Tag Archives: Top Secret

Top Secret – Chinese Navy Guide revealed

 

Office of Naval Intelligence Chinese Navy Recognition and Identification Guide

China People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA(N)) and Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) 2015 Recognition and Identification Guide

Page Count: 1 page
Date: April 9, 2015
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Office of Naval Intelligence
File Type: pdf
File Size: 3,176,873 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256):5863A4A5C997AA7FB5301333A7C8AAD06B79CAC6DEE7A76DA86FB828E0E31411

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SELECTED PLA(N) UNITS NOT DEPICTED
YANCI ADG Bei Qin 736; Dong Qin 860, 864; Nan Qin 203, 205
KANDAO AG Bei Diao 991
KANWU AG Bei Diao 990
KANHAI AG Dong Ce 429, 430; Dong Ce 232; 2 new units
YANHA AGB Hai Bing 721 (722 decommissioned)
KANYANG AGS Nan Ce 426, 428
YANLAI AGS Bei Ce 943, Dong Ce 226, 227; Nan Ce 427
YANJIU AGS Dong Ce 228, 229
HONGQI AK Bei Yun 443, 528; Dong Yun 756; Nan Yun 836 +more
DANDAO AK Bei Yun 599 (decommissioned)
SHENGLI AOT Dong You 621
DADAO AR Dong Xiu 911
YOUDIAN ARC Bei Lan 764, 765; Dong Lan 868, 882; Nan Lan 233, 234
GUANGZHOU AWT Bei Shui 590, 593; Dong Shui 645 (AOT variants decom).
JINYOU 201 AWT Nan Shui 960
LONGMA YDT Bei Jiao 141, 142; Nan Jiu 507, 509
DARONG AG Nan Yun 830, +1 more unit (new construction)
DUCHUAN YFL Bei Jiao 59, 60; Dong Jiao 64, 84, 89; Nan Jiao 83, 87, 89
DUKOU CAT YFL Bei Jiao 90; Dong Jiao 87-88, Nan Jiao 85-86
DULUDAO YFL Bei Jiao 74; Dong Jiao 92-93; Nan Jiao 92
DUSSO YFL Dong Jiao 65
DUZHOU YFL Dong Jiao 82
DUMUJU YFL Bei Jiao 77
YUNNAN II YFU various 3200- and 3300-series (former LCMs)
DULAJI YOS Bei Jian 04, 10; Nan Jian 01-03; Dong Jian 01-06
DULUJIN YOS Nan Jian 04
DULAJI YRC Bei Lan 768, 769; Dong Lan 884, 885; Nan Lan 235
DUJIANG YTM Bei Tuo 644, 648; Dong Tuo 841, 848 + more units
DUNADO YTM Bei Tuo 686

SELECTED MLE UNITS NOT DEPICTED
China Maritime Safety Administration (MSA)
SHUJA WPG Hai Xun 021, 061, 071, 091, 112
SHUIDAO WPG Hai Ce 1501, 1502
XIAOMAO WPG Hai Xun 106
WEISHANG WPC Hai Xun 505, 1546, 1926
NANHUA TYPE A WPC Hai Xun 210, 280, 401, 890, 893, 898, 1129, 1139 + more
NANHUA TYPE B WPC Hai Xun 022, 043, 072, 105, 133 + more
HAITUN WPC Hai Xun 102, 111, 115, 131, 151, 152, 161, 191
GUANCAI WPC Hai Xun 801-806
HAIWAN WPC Hai Xun1001-1004
YANFU WAGL Hai Biao 1003, 1005, 1006, 1501, 1503, 1511, 1512
YANHOU WAGL Hai Biao 52, 152
YANMING WAGL Hai Biao 101, 151, 182
YANNAN WAGL Hai Biao 24, 25, 31, 32 + more
YANFER WAGS Hai Ce 1008, 1009
YANLING WAGS Hai Ce 502, 1504, 1762
TUYANG WATA Hai Te 718, 719, 906, 1503, 1731
China Coast Guard (ex-CMS, BOF, GAC, PAP) – may have new pennants
HULAI II WPC (300-ton anti-smuggling) 44015, 45001, 44017, 44020 + 21 more units
HUTAO WPG (600-ton) 70-meter, 9 new units under construction
SHAOFU WPB Hai Jian 4051, 4061, 4071, 4081
SHAOJIAN WPB Hai Jian 2115, Yu Zheng 44143
SHAOLIN 26 (Sunbird) Hai Jian 1016, 1036, 2055, 3080
SHAOLIN 35 (Sunbird) Hai Jian 4085
HAINAN WPC (mod) Hai Jing 20, 32
LEINIAR 2000A WPB Hai Jing 58, 79, 89, 92, 2003, 4007 + more
NANHUA TYPE A WPC Hai Jian 9040, 9060
SOAHAI WPC Hai Jian 9001
HONGNIANG WPG Hai Guan 201, 202
WUTING WPC Hai Guan 807-809, Hai Jing 44011, 44031, 46014
TYPE 611 WPC Hai Guan 823-833
HUXIN I WPC Hai Guan 705, 706, 711, 712; Hai Jing 44082, 46062
HUXIN II WPC Hai Jing 35013, 35031, 35032, 35051, 35082, 35083, 44012, 44051
HONGSHOU WPC Hai Jing 35061, 35081, 35091, 44041, 44052, 44071, 45024
HONGLAO WPC Hai Jing 13012, 13021, 32108, 37033, 37043
HAIGAO WPC Hai guan 804-822
HAIFENG WPC Hai Guan 901-904
HAIBO WPC Hai Jing 35023, 35024
SHUSHU III WPC Yu Zheng 12016, 12026, 33126, 33415, 35108, 35506, 37172
TUKAT WATA Hai Jing 44092 (ex-01), Hai Jing 02
PLA Maritime Transport Units/Border Defense Force (selected units)
HAIXUN III WAXT AL201
YUWEI WLCU JD100-102, 108-109, 301-302 + more
KD 260-261 + more
ND261, 311, 313, 500-502, 511-513, 736-738 + more
SD115, 119, 121-125 + more
Dozens of additional units
YUPEN WLCM GD405, 422 + more
JD203, 205, 305, 502 + more
ND102, 202, 321, 332, 401, 421, 507, 544, 756-757 + more
Dozens of additional units
YUNNAN II WLCM 100+ units (smaller than YUPEN)
YUNNAN I WLCM Few units remain; open superstructure
SHENYANG WPB SX543, 551-555, 591-592, 865-871, 886
LEIZHUANG WAK JY161, 252, 350; NY301, SY241
HUZONG WPB GZ470-472; JZ143, 146, 220, 320; NZ382, 383
HUNTAO WATA AT361, BT310
HAINU WYFL KJ280, JN328, 605, 773, SJ105
FUZHONG WAOT AU341
FUBING WAOT KU100, 201, 202, 300, 302, NU808, 809
DULOW WYFL JJ511, KJ381, JN11, 325, 483

TOP-SECRET – Operation Northwood

 

  • Proposed Top Secret plan from 1962 stating intent among the Joint Chiefs of Staff to stage terrorist attacks, including killing innocent civilians, to provoke war with Cuba
  • Proposals include use of drone aircraft to stage foreign attacks, staging hijackings, staging attacks on U.S. vessels and facilities, staging riots, as well as the creation of “terror campaigns” on U.S. soil

Operation Northwoods was a plan circulated in the U.S. government in 1962 to stage false flag terrorist attacks inside the U.S. and abroad to provoke “military intervention in Cuba”.  The plan called for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or other operatives to commit genuine acts of terrorism in U.S. cities and elsewhere. These acts of terrorism were to be blamed on Cuba in order to create public support for a war against that nation, which had recently become communist under Fidel Castro. One part of the Operation Northwoods plan was to “develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.”  The document was signed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer and reportedly presented to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on March 13, 1962. 1 2

The previously Top Secret document was originally made public on November 18, 1997, by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board, a U.S. federal agency overseeing the release of government records related to John F. Kennedy’s assassination.3

“Appendix to Enclosure A” and “Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A” of the Northwoods document were first published online by the National Security Archive on November 6, 1998 in a joint venture with CNN as part of CNN’s 1998 Cold War television documentary series—specifically, as a documentation supplement to “Episode 10: Cuba,” which aired on November 29, 1998.  “Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A” is the section of the document which contains the proposals to stage terrorist attacks.4

U.S. Government’s Willingness to Stage Terrorist Attacks

In the recommendations section of the “Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)” memo, the Joint Chiefs of Staff make clear their willingness to stage actual terrorist events with legitimate casualties to sustain their intentions to “intervene” militarily in Cuba’s affairs.  The cumulative effect of many of the recommendations is stated as being to provoke reactions from the Cuban government which would justify “military intervention”.  Many of the suggested actions have a strong component of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) designed to simultaneously engender domestic U.S. support for “military intervention” while portraying the Cuban government as a rogue, dangerous entity which will internationally serve to justify the U.S. military intervention.  The suggested actions include:

  • Use of drone (unmanned) aircraft to simulate air-related catastrophes

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner en route from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will begin transmitting on the international distress frequency a “MAY DAY” message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to “sell” the incident.5

  • Staging “hijacking attempts” of civilian vessels

7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba.6

  • Creation of “terror campaigns” inside the U.S. with legitimate victims

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

The terror campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.7

  • Destruction of U.S. military vessels

A “Remember the Maine” incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to “evacuate” remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.8

  • Staging fires and mortar attacks on U.S. military bases to cause actual damage to installations and potentially personnel

5. Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
6. Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
7. Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.9

  • Using friendly provocateurs to stage riots

4. Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans)10

Source notes:

  1. Pentagon Proposed Pretexts for Cuban Invasion in 1962.  National Security Archive. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/index.html []
  2. Lyman Lemnitzer.  Wikipedia.org.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyman_Lemnitzer []
  3. Operation Northwoods.  Wikipedia.org.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Northwoods []
  4. Ibid. []
  5. Operation Northwoods Documents.  Public Intelligence. http://publicintelligence.net/operation-northwoods-documents/ []
  6. Ibid. []
  7. Ibid. []
  8. Ibid. []
  9. Ibid. []