Serial Killer Charles Sobhraj ~ The Serpent – Full Movie

Hotchand Bhaonani Gurumukh Charles Sobhraj (born April 6, 1944), better known as Charles Sobhraj, is a serial killer of Indian and Vietnamese origin, who preyed on Western tourists throughout Southeast Asia during the 1970s. Nicknamed “the Serpent” and “the Bikini killer” for his skill at deception and evasion, he allegedly committed at least 12 murders. He was convicted and jailed in India from 1976 to 1997, but managed to live a life of leisure even in prison. After his release, he retired as a celebrity in Paris; he unexpectedly returned to Nepal, where he was arrested, tried and sentenced to life imprisonment on August 12, 2004. The Supreme Court of Nepal has finally convicted him and ordered the life imprisonment, this decision was made on 30 July 2010.[1]
While Sobhraj is widely believed to be a psychopath, his motives for killing differed from those of most serial killers. Sobhraj was not driven to murder by deep-seated, violent impulses, but as a means to sustain his lifestyle of adventure. That, as well as his cunning and cultured personality, made him a celebrity long before his release from prison. Sobhraj enjoyed the attention, charging large amounts of money for interviews and film rights; he has been the subject of four books and three documentaries. His search for attention and his overconfidence in his own intelligence are believed responsible for his return to a country where authorities were still eager to arrest him.

TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Last of Seven Defendants Sentenced in AmeriFirst Securities Fraud Case

DALLAS—The final sentencing was held today in the massive AmeriFirst securities fraud case, prosecuted in the Northern District of Texas, that has resulted in a total of seven felony convictions and prison sentences up to 25 years, announced U.S. Attorney Sarah R. Saldaña of the Northern District of Texas. Today, John Porter Priest was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn to one year in federal prison.

Priest, 43, of Ocala, Florida, was sentenced by Judge Lynn to one year in federal prison and ordered to pay $4,742,946 in restitution. He pleaded guilty in September 2010 to one count of securities fraud based on his role in the Secured Capital Trust scheme.

“The AmeriFirst investment fraud came to light just over five years ago. Since that time, a coalition of public agencies, including the FBI, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Office of Inspector General, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Texas State Securities Board, and the Florida Office of Financial Regulation, have worked tirelessly, alongside court-appointed receivers in Florida and Texas, to bring the perpetrators of the fraud to justice,” said U.S. Attorney Saldaña. “The sentencings this week close a five-year chapter in the authorities’ work on this matter. All seven of the most culpable participants in the AmeriFirst scheme have been convicted of felonies and sentenced. We have pursued this matter for the last five years because investment fraud, particularly when it victimizes seniors as the AmeriFirst fraud did, is intolerable and must be redressed.”

Dennis Woods Bowden, 59, of Farmers Branch, Texas, was sentenced last Friday by Judge Lynn to serve 192 months in federal prison and ordered to pay more than $23 million in restitution. Bowden was the owner and chief operating officer of the now-defunct Dallas-based AmeriFirst Funding Corp. and AmeriFirst Acceptance Corp. Bowden was also a manager and owner of American Eagle Acceptance Corp., a Dallas-based company that bought and sold used automobiles, financed purchases of used automobiles, and bought and serviced used car notes. In December 2011, a jury convicted Bowden on four counts of securities fraud and five counts of mail fraud related to his role in a scheme to defraud investors in connection with the sale of securities. AmeriFirst has been under control of a court-appointed receiver since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an emergency action to halt the fraud in July 2007.

In connection with the same scheme, in 2010 a jury convicted Jeffrey Charles Bruteyn, 42, of Dallas, on nine counts of securities fraud. Bruteyn is currently serving a 25-year federal prison sentence. Bruteyn is the former managing director of AmeriFirst. On June 29, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed Bruteyn’s conviction and sentence.

According to evidence presented at the trials, Bowden and Bruteyn orchestrated offerings of promissory notes called secured debt obligations (SDOs) that raised more than $50 million from more than 500 investors living in Texas and Florida, many of whom were retired and all of whom were looking for safe and secure investments.

Bowden paid Bruteyn and brokers working under Bruteyn’s direction to sell the securities, but Bowden also signed documents that went directly to investors. Through the brokers and through documents that he signed, Bowden misled, deceived, and defrauded investors by misrepresenting, and by failing to disclose, material facts concerning the safety of the securities. Among other things, Bowden falsely represented to investors that their investments were guaranteed by a commercial bank, that the investors’ principal was secured by an interest in certain types of collateral, that insurance purchased by AmeriFirst companies insured the investors against loss of their money, and that the issuers of the SDOs were acting as the investors’ fiduciaries. In fact, none of these representations was true. Bowden, supposedly acting as the investors’ fiduciary, spent investors’ money on things investors did not approve or even know about, including an airplane, sports cars, a condominium, real estate for used car lots, and his own personal living expenses.

Another defendant convicted in the scheme, Vincent John Bazemore Jr., 37, of Denton, Texas, a broker who sold SDOs, pleaded guilty in October 2007 and is currently serving a 60-month federal prison sentence. Bazemore was also ordered to pay nearly $16 million in restitution.

Gerald Kingston, 47, of Dallas, pleaded guilty in December 2007 to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, stemming from his role in helping Bruteyn manipulate the stock price of Interfinancial Holdings Corporation (IFCH). Acting at the direction of Bruteyn, Kingston bought and sold hundreds of thousands of shares of IFCH and affected matched trades to create the false impression of widespread interest in the stock. Kingston admitted that he derived more than $1.6 million in proceeds from his fraudulent sales of IFCH in the course of the conspiracy. Judge Lynn sentenced him in January 2012 to a two-year term of probation and fined him $50,000.

Eric Hall, 40, of Fort Myers, Florida, pleaded guilty in June 2008 to one count of securities fraud, based on his role in a scheme to defraud investors in an entity called Secured Capital Trust. He was sentenced by Judge Lynn in April 2012 to a two-year term of probation and ordered to pay approximately $4,742,946 in restitution.

Fred Howard, 64, of Tarpon Springs, Florida, was sentenced by Judge Lynn two weeks ago to five years in federal prison and ordered to pay approximately $4,742,946 in restitution. He pleaded guilty in February 2012 to one count of securities fraud for his role in the Secured Capital Trust scheme.

Today’s announcement is part of efforts underway by President Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) which was created in November 2009 to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. With more than 20 federal agencies, 94 U.S. attorneys’ offices, and state and local partners, it is the broadest coalition of law enforcement, investigatory, and regulatory agencies ever assembled to combat fraud. Since its formation, the task force has made great strides in facilitating increased investigation and prosecution of financial crimes; enhancing coordination and cooperation among federal, state, and local authorities; addressing discrimination in the lending and financial markets; and conducting outreach to the public, victims, financial institutions and other organizations. Over the past three fiscal years, the Justice Department has filed more than 10,000 financial fraud cases against nearly 15,000 defendants, including more than 2,700 mortgage fraud defendants. For more information on the task force, visit

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Alan Buie and Christopher Stokes and Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephanie Tourk were in charge of the prosecutions.

TOP-SECRET – FBI – Serious Health Risks to Law Enforcement

U//FOUO) The FBI assesses with high confidence, based on multiple incident reports from a collaborative source with direct access to the information, that counterfeit and substandard lithium batteries pose a serious health and safety risk to consumers, specifically law enforcement officers, emergency medical services providers, and military personnel who use these batteries extensively. The FBI has received numerous reports of such batteries, which are not manufactured with the safety mechanisms of legitimate US branded-batteries, spontaneously combusting while being used, transported, or stored, resulting in serious injuries to consumers and damage to tactical equipment and property.

(U) Law Enforcement, Military, and Emergency Responders at Risk From Counterfeit or Substandard Lithium Batteries in Tactical Equipment

(U//FOUO) Lithium batteries, primarily CR123A cell batteries, are used by the public in electronic devices; however, they are more frequently used by law enforcement officers, emergency medical services providers, and military personnel in tactical equipment such as flashlights, weapon lights, headlamps, and helmet lights and cameras. Counterfeit and substandard lithium batteries have caused numerous incidents involving serious injury to law enforcement personnel, as well as damage to equipment and property.

(U) How to Avoid Purchasing or Using Counterfeit and Substandard Lithium Batteries

(U//FOUO) Several indicators are associated with counterfeit or substandard lithium batteries; awareness of these indicators can decrease the chances of purchasing inferior batteries that can put users at risk.

• (U) Common exterior indicators of counterfeit batteries include label misspellings, missing label information, blurred fonts, altered logos or seals, different label dimensions, altered or substandard packaging, crimp seal differences, material differences, and differences in the vent perforation of the anode.

• (U) Counterfeit and substandard lithium batteries are often sold at a reduced price on the Internet and at swap meets, store fronts, gun shows, and electronics and technical shows. Although not all batteries sold at these locations are counterfeit or substandard, such sellers are often sources of counterfeit or substandard batteries produced in China and the chance of purchasing a counterfeit or substandard battery is higher at these locations.

(U) Outlook and Implications

(U//FOUO) The FBI assesses that counterfeit and substandard lithium batteries will continue to pose a health and safety risk to law enforcement officers, military personnel, and emergency medical services personnel, as well as unwitting consumers in the general public, as long as they are available for purchase. Taking the following precautions, however, can reduce the likelihood of user injury or property damage from either the purchase of counterfeit and substandard batteries or the improper use of legitimate lithium batteries.

• (U) Law enforcement, military and emergency personnel should use caution when purchasing batteries from online auction sites, online vendors, store fronts, gun shows, electronic and technical shows and swap meets. Individuals purchasing batteries on the secondary market should seek quality assurance and scrutinize labels, packaging and contents; seek authorized retailers; watch for missing sales tax charges; and insist on secure transactions, according to the International Trade Commission.

• (U) To prevent a catastrophic event when using legitimate lithium batteries, individuals should refrain from improperly mixing different types and brands of batteries; using a combination of batteries with different depletion levels (that is, mixing old and new batteries); and removing lithium batteries from one product and placing them into another product in which they are not intended to be used (such as removing a lithium battery from a flashlight and placing it in a camera).

(U//FOUO) The FBI assesses that in addition to the safety risks, the sale of counterfeit and substandard lithium batteries has a negative economic impact on both users and US manufacturers of legitimate lithium batteries. The widespread use of tactical equipment and electronic devices requiring lithium batteries among law enforcement, emergency medical services providers, and military personnel can lead to significant costs for these agencies if they purchase and then must replace defective batteries, tactical gear and property, or pay for emergency care. US manufacturers lose potential revenue when producers in China and other countries profit from the fraudulent use of US brand holders’ trademarks. In addition, when incidents occur involving what appear to be legitimate US batteries, the brand holder often faces costs in terms of both money spent on testing to determine the cause of the incident and potential erosion in brand confidence among consumers.

Unveiled by Wikileaks – BULGARIA – Stasi mayor unacceptable

Date 2011-07-12 13:27:06 From
Others Listname:
MessageId: <>
Text Glasove – Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s governing party Gerb is putting
up a former State Security officer as its candidate for mayor
of Bulgaria’s fifth largest city Russe in the Bulgarian local
elections scheduled for October. The opposition online
newspaper Glasove is disgusted: “Stoilov was a permanent
employee of the State Security who openly admits that he
recruited soldiers for military counter-espionage and is proud
of it to boot. In an interview last year he said that many
things in Bulgaria would have turned out differently had the
State Security been reformed in the right way. … You must
have a screw loose if you can’t find anyone better than a guy
with a Stasi past after four years on the city council.”
(11/07/2011) +++

Benjamin Preisler
+216 22 73 23 19

Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.

TOP-SECRET – European Central Bank Paper: Shadow Banking in the Euro Area


Shadow banking, as one of the main sources of financial stability concerns, is the subject of much international debate. In broad terms, shadow banking refers to activities related to credit intermediation and liquidity and maturity transformation that take place outside the regulated banking system.

This paper presents a first investigation of the size and the structure of shadow banking within the euro area, using the statistical data sources available to the ECB/Eurosystem.

Although overall shadow banking activity in the euro area is smaller than in the United States, it is significant, at least in some euro area countries. This is also broadly true for some of the components of shadow banking, particularly securitisation activity, money market funds and the repo markets.

This paper also addresses the interconnection between the regulated and the non-bank-regulated segments of the financial sector. Over the recent past, this interconnection has increased, likely resulting in a higher risk of contagion across sectors and countries. Euro area banks now rely more on funding from the financial sector than in the past, in particular from other financial intermediaries (OFIs), which cover shadow banking entities, including securitisation vehicles. This source of funding is mainly shortterm and therefore more susceptible to runs and to the drying-up of liquidity. This finding confirms that macro-prudential authorities and supervisors should carefully monitor the growing interlinkages between the regulated banking sector and the shadow banking system. However, an in-depth assessment of the activities of shadow banking and of the interconnection with the regulated banking system would require further improvements in the availability of data and other sources of information.

This paper presents a preliminary investigation of the size and the structure of shadow banking in the euro area, as a contribution to the international and European debate on this issue. In broad terms, shadow banking refers to activities related to credit intermediation, liquidity and maturity transformation that take place outside the regulated banking system. There is widespread international agreement on the need to better understand the activities of shadow banking and the related financial stability risks. Moreover, the forthcoming implementation of Basel III, with the introduction of more stringent capital and liquidity requirements for credit institutions, and the provisions to be applied to insurers may provide further incentives for banks to shift part of their activities outside of the regulated environment and therefore increase shadow banking activities.

Evaluating the size of the shadow banking system in the euro area is not straightforward. A quantitative assessment of the activities of the shadow banking sector can only be based on data sources that unfortunately were not designed specifically for this purpose (i.e. flow-of-funds data and monetary and financial statistics). Moreover, for some activities and markets there are no official data available.

The analysis shows that shadow banking activity in the euro area is smaller than in the United States. In the United States the size of the shadow banking system, measured as the total amount of its assets, was comparable to the size of the banking system in the second quarter of 2011, while in the euro area it represented less than half of the total assets of banking sector. However, the size of assets held by financial
intermediaries that are not regulated as banks is still important in the euro area, especially in some countries.

A proxy for the activities of shadow banking in the euro area can be derived from the analysis of the balance sheets of OFIs, a sector which excludes insurance corporations and pension funds but covers most of the agents engaging in shadow banking. Regarding the dynamics of shadow-banking activities, assets of OFIs grew rapidly in the run-up to the crisis, in the period 2005-07. Starting at the end of 2007, OFI intermediation declined sharply in the context of the general deleveraging triggered by the financial crisis.

The paper investigates some key components of shadow banking. In particular, it looks at financial entities other than banks involved in credit intermediation, such as securitisation vehicles, and at the financial intermediaries and markets providing funding to the banks, such as money market funds (MMFs) and the repo market. The data suggests the following.

(i) Securitisation issuance was smaller in volume in the euro area than in the United States before the crisis (around 5% and 12% of GDP respectively) and remains less developed.

(ii) Assets under management by MMFs amounted to €1.83 trillion and €1.1 trillion in the United States and in the euro area respectively by the second quarter of 2011. However, it should be pointed out that in the euro area MMFs are a somewhat heterogeneous group (even if the CESR, i.e. the predecessor of the European Securities and Markets Authority, published in 2010 guidelines on a Common Definition of European Money Market Funds).

(iii) The repo market is a key source of funding in both the United States and the euro area.

The paper also addresses the interconnection between regulated and non-regulated segments of the financial sector undertaking banking activities. Over the recent past this interconnection has been increasing, likely resulting in higher risk of contagion across sectors and countries. Euro area banks rely more than in the past on funding from the financial sector and in particular from the OFI sector, which covers shadow banking entities including securitisation vehicles. This source of funding is mainly short-term and therefore more susceptible to runs and to the drying-up of liquidity. The relative size and relevance of shadow banking intermediation differs significantly across euro area countries.

A more in-depth assessment of the activities of shadow banking and of the interconnection with the regulated banking system would require an improvement in the availability of data and other related information. More than 60% of the assets that are considered part of shadow banking activities in the euro area are linked to financial institutions for which high frequency statistical information is not available. Similarly, very scarce and non-standardised information is available on repo markets. Moreover, the aggregate data collected for the euro area are not detailed enough to allow a full understanding of key elements such as the presence of maturity transformation and leverage and the possible channels for contagion, which are of particular importance when evaluating possible regulatory measures. The paper concludes with some preliminary considerations regarding possible measures to address data gaps and regulatory options.