not preclude SF units from developing their own standing operating procedures (SOPs) to meet their needs. This FM focuses on the establishment, improvement, operations, and security of SF TACFACs.

SCOPE

This FM presents the details of the three phases of SF TACFAC development in an order that the SF Soldier should expect to encounter them—initial, temporary, and permanent. Additionally, this FM discusses in sequence planning, design, construction, operations, sustainment, funding, and transfer of authority. The primary audiences of this FM are the commanders, staff officers, and operational personnel of Special Forces operational detachments A (SFODAs), Special Forces operational detachments B (SFODBs), and Special Forces operational detachments C (SFODCs).

The primary role of the SF TACFAC is to support special operations (SO) and function as a tactical and operational base. As such, TACFACs serve a primarily defensive function, although they may serve as bases for needed offensive operations. The secondary role of the TACFAC is to be a center that develops, nurtures, and maintains liaison with local host-nation (HN) populace and members of the HN military and civilian leadership. This role is critical in foreign internal defense (FID) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

Over time, the TACFAC helps provide for establishment, restoration, and improvements of many local HN community and governmental services and systems. These essential support systems for the TACFAC and surrounding HN communities are best captured by the acronym SWEAT-MSS (security, water, electricity, administration, trash, medical, sewage, and shelter). Eventually, the SF TACFAC will be returned to the control of the HN government through a relief in place (RIP).

OVERVIEW

1-1. SF operations support the operations and goals of the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) and their subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs). SF TACFACs primarily serve as a base to support SF operations. As such, they serve an operationally defensive role. They allow SF units and partnered HN or multinational forces to meet the tasks and purposes of the defense and aid in setting the conditions for successful offensive operations, which can be either lethal or nonlethal. FM 3-0, Operations, defines defensive operations as “combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop favorable conditions for offensive or stability operations.”

1-2. Several of the purposes of defensive operations are very closely related to SF TACFAC operations. These purposes include the following:

  • Deter and defeat enemy attacks (such as insurgency operations).
  • Achieve economy of force (such as allowing the JFC to concentrate conventional forces elsewhere against an enemy main effort).
  • Retain key terrain (which includes the local populace).
  • Protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure.
  • Develop intelligence (particularly local intelligence).

1-3. SF TACFAC operations also can have a tremendous positive impact in support of friendly information operations (IO), as TACFACs are tangible proof of a stabilizing friendly-force presence. In order for U.S. Armed Forces—and SF in particular—to have any positive effect on the local population’s view of their government, local critical assets and infrastructure must be defended. These assets and infrastructure usually have more economic and political value than tactical military value.

1-4. Prior to selection of the TACFAC site, the Special Forces operational detachment (SFOD) must analyze the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). When planning and designing the TACFAC, the SFOD must take into account the factors critical to the security of the facility, including observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC). The SF TACFAC commander uses all available assets during defensive planning. These include intelligence, reconnaissance, and engineer assets to study the terrain. Optimum use of terrain, depth, and security operations allows the SFOD to minimize defensive resources.

1-5. The smallest SF unit tasked to operate and maintain an SF TACFAC is the SFODA. SFODBs and SFODCs that occupy TACFACs produce much larger tactical footprints in their areas of operation (AOs), which may be a distinct disadvantage. The larger advanced operating base (AOB) or special operations task force (SOTF) TACFAC needed to sustain a greater force requires additional logistics and protection support.

1-6. SF units must determine if there are advantages or disadvantages to breaking ground on a new facility or using an existing facility. Questions that are considered when making this decision include the following:

  • Is the AO permissive, uncertain, or hostile?
  • Are the facilities located in urban or rural settings?
  • Are the facilities logistically sustainable?
  • Are HN defense, security, and protection adequate?
  • Are there established casualty and emergency evacuation plans?
  • Are there future plans to close, convert, or abandon the facility?
  • Are the facilities part of a larger operation with a yet-unspecified strategic plan?
  • Are there Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) missions in the AO?

1-7. In addition to the SFOD (or SFODs) occupying the TACFAC, the facility may also house vetted interpreters and other friendly force personnel on either a permanent or temporary basis. These friendly forces may include other U.S. or multinational force personnel (military, interagency, or contractor), HN personnel (military, constabulary, or civilian government), or irregular forces working with the SFOD. The SFOD must take into account both the size of these elements and any cultural considerations related to these various groups when developing a TACFAC.

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/tacfac.png

 

 

 

FINANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND (FTD) über “GoMoPa”

In der Druckversion der FTD erschien am 28.12.2010 dieser Artikel.

 

Gomopa-Wonach der Markt lechzt

 

Der Finanznachrichtendienst Gomopa will künftig ein Seriositätsrating von Anbietern am grauen Kapitalmarkt veröffentlichen –dabei ist das Unternehmen selbst umstritten

 

Bei Beteiligungsmodellen haben Anleger die Qual der Wahl: Sind die tollen Prognosen von Anbieter A glaubwürdig? Oder wäre vielleicht B mit den bodenständigeren Erwartungen vertrauenswürdiger? Es gibt zwar jede Menge Ratings und Siegel, wirklich hilfreich sind viele aber nicht.

 

Man müsse hinter 95 Prozent der Ratings Gefälligkeitsgutachten vermuten, meint gar Klaus Maurischat, Chef des Finanzinformationsdienstes Goldman Morgenstern & Partners (Gomopa) aus New York, in einem Schreiben an Premiumnutzer seines Dienstes. Schmückende und verkaufsfördernde Ratings oder andere Bewertungen würden von denUnternehmungen bezahlt oder gesponsert, erläutert er. Das führe zu Interessenkonflikten.

 

Gomopa bereite daher ein Angebot vor, „nach dem der Markt förmlich lechzt“: ein Seriositätsrating, das den Markt revolutionieren und auch noch „mindestens sichere 20% jährliche Rendite an die Gründungsmitglieder“ abwerfen soll. Das System bewerte neutral und unbeeinflussbar „mathematisch, nach festen Algorithmen und Parametern die Seriosität einesUnternehmens und des dahinterstehenden Unternehmers“.

 

Daraus ergebe sich tabellarisch ein Ranking nach dem Ampelsystem. Das Rating münde in einer Zahl zwischen 100 und 10 000. Sie zeige die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines positiven Geschäftsausgangs mit dem zu bewertenden Anbieter an. Bei 9067 würden zum Beispiel zu 90,67 Prozent „die Aussagen des Anbieters erfüllt werden“.

 

Beim Rating zählten in erster Linie nachweisbare Leistungen in der Vergangenheit, erläutert Maurischat. Meldungen und Nachrichten würden berücksichtigt und die Werthaltigkeit geprüft. Bei Fondsinhalten sei das nicht nötig. „Die komplizierten Abhandlungen versteht im Endeffekt der eigentliche Verbraucher sowieso nicht“, findet der Gomopa-Chef. Das Rating seimit anerkannten Systemen und Datenbanken wie der Schufa und Google vernetzt. Änderten sich Parameter dort, schlage sich sofort das Ergebnis und Ranking bei Gomopa nieder.

Das wirft allerdings jede Menge Fragen auf. Wie wird etwa die Werthaltigkeit von Informationen bei Google mit einem solchen Ansatz erfasst? Wie geht das System mit neuen Anbietern um oder mit bislang als seriös bekannten Anbietern, die ein offensichtlich schlechtes Produkt auflegen? Maurischat antwortete auf Anfrage, er werde nichts zu internen Geschäftsabläufen mitteilen.

 

Unter dem Namen Gomopa-Rating soll das Angebot allerdings nicht an den Start gehen, schreibt Maurischat den Nutzern, sondern über eine US-Tochter. Das wiederum ist sehr gut nachvollziehbar. Denn über Goldmann Morgenstern &

Partners selbst gab es in der Vergangenheit auch ziemlich negative Meldungen und Nachrichten. Im Herbst wurde zum Beispiel bekannt, dass sich die Staatsanwaltschaft München für Maurischat und einen Gomopa-Kollegen interessiert, weil der Dienst im Frühjahr falsche Informationen zum TecDAX-Unternehmen Wirecard veröffentlicht hatte und der Aktienkurs abgestürzt war. Bei Gomopaselbst fiele der Seriositätsindex damit wohl nicht so vorteilhaft aus.